WARS AS INTERNATIONAL LEARNING:

CHINESE, BRITISH AND JAPANESE IN EAST ASIA

by

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
September, 1974

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June 25, 1974

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ABSTRACT

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by Takashi Inoguchi

Submitted to the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on June 25, 1974, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is a comparative study of the international learning processes of the Chinese, the British, and the Japanese in East Asia for about 300 years preceding 1945. Taking up twenty-two international conflicts for its basis, this study attempts to describe, compare and analyse three international systems in which the Chinese, the British and the Japanese were the protagonists, focusing on their imperial styles, power bases and power perspectives.

This study consists of three parts. In part I, we first set out the models of the three international systems, focusing on thirteen aspects of styles, power bases and power perspectives, and then set out the scripts of the three international learning processes which the three protagonists underwent. Part II consists of fairly detailed case studies of the twenty-two international conflicts. These case studies are loosely analytical, consisting of the delineation of the power bases and perspectives of major actors in each international conflict. They are drawn for substantiating and illustrating the basic assertions set out in Part I. In Part III, we analyse the case studies more systematically. First, we ascertain the approximate fit of the case studies to the scripts. Then, we draw conclusions from the systematic analysis of the coded case studies.

Our major conclusions are:

1) that wars are profitably studied within the framework of the international learning processes of actual and aspirant empires.

2) that, despite all the importance that can be attached to international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control, the culturally differentiated rise and fall of an empire cannot be fully understood without a real understanding of the historically-structurally formed conception of imperial status and stakes:
ABSTRACT (continued)

3) that the Chinese stake in their cultural uniqueness and greatness continued to dominate their thinking; that the perceived stake the British had in commerce determined their actions in the Far East; that the Japanese investment in the racial aspects of their power assets and liabilities became a crucial driving force for their expansion; and that these imperial stakes had major causal significance in determining outcomes, both positively and negatively;

4) that the historically-structurally formed conceptions of imperial status and stakes tended to be carried over to following periods of history, often compelling an empire to war, even at the risk of ultimate self-destruction, in an attempt to sustain the conceptions which had originally elevated it to a great power status;

5) that war was a dominant theme in the East Asian world order, whereas peace was sui generis imperial peace; and that what looked like a balance of power or coexistence was in fact the competition for an imperial order tailored to the preferences of a particular empire.


Title: Professor of Political Science
Acknowledgements

My keen awareness of many shortcomings of this work makes me all the more appreciative of the assistance and encouragement I have received from many people surrounding me. The paradox is that even what seemed to be hindrance and obstruction at the moment they were posed to me turned out to be helping hands in a dialectical sense. Hence my thanks to all who constituted my environment.

My thesis committee members, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Nazli Choucri, and Lucian W. Pye, took enormous trouble to guide my research throughout. Any attempt to record my thanks to them item by item would only miss too much. In this sense my gratitude to each of them is truly beyond description.

Mrs. Mary W. Pye deserves special mention for her careful editorial assistance on portions of the last draft. I am most grateful to her.

Johanna Kovitz, my comrade-in-arms, heroically saved me at the critical moment from making many errors and mistakes by carefully reading the last draft and elegantly correcting my writing. Hence my most heartfelt thanks.

Ijaz Gilani, another comrade-in-arms, kindly served as a critical reader of the last draft. My deepest thanks are accompanied by a sense of regret for my failure to incorporate many of his suggestions.

I am also very thankful to those who contributed, in one way or another, to the completion of this study by helping, encouraging, stimulating or provoking me. They include: Shinkichi Eto, Koy Feldman, Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Talbott W. Huey, Harold R. Isaacs, Noriko Kamachi, James R. Kurth, Kinhide Mushakoji, Andrew J. Nathan, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Seizaburo Sato, Hiroharu Seki, James C. Thomson, Jr., and Alexander B. Woodside.

As one who relied heavily upon library materials, I cannot fail to thank the library staffs of Dewey and Hayden at M.I.T. and Yenching and Widener at Harvard. My especial thanks go, among others, to Alexander Leyfell, George Potter, William Presson, and Nancy Vaupel.

Financial support during my course work and thesis research at M.I.T. was provided by the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (September 1970-May 1973) and the University Consortium for World Order Studies (June 1973-August 1974), to which I express my especial gratitude.
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Part I

Man zitiert immer wieder Talleyrands Satz, die Sprache sei dazu da, die Gedanken des Diplomaten (oder eines schlauen und fragwürdigen Menschen überhaupt) zu verbergen. Aber genau das Gegenteil hiervon ist richtig. Was jemand willentlich verbergen will, sei es nur vor andern, sei es vor sich selber, auch was er unbewusst in sich trägt: die Sprache bringt es an den Tag. Das ist wohl auch der Sinn der Sentenz: le style c'est l'homme; die Aussagen eines Menschen mögen verlogen sein -- im Stil seiner Sprache liegt sein Wesen hüllenlos offen.

Chapter I: Introduction

Certains rôles favoris sont par nous joués tant de fois devant le monde, et ressassés en nous-mêmes, que nous nous référerons plus aisément à leur témoignage fictif qu'à celui d'une réalité presque complètement oubliée.

Chapter 1: Introduction

For the three hundred years preceding 1945, East Asia experienced three distinctive international systems; a system which the Manchu-Chinese dominated in much of the 17th and the 18th centuries, a system which the British spreading from Europe dominated in the 19th century, and a system which the Japanese attempted to dominate in the first half of the 20th century. Most striking of all the differences among the three international systems are the ways in which each protagonist's power bases were generated, mobilized, enhanced or diminished and in which each protagonist's power perspectives were created, stored, modified or scratched in international learning processes.

For the Manchus it was their somewhat exaggerated absorption of advanced Han Chinese culture that enabled the Manchu 'barbarians' to become the builders of the largest historic Chinese empire. For the British it was industrialization ahead of anybody else that made them masters of the seven seas. For the Japanese it was their hypersensitive, defensive reaction to Western gunboat coercion that ultimately drove them to the dream of a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area.' When the Manchus conquered the Jungar Mongol empire spreading over what is now western Mongolia, southwestern Siberia, western Sinkiang and northern Kazakhstan in the mid-18th century, there seemed to be no more enemies around the Ch'ing empire. It looked as if all the neighbors showed loyalty and piety to the Ch'ien-lung emperor. It was seen as the vindication of the pacifying

Notes to chapter 1 appear on page 540.
and harmonizing influence of the great Chinese civilization. When the British soldiers landed in North China, ruined the Summer Palace and Peking, and forced the Manchu emperor to flee to a neighboring desert in the mid-19th century, it looked as if the British could do whatever they pleased in East Asia with their military might. It was seen as the natural victory of overwhelming technological and industrial power which enabled them to use the power bases in Europe effectively in the Far East. When the Japanese beat the Russians in Manchuria and the Japan sea at the dawn of the 20th century, they were recognized by Western powers as in imperialist peer. It looked as if the Japanese had achieved at last their half-century-long wish to stand on equal footing with white people. It was seen as the victory of Japanese willpower, compensating for the perceived handicaps associated with their being a late-comer, non-white, 'modernizing' nation in the Far East.

Conditioned by initial power bases and perspectives and guided by intitial learning experiences providing an underlying bias, each protagonist developed its own power bases and created its own power perspectives as a great power in each international system. By the very development, success and maximization of power bases and perspectives as a great power, each protagonist acquired a certain kind of fixed sense of learning. Inevitable rigidities of learning manifested themselves as an inability to restructure perspectives with changes in power bases. Indeed, times change and circumstances alter, yet often minds remain die-hard and imperious to transformation.
And each protagonist kept playing certain favorite roles, referring himself to their fictitious evidence, as Marcel Proust put it. The natural consequence was defeat, disaster and decline. Just as a certain set of power bases and perspectives worked in each protagonist's favor at the intitial stages of imperial development, the very same set of power bases and perspectives provided each protagonist with stumbling blocks and bottlenecks against lasting successes and a sustained dominance. In short, successes caused failures.

The Manchus' overexaggerated absorption of and obstinate adherence to the belief in the power of Chinese culture became nothing but anachronistic when demographic and economic forces overwhelmed the imperial structure and when the onslaughts of foreign powers fell upon China. The British happy belief in *laissez faire* and free trade became untenable when technological innovation and industrial expansion ceased to be very vigorous and when other powers emerged and competed with Britain. The Japanese compulsion to overcome their sense of racial inferiority while frantically absorbing alien culture became of somewhat paranoid character and was ultimately overdone when ambition and aspiration went far beyond the meager power bases of a parvenu insular empire to the extent of dreaming of Japan as the sole master of East Asia and when another late-comer but far mightier power across the Pacific asserted itself no less vigorously.

The idea that successes cause failures may appear to some no more than *die List der Geschichte* far beyond the comprehension of men intrinsically tied to their day-to-day experiences and living with
their immediate past around themselves. Yet identification of some of the mechanisms of *die List der Geschichte* is often made possible by virtue of hindsight and insight. This study will attempt to substantiate the above assertions set here as hypotheses by describing, comparing and analysing the three distinctive international systems in East Asia for the three hundred years leading to 1945, focusing on the three protagonists as engaged in international conflicts. Drawing upon twenty-two international conflicts, we will examine how international protagonists faced and handled situations which were to lead them to resort to force, how they developed their *chevaux de bataille*, which were to become a more or less self-contained or even, in an extreme case, a self-closed system of handling international affairs, and how they destroyed themselves by their tenacity and obstinacy, clinging to the system developed by earlier successes.

Studies on war are abundant, if for no other reason than the importance of the problem. Yet what is startling is that in many of them there are persistent deficiencies which hinder better understanding of the phenomenon. Perhaps a most important deficiency is a regional bias. It is a Europocentric bias. A glance at some of the well-known works on the subject is enough to be convinced of this bias.¹ There is an overwhelming emphasis on Europe that makes non-European specialists feel somewhat uneasy about these works. Underlying this regional bias is a doctrinal bias. Into many studies there creep strong assumptions and presuppositions on war, nation state and
international system. How these three notions are defined and used reflects an undeniable bias in the doctrine as developed in the western European nation state system, most notably that of a balance of power. The narrow doctrinal position dominates even when a study covers non-European regions and non-modern historical wars. This is something like reading back and/or extending everything that is assumed in modern international law to what were structurally and ideologically entirely different regions and periods. One has to pay due consideration to historical uniqueness and individuality.

A second important deficiency is that many are non-systemic in scope and in treatment. The problem is that an international system is so inclusive that it too often discourages systemic treatment. Our position is that, despite all the difficulties in treating and analysing many aspects and many actors, macro-analysis has its place and is feasible. Macro-analysis is essential especially if we try to understand relatively long-term international systemic dynamics. Not only diplomatic, strategic and political factors, which are usually dealt with in diplomatic and international history, but also deeper underlying technological, economic, social and national psychic factors must be analysed for that purpose. Part of the reasons of this bias is that many diplomatic historians tend to focus on a single country or at most on dyadic relations. It is very rare indeed to find studies which are systemic in scope and treatment. The few works dealing with the subject in systemic perspective are not very systematic in treatment.
A third deficiency is that many are non-comparative in scope and in treatment. This is largely due to the too exclusive treatment of a single country. Indeed, audiatur et altera pars. As it is, there is a tendency to make ethnocentric interpretations, which in turn tend to interpret the more or less universal as something unique to a particular country without explicitly having something else to compare it with. The problem is also often aggravated by the uniarchival approach to a subject, in which one tends to be overwhelmed, trapped or deceived by tons of documents. By comparing and contrasting it becomes possible to identify and analyse what is unique, what is salient, and what is crucial.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one systematic treatment of East Asian/relations with a historical, systemic and comparative perspective. The present study will attempt to contribute to a better understanding of war in general, of East Asian international systems, and of the Chinese, British and Japanese international traditions, in historical, systemic and comparative perspective. Without a solid grasp of historical forces haunting the minds of people, without a broad perspective which can locate a particular event or factor in a larger context, and without a comparative frame of mind which can distinguish the particular from the universal, men will be an easy prey to myopia—historical, geographical, cultural or otherwise. The growing volume of historical research on East Asian life seems to encourage such an undertaking as ours by providing sources from which we can attempt to draw
revealing generalizations and interpretations, however audacious the undertaking seems to some historians.

First, in chapter 2 we will present three models dealing with distinctive features of the three international systems in a historical, systemic and comparative perspective. The aspects we will deal with include international power distribution, economic power gaps, power bases, economic interdependence, expansion, war and negotiation, communication and transportation, mobilization, self-esteem, knowledge and attention, information processing, decision making, and organizational management. These aspects relate to three kinds of larger variables, i.e., international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control. This chapter will attempt to show plausible causal relations of each of these aspects with what is conceived, directly or indirectly, as contributing to the rise and/or fall of an empire. The comparative and systemic description of the three international systems will provide striking contrasts between the three international protagonists' imperial styles.

Second, three scripts of the distinctive international learning processes will be drawn in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The aspects dealt with in the preceding chapter will be used to draw the three scripts in a configurative manner. In other words, we will attempt to bring together much of the piecemeal causal explanations set out in chapter 2 and draw the three international learning processes with broad strokes. The scripts will illustrate contrasting 'subjective histories' of each protagonist striving for and/or holding on to
great power status. The scripts will converge in that, as confidence and arrogance grew and as caution and realism gradually faded, protagonists' conception of imperial stakes determined their fate in a profound way like an ignis fatuus compelling them to pursue blindly their, often void, objectives even to the extreme of self-destruction. They will also indicate contrasting utilizations of its unique power assets and liabilities. Most simply put, what we will attempt to show are: 1) how cultural aspects of power assets and liabilities showed themselves as major dimensions in the Manchu-Chinese view; 2) how commercial aspects of power assets and liabilities were the most important terms in which the British worked; and 3) how racial aspects of power assets and liabilities occupied a prominent position in the Japanese international thought and action. With four phases of the international learning processes across the three protagonists compared and contrasted, these scripts will be a succinct presentation of the basic theses of this study. The scripts will be checked in chapter 28 against twenty-two cases to be drawn in chapters 6-27 to ascertain the extent to which the case studies 'fit' the scripts'.

Third, fairly detailed case studies of the twenty-two international conflicts will be used to illustrate and substantiate the basic assertions set out earlier. These case studies will be presented in a loosely systematic fashion, consisting of the delineation of power bases and perspectives of significant actors involved, with an introduction and summary attached at the beginning and at the end respectively. We will always direct our eyes to the
style of self-expression in a concentrated, collective, violent action called war. What we are most concerned about in case selection is whether they reveal each protagonist's unique styles, power bases and power perspectives. In our view what is important is to identify the crucial dimensions on which each protagonist's power bases rested and through which each protagonist's power perspectives were shaped. For this purpose, only genuine familiarity with subjects can lead to a wise selection. (Appendix will describe how cases were selected and suggest some other cases which might have been profitably included for this study.) We will rely on secondary works instead of probing primary sources. Because of the many cases which must be researched, it is wise to make as extensive examination of as many secondary works in as many languages as possible for this purpose. We will use secondary works primarily in English and secondarily in Japanese, and, to a far lesser degree, in Chinese, Korean, Russian, French and German. To thrust deeply into one or two primary sources on each case would not give us a balanced picture.

Fourth, we will examine more systematically the twenty-two cases against the scripts of chapters 3, 4 and 5. We will have two examinations for this purpose. First, we will examine the extent to which each case study summary fits to the scripts. Then we will turn to a more detailed examination of each case against the scripts. For this purpose, we will code in ordinal scale the case studies and the scripts in terms of the thirteen aspects dealt with in the models of chapter 2. Then we will examine how well the coded case studies fit
to the coded scripts. Coding the scripts and the case studies and checking the scripts against the case studies will establish the basis on which the systematic analysis of the case studies will be attempted in chapter 29.

Fifth, we will analyse systematically the coded case studies established in chapter 28 to draw conclusions. Our major conclusions are: 1) that wars are profitably studied within the framework of the international learning processes of actual and aspirant empires; 2) that, despite all the importance that can be attached to international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control, the culturally differentiated rise and fall of an empire cannot be fully understood without real understanding of the historically-structurally formed self-conception or conceptions of imperial status and stakes; and 3) that the historically-structurally formed conceptions of imperial status and stakes tended to be carried over to following periods of history, often compelling an empire to war even at the risk of ultimate self-destruction in an attempt to sustain the conceptions which had originally elevated it to a great power status; 4) that war was a dominant theme in the East Asian World order whereas peace was sui generis imperial peace; and that what looked like a balance of power or coexistence was in fact the competition for an imperial order tailored to the preferences of a particular empire.

For the sake of simplicity, all the notes are located together after the text and before the bibliography. For the same reason, all
the references in notes are done by author, year of publication, and page, chapter or part specification. In deference to their customs, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese names in the text and notes are given in the order in which they are given in their own languages. However, for the sake of simplicity, most of the diacritical marks are not used.

After this brief introduction, we will now turn to the delineation of the models and the scripts.
Chapter 2: Models

Truth is stranger than Fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick to the possibilities, Truth isn't.

Chapter 2: Models

Perhaps the most obvious change that nobody can fail to note in the history of East Asia for the 300 years preceding 1945 was the change in the masters of the region. Within 300 years the focus of power shifted thrice: first, from the Chinese to the Manchus; second, from the Manchu-Chinese to the British; then from the British to the Japanese. The first shift of power was admirable in the sense that the Han Chinese empire was conquered by small 'barbarian' tribes with their population outnumbered by the Chinese by two digits. The second shift of power was extraordinary in the sense that the natural masters of the region so easily succumbed to the British, who had their bases 11,000-15,000 miles outside of the region. The third shift of power was dramatic in the sense that a small 'dwarf kingdom' on a group of tiny islands in the Pacific transformed itself overnight into a power menacing all the powers in the region.

Why these shifts of power took place in ways in which they did is a natural question to be asked. Before proceeding to that question, it is necessary to describe the essential features of these three international systems. The terms of comparison include: international power distribution, economic power bases, power gaps, economic interdependence, expansion, war and negotiation, communication and transportation, mobilization, self-conception, knowledge and attention, information processing, decision making, and organizational management. Brief as it may be, this

Notes to chapter 2 appear on pages 541-546.
chapter will locate a reader in contexts in which the protagonists worked in ways that will be delineated in the following chapters on scripts of protagonists' international learning processes.

1) Ever since the time of the T'ang dynasty, the idea of the dominance of China was the most important Chinese conception of their place in the world, and this was so irrespective of whether the idea had any basis in fact or not.¹ Her geographical location, vastness, and, most importantly, advanced culture made China the protagonist in East Asia for centuries, though there were important and frequent interregna. China's central dominance had developed an international system where hierarchical relationships were institutionalized and on the whole observed.² This pattern of China's central dominance in the region was to differ remarkably from the ones at the times of the subsequent stages of British and Japanese dominance.

The Western powers' extraordinary intrusions in the mid-19th century crushed the whole pretensions of the central dominance of China in the region.³ The result was an easy victory of the rising Western powers over the decaying empire, and it was the British who headed the thrusts and penetration of non-regional actors into the region, largely because of her technical innovations and industrial production since the late 18th century.⁴ The idea of free trade dominated during the days when the Union Jack was flying all over the world.⁵ East Asia was no more than one of several regions of their attention. Unlike East Asia under Chinese dominance when the region was essentially self-contained and separated from the rest of the world, East Asia under British domination was part
of an interconnected world.\textsuperscript{6} British dominance from without was challenged by other industrial powers since the late 19th century.\textsuperscript{7} When the power of the European nations was diminished in a lethal manner in the European war of 1914-1918,\textsuperscript{8} the most menacing challengers turned out to be two Pacific powers, Japan and the US. Because the European powers felt compelled to concentrate their forces largely in Europe, Japan and the US emerged as leading actors in the Far East and the Pacific. Japanese imperialism emerged, pari passu with American imperialism, to fill the power vacuum in the region left by the declining European powers with China continuously decaying internally.\textsuperscript{9} With the focus of power shifting to the Pacific, the region was best described by the phrase, 'the Far East and the Pacific,' with the maritime powers, Japan, the US, and Britain, competing for the preservation and/or perpetuation of their influence in the region, while Russia and China were in relative oblivion for a while due to their domestic social and political upheavals and self-preoccupation.

2) Underlying the shifting dominance of power lie the different power bases of the protagonists. Extraordinary expansion of population and agricultural output from the beginning of the 18th century until the early 19th century in the non-industrial China was unprecedented in history, including non-industrial European history.\textsuperscript{10} In fact, Chinese agricultural output increased so much that it was sufficient to feed a trebled population growth from the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century.\textsuperscript{11} And this was achieved when there were no major technological innovations or progress since the 14th century.\textsuperscript{12} The changes born of this demographic and agricultural expansion were the economic bases of China's dominance.
If hierarchy and central dominance were characteristics of East Asian international structure, competition and contention were features of European international structure. Competition and contention to excel oneself, or at least not to be dominated by others, among European countries within the tiny spot of Europe helped to create and strengthen their innovative propensity.\textsuperscript{13} Being the second technological revolution that human beings have achieved since the agricultural revolution of 10,000 B.C., the industrial revolution has originated from, diffused in and spilt over Europe. It was the force of 'the unbound Prometheus',\textsuperscript{14} of European competition and contention spearheaded by the British that replaced East Asian self-content and inaction. In Europe the population of 1920 was about 2.5 times as many as that of 1800.\textsuperscript{15} The 19th century was \textit{sui generis} a European century.

The power vacuum created by the European decline helped strengthen the rivalries of the two Pacific powers vigorously expanding industrially and militarily. Being late-comer industrial powers, they were not much perturbed by the kind of problem that weakened Britain, the outmoded technology, the loss of industrial dynamism and the far-flung empire.\textsuperscript{16} On the contrary, their industrial and military growth and dynamism during the first two decades of the 20th century and from the early or mid-1930's on was a major source of the rivalry. Geographical proximity to the continent helped Japan to emerge as a usurper against Britain, with the US being given the role of a checker/challenger to the usurper.

3) Power gaps between a protagonist and other actors in war vary in a
significant way. The fact that none of the actors were called industrial at the time of Chinese dominance gave their international life a quality of less dynamism and more stability. This became especially conspicuous when nomadic or hunting-based actors ceased to play important roles by mid-18th century. With a strained imperial structure due to extraordinary demographic and agricultural expansion, China tended to become a force of self-content and inaction, with heavy reliance upon enforced stability, peace and hierarchy masked by believed and/or perceived overall cultural supremacy and prestige. Power gaps between China and other actors were thin especially on the battlefield, and they were camouflaged and confused by China's conception of supremacy.

Power gaps between Britain and East Asian actors were amplified. The disparity in military technology was indeed colossal. However, no less important was the absolute disparity in organizational and mobilizational capacity. The Chinese forces simply did not have strong enough organizational capacity to cope with well-equipped and disciplined British forces. The Chinese were not able to mobilize abundant resources available in its vast territory for the concentrated, violent action called war. At a time of extraordinary innovation in the field of military technology, the British achieved dominance and enjoyed power perhaps with minimum costs. Various stories reveal the surprising ease with which the Western powers were able to open or subjugate the Far Eastern countries. This was in a sharp contrast to the preceding period, when the costs of campaigns and conquest were high without technological innovation, and to the succeeding period when the costs of dominance became extraordinarily
high with incessant technological innovation and with increasing anti-imperialism. 22

In the 20th century, power gaps were mitigated not only among imperialist powers but also between anti-imperialist forces and imperialist powers. Among imperialist powers the arms race became extremely competitive and incessant technological innovation and large scale production of arms became a way of life for which a vast amount of money was appropriated. 23 No less importantly, power gaps between imperialist powers and anti-imperialist forces were reduced—a fact which makes this period different from the preceding period. Humiliating and devastating defeats inflicted upon China by imperialist powers gradually helped foster Chinese awareness of the necessity of reform and modernization. 24 When the reactionary mandarins' eleventh-hour reform efforts failed to win the hearts and minds of the nationalists, 25 and when the warlords' real-politik but myopic and opportunistic diplomacy only exacerbated the feelings of humiliation and disgrace, 26 awakened nationalism, mobilizing emotional, racial and ideological hatred against imperialism, gained great momentum during and after World War I. 27 Chinese weakness became a strength. The weakened position of imperialist powers vis-à-vis Chinese anti-imperialism was particularly salient in Japan, whose stakes in China were so large and vulnerable both economically and strategically. 28

4) Economic interdependence provides another sharp contrast among the three periods. In the Chinese period, economic interdependence among actors was generally very small, being not so much national autonomy as semi-autonomy of agricultural communities centering around market towns. 29
The important role of semi-autonomous communities and the extraordinary inefficiency and costliness of transportation made economic transaction among international actors extremely limited and almost prohibitively expensive. Fundamentally, this was because urban centers did not develop as they had in Europe since the 14th century, and instead, market towns became the centers of semi-autonomous communities. The non-development of urban centers was due to the absence of technological progress since the 14th century, which forced the economy and society to be structured around small agricultural units. There were generally two patterns of international economic transactions. One was that conducted through tributary missions. The other was transactions between communities and regions along borders and at ports. Absolute paucity of commercial goods was a direct consequence of a subsistence-level economy. However, looked at more microscopically, border transaction involving scarce goods available only through international transaction brought about extraordinary profits to those engaged in trade.

In sharp contrast to this semi-autonomy of actors at the time of China's dominance, the period when Britain dominated the region was characterized by the increasing interdependence between the region and the rest of the world, but not among the regional actors. The impact of British and other powers' intrusion was increasingly disruptive to the Chinese empire. Stubborn and tenacious resistance of the Chinese body economic, social and politic under growing outside pressure was to result in radical self-transformation in the 20th century. Although the impact of China on Britain was far smaller, the stakes many of the British traders, industrialists, politicians and bureaucrats had in
China were significantly strong and sustained so long as there was a nearly invincible belief in the great China market.  

In the 20th century, international economic interdependence not only increased but also was coupled with political, military, social and racial factors. The mechanism of interdependence was so complex and sensitive that a seemingly minor local incident could trigger off a major international conflict. Anything could become a source of trouble or even a *casus belli* when actors were preoccupied with their own interests and desires exclusively. Greater interdependence reflected not so much the increase in the exact ratio of foreign trade over GNP as the increase in the sensitivity and interrelatedness between and among economic and neo-economic factors. Prevalent conceptions of international economic, political and military transactions primarily as state competition of a more or less zero-sum nature was called neo-mercantilism. Chronic economic fluctuations and depressions, social and political problems derived therefrom, and mistrust and insecurity in international affairs were fostered and strengthened by the neo-mercantilist spirit.

5) Modes of expansion show strikingly different pictures. China's military conquest was followed by entrusting substantial power to native local rulers. There was the government's policy of prohibition of Chinese immigration into border areas where the government worked through native local rulers. The policy was called the policy of *ch‘i-mi* or loose reign. It was derived from the extremely limited administrative capacity of the Ch‘ing empire. Although the empire was able to conquer and pacify border regions, the fact was that the empire did not have enough power bases to
enforce its will directly on the population thus conquered. The regime was dependent largely upon native local rulers, quite in accordance with the general structure of the Chinese imperial administration. Thus, expansion was limited both on governmental and non-governmental levels.\textsuperscript{38} It was not until the Russian advance into the border regions in the late 19th century and early 20th century became threatening that the rulers officially adopted the policy of shih-pien, or 'to substantiate frontier regions,' and thereby tried to counteract foreign powers' penetration.\textsuperscript{39}

The picture that emerged under the dominance of Britain is utterly different from the picture above. Private commercial and industrial interests tended to precede the government's entrance into the scene,\textsuperscript{40} and governmental intrusion in commercial and industrial affairs was limited. This was a consequence of the economic principle of \textit{laissez faire} and of the Foreign Office's disdain for anything less than \textit{la haute politique}.\textsuperscript{41} Only when overseas commercial and industrial interests hinged upon the problem of national security or national honour or things that were conceived as \textit{la haute politique}, \textit{Staatsräson} was resorted to. With the commercial and industrial interests spreading all over the world and the somewhat self-righteous concept that, when blocked, free trade had to be imposed even by force, the instances of state military intervention were far from few. As Gallagher and Robinson put it, the principle was "trade with informal control if possible, trade with rule where necessary."\textsuperscript{42} The British naval and industrial predominance being generally accepted by other powers and the British naval dominance being unchallenged in the Far East, this mode of expansion or extension of influence worked well.
Quite in a good contrast, Japan's mode of expansion was that business interests followed the flag of the Japanese imperial state's expansion. Industrialization was promoted initially by the government's vigorous aegis and sponsorship. Overseas economic expansion was also helped by the government. Business entered into the scene with the aegis of the state except for extremely small scale business, and with the notable exception of the textile industry in Central China. The state used not only military action but also economic methods politically to help economic expansion. Many of the economic interests that were extended overseas were relatively small in size and/or competitive with native local industrial and commercial interests, and thus tended to arouse natives' negative reactions in the forms of boycotts and strikes and to rely on the state's protection in case of emergency. At a time of political upheavals, the cry for direct state's military intervention for protection of national subjects and interests was bound to be frequent and intense. This was especially so since their businesses were both of a relatively small scale and absolutely precious to themselves who tended to have left no fortune in Japan proper.

6) Another sharp difference can be found in ways in which military and non-military methods were combined for expansion. The Chinese invented many non-military methods to handle international relations, which were particularly noteworthy compared with the savage force often used by the British and the Japanese. Far from acts of Confucian benevolence, however, the Chinese techniques were derived from a combination of impotence
and self-deception. A limited capacity to mobilize resources and soldiers for war made it imperative to devise less costly, largely non-military methods of handling foreign affairs, an arrangement called by Fairbank the tributary system as contrasted to the treaty system from the mid-19th century on. This necessity was rationalized by the traditional Chinese despising of 'barbarians' and their disdain of 'barbarian affairs.'

This practice became an act of self-glorification and self-indulgence. They hesitated to throw away all the pretensions of Chinese supremacy and grandeur. Seen from the Chinese side, the policy was that of socializing and avoidance of trouble rather than one of confrontation, which would help unmask her pretension and disclose her inability.

The picture that emerged in the British period is far different from the one during the Chinese period. Military methods were most conspicuously used, although Britain actually preferred non-military methods because of the great geographical distance that Britain had to overcome to concentrate gunboats, especially at a time of British involvement in European, African, Middle Eastern, and Indian affairs. However, the Chinese resistance to British demands too often elicited a British 'Dressing' in a John Bullish manner (i.e., gunboat coercion). The ideas underlying the 'Dressing' originated from two totally different philosophies. One is mercantilism; the other is the principle of free trade. Mercantilism was an attempt to control foreign commerce by human efforts because the mercantilists did not believe that things would work if left to themselves. The believers in free trade would force self-closed markets to open because they believed that things would work best if
guided by an 'invisible hand.' Mid-Victorian 'Dressing' was the child of these two ideas. The latter became stronger in the 1840's, 1850's, and 1860's and the former in a new form dominated the latter in the 1930's.

Japan was different from Britain in using more quasi-military techniques as well as purely military methods. One of the important characteristics of Japanese expansion was the fact that it was in part an outlet for social discontent, economic bankruptcy and political suffocation, an almost inevitable phenomenon associated with a hastily growing empire. All sorts of socially disgruntled elements, impoverished people and ex-political activists who had lost their future prospects in Japan were engaged in clandestine activities together with and/or apart from the military and government. The former three kinds of people tended to be used, wittingly or unwittingly, as a spearhead of Japanese imperialism. The conversion of these semi-abortive quasi-emigres into the spearheads of imperialism took shape as Japanese imperialism developed. They could not escape from ties with Japan when Japanese influence was extended to where they had settled. Thus, frequent politico-military involvement in domestic affairs, often in clandestine form, distinguished Japanese imperialism from the Chinese and British cases. Perhaps there were two major reasons for it. One was that, in Japanese eyes, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of sovereign countries did not apply to the Asian Continent. Instead of sovereign countries, these were loosely governed, internally torn countries, where presumably interference from outside could be effectively and efficiently carried out.
The other was that Japan, eager to dominate but weaker in her economic capacity and thus not confident in her ability to compete economically with other powers, did not stop short of 'informal control,' not being a dedicated disciple of the principle of free trade. 62

7) A cheval de bataille of each protagonist presents an interesting contrast. A show of force was a Chinese cheval de bataille. 63 It was a show of strength short of or before its actual exercise. It relied upon B's perception of A's potential strength, i.e., the cost which would be inflicted upon B if B would not comply with A. Simply put, it relied upon the adversary's awareness of opportunity cost. 64 The mode of war was born from three factors on the Chinese part. First, her dominance in the East Asian international system; second, the Chinese belief in their cultural supremacy; third, the Chinese inability to exercise force without paying high costs. The third factor was perhaps most important. Thus, the Chinese cognizance of opportunity costs were very important in shaping this mode of war. This was a direct consequence of limited mobilizational capacity. 65 Negotiation was made on both sides almost separately in their own 'language.' Slow communication, relative isolation and relative ignorance of the outside world often made negotiation difficult. Because of their persistent use of their own 'language' and manner of doing things, negotiation outcomes were produced 'separately' and interpreted differently and 'happily' to each side. Thus, it sometimes happened that a war ended with 'great victory' for both sides. 66 Such a bizarre thing was due in large part to the necessity
for negotiators to please the emperor or the king and thereby not to be dismissed from office. When slow communication and relative isolation became things of the past, mutual self-centered isolation in negotiation became more difficult. Results of negotiation would have to be exposed to the daylight, which would arouse patriotic sentiments later.

Gunboat coercion was a British *cheval de bataille*. Several factors helped create and maintain gunboat coercion as their war style. First, there was the overwhelming industrial and military, especially naval, superiority of Britain over China. Second, the geographical separation between Britain and China made it difficult to send a large number of soldiers. Third, it was impossible to be involved in a land war on a large scale, given the vast number of Chinese population. Perhaps there was the fourth factor—that is, the racism of the British toward Far Eastern peoples which made their psychological dissonance derived from killing civilians mitigated and dissipated on the pretext of civilizing 'inferior' people.67 Gunboat coercion ceased to work well when the British were no longer the only coercor and when the tide of anti-imperialism swayed the Far East. For both reasons, gunboat coercion became little more an anachronism by the 1920's. With overwhelming might, the British negotiation style was of a perfect John Bullish manner. Negotiation was the combination of British *dictat* and Chinese resistance, and coercive diplomacy on the basis of naval bombardment determined the style of negotiation. All kinds of resistance and evasion of *dictat* used by the Chinese tended to frustrate the British and invite further tougher policies from the British.68 As for the balance sheet of negotiation, both of the following propositions are true: one holds that despite seemingly complete military
defeat the Chinese were skillfully able to resist the British demands with sheer skill in negotiation. The other holds that despite seemingly strong military power which was left unused and thus could be mobilized, the Chinese gave in to the British demands too much and too easily. In any case, the British were able to exploit the Chinese with minimal cost, which gave enormous confidence to the British unilateral action even in later days.⁶⁹

In contrast to both China and Britain, Japan had meager power bases upon which she could act internationally. This factor helped create a special strategy. The strategy consisted of a search for an early decisive victory on the battlefield to create a strong bargaining position for negotiations which would hopefully follow.⁷⁰ First, it was to start with a well-prepared and meticulously planned attack. As Prince Yamagata put it, "When drawing the sword, one does not grasp the handle until he has considered first how it can be sheathed."⁷¹ Then, after a decisive victory in battle, negotiation was to follow under favorable conditions, normally with a third party as intermediary. Thus, not only war attenuation was to be avoided but victory was to be assured. This was in short the strategy of reliance on others to win. Not only did the absolute military and industrial inferiority of Japan foster this war style, but also did the international environment of the Western powers' imperialist rivalries from the mid-19th century to World War I enable and condition Japan to play one power against another for her advantage. This was a precarious strategy from the beginning. It fostered on the one hand the idea of an alliance being crucial and vital. On the other hand, as Japan became more and more powerful, the idea that Japan could dispense with
an alliance or the idea of independent action became all the more appealing because of her past and present troubles and difficulties in having and keeping partners.\textsuperscript{72} When combined in a manner which was so untimely, so uncoordinated, so self-centered and full of wishful thinking as they were in the 1930's and 1940's, both of these two ideas were to result in disaster.\textsuperscript{73}

8) Patterns of communication and transportation present the picture of acceleration of speed. In the period of Chinese dominance, slow communication and transportation were basic realities. With the non-existance or non-availability of industrial tools on a large scale, men, horses, and largely non-mechanized ships were the main means of communication and transportation.\textsuperscript{74} Since the 14th century, Chinese technological progress was almost negligible.\textsuperscript{75} This basic fact nurtured the system of on-the-spot decision making and the later sanction by the central government. The extremely small number of officials throughout the empire forced them to be self-reliant in making decisions. Extraordinary power rested upon regional units of the administrative machinery,\textsuperscript{76} which was particularly noticeable in a time of war in places far from the capital.\textsuperscript{77}

In the 19th century, the speed of communication and transportation was accelerated by the invention of the steamship, railroad, and electricity.\textsuperscript{78} The second maritime British empire would not have been able to survive for more than a century without the effective control by the navy of commercial routes and ports all over the world throughout the 19th century.\textsuperscript{79} Without the technology of the cable it would have
been impossible for London to receive reports and give directions to officials abroad. The 'pax Britannica' was a product of industrial and naval technology. British technological innovation had become less vigorous since mid-Victorian days, which would give other Western powers the opportunity to emerge and compete with Britain and finally threaten the British predominant position in the world.

In the 20th century, communication and transportation were far more developed and industrial and military technology for communication and transportation were very advanced. The rapid advancement in military technology was especially remarkable. The invention and diffusion of airplanes, aircraft carriers, submarines, tanks, machine guns and other military weapons changed the characteristics of war drastically and rapidly. The Japanese kept absorbing advanced technology largely from abroad and without being able to make technological innovations of their own at reasonable costs.

9) Patterns of mobilization showed again an accelerating trend. In the Chinese period, administrative sloppiness and organizational inefficiency made mobilizational capacity inevitably very low. Mobilization of resources and technology even in time of war were not easy. War required not only soldiers, but also three to four times as many as bearers for transportation. In agricultural society those who were not engaged in farming were potentially dangerous elements. Conscription of vast numbers of soldiers and bearers would cause social unrest during and after a campaign. Most conspicuous were soldiers and ex-soldiers who tended to cause anti-social disturbances by vagrancy,
engaging in contraband trade and robbery, and starting riots and rebellions. This was particularly acute since late mid-Ch'ing period when demographic and economic forces tended to overwhelm the imperial structure, causing the latter to be constantly strained. There was less and less societal surplus so that even minor unrests and disturbances, when accumulated, could threaten the regime.

British war mobilization was simple and swift: an operation which simply concentrated the British Far Eastern squadron into a combat zone. Given the speed of steamships, swift war mobilization was not difficult. However, when caught up with European, African, Middle Eastern or Indian involvements, war mobilization in the Far East became difficult and slow, and even a planned campaign was sometimes deferred or delayed greatly. Swift war mobilization was made possible by the absence of other foreign powers' strong naval forces stationed in the Far East during most of the 19th century. This pattern was to be broken by the emergence of other powers in the Far East in the late 19th century.

In the 20th century, war became total war. It required total mobilization of national resources and technology. First, industrial and military capacity must be enormous. Second, organizational capacity to handle complex problems for war planning and execution was called for. Japan was in an extremely fragile position industrially and militarily. Most of the resources for industrial and military purposes were dependent upon foreign countries. Furthermore, the political system was not quite adequate for mass, total mobilization. It was dependent, on the one hand, on local notables who gave support for the 'established'
or 'within-system' political parties and, on the other hand, on bureaucracy which supplied politicians and bore the extensive responsibility of policy formulation and execution. Political parties were not able to 'reproduce' competent politicians on their own and failed to play the role of articulating and aggregating increasingly diversified social interests and views. Thus when total mobilization was called for, the result was no more than conjuring up the facade of 'one hundred million with the same mind.' The consequence was a disjointed and frantic effort to meet the requirement for an unprecedented total war.

10) The three protagonists' self-conception provides an extremely important contrast. Chinese self-conception was extremely high and almost invincible. The subjugation of the Mongols, the centuries-long enemy of the Chinese empires, pushed up Chinese confidence to its zenith. Since the Ch'ing conception of the world was limited to the areas around China, the Chinese self-conception was very myopic. Myopia was aggravated by the Manchu's overacculturation to Han Chinese culture. Cultural supremacy was taken for granted and permeated all the external conducts of China. Even if entirely new enemies began to menace the empire, their self-conception was not easily shattered, since they had developed mechanisms to defend their high self-conception despite all the ebb and flow of Chinese imperial life. They tried to 'contain' new enemies in the time-honored manner. The consequence
was the accumulation of humiliation and disgrace which were ultimately transformed into intense anti-imperialism.

British self-conception was also extremely high and almost invincible. Unlike the Chinese outlook, the British outlook was not limited to the area around Britain and Europe. It was world-wide. Supported by industrial and naval dominance all over the world, British confidence was quite proportionate to British power in mid-19th century. Commercial motivations dominated their thoughts and actions, especially in the Far East. What was unique in the British self-conception in the Far East was that the British were not challenged by other powers in the way in which the Chinese were challenged by the British and other powers. Challenge was gradual and piecemeal. It was largely military challenge like the ones from Russia and Japan in the late 19th century. Furthermore, the facade of British dominance was maintained, even after her naval dominance was severely undermined, because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the subsequent Washington treaties in the 20th century. It was only when Chinese anti-imperialism and especially Japanese imperialism overwhelmed the British that their confidence became proportionate to their real power in the Far East.

Japanese self-conception was quite different from the other two. The Japanese were not confident, because they knew too well that they were weak. Their self-conception was in terms of their rank, climbing up from the bottom and catching up with Western powers. Since Western powers were all white and since Japan was the first one among the non-white nations to try to catch up with Western powers in the 19th century, Japanese self-conception was always marred by the acute awareness of the racial difference between the whites and non-whites. Racial
compulsion compounded by disparity in power rank was the driving force of Japanese expansion.

11) The scope of knowledge and attention provides another interesting picture. China's isolation and ignorance of the outside world were very conspicuous and the natural corollaries of inefficient and slow communication and transportation. This situation was also a consequence of the basically closed attitude which may be called the mentality of 'Yeh-lang tzu-ta,' i.e., the tendency to glorify oneself and one's strength with the absence of knowledge of the outside world. This phrase comes from the story that the ancient Chinese ridiculed the people of Yeh-lang who boasted of themselves and their strength without knowing of the presence of the powerful Ch'in empire. By the mid-18th century the Ch'ing dynasty's concern with the outside world had diminished after northern enemies were emasculated or pacified and from then on the external menace was virtually non-existent until the mid-19th century. Chinese confidence in their power and self-sufficiency strengthened their closed attitude toward foreign affairs to which their attention diminished. The disappearance of the northern enemies inevitably brought about the decline of the skill and morale of military forces; peace bred weakness, diminished alertness and fostered self-content. The Chinese displayed poor knowledge of the outside world despite their pretensions of being universal in outlook.

The British showed the most universal approach of the three protagonists. Their knowledge of the outside world was relatively wide and deep, to which their interests in trade markets all over the world contributed. The scope and depth of their knowledge were admirable, given the small
number of their Far Eastern specialists. Although they overemphasized economic interests in assessing political forces, their analyses were basically well balanced and well articulated. 101 This was all the more admirable since the primary attention of both government and opposition alike was not to East Asia but to domestic and European affairs. These problems included political representation, free trade, slavery, Ireland and the balance of power in Europe. 102 Attention to East Asia, which was minimal and only sporadic, was primarily directed toward China throughout the 19th century. 103

In contrast to the Chinese who did not try to know others with seriousness, the Japanese tried hard to know the outside world. Secluded from the rest of the world by her own choice for the 200 years preceding the coerced opening in the 19th century, Japan was now nearly frantic to learn from others, partly because of her overexaggerated fear of becoming dependent on foreign powers. During the years immediately following the opening of the country, the size of the bakufu-sponsored mission for obtaining foreign knowledge was very large, especially when compared to the contemporary Chinese case. 104 When one of the members, Fukuzawa Yukichi, a well-known writer of the persuasion of enlightenment and modernization, wrote a book on the Western countries in 1866, it sold as many as 150,000-200,000 copies. 105 In short, a great amount of attention was always paid to foreign affairs. Fukuzawa once wrote in the mid-Meiji period that there were no political problems other than foreign affairs. Although this was later parodied to the effect that there were no foreign policies which were not political problems, the impor-
tance of foreign affairs was stressed throughout. Ambitious but militarily insecure, Japan kept watching the world lest she lose independence. Her fear of dependence was so great, and they were so hypersensitive to every move by the Western powers, that they developed a system of 'world watching.' For the very reason of their urgency and hastiness to know others, their conceptual schemes tended to be less integrated. Although they were extraordinarily adept at finding cues for action from each move of the Western powers, one large development of a whole situation tended to be overlooked.

12) Given the accelerating tempo of life and complexity of human organization, patterns of information processing differ significantly among the three protagonists. During the time of Chinese dominance, information processing capability was very slow. First, the general tempo of life was so slow that there was not much information to be processed by decision makers. Second, slow communication and transportation made the administrative system decentralized and thus the amount of information small in each unit of the administrative system. The decentralized administrative system made it normal for those on the boarders to handle foreign affairs despite the ultimate power of the emperor and foreign affairs as conducted by border administrators were understood in a similar way as domestic affairs. There was no clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs since imperial orthodoxy was believed to be universal. For instance, distinction among tax payers, tributaries, and tax payers/tributaries was not
clear at all in border regions. Third, administrative continuity was not well achieved due to the general insensitivity to new events which were generally outside the prescription of traditional administrative rules. Slow and sporadic information flow on foreign affairs made it all the more difficult to modify the whole memory system and behavior rules that had been set out long before.

The British administrative competence in handling foreign affairs was clearly discernable. Despite the long distance from the central government and the relatively small amount of attention paid to East Asia, the British managed to process information efficiently. This was due to their relative depth and breadth of knowledge as well as their training in administration. An extremely small number of the British working in China managed to affect many events in China to a great extent, if not her final destiny. Their capacity in executing war and negotiation as well as routine works was unquestionable, especially when compared with the contemporary Chinese. Despite the improved technology of communication and transportation and the strong control by the central government over those on the spot, absolute geographical distance placed a heavy load on the shoulders of those on the spot. Three more factors reinforced this tendency. The high cost of communication did not allow detailed reporting except in extremely important cases. The number of Far Eastern specialists was very limited. And the central government paid attention to the Far East only when there were some big events which aroused opposition in and out of Parliament and the cabinet or when the prime minister, foreign secretary or naval secretary showed
great interest in the Far East due to their own predispositions or policy views. However, the role of the Foreign Office, especially of permanent undersecretaries and other Foreign Office top officials, became increasingly important from the late 19th century and until World War I.¹¹⁶

The Japanese had the administrative skill to manage complex information pouring in from the Continent, and because of their advanced communication technology and the government's firm control of those on the spot, information was largely processed at the center. Perhaps most conspicuous was their diversified way of handling information from abroad, which reflected the far more complex ways in which Japan became involved in the Continent than did Britain, whose importance was predominantly economic. Japan's interests in the Continent involved all sorts of civil, military and colonial agencies, each under its own central authority in Tokyo. The diversification and compartmentalization of these information processing centers impeded the integration of information.¹¹⁷ This was, however, no more than a manifestation of an 'octopus-pot society' extended abroad.¹¹⁸

13) Modes of decision making present contrasting cultural patterns. The Chinese mode of decision making was conformity oriented. Most important in decision making was the conformity to imperial rules traditionally adhered to and to the emperor's will, whim and emotion. Decision making was usually done by a handful of men around the emperor in complete isolation from others.¹¹⁹ Routine work consisted largely of searching precedent and adjusting rule conflict. Non-routine work
was avoided as much as possible so that it would not cause trouble, but when such trouble appeared unavoidable, a mandarin often tried to shirk responsibility by making a false report shrewdly and skillfully worded. Attracting the emperor's attention by their mishandling affairs should be avoided by all means, for the result was often dismissal from office. The cumulative effect of this decision making style tended to reach the point of ritualism in the gradual diminution of clear comprehension of goals-and-means sequels. The emperor styled himself as the man of virtue and strength and did not want to be embarrassed with actions which would imply, according to imperial orthodoxy, the loss of his virtue or his weakness. Central decision makers were disturbed only when there were important rebellions and/or when there was strong opposition to high and middle ranking mandarins. Avoidance of embarrassment and dissonance inevitably resulted in self-deception. Relative isolation enabled deception and self-deception to become rampant, without bringing about serious trouble. However, when imperialists' assaults made too obvious the self-deception, it would be metamorphosed later into the radicalism of impotence. When there was no strong emperor and no wise advisors, decision making tended to be arbitrary, confused and erratic. When authority was undermined or when competition grew, the consequence was confusion, disorder and chaos without an object toward which conformity could be directed.

