THE ELUSIVE TRANSFORMATION:
POLITICS AND ECONOMY DURING THE
FORMATIVE DECADES OF THE CAPITALIST STATE
IN TURKEY, 1908-1930

by

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The thesis is about the political and economic transformations that took place in Turkey following the Revolution of 1908 up until the end of 1930. 1908 represents the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, replacing an absolutist regime run by the bureaucracy. 1930, on the other hand, represents a radical rearrangement of the political system along exclusionary corporatist lines. The dividing line between these two dates is the interregnum between 1918 and 1922.

The first part of the thesis argues that a genuine revolution took place in 1908 which changed not only the political system but the economic structure as well. Using archival material as well as contemporary sources, the political history of the immediate pre-revolutionary years and of the Revolution is told from a viewpoint that has been totally ignored by established scholarship up until now.

The second part of the thesis again argues that important reversals took place beginning with 1923. Here as well, the main argument is radically different from established historiography. In the second part, I argue that a military dictatorship destroyed whatever had been achieved during the 1908-1918 period.

One of the primary aims of the thesis has been to abundantly illustrate the contention that these two periods are really different from each other. By contrasting the period of 1908-1918 with that of 1923-1930, I hope bring a better understanding of those two periods in Turkish history, and help clarify some of the debates in Turkish historiography. In order to illustrate the differences better, detailed historical information is provided in each part, disputing many points which are currently accepted as given in Turkish economic and political history.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

IN THE MOST GENERAL OF TERMS, this thesis is about the profound economic and political changes which took place in Turkey between the liberal Revolution of 1908 and the Third Extraordinary Congress of the Republican People's Party in early 1931. In a sense, these dates represent two extremes. 1908 represents the establishment, for the first time in Turkish history, of a constitutional monarchy with a cabinet which was completely responsible to a popularly elected parliament; thus, replacing an absolutist regime run by the bureaucracy. By contrast, 1931 represents the establishment of a corporatist political and economic system with quasi-fascist overtones run by the state and party bureaucracy.

One of the basic tenets of the thesis is to show the radical changes in politics and the economy in these two decades, from one period to another. This period can be roughly divided in two: the first, being the years 1908 to 1918 during which the Committee of Union and Progress tried and succeeded to hold power; the second beginning with the ascent of the Republican People's Party in 1923.

THERE ARE TWO QUALIFICATIONS to be made. First, although the Republican People's Party ruled Turkey without interruption until the General Elections of 1950, the changes in the political and economic structures during 1930 and 1931 were significant enough to justify an independent analysis of the Republican People's Party's initial phase without considering what followed. I will argue that this first phase of the Republican rule between 1923 and 1930 was first and foremost a reaction to the earlier constitutional regime and its economic policies. This brings me to the second qualification: Because the two periods are
separated by World War I and the subsequent collapse of the old European order, historians have tended to confuse the general effects of the War with processes specific to Turkey's history which had begun beforehand and continued afterwards. By analysing these two periods without recourse to general European history, I hope to show that they are not only linked through a mechanism of revolution and reaction but also must be viewed through a distinctly indigenous lens.¹

Furthermore, I will not only address political change, but economic change, specifically the relationship between different political structures and their respective economic policies. My aim is to show that the political changes of 1908 onwards are immediately relevant to the specific form and development of Turkey's economy. Special attention is given to the interconnectedness of the political structure and form of government with the economic policies that were carried out by various Turkish governments since the Revolution of 1908. My aim is to show the importance as well as the immediate relevance of the political changes from 1908 onwards in shaping both the structure and the development of the Turkish economy.

**ONE OF THE MAIN DEBATES** in Turkish historiography is the issue whether there is continuity or discontinuity between these two periods. This thesis will directly confront this issue and defend a position of discontinuity, although at the same time criticise positions of existing discontinuity theses by pointing out their inadequacies, deficiencies, and limitations.

**KEMALIST IDEOLOGY** permeates the whole Turkish historiography --be it academic or

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¹ Often the general effects of the War and the specificity of the Turkish history are mixed up, and analyses concerning the political and economic history of Turkey give more importance to the general effects of the War in which Turkey was heavily involved than to indigenous events and changes that took place prior to and after the War. These issues will be addressed in order to show the main differences between the two periods under study in this thesis.
official. Though innovative and impressive, Turkish social, political and economic history remain bound by this Kemalist framework. The elements of Kemalist ideology firmly stay in place, providing the general framework as well as the boundaries of historical research. In short the paradigms of Kemalist ideology help shape almost each and every study no matter what the approach of the researcher may be. This applies not only for students of Turkish history who work with explicitly laid out theories such as modernization theory or dependency theory, but also for those without a clear cut theoretical framework. The result is that specific questions have been excluded from academic scrutiny, questions which this thesis will hope to address.

THE EMPHASIS is always on a sharp discontinuity in recent Turkish history, the dividing line being the establishment of the republican regime of Atatürk in 1923.

In broad outline, the generally accepted version of the historiography of Turkey maintains the primary importance of 1923 not only in political but also in economic terms. In politics the emphasis is on the establishment of a radically new regime which is fundamentally different from the old one in terms of its organisation and structure, elimination of the monarchy being given the primary importance. In economics the emphasis is on gaining a greater degree of freedom from foreign intervention and on a more "independent" development.

In this dominant version of Turkish history, 1908 does not count as an important event. It is not even considered a revolution and as such is not called the Revolution of 1908 but the Establishment of Constitutional Regime in Turkish historiography. The changes after 1908 in politics and economics, let alone in the society, are de-emphasized at

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2. The examples of recent scholarship which fall within the bounds of this proposition can be cited as follows: Caglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London: Verso, 1987); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985 (Istanbul: Gercek Yayinevi, 1988); Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931 (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1981); and, Berch Berberoglu, Turkey in Crisis: From State Capitalism to Neo-Colonialism (London: Zed Press, 1982).
the expense of the glorification of the modernising bureaucracy, both military and civilian--mostly military. In a way, the 1908 Revolution is seen only as a beginning--a feeble one--towards modernization by the received versions of historiography.

The real change, it is claimed, came with the "Kemalist Revolution" in 1923. Mistakenly identified as a revolution, the *coup d'état* of 1923 which brought into power Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, is claimed to have modernised Turkey by the so-called Kemalist Reforms during the remaining years of the decade and have created a totally different, modern and western-looking Turkish state and society.

In this version of Turkish historiography, 1930 marks a more or less logical extension of the 1920s, a further step in Kemalist Revolution. The "experimentation with multi-party politics"--as it is so commonly referred to--in 1930 is claimed to have failed due to the lack of enough westernization and sophistication among the Turkish public. As the official story goes, forces of reaction--mostly religious in character--would have gained the upper hand and destroyed the Kemalist Revolution had competitive politics been allowed. It is alleged that the Turkish public was not ready for a European style democracy. It was this argument of political and economic infancy which has been used as justification for the establishment of a rigid one-party regime in 1931, a highly corporatist regime which was only dismantled by popular force in 1946.

In all of the historical writing, the centrepiece of the argument revolves, one way or the other, around the personality of Atatürk and his ingenious way of repelling the enemy from Turkish soil and establishing a modern state on the ruins of an old and decaying one. He is treated as a saviour; and the fate of Turkey is alleged to be determined by his actions during and after the First World War. Ideology equates him with the creation of the republic. Modern Turkey is claimed to be his work. He is taken to be the father of the Turkish Republic.

The ideological impact of Kemalism has been so great that historians invariably
adopt 1923 as the starting date for both the political and the economic history of Turkey. Comparisons with the past --if made at all-- are made only with reference to the pre-1908 monarchical regime of the nineteenth century. In most cases the period between 1908 and 1918 escapes treatment at all. In a sense the history of twentieth century Turkey begins with 1923. In the conventional historiography the early decades of the twentieth century are simply deemed unimportant.

Ignoring the first two decades of the twentieth century helps the conventional historiography to maintain the myth of the creation of modern Turkey in the 1920s. Ignorance coupled with ideology helps perpetuate the belief that it was the First World War that finally terminated the centuries old Ottoman Empire. Thus the end of the First World War, which for reasons specific to Turkey came not in 1918 but in 1923 owing to the war with the Greeks supported by Allied Powers, becomes, for "objective" reasons as well, a convenient demarcation line for the current periodization of Turkish history.

In this "normal" division of periods in Turkish history, 1923, thus, easily becomes an accepted date for both the pro and con arguments for the continuity versus discontinuity theses. Proponents of the continuity thesis dwell upon the continuation of some important institutions from the pre-war to the post-war period, such as the bureaucracy and its alleged modernist predisposition, which is taken as far back as the 1840s --the so-called Tanzimat period. Proponents of the discontinuity thesis try to show the radical differences between the pre-war traditional and monarchical order c.f. the nineteenth century and the modern and republican order of the twentieth century after 1923.

Taking 1923 as the fundamental dividing line between the "old" versus the "new" Turkey is accepted not only by the proponents of the discontinuity thesis but also by the proponents of the continuity thesis. Here one can clearly see the all pervasive influence of Kemalist ideology in Turkish historiography. Even those who criticised existing interpretations of Turkish history cannot escape from the bounds of the Kemalist ideology.
KEMALIST IDEOLOGY'S PORTRAYAL OF PRE-1923 TURKEY is extremely unfavourable. It is alleged that Turkey had a decadent and servile monarchist government before the First World War and this government is held responsible for all the ills of the society. According to the Kemalist ideology, one of the most serious mistakes the monarchist government made was the entry of Turkey into the War. Here the criticism is not only against the monarchy which collaborated with the Allied powers after the end of the war in 1918 but also against the liberal and civilian government of the Committee of Union and Progress which remained in power until 1918. Directly and indirectly, civilian governments and principles of liberalism are seen as the root cause of all the ills that befell Turkey during the War. The War and the ensuing struggle for "independence" are presented in a way to portray the military bureaucracy as the only group in Turkish society which was uncorrupt and truly patriotic in an environment of treachery and collaboration with the foes of Turkey. Thus, true to its origins, Kemalist ideology is highly appreciative of the bureaucracy, both military and civilian, in rescuing Turkey from within and without: from the incompetent and weak monarchical regime which could not defend the rights of the Turkish state against internal enemies, and from the foreign enemy that kept the country in a politically and economically dependent state. The bureaucracy is portrayed as the group that best defended the rights and interests of Turkey. The "state" is taken to be a being whose welfare and protection has best been undertaken by Atatürk and his political party, the Republican People's Party, which is hailed as the pillar of the state.

In Kemalist ideology, Atatürk and the Republican People's Party are portrayed as modernisers and "revolutionaries" which provided for the political, social and economic development of Turkey. Here one additional dimension of Kemalist ideology is the insistence on secularism. This provides ready ammunition for accusing all opposition as being religiously conservative at best and reactionary at worst. Most of the political resistance to Atatürk and his so-called reforms/revolutions are alleged to be inspired by religious fanatics and reactionaries. Therefore, all political struggle between the Kemalists
and their opponents in the 1920s is portrayed as a struggle between the forces of modernity and of religious reaction. 3

The history writing from the Thirties to the Fifties served the Kemalist ideology which had already been worked upon in late 1920s, beginning with the Speech of Atatürk in the 1927 Party Congress held in Ankara. 4 Although pure one-party ideology was disbanded after the loss of Kemalist power in the 1950 elections, variations of that "official" ideology still circulate not only within political movements but within academic circles as well.

In fact, the most fruitful avenue for the perpetuation of the Kemalist ideology in academic circles has been through the modernization theory and its variant in Turkey. Beginning with the early 1960s, modernization theory's interpretation of Turkish history dominated the academic discussion of Turkey's political and economic development. Outside of Turkey, mainly in the United States, academics helped shape the discussion of the Turkish case along the lines of the well-defined boundaries of the modernization theory. 5 The main proponents of interpreters of Turkish history through the lens of modernisation theory are Chambers, Davison, Hale, Hershlag, Landau, Lewis, Rustow, Shaw, Sugar, Tachau, and Weiker. 6 The main concern of these studies was to show that

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3. The pervasive influence of the Kemalist ideology on the issue of secularism versus religious reaction in the affairs of state has found its reflection in the interpretation of nineteenth century Turkish history as well. The resistance to centralization without representation beginning in 1826 with the destruction of the janissary corps through the period of Tanzimat, running from 1839 to 1876, are interpreted and portrayed as conservative, reactionary and religious resistance to the modernising and westernising efforts of the state bureaucracy. See, for instance, Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), and idem, Türkiye'de Cagdaslasma (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973). The argument that masses remained aloof or hostile to modernization efforts of the bureaucracy that would be beneficial to them in the long run is a recurrent theme in Turkish modernization literature. Thus, all popular movements opposing state control of social, political or economic sphere are classified as "reactionary" and condemned as instances that retarded the development of Turkey. See, for instance, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).


6. Richard L. Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey", in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
Turkey was a good example of an underdeveloped country which successfully moved from tradition to modernity without any serious breakdown in the society. Their interpretations found adherents in the early 1970s among Turkish academics. The Turkish variant is represented mainly by the works of Heper, collections in Kazancigil and Özbudun, Kili, Okyar, Onulduran, Özbudun in Huntington and Moore, and Sunar. 7


It seems that a particular version of the modernization theory was well-suited to Kemalist ideology. That particular variant attaches much importance to charismatic leadership and the role bureaucracy--collectively labelled as the modernizing elite along with the intelligentsia--played in developing and transforming a traditional society. Within the context of an underdeveloped social formation, Turkey is portrayed as a success story--meaning no violent revolution and change of either power or property relations in the society--in making a transition from tradition to modernity under the guidance of Atatürk and his elite bureaucracy and political party.  

I have no intention of criticising the limitations of the modernization theory here; that has been done before and elsewhere with much success. What I would like to emphasize here is the modernization theory's attraction towards a secular developmental line. Not only countries are lined up vis-à-vis each other on a tradition-modernity axis, but they are also seen as moving, through time, from tradition towards modernity--a unilinear developmental model which draws criticism from all corners in theoretical debate. What is important in this scheme is that successful modernization is supposed to have taken place in gradual manner. Disruptions in the form of breakdowns at best and revolutions at worst are seen as failures in the developmental process. Since successful modernization/westernization requires smooth transition from a tradition-bound society to a modern one, theoretical considerations in a sense require the portrayal of Turkey as fitting

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8. Studies preoccupied with highlighting the "reformist" agenda of the military bureaucracy in post-World War I Turkey from the perspective of modernization theory abound in the literature concerning Turkish political and economic history. The ones that utilize the original framework developed by the fathers of the modernization theory in explaining the Turkish case are the following: Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (İstanbul: Robert College Publications, 1969), and *idem, Atatürk Devrimi* (Ankara: Türkiye Is Bankası Yayını, 1982); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as State Founder", in *Prof. Dr. Yavuz Abadan'a Armagan* (Ankara: A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayını, 1969), pp.517-573, and *idem, "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective", in Kemal H. Karpat (Ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp.93-120; and, Emre Korgar, *Imparatoriuktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), pp.106-127 and 467-485.
this nonviolent/uninterrupted developmental process. Thus, mainstream modernization theory treats Turkey as a successful example of a modernizing country that has avoided violence and revolution. What this approach causes is the academic blindness towards disruptions and non-evolutionary kinds of change. That change is not always in the direction of greater or higher levels of "modernization" escapes the eyes of the most ardent supporters of modernization theory. Logically this type of analysis easily lends itself to the continuity theses in interpreting Turkish history. Examples of this type of analysis can be found in the work supported by the Princeton project. A seemingly more historical treatment can be found in Bernard Lewis's account of Turkish development where he emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity between the pre- and post-World War I periods.

In some versions of modernization theory --especially the ones propagated by Turkish academics-- there is a strong attraction to attribute the cause of all efforts of modernization to the vigorous energy of Atatürk and his entourage. His political vision and will is brought to the forefront of historical discussion which leads, almost invariably, to personality worshipping. Atatürk, portrayed as a charismatic leader, is elevated to a position of cult symbol. In this version of hero-worshipping, Turkey owes its existence to his leadership alone. Examples of these extremes are to be found in either openly ideological treatments of modern Turkish history or in quasi-scientific analyses of the period by certain exponents of the modernization theory working on Turkey.

Hero worshipping of this sort necessarily leads these proponents to a version of the discontinuity thesis. Atatürk's efforts and the state he established are seen as a fundamental

break with the Ottoman past. Therefore, the aim of this version of the modernization theory is to show conclusively that there was in fact a total breakdown in the system at the end of the First World War. Here, the loss of the War by the Unionist government in 1918 and the subsequent occupation by the Allied Powers is interpreted as the end of Turkey's political independence. Thus, the issue is subverted to a discussion of state building, in the most crude application of modernization theory to a seemingly fitting case. A new state is being born out of the ruins of a dying/dead empire.

In the nationalist versions of this variant, Turkey is even portrayed as the first example of an emerging developing nation to gain independence from the West. Categories of stages of political development which are normally appropriate for former colonies are used by Sura Kili in her interpretation of Kemalism and establishment of modern Turkey under Kemalist dictatorship. Misrepresentation of issues helps shape this version of interpretive history into one of building a radically different, meaning a totally modern society in place of a traditional one. This view is supported by citation of the so-called "revolutions" or reforms carried out in the early 1920s and is used as a proof of Turkey's commitment to western ideals, such as the adoption of Sunday as the weekly holiday, the acceptance of the Gregorian calendar, the metric system, the western dress, and the latin alphabet. These superstructural changes, which in many cases had already been unofficially accepted and practiced for a long time, are offered as proofs of the modernizing efforts of the Kemalist government and of a total break with the "backward" past. Real issues are left undiscussed, least of all economic issues. This is surprising since one would normally expect discussion of the development of a nationalist economy after "independence" from the imperialist "yoke". The reasons for the lack of discussion of this sort within modernization theory will become apparent during the course of the thesis.

ECONOMY is what the dependency theorists are most interested in when they discuss the development of Turkey. Their attention is almost exclusively focused on Turkey's economic development, or backwardness, and the causes of its underdevelopment. Within the dependency approach we also have divisions between the proponents of continuity and discontinuity in Turkish history. At the outset it must again be emphasized that the axis of the debate in the continuity/discontinuity issue revolves around the establishment of the Republican regime of Atatürk in 1923 rather than the Revolution of 1908. However, the choice of 1923, especially from an angle where economic policies take prime importance, is quite arbitrary and reflects the wholehearted acceptance of Kemalist ideology and its framework in examining the economic development of Turkey from a dependency point of view.

Just as in the modernization theorists' division of the ones who insist on continuity versus those who insist on discontinuity, the division reflects the degree of nationalism and acceptance of Kemalist ideology. The more critical the writer is of the Kemalist ideology the more the likelihood that he/she will be on the continuity side of the argument.\(^\text{13}\) The continuity argument, furthermore, is more consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the dependency theory; thus, one can further claim that those who advocate continuity in Turkish economic development make much more sense than those who flirt with the idea of discontinuity.

Those who are representatives of the nationalist variants of the dependency approach and the ones who uncritically accept the version of Turkish history written from the viewpoint of Kemalist ideology support the discontinuity thesis. In summary, they claim that Turkey had become a dependent state, reduced to the status of a colony, at the close of the nineteenth century. The basic decisions concerning the fate of the economy were being taken outside the country and the political structure in the country was unable to

\(^{13}\) The best example is Caglar Keyder's *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987).
resist this outside force although it tried hard to keep foreign influence at bay. This state of affairs, it is claimed, continued throughout the First World War until the establishment of the Republic. Accepting the highly nationalistic version of the episode of the Interregnum between 1918 and 1923 as a war of independence against imperialist powers and their regional lackeys the Greeks, discontinuity version of the dependency approach finds a clear break with the past starting with the successful repulsion of the occupation forces from the country and the establishment of the Republic in 1923. It is claimed with earnest conviction that it was only after Atatürk's victory over the imperialist enemy that Turkey became free to shape her economy as she wished. Thus, proponents of the dependency approach who insist on discontinuity see a sharp difference between the economic structure of pre- and post-World War I Turkey. Extreme nationalists of this approach see Atatürk as the irreplaceable person who miraculously saved Turkey from extinction by virtue of his military and political wizardry.\textsuperscript{14}

This approach connects us in a peculiar way to the Revolution from Above thesis. The most important advocates of this thesis are Trümerger, and Savran.\textsuperscript{15} It is claimed that the state that came into being in 1923 represents a transformation that is brought about by a revolution from above by Atatürk. It is claimed that a capitalist state --a totally new form of state-- is instituted in 1923 with the aim of furthering the interests of the capitalist class. Here, however, the discussion deteriorates into arguments whether there was a bourgeois class to begin with. The same problems with respect to the Revolution of 1908 presents itself: "Was there a bourgeois class who demanded a revolution?"; or, "Was the bourgeoisie so weak as to legitimate the claim made by social scientists that there was not a class of this sort worthy of the name?"; and lastly, "Were these revolutions, especially the

\textsuperscript{14} Exponents of this version are Ismail Cem Ipekci with his Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlıgin Tarihi, First Edition (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1970), and Dogan Avcioglu with his Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın, Second Edition, 2 Vols. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1973).

alleged 1923 revolution from above, made so as to institute a bourgeois class?" It seems that proponents of the Revolution from Above thesis tilt towards the idea that it was the bureaucratic state machinery/apparatus that created both the conditions for capitalist development as well as the bourgeois class to go with it.

There are of course several problems with the Revolution from Above thesis. First of all, a proper definition of this thesis alleges that revolution from above, the classic case being Germany, comes about under circumstances where the bourgeois class is existent but not strong enough to guarantee its political rule vis-à-vis the contending classes in the society, thus trusting political leadership to a more or less autonomous state; giving up political rule in return for protection of capitalist relations of production for the long term. In the Turkish case to argue both for a lack of bourgeois class and for a revolution from above at the same time is a contradiction in terms and results from a lack of concern both for theoretical consistency and historical reality. This also comes at a time when the revolution from above thesis is seriously questioned even in cases which seem to be perfect examples.16

A more internally consistent and coherent narrative comes from the dependency theorists who argue for continuity in modern Turkish history. In their analyses too the establishment of the Kemalist regime in 1923 figures prominently, as some sort of a radical transformation in the political sphere. They too accept the Kemalist ideology's position that monarchical regime continued up until the end of the World War I and that a modern/capitalist state came into existence only in 1923. The main proponents of this thesis are Keyder, Anderson, and others. Thus they too see some sort of "discontinuity" in the political sphere. Yet their analysis depends almost solely on the economy and it is on the question of the economy that they claim a continuity exists.17 A rigorous attempt for

17. Perry Anderson, "The End of the Ancien Régime in Comparative Perspective", Paper presented
continuity comes from Keyder, in his thesis. Here, Keyder sees essentially no difference between the economic policies of pre-War Turkey and the early Kemalist regime. Both, in his view, are equally weak against the onslaught of the capitalist world-economy. Turkey has, in his view, no autonomy vis-à-vis the economically hegemonic powers of the West. Turkey could not pursue an independent economic policy. In his view, only the Great Depression of 1929 liberated Turkey from economic dependence. Along with the other third world countries of the periphery, Turkey started a new course --an independent one emphasizing import-substitution-industrialization-- after 1929. The change thus is totally attributed to causes external to Turkey. 18

In this version of the dependency interpretation of Turkey, it is admitted that there was a secular development towards what might be called modernization/rationalization in Turkish society but the essential fact remains that Turkey could not shake off imperialist control, most visibly exercised by the Public Debt Administration established after the 1881 settlement with the European creditors. Thus, in economic terms, nothing fundamental changed during the period between late 1880s up until 1930. The break, as Keyder would put it, came with the Great Depression. Thus his classification emphasizes 1930 rather than 1923 in terms of pointing towards a radical change in Turkish economy and, consequently, politics. Similar to his economic interpretation, his interpretation concerning the political sphere does not put extra emphasis on 1923 except of course noting that 1923 represents a change in the form of government --which, however, could not change the rules of the game for Turkey in international economy. Apart from a change in the form of government, Keyder sees a continuity in politics from late nineteenth century up until 1930. He characterizes this period as a time during which the bureaucracy attempted to modernize

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Turkey, and helped foster capitalist development.\textsuperscript{19}

ONE OF THE DEFICIENCIES of both the modernization and the dependency theory is their insistence on a unilinear development line. In modernization theory it is a unilinear, secular development from tradition to modernity, a sequential development which finds its most rigid formulation in the stages of political development in an ordered fashion as delineated in the classical textbooks of political modernization literature.

In dependency theory, this unilinear model presents itself in the shape of a necessity: The structure of the world economy is such that the capitalist core countries dominate the periphery at the stage of capitalist development. At the particular stage of this development, which is claimed to have started as early as the sixteenth century, certain countries started on capitalist development and the world-capitalist system came into existence in which core countries exploited other countries which became peripheralized in the international division of labour, thus constituting peripheral countries, \textit{i.e.}, the third world countries of the twentieth century. Turkey found itself in the periphery, and acted according to this preordained scenario. Turkey followed the path of countries similar to her situation, a classical example of an underdeveloped country. Autonomy for independent course of action is prevented by countries of the core and the workings of the world-capitalist system. Examples of this point of view in Turkish historiography can be found, among others, in Gerasimos, Ipekci, Avcioglu, and Pamuk.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Caglar Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development}, \textit{passim}.

Both theories deny any place to internal struggle and resistance to the political and economic system that was in place in Turkey. Part of the explanation for this lack of concern for any attention to internal conflict comes from the requirements of the theories that are used to explain Turkey. Modernization theory, from the very start, accepts a very limited version of functionalism which denies any place to conflict or discord in the theory. It openly and categorically denies conflict as the basis of society. With its insistence on consensus, modernization theory displaces any discussion of conflict from the analysis of actual situations. Under these circumstances one cannot expect studies using a restricted version of the modernization theory to talk about conflicts over politics and the economy in Turkey in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is only natural within the bounds of modernization theory to eliminate any reference to serious conflict in Turkish society. Especially lacking is the absence of group or class conflict, which is a direct reflection of the concerns of the modernization theory. Therefore, one should not look for an historical account of conflicts in Turkish society in works written with an explicit concern to conform to the requirements of modernization theory.

In dependency theory one would expect this particular deficiency to be remedied, especially in view of the fact that dependency theory has been strongly influenced by Marxist theory. Yet, dependency theory has focused its attention on conflicts between the core countries on the one hand and the peripheral countries of the world-economy on the other to the almost total exclusion of paying any attention to the conflict within the peripheral countries. In a simplistic fashion, all attention is given to the peripheral country’s struggle against imperialist penetration and the way that struggle is waged against the core countries and --in certain variants of that theory-- against their allies in the peripheral

countries, the comprador bourgeoisie. The comprador bourgeoisie --if that term makes any sense at all-- however, is not integrated to the theoretical argument as a social class which is part and parcel of the social formation but kept as a separate entity as if it were outside of the system and as if its roots lay completely outside of the peripheral country. In short, there is no place for that class in the discussion except for taking them as mere agents of the imperialists. This, of course, has its repurcussions in the ensuing analysis of concrete situations in underdeveloped countries.

I will not go into a detailed criticism of dependency theory here. Suffice it to say that at one level it is a form of nationalistic ideology, as criticised by Bill Warren in his *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. By focusing exclusively on external pressures, the analysis, in many ways, absolves all and everything that happens within the peripheral social formation. At another level, as criticised by Robert Brenner in his *New Left Review* article, dependency theory represents a Neo-Smithian marxism in which class struggle or class conflict is totally kept out of the picture and replaced by a mechanical economistic rationality which gives no place to class analysis. As reflected into the interpretation of Turkish history dependency approach totally denies any place to the conflicts between different classes or conflicts between classes and the state over the economy and politics.

DENIAL OF ANY PLACE to class conflict in the analyses of Turkish history in either of the theories whether they be modernization or dependency theory also reflect in great measure the dominant, *i.e.*, Kemalist, ideology's position on this issue. For, the Kemalist ideology denies the existence of any class in Turkish society up until the end of the period under our scrutiny. The Kemalist position on this issue was put into circulation no later than the early

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months of 1923, when it became clear that the Kemalists had little chance of victory in the coming general elections if the elections were to be held freely. Under the circumstances no opposition party was allowed to organise to contest the Kemalist candidates. The justification for the ban on opposition political parties was partly based on the frequently utilised fiction that under conditions of life and death, when the country was not totally immune from foreign intervention and re-occupation if divided, political parties were detrimental to national interests; national interests demanded "unity". This justification however could not be used indefinitely. Therefore the fiction of a classless society was concocted so as to justify the continuance of the ban on opposition parties. Again, as early as the spring of 1923, Atatürk started making comments that his party was the people's party by which he meant that his party represented all interest groups in Turkish society; therefore there was no necessity for other political parties to exist. Later, when a particular version of Kemalism was being worked out as an ideology by the group of pseudo-intellectuals around the journal Kadro in the 1930s the emphasis was put on the lack of classes in contemporary Turkish society. That allegation was based on the fiction that there was not a capitalist class in Turkey to speak of and therefore there did not exist a working class being exploited by the bourgeoisie. Turkey, according to pure Kemalist ideology, was a classless society and therefore there was no trace of a class conflict. It was further deduced that since there was no class conflict and conflicting interests there was absolutely no place for opposing political parties to superficially divide the unity of the nation.24

Parts of this ideology strongly resemble the corporatist ideal of Fascist Italy without the rigour of enlisting the population in the fascist cause as it happened in Italy. Turkish corporatism and fascist ideology resemble, therefore, the "exclusionary" corporatism of Franco in Spain and of Salazar in Portugal rather than the "mass support" oriented fascism/corporatism of Italy and Germany.

24. See Kadro, especially the articles by Sevket Süreyya Aydemir.
A DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS can also be organised around the dual concepts of historical continuity and discontinuity. Adherents of both the modernisation and the dependency theories can be found in the continuity as well as the discontinuity theses.

IN GENERAL OUTLINE, the continuity theses propagated by both the modernization and the dependency theorists claim that twentieth century Turkish history experienced no sharp breaks or sudden and radical changes so as to justify "discontinuity". In the modernization theory version of this thesis, 1908 is interpreted as a reform movement executed by the forward looking, secular and westernized bureaucracy. In the eyes of modernization theorists, the nineteenth century as a whole is seen as a secular development in rationalization of state bureaucracy. The history of reforms, it is claimed, has started with the destruction of the janissaries in 1826 and continued from late 1830s onwards, more or less in an unbroken fashion, until the twentieth century. The emphasis the modernization theorists put on is the development of state apparatus, i.e., the bureaucracy --both civilian and military. The rationalization of bureaucracy and of the society is told in the words and concepts of the American interpretation of the Weber thesis. "State building" is incorporated into the modernization literature, and 1908 is seen as another step in building the modern Turkish state. By the same token, 1923 is interpreted by modernization theorists who are on the side of continuity as the culmination of the century-old effort at building a modern state. The difference they see after 1923 is the form of the state, a change from monarchy to republic. This difference too is interpreted as a further step towards modernization, in the now discarded concept of "stages of political development".

The continuity thesis supporters try to show continuity in leadership and politics from 1908 to 1923. They try to show that some of the bureaucrats and leaders after 1923
had not only similarities in terms of social and political background with their counterparts in pre-1923 regime but also people who had worked for the 1908 regime as well. Especially the military bureaucracy is seen as the backbone of the modernity-minded regimes of both 1908 and 1923. The comparisons are quasi-valid only when misrepresentations of the true nature of the 1908 Revolution are allowed in the equation. Furthermore, modernization theorists take quite a number of liberties with facts concerning the political events of both pre- and post-1923 decades to come up with the similarity and continuity thesis.

This point of view is not totally monopolised by modernization theorists alone; some of the dependency theorists too believe in the political continuity not only between pre- and post-1908 era but also between the pre- and post-1923 era. One theorist in mind is Caglar Keyder who has expounded a dependency version of the political continuity thesis in his recently published book, State and Class in Turkey. His version is not dissimilar to that of the modernization theorists.

Almost all of the dependency theorists talk exclusively of the economy to the total exclusion of politics. The ones who see continuity in Turkish history claim that nothing changed in the economy with the 1908 revolution. They claim that the dependent nature of the Turkish state in the capitalist world-economy continued unbroken during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Not only 1908 did not change anything fundamentally but also 1923 was not a point of departure from the economic point of view. According to the dependency theorists who emphasize continuity, the Turkish republic showed the same kind of dependent economic relationship with the western powers during the 1920s as it had been the case in late nineteenth century. For the dependency theorists, the basic determining factor of dependency remained more or less the same, whether Turkey's political structure was constitutional monarchy or republic.

The decisive break, according to the dependency theorists, came not with 1908 or 1923, but with the Great Depression of 1929. It is claimed that it was the economic
depression on a world scale that disturbed the established relations of dependency in dependent countries' favour. It was under conditions of world depression, the dependency argument goes, that underdeveloped countries of the periphery could devise economic policies of their own choosing. In the Turkish case, it is argued that Turkey could shake off the economic policies of dependency and establish the so-called etatist economy only under the conditions of relative relaxation from imperialist domination by core countries.

As is clear from the analysis put forward by the dependency theorists, their preoccupation is to demonstrate the limitations under which a dependent country manages its economy. They do not examine the internal dynamics of the country under study. The Turkish social formation is mentioned only in passing and only for purposes of demonstrating bonds of dependency. Although this approach is partly useful in delineating the structural constraints the underdeveloped countries face in the context of the world economy, it says nothing about domestic political and economic forces that are infinitely much more important in shaping the economic policies than the general workings of the capitalist world economy. There is no analysis of differing positions of different classes on economic and political questions. A uniformity of opinion and non-existence of internal conflict among different classes in Turkish society is implicitly assumed in the existing versions of dependency theory advocating for continuity in Turkish history.

THE DISCONTINUITY THESIS has its adherents working both within the framework of modernization theory and dependency theory. The discontinuity thesis with its several variants in existing literature resembles in many ways the unadulterated version of the Kemalist ideology only dressed in quasi-scientific garb.

The modernization theorists see a basic continuity in politics and the society up until the end of the First World War. The Revolution of 1908 is dismissed, like it is dismissed by the adherents of the continuity thesis, as being a step towards modernization and westernization in Turkey's development and nothing more. They view the pre-1923 era as
a monarchical/absolutist regime unchanged by the Revolution of 1908. They see the real change in 1923 with the establishment of the Republic by Atatürk. The break, according to them, comes with this event with which, it is argued, the absolutist regime, the Ottoman Empire, totally collapses and an absolutely new and modern state is formed under the name of the Republic of Turkey. The issue of semantics rather than substance takes precedence in this view and no real comparison is made between the former regime and that of the post-1923 regime. Nationalist historians, both foreign and Turkish, like Stanford J. Shaw and Suna Kili, interpret 1923 as rebirth of Turkey as a totally modern state. Kili who uses an explicitly laid out model of "nation-building" propagated by the early modernization theorists spells out the various steps after the formation of the republic after 1923 and interprets them as stages in "nation-building". Here she treats the Turkish case as if it were the same with the newly independent states of post-World War II Africa. In this sense, the discontinuity thesis takes Turkey to be a dependency of western powers before the First World War. This version of the modernization theory comes as close as it can get to the official/orthodox Kemalist ideology.

Kongar, who in general, has a critical approach towards modernization theory, falls into the same category of theorists who utilise modernization theory in the service of the discontinuity thesis. He, too, sees the post-1923 period as the establishment of a modern state, and a total break from the monarchical regime of pre-World War I Turkey.

Since making comparisons with the pre-War Turkey in terms of the political and social structure would not support such a contention of fundamental change under republican regime, the modernization theorists put their efforts to show the "revolutionary" aspects of the Kemalist regime. They insist that the changes under Atatürk were both radical and revolutionary, justifying the classification of the post-1923 period as totally new and modern. In order to justify this position the pre-War "reforms" are down played and are tried to be portrayed as either lukewarm or half-hearted efforts at modernization by a decaying and decadent empire.
On their part, the dependency theorists who argue for discontinuity emphasize and exaggerate the changes that took place in 1923. They totally disregard the changes in the domestic and international economic policies that have taken place after the Revolution of 1908. They assume the same policies executed by the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid continued under constitutional monarchy after 1908.

THE AIM OF THIS THESIS is to criticise the conventional approaches in writing modern Turkish history, the examples and variants of which have been summarized above. In order to illustrate the deficiencies as well as the misconceptions about the recent Turkish past I have chosen the period from 1908 to 1930 as a slice of Turkish history which has attracted considerable attention, although it has been treated in an unsatisfactory manner. The dates chosen --1908 and 1931-- are not arbitrary but rather are important dates which constitute, in different ways, turning points in Turkish history.

1908 is the year that a liberal revolution on July 23 changed the political as well as the economic structure of Turkey. In politics, the system was transformed from a bureaucratically-run monarchist regime to a liberal democratic political system in which a popularly elected parliament and a cabinet directly and solely responsible to that parliament began running the affairs of the country. In politics, therefore, there was a definite and sudden break with the past. In the economic arena there was also a definite break with pre-1908 practices. In governmental economic policies the interests of the national groups and classes were given priority over the interests of foreign groups. A "nationalist" economic policy in which free trade was rejected came into existence during the period starting with 1908. A protectionist economic policy was instituted with a view to protect and further the interests of the domestic manufacturing and trading classes. The government took most of the necessary steps in order to facilitate the development of industry in Turkey during this period.

1931, by contrast, represents the year in which the firm establishment of a radically
different political and economic regime in Turkey came into existence. In 1931, after years of struggle from 1923 onwards, a new regime, corporatist in its political as well as economic philosophy, was firmly established, and liberal principles in politics and economics were totally rejected. Thus, from 1931 onwards a totally different political and economic system came into existence which, to a large extent, replaced all political and economic structures which were the products of the Revolution of 1908.

THE PERIODISATION OF TURKISH HISTORY in this fashion is quite unorthodox and goes against the conventional approaches in writing the political as well as the economic history of Turkey. This periodisation is one of the focal points of the thesis, in that these dates illustrate not only the importance of 1908 but also highlight the dramatic changes that were brought about after 1923 and firmly established in 1931.

The period from 1908 to 1931 can be divided into two broad periods. The first of these can be taken from 1908 to 1918. 1908 being the year when the Committee of Union and Progress, the revolutionary party that successfully challenged the authority of the monarchist government, established its own rule and initiated a new economic policy that favoured the domestic producers against foreign competitors. The Unionist period ends with the surrender of Turkey to Allied Powers at the end of the First World War in 1918.

The second period runs from 1923 to 1931. 1923 is the year when Atatürk establishes a regime in which he, as head of a military government, reigns supreme. 1931 denotes the year when this military regime transforms itself into a corporatist one. In one sense the political uncertainty ends with the reorganisation of the party and of the political system and firmer controls both in politics and the economy shape the country anew.

THE REASONS as to why the whole period can be divided into these two sub-periods are manifold. One of the main reasons is that both 1908 and 1923 represent dates when efforts are made to bring about major changes in the Turkish political and economic system.
The period beginning with 1908 was distinguished in economic policy as one in which the state actively engaged in schemes where private enterprise might benefit and develop so as to compete with foreign capital. The decade from 1908 to 1918 witnessed governments -- with two major counter-revolutionary disruptions in 1909 and 1912 -- which worked for the protection of domestic industry against foreign competition. Supporting established industries and being instrumental in establishing new ones through major changes in policy and legal framework were a few of the achievements of the Unionist governments. The pre-1908 practice of establishing monopolies and granting exclusionary concessions either to foreign or domestic companies are done away with and a competitive capitalist system is tried to be instituted in its place.

In politics, too, the aim of the Committee of Union and Progress was to destroy the pre-1908 monarchist form of government where the palace and the bureaucracy ran the country without being responsible to any group or class in Turkey. The Revolution of 1908 immediately changed the political structure from a monarchist absolutist regime to one of constitutional monarchy in which the powers of the monarch and of the bureaucracy were severely restricted and a parliament composed of elected representatives of citizens became the sole arbiter of political and economic issues through a cabinet solely responsible to the parliament.

In short, 1908 represents a revolution in which political power is taken from the hands of the monarch and the bureaucracy and given to representatives of the citizens with a view to establish the political as well as the economic supremacy of a new class. In this sense, 1908 is one of the last examples of a bourgeois revolution before the First World War.

In sharp contrast, the period beginning with 1923 shows a dramatic turn of events from the period of the 1908 and after. In economic policies the principles of liberalism were publicly denounced. Whereas the governments from 1908 to 1918 had intervened in the economy with a view to further the interests of the capitalist class, the government
interventions during 1923 and 1931 represented a restrictive approach. Not only were the government policies unsupportive of capitalist development but they were geared towards undoing what had been achieved in the previous decade. Many of the features of the pre-1908 economic policies --the revival of the institutions of monopolies and privileged concessionary companies being the most prominent examples-- were reinstated, and government intervention in the economy was once again practiced in order to control rather than promote private capital in the country.

In the political arena too, the principles of liberal democracy were done away with. The parliament, though not totally closed down and done away with, was transformed into a non-representative assembly through the elimination of competitive elections which, consequently, made it no more than the rubber stamp of government decisions. From 1923 onwards most of the constitutional rights established by the 1908 regime and meticulously guarded and respected, despite attempts by the Kemalists to circumvent them during the Interregnum between 1919 and 1922, were trampled upon by the Kemalist government as soon as it came into power in October of 1923. Existing autonomous institutions were, one by one, subjected to governmental control just as they had been under the pre-1908 monarchical regime. The aim throughout the 1920s was to subjugate political life to the dictates of the Republican People's Party. The single party regime, however, was firmly installed only after 1931 when the political and economic system was reorganised along the lines of fascist and corporatist regimes of Europe, mainly of Italy and, later, in the Thirties, of Germany.
PART I
Chapter 2

THE TAX REVOLTS OF 1906-07: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1908

Even on the eve of its eightieth anniversary, the revolution of 1908 is still shrouded in mystery. Most argue that it was nothing more than a bureaucratic reform movement, the last in a series of desperate attempts to save the Ottoman Empire from total collapse. And nowhere is this view more strongly held than in Turkey itself. Without exception, Turkish historians, whether they support the modernization or dependency theory, the continuity or discontinuity thesis, insist on the reform aspects of this period, and, as such, have named it the "establishment of the constitutional regime". I will argue that the events of this period involved such profound social, political and economic changes that it has to be considered nothing less than a revolution.

Because the events of 1908 are considered the result of bureaucratic reform from above, it is taken for granted that the "establishment of the constitutional regime" was the result of deliberate planning on the part of a "modernised" civilian and military bureaucracy which had become aware of the state's precarious position. Therefore, it is taken for granted that this was purely an affair instigated and brought about particularly by the "concerned" officers in the army who worked clandestinely towards the overthrow of a regime that had become detrimental to the interests of the state. In Turkish historical discourse, like in all historical discourses dominated by military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of all sorts, it has become fashionable to describe the revolution of 1908 as an attempt at "rescuing the state from its internal enemies and their external allies". It is alleged that the events of 1908 brought about the elimination of a corrupt government
supported by a traditional and anachronistic bureaucracy and the instituting in its place an enlightened regime which cherished the vision of a modern Turkey.

Given this view, it is a foregone conclusion that whatever changes did occur, they had no popular backing. Except for descriptions of general discontent caused by bureaucratic corruption and widespread surveillance of intellectuals by the Hamidian secret police, conventional Turkish historiography does not give us any indication that here may have been cause for truly comprehensive revolutionary activity. Surprisingly, this position completely disregards any connection between the two years of widespread popular unrest prior to 1908 and the fall of the absolutist regime. There has yet to be written a history of popular discontent in the immediate pre-revolutionary Turkey.

Connected to the disinterestedness in the history of social, let alone economic and political, discontent, one finds a total lack of analysis of the Committee of Union and Progress’s role in the pre-revolutionary agitation that became extremely acute in the preceding months of the revolution. As a result, one finds that standard histories generally use one of the strategies when it comes to an analysis of the Committee of Union and Progress during this pre-revolutionary period. Some versions of conventional historiography totally deny its significance from the very start; others downplay its significance by describing the Unionists as being mostly external to the political scene. Whether the Unionists operated clandestinely outside of the country or within Turkey, they are portrayed by conventional historiography as accessories and subordinate to the military officers organised in underground organisations rather than the reverse.

In this chapter, I will argue that these conceptions are, in fact, misconceptions. I will show that not only was there growing widespread dissatisfaction, but that it was the Committee of Union and Progress, far from being part of or subordinate to a group of military conspirators and thus being an instrument of a bureaucratic reform movement, which successfully translated this dissatisfaction into a distinctly revolutionary activity. It was the Unionists who coordinated the various movements of widespread discontent and
civil disobedience which took the form of tax revolts in many localities and helped transform these tax revolts and other acts of civil disobedience into revolutionary action.

FOR peasants in the villages, artisans and shopkeepers in the towns, and merchants in the cities, the burden of taxes had reached unbearable proportions in the spring of 1904, a situation which the notorious rapacity of the tax-collectors only aggravated. At this time, the collection of the "temettii" tax, some form of income tax, met with such problems in Izmir that the collection of that tax was allowed to remain in indefinite abeyance.¹ Similar events took place in Mitylene in February of 1905, though this time complaints came mostly from the local Greek population of the island.²

The rural population was in the direst of straits. There, the peasantry was heavily indebted to the landlords and tax-farmers. In the eastern provinces the situation had caused such poverty and misery that large numbers of peasants had emigrated to the towns and cities in the hopes of subsisting on private charity.³ The decision to abandon the fields was primarily the result of unbearable anxiety. Because it was doubtful whether they would be in their homes to reap the succeeding harvest, peasants had become increasingly reluctant to sow. Those who did faced more uncertainty as the greater part of the crops sown had already been mortgaged to meet the previous year's debts. The crops, when ripe, would not go to feed the peasants, but to the creditors, who were the landlords and the tax-farmers. Steadily increasing taxes made the situation even more impractical, not to say intolerable.⁴

WHAT came to be known as the tax revolts started in early 1906 in various parts of the

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1. F.O. 424/208, Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O’Conor, Smyrna, March 28, 1905 [p.40].
2. F.O. 424/208, Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O’Conor, Smyrna, March 28, 1905 [p.40].
3. F.O. 424/208, Vice-Consul Tyrrell to Sir N. O’Conor, Van, March 20, 1905 [p.43].
4. F.O. 424/208, Vice-Consul Tyrrell to Sir N. O’Conor, Van, March 20, 1905 [p.43].
country upon the decision of the Government to institute two new taxes, one on individuals, the sahşi vergi, and the other, poll tax on domestic animals. Immediately upon the Government's attempt to collect these additional taxes, citizens all over the country began organising acts of civil disobedience, the first of which manifested itself at Kastamonu, a town of little distinction from other towns in Anatolia, except for its high concentration of political exiles of the Hamidian regime.

In late January of 1906, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Kastamonu erupted with the issue of municipal elections. The Government put up the customary notices in public places for the elections of city councillors. Nobody in the city, however, paid any attention to these notices and boycotted the elections on the grounds that they had no control over taxation and expenditure, be it provincial or municipal. They sent their delegates to the local military commander, in order to state their reasons for protesting the elections, and demanded effective control over the expenditures of the municipality. They stated that trustworthy councillors from among their own choice be appointed so as to really know how and where the money was spent. 5 One of the most pressing issues was the new tax on sahşi vergi, the poll tax, which, they claimed was exacted from every individual at the same rate without concern for the wealth of the person. Considering this a serious breach of justice they demanded instant government attention, and refused to pay the tax, especially in view of the fact that all high-level state officials were exempt in the province. 6 They were especially resentful of the fact that Enis Pasha, the Governor of Kastamonu, who was one of the wealthiest persons in the whole province, was not paying a single cent. Representatives of the city demanded that the bulk of the assessed amount on the sahşi vergi should be paid by him as him being the wealthiest. The Military Commander replied the delegation that he could not involve in these matters since these

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pertained to the civilian bureaucracy, and thus, was not in his domain. A petition signed by thirty-two merchants and artisans representing the whole business community of Kastamonu had already been sent to the Central Government in Istanbul about a week earlier, but, as usual, the Palace had taken no notice of it.

When their demands remained unanswered, they organised a demonstration, on January 21, of about five hundred people in front of the Government offices, after which, they proceeded to the Telegraph Office, and occupied the building. They sent telegrams to the Sultan's Palace reiterating their demand for the repeal of the tax. During the day the crowd in front of the Government buildings grew to more than four thousand. Both the Moslem population and the Armenians acted in unity in this act of mass demonstration. People eagerly awaited into the early hours of the morning for an answer from the Palace to their repeated petitions. Enis Pasha, the Governor, was so terrorised as to not being able to leave his residence during the whole day. During the following day two police commissioners tried to enter the Telegraph Office. Both were manhandled, and one of them was seized and taken prisoner, while the other managed to escape. With the full support of a majority of the town's notables, citizens occupied the Telegraph Office for ten days, during which they continuously corresponded with the Central Government and pressed for the acceptance of their demands. On January 31, fresh demonstrations started, again, in front of the Telegraph Office, in which a huge crowd of Moslems, Armenians, and Greeks participated in the protest to have the tax repealed, and have Enis Pasha, the Governor, and the Tax Commissioner recalled. In solidarity with the crowd, all shops and businesses

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remained closed during the day. One of the leaders of the revolt was Esat Efendi, a judge. He and some of the exiled intellectuals, who had been forced to reside at Kastamonu, had carefully planned the movement, and had, furthermore, entered beforehand into negotiations with Ali Riza Pasha, the Military Commander of Kastamonu, and obtained his approval as well as his promise not to use force against them. As soon as he learned of the new disturbances, Enis Pasha summoned the Military Commander as well as the Police Chief to his office and ordered them to disperse the crowd and collect information as to the cause and organizers of these demonstrations. Both men objected to the use of force since they judged that the forces under their command were both weak in strength and unreliable; they said they could not take on the responsibility of the consequences of an attempt at military repression. Thereupon, Enis Pasha tried to have the town notables use their influence on the masses to diffuse the situation. He summoned Namik Efendi, one of the members of the City Council, Sheikh Ataullah Efendi, Sheikh Ziyaeddin Efendi, Mehmed Emin Efendi, the mufti of Kastamonu, Said Hemdem Dede, and Merdane Efendi. Upon being requested by Enis Pasha to talk with the masses, they attempted to "normalise" the situation by meeting with the representatives of the revolt. They were told that the reason and preoccupation of the current revolt was not the repeal of the tax but of the dismissal of the Governor, and several other high-ranking provincial bureaucrats. They were, then, taken hostages and were set free only after they agreed to put their signatures on the petition for the dismissal of the Governor they sent to the Sultan.

The occupation of the Telegraph Office continued for one more day, during which the citizens impatiently waited for the order of the Governor’s dismissal. Eventually, their demands for the expulsion of the Governor as well as the Tax Commissioner were met: on the evening of February 1, Ali Riza Pasha was summoned to the Telegraph Office by the Palace officials, and after communication with him, the Palace decided on the dismissal of Enis Pasha. The Government appointed Ali Riza Pasha interim Governor. The crowd cheered after the news were broadcast and celebrated their success into the small hours of the morning.

Ali Riza Pasha started dismissing the corrupt bureaucrats as soon as he took office on February 2. Although he was also instructed by the Government to collect information on the organisers of the revolt, he did not pursue the matter further and asked to be relieved of his post, since he was a vehement opponent of the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid and did not want to be party to further repression.

In Government circles, there was considerable apprehension that the events in Kastamonu might provide an example for other parts of the country, both taxes being universally unpopular. Indeed, similar incidents began to appear in other parts of the country as well. In Sinob, several thousand people marched on the government offices, captured the telegraph office, and forcibly placed the Sub-Governor of Sinob on a ship bound for Istanbul. In the Mosul province, a riot took place in late January, also in

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connection with the collection of these taxes. 21

However, the most important revolt following the events at Kastamonu took place in Erzurum in February of 1906. The population had already been financially suffering under the rapacious administration of Nazım Pasha, the Governor, since 1902. Instead of using the money for the needs of the province, he had been sending about twenty-five percent of the collected amount to the capital in return for personal favours from the absolutist regime. 22 When the new taxes, sahsı vergi and the poll tax on domestic animals, were announced this became the last straw that broke the camel's back. Thirteen representatives of the local merchants responded to the news of increased taxation by immediately signing a petition and presenting it to the Governor, requesting the repeal of the tax on domestic animals as well as the extraordinary tax levied in order to raise money for the Hedjaz Railway. 23 Nazım Pasha promised to convey the grievances of the population; instead, he sent a telegram, on March 2 to Istanbul, informing the Sultan that certain provocateurs had conducted a propaganda against the new taxes, but that he had taken the necessary measures to suppress the revolt. 24 After receiving no reply from Istanbul, the leading livestock merchants of Erzurum gathered to discuss the situation. They decided to send another telegram reiterating their demand for the repeal of the tax. 25 When they again received no reply, the local members of the Committee of Union and Progress, organised under the name of "Can Veren", decided to take radical action against the local representatives of the Central Government. 26


Almost from the start, the tax revolt in Erzurum was both more organised and larger in scope than on previous occasions. The population demanded the Governor's recall, and merchants closed their shops on solidarity, as citizens took possession, on March 13, of the Telegraph Office in order to directly communicate with the Palace. When the Governor asked the mufti to pacify the population, the latter refused to make a speech to calm the citizens of Erzurum, and, instead, joined the revolt, disregarding political authority by stating that the imposition of the new taxes went against the principles of Islam and that therefore the protest was justified. During these events, military troops at Erzurum disobeyed orders of the Governor and of their officers, and did nothing to suppress the revolt, despite the fact that military officers supported the established order. Further protests took place around March 18, and these were followed up with more telegrams being sent to the Palace, asking for the remission of the tax complained of.

The tax that was most unpopular with the general population was the poll tax, or sahşi vergi, levied on individuals. Here, the unequal levying of the tax had been instrumental to its universal rejection. The particular grievance was that the amount to be paid under the new tax had been fixed at 400, 200, and 35 piasters, according to the category under which each person might be placed. It was generally considered that, under this method of assessment, the burden of the tax would fall heavily on the poor, while the sum to be paid by the rich would remain ludicrously small as compared with their

means. The serious ferment which this tax provoked among the Moslem population of Erzurum led them to join forces with the Christians. As no satisfactory answer had yet been received, they, together, organized a mass protest to be held in front of the Government buildings. The population, however, brought the demonstration to the governor's residence, tearing down the placards which the Government had posted giving public notice of the imposition of the new taxes. The demand for the Governor's recall was renewed and shops were closed again on March 28. During these protests, the city was for nearly ten days in the hands of the population, the usual representatives of the civil authority having practically abdicated their functions.

In the meantime, Suphi Bey, one of the local administrators who was also a member of the underground revolutionary organization, cut off the private telegraph line which Nazim Pasha, the Governor, was found to be using constantly during the revolt, distorting facts, belittling the events, and urging the Government not to give in to the demands of the citizens of Erzurum for his dismissal from office since this would certainly encourage further reprisals against established authority. Nazim Pasha was not allowed to leave his residence.

The remarkable unanimity with which all classes hastened to sign the demand for the abolition of the tax, and the fact that the money, which was no inconsiderable sum, necessary for the dispatch of the telegrams to Istanbul had been immediately forthcoming had shown the Government that the situation was growing more serious.

At the special meeting of the Council of Ministers it was decided that firm action

35. F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, April 12, 1906 [p.35].
37. F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, April 12, 1906 [p.35].
should be taken against the rioters.\textsuperscript{38} The Government issued an imperial decree instructing Zeki Pasha, the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, stationed at Erzincan, to immediately dispatch troops under a capable and trustworthy division commander to Erzurum with a view towards putting an end to the disorders and arresting the ringleaders, using armed force if necessary.\textsuperscript{39} One serious factor which the absolutist Government had to take into account, however, was the fact that its troops, partially the officers, but predominantly the soldiers, had become increasingly disaffected with the established regime.\textsuperscript{40} Zeki Pasha, after judging the situation, decided not to proceed to Erzurum.\textsuperscript{41} Left with no choice, the Government withdrew Nazim Pasha, transferred him to the Governorship of Diyarbakir, and appointed, in his place, Mehmed Ata Bey, Governor of Diyarbakir, as the new Governor in order to placate public opinion.\textsuperscript{42} This decision was all the more timely as, in view of the fact that the sympathies of the troops were so evidently on the side of the population, a dangerous conviction had sprung up among the latter that under no circumstances would they be fired upon.\textsuperscript{43}

The depth of popular disdain was confirmed by the population's continued criticism of Government policy. Complaints ranged from the high salaries paid to certain functionaries to the waste of public money, and the generally wretched state of affairs under the existing regime. Nor were references to recent events of 1905 in Russia wanting, while hopes were openly expressed that the financial control established in Macedonia might be extended to Erzurum.\textsuperscript{44} The response of the Government in Istanbul was to send

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\item \textsuperscript{38} F.O. 424/210, Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, April 9, 1906 [p.23].
\item \textsuperscript{40} F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor, Erzerum, June 15, 1906 [pp.61-62].
\item \textsuperscript{43} F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor, Erzerum, April 12, 1906 [p.35].
\item \textsuperscript{44} F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor, Erzerum, April 12, 1906 [p.35].
\end{enumerate}
a commission to investigate the causes of the troubles. It took great pains to calm down the population, who refused to pay the *sahsi vergi*.\(^{45}\)

On May 10, the new Governor, Mehmed Ata Bey, arrived at Erzurum; his previous position was Governor of Diyarbakır.\(^{46}\) He started office by paying the salaries of the provincial bureaucrats as well as the stipends of the soldiers which had been in arrears for quite some time, and dismissed corrupt officials.\(^{47}\) He also ordered the continuation for the collection of the taxes that the population refused to pay.\(^{48}\) In addition, he started investigations as to the organisers of the revolt with a view to repress the revolutionary movement.\(^{49}\)

By the beginning of April, agitation had also spread to Bayburt, Narman, and Hasankale -- closeby towns-- though Erzurum's example of closing shops seemed to have been followed only at Hasankale.\(^{50}\) Tax revolts had also spread to other commercial centres in Anatolia such as Trabzon, Giresun, Sivas, Kayseri, and other places.\(^{51}\) The new taxes on cattle and domestic animals as well as the *sahsi vergi* caused great hardships on the Macedonian subjects of the Empire, where there were rebellions in April against these


\(^{46}\) "A Erzeroum", *Pro Armenia*, August 5, 1906, p.942; H. Zafer Kars, *Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu*, p.29. Before he was appointed Governor at Diyarbakır on January 9, 1906, Mehmed Ata Bey was a professor of literature at the Galatasaray Lycée in Istanbul and, later, was Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. He had been professor of the history of Turkish literature at the Faculty of Letters in Istanbul until 1882. Later he had been transferred to the Faculty of Political Science, where he taught french (*Pro Armenia*, November 5, 1906. p.991; and, Ali Cankaya, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetliler*, 2, pp.1033-1034). For additional information on Mehmed Ata Bey, see Ibrahim Alaettin Gös, *Türk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi*, p.49.


\(^{50}\) F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, April 12, 1906 [p.36].

taxes, analogous to the ones that had taken place at Kastamonu, Mosul, Erzurum, Sivas, and other places.\textsuperscript{52} In Zeytun there was grave unrest in June, the cause of which was the attempt to collect taxes in arrears as well as the imposition of new taxes.\textsuperscript{53}

In Trabzon, the example of other provinces was repeated. A serious outburst of popular resentment concerning the imposition of the new taxes occurred which could be repressed only by employment of military force. Although the troops managed to repress the revolt, the Government could not enforce the collection of taxes.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, Resad Bey, the Governor, was forced to leave the town following demonstrations by its citizens.\textsuperscript{55} Resad Bey, who had been appointed Governor of Trabzon in 1903, was dismissed by the Government on the grounds of incompetence and replaced by Haci Arif Pasha.\textsuperscript{56}

In late June there was also an uprising at Bitlis which left the Police Commissioner dead, and the Governor wounded. As had happened earlier, citizens captured the local post office and sent telegrams to Istanbul demanding the Governor's dismissal. The Government's threat to use force was answered in kind, and eventually the Governor was recalled.\textsuperscript{57}

In mid-July tax revolts also took place at Samsun, where the citizens protested the new taxes. There was not a day that passed without serious incidents not taking place, including deaths of citizens. In order to keep the disturbances secret, the authorities would not allow anyone, especially the Armenians, into the Telegraph Office.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} "L'impôt sur le bétail", \textit{Pro Armenia}, May 5, 1906, p.894.
\textsuperscript{53} "Les impôts arriérés", \textit{Pro Armenia}, June 20, 1906, p.917.
\textsuperscript{54} "Le mouvement turc", \textit{Pro Armenia}, November 5, 1906, p.991.
\textsuperscript{57} H. Zafer Kars, \textit{Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{58} "Les impôts à Samsoun", \textit{Pro Armenia}, November 20, 1906, p.997.
THE EXTENT of these tax revolts forced the absolutist regime to take some measures to satisfy public outrage. In May, the Government had sent a circular to the Governors of Van, Bitlis, and Trabzon, instructing them to make a tour of their provinces to investigate popular grievances. They were also instructed to remove from office all functionaries who had been guilty of injustice and malpractice. The Sub-Governor of Hinis was subsequently dismissed on the grounds of incompetence. 59 Ferid Bey, the Governor of Bitlis, went on an inspection tour in his province at the beginning of September. 60

In the meantime, no attempt had been made to collect any of the new taxes, the imposition of which had been the cause of the trouble. Encouraged by their apparent success, the population of Erzurum grew bolder on its criticism of the current regime and began to question the administration's right to impose special taxation of any sort, except for purely local needs. The fact that vocal opposition expressed against taxation without representation was significant of the extent to which the respect for established authority had been lessened. 61

The unpopularity of the new taxes created similar outbursts of civil disobedience and revolt in Ankara as well. There too, the local post office was occupied by the citizens and telegraphs were sent to the Palace demanding the repeal of the taxes and the removal of the Governor of the province. The Government, as in similar cases, yielded to the demands of the people and dismissed the Governor of Ankara. 62

During the course of September and early October, the Government arrested in Izmir seven Armenian revolutionaries who were suspected of having connections with the revolutionary movement outside the country. Through the network of spies working for the Palace, the Government made further arrests of Turks, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, who

were all charged with revolutionary activity. There were also investigations by Government authorities in Manisa in connection with revolutionary movement there.63

In early October serious disturbances took place at Trabzon on the issue of the new taxes. The revolt of the citizens, who refused to pay the newly imposed taxes, could only be taken under control by the intervention of military troops. The authorities, however, had to momentarily decide not to press the issue further, and postponed the collection of these taxes.64

THE DISTURBANCES at Erzurum erupted again in the Fall of 1906. On October 21, both the Moslem and Christian citizens of the city acted in unison in demanding the repeal of the new taxes, saying that it was beyond their means to pay any more taxes. The mufti conveyed the grievances of the population to Mehmed Ata Bey, the Governor of Erzurum. Mehmed Ata Bey, however, stood firm and said that there was no question of repeal of the taxes and that he was determined to collect them. Upon being rejected, the population made a violent demonstration directed against established authority. The local police force and the gendarmes opened fire upon the demonstrators, killing many. Infuriated by this act of violence, the crowd replied with equal vehemence by killing the commander of the gendarmerie as well as many policemen and gendarmes.65

Mehmed Ata Bey had formed a commission to investigate the people responsible for the organization of the events of March. In October, Tahir Efendi, the Chief Judge, and Sabri Efendi, the Police Commissioner of the city, presented their findings to the Governor, who, in turn, sent the list to Istanbul and waited for orders. There were twenty-two people who had been found to be leaders of the movement. Among them were Haci Lütfullah Efendi, the mufti of Erzurum, prominent merchants and lawyers, and Durak Bey.

64. "Le mouvement ture", Pro Armenia, November 5, 1906, p.991.
one of the local leaders of the underground revolutionary organization which had ties with the Committee of Union and Progress.  

On October 23, the reply came in which the Government in Istanbul instructed Mehmed Ata Bey to arrest the mufti and many other Moslems, all of whom were suspected of taking the most active part in the events of last March; they were to be sent into exile. During the night the number of arrests reached to about sixty. On the same night, the mufti and others were immediately deported after their arrests. Haci Akif Aga, one of the important local notables and a leader of the revolt, however, offered a successful resistance to the gendarmes who came to arrest him. His resistance publicised the arrests, and the citizens immediately organised for the release of the prisoners. The morning after the arrests, a large crowd of furious Moslems surrounded the Governor's residence, demanding the return of the exiles. The Governor escaped to a private house, but was captured and kept prisoner in the Ibrahim Pasa Mosque. Later that same day, the


outraged mob seized the Chief of Police, and beat him to death despite the fact that he was accompanied by a military guard. Shortly afterwards, his son was killed in much the same way. In both incidents, the military had stood by passively.\footnote{F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 25, 1906 [p.135]; and, Mehmet Nusret, Tarihi-i Erzurum Yahut Hemsehrilere Armagan (Istanbul: Ali Sükrü Matbaası, 1922), p.66, quoted in H. Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu, p.31.} The crowd then went in search of the Commander of the Gendarmerie, causing serious damage both to his house and to that of the Chief of Police. Another police officer was later killed. No excesses were committed against private citizens or their property.\footnote{F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 25, 1906 [p.135].}

A group of fifty mounted citizens immediately left Erzurum in search for the exiled leaders of the revolt. The mufti and his companions were brought back to Erzurum that day, the Governor having been compelled under the threat of death to give orders for their return.\footnote{F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 25, 1906 [p.135].} By order of the mufti, the shops were to be reopened on the following day, and the Governor was permitted to return to his residence. Civil authority remained completely in abeyance, the Government Offices being closed and guarded by strong detachments of troops. Throughout the day no action was taken by the troops, who apparently sympathised with the populace.\footnote{Iurii Asotovich Petrosian, Sovyet Gözüyle Jön Türkler, p.236; F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 25, 1906 [p.135]; F.O. 424/210, Consul Shipley To Mr. G. Barclay, Erzerum, October 27, 1906 [p.173]; and, "Les événements d'Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, December 20, 1906, p.1013.} The following day, shops were reopened and business conducted as usual.\footnote{F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 25, 1906 [pp.135-136].}

Mehmed Ata Bey was recalled, and Mustafa Nuri Bey, Governor of Harput, replaced him as the new Governor.\footnote{M. Sabri, "Anadolu Kıyamları", Terakki, No.11 (April 1907), p.5, quoted in H. Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu, p.33, and p.71.} Mustafa Nuri Bey had been the Governor of Mosul until May 1906; then he had been transferred to the Governorships of Diyarbakir and Harput.\footnote{H. Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu, p.34; "Les événements d'Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, November 20, 1906, p.998; and, F.O. 424/210, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, October 30, 1906 [p.139].} Upon his arrival, Mustafa Nuri Bey acted, initially, in a conciliatory
manner. The pessimists' worries that further repressions would immediately follow did not materialize. Under these conditions of relative laxity, the revolutionary movement and propaganda of the Committee of Union and Progress continued vigorously.\footnote{80}

During the duration of the revolt, the military had not intervened on behalf of the Governor. Zeki Pasha, the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, who had previously refused to repress the March revolt, refused again and stood by. The Committee of Union and Progress, which had been giving support to the citizens of Erzurum in their efforts to successfully resist established authority, lost little time in sending, from its headquarters in Paris, a telegram of congratulations to Zeki Pasha for his neutral attitude in the whole affair. In the telegram Zeki Pasha was praised for his integrity as a soldier and for his protection of the weak and the victimized.\footnote{81}

The October Revolt at Erzurum had grown from a revolt against unjust taxation without representation to an outright and widespread rejection of the existing regime. And it was because this resistance against Hamidian absolutism was the most prominent feature of civil disobedience that representatives of constituted authority, especially the Governors and Police Commissioners were consistently the objects of discontent and hatred. The successful refusal to pay taxes and the expulsion of the Governor as well as other figures representing Central Government was viewed with great concern in Istanbul, where it was interpreted as being unique in Turkish history.\footnote{82}

The news of the successful resistance against established authority in Erzurum quickly spread around. In Van it became a topic of daily conversation among the Moslem population of the town. The existing absolutist regime with its unresponsive attitude was

1908, he was appointed senator.

\footnote{80} "Le Mouvement Turc à Erzeroum", \textit{Pro Armenia}, February 5, 1908, p.1231.

\footnote{81} Unnumbered Letter, Dr. Nazim and Dr. Bahaeddin to Zeki Pasha, Paris, November 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, printed in full in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, \textit{Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Itihad ve Terakki}, pp.213-214.

blamed as the cause of the miserable state of affairs.\textsuperscript{83}

Encouraged by the example of Erzurum, revolutionary activity gained momentum in Trabzon. A new revolutionary movement among the Moslems was discovered in late November by the authorities. The revolutionaries were again using the unpopularity of the new taxes as their rallying point. Ishak Bey, who was one of the shiploads of exiles from Istanbul, suspected of conducting revolutionary activity, was arrested as the organizer of the movement at Trabzon. The police found on him documents concerning the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress. It supported suspicions that he was in communication with the Committee of Union and Progress at Paris.\textsuperscript{84} He had been in communication with several other individuals in the adjoining provinces, including a \textit{molla} from Erzurum. Upon the urging of Hamdi Pasha, the Military Commander of Trabzon, Resad Bey, the Governor, informed the authorities in Istanbul. On the orders of the Central Government, Ishak Bey was exiled to Erzincan following his arrest.\textsuperscript{85} The \textit{molla} from Erzurum was one of the individuals most actively engaged in revolutionary agitation in Trabzon. In addition to his active propaganda in the city he was also openly attacking Hamdi Pasha.\textsuperscript{86}

Resad Bey, the Governor, had to be recalled on account of his extreme unpopularity with the citizens of Trabzon. First, Resad Bey was nominated as Governor of Konya. He, however, was a protégé of Tahsin Pasha, Chamberlain, and using his influence, he got himself appointed, instead, to the more prestigious post of the Governor of Edirne.\textsuperscript{87} Ziver Bey, Director of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice, arrived at Trabzon on February 19 as the new Governor.\textsuperscript{88} He continued enforcing the law on new

\textsuperscript{83} "Le mouvement türc", \textit{Pro Armenia}, January 20, 1907, p.1029.
\textsuperscript{84} "Le mouvement türc", \textit{Pro Armenia}, January 5, 1907, p.1021.
\textsuperscript{85} "Le mouvement türc", \textit{Pro Armenia}, January 20, 1907, p.1029.
\textsuperscript{86} "Le mouvement türc", \textit{Pro Armenia}, January 20, 1907, p.1029.
\textsuperscript{87} "A Trébizonde", \textit{Pro Armenia}, May 5, 1907, p.1086.
\textsuperscript{88} F.O. 424/213, Acting Consul H. E. Wilkie Young, Trebizond, June 8, 1907, "Notes on the General Condition of the Vilayet of Trebizond", p.12; and, "A Trébizonde", \textit{Pro Armenia}, May 5, 1907, p.1086.
taxation and started collecting the *sahsi vergi*.\(^{89}\)

By the beginning of 1907, the Committee of Union and Progress had succeeded in establishing seventeen branches both within and outside the country.\(^{90}\) This was achieved within the span of a year's work of extensive organizational effort on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress which had reorganized in March of 1906, with the intent of increasing revolutionary propaganda within Turkey, rather than working solely abroad and trying to discredit the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid in the European public opinion. In a circular which was drawn up on March 25, 1906 and sent to localities where the Committee of Union and Progress had already established local branches, the local leaders were urged to recruit new individuals to work for the revolutionary propaganda inside Turkey. New ciphers were devised for communication between the centre at Paris and the various branches in Turkey. The centre would remain at Paris where the information gathered through various sources on conditions in Turkey would be publicised in two journals of the Committee; *Suray-i Ümmet*, which was published in Turkish, and *Mechveret*, which was published in French.\(^{91}\)

The early contacts had been established with places on the fringes of the Empire; the Caucasian branch, the Bulgarian branch at Kizanlık, the Cretan branch, the Egyptian branch at Cairo, and the Crimean branch.\(^{92}\) From August 1906 onwards, however, efforts

\(^{89}\) "A Trębizonde", *Pro Armenia*, May 5, 1907, p.1086; and, "Lettre de Trębizonde", *Pro Armenia*, November 5, 1907, p.1185.

\(^{90}\) Letter #255, Dr. Bahadıddin Sakir to representatives of Firka-i Ahrar at İzmir, February 3, 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.245-248, quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabi Tarihi*, 2/4, p.56.

\(^{91}\) Letter #1, Dr. B. Server to local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress, Paris, March 25, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, reproduced in full in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılab Tarihimi ve İttihat ve Terakki*, pp.196-199.

\(^{92}\) Letter #2, Dr. Bahadıddin Sakir to the Caucasian branch, Paris, March 26, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.5-6, reproduced in full in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılab Tarihimi ve İttihat ve Terakki*, pp.199-200; Letter #7, Dr. Bahadıddin Sakir to the Bulgarian branch, Paris, April 2, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.12-13, quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabi Tarihi*, 2/4, pp.47-48; Letter #7, Dr. Bahadıddin Sakir to the Cretan branch, Paris, April 20, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the
were made to establish branches within Turkey proper. One of the first attempts was Salonika. In a letter dated August 6, 1906 sent by the headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress, the desire was expressed that a formal branch be formed in that city for a more organised way of destabilising the established regime. In October, the Committee of Union and Progress sent a letter to Bosnia for the establishment of a branch there. In January 1907, the Committee of Union and Progress established contact with individuals at Erzincan. In February of 1907, in addition to the seventeen branches, an additional branch was opened in Izmir. There the citizens had already formed, in February of 1906, an underground organization with the name of Free Party, and had gotten into contact with the Committee of Union and Progress at Paris and expressed their desire to join them. In August, the Üsküb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress was established under the leadership of Mehmed Necib Draga, Galip Pasinler, and Mazhar Bey. Draga, who belonged to a prominent Albanian family of Mitrovice, was a graduate of the Faculty of Political Science in Istanbul. After his graduation he had worked for


93. Letter #55, Dr. Bahadedin Sakir and Dr. Nazim to *Hatib Naci (?) or Hüsrev Bey (?)*, Paris, August 6, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.84-87, quoted in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkilap Tarihimi ve İtihad ve Terakki*, p.207; see also, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilabi Tarihi*, 2/4, p.54.

94. Letter #7, Dr. Nazim and Dr. Bahadedin Sakir to an individual in Bosnia, Paris, October 18, 1906, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, quoted in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkilap Tarihimi ve İtihad ve Terakki*, p.211.

95. Letter #254, Dr. Bahadedin Sakir to an individual at Erzincan, Paris, January 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, cited in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkilap Tarihimi ve İtihad ve Terakki*, p.222.


Government until 1902, when he resigned and started private practice in law in Üsküb. He had also become a member of the Salonica branch of the Committee of Union and Progress after his resignation, and had been actively engaged in revolutionary activity since. 98 The Monastir branch was organised by Enver and Hasan Tosun Beys. 99

THE EVENTS at Erzurum, though outwardly subsided, nevertheless did not cease to lose their momentum in fermenting public opposition to the absolutist regime. What had originally seemed to be a simple outburst of popular feeling against the general mismanagement of affairs had gradually taken the shape of a definite organisation for purposes of opposition to the Government. By early 1907, this organisation, which consisted of certain representatives taken from each of the Moslem neighbourhoods of the city, began holding meetings at which not only the various questions which from time to time arose between the people and the administration were fully discussed, but also the question as to what their attitude should be in case active measures should be decided upon by the Government with regard to the events of the Tax Revolt of October 1906. Although it was unlikely that the Moslem population of Erzurum would attempt an uprising on its own, there were vague rumours in circulation to the effect that some kind of action was being planned with the cooperation of non-Moslems of Erzurum. 100 In January of 1907 they again started their campaign for the dismissal of the Governor by sending telegrams to the Palace. 101

Revolutionary pamphlets printed in Europe had found their way to Erzurum throughout the March and October revolts. These were eagerly read and discussed, and there was little doubt that active revolutionary correspondence was being conducted with

100. F.O. 424/212, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor, Erzerum, February 15, 1907 [p.44]; and, "A Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, March 5, 1907, p.1053.
other disaffected Moslems in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{102} The events in neighbouring Russia and Iran were also constantly discussed among the more educated citizens of the country, and the increasingly frequent references to these events in Russia and Iran indicated that some considered revolution a possible remedy for the current situation in Turkey.\textsuperscript{103}

The Committee of Union and Progress had begun widespread propaganda efforts as far back as 1905. Unionist papers published outside the country were being smuggled into towns and cities within Turkey where they were widely being distributed. Two of these, \textit{Mechveret} and \textit{Suray-i Ümmet}, were specifically revolutionary in tone and message and were instrumental in discrediting the existing regime among the population.\textsuperscript{104}

On February 27, an Erzurum merchant was arrested and charged with the distribution of revolutionary publications. The merchant, Serdarzade Sitki Bey, who was engaged in transport business, had been arrested on the strength of information which the Governor of Van had forwarded to the authorities at Erzurum; namely that a quantity of seditious documents had been discovered hidden in bales of merchandise which Serdarzade Sitki Bey had dispatched.\textsuperscript{105} Serdarzade Sitki Bey was also one of the leaders of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, along with Hüseyin Tosun, Durak Bey, and Hoca Seyfeddin Efendi.\textsuperscript{106} A group of people, acting evidently under the orders of the revolutionary organisation, proceeded to the Government buildings and boldly demanded of the Governor why Serdarzade Sitki Bey had been arrested. Although the Governor seemed to have taken steps to assure the mufti and other leading moslems that the arrest of

\textsuperscript{102} F.O. 424/212, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, February 15, 1907 [p.44].
\textsuperscript{103} F.O. 424/212, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, February 15, 1907 [p.44].
\textsuperscript{104} Cevri [Abdullah Cevdet Karlıdağ?], \textit{Inkilap Niçin ve Nasıl Oldu?} (Kahire: Matbaa-i İctihat, 1909), p.34, quoted in H. Zafer Kars, \textit{Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{105} F.O. 424/212, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Connor, Erzerum, March 5, 1907 [p.47].
this man was absolutely necessary, concerned citizens stood watch over the gates of the city to prevent the deportation of Serdarzade Sitki Bey. Jailors were also warned that the consequences would be very serious if anything happened to the prisoner. 107

Demonstrations ensued, and continued without interruptions from March 5 to March 22, during which there were held several huge ones. The demands were the same: repeal of the unjust taxes. The revolutionary committee in Erzurum sent two telegrams to Istanbul stating their demands, one on March 8, the other, on March 11. As usual, no satisfactory answer was received. On March 15, a crowd estimated at twenty thousand surrounded the Telegraph Office. After direct communication with the Palace, the Sultan, realising the seriousness of the situation, agreed to give concessions. 108 The Government issued a decree to the effect that all exiles in connection with the disorders of March 1906 would be rescinded, and a general amnesty granted for the events of the following October.

In addition, charges against those who had killed the two police commissioners and a policeman, as well as those who had wounded Mehmed Ata Bey, the Governor, during those events would be dropped. However, although the arrears of the last two years would be remitted, the poll tax had to be paid, as no exception could be made for Erzurum. 109 The population was far from pacified. On the contrary, on the following day a large but perfectly orderly delegation of Moslems visited the Governor, and after having stated that they were too poor to pay the taxes in question, begged him to procure their remission from the Government. 110 Further negotiations were made between the citizens and the Palace, and on March 22, the continued and pervasive resistance against both the poll tax and the

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tax on domestic animals forced the Government to totally give in to the demands of the population. Finally, it was announced in the local newspapers of March 25 that an imperial decree had been issued and communicated to the proper departments which abolished the new taxes. Satisfied with the result of their success, citizens of Erzurum returned to normal life.\textsuperscript{111}

In mid-February, the attempt to collect the new taxes created great misery to the population of Mus who had already been heavily in debt to the landlords as well as suffering from famine.\textsuperscript{112} Under these conditions of heavy indebtedness and famine, the attempt to collect new taxes created tremendous burdens on the already lamentable condition of the population at large. Arrests and torture of those arrested persons reached to indescribable levels.\textsuperscript{113}

The new Governor of Van, Ali Bey, arrived the same month to his post. He was an excessively brutal person, who started his policy of repression as soon as he took up office. He also started with vigour collecting the new taxes, causing great misery to all, the Armenians, the Turks, and the Kurds. Since the population was already financially ruined, collection of these new taxes meant confiscating household affects, such as their beds, furniture, utensils, and the like.\textsuperscript{114}

In April matters came to a head at Van when the French and Russian Consulates put their weight on the side of the population and succeeded, momentarily, suspending the collection of the taxes in dispute. This intervention of the Consulates on behalf of the population led the Governor to take action against the Consulates. Gendarmes tried to violate the French Consulate, which was saved from being broken into by the courageous help afforded by the Armenian revolutionaries. The gendarmes also attacked the Russian

\textsuperscript{111} F.O. 424/212, Sir N. O’Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, March 25, 1907 [p.54]; and, H. Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu, p.35.
\textsuperscript{112} "A Moush", Pro Armenia, April 5, 1907, p.1070.
\textsuperscript{113} "La famine", Pro Armenia, April 5, 1907, p.1071.
\textsuperscript{114} "Lettres de Van", Pro Armenia, July 5, 1907, p.1120.
Consulate, where armed fight took place. Both Consulates protested these incidents to the Governor, who replied back by claiming that these incidents had been caused by revolutionaries, and that Government troops were not responsible. Despite this official excuse, he nevertheless put some of the tax collectors and other Government employees who had participated in the raid against the Consulates into prison. After the events, the Governor mobilised troops in an effort to pursue the revolutionaries. He was given military help by Ferid Pasha, the Governor of Bitlis. The military troops, however, under the pretext of searching for the revolutionaries in the countryside, descended on villages and committed acts of violence and extensive pillage, thus devastating an already economically ruined countryside.\footnote{After these acts of terror, the Government started collecting the new taxes, imposing the sahê vergî on people who had already emigrated, been dead or were still infant, and made remaining family members pay on their behalf.\footnote{But this was not the end of general discontent in Anatolia. On March 15, the events at Trabzon culminated in the assassination of Hamdi Pasha, the provincial Military Commander.\footnote{A lieutenant called Naci Bey killed Hamdi Pasha, Commander of the 14th Division of redifs and the Military Governor of Trabzon. On the surface, the cause of the assassination was the refusal of Hamdi Pasha to pay the salaries of the officers and the stipends of the soldiers that had been in arrears for four months.\footnote{In reality, however, Naci Bey, had been instructed to kill the notorious pasha by the Committee of Union and Progress who had condemned him to death for his acts of tyranny against the population of}}}}
Trabzon. 119 The assassin was subsequently captured and condemned to death. His sentence, however, was not immediately carried out. The assassination of Hamdi Pasha had elicited such strong support and general sympathy among the citizens of Trabzon that Istanbul hesitated to order the execution, and the man remained in prison. 120 Finally, on June 28, the order for his public execution took place in the unusual time of four o’clock in the morning in order not to allow him to address the crowd. 121 As a concession to public pressure, however, the Government conceded defeat by appointing Nemlizade Cemal Bey, one of the wealthiest businessmen and landowners in Trabzon -- he owned valuable properties at Samsun, Erzurum and Istanbul, besides owning half of Trabzon -- to the Presidency of the Municipality. 122 Nemlizade Cemal Bey was also a relative of Nemlizade Salim Bey, one of the three leaders of the local revolutionary underground organization of the Committee of Union and Progress at Trabzon. 123

Revolutionary activity of the Committee of Union and Progress in Trabzon continued, without losing its momentum by the execution of one of its members, Naci Bey. In May, having before them the recent examples of the Russian and the Persian constitutional movements, the Committee of Union and Progress put up posters on the walls of the house of the new Governor demanding the declaration of a constitutional

119. K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", Revue du Monde Musulman, p.821. There exists a correspondence between the Committee of Union and Progress headquarters at Paris and the local branch at Trabzon (Letter #267, Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir to the local branch at Trabzon, March 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, cited in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Ittihat ve Terakki, p.223).

120. F.O. 424/213, Acting Consul H. E. Wilkie Young, Trebizond, June 8, 1907, "Notes on the General Condition of the Vilayet of Trebizond", p.12.


122. F.O. 424/213, Acting Consul H. E. Wilkie Young, Trebizond, June 8, 1907, "Notes on the General Condition of the Vilayet of Trebizond", p.12.

123. The other two leaders were Sancakbeyizade Mehmet and Hasan brothers (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.143). Another relative, Nemlizade Haci Osman, was elected deputy for Trabzon in the General Elections of 1912 (Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.277).
regime. The headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress sent a long letter of instructions to the local branch at Trabzon, also urging the local leadership to exploit the existing state of utmost misery and repression, which had resulted in the taking refuge of about sixty thousand Turkish subjects in adjoining Russia; the Committee expressed hope that new recruits could be found from among the refugees who would fight for the liberation of the country from absolutist oppressors. In another letter addressed to the Trabzon branch, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress urged for increased efforts in the direction of conducting propaganda for the establishment of a parliamentary regime in Turkey.

In June a serious event occurred at Bitlis. What precipitated the action of the citizens was the sending of the Mayor of Bitlis to exile by Ferid Pasha. The Mayor of Bitlis had been persistently criticising the actions of the Governor, who had been refusing to pay salaries to officials who did not cooperate fully with his investigations of the revolutionaries, and forcing judges to incriminate individuals without due process of the law. Upon the instigation of the leader of the movement, the citizens demonstrated against Ferid Pasha, the Governor, whom they charged had been acting in such a way as to divide the opposition to the absolutist regime by trying to sow seeds of dissension between the Moslem and the Armenian population of the town. The crowd of about five thousand Moslems marched on the residence of the Governor and demanded his resignation. In the ensuing struggle, the Governor was wounded by one of the demonstrators. He, in turn, killed one of the rioters, upon which the crowd tried to capture him but he escaped, with the help of the royalist troops and took refuge in the military garrison. The crowd,

125. Letter #296, Dr. Bahadedin Sakir to representative of the local branch at Trabzon, Paris, June 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, quoted in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Inzikap Tarihímiz ve İttihat ve Terakki, p.225.
126. Letter #340, Dr. Bahadedin Sakir to the Trabzon branch, temporarily stationed in Caucasia, Paris, August 23, 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, p.382, quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkillabi Tarihi, 2/4, p.124.
encouraged by the indifference of the soldiers, then lynched the Police Chief and wounded several others, whom they dragged through the town.\textsuperscript{128} The revolt at Bitlis had been organized by a group of sheikhs with ties to the Committee of Union and Progress, who, after the riot had occurred, occupied the Telegraph Office and sent a telegram to the Government demanding that the Governor be removed.\textsuperscript{129} The Palace responded with a threat to use military force against the malcontents. To this, the sheikhs answered that they had fifteen thousand Kurds under arms. The Palace thereupon gave orders that the Governor should be removed from his post, and transferred to Erzincan.\textsuperscript{130} The administration was entrusted in the hands of Celal Pasha, the Military Commander, and the Governor of Trabzon was sent to Bitlis to make investigations.\textsuperscript{131} Ferid Pasha, Governor of Bitlis and a well-known Palace spy, was appointed Acting Governor of Trabzon.\textsuperscript{132} Tahir Pasha, Governor of Van, was appointed the new Governor of Bitlis.\textsuperscript{133}

With their recent successful \textit{coup} against the Governor, the sheikhs and notables of Bitlis saw the extent of their power. During their daily consultations on the current situation, they openly boasted that unless the government introduced reforms --not reforms pressed upon it by the European Powers, but reforms such as they considered satisfactory-- they themselves would introduce and carry out reforms of their own. Rumour had it that the notables of Bitlis were acting in close cooperation with their counterparts in Erzurum and Van.\textsuperscript{134} The Turks and the Armenians of Van and Bitlis were acting in unison in their

\textsuperscript{128} K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", p.824; and, "L'expulsion du vali de Bitlis", \textit{Pro Armenia}, July 5, 1907, pp.1117-1118.
\textsuperscript{129} "L'expulsion du Vali de Bitlis", \textit{Pro Armenia}, July 5, 1907, p.1118.
\textsuperscript{130} "L'expulsion du Vali de Bitlis", \textit{Pro Armenia}, July 5, 1907, p.1118.
\textsuperscript{132} "Faveur hamidienn", \textit{Pro Armenia}, August 5, 1907, p.1135.
\textsuperscript{133} "Faveur hamidienn", \textit{Pro Armenia}, August 5, 1907, p.1135; and, "Lettre de Trébizonde", \textit{Pro Armenia}, November 5, 1907, p.1185.
\textsuperscript{134} F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul W. B. Heard to Sir N. O'Conor, Bitlis, August 25, 1907 [p.146].
efforts to overthrow the oppressive absolutist regime. 135

The headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress at Paris was promptly and well informed about the revolts at Bitlis. In a letter to the Damascus branch, the Committee of Union and Progress urged that the local population of Damascus be informed of the tax revolts at Erzurum and Bitlis, and revolutionary propaganda carried out with a view to incite similar revolts at Damascus; the Committee also expressed hope that if a strong organization could be established within Turkey, including Syria, a constitutional revolution like the recent examples of Persia and Russia would also be realised in Turkey. 136

Matters, outwardly at least, continued to be quiet in Erzurum, but the revolutionary organization had lost none of its zeal. The extent to which it had become a recognised institution was shown by the fact that its adherents were now openly spoken of as members of the Committee of Union and Progress. 137 Encouraged by the repeal of the oppressive taxes, the population became so persuaded of the Government’s weakness that it could scarcely conceal its determination not to submit to the imposition of further taxation without its consent, or that of its representatives. The new law on the temettû, or tax on professions and trades, had already been discussed by them in a sense neither favourable nor respectful, and that the belief at Erzurum was very general that, should an attempt be made to apply its provisions to the province, serious trouble would ensue. 138 In the Summer of 1907, encouraged by the hiding of the Palace spies, there started appearing in Erzurum a revolutionary monthly journal, Sabah-ul-Khair, which enjoyed great popularity. 139

136. Letter #313, Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir to representative of the local branch at Damascus, Paris, [June or July 1907], in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, quoted in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, İnkılap Tarihimiz ve İtihad ve Terakki, p.236.
137. F.O. 424/213, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O’Conor, Erzerum, July 1, 1907 [p.30].
138. F.O. 424/213, Consul Shipley to Sir N. O’Conor, Erzerum, July 1, 1907 [p.30].
In the spring of 1907 several members of the Committee of Union and Progress had travelled from Erzurum to Van to begin revolutionary activity there. They published a few lithographed papers which were left about town, but as the Turks in Van were a definite minority, not much was thought of the matter by the authorities then. That April, local members of the Committee of Union and Progress at Van met with members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation to discuss the possibility of joining forces against the absolutist regime. The fedais of the Committee of Union and Progress did everything to court Moslem sympathy and union. They also conducted an active propaganda campaign aimed at the lower ranks of the gendarmerie and the military in the absence of their commanding officers. There was no doubt that this had a considerable effect on the population at large who had started to openly express more or less sympathy with the fedais of the Committee of Union and Progress, condemning Government policy.

In early June the Government authorities at Van discovered munitions in a search. Further search for arms and ammunition in the houses of the Armenians, however, produced no results. During the search a fedai of the Committee of Union and Progress was captured. The Governor of Van quickly took action against the fedais of the Committee of Union and Progress, and sent an armed force in pursuit of the revolutionaries. The Turkish revolutionaries were blocked by Government troops and a fight took place. A thousand Turkish revolutionaries armed with two cannons fought against the Government troops for a whole day, after which the Government troops temporarily retreated. Government troops had not only been unmotivated for the simple reason that they had received no stipends for months but they had also been outnumbered by the joint forces of the Turkish and Armenian revolutionaries. No longer able to rely on his troops, the Governor found himself powerless against the Armenian revolutionaries and

140. F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor, Van, August 4, 1907 [p.113].
141. F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor, Van, August 4, 1907 [p.113].
fedais of the Committee of Union and Progress. Acting in concert with the Turkish revolutionaries, members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation immediately sent the Governor letters which threatened that if he did not stop military action against the revolutionaries, he would be assassinated; his other choice was to resign. A threat from the Committee of Union and Progress also indicated that the same fate which had befallen the Governor of Bitlis could easily be his. According to information received by the British Consul at Van, an attempt was to be made to assassinate the Governor within ten days. Indeed, Ali Bey, the Governor of Van, was assassinated shortly afterwards by the Armenian revolutionaries, while he was on his way to Istanbul.

In August, the various revolutionary groups in Van met to discuss the prospects of an armed uprising against the Government in conjunction with the Committee of Union and Progress. There were incredible accounts of open propaganda carried out by the fedais. They were also said to hold their own Courts of Justice, publish their own newspapers, and be in constant communication with the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Turkish revolutionaries distributed in Van a political programme --published in Erzurum by the revolutionary monthly journal, Sabah-ul-Khair, and smuggled into the town-- criticising the existing despicable state of affairs, and stating their demands. As usual, the repeal of the sahşi vergi constituted the rallying point of the revolutionaries. The programme, however, was extremely interesting and important in that it addressed issues broader than unjust taxation. It demanded the declaration of the Constitution and the establishment of a constitutional regime with a Parliament composed without any distinction of race or religion. It proposed that the representative Government would work justly for the interests of the people. The programme also included the formation of a

143. F.O. 424/213, Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 20, 1907 [p.112].
144. F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor, Van, August 4, 1907 [p.114].
145. F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor, Van, August 4, 1907 [p.114].
146. "Exécution", Pro Armenia, October 5, 1907, p.1166.
147. F.O. 424/213, Vice-Consul W. B. Heard to Sir N. O'Conor, Bitlis, August 25, 1907 [p.147].
juridical system independent of Government interference. There was an additional point in
the programme which called for the formation of Provincial Councils, members of whom
would be elected without making any distinction as to religion or race, and that these
Councils would control provincial budgets.¹⁴⁸ These propaganda efforts of the
revolutionary groups with ties to the Committee of Union and Progress were quite
successful. By the end of October, the Moslem population of Van had been won over to the
side of the revolutionaries.¹⁴⁹

During the summer months of 1907 there was increased revolutionary activity in
Erzurum. The revolutionaries had started publishing their monthly journal, Sabah-ul-
Khair, in which they expressed their aspirations for a constitutional regime. The
distribution of revolutionary brochures and pamphlets was energetically carried out. The
revolutionary committee also agitated for the recall of Mustafa Nuri Bey, the Governor. In
September, during the Ramazan, citizens met at nights in cafes and houses where they
fervently discussed courses of action they would take against established authority. Secret
agents collected information, eavesdropping conversations at the cafes and mosques. These
information were being sent to Istanbul by Mustafa Nuri Bey who wrote that the province
was infested with revolutionaries who were in constant communication with the Committee
of Union and Progress headquarters at Paris. He informed that demonstrations were being
organised with the knowledge and approval of the Committee of Union and Progress and
that the military was tried to be won over by the revolutionaries.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the
headquarters of the Committee was sending Erzurum instructions from Paris for the
organisation of revolutionary activity, and recommending armed resistance if
necessary.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸. Printed in Sabah-ul-Khair and reproduced in full in "La Fédération révolutionnaire turque",
Pro Armenia, December 5, 1907, p.1197.
¹⁵⁰. "Le Mouvement Turc à Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, February 5, 1908, p.1231.
¹⁵¹. Letter #354, Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir to local representative of the Committee at Erzurum, Paris,
October 15, 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.463-
The revolutionaries pressed for the dismissal of Mustafa Nuri Bey. In late September they succeeded in forcing Mustafa Nuri Bey to resign and leave Erzurum. They also opposed, unsuccessfully, the appointment of Abdul Vehab Pasha to the Governorship. The new Governor of Erzurum, Abdul Vehab Pasha took command on October 22. Just before his arrival, the citizens of Erzurum had sent telegrams to the Palace complaining about the unjust acts of Ali Bey, the Acting Governor, who had insisted on collecting taxes, and protesting about the cruelties of other Government officials. They had also stood firm in opposing to the expulsion of the mufti of Erzurum from the city. In November, the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress in Erzurum distributed leaflets which called on Ottoman subjects of all religions to unite in order to overthrow the existing "oppressive and autocratic form of government". Their object was "a constitution --liberty, justice, and a parliament". The document was similar to the ones that had already been distributed earlier in other Anatolian towns and cities. The document was extremely interesting since it was a further example of the spirit which had shown itself in parts of the Anatolian provinces of Turkey in favour of union, irrespective of religious differences, against the existing regime.

Following this call to arms, Abdul Vehab Pasha, who had conducted intensive investigations shortly after his arrival to the Governorship, arrested some fifty to sixty people and charged them with revolutionary agitation. Among those arrested were Seyfullah Efendi, a wealthy and prominent lawyer; Haci Sevket, an ulema known for his liberal views; Faruk Bey, a former army contractor; Durak Bey, a member of the Erzurum

464. quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkilabi Tarihi, 2/4, pp.81-82.
152. "Le Mouvement Turc à Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, February 5, 1908, p.1231.
Municipality; *Uzun* Osman Efendi, the ex-director of the Erzerum branch of the Ziraat Bankasi; *Haci* Akif Efendi, the mufti of the city; Sheikh Ahmed Efendi, an important exporter of sheep and cattle; and Izzet Efendi, a merchant whose father was said to be the wealthiest person in Erzurum; and, Hüseyin Tosun Bey, an ex-teacher of french in the Military Academy before his escape to Europe to join the revolutionary movement. All were alleged to be members of the Committee of Union and Progress. Numerous documents were found in possession of Seyfullah Efendi, which spoke of the Constitution and establishment of a Parliament. Later, the number of arrests would reach ninety-two; eighty of those charged were prominent merchants and other wealthy notables of the city. All in all, one hundred and seventy people were arrested in connection with the revolt. The revolt could be crushed only after the arrests of the leaders of the movement, and the repression of the population with additional troops shipped to Erzurum by the Government. Hearing reports that police were torturing the accused and that two of these had died as a result of torture, the women of Erzurum, about one hundred, organised a protest and talked with the consuls of foreign powers in Erzurum, an event which led to the release of eighty prisoners and the cessation of all torture.


159. *"Le Mouvement révolutionnaire turc", Pro Armenia*, January 5, 1908, p.1218.


162. "*Les Musulmans contre Hamid*, *Pro Armenia*, December 20, 1907, p.1205.

163. "*Le Mouvement turc*, *Pro Armenia*, February 5, 1908, p.1229; and. K.-J. Basmadjian, "*Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure*", p.822.
summary trials that ended on February 10, 1908, ninety of the accused were brought before the Court; eight of the defendants were given capital punishment, and eighteen, life. The remainder were given sentences of several years. Among those who were given life imprisonment were Seyfullah Efendi, Faruk Bey, Haci Aki Efendi, Hafiz Ali Efendi, Durak Bey, and Tahsin Efendi.

In October, the Committee of Union and Progress had sent from Paris a letter to be delivered to Zeki Pasha, requesting his help in organising a branch of the Committee within the Fourth Army Corps. The headquarters had also expressed hope that Committee newspapers and pamphlets would be regularly distributed in the region. As had happened the year before, Zeki Pasha was once again uncooperative with the authorities at Erzurum in repressing the November revolt. Thus, the Government decided to send those troops who had failed to suppress the revolt to Baghdad, replacing the Erzurum garrison with troops coming from Trabzon.

In October, authorities in Izmir arrested several individuals suspected of being revolutionaries on the strength of information supplied by spies working for the Government. The authorities also discovered thirty kilograms of dynamite and one hundred and fifty kilograms of ammunition and gun powder on board a ship arriving at Izmir. The issue of collecting the new taxes was also creating problems. Since the new taxes hurt the population, among whom the Armenians were primary sufferers, there was

164. Iuri Ashotovich Petrosian, Sovyet Gözüyle Jön Türkler, p.239; Mehmet Nusret, Tarihçe-i Erzurum Yahut Hemsehrilere Armagan (Istanbul: Ali Sükrü Ma'baasi, 1922), p.70, quoted in H. Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu, p.39; K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", p.822; and, "Le procès d'Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, March 20, 1908, p.1254. Those who were given capital punishment were of the artisan class who had been found directly guilty in the killing of the Police Chief, son of the Police Chief, and several other policemen during the events of October 1906 ("Le procès d'Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, March 20, 1908, p.1254).

165. "Le procès d'Erzeroum", Pro Armenia, March 20, 1908, p.1254
166. Letter #398, Dr. Bahadidin Sakir to an officer in the Fourth Army Corps, Paris, October 1907, in Register #1 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, reproduced in full in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Inklap Tarihimi ve Ittihad ve Terakki, pp.239-240.
continual resentment in the Izmir region. Increased revolutionary propaganda that coincided with the regular festivities for the celebration of the anniversary of the accession of Abdülhamid to the throne precipitated large scale police operation mid-October in which many houses in and around Izmir, mostly Armenian, were searched and people arrested.\textsuperscript{170} In November, news reached Istanbul that in many localities in the province of Aydin --economically and otherwise the most important province in western Anatolia--people refused to pay taxes, putting forward similar demands and objections as their compatriots in eastern Anatolia. The spread of tax revolts to western Anatolia alarmed the Government which preoccupied the Cabinet with this issue on its November 10 meeting.\textsuperscript{171} In December, tax revolts had spread to localities as south as Mugla in the Aegean region. There, the population, who were, by and large, Moslems, refused to pay the taxes and marched \textit{en masse} to the Government Building. The crowd could be kept at bay only by the employment of the police force. The arrests of several of the organisers of the demonstration, however, flared up the crowd, who demanded the immediate release of the prisoners. It was clear that the citizens of Mugla had been motivated by the example of similar tax revolts that had taken place recently at Aydin, Konya, and Ankara.\textsuperscript{172}

In Aleppo, a serious food riot took place in late October. There, the hungry crowd of Moslem men and women attacked on bakeries and stores of cereal wholesalers, pillaging these places. Immediately all shops, \textit{khans}, cafes, and restaurants were closed down. The crowd of about two hundred men attacked the departing freight train carrying cereal to the port at Beirut. Another crowd, consisting of about three hundred women, marched on the residence of the Governor, Nazim Pasha. Neither the police nor the gendarmes dared intervene to disperse the protesting women. Later, soldiers were called in to restore law and order. In the ensuing fight many were wounded.\textsuperscript{173} The incident at Aleppo had also

\begin{itemize}
\item[170.] "A Smyrne", \textit{Pro Armenia}, December 5, 1907. p.1199.
\item[172.] "Violences et pillages", \textit{Pro Armenia}, January 20, 1908. p.1222.
\item[173.] "La famine", \textit{Pro Armenia}, November 20, 1907, p.1189; and, "L'Émeute de Halep", \textit{Pro
repercussions at Beirut. There, the crowd attacked a freight train loaded with cereals, and pillaged the contents. Order was restored by the authorities, wounding many of the rioters. 174 As in other revolts and acts of civil disobedience, the Committee of Union and Progress was in constant touch with the local leadership of the revolts at Beirut. In a letter sent to the local branch at Beirut, the headquarters at Paris encouraged revolutionaries in Beirut by giving them information that the Committee of Union and Progress had extensive networks in Macedonia, and Anatolia, especially in Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, and Trabzon, and expressed the necessity for armed insurrection to bring about the fall of the absolutist regime. 175

More serious events, however, took place in Diyarbakir, again in November. There, citizens revolted against the continuing assaults and plunders of the troops under Ibrahim Pasha's command. Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurdish chief and commander of the infamous Hamidian troops, had been kept in power by the absolutist regime despite continual representations by the population for his dismissal. In November his troops, amounting to sixteen thousand men, surrounded Diyarbakir. Fearing that plunder of the city was imminent, citizens took precautionary measures by closing shops and businesses. 176 The leaders of the movement against the Government in Diyarbakir were notables of the city; Cemil Pasazade Mustafa Bey, Haci Circis Aga, Abdulkadir Bey, Faik Bey, Nessi Efendi, Pirincizade Arif Efendi, and several others. 177 The citizens seized both the local Government Offices and the Telegraph Office, from where they sent telegrams to

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*Armenia*, December 20, 1907, p.1206.


175. Letter #443, Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir to the representative of the Committee of Union and Progress at Beirut, Paris, December 8[?], 1907, in Register #2 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.30-31, quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk Inkişabı Tarihi*, 2/4, p.143.


the Palace demanding the dismissal of the Governor as well as the suppression of Ibrahim Pasha.\textsuperscript{178} In the meantime, Fehmi Bey, the Governor of Diyarbakir, escaped arrest by taking refuge in a foreign Consulate.\textsuperscript{179} The citizens of Diyarbakir occupied the Telegraph Office for eleven days, protecting it from being taken over by Governmental authorities with a militia force of four hundred. In the end, the Government in Istanbul yielded to the demands of the citizens and promised to investigate the misdeeds of Ibrahim Pasha and recall the Governor. Quiet was restored only after these promises of the Government.\textsuperscript{180} Mahmud Arif Pasha, Governor of Erzincan, was appointed interim Governor until the arrival of Mustafa Bey, the Governor of Mosul, to take up the post.\textsuperscript{181}

The special envoy, General Talat Pasha, sent from Istanbul for the ostensible reason of investigating the improper acts of Ibrahim Pasha, however, turned his attention to the organisers of the revolt.\textsuperscript{182} The Government arrested Mehmeh Abd-ul-Fazil, a dervish, on whom was found documents clearly linking him to the revolutionary movement. Refusing to give any information to the special envoy, he was sent to Istanbul for a thorough questioning, where he died under torture, without giving away any compromising information. Many other suspects were exiled to Tripoli.\textsuperscript{183} According to information provided by Talat Pasha, the Government found leaders of the revolt at Diyarbakir, notables Pirincioglu Arif, Cezirelioglu Aziz and his brother, Haci Ibrahim, and Haci Circisoglu Gani, guilty. Yet, in a telegram sent to Diyarbakir on March 30, 1908, the Government admitted defeat by stating that the Imperial clemency had been extended to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{179}{"Les troubles", \textit{Pro Armenia}, December 5, 1907, p.1198.}
\footnotetext{180}{K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", pp.822-823; and, F.O. 424/213, Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, November 26, 1907 [p.190]. See also, F.O. 424/213, Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey, Pera, November 26, 1907 [p.219].}
\footnotetext{181}{"Les troubles", \textit{Pro Armenia}, December 5, 1907, p.1198.}
\footnotetext{182}{"Les troubles", \textit{Pro Armenia}, December 5, 1907, p.1198; and, K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", p.822.}
\footnotetext{183}{K.-J. Basmadjian, "Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Asie Mineure", p.822.}
\end{footnotes}
these people, especially in view of the fact that Ibrahim Pasha was exonerated of all charges. 184

By the early months of 1908, popular dissatisfaction with the existing regime had grown to such proportions that various forms of civil disobedience had become commonplace in almost any town of consequence not only in Anatolia proper and Macedonia but also in areas which were considered to be at the fringes of the Empire. Administrative authority had been seriously shaken by constant revolutionary agitation and demonstrations against representatives of public authority. Although demonstrations were seemingly locally organised there was little doubt that there was extensive coordination and cooperation with the other areas through the network of the Committee of Union and Progress, which, although had its headquarters in Paris, nevertheless had managed to organise in almost all of the most important towns in the Empire. Thus, although individual events were sometimes triggered by local dissatisfaction, there was nothing haphazard about the way the demonstrations were organised or the demands made on the central government. Starting with the demand for the repeal of unjust taxation and removal of corrupt officials in early 1906, public demonstrations grew out to be expressions of general dissatisfaction with the existing regime, and towards the end of 1907 and the beginning of 1908, specific demands including the establishment of a constitutional regime with an elected parliament and a radical change in the way the country was run were made.

Gaining strength by these widespread revolts against established authority in almost every town in the Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress increased its efforts in bringing an end to the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid. It was at this juncture and under these circumstances that the formal cooperation between the Unionists and the Armenian revolutionaries concluded with the unequivocal demand for the revolutionary change of

184. F.O. 424/215, Vice-Consul Heard to Mr. G. Barclay, Diyarbekir, April 8, 1908 [p.109A].
government in Turkey in the closing days of 1907. The Unionists were now confident that they should and could destroy the established regime, through armed resistance and bloodshed if necessary, and build a new one in its stead. The call for a liberal democratic regime was stronger than ever in the Spring of 1908.

What made the task of the revolutionaries easier during the last months of the old regime was the spread of disaffection among the soldiers in the army, and the increasing frequency of acts of military disobedience, which contributed to the further weakening of governmental authority in the provinces. The repressive capacity of the absolutist regime was growing weaker and weaker by the week in the months before the final destruction of the old regime in July of 1908. The following chapter deals with the disaffection among the rank and file of the army which was instrumental in giving the final blow in bringing down the absolutist rule. By neutralising the repressive capability of the regime, military disobedience and, finally, revolt freed the revolutionaries from worrying about being suppressed by the authorities and set them free of any restraint.
Chapter 3

THE REVOLUTION OF JULY 23, 1908

The Revolution of 1908 was a totally popular movement in which not only the overwhelming majority of the civilian population desirous of a fundamental change in the existing regime but also the rank and file of the military affected by the Unionist propaganda participated. In the preceding chapter, it is argued that there was organised resistance among the civilian population, mainly in the form of tax revolts, prior to the summer months of 1908. These revolts shook the established regime to its foundations; "law and order" became tremendously difficult to maintain in the provinces.

The events that eventually led to the Revolution as well as the immensely favourable reaction it was accorded by the population constitute the bulk of the present chapter. As in the case with the tax revolts in the provinces, there is nothing known about what happened in Istanbul during the years preceding the Revolution. Turkish historians' disinterestedness with popular movements explains, in part, the total lack of information on revolutionary activity and general condition in the capital. Therefore, in the first part, the situation in the capital during 1907 throughout the summer months of 1908 is given to the extent that past can be reconstructed where public memory is totally blank.

The unrest within the rank and file of the military is another topic which also remains unexplored in Turkish historiography. When the role of the military is discussed relative to the events that culminated in the Revolution of 1908, it is always assumed that the military unrest was geographically restricted to Macedonia and that it was the high ranking officers who were instrumental in bringing about the fall of the regime. None of these two presuppositions reflect reality.
Military unrest among the rank and file was prevalent among the troops of almost all army corps, whether they were stationed in Anatolia or Macedonia. Although documentary evidence is extremely scarce to establish definite links between Unionist revolutionary agitation among the troops and military disobedience to the regime during 1906 and 1907, by 1908, revolutionary activity carried on by the Unionists within the rank and file becomes an accomplished fact. Part of the propaganda was carried on by Unionists, such as Dr. Nazim Bey, who were outsiders to the army. The bulk of the work, however, was carried out by low ranking Unionist officers. The existence of revolutionary officers and the role they played in the Revolution has always been interpreted as proof that the movement was directed by the military. Yet, in all cases of agitation within the military, control was fully in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress, and officers only obeyed the orders of the Committee headquarters where strategies of action were planned.

In the third and final section of the chapter, the popular uprising in Macedonia is described. Although military aspects of the uprising were extremely important from a strategic point of view, it was the civilian aspect of the uprising that gave the movement its revolutionary character. At every town in Macedonia, the civilian revolutionary committees headed by Unionists took the matters in their own hands, liberated the Macedonian provinces of the absolutist regime, and declared the establishment of the constitutional regime before the government in Istanbul succumbed to the demands of the Unionists. Spontaneous public rejoicings in the many towns of central Macedonia and Anatolia, as well as in the capital, are further proofs of the popular character of the revolution.

The task of the revolutionaries were relatively easier among the civilian population in the provinces. There was, to be sure, surveillance of revolutionary activity by palace spies and other government agents. Yet, it was nowhere close to the situation in Istanbul, where security was kept very tight, and, therefore, maintaining correspondence with the revolutionaries at Paris or in the provinces was very difficult throughout 1906.
Consequently, little happened in Istanbul, the capital of the Empire. The continual disturbances in the provincial towns all over Anatolia and Macedonia, however, crippled the repressive power of the state by the end of the year. Beginning with 1907, Istanbul, too, became a centre where popular protests surfaced, which the state seemed unable to keep under control. Throughout 1907, Istanbul was fraught with dissatisfaction with the absolutist regime. Accordingly, the Committee of Union and Progress stepped up its revolutionary propaganda campaign in the capital.

During the first week of January, revolutionary posters appeared on walls at Beyoglu and at several public buildings. These posters denounced the existing form of government, called for a fundamental change, and continued to appear despite police surveillance of the affected areas of Beyoglu and Pangalı. As the Government could not intercept and inspect mail coming through the foreign post offices in Istanbul, the propaganda was sent in from Switzerland, Paris and London.¹ The political police force was therefore strengthened in order to deal with the increased revolutionary activity, and towards the end of the month, police arrested thirty-two individuals suspected of being Unionist revolutionaries who had posted revolutionary posters on the walls of buildings at Beyoglu and Pangalı.²

Already, on January 10, several detachments of cavalry and infantry had descended on Ortaköy, a suburb of Istanbul, in pursuit of Armenian revolutionaries who, according to the Embassy in London, had recently left that city for Istanbul.³

On January 24, the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Germany formally protested the activities of Fehim Pasha, the head of the secret service. In a note they handed to the Turkish Government, they demanded his punishment for having arbitrarily confiscated merchandise destined for Hamburg. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German

¹ "Le mouvement turc", Pro Armenia, January 20, 1907, p.1029.
² "Le mouvement turc", Pro Armenia, January 20, 1907, p.1029; and, "Le mouvement turc", Pro Armenia, February 5, 1907, p.1038.
³ "Le mouvement turc", Pro Armenia, January 20, 1907, p.1029.
Ambassador, was particularly insistent on his removal from office.  

An inquiry was opened and, on February 8, he was found guilty and was immediately relieved of his post. On February 15, at a long meeting with the German Ambassador, Tevfik Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the Sultan was personally convinced of Fehim Pasha's criminal conduct, and the following day, the Government announced his exile to Bursa. Amidst much pomp and circumstance, he arrived at Bursa on February 28, where he continued to show the same ruthless and illegal behavior which had made him infamous in Istanbul. In early March, he broke into the house of a Tobacco Regie inspector, an Armenian who carried an Italian passport. As the French Consulate represented the Italians in Bursa, the French Consul vigorously protested his irresponsible behaviour. Meanwhile, in Istanbul further personnel changes in the secret service followed: To the great satisfaction of the population, some one hundred and thirty-eight secret service agents were fired and sent immediately into exile.

Disturbances, however, continued in the capital. On February 20, a seditious proclamation issued by Prince Sabahaddin, leader of the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative, a group based in Paris which opposed the Hamidian regime, was distributed in the mosques of Istanbul. On the evening of March 30, a bomb exploded on the Grand Rue de Pera, one of the city's busiest streets, killing two people and seriously injuring several others. Evidently, the bomb was intended for a well known palace spy, Anton Bey Keuchesoglou, who had gotten rich by his spying activities. In mid-May, Halil Zeki Bey, translator for Bulgaria's commercial agency at Üsküb, was arrested on

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10. "La bombe de Pera", Pro Armenia, April 5, 1907, pp.1071-1072.
charges of carrying revolutionary Unionist propaganda, and in early July, tipped off by a Cairo informant, the secret service agents arrested a large number of Armenians in Istanbul, also on charges of revolutionary activity.11 Later that month, the exiled Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, son of Midhat Pasha, urged Anatolians to follow the example of Russia, Persia and Japan, where people had successfully instituted constitutional government. Calls for Justice and Liberty were once more repeated.12 On July 15, another bomb went off in front of the United States Ambassador's summer residence at Yeniköy, a suburb on the Bosphorus. The bomb, which was delivered in a package, was apparently meant for Necib Melhame, who lived nearby. The failed attempt, nevertheless, aroused protest against its intended victim.13

September witnessed public protests in Istanbul against the high price of flour and bread which many felt were the result of municipal taxes. The protests took a distinctly anti-government form, and on September 10, the Council of Ministers decided to somewhat lower the price of bread in an attempt to end the crisis. This move, however, neither satisfied the bakers nor the general population.14

The following month, two military pashas, suspected of anti-government activity, were exiled; they were charged with having connections with the Committee of Union and Progress. One of them, Aziz Pasha, was a high ranking bureaucrat at the Ministry of War. The other, Hayreddin Pasha, was professor of medicine at the Military School of Medicine.15 In mid-December, authorities in Istanbul discovered an organisation working for the establishment of a constitutional regime. The organisation, it was stated, had distributed revolutionary propaganda throughout the Anatolian and European provinces of

13. "La bombe de Yenikuey", Pro Armenia, July 20, 1907, p.1126. See also, "La bombe de Yenikuey", Pro Armenia, August 5, 1907, p.1135.
the Empire. 16

THE MOST important revolutionary groups working towards the overthrow of the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid were the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Until 1907, however, their activities were carried out by and large independent of each other. By the end of 1907, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation came to realise that its separate struggle against the Hamidian regime had been fruitless, this despite its success in preparing and organising the Armenian population of eastern Turkey for material change through radical political transformation. In its general assembly meeting, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation decided that, as they shared the same goals, both Armenian and Turkish revolutionaries would work to undo the current regime. The general assembly then agreed to hold a joint congress with the Turkish side in order to decide on a common course of action. 17 As such, in November, representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation appealed to both the Committee of Union and Progress, headed by Ahmed Riza Bey, and the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative, headed by Prince Sabahaddin. 18 On its part, the Committee of Union and Progress discussed the matter of cooperation with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and decided to join forces with them. On November 30, the headquarters at Paris sent a report to the Salonica branch informing them of the nature and objectives of such a cooperation with the Armenians. 19 Preliminary meetings were held in Paris with two delegates from each organisation attending. After extensive negotiations, they accepted the idea of holding a joint congress to discuss the details of the common course of action. 20

19. Letter #442-444, Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir to Salonica Branch, Paris, November 30, 1907, in Register #2 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, excerpted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, pp.128-129.
20. Representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress were Dr. Bahaeddin Sakir and Hüsrev
Nonetheless, the Committee of Union and Progress had serious objections to concerted action with Prince Sabahaddin's group. Over the years, the Committee of Union and Progress had grown to distrust the Prince; not only did it disapprove of his agenda to capture power through a coup d'état, as opposed to a genuine revolution, but members of his group had betrayed the Unionists and their plans to Abdülhamid's political police, causing serious damage to the organisation. By the end of 1907, however, the political situation had become so acute that immediate and united action was of the utmost importance. The Committee of Union and Progress set aside its differences, and all three organisations, along with several other smaller groups, held a congress in Paris from December 27 to 29. After three days of deliberations, the results of the congress were made public.

The revolutionaries declared that Abdülhamid's thirty year rule had brought great depravity not only to his Christian subjects, but to Moslems as well. His reign was criticised for its brutality, its repression of political liberties, as well as for its detrimental effects on commerce, efficient administration, and education.

In particular, the current system was accused of corruption, collecting taxes only for the benefit of the Palace and perpetuation of the absolutist regime. The practice of denying passports to merchants was also criticised; it not only denied individuals the right to travel, but also, many argued, had a detrimental effect on the development of commerce

Sami Bey; representatives of the Ottoman League of Private Initiative and Decentralisation were Nihad Resad Belger and Ahmed Fazli Tung (Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, p.234).
23. For the complete text of this declaration, see "Déclaration du Congrès des Partis d'opposition de l'Empire Ottoman, réuni en Europe", *Pro Armenia*, January 5, 1908, pp.1213-1215. For the text in Turkish, see "Osmanlı Muhalifin Firkalari Kongresinin Beyannamesi", in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, pp.238-242. See also, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi*, 2/4, pp.136-139.
and industry. Lack of concern for agricultural development had been the cause of declining agricultural production, not to mention the abject condition of the peasantry, and the current system of concessions, which favoured Palace officials over private individuals in forestry and mining investment, was vehemently opposed. The economic conditions under absolutist rule, its opponents contended, had worsened so much that many people, deprived of the bare essentials, had been left with no choice but emigrate to Europe and the United States.  

Taking all this into account, the revolutionaries agreed to bring an end to the absolutist regime in any way possible and without further delay. They would force Abdülhamid to abdicate, radically change the existing form of government, and to establish a parliamentary regime.

The declaration made its appeal to all citizens without any distinction of race or religion, to landless peasants, who were suffering under unjust taxes and oppressive administrators, to landlords and merchants, who had been denied of developing their businesses due to restrictions and lack of liberties, and, to underfed and unpaid soldiers, who had been forced to fight against their own people. These were urged to accept that the Hamidian regime’s rigidity had made a peaceful solution to their problems impossible. Revolutionary change through radical action was their only option. The congress suggested a number of ways to combat absolutist rule: armed resistance, unarmed resistance in the form of strikes, acts of civil disobedience such as refusing to pay taxes, the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda among troops so as to prevent them from fighting against the


oppressed people and the revolutionaries, and general insurrection.  

On January 26, 1908, Osman Hulusi Bey, a resident of Istanbul, was arrested in Izmir, while leaving the French Post Office there. He was charged with spreading revolutionary propaganda on behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress as were Mehmed Mecid Bey, Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Izmir Province, Cemil Midhat Bey, censor for the Greek journals, and Abdurrahman Bey, an employee in the Land Registry Office, also arrested.  

MORE critical than civil disobedience, however, was military unrest. And the Committee of Union and Progress had been waging a continuous propaganda campaign among the rank and file, exploiting the already existing unrest within the troops mainly due to arrears in soldiers’ payments. There was a host of propagandists who had been scattered all over the Empire doing their dangerous work, urging the civil population to embarrass the Government by a refusal to pay taxes and to prepare for a general uprising, and persuading the military rank and file of the righteousness of the movement, and obtaining their promise not to fight against their own countrymen when ordered to do so.  

The troops were scattered over the country in small bodies, and many opportunities presented themselves of instilling, slowly and carefully, sentiments of discontent, and hope. So as to obtain easy access to houses and barracks, Turkish revolutionaries disguised themselves as hawkers of cheap jewelry and ribbons, or a: the peripatetic sutlers who sold sherbet and little comforts to the Turkish soldier. In their packs were always concealed the revolutionary tracts that were to spread the propaganda. One well-known Unionist officer for long kept a barber’s shop in Baghdad, and inoculated his customers with revolutionary doctrines. Dr. Nazim

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Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, for instance, wandered over Anatolia beginning with the spring of 1907, sometimes disguised as a hodja, in order to win over the Anatolian regiments.31

On February 9, 1907 roughly twenty-four hundred troops from Yemen were unloaded at Alexandretta, and discharged from active service. On February 12, these troops presented themselves en masse to the sub-governor, and demanded food and their two years' worth of wages, openly threatening to pillage the town if they did not receive prompt satisfaction. Two top ranking government officials were taken prisoner in the Telegraph Office. They were released only after a telegram from Istanbul informed them that the Governor of Aleppo had been instructed to immediately pay their back wages.32

In late May, eighty soldiers, mostly Albanians, assembled at Üsküb's main mosque, also protesting their pay arrears. The authorities promised the mutineed troops that they would be paid shortly. When news of this latest mutiny reached Istanbul, the Government placed military units at every important intersection in the capital. An envoy from Üsküb who had been refused an audience with the Sultan, visited, instead, the Russian Embassy and outlined the troops' grievances.33 On June 2, news reached the capital that the Üsküb mutiny was over. Again, the troops had been paid.34

Later that month, troops in Izmir occupied the city's telegraph office, again demanding their back pay. Realising the gravity of the situation the Government immediately dispatched ten thousand liras to Izmir.35 Nonetheless, another mutiny took place in Izmir in early June. This time, troops returning from duty at Tripoli demanded their back pay. The Governor immediately made arrangements with the Ottoman Bank for their

32. F.O. 424/212, Vice-Consul Catoni to Sir N. O'Conor, Alexandretta, February 13, 1907 [p.42]; and, "Troupes mutinées", Pro Armenia, April 5, 1907, p.1071.
34. "Les Musulmans contre Hamid", Pro Armenia, June 20, 1907, p.1109.
payment.  

That summer, in Hodeidah, Yemen, Turkish troops, protesting the bad conditions in the garrison, mutineed. In Beirut, too, there had been military discontent.

In September, military disturbances also took place in the eastern provinces of Anatolia where troops at Bitlis, Erzurum, Trabzon, Mamuret-al-Aziz, and Diyarbekir had openly revolted. This time, violence ensued and the suppression of the revolts by troops of the Fourth Army Corps at Erzincan had cost many lives. The mutinees in Erzurum and Diyarbekir hinged, again, on the issue of the nonpayment of wages.

In late September, there was another military revolt in the province of Monastir, this time at Florina, where troops had, again, not been paid. These occupied the local telegraph office and sent telegrams both to the Commander of the Third Army Corps at Salonica and to the authorities in Istanbul.

By mid-November, military unrest spread to Istanbul, where some of the troops stationed at the Ministry of War mutineed and refused to enter their barracks until their demands were satisfied. A few days later, the mutiny spread to the Military School. And by mid-January 1908, military dissatisfaction in the capital had spread to the navy: fifteen hundred sailors in the military docks mutineed, also demanding immediate wage payment.

In March, the Ministry of Finance sent money to Edime, where two cavalry regiments of the Second Army Corps had mutineed, and to other localities in Anatolia. On March 26, the government applied to the Ottoman Bank for an immediate loan of ten

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42. "Contre Hamid", *Pro Armenia*, December 5, 1907, p.1198.
thousand liras to be paid to the mutineed cavalry regiments in Edirne. 44

MEANWHILE, Unionists smuggled in subversive revolutionary literature through Greece, and foreign post offices in the Empire. The Italian Gendarmerie Adjoint in Macedonia, reporting on this activity, maintained that the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress resembled those of the Greek and Bulgarian Macedonian revolutionary committees. 45 Although the report exaggerated the extent of cooperation between Greek and Turkish revolutionaries, it was nevertheless true that in 1907 the Greek Macedonian Committee had helped Dr. Nazim Bey move from Paris to Salonica, and that Dr. Zannas, one of the Greek revolutionaries working underground in Salonica, had offered his house as safe meeting place for such Unionist revolutionaries as Rahmi Evranos, Talat, and Cavid Beys. 46

By February of 1908 Unionist activity in Salonica was more or less public knowledge, and an official government document reported that several liberal-minded army officers were directly involved with the Committee of Union and Progress. 47 A peculiarly success had been achieved at the Salonica post office. The staff was won over to a man, and, in addition, the entourage of the Inspector-General was engaged in the game. Newspapers and other literature were forwarded from abroad, under cover to Abdülhamid himself, and duly handed over to the real consignees. 48

In the spring of 1908, the Unionists decided to approach both the Greek

44. "Contre Hamid", Pro Armenia, April 5, 1908, p.1263.
47. No.122/14, Consul Kanellopoulos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Salonica, February 14, 1908, cited in A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.89. See also, Duru's memoirs, where he writes that several cafés on Olympus Square and on the quay were publicly known to be Unionists' gathering places (Kazım Nami Duru, "Itihat ve Terakki" Hâtıralarım, pp.19-20).
Government, through its consulates in Macedonia, and the local Greek community. The Committee of Union and Progress hoped that it might secure their cooperation in and support for the revolution, just as the Armenians had done. In April, Rahmi Evranos, one of the underground leaders of the Committee at Salonica, approached the Greek Consul at Salonica, Kanellopoulos. He spoke of the need for political change and urged Greek cooperation. In May, the Salonica branch of the Committee of Union and Progress reiterated these suggestions, this time to the leadership of the local Greek community. Similar contacts and offers for joint action against absolutist monarchy were made by Unionists representatives in Elassona, Kozani, Monastir, and Serres.

On June 27, Baltazzis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent a circular to all consulates in Macedonia, stating that the Unionists would only bring disaster to the Greek minority in Turkey. He also argued that the fall of absolutist monarchy would cause critical complications, which, in turn, would be harmful to Greek national interests. Finally, he urged the Greek element to remain loyal to established authority. In other words, Greeks living under Turkish rule in Macedonia and in Anatolia should not be involved with the revolutionary schemes of the Unionists.

Greek mistrust was due primarily to the fear that any political change would endanger the Ecumenical Patriarchate's privileges and, by extension, the Greek minority's living conditions. Greek preference for the continuation of the absolutist regime was therefore not as much a matter of principle as it was a matter of necessity.

49. No.619, Consul Kanellopoulos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Salonica, July 6, 1908, cited in A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.89.
50. No.425, Kanellopoulos to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Salonica, May 12, 1908, cited in A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.90.
51. No.148, Consul Enyalis to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Elassona, April 18, 1908; No.575, Consul Dimaras to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Monastir, May 27, 1908; and, No.237, Consul Sachtouris to the Greek Foreign Ministry, Serres, June 1, 1908, cited in A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.90.
52. Circular No.3006, Baltazzis to Consular Authorities, Athens, June 27, 1908, cited in A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.93.
53. A. J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between the Greeks and the Young Turks", p.94.
The situation with the Albanian community was different. As it was distinctly to their advantage, Albanian nationalists readily agreed to cooperate with the Committee of Union and Progress. Moreover, cooperation was made easier by the fact that both groups opposed to any scheme in Macedonia which would lead to the secession of territory to foreign powers. Previously, the meeting between the Russian Tsar and the British King at Reval in June along with their declaration of a reform programme for Macedonia, had signalled an immediate danger to Turkish territorial integrity. If the Sultan accepted the Reval plan, the revolutionaries would gain a powerful weapon against him; if he rejected it, the European Powers would no doubt intervene. In either case, reform would lead to an autonomous Macedonia, and ultimately to its loss. Because an autonomous Macedonia would jeopardize Albanian national unity, the Albanians could only reject any proposal in that direction. On the other hand, they would find a constitutional regime to their advantage. They trusted that the Unionists would do a better job in defending "national" interests than monarchists; besides, they could better organise and work for Albanian independence under a liberal democratic regime than under absolutist monarchy. Therefore, when matters came to a head in early Summer of 1908, they gave their full support to the Unionists, revolting against the established regime which was likely to negotiate the dismemberment of Macedonia. 54

THE FIRST and foremost task before the Committee of Union and Progress was to bring around to the cause the Third Army Corps. The disaffection of these troops had in places manifested itself in open mutiny, and the incompetence and corruption of some of the officers of superior rank, who were indebted to Palace favouritism for their position, filled both the junior officers and the rank and file with an everincreasing disgust. 55 By degrees,

a number of the young officers were affiliated to the Committee, and received instructions to win over the rank and file. The fact that the troops were moving about in small bodies, hunting down bands in the countryside, rendered this proceeding the more easy; because, while engaging in this work, regimental officers, unrestrained by the supervision of the superiors, could give political instruction to the men, and were able to hold meetings among themselves without attracting the attention of spies.\footnote{56} 

By the beginning of July 1908, reports of dissent and revolt within the Third Army Corps stationed at Salonica and throughout Macedonia were a daily affair. The dissemination of revolutionary propaganda among junior officers, and the repeated revolts among the troops led to even further disobedience and revolt. It was at this juncture that the news of the Reval meeting from June 9 to June 11 between the King of England and the Tsar of Russia on the future of Macedonia became the rallying point for the Unionists' attempt to overthrow the absolutist regime.\footnote{57} 

The "reform" plans of the European Powers concerning the future of Macedonian provinces of the Empire had entered a definite stage by the end of 1907. In early March of 1908, the British Government presented a scheme whereby the three provinces comprising Macedonia, \textit{i.e.}, Kosovo, Monastir, and Salonica, were to be governed by a single Governor-General whose term of office would be decided beforehand, and his dismissal be effected only after the approval of the European Powers. The Governor-General would be assisted by foreign military officers and a European gendarmerie. In order to keep the Governor-General out of Palace influence, it was proposed that his salary should be paid out of the Macedonian budget which was to be under the supervision of the Powers. The

\footnote{56} E. F. Knight, \textit{The Awakening of Turkey}, pp.124-125; and, Charles Roden Buxton, \textit{Turkey in Revolution}, pp.50-51. 

ultimate aim of this scheme was to sever Macedonian ties to the central government, and, eventually, declare these provinces autonomous—and, perhaps, independent. The Russian Government expressed its doubts as to the clauses of the proposed scheme, stating that the proposition of the appointment of an "autonomous" Governor-General in Macedonia might be objectionable to the Hamidian regime; however, the Russian side expressed its willingness to work out the details.

The Paris headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress took immediate action. After its deliberations, it sent a report to the Salonica branch on March 16, informing its members of the nature of the proposed scheme, and the course of action the Committee decided on. The Salonica branch was instructed to make propaganda among the Moslem population of these provinces, and bring about the occupation of telegraph offices in cities and towns in the region from where telegrams were to be sent to the central government in Istanbul protesting the European schemes of appointing an autonomous Governor-General. In addition, Paris headquarters urged the Salonica branch to make representations to the consulates of the European Powers, informing them of the firm resolution of the Committee of Union and Progress to protect the territorial integrity of the Empire against foreign encroachment.

By May, it had become known to the Unionists that the British Government had decided to withdraw from the "Concert of Europe", which had failed in dealing with the question of reforms in Macedonia, and that England and Russia were going to work together to introduce a most drastic scheme of reform, which would include the suppression of all the bands in Macedonia by means of flying columns of troops. This

60. Letter #557/12, Paris Headquarters to Salonica Branch, Paris, March 16, 1908, in Register #2 of the correspondence of the Committee of Union and Progress, pp.225-229. excerpted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, pp.152-156.
intended cooperation of England and Russia greatly alarmed the Committee of Union and Progress. Such intervention, in the opinion of its leaders, would necessarily lead to the disintegration of the Empire, and to an immediate foreign domination of Macedonia that would make it impossible for the Committee to carry on the revolutionary movement. 61

The Committee of Union and Progress therefore held secret meetings in Salonica in May. It was decided that it had become necessary for the Committee to reveal to the European Powers the fact of its real existence and great influence, and also to explain to those Powers that the Committee alone could bring peace to Macedonia, and that for various reasons it would be better that Europe should abandon all these futile schemes of reform and leave Macedonia to work out her own salvation. A manifesto to that effect was drawn up and dispatched to each of the European governments. 62

On June 10, a week or so after the Committee had issued this manifesto, King Edward VII met the Tsar at Reval, and shortly afterwards the details of the Anglo-Russian scheme for the pacification and better rule of Macedonia was communicated to the other European Powers. This forced the hands of the Unionists; it was realised that the blow for liberty must be struck soon, or it would be too late. 63

The events, which immediately grew into a full-blown revolution, began with Major Niyazi's insurrection at Resna. Niyazi Bey, an Albanian, belonged to a land-owning Moslem family in Resna, a little town between Monastir and Ohrida. Niyazi had entered the army as a very young man and greatly distinguished himself in the Greek war. Then he was sent to his own country, and for five years preceding the Revolution he was employed with his chasseur battalion in pursuing the various brigand bands in the mountains. The Committee of Union and Progress, exercising its powerful underground influence,

61. E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, pp.129-130.
62. Excerpts from the text of this manifesto can be found in E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, pp.131-133. The manifesto sent to the Russian Consulate at Monastir is excerpted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, pp.156-159. The full text of the manifesto is printed in Ahmed Niyazi, Balkanlarda Bir Gerillaci: Hürriyet Kahramanı Resneli Niyazi Bey'in Anıları, pp.64-76.
obtained for him promotion to the rank of Major and his appointment to headquarters at Resna, the place in which he could serve the cause best. 64 Because, Niyazi had been initiated into the secret Committee of Union and Progress by his fellow officer, Enver Bey, and throughout his operations against the bands, was acting as the instrument of the Committee rather than that of the absolutist Government. 65

At Niyazi's advice, some Moslem inhabitants of the district had formed themselves into a band which was under the direction of the Committee of Union and Progress. 66 On July 3, under the pretext of pursuing a band of brigands, Major Niyazi, who was in command of the Resna Battalion, led a hundred soldiers and a group of many of the local officials up onto the mountains to join a group of some eight hundred armed civilians. 67 Among the local officials there were Hoca Cemal Efendi, the mayor of Resna, Tahsin Efendi, the Tax Commissioner, Tahir Efendi, the Police Commissioner, and the teacher of the Serbian school at Resna. 68 They took with them 600 TLs from the Regimental Chest, seventy rifles, and fifteen boxes of ammunition. 69 They were shortly joined by two other officers as well as officials and inhabitants from the Presba district. 70 General Sensi

65. E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, pp.147-148; and, Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle İlan Edildiğine Dair Vesikalari", p.107n.
66. E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, p.149.

For his account of how the events developed that culminated in the decision for revolt and the arrangements made, see Ahmed Niyazi, Balkanlarda Bir Gerillaci: Hürriyet Kahramani Resneli Niyazi Bey'in Anıları, pp.79-94.
68. Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle Ilan Edildiğine Dair Vesikalari", p.108.

70. Consul W. J. Heathcote to Mr. G. Barclay, Monastir, July 5, 1908, and Colonel H. Conyers
Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Kossovo province, who had been sent from Mitrovitza to Monastir with two battalions to deal with Niyazi’s group, was assassinated by Atif Kamcıl, a Unionist revolutionary, on July 7, shortly before he left Monastir in pursuit of the rebels. 71

Major Niyazi immediately moved into Albanian territory. He visited Dibër, Elbasan, Korçë, and Ohrid. His plan was to expel Hamidian officials and create an Albanian militia for the preservation of order in the liberated areas. The Albanian committee of Korçë had decided to lend its support from the start. At the request of the Committee of Union and Progress, it called on the guerillas in the mountains around Korçë to unite with the insurgent Turkish companies. The Albanian committee of Ohrid followed suit. 72

While most Albanians supported the Committee of Union and Progress, the Unionists still had to reach an understanding with the bulk of the pro-Sultan Moslem population northeast of Kossovo. One of the Unionist appeals, distributed in early July, called on them to unite with the Committee of Union and Progress, in its demand for the establishment of a constitutional regime and the opening of Parliament, which would free the people from unbearable taxation and the injustice of the courts. Hoping to incite them


against the absolutist regime, the appeal denounced the governors as unjust and corrupt and accused ministers and pashas of treason. The proclamation also targeted Austria-Hungary and Italy. Having infiltrated Albania, the proclamation said, these powers had opened churches in order to convert the local population to Christianity. Their sole object, however, was the partition of Albania. In order to further incite the population, the proclamation stated that European powers dominated Macedonia and that the absolutist Government of Abdülhamid either through inaction or design, was responsible.  

In the spring of 1908, Austria-Hungary had begun surveys for the construction of a railway line, and rumours were rife that the Hamidian Government planned to sell the peasant lands to the Austrian Government for the project. The announcement of the Reval agreement only increased the tension. In the first days of July, thousands of armed peasants from the regions of Prizren, Gjakovë, Prishtnë, and Vucitnë assembled at Ferizovich and protested. Young officers of the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress then tried to bring the Ferizovich gathering under their control.

On July 7, the chief of the gendarmerie at Üsküb, Galib Pasinler, arrived with instructions from Mahmut Sevket Pasha, Governor of Kossovo, to disperse the gathering. He was, however, a member of the Üsküb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, and before his departure he had informed Unionist leaders at Salonica of his mission. The Committee instructed him to persuade the Albanians at Ferizovich to support the Unionist declaration for the establishment of a constitutional regime. As soon as he arrived at Ferizovich, Galib Pasinler dispatched emissaries and sent telegrams to the various towns of the Kosovo province in the hopes of increasing the number of representatives and the size of the demonstration, and in the following days, the group

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75. Galib Pasinler, "Galip Pasa'nın Hatıraları", Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, 2/6 (July 1966), pp.8-9; and, Süleyman Külçe, Firzovik Toplantisi ve Mesrutiyet, p.53.
76. Süleyman Külçe, Firzovik Toplantisi ve Mesrutiyet, p.15.
reached approximately thirty thousand armed men. 77 Necib Draga, an Albanian member of
the Üsküb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, also arrived at Ferizovich,
making every effort to discredit the absolutist regime and win over the Albanians to the
cause of the Unionists. 78 Delegates of the Committee of Union and Progress --all of them
prominent figures of Üsküb-- present at the assembly declared that the Constitution was the
only way to prevent the execution of the Reval project and to put an end to European
meddling in Turkish affairs. The gathering at Ferizovich turned into a show of support for
the Unionists, who then sent a telegram to Abdülhamid calling for the reinstitution of
the Constitution of 1876 and the opening of Parliament. 79

On July 12, the British Consul in Monastir was assured by a citizen that the
movements was in no way directed against Christians. This citizen, of some distinction and
a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, expressed anxiety that both the
Committee's strength and popular backing might be misrepresented in Europe. 80 He
handed the Consul a printed declaration which bore the seal of the Committee of Union and
Progress, and stated that its object was to secure the reestablishment of the Constitution of
1876. It accused the existing regime of despotism, favouritism, and corruption, and added
that fundamental change could only come about through a constitutional regime. 81

On July 14, Lieutenant-General Sükrü Pasha from Istanbul met with the officers of

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77. Galib Pasinler, "Galip Pasa'nin Hatıraları", Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, 2/6 (July 1966), p.10;
Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, p.187; Süleyman Külcü, Firizovik Toplantısı ve
78. Süleyman Külcü, Firizovik Toplantısı ve Mesruiyet, p.57; and, Mufid Semsi, al-Hakk-u
Ya'lu ve la Yu'la Aleyh (İstanbul: Bahriye Matbaası, 1919), p.27, quoted in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk
İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, p.199.
79. Galib Pasinler, "Galip Pasa'nin Hatıraları", Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, 2/6 (July 1966), pp.10-
11; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/4, pp.197-200; Süleyman Külcü, Firizovik Toplantısı ve
80. Consul W. J. Heathcote to Mr. G. Barclay, Monastir, July 13, 1908, in "Correspondence
81. For the main points of this declaration see Consul W. J. Heathcote to Mr. G. Barclay,
Monastir, July 13, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey. 1908",
Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.10. See also, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 1, pp.219-
220.
the Üsküb garrison in an effort to determine where these officers stood in relation to the Government. He urged his audience to remain loyal to the Sultan, highlighting the Sultan's continual efforts in the interests of his people. Speaking on behalf of his fellow officers, a lieutenant answered that their aim was also the prosperity of the nation, and he declared that they would never take action against anyone who had genuinely tried to further its interests. The notables of the town were also assembled and addressed in similar terms. Salih Bey, ex-President of the Municipality, responded by saying that, as they were all working for the good of the nation, the Sultan would doubtless sanction their aims. Having achieved nothing tangible, Sükrü Pasha left that same day for Istanbul.82 The officers of the garrison later expelled Lieutenant-General Hüseyin Remzi Pasha, the new commander of the Üsküb military zone, for his refusal to join the Committee of Union and Progress. He had only just arrived from Salonica on July 17. He had been invited by the officers to join the Committee of Union and Progress and he had refused. Whereupon, he was given the choice of remaining at Üsküb confined to his house, and practically a prisoner, or of leaving at once for Salonica. As he chose the latter alternative he was escorted to the railway station. His departure was witnessed by a large crowd of officers and civilians. As the train started, the band played the usual salute, interspersed with the customary three cheers for the Sultan. Then followed applause and cries of "Liberty" and "We are united", raised by the officers and civilians on the platform.83

Three more assasinations took place in connection with the revolutionary movement in Macedonia on July 19. A major and a lieutenant were murdered at Monastir, and four persons, said to be officers in disguise, fatally shot a colonel at Serres.84

84. Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 21, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.7.
During all this time, the Palace was not inactive. After the asassination of Semsi Pasha, who had been sent to Monastir to crush the military rebellion, the Government decided to proceed slowly, and attempted to win over the insurgents with promises of promotion, decorations, and gifts. The rebellion, which had infected all of the Third Army Corps by mid-July, spread to the Second Army Corps at Edirne and to troops stationed at Izmir. On July 10, thirty-eight officers of the Third Army Corps were arrested, brought to Istanbul, and imprisoned. On July 16, an amnesty was proclaimed for all the Unionist officers in Macedonia. In the meantime, two divisions were ordered from Izmir; upon their arrival at Salonica, they were immediately dispatched to Monastir to crush the revolution. But the agents of the Committee of Union and Progress were with them, and the work of the propaganda, carried on intermittently for months past, was brought to a head on the journey. The troops refused to fire. One battalion declared that it would fight against despotism, but not against the revolutionaries. 85 Salih Münir Pasha, the Ambassador in Paris, was dispatched to Athens and Belgrade with the object of stirring up Greek and Serbian bands to attack the revolutionaries. 86 Orders were issued to the authorities in Macedonia to hinder the foreign consuls from obtaining news. Force proving ineffective, conciliation was tried on a magnificent scale. Five hundred and fifty officers received promotion in a single day. The thirty-eight imprisoned officers were pardoned and released. 87

Finally, in the evident hope of checking the movement, particularly in the military, the Sultan dismissed both the Grand Vezier and the Commander-in-Chief, or Serasker. Avlonyali Ferid Pasha's resignation was accepted on July 23, and the Grand Vezierate was promptly offered to Kamil Pasha. Kamil Pasha, however, would accept only under conditions which the Sultan found unacceptable, and Abdülhamid appointed Mehmed Said

Pasha. Ömer Rüsdü Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, was appointed Minister of War in place of Riza Pasha. The official newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi, announced that Ömer Rüsdü Pasha's title would, however, not be Commander-in-Chief, but Minister of War. This change on title was apparently designed to convey the impression that the highly centralised absolutist monarchy had been replaced by a system of ministerial responsibility.

Meanwhile, the Committee of Union and Progress had taken the initiative and proclaimed the constitutional regime in several liberated towns in Macedonia. The decision to proclaim the constitutional regime on July 23 had been taken at a meeting of the Unionists on the night of July 22 in Salonica under the presidency of Manyasizade Refik Bey. On the morning of July 23, the British Consulate at Monastir was informed that in a few hours, the Committee of Union and Progress would proclaim the Constitution, and that the Unionists were firmly determined to maintain order and avoid senseless bloodshed. Marshall Osman Pasha, military commander in Monastir, was taken prisoner and carried off without violence, and the proclamation ceremony took place on the parade ground in front of the local military barracks at about noon. Major Niyazi publicly inaugurated the


89. Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 23, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.8.

90. For the text of the telegram, dated Monastir, July 23, 1908, sent by the Committee of Union and Progress to Abdülhamid, informing him of the declaration of the constitutional regime, see Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle İlan Edildigine Dair Vesikalar", p.122.


reign of liberty and fraternity under the Constitution in the presence of the Governor, various officials, tens and thousands of Christians and Moslems, and the town's entire garrison as well as those battalions which had been sent from Izmir to suppress revolutionary activity. Mollahs offered up prayers; representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress made speeches along with the Greek bishop; and the proceedings ended with an artillery salute. 93 During the afternoon, the prisons were opened and all prisoners, political or otherwise, Moslem or Christian, were released. 94 Celebrations lasted for three days and three nights, all creeds making processions and demonstrations of fraternity. Shouts were raised for the prosperity of the country, but the usual cry, "Long live the Sultan!" was little heard. 95

Midhat Sükrü Bleda, a prominent Unionist, had arrived at Serres with the decision of the Salonica headquarters to proclaim the new regime on July 23. 96 Many members of the Committee of Union and Progress as well as Resid Pasha, the governor of Serres, sent telegrams to the Palace, informing the Sultan that unless he declared the constitutional regime they would not recognise him as the ruler of the Empire. 97 Without waiting for answer from the Palace, however, a proclamation similar to the one at Monastir was made

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93. Ahmed Niyazi. Balkanlarda Bir Gerillaci: Hürriyet Kahramani Resneli Niyazi Bey'in Anıları, pp.224-225; Consul W. J. Heathcote to Mr. G. Barclay, Monastir, July 23, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.30-31; Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 24, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.10-11; and, E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, p.219. See also the telegram sent by the Military Commander of Monastir, Cemal Bey, to the Ministry of War, July 10, 1342/July 23, 1908, reproduced in full in Ismail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle İlan Edildiğine Dair Vesikalara", pp.120-121.


at Serres, accompanied by the speeches from the the highest civil authority as well as the chief preacher of the town. A group of twenty officers and a hundred troops who had marched from Serres also proclaimed the Constitution at Drama. On each occasion, telegrams were sent to the Sultan asking him to recognize the Constitution within two days. The Constitution was proclaimed in Resna, Dibra and other towns in Macedonia and Albania at the same hour that it was proclaimed in Monastir.

Publicly, news of Niyazi's Monastir insurrection reached Salonica early on the morning of July 23, and was quickly disseminated all over Macedonia, the Committee of Union and Progress having complete control over telegraphic communication. In the name of the Committee of Union and Progress, Major Enver Bey announced the establishment of the constitutional regime by a telegram sent on July 23 to the European press. At Salonica, proclamations in favour of liberty and constitutional government were placarded all over the city; leaflets were distributed on the streets and shops, all of this without any serious attempt being made by the police to interfere. From noon until dusk a number of officers and civilians, including Turks, Jews, Greeks, and even a Bulgarian,


100. E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, pp.219-220; Ahmed Niyazi, Balkanlarda Bir Gerillaci: Hüriyet Kahramani Resneli Niyazi Bey'in Anılı, p.225; and, Ismail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle İlan Edildiğine Dair Vesikalar", p.118.


delivered speeches praising the Constitution from the balconies of hotels, the steps of Government buildings, Municipality and Gendarmerie offices, in front of the Ottoman Bank, and other public places. 103 Nesim Russo, a Jewish clerk attached to the International Financial Commission, delivered a speech in a large cafe on the Olympus Square. 104 These speeches were enthusiastically cheered by crowds of all nationalities. Notably, among the speakers were the President of the Municipality, the President of the Commercial Court, the Director of the Technical School, and the editors of two of the local newspapers. Throughout the evening and into the early hours of the morning, officers and civilians paraded through Salonica on foot or in carriages, waving the flag and the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress, and they were greeted with applause wherever a crowd was gathered. 105

Military and civilian officials in Edirne received the news on July 24 with something less than joy. The following day, two representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress met with the Governor, civil functionaries, the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Corps and other principal military authorities, and made them, considerably against their will, swear fidelity to both the Constitution and the Committee of Union and Progress. Administrative matters were left in the hands of the usual officials, but subject to the supervision of the Unionists. 106

Meanwhile, in Salonica, Hilmi Pasha, Inspector-General, received a telegram from

103. Consul-General Harry H. Lamb to Mr. G. Barclay, Salonica, July 23, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.28-29; Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 24, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.10-11; and, P. Risal, La Ville Convoitée: Salonique, pp.306-308.

104. Consul-General Harry H. Lamb to Mr. G. Barclay, Salonica, July 26, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.42. See also, A. D. Zanna, O Makedonikos Agon: Anamneseis, p.53.


106. Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, July 29, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.28.
Istanbul informing him that the Sultan had decided to accede to the wishes of the people and reconstitute the Parliament. Rumours began to circulate, and a large crowd of about fifteen thousand people proceeded to his residence to receive direct confirmation of the news. At half past nine on the morning of July 24, Hilmi Pasha came out and read the telegram. The telegram concluded with the suggestion that, as the Sultan had granted all their demands, there was no reason for the continued existence of the Committee of Union and Progress. The spokesman for the group replied that it was not the Sultan who had accorded them a concession, but they who had exacted it, and that the maintenance of the Committee of Union and Progress was therefore essential until Parliament was duly constituted. The rest of the day was given up to popular rejoicing. Salonica was dressed in flags, processions paraded the streets, speeches were delivered in every public place, and the populace applauded uproariously on every possible occasion.

There were scenes of intense national rejoicing that astonished European observers. On July 24, 25, and 26, the Bulgarian, Greek, and other leaders of bands, the Albanian brigand chiefs, and all their followings of ferocious outlaws of the hills, on whose heads there had been a price for years, men of different races who, since boyhood, had been burning each other's villages and killing each other's women, flocked into Salonica to submit to the Committee of Union and Progress, to be reconciled to one another and to become the friends of the Turks. Sandansky himself, "the king of the mountains", the most formidable of the Bulgarian leaders of bands, came in, harangued the crowds on liberty, fraternity and justice, and was received with the greatest enthusiasm.

Left with no choice, the Sultan issued a proclamation on July 24 which ordered the

107. Consul-General Harry H. Lamb to Mr. G. Barclay, Salonica, July 24, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, I05, pp.29-30; and, Kazim Nami Duru, "Itihat ve Terakki" Hatıralarım, p.33.
108. E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, p.230; Charles Roden Buxton, Turkey in Revolution, pp.70-71; and, P. Risal, La Ville Convoitée: Salonique, pp.313-315. See also, Kazim Nami Duru, "Itihat ve Terakki" Hatıralarım, pp.33-34.
convocation and election of Parliament in accordance with the Constitution. 109 Thus ended the rule of absolute monarchy in Turkey.

THE SUCCESSFUL overthrow of the absolutist regime and the establishment of constitutional monarchy was celebrated by all classes of people throughout Turkey.

On July 25, all the principal thoroughfares of Istanbul were beflagged and people paraded the streets, brandishing flags. A grandiose demonstration in celebration of the new regime took place that afternoon when about fifty thousand people --Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews-- formed a procession and, led by two bands, proceeded to the Sublime Porte. Talat Bey, a well-known and highly respected lawyer, who walked at the head of the procession, was also the spokesman of a deputation which was received by Said Pasha, the Grand Vezier. Talat Bey handed Said Pasha an address for the Sultan. The deputation subsequently proceeded to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs where it was received by Tevfik Pasha. The procession then left Sublime Porte and went to the Ministry of War, giving loud cheers for liberty, equality, justice, and brotherhood as it passed before all the other Ministries. When it reached the Ministry of War, Marshal Ömer Rüdü Pasha, the new Minister of War, with several high-ranking officers appeared on the front steps of the Ministry building, and Adjutant Major Selim Sirri Tarcan and Kemal Efendi, a lawyer, delivered speeches in which both pointed out that it was the duty of everyone to serve in the army and to sacrifice his life for the Sultan and the cause of liberty. They called upon the Minister of War and the high-ranking officers accompanying him to take a solemn oath that they would loyally serve their country. The Minister and the officers swore that they would faithfully fulfill all their duties. The procession then wended its way to the Sheikh-ul-Islamate when Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, offered up a prayer for the Sultan. The procession then continued its way to the Ministry of Finance at

the entrance of which it was met by the Minister of Finance who, like the Minister of War, took an oath that he would conscientiously carry out his duties. 110

The rejoicings continued on July 26, and in the afternoon groups representing Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian and Jewish communities joined a gathering of about one hundred thousand people in the large square of the Ministry of War in Istanbul. From there, this large crowd marched processionally with banners to the Yildiz Palace where various speeches and pledges of loyalty were made in support of the new regime. 111 Enthusiastic scenes were witnessed all day from both shores of the Bosphorus. Gaily decked steamers, launches and other small craft went up and down the straits crowded with people celebrating the event of the day. The round of cheering came from all directions. Added to this was the constant whistling of the steamers which saluted each other and the people on shore. 112

Later that day, a group of revolutionaries, having already accomplished forcing Abdülhamid grant a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, now proceeded to request that certain members of the Palace staff be removed from office, including the notorious Izzet Pasha and Tahsin Pasha, the Sultan's First Secretary. 113 The group was to present these requests to the Sultan through the intermediary of the Sheik-ul-Islam. After much insistence, the deputation was finally permitted to meet with the Sultan. The latter refused to accede to the request for the removal of the members of his staff. 114

112 "Loyal Demonstrations", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 27, 1908, p.1; and, Mary A. Pocyni, When Turkey was Turkey, p.52.
113 "Imperial Clemency", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 25, 1908, p.1; and, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 27, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.14.
The streets in Beyoglu were crowded on the night of July 26, and cheers for the new regime were to be heard on all sides. In the Petits Champs Gardens there was hardly standing room to be found; several bands continually entertained the people until the early hours of the morning.  

On July 27, a large meeting took place at the Santa Sophia Mosque, after which another deputation proceeded to the Yildiz Palace to renew their request that certain members of the Sultan's staff be removed. Reluctantly but bowing to popular pressure, the Sultan was left with no choice but to dismiss Izzet Pasha and others and send them to exile in Damascus. Similarly, yielding to pressure, general amnesty was immediately put into effect; by July 26, all political prisoners in Istanbul had been released. The amnesty also extended to all political fugitives and refugees who could now return home in perfect security. According to statistics, the Armenian refugees abroad numbered around eighty thousand, and the Moslem exiles to sixty thousand.

On July 27 and 29, members of the Committee of Union and Progress and officers of the army addressed the crowds in Istanbul, who swore a religious oath to defend the Constitution even at the cost of their lives.

In August, there were public manifestations of solidarity between the Turkish revolutionaries and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Istanbul. On August 13,


120. Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, July 29, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", *Parliamentary Papers*, 1909, 105, p.16.
mass was celebrated in the Armenian church of the Holy Trinity at Balik Pazari in memory of Moslems who shed their blood in the cause of liberty and justice. At the conclusion of the service, Mgr. Tourian, locum tenens of the Armenian Patriarchate, delivered a patriotic address which was received with cheers. Later, the congregation, which included a large number of Turks, proceeded to Taksim, where they joined with the huge crowd which had already gathered there to celebrate the constitutional regime and the Turkish-Armenian brotherhood. 121

On July 27, Edirne was gaily decorated and illuminated at night on the occasion of the beginning of a new era of constitutional rule. During the day, speeches were delivered before the residence of the Military Commander and before the Prefecture. 122 On July 28, six officers representing the Third Army Corps at Salonica arrived at Edirne by special train. They were met at the station by the civilian and military officials of Edirne, headed by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Corps, both of whom had been compelled to proceed to the station without escort. Soldiers and civilians alike greeted the officers with the utmost enthusiasm. The Governor and Commander-in-Chief were both immediately informed that they were relieved of their posts by order of the Committee of Union and Progress. People raised shouts of "Long live the Sultan!"; but one of the officers asked them to stop cheering for the Sultan, as the Constitution had not been granted by the Sultan, but was result of the efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress. The officers then proceeded to pull down all pro-Sultan inscriptions of, many of which were displayed at the station. Later, several of the officers delivered inflammatory speeches against absolutist monarchy, and a procession then marched from the station to the Municipality buildings where a meeting was held and further speeches were made. The Governor and the Commander-in-Chief were then asked to swear allegiance to the

Constitution, after which they were informed that they were both reinstated, though at greatly reduced salaries. The actual reins of government, however, were to be assumed by members of the Committee of Union and Progress. 123

On July 29, a crowd of Greeks from the area around Drama organised a large demonstration of solidarity with the Committee of Union and Progress which took place in front of the Government buildings. The crowd was estimated at fifteen thousand and the proceedings were nothing short of joyful. 124

In Konya, the Governor, several public officials, as well as those exiles who represented the Committee of Union and Progress accorded the two regiments which had been sent to Izmir and Salonica to suppress the revolution, but had actually joined it, a hero's welcome. Among other outbursts of satisfaction, there was much cheering for liberty. In Salonica, the Committee of Union and Progress had given each soldier a flag bearing either the inscription "Liberty and Progress" or "The Nation and Liberty". These flags were now waving from every rifle. 125 It was reported that the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress had practically become the master of the town, and that the Governor, who was in a very weak position, sought their advice and support. 126

123. "La Constitution à Andrinople", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 3, 1908, p.3; and Consul L. L. R. Samson to Mr. G. Barclay, Adrianople, July 29, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.33-35. On August 1, however, a violent reaction set in against the strong feeling that had found expression on the evening of July 28. The troops rose against their officers, declaring that they believed it was their aim to kill or dethrone the Sultan. The officers were powerless, and a panic ensued in Edirne, but no disturbance or bad consequences took place, although members of the Committee of Union and Progress disappeared, and for a time no authority existed. A deputation composed of some 350 of their number went to Istanbul and appeared before the Sultan. After this reception by the Sultan the soldiers grew calmer and expressed themselves as not opposed to the Constitution, though loyal to the Sultan. The Committee of Union and Progress published a statement in the press at large that this was also their attitude, and this declaration restored calm (Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 4, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.43).


125. F.O. 424/216, Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Konia, August 1, 1908 [p.92].

126. F.O. 424/216, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908 [p.111]. See also, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 4, 1908, in "Correspondence
At Bursa, the rejoicing was indescribable, all creeds and nationalities being represented. A crowd estimated at twenty-five thousand demonstrated in front of the British Vice-Consulate, where the Assistant Military Commandant made a speech praising England, its Constitution and its Sovereign. The Governor refused to take the oath to the Constitution, and was given two days to reconsider his decision. If he still refused, he was to be turned out and sent off to Istanbul. Fehim Pasha, a corrupt pasha who had been exiled to Bursa on representations of the German Embassy, was lynched as was trying to escape from Bursa.

The Committee of Union and Progress had also gained control of Kayseri, Mersin and Adana. In Adana, there were enthusiastic demonstrations in support of the new regime, where the Governor, Bahri Pasha, was dismissed from office. In Mersin the Constitution was received with incredulity and joy. There, too, the Sub-Governor was dismissed from office. The news announcing the establishment of the constitutional regime was received with great enthusiasm by the inhabitants of Alexandretta and its district, where people viewed the Constitution as a new era of prosperity for trade, industry, and all commercial and financial enterprises.

The usual demonstrations took place at Samsun. The members of the Central Government were forced to swear loyalty to the Constitution, though one of the judges was exempted from this on account of his impartiality and impeccable record. On the other hand, the President of the Municipality had the opposite reputation, and was made to take

Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.44.
127. "Lettre de Brousse", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 1, 1908, p.3; "Lettre de Brousse", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 6, 1908, p.3; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 4, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.44.
128. "Lettre d'Adana", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 13, 1908, p.3; and, F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908 [p.111].
129. F.O. 424/216, Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther, Konia, August 1, 1908 [p.92].
130. "Lettre de Mersine", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 27, 1908, p.3.
131. F.O. 424/216, Acting Vice-Consul Catoni to Consul Longworth, Alexandretta, August 18, 1908 [p.124].
the oath three times. Several members of the Committee of Union and Progress arrived at Samsun where they made speeches to large audiences, reiterating the fact that the constitution had been wrung from the Sultan, and not freely granted.

At Trabzon, after a period of scepticism, general satisfaction prevailed, though no immediate demonstrations were held. Monarchist Government officials were clearly displeased. The Governor, the notorious Ferid Pasha, who in 1907 had been so unceremoniously handled and dismissed by the populace of Bitlis and consequently appointed to Trabzon, was forced to resign.

Whereas doubt and disbelief had checked any initial display of feeling at Harput, at last the news arrived by mail, and a semi-official celebration took place on August 7. Crowds of Moslems and Christians paraded the town, which was illuminated and decorated. All political exiles detained at Harput were immediately set free, and Armenian political prisoners, members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, were also liberated. The news produced a kind of stupor in the town.

At Izmir there was the usual period of disbelief followed by an outbreak of the greatest enthusiasm, when all barriers of race and creed were forgotten. A service was held in the chief mosque, attended by the Governor and all his officials. On July 26, streets were so crowded with enthusiastic supporters of the new regime that circulation was practically impossible. Bands stationed all over the town alternately played the Hamidiye March, the Marseillaise, and the British and Hellenic Anthems; Izmir, decorated

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133. F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 26, 1908 [p.122].
throughout, presented a most festive aspect. The military commander, a member of the Council of Administration, together with two other people who were suspected of being Palace spies were placed under arrest. The military commander, who had fled to Konya, was promptly arrested on charges of embezzlement and brought back to Izmir, only to be demoted and dismissed along with other officials, and sent to Salonica. Among the other officials who were demoted and shipped off to Salonica were the Chiefs of Police of Izmir and Aydin, the Chief of the Gendarmerie, the Director of the Telegraph, and the President of the Municipality --all of whom were objects of general dislike. The Governor was also dismissed, and he proceeded to take refuge in the British Consulate. But, hearing that orders had been issued for his arrest and transport to Istanbul, he decided to take flight, and was caught on the coast near Beirut as he was embarking on a small sail boat bound for Cyprus. According to reports, however, there were quite a number of officials of the old regime who had successfully fled by ship to Athens where they had taken refuge. There was some difficulty in liberating the political prisoners, as the criminal prisoners had vowed to kill these if they were not also released. The new authorities promised to review their cases, and they then allowed their hostages to leave.

In Erzurum, political prisoners had been immediately released. The exact number of political prisoners released amounted to ninety-two, sixty of whom were Armenian; thirty-two, Moslem. Eighteen of the latter had received life sentences for their involvement on the disturbances of 1906 and 1907. On August 6, the people organised a magnificent

140. F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908 [p.110].
141. F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908 [p.110].
144. F.O. 424/216, Consul Shipley to Sir Gerard Lowther, Erzurum, August 3, 1908 [p.109]. See also, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 4, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.44.
procession with flags and banners at its head. The procession halted in front of the Armenian Archbishopric and Bishop Saadetian and an officer delivered eloquent speeches dwelling in the revival of the Constitution, and liberty, equality, justice, and fraternity. The speeches closed with frantic cheers. The procession then wended its way amidst scenes of immense enthusiasm to the Catholic and Greek Churches. When it reached the Government Building, the crowd numbered about twenty thousand.\textsuperscript{145} Nonetheless, the population of Erzurum was not totally happy and satisfied. One of the reasons for this was the fact that the majority of the seventy-one prisoners condemned in February of 1908 had not yet been released.\textsuperscript{146} By August 10, they too were released, and only then did general celebrations take place.\textsuperscript{147} Universal satisfaction and relief reportedly prevailed, and the proclamation of the Constitution was eventually greeted with great enthusiasm by Moslems and Christians alike, who paraded the town, raising cheers of liberty and justice.\textsuperscript{148} By August 20, all of the most prominent leaders of the protest movement at Erzurum who had been exiled to Sinop in November 1907, including Seyfullah Efendi, the celebrated lawyer, \textit{Haci Sevket Hoca}, and \textit{Haci Akif Efendi}, returned to the city, where they were given a hero's welcome.\textsuperscript{149}

Taken aback by the proclamation of the Constitution, the Governor of Van hesitated to set the Armenian political prisoners free without further instructions from the Ministry of Justice.\textsuperscript{150} Upon this behaviour, he was summarily dismissed from office, to the general

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146. F.O. 424/216, Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther, Erzerum, August 3, 1908 [p.109].
149. "Lettre d'Erzeroum", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, August 28, 1908, p.3.
\end{flushright}
satisfaction of the province.\textsuperscript{151}

The proclamation was met with astonishment at Diyarbakir. Like some of his colleagues, the Governor hesitated to embrace the new regime, and the local members of the Committee of Union and Progress denounced him and demanded his recall. Except for a few monarchists and reportedly corrupt officials, the people were unanimously and strongly in favour of the movement.\textsuperscript{152}

In contrast to wild rejoicings in many regions of the country, there were certain provinces where the population was divided in its reaction to the establishment of the constitutional regime. In these areas, the population mostly manifested its attitude by being indifferent to the changes that took place with the replacement of the absolutist regime.

One such region was Albania. Here, the reaction of the Albanian community was mixed. In Valona, for example, the proclamation of the Constitution was hailed with the wildest enthusiasm. There were demonstrations and meetings, celebrating the new regime. Christians and Moslems embraced one another in the streets.\textsuperscript{153} At Scutari, however, the Moslem Albanians received the news with indifference. They feared losing their privileges with the Constitution. Afterwards, mainly under pressure from the military authorities, they were forced to celebrate the advent of the new regime.\textsuperscript{154} Albanians of Djakova and Ipek treated with scorn the idea of equality of Christians with Moslems, stating that they would expel judicial authorities if they tried applying rules other than the ones in accordance with the sharia.\textsuperscript{155}

Another region where the fall of the absolutist regime was not particularly welcome

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\textsuperscript{151} F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 26, 1908 [p.121].
\textsuperscript{152} F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, September 1, 1908 [p.126].
\textsuperscript{153} Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1908, KB, Consul at Valona to Foreign Ministry, Valona, July 26, 1908, cited in Basil Kondis, \textit{Greece and Albania, 1908-1914}, p.38.
\textsuperscript{154} Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1908, KT, Consul at Durazzo to Foreign Ministry, Durazzo, August 3, 1908, cited in Basil Kondis, \textit{Greece and Albania, 1908-1914}, p.38.
was the Arab provinces. In provinces such as Mosul, the population did not initially grasp the significance of the political change around them. This was partly due to the relative unfamiliarity of the people with the idea of a unified country based on the principles of justice, equality, and fraternity. Another, and perhaps, a better reason for this was the fact that the Governor, the brother of the notorious monarchist Izzet Pasha, had largely blocked the flow of the active propaganda of the Committee of Union and Progress in these distant areas. The Committee of Union and Progress dealt with this situation by sending telegrams to the larger centres and by dispatching delegates throughout the provinces to explain to the people the true significance of the constitutional movement.156 When the Governor of Mosul attempted to stir up animosity between the Moslems and Christians, the Committee of Union and Progress threatened him with immediate expulsion.157

At Beirut, though Government officials were reserved, the military along with the Moslem and Christian population welcomed the news with jubilance. As elsewhere, the city was decorated and illuminated.158

In Damascus, military officers also celebrated the arrival of liberty and the Constitutional regime.159 Celebrations lasted uninterruptedly from July 31 to August 11. Two constitutional clubs, one civilian, the other military, were founded, and they quickly busied themselves with preparations for the general elections. The administrative affairs of the city were being conducted under the Committee of Union and Progress’ supervision, and several corrupt and incompetent officials were promptly dismissed.160

156. F.O. 424/216, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908 [p.112]. This report is also printed in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.68.
160. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 26, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.73.
THROUGHOUT the last weeks of July, and August, public rejoicings and celebrations of the constitutional regime were the order of the day. Apart from the Arab provinces in the east and the Albanian region in the west, the whole country celebrated the establishment of the liberal regime. During the last years of the absolutist regime, public dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs had reached to heightened levels; therefore, the collapse of absolutism gave the population justified relief from the numerous injustices they had been suffering under it.

Public expression of extreme joy at the destruction of the absolutist regime along with its repressive institutions and restrictions confirms, once again, the popular aspect of the Revolution. Contrary to unfounded allegations of the historians and social scientists that people were totally oblivious to the events of 1908 and that they did not care one way or the other, factual information describing the mood of the population immediately prior to and after the Revolution suggests otherwise. People knew what was at stake, and fully appreciated what the Revolution was all about; suggesting, as conventional historiography does, that they were not conscious of the enormous changes that they themselves had been instrumental in bringing about is an insult of a grand scale.
Chapter 4

THE FALL OF THE OLD AND ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE NEW REGIME

STANDARD accounts of the events that caused the change in the political structure of Turkey on July 24, and what followed afterwards have always either downplayed or totally ignored the importance of the revolutionary character and aspect of this transformation. In academic circles, the notion is still entertained that whatever happened after July 24, happened quite smoothly and without any disruption or upheaval in the state apparatus. Denying the fact that these events constituted a revolution in the fullest sense of the term, historians have not concentrated at all on what happened immediately after the declaration of the Constitution. Disregard for the tremendous upheaval in state apparatus has served as a further justification for the allegation that the whole episode was a "reform" movement from above.

The task of this chapter is to show, with abundant evidence, that the state apparatus was totally disrupted immediately after the Revolution, and that a clean sweep was made in the upper echelons of the civilian and military bureaucracy, which was brought about by the active insistence and vigilance of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress. There was naturally resistance to the wholesale dismissals of prominent pashas of the old regime, who had been accustomed to run the affairs of the country the way they wished without any accountability under the absolutist rule. There was also resistance by the hundreds and thousands of minor officials, who were mostly corrupt and owed their positions to nepotism than to any claim to competency. In the initial stages of the Revolution, during the several months following July 24, the Unionists were strong
enough in effecting these major changes in the state apparatus.

In the face of such abundant evidence of a total overhaul of the old monarchist bureaucracy and replacement of it with a radically different one--to the degree that this was possible under the circumstances where the Committee of Union and Progress did not have total control of government--it will no longer be possible to maintain the fiction that this whole episode was a "reform from above", and that the upper echelons of the civilian and military bureaucracy were executors of these "reforms". No claim can be made for the positive or leading role of the bureaucracy in the establishment of the constitutional regime. Contrary to some accounts given in studies of this period, neither the military nor the civilian bureaucracy was supportive, let alone leading the movement. While none of the high-level bureaucrats were enthusiastic about the proposed changes, some even went as far as actively opposing the declaration of the Constitution.

As it has been tried in this chapter to make it painfully clear, both military and civilian pashas, those who were the trusted statesmen running the absolutist regime, were the first to suffer under the new regime. The revolution that swept the old regime along with its monarchist bureaucratic structure had no sympathy whatsoever with the representatives and pillars of that regime. That their deservedly disgraceful exit from the political and administrative scene following the Revolution has not been told up until now is a further testimony for the persistent efforts of conventional historians to misrepresent events surrounding the regime change in 1908 by ignoring facts of tremendous importance, which shook the whole social system to its foundations and had important bearing on the events that followed. In order to have an understanding of what was at stake in the counter-revolutionary attempts at restoring the old regime in the Spring of 1909 and at later dates, it is crucial to know what really happened immediately after the Revolution.

The Hamidian regime had tried ignoring the tremendous dissatisfaction among the population for as long as it could suppress various revolts with military force. By the
beginning of July, however, the increased frequency of insubordination as well as the inability of the military and civilian authorities to deal with the situation forced the Sultan and the Government to take notice. The Macedonian revolts had caused great concern in the capital where Abdülhamid had summoned both Kamil Pasha and Said Pasha to the Yıldız Palace on July 11, 1908 to have extensive talks with them and find a solution to the crisis. They had both extensive and long experience in Government in the past; however, they were known for their "liberal" views in absolutist circles, which had put them out of political office for quite some time. At this critical hour, though, their supposedly "liberal" outlook was looked upon as a valuable asset to save the absolutist regime with the least damage possible. After reading the joint report these two pashas drew up upon the request of Abdülhamid on the July 11 meeting, the Sultan summoned them again on July 22 to offer them positions in the Government. Upon Kamil Pasha's rejection of the Grand Veziership, but acceptance of position in the new Cabinet as a Minister without portfolio, Abdülhamid appointed, instead, Said Pasha to form the new Cabinet that very same day.

This change in Cabinet was intended to pacify public discontent; it was not at all meant to radically change the way the government was run. The new Cabinet was practically identical to the old one. Cemaleddin Efendi, the monarchist Sheik-ul-Islam for eighteen years, and all the other Cabinet members with the exception of Rıza Pasha, the Minister of War, who was replaced with Ömer Rüsdü Pasha, retained their posts. Kamil Pasha entered the Cabinet as Minister without portfolio.

The most pressing issue this Cabinet faced was the demand for the application of the Constitution and establishment of a parliamentary regime expressed in many

1. İbnüelmin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1060.
2. İbnüelmin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, pp.1060-1061; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, pp.9343-9344.
3. İbnüelmin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1061. Hasan Fehmi Pasha was President of the Council of State; Tevfik Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Memduh Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Zeki Pasha, Head of the Ordnance Department; Mehmed Ziya Pasha, Minister of Finance; Zihni Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Public Works; and Hasim Pasha, Minister of Education (Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, pp.9344-9345).
telegrammes coming to the Palace. In its July 24 meeting of the Cabinet at the Palace, Said Pasha and the rest of the Cabinet, reluctantly, agreed that some sort of promise must be given to the public as to the future form of government; they had come to realise that the situation could not go on indefinitely. What had forced them to grant the Constitution, however, was the fait accompli of the population of Macedonia who had already declared constitutional rule on July 23 in several liberated towns and cities in that region.

Despite the fact that a new regime was established and the Constitution granted, the old monarchist Cabinet still remained in power. This state of affairs caused great uneasiness among the Unionists and the public at large. Said Pasha's immediate act of appointing Hamdi Bey, the sub-prefect of Beyoğlu and a very hated Palace spy, to the important post of the Minister of Police on July 27 totally alienated the public, which had already been skeptical of his sincerity and suspicious of his intentions. Servet-i Fünun of July 28 published both an open letter by Cemil Topuzlu, son-in-law of the Sheik-ul-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi, and an editorial by Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, denouncing this appointment in the strongest terms. The editorial of Servet-i Fünun was instrumental in galvanizing public hatred against the old regime and its personalities. After his resignation, which was brought about by adverse press campaign against him, Hamdi Bey was additionally handled rather roughly by a group of Kurdish porters at the gates of the


5. Said Pasa, Hatırat; Kamil Pasa, Said Pasa’ya Ceşabları; and, Memduh Pasa, Taşvir-i Ahval, Tenvir-i İstikbal, all quoted in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, pp.1061-1063. See also, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, pp.9349-9352.

6. Ahmed Ihsan Tokgoz, Matbuat Hatıralarım, 1888-1923, 2, pp.8-9; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9408.

7. Servet-i Fünun, July 28, 1908, quoted in Ahmed Ihsan Tokgoz, Matbuat Hatıralarım, 1888-1923, 2, pp.11-12. See also, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9409.

Sublime Porte when he returned there for some documents on the afternoon of July 30. Further public demonstrations followed, demanding the dismissals of Ministers of the old regime. One of the most dramatic events of August 1 was the appeal of a group of naval officers for the immediate dismissal of Hasan Rami Pasha, Minister of the Navy. The delegation of naval officers visited Mehmed Rifat Pasha, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army, and Mehmed Pasha, the President of the Naval Council, and asked them how an embezzler like Hasan Rami Pasha could retain his post after the establishment of a just and constitutional regime. Thus, Rami Pasha was forced out of Government. The crowd in front of the Sublime Porte booed Hasan Rami Pasha as he entered the building to hand in his resignation. Tanin of August 2 printed a letter by Yazicizade Hakki Bey, a prominent merchant and a supplier to the Navy, accusing Hasan Rami Pasha of embezzling public funds.

The fate of other Ministers were not much different. Memduh Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, was asked publicly in the pages of the Tanin, the pro-Unionist newspaper, whether he had any right to collect his salary, amounting to the considerable sum of 20,000 kurus, any more.

On August 1, rumours were circulating that individual ministers were contemplating resigning. One confirmed resignation was that of Zihni Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Public Works. Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam, was also rumoured to have contemplated resignation.

These public protests as well as the pressure exerted on the individual Ministers by the Tanin produced the desired result, and the Said Pasha Cabinet tendered its resignation wholesale on the evening of August 1. Said Pasha was, once again, asked to form the Cabinet. He accepted the Grand Veziership, and prepared the new Imperial Decree.

12. "Dahiliye Naziri Gidiyor!", Tanin, July 20, 1324/August 2, 1908, p.4.
In the new Imperial Decree of August 1, he included the intention of the Sultan to grant the Constitution and the convocation of the Parliament. The Imperial Decree also cited, specifically, the equality of all citizens, without any distinction of race or religion, before the law; the guarantee that no individual would be arrested and imprisoned without being explicitly charged and tried before a court of law; the right of the inviolability of the domiciles of citizens; the abolition of the system of spies; the right of all citizens to make both domestic and foreign travel without any governmental restriction; the right to freely assemble; the abolition of the press censure; and, the right to free education. These were articles that the public expected to see established firmly after the inauguration of the liberal Constitution. There was, however, one clause in the Imperial Decree which reiterated the absolute right of the Sultan to appoint the Sheik-ul-Islam as well as the Ministers of War and the Navy. This was in clear violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Constitution.

After Abdülhamid's approval of the new Cabinet list, the Imperial Decree was brought to the Bab-i Ali to be publicly announced on the night of August 1. Nuri Pasha, the Second Chamberlain, who brought the Imperial Decree to the Sublime Porte was mistaken for Tahsin Pasha, the First Secretary to the Sultan, and was booed by the crowd; later, when it was understood that the person who had brought the Imperial Decree was Nuri Pasha, the crowd cheered for the pasha and pushed themselves forward into the main hall of the Sublime Porte in order to listen to the contents of the Decree.

16. İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, secretary to Said Pasha, who wrote the Decree according to Said Pasha's instructions, had objected to this clause as he himself had also found it unconstitutional, but Said Pasha had decided to insert it to the Decree unchanged (İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1066-1067).
17. İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1067.
18. Tanin. July 21, 1324/August 3, 1908, p.3; and, İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı
Though well received at first by the crowd at the Sublime Porte, there followed considerable discontent when it was discovered that Article 10 of the Imperial Decree empowered Abdülhamid to nominate not only the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Grand Vezier, but the Ministers of War and of the Navy as well. According to Articles 7 and 27 of the Constitution of 1876, only the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Grand Vezier were to be appointed directly by the Sultan, the rest of the cabinet being chosen by the Grand Vezier and sanctioned by Imperial Decree.\textsuperscript{19}

The people and press protested strongly against what they considered a breach of faith on the part of the Sultan and Said Pasha, the Grand Vezier.\textsuperscript{20} Even Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam, who was present at the public proclamation of the Imperial Decree at the Sublime Porte on the night of August 1, protested against Article 10 of the decree and let his intentions be known that he could not continue to share responsibility with a Grand Vezier who violated the Constitution with his first act in government.\textsuperscript{21} It was generally felt that the monarchists were determined to keep absolute control over the military, considered the mainstay of the highly centralised absolutist monarchy from which the people had just begun to think themselves liberated.\textsuperscript{22}

Said Pasha’s Cabinet had been presented on the night of August 1, and sworn in at the Palace the following day.\textsuperscript{23} Cemaleddin Efendi was retained as the Sheik-ul-Islam. Abdurrahman Pasha, the former Minister of Justice, and Kamil Pasha were appointed as Ministers without portfolio. Ömer Rüsdü Pasha, the Minister of War, and Hasan Rami Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, were re-appointed to their former posts despite public

\textit{Devrinde Son Sadriazamlar}, p.1067.
discontent against their inclusion to the Cabinet. Tevfik Pasha and Hakki Bey, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Education, respectively, also retained their posts in the new Cabinet. Hasan Fehmi Pasha, former President of the Council of State, was appointed Minister of Justice; Haci Akif Pasha, former Head of the Ordnance Department of the Army, Minister of the Interior; Naum Pasha, Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Public Works; Ziya Pasha, a former Minister, Minister of Commerce; Tevfik Pasha, the President of the Council of Government Employees, Minister of Agriculture, Mining, and Forests; Mehmed Ali Pasha, Secretary of the Grand Veziriate, Minister of Pious Foundations; Ragib Bey, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance, Minister of Finance; Ata Bey, a member of the Financial Commission of the European Provinces of the Empire, Minister of Telegraphs and Posts; Turhan Pasha, former Minister of Imperial Foundations, President of the Council of State; and, Ziya Bey, a high-level bureaucrat on the Imperial Council, Secretary to the Grand Veziriate.24

The general impression was that the Cabinet was only transitory. While some of the appointments were bound to give rise to criticism, surprise was expressed at the retention of in the Cabinet of Hasan Rami Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, against whom the naval officers had manifested their strong disapprobation on July 31.25 Because it consisted largely of high-level monarchist bureaucrats, the new cabinet was not well received by the public and the Unionists.26 The newly established Tanin, the pro-Unionist daily under the editorship of Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, stated that the old criterion of rank, as opposed to those of ability and competence, had once again dominated the nomination process. Hasan Rami Pasha, Minister of the Navy, was the principal target of ridicule in the editorial. Yalcin wrote that Hasan Rami Pasha, against whom both the officers of the Navy and the people had demonstrated just a few days ago, was an even worse embezzler than Riza

Pasha, the former Minister of War. According to Yalcin, a soldier, accused of such crimes but could not find the strength to apply to the courts to clear his name from charges of embezzlement, had no place in a Cabinet. Trying to retain him as a Minister in the Cabinet would invite public distrust to the whole Cabinet. Most of the other Ministers were criticised as being not dishonest but being useless and without the energy required to carry out extensive reforms; among those singled out for this kind of ridicule were Ragib Bey, Minister of Finance, Tevfik Pasha, Minister of Agriculture, Mining, and Forests, and Turhan Pasha, President of the Council of State. The only Cabinet Minister praised in the editorial was Hakki Bey, Minister of Education; Yalcin remarked that he was the only member of Cabinet who deservedly gained public confidence.  

Tanin not only criticised the composition of the Cabinet but also the way it was constituted. The main issue about the way new Cabinet had been formed was the appointment of the Ministers of War and of the Navy directly by Abdüllhamid. Articles 7 and 27 of the Constitution were clear in their wording; the Sultan had the right only to appoint the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Grand Vezier, and no other Cabinet member. The editorial of August 3 in the Tanin denounced in the strongest terms this breach of public confidence at the very start of the new constitutional regime, and regretted the appointment, directly by Abdüllhamid, of a soldier, Rami Pasha, strongly suspected of embezzling public funds. The editorial of August 4 continued the attack on the new Cabinet by reiterating the unconstitutionality of the appointment procedure of the Ministers of War, and of the Navy.

It was not only the press campaign that was adverse to the new Cabinet; the public was also totally dissatisfied with the Ministers. On August 3, upon his arrival to the

Sublime Porte, Ragib Bey, Minister of Finance, was booed by the crowd in front of the building. Haci Akif Pasha, Minister of the Interior, tendered his resignation on August 3, declaring that he had not been consulted and his agreement obtained before his name was included in the Cabinet list. The same day, Hasan Rami Pasha was dismissed from office, following constant press attacks and Unionist representation for his withdrawal from the Cabinet, and the post was offered to Commodore Arif Pasha. Rumours also began circulating that the whole cabinet had tendered its resignation.

The Unionists also started pressing Said Pasha to answer for his acts in Government. Tanin of August 4 asked Said Pasha why and how Tahsin Pasha, the First Secretary to the Sultan, was still kept at his post when it had been established that he was personally responsible for the escape of Izzet Pasha. Servet-i Fünun was more direct; on August 4 it published an editorial demanding the resignation of Said Pasha. In the August 5 issue of the Tanin Said Pasha was asked whether he planned to pay the salaries of high-level bureaucrats the same way as before, and that whether they would still continue undeservedly withdrawing excessively large sums of money from public coffers. Some new appointments with excessively high salaries had prompted the Unionists to question this pillage of state treasury at the expense of the public. Tanin wrote that Said Pasha would be personally responsible as the Grand Vezier for the continuation of this state of affairs. As a result of these pressures, Tahsin Pasha, the First Secretary to the Sultan, was dismissed on August 4 and was replaced by Cevad Bey, who, reportedly bore a good reputation; Ragib Pasha, the notorious Chamberlain, who had amassed great wealth under the old regime, was also fired. He had offered to restore to the Treasury out of his ill-gotten

30. "Yuha!", Tanin, July 22, 1324/August 4, 1908, p.4.
32. "Bahriye Nazirin Azli", Tanin, July 22, 1324/August 4, 1908, p.3; and, Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgası, p.27.
33. "Vükela Heyeti", Tanin, July 22, 1324/August 4, 1908, p.4.
35. Servet-i Fünun, July 22, 1324/August 4, 1908, quoted in Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9412.
gains the sum of 150,000 pounds sterling, stating that this would leave him merely his own patrimony, 200,000 pounds sterling. 37

In the meantime, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress also persistently began to exert pressure on Said Pasha to make radical changes in his Cabinet. Immediately after the revolution the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica had asked the Sultan, through Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, to be permitted to send a deputation to Istanbul in order to discuss matters pertaining to the Cabinet of Said Pasha. 38 The Cabinet, unable to resist pressure from the Unionists, issued a memorandum on July 29 accepting the request of the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress to enter into negotiations with the Government about the proposed changes in the Cabinet. 39 Having travelled to Edirne, the deputation from the Salonica branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, consisting of Cemal and Hakki Beys from the military, and Rahmi Evranos, Talat, Necib, Hüseyin, and Cavid Beys, continued its journey, arriving in Istanbul on August 3. 40 During a lengthy meeting with the Grand Vezier on the same day, the deputation demanded that the Cabinet be revised, proposing among other things, that he step down, to be replaced by Kamil Pasha, and that Receb Pasha, the energetic soldier who was then the Governor of Tripoli, be named Minister of War. 41 Said Pasha's reception of the delegation was so rude as to even shock his Minister of the Interior, Hacı Akif Pasha. 42 The delegation also visited Abdülhamid the same day, and asked him to dismiss

42. Ali Fuad Türkgedli, Görüp Isittiklerim, p.5.
Said Pasha and appoint Kamil Pasha as Grand Vezier, with Receb Pasha as the new Minister of War. For the Sultan, the appointment of Receb Pasha would have cancelled his prerogative to nominate the Minister of War without consulting the Grand Vezier. It was reported that Said Pasha was ready to accept most of their demands, including his own resignation. After this meeting, Said Pasha gave in to the demand of the dismissal of the Minister of the Navy, and Hasan Rami Pasha was fired on August 4. Unsatisfied, however, with only one change in the Cabinet, representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress again met with Said Pasha on August 4. Unable to fully meet the demands of the Committee of Union and Progress and at the same time retain their positions as Ministers of the Sultan, Tevfik Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Haci Akif Pasha, Minister of the Interior, Hasan Fehmi Pasha, Minister of Justice, and Turhan Pasha, President of the Council of State, resigned following the meeting, including the Sheik-ul-Islam. This event led to the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet. The news of these resignations was made public on August 5, along with the announcement that Kamil Pasha would be the new Grand Vezier.

Not only the pressure exerted on Said Pasha by the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress but also the press campaign as well as public outrage against both him and most members of the Cabinet had proved to be influential in the Cabinet’s eventual downfall on August 5.

43. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.27; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9411; and, Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Suretle İlan Edildigine Dair Vesikalar", pp.148-151.
44. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 4, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, pp.43-44.
45. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.27; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9412.
46. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.28; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 5, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.46.
NEWSPAPERS of August 6 printed the Imperial Decree, announcing the appointment of Kamil Pasha as the new Grand Vezier. On August 7, newspapers printed the Cabinet list. It included the names of Tevfik Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hasan Fehmi Pasha, Minister of Justice, and, Hakki Bey, Minister of Education, who had all been retained from the previous Cabinet; Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam had also retained his post. Tevfik Pasha, the Minister of Agriculture, Mining, and Forests in the previous Cabinet, was named as the new President of the Council of State. Recep Pasha, the Unionists' candidate for the post, was made Minister of War, and Commodore Arif Pasha was appointed Minister of the Navy; thus, satisfying both the aspirations and demands of the Committee of Union and Progress and the constitutional rule that these Ministers be appointed not by the Sultan but by the Grand Vezier. Initially, the appointment of Recep Pasha was vehemently resisted by Abdülhamid; but the insistence of the Unionists and Kamil Pasha's acceptance as well as Sheik-ul-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi's personal intervention and representation to the Sultan on behalf of the Unionists had convinced Abdülhamid that he had no choice but accept this appointment. In the new Cabinet, the post of the Minister of the Interior was given to Resid Akif Pasha; that of Finance to Ziya Pasha, a former Minister of Finance. Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem Bey, a member of the Council of State who was better known as a well-known author and poet, was appointed Minister of Pious Foundations; Köprülü Efendi, Judicial Advisor at the Sublime Porte, was named the Minister of Commerce and Public Works and later replaced by Gabriel Nouradunghian, while Prince Mavrogordato Efendi, another member of the


51. Mehmed Cemaleddin, Siyasi Hatıralar, 1908-1913, pp.43-44; and, Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsılı, "1908 Yılında İkinci Mesrutiyetin Ne Surette İlan Edildigine Dair Vesikalar", p.151.
Council of State, took the post of the Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests.  

The Cabinet included several monarchists like Tevfik Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Gabriel Nouradunghian, Minister of Public Works; they were regarded as tactical mistakes. Tevfik Pasha had spent most of his life in the diplomatic service, having been Secretary at Rome and Berlin, Chargé d’Affaires at Athens, and Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Berlin. In November of 1895, he was appointed President of the Council of State, and came to Istanbul. He was described as an amiable old gentleman with no great diplomatic talent or profound knowledge of affairs. Gabriel Nouradunghian had entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the age of nineteen, and had served there since. His position in the Ministry was the Second Legal Advisor. He was a clever lawyer, though with less breadth of view than the other legal advisor of the Ministry. He was also well connected to concessionary companies operating in Turkey. He was President of the Société Générale d'Assurances Ottomane, and one of the members of the Board of Management of the Sirket-i Hayriye, or the Bosphorus Steamboat Company, which was the most successful and best managed semi-public monopolies in which the Civil List was largely interested. 

However, the Cabinet also included several who had sympathised with liberal ideas. Among them were Hasan Fehmi Pasha, Minister of Justice, who was the President of the Ottoman Parliament which had sat in 1877. He was known to be liberal,

52. "Yeni Kabine", Tanin, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.1; "New Ministry Formed", The Times, August 7, 1908, p.5; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 12, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.59.

53. "Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet", The Times, August 10, 1908, p.5.


progressive, and popular. Between March of 1902 and October of 1904 he was the Governor of Salonica, where he had tried courageously to check the excesses then being committed by the military in the Salonica province. This had aroused the hostility of Hayri Pasha, the Commandant of the armed forces stationed at Salonica, and the other fanatical military elements, who had succeeded in having Hasan Fehmi Pasha removed from his post. His departure from Salonica on this occasion had been marked by a general demonstration of popularity and regret. 58 The appointment of Manyasizade Refik Bey, one of the most active members of the Committee of Union and Progress, to the post of the Minister of Police on August 10 was also well received. 59 Receb Pasha, the new Minister of War, had an excellent reputation among the revolutionaries exiled to Tripoli where he was the Governor, himself being exiled there for his liberal views. 60 Receb Pasha’s return from Tripoli was on August 15. He was greeted with extreme joy in the Istanbul harbour by the population. He landed the quay at Sarayburnu in a boat covered with the banners of the Committee of Union and Progress. The people continuously cheered at him on his way from the quay to the Sublime Porte. 61 Unfortunately, he was not to live long; only a day later, on August 16, when he was at a briefing in the Ministry of War he had a stroke, and died shortly afterwards. 62 His sudden death was a heavy blow to the Government, the army and the Committee of Union and Progress. To the army he was the best soldier in the Empire, qualified alike by experience and character to play the principal part in the reorganization of its forces, and assured of the affection and respect of soldiers who had served under his command. To the Committee of Union and Progress, he was not only a

patriotic administrator, who, though practically exiled in Tripoli, had done all in his power to improve the administration and safeguard the integrity of the province, but an uncompromising sympathiser with liberal ideas. He had always sought to make the life of the many exiles in his province as tolerable as possible, and he had discouraged espionage in a manner certain to intensify the suspicions of the Palace. On August 27, Müşir Ali Riza Fasha, upon his arrival from Syria, was appointed Minister of War and took charge of the Ministry.

The new Cabinet was well received. A marked return of confidence was manifested in commercial circles which had thus far regarded the situation with some degree of nervousness. The proclamation of the Committee of Union and Progress expressed satisfaction with the composition of the new Cabinet, and it begged the people to cease their their manifestations and permit those entrusted with matters of government to proceed with their labours. According to the Committee of Union and Progress, there was no member of the new Cabinet whose record was not good.

In the editorial of the Tanin of August 7, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın wrote that the governmental crisis that had been in existence since July 24 was finally over with the formation of Kamil Pasha Cabinet. Returning to the fact that Kamil Pasha had studied at Oxford, which, supposedly, had provided him with a liberal outlook, and that he was in favour of the constitutional regime, he was singled out for praise for his past service as the Governor of Izmir, which had been sufficient proof of his determination for the

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63. All the circumstances surrounding his funeral, which took place on the afternoon of August 17, testified to the deep national sense of loss. Every shop in Istanbul was closed and a large proportion of the foreign owned businesses in Pera and Galata. Flags flew everywhere at half-mast, and the coffin of the dead Marshal was borne to the mausoleum of Sultan Mahmud on the shoulders of volunteers drawn from every class of the population in the capital. One hundred thousand people turned out to witness the imposing ceremony ("The Death of the Minister of War", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3; and, "Honor Dead Minister: 100,000 People in Constantinople Turn Out at Funeral of Redjeb Pasha", The New York Times, August 18, 1908, p.5).
64. Cemal Kutay, Üç Pasalar Kavgasi, p.34.
65. "Reception of the New Ministry", The Times, August 8, 1908, p.5.
66. The New York Times, August 8, 1908, p.3.
establishment of lawful government. Abdülhamid, too, was congratulated for choosing people like Kamil Pasha as Grand Vezier and Cemâleddin Efendi as the Sheik-ul-Islam, who were both conscious of the necessity of a constitutional regime. An additional praise for Abdülhamid was reserved for his noninterference, as stipulated in Article 27 of the Constitution, in the appointments of the Ministers of War and of the Navy; his refraining from dictating his own choices for these positions had eliminated the discrepancy between the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the acts of the Sultan, which had marred the previous Imperial Decree of August 1. In the editorial, Said Pasha was criticised for his disrespect for the Constitution by drawing up the Imperial Decree of August 1, giving away the right to appoint the Ministers of War and of the Navy to the Sultan, and thus violating Article 27 of the Constitution. Yâlcin congratulated those who had successfully resisted such a violation of the Constitution and had stood up for the constitutional rights of the citizens by reversing the unlawful act of Said Pasha with the appointment, in his place, of Kamil Pasha and his Cabinet according to established constitutional practice.

The Committee of Union and Progress and people seemed to have confidence in the new Kamil Pasha Cabinet. Closer to the truth was the fact that public opinion and the press was less likely to worry about the absolutist ambitions of Abdülhamid with the appointment of Kamil Pasha, a strong adversary of the Sultan, as Grand Vezier.

Kamil Pasha had been appointed Grand Vezier in 1895, during the period of the Armenian massacres. His strong measures had rapidly brought about a lull in the troubled situation;

67. Hüseyin Cahid [Yâlcin], "Yeni Heyet-i Vükela", Tanin, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.1. The editorial in the İkdam of August 8, was extremely congratulatory towards Kamil Pasha in tone ("Kamil Pasha's Cabinet", The Times, August 10, 1908, p.5).
69. Hüseyin Cahid [Yâlcin], "Yeni Heyet-i Vükela", Tanin, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.1; and, "Reception of the New Ministry", The Times, August 8, 1908, p.5.
he was, however, dismissed within a month owing to his insistence on nationwide reforms. He was then abruptly dispatched to Izmir as the Governor of the Aydin province, where he remained in semi-exile and under close watch of Palace spies until 1907. In 1907 the then Grand Vezier, Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, accused Kamil Pasha of conspiring with the British Government to overthrow the Sultan's direct authority in the Aydin province, by turning this region into a privileged province along Egyptian lines. The history of the animosity between Kamil Pasha and Ferid Pasha went as far back as March of 1905, when Ferid Pasha had moved to oust Kami: Pasha from the Governorship of the Aydin province and to force him to live in exile either on the islands of Mitylene or Rhodes. Having weathered this storm, in September of 1906, Kamil Pasha had been then accused by Ferid Pasha of failing to stamp out brigandage in the Aydin province. On January 11, 1907 Kamil Pasha was suddenly stripped of his Governorship and was ordered to proceed to Rhodes. He immediately sent a telegram to Istanbul protesting this action. Suspecting that an attempt on his life might be made before he reached Rhodes, he took refuge in the British Consulate at Izmir, which he only left after obtaining Abdülhamid's guarantee that he would be allowed to reside quietly in Istanbul and was not be forced to accept a provincial post. Later, he had taken opportunities of explaining to Abdülhamid the nature of the intrigues of which he had been a victim; and, on the dismissal of Ferid Pasha as a result of revolutionary agitation in Macedonia just before the declaration of the constitutional regime on July 24, 1908, Kamil Pasha had been made Minister without portfolio in the Said Pasha Cabinet. Some twelve days later, on August 5, Said Pasha, unable to establish law and order, was forced to resign and was succeeded by Kamil Pasha.

75. "The Young Turkish Revolution", in G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (Eds.), British
IMMEDIATELY after the revolution, in the first week of August, the Committee of Union and Progress, acting as a vigilante committee, brought about the arrests of a number of Ministers who were in office under the old regime, as well as of principal members of the Palace staff, in order to avoid further escapes such as that of Selim Melhame and Izzet Pasha and other old regime pashas.76

Selim Melhame, the former Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests and one of the most favourite pashas of Abdülhamid, had made his escape on July 28 with the help of the Italian Embassy by boarding an Italian ship, taking all of his ill-gotten fortune with him.77 Son of a Maronite moneychanger at Beirut, he had come to Istanbul as a young man, where he obtained subaltern employment in various public offices. Naturally clever, ambitious, and unscrupulous, he was not slow to discover that the surest road to advancement lay through the Palace, and he consequently lost no time in enrolling himself in the corps of jurnalcis, or purveyors of secret intelligence to the Sultan. As Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests he had succeeded, with consummate cleverness, for more than thirteen years, in keeping the entire mineral wealth of Turkey practically under his own control. Under the specious pretence of "preserving the natural resources of the country" he had arrested the natural development of the immense mineral resources of the country, while amassing very considerable fortunes for himself and the limited number of persons who had known how to identify their interests with his own.78

Izzet Pasha, the Second Chamberlain and one of the most influential pashas in the

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77. Ahmed İhsan Tokgöz, Matbuat Hatıralarım, 1888-1923, 2, p.41; "The Sultan and the New Movement", The Times, August 1, 1908, p.7; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9409, who gives the date as July 29.
Palace, had initially taken refuge at the German Embassy but returned to his house on July 30. On August 1, however, he boarded on a British ship and left Turkey, carrying on him an official document signed by Tahsin Pasha, the First Secretary to the Sultan, stating that he was on a state mission; and thus, he could not be arrested and taken off the ship. Izzet Pasha had originally intended to seek refuge in the United States, but after narrowly escaping arrest at Genoa by a Government agent on August 4, fled to London, via Paris, for asylum. The Government was preparing charges against Izzet Pasha, and the Ministry of Justice would see to it that the charges lodged against him would make him liable to extradition. The indictments would take account of certain secret murders in the Palace, as well as charges of robbery of the people, extortion, customs frauds, and other crimes. Izzet Pasha was reputed to have embezzled at least $7,500,000 which he had invested in the United States.

Ziya Bey, the Head of the Secret Police under the old regime, had also escaped from Turkey and taken refuge in Great Britain. According to his own account, he had been the means of ruining Ministers, officers, and Government officials, and one hundred and seventy Turks, many of them members of the most honourable families; they had all disappeared during his term of office. Ziya Bey had been warned by the Sultan to flee, and during his escape from Istanbul, he had to shoot a man dead who tried to prevent his embarkation despite the disguise he had adopted.

Tanin of August 5 printed that information had been obtained to the effect that Hasan Rami Pasha, former Minister of the Navy, Memduh Pasha, former Minister of the

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Interior, Tahsin Pasha, First Secretary to the Sultan for some thirteen years, Sheik Abu-l Huda, the chief Pan-Islamic advisor to Abdülhamid and well known as the chief inciter of the Armenian massacres of 1895 and 1896, and, Resid Pasha, former Prefect of Istanbul, had been contemplating escape, and that orders had been issued for their arrests in order to prevent their escapes. That same day, these and several other corrupt monarchist Ministers and high-level officials, with the exception of Tahsin Pasha and Abu-l Huda, were taken into custody and were sent to the Ministry of Police for their detention. The crowd, waiting outside of the building, made hostile demonstrations against these prisoners for several hours. Demonstrations occurred on the night of August 5 outside the houses of Tahsin Pasha and Zeki Pasha, the Head of the Ordnance Department. Later, the leaders of the crowd arrested these two pashas and conveyed them to the Ministry of Police, where they were joined on the morning of August 6 by Abu-l Huda, who surrendered rather than face the demonstration.

Among those arrested were also Ragib Pasha and Faik Bey, the notorious chamberlains of the Sultan who had amassed great wealth, and the former of whom was Crown Prosecutor against Midhat Pasha in the beginning of Abdülhamid's rule. Described by the British Embassy staff as being more capable than any of the other

85. Tanin, July 23, 1324/August 5, 1908, p.4; “Tevkifler”, Tanin, July 24, 1324/August 6, 1908, p.3; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, August 6, 1908, in “Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908”, Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.32.


87. "More Arrests of Palace Officials", The Times, August 7, 1908, p.5; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, August 6, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.32.

chamberlains, Ragib Pasha had the reputation of devoting most of his attention to the acquisition of a fortune by means of commercial and industrial undertakings, for the advancement of which he employed his Palace influence. He had intimate business relations with members of the British community in Istanbul. Ragib Pasha was taken only after a stubborn resistance. He had barricaded himself in his house, and he opened fire on the police with a rifle from an upstairs window. Faik Bey, the other chamberlain who was arrested, was humbler and less capable than Ragib Pasha. Nevertheless, he had, likewise, considerable business relations with English merchants and industrial undertakings in Turkey.

Ahmed Pasha, an important Admiralty official, was also put under arrest on a charge of having armed retainers and of encouraging them to attempt to create a disturbance in the bazaars, where they wounded two persons. Their attempt proved singularly unsuccessful; the populace merely summoned the police, who promptly arrested the bravadoes, who denounced their employer. Riza Pasha, the former Minister of War, was arrested at his yali in Vaniköy and taken to the Ministry of War on August 6.

Necib Melhame, brother of Selim Melhame, had been put under house arrest since July 31. He was officially only Under Secretary at the Ministry of Public Works under the old regime, but was better known as unofficial Head of the Secret Police and Special Political Envoy of the Sultan. While in Tunis as a businessman he was frequently before the courts, being three times convicted of assault and battery and narrowly escaping a conviction for fraudulent commercial transactions. Compelled to quit Tunis, he had joined

90. "Turkish Officers Arrested", The New York Times, August 8, 1908, p.3.
92. "Arrests of Officials", The Times, August 6, 1908, p.3.
his brother Selim Melhame in Istanbul, and succeeded in persuading the Sultan that he, and not Salih Münir Pasha, was the man needed to deal with the Young Turk opposition in France. He had accordingly got himself named Conseiller d'Ambassade at the French capital in July 1897. He was, however, refused by the French to be accepted as Chargé d'Affaires in the temporary absence of Münir Salih Pasha, and was consequently withdrawn and transferred as High Commissioner to Bulgaria. There, too, his conduct was despised; he was declared persona non grata and was compelled to leave Bulgaria in January 1902. 95 Tanin of August 7 published allegations, accusing Necib Melhame of embezzling funds collected from the Moslem population of Bulgaria while he was High Commissioner there, and asked for his arrest before making his escape like his brother Selim Melhame. 96

Further arrests followed; on August 9, Ismail Pasha, Inspector-General of Military Schools, and Ismail Mahir Pasha were arrested. 97

Large sums of money and valuables were discovered in the houses of the arrested Ministers. In the house of Hasan Rami Pasha, the former Minister of the Navy, for instance, the Government found cheques, money and titles of immovable properties, the value of which amounted to 200,000 liras, in addition to jewellery worth 70,000 liras; he had been in office for approximately a year and a half. Considering it embezzled or otherwise misappropriated, the Government seized all this hidden wealth. 98

In the meantime, Tanin started on August 9 to publish lists of all the real estates the corrupt pashas of the old regime had been illegally given as "royal gifts". Zeki Pasha, the

96. "Hirsiz Cetes", Tanin, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.3.
98. Tanin, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.4; and, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 11, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.53. The list of all the cheques drawn on Credit Lyonnais and the Ottoman Bank, and other items of value which were found in Hasan Rami Pasha's safe were printed in "Rami Pasa", Tanin, July 26, 1324/August 8, 1908, p.3.
former Head of the Ordnance Department, had amassed not only a large quantity of houses, apartment and office buildings and storehouses in Istanbul, but had also taken possession of two large farms, one in Bursa and the other in Aydin, declared to be worth 16,000 and 25,000 liras respectively. All in all, the total declared value of Zeki Pasha's ill-gotten properties amounted to more than 70,000 liras. The market value of these properties, however, was way above this amount; they were realistically assessed at 150,000 liras. Zeki Pasha had paid only 4,340 liras to "buy" these properties from the State Treasury. Tahsin Pasha had misappropriated various real estates in Istanbul valued at about 4,000 liras in addition to a double hamam whose value was not declared. Several other Palace favourites, including Resid Pasha, the former Prefect of Istanbul, had also amassed wealth through similar means.