The British style of decision making was argument oriented. Insofar as the Parliament was the arena for debate, forceful presentation of
argument was important. In the cabinet, within ministries and between London and the Far East, decision making was basically argument oriented. This description should not obscure the fact, however, that parliamentary management was like persuading gentlefolks in a community club. The Parliament was a small club and it was generally the case that the prime minister's juggling and speechifying to persuade a small number of persons were enough to get things going. This was particularly so during the mid-Victorian period, but it was not without being influenced by oppositions in and outside of the Parliament. As political representation was gradually widened, the influence of public opinion became greater, but the formal influences from outside of the ruling elites were vocal but remained very small. Furthermore, seen in the long run, members of the British opposition tended to be emasculated either by being promoted to high posts of the ruling elites or by the ruling elites' gradual incorporation of opposition ideas. British society in the 19th century showed itself remarkably flexible and able to incorporate gradually and without causing radical changes many of the capable or 'lucky' elements of the lower classes into the establishment. This was in perfect accordance with the Burkean tradition of reforming in order to preserve. Yet when politically relevant strata increased to a certain extent, especially after the second and third Reform Acts of 1867 and 1885, it became more and more difficult to do so, both technically and in principle. When there were so many people of different beliefs and backgrounds, it was difficult to dispense with juggling and speechifying. At the time of extreme difficulties, it degenerated further to such a point as to lead Churchill to state, "All I wanted during World War II was compliance with my wishes after reasonable discussion."
The Japanese style of decision making was consensus oriented. Decision making was based on everybody's agreement at least theoretically. This decision making style took much time before action was taken due to step by step consensus formation processes. Constitutionally being a truncated Leviathan, the Japanese imperial state managed to work well with this decision making style when the decision making body was like government by crony. When the state was in an infantile stage and when the business of daily government was limited to the affairs of the small ruling elites knit together by their strong sense of mission and responsibility, the style largely inherent in Japanese decision making was congruent to reality. And many advantages of this kind of decision making style, i.e., full use of potential resources of organization, boosting of organizational morale and relatively balanced decisions, fully manifested themselves. However, the continuity and homogeneity of leadership was subsequently lost and the decision making body itself became extremely diffused. Fissiparity along faction and policy lines was increasingly visible and serious in a search for an unattainable consensus, which eventually went to the extreme of imposing faits accomplis on others under the name of consensus and unanimity. Incremental consensus formation among small ruling elites tended to degenerate to a post hoc consensus formation through imposition of a fait accompli by a strong-willed, 'sincerity'-driven individual or faction. This often became serious when participants and agitators increased and when the imminence of a situation was felt acutely, although in the long run this style was on the whole successful in incorporating the dissenters within the system.
14) Patterns of organizational management disclose another interesting contrast. In the Chinese system, inefficient communications and the spotty administrative network often caused extraordinarily uncoordinated decision and action, especially in time of war in faraway places. Thus emerged the repeated pattern of the decisions taken on the spot being followed by imperial sanctions which pretended to represent initiatives. The focus of decision making was the officials on the spot. If the decision and action taken on the spot was not liked by the emperor, those mandarins or militarists involved were dismissed or punished. Furthermore, officials' mobility was quite rapid, and therefore senior officials had to rely heavily upon secretaries and underlings who were in close touch with the local population and commanded the special knowledge and techniques essential for daily administration. Confucian doctrine and the civil service examinations stressed generalists and disdained specialists. Being a generalist was the only way to climb high on the imperial ladder. This may have been congruent to a vast agrarian order. But it could not be maintained when specialization and rationalization in a Weberian sense became a Zeitgeist.

In the British system, coordination of decision and action was not a serious problem largely because decision making and policy execution were generally done by those on the spot in the Far East. Although the formulation of general policy objectives and methods took place in London, coordination of decision and action did not become a serious problem. This was due in part to the fact that problems in the Far
East were generally of minor importance to decision makers in London, and in part to the fact that London's unfamiliarity with those problems tended to lend them to trust decisions made and actions taken on the spot. When problems became big and serious, the prime minister and/or foreign secretary personally dominated policy formulation and execution. Permanent undersecretaries and their top officials were increasingly the focus of decision making from the late 19th century on, as imperial problems became more and more complicated and diversified.

There were an extraordinarily small number of experts in Far Eastern affairs and they were generally very stable in their posts. This continuity of permanent officials mostly recruited from very special class-cum-educational backgrounds helped the perpetuation of old perspectives. British Far Eastern policy occasionally disclosed its regression to old behavior styles, most notably gunboat coercion, especially in time of difficulties. At the same time this continuity yielded a remarkable stability and on the whole a skillful handling of conflicts at a time of imperial decline by the time-honored Anglo-Saxon method of 'muddling through.'

In the Japanese system, coordination of decision and action was not well-executed. Japanese organizations had several distinctive characteristics. First of all, in Japan organizations sought consensus before reaching a final decision, tending to delay ultimate decision. Also, during the process of consensus formation, authority tended to go downward and initiative tended to come from the bottom or at least somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, consensus formation tended
to drift in a direction supported by a strongly committed person or group because the majority sought to avoid discrepancy and division.\textsuperscript{142} This permissiveness proliferated factions within groups, or \textit{imperia in imperio}, and thus made it more difficult to reach a quick decision.\textsuperscript{143} For these reasons, organizational decision tended to be slow and uncoordinated. By seeking to accommodate each member of the group and a changing situation, this organizational and decisional style tended to aggravate trouble once it arose. Fissiparity and confusion inevitably resulted. Because middle echelon personnel was the focus of decision making especially in policy initiation, dissenters often came from middle echelon personnel. There were two factors which, when combined, created the syndrome of middle echelon personnel taking power in the bureaucracy, civil or military. One was extremely rapid bureaucratic development\textsuperscript{144} and piece-meal acceptance of many areas of specialized knowledge and skills from abroad. This factor tended to compartmentalize bureaucracy which in turn asserted its autonomy and independence on the basis of specialized expertise. Thus, policy initiative tended to come from experts in each specialized part of bureaucracy. The other factor was the traditional style of decision making, i.e., consensus oriented decision making.
Chapter 3: Script for the self-deceptive pax Sinica

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute Envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. Besides making gifts (of which I enclose an inventory) to each member of your Mission, I confer upon you, O King, valuable presents in excess of the number usually bestowed on such occasions, including silks and curios—a list of which is likewise enclosed. Do you reverently receive them and take note of my tender goodwill towards you! A special mandate.

Chapter 3: Script for the self-deceptive pax Sinica

The three scripts of the distinctive international learning processes will be drawn in chapters 3, 4, and 5. As in the preceding chapter on models, we will compare and contrast the three protagonists. The scripts of international learning processes are, in other words, the history of the memory of states. They are constructed as if they were 'collective memory' on the basis of which protagonists think and act. Identification, comparison and analysis of protagonists' self-conception or their views of their place in the world show striking pictures revealing, among other things, the crucial motivations underlying their international behavior. We will assert: 1) how cultural aspects of power assets and liabilities showed themselves as major dimensions of the Manchu-Chinese views; 2) how commercial aspects of power assets and liabilities were the most important terms in which the British worked; and 3) how racial aspects of power assets and liabilities occupied a prominent position in Japanese thought and action. These aspects will be identified by analysing the relationship between protagonists' power bases and perspectives through time. There are four phases of international learning processes for each protagonist, each phase having a common characteristic. The first phase represents how each protagonist created, through initial learning experiences, consequent power perspectives, which provided an underlying bias for the

Notes to chapter 3 appear on pages 546-549.
subsequent phases as well. The second phase represents how each protagonist maximized its power bases and how each protagonist developed its perspective pari passu with the maximized power bases. A certain kind of fixed sense of learning was developed during this phase, which later would cause trouble. The third phase represents the unmasking of learning rigidities. Even when their power bases decreased, they tended to maintain their great power style as developed and maximized in the preceding phases. Psychological and institutional rigidities prevented them from restructuring their power perspectives in a new direction. The fourth phase represents the consequences that established decline, disaster or defeat. Through all these phases, the salient aspects of protagonists' international learning processes, i.e., cultural to the Manchu-Chinese, commercial to the British and racial to the Japanese, manifested themselves. With the four phases of the three 'subjective histories' compared and contrasted, these three chapters will present in a succinct form the major theses of this study.

*   *   *   *   *   *
The first theme was the metamorphosis from the 'barbarous' conquerors to the 'civilized' rulers of the Middle Kingdom. The absolutely remarkable conquest by the Manchus left little international environmental uncertainty except the latent menace of the Mongols. After a series of Pyrrhic victories in the tribal wars since the time of the rise of a Manchu tribe called the Chien-chou Jurchens, the Manchus very skillfully nullified or emasculated the neighboring powers.\textsuperscript{1} They first pacified and incorporated other Manchu tribes. Then they incorporated and utilized the Han Chinese living in southern Manchuria by conquering them.\textsuperscript{2} After having established a sinicized military-bureaucratic state in Manchuria,\textsuperscript{3} they also nullified the resistance of Korea as a weak ally of the Ming\textsuperscript{4} and also pacified the Chahar Mongols before the Manchus went into China.\textsuperscript{5} They drove into Peking, went further southward and conquered all of China, largely with the forces led by the Han Chinese.\textsuperscript{6} This was a remarkable victory, taking account of the enormous difference in the numbers of the population of a few million Manchus and one hundred times more numerous Han Chinese.\textsuperscript{7}

Their threat came from within the empire rather than from without. The persistent resistance and non-compliance of the Han Chinese were exemplified by the Three Feudatories and the Cheng clan. The former, the rebellious ex-collaborators, almost toppled the newly established Manchu dynasty.\textsuperscript{8} The latter menaced the Manchu rulers for a long time from Taiwan. All of this only increased their suspicion of the Han Chinese loyalty to them. Indeed, the task that confronted the new
Manchu rulers was ambivalent; they had to rule the overwhelmingly out-numbering Han Chinese while retaining their Manchu identity. In order to be accepted as the rulers of the Middle Kingdom, the Manchu emperors had to behave as if they were the emperors of great Confucian virtue. To other 'barbarians' as well as to the rebels, they behaved as bearers of imperial virtues to whom 'barbarians' and rebels should express their loyalty and piety. The Manchus' will to preserve their unity, purity and supremacy was weakened gradually as it experienced the cycle of over-assimilation and over-regression. Hsun-chih loved Chinese culture whereas Oboi swung back to the Manchu assertion. Then K'ang-hsi moved toward more sinification. The important turning point was the K'ang-hsi emperor's court coup in 1669. The perceived necessity to be the most Chinese-like rulers led them to so stylize themselves often overtly despite their persistent effort to preserve the Manchu supremacy. As all the previous conquerors of China, the Manchu conquerors were to be quietly and gradually submerged by the powerful forces of sinification.

Their conception of international environment was largely inherited from the traditional Chinese conception of 'barbarians.' Their acceptance of the tradition was very natural in two senses. On the one hand, their military dominance only made it easy for them to believe in the traditional sinocentric picture of the Chinese world order; on the other hand, the necessity of behaving like the Chinese emperors in ruling the Han Chinese encouraged and prompted their acceptance. For these two reasons, their conceptual structure at the initial stages was
very stable and well-articulated. With confidence in their power, their acceptance and inheritance of the traditional Chinese world view did not cause much problem. Rather, their awareness of its fictitious nature did not blur their eye. However, as time passed on, inflexibility inevitably was to manifest itself in the enforced stability and peace of the empire. When combined with their lack of knowledge about the international environment which surprised Central Asians, it was later to produce the syndrome of self-complacency, self-content and isolation of the Chinese empire.

The second theme was the central dominance of the Ch'ing empire in East Asia fostering and reinforcing their belief in the uniqueness and grandeur of Chinese history and culture. The remarkable achievements of empire-building such as the campaigns against the Russians, the Jungars, the Three Feudatories, the Cheng clan and Tibet enabled the map of the Ch'ing empire to become the largest of all the historic Chinese empires. When the Manchus encountered the Russians encroaching on the northern fatherland of Manchuria, they waged wars with much caution and patience under the shrewd personal direction of the K'ang-hsi emperor. Confidence was accompanied by good preparation and high morale at the time of the K'ang-hsi emperor. The empire was still in the formative stage. The second theme was developed fully and reached its peak during the reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor, who boasted, in the later years of his reign, of ten great campaigns he had successfully accomplished, the most important of which was a series of successes to nullify the traditional northern enemy, the
Mongols. Before the Manchus conquered China, they had pacified the
Chahar Mongols. The Khalkha Mongols came under the Manchu patronage,
seeking a shield from attack by the Jungar Mongols. The Manchus also
also drove the Khoshud Mongols and the Jungar Mongols out of Tibet and
established a protectorate relationship with Tibet. And finally,
taking advantage of internal strife among the Jungar empire, they
conquered it in the mid-18th century.

The pacification of the Jungar empire was the landmark of the
Ch'ing achievements. The central dominance, military and geographical,
of China in East Asia reached the point where there was virtually no
enemy of China and it looked as if the centuries-old sinocentric con-
ception of their place in the world was completely verified. The
belief in the uniqueness and grandeur of Chinese history and culture
was shared more enthusiastically and emphatically by the Manchu rulers
because of their ambivalent status in the empire. Enemies were rela-
tively few and most importantly they were often internally divided
and, in military operation, extremely badly coordinated. Also the
Manchus' possession of heavy artillery helped their victories enorm-
ously. Thus, despite the inefficient imperial communication and
control due to the structural overload of military and administrative
institutions vis-a-vis continuous demographic and economic expansion
and enormous problems derived therefrom, the campaigns against the
Mongols showed remarkable successes. However, their power bases
to support and sustain their belief were increasingly declining. Im-
perial inflexibility and self-satisfaction became increasingly evident
and successive victories made the rulers arrogant and boastful.
There were two characteristically Chinese ways of handling foreign affairs during this period and thereafter. One is the extensive use of a show of force. The other is the obsessive concern for supremacy. They used a show of force extensively to induce an enemy’s early surrender or at least his early sitting at a negotiation table, and even after negotiations were underway, this technique was often used. There were two structural conditions for an extensive use of a show of force. One was the presupposition that China was potentially extremely powerful since it was very big and early negotiation would therefore be profitable to China’s enemy. The other was the basic slowness and ineffectiveness of imperial mobilization. Despite its perceived political strength, the Chinese knew that large scale war mobilization was extremely costly and sometimes prohibitive. The obsessive concern for supremacy was derived from Chinese pride in the uniqueness and grandeur of Chinese history and culture. When they failed to win in battle, the obsession for supremacy became no more than a search for ritualistic supremacy.\(^{29}\) They had to be satisfied with its degenerated form. These two characteristics were to be disclosed more fully, dramatically and painfully in later days.

The third theme is the inability to win, leading to self-deception and the avoidance of reality. The empire building, seemingly so skillfully done, had its weaknesses, which were disclosed first unobtrusively and later conspicuously. Tight institutionalization for internal security and economic exploitation increasingly disclosed its inability to contain demographic and economic forces which had been continuously
growing since mid-17th century on an unprecedented scale and rate. Population increase was so fast that economic production could only keep pace, and vast social institutions, administrative networks and military systems experienced chronic stresses. Under these taxing imperial conditions, military campaigns were also strained. Extraordinary economic expansion during this period was achieved with virtually no technological progress, resulting in what Mark Elvin calls the high-level equilibrium trap. Societal surplus was increasingly small and thinly spread among the continuously increasing population and eventually the economy reached a standstill with almost no societal surplus without new technology to break through the trap. The accelerating imperial decline could not be halted even though there was an extraordinary demographic decrease in the mid-19th century when 10-20 millions were killed.

Many of what were called by the Ch'ien-lung emperor the ten great campaigns were not great at all. The campaigns in Burma, Vietnam and Nepal were very difficult. The Burma and Vietnam campaigns ended in disastrous and humiliating defeats. Imperial inability to mobilize their power bases efficiently became evident but China's vastness and isolation from the outside world helped keep the facade of the glorious empire even after the disastrous defeats. The virtual non-existence of foreign powers who could take advantage of these weaknesses and threaten the Chinese empire prevented the rulers from seeing through the deceptive facade of strength. Self-delusion and unwillingness to face reality became the regular means by which a
disastrous defeat could be converted into a great campaign.41

The most important structural assumption of the two characteristics of war and negotiation, i.e., a show of force and a concern for supremacy, was actual strength in battle, which was increasingly slipping away. The consequence was deception. When victory on the battlefield looked difficult to attain, field commanders made false reports to the emperor by skillful wording.42 In good contrast to the K'ang-hsi emperor, the Ch'ien-lung emperor did not personally direct his expeditions and the consequence was that only the emperor believed there was victory, or at least deceived himself about it.43 Centuries-old concern for Chinese supremacy and greatness produced and nourished this type of thinking, together with their rejection of facing the reality of defeat and their inability to be victorious in battle. This syndrome is what John Wills aptly calls ritualistic supremacy.44 It is very important to note that this type of thinking and behavior had already been visible during the high Ch'ing period and was not just the response to the encounter with mighty Western powers in the 19th century. The fundamental decline of the empire was not disclosed dramatically when there were only small neighbors around the empire and when there were no traditional enemies in the north. When military supremacy disappeared vis-a-vis Western powers whose cheval de bataille was gunboat coercion, the Chinese style show of force was of no avail. When communication and transportation developed and outside knowledge increased, it was impossible to deceive the emperor, the people, and, for that matter, even the officials on the spot them-
selves because the outcome of the defeat was too clear, too visible and too decisive. Thus even ritualistic supremacy became more and more difficult to defend in the 19th century. Even when conditions changed, they stuck to the old behavior rules long adhered to. The defense of ritualistic supremacy had been relatively easy since it did not require that China was always actually victorious on the battlefield due to the disjointed and inefficient imperial communication and control and the relative isolation of the empire. Their extraordinary sense of history and culture was to become too heavy to carry when there was nothing but a facade of power and a show of force. The burdens of a great culture must have made the Chinese perspectives extremely rigid, to which obstinate resistance to change attested. The consequence was defeat and disaster, humiliation and disgrace, impotence and inaction.

In relation to this resistance, foreign intrusion and penetration had two aspects: in the short run, economic and social disruption seems to have been felt most saliently as was disclosed in the events of the mid-19th century. In the long run, however, political and psychological repercussions against foreigners and things foreign seem to have been most serious. Although there were occasional local disruptions of traditional economic and social relationships, these social and economic equilibria tended to be eventually restored. Economic decay, which was due more to inner-generated dynamics than foreign economic impact, had already begun in the late 18th century in the form of the high level equilibrium trap, well before foreign powers'
aggressions. The real importance of foreign intrusion and penetration was the accumulative impact of eroding and breaking through the high-level equilibrium trap in later days, and of providing the psychological shock and loss of confidence of the great culture bearers, thus directing their efforts to overcome them amidst the overall societal disequilibria.

The fourth theme is the impotence of self-deception turning into cultural despair accompanied by an emotional upsurge to revenge humiliation and disgrace. When overwhelmingly strong foreign powers began their onslaughts upon China, it was impossible to deceive themselves any more. The outcome of a battle became too clear for officials on the spot to juggle and too grave for the emperor to overlook by deluding himself. The stubborn resistance to the reality of absolute impotence only accumulated the sense of humiliation and disgrace in the minds of elites and the populace, thus contributing to undermining the power bases of the ruling elites. Economy, society and polity were, meanwhile, undergoing the transformation of inner decay, which reached its nadir in the 1920's to 1940's. Despite the decreasing surplus yielded from the land, the centuries-old practice of equal inheritance of land by male heirs only aggravated the agricultural management of peasants and landlords, who became more and more small scale and competitive. What was worse, the gentry, free from the official local power, became entirely parasitic. Many peasants had to leave land and formed marginal elements and the rampant famines, droughts and wars all aggravated the misery.
Radicalism was fostered among the youth who were deprived of the traditional opportunities to climb up in society in an orderly manner. Their frustrated social ambitions gave rise to chronic outbursts against 'rotten' rulers and imperialist powers whose presence was most conspicuously felt in coastal urban centers, the main power bases of rulers and foreign powers. Hatred against foreigners and their 'running dogs' became the main theme of political life. The absolute inability to retain the self-made fiction of the greatness of China and Chinese culture by self-deception was transformed into cultural despair accompanied by emotionally driven revenge against the humiliation inflicted upon them by foreigners. The force of anti-foreignism and anti-imperialism was the *Leitmotiv* of 20th century Chinese politics. It was what Joseph Schumpeter calls the radicalism of impotence. Imperialist powers were accused as "the ultimate cause of all the difficulties and sufferings of the Chinese people," by the Kuomintang force then moving up to Peking for unification in 1926. However, those who utilized and played with this powerful political force had to pay its price which often was too costly for the rulers with meager power bases when they had to confront imperialist powers. The Kuomintang's regression and retrogression into the 'nationalist-socialist police state' disguised by Confucianism ran counter to the increasing calls for social revolution and anti-imperialism, whose embodiment turned out to be the Communists.
Chapter 4: Script for the Pretentious pax Britannica

Our commerce feeds a vital want; we seek trade, therefore, everywhere, although it is not without its risks and expenses. We seek new and ever-expanding markets to meet our ever-increasing wants and powers of production, and these seem to lie principally in the far East, and there we naturally, if not inevitably, go. Our first step is to obtain access by treaties to the markets they present. The Native Powers being little disposed to enter into negotiations, we bring to bear the only effective means—pressure, and gain the document which purports to give all the rights and facilities for trade required.

Chapter 4: Script for the pretentious pax Britannica

The first theme in the pax Britannica script was Britain's position as leading trader all over the world. England initiated the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century and gained control of the seven seas during and after the Napoleonic wars, setting the stage for the pax Britannica. There were no real competitors in industrial manufacturing until the 1870's when American, Continental European, and later, Japanese manufacturing industries began to threaten the markets which the British had nearly monopolized before.

When the British emerged victorious from the Napoleonic wars, the world environment seemed highly stable. An order was created in which the victors and the losers of the war allied with each other to protect themselves from revolutionary tides, and stability was maintained for a while. More important, British naval dominance supported and substantiated their world order even when revolutionary tides swayed the Continent. Naval power and industrial monopoly, when combined with a relatively rich knowledge of the rest of the world, created and sustained Victorian confidence.

The picture in East Asia was slightly different although the main theme was the same. The Chinese empire was no less self-confident than the British empire. Although Sino-foreign trade gradually increased in the 18th century, China under the Ch'ien-lung emperor

Notes to chapter 4 appear on pages 549-552.
began to restrict it step by step\textsuperscript{6} and the British had to concede much before they gained the upper hand in the attempt to open China and her market. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, British missions to Peking intending to negotiate to 'open' China failed because of a total, outright and high-handed Chinese rejection. 'Undue' Chinese arrogance became increasingly intolerable to British officials and traders.\textsuperscript{7} The imperialism of free trade began to assert itself, triggered by the tough native opposition to the British economic penetration.\textsuperscript{8} China was to provide one of the most successful examples of the policy of expansion through 'informal empire.'\textsuperscript{9}

The second theme was her avoidance of major wars with the consequence of perpetuating her self-image as the greatest power in the world. Despite the occasional criticism of Palmerstonian policy of 'meddle and muddle,' British major war involvements in the 19th century were only three, i.e., the Napoleonic wars, the Crimean war and the Boer war. The fact that there was virtually no challenger to British naval power until the late 19th century undoubtedly strengthened their self-confidence. Indeed, the pax Britannica was dependent upon Europe's acquiescence in the British hegemony in favor of the benefits gained by all from the growth of free trade.\textsuperscript{10} Meanwhile the British empire, formal and informal, could enjoy vast international markets with the British isles being the 'workshop of the world' pumping out manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{11} Victorians enjoyed the age of confidence and content on the basis of social 'equipoise',\textsuperscript{12} as well as of international dominance. The influence of the nobility and landed gentry remained powerful\textsuperscript{13} whereas a
newly emerging bourgeoisie were gradually absorbed into the Establishment and working people were left to themselves, not strong enough to assert themselves.\textsuperscript{14} Victorian stability was based on this balance of old and new classes. When economic depressions prevailed from the mid-1870's on, when social balance was temporarily lost due to continuing social and political realignment,\textsuperscript{15} and when industrial and naval dominance was increasingly threatened, Victorian confidence was to efface itself, though extremely slowly and reluctantly.

Victorian peace was made possible by a secure monopoly, economic and naval. Mid-Victorians could boast of free trade on the basis of this dual monopoly without being fully conscious of its imperialist nature. When confronted with a native rejection of an open market, the British resorted to force, though such force was conceived as necessary to bring about a world in which military power was not required for international transaction.\textsuperscript{16} Given the vast disparity of power, physical coercion in opening the market was effective. However, there were two factors which made British imperialism different from other, later forces of imperialism. First, the mid-Victorian policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries contributed to her minimal war involvements.\textsuperscript{17} Second, the Foreign Office's almost sole concern with \textit{la haute politique} also kept her from becoming bogged down in extensive official entanglements to defend her global economic interests.\textsuperscript{18} In short, this was a happy imperialism--aptly called the imperialism of free trade.\textsuperscript{19}

Seen in the light of such self-confidence, it is quite easy to
'predict' British behavior in China. Despite their own arrogant and lawless behavior, the pressure to punish Chinese arrogance became strong when the East India Company's monopoly of the India and China trade was abolished in 1813 and 1834 respectively. British traders confronted Chinese officials with their dissatisfactions and grievances without the presence of the conflict-absorbing role which had been played by the East India Company. With growing trade interests, frustrations and hostilities accumulated. Immediately after the abolition of the Company's trade monopoly in China, the first use of gunboat coercion was attempted, though with a failure due to the sudden death of Napier, its protagonist. After a brief period of quiescence, mounting British interests in the opium trade and increasingly severe Chinese measures to prohibit it and the attendant drain of silver finally collided in the Opium war of 1839-1842. By that time the British had already changed their former position. In 1793, when the first British mission to China visited the Ch'ien-lung emperor, it proposed that China open her markets even at the sacrifice of the then potentially lucrative opium trade. Now in 1839 it was to coerce 'free trade' as the British understood, which meant that China would have to accept opium. Gunboat coercion was successful this time from the British point of view, but it was coercion imposed upon a country which would never accept the British cause. Even the absolute disparity of military capacity between China and Britain could not change the Chinese mind unless they themselves did so. Thus, despite all the treaties concluded between them, Britain required a 'Dressing' (i.e., bombardments) on China, as Lord
Palmerston put it, 25 to compel the Chinese to execute treaties 'faithfully' as the British conceived them. 26

The Arrow war of 1856-1860 was the biggest 'Dressing' on China in the 19th century. Persistent resistance by the Chinese to military coercion, negotiation, and later, after agreement was concluded, to execution, frustrated the British, who in turn became even more inclined to the use of gunboat coercion. The British desire and effort to have a stable, centralized, well-ordered, strong but 'friendly' government in China for the purpose of free trade only resulted in coercion, undermining the confidence of Chinese mandarins and thus contributing to the general, basically inner-generated, dynamics of imperial corrosion and decline. The Arrow war and the Taiping rebellion presented a dilemma to the British who wanted to punish the imperial government but at the same time did not wish to see the central government collapse. The British wanted neither the total nullification of trade by chaos nor the complete British occupation of China with intolerable costs. 27 Keeping a balance between the two ambivalent desires about the Chinese government, the British attempted to transform the Chinese to a more 'modernized', loyal people in a high-handed paternalistic manner, heavily tinged with racism. 28

These British attitudes and policies were created and crystallized largely by the 1834, 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 wars of bombardment when the absolute disparity of power bases between China and Britain permitted the execution of this policy of unilateral gunboat coercion to 'punish' China and mould her government into a well-ordered centralized
'friendly' government. These unilateral coercions were undertaken with the virtual absence of third parties on the China coast. Except for the Frenchmen, who were minor partners in the Arrow war, there were no competitors with the British. Swift naval concentration and overwhelming bombardment were so decisive that this style of war and negotiation based on gunboat coercion was to be adhered to long thereafter. Gunboat coercion was believed to enhance British objectives to retain and enlarge markets, to foster friendly, central governments and not to get involved in land warfare. The fact that these conflicts were fought with virtually no competitors conditioned the mind of the British enormously. In fact, as a British ex-diplomat put it, "Because British armed intervention in China had so long achieved a success out of all proportion to the forces available to the contestants, the British had to take it for granted that they could and should do whatever they pleased in China." Although the principles of British foreign policy all over the world can be summarized as laissez faire, free trade and non-intervention in domestic affairs of sovereign countries, the fact remains that the inability to have free trade occasionally resulted in outright coercion to force 'free trade.' Although the Foreign Office was extremely reluctant to bother itself with commercial affairs which were thought to be outside its legitimate concerns, the fact still remains that the basic objectives of British foreign policy were national security and trade, both of which were intermingled with each other very closely. In fact, by virtue of the absence of competitors, the Foreign Office could adhere to the age-old principle of almost exclu-
sive concern with la haute politique. When her competitors began to emerge, with direct state support and initiatives, the British were reluctant to reappraise the principles and practices of their foreign policy. 33

The third theme in the British case was an awkwardness caused by being no more than a primus inter pares. Naval dominance was becoming increasingly difficult with Germany's vigorous emergence under Bismark since 1870. The Japanese and Americans had also developed their navies quite rapidly after the turn of the 19th century. 34 Furthermore, industrialization grew vigorously in Continental Europe, the US and Japan and the British world market was now being threatened. 35 Most of the industrial and trade expansion of the newly developing countries had vigorous state support. Free trade was replaced by protection within colonial spheres. Acquiescence to British hegemony was replaced by imperialist rivalries, forcing the British government to change its age-old policy of non-intervention in private business, though still on a modest scale. Nevertheless, Britain stuck to the old policy of free trade until 1930. Britain was, in short, placed in the awkward position of being no more than a primus inter pares in terms of naval and industrial competition while her self-confidence was as high as before. The 'self-assurance' was partially replaced by 'a loss of self-confidence' accompanied by 'self-congratulatory, romantic, even slightly hysterical' conception of the Empire. 36 England was placed in the uncomfortable position of being followed, pursued and even worse, surpassed. After years of glory and confidence, her rulers only slowly and reluctantly
shed the Victorian legacy; a staunch belief in her place as the greatest power in the world. Whether in competition or cooperation, the British were clumsy and when obliged to cope with imperialist rivalries, her awkwardness manifested itself in search for allies. By the 1890's, it was evident that her position was challenged. 37

The 1850's and 1860's were the happiest days for private politicians of influence in England, whereas for political parties, lacking party discipline and cohesion, they were miserable times. 38 Indeed, juggling and speechifying within the parliamentary area 39 were usually enough for the cabinet's policy execution and search for support. However, later the opposition began to make use of lengthy debates, and slow accommodation, always conscious of political parties, public opinion and pressure groups, became essential. As the franchise was enlarged, the nature of parliamentary debates changed considerably, and so did the way in which the government handled the parliament. Thus, both at home and abroad, the mid-Victorian style of unilateral action was forced to give way.

In the China field, too, the picture described above generally holds. The self-strengtheners who had emerged from the ruin of the Taiping rebellion demonstrated their ability particularly in the fields of diplomacy, defense and commerce. 40 In fact, their power bases were in the coastal cities which were, not coincidentally, the areas where foreign powers were influential. 41 Their policy of utilizing foreign advisors enabled the British to follow a more cooperative policy during the 1870's and 1880's than before. This period was like the calm before the storm.
which was to threaten more directly the destiny of the Ch'ing empire. Furthermore, other foreign powers' thrusts into China began to threaten the paramount position of the British in China, so firmly established since at least 1860. Russian thrusts into northern and northwestern China posed a potentially great menace to the British position in the Far East and India. The French victory in the Sino-French war of 1884-1885 exposed a serious weakness of the supposedly 'self-strengthened' China. What was more crucial to China and Britain in determining each of their political outlooks was China's devastating defeat in the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. To China it proved a complete bankruptcy of the self-strengtheners headed by Li Hung-chang and others. The unexpected, victorious emergence of Japan in the Far East, the unanticipated thrust of Russia into China by the tripartite intervention of 1895, the subsequent scramble for concessions, and finally the devastating Boxer intervention all forced the British to reassess seriously and fundamentally the assumptions their China policy had resided upon for the preceding 60 years. First, it assumed the weakness of China and the absolute supremacy of British naval power vis-a-vis China. Second, it assumed that there were no competitors on the China coast. Third, it assumed that there were virtually no military threats to their paramount position in the Far East. Although the first assumption did not seem to be violated severely until World War I, the latter two assumptions were increasingly undermined. For many reasons, the British were able to minimize military involvements during the 19th century and as a result, it was less obvious that the British were not actually superpowerful. After the 1870's
the British had to be concerned about holding on to what they had obtained before. They were now on the defensive, their supremacy very much in doubt. In fact, they were no more than a *primus inter pares*. To counteract against and compete with other powers' state-supported promotion of economic and territorial interests, the Foreign Office too had to change its traditional, almost exclusive concern with *la haute politique*. Without the support of the state, British economic interests in China were thought to be endangered.\(^{45}\)

In China, defeats and humiliations strengthened the voice of radicals\(^{46}\) whose power increased after the Sino-Japanese war. The government's grip of power became quite tenuous when the scramble for foreign concessions was going on around 1898. A coup and a countercoup in 1898 by radicals and by reactionaries respectively and the subsequent eleventh-hour reform efforts hastily executed for 'self-strengthening' now by the reactionaries helped to trigger the Boxer rebellion in 1898-1901. The British position in the multi-national Boxer intervention was a clumsy and precarious one.\(^{47}\) First of all, she had to cooperate as well as compete with other interventionist powers. Especially she had to compete with the Russians and check their ambition in Manchuria and North China. Second, she had to try to keep the imperial government in power which she, together with other powers, was at the same time 'punishing.' She had to find an ally who could check the Russians coming down through Manchuria to the North China coast which is right next door not only to the capital but also to the spheres of British influence in the Yangtze valley region. After cautious probing, with an
eye on the battlefield as well as on other interventionist powers, she finally found an ally, Japan. This was the first British solution in the Far East to the dilemma of her gradual decline.\textsuperscript{48} When belief in her supreme preponderence diminished, British commercial interests around the world became the heavy burdens laid upon the shoulders of the British leadership. It was Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary at the time of the Boxer intervention, who reportedly conversed with a Chinese mandarin on equal terms of the two declining empires.\textsuperscript{49} It was a revival of gunboat coercion that, during the initial phase of the intervention, those on the spot like Sir Ernest Satow screamed for.\textsuperscript{50}

The fourth theme is a response to her heavy burden by vacillation between self-effacement and firmness. Given the economic and naval competition, departures from 'honorable isolation' were inevitable. She had to get involved in continental affairs and deal with all the problems taking place in the now overextended empire. She had to find allies in coping with problems relating to market holding, national security and imperialist rivalries. She had to deal with the increasingly intense self-assertion of the Dominions whose interests did not coincide with those of London, which was now little more than a primus inter pares.\textsuperscript{51} Also, she had to deal with anti-imperialist nationalist attacks directed against her formal and informal empire. Her pretentions of being the greatest power despite evidence to the contrary only increased the problems arising from her role and the situations confronting her. A clumsy search for allies ended only with costly
involvement. Her longest involvement of all the powers in World Wars I and II perhaps attests to this.\textsuperscript{52} When confronted with prospective heavy burdens, Britain vacillated between self-effacement and firmness as ways of minimizing her losses.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance gradually lost its meaning after the Russo-Japanese war.\textsuperscript{53} The Russo-Japanese rapprochement in the Far East developed after the war\textsuperscript{54} and the Japanese resurgence in the Far East was not welcome to many of the British. This feeling was strengthened after World War I when Japan expanded her military control far beyond the areas to which the British originally wanted to restrict her.\textsuperscript{55} England's position on Japan's 21 demands toward China was close to self-effacement at the time of heavy British involvement in World War I despite their aggravated feelings.\textsuperscript{56} The Dominion countries had different interests and views from London's. Australia and New Zealand vacillated between the necessity of defending themselves by relying on Britain and/or Japan, and their abhorrence of being dependent on a non-white people who might penetrate them and cause tremendous problems.\textsuperscript{57} The Imperial conference of 1921 deferred its final decision of whether to continue or terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance to the prospective Washington conference of 1921–1922. This was due to the Canadian delegate's fierce, forceful scepticism about and opposition to the renewal of the alliance. For Canada, increasingly dependent on the US, did not wish to incur the displeasure of the US which looked at the alliance as anti-American.\textsuperscript{58} The Washington conference decided to terminate the alliance and the British became informally allied with the US from then on although the
idea was not explicit in the minds of the British who still thought in terms of naval competition with the Americans who doubled their naval capacity during World War I and became the second naval power in the world.\textsuperscript{59} Furthermore, the American and British perspectives were often extremely divergent especially with respect to China.\textsuperscript{60} The Americans did not have so many vested economic interests in China as the British did. The Americans could act out the largely self-made fiction of being the 'sister republic' without seriously bothering herself with the economic interests.\textsuperscript{61} The concert between them was not easy at all in the Far East.\textsuperscript{62} In response to the mounting nationalist tides in China during the 1920's, the British most readily resorted to gunboat coercion of all the foreign powers. The May 30th incident of 1925 and the Nanking incident of 1927 both attest to the British propensity for gunboat coercion.\textsuperscript{63} In the mid-1920's the British became a prime focus of Chinese anti-imperialist attack. In the May 30th incident, the anti-foreign attack, which originally stemmed from trouble at a Japanese textile factory, was gradually transformed into an anti-British attack, due in part to British policemen's too crude handling of the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{64} In the Nanking incident, which stemmed from the northern expeditionary KMT army's anti-foreign assaults, the British most hastily used gunboat coercion perhaps without much consideration of its consequences.\textsuperscript{65} This was the execution of firmness so believed by the British. However, after 1927, Britain geared her policy to accommodation rather than relying on military force as she did in the mid-1920's.\textsuperscript{66} As the prime focus of anti-imperialist attacks was shifted to
Japan, Britain succeeded almost unobtrusively in her attempt to hold what she had by partial concessions to China. When she realized that she could not avoid the loss of her interests she tried to minimize the situation by conciliation. As a 1929 memorandum put it, it was "an enforced retreat—in which our main effort is directed towards preventing it from being turned into a rout." However, this formula did not work vis-à-vis Japan. Japan's demand was for Western powers to accept the faits accomplis created by Japan in order to offset the 'status quo' perceived as beneficial only to the Western powers. When Japan took action in Manchuria, the British at first adopted a policy of understanding, with a keen awareness of the "burden of resentment" which might fall upon Britain if she spoke out of turn.70

However, when self-effacement, understanding, cooperation, or appeasement did finally become impossible, her stand went back to Victorian firmness. Britain emerged as the most stubborn nation in defending her interests against Japanese demands until late 1940 when the Americans replaced Britain as the power most hostile to Japan.72 This was because of British overestimation of Chiang Kai-shek's grip of power, then already being undermined by the Communists, and because of their underestimation of Japan's power. This policy of firmness toward Japan was pursued despite, or because of, the British appeasement policy then being unabashedly pursued in Europe.73 When he became prime minister in 1940, Sir Winston Churchill told the nation, "You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory—victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be."
In fact, this was the cry for "victory, even if this meant placing the British empire in pawn to the United States; victory, even if it meant Soviet domination of Europe; victory at all costs. This was probably the will of the British people."  

During the Japanese-American negotiation immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Churchill went further than the pro-Chinese Far Eastern Division of the US State Department by denying categorically the possibility of seeking a *modus vivendi* between Japan and the US. After their attack on Pearl Harbor, the agile Japanese were successful in taking Singapore, the symbol of the British presence in the Far East, with surprising speed and ease in 1942. The Japanese invasion of the whole 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area' and the final Japanese defeat played a catalytic role in the ending of Western imperialism. Out of Victorian resolve and firmness, Britain emerged from the war as far less than a *secundus inter pares*. 
Chapter 5: Script for the abortive pax Japonica

In short, the principle of peace as propounded by Britain and the United States is the principle of peace at any price supported by those who favor the status quo and this [principle] has nothing to do with justice and humanity....That is, those who will most benefit are Britain and the United States. Even if other countries, lured by the beautiful words of justice and humanity, join the League of Nations, it may not simply be that they will gain nothing. It may also be that they will shrink economically [because of Anglo-American economic imperialism]. This being the case, it cannot be allowed [for this to take place] not only from the Japanese point of view but also from the viewpoint of justice and humanity. Therefore, the problems that have to be put forward at the forthcoming conference [at Versailles] prior to her joining the League of Nations are at least the rejection of [Anglo-American] economic imperialism and the equal treatment of the white and yellow races. After all, it is not just militarism alone that harms justice and humanity. Although the world was saved from the smoke of power and the hail of bullets because of the German defeat, is it just the military force alone that threatens the equal right of the survival of nations?

--Prince Konoe, "We reject the peace only favorable to Anglo-American powers," in Nihon to Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese), 1918, quoted in Miwa Kimitada, Matsuoka Yosuke, Tokyo, 1971, pp. 60-61.
Chapter 5: Script for the abortive pax Japonica

The first theme is Japan's fear of dependence derived from her traumatic experience of Western gunboat coercion and her single-minded striving for diplomatic equality with the Western powers. Coerced in the 19th century to open the country which had imposed on herself the non-contact with foreign countries for the preceding two centuries from the early 17th century on, Japan was naturally fearful of Western military power. It was this fear of gunboat coercion as exercised by Western naval forces and as experienced personally by many of the young Meiji leaders in the 1850's and 1860's that seriously affected Japanese perspectives throughout the first half century of her modern history. Fear of dependence was exemplified by the interpretation of world politics in 1869, a year after the Meiji Restoration, held by one of the Meiji oligarchs, Iwakura; "It is impossible to have no relations with foreign countries, but they are all enemies of our empire." It was the world of bellum omnium contra omnes. Many of the Meiji leaders personally experienced fear, horror and humiliation, which conditioned their thinking for long thereafter in subsequent international experiences. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, before the Russian Baltic squadron arrived in the Far East, the Russian small squadron stationed at Vladivostok was active around the coasts of Japan. To many Japanese, never forgetting Perry's threat from the Bay of Tokyo

Notes to chapter 5 appear on pages 552-555.
in the early 1850's, it looked as if the Russians would intrude into the Bay of Tokyo and bombard the city. To Yamagata Aritomo, long an influential real-politik type genro, the tripartite intervention of 1895 was the exact replaying of the joint Western bombardment of Choshu han to which he belonged before the Meiji Restoration and for which he fought the battle in horror, humiliation and admiration for the enemy's military power. He was wounded during the battle. To Okubo Toshimichi, a most powerful man in the early Meiji period before he was assassinated, who witnessed the British naval action at Kagoshima in 1863, the Japanese gunboat coercion at Kanghwado, Korea was no more than an act of replaying what the British had done vis-a-vis Japan some ten years before. The commercial treaty concluded between Korea and Japan in 1867 was mostly taken from the clauses of the treaty concluded between the US and Japan. It was because of anticipated Western counteractions that at the time of the Boxer rebellion, Japan took an almost slavishly cooperative policy vis-a-vis Western powers even though Japan had ample desire to take advantage of the situation and rush into China. They feared a repetition of the traumatic tripartite intervention of 1895.

The Japanese approached the Western countries with a combination of timidity and caution, of passivity and patience, of admiration and aspiration. Their utmost concern was not to be dependent on, not to be conquered by, and not to antagonize the Western powers, while trying to expand their influences in neighboring countries. Meanwhile their utmost effort was made to realize reform and modernization so that Japan
could enjoy equal status with the Western world. The proud and sensitive Japanese tried hard to dispel the inferior status brought about by the unequal treaties with their provisions of extraterritoriality and lack of tariff autonomy—terms both psychologically humiliating and economically disadvantageous. The hastiness and singlemindedness that characterized their efforts made in a perceived hostile environment brought about important effects on their perspectives. International uncertainty was extremely high and Japan had extraordinary difficulty in creating a relatively usable conceptual structure. Cues about the international environments tended to be simply juxtaposed without much integration, interconnection and abstraction, so that, when things were complicated or changed drastically, misunderstanding of cues became serious. This situation, when combined with relatively little available knowledge, due in part to their wish to make it by themselves wherever possible without foreigners' help, tended to create occasional frustration and mishaps.

It was an extraordinary fear of being dependent on and possibly conquered by the Western powers that ran through a century of modern Japanese thinking and handling of international affairs since the forced opening of the country. This attitude was especially strong until their victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Fear of dependence produced a kind of syndrome which consisted of such characteristics as alertness, agility, good timing and preparedness in military action, a nearly slavish search for support from third parties in diplomatic maneuvering and a shrewd Clausewitzian expertise in combining war and politics. It is the syndrome which led a contemporary American politician to note:
"The Japanese government always conducts its affairs like a military commander planning a campaign and it has extraordinary capacity for prompt and sudden action. If they see that the tendency of events is going to lead to war, they will not hesitate an instant to bring it on at the time most favorable to them." \(^\text{14}\) Weakness and vulnerability created almost inevitable diplomatic passivity vis-à-vis Western powers. The sum of Western powers' actions were lumped together as the givens or the *faits accomplis* or more aptly as the 'trend of the world.' \(^\text{15}\) Great efforts were made to decipher and adapt to the 'trend of the world,' the monopoly of the Western powers as if Japan could have no say about it. As a shrewd diplomat Komura put it at the time of the Sino-Japanese war, the role of a diplomat is to listen, not to speak.

In contrast to this Japanese attitude toward Western powers, their attitude toward neighboring countries was that of disdain disguised by paternalism. \(^\text{16}\) Even before the opening of the country, Japan was informed of China's humiliating defeat in the Opium war, which knowledge undoubtedly strengthened their fear and suspicion. At the same time, as Japan escaped the same destiny of her neighbors and as she learned Western-style power politics in her own way, the notion developed that Japan should take action for her own expansion to enable her to cope with the Western powers. Since her neighbors were weaker, they were considered to be a good arena for her expansive activity. Her expansion was conceived also in terms of protecting her weaker neighbors against Western powers, an idea which was a psychologically comfortable, though perfectly self-centered, justification for Japanese expansive
activity. The coexistence of the weak East and the strong West in the Japanese mind was only made possible by the Japanese defensive-cum-expansive roles: defensive vis-a-vis the West and expansive vis-a-vis the East.\(^\text{17}\) The 1874 expedition to Taiwan\(^\text{18}\) and the 1875 bombardment of Korea and the subsequent 1881 and 1884 Japanese interferences in Korean politics\(^\text{19}\) were conducted as if Japan were learning Western conduct which had been directed against Japan only a decade or two before. These actions were either skillfully coordinated with domestic power struggles among the Meiji rulers\(^\text{20}\) or shrewdly manipulated to distract the anti-government forces to expansion, often using them as a 'spearhead' of Japanese imperialism.\(^\text{21}\) Driven by fear of dependence, Japan was to become a pupil turned teacher of imperialism.

The second theme is the illusory transformation of Pyrrhic victories into great victories of willpower. Heroic efforts for 'fukoku kyohei' (a rich nation and a strong army) enabled her to win two wars successively, one over China\(^\text{22}\) and the other over Russia,\(^\text{23}\) which were wars considered to be models for later generations. They were models in the sense that they produced victories and especially the latter war achieved victory against one of the Western powers which so long Japan had feared. In spite of swift war mobilization and shrewd conversion of victories on the battlefield into successful negotiation, greatly helped by the enemies' weaknesses and blunders, she was barely able to win these wars. These victories, especially the latter, were Pyrrhic at best. Her desperate efforts seemed to bear fruits at last. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war was perceived as \textit{rendre l'honneur à son}
maitre. She obtained diplomatic equality and began to be treated as a genuine power, though too often with an eye of contempt directed at a parvenu. Her expansive activities toward her neighbors were sometimes justified as 'the yellow man's burden,' which meant that Japan should act as the leader of the backward 'yellow men,' reacting against 'the white man's burden.' Just as Rudyard Kipling never gave a thought to 'colored people,' Tokutomi Soho, a well-known writer and the first to use 'the yellow man's burden,' never gave a thought to non-Japanese 'yellow men.' Like Western powers, Japan acted on the basis of self-congratulatory, self-glorifying and self-righteous beliefs.

What was equally important were the domestic effects of these Pyrrhic victories. Under the hasty nation building efforts, the Meiji state utilized these wars most shrewdly to achieve national mobilization for the support and execution of war. Political parties, theretofore largely anti-government, changed their position overnight into a more chauvinist one than even that of the government before and during the Sino-Japanese war. Populace was enthusiastic and patriotic. By 1900 the government succeeded in incorporating the largest opposition party, which was at the same time the largest party in the parliament, into the government side by setting up a new party with it. By the eve of the Russo-Japanese war there were almost no forces in the parliament opposing the government's war policy besides the more chauvinistic superhawks. However, the agitated and awakened populace came to expect too much of the government of a still militarily and economically weak Japan. However, her victories, though Pyrrhic,
were admirable for such a young country and were subsequently to be regarded as victories of Japanese willpower as the imperial state was solidified and its state ideology enforced and widely shared.\textsuperscript{32} When Japan acquired substantial power vis-a-vis the Western powers, she never failed to miss the opportunities to advance her interests and expansive activities in neighboring countries. So long as her eyes were fixed upon Western powers and so long as her aspirations were closer to or even superior to those of the West, her international activities were bound to grow despite occasional fluctuations. Yet the continuity of the Meiji leadership in the form of the genro politics was being lost. The younger rulers, less fearful of and less deterred by the Western menace, began to assert themselves more confidently, and what was more, each political actor began to assert himself without being aggregated into a coherent and consistent policy, when the genro's strong integrative function disappeared.\textsuperscript{33}

The third theme was the continuous frustration of the late comer's hasty expansive drives. When Japan lifted herself into the position of a middle power after the two successive wars, she was in no less difficulty than she had been before. Her defensive perimeters became perhaps too big for her. The pressures placed upon her by foreign powers as well as anti-imperialist forces were increasingly intense and threatening. Proportionate to these were Japan's frustration and irritation chronically bursting out whenever domestic difficulties went beyond the threshold of the political system's capacity to absorb stresses and strains.\textsuperscript{34} Since political parties became too much a part of the establishment, opposition forces continuously generated by rapid
economic and social changes were left to themselves.\textsuperscript{35} Their dissatisfactions were amplified by Japan’s international frustrations. The first big mass demonstrations and riots took place over the terms of the Portsmouth peace treaty in 1905,\textsuperscript{36} and similar dissatisfactions were disclosed about the treaties of Versailles and Washington in 1919 and 1922 respectively. World War I was conceived as ‘Heaven’s gift’ to Japan who could then take advantage of the power vacuum in the Far East and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{37} It looked to many Japanese as if the problems of the slow development of Manchuria as a Japanese colony and sphere of influence could now be solved once and for all.\textsuperscript{38} However, not only was there no solution but new problems were added. Most important was the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance\textsuperscript{39} and the Russo-Japanese entente\textsuperscript{40} which had provided the balance of power in East Asia. Second, nationalist anti-imperialism was intensified in China with Japan now the target.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, Soviet Russia and Wilsonian America expressed their hostility to the ever ‘power-political’ Japan.\textsuperscript{42} When the Washington conference worked out a \textit{modus vivendi} for \textit{les satis-fais}, Japan was willing to cooperate with the Western powers, given her diplomatic isolation and economic vulnerability.\textsuperscript{43}

The Chinese revolution of 1911,\textsuperscript{44} and particularly World War I\textsuperscript{45} and the Russian revolution\textsuperscript{46} of 1917 all seemed to provide opportunities for Japanese expansion. This meant among other things the military withdrawal of some or all of Western powers from the Far East and the Western Pacific and the resultant power vacuum which Japan could fill. Despite the British reluctance to let her do so, Japan sent a navy as
far as to the Mediterranean and took all the territories then under German control in the Far East and the Pacific. Furthermore, Japan tried to take substantial control of Yuan Shih-k'ai's government by her notorious 21 demands, which highlighted Japan as a major enemy of China and brought about the partial failure of her attempt. Japan repeated the same pattern in the Siberian intervention as in the Boxer intervention, the Chinese revolution of 1911 and World War I. However, Japan took heavy losses in the muddle-like intervention in the Russian revolution, although the losses were not serious enough to unlearn the paradigm already believed to have been tested. World War I had little effect on Japanese perspectives of foreign affairs except to provide an opportunity to advance her interests and influence. Yet all the seeming advancement of Japanese influence in the early 20th century was in fact ephemeral and fragile at best. Russia was bolshevised after all. China was in flux as before and not only Japan but also other foreign powers were often vexed with the political instability and unpredictability of China. Besides, Japan was ambivalent toward the 1911 revolution and when there was ambivalence and incoordination, there was no definite action.

In the Washington conference Japān was assured of much of what she had obtained by force. However, the absolute necessity to cooperate with Britain and the US on such matters as trade and naval competition became the restrictive force against advancement of Japanese interests on the Continent. Given her weak industrial development, the absolute lack of mineral resources and her enormous dependence upon trade with the US and Britain, maintaining economic ties with the US and Britain
was absolutely crucial to Japan. This was particularly so when business slowed down after the war and potential spheres for expansion shrank. Japan accomplished nothing whatsoever by the Siberian expedition. At the end of the Washington conference, it looked as if Japan would seek thereafter a policy of economic cooperation with the US and Britain with less strategic orientation toward the Asian continent. Underlying the seeming cooperative policy of Japan to the system of Versailles and Washington and the League of Nations was a feeling of uneasiness which was exemplified by the comment made by Baron Shidehara, an architect of Japan's 'peaceful' and 'cooperative' diplomacy in the 1920's. He felt that Woodrow Wilson's scheme was "an extremely annoying thing for Japan." Despite all the Japanese efforts to secure the Japanese interests in Manchuria against Chinese anti-imperialism, Chinese reaction came quickly and in a great tide. After having wavered for a while whether to be patient or not, Japan swiftly resorted to her 'good old' policy of handling international conflicts: she took swift action, if not well-prepared, against Chinese nationalism—a totally mobilized nationalism with an emotional upsurge. Japan's low-key policy during the early and mid-1920's precipitated the accumulated dissatisfaction of socially disgruntled elements. When, in addition to the perceived injustices of the Western powers toward Japan, Chinese anti-imperialist attacks were directed against Japan, frustration, irritation and calls for intervention swept Japan to save the 'sacred imperial vested interests in Manchuria' before Chinese nationalist assaults reached there. When the World Depression hit the Japanese economy as well as other capitalist econo-
ties, when Chinese anti-imperialism mounted its attack on Japan and when national defense was felt threatened by the Soviet military emergence in the Far East in the mid-1930's and by the naval limitations at the London Naval Disarmament Conference, Japan reacted with extreme frustration and anxiety. Impulsive drives toward unilateral violent action in defiance of the Anglo-American powers and the Washington system became obsessive with the Japanese.

Some of the conditions under which the paradigm had been developed were disappearing or had already disappeared. First of all, the more or less restricted competitive game of the classical imperialist powers had gone. Absorbed in unprecedented economic difficulties and related domestic problems, all the powers were simply too egotistical and self-assertive to attempt even modest conciliation and restraint of any kind among themselves. Second, anti-imperialist nationalism was total; it was impossible to make a 'dirty compromise', so prevalent in the classical balance of power game, with emotionally driven and mobilized nationalist forces, as long as Japan clung to her vested interests in Manchuria. Third, third parties' cooperation, tolerance or understanding had already gone. Britain was not an ally any more, nor was Russia. The US was becoming conscious of Japan's hidden hostility just as Japan was coming to recognize American hostility.

The fourth theme was Japan's suicidal plunge into perceived pincer attacks by anti-imperialist forces and by other imperialist powers. When her ambition was continually halted and frustrated, and when national security was felt jeopardized, Japan's reaction was unilateral violent action to correct the perceived unjust status quo. Japan felt more
and more her isolation and thus the need for independent action as well as inner resistance thereto. She perceived the situation as if the bakumatsu (mid 1850—mid 1860) had come back again. It was the revival of the syndrome of 'repelling barbarians.' All the Western powers looked hostile to her, and what was worse, China was 'awakened.' To her it was like 'ssu-mien Ch'u-ke,' or enemies everywhere. Under increasing political, social and economic problems in Japan in the 1920's, with the ineffectual political parties unable to solve most of them, the people wanted a psychological outlet just as in the 1870's and 1880's ex-samurai wanted outlets. Political parties were never able to function as solid independent political forces able to articulate and aggregate social interests. They were dependent upon local notables for election, upon genro for forming a cabinet, and upon bureaucracy for policy planning and execution. Furthermore, political parties had never been able to produce competent and able politicians in their half-century history. Surrounded by hostility, Japan's economic expansion hampered by world depression and regional bloc formation, encouraged by the successes of unilateral military actions in Manchuria, first by the Soviets and then by the Japanese themselves, and in Central and Eastern Europe by the Germans, Japan plunged into what was to become a colossal quagmire. Her intention was to create faits accomplis of her own to which foreign powers should succumb and then observe, just as Japan had been compelled to with respect to Western counterparts. In Prince Konoe's words: "The empire believes firmly that foreign powers will conform themselves
to the new situation in East Asia." As Marius Jansen put it, "...definitions of security against the West were reversed upward in line with Japan's capacities." The fact that Japanese action in 1931-1933 did not draw severe military resistance and opposition from Western powers, the Soviets and the Chinese was in fact a partial reconfirmation of her successes along the 'good old' line and pointed to the future course Japan would take for the establishment of her autonomy. The 1931-1933 action was really a repetition of swift, well-prepared military action although it was undertaken under very different circumstances. The subsequent heavy involvement in the China war and the final confrontation against the US and Britain each proved that the outlet was in fact the road to a total disaster.

What was intended to be a grand alliance plan resulted in fatal gamble diplomacy which in World War II tied Japan to Germany and Italy and thus antagonized Britain, the US and the USSR. What was intended to be a bluff military action to 'chastize and rejuvenate' the Chinese resulted in a protracted war of attrition, "chasing after dogs [China] in front while being apprehensive of wolves [USSR] in the rear." What was intended to be a safe step for 'national self-sufficiency' only prompted a showdown with the US. When these became more and more obvious, what remained was the hollowness of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Area' without sufficient power bases to wage war against all the allied powers. The long-held principle of the search for diplomatic support had been neglected in practice, whereas it had been counted upon in planning as if it would be given from Heaven without making
serious effort. The detached understanding of the two wars around the turn of the 20th century as being Pyrrhic victories was lost in its entirety by a fossilized illusion of Japanese willpower. When perplexed by complicated international developments like the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, she only fell back and said that she would pursue an independent foreign policy "based on morality and irrespective of the international situations." 84 Unable to disengage herself from her heavy psychological investment in China and given a Hobson's choice by the US, Japan resorted to force. 85 'Suicidal plunge to find a way out' was the only feasible and honorable response that could be chosen by a proud middle power whose high aspirations were largely frustrated and blocked by no less self-assertive and egotistical other powers who had been preoccupied with unprecedented economic and related problems. As General Tojo put it, "Sometimes man has to jump with his eyes closed, from the temple of Kiyomizu into the ravine below." Or as Admiral Nagano put it, "Even if there is a war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a nation which does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is already a doomed country. Only if we fight to the last soldier will it be possible to find a way out of this situation." 86 The war declaration tellingly summarized the long pent-up grievances and hostilities against the Anglo-American powers. The China war was indeed aufgehoben into the Greater East Asian War in the Japanese mind. The war became an anti-white crusade, which deprived them of the ambiguities and sense of guilt associated with the objectless, drawn-out war in China. 87 But it was a suicidal
crusade from the very beginning—indeed, it was national suicide.

Having completed the delineation of the models and scripts, we will now turn to the twenty-two case studies.
Part II

It takes quite a lack of humor to build an empire. Once an empire is built, humor is bound to develop. People learn to laugh with other people, and eventually they also learn to laugh at themselves.

Table 1: summary of twenty-two cases

1. **Manchu-Korean wars of 1619-1637**: The Ming Chinese forces, together with the reluctant Korean forces, went to punish the emerging Manchus, who in turn completely defeated the former. Later the Manchus invaded Korea twice to secure Korean compliance and a food supply through trade. The wars formed an important part of Manchu imperial development before the conquest of China.

2. **Ch'ing-Russian war of 1685-1689**: The Russian cossacks' colonization in Amuria provoked the Manchus, who turned to Amuria after the long pacification war in China in order to repel the Russians. The war ended with a Ch'ing victory although peace terms were generous, reflecting the Ch'ing's concern for a more serious enemy, the Jungar Mongols.

3. **Ch'ing-Jungar wars of 1755-1759**: The Ch'ing intervened in the internal strifes of the Jungar empire and conquered the Jungar empire. By this war of conquest, the Ch'ing acquired the largest territory of the historic Chinese empires.

4. **Ch'ing-Burmese war of 1766-1769**: Burma's deep intrusion into the Shan states for the preparation for the Burmese-Siamese war provoked the Ch'ing, who in turn invaded Burma four times, all unsuccessfully. The war ended in total disaster to the Ch'ing.

5. **Ch'ing-Vietnamese war of 1788-1789**: The Ch'ing unsuccessfully intervened in the civil war in Vietnam on the side of the Imperial Le forces. Like the Burma war, the Vietnam war ended in total disaster to the Ch'ing.

6. **British abortive mission to the Ch'ing of 1792-1793**: Growing trade with the seclusionist Ch'ing empire led Britain to send an embassy to negotiate on the opening of Ch'ing. Although the embassy was able to meet the emperor, its demand was categorically rejected. The event was the beginning of Western expansion in the Far East in the 19th century, however.

7. **Anglo-Nepali war of 1814-1816**: Nepal and the East India Company in Bengal collided in their expansion toward North India. After some extremely difficult battles, Britain won. Although Nepal pleaded for assistance from the Ch'ing as the latter's tributary country, the Ch'ing could, would, and did take no action. The event was the beginning of the dismemberment of the traditional Chinese world order.
Table 1: summary of twenty-two cases (continued)

8. **Opium war of 1839-1842**: Increasing opium trade caused extraordinary apprehension of the Ch'ing, which took strict regulatory actions. Britain took this occasion to impose the treaties and her will upon the Ch'ing. The Ch'ing suffered from the humiliating and devastating defeat.

9. **Arrow wars of 1856-1860**: The treaties forced on the Ch'ing by Western powers were not observed 'faithfully' by the Ch'ing. Britain and France took joint action to force their will on Ch'ing. The Ch'ing empire redirected her policy because of this devastating and humiliating defeat.

10. **Taiping intervention of 1862-1864**: The Taiping rebellion menaced Shanghai, the main port for British trade. Britain approved an 'informal' intervention in the campaign to suppress the rebellion, providing men and arms. This intervention signaled the coming of Sino-British co-existence in major coastal cities.

11. **Choshu-Western war of 1863-1864**: The anti-foreign Choshu han bombarded Western ships, precipitating a joint Western bombardment of the Choshu han. This naval action shattered all the anti-foreign political forces in Japan and geared the Japanese course toward opening the country and developing reform and modernization for 'a rich country and a strong army'.

12. **Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea of 1875-1876**: The anti-foreign Korea was forced to conclude a treaty with Japan because of the latter's gunboat coercion. The event signaled Japan's entry into Far Eastern power politics.

13. **First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895**: The peasant rebellion in Korea forced the Korean government to ask for assistance from the Ch'ing, which brought about Japanese counteraction. Japan attacked China and won. The unexpected victory and emergence of Japan caused the tripartite intervention to force Japan to return the Liaotung peninsula which Japan had taken from China. The tripartite intervention reinforced Japan's will to power. The defeat of China signaled the bankruptcy of the self-strengtheners and caused a subsequent scramble for concessions.

14. **Boxer intervention of 1900-1901**: The Boxer rebellion was a menace to the foreigners in Peking. The joint interventionist forces imposed their power and will and took indemnity from China. This event disclosed the bankruptcy of China's militant conservatism and paved the way for both reactionaries' reform and revolutionary nationalism.
Table 1: Summary of twenty-two cases (continued)

15. Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905: After the Boxer intervention Russia stayed in Manchuria. Russian rejection of Japan's demand that Russia withdraw from Manchuria and accept Japan's special position in Korea led Japan to attack Russia. The unexpected but costly victory of Japan brought about special interests in Manchuria which were to have an extraordinary influence on Japan's international course.

16. Japan's twenty-two demands toward China of 1915: Japan tried to take advantage of the power vacuum in the Far East created by World War I to force China into a status similar to a protectorate. Japan's attempt partially failed because of China's skillful maneuvering and British opposition. The event also signaled the growing Chinese anti-imperialism.

17. Siberian intervention of 1918-1925: The October Revolution of Russia created a power vacuum in the vast territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Japan intervened to fill the vacuum. However, Bolshevik influences gradually penetrated, and Japan had to withdraw after the long and costly involvement with no gains.

18. Washington conference of 1921-1922: Post-World War I arrangements in the Far East and the Pacific were made with respect to naval disarmament, China, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Naval disarmament brought about the parity of Britain with the US and the local supremacy of Japan in the Western Pacific. China's interests were largely neglected. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated. Although the conference reflected the spirit of cooperation among powers, uneasiness remained strong among the Japanese.

19. Foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution of 1926-1928: During the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition, foreigners were threatened by anti-imperialist actions, against which imperialists intervened. Britain intervened most hastily among imperialists: powers and Japan was more restrained during the First Northern Expedition. During the Second Northern Expedition the positions were reversed. Japan became the prime target of Chinese anti-imperialism.
Table 1: summary of twenty-two cases (continued)

20. **Japan's conquest of Manchuria of 1931-1933:** Japan's Kwantung Army took action to conquer Manchuria to prevent Chinese anti-imperialist influences from further penetrating into Manchuria and jeopardizing Japan's special interests there. The action was so well calculated and executed that no organized resistance came from the Chinese and no protests with any bite came from Western powers, including the Soviets. However, the success was to drive Japan further into China proper.

21. **Second Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945:** The gradual incorporation of North China under Japanese control after 1931 inflamed anti-Japanese actions, and a small skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge developed into a major war. Japan's control of vast territories during the initial two years did not bring about the Chinese surrender. A stalemate ensued and communists increased their influence in the territories under Japanese military control.

22. **Pacific war of 1941-1945:** German control of the European continent encouraged Japan to take advantage of the situation and prepare herself for a coming war with the US. Japan's move to Indochina aggravated the economic embargo by the US, Britain and the Netherlands. Having refused to make a total withdrawal from China, which the US demanded, Japan resorted to all-out war against the allied countries. Despite her initial dazzling victories, Japan was finally destroyed to ashes.
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*Parentheses indicate that, although the parenthesized actor was important, they are only partially included in our description and analysis without a separate heading in a case study.*
Chapter 6: Manchu-Korean wars of 1619-1637

Introduction

In the 16th century Ming China and Yi Korea were continuously plagued by northern and eastern 'barbarians,' i.e., Mongols and Japanese.¹ The Ming's policy toward the Mongols was never successful so that the Ming had to spend an enormous amount of money for defense against the Mongols. In coastal areas Ming was plagued by Japanese pirates who forced the Ming to take the policy of a large scale evacuation of people from coastal areas. The Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592-1598 dealt severe blows both to Yi Korea, whose land was devastated, and to Ming China, whose heavy military expenses for the wars exacerbated their financial situations and only prompted the dynastic decay. What was more important, the Manchus in the rear of Korea asserted themselves vigorously when Ming and Yi were preoccupied with the Japanese.²

The Manchu tribe of Chien-chou successfully unified other Manchu tribes and became an enormous force, benefitting largely from the lucrative Manchu-Chinese trade.³ However, the trade was made difficult by the change of the policy toward the Manchus by the Ming. Nurhachi, the head of the expanding Manchus, continued to expand his influence thereafter, however. In 1616 he declared the establishment of the Later Chin dynasty. Basing themselves upon the trade for livelihood, profit and expansion, the Manchus were forced either to shrink and be

Notes to chapter 6 appear on pages 555-556.
confined to small places or to fight back and expand. The latter was chosen. In 1619, the outnumbering forces of the Ming and the loyal but reluctant Yi were dealt a devastating defeat by the Manchus. It was largely due to the shrewd and courageous commandanship of Nurhachi and the bad coordination of the Ming–Yi forces. However, Nurhachi's expansive drive was halted later by the Ming forces' use of heavy artillery. Ming's economic blockade became strong and strict so that the Manchus had to find a way out for food. The Manchus proceeded to force Korea to become a supplier of food. This was in 1627. The war was a totally one-sided victory for the Manchus. Yet the defeat of the Manchus dealt by the Ming forces after the Manchu–Korean war of 1627 led them to go in a different direction. After subjugating the Chahar Mongols in 1634, the Manchus set up a sinicized, military-bureaucratic state in 1636, consisting of the Manchus, Mongols and Chinese. In this year the Manchus found the Koreans disloyal and invaded again to subjugate them. The war of 1636–1637 completed the pacification of all the neighbors, i.e., the other Manchu tribes, the Koreans, the Chahar Mongols and the Chinese in southern Manchuria. Thus the Manchu–Korean wars played an important part in the history of the Manchus' initial imperial development.
Manchus: Power Bases

The Ming set up military garrisons called wei in Manchuria to exert their control over the Manchus. This was due in part to the necessity to cope with the problem of serious depopulation of the Manchus caused by the Mongols, who were very expansive throughout the 16th century against the Manchus as well as the Chinese. Alongside of the wei system, the Ming tried to secure the loyalty of individual Manchu chieftans by providing positions and authorization cards for the lucrative Manchu-Chinese trade. This was part of the Ming's policy of divide-and-rule to prevent the Manchus from becoming unified and thus threatening to the Ming.

However, two factors contributed to the erosion of this system. There was continuous fighting between the Mongols and the Manchus and among the Manchus, which caused continuous large scale migration. During the Ming period there were mainly three Manchu groups, i.e., the Hai-hsi, the Chien-chou and the Yeh-jen. The Yeh-jen lived in the north, the Hai-hsi in the south next door to the Mongols and the Chien-chou in the south right next door to Korea. The most important reason the Chien-chou moved farther south was the heavy pressure exerted by the Yeh-jen who were forced to move down by the Mongol expansion. The Chien-chou conquered the Han Chinese and the Hai-hsi in southern Manchuria and thus became a strong force well beyond the control of the Ming in this area. Second, the incorporation of the Han Chinese transformed the Manchu society and institutions. Above all, the transformation of a largely hunting, fishing and collecting society
into a more agriculturally oriented society increased class cleavage. The distinction between the rich and the poor and between the powerful and the powerless increased enormously. The concentration of power was the inevitable consequence of this process. This trend was strengthened by the concentration of the Ming's authorization cards for the Manchu-Chinese trade. Ming was obliged to rely upon strong Manchu chieftains to deal with the Manchus, discarding the old divide-and-rule policy. Thus, fighting, migration and power concentration nullified the Ming system of controlling the Manchus. Not only were the Manchus able to liberate themselves from the yoke of the Chinese, but they were also able to strengthen their power by absorbing the advanced Chinese civilization, its technology and institutions. After the turn of the 16th century, the Manchu society gradually absorbed the elements of the sinicized military-bureaucratic state. Especially after the victory in 1619 over the Ming-Yi forces, the Manchu state was gradually organized into a militarily-oriented, sini-bureaucratized state comprising, though without much integration, the Manchu clan groups and subsequently the subjugated Mongol vassals as well as the Chinese. The clan-oriented Manchu system for decision making persisted tenaciously well until early 18th century. The selection and power of the head of the Manchu state was based upon the consent of each clan's head. Special care was often taken in selecting clans' forces so that a commander could get allegiance and loyalty from them without causing trouble.

Having been forced to move to other areas because of invasion and penetration by other powers, the Manchus were successful in capitalizing
on situations in which they found themselves both by force of desperation and by ingenuity. In the 1619 war the Manchu state mobilized all its forces of 60,000 against the combined Ming-Yi forces of 95,600. The Manchus' swift growth was quite impressive. Being militarily organized from the very beginning, the Manchus were able to enjoy an extremely high combatant-noncombatant ratio. The strength of the Manchus becomes more impressive when we consider the fact that the Chinese and Korean forces had a monopoly of artillery and guns at least by the time of the 1619 war and thus were superior in terms of military technology. Even shrewd commandery and agility and courage of soldiers could not help the Manchus to overcome this technological superiority unless the enemy was extremely uncoordinated and disunited.

The gradual incorporation and absorption of Han Chinese technicians, generals and soldiers enabled the Manchu forces to arm themselves with artillery and guns, which would favor the Manchu forces over the Jungar Mongol forces in the late 17th century. The basic strength of the Manchu state lay, however, in its own constant expansion, which allowed continuing rewards to its subjects, including the Mongols and the Chinese in particular. Without the continuing expansion, the Chinese generals, officials and gentry were never satisfied. The Manchus' decision to expand continuously was in part a response to the demand of the Chinese in the Manchu state to get more opportunities in China.
Korea: Power Bases

The aristocratic government consisting of the court and nobles during the Koryo period was replaced by the bureaucratic government of the Yi period. The Yi dynasty based its power originally upon the support of the disgruntled officials who had had little power during the Koryo period. *Pari passu* with the increased officials' influence in the Yi Korea, Confucianism became dominant replacing the strong influence of Buddhism during the Koryo period. Local private educational institutions of Confucian persuasion were developed to enable candidates to pass Chinese-style civil service examinations. Since land allocation and acquisition were largely dependent upon office holding in the central government, many aspirants tried to enter the central government offices through civil service examinations with heavy reliance upon political patronage and lineage. Local private educational institutions were the centers of party factions which competed and fought fierce factional struggles for the offices. The fierceness of factional struggles was such that major members of a faction were completely wiped out and replaced by other faction members once a struggle was over. It also involved the position of the throne. They fought for offices and the accompanying land and tax. The number of applicants increased out of proportion to available offices and arable land. What was worse, many from other classes sought after the *yangban* class status and offices by virtue of wealth, violating the rules against inter-class mobility. In short, factional struggles over land and office grew extremely intense and fierce.
The land controlled by the state decreased along with the increase of privately owned land.\textsuperscript{14} Especially after the loss of tax registers due to foreign invasions, the king's control of state land diminished greatly and the power of the king became increasingly unstable. Because of the loss of government records including registers and census records due to foreign invasions, the state budget shrank drastically. The king became a pawn of a winning faction in the central government. The calamities wrought by foreign invasions in the late 16th century and the early 17th century only intensified factional struggles. Foreign affairs became a critical issue for factional struggles. Besides the king's decreasing hold over land, military power was increasingly monopolized by the Board of Border Affairs often beyond the control of the king. This was in part because of the continuing importance of the military in dealing with the Manchus in northern borders. However, since the military yangban also was involved in factional struggles, and since military forces were often used as a means of effecting a factional coup against another, their fighting capacity was greatly diminished.
Manchus: Power Perspectives

The war of 1619 was the result of Nurhachi's choice for a desperate breakthrough rather than succumbing to the economic blockage and other anti-Nurhachi policies enacted in 1608 by the Ming who had been alarmed by the increasing power of Nurhachi. As if he were waging a war for feeding another war, he continued to expand in neighboring areas and in 1616 he enthroned himself as the emperor of the Later Ch'in dynasty. However, because of the Ming's economic blockade, the Manchus could neither sell furs and ginseng nor buy daily foods. They resorted to frequent raids across the China passes which marked the border. The Ming launched a big campaign to punish the Manchus in 1619. The Ming's force amounted to 85,600 and the Yi Korean force amounted to 10,000. The Manchu forces amounted to 60,000. More than 46,000 Chinese were killed and the entire Korean forces surrendered whereas only 2,000 Manchus were killed. This was largely due to extremely bad coordination among the Ming-Yi forces and the shrewd and courageous commandship of Nurhachi. The Ming forces were dealt a death blow one by one by the agile Manchu forces, and the Korean forces wisely surrendered en bloc. The Ming-Yi forces' possession of artillery and guns did not favor them very much in the 1619 war. After the victory, the Manchus occupied the arable land east of the Liao river. However, the continued economic blockade posed an increasing problem to the expanding Manchus.

After Nurhachi's death in 1626, Abahai was elected emperor by the beile (princes). In 1627, taking advantage of factional struggles in Korea, Abahai invaded Korea to force the Korean government to open
trade markets periodically along the border. Also a small island off northwest Korea, which was used for the Ming's anti-Manchu base, was pacified and transformed into a base for the contraband trade which mediated goods between the Chinese, the Koreans and the Manchus. Although the Manchus surrounded Peking by force and proposed that the Ming emperor dissolve the economic blockade at Shanhaikwan in 1629, the latter refused. Thus the Manchus had to proceed in a different direction. They went to the west in 1634. They conquered the Chahar Mongols, the direct descendents of Genghis Khan, and further forced the Ming forces at the Mongol-Ming border to open the trade market. After subjugating the whole of Inner Mongolia and after accepting the surrenders of many Ming generals and soldiers, Abahai enthroned himself as the emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1636. The state was composed of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese. Aside from its Chinese bureaucratic organization, the state was in perfect accordance with the Manchu system of clan federation. In the same year of 1636, Abahai demanded that Korea recognize the Ch'ing dynasty. The latter refused, remaining loyal to the Ming dynasty. The Ch'ing invaded Korea and forced the Koreans to sever their relationship with the Ming and to establish a tributary relationship with the Ch'ing. For the Manchus the wars of 1619, 1627 and 1637 were largely to secure a food supply for the continually expanding population after the Ming's economic blockade against the Manchus. Because of its geographical proximity, its loyalty to the Ming, and its agricultural products, Korea was an easy target for the Manchu's invasion. The evolution of the Manchus' world views should be noted here. Nurhachi's rise
to power among the Manchus was dependent on the profits derived from the trade with the Chinese. Thus his demand was always to open the trade markets on the borders. Perhaps he never dreamt that the Manchu state would later become the sole center of the East Asian world, dominating all others and forcing them into a tributary relationship. Abahai's peace terms with Korea in 1627 did not forbid Korea from keeping its relationship with the Ming at all, which would only lessen the number of trade routes. Only after Yi Korea's neutral policy swung back again to a pro-Ming policy was Korea forced to sever the relationship with the Ming. Even after 1636, the Ch'ing attempted, though without success, to achieve peace with the Ming so that the trade relationship would be restored. The radical transformation was to come when the Ch'ing took over China proclaiming that the Ch'ing was the dynasty which punished the bandit forces headed by Li Tze-ch'eng, who had overthrown the Ming. A sinocentric world view had to be adopted for their rule.
Korea: Power Perspectives

The basic goal of Korea was the maintenance of independence with dignity. However, there are two other conspicuous perspectives. One was a strong pro-Ming and anti-Manchu attitude. The other was intense factional considerations which often overrode national considerations. As a small country, Korea could not afford a full-fledged independent foreign policy. Only when Korea 'served the larger' (sadae), was she assured her 'independence.' This mentality of sadae was further strengthened at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1592-1598. The Ming came to rescue Korea. Confucianized Yi Korea's pro-Ming attitude was reinforced. When the Ming demanded that Korea provide her forces for the anti-Manchu campaign of 1619, Korea sent her forces amounting to 10,000. However, as soon as the Ming forces were dealt a devastating blow at Sarfu, the Korean forces surrendered without further fighting against the Manchus, promising them to take a neutral policy thereafter. King Kwanghaegun, the architect of this surrender policy, was apprehensive of a possibility that the Korean forces sent for the anti-Manchu campaign would be used for a political coup d'etat. He had in mind what had happened in 1388-1392 when a military commander, instead of going to Manchuria to fight against the Ming forces, went back, took power and established the new Yi dynasty. King Kwanghaegun and the Board for Border Affairs, which took command of military forces, clashed over whether to send Korean forces in response to the Ming's request. Although the latter's view prevailed and the forces were sent, General Kang wisely surrendered, witnessing the Ming's devastating
defeat. Kwanghaegun's policy was, however, terminated in 1623 by an 
abrupt coup d'etat by the westerner faction against the northerner 
faction which had been supporting King Kwanghaegun. The westerner faction 
appealed to pro-Ming sentiments in order to attack the northerner faction. 
Once in power the westerner faction found itself unable to change its 
outright pro-Ming policy, even under the military threat of the Manchus 
without any prospect of the Ming's assistance. That would simply 
jeopardize the whole faction's destiny. Overridden by factional con-
siderations, the policy thus became extremely rigid and dogmatic. The 
victory of one faction over the other meant the former's political 
survival/revival and the latter's political death. The Manchu invasion 
of 1627 was invited and guided by Korean generals opposing and revenge-
ful toward the westerner faction. It was a humiliating defeat, although 
the peace terms were mild, reflecting the Manchus' need for a food 
supply from Korea. The passive resistance of the Koreans to the Man-
chus followed after 1627, and in 1637 Korea was again forced to defeat 
and humiliation. What was striking in the Korean debate between 
the war party and the peace party before the 1637 war was the almost 
singleminded emphasis on loyalty and dignity. Almost no attention 
was paid to the probable consequences of their choices. The assertions 
of the war party were particularly filled with emotional and substance-
less words. Seen from the Korean side, these defeats and a subsequently 
nourished sense of humiliation constituted the foundation of the Man-
chu-Korean relations from the very beginning. A sense of humiliation 
and disgrace was always suppressed by the simple fact of impotence
thereafter. In 1637 a prince of the Korean royal family was brought to Mukden as a captive for quite a while. He later became King Hyojong and planned to fight against the Manchus, strengthening the Korean forces with many guns in the mid-17th century. Revenge against the Manchus was never realised, however. On the contrary, his newly armed forces, prepared for anti-Manchu purposes, were used by the Manchus for their campaigns against the Russians in the 1650's.26
Summary: Manchu-Korean wars of 1619-1637

This chapter has tried to show: 1) that the Manchus developed the Manchu state out of continuous difficulties in fighting and migration while benefitting from the trade with the Chinese and the absorption of Chinese agricultural and military technology and bureaucratic institutions; 2) that the Manchus' world view was not sino-centric at all before they conquered China; rather, their world view reflected the Manchu clan system in which each clan head had absolute control over each clan and only through the consent of each clan head did things work; 3) that without an ideological hang-up, naked military power dominated Manchu foreign relations; Manchu-Korean relations showed a decisive importance of military power, which would become the basis of the Ch'ing-Korean tributary relationship.
Chapter 7: Ch'ing-Russian war of 1685-1689

Introduction

There were three empires on the Asian continent in the late 17th century. The first was the Ch'ing empire, which conquered Ming China and its remnants by the early 1680's. The second was the Jungar Mongol empire, which lasted from the early 17th century to the mid-18th century and which covered what is now western Outer Mongolia, southwestern Siberia, northern Kazakhstan, and western Sinkiang.\(^1\) The third was the Russian empire which, spreading from a small prince state, reached the Pacific by the mid-17th century.\(^2\)

The Manchus were engaged in almost continuous fighting against the resistance and rebellions of the Ming and its remnants for the 40 years following their entrance into Peking in 1644. Besides this, the Jungar empire provided a great menace to the Ch'ing empire because of its continuous attempts to subjugate the Khalkha Mongols and Tibet.\(^3\) The threat came also from the Russians, who had set up their colonies in Amuria.\(^4\) The first clash between Russia and the Ch'ing took place as early as 1652 and 1658.\(^5\) Although the Russians were expelled from Amuria by the Manchus, they resettled in Albazin, now more heavily armed.\(^6\) When the Manchus turned their eyes to the north after the suppression of the rebellions in the south, they found the Russians had settled again. The K'ang-hsi emperor carefully planned and executed a policy whereby an enormous number of soldiers were mobilized

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Notes to chapter 7 appear on pages 556-558.
and sent to Amuria. The Manchu forces sieged Albazin, where the Russians had built a fortress, to force them to withdraw to Nerchinsk. However, the Russians came back again the next year and the Manchus attacked again using an overwhelming number of soliders and artillery forcing them to a negotiation. The competition over the Khalkha Mongols between the Ch'ing and the Jungars in the 1680's and 1690's was one of the most important factors leading the Ch'ing to the 1689 agreement with the Russians.\footnote{7} The treaty of Nerchinsk was an agreement of compromise. Despite the overwhelming forces of the Ch'ing, a far more serious problem lay ahead for them, that of the Jungars. Fourty years of adjustment led to the more clearly delineated treaty of Kyakhta which was to survive for more than a century.\footnote{8}
Russia: Power Bases

After the Tartar invasions most of the territories of Kievian Russia fell under the Tartars' control. In the north, however, Novgorod was out of reach of the Tartar invasions and it prospered as a commercial state in the Kievian tradition. However, the Muscovite state emerged later as a new commercial center and established the foundation of modern Russia. In the 16th century, the Muscovite state of Russia under Ivan IV ended the anarchy of the competing princely states under the appanage of the Tartars. Russia was becoming a centralized state of absolute rule with strong power retained by the boyar or a state service class. The Muscovite state had to face the Swedes who took control of the Baltic sea, which was indispensable for commercial development. Third, it had to face the Lithuanians and Poles who controlled Belorussia and Ukraine as well. Fourth, it had to face the Turks who supported the Crimean Tartars in the south. The small Muscovite state expanded first by defeating the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, thus freeing itself from the Tartar yoke. The Russians moved further east of the Urals, first destroying the Sibir khanate and initiating the Russian expansion to Siberia and the Far East.

There were several driving forces. First, there was the quest for security from the Tartars. Second, there was the search for furs which came to enjoy an extremely high demand in Europe and thus constituted a great financial source for the state which was in almost
chronic deficit due to a series of wars. The percentage of the state's revenue derived from furs was 4% in the late 16th century and 7-10% up to the 1690's. With a mercantilist spirit, the Muscovite state turned the profits from furs into gold and silver. While the European and Asian market for furs increased significantly since the 16th century, the rapid depletion of fur-bearing animals first in south Russia and then western Siberia led the Russians far into eastern Siberia and the Far East. Third, there was the adventurous quest for the settlement by the Cossacks in farming and hunting as well as performing military and administrative roles in their territorial frontiers. A voevoda, a military-administrative chief of each district, was the core of these roles. This does not mean that Russian colonial activities in Siberia and the Far East were always closely supported by the state. What often happened was that Russian colonialists, often outlaws, were far more aggressive and risk-taking than the government.

Although Russia had the big army and semi-regular forces of the Cossacks, the number of soliders in Siberia and the Far East was extremely small and they were isolated from each other. This was compensated for by the extensive use of guns and good organization. In the 1680's Russia was surrounded by such enemies as Swedes, Poles, Crimean Tartars, Turks and Kazakhs. In 1689 Russia was at peace with the Poles and was engaged in a war against the Crimean Tartars. Before 1689, Russia had had wars with the Poles, the Swedes and the Turks, and from 1689 until 1721 with the Turks and the Swedes. Thus,
because of these widespread war involvements, Russian power in Amuria was extremely limited. The extreme difficulty of communication and transportation precluded any possibility of reinforcement of forces for Amuria on a large scale.\textsuperscript{13} Struggles within the court diminished the control over colonialists in the frontiers. Russian power in Amuria was dependent upon the Cossacks in Amuria and its vicinity. There were only 400 to 800 Cossacks in Albazin in 1685 and 1686.\textsuperscript{14} However, their courage and morale were strong enough to hold the fortress, give the Manchus a tough time, and induce them to make mild peace terms.
Manchus: Power Bases

In 1644 an opportunity came to the Manchus to enter China: a Ming general stationed at Shanhaihwan invited them to suppress Li Tze-ch'eng, who had occupied and overthrown the Ming dynasty. Subsequently the Ch'ing conquered all of China. The crucial question in China was whether to get the support of the gentry-official class. The rebel force of Li Tze-ch'eng was unable to develop political and social institutions to stabilize areas it occupied and thus to get the support of the gentry-official class, due in part to the short time span within which the rebel force had to develop. Its support went over to the conqueror state by the Manchus who proclaimed that the Ch'ing punished the bandit force which had overthrown the Ming. The resistance and rebellions of the Ming remnants and ex-collaborators continued, however. It was not until in 1683 that the emperor saw peace in the entire empire. Unrest on the northern borders occasionally drew the emperor's attention, as in the 1650's against the Russians. However, the problems of the Mongols and the Russians had to be dealt with squarely and cautiously after the suppression of the rebellions within the empire.

What made the years of 1685 to 1697 difficult for the Ch'ing was that the problem of the Jungars and the Russians took place at the same time. The Jungar Mongol empire, the last nomadic empire in the world which lasted from the early 17th century to the mid-18th century, provided a great threat to the Ch'ing empire because of its continuous attempts to subjugate the Khalkha Mongols and Tibet.
Taking advantage of the inner strife between the princes of the Khalkhas, the Jungars intervened in the Khalkha affairs and conquered them in 1688. All the Khalkha Mongols fled to Inner Mongolia to seek Ch'ing's help and protection. Starting with the 1690 battle, the Ch'ing were to fight with the Jungars until the Ch'ing finally defeated and pushed back the Jungars from the Khalkha territory in 1697. Before the Jungars' invasion and complete victory in 1688, the Khalkhas wavered for a while between Russia and Ch'ing as a protector against the Jungars. However, the Ch'ing were shrewd enough to choose the appropriate moment to take up the matter. The Khalkhas' defeat by the Jungars enabled Ch'ing to subjugate the Khalkhas without exercising any force at all.

The wars against the Russians had to be fought by the Ch'ing when they had this far more difficult task. The problem of the Russians was not initially well understood by Ch'ing. The first clash with the Russians in the 1650's alerted the Manchus, who considered Manchuria as the sacred fatherland. However, the Manchus were so absorbed with the problem in China that they did not spare soldiers for Manchuria at that time. The empire was not firmly established. Many soldiers who had completed the suppression of the rebellions in the south by 1683 were retained in the event of possible unrests even thereafter. The percentage of soldiers allocated for the suppression of the rebellions was as big as 54% to 92%. Around 1689 the number of Manchu soldiers was 200,000–250,000. The number of soldiers deployed for the Russian campaigns ranged from
3,000 to 10,000.\textsuperscript{19} That is why the Koreans were forced to send their heavily armed soldiers for help in the 1650's.\textsuperscript{20} And that is why after the clashes in the 1650's the Manchus' defense against the Russians had not been well taken care of. In the 1680's the problems of the Jungars seemed extremely large to the Manchus' eyes. The problem of the Russians was threatening in conjunction with their possible alliance with the Jungars against the Ch'ing.

Besides the problems of loyalty among the Han Chinese, and the / Jungars and the Khalkhas and the Russians, there was the problem of Manchu factional struggles.\textsuperscript{21} The internal struggles among the Manchu princes over imperial succession were extremely intense during the K'ang-hsi reign. This was a problem derived from the contradiction between the Manchu and Chinese systems. In the Manchu system decisions were made according to consent by the heads of their constituent banners. However, in the Chinese system, a crown prince was nominated by the emperor himself. The factional struggle between the banners involved the entire bureaucracy. This greatly undermined the power of the K'ang-hsi emperor and the empire. The transition from the Manchu to the Chinese system caused tremendous problems during the early years.\textsuperscript{22}

There are three important factors that enabled the Ch'ing successfully to deal with the Russian problem. One was the K'ang-hsi emperor's shrewd and strong leadership. Had it not been for his leadership, the empire might not have been able to survive a series of serious problems and crises during his long reign. The second was
the overwhelming number of soldiers used for the Russian campaign. Effective use of boats, guns and artillery also helped their victory.\textsuperscript{23} The third was the generally high morale of soldiers used in the campaigns.
Russia: Power Perspectives

Seen from the viewpoint of the Romanov court, Russian policy in Siberia was based on the search for financial resources. Acquisition of new areas for the hunting of fur-bearing animals was one of the basic objectives of Russian Siberian policy. Of more immediate importance was the Cossacks' interests in Amuria. After the destruction of Albasin, their colony with a fortress, by the Manchu attacks in the 1650's, the Cossacks came back and rebuilt their fortress unobtrusively by the late 1660's. Although the Manchus noticed this fact, they were absorbed with the suppression of the rebellions and the Cossacks' presence was overlooked for a while. After the suppression of the rebellions in the south in 1683, the Manchus turned to the north. In 1685 when the Manchus attacked Albasin there were about 600 Cossacks. They were forced to withdraw to Nurchinsk by the attacks of the outnumbering Manchus' artillery. However, the Cossacks came back again. This was a local official's defiance against the order from Moscow. Their return was facilitated by the Manchu general's failure to conform to the K'ang-hsi emperor's order to destroy harvests. The Manchus attacked Albasin again in 1686. This time the number of the Cossacks was 826 in July. By November the number dropped drastically to 66 because of the Manchus' heavy artillery attack. However, they clung to the fortress in Albasin even in 1687. Meanwhile the negotiations were held in 1688 and finally the treaty of Nurchinsk was concluded in 1689. The negotiations were held with the Ch'ing's show of strength backed by a force of 10,000 in violation
of the prenegotiation understanding.\footnote{28}

The most important of the Russian perspectives was the Cossacks' obstinate attempt to hold Albazin. They even pushed their own policy against Moscow's orders to pull out of Albazin.\footnote{29} This was the pattern of the colonialists' tendency to push their own policy against Moscow and then later to obtain Moscow's \textit{post hoc} approval. This pattern shows the large degree of independence of Siberian colonialists. However, underlying all of Russian Siberian policy was the mercantilist assumption of state, state budget, tax, foreign trade and gold, intermingled with the age-old Russian tradition of state service. This mercantilist assumption enabled the Russians to have peace with the Manchus. Unlike the British of the 19th century who claimed the universality of free trade and international law, the Russians could conform themselves to cultural neutrality and limited contacts on the border.\footnote{30}
Manchus: Power Perspectives

There were several objectives. First, it was imperative to repel foreigners' access and penetration to the empire. Second, it was also imperative to preserve the fatherland of Manchuria. Besides its symbolic importance, Manchuria was important as a reservoir of soldiers and other personnel for imperial rule. Third, there was apprehension of a possible alliance of Russia with tribes in Amuria against the Manchus. Fourth, there was apprehension of a possible alliance of Russia with the Jungars, who were menacing the Khalkhas and thus indirectly the Manchus. The first three objectives were achieved by the 1685-1689 wars and the last was to be achieved by the 1688-1697 wars of the Manchus against the Jungars.

Perhaps most conspicuous of all the Manchus' behavior exhibited in the 1685-1689 wars and the preceding and paralleling negotiations was their frequent use of the show of force as a means of getting favorable terms. In 1685 the Manchus' initial show of force failed and fighting erupted. Also in 1688 the Manchus used a force of 10,000 for negotiation by strength. This was in blunt violation of the pre-negotiation understanding about the amount of force. With the far more serious problem of the Jungars remaining to be solved, the Manchus took the policy of "concession backed by military action". In the K'ang-hsi emperor's words, "Because their [the Russians'] nature was similar to that of animals, they could not be brought to terms unless both favor and awe were used in combination." It may be generalized that a show of force is one of the chevaux de bataille
of great powers who are often constrained by many commitments at home and abroad and thus unable to mobilize all the available resources efficiently and intensively. A show of force worked well in 1688–1689. It did not work at all later in 1766–1769 in Burma and in 1788–1789 in Vietnam.

No less important was the Manchus' concern about how to impress the Chinese with their ability and qualification as a great ruler by strictly following or by getting themselves oversocialized by Chinese rules and styles. This was especially true in the initial years of the Manchus in China. As Mancall put it, "Consideration for the opinion of the Chinese bureaucracy was undoubtedly the prime factor in Mala's [the Manchu negotiator's] insistence upon the preservation of correct ceremonial forms." Without the support of the Chinese bureaucracy, Manchu rule would be extremely difficult. Without being able to impress the Chinese mandarins by the Manchus' capacity to follow most Chinese rules and rituals and thus to show them the Manchus' qualification to rule China, the very foundation of their rule would be jeopardized. Perhaps by so doing the Manchus were also able to get rid of their psychological insecurity. However, this also had a pragmatic aspect, which was best exemplified by the Manchu negotiator, Mala's comment on their demand of kowtow and whatnot to the Russian negotiator, Malescu, who commented on the word "tribute". Mala noted: "We are well aware that your master is no subject of the Great Khan's; but time out of mind, our custom has been to speak and to write in that fashion — and that applies to
all countries of the world, nor can it be changed." The keen awareness of pragmatic considerations was salient during the early Ch'ing period. This would be lost gradually from the late mid-Ch'ing period onward, however.
Summary: Ch'ing-Russian war of 1685-1689

We have tried to show: 1) that the Ch'ing's cheval de bataille was seen in this war as a show of force at a time of mobilizational difficulty to avoid a large-scale prolonged involvement; 2) that the kind of mobilizational difficulty that they had in 1685-1689 was different from the one of the later period in that the latter was more deeply imbedded in the overloaded imperial system under enormous demographic and economic expansion; 3) that there was a Manchu effort to behave in a most Chinese-like manner to convince the Chinese bureaucracy of their qualification to rule China; and 4) that the Manchus remained, however, very pragmatic about Chinese rules and styles while following them.
Chapter 8: Ch'ing-Jungar war of 1755-1759

Introduction

Western Mongols, to which the Jungars belonged, moved to the steppe areas from the raiga areas sometime in the mid-Ming days. As was often the case with a primarily nomadic people, as distinguished from people who were half nomadic and half agricultural and hunting-based, they formed a very large group eventually leading to a large nomadic empire. The Jungar empire lasted for more than a century, from the early 17th century to the mid-18th century. The empire was the last empire of nomadic people in human history. The territory of the empire always changed but generally it centered around the Ili region. The empire invaded the Khalkha Mongols, Khoshud Mongols at Kokonor, Tibet, Kashgaria, Kazakhs and Russians at western Siberia. The empire reached its peak during the reign of Galdan in late 17th century. Trained as a Lamaist monk in Lhasa, Galdan attempted to conquer all of the Lamaist world. After the successful conquest of many parts of Central Asia, he turned his eye to the Khalkha Mongols. The conquest of the Khalkhas in 1688 induced the vigorous counterattack of the Ch'ing now as a protector of the Khalkhas. Ten years of fighting resulted in the K'ang-hsi emperor's victory. The Jungars were rolled back out of the Khalkha territory.