The pashas tried to buy their freedom by offering to pay back part of what they had fraudulently obtained in the past. Zeki Pasha expressed his willingness to pay back 5,000 liras on the condition that he be given a signed statement from the Committee of Union and Progress, stating that the party was satisfied with this act of generosity. His condition was, of course, rejected off hand. He later agreed to return all of his ill-gotten properties; and legal arrangements were done on August 11, upon which the properties were returned to State Treasury. Tanin of August 12 wrote that Mehmed Riza Pasha, the former Minister of War, had agreed to sign an Ottoman Bank cheque for the amount of 100,000 liras, thus returning a considerable part of his misbegotten wealth to the Ministry of

99. "Eski Yagmalar", Tanin, July 27, 1324/August 9, 1908, p.3; "Zeki Pasa'ya Verilenler", Tanin, July 28, 1324/August 10, 1908, p.3; and, "Zeki Pasa", Tanin, July 29, 1324/August 11, 1908, p.3.

100. "Zeki Pasa", Tanin, July 29, 1324/August 11, 1908, p.3.

101. "Eski Yagmalar", Tanin, July 27, 1324/August 9, 1908, p.3; "Selremin Sabigi Resid Pasa", Tanin, July 27, 1324/August 9, 1908, p.4; "Eski Yagmalar!", Tanin, July 28, 1324/August 10, 1908, pp.2-3; and, "Eski Yagmalar", Tanin, July 29, 1324/August 11, 1908, p.3.

102. "Zeki Pasa Anlatiyor", Tanin, July 28, 1324/August 10, 1908, p.3.

104. "Zeki Pasa", Tanin, July 29, 1324/August 11, 1908, p.3; "Zeki Pasa'nin Emlaki", Tanin, July 30, 1324/August 12, 1908, p.3; "Restitution by Ex-Ministers", The Times, August 14, 1908, p.5; and, "Money Restored to the Treasury", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3.
In addition to this cheque, he also agreed to return real estates worth another 100,000 liras to Istanbul Municipality. Only after the completion of the legal transfer process by which he turned over his misappropriated wealth, amounting to 200,000 liras, acquired during his tenure of office in an unconstitutional manner, together with lands, obtained by methods which would hardly bear inspection, to the state that Mehmed Riza Pasha was let free on August 13. On August 15, Ragib Pasha's attorney approached the editors of Servet-i Fünun and offered a considerable sum of money in return for the cessation of press campaign against his client and others. On August 22, Hasan Rami Pasha, the former Minister of the Navy, paid back 100,000 liras to the Treasury. An inquiry into his conduct had left no doubt that he was guilty of corruption and malversation of funds to an extent which surprised even many of those who were conversant with the abuses of the old regime.

On September 4, after the completion of the return process of the misappropriated properties to the state coffers, all the leading personalities of the old regime who had been taken into custody were granted freedom on the condition that they live on the Büyükada, off the coast of Istanbul.

AFTER the revolution, there was also a clean sweep in the Ministeries. On August 10, the Minister for Foreign Affairs ordered the cessation of subventions to European newspapers and the suppression of the secret funds of embassies. Previously, on August 6, orders

105. Tanin, July 30, 1324/August 12, 1908, p.4.
106. "Riza Pasa", Tanin, July 31, 1324/August 13, 1908, p.3; "Restitution by Ex-Ministers", The Times, August 14, 1908, p.5; Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.32; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9415.
108. "The New Era in Turkey", The Times, August 24, 1908, p.3; Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, pp.33-34; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9416.
110. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.35; and, "Turkey", The Times, September 5, 1908, p.5.
111. The Washington Post, August 11, 1908, p.2.
had been issued for the process of removing the chief representatives of Turkey in foreign countries, the Ambassadors and Ministers, and these high-ranking diplomats were immediately relieved of their duties.\textsuperscript{112}

Among the dismissed diplomats, Salih Münir Esenbel Pasha, Ambassador at Paris, was one of the most subservient and loyal officials of Abdülhamid. At the time when anti-Hamidian activity had started in Europe, Abdülhamid searched for a totally reliable person whom he could fully trust, and chose Salih Münir Pasha, First Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Public Works, as his Ambassador to France.\textsuperscript{113} Since his appointment to that post in 1896, Salih Münir Pasha had uninterruptedly served Abdülhamid for more than a decade with total loyalty, informing on anti-monarchist activity in France and neighbouring countries. He had been instrumental in the expulsion of several Unionist revolutionaries not only from France but also from Switzerland and Belgium, countries which he had been additionally accredited to.\textsuperscript{114} On August 5, the Unionists in Paris took action against Salih Münir Pasha, and asked his prompt dismissal from office, not only because he was a committed monarchist but also he was an embezzler, using embassy funds for his personal luxury and expenses.\textsuperscript{115} He was dismissed on August 6. The volte face made by Salih Münir Pasha in a statement published in \textit{Le Matin} of August 10 was a sign of the times, as such a striking condemnation of the old regime in the mouth of one of its most prominent and active representatives and agents proved that even its defenders felt driven to compromise with the successful revolution. In his conversation with the journalist of \textit{Le Matin}, Salih


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Tanin}, July 27, 1324/August 9, 1908, p.4, quoting from the August 6 or 7, 1908 issue of \textit{İttihad ve Terakki}, a new Unionist daily appearing in Salonica.
Münir Pasha explained that a continuance of the old regime had become impossible; the finances were in disorder, the officials incompetent the laws not applied, the army badly equipped, and the government weakly and intriguingly conducted. Nothing serious had been accomplished in the direction of seriously attaining the normal exploitation and development of the natural resources of the country. All private enterprise had been hampered with the idea of preventing the formation of revolutionary committees. Salih Münir Pasha further tried to gain the confidence of the Unionist leadership by visiting, in September, Ahmed Riza Bey, who had still not left Paris for Istanbul, and giving an interview to Ahmed Ihsan Tokgöz, editor of *Servet-i Fünun*, during which he claimed that he had not worked against the revolutionary cause!

It was believed that the Embassy in Paris would be offered to Naum Pasha. Indeed, on August 12 the news was confirmed that the successor of Salih Münir Pasha as Turkish Ambassador in Paris was to be Naum Pasha, a diplomat of great experience who had been Governor-General of Lebanon for two periods of five years and Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He was said to be much esteemed for his uprightness and dignity of his character.

Mehmed Ali Bey, the Minister at Washington, was the son of the notorious Izzet Pasha, who had managed to escape to Great Britain immediately after the revolution. The recall of Mehmed Ali Bey was confirmed on August 10. Mehmed Bey was relieved of

his duties at the Embassy on August 11. Münci Bey, the Turkish Consul General at New York, was appointed chargé d'affaires of the Turkish legation pending the appointment of a new Minister to the United States. Münci Bey had been instructed by the Ministery for Foreign Affairs to proceed at once to Washington and take charge of the Legation. After some resistance by Mehmed Ali Bey, who refused to leave the official residence, Münci Bey took control of the Ministry. Münci Bey was an enthusiastic Unionist, who had fomented the agitation among the Turkish subjects in New York against Mehmed Ali Bey. Mehmed Ali Bey received threatening letters. Practically all of these letters had been written by either members or sympathisers of the Committee of Union and Progress in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. In panic, Mehmed Ali Bey left the United States for Great Britain on the night of August 19.

On August 15, the Turkish Government informed the State Department that Hüseyin Kazim Bey, Turkish Minister at Bucharest, had been appointed Turkish Ambassador to the United States in succession to Mehmed Ali Bey. Hüseyin Kazim Bey was a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress, and his appointment to the Washington Embassy was done with an eye to please the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Hüsnü Pasha, and at Berlin, Tevfik Pasha, as well as the Ambassador at Madrid, Serif Pasha, and the Minister at Belgrade, in addition to

several Secretaries and Consuls were also relieved of their duties. Azarian Efendi, who was Consul General at Galatz, was designated Turkish Minister at Belgrade. Sekib Bey, the son of Arif Pasha, a former Minister, was appointed as the new High Commissioner at Sofia.

The Embassy in St. Petersburg was offered to Turhan Pasha, an Albanian in his late sixties. He had passed a considerable portion of his life in the diplomatic service. Commencing as Secretary in succession at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Athens, Vienna, and Rome, he was Chargé d'Affaires at the latter place in 1879, but fell into disgrace through his brother's activity's as an Albanian nationalist. In an interview published in the Berlin daily, Lokalanzeiger, of August 31, Turhan Pasha, the new Ambassador in St. Petersburg, said that events of the recent past had hastened the natural and inevitable satisfaction of the desires of the whole Turkish people. In his opinion, the Sultan was thoroughly convinced that the country was ripe for the Constitution and there was no possibility of reaction.

Osman Nizami Pasha was appointed as the new Ambassador in Berlin in place of Tevfik Pasha. The fact that he was an intimate friend of the retiring Ambassador, Tevfik Pasha, was welcomed as being calculated to assure continuity in the political relations of Turkey and Germany.

There was also vast changes in the Ministry of the Interior. Most of the governors

129. "Turkey", The Times, September 1, 1908, p.3.
130. "Turkey", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5.
131. Tanin, July 29, 1324/August 11, 1908, p.4; and, "Abdul Hamid and the Committee". The Times, August 12, 1908, p.5.
133. Lokalanzeiger, August 31, 1908, quoted in "The New Ambassadors to Russia and Germany", The Times, September 2, 1908, p.5.
134. Vossische Zeitung, August 31, 1908, quoted in "The New Ambassadors to Russia and Germany", The Times, September 2, 1908, p.5.
were dismissed from their posts following the revolution. Among the most visible of them was Abdülvehab Pasha, the Governor of Erzurum, against whom the population of Erzurum had made numerous demonstrations before the Revolution. His dismissal was effected on August 10.

The Governor of the Hedjaz, Ahmed Ratib Pasha, was also dismissed on August 10. He had served as Governor of the Hedjaz since 1893, and had amassed a fortune mostly through illegal practices when in office. He was one of those Governors who was opposed to the new regime, and had deliberately delayed the declaration of the Constitution. In addition to his dismissal, orders were issued for his arrest and confiscation of his property. The arrest of Ratib Pasha was effected at Jiddah. The ex-Governor of the Hedjaz was put on board a steamer for conveyance to Istanbul. Marshal Kazim Pasha, Director General of the Hedjaz Railway works, was appointed Governor and Military Commander of Hedjaz, in place of Ahmed Ratib Pasha. His record as an administrator and soldier was a guarantee that the troubles of future pilgrims would not be aggravated by official blackmail and that a serious effort would be made to

138. Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.83n.
140. Íkdam, August 25, 1908, quoted in "Turkey", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5; and, F.O. 195/2286, Acting Consul Mohammad Husain to Sir Gerard Lowther, Suakin (?), August 23, 1908, quoted in Hasan Kayali. Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.199.
141. "Turkey: The Hedjaz and the Yemen", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
142. "Turkey", The Times, September 1, 1908, p.3.
protect them against Beduin attacks.\textsuperscript{143}

Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Governor of the Aydin province, was dismissed from his post following the declaration of the Constitution at Izmir.\textsuperscript{144} In addition, Tevfik Pasha, the monarchist commander of troops at Izmir, as well as several other military officers and civilian officials of the old regime, especially the head of the police at Aydin, were arrested and degraded from their ranks and sent off to Salonica.\textsuperscript{145} The Governor tried to take refuge in the summer residence of the British Consul at Izmir, but, hearing that orders had been issued for his arrest and transport to Istanbul, he took flight, but was caught on the coast near Beirut as he was embarking on a small sailing boat with the object of getting to Cyprus.\textsuperscript{146}

Ferid Pasha, acting Governor of Trabzon; Fuad Pasha, Governor of Kastamonu; Bahri Pasha, Governor of Adana; and, Mehmet Ali Bey, Governor of Beirut, were relieved of their posts on August 6.\textsuperscript{147}

Mehmed Ali Bey, the Governor of Beirut, was formerly Inspector of Customs at Istanbul and a member of the Palace camarilla. He had been appointed Governor of Beirut in the last days of the old regime. Like the Governor of Aydin, upon his dismissal, he, too, tried to escape abroad. On August 15, he took refuge in the British Consulate General, but subsequently quitted the Consulate.\textsuperscript{148} Nazim Pasha was chosen as the new Governor of Beirut, replacing Mehmed Ali Bey.\textsuperscript{149}

Telegrams from Hodeida accused Marshall Ahmed Feyzi Pasha, Governor of the Yemen and Commander of the Yemen field force, of refusing to declare loyalty to the

\textsuperscript{143} "Kiazim Pasha", \textit{The Times}, September 2, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Resimli Kitab}, 2 (April-September 1909), p.838.
\textsuperscript{146} Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", \textit{Parliamentary Papers}, 1909, 105, p.63.
\textsuperscript{147} "Valilerin Azli", \textit{Tanin}, July 25, 1324/August 7, 1908, p.4; and, Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üc Pasalar Kavgasi}, pp.28-29.
\textsuperscript{148} "Turkish Reforms", \textit{The Times}, August 17, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{149} "Turkey", \textit{The Times}, September 1, 1908, p.3.
Constitution, and asked for his prompt dismissal. The Government received petitions from the Hedjaz, demanding the dismissal of the Sharif of Mecca, Ali Pasha, and the appointment of Sharif Abdullah in his stead. The Governor of Medina, Muhafiz Osman Pasha was dismissed for opposing the declaration of the Constitution, and his functions were taken over by Müsir Abdullah Pasha. Sükrü Pasha, the Governor of Damascus, was relieved of his duties following the revolution. The Governor of Mosul was also dismissed. In place of the dismissed Governor, Ferik Zeki Pasha, who was stationed at Baghdad, was appointed as the new Governor of Mosul.

Kamil Pasha's programme was made public on August 16. In the preamble the Cabinet declared that till Parliament met, its action could only be that of a provisional Government, whose duty it was to prepare the ground for a Cabinet chosen by Parliament when assembled for that purpose.

The first order of business was the state of the nation's finances. Kamil Pasha proposed to cut all unnecessary expenses, while maintaining the efficiency of the army and the navy; the number of officials in each Ministry and the amounts of their salaries would be reduced. To avoid the infliction of unnecessary hardship on the employees, they would receive part pay while on the retired list, and be eligible for re-employment according to their capacities. The Treasury was empty. It was hoped, nevertheless, that by raising

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150. "Turkey: The Hedjaz and the Yemen", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
151. "Turkey: The Hedjaz and the Yemen", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3. See also, Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.199.
152. F.O. 618/3, Devey to Sir Gerard Lowther, Damascus, August 25, 1908, quoted in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.199.
156. "Turkish Reforms: Programme of the Ministry", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
157. "Turkish Reforms: Programme of the Ministry", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5; and, Sir
loans and effecting economies, it would be possible to find the sums urgently needed for the expenses of administration till the meeting of the Parliament, to which a statement of the financial situation would be submitted. While the suppression of abuses would certainly benefit the revenues, their increase would be more than counterbalanced by the necessary expenditure of the revenue-earning administrations. The Cabinet programme expressed hope that the finances would in time be put on a sound basis by improvements in the method of collecting revenue, the revision of certain Commercial Treaties, and the development of agriculture and commerce, schemes for which would be laid before Parliament.\footnote{158}

The existing laws, especially the ones dealing with commerce and land tenure, would be revised so as to render their application more equitable. Steps would be taken to do away with with the uncertainty of real property's tenure, previously among the principal impediments to economic progress.\footnote{159} Kamil Pasha also set an agenda for public works, and made explicit assurances on the rights of private property, considering this as one of the chief sources of the nation's wealth.\footnote{160}

Additionally, the Cabinet programme stated that the system of education would be improved, and that the Government schools and colleges would be open to all creeds and races.\footnote{161} Kamil Pasha's programme also advanced reforms in matters of justice, and he announced that all eligible male citizens, Moslem or not, would be subject to military conscription. Finally, Kamil Pasha vowed to work for the suppression of the privileges conferred by the Capitulations.\footnote{162}

The organs of the Committee of Union and Progress went into far greater detail.

Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.64.
\footnote{158} "Turkish Reforms: Programme of the Ministry", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
\footnote{159} "Turkish Reforms: Programme of the Ministry", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
\footnote{160} Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, Vol.105, p.64.
\footnote{161} "Turkish Reforms: Programme of the Ministry", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
\footnote{162} Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.64.
According to them, everything required immediate and wholesale reform, particularly the economy. 163

ON August 10, the newspapers announced the dismissals of the various monarchist functionaries and made public the sweeping bureaucratic changes being made. 164

The new Government also set out to reorganise the various departments of the Administration, especially of the Council of State. 165 Only sixty out of one hundred and forty members of the Council of State would be retained. With these reductions, the saving of salaries would be enormous. 166 The Administrative and Inspectoral Councils of Indirect Taxation were abolished, and a new Council was reportedly being formed. In the meantime, members of the old Councils were placed on half pay until new posts could be found for them. 167

The Ministry of Pious Foundations would also be subject to thorough reform, while the Ministry of Education was entrusted with the task of creating a uniform national education programme. 168 Towards the end of August, the Turkish Government requested the Prussian Ministry of Education to place at its disposal a plan of the higher educational system in Prussia, together with a complete list of regulations and text books for its guidance in the reform of the higher educational establishments in Turkey. 169

Changes in the Ministry of Finance started on August 10 with the appointment of

163. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908. in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.64.
164. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 11, 1908. in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.53; and, "Abdul Hamid and the Committee", The Times, August 12, 1908, p.5.
165. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, August 18, 1908. in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105, p.64.
166. The Washington Post, August 14, 1908, p.3.
Mahmud Esad Efendi as the new Under Secretary of Finance. Following this new appointment, Ziya Pasha, the new Minister of Finance, declaring that every department of the Ministry was overmanned, dismissed a large number of employees, among them the grandson of Abu-l Huda, who at the age of fifteen had already reached the rank of Inspector of Customs, and he threatened others with the reduction of their salaries. The suddenness of this move, however, almost provoked a riot. The majority of the employees refused to work, averring that while they approved of the dismissal of a certain number of spies and persons appointed by the Palace favourites no fewer than fifteen thousand persons, relatives and dependents of the dismissed officials would be reduced to beggary by the Minister's action. Immediately, those who organised the strike were taken under police custody with the help of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress. Kamil Pasha, in an interview he gave to the Parisian Le Journal, said that the Cabinet hoped to realize a saving of one hundred million francs by the suppression of certain offices and of useless expenditure. Salih Münir Pasha, the dismissed Ambassador at Paris, gave vent to the monarchist sentiment about these measures by expressing his worries in Le Matin that wholesale dismissals would create an army of penniless men, who would attack the new regime and incite disturbances. According to him, such dismissals would create a centre of agitation at Istanbul, which, though not numerically important, would still be serious, owing to the European commercial and financial interests involved there.

The discontent caused by the dismissal of large numbers of official induced the Government to reconsider its position and take a more gradual approach to the problem.

170. "Abdul Hamid and the Committee", The Times, August 12, 1908, p.5.
172. "Maliye'de", Tanin, July 31, 1324/August 13, 1908, p.4.
173. "Turkish Reforms: Prospective Loans", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
174. Le Matin, August 16, 1908, quoted in "Turkish Reforms: Prospective Loans", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
It made an effort to effect retrenchment by reducing salaries instead of by dismissal. Consequently it was decided that all salaries above fifty liras a month would be reduced by half.\textsuperscript{176}

WITH the new regime came an efficient and hardworking Minister of War and General Staff. Riza Pasha, Acting Minister of War, issued orders on August 9 to all the Army Corps to release all officers and soldiers imprisoned under the old regime for political charges. Furthermore, he issued orders for the immediate payment of regular salaries and stipends of the officers and soldiers without any delay; but, payments in excess of the amounts stipulated by law were to be promptly cut until thorough investigations were completed. He also informed the army that a special commission were to be set up for the evaluation of the manpower needs of the armed forces, and that it would plan and recommend as well as prepare the necessary rules and regulations for radical reductions. Orders were also issued to retire all those who were incompetent, and appoint, in their places, able and energetic officers.\textsuperscript{177}

The new Minister of War made a clean sweep of the old corrupt and monarchist administration.\textsuperscript{178} New commanders were appointed to the Armies; but a general and most beneficial change was effected in the staff of the Ministry and the higher ranks of the Army.\textsuperscript{179} On August 15, extensive appointments in the army were announced. Foreign as well as Turkish military opinion was unanimous in congratulating the Government and the Ministry of War upon these appointments, which were considered the best that could possibly be made.\textsuperscript{180} General Pertev Pasha, who had the reputation of being a thoroughly

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180. "New Military Appointments", \textit{The Times}, August 17, 1908, p.5.
capable soldier, with great organizing powers, was appointed Under Secretary of State for War. Izzet Pasha, the new Chief of the General Staff, had done good service in Syria, and later in the Yemen, and was known as an excellent officer, whose German training was an additional asset. The new Vice-Chief Staff was Salih Pasha. Hurşid Pasha was appointed as the new Director of Artillery at the Ministry of War, Ismail Pasha, Director of Cavalry, and Osman Nazmi Pasha, Director of Infantry. These three new Directors at the Ministry of War had also served with such distinction as could be won under a regime suspicious of officers with ability and progressive tendencies. General Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the new Commander of the First Army Corps stationed at Istanbul, was trained at Germany, and was an officer in whom great confidence was placed in the army; his knowledge of military science and his practical organizing ability were considered to be high. Marshal Ali Riza Pasha was appointed Commander of the Second Army Corps stationed at Edirne. After good service in various parts of the Empire, Ali Riza Pasha had the misfortune to suffer complete defeat at the hands of the Yemen rebels at Menakha, in April 1905. The officers who served under him stated that the troops given him for the relief of Sanaa were ill-equipped and undisciplined, and the Marshal met with considerable sympathy as the victim of the mismanagement of the Ministry of War and the interference of the Palace. Marshal Abdullah Pasha was appointed Commander of the Fourth Army Corps stationed at Erzincan; Nazım Pasha, Commander of the Fifth Army Corps stationed at Damascus. They were also excellent soldiers. Nazım Pasha had just returned after seven years spent in exile, during the first five of which he was confined in a cell at Erzincan. He was described by General von der Goltz as one of the best brains in the Empire. The new Commander at Istanbul and of the First Guard Division was Ferid Pasha. The sympathies of all these officers were avowedly Unionist. 181

In mid-August the Imperial High Commission of Military Inspection and the Military Household of the Sultan were suppressed. The former body had in a large degree

181. "New Military Appointments", The Times, August 17, p.5.
usurped the functions of the Ministry of War, and both were scandalously costly. In consequence of this measure, eight marshals, twenty-four generals of division, ten brigadiers, and thirty other officers were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of War.\textsuperscript{182}

On September 13, a group of high level commanders were appointed to a special council responsible for making recommendations on the reorganization and staff reductions of certain departments in the army.\textsuperscript{183}

The Government decided that the Navy, too, should be reorganized and made more efficient. On August 10, Vice-Admiral Halil Pasha, who was trained in the British Navy, was appointed as the new Chief of the General Staff of the Navy.\textsuperscript{184} Previously, the Navy had been a hotbed of bribery and corruption, the consequences of which were a dockyard incapable of effecting any but the smallest repairs, the fleet consisting chiefly of obsolete or useless vessels, and a considerable lack of sea training among its officers and men. One of the chief obstacles to naval reform was the enormous number of officers in relation to the size of the fleet. The task of pensioning off or otherwise reducing the officer corps would have to be faced, a task which would only be made more difficult by the fact that a large majority of the younger officers were supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{185}

It was decided, as a first step in the reorganization of the Navy, to send three vessels, the cruisers Hamidiye, Abdülmecid, and one of the destroyers lately constructed abroad, with full crews and equipment, on a practice cruise in Turkish waters. It was believed that the majority of the old vessels rotting at the Golden Horn and the Dardanelles were to be sold for what they would fetch as old iron.\textsuperscript{186} Four old battleships of the

\textsuperscript{182} "The Progress of Reform", \textit{The Times}, August 21, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{183} The council consisted of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Ethem Pasha, Ferik Riza Pasha, the head of the Ordnance Department, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Commander of the First Army Corps, and Izzet Pasha, the President of the Chief of Staff, who met under the presidency of the Minister of War (Cemal Kutay, \textit{"Uc Pasalar Kavgasi}, pp.36-37).
\textsuperscript{184} "Abdul Hamid and the Committee", \textit{The Times}, August 12, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{186} "The Reorganization of the Navy", \textit{The Times}, August 20, 1908, p.3.
Aziziye class, two or three coast defence ships, and a number of sloops and gunboats, twenty-two vessels in all, which had been struck off the effective list, would be sold. It was anticipated that the Ministry of the Navy would demand permission of Parliament to employ a considerable number of foreign instructors, the majority of whom were likely to be British.

A PROFOUND mistrust of Abdülhamid pervaded the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress; and it was remarkable how little was heard during the first days of the Revolution of the Caliph, a word which had been such a valuable factor in maintaining the old regime and all its iniquities.

A Turkish diplomat at the Embassy in London, who was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress, told the reporter of The New York Times that, in his opinion, the constitutional movement would not attain complete success until Abdülhamid was succeeded on the throne by his younger brother, Mehmed Resad. Long before the revolution was accomplished, the accession of Mehmed Resad had been looked forward to as the day of liberation of Turkey. It was quite well known that Mehmed Resad would grant a Constitution. He was believed to be in sympathy with the ideals of the Committee of Union and Progress.

According to an unconfirmed dispatch from Geneva, dated August 18, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress were to meet in that city the end of August to discuss the question of deposing the Sultan, and, in case of an affirmative decision, to select a successor.

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187. "Turkey: Military and Naval Reforms", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
188. "The Reorganization of the Navy", The Times, August 20, 1908, p.3.
The military and the Committee of Union and Progress were seriously thinking of getting rid of the Sultan. They thought him even capable of bringing in Russia and Bulgaria with a view to overthrowing the Constitution. In late August the power of the Sultan and the monarchists had been all but obliterated and replaced by the Committee of Union and Progress.

Rumours were afloat that the Sultan himself, who could not be trusted by the Committee of Union and Progress, had to either share the fate of his sycophants or perhaps even pay a greater penalty. But the leaders of the movement realized that they would be incurring a grave risk were they to resort to extremities, and that they would not only incur the disapproval of foreign powers but also of the strict Moslems who still looked to their Caliph as the power to be worshipped. The Committee of Union and Progress also regarded the Sultan as a useful figure head and an aid to stability. The feeling against the Sultan was, however, on the increase among the population. This was especially due to the return of exiles who had spent long years outside the country and who were eager for some kind of revenge.

With the sweeping changes in the state apparatus and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876, however defective it might have been in its liberal provisions, the immediate threat to a return to absolutism was practically ruled out. Although not formally in power, the Committee of Union and Progress was both strong as a political organization and had the overwhelming support of the population. Preparations were being made for general

elections, at which the Unionists were expected to win a landslide victory and capture the majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. All Unionist attention was diverted to the election campaign and the ongoing bargaining with the various groups who were aspiring to be part of the future government. The Sultan had been stripped of his powers and was no more than a constitutional monarch, a figurehead, who would have little to do with the political affairs of the country in the future. There was no need to worry about a reactionary attempt on the part of Abdülhamid. He had been rendered harmless; or, many so believed.
Chapter 5

FORCES OF OPPOSITION TO THE NEW REGIME

LITTLE attention has been paid to the ideology of the new regime and the ensuing political conflicts due to ideological change not only in the form of government but in the structuration of political discourse. The old regime represented, ideologically, all the idiosyncraices of a truly non-modern political entity. The empire was polyglot, not unlike the configuration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Up until the Revolution of 1908, the various ethnic, religious, and national communities had been held together through a loose state structure where communities had a large degree of autonomy. Although politically subservient and dependent on the central government, the various communities existed as distinct entities, often, but not exclusively, in a clearly delineated geographic locality. In short, the way the political system functioned was not dissimilar to the workings of a feudal system where the centre had a network of alliances with local notables who exercised a measure of control over their own domains.

The Unionists were determined to destroy this archaic structure. The Revolution represented, among other things, a new concept of state along with a new concept of citizenship. The state would be transformed from a quasi-feudal absolutist monarchy to a modern liberal democracy in which government would be responsible to its citizens.

Not only were the privileges of such pillars of the absolutist regime as the monarchy and the old bureaucracy destroyed, but so were those of the various ethnic and religious communities, privilege in general being considered a vestige of the old regime and a barrier to equality. Previously, these communities had distinct rights and privileges as well as certain exemptions, though they were also excluded from participation in
government. Especially religious in nature, these privileges mainly amounted to the right of the various churches to run the day to day affairs of their communities, and provide education. The church hierarchies, especially the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Armenian Patriarchate also had extensive rights to represent their communities against the state authorities. Thus, state authority was neither superior nor exclusive under the old regime.

Matters became more complex with the introduction of foreign power supervision over domestic affairs. After the mid-nineteenth century, the monarchy's alliance with European Powers, or to be more exact, its reliance on foreign support for its own survival, had resulted in its acceptance of the "international" protection of these various religious and ethnic communities by these powers. In addition, many individual members of these religious and ethnic groups were citizens of the Powers, and as such, enjoyed personal protection as well as exemption from most taxation in the field of commerce, and immunity from Ottoman law. There were, then, privileged groups and individuals within a country, which was already highly hierarchical and exclusionary.

On the other hand, not everyone enjoyed immunity from Ottoman law where non-Moslems were considered inferior subjects, and if they were exempt from certain obligations, they were also denied certain rights. They were not allowed to serve in certain state bureaucracies, the most visible of these being the military bureaucracy. Army was exclusively for the Moslems. Thus, non-Moslems were also excluded from the rank and file, and each community was required to pay a tax commensurate with its male population for this exclusion from military duty.

Bent on Liberty, Equality, Justice, and Fraternity, the Unionist conception of citizenship could not tolerate the separate classification of citizens into hierarchical categories of race, religion or ethnic identity.

Organised religion was the first to feel the effects of the new citizenship. Religious authorities, Christian as well as Moslem, were stripped of authority over their communities
as the state tried to absorb many functions, such as education, previously held by the churches and mosques. Traditional authority, represented by clerics among the Christians and ulama among the Moslems, was intentionally hard-hit; after all, it had been the main collaborator as well as the principal beneficiary of the old regime. Thus, much was at stake on both a general and an individual level.

The liberation of an oppressed population from absolutist monarchy and the destruction of traditional religious authority, however, failed to produce a society where equal citizenship could be immediately and readily appreciated. The new citizenship gave each individual an honourable existence in a state run by its own representatives, but it also stripped individuals of their old local and parochial identities.

Under these circumstances, the possibility of a religious and nationalist reaction couched in counter-revolutionary terms was very real. In order to maintain their privileged positions they enjoyed under the old regime, monarchist notables and clergy fostered animosity towards the new regime in the guise of protecting the rights of their communities. The success of this demagoguery can only be described as tragic. Not only did ethnic and national communities lend their support to the monarchists in their endeavour to suppress the Revolution, perpetuating their less than honourable existence under conditions of inequality, but also they had the misfortune of being led by reactionary forces in their later attempts to achieve national autonomy and, finally, complete independence. In most cases, as in Albania and especially in the Arab provinces, the presence of monarchist and reactionary forces at the helm of these independence movements insured continued poverty and inequity after independence had been achieved. Populations now enjoyed the dubious privilege of being oppressed by monarchist and reactionary forces of their own ethnic and religious background.

The struggle between the Committee of Union and Progress on the one hand and the ethnic, national, and religious forces on the other began with the fall of the old regime and the establishment of the new one in the Summer of 1908. The alignment of political
forces along the axis of reaction and revolution thus corresponded to the axis of separatism and unity. The Unionist programme precipitated this alignment, envisioning as it did a liberal democratic society with liberty, equality and justice for all citizens.

ACCORDING to reports of August 18, the Unionist leadership at Salonica had elected a committee to prepare a political programme for the upcoming elections. The programme was said to contain a proposal for the readjustment of Macedonia’s administrative districts, the details of which were to be left to the future Parliament. It also advocated state supervised education at both the primary and secondary levels. This educational reform would involve the suppression of the Gymnasia hitherto maintained by the different nationalities. Technical schools would also be instituted and measures taken for the improvement of economic conditions. Ecclesiastical privilege would be respected and seminaries would be permitted. Universal military service would also be introduced.¹ In an interview with The Times, Enver Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, stated that all Ottoman citizens should bear their share of personal military service, regardless of their faith or creed.²

By late August, it had become apparent that the Unionist educational programme would encounter strenuous opposition from all the Christian nationalities in Macedonia. None of the various minorities, least of all the Greeks, would abandon the educational privileges so jealously guarded in the past. The attempt to impose Turkish as the language of instruction in all secondary schools in particular promised to lead to serious complications.³

The Greek community formulated its demands and delivered these to the Committee of Union and Progress headquarters at Salonica.⁴ In conformity with the ideas of the

¹. "The Young Turk Programme", The Times, August 19, 1908, p.5.
². "Enver Bey on Young Turkish Aims", The Times, September 1, 1908, p.3.
³. "Difficulties in Macedonia", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5.
⁴. "Difficulties in Macedonia", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5.
Unionists, freedom of person, freedom of conscience, and respect for acquired rights were laid down as fundamental principles. The maintenance of ecclesiastic and scholastic privileges, however, occupied the most prominent place. The complete preservation of all privileges accorded the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the restoration of those which had been revoked were vehemently insisted upon.\(^5\) The Greek community also demanded a system of army recruitment where military units would be composed of people of the same faith and belonging to the same districts.\(^6\) With regard to local government, it was proposed that existing district councils be enlarged and made more independent of the central government with regard to local affairs, by limiting the number of \textit{ex officio} members of these councils to a third of the whole body, the elected members being chosen by direct popular vote, and revising and re-arranging the administrative boundaries. Greater financial independence would also be accorded to the districts. Further proposals included the use of the language spoken by the majority of the population in official documents and courts of law, the formation of local militia, the recognition of the right of various ecclesiastical communities to collect certain dues, and the admission of all Ottoman citizens to state employment.\(^7\)

The Bulgarian and Romanian programmes also advocated a wide measure of decentralisation and autonomy. The desire expressed by all the Christian nationalities for autonomous institutions, and the virtual unanimity with regard to the educational question, apparently impressed the Unionists who now began preparing a modified programme.\(^8\)

By late August, however, it was clear that the demands advanced by the Macedonian nationalities were not to be regarded as definitive, but were intended to enable

\(^5\) "Difficulties in Macedonia", \textit{The Times}, August 26, 1908, p.5; and, "Greeks and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, August 28, 1908, p.5.
\(^6\) "Difficulties in Macedonia", \textit{The Times}, August 26, 1908, p.5; and, "Greeks and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, August 28, 1908, p.5.
\(^7\) "Difficulties in Macedonia", \textit{The Times}, August 26, 1908, p.5; and, "Greeks and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, August 28, 1908, p.5.
\(^8\) "Greeks and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, August 28, 1908, p.5.
the Unionists to form a general conception of their political aspirations. Similarly, the Unionist programme was not to be taken as final, but rather, as the preamble had stated, as an attempt at a compromise which the Unionists hoped to present before the future Parliament. In point of fact, a certain number of the suggestions made by the representatives of the Christian nationalities were included in the Unionist programme, such as the Bulgarian demand for the Senate's abolition. The fourth clause, which promised an "extension of authority in the administrative system", indicated a possible concession on the issue of local autonomy, though it might well have also meant greater independence would be accorded to governors. There was, however, no indication of compromise on the educational question. Even in primary schools, the teaching of the Turkish language would be obligatory, although instruction would, apparently, be given in the children's mother tongue. The secondary higher schools would be mixed, that is, common to all nationalities, and in these Turkish would be the language of instruction.9

Strong Christian opposition, however, did force the Committee of Union and Progress to reconsider its position with the result that by the first week of September, the Unionists were preparing a final electoral programme in which they pledged not to interfere with the various secondary Christian schools and gymnasia, which would be maintained as before.10

THE COMMITTEE of Union and Progress released its programme to the public on October 6.11 The Unionists insisted on ministerial accountability to the Chamber where ministers would have to obtain the approval of a majority of the Chamber in order to stay in office. The official language would be Turkish, and all official correspondence would be

9. "Racial Aspirations in Macedonia", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
conducted in Turkish. Every citizen in the Empire would have the same rights and obligations without any discrimination of racial, ethnic or religious differences. Accordingly, the last section of Article 113 of the Constitution which restricted individual freedoms would be lifted. Provided he had the qualifications, every citizen would have the right to hold public office, and all males --whether Christian, Jewish or Moslem-- would have to serve in the army without exception. Reductions in the army would also be affected. Laws to arbitrate between employers and workers would be enacted, and land reform, providing the peasantry with land without infringing on the rights of the landed classes, would also be implemented. Agrarian taxation would be revised and modernised. Modern methods in agriculture would be encouraged so as to increase the wealth of the country and develop the economy. Finally, there would be no restrictions on private schools, as long as these abided by the Constitution. Regardless, all schools would be under the state's supervision. State would take every step to provide education for its citizens. Turkish would be the language of education in all primary schools. All secondary and higher education would be primarily in Turkish. Religious schools would be exempt from such practice. ¹²

IN its negotiations with the Unionists, the Bulgarian minority would be represented by a group of Bulgarian revolutionaries known as the Internal Organization. Because this organisation was opposed both to the Bulgarian Church and to the conservative government of autonomous Bulgaria, it was likely that the Unionists and the Internal Organization would be favourably disposed towards each other. A complete understanding between the Bulgarians and Turks in Macedonia, who together formed the vast majority of the population, would bring about a radical alteration in the conditions of life hitherto existing there. ¹³

¹³ "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 11, 1908, p.5.
In early August, the Internal Organization's leader, Sandansky, arrived in Salonica. His goal was to enlist The Committee of Union and Progress in his organization's struggle with traditional Bulgarian authorities. Accordingly, he described the Exarch, the Bulgarian Patriarch, as the tool of the Bulgarian Government, and urged that schools in Macedonia should be withdrawn from his jurisdiction and be subjected to the Turkish Ministry of Education. On its part, the Committee of Union and Progress hoped to secure a cessation of civil strife in the region and enlist the Internal Organization in its upcoming electoral campaign. Sandansky declared that his organization was prepared to lay down its weapons provided it be granted an extensive measure of local administrative autonomy. Though the Committee of Union and Progress had no objection to this, it refrained from entering into any definite agreement at that time.

By mid-August, though negotiations had still not yielded any concrete agreement, Sandansky had succeeded in prejudicing the Unionists against other Bulgarian nationalist and monarchist leaders. The Internal Organisation put forth a new series of proposals which included Sandansky's pledge that his organisation would take an active part against Bulgaria in case of a conflict. Sandansky's efforts to enlist the Unionist support promised to have a sinister effect on already strained Turco-Bulgarian relations. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Government's attitude towards the Internal Organization had become cold, apparently in consequence of Sandansky's cooperation with the Committee of Union and Progress.

By mid-August, Enver Bey was in Monastir in order to prepare the electoral ground for the Internal Organisation's candidates. The Bulgarians of Monastir, whose previous relations with the Turks were far more strained than those between Turks and Greeks,

14. "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 11, 1908, p.5; and, "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 15, 1908, p.1.
15. "Turkey: Difficulties of the Situation", The Times, August 12, 1908, p.5.
16. "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3.
17. "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3.
remained sceptical until the Turkish administration in Monastir released about nine hundred Bulgarian prisoners, forty of whom had been sentenced to death by the absolutist regime. Panitza, Deliradeff, and other Sandansky adherents had also left Salonica for electoral campaigns, and at Üsküb, the Internal Organisation founded a political club along the lines of that which they had already instituted at Salonica. The Bulgarian Bishop of Üsküb, who supported Sandansky, attended the club's inauguration, at which Tchernopeeff, Sandansky's lieutenant, made a speech attacking the Bulgarian Government.

By late August, however, relations between the Unionists and Sandansky had cooled considerably. The Unionists, who were at first anxious to conciliate all groups and were attracted to Sandansky's stand, quickly discovered that Sandansky's influence was limited; during the electoral campaign, the Bulgarian community had been, on the whole, hostile to Sandansky's methods and ideas, and his candidates were fairing poorly in their campaigns. Having witnessed yhis first hand, the Unionists, who were at first attracted by Sandansky's readiness to obliterate the purely Macedonian question and sink it in a larger federal scheme, began to question the Internal Organisation's abilities.

Negotiations nonetheless continued. The Bulgarians demanded the reorganization and reduction of the military, including a reduction in the period of military service, in conformity with the nation's economic and international situation. Sandansky also argued for financial reform, such as the reduction of officials' salaries, pushed for the population's material and cultural advancement, and demanded the institution of national schools in which the language of instruction would be that of the district, elementary instruction in Turkish being obligatory. He also demanded a complete amnesty; and called for the

18. "Bulgarians and Young Turks", The Times, August 21, 1908, p.5.
19. "The Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 10, 1908, p.1; and, "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3.
20. "Sandansky and the Young Turks", The Times, August 18, 1908, p.3.
21. "Difficulties in Macedonia", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5.
22. "Racial Aspirations in Macedonia", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
deposition of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{23}

Sandansky's proposals did not include any demand for local autonomy analogous to those granted to Lebanon or Samos. On the contrary, the preamble stated that a scheme of comprehensive autonomy had been abandoned in deference to the Unionist-backed principle of the Empire's integrity. As such, only provincial or district self-government was proposed. There were no demands for the creation of a special militia, as the Greeks had proposed, organised by religious belief.\textsuperscript{24}

The Unionists rejected Sandansky's programme. The latter responded by issuing a circular to his adherents, charging the Committee of Union and Progress with vacillation and irresolution, and declaring that the Internal Organization would henceforth remain unchanged. He also accused Turkish authorities and landowners of continued oppression. Apparently, this signalled the end of relations between the two groups.\textsuperscript{25}

Ultimately, however, Sandansky's actions failed to match his rhetoric, and on September 3/4, the negotiations at Salonica were proceeding tranquilly. Both sides seemed reluctant to take up a fixed position or to make any declaration partaking of the character of an ultimatum. The Internal Organization disclaimed all urgency for its proposals, which, it said, should be taken as statements of principle, the discussion of which might be advantageously reserved for a more general congress representing all the Ottoman groups. In deference to Moslem sentiment, the Internal Organization further withdrew its proposal for the Sultan's deposition. Sandansky suggested that in order to interest the population in the new regime's preservation, the election of municipal and administrative councils in accordance with the Law of the Provinces of 1869 --which the old regime had allowed to lapse-- be implemented as soon as possible. Furthermore, in view of the reactionary threat, the Organization suggested the formation of a national militia composed of all elements of

\textsuperscript{23} "Bulgarians and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, September 4, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{24} "Bulgarians and Young Turks", \textit{The Times}, September 4, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{25} "Difficulties in Macedonia", \textit{The Times}, August 26, 1908, p.5.
the population known for their loyalty to the Constitution.26

Elections would be held on September 13 under the auspices of the various Bulgarian clubs which had been established both in Macedonia and Edirne province, a congress of which would meet in Salonica on September 30. The congress, which would consist of about one hundred members, would draw up a programme for the Constitutional Bulgarian Party in Turkey.27

In the choice of candidates for the general elections, there would be little room for dispute between the various Bulgarian groups as there were only seven or eight Bulgarians whose Turkish citizenship rendered them eligible as deputies.28

ARMENIANS were by far the most important Unionist supporters, and the fact that the Unionists and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had worked together in exile in order to destroy the absolutist monarchy boded well for future negotiations. The cooperation and relations between these two groups were highly strong and amiable.

On August 6, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Daschnaktsoutioun, published its declaration in Istanbul. It demanded free movement throughout the Armenian provinces, the return of land which had been unlawfully occupied, the abolition of repression and persecution, the release of all Armenian political prisoners, and the repatriation of Armenian political refugees.29 In late August, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation also distributed a proclamation in the Anatolian provinces, celebrating the Revolution's success and praising the new era of freedom, equality, and justice.30

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, however, was not alone in its claim for

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26. "Bulgarians and Young Turks", The Times, September 5, 1908, p.5.
28. "Racial Aspirations in Macedonia", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
Armenian representation. The Armenian Patriarchate, which the old regime had recognised as the official representative of the Armenian community, also claimed the right to represent its constituency. Politically, the Patriarchate represented the interests of those wealthy Armenians who had benefitted from and had been an integral part of the absolutist regime.  

Previously underground, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation acquired legal status following the Revolution. Though the Patriarch tried to establish his authority over the Federation, the organisation, which enjoyed considerable support and prestige because of its struggle against the old regime, refused to submit, denouncing the Patriarch and his supporters as money-worshippers and pseudo-patriots.  

On October 1, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation published a revised programme, which now differed somewhat from the Unionists'. Like the Unionists, they took liberty and equality to be the inalienable rights of every individual, and demanded the suppression of religious privileges. They were also ardent supporters of a democratic and constituional regime based on popular representation, and rejected foreign intervention in the political, administrative, financial, and economic affairs of the country. Unlike the Unionists, however, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation stated that its agenda was socialist, and it declared itself in support of an economic system where everyone would receive in proportion to what they produced. Most important, they opposed a system of centralized administration, which, they argued, would be unsuitable in a country with different nationalities and races. They favoured the widest degree of local, legislative and

31. Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.418.
32. Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict, pp.159-165. See also, Puzantion, October 9, 1909, and Azadamard, October 13 and 14, 1909, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.418.
33. "Programme de la Fédération Révolutionnaire Arménienne Daschnakzoutioun: Plateform électorale et programme pour la première législature du Parlement Ottoma", Pro Armenia, October 10, 1908, pp.1365-1366; and, "Armenians and Turkish Reform", The Times, October 6, 1908, p.5.
administrative autonomy.34

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation also advanced a number of specific and concrete proposals in addition to these more general points. They proposed that at least twenty to twenty-five percent of those revenues collected within an administrative unit be spent locally. Except for representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Governor, and the like, they demanded that local councils nominate all other government officials. They further proposed that provincial borders be re-drawn so as to allow for more ethnic and national homogeneity within each province. On constitutional questions, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation demanded the requisite revisions for a policy of decentralisation, the establishment of ministerial responsibility, the suppression of the Senate, and the abolition of the two-degree electoral system in favour of universal direct suffrage.35

On the issue of education, they proposed to make primary education obligatory, and demanded the use of the mother tongue in schools as well as the division of the education budget in proportion to the population of the various communities. While the Armenian Revolutionary Federation recognised Turkish as the official language, it suggested that officials appointed to provinces in which other languages were spoken be required to submit to a proficiency test therein. They also demanded a reduction in the number of state employees.36

On economic and fiscal matters, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation demanded that, by distribution of state land, every peasant be guaranteed a minimum amount of land. Laws would be promulgated to protect agricultural workers, providing them with enough

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34. "Programme de la Fédération Révolutionnaire Arménienne Daschnakzoutioun: Plateform électorale et programme pour la première législature du Parlement Ottoman", Pro Armenia, October 10, 1908, p.1365.
36. "Programme de la Fédération Révolutionnaire Arménienne Daschnakzoutioun: Plateform électorale et programme pour la première législature du Parlement Ottoman", Pro Armenia, October 10, 1908, p.1366; and, "Arménians and Turkish Reform", The Times, October 6, 1908, p.5.
products to assure their subsistence. The revenues of communal lands, such as forests and pastures, would be used for local educational expenses. Mines and other natural resources would be exploited according to public interest. They advocated a reduction in total taxation on agricultural and farm products from over thirty percent to about seven percent, amnesty for past tax debts, state credits which would be accessible to producers, and insurance of agricultural production against natural calamities. They also supported a progressive income and inheritance tax. 37

In regard to the industrial work force, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation proposed the creation of a Ministry of Labour to look after the affairs of industry and labour, and the institution of a labour code to protect workers from exploitation. The code would proscribe maximum hours of work, and conditions of female and child labour, making it illegal to employ children below the age of fifteen. The state would also provide workers with insurance for occupational accidents and illnesses. 38

On October 17, Ahmed Riza Bey, Talat Bey, and Lieutenant Hakkı Bey left Istanbul for Salonica to attend the congress of the Committee of Union and Progress which opened the following day and ended November 8. 39 The members of the Central Committee and a majority of the group leaders from European Turkey and Anatolia were present at the Congress; all were in constant communication with Istanbul and the chief provincial centres. 40

The congress discussed the Unionist programme, its internal organization --namely

the Central Committee's political role and the role of the local branches-- as well as
domestic and foreign policy issues.41 Though it was generally believed that the resolutions
passed favoured a more energetic internal policy, in order to pacify the monarchists, the
Committee of Union and Progress announced that it would protect the Sultan from attack as
long as he supported the Constitutional regime.42

This affirmed, the Unionist programme was drawn up and approved. It emphasized
the importance of the electorate's education through publication of literature in a language
familiar to the masses. Such publications would outline the rights and obligations of
citizens, advocate educational reforms, and encourage the development of private enterprise
among all segments of society. Also, the government would be invited to take immediate
action for the extension of the powers of provincial governors, with the object of ensuring
greater administrative decentralization, and thereby a more rapid development of provincial
resources.43

Finally, the congress decided that Unionist members who were elected deputies
would form a political party in the Chamber of Deputies. This was in response to
monarchist accusations that the Committee of Union and Progress was an underground
organization working under a cloud secrecy, and that the names of Unionist members were
not publicly released. Regulations would also be drawn up governing the relations of the
Committee to the army, and the new Central Committee was elected.44

41. "The Turkish Constitution", The Times, October 28, 1908, p.9; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye
İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9426.
42. "The Turkish Constitution", The Times, October 28, 1908, p.9; Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar
Kavgasi, p.45; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9426.
43. "Turkish Internal Affairs: Programme of the Committee", The Times, November 20, 1908,
p.10; and, Suray-i Ümmet, October 31, 1324/November 13, 1908, reproduced in Tarik Zafer Tunaya,
44. "Turkish Internal Affairs: Programme of the Committee", The Times, November 20, 1908,
p.10; and, Suray-i Ümmet, October 31, 1324/November 13, 1908, reproduced in Tarik Zafer Tunaya,

Ittihad ve Terakki, the Salonica organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, published some
of the decisions of the Unionist Congress held at Salonica from October 19 to November 7 ("Turkish
Internal Affairs: Programme of the Committee", The Times, November 20, 1908, p.10).
The minority issue had been the subject of heated discussion in the daily press. *Tanin* supported a unified system in contrast to the decentralized approach of the old regime. The Unionists wanted to abolish both religious and ethnic privileges, by forging a new concept of citizenship in which all subjects would have the same rights and obligations—a move which the monarchists, and particularly the Greek community which had been the main beneficiary of the existing state of affairs under the absolutist regime, vigorously opposed. The Greek language dailies, *Proodos* and *Neologos*, consistently supported the monarchist position.  

Ahmed Cevdet Bey, the owner of the monarchist *Ikdam*, also controlled *Proodos*, and together with *Serbesti*, which began publication on November 16, led a concerted attack on the Committee of Union and Progress. The fact that the Congress had been held in closed session and that the Central Committee’s composition had yet been announced was deliberately misinterpreted by the monarchist press as signalling the organization’s dissolution. Unionist papers refuted these allegations and announced the members of the newly-elected Central Committee. They were Hüseyin Kadri Bey, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, Hayri Bey, Talat Bey, Ahmed Riza Bey, Enver Bey, Habib Bey, and *Ipekli Hafiz* Ibrahim Efendi.

THE GREEK community was the Unionists’ ablest and best organised opponent. This had mostly to do with the fact that, unlike the Armenian Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate held unrivalled sway over the Greek community and enjoyed the full support of the Greek Government.

The Greek Patriarch, Joachim Efendi, fully realised that the new regime posed a

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threat to the privileges of his community. In late August, he responded by issuing a proclamation which demanded that the Government guarantee the freedoms of individuals and conscience, accept the traditionally acquired rights of his community as fundamental principles, confirm ecclesiastical and educational privileges, restore those previously revoked privileges accorded to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek community, permit the various communities to develop on the basis of their religion and traditions, and implement a system of military recruitment in which units would be formed on the basis of religious and ethnic affiliation and would be deployed in the district of recruitment.49

In particular, the Greek Patriarchate insisted on the maintenance of those privileges which it had enjoyed since the fifteenth century. On their part, the Unionists proposed to revise the laws relating to its jurisdiction over matters of marriage and inheritance. The Patriarchate, it was stated, would appeal to the Great Powers and would forbid all Greeks from taking part in the upcoming general elections.50

While the Unionists remained publicly silent, the situation gave the monarchists an opportunity to win the Greek vote. On August 29, Ahmed Fazli Tung, one of the members of Prince Sabahaddin's inner circle, went to see Joachim Efendi to assure him that steps would be taken to preserve the special rights and privileges in question.51 Some days later, on September 8, Prince Sabahaddin himself visited Joachim Efendi, the Greek Patriarch, and reiterated earlier assurances of his group.52

49. Tanin, August 14, 1324/August 27, 1908 and August 15, 1324/August 28, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.407.
51. "The Ecumenical Patriarchate", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 31, 1908, p.1. Also, Tanin, August 16, 1324/August 29, 1908 and August 17, 1324/August 30, 1908; and, F.O. 371/546/30971, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, September 1, 1908. quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.407.
52. "Le prince Sabaheddine", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 9, 1908, p.2. See also, F.O. 371/559/34308, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, September 28, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.407.
During the last weeks of August, chauvinistically conservative segments of the Greek press became increasingly active. According to a telegram from Salonica, Greek newspapers there accused the Committee of Union and Progress of favouring the Bulgarians. They further warned the Unionists not to interfere with the Greek Bishops, as these, unlike the Izzets and Melhames, would not be intimidated by threats. The Istanbul Greek conservative daily, *Proodos*, adopted a similar tone, and threatened that, if the Patriarchate's privileges were not respected, the Greek community would abstain from all participation in the new regime.  

The Unionists continued to rebuke the violent language of the chauvinistic Greek press, stating that the wave of attacks was calculated to hinder the reconciliation of the various nationalities which the Committee of Union and Progress earnestly desired.

Nonetheless, the attacks continued. The September 13 issue of *Ekklesiastiki Alitheia*, the organ of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, criticised the Unionist educational policy --namely, the adoption of a common educational course in government-run primary schools, the institution of Turkish and the language of the majority of the inhabitants of each locality as the media of instruction in those schools, and the employment of Turkish as the sole medium of instruction in secondary and higher schools-- as the product of Pan-Turkism, designed to strangle the national consciousness of each community. The article demanded the abandonment of such a policy, declaring that its adoption would make the cooperation of Greeks and Turks impossible.

Throughout, Joachim Efendi was in close touch with the Greek Government in Athens, itself extrememly interested in the Turkish elections. In a telegram dated October 20, Baltatzis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the Patriarch instructions on how to intervene in the electoral process, including advice that he bribe Turkish dailies to take up

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53. "Turkey", *The Times*, September 2, 1908, p.5.
55. *Ekklesiastiki Alitheia*. September 13, 1908. quoted in "Turkey: The Diverse Races", *The Times*, September 14, 1908, p.5.
his cause rather than establish more Greek papers. Baltatzis informed Joachim Efendi that he could count on the continued supply of funds for these and other similar activities which the Greek Patriarchate at Istanbul was entrusted to carry on. The Patriarch was also instructed to give financial support to Ismail Kemal Bey, the Albanian monarchist, who was attempting to influence the elections in the monarchists' favour. 56

The Greek community was consistently protesting against election procedures in districts where they represented a sizable minority. They were demanding greater representation for the Greek vote, disputing census figures upon which quotas of minority representation was based. Several days after receiving instructions from the Greek Government, Joachim Efendi took his grievances to Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vezier, who declared that he saw no evidence of fraud or foul play and countered that the Greek claims must have been based on false information. Joachim Efendi thereupon threatened to boycott the elections and to resign unless the Government took measures to rectify what he considered a grave injustice. 57 The atmosphere in Istanbul was tense. The Unionists decided to intervene in the hopes of breaking the deadlock between the Government and the Patriarch. On October 23, a deputation of two Turks, Muhtar Bey and Hasan Bey, and one Greek, Orphanides, visited Joachim Efendi and offered him representation in the Chamber proportional to his community's population. He accepted the offer and appointed two representatives to work out the details with the Committee of Union and Progress. 58 The Greek press of Istanbul, however, kept its sceptical attitude towards the Unionist promise.

56. G. Baltatzis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Joachim Efendi, the Greek Patriarch, Athens, October 20, 1908, quoted in Eduard Driault and Michel Lhéritier. Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 a nos Jours, 5, p.8. See also. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9457.
57. "Les élections et l’élément grec", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 17, 1908, p.2; "S.S. le Patriarche Ecuménique a la Sublime Porte", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 22, 1908, p.2; and, Stamboul, October 23 and 24, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", pp.407-408.
58. "The Ottoman Committee and the Greeks", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 24, 1908, p.1; and, Tarih, October 11, 1324/October 24, 1908, October 12, 1324/October 25, 1908, and October 13, 1324/October 26, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.408.
of proportional representation for the Greeks in the Chamber.\textsuperscript{59}

Towards the beginning of November, however, discussions with the Committee of Union and Progress ran into difficulty, and the Patriarch again approached the Government. This time he was received by Hakki Bey, the Minister of the Interior.\textsuperscript{60} Joachim Efendi repeated his grievances and accused the Government of discriminating against his community in the elections. To the specific question of the eligibility of Greek peasants in Epirus, Hakki Bey replied that as they were not Ottoman subjects, they would not be permitted to vote. There would, however, be Greek deputies representing that region.\textsuperscript{61}

A few days later, Greek and Armenian Church leaders agreed to present a common front in the Istanbul elections and sent a delegation to present a list of their grievances to the Government. The two communities complained that they were not enjoying proportional representation. Hakki Bey once again assured them that the authorities had made every effort to respect their rights, though he ultimately rejected their demands.\textsuperscript{62}

On November 11, a delegation from Prince Sabahaddin's Liberal Union visited the Patriarch to discuss possibilities of cooperation in the upcoming general elections. Though Joachim Efendi agreed to the proposal in theory, after consulting with his advisors, he declared that his position forced him to remain above politics and, therefore, could not agree to openly cooperate with a political party. He saw no reason, however, why Greek and Liberal Union deputies could not support each other in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{59} "La presse greque", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, October 27, 1908, p.2.
\textsuperscript{60} "The Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 5, 1908, p.1.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Tanin}, October 22, 1324/November 4, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.408.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Stamboul}, November 11, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.408.
\textsuperscript{63} "News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 12, 1908, p.1; and, \textit{Stamboul}, November 12, 13, and 14, 1908, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", p.409.
ALBANIANS were a sizable minority in northeastern Macedonia who found, following the Revolution, means of expressing themselves which they had not been able to do under the absolutist regime. Many Albanians felt that the declaration of the Constitution created the ideal situation for the development of a national movement. On July 23, the day Unionists took control of Salonica and declared the establishment of the new regime, the first speech in Albanian was delivered at Olympus Square, praising Albanian national identity. 64 Speeches made on several other occasions introduced the same patriotic note and ended with the chant 'Long Live Liberty! Long Live Albania!' 65

Another sign of possible discord was the disappointment of many Albanians, who appeared to think that they had been duped into accepting the Constitution, which they had not realized would, when put into effect, do away with many of their privileges, such as exemption from military service and taxation. The better informed among them, inhabitants of Scutari for instance, had never had any illusions on that point, and had refused to support the Constitution. 66 Moslem Albanians of Djakova and Ipek had treated with scorn the idea of equality between Christians and Moslems, and declared that they would like to be governed only in accordance with the principles of sharia. 67

But the attitude of most Albanians was somewhat obscure. 68 The great majority of chiefs appeared to have been won over to the Committee of Union and Progress, though the bulk of the population apparently knew nothing about the Constitution. The chiefs, who had held a meeting at Verisovitch before the Revolution and sent the telegram to Istanbul demanding a Constitution, had only induced their clansmen to accompany them by stating

68. "Les Albanais", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 4, 1908, p.3.
that the meeting was being held to protest European interference in Macedonia. At that meeting, the notorious Issa Boletinatz had opposed the move to support the establishment of a constitutional regime and had advocated the maintenance of absolutism. Following the Revolution, Muzaffer Pasha, a monarchist and the head of the military commission which was preparing a report on the Mitrovitza-Uvatz railway, approached Issa Boletinatz to enlist his support in a counter-revolutionary plot. Having obtained reports of the plot, officers loyal to the Committee of Union and Progress had seized Muzaffer Pasha and sent him to Salonica. 69

Immediately after the proclamation of the Constitution, Albanian national clubs were formed in the principal towns of the Albanian provinces as well as in some centres of the Empire where Albanians were concentrated. The avowed aim of these clubs was the cultural development of the Albanian people. 70 Among them, the Istanbul, Monastir and Salonica clubs were the most important. The Istanbul club was formed at the end of August and included a number of distinguished Albanians of all sects, among them a celebrated Merdite chief. 71 By September 21, its statutes had been drawn up and a large mansion situated opposite Sultan Mahmud's mausoleum had been rented. 72 It began its activities on September 24. 73 The Albanian club at Monastir, the Union, or Bashkimi, was founded in late August but began its activities on September 14 under the leadership of George Kyrias. 74 At the inauguration of the Society of the Albanians, or Shqëri e Shqiptarëvet, at Salonica in September, Midhat Frasheri, an Albanian intellectual with pro-Unionist leanings who had been elected its President, stressed that the clubs did not have any

69. "Turkey: Incidents in Macedonia", The Times, August 12, 1908, p.5.
71. "L'Union Albanaise", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 31, 1908, p.2; and, "Turkey", The Times, September 1, 1908, p.3.
73. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9423.
74. The founders of the club asked for the Sultan's financial assistance, who immediately responded by sending 100 Turkish liras ("Albanian Club at Monastir", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 31, 1908, p.1). See also, Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, p.350.
political goals, only humanitarian and educational ones. 75 Despite such statements, the clubs did in fact become centres of political activity for Albanian nationalists. 76 At the Congress of Monastir, which met in November, it was decided that the Monastir club would occupy a central position around which the other clubs, numbering twelve, would converge. 77 The Albanian nationalists seemed to favour the programme of decentralisation which Prince Sabahaddin had advanced. 78

Nonetheless, for the moment, Albanian nationalists were aware that in order to work among the Albanians, they would have to give at least nominal support to the new regime; which meant that the national cause had to pursue a more or less common course with the Unionists. The Albanian nationalists, on the whole, had no confidence in the durability of the new regime; they only wanted it to serve as a means to an end. 79 Unionist surveillance of the clubs, however, prevented the Albanian nationalists from carrying out their activities in the open, and they, therefore, resorted to the formation of secret committees. 80

Though Albania was quiet, the situation in the northern districts remained ambiguous. The Moslem population at Scutari showed no zeal for the Constitution, and there as elsewhere the Unionists had taken precautionary measures against a reactionary movement. At Berat and elsewhere in the northern districts where Albanian nationalist committees were working in harmony with the Committee of Union and Progress, the population had been required to swear allegiance to the Constitution. All the prisons had also been emptied, and the oath administered to the released prisoners. 81

81. "Situation in Albania", The Times, August 17, 1908, p.5.
FROM the start, the Arabs, particularly the Syrians who were the most organized and articulate, were openly hostile to the new regime. Through Izzet Pasha and other Syrian Arabs in the Sultan's employ, they had been the main beneficiaries of the old regime. On the night of August 10, Mehmed Ali Bey, the Minister to Washington and son of Izzet Pasha, attended a meeting of Syrians in Washington to protest the recent criticism of his father by Münici Bey, the Consul-General in New York. Those Syrians present at the meeting strongly supported Izzet Pasha, denying allegations that he was involved in the Armenian massacres of 1895 and had sold government property without proper authorisation. The Syrians claimed that Izzet Pasha was, in fact, an opponent of graft. Trying to account for the source of his enormous wealth, they alleged that he had inherited most of his fortune from his father, though they admitted that he had been a favourite of Abdülhamid and had very often received presents from him.\(^82\)

Not all Syrians in the United States, however, were unequivocally on the side of reaction and Izzet Pasha, and another meeting in New York bore testimony to the fact that there were differences of opinion among the various Syrian groups. The meeting was organised by the management of *al-Hoda*, a Syrian daily newspaper published in the United States, in honour of Nakle Moutran Pasha, for many years one of the leaders of the Young Turks at Paris, and now on a visit to the United States. Salim Mokarzel, the editor of *al-Hoda*, talked about the sufferings of the Young Turk revolutionaries, reminding his audience that the new regime had been established at a very high price. Criticising certain Syrians for their lack of commitment to the Constitution, he said that Syrians had to move forward with the same fire and vehemence with which they had already trod the path.\(^83\)

Though the Sultan was repeatedly praised for having granted the Constitution, the

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dinner was to celebrate the formation of a Syrian society. under the Presidency of Moutran Pasha, which hoped to bring together all Syrians, to gain as much for their own country as possible, now that the Sultan was surrounded by liberal advisors. Moutran Pasha had been busy organising the Syrian-Ottoman General Union which was to enlist not only Syrian but all Arabic-speaking population in the Empire in the cause of reform. He announced the formal establishment of this organisation that evening.

Although the idea of the Constitution had been gradually assimilated, it made little impression on many Arabs. They seemed sceptical of reform, tolerating Turkish rule as Moslem, and harbouring some veneration for the Sultan as the religious head of the state. There were whispers of reaction, but in most cases it could be explained by hesitation on the part of those who were not convinced of the movement's success and therefore refused it their enthusiastic support. In Baghdad, the announcement that Parliament was to be re-assembled after some thirty years and that elections were to be held immediately had been received with some interest but without the smallest sign of enthusiasm. In Mosul, all was quiet, where people hesitated to commit themselves in the absence of knowledge of what was being done in other parts of Turkey. The population of Aleppo received the news with astonishment bordering on incredulity. Similar reactions were observed in Beirut, Haifa, and Jerusalem as well.

85. "Syrians Meet in New York: One Speaker Says This is not Time for Caution, but for Advance", The Washington Post, August 14, 1908, pp.2-3; and, "To Unite All Syrians", The New York Times, August 14, 1908, p.6.
90. U.S., Department of State Records, G. B. Ravenal, Beirut, August 4, 1908; F.O.
The Revolution dealt a blow to the existing political institutions and shook traditional social hierarchies. Local rulers and notables, who were either sympathisers or collaborators of the old regime, were dismissed from office and, in some cases, arrested. In many localities, prominent Arabs who had supported the old regime were publicly humiliated. These attacks on the traditional leadership resulted, on the one hand, in a loosening of the social fabric, on the other, a nationalist reaction. In most cases, the deposed traditional Arab leadership, who had materially benefitted during the old regime, managed to fight back by playing on the "nationalist" sentiments of the population in an attempt to regain their control over the society, creating an atmosphere conducive to reaction. The Unionists' goal of dividing the political field between liberalism and conservatism, transcending ethnic and national boundaries, was therefore defeated. Instead, they inadvertently created an environment where monarchist Arab notables could subvert the issue and refer to the new regime's anti-Arab attitude.  

It was expected that the Arab residents at Istanbul would shortly follow the Albanian example of forming their own club in order to further their interests. Indeed, an Arab nationalist organisation, the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, or Jam'iyat al-Ikha' al-'Arabi al-'Uthmani, was founded on September 2 in Istanbul, much to the irritation of the Unionists. The society was more Arab than Ottoman; the founding membership was not only predominantly Syrian, it also consisted primarily of men closely associated with the old regime --men such as Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad al-'Azm, the organisation's leader and a

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195/2277/138, Consul-General Cumberbatch, Beirut, August 20, 1908; and, F.O. 195/2287/59, Blech, Jerusalem, August 6, 1908, quoted in Elie Kedourie, "The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire", pp.129-130.

91. This interpretation is supported by evidence given in Elie Kedourie, "The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire", pp.135-139.

92. "Turkey", The Times, September 1, 1908, p.3.

prominent Arab related by marriage to ex-Grand Vezier Cevad Pasha, Nadra Matran, a close associate of Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad al-`Azm, and Shakir al-Husayni, a former Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Education under the old regime. Moreover, though the first article of the Society's charter stated that its membership was open to the Ottoman sons of Arabs --any individual who was born Arab or had taken an Arab home as his own--regardless of their community and their sect, only Arabs had joined its ranks, and the society's activities had spread from Istanbul to several Syrian towns. The society's professed aim was to promote Arab welfare through education, the construction of roads and factories, the sedentisation of nomads, and the preservation of Arab rights from all encroachments. Despite the fact that the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society declared itself to be a vehicle for the promotion of Ottomanism, it was clear to the Arab community in Istanbul and leaders of the Syrian emigres in Egypt as well as to the Unionists, that its real aim was to protect Arab interests, particularly monarchist ones, against what its founders considered the new regime's "anti-Arab" stance. It was not surprising that the founders of the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, who were predominantly men intimately associated with the old regime, were prompted by fear of what the new regime held for them and for their monarchist fellow Arabs under the new regime. It was also

94. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", pp.185-186. For the complete list of the founders and members of the society see, Ahmad `Izzet al-`Azami, al-Qadiyya al-`Arabiyya, Asbabuhu, Muqadimatha, Tawurha wa Natajuha (Baghdad, 1932), 2, pp.99-100, and al-Muqattam, September 9, 1908, all quoted in Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", pp.185-186.


On February 17, 1909, al-Muqattam reported the formation of a branch in Aleppo, which found such a welcome that some nine hundred members, including Moslem and Christian Arabs, joined it (al-Muqattam, February 17, 1909, cited in Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.187).


97. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.185.

98. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the
not surprising that the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society was one of the reactionary organisations which was intimately involved with the counter-revolutionary coup of April 1909.\footnote{In the aftermath of the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April 1909, the Committee of Union and Progress would come to distrust the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, considering it a tool of reaction whose secret programme aimed at complete Arab independence from the Empire (\textit{Tanin}, May 18, 1909, and May 20, 1909, cited in \textit{Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914"}, p.187). The Unionists were not alone in their suspicions. Prominent Syrians such as Rafiq al-'Azm, Rashid Rida, and the editors of \textit{al-Muqattam} believed there was no need for such a society and criticised its existence (\textit{al-Muqattam}, May 25, 1909, cited in \textit{Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914"}, p.187). It was subsequently closed down by Government order.}

It was the establishment of the Liberal Union, or Ah\r\ar Firkasi, which united all the opposing ethnic and religious groups against the Committee of Union and Progress. Its leader, Prince Sabahaddin, had founded, in 1906, with Ismail Kemal Bey the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative, the stated objective of which was to promote a system of decentralised government with regard to the ethnically or religiously divided provinces.\footnote{Tarik Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952}, p.142. For the complete text of the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative's revised programme which was approved at its Paris meeting on July 27, 1906, see "Teseb\b\b-ü Sahsi, Mesrutiyet ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti'nin Programı", in Nezahat Nurettin Ege, \textit{Prens Sabahaddin: Hayati ve İli\r\m\ü\d Faalari}, pp.71-72.}

In the early days of the Revolution, there was talk of a fusion between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative of Prince Sabahaddin. Prince Sabahaddin and his group was anxious to receive credit for the events which had resulted with the establishment of a new regime. On August 2, Ahmed Riza Bey and Prince Mehmed Ali, on behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress, as well as Prince Sabahaddin, on behalf of the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative had, in conversation with the correspondent of \textit{The Times}, manifested the strongest desire to convince Europe not only of the genuineness of the modernization
manifested by their joint movement, also promoted by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, but of the fact that it was devoid of any anti-foreign tendency. Thus, Prince Sabahaddin considered himself and his group as part of the new ruling bloc on equal footing with the Unionists.

Thinking that it would be easier to influence events through the Unionists’ well organised and highly popular Committee, the leadership of the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative issued in Paris a statement on August 22 which declared that it was in close agreement with the Committee of Union and Progress on matters of general policy and that it intended to join the Committee shortly. The fact that Unionists too were not totally unwilling to have Prince Sabahaddin on their side at this juncture was proven by the announcement of the Istanbul branch of the Committee of Union and Progress on the same day that the two organizations were having talks of a possible merger under the Committee’s leadership.

Having completed his preliminary negotiations with the Unionist leadership in Paris, Prince Sabahaddin left France at the end of August. On the morning of September 1, a delegation left Istanbul for the Dardanelles to meet the steamer Senegal, bringing the remains of Prince Sabahaddin’s father and the Sultan’s brother-in-law, Damad Mahmud Pasha, who had died in exile in 1903 and had been buried in Paris. Damad Mahmud Pasha’s remains were accompanied by his son, Prince Sabahaddin, who arrived in Istanbul on September 2. He received an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival

at Istanbul; Galata and Istanbul quays and Karaköy Bridge were crowded by thousands of people, cheering for the Prince while he disembarked and drove in a court carriage to the residence of his mother at Kurucesme. 107

Ardent advocates of decentralisation, the Christian communities of Macedonia, placed great hopes in Prince Sabahaddin’s presence in Istanbul. Though he was at one point rumoured to have been won over to the Unionists’ side, it was generally felt that his enthusiastic reception in the capital would give him the confidence to oppose the Committee of Union and Progress and take an independent line. The Greeks, in particular, considered him their champion, and had already taken steps to secure his support. 108 On September 4, only two days after his return, two delegates of the Ecumenical Patriarchate visited Prince Sabahaddin and conveyed to him the welcome compliments of Joachim Efendi. 109 On September 7, a Greek deputation to discuss political matters and ways of common action with the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative met with Prince Sabahaddin, who, in turn, gave a detailed account of his programme to the Greek deputation and stressed the importance of Greeks in Turkey. 110

To the dismay of some, Prince Sabahaddin announced the fusion of the Committee of Union and Progress with the Society for Decentralization and Private Initiative on September 8, prematurely. 111 While no official statement had been issued by the groups concerned, it was difficult to resist the impression that an agreement with regard to the fusion of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Society for Decentralisation and

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111. "Fusion of Liberal Committees", The Times, September 9, 1908, p.7; and, Le Temps, September 9, 1908, p.4.
The Unionists, while not totally against a fusion under their own leadership, stated, however, that the Prince would have to abandon the principle of administrative decentralisation before such a union could take place. The anti-Unionist press, while applauding the fusion, held the principle of decentralisation to be salutary, and argued that it was, moreover, provided for in Article 108 of the Constitution.

An editorial in the conservative *Ikdam* of September 10 defended Prince Sabahaddin's programme of decentralisation by asserting that British institutions had served as a model for its elaboration. Invoking British ideals and their absorption by Prince Sabahaddin was intended to gain additional legitimacy in public opinion, which showed tremendous enthusiasm towards Great Britain in the early days of the Revolution. *Ikdam* also stressed that decentralisation did not mean autonomy, again hoping to allay public doubt about the real intentions of Prince Sabahaddin.

The conservative Greek press in Istanbul devoted considerable attention to Prince Sabahaddin's meeting with Joachim Efendi, the Ecumenical Patriarch -- held the same day he announced the fusion with the Committee of Union and Progress. At the meeting, the Prince pledged that the privileges of the Patriarchate would not only be confirmed, but would be extended under the new regime. The Unionist press, including the *Tanin* of September 9, criticised the visit as well as the promise.

On September 10, representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Society for Decentralization and Private Initiative met, though by the following day, results

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of the meeting were still unknown.\footnote{117}{Le Temps, September 11, 1908, and "The Young Turk Committees", The Times, September 12, 1908, p.5.} It was generally assumed that no final decision on the issue of fusion had been made.\footnote{118}{"The Young Turk Committees", The Times, September 12, 1908, p.5. See also, "Fusion of the Ottoman Committees", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 14, 1908, p.1.} In fact, the Unionists had offered Prince Sabahaddin a more or less honorary position in the Committee of Union and Progress and were unwilling to grant him any real voice in the Committee's direction. Prince Sabahaddin and his group rejected the proposal, and further discussions between the two organizations were discontinued.\footnote{119}{Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimi ve Jön Türkler, p.267. As he was an ardent supporter of the Empire's continued decentralization, the Committee of Union and Progress refused to have Prince Sabahaddin on their side.}

On September 16, Prince Sabahaddin aired his views in a speech delivered to enthusiastic supporters at Istanbul's Théâtre des Variétés.\footnote{120}{"Prince Sabaheddine", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 15, 1908, p.1; "La situation en Turquie", Le Temps, September 18, 1908, p.2; and Huseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatiralari, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 4 (April 25-October 19, 1935), p.133. Tunaya mistakenly writes that the conference took place in August (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasî Partiler, 1859-1952, p.240).} Though he reiterated his policy of decentralisation, he continued to ally himself with the Unionists, and again announced that his group would merge with the Committee of Union and Progress. The news was favourably received by the audience present at the speech.\footnote{121}{"La conférence du prince Sabaheddine", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, p.2; "La situation en Turquie", Le Temps, September 18, 1908, p.2; and Pro Armenia, September 20, 1908, p.1363.} On September 18, Prince Sabahaddin made another appearance at a banquet held at Bebek which was attended by the \textit{corps diplomatique}, members of wealthy minority groups and Turks. He again reiterated his views on decentralisation.\footnote{122}{"La Fête de Bébek", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 19, 1908, pp.1-2.} His proposals for administrative decentralisation, which meant, in general, the creation of semi-autonomous provincial administrations with separate budgets and elected executive councils were enthusiastically received by the Greeks, Arabs, and Armenians.\footnote{123}{"La situation en Turquie", Le Temps, September 19, 1908, p.2; and Pro Armenia, September 20, 1908, p.1363.} Despite being couched in novel
language, Prince Sabahaddin’s proposals were nothing more than a plea for the continuation of the system which existed under the old regime, and thus his ideas were totally counter-revolutionary.

On their part, the Unionists publicly rejected any association with the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative, saying that decentralization and the autonomy which would ensue could only pose a threat to the nation’s unity and safety, particularly given the very real possibility of European intervention on behalf of the Balkan states. Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin reiterated the danger that autonomy would follow decentralisation in his Tanim editorial of September 19.

After the negotiations with the Unionists for the fusion of the two organisations ended in failure, the decision was taken to transform the Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative into a rival political party. Ahmed Samim Bey, a journalist from Ikdam, and Nureddin Ferruh Alkend met to finalize plans for the formation of an opposition party to be led, ostensibly, by Prince Sabahaddin. Apparently, though Prince Sabahaddin would deny any involvement in the formation of such a party, he would provide its founders with all the financial assistance they required. The establishment of the Liberal Union was announced on September 14. Among its official founders were Nureddin Ferruh Alkend, Ahmed Fazli Tung, Kibrisli Tevfiik, Nazim, Sevket, Celalettin Arif and Mahir Said Beys, and Ahmed Pasha. Dr. Nihad Resad Belger, Tahir Hayreddin, Ahmed Samim Beys and Damad Salih Pasha, Tahir Hayreddin’s brother, were also rumoured to be among the party’s founders. Notables who promptly joined the party included Serif

126. Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.240. (Tunaya writes that the conference took place in August. This can not be true since Prince Sabahaddin returned to Istanbul from exile in early September.)
128. Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.239.
Pasha, ex-Ambassador to Stockholm, Hasan Fehmi Efendi, a *Serbesti* journalist, Mevlan Zade Rifat, owner of *Serbesti*, Ali Kemal Bey, editor of *Ikdam*, Krikor Zohrab, a prominent Armenian lawyer, Dr. Riza Nur, and Ahmet Samim Bey, editor of *Saday-i Millet*.

The principal figures behind the party, however, were Prince Sabahaddin and Kamil Pasha.

Ismail Kemal Bey had returned to Istanbul from Paris on December 18 at the request of Kamil Pasha. His membership in the Liberal Union, along with that of Ali Kemal Bey, however, aroused considerable internal strife; both had been exposed for corruption and were known for their monarchist and reactionary leanings, in addition to their collaboration with the old regime, working as informers to Abdülhamid. When the demand for their expulsion was rejected, Dr. Riza Nur, Ahmed Fazli Tung, Mahir Said Bey and Celaleddin Arif Pasha jointly resigned from the party, throwing the capability of the party's leadership into question.

With the opening of Parliament, however, Ismail Hakkı Mumcu Pasha, deputy for Amasya, Mahir Said Bey, deputy for Ankara, Kasım Zeynel, deputy for Jeddah, and Cosmidis, deputy for Istanbul, joined the Liberal Union.

Throughout, Prince Sabahaddin continued to deny reports that he was both the founder and Chairman of the Liberal Union. On October 18 and 19, he published his views on decentralisation in *Ikdam*, defending them against the Unionist criticism that

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*Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, p.239n.


132. Kamil Pasha had sent the message through Münir Pasha, the monarchist Ambassador in Paris (Ismail Kemal, *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*, p.316). See also, Cemal Kutay, *Üc Pasalar Kavgasi*, p.49.


decentralisation meant autonomy, and eventually independence to ethnic and national minorities. In a pamphlet also dated October 18, he desperately defended his position of decentralisation and claimed that it had nothing to do with administrative autonomy.

From mid-October onwards, it was an uphill battle that Prince Sabahaddin and candidates of the Liberal Union fought against the immensely popular candidates of the Committee of Union and Progress in economically developed electoral districts of the country. Despite dim prospects, the Liberal Union entered the elections as the only officially recognised opposition party running against the Committee of Union and Progress. Although they were sympathisers of the Liberal Union, the other opponents of the Unionists --the Arab, Greek, and Albanian minorities-- did neither join the Liberal Union nor form separate parties, but fought the Unionist candidates individually, as members of their respective ethnic communities.

DURING the crucial months of August through October, the lines were drawn between the Unionists on the one hand and the various monarchist and nationalist/separatist groups on the other.

By the time the elections began, it had become apparent that the Unionists could count on the overwhelming support of the Turkish electorate in the economically advanced provinces, as well as the Jewish and the Armenian electorate. The Bulgarians, an insignificant minority in the Macedonian provinces could also be counted on the Unionist side. Apart from these communities, the loyalties of other ethnic communities were divided. Although the Committee of Union and Progress could count on the support of some of the Albanians, the bulk of the Albanian population, as well as the overwhelming

136. İkdam, October 5, 1324/October 18, 1908 and October 6, 1324/October 19, 1908, cited in Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Inkilap Tarıhiımız ve Jön Türkler, p.267.
majority of the Arabs and Greeks were in opposition to the Unionists.

The Liberal Union, as a political party, had little chance of success at the polls, despite the fact that there was undeniable resistance to the Revolution among the various segments of the Empire's population. The most organised opposition to the Unionists, however, were the ethnic minorities who had decided not to formally ally themselves with the Liberal Union and run under its ticket. Therefore, the Liberal Union was, from the very start, was crippled by the decision of the ethnic communities favouring the old regime not to join the party despite their agreement with the party's principles and political views. The Liberal Union was additionally handicapped by its total lack of organisation in the provinces. There was undeniable source of support for the old regime among the Turkish population, especially in the economically less developed regions in Anatolia, which the Liberal Union could have easily mobilised and drawn to its side, had it been organised in these areas.
Chapter 6

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1908

HISTORY of parliamentary elections for the period before the First World War has never been a topic of discussion in Turkish social science. It is interesting to note that nothing has been written on the 1908 Elections, except for passing references to the elections in Istanbul.¹ The only study made by Ahmad and Rustow, in spite of its invaluable collection of all the names of the deputies for the 1908, 1912, and 1914 general elections, completely lacks an analysis of the elections. It does not even contain the basic information as to the exact procedure with which the elections were carried out. Furthermore, there is no information about who the opposition candidates were, and what they stood for. The political struggles as well as electoral alliances are completely absent in their account.²

In the absence of any reliable study on the elections of 1908, most historians have wrongly assumed that the elections were not strongly contested, and, consequently, the whole affair concluded with the overwhelming success of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is taken for granted that the elections took place under conditions less than honest, returning a Chamber totally dominated by Unionist deputies. In standard accounts of Turkish history, this presupposition serves as a convenient pretext to further criticise the Committee of Union and Progress for being power greedy and disrespectful of liberal principles. The myth, therefore, justifies historians’ contempt for the Unionist revolutionaries, and helps them in their attempt to discredit the Revolution as not being a genuinely liberal movement. Thus, the monarchist point of view, transformed into

² Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", pp.245-284.
"objective" history, survives even today.

Despite the lack of official data on the candidates as well as the election results in every electoral district, it has, nevertheless, been possible to reconstruct a fairly clear picture of the elections from accounts published in the daily press. The picture that emerges from a study of these press accounts is fundamentally different from what has been suggested up until now. Press accounts not only point out to a lively election campaign, but they also confirm suspicions that the struggle between the forces of the old and of the new was quite fierce. That neither of these forces were weak enough to be totally dominated by the other is conclusively shown by the elections results.

IMMEDIATELY after the Revolution, the announcement was made that elections would be made and Parliament be convened as soon as possible.\(^3\) This would be the first parliamentary elections since 1876. The new Electoral Law stated that lists of electors were to be prepared every May, and that, once elected, deputies were to be in Istanbul by the end of October.\(^4\) The elections would be conducted in two stages. All taxpayers over twenty-five years of age, with the exception of private soldiers currently serving in the army and persons suffering from various disabilities, were eligible first degree electors. These were responsible for electing a second degree elector, who, in turn, would vote for a deputy. Each administrative district comprised two hundred and fifty to seven hundred and fifty first degree electors represented by one elector of the second degree where one deputy would be returned by one hundred to three hundred second degree electors, two members by three hundred to six hundred, and so on.\(^5\)

Considering they had been working underground up until July, the Unionists


showed remarkable organizational ability sending emissaries into the provinces to explain the nature of their movement, its programme, and in some cases, establishing local organizations for securing the election of their candidates at the forthcoming elections.\textsuperscript{6}

By mid-August, the Committee of Union and Progress had begun to rapidly extend its organization into the Anatolian provinces, where local branches were established in nearly every large town. Its headquarters remained at Salonica, and was likely to remain there at least until Parliament met. According to representatives of its Istanbul branch, the first step in the Committee’s formation three years ago had been the creation of cells, each composed of five members, one of whom acted as a link with other cells.\textsuperscript{7} There were no chiefs, or at least no known chiefs, and at each meeting a chairman was elected to facilitate the transaction of business. Since the Revolution, certain modifications had been made. Though a cell still consisted of five members, each cell now sent a delegate to a local committee; the local committees, in turn, were represented at Salonica.\textsuperscript{8}

The Unionists organized electoral campaigns in most parts of Anatolia and Macedonia. These were disguised as educational campaign to enlighten the population on the benefits of the Constitution and the privileges and rights which citizens were now called upon to exercise. The Unionists were highly successful in southern Albania where many were delighted with their newly-won educational privileges, though the Greek minority showed signs of dissatisfaction. In northern Albania, however, the Unionists faced a far more difficult situation.\textsuperscript{9}

The Committee’s general policy for nominating and supporting candidates stated that the headquarters at Salonica would back all potential candidates with the necessary moral and intellectual qualifications, and that in districts with no Unionist candidates, the

\textsuperscript{7} Samih Nafiz Tansu, \textit{Ittihat ve Terakki Icinde Donenler}, pp.48-51; and, "The New Era in Turkey: Young Turk Organization", \textit{The Times}, August 24, 1908, p.3.
\textsuperscript{8} "The New Era in Turkey: Young Turk Organization", \textit{The Times}, August 24, 1908, p.3.
\textsuperscript{9} "The Young Turks: A Campaign of Education", \textit{The Times}, September 4, 1908, p.5.
Committee would support the candidacy of those who met its standards. Its attitude towards other political organizations, such as those of the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians, would depend largely on their political programme. Provided these did not oppose its own programme, the Unionists would, in certain cases, support their candidates. Finally, the Committee of Union and Progress promised to help the Government in securing the pacific and orderly conduct of the elections, also making sure that those deputies elected were both honest and capable.\footnote{10}

While the majority of the Unionist candidates promised to be Turkish Moslems, the Committee insisted that their selection would be determined entirely by character and ability, and accordingly, the Committee's nominess at Salonica and Izmir included Jews. Though the number of the Unionists candidates had not yet been decided, it was generally believed that a majority of deputies representing the capital and the European provinces, where the organization drew its strength, would be Unionist. In Anatolia, a certain number of seats --in Bursa, Izmir, and Kastamonu-- would probably also go to the Committee of Union and Progress, though it was unlikely to meet with much success in the interior. Nonetheless, as elsewhere, delegates were dispatched to the provinces in order to instruct the population on the nature of its rights and duties, the Unionist programme, and to assist in the selection of candidates.\footnote{11}

By late September, Unionist electoral campaigns throughout Anatolia were in full swing. Though Konya's conservative population had welcomed the delegation of the Committee of Union and Progress, their reception in Erzurum and Trabzon provinces was quieter.\footnote{12}

\textbf{While} Unionists were busy in their election campaigns, the opposition, gathered

\footnote{10. "Electoral Programme of the Committee", \textit{The Times}, September 8, 1908, p.3.}
\footnote{11. "Electoral Programme of the Committee", \textit{The Times}, September 8, 1908, p.3.}
\footnote{12. "Asiatic Turkey: Improved Outlook", \textit{The Times}, September 28, 1908, p.5.}
principally around Prince Sabahaddin, was also actively conducting propaganda in the capital and the provinces. On October 12, Prince Sabahaddin left Istanbul for Salonica and Monastir reportedly to personally thank the officers of the Third Army Corps for their role in the Revolution. 13 His true aim, however, was to downplay differences between his group and the Unionists in order to win support for his own candidates. 14 He had also hopes of participating in the Unionist Congress which started on October 18 --hopes which would not be fulfilled. 15 Towards the end of the month, he also toured in the Albanian provinces where sympathetic crowds greeted his arrival. 16 In Monastir, he delivered a lecture at the Military Club in which he dwelt at length on the urgency of consolidating the constitutional regime through extensive education of the army. 17 On his return to Istanbul, Prince Sabahaddin stopped in Salonica, where he met with the Greek metropolitan and members of the Greek community, and talked about his political programme. 18 Before leaving Salonica, he also met with Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had travelled to Salonica in order to muster support for Prince Sabahaddin's party. 19 Though Ali Haydar Midhat bey's plan involved going as far as Monastir, Prince Sabahaddin informed him that the Unionists had strongly disapproved of his own travels in the Macedonian provinces and had taken steps to neutralise his election campaign. Discouraged, Ali Haydar Midhat Bey decided to return to Istanbul, though before doing so, he met with the Unionist leadership at Salonica. He was greeted coldly and told to keep out of opposition politics. 20

MURAD Bey, another prominent opposition figure, was an intellectual whose collaboration with the absolutist regime had cost him his position in the Council of State immediately following the Revolution. On July 30, he began publication of Mizan and, in an open letter addressed to the Unionist leadership, stated that he still considered himself a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Withdrawing his resignation from the Committee, he declared himself the local leader of the Istanbul branch, stating that if the Unionists did not accept his leadership, he would join the opposition.  

The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress published a press release on August 1, declaring that Murad Bey was not a recognized member of the Committee, let alone leader of the Istanbul branch, and that he was not authorized to act in the Committee’s name.

Murad Bey carried out his threats, and by late August, his constant propaganda for the monarchist cause, his courting of religious reactionaries, his attempts to portray the Unionists in the most unfavourable terms led the Unionist leadership to openly condemn him in their Salonica organ, İttihad ve Terakki. Reactionary propaganda and counter-revolutionary agitation nonetheless succeeded in provoking a religious reaction in Istanbul against constitutional government.

On August 23, there was a fire in Istanbul. The authorities showed the utmost energy in the relief of the victims of the fire. A relief committee had been formed under the presidency of Ziver Bey, the new Prefect of Istanbul, and a public subscription had been opened, to which everyone contributed generously. Despite the fact that only seven lives were lost, the damage was extensive. The number of buildings destroyed in the

conflagration was between two and three thousand. An impression was gaining ground among the public that the fire was the work of reactionary incendiaries. The arrest of two or three criminals who were known to have been formerly spies, on suspicion of having caused two minor fires since, and the diffusion, apparently by reactionary agents, among the more ignorant of the idea that the fire was a divine judgement for the adoption of the Constitution gave some colour to the theory, which, however, could not be easily proved. On September 5, it was officially stated that ten persons were arrested on suspicion of incendiarism in connection with the Istanbul fire, and that the evidence against five of them was sufficiently strong to warrant their detention.

A more serious reactionary outburst, however, occurred during the Ramazan, when on October 6, during his sermon at the Fatih Mosque, Kör Ali, a hodja, urged his congregation to reject the Constitution and the parliamentary regime. He spoke against liberty and equality, belittling the importance of such concepts, and organized an armed march through the streets of the capital. Crossing over the Galata Bridge, the crowd walked to Besiktas and the Yildiz Palace, where it demanded the abolishment of the constitutional regime and pledged its support for the Sultan. The crowd then withdrew, shouting epithets against Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vezier, and Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam. Earlier that day, Abdülhamid had warned against a conspiracy, and many political observers suspected that both he and the monarchists had had a hand in the demonstration. The pro-Unionist press commented that Abdülhamid's "concern" did not tally with the complete lack of interference on the part of both the police and military.

The press, which devoted considerable attention to the incident, also insisted on the

24. "Turkey", The Times, August 26, 1908, p.5.
27. İkdam, September 24, 1324/October 7, 1908, and September 25, 1324/October 8, 1908, quoted in "Empire Ottoman", Revue du monde Musulman, 6 (September-December 1908), pp.518-519.
necessity of police reorganization and demanded exemplary punishment for both the mob's leaders as well as those officers whose inaction had encouraged the mob to attack the barracks. Concerned with the discovery of unreliability among the Palace troops, the Government dispatched three battalions of trustworthy infantry for police duty in the capital along with twenty officers who had been trained in the Macedonian gendarmerie schools. Many felt that it might become necessary either to reduce the Palace guard from its current strength of five thousand or to replace certain of its units with battalions from Macedonia. The discipline of the Palace troops had been notoriously lax under the old regime, and their continued use as police near the Yıldız Palace only promised further trouble. For the moment, the police maintained a high profile in the neighbourhood of Besiktas.  

In addition to fifteen people, Köç Ali was arrested on October 7. Two days later, Murad Bey, editor of Mizan, along with Uryanıza Cemil Molla and Nazif Sururi Beys, both on the staff of Mizan, were detained on charges of inciting disturbances and disseminating reactionary propaganda. Previously, on September 22, Kamil Pasha had met with Murad Bey and the two journalists to warn them against a continuation of their provocative methods. Even the conservative Ikdam had been irritated with Murad Bey's activities, and upon his detention, its editor urged the public not to listen to treacherous statements, designed as they were to sow the seeds of dissension at a time when unity was needed. On his part, in the Mizan of October 10, Murad Bey tried to incite the

33. Ikdam, September 28, 1324/October 11, 1908, quoted in Birol Emil, Mizancı Murad Bey:
population to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Mizan}'s publication was suspended, and he was exiled to Tiflis on October 17; Uryanizade Cemil Molla was sent to Scutari, and, Nazif Sururi Bey to Ibredje.\textsuperscript{35}

During Kör Ali's and his accomplices' trial, despite the defendants' claim to the contrary, the counsel for the defence had pleaded unsound mind. After medical examination, the plea was rejected. Witnesses then stated that the accused had been determined to overthrow the Constitution and had incited Moslems against the Greeks before leading the mob to the Yildiz Palace.\textsuperscript{36} During the proceedings Kör Ali openly declared himself an enemy of the new regime, and on October 26, he and his accomplice, Ismail Hakki, both of whom were charged with seeking to change the current form of government, were sentenced to death by a unanimous decision of the five judges of the Istanbul Criminal Court. The crowd present greeted the sentences with shouts of "Long live the Constitution!".\textsuperscript{37}

By contrast, neither Murad Bey's exile nor \textit{Mizan}'s suspension would last long: After a month, he was allowed to return to Istanbul and resume his activities. Rumour had it that he was again involved in a conspiracy to bring back the old regime and had personally informed the First Secretary of the Sultan that he was ready.\textsuperscript{38} In a pamphlet

\textit{Hayati ve Eserleri}. p.207.


37. "The Turkish Constitution: Death Sentences at Constantinople", \textit{The Times}, October 28, 1908, p.9; and, "Reactionaries Sentenced to Death", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, October 27, 1908, p.1. See also, Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üç Pasalar Kavgası}, p.42, who mistakenly writes that Kör Ali was tried on October 29.

published upon his return to Istanbul, he again violently attacked the Committee of Union and Progress, belittling its efforts to bring down the old regime and accusing it of undue influence in the political process. 39 Despite popular demand that he be hanged, he decided to run as a Liberal Union candidate in the Istanbul elections. Along with Prince Sabahaddin and Kamil Pasha, he only received a handful of votes. 40

ANOTHER counter-revolutionary organization was the Devotees of the Nation, or Fedakaran-i Millet, established in August by Avnullah Kazimi. 41 His real name was Mehmed Selim. He had escaped abroad in 1889, and returned to Istanbul under his new identity. Caught in 1901, he was first exiled to Sivas and then imprisoned in the fortress at Sinop until the Revolution. 42 Its members included Cemal and Sami Beys, two low ranking naval officers, Mevlanzade Rifat, who would become the editor of both the organisation's organ Hukuk-u Umumiye and Serbesti, Hasan Fehmi Bey, a Serbesti journalist, Ibn al-Mahmud Asim and Mazlum Beys, who would become Hukuk-u Umumiye journalists, along with two Armenians, and a dozen men who were known to be paid assassins. 43 Though its ostensible aim was to help the victims of the absolutist regime, the fact that the organization had asked for and received the considerable sum of 1000 liras from Abdülhamid himself made the truth of its claims questionable. 44

The society began publication of its newspaper, Hukuk-u Umumiye, on September 16. 45 Immediately, it used its columns to blackmail officials of the new regime with

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42. İbrahim Alaettin Gövsə, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.212.
unsubstantiated allegations. When confronted with lawsuits for slander, the paper invoked the constitutionally guaranteed press freedom. Despite lawsuits, the paper persisted on its attacks on members of the bureaucracy.

During the general elections, the organization worked hard to form a coalition against the Unionists. Organization members visited the offices of Greek language dailies in Istanbul, attempting to secure Greek support for the opposition's candidates. When Parliament opened, it concentrated its attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress, claiming that as the latter was the only political party in the Chamber, the current government constituted a one-party dictatorship. The paper printed continuous slanders against the Committee of Union and Progress and alleged the party to be illegitimate.

Its propaganda, however, proved ineffective, and failing to win public support, the organization turned to underground activity. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Istanbul finally suppressed the organization on January 12, 1909 on charges of conspiracy. Members of the organization were arrested and charged with gunsmuggling, plotting the assassination of political leaders, threatening Ambassadors, and blackmailing Bahri Pasha, the ex-Governor of Adana, for a sum of 5000 liras. The most important of the charges, however, included a planned attack on Bab-i Ali designed to force the Cabinet to accept the organization's demands. Reportedly, if its demands had not been met, the organisation would have attacked Unionist offices. The trial began on March 24, 1909.

and the defendants were later released for lack of conclusive evidence.\footnote{53}

By October, electoral campaigns were in full swing throughout Turkey, and the Committee of Union and Progress had sent representatives throughout to advance the cause of both the Constitution and the party.\footnote{54} Arrangements for the approaching elections in Macedonia, however, proceeded slowly, and it was feared that Parliament might meet before all the deputies had been elected.\footnote{55} The problem would not be confined to Macedonia. By October 18, only nine deputies had been elected nationwide, and it was now highly improbable that the elections would be completed by November 14, when Parliament was scheduled to open.\footnote{56}

By November 8, some fifty deputies had been elected. As expected, the majority of Turks elected in the European and western Anatolian provinces were members or nominees of the Committee of Union and Progress. On their part, the Greeks appeared to be gaining a fair share of representation, while the Armenians, owing to their wide dispersal in relatively small communities, were likely to be somewhat underrepresented.\footnote{57}

The elections were still taking place on November 22, and with the exception of Izmir, no disturbances were reported. Apparently, the Committee of Union and Progress had triumphed in many districts of European Turkey, and would be well represented among the western Anatolian deputies.\footnote{58} Among the deputies from central Anatolia, however, most were of the ulema class, while the Albanian deputies were primarily semi-


\footnotesize{54. Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Therapia, October 9, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", \textit{Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105}, p.93.}

\footnotesize{55. "Turkey". \textit{The Times}, September 15, 1908, p.3.}

\footnotesize{56. "Turkey: Some Election Results", \textit{The Times}, October 17, 1908, p.7.}

\footnotesize{57. "Progress of the Elections", \textit{The Times}, November 9, 1908, p.7. By November 11, some sixty-nine deputies representing thirty-one electoral districts had been elected ("Les députés", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 11, 1908, p.2).}

\footnotesize{58. "The Turkish Elections: Some of the Results", \textit{The Times}, November 23, 1908, p.6.}
feudal chiefs or their kinsmen.\textsuperscript{59}

In central Anatolia and Arab provinces, the elections hinged on two issues: first, the old religious rivalry between Moslems and Christians, and second, an intra-Moslem struggle between liberals and reactionaries. The first had ended with the defeat of the Christians.\textsuperscript{60} Though the intervention of religion in politics was as old as the Empire, there were, on both sides, some who felt that such intervention was politically regressive and hoped to see the development of fresh political groupings which might overshadow religious influence. Enraged with their defeat, the Christians were ready to throw all blame on the Turks and declare the Constitution a fraud. The authorities, they claimed, had grouped constituencies so as to make a Christian majority impossible. Where, for instance, a village or a section of a town contained five hundred Christian voters --the number necessary to secure a representative among the second electors-- the district was split into three or four portions which were then subsequently attached to overwhelmingly Moslem villages or sections. Christians also claimed that threats of violence and massacre had, in many instances, induced voters to abstain from the political process altogether. Though there was no doubt some truth in both these statements, neither represented the complete truth in regard to Christian failure at the polls. The fact of the matter was non-Moslems were both unwilling and unable to cooperate on the most obvious matters of common interest. The Greek remained jealous of the Armenian, the Armenian of the Syrian, the Syrian of the Maronite, and the Maronite of the Jew, each refusing to support the cause of the other. Races were even divided among themselves: a Greek Catholic would not vote for a member of the Greek Orthodox Church, nor would an Armenian Protestant support a Gregorian, and so forth. It was doubtful, however, whether the various Christian communities themselves could fairly be blamed; the fault lay rather on their bigoted and self-interested leaders. Christian peasants and townsfolk were on the whole well

\textsuperscript{59} "The Turkish Elections: Some of the Results", \textit{The Times}, November 23, 1908, p.6.
\textsuperscript{60} "The Turkish Elections", \textit{The Times}, November 27, 1908, p.12.
disciplined and would vote as they were bidden, making them far less independent in their views than were the Moslems. The election of the Municipal Council at Kayseri was a case in point: There, the one hundred and eighty Christian families voted en bloc and managed to obtain eight seats, while the four hundred Moslem families, who divided their votes, gained only two. The election results created an uproar, and further unrest was only averted by the tactful resignation of five of the Christian members.⁶¹ If this strategy might have succeeded on the local level in such places as Kayseri, in a wider context, it could not, and for this, leaders of the various Christian communities were at fault.

Another reason for the Christian defeat had to do with the census. Compulsory military service was confined to Moslems; in its place, Christians paid a tax. The annual census was held primarily to estimate recruits and taxes, but because no house-to-house counting of heads was possible, census takers were compelled to rely on lists furnished by community leaders -- in the case of the Christians, the church or national councils, and in the case of Moslems, the muhtars, or headmen. The tax, though purportedly based on the number of individuals, was actually levied on the local community as a whole, and it was therefore in its interest to keep its acknowledged numerical strength as low as possible. Though it was true that bribes from unwilling recruits or their mothers made it in the interest of the muhtars to follow suit, it proved easier to conceal the non-payment of a tax than to efface a fully grown human being, and Christian census returns were probably more freely falsified than those of the Moslems. And as it was on these census returns that votes had been allotted, the Christians on the whole had suffered the most.⁶²

In discussing the intra-Moslem struggle, it is necessary to distinguish conservatives and liberals from reactionaries and reformers. Actual reactionaries, men who would welcome the restoration of the old regime, were confined to those who had profited from it and hoped to profite from it again. Though a large and powerful group, most realised that,

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⁶¹ "The Turkish Elections", The Times, November 27, 1908, p.12.
⁶² "The Turkish Elections", The Times, November 27, 1908, p.12.
for the time being at any rate, the game had been lost. The real struggle, then, would be between the numerically weak but well organized Unionists and the pride, ignorance, and superstition of the Moslem population. The Unionists had faced considerable difficulty not only in garnering support for their candidates, but in finding candidates in the first place. In the interior, an enlightened and educated man was in most cases someone who had travelled abroad, that is to say had been absent and had lost local influence. As with the Christians, the religious elements controlled public opinion --elementary education was almost entirely in their hands-- and it was only in the mosques that people assembled to discuss the situation and form their ideas.63

In Istanbul, the Liberal Union decided to run against Unionist candidates by making an election alliance with the Greeks. Ahmed Fazli Tung, Nureddin Alkend, and Ahmed Celaleddin Bey, prominent members of the Liberal Union, paid a visit on November 11 to the Greek Patriarch. They assured him of their party's desire to work in harmony with the non-Moslem element and dwelt on the necessity of an entente with the Greeks in regard to their political programme. The Patriarch said he shared their views.64

In the capital, the election of second degree voters began on November 18.65 Those in Beyoglu began two days later amidst extensive celebrations.66

The Istanbul list of Moslem candidates included Kamil Pasha, Ahmed Riza Bey, and Saib Molla, the distinguished liberal cleric. The Greek refusal to accept the Committee's compromise was expected to cost them a seat, as their tactlessness had alarmed the Armenians, who might otherwise have lent them some support. The second degree elections at Beyoglu further inflamed the Greeks, who demanded their prolongation

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64. "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 12, 1908, p.1.
65. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9428.
from four to ten days and accused the Turkish officials of numerous infractions of the electoral law. That infractions occurred was undeniable, but the problem had more to do with the electoral law's vagueness. Moreover, the almost complete absence of such complaints on the part of the Jews and Armenians rendered it probable that the infractions were unimportant. The Greeks thought otherwise, and on November 22, over twenty thousand marched to the Sublime Porte and demanded the annulment of the Beyoğlu elections. This move was rejected, though the voting period was extended to eight days. The demonstrators left unsatisfied. 67

While Turkish authorities claimed that the Greeks themselves were responsible for infractions, the majority of the Turkish press severely criticised the demonstration. On their part, Greek organs accused the Turks and Armenians of every illegality, calling upon the Greeks of Istanbul to unite in defence of their interests in language which would have been more appropriate during times of civil war. 68 It was under these circumstances that in Istanbul a Greek organisation, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate's approval was established under the leadership of Nikolaides. Its avowed aim was to keep Greeks within the Empire, in an attempt to "hellenise" Turkey, rather than resorting to the immediate secession of the Macedonian provinces and their annexation to Greece. 69

By November 24, tempers had cooled, and Greek voters returned to the polls. Both the Patriarchate and the Turkish press urged the disputants to submit their grievances to Parliament, abstaining from provocative language and conduct in the meantime. The Armenians and Jews voted solidly with the Turks in all the constituencies of Istanbul. 70

By November 26, the second degree elections in Istanbul were complete. 71 On

71. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 16, p.9428.
December 3, amid demonstrations in favour of liberal democracy, the electoral urns were carried through the streets by a huge and well organised procession and deposited with the Municipality.  

During these days, the Liberal Union made public its determination to back Greek candidates in the elections. In the December 9 issue of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın published an editorial in which he accused Prince Sabahaddin of collaborating with Patriarch Joachim Efendi against the Unionist candidates by stating that publisizing decentralisation, Prince Sabahaddin jeopardized the nation's territorial integrity, as a demand for decentralisation, he argued, could only end in a demand for complete autonomy for those provinces where there were minorities. The brunt of his attack, however, fell on Prince Sabahaddin's promise that the Greek Patriarchate would retain its special rights and privileges. Prince Sabahaddin, thereupon, published a pamphlet in which he attempted to answer Unionist charges against him and defended the Liberal Union's programme of decentralisation.

A serious and unexpected quarrel arose between the Armenians and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Unionists objected to the candidacy of one of the two Armenian nominees in the capital, Krikor Zohrab. The Armenian committee protested, threatening to withdraw its participation in the elections. The incident was one which the Unionists would have done well to avoid. The Armenians, who had undoubtedly suffered to some extent from the electoral illegalities committed at their expense in Anatolia and Kurdistan, had, unlike the Greeks, abstained from vocal protest, and had given neither the authorities nor the Committee of Union and Progress cause for complaint. Many hoped that

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73. "Le parti libéral ottoman", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.2.
the Committee would remove its objection to Krikor Zohrab in the interests of maintaining good relations with what was surely the most progressive and politically useful allies it had. In the end, the Unionists did withdraw their objections to the election of Krikor Zohrab, and the elections took place on December 11.76

The results were eagerly and anxiously awaited. There had been considerable opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress, and a Liberal Union victory in Istanbul would undoubtedly shake its power and prestige. Prince Sabahaddin led the opposition with the editorial support of Ali Kemal Bey and İkdam, and Yeni Gazete, which was in the service of Kamil Pasha.77

Istanbul elections, however, resulted in a decisive Unionist victory.78 There were five hundred and seventeen second degree electors, of whom five hundred and twelve participated in the elections.79 The Unionist deputies were Manyasizade Refik Bey, elected with five hundred and three votes, Mustafa Asım Bey, with four hundred and seventy-five votes, Ahmet Rıza Bey, with four hundred and seventy-two votes, Albert [Vitali?] Faraggi, with four hundred and sixty-one votes, Bedros Hallacyan, with four hundred and fifty-five votes, Ahmed Nesimi Bey, with four hundred and twenty-five votes, and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, three hundred and fifty-four votes.80 Although the results were generally considered a vote of confidence in the Committee of Union and Progress, it was significant that Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın whose unpopular candidacy had been pushed by the Unionists, obtained fewer votes than any other successful candidate, with the exception of one of the

Greek deputies. In spite of hostility between the Unionists and the monarchists, the elections took place with exemplary order and decorum. 81

The successful non-Unionist deputies for Istanbul were Krikor Zohrab, a prominent Armenian lawyer with close ties to Kamil Pasha and the Liberal Union, who was elected with three hundred and ninety-two votes, and two Greeks -- Constantine Constantinidis, a lawyer who ran as an independent, winning the elections with three hundred and sixty-nine votes, and Pandelakis Kosmidis, who later joined the Liberal Union, with three hundred and forty votes. 82 All the other Liberal Union and opposition figures lost the elections with wide margins. Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of Ikdam, received sixty-four votes, Ahmed Fazli Tung, one of the founders of the Liberal Union, thirty-one votes, Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vezier, eighteen votes, and Celaleddin Arif Bey, four votes. 83 Prince Sabahaddin, leader of the Liberal Union, received eighteen votes, although he was not officially on the ballot. 84 Nureddin Ferruh Alkend, another Liberal Union candidate, did not receive a single vote. 85 Other opposition figures entering the elections as independents also faired poorly; Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, received sixty-seven votes, Mizanci Murad Bey, a journalist and Palace informer during the old regime, sixteen votes, Hoca Hayret Efendi, twenty-three votes, Halis Efendi, twenty-eight votes, Yagci Sefik Bey, thirty-two votes, Kemal Pasa Zade Said Bey, eleven votes, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, eight votes, Ahmed Rasim Bey, six votes, and Nazim Pasha, no votes. 86

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83. Resad Ekrem Kocu, "Türkiye'de Seçimin Tarihi, 1877-1950", p.181. In the by-elections of 1909, the Liberal Union candidate Ali Kemal Bey would once again run against the Unionists, whose candidate was Rifat Pasha, and once again, he would lose (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.241).
In the Anatolian provinces, the election results were mixed. While the Unionists were strong in cities and towns which were economically advanced, such as Izmir, and several other western Anatolian towns as well as trade centres on the Black Sea coast and in the interior, conservative or reactionary forces were strong, if not totally dominant, in less developed regions of Anatolia.

Izmir was one of the most important city in Anatolia whose Moslem, Armenian, and Jewish population was overwhelmingly pro-Unionist. According to an understanding reached between the Greek community of Izmir and the Committee of Union and Progress, there were to be six deputies for Izmir --two Turks, two Greeks, one Armenian, and one Jew.\textsuperscript{87} Notwithstanding this understanding, in the elections at Bergama, Cevdet Efendi, a sharia teacher at the Bayezid Mosque, was elected instead of the Greek candidate by a plurality of one vote.\textsuperscript{88} The defeat of their candidate gave rise to great discontent among Greek villagers, who had already shown their dissatisfaction with the new regime well before this event.\textsuperscript{89} They organised a mass meeting. On November 15, the demonstrators, who numbered about thirty thousand and were nearly all armed, entered the city and proceeded to the Greek Archiepiscopal Palace. Troops tried to disperse the crowd; bloodshed was avoided when the representative of the Committee of Union and Progress in Izmir promised that two Greek deputies would be elected, the election results notwithstanding. Shortly afterwards, it was announced that the second Greek candidate, who had previously been defeated at Bergama, had been elected.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} "The Smyrna Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 16, 1908, p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{88} "Empire Ottoman", \textit{Revue du monde Musulman}, 6 (September-December 1908), p.517; "Turkey; Some Election Results", \textit{The Times}, October 17, 1908, p.7; "Turkish Internal Affairs: Election Riots at Smyrna", \textit{The Times}, November 17, 1908, p.7; and, "The Smyrna Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 16, 1908, p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{89} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, September 20, 1908, quoted in "The Asiatic Provinces", \textit{The Times}, September 22, 1908, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{90} "The Smyrna Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 16, 1908, p.1; and, "Turkish Internal Affairs: Election Riots at Smyrna", \textit{The Times}, November 17, 1908, p.7.
\end{itemize}
eventually returned two Turkish and three Greek deputies, with the Armenians and Jews having one seat each. The Turkish deputies were Mehmed Seyyid Bey, a lawyer and a prominent Unionist, and Mehmed Said Efendi, the mufti of Izmir. Aristidi Pasha Yorgandjioglu, and Pavlis Carolidis were the Greek deputies. Aristidi Pasha was elected on the Unionist ticket, while Carolidis was independent. Another independent, Stephan Ispartaliyan, was elected the Armenian deputy. Nesim Masliah, the Jewish deputy, was a prominent Unionist.91

Despite the initial enthusiasm for the new regime, Bursa suffered a reactionary outburst on August 24.92 That morning a number of roughs seized the prison, releasing and arming two hundred criminals. These then joined their liberators in a series of demonstrations against the Governor and other officials. They paraded through the streets, announcing their determination not to pay taxes and to abolish all government. Finally, they expelled the judge, appointing in his place one of the local ulema, described as a notorious smuggler. The handful of police and soldiers in the city appeared to have considered discretion the better part of valour. On the morning of August 25, a battalion of the Guards Division arrived and restored order, arresting the ringleaders.93

In Bursa, the elected deputies were Ömer Fevzi Hoca, Hafiz Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, Abdullah Sabri Karter, and Bursali Rifat Tahir Bey.94 Among those elected, only Bursali Rifat Tahir Bey, an army major, was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress.95 He was one of the ten original founders of the revolutionary organisation at Salonica in 1906, where he was the headmaster of the military high school.96

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91. "Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 11, 1908, p.2; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", pp.270-271.
92. "Turkey", The Times, August 26, p.5.
93. "Turkey: The Disturbances at Brusa", The Times, August 27, 1908, p.3.
94. "Turkey: Some Election Results", The Times, October 17, 1908, p.7; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.269.
95. "Lettre de Brousse", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 28, 1908, p.3; and, "Empire Ottoman", Revue du monde Musulman, 6 (September-December 1908), p.517.
96. Samih Nafiz Tansu, İstiḥad ve Terakki İçinde Dönenler, p.48.
remainder were independents, and among them, Hafiz Ahmed Hamdi Efendi would later join the Liberal Union. 97

In Burdur, a small town in the interior, reactionaries seized Government offices and terrorized officials. Though the Ministry of the Interior had received no further information, the reactionaries were rumoured to be practicing political blackmail. 98 Ömer Lütfi Efendi, a conservative candidate, won the race. 99 Although elected on the Unionist ticket, he later resigned from the Committee of Union and Progress and became one of the founders of the monarchist People's Party in the Chamber in February 1910. 100

In Bolu, another small town in the interior, only one of the four deputies was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. While Haci Abdülvehab Ömer Efendi, the mufti of Bolu, Ahmed Serafettin Bey, and Mustafa Zeki Efendi remained independent, Habib Bey, a military officer, who had been elected as a Unionist deputy, would later join the Liberal Union. 101

The population of Sinop had shown considerable support for Dr. Riza Nur, who belonged to one of the town's established families and was a leading member of the Liberal Union. By his own account, it was popular pressure, along with that of the mayor and other officials, which had led him to enter the race, though in the last analysis this may have had more to do with the opposition's wish to put up a strong candidate against the Unionists. 102 On their part, the Unionists had decided to support Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, highly unpopular with the local population. Despite Unionist efforts, Riza Nur

97. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.269.
98. İkdam, October 31, 1324/November 13, 1908, quoted in "Turkish Internal Affairs", The Times, November 14, 1908, p.10.
finally decided to run, a move which was enthusiastically supported by the second degree electors. Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan, the mufti of Sinop who was not entirely trusted by conservative elements, also ran as an independent --again, despite Unionist efforts to keep him out of the race. 103

Though the Unionists had sent an emissary into the province to drum up support for the Committee of Union and Progress, he was hardly successful, failing to produce even a single vote from the electors of Ayancik where the Moslem population was said to have revolted against the Constitution, threatening Unionists officials in the process. 104

The electors of Sinop, Gerze and Ayancik voted en bloc for Riza Nur and Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan, and though Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk carried Boyabat, they became the deputies for Sinop. 105 Though Riza Nur was a committed monarchist, Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan proved to be a political opportunist, and in the general elections of 1912, he would become a Unionist supporter, successfully retaining his Chamber seat. 106

However, in nearby Kastamonu, a town which had become famous as a place for exiled intellectuals under the old regime, Unionist candidates --Haci Ahmed Mahir Efendi, Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Ismail Mahir Efendi, and Ahmed Sükrü Bey-- won all the seats. 107 Tengirsenk, having lost in Sinop, had simply run again, this time for Kastamonu. While he was a teacher at Salonica before the Revolution, Ismail Mahir Efendi

106. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hâkitatım, I, pp.258-259. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrûyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.274. Tümerkan was also elected deputy on the Unionist ticket at the general elections of 1914. After the fall of the Unionist regime in 1918, he changed his allegiance from the Committee of Union and Progress to the Republican People's Party of Atatürk, and remained a Kemalist deputy for Kastamonu until his death in 1933 (Kazım Özü Türk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93).
107. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrûyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.272. Ahmed Sükrü Bey was a prominent Unionist who later became Minister of Education. He was hanged for his alleged involvement with the conspiracy to kill Atatürk in 1926, while he was an outspoken member of the liberal opposition in the Assembly.
had joined in the Committee of Union and Progress.  

Konya was another central Anatolian town with a large population of exiled intellectuals in the last days of the absolutist regime which had enthusiastically embraced the Revolution. By mid-September, however, the clerics and old-fashioned population in Konya were stated to have lost much of their initial enthusiasm for the new regime. The Unionist electoral campaign conducted in October by Bursali Rifat Tahir Bey, one of the most prominent members of the Salonica branch of the Committee of Union and Progress who was himself running for election in Bursa, did not change Committee’s prospects. In fact, reactionaries spread rumours of massacres in a move to discredit the new regime and the Committee of Union and Progress. By presenting a picture of religion in danger, the rumours were also calculated to rally Moslem support to the monarchist cause. Previously, there had been electoral alliances between the various supporters of the new regime in the city; Turks, Greeks, and Armenians had agreed to support each others' progressive candidates. The rumour of massacres, however, effectively disposed of this. No Moslem was expected to vote for a Christian, nor a Christian for a Moslem candidate. Consequently, in the elections concluded by mid-November, none of the Unionist candidates gained a seat in the Chamber. All of the four successful candidates -- Müftüzade Hoca Salim Efendi, Hoca Mehmed Vehbi Celik, Sheikh Zeynelabidin Efendi, and Kürdzade Haci Mustafa Efendi-- were nominally independents, though Müftüzade Hoca Salim Efendi and Sheikh Zeynelabidin Efendi later joined the Liberal Union.  

The elections at Ankara were over by November 24. The elected deputies were Haci Mustafa Beyman, a Unionist ulema, Mahir Said Efendi, a notable and a prominent

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111. F.O. 424/217, Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir Gerard Lowther, Konia, October 31, 1908 [p.88].
112. "Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 18, 1908, p.2; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.273.
member of the Liberal Union, Kasim Nuri Efendi, a Ministry of the Interior representative in the local administration, and, Mehmed Talat Sönmez, a Unionist government employee. 113

At Kirsehir, an electoral district of the Ankara province, the elections were over by November 11. The successful candidates were Benliagazade Ali Riza Efendi, a member of the Court of Appeals at Salonica, and Mahmud Mahir Efendi, a lawyer at Istanbul. Both were independents. 114

By late August, rumours of a reactionary outbreak in Kayseri, another electoral district in the province of Ankara, had surfaced, rumours which the Committee of Union and Progress denied. 115 Nonetheless, reactionary activity was evident by the end of September. Reports stated that hodjas were holding meetings and that counter-revolutionary propaganda, accusing the new regime of being anti-Islamic, was distributed. 116 The monarchist propaganda paid off: the Unionists lost both seats to the reactionary candidates, Haci Kasim Efendi and Ömer Mümatz Bey. Both of them would later join the Liberal Union. 117

Trabzon, a coastal trade centre on the Black Sea, was a city where there had been considerable agitation against the old regime before the Revolution. It was, therefore, to be expected that progressive, if not Unionist, candidates would carry the electoral district. The monarchist press, however, began spreading rumours aimed at discrediting the Committee of Union and Progress. In its September 8 issue, Ikdam reported that bands of men representing themselves as Committee members were conducting blackmail and expelling

114. "Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 11, 1908, p.2; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikiçi Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.274.
116. F.O. 424/217, Vice-Consul Wylie to Sir Gerard Lowther, Konia, September 30, 1908 [p.92].
117. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikiçi Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.274.
officials throughout the Trabzon province. The monarchist campaign proved effective: when the race ended by November 15, none of the seven deputies elected was a Unionist. Mehmed Emin Efendi, the mufti of Trabzon, headed the successful list of independent candidates with one hundred and forty-one votes, Saraczade Ali Naki Efendi came second with one hundred and thirty-seven votes, Eyübzade Izzet Bey, a lawyer, received one hundred and thirteen votes, Haznedarzade Mahmud Mazhar Bey, one hundred and seven votes, Matheos Cofidis, one hundred and six votes, Mahmud Imameddin Efendi, the ex-mufti, ninety-six votes, and Nemlizade Hacı Osman Efendi, ninety votes. Haznedarzade Mahmud Mazhar Bey would later join the Entente Libérale and sit on its executive committee.

At Samsun, an electoral district of the Trabzon province, the elections took place on November 27. Interestingly, no Christians were elected despite their presence in Samsun. The successful candidates were Mustafa Nail Bey, President of the Council of Education, Abdullah Bey, President of the Court of Appeals at Kossovo, Mehmed Ali Bey, President of the Court of Correction at Samsun, and Hacı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, an ulema. Only Mustafa Nail Bey and Mehmed Ali Bey were members of the Committee of Union and Progress; the others had been elected as independents. Mehmed Ali Bey, however, would later resign from the Committee of Union and Progress in late March 1910.

Erzurum had been one of the most important centres of revolutionary activity in eastern Anatolia during the final years of absolutism. There, Turkish revolutionaries had

118. "Young Turks and the Executive", *The Times*, September 9, 1908, p.7.
121. "Lettre de Samsoun", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, December 8, 1908, p.3; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.274.
worked together with members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in an attempt to bring back the constitutional regime. By September 5, the Committee of Union and Progress had established, under the leadership of Vehib Bey, an army major, a local branch of the party in Erzurum. Though he was not a member of the Committee, Karekin Pasturnadjian was also actively involved with the Unionist efforts in winning the elections.  

There, three Moslems and two Armenians had been elected deputies. Of the former, Seyfullah Efendi was a distinguished liberal whose courageous defence and protection of the Armenians during the massacres had been repaired with exile. The other two Moslem deputies were Haci Sevket Efendi and Hafiz Ahmed Ziya Efendi, a Kurd. Though all three Moslem candidates ran on the independent ticket, Haci Sevket Efendi later joined the monarchist opposition. The two Armenian deputies were members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Vartkes Serengülian had been condemned to death for his revolutionary activities at Van, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment as a result of British intervention. He was later released with the declaration of the Constitution. His colleague, Karekin Pasturnadjian, was another revolutionary activist who had taken part in the attack on the Ottoman Bank in 1896.

In closeby Erzincan, however, there was not much support for the new regime. In late August, there were rumours that a regiment of the Fourth Army Corps stationed at Erzincan had taken up arms against the Constitution. These rumours were promptly denied by the Committee of Union and Progress. At Erzincan the election was won by Osman Fevzi Topcu, the mufti of Erzincan, who became an independent deputy in the

123. "Lettre d'Erzeroum", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, September 17, 1908, p.3.
125. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.278.
Chamber. 128

On the other hand, Van, another eastern Anatolian town heavily populated by Armenians, was in support of the new regime. The August 25 issue of the Armenian language Istanbul newspaper Puzantion published a letter from Van, reporting that the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress had been established under the leadership of Major Tayyar Bey. Both the Moslem and Armenian populations were said to enthusiastically support the new party branch. 129 The elections were won by independent candidates, Tevfik Demiroglu, and Vahan Papazian. 130

THE EUROPEAN provinces of Turkey held the distinction of being the region where the Revolution had actually started by military and popular uprising against the absolutist regime in July. In this sense, these provinces promised to be strongholds of the Committee of Union and Progress, especially the centrally located Salonica and Monastir provinces as well as the Edirne province. In these provinces, Unionists had established their underground organisations and were quite strong. As a matter of fact, it was the provinces of Salonica and Monastir which were liberated first, and the constitutional regime declared before the monarchist regime surrendered in Istanbul.

Therefore, Unionists could count on electoral support in these provinces. However, there were also regions, such as the provinces of Kossovo and Janina where the population was predominantly Albanian, and parts of the province of Monastir where Albanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian minorities lived in uneasy co-existence. In these parts of the country, the new regime meant hopes for autonomy, and nationalist candidates ran against Unionists.

130. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mescitiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.278.
The Salonica electoral district contained some twenty-six thousand voters of the first degree, and some sixty electors of the second.\textsuperscript{131} For the whole province of Salonica, which included Serres and Drama, there were five hundred and twenty-three electors of the second degree --two hundred and sixty Moslems, and two hundred and sixty-three non-Moslems. The province would return thirteen deputies of whom six would be Moslem.\textsuperscript{132}

By the end of September, the Unionists candidates for the province of Salonica -- which also included the electoral districts of Serres and Drama-- had been selected. They were Rahmi Evrenos, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, Riza Bey, Dr. Nazim Bey, and Mehmed Cavid Bey. The first three were landowners who had been among the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress since its inception. Rahmi Evrenos, in particular, was considered a sort of unofficial President, while Midhat Sükrü Bleda had been the Committee’s Treasurer. Dr. Nazim Bey’s role in preparing the ground for revolution among the rank and file of the Third Army Corps was well known. Mehmed Cavid Bey, whose official position was Director of the School of Arts and Crafts in Salonica, was known as a man of considerable eloquence and intellectual ability.\textsuperscript{133} Most felt that the only non-Moslem victory would be that of Jewish lawyer Emmanuel Carasso, another prominent Unionist.\textsuperscript{134}

The Greeks in the Serres region were bitter for two reasons. First, they resented electoral arrangements, which, they considered, did not give them their due; and second, the Unionists had placed restrictions on the movements of the Bishop of Drama. The situation was only aggravated by the reports of an interview between Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{131} Douglas Dakin, \textit{The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913}, p.391n.
  \item\textsuperscript{132} "The Elections at Salonika", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 11, 1908, p.1.
  \item\textsuperscript{133} Consul-General Harry H. Lamb to Sir Gerard Lowther, Salonica, September 22, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", \textit{Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105}, p.95.
  \item\textsuperscript{134} Consul-General Harry H. Lamb to Sir Gerard Lowther, Salonica, September 22, 1908, in "Correspondence Respecting the Constitutional Movement in Turkey, 1908", \textit{Parliamentary Papers, 1909, 105}, p.95.
\end{itemize}
and Joachim Efendi, the Greek Patriarch, in which Hilmi Pasha had made it clear that if the Bishop of Drama continued to cause trouble, he would be exiled. 135

During the elections of the first degree, which took place in September and October, the Greek community, encouraged by Greek Consular agents, kept up a constant stream of protest against the Turks. At one time, they threatened to withdraw from the elections which, they claimed, were weighted in favour of the Committee of Union and Progress. In the end, they decided to participate. 136

The elections throughout the province were completed on November 8. The final list of elected deputies included six Moslems --Rahmi Evrenos and Mehmed Cavid Bey, for Salonica; Yusuf Nasid Bey and Midhat Sükrü Bleda, for Serres; and, Riza Bey and Agah Bey, for Drama; three Greeks --Gheorghi Artas and Gheorghi Khoneos, for Salonica, and Dimitri Dinkas, for Serres; two Bulgars --Dimitri Vlachoff for Salonica, and Haristo Daltcheff for Serres; and, one Jew --Emmanuel Carasso for Salonica. 137 Yusuf Nasid Bey and Agah Bey later joined the Liberal Union. The Bulgarian deputies, Dimitri Vlachoff, a schoolmaster, and Haristo Daltcheff, a lawyer, were socialists. 138 The Greek deputies for Salonica, Gheorghi Artas and Gheorghi Khoneos were supporters of the monarchist Liberal Union. The third Greek deputy, Dimitri Dinkas, was an independent. The rest of the deputies were all prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress. 139

The electoral district of Edirne consisted of the city itself as well as the surrounding

six administrative units. The city produced forty-eight electors of the second degree, the rest, eighty-eight electors, making a total of one hundred and thirty-six electors.140

The Mayor of Edirne, Dilaver Bey, was forced to resign after an attempt to falsify election results was discovered. Had it been successful, the scheme would have ensured his election and that of two Greeks to the exclusion of the Unionist nominees.141 The elections complete, no Greek deputies were elected. Among the unsuccessful candidates, Dilaver Bey received forty-four votes, Philippe Efendi, a lawyer in Istanbul, forty-four votes, T. Calivoulos, a doctor practising in Edirne, thirty-seven votes, Panayotti, five votes, and Grocho Tchorbadji, two votes.142

Those elected were Mehemet Talat Bey, a leading member of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had been active in Macedonia and Istanbul, with ninety votes, Asim Bey, an independent, with ninety votes, and Riza Tevfik Bölükbaşı, who though elected with ninety-three votes on the independent ticket, became an influential figure in the anti-Unionist opposition.143

In Kirk Kilise, another electoral district in the province of Edirne, there was disagreement between the Turks and the Greeks as to the results of the elections. By early November, the electoral disputes between the Turks and the Greeks appeared to be settling down. After fresh inquiries, the Government annulled the Kirk Kilise elections, the results of which had been protested by the Greek community there.144 At Kirk Kilise no Greek deputies were elected. The two deputies elected were Mustafa Arif Kocabas and Emrullah Efendi, both Turkish, who belonged to the Committee of Union and Progress.145

140. "Lettre d'Andrinople", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, November 21, 1908, p.3.
142. "Lettre d'Andrinople", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, November 21, 1908, p.3.
143. "Lettre d'Andrinople", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, November 21, 1908, p.3; "The Turkish Elections: Some of the Results", *The Times*, November 23, 1908, p.6; and Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.268.
Emrullah Efendi was an intellectual with liberal convictions who had escaped to Switzerland while he was in Izmir as Director of Education for the Aydin Province. He was, however, extradited and sent back to Turkey. He had been exiled to Konya, where he remained until the Revolution. 146

ELECTION campaigns in Albania ---where the electoral districts comprised Ipek, Scutari, Prezrin, Dibre, Durazzo, Elbasan, Berat, Goritza, Argyrocastro, Senidje, Serfidje, Janina, Prevesa, and Prishtine--- were carried on in an atmosphere of tension. The Albanian clubs maintained active campaigns in favour of the Albanian nationalist candidates, entering into battle with the Committee of Union and Progress, which was determined to secure victory for its own candidates. 147

In Elbasan, the population rejected the Unionist candidate, and elected, instead, the independent Albanian Abdullah Mahir Efendi. 148

In Berat, the monarchist candidate Ismail Kermal Bey came under heavy attack after his visit to Athens in September when he had stated that the Greeks were the natural brothers of the Albanians. 149 Though his return from London via Athens and Vlorë to Avlona, his native region, on September 21, was warmly greeted, Midhat Frashëri, the editor of the Albanian language newspaper Lirija and a Unionist supporter, wrote an open letter to Ismail Kermal Bey, expressing strong disapproval of his policy of friendship with Greece, accusing him of being an instrument of that power and denouncing him of political opportunism. 150

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150. "Return of an Albanian Refugee", *The Times*, September 22, 1908, p.3. *Lirija*, October 4, 1908; and, HHStA, PA XIV/9, Albanien V/6, No.61, Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, November 2, 1908,
Despite Unionist and press attacks, Ismail Kemal Bey secured his candidacy in the Berat ballot. For the candidacy of the second deputyship of Berat a lively competition took place between two cousins, Ömer Pasha and Aziz Pasha Virione.\footnote{151} A few days before the election, a friend of Ismail Kemal Bey informed him that he had come to Valona with a Unionist officer to take all necessary measures against Ismail Kemal Bey's election.\footnote{152} The Unionist propaganda, however, failed and he was elected deputy for Berat, along with Aziz Pasha Virione. Müfid Bey was elected deputy for Argyrocastro. All supported the Liberal Union.\footnote{153} The other deputy for Argyrocastro was Janaki Mammepoulos, a Greek, who also supported the Liberal Union.\footnote{154}

In Serfidje. Kocho Drizis and Yorgos Boussios, both Greeks, were elected as deputies. Bussios was a socialist.\footnote{155}

In the province of Janina, the electoral campaign was fought between Albanians and Greeks. Greeks protested against disenfranchisement of members of their community. Upon pressure, the Government admitted the right to the franchise of some twenty thousand Greek farmers of Janina, whose electoral qualifications had been previously disputed by the local authorities.\footnote{156} On the Albanian side, Süreyya Vlora, formerly President of the Council of the Customs Administration in Istanbul and brother of the former Albanian monarchist Grand Vezier Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, waged an active campaign against the Committee of Union and Progress in the province of Janina.

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\footnote{151}{Ismail Kemal, \textit{The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal}, p.319.}

\footnote{152}{Ismail Kemal, \textit{The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal}, p.319.}

\footnote{153}{HHStA, PA XIV/9, Albanien V/6, No.74, Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, November 21, 1908, quoted in Stavro Skendi, \textit{The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912}, p.360; "Turkey: Some Election Results", \textit{The Times}, October 17, 1908, p.7; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.266.}

\footnote{154}{"A la Chambre ottomane", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 22, 1908, p.2.}

\footnote{155}{"Les députés", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 11, 1908, p.2; "News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 3, 1908, p.1; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.266.}

\footnote{156}{"Progress of the Elections", \textit{The Times}, November 9, 1908, p.7.}
Nonetheless, he met with considerable opposition in the capital of that province, as well as in his own district, Avlona, where his family had until recently been influential. He lost, and two Greeks, the independent candidates Dimitraki Kingos and Constantine Sourlas, were returned by thirty-eight votes against nine given to Süreyya Vlora at the elections on December 12, and became the deputies for Janina.

The Catholic Albanians of Scutari argued that, proportionally, their district should name one Christian deputy and one Moslem deputy and warned of serious disorders if the votes were not distributed accordingly. Their appeal, however, was in vain. Both seats for Scutari went to independent Moslem Albanians.

Unrest also surrounded the election of Hasan Sabri Efendi, considered a Turkish refugee, as deputy for Dibre. At the request of the Dibrans, the Albanian club of Monastir took the initiative, protesting the irregular election and calling on the Albanian clubs to join them in bringing the matter before the Chamber. Finally, Ismail Pasha, an Albanian, was elected as deputy for Dibre.

The only Kutzo-Vlach elected was Philip Mishi, who had been elected as an independent deputy for Goritza. The other deputy for Goritza was Sahin Taki Bey, an Albanian who later joined the Liberal Union. Again, there was no support for the

165. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-
Unionists.

At Monastir, elections for the second degree electors were complete on November 14. There were sixty-four Moslem, fifty-four Bulgarian, nineteen Greek, six Serbian, and two Jewish electors. At Monastir, the Greeks, Serbs, Moslems, and Bulgars had each elected a deputy. The Greek deputy for Monastir was Traianos Nallis, who subsequently joined the Liberal Union. The Serbian deputy, Dr. Janaki Dimitrijevich, was an independent. Mehmed Vasif Bey, the Albanian Moslem deputy for Monastir, was also an independent. The Bulgarian deputy, Pantché Doreff, was socialist. None of the deputies were Unionist.

At Üsküb, where the Christian population was predominantly Bulgar, the Serbs captured one of the four seats, the other seats went to two Moslems and a Bulgar. Alexandre Paritz became the Serbian independent deputy for Üsküb. The Bulgar deputy was Théodore Pavloff, a socialist. Originally, the Bulgarian candidate for Üsküb had been Karayovoff, the President of the Union of Constitutional Clubs, an organisation which had the backing of the Bulgarian Government at Sofia. Shortly after the proclamation of complete Bulgarian independence, however, Sandansky persuaded the Unionists that the Constitutional Clubs were nothing more than agents of the Bulgarian Government. The Unionists then substituted Sandansky’s nominees for those sponsored by the Union of Constitutional Clubs.

The Moslem deputies were Mehmed Necib Draga, one of the founders of the Üsküb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress before the

1918", p.266. For more information on Sahin Taki Bey see, Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetiler, 3, p.459.
166. "Lettre de Monastir", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.3.
168. "Lettre de Monastir", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.3; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.267.
170. "Les élections en province", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 25, 1908, p.2; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.266.
Revolution, and *Hoca* Said Efendi, both Albanians. 172

In the Arab provinces, there was little support for the candidates of the Committee of Union and Progress. Except for a few electoral districts where the Unionists or Unionist sympathisers successfully ran for parliamentary seats, the bulk of the population supported the local Arab notables, most of whom were conservative or outright monarchist.

Following the Revolution, the Committee of Union and Progress sent representatives to Beirut to reorganise the local party organisation there. 173

The province of Beirut, which was divided into five electoral districts, would elect six deputies all together. The electoral districts were Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, Haifa/Akka, and Nablus. 174

The city of Beirut and environs, which included Saida, were to elect two deputies. 175 According to reports from Beirut, there was considerable party strife, where one section of the Christian population advocated the eradication of special privileges of the province, another supported their maintenance, and a third advocated the retention of those privileges as well as representation of the province in the Chamber. 176 The final election results reflected the population's mixed opinions. Suleiman al-Bustani, a prominent intellectual and an independent, became one of the two deputies for Beirut. Rida al-Sulh, an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, became the second deputy. He subsequently joined the Liberal Union, and, later, formed the monarchist opposition party,

172. "Les élections en province", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, November 25, 1908, p.2; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.266.


the Moderate Liberals, after the Liberal Union was closed down for involvement in the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April 13, 1909.\textsuperscript{177}

In Tripoli district, a Moslem Turk, Fuad Hulusi Demirelli, was elected as deputy. A lawyer and a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Demirelli was the emissary sent to Beirut by the headquarters in Salonica shortly after the Revolution to establish the local party branch there.\textsuperscript{178}

The deputy for Latakia was Emir Mohammad Efendi Arslan, son of Emir Mustafa Arslan, chief of the druses. A man of great prestige and considerable fortune, Mohammad Arslan was a friend of the infamous Izzet Pasha, the monarchist pasha who had made his escape to London after the Revolution. With the change of the regime, however, Mohammad Arslan exhibited liberal sentiments.\textsuperscript{179}

Sheikh As'ad Efendi Shuqair was elected for the deputyship of Haifa and Acra. He was a suspect under the old regime, and was granted freedom only after the establishment of the new regime.\textsuperscript{180} In Nablus, Sheikh Ahmad Khammash, a Moslem with ultra conservative credentials, was elected deputy.\textsuperscript{181}


\textsuperscript{179} "Les élections en province", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, November 24, 1908, p.2; "Les Élections législatives dans le Vilayet de Beyrouth", \textit{Revue du monde Musulman}, 6 (September-December 1908), p.526; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.279.

\textsuperscript{180} "Les Élections législatives dans le Vilayet de Beyrouth", \textit{Revue du monde Musulman}, 6 (September-December 1908), p.526; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.280.

\textsuperscript{181} "Les Élections législatives dans le Vilayet de Beyrouth", \textit{Revue du monde Musulman}, 6 (September-December 1908), p.526; and, Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.280.
Thus, for the whole province of Beirut four Moslems, one Christian, and one Druse were elected. In terms of their political leanings, four of them were liberal, one moderate, and one conservative.182

In Damascus, where the Committee's popularity was very weak, two opposition political clubs --Freedom. and Free Ottoman-- were formed in late September. These clubs were essentially local branches of the Liberal Union, and drew their membership from among Prince Sabahaddin's supporters.183

The Committee of Union and Progress sent delegates to Damascus in early fall, entrusted with the task of reorganising the local branch of the Committee. The two delegates from Salonica stayed in Damascus for about six weeks, directing election campaigns in addition to reorganising the party organisation. 184

Rashid Rida, a sheikh of some distinction, was a fervent supporter of the Unionists. Towards mid-October, he came to Damascus to help them in their election campaign, and on October 16, he preached in the Umayyad Mosque, one of the city's principal mosques, urging his congregation to integrate the Koran with science and modern civilization.185 Though his audience was reportedly receptive, the following Friday, on October 23, Salih Sharif al-Tunusi, a pro-monarchist preacher and a follower of Abu`l-Huda al-Sayyadi, denounced Rashid Rida as a heretic, inciting the public against him.

183. F.O. 371/560/37930, Consul G. P. Devey to Sir Gerard Lowther, Damascus, October 1, 1908, cited in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.89.

Syria had not responded enthusiastically to the establishment of the constitutional regime. There was much reactionary feeling in the country, especially in Damascus, which was sympathetic to Abdulhamid and not at all attracted to liberalism (Rashid Ismail Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914, p.210).


Rashid Rida barely escaped with his life. Hearing of the disturbance, As'ad Bey, the Chief of the Police and a prominent local figure in the Committee, arrested Sheikh Salih, charging him with disturbing the peace—a move which only inflamed matters. Thousands gathered, marched on the prison, and demanded the preacher's immediate release, shouting epithets against As'ad Bey and the Committee of Union and Progress. Although As'ad Bey gave orders for the sheikh's release, the mob sought him out, apparently with the intention of killing him. The latter managed to conceal his whereabouts, and troops eventually restored order. The episode ended with Rashid Rida's departure, and a weakening of the Committee's position.  

In Damascus, the Unionist candidates faced considerable opposition from the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, the monarchist Arab society which had been founded in Istanbul by prominent figures of the old regime. Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad, its chief architect, ran against the Committee's candidate and won. The other deputies for Damascus were Sheikh Cuhadarzade Süleyman Efendi, 'Abd al-Rahman Bey Yusuf, Sheikh Mohammad al-'Ajlan Efendi, all independents, and, Rushdi al-Sham'a Bey, who later joined the Liberal Union. No Unionist candidate won any seat in the Damascus elections.

Only Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad had previously declared himself an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress though the others were by no means pleased with the recent Unionist activity. The Unionists tried to annul al-Mu'ayyad's deputyship. He

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187. Al-Muqattam, November 25, 1908, and, al-Ahram, November 26, 1908, cited in Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188.


was criticised for his association with the old regime and charged with having gerrymandered the elections. After its opening, the charges were brought before the Chamber of Deputies where al-Mu'ayyad was accused of having spied for Abdülhamid. He was additionally charged with perjury in a personal inheritance case. Despite these objections, al-Mu'ayyad was endorsed on December 28 after deliberations in the Chamber.

As elsewhere, the Committee of Union and Progress was anxious to prevent the election of outright reactionaries in Aleppo. Accordingly, it had instructed the Governor of Aleppo to eliminate reactionary and monarchist candidates from the elections. The Governor, Ahmed Resid Rey, however, supported the old regime and ignored his instructions with the result that only one out of six deputies elected were Unionist. He was Artin Bosgezenyan, an Armenian. The other five deputies -- Emrizade Mehmed Bahaeddin Bey, Bereketoglu Mehmed Rifat Bey, Ali Cenani Bey, Abd al-Nafi Pasha, and Mesud Efendi -- all ran as independents. Rifat Bey and Abd al-Nafi Pasha subsequently joined the Liberal Union. Abd al-Nafi Pasha and Mesud Efendi were, respectively, uncle and nephew of the late Shafiq Pasha, Minister of Police under the old regime.

Basra was another electoral district where neither Unionists nor sympathisers of the new regime stood any chance of winning the elections. There was reason to believe that the

190. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188.
191. "The Turkish Parliament", *The Times*, December 24, 1908, p.3; "A la Chambre Ottomane", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, December 24, 1908, p.2; "The Turkish Parliament", *The Times*, December 25, 1908, p.5; "The Turkish Parliament", *The Times*, December 29, 1908, p.4; "A la Chambre Ottomane", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, December 29, 1908, p.2; Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, 1/13, December 24, 1908, and, 1/16, December 29, 1908, cited in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.98; and, Taj al-Sir Ahmad Ha.ran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188.
representatives of Basra were likely to be extremely conservative. After the news that Seyyid Talip ibn Receb Bey, a candidate opposed to the Committee’s policies had been elected at Basra, some thought a measure of Liberal Union success in the capital and elsewhere in the country quite possible. Seyyid Talib ibn Receb Bey’s election, however, was later challenged in the Parliament on procedural grounds. As he was one of those prominent Arab notables whose local standing and support could not be overlooked, his deputyship was ratified despite the knowledge that his commitment to the new regime was suspect at best. The other seat went to Züheyrzade Ahmed Pasha, an independent.

Baghdad was also feared to vote for extremely conservative candidates. In preparation for the elections, the Committee of Union and Progress sent Babanzade Hamdi Bey, a prominent Unionist who had Baghdadi connections, and two others to Baghdad where, on October 10, Unionist supporters there, along with many Jews, organised an ostentatious reception for the delegation. The pro-Unionist election campaign elicited strong protests from a number of Arab notables, including the naqib, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, and Isa al-Jamil, who had organised an opposition group; both had been removed from office in the aftermath of the Revolution in consequence of their monarchist pasts. With the arrival of the delegation, they organised a counter-demonstration in front of the government buildings, protesting the newly granted freedoms and the liberal regime, and demanding the dismissal of a high ranking provincial official and the arrest of several Unionist supporters. On the morning of October 14, encouraged by the Governor’s detention of several Unionist

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197. He was described by Rashid Rida as a reactionary and a supporter of the absolutist regime, and denounced him for his complicity with unlawful elements against the state (Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.98).
organisers, reactionaries proceeded to attack the Jews, whom they accused of showing sympathy for the Unionist candidates. In the disturbances that followed, locally recruited army units stood by as the crowd pillaged and vandalised Jewish businesses. 200

Despite the odds against Unionist candidates, the Committee of Union and Progress did well in the elections at Baghdad. Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, a Kurdish Moslem, and Sasun Eski Efendi, a Jewish businessman, won the elections as Unionist candidates. The third seat went to Haci Ali Efendi, an independent. 201

Mosul provided another striking example of Iraqi dislike for the Committee of Union and Progress. There was reason to believe that the representatives of Mosul were likely to be reactionary. 202 Committee representatives arrived in Mosul in mid-October as part of their election campaign. Their presence, however, only helped to increase the anti-Unionist feeling there, and the ulama and other reactionary elements stood in open opposition to them, often exciting public sentiment by provoking religious animosity. 203 The population's anti-Jewish and anti-Christian feelings soon made the delegation's stay in Mosul impossible and they left without having achieved anything. 204 Mohammad Ali Fazil Efendi and Davud Yusufani Efendi, both "independents" won the elections. Later, Davud Yusufani joined the monarchist Liberal Union. 205

Dislike for the new regime was also strong in Benghazi, where the population

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found the idea of judicial and political equality between Moslems and non-Moslems particularly distasteful.²⁰⁶ In Tripoli, many were irked by reform measures which the Unionist-backed administration had put into force, among them the establishment of Turkish as the provincial administration's official language.²⁰⁷ Arabs of position under the old regime doubted the Constitution's stability, considered a reversion to the former state of things not improbable, and generally disapproved of the licence and insubordination to which the sudden fall of the absolutist regime had given rise.²⁰⁸

Though the Unionists established a local branch in Benghazi, they could not rally the local population to their cause. As such, its members consisted mainly of government officials, who organised demonstrations in favour of the new regime in the hope of popularising the Revolution and getting votes for the party in the general elections.²⁰⁹ However, their election campaign proved futile. In fact, opposition to the Unionist delegate who visited the town in October was vocal and unmistakably reactionary; during a meeting, his audience let it be known that it would only recognise the authority of God, the Prophet, and his representative, the Khalif, Sultan Abdülhamid. If the meeting succeeded in anything, it only succeeded in alienating the Committee's lukewarm sympathisers, leaving the political field to its reactionary rival, the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, which was the dominant force in Tripoli.²¹⁰ Another Unionist delegation observed that the local

²⁰⁷ N. Slousch, "L'Enseignement de la langue turque à Tripoli", Revue du monde Musulman, 6 (September-December 1908), p.153
²¹⁰ F.O. 195/2271, Alvarez's No.63 and 65, Tripoli, October 9 and 17, 1908, respectively, and, F.O. 195/2271, Consul Raphael A. Fontana's No.25, Benghazi, December 21, 1908, quoted in Elie Kedourie, "The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire", p.146.
branch in Benghazi had failed to gain the support of any of the influential Arabs in Tripoli. 211 Yusuf Shutwan, one of the founders of the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society, won the general elections and become the deputy for Benghazi. 212 The other deputy for Benghazi was Ömer Mansur Pasha, another reactionary candidate. 213

As it had with al-Mu’ayyad’s election in Damascus, the Committee of Union and Progress tried to annul both Shatwan’s and Ömer Mansur Pasha’s deputyships. 214 Shatwan was criticised for his association with the old regime and charged with having gerrymandered the elections. 215 After its opening, the charges were brought before the Chamber of Deputies where Shatwan was accused of having spied for Abdülhamid. Shatwan was found guilty of having intimidated electors and officials; on December 23, his deputyship was declared null and void, and new elections were ordered. 216 In the new election he again won, and thus, retained his seat in the Chamber. Ömer Mansur Pasha’s deputyship, however, was ratified by the Chamber. 217

THE COMMITTEE of Union and Progress had carried many districts in the elections and appeared certain to dominate the Chamber. While it had secured the support of at least sixty percent of the Turks, it also had some followers among the Kurds, the Albanians, and the

212. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188.
215. Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188.
216. "The Turkish Parliament", The Times, December 24, 1908, p.3; Taj al-Sir Ahmad Harran, "The Young Turks and the Arabs: The Role of Arab Societies in the Turkish-Arab Relations in the Period 1908-1914", p.188; and, Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, p.98.
Arabs, and had established close and friendly relations with Jewish and several Armenian deputies. 218

Yet, certain changes in the composition of the local executive branches of the Committee of Union and Progress, certain acts, as well as changes in tone of various pro-Unionist organs not directly connected with the party, made it evident that differences of opinion concerning matters of general policy were bound to manifest themselves among the Unionist and pro-Unionist representatives. The Unionist "bloc", it seemed certain, would, sooner or later, form two or three groups, professing various degrees of commitment to the Revolution and constitutional regime. 219

The shaky character of the elections results with respect to the Unionist deputies was to be fully demonstrated after the parliamentary regime started working. For various reasons, the candidates had been elected under the Unionist ticket in many electoral districts, but their full support for the Unionist principles were suspect. There were a number of deputies, who, though elected on the Unionist ticket, changed sides as soon as opportunities existed for forming opposition parties with monarchist agendas. In addition, many nominally Unionist deputies remained independent and voted with the opposition on certain issues that put the Unionist leadership into a difficult position: they even voted out of office some of the Unionist ministers which the leadership had managed to install in various "coalition" governments.

Conventional historiography's misrepresentation of facts concerning the balance of power in the Chamber is fully exposed when a proper count is made based on both election results and post-election behaviour of the nominally Unionist deputies in the Chamber.

Although we can still not determine with absolute certainty the exact number of deputies in the 1908 Chamber, most reliable data point to a figure of two hundred and eighty-one. The breakdown according to party affiliation show that there were only about

218. "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", The Times, December 17, 1908, p.12.
fifty-four committed Unionist deputies in the Chamber who could be relied upon by the Unionist leadership. Since this figure constitutes a minority in the Chamber, we can easily dismiss allegations that the Chamber was overwhelmingly Unionist. What tipped the balance in favour of the Unionists in most cases was the large number of "independent" deputies who, in fact, constituted the largest "bloc" in the Chamber with one hundred and forty seven deputies. During the four years of the 1908 Chamber's life, it was therefore the "independents" upon whose votes the Unionist leadership depended. Considering the fact that votes of confidence for Unionist-backed governments and Unionist-backed bills were passed with about two hundred votes at the most, it is not unreasonable to assume that a large proportion of these "independents" voted with the Unionists. Yet, their support was not unconditional, and, therefore, the Committee of Union and Progress had to give in to certain demands made by the "independent" deputies.

The monarchist opposition in the Chamber was not as well organised as the Committee of Union and Progress. Most of the monarchist parties that came into existence during 1908-1912 could not manage to gather more than about thirty-five or forty deputies as formal members. A count of individual deputies who showed ultra-conservative or monarchist tendencies, however, points to a figure of seventy-four, which means that committed monarchists outnumbered committed Unionists in the Chamber.

A breakdown according to ethnic origin and religious affiliation of deputies belonging to Unionist, "independent", and monarchist blocs further illustrates the political divisions that marked the general elections.

Turks were in the majority with one hundred and fifty-three deputies, forty-three of which were committed Unionists, eighty-three "independents", and twenty-seven monarchists. As the number of committed Unionists was fifty-four, it is clear that Turks constituted the bulk of the Unionist deputies, with a handful of Armenian and Jewish deputies who consistently supported them.

By no means homogeneous, the Arabs was represented in the Chamber with fifty-
three members. Clearly, on social, economic, or administrative questions it was difficult to imagine that a common bond could unite the Arabs of commercially more developed regions like Syria and Lebanon, with those of underdeveloped regions such as Yemen and Libya. There were fears, however, that its representatives would quickly become reactionary or anti-Turkish should the pro-Unionist Turkish bloc be so ill-advised as to open a campaign against the Arabic language. 220 Out of these fifty-three deputies only one was a Unionist. Twenty-two Arab deputies were monarchists, who played an active role in organising the various monarchist parties during the four years in the Chamber. The support for the constitutional regime of the thirty "independent" Arab deputies was not always guaranteed, and, therefore, Unionists could not count on the support of all of the "independent" Arab deputies.

Albanians constituted the other moslem ethnic minority whose loyalty to the constitutional regime was divided. Out of a total of twenty-seven Albanian deputies, only two remained committed Unionists; ten were "independents", and most of the fifteen monarchist Albanians constituted the leadership cadres of several opposition parties in the Chamber.

On their part, the Christian deputies did not exceed forty. Among them, certain Armenian deputies had agreed to adopt a more progressive programme and were likely to vote with the Committee of Union and Progress on most questions. The Greeks, however, had been disappointed with the election results, though their failure had largely been their own doing. After a brief period of excitement, the Greek community had come to regard the Revolution with more scepticism than any other non-Moslem community, the result being that it did not gain as much from the Revolution as other Christian groups, such as the Armenians, which had lent the movement their support. Essentially conservative, and blaming the Committee of Union and Progress for its political shortcomings, the Greek

220. "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", The Times, December 17, 1908, p.12.
community was not expected to support the Unionists. They were represented by twenty-two deputies. Their programme had not been published, but there was no reason to believe that their policy would be anything but liberal in general questions, and conservative or rather defensive and clerical in cases where the privileges of the Greek community were at all concerned. 221

A breakdown according to party affiliations show that Turks constituted the bulk of the Unionist bloc. Armenian and Jewish deputies were the only ethnic and religious minorities who were on the Unionist side.

In contrast, the monarchist bloc was overwhelmingly dominated by non-Turkish elements. Out of a total of seventy-four monarchist deputies only twenty-seven were Turkish. Main groups of monarchist support were Arabs with twenty-two deputies and Albanians with fifteen deputies. Although most Greek deputies formally remained "independent", they almost always gave their support to the monarchists, by voting with them in the Chamber.

221. "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", The Times, December 17, 1908, p.12.
Appendix A to Chapter 6

GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1908

KOSOVO/ÜSKÜB (17)

Üsküb (4)

Alexandre Paritz  Serbian Indep
Mehmed Necib Draga  (1867-1921)  Albanian (CUP)
Théodore Pavloff  Serbian (Indep) EL
Hoca Said Ef.  Albanian LU


4. "Les élections en province", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 25, 1908, p.2; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.37; and, "Meclis-


Prishtine (4)

Hasan Fuad Pasha  Albanian  LU  EL
Mustafa Hamdi Ef.  Albanian  CUP
Volcetrinli Hasan Bey  Albanian  LU  ML  EL
Sava Stoyanovich  Serbian  LU
Saban Pasha  Albanian  Indep "EL"

Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.94. He voted with the Entente Liberale on the issue of the dissolution of the Chamber in January 1912 (Tariik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.325n).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmed Emin Ef.</td>
<td>Albanian Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Seref Ef.</td>
<td>Albanian Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Prezlinli</em> Yahya Bey</td>
<td>Albanian LU EL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehbi Ef.</td>
<td>? ?18</td>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali Vasfi Bey</td>
<td>Albanian LU EL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SCUTARI (4)

Scutari (3)

Murtaza Bey  Albanian Indep "EL" 20
Sakir Bey  ( -1909) Albanian Indep 21
Riza Bey  Albanian Indep "EL" 22

Drac/Durazzo (1)

Esad Pasha Toptan  (1862-1919) Albanian (CUP) Indep 23


He later worked for the independence of Albania (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsä, Türk Meshurileri Ansiklopedisi, p.123).
JANINA (7)

Janina (2)

Dimitraki Kingos
Greek Indep\textsuperscript{24}

Konstantin Sourlas
Greek Indep\textsuperscript{25}

Argyrocastro/Ergiri (2)

J. Mammopulos
Greek LU\textsuperscript{26}

Müfidd Bey
Albanian LU EL\textsuperscript{27}


The Greek deputies were elected with thirty-eight votes as against nine given to Turkish candidates ("The Turkish Elections", \textit{The Times}, December 14, 1908, p.7).


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The Greek deputies were elected with thirty-eight votes as against nine given to Turkish candidates ("The Turkish Elections", \textit{The Times}, December 14, 1908, p.7).

\textsuperscript{27} [5th Division; Cemal Kutay, \textit{Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi}, Vol.17, p.9606]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1324-1325, p.39; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1326, p.38; and,
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aziz Pasha Vrione</td>
<td></td>
<td>Albanian LU EL²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Kemal Bey</td>
<td>(1844-1919)</td>
<td>Albanian LU ML²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevesa (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azmi Ömer Akalin</td>
<td>(1858-1940)</td>
<td>Turk CUP³⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdi Bey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Albanian (CUP) Indep³¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


MONASTIR (10)

Monastir (4)

Janaki Dimitrijevich  Serbian Indep
Traianos Nallis  Greek LU
Pantché Doreff  Bulgarian Socialist
Mehmed Vasif Bey  Albanian LU EL
Ali Vasfi Bey*?  Albanian Indep

32. [1st Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9602]; Doctor ("Lettre de Monastir" [November 16], The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.3); Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1098; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Sainame-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Sainame-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Sainame-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.94.
Dibre (1)

Ismail Pasha\textsuperscript{d} (1909) Albanian Indep\textsuperscript{36}

Mustafa Basri [Dukaci]\textsuperscript{*} Albanian LU EL\textsuperscript{37}

Sevket Enön Albanian LU

Hasan Sabri Efendi ? ?\textsuperscript{38}

Fisatzade Sevket Ef. ? ?\textsuperscript{39}

Elbasan (1)

\textit{Hoca} Abdullah Mahir Ef\textsuperscript{d} (1909) Albanian Indep\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{Haci} Ali Ef.\textsuperscript{*} Albanian (CUP) "EL"\textsuperscript{41}

Goritza/Görice (2)

\textsuperscript{36} Deceased (\textit{Resimli Kitab}, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.28).
\textsuperscript{38} Inhabitants of Dibre protested against the election of Hasan Sabri Efendi, who, they alleged, obtained his seat through the influence of the government of Dibre ("News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, July 29, 1909, p.1).
\textsuperscript{39} Elected in place of Ismail Bey, who resigned ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1326, p.38).
\textsuperscript{40} [2nd Division; Cemal Kutay, \textit{Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi}, Vol.17, p.9602]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1324-1325, p.39; Death of Abdullah Mahir Efendi was announced on October 3, 1909 (News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, October 4, 1909, p.1).
Philip Mishi  
Sahin Taki  
  (1867- ? )  
Serbian Indep 42  
Albanian LU 43  

Serfidje (2)  

Yorgos Boussios  
Greek Socialist 44  

Koco Drizis [Doriza?]  
Greek Indep 45  

Harissos Vamvakas  
Greek LU 46  

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44. [5th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9605]; "A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 22, 1908, p.2; Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.29; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Surname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39 [He is the only one listed for Serfidje]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Surname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Surname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.94.


SALONICA (12)

Salonica (6)

Yorgaki Artas Greek LU

Mehmed Cavid Bey (1875-1926) Turk CUP

Yorgos Honaios Greek LU

Emmanuel Carasso Jew CUP

Mustafa Rahmi Evranos (1874-1947) Turk CUP


Dimitri Vlachoff
Serbian Socialist

Drama (2)

Agah Bey
Turk LU

Riza Bey
Turk CUP

Serres (4)

Haristo Daltcheff
Bulgarian Socialist

Yusuf Nasid Bey
Turk LU


EDIRNE (12)

Edirne (3)

Asım Bey\(^d\) \quad (1877-1909) \quad \text{Turk} \quad \text{Indep}^{60}

Mehmed Talat Bey \quad (1870-1921) \quad \text{Turk} \quad \text{CUP}^{61}

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Riza Tevfik Bölükbasi (1869-1949) Turk (CUP) LU EL
Faik Kaltakkiran* (1870-1948) Turk CUP

Dedeagac (1)

Süleyman Bey Turk CUP

Gelibolu (1)

Traianos Narli Greek Indep


He was a graduate of the Medical School. He worked for the Customs Administration until the Revolution. He was also a member of the Medical Association. He was active immediately after the Revolution, making speeches with Selim Sirri Tarcan (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.75).


Gümülcine (3)

Mehmed Arif Bey Turkish CUP
Hasan Fehmi Bey Turkish Independents
Ismail Hakki Bey Turkish LU PP EL

Kirk Kilise (2)

Mustafa Arif Kocabas (1872-1954) Turkish (CUP) Independents

1326, p.37 [Stephani Narli].


Emrullah Ef. (1858-1914) Turk CUP

Tekfurdağı [Tekirdağ]/Rodosto (2)

Haci Mehmed Adil Arda (1869-1935) Turk CUP

Hagop Babigian (1856-1909) Armenian CUP

Hagop Boyadjian (1854-1923) Armenian CUP

70. [5th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9605]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Sâlname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Sâlname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.37; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Sâlname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.90. Professor. Graduate of Mülkiye (1882). While he was Director of Education of the Aydın province he escaped to Switzerland to carry on revolutionary activity, but was extradited and sent back to Istanbul. He was appointed member of the Education Council in 1900, and in 1906, in addition to this post, he was sent to Konya as the Director of the School of Law there, where he remained until after the Revolution (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.96-102).

Immediately after the Revolution he was appointed as headmaster to Galatasaray, and about a month later, as Maarif Meclisi İlim Diire Reisi (Ibrahim Alaettin Gërva, Türk Mescurlari Ansiklopedisi, p.115).


He was Director of Customs at Salonica immediately before the Revolution (Ibrahim Alaettin Gërva, Türk Mescurlari Ansiklopedisi, p.158).


73. Boyadjian replaced Babigian. Boyadjian was professor of mathematics, and many Unionists, including the present Minister of Finance and Minister of Education were among his pupils ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 6, 1909, p.1). Boyadjian, sub-rector of the university, was elected deputy on October 1 ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 2, 1909, p.1). Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.824; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Sâlname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.90. Elected in place of Hagop Babigian, who died ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Sâlname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan Azası", Sâlname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.37). See also Krikor Komurçüyan, Makaleler Serisi?, p.26, quoted in Rh. Y. G. Cark, Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler,
### Istanbul (10)

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<tr>
<td>Manyasizade Refik Bey d</td>
<td>1853-1909</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa Asim Ef.</td>
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<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP 75</td>
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<td>Ahmed Riza Bey</td>
<td>1859-1930</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vitali Faraggi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>Indep 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bedros Haladjian</td>
<td>1871-</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>CUP 78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed Nesimi Bey</td>
<td>Turk</td>
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<td>1861-1915</td>
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<td>Krikor Zohrab</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>LU</td>
<td>1875-1957</td>
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<td>Constantin Constantinidis</td>
<td>Greek</td>
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<td>Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın</td>
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<td>Pantoleon Cosmidis</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>LU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mehmed Rifat Pasha</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>1862-1918</td>
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</table>


Tahir Hayreddin Bey * Turk LU EL 85

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Sandjak of CATALCA (1)

Dimitris Zaphiropoulos Greek LU 86

***

Sandjak of IZMIT (3)

Anastas Mihailidis Greek Indep 87

Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.37).

He was the son of a merchant in Balkapani. He graduated from Mülkiye in 1883. He was Ambassador in Athens before the Revolution. He was the younger brother of Yagci Sefik Bey (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.326).

85. Son of Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha; brother of Salih Pasha. He was one of the founders of Entente Liberale (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.315).


Ahmed Müfiz Saner (1871-1949) Turk (Indep) EL^88

Hafiz Rüdü Ef.

HÜDAVENDIGAR (13)

Bursa (4)

Ömer Fevzi Hoca Turk Indep^90

Hafiz Ahmed Hamdi Ef. Turk LU^91


Abdullah Sabri Karter (1867-1939) Turk Indep

Bursali Tahir Bey (1861-1926) Turk CUP

Karahisar-i Sahib [Afyon] (3)

Riza Pasha (1875-1957) Turk CUP

Hoca Mehmed Kamil Mitas (1915) Turk Indep

Kethudazade Salim Bey Turk Indep


Ertugrul [Bilecik] (2)

Mehmed Sitki Bey  Turk  CUP
Mehmed Sadik Bey  Turk  Indep

Kütahya (4)

Abdullah Azmi Torun (1869-1937)  Turk  CUP
Hatibzade Ahmed Cemal (1871-1928)  Turk  Indep
Hasan Ef.  Turk  ?
Mustafa Safvet Pasha?  Turk  Indep
Havacazade Rasih Ef.?  Turk  ?

102. Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.44.
Ahmed Ferid Tek* (1877-1971) Turk (CUP) 104

***

Sandjak of KARESI [Balikesir] (5) 105

Haci Ali Galib Ef. Turk Indep 106
Muharrem Hasbi Ef. Turk Indep 107
Abdülaçiz Mecdi Tolon Turk Socialist 108
Sefik Ef. Turk Indep 109


He was a graduate of the Military Academy (1895). He was discharged and sent into exile to Tripoli for his political activities. He escaped to Paris in 1900; and stayed in Paris and in Cairo until the Revolution (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.377).

105. Five deputies ("Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 11, 1908, p.2).


Sandjak of KALE-I SULTANIYE (2)

Biga (2)

Arif Ismet Bey\textsuperscript{d} \hfill ( \textenquote{-1911}) Turk \quad "CUP"\textsuperscript{112}

Seyyid Ali Riza Ef.\textsuperscript{d} \hfill ( \textenquote{-1910}) Turk \quad Indep\textsuperscript{113}

Demircizade Mustafa Bey\textsuperscript{*} \hfill Turk \quad Indep\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} "Meclis-i Mebusan", \textit{Salname-i Umumi}, 1328 [1910], p.96. Elected in place of Sefik Ef., who was appointed to government post ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1326, p.39).
\item He died on January 18, 1911 at the Chamber of Deputies. He was about forty years old ("The Ottoman Parliament", \textit{The Orient}, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.2).
\item He was about to be expelled from the CUP by the leadership. He was connected with the dailies \textit{İkdam} and \textit{Sabah} ("The Ottoman Parliament", \textit{The Orient}, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.2).
\item \textsuperscript{113} Died ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1324-1325, p.42).
\item \textsuperscript{114} "Meclis-i Mebusan", \textit{Salname-i Umumi}, 1328 [1910], p.96 [Mustafa Bey]. Elected in place of Ali Riza Ef., who died ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", \textit{Salname-i}}
Atif Kamcil* (1884-1947) Turk CUP

***

CEZAYIR BAHRI SEFID (5)

Rhodes (1)

Theodore Constantinidis Greek Indep115

Lynnos (1)

Mihaliki Koufis Greek ?116

Mytilene (2)

Mihaliki Saltas Greek Indep117

Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.41).


117. [3rd Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9603]; "A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 22, 1908, p.2; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.42; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun,
Panayotis Bostanis  
Greek  Indep\textsuperscript{118}  
Chio/Sakiz (1)  
Mihaliki Tchélébidis  
Greek  Indep\textsuperscript{119}  

** ***  

AYDIN (16)  

Izmir (6)  

Aristidi Yorgandjioglu Pasha  
Greek  CUP\textsuperscript{120}  

\textsuperscript{118} 1326, p.41; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.92.  

He was promoted to the Senate in mid-January, 1911 ("Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.5).
Stephan Ispartaliyan  Armenian Indep
Pavlis Carolidis  Greek Indep
Nesim Masliyah  Jew CUP
Celebizade Seyyid Bey (1866-1924) Turk CUP
Mehmed Said Ef.  Turk Indep

Aydın (2)

Hocazade Süleyman Bilgen  Turk Indep


He was a graduate of Law School (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi, p.353).


126. He sent in his resignation on May 13, 1909, and the Ministry of the Interior gave necessary instructions for the election of a new deputy ("News Items", The


While a student at the Medical School he was exiled for his political beliefs. He first escaped to Europe and then to the United States (Ibrahim Alaettin Gôvsa, Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi, p.388).


Halil Mentese (1874-1948) Turk CUP
Hamza Hayati [Öztürk] (1868-1921) Turk CUP

Saruhan [Manisa] (4)

[Ali] Haydar Bey (1878-1937) Turk CUP
Ilhami Bey Turk Indep
Mansurizade Mehmed Said Bey Turk CUP
Tokadizade Sekib Bey (1871-1932) Turk Indep


He was exiled to Bitlis for his liberal views (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.367).
KONYA (13)

Konya (5)

Mehmed Emin Ef. Turk Indep

Kürdzade Haci Mustafa Ef. Turk Indep

Müftüzade Haci Salim Ef. Turk LU EL

Mehmed Vehbi Celik (1862-1949) Turk Indep

Sheikh Zeynelabidin Ef. Turk (CUP) PP EL


141. [2nd Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9602]; "Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 18, 1908, p.2; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Sainname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.40 [Seyhzade Abidin Ef.]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Sainname-i Servet-
Burdur (1)

Ömer Lütfi Ef. Türk (CUP) PP

[Hamid-i Abad] Isparta (2)

Hacı Esref Bey Türk İndep
Süleyman Sami Bey Türk İndep

Nigde (3)

Fahrettin Ef.? Türk İndep
Sadık Bey Türk İndep

*i Fünun, 1326, p.39 [Seyhzade Zeynelabidin Ef.]; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.94. He resigned from the CUP and was one of the founders of the People's Party in February 1910 (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.294, and p.298). He was one of the members of the first parliamentary council of Entente Liberale (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.315).


Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri  (1867-1921)  Turk  CUP\textsuperscript{146}  
Muhiddin Ef.  Turk  Indep\textsuperscript{147}  
Yorgaki Kurtoglu  Greek  Indep\textsuperscript{148}  

[Teke] Antalya (2) 

Mehmed Hamdi Yazir  (1878-1942)  Turk  (CUP) PP\textsuperscript{149}  
Ebusziya Tevfik Bey  (1849-1913)  Turk  LU\textsuperscript{150}  

***


He was Judge of the Criminal Court at Salonica before the Revolution. He had entered the Committee of Union and Progress there (İbrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.174).


Ulema. He also taught at Mekteb-i Mükiye. He wrote in journals like Beyan-ül-Hak, Sebil-ur-Resad, Sirat-i Müstakim (İbrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, pp.402-403).


He had been exiled first to Rhodes and then to Konya, where he remained until the Revolution (İbrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.109).
ANAKARA (12)

ANKARA (4)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Mehmed Talat Sönmez</td>
<td>1875-1950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasim Nuri Ef.</td>
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<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep&lt;sup&gt;154&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Corum (2)

Ali Osman Bey (1876- ) Turk CUP 156

Kayseri (2)

Haci Kasim Ef. Turk LU EL 157
Ömer Mümtaz Bey Turk LU 158

Kirşehir (2)

Benliagazade Ali Riza (1871-1926) Turk. Indep 159


Mahmud Mahir Ef.          Turk   Indep^160

Yozgat (2)

Edib Bey               Turk   Indep^161
Hayrullah Ef.          Turk   "CUP"^162

***

KASTAMONU (8)

Kastamonu (4)

Hacı Ahmed Mahir Ef.   (1860-1925) Turk   CUP^163
Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk^r   (1878-1969) Turk   CUP^164


In 1903 he was appointed to Istinat Mahkemesi Azaligi; later, he was chief judge at tyhe Istinaf Mahkemesi, and Temyiz Istida Dairesi (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.231).

164. Lawyer (Ahmad and Rustow). Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ismail Mahir Ef.</td>
<td>(1869-1916)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Sükrü Bey</td>
<td>(1875-1926)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necmeddin Kocatas</td>
<td>(1876-1949)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cankiri (2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmed Behcet Kutlu</td>
<td>(1865-1948)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


He graduated from Law School in Istanbul, and also from Paris Law School where he received a Ph.D. in political science and economics. He taught at the Istanbul Law School (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.378).


While he was a teacher and later headmaster at the Selanik Rûşdiyesi, Öğretmen Okulu, and Sanayi Mektebi, he joined the Committee of Union and Progress. Immediately after the Revolution he was appointed as headmaster to the Istanbul Teachers' School, but was later elected deputy (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, pp.231-232).


He graduated from Istanbul Muallim Mektebi, and worked as a teacher and later as headmaster in several schools. He was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress before the Revolution (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, pp.371-372).


He was the son of Sheikh-ul-Islam Tursucuzade Ahmed Muhtar Ef. He graduated from the Law School in 1896. Immediately after the Revolution he was appointed Governor of Baghdad, where he remained for four months (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.219).

Mustafa Tevfik Durlanik (1871-1944) Turk Indep\textsuperscript{169}

Sinob (2)

Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan (1875-1933) Turk CUB\textsuperscript{170}

Riza Nur (1879-1942) Turk LU EL\textsuperscript{171}

***

Sandjak of BOLU (4)

\textsuperscript{169} Identified as Mehmed Resid Bey in Resimli Kitab, 1 (September 1908-March 1909), p.441.


After graduating from the Military Medical School he taught there until the Revolution (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.327).
Hacı Abdülvehab Ef. (1920) Turk Indep¹⁷²
Habib Bey (1928) Turk (CUP) LU¹⁷³
Ahmed Serefettin Bey Turk Indep¹⁷⁴
Mustafa Zeki Bey Turk Indep¹⁷⁵

***

TRABZON (11)

Trabzon (7)

Mehmed Emin Ef. Turk Indep¹⁷⁶


Saraczade Ali Naki Bey (1842-1913) Turk Indep^{177}
Eyübzaide İzzet Bey (1861-1920) Turk Indep^{178}
Haznedarzade Mahmud Mazhar Bey Turk LU EL^{179}
Matheos Cofidis Greek Indep^{180}
Mahmud İmameddin Ef. (d -1910) Turk Indep^{181}
Nemlizade Hacı Osman Bey Turk Indep^{182}

---

and Eastern Express, November 23, 1908, p.2).
Falcizade Mahmud * Türk Indep

Gümüşhane (2)

Misirlizade Hayri Ef. Türk Indep 183
Ibrahim Lütfi Pasha Türk Indep 184

Lazistan [Rize] (2)

Ahmed Bey (Pasha) Türk Indep 185
İbrahim Ferid Ef. Türk Indep 186

***

Herald and Eastern Express, November 23, 1908, p.2); and, Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.36.


Sandjak of CANIK [Samsun] (4)

Abdullah Bey† Turk Indep
Mehmed Ali Bey Türk (CUP) Indep
Haci Ahmed Hamdi Ef. Türk Indep
Mustafa Nail Bey† (1861-1921) Türk CUP
Süleyman Necmi Selmen* (1871-1943) Türk CUP


188. [4th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9603]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.42; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1325, p.41; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.95. President of the Tribunal of Correction ("Lettre de Samsoun" [November 27], The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 8, 1908, p.3); and, Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.995. He voted against Bedros Haladjian along with members of the opposition in Lütfi Fikri Bey's interpellation, and resigned from the CUP ("Un bruit qui circule", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1910, p.2).


He was promoted to the Senate in mid-January, 1911 ("Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.5).

Sivas (13)

Sivas (5)

Nazareth Daghavarian (1862-1915) Armenian LU EL

Mustafa Ziya Ef. Turk Indep

Dr. Hüsnü Bey Turk Indep

Dr. Ömer Sevki Bey (1870- ) Turk Indep


192. Elected in place of Mustafa Nail Bey? (Ahmad and Rustow, p.274).


Ahmed Sükrü Ef. Türk LU PP EL

Amasya (3)

İsmail Hakkı Mumcu (1879-1945) Türk LU ML EL

Muallim İbrahim Cudi Bey (1850-1932) Türk Indep

Arif Fazıl Ef. Türk CUP

Karahisar-i Sarki (2)

Mebusan Azası, Sainame-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.40).


He taught for many years in Terakki Mektebi and Idadi at Salonica (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsə, Türk Məşhurları Ansiklopedisi, p.88).

Ömer Fevzi Ef. Turk LU PP 201
Serdarzade Mustafa Atay (1861-1925) Kurd? Indep 202

Tokad (3)

Sheikh Haci Mustafa Haki Efendi Turk Indep 203
Hattatzade Ismail Pasha Turk Indep 204

Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1870-1954) Turk LU PP EL 205


ERZURUM (7)

Karekin Pasturmadjian  
Armenian Indep\(^{206}\)

Vartkes Serengülyan (1915)  
Armenian Socialist\(^{207}\)

Seyfullah Ef.  
Turk Indep\(^{208}\)

Haci Sevket Ef.  
Turk (CUP) PP\(^{209}\)


Hakkari (1)

Seyyid Taha Ef. Arab Indep

* * *

BITLIS (5)

Bitlis (1)

Arif Ef. Turk Indep

---


Genc [Bingöl] (1)

Mehmed Emin Ef. (1918) Turk Indep

Mus (2)

Kegham Der Garabetian (1918) Armenian Indep

Haci Ilyas Sami Mus (1881-) Turk CUP

Siird (1)

Abdürrézak Ef. Turk Indep

***


MAMURET EL-AZIZ (6)

Mamuret-ul-Aziz [Harput] (3)

Asim Bey Turk Indep 221
Haci Mehmed Nuri Ef. Turk Indep 222
Haci Ziyaeddin Ef. Turk Indep 223

Dersim [Tunceli] (1)

Ömer Lütfi Fikri Bey (1872-1922) Kurd LU ML 224

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After graduating from Mekteb-i Mülkiye in 1890, he studied at the Law School in Paris, graduating in 1893. He returned to Istanbul. He was imprisoned for fourteen
months in 1895 for his involvement in establishing the constitutional regime. Afterwards, he was exiled to Isparta as Tahrirat Müdürü. After serving in Burdur and Konya as a government employee, he escaped to Europe, and then settled in Cairo where he worked as a lawyer (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsə, "Türkiye Məşərələri Ansiklopedisi," p.230). He was one of the members of the executive council of the Moderate Liberals in 1911 (Tarık Zafər Tunya, "Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952," p.277).


227. His deputyship is contested in the Chamber ("A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 24, 1908, p.2); but was validated on December 28 ("A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 29, 1908, p.2). "Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1004.

228. [2nd Division; Cemal Kutay, "Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri"
Riza Ef.?  

Argani-Maden (1)

Niyazi Bey

Ibrahim Ef.

Mardin (1)

Said Bey

Siverek (1)

Nureddin Bey

Turk monarchist

Turk Indep

Turk Indep

Turk (CUP) Indep


230. His election was invalidated by the Chamber. He was tried by default by the Court Martial and sentenced to fifteen years' detention in a fortress. He had been convicted of plotting for the overthrow of the constitutional regime ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 9, 1909, p.1). His deputyship was invalidated by the Chamber on account of his activities as a spy for the old regime ("A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 10, 1909, p.1).


233. [5th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9605]; Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.32; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.42; "Meclis-i
Diyarbekirli Ismail Hakki Bey Türk CUP 234

** **

HALEB (8)

Haleb (6)

Emrizade Mehmed Bahaeddin Arab Indep 235
Berekeoglu Mehmed Rifat Bey d -1910 Arab LU 236
Artin Bosgezenian Armenian CUP 237
Ali Cenani Bey (1872- ) Turk Indep 238

Mebusan Azasi*, Sainname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.40; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Sainname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.92. He voted against Bedros Haladjian along with members of the opposition in Lütfi Fikri Bey's interpellation, and resigned from the CUP ("Un bruit qui circule", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1910, p.2).


Abd al-Nafı Pasha
Mesudi Ef.
Emrizade Besir Ef.*

Maras (2)

Hacı Hasan Fehmi Ef.
Mehmed Sükrü Ef.

---

Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.92.


Sandjak of URFA (2)

Mahmud Nedim Bey

Turk

Independence

Sheikh Safvet Yetkin

(1866-1950)

Turk

CUP

* * *

ADANA (5)

Adana (1)

Ali Münif Yegena

(1874-1950)

Turk

CUP


While he was in the Mekteb-i Mülkiye he joined in the Committee of Union and Progress along with doctors Ishak Sukut, Abdullah Cevdet, and Ibrahim Temo. He was caught and imprisoned, but was pardoned due to his father's connections with the Minister of Police Nazım Pasha. He was appointed teacher to Gelibolu Idaresi. While he was governor of Köprülü he joined in the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress. Immediately after the Revolution he was appointed governor of Görüce, and then became deputy for Adana (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi*, p.403).
Abdullah Faik Copuroğlu (1857-1939) * Turk Indep

Cebel-i Bereket [Dörtyol] (1)

Mehmed Resid Ef. Turk Indep

Ic Ili [Silifke] (1)

Mahmud Bayram Ef. Turk Indep

Kozan (1)

Hamparsoum Boyadjian Armenian Socialist

He was appointed Governor of Ankara, and therefore his deputyship ended in November 1910 ("The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 1/32 (November 23, 1910), p.1).


Mersin (1)

<table>
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<td>Arif Hikmet Bey</td>
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<td>Abdülhalim Bey</td>
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BEIRUT (6)

Beirut (2)

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<td>Suleiman al-Bostani</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rida al-Sulh</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>LU ML</td>
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(1860-1933)

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He was promoted to the Senate in mid-January, 1911 ("Empire News: The Capital", *The Orient*, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.5).

Kamil al-As'ad* Arab (CUP?) EL²⁵⁴

Akka (1)

Sheikh As'ad Ef. Shuqair Arab LU²⁵⁵

Latakia (1)

Emir Muhammed Arslan Bey⁴ ( -1909) Arab -CUP-²⁵⁶
Emir Amin Arslan Bey* Arab LU²⁵⁷

Nablus (1)

---


Sheikh Ahmad Khammash Arab Indep

Tripoli (1)

Fuad Hulusi Demirelli 1876-1955) Turk CUP

***

Sandjak of JERUSALEM [Kudüs-ü Serif] (3)

Ruhi al-Khalidi Bey Arab Indep

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He graduated from the Law School. He worked in the provincial justice administration in Gelibolu and Monastir (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurlar Ansiklopedisi, pp.100-101).

Said al-Husseini Bey

Hafız al-Said Bey

Syria/Damascus (8)

Damascus (4)

Cuhadarzade Suleiman Ef.\(^r\)

Mehmed Aclani Ef.\(^d\) ( -1911)


Rushdi al-Shama (1816) Arab LU ML 265
Shafiq al-Muayyad al-Azam (1815) Arab LU ML EL 266
Abd al-Rahman Bey Yusuf* Arab Indep 267
Shukri al-Asali* (1878-1915) Arab LU ML EL 268

Hama (2)

Khalid al-Barazi Arab LU 269


268. Elected at the by-election in 1911 (Rashid Ismail Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914, p.258). He was one of the founders of the Moderate Liberals in November 1909 (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.277). He was a prominent member of Entente Liberale and a member of the first executive council of the party in the Chamber (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.315).

269. [1st Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9602]; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salmame-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.40; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salmame-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.39; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.93. See also, F.O. 195/2277/212, Devey to Sir Gerard Lowther, Damascus, November 24, 1908, quoted in Rashid Ismail Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914,
Abd al-Hamid Zahrawi (1871-1916) Arab LU EL

Havran (1)

Sa'ad al-Din Ef. Khalil Arab Indep EL

Kerak (1)

Tewfiq Ef. al-Majali Arab (Indep) ML

***

Sandjak of ZOR (1)

p.249.


Hizir Lütfi Ef.  Turk  LU ML 273

***

MOSUL (5)

Mosul (2)

Mehmed Ali Fazil Ef.  Arab  Indep 274
Davud Yusufani  Arab  LU ML EL 275

Kerkük (2)


Salih Pasha                   Arab   Indep 277

Süleymaniye (1)

Haci Said Ef.                  Arab   CUP 278

***

BAGHDAD (6)

Baghdad (3)

Haci Ali Ef.                   Arab   Indep EL 279


Babanzade Ismail Hakki (1876-1913) Kurd CUP

Sasun Eskl [Hasgayl] Jew CUP

Divaniye (2)

Seyyid Mustafa Nuri Ef. Arab Indep

Sevket Pasha (1916) Arab Indep EL

Kerbela (1)

Abd al-Mahdi Ef. (1915) Arab ML

280. [4th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9603; Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.25; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38; and, Meclisi Mebusan, Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.91.

He was a graduate of Galatasaray, and studied at Mektebi Mülkiye; graduated from the Law School (İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi. pp.57-58).


283. [3rd Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9603]; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38; and, Meclisi Mebusan, Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.91. He is identified as deputy for Baghdad in Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.28. He was a prominent member of Entente Liberale (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.333).

284. [4th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9603]; Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.840; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39; Meclisi Mebusan Azasi, Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38; and, Meclisi Mebusan, Salname-i
BASRA (6)

Basra (2)

Zuhayrzade Ahmad Pasha\textsuperscript{d} (\ 1910) Arab Indep\textsuperscript{285}
Seyyid Talib ibn Receb Arab LU ML\textsuperscript{286}
Karataszade Abd al-Wahab Pasha* Turk? Indep

Ammare (2)

Mehmed Selim Ef. Arab Indep\textsuperscript{287}
Hussein al-Alvan Arab Indep\textsuperscript{288}

\textit{Umumi}, 1328 [1910], p.91. He was one of the founders of the Moderate Liberals in November 1909 (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler}, 1859-1952, p.277).


Müntefik (2)

Refet Sunevi Ef.¹ (1890-1910) Arab Indep²⁸⁹
Hizir Ef. Turk Indep²⁹⁰
Ferid Pasazade Abd al-Muhsin Bey * Arab CUP

***

HEDJAZ (3)

Mecca (2)

Abdullah Sarac R Arab ?²⁹¹
Sharif Abdullah Efendi * (1882-1951) Arab LU²⁹²
Sheikh Hasan Seybi [Celebi] Efendi * Arab EL²⁹³

²⁹¹."Echos de la Ville", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 1, 1908, p.2. He was the mufti of Mecca (F.O.195/2286, Monahan to Sir Gerard Lowther, Jidda, December 15, 1908, quoted in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p.209).
²⁹³. He was elected in March 1910 (Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p.210n; and, "Les députés de la Mecque", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 6, 1910, p.2); "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326, p.38
Jiddah (1)

Kasim Zeynel Efendi

Arab  LU^{294}

***

Sandjak of MEDINA (1)

Seyyid Abdillakdar Hashimi Efendi

Arab  Indep^{295}

***

YEMEN (9)

Sanaa (5)?

---

[Sheikh Hasan Seyhi Ef.]; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", *Salname-i Umumi*, 1328 [1910], p.92 [Hasan Seyhi Ef.].


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Indep 296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seyyid Ahmad Cenani Bey</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Indep 297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seyyid Ali bin Hussein</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Indep 298</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1856-1931)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hussein bin Ali Efendi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>LU 299</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seyyid Ahmad Yahya al-Kaysi Efendi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Indep 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadi Mehmed Makhafi Efendi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Indep 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seyyid Ali Musa Efendi</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Indep 302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hodeidah (4)

Seyyid Mehmed Abdulrahman?

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Seyyid Hadi al-Rezak Ef.

Tahir Receb Efendi

Ali Suvayd Efendi

Zühdü Efendi *

Mahmud Nedim Bey *

Arab  Indep

Turk  Indep

Arab  Indep

Turk?  Indep

Turk  Indep

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Sandjak of ASIR (2)

Sheikh Ahmad Efendi  ( -1910)  Arab  Indep


305. [5th Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9605]; and, resigned ("Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.39 [identified as deputy for Sanaa]). Tahir Efendi ("Les députés du Yémen", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 23, 1908, p.2). He resigned on January 3, 1910, protesting that no measures had been taken for improving the situation in the Yemen and that he was unable to collaborate with his Arab colleagues owing to their ignorance of Turkish ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, January 4, 1910, p.1).


Sheikh Ali bin Hasan Efendi
Ferrac Said Bey*

Arab  Indep 310
Turk  (Indep) EL 311

***

TRABLUS GARB (6)

Trabulus Garb (3)

Ferhad Efendi
Mahmud Naci Bey
Sadik Bey

Arab  (CUP) LU PP 312
Turk?  Indep 313
Turk?  Indep 314


311. He was a prominent member of Entente Liberale (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.383).


Cebel-i Garbi (1)

Suleiman al-Baruni Efendi Arab Indep

Fizan (1)²?

Haci Bey Arab Indep

Cami Baykut (1877-195) Turk (CUP)

Horns (1)

Mustafa bin Kaddave Bey Arab Indep

***

Sandjak of BENGHAZI (2)


317. [1st Division; Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, Vol.17, p.9600]; Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1096; "Meclis-i Mebusan Azasi", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.40; and, "Meclis-i Mebusan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328 [1910], p.93. Kolagasi. He voted against Bedros Haladjian along with members of the opposition in Lütfi Fikri Bey's interpellation, and resigned from the CUP ("Un bruit qui circule", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1910, p.2). He was one of the seven deputies who formed the Hizb-i Terakki before the 1911 Congress of the CUP (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.187n).

Ömer Mansur Pasha (1878- ) Turk Indep
Yusuf Shatwan Arab LU

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MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, 1908

Müskir Ali Riza Pasha (1859-1933)
Müskir Gazi Ibrahim Edhem Pasha (1844-1909)
Müskir Ömer Rüüsü Pasha [Mekkelioglu] (1843-1922)
Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (1845-1936)
Hasan Fehmi Pasha (1836-1910)


2. "Les sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 16, 1908, p.1. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1863. In 1895 he was promoted to the rank of müskir [marshal]. He fought in the Greek War and was given the title gazi. After the Revolution he was appointed senator. He became the Minister of War during the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April, 1909. After the suppression of the coup attempt he left for Egypt where he died shortly afterwards (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.125).

3. "Les sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 16, 1908, p.1. "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.86. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1866. He was promoted to the rank of general [liva] in 1884. During the Greek War he was appointed Head of the Military Council. He was promoted to the rank of müsir in 1901. He served as the Minister of War in the first Said Pasha Cabinet after the Revolution (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövs, Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi, p.302).


(1911), p.36). He was elected deputy for Istanbul in the first parliament in 1877. He was known as the "old Young Turk". He was appointed as Minister of Justice after the Revolution, and later served as head of the Council of State (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.134).

6. Ex-Minister of Commerce and Public Works ("Les sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 16, 1908, p.1). Ex-Minister of Hedjaz Railway ("Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.37; and, "Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326 (1911), p.36). "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.86. He graduated from Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye. He was appointed Minister of Finance in 1884. He later served as Minister of Pious Foundations, of Commerce, and of Finance. He also served as governor of Salonica, Aleppo, and Hüdvendigar. He was not demoted after the Revolution since he was known for his honesty. He was appointed as Head of the Council of State before his appointment as senator (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.413).


Ali Riza Efendi¹²  
Sahib Molla Bey ¹³  
Topcu Ali Riza Pasha (1854-1921)¹⁴  
General Muhiddin [Mehmed?]Pasha¹⁵  
General Süleyman Pasha¹⁶  
Vice-Admiral Mehmed Pasha¹⁷  
Ferik Sevket Pasha ¹⁸

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¹⁴ Minister of the Artillery ("Les sénateurs", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 16, 1908, p.1). "Heyet-i Ayan", \textit{Salname-i Servet-i Fünun}, 1324-1325, p.37. He had the rank of ferik ("Meclis-i Ayan", \textit{Salname-i Umumi}, 1328, p.86). He graduated from the Mühendishane in 1880. In 1881 he was sent to Germany for further studies for four years. Upon his return to Turkey he was appointed teacher at the Topcu Mektebi. After the Revolution he was appointed Minister of Tophane and Military Schools. He was later appointed Minister of the Navy. In the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April, 1909, he was injured (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, \textit{Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi}, p.328).


Sharif Ali Haydar Bey (1846-1913)

Reciazade Mahmud Ekrem Bey

Abdurrahman Efendi

Galib Bey

Nasuh Bey

Faik Bey

Halim Bey

Dimitraki Mavrocordato (1858-1919)


Mavroyeni Bey
Georgiadis Efendi
Mustafa Nuri Bey (1851-1923)
Faruki Sami Pasha (1861-1911)
Bohor Efendi
Azarian Efendi
Misirlı Halil Hamada Pasha
Manastırli Ismail Hakki Efendi (1846-1912)


33. "Les sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 16, 1908, p.1; "Hefet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.37; and, "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.86. He was preacher at Dolmabahçe Mosque in 1874, and later at Hagia Sophia Mosque. He was appointed professor of religious law at the Law School in 1884, and continued teaching there until he was appointed a senator (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurleri Ansiklopedisi, p.193).
Mehmed Galib Bey (1835-1914)
Mgr. Avxentios
Bessaraya Efendi
Abd al-Kadir Efendi

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APPOINTMENTS AFTER THE OPENING OF THE PARLIAMENT

1908

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (1839-1918)


38. Son of Sheikh Abd al-Lah Efendi ("Les sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 16, 1908, p.1). "Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.37; and, "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.87. Son of the famous Kurdish Sheikh Ubeydullah, "whom the Committee and the new Government have consulted not once, but many times, concerning their dealings with the Kurdish tribes" (Opening of the Parliament by the Sultan: The Senators", The Times, December 18, 1908, p.5).

39. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1860. He was appointed High Commissioner of Egypt and remained there for twenty-three years. After the Revolution he returned to Istanbul (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Meshurvalı Ansiklopedisi, pp.150-151). He was proposed by the Grand Vezier for the post of Vice-President of the Senate on December 26, 1908 ("The Turkish Parliament", The Times, December 28, 1908, p.3). He had the rank of müsir; Vice-President of the Senate ("Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.37; and, "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.86). Vice-President of the Senate ("Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1326 (1911), p.36). He was elected President of the Senate in October
Said Pasha
Musa Kazim Efendi

1908 or 1909

Raif Pasha
Ibrahim Pasha
Abdurrahman Seref Efendi
Aram Efendi
Laghfet Istarki Bey

1909

Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi


47. Upon the fall of the Kamil Pasha Cabinet in February 1909, the sheikh-ul-Islam in his Cabinet, cemaleddin Efendi was appointed senator ("Au Sénat", The Levant
Avloniyali Mehmed Ferid Pasha (1852-1914)

Damad Ferid Pasha (1853-1923)

Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha (1855-1921)

Müşir Fuad Pasha (1835-1931)

Sharif Nasser Bey

Damad Mehmed Serif Pasha (Cavdaroglu) (1873-1958)

[Mustafa Salih] Resid Akif Pasha (1863-1920)


51. "Informations Parlementaires", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 15, 1909, p.1. "Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.37; and, "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.87. He was promoted to the rank of liva, general, and sent to Kerkük to suppress the Kurds. In 1876, he was sent to suppress the revolt at Scutari. In 1902? he was exiled to Damascus where he stayed until after the Revolution (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Mershurları Ansiklopedisi, p.145).


53. "Informations Parlementaires", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 15, 1909, p.1. "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.87. He was a graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye (1894). He married to Sultan Abdülaziz's youngest daughter Emine Sultan. In 1904 he was promoted to the rank of vezier and thus given the title of pasha. In 1905 he was appointed a member of the Council of State. After the Revolution he was demoted. In August 1909 he was appointed Governor of Istanbul (Ali Cankaya, Müâliye Tarihi ve Müliyeliler, 2nd Ed., Vol.3, pp.608-610; and Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Mershurları Ansiklopedisi, p.369).

54. Ex-Minister of the Interior ("Informations Parlementaires", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 15, 1909, p.1). "Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; and, "Meclis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.86. He was appointed a member of the Council of State in 1902. Later he was appointed Governor of Sivas. After the Revolution he returned to Istanbul and was appointed Minister of the Interior (Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, Türk Mershurları Ansiklopedisi,
Salih Hulusi Kezzak Pasha (1864-1939)

Temko Popovitch Efendi

1910

Mahmud Esad Efendi

Davud Efendi Moiko

1911

Suleiman al-Bustani

Zareh Efendi Düber

Ziyaeddin Efendi

55. "The vacancy left in the Senate by the death of Marshal Edhem Pasha will be filled by Salih Pasha, Minister of War." ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 28, 1909, p.1). "Heyet-i Ayan", Salname-i Servet-i Fünun, 1324-1325, p.38; and, "Mecbiis-i Ayan", Salname-i Umumi, 1328, p.87. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1888. He was sent to Germany for further studies. He returned to Turkey after three and a half years. He served under General von der Goltz. Along with his father-in-law Mūsir Fuad Pasha, he was exiled to Diyarbakır in 1902 and then to Sivas. He returned to Istanbul after the Revolution. He was appointed Commander of the Second Army Corps with the rank of ferik. He was appointed Minister of War in 1909. In the Hakki Pasha Cabinet he was Minister of the Navy (İbrahim Alaettin Gösra, Türk Mesculari Ansiklopedisi, pp.342-343).


57. The Grand Vezier decided to nominate Director-General of Cadastre as senator ("Informations: nouveaux sénateurs", The levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 21, 1910, p.2).


59. He was deputy for Beirut, and Vice-President of the Chamber ("Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.5).


Mustafa Nail Bey (1861-1921)
Sharif Cafer Efendi
Aristides Pasha Yorgandjioglou

1912

Ahmed Riza Bey
Sükrü Pasha
Mahmud Sevket Pasha (1856-1913)

1913

Menemenlizade Mehmed Rifat Bey (1856-1935)

1913?


64. Deputy for Izmir and ex-minister of forests, mines, and agriculture ("Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 1/41 (January 25, 1911), p.5).
65. He was made a senator in January 1912 ("Ahmed Riza Bey, Senator", The Orient, 3/5 (January 31, 1912), p.1)
66. Former governor of Syria, he took the oath as senator in May 1912 ("Chamber of Deputies begins work", The Orient, 3/19 (May 8, 1912), p.1).
67. The grand vezier decided to nominate minister of war as senator ("Informations: nouveaux sénateurs", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 21, 1910, p.2). He was appointed senator upon his resignation from the ministry of war in July 9, 1912 ("Mahmud Shevket Pasha", The Orient, 3/29 (July 17, 1912), p.7).
Mehmed Sükrü Pasha

(1857-1915)
Chapter 7

UNIONIST BID FOR POLITICAL POWER IN EARLY 1909

CONVENTIONAL RECOUNTING OF EVENTS in late 1908 and early 1909 often give a wrong impression of what the real political situation was. As the standard accounts of the Revolution dismiss the genuinely revolutionary character of the movement and portray it as a mere governmental change, or takeover, by a modernising elite, composed of enlightened military and civilian bureaucrats, they take it for granted that these bureaucrats who called themselves Unionists --or "revolutionaries from above", as the proponents of dependency theory would like to label them-- ruled without encountering serious opposition. Given the conventional belief that the general elections turned out a Chamber which was overwhelmingly, if not totally, Unionist, there remains no reason, from a conventional viewpoint, to question the validity of these assumptions.

However, the reconstruction of events which have been told in the previous chapters point to a different direction: The Revolution was genuine --meaning that it was not a simple takeover of state apparatus by a "modernising elite" represented by enlightened bureaucrats. The upheaval in the upper echelons of the civilian and military bureaucracy which took place immediately after the Revolution partly illustrates the true nature of the events. Furthermore, the Kamil Pasha Cabinet which was formed during the initial days of the Revolution also illustrates the transitional, or provisional, character of political rule. Although nominally supported by the Unionist leadership, the government was neither constituted by the Unionists nor represented the real aspirations of the Revolution. Kamil Pasha was far from being a revolutionary figure, and everybody knew that a change in government was inevitable after the opening of the parliament.
The results of the general elections, contrary to common belief among historians, did not turn out to be a total success for the Unionists. The elections did not give the Unionists the overwhelming majority in the Chamber they had hoped for. Nevertheless, being the only organised body in the Chamber, they stood a good chance of challenging the Kamil Pasha Cabinet. Therefore, it was only natural to expect that a government having the confidence of the Unionists take over the reigns of power as soon as the Chamber started to function.

THOUGH not more than about two hundred deputies had reached the capital, Parliament was scheduled to open on December 17. Whereas representatives of the old regime, statesmen who survived the thirty shameful years of the absolutist regime, would dominate the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies would largely consist of men of the younger generation, less experienced than their colleagues in the Senate, though inspired with a more confident temper and a much more patriotic fervor. Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Slavs, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews would be proportionally represented in the Chamber.¹

On the morning of the scheduled opening, all of Istanbul was in movement --troops preparing for the ceremony, artisans feverishly putting finishing touches to the decorations which had been commissioned for the event, festive crowds surging across the bridges over the Golden Horn into Istanbul. The Sultan, whom Kamil Pasha had persuaded to preside over the ceremony, would drive from the Yildiz Palace by way of Pera, the Mahmud Bridge, and Eski Saray to the Hagia Sophia, in the shadow of which stood the Parliament Building. Long before the procession began, crowds of men took up every vantage point along the route, patiently awaiting the Sultan's passage, while women, dispensing with the veil, gathered in windows and along the rooftops. The route was profusely decorated with the Crescent and Star on red and green fields. Newly-clad troops lined the streets and causeways, and all crossroads were picketed with cavalry, and staff

¹. "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", *The Times*, December 17, 1908, p.12.
officers in brilliant uniforms. Despite extensive planning, however, the square which faced the Hagia Sophia and the Parliament Building became so crowded that cavalry had to be called in to help the Albanian infantry stationed there to keep the pressure under control. The lower roofs of the Hagia Sophia and even the lower rim of the main dome were reportedly "black" with sightseers. In front of the Parliament gate was a guard of honour, and there were also detachments of students from the classical, technical, military, naval, and civil schools.²

By eleven fifteen, everyone was in his place as the first deputies arrived, preceded by red and green silk banners. A trumpet called the troops to attention, and military bands clashed out the Constitutional Hymn. At half past twelve, the Royal carriage arrived, with Abdülhamid, his son, Prince Burhaneddin, and the Grand Vezier. As the carriage swung past to the sound of the Hamidian Anthem, the crowd burst into singing, and cheering for the Constitution. Exactly at ten minutes to one, the Turkish flag over the Parliament Building gave way to the Royal ensign and for a second time, Abdülhamid stood before the assembled representatives of his people.³

In the Chamber, facing the tribune sat some two hundred deputies, the monotony of the black stambulines and red fezzes relieved by the white and green turbans of the ulema and hocas and the blue uniforms of a dozen military deputies. Between the tribune and the deputies were ranged the dignitaries of the Moslem, Christian, and Jewish faiths. Beyond the Christian prelates, on the extreme right of the tribune, were the senators --Marshals and Generals in full uniform, and ex-Ministers covered with gold lace. Of all, perhaps the most interesting figure among the senators was that of Said Pasha, who thirty years ago, ambitious of power, and sceptical of constitutionalism, had aided Abdülhamid to overthrow the Parliament of 1876 and laid the foundations of the system of Palace government.⁴

⁴. "Opening of Parliament by the Sultan: Scenes in Stambul", The Times, December 18, 1908,
Written with Kamil Pasha's knowledge, the speech from the throne began with a justification for the Constitution's abrogation. The Sultan stated that "the first Parliament was temporarily dissolved until the education of the people had been brought to a sufficiently high level by the extension of instruction throughout the Empire". The deputies listened without even smiling at what was surely the strangest defence an autocrat had ever offered for the suppression of liberty. But when the Sultan spoke of foreign interference and of the cabinet's need for complete parliamentary support, and when he reiterated his pledge to stand by and preserve the Constitution, the deputies positively erupted into applause. When Abdülhamid left, all were in high spirits. The deputies then chose Naki Bey, deputy for Trabzon and the senior member present, as temporary President of the Chamber. The session ended with all present swearing allegiance to the Constitution and the Sultan, as long as the latter should maintain the Constitution.\footnote{5}

Outside, huge crowds had waited patiently until half past one, when an officer on the summit of Hagia Sophia waved a white flag. Another immediately answered from the Ministry of War, and a moment later the first of one hundred and one guns told the capital that the Sultan had fulfilled his promise to the people. A great shout went up and the amassed bands again played the Constitutional Hymn. The crowd took up the Hymn, and for nearly an hour after, snatches of the Hymn came up to the Chamber of Deputies, mingled with loud cheering as the Sultan, the Ministers, Ambassadors, and the deputies successively left the Parliament Building.\footnote{6}

On the whole, the press greeted the opening of Parliament with satisfaction, gave expression to the joy of the nation, and counseled the people to support the labours of the deputies in whom the nation had placed its confidence.\footnote{7}

\footnote{5. "Opening of Parliament by the Sultan: Scenes in Stambul", \textit{The Times}, December 18, 1908, p.5; and, "Opening of Parliament: Speech from the Throne", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 18, 1908, p.1.}

\footnote{6. "Opening of Parliament by the Sultan: Scenes in Stambul", \textit{The Times}, December 18, 1908, p.5.}

\footnote{7. "The Turkish Parliament", \textit{The Times}, December 19, 1908, p.5.}
The Speech from the Throne was also generally greeted with enthusiasm, though Tanin criticised its brevity and vagueness, and condemned Kamil Pasha for his involvement in its conception. Tanin also expressed the hope that the Austrian and Bulgarian difficulties would be settled as soon as possible in order to allow Parliament to devote itself to domestic questions.  