Notes to chapter 8 appear on pages 558-559.
However, succeeding emperors of the Jungars continued invasion and expansion. The agreement reached between the Ch'ing and the Jungars in 1737 defining the Altai mountains as the border stabilized their relationship for a while. Subsequently, the Jungars turned to the west. Galdan-Tseren invaded the Kazakhs and Russians. The Kazakhs sought the assistance of the Russians, who used this occasion as a means of gradually subjugating the Kazakhs. After the death of Galdan-Tseren, the Russians and the Jungars made peace. Peace was to be broken from within. First, there was a coup by which Dabachi was enthroned. Then, the new khan and his close ally of the coup, Amursana, fell into discord. The latter fled and sought Ch'ing assistance. The Ch'ing did not fail to take this golden opportunity to crush the Jungar empire. The internally torn empire was destroyed by the Ch'ing forces of 50,000 soldiers. Amursana was, however, dissatisfied with the Ch'ing's reward to him, which fell short of his ambition to succeed the entire Jungar empire. He abruptly rebelled against the Ch'ing in cooperation with a Khalkha Mongol general, Chingunjav, who, with Amursana, had fought in Jungaria and was dissatisfied with the Manchus' high-handed handling of the Khalkha Mongols. Before this conspiracy broke out, the Ch'ien-lung emperor heard of this and outmaneuvered them. The rebellion was not coordinated well and Chingunjav was killed in early 1757 and Amursana died of smallpox in 1757 in exile in Russia. The rebellion was crushed. However, the Uigurs who had been under the yoke of the Jungars rejected Ch'ing rule and the third Ch'ing campaign
was launched. The guerrillas were completely wiped out by 1759.9 The whole population of the Jungar empire, 600,000, was killed except those who fled to Russia, amounting to 30,000-40,00010. By these campaigns the Ch'ing controlled the largest territory among the historic Chinese empires, and this territory was to become the foundation of the present Chinese territory.
Jungars: Power Bases

There were three basic characteristics of the empire. First, the Jungar empire made full use of firearms which were captured from and made by the Russians and Swedes. Traditionally a steppe nomadic empire made use of taiga tribes in southern Siberia who produced furs and metals, including arms. Firearms strengthened the military power of the nomadic people, who traditionally used horses and the tactics of surprise attack followed by a disperse-and-destroy operation. This was one of the basic conditions for the expansion of a steppe nomadic empire. However, this condition came to be restricted due to the Russians' gradual control of the taiga tribes in southern Siberia. Second, the Jungar empire used non-nomadic peoples, the Turks and Altaics for agriculture, metals, fur, soldiers (mercenaries) and commerce. Without including peoples who were engaged in commerce and agriculture, the Jungar empire could not have been able to prosper on a large scale. However, unlike the time of Genghis Khan, the empire was sandwiched by the other two expansive empires, Romanov Russia and Ch'ing China. The adjacent areas became increasingly under the influence and control of either of these two empires. Especially, the control of trade by the Ch'ing empire in 1740 dealt a severe blow to the Jungar empire which had benefitted enormously from commerce. More important was the way the economy and organization were affected by having the agricultural population in the empire. The Jungar ruling class became dependent on the exploitation of the agricultural population. The gradual
transformation caused by the empire's increasing dependence upon the agricultural population diminished the dynamism of the Jungar empire. The agricultural population was increasingly alienated from the Jungar conquerors. Third, the Jungars had a strong centralized military organization. It had a force of 80,000–100,000. For survival, it needed incessant wars and expansion which provided constant benefits to soldiers and the population at large. So long as war and expansion continued, contenders for power appeared continuously and one of them dominated the rest. However, the empire was now tightly sandwiched by Russia and China. Without war and expansion, the empire stagnated with incessant internal strife dominating political life. The problem of factional struggles and the lack of unity became increasingly serious. Thus, although the Jungar empire prospered even after Galdan's defeat in 1697, the empire was losing its early dynamism. When the Ch'ing intervened in 1755, the conditions were almost ripe for imperial decay.
Ch'ing: Power Bases

After the suppression of the rebellions in the south by 1683 the Ch'ing empire expanded vigorously. Most basic to the territorial expansion was the societal surplus derived from the enormous economic expansion during the mid-Ch'ing period.\(^{16}\) The productivity of land in relation to labor was steadily growing with the continuous diffusion of agricultural techniques and of maize and sweet potato which could be grown in mountainous areas. Forced by famines or avoiding the increasing competition over land and heavy taxation, people migrated to areas formerly uninhabited or depopulated due to rebellions, suppressions, and famines. Because of the economic expansion and paralleling demographic expansion, and because of the widespread method of taxation on land, instead of on household, which had been predominant by the late Ming period,\(^{17}\) the imperial surplus became enormous. The imperial surplus was further increased by the tight finance during the Yung-cheng period.\(^{18}\) During the reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor it increased steadily despite the enormous amount of money spent for military campaigns. These economic and demographic expansions were the basis of the peace and prosperity during the mid-Ch'ing empire.

Internally, during the Yung-cheng period the most fundamental institutional transformation was accomplished after 1644.\(^{19}\) The Manchus' clan-oriented organizational principle which had plagued the preceding emperors so tenaciously was almost suppressed by the Yung-cheng emperor's ruthless and forceful methods. He virtually
eliminated all the potential contenders for power. The absolute position of the emperor vis-a-vis the Manchu princes, who had been peers with the emperor in the Manchu system was established by the Yung-cheng emperor. Furthermore, he set up the Grand Council (chun-chi ch'u) which directly belonged to the emperor without being bothered by vast bureaucratic channels. This was to counter the forces of the overwhelmingly skillful and powerful Chinese bureaucracy. Through a secret communication system and small scale decision making system, the emperor attempted to establish his absolute power vis-a-vis the influences of the Chinese bureaucracy and the Manchu clans. By these two measures taken in the Yung-cheng period, the foundation of the absolute power of the Ch'ing emperor was laid. Based on the economic surplus and the absolute power of the emperor, Ch'ien-lung enjoyed the height of the Ch'ing empire.

Externally, only the Jungars posed a menacing threat to the Ch'ing. This was especially true from the 1710's through the 1730's. The renewed expansive activity of the Jungars in Tibet and Mongolia kept the empire alert and prepared for hostilities. In 1717 the Jungars under Tsewang Rabdan exerted their control over Tibet. It was only in 1720 that the Ch'ing forces could oust the Jungars from Tibet and from the western part of Eastern Turkestan. Even thereafter the Jungars' continuous attempts to exert their influence made the Ch'ing control over these areas tenuous. In 1731 the Ch'ing undertook a large scale expedition to the Jungar empire now under the new khontaiji Galdan Tseren. Both had an extremely difficult time
until 1734 when an armistice agreement was reached. Because of the surplus accumulated in the imperial budget, the Ch'ien-lung emperor was extremely extravagant in expenses. This extravagance steadily diminished the imperial surplus during the Ch'ien-lung period until it became deficit by the early Chia-ch'ing period (1796-1820). 23 However, in the mid-18th century, the Ch'ing empire was at the height of its power and prestige. Perhaps the fact that most of the soldiers deployed for the campaigns were the Manchus and Mongols, who kept relatively distinctive and separate standings in the empire, helped to alleviate the kind of difficulties that would have to be coped with in later campaigns made in southern edges of the empire. These Jungar campaigns were to become the last Manchu campaigns by which the imperial territory was expanded. The empire was at its height of power in a geographical sense as well.
Jungars: Power Perspectives

The factional struggles centering around imperial succession dominated Jungar political life. The dynamism of the old Jungar empire was steadily being lost by its increasing dependence on agriculture and commerce with the conquered. The stagnation of imperial expansion and the restriction on commerce with the Ch'ing inevitably brought about intensified struggles to get more out of the diminishing pie. The intensity of factional struggles blinded Jungar rulers, who were to be completely outmaneuvered by the Ch'ing's determined policy of extermination. The three key actors, Lama Dorja, Dabachi and Amursana, successively appealed to the Ch'ing emperor for peace and friendship with the hope that the Ch'ing would accept their submission. First, Lama Dorja, frightened by the menace from Dabachi and Amursana, appealed to Peking in 1751 for peace and friendship, with no avail. This only gave Peking a better understanding of the weaknesses of the Jungar empire. In 1752 Dabachi and Amursana finally won over Lama Dorja, and Dabachi enthroned himself in 1752. When Amursana rebelled against Dabachi but was defeated and fled to Kazakhstan in 1754, Dabachi appealed to Peking for peace and friendship with the hope that the Ch'ing would not interfere. However, having received the counteracting appeal made by Amursana, the Ch'ing immediately intervened and crushed the Jungar forces headed by Dabachi. This was in 1755. Then, in 1755, Amursana rebelled against the Ch'ing, but was defeated and fled to Kazakhstan and then to Russia and died there. The persistent use of giving a sign of submission by appealing for peace and friendship was of no avail to the
Ch'ing who were determined to get rid of any potential menace of the Jungar empire. All the appeals were simply ignored. Ch'ing's acceptance of neighbors' submission was restricted to situations where the Ch'ing were not quite strong enough. 26
Ch'ing: Power Perspectives

The Ch'ing's objective was clear and consistent from the beginning. It was the fundamental solution for the northern problem of the historical Chinese empires. It was the extermination of the Jungar empire. The goal was serious because of the Jungar empire had been a real, menacing threat to the security of the Ch'ing empire with the possibility of the Jungar empire's alliance with and/or dominance over the vast crescent consisting of the Russians, the Tibetans, the Buryats, the Chahars, and the Tungus tribes in Amuria. From the mid-17th century onward, especially in the 1680's, 1690's, 1710's and 1730's, the Jungars posed real threats to the security of the Ch'ing empire. Taking into account that the Manchus had the real difficulty of suppressing the rebellions within the empire in the 1670's and 1680's and that the Jungars aspired to a Lamaist empire comprising the Tibetans and the Mongols even with an alliance with the Russians, it was no wonder that the Manchus feared the possibility of a Chinese rebellion and a Jungar invasion. This was exactly how the Manchus themselves conquered China.

Although the real threat decreased after 1734, the memory and institutions persisted. The Li-fan yuan, or the Barbarian Control Office, was devoted to the affairs covering the peoples in the crescent area. Because the Mongols were allies in conquering China and expanding the empire, the Manchus' attitude toward the Mongols, with the Jungars being the only important Mongols not under the Ch'ing's control, was different from the attitude toward the
Chinese or the barbarians in East and Southeast Asia. Also important was the Khalkhas' attitude toward the Jungars who had once completely conquered the Khalkhas and forced the latter to seek protection from the Ch'ing. The Khalkhas' enmity against the Jungars was used by the Manchus in the wars. Out of 200,000 soldiers\(^{28}\) deployed for the wars, one half were the Mongols including the Khalkhas. One of the Khalkha generals who defected and rebelled against the Ch'ing for being treated in a high-handed manner by the Manchus disclosed the Manchus' policy of "using barbarians against barbarians". The Ch'ing's persistent refusal to listen to various appeals to peace and friendship was quite consistent with their basic goal of taking this golden opportunity to solve the most perennial problem of the historic Chinese empires.
Summary: Ch'ing-Jungar war of 1755-1759

We have tried to show: 1) that the Ch'ing were exceptionally successful in exterminating China's historic northern enemy at the height of their power; 2) that Ch'ing's persistent rejection of the enemy's signs of submission in favor of total subjugation presented an important exception to her war style which was constrained profoundly by her extraordinarily limited capacity to mobilize.
Chapter 9: Ch'ing-Burmese war of 1766-1769

Introduction

Burma and its neighboring area consisted of different ethnic groups contending fiercely with each other.  
1 After the Mongol invasion of Pagan Burma in the 13th century the union of Upper and Lower Burma contended for hegemony for a long time.  
2 In the early 18th century the Toungoo dynasty (1600-1752) dominating from its base of Upper Burma, was plagued by invasions of the Shans and the Manipuris.  
Burman rebels in Lower Burma gave a chance for the Mons to rebel against the Burmans, and in 1752 the capital of Toungoo Burma, Ava, fell to the Mons.  
Soon after the fall of Ava, a new self-claimed ruler of Burmans in Upper Burma, Alaungpaya, emerged to force the Mons out of Upper Burma.  
3 He not only ousted the Mons from Upper Burma but also conquered the Mons in Lower Burma.  
The Mons began to flee to Siam.  
A local rebellion near the west Siamese border convinced Alaungpaya of the necessity to show the power and authority of the Burmans in Lower Burma where local dissidents sought Siamese assistance.  
4 In 1760 the war against Siam began.  
Before entering the walls of Ayudhya, the capital of Siam, Alaungpaya was wounded and their force retreated.  
The next war against Siam began in 1764 under Hsínbyúsíñ, Alaungpaya's second son.  
He took the strategy of attacking Ayudhya from both north and south.  
The Burman forces first entered the Shan and Lao states to subdue them and recruit them as soldiers.  
After subjugating Chiaení and Vien Chang in 1764, Hsínbyúsíñ reached and seiged Ayudhya in 1766.  
Ayudhya fell early

Notes to chapter 9 appear on pages 559-560.
in 1767 and was reduced to complete ruin. One of the prime goals of
the Burman invasion was the plunder and deportation of captives to
Lower Burma, where years of fighting and the Mons' exodus to Siam had
caused a considerable decrease in population. 

Meanwhile, however, the Chinese were alarmed by the Burmans' forceful subjugation and penetration of the Shan and Lao states, well beyond what the Chinese understood to be the border. Small Shan states between Yunnan and Upper Burma always shifted their loyalty among China, Burma and Siam, depending upon the particular situation in which they found themselves. It was dependent on the relative power shift among big neighbors as well as each of the Shan states' shift of loyalty to them. It was often the case that a Shan state showed submission to more than one big neighbor. Thinking that the Burmans had been in deep trouble, the governor general of Yunnan and Kweichow, with the approval by the Ch'ien-lung emperor, began a punitive expedition against Kaungton. The Burmans, with the help of the allied Shan states pushed the Chinese back to the border. This defeat caused the suicide of the governor general for loss of face to the emperor. A new governor general Yang Ying-chu led a force through Bhamo to Kaungton, where the Chinese were held up and later pushed back well into the Chinese border. Yang was ordered to commit suicide after the defeat. A third man, Ming Jui, a Manchu, led a force in 1767. Although he reached Singaung, a city located very close to Ava, his communications were cut and finally his forces were obliged to withdraw. He committed suicide right there before the withdrawal. In
1769 a fourth invasion was attempted by one of the emperor's close military advisors, Fu-heng, a Manchu. The Chinese forces built a fortified camp at Shwenyaungbin. When they were sieged and finally driven out by the Burmese, the Chinese asked for terms and a peace treaty was signed on the spot in late 1769. Neither Hsinbyusin nor Ch'ien-lung was informed of the peace terms until after the treaty was concluded.
Burma: Power Bases

The basic picture of Burmese history was a shifting hegemony between and within various ethnic groups. Conflicts were so severe that the population did not increase much. The census around the turn of the 18th century reported a population of barely 2 million in such a big space as Burma. Deporting thousands of captives back to their own areas as well as massacring and plundering was one of the ordinary practices in warfare. Unlike the contemporary Chinese and Vietnamese societies, where rule was based on land, in Burma control over manpower for labor service and warfare was crucial. Unlike China, Vietnam and Java, this society did not have a very sophisticated centralized bureaucracy. Hierarchy was very loose. Qualification to rule was dependent not on literacy in the classics—as was the case in China and Vietnam—but on experience in more practical matters. Rulers of small communities almost inherited their positions. They developed and inherited enormously complex, personal working relationships, often through marriage, both among small rulers and also with higher levels of rulers such as township and provincial headmen. This complex relationship brought about frequent conflict. The king, high officials in the court, and provincial officials formed the core of rulers. However, provincial officials were extremely loosely incorporated into the social and administrative hierarchy of the capital. They retained a firm grip of power in each of their own localities. The king was despotic and theoretically omnipotent. The major constraint on his power was
"poor communication and thin population of the country."\textsuperscript{13}

At the time of the Chinese invasions, the Burmans were trying to establish their power in Burma and neighboring areas. Under the strong king Alaungpaya the Burmans emerged as a strong power in the region. The presence of the despotic king made the kingdom far more cohesive and also made war mobilization far more effective. A strong military force was the basis of his power.\textsuperscript{14} Years of wars had already mobilized a great number of soldiers who could be used now for anti-Chinese wars as well. Despite the extremely difficult position in which they found themselves at the time of the Chinese attacks, they successfully repulsed the Chinese. There were 50,000 soldiers deployed in the war against Siam, and 60,000 in the war against China.\textsuperscript{15} The problem of logistics was not very serious since plundering and levying taxes were ordinary practices. Also very important were geoclimatic conditions in Burma which immensely favored the Burmans. The Chinese, unaccustomed to that geography and climate, wasted their time and energy and many became easy victims of malaria and hunger.\textsuperscript{16}
Ch'ing: Power Bases

The Ch'ing empire was at the height of her power when she conquered the Jungar empire by 1760. After the Jungar campaigns the Ch'ing were not able to increase their territory any more. The campaigns in the southern edges of the empire like Burma, Vietnam and Nepal did not bring any territorial gains. Rather these campaigns were fought to exhibit imperial prestige and grandeur. However, the campaigns unmasked the basic weaknesses of the empire presaging the later imperial malaise when she confronted the Western countries in the 19th century.

Chinese bureaucracy, though extremely sophisticated, had bad communication and transportation within the vast empire. Thus a strong administrative autonomy of province was a natural consequence. Despite all the concentration of power in the emperor and his entourage centering around the Grand Council, the fundamental fact remained that in many matters local officials took policy initiatives which were communicated to and then authorized by Peking. Even the enormous power of the Grand Council did not fully cope with the cunning and greed of local officials. This was especially conspicuous during the enforced peace of high Ch'ing. Morale was loosened both in bureaucracy and regular military forces.

The fact that the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow were extremely far away from Peking strengthened their autonomy. The wealth derived from rule and trade in these border areas attracted officials and often made them err, as was the case in 1755–1759. One of the important
tasks the governor general of Yunnan and Kweichow had to handle was to levy taxes and receive tributes, depending upon the status of a political-administrative group they were dealing with. Taxes were levied on purely administratively controlled groups. Relatively small 'foreign' groups like tributary Shan states were levied taxes and paid tributes or they paid nominal tributes only. There was no clear-cut rule about the subtle or strange mix of tribute and tax applied to border peoples. Since the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs did not exist in theory, and since many border peoples paid submission to more than one big neighbor, the handling of shifting loyalty was one of the most important items of business of the governor general. Officials' considerations about career promotions derived from military successes or private profits from taxes and tributes, often dictated their imperial policies toward border peoples, as was the case with the Burma campaigns.

Besides the weaknesses associated with bureaucratic communication and control, there was an important difference between the previous campaigns and the Burma campaign. The previous campaigns were mainly fought in the terrains to which the Manchu and Mongol soldiers and generals were accustomed. The battlefields were in the north. The Burma campaign was found under extremely different and difficult conditions. Geoclimatic conditions made logistics and inter-unit coordination extremely difficult. The forces deployed in the campaign were largely from the Chinese Green Standard Forces. After the first two defeats, Manchu and Mongol forces were added. Despite the initial
dazzling advances of the last two campaigns, the difficult problems of logistics, inter-unit coordination and geoclimatic conditions ultimately overwhelmed the Ch'ing forces. \(^{23}\)
Burma: Power Perspectives

The most basic objective of the Burmans was the reestablishment of Burman hegemony in Upper Burma and neighboring areas. The strategic inseparability of Upper Burma and other neighboring areas led the Burmans to be engaged in a series of wars against the Mons, the Shans, the Laos, the Manipuris and the Siamese. In order to impress actually and potentially dissident populations, the king had to demonstrate the strength and authority of the new kingdom by force and conquest. A display of strength and a show of force were vital. The war against the Siamese started in what the Burmans saw as Siamese assistance to the dissidents near Tenasserim of the Malay isthmus. The Burmans were compelled to show the dissidents that Siamese assistance would be of no avail to them. The war against the Ch'ing started with the conquest over Shan and Lao states which bordered with China, Burma and Siam. The Burmans took the tactics of penetrating into Ayudhya from the north to outmaneuver the Siamese. The Burman forces' deep thrust into the Shan and Lao states for the purpose of obtaining the latter's allegiance to the Burmans and recruiting well soldiers for war went/beyond the borders that the Ch'ing claimed. The Ch'ing subsequently counterattacked, taking this opportunity to enlarge her tributaries and thus her influence and profits. The Burmans fought and repulsed the Ch'ing's tenacious invasions for 5 years.

Perhaps the most revealing of Burmese perspectives in dealing with China was the commander general Mala Thiha Thura's reasoning for
peace. He reasoned: "War with the Chinese was swiftly becoming a cancer that would finally destroy that nation [Burma]. Compared to Chinese losses, Burmese losses were light, but considered in proportion to the population of the country they were heavy."\textsuperscript{25} He had correct understanding of the already evident desolation of the country wrought by persistent Chinese invasions. He was right in counting on potentially disastrous effects of continuing wars against China and in proposing a mild peace to the Ch'ing. This decision was, however, very unsatisfactory to the king who wanted a thorough victory over the Ch'ing. Although Mala Thiha Thura conquered the Manipuris as a \textit{quid pro quo} before he came back to Upper Burma in order to alleviate the king's furor, Maha Thiha Thura was forced into temporary exile in the Shan states.\textsuperscript{26}
Ch'ing: Power Perspectives

The outstanding characteristics of the Ch'ing policy toward Burma were: 1) the Ch'ien-lung emperor's extreme concern for supremacy and 2) the governor general's exploitation of the emperor's concern for his personal objectives. The Ch'ien-lung emperor's obsession for supremacy after the extraordinary victory over the Jungar empire was recurrent in his wartime correspondence. Being reluctant to throw in a large force to Burma, but optimistic about an early victory, the Ch'ien-lung emperor was bogged down in the Burma quagmire. In his words, "If the Burmese chieftain acknowledges fear of our vanguard and wishes to submit—this will certainly be satisfactory. If he is fearful and flees and hides, and gives up Chao-san, then as soon as we have the criminal, the matter of the jungle bandits will be ended. After all, we have no reason to seek more of the outer barbarians.... If, on the other hand, they are obdurate, if there is an opportunity and it will not lead to heavy commitments of troops going deeply [into their territory] and one can establish eternal southern submission this will be a case of 'one great effort, eternally at peace.'" When the second campaign, which was intended to be the 'one great effort, eternally at peace,' turned out to be a complete defeat, Ch'ien-lung cried out: "How could we stop abruptly in mid-course? Moreover, our dynasty is right at its ascendancy. The Jungars and Moslems have all been suppressed. How can this trifling Burma not be exterminated?" A third campaign, now commanded by a Manchu, ended with another humiliating
withdrawal short of Ava. A fourth campaign was led by a veteran Manchu commander and one of the emperor's military advisors for many years. However, well before they captured Kaungton, let alone Ava, their death toll climbed up so high as to alarm the emperor. Out of 31,000 Manchus sent, only 13,000 survived in the fourth campaign. 29 Far more Chinese soldiers must have died. Before the emperor made a final decision, the negotiations had begun and the Ch'ing commander concluded a peace treaty without the emperor's authorization. Thus, the commander had to report to the emperor that the Burmans showed their submission to the Ch'ing, quite contrary to the fact. "To resort to rhetoric to make the facts palatable" 30 was the only course that could be taken by the commander, who was torn by the military defeat and the emperor's rejection of anything short of supremacy. Having been denied the unpleasant information because of his insistence on the myth of Chinese supremacy, the emperor later came to believe that the Burma campaign was one of the ten great campaigns in his reign. 31

The second characteristic was the officials' exploitation of the emperor's obsession with supremacy. Local officials could rationalize even their greedy conduct or misdeeds in handling foreign affairs by resorting to the necessity to preserve supremacy or secure peace on the borders. 32 They also could use deceptive communication as a means of promoting their careers by pleasing the emperor. In R. Jung's words, "...the officials were compelled to deceive their ruler to avoid criticism and punishment. Rather than settling the problem at
issue, the effect of their evasive deception was to exacerbate it.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite all the institutional set-ups to materialize the supremacy of the emperor and of the empire, the power of the emperor and the empire tended to be severely constrained and substantially diminished by the very presupposition of supremacy.
Summary: Ch'ing-Burman wars of 1766-1769

We have tried to show: 1) that the Ch'ing empire was complacent and arrogant during the wars after having successfully conquered the historic enemy of the north several years before; and 2) that the Ch'ing empire was showing its weaknesses deriving from the very idea of supremacy and the very institutions which were to assure it by permeating deception and self-deception within the imperial communication and decision-making systems.
Chapter 10: Ch'ing-Vietnamese war of 1788-1789

Introduction

The Ch'ing dynasty and the Le dynasty (1427-1527 and 1592-1789) had a relatively stable relationship until the Tay-Son rebellion broke out in 1771,¹ which was to trigger the Chinese intervention in 1788-1789. Taking advantage of the Tay-Son rebellion against the Nguyen family which had divided and controlled the country in competition with the Trinh family since the mid-16th century,² the Trinh force attacked and occupied Hue and Quang-Nam in 1775.³ The Nguyen family escaped to Gia-Dinh by sea. The Tay-Son force tactically surrendered and concluded a truce with the Trinh force. Having directed its force southward, the Tay-Son force had almost finished the suppression of the Nguyen family at Gia-Dinh by 1777, and in 1778 Nguyen Nhac, the eldest of the three Tay-Son brothers, proclaimed himself emperor. The see-saw-like competition between the Tay-Son force and Nguyen Anh, the last of the kingly Nguyen line, over Gia-Dinh continued thereafter, however. In 1786, taking advantage of the violent factional struggles within the Trinh territory and guided by one of two competing Trinh factions, the Tay-Son force fought their way into Hue and raided Hanoi to defeat the Trinh family, though nominally retaining the Le emperor at Hanoi. Since the Le emperor⁴ lost the 'camel seal', which

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Notes to chapter 10 appear on pages 561-563.
had been awarded by the Ch'ing emperor, and furthermore died the next year, the new Le emperor requested the Ch'ing emperor to accept him as the ruler of Vietnam. Having seen the Tay-Son's weakening grip over Hanoi evidenced by Le's independent action, the emerging, ambitious Tay-Son leader Nguyen Hue went up again to Hanoi, forcing the Le emperor to flee from Hanoi and request the Ch'ing to intervene in 1788.

The leading actor of the war, Nguyen Hue, had other opponents to cope with besides the Le and the Ch'ing. They were his brother, Nguyen Nhac at Qui-Nhon, and the presumptive king Nguyen Anh at Gia-Dinh. The Tay-Son brothers, Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Lu and Nguyen Hue, were at odds with each other, particularly after Nguyen Hue's attack on Hanoi in 1786. Nguyen Hue came back from Hanoi and besieged Nguyen Nhac at Qui-Nhon. But the situation in the north forced Nguyen Hue to accept an uneasy truce with Nguyen Nhac, which resulted in the division of the country among the three brothers. Nguyen Nhac ruled from Qui-Nhon what is now the center of South Vietnam, Nguyen Hue ruled from Hue what is now the northern part of South Vietnam and the southern part of North Vietnam, and Nguyen Lu ruled the Mekong delta area from Gia-Dinh. Nguyen Lu died young, and while Nguyen Hue was absorbed in the war against the Ch'ing, Nguyen Anh began to establish himself in the Mekong Delta area. Before leaving Thanh-Hoa for Hanoi in 1788 to attack the Ch'ing force, Nguyen Hue proclaimed himself emperor of Vietnam. After Nguyen Hue's Blizkrieg in the Tet of 1789, he became the virtual ruler of Vietnam and was accepted as
the king of Vietnam by the Ch'ien-lung emperor in 1789. Nguyen Hue was quite cool about 'kowtowing' to China's obsession with ritualistic supremacy. Quite aside from the ritualistic compliance to the Ch'ing emperor, he even planned to invade and conquer Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, the ancient homeland of Vietnamese (Yueh) before the Han conquest. He built large ships for elephants and soldiers to invade Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The change in his China policy was caused by his failure to solve peacefully the problem of restoring some of the border areas then under the influence of the Chinese t'u-ssu. His efforts were halted only by his own sudden death in 1792. The declining morale of the Tay-Sons after Nguyen Hue's death in 1792 and Nguyen Nhac's death in 1793 increased Nguyen Anh's power in the Mekong Delta area, which he then gradually extended to the north. The financial problem of the Tay-Sons forced them to hire, by granting Vietnamese official titles, Chinese pirates who were rampant along the South China coast. Despite the Tay-Sons' efforts, they were eventually defeated by Nguyen Anh, who came to power in 1802 as Gia-Long.
China: Power Bases

The Ch'ing dynasty is often thought to have been at the peak of her stability and prosperity at the dawn of the Chinese intervention in Vietnam in 1788-1789. After the suppression of the Ming partisans and rebellious ex-collaborators in Taiwan and South China in the late 17th century, the Ch'ing dynasty enforced and enjoyed long peace until the late 18th century, when the White Lotus rebellion (1796-1804) broke out.\(^7\) By the mid-18th century the traditionally formidable enemies of the north had been subdued and/or exterminated. Joining to major Inner Mongol tribes who were subdued before and after 1644, Khalkha Mongols became obedient to the Manchus in the late 17th century, seeking a shield from attack by the Jungars, who were later themselves to be almost exterminated by Ch'ien-lung in 1755-1759.\(^8\) The disappearance of the traditional northern enemy had a significant effect on state finance. An extraordinary amount of money which had had to be spent for northern defense was now saved.\(^9\) By the mid-18th century it was as if the Manchu's grip of power had been firmly established.

More fundamentally, however, sweeping social change had been going on from the late Ming period through the mid-Ch'ing period. This change continuously undermined the Manchus' control of vast agrarian order, despite their effort for tight political centralization for internal security and economic exploitation.\(^10\) The growing productivity of the land in relation to labor and the increasing regionalization and monetization of production and commerce forced
institutional readjustments.\textsuperscript{11} The primary unit of taxation changed from household to land. This fact tended to allow the arbitrary exactions by local administration, despite the occasional exemption of taxes offered by the Manchu rulers to whom the loyalty of the Han Chinese gentry and peasantry was of utmost importance. Much of the corvee labor serving local government was replaced by a professional and locally based sub-bureaucracy. The sub-bureaucracy tended to overwhelm district magistrates by its knowledge and expertise in dealing with the local population. Non-governmental social organizations were developed to deal with problems of particular localities, since they were not handled adequately by the small number of district magistrates at this time of growing social diversification.\textsuperscript{12}

More fundamentally, slow and continuous inflation during the mid-Ch'ing period stimulated production significantly (and vice versa), and this was reinforced by the influx of silver to China due to the export of tea, silk and porcelain to Western traders. The increase in production enabled an increase in population. However, arable land did not increase proportionately to the increase in population. The traditional eastern coastal areas had already reached a population limit. A large number of people migrated to hitherto uninhabited mountainous areas, which the introduction and diffusion of sweet potato and maize from abroad made more productive. The migrants were those who had no land and those who evaded heavy taxes in over-crowded areas.\textsuperscript{13} The absence of primogeniture in post-aristocratic (from the Sung dynasty on) Chinese practice exacerbated the peasantry's
economic conditions due to the over-fragmentation of land, which constantly produced landless and poor peasants and often transformed them into anti-social elements of various sorts. They tended to form local organizations which often militantly confronted political and social problems in their own localities. Rebellions of the Triads were frequent in South China in the later Ch'ien-lung period and thereafter. Piracy along the coast of Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang became rampant from the later Ch'ien-lung period on. Unemployed peasants and fishermen often became pirates, and many of them were employed by the Tay-Sons in Vietnam, who desperately needed money and materiel for their war against Nguyen Anh. Piracy along the Grand Canal connecting the rice-rich bowl of Kiangnan and Hukwang and the capital was also increasing. Mines tended to attract the unemployed and thus potentially or actually anti-social elements and to become foci of riots and rebellions. This was a serious problem for the regime since they desperately needed a rapid increase in copper coinage due to the inflation and wide circulation of privately made coins. Since inflation was steady and officials' salaries were almost fixed at a rate established at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, corruption was taken for granted. Also important were poverty and decline of morale in the regular army, the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army, brought about by inflation, fixed salaries, the prohibition against farming by the Eight Banner soldiers, and the loss of the Manchu military vigor and habits amidst the sinicized world. The decline of morale had not been conspicuous during the early Ch'ien-lung
campaigns, but it was to be disclosed in the suppression campaigns of the White Lotus rebellion and the maritime rebellion during the later Ch'ien-lung and early Chia-ch'ing periods. The problem was that too many soldiers did not dare to fight. They were not very different from rebels or bandits or pirates in terms of their social origins and behavior. Also heavy conscription of soldiers often brought about riots and revolts, which enormously decreased the imperial capacity to mobilize.

Extraordinary growth of productivity and population and the subsequent social change from the late Ming period through the mid-Ch'ing period tended to overwhelm the human efforts to contain them. Inefficient communication and extraordinary lack of coordination presented themselves in imperial bureaucracy, especially at the time of non-routine policy planning and implementation. This problem was aggravated by the arrogance of power cultivated by the victory over the northern enemy and imperial stability and prosperity. Economic conditions in the countryside were being aggravated for peasants. Anti-social elements were constantly being produced, imperial bureaucracy was increasingly inefficient, and the military foundation of the Manchu rule was weakening. None of these things, however, became very conspicuous during the Ch'ien-lung period. Despite all of these things, the Ch'ing could and did intervene in Vietnam, because of the absence of the northern problem and the rich state surplus derived from a tight and skillful system of exploitation, helped by Ch'ien-lung's predisposition for campaigns. In short, the facade of prosperity in
the Ch'ien-lung period was maintained in spite of continuously accelerating social and economic problems.
Vietnam: Power Bases

Since 1558 the country had been virtually divided between the Trinh family and the Nguyen family. This division was further rigidified by the long war of 1627-1672. Since the Nguyens fled from Thanh-Hoa to Hue with their military followers, and since they played an active role in the war against the Trinh family, the Nguyen family and Thanh-Hoa people were able to monopolize power. Native people had tended to be excluded from any kind of influence at the Nguyen court. The Nguyen ruler made an effort to recruit native people to officialdom through Chinese-style civil service examinations in order to mitigate the native people's dissatisfaction and grievances, and this inevitably brought about a relative increase in the native people's power. The number of native officials increased drastically after the truce with the Trinh ruler, but they did not acquire higher posts than the Thanh-Hoa military aristocrats. The significant fact is, however, that a new, non-military, bureaucratic class was emerging, which was gradually gaining control of taxation, with the cooperation of village notables. There was another important element in this phenomenon. The native officials tended to be from Thua-Thien, Quang-Tri, Quang-Binh, and Quang-Nam, leaving Quang-Ngai and Qui-Nhon extremely sparcely represented. This fact naturally generated dissatisfaction among the local notables of the latter areas, which later led them to provide their support to the Tay-Son rebellion starting in 1771 near Qui-Nhon. The politics of the Nguyen ruler, which depended heavily on the support of his family and other military
families from Thanh-Hoa, tended to degenerate as peace prevailed after the truce of 1672. Arbitrary and despotic rule of Trung Phuc Loan, who controlled a boy ruler, Nguyen Phuc Thuan (r. 1765-1778), stirred up continuous opposition from inside as well as outside the court.

The communal land, which used to be the central element of Vietnamese society, lost its central meaning gradually after the kingdom of Champa was conquered by the late 15th century. Champa had been the major supplier of the slave labor on which the communal land system strongly depended. The communal land was increasingly appropriated for private use by landlords and rich peasants. A monetary economy was also developing. Taxes of various sorts which were introduced on the rice-rich areas south of Quang-Nam were very heavy, and they generated landless and poor peasants. The situation was probably aggravated by the absence of primogeniture in Vietnamese practice, although it was not so strict in the principle of equal allocation to every child as was the Chinese practice. In this process, landless and poor peasants were easily transformed into anti-social elements, or they migrated further south. A series of natural disasters and famines immediately preceding the Tay-Son rebellion were exacerbated by the despotic rule. Qui-Nhon, a frontier town, was one of the centers of anti-social elements and political refugees. Not only was it far from Quang-Nam and Hue geographically, but it was also both mountainous and coastal, which made rebel movements feasible and unobstructed.
The leader of the Tay-Son rebellion, Nguyen Nhac, was an ex-official of the customs service at a major trade port, Van-Don. He was forced to flee to Qui-Nhon because of his private spending of public money in office, and he became a leader of bandits. Agitated by a political refugee of the Nguyen aristocracy in Qui-Nhon, he started a rebellion against the despotic regent, Trung Phuc Loan. The help of native village notables, rich merchants, highlanders, and a Chinese secret society (the Triads) was very significant. The support of merchants was natural since, despite the growing, if modest, monetary economy, the country was divided and the trade between north and south was conducted via Chinese merchants. In 1773, the Tay-Sons seized Qui-Nhon. In 1775, as we have noted before, taking advantage of the chaos in the south, the Trinh force attacked Nguyen at Hue, forced Nguyen to flee to Gia-Dinh by sea, and forced Nguyen Nhac to surrender at least tactically and to conclude a truce. The Trinh force occupied Hue and Quang-Nham while the Tay-Sons ruled Qui-Nhon. Thereafter the Tay-Sons directed their force toward the south and by 1778 the Tay-Sons ruled much of the center and the south of the country. Thus, the country was divided up by three regional forces: the Trinh in the north, the Tay-Sons in the center and the south, and the Nguyens in the extreme south. Later, in 1786, the country was divided by the three brothers after the Tay-Sons' attack of Hanoi. After Nguyen Lu's death, the south was increasingly controlled by Nguyen Anh. He increased his territory to the one of Nguyen Nhac and later the one of Nguyen Hue, which was to be completed in 1802.
In the Trinh territory, factional struggles were intensified when peace prevailed after the truce with the Nguyen. When there was an outside enemy and when a king was relatively strong, factional struggles became less serious. Underlying factional struggles was the socio-economic process associated with the rapid decrease of communal land, since the emerging large private land holders were competing to increase their influence in the court and to exert control over the throne. Furthermore, unlike the time of Le Thanh-Tong of the late 15th century, bureaucratic elites who had come to power through the centuries-old civil service examinations were submerged and involved deeply in factional struggles, instead of balancing the power of the Thanh-Hoa military aristocrats, who were the core of establishment through the Le dynasty, in favor of the throne. The see-saw game of two factions in the succession struggles over the throne resulted in the uncontrollable mutiny of the once prestigious Thanh-Nghe army (i.e., troops raised in Thanh-Hoa and Nghe-An), instigated by one of the factions. One of the leaders of the rival faction fled to the Tay-Son territory, and subsequently guided the army of the Tay-Sons to Hue and for revenge, further to Hanoi in 1786, creating the conditions for the Chinese intervention in Vietnam in 1788-1789.

The Tay-Son force, despite the tension among themselves and the loss of morale and cohesion in the later period, represented the revitalized social and political forces of the Vietnamese nation at the time of the Chinese intervention. Political and social fluidity
at the time of upheaval favored the Tay-Sons to mobilize soldiers. Although the number of the Tay-Son force was not known, it would have been larger than the Chinese force from the Chennan pass, which amounted to 4,800,\textsuperscript{33} judging from the way in which the Tay-Son force fought the battle. Thus, both in quantity and in quality, the Tay-Son force could and did overwhelm the Chinese intervention force in 1789.

To sum up, the Tay-Sons were functional as the catalytic agent for a radical rearrangement of social institutions that followed in the wake of the decay of communal land, the rapidly increasing \textit{latifundia}, the growth of the monetary economy, the continuous impoverishment of peasantry, the intense factional struggles among military aristocrats, and the growing power of bureaucrats and their immersion in factional struggles. The result was, paradoxically, a regressive rearrangement of the system by tight bureaucratization into a far more sinicized style. Economic processes were largely untouched by the processes of reinstitutionalization under the new Nguyen dynasty, leading to the susceptibility of the country to colonial attack in the late 19th century.\textsuperscript{34}
China: Power Perspectives

The dominant theme that ran through Chinese policies can be said to be the obsessive concern for ritualistic supremacy. After the Tay-Sons' attack on Hue, which the Trinh had occupied since 1775, and Nguyen Hue's subsequent attack on Hanoi in 1786, the Ch'ing emperor could not help but know, belatedly in 1787, that something was going on in Vietnam. The information that Peking obtained was solely from the Le, who distorted the situation in such a way as to report that the Tay-Sons would be suppressed within several months. This would, it was hoped, aid the Le in gaining the reissue of the camel seal lost in the chaos of the Tay-Sons' attack on Hanoi and the recognition of a new king. After Nguyen Hue's second attack on Hanoi in 1788, the Ch'ing government was informed that the Le king had been ousted from Hanoi and was seeking Ch'ing intervention on his behalf. In may 1788, the Ch'ien-lung emperor issued an order to Sun Shih-i, governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, first to encourage the Le to recover the situation by their own efforts, while waiting with Chinese forces on the border. If this did not succeed, Sun was ordered to intervene for the cause of the Le as the tributary king of Vietnam. This policy was self-contradictory since a show of force on border would tend to make intervention inevitable, while non-intervention was sought as the policy of first priority. After some correspondence between Ch'ien-lung and Sun Shih-i, the Ch'ien-lung emperor seems to have made a decision by August 1788 to intervene, primarily based on Sun's information that thousands of Chinese mine
workers in Vietnam would cooperate with the Ch'ing intervention force in exchange for rice, and that the collaboration of a prominent former subject of Nguyen Hue was assured. Sun seems to have been guilty of wishful thinking to the effect that intervention would help a tributary king who was otherwise almost destined to ruin and thus bring about Ch'ing control of Vietnam. The correspondence between Sun and Ch'ien-lung reveals that they assumed their plan would inevitably result in victory and were talking about post-victory policy alternatives without much planning and preparation for the intervention itself. In August, Hsu Shih-heng was appointed as commander-in-chief. In October, by his own request, Sun himself was ordered to command, together with Hsu, a force of 4,800 from Chennan pass, and Wu Ta-ching was ordered to command a force of 5,000 from Yunnan. Despite Ch'ien-lung's concern for supply and communication lines for a possibly protracted intervention, Sun Shih-i did not bother himself with this at all. In late October, Sun left Chennan pass, defeated the Tay-Son force without much resistance, arrived at Hanoi, and gave investiture to the Le. This news did not reach Peking until 9 December 1788. Before this information arrived at Peking, Hsu Chan-i, a naval officer of the Kwangtung forces, who was sent back from Nghe-An, where he had drifted after a storm, made it known that the Tay-Son force was making desperate preparations to counterattack with soldiers of high morale and with highly effective arms. This information forced the modification of Chinese policy in a more limited direction. Despite Sun Shih-i's insistence, Ch'ien-lung ordered him on 16 January 1789 to withdraw
from Hanoi, in effect abandoning the cause of the Le. However, on 25 January 1789, before this order reached Hanoi, and 9 days after it was issued at Peking, the report that the Ch'ing force led by Hsu and Sun had been crushed completely by the Tay-Son force on 3-5 January 1789 reached Peking. Thus, the original goal of protecting the Le and exterminating the Tay-Sons was converted into a policy of headlong withdrawal with no gain for the Chinese. This was not due to the initiative of the Ch'ing force, as ordered by the Ch'ien-lung emperor, but to the victory of the Tay-Sons. Sun Shih-i had delayed effective action for one month after capturing Hanoi, neither having the means (soldiers, bearers, food and arms) to go forward to attack the Nguyen force far south of Hanoi (Sun had been waiting for Wu Ta-ching's force from Yunnan), nor being able and courageous enough to liberate himself from being the captive of the ephemeral gains of the intervention. After receiving the report of Sun's defeat, the Ch'ien-lung emperor immediately appointed Fu K'ang-an governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but allowed Sun to assist Fu for a while before appointing him to another position. Ch'ien-lung did not punish Sun Shih-i severely, because the Ch'ien-lung emperor was responsible for encouraging Sun's personal ambition and furthering his military career by appointing him leader of the Ch'ing force. Sun was known for his administrative and literary ability, but lacked any military experience at all, unlike Fu K'ang-an. Sun had been desperately waiting for an opportunity to come to him, as was disclosed in his unusual mobilization of force for the Triad rebellion in Taiwan
of 1786, for which governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, Fu K'ang-an, was responsible, but not Sun Shih-i. On 29 January, Ch'i'en-lung published his after-thought on the expedition, admitting that the expedition should not have been attempted in the first place.

Negotiations began with the formidable force of the Tay-Sons still on the Chinese border, putting considerable pressure on the Ch'ing negotiators, who had only 3,000 soldiers behind them. Fu K'ang-an made strenuous efforts, however, to avert further Vietnamese military pressure and save the Ch'i'en-lung emperor's face, which would also save Fu's own position and power, of course. Fu reported to the Ch'i'en-lung emperor that Nguyen Hue had sent a messenger begging three times within a month to give him investiture and expressing his desire to visit Peking and apologize to the emperor. The fact was that Fu was desperate to persuade Nguyen Hue's negotiators and even attempted bribery, since Nguyen Hue himself had gone back to Hue to cope with other contenders for power in Vietnam. The story forged by Fu K'ang-an, however, gained much force from the logic of the situation. The Ch'i'en-lung emperor was more than normally pleased by the report since a personal visit and kowtow had never been performed by a Vietnamese king, who instead had always sent a tai-shen chin-jen, an expiatory effigy of himself in gold, to the Chinese emperor. Nguyen Hue's messenger met the Ch'i'en-lung emperor at Jehol in July. After the meeting, Ch'i'en-lung published his second after-thought on the expedition, applauding his own virtue and power in
forcing a tributary king to express his desire to visit personally the emperor of Ch'ing. His correct first after-thought was completely forgotten. The Chinese theory of universal imperial virtue prohibited the Chinese emperor to admit his errors in dealing with foreign countries since to admit them meant to admit the decline of his imperial virtue, which in turn would provide the rationale for the Chinese people to overthrow the emperor. The repetition of this practice, originally intended for internal consumption, would have been very close to or almost identical to self-deception. Then, in turn, Ch'ien-lung's messenger started off for Hanoi for investiture. Not only was the investiture delayed by Nguyen Hue, but also he used his double for the investiture. Furthermore, Nguyen Hue sent his double to Peking for kowtowing. In the spring of 1790 it seemed as if Nguyen Hue was not going to keep his promise to visit Peking, and Fu K'ang-an must have in desperation given his consent, if not explicitly, to a second use of the double, probably the same double as used in the investiture ceremony at Hanoi, which after all might have been Nguyen Hue's original plan since he received Ch'ien-lung's invitation. Although he was being deceived by his favorite general Fu K'ang-an and his opponent in war Nguyen Hue acting together, the Ch'ien-lung emperor was quite unaware of this and gave an unprecedented reception to Nguyen Hue's double all the way to Peking. Although he was a bit alarmed by the extraordinary expense, Ch'ien-lung's desire to demonstrate his virtue by having a tributary king visit him was serious, since traditionally the diffusion of imperial virtue was
thought universal, whether Chinese or non-Chinese.

Thus the entire event wound up with this almost comic but nevertheless serious play-acting by Ch'ien-lung, Fu K'ang-an, Nguyen Hue and the double, of course. In 1792, Ch'ien-lung wrote Shih-ch'uan chi,40 Record of Ten Great Campaigns, and included the shameful Vietnam campaign, in which Ch'ien-lung lost most of the soldiers commanded by Hsu and Sun, including commander-in-chief Hsu himself. Having become the captive of its own fiction, China could only be saved by deluding herself once more.41 When there was only a small enemy (the Tay-Son Vietnamese) and when there was only a rebellion without foreign intervention (the White Lotus rebellion), the increasingly visible social contradictions of the empire could be patched up, if temporarily, without damaging the fictitious glory of the empire. This false assurance, however, only amplified the contradictions between the real power bases of the emperor and his political perspectives, which was to result in total disaster when there were rebellions accompanied by foreign intervention and when they were not only technologically superior but also culturally aggressive enemies in the 19th century.
Vietnam: Perspectives

What ran through Vietnamese perspectives can be said to be a cool understanding of power and an opportunistic use and non-use of traditionally prescribed rules of behavior. In battle as well as negotiation, Nguyen Hue behaved on the basis of military superiority, if local, over the enemy. The untraditional frontal attack at the unprecedented moment of Tet and his use of the double both evidenced his characteristically realist behavior, which was undoubtedly learned in the harsh environment of mainland Southeast Asian competitive politics, which were largely of zero-sum nature, more specifically, in the continuous struggles against Le, Nguyen, Trinh, the other Tay-Son brothers, Nguyen Anh, the Siamese, the Khmers, the Frenchmen, and the Chinese.

His mocking attitude toward Chinese tributary practices while nominally obeying for the sole purpose of his position of power was also conspicuous. First, Nguyen Hue, having received Ch'ien-lung's invitation to Peking, which was the condition for his investiture as the king of Vietnam, was forced to make his real wish conform to Ch'ien-lung's perception of Nguyen Hue's wish, i.e., Fu K'ang-an's false report, in order to consolidate his position of power vis-a-vis the other contenders, Nguyen Nhac and Nguyen Anh. Nguyen Hue thus sent an official messenger to Peking, claiming the messenger was his relative, which was probably untrue. Second, when Ch'ien-lung's messenger started for Hanoi for investiture, the messenger was at the mercy of Nguyen Hue's tactics of not meeting the messenger
personally. He used his double at the ceremony. The messenger was requested by Nguyen Hue several times on his way to Hanoi to change his original schedule, with such excuses as Nguyen Hue's sickness and the intolerable tropical weather. After rejecting Nguyen Hue's abrupt request to perform the ceremony at Hue instead of at Hanoi, the Ch'ing messenger arrived at Chennan pass on 27 August and at Hanoi on 14 October. He performed the ceremony on 15 October and left Hanoi for Peking on the same day. The incredible delays of his trip and the abruptness of his departure immediately after the ceremony seem to reinforce the correctness of the conjecture that Nguyen Hue actually allowed his double to stand in for him at the ceremony. He did not want to expose his double to people from Ch'ing so conspicuously. Third, Nguyen Hue even used his double for kowtowing to Ch'ien-lung in Peking. He was quite successful in taking advantage of the enemy's weaknesses and obsessions without being noticed by Ch'ien-lung.

Also conspicuous was Nguyen Hue's proto-nationalist appeal. In contrast to Nguyen Nhac, who was rather content with the status of a localized, despotic rebel king, Nguyen Hue had the ambition to unify Vietnam, which was evidenced for the first time by their open quarrel in 1786 over whether or not to go forward to Hanoi. After he failed to solve the border problem, he planned a renewed attack against Ch'ing, which had been prepared by such means as the administrative census to recruit soldiers effectively and the construction of large ships for soldiers and elephants. He admired
Genghis Khan and thought that since the less civilized Mongols could conquer China, the more civilized Vietnamese could also do so. His letter to Ch'ing, demanding a girl for himself and retrocession of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, was prevented from being sent only by his own sudden death. This proto-nationalist appeal was absent in the new, essentially regressive Nguyen dynasty, which certainly contributed to its easy succumbing to French colonialism in the 19th century.
Summary: Ch'ing-Vietnamese war of 1788-1789

We have tried to show: 1) that the Ch'ien-lung emperor had extremely limited mobilizational capacity and had to cope with serious problems in imperial bureaucratic communication and control due to the basic overload of tight institutionalization vis-a-vis continuously accelerating economic and social forces; 2) that Nguyen Hue enjoyed high mobilization capacity due to the political and social fluidity originating from long-accumulated social and economic contradictions and triggered by the Tay-Son rebellion; 3) that Ch'ien-lung had an illusion of the power of the Middle Kingdom, which presented itself in the absence of planning and preparation, and an obsessive fear of the loss of the mandate of Heaven, which presented itself in the form of deception and self-deception; and 4) that Nguyen Hue had a cool appreciation of power, which was manifested both in battle and in negotiation, and made opportunistic use and non-use of traditionally prescribed rules of behavior, as expressed in the form of disregard of holiday and ritualistic kowtowing.
Chapter II: British abortive mission to the Ch'ing 1792-1793

Introduction

Two factors contributed to the Ch'ing empire's gradual restrictions laid upon foreign commerce since the early 18th century. One was the gradual increase in foreign commercial activities along the coast.\(^1\) The other was the growing xenophobia fostered by the unprecedented power and prosperity of the Ch'ing empire under Yung-cheng and especially Ch'ien-lung.\(^2\) The Ch'ing empire restricted foreign commerce to Canton through the Cohong, a guild of merchants approved by the court by the mid-18th century. Boasting of self-sufficiency and contemptuous of any commercial activities, the Ch'ing empire took the policy of official supervision and restriction of foreign intercourse. Meanwhile Western commercial activities were growing steadily with the development of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie spurred by the Industrial Revolution.\(^3\) Among Western countries England was one of the most important for commercial intercourse with the Ch'ing empire. Through two parallel monopoly institutions, the Cohong and the East India Company, the two governments were able to avoid official entanglements. However, this relationship had to be transformed. The policy of vigorous commercial expansion of the British government was directed at transforming the very restrictive Canton trade system, for which the Macartney embassy was sent, and which eventually led to the great scale collision of these two empires in the mid-19th century.\(^4\)

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Notes to chapter II appear on pages 563-564.
Britain: Power Bases

During the latter half of the 18th century Britain was generally on the rise, though with the temporary nadir experienced in the early 1780's, toward the second British empire. The Seven Years' war of 1756-1763 provided Britain with great territorial gains. Despite the great loss of territory due to the American War of Independence/ the Commutation Act of 1784 reversed the tea trade war in favor of Britain and provided a great step towards British dominance over the sea, which was to be completed in the naval victories during the Napoleonic wars.

In 1791 the population of England and Wales amounted to about 8.5 millions. The population began to increase very rapidly beginning in the 1780's. The population doubled in 50 to 60 years after 1780 and again in the sixty years from 1841 to 1901. The national industrial output too began to increase beginning in the 1780's. Nine tenths of the exports of cotton goods were concentrated in the last 18 years of the 18th century. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of export industries was due to the fact that: "they could create the illusion of rapid growth by two major means: capturing a series of other countries' export markets, and destroying domestic competition within particular countries, that is by the political or semi-political means of war and colonization." The rise of the Second British Empire was pari passu with the Industrial Revolution. "The Industrial Revolution was generated in these decades--after the 1740's, when this massive but slow growth in the domestic economies combined with the
rapid—after 1750 extremely rapid—expansion of the international economy; and it occurred in the country which seized its international opportunities to corner a major share of the overseas markets."  

Unprecedented social structural changes caused by the Industrial Revolution, especially in the last quarter of the 18th century, wrought various changes in the political map of England. The main political actors were the king, the parliament and the cabinet. One of the significant changes in the 1780's and 1790's was the increasing independence of the cabinet under Pitt vis-a-vis the crown and parliament. Although a very strong Whig oligarchical influence remained in the parliament as well as in constituencies through patronage, diversified opinions gained importance. At the time of rapid socio-economic changes, at the time of rapid international changes, at the time of financially difficult times, Pitt's policy of financial restraint and economic expansion was on the right track. Pitt's policy of commercial expansion was for the interests of the landed aristocracy, who were dominant in the House of Commons, as well as the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. The relative decrease of tax was realised by the increase in the government revenue through trade. Besides the traditionally well-represented interests of landed gentry and aristocracy and also the traditional wool industrial interests in northern England began to assert themselves more strongly than ever before for the abolition of the monopoly of the East India Company and more generally for the vigorous expansion of the market.
Since the Seven Years' war, the East India Company obtained diwani or the administrative power to levy taxes in such areas as Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Diwani was expected to become an important source of the Company's income. However, the fact was that the Company's administrative costs ran high and furthermore the interference in internal struggles among feudal principalities increased military costs. Thus, despite the increase in the material interests and the political power of the Company, it had hard time financing itself. The Company imported tea and silk from China and exported mainly silver which was brought from the New Continent of America. However, the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence interrupted the supply of silver, putting the Company in a difficult position to buy tea, which had become indispensable for European daily life by that time. Silver began to be supplied by country traders who, on the admission of the Company, were engaged in trade among India, Southeast Asia and China. Country traders exported cotton and opium to China and, in exchange for them, obtained silver. Country traders soon became the important supplier of silver to the Company. The American War of Independence also forced the government of Britain to bear the heavy military expenditure, which led the government to levy a heavy tax on tea. This policy endangered the Company's tea trade with China since the Continental trade companies profited from the smuggling of tea trade to Britain. This in turn led the government of Pitt to issue the Commutation Act in 1784, which lowered the tax on tea from 120% to 12.5% to secure the import of tea.
to the people in Britain.\textsuperscript{21} This Act, together with the Napoleonic Wars, caused the Continental companies to decline and the Company to expand its trade amount by leaps and bounds. Along with the increase in the Company's trade, the country traders' trade increased and they supplied more silver to the Company. By 1795 England became the winner of the struggle for the China trade.\textsuperscript{22}


Ch'ing: Power Bases

The later Ch'ien-lung reign was the period in which the social contradictions that had been accumulating were unravelled under the facade of enforced peace and prosperity. The most basic force was the economic expansion, which produced enough to feed the doubled population during the 18th century.\textsuperscript{23} This was an extraordinary phenomenon since there was virtually no major technological innovation or progress in Chinese agricultural methods.\textsuperscript{24} One of the consequences was that the limit of arable land vis-a-vis the continuously increasing population made inevitable the increase of anti-social elements who could undermine the regime's grip of power.\textsuperscript{25} Also, the vast yet thinly staffed imperial bureaucracy presented itself as increasingly slack and malfunctioning.\textsuperscript{26} The bureaucracy gradually became overwhelmed by the size of the task presented by the economic and demographic expansion and the accompanying social problems. These problems were aggravated by the general conceit, arrogance and self-closure of the society in the later Ch'ien-lung period.\textsuperscript{27} Perhaps symbolic of this syndrome was Ch'ien-lung's age itself. In 1793 when the Macartney embassy reached the Ch'ing, he was 82 years old. Surrounded by a small Manchu entourage including such men as Ho-shen, Fu Ch'ang-an and Fu K'ang-an, Ch'ien-lung politics was at the height of arrogance, deception and corruption.\textsuperscript{28}
Britain: Power Perspectives

There were mainly three kinds of voices raised with respect to the China trade. The Company which controlled the profit from the China trade tried to maintain the monopoly against the growing reformist voices. In England, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie began to assert themselves for participation in the China trade. The country traders also became more conscious than before of the restraints imposed upon them by the Company. Also the increase of trade caused an increase of trouble at Canton. Most importantly, there was the policy of commercial expansion at the time of international and commercial difficulties. All of these problems led Britain to send an embassy to China. The Cathcart embassy was designed to fix all the problems, but was terminated by the death of Cathcart on the way to China in 1787. The Macartney embassy was sent in 1792-1793 with the broader objective of increasing Britain’s relations with China and other Oriental countries.

The basic objective of the embassy, i.e., the opening of China, was retrospectively probably premature when we consider the basic interests and attitudes of the Ch'ing court and the Cohong merchants. The interests of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of northern England were put forward by the embassy against the strong opposition of the East India Company, which warned of the futility of the proposed embassy, partly in the interests of preserving the Company's monopoly. The extremely rapid industrial expansion achieved in the last quarter of the 18th century in England undoubtedly strengthened
the self-assertion of the individual bourgeoisie whose voice was translated into the embassy.\textsuperscript{31} The Company, though reluctant, had to bear the cost of sending the embassy due to the strong pressure of the government. Although sound in the British context, Pitt's policy vis-a-vis China was unrealistic when we consider the Ch'ing empire's unchanging and inflexible attitude toward foreign intercourse, the Cohong's interests in retaining the monopoly in trade, and the growing unpopularity of the British country traders' smuggling and violent behavior, which was often close to piracy.\textsuperscript{32}
China: Power Perspectives

The later Ch'ien-lung social atmosphere was characterized by conceit, arrogance and self-closure. There were several factors which brought about this syndrome. First, there was the traditional belief of ti-ta wu-p'ō or vast territory and abundant products or self-sufficiency, which was undoubtedly strengthened by the realization of what they thought was an all embracing empire by the mid-18th century. Second, there was the strong Confucian disdain for commercial activities of any kind, which was reinforced by the increasing trouble with the Western traders' smuggling and near piracy along the China coast. The consequence was a gradual restriction imposed upon foreign trade, which only ran counter to the increasing Western demand for commerce and thus caused further frictions and trouble. The Ch'ien-lung emperor's words sent to King George III reveal this fundamentally self-centered attitude:

...Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State: strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or
ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute Envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. Besides making gifts (of which I enclose an inventory) to each member of your Mission, I confer upon you, O King, valuable presents in excess of the number usually bestowed on such occasions, including silks and curios—a list of which is likewise enclosed. Do you reverently receive them and take note of my tender goodwill towards you! A special mandate. 33

The Macartney embassy was sniffed at by the Ch'eien-lung emperor. Discouraging foreigners' attempts to get access to China by imposing upon them abundant rituals was the favorite tactic of the Ch'ing empire. Kowtow is one of the most well known and most abhorring things for foreigners. There has been a hypothetical yet often asked question: if Macartney had done a kowtow, what would have happened? The answer shared by many seems to be that Macartney would not have been able to achieve his objectives even if he had done the
kowtow. The Dutchmen who kowtowed in the 17th century were not successful in their attempt. Kowtowing was in effect one of the instruments to discourage foreigners from seeking access to the empire. Following the rituals demanded by the Chinese could not be a passport to everything.

In a profound sense, the unprecedented great victory over the northern barbarians achieved by the Chinese empire blinded them to the new kind of extremely aggressive and technologically far superior southern barbarians or Westerners. The Macartney embassy was the dramatic open ceremony, if abortive for the British, of the eventual domination over China by the West.
Summary: British abortive mission to the Ch'ing in 1792-1793

We have attempted to show: 1) that the growing self-conceit and self-closure of the Ch'ing empire with the enforced peace inside and outside the empire and the economic and demographic expansion unprecedented in pre-industrial society, made it inevitable for her to avoid and refuse any intercourse with foreigners except in a way which was not only restrictive but also sinocentric; and 2) that the international financial difficulties and the pressure for more trade derived from the industrial growth led Britain to seek more commercial opportunities in the Far East, with the strong support of the country and private traders, the industrial bourgeoisie in northern England, and the cabinet.
Chapter 12: Anglo-Nepali war of 1814–1816

Introduction

The Chinese expedition to Tibet against the Jungars in 1720 and the Ch'ing's presence in Lhasa thereafter recorded the second presence of the Chinese empire since the time of Yuan.¹ But the Chinese presence did not bring about immediate changes to Himalayan politics, which took place only after the emergence of the Gurkha dynasty in Nepal in 1768, with its ambitious foreign policy.² Under the Malla dynasty much of the trade between India and Tibet had been through the Muslim and Hindu merchants. These merchants were suspected of offering aid to the remnants of the Mallas and were expelled by the new Gurkha dynasty. The Gurkhas were interested in monopolizing the trade opportunities between India and Tibet.³ The East India Company antagonized the Gurkhas by offering military aid to the Malla dynasty which was being overthrown by the Gurkhas in 1767. Moreover, the East India Company was strongly against a Gurkha monopoly of the trade between Tibet and India. It had its own plan to alleviate its own financial difficulties by commercial expansion to Tibet.⁴ Thus, the Gurkhas' relations with Tibet and the East India Company deteriorated very rapidly. Prothi Narayan, king of the Gurkhas, demanded that Tibet allow Gurkha coins be used in Tibet. The Gurkha demand was not accepted by Tibet. The Gurkhas finally resorted to war in 1788.⁵ Power in Nepal resided at that time with the regent, Bahadur Shah, who badly needed a foreign conquest in order to silence internal opposition. The Ch'ing residency at Lhasa opted for a settlement

Notes to chapter 12 appear on pages 564–566.
by negotiation against the emperor's order and for the Tibetans to accept the negotiated settlement. The Nepali mission visited Peking in 1789-1790 and thus it looked as if the conditions for peace were ripe. However, the terms of the treaty of 1789 turned out to be too hard for the Tibetans to execute. The non-execution of the terms by the Tibetans made Bahadur Shah's position extremely difficult in Nepal. Without the realization of the terms of the treaty, he would not be able to overcome the difficulties of the Nepali economy and his opposition, which was opposed to his 'forward policy'. Bahadur Shah resorted to war again. The Nepali advance to the area very close to Shigatse and Lhasa caused the Ch'ing intervention.

After having recognized that his orders had been neglected by the residents at Lhasa, the Ch'ien-lung emperor finally ordered Fu K'ang-an, the governor general of Liangkwang, to go to Tibet to punish the Gurkhas. Dalai Lama was very important to the Ch'ing since he was the religious head of the Mongols, whose compliance to the Ch'ing was considered to be essential to the security of the empire. Meanwhile the Company concluded the first treaty with Nepal in early 1792. The Chinese together with Tibetans, with forces of 13,000 and 10,000 respectively, inflicted a series of defeats on the Nepali force. Fu K'ang-an finally came very close to Katmandu. However, a lack of supplies and communication and the coming of winter forced the Ch'ing to come to terms.

In 1794 Bahadur Shah was deprived of his power and king Rana Bahadur assumed full power. With the dismissal of Bahadur Shah the
treaty with Britain, which had been concluded out of "more or less a council of despair"\textsuperscript{12} was also cancelled. The dismissal and later death of Bahadur Shah did not lessen the opposition to Rana Bahadur, and he was in a sense forced to retire to India in 1800. The treaty between Nepal and the Company was concluded in 1801.\textsuperscript{13} The treaty was concluded out of fear on the part of Nepal that Britain might assist Rana Bahadur, now retiring in India.\textsuperscript{14} However, opposition to this treaty increased, and the governor general Wellesley abrogated the treaty in 1804.\textsuperscript{15} This in turn caused the return of Rana Bahadur to Katmandu in the same year, who was only to be assassinated in 1806.\textsuperscript{16} Bhim Sen Thapa emerged as the dominant figure of influence. Nepal, despite its continuous, fierce, internal strife, continued its expansion. Bhim Sen Thapa advanced toward the west and crushed Ranjit Singh of the Sikh kingdom in Punjab.\textsuperscript{17}

The Napoleonic wars forbade the Company from extensive armed involvements in India. By 1814 things had changed. The Napoleonic wars had ended and Earl of Moira had become the governor general of India in 1813. Britain felt the need to eliminate one of the threats to British India, since two major concerns of the Company in a contingency of the Nepali invasion\textsuperscript{18} were at least partially eliminated. First, the Company concluded the treaty with the Sikhs in 1809\textsuperscript{19}, and second, the Company was pretty sure through information obtained by the resident at Katmandu, Knox, that Nepal would not seek Ch'ing assistance in the event of a British invasion of Nepal.\textsuperscript{20} Britain resorted to force to settle border disputes with Nepal. After a
difficult campaign, Britain was successful in forcing Nepal to agree to British terms. However, Nepal refused to ratify the agreement and Britain resorted to a war again. The Nepali defeat enabled the 1815 terms to be ratified. By this agreement of 1816 not only was British residency permitted at Katmandu but also a substantial territory of Nepal was ceded to Britain.\footnote{21}

This was the first of a series of incidents in which the Ch'ing's tributary countries split from Ch'ing influence.\footnote{22} The Ch'ing could have demanded a residency at Katmandu in competition with Britain. Unfortunately this was far beyond their imagination.\footnote{23}
Britain: Power Bases

In 1772, when Warren Hastings was appointed governor general of Bengal, the East India Company began to consolidate its basis. Since the battle of Plassey in 1757, the influence of the Company became so great as to bring about two fundamental changes in Indian economic life: 1) the Company destroyed the Indian handicrafts and 2) the Company monopolized the commercial trade through India and thus destroyed Indian merchants. Furthermore, the Company's dual form of administration, by which it manipulated the nominal heads from behind, caused the evasion of responsibility both on the part of the Company and the native rulers. The Company was in incessant financial difficulties since it began to rule Bengal. All of these necessitated administrative and financial reforms. When Warren Hastings became the governor general, the situation was worse since, in 1770, there was a great famine in Bengal which was aggravated by the Company's neglect of irrigation facilities and the Company's heavy taxes. Hastings tried to solve this state of affairs in part by expanding the Company's trade activities. Tibet was considered to be an El Dorado where gold and treasures were abundant. One of the targets was trade with Tibet via Bhutan, since the Nepal route was impossible due to the Nepali hostility to the Company. During the Ch'ing-Nepali war of 1791-1792, the Macartney embassy was being sent to Peking in spite of the opposition of the Company, which wanted to use the Tibetan route so that the Company could effectively control the profits of the trade with China. However, the government under Pitt
and more importantly the Board of Control headed by Dundas supported
the new industrial bourgeoisie and proceeded with their plan to use
the sea route to Peking for the principle of an open market.²⁸

After the Ch'ing-Nepali war of 1791-1792, Britain was eager to
know the extent to which the relationship between the Ch'ing and
Nepal was strengthened in case Britain would get into hostility
with Nepal. From 1792 to 1814, Nepali internal strife became ex-
tremely intense, and this was an opportunity for British conquest.
But Britain could not intervene. There were the Napoleonic wars
and the Second Maratha war (1803-1805).²⁹ Furthermore, there was
British apprehension of Ch'ing's possible termination of the Canton
trade, which was very important to the Company.³⁰ When Moira proposed
the conquest of Nepal in 1813, the Company was against it for reasons
of financial difficulties. They argued that since the Company's
monopoly of the Indian trade was abolished and the Company must
strengthen its capacity for competition with other traders, the Company
could not possibly afford another expensive war. What Moira did
was to grab money from the Indian ruler of Oudh.³¹ Despite the
financial difficulties, Britain had no French opposition in India;
it was the time of Britain's conquest of India, Nepal being her
first target. It was also the time when British textiles entered
India for the first time in history.³² The war turned out to be
extremely costly and probably the most difficult of all the wars the
Company had ever fought in India.³³
Nepal: Power Bases

The Gurkha dynasty's expansive drives did not slow down even after the Ch'ing invasion of Nepal. By 1795 Nepal stretched its territory from the border of Bhutan to the border of Kashmir. After long, fierce, internal strife in the court, Bhim Sen Thapa emerged as a real power in 1804. Nepal confronted the Sikhs, but the war ended with a stalemate and the border line set along the Sutlej river. Also Nepal tried to advance southward, which made a crush with British India almost inevitable. Underlying all these expansions was the existence of the large standing army, which had been the basis of its success in overthrowing the Malla dynasty and unifying various rulers in Nepal. In 1816 the Nepali force amounted to as many as 100,000. To feed the military force, expansion was essential. To stifle internal oppositions, continuous rewards and a display of force were indispensable. The Gurkha dynasty was far more dynamic and expansive than the former Malla dynasty, which enjoyed and was content with the status of commercial intermediary between India and Tibet.
Ch'ing: Power Bases

The Ch'ien-lung reign was one of the most extravagant periods in the long history of China. By the mid-18th century, the traditionally formidable enemy of the north had been subjugated. Due to the radical decline in the military expenditure for northern barbarians, the revenues of the Ch'ing court increased. At the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign, the court had 70-80 million silver taels as surplus. The Gurkha campaign cost more than 6 million silver taels. The Gurkha campaign was the last, and the largest external campaign of the Ch'ien-lung reign and of the Ch'ing empire. The difficulty and costliness of the campaign led the Ch'ing to passivity and non-involvement in Himalayan politics thereafter. At the time of the Anglo-Nepali war, the budget balance of the Ch'ing court was completely reversed due to the enormous spending for the suppression of the White Lotus rebellion. Despite the Nepali request for help, the Ch'ing could, would and did take no action. During and after the White Lotus rebellion, the Ch'ing dynasty was beset with increasing financial problems, which made its external dealings inactive and at best passive and defensive. One of the British members who visited Peking both in 1793 and in 1816 noticed perceptively in 1816 that the main buildings in Peking had not been taken care of apparently since 1793.
Britain: Power Perspectives

Although not free from the chronic financial difficulties since the acquisition of diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in return for an annual tribute to the Moghul emperor, the Company was free from the rivalry with France in India by 1814. Despite the Company's opposition, its governor general Moira proceeded to resort to force to solve the disputes with Nepal, which posed a menace just north of the Company's basis, Bengal and Bihar. The liquidation of the northern menace was the chief objective of the war. The motive of opening the trade route to Tibet and thus to China was considered secondary because the sea route through Canton was attempted more seriously since the Cathcart and Macartney embassies in 1787 and in 1793 respectively, which were backed essentially by the cabinet, the country and private traders, and the northern English industrial bourgeoisie. The territorially largest Marathas were declining rapidly through internal strife as well as through the wars with the Company. So was Mysore in the south. Nepal was still expanding southward and collided with the British expansion northward. The result was the most difficult war the Company had ever fought in India. The Company's Himalayan policies of friendly relations with the Sikhs and the Ch'ing were partly achieved by the 1809 agreement with the Sikhs. Ch'ing turned out to be a paper tiger in 1814. The Company was also seriously concerned before the Nepal war with the possibility of a joint anti-British war by Indian rulers. The anti-British joint front never materialized, however. Thus Britain proceeded more vigorously towards
the conquest of India after 1815. The history of the Company since the acquisition of diwani was one of financial difficulties and political involvement. Despite its increase in political power, the Company was always in trouble. As the Company tried to get rid of troubles one by one, it finally conquered all of India.
Nepal: Power Perspectives

Although the unexpected expedition of the Ch'ing forces over the Himalayas close to Katmandu temporarily halted the expansion of the Gurkhas, it continued even more vigorously than pre-war days. Particularly after the compromise with the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh about dividing the territory by the Sutlej River, the Gurkhas turned increasingly toward the south, which was also the direction of the Company's expansion. The area was fertile and thus it was thought indispensable to maintain the large standing army and the survival and independence of Nepal. Nepal opted for a war against the Company rather than for the cession of the disputed territory for several reasons. First, they thought the British demand would not be the last one, and even if Nepal accepted the demand, Britain would pose another demand later. Second, Nepal took the peace agreement with the Ch'ing in 1793 far more seriously or substantively than the Ch'ing did, and expected that the Ch'ing would help when Nepal had trouble with Britain since Nepal was now the Ch'ing's tributary state. Third, there was Bhim Sen Thapa's confidence in the strength of the Gurkha force. Fourth, there was the existence of the Gurkhas' 'understanding' or agreement with Ranjit Singh to the effect that they would wage a joint war against Britain if the Gurkhas succeeded against the British up to a certain point. Retrospectively, the first consideration seems to have been correct. The difficulties inflicted upon the
British by Nepal during the war did deter Britain from demanding more. The second turned out to be a one-sided love of Nepal. Nepal, thereafter, was to develop, after a long search, its unique policy of independence and cooperation with Britain which was to be realized most dramatically by its military assistance to the British besieged at Patna by the Indian Sepoys in 1867.52
Ch'ing: Power Perspectives

With the state of affairs in 1815, the Ch'ing empire was far from able to assist Nepal. What the emperor could do, as he did, was to maintain the form of the tributary relationship with Nepal, whereas all the substantive contents of the relationship were void. The emperor's order was that Ch'ing assist Nepal if the war between Nepal and Britain came to the Ch'ing border, and that Ch'ing let Nepal fight alone if the war was fought along the border between Nepal and Britain. Any area beyond the Himalayan border of the Ch'ing was not considered at all. At that time high officials of the Ch'ing empire were not able to identify the enemy of Nepal. It was called the Feringhi (Westerners in general and the British in India in particular). The problem was that they did not think that the British at Canton and the Feringhi in Bengal were the same. Thus, Nepal's appeal for a joint war against Britain was not considered seriously since the Ch'ing did not know the enemy. The Anglo-Nepali war constituted the first step in the decline and dismemberment of the traditional Chinese world order.
Summary: Anglo-Nepali war of 1814-1816

We have attempted to show: 1) that British policy toward Nepal was dictated by strategic rather than commercial considerations, reflecting a policy toward a 'formal empire' (India), not toward an 'informal empire' (China); 2) that the Ch'ing empire, preoccupied with its own difficulties, remained idle with its tributary state slipping away from its suzerainty, marking the first step in the decline of imperial external influence.
Chapter 13: Opium war of 1839–1842

Introduction

The opposition to the East India Company became more and more intense as the new industrial bourgeoisie became larger in England beginning in the late 18th century.\(^1\) The new industrial bourgeoisie became increasingly dissatisfied with the existence of the trade monopoly of the Company. The new bourgeoisie, based on the cotton industry in northern England, was hostile to the Company. The Company was not only against free trade but also the competitive supplier of cotton textiles to England.\(^2\) There are two reason why the bourgeoisie was very eager to put an end to the monopoly of the Company when the monopoly right of the Company was to be renewed in 1833. First, the free trade between India and England, which had been instituted in 1814, was showing impressive growth.\(^3\) This strengthened the belief in free trade. Second, the strong competitors in the China trade, the Americans, irritated the British who felt that, because of the absence of the old-fashioned, inefficient trade monopoly, the Americans had immense advantages vis-a-vis the British in the China trade. Indeed, American ships had navigational advantages for tea transportation -- their ships were smaller and faster.\(^4\) British navigational technology almost always lagged behind the French and American technology in the 19th century and up to World War I, due to self-content and a resultant lack of effort for improvement.\(^5\) The principle of

Notes to chapter 13 appear on pages 566–568.
free trade became widely shared and the Company was not able to run against it. However, the Company made efforts to retain its colonial administration by partial abrogation of its power, i.e., abolition of the Company's monopoly of the China trade. In 1833 a bill to abolish the Company's monopoly of the China trade was passed in parliament. The abolition of the Company's monopoly, which was a counterpart to the Cohong at Canton, created massive problems to both sides since the disappearance of the Company in trade meant the direct confrontation of the traders and Britain with the Ch'ing empire. Without the intermediary organization, collision became almost inevitable. After 1821 the opium trade became more and more voluminous despite the official prohibition of opium trade in the Ch'ing empire. Country traders were too often such perfect outlaws as to neglect the prohibition of trade except at Canton and go to ports located as north as Fukien, Chekiang and Shantung. They were violent with anybody who stood in their way and who was opposed to the self-claimed free trade principle and practices. They even asserted that they were free from the legal order of the empire as well as from the control of the Company. The country traders, having now surpassed the Company in terms of tonnage of ships as well as in terms of the amount of trade, became increasingly militant. After 1833 the country traders were confronted by the increasingly tougher control of the Ch'ing empire, and accordingly they began to bring about the equally tough intervention of their government, using what was to be called gunboat diplomacy.
In England, capitalist development had already produced workers' organizations and economic depression. The July revolution of France and the general election in England of the same year provided an atmosphere where radical reform could not be escaped. The reform bill of 1832 was passed despite the opposition of most of the landed gentry and aristocracy, in exchange for the suppression of the proletarian movement. At that time Palmerston was foreign secretary under Grey. He had a relatively free hand in foreign affairs because of parliament's relative indifference to foreign affairs. His concern with China was for a developing market. The bill of 1833 abolished the Company's monopoly of the China trade, and the superintendents of trade set out to take care of the China trade. The first superintendent was Napier, who arrived at Canton in 1832. Napier disregarded several strongly established procedures, which so much provoked the officials of Canton as to discontinue trade immediately. His attitude was probably gradually formulated on the way to Canton by his sense of military superiority, as well as by the close advice of Jardine, the English merchant-prince. Although a compromise seemed to be reached between the Cohong and English traders, the governor general and other high officials of Canton vetoed the compromise and subsequently foreign communities were besieged by the Ch'ing force. Napier resorted to gunboat policy. But a fit of malaria
disabled him from pursuing the policy any further under the siege of the enemy. Thereafter a quiescent policy which did not dare to provoke Ch'ing officials dominated China policy until 1836.

Meanwhile the amount of opium trade increased greatly, which in turn led British merchants to improve the trade system. Elliot began negotiations in 1836 when he became the superintendent of trade.\textsuperscript{14} Along with the increase of opium trade, the British began to do transactions at places which Canton officials were not easily able to find, and furthermore they began to reside in Canton permanently rather than living alternately in Canton and Macao, as had theretofore been the case. In the Ch'ing court the policy discussion on opium became intense.\textsuperscript{15} The Tao-kuan emperor requested suggestions for the best policy about opium. Lin Tse-hsu's turned out to be the most cogent to the emperor, and he was appointed as Imperial Commissioner. Anticipating the impending tough policy by Lin Tse-hsu, Canton officials discontinued the trade of opium before Lin arrived at Canton. Although the trade was resumed at the request of Elliot, who showed a compromising attitude toward the prohibition of opium trade, opium trade had been absolutely suppressed before Lin arrived at Canton. His confiscation of opium was considered by the British at home to be a serious violation of the principle of private property.\textsuperscript{16}

Then an incident took place which set fire to a series of violent acts. British sailors killed a Chinese.\textsuperscript{17} Elliot refused to deliver the sailors to Lin, claiming that they should be judged in England.
Lin ordered the Chinese not to supply materials to the British at Macao, who were thus forced to retreat to their ships. A stalemate was reached after several skirmishes took place, since each side lacked enough military forces to overwhelm the other. In 1840 Britain decided to send military forces. Elliot went northward, occupying Ting-hai near Shangai and threatening to proceed to Peking at the mouth of Peiho river. Thereafter Elliot frequently resorted to the gunboat policy of coercion. The negotiations between Elliot and the new Imperial Commissioner Ch'i-shan began at Canton. After the occupation of Humen, a treaty of Ch'uanpi was concluded in 1841. Tao-kuan sent additional forces from all over the empire to Canton, but the British forces sieged Canton and Canton officials were forced to agree to an armistice agreement. However, the treaty was not satisfactory to either Tao-kuan or Palmerston. A new omnipotentiary, Pottinger, attacked Amoy, Chusan, Chenhai, Ningpo, Shanghai, Chinkiang and finally Nanking, and thus controlled the Yangtze river and the great canal, refusing the Ch'ing court access to the route for food transportation to Peking. Peking easily succumbed and the treaty of Nanking was drawn. The U.S. and France followed suit. Thus the Ch'ing became subject to unequal treaties imposed upon them by Western powers; these included the most favored nation clause, extra-territoriality, a fixed tax rate for trade articles, cession of territories, opening ports and others.18
Britain: Power Bases

After the Napoleonic wars Britain was not involved in any major European wars except the Crimean war. In this sense the 19th century was a peaceful century for Britain. The century was the period of British naval supremacy which safeguarded her world-wide trade relationships, on which she was dependent for her survival and prosperity.\(^{19}\) This relative peace did not hide the fact that Britain was engaged in relatively minor—at least to Britain—conflicts in other places such as India, the Far East, Africa, the Mediterranean and Latin America.\(^{20}\) The opium war was one of the minor violent incidents, at least to Britain, whereas it was considered to be an epochmaking event in China.

The victory of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent naval supremacy all over the world tended to blind Britain to naval and navigational technological innovations.\(^{21}\) The Frenchmen and Americans went ahead of the British during most of the 19th century. The menace of American free traders in Canton who used faster ships was one of the reasons British bourgeoisie demanded the abolition of the company monopoly.\(^{22}\) It was no wonder that it was one of the two steam warships the East India Company had at that time that went to Canton for gunboat coercion.\(^{23}\) Despite British naval dominance, she did not have many technologically advanced ships.

At the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840 Britain had a population of 18 million, and if Ireland was included, the population was 26
million. In the first half of the century the Irish population increased enormously because of the diffusion of the potato, which was only abruptly terminated by potato famines in the mid-19th century. From then on there was massive emigration from Ireland to the United States and to Scotland and England. The Industrial Revolution began in the fourth quarter of the 19th century and brought about various social, political and economic consequences. The demand of the middle and working classes became increasingly strong. As an economic historian characterizes this time, "No period of British history has been as tense as politically and socially disturbed, as the 1830's and early 1840's, when both the working class and the middle class, separately or in conjunction demanded what they regarded as fundamental changes." From 1829 to 1832," he goes on, "their discontents fused in the demand for parliamentary reform, behind which the masses threw their riots and demonstrations, the businessmen the power of economic boycott. After 1832, when several of the demands of the middle class radicals were met, the workers' movement fought and failed alone. From the crisis of 1837 on, middle class agitation revived under the banner of the Anti-Corn Law League, that of the laboring masses broadened out into the gigantic movement for the People's Charter, though the two now ran independently of all in opposition to each other. Yet both in that rival ways were prepared for extremes, especially during the worst of nineteenth century depressions 1841-1842: Chartism for a general strike, the middle class extremists for a national look-out which would, flooding the streets
with starving laborers, force the government into action."\textsuperscript{27}

Foreign affairs were most of the time beyond the interests of their demands unless pertaining to free trade and slave trade. Thus Palmerston generally had ample freedom in handling foreign affairs in which the House of Commons was not very interested. The House of Commons was almost completely absorbed in the issues of electoral reform and other domestic issues. This fact tended to strengthen the military's self-claimed guardianship of the Crown and imperial interests that only they could stand for the imperial interests, and their assertion as they understood them; this was exemplified in Napier's words when he fought in 1834.\textsuperscript{28} At the time of the Opium war, Britain was waging the Afghanistan war. Also the ruler of the Dogra kingdom at Jammu invaded Tibet at that time.\textsuperscript{29} British India was in extreme difficulties, second only to those at the time of the Indian mutinies of 1857-1858, due to the engagement of hostilities on the two fronts. In 1840, the Nepali king sent a letter to the Ch'ing emperor through ambans (administrative-cum-military-cum-diplomatic representatives of Ch'ing) at Lhasa to appeal for a joint war against Britain.\textsuperscript{30} The Nepali king was eager to revenge the war of 1814-1816 as well as to make hegemony out of the ever unstable political struggles around the court. However, the Ch'ing empire did not bother itself with the affairs between two barbarians. It did not even recognize the identity of the British at Canton, against whom they were fighting, and the British in Bengal. The affairs outside the border were categorically not stored in the Ch'ing
memory, and thus the knowledge of Britain which must have been acquired in the events in 1793 and further in 1814-1816 had already become nil. 31
China: Power Bases

During the 18th century the population was doubled from 15 million to 30 million, whereas cultivated land increased far less proportionately. During the century preceding 1840 the population was almost tripled. In 1840 the population was 41 million. The virtual exhaustion of the supply of new land, which had been evident by the end of the 18th century when the White Lotus rebellion took place, and the overfragmentation of land because of the hereditary system, whereby land was distributed to all of the sons instead of the first son only, increased the downward mobility of the peasants. Many of them became anti-social elements which threatened communities from outside. By the dawn of the Opium war, anti-social elements had become formidable forces scattering around in many areas.

The commercial revolution in Europe brought a lot of silver into China in the 18th century, which, along with other factors, contributed to the gradual and continuous inflation which increased probably as much as 300% during the 18th century. From China the European countries bought a lot of tea, which had become a rather indispensable commodity for Europeans by the latter half of the 18th century. They paid the balance of trade with silver, which was the international currency at that time. However, the impact of opium, which increased very rapidly, changed the balance of trade of China in the late 1820's. China began to export silver. That meant that there was a continuous drain of silver from the Chinese monetary market. Thus deflation began from the reign of the Tao-kuan emperor (r. 1820-1850). While the
population was still increasing, economic activity became less vigorous. Prices, especially of rice, went down gradually. The result was that the peasants had to pay more tax for rice, since tax rate was almost constant since the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty. Having in mind the simple fact that the loyalty of the peasantry and the gentry to the Ch'ing empire was the crux of the Manchu minority rule, the Manchu rulers tried hard not to increase ungraciously the burdens on the peasantry and gentry. However, a natural increase of the tax burden could not be helped. The government had a smaller budget for public policy, particularly for river control and bandit suppression. The decreasing morale and increasing corruption of officials aggravated the situation. The result was increasing misery and disaster. The life expectancy gradually decreased during the century preceding 1840. In the mid-18th century it was 60 years for the male older than 15 years old in the Jung clan in Kwangtung. In the mid-19th century it dropped to 50 years.

Opium, officially forbidden, was distributed widely, causing further distribution of the normal monetary balance in rural China and further nourishment of anti-social elements, which distributed and profited through opium. Since officials' power could not penetrate the village substructures where rebellions rose and flourished, community leaders began to organize self-defense forces within communities. The gradual transition of power from provincial officials to the gentry originated from the increasing threat from outside anti-social elements. The official sanction of the gentry's power against
British invasions strengthened the gentry's grip on their power. What the Manchu ruling class most feared was that they would be overwhelmed by the Han Chinese. Thus it was not very desirable to prevent the gentry from possessing any counterveiling power. Power should be balanced between district magistrates and the gentry; this was the traditional pattern of government. However, confronted by foreign enemies, they resorted to the encouragement of community militarization, led by the gentry and with the cooperation of the peasants, without the substantial participation of officials. Unchecked by a balance of power in local communities, the gentry's power began to surpass the power of local officials. This social transformation in local communities later began to nourish class antagonism within community, i.e., between the gentry and the peasantry.

Externally, the traditional policy of appeasement vis-a-vis a strong enemy did not bring about the expected result. The Ch'ing policy of managing barbarians at the border only exhibited and exacerbated the imperial administrative malaise of the tail wagging the dog. The British were so much frustrated by the negotiations at Canton that they struck at Peking. They were not simply satisfied with the material benefits at the border. They were concerned with the principle as they saw it. They could not be appeased. What was worse, they had military power with which to force their will. Meanwhile, mass xenophobia emerged as a hindrance to the execution of the official policy of appeasement. It was not only restricted to the populace in Canton; it was widespread in Peking officialdom and the officials
throughout the empire. The peace party's power bases were extremely precarious. Mu-chang-a, the architect of the policy of appeasement during this period and thereafter, was to be abruptly dismissed in 1850 when the anti-foreign Hsien-feng emperor was enthroned.

One of the very important things in decision making style was that the commissioner was given a kind of omnipotent power vis-a-vis foreign countries, and thus the government at Peking tended to be dragged by Canton's faits accomplis. This was because of "the emperor's favorite method to appoint special commissioners who bypassed provincial governors and acted directly for him." -- with carte blanche. This was aggravated by the absolute geographical distance between Canton and Peking (it took 15 days for one way communication) and the officials' tendency to avoid offending the emperor and thus to deceive him with false information. This system not only complicated all decision making at Canton and at Peking, but also irritated and frustrated the British so much as to lead them to resort to gunboat diplomacy. The malaise of the traditional imperial structure of communication and control revealed itself painfully and became the direct cause of the British decision to strike at Peking.
Britain: Power Perspectives

The major concern of the House of Commons was free trade, as far as foreign affairs were concerned. When the increasing pressure of the Chinese emperor on the Canton trade in 1839-1840 was felt, not only Captain Elliot and Jardin, the English merchant-prince, but also cotton industrial interests intervened to terminate the Canton officials' 'unjust' limitation of trade in China. However, as the war went on, a certain number of mercantilists and manufacturers not connected with opium trade asserted that opium trade would decrease the demand for non-opium goods in the China market. The amount of opium trade had already become too great for the government to ignore, and thus the government was thwarted by the vested interests of the drug trade. It seems that there was a distinctive pattern in the assertion of the British bourgeoisie. That is that at the initial stage they were quite supportive of free trade and an open market. Their support was not firmly based on realistic understanding of the situation, but on the principle of political economy which was then a sort of *Zeitgeist*. And at the second stage, the force which benefited from the previous action overwhelmed so much that the 'real' interests of the British bourgeoisie retreated. This pattern was seen in the course of events of the Opium war. The pattern was also seen in the difference of priority between the principle of free trade and the prohibition of opium trade in the years of 1793 and 1834.
China: Power Perspectives

The Cohong merchants' perspectives were dominated by their desire to retain their monopoly of trade at Canton and their monstrous profit therefrom. The Cohong merchants were one class of the two monopolizing merchants sanctioned by the government, the other being the salt merchants. They persistently resisted any measures which would jeopardize their special privileges. They supported the officials who insisted on legalizing opium in order to more effectively/control opium trade and prevent silver drain. The Manchu officials tended to support their policy since they were afraid of the possibility of where anti-Manchu rebellions which might take place because of the strict prohibition of opium, such as capital punishment to every opium smoker and smuggler. Those who supported the strict policy on opium were moralists, most conspicuously from the Hsuan-nan poetry club where, through the Kung-yang interpretation of the Spring and Autumn Annals, which favored the reformist interpretation of Confucianism, they began to try actively to bring about reforms by vigorous intervention of the polity. Lin Tse-hsu, a protagonist of the Opium war, was one of them. They were indignant at the corruptions and malgovernments of rich officials. As we have already noted before, one of the important consequences of Lin's policy against opium addiction was the official sanction of the gentry's control of local self-defense organizations. Unlike the Manchu officials, who were hyper-sensitive to the anti-Manchu action of the Han Chinese, Lin failed to foresee this consequence of his policy, perhaps blinded by
his firm, moral righteousness on the subject of opium addiction. He had anti-mercantilist feelings and thus did not like China's foreign trade. Furthermore, he undervalued the stakes attached to China trade by the British traders and government. Thus, hoping to control the opium trade, he confronted them with two alternatives: total suspension of trade or total prohibition of opium. The fact was that the British government could have dropped opium trade in 1793, when the free trade principle had priority over opium trade, but not in 1839.\textsuperscript{58} The event in 1834 had already shown that British government's higher priority was on opium.\textsuperscript{59} Lin was replaced by the conservative Ch'i-shan after British ships at Tientsin threatened Peking. Ch'i-shan's policy was appeasement to the British and deception of Tao-kuan, both of which were bound to fail. After all, the British won their demands at least on paper in 1842. The Chinese perspective did not change easily, and neither did the British perspective. Thus later in 1849 Palmerston remarked: "These half-civilized governments—all require a Dressing every eight or ten years to keep them in order."\textsuperscript{60}
Summary: Opium war of 1839–1842

We have attempted to show: 1) that the British anti-mercantilist industrial bourgeoisie's voice for free trade was put forward, pointing toward an informal empire, with the inevitable clash with the exclusivist Ch'ing empire; 2) that the Chinese traditional policy of barbarian management by sparing barbarians imperial 'goodies' only allowed them to penetrate further and further into the empire economically, thus undermining traditional economic and social relations; 3) that the Ch'ing policy of mobilizing village communities against foreigners by relegating power to the gentry only undermined the local officials' power and thus the empire's control over the communities; 4) that the combination of official appeasement and self-deception and the popular explosion of xenophobic, passionate, often hysterical sentiments too often wrought the worst consequences, at least in the short run; 5) that the more immediate views and interests of the country and private traders, however, overwhelmed the 'real' interests of the British industrial bourgeoisie in the confrontation, indicating a mixture of the two conflicting ideas of mercantilism and free trade.
Chapter 14: Arrow war of 1856–1860

Introduction

The treaties concluded between China and Western countries between 1839 and 1842 did not satisfy either of them. China did not like the treaties at all. With all the conceivable measures available, China tried to go back to the status quo ante of age-old isolationism. This policy was especially strengthened by the change of emperor from the weary Tao-kuan emperor to the anti-foreign Hsien-feng emperor in 1850. The dismissal of Mu-chang-a, an architect of the post-Opium war appeasement policy, signaled this change. The Western countries were increasingly frustrated by what a British historian termed "duplicity, evasion and cruelty of the Chinese officials." whereas the Chinese were almost desperate to get rid of the intimidation by the Western countries amidst the mushrooming of rebellions in the Yangtze valley area, Shantung, Chihli, Shensi, Yunnan, Kashgaría, and others. Making a casus belli of the Chinese arrest of a British sailor and the murder of a French missionary at Canton in 1856, Britain and France dared to make a joint intervention in China in order to solve the problems, or more aptly, to force the Chinese to execute the letter and spirit of the treaties as they saw them. After bombarding and occupying the city of Canton, the joint force went up to Tientsin, bombarding and threatening to force their way to Peking to have their demands accepted. The British understood now that they had to deal directly with Peking where they thought a

Notes to chapter 14 appear on pages 568–569.
Chinese Foreign Ministry existed rather than Canton which did not actually have ultimate power. In 1858 they signed the treaties of Tientsin which dealt with the problem of Western representation in China, and then moved to Shanghai to negotiate on other questions, such as tariffs. Bruce was sent to enforce the ratification of the treaty. His force was completely repulsed in 1859 at Taku by Seng-ko-lin-ch' in, a Mongol bannerman and commissioner of Tientsin.  

The British government headed by Palmerston was less annoyed by the opposition than by the beginning of the Arrow War in 1857, when Palmerston had to resort to a general election due to strong opposition in parliament.  

Elgin took the bold step of attacking Peking. The Hsien-feng emperor and his entourage, including major war party leaders, fled to Jehol, leaving Prince Kung and other peace party leaders at Peking to negotiate with the Western powers. With Prince Kung, now free from the war party's pressure, the Western powers concluded the Peking convention in 1860. With the death of the Hsien-feng emperor in Jehol and with the control of power by Prince Kung supported by Dowager Empresses Hsiao-ch'in and Hsiao-ch'en, the policy of Peking was conciliatory in foreign affairs for a while. The Tsungli Yamen was established during the Peking negotiations. This was to function as an important organization for dealing with foreign affairs for a while until Li Hung-chang took his place as governor of Chihli and commissioner of northern affairs based on Tientsin.
China: Power Bases

As the state machines for tight internal security and heavy economic exploitation became more and more 'self-defeating' in their functions, the Manchu regime's power bases became fundamentally threatened. The regular forces were increasingly inefficient, corrupt, and powerless against the mushrooming riots and rebellions. The simultaneity of the major rebellions, such as the Taiping in the Yangtze valley, the Nien in Shantung and Chihli, and the Muslim in Shensi and Yunnan, made it absolutely impossible to suppress them with regular troops without relying upon newly organized, regionally based military forces. The regionally based military forces became the focal point of power undermining the Manchu regime, which desperately needed the support of the Han Chinese.

The increasing inefficiency of exploitation machines and the recurrent resistance to the payment of tax by peasants and landlords, as well as the need for a special military budget, put the Manchu regime in chronic financial difficulties. It may be surprising that landlords kept making higher profits even during the period of the Sturm und Drang of the mid-19th century, due to the average increase of production. This was possible because of constant land cultivation, extremely labor-intensive agriculture and constant innovation, though still remaining basically traditional. Despite the stagnation of the population since the early 19th century, particularly after the horrendous suppression of the Taiping rebellion might have mitigated the aggravation of peasants' living conditions, it cannot be said that the living conditions of the
peasants were improved. Rather the heavy tax demands by the state increased the recurrent resistance of peasants and landlords, often together, against the state.9 Low acquisition of taxes by the state due to inefficiency and corruption, rebellion, and an increasingly large share for the gentry rather than for local officials, called for more heavy tax demands by the state which in turn produced more resistance and a resultant even lower tax acquisition by the state.10 Without the semi-universal dissatisfaction of peasants, coolies and opium smugglers around the Yangtze valley, the Taipings' success in this area, albeit short-run, cannot be explained.11

From the point of view of the Manchu regime the threat of the Niens was more strongly felt than from the Taipings. During the Tao-kuan and Hsien-feng reigns only North China was relatively well under the direct control of Peking.12 Plagued by internal rebellions and foreign aggressions, the Manchu regime oscillated between outright anti-foreign chauvinism and a policy of cooperation with foreign powers. The ideological continuity between the internal and the external made it extremely hard for the rulers of China to be submissive to foreign powers,13 since it meant the denial of the absolute imperial virtue and thus made Manchu rule extremely vulnerable to the cause of rebellions.