With the inauguration of the Parliament, the Committee of Union and Progress headquarters at Salonica sent a telegram to the Sultan, reiterating its claim that a system of government based on deliberation was a national right in accordance with the teachings of history and the prescriptions of the Moslem faith. The telegram went on to express the joy of the nation, and wished the Sultan a peaceful and happy reign.

The opening of the Parliament was greeted with celebrations in the provincial centres. At Salonica, the stronghold of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the surrounding towns of Cavalla and Drama, similar rejoicings took place on the day of the opening of the Parliament. There were celebrations in the Anatolian towns as well. At Erzurum, a crowd of about thirty thousand people gathered in front of the government building where speeches were made and loyalty to constitutional regime expressed. In towns all over Anatolia --Trabzon, Adana, Bursa, Izmit and Bandirma-- the population greeted the opening of the Parliament with extreme joy.

The great majority of the deputies were genuinely anxious to help in the task of reorganizing the nation's internal administration and were united in their advocacy of reforms such as the introduction of the principle of ministerial responsibility to the

10. "Lettre de Salonique", and "Lettre de Drama", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 24, 1908, p.3; and, "Lettre de Cavalla", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 23, 1908, p.3.
12. "Lettre de Brousse", "Lettre d'Ismidt", and "Lettre de Pandemra", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 24, 1908, p.3; and, "Lettre d'Adana", and "Lettre de Trebizonde", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 30, 1908, p.3.
Constitution, the alteration of laws concerning the powers of provincial authorities, and the extension of conscription to non-Moslems. Matters of parliamentary procedure would have to be discussed: a President and two Vice-Presidents would have to be elected, a budget, which would inevitably excite debate, would have to be passed; a variety of schemes prepared by the different Ministries would have to be sanctioned.\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Le Temps}, in reference to an interview which one of its correspondents had had with Dr. Nazim Bey, remarked that the proposal to amend the Constitution of 1876 so as to determine once and for all the nature of ministerial responsibility, and to establish a constitutional basis for national sovereignty, was the rock on which the first Russian Duma had split, and that it would constitute the real test of the aims and strength of the Unionists.\textsuperscript{14}

The President and the two Vice-Presidents of the Chamber had not yet been appointed. By Article 74 of the Constitution of 1876, the Sultan would choose these from a list prepared by the Chamber, but it was doubtful whether Abdülhamid would have much freedom in the matter. Ahmed Riza Bey, formerly editor of \textit{Mesveret}, and one of the chief organizers of the Unionist movement outside the Empire, was believed to have an excellent chance of gaining the presidency, in spite of his unpopularity among religious circles. Of the other candidates, Ismail Kemal Bey, the monarchist Albanian deputy for Berat, was also a serious contender: an administrator of proven ability, he was experienced, ambitious, and witty, though detested by the Unionists who accused him of having duped them on the issue of Albanian autonomy.\textsuperscript{15}

The election of the President of the Chamber took place on December 23, and the names of Ahmed Riza Bey, Azmi Bey, and Emrullah Efendi were subsequently submitted to the Sultan. As Ahmed Riza had received a commanding two hundred and four votes, he was expected to be the Sultan's choice.\textsuperscript{16} Ismail Kemal Bey came in fourth, receiving one

\textsuperscript{13} "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", \textit{The Times}, December 17, 1908, p.12.
\textsuperscript{14} "The Turkish Parliament: French Views", \textit{The Times}, December 19, 1908, p.5.
\textsuperscript{15} "The Turkish Chamber of Deputies", \textit{The Times}, December 17, 1908, p.12.
\textsuperscript{16} "The Turkish Parliament", \textit{The Times}, December 24, 1908, p.3; and, "The Turkish Parliament", \textit{The Times}, December 25, 1908, p.5.
hundred and eight votes. 17

The following day, the first round of elections of three candidates for the First Vice- Presidency of the Chamber began. Talat Bey, deputy for Edirne and one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, came first with two hundred and sixteen votes. Sefik Bey, deputy for Balikesir, received one hundred votes, Agop Babikian, Armenian deputy for Rodosto, sixty-one votes, Mustafa Asim Efendi, deputy for Istanbul, thirty-seven votes, Ismail Kemal Bey, Albanian deputy for Berat, thirty-six votes, Ebuzziya Tevfik Bey, deputy for Antalya, twenty votes, Aristidi Pasha Yorgancioglu, Greek deputy for Izmir, eighteen votes, Necib Draga, Albanian deputy for Üsküb, fourteen votes, and Krikor Zohrab, Armenian deputy for Istanbul, ten votes. 18 On the second round the following day, however, the three deputies whose names were to be submitted to the Sultan --Talat Bey, deputy for Edirne, Sefik Bey, deputy for Balikesir, both of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Ismail Kemal Bey, monarchist deputy for Berat--obtained an almost identical number of votes. 19

The December 26 sitting of the Chamber opened with the announcement that the Sultan had named Ahmed Riza Bey President of the Chamber. The announcement was received with the utmost enthusiasm, and Ahmed Riza Bey took the floor and addressed the Chamber. He described how, twenty years before, he had left Bursa and made his way to Paris, where he worked, with the help of devoted patriotic friends, for constitutional liberties. He urged the Chamber to put aside old quarrels and unite for the general good, for the eyes of the nation, and of all of Europe as well, were upon it. He declared that the Committee of Union and Progress would carry out its task with the calm and dignity which had thus far marked its policy, and expressed the hope that his comrades would not allow themselves to be influenced by personal interests in the performance of their duties. He

17. "The Turkish Parliament", The Times, December 24, 1908, p.3; and, "The Turkish Parliament", The Times, December 25, 1908, p.5.
then announced that Talat Bey had been selected First Vice-President. Three candidates were then chosen for the post of Second Vice-President -- Aristidi Pasha Yorgancioglu, Greek deputy for Izmir, with one hundred and twenty-two votes, Necib Draga, Albanian deputy for Drama and member of the Üskülb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, with one hundred and twenty votes, and Ruhi al-Khalidi, Arab deputy for Jerusalem, with one hundred and nine votes. The Sultan was expected to select Aristidi Pasha Yorgancioglu for the post.20

That same day, draft copies of the Chamber's reply to the Speech from the Throne were circulated in the lobbies. The reply began by blaming the calamities and oppression of the previous thirty years on the Sultan's former advisors. With regard to foreign affairs, it declared that Turkey was animated by the most pacific intentions and that the Chamber would give its fullest support to "a Cabinet which, according to the spirit of the Constitution, should be responsible to the Chamber and possess its confidence".21 Though this somewhat vaguely worded passage was expected to arouse considerable discussion, the draft was passed by a large majority on December 28.22

It was generally expected that, once Parliament was convened and the Chamber's executives elected, the Committee of Union and Progress would begin a concerted attack on the Kamil Pasha Cabinet: the Committee would clearly require men of bolder and more modern ideas.23 Whether or not this attack would be prompted by honest motives remained to be seen. Whatever the case, the early days of 1909 promised to test the

nation's commitment to a truly constitutional regime, and whether or not that commitment would extend to Kamil Pasha's removal.24

The question of a vote of confidence for the Kamil Pasha Cabinet was therefore of continued interest in the Chamber. Though the position of independent Turkish deputies was uncertain, the Greek deputies, and a majority of the Albanian and Armenian deputies, were believed to support the Cabinet.25 Syrian deputies, along with other deputies from Arabia, had already made it public that they had decided to support Kamil Pasha's maintenance as Grand Vezier.26

With the elections in the Chamber complete, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress then took steps to provoke an immediate vote of confidence with the intention of bringing down the Kamil Pasha Cabinet.27 Hsing to embarrass the Government on the Crete Question, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, on December 30, proposed that a day be scheduled for a discussion of the Cabinet's foreign and domestic policy.28 The date of Kamil Pasha's statement of policy had not yet been scheduled, but it was expected that the Grand Vezier would defend his conduct of affairs on January 2, 1909, after which the Chamber would adjourn for the Kurban Bayram holidays.29 Yalcin's proposal, however, only weakened the Committee's already tenuous majority, galvanized opposition against the Committee of Union and Progress, and prevented further immediate action against Kamil Pasha at this juncture. The Greek and Christian deputies in the Chamber

29. "Turkish Internal Affairs", The Times, December 31, 1908, p.4.
supported the Government; yet, amid much confusion and debate, the request for interpellation was accepted.  

Though supporting a review of Kamil Pasha's policy, however, the Chamber voted to postpone the debate for a fortnight. The debate was expected to be held on January 11.

The opposition papers, İkdam, and Yeni Gazete were openly in support of Kamil Pasha. In addition, a Greek language newspaper reported that the Albanian deputies intended to support the Liberal Union's policy of decentralization and, implicitly, Kamil Pasha. Though Tanin and Suray-i Ümmet continued to criticise the Grand Vezier's domestic and foreign policy, it was believed that, pending settlement with Austria and Bulgaria, the Salonica Committee had decided to support Kamil Pasha's maintenance, ostensibly in an effort to pacify its own dissenters. It was also rumoured that a majority of the one hundred members of the Deputies' Club had resolved to support the Cabinet in the January 11 debate.

Preparing for his appearance before the Chamber, Kamil Pasha ordered the Ministries to prepare summaries of reforms and budgets over the past five months, all of which the Cabinet would review in an extraordinary meeting on January 9. Ostensibly, Kamil Pasha's speech would emphasize the progress made since the Revolution, highlighting the various schemes for administrative reform which would be submitted to the Chamber.

The day of the Cabinet's extraordinary session, the Unionists held a demonstration at the Sultan Ahmed Square to protest the Greek Government's intention to annex Crete.

Twenty thousand people attended, among them Arabs, Bosnians, Albanians and Kurds, all of whom displayed great enthusiasm, especially when one of the meeting's numerous orators reminded them that, in the economic boycott, Turkey possessed a weapon of proven efficacy, and that, in case of need, it could also be employed against Greece. After a number of speeches had been delivered, the majority of the demonstrators marched to Sublime Porte whereupon they sent delegates to present their resolution to the Grand Vezier: that the Government do everything in its power to oppose Greek annexation of Crete. 38

Kamil Pasha appeared before the crowd, stating that the Greek Government had formally declared that the solution to the Cretan question would be left in the hands of the four Powers; there was no foundation to the rumours, which Unionist newspapers had spread, that the Cretan question was about to be raised. He ended by saying that Crete remained an Ottoman province and that, should necessity demand it, he would not fail in his duty to the nation and the Empire. The speech, which was received with loud cheers, was followed by a demonstration in support of the Grand Vezier --an unforeseen and unpleasant turn of events to those who had organised the meeting in the specific hope of discrediting the Government. 39

On January 10, Suray-i Ümmet, the Unionist organ, published a severe criticism of certain deputies who were accused of forming nationalist "parties" in the Chamber. The paper declared that the safety of the country was jeopardized by such conduct, called the deputies in question fools or knaves, and urged Ahmed Riza Bey to bring about unity within the Chamber. 40 The attack was not well received; Hasan Bey, the Albanian deputy for Prishtina, denounced the Suray-i Ümmet article in the January 11 session of the

Chamber. In its January 11 issue, Süray-i Ümmet published a letter from Ahmed Riza Bey in which he defended the deputies, affirming that they were indeed working for the general interests of the nation. In addition, the paper not only publicly disavowed responsibility for the editorial, but bowing to criticism from the opposition as well as from moderate Unionists, also removed the editor and manager of Süray-i Ümmet. They were replaced by members of the staff of İttihad ve Terakki, the Salonica organ of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Throughout January, monarchist opposition strengthened. A British daily, the Daily Mail, even printed rumours of an insurrection against the constitutional regime involving some twenty thousand conspirators. After imprisoning the Grand Vezier and the President of the Chamber, these reportedly planned to close the Parliament, abrogate the Constitution, and appoint a new Caliph. The conspiracy was said to have spread throughout Turkey.

On January 12, the police raided the offices of the reactionary newspaper Hukuk-u Umumiye, seized a quantity of arms, and arrested several people, all members of the Devotees of the Nation, accused of plotting to overthrow the constitutional regime. The police investigation proved that the offices of Hukuk-u Umumiye had served as headquarters for a gang of political adventurers and blackmailers known as the Devotees of the Nation who appeared to have obtained and distributed arms for the purpose of intimidating both the Government and the Committee of Union and Progress. Some forty members of the organization, including Ismail Hakki Efendi, the editor of Hukuk-u

Umumiye, were subsequently arrested, a majority of whom were released by the end of the month. 47 Hukuk-u Umumiye resumed publication on January 22. 48 In light of the releases, the police action came under heavy attack. 49

On January 13, Kamil Pasha appeared before the Chamber and defended his Cabinet's programme. 50 After referring to the enthusiasm with which the new regime had been received as well as to the extraordinary discipline and moderation displayed by the people, he declared that it was, first and foremost, due to the Sultan that disturbance and bloodshed had been avoided. The Sultan, he argued, had put himself at the head of the Revolution, dissociated himself from the group of evil advisors, and had thus earned the nation's gratitude. Having defended Abdülhamid and exonereated him from any personal wrong doing, Kamil Pasha went on to pay lip service to the various groups which had brought about the Revolution: warm thanks were due to the army, which had identified itself with the nation's aspirations, and to the men, who, undaunted by exile and oppression, had worked perseveringly to overthrow despotism. 51

He then summarized the administrative reforms which his cabinet had initiated. The military, he said, had made great strides since the Revolution, and though the navy's fleet had been allowed to fall into an absolutely disorganised condition under the old regime, the expenditure of 300,000 TLs in the preceding five months had made it possible to commission all vessels. Extensive programme of public works would be submitted to the


Chamber, with a number of demands for concessions on the part of foreign capitalists. Though the Ministries of Public Works, and Mines and Forests, in particular, had the benefit of foreign assistance, he warned that the influx of foreign capital would depend on the practice of sound finance, and a wary, unadventurous foreign policy. British capitalists, who had shunned Turkish investments under the old regime, had lately cooperated with French and German financiers and would, he hoped, continue to aid in the development of the Empire.52

Turning to foreign affairs, the Grand Vezier pointed out that the Government had devoted its attention to the strengthening of its relations with the Powers. Certain political schemes, however, had of late hampered its efforts. The Bulgarian declaration of independence was followed by Austria-Hungary's annexation of the occupied provinces and the evacuation of the sancak of Novi Bazar. The Government had vigorously protested these acts of lawlessness, and had formally requested the Great Powers to convene a European Conference. In the meantime, the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina had shown signs of considerable excitement, as was the case in Serbia and Montenegro. The Government decided to accept the recommendation of the Powers --amounting to a financial arrangement with the concerned parties-- and the immediate danger of war had been averted. As to the Cretan Question, the Grand Vezier stated that the four Protecting Powers had promised to achieve a settlement in accordance with Turkish interests.53

In conclusion, Kamil Pasha stressed that the Government had faced great external and internal difficulties during the last five and a half months. He hoped that, with Divine aid and the patriotic support of the Chamber, the state would emerge from its troubles, taking its place among the proud nations of the world.54


54. "Turkish Policy: Speech by Kamil Pasha", The Times, January 14, 1909, p.5; and, "A la
The speech over, deputies sprang to their feet and cheered the Grand Vezier for several minutes. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, proposed an informal vote of confidence which was unanimously carried, amid frantic cheers. The move had mobilised the monarchists who succeeded in rallying to the side of Kamil Pasha all those who could be won over from the Unionist cause. As a result, the parliamentary majority of the Committee of Union and Progress became shaky, and this prevented the Unionists from taking open action against Kamil Pasha at this juncture. When the President asked Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin if he had anything to add, the latter declined to speak, and with the session over, deputies poured into the lobbies still cheering the Grand Vezier. This was a political victory for the opposition.

Characteristically, the monarchist anti-Unionist press made the most of Kamil Pasha's latest success. The *Ikdam* of January 15 ridiculed the Committee of Union and Progress for its failure to bring about the fall of Kamil Pasha. Admitting defeat, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin wrote that whatever his opinion of Kamil Pasha's policy, he could not but refrain from joining his colleagues in their applause of the former's masterly defence. The speech was generally well-received. Non-Moslem elements were gratified by the Grand Vezier's reaffirmation that military service and state-sponsored education would be open to them, a promise originally made by the Unionists. On their part, members of the Committee of Union and Progress appreciated his complimentary references to their efforts on behalf of national liberties. Criticism was suspended for the moment, and deputies,

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senators, and the general public, almost without exception, expressed satisfaction with the result of Yalcin's interpellation.60

The reception of the Grand Vezier's speech was thoroughly unexpected. Only three weeks before, even the majority of Kamil Pasha's own supporters believed a vote of non-confidence was inevitable. At that time, a segment of the Committee of Union and Progress --composed partly of young and zealous politicians who disapproved of the Grand Vezier's appointments, of senators who resented his independence and were inclined to mistake his caution for timidity, and of those who were personally hostile towards the old statesman-- had obtained the control of Suray-i Ümmet, the organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, and had gained Tanin's support, whose editor Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin was carrying on a vigorous campaign against the Grand Vezier.61

The older and more conservative members of the Committee of Union and Progress not only appreciated Kamil Pasha's political abilities, but realised that "swapping horses while crossing the stream" was both impractical and inadvisable with respect to the long-term plans of the party, and given the apparent extent of his popularity, downright dangerous for the Committee. Under the leadership of Ismail Kemal Bey, the monarhist Albanian deputy for Berat, non-Turkish deputies --among them Greeks, Arabs, and Albanians-- as well as some Turks came out in open support of the Government. Despite such support from the conservative deputies, Suray-i Ümmet continued its campaign against the Grand Vezier until the Unionist leadership forced a personnel and policy change in the paper. Nonetheless, its efforts had served a purpose, namely, to provide cover for the Committee's general retreat.62

The attack, however, was not over. During the January 16 sitting of the Chamber, Mecdi Bey called on Ziya Pasha, the Minister of Finance, to account for the delay in the publication of the Budget. Speaking in defence of his Ministry, Ziya Pasha stated that other

60. "Kiamil Pasha's Speech: General Turkish Approval", The Times, January 15, 1909, p.5.
ministries had not yet sent in their respective estimates, and that, though he had succeeded in drawing up revenue estimates for the upcoming financial year, he was unable to give any estimate of expenditures. At the moment, he could not, regretfully, fix a date for the communication of the Budget to the Chamber. Ziya Pasha's defence did nothing to promote his reputation among the deputies. A short debate followed, and the Chamber finally voted the order of the day.63

Likewise, on January 18, Babanzade Ismail Hakkı Bey, the Unionist deputy for Baghdad, demanded that the ministries of Public Works and Foreign Affairs provide the Chamber with information on the Baghdad Railway. He pointed out that the agreements concluded by the Government with foreign promoters had been kept from the Turkish people and that it was only through the European press that any information on the subject was known. The Turkish people, he said, had the right to a full explanation on this and other points. The Chamber decided that the responsible Ministers should report to the Chamber on January 30.64

The January 23 session was devoted to a series of similar interpellations. Semseddin Bey, the Minister of Pious Foundations, who had appeared to answer questions on the state of his ministry, caused considerable unrest when he declared that while he was ready to answer certain questions, he was unwilling to recognise the Chamber's competency in matters of a purely religious nature. He further stated that thus far he had been unable to introduce any reforms in his ministry, and concluded his speech with an Arabic prayer. The Chamber protested the use of an unofficial language in Parliament, though Ahmed Riza Bey, succeeded in easing tensions by explaining that the Arabic phrases in question were not a part of the Minister's speech, but were a private prayer. After a long debate, in which a number of deputies deplored the inefficiency of Semseddin Bey's leadership, the Chamber voted the Minister's explanations adequate, and proceeded

64. "Turkish Internal Affairs: The Baghdad Railway Scheme", The Times, January 20, 1909, p.5.
to discuss an interpellation concerning the choice of the members of the Council of State. Lütfi Bey argued that twenty-nine of the Council's thirty members owed their positions to nepotism or other undue influences. Hasan Fehmi Pasha's replies were found somewhat unconvincing. The Chamber in his case contended itself with voting the order of the day.  

Signed by fifty deputies, on February 9, another interpellation demanded that the Minister of the Interior, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, account for the absence of order throughout the Empire. The issue caused heated debate, and was finally rejected by a large majority.

Kamil Pasha was by no means a great patriot nor even a constitutionalist. He had quarrelled with Sultan Abdülhamid in the past not because he wanted the latter to summon a parliament but because he wanted the Sultan to give him more power. The principal trait in his character was personal ambition, not liberalism.

With political pressure from the Committee of Union and Progress for the resignation of the cabinet, however, Kamil Pasha and other monarchist politicians forgot about their quarrels with Sultan Abdülhamid. By this time, Abdülhamid, too, had come to perceive that monarchist politicians like Kamil Pasha were his allies, rather than enemies, in the fight against the Unionists.

The public display of an alliance between Sultan Abdülhamid and monarchist politicians came about on January 15, when the Sultan conferred the Grand Cordon of the Mecidiye Order upon Kamil Pasha in recognition of the services rendered by him and his success in obtaining the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies.

By late January, the public began to fully see Kamil Pasha's true colours. On January 26, as part of celebrations for the 610th anniversary of the Ottoman Dynasty, the

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Liberal Union gave a dinner party. The Grand Vezier's presence at this function, which had been privately organized by the Liberal Union, was generally regarded as a political move signalling his preference for monarchy and the opposition party over the Constitutional regime and the Committee of Union and Progress thanks to whom he had initially come to power. The joining of forces between the monarchists and the Liberal Union, on the one hand, and the Liberal Union and Kamil Pasha on the other heralded the beginning of hostilities between Kamil Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress. Ahmed Riza Bey did not attend the dinner; he also told Kamil Pasha that he had done wrong in attending the function himself. The monarchist Serbesti, attaching great importance to the dinner party, wrote that it heralded the commencement of a strong opposition party in the Chamber.

In a concerted effort to publicise the issues monarchist readers would be most interested in, Serbesti started publishing interviews with the politicians of the old regime who were being held under house arrest in the Prinkipo island. The first of these interviews, which was published on February 2, was with Abu'l Huda who claimed that he was innocent and that his captivity was totally unjustified. In the February 3 issue, Serbesti interviewed Memduh Pasha, the ex-Minister of the Interior under the old regime. Complaining about his forced stay in the island, Memduh Pasha said that he was still kept under house arrest because he had not agreed to pay for his freedom, giving the example of Riza Pasha, who had returned his ill-gotten wealth to the Treasury, and consequently been


released. The publication of these interviews at this juncture served no purpose other than prepare the ground for an organised attack on the constitutional regime and the Committee of Union and Progress.

The news that Kamil Pasha and his cabinet were preparing a bill which would restrict press freedom aroused further discontent with those sympathetic to the Revolution. On February 7, a protest meeting was organized during which speeches against such restrictions were warmly received. Later, a delegation met with Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber of Deputies. Additionally, students of the Military School of Medicine expressed their dissatisfaction with the Government's intentions, declaring in a memorandum that they were ready to protect the freedom of the press with every available means. Telegrams poured in from the provinces defending the accomplishments of the Revolution. Public anxiety, however, only increased with the news that Kamil Pasha intended to dismiss certain Ministers from his Cabinet.

On February 10, Kamil Pasha dismissed the Ministers of War and of the Navy. Because he did so in the manner of one who was discharging a banal, everyday duty, his subordinates were under the impression that the pashas in question had asked to be relieved of office, that they had forced the Grand Vezier to accept their resignations, and that, at all events, the matter was one which could have no possible interest for anybody except for the dismissed Ministers themselves. Though Kamil Pasha acted with consummate skill, inducing Arif Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, to resign quietly, the Unionists afterwards encouraged Arif Pasha to complain of the wrong that had been done to him, and even to deny that he had resigned at all. On the other hand, Riza Pasha, the Minister of War,

resigned only under duress and after a vigorous fight, as he later told the Chamber of Deputies. 78 Kamil Pasha immediately appointed Nazim Pasha, the Commander of the Second Army Corps, as Minister of War, and Hüsnü Pasha as acting Minister of the Navy. 79

What had prompted Kamil Pasha to force Riza Pasha's resignation was the latter's reluctance to send certain troops loyal to the constitutional regime away from Istanbul, replacing them with troops loyal to the Sultan. The troops in question were primarily responsible for protecting the Sultan and the Palace. 80 Kamil Pasha had summarily ordered that these troops be dispatched to Janina. The Ministry of War along with Riza Pasha opposed the move, and stood firm. The Cabinet had not been informed of Kamil Pasha's decision. 81

Of course, the posts in question were exactly those which Abdülhamid had, in July 1908, struggled to reserve for his own nominees. Even after he had signed the imperial order reviving the Constitution, on July 31, the Sultan refused to yield his right to fill these two vital posts, as well as that of Minister of Justice, and would not give way until the Unionists made it clear that he had little choice. The Sultan did finally give in, but because of his stubbornness and reluctance in the matter, the Committee of Union and Progress had kept careful watch over these posts, and when its nominees were suddenly dismissed, protest was immediate and vocal. 82

It was Admiral Said Pasha, Kamil Pasha's son and a corrupt monarchist, who was

80. On October 19, battalions from Salonica had been brought to Istanbul to replace the Sultan's troops in the capital in a move to further disarm the Sultan who was suspected of using these troops in a reactionary insurrection. The suspicion was not without foundation. On October 31 some of the members of the battalions replaced by the ones who came from Salonica opened fire to the newly arrived troops, but they were suppressed by the Salonica troops (Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.45).
In an attempt to legitimise his action, Kamil Pasha alleged that Ali Riza Pasha was an ineffective Minister who was incapable of making his orders respected ("Explanatory Memorandum by the Late Grand Vizier, Kamil Pasha", in Demetrios Georgiades, Is the Regeneration of Turkey Possible?, p.154).
82. Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.34.
intimately involved with the scheme to restore control of the Army and Navy to Abdülhamid. The attempt was by no means isolated; it was part and parcel of the monarchists' general agenda since the advent of the constitutional regime. The Unionists had driven Kamil Pasha's predecessor Mehmed Said Pasha, out of office in August of 1908 precisely because he had insisted that the Sultan retain the right to fill the very same posts.

After dismissing Riza Pasha from the Ministry of War Kamil Pasha named Nazim Pasha as his replacement on the same day. Because Nazim Pasha had suffered for his political views under the old regime, no one could openly accuse him of being a tool of reaction. Nevertheless, he was a soldier, with all the soldier's hatred for politics, and while in command of the Second Army Corps at Edirne, he had distinguished himself by his stern repression of the Committee of Union and Progress among his officers. As a result, the troops at Edirne could now be counted on the monarchist side.

Clearly, Nazim Pasha's appointment as Minister of War was an indication of Kamil Pasha's hitherto veiled antagonism towards the Committee of Union and Progress, and many felt that the repressive tactics which had been confined to Edirne might soon be applied to the whole of the army. On the day of Nazim Pasha's appointment, Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, visited Kamil Pasha, expressing the Committee's surprise at such a sudden change in the cabinet. He then asked Kamil Pasha how he dared to act without the consent of the Committee of Union and Progress in such an important matter.

88. "Explanatory Memorandum by the Late Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha", in Demetrius Georgiades, *Is the Regeneration of Turkey Possible?*, p.152.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the issue of the dismissals came to a head on February 11 when deputies discussed giving the Cabinet a vote of no confidence. The Unionists were now determined to overthrow Kamil Pasha and his cabinet, and the Grand Vezier was called to appear before the Chamber on February 13, exactly one month after he had been called upon to defend the conduct of his cabinet. The session was likely to be momentous. A majority of the Turkish deputies, most of whom were Unionist, were hostile to the Grand Vezier, who nonetheless could rely on the support of most non-Turkish deputies. In an editorial which appeared in Tanin that day, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın wrote that Kamil Pasha's tactics were reminiscent of those of the absolutist regime, and that the future of the Constitution was indeed precarious with someone as irresponsible as Kamil Pasha at the helm of the government.

By February 12, however, it was uncertain whether the Grand Vezier would answer the Chamber's interpellation: it was generally felt that he would postpone his answer in order to let the excitement exhaust itself. Fearing for the worst, the Committee of Union and Progress immediately dispatched special envoys to Edirne and Salonica. The envoys delivered the message to the Unionist officers in the Second and Third Army Corps that there was a serious possibility of an attempt for the restoration of the absolutist regime. The Unionists leadership ordered these officers to hold themselves in readiness for action, and telegrams were sent to other towns and cities, informing that the Second and Third Army Corps were ready to defend the Constitution.

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91. Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatiralari, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 4 (April 25-October 19, 1935), p.278; and, Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Sadrazam Kamil Pasha: Siyasi Hayati, p.294. Even non-Unionists, such as Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, were of the opinion that what Kamil Pasha had done was against principles of parliamentary rule (Mahmud Muhtar Pasa, Maziye bir Nazar, p.104, quoted in İbnu'lemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devinde Son Sadriazamlar, p.1404).


93. "Explanatory Memorandum by the Late Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha", in Demetrios
According to an article published in its February 12 issue, *Suray-i Ümmet* announced that Ali Riza Pasha intended to protest his removal from office before the Chamber. The editorial in *Suray-i Ümmet* went on to say that the Grand Vezier's actions constituted a despotic *coup*, not a mere reconstruction of the Cabinet as the latter had claimed. Such conduct being otherwise inexplicable, the editorial concluded, the Grand Vezier's plan could only be to annihilate the Constitution.\(^{94}\) *Tanin* also continued in its attacks on Kamil Pasha, stating that a minister, unlike a governor, could not be changed at will --particularly if that minister enjoyed the confidence of the Chamber. The Grand Vezier's behaviour, *Tanin* said, encroached the Chamber's rights and violated constitutional principles.\(^{95}\) Even *Hukuk-u Umumiye* and *Tercüman-i Hakikat*, two conservative newspapers, though they supported the new appointments, were doubtful of the legitimacy of Kamil Pasha's action. *Yeni Gazete* and *Ikdam*, two staunchly anti-Unionist newspapers supporting Kamil Pasha, were silent.\(^{96}\) Yet, *Yeni Gazete* implicitly expressed its support for the new appointment to the Ministry of War by stating that Nazim Pasha had received a large number of congratulatory telegrams.\(^{97}\)

The monarchist press, however, did not remain silent when it came to the Committee of Union and Progress. As if it were thoroughly abnormal for a political party to question the actions of a cabinet it doubted and to aspire to take over the reigns of government by garnering votes in the Chamber, *Ikdam* accused the Committee of Union and Progress of political ambition and interference in the affairs of the government.\(^{98}\)

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\(^{94}\) Georgiades, *Is the Regeneration of Turkey Possible?*, pp.147-148.

\(^{95}\) "Mesruti Idareye Mühim bir Darbe", *Suray-i Ümmet*, January 30, 1324/February 12, 1909, quoted in "The Turkish Cabinet: Critical Situation", *The Times*, February 13, 1909, p.7, and in Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p.34. See also, "Explanatory Memorandum by the Late Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha", in Demetrius Georgiades, *Is the Regeneration of Turkey Possible?*, p.160.


\(^{98}\) "Cemiyetler, Firkalar", *Ikdam*, January 31, 1324/February 13, 1909, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p.31n.
As the dismissals were clearly unconstitutional, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, and Manyasizade Refik Bey, the Unionist Minister of Justice, resigned in protest on February 12.\(^\text{99}\) The February 13 issue of *Suray-i Ümmet* contained an interview with Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha in which the ex-minister stated that his resignation had been prompted by the fact that the Grand Vezier had not informed him of those matters which had supposedly made the dismissals necessary, matters which would normally have been of the utmost importance to his ministry.\(^\text{100}\) This statement, added to those already made by the dismissed ministers themselves, inflamed public opinion, and further assertions that the Minister of War had been dismissed because of his resistance to remove the four chasseur battalions—which had been sent some months ago from Salonica by the Committee of Union and Progress to prevent any attempt at the overthrow of the Constitution by a *coup de main*—only added fuel to the fire.\(^\text{101}\) On February 13, Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam, Ziya Pasha, the Minister of Finance, and Hasan Fehmi Pasha, the President of the Council of State, also tendered their resignations.\(^\text{102}\)

February 13 came and by half past twelve o'clock Kamil Pasha had still not appeared before the Chamber, much less communicated his intentions to its president. The atmosphere was charged as deputies paced the lobbies discussing the situation, among them several well known Unionist deputies who had not often been seen in Parliament of late. Representatives of foreign embassies were also seen mingling, apparently in an attempt to assess the future of the Cabinet. At two o'clock, the President's bell announced

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that he had taken the chair, and although the Grand Vezier's reply had not yet arrived, the
session began with the announcement that the Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, and of
Finance, along with the Sheikh-ul-Islam had resigned. The Chamber resolved to call the
Sublime Porte, where the Grand Vezier had arrived, in order to urge his presence.

It was then that his long-expected answer arrived. The Grand Vezier stated that
though he had intended to reply personally, vital questions of foreign policy left him
constrained, in the interests of the nation, to postpone a detailed answer until February
17. He added that reports regarding the intended removal of chasseur battalions from
Istanbul to Salonica and Riza Pasha's reluctance to carry out such instructions had been
falsely disseminated to excite public opinion and embarrass the Grand Vezier. The
appointment of Nazim Pasha, he argued, whose capabilities were unquestionable, offered
the strongest proof of his desire to uphold the constitutional regime.

Violent protests frequently interrupted the reading of Kamil Pasha's reply. The
President then read protests by the Ministers of War and the Navy. The Minister of War
declared that he had been removed from office without reason and against the dictates of the
Constitution, and had been appointed to another post which he had not asked for. He
protested this unconstitutional procedure and entrusted the Chamber with his defence. Arif
Hikmet Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, said that although he had tendered his resignation
only a fortnight ago, it had not been accepted: his dismissal, he argued, was clearly
arbitrary.

The President then read a telegram sent by a group of navy officers. These protested the Grand Vezier's actions, urging the Chamber to take measures against the danger which they felt threatened the nation's safety and welfare. They further declared that until Hüsnü Pasha was replaced, they would recognise no other authority than the Chamber. 107 A similar ultimatum had also been sent by officers of the Second Army Corps to Nazim Pasha, telling him that they would not be party to giving strength to an unconstitutionally formed Government. 108 This was more or less tantamount to mutiny which, because some officers of the First and Second Army Corps stationed at Istanbul and Edirne respectively had sent telegrams in support of the new Minister of War, raised the spectre of civil war. 109

Members of the Liberal Union then tried to take control of the Chamber, but despite the intervention of one of its leaders, Ismail Kemal Bey, the Chamber decided to send Kamil Pasha a note informing him that the Chamber had declared itself in permanent session and requested that he appear before it to answer its queries. The message dispatched, debate resumed. 110

At half past three, the session was recessed for two hours, pending the arrival of the Grand Vezier's answer, and vehement lobbying took place. Members of the Liberal Union were visibly discouraged, while the Unionists displayed growing elation: it had already been resolved to withdraw the vote of confidence which had been given a month earlier. 111


The Grand Vezier's answer arrived some time after five o'clock. As had largely been expected, the message briefly reiterated that Kamil Pasha would appear before the Chamber on February 17. After an hour's desultory debate, during which Talat Bey, Vice-President of the Chamber, defended the Committee of Union and Progress, the order of the day, which bore one hundred and two signatures, was read. It stated that the Grand Vezier, in spite of the Chamber's repeated requests for information regarding the ministerial changes, had not complied, and that by doing so he had left the country's situation in doubt, jeopardizing its liberties and its Constitution. For these reasons, the Chamber declared that the Grand Vezier no longer possessed its confidence.

Just as the Chamber was about to vote on this resolution, a third message arrived from the Grand Vezier, stating that he had heard the Chamber was not satisfied with his previous message. Accordingly, as the Chamber seemed unwilling to respect Article 38 of the Constitution -- which declared that though any minister summoned by a majority of the Chamber was bound to reply, that minister was allowed to either send a representative in his place or, with sufficient justification and taking full responsibility, to postpone his reply-- the Grand Vezier was prepared to return the seals of office and to publish an exposé in the press, leaving the Chamber with the responsibility for the consequences of his disclosures. Despite the opinion of some of the deputies that this amounted to a resignation and made further steps unnecessary, the Chamber proceeded to vote. Kamil Pasha received a vote of no-confidence by a vote of one hundred and ninety-eight to

112. "Explanatory Memorandum by the Late Grand Vizier, Kamil Pasha", in Demetrios Georgiades, Is the Regeneration of Turkey Possible?, p.149; "The Turkish Cabinet: Fall of Kamil Pasha", The Times, February 15, 1909, p.7; and, Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Sadrazam Kamil Pasha: Siyasi Hayati, p.298.


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The crisis, as the official Viennese newspaper \textit{Fremdenblatt} observed, highlighted the absurdity of a situation where the Committee of Union and Progress, though responsible for the Revolution and still very powerfull, had been forced to leave the political stage to a government which was fundamentally opposed in its ideology, and more than that, a minority.\footnote{117} Kamil Pasha had, for one reason or another, transferred his ostensible allegiance from the Committee of Union and Progress to the substantially weaker Liberal Union. The crisis, therefore, only vindicated the principle of representative government. As one of the British sympathisers of the Revolution defended the action the Unionists took, "in a country which lived, only seven months ago, under a crushing despotism, it was natural and proper that the Chamber should be sentitive about the control of the army and the navy; if they were to come under the management of a Minister disposed in any way to compromise with Yildiz Palace, the result would be either reaction triumphant or civil war".\footnote{118} In the editorial column of the \textit{Tanin} of February 14, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin expressed similar views. He stated that the Chamber had been faced with a formidable challenge; had the Chamber succumbed to forces of absolutism, Yalcin wrote, a fatal blow would have been struck at the parliamentary regime. Fortunately, he went on, the prompt and decisive action of the deputies saved both the nation and the Constitution.\footnote{119}


\footnote{117} \textit{Fremdenblatt}, February 16, 1909, quoted in "The Turkish Crisis: The New Grand Vezier", \textit{The Times}, February 17, 1909, p.5.

\footnote{118} Noel Buxton, "The Turkish Internal Crisis: To the Editor of \textit{The Times}\textquotedblright, \textit{The Times}, February 19, 1909, p.10.

\footnote{119} \textit{Tanin}, February 1, 1324/February 14, 1909, excerpted in Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Young Turks}, p.36.
he announced the Cabinet members. Not surprisingly, Ali Riza Pasha was re-appointed Minister of War. Manyasizade Refik Bey was also re-appointed Minister of Justice. Rifat Pasha was named Minister for Foreign Affairs. As Rifat Pasha was Ambassador in London, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, the monarchist Tevfik Pasha, was asked to fill in until the former’s return; he refused, and Gabriel Nouradunghian, another monarchist, was appointed as acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ziyaeddin Efendi was appointed to the Sheik-ul-Islamate.

Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha presented his cabinet's programme to the Chamber on the evening of February 17. He declared that internal policy would be guided by the desire to meet all the social needs of a nation governed by liberal principles. In order to achieve this, the laws and institutions of foreign liberal regimes would be studied, and, where suitable, borrowed. But, of all the questions awaiting solution, the most important was the establishment of peace and security. Every citizen, he said, must feel that he lived under a regime of equality and justice. By means of schools and the press, the government hoped to eradicate superstition, the root of conflict between different nationalities and religions, and to enlighten the populace. In the realm of finance, he pledged to do away with the superfluous spending which was the hallmark of the old regime. Implicitly, he also spoke against the monarchist scheme of decentralisation: the programme stated that loyalty to the interests of the country would be the Cabinet's only guide, counteracting those interested

122. He died after a few weeks of his appointment, on March 4 (Cemal Kutay, Uc Pasalar Kagvasi, p.63). The post of the Minister of Justice was filled by Nazim Pasha, ex-Governor-General of Janina Province, on March 14 (Cemal Kutay, Uc Pasalar Kagvasi, p.63).
125. Mehmed Cemaeddin, Siyasi Hatiralar, 1908-1913, p.49.
schemes which aimed at sowing discord throughout the country, the integrity and indivisibility of which were indispensable. He went on to say that union ensured not only the strength and greatness of a nation, but also its security, material prosperity, and prestige among other nations. 127

A short debate followed during which Ismail Kemal Bey, the Albanian deputy for Berat and one of the leaders of the monarchist opposition in the Chamber, said that he was unable to express confidence in the new cabinet: in the first place, he did not consider it constitutional, in the second, he did not think it prudent to entrust the Ministry of War to someone who seemed unwilling to undertake improvements in the military which, by his own admission, was in an unsatisfactory state. As was the case on February 13, Ismail Kemal Bey's resistance proved ineffective, though the vote of confidence was not unanimous. 128

In the February 18 issue of its organ Suray-i Ümmet, the Committee of Union and Progress announced the formation of a parliamentary party of the same name which constituted a majority of the Chamber and would support the new Cabinet. The announcement contained a formal apology for Unionist policy since July, and, while admitting the Liberal Union's charge of having influenced the elections, defended itself on the grounds that it had acted for the national good, not out of selfish interests. The result had been the return to the Chamber of its most capable members. 129

With the fall of Kamil Pasha, those Turkish and Greek newspapers which had supported him attacked the new cabinet and the Committee of Union and Progress with great violence. 130 These were İkdam, Sabah, Yeni Gazete, Saday-i Millet, Serbesti and Osmanlı --the last of these was owned by Prince Sabahaddin, and began publication on

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March 17 as the organ of the Liberal Union.¹³¹ A Levantine newspaper published in
Istanbul, *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, also took the side of the Liberal
Union, criticising the Committee of Union and Progress and demanding its dissolution.¹³²
*Serbesti*, in particular, was fully and explicitly supporting *The Levant Herald and
Eastern Express* in its campaign against the Unionists.¹³³ There were also some
conservative foreign papers, such as *Indépendance Belge*, who were critical of Hüseyin
Hilmi Pasha's appointment as Grand Vezier, and the influence the Committee of Union and
Progress exerted in politics.¹³⁴

One of the issues the monarchist press tried to exploit for its own benefit was the
decision of the new cabinet to introduce a draft law on the press. When Hilmi Pasha
Cabinet announced its intention of introducing a moderate and most necessary press law,
the Liberal Union, the Mohammedan Association and the Sultan's spies raised such a
deafening outcry that people began to suspect that some terrible injustice was about to be
inflicted on them. It was not the liberal minded people who objected to the proposed press
law; it was the old regime papers, *Yeni Gazete*, which was the property of Kamil Pasha
and was really under the direction of his son, Admiral Said Pasha, *Ikdam*, whose editor
Ali Kemal Bey was a Palace informer, *Vulkan*, organ of the Mohammedan Association,
*Mizan*, whose editor Murad Bey was another Palace informer, and *Serbesti*. It was certain
that these papers were being subsidized by the Yıldız Palace.¹³⁵

In view of their weak position in the Chamber, the monarchist opposition set out to

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¹³² Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", *Fikir Harekleri*, 4 (April 25-
October 19, 1935), p.295. Beginning with its February 27 issue, the Levantine newspaper attacked *Tanin*
as well ("Le Tanine devant l'opinion publique", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, February 27,
1909, p.1; and, "Le Tanine devant l'opinion publique", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, March 2,
1909, p.1).
¹³³ *Serbesti*, February 22, 1324/March 7, 1909, excerpted in "Le Comité Union et Progrès et la
¹³⁴ *Indépendance Belge*, February 16, 1909, quoted in Demetrios Georgiades, *Is the
Regeneration of Turkey Possible?*, pp.97-98.
strengthen it by winning over the British Embassy. Many monarchists who had concealed their real views began to gain courage and expressed their disgust with the Unionists who had brought about the fall of Kamil Pasha. Some monarchist deputies approached Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador, to express their alarm at the turn of events, and appealed to Great Britain for help in overthrowing the Committee of Union and Progress from political power. Abdülhamid, too, confidentially expressed to the British Ambassador his deep anxiety at the strength of the Unionists. 136

On the night of February 25, an official communiqué was issued, stating that the Government received reports that, at the instigation of certain individuals, public meetings designed to compromise the harmony that had reigned since the Revolution would be taking place. Accordingly, pending the publication of a special law on the subject of public meetings now under consideration for submission to the Parliament, the Government had ordered surveillance of such assemblies, and was taking measures to prevent any action calculated to endanger public security. Henceforth, the police would have to be notified of such meetings twenty-four hours in advance; meetings without proper authorisation would be forbidden. 137 Police regulations concerning public meetings, the communiqué said, had been issued after careful consideration of similar regulations in force in Western Europe. Though the necessary authorisation would not be refused without good reason, the object of the meeting had to be clearly stated, and that during the transition from the old to the new regime, while reactionary tendencies were still observable, open attacks on the Constitution or the army would not be tolerated. Finally, the communiqué added that the introduction of such measures had been already too long delayed, citing several meetings which the Government felt had assumed an inflammatory and disruptive character. 138

The communiqué was issued in response to an article in the monarchist newspaper

Serbesti which had proposed a demonstration to demand the restoration of Kamil and Nazim Pashas to power. The proposed demonstration was to take place on the 26th in front of the respective pashas' houses. The demonstration had actually been organised by Admiral Said Pasha, son of the ex-Grand Vezier Kamil Pasha, who had distributed five thousand liras in order to gather a large crowd to protest the Government as well as the Committee of Union and Progress.

The monarchist opposition created a furor over the issue of the new regulations. In an interview with Tanin, Hilmi Pasha then tried to pacify opposition by claiming that the regulations concerning meetings had been misrepresented: the required official authorisation was merely a formal acknowledgment of notification. Authorisation could not be refused, he said, as that would deny the right of assembly.

Ismail Kemal Bey, however, took the issue to the Chamber, arguing that the regulations were unconstitutional, and demanded a hearing on March 3. On March 3, the Grand Vezier appeared before the Chamber to defend the Government. Though the opposition rejected the Government's defence, after several hours of debate, the Chamber, by a vote of one hundred and thirty to fifty, finally declined to discuss the issue further.

The monarchist campaign against the Committee of Union and Progress, nevertheless, continued unabated. On March 6, Serbesti published a "document" implicating the Committee in blackmail to extract money from corrupt officials of the old

142. Tanin, February 17, 1324/March 2, 1909, quoted in "Turkish Internal Affairs: The Right of Public Meeting", The Times, March 4, 1909, p.5; and, Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.63.
143. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.63.
in a move calculated to discredit the Unionists, Serbesti and Serbest Izmir, another monarchist newspaper, wrote that Major Niyazi, one of the heroes of the Revolution, had resigned from the Committee of Union and Progress, on account of dissatisfaction with it. This imaginary news was of course denied by Major Niyazi himself.

In early March, an action of the Minister of War precipitated unrest within the troops stationed at the Yildiz Palace. He had proposed that all officers known to have acted as informers and spies under the old regime be dismissed from the army, and, upon his proposal, the Government had demanded a list of officers deemed unworthy to hold a commission. On March 6, there was a disturbance involving troops stationed in the Yildiz Palace. The official version of events stated that a soldier who had been reprimanded for insubordinate conduct induced some of his comrades to demonstrate in front of the Palace, cheering the Sultan. Officers appeared and ordered the demonstrators to return to their quarters, which they did without further disorder. Reportedly, these troops, who were responsible for the November 1908 mutiny, had been disgruntled with the Government's gradual relocation of officers and troops identified with the old regime, substituting with those who were considered loyal to the Constitution. After the November mutiny had been suppressed, many were of the opinion that these troops should have been removed from the capital altogether, and indeed, the new Minister of War had recently proposed the summary dismissal of officers who were known to have acted on behalf of the old regime. But the Committee of Union and Progress had preferred to adopt from the start a more gradual

146. "Le major Niazi bey", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, March 18, 1909, p.1; and, Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, p.39.
approach. That these measures had not yet proved wholly effective was clear, but the Committee’s determination to deal resolutely with reactionary and mutinous tendencies within the army remained unshaken. 149

Despite the gradual approach the Unionists took in cleaning the armed forces from reactionary elements, the move nevertheless upset some of the high-ranking officers generally sympathetic to the old regime. Esad Pasha, replacing Abdullah Pasha who had resigned as Commander of the Fourth Army Corps at Erzurum, also resigned. 150 Ibrahim Pasha, ex-Commander of the Second Army Corps at Edirne, was appointed his successor. 151 Several senior officers of the Second Army Corps who had served under Nazim Pasha before his ill-fated appointment to the Ministry of War were also said to have tendered their resignations. These resignations were attributed to dissatisfaction in the army with the Committee of Union and Progress. 152

In the days following the formation of the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, the opposition found solace in the fact that several deputies had defected from the Committee of Union and Progress. The concerted effort of the monarchist opposition began with press attacks against the Committee of Union and Progress. Dr. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, whose opposition to the Unionists had long been established since his election tour in his district, started the opposition campaign by writing a provocative article ridiculing the Unionists in the March 12 issue of the monarchist daily Ikdam. 153 At the moment when the Constitution was proclaimed, the Committee, wrote Riza Nur, was inspired by lofty ideals

149. "Turkey: Military Incident at Yildiz", The Times, March 9, 1909, p.5.
and patriotic aims, but since then a number persons had joined its ranks and forced their way into its midst who were animated by considerations of personal interest. These elements, Riza Nur continued, who found themselves invested with immense material and moral influence, had produced a radical change in its policy. He then proceeded to put several questions, such as whether the Committee constituted an irresponsible Cabinet, whether it interfered in the acts of the responsible Government, and whether the necessity for its continued existence was justified, and to answer them in detail. The Committee, he alleged, was a regular imperium in imperio, maintaining a whole hierarchy in the various branches of the administration alongside the bureaucratic apparatus. Riza Nur concluded his article by writing that the Committee of Union and Progress ought to dissolve not only its local organisations in Anatolia but also the central committee in Istanbul and the clubs affiliated to it, and confine its activities to Monastir and Salonica.\footnote{154}

A banquet was given on the evening of March 12 in Pera Palas by Damad Ferid Pasha, son-in-law of the Sultan and a senator, Prince Said Halim Pasha, and other gentlemen in honour of the Committee of Union and Progress and the army and the navy.\footnote{155} Among those present were Hilmi Pasha, the Grand Vezier, Said Pasha, the President of the Senate, Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber, the Ministers of War and of the Navy, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, an influential senator, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Commander of the First Army Corps, and many senators, deputies, and officers of high rank.\footnote{156}

\textbf{Damad} Ferid Pasha expressed his pleasure in welcoming so distinguished a gathering, and eulogised the services of the Committee of Union and Progress, the army, and the navy. Afterwards, Hilmi Pasha made a speech in which he said that having

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accomplished the great task of securing the country's freedom, the Unionists had then performed an equally admirable and meritorious act in handing over authority to the Parliament, in whom was vested the power of the nation, and whose decisions the Unionists did not aspire to control. 157

However, it was the speech of Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber, which was the most important and most provocative. He said that the wretches, who under the old regime endeavoured, from motives of personal interest, to sow discord between the various elements of the nation were naturally discontented with the the formation of a new Cabinet capable of understanding and appreciating the parliamentary regime. He added that there were politicians who desired to see the past revived, and, in order to reach this end by another path, were anxious that liberty should be loosed from all control. According to him, it was they who complained of the power of the Unionists; it was they who were working to discredit it in the eyes of the ulema on the one hand and of the non-Moslem elements on the other. It was they, in short, who clamoured loudly for its extinction. 158

Accusing all those, including by implicit reference, members of the Liberal Union, who worked for the restoration of absolutist monarchy as being traitors, he added that these reactionary tendencies had to be firmly repressed. 159

The speech delivered on the evening of March 12 by Hilmi Pasha was sharply criticised in the opposition newspapers. Yeni Gazete noted a contradiction between the Grand Vezier's statement that the Committee of Union and Progress had transformed itself into a simple parliamentary party and had ceased to interfere in the affairs of the Government and the speech of Ahmed Riza Bey, who had declared that the Committee's

duties in relation to the change of regime had not yet terminated.160

Liberal Union organs and other conservative newspapers also severely criticised Ahmed Riza Bey, accusing him of being incapable of that impartiality which should distinguish the President of the Chamber. Most signs were indicative that matters were approaching a crisis.161

In response to Riza Nur's and other monarchists' attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress, the Committee did its best to neutralise the opposition campaign. Lecturing in Monastir on the political situation, Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, urged his audience to boycott Ikdam and Yeni Gazete, who attacked the Unionists and spread baseless rumours.162 In the March 27 session of the Chamber a vehement debate took place regarding the attitude of three monarchist foreign language Istanbul papers --The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, Proodos, and Neologos-- which had recently been engaged in a fierce controversy with the leading organs of the Committee of Union and Progress concerning the political situation. A resolution demanding the expulsion of the editors of these newspapers had been forwarded by the Grand Vezier to the President of the Chamber. After the reading of this resolution, several Unionist deputies strongly urged the suspension of the newspapers and the expulsion of their editors, declaring that their attacks on the police, the army, and the nation were intolerable. The Chamber finally adopted a motion inviting the Government to apply the Press Law to all newspapers publishing inflammatory articles prejudicial to the interests of Turkey and wounding to the honour of the army and the nation.163

The monarchist press campaign against the interference of the Committee of Union and Progress in Government affairs appeared to be producing an effect. It was stated that

the Unionists was deliberating on the advisability of abandoning intermeddling in the
government of European Turkey, though maintaining a control over the Anatolian
provinces. 164

Meanwhile, the monarchists kept up the pressure on the Unionists. On March 30,
Serif Pasha, the monarchist ex-Ambassador to Stockholm who had created a furor among
the Unionists immediately after the Revolution when he had claimed that he was the leader
of the Unionist organisation in Istanbul, published an open letter in Osmanli announcing
his resignation from the Committee of Union and Progress as a mark of disapproval of the
methods of the Unionists, which, he alleged, involved serious danger to the interests of the
country. 165

Kamil Pasha was also active in writing in Ildam criticising the Unionists. 166 In the
Ildam of April 3, he published, in a long statement, the reasons why he had "left" the
office of the Grand Vezierate. 167 His statement drew instant attention in Government
circles. In the April 4 issue of Turquie, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha replied to Kamil Pasha's
statement. The Grand Vezier declared that Kamil Pasha's memoir explained nothing but set
forth a theory of government which amounted to a negation of constitutional regime. Under
the constitutional regime, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha went on, the Grand Vezier was simply the
President of the Council of Ministers, who had to explain its policy to the Chamber, not at
its own pleasure, but when the Chamber desired. Returning to the events that precipitated
Kamil Pasha's downfall, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha said that he had handed in his resignation in
consequence of the dismissal of the Minister of War, but was dissuaded by Kamil Pasha

165. "Chérif pasha", and "Le Comité Union et Progrès et le général Chérif pacha", The Levant
Herald and Eastern Express, March 31, 1909, p.2; and, "The Committee of Union and Progress", The
Times, April 2, 1909, p.5.
166. Hüseyin Cahit Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatiraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 4 (April 25-
167. "Sadı-Sabik Kamil Pasa Hazretleri'nin İzahnamesi", Ildam, March 21, 1325/April 3, 1909,
cited in Ferroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, p.36; "Turkey: Kamil Pasha and the Committee", The Times,
April 5, 1909, p.5; and, Cemal Kutay, "Uç Pasalar Kavgası", p.65. The French translation of his statement
was published the same day in "Le mémoire explicatif de Kiamil pacha", The Levant Herald and Eastern
Express, April 5, 1909, pp.1-2.
because he had understood from him that the Minister of War had accepted the post of High Commissioner in Egypt of his own accord. Furthermore, Kamil Pasha had announced the Cabinet that the Ministers of War and of the Navy had been involved in a conspiracy against the Sultan. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha said that in reality no plot existed; two ministers had been dismissed purely from arbitrary motives. Realizing this, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and several of his colleagues had decided that they had no longer any choice but to resign. There was therefore no external pressure, as Kamil Pasha alleged.168

The press discussed Kamil Pasha’s accusations against the Committee of Union and Progress with much animation. The monarchist Mizan, Ikdam, Yeni Gazete, Serbesti, and Osmanli --organ of the Liberal Union-- regarded it as a crushing indictment of the Committee of Union and Progress and the existing Cabinet.169 Furthermore, Serbesti alleged that the situation of the Committee of Union and Progress was fragile, while Yeni Gazete deliberately fabricated the rumour that the Committee was about to be dissolved.170 The leaders of the Committee, of course, denied any such rumours.171 Tanin, Suray-i Ümmet, and Sabah condemned it as misrepresenting facts and demonstrating the weakness of the ex-Grand Vezier’s case.172

On April 3, the official opening of the Mohammedan Association was celebrated with a large demonstration in Istanbul consisting of religious ceremonies and public speeches by Said-i Kürdi and Dervis Vahdeti.173 The news of the establishment of the Association and


169. "Le mémoire de Kiamil pacha: Les commentaires de la Presse turque", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 5, 1909, p.1; "Turkey: Kiamil Pasha and the Committee", The Times, April 6, 1909, p.5; and, Ali Cevad, Ikinci Mesruiyetin İlanı ve Otuzbirt Mart Haiadesi, p.46.


172. "Turkey: Kiamil Pasha and the Committee", The Times, April 6, 1909, p.5.

173. "L’Union Mahométique", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 5, 1909, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.65.
its by-laws as well as the list of the executive members had already been announced in the March 16 of Volkan, the association's organ.\textsuperscript{174} Despite outward appearance that this was a Moslem religious organisation, it did not represent the Moslem religious establishment; in fact it had nothing to do with religion at all.\textsuperscript{175} The association was Abdülhamid's creation, and was to be used as an instrument for the counter-revolutionary attempt. Its founders were the chief eunuch at the Yıldız Palace, Nadir Agha, the second eunuch at the Yıldız Palace, one of the Sultan's sons, one of the Sultan's nephews, Dervis Vahdeti, and several others of the same type. All of these individuals lived in the Palace.\textsuperscript{176} Dervis Vahdeti was the only one amongst the founders of the Association who could pretend to any kind of religious character. He was, however, a bektasi, therefore an unorthodox and heretical sunni moslem, and thus it was difficult to see how he could become fanatical on the subject of the Sacred Law. Dervis Vahdeti acted as the editor of Volkan.\textsuperscript{177} Another journalist who belonged to the Mohammedan Association was Murad Bey, who, like other tools of Abdülhamid, had begun his public life as a conspirator and exile in Paris. Then he had entered the Sultan's service as an informer, and, when the Revolution succeeded, he had tried, unsuccessfully, to infiltrate into the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{178} Of the five hundred and forty-three principal agitators belonging to this Association, eleven were employees in the Yıldız Palace, seventeen were journalists, and the remainder were military men and hodjas.\textsuperscript{179}

The counter-revolutionary agitation of the Mohammedan Association had started immediately after its coming into existence.\textsuperscript{180} On March 28, their organ, Volkan, had

\textsuperscript{174} Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üc Pasalar Kavgasi}, p.64. Dervis Vahdeti had applied to the Palace for money to publish Volkan (Ali Cevad, \textit{Ikinci Mesrutiyetin İliani ve Otuzbirt Mart Hadisesi}, pp.45-46).

\textsuperscript{175} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.52.

\textsuperscript{176} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.53. The most brilliant of them all was Nadir Agha, the second eunuch, who, in the tenth year of his age, was bought for the Sultan from a slave-merchant in Egypt for a hundred and fifty francs, and had developed during the last few years into Abdülhamid's most trusted advisor (Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.55).

\textsuperscript{177} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.54.

\textsuperscript{178} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, pp.54-55.

\textsuperscript{179} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.55.

\textsuperscript{180} Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üc Pasalar Kavgasi}, p.65; and Ali Haydar Midhat, \textit{Hatıralarım, 1872-1946},
published an article attributed to the leaders of the troops of Albanians who had been sent from Istanbul to Macedonia in which the soldiers allegedly complained about their situation. The paper printed the rumour that all of the regiment dissatisfied with this removal from Istanbul were to join wholesale the Mohammedan Association.\textsuperscript{181}

It was in this climate that, on April 5, the by-election in Istanbul took place. On March 9, it had been announced that the seat in Istanbul left vacant by the death of Manyasizade Refik Bey, the late Minister of Justice, would be contested by Ali Kemal Bey, editor of \textit{Ikdâm}, as candidate of the Liberal Union.\textsuperscript{182} Despite all the efforts of the monarchist Liberal Union, the public was not very enthusiastic about the party and its members. The Unionist candidate was Rifat Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs; the candidate of the opposition Liberal Union was Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of \textit{Ikdâm}. Rifat Pasha won the election by a total vote of two hundred and eighty-one as against one hundred and twenty-nine votes received by Ali Kemal Bey. Murad Bey received fifty, Prince Sabahaddin three, and Kamil Pasha one vote. The by-election in Istanbul was an indication of the weakness of the Liberal Union against the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{183}

On March 29, the Palace troops composed of Albanian and Arab regiments had been removed from the Palace grounds and stationed at Taskisla barracks.\textsuperscript{184} On April 5, the Government obtained the Sultan's consent to the removal from Istanbul of the troops kept in the Taskisla barracks. The Albanians would shortly be transferred to Kossovo, the Arab troops would be incorporated in the Fifth Army Corps, and the Kurds and the Lazes would return to their respective countries.\textsuperscript{185} Abdülhamid, who had had long

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\textsuperscript{181} Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üç Pasalar Kavgasi}, p.65.
\textsuperscript{182} "Turkey: Refik Bey's Constituency", \textit{The Times}, March 9, 1909, p.5; and, "The Turkish Parliament", \textit{The Times}, March 10, 1909, p.5.
\textsuperscript{183} Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üç Pasalar Kavgasi}, p.65; "L'élection législative de Constantinople", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 6, 1909, p.1; and, "Turkey: Kiamil Pasha and the Committee", \textit{The Times}, April 6, 1909, p.5.
\textsuperscript{184} Ali Cevad, \textit{Ikinci Mesrutiyetin İlani ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi}, p.44.
\textsuperscript{185} Ali Cevad, \textit{Ikinci Mesrutiyetin İlani ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi}, p.45; and, "Turkey: The
conversations with the Grand Vezier, the Minister of War, and the President of the Chamber on the subject, was stated to have been much disturbed by the departure of the troops, and to have recognised with considerable reluctance the desirability of a measure which the repeated cases of insubordination since the proclamation of the Constitution had shown to be a necessity. With a view to provoke the troops and the officers against the Government and the Unionists, Serbesti alleged that these measures would have terrible consequences.

On the night of April 6, Hasan Fehmi Efendi, editor of Serbesti, was assasinated in Istanbul under most mysterious circumstances. The owner of Serbesti, Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, was one of the founders of the anti-Unionist society called the "Devotees of the Nation" which had flourished in Istanbul in late 1908 and been involved with underground activities to eliminate the Committee of Union and Progress from the political scene. Abdülhamid was reported to be highly interested in this society, for which he had already made monetary contributions. However, Mevlanzade Rifat Bey's resignation from that society, and his publication of Serbesti in which he took an ultra-nationalist stand, attacking at the same time the Sultan and the Unionists, had greatly annoyed Abdülhamid. Abdülhamid was so angry at this defection that he had decided to have Mevlanzade Rifat Bey assasinated, and offered an assasin a large sum of money to do the work. The assasin, however, wanted more, whereupon Abdülhamid thought that it would be better to buy Mevlanzade Rifat Bey body and soul with the money than to give it to his murderers.

Troops at Yildiz", The Times, April 7, 1909, p.5.
186. "Turkey: The Troops at Yildiz", The Times, April 7, 1909, p.5.
When Hasan Fehmi Efendi was assasinated, the crime was put down, by the monarchists, to the Committee of Union and Progress for obvious political motives. The fact, however, was that one of the Palace police had been seen near the scene of the murder at the time the crime was committed. It was not impossible that the Palace had planned this murder which would certainly provoke an outburst of public feeling against the Unionists. This, in turn, would help the monarchists and Abdülhamid stage the coup d'état they had been planning for some time.

As expected, the news of the crime provoked an outburst of indignation from the students of the Faculty of Political Science and the School of Medicine. Provoked by Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of İkdam who also taught at the Faculty of Political Science, midday on April 7, about one thousand students demonstrated before the Sublime Porte, where Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who met with a mixed reception, was obliged to appear on the steps and calm the crowd by promises that every effort would be made to arrest the murderer. The students, after cheering outside the offices of Serbesti, marched to the Chamber of Deputies and called upon the President of the Chamber to ensure that justice should be done. Meanwhile, in the Chamber, Müfif Bey, the monarchist Albanian deputy for Argyrocastro, demanded that a day be fixed for the interpellation of the Minister of the Interior in regard to the murder. The great majority of the Chamber voted in favour of the motion, which was not opposed by the members of the Unionist bloc.

The funeral of Hasan Fehmi Efendi took place on April 8. It was attended by at least five thousand people, among whom were a number of deputies of the Liberal Union,
many theological students, and Albanians. The funeral procession was used as an opportunity to demonstrate against the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet and the Unionists. The opposition press hinted that the murder was an act of political vengeance. While Osmanlı commented on the alleged passivity of the police, Mizan declared that the patience of the people was about to be exhausted, and that the Government should either do its duty or resign. İkdam even published a petition from its editor to the Minister of Justice in which Ali Kemal Bey declared that he warned Ismail Kemal Bey and Rifat Bey, the assistant editor of Serbesti, that they had been condemned by a group of extremists in Salonica. The monarchist military students and officers took this opportunity to protest the Minister of War, and their protest telegrams were published in opposition newspapers in a move to create unrest and rebellion within the military.

In spite of efforts of the police to discover the identity of the murderer of Hasan Fehmi Efendi, he had not been discovered. The affair was discussed at length in the press. Suray-i Ümmet, the Unionist organ, published a manifesto of the Committee of Union and Progress denying all complicity in the crime, which it unreservedly condemned. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation also issued a manifesto condemning the crime, and appealing to the different political parties to subordinate personal quarrels to national interests, and to combine to meet the dangers which threatened the country.

The monarchist newspapers attacked the Unionists, while, at the same time, trying to capitalise on this event for political gain: disguising its real aim for increased political influence on behalf of the Liberal Union, İkdam of April 11 proposed a "truce" between

196. "The Murder of a Turkish Editor: Feeling in Constantinople", The Times, April 9, 1909, p.3.
198. "Turkish Affairs: The Internal Dissensions", The Times, April 10, 1909, p.3.
the two opposing parties, suggesting that Ismail Kemal Bey be made Vice-President of the Chamber, and that two monarchist politicians replace the ministers of Finance and of War. While paying lip service to the necessity of rapprochement between the Committee and the Liberal Union, *Ikdam*, nevertheless, continued its attack by accusing Ahmed Riza Bey, President of the Chamber, of having declared himself in favour of an enlightened absolutism. *Tanin*, which defended the constitutional regime and the Unionists, wrote that the Liberal Union was a subversive body trying to bring back the monarchical order. The Liberal Union repudiated the designs attributed to it. Rahmi Evranos and Dr. Nazim Bey, two prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who were accused by Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of *Ikdam*, of proposing his murder, were having recourse to the courts.

WITH the assassination of an opposition journalist under suspicious circumstances, and the furor it helped to create in public opinion, the stage was finally set for an attempt by the monarchist opposition to capture political power from the Unionist-backed constitutional government by a *coup d'état*. Ever since the establishment of the liberal regime in July, 1908, the monarchist forces and disgruntled elements within the military had used every opportunity to return to the old regime. Reactionary attempts during the general elections and disobedience of the troops stationed at the Palace had already given a glimpse of what might be expected from the monarchists. Therefore, the Unionist leadership was not unaware of the danger posed against the constitutional regime, and had taken measures, such as the decision of removing the Palace troops from Istanbul, in order to preserve the newly established order.

Unionist precautions, however, were not sufficient to prevent the monarchists from

201. "Turkish Internal Affairs: Parties and Politics", *The Times*, April 13, 1909, p.3.
executing their plans for taking power through unconstitutional means. Preparations for the *coup d'état* had already been made and put into execution. It came at the small hours of April 13, and caught the Unionist leadership by surprise but not unprepared. Political power was captured by monarchists who kept it for the following ten days, while Unionist leadership was forced to go underground. These ten days tested the strength of the forces both for and against the constitutional order, and ended with the victory of the forces supporting the Constitution.
Chapter 8

THE MONARCHIST COUP D'ÉTAT OF APRIL 13, 1909

The coup attempt of April 13, 1909, the intention of which was to restore absolutist monarchy, has a peculiar place in Turkish historiography. It can not be factually ignored, since the constitutional regime established by the Committee of Union and Progress was visibly overthrown, and public order shattered for about two weeks. Moreover, this was a well-organised monarchist attempt to restore the old regime, which, as it turned out, utterly failed due to the determination of the Unionists to protect the liberal regime, and the swift intervention of a section of the military --the Third Army Corps stationed at Salonica-- which remained loyal to the revolution. The counter-revolutionary coup attempt meant the restoration of the Sultan's powers. The mutineed soldiers at the service of the counter-revolutionaries at Istanbul openly proclaimed that, and championed Islam and the Sultan against the Unionists and the Christians. Every prominent champion of constitutional regime and liberty, except for the monarchist Liberal Union politicians, had to flee in order to escape death after the first day of the coup. Abdülhamid regained in large degree his former influence. The members of the Chamber of Deputies were mostly afraid to assemble.¹

The peculiarity in Turkish historiography in general, and Kemalist historiography in particular, arises not from a suppression of facts but a gross misinterpretation of events in the days that followed the April 13, 1909 coup. Bent on denying the genuine character of the Revolution of 1908, Kemalist historiography can not interpret the coup as a counter-revolutionary attempt to restore the ancien regime. According to established scholarship,

¹ William M. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey, p.17.
there has not been a revolution to start with; consequently, it would be absurd to talk of a counter-revolutionary movement. Therefore, Kemalist historiography describes the coup as neutrally as possible, dubbing it as the "Event of March 31", March 31 corresponding to April 13 in the old calendar.

Conveniently, this "event" is explained away as a spontaneous religious reaction on the part of a supposedly ignorant and unenlightened population which revolted against the modernising elite, or the military and civilian bureaucrats, who had been trying to reform Turkey. This helps portray the civilian and military bureaucracy in the most favourable terms by giving undue, and, to a large extent, undeserved prominence to the role it played in the coup's suppression. Obsessed by the ideology of "saving the State", Kemalist historiography congradulates the military and, of course, Atatürk, who really had no part in it except for his chance presence as a junior officer in the Third Army, for preserving and protecting the state against its domestic enemies.

Although this fiction currently reigns supreme thanks to the efforts of the past and present Kemalist ideologues, it is interesting to note that the coup of April 13, 1909 has been correctly interpreted for what it really was immediately after its failure. The true nature of the "event" was laid bare before the eyes of the public not only in the pages of the foreign but also the Turkish press. Foreign scholarship in its pre-Kemalist phase, that is to say, before it was misinformed and confused by the myths created for purposes of legitimising the Kemalist regime, described it as a coup d'état aiming to restore Hamidian absolutism.²

THE COUP began with soldiers belonging to the Rifle Division which had recently been brought from Salonica to Istanbul mutineeing towards the morning of April 13. The Government appeared to have been informed of the coup which was on foot, but its

² There are two books which stand out as examples of excellent journalism, describing and analysing the coup d'état. They are Francis McCullagh's The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, and Paul Farkas' Staatsstreich und Gegenrevolution in der Türkei.
measures were purely defensive. Officers informed their men during the preceding week that they should have been prepared to disperse meetings by force. On the night of April 12, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha issued an decree couched in terms of more than Prussian rigour, ordering the troops, if necessary, to fire upon the softas, the religious agents provocateurs of the Mohammedan Union, and civilians. This decided the majority of the men to mutiny. After binding some of their officers and imprisoning others, messages were sent from barrack to barrack and, at dawn, soldiers, led in the first instance by an Albanian corporal and by a Kurdish hodja, member of the Mohammedan Union marched out of their barracks to the Ayasofya Square, in front of the Parliament Building, shouting slogans in favour of the Sultan and the sheriat. In addition to a large number of persons in religious garb, there were also many ex-officers, who had been laid off with the reforms in the army following the Revolution, in soldiers' uniforms among the mutineed soldiers. All indicated that the march was planned well in advance; there was nothing spontaneous. By late morning, the Parliament Building was surrounded by about six thousand fully armed mutineed soldiers. The organisers of the coup d'état also disguised many men as hodjas, and induced some softas to raise the cry of "Religion in danger!" Many soldiers were provoked by being told that the Committee of Union and Progress and the Cabinet had decided to force all Moslems to become Christians.

The mutineers assasinated Emir Mehmed Arslan Bey, deputy for Latakia, whom they mistook for Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, the prominent Unionist deputy for Istanbul and editor-in-chief of Tanin. They also killed Nazim Pasha, the Minister of Justice, and wounded Ali Riza Pasha, Minister of War.

The Captain of the destroyer Asar-i Tevfik, Ali Kabuli Bey, tried to prevent his crew from joining the mutineed soldiers. Though partly successful in keeping order at first,

5. Edwin Pears, "Turkey: Developments and Forecasts", p.713.
Ali Kabuli Bey subsequently lost control of his crew and was captured by the mutineers, who carried him through the streets of Istanbul in front of the Palace. There, the mutineers cheered for the Sultan and the sheriat until Abdülhamid appeared before the Palace. Under the seemingly approving eyes of Abdülhamid, the mutineers lynched Ali Kabuli Bey, after which they hanged him on a tree on the Palace grounds.\textsuperscript{7}

Throughout the city, the mutineers sought and killed military students wherever they found them. This was more an act of revenge of the ex-officers, who, under Abdülhamid's absolutist regime, had been promoted despite their lack of proper education and experience, and were dismissed from the army following the Revolution.\textsuperscript{8}

Apparently, all the mutineed soldiers had received money. Many observers had seen gold in the hands of privates on both April 13 and 14. Most of them were seen in the bazaars, spending large amounts of money which they could have neither earned nor saved. Many rode about in street carriages, and when the cabbies hesitated to take them, they pulled out money to show they could pay.\textsuperscript{9}

THE APRIL 13 issues of the opposition papers Serbesti and Mizan contained articles which indicated that their authors had advance knowledge of the events that were to take place on April 13. While Serbesti argued for the formation of a new Cabinet along the lines of that of Kamil Pasha's, Mizan's editorial tried to discredit the Committee of Union and Progress and its management of the country by way of criticising the parliamentary form of government.\textsuperscript{10}

That day, the offices of Tanin and Suray-i Ümmet, as well as those of the Committee of Union and Progress were stormed and looted while the Women's Club, an affiliate of the Committee of Union and Progress, was closed.\textsuperscript{11} The offices of the

\textsuperscript{7} Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim, I}, pp.142-143.
\textsuperscript{8} Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim, I}, p.144.
\textsuperscript{9} Edwin Pears, "The Crisis in Turkey", p.519.
\textsuperscript{10} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayı}, pp.28-30.
\textsuperscript{11} "The Counter-Revolution and the Fall of Abdul-Hamid", in G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley
Committee of Union and Progress had been completely wrecked, even the wooden frames having been torn out of the windows. The printing machines of the two Unionist papers, Tanin and Suray-i Ümmet, had been destroyed and the type scattered in the streets.  

Bent on killing Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, counter-revolutionaries instead killed Emir Mehmed Arslan Bey, another deputy in the Chamber, who apparently resembled Yalcin. The latter took refuge in the Russian Embassy, while Cavid Bey hid in the house of a stock broker friend.

The military's lack of response in Istanbul was both noticable and revealing, indicating that its sympathies lay with the monarchist coup. The Grand Vezier, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, and the Commander-in-Chief of the First Army Corps, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, were both to blame for allowing the coup to unfold without much resistance. Because of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's reputation for having played the Hamidian regime and the European Powers off one another in pre-revolutionary Macedonia, some conceded that he was probably the worst Grand Vezier Turkey could have had at such a moment.

Murad Bey, editor of Mizan, appeared at the Babiali, demanding the resignation of the cabinet as well as that of Ahmet Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber of Deputies.

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(Eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume 5: The Near East, p.314. These were the only buildings that were destroyed during the reign of terror (Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.137). See also, Edwin Pears, "The Crisis in Turkey", p.511.

12. Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, p.61; and, "The Revolution in Turkey: Newspaper Offices Wrecked", The Times, April 15, 1909, p.3.


15. The Committee of Union and Progress was of the same opinion. In a proclamation addressed to the nation on the first anniversary of the July 24, 1908 Revolution, the Committee of Union and Progress accused Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, among others, by saying that "it was the cowardice, indecision and incapacity of these men, who had been believed to be able men and who had been in office for a year, that had opened in the bosom of the Fatherland those two almost mortal wounds --the Istanbul insurrection of April 13, and the tragic calamities of Adana" (Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.79).


Ahmed Riza Bey was forced to resign his Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. Though still in Istanbul, Ahmed Riza Bey had been forced into hiding with Talat Bey, Dr. Nazim Bey, and other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. Nonetheless, the Chamber of Deputies met under the presidency of the deputy for Aleppo, Mustafa Efendi. Only twenty-five deputies—almost all of them monarchist—were in attendance.

A monarchist, Mustafa Efendi, the deputy for Aleppo, had published an article in the April 7 issue of El Islam, in fact, only its second issue, praising the sharia. The newspaper had printed other reactionary editorials in which the Constitution and the constitutional regime was strongly criticised.

The deputies were convened to “discuss” the demands of the monarchist Liberal Union which had been forwarded to the mutineed soldiers for submission to the Chamber. The monarchist opposition demanded strict adherence to the rules of sherrit; the dismissals of the Grand Vezier, the Minister of War, the Commander of the First Army Corps, the Commander of Taskisla barracks, and the resignation of the President of the Chamber of Deputies. The monarchists also called for the dismissal of Ahmet Riza Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, Rahmi Evranos, Talat Bey, and Cavid Bey—in effect, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress—from the Chamber of Deputies as well as the dissolution of their party. Finally, Karnil Pasha was to be appointed Grand Vezier, Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, and Ismail Kermal Bey, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Ismail Kermal Bey urged the deputies to give the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet a

20. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.44.
21. El Islam was the organ of the newly established religious association, El Islam Cemiyeti, whose structure of organization was based on Prince Sabahaddin’s principles (Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.45n).
22. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.45.
vote of no confidence, and sending the result immediately to Abdülhamid. Those few Unionist deputies in attendance --Babanzade Ismail Hakki, Bedros Halladjian, and Vartkes Serengülian-- tried to dissuade their colleagues. Later in the day, eighty monarchist deputies would succeed in passing a resolution demanding the Cabinet to step down. Ismail Kemal Bey also urged the Chamber to elect a temporary Minister of War. He nominated Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, the monarchist deputy for Amasya, as the candidate for the post of Acting Minister of War, and the deputies of the monarchist Liberal Union --the only deputies sitting in the Chamber-- immediately accepted. Ismail Kemal was then elected to the presidency of the Chamber by the votes of the sixty Liberal Union deputies.

At two o'clock that afternoon, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha tendered his resignation. Abdülhamid immediately accepted his resignation along with those of his Cabinet. The Ministers were then summoned to the Palace to sign their resignation letters later in the afternoon, after which, Tevfik Pasha was appointed the new Grand Vezier.

Chief of Staff Izzet Pasha felt that a permanent Minister of War had to be appointed as quickly as possible. He was offered the job and accepted. Having secured the nomination of Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha as Acting Minister of War, Ismail Kemal Bey now ardently supported Izzet Pasha's nomination.

At about the same time, it was announced that Abdülhamid had pardoned those soldiers who had mutinied, thus legitimating the coup and absolving those involved of all

charges. Though by no means a supporter of the Unionists, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Commander of the First Army Corps, had proposed resisting the mutiny with armed force, which would have, in effect, crushed the coup. This was the last thing that the monarchists, who were bent on accomplishing the fall of the constitutionally formed government, wanted. Therefore, he was ordered not to use force, and that evening he was dismissed from command. Later, Ismail Kemal Bey publicly announced that Edhem Pasha would be the new Minister of War.

At half past ten at night, Edhem Pasha arrived in the Ayasofya Square and was greeted with loud cheers by the mutineers, whom he addressed, urging them from their appointed as Minister of War. Some fifteen thousand rifles were discharged during the next half hour in token of joy by the soldiers.

THE LIBERAL Union wanted to have Kamil Pasha as Grand Vezier and Nazim Pasha as the Minister of War. Although the mutineers had no clear idea who they supported, the Ikdam of April 14 wrote that the troops wanted to see these pashas in the new cabinet. Another monarchist organ, also wrote that the mutineers wanted Ismail Kemal Bey to replace Ali Riza Bey as the President of the Chamber. At the same time, the paper also announced --prematurely-- that Kamil Pasha had been appointed Grand Vezier and Nazim Pasha, Minister of War. Meanwhile, Mizan warmly welcomed the coup d'etat, congratulating the military for its restraint and orderliness, while other monarchist papers, among them Volkan, printed editorials also praising the coup, and condemning the Committee of Union and Progress.

31. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, pp.36-38; and, "The Revolution in Turkey: Behaviour of the Troops", The Times, April 15, 1909, p.3.
32. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.53.
35. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.46.
36. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, pp.67-68.
By the afternoon of April 14, Tevfik Pasha had formed his Cabinet. Of the new appointees, Zihni Pasha, President of the Council, would resign within twenty-four hours, as would Emin Pasha, Minister of the Navy, who was refused admittance to the Admiralty by the sailors. 37

Once again, Abdülhamid insisted on retaining the exclusive right to appoint the Ministers of War and of the Navy. Despite this, Tevfik Pasha allegedly opposed the Sultan on the ground of constitutionality. 38 Nonetheless, Abdülhamid clearly controlled the military appointments made after the coup.

Tevfik Pasha offered the Ministry of Justice to Ismail Kemal Bey. Ismail Kemal Bey, however, rejected the offer, believing that the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies would be his after Ahmed Riza Bey's dismissal from that office. 39 Additionally, Ömer Rüşdü Pasha, who had been offered the post of Commander of the First Army Corps, declined the offer. Upon hearing this, Ismail Kemal Bey used his influence in Nazim Pasha's favour, and Nazim Pasha was duly appointed Commander of the First Army Corps. As its attempts to get him appointed Minister of War had failed, this was a partial victory for the Liberal Union. 40

The remainder of the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet consisted of the following: Sheik-ul-Islam, Ziyaeddin Efendi; Minister of the Interior, Rauf Pasha (appointed April 16); Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rifat Pasha; Minister of War, Edhem Pasha; Minister of the Navy, Emin Pasha; Minister of Justice, Hasan Fehmi Pasha (resigned April 21); President of the Council of State, Zihni Pasha (resigned April 15), Raif Pasha (resigned April 16); Minister of Commerce and Public Works, Gabriel Nouradunghian; Minister of Finance, Nuri Bey; Minister of Education, Abdurrahman Seref Bey; Minister of Forests, Mines, and

38. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.57.
40. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, pp.59-60; and, "The Revolution in Turkey", The Times, April 16, 1909, p.3.
Agriculture, Dimitraki Mavrocordato; Minister of Pious Foundations, Halil Hammade Pasha. 41

Although a Cabinet had at length been formed, the real power in the capital was the Sultan. Within a few days, stories to this effect began to circulate. Pointing out the fact that Palace spies had again been at work and that each soldier of the Fourth Rifle Battalion had received five liras, many believed that the mutiny in Istanbul had been engineered from the Palace itself. And the fact that the Sultan had issued a complete pardon to the mutineers was considered proof of Abdulhamid’s complicity. 42

The Committee of Union and Progress was quick in trying to enlighten public opinion as to the true nature of recent events. While the monarchists maintained the fiction that the coup was just a party movement against the Committee of Union and Progress, the Unionists insisted that the new constitutional regime was under attack, and that the new Cabinet represented the first reactionary step towards the abolishing of the Constitution and the re-establishment of absolute monarchy. 43 Unionist representatives were immediately dispatched to the provinces in an effort to explain the true nature of the events and gather support for the constitutional regime. 44 In response, the Government issued a series of manifestos which stated that the Constitution was in no way threatened, pointing to the fact that the Parliament was sitting as usual. 45 Monarchist propaganda, however, had little effect. The manifestos of the Committee of Union and Progress had not only been the first to arrive, but representatives had also seen to it that Government propaganda and pro-government newspapers would not reach the provinces. The proclamations of the

41. "The Revolution in Turkey: Composition of the New Cabinet", The Times, April 15, 1909, p.3; and, Ali Cevad, Ikinci Mesrutiyetin Iliani ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi, p.191. Dimitraki Mavrocordato and Gabriel Noradunghian had the same posts in the previous cabinet.


Government and the Parliament, telegraphed to all the provincial authorities, were equally ineffectual. Reports from the European provinces indicated that the recent events in Istanbul were considered to be a coup d’etat and a reaction to the Constitution. Loyalist troops of the Third Army Corps at Salonica were apparently preparing to start for the capital. In the Anatolian provinces, support for the Unionists and the Constitution was said to be equally unanimous.

In Salonica, the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Third Army Corps had taken action the moment news of the coup arrived. Mithad Sükrü Bleda, Secretary General of the Committee of Union and Progress, had been kept informed of all developments. He, in turn, communicated with the Unionist Governor of Edirne, Resid Pasha, and with Mahmud Sevket Pasha. At a meeting with Mahmud Sevket Pasha, it was decided that troops dispatched from Rumelia would be mobilized to crush the coup. Mahmud Sevket Pasha then sent a telegram informing the Ministry of War that preparations were being made to march on Istanbul. Edhem Pasha, the newly appointed Minister of War, replied that because the events in the capital was under control, there was no need for such an action.

On April 14, a demonstration was held in Salonica, the stronghold of the Committee of Union and Progress. Thirty thousand people attended, publicly swearing to protect the Constitution. Many volunteered to enlist in the fight against the monarchist coup.

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49. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.55.
51. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.56.
52. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.64.
53. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.65; and, "The Revolution in Turkey: Resistance Threatened at
PRAISING the coup, the İkdam of April 15 also quoted several monarchist Greek papers which supported the recent developments in the capital.\textsuperscript{54} The Volkan of April 15 also praised the coup and congratulated the military for its restrained behavior.\textsuperscript{55} Volkan also prematurely announced that Ismail Kemal Bey had been "appointed" the new President of the Chamber of Deputies, while Ali Kemal and Murad Beys would be elected deputies, replacing Hüseyin Cahit Yalcın and Cavid Bey who had fled. Finally, the paper hinted that Murad Bey might enter the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{56}

With one hundred and eighty-eight members in attendance, the Chamber of Deputies met and accepted the resignation of Ahmed Riza Bey.\textsuperscript{57} The Chamber, however, could not elect a new President in his place as none of the five candidates --Mustafa Efendi, deputy for Aleppo, Nail Bey, deputy for Canik, Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat, Ahmet Mahir Efendi, deputy for Kastamonu, and Sefik Bey, deputy for Karesi-- could muster enough votes to gain the necessary half of the deputies in attendance.\textsuperscript{58} At an impasse, the Chamber elected its oldest member Ali Naki Efendi, deputy for Trabzon, as acting President. The Chamber then proclaimed that it was "upholding the principles of the Constitution", at the same time, forgiving the mutiny as the product of public dissatisfaction with Unionist policy.\textsuperscript{59}

Later, during the same proceedings, Krikor Zohrab, the monarchist deputy for Istanbul, read a petition which supported the coup and bore the signatures of thousands of

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Salonica", \textit{The Times}, April 16, 1909, p.3.
55. Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.70.
58. Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üc Pasalar Kavgasi}, p.69. Mustafa Efendi received 93 votes, Nail Bey, 82, Ismail Kemal Bey, 68, Ahmed Mahir Efendi, 54, and Sefik Bey 54. 95 votes were required to get elected (Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.75-76).
soldiers from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Army Corps. On the one hand, the petition indicated that support for the coup was widespread among the military; on the other hand, it suggested that the coup had been prepared well in advance and that conspiracy had reached to every army corps spread in the country. 60

The Chamber, however, also received a telegram from Janina in support of the constitutional regime and the Committee of Union and Progress, and called for the immediate resignation of the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet and the reinstatement of the old Cabinet. Despite monarchist efforts to have it read in closed session, the telegram was read in the Chamber. It ended with the threat of military action against the capital. 61

The Sultan, the Grand Vezirate, and the Chamber of Deputies would all receive an increasing number of such telegrams. These poured in from most of the towns and cities of Turkey, though particularly from Rumelia. Some were sent by local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress, some by the local population, and others by members of provincial military clubs. Some were even sent by the provincial civilian bureaucracy. Clearly, the Committee of Union and Progress had orchestrated this latest campaign against the Government. 62 In one of its telegram sent to the Sultan, the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress informed Abdülhamid that if he wanted to avoid bloodshed, he would have to restore the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet to power and re-institute Ali Riza Bey to the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. 63 Another telegram of the Central Committee, addressed to the Sultan, threatened all those who were responsible for the coup. In its third telegram, the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress the Unionists blamed Ahmed Cevdet Bey, the owner of Ikdam, Ali Kemal Bey, its editor, Murad Bey, editor of Mizan, Abdullah Zühdü, owner of Yeni Gazete, Said

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60. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.80.
61. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.82. For the text of the telegramme sent from Janina, see Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hâtiralari, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 5 (October 26, 1935-April 18, 1936), pp.101-102.
63. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.93.
Pasha, son of Kamil Pasha, Mevlanzade Rifat, and Dervis Vahdeti for the coup, adding that Abdülhamid would be held accountable if these were to escape from justice. 64

The army of constitutional forces which had assembled at Salonica, left on the night of April 15. Tevfik Pasha, the Grand Vezier, Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, and Izzet Pasha, Chief of Staff, were immediately informed. 65

WHILE leading members of the monarchist Government along with Nazim Pasha, the newly appointed Commander of the First Army Corps stationed at Istanbul, publicly expressed optimism for their success, many were cognizant of the shakiness of their position, and, therefore, were uneasy.

The monarchists were, nevertheless, powerful enough to threaten even the moderate supporters of the constitutional regime. On April 16, four naval officers -- including the late Minister of the Navy, Arif Pasha-- were forced to take asylum on board a British ship and leave the country. 66 Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, who as Commander of the First Army Corps had recommended the use of force against the mutineers, took refuge with Whittall, an English friend in Istanbul, and narrowly escaped with his life, the house having been surrounded by monarchist troops. 67

That day, Rauf Pasha, Governor of the Aydin province and ex-Commissioner General of Egypt, was appointed the new Minister of the Interior. 68 Later, he, along with the other members of the new Cabinet, was received in the Yildiz Palace and was graciously recognized by the Sultan as the duly appointed Minister of the Interior. 69

64. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.93.
65. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.85.
the exception of the Sultan and the monarchist members of the Chamber of Deputies. However, no one seemed to acknowledge his appointment as legitimate. Provincial governors largely disregarded his circulars, and in some cases, his telegrams were returned to Istanbul unopened. Many governors simply replied that they did not recognise him as the Minister of the Interior. Others accused the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet of unconstitutionality, urged its resignation, and demanded the restoration of the constitutionally established Cabinet of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Some telegrams indicated that the Liberal Union and the Mohammedan Association were to be held responsible for the coup.

The most important of these telegrams was sent by Ibrahim Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army Corps stationed at Erzincan, who attacked both the coup and the Cabinet, and declared that the Fourth Army Corps also was ready to march on Istanbul to restore the Constitution. The Tevfik Pasha Cabinet tried in vain to restore confidence in itself by issuing telegrams to the provinces which claimed that all was well, that the Constitution was still in force, that the new Cabinet contained seven Ministers from the previous Cabinet, and that its policies would be the same.

By now, under Mahmud Sevket Pasha's command, the two battalions loyal to the constitutional regime which had left Salonica on the night of April 15 had taken possession of the Salonica-Demotika railway. At the outset, it seemed almost certain that the Macedonians could only enter Istanbul over the dead bodies of the Edirne troops. In the first place, the Unionists had never been strong in the Second Army Corps, whose former Commander, Nazim Pasha, was no friend of the Committee of Union and Progress, and had sternly refused to allow his officers to join any political association, or to mix

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themselves up in any way with politics. Secondly, antagonism between the two army corps was high due to the fact that it was the Salonica officers who had induced the Chamber to oust Kamil Pasha in February over the issue of Nazim Pasha's appointment to the Ministry of War. Finally, the Second Army Corps was numerically superior to the Third Army Corps. 75 Mithat Sükrü Bleda went to Edirne to assess the situation and reported that the Edirne troops would support the Third Army Corps. 76

On the afternoon of April 16, two military trains, consisting of forty-seven carriages carrying troops numbering fifteen thousand soldiers loyal to the Constitution, had arrived at Catalca, only seventy-two kilometres from Istanbul. 77 One of these had gone on to Ispartakule, and more were reportedly on their way both from Edirne and Salonica. A great Constitutionalist army was assembling in the environs of Istanbul. 78

Members of the Liberal Union met with representatives of the Mohammedan Association, the Albanian Union, the Kurdish Club, and the Albanian dominated Uskub and Scutari branches as well as the Edirne branch of the Committee of Union and Progress to discuss the elimination of the Committee of Union and Progress from the political arena. The last three groups had broken away from the central Committee of the Union and Progress during the preceding two weeks apparently in consequence of the dissatisfaction felt with the policy of its leaders, especially Ahmed Riza Bey and Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin. They decided to send a deputation to Salonica to inform the Unionists of their intention. 79 This deputation never left Istanbul.

Because the Parliament was not scheduled to meet that day, about forty deputies with monarchist leanings held a meeting and decided to send deputations into the various

75. Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.158.
province centers to allay concern for the Constitution's safety. The following morning, however, it was clear that such action was already too late. Only one group of deputies actually left -- to meet with the loyalist troops who were expected at Catalca. 80 Apparently, their aim was to pacify the advancing army.

Nazim Pasha was confident that a compromise would be reached in Catalca. The deputation, composed of eight persons, among whom were Halis Efendi, a military instructor to whom the general supervision of the sofias was entrusted, and the deputies from Uskub and Bursa, however, failed, and was not even allowed to return to Istanbul. One of the members of the deputation, a hodja on whom a pistol and papers proving his complicity in the revolt were found was beaten and imprisoned. 81 A second deputation headed by Izzet Halil Pasha, the Grand Master of the Artillery, was equally unsuccessful, but was permitted to return. 82

The only real assurance the Government could obtain was the guarantee that loyalist troops would not enter the capital as long as it was clear that no preparations for resistance were being made. The representatives of the loyalist troops, assured of the safety of the Constitution, insisted, among other things, on the reinstatement of the late Cabinet and the punishment of those responsible for political violence. Meanwhile, troops continued to arrive at Catalca, without resistance. The monarchist artillery garrison had long since retreated to the capital where it was graciously received at the Palace. 83

By this time, the monarchist Government was convinced that the loyalist forces meant to occupy Istanbul. The Cabinet was so alarmed at the prospect of a conflagration that it sent Rifat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British Embassy for mediation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told British officials that the Cabinet contemplated of sending another deputation to Catalca for negotiations with the loyalist troops, and asked the British to accompany them, since the Unionist forces would more readily credit the statement that there was no attack on the Constitution if it were made by a representative of the British Embassy. Although the British initially accepted to mediate the dispute, later other counsels prevailed and the British Embassy decided that the monarchist deputies should go to Catalca alone. This latest deputation fared no better than its predecessors, and indeed failed even to obtain a hearing.

ON April 17, Abdülhamid summoned Tevfik Pasha, the Grand Vezier, to the Palace and met with him at length. He then received members of the Cabinet and discussed the state of the nation. Finally, the Sultan declared that the Government would remain faithful to the Constitution, adding that those who tried to overthrow the Constitution would be severely punished. He also announced that a special commission would be sent to Catalca "to reestablish calm among the troops".

Still largely unaware of the military situation, the capital was already labouring under a deluge of proclamations. Prince Sabahaddin, the eloquent leader of the Liberal Union, began issuing a series of long and wordy appeals to the clergy, the soldiers, and the nation in general in the vain hope of addressing the crisis. His proclamation to the monarchist soldiers congratulated them for their attachment to religion.

Elsewhere in Istanbul, a group of fifth-rate politicians came together and formed a new party under the name of the Ottoman Union [Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye]. They then proceeded to draw up an almost interminable "proclamation", in which they undertook

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"to put aside all differences and to defend with one accord the country, engaging themselves at the same time to maintain the constitutional laws". According to the proclamation, the founders of this union included the Committee of Union and Progress, the Liberal Union, various Armenian, Greek, Albanian, Kurdish, Circassian, and Bulgarian political clubs, as well as the alumni association of the Faculty of Political Science, and the Association of Medical Doctors. This document was reportedly signed by representatives from eleven associations, as well as by the editors of the monarchist press. The Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica promptly repudiated the signature of the Istanbul branch of the Committee appended to this document.

The Chamber of Deputies met and, at the insistence of Ismail Kemal Bey and Tevfik Pasha "discussed" the temporary Budget Bill. The Bill was passed by one hundred and twenty votes to twelve. In the same sitting, deputies held elections for the seat left vacant by the forced resignation of Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber. Three candidates were selected, and their names, according to the Constitution, were promptly presented to the Sultan for the final choice. Nail Bey and Mustafa Efendi both received one hundred and eleven votes. Haci Ahmed Mahir Efendi received ninety-six, Sefik Bey, sixty, and Ismail Kemal Bey, forty-seven.

The Chamber then chose thirty deputies for the latest deputation to Catalca, after which telegrams which arrived from the provinces were read. These were sent by various popular representatives, army commanders, and local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress. All assailed the military coup, made it clear that the new developments were considered a return to absolutism, and refused to recognize the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet.

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Ismail Kemal Bey tried to sway the increasingly anxious members of the Chamber in the coup's favour, claiming that everything that had been done, had been done constitutionally. Many deputies, among them, Nazareth Daghavarian, Mehmet Ali Bey, Mustafa Arif Bey, and Cosmidis Efendi, argued that the coup was a blow to the supremacy of constitutional rule and the prestige of the Chamber. As long as deputies were afraid for their lives, they insisted, one could not speak of normalcy.\textsuperscript{93}

Realising that the capital was surrounded, monarchist newspapers quickly changed the tone of their editorials.\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ikdam}, so enthusiastic about the coup in its early days, stated that the maintenance of Hamidian absolutism could only ruin the country. It went on to criticize the destruction of pro-Unionist newspaper offices, and stressed that deputies be allowed to live in safety.\textsuperscript{95} Yet, \textit{Ikdam} did not fail to print telegrams sent from the provinces in support of the coup. The editorial praised this support, admonishing the population not be taken in by the lie that the Constitution was in danger.\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Osmanli}, controlled by Prince Sabahaddin, asked for the Sultan's immediate abdication in the interest of peace.\textsuperscript{97} Dervis Vahdeti's editorial in \textit{Volkan}, however, claimed that the "events" of April 13 were, in fact, only a continuation of the Revolution of 1908; in a desperate attempt to legitimate the coup, he asked that readers join the "movement", the roots of which, after all, began with Niyazi and Enver Beys.\textsuperscript{98}

Messages from every part of Turkey poured in to the Ministry of War. Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army Corps at Erzincan, and General Salih Pasha, Commander of the Second Army Corps at Edirne, stated that "having learned that armed men had dared to come to the walls of the Chamber", they were both "ready to

\textsuperscript{93} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.117-118.
\textsuperscript{94} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.110.
\textsuperscript{95} "\textit{En Büyük Tehlike Nedir?"}, \textit{Ikdam}, April 4, 1325/April 17, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.110. Repentance came too late, for \textit{Ikdam} was suppressed indefinitely as soon as the troops from Salonica entered the city (Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.184).
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ikdam}, April 4, 1325/April 17, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.110-111.
\textsuperscript{97} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.184.
\textsuperscript{98} Dervis Vahdeti, "\textit{Öteberi"}, \textit{Volkan}, April 4, 1325/April 17, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.111.
march on the capital". Similar messages came from Prizrend, Yenice, Vardar, Prichitina, Geilan, Burhaniye, Izmir, Janina, Van, Kastamonu, Ankara, Bursa, Kosovo, Beirut, Nablus, Tripoli, Bartin, Durazzo, Mitrovitza, Sivas, Erzincan, Üsküb and a score of other places. all demanding the dissolution of the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet, all declaring that the signatories had decided to take up arms against Istanbul.\footnote{99}

In fact, it seemed the Sultan had lost all of European Turkey, with the exception of a few barracks in the capital, as well as all the Anatolian provinces which were advanced enough to take an interest in politics. Four battalions had embarked at Trabzon; a battalion of sharpshooters had left Erzurum, and other battalions were on their way to Istanbul via Konya. All the best generals and officers were either in Salonica or on their way to join the forces surrounding Istanbul. Riza Pasha, ex-Minister of War, and Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, ex-Commander of the First Army Corps, had reached Salonica and were now among those on their way to join the besieging army.\footnote{100} Istanbul's general population was still unaware of these developments.

The news that the Edirne troops, in particular, had rallied to the Unionist cause considerably strengthened its position, and dealt the Government a severe blow. Although there had been some hesitation for the previous two days, on April 17, the garrison's officers met and decided to throw their lot in with the Committee of Union and Progress. The very force on which the monarchist Government had been relying on as a check on the action of the Unionists was now its declared enemy.\footnote{101}

However, thinking that it might be needed to defend the Bulgarian frontier in the not unlikely event of foreign intervention, Mahmud Sevket Pasha did not ask the Second Army Corps for much material support. Accordingly, the Second Army Corps only sent an infantry and a cavalry brigade to Istanbul. What was infinitely more important, the Second

\footnote{100. Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.180.}
Army sent assurance that it was with Mahmud Sevket Pasha heart and soul, and that it could be relied upon to guard his flank. 102

The deputation chosen from among the members of the Chamber met with the representatives of the Salonica Army, and in a telegram sent to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the president of the delegation -- Esad Toptan Pasha, the independent deputy for Durazzo-- informed the Cabinet that the loyalist forces intended to enter the capital peacefully in order to restore law and order. 103 The deputation learned that ten other trains were following. In a telegram sent to the Chamber in the afternoon, the deputation informed the deputies that fifteen thousand soldiers would advance to the city if any preparations were made to resist. 104

ON the morning of April 18, most in Istanbul believed that the Second Army Corps had routed the Salonica troops, and towards evening, everyone was convinced that there would be no trouble. The peaceful manifesto of the United Parties had been published; the monarchist newspapers were extremely hopeful; the Grand Vezier, in a public appearance, ridiculed the idea of civil strife, and the representatives of several European banks sent reassuring messages to their head offices. 105

In an editorial for Ikdam, Ali Kemal Bey reiterated the Government's claim that the coup in no way threatened the constitutional regime, though he then went on to praise it for having put an end to the political reign of the Committee of Union and Progress. In this connection, he lauded the formation of the Heyet-i Müttefika as its successor. The coup, he said, would allow the nation's political life to proceed on firmer ground. 106 In Osmanlı, Prince Sabahaddin published an open letter to the nation's religious leaders, in which he

103. Sina Aksin, *31 Mart Olayı*, pp.120-121.
thanked them for their cooperation with those troops involved in the coup, and urged them to support the newly established Heyet-i Müttefika. 107 Mizan also welcomed the establishment of the Heyet-i Müttefika. Its editorial disparaged party politics in general, and praised the political unity which Heyet-i Müttefika represented. 108

Volkan, meanwhile, printed a list of demands addressed to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress. Though the paper tolerated the party’s existence, it did accuse Unionists of having misappropriated funds during their rule, and demanded that these be returned to the nation forthwith. The accusation was completely unsupported. 109

At the opening of its session, the Chamber was informed that Abdülhamid had chosen Mustafa Efendi, deputy for Aleppo, as its President. 110 Throughout, the remnant of the Parliament tried hard to persuade itself that the events of the last few days had been perfectly regular, and the Chamber’s monarchist deputies issued a declaration to that effect. "The Parliament", it said, "had called on the Cabinet of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha to resign. Then an imperial decree, issued in conformity with a vote of the Chamber, had accorded a general amnesty to those who had taken part in the demonstration, and all the soldiers had returned to their barracks with joy and confidence, thus giving a proof of their order and discipline." 111

In this extra-ordinary session of the Chamber, the deputation which had been to Catalca reported its findings. Members of the deputation spoke of the firm determination of the loyalist troops not to return, or even to cease advancing, until they had secured guarantees for the Constitution. All were in accord as to the admirable discipline of the regiments which they saw. One of the members of the deputation, himself deputy for

110. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.132; and, "Report in the Chamber", The Times, April 19, 1909, p.5.
Üsküb, stated that the officers were under the impression that the lives of the deputies in
Istanbul were in danger. Another stated that if the Chamber itself did not put the First Army
Corps in order, the loyalist Third Army Corps would do so. On the proposal to send a
further deputation to give advice, Süleyman Bey, another member of the deputation, said
plainly that the leaders at Catalca had told them they had no need for it. 112

During the proceedings, telegrams supporting the Constitution and condemning the
coup were also read. Most of these reiterated the claim that the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet was
illegitimate. 113 Encouraged by the abundance and vehemence of such telegrams, Unionist
deputies --who had been noticeably reticent throughout-- decided to give their version of
the current situation, brushing aside the monarchists' claim that everything was in perfect
order. Nesim Masliah, the Unionist deputy for Izmir, made a speech in which he said that
the telegrams clearly proved the people's loyalty to the Constitution, adding that they had
seen through the lies propagated by the coup's supporters. Using violent language, he
denounced the wrecking of Suray-i Ümmet's offices, "which had for twenty years
defended, in exile, the cause of freedom". "The Parliament", he continued, "had deceived
the nation by issuing lying proclamations." He ridiculed the Government's assertion that
the Constitution was safe in light of the fact that the leadership of the Committee of Union
and Progress and most deputies were in flight or in momentary danger of assassination. 114

That day, the combined forces from Edirne --commanded by Salih Pasha-- and
Salonica --commanded by Hüsnü Pasha, uncle (father-in-law?) of the prominent Unionist
Rahmi Evranos-- advanced to Isparta Kule, some thirty kilometers from the walls of
Istanbul. An advance post of six hundred and fifty men had already been established at
Küçük Cekmece, fifteen kilometers closer to the capital. 115 The main body was nearly

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112. Edwin Pears, "The Crisis in Turkey", p.525; and, "Report in the Chamber", The Times,
April 19, 1909, p.5.
114. Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid, p.171, and Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı,
pp.135-136. See also the defence of the Constitution by other members of the Chamber, including Boso
eight thousand strong, included cavalry and artillery, and its discipline was described as perfect. That evening, the monarchist Government made a last attempt at reconciliation, sending Chief of the Staff Izzet Pasha, who was supposed to be favourably regarded by the Unionists. The attempt, however, was fruitless, and Izzet Pasha returned to Istanbul the following morning, without achieving any result. 116

ON April 19, the monarchist press continued to downplay the significance of the coup. In Ikdam, Ali Kemal Bey tried his best to persuade the public that the existing regime was in no danger. 117 The same paper also published another open letter from Prince Sabahaddin to the monarchist soldiers, celebrating the sharia. 118

Troops in Istanbul, however, had already started defecting to the loyalists. Whole squadrons of cavalry went over at a time. On April 19, the troops of the Rami barracks welcomed the Salonica troops, joined them, and kindly presented them with six machine gun batteries. 119

By now, the population could not but be aware of the situation, and students poured out of Istanbul in a steady stream. Law School students marched through the streets with a flag, on their way to join the Salonica troops at Bakirköy. They were followed by students and professors of the Pangaltı Military School, the Engineering School, the Commercial School, and many others. 120

Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın and Cavid Bey, who had escaped from Istanbul to Odessa several days earlier, returned by train via Budapest, and were now on their way to Salonica. At the border, Turkish soldiers welcomed them, shouting "Down with

Abdülhamed!"], and for the rest of the trip, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin and Cavid Bey were cheered on at every station. That night they reached Salonica where a large crowd had assembled despite the fact that the army had banned all demonstrations. They were immediately taken to a hall to address the population. 121

When Izzet Pasha returned to Istanbul with the news that the loyalists were prepared to march on Istanbul, the monarchists panicked. Ismail Kemal Bey suggested resisting the Salonica army by the monarchist troops still loyal to them, and enlisting the help of foreign powers to boldster the Government's weakened defences. The German and Russian Embassies had already refused their cooperation, and that afternoon, he met with Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador. Although the latter did not rule out the possibility of intervention on behalf of the monarchists, he let it be known that Abdülhamed could not be defended. 122

Meanwhile, Nazim Pasha went to the Taksim barracks and gave orders to resist the approaching Salonica army with every available means. He was in no mood to simply give up and surrender. 123

That day, Tevfik Pasha presented his Cabinet's programme to the Chamber. Assessing the current situation, he blamed the coup on the struggle between the political parties, though he repeated that the Constitution was in no way under attack, and that his Cabinet would protect the Constitution. Not surprisingly, he welcomed the appearance of the Heyet-i Müttefika, as a stabilizing presence. While admitting that the citizens had expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs, he expressed the hope that it would soon dissipate. 124 Finally, with the news of loyalist advances, the Chamber had been pushing for the opportunity to give the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet a vote of no confidence.

122. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.143.
In order to avoid the likely possibility that his Cabinet might get a vote of no confidence from the Chamber which had become reassured of victory for the constitutional regime, Tevfik Pasha met with monarchist deputies and secured a postponement of the vote.  

In the afternoon of April 19, rumours began to circulate that the Committee of Union and Progress had demanded the abdication of the Sultan and was prepared to back its demand with force if necessary. The conviction that the Palace would be attacked was so strong that inhabitants of the surrounding neighbourhoods, Besiktaş and Ortaköy, quickly deserted their homes. Such a message had in fact been sent to the Palace, and Tevfik Pasha relayed this information to the British Embassy through an envoy, indicating that the Committee of Union and Progress had also sent a second telegram demanding that several people whom it considered responsible for recent events be handed over into its custody. Ismail Kemal Bey was among them.

Later that night, Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, Commander of the Salonica troops, drafted a proclamation intended to explain the loyalists' position and motives to the people of Istanbul. Describing the events of the past week as a counter-revolutionary coup designed to bring back the absolutist regime, he called all those involved with the events as reactionaries and informed the public that the loyalists were marching on Istanbul in order to restore the Constitution, and punish those who sought to destroy. The proclamation was distributed throughout the capital the following day.

In a second telegram, which would be sent to the Headquarters of the Chief of Staff to be relayed to the General Staff of the First Army Corps, Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha expressed regret that the First Army Corps had sided with the forces of reaction, but asked the Headquarters to advise the troops of the First Army Corps not to resist the loyalist

128. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, pp.149-150.
129. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.149n.
advance.\textsuperscript{130} The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, Talat Bey and Dr. Nazim Bey, had previously discussed the contents of the telegram with Izzet Pasha.\textsuperscript{131}

The Salonica army continued its march towards Istanbul and during the night reached San Stefano and Bakirköy.\textsuperscript{132} Tevfik Pasha and Edhem Pasha, Minister of War, tendered their resignations; the Sultan refused to accept them, as he would of Nazim Pasha and Memduh Pasha.\textsuperscript{133}

On the morning of April 20, Ismail Kemal Bey, whose arrest was requested by the Unionists, sought and was granted asylum in the British Embassy. He was then escorted to an outbound Egyptian ship.\textsuperscript{134} That same day, Nazim Pasha fled to Büyükada.\textsuperscript{135}

The flight of the counter-revolutionaries had started. Trains for Anatolia were curiously full of passengers in religious garb; deserting soldiers fled to the interior of the country on foot.\textsuperscript{136}

Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Commander of the Third Army Corps in Salonica, sent an ultimatum to the Cabinet which gave it twenty-four hours to resign. It also stated that martial law would be declared throughout the capital but that order would be established and maintained by police force and gendarmes brought in from Macedonia. The Chamber of Deputies would then be convened according to the rules of the Constitution, to elect a new President. Naturally, a new Cabinet would be also formed.\textsuperscript{137}

Out of desperation and in the hope of provoking foreign intervention on his behalf, the Sultan made arrangements to have one of the warships moored off Besiktas open fire

\textsuperscript{130} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.150-151.
\textsuperscript{131} Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdım}, 2, pp.624-629. See also, Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.153.
\textsuperscript{132} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.145.
\textsuperscript{135} Ismail Kemal, \textit{The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey}, p.345.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ikidam}, April 8. 1325/April 21, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.161n.
\textsuperscript{137} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.162-163.
on the German, Russian, Austrian, and French Embassies the moment loyalist troops entered Istanbul.\textsuperscript{138}

That afternoon, Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha’s proclamations, addressed to the people of Istanbul and the General Staff of the Army respectively, were made public. The second proclamation was the more interesting as it was clearly intended to reassure the mutinous troops whom it considered the victims of monarchist designs. The proclamation began with the assertion that the\textit{ coup} was the result of reaction, that those responsible meant to subvert the Constitution all along, and that by appealing to the religious feelings of the troops, the latter had been misled to mutiny, bringing dishonour to the immaculate Turkish Army. To wipe out this stain, detachments of the Second and Third Army Corps had come to San Stefano and Küçük Cekmece to see the Constitution, by the grace of the Almighty, restored. Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha made two demands: first, that the troops in Istanbul take a solemn oath to follow their superiors’ orders, and to henceforth abstain from all interference in politics; second, that the troops in no way interfere with measures taken to punish the guilty, nor could they even look askance at the men of the Second and Third Army Corps whom they were asked to consider their brothers. Accordingly, they were asked to denounce those officers and spies who had incited them to mutiny.\textsuperscript{139}

For those who had participated in the\textit{ coup}, the first proclamation to the population of Istanbul was not very reassuring. Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha stated that the task of dealing with the traitors and malcontents would be left to the military. These would be severely punished so as to protect the constitutional regime and prove that there could never be a force superior to the Constitution, founded as it was on Sacred Law. Those\textit{ agents provocateurs} who, in the guise of religious leaders, had fostered the\textit{ coup} would, in

\textsuperscript{138} This plan was reported to Rifat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, in turn, informed the British Embassy of this provocation ("The Counter-Revolution and the Fall of Abdul-Hamid", in G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (Eds.),\textit{ British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Volume 5: The Near East}, p.318).

particular, be dealt with harshly.\textsuperscript{140}

It was now several days after the ex-President of the Chamber, Ahmed Riza Bey, had escaped to San Stefano, and most of the Unionist deputies, upon the call of the parliamentary deputation that had gone to San Stefano on April 19, chose this moment to join him, indicating that they were prepared to recognize him as the Chamber's legitimate President.\textsuperscript{141}

By April 21, the monarchists had lost all hope of retaining political power in their hands; they were in total disarray. Most tried to save their skins by disclaiming any responsibility with the whole affair. In his editorial of April 21 in the \textit{Ikdam}, Ali Kemal Bey denied that he had ever supported the \textit{coup}.\textsuperscript{142} Ahmet Cevdet Bey, the owner of \textit{Ikdam}, also defended his actions, though he quickly escaped to Vienna.\textsuperscript{143} Murad Bey's editorial in the \textit{Mizan} was very conciliatory; he described the role of the monarchist press in the \textit{coup} as moderate, and stated that although the existence of political parties in the Chamber was desirable, the Heyet-i Müttefika should provide the guiding spirit.\textsuperscript{144}

The Tevfik Pasha Cabinet met and prepared a response to Mahmud Sevket Pasha's ultimatum. In essence, they accepted all demands: thus, accepting an unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{145} Nonetheless, Mahmud Sevket Pasha left Salonica to head the army in besieging Istanbul.\textsuperscript{146}

The number of deputies gathered at San Stefano now amounted to one hundred.

\textsuperscript{141} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, pp.165-166.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ikdam}, April 9, 1325/April 22, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.170; and, Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim}, 1, pp.188-192.
\textsuperscript{144} Murad, "Artık Çocuklugumuza Nihayet Verelim", \textit{Mizan}, April 8, 1325/April 21, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.171.
\textsuperscript{145} Sina Aksin, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.172.
\textsuperscript{146} Cemal Kutay, \textit{Üç Pasalar Kavgası}, p.76.
They met and decided to schedule a joint session with the Senate the following day. 147

IN his *Ikdam* editorial of April 22, Ali Kemal Bey wrote that true patriots had nothing to fear from the Salonica army. 148

As planned, the Chamber of Deputies held a joint session with the Senate at San Stefano. Said Pasha, the ex-Grand Vezier and President of the Senate, jointly presided over the proceedings with Ahmed Riza Bey, who was re instituted as President of the Chamber. 149 Calling itself the National Assembly, this Parliament-in-exile quickly got down to business and in closed session, began discussing the issue of Abdülhamid's dethronement. Later in the afternoon, the Assembly issued a declaration supporting Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha's two proclamations. 150 Said Pasha then met with Mahmud Sevket Pasha. 151

It had become quite clear that the Sultan was willing to come to terms with the Committee of Union and Progress, and that he would forsake his own agents and supporters to do it. The evening papers carried a list of thirty-five persons described as fomenters of the April 13 coup. Among them was the eminent editor of *Ikdam*, Ali Kemal Bey, who barely had not enough time to escape. Though only thirty-five were named, the complete list was said to name some five hundred and forty-three --some of whom belonged to the Liberal Union, others who were friends and associates of the Sultan. It was announced that the Sultan himself had provided the list, and had denounced them to the Unionists. 152

News soon arrived that loyalist troops sent from Izmir were now holding positions

at Eskisehir. Ostensibly, the defence of Istanbul would have to be conducted on two fronts. 153

THE EXODUS of the wealthier population, among whom were monarchist pashas, their households, as well as those wealthy Greeks and Armenians who had supported the coup, gained momentum throughout April 23, and every outgoing ship was filled beyond capacity. 154

Meanwhile, the Heyet-i Müttefika held a meeting during which all the opposition forces against the Committee of Union and Progress tried to devise a strategy to survive the coup's failure. These elected a commission of seven members to meet with the National Assembly in the hopes of gaining a measure of legitimacy. 155

Finally, the Salonica troops began their march on Istanbul. 156 They captured the barracks of Davutpasa and Rumeli, and though monarchist troops put up some resistance at Edirnekapı, these were quickly forced to surrender. 157

ON April 24, the Salonica troops entered Istanbul from Topkapı and Edirnekapı, taking control of police stations on the way and capturing the Ministry of War. 158 They, however, encountered resistance at the Fatih Mosque barracks, at the Bab-i Ali, and at the officers' club adjoining the Bab-i Ali. 159 Lasting over three hours, the battle for control of the government buildings at Bab-i Ali was the fiercest. When it was over, the loyalists had forty-four dead and ninety-five wounded, the monarchists, fifty-seven dead and one hundred and ten wounded. 160 The Bab-i Ali had great gashes made by shells in front and

153. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.177.
154. Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, p.62; and, William M. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey, p.78, and p.87.
156. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.76.
158. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.77.
160. İkdam, April 18, 1325/May 1, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.196n.
on one side, and some of the buildings in its immediate vicinity were pitted like a smallpox patient. 161

Resistance at the Taksim and Taskisla barracks was also considerable, though by the afternoon both would be in the hands of the loyalists. 162 The battle at these barracks left fifty-three dead and sixty-five wounded among the loyalists, two hundred forty dead and four hundred and seventy-five wounded among the monarchists. 163 By late afternoon, the Yildiz Palace was completely surrounded. 164 Mahmud Sevket Pasha issued a proclamation, giving a summary of the events that had taken place in the capital that day. 165

All through the night, the Bosphorus was black with little boats carrying fleeing soldiers and reactionaries across from the Yildiz Palace to the Asian shore. 166

ON April 25, the Yildiz Palace and some barracks were still holding out. The Palace defences were said to include some four thousand troops. 167 Reports further indicated that the Palace guns were prepared to fire on Beyoglu, destroying the European quarter where the Embassies were situated, if any attack were initiated. The Selimiye barracks on the Asiatic side were also still held by the Sultan’s troops, and these reportedly declared that they too would fire on Beyoglu in the event of an attack on the Palace. 168

However, when surrounded, there was no resistance at the Selimiye barracks. When the Salonica troops arrived, half of the garrison had already fled, and those who

161. Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, p.70.
162. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.196; and, Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.77.
163. İkdam, April 18, 1325/May 1, 1909. quoted in Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.196n; and, Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, p.70. In the Court Martial that followed the re-institution of the constitutional regime the commander of the Taskisla barracks was found guilty and given capital punishment (Tanin, July 7, 1325/July 20, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, p.197n).
165. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.77.
166. Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, p.69.
remained surrendered at once. 169

By late afternoon, all the barracks had been taken; the Sultan surrendered without a fight. He was now in the hands of the military pending the arrival of the National Assembly from San Stefano. 170 In the meantime, Mahmud Sevket Pasha declared martial law throughout the city and informed the National Assembly which, in turn, approved the measure. 171 Mahmud Sevket Pasha also told the National Assembly that it was safe to return to Istanbul to the Parliament building, and the Assembly decided to meet there the following day. 172

Those counter-revolutionary leaders who were to stand trial were detained at the Unionist club of Bakirköy. 173 Dervis Vahdeti was caught at Izmir while transferring from the ship he had left Istanbul with to another ship. 174 Nazim Pasha, who had replaced Mahmud Muhtar Pasha as Commander of the First Army Corps after the coup, was dismissed; Mahmud Muhtar Pasha was reinstated. 175

On April 26, the military began making arrests, and a special Tribunal was immediately created. 176 Most of the staff at the Yildiz Palace was taken into custody, put aboard outbound ships, and summarily exiled. 177 More than five thousand prisoners were taken to the camps set up along the Golden Horn. Among the soldiers taken to the camps for confinement, there were also persons dressed as hocas as well as some high officials of the Palace. 178

Printed in Salonica and appearing for the first time since the coup, Tanin published

171. Cemal Kutay, Üç Pasalar Kavgasi, p.77; and, Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, pp.201-208.
174. İkdam, April 13, 1325/April 26, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.203.
177. Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayı, p.216.
178. Mary A. Poynter, When Turkey Was Turkey, pp.69-70.
editorials by Hüseyn Cahid Yalçın and Cavid Bey which advocated the necessity of harsh measures against the counter-revolutionaries in order to guarantee the success of the Revolution of 1908.  

LEAVING Salonica by train the previous night, Hüseyn Cahid Yalçın and Cavid Bey reached Istanbul on the morning of April 27.  

They immediately went to the Chamber of Deputies where they were given a warm welcome.

The Parliament decided to remove Abdülhamid from the throne, replacing him with Mehmed Resad.  

With the exception of the Ministers of Justice, War, and the Navy, the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet was allowed to remain in office until it was replaced by the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet on May 5.  

The leadership of the Liberal Union had either fled or been arrested. Prince Sabahaddin, the leader of the party, had been arrested on April 26 at his estate in Pendik. Kamil Pasha, another leader, was under house arrest; Kamil Pasha's son, Said Pasha, had been deeply compromised in the counter-revolutionary coup attempt. The British and French Embassies, however, came to Prince Sabahaddin's defence, managing to secure his release on April 29. He was subsequently exiled. It was felt that because Prince Sabahaddin had for years lived in exile in Paris, his imprisonment would unduly prejudice French public opinion against the newly reestablished regime.

179. Tanin, April 14, 1325/April 27, 1909, quoted in Sina Aksin, 31 Mart Olayi, pp.212-213.  
On the night of April 27, Abdülhamid and his household were escorted from the Yildiz Palace to a special train destined for Salonica. With the successful suppression of the coup and the removal of Sultan Abdülhamid from the throne, the Unionists in alliance with the Third Army Corps re-established constitutional rule.

THE COUP was a well-organised monarchist scheme to restore the absolutist regime. It is not, as most historians still continue to argue, a spontaneous outburst of religious reaction on the part of the Istanbul mob which, nevertheless, served the purpose of those who wanted a return to the Hamidian regime. As events at Istanbul amply demonstrated, the coup was well-planned ahead, and the Palace as well as monarchist pashas and politicians were intimately involved with its execution. The fact that it was conceived by top-level monarchists well in advance has further been born out by events that occurred simultaneously in the provinces.

The Albanian troops which had been sent away from Istanbul reached Salonica on April 11. They were in such a dangerous frame of mind that two Constitutionalist battalions had to be sent to overawe them before they got on the train which was to take them into the interior.

On the night of April 12, the same night that the counter-revolutionary coup began, anti-Unionist feeling erupted in the barracks of the Salonica battalions, where ex-officers and hodjas had worked up the troops to such a point that they demanded "the land be freed of those atheists, traitors, enemies of Islam, who called themselves Unionists". Early the following morning, soldiers rushed on their unsuspecting officers and detained them. Thus insurrection at the Salonica barracks started at about the same time as it started in Istanbul.

188. Cemal Kutay, Üc Pasalar Kavgasi, p.77; and, William M. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey, p.133.
Disguised as ulemas, many reactionary agents travelled throughout Anatolia preaching against the Unionists and the constitutional regime. The clergy in Istanbul, however, exposed them as fakes by wiring to the provincial centres.¹⁹¹

Immediately before the coup of April 13, agents provocateurs had spread the word in Erzincan to the effect that there would soon be a revolt to establish sheriat during which not only military students and officers but also the Armenians would be massacred. The rumours proved to be correct in Erzincan; on April 13, the same day of the coup in Istanbul, soldiers mutineed, making a pro-monarchist march through the town carrying Korans. Their leader was Kemalettin Sami Bey, a junior officer at the garrison. The mutineed soldiers gathered at the main square of the town where they put their demands to Ibrahim Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, and to Sheikh Haci Fevzi Efendi, a prominent religious leader of Erzincan. One of Kemalettin Sami Bey's men threatened Ibrahim Pasha with a sword but the pasha acted quick enough to stave off the danger to his life. Both Ibrahim Pasha and the Sheikh managed to control the mutineed soldiers with promises to listen to their demands the following day. As the mob dispersed it destroyed the local office of the Committee of Union and Progress.¹⁹²

The next day, the mutineers along with their leaders appeared before the Army Headquarters to see Ibrahim Pasha. As soon as Ibrahim Pasha came out of the building, loyalist soldiers in the garrison trapped the mutineers upon Ibrahim Pasha's signal. All mutineers were subsequently rounded off and disarmed. Having controlled the situation at Erzincan, Ibrahim Pasha left the town for Erzurum, from where news of reactionary activity had reached the Fourth Army Headquarters.¹⁹³

Another pro-monarchist outbreak in Erzurum was prepared to coincide with the coup in Istanbul. Emissaries from Istanbul made promises to the soldiers and gave them money, aided and abetted by reactionary ulemas and the Commander Yusuf Pasha

¹⁹². Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, I, pp.159-160.
himself. Although no direct evidence linked Yusuf Pasha to this plot, many believed that Yusuf Pasha had been conspiring with discontented elements in the Fourth Army Corps. He had been named Military Commander of Erzurum in February of 1909. Evidence showed that he had scarcely reached his new post when he began instigating reactionary intrigues, for, as one of the Sultan's most capable adherents, he immediately saw that the Sultan's interests were threatened by the new constitutional regime.

Having foreknowledge of the monarchist plot, the local members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who were in considerably stronger position than their colleagues at Erzincan, foiled the monarchists' plans by arranging a demonstration to denounce the coup before the monarchists could even act. In addition to the arrival into town of a contingent of cavalry, including well-known Unionist revolutionaries, their task in organizing a demonstration was made easier since public feeling against the coup to bring back the old regime was very strong in Erzurum. The demonstration took place on Friday, April 16. A crowd of ten to fifteen thousand, consisting of Moslems, Christians, and soldiers, assembled in front of the Government building, along with a group of high officials, including Tahir Pasha, the Governor of Erzurum, Ibrahim Pasha, the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, and Yusuf Pasha, the Military Commander of Erzurum. Speeches were delivered by the members of the local Committee of Union and Progress, by representatives of the Moslem and Christian communities, and by several of the ulema. Amid much enthusiastic cheering, resolutions were passed affirming the determination of all present to adhere to the principles of the Constitution, and to defend these to the last. Ibrahim Pasha sent telegrams to this effect to Istanbul and Salonica, adding that the Fourth Army Corps was with the population and that it was ready to furnish a contingent if

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required.\textsuperscript{199}

Yusuf Pasha, however, gained influence over the troops, non-commissioned officers, and some of the subaltern officers of the garrison, and on April 20, sent the 2nd Battalion of the 26th Regiment to the Governor's office in order to repeat the Istanbul drama of a week earlier.\textsuperscript{200} The mutineers encountered no resistance, and Yusuf Pasha took advantage of the situation in order to exile fifty-three Unionist officers under the pretext that the soldiers had insisted on this being done.\textsuperscript{201} He also closed the local Unionist headquarters and there was direct evidence that he had personally been involved in the removal of the two leading civilian members of the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{202} Yusuf Pasha's plans for full scale reaction, however, were cut short when several functionaries of the local telegraph office, members of the Committee of Union and Progress, informed Mahmud Sevket Pasha of these developments. Mahmud Sevket Pasha ordered Marshall Ibrahim Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, to arrest the traitor. As Abdulhamid had fallen in the interval, throwing the monarchist elements in Erzurum into panic, this was fairly easy. Yusuf Pasha was subsequently sent to Istanbul under guard to face the Government's special Tribunal.\textsuperscript{203}

At El-Shukurd, Veil Baba and Kara Kilise, similar monarchists conspiracies were carried out, ending in violence. That a dozen massacres did not occur in Anatolia instead of one or two was due to the efforts of the Unionist officers, who were able to preempt further bloodshed by forging official telegrams and announcing the Sultan's dethronement before the event had actually taken place.\textsuperscript{204}

Although a massacre had been planned in Aleppo, it did not materialize owing to the

\textsuperscript{199} F.O. 424/219, Consul Shipley to Sir Gerard Lowther, Erzerum, April 23, 1909, p.131; and, Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim, I}, p.163.
\textsuperscript{200} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.142.
\textsuperscript{201} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.142.
\textsuperscript{202} F.O. 424/219, Consul Shipley to Sir Gerard Lowther, Erzerum, April 29, 1909, p.133.
\textsuperscript{204} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.142.
fact that, on the eve of the outbreak, the military commander went to the Governor, told
him he was aware of the monarchist plan for a massacre and his complicity in this plot, and
threatened the Governor's life if massacres were to take place. The Governor apparently
collapsed and remained incapacitated until all danger of an outbreak had passed.
Meanwhile, the military patrolled the streets, with orders to arrest anyone who showed the
slightest signs of provocation. 205

ON April 14, the bloody massacre of the Armenians at Adana took place --several days after
the arrival of a member of the Sultan's personal guard. 206 Based on certain absolutely
reliable evidence, the Committee of Union and Progress later learned that the Sultan himself
had given the orders, that not only the Armenians, but all members of the local Committee
of Union and Progress had been targeted, and that the violence had originally been planned
for April 23. 207 As had happened elsewhere, Cevad Bey, the Governor of Adana,
remained aloof, thus letting the massacre plans of the monarchists take its course. He did
not even interfere to stop the tins of petroleum stored in the Government depots from being
taken out to set on fire the Armenian quarter of the city. 208 During the attack on the
Armenians, some seventeen thousand were massacred, while about nineteen hundred of the
attackers were killed by Armenians who tried to repel the attack. 209 Large sections of
Adana had been completely burned down by the mob. 210 The only satisfactory fact was
that the Moslem religious leaders of Adana immediately denounced the outrages and joined
with the Armenian Church leaders to show their sympathy with the victims, thus

206. William M. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey, p.130, p.136, and
p.205.
207. The testimony of Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin's wife, in William M. Ramsay, The Revolution in
Constantinople and Turkey, pp.182-183.
209. Ismail Hami Danismend, Sadr-i-azam Tevfik Pasa'nin Dosyasınaaki Resmi ve Hususi
preventing further massacres. \textsuperscript{211} Similar events also took place in closeby towns, Mersin and Tarsus, where Armenians were attacked and their neighbourhoods burned down by mobs provoked by \textit{agents provocateurs}. \textsuperscript{212} At Kozan and Maras, too, reactionary mobs had attacked the Armenians. \textsuperscript{213} [If the monarchists were thinking of Adana, it was highly likely that they had also had their minds directed to parts of Anatolia closer to the capital. \textsuperscript{214}] Whether Abdulhamid was involved in the massacres or not, in many cases it was more than likely that local governors knew what was coming and that, if they did not wholeheartedly approve, they were at least willing to look the other way. \textsuperscript{215} Others were reportedly paralyzed with fear.

Immediately after the \textit{coup} attempt on April 13, three \textit{agents provocateurs} disguised as \textit{hocas} arrived at Konya, and preaching in the mosques, urged people to make a holy war against the Christians. Though panic seized the town for several days, the population of Konya refused to rise, and actually arrested one of the \textit{hocas}, as he was preaching massacre in front of one of the mosques. \textsuperscript{216}

The Governor remained secluded in his house for six days, reportedly ill, allowing events to take their course. \textsuperscript{217} Hundreds of Armenian refugees gathered in the grounds of the British Consulate. \textsuperscript{218} With the help of the Celebi Efendi, an officer, who had been an exile of Abdülhamid's time, calmed the excited crowd and averted catastrophe. \textsuperscript{219} The Celebi Efendi, head of the Mevlevi dervishes, delivered a speech in which he declared that all men were the children of God; he urged the Turks not to rise against their brethren. \textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{211} Edwin Pears, "Turkey: Developments and Forecasts", p.708.
\textsuperscript{212} Sina Aksoy, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.145.
\textsuperscript{213} Sina Aksoy, \textit{31 Mart Olayi}, p.168.
\textsuperscript{214} William M. Ramsay, \textit{The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey}, p.130.
\textsuperscript{215} Francis McCullagh, \textit{The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid}, p.141.
\textsuperscript{216} William M. Ramsay, \textit{The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey}, pp.201-202.
\textsuperscript{217} William M. Ramsay, \textit{The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey}, p.201.
\textsuperscript{218} William M. Ramsay, \textit{The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey}, p.201.
In Kayseri, the attempt to start riot and massacre was prevented by the decided and energetic action of Cenal Bey, the Governor, who foiled the plans of the monarchists. 221

In various other towns order was maintained with more or less difficulty. That violence and massacre had been planned, and systematically preached by agents provocateurs, who either had or pretended to have a religious character as hocas and dressed accordingly, was beyond dispute. The almost simultaneous appearance of agents provocateurs throughout the provinces and the similarity of the circumstances indicated that everywhere a single plan was in execution, and most felt that the Palace was at the centre of it all. 222

The intention was obvious. The Unionists relied on Christian as much as they relied on Moslem political support. They had preached fraternity and equality, and denounced violence; their ideal was to bring about a unity of races and religions in a well-governed state. The violence organized by monarchists and the Yildiz Palace was designed to make this impossible. Had the plan come to fruition, the monarchists could have denounced the Unionist ideal as an empty dream, shown that the Committee of Union and Progress did not have the strength to establish its authority over Turkey, and righteously declared that the old regime was the only form of government which could preserve peace. 223

Chapter 9

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AND THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE UNIONISTS AND THE MONARCHIST FORCES

AFTER THE RESTORATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME, all power was virtually in the hands of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, though, at first, he did not exercise this power directly. Although he had ostensibly come from Salonica to protect the Constitution, Mahmud Sevket Pasha soon made it abundantly clear that he himself intended to be free of all constitutional checks. He also dissociated himself from the Committee of Union and Progress. In a communique he issued on May 3, Mahmud Sevket Pasha insisted on the army's entire independence of any political party, and stated that any officers who continued to be members of any political organisation would be dismissed from the army. On May 18, without precedent, he became the Inspector-General of the first three Army Corps. The position had clearly been created to meet the prevailing political situation; it placed Mahmud Sevket Pasha outside the Cabinet's authority, and this included that of the Minister of War.

Because all decisions were made under his personal supervision, the Committee of Union and Progress was almost powerless. Besides, the coup had left the Unionists'
entire Istanbul organization in disarray. Faced with the task of reconstruction, the Unionists were unable to really compete for direct power. Moreover, there was still opposition to the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress within the military. Even the Third Army Corps which had restored the constitutional regime at the cost of some lives contained elements which were not particularly pro-Unionist. This included some high level officers - notably, Mahmud Sevket Pasha himself. Thus, the position of the Unionists were quite shaky, although appearance suggested otherwise. This was publicly confirmed by a report published in the May 11 issue of Neues Wiener Tageblatt. According to the article, a prominent Unionist leader at Salonica had admitted during the course of an interview with an Austrian diplomat that most of the Unionist leadership considered the situation very dark and confused. The difficulty of the situation, as the prominent Unionist leader stated, lay in the fact that there was still secret agitation carried on by the supporters of the old regime.

The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, skillfully kept up the appearance of strength, if not dominance, and succeeded in convincing the public that both it and the constitutional regime enjoyed the full support of the military.

After the suppression of the coup the monarchists attempted once more to stay in power. Tevfik Pasha made some changes in his cabinet on April 29: he named Salih Pasha, the Commander of the Second Army Corps, Minister of War, Riza Pasha Minister of the Navy, Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, deputy for Nigde, Minister of Justice, and Cavid Bey,

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Bir Nazar, quoted in Mahmud Kemal Inal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1884; and, Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.48.
6. Halid Ziya Usakligil, Saray ve Ötesi, 1, p.44; and, Edwin Pears, "Turkey: Developments and Forecasts", p.718.
deputy for Salonica, Minister of Finance. Tevfik Pasha had named Ürgüplü Hayri and Cavid Beys, two Unionist deputies, ministers in his reconstituted cabinet without informing either of them. As the Committee of Union and Progress was against the retention of Tevfik Pasha, Ürgüplü Hayri and Cavid Beys immediately handed in their resignations, rejecting the positions offered in an attempt to force Tevfik Pasha leave office. Still trying to cling to power, Tevfik Pasha appointed Sabri Bey, a member of the Chamber, Minister of Justice. The Ministry of the Interior was offered to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who declined it, while the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Public Works and of Pious Foundations were unchanged. On April 30, he appointed Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, the ex-Grand Vezier under the old regime, Minister of the Interior.

Meanwhile, the Unionist leadership at Istanbul met and discussed the political situation on April 30. As the political climate, especially the opposition against the Committee of Union and Progress within the military, was not favourable for the formation of a Unionist cabinet at this juncture, the leadership decided to press for the appointment of either Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha or Hakki Bey as Grand Vezier, and the creation of under-secretaryships in the ministries to be filled with Unionist deputies. That same day, the Unionists prepared a cabinet list with Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha as Grand Vezier, Salih Pasha as Minister of War, Arif Hikmet Pasha as Minister of the Navy, Talat Bey as Minister of the Interior, Hakki Bey as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bedros Haladjian as Minister of Public Works, Cavid Bey as Minister of Finance, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın as Minister of Education, Ürgüplü Hayri Bey as Minister of Justice, Halil Hamada Pasha as Minister of

the Pious Foundations, and Aristidi Yorgandioglu Pasha as Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests. Though under a neutral Grand Vezier, this cabinet list was dominated by prominent Unionist deputies.\footnote{16} However, the monarchists had little intention of leaving the Grand Veziership to even a neutral person, such as Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Upon monarchist pressure, Tevfik Pasha was, once again, given the task to form a cabinet with an imperial decree dated May 1.\footnote{17} He appointed Galib Bey, a senator, as the new Minister of Justice, and Rifat Bey as the new Minister of Finance.\footnote{18} The list of ministers included monarchists and old regime pashas such as \textit{Avlonyali} Ferid Pasha as the new Minister of the Interior, Gabriel Nouradunghian as the new Minister of Commerce and Public Works, and Dimitraki Mavrocordato as the new Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests. Salih Pasha and Riza Pasha were retained as Minister of War and Minister of the Navy, respectively.\footnote{19}

The cabinet had a decidedly monarchist bent. Among the members of the new cabinet, Raif Pasha, the President of the Council of State, Ali Riza Pasha, the Minister of the Navy, and Dimitraki Mavrocordato, the Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests, were fierce opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress, who demanded the imprisonment of Unionists as soon as they took office.\footnote{20} \textit{Avlonyali} Ferid Pasha's appointment caused considerable discussion. Unionists held that his record, especially as Grand Vezier during the last year of the absolutist regime, was not of a character to inspire confidence in the nation.\footnote{21}

Naturally, the cabinet was opposed by the Committee of Union and Progress.

\footnotetext[16]{"The Situation in Turkey: Proposed Young Turk Cabinet", \textit{The Times}, May 1, 1909, p.7.}
\footnotetext[17]{The translation of the imperial decree can be found in "The Situation in Turkey: Rescript by Mahomed V", \textit{The Times}, May 3, 1909, p.7.}
\footnotetext[18]{"The Situation in Turkey: Rescript by Mahomed V", \textit{The Times}, May 3, 1909, p.7; and, "Le Cabinet Tevfik pacha", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, May 3, 1909, p.1.}
\footnotetext[20]{Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 9", \textit{Tanin}, September 7, 1943, p.2.}
\footnotetext[21]{"The Situation in Turkey: The New Ministry", \textit{The Times}, May 3, 1909, p.7.}
Many deputies expressed their dissatisfaction with the reconstituted Tevfik Pasha Cabinet, and it was obvious that it lacked the confidence of the majority of the Chamber.\textsuperscript{22} Even \textit{Yeni Gazete}, a monarchist daily, predicted that the new cabinet would fail to obtain a vote of confidence in the Chamber.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite Unionist opposition and the prevailing uncertainty, the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet proceeded to draw up a programme.\textsuperscript{24} On May 3, Tevfik Pasha tried to get help from the deputies in the Chamber for the drawing up of the programme but the Unionist deputies flatly refused to get involved with a monarchist cabinet.\textsuperscript{25} In fact, Ahmed Riza Bey, the President of the Chamber, echoing the sentiment in the Chamber, was insistent on the immediate resignation of the Tevfik Pasha Cabinet. Talat Bey, the Vice-President of the Chamber, conveyed the sentiment of the deputies to Tevfik Pasha through the intermediary of Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, making it clear that neither the Chamber nor the Committee of Union and Progress wanted to see Tevfik Pasha remain in power. After a joint meeting of the representatives of the Chamber on May 5 -Talat Bey, and Aristidis Yorgandioglu Pasha, the Second Vice-President of the Chamber- and the cabinet, Tevfik Pasha handed in his resignation.\textsuperscript{26}

Besides the names of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and Hakki Bey, the Unionist leadership had also circulated the name of Mahmud Sevket Pasha as a possible Grand Vezier. Actually, Talat Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, had already formally asked Mahmud Sevket Pasha to accept the grand veziership. Fearing that he might lose his prestige and influence within the army if he accepted a political position,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{22} "The Situation in Turkey: The New Ministry", \textit{The Times}, May 3, 1909, p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{24} "The Turkish Outlook: Position of the Government", \textit{The Times}, May 4, 1909, p.5; and, Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatiralari: 9", \textit{Tanin}, September 7, 1943, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatiralari: 9", \textit{Tanin}, September 7, 1943, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, \textit{Görüp Isittiklerim}, pp.40-41; "New Turkish Ministry: Composition of the Cabinet", \textit{The Times}, May 6, 1909, p.5; and, İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, \textit{Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadriaazamlar}, p.1712.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Mahmud Sevket Pasha declined the offer, suggesting, instead, the name of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha as a possible candidate for the grand veziership.\textsuperscript{27} When Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, too, declined the offer for similar reasons, the Unionists' choice fell on Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was re-appointed as Grand Vezier, as the Committee of Union and Progress had originally demanded.\textsuperscript{28}

HÜSEYN HILMI PASHA was appointed to the Grand Vezierate on May 5.\textsuperscript{29} Public sentiment was by now largely behind his re-appointment - indicating as it would that the coup had failed, but that the Constitution was back in force.\textsuperscript{30} However, the Cabinet members remained mostly unchanged: Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha retained Raif Pasha, President of the Council of State, Rifat Bey, Minister of Finance, Rifat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Salih Pasha, Minister of War, Gabriel Nouradunghian, Minister of Commerce and Public Works, Halil Hamada Pasha, Minister of Pious Foundations, and Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, Minister of the Interior, who was intimately connected with the old regime.\textsuperscript{31}

Aristidis Yorgandjioglou Pasha replaced monarchist Dimitraki Mavrocordato as the new Minister of Agriculture, Mines, and Forests; Nail Bey replaced Abdurrahman Bey as the

\textsuperscript{27} Colmar Von der Goltz, "Erinnerungen an Mahmud Schewket Pascha", \textit{Deutsche Rundschau}, October-December 1913, p.198, quoted in Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, pp.75-76.

\textsuperscript{28} Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.75; "Le nouveau Cabinet", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, May 6, 1909, p.1; and Tevfik Pasha's statement, in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal Inal, \textit{Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar}, pp.1712-1713.

\textsuperscript{29} The imperial decree announcing Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's appointment as Grand Vezier is dated Rebiulahir 15, 1327/April 22, 1325/May 5, 1909. The text of the decree can be found in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal Inal, \textit{Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar}, p.1671.

\textsuperscript{30} "New Turkish Ministry", \textit{The Times}, May 6, 1909, p.5; and, Cemal Kutay, \textit{Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi}, 17, pp.9543-9544.

\textsuperscript{31} Halid Ziya Usakligil, \textit{Saray ve Ötesi}, 1, pp.80-81; and Ali Fuad Türkgedli, \textit{Görüp Isittiklerim}, p.40. See also, Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim}, 2, p.399.

new Minister of Education; and, Arif Hikmet Pasha replaced Riza Pasha as the new Minister of the Navy. Sahib Molla was appointed Sheik-ul-Islam. His appointment was widely approved. He commanded very general respect and liking, and the disfavour with which he had been regarded by the Palace during the last years of Abdülhamid's reign bore testimony to the liberalism of his opinions. When Hakki Bey, Ambassador at Rome, refused the post of the Ministry of Justice, it was offered to Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, Unionist deputy for Nigde and Chairman of the Judicial Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. However, monarchist opposition effectively blocked his appointment. Thereupon, Necmeddin Kocatas, the Governor of Baghdad who was a capable official, was appointed to the post on May 17, and thus replaced Galib Bey as the new Minister of Justice. Despite these changes, and the appointment of Cavid Bey as Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the reconstituted Cabinet of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was not totally devoid of monarchist Ministers who had come into power by the coup of April 13.

Though previously supreme and unchallenged, the coup had also left the Committee of Union and Progress weakened in the Chamber. Supported by the military, those deputies who opposed the Unionists had begun a campaign to discredit them by blaming the coup on their "irresponsible" behaviour. The tactic of blaming the coup on its victims proved largely successful, so much so that there would have been considerable opposition both within the military as well as monarchist circles had the Committee of Union and Progress remained intact.

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37. Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrîne Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 9", Tanin, September 7, 1943, p.2. Tevfik Çavdar, citing the monarchist criticism of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, mistakenly assumes that this Cabinet was really dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress (Tevfik Çavdar, Talat Pasa: Bir Örgüt Ustasinin Yasam Öyküsü, p.160).
Progress openly asked for positions in the new Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet.\(^{38}\)

Nonetheless, the Committee of Union and Progress was displeased with the new Cabinet, principally with the fact that all of its members had been chosen from among the "experienced" and decorated pashas. Although these had supposedly been selected for their personal integrity and ministerial competence, their high positions in the old regime made their commitment to the Revolution's political and economic reform programme somewhat dubious. After all, deep down, these pashas were monarchists.\(^{39}\) By May 16, it had become clear that only about one hundred and fifty deputies had promised their votes for Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Although this number was quite sufficient for the vote of confidence, it was significant that the Grand Vezier was opposed by part of the Committee of the Union and Progress, who accused him of having shown culpable weakness on April 13 --an accusation to which Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had already replied at length in the Turkish press.\(^{40}\)

On May 24, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha appeared before the Chamber to present his programme and ask for a vote of confidence. The programme was similar in essentials to that which he had laid before the Chamber when he was first appointed Grand Vezier. With regard to the state of the interior, after declaring that strict application of the law in the case of the reactionary agitators who caused the outbreak in the capital would be indispensable, he pointed out that the disturbances at Adana were brought about by the same reactionary forces. The state of siege proclaimed at Adana was extended by order of the government to Maras and Antakya. He added that the Governor of Adana and the Sub-Governor of Çebeli Bereket had been relieved of their posts on account of failure to do their duties. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha also informed the Chamber that a scheme for the thorough reorganisation of

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the police and gendarmerie had been adopted, and was beginning to be applied. He concluded his statement with a review of the legislative enactments under consideration, among which he specially mentioned the laws concerning the press and public meetings, which he hoped the Chamber would pass without loss of time. 41

Following his statement, the Committee of Union and Progress deputies made their displeasure clear. 42 Though he came under heavy attack, the Chamber finally approved his cabinet by a vote of one hundred and ninety to five. There were several abstentions. The result was not unexpected. The necessity for supporting the only possible cabinet left when once the idea of appointing ministers from the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress was excluded, was so obvious as to diminish its importance as a sign of the real feeling of the Chamber. 43 Some suggested that Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the threat of a complete military takeover had forced the Chamber to support the new cabinet. 44

The press in general accepted the programme of the government with satisfaction, if without great enthusiasm, and expressed the hope that it would be rapidly carried out. The disappointments of the preceding month had undoubtedly caused its reception to be less enthusiastic than would otherwise have been the case. 45 Tanin, however, lost no time in criticising the new Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın began the attack in late May, describing the current situation as a war between the old and the new, between the forces of conservatism and those of progress. After the Revolution of 1908, he said, the old regime's bureaucrats had been allowed to retain their hold on nation's management, a mistake that had almost lost the nation its Constitution. 46 In another editorial, he argued

42. "Heyet-i Vükela'nin Programı", Tanin, May 12, 1325/May 25, 1909, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.50.
44. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.50.
that it was foolish to expect a political cadre which had opposed the Constitution from the very start to overcome the barriers to a fully liberal democratic regime. This task, he stated, could only be entrusted to those young partisans of the Revolution who had risked their lives for the Constitution. He added that the existing cabinet was not one which would carry out the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress.  

Gabriel Nouradunghian, Minister of Commerce and Public Works in the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, defended the monarchist position. In an interview with the editor of La Turquie, he began by criticising the procedure by which the cabinet was formed. In his view, the selection of Ministers from among members of the Chamber, subject to Chamber's approval, had the drawback of making the cabinet "dependent" on the Parliament. Clearly, this position was tantamount to advocating the restoration of the absolutist regime whereby the Sultan alone appointed and dismissed the Ministers. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın countered the monarchists' arguments, vehemently defending the principle of representative government, responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and not to the whims of an absolute monarch.  

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SUPPRESSION OF THE COUP ATTEMPT, the government, prevailed upon by the Third Army Corps and the Committee of Union and Progress, started arresting those suspected of instigating the events. The pursuit of Hamidiyan spies and reactionaries continued with unabated vigour. A Court Martial was established in Istanbul, which began trying the counter-revolutionaries who had been arrested after the


48. The Interview was excerpted in Tanin, May 19, 1325/June 1, 1909 (Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 5 (October 26, 1935-April 18, 1936), p.375).


Third Army Corps had captured the capital.  

One of the first acts of the Court Martial was the trial of thirteen leaders of the mutiny, one a major on the retired list and thirteen belonging to the Fourth Battalion of Chasseurs. Found guilty as charged, they were sentenced to death, and were hanged in public on the morning of May 3. Two military officers, Major Mehmed Ferid, of the Selimiye Barracks at Istanbul, and Adjutant Major Mehmed Namik were sentenced by the Court Martial to expulsion from the army and five years' hard labour. Another trial that took place on May 3 was of the murderers of Ali Kabuli Bey, the Commander of the ironclad *Asar-i Tevfik*, who had been killed while trying to stop the mob at Besiktas. The condemned men, who were all sentenced to death, included sailors, marines, a military imam, and a sub-lieutenant attached to the torpedo factory. Their executions also took place in public on May 12. On May 17, two "ranker" officers and three policemen who were found guilty of mutiny on April 13 were hanged in public.

The Court Martial, at its May 3 sitting, did not give judgement in the case of Murad Bey, editor of *Mizan*. Described by the foreign press as a monarchist infiltrator in the Committee of Union and Progress and a secret agent working for Sultan Abdülhamid, Murad Bey was accused of trying to incite people against the constitutional regime and thus preparing the ground for a civil war. He was one of the few leaders of the coup who could not escape from Istanbul when the attempt had failed, and, consequently, he had

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been arrested on April 24.\(^{59}\)

He defended himself in court on May 31.\(^{60}\) In his defence, despite evidence to the contrary, he denied any foreknowledge of or involvement with the coup attempt. He even denied the role his newspaper Mizan played, despite the fact that his editorialis clearly supported the coup and the restoration of the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid.\(^{61}\) A day later, totally unconvinced by Murad Bey’s defence, the Court Martial found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to exile for life in Rhodes.\(^{62}\) On June 19, along with sixty-three other monarchists found guilty on charges of attempting to overthrow the constitutional regime, he was put on board a ship bound for Rhodes.\(^{63}\)

Sabah of May 7 printed the contents of a journal written by Ali Kemal Bey, editor-in-chief of Ikdam, in which he assured the Sultan that he was always a faithful servant, and that in western Europe and Egypt he had informed him of the Unionist activities.\(^{64}\) Additional journals of Ali Kemal Bey were published in the Sabah of May 17.\(^{65}\)

On May 6, Ahmed Fazli Tung, editor of Osmanli and one of the most prominent figures of the monarchist opposition headed by Prince Sabahaddin, was arrested.\(^{66}\) On June 3, he was brought before the Court Martial. He was acquitted the same day, and was permitted to resume publication of Osmanli.\(^{67}\) Leaving Turkey for the summer months, he


\(^{60}\) Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, "Mizanci Mehmed Murad Bey", p.87.

\(^{61}\) The text of his defence can be found in Mehmed Murad, Tatlı Emeller, Aci Hakikatler (İstanbul, 1330 [1914]), pp.359-369, reproduced in full in Birol Emil, Mizanci Murad Bey: Hayati ve Eserleri, pp.213-219.


\(^{64}\) "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, May 7, 1909, p.1.


\(^{66}\) "Une arrestation", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, May 7, 1909, p.2.

\(^{67}\) "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, June 4, 1909, p.1.
returned to Istanbul on September 28. 68

The Court Martial authorities issued a proclamation concerning the monarchist newspaper proprietors and editors who had fled the country when the coup attempt failed. 69 Ahmed Cevdet Bey, proprietor of Ikdam, Ali Kemal Bey, editor of Ikdam, Dervis Vahdeti, proprietor of Volkan, and Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, proprietor of Serbesti, who were all accused of being the principal organisers as well as inciters of the coup attempt, were granted a delay of ten days to appear before the Court Martial. If they failed to appear within the specified time period, they would automatically be considered outlaws, tried by default, and their properties would be confiscated. 70 Meanwhile, the Court Martial, at its May 26 sitting, sentenced Ömer Lütfi Bey, one of the editors of Volkan, to death. 71

The Court Martial proceeded to hand down judgements on the monarchist newspaper proprietors and editors on July 18, after it became apparent that they had no intention of coming back to Turkey to face the Court. At the July 19 sitting of the Court Martial, Ahmed Cevdet Bey, the proprietor of Ikdam, was acquitted of all charges. 72 Cleared of all charges, Ahmed Cevdet Bey and his wife arrived at Istanbul from Vienna on August 5. He announced his intention of resuming Ikdam's publication. 73

However, Ali Kemal Bey, the editor of Ikdam, was sentenced, in absentia, to banishment from Istanbul for having worked in the interests of Abdülhamid, the deposed Sultan. 74 Having already escaped from the country, Ali Kemal Bey began publication of a newspaper in exile. This paper, Yeni Yol, was prohibited to be circulated in Turkey by a

decision of the cabinet taken on November 15.75

On July 21, the Court Martial sentenced Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, editor of Serbesti, in absentia, to ten years' banishment from Istanbul.76 During the trials of other defendants, documents had been produced, establishing the fact that Mevlanzade Rifat Bey had, on one occasion, taken the considerable sum of seventy liras from Abdülhamid as compensation for his monarchist agitation in the columns of Serbesti.77 On August 10, the government forbid the circulation in Turkey of Serbesti which was being published first in Cairo and after July 27 in Paris by Mevlanzade Rifat Bey with the financial support of Serif Pasha.78 The Court Martial further announced that persons caught selling or buying Serbesti would be liable to pay a fine of two to fifteen liras. The Court Martial decision had been taken on account of the persistence of Serbesti in its monarchist propaganda against the constitutional rule. Serbesti had printed that the government was an organ of oppression operating under the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that the sentences handed down by the Court Martial were in contradiction to constitutional law.79

Meanwhile, the Court Martial also took action against the old regime pashas who had already been found guilty and been exiled immediately after the Revolution. On the morning of May 17, Merduh Pasha, the ex-Minister of the Interior under the old regime, was arrested at the Prinkipo Islands, where he had been exiled, and was taken to the Ministry of War.80 On May 23, the Court Martial decided to degrade him as well as the

77. The journal of Hüseyin Tayyar, quoted in full in Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.394.
other pashas of the old regime, send them to exile for five years, and confiscate their properties. The Court Martial had discovered proofs of their complicity in reactionary intrigues since their exile to the Prinkipo Islands off the coast of Istanbul. These sentences applied, among others, to ex-Ministers who had, immediately after the Revolution, been accused of misappropriating public funds. It was expected that similar judgement would be passed on Izzet Pasha, the ex-Chamberlain, Selim Melhame, and Necib Melhame. The government also banned the distribution of *Moayyad*, the organ of the monarchist Egyptians, within Turkey, as its editor and proprietor, Sheikh Ali Yusuf, was believed to be in close communication with Izzet Pasha, whose agents were reported to be active in the Arab world.

The pashas in question, Tahsin, Mehmed Riza, Ragib, Ahmed Ratib, Sadeddin, Resid, and Ismail, in addition to Memduh, were taken from Prinkipo on the night of May 24 and imprisoned at the Ministry of War. All lost their right to a pension. On May 26, Mahmud Sevket Pasha announced that the old regime pashas at Prinkipo would be exiled to Lemnos, Bodrum, Mytilene, Pias, and Scio. Their departure from Istanbul was affected without delay; on the night of May 27, they were put on a ship to take them to their places of exile. Tahsin Pasha, the ex-First Secretary to the Sultan, Memduh Pasha, the ex-Minister of the Interior, and Resid Pasha, the ex-Prefect of Istanbul, would reside at Scio; Riza Pasha, the ex-Minister of War at Mytilene; Rami Pasha, the ex-Minister of the Navy, Zeki Pasha, the ex-Grand Master of Ordnance, Ahmed Ratib Pasha, the ex-Governor-General of the Hedjaz, and Saadeddin Pasha, the ex-Commander of the First Division of the Guard, at Rhodes; Ismail Pasha, the ex-Inspector-General of Military Schools at

Bodrum; and, Ragib Pasha, ex-Chamberlain to the Sultan, at Cos. 85

At his interrogation by the Court Martial on May 8, Nadir Agha, a palace official who was also a defendant, had told the Court Martial authorities that Dervis Vahdeti's editorials in Volkan had pleased Abdülhamid. Nadir Agha went on to say that the Sultan had given Dervis Vahdeti a considerable sum of money for his services, as well as a monthly stipend for the publication of Volkan. 86

Dervis Vahdeti who was a fugitive was finally arrested at Izmir in late May. 87 During the last days of the coup, when it had become apparent that it would fail, he had first gone to Admiral Said Pasha, Kamil Pasha's son and one of the organisers of the coup, for help. When he could not find refuge in the Palace of Prince Vahideddin, he took the train to Gebze. From there he proceeded over land to Bergama, and then to Izmir. 88 In Izmir, he was informed to the authorities, and was arrested. 89 On May 30, he was brought back to Istanbul under police escort, and was imprisoned at the Ministry of War. 90 In his interrogation, Dervis Vahdeti confessed, and admitted that he had been to the palace where he had taken money from Abdülhamid for the services he rendered in his Volkan for the monarchist cause. 91 His trial continued until early July. Finally, the Court Martial sentenced him to death on July 6. 92

At its July 19 sitting, the Court Martial also notified Said Pasha, Kamil Pasha's son, who was accused of having been one of the principal instigators of the coup attempt of April 13, that he must surrender himself within ten days for trial. If not, he would be

condemned by default and suffer the loss of civil rights and the confiscation of his property. A similar warning was also sent to Niyazi Efendi, ex-deputy for Diyarbakir. However, neither Said Pasha nor Niyazi Efendi was expected to put in an appearance. 93

By May 4, Yusuf Pasha, the Military Commander of Erzurum, was ordered to resign his command and proceed to the headquarters of the Fourth Army Corps at Erzincan. 94 Later, he was brought to Istanbul to face charges. The May 19 issue of Tanin published a letter from Erzurum which declared that the responsibility for the military outbreak there in connection with the coup attempt of April 13 must be assigned to Yusuf Pasha. 95 The Court Martial sentenced Yusuf Pasha to death on account of his support for the monarchist coup. 96

On the morning of July 19, thirteen persons sentenced to death were executed at Bayezid, Sultan Ahmed Square, and Fati̇h. Among them were Yusuf Pasha, the Military Commander of Erzurum, Cerkes Sevket Mehmed Pasha, Dervis Vahdeti, Colonel Nuri Bey, Hakki Bey, a notorious spy, and Colonel Ismail Bey. Cerkes Sevket Mehmed Pasha, popularly known as Kabasakal, i.e., "twisted beard", was a torturer and former aide-de-camp of Abdüllhamid. 97

At the May 1 sitting of the Chamber of Deputies a lively debate had taken place on the Armenian massacres at Adana. Mehmed Cevad Bey, Governor of Adana during the disturbances, and the Assistant Minister of the Interior had been violently attacked and stigmatized as creatures of the Hamidian regime. Finally, after an agitated sitting, a resolution had been passed almost unanimously in favour of the formation of a Court Martial at Adana to try the guilty parties and of dispatching a parliamentary commission of

inquiry and sending immediately a sum of twenty thousand liras to relieve the distress at Adana. The Court Martial which proceeded to Adana on May 6 to try those guilty of the massacres had been formed of officers of the Third Army Corps. In an interview published in the May 14 issue of *Turquie*, Mahmud Sevket Pasha declared that ten battalions of trustworthy troops of the Second and Third Army Corps had been sent to Adana, where the Court Martial had been ordered to inflict the death sentence on persons found guilty of murder and incitement to riot.

The May 24 issue of *Tanin* printed an interview with Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, Minister of the Interior, who informed the public that several soldiers who had taken part in the Armenian massacres in Cilicia had been arrested. Nine persons had already been condemned to death by the Adana Court Martial. With regard to the responsibility for the outbreak, the Minister said that, while he could not definitely ascribe it to official promptings, certain officials had failed to do their duties, among them the Sub-Governor of Cebel-i Bereket, who had been imprisoned pending an inquiry into his conduct. Avlonyali Ferid Pasha declared that the government had made up its mind to discover the criminals and to inflict on them the most severe punishment. His statement, however, was not entirely satisfactory. His desire to satisfy the public would be more likely to be crowned with success were steps taken to inquire into the conduct of Mehemd Cevad Bey, the ex-Governor of Adana, whose conduct throughout the massacres could only be ascribed to complicity. The mere dismissal of this official was hardly a sufficient punishment for having left Adana for more than a week the prey of monarchist agitators and mutineed soldiers.

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On July 15, the government decided to try the ex-Governor of Adana, and the ex-Sub-Governor of Cebel-i Bereket. They were sent to Adana under a strong escort to face the Court Martial there. In addition, some twenty leading Moslem notables of Adana who had already been arrested would be immediately brought before the Court Martial.\(^{103}\)

In its report, the Court Martial appointed to inquire into the massacres at Adana found that various causes led to excessive animosity between Christians and Moslems. It dwelt on the incapacity and lack of energy displayed by the Governor, while other local authorities were also censured. The report concluded that, in addition to fifteen people who had been already hanged, eight hundred deserved death, fifteen thousand deserved hard labour for life, and eighty thousand deserved minor sentences.\(^{104}\)

The Court Martial at Adana sentenced Mehmed Cevad Bey, the ex-Governor of Adana, to suspension from public service for six years on account of his complicity with the monarchists who had organised and carried out the Armenian massacres.\(^{105}\) His connections with the Palace went as far back as 1889, when he had entered the Yildiz Palace as imperial secretary and worked there for eleven years before being appointed Sub-Governor of Jerusalem in 1901, and, later, Governor of Ankara, Konya, and Adana.\(^{106}\) Remzi Pasha, the ex-Military Commander of Adana, was also sentenced to three years' imprisonment.\(^{107}\) The trial by Court Martial at Antakya of the persons implicated in the massacres resulted in about fifteen of those accused being sentenced to death. In addition, a number of notables were exiled.\(^{108}\)

Meanwhile, Ismail Kemal Bey, the monarchist deputy for Berat who had been deeply involved in the *coup* attempt and had escaped after its failure, remained in Athens.

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during May. Due to constant representations to the Greek Government by the Turkish Government concerning Ismail Kemal Bey's stay in Greece, he was forced to leave Athens for Corfu in early June. Some forty fugitives belonging to his party were disarmed and interned by the authorities upon landing at Corfu. He was not expected to stay at Corfu for long. However, his return to his native town of Avlona had been rendered impossible owing to measures taken against him there. 109 Therefore, he left for Rome.

At the Chamber of Deputies' July 8 sitting, Mahmud Sevket Pasha made a formal demand for the surrender of Ismail Kemal Bey on account of the discovery of papers bearing his signature in the house of a person who had been condemned and of the seizure of letters, in which the Albanian deputy for Berat made an uncomplimentary reference to several of the Unionist leaders and described the Court Martial as "executioners". Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülcine, read the report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry into the conduct of the deputy in question. In an eloquent speech, he declared that the commission found no proof of the allegation that Ismail Kemal Bey provoked or attempted to profit by the coup attempt of April 13. All that could be said was that he appeared to have felt personal satisfaction at the overthrow of his political opponents. Even this statement was challenged by one of the Arab deputies, who said that he had seen Ismail Kemal Bey moved to tears by the events which accompanied the outbreak. After a long discussion, a large majority voted that Ismail Kemal Bey should not be given up to the military tribunals in the absence of all proof of guilt. Thus the Chamber acquitted him as well as Müifid Bey, another monarchist Albanian deputy for Argyrocastro who had escaped from Istanbul at about the same time. The result was joyfully received by the Albanian deputies. 110

Ali Haydar Bey, another prominent anti-Unionist working with Prince Sabahaddin,

110. "Turkey: The Chamber and Ismail Kemal Bey", The Times, July 9, 1909, p.5; and, "Ismail Kemal Bey Innocent", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 9, 1909, p.1.
arrived at Istanbul on July 13. He had escaped to Paris after the coup attempt had failed.

EXCLUDED FROM CABINET-LEVEL OFFICE, the Committee of Union and Progress devised a reform plan which would rely less on the cabinet and more on those responsible for the nation's day to day management; the Unionists hoped to gain those key management positions in the Ministries not just for its own adherents, but specifically for its deputies, which was unheard of. By placing Unionist deputies in the various Ministries as Under-Secretaries, the Unionists hoped to influence the cabinet indirectly. Already the Unionists had secured their position in the Palace with the appointment of Halid Ziya Usakligil as First Secretary and Tevfik Bey as Second Chamberlain. The Under-Secretaries were expected to serve a similar though more important function with respect to the cabinet.

The Unionist leadership discussed its plan, and on May 6, Cavid and Talat Beys met with Mahmud Sevket Pasha in the hopes of gaining his support. He summarily dismissed the idea. They then went to see Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha whose response was no less discouraging. He particularly objected to the idea of effectively giving under-secretaries cabinet-level influence, unprecedented as it was in any nation. The Unionist leadership interpreted this resistance as the resistance of the old regime, dedicated as it was to monopolizing political power. The monarchist members of the cabinet, especially

113. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.50.
Gabriel Nouradunghian, Raif Pasha, and the Sheik-ul-Islam were also vehemently opposed to the idea. 117 Monarchist resistance in general gained momentum with Mahmud Sevket Pasha's resistance. Publicly, he still supported the Committee of Union and Progress; privately, he did everything he could to stop them --particularly on this issue. 118

Discouraged but undaunted, the Committee of Union and Progress decided to take the matter before the Chamber. If deputies were to be allowed to hold the office of Under-Secretary, Article 67 of the Constitution would have to be modified. This article stated that a deputy could not hold any other government appointment. 119 Amendments to the Constitution required a two-thirds majority in the Chamber, a majority which the Unionist theoretically had. But the Committee of Union and Progress itself was divided. Some opposed the idea of having Unionist deputies hold two positions on the grounds that it would risk offending public opinion; the Committee of Union and Progress would be viewed not as patriotic, but as power-hungry. 120 The leadership tried to consolidate control over its deputies by officially forming, on June 12, the Parliamentary Party of Union and Progress. Some within the Committee of Union and Progress, however, felt that this was largely a concession to those critics who claimed that the party was still some sort of a secret organisation. 121

The proposal for the Amendment of Article 67 was presented to the Chamber of Deputies on June 1. 122 Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha read the modified version of the Article and then submitted the text to the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution. On June 12,
the issue came up for discussion. Though debate was long and heated, the proposal was finally put to the vote by open ballot. It passed. When Ahmed Riza Bey, President of the Chamber, announced that the motion had been accepted by a majority, however, there was an uproar. Several deputies demanded a second vote by ballot, and the President acquiesced. Because the result of the vote was one hundred and thirteen for and seventy-four against, and not a two-thirds majority, the question was left undecided. On June 17, discussion was again re-opened, but opposition was still too strong, and Talat Bey withdrew the motion on behalf of the Committe of Union and Progress.

Having failed to amend the Constitution, the Unionists decided to simplify their strategy: They decided to push directly for Cabinet positions. The policy of moderation and coexistence with the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet was thus brought to an end. At the same time, measures were taken to enforce unity and discipline within its parliamentary party group as its defeat in the Chamber was largely the result of internal dissension.

CAVID BEY, one of the most prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and deputy for Salonica, was the first real Unionist in a cabinet office, joining the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet in late June as Minister of Finance. Rifat Bey, Minister of Finance had, in fact, resigned, stating that Cavid Bey was infinitely more qualified for the job.

123. Takvim-i Vekayi, June 9, 1325/June 22, 1909, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.52.
125. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.52.
127. Manyasizade Refik Bey had been the first Unionist to be named Minister; he had been appointed Minister of Justice on ? (Tanık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.177). He was not, however, to be in the Ministry for long, as he died shortly after taking office, in March of 1909.
Indeed, reporter to the Budget Commission, Cavid Bey's activity in the Chamber and in parliamentary committee was one of the most encouraging features of the first session of the Chamber of Deputies. He was certainly one of the ablest of the younger men who had come to the front since the Revolution of 1908. He had been rapidly joining the necessary practical training to a sound theoretical education in economics and finance, and it was expected that his honesty, energy, and oratorical gifts would carry him far. His appointment to the Ministry was received with general satisfaction, and was of special significance in that he was the first leading member of the Committee of Union and Progress who had accepted cabinet rank. 128

By July 1909, the Unionists began to consider the possibility of ousting the government out of office by a vote of non-confidence, and setting up a new one with a more pronounced Unionist presence. They secretly approached Kamil Pasha and offered him the Grand Vezirate on just this condition -Talat Bey; in particular, was to be named Minister of the Interior. Though he did not reject the proposal, Kamil Pasha let it be known that he did not consider the Unionist candidates worthy of ministerial consideration. The matter was dropped. 129

The Unionists had also begun to attack the Cabinet in the press. The Tanin of July 20 accused it of containing members attached to the old regime, and demanded that the Government be handed over to the active, honourable, and trustworthy men of the new regime. 130 Three days later, on the first anniversary of the Revolution, the Central Committee in Salonica issued a proclamation, stating that as Ottomans, all factions should put away their differences in the interests of the nation as a whole. Declaring that the

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administration of the country was in hands which showed themselves weak on April 13, citizens were urged to push for a new and younger cabinet, as only youthful vitality and enterprise could save the country from the tradition of the old regime. Yet, at a meeting held on July 26 to discuss cabinet change, it turned out that the Unionist deputies were divided on the issue. Ultimately, it was decided to have a secret vote. The vote showed that the majority of the Committee of Union and Progress was in favour of the maintenance of the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet for the time being. Nevertheless, party leadership continued working to get rid of some of the cabinet members.

By the end of July, there remained little doubt that there would be major changes in the cabinet. It was expected that Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha would resign and would be requested to form a new cabinet which would be still more strongly Unionist than the existing one. Avlonyali Ferid Pasha would certainly be replaced by Talat Bey. Rifat Pasha, who had accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs with reluctance, was expected to retire. In the opinion of many competent observers Gabriel Nouradunghian would probably not be included in the next cabinet.

The August 3 issue of Tanin published what purported to be a secret report transmitted by Avlonyali Ferid Pasha to Yildiz Palace. As a result of Unionist pressure, Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, whose name was intimately connected with the old regime, was forced to resign his post on August 5 as Minister of the Interior. His resignation was precipitated by the attacks in the press, and the unconcealed mistrust of Hüseyin Hilmi

Pasha and his colleagues in the cabinet. His tenure of office was only remarkable for certain appointments, which were not believed to be entirely due to his initiative, of Unionists to provincial governorships, and his determined but unsuccessful attempt to stifle the inquiry into the Adana massacres.  

Talat Bey, who was on a state visit to London, was immediately named his successor. He had won golden opinions as Vice-President of the Chamber of deputies, and was among the recognised leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. This was a crucial step for the Committee of Union and Progress, and most felt the appointment boded for the eventual establishment of a fully liberal democratic regime.

The successful campaign against Avlonaly Ferid Pasha encouraged the Unionists to put pressure, this time, on Gabriel Nouradunghian, another monarchist cabinet member. *Tanin* published highly critical editorials against both his decidedly monarchist political philosophy and his conduct in the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works. Thereupon, Gabriel Nouradunghian brought a law suit against Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın. Nouradunghian's lawyer was Krikor Zohrab, the anti-Unionist deputy for Istanbul, while Yalçın was defended by Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Unionist deputy for Kastamonu. On September 2, three ministers threatened to resign unless Gabriel Nouradunghian resigned the portfolio of Commerce and Public Works. It was an open secret that Nouradunghian had for some time past failed to gain the confidence of some of his

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142. "Dissensions in the Turkish Cabinet", *The Times*, September 3, 1909, p.3.
colleagues in the cabinet. The efforts made to bring about an understanding between the Minister of Commerce and Public Works and his colleagues having failed, Nouradunghian's resignation was regarded in Unionist circles as certain to take place shortly. While the law suit was still being tried at the court, Nouradunghian was forced to resign on September 8, thus averting a cabinet crisis. He was immediately succeeded by Bedros Haladjian, a pro-Unionist Armenian deputy for Istanbul. Haladjian was a young man, a lawyer, and had been educated in Europe. He was legal advisor to the Public Debt Administration, and he had succeeded Cavid Bey as reporter of the Budget Committee. In his part, Yalçın was acquitted on the charge of libel, but was fined five liras for having used insulting language against Nouradunghian.

SUMMER RECESS OVER, the Parliament convened on November 15. There was considerable opposition to Ahmed Riza Bey's re-election as President of the Chamber. On November 12, one hundred and ten deputies of the Committee of Union and Progress had unanimously decided to support the re-election of Ahmed Riza Bey. As some twenty-five other deputies who were still absent from the capital had pledged their support, his re-election could be regarded as certain. Indeed, the Unionist leadership managed to rally its deputies, and he was re-elected with a comfortable majority.

143. "Turkish Cabinet Dissensions", The Times, September 4, 1909, p.3.
144. "Turkey: The Cabinet Dissensions", The Times, September 6, 1909, p.4.
146. "Gabriel Effendi Nouradunghian", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 9, 1909, p.1; "Turkey: Change in the Cabinet", The Times, September 9, 1909, p.3; and, Ali Fuad Türkeldi, Görüp Isittiklerim, p.44. Haladjian's appointment was heavily criticised by members of the anti-Unionist opposition (Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, 2, p.327).
149. "The Turkish Chamber", The Times, November 13, 1909, p.5.
The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress had already made party cohesion and unity a priority. Now, with a battle possibly in the offing, unity only seemed that much more important. Following the establishment of the Parliamentary Party in the Chamber of Deputies, the Unionist leadership urged its members to act in unison on matters of importance before the Chamber. Before the Second Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress took place in October, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın presented the positions of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Parliamentary Party Group in the columns of Tanin, reiterated the need for unity and discipline, and pointed out that those deputies who had been elected under the Unionist ticket were bound to support its programme. To those who could not, he suggested they make up their own programme and form a separate party.151

Prompted by rumours of the establishment of an opposition party, i.e., the Moderate Liberals, the Committee of Union and Progress announced that it would welcome at least one other party in the Chamber, adding that the existence of a visible opposition functioning within the principles of a constitutional liberal regime could only strengthen the existing regime.152

The announcement had partly to do with the fact that Unionists felt increasingly uncomfortable with the presence of the military in political life. Ever since the restoration of constitutional order in late April, the military had been intricately involved in politics, criticising the Unionists for having participated in the political affairs of the country. With the object of allaying the concerns of the military with respect to Unionist intentions in the editorial columns of Tanin first by announcing on September 26 that the Committee of Union and Progress had transformed itself into a parliamentary group in the Chamber of


deputies, and, a day later, on September 27, by informing the public that the Committee of Union and Progress had no desire to work as a political party, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın had tried to pacify the opposition against the Unionists with the information that the Committee and its provincial branches would work as a cultural club dedicated to social work and promotion of education.\(^{153}\)

Having made these declarations, the leadership decided to tackle the problem head on during the annual congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in October of 1909. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın wrote that although the army had valiantly defended the Constitution, further intervention was unnecessary now that the constitutional regime was firmly re-established. He warned that continued interference could be harmful both for the state as well as for military discipline, adding that in the future soldiers would not be accepted as members of the Committee of Union and Progress and its clubs, nor would they be allowed any other connection. Finally, the article expressed the conviction that officers, although they would not be allowed to become members, would continue supporting the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress.\(^{154}\) Thus, while the Committee of Union and Progress desired to keep the senior officers out of politics, it expected junior officers continue supporting the party.

In addition, the Committee of Union and Progress hoped to minimize the role of the Sultan in political affairs by emphasizing the restricted role of a monarch in a constitutional monarchy. During a state reception given by the Sultan, the Unionist deputies refused to kiss the hem of his robe, making it clear that they would not take a subservient role to the monarch.\(^{155}\)

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155. Tanin, October 6, 1325/October 19, 1909, quoted in Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet
THE FIRST FORMAL COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY OPPOSITION PARTY to appear after the coup was the Moderate Liberals, or the Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Firkası. By August, the anti-Unionist opposition had already begun organising -for the first time since the counter-revolutionary coup attempt was suppressed. There were press reports that Lütfi Fikri Bey and Gümülcineli Ismail Bey were preparing to head this opposition in the Chamber. Dr. Riza Nur was also actively working to organise the opposition party in the Chamber. Around September, monarchist Damad Ferid Pasha had invited Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, Dr. Riza Nur and Lütfi Fikri Bey to discuss the possibility of establishing a formal monarchist opposition in the parliament. The decision to establish a monarchist party having been taken during this and the following meetings, Dr. Riza Nur first contacted the Arab deputies. Their leader, Abd al-Hamid Zohrawi, deputy for Hama, first, declared that they preferred to remain as an Arab bloc opposed to the Unionists, without joining with other monarchists in the Chamber. Later, however, they decided to join in with Riza Nur group.

The monarchists also held talks with Colonel Sadik Bey, a military figure within the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress who was believed to have considerable following in the army. Despite the clandestine nature of the talks with Colonel Sadik Bey, the Unionist leadership learned of these meetings. The situation could have been very critical if there were to be defections from the party at this juncture, especially when Hüseyn Hilmi Pasha, in whom the Unionist leadership did not fully trust, was in power. The Unionists were worried about Hüseyn Hilmi Pasha's influence over the Sultan; they

Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.54.
tried to take counter-measures with a view to neutralise any attempt on the part of either Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha or other anti-Unionist and monarchist figures whose regular meetings with the Sultan might turn him decidedly against the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{161}

Meanwhile, organisers of the Moderate Liberals met with Ahmed Resid Rey, and worked on the programme of the party.\textsuperscript{162} Ahmed Resid Rey’s relation with the Unionists were far from being on the best of terms. The Unionists were aware of his anti-Unionist and monarchist sentiments. His activities on behalf of the monarchists during the general elections at Aleppo were still in memory. After Talat Bey’s appointment as Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Resid Rey, who had been the Governor of Aleppo since June of 1908, was relieved of his post in September of 1909 and was summoned to the capital where he was confronted at the Ministry with complaints and accusations of bribery lodged against him. Talat Bey additionally confronted him on the issue of his jurnals, or secret reports, presented to Abdülhamid.\textsuperscript{163}

Soon after his dismissal from government service, Ahmed Resid Rey began publishing Sahrah, a paper vehemently opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress and the principles it upheld. The paper was being financed by Tahir Hayreddin Bey, Mehmed Hayreddin Bey, and Salih Pasha - all of whom were sons of Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha.\textsuperscript{164} The paper encouraged many monarchists, including Colonel Sadik Bey, who were up until then hesitant to openly speak up against the Committee of Union and Progress. Colonel Sadik Bey readily joined in the monarchist opposition by working with Ahmed Resid Rey and others.\textsuperscript{165}

During the second half of October 1909, rumours began to circulate that a formal opposition party along the lines of the Liberal Union was in the offing, and by November

\textsuperscript{161} Halid Ziya Usakligil, Saray ve Ötesi, 2, pp.10-20.
\textsuperscript{162} Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 2, p.336.
\textsuperscript{163} Ahmed Resid Rey, Gördüklerim, Yaptıklarım, 1890-1922, pp.115-121.
\textsuperscript{164} Ahmed Resid Rey, Gördüklerim, Yaptıklarım, 1890-1922, p.126.
\textsuperscript{165} Ahmed Resid Rey, Gördüklerim, Yaptıklarım, 1890-1922, p.127.
9, news of this appeared in the press.\textsuperscript{166} The party, Moderate Liberals, or Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Firkasi, was formally established and presented to the public on November 22.\textsuperscript{167} Among the founders of the party were Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat, Abdül Nafi Pasha, deputy for Aleppo, Abdül Mehdi Efendi, deputy for Kerbela, \textit{Volçetrenli} Hasan Bey, deputy for Prishtine, Hizir Lütfi Efendi, deputy for Zor, Shafiq al-Muayyid, deputy for Damascus, Shukri al-Asali, deputy for Damascus, and Rushdi al-Shama, deputy for Damascus, as well as Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey.\textsuperscript{168} The new party was clearly under Albanian, Arab, and Greek control.\textsuperscript{169} Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat and one of the most ardent supporters of the monarchist \textit{coup}, was named its leader; he would remain in that position until 1911.\textsuperscript{170}

The monarchist and counter-revolutionary press openly supported the new party. \textit{Sada-yi Millet} was the most enthusiastic.\textsuperscript{171} Diran Kelekyan, editor of \textit{Sabah}, another

\textsuperscript{166} "Meclis-i Mebusan'ıda Firkalar ve Vakif-i Ahval bir Zatin Mütalaatı", \textit{Yeni İkdam}, October 27, 1325/November 9, 1909; and, "The Turkish Parliament", \textit{The Times}, November 17, 1909, p.5. \textit{Yeni İkdam} of October 31, 1325/November 13, 1909 printed that the name of the party was still undecided (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952}, p.277n).


\textsuperscript{168} Tarik Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952}, p.277. He mistakenly identifies Shafiq al-Muayyid Bey as deputy for Zor. The names of Lütfi Fikri Bey and of Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey are mentioned by Kutay (Cemal Kutay, \textit{Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi}, 17, p.9733). Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, joined the party later --in 1911-- when his demands were met (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952}, p.281).


monarchist paper, praised it for espousing both liberal and conservative principles. Nonetheless, as the Moderate Liberals were only able to open branches in Rize and Basra, the party's activity was restricted to the Chamber.

On December 2, a number of deputies belonging to the Moderate Liberals held a meeting in order to lay down the basis of their programme. Addressing the deputies, Lütfü Fikri Bey, one of the moderate members of the opposition, suggested that the new party should adopt, in principle, the views of the Committee of Union and Progress with respect to the particulars of the constitutional system. His proposal, however, was rejected. Zeynel Kasim Efendi, deputy for Jiddah, proposed the principle of decentralisation as the main philosophical pillar of the new party. The meeting ended with the election a commission consisted of Traian Nali, deputy for Monastir, Murad Boyadjian, a prominent member of the Hincak party, Dr. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, Volçetrinli Hasan Bey, deputy for Prishtine, Zeynel Kasim Efendi, deputy for Jiddah, and Lütfü Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, to work on the programme of the party.

The Istanbul press reported that members of the Liberal Union, which had ceased to exist as an active party since its repression after the April coup, had joined the newly-founded Moderate Liberals. Dr. Riza Nur not only denied the story, he also denied that the Liberal Union had ever ceased to exist. Nonetheless, members of the Liberal Union

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173. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye'de İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9733.
176. These news were published in Osmanischer Lloyd and Neologos, and quoted in the December 3 to 5, 1909 issues of the Turkish language dailies. See, for instance, Tanin, November 22, 1325/December 5, 1909 (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.246).
177. Sada-yi Millet, November 22, 1325/December 5, 1909 (cited in Tanin, November 23, 1325/December 6, 1909), and Sada-yi Millet, November 27, 1325/December 10, 1909 (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.246n). The declaration that the Liberal Union had decided to cease to exist was made by Nureddin Ferruh Alkend, one of the leaders of the Liberal Union, upon his return to Turkey from exile in France on January 30, 1910 (Sada-yi Millet, January 17, 1325/January 30, 1910. The text of the declaration is printed in Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, pp.253-254).
were active participants in the new party.

THE DIFFERENCES between the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, the opposition, and the Unionists came to a head in December of 1909 during what came to be known as the "Lynch Affair". It began with a plan to force the amalgamation of Hamidiye, a state-owned steamer company on the Euphrates River, and the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company Limited, popularly known as the Lynch Company, a British steamer concern. By imperial decrees of 1834 and 1841, British vessels had been granted the right to navigate the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and, since 1862, the Lynch Company had had the right to operate steamers on both. The concession was for an indefinite period. The Committee of Union and Progress favoured a new arrangement which would put the British company on equal footing with the Turkish one, ending the Lynch Company’s concessionary right. Half of the new company would be owned by the Turkish Government, the other half by the Lynch Company. Although directorship of the company would be left to a British citizen, the company would be registered as a Turkish company. This, in effect, would signal the transformation of what had been so long an entirely British concession into a Turkish company of which Lynch would own a share. The duration of the new concession was to be seventy-five years, though the Government reserved the right to nationalize the company thirty-seven years after the

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180. The text of the Concession, dated Shaban 1250, can be found in Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mevruyet Hatiraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.70.
signing of the new concession. Importantly, Lynch did not acquire any new rights. On the contrary, by amalgamating its interests with those of a Turkish company, Lynch surrendered those he had enjoyed for so many years. Clearly, the new arrangement was more favourable to the Government, although Lynch's position was, in a weakened form, secured for the next thirty-seven years.

The presence of a British navigation concern had posed something of a problem for the German Government which was interested in Mesopotamia and was, at the time, negotiating for the Baghdad Railway concession that would connect Baghdad to Istanbul. German interests wanted the Lynch negotiations postponed until after their own negotiations for the Baghdad Railway were successfully completed. When this did not happen, Osmanischer Lloyd, the newspaper defending German interests in Istanbul, accused Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, in its November 25 issue, of succumbing to British interests.

Some senators, mainly pashas of the old regime with strong monarchist and counter-revolutionary leanings, saw this as their opportunity to put pressure on what they considered to be heavily Unionist Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet. They hastily prepared a draft law which stipulated that the government submit for the Chamber's approval every concessionary agreement involving a foreign company. The Unionists countered by arguing that concessions which did not involve a financial burden on the part of the government should be exempt from such scrutiny. The monarchists then tried to

capitalize on the lack of cohesion within the Unionist ranks by driving a wedge between the leadership and the party's rank and file. The monarchist daily *Yeni Gazete* took up the Lynch concession and, defining the cabinet as Unionist, attacked its supposedly collaborationist policy. Other opposition papers also attempted to drum up disaffection.\footnote{188} Among these, *Sada-yi Millet*, was one of the fiercest in its criticism of the proposed amalgamation of the Turkish and English navigation companies. Its November 16 editorial was deemed to be too provocative, and, consequently, the Court Martial suspended *Sada-yi Millet* on November 30.\footnote{189} Most of the authors writing in the opposition papers were anti-Unionist Arab deputies, including Sevket Pasha, deputy for Divaniye, Hizir Lütfi Bey, deputy for Zor, Emin Arslan Bey, deputy for Lazkiye, and Shafiq al-Moayyad, deputy for Damascus.\footnote{190} The monarchist campaign to divide the Committee of Union and Progress proved largely successful.

Opposition was not confined to monarchist deputies alone; some Unionist deputies were also bitterly opposed to the fusion. Even before debate opened in the Chamber of Deputies, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Baghdad and a prominent Unionist, as well as other deputies from the Arab provinces issued statements saying they believed that the proposed amalgamation masked an ingenious design on the part of Great Britain to effect the economic conquest of Iraq.\footnote{191} On November 9, deputies of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress met to discuss parliamentary strategy. Due to stubborn opposition, however, no decision was taken on the question whether the party should give or refuse its support to the government on the proposed fusion of the two companies.\footnote{192}

\footnotetext{188}{No.9978. Der Botschafter in Konstantinopel Freiherr von Marschall an den Reichskanzler von Bethmann Hollweg, Pera, November 22, 1909, in Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Eds.), *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, 27/2*, p.593.}

\footnotetext{189}{"News Items", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, December 1, 1909, p.1.}

\footnotetext{190}{Cemal Kutay, *Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi*, 17, p.9621.}


\footnotetext{192}{"Turkey: The Committee and the Ministry", *The Times*, December 11, 1909, p.5.}
In the face of this opposition from among the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Unionist leadership decided not to open discussion in the Chamber. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, in an eloquent editorial in the December 11 issue of Tanin, declared that the cabinet had decided not to submit the "Lynch Affair" to the Chamber of Deputies. After defending this decision and accusing the deputies of allowing themselves to be influenced by German intrigues, Yalçın called upon the Unionist deputies to support the cabinet. He pointed out that, owing to the paucity of outstanding political personalities in the Empire, the task of finding worthy successors to the existing cabinet would prove well-nigh impossible. 193

Despite Unionist reluctance to bring the issue before the Chamber, the "Lynch Affair" was discussed on the December 11 sitting. Both sides were prepared to defend their positions to the bitter end. 194 Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha rose to reply to the interpellation on the navigation of the Euphrates and the Tigris. He explained and defended the policy of the government. He maintained that by virtue of Article 118 of the Constitution the Cabinet considered itself entitled to act independently, the more so since it was not granting a new concession, but was modifying, in accordance with the national interests, the terms of one which already existed. After describing the terms of the new arrangement he remarked that the government was not willing to agree to grant an indemnity to the new company for losses which might eventually be caused by irrigation. If such guarantees of indemnification had been granted, and if the state had been thus committed to future financial disbursements, the cabinet would agree to submit the convention to the approval of the Chamber; otherwise not. As for the question of monopoly, there was nothing in the terms of the convention to prevent private private owners from using their own steamers to carry their own cargoes, and sailing boats and rafts would continue to ply their trade

undisturbed. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha concluded by announcing that, if his explanations were not accepted, he and his colleagues would resign. 195

On the Chamber floor, the "Lynch Affair" provoked spirited debate. 196 It was immediately apparent that the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress were not in total agreement. Deliberations of the parliamentary group of the party on November 22 on this issue had already shown that there were many Unionist deputies opposed to the new plan. 197 Nonetheless, the leadership expected a majority of Unionist deputies support its position -though a large number of the Chamber's deputies were expected to oppose it. 198 During the debate which followed, Ahmed Ferid Tek, editor-in-chief of the Unionist organ Sura-yi Ümmet and one of the Secretaries of the Chamber, defected from the official Unionist position and argued against the concession. 199 Ismail Kernal Bey, deputy for Berat and one of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary coup, also spoke against the scheme. 200 Other deputies who openly opposed the Lynch concession were Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, and Talib Bey, monarchist deputy for Basra. 201 Both the Arab deputies and the Iraqis themselves feared British expansion. 202 Sevket Pasha, independent

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196. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.57; and, Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, 2, pp.337-338.
200. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9624.
201. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9625.
202. While the question was being discussed in the Chamber, there had been protest meetings in Baghdad against the concession being granted to an English concern (Stamboul, December 22, 1909, and von Marschall, Constantinople, October 26, 1909 and November 6, 1909, German Diplomatic Documents, 3, p.368, and p.385, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.67). After the debate in the Chamber and the vote of confidence for the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, the situation in Baghdad and Basra became so serious that the Government
deputy for Divaniye, declared that the concession would bring ruin to Iraq. 203 After Sevket Pasha, deputy for Divaniye, had replied to the Grand Vezier, Halil Mentese, leader of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, rose and declared that the Chamber ought to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the cabinet. To the stupefaction of a great part of the deputies, Halil Mentese enlarged upon the fact that machinery destined for the company would be admitted duty free, and laid a resolution before the Chamber. This was an attempt on the part of Mentese to placate opposition. Admitting that the concession was equivalent to a monopoly of river navigation, in that it contained financial exemptions and restricted liberty of commerce, his resolution stated that the Chamber found the explanations of the cabinet sufficient, on condition that the Act of the Concession be submitted to it for ratification. The motion was immediately put to vote and carried by a great majority. The protests of the Grand Vezier were drowned in the general clamour, and the President of the Chamber suspended the sitting. 204

During the interval Halil Mentese conferred with the Ministers, whom his motion had placed in such a difficult position. But on the resumption of the debate, the Grand Vezier announced that the cabinet persisted in its demand for a free hand as regards the concessions; otherwise it would resign. Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, then spoke with bitter eloquence, declaring that the financial exemptions of which deputies complained were granted in every state to concessionnaires. He argued that if every concession were submitted article by article to the Chamber, that body would scarcely succeed in passing four in a year. He claimed that the policy of the Chamber was, apparently, to tie the hands of Ministers—a course which could only endanger the Constitution. He went on to say that the cabinet was resolved to submit no concessions to the approval of the Chamber unless

203. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9621.
204. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9621; and, "Critical Debate in the Turkish Chamber", The Times, December 13, 1909, p.5.
they involved expenditure on the part of the state. He concluded his speech by the warning that if the attitude of the cabinet displeased the opposition deputies, they were free to form a cabinet to their own liking. These words were followed by loud cheers and uproar, ending in a general tumult and the suspension of the sitting. 205

On the resumption of the debate, Halil Mentese, basing himself on an article of the Constitution which permitted the rediscussion of a question on which differences of opinion existed between the Chamber and the cabinet, obtained a vote for the continuation of the debate. This was proof that the government was not yet beaten. During the debate that followed, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, Emrullah Efendi, and Ahmed Ferid Tek criticised the government. Tek raised the spectre of British absorption of the Middle East. 206 Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey opposed the concession on the grounds that Britain was already powerful in Iraq - control of the river system would only make her even more powerful. 207 He went as far as to say that any Minister of the Interior who approved such a scheme could only be a traitor to his country. It was only through the skillful intervention of Talat Bey, Minister of the Interior and one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, that tempers were temporarily calmed. 208 Nevertheless, deputies from Iraq demanded the interpellation of the cabinet. The general excitement reached to such a pitch that the sitting was adjourned. 209

The parliamentary group of the Committee of Union and Progress convened on December 12 and forced Ahmed Ferid Tek to resign as he had violated party unity on this

205. "Critical Debate in the Turkish Chamber", The Times, December 13, 1909, p.5; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9621-9624.
important matter. Party discipline having been strengthened, debate was resumed on December 13. After four and a half hours' debate, Halil Mentese proposed a motion. The motion stated that if the government's last proposals regarding compensation were accepted by the Lynch Company, this and all other concessions which did not involve the government in financial liability should be left to the decision of the cabinet and not submitted to the Chamber for ratification. The Chamber expressed confidence in the cabinet, and the motion was carried by one hundred and sixty-eight votes to eight, with forty deputies abstaining.

Believing that the military had largely been responsible for the opposition, Unionists accused Mahmud Sevket Pasha of concerted action with the Germans. In particular, Mahmud Sevket Pasha was said to have conspired with General von der Goltz to overthrow the Committee of Union and Progress in order to set up a military regime devoted to German interests. Tanin was particularly vitriolic in its attacks, so much so that some believed Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın would be summoned before the military's special Tribunal. Though this did not take place, the Court Martial did suspend Tanin's publication on December 22. In spite of the Chamber's apparent mandate, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha tendered his resignation on December 28. He had understood that it would

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be dangerous to grant the concession to the Lynch Company.\textsuperscript{215}

The monarchist press, which had earlier denounced the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet as thoroughly Unionist, now intimated that the Committee of Union and Progress had forced his resignation. Halil Mentese, leader of the Parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber, categorically denied that the Unionists had exerted any pressure on Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, along with Ömer Naci Bey, another prominent Unionist, who denied the charges made by the opposition and invited Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha to publicly give the details of his resignation.\textsuperscript{216}

In response, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha announced that his resignation, contrary to rumours spread by the foreign press, had not been the result of Unionist pressure, that there was no disagreement between the Unionists and himself, and that, as he had made his decision based on personal reasons, the Unionists had not even had advance knowledge of his resignation.\textsuperscript{217}

In a \textit{Tanin} editorial, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey disparaged the claim that Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha’s resignation was the result of a power struggle between Great Britain and Germany over Mesopotamia and the Lynch Concession as had been suggested in the domestic and foreign press.\textsuperscript{218} However, as Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın had suggested, it was more than likely that the military -which had enjoyed German support since the 1890s and was firmly anti-Unionist- had engineered the resignation following its apparent defeat.

\textsuperscript{215} Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914}, p.67.


on the Lynch issue.\textsuperscript{219}

Chapter 10

THE HAKKI PASHA CABINET

There was considerable speculation as to who would succeed Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. Although Hakki Bey, Kamil, Said and Avlonyali Ferid Pashas were all said to have been considered, Hakki Bey was finally chosen.\(^1\) Publicly, Halil Mentese declared that Hakki Bey and Said Pasha had been considered as possible Grand Veziers by the Committee of Union and Progress, and their names had been presented to the Sultan.\(^2\) Despite the public announcement that the Sultan had chosen Hakki Bey over Said Pasha as the new Grand Vezier, it was clear that the Unionists had pressed for Hakki Bey’s appointment. The appointment of Said Pasha, for example, was successfully opposed by Cavid and Talat Beys.\(^3\) Kamil, Said, and Avlonyali Ferid Pashas had all served the monarchist regime for all their lives, and were thoroughly anti-Unionist; furthermore, Kamil and Avlonyali Ferid Pashas, in particular, had been involved with the counter-revolutionary coup.

Being the least tainted with involvement in the absolutist regime, Hakki Bey was the most acceptable candidate from the point of view of the Committee of Union and Progress. And the fact that he had been legal advisor to the Government as well as Ambassador to Rome gave him roots in the traditional bureaucracy which would render him acceptable to the monarchists. After graduating from Mekteb-i Mülkiye where he had been a highly successful student, he was appointed lecturer at the Law School. This experience made him more open to youth and new ideas than previous Grand Veziers, and

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he was highly regarded for his teaching abilities and his liberal views by both students and intellectuals alike. In Abdülhamid’s days he had never hesitated in private conversation to let his opinion on public events be known, and many had often been struck by his power of seeing both sides of a question and by his judicial habit of mind.

After some hesitation and negotiation, Hakki Bey, who was at Rome as Turkish Ambassador, accepted the post and arrived in Istanbul on January 9, 1910. An imperial decree announcing his appointment was issued on January 12. As the Grand Vezier was customarily required to have the title of pasha, he had been elevated to the rank of pasha immediately before his appointment was made official. Hakki Pasha had only accepted on the guarantee that he be allowed to form a cabinet without any monarchist intervention. While he was unable to obtain the acceptance of certain conditions which he attempted to impose before deciding to accept the grand vezierate, he had formulated certain desiderata which he would discuss with his colleagues and the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress before taking up office. The most important of these desiderata was that the Unionists should pledge themselves to abstain from interpellations of a nature to embarrass the Grand Vezier and the cabinet for a time.

He then appointed Mahmud Sevket Pasha as Minister of War in the hopes of

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curtailing the latter's influence. In his dual capacity as Chief Administrator of Martial Law and Inspector-General of the first three Army Corps, Mahmud Sevket Pasha had been intricately involved in political affairs, but largely independent of ministerial authority. By bringing Mahmud Sevket Pasha into the Cabinet Hakki Pasha hoped, in particular, to put an end to Martial Law which, because it persisted long after the situation had normalized, now made a mockery of liberal principles. Not only did he fail to lift the state of emergency, but he soon found that Mahmud Sevket Pasha's inclusion in the Cabinet did nothing to control the military, and in fact, only weakened the Unionist position, especially with regard to economic matters and financial reform.

The new cabinet contained prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress: Talat Bey and Cavid Bey retained their respective portfolios as Minister of the Interior and Minister of Finance. Although Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, deputy for Istanbul, and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Baghdad, were considered for the post of Minister of Education, finally Emrullah Efendi, deputy for Kirk Kilise, was appointed. Although Sahib Molla was first named the Sheik-ul-Islam in the list provided to the press, a

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11. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), pp.116-117. See also Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.68. For a different interpretation of the circumstances surrounding Mahmud Sevket Pasha's appointment as the Minister of War, see Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.80.

12. "The Turkish Cabinet", The Times, January 13, 1910, p.5; and, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), pp.116-117. See also Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.68.

13. Ibrahim Hakki Pasha's programme can be found in Yeni Tanin, January 26, 1910, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.69.


few days later Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi was appointed in his place. Later, on July 12, he resigned and was replaced by Musa Kazim Efendi, a Unionist senator. Sharif Ali Haydar Bey, who was an Arab and a respected member of the Senate, was appointed Minister of Pious Foundations. Finally, Bedros Haladjian, another prominent Unionist, was named Minister of Commerce and Public Works. Minister of Justice and President of the Council of State was Necmeddin Kocatas, another prominent Unionist. Rifat Pasha, who had been Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, retained his position. The only outright monarchist in the cabinet was Dimitraki Mavrocordato, who was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Forests and Mines.

Hakki Pasha presented his cabinet's programme to the Chamber on January 24.

The basic points of the programme were the establishment of internal peace, judicial reform with a view to change pre-revolutionary absolutist laws, amending the Constitution so as to

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19. "The Turkish Cabinet", The Times, January 13, 1910, p.5; "Le nouveau Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, January 13, 1910, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9628. Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, the Unionist deputy for Nigde, was made Minister of Pious Foundations in early January, 1911 ("The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 1/42 (February 1, 1911, p.2).

20. "The New Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, January 11, 1910, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9628. Inal mistakenly writes that "for four months from the date of the formation of his Cabinet; Ibrahim Hakki Pasha himself took upon the duties of Acting Minister of Commerce and Public Works" (Mahmud Kemal Inal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, p.1767).


fully bring it into conformity with the principles of a constitutional monarchy, and preparation of a balanced budget - in fact, most of the points advocated by the Unionist leadership. One of the most important feature of his programme was the reference to martial law. After pointing out the necessity of exceptional measures for the prevention of disorder, HAKKI PASHA stated that it would be the policy of his cabinet to bring about the disappearance of this unpleasant state of affairs, and, by the gradual adoption of wise measures, to restore normal conditions. 25

Both the cabinet and its programme came under opposition fire, led by HIZIR LÜTFI Efendi, deputy for ZOR, LÜTFI FIKRI Bey, deputy for DERSIM, ISMAIL KEMAL Bey, deputy for BERAT, AHMED FERID TEK, deputy for KÜTAHYA, and DR. RIZA NUR, deputy for SINOP. 26 The monarchists' opposition to the Unionist-dominated cabinet had started as soon as it was announced. President of the Moderate Liberals, ABD AL-NAFI PASHA, the Arab deputy for ALEPPO, as well as ISMAIL KEMAL Bey, the Albanian deputy for BERAT, and other members of the party met with HAKKI PASHA on JANUARY 18, and had a long interview. 27 In its January 25 editorial, the monarchist YENİ GAZETE expressed its scepticism of the new cabinet and its programme. 28 Despite monarchist opposition to the formation of the cabinet, HAKKI PASHA received a vote of confidence of one hundred and eighty-seven to thirty-four. 29

It had become clear from the very start that though GRAND VEZIER, HAKKI PASHA's power was limited. Truly dedicated to the liberal ideals of a constitutional regime, his greatest problem was the smoldering power struggle between the Committee of Union and

Progress on the one hand and the military and monarchist factions on the other. Clearly, to keep these forces in check without himself losing power would require great skill.  

ON FEBRUARY 20, eight Unionist deputies resigned from the party and, a week later, on February 26, declared that they intended to form a second monarchist party called the People's Party, or Ahali Firkasi. The reason these conservative deputies decided to leave the Committee of Union and Progress centered around Hâkki Pasha's appointment of Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi as Sheikh-ul-Islam. The first choice for the position of Sheikh-ul-Islam was Sahib Molla, a prominent liberal and a Unionist. A second choice was Musa Kazım Efendi, another Unionist. When both had been successfully opposed by the conservative faction within the Committee of Union and Progress, Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi had been appointed instead. However, even this appointment did not satisfy the conservatives, who had themselves proposed three names of their own choice for the position. These deputies believed such a post should have been reserved for someone with conservative views.

The first to resign from the Committee of Union and Progress were Sheikh Zeynelabidin Efendi, deputy for Konya, İsmâil Hâkki Bey, deputy for Gümülcine, İbrahim Vasfi Efendi, deputy for Karessi, Ferhat Efendi, deputy for Tripoli, Sevket Bey, deputy for Erzurum, and, Ömer Lütfi Efendi, deputy for Burdur. İsmail Hâkki Bey, deputy for

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30. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p. 68.
31. Yeni Gazete, February 8, 1325/February 21, 1910, cited in Tarık Zafar Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p. 294n; "The Turkish Chamber", The Times, March 5, 1910, p. 5; and, Yeni Gazete, February 14, 1325/February 27, 1910, quoted in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p. 117.
Gümülcine and a former Vice-President of the Committee of Union and Progress, was the leader of the new party, which was generally considered to be decidedly reactionary in its tendencies. According to rumours, Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey had approached the Unionist leadership for the post of the Ministry of the Interior in the new cabinet, and, when refused, had joined in the opposition. On his part, Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey published letters in Sabah, Ikdam, and Yeni Gazete, refuting the statements of Tanin and other papers concerning the motives which impelled his resignation from the Committee of Union and Progress. He alleged that the object of the pro-Unionist papers was to discredit the newly formed People's Party and prevent its development.

In its February 21 issue, Yeni Gazete printed the news of the formation of the People's Party by these deputies, and published its programme. With the announcement of the new party, Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi, deputy for Tokat, Ömer Feyzi Efendi, deputy for Karahisar-i Sarki, Ahmed Sükrü Efendi, deputy for Sivas, Süleyman Sudi Acarbay, deputy for Bayezid, and Mehmed Hamdi Yazir, deputy for Antalya, also resigned from the Committee of Union and Progress. Oppositon newspapers welcomed this new party, among them Yeni Gazete, which had published the party's announcement and programme, Sabah, Sada-yi Millet and Ikdam. Abdullah Zühdü Bey, editor-in-chief of

34. "The Turkish Chamber", The Times, March 5, 1910, p.5.
38. Mustafa Sabri Efendi's resignation was printed in Yeni Gazete of February 10, 1325/February 23, 1910 (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.295n). See also Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 2, p.330, and Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9733. The names of Süleyman Sudi Acarbay and Mehmed Hamdi Yazir are mentioned in the telegram sent by the Edime branch of the Committee of Union and Progress criticising the resignations (Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar, February 14, 1325/February 27, 1910 and Yeni Ikdam, November 11, 1326/November 24, 1910, published in Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.301).
Yeni Gazete, wrote that both the nation and the Chamber of Deputies had long been in need of such a party. 40

On their part, local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress at Edirne, Konya, Gelibolu, Erzurum and other cities strongly criticised the resignations. Many of their telegrams were printed in the daily papers; and leaders of the People's Party defended their actions in the monarchist press. 41

Pro-Unionist newspapers, however, welcomed the appearance of a distinct opposition party. Tanin and Yeni Tasvir-i Efkâr reminded those who were critical of the new party that the Committee of Union and Progress still had one hundred and sixty deputies in the Chamber. 42 In an interview, Halil Mentese, leader of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, added that the resignations made his party's political outlook more coherent. 43

Overall, the People's Party remained relatively weak. Despite The Levant
Herald's, Ikdam's and Sada-yi Millî's claims that it was some thirty deputies strong, other opposition dailies such as Sabah and La Moniteur Oriental wrote that no more than twenty deputies belonged to the new party. The total strength of the party, according to Dr. Riza Nur, was seventeen.