Because of the coincidence of the weak, weary and/or unwise emperors with dynastic difficulties, the old Manchu system of clan oriented decision making was revived for a while to overcome extreme difficulties.14 The peace party headed by Prince Kung, Kuei-liang and Wen-hsiang gained power because of the war party's desertion to Jehol. The presence of
Western powers in North China was the major basis for the peace party's power. The strength of the peace party was largely inversely proportional to the intensity of the foreign powers' military pressure up to a certain point. Beyond that point, the war party's strength diminished. If military pressure was further intensified to the extreme, the peace party would lose face and the war party could gain power. The peace party had to stay at the second stage in order to be in power. This was what happened in 1859-1860. Thus their power was precarious at best. Therefore, their impact on foreign affairs was also precarious. All the agreements concluded by the peace party through the Tsungli Yamen would not be executed if the peace party was not in power. Meanwhile the regionally based Han Chinese officials gradually gained power and prominence in the 1850's and 1860's, constituting *imperia in imperio*. The Manchu rulers, *faute de mieux*, utilized and thus increasingly depended on the Chinese politicians and militarists in order to attract them to the cause of the Ch'ing empire.
Mid-Victorian England enjoyed prosperity. After the period of popular radicalism in the 1830's and the early 1840's had ended, the day of prosperity came—at least to the rich. There was no major European war except the Crimean war since the Waterloo of 1815. The Industrial Revolution was going on. Railroads increased substantially. The standard of living improved steadily, and even the working class began to feel, if belatedly, their improvement, which often accelerated their class consciousness vis-a-vis the bourgeois class rather than vis-a-vis the aristocratic establishment, contrary to the expectation of the middle class radicals of the 1830's and 1840's. The failure of popular radicalism to remain united against the aristocratic establishment was followed by an increasing incorporation of the middle class into the establishment and thus its deradicalization or aristocratization. After economic wealth was achieved, social prestige and political status were sought by the middle class *nouveaux riches*.  

Traditional party distinctions had been only nominally retained, and the leaders of members of the House of Commons surpassed the king, party and parliament in their power. The mid-Victorian period was a heyday for such politicians as Palmerston. It was not party loyalty but the personal persuasion and manipulation of each politician in parliament by these leaders that made a difference in parliament. It was each politician's efforts in his own locality that made a difference in election results. Thus whether or not these leaders were liked by other members of parliament made a significant difference in
parliamentary voting. Extra-parliamentary speeches made by radicals
did not affect parliament very much unless they could mobilize support
in parliament. It was within this setting that the Arrow war aroused
vocal opposition to Palmerton, which succeeded in forcing him to appeal
to a general election. The election ended with Palmerston's victory,
however. This was the first public evidence that the industrial
bourgeoisie had deserted middle class radicalism. However, the
post-election policy toward China had to take into account the exist-
ence of a strong opposition, especially in parliament. The appointment
of Elgin to replace Bowring after the election was intended to make
the China policy less aggressive and thus less vulnerable to the
opposition in Britain. Besides that, the organizational change in
the cabinet by the incorporation of other senior politicians into the
cabinet reduced the 'dictatorial' leadership of Palmerston.

British forces were far superior to the Chinese and other Western
forces, despite the lack of significant innovation since Waterloo.
The Indian soldiers were the most disciplined and professional forces
sent to China to fight. However strong the British force was, it
must be noted that the Chinese were sometimes strong enough to over-
whelm and defeat the British force. The Taku incident in 1859, in
which the British force led by Bruce was repulsed, was evidence of
this. If concentrated, disciplined and commanded well, the Chinese
force was sometimes able to surpass the British force. British
involvement in China was influenced critically by the contingency of
the forces available to them. The end of the British involvement in
the Crimean war enabled the British to force China to execute the treaties faithfully. Also, the Indian mutinies posed one of the most serious threats to British presence in India. Thus, a large part of the British forces were tied to India during the Arrow War.
China: Power Perspectives

First of all, there was extraordinary concern over being overthrown by the Chinese on the part of the Manchu rulers. Their concern for self-preservation amidst the Chinese rebellions and foreign aggression was quite understandable. Thus they were extremely sensitive to subtle ups and downs in power relationships both in and outside of the court. They tended to be conciliatory to foreign powers to avoid further immediate foreign pressures without so much as taking into account any conceivable long-term consequences of their actions. They were absorbed in the day to day management of internal and external threats. The Chinese, on the other hand, tended to be more fundamentalist. Taking advantage of trouble, they attacked the Ch'ing policies using ch'ing-i with a highly moralistic and culturalist tone. Basically free from day to day handling of foreign affairs, they could be confident and opportunistic enough to attack the Manchues for easily succumbing to foreign powers.

The demarcation was not simply ethnic, however. At the highest level, there were the war and peace parties, both of which were largely Manchu. Between them policy differences were intermingled with and even overwhelmed by an intense power struggle. Contention among Manchu princes was revived again during the weak emperor's reign. Also the demarcation was not rigid at all. It was largely a function of the intensity of the foreign powers' military pressure, as we have already described.
The distinction between the Manchu conciliatory policy and Chinese fundamentalism should not obscure the anti-foreignism shared by both. Anti-foreignism was a *Zeitgeist* in late imperial China, where the superiority of China was being jeopardized by the Western demand for equality.  

Because of the continuity of the internal and the external and the universality of the Chinese imperial orthodoxy, the Manchus strongly feared the loss of the mandate of Heaven in times of internal rebellion and foreign aggression, for they themselves had come to power by taking advantage of a similar situation in the preceding dynasty.

Out of the ravages of rebellion and invasion, a strange cooperation with Western powers was born. The Western powers emerged "as a force of political stabilization"  

amidst local disorder. It was the beginning of what Fairbank calls synarchy.
Britain: Power Perspectives

Despite the almost constant British involvements in war and invasion in such areas as India, China, Afghanistan and Latin America, it is noteworthy that British people generally overlooked, or at least were not well informed of, these involvements. In the mind of the British there was only one major war between Waterloo and the Boer war: to most of the British the Crimean war was the only war which broke the peace of the mid-Victorian period. Others were minor wars to which they did not pay serious attention. Palmerston, an architect of mid-Victorian politics, continued his rather frequent foreign intervention without incurring much opposition. The Arrow war of 1856–1860, which was precipitated by the finale of the Crimean war, aroused relatively widespread opposition to Palmerston, forcing him to appeal to a general election. The opposition led by Cobden succeeded in getting such wide ranging support as from Russell, Gladstone, Disraeli, the Peelites and the Manchester radicals. Such cross voting evidenced extremely fluid voting patterns in the House of Commons, in which party discipline and loyalty were at its nadir in British party politics. Rising liberal ideas about free trade, noninterference in domestic affairs, anti-slavery and others were becoming the Zeitgeist of mid-Victorian England. Even if government policies and practices betrayed the oppositions' version of these ideas, the government had to mantle and justify their actions often in similar terms.

Free trade was a case in point. Palmerstonian (imperialist) free trade and Cobdenite (anti-imperialist) free trade principles were from
the same origin. They both believed in progress. Furthermore, they "aspired to raise them [non-British people] all up the steps of progress which they themselves had climbed. Few doubted that *gesta Dei per Anglos*, however they might disagree about His [Palmerston's] choice of method." Palmerstonian imperialism held that Britain must liberate—with force if necessary—other countries from old-fashioned, absolutist, mercantilist, seclusionist policies in order to realize the principle of free trade, whereas Cobdenite anti-imperialism held that the world of free trade must be peaceful; that intervention to force free trade is the violation of the principle itself; and that no foreign politics is the best policy. Although Palmerstonian imperialism was far stronger than Cobdenite anti-imperialism in mid-Victorian Britain, this fact did not make it impossible for parliament to check what it saw as the excesses of Palmerstonian imperialism, whether it was from the Cobdenite anti-imperialist principle or from the mistrust in Palmerston's rough and tough policy and personality. This was exactly what happened in 1857, when Palmerston's handling of the Arrow war made the opposition cast a no confidence vote in the House of Commons. Although the subsequent victory of Palmerston in the election made him pursue his policy, he was afterwards more cautious not to provoke the opposition. 27 On the other hand, the opposition became less militant in opposing Palmerston's policy after the defeat in election. They tended to be silent to Palmerstonian policy in Asia, which was geographically far away and thus not very important to
them, and when they did raise objections to Palmerstonian policy, it was in terms of economic and financial losses of the empire rather than in terms of the principle of free trade. Also the change in cabinet organization tended to mitigate the early 'one-man' leadership of Palmerston. Underlying this phenomenon was the de-radicalization of the middle class radicals who were increasingly intermingled with and incorporated into the establishment. Thus there were not only collisions of views and policies but collusions as well. It is not accidental that after the election Palmerston switched from the belligerent Bowring to the moderate Elgin for his China policy. Elgin was ashamed of the British involvement in the Arrow war and hated his mission. He wrote to his wife: "Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am China's friend in all this." It was not rare in history to find that one had to do what he hated to do. And that was perhaps the case with Elgin. British imperialist aggression was executed, as it were, by an 'anti-imperialist'. It is safe to say that Palmerstonian imperialist China policy was executed perhaps more efficiently, forcefully and successfully—due to the lesser noise from the opposition—by the 'anti-imperialist' Elgin.

With basic military superiority and with Palmerstonian imperialist policy, the British continued 'dressing' on China 'to keep it in order.' As Gros, a French counterpart to Elgin, correctly noted, the treaties that were signed by force were to be executed by force again. Although many years had passed since the full scale
adoption of gunboat coercion in 1839-1842, dressing never ceased. The British could not mould the Chinese to their own taste. And, for that matter, nobody else could. With increasing economic interests in China, the British continued to be imperialist thereafter. With the increasing leverage in the peace party in Peking and thus in China as perceived by the peace party, Britain committed herself to a reactionary government.
Summary: Arrow war of 1856-1860

We have attempted to show: 1) that the British decided to deal directly with Peking, rather than Canton, to force the Ch'ing empire to execute the treaties that had been forced on them by gunboat dressing in order to avoid the evasion and duplicity that had frustrated Britain; 2) that common to Palmerstonian imperialism and Cobdenite anti-imperialism was their awareness that Britain's power rested upon foreign trade; 3) that the Manchu's extraordinary fear of being overthrown by the Han Chinese at the time of foreign aggression tended to lead them to adopt a more conciliatory policy vis-a-vis foreigners, whereas the Han Chinese tended to be more fundamentalist and culturalist; and 4) that the Chinese conciliatory diplomacy was dependent upon the precariously held power of Prince Kung and his peace party in the court, helped by the complete desertion of the war party from Peking because of the British-French attack.
Chapter 15: Taiping intervention of 1862-1864

Introduction

The Taiping rebellion was one of the most disastrous civil wars every waged in human history. The number of those killed is said to amount to 10-20 million.¹ Starting from Kwangsi, the rebellion went up to the Yangtze valley area, which was transformed within 15 years from the richest rice producing area to the one where there were many no man's villages. Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the leader of the rebels, was a man of the Hakka origin, who failed many times in the civil service examinations despite the expectation of the people around him before he experienced a nervous breakdown and a subsequent self-transformation as a pseudo-Christian religious leader of messianic persuasion. The penetration into predominantly Hakka communities forced their rebels into incessant communal fighting with the Puntis (native people of Kwangtung and Kwangsi).² Since the latecomer Hakkas tended to live in poverty in mountainous areas whereas the Puntis had richer land, and since central official control was not so powerful, the only solution was bloody fighting between them, mobilizing their own clans on a large scale. Provincial officials tended to side with the stronger party and brand the other party bandits and thus take the easiest policy, at least in the short run. Since the Puntis were often stronger than the Hakkas, the Hakkas increased their hatred of officials.

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Notes to chapter 15 appear on pages 569-571.
Thus when the Taipings announced their declaration of uprising, it carried manifold meanings: religious, racial, social, economic and political. Absorbing many elements who had been outside of the system, i.e., bandits, pirates, secret societies, opium smugglers, poverty-stricken peasants, disgruntled intellectuals, the Hakkas, ethnic minorities like Miao, ex-soldiers, deserters, coolies, trade merchants and others, the Taipings swept from Kwangsi through Hunan to the Yangtze valley like an avalanche. When it started at Chin-t'ien, Kwangsi, the number of participants amounted to 10,000. When it reached Nanking, the number was over a million. In the years of the Taipings' peak, 1854-1855, the population amounted to 30 million. Thereafter, the population gradually shrunk. First, morale declined and the leadership became corrupt and degenerate. Second, the politically crucial northern expedition was defeated by Mongol auxiliaries led by Seng-ko-lin-ch'in. Third, provincial and other local armies based on t'uan-lien gave formidable threats to the Taipings and gradually regained territories previously controlled by the Taipings. Fourth, foreign powers indirectly and directly assisted the Imperial forces in suppressing the Taipings. Foreign intervention was basically very limited both geographically and in terms of the force employed. Although it is sometimes exaggeratedly estimated that foreign troops killed 2.9 million, foreign intervention was not decisive in determining the fate of the Taipings.
China: Power Bases

The Ch'ing dynasty was declining. Population was still increasing. Deflation was going on since silver drain was continuing. Because the tax rate as measured by silver was almost fixed since the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, the drain of silver made the exchange rate of silver and rice extremely disadvantageous to the peasants. They had to pay much more rice than before. Production activities were declining. Thus surplus labor was constantly being produced and became easily transformed into anti-social elements. The government's military control was declining. Social mistrust was increasing. Accordingly, communal self-defense organizations, t'uan-lien, were becoming increasingly important.\(^{10}\)

In Kwangtung in the midst of the Opium war, t'uan-lien were encouraged officially by Lin Tse-hsu for the first time, and even after an official order to disband, they retained their power.\(^{11}\) Many soldiers in the Opium war lost their jobs after the war and became anti-social elements. The South China sea was liquidated by British naval ships at the time of the war, and pirates in that area moved up deeply into the rivers of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Many merchants and smugglers went to hinterlands of Canton to evade official control after the Opium war. Thus, large parts of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and their adjacent areas became a hotbed of anti-social elements outside of official control.\(^{12}\) The Yangtze river valley suffered from incessant floods in the 1850's as well as in the 1840's, due in part to poor financing for river control and to increasing
private use by officials of the river control budget. The floods aggravated peasants' conditions, which were already under the heavy burden to tax caused by deflation. The Yangtze river valley area was the center of rice production. But this did not mean that an individual peasant was rich. Quite to the contrary, land was over-fragmented because of the absence of primogeniture in Ch'ing China, unlike Victorian England or Tokugawa Japan. Thus, peasants' riots became more and more rampant than before, as they refused to pay taxes, often together with the gentry, since the gentry had basically the same fate as peasants vis-à-vis the state. By the dawn of the Taiping rebellion, the riots, often organized by the Triads, became increasingly frequent in the Yangtze river valley. Because of the lack of coordination and the lack of ideological persuasion, they were not able to unite against the state. However, they created conditions under which the sweeping tide of the Taiping rebellion was later to mobilize them for its cause.

In short, state power was declining politically in South and Central China. The local gentry was gaining power vis-à-vis local officials and the central government, and often playing an antagonistic role. Furthermore, the Manchus' initially firm grip and monopoly of military power as centered in the banner forces had already begun to collapse because of the difficulty in maintaining themselves without agricultural activity, because of their fixed salary since the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, and because of their sinicization.
Their military impotence and corruption had already been disclosed quite vividly in the suppression of the White Lotus rebellion.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the Manchus were losing their ultimate means by which they had governed the Chinese. The defeat inflicted upon the Manchus by the British on the Opium war certainly encouraged the Chinese to further their anti-Manchu cause. The Taiping rebellion can be said to have provided a critical test to the Ch'ing dynasty. What grew out of this rebellion and its eventual suppression was the Han Chinese emergence as a political power in the form of regionalism supported by its own group of staffs and military forces, quite independent of the Manchu central government.\textsuperscript{16}

More microscopically, the power of Prince Kung and the peace party gained its strength especially after the Hsien-feng emperor fled to Jehol in 1860 and subsequently died there in 1861. The court coup d'état of Prince Kung in 1861 to get rid of the opposition cleared the way of the execution of his appeasement policy vis-a-vis foreign powers and his conciliation policy vis-a-vis the emerging, regionally based Han Chinese officials.\textsuperscript{17} Conditions were ripe for the aggrandizement of foreign powers. However, Prince Kung's power bases were precarious. He was not the emperor after all. Without prior understanding, he was not able to conclude any agreements with foreign powers concerning the areas of control by influential provincial officials, despite the newly established Tsungli Yamen or foreign ministry. Provincial power was already strong.\textsuperscript{18}
Britain: Power Bases

The mid-Victorian period is thought to be the period of peace and prosperity. The preceding periods of economic depression and popular radicalism were replaced by a period of continuous improvement in economic welfare spreading down to the lower strata and a new rearrangement of the ruling class, now comprising the bulk of the middle class. Two basic forces which shaped the mid-Victorian period were the population and the Industrial Revolution. The population increased continuously from the fourth quarter of the 18th century up to World War I generally in Europe with the exception of the tragic case of Ireland, whose population was reduced by a half in the mid-19th century due to famine and emigration. The crucial difference between England and Ireland was the existence or absence of the Industrial Revolution, which absorbed the population increase. The Industrial Revolution in England, though having started in the fourth quarter of the 18th century, did not have a positive impact on a large bulk of strata until after the economic depressions of the early 1840's.

The radical reaction to the increasingly felt impact of the Industrial Revolution and its resultant social change was the popular radicalism of the 1830's and the 1840's. Threatened by the prospect of a revolution, the old landed gentry and aristocracy resisted stubbornly against the pressure of popular radicalism until some of their own class members, shrewd and clever, realized that they would not lose their stakes by a Reform bill or a repeal
of the Corn Law.21 Rather, the old landholding power strengthened its influence after the Reform Bill of 1832 in terms of electoral advantage, at least temporarily. The economic wealth acquired by some segments of the middle class led them to acquire political influence and social respect by entering the establishment and the belle monde. The differentiated spill-over effects of the improvement geared by the Industrial Revolution wrought differentiated responses. The illusion of popular radicalism about the common stakes of the middle class and the working class against the old aristocracy eroded too easily without having a real basis for common interests. The disgruntled but capable and ambitious radical of the 1830's and 1840's often turned out to be a cabinet minister in the 1850's and 1860's. Despite all of these, most of the working class people were in miserable conditions. When the emotion, outbursts and cries of popular radicalism faded away, the hostility of the working class became more and more directed against the bourgeoisie who hired and exploited them with low wage and under bad working conditions. The politics of popular radicalism was replaced by the politics of class conflict.22

Despite all the fuss surrounding the Reform Bill of 1832, high politics remained "the plaything of the nobility and gentry."23 They had the last word. Perhaps more important is the fact that parties were not strong at all during the mid-Victorian period. Throughout the preceding period of the Reform Bill of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846, political parties further dissolved into undisciplined
groups surrounding influential men in the House of Commons. They had the control not only of legislation but also of government and of ministers. The result was "politics without effective purpose." This process was the consequence of the decreasing influence of the throne and of the sustaining influence of the gentry class, represented remarkably by the able and bold Palmerston, and enhanced by the sizable incorporation of the middle class.

Throughout the 19th century Britain was thought to be the dominant power over the seven seas. However, it is more apt to say Britain was the leading power in Europe during 1815-1855. They were not predominant in terms of military forces, largely untouched by innovation or reform since Waterloo. However, Britain felt confident of her military, especially naval, supremacy during the period, which led to frequent interventions in European, Asian and Latin American politics. Although Britain did not wage a major war in Europe other than the Crimean war, this war had significant effects on subsequent British foreign policy, especially toward the Continent. There was less frequent intervention after the war. The change was the result of adaptation and adjustment rather than any fundamental revision of policy. Also, the change was limited mostly to European affairs, and British conducts in Asia were relatively immune to it. Yet vocal opposition to British intervention was strong enough to keep the government apprehensive of it. More basically, the previous British intervention in China put too heavy a strain on China for Britain to take advantage of it. The possibility
that the British were afraid of was that their intervention might cause a collapse of the Manchu dynasty, in which case the British would have to rule the vast country of China in order to continue trade with China.\textsuperscript{29}
China: Power Perspectives

The Manchu government did not have enough military forces to suppress rebellions. Thus they resorted to seeking the assistance of local power, which turned out to be a self-defeating policy in the sense that local power gained its own power to the detriment of the central government. 30 It created the kind of situation that the Manchu founders had tried hard to avoid at all costs. Already in the Opium war Lin-Tse-hsu had initiated the policy of relying on local forces to counter the British forces. 31 Now the Manchus took this policy when faced with the Taipings. They were ambivalent about seeking assistance from provincial power. However, the thought that otherwise they would be overwhelmed militarily led them to adopt the policy. 32

They event went further to ask for the help of foreign powers to suppress rebellions. 33 Great ambivalence remained, however, as to the use of foreign troops for suppression, since both rebels and foreigners should be fought off in theory. Faced with internal and external threats, the Ch'ing had to choose the lesser evil as its ally without being able to fight against both at one time. 34 First, the use should be limited to ports "where Western and Chinese interests were bound up together and should be defended in common." 35 Using foreign troops for suppression in the interior would cause no good consequences because "failure would lead to ridicule and success to unpredictable difficulties later." 36 To save imperial face, foreign troops were not to be used in the interior. Second, there
was a time-honoured formula of playing off barbarians against bar-
barians. The use of foreign troops was not so much for its utility for suppression as for nullifying the possibility of the rebels' collusion with foreign troops. In Prince Kung's words, "It is just that there is a danger that if we do not make them our allies, they may be used by the rebels. The harm in that would be insurmountable."37

Their adoption of the policy of appeasement to foreign powers with respect to treaty execution coincided with their decision to use foreign troops for suppression, and with the foreign powers' adoption of the policy of limited intervention in favor of the Imperial forces. The road was opened to what Fairbank calls synarchy in treaty ports.38 Amidst this disorder, the likin tax was intro-
duced in 185339 and the maritime customs fell under the control of foreigners in Shanghai in 1854.40 These did not strengthen the power of the Ch'ing so much as the power of the regionally based Chinese officials.
Britain: Power Perspectives

One of the important characteristics of mid-Victorian British foreign policy was best summarized by Palmerston, its architect: "No country on the face of the globe is likely to suffer less than England from war." 41 Britain was able to exercise enormous influence with amazingly small costs. 42 Palmerston's too often accused intervention policy was deterred not so much by his opposition, which suffered serious setbacks in the 1857 election fought on the Arrow war. The memory of this defeat deterred Palmerston's opposition from harshly attacking Palmerston. 43 What really made British intervention less frequent in the 1860's than in the 1850's were the changes in power distribution among major European countries and in British politics, which felt the growing influence of generally more cautious junior cabinet ministers, especially after the difficult war in Crimea. 44

The Taiping intervention was a case in point. On the other hand, intervention was considered to be one of the serious alternatives to restore law and order. This was the dogma for commercially oriented powers. The law and order dogma was the source of an instinctive reaction to turmoil and disturbances, whether in reality the commercial opportunities were being seriously threatened or not. The dogma was often coloured by racial overtones as exemplified by
Palmerston's well known words in 1851:

These half-civilized governments, such as those of China, Portugal, Spanish America all require a Dressing every eight or ten years to keep them in order. 45

On the other hand, the persistent opposition to intervention in and outside of parliament worked as a strong deterrent force against outright intervention. The inherent prohibitive impulse against intervention was frequently uttered well before the actual intervention. 46

Bowring wrote in 1854:

It is impossible to turn away our attention from consequences contingent upon such interference.... It is no unusual characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race, when settling in foreign regimes, that they began by trading and ended in governing. It is only by anticipating the great tendencies of events that our policy can be safely guided. I do not hesitate to state to your lordship that I have often my misgivings lest the future should retell the tale of British India, over a vaster field, in a grander scale and with large interests involved. 47

The British government not only faced a great deal of criticism at home but also had to compensate for its complicity in atrocities committed by the Imperial forces. Russell, foreign secretary, approved direct intervention on the condition that it be impressed on Prince Kung
that "if he sanctions cruel and indiscriminate punishments he will entirely lose the support of the British authorities."48

The situation in which these inherent tensions were disclosed was one of bad government and bad rebels competing for power, as seen from British eyes, whose primary objective in China was to make the Ch'ing government execute faithfully the treaty settlement for peaceful diplomatic and commercial intercourse. However, the eruption of the Taiping and other rebellions and their threats to the Ch'ing government led the British to speculate on the extreme situations where "Britain had either to govern the country herself in order to trade or not trade at all."49 After the long limited armed neutrality defending Shanghai's concession, Britain intervened in 1862.

Despite occasional oscillations of his views, Bruce generally maintained the view of a very limited, indirect intervention around Shanghai.50 He considered the problem of inducing the Manchu government's cooperation in a new treaty settlement to be far more important than the suppression of the rebels.51 He saw the coup of 1861 as a very encouraging sign for Ch'ing cooperation.52 He was apprehensive that a large scale intervention working through provincial armies would only weaken the power bases of the Manchu government, which would be counterproductive to the British objective in China.53 He expected that by dealing directly with the central government, Britain could contribute to the strengthening of the central government's control over provincial officials.54 However, British officials and officers in Shanghai generally did not understand this grand
objective of Bruce. Their objective was to suppress the rebels.\textsuperscript{55} And they took the initiative of intervention, and only later did Bruce and the Foreign Office assent or acquiesce.\textsuperscript{56} Although intervention was very limited due to the limited forces available,\textsuperscript{57} the possibility always existed that they would broaden the field of their operation as the opportunity presented itself.\textsuperscript{58} The use of British military officers in the Imperial forces was never approved by Bruce, although supported by the Foreign Office headed by Russell.\textsuperscript{59} The limited character of their intervention was vividly demonstrated by the termination of the use of British military officers in the Imperial forces in 1864, occasioned by some atrocities committed by a provincial army headed by Li Hung-chang.\textsuperscript{60} From then on, Britain returned back to the old policy of limited neutrality.

The consequences of the suppression were the survival of the Ch'ing dynasty and the strengthening of provincial powers. Contrary to her belief in progress and liberty, Britain supported a reactionary and repressive government.\textsuperscript{61} Contrary to Bruce's expectation, the central government was too weak to develop its own strong military forces.\textsuperscript{62} Also contrary to Bruce's expectation, much of the profits from maritime customs drained to provincial officials.\textsuperscript{63} Cobden might not have been so absurd and utopian when he attacked the government's intervention policy and proposed that Britain sever its political relationship with the Ch'ing government and that Britain establish such free trade ports as Singapore and Hong Kong.
Summary of Taiping intervention of 1862-1864

We have attempted to show: 1) that the dilemma of the British was between the two options of either full scale intervention on behalf of the Ch'ing -- with both the happiest and worst possible consequences of strengthening the Ch'ing and of replacing the central government by British military power in what could be a protracted war against the rebels -- and no intervention, which would have the possibility of producing a chaos where trade would be impossible; 2) that with domestic opposition in mind, the British government refrained from full scale intervention; 3) that British intervention was carried out by some of the British authorities, civil and military, at Shanghai, whose objective was to suppress the rebels especially around Shanghai, with the later assent or acquiescence by Bruce, the British minister in China, and the Foreign Office; 4) that the chief spokesman for a moderate policy was Bruce, who considered that the main objective in China policy should be to obtain the Manchu government's cooperation in the new treaty settlement for peaceful commercial and diplomatic intercourse; and 5) that the Manchu government, when forced to choose the lesser of the two evils -- i.e., the rebels who demanded the Manchus' extirpation and the foreign powers which demanded the Manchus' capitulation -- officially encouraged foreign aggrandizement.
Chapter 16: Choshu-Western war of 1863-1864

Introduction

The problem of opening a market in Japan had long been unattempted after the Opium war for several reasons. Most important was that British merchants and officials did not consider Japan important at all. Japan did not create the myth of a Japanese market. The priority of Japan in British thinking was very low in terms of the use of naval warships, the main instrument of policy execution in the Far East. The heavy involvement in China postponed the formulation and execution of a British Japan policy.

At the time of Commodore Perry's forced treaty with Japan in 1853-1854, and at the time of Harris' commercial treaty with Japan in 1858, Britain followed the lead of the US and did not compete with the US or other powers in opening Japan. British engagement in the Crimean war, in the suppression of the Sepoy mutiny in India, and most importantly, in the problems of treaty negotiation and execution in China during and after the Arrow war, all detracted Britain from paying attention to Japan. The signing of the commercial treaty in 1858, however, inevitably led Britain to be involved in the political turmoils of Japan. The rapid increase in Japanese trade after 1859 was welcomed by British merchants and officials. Thus, deliberate political efforts on the part of the anti-foreign Japanese to block foreign trade whether they were the Tokugawa government or xenophobic extremes, met vigorous opposition.

Notes to chapter 16 appear on pages 572-574.
from Britain. Anti-foreign murders and disturbances provided a casus belli to Britain. Britain bombarded Kagoshima, the capital of Satsuma han, in 1863. The anti-foreign bombardment of Western ships by Choshu han in 1863 was retaliated by a joint international action against Choshu in 1864. The Western, mainly British, bombardment of Shimonesaki continued for three days before Choshu surrendered in September, 1864. By this bombardment Britain succeeded in opening the Shimono-seki straits and the port of Yokohama. Later, in 1866, Western powers led by Britain succeeded in getting the commercial treaties of 1858 revised in a direction more favorable to the Western powers in terms of maritime customs rate.

British policy after the Shimono-seki war was distinguished from the policy before the war in that they no longer supported the Tokugawa government as completely as they had before. Britain had been in support of the Tokugawa government because of her preference for stability. However, the inability and incompetence of the Tokugawa government led Britain to conceive of a united government, with the Tokugawa at the top but with other han sharing power as more realistic and suitable for their purposes. After the Shimono-seki war, a civil war took place in Choshu. The anti-Tokugawa party emerged as victor, paving the way to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.
Japan: Power Bases

The population of Japan doubled between 1600 and 1720. However, from 1720 to 1830, the population growth rate was almost constant. Since productivity was slowly increasing during the latter period, there was no doubt that per capita income was increasing. However, the increasing monetization of the agrarian economy presented itself as a formidable threat to the foundation of the Tokugawa bakukai system. The samurai ruling class had been largely emasculated in castle towns. Merchants concentrated in castle towns emerged as a new social force controlling money for feudal chiefs or daimyo. Financial difficulties of han, derived from the increasing monetization of han economy and the difficulties of tax exaction, when combined with peasant riots, forced the Tokugawa and han rulers to try to reestablish their power bases from the 1830's through the 1850's. Whether each han was successful in making use of its own resources to its own advantage was crucial in determining who would take the political lead in the succeeding years leading to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

Especially the success of each han in containing and utilizing its own monetized economic sector was very important. The southwestern han like Choshu and Satsuma were able to contain its monetized sector and further to level up inter-han and foreign trade networks, due in part to their relative backwardness. In strong contrast to them, the Tokugawa government was largely unsuccessful in containing its monetized sector. Since the
Tokugawa government ruled most of the commercial centers of Japan where monetization was most advanced, the basically agrarian oriented Tokugawa government was not able to use its monetized sector to its advantage.

This difficult time coincided with the time of the Western attempt to open Japan by using force, if necessary. Since early 17th century Japan had been closed to foreigners, except for tightly limited contact with Chinese and Dutchmen at a small island port. The trouble with foreign pressure was accompanied by struggles for Tokugawa succession and troubles with the Tokugawa bakuhan system itself. Now the legitimacy of the Tokugawa system was questioned because of the problem of the ratification of the commercial treaty drawn up by the Tokugawas. Some of the han rulers attempted to use the court as a unified symbol to topple the authority of the Tokugawa government. The need to identify an ultimate ruler of Japan was precipitated by the need to conform to the Western notion of treaty and international law. Foreign pressure to open the country and its market gradually forced the Tokugawas, the han rulers and the court to have a united government, since commerce and trade could not be handled well within the framework of the bakuhan system. There was also the problem of anti-foreignism. Anti-foreign disturbances revealed the Tokugawas' inability to regulate them and thereby further crippled to Tokugawas' dealings with Western powers. The Tokugawa government failed to make use of national crises for the reestablishment of
power. The court emerged as a new power focus. 18

The power bases of Choshu han, a main anti-Tokugawa force, was as precarious as other han and the Tokugawas, despite its relative success in han reform. However, the utilization of the court, the alliance with Satsuma han, and the increasing self-strengthening by inter-han and foreign trade, made Choshu han one of the most formidable anti-Tokugawa forces. Perhaps most crucial was the militarization of the han with military arms imported through foreign trade. Confronted by the han crisis of waging wars against the bakufu-led forces and against Western warships, the han rulers were able to mobilize successfully not only samurai class but also peasants, well-to-do merchants and landlords through village community organizations. 19

The Tokugawas' internal reform efforts paralleling foreign pressure since 1853 were already suspended in 1858 by the rise to the power of the conservatives in/Tokugawa government. The fact that the power of the Tokugawa government was held by the conservatives during the critical period of 1858–1864 deprived the Tokugawa government of the dynamism and flexibility which were indispensable in holding its leadership over the han rulers. 20 The anti-foreignism of anti-Tokugawa han transformed itself into a means of embarrassing and toppling down the Tokugawa government, rather than an end for its own sake. When reform-oriented anti-foreignism was converted to the policy of 'opening the country', the latter was preferred by the British to the Tokugawa government with its
conservative and weak leadership. When the reformists took power in the Tokugawa government in 1864, anti-Tokugawa forces had already become financially and militarily strong enough to threaten the Tokugawa government. Although Choshu forces were ousted in 1863 from Kyoto, where the new political focus was the court, and although they were crushed by Western powers in 1863–1864, Choshu han was to emerge from the han civil war of 1865 with a policy of anti-Tokugawa and of 'opening the country'.

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Britain: Power Bases

The power of Britain vis-a-vis Japan was constrained greatly by contingent factors. It was the overwhelming importance of China that persistantly delayed the British attempts to open Japan.\(^{23}\) It was the strong myth of the China market that led the British to belittle the importance of Japan.\(^{24}\) It was the difficulties which Britain had encountered in China that made her more cautious in approaching Japan.\(^{25}\) And it was the continuity of the personalities involved in China and Japan that made British Japan policy an extension of her China policy.\(^{26}\)

In the 1840's, the action in Cochin China was attempted whereas the one in Japan was postponed. Japan did not attract British minds more strongly than Cochin China.\(^{27}\) In the 1850's, Britain was very deeply involved in China. The Crimean war forced the British battleships to remain always alert to the Russian squadron in the Far East. Also the Sepoy mutiny in India and the Taiping rebellion in China diverted British attention from Japan. British attempts to open Japan in 1854 and 1858 were precipitated by external forces. The 1854 action was taken as a strategic consideration to counter Russia, with whom Britain was then waging the Crimean war. More basically, the American action in 1853 precipitated the British action.\(^{28}\) The 1858 action was also precipitated by the US success of the commercial treaty with Japan in 1858.\(^{29}\) This happened only after the signing of the treaty with China in 1858. The persistent difficulties in China led Bowring to come to the
conclusion that only by a large naval force could Japan be successfully dealt with.\(^{30}\) This belief long deterred Britain from taking action until the US succeeded. The Elgin mission to Japan in 1858 was with the order not to use force. This was because the British did not want their mistakes in China to be repeated in Japan.\(^{31}\) In many senses, British action in Japan was overshadowed by her action in China.

There was strong opposition to the government's policy in the Far East. In the 1857 action in China, Palmerston was obliged to resort to a general election because of parliamentary opposition to his China policy.\(^ {32}\) Opposition was always there to restrain the government's action. British involvement in the bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863 also stirred vigorous opposition to the government for its "high-handed attitude toward the Japanese and callous indifference to Japanese sensibilities and customs, as if Japan were a nation conquered by military forces."\(^ {33}\) The government was quite responsive to or at least apprehensive of the opposition, due in part to the 1857 event and in part to the growing sentiments in the cabinet and in society at large against the use of force.\(^ {34}\)
Japan: Power Perspectives

Since the time of the initial encounter with Western powers, there had been an extraordinary fear among the Japanese of being conquered by Western powers. This feeling was particularly strengthened by the events in China. Events in China, starting with the Opium war, were internalized, so to speak, by the Japanese, who had been indulged in self-imposed seclusion for the preceding 200 years. "Japanese scholars and pamphleteers, in fact, agreed in viewing the British attack on China as a threat to the independence of Japan. The Opium war seemed a part of Japanese history, heralding as the next stage of European expansionism an attack on the country whose uncompromising attitude to foreign trade and intercourse was even more marked than that of China."  

From the very beginning of their encounter with Western powers, some Japanese went even further to argue for Japanese imperial expansion to counteract and outbid Western expansion and thereby protect her independence.  

This hypersensitive reaction to foreign threats became the basis of the following Japanese course of action, first attempted in each han, most notably in Choshu han, and then in the Meiji imperial state. This reaction was especially salient among middle and lower rank samurai. First, they could not climb up the social ladder under the strictly hierarchical social order. They were at the middle or the bottom of the ruling class. Second, the top of the ruling class was revealing a distressing impotence in dealing with foreign threats. Third, the peasants were increasingly restless,
due in part to the inflation derived from the abrupt increase in foreign trade. Acute insecurity was felt by these men about their status, their han and their country. The merger of the middle and lower rank samurai extremists with the han reformists from above was precipitated by external threats. It brought about wide mobilization of the han population. Even the non-samurai population was recruited for militia organization. Their desperate answer to external threats was to topple the Tokugawa government and to expel barbarians "in a suicidal plunge to find a way out." Western bombardment of Choshu han in 1864 shattered Choshu's anti-foreign actions. After the defeat the moderates temporarily won over the extremists who executed the Shimonoseki war. However, the extremists discarded their policy of 'expel barbarians' and concentrated their efforts on toppling the Tokugawa government. Britain kept a favorable neutrality in the coming Second Choshu-Tokugawa war in 1866. In this Second Choshu-Tokugawa war the Choshu-Satsuma secret alliance against the Tokugawas was established. A few years later the Tokugawa government was toppled.40

The conversion from anti-foreignism to the policy of 'opening the country' was brought about by a gradual understanding of the impossibility of 'expelling barbarians' without fundamental reforms. For conversion to take place a great shock was necessary. Western gunboat coercion played this role.
Britain: Power Perspectives

The most important British objective was trade. The steadily expanding British industrial economy needed its market all over the world. The search for a market dominated British thinking in the Far East. British attention in the Far East was concentrated on China due largely to the long-held myth of the Great China Market, and thus other countries were slighted. It was thought to be legitimate to adopt the threat and use of force to bring about 'free trade.' Force was used first to open a country and next to implement a treaty by gunboat coercion. Combined with racism toward Far Eastern peoples, the principle of free trade and international law, as conceived by the British and as armed by gunboat coercion, produced semi-colonial and/or dependent economic relations.

Commercial considerations were more predominant with Japan than with China although British interest in the Japan market was far smaller than in the China market. There was one instance in which military and even territorial considerations were salient in British Japan policy. That was the Stirling mission in 1853-1854, which was intended to counter the Russians in the Far East at the time of the Crimean war. Except for this instance, British Japan policy was basically a commercially oriented policy accompanied by the carefully planned threat and use of force to bring about a stable and friendly government to ensure 'free trade.' Since the Elgin mission to Japan in 1858, the order not to use force was observed. This took self-restraint on the part of the British. The conduct
in China not only aroused opposition at home but was also incongruent with the principles and sentiments of the increasing number of British officials like Lord Elgin. Although British officials like Alcock in Japan retained their strong penchant for the use of force, nourished during their previous service in China, the British were notably different in Japan, despite the contemporary Japanese perception of British intentions to the contrary.

After the signing of commercial treaties in 1858, many consequences were felt. Prices went up. Peasants became more restless. Samurai's anti-foreign disturbances became more frequent. Western sailors' disorderly behavior disturbed the peaceful native population. Most important to the British was the increasing stake of foreign trade with Japan. As the amount of trade increased rapidly, high importance was attached to foreign trade to the extent that the use of force was acceptable and justifiable as defending it against anti-foreign actions. Foreign trade was increasingly jeopardized by Choshu han at the straits of Shimonoseki. The result was the Shimonoseki war of 1863-1864.

The Shimonoseki war of 1863-1864 was one of the most important uses of gunboat coercion employed by Western powers in Japan. The British thought of political struggles in Japan in terms of the struggle for hegemony over foreign trade long monopolized by the Tokugawa government. Thus they tended to superimpose their conception onto the Japanese conception. Choshu's antipathy to the Tokugawas was thought by the British to be derived from its
jealousy to the Tokugawa monopoly of foreign trade. However, the control of trade was conceived by the Japanese more as a means to achieve an end, political hegemony, than as an end itself. In fact those han which controlled important ports became powerful. One of those han was Choshu han. Shimonoseki was strategically located for inter-han and foreign trade. Anti-Tokugawa forces began to use anti-foreignism to topple the Tokugawa government. The Tokugawa government was obliged to issue an order to 'expel barbarians' to all the han because of the pressure of the imperial court at Kyoto, backed by anti-Tokugawa forces. Only Choshu executed the order and bombarded Western ships on the Shimonoseki straits. Britain took the lead in retaliating and bringing about important changes in the Japanese attitude to foreign trade and intercourse. First, it impressed the most anti-foreign Choshu han with Western military superiority and thus forced it to abandon its anti-foreign policy, and more specifically to open up the Shimonoseki straits. Second, it impressed the Tokugawa government which, under the upsurge of anti-foreignism, adopted an anti-foreign policy and thereby tried to take control over the situation by outbidding the anti-Tokugawa forces, even after the anti-foreign forces were expelled from the Imperial court in Kyoto in August 1863. The Tokugawa government tried to limit the trade and virtually closed the port of Yokohama—the most important port at that time, especially for the silk trade. Third, it impressed all other anti-foreign political forces which
could hinder trade.

Britain was cautious not to get involved in domestic struggles too deeply. That was to be avoided at all means. Britain was weary of and sobered by her experiences in China.\(^{53}\) That was what dictated her policy to be establishing/maintaining political stability, national unity, and free trade.\(^{54}\) She was painfully aware of the consequences of the careless involvement of the strongest power in the world. Once the Tokugawas proved to be very fragile, Britain envisaged a united government under the head of the Tokugawas. This further led to her favorable neutrality towards Choshu in the Second Choshu-Tokugawa war of 1866. However, during the tumultuous years before and after 1868, Britain wisely refrained from over-intervention and helped prevent other powers from taking advantage of the situation and thus damaging free trade.\(^{55}\)

British-Japanese relations were less important, less violent, less inclined to military intervention, and more concerned with trade, compared with British-Chinese relations. The less violent British policy toward Japan coincided with Japanese suppression of anti-foreign violence, which was stronger than the Chinese counterpart. Anti-foreign violence decreased significantly after the new Meiji leaders took an extremely strict policy against anti-foreign violence.\(^{56}\) The perceived overwhelming importance of the China market slighted British effort to open the Japan market from the beginning. The inability to mobilize a certain amount of naval
power from the China coast prohibited vigorous British action in Japan. More basically the mid-Victorian principle of 'free trade' prevailed in British foreign policy. Thus, the result was a British search for a stable and 'friendly' government, with the relatively restrained use of military power and with the highest priority on economic interests. This British policy was reciprocated by the Japanese, who quickly understood the overwhelming might of Western military power; they effectively suppressed anti-foreign violence, and assiduously directed their efforts toward reform and modernization. 57
Summary of Choshu-Western war of 1863-1864

We have attempted to show: 1) that Japan's inflated fear of Western powers due to the internalization of the events in China was further reinforced by gunboat coercion on the part of Western powers and was to become the basis of Japan's action at home and abroad; 2) that, being primarily commercially oriented, British Japan policy was more or less self-restrained, compared to her China policy, due to the gradual change in principles and sentiments on the use of force, and due to Britain's sobered feeling about the China wars; 3) that Britain resorted to force, though well-restrained and well-calculated, when trade increased significantly, to defend 'free trade'; and 4) that British Japan policy was to be reciprocated by Japan's strict suppression of anti-foreign violence and her assiduous efforts towards reform and modernization.
Chapter 17: Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea of 1875-1876

Introduction

In 1875 a Japanese warship provoked Korea and bombarded Kanghwado island for the alleged reason of counterattack and forced Korea to conclude Korean-Japanese diplomatic relationships in 1876, after the long negotiations since the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868.¹ There had been a basically friendly relationship between Yi Korea and Tokugawa Japan for the preceding 300 years on the basis of strictly limited contact. Although Korean embassies visited the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo once in a while, Japanese counterpart never visited the Yi emperor in Seoul. Instead, the lord of Tsushima han, So, was allowed to maintain the Japan House in Pusan for trade. Representing the Tokugawa shogunate, So conducted all the diplomatic missions as well as trade with Yi Korea in the form of a tributary relationship.²

In 1868 the Meiji Restoration took place in Japan and the Meiji leaders wanted to have the kind of relationship with Korea which Japan had been forced to accept by Western powers about a decade before. However, Yi Korea under the Taewon'gun, father of the young king, was stubbornly isolationist. His belief was greatly enhanced by his series of successes in repelling Western ships in the preceding decade.³ His reforms to strengthen the throne's power were attempted to the detriment of the power of the yangban and at the sacrifice of the peasants.⁴ Taking advantage of peasant

Notes to chapter 17 appear on pages 574-575.
rebellions, the Mins, a family of Queen Min, took power from the Taewon'gun in 1873. The Mins represented the interest of the yangban and reversed the Taewon'gun's policies, including the policy of repelling foreigners. However, the policy of the Mins was not accompanied by serious efforts to strengthen Korea, which only created opportunities for foreign aggrandizement. After Japan's settlement of the treaty with Korea, Western countries followed suit. Japanese intrusion into Korea caused great strains and stresses to the Korean economy and society, particularly during the eight years following the treaty of 1876. The mutiny of 1881, which opened a series of political disturbances and foreign interventions, was directly related to the insufficient rice supply on the domestic market due to the large amount of rice exported to Japan.

China's policy toward Korea was influenced greatly by China's relations with Western powers. Li Hung-chang did not want to have trouble in Korea when he already had many problems at home and abroad. The Mins were almost forced by Li Hung-chang to conclude the treaty with Japan in 1876. Without the strong pressure and threat by China, the Mins would not have been able to conclude the treaty since the Board of Border Affairs, the core of military power, was divided nearly half and half with respect to the treaty.

Japanese gunboat coercion was an attempt to solve not only the diplomatic problem with Korea but also domestic problems. The new government was troubled by conflicts among leaders over many ranges
of issues, which were in part derived from the struggles for hegemony among leaders who retained ties with the old han. Okubo, a man of Satsuma, succeeded in preempting a possible alliance of Kido, a man of Choshu, with Itagaki, a man of Tosa, by this incident, which had the effect of obscuring domestic troubles.⁸
Korea: Power Bases

The Taewon'gun's policy of strengthening the throne antagonized the yangban class, and his policy of strengthening military forces caused further exploitation of the peasants. The combination of the yangban's opposition and peasants' rebellions forced him to retire, and the family of the Queen, the Mins, took power in 1873. The Taewon'gun's policy of downgrading big families like the Andong Kim by upgrading minor families like the Mins, resulted in the Mins' assertion that they were beyond the control of the Taewon'gun. The Taewon'gun suppressed sowon, private local educational institutions, the land of which enjoyed the status of tax exemption and which formed the power bases of the yangban families and factions. This act was intended to decrease the power of the yangban class and to increase the state budget so that it would be large enough for national defense against foreign invasions. The yangban's continuous resistance provided enormous costs to the Taewon'gun, who wanted to reassert the power of the throne, which had been deteriorating ever since shortly after the establishment of the Yi dynasty. Autocratic and despotic as the Taewon'gun was, the yangban's power was not diminished to zero by a mere order of the Taewon'gun. The Taewon'gun's intervention in social, economic and political order -- which he intended to be vigorous, although it turned out to be superficial -- cost him his own downfall.