Although the formation of the People's Party was a slight blow to Unionist strength in the Chamber of Deputies, it was not the main threat to the full establishment of the liberal democratic regime in Turkey. The main threat still continued to be the monarchist opposition which was organised both inside and outside of the country. The Moderate Liberals represented the legal monarchist organisation in Turkey. Organised in exile, Parti Radical Ottomân, a strong monarchist opposition group led and financed by Serif Pasha and Prince Sabahaddin, supplemented the Moderate Liberals.

By November 1909, Serif Pasha, ex-Ambassador to Stockholm and an ardent monarchist, had established in Paris the Parti Radical Ottomân, or İslahat-i Esasiye Cemiyeti, a counter-revolutionary organisation. After the Revolution of 1908, Serif Pasha had demanded a position in the new administration. Reportedly, the London Embassy was said to have been the place he most coveted. Nominally, he was a member of the Pangaltı branch of the Committee of Union and Progress - he had joined it with the hope of receiving some high position under the new government. In actuality, however, he was an ardent opponent of the Unionists, and had been openly critical on several occasions. As

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such, the leadership had rejected him for consideration, and he had consequently resigned his membership in the Committee of Union and Progress. His resignation letter was published in the *Ikdam* of March 23, 1909. Serif Pasha had then left for France before the counter-revolutionary *coup* attempt in April 1909 though he was reportedly involved in counter-revolutionary activities. After the *coup*, the Court Martial had tried him *in absentia*, found him guilty of conspiracy, stripped him of his rank, and sentenced him to hard labour.

Immediately after the suppression of the counter-revolutionary *coup* attempt of April 1909, some of the most prominent monarchist editors had escaped to Europe. Among them were Ali Kemal Bey, editor-in-chief of *Ikdam*, and Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, editor of *Serbesti*, who had joined Serif Pasha in Paris to continue their counter-revolutionary activities. Financed by Serif Pasha, Ali Kemal Bey started publishing *Yeni Yol*, whose first issue appeared in mid-October of 1909, and, Mevlanzade Rifat Bey continued publishing his reactionary *Serbesti* in exile at Paris. Later, however, Serif Pasha withdrew his financial support from Mevlanzade Rifat Bey's *Serbesti*, which then continued publication with the financial backing of Hidiv Abbas Hilmi Pasha of Egypt.

Serif Pasha and Prince Sabahaddin instituted a larger counter-revolutionary journal in French, *Mechroutitte*, which began publication on October 15, 1909. Claiming to be a monthly journal defending the political and economic interests as well as the rights of all Ottomans without any distinction of race or religion, *Mechroutitte* was, in essence, the

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French edition of Serbesti. As Dillon, a British journalist who was by no means a Unionist sympathiser, stated, the case of Mechroutiette as well as the monarchist opposition in France was very illustrative. Observing that the opposition had been liberal before the Revolution of 1908, and that it had to edit its press organ in France, the opposition now was conservative or reactionary, and had to seek refuge for its newspaper in Paris; the irony of fate was in truth caustic. Here was a party - Parti Radical Ottoman-which condemned liberty of the press, yet was forced to avail itself of the hospitality of Republican France in order to publish a Turkish reactionary journal, which, to make things still more incongruous, it called Mechroutiette, i.e., "The Constitution". Its editor was first Ibrahim Baha Bey, then Ali Kemal Bey, and later Pertev Tevfik Bey.

Both Yeni Yol, and Mechroutiette were official organs of the Parti Radical Ottoman. Although the Hakki Pasha Government had prohibited the paper's distribution within Turkey, it was, nevertheless, circulated in Turkey. In order to discredit its editor, the Committee of Union and Progress released the journals of Serif Pasha addressed to Abdülhamid before the Revolution of 1908, informing on the activities of the revolutionaries. In late February, these letters appeared in Servet-i Fünun and Tanin.

He would, however, continue publishing his vehemently anti-constitutional views in various politically conservative Paris newspapers and journals.

54. E.J. Dillon, "Fate's Little Ironies in Turkey", p.376.
Clearly, monarchist opposition outside the country was becoming organised, and Paris was its centre.\textsuperscript{59} Counter-revolutionaries and monarchists gathered around Seri\footnote{Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, \textit{Osmanlı Imparatorlukunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele}, pp.473-476.} Counter-revolutionaries and monarchists gathered around Serif Pasha.\textsuperscript{60} In addition to Ali Kemal Bey and Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, two reactionary newspaper editors, there were a number of ex-Military Academy students such as Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Veli Bosna, Pertev Tevfik Beys, who had all escaped to Europe following the crush of the coup attempt of April 1909. Other leading members of the organisation in Paris were Ibrahim Baha Bey, editor of \textit{Mechroutiette}, Kemal Bey, Serif Pasha's trusted man who would be instrumental in organising the monarchist opposition within Turkey, Hoca Kadri Efendi, Yahya Kemal Beyatli, Halid Bey, brother of Fuad Bey who worked as a diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Albert Fua, \textit{İzmirli Kemal Avni Bey}, Köprülüzade \textit{Ressam} Galib Bey, Dr. Nihad Resad Belger, and Dr. Refik Nevzad Bey. There were also a small number of ex-civilian bureaucrats such as ex-Governor of Basra, Mardini Arif Bey, and ex-Sub-Governor Halii Bey, who were all opposed to the new regime and had joined the monarchist opposition in Paris.\textsuperscript{61} Gelenbevizade Muhtar Bey, son of the monarchist Sheik-ul-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi, as well as Rüsdü Pasha, son of the monarchist ex-Minister of the Navy Hasan Pasha, and Fazıl Toptan Pasha, a cousin of Esad Toptan Pasha, were other prominent and wealthy monarchists who supported and actively participated in the counter-revolutionary organisation in Paris.\textsuperscript{62}

In January of 1910, Kemal Bey, alias Ahmed Fehmi Bey, came to Istanbul and took a prominent part in organising the Parti Radical Ottoman here, being assisted by Princess Emine, Serif Pasha's wife, and by his own wife. Branches of this organisation


\textsuperscript{60} Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", \textit{Fikir Hareketleri}, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.133.


were established in Bursa and some other Anatolian towns. Soon after the extension of their activities within Turkey, the government had become fully aware of the movements of the plotters, and started gathering intelligence as to their contacts in Turkey. 63

Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey and Colonel Sadik Bey were not only in close contact with Serif Pasha, they were also receiving his financial assistance. 64 As reported in the Greek language Anatolikos Tahidromos, among those who were intimately involved with Serif Pasha's counter-revolutionary organisation within Turkey were Avlonyali Ferid and Kamil Pashas. 65 During the early summer of 1910, with Parliament in recess between June 28 and November 1, communication with the monarchist opposition only increased. In addition, many with foreign passports arrived in Turkey and visited members of the opposition on Serif Pasha's behalf. 66

WHAT HAD GIVEN THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION an opportunity to increase its efforts within Turkey was the start of the Albanian revolt in the spring of 1910. 67 An octroi had been imposed at Ipek for the embellishment of the town. General dissatisfaction owing to the neglect of the government to do anything substantial for bettering the conditions in Albania was the principal cause of the uprising. Other causes which contributed were the proposal to take a census of the population for the purpose of taxation, and the determination to impose the Turkish script instead of the Latin. The Albanians resisted the octroi, and, after angry disputes, murdered Rüsdü Bey, the Commander, and wounded Ismail Hakki Bey, the Sub-Governor of Ipek. 68

The Albanian revolt in Macedonia generated heated discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. Following the assassination attempt on Ismail Hakki Bey, the Sub-Governor of Ipek, on April 1 by Albanian rebels, the government had declared a state of emergency.69 Two days later, there were rebellions in Prishtine, Volçetrinli, Yakova and Ferisovich.70 On April 9, Albanian deputies requested the interpellation of the Grand Vezier.71 The Albanian rebellion was discussed in the Chamber of Deputies on April 11. Hakki Pasha, the Grand Vezier, explained that the opposition deputies had nothing to fear from the dispatch of the fifty battalions, who, instead of drilling at the capital, "were about to perform military exercises in the plain of Kossovo Polje".72

Mehmed Necib Draga and other Albanian deputies who had remained within the Committee of Union and Progress had resigned from the party on April 10. On the April 11 sitting, they took to the Chamber floor and criticised the government's policy as well as some of its officials.73 Among those who spoke against the government were Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülçine, Volçetrinli Hasan Bey, deputy for Prishtine, Mehmed Necib Draga, deputy for Üsküb, Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat, Hüseyin Fuad Pasha, deputy for Prishtine, Aziz Virione Pasha, deputy for Berat, Saban Pasha, deputy for Prishtine, Müf fid Bey, deputy for Argyrocastro, and Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim.74 It was felt that at least part of this latest round of opposition had little to do with the events on Ipek and were to do with a distinctly monarchist agenda.75 At the end of deliberations,

69. March 19, 1326/April 1, 1910, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9642.
70. "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 6, 1910, p.1; "En Albanie", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 8, 1910, p.1; "En Albanie", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1910, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9642.
74. "Albania", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 12, 1910, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9644-9653.
75. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9644-9653; and, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17,
however, the government received a vote of confidence with one hundred eighty-three votes to four. 76

Albanian and other opposition deputies tried to make the rebellion an issue once again in the May 4 sitting of the Chamber. They proposed to appoint a parliamentary commission to inquire into the causes of outbreak in northern Albania. Their proposal, however, was defeated by one hundred and thirty-two votes to forty-seven. Hakki Pacha maintained that the revolt, which was local and diminishing in intensity, was likely to be encouraged by the dispatch of a parliamentary commission, but he promised that the government would send a commission for the reorganisation and reform of the Kossovo province after the suppression of the outbreak. 77

When the opposition's tactics to use the Albanian outbreak as a rallying point to discredit the Hakki Pasha Cabinet failed, an altogether different strategy was tried out in mid-May -this time on the question of the privacy of correspondence. The discussion on the Budget of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs on May 18 gave a number of opposition deputies an opportunity of complaining that letters and telegrammes addressed to them were not delivered or were opened. In spite of the efforts of the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, many Unionist deputies joined the opposition in bitter protests against the action of the government, which, they averred, had given orders to the Governors and the Post Office authorities to institute a system of espionage. The sitting was finally suspended amid general disorder. 78

On the May 26 sitting of the Chamber, Talat Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and Minister of the Interior, replying to an interpellation respecting the alleged interception by the Governor of Erzurum of letters addressed to

1936), p.166.
Süleyman Sudi Acarbay, the Kurdish opposition deputy for Bayezid, denied that there had been any illegal practices, and made the matter a question of confidence. After hearing explanations from Acarbay, the Chamber, by one hundred and forty-three votes to thirty-one, declared itself satisfied. 79

The discussion concerning the interception of correspondence was partly the result of a previous debate in the Chamber. On May 8 and 9, an exciting debate had taken place with reference to the publication of the journals, or secret reports, discovered at the Yildiz Palace, after its occupation by the army suppressing the coup attempt of April 1909. The debate was opened by Shafiq al-Moayyad, monarchist deputy for Damascus, who complained that Tanin and a Monastir newspaper had accused him of espionage. He said that as long as the journals discovered at the ex-Sultan's Palace remained unpublished, deputies and senators would be exposed to similar accusations. He therefore begged the government to take the necessary steps for their publication. He protested against the attitude of newspapers, which, he added, were generally believed to be inspired by the government. 80

At this point, Cavid Bey, one of the most prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and Minister of Finance, protested against the insinuation, and his protest aroused a storm among the Arab deputies, who averred that the Arabs were incapable of deceit. When the tumult had been calmed, Shafiq al-Moayyad demanded an official inquiry. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçin, Unionist deputy for Istanbul and editor-in-chief of Tanin, then mounted the tribune and declared that the fact that Shafiq al-Moayyad had compared the old regime and the new, to the advantage of the former, was in itself sufficient to arouse suspicions of his political probity. Then, amidst increasing excitement, he accused Shafiq al-Moayyad and another Arab deputy of espionage, declaring that the Court Martial was in possession of the proofs, and was proceeding to give other names of

delators. He then called on the Chamber to annul the election of any deputy who should be proved to have sent *jurnals* to Yildiz.  

Vartkes Serengülyan, a leading Armenian deputy with Unionist sympathies, then rose to propose the publication by the government of all *jurnals* and similar documents that had been prepared by ministers, senators, deputies, provincial governors, and other high-ranking officials. He said that if the Grand Vezier feared the consequences for ministers and senators he should consent at all events to the publication of the reports composed by deputies. The debate grew most acrimonious, and a proposal to demand only the *jurnals* of Arab deputies aroused such fury among the Syrian and Yemen contingent that the President of the Chamber suspended the sitting and sent for the Grand Vezier. During the interval, Unionist deputies held a hurried meeting and decided to limit their demands to the publication of the *jurnals* of deputies.  

On the resumption of debate, questions were asked concerning the activity of the Commission which had been appointed by Parliament to examine the *jurnals* discovered at Yildiz. The President of the Chamber declared that the Commission had not been able to complete its task owing to the enormous amount of material before it, which filled more than three hundred and fifty chests. Hakki Pasha deprecated the publication of any of the *jurnals* discovered at Yildiz on grounds of public interest. Ultimately, Hakki Pasha succeeded in obtaining the support of the Committee of Union and Progress, and, although the debate was revived on May 9, the Chamber took no definite decision.  

**MEANWHILE**, an opposition newspaper, *Sada-yi Millet*, had appeared in Istanbul, itself owned by Pantoleon Cosmidis, the monarchist Greek deputy for Istanbul.  

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84. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", *Fikir Hareketleri*, 6 (April 25-
chief, Ahmed Samim Bey, was murdered on the night of June 9 while walking in company with a member of the staff of Tanin. 85 Sada-yi Millet supported not only the monarchist cause but also foreign interests. Some time before his murder, Ahmed Samim Bey had published an article in Sada-yi Millet, criticising the Unionist policy by pointing out that its methods of procedure in the matter of concessions and political affairs had been of a nature to forfeit foreign, especially British, sympathy. 86

On June 21, several opposition deputies brought the matter before the Chamber. Rida al-Sulh, the Arab deputy for Beirut, demanded that the allegations of the Committee of Union and Progress' involvement be clarified. 87 The opposition referred to a letter written by Ahmed Samim Bey to Kibrisli Sevket Bey shortly before his murder alleging that he had been "condemned to death" by the Unionists. 88 Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, made a deliberately vague statement, blaming the Unionists for the fact that the criminals had not yet been identified and arrested. Cosmidis, deputy for Istanbul and owner of Sada-yi Millet, bluntly accused the Unionists of complicity. 89 Rahmi Evrenos, deputy for Salonica, and Vartkes Serengülyan Efendi, deputy for Erzurum, both leading Unionists in the Chamber, defended the Committee of Union and Progress, arguing that they had nothing to gain from such an act of terror. 90 Nonetheless, Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha,

86. "Murder of a Turkish Editor", The Times, June 11, 1910, p.8.
87. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9685.
88. "Turkey: The Murder of an Editor", The Times, June 15, 1910, p.5. On June 15, the entire press published a letter from Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, who absolutely denied that his party had any part in the death of Ahmed Samim Bey ("The Murder of a Turkish Editor", The Times, June 16, 1910, p.5).
89. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9685-9687; and, "The Murder of a Turkish Editor", The Times, June 22, 1910, p.7.
90. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9688-9689. See also, the letter dated July 28 of Talat Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and Minister of the Interior, sent to The Times in defence of the innocence of the Unionists in the murder ("The Murder of Ahmed Samim Bey: Letter from the Turkish Minister of the Interior", The Times, August 9,
deputy for Amasya and a prominent member of the opposition, renewed the attack. Coming to the Committee's defence, Halil Mentese, leader of parliamentary group of the Committee of Union and Progress, suggested that the recent murder resembled the assassination of Hasan Fehmi Bey, another opposition journalist, who had been killed a few days before the counter-revolutionary coup attempt in April 1909. Though the Committee of Union and Progress had initially been blamed for the murder, it later turned out that the counter-revolutionaries had themselves killed Hasan Fehmi Bey as part of their efforts to provoke the coup. Mentese argued that a similar conspiracy might, once again, have been re-enacted. 91

In July, the government discovered a conspiratorial group which came to be known as the Secret Organisation. It was a sharp reminder of the fact that the new regime in Turkey, although much more firmly established than it was fifteen months ago, had not reached the stage at which attempts to overthrow it were regarded as too hopeless to be made. 92

For some time, rumours had it that in retaliation for Ahmed Samim Bey's murder, a secret organisation had been established to assassinate prominent Unionist leaders. 93 However, the conspirators were said to have hesitated between direct attempts to assassinate the principal ministers - a plan which was abandoned owing to the impossibility of finding hit-men for the task - and an elaborate attempt to stir up popular feeling during the Ramazan. The scheme adopted appeared to be as follows: a number of women of the city were to be paid to disguise themselves as Moslems and in this guise behave in the streets during the holy month in an unseemly fashion calculated to rouse Moslem feeling, and to evoke the comment, "This is what freedom has led us to". When feeling had been

1910, p.6).
91. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9688-9689.
93. "Informations: Société secrète", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 8, 1910, p.2, quoting Sabah, which, in turn, borrowed the news from Neue Freie Presse.
sufficiently excited, an attempt was to be made to stir up a tumult simultaneously in all towns where the Unionists had branches and to overthrow the government.  

According to Berliner Tageblatt, this counter-revolutionary organisation had established several branches in Istanbul -at Besiktaş, Kadıköy, Üsküdar, Fatih, and Sultan Ahmed- and that they had about eighty members registered in these branches. This secret organisation was the arm of the Parti Radical Ottoman -itself established in September 1909- operating in Turkey. The leaders of the Parti Radical Ottoman, were Serif Pasha, Mevlanzade Rifat Bey, Ali Kemal Bey, Pertev Bey, Izmırli Kemal Avni Bey, Albert Fua, Refik Nevzad Bey and Nihad Resad Belger, all of whom lived in exile in France. Ismail Kemal Bey, deputy for Berat and one of the monarchists who had been deeply involved in April coup, was also reportedly a member. According to various press accounts, members within Turkey included such opposition figures as former monarchist Grand Veziers Avlonyali Ferid and Kamil Pashas, Mustafa Asim Efendi, Colonel Sadik Bey, Princess Emine, Serif Pasha's wife, who was the coordinator in Istanbul, and Dr. Riza Nur, who was the chief of the Istanbul branch.  

Colonel Sadik Bey had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress before the Revolution of 1908; as such, he had enjoyed some political support within its ranks. And it was for this reason that, after the coup attempt of April 1909 was crushed, 

95. Riza Nur cites this source and does neither dispute the existence of these branches nor the number of members (Riza Nur, Cemiyet-i Hafiyê, pp.142-143). See also, "The Secret Committee", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 29, 1910, p.1.
the Committee of Union and Progress tried hard to keep him within the party. Sadik Bey was not interested. Playing on feelings of religious bigotry and portraying the Unionist leadership as irreligious, he only tried to increase his support within. His own "religiosity", however, was sheer propaganda. It was one of the religious figures of the Committee of Union and Progress, Hoca Mustafa Beyman, deputy for Ankara, who exposed Colonel Sadik Bey after the latter had tried to win him over to his side. 100

As a first step, the government forbade the distribution of Mechroutiette, the monarchist paper published in Paris by Serif Pasha. 101 It was ascertained that Mechroutiette had not only been distributed in Istanbul but also in the provinces. 102 Arrests followed. By July 12, twenty-six people in connection with the secret organisation, including two employees of the French Post Office in Galata, Hafiz Sami and Saim Efendis, had been detained. 103 Many members of the organisation were also arrested in Bursa, Izmir, Trabzon, Damascus, and Köprülü, and sent under escort to Istanbul. 104 According to press reports, the government would issue a communiqué, giving the full particulars in regard to the secret organisation after the arrest of all the members of that body. 105 On July 20, the government communiqué confirmed the existence of a secret organisation, announcing that forty-eight people had been arrested and were to appear before the Military Tribunal. 106 Serif Pasha was named as the organisation's leader, and in

addition to plotting the murders of various Unionist and cabinet members, the organization was accused of having tried to create dissension among those troops who were being sent to crush the Albanian rebellion.\(^{107}\) Apart from specific charges, the public prosecutor accused those arrested of membership in an organization which sought to restore those civilian and military bureaucrats who had been fired after the Revolution of 1908 to their pre-Revolutionary posts, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, form a new government, and reestablish absolutism.\(^{108}\)

Dr. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, was among those detained on July 18.\(^{109}\) According to \textit{Yeni Gazete}, Dr. Riza Nur had for the preceeding two months been suspected of belonging to the secret organisation, but there had not been enough evidence against him to justify his arrest -until very serious evidence against him had been given by the other members of the organisation who had lately been arrested.\(^{110}\) Dr. Münir Bey had reportedly visited Dr. Riza Nur from abroad, bringing a letter from Serif Pasha. Dr. Riza Nur was charged with conspiracy, and kept under custody for three and a half months.\(^{111}\)


In late August, the committee appointed by the Istanbul Military Tribunal to report upon the Secret Organisation concluded its report. It contained names of fifty persons, who, except those who had evaded arrest, would be brought before the Military Tribunal.\(^{112}\) In early October, the Military Tribunal acquitted twenty-two of the persons accused of belonging to the Secret Organisation; the rest would stand trial.\(^{113}\) The conspiracy trials began on October 17.\(^{114}\) On October 22, the court set Dr. Riza Nur free, not that there was not any hard evidence against him but that Fitzmaurice, the First Dragoman of the British Embassy, along with Rahmi Evrenos, the prominent Unionist deputy for Salonica, and Necmeddin Kocatas, Unionist deputy for Kastamonu and Minister of Justice, intervened on his behalf.\(^{115}\) In addition to Dr. Riza Nur, the Military Tribunal also released Topal Osman, and some other members of the Secret Organisation.\(^{116}\) However, at its October 26 sitting, the Military Tribunal sentenced Serif Pasha and Kemal Bey, his contact within the country, to life imprisonment in a fortress; both had been tried in absentia. The sentences entailed the loss of their civil rights and confiscation of their properties.\(^{117}\) By November 14, fourteen of the forty-eight persons accused of belonging to the Secret Organisation were acquitted. Serif Pasha’s wife and Dr. Münir Bey, who were tried in absentia, were sentenced to five years’ exile and fifteen years’ imprisonment respectively.\(^{118}\) The case of the Secret Organisation, which had been under investigation since July, was finally closed at the end of November by the


condemnation of nineteen persons, who had been found guilty by the Military Tribunal. 119

THE SUMMER RECESS OF THE PARLIAMENT ended on November 14.120 The Committee of Union and Progress had already chosen its candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidencies of the Chamber at an extra-ordinary meeting of the party held on November 10; the Unionist candidates were Ahmed Riza Bey, deputy for Istanbul, for the Presidency, Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, deputy for Nigde, and Suleiman Bustani, deputy for Beirut, for the Vice-Presidencies. 121 On November 14, despite opposition, these Unionist candidates were elected. Out of a total of one hundred and sixty-one deputies present at the elections, one hundred and twenty-four voted for Ahmed Riza Bey, while twelve Greek deputies supported Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, deputy for Edirne; there were fourteen abstentions. 122 Ürgüplü Hayri Bey and Suleiman Bustani were elected Vice-Presidents with one hundred ten and ninety-nine votes respectively. 123

Shortly after the opening of the Parliament, the opposition began its attack on the Hakki Pasha Cabinet. By the end of November, İlkdam and Yeni Gazete wrote that opposition parties in the Chamber, the Moderate Liberals and the People's Party, were prepared to jointly interpellate the Hakki Pasha Cabinet after Hakki Pasha presented his programme in the Chamber on December 5; their spokesmen were to be Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, Ahmed Ferid Tek, deputy for Kütahya, Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, deputy for Edirne, and Shafiq al-Moayyad, deputy for Damascus. 124

120. "Opening of the Turkish Parliament: The Sultan's Speech", The Times, November 15, 1910, p.7; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9706.
121. "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 11, 1910, p.1; "Turkey: The Presidency of the Chamber", The Times, November 11, 1910, p.5; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9706-9707.
At a meeting of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress held on November 20, at which the question whether a vote of confidence should be given to the cabinet had been discussed, several Ministers were severely criticised by the conservative faction. The party finally agreed to abstain from any decision as to its policy until it heard both Hakki Pasha’s statement of the policy of the government and the criticisms of the opposition parties. According to *Ildam*, the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress met again on November 25 and finally decided to support the cabinet in general while admitting the possibility that individual Ministers might be obliged in the near future to resign in consequence of the criticisms of their policy in the Chamber.

Upon persistent demands of the opposition deputies within the Committee of Union and Progress, Hakki Pasha was forced to submit his statement of the policy of the government to the party. The procedure was at variance with all known parliamentary practice. His surrender, however, in no way calmed the excitement within the party, which appeared to be due to the fact that after it had been agreed that conservative Unionist deputies who were dissatisfied with the internal and external policy of the cabinet should be allowed freedom of criticism, the leaders of the party had suddenly reversed their policy. On November 28, when a copy of the Grand Vezier’s speech was read to the parliamentary party, Halil Mentese, leader of the Committee of Union and Progress, laid a motion before his colleagues calling upon them to give pledges to abstain from comment or criticism during the debate on the Grand Vezier’s speech, and at its close to record their votes in favour of the government. The motion met with vigorous disapproval from a strong minority of conservative deputies, which was unsparing of its criticisms of both Halil

126. *Ildam*, November 13, 1326/November 26, 1910, quoted in "Turkey: The Committee and the Cabinet", *The Times*, November 28, 1910, p.5.
127. "The Committee of the Union and Progress", *The Times*, November 29, 1910, p.5; and, "Turkey: Hakki Pasha and the Committee", *The Times*, December 1, 1910, p.5.
Mentese and the Unionist Ministers who were present, and declared that gagging methods were a travesty of representative institutions. The majority finally voted in favour of Mentese’s motion, but it was believed that the strength of the minority might yet force the Unionist leadership to reconsider its decision. 128

On November 29, the Committee of Union and Progress held yet another meeting during which there were stormy debates. Reportedly, there was a serious divergence of opinion among the conservative section of the party. It was rumoured that the position of certain Unionist ministers was not particularly secure. The November 30 issue of Sabah wrote that the conservative faction of the Committee of Union and Progress demanded the overthrow of the cabinet and formation of a new cabinet by Said Pasha. 129 In the editorial of the December 3 issue of Puzantion, Puzant Ketchian reviewed the political situation, exaggerating the differences of opinion between Hakki Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress. Along with Sabah, the monarchist Ikdam had already started talking about the necessity for a cabinet change, urging that a person who was not a member of the Committee of Union and Progress be the Grand Vezier. 130

Serif Pasha, the leader of the monarchist opposition in exile, was also active publishing in his Mechrouitette articles geared towards getting a hold on the army and bringing forward a counter-revolution, addressing the military officers, painting the condition of the country in dark colours. He had been declaring in the columns of Mechrouitette that the Unionists were ruining the country for selfish ends, that they were robbing the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, that Cavid Bey had embezzled out of the loan he had negotiated with the French bankers hundreds and thousands of liras and had purchased immense farms in Dobruca. He had been openly making appeals in the name of his Parti Radical Ottoman to the military to turn

128. "Turkey: Hakki Pasha and the Committee", The Times, December 1, 1910, p.5.
against what he called the "evil regime" and overthrow it as it had overthrown the Hamidian regime. 131

Meanwhile, after Hakki Pasha's statement of the government policy at the December 3 sitting of the Chamber, Riza Tevük Bülbükbasi, deputy for Edime, Pantoleon Cosmidis, the Greek deputy for Istanbul, and Théodore Pavloff, the Serbian deputy for Üsküb, severely criticised the policy of the government and condemned particularly the course pursued in Albania and the violation of rights of individuals. 132 Riza Tevük Bülbükbasi's criticisms were vigorous but diffuse. He protested against the government's tyrannical usage of its political opponents, adding that Dr. Riza Nur's treatment reminded him of the old regime. Talat Bey here interrupted Bülbükbasi, but was called to order by the Speaker and covered with invectives by the opposition. Bülbükbasi, continuing his speech, declared that the tyranny of the government had provoked widespread discontent. On his part, Pantoleon Cosmidis protested against the general unfairness of the government's policy towards the Christians. Deploiring the conduct of the police, he mentioned the case of a Greek who had been beaten to death in the police barracks at Istanbul. After Cosmidis criticised the policy followed in Albania, Théodore Pavloff caused some sensation by giving statistics of the number of persons who had been flogged during the disarmament of the rebellious Albanian peasants. He said that eleven had died of their injuries and sixty-four had been crippled. 133

At the following sitting on December 5, Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, deputy for Amasya, Hoca Vehbi Efendi, deputy for Konya, Ahmed Ferid Tek, deputy for Kütahya, Abd al-Mahdi Efendi, deputy for Kerbela, Krikor Zohrab, deputy for Istanbul, and Shafiq al-Moayyad, deputy for Damascus, all members of the opposition, spoke against the

133. "Turkish Policy: Statement by Hakki Pasha", The Times, December 5, 1910, p.5.
government. Ahmed Ferid Tek reproached the government with having made enemies and failed to gain friends by an uncertain and purposeless foreign policy. He particularly criticised the anti-Greek policy which, he claimed, had thrown them to the arms of the Bulgarians. He also deprecated the policy pursued in Albania. He alleged that the recent campaign to repress the outbreak had broken the strength of the best bulwark of the Empire on its European side, and the Albanian chiefs who had been flogged in the presence of their wives were hardly likely to be grateful to the new regime. Krikor Zohrab also protested against the Albanian campaign. According to Zohrab, the government's foreign policy was a dead failure; the friendly Powers, i.e., Great Britain and France -which supported the monarchist cause in Turkey, were growing cold due to the government's renegotiation of the capitulations and its insistence on the four percent increase in customs duties. It was quite interesting to note that both Tek and Zohrab defended the line foreign powers regularly took in criticising Turkey whenever the Hakki Pasha Cabinet upheld Turkish interests which, in turn, hurt the Europeans.

At the December 7 sitting of the Chamber, the speeches criticising the policy of the government were resumed. The speakers were Yorgos Boussios, Greek deputy for Serfidje, Dimitri Vlachoff, Serbian deputy for Salonica, Haristo Daltcheff, Bulgarian deputy for Serres, Volçetinli Hasan Bey, Albanian deputy for Prishtine, Vartkes Serengülyan, Armenian deputy for Erzurum, Hasan Fuad Pasha, Albanian deputy for Prishtine, and Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim. Vartkes Serengülyan and Dimitri Vlachoff, both of whom entertained socialist viewpoints, criticised the internal policy of the government, Vlachoff laying special stress on the suppression of trade unions and on the


government's failure to initiate agrarian legislation. 137

Lütfi Fikri Bey, one of the leaders of the opposition, then spoke for nearly three hours. With respect to internal affairs, he accused the government of having failed to apply even the unconstitutional measures which it had adopted with any pretense of equality. He emphasized the fact that the Democratic Party's organs were suspended almost daily, while the newspapers of the Committee of Union and Progress were allowed to write as they pleased. The Head of the Department of Public Security had committed the grave impropriety of officially informing the press that the government possessed proofs of Dr. Riza Nur's guilt. 138 He then asked for the interpellation of the government on the issue of Dr. Riza Nur's arrest. 139 He strongly criticised the Government's conduct and asked for a vote. After lengthy deliberations, his request for interpellation was rejected by a vote of ninety-six to seventy-three. 140

The criticism of the Hakki Pasha Cabinet was resumed at the December 8 sitting. The speakers were Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülcine, Mehmed Ali Fazil Efendi, the Arab deputy for Mosul, Sava Stoyanovich, the Serbian deputy for Prishtine, Haci Abdülvehab Efendi, deputy for Bolu, Pavlis Carolidis, the Greek deputy for Izmir, Hamparsoum Boyadjian, the Armenian deputy for Kozan, Janaki Mammapoulos, the Greek deputy for Argyrocastro, Nazareth Daghavarian, the Armenian deputy for Sivas, and Esad Pasha Toptan, the Albanian deputy for Durazzo. 141

137. "Turkish Policy: Critics in the Chamber", The Times, December 8, 1910, p.5.
140. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, pp.9720-9728.
141. "Chambre des Députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 9, 1910, pp.1-2; and, "The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 1135 (December 14, 1910), p.1. See also, "Turkish
After these criticisms, Hakkı Pasha made a four-hour long speech defending his cabinet. He declared that the government had ordered the arrest of Dr. Riza Nur after due consideration. A postcard addressed to him by Serif Pasha from Paris had come under the notice of the authorities. Riza Nur had denied that he had received it, but it had certainly been addressed to him. Further, Riza Nur was known to have burnt documents which were believed to be of a compromising nature. With respect to the disarmament in Albania and Macedonia, Hakkı Pasha said that it was necessary, adding that officials who had committed acts of cruelty would be punished. He added that the condition of the provinces was improving as rapidly as could be expected considering the confusion into which every department of the administration had fallen under the Hamidian regime.¹⁴²

Halil Mentese made a speech at the following sitting, on December 10. He deprecated the exaggerations in the criticisms contained in the speeches of the opposition deputies. He emphasized the real services rendered by the Committee of Union and Progress, praised the course of the Hakkı Pasha Cabinet, and proposed that the discussion be closed.¹⁴³ Finally, Mentese’s resolution that the explanations of the government deserved a vote of confidence was passed by a vote of one hundred and twenty-three against sixty-three.¹⁴⁴ This was hardly a real success for the Unionists, given the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress alone numbered one hundred and sixty-two members of whom at least one hundred and fifty were present in the Chamber at the time the vote was taken.¹⁴⁵ While Mentese’s unexpectedly conciliatory speech and promises for the relaxation of official severity had won several Greek and Bulgarian votes, some twenty-

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five members of the Committee of Union and Progress had abstained from voting. Secondly, many conservative Unionist deputies had been considerably impressed by hearing the arguments of the monarchist opposition which supported the criticisms of some of the methods of the new regime made by foreign correspondents or by short-lived organs of the monarchist opposition. 146

Despite the rejection of Lütfi Fikri Bey's interpellation by ninety-six votes to seventy-three on December 7, the closeness of the vote had already showed the extremely weakened position of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber. Encouraged by the weakness of the Unionist leadership, opposition deputies as well as dissident members of the Committee of Union and Progress asked for a cabinet change. It was expected that in the next meeting of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress the question of changes in the cabinet would be discussed. 147 The Unionist position in the cabinet somewhat strengthened on December 21, when Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, a prominent Unionist, replaced Sharif Ali Haydar as Minister of Pious Foundations. 148 On December 25, the Committee of Union and Progress held a meeting which lasted for five hours. The subject under discussion was the cabinet. Talat Bey, Minister of the Interior, was present, and his explanations resulted in a vote favourable to the cabinet. The Greek papers, however, wrote that the thirty-eight dissenting deputies had announced that if they were unsuccessful in securing the resignation of some members in the cabinet they would withdraw from the Committee of Union and Progress. 149

The political crisis was important enough to summon Dr. Nazim Bey, the President, and Haci Adil Arda, the Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, to Istanbul to attend another meeting on December 27 to discuss the demands of

the party dissidents. The meeting was stormy; dissident members were adamant in their demands, and decided to interpellate some of the ministers. Unionist deputies were unable to arrive at a definite decision with regard to the cabinet, some members suggesting that cabinet changes should be brought about by the refusal of a vote of confidence in certain ministers after they had been individually interpellated by members of the party; others urged that the cabinet should be forced to collectively resign. Hакки Pasha was believed to have expressed the intention of opposing any attempt to effect cabinet changes by the first of these methods, arguing that the latest vote of confidence was given to the cabinet as a whole.

Lütфи Fikri Bey's motion demanding a parliamentary inquiry into the arrest of Dr. Riza Nur and the ill-treatment of political prisoners was discussed in the Chamber on December 31. Lütфи Fikri Bey declared that the proceedings taken against the Secret Organisation were originally inspired by private denunciations. The inquiry was carried out, not by the Department of Public Security, but by an extraordinary commission appointed ad hoc. Another commission, presided over by a military officer, conducted an independent inquiry, but the representative of the Military Court refused to append his signature to its report. He claimed that Dr. Мünir Bey, the principal informer against Dr. Riza Nur, had been tortured with the object of extracting a confession from him. According to Lütфи Fikri Bey, evidence thus produced was worthless. He then gave a minute and circumstantial description of the tortures to which he averred members of the Secret Organisation had been subjected.

Ismail Hakki Bey, monarchist deputy for Gümülcine, declared that the Grand Vezier had threatened to resign if a parliamentary inquiry were voted. This was denied by

Hakki Pasha, who declared that the torture of political suspects did not exist in Turkey. The Chamber was free to discuss the question, and the cabinet would would deduce from its vote whether it possessed the confidence of the majority or not. Haydar Bey, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, advised deputies to pay no attention to attacks on the cabinet. After a further speech by Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey, Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Minister of War, warned the Chamber not to mix up the names of officers in the question. The debate closed with a speech from Dr. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, who, after thanking deputies on both sides of the Chamber for the interest they had taken in his case, declared that he would be satisfied if his painful experience should hereafter prove the means of obtaining greater liberty for the individual. The motion was then put to vote and defeated by ninety-six votes to seventy-three, with several Unionist deputies abstaining from recording their votes.  

Meanwhile, the issue of Dr. Riza Nur's arrest in July in connection with the Secret Organisation and allegations of torture were kept alive by the monarchists and continued to be discussed in the opposition news media. In an article in the Yeni Gazete of January 3, 1911, Gabriel Nouradunghian, one of the most prominent monarchist politicians and ex-minister of Commerce and Public Works, protested against the refusal of the Chamber to investigate charges of torture. He pointed out that capricious administrations that interfered with freedom of speech and conscience had sooner or later fallen by means of a just revolt. According to him, indifference on the part of the deputies to such fundamental rights of humanity gave cause for popular anxiety, criticism, and distrust. It was the duty of the Chamber to find out whether the provisions of the Constitution had, in the case of Dr. Riza Nur and his co-defendants, been respected or not.


In view of Gabriel Nouradunghian's and other expressions of monarchist dissatisfaction, the government decided to proceed to an investigation, in spite of the refusal of the Chamber to investigate these allegations. On January 5, Mahmud Sevket Pasha ordered the formation of a military court of inquiry to examine the alleged cases of torture of political suspects arrested as members of the Secret Organisation. The press, as a general rule, showed great satisfaction with the decision and expressed the hope that the Minister would vindicate the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. 156 Convinced of their increasing strength in the Chamber with the closeness of the vote for Lütfi Fikri Bey's motion and the formation of an opposition faction within the Committee of Union and Progress, monarchists were encouraged to begin their campaign against the Unionist leadership in the cabinet. 157

Their primary targets were Talat Bey, Minister of the Interior, and Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance. In their attempt to oust these prominent Unionists from office, they had also been encouraged by the knowledge that Mahmud Sevket Pasha, too, was highly critical of them, and that in October he had threatened Hakki Pasha with resignation if Talat and Cavid Beys remained in the cabinet. 158

Indeed, in mid-October, there had been serious dissension between Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, and Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Minister of War, on the issue of the Military Budget. The newly-formed Audit Department had refused to sanction a payment for four hundred thousand liras worth of military stores ordered by the Minister of War on

156. "Alleged Torture in Turkey", The Times, January 6, 1911, p.5. The commission of inquiry into the alleged torture of political prisoners was composed of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of War, and Ferid Bey, a distinguished artillery officer and formerly President of the Istanbul Court-Martial ("The Alleged Cases of Torture", The Times, January 11, 1911, p.5).
157. Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9729; and Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Resad Han'ın ve Halefinin Sarayında Gördüklerim, 1, pp.138-139.
account of the extraordinary military Budget for 1909. It gave as the reason for its refusal the fact that this expenditure could only be authorised under the existing Budget Law when the corresponding extraordinary receipts for that year's Budget were realised. These extraordinary receipts included the proceeds of the sale of Abdülhamid's jewelry, which was still unsold, and his deposit in the German Imperial Bank, on which the Turkish Government had not yet been able to lay its hands. Cavid Bey had upheld the decision of the Audit Department on grounds of legality.¹⁵⁹

On the night of October 16 Mahmud Sevket Pasha had visited the Grand Vezier and informed him that he should insist on the financial independence of the Ministries of War and Navy; otherwise either he of Cavid Bey should go. Then, Mahmud Sevket Pasha had suggested that the Grand Vezier should also resign in order to return to power at the head of a new cabinet in which Cavid Bey would be succeeded by Emin Bey, ex-Treasurer of the Salonika province, and Bedros Haladjian by an officer of the General Staff. Hakki Pasha had suggested that Mahmud Sevket Pasha had better wait until the Chamber of Deputies met in November, when a law embodying his views on military finance would be submitted to the representatives of the nation.¹⁶⁰

Mahmud Sevket Pasha had then visited Talat Bey, but no satisfactory solution had been found. The Committee of Union and Progress was known to be much perturbed at the turn of events.¹⁶¹ However, the crisis had been averted on October 18; in consequence of the mediation of several of his colleagues, Cavid Bey had accepted certain amendments in the new law of public accounts, which would be discussed by the Grand Vezier and the Under-Secretary of Finance.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹. "The Turkish Cabinet: Strained Relations Between Ministers", The Times, October 18, 1910, p.5.
¹⁶⁰. "The Turkish Cabinet: Strained Relations Between Ministers", The Times, October 18, 1910, p.5.
¹⁶¹. "The Turkish Cabinet: Strained Relations Between Ministers", The Times, October 18, 1910, p.5.
The parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress held a meeting on January 5 to discuss the issues concerning Talat and Cavid Beys. Tanin of January 6 gave the figures of the voting at the January 5 special meeting of the Committee of Union and Progress at which Talat Bey, Minister of the Interior, and Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, obtained votes of confidence, the former by eighty-nine votes to fifteen, the latter by ninety-one to four, several members abstaining from voting. The fact that only one hundred and four members of the party out of a nominal total of one hundred and sixty responded to the urgent whip was regarded as a sign of the growing weakness of the party. 163

163. Tanin, December 24, 1326/January 6, 1911, quoted in "Turkish Politics: The Committee Party", The Times, January 7, 1911, p.5
Chapter 11

THE EVENTS OF 1911:
CONTINUING MONARCHIST EFFORTS TO TOPPLE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME

MONARCHIST EFFORTS to create an opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress and bring about its downfall through extra-parliamentary means continued despite the exposure of the Secret Organisation. There was a considerable number of officers in the army who were highly critical of the Unionists, and the dispute between Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the Unionist leadership had encouraged them to get organised clandestinely. Colonel Sadik Bey was deeply involved in the organisation. ¹

In late September 1910, Unionist leadership had intercepted a letter by Colonel Sadik Bey, urging the officers at Monastir to join them for a military putsch.² In December, a number of junior officers in the Second Army Corps at Edirne and the Third Army Corps at Salonica formed an opposition group, criticising the Hakki Pasha Cabinet for making political appointments in the army.³ The man behind this movement was again Colonel Sadik Bey, who was arrested in Edirne but was later set free upon pressure.⁴

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Yusuf Ziya Bey, a conservative officer attached to the General Staff and formerly a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, met in January of 1911 with Dr. Nazim Bey and Ömer Naci Bey. He recommended that Talat Bey and Cavid Bey be induced or compelled to resign their portfolios. He reportedly also suggested that the Ministers in question be offered, as a sort of punishment, the Under-Secretaryships of State for the Interior and Finance respectively. These demands were rejected; but, the monarchist pressure continued. In the last days of January, Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, the deputy for Edirne and one of the leaders of the monarchist opposition, made a visit to Salonica in order to confer with the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The threat posed by the machinations of Colonel Sadik Bey and the monarchist opposition in the army along with the general unrest in the Macedonian provinces dictated a change in cabinet policy towards the ethnic minorities whose rebellion against Turkish rule and support for the monarchist cause had made the Unionist leadership sensitive to their demands at a juncture when it had come under attack by the monarchists. In early January, Bulgarian members of the Chamber sent a document to Hakki Pasha specifying many acts of cruelty and tortures alleged to have been inflicted by the courts martial in Macedonia on Bulgarian Ottomans, and requesting an investigation and the release of innocent men kept in prisons. As a result of pressure, in mid-January, the principle of centralisation in provincial administration which had drawn considerable criticism from the opposition groups in the Chamber, especially among the Albanian, Greek, and Arab deputies, was quietly withdrawn.

The withdrawal of the principle of centralisation, however, did not satisfy the monarchist opposition. The opposition wanted more. In early March, Lütfi Fikri Bey,

deputy for Dersim and one of the leaders of the monarchist opposition in the Chamber, submitted a project to the Chamber's Committee on draft laws, granting a large measure of autonomy to the province of Yemen, where the population had revolted against Turkish rule in mid-January. He proposed the appointment by the Sultan of a governor-general who would reside at Sanaa, and would be assisted by a council of five directors—for the interior, education, justice, agriculture, and public works—as well as by a legal counsellor. The legislative power was to be vested in a diet composed of the tribal chiefs, of representatives from the cities, of the higher officers of the province, and of a number of seyyids, or men educated in the religious law. According to Lütfi Fikri Bey's project, the governor-general was to have absolute veto power, subject only to appeal to the Grand Vezier. 9

Although the Unionist leadership ignored the demands of the discontented officers organised clandestinely in Monastir, Salonica, and Edirne, the issue of ministerial resignations came up in February in an altogether different context.

One of the issues that created problem between Hakki Pasha on the one hand and Mahmud Sevket Pasha, the Minister of War, and the Unionist members of the cabinet on the other was the prolongation of the state of emergency. On their February 4 meeting, Talat Bey and Mahmud Sevket Pasha had met and agreed on the necessity of the continuation of the state of emergency. However, pressed by the monarchist opposition to lift the state of emergency, Hakki Pasha was reluctant to its prolongation. At the cabinet meeting on February 6, when all Unionist ministers insisted on the continuation of emergency measures, Hakki Pasha told the cabinet that he would resign rather than prolong the state of emergency. 10 After negotiations with Talat Bey on February 7, Hakki Pasha agreed to the state of emergency only on the condition of a change in the cabinet. He told

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Talat Bey that, due to fierce monarchist opposition, retention of Bedros Haladjian and Emrullah Efendi in a reconstituted cabinet would be impossible. He also suggested that Halil Mentese, instead of Talat Bey, be appointed Minister of the Interior, as Talat Bey, too, was being opposed both by the monarchists and their allies within the military.\footnote{11}

The question of ministerial changes constituted the main discussion in the February 9 meeting of Hakki Pasha and the Unionists members of the cabinet. Hakki Pasha told the Ministers that his resignation would lead to the formation of a Said Pasha Cabinet, and, as the Unionists did not want this, this solution was out of the question. Therefore the Ministers had to resign individually. After deliberations, it was agreed that the best strategy would be the joint resignations of Bedros Haladjian and Talat Bey during the debates over the Budget in the Chamber. As to Emrullah Efendi, Hakki Pasha said that he could find no reason for his resignation, as he, along with other cabinet members, had received an overwhelming vote of confidence just two weeks previously. Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, without being able to justify his position, declared his intention of resigning unless Dimitraki Mavrocordato and Rifat Pasha did not also resign. As a possible solution to the impasse, it was even suggested that, should the Hakki Pasha Cabinet resign, either Said Pasha or Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha could form the new cabinet with Cavid Bey as the Unionist member along with Mahmud Sevket Pasha as the Minister of War. However, declaring that he had consented to work with Mahmud Sevket Pasha in the cabinet only under extraordinary circumstances and the assurances he got from Hakki Pasha himself, Cavid Bey objected to this scenario, and said that he would never consider serving in a monarchist dominated cabinet in which Mahmud Sevket Pasha retained his post. The meeting ended without any agreement.\footnote{12}

\footnote{12} Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 16", \textit{Tanin}, September 14, 1943, p.2.
On February 11, Talat Bey handed in his resignation to Hakki Pasha. His resignation, given the fact that he was the party leader and the Unionists held a majority in the Chamber and had recently been given a vote of confidence, seemed particularly odd. It provoked considerable comment in the press, which, however, seemed quite unable to give any clear explanation of the event. His resignation, however, was less the result of opposition within either the cabinet or the Chamber as it was of pressure from outside, namely Colonel Sadik Bey's. Indeed, Talat Bey was reported to have informed the members of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, at a meeting held on February 12, that the attacks of opponents within and without the party and the fact that a faction within the Committee of Union and Progress had lately shown signs of want of confidence in certain members of the cabinet had compelled him to withdraw from office. There were rumours that his resignation was only a prelude to further ministerial changes, and it was certain that the position of Cavid Bey and other Unionist ministers was less secure than had been recently the case.

At a meeting he held with Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Minister of War, and Colonel Mahmud Muhtar Bey, Minister of the Navy, on February 12, Hakki Pasha informed them of his intention to invite Halil Mentese into his cabinet as Minister of the Interior—to which


At its meeting on February 21, the Committee of Union and Progress elected Talat Bey as President of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, with Seyyid Bey, deputy for Izmir, Ali Münir Cagil, deputy for Corum, Ali Cenani Bey, deputy for Aleppo, Mansur Pasha, deputy for Benghazi, as members of the Executive Council, and Haci Ali Galib Bey, deputy for Karesi, as Treasurer (Tanin, February 9, 1326/February 22, 1911, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.87a).


the Ministers agreed on two conditions: that the cabinet should accept the proposal for a constitutional amendment concerning the dissolution of the Chamber, and that Nazim Pasha, the Governor of Baghdad who had been exiled there for his role at the monarchist schemes to overthrow the new regime, be recalled from his post to Istanbul immediately. Naturally, the Unionist leadership was against any amendment to the Constitution which might lead to a premature dissolution of the Chamber and call for new elections -especially when the party was not ready for it.

The trial of strength between the military and the Committee of Union and Progress gave rise to serious apprehensions lest Turkey became involved in a grave crisis at a moment when the government needed all its authority and attention for Macedonia, Albania, and Yemen, and for the Baghdad Railway negotiations. The question alleged to have been raised by Mahmud Sevket Pasha as to the future attitude of the Committee of Union and Progress towards the cabinet was regarded as almost an ultimatum. The decisions of the Committee of Union and Progress were consequently awaited with interest, as they were expected to show whether the Unionists were prepared to successfully resist the demands of the military or whether the trend of Turkish politics towards a military dictatorship under Mahmud Sevket Pasha would be accelerated.

The best judges of Turkish affairs were persuaded that the establishment of military dictatorship was only a question of time, possibly of a very short time, and believed that such an eventuality would clarify the outlook in many respects. The reality was that the Army's position, after the suppression of the coup attempt of April 1909, had become


supreme, and the only question was whether its supremacy would stand revealed to the
world, or continue to be masked. Practically, the issue between Mahmud Sevket Pasha
and the Unionist leadership was whether the Army would obey its chiefs alone, or whether it
would serve primarily the interests of non-military, i.e., Unionist, politicians. 19

The Unionists, however, managed to have the Ministers agree to the withdrawal of
their conditions; and proceeded with the plan. At the party meeting on February 14, the
majority, in conformity with the decisions taken at the meeting between the Unionist
leadership and Hakki Pasha on February 9, decided to withdraw their support from Bedros
Haladjian, Minister of Public Works, and Emrullah Efendi, Minister of Education, thus
forcing them to resign their posts in the cabinet. 20 At a vote following a heated debate,
Bedros Haladjian had obtained only twenty-six votes out of ninety-six. 21 The next day,
both handed in their resignations. 22 At a meeting of the parliamentary party of the
Committee of Union and Progress on February 16, sixty-five deputies voted that Halil
Mentese should be appointed Minister of the Interior, the remaining forty-eight expressing
the opinion that he should remain leader of the party. The vote, although it turned out in
favour of the Unionist leadership, clearly showed that the faction within the party was quite
strong. 23

While the government was attempting to make Parliament the political centre of

20. Mehmed Cavid. "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatiralari: 18", Tanin, September 16,
1943, p.2; and, "The Position of the Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 15,
1911, p.1.
21. "The Position of the Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 15, 1911,
p.1.
22. Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatiralari: 18", Tanin, September 16,
1943, p.2; "Turkish Politics: The Committee and the Ministry", The Times, February 16, 1911, p.5; "The
Ministry of Public Works", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 16, 1911, p.1; "The
Ministry of Public Instruction", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 16, 1911, p.1; "The
Ministry of Public Instruction", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 17, 1911, p.1; "The
Situation in Turkey: The Cabinet", The Times, February 18, 1911, p.5; and, "Empire News: The Capital",
The Orient, 1/45 (February 22, 1911), p.6.
23. "Turkish Politics: The Committee and the Ministry", The Times, February 17, 1911, p.5; "La
situation politique", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 17, 1911, p.1; and, "The Ministry
gravity, the monarchist politicians as well as the monarchist press, convinced of their strength, demanded the resignation of the Grand Vezier as the only solution to the crisis. However, strongly supported by the Unionist leadership, Hakki Pasha, was firmly resolved not to resign, and denied the existence of a crisis, on the ground that the cabinet as a whole was responsible to Parliament as a whole. After negotiations, Halil Mentese accepted the offer, and was appointed Minister of the Interior on February 17. Yet, on February 19, there were vague rumours of further resignations of members of the cabinet, notably of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Minister of War. Besides, no successors had been appointed to Emrullah Efendi and Bedros Haladjian, whose places had been temporarily filled by Hakki Pasha and Cavid Bey. However, on February 20, no further ministerial changes were reported, but it was generally believed that the life of the cabinet would be brief and troubled. In an attempt to force Hakki Pasha's resignation, the February 20 issues of Yeni Gazete and other monarchist newspapers claimed that his persistent refusal to treat the party vote of non-confidence in one minister as implying want of confidence in the whole cabinet had lowered his prestige. It was anticipated that Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, would have to face some opposition on the part of the members of both the opposition and the dissident faction within the party on the February 22 sitting of the Chamber of Deputies during which the Budget would be discussed. The position of Rifat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was also said to be insecure, and rumour -which had been officially denied- had even named Resid Pasha, Ambassador in Vienna, as his successor.

25. "The Situation in Turkey: The Cabinet", The Times, February 18, 1911, p.5; ; and, Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Resad Han'ın ve Halefinin Sarayında Görüldüklerim, I, p.136. Arar states that he was appointed Minister on February 19 (Ismail Arar, "Halil Mentese'nin Hayati ve Anıları Üzerine Tamamlayıcı Bilgiler", in [Halil Mentese], Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Mentese'nin Anıları, p.22).
27. "The Turkish Cabinet: Criticism of Hakki Pasha", The Times, February 21, 1911, p.5.
28. "Turkish Politics: The Committee of Union and Progress", The Times, February 22, 1911,
On February 22, Cavid Bey began his Budget statement in a four hours' speech, devoted in part to a reply to the attacks of certain critics, and in part to a review of Turkish financial history since the Revolution, with special reference to the last financial year. He made but a brief reference to the loan negotiations, the failure of which, he said, was not due to any hostility on the part of the French Government. In an attempt to placate both the foreign and the monarchist criticism of Unionist measures to control foreign capital in Turkey, he said that he had never dreamt of attacking any European financial establishment in Turkey—though he had to point out that these establishments had duties to the Turkish Government. As for the friendship of France and Turkey, France had many reasons for desiring to maintain good relations with Turkey—notably her enormous investments in the Turkish Funds and in Turkish commercial and industrial undertakings. Turkey, on the other hand, desired the friendship of France for sentimental and moral, as well as material, reasons—above all, on account of gratitude for the great French Revolution which, Cavid Bey acknowledged, had first opened their eyes. 29

Cavid Bey continued his Budget speech on February 23, and characteristically began by protesting against the hypercritical and pessimistic attitude of the Budget Commission. There was no need to fear that the government would demand extraordinary credits for the coming financial year. His estimates showed a revenue of twenty-eight million and six hundred thousand liras, and an expenditure of thirty-four million and five hundred thousand liras. Taking the latter figures first, he pointed out that no great increase was shown in any chapters, except those of the Ministry of Finance, where one hundred and fifty thousand liras had been added for the purchase of coastguard vessels and grants to agriculture, and under the head of debt, of which the increase, close to two million liras, was largely due to increased expenditure for pensions. Military and naval expenditure

29. "The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 1/46 (March 1, 1911), p.2; and, "Turkish Financial Policy: Speech by Djavid Bey", The Times, February 23, 1911, p.5.
would amount, in round figures, to thirteen million liras. Though he was not a supporter of the sudden increase in naval expenditure, Cavid Bey stated he recognised that the Budget of the Navy was too small considering the extent of the coastline. The pay and numbers of the gendarmerie and the police would have to be increased. Assuring the Chamber that the War Budget was moderate in proportion to that of other Powers, Cavid Bey admitted that the needs of the Ministry of War were bound to increase annually. 30

His estimate of revenue, based on the average of the last five years, was found too optimistic by the Budget Commission, who had reduced it from twenty-eight million six hundred thousand to twenty-six million and nine hundred thousand liras. Admitting this, Cavid Bey was faced by a deficit of about seven million liras. Unexpended credits and the increase of revenue during the last financial year left him with about three million liras in hand, so that the deficit was reduced to about four million liras, which he proposed to cover by loan. He believed that the government would, in a comparatively near future, arrive at financial equilibrium by the increase of existing revenues. The new house tax, where it was in thorough operation, showed an increase of fifty percent. The government hoped soon to obtain the consent of the Powers to the application of a new income tax, in substitution for the old professional tax, or temettü vergisi. The projected four percent increase in the customs duties would bring in a million and a half liras, but the realisation of the increase depended on the Baghdad Railway question, for according to the Convention, the surplus customs revenue had to be affected to the construction of this line. Preliminary discussions were now on foot in regard to the question, and would, he hoped, end favourably for Turkey. The surplus revenues were sufficient for the prolongation of the line to al-Halif; only three hundred thousand liras would be deducted from the proceeds of the proposed four percent customs surtax for this purpose. Cavid Bey also informed the deputies that he was in correspondence with the Public Debt Administration on the subject

30. "The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 1/46 (March 1, 1911), p.2; and, "The Turkish Budget: Djavid Bey's Optimism", The Times, February 25, 1911, p.5.
of the Tobacco Régie, which he hoped would be administered as a government monopoly in 1914 instead of a foreign concession. With these possibilities, he hoped in the near future to see the revenue reach thirty-five million liras, and he could confidently promise the Chamber a surplus of five million liras after the coming general elections in 1912. He concluded his Budget speech with a reference to the four railway schemes, which he considered of vital importance -namely, the Baghdad Railway, the Istanbul to Basra Chester scheme, and the Samsun-Sivas and Danube-Adriatic railways- which he hoped would soon be begun to revolutionise the life of those provinces.31

At the March 1 debate on the Budget in the Chamber, Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülçine and leader of the monarchist People’s Party, made a long criticism of Cavid Bey’s financial policy, at the close of which, after paying lip service to the loyalty of the great majority of the Turkish Jews, he hinted that Cavid Bey had shown undue preference to Jewish capitalists and their agents, some of whom he accused of favouring zionism. He also drew the attention of the Chamber to the growth of zionist propaganda in Turkey and to the efforts of the foreign Jewish agents on behalf of that cause. Gümülçineli Ismail Hakki Bey then treated the Chamber to something of an anti-climax, naming Sie Ernest Cassel and other unlikely persons as presumable zionists. Hakki Pasha explained that Sir Ernest Cassel was a member of the Anglican Church, and was an intimate friend of the late King, and therefore a true and loyal friend of Turkey. Answering the statement of Gümülçineli Ismail Hakki Bey, Talat Bey said that proposals had been made to him and to Cavid Bey by the Jewish General Colonisation Society, which they had been unable to accept. He admitted zionist activity, but said that the law preventing Jewish immigration into Palestine remained in force.32

On March 1, Babanzade Hakki Bey, deputy for Baghdad and a prominent Unionist,

was appointed Minister of Education in place of Emrullah Efendi.\textsuperscript{33} Despite this appointment, the Unionist position in the cabinet was somewhat shaky. Reportedly, divergences of opinion had arisen in the cabinet, first as to whether the government could prolong the state of siege without submitting the matter to the Chamber of Deputies, and, secondly, as regards the appointment of a successor to Bedros Haladjian. It was reported that the portfolio of Public Works should be offered to General Sami Pasha, Commander of the Havran Field Force and a kinsman of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, and that Gabriel Nouradunghian should be appointed President of the Council of State with cabinet rank. These proposals had met with strong opposition from the Unionist leadership.\textsuperscript{34} In contrast to the weakening position of the Committee of Union and Progress in the cabinet, with the prolongation of the state of siege for an indefinite period of time on March 13, Mahmud Sevket Pasha's position remained as strong as ever.\textsuperscript{35}

BY MID-APRIL, the Unionist leadership had obtained extensive and reliable information about Colonel Sadik Bey's machinations within the ranks of the party. Even in early March, it was reported from Salonica that violent dissensions prevailed among the Committee of Union and Progress. There was little doubt that the military clubs both at Salonica and at Üsküb and Monastir regarded the proceedings of the Unionist politicians with growing dissatisfaction. Some of the officers, indeed, openly hinted that a great change was in preparation. The officers who had been formerly favourable to the Committee of Union and Progress had changed sides, and the Army was stated to be

\textsuperscript{33} "The Turkish Chamber and Zionism", The Times, March 3, 1911, p.5; "The New Minister of Public Instruction", The Orient, 1/47 (March 8, 1911), p.2; and, Edwin Pears, "Developments in Turkey", p.11.

\textsuperscript{34} "The Turkish Cabinet", The Times, March 14, 1911, p.5.

wholly devoted to Mahmud Sevket Pasha and to be ready to support him should he see fit to proclaim a military dictatorship. Mahmud Sevket Pasha, however, seemed to have little political ambition, and was indisposed to extend the sphere of his activity beyond the Army. Should he resolve to take action, the remnants of constitutionalism would probably disappear, as he was known to have little admiration for parliamentary institutions. 36

On April 14, Talat Bey, Dr. Nazim Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, and Cavid Bey met and discussed matters of internal party politics. The matter that needed urgent attention of the Unionist leadership was Colonel Sadik Bey's attempts to form an opposition faction within the party when it had become apparent that trying to establish a strong opposition party by itself had not given the result monarchists desired. The information Unionist leadership received suggested that Colonel Sadik Bey had been trying, with some success, to severe some of the deputies' ties with the Committee of Union and Progress through religious propaganda. 37 Deputies who might be favourably disposed towards religious propaganda were being summoned individually to Colonel Sadik Bey's house where they were being told about the Unionist leadership's involvement with masonic lodges and the danger it posed to Islam. Reportedly, Colonel Sadik Bey had been trying to win these deputies over by arguments of cleaning the party from those "masonic and anti-religious" elements. 38

Among the deputies who had been contacted by Colonel Sadik Bey were Ali Osman Bey, deputy for Corum, Haci Mustafa Beyman, deputy for Ankara, Abdullah Azmi Torun, deputy for Kütahya, and Mehmed Talat Sönmez, deputy for Ankara -whose names came as a surprise to the Unionist leadership. There were also familiar names such as Ibrahim Vasfi

36. "Committee and Army", The Times, March 14, 1911, p.5.
Efendi, deputy for Karesi, Mehmmed Hamdi Yazır, deputy for Antalya, and Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi, deputy for Tokat, all of whom had already resigned and joined the People's Party, and Habib Bey, deputy for Bolu, Basri Dukaci, deputy for Dibre, Sekib Bey, deputy for Manisa, Ömer Fevzi Efendi, deputy for Bursa, Ömer Mümtaz Bey, deputy for Kayseri, and Ismail Sidki Bey, deputy for Aydın. 39

Unionist leadership had known for some time the involvement of Naim Bey and Yusuf Ziya Bey, along with a number of army officers, in this monarchist plot to win over some members of the Chamber to their cause. The leadership also learned that Colonel Sadik Bey had sent emissaries to Salonica and Monastir, with instructions to inform the army officers there about the differences of opinion between Mahmud Sevket Pasha and Cavid Bey, in an attempt to discredit the Unionists in the eyes of the military. 40

Apart from their influence within the military, the monarchist conspiracy had also following in the civilian bureaucracy. Highly critical of many prominent Unionists, such as Cavid Bey, Talat Bey, and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, Avlonyali Ferid Pasha, Governor of Aydın, was one of those high level bureaucrats who was intimately involved with the monarchist scheme to end Unionist influence in government through unconstitutional methods. He had made several trips to Istanbul within the last month where he had contacted discontented military elements to work out the logistics of a military uprising both in Istanbul and the provinces, to coincide with the formal defections from the Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber. 41

His anti-Unionist stand and strong preference for the monarchist cause as well as

One of the informers was Habib Bey, deputy for Bolu, himself, who first joined the New Faction but then defected back to the Unionist side (Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.310).


his involvement in the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April 13, 1909 being public knowledge, the Unionists also suspected Fitzmaurice, the First Dragoman of the British Embassy in Istanbul, who had lately been seen talking with monarchist deputies on certain occasions. Despite the Christian Socialist Reichspost of Vienna's rejection of the insinuation of Unionist newspapers that Fitzmaurice organised the monarchist agitation against the Committee of Union and Progress, the suspicions of the Unionist leadership were well founded: the conspiracy enjoyed British support. It was The Times correspondent who had reportedly approached Habib Bey, deputy for Bolu, and informed him that Cavid Bey had instructed the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress to send telegrammes denouncing him and Hoca Mecidi Efendi, deputy for Karesi. At the same time, The Times correspondent suggested that Cavid Bey's expulsion from the Ministry of Finance would result in increased British investment in Turkey. Upon receiving this intelligence, Cavid Bey expressed the Unionist concern to British representatives in two separate interviews—one with Sir Henry Babington Smith on April 28, and the other with Sir Adam Block on May 3. Apparently, Sir Adam Block was in full knowledge of Fitzmaurice's efforts at destabilising the Unionist-supported cabinet, and expressed his disapproval of these attempts to Cavid Bey.

By April 18, according to rumours, the number of discontented deputies within the Committee of Union and Progress had risen to about thirty. Other estimates put the number as high as seventy-five, or nearly fifty percent of the party. The dissensions which had long existed in the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress had

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43. Reichspost, April 23, 1911, quoted in "Turkish Politics: Opinion in Vienna", The Times, April 25, 1911, p.3.
come to a head and was likely to lead to important cabinet changes. Organised by Colonel Sadik Bey and other military figures, the dissident faction within the party had mutinied against Talat Bey’s leadership. What appeared to have brought the discontent of the deputies to a head was the election of Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor-in-chief of Tanin and a prominent Unionist deputy for Istanbul, as delegate of the Ottoman bondholders on the Council of the Public Debt Administration while he was already a member of the board of the National Bank of Turkey. Some of the provincial Unionist organs in Macedonia, which were controlled by the military officers who had joined Colonel Sadik Bey’s attempt to destroy the Committee of Union and Progress from within, were publishing violent attacks on Tanin and counselling their readers to boycott the newspaper.

The opposition movement within the party was serious enough to force the leadership to meet with these deputies on April 19. In an attempt to counter monarchist propaganda, the same day, Talat Bey, President of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, had to issue a statement denouncing that rumours of the dissolution of the party was contrary to facts. On April 20, Talat Bey also met with Colonel Sadik Bey. The latter accused the Unionist leadership of being freemasons and therefore unacceptable to his faction and put forward several demands, including resignations of several ministers from the cabinet and several deputies from the Chamber. The meeting ended without agreement.

Calling itself the New Faction, or Hizb-i Cedit, the movement represented a conservative insurrection against the supposed radical tendencies of an energetic minority

47. "Turkish Politics: Split in the Committee Party", The Times, April 19, 1911, p.5.
48. "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee Party", The Times, April 21, 1911, p.3. See also, "Turkish Politics: The Committee and the Albanian Rising", The Times, April 26, 1911, p.5.
whom the dissidents considered over-represented in the cabinet. The New Faction wanted the resignations of Hakki Pasha, the Grand Vezier, Musa Kazim Efendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, and as well as the banishment of Talat Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior, to a remote province after relinquishing his post as President of the Committee of Union and Progress. They also demanded that Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor of Tanin, resign his deputyship.

The New Faction further demanded that the new Ministers be appointed from outside the Chamber, representing, in effect, a return to the practice under the pre-revolutionary absolutist regime -the practice which the Unionists had fought so hard to change, and had finally succeeded in replacing it with a cabinet chosen from among the members of and responsible to the Parliament. Furthermore, the dissidents also demanded a return to the original Midhatian Constitution -a Constitution which excluded clauses for the establishment of representative government and a liberal democratic regime. The aim of the New Faction was clearly to restore the absolutist monarchical political regime.

At first, it looked as if the dissident deputies within the Committee of Union and Progress led by Colonel Sadik Bey had been completely successful. At the meeting held with dissidents, the Unionist leadership had to accept to consider their demands which might eventually lead to giving certain other concessions. The original regulation stipulating that members should not seek office or concessions had been reaffirmed, while an important modification was introduced granting liberty of action to a minority of the party in the Chamber when in disagreement with a two-thirds majority of the party. Up until then, in these circumstances, the minority had been compelled to vote with the majority. It was quite obvious that this modification would greatly weaken the position of the Unionist

54. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.325; and, "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee", The Times, April 22, 1911, p.5.
leadership in the Chamber and conduce to the instability of ministers.\textsuperscript{55}

On April 21, the press and the public, unconvinced by Talat Bey's denial of the existence of serious dissension in the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, discussed the rift between what might be described as the governmental and opposition sections of the Committee of Union and Progress. The press, however, was divided along party lines. \textit{Tanin}, along with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation's \textit{Azadamard}, and \textit{Turquie}, hinted at the dangers of internal anarchy and even of a repetition of the events of April 13, 1909.\textsuperscript{56} On the other hand, monarchist papers of April 21, especially \textit{Ikdam} and \textit{Yeni Gazete}, expressed their satisfaction with the latest developments in the Committee of Union and Progress. They pointed out that the internal situation had changed in the last two years, and suggested that what they misleadingly called "a little more liberalism on the part of the official majority" would not be harmful to the interests of the Empire. Congratulating Colonel Sadik Bey and the discontented deputies in the Chamber for their roles in recent developments, they expected the existing leadership to be soon forced to step down and dissidents in the Unionist ranks to take over the management of the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, monarchist opposition hoped that the first result of the alleged agreement between the dissidents and the Unionist leadership would be the fall of the Hakki Pasha Cabinet.\textsuperscript{58}

This prompted an immediate response from Hakki Pasha and the Unionist leadership. At their meeting on the same day, they decided to convene the Unionist deputies the following day and either let them know in the strongest of terms that the country needed stability at this juncture and threaten them with the government's intention of dissolving the Chamber and call for new elections should some of the deputies continue in their efforts to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee Party", \textit{The Times}, April 21, 1911, p.3; and, "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee: Opposition Demands", \textit{The Times}, April 22, 1911, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{56} "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee", \textit{The Times}, April 22, 1911, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavt Bey'i'n Hatiralari: 31", \textit{Tanin}, September 29, 1943, p.2; and, "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee", \textit{The Times}, April 22, 1911, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{58} "Turkish Politics: The Split in the Committee Party", \textit{The Times}, April 21, 1911, p.3.
\end{itemize}
undermine the party, or invite the dissidents to formally resign from the party, establish their own, and form the government themselves if they could manage to gather enough votes to support it in the Chamber. 59

On April 22, while Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın published a strongly worded editorial in Tanin, informing the public of foreign intervention in the internal politics of Turkey and describing the situation as potentially leading to anarchy and disruption, the monarchist papers prematurely celebrated their success. Cevdet Bey, proprietor of Ikdam, as well as several followers of Colonel Sadik Bey, had come to the Chamber where they were seen in a particularly joyous mood. 60

The Unionist leadership, however, managed to turn the table against the dissidents in the party meeting. Before the party meeting, the Unionists could only count on the firm support of fifty to fifty-five deputies. 61 During the debates that lasted for the whole day, the leadership successfully exploited the dissidents' lack of any coherent set of counter-arguments or an alternative programme. 62 The debates ended with the signing of a document by the one hundred and seventy members of the party which stated the recognition of the differences between the leadership and the dissidents on the general principles of the party and the decision that these differences would be fully discussed at the next congress of the party. Thus, the immediate threat to party's potential dissolution was averted. 63

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63. Tanin, April 10, 1327/April 23, 1911, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, pp.87-88; Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 31", Tanin, September 29, 1943, p.2, and "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 32", Tanin, September 30, 1943, p.2. See Tunaya for the text of the dissidents' demands which were accepted by the Committee of Union and Progress (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.186). Pears writes that the document was signed by one hundred and fifty-three deputies (Edwin Pears, "Developments in Turkey", p.13).
The Unionists accepted the New Faction's demand that deputies not be allowed to participate in business deals, nor accept government employment. The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress further agreed that party deputies could only become ministers as long as a two-thirds majority of the party approved the candidate by secret ballot. Finally, the Unionists also agreed to organise the procedure by which government employees were appointed and dismissed. In return, the New Faction would incorporate elements of the Unionist platform into its formal declaration. These included demands for progress in agriculture, commerce, and industry as well as for increased expenditure on education. Importantly, the New Faction also agreed to support the passage of constitutional amendments restricting the political role of the monarchy. 64

The monarchist press, including İkdam and Yeni Gazete, celebrated the agreement as yet another victory for the opposition. Hoca Abdülaziz Mecdi Efendi, deputy for Karesi and one of the important figures of the New Faction, published an article in which he defended conservatism, saying that "principles of conservatism would better serve the nation, ninety percent of which were conservatives themselves". Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın countered in Tanin, accusing Hoca Abdülaziz Mecdi Efendi of supporting reaction and the restoration of the old regime. 65

With respect to cabinet changes, the monarchist press was still busy expressing doubt whether the Hakki Pasha Cabinet would remain in power now that the Unionist leadership yielded to dissident pressure. Tanin, however, had no illusions on this score. Its editor, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, declared in an outspoken editorial in the April 24 issue that the leaders of the dissidents, who, he hinted, were actuated by personal jealousies, had decided to overthrow the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, of Finance,

and of Education. There was little doubt about the truth of the pressure of the dissidents for the resignation of these Ministers, though it was anticipated that the Ministers in question would await the passing of the Budget of the Ministry of Finance before taking any step. Nothing was definitely known as to their possible successors, although there seemed to be consensus of opinion that Resid Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna, was likely to succeed Rifat Pasha, and that Rasim Pasha would become Minister of the Navy, replacing Mahmud Muhtar Bey.66

Despite the joyous mood in the monarchist camp for their relative success at the April 22 meeting of the party, according to information received from trusted Unionist sources within the military, it had become apparent that Colonel Sadik Bey's influence among the officers was negligible. Once this fact was established, Hakki Pasha and the Unionist members of his cabinet expressed the opinion that Colonel Sadik Bey be dealt with swiftly. There was agreement among the ministers that he should immediately be discharged from the army.67 Cavid Bey was determined to crush the conspiracy by sending Colonel Sadik Bey before the Court Martial; the headquarters at Salonica was also insistent upon Colonel Sadik Bey's arrest.68 Among the cabinet members, only Mahmud Sevket Pasha, the Minister of War, was reluctant to take this measure, although he was told by the Grand Vezier that Colonel Sadik Bey's continued presence within the ranks of the army posed a dangerous threat to the stability of the constitutional regime.69

Unsuccessful in their attempts to convince Mahmud Sevket Pasha of the necessity of Colonel Sadik Bey's discharge from the army, or, at least, his exile from Istanbul with a commission to either Salonica or Izmir, the Unionist ministers agreed to jointly resign.

68. Edwin Pears, "Developments in Turkey", p.13; and, Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasa and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.88.
Agreeing with most of the points the Unionist ministers made, Hakki Pasha, nevertheless, told them that he would try, one more time, to reason with Mahmud Sevket Pasha.\textsuperscript{70} The same day, on April 27, the cabinet received a vote of confidence by a substantial majority of one hundred and forty-five to forty-five.\textsuperscript{71}

Armed with a strong support behind him in the Chamber, Hakki Pasha informed the Sultan that unless Mahmud Sevket Pasha promptly dealt with Colonel Sadik Bey, he would hand in the cabinet's resignation. Upon this move, the Sultan sent an urgent message to Mahmud Sevket Pasha, telling him to dismiss Colonel Sadik Bey.\textsuperscript{72} This produced the desired result, and on May 1, Mahmud Sevket Pasha finally signed the papers for Colonel Sadik Bey's exile from Istanbul to Salonica.\textsuperscript{73} According to the May 5 issue of the Viennese newspaper \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, Colonel Sadik Bey was expected to leave Istanbul within a week.\textsuperscript{74} This was certainly a blow to Mahmud Sevket Pasha. On his part, Colonel Sadik Bey, on his arrival at Salonica, was met by a large number of officers, who greeted him with every sign of enthusiasm, and escorted him in triumph to his quarters.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{THE CABINET CRISIS, however, was not over}.\textsuperscript{76} The struggle was serious, and for a time looked very dangerous. Monarchist pressure continued unabated. After much private

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Aıt Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 34", \textit{Tanin}, October 4, 1943, p.2; and, Edwin Pears, "Developments in Turkey", p.13.
\item Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914}, p.90.
\item A.A., Türkei 201, #A7812, Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg, Pera, May 13, 1911, quoted in Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasa and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.88; and, Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Aıt Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 35", \textit{Tanin}, October 5, 1943, p.2.
\item \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, May 5, 1911, quoted in "The Committee Dissensions", \textit{The Times}, May 6, 1911, p.7.
\item "Djavid Bey and the Cabinet: Grand Vizier in Difficulties", \textit{The Times}, May 8, 1911, p.5.
\item "Turkish Politics: The Committee Party", \textit{The Times}, May 1, 1911, p.5; and, Edwin Pears, "Developments in Turkey", p.13.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
discussion in the Committee of Union and Progress and the cabinet, it was agreed that Cavid Bey and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, both of whom retained the highest confidence of a large section of the Committee, should resign, but the cabinet should continue in power. Agence Ottomane, the official news agency, which had either denied the existence of a real split in the Committee of Union and Progress or had minimised its importance, confirmed on May 7 the news of Cavid Bey's impending resignation, adding that Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, Minister of Education, had announced his intention of following his colleague's example. The successors to the retiring ministers would, Agence Ottomane said, be chosen outside the Committee of Union and Progress by Hakki Pasha. Thus, only a week after the agreement with the New Faction had been made public, on May 9, Tanin, which had been publishing rumours to that effect for some days, announced the resignations of Cavid Bey and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey. It was believed that Sheik-ul-Islam Musa Kazim Efendi's resignation was only a matter of weeks. Musa Kazim Efendi, who was himself a freemason, was under pressure because of Colonel Sadik Bey's agitation against the Masonic Lodges.

A few days before these resignations, on May 3, the Unionist leadership had met with Hakki Pasha and discussed the situation of the cabinet. They had talked about the

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78. "Djavid Bey and the Cabinet: Grand Vizier in Difficulties", The Times, May 8, 1911, p.5.


possibility of the resignation of the whole cabinet and formation of either a Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha or a Said Pasha Cabinet, with limited Unionist participation. After lengthy deliberations, however, they had decided that Hakkı Pasha remain the Grand Vezier, as they believed that Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha would be too weak a Grand Vezier and thus might strengthen the position of Mahmud Sevket Pasha -which nobody, including the neutral Sultan, wanted- and that Said Pasha might be intimidated to leave office after a very short time. In either scenario, the Unionist ministers as well as Hakkı Pasha was afraid that Mahmud Sevket Pasha would be the single most strong person; on the other hand, leaving him out of office in a reconstituted cabinet would only mean to invite his return to power as a military dictator. In short, there was no choice except for the resignations of the Unionist ministers that the monarchists called for. 81

Recent events had dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the Committee of Union and Progress. In a May 13 telegramme sent from the party headquarters in Salonica to its local party branches, the Unionist leadership tried its best to portray the situation in the most favourable of terms, stressing that there was no serious disagreement between the members of the party, that division within was more rumour than reality. The telegramme nonetheless ended with a plea for unity. 82

Many felt that Cavid Bey’s forced resignation was both a distinct loss to the country and a serious blow to the Committee of Union and Progress and its ideals. 83 There were public sentiment and regret for Cavid Bey’s resignation in İzmir -where Köylü, in particular, expressed sorrow for his departure- Beirut, and Salonica. 84 A brilliant and


82. Tanin, May 1, 1327/May 14, 1911, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), pp.372-373.

83. Tanin, April 24, 1327/May 7, 1911 and April 26, 1327/May 9, 1911, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), pp.357-358; Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey'in Hatıraları: 36", Tanin, October 6, 1943, p.2; and, "The New Minister of Finance", The Orient, 2/5 (May 17, 1911), p.4.

incisive speaker, an energetic parliamentarian, he was the most outstanding personality among the parliamentary leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. His tenure in office was distinguished by the passage of several much needed reforms, notably the establishment of an Accountant-General's Department and the creation of an Inspectorate -moves which those corrupt provincial officials who had escaped the Ministry of Finance's "purification" were now beginning to feel. 85

In the May 14 editorial of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın wrote that the monarchists had succeeded first to force Talat Bey to resign his post; then Bedros Haladjian was forced to resign. With the forced resignations of Cavid Bey and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, the Committee of Union and Progress had lost almost all of its most prominent members in the Cabinet. 86 With regard to party affairs, the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress elected Seyyid Bey, a moderate Unionist deputy for Izmir, as the new President, replacing Talat Bey, who had been forced by the New Faction to withdraw his candidacy for re-election. Seyyid Bey's election was interpreted to be the result of a compromise between the leaders of the two groups in the party. 87

Unsatisfied with mere resignations, the monarchists' aim was to push for the formation of a non-party cabinet. The Unionists opposed the idea, for if such a cabinet were to take power, the government would once again be in the hands of the monarch pashas of the old regime, signalling the end of Turkey's new constitutional regime. 88

The Unionists, however, did succeed in naming moderate members of their party to the vacant ministerial posts. Abdurrahman Seref Bey was appointed the Minister of Education, and Nail Bey, a Committee of Union and Progress senator who had been

86. Tanin, May 1, 1327/May 14, 1911, quoted in Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 6 (April 25-October 17, 1936), p.358.
Minister of Education in the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, replaced Cavid Bey as Minister of Finance. The Unionist leadership felt that, though he was not as brilliant as Cavid Bey, Nail Bey was the best man both for the job as well as Unionist interests. In the second half of May, however, there would be two more new appointments to the Cabinet which would tip the balance against the Committee of Union and Progress. These were the appointments of Hulusi Bey, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works, as Minister of Public Works on July 4, replacing Bedros Haladjian, and Istanbulian Efendi, Judicial Inspector, as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs on July 7. What was significant was the fact that neither was a member of either the Senate or the Chamber, indicating a regression to absolutist bureaucratic control of the executive branch.

Meanwhile, anti-Unionist pressure was kept up. Tanzimat, an organ of the monarchist opposition, having published a violent attack upon Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın in its May 17 issue, and Tanin having replied with its usual vigour on May 18, both newspapers were suppressed by order of the Court Martial, which seemingly gave further proof of impartiality by ordering the Greek Neologos and the Pan-Islamic Sirat-ul-Mustakim to suspend publication. Tanin nonetheless continued to appear under such different names as Cenin, Senin, Renin, and the like. Unable to control Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the actions of the Court Martial, it was clear that the Unionist-supported government was


93. "Suppression of Turkish Newspaper", The Times, May 19, 1911, p.5.
essentially powerless against the military. 94

While Tanin was being suppressed, the monarchist press was left free to publish, on May 21, a manifesto of Colonel Sadik Bey criticising Unionist policy and asking the Unionist officers to leave politics by resigning from the party. 95 Only Osmanischer Lloyd commented on the true nature of the manifesto by writing that what Colonel Sadik Bey really wanted was the involvement of the military in politics - as long as it corresponded to his political views. 96 In addition, monarchist Ikdam published a letter from Colonel Sadik Bey, in which he demanded his return from Salonica to Istanbul. 97

Following Colonel Sadik Bey's manifesto, Mahmud Sevket Pasha issued a declaration on May 24, addressing all military officers. Conceding the fact that during the events leading up to the Revolution of 1908 the military was heavily involved in politics, Mahmud Sevket Pasha justified it on grounds of necessity. According to him, as the Revolution had succeeded and the constitutional regime established, there was no justification for the continued involvement of the officers in politics. He ended his declaration with the threat that he would punish all officers who continued to involve themselves in politics. 98

By May 29, Colonel Sadik Bey was forced to resign and placed on the retired list. 99 He immediately returned from Salonica to Istanbul, where one of Mahmud Sevket

99. "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, May 29, 1911, p.1; and, Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevcket Pasa and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.89.
Pasha's Aides-de-Camp and many of the principal officers of the Ministry of War came to welcome him on his arrival on May 29. In sharp contrast to ex-Colonel Sadik Bey's reception, the fact that the officers of the local garrison had taken no part in greeting Talat Bey on his visit to Salonica was interpreted as proof that military sympathies in general were on the side of the monarchist dissidents. The belief that this was the case would have encouraged the latter to disregard the menaces of the violent Unionist organs published in Salonica and other Macedonian towns, had not one of the bitterest of these newspapers exposed the hollowness of their threats by opening its columns to a list of names of persons ready to march on Istanbul and destroy the forces of reaction.

Now a private citizen, ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, however, continued his political activities in Istanbul. Although his subversive activities were geared towards inciting a military unrest with the aim of instituting a monarchist government in place of a constitutional one, the martial law authorities did nothing. On its part, the cabinet could not even expel him out of the capital for fear of opposition from military circles.

The final session of the Chamber of Deputies was particularly sensational. The Senate refused to approve certain articles which the Chamber had appended to the Budget Law for the year 1911. The articles in question proposed that the government increase the deductions for pension from the salaries of the civilian employees from five percent to seven and a half percent, and slash military pensions by twenty to twenty-five percent, depending on the beneficiary's seniority. The Senate maintained that such amendments in pension law could not singly be "tacked on" to a money bill. In spite of the Minister of War's eloquent appeal on his officers' behalf, the Chamber refused to alter its decision, stating that the articles in question were an integral part of a larger financial measure.

101. "Turkish Politics: The Army and the Committee", *The Times*, June 2, 1911, p.5.
Finally, the amendments were approved in the Chamber of Deputies by the Unionist majority. The Senate, however, proved intransigent, and for eighteen hours both groups battled it, but to no avail. Daybreak finally ended the Parliament's third session, the Senate remaining in opposition to the amendments. 103

Most felt that the Cabinet would postpone its decision on the pension issue until Parliament's next session. This ending of the session in a deadlock created an unsatisfactory impression, which was heightened by a tardy realisation of the fact that the deficit in the Budget, if exaggerated by opposition deputies, was nevertheless dangerously large. Mahmud Sevket Pasha's failure -his first- to obtain a credit from the Chamber was also much commented upon in parliamentary circles. 104 Public opinion was largely indifferent to the positions taken in the Chamber and in the Senate, save in military circles, where most attacked the Chamber and praised the largely conservative and monarchist Senate. 105 The press was divided on the subject of the conflict between the Senate and the Chamber, monarchist newspapers adopting the contention of the Senate that the Chamber, in voting the addition to the Budget Law of the articles relating to pensions for civilian and military functionaries, was guilty of tacking, while the liberal press followed the majority of the deputies in maintaining that these articles were an integral part of the financial law in question. 106

COINCIDING WITH THE SULTAN'S STATE VISIT to the Albanian provinces in June, civilian members of the Committee of Union and Progress demonstrated throughout Macedonia, hoping to rally enough support to carry the party congress which was to be held in Salonica

in late September. Meanwhile, the conservative clique in the party, led by ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, worked hard in Edirne and Istanbul in the hopes of garnering considerable Arab and Albanian support. By August, however, it was certain that the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress would both disavow and expel ex-Colonel Sadik Bey and his supporters at the upcoming Congress.

By the beginning of July, rumours for a monarchist takeover of government had become rife. Monarchist offensive against the Committee of Union and Progress started with articles in monarchist newspapers calculated to discredit Unionists in the public eye. In its July 4 issue, the monarchist Sahrah reproduced the translation of a long article from the well-known Arab divine Sheikh Rashid Rida, of Cairo, which had been recently published by al-Manar, an Arabic monthly review devoted to political, religious, and philosophical questions. In the article, which dealt with the causes of the recent split in the Committee of Union and Progress, Sheikh Rashid Rida claimed to have made the acquaintance of the great majority of the senators and deputies of all parties and of many of the leading monarchist statesmen, soldiers, and authors. Ascribing the split in the party to a variety of causes, he claimed that, in the first place, the Unionists had grown unpopular through their interference in all the departments of state. Unionist supporters in the cabinet, the central bureaucracy, and the military were numerous and well organised, and the rules of its party discipline extended even to cabinet ministers who had taken the oath of allegiance to it. In a provocative tone, he alleged that the entire control of the parliamentary


110. "The Sins of "Young Turkey"", The Times, July 7, 1911, p.5.
party of the Committee of Union and Progress had fallen into the hands of Talat Bey, Cavid Bey, Halil Mentese, and Rahmi Evrenos, with Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey in the second line. The decisions of a two-thirds majority being binding on the party, the vote of forty members out of a quorum of sixty might carry the day against what he alleged the opposition of the silent majority, and the Unionist leadership was the more certain of success owing to the general belief that it enjoyed the support of Salonica. 111

Political freemasonry, said Sheikh Rashid Rida, was another cause of the split. He alleged that all the most important members of the Committee of Union and Progress were freemasons, and great efforts were made to induce those members of the cabinet who were not already members to join the lodges. In an attempt to gather political support from the religious conservatives, Sahra article claimed that the object of freemasonry was the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate, and the gradual elimination of the sharia, but its aims were complicated by the presence in the lodges of strong Jewish influences, working in favour of zionism and also for the exploitation by Jewish capitalists of the Ottoman provinces of Syria and Palestine. Sheikh Rashid Rida wrote that the inner ring of the Committee of Union and Progress also aimed at the turkification of the Empire and the sustituation of the Turkish for the Arabic language in certain Asiatic provinces and also as the religious language of the Empire. He concluded his article by ascribing the temporary success of the insurrection within the Committee of Union and Progress to the determined opposition of Colonel Sadik Bey to the Unionist leadership. 112

Coinciding with the Sahra article, in its July 4 issue, Tanzimat, now appearing under the name of Matbuat, published an interview Lütfi Fikri Bey, its editor, had conducted with Kamil Pasha. Strongly critical of the Unionists and their domestic policies,

Kamil Pasha answered a question with respect to the situation in Yemen and Albania by saying that he was in favour of decentralisation -which meant giving autonomy, possibly independence, to these nations. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçin defended Unionist policy in Tanin, then Renin; despite this, Kamil Pasha reiterated his views in a further interview with Lütfi Fikri Bey.

The July 6 issue of Neue Freie Presse printed an unconfirmed report that the aged monarchist Kamil Pasha was to supersede Hakki Pasha as Grand Vezier in order to make peace with the Albanians, who had, once again, revolted in April of 1911 and still continued to resist Turkish military forces. The July 9 issue of the monarchist Yeni Gazete -which ventilated Kamil Pasha's views on political affairs- urged the government to settle the Albanian question once for all by the adoption of a policy of conciliation, and condemned the system of bargaining with the rebels, to the accompaniment of successive prolongations of the amnesty, as injurious to Turkish prestige.

In the first week of July, Nazim Pasha, who had earlier approached the Unionist leadership with the hopes of gaining political power by the backing of the Committee of Union and Progress, entered into further negotiations for either his Grand Veziership or his Ministry of War. A political opportunist, the monarchist Nazim Pasha had in mind to exploit the existing differences of opinion between Mahmud Sevket Pasha and the Unionist leadership. Unionists promised nothing, though they told Nazim Pasha that they had no hard feelings against him.

From Paris, Serif Pasha and his Parti Radical Ottoman also worked to undermine

114. This interview is published in "An Ex-Prime Minister on Turkish Policy", The Near East, August 9, 1911, p.316.
115. Neue Freie Presse, July 6, 1911, quoted in "The Sins of "Young Turkey"", The Times, July 7, 1911, p.5.
the Unionist dominated coalition government. In a letter sent to The Near East, he accused the Committee of Union and Progress in the strongest of terms of being insincere in its belief in liberal democratic principles. Attempting to win the military's support, he attributed the ills of the existing situation to the Committee's hold over the military and its ability to order military operations, stating that certain commanders took their orders directly from the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress. Finally, noting that Great Britain had lent its support to the Kamil Pasha Cabinet, Serif Pasha wrote that when the time came to topple the constitutional regime, he hoped Great Britain would not deny the monarchists the same help. 118

ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 10, Zeki Bey, a chief secretary in the Public Debt Administration, was shot dead while returning to his house in Bakirköy. Zeki Bey, who had been arrested after the coup attempt of April 13, 1909, but had been acquitted by the Court Martial, was a clever and hard-hitting monarchist journalist, who had helped at the time of the split in the Committee of Union and Progress to found Sahrah, an extremely monarchist newspaper which, despite sundry changes of name consequent upon suppressions by the Court Martial, had not lost an opportunity of attacking the Unionist leadership in the most vigorous terms. It was suspected that Zeki Bey's murder was committed by extremists, who supposed that he had entered into negotiations with Colonel Sadik Bey with the object of joining his party. This hypothesis was strengthened by the arrest of Nazim Bey, brother of Dervis Bey, Unionist deputy for Serres. 119 A perquisition at the house of a relative of Nazim Bey resulted in the discovery of documents which, it was believed, would throw considerable light on the crime. It appeared that Zeki Bey had incurred the ire of the

118. Serif Pasha, "Turkey and Great Britain", The Near East, July 12, 1911, p.221.
119. "Mystérieux assassinat", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 12, 1911, p.1; "Political Murder in Turkey: Two Arrests", The Times, July 12, 1911, p.5. Dervis Bey, who was summoned to appear before the Prosecutor General's Office in connection with the murder of Zeki Bey, was believed to have fled to Bulgaria ("The Macrikeui Murder", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, July 13, 1911, p.1; and, "The Difficulties of Turkey: The Murder of Zeki Bey", The Times, July 15, 1911, p.5).
Unionists not only by entering into negotiations with ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, but by publishing a translation of an article in the Egyptian review *al-Manar* which drew attention to the revolutionary political activity of the Young Turk Masonic Lodges.\(^{120}\) By July 12, three persons -Nazim Bey, Ahmed Agha, and Ferid Bey, all of Serres- had been arrested for Zeki Bey's murder. After some unconvincing explanations, they had made admissions of the most damaging character, and were later identified by eyewitnesses of the murder.\(^{121}\) A preliminary inquiry on August 25 resulted in the committal for trial of Ahmed Agha and Nazim Bey, the former on a charge of murder, the latter as an accomplice.\(^{122}\)

The murder appeared to be as stupid as it was criminal. Though the victim was a man of considerable influence and an active supporter of ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, the advantage of eliminating him would hardly have seemed to men in their senses commensurate with the disadvantage of directing foreign attention to the Unionist methods at so critical a moment in Turkish affairs, a moment, moreover, when the Committee of Union and Progress was struggling desperately against the conservative and monarchist forces that had for some months past been getting organised and growing in strength. The fall of Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, despite the Unionist efforts to maintain him in office, was the first serious sign that things in Turkey were deteriorating. Although the crime appeared to have no direct connection with the insurrection in Albania -save in so far as the victim was a personal friend of the monarchist Albanian deputy Ismail Kemal Bey, who now had been actively working for the success of the Albanian revolt, and that *Sahrah* had advocated the granting of autonomy to Albania- it was supposed that public disapproval of the murder might strengthen the hands of those monarchist politicians like Kamil Pasha who desired to give Albanian rebels extensive concessions, which, in effect,

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amounted to recognising their independence. 123

Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim and editor of Tanzimat -the official organ of the monarchist Moderate Liberals now appearing under the name of Merih- bade farewell to his readers in the July 13 issue, "until the revolver ceased to be an instrument of discussion", in a leading article in which he roundly accused the Unionists of having planned Zeki Bey's murder. 124

By mid-July, news of ex-Colonel Sadik Bey's efforts of reorganising the monarchist opposition by accomplishing the secession of a number of deputies from the Committee of Union and Progress became rife. The July 18 issue of the monarchist newspaper Yeni Gazete wrote that, at the beginning of the upcoming parliamentary session, several deputies belonging to the Committee of Union and Progress would resign to join the Ottoman Union, the party to be formed by ex-Colonel Sadik Bey. 125 By the end of the month, ex-Colonel Sadik Bey applied to the authorities to establish a political journal, Misak, as Ottoman Union's official organ. 126 By mid-September, the preparations for the new party were almost complete. Alemdar of September 14 announced that it would print the party's programme after the establishment of the Ottoman Union. 127

ALTHOUGH RUMOURS, both of an impending cabinet change and of the convocation of an extraordinary session of Parliament to which the Albanian policy of the Hakki Pasha Cabinet was to be submitted, were current at the end of July, they were denied by the organs of the Committee of Union and Progress. It was generally believed that there would be no changes in the cabinet until after the Unionist congress was held at Salonica in late

123. "The Salonika Committee and the Crime", The Times, July 13, 1911, p.5.
127. Alemdar, September 1, 1327/September 14, 1911, quoted in "Le parti de Sadik bey", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, September 14, 1911, p.2.
September. At the congress, the demands of the New Faction would be discussed, and the party would consider the position of ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, who continued to work on behalf of the monarchists and had obtained definite promises of support from between forty and fifty nominally Unionist deputies. 128

The situation of the cabinet remained a difficult one. It had been fatally handicapped since its reconstruction by a legacy Albanian, Arab, and Macedonian troubles, and the thinly-veiled hostility of the monarchist opposition and the non-Turkish communities. To the discontented elements -Albanian, Arab, Greek, and Bulgarian- must now be added the Armenians of the powerful Armenian Revolutionary Federation, whose organ, Azadamard, had started publishing vigorous attacks on the internal policy of the Hakkı Pasha Cabinet, which it compared to that of the Hamidian regime. Annoyance at the shelving of the Chester railway scheme, the revival of attacks on the Armenians of Mus, Bitlis, and Van by Kurdish beys, and the loss by the Armenians of the Ministry of Public Works -for which the appointment of Istanbullian Efendi to be Minister of Posts and Telegraphs was regarded as a poor consolation- explained this change of attitude on the part of the best organised political group in Turkey. 129

The attitude of Moslem Istanbul had also to be taken into account. To the ill-feeling caused by such incidents as the murder of Zeki Bey, and by some misguided attempts which had been made by part of the press to explain away this stupid crime, must be added the discontent engendered by economic causes, notably by the general increase in rents and in the price of food and charcoal which had been a marked feature of the past two years. The latest fires, which had destroyed whole quarters and rendered scores of thousands of people homeless, were not calculated to improve the situation. Rumours of the return of "elder statesmen", i.e., Kamil and Said Pashas, had become rife. However, it was certain

128. "The Internal Situation in Turkey: Widespread Discontent", The Times, August 2, 1911, p.3.
that neither Kamil Pasha nor Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, nor Ferid Pasha would accept office without ample guarantees that the Unionists would adopt and enforce a policy of "hands off" in matters of internal administration. 130

On August 9, newspapers announced the appointment of Rifat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to be Turkish Ambassador to France. 131 The August 13 issue of Tanin, commenting on the appointment of Rifat Pasha as Ambassador in Paris, hinted that the time of Hakki Pasha's resignation was approaching. The cabinet, according to Tanin, had outlived its utility after the resignation of Talat and Cavid Beys, and other Unionist ministers. Already, a large number of Unionists objected to Hakki Pasha, whose Cabinet was described by Tanin as a "patchwork cloak retaining few vestiges of its original Unionist colour". 132 In an interview with The Near East, Halil Halid Bey, a Unionist, also criticised the cabinet, saying that such men as Hakki Pasha and Rifat Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, men who had both served the old monarchist regime until the end, were to be blamed for the diminution, since the early days of the Revolution, of the new regime's popularity among the European public opinion. 133

The announcement of Rifat Pasha's resignation of the Foreign Ministry, the approaching return of Cavid Bey from Kurdistan, and the absence of Halil Mentese from the Sublime Porte gave rise to rumours of the impending fall of the cabinet, which was naturally desired by the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress who wished to see Hakki Pasha resign before the Unionist congress at Salonica in late September. His resignation would strengthen the demand of the party leadership for an entirely Unionist cabinet, but it was realised that there were difficulties in the way of any scheme that would

130. "The Internal Situation in Turkey: Widespread Discontent", The Times, August 2, 1911, p.3.
131. "News Turkish Ambassador to France", The Times, August 10, 1911, p.3.
132. Tanin, July 31, 1327/August 13, 1911, quoted in "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, August 30, 1911, p.387, and in "Turkish Politics: The Committee and the Cabinet", The Times, August 14, 1911, p.3.
involve the "disembarking" of the Grand Vezier during the parliamentary vacation. 134

Throughout late August, the Turkish press continued to speculate about Hakki Pasha's resignation and the formation of a Said Pasha Cabinet, all of which would theoretically take place during the first weeks of the Parliament's fourth session in mid-October. Some Unionists hinted that Said Pasha's Cabinet would be transitory, that the Unionists would take advantage of the dispute between the Senate and the Chamber to bring about the dissolution of the Parliament, and that a thoroughly Unionist Cabinet would be placed in power after the Unionist triumph in the general elections. 135

During late August, Unionist financial policy came once again in direct conflict with the Budget of the Ministry of War. The cabinet was engaged in the discussion of the divergence of opinion which had arisen between Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Minister of War, and Nail Bey, Unionist Minister of Finance, on the subject of the Army Budget for 1912-1913. Nail Bey, who had consistently opposed the tendency prevalent in almost all the Ministries to submit inflated estimates of expenditure at the beginning of each financial year and to ask the Chamber for credits which could not be expended during its course, desired to reduce the Army Estimates from nine million liras to eight million. The Minister of War did not accept the proposal. 136

Tanin of August 28 asserted that Mahmud Sevket Pasha's refusal to submit the Ministry of War accounts to the direct control of the Accountant General's Department of the Ministry of Finance was the direct the cause of Nail Bey's unwillingness to grant the nine million liras Mahmud Sevket Pasha desired. Tanin wrote that however great his confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the Minister of War, no Minister of Finance would accept an indefinite prolongation of this anomalous state of affairs, adding that if Sevket Pasha insisted on its maintenance, he would find himself unable either to form or to

136. "Turkish Ministerial Differences: Mahmud Sevket Pasha and Nail Bey", The Times, August 29, 1911, p.3.
enter a new cabinet. Tanin's criticisms of Mahmud Sevket Pasha caused considerable comment: they were regarded as an indication of the hostility of the Unionist leadership. There was, indeed, no doubt that the Unionist leadership had taken advantage of the ministerial differences arising on the Budget question with the object of forcing a cabinet crisis, and, incidentally, of weakening the position of Mahmud Sevket Pasha.

The August 29 issue of the conservative daily Sabah published an account of a conversation between its editor and Mahmud Sevket Pasha, who declared that his difference of opinion with Nail Bey had no reference to the question of the Army Accounts, but was caused solely by the latter's desire to reduce the Army Budget. On his part, Nail Bey declared his determination to resign if the Minister of War insisted on the increase of the Army Budget. Allegedly, he was supported by Hakki Pasha. Military feeling, on the whole, favoured Mahmud Sevket Pasha, who was visited by a deputation of officers. They expressed regret at the criticisms of the general's policy, and promised him unswerving support. Although in limited circulation, rumours had been spread by the monarchists that Mahmud Sevket Pasha had joined ex-Colonel Sadik Bey's group. In order to avoid further damage, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçin, in his editorial in the September 3 issue of Tanin, denied the rumours.

By early September, the Unionists approached Mahmud Sevket Pasha and told him about their intention of forming a Haci Adil Arda Cabinet, in which he was promised to retain his position as Minister of War. Mahmud Sevket Pasha, however, rejected this since

137. Tanin, August 15, 1327/August 28, 1911, quoted in "Turkish Ministerial Differences: Mahmud Sevket Pasha and Nail Bey", The Times, August 29, 1911, p.3.
138. "Mahmud Shevket and His Colleagues: Activity of the Left", The Times, September 1, 1911, p.3.
139. Sabah, August 16, 1327/August 29, 1911, quoted in "The Turkish Ministerial Differences", The Times, August 30, 1911, p.3.
140. "The Ministerial Crisis", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 29, 1911, p.1; and, "The Crisis in the Turkish Cabinet: The Army Estimates", The Times, August 31, 1911, p.3.
141. "The Turkish Ministerial Differences", The Times, August 30, 1911, p.3.
142. Tanin, August 21, 1327/September 3, 1911, cited in "The Turkish Ministerial Differences", The Times, September 4, 1911, p.3.
he was opposed to the formation of a distinctly Unionist cabinet. Instead, he indicated his willingness of forming a cabinet under his grand veziership, with ministers from the Committee of Union and Progress. He had no objections to Haci Adil Arda and Cavid Bey as possible ministers in his cabinet. However, as news arrived that the rank and file of the party, which partly remained under the influence of ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, would object to the formation of an outright Unionist cabinet, the Unionist leadership decided to leave the question of a restructured "Unionist" cabinet until after the end of the party congress to be held in late September. 143

When it became apparent that the military wing of the monarchist opposition was intransigent and bent on destroying the Committee of Union and Progress rather than negotiate with the Unionists for sharing power, the leadership of the party decided to exclude ex-Colonel Sadik Bey's New Faction and strike a deal with the civilian members of the monarchist opposition. In this attempt to deal with Prince Sabahaddin and others alone, the Unionists also hoped to sever the ties between the two groups, and isolate the military faction, thus eliminating military threat to constitutional rule.

During September, the Unionist leadership entered into negotiations with the monarchist opposition, who had already expressed their desire to share governmental responsibility since July. In addition to tactical reasons calculated to drive a wedge between the two monarchist groups, both domestic troubles -mainly, the unrest in Albania and Yemen- and the international dispute between Italy and Turkey over Tripoli had also made it imperative that Unionists seek support for the formation of a coalition government. Besides, the military wing of the monarchist opposition led by ex-Colonel Sadik Bey had been working hard to discredit the Unionists in public on the issue of the dispute over Tripoli between Turkey and Italy. 144

The Unionist leadership first approached Prince Sabahaddin, the leader of the monarchist opposition, and offered him a post in a Unionist-led coalition government. They also stated that they were prepared to give concessions on the issue of centralisation, accepting certain points of Prince Sabahaddin’s decentralisation programme. Though Dr. Nihad Resad Belger, one of Prince Sabahaddin’s closest colleagues, expressed enthusiasm, Prince Sabahaddin rejected the offer, saying that he was not interested in a cabinet position. Unionist leadership then met with Murad Bey, formerly editor of Mizan, in an effort to enlist his intervention for a rapprochement between the civilian members of the monarchist opposition and the Committee of Union and Progress.  

Additionally, Talat Bey talked with Lütfi Fikri Bey, one of the opposition leaders in the Chamber, who was busy at that time trying to establish a monarchist party with the help of ex-Colonel Sadik Bey to counter Unionist influence in the Chamber. Negotiations started with Lütfi Fikri Bey and other members of the soon-to-be-formally-established Entente Libera. Greek deputies would form an important bloc within the new party. Therefore, Lütfi Fikri Bey demanded that Yorgos Boussios, deputy for Serfidje, and Pantoleon Cosmidis, deputy for Istanbul and owner of several monarchist newspapers, be included in the proposed coalition government. The Unionists, however, were categorically opposed to the presence of monarchist Greek deputies in the cabinet and, as a consequence, negotiations broke off.  

Then came another dispute between Nail Bey, the Minister of Finance, and Mahmud Sevket Pasha, the Minister of War.  

liras, the Ministry of the Interior's by two hundred and twenty thousand liras, the Ministry of Education's by one hundred and fifty thousand liras, the Ministry of Public Works' by one hundred and fifty thousand liras, and the Ministry of Mines and Forests' by sixty thousand liras. Along with other fiscal measures, these proposed reductions would reduce the budget deficit by two and a half million liras. Expressing their readiness to somewhat reduce their estimates, Nail Bey's colleagues did not, however, think that the deficit could be reduced by more than a million liras. Mahmud Sevket Pasha, in particular, found a reduction of more than one hundred and fifty thousand liras in the military budget completely unacceptable. It was finally agreed that the members of the Cabinet, each accompanied by his chief accountant, would meet at the Ministry of Finance to make a final decision on the matter. 148 Though the question of reductions in the military budget was left unresolved following the meeting, the remainder of the Cabinet yielded to Nail Bey's proposals and made the requisite reductions. 149

_Tanin_ immediately published a leading article which criticised the Minister of War, and provoked a certain amount of resentment among the officers of the General Staff. 150

_Nur-u Hakikat_, of Monastir, and _Silah_, of Salonica -both Unionist newspapers- also published violent attacks on Mahmud Sevket Pasha. The entry of _Silah_ into Istanbul was prohibited. 151 Several Macedonian newspapers, like _Rumeli_ and _Silah_, generally thought to represent the views of the Unionists' military wing, continued publishing bitter attacks on Mahmud Sevket Pasha's behaviour. 152

**THE CONGRESS OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS** was scheduled to open

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148. "Turkish Finance and the War Minister", _The Times_, September 13, 1911, p.3; and, "Constantinople Letter", _The Near East_, September 20, 1911, p.463.
151. "Press Attacks on the Turkish War Minister", _The Times_, September 14, 1911, p.3.
on the last day of September.\footnote{153} Cavid and Talat Beys left Istanbul for Salonica on September 24.\footnote{154} Sixty-one members would take part, fifty-five as ordinary members, representing the provincial organisations, the Central Committee of Salonica, the parliamentary party, the Committee inspectors, and the local authorities. Six would be extraordinary members, representing the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Though the Congress would be convened to discuss vital issues of policy, it was uncertain whether the six representatives of the Senate and the Chamber would have more than a consultative role.\footnote{155}

No previous Unionist congress had been awaited with such uncertainty as to its outcome; for the movement under ex-Colonel Sadik Bey for the organisation of a secessionist group or party was so popular in monarchist quarters as to inspire no little uneasiness in Unionist circles. It was expected that the congress would make every effort to strengthen the bonds that united all wings of the party. The recent tour of Cavid Bey and Ömer Naci Bey in eastern Anatolia, especially in the Van and Bitlis provinces and along the Black Sea coast, had been timed to increase the prestige and influence of the Committee of Union and Progress in that region, and make it possible for it to win support there during the upcoming 1912 general elections which would be critical -because two crises were approaching.\footnote{156}

First, there was the cabinet crisis. Although the divergence of opinion between Mahmud Sevket Pasha and Nail Bey on the subject of the Budget of the Ministry of War would probably be amicably settled, it was a fact that the Hakki Pasha Cabinet was by no means on a secure footing. A week before the opening of the congress, Rumeli, the organ of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica, had expressed its dissatisfaction with

\footnotesize{153. "The Salonika Congress", \textit{The Times}, September 15, 1911, p.3.  
156. "The Turkish Elections", \textit{The Times}, September 8, 1911, p.3; and, "Committee of Union and Progress to Meet", \textit{The Orient}, 2/24 (September 27, 1911), p.2.}
the way government was run. Failure of the statesmen, Rumeli wrote, had made it imperative for the Unionists to take action immediately. Instead of trying to influence the events from outside, the paper recommended taking direct responsibility of governing the country. According to Rumeli, only then everybody would see clearly to what extent and for how long a period the statesmen, who had been appointed on the ground of their experience, had been a failure. As the article in Rumeli showed, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress would prefer running the government directly, rather than controlling the dummy players from behind the screen.

Second, there was the issue of the general elections: the coming session of the Chamber was its fourth and last. Elections would be held for a new Chamber, and it would be in the best interests of the Committee of Union and Progress to patch up the differences between the leadership and the dissidents in the party.

THE WHOLE POLITICAL SITUATION, however, changed on September 28. That day, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires relayed an ultimatum to the Turkish Government, informing it that in consequence of its failure to meet the demands of the Italian Government, Italian troops would occupy Tripoli and Benghazi. The Turkish Government was given twenty-four hours to communicate the news to the garrisons of these towns.

For some weeks past, there had been much diplomatic discussion concerning the Italian demands on Tripoli. Several cabinet meetings had taken place to discuss the issue. In his meeting with Cavid Bey on September 20, Hakki Pasha told him that war

157. "Committee and Cabinet", The Orient, 2/23 (September 20, 1911), p.3.
158. "Committee of Union and Progress to Meet", The Orient, 2/24 (September 27, 1911), p.2.
159. "Committee of Union and Progress to Meet", The Orient, 2/24 (September 27, 1911), p.2.
161. "Italy and Tripoli: Turkish Uneasiness", The Times, September 21, 1911, p.3.
might be unavoidable. Entering into negotiations with the Italian government concerning
economic concessions would be another alternative which neither Hakki Pasha nor the
Unionist leadership wanted.\footnote{162} Indeed, the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires in Paris stated in
the September 24 issue of \textit{Le Temps} that he had no knowledge of any negotiations
between Turkey and Italy with regard to Tripoli.\footnote{163} Therefore, it was agreed that there was
no other way out except for fighting against the Italians should they declare war on Turkey.
Conceding defeat without a fight no matter how poor the prospects of winning it might be
would open up the way for the eventual dismemberment of the empire.\footnote{164}

Turkish Government demanded the intervention of Germany and Austria-Hungary
on Turkey’s behalf.\footnote{165} On September 25, Cavid Bey met with Baron Marschall von
Bieberstein, the German Ambassador, who, though sympathetic to the Turkish side,
nevertheless suggested that Turkey give some economic concessions to Italy. He told that
there was animosity among the European Powers against Turkey for its policy of not letting
foreign capital enter into the country. Thus, he insinuated the necessity of giving in to the
Italian demands pertaining to economic matters. His behavior also suggested that Germany
would not openly side with Turkey should Italy declare war on Turkey.\footnote{166} That same day,
Hakki Pasha talked with the German Ambassador, and acknowledged his readiness to
grant certain economic concessions to Italy as long as Tripoli remained Turkish
territory.\footnote{167}

In the meeting the Unionist leadership held with Hakki Pasha on the night of

\footnote{162} Mehmed Cavid, “Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey’in Hatıraları: 45”, \textit{Tanin}, October 15, 1943, p.2.
\footnote{163} “The Tripoli Question: Benevolent Neutrality of France”, \textit{The Times}, September 25, 1911, p.3.
\footnote{164} Mehmed Cavid, “Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey’in Hatıraları: 45”, \textit{Tanin}, October 15, 1943, p.2.
\footnote{165} “Italy and Turkey”, \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, September 26, 1911, p.1.
\footnote{166} Mehmed Cavid, “Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavit Bey’in Hatıraları: 45”, \textit{Tanin}, October 15, 1943, p.2.
\footnote{167} A.A., Türkei 202, #A15215, Marschall to A. A., Therapia, September 25, 1911, cited in Glen Wilfred Swanson, Mahmud Sevket Pasa and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, p.132.
September 25, it had also become apparent that Hakki Pasha had been under fire from the monarchist side on the issue of the Italian conflict. The monarchists had intimidated him so much so that he told the Unionist leadership that the days of the Committee of Union and Progress were numbered and that the formation of a Kamil Pasha Cabinet was unavoidable. 168

Under fire both from the Italians and the monarchists, Hakki Pasha immediately summoned a Council of Ministers to discuss the note the Italian government handed. 169 The Cabinet decided to reply in conciliatory terms, promising to examine Italy’s grievances and recognizing its privileged economic position in Tripoli - knowing only too well that at best they might postpone the disaster a few days. It was too late. The following afternoon Italy declared war. 170


Chapter 12

THE SAID PASHA CABINET

HAKKI PASHA resigned immediately following the declaration of war. 1 Said Pasha, despite ill health and advanced age, accepted the grand veziership. As he had better relations with the Unionists than any other statesman of the old regime, the Committee of Union and Progress promised to support the new government. 2 Kamil Pasha had also been considered for Grand Veziership in monarchist circles, but he refused to serve without guarantees of complete freedom from Unionists intervention, and was duly left out of consideration. 3 The Unionist leaders had feared that were Kamil Pasha to replace Said Pasha as Grand Vezier their surrender would be universally interpreted as a defeat, and they would lose all the prestige that they had been able to preserve since 1910. 4

Said Pasha's appointment to grand veziership prompted the monarchist opposition to actively engage in political schemes to prevent the new government's formation under his leadership. Monarchists approached Mahmud Sevket Pasha, offering to retain him as the Minister of War in a Kamil Pasha Cabinet they hoped would replace Hakki Pasha's.

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3. "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, October 11, 1911, p.547. See also, F.O 371/1251/38318, Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, October 1, 1911, and, Boppe de Selves, Therapia, October 3, 1911, Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, Second Series, 14, no.391 and 580, both quoted in Feruz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.94. According to a rumour, Kamil Pasha, when requested by the Committee of Union and Progress to accept the position of Grand Vezier, replied that the Sultan alone had the right to offer the post to whomsoever he pleased ("Current Comments", The Near East, October 11, 1911, p.559).
The emissary for the monarchists was Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, deputy for Amasya and one of the leaders of the monarchist opposition in the Chamber. Mahmud Sevket Pasha, however, declined to accept the monarchist offer and continued to function in the existing Cabinet.  

Said Pasha had great difficulty in forming his Cabinet, and his success was jeopardised at the last moment by Resid Pasha's refusal to accept the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. After much negotiation with the monarchists, the Cabinet was finally formed and announced to the public on October 4. As the question of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs had not yet been settled despite strenuous efforts, Said Pasha was also the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new cabinet. Eventually, it was hoped that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would go either to Resid Pasha, Turkish Ambassador in Vienna, or, in the event of his refusal, Asim Bey, Turkish Minister in Sofia. On October 6, the press prematurely announced that Resid Pasha had accepted the portfolio. In fact, he had refused. Whether or not it be true that the refusal of Resid Pasha shook confidence in the vitality of the Said Pasha Cabinet as a whole, it evidently revealed the extreme difficulty of the internal political situation in Turkey. Faced with a monarchist scheme to thwart his attempts in forming the cabinet, Said Pasha was forced to invite Gabriel Nouradunghian to the Sublime Porte on October 8, and offer him the post. He also refused. Said Pasha,

7. "Turkish Ministers and the Committee", The Times, October 6, 1911, p.6; and, "The New Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 5, 1911, p.1.
9. "The New Cabinet", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 6, 1911, p.1; and, "Italian Action and Its Possible Effects: The Turkish Foreign Minister", The Times, October 7, 1911, p.3.
10. "The Internal Situation in Turkey: Resid Pasha and the Cabinet", The Times, October 9, 1911, p.3.
once again, met with Resid Pasha in the hopes of convincing him to accept the portfolio. He had a long interview with Resid Pasha on the afternoon of October 9, but the latter definitely rejected the offer. Following this interview, Said Pasha received Asim Bey. Finally, the question was solved, with the acceptance of the portfolio by Asim Bey, who had arrived at Istanbul that very same day. Asim Bey was a genuine Unionist, whose belief in the necessity of reform and progress in Turkey was known to his friends and acquaintances for many years past.

Mahmud Sevket Pasha remained as Minister of War, as did Nail Bey as Minister of Finance, Abdurrahman Seref Bey as Minister of Education, and Hulusi Bey as Minister of Public Works. Celal Bey was appointed as the new Minister of the Interior, replacing Halil Mentese. Formerly Governor of Erzurum, Celal Bey was currently Governor of Edirne, and was popular with the Committee of Union and Progress. Ürgüplü Hayri Bey was appointed as the new Minister of Justice, replacing Necmeddin Kocatas. He had also provisionally taken the portfolio of the Ministry of Pious Foundations. Sheikh-ul-Islam was Musa Kazim Efendi, a Unionist senator. Hursid Pasha, the Chief Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan, filled the portfolio of the Ministry of the Navy. Krikor Sinapian was appointed as the Minister of Mines and Forests; he was legal advisor in the Ministry of which he now took charge. Ibrahim Soussa, a Syrian Catholic who was Governor of the Archipelago, was the new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

13. "The Turkish Cabinet", The Times, October 10, 1911, p.3.
15. "The Turkish Foreign Office: Assim Bey at Constantinople", The Times, October 10, 1911, p.3.

In late October, Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, who had been made Minister of Justice in the Said Pasha Cabinet while provisionally retaining his place as Minister of Pious Foundations, presented his resignation in the former capacity and retained the Ministry of the Pious Foundations. The portfolio of justice was entrusted to Memduh Bey ("Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 2/29 (November 1, 1911, p.6).
Neither Hursid Pasha, Krikor Sinapian, nor Ibrahim Soussa was particularly identified with any party. The absence of any Greek from the cabinet and the retirement of Halil Mentese and Necmeddin Kocatas aroused much comment. Mentese had been lately severely criticised by some members of his party for his failure to support Hüseyin Kazim Bey, the Unionist ex-Governor of Istanbul. Kocatas had of late been subjected to attack by Tanin, which after two years' silence had unearthed his former association with Necib Melhamé in relation to mining and other concessions. 17 On the other hand, the Committee of Union and Progress had pushed for the restoration of Talat and Cavid Beys to their former positions, but failed. 18

The new cabinet was generally regarded as rather colourless. 19 If it was considered at all Unionist, it was only because it enjoyed a measure of support from the Central Committee of the party at Salonica, and included Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, as its new Minister of Justice, and Celal Bey, as its new Minister of the Interior, both of whom were generally felt to be solid Unionists. 20 Unionists had but little choice in supporting Said Pasha. The leadership was worried that, in the event of their refusal to support the new government, Said Pasha might request the Sultan to dismiss the Chamber of Deputies so that new elections might be organised without consulting the Committee of Union and Progress. This the Unionists were the more anxious to prevent, since their influence had already been diminished by the appointment of Said Pasha. 21 However, should the Chamber of Deputies refuse a vote of confidence in Said Pasha's purely provisional cabinet or in a Unionist cabinet, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress decided to advise

17. "Turkish Ministers and the Committee", The Times, October 6, 1911, p.6.
20. "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, October 11, 1911, p.547; and, "Turkish Ministers and the Committee", The Times, October 6, 1911, p.6.
the Sultan to dissolve Parliament rather than risk the appointment of either a Kamil Pasha or a Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha Cabinet supported by the monarchist opposition and the dissident members of the Committee of Union and Progress. They dreaded the vengeance of these older statesmen, neither of whom would accept office without guarantee that the political activity of the Committee of Union and Progress, or its branches, to which they attributed much of the provincial unrest, should immediately cease. 22

The Said Pasha Cabinet met with the approval of Unionist newspapers. Tanin, while giving qualified support, criticised the attitude of the opposition. In his editorial column, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın wrote that he would have been totally satisfied had there been in the Said Pasha Cabinet a greater number of experienced statesmen. He expressed the view that what the country needed was not a party cabinet, not a programme cabinet, but a cabinet for the resistance to the enemy. Declaring that he would have preferred at such a crisis a union of political leaders, he regretted to observe that some had made no response whatsoever, while others had refused the proffered posts. The reference was, of course, to Kamil Pasha and other monarchist statesmen who had done all in their power to block the formation of any cabinet which was not dominated by themselves. Yalçın wrote that the opposition did not appreciate as it should the conciliatory and friendly attitude taken by the Committee of Union and Progress, which was the majority party in the Chamber. While the very person, the policy and the independent spirit of Said Pasha ought to be enough to unite under the banner of union and in face of the duty of national defence both government and opposition, the monarchist opposition, he added, had shown their dissatisfaction because their candidates were not in power. Yalçın took this attitude as proof that the opposition did not wish an impartial cabinet, but one that should be of their own opinion. Under these circumstances, Yalçın predicted that the new cabinet would run into difficulties in the Chamber. Confessing that the new cabinet, taken as a whole, was not a kind to give

22. "The Turkish Cabinet: Policy of the Committee Leaders", The Times, October 10, 1911, p.3.
entire satisfaction to any party, he added that this fact, which in ordinary times might have been seen a sign of weakness, might possibly be a cause of strength at this crisis.  

The cabinet was coldly received by the monarchist press. *Yeni Gazete*, a monarchist newspaper reflecting Kamil Pasha's views, published a severe attack upon the foreign and domestic policy of the Committee of Union and Progress from the pen of Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, deputy for Edirne and one of the leading members of the monarchist opposition. The publication of this article resulted in the suspension of *Yeni Gazete* and an order to court martial the author.  

Furthermore, the fact that the Court Martial had warned the press to abstain from all criticism of the government policy was interpreted as a proof that the position of Said Pasha's Cabinet had been but little strengthened by Asim Bey's acceptance of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Court Martial's action seemed to have been caused by the publication in *Tanin* of an editorial in which the government's reluctance to expel Italian subjects had been roundly blamed.  

A few days later, *Ekklesiastike Aletheia*, *Proodos*, *Nea Patris* - all Greek language monarchist newspapers published in Istanbul - and *La Bourse d'Orient*, another monarchist daily, were suspended by order of the Court Martial for publishing articles adjudged by the Court Martial to be dangerous.  

*La Bourse d'Orient* had begun publication in Istanbul in July of 1911 under the editorship of a Spanish Jew by the name of Ximenes. After the massacres of Armenians at Sassoun in 1894, he had gone to London representing himself as a Spanish traveller, and had given to Reuter's agency a long dispatch stating that he had travelled through Sassoun and never heard of a massacre there. He alleged as an eye-witness that there had been no such massacre. Such papers as sympathised with Abdülhamid had published this dispatch,

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24. "Turkish Ministers and the Committee: Reception by the Press", *The Times*, October 6, 1911, p.6.  
adding that, as the man was a Spaniard, he would have no object in lying. For this service to the absolutist regime, he had been given official favour by Abdülhamid. 27

Military opinion no longer generally supported the Committee of Union and Progress, or even the Minister of War, as had been the case a year ago. 28 Hostility towards Mahmud Sevket Pasha was particularly high, and there were rumours that monarchist pashas such as Nazim Pasha or Mahmud Muhtar Pasha might replace him at the Ministry. 29 Though the Salonica and Monastir garrisons, i.e., the Third Army Corps, firmly supported the Committee of Union and Progress, it was generally believed that the First Army Corps stationed at Istanbul was equally divided. On the other hand, the Second Army Corps, especially the Kossovo, Edime and the Rodosto-Dardanelles troops, were openly hostile to the Unionists. 30

AFTER HAKKI PASHA’S FALL, various opposition groups began discussing the formation of a coalition party which many estimated could count on the support of as many as one hundred deputies. The coalition would consist of the Moderate Liberals, the People’s Party, the Independents, several Albanian deputies, half a dozen Serbian and Bulgar deputies from Macedonia, a few non-Unionist Armenian deputies, and all the Greek deputies, except for four who had taken the Unionist oath. 31 On October 12, just prior to the opening of the fourth session of the Parliament, they formally announced the formation of this coalition with Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, deputy for Amasya, as its leader. 32 Though still inferior in numbers to the nominal strength of the Committee of Union and Progress, it would be distinctly more powerful than the last session’s opposition, which


had seldom mustered more than seventy-five votes.33

The same day separate meetings were held at the Chamber of Deputies of the monarchist opposition and the adherents of the Unionist majority, the former numbering about sixty-five presided over by Riza Tevfik Bölükbaşı, and the latter numbering over eighty. The Unionists first proposed a collective meeting in order to discuss a common programme and to present a united front in this time of national crisis -the continuing war with Italy over Tripoli. The monarchist opposition, however, declined, stating that it was a question of the cabinet, and they had no confidence in the Said Pasha Cabinet. Thereupon, the Unionists proposed to dispatch a joint deputation to obtain from the Grand Vezier a statement of his programme. The monarchists again declined, declaring that such procedure was unconstitutional. The meetings were then continued separately, the opposition deciding to refuse to support the vote of confidence in the Said Pasha Cabinet.34

Counting the members of the New Faction, the Unionists could muster about one hundred and thirty votes. The monarchist opposition could count a maximum of about one hundred votes. The balance of about thirty-five deputies, however, included a number of Arabs, whose allegiance was doubtful, and seven or eight members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, whose support of the Committee of Union and Progress was not guaranteed. The opposing forces were more or less evenly divided; thus, if the thirty or forty dissidents of the New Faction were to desert the Committee of Union and Progress, it would probably give the monarchist opposition an appreciable majority.35

Under these circumstances, the Unionist leadership tried to open negotiations with the new coalition's leaders. The monarchist opposition, however, made any discussion conditional on the Unionists' acceptance of the following points: that the Sultan's power to appoint the Grand Vezier be left intact; that the Grand Vezier be allowed to choose his

34. "Deputies and the Said Ministry", The Times, October 13, 1911, p.5.
cabinet; that only an adverse vote in the Chamber, as opposed to outside pressure, henceforth be the sole political cause for any member of the cabinet's resignation; that the Parliament should not interfere with the executive branch; and that the government follow a moderate foreign policy. 36

On October 14, the fourth session of the Parliament opened. 37 Marshal Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was appointed President of the Senate, and Sharif Ali Haydar Bey, a former Minister of Pious Foundations, Vice-President. 38 At a meeting of the Committee of Union and Progress and opposition groups, the Unionists proposed to re-elect Ahmed Riza Bey as President of the Chamber, undertaking, however, to vote for the candidate of the opposition for the Vice-Presidency. The opposition was unable to agree to the proposal, as their aim was not to solve the question at hand but still to affect the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet. So, the question of the cabinet was discussed, the monarchists insisting that Kamil Pasha should become Grand Vezier. The Unionists were naturally against the proposal, and suggested the selection of a neutral person. The meeting ended with no decision having been arrived at. 39

The Committee of Union and Progress had first to deal with its own conservative military wing -the New Faction led by ex-Colonel Sadik Bey- which was critical of certain prominent party members. According to accounts of the Unionist congress published by the Salonica and Istanbul press, most of the ten demands made by the New Faction had been either refused or only accepted after their pristine vigour had been weakened by copious amendments. This was especially the case in regard to the New Faction's demand that the Committee of Union and Progress should condemn the secret societies -that is, the

masonic lodges - which occupied themselves with politics. According to the published versions of the proceedings at Salonica, this was not accepted by the majority on the ground that the existence of a law prohibiting secret political associations made it unnecessary for the Unionists to pass any resolution on this subject. Before the vote for the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, the Unionists sacrificed Emmanuel Carasso in an effort to appease the New Faction and maintain party unity. This news, which appeared at the October 14 issue of *Le Jeune Turc*, caused much surprise.⁴⁰ An active Unionist deputy for Salonica, Carasso was unpopular with the New Faction, mainly because it had demanded the suppression of secret societies in the last of its declaration's ten articles, and Carasso was known to have masonic ties.⁴¹

The election for the Presidency of the Chamber took place on October 14. In return for Carasso's sacrifice, the New Faction, keeping their side of the bargain, pledged to support Unionist candidates for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency of the Chamber.⁴² Despite all the efforts of the Unionist leadership, altogether only one hundred and fifty deputies participated in the election. Ahmed Riza Bey was re-elected by eighty-six votes against fifty-five given in favour of the candidate of the opposition, Mahir Said Bey, a nominally independent deputy. Ahmed Riza Bey had barely succeeded to get the necessary minimum number of votes. Necmeddin Kocatas and Halil Mentese received six and three votes respectively.⁴³

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⁴⁰ "The Salonika Congress: The Committee and Freemasonry", *The Times*, October 16, 1911, p.5; and, "The Committee of Union and Progress", *The Times*, October 18, 1911, p.5.

⁴¹ Carasso informed *Le Jeune Turc* that he had been obliged to obey the dictates of his conscience and leave the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress in consequence of the hostile attitude which it had adopted towards freemasonry and other secret societies. Carasso was Venerable of the well-known Macedonia Risorta lodge of Salonica at the time of the Revolution, and was thus enabled to give the revolutionaries great assistance and to obtain their favour. After the downfall of Abdülhamid, he had shown great activity as a masonic propagandist and helped to found many lodges ("Constantinople Letter", *The Near East*, October 25, 1911, p.603).


⁴³ Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey’in Hatıraları: 46", *Tanin*, October 16, 1943, p.2; "Turkish Parliamentary Situation: Election of President", *The Times*, October 16, 1911, p.5; "The Opening of Parliament", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, October 16, 1911, p.1; and,
In order to win the votes of the Arab deputies, the Unionists, at a meeting held on October 15, decided to support the candidacy of Abdul Hamid Zohrawi, a prominent member of the monarchist opposition, for the Vice-Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. The decision partially confirmed reports that the Committee of Union and Progress desired to diminish the hostility, if it was unable to win the support, of the monarchist opposition by a more conciliatory policy during the existing crisis. However, the conciliatory overtures of the Committee of Union and Progress did not have much effect on the opposition, who refused the offer of the Vice-Presidency for one of their members. Consequently, two Unionist deputies, Ruhi al-Khalidi, Arab deputy for Jerusalem, and Emmanuel Emmanuelidis, Greek deputy for Izmir, were elected First and Second Vice-Presidents of the Chamber respectively.

On October 16, Cavid Bey and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçin discussed the possibility of the formation of a coalition government. Although they found this idea tempting, they were not sure how the other Unionist leaders would react to such an arrangement. Yalçin had already mentioned this possibility to Said Pasha when he was trying to form his cabinet, but Said Pasha had rejected the idea as being unfeasible. Later during the same day, representatives of the Unionist leadership - Cavid Bey, Talat Bey, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, and Halil Mentese - met with a group of Armenian deputies consisting of Krikor Zohrab, Karekin Pasturmadjian, and Vartkes Serengüyan.

Pasturmadjian and Serengüyan were sympathetic to the Unionist position.

However, representing the monarchist opposition, Zohrab put forward their demands which had been agreed upon at a meeting attended by himself along with Lütfi Fikri Bey, Gümüşcineli Ismail Hakki Bey, Mahir Said Bey, Sidki Bey, and Dr. Riza Nur. Criticising the existing state of affairs, the monarchists claimed that it could not be considered a constitutional regime. Demanding the elimination of the power of the Committee of Union and Progress in governmental affairs, the monarchists complained of what they called the chauvinistic attitude of the Unionists towards the Arabs, Albanians, and other ethnic and religious minorities. Urging the Unionists to change their attitude towards the minorities, the monarchists also asked the lifting of the state of emergency as they claimed that it was not compatible with the notion of constitutional rule. The main point of their demands however was the formation of a Kamil Pasha Cabinet. 49

While expressing qualified agreement on most of their demands, the Unionist leadership stood firm on the issue of the appointment of Kamil Pasha as Grand Vezier. The Unionist leadership argued that not only Kamil Pasha was not an excellent choice as had been suggested but that his unashamedly pro-British stand on every domestic and foreign issue would compromise Turkey's international position at this juncture. They said that a strongly anglophile vezier such as Kamil Pasha would totally alienate Germany, while his appointment would not even be well-received by France either. In short, Unionists argued that Kamil Pasha's appointment to the grand veziership would not be beneficial to Turkey's interests. Furthermore, their total disagreement with Kamil Pasha would render a coalition government under his grand veziership totally unacceptable to the Committee of Union and Progress. The meeting ended with the Unionists' offer of a formation of a coalition government -presumably under Said Pasha's leadership- which would include three or four opposition deputies as Ministers. 50

On October 17, the leaders and representatives of the different parliamentary parties held long meetings at which the question of a vote of confidence to the Said Pasha Cabinet was discussed. The Unionists intended to reserve their decision until a further attempt was made to arrive at an agreement with the leaders of the monarchist opposition as to common action. A combined meeting of the opposition groups discussed the possibility of arriving at an understanding during the existing crisis—the war with Italy over Tripoli—with the Committee of Union and Progress, but decided to make the acceptance by their opponents of certain conditions such as the formation of a non-parliamentary cabinet and the recognition of the grand vezier's right to form a cabinet in accordance with his own opinions a sine qua non of their entering into any combination with the Unionists.  

The monarchists had in mind the appointment of Kamil Pasha as Grand Vezier. In fact, Mecdi Efendi had personally visited the Sultan and requested that Kamil Pasha be appointed as Grand Vezier in place of Said Pasha. All the members of the royal family were also pressing for Kamil Pasha's appointment. The Sultan, however, was thoroughly opposed to Kamil Pasha, and let his views be known to Mecdi Efendi. According to the Sultan, Kamil Pasha was not a dependable politician, especially in view of the fact that he was a man of the old regime and that several journals of him written to the ex-Sultan Abdülhamid heavily compromised his integrity. In addition, the mere mention of Kamil Pasha's name invariably aroused the utmost scorn among the Unionist leadership. Despite this, there were still some hopes among monarchist circles that the Committee of Union and Progress and the opposition would eventually come to a temporary

understanding on the basis of a coalition government. 54

On October 18, Said Pasha read a statement of his government's policy. With respect to domestic affairs, he said that necessary modifications to the Constitution, the definition of the duties of the ministers, laws regarding the administration of the provinces, the elections, military service, and the gendarmerie were contemplated. The financial policy included the increase of revenues by greater customs duties, the universal application of the professional tax, or temetti vergisi, and new taxes on luxuries. Then, he stated the government's foreign policy. Declaring that the government would defend Ottoman rights at all costs, he added that in order to safeguard the interests of the country, it was proposed to modify the policy hitherto pursued by Turkey and to seek alliances. He promised that the first and foremost task of the government would be to reach a solution of the Tripoli affair such as Turkey considered most favourable to her interests. Expressing desire that Turkey would strengthen her friendly relations with all the Powers, particularly the Balkan states, on a basis of mutual confidence and the recognition of common interests, he assured the Chamber that Turkey had no ambitious designs against any country or any state. Declaring that this constituted the pillar of his cabinet, he promised the pursuance of its execution if the deputies extended to him and his cabinet their confidence. 55

Delegates of the Committee of Union and Progress and of the opposition met on October 19. The Unionists were represented by Necmeddin Kocatas, Seyyid Bey, Talat Bey, Ali Cenani Bey, Mehmed Ali Bey, Bedros Haladjian, Emrullah Efendi, and Mecdi Efendi. The opposition was represented by Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, Lütfi Fikri Bey, Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey, Ahmed Ferid Tek, Riza Tevfik Bölükbsi, Dr. Riza Nur, Hamdi Bey, Krikor Zohrab, and Yorgos Boussios. After three hours' discussion, the

majority of the delegates decided to inform the Grand Vezier that they would give him a vote of confidence if they received assurances from him that six Ministers - Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, Hulusi Bey, Nail Bey, and Abdurrahman Seref Bey, who belonged to Hakki Pasha's last Cabinet, and Celal Bey, the new Minister of the Interior would immediately resign their portfolios. According to Le Moniteur Oriental of October 20, Said Pasha replied that while he accepted the decision in principle, he would require at least two months to put it into execution. On this point the parties split. The Unionist delegates agreed to temporize. The monarchist opposition, however, refused, and inter-party negotiations ceased then and there. 56

Later in the day, parliamentary debate on the cabinet programme began. Monarchist deputies Pantoleon Cosmidis, Riza Tevfik Bölükbaşi, and Sidki Bey spoke for the opposition, and Emrullah Efendi replied. Said Pasha then made an impassioned refutation of the charge of inaction, and pleaded for a chance to work for the country. 57 There were moments when the tide seemed turning against the Grand Vezier. However, members of the New Faction with the majority of the Albanian and Armenian deputies rallied to the Committee of Union and Progress, and late at night Said Pasha obtained a vote of confidence by one hundred and twenty-five votes to sixty. 58 The Unionist leadership was so pessimistic in the result of the vote of confidence that they were prepared to regard even a majority of one hundred and ten victorious. A total of one hundred and twenty-five votes, which were above and beyond their expectations, was mainly due to the fact that the bulk of the Armenian deputies had decided, at the last minute, to throw in their support to the

56. Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatiraları: 50", Tanin, October 20, 1943, p.2; "The Turkish Chamber and the Cabinet: A Vote of Confidence", The Times, October 20, 1911, p.5; and, "The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 2/28 (October 25, 1911), p.1.
58. "The Turkish Chamber and the Cabinet: A Vote of Confidence", The Times, October 20, 1911, p.5; Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatiraları: 51", Tanin, October 21, 1943, p.2; and, "Cabinet Obtains Vote of Confidence", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 20, 1911, p.1.
Committee of Union and Progress instead of remaining neutral.\(^{59}\)

The result of the debate was regarded as to a large extent a personal triumph for Said Pasha, who, in spite of his age and infirmity, rose to the occasion in an astonishing manner. He kept the unruly elements thoroughly in hand, and by his speech undoubtedly secured the support of at least twenty waverers or members of the opposition. His position was, of course, far from secure. The demand made by representatives of the monarchist opposition that he should dismiss six of his colleagues was sufficient proof of this. However, his adherents hoped that his success would enable him to obtain support from certain statesmen who had hitherto refused to enter the cabinet, or, at least, to find successors for those six ministers who, according to popular belief, were doomed.\(^{60}\)

Hopes for a rapprochement between the Unionists and the monarchists were too optimistic. Kamil Pasha was busy organising a press attack against the new government.\(^{61}\) In its October 26 issue, the monarchist \textit{Ikdam}, in an effort to force cabinet changes, alleged that Celal Bey, the Unionist Minister of the Interior, had sent in his resignation, and that the Grand Vezier had proposed that office to \textit{Avlonyali} Ferid Pasha, formerly Grand Vezier under the old regime.\(^{62}\) This totally baseless rumour was immediately denied by Said Pasha.\(^{63}\)

The monarchist opposition nevertheless kept up the campaign to discredit the Committee of Union and Progress in any way imaginable. \textit{Ikdam} published in its October 27 issue the copy of a letter addressed to Seyyid Bey, who had been re-elected to the leadership of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, by Basri


\(^{60}\) "The Turkish Chamber and the Cabinet: Said Pasha's Position", \textit{The Times}, October 21, 1911, p.5.


\(^{63}\) "News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, October 27, 1911, p.1.
Dukaci, deputy for Dibra and a prominent member of the New Faction. Dukaci stated that he had been obliged to sever all connection with the Unionists owing, first, to the refusal of the Central Executive Committee to allow the senators and deputies who were present at the Salonika Congress, to take any effective part in its deliberations; secondly, its continued interference, despite its promises of amendment, with the cabinet; and thirdly, in consequence of the extent to which personal considerations were still influencing their policy. 64

Despite monarchist attempts to undermine the liberal democratic order and constant attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress, Unionists had a chance to show their firm commitment to liberal principles - which included the exclusion of the military from involvement in politics - in early November. On November 1, the lately suspended opposition newspaper Tanzimat, the editor of which was Lütfi Fikri Bey, reappeared under the name of Müdafaâ-i Hukuk without permission of the Court Martial. In the October 29 issue of Tanzimat, Lütfi Fikri Bey had openly accused the Unionist leadership in Zeki Bey's murder, although there was no strong or concrete evidence in support of this allegation. Besides, the trial of the alleged murderers was still continuing, and no verdict had yet been reached. 65 He continued to attack the Unionists and the judicial system in the November 1 issue of Müdafaâ-i Hukuk. All the copies exposed for sale were consequently confiscated. 66 Owing to Lütfi Fikri Bey's insistence on the publication of his newspaper, notwithstanding the order for its suppression, on November 4 he was invited to attend before the Court Martial. He refused to comply on the ground of his parliamentary immunity unless he was forced to do so. The police requested him to wait while they telephoned for instructions, but Lütfi Fikri Bey proceeded to the Chamber, where he

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64. "Committee Methods Exposed", The Times, October 28, 1911, p.5.
submitted his case to Ahmed Riza Bey, the Unionist President of the Chamber. An urgent motion was adopted, unanimously describing Lütfi Fikri Bey's attempted arrest as a clear and insolent violation of the Constitution and inviting the Minister of War to furnish explanations forthwith. 67

At the close of the November 4 debate on the case of Lütfi Fikri Bey, Idris Pasha, the President of the Istanbul Court Martial, arrived at the Chamber and discussed the situation for nearly an hour with the Unionist leadership. He informed them that the Minister of War was ready to take all responsibility for the action of the Court Martial and would furnish the Chamber of Deputies the necessary explanations at a later date. The incident aroused considerable excitement in parliamentary circles, and speculation was rife regarding its possible consequences. While an overwhelming majority of deputies appreciated the firm stand of the Unionist leadership against the Court Martial authorities, some members of the monarchist opposition still expressed scepticism as to the willingness of the Committee of Union and Progress to support the opposition deputy, who identified himself with the anti-Unionist agitation against the Court Martial, on a question of principle. 68

At the November 6 sitting of the Chamber, a message from the Minister of War was read, promising to be present in person or by delegate on November 8 to answer the interrogation of the previous sitting. The deputies were roused to a high pitch of zeal for the defence of the Constitution against what they deemed an attack by Mahmud Sevket Pasha, whom Riza Tevfik Bölükbsi did not hesitate to call publicly a "mannequin stuffed with straw". The Chamber decided to insist on the Minister of War attending immediately to offer his explanations. During a prolonged noon recess, Mahmud Sevket Pasha was


68. "The Turkish Parliament and the Court Martial: The Case of Lutfi Bey", The Times, November 6, 1911, p.5.
interviewed, and he stuck to his guns, but sent in his place Idris Pasha, the President of the Istanbul Court Martial, who when the Chamber sat again, explained that Lütfi Fikri Bey had been merely invited to appear before the Court Martial, and that there had been no intention or attempt to arrest him; that the Minister of War had been very busy; and that with the ongoing manoeuvres in the vicinity of Istanbul he had been compelled to postpone appearing before the Chamber till November 8. The Chamber chose to consider these explanations insufficient, but agreed to wait two days more for the Minister. 69

Idris Pasha’s statement in the Chamber on November 6 was regarded as an advance version of the explanations which would be given by the Minister of War on November 8. 70 At the November 8 sitting, Mahmud Sevket Pasha appeared before the Chamber and made his reply, which lasted nearly an hour. He gave his reasons for not appearing earlier, and indignantly denied having attempted any violation of the Constitution. He also denied the charge made by some newspapers that he was taking the role of a dictator. He declared his confidence in the Committee of Union and Progress and his unwillingness to take a position in any cabinet to be formed by Kamil Pasha or anyone else, if not favourable to the Unionists. The Minister then reviewed the career of Tanzimat and the subversive articles published therein. He went on to say that the Court Martial had therefore summoned the editor to appear, but that there had been no order to arrest. At the afternoon sitting, Lütfi Fikri Bey answered the speech of Mahmud Sevket Pasha, alleging that it was no mere request to attend that was served on him, but a preceptory order. He also violently criticised the whole attitude of the Minister of War, and the prolongation of martial law in the capital. The Grand Vezier then made a long speech, condemning the violent recriminations of Lütfi Fikri Bey and upholding the Minister of War. 71

The firm stand of the Committee of Union and Progress on this question involving

70. "The Turkish Political Situation", The Times, November 7, 1911, p.7.
constitutional rights of the deputies produced the desired result: the military accepted its mistake. Minister of War's explanations in the November 8 sitting of the Chamber was an admittance of the military's wrongdoing. Mahmud Sevket Pasha's explanations were interpreted that the Court Martial would in future confine itself to sending written invitations to deputies to furnish it with explanations. The motion proposed by Seyyid Bey, the leader of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was accepted by the Chamber on November 9, and the declarations of the Grand Vezier both implied that any attempt on the part of the Court Martial to arrest a deputy during the session would be regarded as an anti-constitutional act.\(^72\)

By mid-November, a rift between Said Pasha and the monarchist-dominated Senate had appeared, and was growing ever wider. This had to do with what the Grand Vezier considered the Senate's independent attitude.\(^73\) Halid Ziya Usakligil, the Sultan's Secretary and one of the most trusted members of the Committee of Union and Progress had been nominated for senator.\(^74\) Damad Ferid Pasha, however, opposed his nomination on the ground that the Constitution forbade pluralism, and that officials or officers in active employment could not become senators unless they resigned their posts.\(^75\) Although Halid Ziya Usakligil's resignation in order to accept the office of senator was announced in the November 2 issues of the newspapers, monarchist opposition was adamant.\(^76\) After a sharp exchange on the Senate floor, opposing senators led by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, were able to carry their point. They then decided to select a deputation which would present their case to the Sultan. Vainly, Said Pasha urged them to reconsider this last decision, pointing

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out that the Senate would be exceeding its rights if it ignored the government and communicated directly with the Sultan. Hüseyn Hilmi Pasha, Gabriel Nouradunghian, and Damad Ferid Pasha, along with other well known senators maintained that nothing in the Constitution forbade them to do so. 77

They carried out their protest and communicated to the Sultan the Senate's protest against the nomination of Halid Ziya Usakligil as a senator. The protest note was handed by the Sultan to Said Pasha, whose reply described the Senate's action as illegal. However, the Senate, led by Hüseyn Hilmi Pasha in the struggle with the Said Pasha Cabinet, showed no signs of readiness to accept the Grand Vezier's ruling. 78 Though Usakligil resigned his senatorship, Said Pasha insisted on the question of principle. The matter, however, was left unresolved. 79

On November 14, rumours were circulated that Nail Bey, one of the few Ministers of the Said Pasha Cabinet who had gained both in popularity and prestige of late, contemplated resigning office after the upcoming debate on the Budget. The cause of the decision was ascribed to the hostility of one of his recently appointed colleagues in the cabinet. 80 Of course, the differences of opinion arose on the issue of the military budget. Nail Bey's plea before the Chamber for economy in the control of military expenditure caused much comment in Unionist circles of a general and deservedly favourable character. The obvious incompatibility of his views with the Minister of War naturally aroused some speculation as to the possibility of a further conflict between the Unionist leadership and Mahmud Sevket Pasha. The Unionist stand on the issue of the military budget was extremely courageous, and they had to be congratulated for advocating economy at a

77. "The Turkish Political Situation", The Times, November 7, 1911, p.7; "Scenes from the Senate", The Orient, 2/31 (November 15, 1911), p.4; and, "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, November 22, 1911, p.63. See also "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, November 15, 1911, p.35.
78. "Scenes from the Senate", The Orient, 2/31 (November 15, 1911), p.4; and, "The Turkish Senate and the Grand Vezier", The Times, November 16, 1911, p.5.
79. "Political Parties in Turkey", The Times, December 5, 1911, p.5.
80. "The Turkish Finance Minister", The Times, November 15, 1911, p.5.
moment when all the chauvinist elements in the country were clamouring for the increase of military and naval expenditure.\textsuperscript{81}

ON NOVEMBER 21, the much talked-about new opposition party, conservative and monarchist in nature, was finally formed under the name of Entente Libér".\textsuperscript{82} Its founders were Damad Ferid Pasha, a well known monarchist senator, ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, the leader of the opposition group New Faction, Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, leader of the Moderate Liberals, Lütfi Fikri Bey, opposition deputy for Dersim, Dr. Riza Nur, monarchist deputy for Sinop, Riza Tef"ık Böl"ükbaşı, monarchist deputy for Edirne, Marshal Fuad Pasha, better known as Deli Fuad Pasha, Süleyman Pasha, retired General of Cavalry, Vefik Pasha, ex-Governor of Konya, Abdul Hamid Zohrawi, the well known monarchist Arab deputy for Homs, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, deputy for Tokat, Nazaret Daghavarian, Armenian deputy for Sivas, Volçetrlı Hasan Bey, Albanian deputy for Prishtine, Mustafa Basri Dukaci, Albanian deputy for Debre, and Tahir Hayreddin Bey, son of Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha and a monarchist journalist.\textsuperscript{83}

The administrative council of the party was headed by Damad Ferid Pasha and included ex-Colonel Sadik Bey as its Vice-President, and the following deputies: Dr. Riza Nur, deputy for Sinop, Lütfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, Gümülcenili Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülcine, Riza Tef"ık Böl"ükbaşı, deputy for Edirne, Mahir Said Bey, deputy for Ankara, Ismail Sidki Bey, deputy for Aydın -all of whom were Turks- and the

\textsuperscript{81} "Turkish Finance: A Plea for Economy", The Times, November 29, 1911, p.5.


Albanians Mustafa Basri Dukaci, deputy for Debre, and Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, deputy for Ipek, and Shukri al-Asali, Arab deputy for Damascus. It also included Siret Bey, a journalist who was known to be a close friend of Prince Sabahaddin, Kemal Midhat Bey, a representative of the Midhat Pasha family, and, Midhat Frasher, formerly Political Director to the Salonica province.84

At its November 23 meeting, the new party elected as its Leader of the parliamentary party Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha and as its Deputy-Leaders Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi and Nazareth Daghavarian. The administrative committee consisted of Sheikh Zeynelabidin Efendi, deputy for Konya, Said al-Hussein Efendi, deputy for Jerusalem, Ibrahim Vasfi Efendi, deputy for Karesi, Davud Yusfani Efendi, deputy for Mosul, Ahmed Sükrü Efendi, deputy for Sivas, and Mahmud Mazhar Bey, deputy for Trabzon.85

A majority of the Greek and Albanian deputies supported the new party's programme, but declined to join, stating that such a move would be distasteful to their electors.86 Nonetheless, there was reason to believe that the Committee of Union and Progress would suffer further defections following publication of the new party's platform. Some monarchists estimated that Entente Libérale might be, in fact, one hundred deputies strong.87 Indeed, on November 24, it was announced that five Unionists deputies had resigned from the Committee of Union and Progress and joined the Entente Libérale. These deputies were Sükrü Bey, deputy for Maras, Ferac Bey, deputy for Assir, Besir Efendi, Yeni İkdam, November 11, 1911, and Yeni İkdam, November 11, 1911, both quoted in Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.315; "Le parti de l'Entente Libérale", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 25, 1911, p.2; "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, November 29, 1911, p.95; and, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.6.


deputy for Aleppo, Sevket Pasha, deputy for Divaniye, and Kamil al-Asad Efendi, deputy for Beirut.  

Including the defecting deputies from the Committee of Union and Progress, the total number of Entente Libérale deputies, however, remained around seventy. This meant that the new party failed to obtain a majority in the Chamber, and was thus unable to force the formation of a new government. In addition, it was not likely that any of the monarchist statesmen, whom rumour described as the real leaders of the new party, were particularly anxious to accept the responsibility of office at this particular juncture.

The conservative and monarchist press praised the Entente Libérale. The conservative Sabah of November 23 welcomed the formation of the new party in the most favourable terms. The monarchist Levant Herald and Eastern Express of November 27 was also highly jubilant at the establishment of a distinctly monarchist party. Another monarchist newspaper, Ikdam -now appearing under the name of Yeni Ikdam- wrote that a study of the programme of the Entente Libérale showed that the party had been formed, not to domineer and oppress, but to respond to a social necessity. "Had the country not felt such a need, the nature of events would not have compelled the formation of this party." Claiming that the party had accepted the programme prepared according to convictions, Ikdam wrote that in their political consciousness there was nothing save the contents of that programme. Expressing the wish that the Turkish Chamber should resemble that of England, Ikdam went on to say that they were in favour of having two parties in the Chamber, as there were in England. In an explicit effort to merge all the parliamentary groups opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress within the Entente Libérale,

Ikdam alleged that there was no group that could not enter the Entente Libérale as the party’s programme was so flexible. Expressing the view that they did not believe there was in Turkey a programme more conformed to the country’s interests, Ikdam did not approve the attitude of the Greek and Armenian deputies, who held themselves between heaven and earth. The newspaper urged these deputies to immediately join the Entente Libérale. 93

The establishment of the new party, as well as its programme, drew sharp criticism from Tanin, Rumeli, Silah and other Salonica newspapers. The pro-Unionist press generally condemned the new party as a public danger. 94 Writing in the Tanin of November 23, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın commented that what had brought this group together was not a coherent ideal or point of view, but the wish to destroy the Committee of Union and Progress along with the liberal democratic regime it was trying to establish. He expressed the view that sooner or later dissensions would arise among the members of this party who held such diverse political opinions. 95 In his newspaper Isopolitia, Yorgos Boussios, Greek deputy for Serfice, criticised the programme as being hastily drawn up and wanting the elements needed for a really useful basis of work, and as being long rather than stout. La Liberté wrote that the new party seemed to be merely a syndicate of malcontents, whose programme lacked clearness and preciseness on the very points where the various nationalities were in danger of splitting apart. Reflecting Unionist viewpoint, Le Jeune Turc, said that they still remembered the violent and vehement polemic between Riza Tevfik Böülükbası, monarchist deputy for Edime, and Hoca Basri Efendi, religious conservative deputy for ?, the previous year in the columns of Yeni Gazete, each of them upholding principles and ideas absolutely irreconcilable. 96

On their part, monarchists continued their press attacks against members of the Committee of Union and Progress. Their latest target was Musa Kazim Efendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who was a freemason. In the eyes of the monarchists, the fact that he was a freemason made his devotion to Islam questionable; he was forced to publicly defend himself as a result of the attacks. In his editorial column in Tesisat, Lütfi Fikri Bey called upon the Sheikh-ul-Islam to resign. While writing that it was not just, in an age of liberty of conscience and of religion, to call in question the religious belief of any individual, Lütfi Fikri Bey nevertheless went on to say that when there was the slightest doubt cast on the religious convictions of one occupying one of the highest religious positions, such a person ought at once to resign his position and straightaway defend himself.

MEANWHILE, the Entente Libérale decided to enter the Istanbul by-election to be held on December 11, contesting the seat that had been left vacant when Rifat Pasha, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hakki Pasha Cabinet, was appointed Turkish Ambassador in Paris. The new party mounted a vigorous propaganda campaign aimed at both the first and second degree electors. Memduh Bey, the new Minister of Justice, had been chosen as the Unionist candidate, but overconfidence marred his campaign. His opponent was Tahir Hayreddin Bey, son of a former Grand Vezier Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha, proprietor of the monarchists' organ Alemdar, and one of the Unionists' most outspoken critics.

Two hundred and ninety-four electors participated in the by-elections that were held on December 11. Tahir Hayreddin Bey, the Entente Libérale candidate, received one
hundred and ninety-six votes, while Memduh Bey, Minister of Justice and the Unionist candidate, obtained one hundred and ninety-five votes, losing the race by only one vote. Thus, to the surprise of the Committee of Union and Progress as well his own, Tahir Hayreddin Bey, won by a margin of one vote, thanks largely to Christian support and the recent wave of defections from the Committee of Union and Progress.

Addressing the Entente Libérales supporters, Damad Ferid Pasha claimed that the election of Tahir Hayreddin Bey had shown that the nation had full confidence in the new party, and that Entente Libérales, thus clothed with national confidence, could render noteworthy service to the state. He said that the party had two main objects: one, the establishing of an actual Constitution; the other, the securing of Ottoman unity by full harmony between the various nationalities. While the majority given Tahir Hayreddin Bey was a proof that the former was well appreciated by the Ottoman nation, the latter was already assured, since the Greek and Armenian second degree electors, with few exceptions, had voted almost unanimously for the Entente Libérales candidate.

The victory of the Entente Libérales candidate by a single vote caused general surprise. It was ascribed by the monarchist press to the growing unpopularity of the Committee of Union and Progress in the capital and elsewhere. The monarchist Yeni Gazete lost no time in claiming that the Committee of Union and Progress had, with the lapse of time, departed from its original basis and was losing ground each day by following a policy of favouritism for its partisans. Yeni Gazete went on to say that the nation wished

101. "Legislative Election", and "L'Election d'hier", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 12, 1911, p.1; and, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.22. Two votes were cast for Sefik Bey and one vote for Semsettin Bey, a former Minister of Pious Foundations ("L'Election d'hier", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 12, 1911, p.1).
103. "The Defeat of the Committee of Union and Progress", The Oriëni, 2/36 (December 20, 1911), p.4.
to live under a free and truly constitutional administration, asserting that it would tolerate no oppression from any quarter whatever and it would not forgive those who abused its confidence.  

Indeed, there was a decrease in the enthusiastic support accorded to the Committee of Union of Progress in some parts of Anatolia. Despite Cavid Bey's successful visit in the fall of 1911, the Committee's influence in Erzurum, for instance, had become questionable. While dissension plagued the Erzurum branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, two of its local branches in the countryside had ceased to exist, and some of those who remained were said to be leaning towards the newly formed monarchist political party, Entente Libérale. By December, placards denouncing the Committee of Union and Progress and the Constitution were visible throughout the town, and meetings between mollahs and other reactionaries were reportedly being held.  

There was reason, however, to believe that the Unionists might have held the Istanbul seat had they not presumed too much on the superiority of their organisation and neglected to employ canvassers. In any case, the general elections was still five months ahead, and any deductions from the result of the Istanbul by-election might prove misleading. Writing in Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın reminded the fact that at the elections held two years previously one of the opposition candidates had received one hundred and twenty votes, another thirty and a third thirty-five. That is, two years ago, more than one hundred and eighty votes in Istanbul had gone to the opposition. Given these figures, Yalçın wrote that in the course of the two years the opposition had gained only twenty-six votes, claiming that it was no great success. He then draw upon lessons

105. "The Defeat of the Committee of Union and Progress", The Orient, 2/36 (December 20, 1911), p.4; and, Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatıraları: 60", Tanin, October 30, 1943, p.2.

from the Unionist defeat. Admitting that the Committee of Union and Progress could not live on the glorious record of its first success in bringing in the constitutional order, he took it as only natural that the Unionists should be attacked from without, and that treachery should appear from within. Foreseeing possible defections from the party, Yalçın declared that the Committee of Union and Progress, secure on its grand foundations, needed to purify itself. Insisting that the purification be as radical as possible, he declared that those who had joined from personal motives and not from conviction would confer a great benefit on the party by quitting it. There was indeed a defection from the party: The Levant Herald and Eastern Express of December 14 announced that Mustafa Asım Efendi, deputy for Istanbul, resigned from the Committee of Union and Progress.

ON DECEMBER 13, a rumour which had been circulating for several days crystallised into fact. Said Pasha summoned the Chamber for a special session to propose the modification of Article 35 of the Constitution.

Said Pasha's proposal had first been discussed in early October during the Unionist Congress in Salonica. Article 35 stated that the Sultan might, in the event of a continued dispute between the Chamber of Deputies and the Cabinet, dissolve the Chamber, should the Senate give its consent. The Committee of Union and Progress decided that it

would propose an amendment of the final clause and advocate the abolition of the senatorial veto. The outbreak of war with Italy, however, had prevented any action from being taken at the time. It was generally believed that the Unionists would keep this political card up their sleeve until the next general elections drew near, or, if the electoral outlook was favourable, until a new Chamber had been elected.\(^\text{113}\)

Said Pasha's decision to pursue the issue at this moment was the subject of much speculation in political circles. There were three theories: that Said Pasha was intentionally riding for a fall; that he was intentionally risking defeat in the hopes of bringing the cabinet's fall and the opportunity to form a new and stronger cabinet; or, that the Committee of Union and Progress was considering a sort of political coup. The supporters of this last view maintained that the Central Committee of the party had been greatly alarmed by its defeat in the Istanbul by-election, and that its leaders, knowing that they could depend on the support of a great majority of the provincial representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, who could do a great deal to control the elections, and fearing that further delay might prove prejudicial to their chances, had decided to play a bold game and strike for the dissolution of the Chamber and call for general elections.\(^\text{114}\)

This apparently was what the Committee of Union and Progress was aiming at. Having lost the Istanbul by-election, the leadership decided to call for general elections by dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. For this, however, the Committee of Union and Progress needed the unlikely approval of the monarchist-dominated Senate, and the proposed amendment would solve that problem nicely.\(^\text{115}\) The December 14 meeting of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, was stormy. It was reported that many deputies threatened to leave the party rather than vote for the measure. They were supported by Seyyid Bey, the leader of the parliamentray party, and

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Emrullah Efendi, ex-Minister of Education. The meeting finally came to an end for want of a quorum, and Seyyid Bey informed the deputies that they were free to vote as they wished. The executive council of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica had not yet given its instructions to the party. However, what these instructions might be was foreshadowed in *Tanin* in two leading articles, the work of Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, both of whom supported Said Pasha's proposals.  

At another meeting the Unionist leadership held on December 16, the question of the modification of Article 35 was discussed. Talat Bey informed the meeting that Salonica insisted on modification. The parliamentary Commission for the Revision of the Constitution, of which Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey was Chairman, would accept it, and whatever difficulties might be raised by individual members of the party the measure ought to be passed at all costs. Major Hüseyin Kadri Bey suggested that recalcitrant deputies belonging to the New Faction could be forced to come into line by the publication or by the threat of publication of *jurnals* relating to them. Cavid Bey said that it was rather late in the day for such a measure and advised the party if such a measure was adopted it should confine itself to the publication of the names of *jurnalcis*, or the persons who wrote the *jurnals*. The meeting, which did not seem to have arrived at an absolute agreement as to the employment of this weapon, then heard a memorandum from Salonica headquarters read and expounded by Talat Bey and others. After rebuking the Istanbul Committee for failing to check undue criticism and discussion, the Central Committee expressed its conviction that safety was to be found in the strengthening of the Caliphate and Sultanate, and there was no reason to fear that the throne would abuse its powers.

At the December 16 sitting of the Chamber, Said Pasha explained the modification in a lengthy speech which was repeatedly interrupted by the monarchist opposition.

117. "The Committee and Foreign Affairs", *The Times*, December 26, 1911, p.3.
Declaring that the war with Italy had to lead to negotiations for peace, Said Pasha told the Chamber that a strong and well-balanced government was needed to bring these negotiations to a successful end. He indignantly denied that he desired to dissolve the Chamber to reinstate absolutism. Mecidi Efendi said that however desirable such an amendment to the Constitution might be, it could not possibly obtain the requisite two-thirds vote of the deputies, or one hundred and eighty-four out of two hundred and seventy-six votes, so that it best be referred to the Parliamentary Commission for the Revision of the Constitution. Lütfi Fikri Bey inveighed against the proposed change, and especially against making it a matter of urgency. Said Pasha tried to reply, but was so often and so violently interrupted that he finally left the Chamber in disgust. After a recess of half an hour, the Chamber voted to refer the proposed amendment to the Commission, and by a smaller majority agreed to make it a matter of urgency, demanding immediate action and report. 118

Said Pasha's proposal for the modification of Article 35 was then presented to the Parliamentary Commission for the Revision of the Constitution. As the Commission was chaired by Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, a prominent Unionist deputy for Baghdad, and as nearly two-third of its members were Unionist deputies, there was little doubt that it would support the proposal. The real struggle would come later, as Said Pasha could hardly hope to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Chamber, much less in the Senate. 119

At the December 18 sitting of the Chamber, Ahmed Ferid Tek, opposition deputy for Kütahya, presented a written request for an explanation as to what constituted a "new


cabinet" in Article 35 of the Constitution. He also demanded a formal vote on the question of urgency of the previous sitting. In the afternoon sitting, Basri Bey, the Albanian opposition deputy for Debre, presented a written accusation against the Grand Vezier, as being an unchangeable and bitter enemy of the Constitution. President Ahmed Riza Bey refused to read this motion except in the presence of Said Pasha himself. A tumult arose which soon became a veritable pandemonium, members of the government and opposition parties shouting at one another, and barely escaping actual blows. The President, when he could stand it no longer, left the chair and the hall. Seyyid Bey, parliamentary leader of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Haydar Bey, Secretary of the Chamber, tried in vain to quiet down Feyzi Bey and Zeynelabedin Efendi, who were known as the two heavyweights of the Entente Libérale. The deputies, left without a presiding officer, gradually withdrew from the hall, and when Ahmed Riza Bey returned, he had no deputies to call to order, and no meeting to adjourn. 120

*Tanin* of December 19 wrote that neither the Italians -with whom Turkey was at war- nor the revolutionary Bulgarian Internal Organisation which was engaged in acts of violence against Turkish authority in Macedonia were so harmful as the attempted destruction of constitutional order by the monarchist opposition. *Tanin* wrote that nothing good or useful for the nation could any longer be expected from those whose judgment was so inflamed by ambition or hatred. In addition to the scene in the Chamber, *Tanin* cited an article by Dr. Riza Nur published in the monarchist newspaper *Tesisat* which, the newspaper claimed, was calculated to provoke the Kurdish population against constituted authority. Indeed, Dr. Riza Nur had attacked Said Pasha in his *Tesisat* article, saying that the government was on the point of taking from the Kurds the lands they possessed, and giving them to the Armenians. *Tanin* was worried that this distorted version of actual facts would be carried to Kurdistan where the population would be exasperated at seeing

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themselves about to be dispossessed for the benefit of the Armenians. Under these circumstances, Tanin declared, members of the Committee of Union and Progress were of opinion that the greatest patriotic service they could render the country would be to deliver it from this Chamber, or, at least, to resign in a body, so that the Chamber might be dissolved and new elections take place.\footnote{Tanin, December 6, 1327/December 19, 1911, excerpted in "Is the Chamber of Deputies a Menace?", The Orient, 2/37 (December 27, 1911), p.5.}

It was at precisely this juncture that Unionists raised the question of Palace informers and their jurnals, i.e., secret reports, to Abdülhamid under the absolutist monarchy in order to embarrass and discredit some of the members of the New Faction as well as monarchist members of the opposition party. Tanin threatened the opposition with the publication of these jurnals.\footnote{"Constantinople Letter", The Near East, December 29, 1911, p.223.} These jurnals, in some cases, were prepared by ministers and other officials of the state in accordance with official instructions; others were mere denunciations, inspired by private hostility or the desire for gain and favour. The number of more or less recognized informers under the old regime was believed to be in excess of eighty thousand.\footnote{"Constantinople Letter", The Near East, November 29, 1911, p.95.}

At the December 20 sitting of the Chamber, Mahmud Sevket Pasha did his best to prevent the publication of these reports, warning the Chamber against the dangers of disunion. Neither Moslem nor Christian would gain from a policy of personal recrimination. He told the Chamber that he was not in favour of the publication of these documents. He also suggested that if the jurnals were published, few honest men would remain to carry on the government's business, adding that he himself had refused to dismiss officers guilty of such activity in the past, giving them instead a chance to start afresh and prove their worth under happier conditions.\footnote{"The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 2/37 (December 27, 1911), p.1; and, "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, December 29, 1911, p.223.} The issue was left unresolved.

Meanwhile the discussion of Article 35 continued without intermission. While the
Parliamentary Commission for the Revision of the Constitution examined the problem, delegates, from both the Committee of Union and Progress and the Entente Libérale, met at the invitation of the "independents", composed mostly of ex-members of the Committee of Union and Progress and a group of Albanian nationalists, to "discover a modus vivendi". 125

The demands of the Entente Libérale delegates, however, were more sweeping than their party's strength appeared to justify. They asked for the abolition of martial law in Istanbul, the proclamation of a general amnesty for those banished, exiled, or imprisoned for counter-revolutionary offences, the formation of a neutral cabinet from which prominent Unionists were excluded, and a declaration to be made by the Unionists that officers and officials would be forbidden to enter any political organisation as a member thereof. 126

The Unionists voted by a large majority in favour of the maintenance of Said Pasha. 127 Though they were at first unwilling to discuss these demands seriously, they would later change their attitude and accept the first two points as well as the last positions which the Committee of Union and Progress essentially supported. 128 The leadership, for example, had already tried to lift martial law in Istanbul in the hopes of curtailting the military's influence. They had failed, and the Court Martial had then suppressed the pro-Unionist Tanin. Some of the Unionist leadership was also not adverse to a political amnesty. In the words of Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, it made little sense to exile people like Mizanci Murad Bey while the equally guilty owners, editors and journalists of the

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monarchist *İkdam* and *Yeni Gazete* were allowed to remain, publishing anti-Unionist propaganda just as they had done before. 129

The Unionists, however, absolutely refused to let Said Pasha fall from the Grand Veziership. Although he was not a Unionist, the Committee of Union and Progress considered him an able statesman who could withstand outside pressure. The Unionists then would only agree to the formation of a caretaker cabinet of a neutral political complexion as long as Said Pasha was at the helm. 130 After lengthy negotiations between parties on December 26, the Unionists consented to the portfolios of War, Interior, and Foreign Affairs changing hands but on condition that Said Pasha remained Grand Vezier. 131 This was not at all in conformity with the wishes of the Entente Libérale. The Entente Libérale delegates created a scene, swearing that they would never consent to Said Pasha's maintenance. The Unionists stood firm, refused to negotiate on any other basis, and the Entente Libérale, after deliberation, consented. The Entente Libérale delegates then demanded that the Committee of Union and Progress forgo its plan to modify Article 35, pledging not to submit the proposal to the Chamber. The Unionists categorically refused, and the negotiations came to an abrupt end. 132

Part of the Unionist intransigence on the issue of a new Said Pasha Cabinet had to do with Said Pasha himself. The latter had made it abundantly clear that although he was ready to make concessions to public opinion with respect to martial law and a general amnesty, and although he himself was contemplating replacements within the cabinet, he would not allow the haggling of rival political parties to determine either his position or

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those of his Ministers. Because Said Pasha's support was necessary for the amendment of Article 35, any idea that the Committee of Union and Progress leadership might have had of giving in on the cabinet issue quickly evaporated. Said Pasha was to be supported at all costs. 133

As expected, the Parliamentary Committee for the revision of the Constitution had passed the modified version of Article 35, though there were a few amendments. 134 On the opening of the Chamber on December 27, Vasfi Hoca, Entente Libérale deputy for Karesi, on behalf of the opposition, objected to the placing of the proposed constitutional amendment on the order of the day, since this had been done at the close of the previous sitting in the acknowledged default of a quorum. He was seconded by Ahmed Ferid Tek, deputy for Kütahya, representing the independents, who urged postponing action on Article 35 until January 1, 1912, in order to give the independent group more time to arrange an understanding between the two main parties. On behalf of the Albanian deputies, Hamdi Bey, deputy for Prevesa, urged the necessity of prior settlement of the Albanian crisis. Said Pasha asked for time to consult with his colleagues, and an hour's recess followed, which was devoted to lobbying. When the meeting was again called to order, two motions were presented, one by the Committee of Union and Progress fixing the discussion on December 30, the other by the Entente Libérale, deferring it until January

134. "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 22, 1911, p.1; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye İstiklal ve Hüriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 17, p.9806. The modified proposal ran as follows:

Article 35: "In case of a disagreement between the cabinet and the Chamber, if the cabinet insist on its point of view and in case of a formal and repeated refusal on the part of the Chamber, the Sovereign has the right either to change the cabinet or to dissolve the Chamber, on condition that fresh elections be held and the Chamber convoked within three months, and also that the Chamber be not dissolved more than once in the course of a year. The Sovereign also has the right in case of war to decree the temporary suspension of the debates in the Chamber, but on condition that this suspension shall not exceed in duration half the current session of Parliament. In case of the dissolution of the Chamber His Majesty shall be at liberty to have recourse or not to have recourse to the Senate's opinion. If the new Chamber insists on the point of view of its predecessor, its decision must then be accepted." ("Constantinople Letter", The Near East, January 5, 1912, p.259).
1, 1912. After considerable sparring, the vote was taken, resulting in the adoption of the Unionist motion by a vote of one hundred and seven to ninety-nine, most of the independents refraining from voting.\textsuperscript{135}

On December 29, all the main parliamentary groups—the Committee of Union and Progress, the Entente Libérale, and the independents—held meetings in the Chamber. It was significant that the meeting of the Committee of Union and Progress was only attended by sixty members of that party. On their part, the independents sent delegates to the Entente Libérale to urge them to agree to the retention of Said Pasha as Grand Vezier. Entente Libérale leadership expressed its willingness to accept the independents' proposal only on the condition that all the other ministers were changed.\textsuperscript{136}

As there were one hundred and seven Unionist deputies to the Entente Libérale's ninety-nine, the battle promised to be long and fierce. Twenty-four independents had decided to refrain from voting.\textsuperscript{137} The debate, however, did not take place on December 30. The opposition had decided to abstain, and the one hundred and twenty odd Unionist deputies faced only a half-dozen members of the opposition who were present only to insure that the Unionists remained within the bounds of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{138} Neither the Entente Libérale deputies, nor the independents, nor the Greeks, nor the Albanians would enter the hall; and the Unionists could not muster a majority without them. At no time were there more than one hundred and thirty-one deputies present, whereas one hundred and forty were necessary for a quorum.\textsuperscript{139} During the afternoon sitting, the Grand Vezier


\textsuperscript{136} "News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 30, 1911, p.1.

\textsuperscript{137} "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, January 5, 1912, p.259. The total number of deputies in the Chamber was 278 (Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", \textit{Fikir Hareketleri}, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.37).


addressed President Ahmed Riza Bey and said he wished to convey to the nation through the deputies present the views of the cabinet. He said that the prolongation of martial law was a detriment, and should soon be suppressed; that there were some now in prison who should be pardoned; that reforms were needed in Albania; but that the main question was the proposed constitutional amendment, which, he said, was necessary for the establishment of a strong government able to carry out the reforms required by the country. Continuing his speech, he quoted a letter to Le Temps, which stated that if Italy was able to prosecute her African venture successfully, it was because of Turkey's internal quarrels. He then retired. After some time, the cabinet returned and Said Pasha announced that the obstructionist tactics of the majority of the deputies compelled him to hand in his resignation, and leave the ground free for those who were greedy for power. 140

FACED WITH THIS MONARCHIST OBSTRUCTION, Said Pasha resigned that evening. 141 The Unionists, at a meeting held that night, decided to press for Said Pasha's reappointment to the Grand Vezierate and to render him unswerving obedience and support for the remainder of the Session. Despite the Unionist leadership's determination to support Said Pasha, it was now doubtful whether the Committee of Union and Progress possessed more than a bare majority, if that, in the Chamber. The Entente Libérale, with their Greek allies, mustered nearly one hundred votes. The attitude of the eight or nine members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was doubtful. The failure of their group to secure the election of their nominee to the Armenian Patriarchate had shown them that their recent policy was not altogether favourably viewed by the strong conservative element among the


Armenians, and the recent abstention of their deputies from voting might signal a prelude to a change of attitude towards the Committee of Union and Progress, which hitherto as a general rule they had supported.\textsuperscript{142} Although not deserting the Unionist camp altogether, members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation declared themselves opposed to the Chamber's dissolution.\textsuperscript{143} The situation with the Albanian members of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, was totally different. Seven of the ten Albanian deputies - including Bedri Bey, deputy for Ipek and father of Mazhar Bey, Governor of Kossovo during the Albanian insurrection of 1910 - who had remained with the Committee of Union and Progress seceded from the party on December 30. Upset with the Unionists' unwillingness to fix a day for the discussion of government policy in Albania, these now realised that the Unionists were committed to a speedy parliamentary dissolution, leaving no time for such discussion. Therefore, they joined the independents.\textsuperscript{144}

In an attempt to solve the political deadlock, which, in part, had been caused by the refusal of the independents to participate in the voting, the Sultan sent a message to the independents on December 31, advising them to abandon obstruction. The deputies belonging to the independent group held a meeting on January 1, 1912 to discuss the situation. Although they decided to resume negotiations for an understanding between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Entente Libérable, the success of these efforts was highly improbable. Consequently, the dissolution of the Chamber and fresh elections were regarded as inevitable.\textsuperscript{145}

The resignation of the cabinet was the logical outcome of the deadlock in the Chamber, and especially the failure of the Unionists to secure even a quorum at the

\textsuperscript{142} "Parliamentary Crisis in Turkey: Resignation of the Cabinet", \textit{The Times}, January 1, 1912, p.5.
\textsuperscript{143} "The Turkish Cabinet Crisis", \textit{The Times}, January 3, 1912, p.3; and, "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, January 12, 1912, p.291.
\textsuperscript{144} "Parliamentary Crisis in Turkey: Resignation of the Cabinet", \textit{The Times}, January 1, 1912, p.5; and, "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, January 12, 1912, p.291.
\textsuperscript{145} "The Political Deadlock in Turkey: A Government Proclamation", \textit{The Times}, January 2, 1912, p.3.
Chamber on December 30. Said Pasha was immediately given the task of forming a new government.\textsuperscript{146} This, too, was equally logical, for Said Pasha had not received a rebuff of a vote of non-confidence, nor forfeited his position by any step of which the Sultan did not approve. Moreover, so long as the Committee of Union and Progress was really the party in power, its candidate was the natural choice to head the new cabinet. By their passive resistance, the monarchist opposition had apparently lost rather than gained in the public opinion, especially in view of the fact that in principle they acknowledged themselves in favour of the extension of the powers of the throne. The measure proposed by Said Pasha — that Article 35 of the Constitution be so revised as to give the Sultan power to dissolve the Chamber even without the consent of the Senate — alarmed quite a section of the country, since this had been mistakenly interpreted as the prelude to another coup d'\textsuperscript{\textacute{e}}tat and the assumption of autocratic power. The Entente Libérale had seen here its opportunity to pose as the champion of constitutional liberty, though it knew well that the proposed amendment was not a step towards absolutism.\textsuperscript{147}

A power struggle ensued following Said Pasha's resignation. Although the Sultan, pressed by the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, immediately re-appointed Said Pasha to form a new government, the monarchists did not give up the fight for political power. La Liberté mentioned views expressed in monarchist circles that Damad Ferid Pasha, senator and leader of the Entente Libérale, be appointed Grand Vezier. However, even opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress realised that the monarchists could supply neither the Grand Vezier nor the most important portfolios in the cabinet, since the opposition was an aggregation of several groups with but a single feature in common: hatred of the party in power. Supporters of the Entente Libérale - the Greek, Albanian, Armenian, and Arab deputies - had all their own programmes and their


\textsuperscript{147} "Said Pasha His Own Successor", \textit{The Orient}, 3/1 (January 3, 1912), p.1.
separate agendas. These deputies would naturally be with the opposition - until the Entente Libérale came into power.\footnote{La Liberté, January 1, 1912, excerpted in "Political Possibilities", The Orient, 3/1 (January 3, 1912), p.2.} Despite unfavourable political opinion, an Entente Libérale deputation composed of Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, leader of the parliamentary party of the Entente Libérale, Haci Ali Efendi, deputy for Baghdad, Abd al-Nafi Pasha, deputy for Aleppo, Gümülcinenli Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Gümülcine, Tahir Hayreddin Bey, deputy for Istanbul, Nazareth Daghvarian, deputy for Sivas, Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi, deputy for Tokat, and Shafiq al-Muayyad Bey, deputy for Damascus, visited the Sultan on December 31 to ask him to reconsider his decision.\footnote{Reunion de l'Entente Libérale", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, January 1, 1912, p.2.}

The Damad Ferid Pasha option having failed, the monarchists proposed another combination. The proposed monarchist "solution" consisted in forming a cabinet whose members would be chosen outside the Chamber, and which would unite with a conciliatory object the most prominent monarchist or conservative statesmen in the Empire: Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, Mahmud Sevket Pasha, Gabriel Nouradunghian, and the like. The monarchists' choice for the position of the Grand Vezierate was Kamil Pasha. Although all of the monarchist pashas would be willing to serve under him, there was the absolute impossibility of Said Pasha ever being persuaded to serve in a cabinet which Kamil Pasha was the Grand Vezier - and there was no question that Said Pasha could be left out of power. Thus, this combination was also out of the question.\footnote{La Liberté, January 1, 1912, excerpted in "Political Possibilities", The Orient, 3/1 (January 3, 1912), p.2.}

By January 2, official notification of the formation of a new cabinet had not been published, but there was reason to believe that Said Pasha had consented to the substitution of Talat Bey for Celal Bey as Minister of the Interior. Abdurrahman Seref Bey had refused to take office again, and his place would probably be taken by Emrullah Efendi.\footnote{"The Turkish Cabinet Crisis", The Times, January 3, 1912, p.3: and, "The New Cabinet", The Orient, 3/1 (January 3, 1912), p.5.}
Pasha announced his cabinet on January 3. The cabinet, however, was formed without Talat Bey.\(^{152}\) Talat Bey’s as well as Cavid Bey’s exclusion from the new cabinet was mainly due to Mahmud Sevket Pasha’s objections.\(^{153}\)

The new Sheik-ul-Islam was Abdurrahman Nesib Efendi, former Cadi of Egypt. Memduh Bey, Minister of Justice, would act as Minister of the Interior. Emrullah Efendi took the place of Abdurrahman Seref Bey as Minister of Education. Aristidi Pasha Yorgandjioglu became Minister of Mines and Forests. Sinapian Efendi was appointed as the new Minister of Public Works. There were no other changes.\(^{154}\) One of the most significant departures from the previous cabinet was the appointment of Sinapian Efendi, a monarchist, to the Ministry of Public Works. His predecessor had been Hulusi Bey whose policy of favouring domestic entrepreneurs and capitalists at the expense of foreign concessions had provoked anxiety among foreign investors. Sinapian Efendi’s appointment was clearly calculated to alloy their concern.\(^{155}\) For the moment the portfolio of the Interior remained unfilled; Haci Adil Arda, a moderate member of the Committee of Union and Progress, would later be named to the post.\(^{156}\) Despite this, the new Cabinet was devoid of a strong Unionist presence. In the words of the Unionists, this was a "Said Pasha Cabinet", or a colourless Cabinet d’Affaires.\(^ {157}\)

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE FORMATION OF HIS NEW CABINET, Said Pasha, at the

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January 3 sitting of the Assembly, presented the famous amendment to Article 35 of the Constitution, and said the new cabinet insisted on its being voted. Sidki Bey, opposition deputy for Aydin, claimed that this was really not a new cabinet, in as much as the previous cabinet had not had an adverse vote and had no legal right to resign; and that furthermore, the Chamber had no right to discuss this amendment now, since there were other items on the agenda previous to this -referring to the Albanian question. He ended by presenting a motion that the Senate be consulted as to whether the present cabinet was or was not to be considered a new cabinet. Sabri Hoca, opposition deputy for Tokat, gave legal reasons why the claim of the Grand Vezier that the Chamber had by its obstruction virtually rejected the proposed amendment could not stand, and said it was evident that the cabinet was determined to dissolve the Chamber. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor of Tanin and Unionist deputy for Istanbul, expressed his disapproval of this speech. The Grand Vezier vigorously repudiated the charge of wishing to dissolve the Chamber, and condemned the obstructionist tactics of the monarchist opposition. Seyyid Bey, leader of the parliamentary party of the Committee of Union and Progress, refuted the arguments of Sabri Hoca, and moved that the amendment be immediately discussed. At the demand of Said Pasha, this motion was put before that of Sidki Bey, but this led to high words and some very plain but unparliamentary appellatives between Ahmed Ferid Tek, opposition deputy for Kütahya, and Talat Bey, who were with difficulty separated. Seyyid Bey's motion was carried, the opposition having left the hall, by a vote of one hundred and three to two. The Entente Libérale deputies returned for the vote on referring the legal point to the Senate, which motion was defeated by one hundred votes to ninety.  

At the January 4 sitting of the Chamber, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey, Unionist deputy for Baghdad and Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for the Revision of

the Constitution, gave a long explanation of the object of the proposed amendment. Denying that the amending of Article 35 was a blow at the Constitution, he said that it was on the contrary intended to strengthen it. He called attention to the frequency of a dissolution of Parliament in Great Britain, and to the fact that a newly elected set of deputies would represent more accurately the national opinion. France also saw frequent dissolutions. The restriction on the power of the throne to dissolve the Chamber, relating to the consent of the Senate, existed in no other monarchy, and had been introduced from the Constitution of the French Republic, where the Senate was an elective body. If the Chamber had the right to concur for the dissolution of the Senate, it would even up matters, but the existing provision gave the Senate a great advantage over the Chamber. 159

Sidki Bey replied for the Entente Libérale. He occupied an hour and a half in setting forth the illegality of the procedure of the cabinet, in proposing a constitutional amendment before the cabinet had unfolded their programme or obtained a vote of confidence, and especially without the concurrence of the new Sheik-ul-Islam, who had not yet arrived from Egypt. He said it was not the Sultan whom the Entente Libérale feared but the Grand Vezier who protested so loudly that he had no desire to dissolve the Chamber while in reality that matter was not in his hands. The debate was afterwards adjourned until January 6. 160

The continuous obstruction of the Chamber's proceedings by the monarchist deputies led the Unionist leadership to take action. In retaliation, the Unionists again threatened to publish those journals which members of the opposition had sent to Abdülhamid during the pre-revolutionary period. In an open letter published in the Tanin


160. "The Turkish Chamber and the Cabinet", The Times, January 5, 1912, p.3; and, "The Ottoman Parliament", The Orient, 3/2 (January 10, 1912), p.1.
of January 6, Talat Bey accused one of the prominent monarchist members of having written to Abdülhamid, urging him to oppose a constitutional monarchy on the grounds that it would not be beneficial to the country. 161

The debate on the proposed constitutional amendment was continued on January 6. Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey began by answering the arguments of Sidki Bey. He said that the refusal to discuss the project was tantamount to a rejection; that in presenting this amendment the new cabinet did present its programme, and that the vote of the Chamber to discuss it immediately was in reality a vote of confidence. He ended his speech by begging the opposition to cease obstructionist tactics and express themselves on the principles of the amendment. 162

Daltcheff, deputy for Serres, criticised the government for trying to make itself stronger when the trouble was, it was too strong already. He alleged that the government had used illegal force in Albania, Macedonia, and lately at Istib, where, he claimed, troubles were due to governmental mistakes. In his view, to give such a government more power would be to re-establish absolutism. 163 Boussios, Greek deputy for Serfice, said that they did not accept the amendment because they did not wish to leave the country in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress. Pointing out that the Unionists were losing adherents in the Chamber, Boussios declared that a party that mustered only one hundred votes in an assembly composed of two hundred and eighty members could not in any country pretend to have a majority. His advice to the Committee of Union and Progress was to leave the power to others. 164 His speech was well publicised in the monarchist press. İkdam of January 7 praised him for his oratorial gifts and used this opportunity to further attack the Unionists. 165

165. İkdam, December 25, 1327/January 7, 1912, excerpted in "An Able Greek Deputy", The
At the January 9 sitting of the Chamber, Dr. Riza Nur, Yorgos Boussios, and Feyzi Efendi tried obstructionist tactics for a while, but the debate on Article 35 proceeded. Abd-al Hamid Zohrawi Efendi, monarchist deputy for Hama, in a long harangue, aroused harsh feelings by his unfair criticisms. Emmanuel Emmanuelides, Unionist Greek deputy for Izmir, defended the Committee of Union and Progress against the attacks of Boussios.\textsuperscript{166} The following day, on January 10, Dr. Riza Nur and Basri Bey, deputy for Dibre, occupied the whole afternoon sitting in attacking the Unionists and the amendment, being frequently interrupted in most unparliamentary form. Dr. Riza Nur criticised the government for trying to force the measure while the Grand Vezier was ill, the Sheik-ul-Islam absent, and the Ministry of the Interior vacant. Alleging that the real object of the cabinet was to strengthen the position not of the Sultan but of their own party, he said he preferred an absolute sovereign who respected the law to a constitutional monarchy which did not.\textsuperscript{167} At the January 11 sitting, Riza Tevfik Bölükbaşı, one of the leaders of the Entente Libérale, openly cursed the Unionist deputies in an address to the Chamber, denounced the Committee of Union and Progress, and wished calamity on the constitutional regime.\textsuperscript{168} By now it was perfectly clear that the opposition's aim did not fall within the bounds of a liberal democracy; the aim was not merely to criticise the deeds of the Said Pasha Cabinet as one would normally expect in a liberal democratic parliamentary regime but to destroy both the Committee of Union and Progress and the liberal democratic regime.\textsuperscript{169}

\textbf{BACKED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE MONARCHIST-DOMINATED SENATE. Hüseyin Hilmi}


\textsuperscript{166} "The Ottoman Parliament", \textit{The Orient}, 3/3 (January 17, 1912), p.1.


Pasha submitted, on January 9, to the leaders of the two parties a scheme for an understanding. The scheme was based on the main point that the proposed modification of Article 35 be accepted with one amendment -namely, consultation of the Senate to be a necessary preliminary to the dissolution of Parliament. He further proposed that dissolution of the Chamber not to take place in 1912 and that a paragraph providing for this be added to the modified Article. Requesting that party organs abstain from further polemics for the remainder of the session, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha also asked the Chamber to bind itself to abstain from unnecessary interpellations on penalty of having debates suspended for three months. 170

However, his attempt to effect a compromise between the warring parties on the question of the amendment of the Constitution ended in failure. 171 In an interview published in the January 12 issue of La Liberté, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha expressed regret that his proposals for a compromise had not been accepted by either side, and added that he did not believe the government would obtain a two-thirds majority, or one hundred and fifty-six votes, for the proposal of the amendment of the Constitution. He told La Liberté that the majority of the Senate also opposed to the immediate modification of Article 35. The creation of new senators in order to constitute a majority in favour of the amendment would, in his opinion, have the unfortunate result of lowering the prestige of that body, which, he claimed, should hold the balance of power between the parties. Informing the public that holding of general elections would be inevitable should the Parliament be dissolved, he expressed the opinion that this was not an opportune moment for electoral struggles, which were certain to cause agitation, and might result in disturbances which would only increase the malaise from which the whole country had been suffering in consequence of parliamentary rivalries. He added that an understanding between Moslems

170. Mehmed Cavid, "Mersutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatıraları: 63", Tanin, November 2, 1943, p.2; and, "The Turkish Constitutional Debates: Proposals for a Compromise", The Times, January 10, 1912, p.3.
and Christians and between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Entente Libérale was necessary for the welfare of Turkey. His advice was that the prorogation of the Chamber for three months would be a simple method of putting an end to these polemics, which, he alleged, had been having a bad effect everywhere. 172

The government decided to put the proposed amendment to a vote in the Chamber at all costs. On January 13, the Chamber narrowly sanctioned the proposal by a vote of one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and five, which, because this was not a two-thirds majority, effectively meant defeat for the Committee of Union and Progress. The Government then decided to dissolve the Chamber and call for new elections. The new Chamber would meet in three months' time. 173 On January 15, the Sultan transmitted to the Senate an imperial decree informing it of his decision to dissolve the Chamber, and, in conformity with Article 7 of the Constitution, awaiting the Senate's reply. 174 The Senate decided to appoint a commission composed of nine members - Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, Prince Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed Galib Bey, General Salih Pasha, Bassaria Efendi, Serif Cafer Pasha, Ismail Hakki Efendi, Dilber Efendi, and General Hüsnü Pasha- to report on the advisability of a dissolution. As the majority of the members of this commission was sympathetic to the Committee of Union and Progress, it was expected that the Senate had decided not to raise difficulties. 175 After weighing the pros and cons, the commission decided that it would be wiser to yield on this issue of new elections than to enter into a struggle which would pit the Senate against the Committee of Union and Progress, the

174. "Turkish Chamber to be Dissolved", The Times, January 16, 1912, p.8; and, Tanin and Yeni Ikdam, January 3, 1327/April 16, 1912, cited in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.102n.
Grand Vezier, and the Sultan. On January 17, the Senate voted thirty-nine to five with one abstention that the Sultan be advised to dissolve Parliament.


Chapter 13

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1912

The Imperial Decree dated January 17 for the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and calling for the new elections and the constitution of the new Chamber within three months was published in the newspapers of January 18.1 The elections, it was said, would begin in a month's time. All prophesies concerning the composition and character of the next Parliament were based on mere surmise and had to be accepted with the utmost caution. All that could be said was that while the Committee of Union and Progress had lost ground, there was no proof that the Entente Libérale had gained any access of strength except in Albania and perhaps in the Arab provinces. The general pessimism, accentuated by the ongoing war with Italy over Tripoli, was perhaps the most striking feature of the situation.2

Although a definite decision had not been taken with regard to further cabinet changes, there was reason to believe that an influential section of the Committee of Union and Progress wished to strengthen the cabinet by the appointment of Talat Bey as Minister of the Interior, and of Cavid Bey as Minister of Public Works.3 Immediately after the call for new elections, the Unionist leadership began criticising the Said Pasha Cabinet for being transitory, and for not having accomplished anything new or drastic in the way of


institutionalising the Revolution.\(^4\)

The pressures worked. Haci Adil Arda, ex-Governor of Edirne and Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, was appointed Minister of the Interior on January 22. He was a man of considerable administrative experience, especially in the Customs Administration, and was believed to be of a more moderate and conciliatory disposition than some of his colleagues in the Committee of Union and Progress.\(^5\) In the January 23 issue of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın welcomed the news of Arda's appointment as Minister of the Interior, but expressed worry that there was needed more energetic people in government which had a difficult task to accomplish in the upcoming three months.\(^6\)

Haci Adil Arda was soon joined by Talat Bey, the new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, replacing Ibrahim Sousa.\(^7\) The official news of his appointment, though, did not appear until February 3.\(^8\) He took up his duties on February 5.\(^9\) Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, another Unionist, was already in the cabinet as Minister of Pious Foundations. However, still unable to have Cavid Bey appointed as Minister of Public Works, Tanin kept up the pressure, arguing that because the cabinet had come into power only with the support of the Unionist deputies, it was the Committee of Union and Progress which was largely responsible for the government's actions and policies. Yet, no Minister was a prominent member of the party, and this raised the problem of accountability. Extending this logic, Tanin argued that those who were responsible for the policies of the government should

\(^7\) "The Turkish Senate: Appointment of Ahmed Riza Bey", The Times, January 25, 1912, p.5; and "Empire News: The Capital", The Orient, 3/6 (February 7, 1912), p.7.
\(^8\) "News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 3, 1912, p.1; and, "Turkish Politics: Talaat Bey's Appointment", The Times, February 5, 1912, p.5.
also be in the cabinet as well.\textsuperscript{10}

After persistent Unionist efforts, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress finally managed to have Cavid Bey appointed to a cabinet post. On February 17, Sinapian Efendi having handed in his long-awaited resignation, an Imperial Decree was issued appointing Cavid Bey Minister of Public Works.\textsuperscript{11}

BY LATE JANUARY, both the Committee of Union and Progress and the Entente Libérale had begun preparations for the upcoming general elections. It was generally expected that the first degree elections would be over by the end of February, the second some time in April. By and large, the Committee of Union and Progress was expected to win.\textsuperscript{12}

The Entente Libérale, the main opposition party, consisted of monarchist Turks, Albanians, Arabs of Syria and Iraq, a large majority of Greeks, Bulgarians, and a few of the more conservative Armenian communities.\textsuperscript{13} By the end of January, an arrangement had been practically concluded between the Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia for common action at the approaching elections. The efforts made by Unionist envoys to sow discord between the Greeks and the Bulgarians appeared to have failed, and the Bulgarians were stated to have rejected the Unionist offer of seven seats in the new Chamber provided that they would not cooperate with the Greeks.\textsuperscript{14} An exchange of visits between the Bulgarian Minister in Istanbul and the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch in the last days of January caused considerable comment in political circles. It was quite rightly interpreted as a proof of the friendly relations existing between Greeks and Bulgarians, and their


\textsuperscript{11} "New Turkish Minister", The Times, February 19, 1912, p.5.

\textsuperscript{12} "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, February 9, 1912, 427.

\textsuperscript{13} "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, February 16, 1912, p.459.

\textsuperscript{14} "Macedonia and the Young Turks", The Times, January 31, 1912, p.5; and, "The Elections in Macedonia", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, February 5, 1912, p.1.
respective Churches. Having joined the Entente Libérale, the Greeks and Bulgarians, together with the help of their clergy, were doing their utmost to undermine the Unionist organisation in Macedonia.

The Unionist concern for the accord reached between the Greeks and the Bulgarians in the Macedonian provinces of the Empire was aggravated by the rapprochement between the Greek and Bulgarian states. Commenting in the Tanin of January 31 on the visit of the Crown Prince of Greece to Sofia, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey expressed the Unionist consternation that the "pompous menacing" Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement was directed against Turkey. As for the possibility that it might lead to interference in the internal affairs of the Empire, Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey said that Turkey was strong enough to resist such attempts and could count upon the help of elements oppressed by the foreigners. The article faithfully reflected the apprehensions caused in Unionist circles by the steady improvement in the relations between the Greeks and Bulgarians both within the boundaries of the Empire and outside them.

On the other hand, the Bulgarian leaders and the Albanian chiefs maintained the accord arrived the previous spring. The Albanians, recognising the error they had committed in the Spring of 1911 by beginning the revolt prematurely, were determined to remain quiet for the time being, but to continue their preparations. This decision by the Albanian chiefs had been taken before the announcement of certain reforms on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress, and consequently could not be regarded as the result of the conciliatory attitude of the Unionists towards the Albanians. In any case, the Albanians regarded the promise of reforms as an electoral device and did not take it seriously.

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Committee of Union and Progress did not expect this constituency to vote in its favour. In fact, the insurrection in the Spring of 1911 and the government's inability to introduce certain promised reforms had made the Albanians the Unionists' most bitter opponents.19

By the end of January, the situation in Albania, which was already bad, had considerably worsened. A further complication had arisen in the refusal of the peasants in the Valona and Argyrocastro districts -two monarchist constituencies- to pay taxes. Not only had the payment been refused, but the tax collectors had been warned that should they persist in their demands, their lives would be endangered. The inhabitants stated that they were without means and therefore could not pay the amount demanded of them. The opinion of the local officials was that this situation was due to the instigation of certain interested parties -among whom Ismail Kemal Bey, the monarchist Albanian deputy for Berat, figured prominently- who were desirous of creating further difficulties for the government in Albania. The collectors' request for military assistance had been categorically refused by the local military authorities, and the matter had been referred to the Ministry of the Interior.20

In consequence of these disturbances, it was officially announced in Istanbul that Haci Adil Arda, Minister of the Interior, would start on a tour of the Macedonian provinces, accompanied by a staff of civilian and military officials. Arda would be given full powers for the immediate application of remedial measures.21 Arda left Istanbul for Salonica on February 17 on his tour of inquiry into the condition of the Macedonian and Albanian provinces.22 The Albanians, however, were determined to resist the Turkish authority. By mid-March it was reported that an Albanian band had ambushed the escort of Haci Adil Arda on the road between Ipek and Djakova. Official secrecy was maintained as

to the number of victims. 23

Since the Italian declaration of war, the state of Albania had not improved, while
that of Macedonia had gone from bad to worse. The revival of the Bulgarian revolutionary
propaganda was one of the worst features of the existing situation. It was generally
ascribed to the severities which marked the disarmament of 1910-1911, following the
suppression of the revolt by government troops, and which undoubtedly drove some of the
Bulgarian peasants to the hills. Given the fact that the average Bulgarian peasant would
generally bear the bastinado and worse treatment with dour patience, it was, however, clear
that the causes of the discontent lay deeper. The real causes of the revival of the Bulgarian
revolutionary propaganda in Macedonia were due to the failure of the new regime to
grapple with the agrarian question, the breakdown of the gendarmerie organisation, and the
frequent and unpunished massacres of Bulgarian peasants by the hired assassins of
Moslem murder clubs. 24

The situation was not a simple one. It was not only the Moslems who killed the
Bulgarian peasantry. Bands of the Bulgarian revolutionary Internal Organisation were busy
attacking not only the representatives of the state, but also terrorising the Bulgarian
peasantry in an attempt to force them join in their struggle against Turkish rule. On
February 17, a bomb exploded in the police headquarters of the town of Kirchevo, to the
north of Monastir, destroying the building and killing one person and injuring five others.
The crime was attributed to the Internal Organisation. The day being market day at
Kirchevo, it was apparently hoped to provoke further incidents such as occurred at Istib in
December, but the authorities took prompt measures to prevent any disturbances, and order
was restored. 25

A few days later, the refusal of the Bulgarian inhabitants of a mill at Petritch in

23. "Turkish Minister's Tour: Escort Ambushed by Albanians", The Times, March 16, 1912, p.5.
24, 1912, p.7.
Serres to lend their support to the Internal Organisation was the cause of a particularly revolting crime which was attributed by the authorities to the revolutionary chief Donjo, whose band had attacked the mill and ruthlessly massacred the Bulgarian inhabitants. The peasants being unarmed were unable to defend themselves and inflicted no loss upon the brigands. It had become evident that orders had been issued to the bands that the Bulgarian villages were to be terrorised into extending their hospitality to the revolutionary Internal Organisation.

It was not only Bulgarians that were being assasinated in Macedonia. The situation had considerably deteriorated, and it had almost approached to the level of civil strife in the whole region. By mid-February, the continuation of the series of assasinations of Moslems by Bulgarian bands had given rise to a growing feeling of resentment and anger among the entire Moslem population of Macedonia. It was feared that if the government did not succeed in putting an end to these outrages, it would be very difficult to avoid large scale massacres on both sides.

In an effort to settle the outstanding issues between the Internal Organisation and the Turkish Administration, Sükrü Bey, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, and Abdülkerim Bey, Inspector of Public Instruction, went to Sofia to ask the representatives of the Internal Organisation what reforms would satisfy them and under what conditions they would put a stop to the bomb explosions and terrorist activity. The representatives of the Internal Organisation gave the uncompromising reply that the Internal Organisation refused to negotiate with the Turkish Government and would continue its terrorist activity until it attained its object, i.e., autonomy through international European intervention.