The Min government, however, was not fundamentally different from the Taewon'gun's. The policies undertaken by both were far
short of being able to vitalize Korean society, which was beset by the stagnant societal surplus fiercely striven for by competing factions with their own power bases far out of control of the central government. The only crucial difference between the Min and the Taewon'gun governments was that the former was more conciliatory to foreign powers. The fact that the Min government was conciliatory without vigorous reform efforts only made it an easy prey to foreign powers. Without modern naval power, without much knowledge of the strength and intentions of foreign powers, and without any institutional basis for social mobilization to cope with new internal and external threats, Korea became the pawn of foreign competition.\(^10\)

The Kanghwado incident opened the way to Japanese, Chinese, and Western countries' penetration into Korea. The sudden exposure to foreign goods, money and soldiers brought about convulsions and strains to Korean society.\(^11\) The basic impotence and unpreparedness of Korean rulers to handle foreign relations of a new kind aggravated the situation. Li Hung-chang's influence upon Korean rulers through revived traditional ties with Korea provided further complications.\(^12\) Continuous economic deterioration aggravated by the inflow of foreign economic goods and currency, when coupled with the basic incompetence of the rulers, wrought riots and rebellions, which in turn intensified factional struggles among the rulers and introduced further foreign interference. This in turn solicited reactionary responses from the rulers.\(^13\) When a handful of self-claimed reformers
tried to take power, it was with nearly absolute dependence on foreign military power.¹⁴ Despite the subjective intentions of Korean rulers and reformers, their inability and incompetence only provided opportunities for foreign penetration and aggression.
Japan: Power Bases

Although Japan was divided by more than 200 semi-autonomous, feudal han, the Tokugawas maintained its skillful control over them. The Tokugawas' power was based on many things. Important among them were the Tokugawas' military dominance since 1600, well-calculated geographical assignments of han, many devices to check han loyalty to the Tokugawas, many devices to keep the han economy around the threshold for survival, the Tokugawas' monopoly of nation-wide commerce through direct rule of important commercial cities, and the Tokugawas' dominance in economically critical areas such as Kanto and Kinai.¹⁵

During the 200 years of peace, several forces undermined the Tokugawas' effective control. Slow development in monetary economy, retarded innovation in agricultural technology and heavy exploitation of peasants resulted in the stagnation of the economy and the population. When famine assaulted peasants, there was no alternative for them but to rebel. The frequent, widespread peasant rebellions around the early 19th century forced each han to reform.¹⁶ The Tokugawas were not successful in their efforts. This was due in part to their inability to incorporate and utilize the most commercially advanced economy of Kinai. The financial strains derived in part from this failure had continuous effects on the Tokugawas' policy of power centralization and preservation in order to cope with new external threats. Other han such as Choshu and
Satsuma were relatively successful in various ways of mobilizing their resources. Such factors as the relative under-development of the commercial economy in these **han**, their geographical smallness and contiguity, the benefits from inter-**han** and foreign trade, and especially the later acquisition of major commercial and trade routes in western Japan contributed to their relative financial success.\(^{17}\) The effort to overcome the overall crisis was accelerated by foreign pressure, especially after the traumatic experience of naval bombardment by foreign powers. The rearrangement of the system was first made separately within each **han**, secondly through the competition for hegemony between the southwestern **han** like Choshu and Satsuma and the Tokugawas, and finally the southwestern **han** dominated the Tokugawas.\(^{18}\)

With the 1868 coup and the subsequent civil war between anti-Tokugawa and Tokugawa forces, the Meiji government was established. However, the decentralized **han** system remained almost intact and the influence of the central government was extremely small. The increasing awareness of the need to centralize power resulted in the 1871 coup, which abolished the **han** system.\(^ {19}\) This in turn aggravated the problem of dealing with dissatisfied ex-samurai. These ex-samurai, especially of the southwestern **han**, which contributed most to the overthrow of the Tokugawas, were extremely restless and showed a possibility of open rebellion against the new government. Some of the Meiji leaders thought to use them in a foreign war so that their energy would be safely dispersed abroad,
also allowing Japan to demonstrate her power to Western countries which had imposed unequal treaties on her. The argument for the conquest of Korea (seikan ron) was put forward in 1873 and ended with the victory of the anti-seikan ron party and the resignation from the government of the seikan ron party headed by Saigo and Itagaki.\textsuperscript{20} The anti-seikan ron party was concerned more with domestic considerations. They wanted to spend the government's energy for radical reforms rather than for foreign expeditions.\textsuperscript{21}

The ex-samurai's open rebellions broke up. The financial basis of the new government was still fragile. The institutional form of the government was still very shaky and fluid. The internal strife for hegemony among key government leaders, Okubo, Kido and Itagaki, (the last of whom came back to the government after some compromise), kept the government's grip of power somewhat shaky as before. Okubo and the Satsuma-dominated navy determined to make a show of force in Korea to solve all the problems Japan had had with Korea once and for all. This was also planned and executed to alleviate domestic problems especially for Okubo. Okubo would have been in deep trouble if Kido had been successful in allying himself with Itagaki.\textsuperscript{22}
China: Power Bases

The recovery from the devastating Taiping rebellion began during the T'ung-chih period. Even after the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, other problems like the Nien and the Moslem rebellions in Yunnan and in the northwest continued. After the suppression of the Niens in 1868, Li Hung-chang was appointed as the governor general of Hukwang. However, his reputation for his skills led the government to assign him to settle the problem of anti-Western disturbances in Kweichow and Szechwan and to suppress the uprisings at Shensi. The breakdown of the negotiation with France with respect to the Tientsin massacre brought him to a new position in 1870, governor general of Chihli and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports. 23

On the basis of his double position Li Hung-chang further advanced his strength. Regional military leaders who had emerged from the suppression of the Taiping and other rebellions now took control of the provinces and even overwhelmed the central government. He controlled his large army, customs service, the Grand Canal and the rice supply to Peking, and various arms factories. He also began to build the big Northern Navy. With all of these power bases in his hands, he gradually began to overwhelm the Tsungli Yamen. Foreign affairs were increasingly dealt with meaningfully only through him. 24

At the time of the Kanghwado incident, the Ch'ing had a different problem. The Margary incident erupted in Yunnan and
brought about de facto severance of British-Chinese diplomatic relations for a while. Li could not possibly deal with both of the Margary and Kanghwado incidents simultaneously. There was even a plan in the British government to have a joint action with Japan against China.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite all the accomplishments Li made during his heyday, they were to be tested soon in the confrontation with foreign powers. When he spoke of self-strengthening, he actually meant the strengthening of himself first of all. All his efforts focused on how to maintain and enlarge his power. The fields in which the restoration was achieved most successfully were military, diplomatic and commercial, and the least successful fields were the restoration of effective civil government, the reestablishment of local control, and the rehabilitation of the economy.\textsuperscript{26} Such leaders as Li Hung-chang were not able to "see the relevance of modernization to what, in their eyes, were essentially traditional problems."\textsuperscript{27} Thus, their accomplishments in the supposedly most successful fields turned out to be only superficial. The Kanghwado incident was the mere beginning of the test.
Korea: Power Perspectives

In opposition to the Taewon'gun's strict seclusion policy, the Min government tried to take a more open policy towards foreign affairs. Although the Min government became suspicious of Japan, who dared the Taiwan expedition in 1874, and thus delayed the negotiation with Japan over the opening of Korea, the Min government was not prepared. They were not prepared at all for problems which would arise from the policy since they were not so much anti-seclusionist as anti-Taewon'gun. When the Kanghwado incident took place, the Office of State Councillors was overwhelmingly against the opening of the country. Not very determined, unlike the Taewon'gun, the Mins were easily forced to sign the treaty simply by Chinese pressure and threat. Ignorance of Western-style foreign affairs caused diplomatic mistakes which were an enormous disadvantage to Korea, just as Japan had suffered from ignorance a decade or two before. Unprepared both militarily and psychologically, Korea had to endure the coerced opening of the country, the consequences of which were recognized by none of the rulers.
Japan: Power Perspectives

With Saigo and Itagaki out of government after the victory over the seikan ron party in 1873, Okubo's power became increasingly strong. In 1875 a compromise was reached between Okubo and Itagaki at Osaka, with Kido acting as an intermediary. However, the promise made at Osaka to Itagaki and Kido to separate the functions of the cabinet and ministries had not been realized in 1875.\textsuperscript{30} Itagaki and Kido were increasingly dissatisfied with and antagonistic to Okubo. At that time a show of force directed at the ever stubbornly seclusionist Korea was planned and executed. Kido saw the incident as more important than the problem of separation of the cabinet and ministries, and he parted ways from Itagaki, who again resigned from the government.\textsuperscript{31} Thus Okubo's bid against a possible realization of the alliance between Itagaki and Kido against himself was blocked. Not only was the diplomatic impasse with Korea broken but the possible anti-Okubo alliance within the cabinet was blocked.

After long frustrating negotiations to establish Western type diplomatic relations and discard the traditional, very restricted relations between Korea and Japan, Japan finally seized the moment to force Korea to open the country. For the Japanese this was replaying what Japan had been forced to do a decade or two before. The manner in which gunboat coercion was executed was reminiscent of Commodore Perry's action in 1853-1854.\textsuperscript{32} The Kanghwado treaty was largely taken from the commercial treaty with Britain in 1858.\textsuperscript{33}
It was far more 'unequal', however, in the sense that it allowed the use of Japanese currency in trade, in addition to extra-territoriality and the non-autonomy of the customs tax. The Japanese went further than their 'teachers'.

Japan was extremely sensitive to and apprehensive of the reaction of foreign powers to her action. This time she was concerned with reactions of Britain, Russia and China. After some predicting of their reactions to a possible Japanese military action in Korea, Japan judged they would be minimal and went ahead with success. However, Japan was very cautious and even timid in her approach due to her fear of possible failure as compared to later bolder policies toward Korea. Quick battle and quick settlement to avert interference by foreign powers was the Japanese approach, which would be developed as her cheval de bataille.

Underlying the event was the Japanese aspiration to stand on equal footing with Western powers who had unequal treaties with Japan. By demonstrating her ability to do what Western powers had done, Japan wanted to gain diplomatic equality, which was only to be accorded a decade or two later. As Iwakura, one of the leaders of the anti-seikan ron party, put it:

We will not be able to restore our national rights without first making concrete achievements and establishing real power. To accomplish this, we must consolidate political control at home and expand our wealth. Our work will not
have lasting results if we seek rash and hasty achieve-
ments. 37

Or Enomoto Takeaki put it in 1876 before the Kanghwado negotiation:

It is no doubt that to control the port of Pusan is
'strategically' indispensible to Japan. It is also our
major policy requirement to open Korea, to let Korea to
have intercourse with foreign countries and to have trade
at Kanghwa or Hanyang [Seoul]. It would provide immense
'political' prestige to our country, since no other
country has done it before. This is all the more true
since only the Japanese, among the similar races like the
Chinese, Vietnamese and Siamese, think of it and do it. 38
China: Power Perspectives

Li Hung-chang's eyes stayed on North China and the Yangtze valley area in which his power was cultivated and upon which it rested. His policy was the 'coastal defense first' policy. Thus his interest in Korea was strong. When the Kanghwado incident occurred, he decided to put pressure on Korea to comply with Japan to avert a military confrontation with Japan or with Britain, which would only undermine or even jeopardize his power bases, especially his Northern Navy. Thus Li Hung-chang invited Japan to Korea in 1876 as a means of alleviating the Ch'ing's military and diplomatic burdens. Although he was vehemently for the 'coastal defense first' policy, he was not able to dare to risk a naval confrontation with any power. By emphasizing the threats from sea he acquired a larger naval defense budget and further strengthened his power. The only way to cope with external threats without consuming his power bases was the time-honored policy of playing off barbarians against barbarians or i-i-chih-i.

When Japan succeeded in opening Korea, the US rejoiced over the Japanese success and tried in vain to make a similar treaty with Korea with the good offices of Japan. The US turned to the Ch'ing after the failure to work through Japan, and asked Li Hung-chang to persuade Korea to open in exchange for American assistance to naval equipment and training as well as an alliance against Russia, which had been menacing China in Ili. Again having
in mind the time-honored scheme of _i-i-chih-i_, Li Hung-chang put pressure on Korea directly and indirectly.\textsuperscript{41} Since the Kanghwado incident, he continuously and rather opportunistically used the traditional framework of tributary relations between China and Korea for the purpose of maintaining his own power. His rather myopic use of _i-i-chih-i_ only resulted in intensified competition with other foreign influences in Korea, and finally erosion of the Ch'ing influence.
Summary of Japan’s gunboat diplomacy toward Korea of 1875-1876

We have attempted to show: 1) that Korea, militarily and psychologically unprepared, became an easy prey to foreign aggrandizement spearheaded by Japan; 2) that Japan forced to do what she had been forced to do by Western powers a decade before; 3) that Japan furthermore showed extraordinary tact and skill in utilizing foreign affairs to divert domestic opposition; 4) that Japan developed her cheval de bataille of 'quick battle and quick settlement' to avert interference by third parties and prolonged wars; 5) that in China power was used privately for provincial officials' private purposes and thus could not be risked easily for national purposes; 6) that thus China was obliged to resort to the time-honored policy of playing off barbarians against barbarians to cope with external threats; and 7) that, since China was not strong, this policy only resulted in the further increase of foreign influences and thus in the decrease of Ch'ing control.
Chapter 18: First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895

Introduction

A peasant rebellion, having started in a port city on the western side of southern Korea, spread to the neighboring areas and even occupied the capital of Cholla province, Chonju. The government was frightened and sought the assistance of Chinese forces. To counter the Chinese forces in Korea, Japan sent their forces to Korea. The rebel forces and the government forces concluded an agreement at Chonju, facing the grave situation of possible clash between Japan and China in Korea. Meanwhile, the negotiations between China and Japan failed to reach an agreement. With a Japanese surprise attack against the Chinese naval warships, the First Sino-Japanese war started in 1894. The Japanese forces both on land and at sea overwhelmed the Chinese forces. They also suppressed the Korean rebel forces. Internally torn and unable to mobilize military forces throughout China, Li Hung-chang lost in the war what was then believed to be his most valuable political asset, the Northern Navy, and thus his power. Not only was the Japanese government successful in overcoming parliamentary opposition by appealing to national jingoism, but it also succeeded in demonstrating Japan's power and thus its international status comparable to Western powers.1

Notes to chapter 18 appear on pages 575-576.
Korea: Power Bases

The slow but continuous disintegration of the traditional social order of strict class distinctions could not be stopped by ill-conceived policies executed by traditional rulers. The abortive efforts made by the Taewon'gun to strengthen the throne's power at the sacrifice of the yangban and, more importantly, of the peasants only aroused the dissatisfaction of many social strata.² Politically, the Min family who succeeded the Taewon'gun politics in 1873 was fundamentally ill-prepared for the on-going social changes and international developments surrounding Korea. Slow monetization and a sudden, massive influx of foreign currency and goods after 1876 prompted social diversification and disintegration. Most prominent among the social strata which experienced social vicissitudes were the declasse yangban, the merchant nouveaux riches, and the poverty stricken peasants. Some of the declasse yangban and chungin (a social status accorded to those whose careers were bound to end up as minor officials) were acutely and painfully cognizant of their declining status and its natural extension, the declining status of Korea. They were dissatisfied with the tradition-bound government beset by factional struggles. Their aspiration to power was strengthened when they found encouragement from the native Korean silhak thought and the 'Japanese model' for reform and modernization. The Min clan survived the abortive Kapsin coup d'état of 1884 because of the aid the Chinese military forces gave. This fact created a condition whereby Chinese influence increased
in Korea after 1884. The Min clan government was under strong pressure from Yuan Shih-k'ai. Chinese commercial interests were introduced in Korea and competed with and even began to overwhelm the Japanese interests after 1890. These foreign economic influences were one of the destabilizing forces in Korean society. The middle rank social strata, e.g., merchants, some officials and clerks, agents for landlords, gained prominence vis-à-vis the more traditional strata such as landlords and peasants. Some of the merchant nouveaux riches climbed up the traditional social order by buying governmental ranks and positions. Exploitation by the middle rank social strata added to the traditional burden imposed upon peasants by landlords. The Min government's efforts of modernization in military and administrative fields caused financial strain. All these efforts were made on the basis of taxes paid by the peasants. Thus, peasant rebellions became more rampant. 3

Many peasants sought a solution in the pseudo-religious Tonghak movement. When the government gave permission to Christian missionary activities while not to the Tonghak, the movement gained momentum by organizing protests to the government. However, the genuinely large development came when a low ranking local leader of the Tonghak led an uprising at Kobu, Cholla, against the government's suppression of the Tonghak, followed by the suppression of a small peasant uprising at Kobu. The peasant rebellion of 1894 started as a usual small riot against a minor official and developed, after the suppression, to a major rebellion which swept three rice-
rich provinces located in south Korea. Rallying around minor Tonghak priests and using the Tonghak organization, peasants developed the rebellion to an unexpected degree. The peasant rebellion represented a prevailing social mood for reform. Though it was within the traditional framework of reform, it had some concrete reform policies which were in some points parallel to the ones attempted by the short-lived government of 1894-1895 after the Japanese expulsion of the Min clan. 4
China: Power Bases

The first test of the so-called T'ung-chih restoration against foreign powers was the Sino-French war of 1884-1885. Whereas the so-called self-strengthening in the military field was the most successful, the war ended in a complete defeat. This was the obvious consequence of the lack of basic economic, social, and political rearrangements during the T'ung-chih and early Kuan-hsu periods. The Chinese mandarins who had emerged from the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in the Yangtze valley area attempted to retain and increase their own power primarily for their own sake, not for the country. When they talked about self-strengthening, they meant strengthening themselves.

Li Hung-chang, then the most powerful figure, was perhaps the most conspicuous example. It is he who refused to use his Northern Navy at the time of the Sino-French war in 1884-1885. It is he who argued for abandoning the Ili region to Russia since, according to him, maritime defense was more important than the defense of a scarcely populated peripheral border. His power bases lay: 1) in his control of Peking, i.e., the court and the government; 2) his control of Tientsin, where he obtained lucrative profits from maritime customs and where he maintained his Northern Navy; 3) and his control of the Grand Canal and Kiangnan, i.e., likin and rice.

Chinese influence in Korea had grown significantly after the Imo mutiny of 1881 and the abortive Kapsin coup of 1884. Both
pro-Japanese and pro-Taewon'gun elements suffered from major setbacks and the Mins stayed in power. However, the Min government felt increasing pressure from China through her representative in Korea, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a protege of Li Hung-chang. Yuan's blunt approach to Korea led the Korean government to seek Russian support secretly. Japan sought a more conciliatory policy vis-à-vis China to retain what little influence Japan then had in Korea. Yuan tried to strengthen the traditionally conceived 'suzerainty' relationship with Korea and even forced Korea to send a 'tributary' mission to Peking. Yuan also introduced Chinese merchants to Korea. Yuan's increasing influence in Korea was a direct extension of the power of Li Hung-chang in North China.11

When Li was confronted by the Japanese challenge in Korea, he was the leader of the peace party in China. He was afraid of losing his Northern Navy, which he had invested in for quite a while and thus which was put to its first test. The war party accused him of cowardice as well as mei-wai (cringing and currying favor with foreigners) and tried to remove him from power. When his Northern Navy turned out to be no more than a paper tiger, he was dismissed from his posts. The First Sino-Japanese war was in fact a war waged between Li Hung-chang and his rivals in China. Since resources were not fully mobilized, the defeat was obvious even before the battle. On this sad state of affairs, Yen Fu, an enlightened scholar-official lamented: "When the head is attacked all four limbs must respond: When the stomach is stabbed, the whole body must suffer."
On the contrary, the whole burden of defending the empire had fallen upon "one corner of the northeast."\textsuperscript{12} As Li Hung-chang himself put it, "One province, Chihli, is dealing with the whole nation of Japan."\textsuperscript{13} The total bankruptcy of the self-strengtheners led by the post-Taiping mandarins was dismantled by the First Sino-Japanese war. From defeat and humiliation were born radical culturalist and nationalist responses.
Japan: Power Bases

Despite all the turmoil around 1868 until the final suppression of the ex-samurai's rebellions in 1877, the Japanese economy showed a slow but continuous growth trend. Economic development in the latter half of the 19th century was largely based on the extension of traditional economic trends and the transformation of the socio-economic class relationships after the Meiji Restoration reforms. First, there was the continuous, relatively low population growth, which must have relieved much of the burden on a modernizing government with scarce resources and abundant tasks. Secondly, there was the continuous technological innovation in agriculture, even if it was slow and of a traditional type. Agricultural productivity was further increased by the disappearance of regional gaps in technological development after national unification. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, there was a fundamental transformation of the pattern of income distribution by land reform. Agricultural income, previously heavily exploited by the samurai class, now went to the pockets of the land owning class. The tax rate on land was lessened considerably, compared to the pre-Restoration days.

All of these factors had two major consequences. First, more of the agricultural income went to savings which could in turn be invested in industrial, social, and administrative development. Second, the government could depend on the landowning class for its revenue without fundamentally antagonizing it and without incurring
general, widespread social antagonism from non-land-owning classes. The government succeeded in containing and further incorporating the land-owning class into the government's side by the turn of the 19th century. The ex-samurais' rebellions were suppressed with utmost determination. Peasant unrest due to disenchantment and continuing poverty shortly after the Restoration were also suppressed. With the rebellions and riots of ex-samurai and peasants contained, and with the land-owning class standing basically on the government side, the government managed to achieve potentially very disruptive reforms. Hence the relative social and political stability of the Meiji period. During the preceding decade of the First Sino-Japanese war, industrialization efforts depended heavily on the government, which concentrated, among other things, on public works (especially railroads) and military investments. After the Kapsin abortive coup in Korea, by which Japanese influence was severely damaged, the government strenuously built a modern army. The military reforms successively executed from 1886 to 1889 established the Japanese modern army on a miniature scale. As far as military preparation was concerned, the government was ready for a war by 1893.
The Jiyuminken (freedom and civil rights) movement flourished after the suppression of ex-samurai rebellions until about 1882, when the government began to take measures to suppress it in preparation for opening a parliament. As the central bureaucracy was consolidated and the local administrative system was established in the 1880's, the Jiyuminken movement's energy was absorbed in local parliaments in the mid-1880's. The major elements of the movement were the ex-samurai and the land-owning class. The latter was very dissatisfied with the tax burden they solely had to bear for the increasingly ambitious government's efforts at modernization. With the prospect of opening of a parliament in 1890, both government and anti-government forces tried to strengthen their positions. In 1890 the Jiyuto party was reconstructed, and in the next year it was transformed to one suitable for a parliamentary party. The large ex-parliamentary corps, originating from the Jiyuminken movement, was replaced by a group of parliamentary members. After a series of direct, fierce confrontations between the chozen (non-party cabinet principle) government and anti-government parties, the latter of which had the majority in the parliament, they gradually began to find a working formula. Already in 1893 the government tried to attract the biggest opposition party, the Jiyuto party, to their side, or at least to detract it from the anti-government alliance with the second largest Kaishinto party. The latter took the more chauvinistically critical position on the government's 'soft' positions toward treaty revisions and foreign affairs, although
it was not conspicuous in 1893-1894. News of the war against
China and a series of victories drowned people with jubilance.
The long impasse in the parliament was solved overnight. Over-
whelming support for the government came for the first time since
1890 when the parliament was opened. 22

The parties lost their enthusiasm for vigorously opposing the
government. Rather they became increasingly interested in approach-
ing and sharing power by compromise. The First Sino-Japanese war
was a scene of very close positions of government and anti-govern-
ment forces in a rich country and a strong army.' These processes
continued after the First Sino-Japanese war and the ambitious
government policy of 'strong army' was executed with such speed as
to triple the military budget from 1895 to 1897 without incurring
fundamental opposition. The government opposition was rather in-
tended as leverage to obtain strong bargaining power vis-a-vis the
government with respect to sharing power or cabinets. Finally the
amalgamation of the government and opposition parties was realized
by the formation of the Seiyukai party in 1900. Underlying all of
the erosions of various party stances against the government's
'a rich country and a strong army' policy were such factors as:
1) the continuous decrease in the land tax burden on landlords and
peasants due to the rapid rise in the price of rice; 2) the in-
troduction of an indirect taxation system, which diffused the tax
burden on all the social strata; and 3) the emerging importance of
business interests, to which the parties began to shift their focus
of constituency from the previous, almost exclusive dependence on
landlords and well-to-do peasants. Besides these factors, there were increasing constraints on the free-floating opposition politicians. The consolidation of a central bureaucracy and local parliaments thinned out the range of their activities. They were tied to a parliament in which the main business was the government's manipulation of parties to get bills passed and party maneuvering for power sharing. Thus, unlike China, which suffered from national disunity, Japan was establishing basic national political unity and achieved effective war mobilization despite its still infantile stage of industrialization.
Korea: Power Bases

The reform plans and/or attempts made by the Taewon'gun (1863–1873, 1882, 1894–1895), the Min clan (1874–1894), the pro-Japanese reformists (1884, 1894–1895) and the peasant rebels (1894–1895) all manifested extremely fragile power bases and often a superficiality of reform efforts. They attempted their reform policies under the conditions of fierce factional struggles, extreme financial difficulties, and rampant foreign intervention. Without its own military forces of significant number, equipment and discipline, each political actor had to rely on foreign powers to bring about changes in rulers and policies. An extremely centrifugal society like Korea did not produce regional forces which could compete with each other for power without relying on the power held at the center. Exclusiveness in political struggles did not allow more open competition within the same government. Thus, what emerged from all of this was the Koreans at the mercy of foreign powers, despite their continuous but disjointed and rather superficial efforts to strengthen the country.
China: Power Perspectives

As it turned out in 1884-1885 vis-a-vis France and in 1894-1895 vis-a-vis Japan, Li's accomplishments in military, diplomatic and commercial spheres were not enough to wage a major war with foreign powers. Li Hung-chang did not want to jeopardize his ultimate power bases, i.e., the Northern Army and Northern Navy, in a war with foreign powers. Thus, he tried hard to obtain the diplomatic support of third parties to avoid a military confrontation with Japan, even after Japan sent more than twice as many soldiers as there were Chinese soldiers. Since he did not want to jeopardize his forces in foreign wars, what he could do was limited to the following two methods. First, there was a show of force. This was exactly what Li did in 1894. However, it was not able to deter Japan from entering into hostilities. Li was outmaneuvered by Japan, which sent soldiers outnumbering his own to Korea and provoked China. Second, there was the time-honored policy of i-i-chi-i. Li tried to avert a war against Japan up to the last moment by diplomatic maneuvering and manipulation. However, with the mounting pressure placed upon him in China, he was almost forced to wage a war against Japan. What was worse, Li thought he could win since he thought Japan's political split between the government and major political parties would be detrimental to her execution of war. He was wrong.26

In a sense, it was a war waged between Li and his militant conservative opponents in China, who merely watched Li's forces
fighting against Japan without assisting him. Even when the war turned out to be a devastating defeat to China, Li's opponents of militant conservative persuasion were against the peace with Japan. They wanted in effect to see Li's power bases more completely destroyed by the Japanese. Although Li was dismissed from his posts, he was assigned to execute the negotiations for a peace treaty. The treaty stipulated as concessions the Liaotung peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores islands, commercial and trade privileges in China -- which were open to other foreign powers as well -- and the indemnity of 200 million taels and the observance of the 'independence' of Korea. Although the tripartite intervention allowed China to retain the Liaotung peninsula temporarily, China had to make far more concessions to the Dreibund and other Western powers. It was the beginning of the scramble for concessions.

After this devastating and humiliating defeat, China moved slowly to transform itself in a more radical direction. The post-Taiping mandarins' pragmatic, rather passive but very manipulative approach to foreign affairs admitted to failure. More ideologically oriented nationalistic radical reformists overwhelmed the pragmatic mandarins. Instead of trying to 'contain imperialism' by concessions, as the pragmatic mandarins did, they wanted to preserve Chinese culture against foreign influence or to recover national rights. After the militant conservatives' bankruptcy in the Boxer rebellion, the latter nationalistic approach gained acceptance in Chinese officialdom.
Japan: Power Perspectives

The growing influence of China in Korea after the Imo mutiny of 1881, and especially after the failure of the Japanese-supported Kapsin coup d'état of 1884, Japan was anxious to repel Chinese influences in Korea and establish a hegemony over Korea. The establishment of the hegemony over Korea was considered to be an accomplishment to demonstrate that Japan was a country which deserved to be treated as an equal to Western powers.  

The peasant rebellion in Korea which started in 1894 was an opportunity for Japan to intervene. The wide-spread rebellion forced the Korean government under the Min clan to ask for Chinese military assistance. Chinese action brought about Japanese counteraction. Japan attempted to use this opportunity to establish Japan's hegemony over Korea. Japan desperately sought a casus belli against the Chinese forces stationing in Korea for a while after sending her forces. Japan wanted to strike at the Chinese forces as swiftly as possible without incurring interference by third parties. When Japan faced Russia's strong opposition to her sending of forces, Japan tried desperately to obtain again the support of Britain, which had been antagonistic to Russia on a global scale. To block the Chinese supporting forces heading for Korea, the Japanese Navy started hostilities by a surprise attack. Well-prepared and helped by the bad preparation of the enemy, Japan could beat the Chinese forces at sea and on land. Japan's style of warfare shaped in the First Sino-Japanese war was to be repeated, if
not wholly, in the subsequent wars that she waged. First, there was a swift, well-prepared attack; second, a keen awareness of thin military balance; third, a desperate search for the diplomatic support of third parties; fourth, a search for an initial, decisive victory, which could be converted favorably at a negotiation table. All of these were conditioned on Japan's still fragile power bases and especially her questionable ability to wage prolonged wars. 30

The tripartite intervention after the treaty of Shimonoseki, to the effect that Japan return the Liaoting peninsula to China, only reinforced the Japanese view of international relations as the tiger world in which the more powerful dominate the less powerful. After the intervention, the Japanese government tripled her military budget in three years, with a clear objective of preparing herself for a war against Russia. 31 Japanese rashness of achievement in the international arena was enforced by what they thought to be the extreme humiliation and disgrace wrought by Russia. Like the coerced opening of the country, the tripartite intervention played an extremely important role of convincing the Japanese of the crucial importance of military power and of driving them to the Wille zur Macht. As Tokutomi Soho, a well-known journalist and writer put it:

It is no exaggeration to state that the return of the Liaotung peninsula decided my fate. Thereafter I became a different man spiritually. Japan was forced to succumb to the Powers' will only because it was weak. I was convinced that, without power, justice and morality had no value at all. 32
Summary of the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895

We have attempted to show: 1) that Japan was successful in establishing national unity and war mobilization at the dawn of the First Sino-Japanese war; 2) that Japan's goal was to establish her hegemony in Korea to demonstrate that Japan could be treated as an equal to Western powers; 3) that, in the first major war, Japan exhibited extraordinary skill and tact in war planning and execution, which set the 'model' for later wars; 4) that China suffered from political disunity and extremely insufficient war mobilization; 5) that China's manipulative approach to foreign affairs finally admitted to failure, which was to pave the way for the dominance of radical culturalist and nationalist approaches; and 6) that Korea was basically unable to cope with increasing foreign penetration, which was only aggravated by the tendency of Korean rulers to use foreign powers to bring about political changes.
Chapter 19: Boxer Intervention of 1900-1901

Introduction

The self-strengtheners who had emerged through the suppression of the Taiping and other rebellions in the mid-19th century exposed their powerlessness when China was defeated by Japan in 1895 in a devastating and humiliating way. More radical reformers began to assert themselves after this defeat and the scramble for concessions following it. And at last in 1898 they came to power, only to be ousted 100 days later. The militantly conservative policies of Empress Dowager, the protagonist of the counter coup d'etat in 1898, amplified all the trouble at home and abroad.

Imperialist penetration brought about various social changes in China. An influx of foreigners, entrepreneurs, construction engineers and missionaries, especially in coastal areas and key transportation spots, brought about various forms of trouble. Anti-Christian and anti-foreign riots were frequent. Not only for racial, religious and cultural reasons, but also for social, economic and political reasons, the Chinese people resorted to action. 1 Native converts backed by foreign powers threatened the social bases of the gentry. Foreign capital threatened Chinese workers engaged in river transportation and small scale handicraft industries. When all of this was combined with a series of natural disasters aggravated by a bad government, dissatisfaction burst out. Since 1897, floods

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Notes to chapter 19 appear on pages 576-577.
in North China were frequent and disastrous, due to the poor main-
tenance of dykes since the breakdowns at the time of the Taiping
and Nien rebellions. Drought and worm also attacked North China.
These disasters inevitably produced hundreds of thousands of land-
less and unemployed people in need of food.

One of the most important policies of the government after
1898 directly associated with riots was the drastic cut in the
defense budget and thus in the number of soldiers. Unemployed ex-
soldiers floated around North China, particularly in metropolitan
areas. The consequence of these domestic and foreign factors was
the Boxer uprising. Without articulate policies and without real
power bases, China, led by the Empress Dowager, was only 'raped'
by foreign powers, just as she had been forty years before. 2
After the Opium war and especially the Taiping rebellion, the power of the gentry was extremely strengthened vis-à-vis the central government. The gentry now had the power to maintain a militia and to collect taxes. The influence of the Ch'ing gradually declined, both by the gentry's increasing control of the provinces and by the aggrandizement of foreign powers through military, economic and administrative means and missionary activities. Alarmed by the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese war and the scramble for concessions, the radical reformists, headed by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, carried out a coup d'état in 1898. The reformists believed more strongly than the self-strengtheners in the necessity of transformation of political and economic institutions. This met two kinds of opposition. One was militant conservatives, who categorically rejected things Western. The other was the gentry, to whose interests the reformists' efforts at centralization were extremely detrimental. The reformists were overthrown by the militant conservatives after only 100 days in power. 3

Meanwhile foreign penetration throughout China caused increasing frictions. Besides, floods, famines, droughts and worms attacked North China since 1897 and produced a large number of people drifting en masse searching for food. The Boxers were those people who were organized by a quasi-religious secret society. Although the Boxers' fanatical anti-foreignism was in accord with the militant conservatives of the Ch'ing court headed by the Empress Dowager,
intervention by foreign powers proved that the position was utterly untenable. The southern viceroy refused to commit themselves to the Ch'ing court, insisting that the Boxers be suppressed and that peaceful relations be maintained with the powers. 4 North China was ravaged by foreign powers and Manchuria was occupied by Russia. Central and South China were out of control of the court. Out of this devastating situation the Ch'ing resumed their eleventh hour reform efforts.

After the Boxer rebellion, revolutionary nationalism spread, especially among Chinese students. The slowness of reform disenchanted both reformists and revolutionary nationalists. Anti-Manchu racism was further strengthened among revolutionary nationalists. The gentry, alarmed by the centralization efforts by the Ch'ing court, based themselves in newly created local parliaments and finally joined the anti-Ch'ing forces for the preservation of their interests when the 1911 revolution took place. After the revolution the power of the center was further weakened. This was no more than the continuation of the trend that had been operating at least since the Taiping rebellion. The Boxer intervention only paved the way for removing the facade of unified control by the government by complicated causal links. 5
Japan: Power Bases

Initial modern economic growth was steadily continuing since mid-1880's. Heavy military investments after the humiliating tripartite intervention in 1895 reinforced the singlemindedness of Japan's efforts. Military expenditures soared extremely rapidly. Before 1895 military expenditures amounted to more than 20 million yen. In 1896 they amounted to more than 70 million yen. In 1897 they amounted to more than 100 million yen. This extraordinary expansion of military spending was made possible by several factors.

First, both government and anti-government forces were stunned by the tripartite intervention which emphasized Japan's sheer impotence all the more because of her admirable victory in the First Sino-Japanese war. Especially anti-government parties, previously opposing to the government's policy of heavy taxation for 'a rich country and a strong army', began to commit themselves to the government's policy. Second, the government's taxation policy shifted from previous exclusive reliance on land taxes to the indirect taxation and taxation on industry and commerce, from which the government had formerly refrained, in order to foster and nurture industrialization. This lessened the opposition of the land owning class, which was represented heavily in the anti-government parties. Third, as the institutional framework of central bureaucracy and local administration took shape, the range of activities of the anti-government parties was gradually thinned and confined largely to the parliament. The relative stability of
the distribution in terms of parliamentary members' socio-economic background and of the ratio of government to anti-government forces encouraged both government and anti-government forces to seek some compromise between them. The government wanted desperately to get bills passed for heavy military investments, for which it was constitutionally indispensable to get support of the anti-government parties, which far surpassed the pro-government parties in number. Anti-government parties also wanted to gain and share power largely to broaden one faction's strength vis-a-vis others within a party. Extremely complicated alliances took shape, cross-cutting government and anti-government forces. The Kenseito party (formerly the Jiyuto party) allied with the Ito-led bureaucratic forces in the government. The Kaishinto party failed to gain power and strengthened its chauvinistic attack on the government for a while. Yamagata-led bureaucrats, peers, and pro-government parties remained hostile to Ito's efforts to share power with anti-government parties. Ito and the Kenseito party established a merger party, Seitukai, in 1900. Yamagata-led forces tightened their position. However, the second generation politicians under Ito and Yamagata already began unobtrusively to work out a more solid compromise with anti-government parties. During this process fierce confrontation took place in parliament. It was all the more fierce because of their political similarities and still their equally strong thirst for power.

At the time of the Boxer intervention, heavy military
investments were under way. However, Japan was not powerful at all as contrasted to Western powers. Close cooperation with Western powers was the prerequisite for Japan's expansion on the continent. Geographical proximity and a large number of forces available for the intervention were Japan's two major advantages vis-a-vis Western powers, especially Britain.
Britain: Power Bases

The British economy experienced the Great Depression from 1873 to 1896, when both prices and profits fell continuously. Agricultural depression wrought the decline of the landed aristocracy. Industrial depression caused increasing investments abroad. The Reform Bill of 1884 was to bring about fundamental changes in political maps. The working men were finally enfranchised. However, the political scene was still dominated by the Tories. Workers were absorbed in the growth of their own trade unions. The Liberals were divided. A general wish for stability dominated the minds of the upper and middle classes. It was not until the 1900's that the Liberals and the Labor emerged as strong political forces.\textsuperscript{14}

Externally, however, British hegemony in the world had already been fundamentally called into question. Other powers had already become menacing to Britain. Despite her seemingly increased colonial possessions, her industrial dynamism had already been lost. Naval supremacy, which enabled her to presuppose that all other powers were potential enemies, had already become untenable.\textsuperscript{15} The paramount position of Britain in China, which had been established at least since 1860, was fundamentally challenged by the unexpected Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, and more importantly by the following tripartite intervention. The Russian emergence in Manchuria was also a great threat to the British position in China. Imperialist rivalries all over China, together with the rapid naval development of other powers, called into
question the very assumption of British supremacy in the Far East, on which the whole British China policy had been based. Extensive British interests in railway and trade were suddenly jeopardized by thrusts by other powers into China, which had been heavily state-supported. Rapid naval development of the US, Germany and Japan did not allow Britain to stick to the two-power standard set in 1889.\textsuperscript{16} The difficulty in China was compounded by her heavy involvement in the Boer war. Britain had to send as many as 300,000 soldiers to face some 75,000 Boers.\textsuperscript{17} This number of 300,000 broke the previous world record of soldiers sent overseas. The record had formerly been held by the Japanese, who send as many as 200,000 to Korea in the 1590's.
The Boxer intervention was a watershed. It was "the major turning point of modern Chinese history." The untenability of the militant culturalist position was disclosed. The manipulative, compromise-oriented self-strengtheners had already been bankrupt by 1895. Culturalist defense against foreign penetration proved impossible in the Boxer intervention. The nationalist reformists' policy of recovering and preserving national rights by self-transformation was the only course the Ch'ing court could adopt. The reform plans attempted in 1898 were now put into the hands of the conservatives of the Ch'ing court, whose survival was now at stake. The Ch'ing court conservatives were now transformed from militant conservatives into the supporters of national rights. The Boxer intervention set the stage of 20th century Chinese politics by advancing the force of nationalism within and outside the government.
Almost excessively apprehensive of another joint action against Japan by the Dreibund of 1895, Japan was initially very cautious about intervening in the Boxer rebellion. Cooperation with other powers was sought after to the end. The tripartite intervention of 1895 reminded them too vividly of the complete defeat experienced by Choshu han in 1864, when Western powers executed gun-boat coercion in reprisal of the anti-foreign action by Choshu han. To Yamagata the tripartite intervention was a repetition of the nightmare which he had personally experienced in 1864 as a combatant.  

The memory of 1864 and 1895 led Japan to caution and meticulous calculation. Taking advantage of geographical proximity and the availability of a large number of soldiers, Japan waited for the time to come when other powers would solicit the help of Japanese soldiers. When Britain and Russia did so, Japan sent the largest number of forces to China. Until then Japan's sending out of soldiers was on a very small scale, though it was swiftly done. It was as if "she behaved like a modest virgin initially and then like a running hare."  

While cooperating in North China, Japan tried to advance her interests, especially in Korea on the one hand and in Fukien and Chekiang on the other. Despite the remarkable shrewdness displayed by Japan in the Boxer intervention, timidity was another outstanding characteristic of Japan's behavior. Japan's proposal to negotiate over Korea with Russia was categorically rejected by Russia, Japan's
plan to establish a foothold in Fukien and Chekiang saw an abrupt halt after the Western powers' opposition. As Nish's parody goes, "The expansion had at first all the bounding energy of a running hare; but why did it halt abruptly like a modest virgin?" The fear of Western powers paralyzed Japan's action in Korea and South China.

Russia's categorical refusal to hold negotiation on Korea was a slap in Japan's face. Hostility accumulated. To overcome the weak position of Japan, an alliance was contemplated, either with Russia or with Britain. The former was the policy of compromise. Japan concluded an alliance with Britain in 1902, having Russia in mind as her potential enemy. The drift to a war with Russia had begun.
Britain: Power Perspectives

The erosion of British supremacy in China forced her to seek special arrangements with other powers to decrease potential enemies. This was felt especially strongly at the time of the protracted war in South Africa, which turned out to be the second largest war Britain had had after Waterloo. The extent to which the assumption of British supremacy disappeared varied from person to person and disclosed the strong tenacity of traditional thinking. Salisbury, prime minister (1895–1902), felt that British supremacy was not fundamentally jeopardized and sought an inconspicuous solution by not taking any drastic action in the Far East, whereas some others held that the supremacy was indeed being lost and sought more positive action. Indecision, caution and timidity characterized Salisbury's handling of the Boxer intervention, whereas a more positive and bolder policy was called for by the British representatives in China. Satow, representative in China since 1900, even lamented that Great Britain had followed the wrong policy over the past 40 years and thought that the old gunboat policy was the best. Salisbury attempted not to provoke Russia by opposing what Britain could not prevent Russia from doing. He attempted to minimize losses. He thought that Britain could maintain her preponderent position in the Far East without concluding a formal alliance if she could make skillful diplomatic maneuvers specifically by using informal agreements or understandings, often in an ad hoc form. Salisbury objected that Japan's casus belli would ultimately become the
casus foederis. On the other hand, others thought that the British preponderant position in the Far East had already been lost, and that to defend or at least minimize losses it would be necessary to ally formally with other powers.

Confronted by the sudden emergence and thrust into China by Russia and Germany, Britain was obliged to be defensive in her policy goal, whether the policy itself was defensive or not. Her policy was a cautious and rather gradual search for solutions during 1895-1902. First, there was the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1899 to check the Russian advance to the Liaotung peninsula. Second, there was the Anglo-German agreement in 1900 to check German ambition in the Yangtze in reprisal against the Russian advance in Manchuria. Finally there was the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 as a counterbalance against the Russian advance, since the Anglo-German formula had not been fully developed. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was at the peak of solidarity at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. Since then, alliance relations with other European powers were developed in the European context, and the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance decreased at least to Britain. After World War I the close, though informal, cooperation with the US through the Washington treaties replaced and terminated the alliance in 1923.
Summary of the Boxer intervention of 1900-1901

We have attempted to show: 1) that the Chinese militant conservative culturalist position on foreign affairs was quashed by the Boxer intervention, which opened the way to the twentieth-century Chinese politics of nationalism; 2) that the continuous trend of local independence led by the gentry in China was further strengthened by the 11th hour reform effort for centralization, which paved the way for the 1911 revolution; 3) that the Japanese government was successful to mobilize national resources for the singleminded purpose of a strong army and navy after the traumatic tripartite intervention of 1895; 4) that Japan, always extremely mindful of the 1895 intervention, executed the Boxer intervention in a manner that would not draw Western powers' suspicion and opposition, and made an abrupt halt to the original expansion plan; 5) that British predominance had already been called into open question in the Far East, as well as in the rest of the world, because of the general weakening of industry and the navy and society at large; 6) that the British decision makers split as to the best British policy toward China and Japan, the controversy exhibiting, among other things, the extraordinary tenacity, at the time of imperialist competition, of the assumptions created at the time of British supremacy.
Chapter 20: Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905

Introduction

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was the watershed of modern Japanese history. Victory in the Russo-Japanese war enabled Japan to acquire a great power status in the Far East. It demonstrated her successful nation building, especially in industrialization and national mobilization for international achievements. Japan now shed her former humiliating status by revising the unequal treaties that had been her anathema for half a century. This victory was conceived by many as the first victory of the non-white over the white. It was the challenge of the non-white against the centuries-long white domination. The Russo-Japanese war exemplified all the strength and weaknesses of this ambitious parvenu middle power empire that were to be revealed with jubilation and frustration in the following half a century.¹

To Russia it was one of the very important turning points in the downfall of the Romanov empire and the building of a revolution. General revolutionary potential that had been accumulated for quite a while manifested itself at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and the suppression of a mutiny and a large demonstration in St. Petersburg only strengthened the revolutionary potential in the long run. The eleventh-hour reform efforts of the autocratic monarchy after the defeat only activated and amplified the revolutionary potential and moved a large step forward toward a revolution which was to erupt again in 1917 amidst a series of

Notes to chapter 20 appear on page 578.
defeats in World War I.  

The Russo-Japanese war started with a struggle over Manchuria. When the Boxer rebellion started off in North China in 1898, Russia had been hurrying forward the completion of the Trans-Siberian railways system, including the Chinese Eastern railway, which was to create the powerful basis of the Russian Far Eastern advance into the Far East and the Pacific. (Incidentally, the rights for building the Chinese Eastern railway were obtained in 1896 after the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895.) Russia occupied Manchuria before the Boxer rebellion spread into all of Manchuria. When the Boxers' anti-foreign attacks were intensified, imperialist power intervened. With a suspicious eye on each other's motivation by simply projecting one's own malicious motives, imperialist powers competed for gains in this intervention. Russia stayed in Manchuria, holding large military forces there, even after the withdrawal of other powers.

Britain was very annoyed by Russia's advance in the Far East, which was thought to be part of the great Russian push into the spheres of interest and influence of the British empire. Japan was not only extremely annoyed but threatened, since she was far from having established a solid footing in Korea, which was thought to be the vital line of the Japanese empire. When a British search for an ally to check the Russian advance ended up with the Anglo-German agreement, which did not include a mutual commitment in Manchuria, Britain turned to Japan, which also desperately needed
an ally. To Japan, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 meant the lifting up of her international status; she was now recognized as an ally by the still most powerful nation which, with the increasingly agonizing cognizance of her declining power but with the counteracting will to hold her overstretched empire, wanted to hold her position by parting ways from the tradition of honorable isolation.3

Russia, apparently prompted by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, agreed to withdraw from Manchuria in the treaty with the Ch'ing government. However, this was delayed by the Russians' persistent efforts to get a quid pro quo from the Ch'ing, who resisted it. All of these slow negotiations and the apparent Russian reluctance to withdraw only irritated and annoyed Japan, who thought that her vital line, Korea, would be jeopardized by the Russian presence in Manchuria. The negotiations between Japan and Russia were going on pari passu with the one between Russia and China. The negotiations reached a deadlock when the Japanese demanded that Russia admit Japan's position in Korea and the Russians rejected their demands. Convinced of the vital necessity to have Korea unjeopardized by any other power, Japanese decision-makers rapidly rallied to a war with Russia. While Russia underestimated Japan's power bases and thought it very unlikely that Japan would resort to a war, Japan finally resorted to it with the calculation that she must take advantage of the situation in which the Trans-Siberian railway and the naval squadron were not yet completed. With a series of
victories on battlefields and with successful negotiations, Japan managed to win the war. The victory was more Pyrrhic than anything else, however.
Russia: Power Bases

Russia, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, was an old society which was unable to absorb fully all the stresses and strains that had been generated by the urge to industrialize since the 1890's. The architect of its industrialization efforts was Count Sergei Witte, who held that the key to maintaining Russia as a great power was industrial and military power. The economy was dominated by agriculture, and yet to generate its own dynamics of industrialization, it had to be directed by the state itself toward that goal. Russian society was to be overloaded by the ambitious pursuit for greatness of the empire. First, peasants were more and more impoverished by the government's policy of imposing heavy tax on peasants for state-directed industrialization, and the government's saving of grain for the purpose of exporting it to foreign countries in return for foreign currency, a sine qua non for investment. Second, workers who were uprooted from the countryside worked for extraordinarily cheap wages and under bad labor conditions. The accumulation of this impoverished and psychologically humiliated population only hampered the efforts of state-directed industrialization.

Russia was a vast society of astonishingly weak and inefficient administrative structure with the autocratic emperor at the top. The increasing frustrations and dissidence were only met with repressions of a most primitive and brutal sort. It is perhaps not entirely unfathomable that on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war
a minister felt a small war would be necessary to avert internal turmoil. Political oppression and social suffocation only created disgruntled intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who were to drive society in the direction of a revolution. With this threatening trend, the landed gentry, the most conservative element, reacted strongly against Witte's efforts at industrialization. This only undermined the power bases of the landed gentry and thus of the Russian ruling class and monarchy itself. Witte was dismissed from the office of the powerful Minister of Finance in 1903. With the most reactionary elements at the forefront of the decision making structure, Russia was only able to push outside for imperial glory and to reinforce oppression inside to show the imperial will to rule. "The autocracy was in fact revealed in its full unviability."5 In the court, "there is nothing consistent, considered or firmly directed. Everything is done spasmodically, haphazardly, under the influence of the moment, in accordance with the intrigues of this or that person, or the lobbying of those crawling out from their different corners in quest of fortune."6 This structure of decision making was to paralyze Russia before and during the war, aggravated perhaps by the loss of Witte from the scene. He was to be brought back for peace negotiations in 1905.