Indeed, the aim of the Internal Organisation was to capture the attention of the

European Powers. As part of their propaganda effort, Professors Miletich and Georgov, both of Sofia University, had arrived at St. Petersburg in mid-March as delegates of the Internal Organisation to agitate in favour of European intervention against the alleged atrocities perpetrated by the Turkish Government. An international press campaign had already started. In leading articles and interviews, they insisted on the revival of the programme of reforms outlined at the Reval meeting of 1908 between the King of Great Britain and the Czar of Russia. The delegates then proceeded to London and other European capitals. 29 Meanwhile, the Internal Organisation continued its terrorist activities throughout the election campaign. On March 26, it was reported that ten bombs had been found on the Salonica-Monastir railway near Florina. 30

Another group which was in close touch with the Entente Libérale was the secular as well as the religious leadership of the Greek community. Though sympathetic to the monarchist cause, the Greek community had formally refrained from joining the Entente Libérale up until mid-January despite persistent appeals by the Entente Libérale leadership. With the heated debate on the modification of Article 35 of the Constitution, the consequent dissolution of the Chamber, and the call for general elections, however, conservative Greek deputies decided to formally ally themselves with the Entente Libérale. The conservative Sabah and the monarchist Yeni Gazete of January 12 informed the public that a protocol had been signed between the two sides and that twenty-two Greek deputies had joined the Entente Libérale. 31 With the protocol, the Entente Libérale guaranteed minorities' rights in the elections, and promised to maintain the rights of the Greek Church. 32 They also pledged that they would support the election of fifty-two Greek deputies to the new

30. "Bombs on a Turkish Railway", The Times, March 27, 1912, p.5.
Chamber. 33

The protocol signed between the Greek deputies and the Entente Libérale, formally allying the former to the monarchist opposition, caused consternation in the Unionist camp and indignation among some sections of the Greek population in Anatolia. The Unionists were anxious to obtain the support, or, at least, the neutrality of the Greeks in the upcoming elections. 34 On January 28, Talat Bey and Halil Mentese - two prominent members of the Unionist leadership - visited Joachim Efendi, the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch, and talked about the upcoming elections. In an effort to win the Greek minority to the Unionist side, they proposed cooperation between the Greek community and the Committee of Union and Progress. Reportedly, they promised that all the legitimate demands of the Patriarchate would be granted. 35 On behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress, they also promised that they would allocate thirty-seven seats for the Greek community in the new Chamber. Their offer to Joachim Efendi included a promise of several key governmental positions in the Ministries as well as the offer of the Ministry of Justice to Aristidis Yorgandjioglu Pasha. 36

As the Unionist offer to Joachim Efendi constituted an effort on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress to come to an understanding with the Greek community, this posed a threat to the agreement reached between the Greek deputies and the monarchist Entente Libérale. Therefore, the monarchist press did everything in its power to prevent the conclusion of a definite agreement between the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Committee of Union and Progress. Press attacks of the Unionist proposals followed. In response to factually distorted monarchist press attacks, Talat Bey and Halil Mentese made

33. Caterina Boura, "I vouleftices ecloges stin othomaniki aftocratoria I ellines vouleftes 1908-1918", p.79.
a declaration which appeared in the February 3 issues of newspapers, denying that the visit to the Patriarch was to propose the elimination of Greek deputies from the Chamber. They said that the Committee of Union and Progress supported the election of Greek deputies and that the Unionists did not bear any ill-feeling because of an understanding reached between Greek Constitutional League, a conservative political organisation, and the Entente Libérale. 37 On its part, Amalthia, a Greek newspaper published in Izmir, criticised Greek alliance with the Entente Libérale, saying that declaring themselves against the Unionists would not be beneficial to the Greek community at large, as the Committee of Union and Progress was expected to have the majority in the next Chamber. 38

The leadership of the Greek community in Istanbul, however, was decided to oppose the Committee of Union and Progress in the elections. They were also active in trying to recruit other communities in the Entente Libérale camp. On February 10, it was reported that Solon Casanova and Dingas, representatives of the Greek Electoral Club, had entered into negotiations with the Armenian Social Democrats, or Hinchakists, the conservative rival of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, with the object of having a joint action against the Committe of Union and Progress. 39 Convinced of their electoral strength, the Armenian Social Democrats, however, also bargained with the Committee of Union and Progress and declared on February 13 that they had decided not to oppose the Unionists in the elections in return for guarantees that their conservative candidates -most importantly, Krikor Zohrab- would not be opposed by the Committee of Union and Progress. 40

The greatest achievement of the Entente Libérale, however, came in mid-February with the announcement in Salonica that the ulema had decided to leave the Committee of

Union and Progress and join the Entente Libérale. As a result of protracted negotiations, the influential *ulema*, or religious leaders, had decided to withdraw their support from the Committee of Union and Progress, and to throw in their lot with the Entente Libérale. In view of the undoubted authority exercised by the *ulema* over the Moslem population, this was a political change of considerable importance, and one which might well have a most unexpected influence upon the upcoming elections. As some considerable surprise was doubtless manifested at the decision of the *ulema* to aid so substantially the Christian candidates, it was interesting to note that the *ulema* now claimed that in working in harmony with their Christian brethren they had the sanction of the Koran. The representatives of the *ulema* argued that they were convinced not only that in a union of diverse communities of the Empire lay the one way of salvation for Turkey, but that such a union could never now be obtained under the organisation of the Committee of Union and Progress, and could only be effected under the auspices of the Moslem religion and by convincing the Moslems that the Koran not only permitted, but encouraged, an *entente* with the Christians.\(^41\)

Coinciding with the *ulema*'s statement, the Entente Libérale announced the establishment of its Salonika branch. Sheikh Ömer Efendi was chosen as the first president and *Selanikli* Hamdi Beyzade Adil Bey as the vice-president of the local branch of the Entente Libérale at Salonika, to which body the local Greek and Bulgarian organisations had already promised their adhesion.\(^42\) The *ulema* would run their own candidate, *Hafiz Süleyman Efendi*, in Salonika where the organisation and influence of the Entente Libérale would be placed at their disposal. On the other hand, the candidates of the Entente Libérale


would receive the hearty support of the *ulema* throughout the province. The local leaders of the Entente Libérale were very optimistic about their chances at the elections. Counting upon the support of the whole of the Greek and Bulgarian and the religious conservative Moslem population, they hoped to control three quarters of the voting strength of the Salonika province, and thus heavily to defeat the Unionist candidates.\(^{43}\)

**AT THIS TIME,** the Committee of Union and Progress was composed mainly of Turks, with a very respectable number of Arabs from the provinces of Iraq, Yemen, and to a degree, Tripoli.\(^{44}\) According to press reports, an agreement with *Imam* Yahya stipulated that there would be twenty-five deputies for Yemen, as opposed to thirteen in the last Chamber.\(^{45}\) This move was calculated to quiet down the Yemenite rebellion that had been going on for several months, which the government troops had been unable to suppress. The Committee of Union and Progress also enjoyed Jewish support, as well as a small measure of Serbian support. Despite their differences on the issue of Parliament's dissolution, Armenian Revolutionary Federation also remained supporters of the Unionists.\(^{46}\)

In an attempt to win the bulk of the Armenian vote in Anatolia, it was announced on February 7 that Ürgüplü Hayri Bey, the Unionist Minister of Pious Foundations, would make a trip to eastern Anatolia. His tour of inspection was connected with the question of the restitution of Armenian properties, seized by the Kurds under the Hamidian regime, to their former legitimate owners.\(^{47}\) Ever since the establishment of the liberal democratic regime, the issue was on the Unionist agenda; however, Kurdish resistance, supported by monarchist politicians, had effectively blocked the execution of this policy. On February


\(^{47}\) "The Turkish Government and the Armenians", *The Times*, February 9, 1912, p.5.
12, the government announced that it had decided to open a credit of one hundred thousand liras for the settlement of the Armeno-Kurdish land disputes in the eastern provinces. Armenians who had been wrongfully dispossessed and were able to give proof of their title would be reinstated in their old holdings, while compensation would be paid to the Kurdish squatters. Extended powers for the introduction of reforms and the maintenance of order would be conferred on the Governors of Bitlis and Erzurum. These measures were likely to secure the Armenian Revolutionary Federation vote for the Committee of Union and Progress at the upcoming elections. 48

On February 29, it was formally announced that the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had agreed to join forces. Delegates of both parties signed an agreement for common action at the elections. The protocol also stated that deputies of the two parties would cooperate in the Chamber until the dissolution of the next Parliament. 49 On March 7, it was further announced that the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had been having negotiations on the number of the deputies to represent the Armenian minority. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation had been demanding twenty deputies, as it claimed that this number was justified and represented a figure proportional to the Armenian population in the Empire. 50

On March 20, Protestant and Catholic Armenians met to discuss to collaborate in the general elections. The majority of the participants were declared to be in favour of cooperating with the Committee of Union and Progress. 51

THE OPPOSITION had a large number of newspapers under its control, including such

49. "Turkish Committee and the Armenians", The Times, March 1, 1912, p.5.
Turkish language dailies as the prominent _İkdam_ and _Yeni Gazete_, as well as most of the minority newspapers.  

Writing editorials in _Yeni Gazete_, Yorgos Boussios, the prominent Greek deputy for Serfidje, was one of the Unionists' fiercest opponents. He enjoyed the support of Ahmed Cevdet Bey, the owner of _İkdam_; and, when Pantoleon Cosmidis, a prominent Greek monarchist deputy for Istanbul, established _Phoni_, a Greek language newspaper, Yorgos Boussios became its editor-in-chief. Apart from its attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress, _Phoni_ became known for its highly derogatory and racist propaganda against the Turkish population. In one of its February issues, _Phoni_ reproduced an article by E. J. Dillon, of the British newspaper _The Daily Telegraph_, on the internal situation in Turkey. When this article -which was a totally racist and disrespectful piece of pseudo-journalism against the Turkish population- came under attack, _Teminat_, another monarchist newspaper owned by Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, deputy for Amasya and leader of the Entente Liberales, rushed to _Phoni's_ defence, claiming that the slurs were the result of printing errors. Nevertheless, _Phoni's_ owner, Pantoleon Cosmidis, appeared before the Court Martial which sentenced him on February 15 to four month's imprisonment and a fine of thirty-four liras for publishing articles calculated to excite the public against the government. On February 4, the Court Martial also sentenced Tahir

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Hayreddin Bey, monarchist deputy for Istanbul, to two months' and ten days' imprisonment for publishing articles in Bedahat calculated to bring the government into disrepute and to cause disorders. The verdict was pronounced in absentia as he had already left Istanbul to avoid arrest. However, Cemal Bey, the owner of Bedahat and a former governor of Izmit, was arrested.

Hoping to publicly discredit the monarchists, Tanin published, in its February 16 issue, the text of a letter Kamil Pasha had written to the Sultan from Egypt on December 20, 1911 which amounted to nothing less than a wholesale indictment of the Unionists and their policies. Kamil Pasha confidently asserted that owing to the despotic attitude of the Committee of Union and Progress, Turkey was in danger of dismemberment and the Caliphate was threatened. He charged the Unionists with inability to govern along constitutional lines, and of resorting therefore to martial law. He claimed that the Unionists had dismissed competent officials in both the capital and the provinces and had replaced them by inexperienced and incompetent Unionist followers, whose unsatisfactory administration was responsible for the troubles in Albania, Arabia and the Yemen, involving such a waste of lives as well as money. He threatened that unless the Unionists relinquished their control, another revolution would take place, aided by the army, against their despotism.

Kamil Pasha argued that the Unionists' maladministration had also caused coldness on the part of European powers towards Turkey. The most interesting feature of the letter was the reference to the foreign policy of the Unionists. Kamil Pasha charged the

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*The Orient, 3/8 (February 21, 1912), p.7.*


59. *Tanin*, February 3, 1327/February 16, 1912, excerpted in "Indictment of Young Turkish Policy", *The Times*, February 17, 1912, p.5; and, "Kamil Pasha Scores Union and Progress Committee", *The Orient, 3/8* (February 21, 1912), p.3. The letter has also been reproduced in Hilmi Kamil Bayur, *Kamil Pasa*, pp.308-312.
Committee of Union and Progress with having alienated old friends, and with having given a pretext for Italian hostility by its provocative attitude. In his words, a friendly understanding with Great Britain was hindered by the Committee of Union and Progress. Kamil Pasha expressed the opinion that the Arab world, especially Egypt where the Khedive was hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress, would learn from recent events that it could not expect effective protection from Turkey, and Egypt would eventually declare her independence, after coming to an arrangement whereby she would be assured of the protection of Great Britain. He blamed the Unionists for all the misfortunes which now afflicted Turkey, demanded the Committee's dissolution and the lifting of martial law, at the same time, proposing that Turkey enter into alliance with Great Britain in order to avoid further international disaster.60

By publishing the letter, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın effectively established the complicity of forces both within and outside of the country in the monarchist plan to topple the constitutional regime.61 Yalçın continued his criticism of Kamil Pasha in the February 18 issue of Tanin. Declaring that the Committee of Union and Progress had a clear conscience and was ready to give an account of its deeds, Yalçın accused Kamil Pasha of incapacity and wrote that the Committee of Union and Progress had had much better success in international negotiations, as witness the better terms secured by Cavid Bey for a loan than by Kamil Pasha. In reply to Kamil Pasha's criticisms of the domestic and foreign policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, Yalçın asked why Kamil Pasha had not concluded an alliance with Great Britain during his grand veziership. Reminding him that his government had neither prevented the annexation of Bosnia nor the declaration of

60. Tanin, February 3, 1327/February 16, 1912, excerpted in "Indictment of Young Turkish Policy", The Times, February 17, 1912, p.5; and, "Kamil Pasha Scores Union and Progress Committee", The Orient, 3/8 (February 21, 1912), p.3. The letter has also been reproduced in Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Kamil Pasa, pp.308-312.

Bulgarian independence, Yalçin wrote that if political events were to be regarded as the results of a general scheme of policy, the Italo-Turkish War had to be considered the outcome of an agreement between Italy, France, and Great Britain. 62

Electoral campaign in the provinces started in late January, almost immediately after the publication of the imperial decree that dissolved the Chamber and called for new elections. It was no secret that in the Arab provinces, as well as in parts of Macedonia and Eastern Turkey, disappointed minority nationalists - Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Armenians - were expected to do their best to overthrow the constitutional regime and the Committee of Union and Progress, resenting as they did its "Turkification" policy. 63

*Indépendant de Salonique* informed in one of its late January issues that the electoral campaign had started in the province of Kossovo, with the local Committee of Union and Progress forming an electoral committee. The Üsküb branch of the Committee of Union and Progress had decided to put forward the candidacies of two Bulgarians and two Turks. 64 Intelligence received by the Committee of Union and Progress had convinced the leadership that Bulgarians had to be given two deputyships; otherwise the Unionists would not have much chance of success at the elections there. On February 8, a deputation on behalf of the Üsküb Serbians visited Talat Bey, protesting that the elimination of the Serbian deputy would constitute an infringement of their rights. In the 1908 Chamber the Serbians had one deputy for the Kossovo province. This time, although the Unionist leadership promised that they would guarantee the election of one Serbian for the province - but not for the Üsküb electoral district - the Serbians were not satisfied, and asked for an additional deputy. 65

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65. Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatıraları: 72", *Tanin*, November 11,
By the beginning of February, the Izmir campaigns were in full swing. By law, the district would elect six deputies: two Turks, two Greeks, one Jew, and one Armenian. Muammar Bey, grandson of Midhat Pasha, was the Entente Libérale candidate. Mustafa Nuri Bey and Seyyid Bey were the Unionist candidates. Muammar Bey, the Entente Libérale candidate, was not expected to win. Proodos of February 6 printed the news that a sanguinary conflict took place in early February near the local party headquarters of the Entente Libérale in Izmir between the monarchists and the Unionists. A plainclothsman was killed and two gendarmes and three other persons were wounded. The February 7 issue of Ikdam reported that the events at Izmir had been organised against Lütfi Fikri Bey, who had begun his electoral campaign for the Entente Libérale. The official Agence Ottomane denied the news of the conflict in Izmir between the Unionists and members of the Entente Libérale in which a policeman was said to have been killed and two gendarmes wounded. Yorgos Boussios arrived at Izmir for political campaign on behalf of the Entente Libérale in the first week of March. There, he made an important propaganda speech at the Entente Libérale club. By the second week of March, Boussios was continuing his propaganda campaign around Izmir. On his arrival at Urla, he was met with great enthusiasm.

On his way back from Egypt, Kamil Pasha stopped in Izmir as part of the Entente Libérale campaign and met with several prominent members of the British colony. He consistently opposed the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress. Reportedly, his

1943, p.2.
return to Istanbul was in no small measure due to his anxiety about the Entente Libérale's political future, and he expressed dismay at the general situation of the country during the meeting. 73

By early February, monarchist Arab deputies arrived at Beirut to campaign for the Entente Libérale, among them Lutfi Fikri Bey, the incumbent deputy for Dersim, who had distinguished himself by his fearless attacks on the Committee of Union and Progress. 74 Accompanied by Shukri al-Asali, the Entente Libérale deputy for Damascus, Lutfi Fikri Bey held a conference in one of the prominent cafés facing the town square to explain the principles and expose the salient features of his party's policy. 75 The Entente Libérale's position in Beirut -as in several other Arab provinces- was by no means dominant; and the party had enough trouble recruiting committed local leaders, to say nothing of garnering the support of local voters. 76 As the electorate was fairly evenly divided between the two parties, the Entente Libérale hoped to incite more defections: The Committee of Union and Progress, however, rearranged Beirut's electoral districts in order to break up its support for the opposition. 77 As part of the Unionist campaign, Senator Câfer Pasha arrived at Tripoli in Lebanon on March 11 where he was given an enthusiastic reception. It was reported that the Committee of Union and Progress had great chances of success in the area. 78

After his campaign on behalf of the Entente Libérale candidates at Beirut, Lutfi Fikri Bey proceeded to Damascus, arriving there on February 10, accompanied by Nazim Pasha. 79 Then, he visited Aleppo. According to reports from Aleppo, Lutfi Fikri Bey met

73. "Notes From Smyrna", The Near East, March 29, 1912, p.676.
76. HHS. PA 32/354, Pinter to Berchtold, Beirut, April 3, 1912, quoted in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p.153.
77. HHS. PA 32/354, Pinter to Berchtold, Beirut, April 3, 1912, quoted in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp.156-157.
with an enthusiastic reception on his arrival there on February 15. Lütfi Fikri Bey was met at the station by the partisans of the Entente Libérale who were very numerous at Aleppo. The Unionist attempted to organise a counter-demonstration but they completely failed to do so. Syria's electorate was evenly divided between the two parties. Both the Committee of Union and Progress and the Entente Libérale organised campaign tours throughout the province.

Well aware that some of the Syrian deputies had thrown in their lot with the monarchist opposition, Unionists also arrived in the province, and campaigned aggressively. It was important for the Unionists not to lose the Syrian seats wholesale to the opposition in a place where public opinion was more or less equally divided. Under the leadership of Senator Cafer Pasha, the Unionist mission arrived at Aleppo in the first week of March, where it was enthusiastically received. The Unionist mission for electoral propaganda, presided by Senator Cafer Pasha, arrived at Hama by March 15. He arrived at Damascus on March 15. In the name of Cafer Pasha and the Unionist mission, Sheikh Esad Efendi, incumbent deputy for St. Jean d'Acre, made a political speech. The Syrian press attacked Esad Efendi. According to the monarchist Teminat, the Arab newspapers had printed that Sheikh Esad Efendi represented zionists. By March 23, Cafer Pasha had arrived at Jaffa. In a propaganda speech he delivered at Jaffa, he invited the population to vote for the Unionist candidates.

82. HHS. PA 12/205, Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, March 12, 1912, quoted in Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p.155.
IN THE CAPITAL, the electoral campaign started in early February. On February 5, Cavid Bey spoke at the Unionist club at Kadiköy. Among the audience there were many Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and even members of the Entente Libérale, in addition to members of the Committee of Union and Progress. His criticism of the Entente Libérale platform made an excellent impression on the audience.\(^{88}\) Between February 10 and February 14, Cavid Bey gave a series of conferences at the various workers' clubs at Istanbul neighbourhoods, including Besiktas, Samatya, Fatih, and Süleymaniye. There was much enthusiasm for his speeches. On account of popular demand, he had to make two speeches at the club at Besiktas. At all of the conferences he gave, there were a mixed crowd of Unionist sympathisers as well as devout Moslems and Entente Libérale supporters. Explaining the Unionist policy to his audience, Cavid Bey at the same time strongly criticised not only the the Entente Libérale platform but also the socialist viewpoint.\(^{89}\) Hüseyin Cahid Yalçin conducted additional Unionist campaign in Istanbul in mid-February, giving public speeches at the neighbourhoods of Aksaray, Davud Pasa, and Fatih.\(^{90}\)

The Entente Libérale was also actively campaigning in Istanbul. Riza Tevfik Bölükbası and Pantoleon Cosmidis organised an Entente Libérale meeting to be held on the Prince Islands. As Istanbul was still under martial law, organisers of all public meetings had to secure permission from the authorities at least forty-eight hours in advance. In defiance of martial law rules and regulations, the Entente Libérale tried to hold the meeting without the required authorisation. Consequently, Riza Tevfik Bölükbası was arrested and given a twenty-five day prison sentence for not observing the regulations.\(^{91}\)

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91. "The Turkish Court-Martial: Sentence on Riza Tevfik Bey", The Times, February 21, 1912,
The Entente Libérale campaign, however, continued. On February 26, Yorgos Boussios, the incumbent deputy for Serfidje, gave a conference at the Entente Libérale branch at Findikli. The February 29 issue of Ameroliptos printed the news that Hamid Bey, President of the Koca Mustafa Pasha branch of the Entente Libérale in Istanbul, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Bey, a retired officer and an influential member of the Entente Libérale, were arrested and imprisoned at the Ministry of War for infractions of martial law rules concerning public meetings. The Entente Libérale leadership immediately addressed a letter to the Grand Vezierate protesting the methods employed in the general elections.

THE OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS OF MARCH 5, among which Iktam -now appearing under the name of Iktihan- was the one that devoted its whole front page to the news, printed the electoral platform of the Entente Libérale. The party platform incorporated many ideas of the Ottoman League for Decentralisation and Private Initiative and reflected the views of Prince Sabahaddin. The party platform promised that laws would be enacted to establish administrative decentralisation, or autonomy; provincial administration would be taken out of the hands of the central government. As the Entente Libérale's main support came from both religious and ethnic minorities, the party paid special attention to the rights and privileges of the minorities in the Empire. Although the electoral system in existence gave ample protection to the right of minority representation in the Chamber of Deputies, Entente Libérale nevertheless reiterated the point that proportional representation of minorities was one of its main planks, and that it would respect the constituent elements of the Empire.

Entente Libérale's stand on the minority issue went so far as promising the electorate that it would enter into alliances with the other Balkan states in order to guarantee the rights and privileges of the minorities within Turkey. Within the context of international affairs, this promise was as unreal as it was a threat to Turkish territorial integrity, since it was a well-known fact that both Greece and Bulgaria had been having formal talks to enter into a military alliance in an attempt to occupy the Macedonian provinces of Turkey. Promising an alliance with both Greece and Bulgaria, whose ethnic sympathisers within the Turkish borders in touch with these states were already busy working to destabilise the political and social order in Macedonia was an extremely dangerous game to play.

With respect to domestic affairs, the Entente Libérale promised to make changes in both the press law and the penal code, liberalising both. As regards the economic policy, the party stood for lifting all the barriers to private enterprise. Most importantly, the Entente Libérale expressed its determination to eliminate all the existing restrictions to the entrance of foreign capital into Turkey; it promised to facilitate foreign ownership of economic enterprises. As such, the Entente Libérale's economic policy stood diametrically opposite to the one advocated by the Committee of Union and Progress which strived for the elimination of capitulations and raising the customs tariffs so as to help develop the domestic industry owned and operated by Turkish nationals. While the Unionists were attempting to lay the foundations of a liberal economic system with a strong national base under domestic control, the monarchists represented by the Entente Libérale were trying to keep the economic and financial conditions the same as they had existed during the absolutist regime.

BY LATE-FEBRUARY, municipal elections began to take place in almost every town all over Turkey. Needless to say, there was great interest in these elections as they would give a clear indication of what the prospects of the main political parties might be in the upcoming parliamentary elections. As such, muniup elections were observed with great interest by all the interested parties.

One of the earliest and the most important of these municipal elections was the one at Salonica. Salonica was not only one of the most important towns in Turkey but also the birthplace of the Revolution and the stronghold of the Committee of Union and Progress. Therefore, results of the municipal elections there would be, at least psychologically, very important for elections to be held elsewhere, not to speak of its bearing on the parliamentary elections.

By February 18, it was reported from Salonica that the Entente Libérale following was increasing day by day.\(^\text{98}\) Although the Unionists had a strong and well-established party organisation there, electoral victory was by no means certain. What was worse, the ulema, whose influence among Moslems was almost equal to that of the priests among the Christians, had held a meeting at Salonica and decided to support the Entente Libérale, or in other words, to work with the Christians against the Unionists.\(^\text{99}\) Indeed, the agreement reached between the ulema and the Entente Libérale at Salonica proved to be very effective in capturing the votes of the Moslem population. At the Salonica municipal elections which took place on February 23, the Committee of Union and Progress was defeated. Out of the six seats of the Municipal Council, the Unionists managed to capture only one: Ismail Bey won the elections as the Unionist candidate. The completed returns showed that two Greeks, one Jew, and two members of the Entente Libérale had been returned as Councillors. One of the Greek Councillors, M. Hondrodimo, who had headed the poll,

was appointed the Mayor of Salonica.  

The monarchist press capitalised on the Unionists' failure to capture the majority in the elections for the Municipal Council at Salonica. This was portrayed as a general defeat of the Committee of Union and Progress at the polls. In an attempt to portray the Entente Libérale in the best possible light, the monarchist press also argued that apart from Ismail Bey -who, they claimed, was not a Unionist but and independent- all the other elected councillors belonged to the Entente Libérale. Despite the fact that Ismail Bey sent a protest letter published in the Tanin of February 28 pointing out the inaccuracies in the monarchist press' description and interpretation of the election results, the damage to Unionist prestige had already been done.

It was clear that if the Committee of Union and Progress lost Macedonia, its traditional bastion of support, it could barely hope to keep the country together and itself in power. At a meeting Cavid Bey held on March 2 with a Unionist delegation from Salonica, the results of the municipal elections were discussed. It was apparent that intra-party rivalry had played an important part in the Unionist defeat. Nevertheless, as a consequence of this electoral disaster, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress took immediate action, and sent invitations to all the local party branches throughout the Empire, asking them to send delegates to an extra-ordinary congress to be held in Salonica in the first week of March.

Despite energetic efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress to win the municipal elections, the results were mixed and not totally in favour of the Unionists.

100. "Committee Defeat at Salonika", The Times, February 27, 1912, p.5; and, Mehmmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hatiralari: 77", Tanin, November 16, 1943, p.2.
On March 5, municipal elections took place at Çankiri, a small Anatolian town, where the results were favourable to the Committee of Union and Progress. In the province of Basra, municipal elections that took place at its principal town -Basra- on March 5, the Unionist list won with a large majority. Likewise, at Mardin, a southeastern Anatolian town, the Unionists won the majority of the seats on the Municipal Council in the elections which were over by March 7.

However, municipal election results at the prominent towns in western Anatolia were not always favourable to the Committee of Union and Progress. For instance, municipal elections held at Eskisehir in early March resulted in the victory of the Entente Libérale candidates who won the majority of the seats on the Municipal Council. By March 20, municipal elections at Eskisehir was over. The final result was favourable to the Entente Libérale. However, on account of electoral irregularities, the elections were declared null and void.

In Balikesir, where the Municipal Council consisted of five seats, the Committee of Union and Progress won two seats, Entente Libérale one, and independents two. It was considered a victory for the Entente Libérale as the two independents had allied themselves with the Entente Libérale Councillor. At Bandirma, another western Anatolian town, the Entente Libérale won a victory at the municipal elections. However, at Alasehir, a close-by town, the municipal elections, which were over by March 28, resulted in the victory of the Unionist candidates.

In central Anatolia, the Unionists won the municipal elections at Ankara which were held on March 14. The results of the municipal elections at Kastamonu also concluded in favour of the Committee of Union and Progress. Hamdi Bey, pharmacist in Istanbul who ran as the Entente Libérale candidate at Kastamonu, received very little support.

By early March, first degree elections, i.e., the election of the electors, had only taken place in one or two districts. Another two to three weeks had to elapse before any idea of the probable composition of the electors could be formed. It looked, however, that the Unionists would obtain a majority.

By March 14, the first degree elections had been completed at Malkara in Tekfurdağı. Out of a total of twenty-one electors, nineteen belonged to the Entente Libérale and two to the Committee of Union and Progress. By March 22, the first degree elections at Bayramiç, an electoral district of Kale-i Sultaniye, was over. The population unanimously voted for the Unionist candidates. The chosen electors, Lieutenant Atif Bey and Captain Asim Bey, had both played remarkable roles during the Revolution of 1908.

The Entente Libérale would stop at nothing to disturb the peace during the elections. Faced with an apparent loss of support, the monarchist opposition appealed to religious sentiment in an effort to mobilise the voters. As a consequence of reactionary agitation orchestrated by the monarchists, disturbances occurred in Eskisehir, Salonica, and Izmir.

The first degree elections at Eskisehir was scheduled to take place on March 24. If public sentiment were to be trusted, Unionist candidates were expected to win.

119. "Les Elections: A Eski Chéhir", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, March 20, 1912,
the elections on March 24, however, there were serious disturbances. Haci Veli, the local Entente Libérale leader at Eskisehir, provoked the population with religious fanaticism, portraying Unionists as the destroyers of Islam. Excited by monarchist agents provocateurs, a group of religious fanatics roamed the town and attacked Unionist sympathisers, accusing them of being atheists. Besides Haci Veli, the reactionary movement was also organised by Abdurrahman Hoca, who had previously been deeply involved in the counter-revolutionary coup d'état of April, 1909. The groups organised under his supervision also called for everybody to vote for the Entente Libérale. Several additional disturbances also took place in the villages surrounding Eskisehir, whereupon two members of the Committee of Union and Progress, Hamdi Bey, Secretary of the Commission for the Verification of Election Procedures, and Haroutioun Ohannessian, went on a tour of inspection accompanied by gendarmes. At Devêkoy and Kümbet, reactionaries demonstrated against the electoral commission members and carried on monarchist propaganda. After the success of the Unionists at the elections, the partisans of the Entente Libérale made demonstrations in Eskisehir, shouting, "We want sharia!". The first degree elections at Eskisehir, which were over by April 4, ended with the victory of the Entente Libérale candidates who captured the majority of the votes.

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Despite the fact that the Entente Libérale captured the majority of the electorships in Eskisehir, in late April fourteen Entente Libérale candidates were still protesting against what they called electoral irregularities at Eskisehir. 129

Entente Libérale pursued the policy of monarchist agitation at Salonica as well. On March 27, a serious disturbance occurred at the Langhaza district of Salonica in connection with the first degree elections. A number of armed peasants, incited by monarchist agents provocateurs, made a demonstration in the town, shouting slogans that they did not want the liberal regime but that they preferred sharia, and attacked the gendarmes, who were compelled to intervene. In the fight that ensued, ten peasants and one gendarme were killed and twenty gendarmes and peasants were wounded. Many rifles had been seized and order was restored. 130 The ex-mufti of Langhaza, who was involved in the monarchist counter-revolutionary propaganda at Langhaza, was brought to Istanbul for trial. 131

Although the monarchists conducted a similar religious propaganda campaign in Izmir, their agitation did not adversely affect the elections. 132 On March 27, the first degree elections took place at Izmir. There was overwhelming support for the Committee of Union and Progress, and Unionists were expected to win by a large majority. The electoral urns were brought to the Municipality amid enthusiastic crowds for the counting of votes. The voters of Izmir's Ninth District comprising the neighbourhoods of Halil Efendi, Tuzcu Hasta Mescidi, Kalafat, Balci, and Dayi Emir unanimously voted for the two Unionist candidates, Hursid Bey and Mehmed Niyazi Efendi, both of whom obtained six hundred and fifty votes. The Entente Libérale candidates did not receive any vote. 133 Unionists also

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won in the first degree elections at Salihli, a town in the Aydin province. The first degree elections at various Anatolian towns concluded without serious monarchist disturbance. At Kütahya, where the first degree elections were over by April 1, the population voted for the Unionist candidates. Altogether one hundred and twelve electors were chosen for Kütahya, the majority of whom were Unionist sympathisers. In Kayseri, the first degree elections resulted in a Unionist victory; the majority of the electors were Unionist. At Kastamonu, the majority of the electors were Unionist. At Aydınçık, an administrative district of Kastamonu, the Entente Libérale candidate won the first degree elections.

The first degree elections at Trabzon were complete by March 28. Out of the twenty-three electors, twenty-one were Unionists - including the members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation - as opposed to two Greeks representing the Entente Libérale. Prince Sabahaddin, who had contemplated of putting his candidacy for Trabzon decided not to do so after the results of the first degree elections were made public. Greek metropolitans of Ephesus, Monastir, Verria, Rhodes, Aenos, Sisaniou, and Çatalca protested in late March against alleged electoral irregularities concerning the number of the electors to represent the Greek minority. At Dedeağ, Greek and Bulgarian population which totalled forty-five thousand were given seventeen electors, whereas the Turkish population of forty thousand were given twenty-nine electors. Protesting the disproportionate distribution of electors among the different ethnic and religious groups,

Greeks and Bulgarians decided not to take part in the elections. On March 21, the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul registered a complaint with the authorities in regard to alleged election irregularities at Izmir.

First degree elections commenced at various neighbourhoods of Istanbul beginning with the first week of April. First degree elections were scheduled to take place at Kasimpasa, Hasköy and the Prince Islands between April 3 and 4, at Besiktas between April 3 and 7, at Anadolu Hisari, Beylerbeyi, Arnavutköy, Bebek and Kuruçeşme between April 4 and 6, at Fatih between April 4 and 7, at Selimiye between April 6 and 7, and, at Kadıköy, Üsküdar, Yeni Mahalle, Kireçburnu and Tarabya between April 6 and 10.

At Kartal, a suburb of Istanbul, the first degree elections had already been over by March 19. Osman Bey, a Unionist candidate, won the elections with seven hundred and ninety-nine votes to represent Kartal on the second degree elections. Haci Melcon Efendi, representing the Hintchakists, obtained six hundred and seventy-one votes, whereas the Entente Libérale candidate received three hundred and forty-two votes. By March 20, Halil Efendi, a Unionist, was elected with one hundred and ninety-eight votes to represent Gebze, a town close to Istanbul, as its elector in the final elections. Likewise, the first degree elections at Eyüb were already over by April 3 with the overwhelming victory for the Unionist candidates who obtained between four thousand two hundred and sixty-three and four thousand two hundred seventy-five votes as opposed to the monarchist opposition's two hundred twenty and four hundred and eleven votes.

148. "Les Elections: Victoire unioniste à Eyoub", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April
According to the April 6 issue of *Iktiham*, the election results at the Prince Islands showed that the Entente Libérale captured the majority of the electorships with nine hundred and seventy-four votes as opposed to one hundred and seventy votes received by the Unionist candidates. 149

The first degree elections at Büyükdere were over by April 8. The overwhelming majority of the electors were Unionists, who received between two thousand three hundred and sixty-three and two thousand three hundred and fifty-two votes. 150 At Beylerbeyi, Anadolu Hisari and Bayezid, Unionist candidates obtained the majority of votes. 151 At Fatih, the first degree elections were also over by April 8. About forty-five Unionist candidates, who obtained between thirteen thousand five hundred and ninety and thirteen thousand five hundred and seventy-nine votes, were declared as electors to represent the neighbourhood. The Fatih branch of the Entente Libérale lodged a complaint, accusing the authorities of electoral fraud. 152 The Üsküdar section of the Hincthakist party and the Kızıltoprak branch of the Entente Libérale sent a formal complaint to the office of the Grand Vezírèate protesting what they claimed certain election irregularities and declaring that they would therefore abstain from voting in the first degree elections. 153

The Kadıköy branch of the Entente Libérale also complained about election irregularities and declared that they would abstain from voting. 154 There, the Unionist list obtained six thousand two hundred and forty-three votes as against Entente Libérale's two hundred and nineteen. 155 At Üsküdar, the Unionists obtained between three thousand

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eight hundred and fifty-two and three thousand eight hundred and forty-four votes as opposed to Entente Libérale's fifty-two votes. 156

At Besiktas, the Unionist candidates received between eleven thousand one hundred and ninety-nine and nine thousand one hundred and ninety-seven votes. The Entente Libérale candidates obtained nine hundred and forty-seven votes. 157 Likewise, at Beykoz and Arnavutköy, candidates of the Committee of Union and Progress won the elections with wide margins. 158 At Tarabya, Unionist candidates were elected with a majority of two hundred and forty-four votes. 159 At Beyoğlu, the Entente Libérale list included forty-one Greeks and nine Armenians. 160 Elections there were over by April 16, where ninety-two Unionist candidates won with twenty-six thousand votes. 161

SECOND DEGREE ELECTIONS did not start until mid-March. Therefore, by the end of March, it was still too early to speak of election prospects. 162 In late April, elections were still taking place in such remote areas as Albania, where the population in general proved more independent than in other parts of the country.

In the Kosovo province, the sandjak of Üsküb had a total male population of two hundred and thirty thousand. The sandjak was entitled to elect five deputies, two of which would be Moslems, two Bulgarians, and one Serbian. 163

At Serfidje, Unionist delegation arrived in mid-March for the election campaign. Tahsin Bey, from the Audit Department, did not accept the candidacy for Serfidje. In his

place, Osman Bey, a legal councillor at the Ministry of the Interior, was chosen as candidate. According to Tanin, a Unionist electoral success at Serfidje was certain. By April 11, it was reported that the second degree elections at Serfidje were turning in favour of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose candidates were Hasan Tahsin Bey and Gregorius Efendi. By then, it had become clear that the election of Yorgos Boussios was highly unlikely. The Greek Constitutional Club, a separatist group which had allied itself with the monarchist opposition in Turkey, declared that it would protest in the Chamber of Deputies against the way the elections were carried out at Serfidje.

Despite efforts on the part of the government, Albanian constituencies elected several Entente Libérale and independent candidates. In late January, Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha’s brother Süreyya Vlora approached the Unionist leadership through intermediaries for his nomination on the Unionist ticket for the candidacy for Berat. Since it was understood that Ismail Kemal Bey would not be allowed to run for re-election, he asked to be put on the ballot in place of Ismail Kemal Bey, promising that he would follow the Unionist line in the Chamber in all matters except for those pertaining to Albanian affairs. The Unionist leadership was not enthusiastic about his nomination since it was believed that he was no better than Ismail Kemal Bey. At Berat, Ismail Kemal Bey was not re-elected, the government having prevented him from landing at Avlona, and having issued orders to the local authorities to arrest him if he landed. Nonetheless, Albanian nationalists were able to elect two of their candidates, Süreyya Vlora and Sami Vrionis. At the elections, Süreyya Vlora obtained sixty-one votes, and Sami Vrionis, sixty votes. The other two unsuccessful candidates, Aziz Pasha and Ismail Kemal Bey, obtained forty-nine

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and thirty-seven votes respectively.¹⁶⁹ According to Hak, a Unionist organ, Süreyya Vlora, the newly elected deputy for Berat, had accepted the Unionist programme.¹⁷⁰ The Albanians' resistance to official pressure also met with success at Ipek, Djakova, and Prizren. Necib Draga, Bekir Bey, and Hasan Bey of Prishtina, the first and last of whom were well known for their nationalist positions and their advocacy of the Latin alphabet, were elected with another Albanian Nationalist deputy for Prishtine, after a bitter struggle, which at one point seemed likely to end in bloodshed.¹⁷¹

Despite its efforts in Monastir, the Committee of Union and Progress won only one out of the five seats, with Ali Fethi Okyar, the Unionist candidate, obtaining thirty votes. Two seats went to Trayan Nali Efendi, with twenty-nine votes, and the Albanian candidate Mehmed Vasif Bey, both of whom were on the Entente Libérale ticket; one went to the socialist candidate Panthée Doreff, and the last seat went to an independent -Dimitrievitch Efendi, who was elected with twenty-eight votes.¹⁷² Except for Ali Fethi Okyar, all were incumbents. The former replaced Ali Vasfi Bey, an independent Albanian deputy of the 1908 Chamber.¹⁷³

Vildan Efendi, a preacher at Istanbul, was a candidate for Dibre.¹⁷⁴ Basri Efendi, ex-deputy for Dibre, declared that he was determined to boycott the elections.¹⁷⁵ Dibre insisted on the election of Basri Bey and no other.¹⁷⁶

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¹⁷³ Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.267.
Haci Ali Efendi, an ulema and President of the Albanian Club at Istanbul, was a candidate for Elbasan. Rasih Bey, ex-President of the Audit Department, was a candidate for Çamlık, in the Province of Janina.

In January, the Unionist leadership at Istanbul had gathered intelligence to the effect that there was growing resentment at Salonica against especially Cavid Bey's candidacy. There was even the likelihood that Cavid Bey might not be re-elected due to counter-propaganda waged by Selanikli Hamdi Beyzade Adil Bey who had organised the ulema against the Committee of Union and Progress. There was also the tactical errors committed by the Unionist Governor of Salonica who had alienated some of the population. Both Selanikli Hamdi Beyzade Adil Bey and Serezli Hulusi Bey were active in the electoral campaign for their own candidacies. Although they belonged to the opposition, they nevertheless tried to get the nomination of the Committee of Union and Progress, as they judged that they would stand a better chance of winning on the Unionist ticket. Of course, their applications were rejected by the Committee of Union and Progress.

On February 7, Cavid Bey met with Midhat Sükrü Bleda and talked about the election prospects at Salonica. Bleda assured Cavid Bey that some influential notables of the city backed the Committee of Union and Progress. Bleda also related that he had tried convincing Hulusi Bey not to run as a candidate for Salonica but try Serres instead. Despite Bleda's assurances, there was growing concern within the Unionist leadership that all was not going well at Salonica. Local Unionist leadership from Drama visited Cavid Bey on March 7, informing him that his prospects for re-election as deputy for Salonica might be in jeopardy. Local leadership suggested that Cavid Bey put his candidacy from either Kavala or Drama, where he was extremely popular and therefore was assured of

certain victory. When Cavid Bey categorically refused to change his constituency, Midhat Sükrü Bleda's name was put on the list of Unionist candidates for Drama.181

By mid-March, news reached to Istanbul that support for Unionist candidates at Salonica were growing day by day, owing, in most part, to the active propaganda campaign conducted by Dr. Nazim Bey. According to reports, the Unionists had almost regained their former popularity, especially in the town, but in the whole province as well.182 After meeting with Cavid Bey on March 18, Rahmi Evranos departed for Salonica in order to drum up support for the Committee of Union and Progress. He was especially optimistic that there was still a likelihood of working with at least some of the Greek electors.183

The success of the Unionists at Salonica was not a foregone conclusion, despite the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress had made it its first centre, and that it was, to all intents and purposes, the political capital between 1908 and 1910. There was trouble in Salonica. Owing to discontent among non-Turks, including many of the town's Jewish socialist workers, the loss of confidence in the new regime felt by a section of the merchants, the general effects of the war on trade, and unrest in Macedonia and Albania, the Committee of Union and Progress, which had already thoroughly lost the municipal elections, now stood a good chance of losing a majority of its Chamber seats.184

The Unionist electoral campaign in Salonica continued with public appearances of Cavid Bey during the week beginning with April 6. After a dinner party given by the Governor in his honour, Cavid Bey took the opportunity to address the notables of the town gathered for the occasion. He talked about the achievements of the Committee of

Union and Progress, attacking those who organised the monarchist opposition in Salonica at the beginning of the electoral campaign and rejecting the baseless allegations with which the monarchists accused the Committee of Union and Progress. His speech especially contained sharply worded condemnation of the attitude of the religious leadership of Salonica which had chosen to ally itself with the monarchist cause. The speech on the whole left a strong impression on the select audience.  

Cavid Bey gave a public conference on the night of April 8 at the İttihat ve Terakki Mektebi. Since the Revolution of 1908, Salonica had not seen such a large crowd gathered for a political occasion. The crowd not only totally filled the school building itself but also flowed over to the garden and the street. In his speech which lasted for two hours and extremely well received, Cavid Bey once again talked about the past achievements as well as the future plans of the Committee of Union and Progress. In particular, he attacked those who claimed during the election campaign that the days of the Committee of Union and Progress had come to an end.  

Cavid Bey travelled to Langhaza on April 9. Langhaza was the locality where monarchists had organised a counter-revolutionary demonstration at the early stages of the electoral campaign, demanding the restitution of the absolutist regime as well as the sharia. Denouncing the organisers of the reactionary demonstration and exposing the real intent and purpose of these monarchist agents provocateurs, Cavid Bey spoke of the duties of the citizens in protecting the liberal regime and defending the Constitution against monarchist encroachment.  

The Entente Libérale candidates for Salonica were Hafiz Süleyman Efendi, Osman

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Adil Bey, Honeos Efendi, Adamidis Efendi, Vlachoff Efendi, and Asir Salim Efendi.\textsuperscript{188} The elections results were close to a landslide victory for the Committee of Union and Progress, which won four of the six seats with Cavid Bey, Major Halil Bey, Emmanuel Carasso, and Rahmi Evranos.\textsuperscript{189} There were eighty-three electors for Salonica. At the elections which were over by April 14, the Unionist list, containing the names of Cavid Bey, Major Halil Bey, Emmanuel Carasso, and Rahmi Evranos, received seventy-seven votes. The two remaining seats went to independent candidates -Tchikotchanov, a Greek, and, Yurdan Nikolov, a Bulgarian.\textsuperscript{190}

According to \textit{Makedonia} of Salonica, the Entente Libérale had strong support in the districts of Kavala and Drama, two important towns of the Salonica province. The Entente Libérale candidates were Solon Casanova and \textit{Hoca} Sabri Efendi.\textsuperscript{191} The other candidates for the Entente Libérale were \textit{Selanikli} Hamdi Beyzade Adil Bey and \textit{Hoca} Süleyman Efendi.\textsuperscript{192}

Electoral campaign at Serres was not without incidents. Mustafa Nuri Bey, a lawyer at Serres working in the Entente Libérale campaign, was attacked in a public thoroughfare at that town and most brutally handled.\textsuperscript{193} Mahir Said Bey, ex-Deputy for Ankara, and Riza Nur, ex-Deputy for Sinop, protested to the Grand Vezierate and the Ministry of the Interior for Mustafa Nuri Bey's maltreatment at Serres by individuals belonging to the Committee of Union and Progress. The protest letter was also signed by ex-Colonel Sadik Bey, Vice-President of the Entente Libérale.\textsuperscript{194} Mustafa Nuri Bey, arrived in Istanbul on

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\textsuperscript{188} "Les Elections: A Salonique", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 10, 1912, p.2.
\textsuperscript{189} Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.267.
\textsuperscript{190} "Les Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 15, 1912, p.2; and, "Les Elections: 141 élus", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 16, 1912, p.2.
\textsuperscript{191} "Les Elections: Candidatures", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, March 18, 1912, p.2.
\textsuperscript{192} Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hâlîraları: 78", \textit{Tanin}, November 17, 1943, p.2.
\textsuperscript{193} "News Items", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, February 14, 1912, p.1.
\textsuperscript{194} "L'Entente Libérale", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, February 9, 1912, p.2.
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February 13. He intended to publish particulars of the incident and calling the attention of the government to the situation in Serres. He would ask the government to take measures for the protection of the partisans of the Entente Libérale. 195

Public order was once more disturbed in late March at Serres, when officers with divergent political views had a fight among themselves. At the Serres Military Club, a fight broke out between Unionist officers and Ententist officers, leaving several Unionist officers wounded. The matter taken under control, Ententist officers who were found guilty were immediately transferred to another garrison. 196

At Serres, the five candidates of the Entente Libérale were Hafiz Mehmed Riza Bey, ex-Governor of Siirt, M. Iconomo, a Greek lawyer, Mustafa Bey, Hamid Bey, a judge, and Mustafa Hilmi Bey, Governor of Corum. At the early stages of the campaign, there was no mention of Dervis Bey, the Unionist incumbent deputy for Serres. 197 A graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Hafiz Mehmed Riza Bey had been appointed Governor of Siirt on October 20, 1909 and dismissed on November 6, 1910. 198 Mustafa Hilmi Bey was a graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was the son of Kocaagazade Haci Ali Efendi, a notable of Serres. 199

At Serres, the Unionists could win only one of the five seats. At Nevrehop, an electoral district of Serres, Unionist candidate Dervis Bey, and opposition candidates Hulusi Bey and Stoju Hadziev won the elections with thirty-eight votes against three. 200 Overall, Serres was carried by the independents - Bulgarian candidates Alexandre Bujnov and Stoju Hadziev, Greek candidate Dimitris Dirgas, and Turkish candidates Hulusi Bey- and Unionist Dervis Bey. 201

Departing from Istanbul on the night of March 21, Cavid and Talat Beys arrived at Edirne the following morning, where they were met with an enthusiastic crowd. Cavid Bey gave a speech on matters pertaining to public works, emphasizing the achievements of the liberal democratic regime in this field and cautioning the public that although they had every right to expect the revolutionary regime to achieve even more, they had to be realistic in their expectations. At another gathering the same day, Cavid Bey spoke about the proposed amendment to the Constitution—the famous Article 35— as well as on the domestic and foreign policy of the Committee of Union and Progress. Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce came out into the open and declared themselves in support of the new regime and the Committee of Union and Progress. It was also interesting to observe that military officers stationed at Edirne were supportive of the Unionist electoral campaign. 

In Gümülcine, there was an active effort to have Gümülcineli Ismail Hakki Bey, one of the most prominent members of the monarchist opposition, put on the ballot as the Entente Libérale candidate. However, the effort to put him on the ballot was not successful. The electoral campaign of the Entente Libérale also met with physical violence at Gümülcine. Riza Tevfik Bölükbasi, the prominent Entente Libérale politician who was released from prison on March 16, left Istanbul on March 21 for an electoral tour in Gümülcine, Kirk Kilise, Edirne and Salonica. He arrived at Gümülcine on the evening of March 22. The following day, the Greek Archimandrite, accompanied by some Greek notables of the town, visited Bölükbasi at his hotel. While he was talking to his visitors, a party of twenty people arrived at the hotel and assaulted Bölükbasi. They dragged him to the railway station, maltreating him on the way. The police intervened and rescued Bölükbasi, who was slightly injured. He was taken to the hospital where his wounds were

attended to. He then went to the residence of Gümülcine Ismail Hakki Bey, ex-deputy for Gümülcine, where he stayed. He continued his campaign in the other towns of Edirne province, arriving at Dedeagaç on March 24. Tanin of March 24 reproved the act and invited the authorities to punish the guilty and take measures to ensure the protection of opposition deputies in future and prevent such scenes. Other cases of assault on propagandists of both political parties were reported from different quarters. At Gümülcine, the electors of Daridere voted for Unionist candidates. The successful candidates who got elected were Haci Adil Arda, the Unionist Minister of the Interior, Mehmed Efendi, an ulema, and Mehmed Bey.

The population of Kirk Kilise, where Emrullah Efendi was the Unionist candidate, petitioned that Ali Tevfik Bey, Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Public Works, be also included in the list of candidates.

In neighbouring Tekfurdağı, the Armenian notables of the town sent a petition to the Central Committee of Union and Progress for the inclusion of the candidacies of Simpat Katibian, a graduate of the Paris Law School who was working as a lawyer for the Credit Lyonnais. By the beginning of April, there was grave disagreement between the parties at Tekfurdağı. Armenians refused to support the candidacies of Agop Boyadjian, the incumbent Armenian deputy for Tekfurdağı, and the two other Unionist candidates - Mazhar Pasazade Veleddin Bey, and Bedri Bey, Governor of Hayrabolu. At the second degree

206. "Dr. Riza Tevfik Assaulted at Gümuldjina", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, March 25, 1912, p.1; and, "The Turkish Election Campaign: Assault on Dr. Riza Tevfik", The Times, March 25, 1912, p.5.
207. "The Turkish Election Campaign: Assault on Dr. Riza Tevfik", The Times, March 25, 1912, p.5.
elections that had been held at Malkara in mid-April, the Entente Libérale candidate Emin Efendi, Mufti of Malkara, obtained nineteen out of a total of twenty-two votes.\textsuperscript{213}

Unionist candidates for Istanbul were Asim Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Memduh Bey, Minister of Justice, Hulüsi Bey, ex-Minister of Public Works, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, incumbent deputy and editor-in-chief of\textit{ Tanin}, Bedros Haladjian, incumbent deputy and ex-Minister of Public Works, Vassilakis Orphanidis, a functionary in the Régie des Tabacs, and Faraggi, incumbent deputy. According to an agreement reached between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian community, Krikor Zohrab, one of the most prominent members of the opposition, was also included in the Unionist ticket.\textsuperscript{214} The final list of Unionist candidates for Istanbul was made public on April 16. The list contained the names of Ahmed Nesimi Bey, incumbent deputy, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, Memduh Bey,\textit{ Yagci} Sefik Bey, a prominent businessman, Hüseyin Hasim Sanver, a high-level bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance, Artas Efendi, Greek incumbent deputy for Salonica, Vassilakis Orphanidis, Bedros Haladjian, Faraggi Efendi, and Krikor Zohrab.\textsuperscript{215} The Entente Libérale declared that it would not put forward any list in the Istanbul elections, claiming that irregularities in the first degree elections had made the electoral race meaningless.\textsuperscript{216}

At first, the Unionist leadership was not absolutely confident that Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın could be re-elected from Istanbul. Some were even sure that his re-election was totally impossible. There were suggestions that he should try to put his candidacy from Serrès, Drama, or Karesi. Although no decision had been reached as to from where Yalçın would put his candidacy, both Cavid Bey and Yalçın himself thought that it would be

\textsuperscript{213} "Les Elections: A Rodosto", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 11, 1912, p.2.
\textsuperscript{216} "Les Elections: Les candidats de Constantinople", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 17, 1912, p.2.
strategically unwise for the prestige of the Committee of Union and Progress to change Yalçın’s constituency. 217

A day before the second degree elections, on April 16, Armenian electors of Istanbul, forty-six in number, declared that they had decided to vote unanimously for the Unionist list, which also incorporated the list of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. 218 At the Istanbul elections which took place on April 17, the Unionist list obtained the overwhelming majority of the votes. Out of the four hundred and seventy-one electors, four hundred and fifty-seven cast their votes; fourteen electors abstained. All of the candidates on the Unionist ticket were elected as deputies, each receiving between four hundred and fifty-seven and four hundred and fifty votes. The other two official candidates that entered the race were independents - Ahmed Saki Bey, representative of the Moslem population of Rethymo, and Izzet Bey, Sub-Governor of Bogazliyan. Entente Libérale politicians as well as other independents who were not officially running in the Istanbul elections nevertheless got between six and one votes. Among those non-candidates who received one or two votes from the Istanbul electors were Lütfi Fikri Bey, Pantoleon Cosmidis, Nazareth Daghavarian, Tahir Hayreddin Bey, Constantinidis Efendi, Riza Tevfik Bölükbsi, Ahmed Cevdet bey, editor-in-chief of Ikdam, and Kamil Pasha. 219

In early March, it was announced that Nazim Bey was an independent candidate for İzmit. 220 Unionist leadership conducted an active electoral campaign at İzmit and the adjoining towns like Adapazari and Sabanca, for its candidates. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, the incumbent Unionist deputy for Istanbul, accompanied by Ahmed Müfidi Saner, the incumbent Unionist deputy for İzmit, arrived at Adapazari on March 24 and made a

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campaign speech on behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress. He also appeared before the public at Sabancı and İzmit, delivering speeches at the local branches of the party.\textsuperscript{221}

Papadopoulos, an employee of the Public Debt Administration, was a candidate for Bursa.\textsuperscript{222} In late March, Sidki Bey, incumbent deputy for İzmir and owner of Köylü, arrived at Bursa to make propaganda speeches.\textsuperscript{223} At Bursa, a majority of the most prominent ulema had supported the Revolution of 1908, though some did not join the Committee of Union and Progress, but chose, instead, to remain independent. A large number of lesser ulema, however, did not support the Revolution and these joined the Entente Libérale.\textsuperscript{224} As a result of their active campaigning in the villages and towns around Bursa against the Committee of Union and Progress and the principles of the Revolution, the Entente Libérale candidate, Haфиз Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, won a seat. The independents, Ahmed Fevzi Efendi and Abdullah Sabri Karter, also won seats, as did the Unionist candidates Hasan Rafet Canitez and Riza Bey.\textsuperscript{225}

At Karesi, Abdülaziz Mecdi Tolon and Ibrahim Vasfi Efendi, both incumbent deputies, lost the elections to Unionist candidates.\textsuperscript{226} The Unionist candidates, Hacı Ali Galib Bey and Mehmed Vehbi Bolak, received twenty-seven and twenty-four votes respectively and were declared the winners. Other successful candidates were Hasan Ferhat Bey, Hüseyin Kadri Bey, and Konstantinos Savopoulos, who obtained twenty-three votes each.\textsuperscript{227}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} "Les élections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, February 5, 1912, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{223} "Les Elections: A Brousse et à Smyrne", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, March 21, 1912, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim}, 2, pp.475-476.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.269.
\item \textsuperscript{226} "Les Elections: A Carassi", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, March 29, 1912, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{227} "Les Elections: A Karassi", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 4, 1912, p.2.
\end{itemize}
According to Azadamard, electoral campaign at Chios started in mid-March. The island's mainly Greek population was divided for about twenty years between the followers of Couvélis and the followers of Canélis. Couvelists formed the majority in the island. Their candidate was Ladopoulos, Chief Translator of the Governor. The Canélist candidate was Achille Arodiago, a graduate of the Galatasaray Lycée in Istanbul. Tchélébidis, the incumbent deputy for Chios, supported the Couvelist candidate. 228

By mid-March, neither the Committee of Union and Progress nor the Entente Libérale had selected their respective Moslem candidates in Izmir. Only Mehmed Seyyid Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, had been put forward by his party, and his election was considered certain. There were still two candidates to be selected among the Moslem population, and their choice would probably be among staunch supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress. 229 In mid-March, it was announced that the Administrative Council of the Aydin Province had designated the three Greek candidates for Izmir. They were Nicolaki Tchurukdjiooglou, editor of *La Reforme*, and, Tchakirooglou and Youvanovitch, both medical doctors. 230 However, by late March it became apparent that the three strongest candidates for the two Greek seats were D. Dimitriadis, X. Anastassiadis, and Emmanuel Emmanueledis. The latter was an incumbent Unionist deputy for Izmir. Stephen Spartali, who was the Armenian candidate at Izmir, ceded his place to Vahan Bardizbanian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. 231 The final list of Armenian candidates for the one Armenian seat were Diran Achnan, Vahan Bardizbanian, and S. Davidian. As for the Jewish seat, the community was divided: the section of the community siding with the Committee of Union and Progress desired to nominate Nesim Masliah, the incumbent deputy for Izmir, whereas a

considerable majority supported the candidacy of Selim Misrahi.  

By mid-March, the impression was gaining ground that the Committee of Union and Progress candidates would come in with a large majority. The superior organisation of the Committee of Union and Progress rendered it almost certain that its candidates would sweep the polls everywhere. By April 3, second degree elections were over. The urns were then carried to the Municipality with great joy by a crowd of more than fifty thousand people of all classes shouting "Long Live the Ottomans!" and "Long Live the Committee of Union and Progress!". One hundred and twenty-five out of a total of one hundred and twenty-eight electors had voted in the elections at Izmir. The Unionist candidates obtained one hundred and eight votes. Seventeen Greek electors voted for the Entente Libérale candidates. The Unionists won both Turkish seats with Musa Kazim Efendi and Mehmed Seyyid Bey, and both Greek seats with Emmanuelidis and Carolidis Efendis. The incumbent Unionist deputy Nesim Masliah also won the Jewish seat. The Greek candidate for the Entente Libérale, M. Conéménos, a medical doctor, obtained only one vote. 

In Aydın, the Entente Libérale could not win any of the three seats. The independent, Kazim Bey, won one seat, and the Unionists -Yunus Nadi Abalioglu and Ubeydullah Hatipoglu- took the other two.

239. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ikinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.270.
Sadik Bey, ex-cadi of Edirne, and Besim Bey, ex-Chief Accountant of Tripoli, were candidates for Denizli. Eventually, Sadik Bey and Gani Bey won the elections at Denizli.

At Manisa, Mansurizade Mehmed Said Bey, the incumbent independent deputy, obtained the majority of the votes and was thus re-elected. The other candidates who won the elections were Unionist -Hüseyin Kazim Bey, the Governor-General of Salonica, and Mustafa Fevzi Efendi, The President of the Court at Beyoglu. At Soma, the Unionist candidates Hüseyin Kazim Bey and Sabri Mustafa Efendi received the majority of the votes.

In mid-March, Halil Mentese, the incumbent deputy for Mentese and former parliamentary leader of the Committee of the Union and Progress, arrived at Mugla where he was met with enthusiastic crowds. He was re-elected on the Unionist ticket for Mentese. The other seat went to an independent, Ali Haydar Yulug, Governor of Nazilli.

The Unionist candidates for the sandjak of Konya were Mehmed Emin Efendi, the incumbent deputy, Ali Haydar Efendi, Director of Agriculture at Sivas, Tekelizade Riza Efendi, and Ömer Efendi. The Entente Libérale candidates were Sheikh Zeynelabidin

Efendi and Mustafa Efendi, both incumbent deputies, Mehmed Efendi, Safvet Efendi, and Ali Riza Efendi, President of the Civil Court at Konya. 247

There was an incident at Konya on March 21. At the Alaeddin Mosque, Hoca Mustafa Sabri Efendi, an ulema and the incumbent Entente Libérale deputy for Tokat, made a speech in which he liberally interpreted the Koran, stating that the spirit of Islam preferred a free Christian to an enslaved Moslem. This speech had the intention of both warming the Moslem population to the Entente Libérale which had entered into an electoral alliance with those segments of the Christian population who were actively working for the dissolution of the Empire, and at the same time criticizing the Committee of Union and Progress by accusing it of enslaving even the Moslem population. 248 Mustafa Sabri Efendi's provocative speech caused a fight to break out. The Governor General of Konya tried to interfere with the intention of keeping the fight within acceptable boundaries. However, it was only after the partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress were kept out of the mosque that the fight subsided. 249

In early April, a counter-revolutionary agitation erupted at Konya as a consequence of Entente Libérale propaganda in and around the town. According to the Iktiham of April 11, thirty-eight Entente Libérale agitators had been arrested on charges of making propaganda on behalf of the absolutist regime. 250

Konya elected an Entente Libérale candidate: the conservative hoca, Sheikh Zeynelabidin Efendi. 251 As a matter of fact, Konya was one of the important provinces in Anatolia where none of the Unionist candidates won the elections. The remaining four of a

total of five deputyships went to independents Mehmed Emin Efendi, Ali Kemali Bey, Mehmed Riza Bey, and Ömer Vehbi Büyükvalvaç.\(^{252}\)

Kelekian Efendi was a candidate for Kayseri.\(^{253}\) The chosen candidate at Kayseri was Soubour Bey, a government official at Istanbul.\(^{254}\) The population of Kayseri, however, persisted in their demands that Kelekian be also included in the list of candidates.\(^{255}\) To the Unionists' surprise, the electors of Kayseri insisted on voting for candidates of their own choice. At the second degree elections at Develi in Kayseri, Ömer Mümtaz Bey, the incumbent deputy, obtained seventeen votes; Ahmed Rifat Çalık'a, the opposition candidate, thirteen, and Arsen Efendi and Major Ali Galib Bey, the Entente Libérale candidate, ten each.\(^{256}\) Kayseri voted for the Entente Libérale candidates and succeeded in electing the opposition candidates, Ali Galib Bey, and Ahmed Rifat Çalık'a.\(^{257}\) Major Ali Galib Bey and Ahmed Rifat Çalık'a were declared winners with seventy-nine and fifty votes respectively. The Unionist candidates, Armenak Efendi, a lawyer, and Ömer Mümtaz Bey, the incumbent deputy for Kayseri, trailed the successful Entente Libérale candidates with forty-five and forty-one votes respectively.\(^{258}\)

At Kastamonu, Çayhanecioglu Hüseyin Agha, from the village of Hoca Hacib, organised a demonstration. The group consisting of about one hundred and fifty people marched to the Governor's residence where they demanded the application of the sharia.\(^{259}\) At Kastamonu, four deputies were to be elected. Necmeddin Kocatas, ex-Minister of Justice, Ahmed Mahir Efendi, and Hüsnü Bey were elected on the Unionist

\(^{252}\) Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.273.


\(^{257}\) Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Mesrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.274.


ticket. 260

At Sinop, the second degree elections at Boyabat and Ayancik took place by March 28, where the electors voted for the Unionist candidates. Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan, ex-deputy for Sinop, and Lieutenant Ismail Hakki Bey, Aide-de-Camp to the Minister of War, received fifty-five and fifty-one votes respectively, while Dr. Riza Nur, the incumbent deputy for Sinop and the Entente Libérale candidate, obtained ten votes. 261 Finally, the winners were Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan and Ismail Hakki Bey, the latter replacing Riza Nur. 262

By mid-March, Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan, the incumbent deputy for Sinop, and Haci Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, incumbent deputy for Samsun, made speeches in the mosques at Trabzon on behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress. Commenting on the elections prospects at the Trabzon province, Tanin wrote that the Entente Libérale had support neither at Trabzon nor at Ordu or Giresun. 263 All reports from Trabzon were optimistic about the electoral success of the Unionist candidates. 264

However, Trabzon was not immune to monarchist agitation and provocation. There was a reactionary outburst in Ersen, a village close to Trabzon, where two agents provocateurs, Mehmed Agha and Mehmed Efendi, managed to stir the villagers into shouting slogans that asked for the application of the sharia and the return to absolutist rule. However, the agents provocateurs were arrested and the demonstration suppressed. 265

Osman Nuri Efendi, a palace preacher, was a candidate for Sivas on the Entente

Libérale ticket. Nazareth Daghavarian, the incumbent deputy for Sivas and a founding member of the Entente Libérale, Hairanian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and Tigrane Zaven, an Armenian publicist, were Armenian opposition candidates for Sivas. Dr. Garabet Pashayan, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, was the Armenian candidate on the Unionist ticket. The other candidates who were on the Unionist ticket were Ömer Sevki Bey, the incumbent deputy, Mustafa Ziya Bey, and Hoca Emin Efendi. The second degree elections at Sivas were over by April 4. By and large, the electors voted for the candidates on the Unionist ticket.

Tanin of March 12 announced that Arif Fazil Efendi, a religious figure and the incumbent deputy for Amasya, was invited to run once again as the Unionist candidate for Amasya. In mid-March, it was confirmed that he would run as the Unionist candidate.

At Amasya, the majority of the electors of the towns of Köprü and Mecidözü cast their votes for the Unionist candidate Arif Fazil Efendi, and independent candidates Haci Mustafa Efendi and Hasan Rasim Efendi. At Vezirköprü, Mahmud Beyzade Hüseyin Efendi, a Unionist candidate, obtained a majority of the votes, but failing to get the majority of the votes for the whole sandjak of Amasya he lost the elections. At the Amasya elections, Ismail Hakki Mumcu Pasha, the incumbent deputy and the Entente Libérale candidate, managed to obtain only three votes at Vezirköprü. After the final count, Arif Fazil Efendi, Haci Mustafa Efendi, and Hasan Rasim Efendi were elected deputies for

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Amasya, the latter obtaining the great majority of the votes. 276

At Tokat, the second degree elections were over by April 16. Like in some other Anatolian towns, there were troubles at Zile as a consequence of the counter-revolutionary propaganda by monarchist forces. However, despite the efforts of the monarchist agents provocateurs, public order was maintained, and the elections resulted in the victory of three independent candidates - Kemerlizade Sakir Bey of Tokat, Topçuzade Hoca Kamil Efendi of Zile, and Tahsin Riza Bey of Niksar. 277

In Erzurum, where the population had an independent spirit as had been amply shown during the months leading up to the Revolution, the opening of the local branch of the Entente Libérale in early March created a furor among the citizens who held demonstrations against the establishment of a monarchist party club at Erzurum. Judging all political activity as divisive and potentially explosive, especially in a social setting where ethnic and religious wounds caused by the Hamidian policy of letting the Kurdish chiefs terrorise the Armenian peasantry to the point of widespread massacres were still fresh, the population of Erzurum also expressed its concern for the existence of the branch of the Committee of Union and Progress as well as that of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. 278

Incumbent Armenian deputies Vartkes Serengülyan and Karekin Pasturmadijan were candidates for Erzurum. 279 Vartkes Serengülyan, the incumbent deputy for Erzurum, and Hüseyin Tosun Bey, Director of Ottoman Telegraph Office and a Unionist propagandist, arrived at Bayburt on March 4. Making propaganda speeches in favour of the Committee of Union and Progress, they explained the conditions of the agreement reached between the Unionists and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. 280

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277. "Notes de Tokat", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 29, 1912, p.3.
278. "Manifestations à Erzeroum", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, March 5, 1912, p.2.
Armenian newspaper published at Erzurum, protested against the candidacy of Hafiz Osman Efendi, a local notable, who had enriched himself by plundering the properties of the Armenian peasantry.  

The elections which ended by April 14 resulted in Unionist victory. Hakim Bey came first with one hundred and seventeen votes. Hüseyin Tosun Bey was elected with one hundred and sixteen votes, Rezak Efendi with ninety-seven, and Saban Efendi with seventy-nine votes. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation candidates -Vartkes Serengülyan and Karekin Pasturmadjian- who were supporting the Committee of Union and Progress also won the elections, receiving one hundred and six, and one hundred and four votes respectively. 

Zeki Moghamez Bey, a man of letters, was a candidate for Aleppo. At Aleppo, where at Maara the second degree elections were over by April 12, all the electors had voted for the Unionist candidates. 

The Unionist-dominated administration at Beirut re-arranged the constituencies. Even with this gerrymandering, Unionist victory was not be complete. Muharrem Misbah won the electoral race as an independent; the other seat went to the incumbent deputy, Kiamil al-Asad, a shiite Unionist. St. Jean d'Acre voted for Sheikh Esad Efendi. 

Atif Bey, a retired officer, was candidate for Damascus. Abd al-Ghani Pasha, and Rafiq Bey were candidates for Damascus. In Damascus, the Unionists were

eventually strong enough to eliminate Shukri al-Asali, Rushdi al-Shema and Shafiq al-Muayyad, all members of the Entente Libérale and deputies in the Chamber, from the political race; yet they were not dominant enough to have their own candidates elected. The Committee would win only one of four seats in Damascus; the other three were won by independent candidates.289

General Hasan Riza Pasha, Military Commander of Scutari in Albania, was a candidate for Baghdad.290 On March 12, ex-Colonel Sadik Bey addressed, in the name of the Entente Libérale, a letter to the Ministry of the Interior protesting the events at Baghdad.291

The elections at Basra was over by April 1. The Unionists lost the elections. Entente Libérale candidates Zuhayrzaade Abdullah Bey and Talib won the two seats for Basra.292 There was concern within the Unionist leadership at Istanbul that other constituencies in the Basra province might also go overboard to the monarchist side.293

On March 7, Sharif Ali Haydar Bey, former Minister of Pious Foundations and Vice-President of the Senate, arrived at Medina where he was warmly welcomed by both the civilian and military authorities and the representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress. There was also a large crowd present.294

Artillery Captain Abdullatif Bey was elected deputy for Fizan in late March, replacing Cami Baykurt. He was one of the early participants in the Revolution of 1908. At Salonica, he was among the revolutionary officers who had fired the first salvo to salute the

289. Feroz Ahmad and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meselesi Döneninde Meclisler, 1908-1918", p.280.
Revolution. 295

Appendix to Chapter 13

GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1912

KOSOVO/ÜSKÜB (16)

<table>
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Ipek

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Senica/Novi Bazar (1)

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<td>Indep&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Prishtine (1?)
Rifat Bey

Prizren (3)
Abdülabız Ef. Albanian CUP^6
Haci Destan Ef. Albanian CUP^7
Tevfik Nazif Bey Albanian CUP^8

Taslica (1)
Mehmed Izzet Pasha Turk Indep^9

* * *

SCUTARI (4)

Scutari (2)
Murtaza Ef.^1 Albanian Indep^10
Riza Bey^1 Albanian Indep^11

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Drac/Durazzo (1)

Esad Pasha Toptan\(^r\) (1862-1919)  Albanian  Indep\(^{12}\)

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JANINA

Janina (2)

Dimitraki Kingos\(^r\)  Greek  Indep\(^{13}\)
Konstantin Sourlas\(^r\)  Greek  Indep\(^{14}\)

Argyrocastro/Ergiri (2)

Despri Ef.  Albanian  Indep
Müfiz Bey\(^r\)  Albanian  EL\(^{15}\)

Berat (2)

Süreyya Bey Vlora  Albanian  Indep\(^{16}\)
Sami Vrionis  Albanian  Indep\(^{17}\)

Prevesa (1)

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15. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Son of the late Noga Pasha ("Turkey: Some Election Results", *The Times*, October 17, 1908, p.7)).


17. He was elected with 60 votes ("Les Elections: Ismail Kemal bey échoue à Bérat", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, May 4, 1912, p.2).
No deputy elected in 1912 elections.

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**MONASTIR (10)**

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**Elbasan (1)**

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21. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. Ahmad and Rustow


23. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.
Sevket Bey  Albanian  Indep\textsuperscript{24}

Goritza/Görice (2)

Philip Mishé\textsuperscript{r}  Serbian  Indep\textsuperscript{25}
Süleyman Ef.  Albanian  Indep\textsuperscript{26}

Serfidje (2)

Gregorius Ef.  Greek  Indep\textsuperscript{27}
Osman Bey  Turk  CUP\textsuperscript{28}

\[ \text{***} \]

Salonica

Salonica (6)

Mehmed Cavid Bey\textsuperscript{r}  (1875-1926)  Turk  CUP\textsuperscript{29}
Emmanuel Carasso\textsuperscript{r}  Jew  CUP\textsuperscript{30}

\[ \text{---} \]


30. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and
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**Drama (2)**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riza Bey</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP³⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midhat Sükrü Bleda</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP³⁶</td>
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**Serres (5)**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Bujnov</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Indep³⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimitris Dingas</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Indep³⁸</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Eastern Express, April 15, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.*


38. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 22, 1908, p.2).
Hulusi Bey  
Turk  
Indep

Stoju Hadziev  
Bulgarian  
Indep

Dervis Bey  
Turk  
? 

* * *

EDIRNE (12)

Edirne (3)

Mehmed Talat Bey\(^r\)  
(1870-1921)  
Turk  
CUP

Faik Kaltakkiran\(^r\)  
(1870-1948)  
Turk  
CUP

Emin Bey  
Turk  
CUP

Dedeagac (1)

Süleyman Bey\(^r\)  
Turk  
CUP

---


42. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Nouveaux députés unionistes", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 12, 1912, p.2; "Les Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


45. Captain. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Gelibolu (1)

Traianos Narlı

Hüseyin Ulvi Bey

Greek

Turk

Indep

Indep

Gümüşcine (3)

Hacı Mehmed Adil Arda

Mehmed Arif Bey

Müşderris Mehmed Bey

Turk

Turk

Turk

(1869-1935)

CUP

CUP

CUP

Kirk Kilise (2)

Emrullah Ef.

Ömer Naci Bey

Turk

Turk

CUP

CUP

(1858-1914)

(1880-1916)


48. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


Agop Boyadjian
Armenian
CUP

Bedreddin Bey
Turk
Indep

***

ISTANBUL (10)

Istanbul (10)

Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın
(1875-1957)
Turk
CUP

Vitali Faraggi
Jew
Indep

Bedros Haladjian
(1871- ?
Armenian
CUP

Ahmed Nesimi Bey
Turk
CUP

Krikor Zohrab
(1861-1915)
Armenian
EL

Artas Ef.
Greek
Indep

Hüseyin Hasim Sanver
(1873-1958)
Turk
CUP

52. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Boyadjian replaced Babigulian. Boyadjian was professor of mathematics, and many Unionists, including the present Minister of Finance and Minister of Education were among his pupils ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, August 6, 1909, p.1). Boyadjian, sub-rector of the university, was elected deputy on October 1 ("News Items", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, October 2, 1909, p.1). Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.24.


57. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. Lawyer (Ahmad and Rustow). "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


59. Graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Class of 1891. His deputyship ended when the Chamber was dissolved on account of the Balkan War (Ali Çankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeler, 3, p.476). "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Memduh Bey Turk CUP
Orphanidis Ef. Greek Indep
Yagci Sefik Bey (1852-1915) Turk CUP

***

Sandjak of ÇATALCA (1)

Hafiz Süleyman Ef. Turk CUP

***

Sandjak of IZMİT (3)

Anastas Mihailidis Greek Indep
Ahmed Müfîd Saner (1871-1949) Turk Indep
Ismail Canbulat (1880-1926) Turk CUP

***

HÜDAVENDIGAR

Bursa

Abdullah Sabri Karter\textsuperscript{r} (1867-1939) Turk Indep\textsuperscript{67}

Hasan Rafet Canitez (1880-1946) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{68}

Ahmed Fevzi Ef. Turk Indep

Hafiz Ahmed Hamdi Ef. Turk EL

Riza Bey Turk CUP\textsuperscript{69}

Karahisar-i Sahib [Afyon] (3)

\textit{Hoca} Mehmed Kamil Mitas\textsuperscript{r} (1875-1957) Turk Indep\textsuperscript{70}

Salim Bey\textsuperscript{r} Turk Indep\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Haci} Ahmed Ef. Turk Indep\textsuperscript{72}

Ertugrul [Bilecik] (2)

\textsuperscript{67} Graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Class of 1889. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. On April 7, 1906, he was appointed Istanbul Adalar Kazalari Kaymakami. On August 2, 1908, he was appointed Mutasarrif of Elbasan, but was elected deputy on November 8, 1908 (All Çankaya, \textit{Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeller}, 3, pp.394-397). "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.

\textsuperscript{68} "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.


\textsuperscript{72} "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Mehmed Sadik Bey⁷³
Hakki Baha Pars ( ? -1944) Turk CUP

Kütahya (4)
Abdullah Azmi Torun⁷⁴
Hatibzade Ahmed Cemal⁷⁵
Yenibahçeli Nail Bey ( ? -1926) Turk CUP⁷⁶
Sadik Ef.

***

Sandjak of KARESI [Balikesir] (5)

Haci Ali Galib Bey⁷⁸
Konstantin Savapoulos⁷⁹ ( ? -1918) Greek Indep

---

73. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Rösimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1023).
74. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. Lawyer (Ahmad and Rustow). "Les Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
75. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
78. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
79. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Hasan Ferhad Bey
Turk
CUP^80

Mehmed Vehbi Bolak
(1881-1948)
Turk
CUP^81

Hüseyin Kadri Bey
Turk
CUP^82

* * *

Sandjak of KALE-I SULTANTIYE (2)

Çanakkale [Biga] (1)

Atif Kamçıl
(1884-1947)
Turk
CUP^83

Kazim Bey
Turk
CUP^84

Gelibolu (1)

Hafız Hüseyin Ef.
Turk
CUP?^85

* * *

CEZAYIR BAHRI-I SEFID


82. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.

83. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.

84. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.

85. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2.
Rhodes
No deputy elected in 1912 elections.

Lymnos (1)
Mihaliki Coufis r Greek 86

Mytilene
Dimitraki Sava Ef. Greek Indep

Chio/Sakiz (1)
Achille Bodiano Greek 87
Apadyako Ef. Greek Indep

***

AYDIN

Izmir
Emmanuel Emmanuelidis r Greek CUP 88
Vahan Bardizbanian Armenian ARFIndep 89
P. Carolidis r Greek Indep 90

86. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("A la Chambre ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 22, 1908, p.2. Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.45).
88. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
89. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
90. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. Professor of history (Ahmad and Rustow).
Nesim Masliah
Jew
CUP

Mehmed Seyyid Bey
(1866-1925)
Turk
CUP

Musa Kazim Bey
(1881-1930)
Turk
CUP

Aydin (3)

Kazim Bey
Turk
Indep

Yunus Nadi Abalioglu
(1880-1945)
Turk
CUP

Ubeydullah Hatiboglu
(1857-1937)
Turk
CUP

Denizli

Gani Bey
Turk
CUP

Sadik Bey
Turk
"CUP"

"Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.

91. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


98. According to Ahmed Resid Rey, he was a CUP sympathiser (Ahmed Resid Rey, p.133). "Les Elections: A Dénizli", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 10,
Mentese [Mugla]

Halil Mentese
(1874-1948)
Turk
CUP

Ali Haydar Bey
(1878-1937)
Turk
Indep

Saruhan [Manisa]

Haydar Bey
Turk
CUP

Mensurizade Mehmed Said Bey
Turk
Indep

Mustafa Feyzi Ef.
(1880-1933)
Turk
CUP

Hüseyin Kazim Bey
(1870-1934)
Turk
CUP

Mehmed Sabri Toprak *
(1877-1938)
Turk
CUP

***

KONYA (14)

1912, p.2; "Les Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


101. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 3 (October 1909-March 1910), p.33).


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<th>Province</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>Mehmed Emin Ef.</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seyhzade Zeynelabidin Ef.</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>EL 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Kemali Bey</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mehemd Riza Bey</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ömer Vehbi Büyükyalvaç</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1870-1927)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burdur</td>
<td>Galib Pasha</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamid-i Abad [Isparta]</td>
<td>Esref Bey</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep 107</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mustafa Hakki Bey</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep 108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigde</td>
<td>Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>CUP 109</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1876-1921)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhiddin Bey</td>
<td>Türk</td>
<td>Indep 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1009).
106. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("Les députés", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 18, 1908, p.2).
109. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. Lawyer (Ahmad and Rustow). "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
110. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Ananias Ef. Greek Indep
Teke [Antalya] (2)
Idris Bey Turk Indep
Münir Bey Turk Indep

***

ANKARA (12)

Ankara (4)
Halil Halid Bey Turk CUP
Hacı Mustafa Beyman (1866-1931) Turk CUP
Nusret Sadullah Ayaslioglu Turk CUP
Mehmed Talat Sönmez (1875-1950) Turk CUP

Çorum (2)

111. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmed Münir Cagil¹</td>
<td>(1874-1954)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP¹¹⁸</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Osman Ef.¹</td>
<td>(1876-? )</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP¹¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Hamdi Bey]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kayseri (2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Galib Bey</td>
<td>(1872-? )</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>EL¹²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Rifat Calik'a</td>
<td>(1888-1963)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>EL¹²¹</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kirsehir (2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benliagazade Ali Riza¹</td>
<td>(1871-1926)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep¹²²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud Mahir Ef.¹</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep¹²³</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yozgat (2)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Münir Bey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinacizade Sakir Bey</td>
<td>(1875-1940)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP¹²⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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124. "Nouvelles du Jour", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, May 14,
KASTAMONU (12)

Kastamonu (4)

Ahmed Mahir Ef.\textsuperscript{r} (1860-1925) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{125}
Necmeddin Kocatas\textsuperscript{r} (1876-1949) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{126}
Ismail Mahir Ef. (1876-1916) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{127}
Hüsnü Bey Turk Indep\textsuperscript{128}
Ahmed Sükrü Bey (1872-1930) Turk \textsuperscript{?129}

Bolu (4)

Habib Bey\textsuperscript{r} (1876-1928) Turk El\textsuperscript{130}
Rifat Kamil Madenci (1886- 1930) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{131}

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129. Graduate of Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Class of 1894. He was elected deputy at the by-elections on January 24, 1913 (Ali Çankaya, Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetiler, 3, p.564).


Mustafa Zeki Ef. r  Turk  Indep 132
Yusuf Ziya Özenci  (1875-1951)  Turk  CUP 133

Çankırı (2)
Mustafa Tevfik Durlanik r  (1871-1944)  Turk  Indep 134
Mehmed Sabri Ef.  (?-1914)  Turk  CUP 135

Sinop (2)
Hasan Fehmi Türmerkan r  (1875-1933)  Turk  CUP 136
Ismail Hakkı Bey  Turk  CUP 137

***

TRABZON (16)

Trabzon (7)
Eyüpzade İzzet Bey r  (1861-1920)  Turk  Indep 138

132. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.823).
136. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.
138. Lawyer (Ahmad and Rustow). Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: A Trébizonde [April 11]", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 13,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matheos Cofidis</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Indep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Osman Güley</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nemlizade Haci Osman Ef.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
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<td>Hafiz Mehmed Engin</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
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<td>Falcizade Mahmud Memduh Ef.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
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<td>Servet Bey</td>
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<td>CUP</td>
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Canik [Samsun] (4)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Süleyman Necmi Selmen</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haci Ahmed Hamdi Ef.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


142. President of the Penal Court at Samsun ("Les Elections: A Trébizonde [April 11]", *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, April 13, 1912, p.2).


Hakki Bey  
Turk  
Indep

Amizade Talat Avni Bey  (1880-1939)  
Turk  
CUP

Gümüşhane (2)

Hayri Bey  
Turk  
Indep

Hasan Fehmi Ataç  (1879-1961)  
Turk  
CUP

Lazistan [Rize] (2)

Ahmed Pasha  
Turk  
Indep

Ziya Molla Bey  
Turk  
CUP

Sivas


149. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 15, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmed Vasfi [Seçer]</td>
<td>(1863-1932)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>?(^{153})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emin Edip Ef.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Ziya Bey(^{r})</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep(^{154})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüsnü Bey(^{r})</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep(^{155})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karabet Pasayan</td>
<td>(1864-1915)</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Indep(^{156})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ömer Sevki Bey(^{r})</td>
<td>(1870- ? )</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep(^{157})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amasya</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arif Fazil Ef(^{r})</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP(^{158})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haci Mustafa Ef.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep(^{159})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hasan Rasim Ef.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep(^{160})</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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153. He is not listed in Ahmad and Rustow.


Karahisar-i Sarki

[Ömer Feyzi Efendi] Türk EL
[Serdarzade Mustafa Atay (1861-1925) Kurd? Indep]
Hafizzade Mehmed Efendi ?
Kürdzade Zihni Efendi Kurd ?

Tokat (3)

Topçuza Haci Kamil Efendi (1870-1933) Türk Indep
Kemerlizade Sakir Bey Türk Indep
Tahsin Riza Bey Türk Indep

***

161. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 1 (September 1908-March 1909), p.441; Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1008; and, "Les élections en province", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.2).

162. TBMM kitabında 1912'de mebus olduğu yok. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("Les élections en province", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, November 24, 1908, p.2. His deputyship is objected because of his reactionary activities. Armenians of Karahısar-i Sarkı complained that he was involved/took active part in the massacres of 1896 ("A la Chambre Ottomane", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, December 24, 1908, p.2); and, Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1009).


166. Notable of Tokat ("Notes de Tokat", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 29, 1912, p.3). "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1; and, "Notes de Tokat", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 29, 1912, p.3.

ERZURUM

Erzurum (6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karekin Pasturmadjian⁷</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Indep¹⁶⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vartkes Serengüyan⁷</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Socialist¹⁶⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacı Lütfullah Ef.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raif Đino (1874-1949)</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saban Ef.</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep¹⁷⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Tosun Bey</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Indep¹⁷¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezak Ef.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>CUP¹⁷²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakim Bey</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>CUP¹⁷³</td>
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Bayezid (1)

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Sudi Acarbay⁷</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>CUP¹⁷⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Erzincan (1)

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¹⁷⁴. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.822).
Halef Sagiroglu  (1880-1947)  Turk  CUP

***

VAN

Van (2)

Midhat Altıok  (1884-? )  Turk  Indep

Virmiyan Ef.  (? -1915)  Armenian  Indep

Hakkari (1)

None listed in Ahmad and Rustow.

***

BITLIS

Bitlis

Nusret Sadullah Eren  (1867-1933)  Turk  Indep

Genc [Bingöl]

Mehmed Emin Ef.  (? -1918)  Turk  Indep

Mus

Kegham Garabetian  (? -1918)  Armenian  Indep

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175. "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


177. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("Les députés", The Levant Herald and
Haci Ilyas Sami Musr (1881- ? ) Turk CUP\textsuperscript{178}

Siirt

Nazim Bey Turk Indep

***

MAMURET EL-AZIZ (6)

Harput/Mamuret-ul-Aziz (3)

Haci Mehmed Nuri Ef.\textsuperscript{r} Turk Indep\textsuperscript{179}

Haci Osman Ef.

Esperzade Mustafa Safvet (1866-1929) Turk Indep\textsuperscript{181}

Dersim [Tunceli] (1)

Salim Ef. Turk Indep\textsuperscript{182}

Malatya (2)


\textsuperscript{178} Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber ("Les députés", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, December 22, 1908, p.2; and, \textit{Resimli Kitab}, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1019).


Osman Avni Bey

Hoca Mehmed Tevfik Ef. r

Turk

Indep 183

Diyarbakır

Diyarbakır (2)

Pirincizade Fevzi Bey r

(1879-1933)

Kurd

Indep 185

Mehmed Zülfı Tigrel

(1876-1943)

Turk

CUP 186

Argani-Maden

Stephan Ciracian

(? -1915)

Armenian

Indep

Ziya Bey

Turk

Indep 187

Mardin (1)

Hasan Lami Bey

Turk

Indep

Said Bey r

Turk

Indep 188


185. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "En province", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 6, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


188. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.848).
Siverek (1)

Müftüzade Ismail Hakki Bey

Turk

CUP

***

HALEB

Haleb/Aleppo

Sadik al-Rifai

Arab

Indep

Baha Efendi

Arab?

Indep

Bahri Bey

Arab?

Indep

Artin Bosgezenian

Armenian

CUP

Ali Cenani Bey

Turk

Indep

Hamid Bey

Arab

Indep

Maras

Hasan Fehmi Efendi

Turk

Indep

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191. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.825).


194. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.
Haci Evliya Efendi  Turk  Indep

Urfa
Sheikh Safvet Yetkin  (1866-1950)  Turk  CUP\textsuperscript{195}
Omer Edib Bey  Turk  Indep\textsuperscript{196}

* * *

ADANA

Adana (4)
Abdullah Faik Copuroglu  (1857-1939)  Turk  EL\textsuperscript{197}

Cebel-i Bereket [Dörtyol]
Hasan Sezai Bey  Turk  Indep

İçel [Silifke]
Hafiz Emin Inankur  (1876-1944)  Turk  CUP\textsuperscript{198}

Kozan (1)
Ali Ilmi Ef.  Turk  Indep

\textsuperscript{195} Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.

\textsuperscript{196} "Les Elections", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 13, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.

\textsuperscript{197} Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. His deputyship was confirmed with some objections in the Chamber ("The Ottoman Parliament", \textit{The Orient}, 3/25 (June 19, 1912).

\textsuperscript{198} "Les Elections: A Itch II", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 8, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", \textit{The Levant Herald and Eastern Express}, April 18, 1912, p.1.
Mersin (1)
Sadik Pasha Turk Indep

* * *

BEIRUT (6)

Beirut (3)
Kamil al-As'ad Arab CUP
Misbah Ef. Muharrem Arab Indep
[Mslih Bey ? ?

Akka/St. Jean d'Acre (1)
Sheikh As'ad Efendi Shuqair Arab EL

Latakia (1)


200. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


Abd al-Wahid Efendi Haron Arab Indep

Nablus (1)
Haydar Bey Tufan Arab Indep

Tripoli (2)
Muhammed Efendi al-Cisr Arab Indep
Sa'adallah Efendi Munla Arab Indep

* * *

JERUSALEM (3)

Jerusalem (3)
Ahmad Efendi al-Aref Arab Indep


Ruhi al-Khalidi Bey Arab Indep 209
Uthman Efendi Nashashibi Arab Indep 210

* * *

SYRIA/DAMASCUS (8)

Damascus (4)
Muhammed Fawzi Pasha al-Azm Arab Indep 211
Abd al-Rahman Pasha Yusuf Arab Indep 212
Amin Efendi Tarazi Arab Indep 213

Express, May 4, 1912, p.2.


Abd al-Muhsin Efendi Ustwaini  Arab  Indep

Hama
Sa'ad al-Din Efendi Khalil  Arab  215
Khalid al-Barazi  Arab  EL 216
Seyyid Hasim Bey  Turk  CUP 217
Abd al-Hamid Zohrawi  Arab  EL 218

Homs
Mehmed Sefik Bey  Turk  CUP 1876

Havran (2)
Ismail Ahmad Bey  Arab  Indep 219

and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


219. F.O. 195/2389/24/1989, Devey to Sir Gerard Lowther, Damascus, April 16, 1912, quoted in Rashid Ismail Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914, p.258. His name is given as Ismail Harari Bey in "Les Elections: Pas un député d'opposition!", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 9, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912,
Rushdi Bey Tali'a (1873-1924) Arab CUP\textsuperscript{220}

Kerak (1)

'Atallah Ef. al-Ayyubi (1876-1951) Arab Indep\textsuperscript{221}

* * *

ZOR (1)

Zor (1)

[Mehmed Nuri Ef. Turk Indep]

Fethi Bey ? CUP\textsuperscript{222}

* * *

MOSUL

Mosul

Salih Saadi Bey ( ? -1915) Arab Indep


Hasan Faik Bey
Arab
Indep
Ibrahim Fevzi Ef.
Arab
Indep

Kerkük
Mehmed Ali Bey
Turk?
Indep
Bahaeddin Bey
Turk?
Indep
Abdullah Safi Ef.
Arab
Indep

Süleymaniye
Babanzade Hikmet Bey
(1945)
Kurd
CUP

***

BAGHDAD

Baghdad (4)
Sasun Eskl [Hasgayl]
Jew
CUP
Fuad Bey al-Deferi
Arab
Indep
Nakibzade Seyyid Muhiddin Efendi
Arab
Indep
Süleymanzade Murad Bey
Arab
Indep

Divaniye (1)

223. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.1100).
Babanzade Ismail Hakkî (1876-1913) Kurd CUP

Kerbela (2)
Fuad Efendi Turk? Indep
Nuri Efendi Turk? Indep

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BASRA

Basra (2)
Zuhayrzade Abdullah Arab EL
Seyyid Talib ibn Receb Arab EL
[Karataszade Abd al-Wahab Pasha Turk? Indep]
[Babanzade Ahmed Naim Bey (1873-1934) Kurd CUP]

Ammare

No deputy is listed for 1912 elections.

233. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.
Müntefik

Ferid Pasazade Abd al-Muhsin Bey\textsuperscript{r} Arab CUP\textsuperscript{234}
Cemil Bey Turk Indep
Mehmed Hamza Bey (1873-1921) Arab? Indep

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JIDDAH

Sharif Faisal Ef. (1883-1933) Arab EL

***

HEDJAZ (3)

Mecca (2)
Sharif Abdullah Ef.\textsuperscript{r} (1882-1951) Arab EL\textsuperscript{235}
Hasan Seybi Ef.\textsuperscript{r} Arab EL\textsuperscript{236}

Medina (1)
No deputy is listed for 1912 elections.

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\textsuperscript{234} Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.
YEMEN

Asir
Seyyid Yusuf Fazil Bey Arab Indep
Hüsameddin Bey Turk? Indep

Taif
No deputy is listed for 1912 elections.

Sanaa
Seyyid Ahmed Bey Arab Indep\(^\text{237}\)
Nuri Bey Turk Indep
Seyyid Husayn Ef. Arab Indep
Seyyid Ali Ibrahim Ef. Arab Indep
Seyyid Ahmad Yahya al-Kaysi Ef.\(^r\) Arab Indep\(^\text{238}\)

Hodeidah
Mustafa Fehmi Bey Turk Indep
Hifzi Bey Turk? Indep
Hakki Ilhami Bey Turk? Indep
Zühdü Bey\(^r\) Turk? Indep\(^\text{239}\)
Seyyid Yahya Pasha Arab Indep

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\(^{238}\) Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.

\(^{239}\) Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber.
TRABLUS GARB

Trabulus Garb

Ferhad Ef. r Arab EL 240
Mahmud Naci Bey r Turk? Indep 241
[Muhtar Kabar Arab Indep]
Sadik Bey r ? CUP 242
Hadi Kenan Bey ? 243

Benghazi (2)

Ömer Mansur Pasha r (1878- ? ) Turk Indep 244
Yusuf Shutwan r Arab EL 245
Abdülkadir Pasha Arab? Indep

Cebel-i Garbi

Suleiman al-Baruni Efendi r Arab Indep 246

240. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.

241. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber. "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2; and, "Ouverture du Parlement", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 18, 1912, p.1.


244. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 2 (April-September 1909), p.992).

245. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber (Resimli Kitab, 4 (April-September 1910), p.823).

246. Also deputy in the 1908 Chamber; and, "Les Elections: Résultats à ce jour", The Levant Herald and Eastern Express, April 1, 1912, p.2.
Feyzullah Zubayr Efendi

Fizan

Carni Baykut (1877-195?)

Abdullatif Bey

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Chapter 14

OPENING OF THE PARLIAMENT

The Parliament convened on April 18 as scheduled. If somewhat vague on matters of internal policy, the Speech from the Throne was clear enough with regard to the continuation of the war with Italy and the Porte's absolute refusal to surrender one bit of its sovereignty in Turkish Africa, much less the whole of Tripoli as the Italians had demanded. The news of the attack on the Dardanelles reached Parliament at the outset of the opening ceremony, reportedly causing no alarm.

As expected, the elections had not been totally completed, and without a majority of its deputies in attendance, the Chamber could not begin conducting business. Up until mid-April, about one hundred and sixty-seven deputies had been elected. In mid-May, some one hundred and eighty deputies had arrived at Istanbul, many of whom were members of the Committee of Union and Progress.

With the election nonetheless effectively over, the Committee's leadership returned to the modification of Article 35 of the Constitution, and a meeting was held at Cavid Bey's house. Said Pasha, and a group of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress -- Emrullah Bey, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, Nesimi Bey, Ziya Bey, Hayri Bey, and Dr. Nazim Bey -- were all present.

6. Cavid Bey, "Hatıraları", *Tanin*, January 2, 1944, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*: 
By early May, the cabinet had approved the proposed modifications which then had
to be submitted to the Parliament. The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress
was confident that it would obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the Chamber of
Deputies. With Article 35 passed, the Chamber would then pass the Budget, discuss, and
perhaps pass, certain demands for extra-ordinary credits, and then be prorogued.\textsuperscript{7} The
Chamber, however, refused to cooperate. A majority of the deputies decided that the article
in question should be modified so as to give the Sultan, in the case of the Chamber's
repeated refusal to accept a proposal supported by the cabinet and acting on the advice of
the government, the power to dissolve Parliament and order new elections to be held. The
proposal also stipulated that if after the elections, the Chamber persisted in its point of view
the government would have to give way. In response, the government attempted to further
modify the article, in a proposal which would give the government freedom to disregard the
decisions of a newly elected Parliament. This latest proposal encountered so much
opposition that it was quickly withdrawn.\textsuperscript{8}

On June 22, after some discussion on the floor, the Chamber modified, by a vote of
two hundred and ten votes to thirteen, Articles 7, 43, and finally, 35 of the Constitution in
accordance with the recommendations of the Committee for the Revision of the
Constitution, which had not gone so far as the Government wished.\textsuperscript{9}

Meanwhile, the Unionist leadership had also encountered difficulty in selecting an
acceptable candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber. Its first choice had been \textit{Haci} Adil
Arda, then on an inspection tour in Macedonia. His nomination, however, had met with
strong opposition in the Chamber, and was dropped. Consequently, Halil Mentese, a
former Minister of the Interior, and leader of the parliamentary group of the Committee,

\begin{flushright}
\textit{The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914}, p.105.
\textsuperscript{7} "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, May 17, 1912, p.39.
\textsuperscript{8} "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, June 21, 1912, p.199.
\textsuperscript{9} "Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, July 5, 1912, p.263, and \textit{Tanin}, June 10, 1328/June
23, 1912, quoted in Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish
Politics, 1908-1914}, p.105.
\end{flushright}
was nominated. 10

In mid-May Halil Mentese was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. The First Vice-President was Mehmed Pasha, deputy for Damascus, the Second, Haladjian Efendi, deputy for Istanbul and former Minister of Public Works. All three were the nominees of the Committee of Union and Progress. 11

Rumours of cabinet instability persisted, though it seemed premature to predict any immediate change. Most felt that the Unionists would continue to make use of Said Pasha for just as long as needed, and that when he retired on account of old age, ill health, or under pressure he would probably be succeeded by another "elder statesman", meaning, another non-Unionist pasha. 12

In late May, Nail Bey, Minister of Finance, resigned. He had been appointed to the Ministry in May of 1911, replacing Cavid Bey who had been forced to resign under monarchist attack. A strong advocate of economy, he had followed Cavid Bey's policies and had the pleasure of seeing a distinct improvement in revenues, while his efforts to reduce expenditure, if not entirely successful, had none the less produced an improvement in the financial situation of the Government. Cavid Bey was appointed Acting-Minister of Finance, and would probably succeed him, in which case Haladjian Efendi would probably replace Cavid Bey as Minister of Public Works. There were rumours that Asim Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, would also resign shortly. As he was not on the best of terms with Said Pasha and some members of the Committee of Union and Progress, it was certain that such a move would not be entirely voluntary. 13

WHEN IT REALISED that it had no hope of capturing political power through constitutional means, the monarchist opposition decided to resort to a coup d'etat, one which would

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center around the discontented Albanian elements in Macedonia. Dr. Riza Nur, one of the leaders of the Entente Libérale, held talks with Colonel Yakovali Riza Bey who was, at the time, exiled to Sinop for his role in the counter-revolutionary coup attempt of April, 1909. They agreed to work together to provoke an Albanian rebellion which would ostensibly lead to the destabilisation and fall of the Unionist government. Just as Dr. Riza Nur was arranging for Yakovali Riza Bey’s escape from Sinop, the latter was amnestied. He then returned to Albania where he began organising, as had been planned, the rebellion.

Dr. Riza Nur maintained contact with the Albanian rebels through such intermediaries as Celal Pasazade Emin Bey. This network also included Prince Sabahaddin, who was introduced by Dr. Riza Nur to Yakovali Riza Bey, and helped finance the clandestine operation. Hoca Said Efendi and Necib Draga, both ex-deputies for Üsküb, Volcetrinli Hasan Bey, ex-deputy for Prishtina, and Isa Bolatin would also join the conspiracy.

While leaders of the Entente Libérale were busy coordinating and financially supporting the Albanian rebellion, however, monarchist supporters in the army started a rebellion in the Monastir area on May 6. Some officers left their garrisons and took to the mountains; some were captured and brought to Istanbul. News of this military insurrection would not appear for almost six weeks.

Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu, a secret military organisation, was to become the lynchpin of the monarchists' plans. One of its members, Kurmay Binbasi Kemal Bey, had

18. One of the rebel officers, Tahsin Bey, was appointed as the Police Commissioner of Istanbul by the monarchist/collaborationist Damad Ferid Pasha Government during the Armistice after the World War I. Nafiz Bey, one of the officers who had been captured by the authorities, later became aide to Nazım Pasha who was appointed Minister of War after the coup d'état of July 1912 and was killed during the Raid on the Sublime Porte of January 1913 (Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.499).
19. Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Millî Mücadele,
contacted Prince Sabahaddin through Scaliere, a Greek politician.²⁰ Prince Sabahaddin had then invited Dr. Riza Nur and several other opposition politicians to discuss the prospects of the Albanian rebellion. They agreed that, at this critical juncture, in order to effect the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet, the Albanian rebellion could use the help of a general military upheaval.²¹ Following the meeting, Prince Sabahaddin would add his own views to the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu’s manifesto, and this revised version would be secretly printed in large quantities in a print shop at Beyoglu. Again, Prince Sabahaddin would be responsible for financing.²²

Monarchists then set about diligently recruiting army officers. Acting as liason between the officers on the one hand and Prince Sabahaddin, Kamil Pasha, and Nazim Pasha on the other, Dr. Riza Nur also used his residence as the headquarters for the preparation and distribution of counter-revolutionary propaganda.²³ Nazim Pasha, head of the Council of War, also served as intermediary between the leadership of the Entente Libérale and the secret military organization, though most communication between the two groups was highly secret and, in general, the organisation was geared to disguise its political machinations as a purely military unrest.²⁴

In late June, newspapers finally printed news of the revolt at Monastir, though most downplayed its significance, portraying it as the action of a few disgruntled officers and soldiers who were rebelling against their supervisors.²⁵ But, the mutiny at Monastir proved to be a more serious problem than was at first indicated. The Government soon

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22. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.528, quoting Riza Nur, Hürriyet ve İtilaf Nasil Dogdu, Nasil Öldü? ?
realised that it was, in effect, a deliberate revolt against the Cabinet on the part of at least one organisation, ostensibly the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu, which by itself represented an influential body of military opinion. Although local factors seemed to have caused a premature outbreak at Monastir, there was good reason to believe that the secret military organisation had for some time been contemplating open hostility against the Committee of Union and Progress and that it had only held back on account of the Tripolitian war. With the crisis past, however, the unrest in Albania and monarchist activity combined to strengthened the hands of the malcontents in Monastir.26

On June 24, Captain Tayyar Bey, an Albanian officer from Dibre and a member of the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu, left the barracks at Bistritza, three miles from Monastir, with several other officers, some sixty men, several machine guns and 1,000 TLs. He was later joined by more officers and troops, mostly Albanians, though a few were Turks and Christians from Dibra and Perlepe.27 He then announced that he and his comrades supported the Albanian insurgents, and sent a telegram to the Government demanding the resignation of the existing Cabinet, the impeachment of Hakki Pasha's Cabinet for its lack of military preparations in Tripoli, as well as the trials of Talat Bey, Cavid Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, Ömer Naci Bey, Dr. Nazim Bey, Ismail Hakki Babanzade, and Rahmi Evranos—all of whom were leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. He also demanded that the Committee of Union and Progress be prohibited from any further political activity, that army officers' grievances be addressed, that a General Staff at the Palace be created, and that new elections be held.28

The Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu addressed its demands to the Council of War, which was conveniently headed by one of its conspirators, Nazim Pasha. Acting in his official capacity, Nazim Pasha urged that the Cabinet give the matter immediate attention,

suggesting that discontent was widespread enough to warrant its resignation. Although the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu had demanded that the Sultan preside over the General Staff, apparently to correct certain "irregularities" in the army's advancement procedures, there could be no doubt that its demands were primarily political. It had singled out Cavid and Talat Beys, two of the most prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and ministers in the cabinet, as well as Mahmut Sevket Pasha, the Minister of War; and called for the Committee's dissolution, as well as the new parliament's.

After the news of the outbreak at Monastir, the government summoned the Chamber for the special purpose of passing a bill introduced by Mahmut Sevket Pasha, Minister of War, which would prohibit political activity on the part of officers and troops. In the speech he delivered to the Chamber on July 1, Mahmut Sevket Pasha praised the alliance between officers and Unionists prior to and during the Revolution of 1908. Yet he went on to say that he was generally against the military's involvement in politics and was proposing a bill to that effect. Apart from the Albanian and Entente Libérale deputies, a majority of the Chamber was favoured the bill. Nonetheless, Ali Galib Bey, the opposition deputy for Kayseri, criticised the proposal as unconstitutional, adding that if the bill were passed, the fact that the officers and troops of Monastir would automatically be guilty might only provoke them further still. Vartkes Serengüylan, the socialist deputy for Erzurum, responded to the monarchist rhetoric of Ali Galib Bey by denouncing any political party which leaned on military support. The bill, prohibiting all political meetings and demonstrations by the military, as well as its taking any part in any

33. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesи, II/123, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, pp.385-387.
34. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesи, II/123, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, p.390.
35. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesи, II/123, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, pp.393-394.
36. Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesи, II/123, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, p.413.
political struggle, passed that day.\footnote{37}

The government's measures to deal with the revolt, however, provoked little more than its own embarrassment. After having announced that loyal troops at Monastir would pursue the deserters rigorously, the Cabinet was informed that the garrison could not be counted upon to take action against its comrades. The government then ordered its commander in Izmir to send a detachment of his troops to the afflicted region, but he allegedly replied that no Turkish officer would take the field against his brother officers. Troops, however, were eventually dispatched to Monastir. Nonetheless, the Government, now aware of the strength and extent of its opposition, was not prepared to risk civil war, and while some pushed for strong military action, others continued to support the ongoing negotiations with Tayyar Bey conducted through officers of the Monastir and Salonica garrisons who acted as the government's representatives.\footnote{38}

Unable to rely on other troops in Macedonia, the Government sent in an entire division from the Dardanelles. Though it contained elements which were decidedly hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress, the army was by no means unanimously anti-Unionist, and most officers wished to avoid a military conflagration at all costs. These supported a cover-up of the Monastir episode which involved letting the mutineers escape without much punishment. Mahmut Sevket Pasha and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, declared that while those deserters who surrendered within a given period would be dealt with as mildly as possible, those who refused would be punished with the utmost severity. Yet, neither the Minister of War nor the Unionists could feel at all secure; they were relying largely on the patriotism of the officer class to prevent

\footnote{37. "Salonika Letter", \textit{The Near East}, July 12, 1912, p.295. The bill, however, did not become law immediately. Before the other required procedures were carried out, Mahmut Sevket Pasha was forced to resign. After the \textit{coup d'état} of July 1912, Nazim Pasha, the new monarchist Minister of War, deferring to the wishes of the monarchist deputies, delayed the carrying out of the remaining formalities for three months, and the bill was finally published in October 1912 (\textit{Takvim-i Vekayi}, September 27, 1328/October 10, 1912, cited in Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Tazdim}, 2, p.516).}

\footnote{38. "Notes of the Week", \textit{The Near East}, July 5, 1912, p.261.}
any extension of the movement. 39

There was little doubt that there had been signs of disaffection among the troops at Izmir, Edirne, and to a certain extent Erzurum and Erzincan. 40 At Izmir, the army, six divisions strong and under the command of the anti-Unionist Abdullah Pasha, demonstrated in sympathy with the mutineers. 41 On July 6, the Commander of the Damascus Army Corps detained two officers for their involvement in political demonstrations. The officers of the garrison demanded their release, which was at first refused. The garrison then went on strike, adopting such a hostile attitude that the commander was finally forced to release the officers. 42 Additionally, the commanders of one or two isolated battalions on the Anatolian coastline reported that their officers had made the same demands as the Monastir mutineers. 43

ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 9, Mahmut Sevket Pasha resigned his portfolio, stating that it would be more fitting for someone else to enforce the new law concerning political activity within the military. 44 As his resignation was the result of an Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu ultimatum, he was the first to be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation. 45

Mahmut Sevket Pasha's resignation was followed by that of his cousin and brother-in-law, Hadi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, who had replaced Izzet Pasha when the latter went to Yemen. 46 Other high officers were also expected to resign, including Ismail Hakki Pasha, Chief of Provisions. 47

Meanwhile, counter-revolutionaries sent a stream of threatening letters to leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, expressing their designs to assassinate certain Ministers and leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, and at the same time, spread rumours designed to destabilize the Government. In Izmir, hand bills were distributed both among the troops and the civilian population. Müsavat, a monarchist paper there also printed unfounded stories that several Cabinet members, including Mahmut Sevket Pasha, had been assassinated. 48

Said Pasha asked the Minister of the Navy, Hursid Pasha, to take over the Ministry of War as Acting Minister. The latter, however, was of the opinion that the whole Cabinet should resign. Under pressure from Said Pasha, he reluctantly accepted and was appointed pending the selection of a successor. 49 Nazım, Turgut Sevket, Abdullah, Ibrahim, and Tatar Osman Pashas were all considered possible successors, and although Turgut and Nazım Pashas had both refused, monarchist press hoped that Nazım Pasha, who had been holding long talks with the Cabinet, might reconsider. Not wanting to further strain an already delicate situation, the Government clearly hoped to resolve the Ministry question as quickly as possible. There was, however, some hope that the division between those officers who had strictly military grievances, and wanted no more than Mahmut Sevket Pasha’s resignation, and those who had a definite political programme, which included the resignation of the Cabinet, the overthrow of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the dissolution of the existing Chamber of Deputies, might bring about a compromise and save the country from a pronunciamento. 50

When Said Pasha asked Nazım Pasha to take the Ministry of War, the latter had made his acceptance conditional on several points. First, he stated that he would not

vigorously pursue the Monastir rebels; second, he demanded that martial law be lifted and a
general amnesty declared; third, he wanted the creation of a new office, Supreme
Commander, the responsibilities of which would be given to the Minister of War. The
Unionists leadership indicated that whereas they were willing to accept the first two
conditions, they could not accept the third, pointing out that, as stipulated in the
Constitution, only the Sultan himself could be considered Supreme Commander. Nazim
Pasha, however, insisted and was duly passed over as a candidate for the Ministry of
War. 51

Said Pasha then offered the job to Abdullah Pasha, Commander of the Army at
Izmir, who declined the offer on the grounds of competence, leaving the Grand Vezier no
choice but to offer the Ministry to Mahmud Muhtar Pasha. 52 Made on July 16, this offer
would be the Cabinet's last chance to hold its ground. 53 Mahmud Muhtar Pasha predicated
his acceptance on conditions similar to the first two Nazim Pasha had presented, and
though the Committee of Union and Progress agreed, he eventually declined the offer. 54
Nonetheless, that day, the press announced that Mahmud Muhtar Pasha had been named to
the post. The imperial decree confirming the appointment was never issued. 55

The pashas had been acting in collusion all along, and their persistent refusals had
left the Unionist-backed Said Pasha Cabinet in a difficult position. And it was at this critical
juncture that Hursid Pasha, also involved in the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu, fearing that if
Mahmud Muhtar Pasha were forced to accept the post, the Cabinet might be saved and the

51. Hüseyn Cahid Yağıcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24,
52. Hüseyn Cahid Yağıcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24,
54. Hüseyn Cahid Yağıcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24,
1936-April 17, 1937), p.182. M. Ragip, İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi, pp.96-100: Cavid
Bey, "Hatıralar", Tanin, January 14 and 15, 1944; Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, La Turquie, p.159 (All cited in
Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914,
coup crushed. 56 His resignation, however, had the intended effect: despite the advice of Cavid and Talat Beys who refused to succumb to monarchist intimidation, Said Pasha resigned. 57

On July 17, the Said Pasha Cabinet resigned --just two days after it had been given an overwhelming one hundred ninety-four to four vote of confidence. That day both Said Pasha and Asim Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made well-received speeches on both the domestic unrest and its effect on international relations. 58

Although Asim Bey had tendered his resignation four times during the cabinet crisis, Talat Bey had consistently prevented it. When Hursid Pasha finally resigned, leaving both the Ministry of the Navy and of War empty, Said Pasha had told the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress that it would be impossible to carry on. In order to gain time, however, Talat Bey urged Said Pasha to postpone his resignation, and Said Pasha acquiesced, waiting another day before submitting the cabinet's resignation to the Sultan. 59

The previous Hakki Pasha Cabinet had been forced to resign, at the beginning of the war with Italy, owing to popular indignation over its failure to avoid the war or make

58. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, p.107. The letter of resignation was dated July 15, 1912. It was made public with the Takvim-i Vekayi, July 18, 1912. The text of the resignation letter can also be found in Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, pp.536-537.
adequate preparations for it. Said Pasha had filled the gap with a nominally non-party Cabinet, though before long the Committee of Union and Progress had seen fit to strengthen its position by placing some of its leaders in the cabinet. This process of consolidation was then applied to the Chamber, where the elections were carefully designed to secure parliamentary support for the Committee of Union and Progress. From that moment on, the fate of the cabinet was sealed. Internal dissensions within its ranks became acute; the monarchist opposition now had an invaluable rallying cry, while at the same time, dissatisfaction among the military could only grow, inseparable as it was from the Unionist policy of consolidating its power. 60

After Mahmud Sevket Pasha’s resignation, the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu had prepared a proclamation in which they demanded the immediate resignation of the Said Pasha Cabinet, the dissolution of the Chamber, and appointment of Kamil Pasha to the Grand Vezierate. On July 18, the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu gave its proclamation to Hursid Pasha and Nazim Pasha. 61 Hursid Pasha brought it to the attention of the Cabinet. The Cabinet members who were present during the ensuing discussion were Said Pasha, Haci Adil Arda, Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, Minister of Posts, Hayri Bey, Minister of Pious Foundations, and Asim Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Haci Adil Arda and Talat Bey urged Hursid Pasha to use force against the rebellious officers. Hursid Pasha, however, rejected any such plan and recommended that the proclamation be presented to the Sultan. 62 The Cabinet was at an impasse. Said Pasha summoned Nazim Pasha to the Sublime Porte, but Nazim Pasha refused, agreeing with Hursid Pasha that the ultimatum should be immediately referred to the Sultan, something he himself was prepared to do. 63

The Cabinet, however, decided that if the Sultan needed to be informed of the situation, Said Pasha should be the one to do it. Nonetheless, Hursid Pasha took matters into his own hands and went to the Palace. The Sultan then summoned Said Pasha and requested that the Cabinet draft a conciliatory proclamation, addressing the military's grievances. The Cabinet then prepared its proclamation and submitted it for the Sultan's approval. That night, however, Nazim, Hursid, and Hadi Pashas revised the proclamation, deleting, among other things, all references to the punishment of rebellious officers. Seeing the altered text in the newspapers the next day, the Cabinet met and declared that this constituted a serious breach of constitutional rules.

On July 19, the Sultan again offered Tevfik Pasha, the monarchist pasha who had been appointed Grand Vezier during the April, 1909 coup, the helm of the government. In its response to the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu, the government reprimanded the rebellious officers for having interfered in politics. The proclamation announced that the Sultan had consulted the Presidents of both the Chamber and the Senate, and with their consent, had invited Tevfik Pasha to take the post of Grand Vezier. The Sultan added that the new cabinet would be composed of those who had wide experience of matters of State, independent views, and that this cabinet would be free from all outside influences. In essence, this meant the establishment of a conservative government composed mostly of

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64. Letter of Hakki Baha Pars, Unionist deputy for Bursa, to Celal Bayar, Unionist local party member, Istanbul, July 12, 1328/July 25, 1912, reproduced in full in Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2?, pp.523-526. Hursid Pasha claims that he was authorised to see the Sultan and present the military ultimatum ("Hursid Pasa'nin Kabine Hatiralari", Hayat, January 23, 1964, p.5, quoted in Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.534).


old regime pashas with the aim of keeping the Unionists out of power.

Tevfik Pasha's conditions for accepting the Grand Veziership, however, were the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the abolition of the Committee of Union and Progress. Naturally, the Unionists rejected these demands, and Tevfik Pasha was passed over as a nominee for the Grand Veziership. 68

The situation was clearly deadlocked. As forces operating outside established parliamentary rules had forced the Said Pasha Cabinet to resign, it was clear that the monarchist opposition aspired to a totally anti-Unionist Grand Vezier and cabinet. This could only be thoroughly unacceptable to the Committee of Union and Progress and the predominantly anti-monarchist Chamber. 69 The names of Ferid Pasha and Kamil Pasha had also been circulated by the monarchists, but the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress had also successfully resisted their nominations. In the case of Kamil Pasha, Talat Bey had even urged Halid Ziya Usakligil, Secretary to the Sultan, to use his influence with the Sultan to block the nomination, indicating that it might well lead to civil war. 70

DESCRIBED BY ITS ADHERENTS as the "Great Ministry", the new Cabinet was formed on July 21, under the presidency of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha. It included Gabriel Noradunghian, the monarchist senator and now Minister for Foreign Affairs, Avlonyali Mehmed Ferid Pasha, the deposed Grand Vezier of the absolutist regime and now Minister of the Interior, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, ex-Grand Vezier and now Minister of Justice, Nazim Pasha, member of the Council of War and now Minister of War, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, Minister of the Navy, Said Bey, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education and now Minister of Education, Ziya Pasha as Minister of Finance, Damad Serif Pasha, President

68. "Notes of the Week", The Near East, July 26, 1912, p.349.
of the Civil Bureaucracy Section of the Council of State and now Minister of Public Works, Resid Pasha, ex-Ambassador to Vienna, now Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, and Mehmed Fevzi Pasha, deputy for Damascus and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, now Minister of Pious Foundations. Kamil Pasha was named President of the Council of State; Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi was appointed Sheik-ul-Islam.  

Avlonyali Mehmed Ferid Pasha, however, had been named to the Ministry of the Interior without either his prior knowledge or consent, and he immediately declined the position. 72 Ziya Pasha, the new Minister of Finance, was named as his replacement; in turn, Abdurrahman Efendi, a member of the Finance Commission was appointed to the latter's position. 73 However, unable to compromise, Ziya Pasha soon left the Cabinet altogether. 74 Damad Serif Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, was then appointed in his place, but he too resigned shortly afterwards. 75 The Ministry was then entrusted to Danis Bey, an Albanian and former governor of Salonica who, after the Revolution, had been dismissed from office for incompetence. 76 Reluctant to appoint such a dubious character, the Sultan had once again offered the post to Avlonyali Mehmed Ferid Pasha, who had, once again, refused. 77

But by this time, it was clear that the constant ministerial shuffling was the result of concerted monarchist efforts to force Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha from office, in the hopes of replacing him with Kamil Pasha. Ferid Pasha had suggested as much his meetings with

73. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.565.
74. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.565.
75. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.565.
76. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.565.
77. Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.566.
Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha. The move reportedly began with Hoca Said Efendi, the Entente Libérale’s ex-deputy for Üsküb, who, along with several other Albanian politicians, now openly petitioned to the Palace for these demands.

The blatant instability of the new cabinet worried the Committee of Union and Progress. Whereas monarchists called it "The Great Ministry", Tanin described it as the "Cabinet of Revenge", and along with Hak, and, to a lesser degree, Jeune Turc, campaigned against it.

On their part, the monarchists realised that the cabinet, which had come to power without the support either of a parliamentary majority or the Committee of Union and Progress, left the Entente Libérale vulnerable to retaliation --at least as long as it failed to dissolve the Parliament.

THE HALASKARAN ZABITAN GRUBU was a secret military organization formed sometime in 1911. Its aim was not only the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet, but the complete exclusion of the Committee of Union and Progress from political life. The organisation hoped to achieve its ends by threatening the Unionist leadership with nothing short of violence and death. Accordingly, in a letter dated July 24, Halid Ziya Usakligil, the Unionist Secretary to the Sultan, was told to resign within twenty-four hours and return to private life or lose his life.

Halil Mentese, the Unionist President of the Chamber of Deputies received a similar letter, again, dated July 24. Here, the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu expressed dissatisfaction with Mentese for having blocked Kamil Pasha’s appointment to the Grand Vezierate, and demanded the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. If its demands were
not met within forty-eight hours, the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu promised to assassinate Mentese. The latter immediately met with Talat Bey, leader of the Committee of Union and Progress; they decided to take the matter before the Chamber of Deputies.

Halil Mentese presented the letter that following day, and the Chamber reacted energetically. Talat Bey, Seyyid Bey, and Halil Mentese declared that they were prepared to die for the Constitution. Ömer Naci Bey, deputy for Kirk Kilise and a prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, made a moving speech in which he denounced the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu's tactics and aims, and reiterated his and his party's commitment to defend the Revolution and the new constitutional regime against military intervention.

But the most important speech came from Vartkes Serengülyan, the socialist Armenian deputy for Erzurum, who joined in the condemnation, adding that they had eliminated similar charlatans during the pre-revolutionary days and were prepared to do so again. He went on to say that the Chamber could not be dissolved through outside pressure, and he urged his colleagues to turn to the Government for an explanation, at the same time, inviting representatives of the Government to confess that they had gained power with Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu support. Finally, he ended his speech by stating that as long as strong adherents to a parliamentary regime remained, the country would never be ruled by a military dictatorship.

The address was significant in so far as it gave voice to widespread Unionist dissatisfaction with the way the Said Pasha Cabinet had been forced to resign, and publicly

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raised the question of the current military-backed government's legitimacy. Nesim Masliah, a prominent Unionist deputy for Izmir, along with the other Jewish and Armenian Unionist deputies condemned the ultimatum, and demanded that the Government come to the parliamentary regime's defence. 89

Meanwhile, monarchist papers were in an unabashedly festive mood. Not only did they publish the ultimatum in its entirety, they openly gave the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu and its demands their whole-hearted support, urging the Government to obey the rebel officers and dissolve the Chamber. 90

Eventually, Nazim Pasha, the monarchist Minister of War, appeared before the Chamber. He began by saying that the threatening letter was in all probability a bluff, nonetheless, he assured the the Chamber that the culprits would be pursued and punished. 91 Seyyid Bey, deputy for Izmir and leader of the parliamentary group of the Committee of Union and Progress, asked Nazim Pasha what steps he was prepared to take in regard to those newspapers which had publicly endorsed the military organisation's threats. Nazim Pasha avoided the issue by blaming the press' behavior on the public and its hunger for sensational news. 92

Dissatisfied with Nazim Pasha's answers, the Unionist press attacked the monarchist opposition and took it upon itself to discredit the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu. 93

Despite threats against Unionist journalists, _Hak_ printed an editorial by Süleyman Nazif, entitled "Armed Politics", which ridiculed the army’s motto, "The military is the defender of the Constitutional Regime". The editorial went on to say that the army's sole and proper function was to defend the nation against foreign attack, that it had no place in domestic politics, and that the survival of a constitutional regime depended not on the sword, but on the conscience of the citizenry.⁹⁴ The Unionist press also began printing letters which denounced the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu and supported the constitutional regime, sent by loyal officers in such Macedonian towns as Salonica, Ipek, and Senice.⁹⁵

It became clear that the Committee of Union and Progress would do everything in its power, particularly in the Chamber, to resist the newly formed monarchist Cabinet and its wish to dissolve the Chamber.⁹⁶ On their part, the monarchists were looking for a seemingly "legal" way to dissolve the Chamber. Lütfi Fikri Bey, a monarchist ex-deputy for Dersim, who was known for his independent views, came up with one solution: "If each and every deputy were "persuaded" to resign, then the Chamber would be automatically dissolved".⁹⁷ This was clearly impossible.

_GAZI AHMED MUHTAR PASHA_ presented the new government’s programme on July 30. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the new Minister of Justice, asked the Chamber for its unconditional support. Under pressure, the deputies approved the government's programme by a vote of one hundred and thirteen to forty-five that same day.⁹⁸

Armed with an apparent mandate, the Government lost no time in replacing the

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Head of Police, as well as the Chief Military Commander in Istanbul, and state of emergency was promptly lifted. Military and provincial authorities in the Macedonian provinces were also ordered to exercise leniency with regard to Albanian and other rebels still at large. Finally, those rebels currently in detention were amnestyed and immediately set free.

The amnesty drew heavy criticism from the independent daily press in Istanbul, among them Arevelk and Jamanak, two Armenian newspapers. Both attacked the military Government, pointing out that, with few exceptions, it consisted of prominent figures from the old absolutist regime. Jamanak went on to say that if the new Government thought it could solve the current crisis by bringing in Hamidian reactionaries, it was dead wrong. Puzantion, another Armenian daily, denounced the amnesty, saying that it included not only Hamidian spies, conspirators, and other reactionaries who were involved in the uprising, but also corrupt Hamidian bureaucrats and ministers who had been exiled or imprisoned long before.

Dr. Riza Nur, one of the conspirators who had brought about the fall of the constitutional regime, remained in close contact with Albanian nationalist/seperatist leaders. Towards the end of July, a telegram he had sent to Hoca Said Efendi, the monarchist ex-deputy for Üsküb who was organizing the Albanian revolt in Prishtina, was intercepted. In it, he promised the hoca that the Chamber's dissolution was only a matter of time. The text was printed in Tanin.

Local partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress sent telegram after

telegram to the Grand Vezier, urging him not to dissolve the Parliament, and threatening to raise a force of ten thousand volunteers if any move were made in this direction.\(^{104}\) Countless letters and telegrams from concerned citizens of all political convictions throughout the country poured into the Chamber in support of the constitutional regime, denouncing the proclamations and threats of the secret military organization.\(^{105}\)

The military Government, however, had found a "legal" way to dissolve the Chamber by modifying Article 7 of the Constitution which defined the rights of the Sultan. The Cabinet proposed that the article be modified in such a way as to empower the Sultan to dissolve the Chamber under extraordinary circumstances after consultation with the Senate.\(^{106}\) After a stormy debate, the Chamber sent the Government's proposal to the Commission for the Revision of the Constitution. Realising that the Commission would certainly reject its proposal after delaying its reply for as long as possible, the Government turned to the monarchist-dominated Senate, and a special sitting was scheduled for the morning on Sunday, August 4.\(^{107}\)

In response, and in order to test the Unionist strength in the Chamber, eight Unionist deputies --Ziya Bey, deputy for Rize, Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan, deputy for Sinop, Osman Bey, deputy for Serfice, Bedros Haladjian, deputy for Istanbul, Mehmed Münir Cagil, deputy for Corum, Nuri Bey, deputy for Kerbela, Ibrahim Fevzi Efendi, deputy for Mosul, and Talat Bey, deputy for Edirne-- submitted a petition to the Chamber of Deputies on August 4 which criticised both the actions of the Halaskaran Zabitan Grubu and the laxity on the part of Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, and the Government towards the rebel officers. The deputies alleged that Nazim Pasha, far from opening an investigation into counter-revolutionary activity among his officers, had, in fact, invited the Halaskaran

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\(^{104}\) F.O. 424/232, Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey, Constantinople, August 1, 1912, p.86.
\(^{105}\) Celal Bayar, \textit{Ben de Yazdim}, 2, p.548.
Zabitan Grubu members to the Sublime Porte, and congratulated them. The petition also criticised the fact that these officers had complete access to the Chamber without the proper authorities' knowledge or authorization. The deputies demanded that the Ministry of War be held accountable. 108

During the closed Senate session that same day, the Government gave its version of the events in Macedonia. Twenty out of sixty garrisons in Albania, it said, had revolted against government authority and joined the uprising, and coupled with the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress on the whole did not enjoy widespread military support, a resolution to the crisis in Albania clearly called for the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. 109 Mahmud Sevket Pasha, the ex-Minister of War who had been named senator immediately after his forced resignation, questioned the validity of these allegations as well as the government's logic. He pointed out that a majority of the garrisons in Macedonia had remained loyal and had sent telegrams supporting the constitutional regime --both to the Sublime Porte and to Parliament. These troops, he argued, were perfectly capable of maintaining order; the activities of a few mutinous garrisons were clearly no reason to dissolve the Chamber. The monarchist-dominated Senate, however, paid little attention to his arguments, and proceeded to make legal arrangements for the Chamber's dissolution. 110

By a vote of twenty-eight to five, with one undecided, the Senate passed a modified version of Article 35. It then passed an amendment to Article 43 which shortened [check] the parliamentary session to six months, though it could be prolonged for an additional period of time. Because the Senate declared that the present Parliament was a continuation of the Parliament of 1908, making the last elections null and void, and because this

Parliament had been sitting for much more than the proscribed term, the Senate authorised the Government to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.\(^{111}\)

That night, Halil Mentese rushed to the Palace and implored the Sultan not to issue the decree of dissolution, but to no avail. The Imperial Decree was issued at midnight.\(^{112}\)

Hoping to mount a counter-attack, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress decided to convene the Chamber before the official announcement was made. On the morning of August 5, Halil Mentese did not relay the Imperial Decree to the Chamber. Instead, he simply confirmed that such a decree had been issued, allowing the session to continue as if nothing had happened.\(^{113}\) After several Albanian deputies had tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the proceedings, Cavid Bey took the floor and made a highly charged speech, in which he declared that more than the existence of the Chamber was at stake: the rights of the entire nation were under siege.\(^{114}\) After fierce debate, the Chamber gave the Government a vote of no confidence, and adjourned "till summoned by its President".\(^{115}\)

_Gazi_ Ahmed Muhtar Pasha arrived at Parliament at 1 p.m. and read the decree of dissolution to a handful of Senators, a dozen monarchist Albanian deputies, as well as Seyyid Talib ibn Receb Bey, deputy for Basra, and Zeynelabidin Efendi, deputy for Konya. He informed the deputies that the Government would not recognise the morning's proceedings.\(^{116}\) Halil Mentese went to the Palace, where the Sultan refused to see him.

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\(^{111}\) "Constantinople Letter", _The Near East_, August 16, 1912, p.435. Those who voted against were Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, Besarya Efendi, Musa Kazım Efendi, Tilkof Efendi, Ahmed Riza Bey. Mahmud Sevket Pasha was undecided. Some senators had left the Senate in protest during the closed session (Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", _Fikir Hareketleri_, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.246).


\(^{113}\) Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", _Fikir Hareketleri_, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.246.

\(^{114}\) _Tanin_, July 24, 1328/August 6, 1912, in Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", _Fikir Hareketleri_, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.246.


Later, after a scene in the Speaker's room, where Esad Toptan Pasha behaved with such violence that Halil Mentese was forced to summon the police, the Chamber of Deputies was locked up by Ferid Pasha's order and the Cabinet met to discuss the situation.  

Throughout that day, loyalist officers demonstrated in Hürriyet-i Ebediye Tepesi Square. In a proclamation issued that day, they declared their allegiance to the constitutional regime, denounced the rebel officers, and asked for the latter's immediate arrest and trial.

Immediately after the dissolution of the Chamber, the Government re-instituted the state of emergency: organizing demonstrations, giving public speeches, making propaganda on behalf of political parties, meeting in political clubs, and publishing editorials or criticisms of a political nature were forbidden. On August 10, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcìn temporarily closed Tanin, the pro-Unionist daily with one of the largest circulation in the capital. After meeting with the Unionist leadership --which itself had moved back to Salonica from Istanbul-- Yalcìn, however, resumed publication on August 21 with an editorial which, though conciliatory in tone, remained firm in its expressed determination to oppose any event considered detrimental to the country.

Several Greek papers, on the other hand, celebrated the Albanian revolt. One of these, Proini, even welcomed the establishment of an Albanian state. In telegrams sent

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to Pristineli Hasan Bey, Riza Nur reiterated monarchist support for the revolt. These were again intercepted and published in Tanin.\textsuperscript{123}

THERE WERE SIGNS, however, that the cabinet was not as unified as it seemed. Ziya Pasha had resigned as Minister of the Interior because, as he put it, he thought himself unfit for the difficult task of restoring internal tranquillity in the face of the Albanian uprising. But it was also due to the underground opposition of the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{124}

Damad Serif Pasha, who succeeded Ziya Pasha, was something of a nonentity and was considered Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's man. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, in turn, was thought to be in contact with the Unionist leadership. The Indépendant of Salonica confirmed these suspicions by asserting that Hilmi Pasha would be the Unionist nominee for Grand Vezier when the Committee of Union and Progress came back into power.\textsuperscript{125}

Following in Ziya Pasha's footsteps, Damad Serif Pasha demanded a free hand in the appointment and dismissal of governors, sub-governors, and other important provincial officials. Mostly, he wanted the summary dismissal of those governors who had been appointed under the Unionist administration.\textsuperscript{126} The Grand Vezier refused to give him such power, mainly because of Hilmi Pasha's opposition to any such wholesale changes, and Damad Serif Pasha promptly resigned. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha then gave an interview, not to any official organ or monarchist paper, but to Jeune Turc, in which he declared that the Cabinet intended to make no widespread changes and had only accepted the resignation of certain governors who had absolutely refused to obey orders. The monarchist press took up the cudgels for Damad Serif Pasha, saying it was folly to leave the conduct of the next elections in the hands of Unionist officials, whom they accused of gerrymandering the last

\textsuperscript{123} Tanin, July 26, 1328/August 8, 1912, in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatırâlari, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.259.
\textsuperscript{124} "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, August 23, 1912, p.463.
\textsuperscript{125} "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, August 23, 1912, p.463.
\textsuperscript{126} Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatırâlari, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.278.
elections. The Cabinet was increasingly divided between such hard-liners as Kamil and Nazim Pashas and such moderates as Gazi Ahmed Muhtar and Hüseyin Hilmi Pashas, and their differences only worsened. While the Grand Vezier and the Minister of Justice urged a moderate form of repression against the Unionists, the Kamil Pasha clique was clearly out for revenge. The Entente Libérale's distrust of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha increased, particularly as preparations for the next elections were still incomplete. For a time, Hilmi Pasha could ignore recriminations of some of the Cabinet members, but on August 20 [21?] monarchist pressure forced him to finally resign. He was accused by most of the monarchist Ministers in the Cabinet for his continuing contacts with the Committee of Union and Progress. In an interview with Tanin on August 22, he cited the ongoing monarchist press campaign against him and the worsening domestic situation as the reason for his resignation. Upon the resignation of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha the Tanin printed an editorial in which the Government party, the Entente Libérale, was severely criticised for its lack of concern for the country and for its fighting over the spoils, the distribution of bureaucratic posts among their favourites, at a time of national crisis.

Whatever the cause of Hilmi Pasha's resignation, it marked a change in the character of the government which, once supposedly neutral and "above mere party politics", now had a distinctly monarchist bent. A staunch monarchist, Ali Danis Bey --the controversial Albanian ex-governor of Salonica who had been dismissed for incompetence-- was appointed Minister of the Interior. Halim Bey, a moderate monarchist Senator, was appointed Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's successor at the Ministry of Justice, and Ahmed Resid

130. Tanin, August 9, 1328/August 22, 1912, in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.278.
Rey, the ex-governor of Aleppo and ex-editor of the defunct Sahrah --one of the fiercest anti-Unionist organs that was ever suppressed by the Court Martial before the monarchist takeover-- was named governor of Izmir.132

By late August, rumours of further impending resignations had begun to circulate. Supporters of Kamil Pasha asserted that he, along with Nazim Pasha and Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, were annoyed with Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's apparent unwillingness to adopt certain measures were considered indispensable to the restoration of the monarchist regime. Others declared that Mahmud Muhtar Pasha's presence in the Cabinet was the principal cause of dissension.133

Mahmud Muhtar Pasha's position as Minister of the Navy was a difficult one. To begin with, he was an army officer --a fact which only inspired the fleet's hostility. Yet neither did he enjoy the support of his own service: most of his fellow army officers considered him an ambitious but hot-headed officer who had played, none too skillfully, for his own hand in the past, and had at times played the game of the Unionists, who were anathema in most military circles. Monarchists accused him of being in close touch with the Unionist leadership, and drew attention to his recent interview with Talat Bey, lasting for more than an hour, and in which the political situation was discussed with great freedom. Finally, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha had been a member of the Hakki Pasha Cabinet, which most of the supporters of the Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha Cabinet had laboured to impeach.134

THAT YEAR, the annual congress of the Committee of Union and Progress was to be held not in Salonica, but in Istanbul, or if this was not expedient, Bursa. The leadership needed to maintain the Committee's credibility at all costs, and in this case the price was high:

because Istanbul was under martial law, the complete freedom of the proceedings would have to be sacrificed.\textsuperscript{135} By late August, though Cavid Bey was still in Salonica, Talat Bey had returned to the capital.\textsuperscript{136}

Dr. Rifat Bey's frequent trips between Salonica and the capital were also the subject of speculation. He was a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Rumour had it that he was negotiating with Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha in an effort to induce the latter to accept the presidency of the Committee. Hilmi Pasha was supposedly not altogether opposed to the idea, provided the Committee of Union and Progress make certain changes in its programme.\textsuperscript{137}

Despite this activity, the Committee's position with respect to the upcoming elections was a matter of contention, and the leadership hoped the Congress would settle the question before it was too late. There were two different currents of opinion as to the best course to adopt. Cavid Bey and others advocated complete non-participation as a protest to what they considered the Chamber's illegal dissolution; taking part in them would be a condonation of the dissolution of the Parliament. Others favoured an energetic struggle to maintain the Committee's influence. Among the other topics to be discussed were: the principle of decentralisation, which the Committee leadership had always opposed, the possibility of peace with Italy, as well as certain measures affecting the party's internal organization and constitution. Some seventy delegates would attend the Congress, and it was expected to last about a week.\textsuperscript{138}

The Congress opened in Istanbul on September 2. Haci Adil Arda was elected President; Talat Bey and Ahmed Nesimi Bey were made Vice-Presidents.\textsuperscript{139} Despite protest, two police officers were present throughout the proceedings, appointed by the

\textsuperscript{135} Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.294.
\textsuperscript{136} "Salonika Letter", The Near East, September 6, 1912, p.520.
\textsuperscript{137} "Salonika Letter", The Near East, September 6, 1912, p.520.
\textsuperscript{138} "Salonika Letter", The Near East, September 6, 1912, p.520.
\textsuperscript{139} "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, September 13, 1912, p.547.
government in accordance with Article 18 of the Law of Public Meetings --a law which many in the Committee of Union and Progress had helped to pass.\textsuperscript{140} The Central Bureau's report condemned the action of the Senate, whose interpretation of Article 43 was described as "contrary to the spirit of the Constitution", along with the Government which had then carried out the illegal dissolution. On September 4,[Wednesday] sixty-three delegates voted in favour of participating in the elections; fourteen delegates, headed by Dr. Nazim Bey, voted in opposition, claiming that the Committee's participation in the elections could only legitimise the government's actions.\textsuperscript{141}

The Congress ended with the election of Prince Said Halim Pasha of Egypt as Secretary-General for the following year.\textsuperscript{142} The new Central Committee were also elected, and except for Rahmi Evranos, it consisted of the party's leadership --though men such as Suleiman Bostani, Haci Adil Arda, and Hüseyin Kazim Bey, ex-governor of Salonica, who were known for their moderate views now also counted among its members.\textsuperscript{143} The Central Bureau, which was presumably composed of the Central Committee's leaders, featured Talat Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior, Ismail Hakki Bey, ex-governor of Van, Mithad Sükrü Bleda, ex-deputy for Serres, Abdullah Sabri Efendi, and Ziya Bey.\textsuperscript{144}

On the second day of the Congress, September 3, the Government took action and suspended publication of \textit{Tanin}.\textsuperscript{145} The Unionists, however, had already obtained, under different names, permits to establish several new newspapers, and \textit{Tanin}, in effect,
reappeared in the guise of Cenin, allegedly under Cavid Bey's direction. When Cenin was then suppressed, it resurfaced as Senin under the direction of Babanzade Ismail Hakki. On September 5, the Court Martial authorities charged Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, Cavid Bey, and Orhan Talat Bey, the paper's manager, for printing subversive material against government orders. On September 11, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın was sentenced to a month in prison; Cavid Bey and Orhan Talat Bey were each given twenty days and were immediately imprisoned. Senin published the news the following day, and was immediately closed down. Nonetheless, Tanin again resurfaced as Hak on September 13 and published a harsh editorial on the trial and the government's treatment of the defendants.

Ardent supporters of the monarchist Cabinet believed that the imprisonment of Cavid Bey and Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın would terrify the Unionists, paralyse their efforts in the upcoming elections, and discourage public support. The Committee, they said, would be lucky if it had forty deputies in the next Chamber. But the affair had the opposite effect. Far from silent, the anti-monarchist press made the most of what it considered an unfair, trumped-up trial, and the public outcry was so great, that on September 17, Tanin was allowed to resume publication under its own name. As a result of the publicity, large numbers of people visited the imprisoned Unionist leaders which in turn drew the attention of monarchist politicians, among them Lütfi Fikri Bey, who asked that the Martial Law authorities disallow these visits.

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A recent cabinet circular which demanded that municipal council members refrain from any political affiliation also aroused a measure of opposition. Several local councillors refused to comply with the circular, and in Izmir, the problem was compounded by the government’s dismissal of certain officials who were replaced by well-known adherents of the old regime.152 This was the work of Kamil Pasha.

Kamil Pasha’s influence in the Cabinet rivalled the Grand Vezier’s, and it was because of him that Fuad Bey, a member of Kamil Pasha’s family, was named Director of Political Affairs for Izmir. He had held the post during the old regime, had fled the country when the Constitution was proclaimed, and because the Committee considered him reactionary, was excluded from political office during the time Unionists were in power. In Izmir, the Committee of Union and Progress was quite strong; but with the formation of the monarchist Cabinet, the Entente Libérale opened a club and Dr. Riza Tevfik Bölükbası, ex-deputy for Edirne and one of the party’s leaders, came from Istanbul for the inauguration.153

ON SEPTEMBER 30, quoting Osmanischer Lloyd, the official German organ in Istanbul, Tanin announced that the Great Powers had arranged to discuss certain reforms which were to be imposed on the Macedonian provinces. It was also reported that Great Britain was in complete agreement with the scheme. Unionists not only considered this a potential breach of sovereignty, but also a regression to pre-revolutionary days when European Powers had dictated reform measures and the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid had carried these out without resistance. The association was unnerving, to say the least.154

On October 1, the news that the Bulgarian and Serbian armed forces had been put on a state of alert, reached Turkey. Echoing public opinion, the Committee of Union and

152. "Notes From Smyrna", The Near East, September 27, 1912, p.603.
Progress, declared that it would support a war should the Balkan states decide to attack.\textsuperscript{155} The Committee also announced that a demonstration to support Turkish sovereignty and oppose the imposition of any reform scheme of European Powers would be held at Sultan Ahmed Square on October 4.\textsuperscript{156} A large crowd attended. Prominent Unionist politicians -- Talat Bey, ex-deputy for Edime and one of the members of the Central Committee, Hasan Fehmi Tümérkan, ex-deputy for Sinob, Emmanuel Emmanuelidis, ex-deputy for Izmir, Boyaciyan, ex-deputy for Rodosto/Tekfurdağ, Nesim Maslıah, ex-deputy for Izmir, Ömer Naci Bey, ex-deputy for Kirk Kilise-- as well as Celaleddin Arif Bey, representative for the Bar Association, Besarya Efendi, member of the Senate, Übeydullah Efendi, and Yusuf Akcura made highly charged speeches, defending Turkey's territorial integrity as well as the rights of its citizens.\textsuperscript{157}

While public opinion and the Committee of Union and Progress vociferously opposed any submission to the European Powers, the monarchist Government showed itself willing to capitulate to outside pressure, and on October 6, it announced its decision to adopt measures based on those prepared by the European Reform Commission for the re-organization of the Eastern Rumelian Administration which had been created in 1880 according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin. This, however, did nothing to relieve external pressures, and if anything, only worsened the internal situation.\textsuperscript{158}

The following day, students organized a meeting at the university, after which a crowd of several hundred, led by Dr. Nazim Bey, Muhiddin Bey and other Unionists, appeared before the Sublime Porte and called on the Grand Vezier to make an appearance.


\textsuperscript{157} Tanin, September 22, 1328/October 5, 1912, in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.405.

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha asked to meet with a delegation, but the crowd refused. Finally, he appeared with his son, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, and was met with shouts of "Down with the Government!", "We Want no Reforms", "We Want War". Mahmud Muhtar Pasha then spoke. Though based on the agreement of 1880, the reforms, he said, were not identical with those of the Treaty of Berlin --but this was hardly the point, he continued: whatever the case, the Government would not be bullied either by the Balkan states or the riotous students. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha spoke along the same lines, shortly before the arrival of troops put an end to the demonstration.\footnote{159}

Unsatisfied, the population became increasingly uneasy throughout the evening, and in a move to preempt unrest and silence the opposition, the Government proclaimed martial law, and all newspapers were barred from printing any news of the demonstration.\footnote{160} Tanin journalists, Aka Gündüz, Hakki Cemil, Recai Nüzhet, and Ubeydullah Efendi were arrested, and the paper was again closed down on October 12.\footnote{161}

The day after the demonstration, on October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey.\footnote{162} On October 10, Ambassadors of the Great Powers --Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany-- handed a note urging the Turkish Government to start immediately discussing the reform proposals. The Turkish Government replied that it had already accepted the proposal and that it was about to put measures into effect.\footnote{163} On


\footnote{161} Tanin of September 25, 1328/October 8, 1912, printed the government order barring the press to report the demonstration (Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatırları, 1908-1918", \textit{Fikir Hareketleri}, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.406).

\footnote{162} It reappeared under the name of \textit{Cenin} on October 13 (Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatırları, 1908-1918", \textit{Fikir Hareketleri}, 8 (April 24-October 16, 1937), p.5).

October 14, however, the Bulgarian Government gave a note to Turkey demanding full autonomy for the Macedonian provinces, the appointment of either Belgian or Swiss governors, and the creation of an independent gendarmerie. On October 15, Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, and two days later declared war on both Bulgaria and Serbia. Greece declared war on Turkey that same day.

THOUGH THE WAR overshadowed the domestic political crisis, it also made it easier for the monarchist government to take further action against the Unionists. On October 26, [?] the governor of Istanbul was dismissed and Cemil Topuzlu, son-in-law of Cemaleddin Efendi, was appointed in his place; other important functionaries in the state bureaucracy were also replaced. Rumours that Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha would step down, to be succeeded by Kamil Pasha, began to circulate, and on October 29, this became a reality. By this time, Tanin, as Senin, had been again closed down, only to reappear as Hak on the 30th. In an editorial of that day, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın severely criticised the change of Government at such a critical moment, and as everyone knew that Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha had no intention of resigning, he blamed Kamil Pasha's ambition for such a change. The government responded by suppressing several more anti-monarchist papers which had joined in Tanin's condemnation. The liberal Egyptian press also criticised Kamil

169. Hak, October 17, 1328/October 30, 1912, printed in full in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatıraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 8 (April 24-October 16, 1937), pp.53-54; and, "Constantinople Letter", The Near East, November 8, 1912, p.3.
Pasha's appointment, and Al Alam was suppressed for its attacks. The new Grand Vezier immediately announced that the general elections would be postponed indefinitely due to domestic and foreign conditions.

Monarchists celebrated Kamil Pasha's long-awaited rise to power, feeling that he would restore confidence in a solution to Turkey's problems which would be compatible with the dignity of the Empire. Because he had friendly ties with Great Britain, monarchists felt that in case of need, Great Britain would surely come to Turkey's rescue. In addition, the British were sure to be pleased with the appointment of Ahmed Resid Rey as Minister of the Interior. After the military coup of July, 1912, Ahmed Resid Rey had been appointed Governor of Izmir, to the full satisfaction of both the monarchists and the British colony.

The battle of Lüleburgaz began on October 29, and ended two days later with a complete Turkish defeat. Though Turkish troops rallied at various points in an effort to delay the Bulgarian advance, by early November, they had been defeated from Corlu to Istranca. Ipek fell to the Montenegrins, and Prisrend to the Serbians; the fall of Rodosto/Tekfurday to the Bulgarians seemed imminent. The Greeks continued their advance on Salonica, their intention being to isolate the city rather than make a direct attack. And while the Serbian armies were closing in on Monastir, also advancing towards Salonica, King Peter entered Üsküb in triumph, restoring the ancient capital of the Serbs which had been lost some five hundred years before.

Following the Turkish defeat at Kirk Kilise, there were two or three days of official
silence during which Nazim Pasha went to the front and took command. The next official communiqué spoke of fighting on a line between Lüleburgaz and Vize, and the public realised that the Turkish forces had been pushed back half way to the capital. 176

Another communiqué, issued in Istanbul on November 3, warned that a nation at war could but await its end with patience and courage, and submit with resignation to all its consequences. It went on to announce that while Turkish troops were "successfully holding their own in the Scutari and Janina districts, the Eastern Army in the Lüleburgaz and Vize districts had found itself obliged to retire on the Catalca lines of defence, in order to enable it to offer a successful resistance." 177

That day, the Turkish government instructed its Ambassadors to request that the Powers intervene towards the immediate cessation of hostilities. 178 The Powers replied that neutrality forbade them to intervene, but that they were ready to offer their mediation should the Turkish Government place itself unreservedly in their hands. 179 The monarchist Government [on November 3 or 4] at once showed a due appreciation of the position of the Powers, by following up its first application by an appeal "for the collective mediation of the Great Powers, with a view to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the settlement of the conditions of peace". 180 This was tantamount to unconditional surrender. By placing itself unreservedly in the hands of the Great Powers, the monarchist Kamil Pasha Cabinet effectively conceded defeat, and as surely as if it had surrendered directly, opened itself up to the demands of the Balkan states. 181

At this point, the army declared itself opposed to any ceasefire which might even

177. "Notes of the Week", The Near East, November 8, 1912, p.1. For the text of the Government communication, which was published in the October 22, 1328/November 4, 1912 issues of newspapers, see Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hâtîraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Harakâtleri, 8 (April 24-October 16, 1937), p.55.
have vaguely resembled an unconditional surrender. Kamil Pasha convened a meeting of generals at the Sublime Porte. The generals expressed themselves in favour of resistance, and were supported by Nazim Pasha and a large number of field officers. The Government suddenly changed its position and declared that it would exhaust all military means before yielding to the mediation of the Powers --news which the Committee of Union and Progress welcomed. The German and Austrian Ambassadors and military advisors at Istanbul had also strongly urged resistance.

This decided, Edirne contrived to hold out for another week. Turkish forces offered fierce resistance, keeping the besieging Bulgarian forces at a respectful distance and inflicting heavy losses. Rodosto/Tekfurdayi did not fall into Bulgarian hands until November 10.

By November 7, the Greek army had advanced within striking distance of Salonica. That evening, the commandant and a representative of the commander of the Turkish army, together with the Consuls-General, discussed proposals for the capitulation of the port and its garrison. The Turkish army was given until the following morning to accept the Greek conditions, and when after further talks no reply was forthcoming, the Greeks advanced. As they drew near the Turkish outposts, however, a letter arrived from the Turkish commander accepting the conditions; the Greeks duly took possession of the city, and on November 9, a Bulgarian division arrived, along with a Serbian regiment. The fate of Salonica would form part of the general settlement after the war, and indications favoured its establishment as an international port.

IN THE NOVEMBER 9 ISSUE OF TANIN, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın stated that the Unionists

184. "Notes of the Week", The Near East, November 15, 1912, p.34.
185. "Notes of the Week", The Near East, November 15, 1912, p.34.
wanted Mahmud Sevket Pasha appointed Commander-General of the Armed Forces.  

_Tanin_ was closed down upon the publication of this editorial, and its appearance under any other name was banned. Yalcin argued that the revocation of newspaper licences was unlawful; the government's reply stated that the law no longer applied.

On November 12, the Kamil Pasha Cabinet decided to ask its enemies for their terms of peace. The guns ceased to boom along the Catalca lines, an armistice was proclaimed, and plenipotentiaries were appointed to discuss the terms under which the Balkan states were prepared to ratify peace.

The first meeting of the Bulgarian and Turkish plenipotentiaries took place on November 25, and a neutral zone between the two armies along the Catalca lines was established. Two days later, the delegates met again, and approached the question of the conditions on which an armistice would be granted and accepted. The Turkish Government was extremely reluctant to recognise even the accomplished fact in Thrace, at least in regard to Edirne, which still held out against the Balkan forces.

Apart from Edirne, Scutari too had successfully resisted the Balkan forces, so much so that the Montenegrins had been obliged to enlist the help of Serbian artillery. A decisive attack on Tarabosh was expected any day, though Esad Pasha, the commander of the garrison, was confident his power could hold out indefinitely.

The fall of Monastir which took the life, among others, Fethi Pasha, the Commander of the Seventh Army Corps, and the successful torpedo attack on the Hamidiye by Bulgarian torpedo boats were the chief military events of mid-November. At Catalca, [during November 15-23] a meeting was arranged between a Turkish officer and

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188. "Why the Young Turks Failed", _The Near East_, November 22, 1912, p.77.
representatives of the allied Balkan armies. The meeting took place, but the Turkish command considered the Balkan terms for armistice too severe, and further negotiations seemed impossible. 192

The government, however, was once again willing to accept the conditions of the Balkan states on any terms, though the pro-monarchist Ikdam of November 21 stated that the Government considered the latest Bulgarian demands less than acceptable. 193 A few days later, however, the November 27 issue of Ikdam announced a ceasefire and the beginning of negotiations, and the monarchist press began advocating peace at all costs. 194 In an Ikdam editorial of November 28, Mizanci Murad Bey wrote that Turks had to realise that from now on the nation would have to live under the protection of a European power. 195

It was during this time, between November 15 and 23, that the Kamil Pasha Cabinet ordered the arrests of leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress. 196 Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, however, had already left Istanbul for Vienna by sea via Romania on November 12, after the closure of Tanin by the Government, and thus escaped arrest. 197 Cavid Bey and Babanzade Ismail Hakki Bey also escaped arrest thanks to telephone operators who had intercepted the government's orders. 198 Talat Bey also managed to escape. 199 But Ismail Canbolat, Emmanuel Carasso, Ahmed Agaoglu,

199. The order for Talat Bey's arrest was published in the Ikdam, November 1, 1328/November 14, 1912 (Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Mesrutiyet Hatiraları, 1908-1918", Fikir Hareketleri, 8 (April 24-
Necmeddin Molla, Bedros Haladjian, Müstak Bey, Muhiddin Bey, manager of Tanin, Faik Kaltakkiran, ex-deputy for Edirne, Riza Pasha, ex-deputy for Afyon, Süleyman Nazif Bey, ex-governor of Trabzon, Hüseyin Kazim Bey, one of the editors of Tercüman-i Hakikat, Aka Gündüz, Hatipoglu Ubeydullah Efendi, Cemil Bey, a Tanin journalist, and many others were arrested. Aka Gündüz was sentenced to seven years’ detention in a fortress; Hatipoglu Ubeydullah Efendi and Cemil Bey, were both sentenced to five years’ detention in a fortress — all on account of their participation in the student demonstration at the Sublime Porte on October 7. Although the authorities claimed they had discovered a plot against the Government, this move was clearly motivated by the desire to crush the Unionist opposition. The following week saw further arrests, and these continued through the first week of December.

Bowing to opposition and resistance, however, Nazim Pasha and Kamil Pasha were forced to dismiss the current Court Martial, appointing a new one composed of officers with a reputation for fairness and integrity. All prisoners were subsequently released.

Serif Pasha, the monarchist who was living in exile in Paris and the owner of the anti-Unionist Mesrutiyet and other monarchist journals, returned to Istanbul in early December, as well as other members of the monarchist Liberal Union.
ON DECEMBER 6, Ikdam announced the signing of the armistice. The peace conference was to be held in London later that month. It was generally believed that the monarchist Kamil Pasha Government would admit Greece to the negotiations without insisting on an armistice, and would then raise the question of the re-supplying besieged fortresses. Just as it was unlikely that the Bulgarians would consent to the re-supplying of Edirne—which, according to well-informed sources, had to capitulate from lack of provisions in six weeks' time—it was improbable that the Greeks would likewise strengthen Janina, which had proved a hard nut to crack, and had been bolstered by remnants of Zeki Pasha's forces. Edirne, the Albanian frontiers, and the Aegean islands, would all be sources of difficulty and danger during the conference.

Though there were three meetings during the last week of December, it was not until New Year's Day that negotiations took serious form. On December 28, at their first meeting after the Christmas adjournment, Turkish delegates presented their counter-proposals to the Allied terms. Balkan demands were thoroughly ignored; instead, Turkey proposed that the province of Edirne remain under the full sovereignty and direct administration of the Turkish government, that Macedonia become an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of Turkey, that Albania be constituted an autonomous province under a prince of the Ottoman Imperial House, and that the Aegean islands be retained by Turkey. Crete, it was argued, had been entrusted to the Protecting Powers, and was, therefore, outside the scope of the negotiations. The Allies refused to discuss these proposals, and the Turkish delegates were left to seek further instructions from Istanbul.

When the Conference met again on December 30, the Turkish delegation explained that it had been unable to entirely decipher the telegram it had received from the

government, but that it was prepared to continue the negotiations on such points as were clear in the telegraphic instructions. As the Balkan delegates were expecting this, they had decided to authorise Dr. Daneff, a Bulgarian delegate, to attend the conference on their behalf in order to decline to discuss the Turkish side's fragmentary instructions at that time. Resid Pasha's communication was understood to include a vague allusion to the cession of parts of Macedonia and a proposal to refer certain points at issue to the mediation of the Great Powers. Dr. Daneff requested that Turkey submit the whole of its proposals in writing by January 1. 209

When the delegates next met, Turkey's proposals were spelled out as follows: first, all occupied territories to the west of the province of Edirne would be ceded, but the determination of the boundaries and status of autonomous Albania would be submitted to the decision of the Great Powers; second, the province of Edirne would remain in direct possession of Turkey, though Turkey and Bulgaria would negotiate any necessary rectification of their frontier; third, though Turkey would not cede any of the Aegean islands, it was prepared to discuss any related questions with the Great Powers; fourth, Turkey was disposed to consent to any resolution put forth by the Great Powers concerning Crete; and, fifth, the points mentioned above would be considered an indivisible whole. 210

Following some deliberations, Venizelos, the President of the conference for the day, read the Allied response. First, the Allies would accept territories situated to the west of the province of Edirne under the express condition that this cession would apply not only to occupied territory, but also to territory not yet completely occupied. As regards Albania, the Allies maintained their former proposal. Second, the Turkish proposal regarding the province of Edirne itself was unacceptable, as it implied separate agreements, and, moreover, did not grant the territory demanded. The Turkish propositions concerning

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the Aegean islands and Crete were also unacceptable; the Allies reiterated their former demands as regards the cession of the islands and the abdication of all Turkish rights in Crete. 211

With the prospects of a settlement somewhat improved, the conference adjourned until January 3. But because the delicate issue of Edirne remained at the centre of further negotiations, the road ahead promised to be difficult. Neither the Bulgarians nor the Turks would not be denied its possession. The issue was also symbolically charged for Turkey, as Edirne had once been the capital of the Empire. The monarchist demand for Great Power mediation, however, indicated that the Kamil Pasha Government was willing to compromise. Clearly, the government hoped to lessen the blow to Turkey, and European insistence would correspond more adequately with Kamil Pasha's conception of force majeure than would the demands of the Balkan states. That the Powers would contemplate a modification of the Allies' demands in regard to Edirne could hardly be expected, but Turkish demands, it was suggested, might be met halfway by arrangements which would leave the mosques of the city under Turkish administration and under extra-territorial guarantees. 212

BY THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY, 1913, rumours of another cabinet change had begun to circulate. Many felt that Kamil Pasha would soon retire, making way for Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and a coalition cabinet, and the fact that Nazim Pasha had recently offered Mahmud Sevket Pasha a post in what he termed a "reconstructed" cabinet only seemed to confirm this view. Mahmud Sevket Pasha refused, but the fact that the offer had been made was significant; Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and Mahmud Sevket Pasha had been on extremely friendly terms for years, and many felt that, should the former return to office, he would no doubt extend the offer again. On his part, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, however, was not

expected to accept office immediately. The ex-Grand Vezier and ex-Inspector-General of Macedonia enjoyed a reputation for shrewdness, and he would hardly want to take office before the settlement of the peace negotiations. Whatever the outcome, the settlement could not but end unfavourably for Turkey, and the public was likely to make any government that signed peace a scapegoat for the sins of its predecessors. It was, therefore, probable that Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha would wait, sounding out the Committee of Union and progress through Cavid Bey in Vienna, and assessing the feeling of the military through his friend Mahmud Sevket Pasha. 213

At this juncture, the Unionists tried to exploit differences of opinion among current cabinet members, especially those between Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, who had wanted to continue the war, and Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vezier, who had wanted peace at all costs. Public news of the rift first appeared in Ikdam on December 29. The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress tried to win Nazim Pasha over to its side by showing itself strongly in favour of defending Turkish interests in the Balkans. 214 Shortly after, Talat Bey reportedly began negotiations with Nazim Pasha on the issue for a change in the cabinet and in the policy towards conducting the peace negotiations. 215 These negotiations did not long remain confidential; rumours that Nazim Pasha was leaning towards the Unionist position began to spread. In a letter to Ikdam, however, Nazim Pasha denied these rumours and stated that he was not involved with any political party. 216 With continued reports of dissenison within the cabinet, the government banned all news on such issues, and on January 16, Tasvir-i Efsar was closed down. 217 Yunus Nadi

Abalioglu, the editor-in-chief, and two of his editorial staff members were put under investigation, along with several other journalists. 218

As neither side had shown any willingness to compromise, the peace negotiations remained suspended throughout mid-January. In the meantime, the Great Powers drew up a Collective Note, which was forwarded to their ambassadors in Istanbul for presentation to the Turkish Government. The Note urged Turkey to surrender Edirne and to leave the question of the Aegean islands to the Powers. 219 According to the Turkish press, which was fairly well informed on the subject, the Powers, after calling attention to Turkey's need for foreign capital in the development of its Asiatic provinces, pointed out that foreign financial support could not be expected until the war was over. Though the Note urged the government to yield Edirne, the Powers promised to take all the necessary steps to obtain concessions from the Bulgarians concerning the mosques, pious foundations, and other religious and historical monuments of the old capital. 220 Kamil Pasha decided to convene a consultative assembly, ostensibly with a view to divest himself of the responsibility for the decision to surrender Edirne or to renew the war. 221

The Government did not feel politically strong enough to reply to the note without consultation. Though Kamil Pasha and a good number of his ministers supported peace at any price, there was also public opinion to reckon with, not to mention the Committee of Union and Progress, which was against signing of an unjust peace. The consultative assembly consisted of members from the Senate, ulema, Ministry of War, Ministry of Justice, Council of State, Ministry of the Navy, as well as a number of other high ranking

221. "Notes of the Week", The Near East, January 17, 1913, p.293.
administrators. The Sultan approved Kamil Pasha's decision to convene such an assembly, and it was publicly announced on January 22, the day of its first meeting.\footnote{222}{I DAM, January 9, 1328/January 22, 1913, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalcın, "Mesrutiyet Hatiralari, 1908-1918", \textit{Fikir Harekeelleri}, 8 (April 24-October 16, 1937), p.119.}

The decision to convene a consultative assembly was an indication of the gravity of the situation. Little doubt was entertained of the leanings towards peace at any cost of Kamil Pasha himself and of the rest of his monarchist Cabinet, but those who were in favour of continuing the war could count on the support of the great bulk of the army officers and the Committee of Union and Progress, which had not ceased to be a factor in the political life of the capital despite constant harrassment and the resulting imprisonment of some of its leadership. Many felt that a renewal of hostilities was inevitable.\footnote{223}{"Notes of the Week", \textit{The Near East}, January 17, 1913, p.293.}
The Committee of Union and Progress and the military were determined to prove that the Turkish army could make a better stand than it had at Luleburgaz and Kumanovo. Kamil Pasha, however, desired peace, and, were it left to himself, would have yielded to the demands of the Balkan states.\footnote{224}{"Constantinople Letter", \textit{The Near East}, January 17, 1913, p.295.}

If the assembly provided Kamil Pasha with a visible scapegoat should anything go wrong, it certainly had no real power, and the government lost little time in formulating its response to the note. Though the military was prepared to renew hostilities, it recognised that without adequate financial support it would be impossible to wage an effective campaign, and it agreed to support the cabinet's decision to accept the Powers' advice. Then, on January 22, the Grand Council of the Empire, the consultative assembly, met in closed session. Kamil Pasha presented the facts, and supported by Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, Gabriel Nouradunghian, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Finance, argued that the war could not be continued with any prospect of success. When the meeting came to an end after four hours of deliberations, the Council was overwhelmingly in favour of accepting the government's point of view. That evening, a statement was issued to the
effect that the Council, "trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Great Powers, left to the patriotic hands of a loyal Cabinet the task of working with the effective support which had been promised by the Great Powers for the future prosperity of the country and for the assurance of its vital financial interests". This was tantamount to accepting total defeat and surrendering unconditionally to the demands of the Balkan states.

The unmistakable movement among officers in favour of the continuation of the war was invested with all the importance of a plot, and arrests followed. It was also in mid-January that the monarchists announced their intention of making amendments to the Constitution after the war was over. In a declaration made to the editor of the monarchist Sabah, the Sultan pointed out that "the constant changes of Cabinet which had accompanied the introduction of parliamentary government into Turkey had been a grave hindrance to progress and reform". "In the future", he said, "some means must be devised of preventing the frequent changes and reversals of policy which had marked the era of parliamentarism in Turkey". It was clear that these means could only be found in the removal of parliamentary control over the executive branch.

ON JANUARY 23, the day following the Grand Council's acquiescence in the Cabinet's proposal to make the Collective Note of the Powers the basis of peace, a small company of mounted officers headed by Cemal Bey, Governor of Adana, rode into the Sublime Porte. Their arrival was the signal for a concerted rush on the part of various groups that had been waiting close by. Enver Bey and Halil Mentese appeared, and, with Cemal Bey, they entered the Porte and asked to see the Grand Vezier. They were followed by Talat Bey, Ömer Naci Bey, and Midhat Sükrü Bleda, and other leaders of the Committee of Union and

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Progress. Nazim Pasha came out of the Council Chamber and was at once shot by a member of the advancing group. His aide-de-camp was also killed, while Nazif Bey, aide-de-camp to the Grand Vezier, after shooting down Nazim Pasha's assassin, was the third victim. Enver Bey, according to one account, then entered the Council Chamber and informed Kamil Pasha that he must either resign or swear to continue the war. The Grand Vezier chose the former course, and, armed with his resignation, the Unionists proceeded to the Palace, where they secured the Sultan's assent to the appointment of Mahmud Sevket Pasha as Grand Vezier. 228

A new Cabinet was formed the same day. It included Prince Said Halim Pasha, President of the Council of State, who also took over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Haci Adil Arda, Minister of the Interior; and, Rifat Bey, Minister of Finance. 229

One of the first measures of the new Government was to place the Ministers of Kamil Pasha's Cabinet under arrest, while numerous other arrests were made during the following days. 230 Abdurrahman Bey, Minister of Finance, and Resid Rey, Minister of the Interior, were confined in prison. 231

The houses of Kamil Pasha and Cemaleddin Efendi, the Sheik-ul-Islam in the Kamil Pasha Cabinet, were surrounded by secret service agents and gendarmes, and all communications addressed to Kamil Pasha were opened. 232

The monarchist press was suppressed by the new Government and ceased publication. 233

The government's next step was to give publicity to the determination not to surrender under any consideration Edirne and the Aegean islands. 234 On January 30 the

Porte presented to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador its reply to the Collective Note of the Powers. The document was couched in moderate terms. The Turkish Government stipulated for the retention of the city of Edirne, and proposed to leave to the Powers the disposal of the land on the right bank of the Maritza. The maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over the Aegean islands was insisted upon, but the question of administration was left to the Powers.²³⁵ The note differed from the one prepared by the Kamil Pasha Cabinet in its demands for economic liberty.²³⁶

PART II
Chapter 15

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN 1922:
LIBERAL RESISTANCE TO THE POLITICAL AMBITIONS OF ATATÜRK

Usually, the political struggles of early twenties are taken to be nothing more than clashes between personalities having little to do with fundamental policy issues. I will argue that these clashes were not the result of personal animosities, but rather stemmed from radically different world views concerning the economic and political future of Turkey. The liberal opposition to Atatürk, therefore, not only had a program, it had one which was diametrically opposed to the Kemalist agenda.

This chapter will tell the story of the formation of the liberal opposition to the Kemalist government from early 1922 onwards, keeping in mind that it is only with a proper assessment of the political struggles of the twenties that we can truly understand the reactionary nature of Kemalist economic and social policy.

By treating the events of the twenties as a reaction to 1908 Revolution, I hope to shed some light not only on the twenties as a whole, but also on the events of the following decade, the so-called etatist era.

For Turkey, the First World War ended not in 1918 but in 1922. Defeated, Turkey had surrendered to the Allied Powers in October 1918, but would not regain territorial integrity until 1923. Beginning in the spring of 1919, Greek forces would occupy the western part of the country, and this would be the main source continued military activity. From May 1920 to September 1922 the Turkish provisional government at Ankara would fight to gain
control of these and other occupied territories in the east and the southeast, both with Greece and the collaborationist government at Istanbul which had signed them away with the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Finally, in the summer of 1922, the withdrawal of British support for the Greek occupation left the Greeks with no choice but to leave western Anatolia in the hands of the provisional government of Ankara.

STILL IN EXILE IN EUROPE, Cavid Bey met on March 11 with Kara Kemal Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın and Ismail Canbulat about the political situation in general and the future of the Committee of Union and Progress in particular. They decided that, for the moment, no one was authorised to speak in the name of the Party since it had been officially disbanded after the Armistice of Mudros in 1918. Furthermore, they agreed that since no official party existed, they would have to wait to organise the party and call for a congress in which they would set the principles as well as the political strategy. They decided that this congress should convene either before or immediately after peace. Kara Kemal Bey had already talked with other leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was charged with talking with other politicians in Istanbul and Ankara.¹ During their discussion on constitutional matters, they decided that the liberal Constitution that had been instituted after the Revolution of 1908 was to be favoured instead of the Basic Law that the Assembly in Ankara had legislated in 1920. While Cavid Bey expressed the view that Senate should be preserved, other members of the leadership said it was a side issue that could be dealt with later.²

During their discussion about membership to the Committee of Union and Progress, there was a considerable divergence of opinion as to the status of Atatürk. Kara Kemal Bey expressed the view that since Atatürk, who had a reputation for being strong,

was already leading the struggle in Ankara, he could be offered to be the new leader of the Committee of Union and Progress. He also expressed his belief that this invitation would be welcome by the public. The Unionist leadership agreed that since the country needed a strong leadership, the choice of Atatürk to lead the Committee of Union and Progress was an excellent one. They were, however, not sure whether Atatürk would be willing to accept. In particular, Cavid Bey, who knew that Atatürk's political philosophy as well as his style was fundamentally different from that of the former Unionist leader Talat Pasha, was not at all sure that this offer would be welcomed by Atatürk.³

Cavid Bey's opinion was based on previous experience. During the Fall of 1921, after Yalcin's and others' freedom from internment at Malta, exiled Unionist leaders in Europe had expressed their readiness to return to Anatolia to join the resistance movement. However, fearing from Unionists' strength within the country, Atatürk refused to accept them; he did not want any of the top leadership to join him in Ankara lest he himself might lose complete control over the political process. Therefore, the Unionist leadership had been forced to continue living in exile.⁴

Leaving this question aside, Kara Kemal Bey said that their party organisation in Istanbul remained intact; in other places, they had to reorganise. Since they decided that working underground in Ankara and elsewhere in the country would not be a good idea, they decided that they would make the offer to Atatürk to lead the Committee of Union and Progress, and if he refused, they decided to inform him that they were going to go ahead with their plan of reviving the party themselves.⁵

By mid-May, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, the former Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, held talks with the Kemalist government in Ankara and returned to

Istanbul with an agreement signed by the Kemalist leadership. By the terms of this agreement, it was understood that the Unionist leadership, with the exception of Enver Pasha, who was in Turkestan, and Cemal Pasha, who was busy organising an Afghan resistance, was allowed to return to Anatolia, provided that they abstained from opposition to Atatürk. The general impression was that such an agreement was a sign that Atatürk's position was weakening.  

The fact that Atatürk and other Kemalists were opposed to any Unionist involvement with the reconstruction of new Turkey was evident by their attempts to keep Unionists from holding any public office. One such case involved Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin.

Although he had been interned at Malta, Yalcin had formally continued to sit on the board of the Public Debt Administration as the Turkish delegate. His term of office, however, ran out in April of 1922 when new elections would take place. Contacting with his colleagues at the Ottoman Bank, Cavid Bey succeeded in creating a favourable climate for Yalcin's reelection. As soon as Yalcin's likely reelected became known, however, the Kemalist government took steps to prevent it. During early May, Atatürk informed the Ottoman Bank and the Public Debt Administration that in the event of Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin's election to its board, he would strongly protest this move. In order not to fall from the good graces of the Kemalist government, the board did not re-elect Yalcin. Immediately reacting to this Kemalist manoeuvre to keep him out of office, Yalcin sent a letter on May 8 to Atatürk demanding an explanation concerning his motives.

On May 11, news reached to Cavid Bey that he had been elected to the board of directors of the Public Debt Administration. This seemed to be due to the fact that his candidacy had been kept secret up until the last minute in order not to attract the attention of  

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the Kemalist government and prevent a similar protest.\footnote{Mehmed Cavid, "Felaket Günleri: Müttareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi: 286", \textit{Tanin}, November 21, 1946, p.6.}

AS 1922 PROGRESSED, Atatürk's popularity gradually eroded, and the liberal/Unionist forces began to gain their former popularity. Having dominated Turkish political life for a decade, the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress constituted by far the greatest organised threat to Atatürk's ambitions. Though they were only partially represented on the floor of the Assembly, they had an experienced and vocal leadership outside the Assembly which included Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor of \textit{Tanin}, the most influential daily of the time, Cavid Bey, former Minister of Finance, Kara Kemal Bey, ex-Minister of Provisions during the First World War, Rahmi Evrenos, former Governor of Aydın, and Midhat Sükrü Bleda, who had been Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress.\footnote{Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.25.}

With the war effectively over, internal differences on policy matters came to the fore. In the Assembly, the opposition had joined forces with the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress along with several influential liberal figures who had been detained by the British on the island of Malta until November 1921. By July 1922, the "Second Group" in the Assembly had been formed to carry on a formal and active opposition to the policies of Atatürk.\footnote{Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, pp.21-22.}

IN GENERAL, the army continued to be the main source of support for the Nationalist/Kemalist movement. But even here, opposition began to emerge. There was a very real current of opposition to the regime of Atatürk among important and influential generals of the military. Although personal ambition and political differences were kept at a
minimum during the course of the resistance against the Greek forces in western Anatolia between 1919 and 1922, professional jealousy could not be controlled. Having seen Atatürk's mediocre and younger proteges promoted at their expense, many of the ablest and older high ranking officers had grown disgruntled. Furthermore, several prominent generals were genuinely disgusted with Atatürk's political ambitions.  

Among the high-ranking pashas who had become critical of Atatürk's tactics and the way he handled the army were Ali Ihsan Sabis, Kazim Karabekir, Refet Bele, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, and Nureddin Pashas. This was especially noticeable in the case of Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, Commander of the First Army on the western front, who was subordinate to Ismet Inönü Pasha.  

Another military figure, Rauf Orbay, a naval captain with Unionist sympathies highly respected by military and civilians alike, was also critical of Atatürk's methods. Elected to the last Chamber of Deputies, he had been arrested by the British in March 1920, and sent to Malta along with a number of other prominent Unionists and nationalists. Released in November 1921, he returned immediately to Ankara where he joined the Assembly as deputy for Sivas and entered the provisional government as Minister of Public Works. Subsequently, he was elected Vice-President on March 1. Because he favoured the establishment of a constitutional democracy, he was in essential conflict with the authoritarian proclivities of Atatürk.

Disappointment in military affairs was not only confined to leading generals of the
country. Deputies in the Assembly were also concerned with the state of the military and charges of incompetence in the Kemalist military leadership. In December 1921, opposition deputies had expressed their intention of establishing a war council so as to closely examine the military situation. Vasif Karakol, deputy for Sivas, lobbied for this motion in the Assembly while Rauf Orbay, Minister of Public Works, did the same in the cabinet.  

Refet Bele Pasha, Minister of Defence, Hasan Saka, Minister of Finance, and Riza Nur, Minister of Health, also supported the move. On the other hand, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers and Chief of the General Staff, Celal Bayar, Minister of the Economy, and Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver, Minister of Education, argued that there was no need for such a council.

At the December 27, 1921 closed sitting of the Assembly, deputies started debating on the motion for the formation of a war council to investigate charges of abuses of power, mismanagement of army funds, and other questions related to the military. A joint Assembly committee composed of the Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs Committees had already discussed the issue and decided to advise the Assembly that a war council be formed. Having decided that it was imperative for the war council to be immune from both the interference of the military authorities and the council of ministers, the joint committee advised that all ten of the council's members be elected by, and report directly to the Assembly. The proposal stated that President of the Assembly, Atatürk, would sit as the council's extraordinary chairman.

As soon as the debate began, it became quite clear that opposition deputies who had complained about the mismanagement of military affairs and demanded the establishment of a war council were in no mood to be tricked by the changes made in their original proposal. Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu], opposition deputy for Bitlis, criticised the amended version since it

did not address the real issue.\textsuperscript{21}

The real issue was, of course, to curb the powers of Atatürk and put him under Assembly control via the War Council. This proposal, however, had subverted the real purpose of the motion by making Atatürk the head of the Council.\textsuperscript{22} Throughout the debate that continued from December 31, 1921 to January 7, 1922, opposition deputies, among whom Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, and Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, were the most articulate, objected to the new version of the proposal, stating that it violated the Constitution as it gave the War Council sweeping powers and set its authority above and beyond the Council of Ministers. In quite explicit language, Hüseyin Avni Ulas and Mehmed Vehbi Celik, deputy for Konya, warned the Assembly that this might lead to military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{23}

At the January 7 closed sitting of the Assembly, during which Rauf Orbay handed in his resignation in protest of Kemalist manoeuvres, deputies discussed military issues.\textsuperscript{24} At the January 9 closed sitting, the problem inevitably revolved around Atatürk’s usurpation of power. Deputies complained that offices of both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of General Staff were in Ankara, and, consequently, were far away from the front. This situation, the deputies argued, had caused inadequate supervision of the troops with the result that the army was in worse shape than it had previously been. Deputies pointed out that the cause of this pitiful state of affairs had to be sought in Atatürk’s insistence of keeping both the post of the Commander-in-Chief and the President of the Assembly.\textsuperscript{25}

Additionally, they complained about the concentration of power in the hands of the

\textsuperscript{21} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.553-563.
\textsuperscript{22} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.553-563.
\textsuperscript{23} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.567-588.
\textsuperscript{24} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.588-592; and, Feridun Kandemir, Hatiralari ve Söyleyemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay, p.58.
\textsuperscript{25} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.596-604. See also, "Anatolians Restive: Weary of Kemalist Dictatorship", The Times, January 30, 1922, p.9.
Head of the Council of Ministers who was also the Chief of the General Staff. Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, argued that civilian and military affairs had to be kept separate from each other. Their merger in the personality of Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, a close associate of Atatürk who held both positions, had spelled disaster for Turkey. 26

Speaking on this issue, Refet Bele Pasha, the Minister of Defence and a general critical of Atatürk's handling of affairs, agreed with many points the opposition deputies made and expressed his opinion that the posts Atatürk jointly held had to be separated from each other. 27 Aware of the likely consequence of the debate, Atatürk intervened and threatened the Assembly with resignation. This move prevented its further discussion both within the cabinet and the Assembly. 28

This led to a cabinet crisis which resulted in the resignation of Refet Bele Pasha on January 10, in addition to Orbay's on January 9; both of which were made public at the January 12 sitting of the Assembly. 29 It was already public knowledge among the military commanders that there were irreconcilable differences of opinion between Atatürk, the Commander-in-Chief, and Refet Bele Pasha, the Minister of defence. 30

The forced resignation of Refet Bele Pasha was a blow to a majority of the deputies who held him in high esteem. In order to register their displeasure with Atatürk's intervention, the deputies drafted a motion, thanking Refet Bele Pasha for his services to the country. Despite Atatürk's desperate intervention to prevent the Assembly from publicly acknowledging its thanks for Refet Bele Pasha's services to the country, the motion to this effect put forth by Hüseyin Avni Ulas, Salahaddin Köseoglu and forty-eight opposition

29. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 16, p.16; and, "Turkish Ladies in Peril", The Times, January 14, 1922, p.10.
deputies was passed by the majority of the Assembly.  

As a compromise, for the post of the Minister of Public Works which Orbay vacated, Atatürk nominated three candidates --Fevzi Pirinccioglu, deputy for Diyarbakir, Sirri Bellioglu, deputy for Izmit, and Ismet Eker, deputy for Corum-- all of whom leaned towards the opposition. However, for the post of the Minister of Defence, he nominated Kazim Özalp Pasha, deputy for Karesi, and Fahreddin Altay Pasha, deputy for Mersin, both of whose military accomplishments were mediocre but had the reputation of being staunch supporters of Atatürk. Kazim Özalp Pasha was known among military circles as blind a follower of Atatürk as Ismet İnönü Pasha was.

At the January 14 sitting, the Assembly voted Fevzi Pirinccioglu and Kazim Özalp Pasha as the new ministers. Out of a total of two hundred and twenty-one deputies participating in the elections, Özalp managed to receive only one hundred and forty-seven votes, reflecting the Assembly's displeasure with Atatürk's choice. In the same sitting, Celal Bayar, Minister of Economy, handed in his resignation. As a concession to the opposition, Atatürk refrained from nominating a candidate for his vacated post. Sirri Bellioglu was elected as Minister of Economy despite Kemalist deputies' efforts. The cabinet crisis arising from the deputies' displeasure of the mismanagement of military affairs ended with partial victory of the opposition.

Second Group deputies did not cease conducting a campaign, criticising, in particular, the Kemal list military policy. Having been elected as the new Vice-President of the Assembly at the beginning of March with the overwhelming majority of the deputies who participated in the elections, Orbay incessantly demanded explanations from Atatürk

31. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceredesi, 16, pp.16-42.
32. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceredesi, 16, p.42?
34. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceredesi, Vol.16, pp.48-49.
36. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceredesi, 16, p.90.
on the military situation. Dissatisfaction reached to such proportions that it could not be contained in the Assembly. 38

At the March 6 closed sitting of the Assembly, Atatürk felt it necessary to give explanations on matters pertaining to military issues. In reply to strong criticism from members of the Second Group, Atatürk defended his general military strategy. However, by way of demagogic argument, he turned the tables around and threatened opposition deputies with exposure of weakening the internal strength of the country by creating dissension and lowering morale. He tried to prevent open discussion and criticism of his military strategy by urging deputies to refrain from doing anything that would divide the country and give the enemy the impression of the existence of serious dissension within the leadership. Opposition deputies criticised Atatürk as they alleged that he had been ordering deputies to remain silent whereas their duty was to question the soundness of the actions taken so as not to compromise the best interests of the country. Scolding Atatürk for doubting the good intentions of the deputies, Ulus and Kâseoglu added that the Assembly would not rubber stamp his every demand. 39

Every indication pointed out to the undeniable fact that the majority of the deputies had lost confidence in Atatürk. Even though the Kemalist deputies succeeded in preventing further discussion of military issues which had become so embarrassing to Atatürk, their motion for a vote of confidence could not be passed because of the lack of a quorum at the March 6 sitting. 40 The question was not so much Atatürk's credentials as a military leader as his ambitious behaviour to control everything by virtue of leading the Turkish army as Commander-in-Chief. In his April 18 Assembly speech concerning the military as well as the diplomatic situation, Atatürk felt it necessary to reassure the deputies doubtful of his

39. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitları, 3, pp.2-28; and, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.148-149.
40. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitları, 3, p.27; and, T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 18, pp.73-81.
good intentions by promising that the Turkish army under his leadership would not be an instrument to establish military rule.\textsuperscript{41}

The reassurances Atatürk made from time to time, however, did not convince the deputies who were observant of the discrepancy between his words and his deeds. Consequently, when the term of Atatürk's position as Commander-in-Chief ran out in early May, the deputies flatly refused to extend it.

Atatürk had already encountered difficulties when his position had come up for renewal on February 2; Ulas had criticised the Kemalist motion for the extension.\textsuperscript{42} At the February 4 sitting, opposition deputies had put forth a counter motion which made an amendment to the effect that the Assembly could cancel its authorisation for extension any time. Had proper Assembly procedures be followed and this motion been allowed to be discussed and put to vote, it was more than likely that the amended version would have been passed. However, Musa Kazım Göksu, Kemalist deputy for Konya and the presiding Speaker of the Assembly, had violated every procedural rule, and, despite justified protests of opposition deputies, the Kemalist motion had been passed under questionable circumstances, extending unconditionally Atatürk's term of office for another three months.\textsuperscript{43}

This time, however, deputies were adamant. When the Kemalist motion was forwarded for debate in the Assembly floor on May 4, opposition deputies first objected on grounds of procedure. As in most occasions when issues deemed important to the Kemalists were to be discussed by the Assembly, Musa Kazım Göksu occupied the chair as presiding Speaker. Köseoglu argued that draft laws had to be first forwarded to appropriate Assembly committees before being discussed on the floor. He protested the way these draft laws were being presented and swiftly passed by the Assembly without

\textsuperscript{41} T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 19, pp.296-297; and, [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk], Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 1, pp.238-239.
\textsuperscript{42} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 2, pp.675-677.
\textsuperscript{43} T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 16, pp.203-204.
allowing deputies time to discuss them properly. Arguing that immediate military danger had passed, the excuse for urgent approval was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{44} That there were clear violations of Assembly rules was evident by the fact that even Rauf Orbay, who though opposed to Atatürk's policies still remained within the Kemalist bloc, accused Göksu of violating rules and bringing the draft law to vote without going through proper channels. Ziya Hursid Bey, opposition deputy for Lazistan, cited the by-laws of the Assembly which clearly required that draft laws be forwarded to the Committee on Draft Laws before debate opened in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{45}

Mehmed Sükrü Koc, opposition deputy for Afyon and owner of \textit{Ikaz}, spoke against the draft law, citing that Atatürk had violated the trust of the Assembly by abusing the powers he had been given by this law. Koc stated that because Atatürk had flagrantly violated laws and caused financial ruin to many by, for instance, instituting forced labour which the Basic Law had clearly abolished, there were constant protests by the people who were bitterly opposed to the renewal of this law.\textsuperscript{46}

Second Group leaders Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, and Vasif Karakol, deputy for Sivas, all spoke against the renewal of the draft law so long as it contained the clause that gave Atatürk extraordinary legislative powers by placing him above and beyond the control of the Assembly which, in turn, was in clear violation of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{47} Both Karakol and Ulas stated that with the request of the Allied Powers for ending hostilities, war was effectively over; so, the allegation that the state of emergency continued was no longer valid. Since there was no immediate military danger, they argued, further extension of Atatürk's emergency powers was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{44} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3. pp.315-316.
\textsuperscript{45} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3. pp.317-318.
\textsuperscript{46} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3. p.318.
\textsuperscript{47} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3. pp.319-326.
\textsuperscript{48} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3. p.326; and, T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 19, p.521.
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In addition, Karakol said that there was no need for special legislation for the post of Commander-in-Chief, arguing that regular legislation concerning the military would be sufficient and added that the Commander in Chief should be held accountable in the same way as other men in the military.\textsuperscript{49} Karakol also expressed the view shared by many deputies that the Commander-in-Chief should be concerned with military matters only, not getting himself involved with every conceivable problem.\textsuperscript{50}

By now, a majority of the deputies had grown conscious of not only the concentration of several positions --civilian and military-- in the hands of Atatürk but also the abuse of power arising therefrom. In his speech against the prolongation of Atatürk's term, Mehmed Salih Yesiloglu, another opposition deputy for Erzurum, said that Atatürk had trampled upon the rights of the Assembly and continued to do so. He urged other deputies to terminate Atatürk's term of office as Commander-in-Chief since there was every indication that he would continue infringing the rights of the Assembly in the future.\textsuperscript{51}

During the heat of the debate, Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Kemalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, intervened by presenting a telegramme he claimed he received an hour ago, which informed that Greeks had decided to continue fighting. There was no doubt that Tengirsenk's move was a calculated move to sway the Assembly in favour of the extension of Atatürk's powers. Protesting Tengirsenk's intervention, opposition deputies continued the debate, disregarding the alleged contents of the telegramme.\textsuperscript{52}

Opposition deputies put forth a counter motion, eliminating Article 2 of the law which gave Atatürk extraordinary legislative powers. They managed to have this motion put to vote. Out of the one hundred and seventy-six deputies who voted, seventy-three were in favour, twelve undecided, and ninety-one against. Although the opposition did not succeed in passing its own version, the vote nevertheless showed the deep division on the

\textsuperscript{49} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, p.326; and, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.163.  
\textsuperscript{50} Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.164.  
\textsuperscript{51} Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.160-165.  
\textsuperscript{52} T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.321-324.
issue. Opposition to Atatürk’s flagrant violation of the Basic Law was so great that, when the Kemalist version of the draft law was put to vote, opposition deputies left the Assembly hall in protest. Since there was no quorum, the vote was invalid, and the motion was therefore considered rejected. At the cabinet meeting following the Assembly sitting, Minister of Defence as well as the Chief of the General Staff expressed their disappointments at this turn of events. Considering that this constituted a vote of no confidence, the cabinet decided to resign.

Atatürk, however, was determined to fight to the very end and not let go of his accumulated powers. When the cabinet met under his presidency that night to consider the political situation, he strongly expressed the view that he would hear nothing about the resignation of the cabinet. After some debate, he asked the cabinet to withhold its resignation for twenty-four hours during which time he promised to solve the matter. Indeed, the next day, on May 5, he appeared at the private meeting of the deputies in the Assembly building, and made a strongly worded speech in which he told the deputies that the rejection had meant that Turkish armies had been left without leadership and that this created tremendous weakness which might be exploited by the enemy. During a highly charged demagogic speech, he attacked the deputies who had advocated for the termination of his term of office. He repeated that Turkey was at a critical juncture and that he could not leave military matters unattended. Finally, he showed his determination to keep the post of the Commander-in-Chief by adding that, no matter what the Assembly decided, he would not give up the post. This was a military threat to violate the constitutional rights of the Assembly. Under such coercion, the Assembly was forced to vote for a second time at the May 6 sitting. Succumbing to military threat, the Assembly passed the bill for the extension

54. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 19, p.522; and, Mustafa Kemal Atatürkü, Nutuk, 2, p.159.
55. Mustafa Kemal Atatürkü, Nutuk, 2, p.159.
56. Mustafa Kemal Atatürkü, Nutuk, 2, pp.160-165; and, Cemal Kutay, Türkiye Istiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 19, pp.11144-11145.
of Atatürk's duties as Commander-in-Chief for a period of three more months by one hundred and seventy-seven votes to eleven against and fifteen undecided.\textsuperscript{57}

HAVING SECURED HIS POSITION as Commander-in-Chief for another three months, Atatürk decided to deal with the opposition within the military. The most significant threat was, of course, Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha. A well-known and highly respected general, Sabis Pasha had been interned after the Armistice of Mudros at Malta by the British for his pro-Unionist/anti-collaborationist stand. Immediately after his release from internment, he had returned to Ankara on October 5, 1921 where, despite Kemalist displeasure, he was appointed to command the First Army Corps. His immediate superior at the front was Ismet İnönü Pasha, Commander of the Western Front, who was his inferior both in rank and in military aptitude. Yet, Sabis Pasha had accepted the offer despite his rank officially required a higher position.\textsuperscript{58}

Sabis Pasha's military and organising skills, being far superior to any of the Kemalist generals, had bore their fruit in a relatively short period of time, and the First Army Corps under his command had become strong enough not only to resist the Greek occupation forces but also to attack them if need be. The morale of the soldiers had reached an all time high due to his popularity; he commanded the respect of all of his subordinates.\textsuperscript{59} The civilian population too had tremendous trust in him, and they were confidant that under Sabis Pasha's command, the army would be victorious against the occupation forces.\textsuperscript{60} During May and early June, the Istanbul press, especially \textit{Tevhid-i Efkar}, had published a series of articles, praising Sabis Pasha's achievements. Even \textit{İleri}, the pro-Kemalist daily in Istanbul, had admitted to Sabis Pasha's military prowess in its

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 19, pp.528-530; and, Cemal Kutay, \textit{Türkiye İstiklal ve Hürriyet Mücadeleleri Tarihi}, 19, p.11145. See also, \textit{Türk İstiklal Harbi}, 2/6/1, p.195.
\textsuperscript{59} Ali Ihsan Sabis, \textit{Harb Hatıralarım}, 5, passim.
\textsuperscript{60} Ali Ihsan Sabis, \textit{Harb Hatıralarım}, 5, p.127.
May 25 issue. 61

Sabis Pasha's immense popularity, however, became his undoing. 62 In addition, intelligence reports, supplied to the Kemalist leadership which informed them of Sabis Pasha's contacts with some of the Second Group deputies on various occasions, had irritated Atatürk. 63 Moreover, Sabis Pasha had sent a report concerning the abuses in the army with Osmanzade Hamdi Aksoy, Kemalist deputy for Ertugrul and general manager of Yeni Gün, to Ankara to be presented to the Assembly. 64 Suspicious of an attempt to supplant Kemalist military authority, Atatürk and his loyal lieutenant İnönü started plotting against Sabis Pasha. Beginning almost immediately after his appointment to command the First Army Corps, İnönü, with Atatürk's personal approval and encouragement, started to provoke Sabis Pasha in an attempt to force him to disobey his orders which would constitute a treasonable offense to be punished by the court martial.

Despite incessant provocation, Sabis Pasha kept his professional composure and refrained from doing anything that could be considered or even interpreted as disloyalty to his military superiors. His attitude, however, did not prevent İnönü and Atatürk to take measures against him.

Determined to get rid of Sabis Pasha at all costs, on June 19, Atatürk ordered his dismissal and immediate recall to Ankara. 65 The news of Sabis Pasha's dismissal reached the Second Group deputies only a few hours after the actual issuance of the order. Having discussed the situation privately on the night of June 19, Second Group deputies questioned the wisdom of the order in the lobbies and committees of the Assembly the next day. Rauf Orbay, in his capacity as Second Vice President of the Assembly, relayed the worries of the deputies and demanded an explanation as to the reason for Sabis' abrupt

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64. Fahrettin Altay, On Yıl Savas (1912-1922) ve Sonrasi, p.326.
dismissal. 66

The displeasure among military circles of Atatürk's dismissal of Sabis Pasha was so great that all of the most respectable generals, among whom Ali Fuad Cebeşoy and Refet Bele Pashas who were offered Sabis' post, rejected it on account of the inappropriateness of the decision. 67 This created a highly embarrassing situation for Atatürk. 68 Unable to find a successor, Atatürk temporarily appointed Fahrettin Altay Pasha, one of his staunchest supporters who was not held in high esteem in military circles due to his inferiority in military skills. 69

A fortnight after his dismissal, on July 3, Atatürk decided to refer Sabis Pasha's case to the Ankara Tribunal of Independence. 70 The tribunal consisted of loyalist Kemalist deputies, Ihsan Eryavuz, deputy for Cebel-i Bereket, Ali Kilic, deputy for Gaziantep, Hüseyin Gökcelik, deputy for Elaziz, and Cevdet Izrab Barlas, deputy for Kütahya. Summoning Eryavuz, President of the Ankara Tribunal of Independence, Atatürk personally instructed to collect every piece of evidence against Sabis Pasha with a view to indict him. 71

In the Assembly, deputies were furious with the turn of events. Upon persistent questioning, Kazım Özalp, Minister of Defence, was forced to defend the Kemalist position in a closed sitting of the Assembly. Accusing Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha of inciting the population and the army to open rebellion, Özalp managed to help pass a resolution that accepted the decision for Sabis Pasha's questioning by the Tribunal. 72

Having left Ankara for the Western Front in order to make the investigation, the Tribunal could not find even a shred of evidence against Sabis Pasha despite its painstaking efforts. The Tribunal returned to Ankara empty-handed, reporting to Atatürk that it could not find any incriminating evidence against Sabis Pasha. Ataturk, however, was determined to indict Sabis Pasha. On August 12, Kazım Özalp, Minister of defence, informed Sabis Pasha that he was to be judged by a court martial. Indeed, his case was referred to the Court Martial at Izmir on January 24, 1923, and the court, under direct pressure from Atatürk, decided on May 13, 1923 that Sabis Pasha was guilty as charged.

The differences between the authoritarian group represented by Atatürk on the one hand and the liberal group represented by Rauf Orbay within the Kemalist bloc and the Second Group on the other came to a head in early July when members of the Second Group successfully challenged the rules by which cabinet ministers were elected.

According to the draft law which Atatürk urged the deputies to accept, cabinet ministers would be nominated by a committee composed of the President of the Assembly, who was Atatürk himself, the Vice-President of the Assembly, Chairmen of the Sharia, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, Finance, Economy, Public Works, Education, and Health Committees of the Assembly, and the President of the Council of Ministers.

Second Group deputies strongly objected the proposed changes. At the July 6 sitting, Ali Sükrü Bey, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, Mehmed Sükrü Koc, Ziya Hursid Bey and Vasif Karakol made speeches against the nomination process, urging the deputies to reject it in favour of direct election by the Assembly. Having succeeded in gathering enough


support and eliminate this clause of the draft law. Second Group deputies submitted their own version which stipulated that the Assembly would directly elect ministers by secret ballot. 76 Despite last minute efforts on the part of some Kemalist deputies to save their draft, the modified version was passed on July 8 by one hundred and twenty-four votes to forty-six against and fourteen undecided. 77 The new law clearly curtailed Atatürk's power to control the executive by preventing him from imposing his own choice of ministers on the Assembly; and, as such, it was considered a success for the Second Group. 78

Assembly's rejection of the procedure favoured by the Kemalists and the subsequent adoption of the draft law prepared by members of the Second Group eliminating Atatürk's direct involvement with the formation of the cabinet was tantamount to a vote of no confidence. Having lost the bid for firmer control over government, the Kemalist cabinet headed by General Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, a close associate of Atatürk, resigned on July 9. 79 Although it was technically not a vote of confidence, the resignation was stated to have been presented for sake of form in order to give the Assembly the opportunity to reinstate or withdraw the mandate given to the cabinet under the old procedure.

The Kemalist deputies convened under the presidency of Atatürk to decide on their nominees for the new cabinet. Despite Atatürk's objections, the majority decided to nominate Rauf Orbay as President of the Council of Ministers. The Second Group deputies had already expressed their intention to vote for nobody else but for Orbay. Aware of Atatürk's authoritarian intentions, Orbay insisted on guarantees that Atatürk would not get himself personally involved with cabinet matters. Having no other choice, Atatürk gave his

76. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 21, p.326.
78. F.O.424/254, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, July 14, 1922 [p.38]; and, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nuhuk, 2, p.166.
promise, only to break it shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{80}

On July 12, the Assembly elected the new ministers. Rauf Orbay was elected President of the Council of Ministers with one hundred and ninety-seven votes out of a total of two hundred and four.\textsuperscript{81} Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kazim Özalp Pasha, Minister of Defence, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, and Hasan Fehmi Atac, Minister of Finance, all of whom were Kemalists, were reelected. While others received overwhelming support of the deputies, Kazim Özalp was reelected with only about half of the votes cast, reflecting deputies' opposition.\textsuperscript{82} Hasan Fehmi Atac, Minister of Finance, and Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, the newly elected Minister of Economy, had supporters within the Second Group although they were Kemalists.\textsuperscript{83} Fuad Umay, the re-elected Minister of Health, Abdullah Azmi Torun, Minister of Sharia, Celalettin Arif Bey, Minister of Justice and one of the most respected leaders of the Second Group, Mehmed Vehbi Bolak, Minister of Education, and Resad [Kayali], Minister of Public Works, were opposition figures, some of whom belonged to the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{84} As a matter of fact, the formation of the Orbay Cabinet was referred to as the beginning of a Unionist revival.\textsuperscript{85} On July 13, Adnan Adivar, a liberal deputy for Istanbul who was against the usurpation of power by force, was reelected First Vice President of the Assembly, securing a seeming victory for the liberals in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{86}

 Atatürk and his supporters were reported to be perturbed by the unexpected success

\textsuperscript{80} "Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Position", \textit{The Times}, July 20, 1922, p.9; and, Feridun Kandemir, \textit{Hatıraları ve Söyleyemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay}, pp.60-61.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 21, p.359; and, Feridun Kandemir, \textit{Hatıraları ve Söyleyemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay}, p.61


\textsuperscript{83} Ali Fuad Cebesoy, \textit{General Ali Fuad Cebesoy'un Siyasi Hatıraları}, 1, p.20.


of the Committee of Union and Progress. They feared that the Assembly's assertion of its independence in electing the ministers would curb Atatürk's dictatorial power.\textsuperscript{87} It was observed that the Kemalist organisation was subject to increasing internal strain. With the passage of the opposition's version of the law concerning the election of cabinet members which had shaken Atatürk's personal ascendance, opposition in the Assembly and, more important, in the army, had become more vocal.\textsuperscript{88} Many high ranking officers had already grown sick and tired of Atatürk's abuse of power. Most complaints centered around frequent and quite unnecessary promotions of undeserving officers on Atatürk's personal orders.\textsuperscript{89} In the Assembly, some deputies were even openly wondering if the time had come to force Atatürk out of the political scene altogether.\textsuperscript{90}

Therefore, in late July, when the time for the renewal of Atatürk's term as Commander-in-Chief came, a great number of deputies had already voiced their opposition to unconditional renewal.\textsuperscript{91} Especially the Second Group deputies were determined not to renew Atatürk's prerogatives, and they had informed Orbay know of their decision to vote against any further prolongation. In no ambiguous language, they informed Orbay of their worries that Atatürk would declare himself dictator if he continued keeping the post of Commander-in-Chief which gave him extraparliamentary rights and privileges.\textsuperscript{92} That there was considerable opposition to Atatürk's dictatorial ambitions even within the Defence of Rights Association, or the First Group, was confirmed by Atatürk's forced resignation, on July 18, from its chairmanship.\textsuperscript{93}

As the opposition deputies' position spelled parliamentary dissension which might

\textsuperscript{88} F.O.424/254, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 5, 1922 [p.97].
\textsuperscript{89} Feridun Kandemir, \textit{Hatıraları ve Söylenemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay}, pp.63-64.
\textsuperscript{91} "Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Position", \textit{The Times}, July 20, 1922, p.9.
\textsuperscript{92} Feridun Kandemir, \textit{Hatıraları ve Söylenemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay}, p.64.
\textsuperscript{93} "Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Position", \textit{The Times}, July 20, 1922, p.9.
lead to the cabinet's fall in the eventuality of rejection, Orbay as well as Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Refet Bele Pashas put pressure on Atatürk at a private meeting they held on July 19. They advised moderation and intimated that he should let go of his insistence on the renewal of the extraordinary powers that came with the post of the Commander-in-Chief, adding that deputies needed to be really convinced of his good intentions. They informed Atatürk that deputies would accept the renewal only if they were completely convinced that he would not forfeit their trust and promise to remain within the bounds of the law. They informed Atatürk that the majority of the deputies certainly did not wish to be confronted with a fait accompli. 94

Faced with such determined opposition not only from the Second Group in the Assembly but also from among the leading figures of the kemalist bloc, Atatürk retreated. In his July 20 speech to the Assembly, he conceded that there was no further need for keeping the extraordinary emergency powers. Congratulating the Assembly for having trusted him in the past, he asked for the prolongation of his post without emergency powers. In addition, he also promised that immediately on the conclusion of a just peace he would make it a point of honour to resign the important functions which he had "reluctantly" accepted during the critical period of the Greek offensive on the Ankara Front. 95

Justifiably distrustful of Atatürk's empty promises, deputies, however, took the necessary steps to eliminate any possible loopholes. Before extending Atatürk's term of office without the extraordinary powers attached to it, they first voted on the motion submitted by Refik Sevket Ince, opposition deputy for Saruhan within the Kamalist bloc, which declared the previous law extending Atatürk extraordinary powers null and void.

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94. Feridun Kandemir, Hatiraları ve Söyleyemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay, pp.64-65; and, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, General Ali Fuad Cebesoy'un Siyasi Hatiraları, 1, pp.30-32.
Mehmed Salih Yesiloglu, a prominent Second Group deputy for Erzurum, argued that with the abrogation of that law, all Tribunals of Independence formed by Atatürk's personal orders should also have to be considered to have ceased to exist.96

BY MID-JULY, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress which had been forced to either leave the country or go underground in order to avoid monarchist reprisal under Allied Occupation after the signature of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918 reentered public life and quickly renewed their political activity. The return of Unionist politicians were, however, not welcome by the Kemalists. They were concerned over renewed Unionist activity, and took steps of requiring the ex-Malta prisoners, who were supposed to have been embraced in Ankara, to leave the provisional capital and settle down in provincial towns. Trabzon was placed out of bounds as it had already a strong reputation for Unionist activity. Indeed, Fethi Okyar, Minister of the Interior, went so far as to order the Committee of Union and Progress clubs in Trabzon to be closed. But the order was successfully challenged by the Assembly, two-thirds of which were by now either Unionist or Unionist-sympathisers.97

On July 3, Cavid Bey, who had fled from Turkey after the Armistice of Mudros, returned to Istanbul in order to fulfil his duties as Turkish delegate on the Council of the Public Debt, and on the following day, spoke publicly on the state of Turkish finances.98 In addition to his views on Turkish finances, he also expressed considerable optimism in regard to European public opinion towards Turkey, and also with regard to the result of the struggle in progress in Anatolia. "We all desire", he said, "the conclusion of a peace ensuring the independence of our country." Cavid Bey's use of the term "independence".

italicised by himself, lend added force to his expressions of approval of the nationalist policy as supported by the Assembly. His views was published in the Journal d'Orient of July 5, among others.

Cavid Bey lost no time in airing his views not only with the Turkish public, but also with the representatives of the Allied Powers. On August 10, he paid a visit to Sir Horace Rumbold, the head of the British Legation at Istanbul. Discussing the freedom of the straits and the protection of the minorities, Cavid Bey stressed the necessity of abolishing the economic and judicial capitulations. He claimed that only by obtaining complete fiscal independence, would Turkey be able to meet her financial obligations.

Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, another important figure in the liberal wing of the Committee of Union and Progress and a close friend of Cavid Bey, returned to Istanbul on July 15. Although he was offered by Mihran Kelekyan, the owner of Sabah, to work as editor-in-chief of that paper, Yalcin flatly refused it as Sabah had been one of the staunchest supporters of the collaborationist regime under Ali Kemal Bey's editorship. Instead, he began writing for Vakit. By mid August, Yalcin decided to re-establish Tanin, and obtained the help of Cavid Bey, who approached the Ottoman Bank for a loan to start the newspaper. Since Istanbul was still under Allied occupation, prospective newspapers had to obtain permits from the Allied administration in Istanbul. Tanin, by

100. F.O. 424/254, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, July 11, 1922 [p.45].
104. F.O.424/254, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.98].
virtue of its support for the anti-Allied Unionist cause during the war, had been put on the black list. Therefore, the new paper was not allowed to appear under that name. After negotiations with the authorities, Yalçin managed to establish his paper under the name of Renin and began publishing on October 14. 106

Other Unionists who returned to Istanbul in the summer of 1922 included Kara Kemal Bey, who was Minister of Provisions during the war, Necmeddin Kocatas, ex-Minister of Justice, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, former Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Ismail Canbulat, ex-Minister of the Interior and one of the most prominent Unionist politicians. 107

Before the end of the war, Kara Kemal Bey had been influential in the labour circles of Istanbul. After his return, he was believed to be actively engaged in the creation of an organisation of labourers who had belonged to the now defunct guilds. 108 His office at Sirkeci operated as the headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress. 109 In addition, he made at least one journey to Anatolia since his return to Istanbul. 110

Midhat Sükrü Bleda, the ex-Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress, was formerly one of the Unionist leaders who had remained in the shadows. Presently, he was understood to be active in liaison work between Istanbul and the interior. 111

Without losing time, Unionists attempted to enter into negotiations with the Kemalists. During mid-August, Ismail Canbulat, one of the leaders of the Committee of

107. F.O.424/254. Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.98].
108. F.O.424/254. Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.98].
110. F.O.424/254. Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.98].
111. F.O.424/254. Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.98].
Union and Progress, went to Ankara to meet with Atatürk and other politicians to talk about the political arrangements, including the future of the Committee of Union and Progress. His report reached the Unionist leadership in Istanbul after a month's delay, on September 19, by post --which was under Kemalist control. In his report, Canbulat related his contacts with the politically influential people in Ankara, and added that he had been welcome by Rauf Orbay. He informed the Unionist leadership that he had been offered the governorship of Adana, but that he had refused on account of his reluctance to work with Fethi Okyar, Minister of the Interior and a close confidant of Atatürk.  

112 There was no doubt that the Kemalist leadership in general and Atatürk in particular bitterly opposed the Unionist leadership. There was growing antagonism, especially towards Cavid Bey, among Kemalist circles in Ankara, as they viewed him, who was one of the ablest of Unionist politicians, as a possible threat to their authoritarian ambitions.  

113 In late August, publication of an attack against Unionist leadership appeared in the Kemalist Istanbul press upon the publication of Yalcin's cry for pity for Unionists which was occasioned by the news of Cemal Pasha's murder.

The campaign had already been waged in the lobbies of the Assembly at Ankara between the Committee of Union and Progress represented by the Second Group, and the Kemalist nationalists. Yalcin opened the press campaign with an article published in Vakit, entitled "Respect for the Dead" in which he stated that Turkish citizens were showing an awakening of national consciousness as the list of victims fallen in foreign lands lengthened. Hundreds of patriots would, he continued, pick up the banner that fell from the hands of Talat and Cemal Pashas --two of the most prominent Unionist politicians.  

114 This rhetorical appeal met with a severe riposte from Rauf Ahmed Bey, the editor
of Yeni Sark, who, in a leading article entitled "Pity for the Living", stated the moderate Kemalist case against Cemal Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress. Ikdam, another paper supportive of the Kemalist cause, also published a reply to Yalcin from the pen of Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu, who pointed out that Yalcin's appeals to sentiment on behalf of the slain Unionists were all very well, but asked whether he had forgotten the national mourning of the previous three years. He added that the corpses of hundreds and thousands of Moslems separated the Kemalists from those Unionists. 115

Maintaining close contact with Anatolia, the Unionists directed their efforts towards building up a position in Istanbul which remained under Allied control and out of direct Kemalist reach. Naturally, they professed great admiration for Atatürk's national movement, but it appeared increasingly obvious that their true aim was to supplant his regime and restore the domination of the old Committee of Union and Progress. They became a factor of considerable political importance. Clearly, their organisation would have to be reckoned with should there be any new development in the political situation. 116

On October 29, the Unionist leadership, Kara Kemal Bey, Rahmi Evranos, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, and Cavid Bey, met and discussed the political situation. However, they postponed any decision on the future course of action until after Rahmi Evranos' upcoming trip to Ankara and Izmir. 117

WITH THE RETREAT OF THE GREEK FORCES and their complete evacuation of western Anatolia on September 9, discussions began - first to sign an armistice and then to convene a peace conference. 118 Accepting the Allied Powers request of ceasefire, dated September

116. F.O.424/254, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour, Constantinople, August 1, 1922 [p.100].
118. "Turks Moving Forward: Threat to Greek Flank", The Times, September 1, 1922, p.8; "Greeks Fall Back: Strong Turkish Onslaught: Five Days' Battle", The Times, September 2, 1922, p.8; "Greek Army's Escape: Northern Forces Withdraw", The Times, September 4, 1922, p.8; "Greek Army's
23, the Mudanya Conference opened on October 3. Ismet Inönü Pasha, one of the most loyal followers of Atatürk within the army, was empowered to negotiate the terms of armistice. From October 7 through October 10, the Assembly sat in closed session, discussing the terms of the armistice being negotiated at Mudanya. After one or two tense moments and one final period of anxiety caused by delay in the receipt of the Turkish reply, an agreement was signed at Mudanya on October 11 by the Allies and the representatives of the provisional government at Ankara. The terms of the Armistice
came into force on October 14 at midnight, and the evacuation of Thrace by the Greek troops begun under the supervision of Allied detachments.  

One special problem was presented in the Allied withdrawal from Istanbul. However, this question, too, was duly settled and when the Allied Powers withdrew from Istanbul in late October, the provisional government in Ankara took control, Refet Bele Pasha becoming the highest civilian and military authority. The monarchist government of Tevfik Pasha resigned, setting aside one of the most important barriers to the establishment of Turkish unity under a permanent authority.

SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE and the tacit acceptance that the provisional government at Ankara was the true representative of Turkish nation brought the question of post-war political settlement into light. This involved not only the question of the retention or abrogation of constitutional monarchy, but also the question of the political future of Atatürk.

Not only the Assembly but also the liberal Istanbul press was concerned about Atatürk's dictatorial ambitions. Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, after reopening his old pro-Committee of Union and Progress newspaper, Tanin, under the new name of Renin, wrote an article in the first issue of October 14 in which he said that national sovereignty could be the only form of government, denouncing both monarchy and dictatorship. This last reference was to Atatürk's hardly subtle move toward authoritarianism at the end of formal Allied occupation. Furthermore, in the October 14 issue, Yalcın wrote that the


124. F.O. 424/255, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 5, 1922.


Assembly had to be the sole power; no one person could be the principal arbiter in national affairs. In the editorial column of the October 16 issue of Renin, he reiterated the necessity for the inviolability of parliamentary regime, rejecting dictatorial ambitions of any single individual in the nation's political affairs. The point that the government should be accountable to the legislative and that there should be no concentration of power in any single political institution was clearly made in his editorial of October 27.

In addition to criticising ambitions of dictatorship and defending the institutions of liberal democracy in his editorials during October, Yalcin also mentioned the question of political parties. In the Renin of October 29, Yalcin, aware of Atatürk's contemplation of forming a political party to support his ambitions for the establishment of an authoritarian regime, wrote that political parties could be neither established by decree nor ordered to measure. With reference to the Committee of Union and Progress, he wrote that although rival political groups had worked together during the resistance between 1919 and 1922, that had come to an end with the liberation of Turkey from enemy forces. Now, he said, was the time for the convening of a Unionist congress to draw up a new programme and establish future policy. He pointed out that it was highly likely that there would be political groups which would oppose this, but added that it was only natural for political dissension to occur among various groups defending different points of view.

In addition to the liberal press in Istanbul, the Second Group deputies in Ankara were also highly critical of Atatürk's intentions of extending his powers by way of

eliminating monarchy. Abrogation of the monarchy was seen to be a perfect disguise for his ambitions. As a matter of fact, information to this effect made Second Group deputies take strong action. Being personally informed of their displeasure about this scheme, Rauf Orbay pressured Atatürk to think matters over. At a private meeting between Orbay and Atatürk in which Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Refet Bele Pashas were also present, opposition’s objections to Atatürk’s intentions were explained to him. Orbay, Bele, and Cebesoy forced Atatürk to concede on the issue of the abrogation of the monarchy and convinced him to make a speech to that effect in the Assembly in order to satisfy the opposition.

THE WORRIES OF BOTH THE LIBERAL PRESS and the Second Group in the Assembly were not unfounded. Their anticipation for a Kemalist move towards a sudden political change geared to increasing Atatürk’s grip on the political process by constitutional amendment came on October 30 within the context of the discussion of a telegramme sent to the provisional government at Ankara by Tevfik Pasha, head of the collaborationist government at Istanbul, requesting a meeting between the two administrations to draw up a joint strategy of action at the upcoming Peace Conference at Lausanne.

Immediately before the October 30 sitting in the Assembly, Atatürk sent for Rauf Orbay and Kazim Karabekir, two of the most respected deputies in the Assembly who still officially belonged to the Kemalist bloc, and, as if he had not previously promised to the contrary, ordered them to speak in favour of separating the caliphate from the sultanate and abrogating the monarchy at the sitting which was about to convene. When the Assembly convened for discussion, Atatürk took up his seat as Speaker of the Assembly, giving him the advantage of directing the sitting to his intentions.

131. Ali Fuad Cebesoy, General Ali Fuad Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatiralari, 1, p.117.
133. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.182-183.
134. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, p.270.
He spoke first, reading a telegramme from Tevfik Pasha, dated October 17. In this telegramme, Tevfik Pasha stated that the Powers would issue a double invitation to the forthcoming Peace Conference, and he, therefore, begged that a representative of the provisional government in Ankara be sent without delay to Istanbul in order that the two administrations might decide upon a common course of action. He further claimed that the presence of delegates of the Istanbul government at the Lausanne Conference would be an advantage and even a necessity. Atatürk said that he had informed Tevfik Pasha that the only legitimate government was that of the Great National Assembly at Ankara which alone had the right to send delegates to the forthcoming conference. Atatürk then read Tevfik Pasha's second telegramme, dated October 29, in which he begged unity of action and stated that if the Istanbul government did not hear from the Assembly at Ankara, they would send Ziya Pasha as their representative to the Peace Conference. 135

After his opening speech, Atatürk invited --as had been previously arranged-- Rasih Kaplan, a religious figure and Kemalist deputy for Antalya, to the rostrum. Making a speech with clear religious overtones, Kaplan said that the Assembly at Ankara was the only body to represent Turkey and all the Moslems. Another Kemalist deputy, Refik Koraltan, indiscreetly ridiculed Tevfik Pasha. 136

As the Second Group knew where the debate was headed, Hüseyin Avni Ulas took the rostrum, making a skillful speech in which he both ridiculed the collaborationist government in Istanbul that had turned for help from the Assembly when it had realised everything had been lost, and condemned, at the same time, all absolutist regimes whether they be monarchical or dictatorial. He finished his speech by emphasizing the supremacy of representative government, adding that the rights of the nation had to be protected not only

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against the collaborationist monarchy but also against usurpers with dictatorial ambitions. 137

After several deputies spoke against the collaborationist government in Istanbul, Riza Nur submitted a motion signed by seventy-eight Kemalist deputies, including Atatürk himself, which claimed that Ottoman autocracy had ended and that the Ankara government was the sole representative of the nation. Monarchy having abrogated, the motion went on, caliphate would be liberated from foreign hands. 138

Trying to prevent a fait accompli, Second Group deputies immediately put forth another motion which would require Riza Nur’s motion to be forwarded to the Committee on Draft Laws, as it was clearly a law --and an important one at that, since it involved constitutional change. 139 The Second Group’s aim was to block the cursory discussion of the Kemalist motion, a motion with tremendous future repercussions. However, Atatürk again took the floor, putting forth a motion whether to answer Tevfik Pasha or not. The Assembly voted not to answer the Istanbul government’s telegramme. Then, amid confusion and protests of clear violation of Assembly rules and regulations, he put Riza Nur’s motion to vote. The opposition, realising that their attempts had been foiled, decided to obstruct the sitting by leaving the Assembly hall one by one as their names were being read. Although there were more than two hundred deputies present at the beginning of the October 30 sitting, only one hundred and thirty-six deputies participated in the voting. Upon the result of this inconclusive vote due to lack of the required quorum, Atatürk was forced to adjourn the sitting until November 1, when it would again be put to vote. 140

137. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, p.275; and, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, General Ali Fuad Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatirralari, 1, pp.119-120.
Having defended at the First Group meeting on October 31 that abrogation of the monarchy was an absolute necessity, Atatürk continued to advocate for his position at the November 1 sitting. Many deputies were in favour of a postponement of the matter until after the Peace Conference. During this stormy sitting, it was observed that Atatürk lobbied for the transfer of the post of caliphate or sultanate or both to himself, thus eliminating both the government at Istanbul and installing himself as an absolutist sultan at one stroke.

The first alternative, *i.e.*, the transfer of the caliphate from Sultan Vahideddin to Atatürk, did not involve the matter of the sultanate. In order to prevent Atatürk from declaring himself Caliph, the Second Group deputies drafted a counter-motion concerning the legal status of the caliphate which was geared towards either abolishing the caliphate altogether or severely restricting its rights and privileges. While the Second Group was lobbying for this motion, Atatürk changed tactics and emerged as the defender of the constitutional rights of the caliph, clearly exposing his intention for having himself chosen as Caliph in place of Sultan Vahideddin.

Taking the floor, Atatürk spoke at length about the caliphate, telling a highly selective history of that institution. Drawing implicit parallels between Prophet Mohammed and himself, he prepared the ground for his election as caliph, by citing examples that caliphate had been transferred from dynasty to dynasty through the centuries, and that there were also examples of caliphs who occupied the post by *election* instead of succession. Arguing that the temporal and spiritual power could not be seperated from each other, he...

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November 16, 1922, p.626.
claimed that the office of caliphate could not remain in Istanbul but should be taken under
the control of the Ankara Assembly and its government. He ended his speech by adding
that somebody whose authority derived from the Ankara Assembly must occupy the post of
the caliph. 145

He was successful in having some Kemalist deputies submit another motion on the
legal status of the caliphate. Musa Kazim Göksu, the Kemalist presiding Speaker of the
Assembly, prevented opposition deputies from discussing the issue further. Thereupon,
Süleyman Necati Güneri, deputy for Erzurum and owner of Albayrak, Tahir Kucur,
deputy for Isparta, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, all members of the Second
Group, and Mustafa Cantekin, deputy for Kozan, submitted separate motions requesting
that the Kemalist and the Second Group motions be forwarded to the Committee on the
Constitution. Ziya Hursid Bey, deputy for Lazistan, and nineteen members of the Second
Group, including Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, and Vasif Karakol, deputy for
Sivas, put forth a motion demanding that Riza Nur’s revised motion be forwarded to a joint
committee composed of members of the Committees of Sharia, Justice, and Constitution.
Despite fierce resistance by the Kemalists, the opposition succeeded in having this motion
passed. 146

This was followed by a three hours’ recess during which the joint committee met to
discuss and prepare a resolution. Müfîd Kurutluoglu, opposition deputy for Kirsehir, was
elected as chairman of the joint committee. During the deliberations, it became apparent that
there were many sides to the issue and that it could not be hastily resolved. Realising that
the debate would not lead to the result he wanted, Atatürk moved to speak, openly

Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatiralari*, I, p.128, where Cebesoy briefly talks about this speech, without giving any
details as to its true nature and intention.

146. *T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi*, 24, pp.311-312; Mehmed Cavid, "Felaket Günleri: Mittareke
Devrinin Feci Tarihi: 303", *Tanin*, December 19, 1946, p.6; "The Sultan’s Future: Angora Attack on the
Cebesoy’un Siyasi Hatiralari*, I, p.131.
threatening the deputies with death by saying that, if necessary, heads would roll if they did not prepare the resolution according to his wishes. 147

Upon this threat, joint committee members immediately drafted the law according to Atatürk's orders. The new draft said that Turkish nation did not recognise any government other than that of the Ankara Assembly and that, as monarchy was abrogated and the Sultan deposed, a new caliph from among the members of the Ottoman dynasty would be elected. When the session opened, this draft was read and, without further discussion, it was put to vote. Under pressure of military takeover and amid protests of opposition, the Assembly voted in favour of the resolution abolishing the monarchical government in Istanbul. 148

In his editorial column of the November 4 issue of Renin, Yalcin interpreted the news of the abolition of the sultanate by the Assembly in its November 1 sitting as the establishment of a new regime which could be labelled as a republic. Expressing his usual concern for the concentration of power in fewer hands, Yalcin, nevertheless, interpreted this event as one of the logical outcomes of the Revolution of 1908 which had replaced absolute monarchy by constitutional monarchy; now, the nation had gotten rid of this monarchy which had discredited itself by collaborating with enemy forces after the Armistice of Mudros. 149 Cavid Bey was of the opinion that this stark truth about the future intentions of Atatürk would not please him. 150 Indeed, Atatürk was irritated by the use of the word "republic" as he and other Kemalists saw that it might have upset plans for complete takeover. Yalcin was urged by a special envoy of Ahmed Agaoglu, the Director of

147. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.185-186. See also, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, General Ali Fuad Cebesoy'un Siyasi Hatıraları, 1, p.131, where he discreetly avoids mentioning Atatürk's threats.


the Press of the Kemalist regime, not to use the word in his future editorials. On November 6, Yalcın published another editorial in which he advised common sense and moderation --another reference to Atatürk's authoritarian intentions. There was no doubt that this editorial, too, would anger the Kemalist leadership in Ankara.

Two other Istanbul papers --Vakit, whose editor was Ahmed Emin Yalman, and İleri, whose editor was Celal Nuri İleri-- also published articles about what they saw as the uncertain future, albeit from different angles. After praising in highly complimentary words what he achieved for the country, Yalman recommended that Atatürk, like George Washington, retire from politics, having already secured victory. İleri, however, recommended the immediate establishment of a military dictatorship lest civilian politicians seize power from Atatürk.

On November 8, Yalcın wrote a sharply worded rejoinder in the columns of Renin, strongly criticising İleri and other ardent supporters for a Kemalist dictatorship. He wrote that supporters for such causes had to be seen as enemies of revolution, adding that the best thing these people could hope for was not to be labelled as traitors. For the well-being of the country, he continued, one had to not applaud Atatürk's unmistakable move towards dictatorship. He also categorically rejected the Kemalist argument that differences of opinion on the question of political regime should not be expressed at a time when Turkey started the peace negotiations at Lausanne. He added that not to talk about these matters of vital importance would only be a disservice to the nation in the long run.

of November 10, Yalcin, once again, reiterated the value of liberal democratic principles and expressed his sorrow that one still had to defend these principles which everyone had thought to have been established with the Revolution of 1908. He urged everyone to work for a Turkey respectful of liberal principles. 156

WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MONARCHIC GOVERNMENT, the administration of Istanbul and its neighbourhood came under the Ministry of the Interior of the provisional government at Ankara, and the laws of the Ankara government were to be applied as from November 4 at midday. Although Refet Bele Pasha stated that he had not been instructed to take any action, he had a scheme for the creation of a provisional administration all ready in his pocket when he assumed control of affairs. 157

Refet Bele Pasha, in response to the questions of the correspondent of Le Petit Parisien, said that the Ankara government’s Note of November 5 merely requested the evacuation of Istanbul, but that this was not imposed and that the Allied Powers were only asked to withdraw their forces if convenient to them. 158

No sooner than he took control of Istanbul, Refet Bele Pasha started procedures against the Palace and the Palace staff. After his arrival at Istanbul on October 19, he had paid a visit to the Sultan on October 29, during which the Sultan’s position had formed at least an important item of the conversation. 159 By November 13, one hundred and forty members of the Palace staff were taken under British custody to be evacuated to Malta. 160

The November 16 issue of Tevhid-i Efkar published news to the effect that the Ankara government had decided to put both the Sultan and the monarchical cabinet on trial. One

160. "Sultan’s Staff: To Be Sent to Malta", The Times, November 15, 1922, p.12.
possible effect of this decision would be a demand for the surrender of the Sultan, who was still in the Palace. The Sultan, fearing his life to be in danger, asked for British protection, which was accorded, and on November 17 he was taken on board the British battleship Malaya, which left for Malta.

The news of the flight of Sultan Vahideddin was received in Ankara the same day and formed the subject of a secret discussion of the cabinet, which took certain decisions and communicated these to the Assembly. On November 18, the Assembly held three closed sittings on the issue.

During the closed sittings, both the issue of Sultan Vahideddin's deposition from the caliphate and the election of a new one were discussed. Deputies demanded that a ferva be drawn up for Vahideddin's dismissal as Caliph. This issue settled, Second Group deputies made speeches in favour of the Caliph to reside in Ankara since, they argued, foreign influences in Istanbul would keep the newly elected Caliph under foreign control. The Kemalists, however, strongly objected to this as it would potentially weaken Atatürk's power. Atatürk took the rostrum and made a speech in which he clearly indicated that he would not allow the Caliph to come to Ankara. Salahaddin Köseoglu said that the Second Group did not object to the immediate election of the Caliph by the Assembly but insisted that the ceremony for his taking of office be performed at Ankara. Vasif Karakol and seven other opposition deputies put forth a motion requiring the Caliph to reside in Ankara until the conclusion of peace. Another opposition motion required the ceremony to take place in Ankara. Köseoglu intimated that if their motions were not put to vote first they would not participate in the vote for the election of the Caliph.

164. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.1042-1065.
166. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.1042-1065; and, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, General Ali
Despite Second Group objections and protests, the Kemalist leadership managed to lead the Assembly in their direction and the closed sitting of the Assembly ended with approval of electing Abd-ul Mecid Efendi as the new Caliph in the public sitting. At the public sitting during which the *ferva* approving the deposition of Vahideddin as Caliph was read and accepted, and the new Caliph was elected. The Second Group deputies having left the Assembly in protest, Abd-ul Mecid Efendi, the new Caliph, was elected by one hundred and forty-eight votes out of a total of one hundred and sixty-three deputies present. The significance of these numbers was that the total number of deputies amounted to three hundred and twenty, and, according to the Ankara Constitution, one more than half this number constituted a quorum, without which no sittings could be held. On the momentous occasion when the deposition of the former Caliph and the election of a successor was decided, therefore, there was only a bare quorum, and the new Caliph was elected by less than half the total membership of the Assembly.

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*Fuad Cebeşoy'un Siyasi Hatıraları*, 1, pp.153-154.


Appendix to Chapter 15

1920 ASSEMBLY

Adana (7) (5)

Esref Akman (1878-1938) BG
Abdullah Faik Copuroğlu (1857-1939)
Mehmed Hamdi Izgi (1878-1959)
Kethüdazade İbrahim Bey r3
Gülezkade Tevfik Bey r4
Aziz Zekai Apaydin* (1880-1947) BG CHP

2. He was deputy in the 1908 and 1912 Chamber of Deputies (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
3. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) See also, Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.175ff. Aziz Zekai Apaydin was elected in his place (Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.175ff)
4. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
5. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
6. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.989-992. He joined the Assembly on September 1, 1920 (Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.175ff. He was appointed member of the Eskişehir Tribunal of Independence. He attended the Lausanne Conference. He was Minister of Agriculture from March 6 to August 30, 1924. He was appointed Ambassador to London in September 1924, and to Moscow in May 1925 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.991). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
Amasya (7)

Hamdi Apaydin (1862-1936) IG
Bekir Sami Kunduh (1867-1933) BG
Ali Riza Özdarende (1876-) (BG) IG
Asim Sirel (1876-) BG
Mehmed Ragib Topala (1877-1952) IG
Ali Topcu (1868-) BG
Ömer Lütfi Yasan (1878-1956) (BG) IG

Ankara (9)

7. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
9. Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
11. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
12. Landowner (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
13. Military Academy, Minister of Public Works (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) BG
Semsettin Bayramoğlu (1883-1944) BG
Hacı Mustafa [Beyman] (1866-1931) BG
Ahmed Rüstem de Bilinski (1862- ) 17 BG
Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pasha (1882-1968) BG
Sakir Kinaci (1875-1940) BG CHP
Hacı Atif (1858-1926) BG
Cayırlioglu Hilmi Bey (1870- ) BG
Ömer Mümtaz [Tanbi] (1859-1925) BG

Antalya (6)

14. He had been elected deputy for Erzurum in the Chamber of Deputies. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi' nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246.
15. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi' nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246.
17. Resigned on September 8, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
19. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi' nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246.
22. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi' nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246.
Mustafa Ibrisim (1877-1944)BG CHP
Rasih Kaplan (1883-1952)BG CHP
Halil İbrahim Özkaya (1892-1972)BG
Ali Vefa Seyhanli (1876-1953)BG
Hasan Tahsin [Sürekök] (1869-1930)
Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver (1886-1966)BG CHP

Ardahan (2)

Osman Server Ahiska (1884-1962)IG
Filibeli Hilmi Bey (1885-1926)IG

Aydin (9)

23. Mayor of Antalya (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
24. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibaşınıcılı Yılları'ını Anıs, pp.245-246.
25. Lawyer (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibaşınıcılı Yılları'ını Anıs, pp.245-246.
26. Mekteb-i Müllkiye (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). On August 23, 1923, he was appointed Mutasarrif of Kayseri, and when Kayseri was made a province, he was appointed Governor of Kayseri (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Müllkiye Tarihi ve Müllkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.739-740). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibaşınıcılı Yılları'ını Anısı, pp.245-246.
27. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibaşınıcılı Yılları'ını Anısı, pp.245-246.
28. Engineer and doctorate at law (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Sıyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
29. Landowner. Hanged by the Tribunal of Independence (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Sıyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
Mehmed Emin [Arkut] (1873-1929) BG
Cami Baykut (1877- ) BG
Mazhar Germen (1887-1967) CHP
Esad İleri (1882- ) BG CHP
Hasan Tahsin San (1865-1951) BG CHP
Sadik Ünver (1874-1920)
Ahmed Sükrü Yılmaz (1935-1936)

[Hamza Hayati] [Kazim Karabekir]

Batum (5)

Ali Riza Acara (1883-1969) (BG) IG

30. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmılbecinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
32. Doctor (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
34. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmılbecinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
35. Died on December 27, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
36. Resigned on November 22, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
37. He was deputy for Mentese (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
38. He preferred Edirne (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
39. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmılbecinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vehsel Genya (Tarihi Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Political Affiliation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edib Dinc</td>
<td>(1881-1963)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Fevzi Erdem</td>
<td>(1885- )</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akif Sümer</td>
<td>(1879-1944)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Nuri Efendi</td>
<td>(1887- )</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
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Bayezit (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Süleyman Sudi Acarbay</td>
<td>(1866-1927)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atif Bayazit</td>
<td>(1882- )</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevket Bayazit</td>
<td>(1887-1943)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacı Mehmed Öney</td>
<td>(1844-1923)</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refik Saydam</td>
<td>(1882-1942)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Biga (5)

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40. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538).
41. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538).
42. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538).
43. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538).
44. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538).
46. Doctor (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
Mehmed Dinc (1873-1952) BG
Hafiz Hamdi Dumrul (1879-1947) (BG) IG
Hamid Karaosmanoglu (1886-1961) (BG) IG
Ismail Subhi
Mehmed Akif

Bitlis (7)

Sadullah Eren (1867-1933) (BG) IG
Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu] (1882-1925) IG
Hüseyin Hüsnü Orakcioglu (1887-1947)
Arif Özdemir (1885-1948) IG
Vehbi Öztekin (1888-1963)
Dervis Sefünc (1880-1934) IG

47. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibeşinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
48. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibeşinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
49. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibeşinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
52. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibeşinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
53. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
54. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
55. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de
Resul Bey (1863-1924) BG CHP

Bolu (8)

Nuri [Aksu] (1857-1930) BG IG
Abdullah Sabri Aytac (1870-)
Sükrü Güler (1869- BG CHP
Cevad Abbas Gürer (1887-1943) BG CHP
Hacı Abdülvahap Ömerd (1869-1920)
Tunali Hilmi (1871-1928) BG CHP
Fuat Umay (1885-1963) BG CHP
Yusuf Izzet Pasha[d] (1876-1922)

Burdur (8)

Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
56. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
57. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
58. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
59. Aide-de-camp to Atatürk. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
60. Died on July 21, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
61. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar, pp.245-246.
63. Died on April 15, 1338/1922 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Ismail Hakki Calli\(^r\) (  -  )\(^{64}\)
Sevket [Candaner]\(^d\) (1876-1920)\(^{65}\)
Halil Hulusi [Ernis]\(^d\) (1880-1920)\(^{66}\)
Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-1936)\(^{67}\) (BG) IG
Veliyütün Saltıkci (1880-1935)\(^{68}\) BG
Ismail Subhi Soysallıoğlu (1885-1967)\(^{69}\) IG
Ali Ulvi Bey\(^d\) (1866-1922)\(^{70}\)
Fahreddin Bey\(^r\) (  -  )\(^{71}\)

Bursa (7)

\(^{64}\) Resigned on July 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{65}\) Died on November 11, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{66}\) Died on April 25, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{67}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anıs, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\(^{68}\) Mekteb-i Müllkiye. Professor of Constitutional Law between December 1, 1918 and March 30, 1920 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Müllkiye Tarihi ve Müllkveliler, Vol.3, p.1063; and, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anıs, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). He was appointed member of the Samsun Tribunal of Independence; attended the Lausanne Conference (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Müllkiye Tarihi ve Müllkveliler, Vol.1063). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anıs, pp.245-246. He returned to Istanbul and taught at the Law School at the end of his term. He was appointed Legal Advisor to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1926, along with professorship of Constitutional Law at the Ankara Law School. He remained at these posts until his death in 1935 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Müllkiye Tarihi ve Müllkveliler, Vol.3, p.1063).
\(^{69}\) Journalist and teacher. Owner of Söz (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\(^{70}\) Died on October 16, 1338/1922 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{71}\) Resigned on July 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Sheikh Servet Akdag (1880-1962)
Emin Erkul (1881-1964) (BG) CHP
Mustafa Fehmi Gerceker (1868-1950) BG CHP
Hasan Fehmi [Kokay] (1880-1922)
Necati Kurtulus (1882-1956) (BG) IG
Osman Nuri Özpoy (1878- ) BG
Muhiddin Baha Pars (1885-1954) BG

Canik (6)

Süleyman Bosank (1872-1949) (BG) IG
Hasan Fehmi [Coldurzade] (1879- )

73. Mufti of Karacabey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
74. Resigned on October 9, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
75. Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
76. Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
77. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
78. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
79. Considered resigned on October 30, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
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<td>Sükrü Fırat</td>
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<td>(BG) IG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Em'ın Geveliğlu</td>
<td>(1889-1934)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Nafiz Özalp</td>
<td>(1889-1955)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdi Yalman</td>
<td>(1877-1959)</td>
<td>(BG) IG CHP</td>
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**Cebelibereket (3)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>İhsan Eryavuz</td>
<td>(1877-1947)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<td>Rasim Öztekin</td>
<td>(1874-1933)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Faik Özlak</td>
<td>(1883-1951)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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</tbody>
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**Cankiri (7)**

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80. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
81. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
82. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
83. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
84. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246.
85. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246.
86. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was appointed Director of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior on June 4, 1920. On August 21, he was appointed Inspector General of that Ministry. He was elected deputy on September 13, 1920 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiveliler, Vol.3, p.1083). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıldırımboşnun Anis, pp.245-246.
M. Neset Nazim Akkor (1889-1964) (BG) IG  
Tevfik Durlanik (1871-1944) (BG) IG  
Ziya Esen Isfendiyaroglu (1878-1940) BG CHP  
Behcet Kutlu (1865-1948) (BG) IG  
Tahir [Asik Musuloglu] (1872-1926) BG  
Müstak [Torbo] (1882-1930)  
Said Ucok (1878-1953) BG  

Corum (7)  

Hasim Apaydin (1876-1940) BG  
Ismet Eker (1877-1962) BG CHP  
Atif Köse (1880- )  

87. Mekteb-i Mülikye. (All Cankaya, Yeni Mülikye Tarihi ve Mülikyeliler, Vol.4, no.1296). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)  
88. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)  
89. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.  
90. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)  
91. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.  
92. Considered resigned on October 21, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)  
93. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.  
94. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.  
95. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.  
96. Doctor. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ferid Törüüm [Küney]</td>
<td>(1878-1925)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<td>Siddik Mumcu</td>
<td>(1881-1943)</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dursun Yalvac</td>
<td>(1872- )</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuad Bey (^d)</td>
<td>(1883-1921)</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Denizli (5)

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<tr>
<td>Mazlum Baba Babalim</td>
<td>(1860-1945)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yusuf Baskaya</td>
<td>(1879-1945)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Hakki Behic Bayic</td>
<td>(1882-1943)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necib Buldanlioglu (^r)</td>
<td>(1877-1946)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Tavaslioglu (^r)</td>
<td>(1880-1942)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Tokcan</td>
<td>(1866-1943)</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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97. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
98. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
99. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tari妄 Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
100. Died on September 3, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
101. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
102. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
104. Considered resigned on December 28, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
105. resigned on December 28, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
106. Mufti of Denizli (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin
Dersim (6)

Abdülhak Tevfik Genctürk (1885-1966)\textsuperscript{107} IG

Hasan Hayri [Kanyo] \textsuperscript{(1880-1925)}\textsuperscript{108} IG

Mustafa Agha Öztürk \textsuperscript{(1859-1938)}\textsuperscript{109}

Mustafa Zeki Saltuk \textsuperscript{(1881-1969)}\textsuperscript{110} (BG) IG

Ramiz [Tan] \textsuperscript{(1884-1928)}\textsuperscript{111} (BG) IG

Diyab Agha [Yıldırım] \textsuperscript{(1852-1932)}\textsuperscript{112} BG

Diyarbakır (7)

Haci Sükrü Aydınşah \textsuperscript{(1883-1935)}\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{107} Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{108} Hanged by the Tribunal of Independence (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{109} Leader of Abbasoglu tribe (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)

\textsuperscript{110} Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirimbesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{111} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirimbesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{112} Leader of Ferhad Usagi tribe (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirimbesinci Yıldönümü Anis, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{113} Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
Edime (5)

Mehmed Seref Ay kut (1874-1939)\textsuperscript{120} BG

Cafer Tayyar Eğilmez (1879-1958)\textsuperscript{121} "IG"

İsmet İnönü (1884-1973)\textsuperscript{122} BG CHP

\textsuperscript{114} Military Academy. Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.


\textsuperscript{116} From Malta (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1339/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{117} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{118} Mekteb-i Mülkiye. Elected deputy for Diyarbakır on April 20, 1919 when he was Mutasarrif of Mus. When Chamber of Deputies was disbanded, he joined the Assembly at Ankara. He resigned when he was appointed Governor of Van (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetilleri, Vol.3, p.1050). Resigned on October 19, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

\textsuperscript{119} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{120} From Malta (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{121} From Greece (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

\textsuperscript{122} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbincisi Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
Faik Kaltakkiran (1870-1948) \(^{123}\) BG CHP
Kazim Karabekir (1882-1948) \(^{124}\) BG "IG"

Elaziz (7)

Hasan Tahsin Berk (1881-) \(^{125}\) CHP
Haci Feyzi Celayer (1859-1940) \(^{126}\) BG
Mustafa Sükrü [Caglayan] (1882-1920) \(^{127}\)
Muhiddin Cötelı (1866-1928) \(^{128}\) BG CHP
Hüseyin Gökcelik (1867-1933) \(^{129}\) BG CHP
Naci [Karaali] (1856-1926) \(^{130}\) BG
Rasim Tekin (1877-1938) \(^{131}\) BG

\(^{123}\) From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.

\(^{124}\) Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.


\(^{126}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.

\(^{127}\) Considered resigned on December 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

\(^{128}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.

\(^{129}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.

\(^{130}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.

\(^{131}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırdınlınumun Anis, pp.245-246.
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<td>Rüştü Bulduk</td>
<td>(1874-1924)</td>
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<td>Mahmud Signak</td>
<td>(1866-1942)</td>
<td>IG</td>
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<td>Nüzhet Saracoğlu</td>
<td>(1861-1942)</td>
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<td>Sirri Özata</td>
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<td>Kadri Bey</td>
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<td>(BG) IG</td>
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<td>Memduh Bey</td>
<td>(1892-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mehmed Emin Bey*</td>
<td>(1859-1952)</td>
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<td>Kazım Vehbi Oral*</td>
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<td>Ali Sefik Bey*</td>
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<td>Salih Efendi*</td>
<td>(1892-)</td>
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132. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

133. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

134. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

135. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

136. His deputyship was rejected on February 10, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

137. Resigned before joining the Assembly. Mehmed Emin was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

138. Resigned before joining the Assembly. Ali Sefik Bey was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

139. Resigned before joining the Assembly. Salih Efendi was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

140. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Ertugrul (7) (5)

Ahmed Dakse (1883- )

Mustafa Kemal Güney (1880-1943) IG

Halil Isik (1879-1935) BG IG

Necib Soyadan (1890-1939) IG

[Mehmed Salih Yesiloğlu] 146

[İsmet İnönü] 147

Osmanzade Hamdi Aksoy (1883-1957) BG CHP

Erzincan (5)

Hüseyin Aksu (1893- )


143. Lawyer (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

144. Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbeyinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.


146. Preferred Erzurum. İsmet İnönü was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

147. Preferred Edirne. Osmanzade Hamdi Bey was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)


149. Leader of Abbasusagi tribe (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Sheikh Haci Fevzi [Baysoy] (1864-1924)

Tevfik Kütükbasi (1880-1942)\(^{150}\) (BG) IG
Emin Lekili (1883- )\(^{151}\) (BG) IG
Osman Fevzi Topcu (1862-1939)\(^{152}\) BG

Erzurum (10)

Ismail Arslan (1863-1940)\(^{153}\) (BG) IG
Ziyaettin Gözübüyük\(^{\text{r}}\) (1877-1944)\(^{154}\) IG
Süleyman Necati Güneri (1892-1944)\(^{155}\) (BG) IG
Asım Vasfi Mühürdaroglu (1891-1966)\(^{156}\)
Zihni Orhan\(^{\text{r}}\) (1883-1955)\(^{157}\) IG

\(^{150}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YirmiBisinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\(^{151}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YirmiBisinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\(^{152}\) Muftı of Erzincan (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YirmiBisinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

\(^{153}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YirmiBisinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)


\(^{155}\) Owner of Albayrak (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YirmiBisinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\(^{156}\) Not reelected in 1923, but elected in 1927 and 1931 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)

\(^{157}\) Resigned on November 27, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I:
Mustafa Durak Sakarya (1876-1942)\textsuperscript{158} (BG)
Mehmed Nusret [Son] (1876-1930)\textsuperscript{159} (BG) IG
Hüseyin Avni Ulas (1887-1948)\textsuperscript{160} IG
Mehmed Salih Yesiloglu (1877-1954)\textsuperscript{161} IG
Celaleddin Arif Bey (1875-)\textsuperscript{162} IG

Eskisehir (7)

Eyüb Sabri Akgöl (1876-1950)\textsuperscript{163}
Hacı Veli Bayraktar (1857-)\textsuperscript{164} BG
Mehmed Niyazi Camoğlu (1863-1945)\textsuperscript{165} BG
Hüsrev Sami Kızıldogan (1884-1942)\textsuperscript{166} BG

\textsuperscript{158} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
\textsuperscript{159} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\textsuperscript{160} Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\textsuperscript{161} Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\textsuperscript{162} Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539). See Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeller, Vol.2, pp.956ff.
\textsuperscript{163} Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
\textsuperscript{164} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{165} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{166} Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
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<tr>
<td>Emin Sazak</td>
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<td>Halil Ibrahim Sipahi</td>
<td>(1862-1967)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdullah Azmi Torun</td>
<td>(1869-1937)</td>
<td>BG &quot;IG&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurrahman Lami [Ersoy]</td>
<td>(1875-1930)</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilic Ali</td>
<td>(1889-1971)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yasin Kutlug</td>
<td>(1889-</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hafiz Mehmed Sahin</td>
<td>(1877-1959)</td>
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<td>Ragib Yogun</td>
<td>(1876-1955)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Cenani Bey</td>
<td>(1872-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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167. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
168. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
170. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
171. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
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173. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
174. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
175. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
Gelibolu (1)

*Celal Nuri İleri* (1882-1938)\(^{176}\) CHP

Genc (6)

*Sheikh Fikri Ergün* (1869-1950)\(^{177}\) IG

*Fikri Faik Güngören* (1884-1956)\(^{178}\) IG

*Ali Vasif Telli* (1873-1936)\(^{179}\) BG

*Hamdi Yılmaz* (1879-1938)\(^{180}\) BG

*Mehmed Celal Bey* (1888-\(^{181}\) IG

*Ali Haydar Bey* (1880 1923)\(^{182}\) BG IG

Gümüşhane (6)

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177. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (*Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, p.539).

178. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (*Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, p.539).


180. Political affiliation according to *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü* Anıs, pp.245-246.

181. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (*Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, p.539).

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<td>Mustafa Darman</td>
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<td>Rusen Oktar</td>
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<td>Mehmed Sükrü [Ücüncüoglu]</td>
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<td>Tufan Ülker</td>
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<td>İbrahim Arvas</td>
<td>(1884-)</td>
<td>CHP</td>
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<td>Gölemrekli Ömer Efendi</td>
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<td>Seyyid Mustihiddin Pasha</td>
<td>( - )</td>
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183. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
184. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
186. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
188. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was appointed Governor of Bitlis in January 1919. He was dismissed as he attended the Erzurum Congress (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetler, Vol.3, pp.478-479). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
189. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye' de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952. p.539)
190. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
191. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
192. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23
Seyyid Taha Yılmaz

Icel (7) (6)

Sami Arkan (1887-1963) (BG) IG
Ali Riza Ataisik (1865-1942) (BG) IG
Sevki Göklevent (1886-1955) (BG) IG
Hacı Ali Sabri Güney (1885-1947) (BG) IG
Naim Ulusal (1874-1938) (BG) IG
İsmail-Safa Yılmaz (1895-1959) (BG) IG
Haydar Lütfi Aslan* (1885-1963) (BG) IG

193. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

194. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539). Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

195. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

196. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

197. Kadi of Tarsus (See Damar Arkoğlu, Hatıralarım, p.175ff). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539). Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

198. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

199. Resigned before joining the Assembly. Haydar Lütfi was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

200. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin YırmıBesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539). Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Isparta (6)

İsmail Remzi Berkün (1870-1955) IG
Hafız Ibrahim Demiralay (1883-1939) BG CHP
Hacı Tahir Kucur (1885-1960) (BG) IG
Cemal Mersinli Pasha (1873-1941) (BG) IG
Hüseyin Hüsnü Özdamar (1875-1961) BG CHP
Mehmed Nadir [Süldür] (1856-1928) IG

İstanbul (13)

Adnan Adıvar (1882-1955) BG "IG"
Ahmed Mazhar Akifoglu (1891-1968) (BG) IG

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201. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
202. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
203. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
204. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isım Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
205. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
206. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
207. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
208. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Vey sel Genya (Tarkan Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Ali Riza Bebe (1881-209) BG CHP
Hüseyin Hüsnü Isik (1879-1960)210 (BG) IG
Haci Arif Marlali ( 1938)211 (BG) IG
Ahmed Sükrü Oğuz (1881-1953)212 IG
Ali Fethi Okyar (1881-1943)213 BG CHP
Ahmed Ferid Tek (1877-1971)214 BG
Neset Özercan (1881-1945)215 BG CHP
Numan Usta (1885-1934)216
Ahmed Muhtar (1870-1934)217 BG
Salahaddin Beyd ( 1921)218

209. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
210. Mufti of Gebze (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
211. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
212. Military Academy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkçe'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
213. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
216. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
IZMİR (8)

Yunus Nadi Abalioglu (1879-1945)  BG CHP
Refet Bele Pasha (1881-1963)  BG "IG"
Mustafa Bengisu r (1880-1942)  BG
Hacı Süleyman Bilgen (1856-1923)
Mahmud Esad Bozkurt (1892-1943)  BG CHP
Enver Tekand (1887-1960)  (BG) IG
Tahsin Uzer (1879- )  CHP
Resid Bey d ( -1920)

220. Owner of Yeni Gün (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
221. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
223. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
Izmit (7)

Tahir Barlas\(^{r}\) (1888-1962)\(^{227}\)

Sirri Bellioglu (1876-1958)\(^{228}\) (BG) IG

Mehmed Fuad Carim\(^{r}\) (1892-1972)\(^{229}\)

Halil Ibrahim Gürsoy (1859-1926)\(^{230}\) (BG) IG

Hamdi Namık Gör (1879-1957)\(^{231}\) (BG) IG

Hafiz Abdullah Tezemir (1871-1940)

Yusuf Izzet Pasha\(^{r}\)\(^{232}\)

Karabisar-i Sahib (8)

Ömer Lütfi Argeo (1879-1942)\(^{233}\) (BG) IG

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227. Resigned on December 27, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

228. Minister of Economy (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)


230. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)


233. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Halil Hilmi Bozca (1886-) IG
Mustafa Hulusi Cağiğer (1872-1938) BG
Ismail Sükrü Celikalay (1876-1950) BG
Ali Cetinkaya (1878-1949) BG CHP
Mehmed Sükrü Koc (1887-1938) (BG) IG
Hulusi Kutluoğlu (1884-1948) IG
Nebil Yurteri (1877-1943) (BG) IG

Karphisar-i Sarki (5)

Mustafa Atay (1861-1925) IG
Mehmed Mesud Benli (1868-1937) IG

234. Considered resigned on August 8, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923). Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
235. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
236. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
237. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
238. Owner of Ikaz (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
239. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
240. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
241. Member of the IG according to Veyssel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Memduh Necdet Erbek</td>
<td>1890-1957</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mehmed Vasfi [Secer]</td>
<td>1863-1932</td>
<td>IG</td>
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<td>Ali Sururi Tönük</td>
<td>1888-1926</td>
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Karesi (7)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmed Vehbi Bolak</td>
<td>1881-1958</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
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<td>Hasan Basri Cantay</td>
<td>1887-1964</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacim Muhiddin Carikli</td>
<td>1881-1965</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
</tr>
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<td>Abdülgafur Istan</td>
<td>1879-1951</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazim Özalp Pasha</td>
<td>1880-1968</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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243. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yılimbesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.

244. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

245. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was dismissed from his post as Mutasarrif of Catalca by the Ferid Pasha Cabinet in February 1919. He returned to Balikesir where he joined the local resistance. He was elected President of İzmir Simali Cebheleri Heyeti-i Merkeziye; remained President until Balikesir was occupied on June 30, 1920. He attended the İzmir Economic Congress as representative of Balikesir landowners (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.1084-1086). See also Samed Agaoglu, Kuvay-i Milliye Ruhu, pp.226-227, where he writes that Bolak was the candidate of the Second Group for the Ministry of Education, when he replaced Tanrıöver. Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yılimbesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.

246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

247. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was appointed Governor of Bursa on May 16, 1920. Returned to Ankara when Bursa was occupied on July 6, 1920. He was appointed President of the Konya and East Tribunals of Independence (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.1029-1031). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yılimbesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.

248. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yılimbesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

249. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yılimbesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
Ibrahim Yörük (1877-1960) BG
[Kazım Karabekir Pasha]

Kars (3)

Ali Riza Ataman (1889-1955) (BG) IG
Cavid Erdel (1884-1933)
Fahrettin Erdogan (1874-1958) BG IG

Kastamonu (8)

Rüsdü Colakoglu (1872-1938)
Hasan Sabri Dura (1880-1938) IG
Hulusi Erdemir (1887-1962) BG
Mehmed Besim Fazlioglu (1878-)

250. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
251. Preferred Edirne (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
252. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
253. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
254. Resigned on November 22, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
255. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
256. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
257. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Abdülkadir Kemal Ögütcü (1889-258) IG
Murad [Pala]d (1881-1921)259
Suad Soyer (1879-1942)260 BG
Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk (1878-1969)261 BG CHP

Kayseri (7)

Remzi Akgöz (1876-1938)262
Rifat Calık'a (1888-1963)263 (BG) IG
Mehmed Alim Cinar (1861-1939)264 BG
Sabit Gözügeçgel (1876-1938)265 BG
Ahmed Hilmi Kalac (1887-1966)266 BG CHP

258. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
259. Died on September 22, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
262. Mufti of Kayseri. Resigned on November 9, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
263. Mayor of Kayseri; Minister of Justice. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllıkönmünü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
264. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllıkönmünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
265. Chief Editor of Misak. He was not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllıkönmünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
Mehmed Atif Tüzün (1885-1970) BG CHP
Osman Ussakli (1874-1944) IG

Kirşehir (8) (6)

Cemaleddin [Celebiogullari] (1862-1922)
Müfidd Kurutluoglu (1879-1958) (BG) IG
Sadik Savtekin (1874-1949) (BG) IG
Cevdet [Seckin] (1884-1931) IG
Riza [Silsüpur] (1877-1926) (BG) IG
Bekir [Kocaoglu] (1875-1930)
[Hakki Behic] (1874-1942) BG CHP

267. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was not reelected in 1923, but was reelected afterwards (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.4, no.1260. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbıscinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

268. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)


270. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbıscinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

271. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbıscinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

272. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbıscinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

273. Expelled when it was understood that Sadik had not resigned (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

274. Preferred Denizli. Yahya Galib was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

275. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbıscinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
Arif Baysal (1861-1945) 276 (BG) IG
Ömer Vehbi [Büyükyalvac] 277
Abdülhalim Celebi (1874-1945) 278 BG
Mehmed Vehbi Celik (1862-1949) 279 (BG) IG
Hulusi Göksu 280
Musa Kazim [Göksu] (1881-1930) 281 BG CHP
Refik Koraltan (1889- ) 282 BG CHP
Rifat Saatci (1869-1936) 283 IG CHP
Hacı Bekir [Sümer] (1867-1927) 284 BG CHP
Kazim Hüsnü Bey (1883-1934) 285 BG CHP

276. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
277. Resigned on May 22, 1338/1922 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defterleri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
278. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
279. Minister of Sharia and Pious Foundations (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
280. Considered resigned on April 30, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defterleri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
281. Minister of Sharia and Pious Foundations (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
282. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
283. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tariq Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
284. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
285. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin
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<td>Mustafa Cantekin</td>
<td>(1878-1955)</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<td>Hüseyin [Celik]</td>
<td>(1871-1927)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<td>Fikret Onuralp</td>
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<td>Besim Atalay</td>
<td>(1882-1965)</td>
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<td>Cemil Altay</td>
<td>(1868-1940)</td>
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Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
286. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
288. Mayor of Kozan (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
290. Resigned on October 7, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923), to be appointed Governor of Sivas (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
291. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
292. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Resigned from the BG (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
Sheikh Seyfi [Aydin] (1874-1925) (BG) IG
Cevdet Izrab Barlas (1891-1960) (BG) CHP
Ragib Soysal (1881-1947) (BG)
Haydar Bey (1878-) (BG) IG

Lazistan (6)

Abidin Atak (1879-1939) (BG) IG
Necati Memisoglu (1886-1953) (BG) IG
Osman Özgen (1890-1943) (IG)
Esad Özoguz (1873-1954) (BG) CHP
Ziya Hursid Bey (1890-1926) (BG) IG

293. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
294. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
295. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
296. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538)
297. Doctor (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
298. Lawyer (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
299. Engineer (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
300. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
301. Hanged by the Tribunal of Independence (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Sevki Bey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resid Agha Agar</td>
<td>1875-1935</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa Feyzi Bilgili</td>
<td>1882-1944</td>
<td>BG IG</td>
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<td>Lütfi [Evliyaoglu]</td>
<td>1867-1923</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<td>Hacı Bedir Agha [Fırat]</td>
<td>1872-1928</td>
<td>BG CHP</td>
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<td>Sitki Gür</td>
<td>1874-1952</td>
<td>IG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hacı Karip Agha [Taner]</td>
<td>1871-1925</td>
<td>BG IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsin Efendi</td>
<td>-1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacı Mustafa Efendi</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>İsmet Efendi</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IG according to Veysel Genya (Theais Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

302. Resigned on October 4, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
303. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
304. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
306. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
307. President of the Criminal Court at Malatya (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
308. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünün Anısı, pp.245-246.
310. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
311. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Abdullah

Mehmed Ali Efendi

Maras (8)

Mehmed Hasib [Aksöyek] (1880-1930) (BG) IG
Aslan Ata (1886-1963) BG
Pese Yakup Hamdi Bozdağr (1887- )
Rüsddü [Bozkurt] (1872-1932) BG
Tahsin Hüdaioglu (1887- ) BG IG
Refet [Seckin]r (1863-1928) BG
Hacı Mehmed Ertenr (1884- ) CHP

312. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.i.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
313. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
314. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veyesel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
315. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
316. Resigned on October 21, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) to be appointed as Sub-Governor of Pazarlık (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
317. Landowner (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
Ibrahim Agha ( - )

Mardin (6)

Hasan Tahsin [Artik] (1845-1921) 322 BG
Necib Güven (1876-1960) 323 BG
Esad Önen (1873-1936)
Ibrahim Turhan (1880-1968) 324 BG
Midhat Ulusal (1874-1925) 325 (BG) IG
Dervis Ural (1866-1925) 326 BG CHP

Mentese (12)

Tevfik Rüdü Aras (1883-1972) 327 BG CHP

321. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
322. Died on September 15, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
324. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.
325. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
326. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anı, pp.245-246.
Edhem Fehmi Arslanlı (1866-1947) \( ^{328} \) (BG) IG
Rifat Börekç Wells (1860-1941) \( ^{329} \)
Mahmud [Hendek] \( ^{d} \) ( -1920) \( ^{330} \)
Hamza Hayati [Öztürk] \( ^{d} \) (1868-1921) \( ^{331} \)
Sadettin Özsan (1874-1949) \( ^{332} \) BG
Emin Kamil Efendi Wells ( - ) \( ^{333} \)
Kazim Karabekir Wells \( ^{334} \)
Mesud Efendi Wells ( - ) \( ^{335} \)
Kasim Nuri Bey Wells ( - ) \( ^{336} \)
Hacı Ahmed Efendi Wells ( - ) \( ^{337} \)
Ziya Bey Wells ( - ) \( ^{338} \)

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328. Mekteb-i Mücliyete. He was dismissed from his post on June 14, 1914 as Mutasarrif of Silivri. He remained unemployed until March 10, 1919, when he was appointed as Mutasarrif of Canik. He was appointed member to the Kayseri and Yozgat Tribunals of Independence in 1921 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mücliyete Tarihi ve Mücliyeliler, Vol. 3, p.427). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’dedeki Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
329. Resigned on October 27, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
331. Died on March 14, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
332. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
334. Preferred Edirne (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
335. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
336. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
337. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
338. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Mersin (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth-Death</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fahreddin Altay Pasha</td>
<td>(1880-197)</td>
<td>CHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf Ziya Eraydin</td>
<td>(1890-1952)</td>
<td>(BG) IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhtar Fikri [Gücün]</td>
<td>(1879-1930)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<td>Salahaddin Köseoglu</td>
<td>(1882- )</td>
<td>IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Safa Özler</td>
<td>(1885-1940)</td>
<td>BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emin Efendi f</td>
<td>( - )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Hüsnü Konay f</td>
<td>(1876- )</td>
<td>CHP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mus (7)

339. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırdıcmi Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

340. Landowner (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırdıcmi Anıs, pp.245-246.

341. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

342. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. Journalist. Minister of Education (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973). He was elected Minister of Education despite Atatürk’s objections in October 1922 (Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.299, quoted in All Cankaya, Yeni Müktebi Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.1180-1182). He was the son of a large Adana landowner. In late 1913, he opened a private secondary school at Adana, called Turan Mektebi; he was the headmaster of that school until 1918 (All Cankaya, Yeni Müktebi Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, p.1181). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırdıcmi Anıs, pp.245-246.

343. Resigned on July 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

Haci Ahmed Hamdi Bilgin (1869-1943) BG
Osman Kadri [Bingöl] (1881-1930) BG
Kasim Dede (1886-1958) IG
Abdülgani Ertan (1889-) (BG) IG
Ali Riza Kotan (1890-1951) BG IG
Hacı Ilyas Sami Mus (1881-) CHP
Mahmud Said Yetgin (1885-1954) (BG) IG

Nigde (6)

Mehmed Ata [Atay] (1882-1931) BG CHP
Mustafa Vehbi [Corakci] (1876-1932) BG

345. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
347. Member of the IG according to VeySEL Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
348. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
350. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
351. Doctorate at Law (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
352. Mekteb-İ Mülkiye. When he was Mutasarrif of Maras, he was elected deputy for Nigde in December of 1918. He was Minister of the Interior between April 29 and June 30, 1921; October 21, 1921 to March 3, 1923; December 25, 1923 to March 7, 1924 (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetler, Vol.3, p.1071). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anis, pp.245-246.
353. Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan
Mustafa Hilmi Soydan (1881-1958)\textsuperscript{354} BG
Mustafa [Soylu]\textsuperscript{d} (1883-1921)\textsuperscript{355}
Hakki Sütekin Pasha (1867-1942)\textsuperscript{356} BG IG
Abidin Efendi\textsuperscript{r} (1869-1944)\textsuperscript{357}

Oltu (2)

Rüstem Acar (1866-1952)\textsuperscript{358} BG IG
Yasin Hasimoglu Akdag (1895- )\textsuperscript{359} (BG) IG

Saruhan (9)

Mahmud Celal Bayar (1884-1985)\textsuperscript{360} BG CHP

\textsuperscript{354} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar Anıları, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{355} Died on January 6, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

\textsuperscript{356} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar Anıları, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{357} Resigned on October 11, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

\textsuperscript{358} Landowner (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar Anıları, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{359} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar Anıları, pp.245-246. Considered to have resigned from the BG (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyası Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veyser Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyası Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{360} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Anılar Anıları, pp.245-246.
Ismail Hakki Calli\textsuperscript{f} (1877- )\textsuperscript{361} BG CHP
Refik Sevket Ince (1885-1955)\textsuperscript{362} BG CHP
Resad [Kayali] (1881-1926)\textsuperscript{363} BG IG
Mustafa Necati [Ugural] (1892-1929)\textsuperscript{364} BG CHP
Ömer Lütfi Ünlü (1881-1951)\textsuperscript{365} BG CHP
Ibrahim Süreyya Yigit (1880-1952)\textsuperscript{366} BG CHP
Avni [Zaimler] Pasha (1876-1930)\textsuperscript{367} BG CHP
Resid Bey (1877- )\textsuperscript{368} BG CHP

Siird (6)

Salih Atalay (1873-1961)\textsuperscript{369} BG IG

\textsuperscript{361}. Resigned on July 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. \textit{Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923})
\textsuperscript{362}. Elected for Manisa in 1931, 1935, 1939 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Toplantıları Yıllık Osmanlı’nın Anıları, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{363}. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Toplantıları Yıllık Osmanlı’nın Anıları, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{364}. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Toplantıları Yıllık Osmanlı’nın Anıları, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{365}. Landowner (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
\textsuperscript{366}. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He was dismissed from office [Mutasarrif of İzmit] by the Ferid Pasha Cabinet on March 10, 1919. He travelled with Orbay through Bandırma, Manisa, Denizli, Usak, Ankara, and Samsun to Amasya, where he signed the Amasya Protocol. He was Amasya delegate at the Erzurum Congress, and Balikesir delegate at the Sivas Congress. He was elected deputy for Saruhan in October 1919. He joined the Ankara Assembly when the Chamber of Deputies was closed on March 16, 1920. He was instrumental in putting forth the motion that gave Atatürk the title of Gazi [Kanun #153] (Ali Cankaya, \textit{Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler}, Vol.3, pp.831-833). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Toplantıları Yıllık Osmanlı’nın Anıları, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{367}. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yıllık Toplantıları Yıllık Osmanlı’nın Anıları, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{368}. Dismissed on January 8, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. \textit{Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923})
\textsuperscript{369}. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin
Halil Hulki Aydin (1869-1940)\textsuperscript{370} BG CHP

Hacı Nuri Bayam (1869-1940)

Hacı Mustafa Sabri Baysan (1887-1960)\textsuperscript{371} (BG) IG

Necmeddin [Bilgin] (1875-1933)

Kadri Oktay (1888-1956)

Sinop (6)

Serif [Avkan] (1845-1929)\textsuperscript{372} BG

Abdullah Karabina (1867-1935)\textsuperscript{373} BG

Rıza Nur (1878-1942)\textsuperscript{374} BG Opp

Sevket Peker (1880-1936)\textsuperscript{375} BG

Hakki Hami Ulukan (1889-1938)\textsuperscript{376} (BG) IG

Rıza Vamık Uras (1877-1946)\textsuperscript{377} BG

\textit{Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs}, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{370} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{371} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyası Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{372} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{373} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{374} Doctor (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{375} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.

\textsuperscript{376} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyası Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

\textsuperscript{377} Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
Sivas (8)

Mehmed Rasim Basara (1882-1945) 378 BG CHP
Ziyaeddin Basara (1869-1943) 379 BG CHP
Mustafa Taki Dogruyol (1873-1925) 380 BG
Vasif [Karakol] (1871-1931) 381 IG
Emir Marsan Pasha (1860-1940) 382 (BG) IG
Hüseyin Rauf Orbay (1881-1967) 383 [BG] Opp
Hayri [Sigirci] r (1888-1931) 384
Bacanakzade Ziya Bey r ( - ) 385

Siverek (8) (6)

378. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Meclis Anıları, pp.245-246.
379.Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Meclis Anıları, pp.245-246.
380. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Meclis Anıları, pp.245-246.
381. From Malta (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1339/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tark Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
382. Landowner, graduate of Law School (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yıllık Meclis Anıları, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tark Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
384. Resigned on October 21, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Mustafa Lütfi Azer \( (1880-1939)^{386} \) IG
Abdülgani Ensari \( (1887-\ )^{387} \) BG CHP
Bekir Sütki Ocak \( (1881-1936)^{388} \) BG
Mehmed Sirri [Tayanc] \( (1876-1923)^{389} \) (BG) IG
[Abdülhamed Hamdi]^r \( ^{390} \)
[Kadri Ücok]^r \( ^{391} \)
Ihsan Saglam *r \( (1877-1953)^{392} \) IG
Mehmed Rauf Bey *r \( (\ - \ )^{393} \)

Tokat (7) (6)

Rifat Arkun \( (1872-1945)^{394} \) BG

\(^{386}\) Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\(^{387}\) Not reelected in 1927 (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
\(^{388}\) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
\(^{389}\) Resigned from the BG (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
\(^{390}\) Preferred Diyarbakır. Ihsan was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. İsim Deftleri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{391}\) Preferred Diyarbakır. Mehmed Rauf was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. İsim Deftleri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{393}\) Resigned on October 27, 13336/1920 (T.B.M.M. İsim Deftleri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
\(^{394}\) Mayor of Tokat (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmibesinci Yıldönümünü Anısı, pp.245-246.
Izzet [Genc]d  (1865-1923)395
Hamdi [Mütevellioglu]  (1884-1932)396 IG
Ali Nazim [Öztelli] Resmor  (1867-1935)397 CUP
Sheikh Sükrü Keskinr  (1888-1948)398
Hoca Fehmi Efendi  ( - )399
Mustafa Vasfi Süsoy  (1876-1934)400 BG CHP

Trabzon (+) (7)

Recai [Baykal]  (1886-1933)401 BG CHP
Hüsrev Gerede  (1885-1962)402 BG CHP
Ali Sükrü Bey  (1884-1923)403 IG

396. Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
397. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. He joined the Yanya Committee of Union and Progress after 1907, and played a role in the Revolution at Yanya. He was dismissed by the Ferid Pasha Cabinet for his connections with the Committee of Union and Progress. He was elected Minister of the Interior as the opposition's candidate by receiving ninety-eight votes against eighty-nine. He was forced to resign by Atatürk two days later. He was accused of treason. The Assembly revoked his deputyship on May 12, 1921. He was tried and sentenced to fifteen years' hard labour (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler, Vol.3, pp.405-406). Dismissed on May 12, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Mekteb-i Mülkiye (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973)
398. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
399. Resigned [before joining the Assembly?]. Mustafa Vasfi was elected in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
400. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
401. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anıs, pp.245-246.
402. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümü Anısı, pp.245-246.
403. Killed on April 2, 1339/1923 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923) Owner of Tan. Member of the IG according to
Izzet [Eyüboğlu] (1861-1920)
Faik [Ayyab] (1865-1930)
Hamid Bey (1878-)
Sabri Nemlizade (1860-)
Nebizade Hamdi Ülkümen* (1888-1969) BG CHP
Hasan Hüsnü Saka* (1886-1960) BG CHP
Celaleddin [Aykar] (1867-1929)
Hafiz Mehmed Engin* (1874-1926) (BG) IG

Urfa (5)

Ali Saib Ursavas (1887-1939) BG CHP

Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
404. Died on May 13, 1336/1920. Hamdi was elected in his place (T.B.M.M.
Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
405. Resigned on October 4, 1336/1920. Hasan was elected in his place
(T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
406. Considered resigned on October 21, 1336/1920. Hafiz Mehmed was elected
in his place (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan
1339/1923)
407. Resigned on September 23, 1336/1920. Celaleddin was elected in his place
(T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
408. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin
Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anış, pp.245-246.
409. Mekteb-i Mükkiye. He was elected deputy for Trabzon in January 1919. He
came to Ankara on February 6, 1921. He was elected Minister of Finance in December
of 1921; Minister of Economy in April of 1922; Minister of Commerce in November
of 1922. He was a delegate at the Lausanne Conference (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mükkiye Tarihi
ve Mükkiyeiller, Vol.3, pp.1191-1193). Political affiliation according to Türkiye
Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anış, pp.245-246.
410. Hanged by the Tribunal of Independence (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Albümü, 23 Nisan 1920-14 Ekim 1973) Political affiliation according to Türkiye
Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anış, pp.245-246. Considered to
have resigned from the BG (Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-
1952, p.538). Member of the IG according to Veysel Genya (Tarik Zafer Tunaya,
Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
411. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin
Yirmibesinci Yıldönümü'nü Anış, pp.245-246.
Esad Bey\(^f\) \(\quad\) \(^412\)  
Hacı Hayali Efendi\(^d\) \(1869-1922\) \(^413\)  
Hacı Mustafa Efendi\(^f\) \(\quad\) \(^414\)  
Pozan Bey \(\quad\) \(^415\) (BG) IG

Van (7)

Tevfik Demiroğlu \(1862-1933\) \(^416\) BG  
Emin Girdivan\(^f\) \(1874-\) \(^417\)  
Hasan Siddik Haydari \(1887-1966\)  
Hakki Ungan \(1880-1943\) \(^418\) BG IG-CHP  
Haydar Hilmi Vaner \(1873-1954\) \(^419\) BG IG  
Kamil Mendi\(^f\) \(1876-\) \(^420\)

412. Considered resigned on October 9, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

413. Died on January 26, 1338/1922 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

414. Considered resigned on October 9, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

415. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbessinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL Genya (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’dede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

416. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbessinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.


418. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbessinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

419. Mekteb-ı Mülkiye. He was appointed Governor of Van in December of 1918. He was dismissed as he supported the resistance movement. He attended the Sivas Congress as Van delegate (Ali Cankaya, Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyetiller, Vol.3, pp.814-815). Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin Yırmıbessinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

420. Resigned before joining the Assembly (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)
Sheikh Masum Efendi

(1885- )

421. Resigned on July 6, 1336/1920 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

Yozgat (7)

Mehmed Hulusi Akyol

(1885- )

422. IG

Ahmed Baydar

(1866-1940)

423. BG

Ismail Fazıl [Cebesoy] Pasha

(1856-1921)

424

Riza [Ersoy]

(1860-1926)

Süleyman Sirri İcöz

(1878-1963)

425. BG CHP

Bahri Tatlıoğlu

(1880-1957)

426. (BG) IG

Feyyaz Ali Üst

(1879-1942)

427. (BG) IG

423. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

424. Died on April 18, 1337/1921 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre I: 23 Nisan 1336/1920-16 Nisan 1339/1923)

425. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246.

426. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)

427. Political affiliation according to Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Yırmıbesinci Yıldönümünü Anıs, pp.245-246. Member of the IG according to VeySEL GENYA (Tarih Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952, p.539)
Chapter 16

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice of Mudanya, preparations started for the upcoming Peace Conference. One of the most important issue was the election of the conference delegates. There was every indication that the composition of the Turkish delegation would be hotly debated in the Assembly, as a great number of deputies had no trust in the Kemalist leadership and its likely choice of delegates.

In order not to face another Kemalist fait accompli, the majority of the deputies expressed their overwhelming support for Orbay’s candidacy for the position of Chief Plenipotentiary in the Conference even before any formal discussion on the issue took place.1 Orbay had all the qualifications that the deputies could ask for: he was a well known personality in European circles; he was experienced and had excellent command of English --both of which made him the best choice possible. Deputies had little objection to the nomination of Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Riza Nur, Minister of Health, as the other members of the delegation, provided that Orbay was appointed the Chief Plenipotentiary.2

Atatürk, however, was firmly opposed to Orbay’s nomination.3 It was anticipated that he preferred Fethi Okyar to be the Chief Plenipotentiary, and that he would push for his appointment. Besides being a close confidant of Atatürk, Okyar had a reputation for

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completely lacking any initiative of his own. There was no doubt that he would blindly obey Atatürk, rather than follow the cabinet's instructions. As such, he suited perfectly well for Atatürk's schemes of having the delegation under his own control. Some cabinet members, particularly Tengirsenk and Nur, had objections to Okyar's nomination.⁴

At a cabinet meeting held on or shortly before October 15, at which Atatürk was also present, there was a discussion on the topic of likely candidates to lead the delegation. In order to prevent Okyar's nomination, Tengirsenk intervened and proposed that Orbey lead the delegation as he had both the cabinet members' and the deputies' confidence. All cabinet members, with the exception of Riza Nur, supported this proposal, which left Atatürk with little choice but accept it. As for the other members of the delegation, the cabinet chose Riza Nur, and, upon Atatürk's insistence and Orbey's consent, İsmet İnönü as Military Advisor.⁵ Despite the cabinet's agreement on Orbey as Chief Plenipotentiary, Atatürk did not cease trying to impose his choice upon the cabinet. Having secured İnönü's nomination as Military Advisor, he then insisted that İnönü would be an excellent choice to lead the delegation. Atatürk was, however, unsuccessful in his push, as the cabinet refused to even discuss the matter any further.⁶

However, a technical problem stood in the way of Orbey's appointment as Chief Plenipotentiary. It was immediately understood that Prime Ministers of neither Great Britain nor France would participate in the Peace Conference. Instead, these countries would be represented at the level of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Under these circumstances, it immediately became clear that Orbey could not represent Turkey at the Conference.⁷

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⁴. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, 3, p.961. See also, Günvar Otmanbölük, İsmet Pasa Dosyasi, 1, p.130.
Riza Nur had expressed to Atatürk his dissatisfaction with the election of Orbay as Chief Plenipotentiary even before it became known that countries would be represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. His choice, just as Atatürk's, lay with İsmet İnönü, another close confidant and trusted friend of Atatürk. But İsmet İnönü's appointment was technically impossible as he was neither Minister for Foreign Affairs nor even a member of the Orbay Cabinet. Before leaving for Bursa on the night of October 15, Atatürk informed Riza Nur that he had already made up his mind to appoint İnönü as Chief Plenipotentiary and that he would find a way to achieve that end.\(^8\)

Upon his arrival at Bursa, Atatürk met with his trusted colleagues, namely, İsmet İnönü Pasha, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, and Kazım Özalp Pasha, Minister of Defence. Kazım Karabekir and Refet Bele Pashas were also at Bursa, attending the discussions. The only objection to İnönü's appointment as Chief Plenipotentiary came from Kazım Karabekir Pasha; his objections, however, did not carry any weight. Having convinced himself of the unconditional support of the military, Atatürk proceeded with his plan. He sent a telegramme to Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk ordering him to resign the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs and recommend, in his letter of resignation to the Assembly, İsmet İnönü his successor.\(^9\)

Forced to obey Atatürk's highly irregular order, Tengirsenk handed in his resignation which was read at the October 25 sitting of the Assembly.\(^10\) Fiercely opposed to İnönü's nomination to the post, a delegation of Second Group deputies approached Riza Nur and declared their readiness to support him as their candidate for the Ministry. However, Nur rejected this offer.\(^11\) When this strategy failed, Adnan Adivar, the liberal

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deputy for Istanbul, submitted a motion, requesting the Assembly to disregard Tengirsenk's letter of resignation and give him a leave of absence instead. Abdülhak Tevfik Genctürk, deputy for Dersim, Feyyaz Ali Üst, deputy for Yozgat, and Yusuf Ziya Eraydın, deputy for Mersin, all Second Group deputies, made speeches supporting Adivar's motion and protesting Tengirsenk's forced resignation. Adivar's motion was put to vote and accepted by the majority of the deputies. This was followed by Rauf Orbay's motion for the nomination of Riza Nur to temporarily take over the Ministry during Tengirsenk's absence. Deputies also passed this motion, thus preventing the takeover of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by İnönü.\(^\text{12}\)

Atatürk, however, was not the type to accept defeat easily. At the next day's sitting, Musa Kazim Göksu, a staunch Atatürk supporter who by now had become quite infamous for breaking rules and regulations whenever Kemalists faced unsurmountable opposition, took the chair as presiding Speaker of the Assembly. Disregarding the previous day's decision, he announced that the Assembly would immediately proceed to elect a successor to Tengirsenk. Despite Hakki Hami Ulukan's protests that they had not been properly informed and that it was not even on the official agenda, Göksu proceeded, violating the Assembly rules. Fiercely opposed by Second Group deputies, İnönü was nevertheless nominated, and declared elected by one hundred and fifty-five votes out of a total of one hundred and seventy-four.\(^\text{13}\)

Having been formally invited to the Peace Conference with an Allied Note dated October 27, the Orbay Cabinet met on October 31 to discuss the course of action.\(^\text{14}\) To the astonishment of all cabinet members, Atatürk immediately suggested that they elect the delegation for the Conference, pretending as if the question had not been settled a fortnight

\(^\text{12}\) T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, pp.183-185; and, Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Vatan Hizmetinde, p.286.

\(^\text{13}\) T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, pp.198-208; and Günvar Otmanbölüük, Ismet Pasa Dosyasi, 1, p.132.

ago. Without allowing for anyone to raise objection, he proceeded by declaring that he personally favoured İnönü to lead the delegation --a suggestion that left Orbay as well as some other ministers dumbfounded. Without asking for the cabinet's opinion, he then put forward Hasan Saka's name as the Financial Advisor. Left with no choice, the cabinet reluctantly consented to his and Riza Nur's nominations as well as İnönü's. 15

As these nominations were in express disapproval of some cabinet members as well as a great number of deputies, the November 2 sitting of the Assembly promised to be rousing. Indeed, at the very start of the closed sitting, Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin and one of the leaders of the Second Group, asked Orbay whom the delegates represented. Upon Orbay's half-hearted answer that they represented the government, Köseoglu went on to say that a great many deputies had objections to the method of election. Insisting that the Assembly had not relinquished its right to appoint conference delegates to the cabinet, Köseoglu urged that the Assembly should proceed to elect the delegates itself. He also rhetorically asked how the government could select persons that totally lacked the deputies' confidence. 16

Hakki Hami Ulukan, another Second Group deputy for Sinop, expressed the opinion shared by many that he was confident the Assembly would reject the government's choice in favour of others. Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu], deputy for Bitlis, criticised the Kemalist misinformation campaign in the columns of the semi-official Hakimiyet-i Milliye and the Kemalist Yeni Gün, both of which alleged that the selected delegates conformed to the will of the nation. In quite strong language, Ulukan and Köseoglu argued that there was no difference between the absolutist monarchy the Assembly had abolished just a few days ago and the Kemalist rule established in its place. Köseoglu went on to accuse the cabinet for violating the principle of national sovereignty. Declaring that the nation would not

15. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratım, 3, p.963. See also, Günvar Otmanbölük, Ismet Pasa Dosyasi, 1, p.132. For the government decree, see T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, p.335.
accept *fait accompli* anymore, he maintained that the nation demanded to have its voice heard.\(^{17}\)

Ziya Hursid Bey, another prominent Second Group deputy for Lazistan, asserted that the Assembly had fought for three years in order to preserve the rights of the nation against absolutist encroachments. He expressed his confidence that at such a vital issue as the conclusion of peace, the Assembly would reassert its determination to protect the citizens' rights of representation. He rhetorically asked which deputy would forsake his responsibility to his constituency.\(^{18}\)

Motions to this effect already been forwarded on October 30, other Second Group deputies, including Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, Mehmed Vehbi Celik, deputy for Konya, Mehmed Sükrü Koc, deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib, and Süleyman Sirri İcöz, deputy for Yozgat, joined in, fervently defending the right of the Assembly in electing the members of the delegation.\(^{19}\)

Besides the method of selection, deputies also questioned the competence of the delegates. Sirri Bellioglu, Second Group deputy for Izmit, brought into question Riza Nur and İsmet İnönü's lack of a commanding knowledge of any foreign language.\(^{20}\) Köseoglu and Ulas worried about the list of advisors, urging that a sufficiently large number of competent Turkish experts abroad or at Istanbul who were well acquainted with Turkey's financial obligations and who had previously attended conferences as high level negotiators

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be appointed to work with the delegation. They both argued that Turkey could not afford not employing financial experts with ten to fifteen years of experience behind them.\footnote{21} Doubtless, this was an oblique reference to financial experts such as Cavid Bey, the Unionist ex-Minister of Finance. Celik called upon the wisdom of sending six junior officers to Lausanne at considerable --and quite unnecessary-- expense while the delegation lacked proper advisors.\footnote{22}

Despite all the uproar concerning the method of selection as well as the question of competence, Kemalist leadership showed its determination by putting to vote not the motion of the Second Group but the Kemalist one drawn up by Yasin Kutlug, deputy for Gaziantep. Although there were protests that multiple votes were being cast by Kemalist deputies, it was declared that the Kemalist motion accepting the government's choice of delegates was passed by one hundred and twenty-one votes to sixty-one against and ten undecided.\footnote{23}

Having secured Ismet Inönü's appointment to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Kemalist leadership asked for leave of absence for the three plenipotentiaries as well as the other deputies who had been appointed as advisors.\footnote{24} The November 3 sitting of the Assembly, during which the government's request was discussed, proved to be yet another occasion for registering opposition to the choice of plenipotentiaries. Despite Riza Nur's plea for unanimous support for his leave of absence, Second Group deputies were adamant in their opposition.\footnote{25} Only one hundred and twenty-two deputies voted in favour of granting Riza Nur a leave of absence, while fifty-four voted against with thirteen undecided. Hasan Saka received a somewhat less negative vote.\footnote{26} Ziya Hursid Bey took the floor and said that Riza Nur, having received almost seventy negative votes, could not
represent Turkey.  

AFTER LONG DELIBERATIONS, the Assembly instructed Ismet İnönü to obtain the realization of four main points at the Lausanne Conference. These were to draw the western frontiers of Turkey to be in accordance with the National Pact, to demand a war indemnity to be paid by Greece, to achieve the complete independence of Turkey in financial, economic, and political matters by suppressing capitulations, and to ask for the modification of the frontiers of Iraq with a view of having Mosul returned to Turkish administration. These also reflected the Orbay cabinet's views.

Private instructions, however, were completely different. Badly in need of foreign support in the shape of a Peace Treaty which would allow him to turn his attention to domestic affairs and continue his highly despotic and unpopular rule, Atatürk called for unconditional surrender. He advised İnönü to withdraw the Turkish demand for Western Thrace. He instructed İnönü to cede even Istanbul in order to conclude peace. With regard to Mosul, Atatürk said that the Turkish plenipotentiaries should not even bother discussing the topic with the British Government.

Atatürk also placated the European public opinion by giving an interview published in the November 1 issue of Petit Parisien, in which he, after paying lip service to Turkish demands concerning the suppression of capitulations, declared himself to be in favour of an open door economic policy, adding that he warmly welcomed foreign capital. With regard to the Straits, he said that Turkey was aware of the Allied Powers' interest in the issue, and that she was ready to accept whatever the European Powers decided on the issue.

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27. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 24, p.338.
30. "Kemalist Leader's Views: French Attitude to Peace Conference", The Times, November 2, 1922, p.11. This interview has also been published in the November 2 issue of Tanin. For the Turkish text of this interview see, Nimet Unan (Compilor), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeleri, 3, pp.48-52.
On November 5, having received Atatürk's private instructions for total surrender, İnönü left Ankara, arriving in Istanbul on November 7. In Istanbul, he held private discussions with Cavid Bey on financial matters and later asked to join him as financial advisor in his private capacity—to which Cavid Bey obliged. On November 9, the delegation left Istanbul for Lausanne.

The Lausanne Conference was opened on November 20 by M. Haab, the President of the Swiss Confederation. After his opening speech, Lord Curzon spoke on behalf of the Allies, expressing the hope that this conference would succeed in concluding peace. Immediately following Lord Curzon's speech, Ismet İnönü, against accepted procedure and despite Poincaré’s intervention, took the floor, and read a prepared statement in poor French which, besides being utterly undiplomatic, was highly nationalistic in tone.

İnönü's sharp remarks at the very start of the Conference served no purpose other than creating an atmosphere of uneasiness. Allied plenipotentiaries did not miss the opportunity to register their protests at this highly irregular move. At the end of İnönü's speech, it was observed that no Allied head of state or plenipotentiary applauded him; the only exception was Mussolini. This negative move which was considered to have been a diplomatic blunder was immediately criticised by the liberal Turkish press, most notably by Tanin.

In addition to their diplomatic inexperience, the Turkish plenipotentiaries had also

31. Tevfik Bıyıklioğlu, Trakya’da Milli Mücadele, 1, p.469; Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam, 1, p.221; and, "İsmet Pasha's Arrival", The Times, November 8, 1922, p.12.
35. Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Pasa, p.65; and, Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam, 1, p.223.
arrived at Lausanne totally unprepared. They had neither detailed proposals to make nor comprehensive reports to defend the Turkish position. 36 Turkish state of unpreparedness was confirmed on November 22, at the very first meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission. At the start of the meeting, Lord Curzon invited İnönü to state the Turkish point of view with respect to the frontiers of Thrace. İnönü's one-sentence statement on this important issue forced Lord Curzon to enquire whether the Turkish delegation did not wish to justify its demands by historical, geographical, political or ethnographic arguments. He added that the Conference could not make a pronouncement on this question after having heard a mere statement of claims from the Turkish side. 37

Speaking in Turkish, İnönü made another short statement, elaborating in summary fashion the Turkish point of view without going into any substantial detail. 38 Unsatisfied with İnönü's yet another short but imprecise and vague answer, Lord Curzon asked him to give the Conference some further explanations in support of his claim that the greater part of Thrace west of the Maritza was Turkish in character. Totally unprepared in one of the most important topics that was being discussed at the Conference, İnönü said that he would reply to this question after consultation with his expert advisors. 39 He further manifested his incompetence by not being able to answer the Greek plenipotentiary when Lord Curzon enquired whether he would like to reply to Venilezos who had competently argued for the Greek position and criticised the Turkish point of view. 40

During the second meeting of the same commission held the same afternoon, Stambouliisky, the Bulgarian plenipotentiary, was invited to state his country's position.

Inönü could not answer him as well. Instead, he asked for an adjournment to examine the Bulgarian proposals. Expressing his astonishment that the Turks were not ready, Lord Curzon said that he did not think that any points put before the Conference that day could have come as a surprise to the Turkish delegates. The first day of the Conference ended with a clear exposure of total Turkish ineptitude.

Aware of the ineptitude and suspicious of the real intentions of the Kemalist plenipotentiaries at Lausanne, the Second Group deputies in the Assembly asked the government to give information on the Conference. On November 22, Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu], the Second Group deputy for Bitlis, mentioned press reports informing that the British, French, and Italian plenipotentiaries had met before the Conference had convened and had agreed among themselves with respect to Allied conduct at the Conference. He asked the government to respond to these news.

One response of the Kemalist government was the institution of censure on the press. Despite the existence of censure which made explicit criticism impossible, the little the liberal Istanbul press could publish made it quite clear that Turkey faced considerable resistance from both the Allies and the Balkan states. The propaganda which had been much publicised by the Kemalist newspapers concerning Turkish strength at Lausanne was discarded in view of the publication of the more realistic assessments in the liberal press. It was natural that more criticism of Kemalist policy would follow.

Meanwhile at Lausanne, discussions opened on the Ottoman Public Debt on November 27 with the first meeting of the Economic and Financial Commission. At the November 28 meeting of the Commission, Inönü insisted that the Ottoman Empire no longer existed. He gave the impression that the Kemalist government did not consider itself

the sole heir of the old regime, and, although ready to accept a certain share of the Ottoman Public Debt, was unwilling to be bound by the various conventions and agreements reached at with the creditors in the past.\textsuperscript{45}

Barrère, the French plenipotentiary who presided the meetings of the Economic and Financial Commission, declared that the Ottoman Public Debt was an institution whose status had been defined by the Muharrem Decree of 1881 and had been placed under the European Powers' guarantee. Summing up that the Ottoman Public Debt was a regular arrangement between Turkey and her creditors, who at the time of the formation of the Commission of the Ottoman Public Debt had accepted a reduction of about two-thirds of their claims, Barrère concluded that Turkey should think carefully before destroying the credit which she urgently needed for the purpose of raising money.\textsuperscript{46}

Hasan Saka was responsible for the economic and financial issues, as neither Ismet İnönü nor Riza Nur were knowledgeable in these matters. However, Saka, though nominally an expert, was also not a competent negotiator. Just as his colleagues, he, too, had arrived at Lausanne unprepared. The Ottoman Public Debt was the most important issue besides the question of capitulations. Yet, Saka was not even able to state with precision how much total debt Turkey owed to her creditors.\textsuperscript{47}

In response to Second Group questioning, Rauf Orbay made a speech on November 29 in the Assembly, giving information concerning the proceedings at the Conference. He stated that the Greek side insisted on the Maritza line as the border, but that the Turkish side demanded the restoration of the 1913 border which included Karaagac. Defending the National Pact, Orbay assured the Assembly that Mosul was regarded as Turkish territory and that the plenipotentiaries would pursue to have Mosul returned to


Turkish rule. 48

Criticism of the Turkish delegation was not confined to the Assembly alone. As a matter of fact, there was increasingly widespread dissatisfaction in regard to the absence of concrete results at the Lausanne Conference among the people at large, which found an outlet in the pages of liberal newspapers. In its December 4 issue, the opposition newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar stated that the Lausanne Conference was wasting time in futile discussions while the promised fulfilment of the National Pact was awaited by a Turkish army two hundred thousand strong, which had ceased operations in accordance with European appeals. Since Kemalist censure strictly forbade any direct attack against the conduct of the Turkish plenipotentiaries, Vakit, another liberal Istanbul newspaper, criticised the Kemalist policy by way of reprimanding Lord Curzon’s efforts to impose yet another Sèvres Treaty, adding that the Turks would not yield an iota of the National Pact. 49

One of the most important meetings of the Territorial and Military Commission was the ninth one of December 4. In that meeting, the question of the Straits was addressed. As usual, Lord Curzon asked İnönü to state the Turkish proposal with reference to the regime Turkey desired to have instituted. As at previous occasions, İnönü made a very brief statement which not only lacked any argument but, more than that, suggested that Turkey was ready to accept the Allied Powers’ point of view. 50 This statement conformed exactly to what had Atatürk said in the Petit Parisien interview of November 1, and as such, confirmed Turkish submission to the Allied Powers.

İnönü’s brief statement astonished Lord Curzon, who remarked that his declaration

was not to be the only contribution of the Turkish delegation to the discussion. He said he had thought that İnönü would furnish his views on the complicated issues surrounding the Straits Question and indicate how the interests of Turkey could be reconciled with the other great interests involved. It was obvious that unless İnönü made such a contribution, the discussion would be abortive. Despite Lord Curzon's repeated invitations, İnönü replied by saying that he had nothing further to say at present. Upon İnönü's refusal to defend Turkish interests on such a vital issue, Lord Curzon was left with no choice but invite the next plenipotentiary, Chicherin, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, to express his views. 51

Chicherin's statement was extremely elaborate and well argued. The Soviet point was permanent liberty of commercial navigation both in peace and in war for ships of all countries without distinction; the closing of the Straits and the Sea of Marmara to warships and aircraft of all nations except Turkey; and, liberty for Turkey to fortify the shores of the Straits, and to maintain there such naval and military forces and appliances as she might think desirable. 52 Chicherin's well articulated proposal was an infinitely much better one over İnönü's conciliatory and vague suggestions. 53 Irritated by Chicherin's eloquent statement which was in total conflict with the Allied proposal, Lord Curzon took the opportunity to ridicule the Turkish plenipotentiary by saying that in addition to representing the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Georgia, Chicherin, "wearing the kalpak of Ismet Pasha", appeared to have acted as the spokesman for Turkey as well. 54


Lord Curzon went on to say that Turkey had failed to give any indication of the solution advocated by her own government. He therefore asked İnönü whether he accepted the Soviet case as the case of the Turkish government, or whether the Commission was to have the pleasure of hearing a separate statement of the Turkish case later. İnönü blundered and said that he was obliged to examine all proposals, therefore,-reserving the right to develop his views later on. In this already highly charged atmosphere, the irritated Lord Curzon said that he understood İnönü's reply to be a refusal on the part of the Turkish delegation to put its own views before the Conference at the present stage, adding that İnönü's reply really amounted to trifling with the Conference.  

After hearing the Allied proposals at the tenth meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission on December 6, İnönü finally managed to argue for the Turkish case at the eleventh meeting on December 8. In the intervening period, the Turkish delegation held private meetings in order to prepare the Turkish reply. Turkish plenipotentiaries not only did not appreciate the Soviet standpoint concerning the Straits question, they were moreover disturbed by it, lest it might delay the hasty conclusion of the Peace Treaty. However, Captain Sevket Dogruker, brother of the Second Group deputy Ali Sükrü Bey and Naval Advisor to the Turkish delegation, vigorously resisted both Turkish assent of demilitarized zones at the Straits and the freedom of navigation as proposed by the Allied Powers. Ismet İnönü and Riza Nur, however, leaned towards succumbing to Lord Curzon's proposal. This led to serious disension within the Turkish delegation as Dogruker was decidedly opposed to these concessions. Despite his advice, remarks and objections, Dogruker was totally disregarded.


57. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratım, 3, p.1005, and, pp.1020-1022. The Soviet delegation was so upset at the Turkish stance as to hand İnönü a note criticising his attitude at the Conference (Riza Nur,
At the December 8 meeting, İnönü's half-hearted and weak arguments in support of the right to fortificate Istanbul which was the capital and thus needed protection was quickly challenged, upon which he readily gave in. He went even further by surrendering totally to the Allied demands by accepting in general the principle of demilitarized zones on both sides of the Straits and expressing his willingness for the formation of an international commission for the regulation of navigation of the Straits. By accepting all of the Allied demands, İnönü left Chicherin in amazement, who still tried to save the day by rejecting Lord Curzon's summary of Allied proposals and defending the Turkish rights better than the Turkish delegation itself. However, all was lost. In the afternoon meeting, Lord Curzon, in the name of the three Allied Powers, immediately expressed his gladness to accept Turkish concessions, and the issue was thus settled unfavourable to the sovereign rights of Turkey over the Straits.

Capitulating to the Allied point of view on the Straits Question, İnönü moved on to exhibit his unpreparedness on the issue of the minorities at the thirteenth meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission which started to deal with the problem on December 12. After Lord Curzon’s, Barrère’s, and Marquis Garroni’s speeches on the issue which was intricately intertwined with the issue of foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of Turkey justified on the right of European Powers as protectors of Christian minorities in Turkey, İnönü spoke.

As he was totally unprepared for this meeting, he tried avoiding the prospect of not

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Hayat ve Hatıratım, 3, pp.1024-1026).


speaking at all by reading for three hours a long memorandum written previously on the
history of the minorities in the empire from the time of Mehmed II, i.e., 1453, onwards. Highly nationalistic in tone, the text made repeated references to the interventionist role
czarist Russia played in the name of protecting orthodox Christians in the Balkans and
Armenians in eastern Anatolia, which left Spalaikovitch, the Serbian plenipotentiary, with
the impression that he was hearing an impeachment of czarist Russia and an unreserved
defence of Hamidian Turkey. The text also contained numerous accusatory remarks
concerning the minorities and demanded the expulsion of all religious minorities with the
exception of Jews by way of exchange of populations. As such, İnönü’s speech displayed
the highly chauvinist attitude of the Kemalists whose racist views did not necessarily
 correspond to the majority of Turkish people’s sentiments, who, immediately after the
successful expulsion of the Greek troops from western Anatolia, had made demonstrations
in towns throughout the region against the forced expulsion of Greek and Armenian
population from Turkey. Prominent Turkish economists were also against a wholesale
deporation of all Turkish citizens of Greek and Armenian origin as this was feared to
negatively effect several branches of the economy, most notably the silk, dried fruit,
tobacco, opium, and wool industries.

At the conclusion of İnönü’s speech, Lord Curzon took once again the opportunity
to deride İnönü by observing that "the delegates had hitherto regarded İnönü as a successful
general and a capable diplomat; he had that afternoon shown them that he was also a

61. Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Pasa, p.128; and. Sir Harold George Nicolson,
Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, p.316. The full text of the memorandum can be found in Great
Britain, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs. 1922-1923, pp.190-204. See also, "Protection of
62. Great Britain, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs. 1922-1923, p.187; and,
63. The Times, late september or early october 1922?
64. "Kemal Pasha as Reformer: Military Success not Enough", The Times, December 8, 1922,
p.12. For detrimental effects of the exodus of minority businessmen, see "The Exodusa from Turkey", The
Times, December 9, 1922, p.9.
professor of history, and had given them a long lecture on Turkish history from the days of Mehmed the Conqueror to the present time". Saying that much of the text was interesting, he added that all of it, however, was entirely irrelevant to the problem under discussion. Confessing that he was bitterly disappointed by İnönü's text, Lord Curzon said that if the speech were circulated to the world, which had its eyes fixed on the Conference, there would be a very great disappointment. 65

In the December 13 meeting of the Commission, Lord Curzon also made a serious warning which was published in the newspapers: "If", he said, "the Conference breaks on the question of minorities --if we are to leave Lausanne on this question-- will a single voice be raised in favour of the Turkish delegation? They may get support from Angora, but they will get no support, nothing, anywhere else." 66

At the December 14 meeting which continued to discuss the minorities problem, İnönü answered Lord Curzon’s remarks of the December 13 meeting, when he had pleaded on behalf of the Christian minorities, and especially the heavily decimated Armenians, asking whether Turkey would still keep on resisting the return of Armenians to their homes. 67 İnönü indulged in the insupportable chauvinist argument with a view to totally deny Turkey's official policy of systematic deportations and massacre of a great majority of the Armenian population in the hands of military authorities during 1915 and 1916. He concluded his highly repugnant rebuttal of facts on the Armenian massacres by saying that Turkey absolutely refused to allow the survivors of the atrocities to return to their homes in


Turkey. 68

Whatever little optimism people had with regard to the peace negotiations was smashed by mid-December, partly on account of the Allied attitude in connection with the question of minorities, partly owing to the British refusal to give up Mosul. The press generally complained of the delay and absence of concrete results. 69

On December 16, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, one of the leaders of the Second Group, handed a question to Rauf Orbay on the Lausanne Conference -- which Orbay answered the same day. 70 Orbay began with complaints of the opposition to Turkish claims, and suggested that the Powers had hitherto been testing the degree of energy which the Turks were prepared to expend in defence of their cause, adding that Turkish legitimate claims, however, were clearly defined. He said that the plenipotentiaries had started discussing capitulations, assuring the Assembly that the government categorically rejected the continuation of capitulations. With respect to the reparations demanded from Greece as war indemnity, he said that there was still no settlement. 71

Weary of Atatürk's personal involvement with the Lausanne Conference, Hafiz Mehmed [Engin], the Second Group deputy for Trabzon, asked for an explanation about the nature of the note that the Allied Powers' plenipotentiaries had jointly sent to the government, which Atatürk had replied without discussing it with the cabinet. Orbay answered that the note referred to the status of Istanbul and that the Allied plenipotentiaries had asked the Turkish government not to make any unilateral changes that might prejudice the negotiations at Lausanne. 72

70. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 25, p.405.
Encouraged by Orbay's firm stance on several important issues that were being negotiated at Lausanne, *Vakit* of December 17 published reports to the effect that the British offer to return only Kerük and Süleymaniye was unacceptable, because Mosul lay within the National Pact frontiers. In order to put pressure on the Kemalists with a view to prevent them from signing an unjust Treaty, *Vakit* also printed that the entire Turkish delegation was dissatisfied, and intended to endeavour to ascertain the definite views of the Allies in connection with peace conditions generally, expressing the desire of the nation that if these did not constitute a basis for further negotiations, the delegation would return to Ankara before Christmas.  

Upon persistent demands of the deputies, Orbay made another statement on December 25 concerning the conduct of the negotiations at Lausanne. The general tone of the speech left no doubt that even Orbay was not himself pleased with the negotiations and that nothing positive had been achieved.

In reply to Ali Saib Ursavas' question with respect to the incident between Nur and Venizelos, Orbay said that the argument which had started between Riza Nur and Venizelos had gotten out of hand, and that the meeting had to be suspended. Answering Haci Sükrü Aydindag, deputy for Diyarbakir, Orbay admitted that the Mosul question had been taken out of the agenda, adding that Lord Curzon had handed Inönü a note in which it was stated that Great Britain absolutely refused to hand over Mosul to Turkey.

Both Osman Özgen, deputy for Lazistan, and Ismail Subhi Soysallioglu, deputy for Burdur, remarked that from what they had heard so far, they understood that nothing had


74. *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari*, 3, pp.1146-1163. The official press release was somewhat different: "In spite of the good intentions and the desire for agreement animating our delegation, no decision has yet been reached at Lausanne. The present phase of the Conference shows that it is quite probable that we shall be obliged to give the task of obtaining our legitimate demands to our Army" ("Disappointed Turks", *The Times*, December 30, 1922, p.8).


been achieved at Lausanne. Soysallioglu additionally reproached the Kemalist press for misinforming the public by painting an unjustifiably rosy picture of the proceedings while the reality was diametrically opposite to Kemalist propaganda. 77 Mehmed Hasib [Aksöyek], deputy for Maras, protested the press censure on news from Lausanne, while Hamdi Ülkümen, deputy for Trabzon, and Feyyaz Ali Üst, deputy for Yozgat, complained about the fact that Orbay had not given them any additional information that had not already been printed in the columns of Tanin which remained to be the most reliable source for the Conference proceedings. 78

Strongly criticising the way foreign affairs were conducted, Hamdi Ülkümen said that this state of affairs had to be considered as a natural outcome of previous diplomatic blunders. He repeated the view generally held by high-ranking generals opposed to Atatürk that Turkey had lost the initiative by the premature signing of the Mudanya Convention when she had the upper hand, and moreover, that she had given in on certain issues which had proved to be the cause of present difficulties at Lausanne. 79 According to him, the blind trust shown by the government for Great Britain had also been a mistake. He reprimanded the government and especially the plenipotentiaries for constantly repeating that Turkey wanted peace, which, he justly claimed, had created the impression that she was succumbing to pressure. 80

Alluding to the fact that the plenipotentiaries completely lacked diplomatic skills, Necati Memisoglu, deputy for Lazistan, said that they had not stood firm in defence of the National Pact. Observing with regret that the issues under discussion at Lausanne were trivial compared to the instructions with which the plenipotentiaries had been sent there, he wondered why the Allied Powers had started to ask for more concessions, rhetorically

77. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.1152-1155.
78. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.1152-1157.
asking whether Turkey had been pushed into a worse position than she had been before she
had signed the Mudanya Convention. He also registered his suspicion that not all of the
discussions at Lausanne reached Ankara, and that the deputies remained in the dark as to
the true nature of developments. Soysallioglu cited reports in the liberal press which
criticised that the Turkish plenipotentiaries were not firm in their stand against the Allied
Powers' claims. A motion was presented, requesting cease of further negotiations at
Lausanne and the immediate recall of the Turkish delegation. Emir Marsan Pasha, deputy
for Sivas, summed up the general feeling of the Assembly by observing that the
Conference was proceeding against Turkish interests. 81

In an effort to placate public opinion in Turkey, İnönü gave an interview to Tanin,
which was published in its December 28 issue. Distorting in many ways his handling of the
negotiations, İnönü claimed that he was confidant Karaagac and other regions necessary for
the defence of Edirne would remain inside the Turkish frontier. The truth of the matter was
that he had already conceded to the Allied proposals which did not include the areas he
referred to. Likewise, his statements on the Straits Question were misleading. Allied
Powers had not agreed to Turkish demands for the militarization of the Straits and the Sea
of Marmara as İnönü claimed they had. 82 There was no doubt that İnönü had found it
necessary to make statements distorting facts in order to eliminate at least part of the
growing negative feeling towards the Turkish delegation within the country.

In the January 1, 1923 closed sitting of the Assembly, Hasan Saka, who had
returned to Ankara for consultation with the cabinet, gave information to the deputies. With
reference to the Ottoman Public Debt, he said that the Allied Powers had rejected the
Turkish viewpoint of paying back the debt in Turkish liras as this openly constituted a
violence of the original agreement reached with the creditors. On the issue of war

81. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabitlari, 3, pp.1159-1161.
82. Tanin, December 28, 1338/1922, excerpted in "The Problems at Lausanne: Ismet Pasha Talks
at Large", The Times, January 5, 1923, p.9.
reparation, he informed the Assembly that the Allied Powers had objected Greece paying war indemnity to Turkey and vice versa. In response to Süleyman Sirri İcöz's question concerning the south-eastern border of Turkey, Saka answered that it had not yet been negotiated. All in all, Saka's speech was nothing less than a disguised admission that the plenipotentiaries at Lausanne had failed in their labours.

The Second Group continued putting pressure on the Kemalist government. On January 3, Mehmed Salih Yesiloglu, deputy for Erzurum, submitted a motion requesting that the plenipotentiaries at Lausanne be strongly advised not to compromise Turkish interests which had clearly been stated in the National Pact.

The motion was given partly in response to the news from Lausanne, where the Conference had discussed, on December 28, the issue of capitulations. At its December 11 sitting, the Sub-Commission dealing with foreign interests in Turkey had already discussed foreign financial and industrial interests in Turkey. Reportedly, the Turkish delegates had then privately admitted the right of foreigners to acquire rural property, which they had hitherto been precluded from doing. This was considered an important step in the extension of capitulary concessions to foreigners. It had also allayed Allied fears that Kemalists had been animated by hatred of foreigners.

At the December 28 meeting of the Commission on the Regime of Foreigners, the delegates had discussed the proposals which had been prepared during the December 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, and 20 sittings of the Sub-Commission. The main four issues were the rights governing the establishment of individuals, the rights governing the establishment of juridical persons and corporations, the personal status of foreigners, and the judicial regime to be applied to foreigners in matters other than those of personal status.

Despite his strong nationalist language in refusing to accept the continuation of

84. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 26, pp.140-141.
85. "Foreign Interests in Turkey", The Times, December 12, 1922, p.12.
judicial, financial, and economic capitulations, İnönü, in essence, accepted many Allied demands. According to The Times, İnönü's speech at this meeting was "the most unsatisfactory speech of any delivered on behalf of the Turkish delegation during the present Conference". 87

In response to an Allied questionnaire, Turkey answered that she would allow for the nationals of Allied Powers the right in Turkey to acquire, possess and transfer all kinds of personal and real property, with the exception of rural property. The Turkish delegation insisted that the right to acquire rural property would be reserved for nationals. With respect to capitulations which were economic in nature, Turkish delegation readily agreed that foreigners would be allowed to engage in all forms of commerce, professions, industry, and enterprise, except those reserved to the state or to Turkish nationals. 88

At the January 3, 1923 closed sitting of the Assembly, Orbay took the platform, conceding that there was talk that the plenipotentiaries had lost the confidence of not only the Assembly, but the nation as a whole. 89 The information he gave with respect to the negotiations further confirmed this loss of confidence. When he informed the Assembly that the plenipotentiaries had accepted the right of foreigners to freely settle, open up business ventures, and own property --with the exception of rural estates-- without any restrictions in Turkey, Salahaddin Köseoğlu, deputy for Mersin, and Hafiz Mehmed [Engin], deputy for Trabzon, interrupted Orbay by making the observation that the Allied Powers had reinstated capitulations under a different name and that this was nothing less than opening up the whole country to foreign control. 90

Accusing the government that it had not made it perfectly clear that Turkey would not sign a Peace Treaty unless her complete independence was respected, Hafiz Mehmed

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88. "Counter-Proposals presented by Veli [Saltıkç]' Bey on behalf of the Turkish Delegation on December 9, 1922", in Great Britain, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, pp.504-505.
89. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 26, p.142.
90. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 26, pp.150-151.
[Engin] declared that Turkey could not sit down at the conference table to negotiate away financial, economic, and judicial independence. He regretfully observed that negotiating away these vital issues constituted yet another diplomatic failure of the Turkish delegation.  

In order to force İnönü not to give way to Allied pressure and agree to clauses that might be prejudicial to Turkish interests, Orbay took this opportunity to boldly and publicly state that the plenipotentiaries would not conclude peace unless they succeeded in having Karaagac in Thrace and Mosul province in southeast Anatolia returned to Turkish rule. He also stated that before conceding freedom of the Straits, Turkey had to obtain full guarantees in regard to the security of the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul, adding that Turkey categorically refused to accept any foreign control on Turkish territory. On the question of capitulations, Orbay reflected the Assembly’s sentiment that Turkey would remain true to the National Pact, by which they had been abrogated.

*Vakit* of January 4 joined in the criticism of the Conference, expressing disappointment with the way negotiations had been conducted. As usual, *Vakit* put most of the blame on British and French delegates, as Kemalist censure did not allow for direct criticism of the Turkish delegates. There were also reports from Izmir that people there were highly critical of the negotiations at the Conference.

On January 4, debate in the Assembly again centered on the negotiations at Lausanne. At this highly turbulent sitting during which the Kemalist deputy for Trabzon, Hüsrev Gerede, physically attacked some Second Group deputies, Abidin Atak, deputy for Lazistan, managed to declare that they would refuse to accept injustice at Lausanne.

On January 5, Hasan Saka, member of the delegation to the Lausanne Conference,

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left Ankara bearing detailed instructions for the Turkish plenipotentiaries at Lausanne. It was regarded as significant that Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, editor of *Yeni Gün* and Kemalist deputy for Izmir who was also Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Assembly, had been received in private audience by Atatürk before his departure for Istanbul. 95 No doubt, Kemalist press strategy to be followed with respect to developments at Lausanne was the topic of discussion between Abalioglu and Atatürk.

Meanwhile at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation, under the leadership of Ahmed Ferid Tek who was Kemalist representative at Paris, continued giving yet another exhibition of levity and inconstancy of purpose at the January 5 meeting of the Sub-Commission on Turkish debts, which led independent financial experts towards the opinion that the Turkish delegation either did not understand anything or that they were not serious. 96

No progress whatever was made on January 6. The egregious Riza Nur treated the Minorities Sub-Commission to another of those exhibitions of bad manners or bad temper which had become only too familiar, and finally left the Conference room. The incident was precipitated by the discussion of the Armenian question, which Riza Nur had violently refused to hear. 97

**Realising that opposition in the Assembly** had grown to proportions that had become impossible to contain or repress by his usual terror tactics, Atatürk decided to establish a counter-organisation which would present an organised resistance to the Second Group. Eventually, events forced Atatürk to come out into the open with his intention of forming a political party based exclusively on his views. On December 6, he had given a

tea party at his residence at Cankaya for representatives of the Kemalist press—Hakimiyet-i Milliye, Yeni Gün, and Öğür. There he had revealed, for the first time, his plans in detail and announced the name of this future party—the People's Party. He had invited the nation's patriots and intellectuals to participate in the establishment of a program appropriate to guide the yet-to-be-established party. 98

Atatürk had been President of an organisation called the Defence of Rights Association up until July 1922, when he had been forced to resign. However, this was not a political party: it was an association of those dedicated to the fulfilment of the National Pact. As such, this organisation did not have the appropriate structure to allow Atatürk exercise the degree of control that he wished to apply. As a matter of fact, by the end of 1922, many local Defence of Rights Organisations had started to actively oppose Kemalist domestic and foreign policy. As the year came to a close, it became more and more apparent that Atatürk's power seemed to rest more on his ability to control the heterogeneous Assembly than on an unchallenged dictatorship. 99 The resistance of the local leadership of the Defence of Rights Organisation to unquestioningly obey Kemalist orders had left Atatürk with no choice other than supplanting them with a party of his own.

Therefore, in January of 1923, Atatürk launched a campaign for the creation of a separate and exclusively political organisation, to be called the People's Party with a view to consolidating and prolonging his ascendancy in the new Turkey. The stated idea was to establish a party which would include both his personal adherents and defectors from the Committee of Union and Progress. 100

Atatürk's opponents consisted of several groups united more or less by common


antagonism to what they saw as his personal dictatorship and to certain elements of his domestic and foreign policy. They consisted of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, who were pretty well organised, of monarchist and conservative factions of a religious nature, and of miscellaneous personal and political adversaries of the Pasha. From time to time, Atatürk had made attempts to bring the Unionists into the Kemalist fold through negotiation and patronage. These efforts were renewed in January of 1923, and the idea of a fusion was apparently supported by some of the ex-members of the Committee of Union and Progress. 101

The Unionist leadership, however, was more interested in unifying its own party, and Kara Kemal Bey led the efforts in this direction. The Unionist opposition in the Assembly remained intact under the leadership of Vasif Karakol, one of the Unionist leaders. Everything pointed to a reconstructed Committee of Union and Progress becoming the real effective opposition to Atatürk, and very possibly the governing force in the country if and when the Peace Treaty was concluded. 102

COGNISANT OF HIS SLIPPERY POWER BASE and realising that elections would soon take place, Atatürk left Ankara on January 13 by personal train for an "inspections" tour, which was rather of a political than of a military nature. 103 His chief concern was to enlist adherents for the People’s Party, which it was his ambition to organize in order to dominate the general elections after the conclusion of peace. 104

According to his entourage, Atatürk was in favour of signing the Peace Treaty. 105

101. F.O.424/256, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, March 7, 1923 [p.641].
102. F.O.424/256, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, March 7, 1923 [p.641].
By mid-January, the British press, especially The Daily Telegraph, was confident enough to publish news that the Conference was nearing its end and that the signing of the Peace Treaty could be accomplished before the end of the month. 106 No doubt, this confidence was due to private information and expectation that İnönü was ready to sign the Treaty.

Before leaving for his propaganda tour, Atatürk sent fresh instructions to İnönü at Lausanne concerning the peace negotiations. Hasan Saka returned from Ankara to Lausanne with instructions that amounted to a free hand for the delegates, suggesting that Atatürk was satisfied with the concessions already secured by Turkey, and would be content with a treaty embodying them. 107 Indeed, in his Arifiye speech of January 16, Atatürk lobbied for support for the ratification of the draft Treaty being prepared at Lausanne. 108

ON JANUARY 16, the Istanbul representative of the provisional government at Ankara invited the editors of five Istanbul newspapers for a press conference with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at İzmit. 109 They were Ahmed Emin Yalman of Vakit, Velid Ebüzziya of Tevhid-i Efkar, Fâlîh Rîfki Atay of Aksam, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu of İkdam, Ismail Müstak Mayakon of Tanin, and Suphi Nuri İleri of İleri. 110 It was not known what the topics would be, but, according to Ahmed Emin Yalman, editor of Vakit, the main issue seemed most likely to be their opposition to the establishment of the People’s Party. 111

Atatürk did not immediately address the question of their opposition. Instead, he tested the editors’ reactions to a variety of his proposals. On the issue of the caliphate, for

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108. Hakimiyet-i Millîye, January 24, 1923, printed in Nimet Unan (Compiler), Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 2, pp.52-53.
109. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.28. He mistakenly attributes that they were informed on January 17 that they were invited to İzmit.
111. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.28.
example, he told them that this office should be abolished and added that he wanted their support in this endeavour.112 In his speech at İzmit on this issue, he said that people could not entrust the defence of their rights to a single person, the Caliph.113

Atatürk also talked about the political opposition which existed in the Assembly. He alleged that the Second Group had been formed by those who were personally opposed to him and some of his closest colleagues. He accused them of being reactionary, but more than that, they were opportunists who only thought of their own private gain. He alleged that they acted dishonestly in the Assembly. Despite the facts to the contrary, he claimed that the number of the Second Group deputies had dwindled from seventy-four to twenty-three --and attributed this decline to their despair and remorse.114 In reality, this information was totally wrong, the Second Group being as strong as it had previously been.115

In order to pacify public opposition to his political ambitions, Atatürk told the editors that if he had been thinking only of his own interests, he would have left politics long ago. After all, the task of national liberation was over. He said that although political life would wear him out, he could not leave matters half resolved. It was his duty to continue.116

Finally, he broached the topic of his party. A bold programme was needed for the creation of a new Turkey, and it was only through a political party with strict discipline that this programme could be successfully carried through to fruition. His intention to establish a party was for this purpose.117

117. Ismail Arar (Ed.), Atatürk'ün İzmit Basin Toplantısı, 16/17 Ocağ 1923, pp.52-54; and, Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.85.
In the past, he had resisted the idea of the renewal of elections when the opposition had introduced the idea in the Assembly. He stated that he was now in favour of renewed elections. His tone became threatening when he referred to the Second Group deputies who now favoured a continuation of the existing Assembly, and accused them of terrorising and monopolising the power the nation had given them.\textsuperscript{118} He used this demagogic argument to further discredit the members of the Second Group who were continually pressing the Kemalists in the Assembly, and had become a force that Atatürk was no longer able to control or pacify.

In a move to win the support of the Istanbul press or at least keep its antagonism at a minimum, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk also made promises to guarantee freedom of the press as well as personal liberties.\textsuperscript{119}

Another important reason why Atatürk held the Izmit press conference was his desire to meet and negotiate with Kara Kemal Bey, the representative of the Committee of Union and Progress, with respect to issues of party politics. However, he did not want to hold these discussions in public, as it would expose his political weakness. To avoid the impression that he was negotiating with the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, Atatürk, therefore, met with Kara Kemal Bey with whom he discussed the current political situation in private.\textsuperscript{120} Atatürk reportedly asked what the plans of the Committee of Union and Progress were. Kara Kemal Bey was evasive in his answer, and finally Atatürk requested that Kara Kemal Bey hold a meeting with the Unionists and decide among themselves what their position would be \textit{vis-à-vis} the Kemalists.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, the meeting ended with no concrete result being achieved.

\textsuperscript{118} Ismail Arar (Ed.), \textit{Atatürk'ün Izmit Basin Toplantisi, 16/17 Ocak 1923}, pp.57-58.

\textsuperscript{119} When the journalists were arrested in December 1923, Yalman published an editorial reminding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of his promise (Ahmed Erim Yalman, \textit{Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim}, 3, p.97).


\textsuperscript{121} Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, \textit{Siyasal Anılar}, pp.272-274.
ON JANUARY 17, at the Eskisehir stop of his Anatolian tour, Atatürk declared that peace could be made if Europe recognised the Turks as a civilised people. Although his Eskisehir speech gave the Turkish public the impression that no peace treaty would be signed until Turkish demands were satisfactorily met, his actions as well as his January 18 Izmit speech in which he reminded the people that Turkey had now to turn her attention to the economy left the Allied Powers with the belief that he was in desperate need of a peaceful settlement. 122

That he was earnestly trying to cultivate foreign capital and that he was ready to give in to capitulations was further illustrated at his Bursa speech of January 22. In the economically developed Bursa, where local population was well aware of the adverse effects of free trade and capitulatory rights on the Turkish economy in general and on the local economy in particular, there was much resentment against Atatürk's willingness to compromise Turkish economic interests at Lausanne for his selfish dictatorial ambitions.

Even though he was severely heckled by the audience in regard to the participation of foreign capital and business enterprise in Turkey, he firmly stuck to his position in support of foreign economic intervention, claiming that Turkey needed the assistance of foreign capital. 123

Atatürk's main concern, however, was internal opposition to his dictatorial ambitions. At Izmit, he assured his audience that all opposition to the Kemalist regime would be ruthlessly suppressed. 124 That such opposition had gained momentum was proved by the fact that the Second Group, consisting of at least eighty members in the Assembly, many of whom formerly belonged to the Committee of Union and Progress,

123. "Kemal Heckled", The Times, January 25, 1923, p.9; and Nimet Unan (Compiler), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeleri, 2, pp.65-70.
had just founded a newspaper of their own called *Tan* in Ankara, which had started publication on January 20. Under the editorship of Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, *Tan* was one of the very few newspapers which dared to be openly anti-Kemalist in its editorial outlook.125

 Atatürk's irritation with the liberal press was openly manifested on January 15 at a meeting in Eskisehir with Basri Bey, the proprietor of *Istiklal*, who had complained about censorship, hostility of the officials towards the journalists, and uncooperative attitude of the Kemalist-controlled news agency. Atatürk replied that the press was free only to the degree established by the law and that when press went beyond the law it would be natural that they would be prosecuted.126

**MEANWHILE, IN ANKARA**, the January 25 sitting of the Assembly proved to be yet another occasion for the Second Group deputies to register their protest against diplomatic incompetence at Lausanne. Lord Curzon had made a statement with reference to Kurdish deputies in the Ankara Assembly, alleging that they had been appointed by Atatürk rather than elected by the free will of the people. Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu], the Second Group deputy for Bitlis, made a speech in which he accused the Turkish plenipotentiaries for not giving a satisfactory reply to Lord Curzon's allegations, as his claim was an insult not only to the Turkish nation but also to the Assembly and the deputies representing Kurdish provinces. He also took this opportunity to declare that the Assembly was supreme and that Atatürk had not more rights and privileges than any other deputy in the Assembly.127

In the closed sitting which followed this debate, Orbay gave information on the

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negotiations. Immediately after Orbay's statement, Kemalist deputies--Ali Cetinkaya, deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib, Mustafa Necati [Ugural], deputy for Saruhan, Refik Koralta, deputy for Konya, and Rasih Kaplan, deputy for Antalya--tried to suppress debate. Hakki Hami Ulukan, deputy for Sinop, Mustafa Zeki Saltuk, deputy for Dersim, Mehmed Salih Yesiloglu, deputy for Erzurum, and Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, all of whom belonged to the Second Group, protested the Kemalist terrorist tactics in the Assembly to prevent discussions of what had really been going on at Lausanne. Yusuf Ziya [Kocoglu] accused the Kemalists that they were afraid the truth about their real mission at Lausanne might come out if discussion took place. Ali Sükrü Bey added that they had kept their silence up until now for considerations of national interest, but that they had reached the limit.

CONTINUING HIS ELECTORAL TOUR which would eventually take him to Izmir, Atatürk made several more stops to take the opportunity to win support for the Lausanne Treaty. His Alasehir speech on the night of January 25, and Salihli, Kasaba, and Manisa speeches on January 26 were all geared towards this purpose. In his January 27 speech at Izmir, he was even more elaborate and quite optimistic in his portrayal of the negotiations at Lausanne. Describing the results of the Conference as highly satisfactory, he claimed that everything Turkey had asked for as absolute minimum for the conclusion of an honourable peace had been accepted by the Allies and that only the final formalities remained. Indeed, all three Commissions had held their final meetings on January 27, and the discussions of the Conference were brought to an end.

Yet, the terms of the draft Treaty was totally unacceptable both to the Orbay Cabinet

130. Nimet Unan (Compilor), Atatürk 'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 2, pp.70-74.
131. Nimet Unan (Compilor), Atatürk 'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 2, p.80.
and the Assembly. On January 27, Orbay sent a telegramme to Atatürk, requesting his immediate presence at Ankara in order to preside at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly, which had been urgently recalled to discuss the situation arising out of the failure of the Lausanne Conference. In the meantime, Orbay made an official statement that the Assembly would be called upon to take very important and final decisions. Stating that the possibility of a rupture at Lausanne would leave the Cabinet unmoved, Orbay said that İnönü would issue a proclamation to the world explaining Turkey's position and leave Lausanne unless the British delegation altered its attitude at the last moment. Orbay's action was precipitated by Riza Nur's telegramme of the same day, warning that the climate at Lausanne was very precarious --an intimation that İnönü was about to give way-- and that he was personally opposed to signing the Treaty which he feared to contain unfavourable clauses.

On January 29, the Allied Powers informally handed the Turkish delegation at Lausanne the draft Treaty. The main provisions of the draft Treaty showed that it was totally against Turkish interests and in express contradiction to the Assembly's instructions given to the Turkish delegation. The draft Treaty was a document which confirmed Turkish plenipotentiaries' incompetence on the one hand and illustrated the Allied Powers' determination on the other.

Justifiably fearing that he would be personally held responsible for bringing the


events to such a disastrous end by encouraging both the people and the delegation at Lausanne to accept the draft Treaty at all costs, Atatürk thought it best for his personal interests not to go to Ankara and attend the Assembly's most important meeting, but rather to stay at Izmir. Without his presence, the Assembly held its closed session lasting forty-eight hours and adopted a resolution laying down once more that the terms of the National Pact were inviolable and unalterable, and that Turkey was prepared to make supreme sacrifices in their defence. The resolution was communicated to İnönü at Lausanne and to Atatürk at Izmir.\footnote{137}

The Orbay Cabinet and the press were unanimous in condemning the terms of the draft Treaty, which was considered unacceptable. Up until then, public opinion had been misled in believing that the only serious outstanding difficulty had related to Mosul. Both the press and the deputies got furious when they found out to their dismay that the questions of the capitulations, the Ottoman Public Debt, war indemnity, and the border with Greece still figured disagreeably among the conditions.\footnote{138}

On January 31, Rauf Orbay addressed the Assembly, expressing the view that if the Allied Powers did not make further concessions peace would be imperiled. Having assured the deputies that a treaty detrimental to Turkish interests would not be signed, he added that the blame for a likely disruption of the Conference could not be theirs. These assurances calmed down the Assembly which afterwards passed a motion of confidence in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne.\footnote{139}

Realising that the Orbay Cabinet, the majority of the Assembly, and the country were all totally against the draft Treaty, Atatürk was forced to publicly modify his views on the draft Treaty. During a speech at Izmir on January 31, completely reversing his previous position on the draft Treaty, he described the peace terms as unacceptable to any

\footnote{137} "Angora Defiant: "No Shrinking from War"", \textit{The Times}, January 31, 1923, p.10.  
\footnote{138} "Turkish Press Condemn the Treaty", \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, February 1, 1923, p.8.  
\footnote{139} "Angora Premier: "Our Viewpoint Must be Accepted"", \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, February 2, 1923, p.9.
independent nation. 140

The same day, a combined meeting of the First, Second, and Third Commissions took place at Lausanne in which the Allied Powers formally submitted the text of the draft Treaty to the Turkish delegation. 141 Lord Curzon spoke in which he said that the Allies had come to the unanimous conclusion that more would not be expected from further meetings of Commissions and Sub-Commissions, and accordingly they had drawn up, in the form of a definite Treaty, the essential conditions upon which they were convinced that a general and honourable peace could be concluded. Expressing the view that he should like to think that İnönü would accept the Treaty straight away, Lord Curzon continued to say that he did not even entertain the thought that İnönü might reject it. 142

Immediately after this meeting, İnönü privately expressed his willingness to sign the draft Treaty to Riza Nur, the other plenipotentiary at Lausanne. Despite Riza Nur's determined stand to the contrary, İnönü did not cease, for the next three days, to try convincing Nur to sign the Treaty and conclude peace. 143

In the meantime, İnönü was instructed by the Orbay Cabinet to submit a list of counter proposals, containing some thirty points in the draft Treaty. It was understood that the Allies were prepared to make some concessions in order to meet the Turkish views. 144 However, the points which the Allied Powers accepted were of minor importance: the limitation of Turkish troops in Eastern Thrace was abandoned, and the fifteen million Turkish liras payable for settlement of the claims of Allied nationals was reduced to twelve

143. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatirain, 3, pp.1148-1149. See also, Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam, 1, p.245.
million. There was, of course, no change in the matter of Mosul. Nevertheless, the Allied Powers hoped that these minor concessions would make it easier for İnönü to sign the Treaty by February 4.

That İnönü, the Chief Plenipotentiary, and Atatürk wanted peace there was no doubt, but the Assembly in Ankara was decidedly opposed to accept it under the terms presented by the Allied Powers. İnönü handed a memorandum to the Allied Powers on February 4, stating that Turkey was prepared to accept the convention regarding the Commercial Regime on condition that the abolition of economic capitulations also figured in the Treaty of Peace; that this convention have a duration of five years for the four Allied Powers and of one year for the other signatory Powers; that the clause restricting the right of Turkey to regulate the question of coastal traffic be suppressed; and, finally, that goods the importation of which had been prohibited on December 15, 1922, be transferred from the list of articles coming under the coefficient of increase of 8 to the list under the coefficient 12.

The same day, news spread that İnönü had sent a telegramme to Poincaré at Paris, expressing his intention that he would sign the draft Treaty. Following this news, there were renewed negotiations at Lausanne between the representatives of the Allied Powers and İnönü. A meeting was held in Lord Curzon's room at the Beau Rivage Hotel at


5.40 p.m. during which Lord Curzon observed particularly and with great satisfaction that İnönü had concluded his note with the most earnest expression of his desire for peace, and with a statement that he would be willing without further delay to sign the Treaty.150

Although seemingly resistant at this meeting to accept the draft Treaty, İnönü was nevertheless ready to sign it. Without the knowledge of the members of the Turkish delegation, he had already expressed his readiness to sign the Treaty at a private meeting he had had with Lord Curzon earlier in the day.151 Riza Nur, who was opposed to the signing of the draft Treaty, intervened in order to prevent İnönü from stating finally that he accepted it. Interposing to point out to the Allied representatives that the Turkish delegation had done all they could, Nur added that if they gave way further on the points under discussion, the Treaty would not be ratified by the Assembly at Ankara. Thus, the meeting ended without reaching a final agreement.152 More private negotiations took place during the remainder of the day, but fierce resistance of some of the members of the Turkish delegation, especially of Tahir Taner, effectively prevented İnönü from signing the Treaty, and, by the end of the day, negotiations broke off.153

That day Lord Curzon left Lausanne for London.154 A day later, Barrère and Bompard, the French plenipotentiaries, too left after having an interview with İnönü.155 On February 6, discussions between the British and French governments were concluded, and Poincaré sent a personal message to İnönü urging him to delay his departure from Lausanne and to comply with the British request which asked that the Turkish delegation's

150. "British Secretary's Notes of Meeting held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Beau Rivage Hotel, Lausanne, on Sunday, February 4th, 1923, at 5.40 p.m.", in Great Britain, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, pp.842-851. See also, Sir Harold George Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, pp.346-347.
152. "British Secretary's Notes of Meeting held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Beau Rivage Hotel, Lausanne, on Sunday, February 4th, 1923, at 5.40 p.m.", in Great Britain, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, p.850; and, Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 3, pp.1151-1152.
proposals be furnished to them in writing. This final appeal, however, was unavailing, and Inönü and his principal advisors left Lausanne for Ankara on February 7. 156

Chapter 17

KEMALIST INTRIGUES AND LIBERAL RESISTANCE
DURING EARLY 1923

Despite the seriousness of the situation at Lausanne, Atatürk did not return to Ankara to attend to matters, partly on account of the fact that he knew his foreign policy would be severely criticised and partly because he was busy establishing the ground for his newly announced but still nonexistent party for which there was absolutely no public support.

In an address to the citizens at Izmir on January 27, Atatürk said that the best form of government for Turkey was the existing system. He claimed that the constitutional regime which was established after the 1908 Revolution had been essentially no different from the absolutist monarchy. This was a deliberately misleading argument, designed to discredit the liberal democratic regime of the Committee of Union and Progress by equating it with the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid. This way he hoped to lessen the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress which was ever so popular with the population in western Anatolia.

At Izmir on January 30, Atatürk restated the necessity that the People's Party take power after peace. In order to eliminate competition from the Committee of Union and Progress, he added that his party would represent every class, claiming that the competition of a multi-party system would be dangerous to the well-being of Turkey. Because the People's Party represented every class, it would be the sole representative in the political

1. Nimet Unan (Compilor), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 2, p.79.
MEANWHILE, the Assembly, relatively free from daily interference from Atatürk, resumed its work, which was, in many ways, contrary to what Atatürk would have approved. On February 3, the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly accepted the draft law making five years' residence in a constituency as essential qualification for future eligibility to the Assembly. If the law passed, many existing deputies, natives of the lost provinces, would be unable to stand for re-election. Even Atatürk himself, who was born in Salonica, would be affected, unless special exemption was made.

The beginnings of this draft law went so far back as November of 1922. In early November, the Second Group, the main organised group against Kemalist dictatorship, had tried to profit from the prestige they had gained as a result of having authored the two operative paragraphs of the law abolishing the sultanate. Their efforts to improve the Second Group's political position had come to fruition on November 9, with the successful election by secret ballot of Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzerum, to the position of First Vice-President of the Assembly. With this success, they had felt emboldened to publicly press forward for some of their other objectives.

On December 2, 1922, the regular meeting of the Assembly had begun quite normally with Adnan Adivar in the chair as Speaker of the Assembly. He opened the session by stating that the Committee on the Draft Law had found a proposal regarding modification of the Election Law worthy of consideration. Authored by members of the Second Group, the modifications would have excluded Atatürk -- without mentioning his name -- from candidacy on future general elections. Though the proper procedure required that the proposal be forwarded to the appropriate committees before being debated by the

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2. Nimet Unan (Compiler), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeleri, 2, p.82.
Assembly, Ali Riza Bebe, deputy for Istanbul, and Hüseyin Hüsnü Özdamar, deputy for Isparta, both closely allied with Atatürk, intervened and requested that the proposal be debated forthwith by the Assembly. In his official capacity as the presiding Speaker of the Assembly, Adnan Adivar refused to suspend normal procedure and restated that the bill would be referred to the committee. Atatürk, livid with anger, jumped up and took over the rostrum in his capacity as President of the Assembly. Getting straight to the point, he accused the Second Group of having authored this proposal with the sole and unabashed purpose of robbing him of his civil rights.\(^5\) His violent protests, however, were disregarded by the Assembly, and the draft law had been handed down to the appropriate Assembly committees for study.

It was interesting to note that Tan, the organ of the Second Group, questioned the validity of the electoral mandate of the existing Assembly, and demanded new elections, insisting that powerful politicians who were rich in resources at their command had to, in future, be subject to the law the same as the weak who had no governmental facilities under their control.\(^6\) This was no doubt a criticism in disguise, reprimanding Kemalist tactics of abusing the bureaucratic system for their own benefit, even side-stepping, on many occasions, rules and regulations.

PARTLY IN RESPONSE to opposition deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib Ismail Sükrü Celikalay’s statement criticising the legislation concerning the caliphate and his recently published pamphlet on the same issue, and partly in order to register his disappointment and disapproval for what had been happening at the Assembly in Ankara, Atatürk made a highly demagogic speech at Balikesir on February 4, denouncing and threatening dire penalties upon those who sought to limit the sovereignty of the people, or try, under cover


\(^6\) "Awaiting the Issue", *The Times*, February 5, 1923, p.10.
of religion, to deceive them in political matters.\textsuperscript{7}

In a deliberate attempt to confuse the public as to his real intentions, and subvert the true nature of the overwhelming criticism of Kemalist policies both in the Assembly and in the press, he made another speech on February 5, this time at Akhisar, emphasizing that sovereignty rested with the people. In order to dispel insinuations that the legitimacy of the Assembly was being eroded by continuous Kemalist infringements of Assembly rules and regulations, he felt it necessary to assure the public that the Assembly's work was exemplary. He also added that the old regime was definitely superseded.\textsuperscript{8}

Atatürk made a similar but stronger statement in his Balıkesir speech of February 7. Alluding obliquely to the Unionist regime, he described the adverse effects of competing political parties on Turkish society in the past. He claimed that the multi-party system could work only in countries with a multitude of classes representing distinct economic interests. But Turkey, he claimed, was classless, and the existence of different parties had caused nothing but misfortune. Contradicting himself on the question of classes in Turkey, Atatürk again stated that the People's Party would represent \textit{all} classes in Turkey.\textsuperscript{9}

In this speech, he acknowledged opposition to his plans, suggesting that some people had advised him not to form such a party. Granting that it would be easy for him to leave politics, he claimed he had no choice in the matter: the recent gains were still too young to endure without his supervision. According to him, it seemed that some people already wanted to destroy what little had been accomplished.\textsuperscript{10}

MEANWHILE, the liberal opposition in the Assembly was working towards safeguarding the freedom of speech, justifiably fearing that the latest Kemalist ultra-nationalist demagoguery was geared towards preparing the ground for suppressing all opposition in

\textsuperscript{7} "Constantinople Calm: Hopes for Peaceful Settlement", \textit{The Times}, February 6., 1923, p.9.
\textsuperscript{8} Nitel Unan (Compiler), \textit{Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri}, 2, p.91.
\textsuperscript{9} Nitel Unan (Compiler), \textit{Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri}, 2, pp.96-97.
\textsuperscript{10} Nitel Unan (Compiler), \textit{Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri}, 2, pp.97-98.
the name of national security. The Second Group insisted on the guarantee of civil liberties. Abdülkadir Kemalı Ögütçü, the liberal deputy for Kastamonu, had submitted amendments to the Criminal Code, preventing government officials from arresting individuals without proper authority. The bill had first come up for discussion in the Assembly on January 17.\textsuperscript{11}

On February 7, the second round of discussions took place during which Kemalist deputies, the opponents of the bill, argued that state officials would be captives of public prosecutors if the bill was passed.\textsuperscript{12} At the February 8 sitting, the bill was defended by Second Group deputies Mehmed Sükrü Koc, deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib and owner of \textit{Ikaz}, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, and Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon.\textsuperscript{13} On February 10, Fethi Okyar, the Kemalist Minister of the Interior, argued against the bill, upon which he was immediately accused by the Second Group deputies of being afraid of lawful procedures in the country.\textsuperscript{14} Despite obstruction and delays by the Kemalists, this long awaited amendment was finally ratified, but only because of the persistence of the Second Group. It was finally passed on February 12; one hundred and eight deputies voted for the amendment, fifty-eight against, and eight deputies abstained from voting.\textsuperscript{15}

However, the Kemalists were terribly irritated by the new amendments to the Criminal Code with which arbitrary state action against individual liberties was forbidden. On March 21, a most heated debate arose in the Assembly on a motion by Kazım Özalp Pasha, the Kemalist Minister of Defence, for the repeal of part of the personal liberty law which he represented as having seriously interfering with the maintenance of discipline in the Army. The proposal was vigorously opposed by Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for

\textsuperscript{11} Mete Tuncay, \textit{Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931}, p.51n.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 27, p.208.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 27, pp.223-242.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 27, p.265.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi}, 27, p.283.
Erzurum, Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, and Sirri Bellioglu, deputy for İzmit, all prominent members of the Second Group, who professed the utmost suspicion of Özalp’s motives and asserted that personal liberty should be preserved at all costs. That there was serious dissension within the cabinet on this issue was confirmed by the fact that Hasan Fehmi Atac, deputy for Gümüşhane and Minister of Finance, and Rifat Calık’a, deputy for Kayseri and Minister for Justice, declined to support Özalp’s motion. They, in fact, attacked the motion on the ground that any interference with the personal liberty law was likely to lead to the reimposition of those absolutist restrictions of freedom of movement within Turkey which, before the Revolution of 1908, were such a nuisance. The motion was accordingly rejected by the Assembly. 16

IN ORDER TO SUBVERT the real issues which had caused such a dramatic failure at Lausanne, Kemalist press started, on February 6, a campaign of violent attacks on the Allied Powers, especially the French. Kemalist daily Yeni Gümün, the editor of which was Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, made an inspired statement to the effect that the official announcement of the rupture at Lausanne nullified not only the Mudanya Convention, but also the Ankara Agreement with the French, and if the rupture was decisive, war would be resumed. 17 As it would later during the month be crystal clear, the aim of this Kemalist tactic was not so much as to threaten the Allied Powers as it was to repress internal opposition to the draft Treaty by raising the spectre of war.

By contrast, in Istanbul where the tone of the local liberal press was so little flamboyant as to have earned a rebuke from the Kemalists, it was suggested that rupture was too strong a word to use in reference to events at Lausanne, where the Conference was

only interrupted to allow the delegates to return home to consult their governments.\textsuperscript{18}

The Kemalist press in Ankara, however, continued its inspired outcry against the French on February 7, accusing them of double-facedness and treachery, and of wrecking the Conference. \textit{Yeni Gün} insisted that all of İnönü's concessions at Lausanne were annulled by the suspension, and clamoured for war as the only means of clearing the air.\textsuperscript{19}

Faced with a delicate international situation, Atatürk gave a reassuring interview to the correspondent of \textit{Le Temps} at Izmir which was printed in its February 14 issue. Stating that he had always declared that the new Turkey would never agree to the maintenance of the capitulations in any form whatever, he expressed his surprise at the attitude of the French delegation at Lausanne, who, precisely on this point, had been more intransigent than any of the others. He added that the suppression of the capitulations did not mean the ruin of French interests in Turkey, as Turkey intended in good faith to grant all the necessary guarantees. He ended the interview by expressing his wish to remain on good terms with France and his desire that peace would soon be found.\textsuperscript{20}

In the February 13 issue of \textit{Tanin}, Yalçın reported the dissension in the country on the merits of the draft Treaty, expressing the view that many believed the draft Treaty was not totally in the best interests of Turkey. He called for İnönü to explain the course of events as he was the single most responsible person for the handling of the peace negotiations. He acknowledged the fact that many people in Turkey were genuinely disappointed with İnönü's conciliatory note submitted to the Allied Powers on February 4. It had been interpreted as a total surrender to the Allies’s demands.\textsuperscript{21}

While the budget for the administration of Istanbul was being discussed in the

\textsuperscript{18} "Sabre-Rattling by the Turks: Anxiety of French at Smyrna", \textit{The Times}, February 8, 1923, p.10.

\textsuperscript{19} "Warships at Smyrna: A Firm Stand", \textit{The Times}, February 9, 1923, p.10.


Assembly's February 12 sitting, Kemalists criticised what they saw as the negative attitude of both the Istanbul press and the Unionists based there towards both the Kemalist government and İnönü's conduct of the peace negotiations at Lausanne. Tanin was one of the most important targets of Kemalist attack. Some Kemalist deputies also attacked the intellectuals in Istanbul who were, on the whole, opponents of a Kemalist dictatorship. There had followed a debate during which the Second Group deputies had expressed their strong support of the public opinion prevalent in Istanbul. In the February 20 issue of Tanin, Yalcın replied to the criticism that Tanin was conducting a campaign of opposition to the Kemalist government and the draft Treaty. He defended his paper's course of action as being legitimate, adding that true journalism required not a blind and unconditional support of the government as some of the other newspapers--Kemalist ones--had been engaged in, but responsible criticism.

After leaving Lausanne on February 7, İnönü took a leisurely journey back to Ankara, most likely on private orders from Atatürk, who needed time to devise a strategy, as he feared the Assembly would be fiercely critical of the results of the peace negotiations at Lausanne. Despite good advice from other members of the delegation, İnönü advanced to Bucharest, where he reportedly negotiated with the Romanian government. However, even the inspired Yeni Gün did not give credence to these news by printing that İnönü had no legal right to enter into negotiations as his authority had lapsed with the end of the


Lausanne Conference. 27 After a troubled journey due to heavy weather conditions, he reached Constanza from where he took the boat, arriving at Istanbul on the night of February 16. 28

Upon his return to Istanbul from Lausanne, İnönü met with Admiral Bristol, the head of the American Legation, on February 17. İnönü assured Bristol that Atatürk supported his handling of the negotiations, in spite of the fact that the two had not been in contact since he had left Lausanne. He expressed, however, considerable doubt about whether or not he would receive the same support from Rauf Orbay, whom he knew was opposed to many clauses in the draft Treaty. 29

İnönü also had conversations with General Harington, and Neville Henderson, the British Acting High Commissioner. 30 To the British visitors İnönü was friendly but non-committal. To Henderson's communication of Lord Curzon's special message announcing that the British government were still ready to sign the Lausanne Treaty as it stood, and reminding the Turks of the unwise of rejecting its unusually favourable terms, İnönü returned a polite reply. 31

However, as one of his aides-de-camp informed the British legation at Istanbul, İnönü was strongly in favour of peace, broadly on lines proposed by Lord Curzon, and would do his utmost to obtain consent of the Assembly, going even to length of resigning in the event of failure. 32

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29. RG, 867.00/1637, Admiral Bristol's War Diary for Februrary 17, 1923, p.5, quoted in Michael M. Finerfrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.126. See also, Ali İhsan Sabis, Harb Hattıralarım, 5, p.359.


32. F.O.424/256, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, February 22, 1923 [p.588]; and "Ismet and Kemal Leave for Angora: The Coming Critical Debates: "When
After discussing the situation with all the members of his delegation, together with Adnan Adivar, Yusuf Kemale Tengirsénk, and Bekir Sami Kunduh, his predecessors in charge of Kemaist foreign policy, İnönü left Istanbul for Ankara on February 18. The same day, he met with Atatürk and Fevzi Çakmak Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, at Eskisehir and privately discussed the results of his negotiations at Lausanne before he reported first to the cabinet. Having decided on the course of action to be followed in the Assembly, they then jointly arrived at Ankara on February 20. Bypassing Rauf Orbay and the cabinet --which was highly irregular in and of itself-- immediately drew protests from not only Orbay but also most of the Second Group deputies.

After his return to Ankara, İnönü addressed a closed session of the Assembly on February 21. Without touching upon the clauses of the draft Treaty handed by the Allied Powers on January 31, he told the Assembly a highly selective history of the negotiations. Downplaying the significance of the financial and economic clauses of the draft Treaty, he misled the Assembly by adding that Allied Powers had, for all practical purposes, given up financial aspects of the capitulations. In anticipation of a question concerning the Straits Question and the role of Soviet Union on this issue at the Conference, İnönü said that there was disagreement between the Turkish delegation and the Soviet one which had insisted on

the Negotiations will be Resumed"". The Manchester Guardian, February 19, 1923, p.8; and, "Ismet's Report to the Angora Assembly: Secret Session Tomorrow", The Manchester Guardian. February 20, 1923, p.9.


the complete Turkish sovereignty of the Straits. By stating the cause of the disagreement between Turkey and the Soviet Union, İnönü exposed himself as not being in favour of the complete Turkish control of the Straits.

There was no debate on draft Treaty in the Assembly on February 21. Atatürk, the cabinet, Lausanne delegation, and Fevzi Cakmak Pasha met on February 22 in order to prepare a counter-draft to Allied proposals. They also got ready for the anticipated Second Group offensive at the Assembly. Second Group deputies, in which there were many of the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress, had already publicly declared their confidence that the nation would not submit to any form of economic and financial bondage. Meanwhile, the liberal press continued its attack on Kemalist failure at Lausanne.

Ali Sükrü Bey's opposition newspaper, Tan, referred to the treaty as the "new Treaty of Sèvres", and this reaction was generally supported by the liberal Istanbul press. The editorial in the Vakit of February 22, for example, openly criticised the way the negotiations had been carried out and urged a radical change in the handling of the peace talks. In its February 20 issue, Vakit, instead of directly criticising the Turkish delegation's acceptance of the economic and financial clauses which were capitulatory in nature, had already attacked The Times leading article of February 15, asserting that it was a ridiculous attempt to frighten the Turks by threats that the Lausanne concessions, if not speedily accepted, would be withdrawn, and attributed to the ignorance of British journalists the idea that such language was likely to influence Turkey to re-enter economic

bondage.\(^{41}\)

Newspapers continued to explain away the cause of the rupture of the Conference as being due to the Great Powers in general and to the French in particular; thus, trying to avoid directly criticising Kemalist position.\(^{42}\) Ahmed Emin Yalman, in his \textit{Vakit} editorial, wrote that there were in the draft Treaty certain economic and financial clauses which was impossible to accept.\(^{43}\) The organ of the Second Group, \textit{Tan}, had been even more stronger in its rejection of the draft Treaty. In an article in its February 18 issue, Nebizade Hamdi Bey, deputy for Trabzon, had expressed his confidence that after having heard İnönü's report on the Conference, the Assembly would decide that the shortest way to arrive at the realisation of the National Pact was by war.\(^{44}\)

There was much talk of the likelihood of war by the opposition since the return of the Lausanne delegation. Sections of the press continued day by day seriously to discuss the option of war as the best means of obtaining the final concessions on the one or two remaining points at issue. Even \textit{Yeni Gün}, the newspaper of Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, the Kemalist deputy for Izmir, remarked that it was very possible that the Assembly would pose certain questions to the Western Powers, and it was according to their answers that it would become clear as to whether it was to be peace or war. \textit{Tevhid-i Efsar} expressed the opinion that Anatolian people would notify the world of their readiness to have recourse to the shedding of their blood rather than accept conditions assailing Turkish prestige and independence. \textit{Tevhid-i Efsar} also reported that the Second Group was categorically opposed to accepting anything which constituted an infringement of the National Pact, and that their number in the Assembly was increasing. \textit{Tan}, analysing the draft Treaty and

\(^{41}\) \textit{Vakit}, February 20, 1339/1923, quoted in ""Turkish Leaders Confer: Truculent Press", \textit{The Times}, February 21, 1923, p.11.


\(^{44}\) "Turkish Press and the Treaty", \textit{The Near East}, March 1, 1923, p.215.
speaking of the possibility of the European Powers changing their attitude towards Turkey, feared that it was now too late. 45 Tan further claimed that not only the economic and financial clauses but also the minority arrangements were quite unacceptable. 46

On its part, Tanin advised moderation as these issues were highly important and that quick and irresponsible remarks on the question of war and peace were not conducive to taking a responsible course of action. Having criticised the handling of the negotiations and the objectionable nature of some of the points in the draft Treaty, Yalcin, nevertheless, asked whether there was concensus among the public for the continuation of war should Turkey totally reject the draft Treaty. However, along with other editors, he also invited the government to put forth clearly what had been discussed at Lausanne, what had been agreed upon, and what the differences between the Turkish demands and the Allied delegations' response were. He expressed his conviction that this was the only way to win public opinion on the side of a just Treaty. On the other hand, he reminded the draft Treaty's warm supporters of the "danger" that open discussion might lead to the conclusion that the draft Treaty was unacceptable and that Turkey should not sign the Treaty even if this meant war. 47

ON FEBRUARY 23, a special council, composed of Atatürk, the cabinet members, Fevzi Cakmak and Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pashas, sat until midnight and resumed its labours on February 24. The Council appeared to be engaged in revising the draft reply to the Allies to be submitted to the Assembly. 48 Vakit of February 25 reported the Kemalist government as having decided to accept a postponement of the Mosul settlement for one year and to

46. "Smyrna Incident Closed: Draft Note to Allies: Debate Begins", The Times, February 27, 1923, p.11.
abandon the claims to Karaagac and Western Thrace, and said that the government would recommend the Assembly to accept the Peace Treaty as it stood, provided that the financial and economic clauses be postponed for subsequent negotiation.\textsuperscript{49} The Economic Committee of the Assembly met on February 25 and decided in what points the economic and financial clauses infringed the National Pact. Due to pressure from the Second Group deputies, the terms of the draft was altered on February 26 by the government.\textsuperscript{50} While it was too soon to prophesy the result of the Assembly debate, opinion in political circles in Ankara was that the Istanbul deputies, most of whom were either members of or leaned towards the Committee of Union and Progress, would probably insist on further amendments.\textsuperscript{51}

On February 27, the government was finally ready to make its presentation.\textsuperscript{52} Ismet İnönü was to speak for the delegation; Rauf Orbay for the government.\textsuperscript{53} The task of İnönü was expected to consist in persuading the Assembly that his draft note of February 4 represented a considerable advance on the Allies' terms, while making sure that it did not go too far beyond the modifications already verbally accepted by the Allies on the last day at Lausanne.\textsuperscript{54} Up until the last moment, İnönü was reported to be using all his endeavours to facilitate the passage of the Treaty from the Assembly.\textsuperscript{55}

Indeed, İnönü warmly recommended the adoption of the draft Treaty, of which he and his colleagues felt justly proud, and which he was confident would, after a few mutual


\textsuperscript{51} "Smyrna Incident Closed: Draft Note to Allies: Debate Begun", \textit{The Times}, February 27, 1923, p.11.

\textsuperscript{52} Ali Fuad Cebesoy, \textit{General Ali Fuad Cebesoy'un Siyasi Hatiraları}, 1, p.243.

\textsuperscript{53} "Turkish Counter Proposals: Accusations Against the French", \textit{The Times}, February 28, 1923, p.12; and, Michael M. Finefrock, \textit{From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics}, 1922-1924, pp.130-131.

\textsuperscript{54} "The Turks and the Treaty", \textit{The Near East}, March 1, 1923, p.211.

\textsuperscript{55} "The Treaty Debate at Angora", \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, February 27, 1923, p.9.
concessions and minor sacrifices, more than satisfy the Turkish people. 56

This session revealed strong opposition to İnönü's handling of the negotiations. 57 This was not unexpected: according to reports by the liberal press, it had widely become known that there was considerable opposition among the deputies not only to the original draft Treaty, but also to the government's counter-proposals. 58 Main opposition came from members of the Second Group. The Second Group alternately scolded İsmet İnönü for having failed to obtain peace, and criticised him for offering too many concessions in its pursuit. 59 The situation in the Assembly was described as chaotic. 60

The opinion was prevalent among the deputies that the government's counter-proposals, which provided for the postponement of financial and economic clauses of the Treaty for six months, were incompatible with the National Pact. 61 Reportedly, two members of the Kemalist bloc, Mehmed Hamdi Izgi, deputy for Adana and former Minister of Pious Foundations, and Rifat Saatci, deputy for Konya, seceded on the grounds that the cabinet was too much swayed by sentiment. 62

Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, expressed total dissatisfaction with İnönü's statement. Criticising the cabinet for making decisions without the consent of the


Assembly, Ulas said that the government should resign if it contemplated giving concessions from the National Pact. Demanding that the Assembly be completely informed of all the financial, economic, and judicial clauses of the draft Treaty, he added that if the Turkish delegation had not prepared an honourable counter-proposal, it should better resign and leave its place to a competent one. 63

Remarking that on all the important territorial issues --Mosul, Karaagac, and the Straits-- the Turkish delegation had given too many concessions, Mustafa Durak Sakarya, another Second Group deputy for Erzurum, said that these were all against Turkish interests. Observing that İnönü had completely disregarded the clauses of the National Pact, Sirri Bellioglu, deputy for İzmit and a prominent member of the Second Group, demanded that both the cabinet and the delegation ask for a vote of confidence. Hüseyin Avni Ulas repeated that the cabinet and the delegation should resign if they had decided to accept the clauses of the draft Treaty. 64

 Atatürk intervened, declaring that all of the clauses of the Treaty was to his satisfaction with the exception of the clauses dealing with territorial boundaries. However, he added that Karaagac and Mosul had to be sacrificed; thus, he urged the Assembly, in a roundabout fashion, to accept the draft Treaty. The Assembly did not calm down with Atatürk's speech, but resumed discussion on March 2. 65

The Morning Post of March 1 was impressed with the seriousness of the Second Group's opposition to Atatürk, and was not hopeful that the Assembly would accept the draft Treaty. It said that a government which had to face a considerable proportion of the

Unionists was obviously not in a strong position to enforce a Treaty. 66

The first week of March was a serious period for the Kemalists. The government elaborated its counter proposals to the Allies' terms, and submitted them to the Assembly. There was much impassioned oratory behind closed doors. 67 In closed sessions which continued until March 6, the majority of the Assembly proved to be far more critical than had been expected, urging rejection of everything that had been agreed to. 68 The Second Group leaders, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, Ali Sükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, and Salahaddin Köseoglu, deputy for Mersin, accused Ismet İnönü of incompetence, and held him responsible for having spoiled all efforts for peace as he had ignored the instructions of the Council of Ministers, especially those of Rauf Orbay. 69

It was clear from these statements, as well as from those made by some of the Kemalists, that a significant number of deputies lacked real confidence in the Conference delegates. Specifically, they complained about the failure to gain control of Mosul, the Straits, the Aleppo Railway, the Islands under Greek occupation, as well as the lack of a war indemnity from the Greek Government --all of which they claimed was rightfully theirs. At the same time, they categorically rejected any responsibility for the Ottoman Public Debt. In principle, however, they objected most to the relinquishing of the Assembly's executive authority to a plenipotentiary, i.e., Ismet İnönü, over whose actions they had no power of veto. 70 The Second Group sought not only to reject all attempts at

compromise with the Allies, but also to force İnönü's permanent removal as Chief Plenipotentiary to the Conference. 71

The split in the Assembly was such that the Kemalists could gather only about one hundred and ten votes as opposed to the seventy-three of the Second Group and the seventy-eight of the independents. 72 Given this last figure, it was undeniable that, at the time of the debates on Lausanne, any possible defection from the Kemalist bloc would pose a serious threat to continued control of the Assembly by the Kemalists.

In the leading editorial of the Tan of March 6, Ali Sükrü Bey declared that if new elections were called for, it would be impossible for those who had so clearly failed to defend Turkish rights to return to office. 73

At the March 6 session of the Assembly, Atatürk again intervened on behalf of İnönü, expressing his opinion that the delegation had worked quite successfully at Lausanne. He also took the opportunity to criticise Unionists, especially Cavid Bey and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın. Conceding the fact that they had been summoned to Lausanne due to opposition's pressure, he nevertheless said that he did not want them to intrude into the affairs of the delegation any more. 74

In order to cut the debate short and prevent any likelihood of a vote of non-confidence, he claimed that the right to judge whether the delegation had obeyed orders or not lay with the cabinet to whom the delegation was responsible. Having argued this point of view, he further added that instructions would be given to the delegation by the government and that the deputies had no right to intervene. 75 In highly irregular fashion,

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72. Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.132. According to The Times, Kemalists had about one hundred and thirty-five members; the Second Group, eighty-seven, and the independents, fifty ("Smyrna Incident Closed: Draft Note to Allies: Debate Begun", The Times, February 27, 1923, p.11).
73. Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.133.
74. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabîlitları, 4, pp.174-175.
75. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.209; Feridun Kandemir, Haïralari ve Söyleyemedikleri
Ali Fuad Cebesoy, the Speaker of the Assembly, refused to put to vote a motion signed by Vasif Karakol, deputy for Sivas, and sixty other opposition deputies, which stated that the Turkish delegation had disregarded to carry out the instructions of the Orbay cabinet, and therefore had failed its mission. Instead, he put to vote a Kemalist motion giving permission to the cabinet to give further instructions to the delegation in order to carry on negotiations. Despite fierce resistance by the Second Group deputies to this blatant break of Assembly rules, Ali Fuad Cebesoy proceeded with the vote. The Second Group deputies having walked out in protest, the Kemalist motion was passed with reportedly one hundred and ninety votes. A delegation of deputies who later visited Istanbul, however, declared that the motion had been passed by one hundred and sixty-nine votes to twenty against, with ninety-six abstentions, while forty deputies were absent or on leave.

The motion accorded the government what was equivalent to a mandate to continue the peace negotiations on the lines previously followed by İnönü. The advantages of these tactics to Atatürk was obvious. If the delegation had signed the Treaty at Lausanne there was the danger that the Second Group would have been able to make capital out of a betrayal of the National Pact and would have either secured the rejection of the Treaty or at least used the Lausanne Conference to undermine Atatürk's position. This way, İnönü as well as Atatürk had gained time, while the Turkish delegation was authorised to continue as before.


Having suppressed debate in the Assembly on the question, the cabinet prepared the final draft of the counter-proposals to be presented to the Allied delegates.\textsuperscript{81} On March 8, Turkish counter-proposals were formally submitted to representatives of the Allies in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{82} The counter proposals did not contain many surprises for the Allies.\textsuperscript{83}

Turkey's counter proposals to the Lausanne Treaty aroused remarkably little public comment in business and private circles in Istanbul. Although business circles were not happy with these counter-proposals, Kemalist censure made it impossible to register strong public disapproval. If the dozen or so main modifications demanded were not altogether anticipated, at any rate, the general tenor of the reply to the Allied proposition was somewhat milder than many had expected. In other words, it was realised that the Second Group in the Assembly had not had their own way, but that, after much Kemalist rhetoric and little argument, they had eventually been overshadowed by Atatürk and İnönü.\textsuperscript{84}

As far as could be judged from the summaries of the documents, there was no reason from the point of view of the Allies for abandoning the confidence inspired by İnönü's actions at Lausanne that the Turks were eager to sign peace. The Kemalists had fenced with the Second Group without allowing themselves to be forced into a non possumus attitude. The new counter-proposals were tailored so as to disarm the Second Group's criticism that the Kemalist government had shown excessive subservience to the Allies. Some of the demands or suggestions now made affected portions of the draft Treaty that İnönü had already accepted at Lausanne, and they concerned for the most part the economic sections. The further claims showed the stedfastness of their resolve to rid themselves of all economic control, and a desire to obtain through the Greeks a sum of


\textsuperscript{82} "Turkish Counter Proposals: Note Handed to the Allies", \textit{The Times}, March 10, 1923, p.10; Ali İhsan Sabis, \textit{Harb Hatıralarım}, 5, p.362. Yalman writes that Adnan Adivar, the Kemalist envoy in Istanbul, handed the counter-proposals on March 10 (Ahmed Emin Yalman, \textit{Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim}, 3, p.36).

\textsuperscript{83} "Angora Debate Result: Negotiations to be Resumed", \textit{The Times}, March 8, 1923, p.10.

\textsuperscript{84} "Angora's Decision", \textit{The Near East}, March 22, 1923, p.292.
money, however small, in order to begin the new regime with some cash in hand. 85

In his memorandum of February 4, Inönü had stated that Turkey accepted the western frontier as proposed by the Allied Powers. The new Note, however, asked for Turkish sovereignty over Castellorizzo, and the small islands dependent on Tenedos, and suggested that the valley of the Maritza as the frontier of Thrace rather than the left bank of the river. 86 The Note issued from Ankara also claimed that in addition to the Economic Clauses embodied in the draft Treaty, Articles 1 to 11 of the Convention respecting the commercial regime should be seperated from the draft, and be reserved for subsequent discussion. 87

Despite Kemalist censure, criticism of the Turkish delegation did not stop. 88 In his editorial column of the March 12 issue of Tanin, Yalcin joined in the criticism of the incompetence of the conference delegates. He wrote that the only reason of General Inönü's election as the Chief Plenipotentiary at the Lausanne Peace Conference was his membership in the army which had been victorious in driving out the enemy from Turkish soil. Implying that Inönü had little diplomatic skill, Yalcin wrote that one wished a career diplomat competent at negotiations and knowledgable in European affairs had been elected to lead the Turkish delegation instead of Inönü. He also strongly criticised other delegates. Yalcin especially regretted that Riza Nur had been sent to Lausanne where his indiscretions had caused considerable embarrassment, tarnishing Turkish reputation. Yalcin pointed out that Riza Nur had been a liability for the Turkish delegation and strongly urged his immediate withdrawal. 89


For Riza Nur's indiscretions at the Conference, see, for example, "The Implacable Turk: Angora
LESS THAN A WEEK after the debate in the Assembly on the Lausanne Conference, Atatürk left Ankara on March 12 for further public appearances throughout southern Anatolia. He travelled to Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Konya, Afyon and Kuşadası, accompanied by his wife and his trusted entourage among whom were the Chief of the General Staff Marshall Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Ali Kilic, deputy for Antep, and Damat Arikoglu, deputy for Adana.

His main concern was the influential body of large landowners who had benefitted in the recent past from the Unionist economic policies and, therefore, sympathised with the Committee of Union and Progress. He had shown the same concern for the large landowners of Bursa when he had arrived there on January 20. In his January 22 Bursa speech, he had used a language aimed at cultivating the sympathies of the landowners and winning their support.

In an address to a group of landowners on March 16 at Adana, he again attempted to win landowner support. He further attacked his political opponents and accused, in strong yet very vague terms, his adversaries of deception, claiming that they portrayed what was, in fact, bad as good. Emphasizing unity, he continued that national sovereignty would under no circumstances be compromised and no other regime would be allowed to replace it. Finally, he talked about the upcoming general elections, and his


92. Nihat Unan (Compiler), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeleri, 2, p.67.


intention of establishing the People's Party to address, among other things, the needs of the landowners.  

At another speech made to landowners, this time at Tarsus on March 18, Atatürk once more talked about the dangers within. He referred to the traitors who might be working with the enemies of Turkey, and urged watchfulness. He would repeat this line of attack in a speech at Konya on March 20, alleging that enemies were trying to destroy Turkey from within.

BEFORE ATATÜRK left Ankara for his election tour, he had charged Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu, a Kemalist journalist and special envoy to Atatürk, to conduct a series of talks with Unionists and other opposition politicians at Istanbul in order to effect some sort of rapprochment. However, at their meeting in early March, neither Velid Ebüzziya Bey, who represented the conservatives, nor Kara Kemal Bey, who represented the Unionists, took Karaosmanoglu and the Kemalist Istanbul "organisation" seriously. Kara Kemal Bey later told Karaosmanoglu that although he felt a reconstruction of the Committee of Union and Progress was unlikely at the present time, there were elements remaining which could be brought together for political purposes. Indirectly, Kara Kemal Bey hoped to pacify Atatürk's fears of opposition.

Still provided with an efficient party organisation, the Committee of Union and Progress was able to secure the whole of the seats in the recent municipal elections in Istanbul without undue exertion. Under these circumstances, there was no need to enter into negotiations with Atatürk, who was in an inferior position as he still did not have any

political support in Istanbul. In order to gain strength there, Atatürk had charged Colonel Hafiz Besim Bey with the task of forming branches and recruiting political workers for the People's Party, but, up until mid-March, all Kemalist efforts had been fruitless.  

Upon the failure of Karaosmanoglu's attempt to reach an agreement with the opposition, Atatürk sent two of his trusted men -- Ali Cetinkaya, deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib, and Rais Kaplan, deputy for Antalya-- to Istanbul to take matters out of Karaosmanoglu's hands. They arrived at Istanbul by March 26 to speed up the organisation work of the Defence of Rights Committee, which was campaigning on behalf of Atatürk's own People's Party. At the same time, possibly in the hope of crippling their opponents, the Kemalist press in Ankara began to clamour for the prosecution, under the formidable Law #2 passed on April 29, 1922, for the supression of the crime of lése patrie of all the one hundred and sixty-nine members of the old Entente Libèreale whose names appeared in the list found lately among the papers of Cosmidis, once deputy for Izmir in the Chamber of Deputies before the War. Despite every effort, however, the Kemalists could not gain strength in Istanbul.

ATATÜRK RETURNED from his electoral campaign to Ankara on March 25. Little had changed to make him optimistic about the existing political situation. As a matter of fact, his extremely cool reception, especially at Konya, had left him with little doubt that his popularity was on the wane. As a remedy, Atatürk immediately started to threaten the public by declaring that if laws were not strong enough to restrain what he labelled as the reactionaries, he would supplement it with his own right arm.

102. "Turks Preparing for Elections", The Times, March 27, 1923, p.11.
103. Ismail Arar (Ed.), Atatürkün İzmit Basin Toplantısı, p.11.
In Istanbul, on the other hand, the liberal press openly discussed the resurgence of the officially defunct Committee of Union and Progress, of which a number of formerly prominent members still remained politically aloof from the Assembly, feeling that it was only temporary. Some eighty deputies still opposed the Kemalists, and another fifty or more refused to commit themselves either way. Although manageable, the political situation was precarious and the continuing editorial railing of Ali Sükrü Bey in the pages of Tan had become more than just an aggravation.\(^{105}\)

The likely reopening of peace negotiations in mid-April had also enlivened opposition to Kemalist foreign policy. On March 22, Cavid Bey, who had acted on occasion as a kind of advisor to the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, called on Sir Horace Rumbold, the British envoy to Istanbul. During the meeting, Cavid Bey frankly admitted that the Turkish delegation had committed serious mistakes. Saying that Ismet İnönü was an honest man, Cavid Bey nevertheless expressed his opinion that İnönü did not understand economic and financial questions. He went on to say that İnönü's handling of the Turkish case had not been skillful and had been in marked contrast to Lord Curzon's management of the business of the Conference. According to Cavid Bey, İnönü had made the mistake of deferring the solution of some of the principal territorial and political questions, with the result that, in the end, he had had to give way on them.\(^{106}\)

The March 28 issue of Tanin expressed the fear that France and Italy had rallied to the British view concerning the judicial safeguards, thus abandoning their conciliatory last moment attitude at Lausanne. Tanin gloomily remarked that if the news were as bad as it appeared, it was useless for the Turkish delegation to return to Lausanne. However, if it was essential to return to Lausanne, Tanin insisted upon the necessity for changing the

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106. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, March 22, 1923 [pp.4-5].
members of the Turkish delegation. 107

AT THIS MOMENT, however, all attention was focused to the mysterious disappearance of Ali Sükrü Bey, one of the leaders of the Second Group in the Assembly and editor-in-chief of *Tan*. 108 On March 27, Ali Sükrü Bey mysteriously disappeared. 109 Ali Sükrü Bey had formerly been a naval officer. After the 1908 Revolution, he had gained a reputation as a patriot for his activities on the Fleet Committee and his role on the development of the navy and ancillary transport services. He served during the war, but was retired after the armistice. Following his retirement, he devoted himself to politics. At Ankara, he identified himself with the Second Group, and started, on January 20, 1923, *Tan*, a daily newspaper. While not alone in its strident patriotism and anti-Allied, including anti-British, stance, *Tan* was the only newspaper in Ankara to openly attack the Kemalists on questions of domestic policy. *Tan* had taken a particularly active role in the campaign for the Law on Personal Liberty, which, though passed in March, the Kemalists were still attempting to modify. 110

Although his friends assumed that the Kemalists were responsible, their public response was limited to a condemnation of political crime in general. 111 The Second Group had every right to suspect Atatürk and other Kemalists. It was no secret that in January Atatürk had ordered Ali Kilic and several other members of his personal entourage to murder Ali Sükrü Bey. Then, Ali Kilic and others had objected to Ali Sükrü Bey's immediate murder on the grounds that they would be suspected of the murder. However, they had promised that they would make the appropriate arrangement and kill him later.

111. F.O.424/256, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, March 31, 1923 [p.872].
Knowledgeable of the previous Kemalist threat on Ali Sükrü Bey's life, the leadership of the Second Group created storm in the Assembly. The opposition attacked the government in the Assembly on March 29, and rejected a proposal to discuss the affair in closed session. The incident received much publicity in Istanbul which was still a relatively open city. Nonetheless, Kemalist supporters did not hesitate to threaten the opposition.

Hüseyin Avni Ulas, deputy for Erzurum, Refik Sevket Ince, deputy for Saruhan, and Ziya Hursid Bey, deputy for Lazistan, led an excited debate of which the result was that Rauf Orbay, President of the Council of Ministers, after vainly asking the Assembly to wait until it was known whether the disappearance was due to political assassination or ordinary murder, offered the resignation of the whole cabinet if the author of the supposed crime was not discovered. He announced that every effort was being made and that a special commission had been appointed to direct the investigation.

Indeed, Orbay was earnestly interested in finding out the murderers and bringing them to justice. Rifat Calik'a, Minister of Justice and one of the prominent figures of the Second Group, was also determined to find out the truth. On March 31, led by Mehmed Necati Memisoglu, the opposition deputy for Lazistan, Second Group deputies continued to press the matter further and demanded quick action. The evidence was so

overwhelming that many did not hesitate to publicly accuse Atatürk himself of having ordered the liquidation of Ali Sütkrü Bey, for obvious reasons.\(^1\)

The special commission in charge of the investigation started its work immediately, and, within a few days, the whole affair came to light. It was established that an Osman Agha, one of Atatürk's personal bodyguards, was intimately involved with the case.\(^2\) Police investigation showed that on March 27 he had kidnapped Ali Sütkrü Bey to his house, where he and eight of his men had strangled him. Among the accessories to the crime were Salih Bozok, Receb Peker, Fuad Bulca and Captain Rizeli Rauf Bey, all of whom Atatürk's closest lieutenants. After the crime, they had taken Ali Sütkrü Bey's body to Cankaya where they had buried it.\(^3\)

On April 1, investigators found Ali Sütkrü Bey's body buried in the fields at Cankaya.\(^4\) The prosecutor called for Osman Agha's immediate arrest. As soon as Atatürk received the news that Osman Agha was going to be arrested, he intervened with a view to preventing him to be captured alive by the police, as Osman Agha might confess that he had been ordered by Atatürk himself to carry out the murder.\(^5\)

Atatürk convened his trusted entourage to his residence at Cankaya to decide on the course of action. All of them --Receb Peker, İsmet İnönü, Fuad Bulca, and Riza Nur-- were fully cognisant of the seriousness of the situation. Riza Nur suggested that Atatürk dissolve the Assembly as it had become quite obvious that the Kemalists could neither

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control nor suppress debate in the Assembly. 124

The next morning, on April 2, Atatürk's bodyguards, dispatched to where Osman Agha and his men had been hiding, murdered them. Up until the last minute, Osman Agha was led to believe that Atatürk had sent his men for his rescue from the authorities. Alleging that Osman Agha and his men had fiercely resisted arrest and therefore Atatürk's men had to answer the fire and kill them during the besiege, Atatürk presented Osman Agha's as well as the others' dead bodies to the authorities, disguising one murder with several others. 125

The investigation, therefore, produced no tangible result in implicating and prosecuting Atatürk for having given the order to kill Ali Sükrü Bey. Rauf Orbay, informed the Assembly of the dramatic end of Osman Agha, insisting that the murder was not political but the result of a personal feud. 126 Having saved his skin, Atatürk fired the Minister of Justice, the Public Prosecutor, the judges, and all the gendarmes connected with the case as soon as the Assembly was dissolved in late April. 127 Thus, all evidence implicating Atatürk was suppressed for good. In return for their invaluable services, Atatürk's accomplices in the murder --Salih Bozok, Fuad Bulca, Receb Peker, and Rizeli Rauf Bey-- were all "elected" deputies by his personal intervention in the general elections that soon followed. 128

THIS EVENT and the debate to which it had given rise was extremely likely to hasten the

cleavage between the groups in the Assembly and promote the formation of definitely antagonistic parties, which, in turn, was feared to be instrumental in giving a boost to Atatürk's steadily diminishing grip over the Assembly. This was most unfortunate for the interests of Turkey, as signs were increasingly apparent that Atatürk's control of the army and country had been somewhat impaired. Atatürk's diminishing control over the army had partly been attributed to the discontent of certain generals owing to the political predominance accorded to Atatürk and their unwillingness to totally submit to his dictatorial ambitions. 129

As expected, this episode provided the context for a major political crisis. 130 Kemalists had realised by now that they did not hold the majority in the Assembly. The number of the Second Group deputies had risen to one hundred and twenty. 131 Assembly debates on the peace negotiations had brought to light the serious dimensions of dissension even within the Kemalist bloc. The majority of the Assembly believed that Turkey had lost at the conference table what she had won in the battlefield. Not only the majority of the deputies but also the public at large had lost confidence in the delegation and the Kemalist strategy. With the news of Ali Sükrü Bey's murder, public reaction to Kemalist rule heightened to new proportions. 132

The already more than simmering opposition was now boiling over, and Atatürk decided to use the situation to his own advantage. On the night of March 30, there was held a cabinet meeting at which Atatürk was also present. The Kemalist leadership expressed the opinion that it had become extremely difficult to continue peace negotiations especially after it had become widely known that they were bitterly opposed by a considerable number of deputies in the Assembly, the majority of the free press, and the people at large. Kemalists

130. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 3, 1923 [p.21].
realised that they no longer held a comfortable majority in the Assembly to legislate as they wished. Therefore, they judged it best to dissolve the Assembly and call for new elections. 133

On March 31, the Executive Council of the First Group, i.e., the Kemalists, held a meeting, in which Atatürk lobbied for the holding of new elections. 134 Resad [Kayali], deputy for Saruhan and Chairman of the Executive Council of the First Group, objected to the timing of this decision as the public was still occupied with the murder of Ali Sükrü Bey, saying that without a proper investigation that would clear the matter in the public mind, holding of new elections would be highly inappropriate. However, the view he represented remained in the minority, and the decision to hand in the Kemalist motion to call for new elections was taken at this meeting. 135

On the morning of April 1, the Kemalists decided to move in the Assembly for new elections to be held within two months. That afternoon, a group of one hundred and twenty Kemalist deputies led by Esad İleri, deputy for Aydın, laid the motion before the Assembly, proposing an annulment of the current special provision that the present Assembly continue to sit until after the signing of the Peace Treaty. 136 İnönü urged that while the peace negotiations were progressing at Lausanne, the electorate could be consulted at home in order that a new Assembly should be in existence in readiness to ratify


the Treaty if signed. The opposition feigned confusion, pointing out that Ismet Inönü had opposed a proposal to hold new elections when it had been put forward by members of the Second Group just several weeks before --what had changed? 137

The political situation at Ankara rapidly came to a head. The Kemalist motion of April 1 calling for general elections was approved by a majority of the Assembly. Second Group deputies took exception to the wording of the article abrogating the existing special provision regarding the life of the existing Assembly. Second Group deputies were strong enough to cancel the part of the Kemalist motion which asked for the immediate dissolution of the Assembly; and, therefore, the law was accepted not as drafted by the Kemalist authors of the motion. 138 The deputies then proceeded to consider the unfinished clauses of the electoral law, which was expected to end that evening. According to one version, the proposal was that new elections would be held within two months, and that existing Assembly should continue to sit meanwhile. 139

A separate bill, already prepared and swiftly passed on April 3, fundamentally revised the electoral system to Atatürk's advantage. The system of election by colleges of secondary electors was maintained, but the proportion of deputies to the male population was fixed at one to twenty thousand instead of fifty thousand, and that of secondary electors to the male population at one to two hundred instead of five hundred. Because the bill called for both the elimination of the poll tax and a lowering of the minimum voting age


139. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 1, 1923 [p.1]; F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 3, 1923 [p.22]; and, "Allied Note to Turkey: Delivery at Angora", The Times, April 2, 1923, p.8.
from twenty-five to eighteen, thousands of demobilised veterans, as well as troops still under arms, suddenly found themselves enfranchised. Moreover, by restructuring the electoral districts, the bill reduced the total number of deputies to two hundred and eighty-seven, increasing at the same time, the number of electoral districts.\footnote{140} The first Assembly had a total of three hundred and thirty-seven deputies representing sixty-six electoral districts. The new one would have two hundred and eighty-seven deputies representing seventy-two districts.\footnote{141} Further gerrymandering insured that opposition candidates would have little chance of being reelected in their new districts.\footnote{142}

Public attention was occupied with the prospects of the general election so dramatically sprung upon the country, which had not expected it before the ratification of the Peace Treaty. Announcing in the Assembly his intention to stand again, Atatürk tried to allay public distrust shown towards himself by depreciating the idea that a dictatorship was possible in democratic Turkey, which was devoted to the maintenance of popular sovereignty.\footnote{143}

The election news, being totally unexpected, created general surprise among the inhabitants of Istanbul. The most prevalent interpretation was that the Kemalists, apprehensive of the growing strength of the liberal opposition, had resorted to this course in order to eliminate undesirables and rush elections before the opposition organisation was ready. The fact that the Assembly would continue to sit meant that opposition deputies would be tied to Ankara and unable to participate in the electoral campaign.\footnote{144}

\footnote{140} Düstur, Kanun #320; "Turks Reply to the Allies: The New Electoral Law", The Times, April 5, 1923, p.9; F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 10, 1923 [p.53]; and, André Mary-Rousselière, La Turquie Constitutionnelle: Contribution à l’étude de la politique intérieure turque, p.274.


\footnote{142} Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.171; and, André Mary-Rousselière, La Turquie Constitutionnelle: Contribution à l’étude de la politique intérieure turque, p.274.

\footnote{143} "Turkish General Election: Public Surprised: Kemal Pasha to Stand Again", The Times, April 3, 1923, p.10.

\footnote{144} "A Possible Government Manoeuvre", The Manchester Guardian, April 3, 1923, p.7.
Responsible Turkish opinion, while surprised at the suddenness of the decision, generally welcomed the prospect of the election as enabling the country to return a more genuinely representative Assembly composed of men with wider experience. The liberal press in Istanbul expressed the opinion that as the existing administration was the result of a coalition of groups, it was unlikely that the Kemalist government could exercise much pressure in favour of individual candidates. Tanin, however, questioned the timing of the decision and criticised the Second Group representative Rifat Calik’a's consent to the Kemalist decision at the March 31 meeting without consulting the other members of his group.

FACING INCREASED CRITICISM, Atatürk and his supporters could no longer rely on a solid majority in the Assembly. They therefore wished to keep the Assembly engaged in trivial matters until the new elections. Though the opposition had grown too powerful to be stifled or ignored, Atatürk believed the country was essentially his and that the new elections could only bear this out. His recent bid for the landowners' vote at the Economic Congress of Izmir, and Kemalist control of the state apparatus all seemed to insure Atatürk's success. Moreover, he still hoped that he would be able to divide and attach to himself a section of the Committee of Union and Progress. Certainly there would be a political struggle, but now, with such strong chances for success, was the time to fight: he knew that he was in for a struggle, but he very likely hoped that by engaging in it now he would emerge a dictator.

The first weeks of April saw a growing storm of confused controversy not only over which parties existed, but over what these parties stood for. The Defence of Rights

146. Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.322.
147. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 3, 1923 [p.23].
Association was more or less a loose conglomeration of local resistance groups which held similar views on such issues as the restoration of complete territorial integrity and the creation of a unified political system. Although Atatürk had himself elected President of this association, the position was relatively meaningless, and the Association never had the distinguishing works of a centralised political party. The fact that the organisation was not centrally controlled allowed the opposition to move against Atatürk within the organisation without appearing to work as an opposition party. The fiction that it was an all encompassing national organisation was maintained to such an extent that the opposition elements, popularly known as the Second Group, were able to represent themselves not as being a separate party in the Assembly, but as being a "second group" of the Defence of Rights Association itself.  

The situation was to some extent clarified on April 7, when Atatürk announced that during a meeting with Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, Fethi Okyar, Minister of the Interior, and Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, editor-in-chief of Yeni Gün, held at Rauf Orbay's residence the previous night, it had been decided that the Defence of Rights Association would be converted into the People's Party.  

It was during this meeting that Atatürk first revealed the "Nine Principles" which would become the basis for a common campaign platform. It contained, among other things, a series of detailed promises designed to address the interests of to the landowning class, and the military and civilian bureaucracy. Apart from giving specific assurances to

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148. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 11, 1923 [p.54].
these groups, the Nine Principles also made some general and vague promises for the amelioration of economic conditions for the benefit of trade and industry.\textsuperscript{151} The Nine Principles were so pitched as to cater particularly to the landowning class and merchants, who constituted not only the vast majority of the rural and urban electorate but also the most likely groups, along with the military and civilian bureaucracy, to give support to a nationalist party.\textsuperscript{152}

The Nine Principles also called for the conversion of the Defence of Rights Association into the People's Party.\textsuperscript{153} In this way, Atatürk hoped to eliminate any potential opposition within the Defence of Rights Association and thus consolidate his control over the organisation. This proposal, however, created opposition among the local Defence of Rights Association leadership, the strongest of which came from Trabzon, the power base of Ali Sükrü Bey. Already, Ahmed Barutcu, the local leader of the Defence of Rights Association, and Faik Ahmed Barutcu, his son and the owner of \textit{İstikbal}, had condemned the assassination of Ali Sükrü Bey. With Atatürk's latest move, opposition only increased and, using the by-laws of the Association as justification, they rejected Atatürk's demands. Atatürk, however, had made up his mind and, therefore, was not interested in the views of the local leaders. He immediately sent a delegation consisting of two deputies who declared the leadership in the local office of the Defence of Rights Association in Trabzon null and void and replaced them with Kemalist sympathisers.\textsuperscript{154}

At the same time, the Kemalist press began to attack the prospect of a reconstructed Committee of Union and Progress as a dangerous development, generally accusing the

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\textsuperscript{152} Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.179.


\textsuperscript{154} Mete Tuncay, \textit{Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931}, p.53.
opposition of being untrue to the principle of national sovereignty, and raising cries of "reaction" and "occult forces". 155

Despite the absence of an official organisation, the Unionists were a strong force in the political arena. Although they thought that they were superior to the Kemalists in power of organisation, they also knew that their political clout would remain limited by the lack of official recognition. 156 The April 5 issue of the liberal newspaper Vatan made an appeal for the political legitimization of the Committee of Union and Progress, claiming that its members should be free to compete in the upcoming elections and thus be allowed to work for the good of the country. 157 A week later, in the April 11 issue, putting further pressure on the Kemalists, Vatan announced that the Committee of Union and Progress intended to stand apart from both the People’s Party and the Second Group, and had begun to formulate a programme of its own. Importantly, the party favoured the abrogation of the caliphate, but specifically demanded a constitutional assembly to decide on the future form of government. Furthermore, although five members of the Assembly -- Eyüb Sabri Akgöl, deputy for Eskisehir, Hilmi Bey, deputy for Ardahan, Necati Kurtulus, deputy for Bursa, Hafız Mehmed [Engin], deputy for Trabzon, and Yusuf Baskaya, deputy for Denizli-- already belonged to the Committee of Union and Progress, another twenty-five to thirty deputies were reportedly considering joining its ranks -- this despite the fact that the party had not yet decided to enter the elections. 158

ATATÜRK’S DOMINATION clearly violated governmental and legislative independence.

155. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 11, 1923 [p.54].
156. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 3, 1923 [p.23].
158. Ahmed Emin [Yalman], "İttihad ve Terakki’yi Diriltmege Çalışanlar", Vatan, April 11, 1923, quoted in Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.56. Out of these five deputies, two - -Hilmi Bey and Hafız Mehmed [Engin]-- paid the price of their courage with their lives: both were hanged by the Tribunals of Independence in 1926.
Though highly critical of Atatürk's political manoeuvres, Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay decided to continue in their official capacities -- the former as Vice-President of the Assembly, the latter as President of the Council of Ministers. But they were by no means quiet, or powerless. Their criticism during or immediately after the April 10 meeting of the Central Election Committee, for example, forced Atatürk to publicly reiterate his pledge to step down and withdraw from politics once his task was complete.\textsuperscript{159} He alleged that at the moment, however, his task was far from complete. As if he were not personally responsible for it, he pointed to electoral corruption as a sign of the enemy within, particularly in Istanbul. Again, he urged unity and watchfulness.\textsuperscript{160}

In an interview disseminated by the official news agency, Anadolu Ajansi, on April 14, Atatürk was asked whether representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress had proposed a coalition. Evading an answer, he replied that the Committee of Union and Progress had not been in existence since the end of the war. Moreover, its post-war successor, the Reform Party, had been assimilated into the Defence of Rights Association and accepted its programme. By inference, he suggested that, historically speaking, the Defence of Rights Association was the Committee of Union and Progress.\textsuperscript{161} He was anxious to downplay the political differences between his People's Party, a non-entity, appearing as yet only on paper, and the well-organised Committee of Union and Progress. He was doing his best to confuse the minds of the electorate as to the true nature of the People's Party's political stance.

Atatürk's allegation that the Committee of Union and Progress no longer existed drew an immediate and sharp response from the Unionist leadership. On April 19, \textit{Tanin

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with the Anadolu Ajansi reporter, dated April 14, 1923, in Nimet Unan (Compiler), \textit{Atatürk'\'un Söylev ve Demecleri}, 3, p.62; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.187.

\textsuperscript{160} Ahmed Emin Yalman, \textit{Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim}, 3, pp.56-57.

\textsuperscript{161} Nimet Unan (Compiler), \textit{Atatürk'\'un Söylev ve Demecleri}, 3, p.62; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.187.
published an editorial entitled, "What are the Unionists doing?" written by its editor-in-chief, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın.\textsuperscript{162} Regretting that most of the Unionist leadership had perished during and after the War, Yalcın, nevertheless, asserted that the party organisation still existed. In order to neutralise Kemalist smear campaign, he warned the public that the relative silence of the Committee of Union and Progress was a reflection of this situation, and that it should not be taken as a sign that it had been illegally working underground.\textsuperscript{163}

Pointing out the differences between the Kemalists and the Second Group, Yalcın went on to say that it was the Committee of Union and Progress which had made the Revolution of 1908, with which liberal democracy had been established in Turkey for the first time. This reminder was, of course, directed against the Kemalists whose propagandists were busy claiming to have inherited Unionist ideals. In conciliatory mode, he wrote that he did not see any differences of opinion between the Kemalists and the Unionists, as both parties professed to uphold liberal principles, adding that Unionists were as patriotic, and progressive as the Kemalists. These lines were, doubtless, written so as to disarm Kemalist offensive.\textsuperscript{164}

The opposition, however, was hampered by its heterogeneity, and, as was the case of its most coherent group, the Committee of Union and Progress, by highly exaggerated rumours of corruption and profiteering during the war. Although it might have helped the opposition to gain definition, it was difficult, if not dangerous, to openly come out with a cohesive policy opposed to that of Atatürk. They were, however, active. Rumours circulated that the Committee of Union and Progress was planning to issue a counter-

\textsuperscript{162} Hüseyin Cahid [Yalcın], "İttihat ve Terakki Ne Yapıyor?", \textit{Tanin}, April 19, 1923, printed in full in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Yalcın’in Elli Yıllık Hatıraları: Atatürk Devri: 25", \textit{Halkci}, April 14, 1955, p.4. See also, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.188.

\textsuperscript{163} Hüseyin Cahid [Yalcın], "İttihat ve Terakki Ne Yapıyor?", \textit{Tanin}, April 19, 1923, printed in full in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, "Yalcın’in Elli Yıllık Hatıraları: Atatürk Devri: 25", \textit{Halkci}, April 14, 1955, p.4.

manifesto advocating the creation by a new Grand National Assembly with a second chamber, which, with the Assembly itself, would form a Constituent Assembly. According to Yalçın, editor-in-chief of Tanin, this new Assembly would elaborate on a constitution restoring a liberal democratic form of government with a cabinet responsible to the parliament while retaining constitutional monarchy, establishing direct elections, and maintaining Istanbul as the capital. However detailed its programme might have been, the opposition could not afford to openly challenge the Kemalist Regime, unless it could rely on at least an important section of the army to support this challenge. 165

On April 14, Tanin, one of the most prominent newspapers which voiced the Unionist viewpoint, created a sensation with an article by Yalçın, its editor-in-chief, which stated that even if the Committee of Union and Progress did not have official status as a political party, it did exist and it was organised. The proof was that its leaders had held an unofficial congress. The public, the article continued, had before it two groups: the First Group and the Second Group. Because there was no essential difference between the principles of each group, there were Unionists in both groups. Moreover, it stated that Atatürk and the First Group were in fact carrying forward with great boldness the original Unionist programme. The only point of difference was on the question of equilibrium between the powers of the State, which the Unionists thought it necessary to restore. They did not seek to wrest authority from the Kemalists. They had offered their collaboration to Atatürk. The sting of the article lay in its attack on the Kemalist constitutional system and in the suggestion that the Unionists, as a party organisation, were important enough to make terms with the rulers of the provisional government in Ankara. If national sovereignty was mainly advertised as meaning the permanent abolition of the monarchy, it was no less a cardinal principle of the Kemalists that it involved the unification of all power, executive as well as legislative, in the Assembly; and, it was principle of the unification of power which

165. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 11, 1923 [p.54].
threatened the existence of a liberal democratic form of government that the Unionists objected.166

THE TANIN ARTICLE OF APRIL 14 provided the justification that the Kemalists had been looking for in order to stifle and totally suppress press freedom. Atatürk was additionally irritated by the negative publicity the Ali Sükrü Bey murder had rekindled.167 On April 15, the Kemalists brought off their greatest coup so far and secured the adoption of a draft law which would immediately become known as "Cahid Bey Kanunu", designed as it was to deal with the case of Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin as well as other members of the liberal press whose criticisms of the administration had so irked the Kemalists.168

Extremely heated discussions took place in the Assembly on the new law making it treasonable to work for the reunion of the Sultanate and Caliphate, or to write or speak against the complete sovereignty of the Ankara Assembly. Every attempt was made by the liberal opposition to adjourn the discussion and to prevent the presence of a quorum, as they recognised the law was directed against their group, and condemned what was to be the main point of their electoral campaign.169

Second Group deputies urged that the proposed law would be an infringement of the freedom of thought, and that its enforcement would be tyrannical. Fethi Okyar, the Kemalist Minister of the Interior, supported the law, claiming that it was simply a logical consequence of the law vesting sovereignty in the nation.170 Though there was strenuous argument from a number of the Second Group deputies against the adoption of the law, it

166. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 18, 1923 [pp.67-68].
was nevertheless passed by the Assembly --which had only refused to vote off-hand several days previously when the Kemalists had laid it on the table. 171

This law made it lese-patrie to question the legitimacy of the Assembly, or oppose by word, writing or act the decision of November 1, 1922 which abolished the Sultanate and asserted the indivisible sovereignty of the Assembly as sole representative of the people. The law was designed to make all opposition to the dominant Kemalist bloc impossible, the penalty for lese-patrie being death. 172 Because of its reference to the sovereignty of the Assembly and the abolition of the Sultanate, Atatürk's Nine Principles would suddenly be protected from criticism. Indeed, as President of the Assembly, Atatürk himself would also be immune to criticism. Atatürk thus made it impossible for the opposition to attack either him or his party. To do so would have been to imply criticism of the Nine Principles with its references to the sovereignty of the Assembly and the efficacy of the abolition of the sultanate, and this suddenly constituted a treasonable offence. 173 In short, as The Near East observed, the new law bore a stronger likeness to the despotism of Abdülhamid than to the legislation of a free country. 174

Clearly, if strictly applied, this law would prevent any dissenting group, whether it be the Committee of Union and Progress or the conservative opposition, from fighting the Kemalists, except by intrigue or more or less revolutionary methods. 175

175. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 18, 1923 [p.68]; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.199.
Chapter 18

THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1923

HAVING SECURED THE "LEGAL" MEANS of silencing political opposition to Atatürk's aspirations for dictatorship, Kemalists practically dissolved the Assembly on April 16.¹

That same day, the Unionist leadership held a meeting at Cavid Bey's house in Istanbul.² The meeting had been called partly as a consequence of Kara Kemal Bey's talks with Atatürk in January. After his return to Istanbul, Kara Kemal Bey had sent letters to various Unionist politicians, inviting them to a private meeting in order to discuss the political situation which had come about as a result of the meeting he and Atatürk had had at Izmit on January 16.³

About fifteen to twenty Unionists attended the meeting. Among them were Cavid Bey, former Minister of Finance, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, editor-in-chief of Tanin, Dr. Nazim Bey, Kara Kemal Bey, former Minister of Provisions, Dr. Rusuhi Bey, Ahmed Sükrü Bey, former Minister of Education, Fillibeli Hilmi Bey, Second Group deputy for Ardahan, Yenibahceli Nail Bey, Selahaddin Köseoglu, Second Group deputy for Mersin, Vehbi Bey, former leader of the Fatih branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, Ahmed Nesimi Sayman, Hüseyinzade Ali Turan, Ismail Canbulat, former Minister of the Interior, Rahmi Evrenos, former Governor of Aydın, and Talat Sönmez, former deputy for

Ankara in the Chamber of Deputies. 4

During the meetings that lasted for two consecutive days, the Unionist leadership discussed Kara Kemal Bey's talks with Atatürk at İzmit, the question of a party programme, the upcoming elections, and the likely candidates for the elections. 5

The party programme the leadership worked out left no doubt that the Committee of Union and Progress was being revived. Stating that the Committee of Union and Progress was a radical party, the First Article of the programme stated that the party was respectful to all liberties. Rejecting in total the Basic Law that had been passed by the Assembly at Ankara in 1921, the programme also stated that all laws and regulations would be amended so as to conform to the libertarian principles of the Constitution. 6 In addition to better protecting the freedom of the citizens, the party programme also included articles on constitutional issues concerning the balance of power between the legislative and the executive. In this connection, the Unionists favoured a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, instead of having only an Assembly as preferred by the Kemalists. The party programme stated that these two bodies would work as a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution on liberal principles. The Fifth Article of the programme affirmed that Istanbul would remain as the Turkish capital. Finally, the Ninth Article expressed the promise that the Committee of Union and Progress would work for a rapid economic recovery through a just administration. 7

Although their previous offer had been rejected, the Unionist leadership, once

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again, decided to offer Atatürk to lead the Committee of Union and Progress. In the more than likely event of Atatürk's refusal to lead the party, they agreed to communicate their neutrality towards his leadership of the People's Party. They also voted to inform Atatürk that the Committee of Union and Progress would not object to his presidency of the yet-to-be declared Republic. 8

With respect to the elections, the leadership judged that it would be best not to openly challenge Atatürk's newly "established" People's Party. Because it was clear that Atatürk would not allow a Unionist ticket in the upcoming elections, they decided that individual members could run under the Defence of Rights Association ticket. Along with several other proposals for the future of the Turkish political system, their decision was rapidly dispatched to Atatürk. 9

Atatürk responded that he did not want their help in the elections, and, furthermore, that he would not tolerate any opposition to the elections themselves. 10

In Istanbul, many well-known men were mentioned as likely to represent the province. Among the likely liberal candidates were several prominent Unionists, Cavid Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, former Secretary-General of the Committee of the Union and Progress, Dr. Nazım Bey, Kara Kemal Bey, former Minister of Provisions, Cemil Bey, professor of International Law, and Mihhon Ventura, professor of Roman Law, both at Istanbul University. 11

Reportedly, Ismail Müstak Mayakon, former secretary of the Senate and now general manager of Tanin, and Salah Cimcoz, a former Unionist deputy interned at Malta, were standing for the new Assembly, the latter as a socialist candidate. Esad Bey, the ex-

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Governor of Istanbul, who was a brother of Marshal Izzet Pasha, the late Grand Vezier, was also believed to be standing.\textsuperscript{12}

The Entente Liberale was represented by Lütfi Fikri Bey, President of the Bar and former editor of \textit{Sabah}.\textsuperscript{13} Among other things, his electoral platform included the promise that he would work for the retention of Istanbul as capital.\textsuperscript{14} The independents were Prince Sabahaddin, son of Damad Mahmud Pasha and a nephew and well-known opponent of ex-Sultan Abdülhamid, Professor Muslihiddin Bey, former deputy for Istanbul in the Chamber of Deputies, and Muhtar Bey, son of ex-Sheik-ul-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi.\textsuperscript{15}

Several editors of the leading Istanbul newspapers were also likely to enter the race, among whom were Ahmet Emin Yalman, of \textit{Vatan}, Necmeddin Sadak, of \textit{Aksam}, and Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu, of \textit{Ikdam}.\textsuperscript{16}

The eagerness of the Kemalist government not to neglect any possible source of strength was observable in the cabinet’s proposal to find immediate employment for and to pay the arrears of salaries due to former imperial officials now on the shelf. These officials formed an influential and hitherto disgruntled group, and were often accused of reactionary leanings by the patriotic press, but they controlled many useful votes in the Istanbul area.\textsuperscript{17}

Meanwhile, all parties were eager to avoid being first in the field with a political programme.\textsuperscript{18} The most important of the political developments was the decision announced on April 7 after a meeting of the Kemalist leaders at Rauf Orbay’s residence that Atatürk’s Defence of Right group had definitely taken the field as the People’s Party. This ended a fiction hitherto maintained that there were no parties in Turkey but merely groups

\textsuperscript{12} "Turkish Delegation for Lausanne: Kemalist Note to Moscow", \textit{The Times}, April 11, 1923, p.11.
\textsuperscript{13} "The New Electoral Law", \textit{The Times}, April 5, 1923, p.9.
\textsuperscript{15} "The New Electoral Law", \textit{The Times}, April 5, 1923, p.9.
\textsuperscript{16} "The New Electoral Law", \textit{The Times}, April 5, 1923, p.9.
\textsuperscript{17} "Political Struggle at Angora", \textit{The Times}, April 7, 1923, p.9.
\textsuperscript{18} "Political Struggle at Angora", \textit{The Times}, April 7, 1923, p.9.
in an otherwise united Assembly.\textsuperscript{19}

The preamble of the Nine Principles rejected any peace which did not secure the administrative, economic, and financial independence of Turkey.\textsuperscript{20} While the First Clause reaffirmed of popular sovereignty, Second Clause insisted on the maintenance of the abolition of the Sultanate. Third and Fourth Clauses guaranteed peaceful internal administration, and equal and equitable dispensation of justice. The Fifth Clause adopted as the basis of the economic policy of the country of the economic pact elaborated by the Izmir Economic Congress. The Sixth Clause promised a reduction of the Army, while the Seventh Clause promised adequate provision for deserving officers. The Eight Clause pledged an improvement of the conditions of pay and pension of the civil service. Finally, the Ninth Clause gave assurance that devastated areas would be reconstructed.\textsuperscript{21}

A day later, on April 8, formal candidacies of prominent politicians of the Kemalist bloc were announced. Atatürk put his candidacy for Ankara; Rauf Orbay, President of the Council of Ministers, Ismet Inönü, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fethi Okyar, Minister of the Interior, and Muhtar Bey, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, for Istanbul; Riza Nur, Minister of Health, for Sinop; Kazim Özalp Pasha, Minister of Defence, for Karesi; Feyzi Pirincioglu, Minister of Public Works, for Diyarbakır; Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, Minister of Economy, for Izmir; Hasan Fehmi Atac, Minister of Finance, for Gümüşhane; Ismail Safa Özler, Minister of Education, for Mersin; Rifat Calik'a, Minister of Justice, for Kayseri, and Mehmed Vehbi Celik, Minister of the Sharia, for Konya.\textsuperscript{22}

On April 12, the local press in Istanbul published a manifesto addressed by Atatürk to the inhabitants of Istanbul. He said everything short of promising to restore Istanbul to

\textsuperscript{19} "Turkish Election Campaign: Kemal Pasha's Programme", \textit{The Times}, April 10, 1923, p.11; and, "Kemal's Election "Platform": Treaty Ensuring Turkish Independence", \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, April 10, 1923, p.10.

\textsuperscript{20} "Kemal's Election "Platform": Treaty Ensuring Turkish Independence", \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, April 10, 1923, p.10; and, "Turkish Election Campaign: Kemal Pasha's Programme", \textit{The Times}, April 10, 1923, p.11.

\textsuperscript{21} "Turkish Election Campaign: Kemal Pasha's Programme", \textit{The Times}, April 10, 1923, p.11.

\textsuperscript{22} "Turkish Election Campaign: Kemal Pasha's Programme", \textit{The Times}, April 10, 1923, p.11.
its position as capital. Congratulating its people on their courage in adversity, he reminded
them that the Defence of Rights Association had made its object to deliver them, but that the
deliverance was not yet complete. He invited their confidence in the Kemalist organisation,
and entreated them not to encourage the foreigner by dispersing their votes. 23

The press also announced that several of the leading figures of the Kemalist bloc
would be put forward as candidates for the representation of Istanbul in the new Assembly.
Various measures had been taken to ensure their election, even should their personal
prestige not suffice. 24

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED MAYOR OF ISTANBUL who had a considerable role to play
in the supervision of the primary elections fell under Kemalist suspicion when members of
the Committee of Union and Progress were successfully elected to a majority position on
the City Council. 25 The fact that the Committee of Union and Progress had a majority on
the City Council was significant, because the members of the local election committee were
to be chosen from its ranks. In order to eliminate any Unionist influence, the Kemalists
chose only loyalist members of the City Council, who were in the minority, to sit on the
local election committee charged with the supervision of the proceedings. This assured
certain Kemalist success in the primary elections. 26

The Kemalists were decided not to take any chances at Istanbul. In addition to their
capture of the election committee, there was talk that all the leading Kemalists, including
Atatürk and the Kemalist cabinet ministers, would present themselves as candidates for

23. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
April 18, 1923 [p.67].
24. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
April 18, 1923 [p.67].
April 16, p.6; and, F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 18, 1923 [p.67].
26. F.O.424/257, Sir Horace Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
April 18, 1923 [p.67].
Istanbul, as they feared that the Unionists might score there unless opposed by the Kemalist heavy-weights.27

Because Ziya Bey, the government-appointed Mayor of Istanbul, was suspected of only half-heartedly supporting the Kemalist plan of campaign, he was quickly dismissed, to be replaced on April 12 by the newly arrived Governor-General of Istanbul, Ali Haydar Yulug, who also became Acting Mayor.28 Ziya Bey's removal, whose functions would be exercised by the newly-installed Governor, was feared to exert an undue influence in the upcoming elections.29

AS SOON AS the motion calling for new elections was passed by the Assembly, Atatürk established at Ankara a Central Election Committee composed of his trusted men in the cabinet and from among the loyal members of the Defence of Rights Association.30 The committee included, among others, Damar Arikoglu, Falih Rifki Atay, and Yunus Nadi Abalioglu.31 Their task consisted of screening candidates. Under the personal attendance of Atatürk, this committee collected information on all of the candidates, in an attempt to eliminate anybody suspected of belonging to the opposition or even of being a lukewarm Kemalist supporter.32

In their screening process, they were assisted by two collaborators, Mehmed Sabri Toprak and Rasim Basara. Presently the Kemalist Director General of Posts, Telegraphs

30. Damar Arikoglu, Hatiralari, p.323; and, Ali Kilic, Kılıç Ali Hatıralarını Anlıyorum, p.120.
32. Damar Arikoglu, Hatıraları, p.323.
and Telephone, Toprak had formerly worked at the Kadiköy branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, and had inside information on many candidates who had Unionist sympathies. On the other hand, Basara had been a deputy in the Chamber of Deputies before the war, which qualified him to be an expert on the parliamentary behaviours of ex-deputies who intended to run in the upcoming elections.  

Adnan Adivar was expected to leave Istanbul during the second week of April for Ankara to assist in the work of the Central Election Committee. Other government officials from Istanbul were also summoned to Ankara by the Kemalist leadership for instructions and the strategy to be carried out in the elections.  

By late May, the Central Election Committee had prepared the candidate lists for most of the provinces. These lists had been finalised only after going through the lists of candidates one by one so as to make it doubly sure that there remained no doubt as to their complete loyalty to Atatürk. The screening was so thorough that the final lists excluded many prospective candidates, while they included names which shocked even some supporters of Atatürk: During the process of elimination, it had become apparent that mostly opportunists had gotten into the lists.  

There was apprehension among not only the liberal press in Istanbul but also the honest members of the Defence of Rights Association who still followed Atatürk, though with increasing reservations. Totally appalled by the final list of candidates, provincial politicians as well as the public were busy pressuring some Kemalist candidates to quit the race on the one hand, and further discrediting these loyalist candidates who had already been openly dubbed as daikavuks, or courtiers, on the other.  

33. Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.323.  
AS ANTICIPATED, the new Treason Law had effectively stifled all opposition to Atatürk's People's Party. It was acting like a wet blanket on electoral activity. Many preferred in the altered circumstances not to express any political opinion. 39

During mid-April, the Second Group, which the Kemalist organisation had taken such pains to discredit, showed little sign of life; its headquarters in Ankara was deserted and the group seemingly dissolved. 40 By April 9, the organ of the Second Group, Tan, of which the late Ali Sükrü Bey was editor-in-chief, had ceased publication. 41 By April 15, they had not published a programme, being confronted with serious difficulty in taking up their stand on political questions owing to the threat that their action would be regarded as high treason. 42 By April 22, most of its members had arrived in Istanbul where they were reported to resume the publication of Tan which had hitherto appeared in Ankara. It was unclear whether any of its members would run as deputies for Istanbul. 43

Members of the Committee of Union and Progress also refused to come into the open under that label, as they declared that the programme of the People's Party did not differ from their own. 44

In consequence of the amendment to the Treason Law, the Committee of Union and Progress was also forced to withdraw from the elections, though the party organ, Tanin, cloaked its retreat with high-sounding phrases regarding the necessity for solidarity at this most delicate of junctures. Ismail Canbulat's empty-handed return to Istanbul was followed

40. F.O. 424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 24, 1923 [p.98].
41. "Turkish Delegation for Lausanne: Kemalist Note to Moscow", The Times, April 11, 1923, p.11.
43. "Turkish Elections: 8,000 Candidates in the Field", The Times, April 23, 1923, p.11; and, F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 1, 1923 [p.128].
by Kara Kemal Bey’s April 18 declaration that the Committee of Union and Progress had withdrawn in order to avoid internal division before the conclusion of peace at Lausanne. Towards this aim, the Committee of Union and Progress would remain absolutely neutral. But this public position would not prevent the Unionists from trying to smuggle at least some of their adherents into the new Assembly under the guise of Kemalists. Consequently, they were willing to offer themselves wearing the Kemalist colours; but the Kemalists were taking no chances, especially at Istanbul, which was considered as suspect. As a result, all the leading Kemalists, with the exception of Atatürk himself, were presenting their candidacies for Istanbul, as they feared that the Unionists might score at Istanbul unless opposed by the Kemalist heavyweights.

An invitation had been issued to Atatürk in the name of the Istanbul electors, but in his reply, after referring to the fact that the complete liberation of the city had not yet been realised, he expressed his regret at being unable to accept it. It was more likely that he did not want to risk his future political career, as there was still a slight likelihood of the Unionists winning the Istanbul seats.

It seemed probable that the task of opposing any Second Group or other opposition candidates would be entrusted to some of the lesser figures of the Kemalist party. In the event of the latter meeting with defeat, this could be attributed to the fact that the electors were prevented through foreign influence from registering their true wishes, whereupon it would doubtless be easy, after the evacuation of the city by the Allies, to secure the quashing by the Assembly of the elections in so far as Istanbul was concerned and the holding of fresh elections, when adequate measures could be taken to ensure that only

45. "Turks Leave for Lausanne: Attitude on Chester Concession", The Times, April 19, 1923, p.11; and, F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 24, 1923 [p.98]. See also, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, Siyasal Anilar, pp.272-275.


47. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 1, 1923 [p.128].
approved candidates obtained election.48

Under the circumstances, only Kemalist candidates were forthcoming for the Istanbul seats. Ismet İnönü, before leaving for Lausanne, gave an interview to the press, expressing his confidence that the Kemalists would win the elections.49

On May 11, the press published inspired forecasts of the official list of candidates for the twenty-odd seats --the precise number was yet not known-- of the Istanbul constituency. Contrary to expectation, Atatürk's name did not appear, but the list included most of the chief personalities of Nationalist Turkey, of whom several deserved so well of their country that it was a foregone conclusion that they would be returned, regardless of party views by the voters. Among the soldiers was Marshal Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, Refet Bele Pasha, former Minister of Defence and now the High Commissioner for Thrace, Ismet İnönü Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, formerly commanding the eastern front, Halid Pasha, one of the commanders of the İzmit front, and Ali Fuad Cebeşoy Pasha. The Navy was represented by Rauf Orbay, the Prime Minister. Other leading candidates for Istanbul seats were Adnan Adivar, representative of the provisional Ankara government at Istanbul, Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver, former Minister of Education and now Chairman of the Assembly Committee for Foreign Affairs, Fethi Okyar, Minister of the Interior, Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed Ferid Tek, former Kemalist representative in Paris. The only avowed Unionist on the list was Ismail Canbulat, a former Minister of the Interior.50

Among the additional candidates announced on May 20 were those of Ali İhsan Sabis Pasha, former Commander of the First Army at Afyon Karahisar, for Istanbul; of

48. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 1, 1923 [p.128].
49. Tevhid-i Eفكر, April 18, 1339/1923, quoted in "Turks Leave for Lausanne: Attitude on Chester Concession", The Times, April 19, 1923, p.11.
Refet Canitez, former Governor of Adana, and Ali Hikmet Ayerdem Pasha, Commander of the Second Army, both for Bursa. While Ali Ihsan Sabis was an opposition figure, the two candidates for Bursa, Canitez and Ayerdem were staunch supporters of Atatürk. In order to discredit Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha in the eyes of the electorate, Kemalist officials were spreading the blatant lie that he had been found guilty and sentenced accordingly by the Court Martial at Izmir.

Though the precautions taken by the Kemalists assured them a sweeping electoral victory, the elections would not be completed before July. Up until mid-April, it had been difficult to forecast the attitude of the minorities towards the elections. With treason and death as the price of opposition, however, they were left with little latitude in their choice, and it was reported that—as was to be expected under the circumstances—all Christians remaining in Anatolia had decided to participate on the side of the Kemalists.

As regards Istanbul, some doubt still existed as to the line which would be adopted by the Greek population, who were awaiting advice from their Patriarchate. Indications pointed, however, to their probable complete abstention. The Jewish and Armenian communities had, on the other hand, decided on the recommendation of their religious leaders to give their support to the Kemalist candidates. At one time, it was proposed that at least two leading Jews should enter the elections as candidates. Influenced no doubt by a declaration by Ali Haydar Yulug, the new Governor, to the effect that the non-Turkish elements would be unable to obtain majorities sufficient to secure the election of any of their own candidates unless they collaborated with the Turkish population, it was understood that this proposal had been abandoned.

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53. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 6, 1923 [p.127]; and F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.233].
54. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 24, 1923 [p.99].
55. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
community was clearly defined on April 20, when the Istanbul press published the text of a
telegramme addressed in the name of the Armenians of Istanbul to Atatürk stating that the
Armenians, "like all the children of the fatherland", would take part in the elections and
would give their votes to the candidates of the Defence of Rights Association. 56

Intrigue and espionage had already grown to proportions equal to those of the
absolutist regime of Abdülhamid. Already the bulk of Istanbul's largely intellectual
population was thoroughly anti-Kemalist, and the lower classes, dissatisfied with the
increase in the cost of living as a result of ill-considered legislation, were rapidly joining
their ranks. Throughout the country, the Treason Law produced an uneasy feeling. 57

THE PRESS reckoned that no fewer than four thousand six hundred and forty-three
adherents of the People's Party had announced their candidacies for the upcoming
elections. As all these candidates were Kemalists, and presumably held identical political
views, the view was expressed that the elections would be only a contest of personalities.
The criticism was made that the new Treason Law was more than likely to render the
elections unreal. 58

While some newspapers applauded the patriotic self-sacrifice of those who
proposed to stand for election, others found that this tendency was somewhat overdone.
Ileri, commenting on the candidates, which had numbered around eight thousand,
scornfully predicted that all male Turks of thirty or over would be found to be candidates
when the secondary elections began. It also suggested that, as the majority of the
candidates were in search of employment, it would be well to provide that all deputies
should have some sort of profession, as otherwise the new Assembly would be composed

April 24, 1923 [p.99].
56. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
April 24, 1923 [p.99]. See also, "Kemalist Successes", The Times, June 25, 1923, p.12.
57. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
May 6, 1923 [pp.126-127].
exclusively of ex-government officials!  

Prominent deputies who had arrived to Istanbul from Ankara predicted that the new Assembly would be composed exclusively of the Kemalists, and that the opposition would not be represented. They considered that the number of religious figures in the Assembly, who numbered sixty, would be reduced to fifteen or twenty.

From press comments on the elections, it was apparent that Atatürk's party, the Defence of Rights Association under its new name as the People's Party, was actively, though quietly, completing its organisation for sweeping the country when the struggle, one-sided though it would certainly be, would really open after mid-May. The electoral lists were nearing completion, and the claims of the thousands of candidates for nomination were being scrutinised by the Central Election Committee appointed by Atatürk.

INTERNAL OPPOSITION and threats to his continued rule convinced Atatürk that his position was precarious. He was aware that only another "victory" against the foreign enemies of Turkey might salvage whatever was left of his reputation. Therefore, he desperately needed the immediate conclusion and signing of the Peace Treaty so as to present it to the public as yet another Kemalist victory. At a meeting with his principal supporters towards the end of April, Atatürk insisted on the necessity of peace at all costs. In response to Rauf Orbay's assertion that the Assembly would only approve a peace which was in accord with all the points of the National Pact, Atatürk declared that if the Assembly rejected the Peace Treaty, he was prepared, "in the interests of the nation" and only as a last resort, to make a coup d'état and establish military dictatorship.

59. *Ileri*, April 21, 1339/1923, quoted in "The Turkish Elections: 8,000 Thousand Candidates in the Field", *The Times*, April 23, 1923, p.11; and, F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, April 24, 1923 [p.99].


61. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 1, 1923 [p.128].

62. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 6, 1923 [p.127].
Atatürk's threats were effective, as it was observed at Lausanne --where negotiations re-opened on April 23-- that the Turkish delegation was in an exceptionally conciliatory mood. At the April 28 meeting of the Lausanne Conference, almost the whole of the articles discussed that day --namely, Articles 91 to 93, which referred to the revision of certain judgements given by the Turkish authorities during the war, sales of mortgaged property during the war, and the definition of enemy subjects, together with the insurance annex, and Articles 101 to 105, on debts of industrial, literary and artistic property, mixed arbitral tribunals, and treaties-- were accepted by İnönü, who had dropped many of his earlier objections. 63

It was also declared that İnönü had been somewhat alarmed at French resentment of recent Turkish actions, and according to reports, his conversations with General Pellé on the eve of the French plenipotentiary's departure for Paris had revealed a much greater desire for an arrangement which would be agreeable to all parties than had been shown in his public attitude. 64

Taking a general view, it did not appear that the Turkish delegation had been so stubborn in their claims as had been expected. There was, indeed, cause for Allied hope that most of the Articles already touched on would go through without difficulty and without any concession of principles by the Allied Powers. 65

During the last week of April, a large number of Articles had been accepted by the Turkish delegation, or referred to the experts, which had been found to mean only that some elucidation was necessary before their passage could be secured. The smooth working of the arrangements made by Sir Horace Rumbold and the conciliatoriness of İnönü encouraged the Allied hope that the second round of meetings at Lausanne would bring to a successful conclusion the work of its predecessor, and that İnönü might fulfil the

63. "Pace at Lausanne "Too Hot": Turks Conciliatory", The Times, April 30, 1923, p.11.
64. "General Pellé's Visit to M. Poincaré", The Times, April 30, 1923, p.11.
hope with which he had been accredited of returning to Ankara, with the Peace Treaty in his portfolio, by May 15.66

On May 15, the Third Committee dealing with economic questions considered the report of the economic experts on those of the economic clauses which had been referred to them. The Turkish delegation again showed --what was described as-- preternatural amiability. The economic clauses as a whole got through with surprising ease, including the life insurance annex which was regarded by the Allied Powers as a triumph of western interests. 67

While the reparations question between Greece and Turkey was being discussed, the Allied Powers suggested that Greece was unable to make any payments to Turkey, but, instead, was willing to give Karaagac as compensation. In two telegrames he sent to Ankara on May 19 and 22, İnönü asked for the opinion of the cabinet on the issue.68 On May 23, İnönü received instructions from Rauf Orbay not to accept Karaagac alone as reparations, but also to demand the railway line between Kuleli Burgaz and the Bulgarian frontier.69 However, İnönü, judging by himself that this new proposal of Ankara could not possibly be accepted either by the Allies or the Greeks, did not officially transmit his new instructions to the Allied Powers.70 On the contrary, İnönü sent a report to Ankara on May 24, arguing that he did not think the Allied would assent to the reparations.71 In a separate and private telegramme he sent to Atatürk, İnönü pointed out the differences between him and the cabinet on this issue, complained about Orbay's insistence on the reparations question, and asked for Atatürk's help.72

All information pointed to an intractable spirit on the part of the Orbay Cabinet in

66. "Progress at Lausanne", The Times, May 1, 1923, p.15.
the matter of reparations. Since there was serious differences of opinion between the Orbay Cabinet and İnönü, the situation was considered to be very critical. 73

Dissension on this particular issue lay bare the fundamental points of disagreement on Lausanne negotiations between Atatürk and İnönü on the one hand, and Orbay and a majority of the deputies on the other. By his own admission, Atatürk unequivocally supported İnönü. He desired peace at all costs; if the Turkish side insisted on the payment of reparations, it would certainly cause a delay. However, he was in the minority, and could not prevail on the decision taken at the cabinet meeting of May 25. The Orbay Cabinet, according to the decision reached after long deliberations, instructed İnönü not to accept Karaagac in lieu of reparations. Without the knowledge of the cabinet, however, Atatürk sent a private telegramme to İnönü the very same day, instructing him to disregard the cabinet’s directives. 74

Disregarding express orders of his government, at the meeting of the Conference dealing with this issue on May 26, İnönü, immediately after the introductory Allied speeches, accepted the Greek offer to cede the Greek town of Karaagac to Turkey in exchange for the Turkish renunciation of the financial reparation claim. 75

The Turkish journalists attending the Conference, among whom were Tanin’s Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, were dissatisfied, and all of them declared that Turkey was expecting money and not territory. Disregarding public criticism, İnönü received the Turkish journalists after his surrender at the conference table, and expressed his optimism, adding that peace would be signed within a week. 76

In all probability, the settlement would provoke a storm of criticism from the

opposition politicians at Ankara, who had strongly opposed an arrangement based on the Greek cession of Karaagac. 77 Indeed, there were some politicians who predicted that the Assembly would not dare to ratify a Treaty containing such a provision. 78 There was also strong irritation within the Cabinet at İnönü's exceeding his instructions. 79 Orbay immediately sent a telegram to İnönü, reprimanding him for his disobedience to the cabinet's explicit orders and telling him that the cabinet would not accept this fait accompli. He also ordered İnönü not to give any more concessions. 80

The general tendency of the Turkish press was also to voice complaint that the compensation given to Turkey by waiving the indemnity claim was insufficient. Despite the fact that Kemalist politicians were making great efforts to impress on the people that the Turco-Greek agreement was satisfactory, public opinion remained totally sceptical. 81

Although the Kemalist press was silent on the subject, the May 31 issue of Tevhid-i Efkar continued to attack the Karaagac settlement, and Tanin suggested that the last had not yet been heard about it. Due to strict Kemalist censorship, open press attacks were not bolder; but, in private conversations, much resentment was expressed at the idea of accepting thirty-three square kilometres of land subject to flooding by the Maritza in lieu of those vast sums to which Turkey considered itself entitled for reparations. 82

AS A DIRECT RESULT of the progress made in the negotiations at Lausanne during the last week of May, there was a growing tendency to hasten the elections. This was due to the Kemalist desire to convene the new Assembly as soon as possible in order to make it sure

79. F.O.424/257, Mr. Neville Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 31, 1923 [p.258].
that, in the event of the signing of the Peace Treaty, the new one and not the old Assembly would be entrusted to ratify it, as the Kemalists knew that the existing Assembly would be highly critical of the terms of the Treaty. Even in Istanbul, where the delay in the preparation of the electoral college seemed to have been the greatest, the lists of electors had been posted by June 6. 83

Propaganda on behalf of the Kemalists was in full swing, and the press was being forced to call for national unity. In an attempt both to avoid future criticism of the conduct of the Lausanne negotiations and to suppress opposition propaganda, Kemalists were busy drawing attention to the manner in which internal dissension had weakened the position of İnönü and strengthened that of the Allies at Lausanne. The June 2 issue of İleri, the pro-Kemalist newspaper published at Istanbul, asked its readers to realise that, though the draft Treaty did not satisfy all the Turkish aspirations, its terms had to be accepted as the best which could have at present been obtained. It likewise reminded the public of the difference existing between these terms and those of the Treaty of Sèvres, which, but for the struggle of Atatürk and his followers, would have been imposed on Turkey. 84

THE ORBAY CABINET was manifesting much stubbornness in the conduct of the negotiations. 85 As a last resort and in an attempt to better defend Turkish rights and prevent any further concessions at the conference table by İnönü, Orbassy made an official statement at Ankara on June 10. With regard to the question of Ottoman Debt payments, he said that Turkey could only agree to pay her debt in francs, and any other form of settlement would be unacceptable from the point of view of national independence. He asserted that the country would not tolerate any further concessions to the Allies, and that it

83. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 6, 1923 [p.305].
84. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 6, 1923 [p.305].
was idle to expect the government to attempt to make any. Expressing his confidence that the nation and the Assembly were prepared for any eventuality, he said that the responsibility for a rupture would be with those who were trying to force Turkey to submit to economic and financial slavery.  

The differences of opinion between Orbay and the Kimals over the terms of the Lausanne Treaty came to a head in late June. When İnönü decided to disregard the Assembly's instructions, Orbay demanded an explanation for his irresponsible behaviour. In a cable sent from Lausanne on June 26, İnönü responded angrily, saying that he regretted the Assembly no longer trusted neither him nor his delegation, and he compared the government to an absolutist regime, ignorant as it was of the nation's best interests.  

It was clear that İnönü and Atatürk had agreed among themselves as to the necessity of the immediate signing of the Peace Treaty and, therefore, objections made by either Rauf Orbay as President of the Council of Ministers or any other authority would scarcely carry any weight --especially when Kimals were having trouble in the election campaign.

While it was almost impossible to obtain reliable information regarding the actual situation in Anatolia, and more particularly in the Trabzon area and in the eastern provinces, there was good reason to believe that the Kimalist organisation was facing a considerable measure of opposition. The opposition in Trabzon had already come to a head during the last week of April, during which telegraphic communication with Ankara and Istanbul was cut off. According to the reports of Second Group deputies, there was active disorder throughout the areas of Trabzon, Erzurum, Erzincan, Ardahan, and Kars, accompanied by a vigorous propaganda campaign urging local autonomy. This disorder was, however, for

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the most part shortlived, though it still persisted in the towns of Trabzon and Erzurum. 88

At Erzurum, the local population had been organised around the Committee for the Preservation of Sacred Rights. They had issued a proclamation denouncing Atatürk for having transformed the Defence of Rights Organisation into a party of his own without the required authorisation from all of the local branches. Arguing that Atatürk's political ambition was to establish a despotic republic, the Committee declared itself totally opposed to this fait accompli and expressed its determination to sever the town's ties with Ankara. Indeed, communication was cut off. Judging the seriousness of this attempt at rebellion to Kemalist authority, Atatürk ordered Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the Army Corps at Erzurum, to pacify the population. He also sent a proclamation, assuring the inhabitants of Erzurum that he had no intentions of establishing a republican form of government. 89

Ten Kurdish opposition deputies, including almost all of the deputies for Bitlis, had also met on April 22 and decided to oppose the Kemalist party by every possible means. A local uprising of some importance among the Kurdish tribes in the eastern provinces took place about the end of April. The immediate cause for the uprising appeared to have been an attempt by the government authorities to collect military taxes. The uprising spread to other tribes near the Iraqi-Turkish frontier, and Cevad Cobanlı Pasha was sent to the seat of trouble where severe measures had been taken. The Governor of Diyarbakır as well as Sub-Governors of Ergani and Siverek were dismissed, the officer commanding the local troops was shot for cowardice and incompetence, and the province of Diyarbakır was placed under martial law, the administration being under Cevad Cobanlı Pasha's hands. These measures, however, had merely had the effect of further solidifying the opposition of the Kurdish deputies to Atatürk and of intensifying the propaganda campaign in favour of

88. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [pp.233-234].
the independence of the eastern provinces.90

The Kemalists had already lost the support of the local Defence of Rights Organisation at Trabzon after the assasination of Ali Sükrü Bey.91 These now conducted an active press campaign against the authorities at Ankara, openly accusing the leaders of the Kemalist movement of complicity in the crime.92 The local press at Trabzon, *Istikbal*, was thoroughly against Kemalist intrigues. At the time when Ali Sükrü Bey’s body arrived at Trabzon for burial, the newspaper’s owner and editor-in-chief, Faik Ahmed Barutcu, had made a speech in which he had openly, and in quite harsh words, accused Atatürk and his entourage for their roles in the whole affair.93 The Trabzon branch of the Defence of Rights Association had gone so far as to remove a picture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from the headquarters of the group and to put in its place one of Ali Sükrü Bey in a black frame.94

At the April 4 issue of *Istikbal*, Hamid [Kapanci], the ex-Governor of Adana, wrote a leading article in which he said that Ali Sükrü Bey had become the first victim of a dragon who had been trying for some time to kill the nation. He defended the view that one had to be out of his mind in order to believe that Ali Sükrü Bey’s assasination was a simple murder, adding that his murder was the culmination of the despotic attempts which had been brewing for the past three years. In very strong language, he denounced Atatürk’s courtiers who had been following him blindly as accomplices, and ended his article by affirming that the nation was as much interested in preserving its liberty against its internal enemies as it was determined to do the same against its foreign enemies.95

90. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
92. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [pp.233-234].
94. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
The President of the local branch of the Defence of Rights Association was Ahmed Barutcu, father of Istikbal's owner Faik Ahmed Barutcu. He was an experienced politician who had worked for the Committee of Union and Progress for many years. Ever since Ali Sükrü Bey's murder, he had actively been campaigning against the Kemalists. In this connection, Nabizade Hamdi Ülkümen, the Kemalist deputy for Trabzon, was being daily attacked by the inhabitants of Trabzon for blindly following Atatürk. 96

On April 18, Atatürk commissioned Damar Arikoglu and Refik Sevket Ince to conduct an investigation at Trabzon. Leaving Ankara on April 19, the special mission went to Istanbul from where they took a boat for Trabzon, arriving there a few days later. Their mission was to pacify the local population. Atatürk had also authorised the mission to dissolve the local branch of the Defence of Rights Association at Trabzon, and to close and seal up the headquarters. 97

After a futile attempt at having tried to allay the doubts of the local leadership about the Kemalist leadership at Ankara, the mission decided to dissolve the existing executive council of the Trabzon branch, which had totally been in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress. They also made counter-propaganda in the columns of Güzel Trabzon, a Kemalist newspaper under the ownership of Ali Becil Bey. In their efforts to pacify the inhabitants of Trabzon, they were also being assisted by Danis Eyüboğlu and Arif Sayil, two local Kemalist collaborators. All three would be appointed deputies for Trabzon at the 1927 general elections in appreciation of their services to the Kemalist cause. 98

The special mission, having announced the closure of the local branch of the Defence of Rights Association in the columns of Güzel Trabzon, held talks with the notables of the town, among whom was Haci Hamdizade Hami Bey, the President of the

97. Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, pp.327-329; and, F.O. 424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
98. Damar Arikoglu, Hatıralarım, p.333.
Trabzon Chamber of Commerce. They appointed a new executive council composed mainly of merchants and businessmen. It was only after the formation of a so-called loyal committee of Defence of Rights Association that the headquarters were reopened. 99

After the reopening of the loyal branch, Atatürk addressed a vigorous election proclamation to the inhabitants of Trabzon, where anti-Kemalist opposition centered. In the proclamation, he said that intriguers were trying to undermine the existing regime and were attacking the essential principles which had been devised to safeguard the liberty of the country. Alleging that the opposition deputies were guided only by personal ambitions, he claimed that opposition figures were doing everything to destroy the unity which was so necessary. Expressing confidence that the inhabitants of Trabzon were loyal friends of progress, Atatürk ended his proclamation by saying that he expected them to vote solidly against the enemies of the regime. 100

A reply was returned in which the newly opened branch asserted its unwavering loyalty towards the "national hero". Atatürk's proclamation and the loyal reply were duly reproduced in all the Istanbul newspapers in the hope that this propaganda campaign would help the public forget about the serious disturbance and opposition against Kemalist dictatorship. 101

Despite all the Kemalist repression, Refik Sevket Ince's mission ended in failure and local hostility towards the Kemalists continued. It was not unlikely, however, that at Trabzon, as well as in the eastern provinces, the Kemalist organisation might in the end succeed in securing at least a paper majority by dint of threat, intrigue or force. 102

100. "Turks and the Rival Capitalists", *The Manchester Guardian*, April 23, 1923, p.8; and F.O. 424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
101. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
102. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 13, 1923 [p.330].
On May 20, the strictly controlled Turkish press nevertheless published statements made by Refik Sevket Ince, deputy for Saruhan and ex-Minister of Justice, regarding the Defence of Rights Association at Trabzon. From these statements, it appeared that the central committee of the Defence of Rights Association aided by the Kemalist deputies in the Assembly had exercised almost despotic powers, which had led the local Trabzon branch to go overboard to the opposition. The assassination of Ali Sükrü Bey by the Kemalists had only made things worse. From the concluding sentences of Ince's statement it appeared that the repressive measures had not been altogether successful, as he remarked that the Second Group was still continuing its activities and it was suggested that the election of Kemalists was by no means certain. 103

To assure some measure of tranquillity, the Kemalist government was forced to make certain concessions. Sükrü Bey, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress interned at Malta and Minister of Education in the Cabinets of Prince Said Halim and Talat Pashas, was appointed Governor of Trabzon at the end of April. Kemalists expected that his appointment would in a measure abate the unrest existing there since the sudden vacancy of the parliamentary representation of that province by the murder of Ali Sükrü Bey, one of the most prominent leaders of the Second Group and the late editor-in-chief of Tan. 104

By May 15, it became probable that primary elections might be held in a considerable number of constituencies on May 25. 105 By May 30, polling had taken place in several districts; and, in every case, Kemalist electors had been returned. 106 Progress of the elections was more marked in Anatolia, where the primary elections had, in a few areas,

103. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, May 22, 1923 [p.234].
actually been completed, in each case with the choice of Kemalist electors. There were indications, however, that at least in some localities, these elections had not been carried out without some difficulties.

There was strong opposition to Kemalists in the economically developed areas of western Anatolia. The list of Kemalist candidates sent by Atatürk to Manisa had aroused strong reaction, particularly the choice of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu. The inhabitants of Manisa sent hundreds of telegrams to the Central Election Committee at Ankara, urging it to drop Karaosmanoglu from the list of candidates. In the end, opposition to his candidacy was so strong that Karaosmanoglu's name had to be dropped from the Manisa list, only to appear on the Mardin list. In addition, Hakki Tarik Us, one of the owners of Vakit and a staunch Kemalist, had to be dropped from the Manisa list. However, he later appeared as a candidate in the Giresun electoral district.

In Izmir itself, opposition to Kemalists was quite strong. Here, the opposition rallied the public on the issue of the Peace Treaty. In its May 31 issue, Aksam reported that the success of Kemalist candidates at the Izmir election had been made doubtful by the acceptance by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne of the reparations settlement -- which the liberal opposition considered to be totally inadequate. Because of the unfavourable reparations settlement, the opposition, composed almost exclusively of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, was stronger than ever before. The following day, the success of Unionist candidates in one district near Izmir prompted Atatürk to declare those elections null and void. This showed that the Kemalist organisation would stop at nothing to secure the success of its own candidates.

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107. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 6, 1923 [pp.305-306]; and, "Turkish Elections: First Results in Favour of Ministerialists", The Times, June 11, 1923, p.11.
108. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 6, 1923 [pp.305-306].
The elections were taking place more quickly in the provincial towns of Anatolia than anywhere else. The second degree elections had started in early June, one of the first ones taking place at Biga on June 7. In some of these electoral districts, the second degree elections had already ended with the victory of Kemalist electors. There were indications, however, that, at least in some localities, these second degree elections had not gone without some difficulty.

The Kemalist desire to hasten the election of at least the nucleus of the new Assembly was indicated by the publication almost daily in the local press of reports of the overwhelming success of the Kemalist candidates in the second degree elections. Although the Kemalist press portrayed the elections as an overwhelming success, even they reported difficulties. In general, these had arisen because of Atatürk's decision not to allow the districts a free choice of candidates. These would be nominated in Ankara. Though the population in most localities had already been terrorised enough not to dare nominate its own candidates, Atatürk found it necessary to issue a circular telegramme warning the electors against "spurious" candidates, even if these declared themselves to be members of the Defence of Rights Association. He reiterated that the electors would be allowed to choose only from the list provided by the Central Election Committee at Ankara under his domination.

In mid-June, Atatürk gave Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, Kemalist deputy for Izmir and editor-in-chief of Yeni Gün, the task of concluding an agreement with Dr. Nazim Bey and the other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress at Izmir. The basis of this agreement was to be the equal division of Unionist funds between the Defence of Rights Association,

112. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 6, 1923 [pp.305-306].
113. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 13, 1923 [p.330].
People's Party, and the remaining members of the Committee of Union and Progress, which would thereby automatically cease to exist. In the event that the Unionists refused to accept this agreement, Unionist leaders would be immediately arrested and put on trial for abuse of power during the war and for their subsequent anti-Nationalist activities. Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, accompanied by Dr. Nazim Bey, Midhat Sükrü Bleda and Aziz Bey, ex-treasurer of the Committee of Union and Progress, returned directly to Ankara, and stated that the Committee of Union and Progress leadership had accepted the offer in principle, and that only the question of the actual division remained to be settled. This negotiation was significant in two ways. On the one hand, it showed that Atatürk was not absolutely confident the Kemalists would win the election; on the other, it meant that the Committee of Union and Progress was still powerful enough to require compromise, not just brute intimidation.  

The talks between Atatürk and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, broke down when the latter refused to hand over the party funds. The three Unionists returned to Izmir, where they were believed to be in contact with the leaders of the local Defence of Rights Association and other opposition groups.

BY JUNE 18, the primary elections at Istanbul had taken place in practically all the quarters of the city amidst what was described in the Kemalist-controlled press as universal enthusiasm and rejoicing. In actual fact, signs of popular enthusiasm had been noticeably absent as, beyond the appearance of a few extra flags and small flag-waving processions with a picture of Atatürk carried at their head, there was nothing to indicate that the people were engaged in choosing their representatives.

114. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 13, 1923 [pp.330-331].
115. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69].
116. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.353]; and, "Constantinople Primary Elections", The Times, June 20, 1923, p.13. See
Unionist leadership strongly criticised Atatürk during the elections in Istanbul. Cavid Bey claimed that Atatürk was a military figure, and thus could not possibly know what politics and government were all about. Dr. Nazim Bey was an even harsher critic; he echoed the feeling in military circles. Claiming that it was Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha who had made all the military preparations and set the stage for the Greek retreat, he denounced Atatürk’s military prowess; according to Dr. Nazim Bey, Atatürk had only been in the right place at the right time.\footnote{117}

In the face of general apathy and the abstention of a large proportion of the Christian voters, there was some surprise at the announcement of the Kemalist press that over ninety percent of the voters had participated in those areas where the primary elections was complete. In its June 17 issue, Tanin, offered an explanation, by way of a story about a voter who, on his way to the polling booth, was told by the official in charge that his vote had already been cast on his behalf. Tanin added that this was by no means an isolated case. With the whole machinery of the election in the hands of the Defence of Rights Association, it was unlikely that any but Kemalist candidates would be elected. Such farcical proceedings only helped to further decrease whatever degree of popularity the Kemalist regime might have enjoyed in Istanbul. By now, the liberal press had become increasingly critical of the methods of the Kemalists, and though generally silent, it hinted that a certain measure of silence would be maintained only until the conclusion of peace.\footnote{118}

By the end of June, the campaign of press criticism had considerably grown, and was no longer solely confined to Tanin. The hitherto loyalist Vakit inserted on June 21 a

\footnote{117} Fañih Rifiñi Atay, Cankaya, 2nd Ed., pp.367-368.
\footnote{118} F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.353].
partly censored letter from Cerkes Edhem, accusing the Turkish army of treason, praising the Committee of Union and Progress, and defining the Kemalist concept of "national sovereignty" as despotism. 119

Information from all sources was confirmatory of growing internal disunion amongst Turks, of increasing administrative disorganisation and of waning influence of Atatürk, at any rate amongst civilian population. Kemalist administration was the subject of daily criticism in the liberal press. In this connection, the publication of the partly censored letter from Cerkes Edhem was in itself highly significant. 120

On June 25, Tevhid-i Efkar, in common with Tanin, published a proclamation by Lütfi Fikri Bey, the President of the Turkish Bar Association, in which after a general criticism of the Kemalist administration, particularly in connection with the elections, he quoted the Bulgarian elections, which had resulted in an overwhelming majority for Stamboliisky and which had merely precipitated the recent coup d'état in that country, as an example from which it would be well for the Turks to take warning. 121

It was significant that at the last meeting of the Istanbul Municipal Council, the Governor and Acting Mayor, Ali Haydar Yulug, was the object of much criticism, the Council going so far as to veto his claim to appoint officials in the prefecture. 122 In addition, the liberal Istanbul press urged the government to dismiss Ali Haydar Yulug. Even if he were dismissed, however, things would not dramatically be changed. 123

Kemalists based their great expectations on the effect of a proclamation which Atatürk was expected to address to the inhabitants of Istanbul in acknowledgment of the

119. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.6].
120. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 24, 1923 [p.359].
121. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.6].
122. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.353].
123. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.353].
grant to him of the freedom of the city. It was announced that shortly after the publication of this proclamation the names of the candidates for the primary elections would definitely be made public. Indications pointed to the probability that the names of only a few leading Kemalists would be included in the list, as it had already officially been announced that Atatürk himself would be a candidate for İzmir, and İnönü for Malatya.  

On June 22, Atatürk's telegramme, dated June 20, to Ali Cetinkaya, the Kemalist deputy for Karahisar-i Sahib in charge of the supervision of the elections at Istanbul, was printed in the Kemalist Vakit. Atatürk expressed sleek satisfaction with the attitude of the Greeks in Istanbul and the surrounding districts. He also sent to the Istanbul Municipality a long address of thanks for the recently received certificate of the freedom of the city, in which Istanbul was referred to as the "precious, enlightened city of Great Turkey, who was free and mistress of her destinies. But this and other flattering hopes were doubtless meant to give an air of reality to the final elections.  

Throughout the electoral districts of Istanbul, the Kemalists had distributed a memorandum urging the authorities to include only Kemalist electors on the final lists, making sure that none of the opposition candidates could be elected to the Assembly.  

The sweeping success of the Kemalist lists of candidates not only at Istanbul but elsewhere was adversely commented upon in the liberal press. They wrote that the opposition had not been given a chance of entering into competition. In his editorial column of the June 23 issue of Tanin, Yalcin wrote that there could now be no hesitation in

124. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.353].  
forecasting what would be the character of the new Assembly be. Reporting that Atatürk's Defence of Rights Association had been winning everywhere, he commented that it caused a certain anxiety as the Kemalist victory was so complete. Yalcin asked whether there was in the whole country anyone belonging to the opposition, and, if so, why he had not been elected. 129

On June 24, Yalcin continued to criticise the Kemalist restrictions on the electoral process and the curtailment of the freedom of vote. Inviting the leadership of the Defence of Rights Association to be tolerant towards the opposition within the country, Yalcin advised moderation and a firm application of the rules and regulations guaranteeing freedom of speech to the citizens. He also argued that tolerance of a certain opposition was healthier than an attempt at total suppression. 130 Experience in Istanbul had shown that elections were a farce and were recognised as such by Turks themselves. None but members of the Defence of Rights Association had been elected for the simple reason that there was no liberty of vote. Many Turks regarded a dictator with dislike and apprehension. 131 Yalcin concluded his editorial by reminding the Kemalists that only by being respectful to the rights of the citizens that they could hope for peace and tranquillity in the country. 132 On June 27, Yalcin repeated his plea for the application of laws, not only in the general elections but also in the administering of the country in general. 133

It had been anticipated that no opposition candidates would take the field. On June


131. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 24, 1923 [p.360].


25, however, Tevhid-i Efkar announced that three independent candidates would run for election, but, as one of these was, until recently, President of the Istanbul branch of the Defence of Rights Association, it remained to be seen whether these were actually opposition candidates, or whether they were in reality Kemalist candidates put up to demonstrate the alleged freedom of the elections. The same day, Lütfi Fikri Bey, the independent candidate, published a manifesto in which he adjured the electors to choose their deputies according to their conscience, and not only under Kemalist influence.

On the other hand, particular importance was attached to the announcement made on June 26 that three hundred electors had petitioned the authorities in favour of the candidacy of Nureddin Pasha, whose opposition to Atatürk was a well-known fact. It was also stated that the absence of a Jewish candidate from the electoral list had caused dissatisfaction in Jewish circles. It had been hoped to secure the nomination of the ex-Grand Rabbi, Haim Naum Efendi, but his candidacy at Istanbul or at Izmir was not approved by the Kemalis.

The nomination of Nureddin Pasha created considerable excitement in Kemalist circles, and immediate but unsuccessful efforts were made to suppress it. According to unconfirmed reports, Atatürk ordered the immediate return to Ankara of Nureddin Pasha, the Commander of the Western Army. However, Nureddin Pasha had shown no signs of complying. It was also stated that the police had lately seized letters of a compromising nature written by Nureddin Pasha, and that, as a result, the general had been relieved of his command.

The Committee of Union and Progress openly endorsed the candidacies of

134. "Turkish Election: Independent Candidates' Chances", The Times, June 26, 1923, p.11; and, F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5].
136. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5].
137. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 4, 1923 [p.41].
Nureddin Pasha, Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, Lütfi Fikri Bey, who all entered the race as independents, and, Ismail Canbulat, Rauf Orbay, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Refet Bele Pasha, Fethi Okyar and Adnan Adivar, all of whom ran under the Defence of Rights Association ticket.  

The primary elections in Istanbul were complete by June 27. Needless to state, only the electors whose names appeared on the lists furnished by the Kemalist organisation were actually nominated. The grotesque nature of the entire proceedings was shown by the fact that, two days before the ballot boxes were opened for the counting of votes, the municipal officer in charge of the elections dispatched a telegramme to Ankara informing Atatürk of the unanimous vote accorded by the population of Istanbul to the candidates of the Defence of Rights Association, a telegramme, moreover, which was suitably acknowledged before the counting of the votes commenced!

Altogether, one thousand two hundred and seventy-five electors had been chosen. These would proceed on June 28 to elect the fifteen deputies for the Istanbul area. A list of candidates was issued, fifteen in number, including such prominent figures as Rauf Orbay, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Refet Bele Pasha, Fethi Okyar, Adnan Adivar, and Ahmed Muhtar Bey. Perhaps the most significant feature of the list, however, was the inclusion of Ismail Canbulat, one of the most active members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had never been at pains to conceal either his Unionist leanings or his animosity towards Atatürk himself.

138. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 4, 1923 [p.41].


140. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5]. Atatürk's telegramme, dated June 23, 1923, was published in *Vakit*, June 24, 1339/1923. For the full text of the telegramme, see "İstanbul İkinci Seçmenleri Hakkında Telgraf", in Sadi Borak and Utkan Kocatürk (Compilers), *Atatürkün Söylev ve Demecleri: Tamim ve Telgrafları*, Vol.5, p.145.


142. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
The Istanbul elections took place on June 28 at the Istanbul University. From all accounts, the voting was distinctly farcical. The Kinalists saw to it that the electors were only supplied with lists containing the names of their fifteen candidates, members of the organisation themselves were constantly present in the room where the electors were filling up the ballot papers. The electors engaged in filling the papers up sat at a table like a number of undergraduates being examined, with so little space between them that it was perfectly easy for one elector to read the votes of his immediate neighbour. This actually occurred in several cases, and at least, one departing elector was accused of having voted traitorously, that is, for one of the independent candidates. ¹⁴³

Despite election irregularities and Kinalist fraud, the result of the elections at Istanbul was almost a complete victory for the Unionist-backed candidates. Although the electors were not allowed to choose from a multitude of names, their ranking of the candidates reflected sympathy not to the Kinalist candidates but to the liberals who had been backed by the Unionists. Among them were Rauf Orbay, who came first with one thousand two hundred and fifty-two votes, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, with one thousand two hundred and fifty votes, Refet Bele Pasha, with one thousand two hundred and thirty-eight votes, Adnan Adivar, Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, Ismail Canbulat, and Fethi Okyar. ¹⁴⁴

None of the independent candidates, the Unionist-backed Nureddin Pasha, Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha and Lütfi Fikri Bey, however, were successful; Nureddin Pasha received one hundred votes, Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, fifty-two votes, and Lütfi Fikri Bey, thirty-eight votes. ¹⁴⁵ The disparity between the votes received by the Defence of Rights

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June 27, 1923 [p.5].
¹⁴³ "Constantinople Elections: Kinalists See to the Voting", The Times, June 30, 1923, p.11.
Association candidates and the independents was too ludicrous for words; the whole proceedings were an elaborate farce.\textsuperscript{146}

All the successful candidates were nominally members of the Defence of Rights Association. Therefore, technically speaking, no opposition candidate had won the elections. Indeed, Istanbul's all fifteen seats had been won by Kemalist nominees, and hardly any vote had been cast for the independent candidates. The electors had not even been allowed to look at the list of twenty-six independent candidates, among whom there were three non-Moslems, namely, Haim Naum Efendi, the ex-Grand Rabbi, another Jew, and a Greek.\textsuperscript{147}

The Unionist-backed liberals elected on the Kemalist ticket in Istanbul had no intention of giving up the struggle. Immediately after the elections at Istanbul, Refet Bele Pasha expressed his views in the \textit{Tanin} of July 3. He pointed out that Turkey had gained no real benefit by the construction of imposing but useless palaces at Istanbul. What was really needed was the development of railways and agriculture and the curtailment of the number of useless functionaries. He also spoke about the beneficial employment of foreign experts in business, and welcomed the introduction of foreign capital in a limited manner. It would be going too far to suppose that these declarations constituted any deliberate challenge to the Kemalists as yet, but the statement was interesting as an indication of that opposition which was expected to develop after the meeting of the new Assembly.\textsuperscript{148}

Another newly elected Unionist deputy for Istanbul, Ismail Canbulat, also expressed his views to the press, this time on the question of the capital and the future of Istanbul. The Kemalist press had already started to agitate for the confirmation of Ankara as the capital. Ismail Canbulat pleaded for the retention of Istanbul as the capital with the

\textsuperscript{146} "The Elections Farce", \textit{The Near East}, July 12, 1923, p.35.
significant remark that, even of Ankara remained the capital during the forthcoming Assembly, Istanbul would regain its place after the next elections. This statement could only be interpreted as a clear indication that the Unionists expected opposition to the Kemalists to develop successfully.  

AT IZMIR, where Kemalists had already encountered difficulties, Rahmi Evrenos, the highly popular former Unionist Governor of Aydin, along with other leading Unionists, had been conducting an active campaign with fair prospects of success. This prompted Kemalists to take extraordinary measures to prevent their election. By June 24, the elections at Izmir were over. Atatürk was declared one of the city's deputies, and the other successful candidates were also of his party.  

The elections in western Anatolia had made considerable progress, and, by the end of June, ninety deputies had been elected. With the elections concluded on June 25, the final list of elected deputies for Izmir included, as usual, only Kemalist candidates, Atatürk himself being at the top. Although over eight hundred electors should have participated in the final election of Izmir's nine deputies, only three hundred and fifteen had done so, the remainder being reported unavoidably absent due to "illness" and other reasons. In view of what was already known about Kemalist electoral methods, these figures would seem to indicate that local feeling had become to a large extent anti-Kemalist.  

Eskisehir was one of the other cities where resistance to dictation had been successful and, consequently, second degree electors had not been chosen from among the

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150. F.O.424/257, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 20, 1923 [p.354].
152. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5]; and, Gotthard Jaeschke and Erich Pritsch, "Die Türkei seit dem Weltkriege: Geschichtskalender, 1918-1928", Die Welt des Islams, 10 (1927-1929), p.73.
list provided by the Kemaölists. Disobedience to Kemalist dictatorship had, of course, its price: enquiries were being made regarding the causes of these incidents.  

Despite Kemalist intimidation in Eskisehir, the electors had the choice nine candidates for three seats. This situation existed despite Kemalist efforts to limit the number of candidates to the number of seats, leaving the electorate with no choice at all. In their campaigns as printed in Yeni Türkiye, three of the nine candidates claimed to be the true representatives of the Defence of Rights Association. Informed of this opposition, Atatürk immediately sent a telegramme to the local Defence of Rights Association headquarters which prevented the three candidates from entering the elections on the Defence of Rights ticket. Two of the candidates were eliminated, but the third, Emin Sazak, a wealthy landowner, managed to get himself elected despite Kemalist pressure and the fact that his membership in the party had been declared null and void in a telegramme sent by Atatürk on July 9. Thus, at least one deputy in the new Assembly would not be a recognised member of the Defence of Rights Association.  

Difficulties also appeared at Ankara. Despite the fact that the Kemalist government brought some thirty of the most reliable Kemalist policemen from Istanbul to terrorise the town's inhabitants, an opposition list of candidates was published along with the officially prepared list of the Kemaölists. The electors refused to accept unconditionally the candidacy of former Kemalist deputies who, they alleged, had done nothing for the country. They demanded that they should have a say in the choice of the candidates who were to request their votes. 

153. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.6].
154. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69]; and, Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, pp.56-57.
155. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5].
156. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 4, 1923 [p.42].
Atatürk, knowing how cantankerous was the character of the inhabitants of Ankara, was finally compelled to allow them to draw up their own list of candidates, all of whom were natives of the town. Among the thirteen candidates figuring on the list were several followers of Atatürk, but as there were only six seats, it was possible that something like a free election might take place in the very stronghold of Kemalism. 158

In order to insure the election of Kemalist candidates, the final elections at Ankara were postponed. More reliable policemen from Istanbul were brought so as to completely terrorise the Ankara electors. Despite these terror tactics and repression, which had been successfully used against electors at other towns resisting Kemalist dictation, electors in Ankara were not intimidated. Forced to change tactics, Atatürk announced that he would now also head the list of approved Ankara candidates, and that, in the event of his election, which could not be doubted, a law would be introduced empowering him to hold both the Ankara and Izmir seats. 159 After weeks of delay, the Ankara elections finally took place, ending with the unanimous election of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the head of six Kemalist deputies. 160 As Atatürk had already been elected for Izmir on June 25, it was understood that he would resign the latter mandate and not obtain the permission of the Assembly to represent the two constituencies. 161

In late May, primary elections were held in Konya, where the secondary electors, who would then be chosen, would have the task of selecting five members out of the three hundred and twenty-four candidates to represent their province. 162 At Konya, too, there was considerable resistance to Kemalist dictation.

159. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69].
160. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 25, 1923 [p.101].
During his electoral tour, Atatürk had visited Konya on March 20, and made his opposition to the Second Group quite clear by appearing in public with a religious leader who was an awoved opponent of Mehmed Vehbi Celik, Minister of the Sharia and a member of the Second Group. The local notables of the city, however, were decidedly pro-Second Group. The extent of their opposition to Atatürk was apparent from the fact that they had invited Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, one of the ablest of generals who had been dismissed from his post on Atatürk's orders in June 1922, to all the functions they held in honour of Atatürk, which visibly irritated him. 163 In addition, during a speech he delivered on the occasion, the Mayor of Konya described Atatürk as a conqueror; this was a criticism in slight disguise which had also made Atatürk furious. 164

Despite the unrest, elections at Konya were completed by July 11. Stripped of their rights to vote for candidates of their own choice, the electors of Konya, nevertheless, voiced their opposition to Kemalist candidates by voting instead for Usakizade Latife Hanım, Atatürk's wife, although no women candidates were officially allowed to run. 165

There was also resistance in Afyon against the Kemalists. Mehmed Sükrü Koc, the Second Group deputy for Afyon and the owner of İkaz, was opposed to the Kemalists. So was Ismail Sükrü Celikalay, another opposition deputy for Afyon, who, in late April, had addressed the local population in a propaganda speech in which he had spoken against the Kemalists. 166 Although Kemalist newspapers condemned his speech and branded him a reactionary to the point of treason, his constituents showed themselves strongly in his favour, somewhat to the surprise of those who had lately become disinclined to openly oppose the Kemalists in electoral matters. 167 In fact, all the ex-deputies representing Afyon, with the exception of Ali Çetinkaya, who was installed there by Atatürk were

163. Ismail Habib Sevük, Atatürk İcin, pp.35-37.
164. Ismail Habib Sevük, Atatürk İcin, pp.43-44.
165. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69].
against what Atatürk stood for. Consequently, they were all eliminated from the lists prepared under Atatürk's personal supervision at the Central Election Committee in Ankara, and none of them was re-elected.

In Adana, one of the Kemalist candidates was Damar Arikoglu, a close confidant of Atatürk. He left Ankara for Adana on May 31, carrying instructions from Atatürk to all the local military and civilian bureaucrats which ordered them to help Arikoglu and other Kemalist candidates in the elections.\textsuperscript{168} In Adana, Abdülkadir Kemalı Ögütcü was the most courageous candidate to openly declare himself an opponent of Atatürk. A deputy for Kastamonu in the out-going Assembly, Ögütcü published a manifesto denouncing the military tyranny in power, claiming that he would work against military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{169}

Opposition of the inhabitants of Adana to Atatürk had been amply manifested on the occasion of his visit to the town as part of his electoral campaign in March. Abdullah Faik Copuroglu, a mufti and opposition deputy for Adana in the Assembly, had given a sermon, criticising the Kemalists. This had prompted Atatürk to severely reproach Copuroglu. Addressing a sympathetic crowd at the local branch of the Türk Ocagi, a nationalist organisation under Kemalist control, he threatened all those who dared criticise the Kemalists with death.\textsuperscript{170}

Moreover, Adana newspapers openly supported the Second Group candidates, and conducted propaganda campaign against the Kemalists.\textsuperscript{171} During his electoral tour in March, Atatürk had personally been attacked by the Adana press. The issue was embezzlement of funds. The Indian Moslems had sent 300,000 liras to be used for the purposes of resistance against the Allied Powers. However, Atatürk had kept the money for himself, and the issue had created considerable resentment among the public. Now,

\textsuperscript{168} Damar Arikoglu, \textit{Hatıralarım}, p.338.
\textsuperscript{170} Ismail Habib Sevük, \textit{Atatürk Icin}, p.44.
Karamanli Ata Celebi, a left-wing politician, had published an open letter in his newspaper at the time of Atatürk's March visit, inviting him to give an account of the "lost" money. 172

The opposition candidates at Adana included Sinan Tekelioglu and Kethüdazade Ibrahim Bey. Backed by Mehmed Rasim Bey, a local publisher, Tekelioglu was a serious contender. When it became clear that his anti-Kemalist propaganda campaign was effective, Atatürk called him to Ankara and tried to bribe him into leaving the elections. However, Tekelioglu refused the offer and continued his campaign. 173 The two most important politicians working on behalf of the candidates for the liberal opposition were Süleyman Vahid Bey, former Mayor of Adana, and Mehmed Diblan, former Mayor of Pozanti. Both would become so popular that they would eventually be able to persuade the second degree electors not to vote for the Kemalist candidates. 174

During the actual voting, grave incidents took place in Adana. The first round of elections was postponed because of Ankara's decision to have Turks and Arabs vote seperately. Convinced of election fraud, citizens and supporters of the Second Group candidates led by Mehmed Rasim Bey, the newspaper publisher, actually invaded the polling station, and carried off the ballot box, which they unceremoniously destroyed, and tore up the voting papers. 175 By the end of June, over thirty people had been arrested for anti-Kemalist activity. Among them were Mehmed Rasim Bey, who was charged with inciting violence and impeding the voting process, and the two mayors who were accused

172. Damar Arioglu, Hatıralarım, p.315. According to Arioglu, the embezzled money amounting to 300,000 liras constituted Atatürk's personal share in Türkiye İs Bankası which he founded in 1924 (Damar Arioglu, Hatıralarım, p.315).

173. Damar Arioglu, Hatıralarım, p.339. Needless to say, his candidature was overridden by Atatürk and persons whose fidelity to Atatürk was undoubted were declared the winners in Adana.


of destroying the ballot boxes in the Eski Istasyon neighbourhood of Adana. 176

As a protest to Ankara's terror tactics, the secondary electors voted for two non-
candidates who were nonetheless still Kemalist, Ismet Inönü and Fevzi Cakmak Pashas. 
Despite all the protest, however, Kemalist candidates --Ismail Safa Özler, Damar Arıkoğlu, 
and Kemal Kusun-- were declared the winners. 177

In neighbouring Mersin, there was also strong opposition to Kemalist candidates. 
Two of the most prominent leaders of the Second Group, Salahaddin Köseoğlu and Yusuf 
Ziya Eraydın, were both deputies for Mersin. During Atatürk's electoral campaign to 
Mersin on March 17-19, Eraydın was mistreated by the Kemalist entourage on personal 
orders of Atatürk who did not want any demonstration of opposition to his electoral 
campaign. 178 Despite all the efforts Atatürk and his entourage exerted to turn the tour into 
a Kemalist victory, the Mersin visit ended in almost complete fiasco. 179 Immediately after 
Atatürk's departure from Mersin, Cemal Mersinli Pasha, deputy for Isparta and one of the 
leaders of the Second Group, went on tour among his constituents at Mersin for the 
purpose of repairing possible damage done to his electoral prospects there by the recent 
visit of Atatürk. 180

As elsewhere, at Mersin too the Kemalists rejected to include opposition candidates in 
the electoral lists. Among the rejected candidates was Haci Bey, the father-in-law of 
Yusuf Ziya Eraydın, a member of the Second Group. Another candidate for Mersin, 
Ahmed Remzi Yüregir, the President of the Adana Small Businessmen Association and 
owner of Yeni Adana, had also been, according to Refet Canitez, the Kemalist governor of

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176. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, 
July 4, 1923 [p.42]; Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), pp.80-81; "Turkish Bluster: Growing Opposition to 
178. Ismail Habib Sevük, Atatürk Icin, pp.30-31; and, Damar Arıkoğlu, Hâiralarım, pp.309-
310, and, p.312.
179. Damar Arıkoğlu, Hâiralarım, pp.312-314; and, Ismail Habib Sevük, Atatürk Icin, pp.32-
33. See also, Mehmet Önder, Atatürk'ün Yurt Gezileri, p.278.
Adana, intimately involved with the liberal opposition there. Despite Arikoglu's intervention and Yüregir's defence of his conduct at Ankara with members of the cabinet, he was also eliminated from the list of candidates.\textsuperscript{181} Instead, Ahmed Besim Özbek, a judge, and Niyazi Ramazanoglu were nominated and elected as deputies for Mersin.\textsuperscript{182} Özbek was definitely a compromise candidate, who, though elected on the Defence of Rights Association ticket, later joined the Progressive Republican Party.

At Kayseri, one of the candidates was Rifat Calık'a, deputy for Kayseri and Minister of Justice in the provisional government. Since he belonged to the Second Group, however, Atatürk rejected his candidacy. Despite Calık'a's efforts and his local popularity, his name was left off the list. He would never be allowed to run again.\textsuperscript{183}

Kastamonu was another town where Kemalists encountered stiff opposition. In the outgoing Assembly, out of the seven deputies for the province, three --Hasan Sabri Dura, Mehmed Besim Fazlıoglu, and Abdulkadir Kemalı Ögütçü-- were prominent members of the Second Group.

In order to terrorise the public, Atatürk appointed a new Governor in mid-April, and ordered Ismail Habib Sevük, who was designated party inspector in charge of the elections at Kastamonu, to accompany the new Governor, Ferid Bey, who was also one of Sevük's close friends. Atatürk had specifically instructed that both should be seen in public together, so as to make it clear that no opposition propaganda would be tolerated under the administration of the new governor.\textsuperscript{184}

Arriving at Kastamonu in late April, Sevük began his electoral campaign for the Kemalist cause. On May 15, he addressed the inhabitants of Kastamonu at an election rally. His speech was geared towards allaying the negative opinion people had about Atatürk.

\textsuperscript{181} Damar Arikoglu, \textit{Hatlalarım}, pp.340-341. In return for his unwavering loyalty, Canitez was "elected" on the Kemalist ticket and was made a deputy for Bursa.
\textsuperscript{182} Damar Arikoglu, \textit{Hatlalarım}, p.341.
\textsuperscript{183} Damar Arikoglu, \textit{Hatlalarım}, p.337.
\textsuperscript{184} Ismail Habib Sevük, \textit{Atatürk İcin}, pp.70-72.
Portraying Atatürk as a national hero, he equated Atatürk with the soul of the Turkish nation, and reprimanded those who disapproved following Atatürk blindly. In essence, this speech was more of an unashamed praise for Atatürk than anything else. In an effort to reach a great number of the electors, this propaganda tract was printed and distributed among the population of Kastamonu.185

Despite Kemalist intervention, which succeeded in eliminating Dura, Fazlioglu and Ögütçü from the race, Ismail Habib Sevik's mission ended in failure.186 Inhabitants of Kastamonu managed to elect two opposition politicians; they were Necmeddin Kocatas, one of the prominent figures in the Committee of Union and Progress, and Halid Akmansü, who would later join the Progressive Republican Party in 1924.

Trouble persisted through the elections in Trabzon. The Kemalists had forwarded a list of candidates whose election they demanded. The inhabitants of Trabzon, however, would not be easily intimidated or made to blindly follow Kemalist orders. The Kemalist list of candidates was completely ignored by the local Defence of Rights Association which submitted to Ankara a list of its own candidates. Atatürk responded by replacing Kazim Karabekir Pasha, an opposition sympathiser, with Said Pasha, a trusted Kemalist supporter, as Commander of the Eastern Front. Said Pasha then went to Trabzon and Erzurum where, with a division of troops, he terrorised the population, supervised the elections in such a manner that only Kemalist deputies would be elected, and arrested those who had played a leading role in the opposition.187 Consequently, there was considerable delay in the conclusion of the elections.188

At Giresun, another Black Sea town which had resisted Kemalist pressure, the

186. Ismail Habib Sevük, Atatürk İcin, p.100.
188. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69].
number of electors who had actually voted was so small that fresh elections were ordered. Samsun also emerged as a centre of opposition, as it was reported that Atatürk had given orders for the immediate dissolution of the local Defence of Rights Association there. In addition, troops had been sent there to repress the population which had been staging a rebellion against Kemalist dictation. Kemalist repression methods, however, did not appear to have been very successful. According to reports that filtered through, the troops were demoralised and were in many cases making common cause with the population.

As regards the eastern provinces, the elections at Kars had been suspended due to the activities of the anti-Kemalist opposition. At Diyarbakir, the population had protested the candidacy of Fevzi Pirinçcioğlu, the Kemalist Minister of Public Works. In view, however, of the fact that he had been nominated by Atatürk, there was no reason to doubt that his election would be secured. At Harput, again, disturbances occurred when the population rejected the list of candidates furnished by the Central Election Committee at Ankara, but a considerable number of troops were brought in and the elections were completed under an atmosphere of military terror. Cevad Cobanlı Pasha, commanding the troops at the eastern front, was elected as one of the deputies for Elaziz.

On June 25, the election of the two deputies for Erzincan was complete, with the victory of Sabit Sagirolu and Hamdi Arpak. Though both were elected on the Defence of Rights ticket, Sagirolu was a liberal who would later be one of the founders of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924.

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189. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 11, 1923 [p.69].
191. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 4, 1923 [p.42].
192. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, July 25, 1923 [p.102].
193. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, June 27, 1923 [p.5].
Appendix to Chapter 18

ELECTIONS OF 1923

ADANA (3)

Ismail Safa Özler+ (1885-1940)¹
Zamir (Damar) Arıkoğlu+ (1889-1969)²
Kemal Kusun (1889-1956)³

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AFYON KARAHISAR (6)

Ali Çetinkaya+ (1878-1949)⁴ CHF
Izzet Ulvi Aykurt (1880-1957)⁵

2. Landowner. Deputy for Adana from 1st till 7th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.1).
3. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
5. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
Kamil B. Mıras (1875-1957)\(^6\) TpCF
Musa Kazım Gürsel (1875-1967)\(^7\)
Rusen Esref Ünaydin (1892-1959)\(^8\)
Sadık Bey (1869-\(^9\)

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AKSARAY (3)

Besim Atalay\(^+\) (1882-1965)\(^10\)
Mustafa Vehbi [Corakci]\(^+\) (1876-1932)\(^11\)
Neset Özerkan\(^+\) (1881-1945)\(^12\)

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AMASYA (3)

6. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
7. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
8. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
9. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.74)
Ali Riza Özdarenş (1876-1952)
Esad Uras (1882-1960)
Osman Bey* (1879-1962)
Nafiz Aktin (1879-1962)

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ANKARA (6)

Ali Fuad Cebeşoy Pasha+ (1882-1968) TpCF
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk+ (1881-1938)
Hilmi Bey+ (1870-)
Sakir Kinaci+ (1875-1940)

14. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)
15. Resigned on September 9, 1339/1923 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)
16. Elected on December 10, 1339/1923 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)
17. Military Academy. Not reelected in the 3rd Assembly, but reelected from 4th Assembly onwards (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.3).
Ömer Mümmtaz Tanbi\textsuperscript{d} (1859-1925)\textsuperscript{21}

Ihsan Pehlivanli (1885-1961)\textsuperscript{22}

Kütükçüoğlu Ali Bey\textsuperscript{*} (1862-1933)\textsuperscript{23}

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ANTALYA (4)

Rasih Kaplan\textsuperscript{+} (1883-1952)\textsuperscript{24} \textit{CHF}

Ahmed Saki Bey (1876-1930)\textsuperscript{25}

Hasan Sitki Bey (1859-1933)\textsuperscript{26}

Murad Bey (1874-)\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{21} Bureaucrat. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.4). Died on February 23, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II)

\textsuperscript{22} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)

\textsuperscript{23} Law. Reelected deputy for Antalya from 1st through 8th Assembly -- except for 7th, Maras (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.5).

\textsuperscript{24} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)

\textsuperscript{25} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.75)

\textsuperscript{26} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)

\textsuperscript{27} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)
ARDAHAN (2)

Talat Sönmez (1875-1950) 28
Halit Pasha (1883-1925) 29
Tahsin Uzer*+ (1879- ) 30

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ARTVIN (1)

Hilmi Gür (1877-1939) 31

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AYDIN (4)

Mazhar Gerner+ (1887-1967) 32

28. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)
29. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76) Died on February 14, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
31. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)
32. Doctor. Deputy for Aydin from 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)
Tahsin San* (1865-1951)33
Zekai Apaydin+R (1877- )34
Izzettin Calislar Pasha† (1882-1951)35
Resid Galib* (1893-1934)36
Midhat Aydin* (1884-1959)37

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BAYEZID (2)

Süleyman Sudi [Acarbay]* (1866-1927)38
Sefik Baydar (1871-1936)39

Albümü, p.6).

33. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Aydin from 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.17).

34. Mekteb-i Mülkiye. Deputy for Adana in the 1st Assembly. Deputy for Diyartakir from 3rd through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.2). Resigned on October 18, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II); he was appointed Ambassador to London (T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.9, p.4).

35. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77) Resigned on November 1, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

36. Elected on January 24, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.76)

37. Elected on January 24, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77)

38. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Bayezid in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.8).

39. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77)
BIGNA (3)

Mehmed Dinc ($^+$) (1873-1952)$^{40}$ opp
Samih Rifat Bey (1875-1932)$^{41}$
Sükrü Yasin (1882-1940)$^{42}$

BITLIS (1)

Resul Bey ($^{+d}$) (1863-1924)$^{43}$
Muhittin Nami Bey ($^*$) (1884-1932)$^{44}$

40. Businessman. Deputy for Biga in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Canakkale in the 3rd Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.9).
41. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77)
42. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77)
43. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Bitlis in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.10). Died on October 18, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
44. Elected on February 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.77)
BOLU (5)

Cevad Abbas Gürer* (1887-1943)45
Sükrü Güler* (1869- )46
Emin Cemal Suda (1877-1940)47
Fahri Rifki Atay (1893-1971)48
Mehmed Vasfi Nuhoglu (1875-1948)49

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BOZOK (4)

Süleyman Sirri Icöz* (1878-1963)50
Ahmed Hamdi Bey (1878-1933)51
Avni Dogan 1892-196552

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45. Military Academy. Deputy for Bolu from 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.10).
46. Businessman. Deputy for Bolu from 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.11).
47. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
48. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
49. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
50. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Yozgad from 1st through 8th Assemblies, except for 2nd Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.73).
51. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
52. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
Salih Bozok (1881-1941) 53

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BURDUR (2)

Hüseyin Baki Bey (1885-1949) 54
Mustafa Seref Özkân (1887-1938) 55

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BURSA (5)

Mustafa Fehmi Gercekær (1868-1950) 56
Necati Kurtulus+ (1882-1956) 57 TpCF

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53. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.78)
54. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79)
55. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79)
Osman Nuri Özpây† (1878-)
Ali Hikmet Ayerdem Pasha (1877-1939)
Refet Canitez (1880-1946)
Nureddûn Pasha * (1873-)

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CANIK (3)

Cavid Pasha (1871-1972)
Süleyman Necmi Selmen (1871-1943) opp
Talat Avni Bey (1880-1939)

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59. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79) Resigned on November 1, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
60. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79)
61. Elected on March 10, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79)
62. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.79)
63. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80)
64. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80)
CEBELIBEREKET (2)

Avni [Zaimler] Pasha\textsuperscript{+} (1876-1930)\textsuperscript{65}
Ihsan Eryavuz\textsuperscript{+} (1877-1947)\textsuperscript{66}

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CANKIRI (4)

Ziya Esen Isfendiyaroglu\textsuperscript{+} (1878-1940)\textsuperscript{67}
Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1881-1957)\textsuperscript{68}
Rifat Ünüver Saracoglu (1880-1936)\textsuperscript{69}
Talat Omay (1888-1955)\textsuperscript{70}

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\textsuperscript{65} Military Academy. Deputy for Saruhan in the 1st Assembly, and for Cebelibereket in 2nd and 3rd Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.61).

\textsuperscript{66} Military Academy. Deputy for Cebelibereket from 1st through 3rd Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.15).

\textsuperscript{67} Landowner. Deputy for Cankiri from 1st through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.17).

\textsuperscript{68} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80)

\textsuperscript{69} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80)

\textsuperscript{70} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80).
CATALCA (1)

Sakir Kesebir (1889-1966)\textsuperscript{71}

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CORUM (5)

Mustafa Cantekin\textsuperscript{+} (1878-1955)\textsuperscript{72}
Ismet Eker\textsuperscript{+} (1877-1962)\textsuperscript{73}
Ferid Torum [Küney]\textsuperscript{+d} (1878-1925)\textsuperscript{74}
Ismail Kemal Alpars (1874-1942)\textsuperscript{75}
Münir Cagil (1874-1954)\textsuperscript{76}
Ziya Bey \textsuperscript{*} (1883-1962)\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{71} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.80)
\textsuperscript{72} Military doctor. Deputy for Kozan in the 1st Assembly. Deputy for Corum from 2nd through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.49).
\textsuperscript{73} Bureaucrat. Deputy for Corum from the 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.18).
\textsuperscript{74} Bureaucrat. Deputy for Corum in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.17). Died on March 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Deferleri, Devre II)
\textsuperscript{75} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.81)
\textsuperscript{76} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.81)
\textsuperscript{77} Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim
DENIZLI (5)

Mazhar Müfid Kansu\(^+\) (1873-1948)\(^{78}\)
Yusuf Baskaya\(^+\) (1879-1945)\(^{79}\)
Necib Ali Kücüka (1892-1941)\(^{80}\)
Haydar Rüsdü Öktem (1890-1951)\(^{81}\)
Kazim Samanli (1890-1941)\(^{82}\)

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DERSIM (2)

Ahmed Sükrü Bey (1885-1938)\(^{83}\)

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\(^{78}\) Bureaucrat. Deputy for Hakkari in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Denizli from 2nd through 5th Assemblies; and, deputy for Coruh in the 6th and 7th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.33).

\(^{79}\) Landowner. Deputy for Denizli from 1st through 7th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.19).

\(^{80}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)

\(^{81}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)

\(^{82}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.81)

\(^{83}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)
DIYARBEKIR (5)

Fevzi Pirincioglu+  
(1879-1933) 85  
Zülfü Tigrel+  
(1876-1940) 86  
Seref Ulug  
(1892- ) 87 opp  
Ziya Gokalp d  
(1876-1924) 88  
Mehmed Bey d  
(1887-1925) 89 opp  
Cavid Ekin*  
(1892- ) 90  
Ibrahim Tali Öngören*  
(1871-1952) 91

84. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.81)
86. Landowner. Deputy for Diyarbakır from 1st through 6th Assemblies with the exception of 3rd Assembly (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.21).
87. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)
88. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83) Died on October 27, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
89. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82) Died on October 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
90. Elected on January 7, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)
91. Elected on January 11, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.82)
EDIRNE (3)

Cafer Tayyar Eğilmez Pasha\(^+\) (1879-1958)\(^{92}\) TpCF
Faik Kaltakkiran\(^+\) (1870-1948)\(^{93}\)
Hüseyin Rifki Bey (1883-1959)\(^{94}\)

ELAZIZ (5)

Hüseyin Gökcelik\(^+\) (1867-1933)\(^{95}\)
Muhittin [Cötelî]\(^+\) (1866-1928)\(^{96}\)
Naci Karaali\(^{+r}\) (1856- )\(^{97}\)

93. Landowner. Deputy for Edirne from 1st through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.21).
94. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83)
97. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Elaziz in the 1st Assembly. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü,
Cevad Cobanli Pasha* (1870-1938)
Mustafa B. [Ispir] (1866-1929)
Suleyman Bey (1867-1939)

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ERGANI (3)

Ihsan Saglam+ (1877-1953)
Kazim Vehbi Oral(+) (1892- )
Ihsan Hamid Tigrel (1890- TpCF)

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ERTUGRUL (5)

p.23). Resigned on December 16, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

98. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83) Resigned on December 22, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

99. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83)

100. Elected on March 22, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83)


103. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.83)
Fikret Onuralp
+ (1887-1946)
Halil Isik
+ (1879-1935) TpCF
Rasim Öztekin
+ (1874-1933)
Ibrahim Colak
 (1878-1944)
Ahmed Iffet Mercimekoglu
 (1885-1935)

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ERZINÇAN (2)

Sabit Sagirolgu
 (1881-1960) TpCF
Hamdi Arpak
† (1882-)

104. Doctor. Deputy for Kozan in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Bilecik in the 3rd Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.49).


106. Military Academy. Deputy for Cebelibereket in the 1st Assembly; for Bilecik in the 3rd; and, for Kütahya in the 4th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.15).

107. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84)

108. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.98)

109. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84)

110. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84) Resigned on October 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
Abdülhak Firat * (1881-1953)\textsuperscript{111}

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ERZURUM (6)

Ziyaeddin Gözübüyük\textsuperscript{+} (1877-1944)\textsuperscript{112} (CHF)

Cazim Duru (1886-1972)\textsuperscript{113}

Halet Sagiroglu (1880-1947)\textsuperscript{114} TpCF

Münir Hüsrev Göle (1890-1955)\textsuperscript{115} TpCF

Raif Dinc (1874-1949)\textsuperscript{116}

Rüsdü Pasha\textsuperscript{h} (1873-1926)\textsuperscript{117} TpCF

Bahri Sarıtepe* (1875-1935)\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{111} Elected on January 18, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84)

\textsuperscript{112} Teacher. Deputy for Erzurum in the 1st Assembly. Not reelected afterwards (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.28). Resigned from the CHF on November 10, 1340/1924 (Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.103).

\textsuperscript{113} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84)

\textsuperscript{114} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.85)

\textsuperscript{115} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.85)

\textsuperscript{116} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.85)

\textsuperscript{117} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.85) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

\textsuperscript{118} Elected on January 29, 1927 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.84)
ESKİŞEHİR (3)

Abdullah Azmi Torun† (1869-1937)\textsuperscript{119}
Emin Sazak† (1882-1960)\textsuperscript{120}
Arif Bey\textsuperscript{\textdagger} (1882-1926)\textsuperscript{121} TpCF
Ali Ulvi Bey* (1873-1930)\textsuperscript{122}

GAZIANTEP (5)

Ali Cenani Bey† (1872- )\textsuperscript{123}
Kılcı Ali† (1889-1971)\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{119} Law. Deputy for Eskisehir in the 1st Assembly. Not reelected afterwards (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.28).

\textsuperscript{120} Landowner. Deputy for Eskisehir from 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi Albümü, p.28).

\textsuperscript{121} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
Albümü, p.85) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim 
Defteri, Devre II)

\textsuperscript{122} Elected on July 25, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, 
Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
Albümü, p.85)

\textsuperscript{123} Landowner. Deputy for Gaziantep in the 1st through 3rd Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi Albümü, p.30).

\textsuperscript{124} Military. Deputy for Gaziantep from the 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi Albümü, p.30).
Hafiz Mehmed Sahin\(^{+}\) (1877-1959)\(^{125}\)

Ahmed Remzi Güres (1893-\()^{126}\)

Ferid Bey (1876-1941)\(^{127}\)

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GELIBOLU (1)

Celal Nuri İleri\(^{+}\) (1882-1938)\(^{128}\)

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GENÇ (1)

Ali Haydar Bey\(^{+d}\) (1880-1923)\(^{129}\)

Muhittin Bey\(^{*}\) (1893-1938)\(^{130}\)

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125. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Gaziantep from the 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.30).

126. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.86)

127. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.86)

128. Ph.D. in law. Deputy for Gelibolu from the 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.31). Died on December 3, 1339/1923 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

129. Military doctor. Deputy for Genç in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.31). Died on April 14, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet
GIRESUN (5)

Hacim Muhiittin Carikli\(^+\)  \(1881-1965\) \(^{131}\)

Hakki Tarik Us  \(1889-1956\) \(^{132}\)

Kazim Okay  \(1892-1958\) \(^{133}\)

Sevket Colak  \(1886-1960\) \(^{134}\)

Tahir Bey  \(1873\) \(^{135}\)

GÜMÜŞHANE (3)

Hasan Fehmi Atac\(^+\)  \(1879-1961\) \(^ {136}\)

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\(^{131}\) Bureaucrat. Deputy for Karesi in the 1st Assembly; for Giresun in the 2nd and 3rd Assemblies; and, for Balikesir from 4th through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 42).

\(^{132}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 86)

\(^{133}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 86)

\(^{134}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 86)

\(^{135}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 87)

\(^{136}\) Landowner. Deputy for Gümüşhane from the 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p. 32).
Veysel Riza Bey\(^d\) (1873-1924)\(^{137}\)
Zeki Kadır Beyoğlu (1884-1952)\(^{138}\) TpCF
Cemal Hüsnü Taray * (1893-\()^{139}\)

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HAKKARI (2)

Asaf Doras (1883-1946)\(^{140}\)
Nazmi Dilaveroğlu (1874-1958)\(^{141}\)

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ICEL (2)

Tevfik Bey (1875-1944)\(^{142}\)

138. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.87)
139. Elected on February 10, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.87)
140. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.87)
141. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.87)
142. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.87)
Hafiz Emin Inankur (1876-1944)

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ISTANBUL (15)

Ahmed Muhtar Bey+ (1870-1934)
Ali Riza Bebe+ (1881-)
Refik Saydam+ (1882-1942)
Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver+ (1886-1966)
Kazim Karabekir Pasha† (1882-1948) TpCF
Ali Fethi Okyar+r (1881-1943)

143. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88)
144. Diplomat. Deputy for Istanbul in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies; deputy for Kastamonu in the 4th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.36).
145. Military Academy. Deputy for Istanbul in the 1st Assembly; for Cebeliberkeket in the 3rd Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.36).
146. Doctor. Deputy for Bayezid in the 1st Assembly; for Istanbul from the 2nd through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.8).
147. Diplomat and professor at Istanbul University. Deputy for Antalya in the 1st Assembly; for Istanbul in the 2nd and 3rd Assemblies; for Icel in the 7th Assembly; for Istanbul in the 8th Assembly; for Manisa in the 9th Assembly; and, for Istanbul in the 10th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.5).
149. Military Academy. Deputy for Istanbul in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Gümüşhane in the 3rd Assembly; for Bolu from 5th through 7th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.36). Resigned on March 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defterleri, Devre II)
Adnan Adivar⁴² (1882-1955)¹⁵⁰ TpCF
Fevzi Cakmak Pasha⁴² (1876-1950)¹⁵¹
Refet Bele Pasha⁴² (1881-1963)¹⁵² TpCF
Hüseyin Rauf Orbay⁴² (1881-1967)¹⁵³ TpCF
Ahmed Hamdi Denizmen (1876-1959)¹⁵⁴
Yusuf Akcura (1876-1935)¹⁵⁵
Abdurrahman Seref Bey² (1853-1925)¹⁵⁶
Süleyman Sirri Bey² (1874-1925)¹⁵⁷
Ismail Canbulat¹ (1880-1926)¹⁵⁸ TpCF

150. Doctor. Deputy for Istanbul in the 1st Assembly; and in the 7th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.37). Resigned January 30, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
151. Military Academy. Deputy for Kozan in the 1st Assembly; and, deputy for Istanbul in the 8th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.49). Resigned on November 1, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
152. Military Academy. Deputy for Izmir in the 1st Assembly; and, deputy for Istanbul from the 5th through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.38). Resigned on November 2, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
153. Naval Academy. Deputy for Sivas in the 1st Assembly; and, for Kastamonu in the 6th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.65). His deputyship was revoked on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
154. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89)
155. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88)
156. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88) Died on February 19, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
157. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89) Died on December 16, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
158. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
Hakki Sinasi Erel Pasha* (1868-1941)\textsuperscript{159}
Edib Servet Tör* (1880-1960)\textsuperscript{160}
Tevfik Kamil Koperler* (1888-1964)\textsuperscript{161}
Behic Erkin* (1876-1961)\textsuperscript{162}
Ihsan Sökmen Pasha* (1873-1955)\textsuperscript{163}
Fuad Agrali* (1878-1957)\textsuperscript{164}
Ziyaeddin Karamursal* (1873-1957)\textsuperscript{165}
Ali Haydar Yulug* (1879- )\textsuperscript{166}

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IZMIR (8)

\textsuperscript{159}. Elected on January 17, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88)
\textsuperscript{160}. Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88)
\textsuperscript{161}. Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.90)
\textsuperscript{162}. Elected on January 11, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.88)
\textsuperscript{163}. Elected on March 31, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89)
\textsuperscript{164}. Elected on December 25, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89)
\textsuperscript{165}. Elected on December 25, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.90)
\textsuperscript{166}. Elected on December 25, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.89)
Tevfik Rüsdü Aras* (1883-1972)\textsuperscript{167}
Mahmud Celal Bayar* (1884-1987)\textsuperscript{168}
Mahmud Esad Bozkurt* (1892-1943)\textsuperscript{169}
Mustafa Necati [Ugural]* (1892-1929)\textsuperscript{170}
Fahrettin Altay Pasha*\textsuperscript{r} (1880- )\textsuperscript{171}
Mustafa Kemal Pasha*\textsuperscript{r} (1881-1938)
Mustafa Rahmi Köken (1881-1952)\textsuperscript{172}
Sükrü Saracoğlu (1887-1953)\textsuperscript{173}
Seyyid Bey* (1873- )\textsuperscript{174}
Osmanzade Hamdi Aksoy*\textsuperscript{r} (1883-1957)\textsuperscript{175}
Münir Akkaya* (1871-1947)\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{167}. Doctor. Deputy for Mentese in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Izmir from the 2nd through 5th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.56).
\textsuperscript{168}. Deputy for Saruhan in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Izmir from the 2nd through 7th Assemblies; for Istanbul from the 8th through 11th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.62).
\textsuperscript{169}. Law and landowner. Deputy for Izmir in the 1st through 7th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.38).
\textsuperscript{170}. Law; Journalist. Deputy for Saruhan in the 1st Assembly; for Izmir in the 2nd and 3rd Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.62).
\textsuperscript{171}. Military Academy. Deputy for Mersin; and, for Burdur in the 7th Assembly (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.58). Resigned on November 1, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II)
\textsuperscript{172}. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.90)
\textsuperscript{173}. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.90)
\textsuperscript{174}. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.91) Resigned on December 15, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II)
\textsuperscript{175}. Elected on October 30, 1339/1923 (T.B.M.M. İsim Defteri, Devre II). Landowner, and journalist (managing editor of Yenigün). Deputy for Ertugrul in the 1st Assembly; deputy for Izmir in the 2nd through 5th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.26).
\textsuperscript{176}. Elected January 21, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. İsim
Kamil Dursun* (1878-1951)\textsuperscript{177}

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ISPARTA (3)

Hüseyin Hüsnü Özdamar\( ^{+} \) (1875-1961)\textsuperscript{178}

\textit{Haftı} Ibrahim Demiralay\( ^{+} \) (1883-1939)\textsuperscript{179}

Mükerrem Karağaç (1885-1949)\textsuperscript{180}

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KARESI (8)

Kazım Özalp Pasha\( ^{+} \) (1880-1968)\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{itemize}
\item **Defteri, Devre II**. (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.90)
\item Elected on January 21, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.90)
\item Mufti of Isparta. Deputy for Isparta in the 1st through 6th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.35).
\item Bureaucrat (Member of the Uluborlu Court). Deputy for Isparta in the 1st through 6th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.35).
\item (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.91)
\item Military Academy. Deputy for Karesi in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies; for Balikesir in the 3rd through 8th Assemblies; for Van in the 9th Assembly (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.43).
\end{itemize}
Mehmed Vehbi Bolak\(^+\) (1882-1948)\(^{182}\)
Ahmed Süreyya Özgeevren (1888-1969)\(^{183}\)
Ali Suuri Bey (1890-1934)\(^{184}\)
Haydar Adil Bey (1890-1942)\(^{185}\)
Hulusi Zarfli (1883-1968)\(^{186}\) TpCF
Mehmed Cavid Demir (1880-1950)\(^{187}\)
Osman Niyazi Burcu (1875-1955)\(^{188}\)

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KARS (2)

Ahmed Agaoglu (1869- )\(^{189}\)
Ömer Bey (1874- )\(^{190}\)

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183. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.91)
184. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.91)
185. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.91)
186. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.91)
187. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92)
188. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92)
189. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92)
190. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92)
KASTAMONU (7)

Ali Riza Bey (1877-1935)\textsuperscript{191}
Halid Akmansü (1884-1953)\textsuperscript{192} TpCF
Hasan Fehmi Tümerkan (1875-1933)\textsuperscript{193}
Mehmed Fuad Müftüoğlu (1875-1952)\textsuperscript{194}
Necmeddin Kocatas (1876-1949)\textsuperscript{195}
Veled Izbudak (1869-1953)\textsuperscript{196}
Ahmed Mahir Bey\textsuperscript{d} (1861-1925)\textsuperscript{197}
Ali Nazmi Özügür* (1882-1945)\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{191} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{192} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{193} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{194} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{195} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{196} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.93)
\textsuperscript{197} (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92) Died on October 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
\textsuperscript{198} Elected on January 2, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.92)
KAYSERI (4)

Ahmed Hilmi Kalac+ (1887-1966)\textsuperscript{199}
Sabit Gözügeçgel+ (1876-1938)\textsuperscript{200}
Halid Bey (1889-)\textsuperscript{201}
Nuh Naci Yazgan' (1886-1947)\textsuperscript{202}
Zeki Bey* (1888-1937)\textsuperscript{203}

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KIRKLARELI (2)

Fuad Umay+ (1885-1963)\textsuperscript{204}
Sükrü Naili Gökberk Pasha' (1876-1936)\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{199} Bureaucrat (Karaman Kaymakami). Deputy for Kayseri in the 1st through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.45).

\textsuperscript{200} Notable; owner of Misak. Deputy for Kayserin in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies. Not reelected (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.47).

\textsuperscript{201} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94)

\textsuperscript{202} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94) Resigned on December 22, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

\textsuperscript{203} Elected on March 7, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94)

\textsuperscript{204} Government Doctor. Deputy for Bolu in the 1st Assembly; for Kirklareli in the 2nd through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.11).

\textsuperscript{205} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94) Resigned on November 1, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
206. Elected on January 24, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94)

207. Bureaucrat (Deputy Governor of Ankara, and defterdar). Deputy for Kirsehir in the 1st through 3rd Assemblies; for Ankara in the 4th through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.47).

208. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95) Died on October 18, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

209. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.94) Died on April 22, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

210. Elected on December 31, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95)

211. Elected on June 1, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95)
KOCAELI (5)

Ibrahim Süreyya Yigit+ (1880-1952)²¹²
Sirri Bellioglu+ (1876-1958)²¹³
Ibrahim Tolon (1880-1956)²¹⁴
Mustafa Bey (1874-1941)²¹⁵
Saffet Arikan (1887-1947)²¹⁶
Ahmed Sükrü Beyʰ (1875-1926)²¹⁷ TpCF
Ragib Akca * (1887-1945)²¹⁸

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KONYA (10)

²¹² Bureaucrat (Izmit Mutasarrifi). Deputy for Saruhan in the 1st Assembly; for Kocaeli in the 2nd through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.62).

²¹³ Deputy for Izmit in the 1st Assembly and Minister of the Economy; deputy for Kocaeli in the 2nd Assembly. Not reelected afterwards (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Meclisi Albümü, p.40). He is not listed in the T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri.

²¹⁴ (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95)
²¹⁵ (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95)
²¹⁶ (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96)
²¹⁷ (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
²¹⁸ Elected on December 25, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.95)
Haci Bekir [Sümer] (1867-1927) 219
Kazim Hüsnü Bey (1883-1934) 220
Musa Kazim [Göksu] (1881-1930) 221
Refik Koralan (1889-) 222
Fuad Gökbudak (1892-1958) 223
Eyüb Sabri Hayirlioglu (1886-1960) 224
Mustafa Ulusan (1872-1943) 225
Mustafa Feyzi Karaagac (1880-1968) 226
Naim Hazim Onat (1889-1953) 227
Tevfik Fikret Silay (1890-1959) 228

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221. Lawyer. Deputy for Konya in the 1st through 3rd Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.48).
223. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96)
224. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96)
225. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96)
226. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.96)
227. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)
228. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)
KOZAN (2)

Ali Saib Ursavas

Ali Sadi Celik

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KÜTAHYA (6)

Cevdet Izrab Barlas

Ragib Soysal

Ahmed Ferid Tek

Sheikh Seyfi [Aydin]

Receb Peker


230. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)


234. Mayor of Kütahya. Deputy for Kütahya in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.51). Died on April 15, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

235. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Nuri Conker (1881-1937)

Mehmed Riza Dincer* (1874- )

Faik Soylu* (1874-1945)

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MALATYA (5)

Hacı Bedir Agha [Firat] + (1872-1928)

İsmet İnönü Pasha + (1884-1973)

Resid Agar + (1875-1935)

Hilmi Oytac (1881-1942)

Mahmut Nedim Zabci (1882-1955)

[Note: The text contains references to various individuals with their respective years of birth and death, along with additional notes and references.]

* Albümü, p.98
236. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)
237. Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)
238. Elected on January 9, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.97)
239. Deputy for Malatya in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies; for Kars in the 3rd Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.52).
240. Military Academy. Deputy for Edirne in the 1st Assembly; for Malatya in the 2nd through 5th Assemblies; for Ankara in the 6th through 8th Assemblies; for Malatya in the 9th through 11th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.21).
241. Landowner; Member of Court. Deputy for Malatya in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies; for Gaziantep in the 3rd through 5th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.53).
242. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.98)
243. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.98)
MARAS (4)

Haci Mehmed Erten $^+$ (1884-244)
Tahsin Hüdaioglu $^{+tv}$ (1887-245)
Abdülkadir Bey (1880-1966)246
Midhat Alam (1881-1936)247
Nureddin [Özdemir] $^*$ (1887-1929)248

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MARDIN (5)

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244. Landowner and businessman. Elected deputy for Maras in the 1st Assembly, but resigned before arriving in Ankara. Deputy for Maras in the 2nd through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.54).

245. Deputy for Maras in the 1st and 2nd Assemblies. Not reelected (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.55). His deputyship was revoked on April 7, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II).

246. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.98)

247. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.98)

Abdülgani Ensari\(^+\) (1887-)\(^{249}\) (CHF) opp
Necib Güven\(^+\) (1876-1960)\(^{250}\) (CHF) opp
Dervis [Ural]\(^+d\) (1866-1925)\(^{251}\)
Abdürrazak Satana (1879-1948)\(^{252}\)
Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu (1889-)\(^{253}\)
Ali Riza Erten * (1887-1964)\(^{254}\)

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MENTESE (4)?

Yunus Nadi Abalioglu\(^+\) (1879-1945)\(^{255}\)


\(^{250}\) Director of Ziraat Bankasi at the Mardin branch. Deputy for Mardin in the 1st Assembly. Not reelected afterwards (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.56). Resigned from the CHF on November 23, 1340/1924 (Vakit, November 24, 1340/1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.106).

\(^{251}\) Bureaucrat. Deputy for Mardin in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.55). Died on April 8, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

\(^{252}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.99)

\(^{253}\) (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.99)

\(^{254}\) Elected on November 12, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.99)

\(^{255}\) Law; journalist (Owner of Yenigün). Deputy for Izmir in the 1st Assembly; for Mugla in the 3rd through 6th
Esad Ileri (1882-1897)
Sükrü Kaya (1883-1959)

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MERSIN (2)

Ahmed Besim Özbek (1882-1965) TpCF
Niyazi Ramazanoglu (1889-1965)

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MUS (3)

Haci Ilyas Sami Mus (1881-1897)
Osman Kadri [Bingöl] (1881-1930)

Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.39).
257. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.99)
258. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.99)
259. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)
260. Deputy for Mus in the 1st Assembly; for Bitlis in the 3rd Assembly; and, for Coruh in the 5th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.59).
Riza Kotan+ (1890-1951)262

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NIGDE (4)

Mehmed Ata [Atay]+ (1882-1931)263
Ebu Bekir Hazim Tepeyan (1863-1947)264
Galib Bey (1877-265
Halid Mengi (1884-1958)266

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ORDU (5)

Hamdi Yalman+ (1877-1959)267

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264. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)
265. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)
266. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)
267. Teacher. Deputy for Canik in the 1st Assembly; for Ordu in the 2nd through 8th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.),
Recai Baykal
(1886-1933)

Faik Günday
(1884-1964) TpCF

Halil Sidki Bey
(1864-1927)

Ismail Camas
(1872-1954)

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RIZE (5)

Esad Özoguz
(1873-1954)

Ali Zirh
(1888-1951)

Ekrem Rize
(1891- ) CHF

Ahmed Fuad Bulca
(1881- )

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.14).


269. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)

270. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.100)

271. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101)


273. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101)

274. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101) (Trusted: Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.91)

275. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101)
Rauf Bey d (1881-1925) 276
Hasan Cavid Belul* (1878-1950) 277

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SARUHAN (7)

Resad [Kayali]^d (1881-1926) 278
Edhem Bey (1884-1953) 279
Kemal Bey (1883- ) 280
Mehmed Sabri Toprak (1877-1938) 281
Mustafa Fevzi Sarhan (1875-1933) 282
Vasif Cinar^r (1892-1935) 283
Abidin Bey^h (1890-1926) 284 TpCF

276. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101) Died on October 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
277. Elected on December 30, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.101)
279. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.102)
280. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.102)
281. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.102)
282. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.102)
283. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.103) Resigned on October 26, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
284. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Yasar Özey* (1889- )
Saim Uzel* (1882-1941)
Nafiz Duflu* (1880- )

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SIIRD (2)

Halil Hulki Aydin+ (1869-1940)
Mahmud Soydan (1883-1936)

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SINOP (3)

 Albümü, p.102) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
  286. Elected on March 31, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.102)
  287. Elected on January 6, 1927 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.103)
  289. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.103)
Riza Nur† (1878-1942)²⁹⁰
Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk† (1878-1969)²⁹¹
Kemalettin Sami Gökcen Pasha²⁸⁹ (1884-1934)²⁹²
Recep Zühdü Soyak * (1893-1966)²⁹³

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SIVAS (6)

Rasim Basara† (1882-1945)²⁹⁴
Ziyaeddin Basara† (1869-1943)²⁹⁵
Ömer Sevki Bey (1870- )²⁹⁶ (CHF) opp


²⁹¹. Law; professor of economics at the Istanbul University. Deputy for Kastamonu in the 1st Assembly; for Sinop in the 2nd through 7th Assemblies, Minister of Justice, Economy; and, Foreign Affairs (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.45).

²⁹². (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.103) Resigned on October 27, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II) He was appointed Ambassador to Berlin on August 20, 1924 (Mete Tuncay, Türkiye, p.102 and 115)

²⁹³. Elected on January 22, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.103)

²⁹⁴. Graduate of Faculty of Letters. Deputy for Sivas in the 1st through 5th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.66).

²⁹⁵. Director of Industrial School. Deputy for Sivas in the 1st through 7th Assemblies (Kazım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.66).

Muamner Bey (1874-297
Rahmi Bey (1878-1934)298
Halis Turgut Bey h (1886-1926)299 TpCF
Semsettin Günlaltay * (1883-1961)300

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SIVEREK (3)

Kadri Ahmed Kürkcü (1882-301
Mahmud Bey (1859-1932)302
Cudi Pasha d (1870-1924)303
Halil Fahri Gürmen * (1894-304

297. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.104)
298. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.104)
299. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.104) Hanged on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
300. Elected on January 15, 1927 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.104)
301. Military Academy. Deputy for Diyarbakir in the 1st Assembly. Not reelected (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.21)
302. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.105)
303. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.104) Died on October 18, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)
**SARKI KARAHISAR (3)**

Ali Sururi [Tönnük]+d (1888-1926)

Ismail Sabuncu (1891-1961)

Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944)

Ali Riza Bey* (1861-1930)

**TEKIRDAG (2)**

Faik Özttrak+ (1882-1951)

Cemil Uybadin (1880-1957)

305. Lawyer. Deputy for Sarki Karahisar in the 1st Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.41). Died on November 3, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II)

306. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.105)

307. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.105)

308. Elected on January 6, 1927 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.105)


310. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.105)
** **

TOKAT (4)

Bekir Sami Kunduh\(^+\) \((1867-1933)^{311}\) TpCF
Mustafa Vasfi Süsoy\(^+\) \((1876-1934)^{312}\)
Emin Bayari \((1878-1955)^{313}\)
\textit{Haci Kamil Bey} \((1870-1933)^{314}\)

** **

TRABZON (7)

Hasan Saka\(^+\) \((1886-1960)^{315}\)
Nebizade Hamdi Ülkümen\(^+\) \((1888-1969)^{316}\)

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313. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.106)
314. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.106)
316. Law at Sorbonne; journalist. Deputy for Trabzon in the 1st through 6th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), \textit{Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü}, p.70).
Ahmed Muhtar Cilli (1871-1958)\(^{317}\) TpCF
Abdullah Bey (1869-\(\))\(^{318}\)
Rahmi Eyüpoglu (1877-\(\))\(^{319}\) TpCF
Süleyman Sirri Gedik (1862-1939)\(^{320}\)
Ali Sefik Bekman (1886-\(\))\(^{321}\)

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URFA (4)

Hüsev Gerede\(^{r}\) (1885-1962)\(^{322}\)
Ali Bey (1876-1941)\(^{323}\)
Saffet Yetkin (1866-1950)\(^{324}\)
Yahya Kemal Beyatlı\(^{r}\) (1884-1958)\(^{325}\)

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317. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.106)
318. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.106)
319. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.106)
320. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.106)
321. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107)
322. Military Academy. Deputy for Trabzon in the 1st Assembly; for Sivas in the 5th Assembly (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.69). Resigned on October 18, 1340/1924 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II); he was appointed Ambassador to Budapest (T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.9, p.4).
323. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107)
324. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107)
325. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107) Resigned on May 23, 1926 (T.B.M.M. Isim
Refet Ülgen* (1888-1964)\textsuperscript{326}
Dr. Refet Bey* (1872-1932)\textsuperscript{327}

***

VAN (3)

Hakki Ugan\textsuperscript{+} (1880-1943)\textsuperscript{328}
Ibrahim Arvas\textsuperscript{+} (1884- )\textsuperscript{329}
Münib Boya (1872-1958)\textsuperscript{330}

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ZONGULDAK (4)

\textsuperscript{326} Elected on January 17, 1341/1925 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107)

\textsuperscript{327} Elected on January 15, 1927 (T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, Devre II). (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.107)

\textsuperscript{328} Bureaucrat. Deputy for Van in the 1st through 7th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.71).

\textsuperscript{329} Bureaucrat (Semdinan Kaymakami). Deputy for Hakkari in the 1st Assembly (resigned before coming to Ankara); for Hakkari in the 3rd and 4th Assemblies; for Van in the 5th through 7th Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.33).

\textsuperscript{330} (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.108).
Tunali Hilmi+ (1871-1928)³³¹
Halil Türkmen (1883-1943)³³²
Ragib Özedméroglu (1893-1958)³³³
Yusuf Ziya Özençi (1875-1951)³³⁴

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One hundred and twenty-four deputies had been reelected to the Second Assembly.

³³¹. Bureaucrat. Deputy for Bolu in the 1st Assembly; for Zonguldak in the 2nd and 3rd Assemblies (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.11).
³³². (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.108)
³³³. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.108)
³³⁴. (Kazim Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Albümü, p.108)
Chapter 19

ATATÜRK'S BID FOR POWER:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KEMALIST DICTATORSHIP

AUGUST 2 had been freely hinted as the opening day of the new Assembly.\(^1\) However, according to August 1 news of the election results, the elections had not been completed. Up until then, two hundred and sixteen deputies had been elected to the Assembly, all members of the Defence of Rights Association, or the People's Party. Despite the fact that all of the deputies formally belonged to the People's Party, there were members of the former Committee of Union and Progress as well as other groups among the deputies elected.\(^2\) Reportedly, only one hundred and thirteen deputies had formally enrolled in the yet-to-be-established People's Party.\(^3\)

There were only three Second Group deputies from the first Assembly who, despite resistance from the Kemalists, got themselves elected. These were Ali Riza Özdarende, deputy for Amasya, Mehmed Dinc, deputy for Biga, and Ali Riza [Silsüpür], deputy for Kırşehir.\(^4\) Zeki Kadırbeyoğlu, deputy for Gümüşhane, was also an opponent of the Kemalists; he was one of the two dissident deputies who chose to remain outside of the Defence of Rights Association, or the People's Party.\(^5\) The other dissident deputy was

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4. Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1932, p.55n;
   Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.209n, citing Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p.312n, but giving the last names of the deputies incorrectly. Ali Riza [Silsüpür] was sentenced to capital punishment by the Kemalist Tribunal of Independence and executed on January 11, 1926 (Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1932, p.55n).
Emin Sazak, who was elected deputy for Eskisehir on the independent ticket despite election intrigues by the Kemalists. 6

There were still about sixty deputies unelected, and, although news from the eastern provinces was scanty, it was certain that great difficulties were being experienced by the Kemalists in their efforts to make these constituencies accept their nominees. 7

THE GENERAL SITUATION was so confused that even Atatürk's future seemed uncertain. The first Assembly had decided that his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army would end with the signature of peace. Because it was certain that Atatürk did not have the popular backing to secure the renewal of this position, and because Rauf Orhay would presumably again be president of the Council of Ministers of the provisional government until a final constitutional settlement, only the presidency of the Assembly seemed to remain. 8

The press printed a probably inspired statement which informed the public that the Assembly would not perpetuate the attributes of Commander-in-Chief to Atatürk. 9 In all likelihood, this statement was made so as to placate public opinion, as many people worried that Atatürk would not let go his extraordinary powers. Although the lapse of his extraordinary powers was a natural consequence of the change from a state of war to that of peace, many people nevertheless read in it a sign of the decadence of Atatürk's personal power and status. 10

The army's attitude was likely to be key to the internal situation. Already, there were indications of considerable disaffection among its officers, and the government had

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8. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 7, 1923 [p.117].
been at pains to minimise their interference in the political field. At Konya, an organisation known as the Officers' Union, or Ittihad-i Zabitan, was formed to protect the rights of officers who were dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Kemalists. Opposed to Atatürk, Nureddin Pasha, Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, Cemal Mersinli Pasha and other officers of high rank were reported to have become members of this organisation, which was also supported by non-military influential opposition elements. At the same time, these, led by Ismail Canbulat, deputy for Istanbul and a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, were working towards the establishment of a new group in the Assembly opposed to the Kemalists.

With the general elections over, constitutional issues came to the fore. The first of these was the question of the capital. Ankara was the temporary seat of the provisional government. With the war over and Istanbul, the capital, regained, it was expected that the seat of government would once again be Istanbul. However, there was division on this issue. Since Ankara had become his power base for the last three years and his fortunes had been personally identified with the city, Atatürk was reluctant to part with it. Under the prevailing political climate in which his popularity had been on the decline, a move to Istanbul where the liberal opposition was strongest could be the end of his political future. Fethi Okyar, the outgoing Minister of the Interior, advocated, along with other members of the liberal opposition, to retain Istanbul as capital as it was stated in the Constitution. Furthermore, the opposition argued that the financial cost of moving to Ankara would be prohibitively high. The Kemalists, however, wished to remain in Ankara, assuring them a certain degree of independence from the liberal politicians who had remained in Istanbul.

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11. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 7, 1923 [p.117].
during the war. This issue promised to be hotly debated on the Assembly floor.\textsuperscript{14}

Another matter of prime importance was the modification of the Constitution in the sense of creating the collective responsibility of the cabinet. During the first week of August, \textit{Vatan} reported that a commission of members of the Defence of Rights Association was preparing a plan by which the President of the Assembly would submit the names of two deputies for each post in the cabinet, and these would be submitted to the Assembly, which would choose one of them by ballot.\textsuperscript{15} While this new system would eliminate some of the inconveniences in the election process, it would certainly give the President of the Assembly a much more prominent role than before. As Atatürk was expected to be elected President of the Assembly, this change in the rules would give him privileges which he had unsuccessfully lobbied for in 1922.

The attacks in the liberal Istanbul press on the abuse, corruption and incompetence of the whole Kemalist administrative machinery had become so pervasive and bitter that a lively and prolonged debate was also expected when the constitutional question would come up for discussion in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{ATATÜRK RETURNED FROM İZMİR to Ankara on August 2.}\textsuperscript{17} On August 4 Rauf Orbay was replaced by Fethi Okyar as the President of the Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{18} Although not yet confirmed by the Assembly, the decision seemed definite. Yet, only three weeks before, Orbay had appeared to be firmly established, acquiring an ever-increasing share of political control. The August 4 announcement was a clear sign that the political situation was both volatile and uncertain. Several weeks before, it had been announced that Orbay

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Manchester Guardian}, July 24, 1923, quoted in \textit{Oriente Moderno}, 3 (1923), p.82; and, "Turkey After the Peace: Home Problems", \textit{The Times}, August 6, 1923, p.7.

\textsuperscript{15} "Cabinet Responsibility", \textit{The Near East}, August 16, 1923, p.166.

\textsuperscript{16} F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 7, 1923 [p.117].

\textsuperscript{17} Ali Kilic, \textit{Kilic Ali Hartiralarını Anlatıyor}, p.124.

would take a short rest before the opening of the Assembly.\textsuperscript{19} This appeared so natural that it attracted little attention, and it was not until a few days before the final announcement that the unconfirmed rumours of a split between Atatürk and Orbay crystallised into certainty. Atatürk had clearly become jealous of Orbay’s growing popularity and political power, and this emotional factor undoubtedly contributed to the suddenness of Orbay’s removal.\textsuperscript{20} For his part, Orbay was also totally dissatisfied with Atatürk’s constant scheming. Nonetheless, with the dismissal of Orbay, Atatürk had removed his most powerful rival.\textsuperscript{21}

On August 7, a preliminary party meeting of the Defence of Rights Association, or the People’s Party, took place under the presidency of Atatürk. At this meeting, the statutes of the constitution of the party were distributed. The immediate programme of the party consisted of the ratification of the Peace Treaty as soon as possible, the modification of the electoral law in the direction of one-degree elections for deputies, limitation of the mandate of the Assembly to four years, institution of collective cabinet responsibility to the Assembly, and the formation of a new Council of State which would replace the old one.\textsuperscript{22}

On August 9, the Defence of Rights Association reconvened for its final session to discuss draft regulations for the new People’s Party. With the dissolution of the Defence of Rights Association, the new party was officially established, and Atatürk was elected as President of the party. Getting down to business, Atatürk made it clear that only Fethi Okyar or Kazim Karabekir were acceptable candidates for the position of the President of the Council of Ministers, his personal choice being Okyar. The congress approved Atatürk’s entire slate of party candidates for both Assembly and ministerial positions.

\textsuperscript{19} F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 14, 1923 [p.142].
\textsuperscript{20} F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 14, 1923 [p.142]; and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, \textit{Nutuk}, 2, pp.260-261.
\textsuperscript{21} F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 14, 1923 [p.142]; and, Cemal Kutay, \textit{Fethi Okyar: Üc Devirde Bir Adam}, p.335.
Despite his own objections, Ali Fuad Cebesoy was chosen to be the Kemalist candidate for the vice-presidency of the Assembly.23

THE ASSEMBLY officially opened on August 11 with one hundred and eight-nine deputies attending.24 On August 13, the Assembly unanimously elected Atatürk its President. There were one hundred and ninety-six votes cast.25 Ali Fuad Cebesoy, deputy for Ankara, was named Vice-President of the Assembly.26 Mehmed Sabri Toprak, deputy for Saruhan, and Ismet Eker, deputy for Corum, were chosen as Second and Third Vice-Presidents respectively.27

The August 13 inaugural address of Atatürk as President of the Assembly was disappointing. In his speech, he talked about the dangers Turkey faced. He did not enter into precise details as to the quarter whence danger was likely to arise, but he declared that anybody who tried to upset the existing state of affairs would find himself faced by all the forces of the government. His exact meaning was not quite clear, but it was certainly intended as a hint to certain high-ranking army generals, who were reported to be disgruntled, and also to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress.28

27. "Future of Turkey: Speech from the Chair at Angora", The Times, August 15, 1923, p.9; and, Mahmut Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1923, p.214.
Atatürk indicated that although he had considered the idea of a government along
democratic and constitutional lines, he had decided to take his chances with the army --
which he could trust-- rather than face constitutional revision which could only destabilise
his already uncertain personal position. Pride of place in the plans for the future was thus
accorded to the organisation of an efficient army. Constitutional revision could wait,
particularly since the People's Party was still rather disorganised. Additionally, growing
opposition within the higher ranks of the military presented an immediate danger to his
ascendancy. A born opportunist, Atatürk doubtless hoped that, if and when this opposition
came to a head, the occasion itself would provide the means for dealing with the disaffected
generals. In the meantime, Atatürk praised the military as the sole guarantee of Turkey's
future security and independence. The military apparatus, he claimed, must therefore be
developed and organised. If he was planning to establish a military dictatorship, he would
scarcely have expressed himself differently.29

By glorifying and strengthening the army, by flattering the Assembly, and by
securing the nomination of Fethi Okyar as President of the Council of Ministers, Atatürk
appeared, for the time being, to have succeeded in reestablishing his political ascendancy
and a return to business as usual.30

The appointment of Fethi Okyar as Rauf Orbay's successor was symptomatic of
Atatürk's tactics. Because he had been one of Atatürk's most steadfast supporters, he was
expected to be a willing instrument for the furtherance of Kemalist schemes without any of
the qualms of conscience which had disturbed Orbay.31

Atatürk's staunchest supporters wished to see Ismet İnönü as President of the

29. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
August 18, 1923 [p.150]; and, "Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Speech", The Near East, August 30, 1923,
pp.214-215. See also, Ali Kılıç, Kılıç Ali Hatıralarını Anlatıyor, p.125. For the text of Atatürk's speech,
see, [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk], Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, 1, pp.300-309.
30. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
August 18, 1923 [p.151].
31. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople,
August 14, 1923 [pp.142-143].
Council of Ministers. Among these were Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, Falih Rifki Atay and Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk. But there was enormous opposition to İsmet İnönü in the Assembly. Since April of 1921, Refet Bele and other Second Group deputies had criticised İnönü for his military incompetence against the Greeks. Some deputies of the old Assembly had even gone further, demanding that he be court-martialed for his military ineptitude. The general feeling was that the war had been mishandled, and İnönü had to shoulder the blame for this. 32 Furthermore, he had also demonstrated his inability at the peace talks at Lausanne. Therefore, he was totally unpopular with both the Assembly and the public at large. Faced with this opposition and without a majority in the Assembly, the Kemalists could not push his appointment through. 33

On August 14, with one hundred and ninety deputies in attendance, the Assembly confirmed the new cabinet. 34 Fethi Okyar was confirmed President of the Council of Ministers as well as Minister of the Interior. 35 Marshal Fevzi Çakmak Pasha was named Chief of the General Staff, İsmet İnönü Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kazim Özalp Pasha, Minister of Defence, Seyyid Bey, Minister of Justice, Hasan Fehmi Atac, Minister of Finance, Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, Minister of Economy, Riza Nur, Minister of Health, Ismail Safa Özler, Minister of Education, Musa Kazım [Göksu], Minister of Sharia, Feyzi Pirinçcioğlu, Minister of Public Works. 36

The only changes were in the Premiership and in the Ministry of Justice, which was formerly occupied by Rifat Calik’a, who, being a member of the Second Group, that is in opposition to Atatürk, had not been elected a deputy in the new Assembly. 37 The main

32. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, Politikada Kirkbes Yılı, pp.29-33; p.36.
37. "Turkish Ministry Reconstructed: A Vigorous Policy", The Times, August 16, 1923, p.7;
feature of the cabinet was the exclusion of Rauf Orbay. The cabinet was formed on a narrow basis, and suffered from the exclusion of a number of prominent men whose presence in the cabinet might have been expected on the strength of their recognised ability regardless of their political predilections.38

The liberal press attacked the new cabinet by way of criticising the autocratic control over the Assembly exercised by Atatürk. Complaints began to be heard that the new Assembly was showing itself to be ridiculously servile. In his Tanin editorial of August 16, Yalcın criticised the new cabinet, pointing out that the fact that as all the ministers had been elected practically unanimously proved that the deputies had not overtaxed their brains and had been content to vote as ordered by their chiefs.39 This criticism was not isolated. Tevhid-i Efkar, for instance, protested against party discipline being carried to extreme, as though the party had been the army. It especially attacked the clause of the People's Party's programme in which it was apparently laid down that "in the course of discussions in the Assembly only the Leader and his lieutenants may speak in the name of the party; other members will approve and support from their places, and by brief utterances, the words of their chiefs".40

The press reception of the new government was on the whole unfriendly. The absence of Rauf Orbay was almost universally deplored. In his Tevhid-i Efkar editorial of August 18, Velid Ebuzziya Bey praised Orbay for his moderate views, and expressed doubt that the new Assembly had the strength to execute the necessary programme of gargantuan social and economic reconstruction. Pointing out that the object of the new cabinet was to bring about vast changes in the political and economic structure, Velid Ebuzziya Bey wrote that there were fundamental differences of opinion between the

Kemalists who formed the government and the liberal opposition in the method of carrying these schemes into execution. He suggested that this was the reason why Orbay had refused to participate in the new cabinet. 41 Velid Ebuzziya Bey further claimed that one additional reason for Orbay's nonparticipation in the new cabinet was his politically conservative outlook. 42

Supporting Orbay, Ahmed Agaoglu, who had resigned on August 11 from his post as Director-General of the Press as a consequence of a change in the cabinet, responded to Velid Ebuzziya Bey's editorial, which had portrayed Orbay as conservative, in the August 27 issue of Vatan with the assertion that Orbay was an ardent supporter of the liberal democratic regime, and that the abolition of the Sultanate and the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate had been achieved with his full cooperation. As such, Orbay could not be considered a conservative. 43

Along with Tevhid-i Efkar, Tanin strongly criticised the Fethi Okyar government. Not only was the government weak, it said, but both Fethi Okyar and his cabinet were already unpopular. 44 Yalcın's editorial in the columns of Tanin went on to state that the new cabinet had been composed of opportunists. 45 Mocking the Prime Minister's declaration that his new cabinet was a business cabinet, Yalcın wrote that, if the new ministers had been strangers, he would feel inclined to wait and see; but, having seen them at work, he had his unfavourable opinions already formed. 46

The liberal press was almost unanimous in stating that Okyar's opening speech was

44. Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), p.211.
45. Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), p.211.
altogether inadequate for the present circumstances. In general, Atatürk's indication that the army might have a major role in the new Turkish state only made the current government's apparent weakness all the more alarming. 47

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE ASSEMBLY having finished its study of the Lausanne Treaty, debate on the Assembly floor began on August 21. 48 The Assembly was filled to the limit of its capacity, and a considerable number of the public, including foreigners, were present when Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, made his introductory speech, which naturally was general and commendatory, and aimed chiefly at emphasizing the fact Turkey was now on a par with the great European Powers. At the beginning of his speech, Tengirsenk had congratulated İnönü on his achievement, but towards the close he turned towards Atatürk with a theatrical gesture, and said that the Treaty was entirely his work, a statement which was received with loud cheers. Atatürk, on his part, did not even make the most formal protest against this flattery. 49

The subsequent debate showed a certain amount of discontent, especially with the southern frontiers, and the criticisms of Niyazi Ramazanoglu, deputy for Mersin, were so violent that Colonel Mougins, the French representative at Ankara, expressed his regrets at hearing such a speech. Ramazanoglu complained of the loss of territory and the non-fulfilment in its entirety of the National Pact, and expressed the view that the unsatisfactory arrangements made for Turks remaining on French soil would prevent his voting for the Treaty. 50 Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver, Kemalist deputy for Istanbul and a staunch

47. F.O.424/258, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 21, 1923 [p.156].
supporter of Atatürk, made a similar criticism by declaring that the position of the Turks in Antakya and Iskenderun was unenviable. He added that so long as the existing situation remained in the south, the era of peace and tranquillity would not be free from danger.  

Yahya Kemal Beyatli, another Kemalist deputy for Urfa, was even more threatening. He referred to the pertinacity with which the French had pursued the ideal of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine, and said that in the same way the Turks looked forward to the day when the Turkish flag would fly over the Turkish, Turcoman, and Kurdish villages on the other side of the southern frontier.  

So many deputys were anxious to take part in the debate on the Peace Treaty that İnönü was forced to postpone to August 23 his speech in which he would wind up the discussion. On the whole, the speeches on August 22 were more moderate than those of the first speakers, and even those who announced their intention to vote against the Treaty clothed their remarks in comparatively sober language.  

The most striking exception was Mustafa Necati [Ugural], Kemalist deputy for Izmir, who flung criticisms about in a spirit of wholesale and reckless condemnation. He complained that the Treaty was incomplete, because the questions of the Ottoman Debt and Mosul had been left undetermined, and he warned the whole world that in separating the question of Mosul from the Treaty the Allies would not obtain any advantage. On the question of the Ottoman Debt, he attacked its partition as illegal and unjust. He also cited various provisions which, in his eyes, constituted a continuation of the Capitulations.  

Süleyman Sirri Bey, deputy for Istanbul, also criticised the line of the frontiers in the west and south, but it was noticeable that he employed polite language in speaking of

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the British and French. His reference in the western frontier was less satisfactory.\footnote{55} 

The probable official reply to this and other criticisms was clear from the speech of Tevfik Rüsdü Aras, Kemalist deputy for Izmir and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who declared that "as regards the frontiers of Thrace, Turkey, in pursuing the political aim of being an element of peace and concord in the Balkans, considered it a happy event that a zone mutually demilitarized should be formed". As regards the payment of the Ottoman Debt, Aras said payment would be made neither in gold nor in sterling. As for the frontier of Iraq, he said that the problem would be solved in a pacific manner with the British Government.\footnote{56}

Following the debate in the Assembly, İnönü spoke. At pains to portray the Unionist regime in the worst light possible, İnönü distorted historical facts, and made a contrast between the policy of the Ottoman Empire and the Ankara Government, when he claimed that, whereas the Empire was conducted on the principle of absolutism at home coupled with unlimited confidence in some foreign Power or other, the Ankara Government aimed at giving the people as large control as possible over their own affairs, and in their relations with foreign Powers at the taking up of a firm and dignified attitude.\footnote{57}

Primarily designed as a dialectical defence of the Lausanne Peace Treaty against violent criticism on the part of a few members of the Assembly, it contained a reasoned account of the difficulties encountered by the Turkish delegation in its struggle against the serried forces of Europe, and a tacit recognition of the relative weakness of Turkey. Self-congratulatory in tone, İnönü’s speech was also unashamed in its praise for Atatürk. The speech, however, betrayed a sound comprehension of the realities of Turkey's international

\footnote{55} "Turkish Peace Ratified: Angora Assembly Decision: Sharp Criticisms", \textit{The Times}, August 24, 1923, p.8; and, Mahmut Goloğlu, \textit{Türkiye Cumhuriyeti}, 1923, p.270.


situation.  

İnönü ended his speech by replying in some detail to criticisms of the hostile deputies who were discontented with the frontiers, and declared that the arrangements made as to the western frontiers was a matter outside the National Pact. As regards Iraq, he laid emphasis upon the renewal of friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain, and expressed the hope that a satisfactory solution would eventually be achieved.  

After İnönü's speech, the Assembly ratified the Treaty on August 23 by two hundred and thirteen votes out of two hundred and twenty-seven. Oddly enough, the fourteen deputies who voted against the Treaty were all Kemalist sycophants, who, doubtless, had been ordered to vote against the Treaty on Atatürk's orders. It was not by coincidence that most of the fourteen Kemalist deputies represented border provinces in the southeast and the west. The overwhelming majority by which the Treaty was ratified emphasised the excellence of party discipline, but, however great might be the unanimity on this cardinal point in foreign affairs, the course of internal affairs gave everyone much food for thought. The divergence of views between the out-and-out Kemalists, the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the old conservatives on such questions as the separation of the sultanate from the caliphate, the situation of the capital, the policy to be pursued towards the Soviet Union, and the settlement of the financial

60. "The Turkish Peace: İsmet's Defence of Treaty", The Times, August 25, 1923, p.8; and, Mahmut Gologlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1923, p.275. The Times of August 24 reported that the Treaty was ratified by two hundred and fifteen votes out of two hundred and thirty-five ("Turkish Peace Ratified: Angora Assembly Decision: Sharp Criticisms", The Times, August 24, 1923, p.8); and, Le Temps of August 25 stated that the total number of votes cast was two hundred and twenty-five ("Ratification du Traité de Lausanne à Angora", Le Temps, August 25, 1923, p.2).  
situation of the ex-officials and reserve officers, showed no sign of being healed. 62

Additionally, liberal deputies as well as the independent press at Istanbul were worried about the conduct of business in the Assembly. Kemalist regimentation was criticised in these circles which complained that the procedure adopted was very similar to that of the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid. If, it was said, important measures were not introduced into the Assembly until they had been thrashed out in secret sessions of the People's Party, the country would soon realize that it was being governed by a caucus, and the general public would not have the means of knowing after what discussions and what objections by which deputies the measures were presented in their final form to the Assembly. According to the liberals' viewpoint, the proceedings of the Assembly would tend, therefore, to become unreal and the public would lose the educative value of open and genuine debates. 63

The almost open defection of Rauf Orbay was regarded as extremely significant. There was also growing uneasiness of enlightened Turkish opinion in Istanbul as to the economic fate of the city, and the growing conviction, which was finding its way into print, that the real touchstone of the settlement of Turkey's future was the debt settlement. In addition, the disaffection of the demobilised officers' associations who were actively preaching opposition to Atatürk at numerous important centres in Anatolia, such as Izmir, Konya, and Kayseri, created yet an additional problem to the Kemalist government. 64

The press showed a noticeable reticence in commenting on the action of the government in dealing with the brigands infesting much of western Anatolia. This silence was partly due to recognition of the fact that much of the brigandage was the direct outcome of the existing social and economic conditions. Many believed that ex-officers, for example, had taken a life of brigandage owing to the lack of means of gaining an honest

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liveliood. Tanin boldly suggested that the presence among the bands of at least one former deputy was the direct consequence of the recent packed election.65 The name of the former deputy which Yalcin referred to in his Tanin editorial was Cerkes Resid, the elder brother of Cerkes Edhem. He was deputy for Saruhan in both the last Chamber of Deputies, and the first Assembly at Ankara. At one time a classmate of Enver Pasha at the Military Academy, Cerkes Resid, along with his younger brother Cerkes Edhem, was among the most prominent of those who fought against Kemalist dictation. It might therefore be easily understood that in undertaking to stamp out brigandage, Okyar had undertaken a very difficult task, and one which might call for a distinctly invidious exercise of firmness and ingratitude.66 Some doubts were expressed as to whether the peasants would consent to surrender their arms in accordance with the government's orders, owing to the general distrust of the ability of the government to suppress the brigands, and it was argued that the only effect of this might be to increase the number of brigands.67 Fethi Okyar, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior, seemed, therefore, to be squarely faced with the necessity of making good his words either to restore the security of the country or resign.68

The long expected declaration of policy by the new government was at length read on September 5 by Fethi Okyar. The main points on which the government proposed to concentrate were the reform of the finances, the question of public security, the improvement of the situation of government officials, and the reorganisation of public instruction. The program also stated that agricultural development was to be encouraged by state aid to the Ziraat Bankasi, and by reductions in the tithe rates and general economic

progress by the despatch of students to Europe and by the more equitable levy of the temettü, or income tax.  

69. The most striking omission was the absence of any reference to those constitutional reforms of which so much was heard before the meeting of the Assembly.  

ON SEPTEMBER 9, the People's Party's programme was ratified, and, on September 11, the party was officially established. Atatürk was elected President of the newly established People's Party; Deputy-President was İsmet İnönü. Fethi Okyar was elected the party group leader in the Assembly, and Ali Çetinkaya, deputy for Afyon Karahisar, and Münir Cagil, deputy for Corum, were elected Vice-Presidents. Members of the executive council of the parliamentary group were Ahmed Mahir Bey, deputy for Kastamonu, Ali Riza Bey, deputy for Kastamonu, Hakkı Ungan, deputy for Van, Refik Koraltan, deputy for Konya, Rüşdü Pasha, deputy for Erzurum, Galib Bey, deputy for Nigde, İhsan Eryavuz, deputy for Çebelibereket, and Mustafa Necati [Ugural], deputy for İzmir. The position of Secretary-General was given to Receb Peker, a trusted Kemalist officer and deputy for Kütahya. Other members elected to the executive council of the party were Sabit Sagirolu, deputy for Erzincan, Mahmud Celal Bayar, deputy for İzmir, Cemil Uybadin, deputy for Tekirdağ, Refik Saydam, deputy for İstanbul, Safvet Arikân, deputy for Kocaeli, Münir Hüsrev Göle, deputy for Erzurum, Kazım Hüsnü Bey, deputy for Konya, and Zülfü Tigrel, deputy for Diyarbakır.  

ON GENERAL POLITICAL MATTERS there was nothing obvious happening, but much was


going on beneath the surface. Interest chiefly centred in a vigorous press discussion on the functions of a political opposition. Liberal journalists maintained that criticism of the government and its doings was a legitimate function of the people in whom the sovereignty lay and was not to be confounded with that heinous but ill-defined crime of lèse patrie. *Iléri*, which was a government newspaper, had been writing obviously inspired articles, which conveyed the implication that the government was alarmed at the strength of the opposition in the country. It confessed that the government had officially suppressed the opposition in the Assembly in order that the whole body might have its hands free to devote itself to securing practical advantages for the country. *Iléri* inveighed against the ex-functionaries and ex-officers who were embarrassing the Assembly by their attempts to create fresh difficulties for the country.  

Growing dissatisfaction with the Kemalist government was causing a flood of underground rumours concerning the instability of the Okyar cabinet and the possibility of an internal convulsion. Without paying too much heed to such opinions and rumours, which were usually spread with an ulterior motive, independent observers nevertheless did notice a very considerable weakening of the government’s hold over the country, and internal developments seemed likely to appear much sooner than at one time appeared possible.  

There were many reasons for thinking that an internal upheaval was by no means a remote possibility. The exacerbated tone of disapproval, and the caustic criticism of any sin of commission or omission of the government were a notable feature in the Istanbul press, with the sole exception of *Iléri*, which was waging an uphill battle on behalf of the government. The main causes of discontent were the inactivity of the government in dealing with the brigandage evil, the pitiable condition of ex-officers and discharged public

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servants, the government's policy in sanctioning the establishment of educational institutions in Ankara and elsewhere, while the existing facilities in Istanbul were starved by want of funds and hampered by maladministration. There were also sarcastic references made to the Finance Minister's budget statement, which talked of a surplus of about fifteen million liras.\textsuperscript{75}

Although the cabinet was only six weeks old, by late September rumours spread around that there was serious dissension within the government. Ever since the cabinet's formation, Hasan Fehmi Atac, Minister of Finance, had been expected to resign. Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, Minister of Economy, had misgivings about his health, and was expected to be replaced by Hasan Saka. Ismail Safa Özler, Minister of Public Education, was annoyed about the conduct of affairs, and rumours were insistent that he would be succeeded by Sükrü [Kaya?]. Seyyid Bey, Minister of Justice who was a prominent Unionist before the war, expressed his wish to resume his professional career at the Istanbul University, and the press speculated that Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk would succeed him.\textsuperscript{76}

Meanwhile, Musa Kazim [Göksu], Minister of Sharia, had already resigned on August 30 on theological grounds.\textsuperscript{77} On September 24, it was reported that several changes were being made in the cabinet, that Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, Minister of Economy, who had been keenly attacked in the Assembly, was likely to be succeeded by Hasan Fehmi Atac, a member of the Lausanne delegation and Minister of Finance. Change was also expected in the Ministry of the Interior. By late September, Fethi Okyar, who held that ministerial post in addition to his premiership, was being strongly criticised in the columns of Tanin by Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, who reproached Okyar with not having kept

\textsuperscript{75} "Causes of Discontent", The Near East, October 4, 1923, p.347.
\textsuperscript{76} "The Government", The Near East, October 4, 1923, p.346.
\textsuperscript{77} "Turkish "Dry" Regime: Minister Resigns", The Times, August 31, 1923, p.7; and, "The Government", The Near East, October 4, 1923, p.346. The reason of his resignation was a difference of opinion over the "dry" regime, which he wanted to have maintained, whereas the government was unwilling to sacrifice the revenue derived from the sales of alcohol, and was also influenced by the vine-growers, who had presented a petition pointing out that they would be ruined ("Turkish "Dry" Regime: Minister Resigns", The Times, August 31, 1923, p.7).
his promise either to stamp out brigandage or resign altogether from the cabinet.\textsuperscript{78} Okyar, on pressure from the opposition, felt obliged to express his desire of devoting himself to the question of the exchange of populations, and handing over his task as Minister of the Interior to Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda, Kemalist governor of İzmir.\textsuperscript{79}

DURING THE DAYS immediately following Atatürk's inaugural speech of August 13 in the Assembly, the question of constitutional arrangement came to the fore. The Ankara government as well as the Basic Law of 1921 was essentially provisional, and, therefore, required legal attention so as to give it permanence. As the general elections had been such a farce, and had returned almost only the Kemalist supporters of the Defence of Rights Association to the Assembly, liberal opposition was justifiably worried about further Kemalist intrigues. In order to prevent a Kemalist \textit{fait accompli}, the liberals, represented by members of the Committee of Union and Progress and most of the Istanbul press, opened a public debate on the constitutional question.

Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın started the debate in his editorial column of the August 17 issue of \textit{Tanin}. He pointed out that the existing constitutional arrangements provided for an Assembly which embodied \textit{both} the legislative \textit{and} the executive functions. The Assembly was therefore directly involved in the executive process. This arrangement had been preferred in the past three years so as to allow the deputies to fully participate in the administration. However, as Yalcın aptly observed, this had created a unique situation where the Council of Ministers, because of its members being individually elected and confirmed by the full Assembly, did not have the nature of a coherent cabinet, and more than that, did not have collective responsibility. In short, because of its special nature, the Council of Ministers could not be held responsible for its actions in the strict sense of the

\textsuperscript{78} "Mustapha Kemal's Ambitions: A Turkish Republic", \textit{The Times}, September 25, 1923, p.9.
Arguing that these arrangements could not be carried on under a permanently established regime, he stated that the executive had to have responsibility. As most agreed on this point, the question that remained was the constitutional form of this responsibility being instituted. Here, Yalcin vehemently objected to the Kemalist plans for the creation of a Supreme Council to indirectly check the actions of the Council of Ministers by way of empowering this body to investigate the political behaviors of the deputies. Of course, the idea behind this Kemalist plan was to keep deputies under stricter Kemalist control. Yalcin rightly observed that such a supervising body would inevitably create more problems than it could possibly solve, and would most likely damage the political process by exerting too much power over the elected representatives of the people.

Having ruled out this alternative for creating political responsibility, Yalcin noted that the best alternative would be to leave the Assembly only as a legislative body, stripping it of its executive functions. This would more readily conform to the concept of a parliamentary regime than any other conceivable arrangement. According to Yalcin, stripping the Assembly of its executive functions would also force deputies to be more sensitive to public opinion. If the deputies concentrated executive powers in their hands as well, there was the strong likelihood that they could legislate as well as rule the way they wished, without any constitutional check or restriction. Under these circumstances, deputies would certainly abuse the system so that general elections, which was supposed to be a test for their popularity with the public at large, could be easily subverted from its intended function and become meaningless.


82. Hüseyin Cahid [Yalcin], "Lüzumlu Tadilat", Tanin, August 17, 1339/1923, reproduced in full in Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, "Yalcin'in Elli Yıllık Hâirları: Atatürk Devri: 32", Halkci, April 21, 1955,
On the question of the Assembly itself, there was the debate on the length of its term. As stated in the Basic Law of 1921, the length of the Assembly was two years. Yalcin admitted that this was too short a period, and expressed his willingness to extend it to four years. He was, however, opposed to a term longer than that. He tried to preempt the likely Kemalist designs for extending the term of the Assembly for more than four years by ridiculing, in a clever piece of journalism, those who might argue to the contrary. Citing the existence of certain sycophants as well as certain Kemalist newspapers who would definitely express joyful approval at a Kemalist move to lengthen the term of the Assembly, Yalcin implicitly warned his readers that a lack of decisiveness at this juncture on the part of the citizens might prove to be fatal for the future of liberal democracy in Turkey.\footnote{83}

Yalcin also warned the public of the dangers of a lack of checks and balances exerted upon the legislative. Conceivably, the Assembly could enact any piece of legislation it desired. The Basic Law of 1921 was silent on this issue. There was neither a Supreme Court nor any other judicial body where the constitutionality of laws or other legislative decisions could be contested. Yalcin argued that while the executive branch was put under the strictest of checks and balances in all liberal democracies, it would be totally inconceivable that the legislative be left without any superior judicial control. So, he also expressed hope that when constitutional amendments came up for discussion in the Assembly, deputies would be alert to this fact and make the necessary arrangements, amending the Constitution so as to make it conform to liberal democratic principles.\footnote{84}

A special committee of the People's Party, with Ziya Gökalp, a moderate Kemalist deputy for Diyarbakır, as one of its members, was appointed early in September to prepare


the draft of a new constitution. One point seemed to be decided, namely, that the government would be both in name and in form republican. However, discussion was rife on the question of the title and attributes of the President, or the Head of the State, concerning the length of his term of office and his relations with the Assembly and individual political parties. The main object appeared to be the appointment of Atatürk to a permanent position outside the vicissitudes of party changes. But, judging by the inspired comments of well-informed Kemalist newspapers, the project did not quite satisfy this principle. The liberal press, on the other hand, was critical, as the project had gone too far and combined the offices of President of the Republic with that of President of the Assembly.

Another constitutional principle which appeared to be envisaged in the proposed modifications was the separation of the legislative and executive functions which were combined in the Assembly to the obvious detriment of "efficient" government. The Kemalist proposals provided that the Assembly would sit for only five months in the year with purely legislative functions, and that the executive would be under the control of ministers responsible to the prime minister and the Assembly. During the Assembly's vacations, the control of the executive would be in the hands of a kind of enlarged cabinet, consisting of the ministers reinforced by the presidents and vice-presidents of the Assembly, plus certain parliamentary commissions.

On September 11, Atatürk consulted Falih Rifki Atay, Mehmed Sabri Toprak, and Yunus Nadi Abalioglu on issues of constitutional change, especially on the question of the republic, the term of office for the presidency, and the dissolution of the Assembly. Toprak was hesitant to give the President the right to dissolve the Assembly; he cited the

unfortunate examples of the 1908-1918 period.\textsuperscript{88}

Within less than two weeks, however, dissension among the members brought the work of the special committee to a standstill, with its assignment still officially incomplete.\textsuperscript{89} The proposed changes in the Constitution had split the Assembly in two. The Kemalist majority was in favour of Atatürk's assumption of the title of Head of State and his simultaneous retention of the presidencies of the Assembly and the People's Party.\textsuperscript{90} However, they were at the same time aware that Atatürk's differences with Orbay and other liberals turned on this very issue of his intention of being both President of the Republic and head of the party. They were uncertain whether the move to a republican form of government would include an attempt to placate the opposition.\textsuperscript{91} In a futile attempt to convince the liberals of the sincerity of their proposals, some Kemalists even made the quite absurd argument that in this way it would be easier to exercise some measure of control over Atatürk's power! On its part, the liberal opposition wished Atatürk to take the title of President of the Republic and withdraw from membership in both the Assembly and the People's Party. The President could, however, have the right to nominate a prime minister, who would then choose his cabinet from among the members of the Assembly or even outside of that body.\textsuperscript{92}

BECAUSE HIS APPEAL TO THE ARMY had largely been successful, Atatürk now turned to the issue of constitutional reform —in his own way. In an interview with the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna, Atatürk revealed his intention of establishing a republic.\textsuperscript{93} After pointing out that under the existing Constitution the legislative and executive powers were

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Falih Rifki Atay, Cankaya, Second Edition, pp.373-375.
\item \textsuperscript{89} RG 165 MID 2657-T-452, p.26, February 4, 1926, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.241.
\item \textsuperscript{90} "Mustapha Kemal's Title: Question of Powers", The Times, October 2, 1923, p.11.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.242n.
\item \textsuperscript{92} "Mustapha Kemal's Title: Question of Powers", The Times, October 2, 1923, p.11.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), pp.269-270.
\end{enumerate}
concentrated in the Assembly, which was "the sole and true representative of the nation", Atatürk continued to say that there was no other word in the dictionaries than "republic" to define what resembled this constitutional arrangement. However, he added that the constitutional development of Turkey had not yet been finished. He informed the Neue Freie Presse correspondent that there would be further modifications, which would tend towards the principles governing a republic. According to Atatürk, there would be in Turkey a democratic republic, even more pronounced perhaps than the existing one. He ended his statement by adding that its principles would not differ in any way from those obtaining in the republics of the West. 94

Atatürk’s statement caused considerable excitement in Istanbul, where especially his last words aroused most suspicion. If it was said that Turkey was to follow exactly the model of ordinary constitutional republics, this could only mean that Atatürk intended to make himself President of the Turkish Republic. Liberal opposition expressed fears that this might only be an intermediate step, such as that taken by Louis Napoleon in December, 1848. Since the interview had not appeared in any of the Turkish newspapers and the journalists had only private information as to the nature of the statement, the press had not had time for editorial comment on September 24, the day the news spread around. However, the growing frankness of its attacks on the government, and the prominence given to the reported conversation, the terms of which had not been denied, suggested that, if views expressed in private were any criterion, this criticism would be quite animated. 95

Atatürk’s hint of the coming proclamation of a Turkish Republic formed the principal topic of conversation and aroused the keenest interest in the liberal Istanbul press on September 25. It expressed considerable astonishment that news of such transcendent national importance should have been given first to a foreign journalist. Additionally, it was plausibly argued that if Atatürk had seen fit to entrust his views to the Turkish press it

would have been easier to understand what exactly he meant by his phrase "People's Republic of Turkey." In addition, the contemplation of a major constitutional change without even the semblance of discussion, drew severe criticism. The Vatan of September 25 attacked the way the Kemalist government generally operated: in closed sessions and without free and open debate on important issues.

There were, of course, certain sycophants who blindly applauded the proposed change just as lightheartedly as they had accepted the abolition of the Sultanate and the other legislation of November 1, 1922, but the majority of the press was frankly disturbed and anxiously inquired whither the country was being led. It was pointed out that the existing Assembly had been elected on the programme of acceptance of the Nine Principles of the People's Party, and the deputies were reminded that if such radical changes were to be made they should be enacted not by this Assembly but by a Constituent Assembly.

Again, those sycophants who had always predicted that the investiture of the Assembly with full executive and administrative powers would prove unworkable in practice were naturally jubilant at this confession by Atatürk and other Kemalists at Ankara that they were right, and several Kemalist Istanbul newspapers of September 25 recalled to their readers that when they had argued that matters had to eventually come to the proclamation of a Republic they had been ordered to keep silent.

It was still too soon to foresee how the country would take this change in the Constitution, but there was, at any rate, a certain feeling of relief that an attempt was being made to put an end to the existing anomalous situation. This view was most clearly expressed in Yalcin's editorial in the September 25 issue of Tanin, in the course of which he expressed satisfaction that Atatürk had at last recognised the advantage of putting

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97. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gürdüklerim ve Gecirdüklerim, 3, p.76.
himself above party bickerings and the uncertainties attaching to the position of a mere party leader. Pointing out the fact that he himself had labelled the existing political arrangement as conforming to the principles of a republic in his editorials of November, 1922 [?] for which he had immediately been reprimanded, Yalcin cited Atatürk's interview with the Neue Freie Presse correspondent, and congratulated him for his admission at last that the form of government fell in with republican principles. Yalcin added that the existing uncertainty as to the exact constitutional arrangement would thus be resolved. Again, Yalcin was at his best in disguised mockery. Expecting that Atatürk would be the President of the Republic and consequently relinquish the leadership of the People's Party, he regarded this development as beneficial to all the parties who were concerned with the establishment of liberal democracy, as, Yalcin went on, his being at the head of the People's Party had created the awkward impression that he represented not the whole of the Turkish nation but only the adherents of the People's Party. In a satirical vein, Yalcin also welcomed the new development, as it would save Atatürk from political bickering which might diminish his popularity. As President, however, his insularity from daily politics would guarantee him that his past services for the country would not be forgotten.  

Although Yalcin outwardly professed joy at the prospect that Atatürk by becoming President might long continue to render services to his country, it was hard not to see that his editorial was really a masterpiece of irony. 

Whether this judgment be correct or not, there were many who hoped that with Atatürk once President of the Republic he would gradually lose grip on the party machinery and be thrust into the background. Consequently, these liberal opponents of Atatürk argued that the People's Party would not be able to pack the next general election as those the recent general election had been packed, and power would again pass to the Committee of  


Union and Progress, the adherents of which openly said that they had been gaining ground, especially in Istanbul. It was, however, impossible not to suppose that this eventuality had been foreseen by Atatürk, and, therefore, one understood the nervous hints in liberal newspapers that there was no guarantee that the proposed change would be the last, and that when once sovereignty was taken out of the hands of the people, as represented by the Assembly, a precedent would have been set for gradually accumulating power in the hands of one man. 103

The agitation caused by the proposed changes in the Constitution showed no signs of diminishing in spite of various Kemalist attempts to calm public opinion by statements that the sovereignty of the people would remain virtually intact. According to reports, however, the tendency was rather in the opposite direction. Among the proposals mentioned on September 26 were schemes for the institution of a Council of State, having practically the powers of a Senate, and also of a Committee of Control, the members of which would be nominated by the President of the Republic. 104

In these circumstances, it was intelligible that certain liberal newspapers, such, for example, as Tevhid-i Efkar, should continue to express great nervousness. The September 26 issue of Tevhid-i Efkar demanded further details as to the duration of power of the future President, which sometimes was said to be going to last for four years, like that of the Assembly itself, sometimes for six years, while there were other rumours that Atatürk would be elected President for life. Again, it was still unknown whether Atatürk, who, it was expected, would remain President of the Assembly, would also retain the presidency of the People's Party, and thus completely stultify any power which should properly be exercised by the Prime Minister of a nominally responsible cabinet. 105

In the September 27 issue of Vatan, Yalman argued that if there were to be a

Republic, the President should be above daily politics and, as such, he should not be actively involved with a political party. Yalman expressed the fear shared in liberal circles that Atatürk's position as President of the People's Party could be a tremendous threat to the continuation of a liberal democratic regime in Turkey. Sooner or later, his totalitarian tendencies would have to fully express themselves. 106

Yalçın also continued to express his concerns on the same issue in his Tanin editorial of September 27. He openly declared that it would be a tremendous mistake if Atatürk retained, as had been reported, the presidency of the Assembly after being elected President of the Republic. He wrote that the country would politically suffer in the event of Atatürk retaining also the People's Party's leadership in addition to the presidency of the Assembly and the presidency of the Republic. Considering the function of the presidency mainly on ceremonial lines, Yalçın went on to say that Atatürk's deputyship should cease with his election as President. This constitutional point accepted, Yalçın had no qualms on the term of the presidency; it could be as long as seven years. On other constitutional questions, Yalçın was equally outspoken. With respect to the Kemalist intention of creating a Council of State, Yalçın wondered whether this body would resemble a senate. Assuming that it would be similar in function to a senate, Yalçın registered the liberal objection that members to that body should be appointed by the cabinet and not by the President of the Republic, as the cabinet, and not the President, constituted the executive branch in a parliamentary regime. He cited the precedent that, during the constitutional monarchy between 1908 and 1918, members of the Senate were appointed not by the Sultan who was politically unaccountable but by the cabinet which was responsible to the parliament. In addition, Yalçın wrote that the envisaged rights of the President were too extensive, and, consequently, they had to be restricted as well, especially his right to dissolve the Assembly, and to veto legislation passed by that body. 107

106. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.78.
107. Tanin, September 27, 1339/1923, excerpted in Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Yalçın'ın Elli Yıllık
Yalman made a personal appeal to Atatürk in the form of an open letter published in the October 5 issue of Vatan. In it, he warned of the inherent danger to democracy the establishment of a single party system presented, criticised the Kemalists for giving Atatürk so much power, and reiterated his earlier assertion that the President should remain politically unaffiliated. The letter drew sharp response from the Kemalist press. Both Asım Us of Vakit and Suphi Nuri İleri of İleri attacked Yalman. Moreover, citing the examples of Mussolini in Italy and de Rivera in Spain, İleri, an ardent supporter of dictatorship, stated that Atatürk should immediately declare Turkey a republic, and install himself as its dictator.

İleri's open invitation for a Kemalist dictatorship was immediately rebuked in the liberal press. In the October 9 issue of Tanin, Yalçın squarely addressed the issue, stating that Turkish citizens had followed Atatürk during the past three years precisely because he had led the nation against the absolutist ambitions of Sultan Vahideddin. He warned Atatürk that if he declared himself dictator it would simply mean that his resistance against absolutism had been just a front to disguise his hunger for power. Reminding Atatürk that the main purpose of national resistance was to re-establish liberty in the country, Yalçın wrote that he would immediately lose the popularity he enjoyed up until now the moment people realised that he solely worked for the aggrandizement of his own power. Yalçın also took the opportunity to remind Atatürk that he did not enjoy unconditional support of the nation. Calling Atatürk's attention to the fact that he had been empowered by the nation, Yalçın pointed out that withdrawal of that support would leave him powerless, his only power base being adventurers and opportunists around him. He also reminded Atatürk that

Hatıraları: 35", Halkcı, April 24, 1955, p.4.
the Turkish nation would not put up with a power hungry dictator and resist such a move by every available means. Therefore, he advised Atatürk not to make any move in that direction. 111

These severe criticisms were part and parcel of a continuing frontal attack against Atatürk's dictatorial ambitions. Ever since the end of hostilities with the Greek military forces in western Anatolia in mid-1922, liberals had expressed their fears for such an eventuality. Now, with Atatürk's hardly subtle move in that direction, resistance to Kemalist dictatorship gained poignancy. Almost all of the independent newspapers joined in the condemnation of dictatorship. Ahmed Cevdet Bey of Ikdam, Ahmed Emin Yalman of Vatan, Velid Ebuzziya Bey of Tevhid-i Efskar, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin of Tanin, and Necmeddin Sadak of Aksam voiced their concerns for the future of the liberal democratic regime in Turkey. Despite continuous press criticism, especially those of Yalcin which increasingly irritated him, Atatürk, who had already made up his mind, proceeded with his plans for a military takeover. 112

RAUF ORBAY, having initially left Ankara for Sivas in early August, had appeared in Izmir which was one of the strongholds of Unionist opposition. There he openly resumed his friendship with prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, especially Rahmi Evrenos, the former Unionist governor of Aydin. 113 On September 9, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Vice-President of the Assembly and a Unionist sympathiser, arrived in Izmir at the head of an Assembly delegation to participate in the anniversary celebration of the city's liberation. He stayed in Izmir for several days, met with Orbay, and gave him a message from Atatürk. Now conciliatory, Atatürk offered him Cebesoy's position in the Assembly -

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113. RG 59 867.00/1737, p.3, October 15, 1923, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.238.
-which Orbay immediately refused. 114

The Committee of Union and Progress had for some time had its headquarters at Izmir. Renewed Unionist activity seemed to indicate the formulation of an active opposition. Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the most prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, went to Istanbul to contact certain ex-Kemalist ministers and others who were now ready to work against Atatürk. On September 16, he held a meeting, with Orbay's knowledge and consent, to coordinate opposition activity and draw up a common programme. As an incentive, he stated that the funds of the Committee of Union and Progress would be put at the disposal of this new group. After considerable discussion, those in attendance decided that the proposal deserved further examination, and that, if common ground for cooperation could be found, the local opposition groups would give their support. In the meantime, Dr. Nazim Bey remained in Istanbul, and it was not inconceivable that a preemptive "counter-coup" was at least under consideration, particularly in view of the fact that the Caliph, an ardent partisan of the Committee of Union and Progress, had arrived in Istanbul along with several members of the former Unionist Government and Refet Bele Pasha, whose loyalty to Atatürk could no longer be relied upon. 115

Criticism of the manner in which the general elections had been carried out continued. After his meeting with Cebesoy, Orbay was approached by several Kemalist emissaries who urged him to join the government, but on each occasion the ex-President of the Council of Ministers advised the dissolution of the Assembly and the holding of fresh elections at which the people could be at liberty to vote for the candidates of their choice. Although Refet Bele Pasha, and even Ismet İnönü, were of the same opinion, Atatürk

115. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, September 25, 1923 [p.4].
showed no sign of accepting their advice.\footnote{116}

Undoubtedly bolder, the opposition groups remained cautious. In a shroud of mystery, Orbay left Izmir for Istanbul, to meet with Refet Bele Pasha. Both were closely watched by Kemalist agents. Despite the fact that Orbay was only passing through on his way to Ankara, and that he did not have any official title, he was, nevertheless, received by leading local officials at Istanbul.\footnote{117} Meanwhile, rumours about cooperation between Atatürk and the remaining leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, with whom Orbay was closely in touch, continued to circulate.\footnote{118}

A Kemalist deputy and brother of İleri’s publisher, Celal Nuri İleri wrote an article which appeared in the İleri of October 11. In the article, he claimed to have resolved the question of the Committee of Union and Progress: there was no question but that the Unionists sought a return to power, and were using several newspapers as the instruments of their craze.\footnote{119} This piece of demagogic argument was geared towards discrediting both the Unionist leadership and the liberal newspapers by portraying them as if they were engaged in illegal activity. He also attacked multi-party politics as being ruinous for the country. Although in appearance the article simply attacked the Committee of Union and Progress, in reality, it aimed to defame all political parties.\footnote{120}

In a deliberate attempt to confuse the public mind, Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, Kemalist deputy for Mentese and editor-in-chief of Yeni Gün, seemingly came to the defence of the Committee of Union and Progress in the October 12 issue. Although it no longer existed as a political party, he praised the Unionists for their past contributions to the renovation of

\footnote{116. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 2, 1923 [pp.10-11]; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.244.}
\footnote{117. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 17, 1923 [p.27].}
\footnote{118. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 17, 1923 [p.27].}
\footnote{119. Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), p.346.}
\footnote{120. al-Ahram, November 5, 1923, quoted in Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), p.406.}
Turkey, adding that he regarded Atatürk as "the first and greatest of Unionists". 121

This statement was ill-received, both by Unionists, led by Yalçın in his Tanin editorials, and by hard-core members of the People's Party. The latter declared that their programme was clearly incompatible with the Unionist agenda. After all, Atatürk had declared: "If the Unionists raise their heads, I'll break them". 122

The motives of Yeni Gün were hard to fathom. According to some, Atatürk was anxious to enlist the support of the Committee of Union and Progress, the strength of which had been rapidly growing. Others saw therein a manoeuvre intended to split the ranks of the Unionists. 123 According to Yalman, Abalioglu had published this statement in order to confuse the large section of the population sympathetic to the Committee of Union and Progress. According to Abalioglu, People's Party was the natural home of true Unionists, and there was no need for Unionists to look for a party separate from the People's Party. 124

There was little doubt that the problem of amending the Constitution caused considerable difficulty, and even threatened to provoke a serious cleavage in the Assembly. Though many had expected the amendments to have been already submitted to the Assembly and Atatürk officially elected President of the Republic, the official Anatolian Agency now announced that everything hitherto published on this subject had been mere supposition and that the amendments were still in the hands of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution. The Committee had met frequently but was unable to decide on the final form of certain paragraphs which were of capital importance to the nature of the

political regime to be established. 125

It was not only clear that dissatisfaction was becoming more articulate, but increasingly likely that open opposition in the Assembly would soon make its appearance. Theoretically, this party would be unwilling to grant over-extensive powers to the President of the Republic, and reports indicated that Atatürk, in a move to placate opposition, had decided not to aim for the presidency, and that the position might be offered either to Marshal Fevzi Cakmak Pasha or Ismet Inönü Pasha. 126 At this point, İnönü had started to gauge Kemalist opinion to see whether the presidency of Marshal Fevzi Cakmak would be acceptable to the lukewarm Kemalist supporters within the party. 127 Meanwhile, the liberal press continued suggesting that Atatürk could better serve his country by becoming a prime minister. Clearly, the possibility that the powers of the President might be jealously limited was very real. But Atatürk's ascendance to power was hardly over. Rumours of Atatürk's bid for prime minister indicated that the current prime minister, Fethi Okyar, had no strong hold on the imagination of the country, and would not represent a serious obstacle. 128

In October, a by-election was held in Izmir for the seat left vacant by Atatürk's resignation from his deputyship there, retaining only the one for Ankara. The strongest candidate was the former governor of Aydın and a prominent Unionist, Rahmi Evrenos. Through intimidation and corruption, his chances for success were eliminated, and the Kemalist candidate, Hamdi Aksoy, formerly deputy for Bilecik, was declared the winner. 129 This event highlighted the relative strengths of the two contending groups. That the Kemalists clearly had no popular support to win an honestly contested election

125. "Mustapha Kemal's Future: President or Premier", The Times, October 19, 1923, p.11.
126. "Mustapha Kemal's Future: President or Premier", The Times, October 19, 1923, p.11. See also, Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, 3, p.1257, where he recounts a private meeting at the residence of Tevfik Rüştü Aras around October 18, during which Atatürk categorically denied that he had any intentions of becoming President.
128. "Mustapha Kemal's Future: President or Premier", The Times, October 19, 1923, p.11.
129. RG 59 867.00/1737, pp.2-3, October 15, 1923, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.245.
worried most of the Kemalists.  

BY-PASSING THE USUAL PROCEDURE established by the Assembly, the Kemalists prepared for constitutional changes paving the way for dictatorship in secrecy. Vatan, however, obtained transcripts of their proposals and on October 22 began to publish these. Even the majority of the Kemalist deputies knew nothing of the proposed changes until the first installment of the one hundred twelve articles appeared in Vatan. Celal Nuri Ileri, who was responsible for the draft, reportedly attempted to resign upon these revelations, but Kemalists denied the existence of the proposed constitutional amendments and alleged that what had been printed in the liberal press was fabrication.

Despite denials, however, Kemalist preparations for the establishment of dictatorship was complete by the third week of October. The plan for an artificial governmental crisis was put into execution on October 21 [?]. Citing his heavy workload, Fethi Okyar requested that he be relieved of either the premiership or the portfolio of the Minister of the Interior. He was reportedly urged to retain the former.

In an attempt to pacify the army, which still contained high ranking and influential pashas opposed to Atatürk's dictatorial ambitions, Atatürk declared that the cabinet's original proposal for army pay increase was inadequate, and he insisted on modifications. It was clear, for the moment, that the needs of the Budget would be subordinate to the needs for conciliation with the army, and that Atatürk stood firmly on the side of the military, against the Assembly. Already, high ranking officers were unhappy with the

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130. An unidentified member of the Kemalist leadership to American Vice-Consul Maynard B. Barnes, RG 165 MID 2657-T-328, Mr. Barnes to Admiral Bristol, October 20, 1923, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.248.
current regime and the proposed changes, but their grievance centered around issues of
general policy and not on monetary matters. This latest move was designed to placate the
junior officer corps whose disaffection and complaints had mostly to do with money,
having not been paid for the past three or four months. Thus, when, as a result of
demobilisation and economisation measures, some six thousand officers were transferred
from the regular army to reserve officer status, discontent among those who remained on
active duty was immediately offset by a pay increase of roughly fifty percent. 135

In a meeting of the People's Party on October 25, a group of opposition deputies
nominated Rauf Orbay, deputy for Istanbul, and Sabit Sagainoglu, deputy for Erzincan,
candidates for the posts of Vice-President of the Assembly and Minister of the Interior,
respectively. 136 Atatürk was personally opposed to both of these nominations. 137 Fethi
Okyar immediately countered by nominating Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, deputy for Sinop,
and Ahmed Ferid Tek, deputy for Kütahya. In a party meeting that following day,
however, Orbay and Sagainoglu were elected as the official party nominees. 138 Atatürk
declared that this constituted a vote of no confidence. He called the members of the Okyar
Cabinet to Cankaya and, invoking the previously nonexistent principle of collective
responsibility, demanded their resignation en bloc and a promise from each not to serve if
separately elected. 139 The following day, on October 26, at a party meeting presided over
by Atatürk, Okyar's entire cabinet dutifully submitted their pro forma resignation, "in order
to make way for the formation of a cabinet having the confidence and support of the

135. Düşür, Kanun #355, October 18, 1923; Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic:
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.229.
136. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.265; Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to
Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.253; and, Cemal
Kutay, Fethi Okyar: Üc Devirdi Bir Adam, p.341.
137. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.264.
138. Avni Dogan, Kurulus, Kurulus ve Sonrası, p.139; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From
Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, pp.253-
254.
139. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.265.
Assembly in every respect."  

The cabinet's resignation was announced in the Assembly that same day. In his resignation letter, Fethi Okyar stated that only through a strong Council of Ministers with the Assembly's full support, could the government deal with the problems Turkey faced both at home and abroad. Consequently, the cabinet had resigned in order to force the formation of such a cabinet. Thus, by design, resignation of the cabinet resulted in a deadlock, and, by deft handling, provided Atatürk with the awaited opportunity for a settlement of the much-discussed constitutional question.

According to Falih Rifki Atay, a trusted member of Atatürk's inner circle, Atatürk had, in fact, provoked the irreconcilable split between the Kemalists and the opposition on the issue of constitutional change, and that it was the power struggle which followed that had brought deadlock and, finally, crisis. Having forced the Okyar Cabinet to resign and having ordered most of the eligible candidates for ministerial position not to accept any cabinet offer, Atatürk had effectively made the formation of a new cabinet impossible. Theoretically, there were now two choices: support Atatürk, or to topple him --but clearly the latter was not possible.

In an article in the Vatan of October 27, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, who had previously been publicly silent, pointedly called attention to the fact that any change in the form of government or the constitution would require at least a two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly.

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142. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 30, 1923 [p.36].
145. Feridun Kandemir, Siyasi Darginliklar, 2, p.80; and, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2,
On October 28, a preliminary meeting of the People's Party was held to prepare for the Assembly proceedings of the following day. When the government fell, it seemed that the Kemalist choice for the premiership would be either İsmet İnönü or Fevzi Cakmak. Unanimity, however, was impossible, and an alternative cabinet was proposed by the opposition with Ali Fuad Cebesoy as president of the Council of Ministers, Rauf Orbay as Vice-President of the Assembly, Adnan Adivar as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Celal Bayar as Minister of the Economy. It was clear, however, that none of the ex-ministers would join such a cabinet, and the difficult task of preparing a final list was delegated to a committee which was instructed to make its report at a full meeting of the party on the morning of October 29. On the night of October 28, Atatürk invited some members of the Kemalist clique, Kemalettin Sami Gökçen Pasha, deputy for Sinop, Halid Pasha, deputy for Ardahan, Kazım Özel Pasha, deputy for Karesi, İsmet İnönü Pasha, deputy for Malatya, Fethi Okyar, deputy for Istanbul, Ahmed Fuad Bulca, deputy for Rize, and Rusen Esref Ünaydın, deputy for Afyon --all of whom officers-cum-deputies with the sole exception of Ünaydın-- to Cankaya where he instructed them on the strategy to be employed on the Assembly floor the following day.

On the morning of October 29, the committee did make its report, but its suggestions proved unacceptable to the Kemalists. Opinion among the deputies was divided, and it was decided, at the urging of Kemalettin Sami Gökçen Pasha, a trusted Kemalist deputy for Sinop, to refer the whole matter to Atatürk for mediation.

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150. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.269-271; Avni Dogan, Kurtulus, Kurulus ve Sonrası,
was no doubt that this decision had been anticipated, if not engineered. Atatürk was ready, and promptly gave his response. He intimated that he would mediate only on condition that his proposals for the proclamation of a republic be accepted forthwith. 151 These proposals included the right of President of the Republic to also head the Assembly, and the right to appoint the prime minister. The latter, in turn, would be able to choose his own cabinet, but it would be the President of the Republic who would present the cabinet to the Assembly for approval, effectively giving him veto power over the selection process. 152

As soon as the real intent of the committee’s proposals were properly understood, the majority of the deputies registered their objections. A heated debate followed in the group meeting. There were mainly three groups. The liberals objected to all of the proposed amendments, arguing that the proposal involved fundamental changes in the Constitution. Therefore, they insisted, not a small select committee but a constituent assembly would be the proper body to prepare the new constitution. On the other hand, ardent supporters of Atatürk pushed for the immediate acceptance of the proposed amendments, as they argued that the political situation necessitated prompt action. Moderate Kemalists offered a compromise between these two widely divergent viewpoints, pointing out that for the time being only the procedure for the election of the cabinet might be changed so as to solve the immediate problem but that wholesale constitutional change should be discussed later. 153

Despite the liberals’ objections and the moderates’ intermediation, Kemalists were stubborn in their determination to carry out the fait accompli. After strenuous arguments on both sides, Atatürk’s proposals, which amounted to a legalisation of dictatorship, were

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152. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, p.272; Avni Dogan, Kurtulus, Kurulus ve Sonrasi, pp.143-144; and, The Times, October 30, 1923.

153. Avni Dogan, Kurtulus, Kurulus ve Sonrasi, p.144.
accepted by the Kemanist deputies, and submitted to the Assembly. Among the ardent supporters of Atatürk's proposals were Vasif Cinar, deputy for Saruhan, Eyüb Sabri Hayirlioglu, deputy for Konya, Ragib Soysal, deputy for Kütahya, Rasih Kaplan, deputy for Antalya, Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver, deputy for Istanbul, Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, deputy for Mentese, Seyyid Bey, deputy for Izmir and Minister of Justice, İsmet İnönü, deputy for Malatya, Abdurrahman Seref Bey, deputy for Istanbul, Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, deputy for Sinop, and Mehmed Emin Yurdakul, deputy for Sarki Karahisar, who took the Assembly floor and spoke in favour of the declaration of the republic and the election of Atatürk as President.

During the short debate, Sabit Sagiroğlu, deputy for Erzincan, Ebubekir Hazim Tepeyran, deputy for Nigde, Mehmed Vehbi Bolak, deputy for Karesi, Halil Isik, deputy for Erzurul, Abidin Bey, deputy for Saruhan, and Abdullah Azmi Torun, deputy for Eskisehir, criticised the proposals, arguing that such important constitutional amendments should not be rushed through without proper reflection and expression of legal opinion.

Engineered as a fait accompli, the proposals were at once passed by the Assembly, and on the night of October 29 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was elected the first President of the Turkish Republic by unanimous vote. Only one hundred and fifty-eight out of a total of two hundred and eighty-eight members ['?] deputies were present, representing barely fifty percent of the total membership. The opposition argued that a constitutional change of such magnitude should have been made after at least a minimum of debate and in the presence of no less than two-thirds of the Assembly, but the decisions of October 29 had given Atatürk such power that their arguments were in vain.

156. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.272-275.
157. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 30, 1923 [p.37].
Chapter 20

LIBERAL RESISTANCE TO KEMALIST EFFORTS OF INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE DICTATORSHIP

The proclamation of the Republic was, of course, greeted with official celebration, but it was too early to estimate the effect the latest coup d'état had on the population, or predict the liberal opposition's response. Importantly, Rauf Orbay, who was in Istanbul at the time the coup took place, was considered the central opposition figure.¹

The constitutional crisis was viewed very differently by the Kemalist press in Ankara and the liberal press in Istanbul. The liberal press was by and large united against the formation of the Republic by way of a coup d'état.² Though the Istanbul press was reserved in its tone, it insinuated that the so-called cabinet crisis had been a ruse perpetrated by the Kemalists to force the adoption of constitutional change.³ Similar sentiments were voiced even by mild supporters of the Kemalists, so that only the hard-core official Kemalist press in Ankara whole-heartedly supported the outcome of the crisis.⁴

Tevhid-i Efkar, an independent paper with the largest circulation in Turkey, called Fethi Okyar's resignation a "put-up job". It claimed that the Republic was contrary to all liberal democratic principles, and, because constitutional amendments were only within a constituent assembly's jurisdiction, that the present assembly had had no right to amend the Constitution. The Tevhid-i Efkar editorial further criticised the proceedings, pointing to

¹ F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, October 30, 1923 [p.38].
² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.277-280.
³ F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 6, 1923 [p.47].
the fact that so few deputies had voted, and demanded an explanation.  

Realising that the events in Ankara had been a singular victory for Atatürk, the liberal Istanbul press quickly mounted its own attack. On the October 31 issue of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin wrote that the public regarded the peculiarity of the circumstances with which the republic had been proclaimed. Openly expressing his view that it had been a fait accompli, Yalcin went on to say that it was extremely irregular that important constitutional changes had been affected when it was being reported that the People's Party parliamentary group was still debating these constitutional issues and that there

On October 31, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin published a satirical editorial in Tanin entitled, "Long Live the Republic!", in which he subtly pointed out that more than just "prayers, rejoicing and fireworks" were needed to make the Republic a viable form of government. "The salute of cannon serves to confirm that something has in fact happened, and removes all doubt as to what it is".  

In Tanin, Yalcin wrote that the right to bring down a cabinet and establish a new form of government was the prerogative not of any single individual, like Atatürk, but of the Assembly. He compared the present situation with those south American dictatorships where the term "republic" was just a name, adding that presidents who got themselves "elected" by force were nothing more than usurpers.

Though the liberal press outwardly accepted the coup d'état as a fait accompli, it was clearly worried that so important a change had been so hastily made and that Atatürk had emerged with such tremendous power. Given the Assembly's upcoming vacation, it seemed more than likely that over the next months, Atatürk would be governing with a cabinet which had not been subject to the Assembly's approval, and, therefore, entirely of

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5. The Times, October 31, 1923.
6. Hüseyin Cahid [Yalcin], "Yassasin Cumhuriyet!", Tanin, October 31, 1339/1923, quoted in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2, pp.277-278; Avni Dogan, Kurulus, Kurulus ve Sonrası, p.145; and, Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, p.260 (quoting probably Cebesoy, 2, or Kandemir, Siyasi Darginlikar, 2, pp.76-79).
his own choosing. Worse, the possibility of a governmental crisis during this period meant that Atatürk alone might soon be governing the country.⁸

Many regarded the whole affair as a manoeuvre designed to short circuit the election of Orbay as Vice-President of the Assembly, a move many deputies clearly supported, but which the Kemalist clique just as clearly opposed. Instead, Fethi Okyar was elected Vice-President of the Assembly under the Republic, replacing Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pasha.⁹ He received one hundred and fifty-one out of one hundred and fifty-eight votes cast.¹⁰

On November 1, Vatan and Tevhid-i Efkar simultaneously published the text of an interview which their respective editors, Ahmed Emin Yalman and Velid Ebuzziya Bey, had conducted with Rauf Orbay.¹¹ Orbay declared that there was no misunderstanding between him and his friends in the People’s Party. Still, he argued that the republic had been rather hurriedly declared. “This caused people anxiety and gave the idea that it was introduced by irresponsible persons in the form of a fait accompli... The republic was proclaimed in haste”. Orbay further suggested that the reason for such undue haste had yet to be satisfactorily explained by the government and the Assembly.¹² He defended the principle of national sovereignty but criticised the latest developments as procedurally unconstitutional.¹³ He said that the country had much suffered from personal rule in the recent past, and that it was for this reason that the Assembly had been invested with the sole right to rule the country in order to avoid past misfortune. He added that, before October 29, the government had effectively represented the will of the people. Now there was good reason to be uneasy.¹⁴ Refet Bele and Kazim Karabekir Pashas also attacked the

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⁸ The Times, November 1, 1923.
⁹ The Times, November 1, 1923.
¹⁰ The Times, November 3, 1923.
¹¹ Tevhid-i Efkar, November 1, 1339/1923, quoted in Oriente Moderno, 3 (1923), p.412; and, Vatan, November 1, 1339/1923, quoted in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nuituk, 2, p.280.
¹³ Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, 3, 91.
¹⁴ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nuituk, 2, pp.282-284; and, Hasan Riza Soyak, Atatürk’ten
new developments, the latter criticising the formation of the Republic at a public speech he delivered at the Istanbul Law School.\textsuperscript{15}

Naturally the Kemalist Ankara press, particularly the semi-official \textit{Yeni Gün}, vehemently attacked Rauf Orbay and Refet Bele Pasha, dredging up their their views on all constitutional issues such as the caliphate, and the like.\textsuperscript{16} In the November 3 issue of \textit{Yeni Gün}, Yunus Nadi Abalioglu rhetorically asked whether Orbay did not consider national sovereignty to be permanent, and whether he had the temerity to believe in an imperial restoration.\textsuperscript{17} Responding to Orbay's statement that the proclamation of the Republic was hasty and premature, \textit{Yeni Gün} argued that the Republic had existed in spirit over the last four years. It continued to say that those malcontents in Istanbul would soon find their palaces brought down on their own heads.\textsuperscript{18}

Rumours circulated that Ankara was becoming seriously alarmed at the hostility of the liberal Istanbul press.\textsuperscript{19} Ihsan Eryavuz, Kemalist deputy for Cebelibereket and Minister of the Navy, demanded that Orbay account for his motives in granting the November 1 interview.\textsuperscript{20}

In the November 9 issue of \textit{Tanin}, Yalcin published en editorial which, for the first time, directly argued that the recent developments threatened Turkey with dictatorship. It described the Kemalist deputies as "courtiers", and boldly put forth the satirical question whether Atatürk intended to add the caliphate to the existing powers of the President of the Republic.\textsuperscript{21} In the November 10 issue of \textit{Tanin}, Lütfi Fikri Bey published an open letter,
criticising the premature decision of the abrogation of the caliphate which had paved the way for further centralisation of power in the hands of Atatürk. 22 This was followed on November 11 by Yalcin's sharply-worded editorial which rebuked the way these critical constitutional issues had been passed in such a hurry. 23 Furthermore, Cavid Bey had argued for some time that because both Atatürk and İnönü were military figures, the Ankara regime would necessarily become a military dictatorship; the name "republic" was only a smokescreen to cover up the real nature of the political regime. 24

On the same day Yalcin's November 9 Tanin editorial appeared, an article appeared in Ikdam which announced that the government was making secret preparations to deal with the opposition in Istanbul, particularly the press. 25 Meanwhile, both İsmet İnönü, the Prime Minister, and Ahmed Ferid Tek, the Minister of the Interior, had stated that although they supported the freedom of the press, they wanted to insure that what was published was done so for the good of the country. 26 On his own initiative, Zekeriya Sertel, the recently appointed liberal Director-General of the Press, issued a categorical denial of the Ikdam story on November 11. 27 There had been, in fact, discussions on restricting press freedom. İsmet İnönü had expressed his dissatisfaction with the liberal press and had asked Sertel to curb freedom of the press. A firm believer in a free press, Sertel had advised moderation to İnönü. By making this denial, Sertel hoped that it would dissuade the government from taking restrictive measures. 28 It managed, however, only to upset

27. Vatan, November 12, 1339/1923, printed in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.99; and, RG 59 867.911/6, November 17, 1923, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, pp.271-272.
Ahmed Ferid Tek, the Minister of the Interior, who reprimanded Sertel, adding that the government was indeed contemplating restrictions on the press. Sertel immediately offered his resignation, stating that he could have nothing to do with an administration which did not respect the press. On November 14, the cabinet accepted Sertel’s resignation, publicly indicating that it had, in fact, every intention of muzzling the press. In an interview he gave to both *İkdam* and *Vatan*, Sertel confirmed suspicions that the cause for his dismissal was his press release of November 11 concerning the freedom of the press.

Thus, the very short tenure of Zekeriya Sertel as Director-General of the Press came to an abrupt end; he had been appointed to that post only on September 4, having replaced Ahmed Agaoglu, another liberal. The Directorate-General of the Press was administered by Alaeddin Bey, Vice-Director General, until he was replaced by Ercümend Ekrem Talu, who assumed his official duties on December 16.

On November 15, *Tevhid-i Efkar* reported that a parliamentary commission had prepared a revision of the Press Law whereby pro-caliphate propaganda as well as any writing against the President of the Republic or the Assembly would be considered criminal, and would carry a prison sentence of anywhere from four months to a year. On November 22, the text of the new Press Law, amending articles 26, 27, 28, and 29, was published. In the law’s final form, the maximum prison sentence was, not one, but three years for the editors and managers of newspapers who published defamatory articles against the President of the Republic.

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30. RG 59 867.911/6, November 17, 1923, quoted in Michael M. Finefrock, From Sultanate to Republic: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Structure of Turkish Politics, 1922-1924, pp.271-272.
34. *Oriente Moderno*, 3 (1923), p.413.
35. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 6, 1923 [p.47].
CLEARLY, even before the revision of the Press Law, the government had decided how it would deal with the Unionist opposition. Legal proceedings were about to be commenced against Rahmi Evrenos, the Unionist ex-Governor of Aydin, for his activities during the War. Recently, Rahmi Evrenos had been in Istanbul for some time, and in close touch with Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele Pasha, and others. Though he was regarded as one of the leading figures in the Committee of Union and Progress, he was less well-known to the general public than the other Unionist politicians, and, therefore, did not enjoy the kind of popular recognition and support his colleagues did. Atatürk needed a good test case before he took on the other more visible leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. Evrenos suited perfect for the test case. Later, perhaps he could tackle the man who had signed the Mudros Armistice, Orbay himself. Whatever the outcome, the battle lines were already clearly drawn: between Ankara and Istanbul, between Kemalist dictatorship and constitutional government.\(^\text{36}\)

The opposition in the Assembly claimed that the İnönü Cabinet had established a police state. The right to private correspondence was violated and every movement of the opposition was followed by agents who reported everything to the Ministry of the Interior. Those who claimed that they were being followed by secret agents were big in numbers.\(^\text{37}\)

Ihsan Eryavuz, one of the closest colleagues of Atatürk, accused Orbay of creating dissension within the party and demanded an explanation from him and urged him to defend himself in the Party meeting.\(^\text{38}\)

Rauf Orbay had made a speech in the Assembly stating that national sovereignty were to be exercised by the Assembly and that nation would take it as a disgrace to have it

\(^{36}\) F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 6, 1923 [p.48].

\(^{37}\) Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, Politikada Kirkbes Yil, pp.46-47.

\(^{38}\) Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.72.
given to a single individual. 39

On November 22, a meeting of the People's Party was held to "allow" Rauf Orbay a chance to explain the November 1 interview. The meeting, which lasted eight hours, ended in disagreement between Orbay and the Kemalists, İsmet İnönü leading the fiercest attack. Orbay stated that he was in favour of a republic, but added that he opposed any move which abrogated the principles of national sovereignty -- meaning free will of the people -- and limited both press and personal freedom. 40 Orbay reiterated his point that every republic was not a democracy and that every democracy depended upon the principle of national sovereignty. 41 The fact that Orbay was forced to defend himself in such a way revealed the extent of Atatürk's power. Nonetheless, that Orbay could address the deputies at all indicated that he still retained a good measure of support within the party. Despite this tacit support of a good number of deputies, the party meeting made it clear that dissident deputies were not ready to join Rauf Orbay in his open criticism of the Kemalist tactics. 42

ON NOVEMBER 23, three Kemalist deputies introduced a bill with twenty-four articles, proposing various constitutional changes which could only consolidate Atatürk's dictatorship. The bill dealt with a large range of subjects effecting the powers of the President, the Cabinet, and the Assembly, including provisions which lengthened the term of the Assembly from two to four years, and gave the President veto power over the Assembly's legislation as well as the right to dissolve the Assembly. 43 The proposal was signed by Ahmed Saki Bey, deputy for Antalya, Ali Saib Ursavas, deputy for Kozan, and Ali Riza Bebe, deputy for Istanbul, all staunch Kemalist supporters. 44 The draft law was

39. Yakup Kadı Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada Kırkbes Yılı, p.44.
41. Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.72n.
43. F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 27, 1923 [pp.89-90].
rejected by the Committee on Drafts of the Assembly, but on December 1, the Assembly itself accepted Yunus Nadi Abalioglu’s proposal which overruled the Committee on Drafts and referred the draft law to the Committee for Constitutional Amendments, despite the liberal opposition led by Ismail Canbulat, deputy for Istanbul and one of the old guards of the Committee of Union and Progress, fought vigorously to prevent this. On December 5, the proposal was sent to the Committee for Constitutional Amendments.

The opposition deputies took these proposals for the amendment of the Constitution to be nothing less than the establishment of a dictatorship. Many deputies were worried that constitutional rights had been trampled upon. The liberal Istanbul press, notably Tanin and Tevhid-i Efkar, also criticised this latest motion, claiming that these constitutional changes would, in fact, legalise dictatorship. The liberal press wrote that Kemalist deputies, whose only concern in supporting Atatürk had been their selfish interests, could not be regarded as truly representing the nation for which its sons had sacrificed their lives; they had not died so as to make it easy for people with personal ambitions capture the state apparatus.

IT WAS THE PREMATURE APPEARANCE in opposition newspapers of a letter to the government written by Aga Khan and Ameer Ali which finally prompted the Kemalist government to suppress the freedom of the press. A Tribunal of Independence was immediately formed on December 8, with İhsan Eryavuz at the head, and sent to Istanbul to stem what was considered the intrigues of the Caliph. Only one hundred and fifty-six deputies voted on the issue, twenty-two of whom remaining neutral. Thus, the creation of the Tribunal of Independence was forced to go through the Assembly by only one hundred and thirty-four deputies, an absolute minority. Apart from İhsan Eryavuz, deputy for

45. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Devre II, Vol.3, p.685; and, F.O.424/259, Mr. Nevile Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, November 27, 1923 [p.100].
46. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Devre II, Vol.4, p.46.
48. The Times, December 11, 1923; and, Düstür, Third Series, 5, p.463.
49. Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.79.
Cebelibereket, the Tribunal consisted of Refik Koraltan, deputy for Konya, Asaf Doras, deputy for Hakkari, and Cevdet Izrab Barlas, deputy for Kütahya. Vasif Cinar, deputy for Saruhan, was the prosecutor. 50 The Vatan of December 7, hinted that the true aim of the Tribunal was to terrorize the public and prepare the ground for the abolition of a free press. 51

The Tribunal alternately questioned Velid Ebuzziya Bey, editor of Tevhid-i Efkar, Ahmed Cevdet Bey, editor of Ikdam, and Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor of Tanin. 52 Eventually, they were charged with treason on the ground that their publications were calculated to provoke sedition, and essentially against the Republic. 53 The President of the Turkish Bar Association, Lütfi Fikri Bey, was also arrested. 54

Representing the Association of the Turkish Press, Halid Ziya Usakligil sent an appeal to both the Assembly and the Tribunal, protesting this infringement of liberty and expressing confidence that, ultimately, the Tribunal could not but respect justice. 55 On December 13, the Kemalists stroke back. During the Assembly debate concerning the Tribunal's scope of activity and the extent of its authority, Rasih Kaplan, the Kemalist deputy for Antalya, asked for investing the Tribunal with the fullest possible powers of investigation pertaining to any activity which threatened the security of the state. This created a hot debate. Despite fierce opposition by liberal deputies, Kemalists managed to pass this resolution by eighty-nine votes to sixty-three, six deputies remaining uncommitted. 56

50. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklem ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.94; and, Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.79.
51. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklem ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.95.
52. The Times, December 12, 1923; and, Vatan, December 10, 1339/1923, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.79.
53. The Times, December 13, 1923.
54. The Times, December 15, 1923; Vatan, December 14, 1339/1923, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.80; and, Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklem ve Gecirdiklerim, 3, p.96.
55. The Times, December 14, 1923; and, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p.275.
56. Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.79; and The Times, December 15, 1923.
A storm broke out in Ankara. Having lost this motion, twenty-five opposition deputies handed in a petition, demanding that all verdicts of the Tribunal be submitted to the Assembly for approval. Among these were Sabit Sagleoglu, Rauf Orbay, Ismail Canbulat, and Feridun Fikri Dusunsel, nephew of Lutfi Fikri Bey. Ismet Inonu declared that the Assembly's acceptance of this petition would force him to resign, and it was rejected by a vote of one hundred twelve to forty-four. With the exception of death penalties, the sentences passed by the Tribunals of Independence did not need the final approval of the Assembly. Those deputies who had opposed these latest measures were now in danger of being expelled from the People's Party.

Ahmed Cevdet Bey, Velit Ebuzziya Bey, and Huseyin Cahid Yalcin were arrested on December 22. During the trial, Yalcin taunted the authorities, declaring that they had learned nothing from the old mistakes of the Committee of Union and Progress. Turkey, he said, had lost important interests with the Treaty of Lausanne, but he insisted that a time would come when the nation, realising its loss, would hold those who had accepted it accountable. At times, it seemed that it was the Tribunal itself which was on trial. Finally, all three editors were acquitted.

A mass of university students assembled to greet the defendants, applauding them as they left Fındikli Palace where the Tribunal had sat. It was now unclear how Ismet Inonu, the man behind the creation of the Tribunal, could remain in power, particularly in light of the fact that the court had openly praised the patriotic careers of all three editors,

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and congratulated them on having successfully established their innocence.66

In general, the acquittal of the editors was received with popular enthusiasm. Several provincial newspapers distributed free special supplements which covered the story. The liberal Istanbul press praised the Tribunal's impartiality, and both Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin of Tanin and Ahmed Cevdet Bey of Ikdam expressed satisfaction that both the law and the Republic had been vindicated.67

ATATÜRK ARRIVED AT İZMİR on January 3, 1924, taking up residence in an English villa at Buca.68 Throughout Turkey, but particularly in Izmir, the demand for Tanin, the Unionist organ, had increased during the trial, indicating popular support for the reemergence of the Unionists. These, however, made no public move.69

In a meeting with Atatürk on February 4 in Izmir, editors of the liberal Istanbul newspapers continued to criticise the government. Ahmed Emin Yalman cited the incompetence of the present bureaucracy which had clearly slowed the economy down.70 When Atatürk was asked whether his reform plan could pass in the Assembly where he did not have a safe majority, he answered that he would proceed with his plans no matter what. When asked what he would do if the Assembly were to vote for the establishment of a liberal democratic regime, Atatürk replied that he would chase those deputies who supported such a move from the Assembly, adding that he would remain the head of the People's Party precisely to prevent such a move by opposition deputies. On his part, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin reiterated earlier statements that the positions of President and party leader should not be left in the hands of one person.71

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66. The Times, January 3, 1924.
67. The Times, January 4, 1924.
68. The Times, January 5, 1924.
69. F.O.424/260, Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Nevile Henderson, Smyrna, January 11, 1924 [p.19].
70. Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim. 3, pp.102-103.
It was clear that the true agenda for the meeting was to work out an agreement whereby the liberal opposition would drop the issue of the caliphate and the Tribunal in exchange for Atatürk's toleration of both the press and the opposition. In this respect, Atatürk was interested in sounding the press out on the abolition of the sultanate, and, most important, the abolition of the caliphate. Thinking it might be an effective tool in international politics, Yalçın rejected the abolishment of the caliphate at this juncture. Atatürk did not agree.  

Further talks were held the following day. That night, Atatürk gave an elaborate banquet for the visiting editors. During the banquet, Atatürk made a speech in which he emphasised his right to demand the unconditional support of the press for government's actions policies. He emphasised that the well-being of the country depended on unity. In response, Yalçın said that he believed the press had acted responsibly, adding that a liberal regime could only be instituted through mutual respect and toleration, and that if the President wished for the support of the press, he must treat it with consideration.

Conversations between Atatürk and the editors were confidential, so nothing was published. Atatürk made quite an impression on some of the journalists, who emerged saying that he was equally as supreme in peace as he had been in war. Possibly as a result of this triumph, it was publicly announced that Atatürk would visit Istanbul and Edirne in the beginning of May.

Like Atatürk, the liberal opposition considered the meeting a triumph. On the one hand, the editors felt certain that positive changes in government policy were in store, and

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72. Asım Us, Gördüklerim, Duydüklerim, Duygularım, pp.89-92.
73. The Times, February 8, 1924.
76. The Times, February 9, 1924.
on the other, Yalcin, who had taken a particularly strong stand against Atatürk, had emerged as something of a hero. The meeting derived its main importance from the measure of understanding reached between him and Atatürk. Exactly what concessions had been made on either side was a matter of conjecture, but it was thought likely that Atatürk would relent on the issues of the presidential right to dissolve the Assembly and the power of veto. In exchange, Yalcin and other liberal editors were believed to have consented to relax their championship of the caliphate now that they had been satisfied with Atatürk's explanations. Clearly, for Atatürk, any visit to Istanbul depended, to some extent, on an undermining of the Caliph's influence, and it was noteworthy that another campaign against the Imperial Family had begun in the Kemalist press. Whatever the case, speculation had it that the editors' visit was essentially an attempt at reconciliation between Atatürk and the more moderate Unionists such as Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, Rauf Orbay, Cavid Bey, Ismail Canbulat, and Fethi Okyar. This would depend on the removal of the staunchest Kemalist supporters from the cabinet. In this respect, great importance was attached to Yalcin's remark in Tanin: "I see with regret that Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] has not been granted by fate and providence colleagues endowed with the same ideas and energetic will". Yalcin also announced that he would run in the next elections. Though it was premature to say whether or not this reconciliation would become firmly established, there was no doubt that the support and aid of some of the best liberal minds, now excluded from public service, could only benefit the nation.77 In this climate, rumours that the İnönü Cabinet would shortly be remodelled became more persistent.78 Some even suggested that Atatürk intended to discard İnönü altogether, giving the opposition, including members of the Committee of Union and Progress, a place in the new government. The general understanding, then, was that the editors' support for Atatürk

77. *The Times*, February 11, 1924.
78. *The Times*, February 23, 1924.
was personal, and did not extend to the İnönü Cabinet. 79

Officially, Atatürk was in Izmir, ostensibly to observe military manoeuvres, such that around the time of his meetings with the press, he was also in contact with the military leadership. Though public knowledge, the content of these meetings could only be guessed at. Generally, it was clear that, once again, Atatürk was attempting to placate the reportedly disaffected military --rumours of disaffection towards him in high military quarters had long been rife. It could safely be assumed that, given the latest political developments, one of the objects, if not the principal object, of the meetings between Atatürk and practically the whole military command was to arrive at such an understanding with them as would enable him to count upon them and their troops in any contingency. 80 Whatever the case, while Atatürk negotiated with the liberal press and the opposition, he was also taking measures to engage the military.

Friction between the press and the government continued. One incident concerned Ali Saib Ursavas, a Kemalist deputy, who had assaulted two Vakit journalists for criticising the Assembly’s recent pay increase. As a protest, correspondents of Istanbul newspapers went on a strike for three days, creating a news blackout from Ankara. 81

Vakit, whose reporters had been assaulted, claimed that the pay increase debate in the Assembly floor clearly separated the honest deputies from the dishonest. 82

79. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, February 20, 1924 [p.53].
80. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, February 20, 1924 [p.53].
81. Giagadamard, January 24, 1924, quoted in Oriente Moderno, 4 (1924), p.87; and, Vatan, January 24, 1340/1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.99n.
82. Oriente Moderno, 4 (1924), pp.87-88.
The Türkisch Journalists Association met on January 28, and issued a statement to the effect that the incident had been a clear violation of the honour and security of the press corps. Its members demanded that the perpetrator be brought before the courts. The Association also sent a telegramme with the same message to Fethi Okyar.  

While Rauf Orbay came to its defence, the issue of the freedom of the press was once again on the fore. Kemalists such as Ali Saib Ursavas, deputy for Kozan, Ahmed Hamdi Bey, deputy for Bozok, and Yahya Galib Kargi, deputy for Kırşehir, attacked the press and demanded that restrictions be applied. The Times published that Ali Saib Ursavas had made a proposal to legalise duello in cases where the honour of a deputy was involved. Some of People’s Party deputies apparently endorsed this proposal, others reportedly wished to attack the problem at its root by barring all journalists from the Assembly building.

The Assembly quickly passed the first seventeen articles of the Constitution on March 16. Deputies, however, expected a great deal of debate when the clauses dealing with the President’s right of veto and dissolution of the Assembly would come up for debate. Already, Sükrü Saracoğlu, deputy for İzmir, said that in any other country the concentration of such power in one person would constitute a reaction. Unable to secure a substantial majority in favour of all the measures which Atatürk considered of prime importance, İsmet İnönü found himself on shaky ground. In the Assembly, his support of the President’s right to dissolution put him strongly in the minority.

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87. The Times, March 18, 1924.
88. The Times, March 18, 1924.
89. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, March 26, 1924 [pp.95-96].
The first sign of serious trouble for İsmet İnönü came on March 17 and 18 with his failure to secure the election of his candidates for the two vice-presidencies of the People’s Party as well as for posts on the committee of the Party. İnönü himself was elected president, but the vice-presidencies and most of the posts on the committee were filled with members of by the opposition group. Fevzi Pirincioglu, deputy for Diyarbakir, was elected first vice-president. This group strongly opposed both the absolute right of veto and the unlimited right of dissolution, as had been proposed in the draft Constitution. Rumours of a cabinet crisis began to circulate.90

After a week’s break, the Assembly resumed its debate on the draft Constitution on March 23[, the last debate on the constitution having taken place on March 16].91 Knowing that it would almost certainly be rejected, Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, Kemalist President of the Constitutional Committee, attempted to postpone the discussion of Article 25 concerning the dissolution of the Assembly. He stated that the article required further consideration and should be returned to the committee for that purpose.92 On the grounds that this proposed reconsideration was against procedure, Ahmed Süreyya Özgeevren, opposition deputy for Karesi, spoke against it; and the request for postponement was rejected.93 He also spoke fervently against the President’s right to dissolve the Assembly.94 Resad [Kayali], opposition deputy for Saruhan, added that the young men in his constituency wished to know whether Atatürk had forgotten his own principles. True to Atatürk’s previous statements, he continued, the nation would not part with an ounce of its sovereignty. Even if God himself were President, the Turkish people would not grant the

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90. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, March 26, 1924 [pp.95-96].
91. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, pp.179-214.
92. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, p.179.
93. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, pp.179-181.
94. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, pp.194-207; especially p.204.
right of dissolution. 95

Eventually, Receb Peker, a staunch Kemalist, suggested compromise. He proposed that the President be given the right to recommend dissolution to the Assembly for reasons of high national interest. Peker’s proposal for amendment stipulated that the President’s recommendation would be effective unless rejected by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. 96 Though fifteen deputies known to be personally very close to Atatürk -- Izzet Ulvi Aykurt, deputy for Afyon, Ali Saib Ursavas, deputy for Kozan, Ali Riza Bebe, deputy for Istanbul, Hamdi Arpak, deputy for Erzincan, Muhittin Çötemi, deputy for Elaziz, İhsan Eryavuz, deputy for Cebelibereket, Falih Rifki Atay, deputy for Bolu, Hüsrev Gerede, deputy for Urfa, Receb Peker, deputy for Kütahya, Ragib Soysal, deputy for Kütahya, Süleyman Sirri Bey, deputy for Istanbul, Ahmed Fuad Bulca, deputy for Lazistan, Ali Kilic, deputy for Gaziantep, Nuri Conker, deputy for Kütahya, and Safvet Arikan, deputy for Kocaeli-- supported this latest motion, it was rejected by a vote of one hundred and twenty-two votes to seventy-one, with one abstention. 97 Upon this, the ministers as well as the fifteen supporters of the motion and other Kemalist deputies gradually left the Assembly. The draft article was then put up for vote in its original form, and was rejected by a vote of one hundred twenty-seven to two, again with one abstention. On March 24, the article was again rejected in an almost identical vote -- one hundred twenty-six to two, with two abstentions-- guaranteeing that the article was definitely thrown out. 98

The Vatan of March 25 announced that the Assembly had unequivocally rejected

95. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüsmeleri, pp.184-188.
97. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüsmeleri, pp.210-212; F.O. 424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, March 26, 1924 [p.96]; and, The Times, March 25, 1924.
98. A. Seref Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin (Eds.), 1924 Anayasasi Hakkindaki Meclis Görüsmeleri, pp.214-215; F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, March 26, 1924 [p.96].
the Kemalist proposal for Article 25, adding that government deputies had left the Assembly in order to obstruct the continuation of the debate which would certainly discredit the Kemalist position even further. 99

Rejection of the Kemalist proposal naturally created a political crisis. Resignation of the İnönü Cabinet seemed possible. Also, rumours of a split in the People's Party began to appear along with the talk of an immediate dissolution of the Assembly, be it voluntary or compulsory. 100 It was reported that Fethi Okyar, the President of the Assembly and a possible Prime Minister, had thrown in his lot with the opposition. 101

On the March 27 meeting of the People's Party, the government received a vote of confidence. It was practically unanimously, with one hundred and fifty-four for, one against and four abstentions. 102 Although the government had the vote of confidence it politically needed to reintroduce the clause concerning the power of dissolution in a modified form, several newspapers suggested that the vote was not altogether spontaneous and was due to pressure from above. 103

The Assembly resumed debate on the Constitution on March 30. All Kemalist deputies in Istanbul had been urgently recalled to Ankara. The recall had been intended to insure a government majority when the discussion of the President's power of dissolution and the right of veto came up for debate. 104 Kemalist efforts, however, proved to be in vain. The day saw a complete victory for those who were opposed to giving the President

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99. Vatan, March 25, 1340/1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.88n. An editorial written by Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, who was Chairman of the Constitutinal Committee and an ardent supporter of Atatürk, upon the rejection of Article 25 was criticised by opposition members who reminded him of the circumstances he obtained the printing press that used to belong to Manosyan for his newspaper on favourable terms, and that he was now paying his dues to the Kemalists (Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.88n).

100. The Times, March 26, 1924.
101. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, March 26, 1924 [p.96].
102. F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, April 2, 1924 [p.98].
103. The Times, March 29, 1924.
104. The Times, March 31, 1924.
any powers of dissolution. The final form of the article declared that although a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Assembly could bring about its dissolution, only the Assembly had the right to initiate such a proceeding.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, the Assembly passed a number of new articles in the Constitution whereby the rights of the Assembly were successfully extended at the expense of the President of the Republic. Though the Kemalists had proposed a presidential term of seven years, the final article stated that the President had to be elected by the Assembly from among its own members for a period equal to that of its mandate. Obviously, although the President could be re-elected, it was not for his advantage to work for the dissolution of the Assembly. Finally, the right of veto was granted in an amended form. The President would be forced to respect laws that were voted for a second time in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{106}

The remaining clauses of the Constitution were passed on April 20, and whole Constitution was accepted almost unanimously.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} F.O.424/260, Mr. R. C. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, April 2, 1924 [p.98]; and. The Times, April 1, 1924.
\textsuperscript{106} The Times, April 1, 1924.
\textsuperscript{107} The Times, April 23, 1924.
Chapter 21

POLITICAL SITUATION, 1924-1925:
FORMATION OF OPPOSITION TO KEMALIST DICTATORSHIP

By late March, 1924, rumours that the People's Party would be split in two and that an opposition party under the name of the Republican Party would be established had begun circulating.\(^1\) Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the government, public order was maintained in Istanbul. Several isolated incidents, however, pointed, on the one hand, to the fact that grievances persisted, and, on the other, to a deterioration of the population's age old respect for military authority.\(^2\) Though there was no direct news of Unionist activity, men like Cavid Bey, Rahmi Evrenos and, Kara Kemal Bey, could not be underestimated. Already, Cavid Bey, who had returned from a holiday in Europe, with his mordant pen, had resumed the attack on the government.\(^3\) Moreover, the August 24 issue of *Vatan* criticised the government was for its insistence of central control of municipalities and local authorities. Democracy, the article argued, meant rule of the people by the people. Centralization amounted to an elimination of municipal government which, in turn, meant less people effectively participated in political power.\(^4\)

On its part, the government continued its attack on the Istanbul press throughout the summer of 1924. Police interrogations and inquiries became daily events for journalists.\(^5\)

The press' counter-attack on government policy prompted Receb Peker, the Minister of the

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2. F.O.424/261, Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, July 23, 1924 [p.17].
3. F.O.424/261, Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, July 23, 1924 [p.18].
Interior and one of the Kemalist hardliners, to Receb Peker, to go to Istanbul in August to hold talks with prominent liberal editors. His meeting with Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın was well received among members of the opposition whose fears of the repression of free speech and a free press had fully reemerged.  

In Trabzon, Atatürk attacked the opposition within the People's Party by denying its existence. People's Party, he claimed, sought to unify Turkey, not divide it, bringing freedom and sovereignty to the people in the process. He said that he could not detach himself from daily politics; he said he was a partisan of both the People's Party and the Republic. His words were an open challenge to members of the liberal opposition who had attempted to force him surrender the leadership of the Party, in the hopes that he would thereby lose his singular influence. He repeated his position in a speech at Samsun, stating that People's Party was --and, would remain to be-- the only party that would rule Turkey, and that competitive politics could not be allowed given the present situation of the country.

The Vatan of September 19, published an editorial which criticized Atatürk's Trabzon speech. Ahmed Emin Yalman wrote that the single party system would only pave the way for dictatorship, reiterating his belief that the people wished to see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a political arbiter and national leader, detached from the interests of any one political party.

Partly in response to the Vatan attack and the public criticism he encountered for his

8. The Times, September 19, 1924. Atatürk's Trabzon speech of September 16, 1924 has been printed in the Hakimiyet-i Millîye, September 18, 1924 (Nimet Unan (Ed.), Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri, Vol.2, pp.191-192).
Trabzon and Samsun speeches, Atatürk toned down his push for a single party. At a speech in Amasya, he attempted to address the concerns of the liberal opposition by denying he had any aspirations to dictatorship.  

In early October, however, the Istanbul press began to publish reports that the government was contemplating some sort of action against the Committee of Union and Progress at Izmir. The occasion for these rumours was a confidential interview with Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, editor of Tanin and a prominent Unionist, conducted by Mr. Macartney, the Istanbul correspondent of The Times.  

In the interview, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin said that the decision to establish an opposition party was now definite, and that it could be expected to materialise soon, perhaps before, or shortly after, the meeting of the Assembly. He claimed that general dissatisfaction with the government's mismanagement of national affairs --a feeling shared by educated men within and outside of the Assembly-- had made such a development necessary. He further claimed Atatürk's popularity was on the wane, and only slightly ahead of that of İsmet İnönü and his cabinet. Yalcin added that official announcements that the President's eastern tour was a quasi-military inspection of the north-east frontier should be discounted; its sole object was to generate some support for the People's Party in the north-east, where it had always been conspicuously absent, particularly since the murder of Ali Sükrü Bey in March of 1923. Nor had the tour succeeded; the reports of cordial receptions in various towns published in Kemalist papers were, he said, exaggerated. The People's Party in those regions usually consisted of one or two officials with absolutely no following, and the fact that the governor of Trabzon was removed after the completion of the tour only confirmed the suspicion that the President's reception had been something

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12. F.O.424/261. Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, October 8, 1924 [p.52].
less than satisfactory.  

Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin stated that the new opposition party would not be a reconstituted Committee of Union and Progress, though undoubtedly many from the old organisation would join. Nor would this party become a cover for any anti-republican or reactionary elements. The new party, he said, would oppose the Kemalist government strictly along constitutional and republican lines. Finally, he promised that this new party would refrain from marked hostility towards Atatürk, at least until the latter clearly defined his position vis à vis the party.  

REPORTS THAT A REFORMED COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS was about to re-enter political life as an active opposition party began to circulate. News came from Izmir that sixty Unionists who had intended to hold a secret congress there had been denounced to the authorities by informers. Usakizade Muammer Bey, the President’s father-in-law and a prominent Unionist, was forced to resign as prefect of Izmir when news of the intended congress became public. At the same time, Unionists were reportedly holding meetings at the house of Kara Kemal Bey in Istanbul. In a statement published by Vatan, Kara Kemal Bey, the ex-Minister of Supplies during the war and a prominent Unionist, denied that he had any intention of returning to politics. However, Ali Bey, another Unionist ex-minister, hinted at the possibility of the formation of a Republican Party based on the principles of the Committee of Union and Progress.  

Though there was little to reason to suppose the old Committee of Union and Progress would be revived, the liberal press capitalised on these statements and rumours, urging the Committee of Union and Progress to come out into the open. Clearly, something was brewing.  

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13. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, October 8, 1924 [pp.52-53].
14. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, October 8, 1924 [p.53].
15. The Times, October 6, 1924.
16. The Times, October 6, 1924.
were unwilling to accept Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's insistence that his own, People's Party, be the only political party in Turkey, feeling that not only was it ridiculous to force people with such widely divergent views under a single roof, but that the country already suffered enough from the lack of a recognized opposition, denying as it did the possibility of progress through a dialogue of constructive criticism in the Assembly. Though it would probably be some time before matters came to a head, many felt that a new party, comprised of those who were nominally members of the People's Party, should be openly formed at the earliest opportunity. 17

One issue which might have launched such a party centered on foreign policy. Claiming to express general sentiment, Tanin complained that the government's handling of foreign policy matters was both superficial and lighthearted, and urged deputies, who ostensibly represented the nation, to approach the upcoming debate from this standpoint. Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın stated that Ismet İnönü's handling of the Mosul Question at the Lausanne Peace Conference had led to widespread dissatisfaction. 18

But the first real news about the likely appearance of a new opposition party came on October 6 with an article in Son Telgraf which announced that Rauf Orbay, Ismail Canbulat and Refet Bele were its leaders. 19 Taken by surprise, Atatürk began an intensive campaign to prevent wholesale defection of deputies to the opposition. Throughout the second half of October, he invited groups of various opposition deputies to dinner parties at his residence in Cankaya. 20

One of the opposition deputies with whom Atatürk met was Feyzi Pirinccioğlu, deputy for Diyarbakır. Reportedly, he had a following of about thirty deputies in the Assembly, and therefore his position on the issue of joining the yet-to-be-formed liberal

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17. The Times, October 6, 1924.
18. The Times, October 16, 1924.
opposition party or not was of tremendous importance. If he and his followers decided to
join in the opposition party that the Karabekir group had been contemplating of
establishing, the balance of forces in the Assembly would be such that the Kemalist
government of İsmet İnönü would certainly be voted out of office. Counter-attacking
Atatiirk's move of neutralisation of the opposition deputies, members of the liberal
opposition publicly registered their dissatisfaction, expressing their anxiety that Atatürk,
who, as President of the Republic, was expected to remain above daily politics, might
abuse his authority and force them to vote in favour of the People's Party. 21

By mid-October, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Adivar had met with Ahmed Emin Yalman
to discuss their plans for the new opposition party. Rauf Orbay stated that democracy
would certainly not survive a one-party regime, and, along with the others, asked Yalman
to join them, suggesting that Vatan could become the new party's organ. Yalman rejected
their offer. 22

THE MOVEMENT GAINED MOMENTUM with the announcement in the October 28 issue of
Vatan that Kazim Karabekir Pasha had resigned from the army, preferring to keep his seat
in the Assembly. 23 According to Cumhuriyet, he had reached this decision at a midnight
meeting in his house with Rauf Orbay, General Refet Bele Pasha, Adnan Adivar, and
Ismail Canbulat. 24 Because of a law which precluded anyone from simultaneously holding
both a military position and an Assembly seat, his resignation was seen as a definite move
into political life, and following as it did Refet Bele's resignation from the military, was
interpreted as a preliminary step towards the establishment of the long awaited opposition

21. Son Telgraf, October 24, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti
Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.101n.
23. Vatan, October 28, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti
Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.100.
24. The Times, November 3, 1924.
party. The signs became unmistakable when their resignations were followed by those of Ali Fuad Cebeşoy and Cevad Cobanlı Pashas.

The resignation of the pashas from the army with the intention of forming an opposition party caused great concern to Atatürk who feared a military conspiracy and directed his most trusted generals to give up their seats in the Assembly, and assume their posts in the army. This would be done shortly after the Assembly opened on November 1.

Kazım Karabekir's resignation from the military command and his assumption of his position as deputy created some sensation. In his letter of resignation printed on October 28, Karabekir stated that his work in the military had not been taken seriously and that he could accomplish more for the nation as a deputy. But that same day, newspapers reported that some forty or fifty opposition deputies were holding meetings in order to prepare for concerted action in the Assembly which would open on November 1.

On the eve of the Assembly's opening, Vatan printed an editorial which recommended the resignation of the İsmet Pasha Cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet which had the sympathy of the public and the confidence of the Assembly.

The Assembly opened, and on November 2 the pashas made their moves to take their seats, but they were obstructed by Atatürk on matters of formality.

On November 3, it was announced that the Kemalist generals Fevzi Çakmak, Fahreddin Altay, Izzeddin Çalışlar, Ali Hikmet Ayradm and Sükrü Naili Gökbek Pashas

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26. Vatan, October 29, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.100.
had decided to resign their deputyships and return to their military commands.\textsuperscript{31} With the exception of Fevzi Cakmak Pasha, the chief of the General Staff, those who returned to their commands were generally considered less capable than those who had chosen to sit in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{32}

In the elections to places on the Parliamentary commissions, the Kemalists successfully excluded Kazim Karabekir and Refet Bele Pashas, in spite of their undoubted technical qualifications.\textsuperscript{33}

The possibility of open struggle between the opposition and the Kemalist government seemed inevitable. It was highly significant that Atatürk issued, through Vakit, a cryptic but stern warning against the "opportunistic" activity of certain deputies who, he calimed, were accustomed to fishing in troubled waters in order to realize their personal ambitions. He also warned against the idea of a religious reaction against the Republican army and state.\textsuperscript{34} This last statement, which was totally unwarranted, served no purpose other than preparing the ground for attacking the liberal opposition by raising the spectre of religious reaction, and justify its repression should the opportunity presented itself.

In a leading article in the November 4 issue of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcın implied that the government had forced the recent movement between the military and the Assembly by prohibiting officers from simultaneously holding positions in both organisations. In a clever piece of journalism, Yalcın congratulated Turkey on this complete exclusion of the army from politics. How unfortunate it would have been, he continued, if Turkey had come to resemble those South American states where the republican form of government served merely as a cloak for military dictatorship. There followed a lengthy

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\textsuperscript{31} The Times, November 3, 1924: and, F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, November 4, 1924 [p.67].
\textsuperscript{32} The Times, November 3, 1924.
\textsuperscript{33} F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, November 4, 1924 [p.67].
\textsuperscript{34} The Times, November 3, 1924.
\end{flushright}
description of conditions prevailing in South America, every word of which was precisely applicable to current Turkey, and, with scarcely concealed irony, the article ended by exclaiming how the Turkish heart would beat with joy at the recent decisions, and how Europe would respect the young republic whom she had hitherto regarded as pure comedy. 35

Matters within the People's Party were rapidly reaching their boiling point, though it was still uncertain what would provoke the final rupture. Many of the Ankara correspondents of Istanbul newspapers predicted that the members of the new opposition would be expelled from the Party at its next meeting. Some put the membership of the opposition as high as seventy, an estimate which seemed to be based on the voting pattern of the latest Party meeting in which candidates for the vice-presidencies of the Assembly and other positions were chosen. 36

After the opening day of proceedings, it was announced that, for the moment, none of those generals who had recently resigned their commissions would be allowed to participate in Assembly business. At the beginning of the November 5 session, a letter from Kazim Karabekir was read in which he demanded an explanation. After all, he wrote, he had resigned his inspectorship a week ago and had already sat and voted in the Assembly. Ismet Inönü, President of the Council of Ministers, and Kazim Pasha, Minister of Defence, replied that until Karabekir had officially handed his duties over to his successor, he would be unable to sit. Karabekir's friends proposed that the question be referred to the Constitutional Committee, but the Government successfully blocked this move, despite the fact that forty members of the opposition had voted in favour, and some thirty deputies had abstained. 37

35. *Tanin*, November 4, 1924, quoted in F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, Constantinople, November 4, 1924 [p.67].
36. *The Times*, November 5, 1924.
37. *The Times*, November 7, 1924.
The leaders of the new opposition were relatively silent until November 6 when Rauf Orbay put forth a series of questions addressed to the government which outlined the future tactics of the opposition. In part, Orbay was concerned with questions of fact. How far had the law against brigandage been applied? Out of the fifteen million Turkish Liras assigned for railways in Anatolia, especially on the railway between Ankara, Samsun and Sivas, how much had actually been spent? Why had the length of elementary education been reduced to five years? But he was also concerned with constitutional questions, such as what had become of the proposal for forming a Council of State, and why the prefect of Istanbul was appointed by the Government and not elected by the population.38

It was already regarded as certain that when the final vote was taken on November 7 or 8, Ismet Pasha would obtain a large majority. The proceedings were, however, interesting as affording the first serious indication in the Assembly of the strength of the opposition.39

On November 7, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk held a meeting with the inner circle of the People's Party in an attempt to establish the extent of internal dissension. They quickly realised that they did not hold a majority in the Assembly when they made a count of all the opposition deputies.40 Atatürk decided to appeal to a large group of eighty to ninety dissenters who were represented by Feyzi Pirinçcioğlu and Zülfü Tigrel, both Kurdish deputies for Diyarbakır. They were called to Atatürk's residence, but it became clear that they had already held a meeting of their own, and that they were leaning towards Rauf Orbay.41

That day, Tanin called for the resignation of the Ismet İnönü Cabinet.42 but on November 8, the government would receive a vote of confidence from the Assembly by a

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38. The Times, November 8, 1924.
39. The Times, November 7, 1924.
40. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Polistikada 45 Yıl, pp.70-71.
41. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Polistikada 45 Yıl, p.73.
42. The Times, November 8, 1924.
vote of one hundred and forty-seven to nineteen. It was clear that the attendance was scanty, as the full Assembly was 273, there being 13 vacancies. There were one hundred and seventy-five deputies present at the vote. 43

Though the result of the November 8 vote was naturally hailed as a victory for the Kemalist Government, it was clear from the columns of Tanin and other Istanbul dailies that the liberal opposition had no intention of abandoning the struggle. The November 9 issue of Tanin reported that whether the members of the opposition were expelled from the People’s Party or whether they seceded voluntarily, they meant to form a new party under the Republican title. 45 In his Tanin editorial, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın declared that the existing artificial system was doomed, and that the present political ferment could only be the prelude to such a development. What, he asked, would be the result of a duel between the true principle of national sovereignty and the present parody of this principle, destined as it was to be the plaything of private ambitions of Atatürk? He suggested that though personal despotism might gain the upper hand, this could only be temporary. 46

The cabinet met on November 9 at the house of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at Cankaya and under his presidency. Meanwhile the opposition press was by no means disturbed by November 8th’s defeat in the Assembly, and dwelled rather on the fact that the Government only obtained the support of a bare fifty percent of the total membership of the Assembly. It argued that İsmet Pasha was responsible for the split because his cabinet disregarded the just complaints of the country made both inside and outside the Assembly and proceeded on its own course. 47

In the Assembly on November 10/11, the reading of the letters of resignation from the seceding deputies was followed by further tirades against them, especially against

43. The Times, November 10, 1924.
45. The Times, November 10, 1924.
46. Tanin, November 9, 1924, quoted in The Times, November 10, 1924.
47. The Times, November 11, 1924.
Ismail Canbulat, a former leader of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Rauf Orbay.48

THOUGH NOT OFFICIALLY DECLARED, reports of the likely formation of the opposition party appeared on November 9.49 Deputies who voted against the Government forestalled the intention of their opponents to oust them from the People's Party by resigning their membership of that body.50 On the night of November 9, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk received letters of resignation from Ali Fuad Ceboz Pasha, deputy for Ankara, Adnan Adivar, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele Pasha, and Kazım Karabekir Pasha, all deputies for Istanbul, Sabit Sagiroğlu, deputy for Erzincan, Feridun Fikri Düsünsel, deputy for Dersim, Ahmed Muhtar Cilli, deputy for Trabzon, Halis Turgut, deputy for Sivas, Faik Günday, deputy for Ordu, Rüsdü Pasha, deputy for Erzurum, and several others.51 A day later, Ziyaeddin Gözübüyük, deputy for Erzurum, also gave his resignation.52

Several more resignations from the People's Party were announced on November 15.53 The November 15 issue of Vatan wrote that although more deputies were expected to resign from the People's Party, Kemalist intimidation had prevented more from already doing so.54 The November 18 issue of Tevhid-i Efkar reported that another deputy, Mustafa, deputy for Bayezid, had resigned from the People's Party, and added that about fifteen more deputies were expected to resign during the week.55 On November 24, Vakit

51. Yakup Kadı Karaşmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıll, p.74; and, Vakit, November 10, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.102.
52. Tevhid-i Efkar, November 11, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.103.
53. The Times, November 18, 1924.
55. Tevhid-i Efkar, November 18, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.106. [Mustafa isminde bir Bayezit milletvekili yok]
announced that Osman Nuri Özpay, deputy for Bursa, Necati Kurtulus, deputy for Bursa, Abdülgani Ensari, deputy for Mardin, Necip Güven, deputy for Mardin, Dr. Ömer Sevki, deputy for Sivas, Halil Isik, deputy for Ertugrul, had resigned.  

On November 17, the Minister of the Interior and the Director of Public Safety granted the opposition deputies the necessary legal approval for the formation of a new party, to be called the Republican Progressive Party. Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pasha was named Secretary-General, and Kazim Karabekir was expected to be elected president.  

Rauf Orbay and his friends put the principle of national sovereignty above all and opposed the President's having the right of veto and the power of dissolution of the Assembly. They desired that the President of the Republic should be more or less of a figurehead, and their pursuit of such a policy must entail an open breach with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.  

It was thought that some thirty other dissidents would quickly join the new party. If, as was expected, the new party took the title of Republican, it would be a marked rejoinder to the partisans of the Government, who continued their abusive campaign against the members of the opposition, accusing them of being monarchists, caliphatists, and all-round reactionaries and declared that they were seeking to establish a republic of generals such as may be found in China.  

The program of the new party was said to differ but little from that of the People's Party, but the essential points would be set out in the declaration which the party would shortly submit to the Government. Meanwhile it was known that direct and universal suffrage, the popular election of prefects and the abolition of the presidential rights of veto

56. Vakit, November 24, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması. 1923-1931, p.106.  
58. The Times, November 10, 1924.  
59. The Times, November 11, 1924.
were among the main planks.60

Article 12 of the principles of the Progressive Party proposed that "the person elected to be President of the Republic would lose his quality as deputy immediately after his election". It was obvious that if this principle were carried out Mustafa Kemal Atatürk would lose his exceptional right to preside over the Assembly, and a first breach would be made in his cumulated powers.61

It included a strong denunciation of all forms of despotism and oligarchy, and of the undue predominance in the state of any individual. The Progressives further declared themselves against sectarianism, and advocated a broad spirit of toleration and a programme of legal modernisation.62

Contrary to the charges made against it by its opponents, the Progressives were more radical and more constitutional than the ruling clique. There was a distinct impression among the opposition that the constitution was not being administered in the democratic spirit in which it was conceived, and that in practice the government of the country was at present a thinly disguised oligarchy.63

The Progressives' general tendency was towards greater liberalism, and they were not satisfied to hear arbitrary measures condoned on the score of the "low intellectual level of the country", "lack of political education", and so forth.64

The draft Constitution presented to the Assembly the previous spring had contained clauses giving to the President considerable powers of vetoing legislation and of dissolving the Assembly. Though presidential power had been drastically curtailed in April, many were surprised that this had transpired without much comment on the part of Atatürk. In light of recent developments, Kemalist deputies became anxious to restore these through

60. *The Times*, November 11, 1924.
61. *The Times*, December 18, 1924.
62. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, November 24, 1924 [p.82].
63. *The Times*, November 13, 1924.
64. *The Times*, November 13, 1924.
renewed constitutional revision. It was this proposal which aroused intense opposition, and undoubtedly precipitated the formation of the Progressive Republican Party. The eventual fall of the İnönü Cabinet would severely check any new developments in this direction.65

The press widely praised the arrival of this new party.66 The Progressive Republicans quickly began a campaign designed to further lessen Kemalist influence. They urged deputies with milder anti-Kemalist feelings to form their own opposition groups, thereby reducing the size of the People's Party in the Assembly.67

In spite of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's threats, made especially during his Black Sea tour, the single party system came to an end.68

The Son Telgraf of November 17 reported that Unionists, under the leadership of Kara Kemal Bey and Cavid Bey, fearing reprisal against the new party due to their presence, had not decided whether to join, or to establish their own party.69 In the Vakit of November 18, Kara Kemal Bey denied that any decision was being contemplated.70 Vakit, however, commented on the fact that old Unionists such as Ismail Canbulat, deputy for Istanbul, and Sükrü Bey, deputy for Kocaeli and former Minister of Communication, were members of the new party, indicating that such negotiations were possible.71

CLEARLY, discontent with the Kemalist government had been growing for some time. Istanbul was notoriously disenchanted with the quasi-dictatorship in Ankara, and, in this respect, it was significant that no pro-government newspaper was able properly to pay its

65. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, November 24, 1924 [p.82].
68. The Times, November 11, 1924.
69. Son Telgraf, November 17, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.103.
70. Vakit, November 18, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.103.
71. Vakit, November 19, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, pp.103-104.
way in Istanbul. Most significant, however, was the fact that the opposition's leadership consisted of Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, Adnan Adivar, Ismail Canbulat, and Kazim Karabekir Pasha, all of them Istanbul deputies.\footnote{72}

But this discontent was by no means confined to Istanbul. In the aegean coast, Izmir was none too happy. In addition, almost all of the towns along the Black Sea littoral were thoroughly anti-Kemalist. Atatürk's trip through the Black Sea littoral had been first and foremost a courageous tour undertaken in order to encourage the growth of the People's Party and its principles among people who had shown themselves but lukewarm adherents. The sharpness of some of his speeches there indicated that he had found the situation there even more unfavourable than he had expected.\footnote{73}

In the speeches he gave at Trabzon and Samsun, Atatürk identified himself as President of the Republic with the People's Party, and insisted that the People's Party alone was to be considered as embodying the true principles of Republicanism and of intellectual and social evolution. In his speeches he had demanded that the formation of other parties had to be adjourned until the Republic was upon a firmer foundation. These Trabzon and Samsun speeches might in fact be regarded as the throwing down of the gauntlet by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was quickly picked up. The argument that the President of the Republic had no business to remain the avowed leader of a party caucus was again revived, and it was pointed out in several of the leading newspapers that whereas it might have been feasible to force all the deputies into one party so long as the Assembly had the single preoccupation of winning the War of Independence, it was absurd and undemocratic to attempt to maintain such barrack-square discipline in peace time.\footnote{74}

The \textit{Vatan} of November 21 urged the president to remain above party politics and play the role of an arbiter in order to protect democracy and progress in the country.\footnote{75}

\footnote{72. \textit{The Times}, November 13, 1924.}
\footnote{73. \textit{The Times}, November 13, 1924.}
\footnote{74. \textit{The Times}, November 13, 1924.}
\footnote{75. Ahmed Emin Yalman, \textit{Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim}, Vol.3, p.151.}
THREE DAYS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT of the new opposition party, the majority of the People's Party deputies rejected Atatürk's proposal to declare a state of emergency. With this rejection, the İsmet İnönü Cabinet tendered its resignation on November 21. The following day, newspapers announced that İsmet İnönü had resigned for reasons of health, and that Fethi Okyar was given the task of forming a new cabinet. Because he was considered Atatürk's loyal strong-arm man and not a politician in his own right, his cabinet was largely expected to be temporary. The fact that he was not given a leading position within the People's Party confirmed this suspicion.

Fethi Okyar had immediately set to work on November 21. Acting in close consultation with Atatürk, or, to be more precise, taking orders from him, he produced his cabinet list that day. In an attempt to prevent further defection, it included Sükrü Saracoğlu, deputy for İzmir, and Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, deputy for İzmir, two moderate Kemalists who had opposed the president's unlimited powers of veto and dissolution of the Assembly. The marked absence of a Minister of Defence, however, constituted a weakness and only confirmed that this cabinet would be one of transition. As one observer remarked, it was, on the whole, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's cabinet of preference, "consisting of one right-hand man and a lot of dummies".

Hüseyin Avni Ulas had expressed the view that the causes for the formation of the new party was the same as those for the formation of the Second Group.

76. See Atatürk, Nutuk?, also Avni Dogan
77. Vakit, November 22, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.105.
78. The Times, November 24, 1924.
79. Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, 1923-1931, p.105n.
81. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, November 24, 1924 [p.81].
82. Vakit, November 23, 1924, quoted in Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti
On November 21, Atatürk received Mr. Macartney, *The Times* correspondent. He made his position vis-à-vis the Progressives quite clear: he stated that they were insincere in their republicanism, that their programme was a fraud, and that they were mere reactionaries. Clearly, the President would have nothing to do with the new opposition. His language and the tone of his remarks, not reported in *The Times*, indicated that he would do more than remain aloof; he would fight this new party to the bitter end. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reportedly worked himself up into a perfect frenzy, turning red in the face as he ticked off one by one each member of the liberal opposition, whom he characterised as disloyal, ungrateful, and seditious. Apparently, Hamdülah Suphi Tanrıöver, the deputy for Istanbul who acted at the interview partly as introducer and partly as interpreter, interrupted more than once, exclaiming: "Be calm, Gazi Pasha, do not be so indiscreet," but nothing could check the flood of indignation. Though *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the official Kemalist organ, later published an extremely edited version of the interview, it remained clear that he was extremely uncomfortable with the establishment of an opposition party so openly opposed to the establishment of a dictatorship.

If the new Progressive Republican Party was not particularly strong in number, it was influential. Only about thirty deputies had actually resigned from the People's Party, and not all of these had joined the Progressives. But the new opposition certainly consisted of the most intelligent men in the Assembly, and it was clear that they had a measure of unspoken support.

On November 25, *Tanin* published a strong appeal to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,

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Yönetimi'nin Kurulması. 1923-1931, p.107.

83. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, November 25, 1924 [p.83].


85. F.O.424/261, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, November 24, 1924 [p.82].
urging him to resign his presidency of the People's Party. Though he denied that such a statement could be rigorously exact, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın in effect declared that while a form of national sovereignty had been nominally established, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was actually supreme in both the Party and the Assembly, the majority of which was composed of his creatures, owing to his influence over officials who had gerrymandered the elections in his favour. At the very least, he said, appearances lent credence to this view. He applauded the fall of İsmet İnönü Cabinet in this connection, and reiterated the demand that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk submit to the exigencies of national sovereignty.86

Despite these attacks, the Fethi Okyar Cabinet received a unanimous vote of confidence on November 27. One hundred and eighty-eight deputies had voted.87

Enraged by mounting criticism in Tanin and Vatan, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wrote an anonymous letter to Hür Fikir, a provincial paper in İzmit, in which he criticized the concept of a free press. Neither misled nor undeterred, Ahmed Emin Yalman replied in the December 1 issue of Vatan that Atatürk should be glad that a free press still existed in Turkey. He continued to say that one had every right to fear the elimination of the freedom of the press as long as a regime where a strong military leader exerted influence in politics remained. He added, moreover, that the nation had every right to demand that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk drop some of his hopes and aspirations. Lastly, Yalman expressed his regret that Atatürk did not think of resigning the leadership of the People's Party.88

THE BY-ELECTIONS to fill the thirteen vacancies in the Assembly were to be held in mid-December. There was a persistent rumour that Atatürk was planning to come to Istanbul to lend his support to the People's Party's candidate who was running for Marshall Fevzi

86. The Times, November 27, 1924.
87. The Times, December 1, 1924.
Cakmak Pasha's seat. The latter had opted to remain in the army. Although the Istanbul by-election would probably be held on December 11, by the beginning of the month, neither the People's Party nor the Progressive Republicans had officially announced their candidates. Nonetheless, it was generally felt that Hakki Sinasi Erel Pasha, formerly a naval surgeon, would be the Kemalist candidate. On December 11, Hakki Sinasi Erel Pasha, ran against Ali Ihsan Sabis Pasha, the pro-Progressive independent candidate, winning by a vote of one thousand and forty-three to one hundred and five. Only Tevhid-i Efkar commented on the results in its December 13 issue, declaring that these did not reflect the sentiments of the city, but instead, showed how efficient the People's Party's electoral organisation was when supported by the resources of the Government; without question, the by-elections had been heavily rigged.

**IN AN INTERVIEW** with the Times correspondent Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said that in countries which had adopted the principle of national sovereignty, and more especially in those countries which possessed a republican form of government, the existence of political parties was quite natural. It was beyond doubt that in the Turkish Republic also parties would be formed which would control one another. In the presence, therefore, of this perfectly normal situation the attitude of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk "could not be otherwise than normal". The president declared categorically that "the formation of a new political party was subject in Turkey to compliance with certain legal formalities." Thoroughly exasperated with the climate of open criticism which prevailed, the Kemalists proposed a bill, tabled by Ali Saib Ursavas, deputy for Kozan, which would require that a newspaper's managing director be at least thirty-five years of age; that he and

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89. *The Times*, December 2, 1924.  
90. *The Times*, December 8, 1924.  
92. *The Times*, December 18, 1924. See also *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, December 11, 1924, for the Turkish version of the interview. It has been printed in Nimet Unan (Ed.), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demecleri*, Vol.3, pp.76-77.
his staff hold high school diplomas; that all newspapers write in favour of a republican regime; that a newspaper be suppressed for illegal publications and its assets seized; and that the proprietor of a newspaper which was once been suppressed be forbidden to found another. 93

The press in general was getting into hot water. On December 30, the police, acting under orders from Ankara, closed the Orient News, an English newspaper, which had been critical of internal policy. Following the publication of an article which compared the growth of the People's Party to ivy entwining and strangling a poplar tree, the newly-founded Toksöz, the editor of which was Abdulkadir Kemali Ögütcü, the liberal ex-deputy for Kastamonu, was also closed. 94

RECEB PEKER, the Kemalist Minister of the Interior, resigned after the cabinet declared itself in favour of making the office of the Prefect of Istanbul elective as it was in other prefectures. Because this reform was included in the Progressive platform, the cabinet's position was a clear indication of their strength. If they had been meeting with only small success in the by-elections, the Progressive Republican Party at least had the satisfaction of seeing that several of its ideas were gaining ground. 95 Receb Peker, who had persistently supported the principle of appointment rather than election for the prefecture of Istanbul, was then appointed Secretary-General of the People's Party. 96

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, division within the People's Party was far from non-existent. The decision on municipalities had only helped illustrate this deep division between the two opposing mentalities. On January 8, 1925, Vatan published an editorial

93. Like most soldiers in all countries, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, too, was no lover of the press. He said to the Times correspondent that there was no need for him to explain out of his own mouth the fact that many newspapers at Istanbul criticised the People's Party and its Government, and that they showed themselves well disposed towards the opposition (The Times, December 18, 1924).
94. The Times, January 3, 1925.
95. The Times, January 6, 1925.
which put this split squarely before the public. On the one hand, Yalman said, there were politicians within the People's Party who thought of Turkey as essentially backward, and, having a military frame of mind, insisted on a centralised and nonrepresentative regime. On the other, there were politicians who thought it not only possible but highly desirable to let people rule themselves under the aegis of democratic local elections. 97

After further examination, the cabinet again decided in favour of the proposal that the Prefect of Istanbul be elected by the municipality. The matter was scheduled for review at the January 10 meeting of the People's Party. Though the outcome of this meeting could not be easily predicted, the possibility of a change of cabinet was very real. 98

The division within the People's Party on this issue became so sharp that a formal split seemed inevitable. Atatürk, who was at Konya at the time intervened, and the issue was momentarily dropped. 99 In his Konya speech, delivered on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the İnönü Battle, Atatürk portrayed İsmet İnönü in the best possible way so as to take off some of the pressure exerted on him by the liberal opposition. 100

Under constant Progressive attack for his dictatorial ambitions, Atatürk attempted to placate public opinion by confessing to some of the charges, but denying that he had ever been a dictator; he had always acted in good faith. His accusors, he said, were the real traitors. He added that the ruthless suppression of the opposition had been carried out for the good of both the nation and the people. 101

In the Bursa by-elections, the opposition candidate, Nureddin Pasha, defeated the People's Party's candidate, Emin Bey, prefect of Istanbul. Citing the reason that because Nureddin Pasha had not resigned from the Supreme War Council, the Elections Committee

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98. The Times, January 10, 1925.
of the Assembly, dominated by the Kemalists, refused to recognise the validity of the elections, and the matter was referred to the Assembly for further consideration. After heated discussion, the Assembly invalidated Nureddin Pasha's election by a vote of one hundred and thirty-five to fifty-six. A second round of elections was ordered, but because Nureddin Pasha had by now complied with the law and would most certainly be re-elected, the People's Party decided to avoid embarrassment and not run against him.

It was not until the discussion of the budget came to the Assembly floor that the Kemalists returned to their tactics of intimidation. Ali Cetinkaya, deputy for Afyon and one of Atatürk's staunchest supporters, shot another deputy, Halid Pasha, during an Assembly debate on February 10. Halid Pasha died four days later. The press expressed concern and condemned such terror tactics, but nothing happened, and Ali Cetinkaya ran free.

FURTHER DEBATE ON THE BUDGET concerned the Ministry of the Interior. On February 14, several deputies denounced the Ministry for its handling of the by-elections. Feridun Fikri Düsünsel, opposition deputy for Dersim, claimed that second degree electors at Kemah, Erzurum, had been imprisoned and that the governor had intimidated voters by armed force. He also claimed that after the elections, the governor of Kayseri had refused to open the ballot box, suspecting that the independents had won.

THOUGH, ON FEBRUARY 23, the Government had decided to acknowledge the seriousness of the Kurdish Revolt, by the time of the meeting of the People's Party the following day, little more was known about the situation. Fethi Okyar announced, however, that fresh legislation would be introduced in which any newspaper or speech that used religion as a

102. *The Times*, January 6, 1925.
103. *The Times*, January 20, 1925.
105. *The Times*, February 16, 1925.
means to incite popular excitement would be considered seditious. Surprisingly, he rejected the proposal to proclaim martial law in Istanbul, indicating that he might be more independent from Atatürk than anyone had imagined. 107

On February 26, news arrived that a town in the province of Mamuret-el-Aziz had been retaken from the insurgents. It was interesting to note that they had been chased out by the inhabitants, and not by government troops. 108 On February 28, all danger of any extension of the Kurdish Revolt was said to be at an end, and the area affected was limited roughly to the district forty-five miles long by twenty-five miles wide of which Palu was at the north-west corner. Not only had many of the Kurdish tribes refused to respond to call Sheikh Said’s call, but many tribesmen had reportedly gone to Diyarbakir to cooperate with the regular army. 109 Despite this, martial law was declared. Meanwhile, the People’s Party’s proposed amendments to the Law of Treason were duly passed in the Assembly. The penalty for infraction carried a sentence of anywhere from two years’ imprisonment to death. Singling out the press, the government warned that any news designed to encourage the rebellious-minded would be dealt with drastically. 110 Vatan responded on March 1 with an article which suggested that the Kurdish rebellion could well become a pretext for taking hostile action against not only the liberal press but also the Progressive Republicans. 111

Because of the generally conciliatory approach he had adopted, Fethi Okyar had been governing with the tacit support of the Progressive Republicans for the past three months. He had been put into office for three reasons: to allow for Ismet Inönü’s “recovery”, to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, and to stop the disintegration of the People’s Party. His position had been difficult: he was constantly dependent on the

108. *The Times*, February 27, 1925.
110. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 3, 1925 (p.109).
People's Party for support, which was not always forthcoming. Since the beginning of January, both the head of the Party, İsmet İnönü, and its Secretary-General, Recep Peker, had been lobbying against him. Moreover, İsmet İnönü and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who had both stretched the letter of the law by attending cabinet meetings, were de facto in control of the cabinet.  

An important meeting of the People's Party was to be held on March 2, when Fethi Okyar was expected to report on both the revolt and his recent conversations with Progressive Republican Party leaders. The situation was complicated by a dispatch from the Ankara correspondent of the semi-official Cumhuriyet, which suggested that he might resign, to be replaced by İsmet İnönü.  

Many Kemalist deputies were dissatisfied with what they considered to be the soft approach the government had taken with respect to the Kurds, and, on March 2, the meeting of the People's Party became a struggle between these extremists, who wished to see martial law proclaimed throughout the country, and Fethi Okyar, who had declared that the situation was in hand, and that further exceptional measures were unwarranted for the time being.  

The meeting of the People's Party lasted over ten hours, and ended with Fethi Okyar in the minority. In fact, he might well have won the struggle had it not been for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's intervention on behalf of the extremists. These seized the chance to oust a prime minister they had never liked, and, in the words of one deputy, "to complete the revolution", presumably through vigorous measures against the Progressive Republican Party, the press, and any other institutions suspected of working against the existing regime.  

That day, the Fethi Okyar Cabinet was given a vote of no confidence by a vote of  

112. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 3, 1925 [p.100].  
113. The Times, March 3, 1925.  
114. The Times, March 3, 1925.  
115. The Times, March 4, 1925; and, The Times, March 5, 1925.  
116. The Times, March 4, 1925.
ninety to sixty. He resigned, and, as predicted, was replaced by İsmet İnönü. 117 Fethi Okyar was appointed Turkish Ambassador to Paris. 118

117. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.112].

118. A British diplomat's views on the personality of Fethi Okyar was precise and to the point: "Whether from a dog-like fidelity to Mustafa Kemal's person or from lack of political perception, Fethi Okyar shows no resentment whatever at his treatment, and is as happy as a sand-boy at the prospect of Paris" (F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 24, 1925 [p.131]).
Chapter 22

MILITARY DICTATORSHIP INSTITUTIONALISED, 1925-1927

ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 4, the People's Party held a meeting to present the new Government's programme. It approved, and on that afternoon, it was presented to the Assembly. Among the proposals, two measures were drawn up to address the special needs of the moment: a law for the "stabilisation of tranquillity", and a call for the establishment of two tribunals of independence.¹ Under the former, the government would have the right, subject to the President's consent, to suppress any organisations, publications, or institutions which had proven themselves contrary to the interests of the nations. The latter proposal called for the establishment of Tribunals both in the area under martial law and in Ankara. Whereas the first Tribunal would have full powers, death sentences handed down by the Ankara Tribunal would be subject to approval by the Assembly.²

Kazim Karabekir, the leader of the opposition Progressive Republicans, while supporting the disciplinary measures against the Kurdish insurrectionists, refused to accept the measures which he felt were calculated to crush the natural rights of both the citizens and the press. He declared that the Government's proposal was a discredit to the Republic. After other deputies had also denounced the proposal as a calumny against the Turkish nation, Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pasha raised the issue of the recent cabinet crisis, demanding that Ismet Inönü explain why the Assembly had so suddenly withdrawn its support for Fethi

¹. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.113].
². The Times, March 6, 1925.
Okyar. Only a week earlier, the opposition pointed out, Fethi Okyar had been given a unanimous vote of confidence, and asked what could have happened since to justify its reversal. Ismet İnönü declined to furnish any explanation.

The Progressive deputies continued to argue against the Law for the Maintenance of Order, claiming that it could not but open the doors to an absolutist regime far worse than that of the Abdülhamid era. There would be left no freedom of speech, press, or life under the new law. Kazım Karabekir pointed out that although the restrictions on free speech did not apply to deputies, there was nothing to prevent further extension of these measures into the very halls of the Assembly itself. Feridun Fikri Düşünsel, deputy for Dersim and one of the prominent members of the Progressive Republican Party, said that the law reminded him of the Reign of Terror in France where thousands of innocent people had been sent to the gallows.

DESPITE THE PROGRESSIVES' STOUT OPPOSITION, the proposals both became law on March 5. Altogether, twenty-three deputies had voted against it, and two deputies had remained undecided. In its final form, the law gave the government the authority to apply restrictions for a period of two years. The Government, subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, could now, by administrative procedure, prohibit any organisation, or any incitement to reaction or revolt designed to disturb social order, public tranquillity or general security. Those guilty of such offences would be sent before a Tribunal of Independence. The law had been opposed largely on the grounds of its vagueness, and, indeed, it was difficult to imagine how the net of repression could have

3. The Times, March 6, 1925.
4. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.113].
5. The Times, March 6, 1925.
8. The Times, March 6, 1925.
been thrown out more widely. It virtually gave the Government a free hand to do what it wished for two years. Some felt that the Kemalist government had deliberately exaggerated news of the revolt and that the end of the revolt would not the end of repression, but the beginning of a new campaign against the Progressives and the liberal opposition.

The press felt the first effects of the Law. On March 6, the day after its passage, three Istanbul papers were suppressed -- Tevhid-i Efkar, Son Telgraf, and Istiklal. Tevhid-i Efkar was the newspaper with the largest circulation in Turkey. Later, Sebilürresad, Aydinlik, and Orak-Cekic were also closed down. Along with the Istanbul papers, the government suppressed Savha of Adana and Istiklal of Trabzon. It seemed certain that more newspapers would be closed, some, perhaps voluntarily, their staff unwilling to work under such impossibly cramped conditions. As some had foreseen, the government's new attitude differed from that of the Abdülhamid regime. Yet, despite the eventual suspension of some eight daily and periodical publications throughout Turkey, Ankara tried to reassure the population through its own press.

On March 8, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared that the Government would not hesitate to use its new powers with firmness and energy in the interest of order and tranquillity. After noting with pride the manner in which the nation had rallied to the Republic, Atatürk called upon all officials, civilian as well as military, to forestall any incidents, rather than resort to repression after these had occurred, warning them that

9. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.113].
10. The Times, March 30, 1925.
11. F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.113].
12. The Times, March 7, 1925.
14. The Times, March 7, 1925.
15. The Times, March 7, 1925.
16. The Times, March 9, 1925.
negligence on their part would be severely punished.\textsuperscript{17}

The following day, the government closed down four more newspapers: Sadayi Hak of Izmir, Istikbal and Kakhaha of Trabzon and Presse de Soir of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{18} Two more newspapers in Trabzon would also go under, one in Eskisehir and another in Adana.\textsuperscript{19}

MUSTAFA NECATI UGURAL, deputy for Izmir and Procurator-General of the Tribunal of Independence in Ankara, resigned on the grounds that his brother was ill. A few days before, Hacim Muhittin Carikli, deputy for Giresun, President of the Tribunal in the area of the Kurdish revolt, had also resigned, this time on the grounds of his own illness. These two resignations seemed to suggest that some were unhappy with the apparent intent of the Tribunals. This view gained further credence with the fact that the governor of Adana, Hilmi Uran, had been summoned before the Ankara Tribunal because he had been less than cooperative in sending certain witnesses subpoenaed by the Tribunal.\textsuperscript{20}

ON MARCH 31, the Assembly considered a proposal which stipulated that death sentences handed down by military courts would be subject only to the approval of division commanders. The Progressives argued that this bill was a deliberate infringement of the rights of the Assembly, and a clear breach of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the bill passed by a vote of one hundred and twenty-one to twenty.\textsuperscript{21}

The Government became increasingly angry with the continued criticisms of the Progressives. An article in the April 2 issue of Hakimiyet-i Milliye, a government organ,

\textsuperscript{17} The Times, March 9, 1925. This declaration was printed in the March 8 issues of the newspapers (Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, Vol.3, p.164).
\textsuperscript{18} Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, Vol.3, p.164.
\textsuperscript{19} F.O.424/262, Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, March 10, 1925 [p.113].
\textsuperscript{20} The Times, March 23, 1925.
\textsuperscript{21} The Times, April 2, 1925.
declared that speeches made by members of the Progressive Republican Party produced the impression that the Republic was in the hands of a power hungry party which had consistently refused to recognize the most elementary rights of the Turkish people, and had muzzled both the press and the Assembly. Because these accusations were clearly groundless, the newspaper said, the presidents and members of several provincial branches of the Progressive Republican Party had been arrested on suspicion of inducement in reactionary intrigues. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* went on to say that the Progressives' nebulous attitude *vis-a-vis* the Kurdish revolt and the current agitation only made them more suspicious. These attacks strengthened the fear that the government would eventually use its extraordinary powers to crush the Progressive Republican Party altogether.  

AT MIDNIGHT ON APRIL 12, acting on instructions from Cemil Uybadin, deputy for Tekirdag and Minister of the Interior who was a graduate of the Military Academy, the police descended on the Istanbul headquarters of the Progressive Republican Party and its various branch offices throughout the city. All documents were seized, and because several people had been arrested at the suburban branch offices, it was expected that others at the head office would also be arrested. The raids were, reportedly, the culmination of an investigation conducted by the Ankara Tribunal of Independence into the Party's alleged arms dealings. Although nothing had been proven, the raids were designed to justify the government's position that the mere existence of an opposition led to intrigue and constituted a danger to national security.  

On the morning of April 16, the editors of *Tanin* received orders from the government to cease publication effective the following day. The order did not specify the length of the closure. Nor was any reason offered. The action was relatively unexpected

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at this juncture, since *Tanin* had refrained from covering the current political situation for several weeks. Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, its editor, whom the People's Party leadership looked upon with suspicion since he was one of the ablest supporters of the Progressive Republican Party, was arrested at two o'clock on the morning of April 19, and immediately sent to Ankara to face charges. Already, three members of his staff were in Ankara for questioning. Upon Yalcin's arrival, all four were officially charged with breaching the recently enacted Law for the Maintenance of Order.

The charges against Yalcin were based on the fact that *Tanin* had described the police search of the Progressive Republican Party headquarters in Istanbul as a "raid". Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin defended himself by saying that he could not accept punishment on matters of thought or journalism. His trial ended on May 7. He was condemned to perpetual banishment and ordered exiled from Istanbul, to be sent to Corum, a small provincial town in Anatolia halfway between Ankara and Samsun. Based on Article 17 of the Law for the Maintenance of Order, the severity of the sentence was largely due to the nature of Yalcin's defence. He had argued that a guilty verdict could only be a violation of law and justice, proving that the proceedings had been directed solely by force and premeditated vengeance.

Despite the fact that the government would probably have dissolved it long before, the Progressive Republican Party, on May 18, announced its intention to hold a general congress in Istanbul that June. The government organs, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* and *Cumhuriyet*, pointed to the likelihood of wholesale suppression of the Progressive Republican Party on the eve of its general congress.

25. *The Times*, April 17, 1925.
30. *The Times*, May 9, 1925.
32. *The Times*, June 6, 1925.
The following day, on May 19, the Diyarbakir Tribunal of Independence condemned Fethi Bey, Secretary-General of the Progressive Republican Party, to three years' detention in a fortress. The Tribunal also ordered the closing of all Progressive clubs within its jurisdiction. The decision was ominous.\footnote{The Times, May 21, 1925.}

On June 4, the Government issued a long decree which finally closed all branches of the Progressive Republican Party. Progressive organisation, it claimed, was being used as a reactionary tool.\footnote{Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, Vol.3, p.165.} The government requested Yalman, editor of Vatan, to publish a condemnation of the Progressives, coming out in favour of the government's move. Despite continuous pressure, Yalman refused to be part of this totally unjust smear campaign against the Progressive Republican Party, which, in the end, prompted Ankara's decision to close Vatan down.\footnote{Ahmed Emin Yalman, Gördüklerim ve Gecirdiklerim, Vol.3, p.170.}

ON JULY 27, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk presided over a secret Assembly meeting. The meeting was attended by those cabinet ministers currently in Ankara, members of the Tribunal of Independence, and several deputies from the People's Party. It was believed that fresh measures against the liberal opposition and their alleged reactionary allies were imminent. Vakit predicted more arrests to be imminent. Vatan, however, reported that these had already taken place, naming several well-known men who were currently in detention, including several former members of the Committee of Union and Progress.\footnote{The Times, July 30, 1925.}

At the request of the Public Prosecutor of the Tribunal of Independence at Elaziz, four leading journalists were arrested on August 11. They were Ahmed Emin Yalman, owner of Vatan, Ismail Müştak Mayakon, a former journalist working for Yalcin's Tanin, Subhi Nuri İleri, editor of İleri, and Ahmed Sükrü Esmer, editor of Vatan.\footnote{The Times, August 13, 1925.} Vatan, the
last remaining independent newspaper in Istanbul, was closed down on August 12 by a
decision of the Tribunal of Independence at Elaziz. 38

With the exception of Abdülkadir Kemali Ögütçü, the owner of Töksöz, whose
case had been referred to the Tribunal of Independence in Ankara, all the journalists
arrested in August were acquitted at Elaziz. 39

ATATÜRK was becoming more and more clearly the absolute dictator of the state, and the
decisions taken, even in matters of the highest importance, were ever more likely to be in
accordance with his personal wishes. The elements of uncertainty as to state policy which
were inseparable from any dictatorship became very strongly marked. 40

On the way from Bursa to Izmir, Atatürk made a speech at Balikesir in which he
threatened all who might venture to oppose the advance of the Turkish nation towards
progress and civilization. The speech was primarily aimed at the members of the liberal
opposition, and was especially interesting in view of the movement which was on foot
among the Kemalist electors of Istanbul to compel Refet Bele Pasha, Kazım Karabekir
Pasha, and other liberal deputies who had gone into opposition to resign their seats. 41

The Istanbul by-elections which were held in October saw the Republican People's
Party win two seats: one formerly held by the liberal opposition, the other formerly held by
Fethi Okyar. During the election, a referendum was circulated among the secondary
electors which demanded the suspension of five Progressive Republican Party deputies on
the ground that these had failed to defend the rights of the people. The five Istanbul
deputies were Refet Bele Pasha, Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir Pasha, Dr. Adnan Adivar,
and Ismail Canbulat. The referendum was endorsed by a majority of the secondary

39. The Times, September 15, 1925.
40. F.O.424/263, Sir Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, September 28, 1925
[p.36].
41. The Times, October 12, 1925.
electors, many of whom were government officials, and in accordance with this procedure, locally considered to be constitutional -- although, in reality, it was far from being constitutional -- the five deputies were suspended from all legislative duties. 42

TOWARDS THE END OF NOVEMBER, opposition to Kemalist repression had become quite vocal in several Anatolian towns. At Erzurum, Ismet İnönü admitted, a group of malcontents had closed the bazaar and demonstrated in front of the government building. 43 According to the Aksam of November 28 [?], one hundred and fourteen people were arrested, of whom three had been condemned to death and two condemned to ten years' imprisonment. Rumours were also appearing in the press that discontent had become manifest at Sivas, Trabzon, and Rize. Given the state of the Turkish press, it seemed probable that the situation was even worse than reported. 44

The enforcement of a new law which demanded that men wear modern hats met with considerable opposition in Maras, which culminated in a meeting at the principal mosque, during which a religious banner was displayed. People were arrested and brought before the Tribunal of Independence in Ankara, and an attempt was made by the prosecution to implicate the Progressive Republican Party. The trial ended on January 18, 1926, when twenty-two people were sentenced, seven to death. 45 In addition, six men were sentenced by the Tribunal of Independence to various prison terms for having made anti-hat propaganda in Kayseri. 46

In January, a more serious disturbance took place in Rize. Troops were quickly dispatched from Trabzon, and the incident ended with eight executions. 47

42. The Times, October 27, 1925.
43. The Times, November 28, 1925.
44. The Times, November 30, 1925.
45. The Times, February 3, 1926.
46. The Times, February 10, 1926.
47. The Times, February 3, 1926.
On June 19, the press announced the discovery of an assassination plot against the President at Izmir. Reportedly, one of those involved denounced the conspiracy at the last moment while Atatürk was on his way from Bursa.

Apparently, one or two assassins had arrived in Izmir from Istanbul, to be joined by one or two others who were known to have been *fedais* since the days of the Committee of Union and Progress. It was said that the assassins were working under the direct orders of an ex-deputy as well as a current deputy who had been a member of the Progressive Republican Party. According to Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, a staunch Kemalist deputy as well as the owner and editor of the semi-official *Cumhuriyet*, who went to Izmir and had interviewed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as well as members of the Tribunal of Independence, the plot against the President had been hatched specifically by members of the Progressive Republican Party. The preparation and execution of the plot, he said, was given to a committee headed by Ahmed Sükrü Bey, deputy for Kocaeli, who was in close touch with Kara Kemal Bey, a Unionist. Allegedly Cavid Bey, presently the Turkish representative to the Council of the Public Debt, had provided all funding. As a matter of course, there were wholesale arrests.

Most of what had been the parliamentary opposition now seemed to be in prison or under house arrest. In the first category were Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, and Cafer Tayyar Egilmez Pashas. In the latter category were Refet Bele Pasha, who had recently returned from abroad, Bekir Sami Kundul, and Ismail Canbulat. Less known opposition members in the previous Assembly, and those who had belonged to the now abolished Progressive Republican Party, had either been arrested or put under constant surveillance. Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the Unionist leaders, was arrested along with other

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48. F.O.424/264, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, June 23, 1926 [p.93].
50. F.O.424/264, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, June 23, 1926 [p.93].
prominent Unionists such as Ahmed Sükrü Bey, deputy for Kocaeli and a former Minister of Education as well as of the Post and Telegraph Unionist cabinets. 51 Abidin Bey, deputy for Saruhan, Arif Bey, deputy for Eskisehir, Münnir Hüsrev Göle, deputy for Erzurum, Midhat Sükrü Bleda, a minister of education in the days of the Committee of Union and Progress, the former deputies Edib Salaheddin Köseoglu, ex-deputy for Mersin, Hüseyin Avni Ulas, ex-deputy for Erzurum, Hafiz Mehmed Engin, ex-deputy for Trabzon, and Eyüb Sabri Akgöl, ex-deputy for Eskisehir, together with Vasif [Karakol], ex-deputy for Sivas and secretary-general of the Progressive Party, and Rasim Bey, the brother of Ismail Canbulat. Many of those were arrested at Istanbul and were sent in a torpedo-boat to Izmir. 52 Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Refet Bele Pashas were shipped off to Izmir. Also Bekir Sami Kunduh, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faik Bey, brother of Ziya Hursid; Cavid Bey had been arrested; Cafer Tayyar Egîlmez and many others besides including every name in the opposition that was ever heard of, except Dr. Adnan Adivar, who was in England for a year, and Rauf Orbay, the real leader of the Progressives, who had left for Europe at the end of May. Most people considered that the Government was making another effort to kill an opposition which everybody thought had been killed a year ago. 53 Nearly all the Progressive deputies in Turkey had been arrested, together with many members of the first Assembly. 54

THE CONSPIRACY TRIAL began on June 26 at Izmir. The public prosecutor opened with a long and detailed account of the conspiracy. According to the prosecutor, though Sükrü Bey, former minister of Education under the Committee of Union and Progress, and now

51. F.O.424/264, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, June 23, 1926 [p.93], and The Times, June 21, 1926.
52. The Times, June 21, 1926.
53. F.O.424/265, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, June 28, 1926 [pp.1-2].
54. The Times, June 22, 1926.
deputy for Kocaeli, was, in fact, the ring leader, he was helped by Abdülkadir Bey, a former governor of Ankara, whom the police had not as yet succeeded in arresting.  

During the first round of interrogations, all the arrested generals, with the exception of Rüştü Pasha, deputy for Erzurum, denied any knowledge of the conspiracy against the President. Great attention was given to the circumstances attending the formation of the Progressive Republican Party, and the generals' motives for having joined it. Kazim Karabekir's cross-examination on the July 4 sitting, for example, largely consisted of queries and answers relating to the necessity for opposition parties and their role in post-war Turkey. Karabekir said that he joined the Progressive Republican Party because he had been consistently excluded from political matters, including the decision to establish the Republic.

Indeed, every day the trial assumed more and more a political aspect and a great deal of evidence had more of a bearing on past history than on the actual conspiracy. The prosecution generally seemed intent on proving that the Progressive Republican Party was the direct offspring of the Second Group of the first Assembly, which, in turn, was the child of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Cavid Bey was among those examined on July 6. The Tribunal decided to send him to Ankara, where he would be tried afresh, together with other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. The pro-government newspapers continued to circulate rumours that Cavid Bey and other members of the Committee of Union and Progress were the true instigators of the plot which, in fact, extended beyond the murder of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and included a whole series of political assassinations designed to effect a change of

56. The Times. July 1, 1926.
57. The Times. July 6, 1926.
58. The Times. July 1, 1926.
60. F.O.424/265, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, July 21, 1926 [p.8].
regime. There were, however, no facts to substantiate these claims.\footnote{The Times, July 8, 1926.}

Ali Bey, President of the Tribunal, in conversation with the correspondent of Aksam, said that the Izmir trials had made it clear that the Progressive Republican Party consisted of three elements: first, former members of the Committee of Union and Progress; second, those who had been in opposition under the name of the Second Group in the first Assembly; and third, those discontented politicians who opposed the government for personal reasons. Despite the lack of substantiation, he stated that it had been officially established that the Progressive Republican Party was responsible for the plot, and that the plot was indeed designed to bring down the present government.\footnote{The Times, July 12, 1926.}

The first part of the trial at Izmir ended on July 13. Though the public prosecutor had asked that eleven of the defendants be given death sentences, the Tribunal went better than that and condemned fourteen to be hanged, including two Kara Kemal Bey and Abdülkadir Bey who had not yet been apprehended. Ahmet Sükru Bey was one of the condemned. An old Committee of Union and Progress man, e had been the Minister of Public Education in the cabinet which had launched Turkey into the First World War, and, according to the authorities, he had been the chief organiser of various political assassinations in 1910 and 1911. Apparently, at one time, he had even tried to effect the removal of Colonel Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, now the President. Ismail Canbulat, deputy for Istanbul, ex-Unionist, and one of the founders of the Progressive Republican Party, was also condemned to death. Rüsdü Pasha's death sentence, however, was something of a surprise. He was a soldier and a general, though not a soldier of particularly high standing; nonetheless, as deputy for Erzurum, he had taken a prominent part in the parliamentary opposition of 1924. Two or three other deputies and ex-deputies were also condemned along with seven or eight considered to be assassins.\footnote{F.O.424/265, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, July 21, 1926 [p.8]. The Times, July 14, 1926.}
TRAVELLING BY SPECIAL TRAIN, the Tribunal of Independence arrived at Ankara on July 20, and the curtain rose on the second phase of the trial which was to deal with the instigators and the accomplices. These were Rauf Orbay and Dr. Adnan Adivar, who were abroad and had been summoned to submit to the court; Dr. Nazim Bey, one of the original founders of the Committee of Union and Progress; Rahmi Evrenos, a prominent Unionist and ex-governor of Izmir during the First World War; and Cavid Bey, one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and former Minister of Finance. When the news of the conspiracy and of the arrests appeared in the morning papers, Cavid had completely lost his head and a scene of the wildest excitement had taken place in his house, with all the deputies of the Progressive Party then in Istanbul rushing in and out.  

The trial in Ankara began with those who had been connected with the Committee of Union and Progress. The charges varied from conduct before and during the First World War, corruption, opposition to the present government during the Lausanne Conference, to the attempt to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Public Prosecutor, Necib Ali Küçüka, reiterated the government's claim that the plot against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not an act of vengeance but the starting point for a coup d'état organized by a secret committee of deputies from the Progressive Republican Party and the Committee of Union and Progress. He went on to accuse the Commitee of Union and Progress of having involved Turkey in the First World War. The prosecutor asked for sentences of hard labour for life in a fortress against thirteen of the accused, including Cavid Bey, Hüseyin Cahid Yalcin, Dr. Nazim Bey, Rauf Orbay, Dr. Adnan Adivar, Rahmi Evrenos, Küçük Talat Bey, and Azmi Bey.  

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64. F.O.424/265, Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, July 21, 1926 [p.8].
65. The Times, July 23, 1926.
66. The Times, August 4, 1926.
67. F.O.424/265, Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, August 4, 1926 [p.12]; and, The Times, August 4, 1926.
others. 68

If the proceedings of the first two days offered any indication, the trial would be a long one. The intention of the court appeared to be to extract as much information regarding the aims and activities of the Committee of Union and Progress from the time of the armistice onwards, and finally to discredit the liberal opposition by convincing the public that all its leaders had been connected with this thoroughly corrupt and seditious organisation. 69 It was clear by all accounts that the real aim was to totally purge the Committee of Union and Progress; and that this assassination attempt was being used to justify that aim. 70

The main object of the trial was to discover what had been going on among the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress since the War and thus enable the Tribunal to punish those deemed guilty of plotted against the present regime. It appeared that the chief articles of the Committee of Union and Progress's revised program were drawn up in Cavid Bey's house in Istanbul. They were first that the Committee of Union and Progress should be a radical party, secondly that Istanbul and not Ankara must be the capital of Turkey, thirdly that it was necessary to establish a more practical regime than that of the nationalists, fourthly that Turkey should have two chambers instead of one, fifthly that elections should be held on a basis of universal manhood suffrage. 71

With the completion of the cross examinations, the Prosecutor gave his final speech on August 23. Although at pains to state that the accused were not being judged for their wartime activities, Necib Ali Küçüka did nothing more than rake over the ashes of the past. He described the past sins of the Committee of Union and Progress, in great detail, laying great emphasis on the fact that at a time when Turkish soldiers were fighting against a superior enemy while their wives and children were starving at home, the Unionist leaders

68. The Times, August 4, 1926.
69. F.O.424/265, Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, August 4, 1926 [p.12].
70. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, Siyasal Anılar, p.281.
71. The Times, August 5, 1926.
were living in luxury and debauchery. As regards the actual charge of conspiracy, the prosecutor said that the members of the Committee of Union and Progress had formed the Progressive Republican Party, which was not illegal but was certainly ridiculous as such a party was unnecessary. Proven to be reactionary, the Progressive Republican Party was abolished by the Government, whereupon its leaders had formed the secret society, which had masterminded the plot on the President's life. By deliberately confusing the past and the present, the prosecutor doubtless hoped to gloss over the fact that the prosecution did not have a shred of evidence to support the charge of conspiracy. Despite the strictest surveillance of the secret police and extensive cross examination, the Tribunal had utterly failed to establish any relation between the actions of the accused and of those who were alleged to have been their agents. Unfortunately, these had already been hanged at Izmir.  

The prosecutor asked for the death sentence for the Committee of Union and Progress leadership. Not satisfied with blood alone, he also requested that the government seize those companies and Itibar-i Milli Bankası which, the prosecution alleged, had been formed with the ill-gotten gains of the Committee of Union and Progress.  

The Tribunal gave its decision on August 26, sentencing Cavid Bey, Dr. Nazim Bey, Hilmi Bey and Nail Bey to death. With their execution, the last of the old leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress disappeared.  

The trial which resulted in their deaths had throughout been a mockery. The charge was ignored, the case for the prosecution collapsed, if indeed it ever existed, and, so far as there was any defence, it did not matter one way or the other. The tribunal had doubtless been instructed from the outset as to the conviction which it should reach, and in the event, Ankara did much to justify the new name of Asmaköy, the hanging village, which was

72. F.O.424/265, Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, August 30, 1926 [p.19].

73. F.O.424/265, Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, August 30, 1926 [p.19 and 21]. It must have been with this decision of the Tribunal that the Itibari-i Milli Bankası was closed down and its assets were transferred to the Türkiye Is Bankası, the main shareholder of which was Atatürk.

74. The Times, August 27, 1926.
apparently being applied to it.\textsuperscript{75}

IT WAS NOT KNOWN whether the opposition leaders, notably Kazim Karabekir, Refet Bele and Ali Fuad Cebeşoy Pashas would be allowed to remain in politics as none of them were present when the Assembly opened in November.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed, they were forced to resign their seats in the Assembly.

The People's Party duly selected its candidates for the ten by-elections which were to be held in different parts of the country to fill the vacancies in the Assembly caused by the recent executions in Izmir and Ankara and by resignation.\textsuperscript{77} Ali Haydar Yulug, Fuad Agrali, and Ziyaeddin Karamursal were elected as Kemalist deputies for Istanbul without opposition. They won the seats formerly held by Refet Bele Pasha, who had resigned, Dr. Adnan Adivar, who was in exile in Europe, and Ismail Canbulat, who had been executed.\textsuperscript{78} Several days later, Refet Bele Pasha was placed on the list of retired army personnel.\textsuperscript{79}

AT A MEETING of the inner circle of the Republican People's Party on February 27, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk announced that although the Tribunals would shortly be dissolved, the Law for the Maintenance of Order would be prolonged for another two years.\textsuperscript{80} On March 3, İsmet İnönü presented this proposal to the Assembly and it was unanimously approved.\textsuperscript{81}

With general elections ahead, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his advisors turned their attention to the Assembly. The last Assembly had had two hundred and eighty-four

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{75. F.O.424/265, Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, August 30, 1926 [p.21].}
\footnote{76. \textit{The Times}, November 27, 1926.}
\footnote{77. \textit{The Times}, December 4, 1926.}
\footnote{78. \textit{The Times}, December 14, 1926.}
\footnote{79. \textit{The Times}, January 18, 1927.}
\footnote{80. \textit{The Times}, March 2, 1927.}
\footnote{81. \textit{The Times}, March 4, 1927.}
\end{footnotes}
deputies, but it was believed that due to increased population levels, the next Assembly would have upwards of three hundred. It was thought that only about half of the present Kemalist deputies would retain their seats, as the hocas, having served the Kemalist cause, were unlikely to be re-elected, and former army chiefs, such as Kazım Karabekir and Cafer Tayyar Egilmez Pashas, would also lose their seats.\textsuperscript{82}

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ismet Inönü, and Safvet Arikân, Secretary-General of the Republican People's Party, were primarily responsible for choosing the new deputies.\textsuperscript{83} The list of candidates for the coming elections were published. It gave a total of three hundred and fifteen candidates -- the Assembly would consist of three hundred and fifteen deputies, of whom one hundred and twelve had not previously been deputies. All these belonged to the Republican People's Party, and every prominent Kemalist figured in the list. None of the former Progressives was a candidate, and liberal-minded military leaders such as Ali Fuad Cebedoy, Kazım Karabekir, and Cafer Tayyar Egilmez Pashas had all but disappeared from political life.\textsuperscript{84} The elections were held at the beginning of September.\textsuperscript{85} One of the most notable features of the election was the total eclipse of the Progressive Party.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{THE CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S PARTY} opened on October 15. All the newly elected 315 deputies and 126 delegates from the provinces attended the meeting. The congress was to be scheduled to last for eight days. The principal event was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's speech.

Practically all the commanders of the Nationalist forces except Ismet Pasha came under trenchant criticism from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Cafer Tayyar Egilmez Pasha was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{The Times}, August 13, 1927.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{The Times}, August 13, 1927.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{The Times}, August 31, 1927.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{The Times}, September 3, 1927.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{The Times}, September 6, 1927.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} \textit{The Times}, October 15, 1927.
\end{itemize}
blamed for vacillating conduct at Edirne which caused the loss of Thrace to the Greeks. Ali Fuad Cebesoy Pasha failed to maintain strict enough discipline and was recalled from the post of commander-in-chief in Anatolia and was appointed Ambassador to Russia. Refet Bele Pasha, commanding the southern Anatolian front against the Greeks, proved to be unsuccessful and yielded his post to Ismet Pasha, who assumed command of the whole Anatolian front. Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who, it was admitted, had repressed the Armenian revolt, received little praise. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk spoke in the warmest terms of Ismet Pasha and also cited Ali Cetinkaya and Kilic Ali, of the Ankara Tribunal of Independence, for their military prowess. \(^8^8\)

Halide Edib Adivar wrote a letter to *The Times* answering charges made against her in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Speech. \(^8^9\) Rauf Orbay, too, sent a letter to *The Times* in which he wrote that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had used the prestige and glory attached to his name to establish a dictatorship, and Rauf Orbay saw it with regret that, in order to excuse and to show the necessity for the atrocities and corruptions of the last few years, Atatürk had falsified important historical events. \(^9^0\)

\(^8^8\) *The Times*, October 20, 1927.
\(^8^9\) *The Times*, October 21, 1927.
\(^9^0\) *The Times*, November 2, 1927.
Chapter 23

THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE KEMALISTS AND THE ECONOMY IN THE 1920S

On December 1, 1922, a small group of Istanbul businessmen met to establish the Milli Türk Ticaret Birligi, the Turkish National Union of Commerce. They intended to hold an economic congress at Istanbul as soon as possible, primarily to discuss import-export problems. When the Istanbul newspapers announced their plans for the congress, the provisional Kemalist government in Ankara immediately sent a telegramme urging the businessmen to cancel their meeting, as the government had been considering the idea of a much broader economic congress at Izmir. The government requested that the businessmen send their delegates there instead.¹

Accepting the government's offer to attend the Izmir Economic Congress, the members of the Milli Türk Ticaret Birligi held their own meeting in Istanbul anyway. They convened in mid-January and prepared, along with a series of resolutions, a list of proposals to be discussed at the Izmir Economic Congress. After deliberations for two days, they produced a document which the delegates from the Union would discuss at Izmir.²

According to the leading businessmen of Istanbul, one of the most important issues concerning the economy was the tariffs and customs duties. The Union wanted protection for the development of domestic industry. The businessmen were aware of the fact that domestic industry had to be protected from foreign competition by high customs tariffs.

¹. Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.376.
². Gündüz Ökcün, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, pp.144-145.
They were of the opinion that domestic industry could not develop so long as foreign goods were freely imported. Accordingly, the remedy for protecting the domestic industry could be found in establishing import restrictions in addition to raising the customs duties. In raising the customs duties the aim had to be towards increasing domestic production.\(^3\)

As one of the most important topics to be discussed in the peace conference at Lausanne would be the future of capitulations, the businessmen insisted that the government take a firm stand on this issue. They demanded that foreign powers should not interfere with the setting of the customs duties and that the customs duties should be high enough to encourage and fully protect domestic industry.\(^4\)

The Union was also strongly against the creation of new or continuation of already existing state monopolies. They were particularly against any government scheme of establishing new monopolies which would be controlled by foreign capital.\(^5\) Instead of promoting the public good, the Union said, monopolies had caused much economic damage by restricting the freedom of investment in many fields. The Union opposed any monopolies be they domestic or foreign, state-owned or privately operated. It was especially against the tobacco monopoly, known as the Regie.\(^6\)

With respect to navigation, the Union demanded that local shipping among the Turkish ports be done exclusively by Turkish vessels.\(^7\) The Union was strongly in favour of competition in the shipping business and, as in the other fields of economic activity, it was totally opposed to the idea of creating a maritime monopoly to be run by the government.\(^8\)

They wanted the establishment of a central bank whose shareholders would be Turkish businessmen, and called for the regulation of foreign exchange. The successful


\(^7\) Gündüz Ökcün, *Türkiye İktisat Kongresi*, pp.144-145.

\(^8\) Gündüz Ökcün, *Türkiye İktisat Kongresi*, pp.148-149.
operation of domestic commercial banks, the Union claimed, hinged not only on sound financial policy but importantly on the existence of a strong national bank. The Union said that Itibar-i Milli Bankası, the bank that the Unionists had established for similar purposes during the war, could easily be transformed for these purposes. This bank was to be given the task of regulating foreign exchange, as the wild fluctuations in the exchange rate, mainly due to the absence of such a regulatory agency, had extremely adverse effects on the export-import business.

The Union was concerned with the unorganised foreign exchange market. They were especially cognisant of the wild fluctuations in the exchange rate and its adverse effects on the export-import business. They wanted an end to speculation by bankers and banks; in order to prevent speculation they wanted a national bank to take control of this situation.

With regards to foreign capital, the Union was not totally opposed to it, but it insisted on controls which would exclude foreign capital which it considered detrimental to Turkish interests. The Union was quite clear about the type of foreign investment that it wanted to be kept out. It was against the introduction of foreign capital in industries in which Turkish industrialists had already a hand. These industries, the Union demanded, had to be left exclusively to domestic capital. As to those industries that foreign capital would be allowed to enter the country, the Union required that there should be strict rules and restrictions put on foreign investors. Taken in conjunction with the customs policy the Union demanded, its stand on the issue of foreign capital reflected the strong feeling among Turkish industrialists that the government should encourage industry. These additional policies were seen as part and parcel of a policy of promoting domestic

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industry.  

Finally, demanding that their views be taken when laws and regulations concerning business were being discussed in the Assembly, the Union urged the government to immediately revise the organisation of the Chambers of Commerce. These organisations, the Union said, were totally incapable of doing their job, due, in part, to their lack of authority. The Chamber in Istanbul, in particular, was criticised for its blatant ignorance and its total lack of initiative. The Union accused the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce of being ignorant about factual information on commercial activity in Istanbul, let alone within the country. The Union complained about the fact that the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce had ceased publication of reports to inform the business community ever since the monarchists had formed the government after the armistice in 1918 and changed the structure and leadership of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. One of the most important complaints concerned the Chamber's executive council which had not held elections for the board of directors since March 16, 1336/March 29, 1920. Though the council had said that it was the war that made it impossible to hold proper elections, the Union suggested it was the result of the domination of the executive council by monarchist members whose interests concurred with the importing houses and foreign companies. This situation had hampered business in Istanbul to such a point, that they, the businessmen of Istanbul, had been forced to establish the Milli Türk Ticaret Birligi.  

On January 21, Istanbul industrialists held a separate meeting. Along with the Union, they strongly urged the government to raise customs duties to a level that would effectively protect domestic industry and advised a vigorous application of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry.  

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IT WAS POLITICS which had originally prompted the Kemalist government to sponsor an economic congress. Atatürk had just announced his plan to form a new political party, and Atatürk presiding over its opening, the congress was to follow up by providing a set of national goals without too much debate over economic and financial policy. The Economic Congress of Izmir was to last about a week. Had the original timetable been followed, it would have provided Atatürk with the opportunity both to enhance his political image and explain the concept of the People’s Party to an audience which largely represented the agricultural vote. The plan failed, however, due to the uncooperative attitude of a majority of the delegates as well as to the controversy over İsmet İnönü’s handling of the negotiations at Lausanne which required Atatürk’s presence in Ankara. 18

After their arrival in Izmir, influential members of the Istanbul delegation formed an ad hoc steering committee. When it came time to nominate a President of the congress, Ahmed Hamdi Basar, the Secretary-General of the Milli Türk Ticaret Birligi, proposed Kazim Karabekir. Karabekir, who had just arrived in Izmir as the industrialists’ delegate from Manisa, was initially taken aback by the proposal, but he finally accepted. 19

Kazim Karabekir had been involved with Turkey’s post-war economic reconstruction since January of 1922 when he had urged the government to involve itself in more than just military matters, claiming that from 1920 onwards, the Ankara Assembly had clearly neglected the economy. In his view, the Assembly should have commissioned experts to draw economic plans and programs for the post-war reconstruction. 20 Criticising the government’s lack of planning and expertise, Karabekir then commissioned

18. Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.384.
Alimet Serif Önay to prepare an economic reconstruction plan for the areas under his jurisdiction, Trabzon and Erzurum, where he had close links with the commercial interests. Önay's plan was prepared and published before the Izmir Economic Congress met in February 1923.21

The Union's specific proposals which had been prepared in advance for discussion at the Congress were the reform of commercial law, income tax reform and other changes in general tax regulations, unrestricted Turkish sovereignty in the establishment of protective tariffs, establishment of a national bank with participation therein by the state, control of the foreign exchange market by the state, prohibition of all monopolies, state and foreign, and the removal of existing ones, particularly the tobacco Regie, elimination of unnecessary foreign influence in the Turkish economy, consideration for professional and interest groups in the establishment of economic and fiscal policy.22

The portion of the Izmir Economic Congress devoted to industrial concerns ended with proposals to raise customs duties and protect domestic industry from foreign competition, re-examine the Law for the Encouragement of Industry so as to make it more suitable for the promotion of industry in the country, re-establish regulated cargo rates for the railways by reducing them to a modest amount, form a chamber of industry in Istanbul, and establish an industrial bank.23 The proposals also included mining which, the delegates said, should be intensified with preference given to Turkish nationals.24

Proposals made during the agricultural section of the Congress included the abolition of the tithe and its replacement by a more just form of agricultural taxation, the

24. Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.379.
creation of both an agricultural and commercial bank, and the further development of railways and roads.\textsuperscript{25}

On its part, the commercial section suggested a system of individual loans, the reduction of railway tariffs, and the elimination of customs duties on automobiles and buses.\textsuperscript{26}

The Congress recommended that action be taken to check foreign exchange rate fluctuations and speculation in foreign currency by establishing a "central" bank with a strong capital base.\textsuperscript{27} The creation of a national bank was recommended for the purpose of endorsing certain national debts and training Turkish nationals in banking methods.\textsuperscript{28}

The Kemalist Government was, on the whole, against many of the recommendations the Congress put forward. It came out strongly against the transformation of the Itibar-i Milli Bankası into a national bank. It was clear that the Kemalists were in no mood to support this particular bank, founded as it had been by the Unionist government in 1916 as an institution to provide credit for domestic industry and business.\textsuperscript{29} Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, the Kemalist Minister of the Economy, criticised the economic policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, saying that the liberal economic policies of this regime had been ruinous. He added that liberalism had been discredited worldwide, and that the Kemalist regime would not allow the country to be ruined once again by liberal economic policies.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{25} Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, pp.379-380.

\textsuperscript{26} Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.380.

\textsuperscript{27} Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.379.

\textsuperscript{28} Michael M. Finefrock, "Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", Middle Eastern Studies, p.380.

\textsuperscript{29} İbâdât, March 1, 1923 excerpted in Gündüz Ölçün, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, p.312.

\textsuperscript{30} Aksam, March 25, 1923 excerpted in Gündüz Ölçün, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, pp.334-335.
IN MARCH OF 1924, municipal authorities, without any warning, imposed octroi duties on both foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Although the law governing the octroi stated that municipal authorities had complete authority over the matter, the octroi was by no means compulsory. If a municipality found such octroi necessary, these were to be levied according to the economic situation of the community, and limited to the maximum rate determined by the government. The government-appointed Prefect of Istanbul, however, without consulting the Chamber of Commerce or any other commercial organisation, had imposed the octroi in its entirety and at the maximum rate, in spite of the high cost of living, the general stagnation of trade, and the already existing municipal taxes. Furthermore, the municipal agents demanded that the payment be made on all stocks irrespective of their date of entry into the country, which was clearly contrary to the provisions of the law.

Such commercial organisations as the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the Türk Milli Ticaret Birligi unanimously condemned the octroi, both in regard to the principle of such a tax and to the method of its application. The liberal Istanbul press also joined in the condemnation. A meeting of the Turkish Commercial Congress, representing the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and the Türk Milli Ticaret Birligi, was held to protest the tax, and a special commission was formed to make a formal appeal to the municipal authorities. Independently of the Turkish Commercial Congress, the Turkish Chamber of Commerce requested that the collection of the octroi be suspended pending a complete revision of the tariffs in question, such a revision to be effected by the municipal authorities in consultation with merchants and economic specialists. However, these representations and requests did not produce any result. Although the question of the abolition of the octroi or the elimination of articles of primary necessity from the list of articles on which these duties were levied were considered from time to time, no such decision was ever taken by the
Kemalist government.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{DESPITE DEMANDS BY THE GROUPS REPRESENTING INDUSTRY} for a general decrease in transportation costs for manufactured goods, the Kemalist Government did just the reverse. The Assembly passed the new freight fares in 1924. Special tariffs were applied to cereals, flour, livestock, construction material, coal, minerals, sugar beets, and export products. Different rates applied according to the nature of freight. While agricultural goods and minerals were to be carried by the state railways for 3.30 kurus/ton per kilometer, semi-manufactured goods would be carried for 4.05 kurus/ton, and manufactured goods for 5.25 kurus/ton. Clearly, the industrialists had lost out, since the new tariff was to the detriment of manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{32}

Again, despite the manufacturers' concern that foreign capital dominated the Turkish economy to the detriment of domestic industry, the Kemalist regime passed a new law which facilitated the entry of foreign capital into the country by liberalizing the conditions of foreign ownership of property in January of 1924.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, in addition to the already existing utility and mining companies, Turkey saw a new crop of companies also under foreign control.

Foreign capital made up forty-three percent of the total amount of capital investments in Turkish corporations established during the 1920s. Its share in the total capital of mining and manufacturing firms was sixty-seven percent. The combined effect was such that there were roughly two liras of foreign investment to every one lira of domestic backing: in absolute amounts, foreign capital represented 21,000,000 liras of investment in production as against 10,500,000 liras of Turkish capital.\textsuperscript{34} Most of the

\textsuperscript{32} Caglar Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929}, p.31.
\textsuperscript{33} Caglar Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929}, p.59 [quoting Tezel's thesis].
\textsuperscript{34} Caglar Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929}, p.60, from Gündüz Ökcün, table 7, p.126
foreign companies had concentrated in utilities. Of the 21,000,000 liras of foreign investment, 5,500,000 liras were invested in electricity, gas works, and other municipal services. The second largest investment was in mining, and the third, with 4,000,000 liras, in cement. The food processing sector was the fourth largest concentrated foreign investment. Three foreign firms had a total capital of 3,400,000 liras invested in this sector against to the 3,200,000 liras of nineteen Turkish firms. Foreign capital reflected larger scales of investments in industry: in the manufacturing sector, the average capital advanced per foreign firm was 825,000 liras, while Turkish firms advanced on the average only 180,000 liras.\footnote{Caglar Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929}, pp.60-61. from Gündüz Öкcün, Table 7.}

A \textit{STATE BANK}, the Türkiye Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası, was established by law on April 19, 1925. Its explicit purpose was to serve the needs of industrial establishments, primarily by extending credit to industrial concerns. It would also be responsible, however, for the management of all state-owned factories and mines, except for military concerns, as well as for further industrial development. The law declared that the shares of the Ministry of the Economy held in various ventures along with the capital of the state-owned factories would constitute part of the capital of this new bank. Because it was the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy, the cabinet and the President to appoint its board members, the bank would be in the hands of the government. It was further stipulated that neither de{	extit{v}}\text{e}nties, industrialists nor mine-owners could be elected to the board.\footnote{Kanun \# 633, Türkiye Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası Kanunu, \textit{Düstur}, Vol. (192 ), pp.560-562.}

During the Assembly debate, some deputies complained about the law's vagueness on the issue of the bank's takeover of industrial establishments. One specific question concerned the announcement that the bank would assume control of the privately-owned sugar industry. The Minister of the Economy, Ali Cenani Bey, responded that, indeed, the
sugar industry would be turned over to the bank pending the establishment of state-owned companies. It was becoming clear, even in early 1925, that the Kemalist regime aimed to gain control of Turkey's private industry.

The Government also adamantly insisted on excluding private entrepreneurs from the management of the bank. When Mehmet Vasfi Nuhoglu, deputy for Bolu, demanded an explanation, he was drowned out by government supporters and denied an answer. Realising that the bank would fall under exclusive Kemalist control, Feridun Fikri Düsünsel, the opposition deputy for Dersim, proposed an amendment stipulating that no deputy could sit on the governing board. The Assembly passed this amendment. He also objected to the government's transfer of funds previously earmarked for industrial development to this bank. This was a move which effectively took away the Assembly's control over this money, and meant that it could be used for promoting state owned concerns as opposed to private ones. Other deputies also objected to the clause that the bank would be immune from the Assembly's scrutiny.

DURING 1923 AND 1929, value added in manufacturing increased by 50 percent in constant prices. During the same period, however, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to national product declined from 13 to 10 percent. The 50 percent overall rate of change in value added conceals a wide variation in profitability; while some new and profitable firms were established, many old ones, facing competition from imports, went into bankruptcy. The 1920s can not be considered a period of secular boom for the whole of the manufacturing sector.

37. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.18, April 18, 1925, p.139.
38. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.18, April 18, 1925, p.140.
40. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.18, April 18, 1925, p.144.
One of the most successful sectors in terms of profitability was the cement sector. When demand by the public sector, which was even greater than the private demand, was added cement factories obtained 36 percent profits on paid-up capital in 1927, and 38 percent in 1928. These profit rates attracted foreign capital, which established two new plants near Istanbul in 1928 and 1929.43

TÜRKİYE IS BANKASI is always cited as the single most example of the initiative of the private sector, and a direct consequence of the liberal economic policies of the Kemalist regime. Alleging that it was a private bank founded by private investors, established wisdom maintains that the formation of this bank provides the best example of the government's laissez faire economic policy in the 1920s. Liberal economic policy and this bank are regarded as synonymous. There are, however, problems with this interpretation. Only with a far stretch of the imagination that this bank can be regarded as the fruit of private investment. Apart from this fact, the way this bank's involvement with the industrial establishments leaves us with no doubt that this bank eliminated in many fields private initiative.

TÜRKİYE IS Bankası was founded on August 26, 1924 with a total capital of 1,000,000 liras.44 Atatürk put up 250,000 liras, a quarter of the bank's capital, and became one of the principal shareholders.45 Atatürk had received 250,000 liras from Usakizade Muammer Bey, his father-in-law. At Atatürk's request, Usakizade Muammer Bey approached Celal Bayar with their joint intention of using the money to form an import/export firm. Bayar said that it would be inappropriate for Atatürk to personally

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44. A. Gündüz Ökcün, "1909-1930 Yillari Arasinda Anonim Sirket Olarak Kurulan Bankalar", in Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoglu (Eds.), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, pp.441-442; and, Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi, p.66.
45. A. Gündüz Ökcün, "1909-1930 Yillari Arasinda Anonim Sirket Olarak Kurulan Bankalar", in Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoglu (Eds.), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, pp.441-442.
involve himself in a commercial venture, and suggested, instead, that they form a bank.46 This was clearly the impetus behind the creation of the Türkiye Is Bankası.


The members of this bank's board of directors were all Kemalist deputies of the Assembly who had close ties to Atatürk. Out of the nine board members, five -- Mahmut Soydan, deputy for Siirt, Salih Bozok, deputy for Bozok, Fuat Bulca, deputy for Rize, Ali Kilic, deputy for Anteb, and Ihsan Eryavuz, deputy for Cebeliberet -- were from the military. Fikret Onuralp, deputy for Ertugrul, was a medical doctor; Rasim Basara, deputy for Sivas, was a graduate of the Faculty of Letters; Sakir Kinaci, deputy for Ankara, was one of the prominent businessmen of Ankara; and, Rahmi Köken, deputy for İzmir, was a

47. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.66.
By the beginning of 1925, only 409,000 liras could be counted as paid capital. As the government had not yet participated, this meant that private shareholders had only advanced 159,000 liras to Atatürk's 250,000 liras. The remaining capital would be raised by February of 1926. With the collection of the last part of the capital in February of 1926, the capital was paid in full to 1,000,000 liras. At the June 30, 1926 meeting of the bank's executive council, it was decided to raise the total capital to 2,000,000 liras. This raise was made possible before the fusion of the funds of the Itibar-i Milli Bankasi with the Türkiye Is Bankasi.

The merger of the Itibar-i Milli Bankasi with the Türkiye Is Bankasi was announced on June 29, 1927. The merger would officially take effect that July. The merger complete, Türkiye Is Bankasi more than met its capital goal. In addition to the bank's paid capital of 2,000,000 liras, the merger brought another 2,000,000 liras, thus raising the capital of the bank to 4,000,000 TLs. With this merger, Türkiye Is Bankasi became one of the most important banks in Turkey. In an extraordinary shareholders meeting on May 21, 1929, it was decided to further raise the capital by 1,000,000 liras by issuing an additional 100,000 shares at 10 liras each. This was achieved in 1930.

During its first ten years, the state's share of the bank was only 618,935 liras. Nonetheless, the commission of American specialists who had written a lengthy report on

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50. Türkiye Is Bankasi'nin On Yili, p.16.
51. A. Gündüz Ökcün, "1909-1930 Yillari Arasinda Anonim Sirket Olarak Kurulan Bankalar", in Osman Oktay and Ünal Nalbantoğlu (Eds.), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, p.442.
52. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.66.
53. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.66.
55. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.68; and, Türkiye Is Bankasi'nin On Yili, p.21.
56. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.69.
58. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.64.
the Turkish economy in 1933 put Türkiye İş Bankası in the semi-public category.\(^5\) This was not only due to the fact that the bank's funds had been partly provided by the state but that the bank established many joint-ventures with the state, holding, in many cases, monopolistic rights. By 1938, the state's share had dropped to 580,230 liras.\(^6\)

**THE BANK’S FIRST NEW COMPANY** was Dokumacılık T.A.S., later known as Ipek İş Mensucat T.A.S., a silk textile concern, at Bursa in 1925. Founded with an initial capital of 250,000 liras, the company built its factory in the Muradiye region of Bursa.\(^7\) The initial capital was raised to 400,000 liras on October 30, 1930, when the bank went into partnership with Antoin Pios, Hüsnü Bey, Hafiz Halid Bey and Ahmet Vefik Bey, all businessmen. The company's name was changed to Bursa Dokumacılık ve Trikotaj T.A.S.\(^8\) By 1933, fifty-four factories in the silk weaving industry employed roughly 2,430 workers.\(^9\) The İş Bankası factory employed between 250 and 300 of these workers.\(^10\) In 1935, with the decision to take over a woollen textile factory, the capital was again raised to 800,000 liras.\(^11\) In 1941, the name changed to Ipek İş, the company incorporated the Ankara Mensucat T.A.S., the other textile factory of İş Bankası, and increased its capital to 1,400,000 TLs.\(^12\)

Yün İş, another venture of the bank, was in woollen textile business. The bank, shortly after its formation, bought a woollen textile factory in Ankara which the original

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\(^{6}\) Turgut Bayar, *La Türkiye İş Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie*, p.64.


\(^{9}\) Turgut Bayar, *La Türkiye Is Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie*, p.189.

\(^{10}\) Turgut Bayar, *La Türkiye Is Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie*, p.190.


owners had been unable to operate due to lack of industrial credit. 67 The factory started operation in 1930 with extensive renovations and installations of modern machinery which made it possible to produce different qualities of woollen fabric. 68 Initially, the capital of Yün Is was 300,000 liras. 69 In 1933, at the second year of operations, the capacity of the factory tripled. On that occasion, the capital was raised to 600,000 liras. The factory made enough profits to distribute regularly ten percent dividends. 70 The factory employed a labour force of about 250 people, including workers, engineers and clerks. It worked 300,000 kilograms of wool and mohair, and 28,000 kilograms of imported yarn. It produced 125,000 kilograms of coarse woollen textile in addition to 90,000 kilograms of fine woollen textile a year. 71

The Elektrik-Radyo T.A.S./Siemens was formed by government decree on August 15, 1925. Its shareholders were Itibar-i Milli Bankasi, Deutsche Bank, Siemens T. Halske A.G., Siemens Schuckert-Werke A.G., and Türkiye Is Bankasi. Out of a total of 29,450 shares, Siemens had 17,400, Türkiye Is Bankasi 5,850, and Deutsche Bank 2,700 shares. Hamdi Bey, the Vice-president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Sezai Bey, Director-General of National Palaces were also shareholders with 50 shares each. Among its board of directors were Celal Bayar, deputy for Izmir, Necmeddin Kocatas, deputy for Kastamonu and director of the Executive Board of Itibar-i Milli Bankasi, Rasim Basara, deputy for Sivas and member of the Board of Directors of the Türkiye Is Bankasi. By 1929, Türkiye Is Bankasi would control twenty percent of the total shares. 72

71. T.C. Icileri Bakanligi, The Development of National Banking in Turkey, pp.78-79.
Türkiye İş Bankası's establishment of coal companies was undertaken in conjunction with the government's intention to form a centre for the iron and steel industry at Ereğli in the region of Karadeniz. The law concerning the establishment of the iron and steel industry was passed on March 17, 1926. It authorised the government to spend a total of eighteen million liras over the next four years towards the research and development of both the coal and the iron and steel industries. Türkiye İş Bankası would form five coal mining companies over the next ten years.

The bank established its first coal mining company, Kömüris/Kozlu Kömür Madeni A.S., on June 27, 1926 at Kozlu, Zonguldak with a capital of 500,000 liras. On September 1, 1929, the company raised its capital to 3,000,000 liras. With this raise, fifty-one percent of the company's capital belonged to Türkiye İş Bankası and forty-nine percent to Ereğli Sirketi. This company's coal production was 85,900 tons in 1930. It reached to 198,560 tons in 1933.

The second company was Türkis-Maden Kömürii Isleri T.A.S. which was established on July 1, 1926 with a capital of 1,000,000 TLs. Seventy-five percent of the shares belonged to Türkiye İş Bankası. The production in the first year was 65,786 tons. This figure increased every year so that by 1933 it would reach 193,330 tons. For the purpose of modernisation, the company invested about 1,500,000 liras in 1926, 2,000,000 liras in 1934, 3,500,000 liras in 1935, and about 4,500,000 liras in 1936.

In 1934, the bank established two more coal mining concerns: Kireclik Kömür

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76. Türkiye İş Bankası'nın On Yılı, 1924-1934, p.64.
78. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye İş Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.181.
80. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye İş Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.181.
Madeni T.A.S. with a capital of 300,000 liras, and Kilimli Kömür Madeni T.A.S with a capital of 400,000 liras. The bank held sixty percent of the former's shares, and seventy-five percent of the latter's.81

As part of the First Five Year Plan, Sümerbank, a state bank, and Türkiye İş Bankası were given permission to construct and run an anthracite, or semi-coke, factory with a capital of 1,660,000 liras.82 The construction of the factory began in August, 1934 and was completed in October of 1935. The capacity was at first 60,000 tons but was later raised to 120,000 tons.83

The total production of the coal mines controlled by Türkiye İş Bankası increased from 1,216,000 tons in 1926 to 2,307,000 tons in 1937.84 Beginning in 1930, these companies exported coal to the tune of 81,000 tons valued at about 1,000,000 liras. By the end of the decade, exportation would increase to more than 500,000 tons valued at upwards of 3,000,000 liras.85 As the production levels increased, the companies entered into negotiations with foreign concerns to modernise their extraction process.86

Bulgardagi Madenleri T.A.S., a lead mining concern, was established on August 1, 1925 by a partnership of the Ministry of the Economy, Edib Servet Tör, deputy for Istanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası and Franz Traudes. The total capital was 1,000,000 liras.87 The bank held ten percent of the total shares, and production reached in excess of 10,000 tons per year. The company became paralysed in 1929, however, with the decline of world lead prices.88

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81. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye İş Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.182.
82. Türkiye İş Bankasının On Yılı, 1924-1934, p.65; and, T.C. İciséleri Bakanlığı, The Development of National Banking in Turkey, p.78.
83. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye İş Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.191; and, Tarik T. Dümer, Türkiye İş Bankası A.S., p.165.
85. Tarik T. Dümer, Türkiye İş Bankası A.S., p.139.
86. Tarik T. Dümer, Türkiye İş Bankası A.S., p.139.
Ergani Bakiri T.A.S., a copper mining company, had been established in 1918 by a group represented by the Itibar-i Milli Bankası. In 1924, the concession was renewed and a partnership was formed in 1925 between the Ministry of Finance, Itibar-i Milli Bankası, and Deutsche Bank. Its total capital was 3,000,000 liras with the German bank putting up 1,500,000 liras, the Ministry, 1,000,000 liras, and Itibar-i Milli Bankası, 500,000 liras. In 1926, the Ministry's share was given to the newly established Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası, the state-owned industrial bank.

After the Unionists' trials in the summer of 1926, Itibar-i Milli Bankası was closed down in 1927 and its assets were turned over to Türkiye Is Bankası by government decree. In the process, Türkiye Is Bankası became a shareholder in Ergani Bakiri T.A.S. The capital was raised from 3,000,000 liras to 4,500,000 liras in 1936 when Etibank, another state-owned bank, bought the newly issued shares as well as all of the Deutsche Bank's 150,000 shares valued at 1,500,000 liras. The sole owners were now Etibank and Türkiye Is Bankası. Türkiye Is Bankası controlling eleven percent of the company's shares at a value of 493,000 liras. The emergence of Etibank was part of the government's program for nationalisation, and, in 1945, Etibank would take complete possession of the company by buying off the shares of Türkiye Is Bankası.

Another mining concern with which Türkiye Is Bankası was involved was Keciborlu Kükürtleri Isletmesi Müessesesi. The sulphur mine had been exploited by the Germans during the First World War and, after the war, the concession was transferred to

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89. Kemalettin Apak, Cevdet Aydinelli and Mehmet Akin, Türkiye'de Devlet Sanayi ve Maadin İşletmeleri, p.319.
90. Kemalettin Apak, Cevdet Aydinelli and Mehmet Akin, Türkiye'de Devlet Sanayi ve Maadin İşletmeleri, p.320.
92. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye Is Bankası et l’Economie de la Turquie, p.185.
94. Kemalettin Apak, Cevdet Aydinelli and Mehmet Akin, Türkiye'de Devlet Sanayi ve Maadin İşletmeleri, p.320.
General de Mine et Metallurgie, a French company. Later, Italians were also involved with the mine. In 1932, the concession was annulled by the government. In 1933, Sümerbank prepared a report and in 1934, the company was formed by Sümerbank and Türkiye İş Bankası upon the granting of the concession by the Ministry of Economy. The exploitation of the sulphur mine started in 1935. The newly-founded company was owned equally by Türkiye İş Bankası and Sümerbank. Türkiye İş Bankası's fifty percent share represented 150,000 liras. In 1936, Sümerbank's share were transferred to Etibank. Türkiye İş Bankası remained the co-owner of the company until 1943 when it's shares were totally bought by Etibank.

During its early years, Türkiye İş Bankası was also involved in hotel business as well. It established Ankara Palas T.A.S., in Ankara, on December 28, 1927 with The Oriental Industrial Monopolies Ltd., A. Pios, Jules Fresco, and Ibrahim Bey. Türkiye İş Bankası had ten percent of the total shares. Bursa Kapıcaları T.A.S., the health spa at Bursa, was established on February 20, 1928 by a partnership of Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Türk Ticaret ve Sanayi Bankası, Evkaf Genel Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Ziraat Bankası, the Bursa Municipality and Türkiye İş Bankası. Out of a total of 550,000 liras capital, the bank owned 100,000 liras. According to the figures of July 24, 1933, the company had not increased its capital, and Atatürk personally owned 29,910 liras of the shares while Türkiye İş Bankası increased its shares to 200,000 liras.

TÜRKİYE İŞ BANKASI'S INVESTMENTS totalled 580,340 liras in 1925. By 1933, this figure

95. Kemalettin Apak, Cevdet Aydinelli and Mehmet Akin, Türkiye'de Devlet Sanayi ve Maadin İşletmeleri, p.343.
had grown to more than 11,000,000 liras, and would further increase to about 14,000,000 liras in 1934, and close to 20,000,000 liras in 1937. The bank’s net profits soared almost immediately after its establishment. In 1925, net profits were recorded at 402,523 liras. This figure doubled to 830,752 liras by 1926, and the following year it reached 1,036,158 liras, 1,362,481 liras in 1928, and 1,807,119 liras in 1929. With the economic recession in 1930, however, profits dropped to 816,515 liras. This figure hardly changed the next year, but in 1932 and 1933 it dropped further to 605,741 liras and 616,754 liras respectively. From 1925 to 1928, the bank distributed a fifteen percent dividend to its shareholders. With the onset of economic depression in 1930, dividends dropped to ten percent, and remained there through the following year. In 1932 and 1933, dividends again dropped to eight percent. This figure rose the following year and would reach ten percent by 1938.

The bank had also commercial enterprises. In May 1931 the bank established with capital of 500,000 TLs the Is Limited with the purpose of exporting Turkish goods. The bank’s share constituted 400,000 TLs.

The bank also created Pamuk Is Limited, a company to deal in cotton trade, to buy cotton in the markets of Adana and to sell cotton in domestic and foreign markets. In view of the plans to establish state cotton textile factories according to the First Five-Year Plan the bank established in September 1932 a joint-stock company, the Pamuk Is with a capital of 50,000 TLs of which 60 percent was subscribed by the Is Bankasi. In 1932 after the establishment of state cotton textile factories the demand for domestic cotton

102. Turgut Bayar, La Turquie Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.81.
103. Turgut Bayar, La Turquie Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.171.
104. Tarık T. Dümür, Türkiye Is Bankası A.Ş., p.149.
105. Tarık T. Dümür, Türkiye Is Bankası A.Ş., p.149.
106. Turgut Bayar, La Turquie Is Bankasi et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.171.
increased. Of the 63,000 tons of cotton produced in Turkey about 40 percent were used by domestic factories. State factories used 11,400 tons and private factories used 12,724 tons. 107

In 1935 the bank established in Izmir with the collaboration of the Ziraat Bankası the Taris Limited to regulate the sale of principally raisin in domestic and foreign markets. 108 The capital of this company was 1,000,000 TLs of which 30 percent belonged to the Is Bankası. 109 The aim was to enter directly into the Izmir market for the purpose of buying to export. 110

In 1936 the bank formed Tütün Is Limited with the participation of the Monopolies Administration and the Ziraat Bankası in order to export tobacco. 111 The capital was 1,000,000 TLs and the Is Bankası owned 45 percent of the total shares. 112 The Law for tobacco and tobacco monopoly #3437, dated June 21, 1938 established limited zones, etc for the production of tobacco. 113

The bank also created Misir Is Limited and Is Komimport to deal with import/export trade. The Misir Is had an office at Alexandria, the Is Komimport had an office at Hamburg. 114 In late 1930s trade with Germany increased to significant proportions, and trade was done by clearing arrangements. While a little over 10 percent of Turkish foreign export trade was conducted with Germany in 1931, this proportion grew to a little over 50 percent in 1936. 115

The bank’s involvement in foreign trade took on new dimensions in 1937 when the director general of the bank, Muammer Eris, paid an official visit to London as head of a

107. Tanık T. Dümer, Türkiye Is Bankası A.S., pp.149-150. See also, Hüseyin Avni Sanda and Halit Güleryüz, Türkiye'de Sanayiin İnkılapı, p.53.
111. Tanık T. Dümer, Türkiye Is Bankası A.S., p.150.
financial delegation to discuss development of commercial relations between Great Britain and Turkey. Upon his return Eris wrote an article in the Cumhuriyet about the immense possibilities of transaction between the two countries.\textsuperscript{116}

Halk Bankası T.A.S. was established on March 20, 1938 with a capital of 1,200,000 TLs. In addition to the bank Sümerbank, Ministry of Finance, Ziraat Bankası, Türk Ticaret Bankası, Etibank and Türkiye Emlak ve Kredi Bankası.\textsuperscript{117}

Pasabahçe Türkiye Sise ve Cam Fabrikası was another İş Bankası concern. The concession to establish a bottle and glass factory was given to İş Bankası and a joint-stock company was formed in 1935 with a capital of 1,000,000 TLs. The production of this factory was geared towards satisfying the domestic market. The aim was to cut back glass imports.\textsuperscript{118} The plant was erected as part of the First Five-Year Plan in order to satisfy a great part of the domestic demand for bottles, window panes, and other glasswares.\textsuperscript{119} After preliminary research about the feasibility of erecting a glass and bottle factory in Turkey the company was formed in 1934 and construction began in 1935.\textsuperscript{120} The factory has a capital of 1,750,000 TLs.\textsuperscript{121}

\textbf{The Creation of New Monopolies} became a main feature of the Kemalist government's economic programme during the 1920s. Considered convenient and lucrative sources of revenue, these monopolies were doubtless attractive from the government's viewpoint, but their creation had a disturbing effect on trade and they inevitably gave rise to a marked increase in the cost of living.\textsuperscript{122} Türkiye İş Bankası was the main instrument as well as the prime beneficiary in the creation of monopolies.

\textsuperscript{116} Tarık T. Dümer, \textit{Türkiye İş Bankası A.S.}, p.155.
\textsuperscript{117} Kemalettin Apak, Cevdet Aydinelli and Mehmet Akin, \textit{Türkiye'de Devlet Sanayi ve Maadin İşletmeleri}, p.83.
\textsuperscript{118} Tarık T. Dümer, \textit{Türkiye İş Bankası A.S.}, p.165.
\textsuperscript{119} T.C. İciserleri Bakanlığı, \textit{The Development of National Banking in Turkey}, pp.79-80.
\textsuperscript{120} Turgut Bayar, \textit{La Türkiye İş Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie}, pp.192-193.
\textsuperscript{121} T.C. İciserleri Bakanlığı, \textit{The Development of National Banking in Turkey}, p.80.
Previous to the Kemalist regime's creation of monopolies in many articles beginning with 1924, there were basically two existing monopolies. One was the salt monopoly which was under the control of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. It was a valuable source of revenue to the state. Its total output was estimated at about 3,500,000 tons per year. A considerable amount was exported to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, and some 50,000 tons were said to be sold annually to India. 123

The other monopoly existed in tobacco. Tobacco cultivation had been controlled by the Société de la Regie Co-Interesse des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman, a monopoly granted to foreign capital by the Turkish Government in 1884 originally for a period of thirty years. The concession, however, had been renewed in April of 1914. Under the Regie administration, each cultivator was required to appear before Regie officielas to file for a permit before planting. He was either required to produce a title deed to the property he intended to cultivate, or, in the case of non-ownership, a lease from the owners. After planting and before cutting, Regie experts named by both the State and the Public Debt Administration would estimate the probable amount of the crop on which the producer had to pay a 12.5 percent tax. Sales also had to be authorised by the Regie. 124

On September 17, 1924, the Turkish Government informed the Societe de la Regie Co-Interesse des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman that the concession would terminate on March 1, 1925, the beginning of Turkey's fiscal year. This action was justified by Article 8 of the Regie's contract with the Government, dated June 13, 1923. The Turkish Government agreed to reimburse the Regie the sum of 40,000,000 French francs for the cancellation of its concession and the appropriation of its property. 125

A draft law was presented before the Assembly on February 23, 1925, and deputies were urged to vote on the matter as soon as possible. This motion was voted on the same

day. The debate on the draft law took place on February 25. The draft law prepared by the Government stipulated that from March 1, 1925 onwards all transactions concerning tobacco, including sale of tobacco, and production and sale of cigarettes would be totally controlled by the state. Civil servants were obligated to watch for, report and take action against contraband products and sales of contraband tobacco. Because the government made no provisions for a reorganisation of the tobacco monopoly but simply take over the Regie without changing the conditions of either the production or the sale of tobacco and tobacco products, opposition deputies objected to the law. They expressed the view that both producers and consumers had expected the complete elimination of the Regie with all of its restrictive stipulations. Despite these objections, the draft was passed by a vote of one hundred and seventy on February 26.

The law was put into effect immediately and the Regie passed into the hands of the Government on March 1, 1925. Seyfi Bey, undersecretary of Finance, was appointed temporarily as Director-General to administer and operate the tobacco monopoly.

On June 9, 1930, the Assembly passed another law pertaining to the tobacco monopoly which gave complete control of the tobacco industry to the state. The state became the sole buyer and processor of tobacco, producer of all tobacco products, and distributor of all imported tobacco and tobacco products. The state would regulate the place and extent of tobacco production, and all farmers were to obtain cultivation permits in order to engage in tobacco production. In addition, the sale of all tobacco products within the country would be completely taken over by the state. The private export of domestic


On March 25, 1925, the Assembly pronounced itself in favour of the bandrolle system, i.e., internal revenue stamp, rather than the state monopoly system, thus making the manufacture and sale of tobacco and cigarette paper unrestricted to private enterprise, subject only to payment of state taxes. It was not clear, however, just when this action of the Assembly would become effective (G. Bie Ravndal, Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, p.97).
tobacco to foreign markets, however, would be allowed.\textsuperscript{129}

In addition to these monopolies, hitherto administered by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the Government decided during 1924 to monopolize the manufacture and sale of alcohol, and matches.\textsuperscript{130}

The first legislation concerning the alcohol monopoly was enacted on March 9, 1924.\textsuperscript{131} This provisional law stipulated that, pending the construction of state distilleries, private concerns would be allowed to operate alcohol factories under state supervision. The law also said that these factories would be given the permission to employ foreigners as technical experts for a duration of two years following the opening of the plant, but that, on expiration of this period, these experts had to be replaced by Turks. Under this arrangement, the Government in early 1925 invited tenders for the annual supply of 1,100,000 kilos of alcohol for industrial and other uses, delivery to begin on April 1, 1925. Monopolization became effective on June 1, 1925.\textsuperscript{132}

On March 22, 1926, the Law for the Alcohol and Liquor Monopoly was enacted. The law stipulated that production, importation and sale of all kinds of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, including wine, beer, and all kinds of liquor, were to be conducted under government monopoly, though Article 1 of the law gave the government the right to transfer the operation of this monopoly to a Turkish company. All prices, however, were to be fixed by the government. Though the production and exportation of wine was permitted, internal sale and consumption of wine was to be conducted through the monopoly, which, in turn, would be responsible for further development of the wine industry. Article 5 of the law charged the monopoly administration with the construction of an alcohol factory within two years. It was stipulated that the factory would have the capacity to produce three

\textsuperscript{129} Tütün Inhisari Kanunu, #1701, June 9, 1930, Diüstur, 3rd Series, Vol.11, pp.1804-1825. See also Yorgaki Effimianidis, Cihan İktisat Buhrani Önünde Türkiye, Vol.2, pp.136-137.

\textsuperscript{130} G. Bie Ravndal, Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, p.162.

\textsuperscript{131} Jaeschke, Vol.10, p.149.

\textsuperscript{132} G. Bie Ravndal, Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, p.162.
million kilograms of alcohol per year, and that, within five years, the administration would satisfy all internal demand. Moreover, existing factories could be authorised to continue production as long as these met a production capacity of two hundred and fifty kilograms of pure alcohol per twenty-four hours per individual distilling machine. Those that did not meet this minimum amount would be closed down and reimbursed for their assets, the value of which would be determined by the government. Nonetheless, Article 9 stipulated that, if deemed necessary, the monopoly administration could still nationalise those firms which had met the minimum production requirement. Finally, no new factories could be established nor any additions or repairs made to existing ones without government approval. 133

By a decree, dated May 16, 1926, the government extended the liquor monopoly all the privileges accorded to industrial establishments by the Law for the Encouragement of Industry. 134 And, on June 1, 1926, basing its case on Article 1 of the Law for the Alcohol and Liquor Monopoly, the Kemalist government turned over the right to exploit this monopoly to Ispirto ve Mesrubat-ı Küülüye Inhisari İşletme T.A.S., a private joint-stock company formed by Türkiye İş Bankası and Nacelna Organizacya Pisemislogojelni Rolincih Polse, a polish firm. The concession to run the monopoly and produce alcohol as well as alcoholic drinks including wine, beer, and all kinds of liquor would run from June 1, 1926 to April 26, 1927. 135 The company began operations in September of 1926. Its capital was 2,000,000 liras, of which forty-five percent belonged to the Treasury. Among the private shareholders were Mahmut Soydan, deputy for Siirt, Mithat Alam, deputy for Maras, and Hakki Ungan, deputy for Van --all belonging to the ruling Republican People's

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Party. They were also members of the board of directors of the monopoly. 136

Türk Bira Fabrikalari (Bomonti-Nektar) T.A.S. was established at Istanbul on June 20, 1928. The company overtook the factories of the Müttehit Bira Fabrikalari (Bomonti-Nektar) Isvicre Anonim Sirketi at Istanbul and Izmir (Aydin Bira Fabrikasi) and ran them. The Ispirto ve Mesrubat-i Küüliye Inhisari İdaresi had a small share in the company, 65 out of a total of 80,000 shares (6,500 out of a total of 8,000,000 Swiss francs), but nevertheless obtained a seat in the board of governors. The company was taken over by the Monopoly Administration in 1940 for a total sum of 400,000 TL. 137

PREVIOUSLY REGULATED BY BANDROLL, the sale of matches was taken under state monopoly on April 20, 1924 with the promulgation of the Budget Law #490. 138 The article of the Budget Law concerning the sale of matches further stipulated that the government would be authorised to run the monopoly by itself, or by a private company under government supervision. 139 The monopoly, Türkiye Kibrit Inhisari T.A.S., was established on January 18, 1925. The preliminary agreement having already been signed on December 8, 1924, the Kemalist government gave a twenty-five year concession to Robert de Bodt, representative of the Belgian Ozin-Allumetier de Flandres S.A. 140 The agreement stated that the Belgian firm would be allowed to import ready-made matches for a period of two years, on the condition that it build a factory in Turkey which would be operational at that time. The capital was set at 600,000 liras, fifty-one percent of which was Turkish, the remaining forty-nine percent Belgian. 141 By 1927, the capital had doubled, and fifty-one

138. Bütçe Kanunu, #490, April 20, 1340/1924, Düstur, 3rd Series, ...See also, Yorgaki Effimianidis, Cihan Iktisad Buhrani Önünde Türkiye, Vol.2, p.129.
141. Gündüz Ökcün, 1920-1930 Yillari Arasinda Kurulan Türk Anonim Sirketlerinde Yabanci
percent of the company was owned by the Belgian firm.\textsuperscript{142}

The Societe Generale Allumetiere et Forestiere was the largest shareholder in the company with 2,900 shares out of a total of 7,929. The next largest shareholder was Türkiye Is Bankası with 1,833 shares. Ziraat Bankası, with 800 shares, and Itibar-i Milli Bankası, with 333 shares, followed. High level Kemalist deputies were also shareholders. Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, deputy for Sarkikarahisar, had a total of 267 shares; İsmet İnönü, deputy for Malatya, 200 shares; Celal Bayar, deputy for İzmir, 80 shares; Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, deputy for Mentese, 80 shares; Cemal Hüsni Taray, deputy for Gümüşhane, 80 shares; and Cevdet Izrab Barlas, deputy for Kütahya, 30 shares.\textsuperscript{143} Celal Bayar, Yunus Nadi Abalioglu, Cemal Hüsni Taray and Cevdet Izrab Barlas, along with Ali Cenani Bey, deputy for Gaziantep, were also members of the Governing Board of the Monopoly until the following year's board was formed in 1927.\textsuperscript{144} This new board included Muammer Eris and Nusret Mithat Bey, two bankers from Türkiye Is Bankası, Selahattin Bey, Secretary-General of Ziraat Bankası, Seref Ulug, deputy for Diyarbakır, and Enver Tekand, deputy for İzmir.\textsuperscript{145}

In order to provide the match monopoly with the necessary raw material, Zindan ve Cangal Ormanları/Zingal T.A.S., a forestry firm was established on June 12, 1926. The founders were Türkiye Kibrit Inhisari T.A.S., Türkiye Is Bankası, and Ozin-Allumetier de Flandres with an initial capital of 500,000 liras, which was raised to 1,000,000 liras in 1927 and to 1,500,000 liras in 1928.\textsuperscript{146}


The Match Monopoly built a factory at Sinop in 1927, but the machinery had not yet been installed, and the factory itself, built on a most unsuitable site, already showed signs of collapse.\textsuperscript{147} The factory would not become operational, and this would lead to the dissolution of the existing monopoly on October 23, 1930.\textsuperscript{148}

A second law on the match monopoly was announced on June 2, 1929 which stipulated that the importation, production, and sale of all kinds of matches and the like would be put under government monopoly.\textsuperscript{149} The right to exploit this monopoly was given to a foreign company organised under the name of The American-Turkish Investment Corporation by the law of June 15, 1930.\textsuperscript{150}

On April 5, 1925, the Assembly debated a draft law concerning Turkey's sugar industry.\textsuperscript{151} According to the draft, the Turkish Government would be empowered to grant exclusive sugar concessions to companies for a duration of twenty-five years. The concessionary right of any one factory would include five adjoining provinces, and the factories would benefit from the Law for the Encouragement of Industry with the exception of Article 23 of the said law. Furthermore, the sugar factories would be exempt from the consumption tax for eight years. The state would also provide, gratis, the necessary land, not to exceed five hectares, for the erection of a factory. Finally, the raw materials required by the factories as well as their finished products would be transported at reduced freight tariffs on the state-owned railroads.\textsuperscript{152}

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Immediately after the promulgation of this law, two companies, founded by private capital, started to erect factories for sugar production. One was the factory at Usak which had been established exclusively by private investors. The other sugar refinery at Alpullu was established in 1925 by Istanbul ve Trakya Seker Fabrikalari T.A.S. with a capital of 1,200,000 liras.153 The Alpullu factory opened for production on November 15, 1926. Türkiye Is Bankasi held sixty-eight percent of the shares in that concern.154

The Kemalist government, however, had other plans when promulgating the law concerning the sugar refineries. The aim seemed to be the creation of sugar monopoly. After a short debate in the Assembly, the law that created the sugar monopoly was enacted on January 25, 1926.155 Interestingly, the right to run both the Alpullu and Usak sugar refineries were given to Türkiye Is Bankasi soon after the creation of the state monopoly on sugar production and importation.156 Thus, Türkiye Is Bankasi became the sole owner of all the sugar refineries in Turkey, protected by monopolistic rights.

With the onset of the corporatist decade after 1930, two more sugar refineries were built in Turkey. The first, Anadolu Seker Fabrikalari T.A.S at Eskisehir was established in 1932.157 Its capital was 3,000,000 liras.158 This was a joint project owned equally by Sümerbank, Ziraat Bankasi --two state banks-- and Türkiye Is Bankasi. The refinery started production in 1933.159 The second refinery, Turhal Seker Fabrikasi T.A.S., was


established a year later. This factory was jointly owned by Türkiye İş Bankası and Ziraat Bankası. It started production in 1934.

On June 18, 1935, a reorganisation took place. Türkiye Seker Fabrikaları A.S. was established with a capital of 22,000,000 liras. The shares were equally divided between Türkiye İş Bankası, Sümerbank and Ziraat Bankası. Despite a reduction in the price of sugar the company distributed 5 percent dividend in its first year, 6.5 percent in 1936 and 6.75 percent in 1937.

PETROLEUM AND BENZINE MONOPOLY was created in January 1926. As in the case of sugar the importation of petroleum and benzine is unrestricted, subject to the payment of the monopoly tax. The law regulating the monopoly of petroleum and petroleum products came into effect on January 26, 1926. The importation and wholesale distribution of petroleum products in Turkey was under government monopoly, but domestic sales were to be carried out by private retailers who would pay an 8 kurus per kilogram of petroleum product monopoly duty over the import price.

SPORTING GUN CARTRIDGES, firing caps and revolvers was also taken under government monopoly and the right to exploit this monopoly was ceded to a Turkish company. All orders had to passed through this company.

On June 2, 1926 the Government represented by Hasan Saka, Minister of Finance,

163. Turgut Bayar, La Türkiye İş Bankası et l'Economie de la Turquie, p.175.
and Ibrahim Beyzade Lütfü Bey and partners agreed upon the principle that all orders for cartridges and other matériel would go through Ibrahim Beyzade Lütfü Bey and partners. The company formed for this purpose, T.C. Revolver ve Av Fisenkleri Inhisari T.A.S., had a capital of 1,500,000 TLs, of which half was subscribed by the Ministry of Finance. The Oriental Industrial Monopolies Holding had shares worth 730,000 TLs. Ibrahim Beyzade Lütfü Bey and partners had 10,000 TLs worth of shares whereas both Explosif Minelite and l'Azotte Francais had 5,000 TLs worth of shares each.\(^{167}\) The board of directors included deputies, Hasan Saka, deputy for Trabzon, Tahsin Uzer, deputy for Ardahan, Fikret Onuralp, deputy for Erzurul, and Cevad Abbas Gürer, deputy for Bolu. In 1934 the company was dissolved and was completely taken over by the state.\(^{168}\)

INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES was also ceded to the Turkish company that also deals with cartridges, revolvers, etc.\(^{169}\) Monopoly rights for explosives were given to Ibrahim Beyzade Lütfü Bey and his partners by an agreement reached by the Government and the said entrepreneurs on September 7, 1926. A company was to be formed by them to run the monopoly. This company was formed under the name of T.C. Barut ve Mevad-i Infilakiye Inhisari Anonim Sirketi with the participation of the Paris based The Oriental Industrial Monopolies Holding, Paris based Explosif Minelite, and Paris based l'Azotte Francais on January 23, 1927. The total capital of the company was 1,500,000 TLs. Half of this capital was subscribed by the Ministry of Finance. The Oriental Industrial Monopolies Holding had shares worth 730,000 TLs. Ibrahim Beyzade Lütfü Bey and partners had 10,000 TLs worth of shares whereas both Explosif Minelite and l'Azotte Francais had 5,000 TLs worth of shares each.\(^{170}\) Out of the eleven members of the board of directors four were deputies

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170. Gündüz Ökcün, 1920-1930 Yillari Arasinda Kurulan Türk Anonim Sirketlerinde Yabancı
of the Republican People's Party: Hasan Saka, deputy for Trabzon, Tahsin Uzer, deputy for Ardahan, Nuri Conker, deputy for Kütahya, and Cevad Abbas Gürer, deputy for Bolu. The company was dissolved and was taken over completely by the state in 1934.

THE 1927 LAW FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY was ratified in the Assembly on May 28, 1927. The law divided industrial establishments into four categories. The first category consisted of factories which used engines more than ten horse powers and worked more than 1,500 man hours. The second category consisted of establishments which utilised less than ten horse powers and more than 1,500 man hours, or vice versa, or employed more than ten workers daily but had no power tools. The third category consisted of establishments with less than ten horse powers but more than 750 man hours. The last category comprised establishments with no mechanised tools and used hand looms and the like.

Article 7 of the law stipulated that the firms would not be liable to musakkafat vergisi, land tax, and the profits tax.

With Article 9 the firms would be exempt from the customs duties and octroi dues for the machinery as well as the raw materials they would use in the factories. [this article is declared void in 1933]

Article 10 guaranteed that state railways and maritime lines would apply a thirty percent discount on all freight charges for the shipment of factory machinery and all building materials for the founding of the factories.

Sermaye, pp.58-59.
The state was also authorised to apply discounts on the shipments of raw materials if the cabinet decided on a case by case basis. 176

None of these privileges were being afforded to factories other than in the first category. All others were denied these privileges except for establishments in the second and third categories, which benefitted from being exempt from customs and octroi duties for the imported machinery and their spare parts. This exemption did not extend to imported raw materials, though. 177

Article 20 of the law stipulated that for companies which would establish a nonexistent industry in Turkey and produce its own raw material and satisfy domestic demand for the finished good—they had obviously sugar factories in mind when drawing this article—the state was authorised to give exclusionary concession rights not exceeding twenty-five years in area not exceeding eight contagious provinces. These factories as well as sugar factories were to benefit from all of these concessionary rights. 178

Article 41 stipulated that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce would draw up a list of raw materials to be exempt from the customs and octroi duties, to be in effect for five years after which the lists would be re-arranged. 179 This article was changed in 1933.

In early 1927, the Commission on the proposed free zone of Istanbul made a report recommending the establishment of such a zone but no action had yet been taken toward determining the site of the same. The commission which was examining reports on the subject was stated to be divided on the question as to whether the zone should be set up on the European or Asian shore, with sentiment more strongly favouring the latter location. Several proposals relative to the construction work which the establishment of the zone will

entail had already been made to the government by private firms, among them a Dutch financial group which was understood to have American connections.\footnote{180}

The Grand National Assembly during its session recently ended in June[?] adopted a law which provided for the establishment of a free zone in the port of Istanbul. The general provisions of this law were the same as those governing the operations of free ports throughout the world. Up to the present time merchandise of all sorts could be shipped in transit through the port of Istanbul but with the exception of special instances no manipulation or changes in the packing of such goods was permitted. With the authorisation granted by this law the Turkish Government was now in a position either to establish such a free zone on its own account or else to grant a concession for the establishment of a free zone at some suitable location within the city of Istanbul. The location of this free zone was under consideration for some time but no decision had been adopted.\footnote{181} The head of the Copenhagen free port administration was in Istanbul during April of 1928, studying the proposal for the establishment of a free port in this city.\footnote{182}

Besides Swiss pharmaceutical firms, and Nestle's chocolate factory, American companies were also represented in the form of a Columbia record factory, and more importantly by Ford in a car and tractor assembly plant.\footnote{183}

The Ford Motor Export Company, Inc. was the first to establish an assembly plant in the Near East, having opened it in Trieste in 1923, and having also established a similar plant in Alexandria in 1926. Mr. William Collins arrived in Istanbul at the end of October 1928 to conduct the final negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to the granting of full free port privileges in the port of Istanbul. He has gone to Ankara to come

\footnote{180. \textit{The Levant Trade Review}, Vol.15 (1927), p.155.}
\footnote{181. \textit{The Levant Trade Review}, Vol.15 (1927), pp.296-297.}
\footnote{182. \textit{The Levant Trade Review}, Vol.16 (1928), p.184.}
\footnote{183. Caglar Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey. 1923-1929}, p.62.}
to a final agreement with the Ministry of Finance.\textsuperscript{184}

In addition to the local project of the Ford Motor Export Co., Inc., for a transit and assembly plant at Istanbul, which has been arranged at Ankara, there have in recent weeks been various other announcements in the daily press concerning the plans of the Ford Motor Company in regard to its export organization.\textsuperscript{185}

The negotiations conducted on behalf of the Ford Motor Co. by Mr. Collins were successfully completed at the end of November and led to the signature of an agreement which will have to be ratified by the National Assembly, especially since certain free port and other privileges are to be granted which are not provided for by any existing Turkish laws. While the exact text of the accord has not been made public, the local press has published the main features, which should facilitate this sort of transit operations on a free port basis, and open the door to many similar enterprises at Istanbul.\textsuperscript{186}

The National Assembly voted on February 2, 1929 the law covering the agreement with the Ford Motor Company for a transit and assembly plant in Istanbul\textsuperscript{187} On February 9th, Mr. Collins and Saadullah Bey, the director general of the Seyr-i Sefain, the Turkish State Steamship Service, signed an agreement for the leasing by the Ford Motor Company, for a period of ten years, of the Tophane Transit Warehouses, erected some years ago by the Seyr-i Sefain, and since then used as a transit warehouse under the administration of the Chamber of Commerce of Istanbul. These warehouses are to be emptied within three months, and the Company has another six months after that in which to complete its installation.\textsuperscript{188}

The site and buildings occupied by the warehouses and stores of the Istanbul

\textsuperscript{184.} The Levant Trade Review, Vol.16 (1928), p.391.
\textsuperscript{185.} The Levant Trade Review, Vol.16 (1928), p.426.
\textsuperscript{186.} The Levant Trade Review, Vol.16 (1928), pp.432-433.
\textsuperscript{188.} The Levant Trade Review, Vol.17 (1929), pp.19-20.
Turkish Chamber of Commerce were selected as suitable and the latter were taken over by Mr. W. G. Collins in the name of the Ford Motor Company on May 15, 1929.189

The Government granted the company the right to construct, establish and operate, within the boundaries of the Istanbul Customs an assembly plant for the local preparation, completion and finishing of automobiles, trucks, tractors, airplanes and material and parts and accessories and for the preparation of bodies, from material brought here unassembled and in pieces. The contract was to be valid for a period of twenty-five years. All the requisite automobiles, trucks, tractors, and spare parts and other tools and implements and materials to be introduced into the plant, as well as transactions in its offices, would be exempted from customs duty and other import dues of any kind and all other taxes. The company was permitted to reexport all goods, materials, tools, machines and other supplies. Of these, the payment of customs duty, transaction tax and other dues and imposts usually collected at the time of importation was, however, compulsory on automobiles, trucks, tractors, spare parts, airplanes, etc., which were brought out of the free zone and introduced into the country.190

The Government, taking into consideration the advantages which would result for the country’s economic life from this establishment and especially the fact that the retouching, painting, assembling and other finishing operations of the automobiles would be executed by local labour, undertook the payment of a premium of thirty dollars for every one of any kind of automobile, truck, and tractor imported into Turkey. This premium of thirty dollars which the Government would pay the Company would not exceed 20 percent of the Customs duty the Company would pay to the Government.191

Beginning October 1, 1929 the main office of Ford Motor Co. Exports, Inc., would be transferred from Alexandria to Istanbul, under which office the entire Near

Eastern business of the Ford Motor Company would be concentrated. It was expected that the local plant would be ready to start assembly operations by the latter part of November. The Company's plant at Alexandria was shut down on September 26, 1929, and transferred to its new quarters in Istanbul and on October 15, 1929, service stock was being delivered from the new plant, the general office organisation having been in going order some fifteen days.

On December 17, 1929 the Ford Motor Company Plant under the general management of Mr. Collins saw its first car off the assembly line. The first of the Ford cars to be assembled in the new plant at Tophane were placed on display in the dealer's showrooms in Istanbul on January 5, 1930.

The Ford Motor Company Plant was situated in its own free port, covering some 273,000 square feet of ground, on the water's edge, where ships of suitable draught could come alongside and load and unload. The plant was capable of producing 80 automobiles per 8-hour day. Every kind of work from the assembling of the chassis members to the last coat of paint was performed at Tophane and the automobile when finished may find its way, north, south, east or west into one of some nineteen countries.

As a result of unfavourable economic and commercial conditions, sales of passenger cars during the first quarter of 1930 were extremely poor. In Istanbul, the most important market in Turkey for passenger cars, sales were poor on account of money scarcity. Economic depression was having an adverse effect on automobile sales, which were estimated for the first half of 1930 at about 60 percent below the same period of 1929.

193. The Levant Trade Review, Vol.18 (1930), p.44.
196. The Levant Trade Review, Vol.18 (1930), p.44.
Chapter 24

FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ECONOMIC DEPRESSION, 1927-1930

In 1926, 1 Turkish lira was worth 14.50 Italian lire. Yet by January 1927, due to an increase in the value of lire by the active support of the Italian government, 1 Turkish lira would only be worth 6 Italian lire. Already, Turkish importers had a total debt of about two hundred and eighty million Italian liras. The fall in the exchange rate alone increased their debt by six to seven million Turkish liras.¹

The Turkish lira also dropped sharply against the British pound in early February. On February 1, 1 pound was worth 9.38 liras. Only five days later, it would be worth 9.58 liras. The rest of the month saw values range from 9.50 liras to 9.57 liras. The government felt that a few insignificant currency purchases for its own needs would be enough to stop further decline, and it hoped it was unlikely that exchange would fall for three months to come.²

However, these expectations did not materialise. The Italian lire rose sharply beginning on March 1. It now stood at 112 lire to 1 pound and, by April 25, had reached 85. There was a reaction at the end of the month, and the exchange rate closed at 91.5 lire to the pound. The rapid rise in the value of the lire spelled disaster for importers of Italian goods --mainly on cotton merchants-- and at a meeting of creditors, it was suggested that payments to Italian manufacturers be made at 125 lire to the pound, though it was not known whether Italian manufacturers would accept these terms.³

Contrary to all expectations, the value of the Turkish lira fell further against the British pound during August, reaching a two year low. On August 9, the pound sterling reached 9.90 lira. This increase took business by surprise, as many had anticipated a decline on the eve of the export season. Given the import sector's method of currency purchasing, however, this increase seemed perfectly normal. For the last few years, importers had adopted the practice of covering their needs during the export season, when foreign exchange was plentiful. By January/February, importers would have already withdrawn from the exchange market, borrowing from banks to cover their needs in the interim with the intention of waiting until August/September to reenter the exchange market. There was, therefore, an extraordinary accumulation of demand for exchange which, added to government needs, more than counterbalanced even the important offers of Izmir, Turkey's main export port.

At the same time, the Izmir exporters took their cues from the import sector and abstained from selling exchange prior to the export season. Having realised that both the government's and the importers' needs were sufficient to absorb their offers at favourable rates, the exporters sold the foreign exchange in their hands only in small amounts to cover actual current exports, and these transactions in foreign exchange were immediately absorbed. However, when the exporters delayed selling their exchange, the importers who had been waiting since the early part of the year to cover their obligations, became impatient and commenced buying exchange during August.

As had previously been the case, the importers of Istanbul expected that Izmir would start offering exchange as early July as. This practice now being abandoned by the exporters, exchange to cover export obligations did not begin to appear until the end of August. This explained the fact that Istanbul importers had commenced their purchases during the first days of August. Correspondingly, the pound, which was quoted at 9.58 liras on August 1, had reached 9.90 liras by August 9. After a downward reaction which lasted a week, the pound strengthened again, and on August 20 was quoted at 9.87 liras.
After August 22, Izmir began offering exchange and the market remained weak until the end of the month when the pound stood at 9.65 liras.\(^4\)

The commercial demand for exchange was not in itself important enough to justify the high rate of 9.90 liras per pound. The government's purchases contributed in equal measure. These purchases were a regular feature of the market, and they added to the commercial demand which began in August. Since the demand for foreign exchange could not be covered by the paucity of local offers in Istanbul or those of Izmir, the pound naturally rose as a result.\(^5\)

There was no doubt that during the coming months, import demands would increase as would those of the government. On the other hand, however, at least during September and October, important offers from the Izmir market were expected to provide a one or two month respite from the pound's ascent. With the exception of figs, olives, and opium, the Izmir crops, particularly tobacco, were reportedly plentiful and of good quality. The tobacco crop in particular was abundant in 1927 in the Izmir region. In 1926, Izmir had produced about sixteen millions of okes, in 1927, about twenty-two millions were anticipated. In short, the outlook for the near future was good.\(^6\)

But all hope was not based on Izmir. Other sections of Turkey were likewise expected to furnish important exchange. Nuts were plentiful and would find an easy market in 1927, as would cotton. Information regarding cereals, however, was contradictory, and, owing to the absence of statistics, it was difficult to forecast whether or not the crop of 1927 would satisfy the needs of the country. Though the crop in Anatolia had been damaged by extreme heat, the general feeling was that the crop in Thrace would be three times larger than that of the previous year.\(^7\)

The tightness of Turkish money forced the pound down from 9.90 liras to 9.29

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liras. This monetary crisis attained unique proportions for two reasons.

First, each year, it was not until the end of August or the beginning of September that banks and individuals began to take the necessary steps to provide against the period of tightness in the money market. In 1927, however, they had scarcely started, when they found themselves in the midst of the crisis.

Secondly, having decided to pay its two months in advance, the government forced banks to withdraw their funds deposited with other banks. This crisis forced all those who needed Turkish liras, particularly banks, to obtain loans in foreign exchange and then sell this exchange on the market. This precipitated the fall of the pound. The abundance of offers of foreign currency, therefore, resulted not only from exportation of tobacco, nuts, mohair, and the like, but also and more especially from those who had had to sell short to obtain Turkish liras. The falling off of foreign exchange purchases as a result of the scarcity of Turkish money with which to settle also contributed to the unhealthy rise of the exchange rate during September. 8

Exchange conditions in October were practically the same as those of September. The intensity in the currency market continued, and the pound, quoted at 9.29 liras at the end of September, dropped to 8.92 liras on October 4, the lowest rate of the month. A reaction followed this drop, and on October 18, it rose to 9.27 liras, the high for that month. 9

One of the main factors in this decline was the continued scarcity of Turkish money which only became more pronounced as the purchasing season for produce drew to a close. On the other hand, the buying season in Istanbul for goods destined for the interior began, and, during the second week in October, there were signs that the monetray crisis might be subsiding. 10

IN SPITE OF RELATIVELY FAVOURABLE REPORTS from the fruit and tobacco-growing districts of Anatolia and the prospects of satisfactory sales of produce in foreign markets, the rate of the pound, which would usually show marked weakness at this point in the year, had been exceptionally steady. Whereas a low-level September rate of approximately 9.00 liras had been observed in certain local financial circles some two months ago, the pound continued to fluctuate steadily between 9.90 and 9.60 liras.\textsuperscript{11} Clearly, this was related to the drought throughout July and August which had rendered the earlier optimistic reports from the produce centres obsolete.\textsuperscript{12}

After two months of continuous depreciation, the lira showed a marked change on the latter half of November when the amount of foreign exchanges rose. The principal reason for this was the presumption that the monetary crisis was ending. In fact, the first liquidation in the Istanbul Exchange was accomplished under perfectly normal conditions. Participants in the market, labouring under the illusion that the crisis had passed, lost no time in purchasing the foreign currency they needed. The government, in particular, entered the field as a buyer, and the consequent rise was therefore anything but natural. It soon became apparent that the liquidation had not been normal, the favourable report being due not to the passing of the money crisis, but to an improvement in the situation coupled with the scarcity of securities. When this was finally realised, therefore, the exchange rates declined slightly and maintained a tendency varying between calm and weak until the end of the month.\textsuperscript{13}

The unprecedented stringency in the money market accentuated the usual seasonal appreciation of Turkish lira during the export season of 1927. The scarcity of money had been so pronounced during October and November that a number of the local branches of

\textsuperscript{11} The Economist, October 1, 1927, Vol.105 (July-December 1927), pp.563-564.  
\textsuperscript{12} The Economist, October 1, 1927, Vol.105 (July-December 1927), p.564.  
\textsuperscript{13} The Levant Trade Review, Vol.15 (1927), p.539.
foreign banks as well as the bulk of Turkish financial establishments were compelled to call in on short notice their Turkish currency advances placed on the market. This unusual measure, taken at a time when exporting centres were calling for more and more Turkish currency, naturally worsened the situation, and foreign banks were forced, in some instances, to sell a portion of their exchange reserves in order to provide currency for the till. The critical situation gave rise to mutual recriminations, numerous press interviews with local financial and mercantile magnates, and to heated polemics in the press.  

Owing to the continued shortage of currency, exchange operations were again restricted in December. The only apparent explanation for this persistent shortage was that the money which had passed into the interior in exchange for produce had not returned to Istanbul in anything like its customary volume. Seasonal purchases for the interior in the Istanbul market were stated to be as much as thirty percent lower for some commodities than those of previous years. The lack of purchasing clearly indicated an unprecedented shortage of money in the interior.

The monetary crisis became less pronounced in January of 1928, and, although the liquidity of the market could not yet be considered normal, there was now considerably more scope for the accommodation of loans and discounts.

Remarkably, the monetary stringency which had plagued the economy for more or less five months disappeared in February. An unexpected influx of money from the interior had suddenly rendered the market extremely liquid, and there was more now than enough to meet the requirements of borrowers. The demand which ensued, coupled with the absence of export sales, created a sharp fall in the Turkish lira, and, at one moment on February 27, pound was quoted at 9.77 liras, though it subsequently reacted under the

influence of the liquidation of some long positions, to close at 9.72 liras.\textsuperscript{17}

There was more than sufficient currency to meet all requirements throughout March, though the demand for accommodation was rather less. On the other hand, the suspension of payment to foreign concerns by several import firms --one of considerable magnitude-- and the uncertain import position of certain smaller firms, had caused financial houses to be very circumspect, though, generally speaking, the situation was stable enough for the resumption of normal export-import activity.\textsuperscript{18}

But, by the beginning of April 1928 the situation, however, took a turn for the worse. Trade in Izmir was extremely bad, and there was a major financial and commercial crisis which left many companies bankrupt.\textsuperscript{19}

Money market conditions in April were similar to those of March. Although there continued to be an ample supply of money, with the series of fresh failures mostly involving textile importing firms, financial houses were disinclined to grant new credits, and took steps to curtail existing ones. The exchange market was characterised by an almost complete absence of commercial demand, reflecting the stagnancy which persisted in the market. The purchases which were made were principally made in connection with the projected founding of a central bank and the eventual settlement of Turkish foreign debt.\textsuperscript{20}

By May 1928, the glut of lower-grade leaf tobacco which had been steadily accumulating on Turkish markets as a result of the difficulty in disposing of export stocks had made banking and financial circles increasingly apprehensive. High-grade leaf was selling well enough and at good prices --but it seemed that the Regie, which had become a


\textsuperscript{19} F.O.424/268, Consul-General Morgan to Sir G. Clerk, Smyrna, April 19, 1928.[p.83]

state monopoly, and as such in complete control of production and distribution, took the bulk of the higher-grade leaf for its own requirements. As the tobacco monopoly's sales of cigarettes and cut tobacco had been increasing steadily in both the domestic and foreign markets, and as the manufactured article produced by the Regie was generally a mixture of roughly twenty-five percent of the inferior tobacco with seventy-five percent of the high-grade leaf, the exporting merchant had to content himself, if he was to do any business at all, with the average and lower grades. But these lower grades were only of interest to European importers as long as a fair proportion of the higher quality tobacco was also available for blending purposes. With the paucity of these higher grades on the open market, the lower qualities had become increasingly difficult to dispose of, and hence the glut, which in Istanbul alone was estimated at something like six thousand tons.

The situation of tobacco trade went from bad to worse during May and June of 1928. It was reported that accumulated, unsold stocks of medium and low-grade leaf amounted to close to ten thousand tons. Moreover, it was now almost impossible to induce any local bank to accept this commodity as security for loans. Indeed, in most cases the banks continued to press for settlement of outstanding advances, and, as no domestic or foreign markets could be found for the bulk of this tobacco, the situation had become critical.

This state of affairs appeared to have seriously affected the stability of a number of tobacco exporting houses, and, although the banks had covered themselves in the majority of cases by calling upon their customers for additional security, this security usually meant more tobacco. But the value of this collateral which had ceased to be an easily marketable commodity was becoming increasingly dubious.

The general lack of confidence in the economy gained further momentum with the

collapse of those Istanbul firms in the wholesale textile trade.\textsuperscript{25}

The bankruptcy of Avundukzade Brothers, in particular, had repercussions in trading circles throughout Turkey. This firm was one of the largest importers of cotton goods in Turkey, and did most of its business in Anatolia. Though the exact amount of the failure was unknown, but it was estimated to be at least three million Turkish liras, or about three hundred thousand pounds. The head office of Avundukzade was in Istanbul, but it had several branches abroad, including one in Manchester. Importantly, the firm did considerable business in Italy, and it was believed that the recent rise and consequent stabilisation of the Italian lire was responsible for a great part of Avundukzades' losses, with liabilities of about four million Turkish liras, as against assets of about one and a quarter million liras. As the senior partner in the firm was also the Vice-President of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul -- the oldest and most important organisation in its class in Turkey -- the effect on public opinion was distinctly discouraging. A few Turkish houses of minor importance followed suit, and it was feared that others were also in difficulty.\textsuperscript{26}

Rumours quickly became fact. The bankruptcies of Istanbul cotton textile import houses amounted to close to ten million liras, the liabilities of two of the leading Turkish finns alone standing at five million liras with practically no available assets. The losses fell principally upon Italian, Belgian, and Czechoslovakian cotton manufacturers, who, since the end of the First World War, had been in the habit of granting long-term credits to Turkish import houses. Operating in nearly every instance on a cash basis, the Manchester finns remained virtually unaffected.\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{25} The Economist, May 12, 1928, Vol.106 (January-June 1928), pp.983-984.
\textsuperscript{26} The Times, March 31, 1928; and, The Economist, May 12, 1928, Vol.106 (January-June 1928), pp.983-984.
\textsuperscript{27} The Economist, July 14, 1928, Vol.107 (July-December 1928), p.70.
\end{flushright}
Although overtrading and the reckless desire for quick profits might have had something to do with these failures, the main trouble seemed to date back to the somewhat sudden revalorisation and quasi-stabilisation of the Italian lire. In certain grades of cotton textiles and yarns, Italian manufacturers practically held a monopoly in Turkish markets. When the Italian lire suddenly and unexpectedly appreciated in value, local merchant houses, which enjoyed from three to six months' credit from Italian exporters, failed to honour their engagements at maturity and declined to carry out their contractual obligations. A compromise was eventually reached with Italian export houses, mostly those in Milan, taking a loss of roughly thirty percent. It was expected that their losses would be even more serious, the liabilities of the Avundukçades alone to Italian and Czechoslovakian exporters reportedly exceeding one million and eight hundred thousand liras.  

During the course of 1928, the total number of firms which had either voluntarily or involuntarily closed their doors amounted to five hundred and sixty-four, two hundred and forty-five of which were in Istanbul alone. It was a year of tremendous volatility and rapid turnover. The number of newly registered businesses numbered six hundred and forty-one, two hundred and sixty-four of which were in Istanbul. 29 The Turkish Government, while aware of this crisis, did little to remedy it, and it was feared that the remedy might be out of reach. 30 Indeed, the situation continued through the first five months of 1929 during which one hundred and thirty-five more firms suspended operations and two hundred and fifty-two others closed down completely. 31 According to İkdam, four to five thousand firms and merchants retired from business that year, with eight to ten applications a day to the Chamber of Commerce for closure of business and annulment of registration. 32 During the first five months of 1929, one hundred and thirty-six new firms came into existence and

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30. The Times, February 5, 1929.
two hundred and twenty-five new merchants went into business.\textsuperscript{33}

THE NEW TAX ON ANIMALS which caused much agitation had many ramifications, and in some respects it was not exactly clear. All animals were to be taxed more, the rates running from twenty piasters for mohair goats up to 200 piasters for pigs.\textsuperscript{34}

The fig and raisin crop for 1925 was far below the 1924 figures, as indicated by reports published. The fig production of 1925 amounted to about twenty-four million kilograms. The raisin crop was also far below the 1924 figures, and it was estimated that the crop would be about sixty percent less than it was in 1925.\textsuperscript{35}

Turkey since 1922 had made a great advance in the production of tobacco, and in mid-twenties claimed the greatest output of any of the Balkan countries. Before the War the country never produced more than thirty million kilograms, and during the War the production had dropped to a much lower level. Since the War Turkey had been steadily increasing her output, and at the end of 1925 led Greece and Bulgaria on the market. Turkey produced twenty-one million kilograms in 1922 and in 1924 sixty million kilograms, while the 1925 crop was estimated at fifty million kilograms. Greece was the nearest competitor with thirty million kilograms for 1925. According to Government figures tobacco equalled forty percent of Turkey's exports.\textsuperscript{36}

Tobacco crop for 1925 also suffered in the Izmir region, dropping off fifteen percent in production.\textsuperscript{37}

TURKISH AGRICULTURE was greatly handicapped by the lack of sufficient capital to finance greater production. The farmers were continually asking for loans of money, seed, or in

\textsuperscript{34} The Economist, January 2, 1926.
\textsuperscript{35} The Economist, November 7, 1925.
\textsuperscript{36} The Economist, March 13, 1926.
\textsuperscript{37} The Economist, November 7, 1925.
some cases, tractors. In the hinterland of Izmir, there was abundant land for cultivation, but farmers could only plough a third or fourth of their land. The Izmir farmers even offered to pay high rates of interest on loans or give the banks a certain percentage of the crops at the end of the season. Their offers were rejected, and the farmers could not obtain enough seed in 1925 to cultivate half of the land. 38

It was only after the situation became something of a crisis that Ziraat Bankasi started extending credit to farmers. In 1925, Ziraat Bankasi advanced roughly nineteen and a half million liras to farmers, compared to a mere four hundred and eighty-six thousand liras in 1923, and one million and six hundred thousand liras in 1924. This sum would fall to sixteen million liras in 1926 and in 1927, still, by no means a negligible amount. In 1928, the bank advanced two million seven hundred and fifty thousand liras to cultivators in drought-stricken grain-producing districts, such as Thrace, Konya, and the Ankara plain. Its advances to tobacco producers amounted to two million liras. The cotton growers in the Cilician plain and the Izmir region also received two million liras; one and a half million liras went to the former, five hundred thousand liras to the latter. By contrast, loans to fig growers and vineyard owners in the Izmir region were almost negligible. 39

As a result of prolonged drought in the central Anatolian plateau --the most fertile wheat-producing area in the whole of Asia Minor-- a very considerable proportion of 1928’s grain crop had been destroyed which had translated into famine for most of its inhabitants. Indeed, the spectre of famine became so threatening in certain outlying districts that relief work on a comprehensive scale had to be undertaken by the government in conjunction with the Red Crescent in late August. Imported grain and flour was distributed among the starving peasantry. The shortage of fodder also became so critical that in many instances, farmers were compelled to sell their livestock for a fraction of their worth. 40

38. The Economist, March 13, 1926.
Nor had livestock escaped the ravages of the previous cold winter; these had a mortality rate of twenty to twenty-five percent in the eastern provinces.\(^1\) The provinces of Konya and Afyon were especially hard hit.\(^2\) The government had provided some help, but owing to the drought's persistence, a commission was appointed to visit Konya and determine what further relief measures could be made.\(^3\) The Red Crescent decided to send five hundred thousand liras more to the region. It was also reported from Trabzon that the prolonged drought in that province threatened both its inhabitants and the wheat crop.\(^4\)

The southern area, between Konya and the Toros Mountains, however, had not suffered to any great extent, thanks to the Lake Beysehir irrigation works, an undertaking carried out by German engineers in pre-war days during the Unionist regime.\(^5\)

The harvest prospects in other quarters were, unfortunately, also discouraging in 1928. In the middle eastern and some of the eastern provinces, locusts had caused damage to an estimated twenty-five percent of the crops. The tobacco harvest was both quantitatively and qualitatively poor; too much low-grade leaf having again been cultivated in certain areas. The Black Sea hazelnut crop --a staple product of the region which extends from Giresun to Rize-- had been singularly disappointing, and the Cilician cotton plants had not recovered from the degradations of the boll-worm, although foreign experts had been at work in that region for the last eighteen months. The Bursa silk production and industry was also at a very low ebb. Only the fruit crop in western Anatolia seemed promising, although the estimated exportable surplus of high-grade brewing barley from that district was well below the average.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) *The Times*, June 30, 1928; and, *The Times*, July 28, 1928.

\(^4\) *The Times*, July 28, 1928. Extreme heat had prevailed throughout Turkey during mid-July, the thermometer registering 86 degrees in the shade in Istanbul and over 95 degrees in the interior of Anatolia.


BY 1929, however, the silk industry in Bursa had begun a slow but continuous recovery. Cotton production in the Cilician plain also enjoyed a measure of stability. In certain respects, the considerable decrease in tobacco production might also have been regarded as advantageous, as it facilitated the liquidation of old stocks and tended to relieve the post-war crisis. The tobacco monopoly also hoped to address this problem by limiting cultivation and controlling quality. 47

Despite some gains, the rural population's purchasing power only decreased, and it was this population which was the principal market for imported goods in cotton textiles and the like. 48

Throughout the late 1920's, agricultural prices had dropped as compared to non-agricultural goods. Previously, the rural population had been able to buy an arsin of cotton textile goods for an oke of wheat, an oke of fuel oil for an oke of wheat, and an oke of sugar for two to two and a half okes of wheat. Now, the population had to exchange eight to ten kilograms of wheat for an arsin of cotton textiles, seven to eight kilograms of wheat for a kilogram of fuel oil, and sixteen to eighteen kilograms of wheat for a kilogram of sugar. 49 In general, while agricultural goods were valued at thirty-three to thirty-five percent of their pre-war value, industrial goods could only be had at the same price or more. 50

Normally, textiles were the chief import. Demand for textiles, in particular, remained heavy, which resulted in the reduction of excessive stocks resulting from too generous credits in the past. The mistakes made had been costly, and bankruptcies in Istanbul, which in 1927 numbered 28, rose to 72 for the year 1928. The quality of

discountable bills was becoming poorer, the average length of credits longer, while requests for renewal were certainly more frequent.  

The Customs statistics reflected the seriousness of the situation and its influence on foreign exchange. For the past several years, the total amount of import-export volume showed a constant decrease from four hundred and thirty-four million liras in 1925 to four hundred and twenty-one million in 1926, and to three hundred and seventy million in 1927. In terms of exports alone, this meant a drop from one hundred and ninety-two million in 1925 to one hundred and seventy-three million in 1928, and to one hundred and fifty-five million in 1929.

The very high cost of living resulted in great hardship. Until recently, the authorities had been confident that the docile character of the Turkish people would prevent the situation from becoming critical. The extraordinary severity of the winter of 1928/1929 had, however, inflicted fresh suffering on the poverty-stricken population, and the government recognised that it was faced with a serious problem. During the spring months of 1929, the newspapers reported several cases of starving men and women in Istanbul who had attempted suicide, and cartoons appeared weekly which suggested that the populace was in grave danger of starvation if the economic crisis persisted.

The protracted economic crisis was chiefly responsible for the high cost of living. The crisis had slowly come to a head during the last five years. Its causes were bad crops, excessive direct and indirect taxation, faulty administration, a surfeit of state monopolies, and the diminishing importance of the port of Istanbul. A financial crisis had accompanied the economic. Three banks -- the Ionian (British), the Marmoresch Bank (Romanian), and the Banque Belge pour l'Etranger (Belgian) -- had closed their Istanbul offices within the

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54. The Times, July 8, 1929.
past twelve months. In other spheres, bankruptcies continued. All the leading stores and shops reported poor sales. The decline in attendance at hotels, restaurants, cinemas and cabarets made it clear that the public had less to spend on entertainment.\footnote{55. The Times, July 8, 1929.}

In 1929, too, the harvest was not good. In Izmir, the dried fruit harvest was not as abundant as some had predicted. The eastern Black Sea coast in the vicinity of Trabzon had been subject to a series of disastrous cloudbursts which had practically laid waste to the important hazelnut plantations in Sürmene and Of. In the central Anatolian plateau, the drought had returned with such sustained and intense heat that grave fears of yet another poor crop were expressed in official circles.\footnote{56. The Economist, September 7, 1929, Vol.109 (July-December 1929), pp.437-438.}

By late 1929, disappointing harvests and a critical commercial situation gave rise to profound and widespread pessimism. In regard to the crops, the high expectations entertained in the spring of 1929 had not been fulfilled. Many had hoped that the 1929 harvest would compensate for the paucity of those of recent years, particularly the last. The partial failure of the 1929 crops, followed by a further depreciation of the Turkish lira, the fear that importers would be unable to pay for the abnormally heavy imports of manufactured goods which were rushed into the country in order to avoid increased customs duties, heavy taxation, and a widespread belief that the government had been incompetent and short-sighted in the sphere of finance and commerce, only contributed to the prevalent feeling of depression.\footnote{57. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].}

Various events combined to disappoint whatever hope people did have. As regards cereals, the 1929 harvest in Anatolia was much better than that of 1928 and was well up to the average of post-war years, but, Thrace had not been so fortunate. There, the wheat harvest had been very light and it was became increasingly obvious that it would once again
be necessary to import foreign wheat. In the late winter and spring of 1929, one hundred thousand tons of foreign wheat were imported and, although it was not expected that so large a quantity would be required the following year, local importers pointed out that the 1929 harvest would be exhausted by February or March of 1930 and that imports would then be necessary until July of 1930 when the new harvests were gathered. 58

The situation in dried fruit was equally unsatisfactory. The 1929 crop was well up to the average, but heavy rains seriously damaged the already ripe fruit, and out of a total of seventy-five thousand tons of sultanas it was estimated that twenty-five thousand tons had been damaged and another ten thousand totally destroyed. Some damage was also done to the fig crop, but the percentage of rejections by the United States, the principal buyer of Turkish figs, was appreciably less than that of 1928. 59

The tobacco crop of 1929 was also about average and amounted to forty-two thousand tons. But again, bad weather had interfered, affecting the quality to the point where the Samsun district, which normally produced the best and most marketable leaf, would not yield more than four thousand tons, as against six thousand five hundred and eighty tons in 1928. 60

The hazelnut crop had been simply disastrous. In the early summer, the crops on the trees were estimated at twenty thousand tons, but insects almost entirely destroyed these, and the amount of sound nuts available for export was not expected to exceed thirty-five hundred tons. This effectively ruined a number of growers and exporters, who were now totally incapable of fulfilling their contracts. 61

By contrast, the output of wool, mohair and opium had been up to or above the

58. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].
59. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].
60. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].
61. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].
average, while the cotton crop was clearly better than that of preceding years. In Adana, the principal producing centre, the crop of 1929 was estimated at two hundred thousand bales, as against one hundred thousand bales the previous year. 62

CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE, it was disappointing to find how ineffective the government had been in assisting its development. Turkey was essentially an agricultural country and its prosperity depended on the success or failure of its crops, and yet agriculture was neglected among the state departments, having no ministry of its own. The semi-official Ziraat Bankasi, with a capital of twenty-two million liras, should have been in a position to aid farmers, but in practice it had diverted most of its capital to monopolistic enterprises and was of little use to agriculture. The attitude of this bank, as well as of all other Turkish banks, had only exacerbated the situation. Farmers were charged high interest rates on advances made against their crops, with the result that they were constantly in debt and increasingly discouraged. Now, the government was trying to make amends by hastily forcing the peasants and farmers to form cooperative societies which, through lack of experience and funds, were likely to end in disaster. Production could only be substantially increased through the widespread introduction of modern methods. But, in most cases, farmers could not afford to buy the required machinery. Unless the government arranged for Ziraat Bankasi or some other institution to lend money to farmers at a reasonable rate of interest, supply them on easy terms with modern requisites and provide exert advice for their use, most felt that no radical improvement in the present situation could be expected. 63

Turkish banks had so far been remarkably successful, but this success was due to government support and the fact that they had been able to charge exorbitant interest rates at

62. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [pp.87-88].
63. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [p.88].
the expense of industry and agriculture. In the mercantile sector, it was noteworthy that three of the most important Turkish firms had all been in difficulties. Avundukzades, the largest importer of textiles, had gone bankrupt; Kirzade, the most important Turkish shipowner, had only been able to continue through the goodwill of his creditors, to whom all his ships and other property were mortgaged. Finally, Nmelizade Brothers, the biggest private tobacco exporter, was on the verge of ruin because it had diverted most of its capital to the construction of a railway from Samsun to Carsamba. The railway was a financial disaster, and the firm only saved itself from bankruptcy by persuading the government to buy out all of its railway interest. 64

Imports in 1928 had exceeded exports by about fifty million liras. This was not completely unusual. For the past six years, Turkey's total trade deficit amounted to upwards of three hundred million liras. There was no doubt that Turkey had been living beyond her means for many years. This deficit had been made up by firms who had drawn on their capital and realised their assets. Clearly, this state of affairs could not continue indefinitely. In 1929, the problem became more serious when importers, many of whose operations were speculative, brought abnormally heavy stocks of manufactured goods into the country during the months of July, August and September in order to avoid the increased customs duties which would take effect on October 1. These importers were to be disappointed, however, as they had entirely overlooked the fact that for a large number of articles, principally cotton and woollen goods, the old tariffs would remain in force as dictated by previous commercial treaties. 65 Moreover, the increased duties prophesied by the newspapers were not half as drastic and comprehensive as predicted --many articles

64. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [p.89].
being assessed at lower rates than under the old tariff.\textsuperscript{66} As a result, buyers were content to bide their time before making their winter purchases.\textsuperscript{67} This situation forced banks hold a very large number of long-dated trade bills drawn for the most part in British pounds, while the importers' warehouses were choked with goods against which they had advanced thirty percent of invoice value.\textsuperscript{68} Importers who had placed orders in excess of their current requirements and of their financial capacity found themselves in a very precarious and embarrassing situation. Maturities would come around, adjournments would be applied for; sometimes they would be granted, but the fate of the great majority of these bills would remain problematic.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, disappointing harvests had, in many cases, put a check on heavy buying in the interior. Practically, all the stocks in Istanbul were bought on credits of four to six months and, now it was feared that a great number of merchants would be unable to meet their obligations, when the bills fell due towards the end of the year, forcing increasing numbers of merchants into bankruptcy. In 1927, 572 merchants withdrew from business in Istanbul and, for the period January to September 1928, a further 600 withdrawals had been registered.\textsuperscript{70} The Istanbul textile and produce markets were passing through an economic and financial crisis which is without precedent in the annals of Turkish domestic trade. From the available evidence it appeared that Turkish commercial centres felt the reaction of the state of atrophy and indecision which characterised European, American and Egyptian producing centres.\textsuperscript{71}

Turkey was unfortunately afflicted in 1928 by a prolonged period of drought, which gravely endangered the standing crops. The Anatolian peasant, who is the leading buyer on the Istanbul and Izmir markets for manufactured goods, has, therefore, found

\textsuperscript{67. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [p.90].}
\textsuperscript{68. The Economist. November 2, 1929, Vol.109 (July-December 1929), p.820.}
\textsuperscript{69. The Economist. November 2, 1929, Vol.109 (July-December 1929), p.820.}
\textsuperscript{70. F.O.424/271, No.455, Sir G. Clerk to Mr A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 13, 1929 [p.90].}
\textsuperscript{71. The Economist. November 2, 1929, Vol.109(July-December 1929), p.820.}
himself without the wherewithal to effect his customary purchases. This unexpected mishap has placed local wholesale houses in a grave predicament, but the action of these houses during the past six months calls for some examination. On the strength of unofficial press statements to the effect that, with the coming into force of the new Customs tariff, the duties on certain commodities would be raised to an almost unheard of level, importers proceeded to lay in as large a stock of manufactured goods as time would permit before the new coefficients acquired force of law. To judge by the arrivals of cargo vessels, the encumbered state of the Custom House and the quay company's godowns, together with the undischarged lighters --more than 500 of them-- which became a menace to navigation in the Golden Horn, one could imagine oneself back in early post-war days, when the country was denuded of almost every article of prime necessity. The foreign manufacturer, suffering from a serious hold-up of production, was more than ready to take advantage of so convenient an outlet as the Turkish market; his representatives in this country egged on local importers to place more and more orders, and importers were not at all averse to following the agents' advice. Foreign exporters shipped large parcels of goods on consignment to their Istanbul agents, which goods the latter lodged with local banks as collateral for advances with which to pay the Customs duty and landing charges.72

In order to pay the customs duty and expenses, banks and importers had to make a very considerable outlay in the national currency. This had naturally contributed, in turn, to the great tightness in the local money market, the effects of which would not be dissipated for a long time to come, since the cost price of the goods was becoming more and more surcharged with expenses. Owing to the stringency now ruling, local banks had increased their rate to twelve percent per year for accommodation in Turkish liras. Pound advances, independently of the exchange risk run by the borrower, were nearly as burdensome, as the local rate, in sympathy with the recent upward trend of the Bank of England rate, seemed to

have crystallised round about ten percent. 73

The Istanbul market remained in an abnormal, almost chaotic situation as a result of
the immoderate importation of foreign manufactured goods by the local trading community.
This situation had arisen from an attempt to benefit by the difference between the new
customs tariffs and the old without regard to the requirements of the country, or its capacity
to absorb these redundant stocks. The situation, aggravated by the recent persistent rise in
the rate of pound, preoccupied official and banking circles. 74

How deplorable the situation really was might be gathered from the fact that since
the beginning of 1929 over 500 bankruptcies and approximately 600 voluntary liquidations
had been registered among Istanbul business houses alone. 75

It had been evident that a critical situation on the Turkish exchange market was
rapidly approaching. The relative shortage of exchange arising out of successive crop
failures and the increased demand to cover imported manufactured goods, coupled with the
steady purchases of the Treasury, had at last brought matters to a head. To make thing
worse, the trouble had been magnified by persistent local rumours to the effect that the
government intended to raise funds by cutting in two and revalorising all Treasury notes
now in circulation. This rumour, although denied in a strongly worded official
communique, continued to receive credence and caused widespread anxiety and alarm
among the poorer classes of the populace. 76

ON DECEMBER 5, pound rose to an opening price of 11.00 liras, and, after fluctuating
wildly throughout the day, reached an unprecedented high of just over 12.00 liras, closing
at 10.75 liras. The authorities, already seriously alarmed when the pound stood in the
neighbourhood of 10.75 liras, announced their intention of taking drastic measures which

would put matters right again. A cabinet meeting was accordingly convened, and, by special regulations put immediately into force, all state purchases overseas of material for railways and other public works would be suspended; state agencies would meet their requirements by acquiring native supplies; the acquisition by the state of material unprocurable in Turkey was temporarily suspended; banks and foreign establishments were to obtain the authority of the cabinet before effecting any purchases of foreign exchange; bona fide demands made by individuals were to be established by documentary evidence, which was to be submitted in every instance and for every item to the scrutiny of the Commissary of the Istanbul Exchange; and, lastly, the originators of the recent malicious rumours were to be prosecuted.\footnote{77}{The Times, December 7, 1929; The Economist, December 14, 1929, Vol.109 (July-December 1929), p.1132; and, F.O.424/271, No.488, Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson, Angora, December 17, 1929 [p.100].}

No banks or business houses would be allowed to buy foreign currency without full written justification. Turkish merchants continued to be obliged to buy foreign currency in order to pay for their extensive foreign orders. It was officially denied that a moratorium would be declared.\footnote{78}{The Times, December 7, 1929.}

The reason for the collapse of the Turkish lira could be attributed to several causes. The poor harvests, the flood of imports and the panic created by the government's mishandling of the situation appeared largely responsible for the sudden drop in the exchange rate. In addition, Turkey had, for the first time, to make heavy payments abroad on account of the Oriental Railways, Anatolian Railway and the public debt.\footnote{79}{F.O.424/271, No.488, Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson, Angora, December 17, 1929 [p.100].}

It was some time before the government really understood the situation. When it did, its first inclination was to denounce speculators --supposedly Greek-- on the Istanbul Exchange. It then saw that the volume of imports and exports might have something to do with the trouble, and it proceeded to start its campaign for "buying Turkish". It then took
the practical measure of borrowing five hundred thousand pounds from the Ottoman Bank, a step which must have been as distasteful to the nationalism of the authorities as it was encouraging for the future of the bank. Following its announcement on December 5, the government entered the market as a seller of pound, with the result that the Turkish lira recovered about fifty kurus.

On December 12, Ismet Inönü, the Prime Minister, dealt with the whole question in a long speech, which he read to the Assembly. He correctly attributed the fall in the exchange to over-importation, under-exportation, unusual foreign payments, and, in particular, panic. He announced that the government was going to do all in its power to encourage the production and use of Turkish goods, to promote economy and saving among the people, and to punish speculation. He stated that the aim of the government was to make the country self-supporting by preventing it from spending more than it earned. Government and municipal authorities had been prohibited from giving any further foreign orders. Ismet Inönü declared that a central bank would be founded with Turkish capital, and that shares would be offered to the public.

Despite prolific legislation and the enactment of hurried, last moment measures by the Assembly, Turkey's position deteriorated. Nobody knew what might happen if the agricultural situation turned out to be as bad in 1930 as it had been for the preceding three years.

In Turkey, 1929 was difficult, although the various crops showed in quantity a general increase over those of the previous year. The production of wheat was 2,000,000 tons, against 1,600,000 tons in 1928; cotton, 130,000 bales, against 110,000 bales; and

80. F.O.424/271, No.488, Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson, Angora, December 17, 1929 [p.100].
81. The Times, December 7, 1929.
82. F.O.424/271, No.488, Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson, Angora, December 17, 1929 [p.100].
tobacco, 40,000,000 kilograms, which was a yield above the average. An exception, however, was the crop of hazelnuts, which is ordinarily an important export, the harvest of which was almost entirely destroyed on the eve of maturity. This meant a loss of at least 1,000,000 pounds to the credit side of the commercial balance of the country. 84

Two other factors exercised a depressing influence on Turkish agricultural exports. One factor was the world depression in agricultural prices, a serious matter for a country which was purely agricultural. The second factor, more particularly Turkish, was the increased competition which its exporters encountered on the world markets for products which had always been essentially associated with Anatolia. In the tobacco market, Greece and Bulgaria; in the fruit market, California and Australia; in the mohair market, America and South Africa; in the carpet market, Greece again had all intensified their production of commodities for which Turkey had previously been the prime supplier. 85

The results could be seen in the decrease in the value of Turkish exports. Statistics showed a fall from 192,000,000 TLs in 1925 to 173,000,000 TLs in 1928, and a further fall to 155,000,000 TLs in 1929. 86

IN THE BEGINNING OF 1930, it was reported that although cultivation had reached an unprecedented scale, an exceptionally mild January had caused fresh misgivings. Late snows and hard frosts will do immense damage and the gloomy prognostications of the pessimists may be realised. A continuance of mild weather and adequate rains will yield an abundant harvest and the worst of the economic crisis will be over. Even so, however, it is so grave that the Turkish currency cannot, without foreign financial assistance, be maintained at its present artificial level when exchange operations take place on a more or

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less free market.

Chapter 25

POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO
THE KEMALIST DICTATORSHIP, 1929-1930

There were indications that not all Turks found the Kemalist dictatorship easy to endure. In early October of 1928, posters appeared in the Turkish quarter of Izmir which called the current regime a government of "leeches", and denounced the ruling Republican People's Party a misnomer on the ground that people had no real representation in it or in the Assembly, and called for justice for all Turks. News of this discontent failed appear in the strictly-controlled press.¹

It would be a gross exaggeration, then, to say that the current Kemalist regime was popular, at least as the term is understood in a Western democracy. The eastern provinces remained an open sore which refused to yield satisfactorily to treatment. There were reports of abortive risings in Istanbul, Bursa, Konya and Sivas, revealing a state of affairs which was not altogether satisfactory. In the rural districts, the poor harvest of 1928 could not but fail to add to the fuel of discontent caused by increased taxation. In the larger urban centres in Anatolia, trade had not been developing as quickly as it should have.² This was largely due to the imposition of heavy, and in some cases unfair, taxes, as well as the creation of a number of state monopolies which had only increased the cost of living.³ Moreover, virtually everyone was effected by reports of a new survey with the certainty of

¹ F.O.424/269, Consul-General Morgan to Sir G. Clerk, Smyrna, November 19, 1928 [pp.46-47].
³ The Times, January 4, 1929.
increased property taxes which would inevitably cause greater hardship. The blame for this could only be laid at the door of the government. There was also a feeling of pronounced distrust when it came to the government's dealings with foreign capital: it was strongly believed by the population at large that foreign capital contributed very largely to the economic crisis.

There were also specific grievances not directly connected to the economic crisis. First, there was the introduction of the new latin alphabet; second, the apprehension of government interference with the Moslem religion; and, third, the perception that the government was prey to ambitious individuals who were only scheming to secure power for themselves. With neither a free press nor free speech, discontent in any form found no way to constructively express itself.

Moreover, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, deputy for Mardin who had been labelled by the public as courtier to Atatürk, writing in Milliyet, raised the possibility of a government sanctioned press monopoly. He stated that both the introduction of the latin characters and the general economic climate had thrown the press into a crisis. As if the Kemalist government had had no direct responsibility in the matter, Karaosmanoglu went on to write that many weekly and monthly reviews had ceased publication, and that it seemed that daily newspapers were now threatened with the same fate. He announced that the only way to preserve the intellectual life of Turkey was through complete government control of the press. At that time, four morning and two evening newspapers appeared in Istanbul. One was official; four were owned and edited by Kemalist deputies; and the sixth consistently reflected the government's point of view. It was thus rather difficult to see what further control could be placed on the press.

5. The Times, January 4, 1929.
7. The Times, April 19, 1929.
8. The Times, April 19, 1929.
DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1930, there had been continual reports and persistent rumours about a change of government. It was said that Ismet Pasha was no longer persona grata with Atatürk, and the name of his successor was freely mentioned. Atatürk's unusually long stay at Yalova during the Fall of 1929 was interpreted by foreign political observers, especially the French, as a sign that he intended to saddle İsmet İnönü with all the blame for the current situation, recalling Fethi Okyar from Paris to replace him. But this idea was more likely the pious wish of the French, who believed that, if Fethi Okyar were in power, Atatürk would support him in contracting foreign loans to remedy the economic situation. In any event, the rumours proved untrue. But, İsmet İnönü had to resort to certain wiles to keep himself in power. For the past year, it had almost been common knowledge among leading members of the Republican People's Party that some sort of an opposition party would probably be established in the near future; discussions about the establishment of an opposition party with Atatürk's approval and possible control behind the scenes were being conducted for about a year. Responding to this, İsmet İnönü succeeded in suppressing any opposition within the Republican People's Party by encouraging the Assembly's recent salary increase, making Turkish deputies the best paid in the world.

While İnönü managed to keep both the party and the Assembly under his control from the Fall of 1929 when the economic crisis reached its zenith with the collapse of the Turkish currency in November until July of 1930 and seemed to have weathered the storm, the continued economic depression and government's ineptitude to deal with the crisis

10. F.O.424/271, No.488, Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson, Angora, December 17, 1929 [p.101].
11. The Times, July 5, 1930.
increased popular opposition. Dissatisfaction with the government remained strong in both Istanbul and Anatolia. 14 Though the general elections of 1927 had resulted in a sweeping victory for the Republican People's Party, this was totally due to the complete control of the elections by the Kemalist state apparatus than to any visible support for the Republican People's Party in the country. Nevertheless, İsmet İnönü and the Republican People's Party had become overconfident by their success, committing many tactical errors which had gradually cost them their hold over the country. 15 The protracted economic crisis and the serious scarcity of money added fuel to popular dissatisfaction with the Kemalist government, and it was felt that unless foreign assistance was forthcoming the current state of affairs was likely to continue. 16 The fact that Fethi Okyar would be returning to Turkey in July, presumably on a summer holiday, acquired increasing significance.

 Atatürk first spoke of his plans to establish an opposition party to Fuad Bulca, a relative and deputy for Rize. Apparently, the idea behind such a plan was to counterweigh İsmet İnönü's influence. 17 Atatürk also consulted with Nuri Conker, one of his most trusted friends and deputy, about his plans, saying that he had decided that Fethi Okyar would be the leader of this new party. 18 On June 17, 1930, İsmet İnönü told Asim Us, [his confidante] and deputy, that the possibility of an opposition party in the upcoming elections remained, and that Fethi Okyar's name had been circulated as a possible leader. Because of the considerable risk to Okyar's reputation, however, it was unclear whether or not he would accept. 19 Indeed, the political rivalry between İnönü and Atatürk played a prominent role in the establishment of the new party. İnönü had taken control of the Republican People's Party and there was now talk that İnönü might be elected President after the next general elections. The formation of a new party which would highlight the

unpopular aspects of the Ismet İnönü Government, decreasing İnönü's power in the Assembly, seemed an ideal solution. If need be, Fethi Okyar would be appointed Prime Minister, and Atatürk would regain his control of the Assembly.  

According to some, İnönü should also be insisted in the creation of an opposition. Under the existing regime, all debate and discussion had to take place in the meetings of the Republican People's Party. Decisions could only be adopted by a majority vote, and party discipline demanded that thereafter unanimity would reign in the Assembly. During the winter of 1929, however, criticism had grown to such an extent that some leaders within the Republican People's Party must have foreseen the day when party discipline would no longer control the Assembly proceedings. Since, opposition, though suppressed, clearly existed, the government had two choices: it could either contain the opposition or continue suppressing it. Already, suppression had not been tremendously effective and some feared that a continuation of this policy might only lead to serious riots, if not to revolution. These apparently broached the subject with İnönü. On the one hand, they said, the members of such an opposition would become imbued with republican ideals, while public opinion would be placated by the possibility of a legitimate channel for criticism. On the other, these members could also be trained to discreetly take control of the country, constitutionally, of course.  

Fuad Bulca, however, warned Fethi Okyar on his arrival in July, 1930 that Atatürk would offer him the leadership of a new political party, advising him not to get involved with the project. Okyar himself had heard such talk from other deputies as well.  

On July 24, Atatürk talked with Okyar, his Ambassador to France, about a confidential report he had obtained which indicated that the French were worried about

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23. Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, p.379.
Soviet influence in Turkey. In this connection, the French government had expressed the necessity to offer Turkey financial support. It seemed, however, that the French also wanted to see changes both in the political regime and Turkish financial policy, particularly on the issue of debt repayments which Turkey had consistently failed to provide.24

The creation of an opposition party would clearly answer the implicit demand for a liberal democracy. But the formation of such a party with Fethi Okyar as its head, would also reassure Turkey's edgy European creditors, as Okyar advocated a policy of strict and complete payment. Atatürk was pleased to hear that the news of a new party was welcomed in European capitals, and he told Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that they had done a good job in deceiving the foreign public opinion.25

It seems highly probable that Atatürk's plan for an opposition party also had yet another domestic component. After all, to discredit liberal principles once and for all it was necessary that these fail. The party would be formed in defence of these principles only to be forced out of the political arena. This would justify Atatürk's claim that such principles were out of date and had no place in Kemalist Turkey. Indeed, Atatürk was quoted as telling his close associates that Fethi Okyar would be thrown before Ismet Inönü to be totally destroyed. The meeting during which Atatürk expressed this view took place even before Okyar began organising the party.26

On August 7/8?, Atatürk met with Ismet Inönü, Fethi Okyar and others at Yalova to discuss the future economic and financial policy of Turkey. There were divergent views with reports that one school favoured the continuation of Ismet Inönü's nationalist policy, while the other advocated a broad-minded economic and financial policy coupled with administrative change.27

Differences between Atatürk and Inönü came to a head several days later in the

25. Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, p.492.
27. The Times, August 9, 1930.
presence of both Fethi Okyar and General Kemalettin Sami Pasha, Ambassador to Berlin. In the heat of argument, Atatürk asked Kemalettin Pasha whether he would be willing to replace either İsmet İnönü or Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff. The general wisely declined both positions. Atatürk then demanded that İsmet İnönü hand over power to Fethi Okyar. İnönü categorically refused to yield his position, except constitutionally. İnönü argued that Fethi Okyar had to become a member of the Assembly, start his own political party, and obtain a majority in the Assembly. Though Atatürk's position was probably strong enough for him to have carried the day, he apparently decided not to insist. He probably felt that he would be risking his own position too much if, as was probable, Fethi Okyar proved little better than İsmet İnönü. 28

It was clear that some kind of crisis had been brewing during the early days of August. During the Yalova meeting, the official Milliyet published a report which Herr Schacht and Herr Müller had prepared about the state of Turkish finances. Although their report, which had been hushed up until now, contained pertinent criticism of the government's handling of the financial situation, the circumstances of its publication made it a distinctly political manoeuvre designed to discredit İsmet İnönü. In addition, several of Atatürk's close advisors told The Times correspondent that Atatürk had been considering the nature and form of potential political change for some time. One of the main difficulties was known to have been Fethi Okyar's unwillingness to re-enter Turkish political life. 29

FETHI OKYAR accepted the position after for some hesitation and guarantees from Atatürk, and the result was the creation of the Liberal Republican Party.

The upshot of the matter was that a new political party under the leadership of Fethi Okyar was to be formed forthwith. It was possible that Atatürk would resign the

29. The Times, August 9, 1930.
The presidency of the People's Party and would not take so active a part in internal politics.\textsuperscript{30}

Fethi Okyar telegraphed his resignation as Ambassador from Yalova to Ankara, and it was promptly accepted. He then announced that a new party would be formed, to be called the Free Republican Party. In a statement to Yarın, the newspaper which had waged such a bitter campaign against the İnönü Government last April, Okyar explained that the party's programme would include economic and financial reform, proposal for a new system of taxation, the reestablishment of free speech and a free press, and a lessening of state control over business. He also announced that the new party would advocate closer collaboration with Europe and a more tolerant attitude towards foreign capital.\textsuperscript{31}

The formation of a new party had even been talked about in the local Republican People's Party organisation when their views had been asked. The İzmir local party official had made this public upon hearing the formation of the Liberal Republican Party. He had dismissed it as a fake.\textsuperscript{32}

The İzmir local People’s Party official had said that deliberations for the establishment of an opposition party had taken place within the party about two months ago and that the issue was whether to have it extra-parliamentary or a parliamentary opposition. It was decided that the second option would be better.\textsuperscript{33}

The name of the party had been chosen by Atatürk himself as the Liberal/ Free Republican Party in a little discussion with Recep Peker.\textsuperscript{34}

PUBLIC OPINION was delighted with the prospect of a new party. The press welcomed

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30. \textit{The Times}, August 9, 1930.
31. \textit{The Times}, August 11, 1930.
33. \textit{Cumhuriyet}, August 13, 1930, quoting the news printed in the \textit{Yeni Asır}. Cumhuriyet also wrote that Salih Bey had renounced that he had made such a statement printed in the \textit{Anadolu Yarın}, in its August 14, 1930 issue, published that the original news was correct (Cetin Yetkin, \textit{Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı}, p.33n.)
\end{flushright}
Fethi Okyar's return to political life, and the sale of newspapers which supported Okyar and his party jumped so much that the government had to increase subsidies to its pro-government press in order to be able to keep them in business. Business and financial circles in Istanbul also received the news with great satisfaction, which was accompanied with a distinct rise in the value of Turkish stock. Finally, Okyar received hundreds of telegrams of support from those who belonged to the liberal professions as well as private citizens and intellectuals.

Several days later, the Liberal Republican Party programme was published. It consisted of eleven articles, which included proposals to stabilize the Turkish currency; reduce government intervention in business; allow foreign capital to enter the country; eliminate abusive taxation -people who were unable to pay their taxes were thrown into prisons, which contained more prisoners of this sort than common criminals; lower taxes just enough to free up capital for investment without encouraging over-investment; suppress the Istanbul Port monopoly, and reduce railway tariffs and port duties; wage a vigorous campaign against corruption; and take steps to speed up the administration of justice. The new party also supported a system of direct suffrage for the Assembly. In addition, it would extend credits to farmers and peasants at cheap rates; and Ziraat Bankasi would be reorganised towards this end. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry would be properly applied and protections and privileges granted by this law would be further extended so as to help develop private industry. Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi would also be financially strengthened so as to help industry.

It was expected that such a programme would find favour with the majority of the Turkish intelligentsia, who were dissatisfied with the foreign and domestic policies of the

35. The Times, August 11, 1930; and, Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, p.473.
36. The Times, August 11, 1930; and, F.O.424/273, No.69, Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson, Constantinople, August 10, 1930 [p.29].
37. Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, p.492.
38. Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, p.478.
39. The Times, August 14, 1930; and, Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam, pp.470-472.
Kemalist Government. Indeed, as soon as Fethi Okyar had established his office in Istanbul, he received thousands of applications for admission to the new party, mostly form members of the intelligentsia. It was clear that public and political opinion was largely behind Okyar and the new party. The Istanbul branch, headed by Ismail Hakki Baltacioglu, a professor of sociology and President of Istanbul University, was overflowing with enthusiastic individuals, again, many of them intellectuals, whom the Republican People’s Party had been unwilling or unable to attract. In Izmir, support also came from those in the liberal as well as commercial professions. Here, the Party was headed by Dr. Ekrem Hayri Üstündag, who would later organise the Democrat Party in Izmir in 1946 and become the Minister of Health in the first Menderes Cabinet of 1950. Moreover, several deputies --independent of the ones who had joined the party by Atatürk’s orders-- defected to the Free Republican Party and Fethi Okyar now enjoyed the backing of some twenty deputies.

BY LATE AUGUST, both parties began to prepare for the upcoming municipal elections in many towns and cities, including Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir which were to be held in October. Although the Free Republicans were expected to achieve some success, most felt that the capital would remain faithful to the Republican People’s Party.

In the meantime, Fethi Okyar decided to make a trip to Izmir where he was assured of a warm welcome and then campaign in various towns in Anatolia in order to strengthen support there. He made a short appearance at Canakkale on the way, and was warmly

40. The Times, August 16, 1930.
41. The Times, August 26, 1930.
42. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.495.
43. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.497.
44. Cetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı, p.106.
45. The Times, September 4, 1930.
46. The Times, September 4, 1930.
47. The Times, September 4, 1930.
greeted by doctors, engineers, lawyers, merchants and farmers. 48

His reception at Izmir on September 4 was no less enthusiastic. Thousands of excited people lined the quays and the streets. Contrary to police orders, many houses and shops displayed flags, and some arrests were made. Addressing the crowd from the balcony of his hotel, Okyar thanked Izmir for its warm welcome, but exhorted everyone to maintain law and order. Nonetheless, the army watched over the crowd patiently. 49

It was increasingly apparent that the populations of Istanbul and Izmir, two of the largest cities in Turkey, supported Okyar's new party. Ismet İnönü and his supporters, however, denied this, saying that Anatolia was firmly behind the government. 50 But, the enthusiastic reception accorded to Fethi Okyar in Izmir naturally irritated local leaders of the Republican People's Party. The Izmir newspaper Anadolu, organ of the Republican People's Party, published an open letter which violently criticised Okyar and his party. Already stirred up by the authorities' refusal to allow them to greet Okyar without restrictions, supporters of the new party demonstrated outside the offices of Anadolu. The demonstration quickly escalated: windows were broken, and police opened fire, killing one or two people and wounding several others. 51 The father of a student who had been killed on the incident went to Okyar, begging him to deliver the people from oppression. 52

Fethi Okyar spoke at the Izmir Stadium before an estimated crowd of fifty thousand people, although the official Milliyet later claimed that only five thousand people had attended. Okyar said that the Free Republican Party had been created with Atatürk's consent. The new party approved of the railway construction in Anatolia, but disagreed with Ismet İnönü's methods. The three contracts with the Belgian, Swedish, and German

49. The Times, September 6, 1930; F.O.424/273, No.355, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson, Constantinople, September 8, 1930 [p.66]; and, Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.498.
51. The Times, September 8, 1930.
52. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.499.
firms clearly constituted too heavy a burden on the Turkish taxpayer, as the contract concluded with the Swedes had assured them a net profit of twenty percent, and the contract with the Germans even more.\textsuperscript{53} He went on to say that the infusion of foreign capital into Turkey's economy was necessary to stabilise currency. At the prevailing rate of interest from fifteen to forty percent the economy was in serious danger. In regard to state monopolies, Okyar advocated the suppression of the petroleum, sugar and Istanbul Port monopolies, and recommended an investigation into the workings of the tobacco monopoly.\textsuperscript{54}

Excepting one or two independent organs, the Izmir speech received extremely bad press in Istanbul. Reactions by the newspapers owned or edited by Kemalist deputies ranged from disappointment to criticism of what was seen as Okyar's lack of constructive proposals. The official \textit{Milliyet}'s tone was especially severe.\textsuperscript{55}

Continuing his political tour through western Anatolia, Fethi Okyar spoke at Manisa, where he was warmly received. His criticism of the government was more strongly worded than on previous occasions. He again attacked the system of state monopolies, saying that it only made for more corruption.\textsuperscript{56} After Manisa, Okyar went on to Aydin and Balikesir. He received a warm welcome in both towns, as well as offers of support and services.\textsuperscript{57}

The events at Izmir must have come as something of an eye-opener for the government. Izmir stood for the productive wealth of Turkey, but the disastrous Greek campaign, the Great Fire of 1922, uneconomic taxation and other factors had clearly reduced Izmir to misery. Though it was true that some individuals in Izmir had obtained confiscated Greek property at a tenth or less of its value through the government, the town

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{The Times}, September 9, 1930.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{The Times}, September 9, 1930.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{The Times}, September 10, 1930.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{The Times}, September 10, 1930.
\textsuperscript{57} Fethi Okyar, \textit{"Uc Devirde Bir Adam}, p.500.
in general had little reason to bless the Kemalist regime, and for five years had had no opportunity to voice its grievances. It was therefore natural that when Fethi Okyar arrived to preach his new gospel with the apparent blessing of Atatürk, long-suppressed discontent rose to the surface. The government took a hard line in Izmir, but only after it realised that Istanbul itself might be in the same position. After all, Istanbul might have been richer, but most of this new wealth fell into the hands of those in the "commission business" -- shipping, banking, storage, an the like.  

Fethi Okyar returned to Istanbul, and had a long meeting with Atatürk. He vigorously protested the arrests of three Izmir newspaper owners and editors who supported his cause. He also protested the arrest of the owner of the Istanbul evening newspaper Son Posta. All four had been charged with the publication of articles which were considered detrimental to the moral prestige of the government.

With the elections heating up, the Free Republicans also identified themselves with the minority populations of Istanbul and Izmir. Okyar publicly declared that he would welcome the collaboration of the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, and the latter consequently took a prominent part in the municipal elections. Several Christians were also put on the list of Free Republican candidates. Taking an extremely nationalist and racist stand, the government press promptly attacked the Free Republicans for allowing such a collaboration. The minorities themselves also suffered severe criticism. Fethi Okyar had come out openly in favour of the participation of the minorities in the elections, and the lists of candidates submitted by the Liberal Party included several christians. Okyar's attitude aroused the indignation of the Government press, which feared that there was now a possibility of a christian becoming a deputy.

59. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, pp.500-503.
60. The Times, September 15, 1930.
61. The Times, November 3, 1930.
62. F.O.424/273, No.107, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A Hender-son, Constantinople, October 14, 1930
BY MID-SEPTEMBER, however, it became clear that Okyar's party would come to nothing. One Kemalist deputy characterised it as a "disastrous experiment" on the part of Atatürk. Things had not turned out as expected. There had been two objects in view --the establishment of a form of "democratic" government and the preparation for the disappearance of İnönü from the political scene. In practice, neither of these objects had been attained. The events of İzmir had been a very nasty surprise both for the government and, most important, for Atatürk. The latter now thought it desirable to sacrifice Fethi Okyar in order to reestablish peace with İnönü. But, this did not mean complete surrender. The price of agreement was the dismissal of several ministers who had been the object of much opposition criticism. These included the Ministers of Public Instruction and Justice, probably the Minister of Economy, and possibly the Minister of Finance. Atatürk therefore surrendered Fethi Okyar while Ismet İnönü surrendered his unpopular Ministers. 63

The leaders of the Free Republican Party expected that the Republican People's Party would do everything in its power to rig the municipal elections by using government resources. And, indeed, forty deputies from the Republican People's Party were sent to various provinces where they crossed out the names of all voters who were suspected of having anti-People's Party views. Free Republican Party sympathisers were threatened with arrest, and in certain localities, the police raided local party offices without search warrants. 64

These tactics continued through the elections in October. As soon as the voting started, it became immediately clear that the Republican People's Party was determined not to let the Free Republican supporters freedom to vote as they wished. Police and military troops cordoned off polling stations such that only Republican People's Party supporters

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64. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, pp.511-512.
were allowed to vote. In stations where Liberal Republicans were allowed to vote, representatives of the Liberal Republican Party counted votes as these were cast, registering the final count with notary publics. Even in these stations, however, the final tally did not concur with the earlier counts. 65 Rumours circulated that election officials themselves had opened the ballot boxes at night, and discarded the Liberal Republican votes. 66 Clearly there was fraud at every station. 67

In Istanbul, adherents of the Free Republican Party had stormed several polling stations in the hope of securing the ballot boxes and placing them in public view, but armed gendarmes, assisted by police and fire engines, were successful in maintaining the inviolability of the invisible ballot boxes and the alleged impartiality of those in charge. Foiled in their attempts to secure the boxes, many passed through rows of armed policemen and entered the polling stations peacefully to record their votes for the Free Republican Party only to find that their names could not be found in the register of voters. Voters for the Republican People’s Party met with no such difficulties. 68

The Republican People’s Party stated that its candidates would obtain overwhelming majorities in all districts. Although the Republican People’s Party spokesmen estimated that possibly five percent of the electors would vote for the Free Republican Party, these would undoubtedly be convicts enjoying temporary liberty; reactionaries; knaves who had sold their souls for money; fools who believed that sugar and petroleum would cost less under a different regime and that taxes and military service would be reduced; communists; and, finally Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. 69

Nonetheless, for the first time since the establishment of the Republic, people were

65. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.513.
67. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.513.
68. F.O.424/273, No.107, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, October 14, 1930 [pp.94-95].
69. F.O.424/273, No.107, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, October 14, 1930 [pp.94-95].
able to openly express criticism without immediate danger, and male and female voters had taken advantage of this privilege. Certainly, there had been tension and recriminations at the polling stations, but there were also signs of real pleasure in the elections. 70

Out of the five hundred and two electoral districts, the Free Republicans had secured thirty-one. All of these were located in the economically developed regions of Turkey and were concentrated in the provinces of Izmir, Aydin, Samsun, Amasya, Icel, Kirklareli and Tekirdag. 71

The greatest victory had been won in Samsun where, due to the governor's honesty and integrity, the elections had been held without any interference or intimidation on the part of the government. The candidate of the Free Republican Party received three thousand three hundred and twelve votes as against the four hundred and sixteen cast for the Republican People's Party's candidate. 72

Although the Republican People's Party secured overall victory, it was clear that the government did not enjoy the nation's confidence. The number of those who had voted, or tried to vote, against the Republican People's Party was greater than had been anticipated. But more striking was the large number of those who had abstained from voting, those whom the government had been depending on to ensure overwhelming victories at the polls. 73

The municipal elections showed that the electorate would not be satisfied with such palliative measures as the government's promise of reduced taxation. Atatürk realised that the two-party system effectively allayed the current discontent. In his speech on the occasion of the opening of the Assembly, he made it clear that the two-party system would continue, which meant that both parties would compete in the 1931 General Elections. At

70. F.O.424/273, No.107, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, October 14, 1930 [pp.94-95].
73. F.O.424/273, No.127, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 13, 1930 [p.111].
the same time, however, he warned these parties to purge their ranks of all elements that
were not truly republican.  

ON NOVEMBER 15, having already met with Atatürk in the house of Tahsin Uzer, deputy
for Erzurum, and discussed the outcome of the elections, Fethi Okyar addressed the
Assembly on the issue of election fraud. In a speech which lasted for four hours, he
accused the government of having engaged in unlawful practices in order to win the recent
municipal elections. He claimed that, in some places, the election authorities had told Free
Republican voters that their names were not on the registers. In other places, the authorities
had demanded birth certificates from voters. If these were going to vote Free Republican,
they were told that their certificates were not in order. He also alleged that there had been
falsification where illiterate voters were concerned, as hundreds of votes given for the
Republican People's Party bore the same thumb-print. He named localities where more
votes were found to have been recorded than there were voters, and others where packets
of voting papers were found in the ballot boxes either unsigned or bearing in every case the
same thumb-print. In Adana, for example, a city with only four thousand six hundred
and fifty-two registered voters, the ballot-box contained a total of four thousand seven
hundred and thirty votes, bundles of these with the same fingerprint cast for the Republican
People's Party's candidate. Elsewhere, in Silivri, it had been established that eight hundred
voters had cast their votes for the Free Republican candidate. When opened, however, the
ballot-box contained only two hundred and seventy votes for the Free republican Party.  

74. F.O.424/273, No.127, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 13,
1930 [p.111].
75. F.O.424/273, No.127, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 13,
1930 [p.111]; and, The Times, November 17, 1930.
76. The Times, November 17, 1930.
77. F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19,
78. T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, Vol.22, Devre 3, Ictima 4, Inikat 5, Celse 1, pp.18-22, quoted in
Cetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi Olayi, pp.195-196.
Moreover, in some places like Antalya, soldiers and police had forcibly prevented Free Republicans from voting, while in others, the latter had been detained during the elections.\footnote{79} He also energetically denounced the Republican People's Party's practice of branding Free Republican voters as communists, reactionaries and anarchists.\footnote{80} By contrast, he said, citizens wishing to vote for the Republican People's Party had been afforded every facility.\footnote{81}

Sükrü Kaya, Minister of the Interior, denied Okyar's allegations, declaring that the activities of unruly elements had made the restrictive measures taken by the government necessary. Echoing the Republican People's Party's view of the Free Republican constituency, he added insult to injury by suggesting that the Free Republicans themselves were responsible for stirring up trouble in various parts of the country. In fact, he continued, the Free Republicans were the ones who had interfered with a free election. Its supporters had intimidated voters and threatened public order.\footnote{82} But by and large, the Minister's response made no attempt to refute or explain the bulk of Okyar's specific charges.\footnote{83}

Vasif Cinar, ex-Minister of Education, chimed in stating that, of three bandits arrested at Ödemiş, one had a Free Republican membership card, and another was wearing a suit given to him by a leading local Free Republican supporter. From this, he said, he could only draw the conclusion that the Free Republican Party was composed of brigands, assassins and prison breakers.\footnote{84}

On his part, Ali Kilic, former President of the notorious Tribunal of Independence,

\footnote{79} The Times, November 17, 1930.
\footnote{80} F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114]. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, pp.515-517.
\footnote{81} The Times, November 17, 1930.
\footnote{82} The Times, November 17, 1930; and, F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114].
\footnote{83} F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114].
\footnote{84} F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114].
said that he regretted the new party, instead of being useful to the country, was well on its way to being a misfortune to it. He predicted that such disorder as it provoked would inevitably lead to bloodshed. This, he said, must be avoided at all costs. 85

During the debate, it was noticed that Atatürk, while showing amusement at some of the more telling points in Fethi Okyar's speech, displayed overt approval for the government's position and its descriptions of the new party's supporters. 86

The Assembly rejected Okyar's want of confidence motion by two hundred and twenty-five votes to ten. 87 Free Republican Party deputies held a meeting in Ankara the following day, and decided to dissolve the party. 88 Those who attended were Fethi Okyar, deputy for Gümüşhane, Ahmed Agaoğlu, deputy for Kars, Nurı Conker, deputy for Kütahya, Nakiyeddin Yücekök, deputy for Elazığ, Talat Sönmez, deputy for Ankara, Ali Galib Bey, deputy for Nigde, Tahsin Uzer, deputy for Erzurum, Senih Hıziroğlu, deputy for Bursa, Rasim Öztekin, deputy for Bilecik, Refik Ismail Kakmacı, deputy for Sinop, and İbrahim Süreyya Yigit, deputy for Kocaeli. Ali Haydar Yulug, deputy for İstanbul, Süreyya İlmen, deputy for İstanbul, and Mehmed Emin Yurdakul, deputy for Sebinkarahisar did not attend as they were not in Ankara at the time and Dr. Resid Galib had already deserted the Party. 89 In the General Elections of 1931, Okyar, Agaoğlu, İlmen and Yulug would not be re-elected as deputies; the others, who had all joined the Free Republican Party on Atatürk's orders, would be returned to the Assembly as deputies of the Republican People's Party. 90

85. F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114].
86. F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.114].
88. The Times, November 17, 1930. F.O.424/273, No.128, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson, Constantinople, November 17, 1930 [p.112].
90. Fethi Okyar, Üc Devirde Bir Adam, p.537.
SINCE ATATÜRK’S SPEECH at the opening of the Assembly on November 1, the Republican People’s Party had been hard at work reforming its organisation, inspecting its clubs with a view towards educating the voters and securing new adherents, and finally altering the government’s programme and promising further reductions in taxation. In its desire to gain the favour of public opinion and widen its base, the Republican People’s Party was rumoured to be considering the formation of a coalition with the Free Republicans. Refet Bele, who had been arrested and tried for being a leader of the anti-government Progressive Republican Party in 1926, had been staying in Ankara for a few days, and, although he stated that his visit was purely private, he was reported to have visited İsmet İnönü. In addition, Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın had been offered the post of Director of the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası.91

There was no doubt that Atatürk had been working hard to probe popular discontent and remedy it. It was announced that on November 17, he would set out for a tour of Turkey, accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, Nuri Conker, the Secretary-General of the Free Republican Party, a representative of the Republican People’s Party and several deputies. Clearly, Atatürk’s object was to evaluate the condition of the people, and ascertain their views in order to form his own opinion about the conduct of the municipal elections. But Atatürk’s tour was probably also designed to evaluate the state of his own personal prestige.92 As a result of the Free Republican Party’s dissolution on November 16, Nuri Conker did not however accompany Atatürk when he set out for Kayseri, the first leg of his journey.93

Though it lasted for only four months, the Free Republican Party had brought about radical changes within the Republican People's Party, which was now putting its house in order, weeding out suspicious elements, and trying to bring itself more into harmony with popular opinion. For the moment, Ismet Inönü reigned supreme, and, tour or no tour, Atatürk's prestige had clearly suffered. 94

94. F.O.424/273, No.131, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Hender-son, Constantinople, November 19, 1930 [p.115].
Chapter 26

CONCLUSION

A POLYGLOT EMPIRE in more or less the same way that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was, Turkey included within her borders populations which belonged to totally different religions and ethnic identities. In fact, like the pre-World War I Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey was an empire with colonies which lay adjacent to the mainland. Only Libya and Yemen were not contiguous to Turkey proper; the other colonies --Albania in the Balkans, the Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea, Armenia and Kurdistan in the east, and Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the Hedjaz in the Middle East-- were all administrative units --provinces-- that happened to be contiguous to Turkey proper. Before the Revolution of 1908, all of these colonies had more or less an autonomous existence within the empire. The archaic political structure of this absolutist monarchy allowed these colonies to exist with their own customs more or less untouched. Moreover, with the growth of revolutionary activity towards a liberal democratic regime, the absolutist monarchy came to tacitly ally itself with the local leadership in these colonies in order to be able to resist political change in Turkey.

The Revolution of 1908 changed the whole political configuration. The principles of the Revolution was "Brotherhood, Equality, Justice, and Liberty". True to their word, the Committee of Union and Progress tried to create a unified, centralised, and modern state out of this archaic structure. They envisioned a totally new political system whereby subjects would be citizens. Everybody would be treated like equals, having the same rights of citizenship. It followed that former exclusionary statutes as well as communal, religious, and ethnic privileges of the colonies would be done away with.
The liberal Revolution, therefore, implanted the ideas of brotherhood, equality, justice and liberty, on the one hand, while it created the conditions for independence movements within the colonies on the other. Colonies could exist as provinces of the empire so long as they remained as separate entities in this polyglot and decentralised political structure. Centralisation, and extension of rights to every subject of the empire and making them citizens upset the whole pre-existing political arrangement.

It is to the credit of the Committee of Union and Progress that it remained loyal to its principles of brotherhood and equality and tried to create a unified state where the population of the centre as well as those of the colonies would have identical political, economic, and social rights. There was to be no discrimination whatsoever against the colonised populations. For the oppressed people of the colonies, however, the new regime with its principles of equality and justice meant something different. They saw in it their golden opportunity to obtain their freedom --not within the empire but from it.

The new revolutionary ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress certainly helped the populations in the colonies to open their minds to thinking alternative and new ways of existence. If there were to be freedom and equality, it could very well be freedom from Turkey. The political upheaval resulting from the Revolution also helped develop the idea of independence from Turkey. In addition, the established leadership of the colonies --mostly what might be labelled as landed aristocracy in the service of the absolutist regime-- was the singlemost group who stood to lose from the changes that were brought about by the revolution. This leadership was the first to suffer the consequences of the revolution; its status and privileged position was destroyed.

Naturally, the local leadership in the colonies found themselves in close agreement with the monarchists in many issues. They were already cooperating with each other in the past. Now, with the revolution having succeeded, the urgency of the situation made cooperation even more desirable. The political history of Turkey from 1908 up until the end of World War I could be seen as a continuing attempt on the part of the monarchists and the
local leadership in the colonies to jointly destroy the new liberal regime; for different reasons. For the monarchists in Turkey, cooperation with the colonial leadership meant regaining their former political and social, not to mention their economic power. For the local leadership in the colonies, especially in Albania, Syria, and Iraq, cooperation with the monarchists meant eventual independence from Turkish yoke. Despite these differences, they were to support each other in fighting against the Committee of Union and Progress and the liberal regime it represented up until the very end of World War I.

One can seriously consider that the beginnings of World War I can be taken as far back as 1911, when Italy declared war on Turkey and occupied Libya. This was to be the first colony to be lost by Turkey under the new regime. Albania would be second. Uprisings and rebellions which had started as early as 1910 culminated in Albania's independence in 1912. The First Balkan War in 1912 as well as the Second in 1913 were partly the consequence of the Revolution of 1908 which totally upset the political balance of power within the empire. Diplomatically supported, militarily supplied and financially backed by Great Britain, France, Italy, and to some extent by Austro-Hungary, first the colonies in the Balkans, then the ones in the Middle East became the fighting ground for imperialist ambition on the part of the European Powers and for desire to be independent from Turkey on the part of these colonies.

What this all means in practical terms was that the colonies had little, if any, interest in the new revolutionary liberal democratic regime established in Turkey. Therefore, trying to create a unified and centralised modern state backfired and created problems rather than solutions for the Unionists. Yet, the Committee of Union and Progress was determined to pursue its policy of centralisation within the framework of a liberal regime.

**Unionist Determination** for the maintenance of a liberal democratic constitutional order at all costs manifests itself in both the general elections of 1908 and of 1912.

Immediately after the Revolution, the Committee of Union and Progress called for
the establishment of a representative parliament. Not only Turkey proper but also the colonies were regarded as constituting the whole. Therefore, all the lands under Turkish administration had the right and privilege to send deputies to the parliament. With the principle of proportional representation, everybody in the empire had the privilege of being represented by politicians of their own choice.

General elections became a testing ground of democratic principles for all the parties concerned. Most of the colonies failed miserably. In Albania and the Balkan provinces in the west, and in Syria, Iraq and some of the Middle Eastern provinces in the east, mostly the local leadership who was supported by the monarchists was returned as deputies to the parliament. Albanian and Syrian nationalists in particular were well represented in the new Chamber of deputies. The Armenians were divided, most of them giving their support to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation which fully supported the new regime and the Committee of Union and Progress. However, by and large, the Greek minority organised by the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate at Istanbul which was clandestinely supported by the Greek Government did everything to subvert the elections in Anatolia, but especially in Macedonia. The Arabs acted in more or less the same fashion in their constituencies.

The practical result of the elections by which the parliament came into existence was that while the Committee of Union and Progress deputies represented the ideals of a new political order and supported the new liberal democratic regime, deputies representing the colonial provinces were basically separatist, or nationalist, and found themselves the natural allies of the monarchists who had every reason to restore absolutist monarchy to power. During the term of the 1908 Chamber, opposition deputies worked hand in hand with forces outside the parliament to topple the constitutional regime. The nature of the political struggles from late 1908 through the general elections of 1912 leaves one with little doubt as to the real intentions of the opposition.

During the general elections of 1912, monarchist propaganda within Turkey proper and the nationalist and separatist propaganda in colonial provinces became more
pronounced. The opposition openly challenged the constitutional order, demanding the restoration of the old order as the main slogan of their electoral campaign. Counter-revolutionary outbursts occurred in many constituencies which genuinely threatened the liberal regime. All of this happened when Turkey was at war with Italy, and when every indication pointed to the direction that a regional war in the Balkans was fast approaching. Yet, despite all internal and external threats to the well-being of the new political order, the Unionist-backed government went ahead with the elections.

Although Entente Libérale, the openly monarchist party, failed to obtain more than twenty seats, and the Committee of Union and Progress emerged as the largest parliamentary party in the new Chamber, the majority of the Chamber constituted of the independents, divided among themselves more or less equally between non-Unionist supporters of the new regime and monarchist sympathisers. Therefore, results of the 1912 elections must not be regarded as a victory for the Unionists but instead a victory for the parliamentary regime.

That deputies representing the colonial provinces as well as monarchist politicians had no interest in competitive politics manifested itself after the 1912 elections. A military *coup d'état* in July of that year restored monarchist politicians in power who closed down the parliament with little intention of re-opening it again, at least with the same constitutional prerogatives. Once again, it was the destiny of the Committee of Union and Progress to re-establish constitutional order in early 1913. Despite the Balkan War going on at the time, competitive politics and constitutional rights were restored; this time not to be disturbed up until the end of World War I. Monarchists would take over in late 1918 --after Turkey surrendered to Allied Powers-- doing away with all the principles of the Revolution of 1908 and restoring the absolutist regime under Allied support and protection.

THIS BRINGS US to one of the most important debates in Turkish historiography: that of the development of liberal democratic rule in Turkish politics.
One of the most important tenets of my thesis is that the liberal democratic regime in Turkey was instituted with the Revolution of 1908. Despite the contention of established scholarship that the "events" of 1908 represent nothing more than a gradual development towards modernity --which, allegedly, fully bloomed under Atatürk's farsighted administration after 1923-- under the auspices of a westernising bureaucratic elite, I argued, showing in great detail that the "events" of 1908 were no ordinary gradual development. Rather, it represented a sharp break with the past, and had nothing to do with the westernising vision of an enterprising bureaucratic elite.

The Revolution of 1908 was the culmination of a long struggle between the absolutist monarchy and its supporters and the liberal forces opposing this archaic political regime which stifled not only individual expression of any sort but also the development of the economy by virtue of restrictions imposed by the absolutist monarchy. The revolutionaries, i.e., the Unionists, were not representatives of the bureaucratic elite. They were rather representatives of a new class of people who were totally outside of the bureaucratic mold. Therefore, their vision was not to westernise or modernise the bureaucracy, or the state apparatus, but to totally transform it in order to serve for the needs and aspirations of a new class.

The revolutionaries' concern was not how to save the state through reforms, as has continually been claimed by proponents of received ideas on Turkish history. The "events" of 1908 were neither a "revolution from above" nor a "reform movement" to strengthen state power against decay. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this ascription to the Unionists' intentions. Their agenda had little to do with the state as such. They were rather concerned with issues of individual freedom and liberty. For them, the issue of constitutional rights and protection of individuals from arbitrary state action under an absolutist rule lay paramount. Their motto was liberty, equality and justice, and they took these concepts very seriously. The constitutional order the Unionists established guaranteed all of these rights within the basic framework of a liberal democratic regime. In this sense,
the Revolution of 1908 is the last bourgeois revolution in Europe, eliminating the longest enduring absolutist monarchy in its history.

Corresponding to principles of freedom and liberty in the political arena, the Unionists had also their notions of a liberal economic order. Established scholarship on this period still claims that the Unionist had no notion of an alternative economic order. They argue that the Unionists had no clear-cut economic policies which were different from those of the monarchists. However, evidence proves otherwise. The Unionist regime represented the first conscious effort to protect domestic private commerce and industry. The Unionists eliminated most of the restrictions put on private enterprise under the absolutist regime. They liberated the economy from the control of the state. This went hand in hand with their policy of the protection of the domestic market against foreign competition. Creation of a native commercial and industrial base was one of the most important priorities of the new regime represented by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The monarchists, on the other hand, were totally opposed to the political liberties as well as to the new economic policy. It is easy to comprehend their opposition to political liberties. Their opposition to the new economic order needs some explanation. The pre-revolutionary economic arrangements favoured foreigners, as capitulatory rights gave them privileges which their domestic counterparts did not have. As such, foreigners or individuals with foreign passports who were thus under the protection of foreign powers had a more privileged status in the empire than the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. While Ottoman subjects were restricted by laws and regulations, and taxed heavily, foreigners enjoyed the benefits of extraterritorial rights granted by capitulations.

Most of the Ottoman subjects who had foreign passports and therefore had the protection of foreign Embassies were ethnic and religious minorities, mostly Greeks and Armenians. When the Unionists established the new liberal regime, one of their first acts were to work for the elimination of the capitulations which had institutionalised unfavourable conditions for citizens of the empire. However, the Unionist move to
eliminate these extraterritorial rights were met with fierce resistance not only from the European Powers but also from the minorities within the empire who enjoyed these privileges. In need of political support from both the ethnic and religious minorities in the empire and the European Powers for the restoration of the absolutist regime, the monarchist forces cooperated fully with the domestic and foreign opponents of the new regime in an attempt to regain political power. The servile attitude of the monarchist politicians manifested itself in their dealings with the European Powers over political and economic matters during their term of office after the coup d'état of July 1912.

HAVING REJECTED the conventional historiography's contention that the Revolution of 1908 was little more than a reform movement on the part of a modernising bureaucratic elite to save the state from total collapse, I can now dwell on the second part of my thesis. Just as I draw a sharp contrast between the pre-revolutionary political order and the new order under the Unionists in pre-World War I Turkey, I do the same between the liberal democratic regime before 1918 and the military dictatorship after 1923.

As has been cited in the Introduction, there are contending arguments as to whether there is a continuity or discontinuity between these two periods under discussion. Firm Kemalist supporters, of course, maintain that there was indeed a sharp discontinuity. They claim that it was the Kemalists, or to be more precise Atatürk himself, who broke away with all the vestiges of an old order and created a new in its place after total destruction during the war. In their view, modern Turkey is established under Atatürk's leadership, beginning with the establishment of the Republic in October of 1923.

By contrast, most of the recent academic works on both sides of the political spectrum stress the continuity between the two periods. A weakening of the Kemalist ideology and therefore a lessening impact of it on scholarship is largely responsible for this change of focus from discontinuity to continuity. Yet, this change in scholarship has happened at the expense of ignoring pre-Kemalist history. A consistent theory to sustain
the argument of continuity could be developed only if the period between 1908 and 1918 was taken to be nothing more than an unsuccessful reform movement to modernise Turkey. Political and economic historians could possibly argue in favour of continuity only by denying the revolutionary aspects of the Unionist regime.

Within this framework, Revolution of 1908 had to be denied. According to adherents of these theorists, no revolution occurred in 1908. It was just a bureaucratic intervention, attempting to reform Turkey without drastically changing anything. Consequently, there were no political changes to speak of. It was true that a constitutional order had been established in place of an autocratic one, but it was the absolutist Constitution of 1876 which had been restored, not a liberal democratic one. Monarchy remained; therefore monarchical regime continued. For these theorists, it was not worth distinguishing between an absolute monarchy and a constitutional monarchy where the monarch was just a figurehead with little political influence as was the case after the Revolution of 1908.

Discussing economic policy, theorists and historians with conventional views had to insist on the continuity as well. Therefore, they had to argue that the Unionists did not try to radically change the economic order. They even deny that the Unionists did not have a conscious economic policy which they put into execution. They argue that the Unionists had little to do with economics. At best, the Unionists are regarded as responsible statesmen who tried as best as they could to keep Turkey and the Turkish economy from total collapse. This interpretation also fits in very well with theories of dependence. In a world dominated by imperialist European Powers totally controlling the so-called periphery, what could a poor country like Turkey do by itself? She was totally helpless against imperialist encroachment. Economic and financial independence would be impossible even if Turkey tried.

Within this context, the dependency argument is used to deny any role to the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey's economic development. Misleadingly
argued that the Unionists had no agenda of economic development of their own, it is also argued that they stood no chance to succeed even if they had one. Whatever little written on the pre-World War I Turkish economy is at pains to emphasize continuity, rather than change.

Inadvertently, this provides a legitimate argument for the economic policies of the Kemalist period. Dependency argument is used as a perfect justification to disguise the destructive economic policies of the military dictatorship after 1923. Consistent with theoretical assumptions, dependency theorists argue that the Kemalist regime, just as the Unionist regime coming before it, had little leverage in arranging for an independent economic policy from the world economic powers. A periphery in the world-economic system, Turkey could only play the role assigned to her. Therefore, the Kemalist regime could not but continue following the economic policy inherited from its predecessor.

This dependency argument is totally wrong in two important respects. The first concerns its misleading assumptions for the pre-World War I Turkish economy. Encouraged by the new regime, Turkish entrepreneurs did succeed in developing the economy during the decade between 1908 and 1918. In agriculture, commerce, but most importantly in industry, there were great achievements, thanks in large part to the active support of the new regime. Protecting the domestic market as best as it could, the new regime actively helped the economy through legislation favourable to capitalist development. Direct state intervention was kept to a minimum, letting free the capitalists to establish new businesses. State monopolies were genuinely discouraged by the Unionists, who were believers of an unrestricted liberal economy.

As a result of these economic policies, which included building of a communications network geared towards integrating the Turkish market and establishment of financial institutions to provide the necessary funds for the private enterprise, Turkish economy recognisably developed during the decade following the Revolution. If we consider that half of this period coincides with the World War I, we can appreciate the
importance of this success even more. The backbone of Turkish economy was created during this decade, which the military dictatorship after 1923, despite its efforts, could not destroy.

In sharp contrast to the Unionist economic policy, the economic policy pursued by the Kemalist dictatorship tried to reverse the trend. Just as the monarchists had to depend on the European Powers for their survival during the liberal democratic regime between 1908 and 1918, and after during the occupation between 1918 and 1913--Kemalist dictatorship had to give concessions to European Powers for its own survival, as resistance by the liberal opposition was too strong to contend with. Desperate to conclude peace in Lausanne at all costs, the Kemalists gave up many of the economic freedoms Turkey enjoyed after the Revolution. A new version of capitulations was accepted --to be in effect for five years. Bitterly opposed by the liberal opposition both within the country and the Assembly, the Lausanne Treaty was nevertheless passed by a new Assembly formed after the general elections of 1923 which was wrought with fraud.

Conventional historiography labels the economic policies followed between 1923 and 1931 as liberal. Contrary to what the established scholarship claims, the decade following the Kemalist coup d'état of October 1923 was anything but liberal. Defining the Kemalist economic policy as liberal is, to say the least, a great misnomer. Interestingly, we only have to read what the Kemalist government publicly said on the issue. At the Economic Congress of Izmir held in early 1923, the Kemalist government announced that it rejected the liberal economic policy and that it was in favour of state intervention in the economy. They also stood in opposition to what the businessmen and representatives of industry and agriculture demanded at the Economic Congress.

First of all, domestic market, left unprotected against foreign competition, was flooded with foreign goods, the importation of which was totally unrestricted up until the end of 1929. Economic policy was liberal only in the sense that every foreign country was free to sell directly or set up companies in Turkey to enter into business without any
restriction whatsoever. From 1923 up until the collapse of the Turkish economy beginning with 1928, Kemalist government pursued an open door policy to foreign imports as well as to foreign investment. Legislation to liberalise foreign investment was quick to follow. Foreign investment was made additionally attractive with the enactment of the free trade zone legislation in 1928 which further opened the door to potentially totally control industrial production in Turkey.

Through retrograde legislation, chambers of commerce in Turkey were stripped of their autonomous status and became once again --as in the days of the absolute monarchy-- tools of state policy in the hands of the Kemalist government. Independent voice of the business community thus stifled, Kemalist government pursued its policy of heavy taxation without consultation with or consent of the business's concerned. Once again, through ill-conceived legislation, products of foreign origin were made to be more competitive than their domestically produced rivals. Industrial development of Turkey was arrested. In point of fact, economic indicators of the period show that the share of industry in Turkish economy declined during the 1920s. And this the Kemalist government managed to achieve under conditions which were extremely conducive to rapid economic development. Even adverse conditions during World War I had not been so bad as to slow down the Turkish economy to an extent that the Kemalist government succeeded in doing.

While private enterprise was not encouraged, state monopolies with exclusionary rights came into existence, in some cases driving private capitalists out of existence altogether as in the case of sugar industry. Monopolies created in agricultural goods put restrictions on production levels, and prices of these goods set by the state only helped keep the producers in perpetual misery. While depressing the economy as a whole, state monopolies became a lucrative business for the Kemalist regime, which set the prices of the monopolistic goods at such high levels that consumption of these goods dropped. Sugar was priced several times over the prevailing world prices. Salt was so expensive that peasantry could not afford to use it in even agricultural production.
The period between 1923 and 1930 is mistakenly labelled as liberal for an additional reason. Economic historians who argue that the Kemalist regime favoured private enterprise point out that the creation of Türkiye İş Bankası in 1924 alone justifies the claims that the Kemalists were fully behind private enterprise and supported it wholeheartedly through this bank. As alleged by Kemalist ideologues, Türkiye İş Bankası is referred to as a privately owned financial institution which helped developed private industry since its establishment. The fact is that the bank was neither private nor it helped develop private enterprise. Owned partly by Atatürk himself and his cronies and partly by the state, Türkiye İş Bankası was a convenient institution created to funnel lucrative business and money into Atatürk's and his cronies' pockets. Atatürk died as the richest "businessman" of Turkey. Far from extending credits to private industry, the bank exclusively supported its own firms, which were mostly companies or factories jointly owned by the state dealing in monopolistic activities. There was no single industry in Turkey in the 1920s that this bank was not involved with. Protected in the marketplace by exclusionary monopolistic rights and privileges and fully backed by the state, companies owned by Türkiye İş Bankası were guaranteed of excessive profits. Türkiye İş Bankası can be considered as an example of the success of private initiative only if one can take Atatürk to be a private entrepreneur. Neither of these claims can, of course, be sustained.

The so-called liberal decade did not adversely affect the industry alone. Not only industry but also agriculture suffered from the negative economic policies pursued by the Kemalists. Unionist support for agricultural production through financial support and credits given to the farmers were severely cut off after 1923. Left with little opportunities to get credits for agricultural production, farmers could not get the full benefit of peacetime expanding world trade. Let alone rapid agricultural development, even pre-war levels of agricultural production in certain goods could not be easily achieved under such adverse governmental policies. In addition to cuts in farm credits --the money was diverted to governmental needs: for the military budget of a demobilised army and the civilian
bureaucracy— the Kemalist government reversed many of the Unionist legislation for the support of agricultural production. One such legislation concerned mechanised farming. In order to modernise Turkish agriculture the Unionists had created special legislation encouraging the use of engine-powered farm machinery instead of traditional farming instruments. With one stroke of new legislation, Kemalists discouraged the use of modern technology in agriculture by supporting instead the use of traditional farm implements. Tax exemptions and special favours bestowed upon farmers using modern implements were totally cancelled.

Businessmen in export and import business were also left out in the cold, although one may argue that initially importers were the main group that benefitted from the so-called liberal import policies of the Kemalist regime. Totally left to its own devices, the foreign currency market fell prey to seasonal fluctuations, which adversely affected both the exporters and the importers. The only beneficiaries of the liberal foreign exchange market were the foreign owned and operated banks which dominated import-export financing in Turkey. High profits were achieved due to non-involvement of the government in regulating the money market. With the collapse of the money market came the financial ruin of many of the import-export houses. When the government got itself involved in the foreign exchange market it was already too late for the economy. World depression had set in.

Worldwide economic depression which started in late 1929 brings us to another topic which needs to be dwelt upon. Accustomed to explaining away most economic development or stagnation in the periphery by designs of the imperialist powers within the framework of the world-system, dependency theorists absolve Kemalist government of any wrongdoing or even miscalculation in Turkey's economic collapse in the late 1920s. In their view, Turkey and the Kemalist government was a victim of world economic conditions which were beyond their control or even apprehension. As a matter of fact, dependency theory inadvertently and unintentionally obscures what really happened in
Turkey. A close look clearly shows that Turkey’s economic troubles started about two years before the Great Depression and therefore can not be seen as resulting from it.

The effect of the Great Depression on Turkey’s economic and political structure can not be denied. It magnified the fragility of the Kemalist system. Both liberal political resistance and economic stagnation due to Kemalist policies had already weakened the hold of the military dictatorship on Turkey. The Kemalist dictatorship, in a sense, collapsed during the summer of 1930. Competitive elections, albeit only municipal elections, had to be allowed to take place for the first time since the Kemalist takeover in 1923. Total Kemalist defeat at these elections lay bare the population’s extreme displeasure of the military dictatorship. The Kemalists could not hope for success in the general elections scheduled for 1931. Therefore, the opposition party was dissolved a few months later, and competition eliminated. Turkey would not witness another competitive election of any sort up until 1946.

The question of competitive elections brings us to the nature of the political system that was established in 1923. Kemalist historiography takes special pride in claiming that a totally new and modern form of state --a republic-- was created in 1923. Monarchy eliminated, this republic represents in the Kemalist ideologues’ view the best form of government. They even equate it with the liberal democratic regime, conveniently forgetting that Atatürk himself personally despised liberal democracy. They view the new regime the Kemalists instituted as a development over and above the one that existed before the war. In a quite absurd fashion, they point out that the elections in the Summer of 1930 is a concrete proof of Atatürk’s determination to make work the liberal democratic system. According to these sources, which have tremendously influenced contemporary thinking, it was the opposition which exploited Atatürk’s generosity and therefore left him with no choice but to suppress this destructive opposition in order to save the country from misfortune.

Pseudo-intellectuals in the service of a particular ideology can be excused for
spreading propaganda, as one would not expect to hear otherwise from these sources of misinformation and distortion of historical facts. Hearing similar allegations and interpretations from supposedly academic --and thus, presumably responsible circles--however, is an altogether different matter. Yet, established scholarship takes a strikingly similar view with respect to political developments after 1923. In their essential points, their interpretations are no different from those offered by the Kemalist ideologues.

First and foremost of all, they categorically reject that the form of government established in 1923 has any resemblance to military dictatorship. Although partly disguised at first, the undeniable appearance of military dictatorship especially after 1925 when the Constitution was shelved for reasons of state can not be ignored. A minority of scholars, both Turkish and foreign, have, of late, come to the conclusion that the regime that Atatürk established in 1923 was not liberal after all. One can only agree with this realisation --although it is too little and too late. They still refrain from calling it an outright military dictatorship.

Nevertheless, those who have realised that the Kemalist regime was neither liberal democratic nor republican in any sense of these concepts try to explain what it was and how it came about in highly questionable terms. In an attempt to justify the military dictatorship and thus absolve Atatürk from any charge of being a usurper of political power through unconstitutional means, established historiography claims that Turkey was a politically underdeveloped country at the time and therefore was not in a condition to support, let alone appreciate, a liberal democratic form of government. As the justificatory explanation goes, ignorance and disinterestedness on the part of the backward-looking citizenry was, in large part, responsible for this state of affairs. In their view, Atatürk could not be blamed for what he did. In short, they argue that Turkey got what she was ready for: a republic with a questionable commitment to liberal principles.

Had Turkish citizenry not literally fought for liberty, justice and freedom, deposed an absolute monarch along with getting rid of most of the institutions that came with it,
established a liberal democratic regime in its place in 1908, and protected it against monarchist efforts of restoration of the old regime, one might have conceivably accepted that the same citizenry in 1923 was not ready for liberal democracy. By contrasting two periods of history in this thesis, I hope I have shown how untenable the arguments of the established scholarship are in this respect. Even leaving the Unionist regime aside, the political fights in the Assembly between 1921 and 1923 alone is sufficient to demonstrate how determined the representatives of the people were to protect both the constitutional rights of the citizens and the liberal democratic regime under extremely difficult circumstances.

Adding insult to injury, conventional historiography even tries to portray the political struggle between the Kemalists and their liberal adversaries in the Assembly as nothing more than clashes of personality, involving no matters of principle but only personal ambition. Debates on the proposed Lausanne Treaty as well as successful resistance to Atatürk's ambitions of absolute power during the life of the 1920 Assembly is ample proof that principles of liberal democracy, justice, and constitutionalism alone played the utmost role in these proceedings. One can not hold those who resisted Atatürk with only the legal means at their disposal responsible for their ultimate failure in preventing him from becoming a military dictator. It is not only in Turkey that armed force has proved superior to constitutional weapons.
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