In short, Russia was caught in a dilemma on the eve of the war. She was under constant strain. "It was Russia's tragedy—and that of many underdeveloped countries after her—that the bases of her society and tradition, the pillars of a sound polity, were
being irresistibly undermined at the very time when the ambitions of both the government and the people required the utmost effort to catch up to the Western model. When state and society should have been exceptionally strong to cope with an exceptional emergency, they were progressively weakened by the disloyalty created by that very model. Much of Russia's subsequent development has been conditioned by an understandable desire to escape from the worst effects of such subversion."
Japan: Power Bases

The ten years after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 were a period of two critical changes. One was the development of extremely ambitious armament efforts after the traumatic and humiliating tripartite intervention of 1895. These efforts placed an extremely heavy burden on the non-land holding class tax bearers, and also triggered accumulative economic and social changes. The other was a major political realignment which established and solidified the 1890 constitutional system.

The traumatic event of 1895 left no alternative for most Japanese but to reaffirm for themselves the Hobbesian zero-sum view of international politics. A frantic effort to strengthen military forces was made possible by the resentment against Russia as a driving force. This effort of 'a rich country and a strong army' required a change in the taxation system. The major tax bearers up to that point had been the landholding class, whose opposition to the government's heavy taxation was a major subject of political debate in parliament since 1890. A broadened base of taxation was made possible by the introduction of indirect tax. The tax burden was now shared unevenly by the lower income strata. Rapid industrialization efforts which were initiated, directed, supported or protected by the state made an increasing impact. Uprooted from the countryside, impoverished and distressed in urban settings, workers began to make their presence felt socially and politically, though slowly.
Despite of all the social changes that were going on, the range of political representation was not proportionate at all. Government, bureaucracy and political parties were not concerned with these newly emerging forces. The establishment was being formed during the preceding 10 years before the Russo-Japanese war. The hanbatsu-dominated government was being strengthened by absorbing the force of the political parties, theretofore the main anti-government elements in parliament. The government desperately needed the cooperation of the political parties which dominated parliament in the number of seats and therefore could kill the ambitious armament plan drawn up by the government. The political parties, having already committed themselves to the 1890 Constitutional system and retaining extraordinary hunger to share and/or take power, could not resist the government's overture. The government was successful in setting up a new party with the Seiyukai party, the largest political party around the turn of the 19th century. The other party, Kenseito, was jealous of this, but the surprise of the development paralyzed the Kenseito for a while. Within the hanbatsu government, there were two major forces headed respectively by Ito and Yamagata. The former merged with the Seiyukai. The latter allied itself with bureaucracy, peers and minor government-sponsored political parties, with the non-party cabinet principle. This political configuration was to continue at least until 1918.10

With the parliamentary opposition contained by the
government's promise to share power, the government was to face no threatening opposition during the war. The powers of these forces were well-balanced at the time of war. Also the more head-strong second-generation politicians and the more cautious genro balanced each other in executing the war. These facts undoubtedly strengthened Japan's position vis-a-vis Russia. However, Japan's economic and military capacity was too small to carry the total war for a long time. The move for peace had to start immediately after the beginning of the war.
Russia: Power Perspectives

It was Russia's underestimation of Japan's resolve to defend
what the latter considered her vital interests that caused Russia to
be surprised when the war broke out. In fact, Kuropatkin and Witte,
the ministers of war and finance respectively, were both against a
war for the reason that internal disaster would increase in the event
of war. Kuropatkin was not sure that a war, if it broke out, would
end in Russia's victory. Nicholas II himself thought that a war
would be against Russia's interests. However, he did not think that,
even after Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, Japan
would resort to force. Russia took the position that whether, how
fast, and on what conditions Russia would withdraw from Manchuria
would be decided upon by the negotiation with China. However,
other powers, especially Japan, took extremely seriously Russia's
presence in Manchuria since 1900. Even when the negotiations with
Japan began, Russia seems to have taken lightly Japan's position,
which demanded that Russia admit Japan's preponderant position in
Korea and that Russia withdraw from Manchuria. Though this original
position of Japan was later modified, the basic tone was not
changed at all. The arbitrary and diversified decision-making system
of Nicholas II successively enabled extremists and fanatics to have
influence. One of the instances was Bezobrazov, who made great pro-
fits from contracts for wood in the Yalu river basin. This only
stirred up Japanese suspicion of Russia's interest in Korea, which
was considered the vital line by Japan.12
In spite of the quantitative advantage that the Russian army had, and in spite of the increasing new mobilization of soldiers from European Russia through the Trans-Siberian railway, the Russian forces made a poor showing on the battlefield. This was believed largely to be due to the tactical mistakes of commander Kuropatkin, who was so sensitive that he too often became a captive of Japanese moves for deception. However, Kuropatkin's strategy of inflicting as heavy blows as possible upon the Japanese forces and of withdrawing in good shape while waiting for reinforcement of his forces from Europe, and finally of making a final confrontation with the largest forces, seemed to be pretty successful, although his final stage was never realized. (Incidentally, Japanese forces extended to the extreme in Manchuria and there were no more soldiers in Japan, even including reserves. There was a shortage of munitions and arms from the beginning.) The disastrous defeat of all the fleets of Vladivostok, Port Arthur, and most importantly, the later dispatched Baltic and Black Sea fleets, accelerated the end of the war.

The most important consideration that led Russia to peace was the accelerating increase in internal disorder that shook the empire. Strikes, demonstrations and mutinies swayed the empire in 1905. Indeed, "the reestablishment of internal order was much more important than a victory over the extended enemy."\(^{13}\) Despite the temporary defeat of the revolutionary forces in 1905, they were to rise up again during World War I in a way similar to/the Russo-Japanese war. The slogan was, 'the worse, the better'. 
Japan: Power Perspectives

The difficulties experienced in handling Korea even after the victory of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 were largely because of the Korean resistance to Japanese influence and their playing-off moves by inviting the Russians into the scene. However, these difficulties, when earlier difficulties were taken into account, only made Japan more convinced of the necessity to have Korea in her hands. Whereas Japan had not been able to build any solid footing in Korea, Russia created a strong fait accompli in Manchuria. This fact generated an extreme sense of irritation and urgency among Japanese decision-makers. When combined with the feeling of resentment against Russia since 1895, the sense of urgency was strengthened and gained a force among the decision-makers. Furthermore, the argument for an early strike before the Trans-Siberian railway system was strengthened. This was the psychology of Japanese decision-making, reappearing later again and again due to her basic weaknesses, 'now-or-never' psychology, or 'don't miss the bus' psychology. The positive policy toward Russia was supported forcefully by the younger decision-makers of the second generation rather than by the genro, who were rather cautious and timid vis-à-vis Western powers in general and Russia in particular. This is a noteworthy fact. The consensus, however, was that only by a swift, decisive victory and a swift peace settlement would Japan be able to manage a war with Russia.

When it turned out that Russia was not in the mood to accept Japan's demands at all, Japan made concessions one after another
while retaining the basic line intact. However, when it reached a
deadlock, the only action left for Japan was thought to be a war.
The stakes which Japan thought she had in Korea were so strong and
widely shared that the decision for a war was quick, and its ex-
ecution was well-prepared, swift and vigorous. Good coordination
was maintained between and among civil and military leaders, which
was perhaps one of the most crucial differences between Japan
and Russia. With cautious oligarchs serving as a restraint and with
diplomats and military officers as vigorous and shrewd policy
executors, and with political parties supporting the government in
its war policy, the whole nation served as one cohesive war machine.  
With the Anglo-Japanese alliance now in operation, with China being
kept neutral, and with the US serving as an intermediary on Japan's
request, Japan could carry off a war victoriously, however
Pyrrhic its victory was.  

\[16\]
\[17\]
The Russo-Japanese war was a second starting point for Japan. Japan got a solid foothold in Korea. She was to commit herself further to Manchuria from then on. Accumulative psychological investment and emotional involvement were felt so strongly that Manchuria was considered to be a *sine qua non* to the destiny of Japan. Japan's economic weakness and military vulnerability in Manchuria inevitably prompted the institution of military colonial administration and state-directed industrialization. When threatened by mounting nationalist assaults coming up from the south, Japan was to resort to force to defend Manchuria. All the manipulations and interferences in Chinese politics conducted by the spearhead of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria could not prevent nationalist influences from reaching Manchuria. Even when they did not keep many of the essential conditions of the victory -- such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the good offices of a third party (the US), the good coordination among decisionmakers, the politically restraining influence of the *genro* and non-messing by political parties -- they thought they could win in the same way as they had in the Russo-Japanese war. All the difficulties were subsequently to be wittingly or unwittingly forgotten. The victory being nothing but Pyrrhic, tended to be overlooked. All the heavy human sacrifices in wartime only increased the psychological investment that was to constrain and further paralyze Japan and constrain her options.18
Summary of Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905

We have attempted to show: 1) that Russia had been experiencing strains and stresses wrought by efforts to industrialize for the glory of the empire; 2) that Russia did not expect that Japan would resort to force and thus did not prepare herself well for the war; 3) that Russian rulers were less concerned with her defeat in the war than with her internal disorders, which led Russia to conclude a peace treaty; 4) that Japan's heavy military investments were made possible by the major political rearrangement since 1890, which successfully nullified the fundamental opposition to the government's war policy; 5) that Japan was prepared well for the war and executed it with good coordination; 6) that Japan's basic economic and military weaknesses forced her to seek peace immediately after the start of the war; 7) that despite the victory being nothing but Pyrrhic, the psychological investment in the war and Manchuria were increasingly so heavy as to lead the nation to take a very rigid position on Manchuria.
Chapter 21: Japan's 21 demands toward China of 1915

Introduction

The two successive victories in 1895 and 1905, which brought great power status, colonial territories and spheres of influence to Japan, swelled both her defense perimeters and her greed, and thus a sense of insecurity. The amorphous Chinese political situation and the difficulties in asserting Japan's interests vis-a-vis other imperialist powers in China gradually aggravated Japan's sense of frustration, especially when the Chinese revolution in 1911 took the Japanese by surprise. Political fluidity in China and Yuan Shih-k'ai's elusiveness and toughness frustrated Japan's attempts. When World War I broke out, Japan attempted to take advantage of the European absence in the Far East and the Pacific. Japan took all of Germany's colonial territories in China and the Southern Pacific. She also wanted to consolidate her position in China and Manchuria. The notorious 21 demands were forwarded to China in this context. Despite Japan's intention of doing it swiftly and secretly, Yuan outmaneuvered Japan by leaking the contents of the demands and by deliberately delaying the negotiations. Facing opposition from Western powers including Britain and from the genro, Foreign Minister Kato's diplomacy saw an abominable end. The diplomatic failure of the 21 demands, despite Yuan's acceptance of the deflated ultimatum, revealed the kinds of difficulties Japan had to face for the next 30 years. ¹

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Notes to chapter 21 appear on pages 578-580.
China: Power Bases

After the complete bankruptcy of the modernization movement occasioned by the First Sino-Japanese war by the self-strengtheners, the radical reform movement emerged and competed with reactionary conservatism in the court. The reform movement's success was only ephemeral. It was in power for only 100 days. A counter-coup was successful. Eleventh-hour reform efforts were now undertaken by the reactionaries to tighten the slackened central control by the Manchu government. However, these efforts were not only antagonistic to revolutionaries but also to the gentry, who had been enjoying less state intervention in the decaying process of the central government.  

The attempts to nationalize railways, hitherto privately operated, met vigorous opposition by the gentry, now the owner of railways and the would-be loser once the government penetrated into the provinces. The uprising at Wuchang swiftly spread all over China under the unstable conditions of dynastic decay. Having a stake in the status quo, the gentry was afraid that these revolutionary tides were turned against the gentry itself. The gentry quickly reversed its position and took over the lead of the revolution, turning the revolution into an anti-Manchu revolution. Despite the decisive roles played by the disgruntled middle echelon soldiers in the revolution, the gentry gave its support to the opportunist general Yuan Shih-k'ai.
Yuan Shih-k'ai soon disclosed his ambition to enthrone himself. When
this became evident, the gentry now shifted its support to anti-Yuan
forces, most notably the one represented by the Kuomintang. However,
the 'second' revolution of 1913 was abortive by Yuan's suppression,
and parliament became under Yuan's control. Yuan looked, at the
eve of World War I, as if he would and could become emperor. After
having successfully outmaeuvered the Japanese, who presented the
21 demands to Yuan in a brutally naked manner, he attempted to
enthrone himself again. However, this attempt was again prevented and
he died in bed in 1916.

Meanwhile power in the countryside rested upon the gentry, who
enjoyed independence and autonomy from the central government.
Despite the growing diffusion of ideas such as nationalism, liberalism,
democracy, anarchism, socialism and communism during this period, social
and institutional arrangements were not significantly changed at all. The facade of central government notwithstanding, the scene in the
countryside, and particularly power relationships, did not change, except for the gentry's increased power. Agricultural production was
increasing barely enough to support the still growing population,
though at a slower pace than in the pre-1850 years. Although slow
commercialization of agricultural products was achieved in treaty
ports and adjacent areas, they relied upon premodern methods of
agricultural production.

Limited power bases of the central government were a natural
consequence of the gentry's increased power and the superficial
governmental control. This fact increasingly forced the central government to seek aid from foreign powers. The seemingly powerful but essentially fragile position of Yuan was evidenced by his strong desire to obtain foreign loans to strengthen the government. Britain, the power having the most vested interests in China, supported the status quo. Britain did not like other powers to divide and grab territorial and commercial interests from China to her detriment. The convergence of British interests and Yuan's interests helped Yuan very much. Yuan's policy of playing off barbarians against barbarians was enormously successful, given his extraordinarily limited power bases. His mobilization and manipulation of nationalist anti-imperialist forces in China, and of world public opinion against Japan's 21 demands toward China, were so shrewdly accomplished that Japan had to bear diplomatic defeat, so bitter and so fruitless.
**Japan: Power Bases**

World War I boosted the Japanese economy. Almost unlimited expansion in overseas markets occurred, and export rose sharply. Markets increased so rapidly that production could not catch up. The increase in the national income inevitably resulted in an increasing demand for consumption. This in turn caused a rapid rise in commodity price. The firm's profits rose suddenly by the fast rise in prices and the rather slow catch-up of wages. Japan suddenly turned from a chronic debtor into a large creditor. Investments rose sharply in domestic as well as overseas markets.  

This sudden economic expansion, after 30 years of generally balanced growth of a modern economy, undoubtedly influenced the minds of businessmen and politicians who now became more confident in Japan's overseas economic expansion.

The Okuma cabinet did not enjoy a powerful position in 1915. By 1914 the Seiyukai party had become a formidable political force, spreading its influence especially to local notables and businessmen by its expansive economic policy under the shrewd and vigorous leadership of Hara Kei. The government of the non-party cabinet principle felt increasing threats from the Seiyukai's growth, and Katsura, a prótege of Yamagata, made a secret promise during the Russo-Japanese war to the effect that Saionji, the Seiyukai chairman, and Katsura would alternately form cabinets. Despite the compromise, this involved considerable strain, which resulted in 1911-1912 in a worse anti-Katsura government upsurge. The growing
dominance in parliament of the Seiyukai irritated Katsura, who in turn formed the Doshikai party in 1913, against Yamagata's will. The Doshikai under Kato, who succeeded Katsura after the latter's death, did well in upsetting the balance between the Seiyukai and the Doshikai in the election of 1914.  

However, the proliferation of Japanese imperial interests did not make it easy at all to execute foreign policy at Kato's will. First, there was fierce antagonism between Kato and Yamagata. Second, the Army, irritated by what it felt was slow Japanese expansion, made its presence increasingly felt by forcing either its views or faits accomplis to achieve its views and policies. Third, there was an increasing adventurist-expansionist influence upon foreign policy making. The fissiparity of decision making and policy implementation became greater as imperial interests grew on the Continent. Fourth, there was an attack of the opposing parties on the government's vacillating China policy. The Seiyukai party's two major policy emphases were on industrial expansion and 'positive' foreign policy. Constitutionally a truncated Leviathan, the Japanese imperial state foreign policy machines exhibited a far greater disarray and incoordination with an increasing loss of the solid control and the integrative function formerly played by the genro. Thus growing economic resources were not accompanied by proportionate political articulation and aggregation by political parties, leaving many diversified interests to themselves.
Britain: Power Bases

Having been forced into the status of no more than a *primus inter pares*, and having been engaged in an alliance but still tenaciously holding the belief in her being the greatest power, Britain had to bear enormous burdens in World War I. Already caught up with by some other countries in Europe and North America in terms of industrial and military power, Britain was to decline further. 17

Britain was perhaps at no time more dependent on the Anglo-Japanese alliance than during World War I. Britain was almost completely absorbed psychologically and militarily in the European front. Although apprehensive that Japan might be exploiting the power vacuum in the Far East and the Pacific, even as far as to be detrimental to British 'paramount' interests there, she had no alternative but self-restraint, and a mild but tenacious effort to restrain Japan. The British power position in China was preserved in large part by a major political crisis in Japan and Kato's diplomatic blunder. Without these, Britain would not have been successful in preserving her interests in the Yangtze valley region. 18
China: Power Perspectives

What was most conspicuous about the ways in which Yuan handled Japan's blatant demands was his keen awareness of China's fundamental weaknesses and his shrewd tactics to convert his weaknesses into a strength. When Japan issued the 21 demands to Yuan and forced negotiations, he delayed the negotiations and irritated the impatient Japanese while he mobilized and manipulated all the anti-imperialist emotions and forces in China as well as outside China. He saw correctly that Japan wanted China to succumb to her as secretly and swiftly as possible in order not to introduce other powers into the dealings. Also he saw correctly that Britain was in disharmony with Japan over this matter, if not fundamentally, and utilized this fact. 19

Once Britain gave a sign of siding with Japan over this matter, Yuan finally accepted the demands, except for the so-called 'desiderata'. clauses. 20 This was an extraordinary success for the Peking government, which possessed small power bases. This is perhaps a classical example of China's traditional method of playing off barbarians against barbarians. The irony of history was that Yuan, triumphant over this success, embarked shortly thereafter to enthrone himself as emperor, only to die in bed in 1916. The failure of his second attempt to become emperor was in no small measure attributable to Japan's intrigues and strategems to foster anti-Yuan forces in China. Japan was to have the far more 'cooperative' Tuan Ch'i-jui in Peking. 21
One important episode which exemplified the coming era of anti-imperialism was that China set the day of her acceptance of the 21 demands as the national humiliation day, a kind of national anniversary. It would be unthinkable for other nations to set a day of humiliation as a national anniversary. Behind this episode was the mounting tide of a sense of national impotence and disgrace, which was to be transformed into and exhibited very soon as the radicalism of impotence.
The first thing that came to Japanese decision-makers when World War I took place was that this was Heaven's gift to Japanese expansion, economic and military. It was conceived first of all as an occasion which should not be passed by, but which should be exploited fully for Japanese interests in the Far East and the Pacific. Russo-Japanese rapprochement rapidly developed after the Russo-Japanese war, and the agreements to accomodate their interests in Manchuria and Mongolia gradually took shape through several stages. However, there still remained strong cautions and suspicions against Russia, especially among the genro and the Army. They were extremely anxious to substantiate Japan's claim over the spheres of influence, mutually understood with Russia, especially Korea, Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, in exchange for Russia's claim on Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria. After the complete and formal annexation of Korea in 1911, Japan directed her efforts to substantiate and consolidate her influences in the rest of the above-mentioned areas and to expand her influences even further.

Japan's estrangement from Britain can be understood in this context. After the Russo-Japanese war, the areas in which the alliance was effective were specified. However, a growing divergence of interests in China became the major cause of estrangement. Many Britishers felt increasingly that Britain gave Japan a shield for Japanese expansion in China. Furthermore,
Japan's efforts to penetrate into the Yangtze region were sharply in opposition to British interests in the area, which Britain considered her paramount interest in China. The tough discussions between Britain and Japan about railways in 1913–1914 exhibited their divergent views of the alliance and of China. The negotiations for how to set up a consortium for the government in Peking were also viewed as a manifestation of imperialist powers' rivalries in China.

The outbreak of World War I and the subsequent negotiations over Japan's participation in the war all exhibited British anxiety over Japan's expansion in China and in the Yangtze valley region in particular. Foreign Minister Kato was an independent and strong-willed man who dispensed with consultation with the *genro* on foreign policy. Previously this had generally been thought indispensable. He was a *genro*-phobe and wanted to establish the independence of the Foreign Ministry from the *genro* and the military. At the same time he was considered to be an outright Anglophile. However, the British position on the consortium problem and Japan's participation in World War I hurt Kato's pride and self-esteem extremely. Britain at first forbade Japan to participate. Britain did not like Japan to enter the Yangtze valley region at all, and instead proposed that Japan reciprocate their mutual respect for Japan's interests in Manchuria and British interests in the Yangtze. Japan maintained that her interests in Manchuria were largely based on treaty rights, while the British
should allow the Yangtze region to be kept open to other powers since it did not have the legal rights to exclude them. Japan was interested in economic expansion in the Yangtze valley region. All of this undoubtedly affected Japan's decision in 1915. It seems that Japan tried to achieve what she had failed to do in 1913-1914 vis-a-vis Britain with respect to China. Britain's brusque notice at the outbreak of World War I was reciprocated unwisely by Japan's failure to consult with Britain over the 21 demands toward China. In retrospect, this was the biggest mistake Kato ever made. For Britain might have been very likely to give her tacit assent to Japan's expansion as long as the most objectionable one-fifth of the 21 demands were dropped. With British support, the negotiations would have been considerably easier.

Kato's miscalculation that Britain would not be able to intervene if things were executed swiftly proved false. Having failed to obtain Britain's consent and also to force Yuan to succumb swiftly, Kato was in great difficulty. The genro's antagonism to Kato because of his foreign policy handling exacerbated the problem. Kato was forced to resign soon thereafter. Underlying Kato's independence and defiance in handling international relations vis-a-vis the genro was the emergence of confident, young generations of diplomats, politicians and militaries. Kato was in a weak position in the confrontation with the genro. To confront them, he had to rely on other forces. This
in turn exposed Kato to an enormously wide range of social and political forces with divergent and inflated expectations, all of which were amalgamated into the 21 demands. 34
Britain: Power Perspectives

Given her absorbing involvement in World War I, it would be "madness" to get involved in the Sino-Japanese dispute, as Grey put it, until the war was over. This was a play at self-effacement at the time of inability. Grey was so willing to conciliate Japan as to understand Japan's Lebenslaum in the Continent (Manchuria), considering Japan's expanding population, industry and limited resources. What Grey envisaged was some sort of agreement on the spheres of influence between Britain and Japan, with the Yangtze region for the former and Manchuria for the latter. He was persistently and forcefully opposed to any idea that Japan be allowed to enter the Yangtze valley region. Thus Grey announced in a brusque way that Britain did not wish Japan to participate in the war in August 1914. Japan's proud and reputedly Anglophile Kato was extremely hurt by this action, which must have greatly affected Kato's handling of the 21 demands vis-a-vis Britain. When pushed back by Japan, however, Britain, with no strong card in her hands, was obliged to give Japan post facto recognition of her decision to enter the war.

Mutual suspicion and estrangement ensued thereafter. When Japan did not consult with Britain beforehand over the 21 demands toward China, Britain strengthened her suspicion of Japan. Because of Grey's willingness to understand Japan's position in China, if not in the Yangtze region, and because of the British inability to do things positively, it would have been likely that
Britain would not oppose Japan's 21 demands toward China, so long as the 'desiderata' clauses were excluded. After all, it was not the aims but the methods of Japan, not the fact but the direction of Japanese expansion, that Grey was opposed to. Foreign Secretary Grey differed with his permanent officials in the White House on this point. As it was, Britain and Japan stood mutually suspicious when the war was over, and they were to face the termination of their alliance soon thereafter.
Summary of Japan's 21 demands toward China of 1915

We have attempted to show: 1) that most important among China's power bases were the skill in manipulating foreign powers and the anti-imperialist, nationalist emotions and actions, both of which Yuan Shih-k'ai most shrewdly utilized; 2) that the centrifugal tendency of Chinese society and polity were strengthened by the reform efforts in the 1900's and 1910's, especially after the 1911 revolution; 3) that Japan attempted to take full advantage of the power vacuum created by World War I, driven by insecurity and greed which were derived from the enlarged defense perimeters after the 1895 and 1905 victories; 4) that the Japanese economy expanded enormously during World War I, which encouraged Japanese economic expansion in China; 5) that the Japanese political map evolved around the Seiyukai party's persistent growth, due to its expansive economic policy and the anti-Seiyukai forces' efforts to counter it; 6) that the genro's integrative function was gradually lost due to the swollen body politic of the empire and the confident and increasingly self-assertive second-generation politicians; 7) that Japan was completely outmaneuvered by Yuan Shih-k'ai, in part because of her miscalculation of Yuan's tact and ability to resist and Britain's ability to influence, and in part because of the决策al disarray directly reflecting the waning power of the genro; 8) that although Britain basically effaced herself because of her total involvement in World War I, she could exert influence
over Japan by withdrawing her support for a while; that World War I and the 21 demands further aggravated the suspicion and mistrust between Britain and Japan, which would lead eventually to the termination of their alliance.
Chapter 22: Siberian intervention of 1918–1925

Introduction

The February Revolution of Russia weakened the Allied position vis-a-vis the Central European powers. However, the provisional government kept the Russians in the war with the belief that Russia's continued participation was crucial if the government were to obtain the support of other Allied powers. Thus, despite the revolution, Russia continued to act as a pawn of the Allied powers. This was done only at the sacrifice of Russian people with no adequate arms, food or training, who were left at the mercy of German guns and tanks. The Bolsheviks' coup in Petrograd, which signalled the October Revolution and the subsequent separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, was a thunderbolt to other Allied powers, which were in great difficulties because of the continuous, vigorous German attacks on the Allied positions on the Western front. It also created a power vacuum in the Russian Far East and Siberia.¹

The Bolsheviks pushed their power gradually into Siberia and the Far East, too. People in Siberia were generally more in favor of the February Revolution than of the October Revolution, due to: 1) their preference for self-government; 2) their racial diversity; and 3) their strong socialist and nationalist feeling. The

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Notes to chapter 22 appear on pages 580–581.
Bolsheviks were considered to be an outside force trying to impose the October Revolution from Petrograd. However, as many of the Bolshevisted soldiers from the fronts spread to all of Russia, the Bolsheviks took power in most of the places along the Trans-Siberian railways, including Harbin and Vladivostok. It was at this moment that the Chinese forces ousted the Bolshevik forces from Northern Manchuria, with the result that various forces previously overwhelmed and suppressed by the Bolsheviks burgeoned again in the Amur basin, with overt and covert support of foreign powers. Semenov, Horvat, Kalmikov and others all vied for power in their own ways.²

When 500,000 Czechoslovaks turned against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, the anti-Bolshevik forces were further strengthened, though only temporary. Seizing this opportunity to save the Czechoslovaks in Siberia, who had surrendered to Russia from the Austro-Hungarian forces, Britain and France tried to intervene with the help of Japan and the US. Britain was very anxious to use Japanese soldiers to save the desperate situation on the Western front. Although the US was initially hesitant for many reasons, Wilson was moved by the cause of the national self-determination of the Czechoslovaks and agreed to intervene. However, Japan had different thoughts. Japan sent 10 times as many soldiers to Siberia as were agreed upon with the US. However, the foreign powers' intentions and their cooperation with these anti-Bolshevik forces alienated much of the population and drove them from the
anti-Bolshevik causes. Wavering between the creation of buffer zones and the cooperation with the US, Japan's intervention was dragged on until 1925, five years after the withdrawal of other interventionist powers. As soon as the military forces of the foreign powers withdrew from Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power everywhere with little difficulty.
Japan: Power Bases

World War I posed both opportunities and limitations for Japan. It created a power vacuum in the Far East and the Pacific since all the European powers were absorbed on European fronts. This was not limited to a military power vacuum. It was also an economic power vacuum. Both Chinese and Japanese economic enterprises burgeoned during the war. At the same time it created a serious problem to Japan. She suddenly lost one of the two pillars of Japanese diplomacy, i.e., the Russo-Japanese agreements. Furthermore, the other pillar, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was already seriously weakened by such problems as Britain's handling of Japan's participation in World War I and Japan's handling of her 21 demands toward China. Japan had no solid diplomatic support from any other powers. Although Japan's economic and military emergence was significant, there was another power rapidly and vigorously emerging in the Pacific. The rapid naval buildup of the US during the war period and her vigorous economic expansion added a new dimension to some of the Japanese leaders' perspectives. The US emergence in the Pacific, when coupled with the weakened alliances with Britain, made Japan's position all the more difficult, unless she could create some working formula. Japan's increasing dependence on the US put increasing constraints on Japan's ever strong desire to expand. It was getting more and more difficult to play the game of balance of power because of European decline and American emergence.
Japan's war boom was enormous. Overnight Japan changed from a deficit country to a creditor country. Exports climbed rapidly. Business enterprises mushroomed everywhere. Prices rose up sharply, whereas wages were stationary. Uprooted from the countryside, urban labor became a new social force threatening the government, frequently resorting to strikes for the improvement of working conditions, and rallying and demonstrating for universal suffrage. More threatening than urban labor were the nation-wide rice riots, mobilizing 700,000 people protesting the sharp rise in the price of rice.

Along with new developments in the Continent, these emerging social forces became all the more threatening. First, there was the collapse of the Russian monarchy and the appearance of the Bolsheviks; second, anti-imperialist demonstrations in Korea, mobilizing 2 million, were extremely effective in reminding Japanese rulers of their fragile position in the annexed Korea. Anti-imperialist demonstrations and boycotts in China were continuously unfolding against Japan's occupation of Shantung, the 21 demands toward China, Japan's 'Assist-Tuan' policy, the Sino-Japanese military and naval agreements, and the Versailles decision on Shantung. Alarmed by the new tides of nationalism and communism on the Continent, the Japanese who had emigrated to the Continent began to come back to save Japan, where social unrest and political instability seemed to prevail. The instability and unrest in Japan were compounded and aggravated by the situation on
the Continent. The Japanese rulers became extremely concerned about the prevention of 'dangerous ideas' from spreading to Japan and her vital spheres of interest. This was particularly so when the Okuma cabinet seemed to fail to capitalize on the golden opportunity created by World War I.

The Terauchi cabinet claimed to become a 'transcendent national government' and tried to make a 'consensus' by creating what was called the Provisional Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, drawing on all the major parties and other key actors. However, the Doshikai party, which was the party in power under the Okuma cabinet, did not accept it. More difficult than this was the problem of coordinating the extremely divergent views within the Council. The genro's power was declining. They lost the firm grip of power that they had had until the turn of the century. Many divergent interests and views began to take independent courses without being coordinated. It is one of the important characteristics of Japanese decision-making that the times when national consensus is called for are the times of fissiparity of opinions and policies. The creation of an organization aimed at the generation of consensus actually became a body which revealed the lack of consensus and thereby amplified fissiparity.
China: Power Bases

After the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916 what is called the warlord period began. This was the period when the centrifugal tendency of the society that had been advanced by the gentry finally manifested itself without a semblance of unity. The Peking government controlled the area around Peking and little more. It was the period when warlords relied on nothing but their military forces, competing with each other for the control of the capital, i.e., power. Warlords generally lived in harsh environments where only military power mattered. After the collapse of the Confucian imperial order emerged a naked competition among warlords who had quite limited power bases. In 1917-1918, there were two main competitive groups in Peking: one was headed by Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui, whose policy was to rely on Japanese loans. The other was headed by Feng Kuo-chang, who took the policy of relying on a consortium made of several imperialist powers. President Li Yuan-hung chose to rely on Feng and dismissed Tuan on May, 1917, taking for granted Feng's support, which was not realized, however. When Li sought Chang Hsu's assistance, Chang in turn made a coup and restored the Manchu dynasty on July, 1917, although it was to last only for two weeks. Tuan and Feng were temporarily reconciled. Tuan became premier and Feng became president. The nationalists, headed by Sun Yat-sen and supported militarily by the southwestern warlords, set up a rival government at Canton in 1917. In other areas, warlords of small and medium power controlled each domain.
The fact that warlords relied on foreign powers as a source of their power became more and more annoying and humiliating to many of the young urban population, anxious for opportunities to climb the social ladder since the traditional social structure had been abolished well before the Revolution. They were ambitious, disgruntled, frustrated and indignant to society in general, which did not welcome them. Particularly during and after the war period the population of major cities such as Peking almost doubled in a few years. This new disgruntled force increasingly began to undermine the warlords' power bases, accusing them of being the 'running dogs of imperialism'. Warlords were continuously suspicious of other warlords, and this fact tended to invite the interference of foreign powers in various forms.

When the Bolshevik Revolution took place, the government saw this as an opportunity to claim sovereignty over Northern Manchuria, which Russia had controlled by virtue of her control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When the tide of Bolsheviks spread to Siberia, the Russian Far East, and Manchuria, China sent her forces to expel the Bolsheviks. This took place in late December 1917. This action was taken at Feng's suggestion and backed by the representatives of Western powers in Peking. As if counteracting this move backed by Western powers, Japan forced the reluctant Tuan to conclude the Sino-Japanese military and naval agreements which paved the way to Japanese military operations in Northern Manchuria, Siberia, and the Russian Far East.
Japan: Power Perspectives

Japan was placed in a difficult situation after the victory of the Russo-Japanese war. She had enough power bases to expand to neighboring areas. Because of Japan's pride and aspiration for power, which had been encouraged by two successive victories in 1895 and 1905, it was very difficult to control her drive for expansion and imperialist action. Other Western powers' understanding and support were increasingly slipping away from Japan, with the exception of Russia, which was also to disappear as an ally in 1917. Accordingly, the necessity to have diplomatic support tended to be slighted. It was the dilemma of a parvenu middle power in the Far East. Opportunities could be easily converted to disasters when trapped by unrestrained and unbound greed.18

There were various possible policy alternatives to the power vacuum generated by the 1917 revolutions. One was to expand nearly unilaterally to the Amur basin with the establishment of a local puppet regime or regimes in that region, along the line which the Army had attempted without success in Manchuria and Mongolia since the 1911 revolution in China. This was also along the line which forced Yuan Shih-k'ai to accept the 21 demands in 1915 and which forced Tuan to conclude the Sino-Japanese military and naval agreements. This perspective was shaped basically by the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters and Foreign Minister Motono, though independently. The second alternative was to expand more cautiously with the US, which was increasingly interested in the region, in
view of the loss of diplomatic support from Britain and Russia. This perspective was shared initially by many of the members of the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations such as Prime Minister Terachi, the genro Yamagata, president of Seiyukai party Hara and Baron Makino.19

The first perspective was pushed forward by Motono, who met opposition in the Council and resigned as foreign minister in the spring of 1918. He had gone too far and too fast. Meanwhile the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters quietly made preparations for massive intervention in Siberia. As Britain and France, desperate on the Western front, pressured the US for a large scale joint intervention with Japan, and as the Czechoslovaks emerged in Siberia as the most formidable military force confronting the Bolsheviks, the mood of the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations shifted in the direction of the first perspective, despite the resolute opposition from Hara and Makino. These two succumbed, however, when the majority assured them that the intervention would be limited and joint with the US, since their utmost concern was to develop a cooperative atmosphere and policy with the US, who had already invited Japan to a joint intervention of very limited intent. When the decision was made, the Army went to execute its original policy and sent ten times as many soldiers as was agreed upon with the US: 70,000 instead of 7,000. There was virtually no cooperation between them, and antagonism increased between them.20
The US wavered between emphasis on the anti-Bolsheviks and on the policy of restraining and blocking Japan's expansion. Appealed to by the cause of Czechoslovak self-determination, Wilson made a final decision to intervene. The presence of the Czechoslovaks gave all the mantles for the American intervention. However, the government at Omsk became increasingly anti-liberal and finally dictatorial and alienated the US. Its position was weakened considerably by late 1919, leading Britain to withdraw from the intervention. By that time, Terauchi had stepped down and Hara had become prime minister. Hara tried to restrain the Army and to cooperate with the US. He committed himself more strongly than others to the anti-Bolshevik cause of the Kolchak government, out of the fear that anti-imperialist ideas might spread and threaten Japan's spheres of influence, colonies, and even Japan itself, where strikes, riots and demonstrations became increasingly rampant. Furthermore, business interests in Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria led the government to devote its main attention to the government at Omsk, which pretended to be the All-Russian government, unlike the far more parochial Semenov and others. Hara went further and took the initiative to propose a joint allied recognition of the Kolchak government. However, the Kolchak government's decline was too evident by the summer of 1919.

There are several reasons for his decision not to withdraw. First, the US was still there. It was necessary, he thought, to
cooperate with the US and coordinate his action with the US action. With no formal ally, Japan had to cooperate with the US. Since Japan was militarily and economically weak, Japan had to rely on the US for military supplies and foreign trade. Second, he considered it important to have some defense against the spread of Bolshevism in the Far East, since there were increasing internal unrest and anti-imperialist attacks in China and Korea. Third, the Army was opposed to Japan's withdrawal because it insisted on a larger intervention. As long as the US stayed in Siberia, Japan could escape from the accusation of being the sole anti-Bolshevik imperialist. However, by late 1919 the Kolchak government collapsed completely. What was worse for Hara, the US began to withdraw abruptly in early 1920 without notifying Japan that it was doing so. To Hara, the US action was a thunderbolt out of the blue sky. His Russian and American policy had failed completely. Since there was no foreign country in Siberia but Japan, she had to bear all the military and financial costs of intervention from then on. The fear of Bolshevism spreading to Japan's spheres of influence prevented her from deciding to withdraw, so Japan was to stay in Siberia, claiming that she could not make an immediate withdrawal for the purpose of self-defense in the absence of a stable government in Siberia. However, Japan agreed to withdraw from Trans-Baikalia in 1920 with the Far Eastern Republic, a dummy of the Soviets in the Far East, although she stayed in Vladivostok until 1922 and in Northern Sakhalin until 1925, when diplomatic relations were finally established.
China: Power Perspectives

One of the most important perspectives of the warlords was survival. The control of Peking was considered profitable and prestigious because it enabled the warlords to have diplomatic representation and financial resources. Attempts to make a bid for power evolved in Peking. Foreign aid of various sorts was a big issue in warlord politics since it tended to become used as crucial leverage for a new political change. Tuan relied on Japan, and Feng on Western powers. The Canton government was by a coalition of nationalists and southwestern warlords. In Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin was increasing his power. Besides those major actors, there was an increasing voice of anti-imperialism, especially in major urban centers where there were many disgruntled, frustrated, and indignant youth, deprived of normal social and political channels for improvement since 1905.\textsuperscript{27}

Japan's coercive diplomacy of 1915 aroused anti-imperialist sentiments among the Chinese people. The Sino-Japanese military and naval agreements which were achieved by the threat of withholding aid to Tuan unless he accepted them, reminded the Chinese of their humiliating experience of 1915.\textsuperscript{28} The Japanese occupation of Shantung in World War I and the subsequent failure of the Versailles conference to force Japan to return it to China led to the May Fourth Movement in 1919. There were anti-Japanese demonstrations and even strikes, and Tuan was forced to drop three pro-Japanese ministers, succumbing to the demands of anti-imperialist demonstrations.\textsuperscript{29}
Anti-imperialism was directed not only against Japan but also against Russia. The action taken in late 1917 to oust the Bolshevik forces along the Chinese Eastern Railway was a conspicuous example. The spread of anti-imperialism like a 'prairie fire' was the **Leitmotif** of the Chinese politics of the late 1910's and 1920's.
Summary of Siberian Intervention of 1918-1925

We have attempted to show: 1) that, despite imperial expansion after the Russo-Japanese war and especially during World War I, Japan had to meet extraordinary external difficulties due to the disappearance or weakening of the two diplomatic pillars of Japan's foreign policy, Russia and Britain; 2) that her economic growth, especially accelerated during World War I, brought about profound changes in social and political maps by producing diversified social interests and fluid political groupings; 3) that Japan had to reckon increasingly with the US role in her external activities because of Japan's increasing international reliance on the US, which in turn tended to conflict with Japan's desire to expand; 4) that the fluidity of political groupings and the waning of the influence of the genro made it more difficult than before to coordinate imperial decision and resulted in fragmentariness just when consensus was most needed; 5) that Japan's involvement on the Continent inevitably aggravated the political turmoil in Japan because of the revolutionary changes on the Continent; 6) that in China after Yuan Shih-k'ai's death the warlords manifested an increasing centrifugal tendency, maintaining no more than a semblance of national unity; 7) that the Peking government which was formed by the changing power alliances among warlords increased in foreign dependence because of the paucity of its power bases, which only flared anti-imperialist nationalist sentiments and actions.
Chapter 23: Washington conference of 1921-1922

Introduction

Peace was formalized at Versailles after World War I. Territorial adjustments, reparation and the setting up of the League of Nations were achieved. For Far Eastern affairs, however, another conference was necessary. The Washington conference was held in 1921-1922. The conference was necessitated by the decision of the British Imperial Conference of 1921 to have the Washington conference and to make a final decision on the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The conference was also necessitated by the Anglo-American-Japanese naval race, which involved such an extreme in spending as to become a heavy burden upon the war-weary British economy and the once booming but now fragile Japanese economy. The conference achieved three treaties: the Four Power treaty, which terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance; the Five Power Treaty, in which the naval disarmament was agreed upon; and the Nine Power Treaty, which prescribed the principles which were to apply to China. It was a remarkable achievement of the participants of the conference that they could control the arms race at all. However, it is also true that 10 years after the Conference was held its goals

Notes to chapter 23 appear on pages 581-583.
proved not to have actually been achieved. Although the conference itself was not a violent conflict, it represented a conflict of interests which eventually turned out to be impossible to control.
Japan: Power Bases

World War I provided momentum for the continuation of rapid growth in the Japanese economy, which had tended to grow steadily and in a balanced way before the war. It produced a boom. It created an enormous number of industrial opportunities. However, the basically fragile Japanese economy had to experience a sudden setback as early as 1920, due to the end of the war. Thereafter the economy continued to expand with far less vigor and with chronic recessions. The arms race continued even after the war. Especially the naval arms race was fierce among Japan, the US and Britain. The extremely rapid naval expansion of the US during the war enabled the US almost to surpass Britain. Japan, no less enthusiastic about naval expansion than the US, competed so desperately that the military budget reached nearly half of all government expenditures. This was an extraordinary strain for an economically fragile government. Despite the strong passions for more vigorous naval construction, the view that naval disarmament was necessary was widely shared by many politicians and militarists in Japan.

The government of the Seiyukai party headed by Hara had been extremely successful in expanding and strengthening the party's power bases for the preceding 15 years. This party's policy was to establish and maintain as big a coalition as possible by distributing various opportunities to local notables, businessmen and other commercial interests. Continued heavy military
appropriations would jeopardise this policy, especially by fostering other old political forces to the detriment of their own forces. Once Hara took power in 1918 it was vitally important to contain forces that would be likely to threaten and/or overthrow the government. Most prominent among these forces were the outright expansionists, cutting across military men and politicians. The use of the constitutionally prescribed Independence of Supreme Command by the military was one of the ways to overthrow the government. It was vital for the government to contain the by military/ appeasement and cooptation. Rapid economic expansion produced a large number of urban dwellers. Uprooted from the countryside, they became workers in factories under miserable conditions. Ambitious, they became frustrated in the cities which had seemingly abundant opportunities but with too many pitfalls. These forces were not only politically unrepresented but also neglected by the government and the political parties of the day. When awakened, they caused chronic disturbances and sometimes threats to society in general and the government in particular. Hara had to reckon with these forces as well.

Internationally, Japan had already lost two pillars of her diplomacy. One was the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had already been weakened considerably. The other was the disappearance of Imperial Russia, with whom there were Russo-Japanese agreements with strong commitments. Economic dependence on the US and Britain was such that there seemed to many Japanese to be no alternative to
the policy of close cooperation with them. In China, the diplomacy of coercion in 1915 was one of Japan's numerous interferences after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty intended to take advantage of the disunity of China. This event showed the extraordinary difficulty of coercing Chinese warlords in Peking. Outright coercion as attempted in 1915 was gradually replaced by a policy of appeasement and conciliation. After Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, Japan took the policy of working through Tuan Ch'i-jui instead of bluntly coercing him. Furthermore, she encouraged accommodation between the Canton and Peking governments for a while after Hara became prime minister in 1918. However, increasing anti-imperialism, as exemplified by the May Fourth movement in China, forced Hara back to the policy of more coercion and more frequent interference.

Ideological 'offensives' from Russia and the US added an important factor to Japan's increasing international isolation. Japanese society was experiencing stresses and strains triggered by extraordinary economic expansion and post-war chronic depressions. Political parties were not interested in newly emerging social forces. They were dependent on local notables for support in election. Neglect begot violence. Strikes and demonstrations became more and more frequent. Soaring prices caused nation-wide riots, mobilizing 700,000 in 1918. The influence of anarchism, bolshevism and socialism became visible. Frightened by this social unrest and diffusion of 'dangerous' thoughts, political leaders were
very apprehensive of national security. Manchuria was already considered to be the 'vital line' of national defense. They thought that direct bolshevik influence was to be mitigated by intervention. The Siberian intervention ended in total failure.\textsuperscript{13}

Wilsonian 'idealism' disturbed Japanese leaders in a different sense. The idealistic tone of the 14 points of peace propounded by Wilson was disturbing to Japanese leaders long accustomed to 'classical' power politics among imperialists. Even the architect of the 'peaceful' economic diplomacy in the 1920's, Baron Shidehara, was annoyed by the ideological crusade.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Japan's international environment at the dawn of the Washington Conference was entirely different from the pre-World War I scene.
US: Power Bases

The most significant development in American society produced by World War I was the extension to an international arena of the principle of what Williams calls market place society, by the turn of the 19th century, seeking trade and international opportunities. Underlying this was a vigorous economic expansion and the disappearance of the frontiers in North America. As Alexander Hamilton correctly prophesized long ago, when new lands disappeared, American would become like European powers, playing 'dirty' imperialist power politics. Naval expansion was encouraged ever since the Spanish-American war. Because of this naval expansion, propounded by A.T. Mahan and executed by T. Roosevelt before the war, the size of the Navy was doubled during the wartime. The US became the largest naval power next to Britain by the end of World War I. The number of commercial ships far exceeded that of Britain during the war. The US became the top commercial power. This was the international emergence of the US.

Profiting enormously during the war just like Japan, the US was in an extremely powerful position. Unlike Japan, however, the US did not have vast, vested colonial and economic interests in China. This enabled her to act more freely in international affairs and relieved her from being branded as imperialist. Rather, Wilson was able to disguise himself and the US as a champion of anti-imperialism, with conscious and unconscious awareness of the competition with Bolsheviks' anti-imperialism. The power bases of the US were augmented by this new ideological appeal.
Britain: Power Bases

Britain was hit hard by World War I. The effects were severe. A large amount of debts remained. The young male population decreased significantly because of war and emigration. Britain was slow to recover from the blow. The arms race especially with France, the US and Japan became an extremely heavy burden on British national life. Some kind of naval disarmament was thought indispensable.

These immediate effects of the war aside, there was a basic problem of outdated industrial structure. The gigantic export-oriented industries no longer met world market needs and produced an enormous number of unemployed workers. Particularly the cotton, coal and ship-building industries were "seriously depressed or in decline." Unemployment persisted during the whole inter-war period. However, out of the necessity to redirect new industrial structures, rapid economic growth was to be achieved during the inter-war period. "Fairly rapid growth took place at a time when the economy was inherently unstable and subject to random and often violent shocks." Also very important was the change in the nature of the Imperial Dominions, which became more and more self-assertive and even recalcitrant vis-a-vis London. This was the immediate consequence of the visible weakness of the Royal Navy.
Japan: Power Perspectives

The majority of Japanese leaders perceived that there was no alternative to cooperation with the US and Britain as a post-World War I formula. This was nearly dictated by Japan's economic dependence on the US and Britain. The amount of trade with these two countries was such that a possible war with either one of them would be deemed by many as simply disastrous. In the 1920's the percentage of Japan's total export that went to the US was generally over 40%, whereas the percentage of Japan's total imports that came from the US was only 25-35%. The US became a major export market to Japan. 24

Naval disarmament was a major issue. When the military budget became so heavy a burden as to reach nearly 50% of the total governmental budget after World War I, agreement on naval disarmament among powers was more than welcome to many hard-headed leaders of realism including those in the Navy. Despite the existence of persistent opposition to disarmament, particularly within the Navy, naval disarmament was agreed upon. The size of the Navy was cut short. The days of disgruntlement for the Navy were to last for the following 10 years. The Army, whose budget had been slighted in favor of the Navy for the preceding several years, welcomed the budget cut for the Navy. 25

One of the most difficult problems besides naval disarmament was China. Japan was stubborn about holding whatever she had gained by force during World War I and had been assured in the
Versailles conference. Chinese anti-imperialism was more threatening than before. The hope that Hara had for US-Japanese cooperation was the Ishii-Lansing agreement of 1917, which was very ambiguously worded and often interpreted by the Japanese as America's understanding of Japan's special interests in China and Manchuria. Hara hoped this would be the basis for a new formula in the Washington conference. The basis of the Lansing-Ishii agreement was fragile, however. The agreement was superceded by the Washington treaties. The Washington treaty system was totally dependent upon the 'good will' of the powers who participated in the conference. This was the price of the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and of the Lansing-Ishii and other Japanese-American agreements. More fundamentally, China was forced to bear all the heavy burdens and Soviet Russia was totally neglected in this international arrangement.

Underlying all the hard-headed realism in the Washington conference was bewilderment at a new environment. When there were imperialist rivalries, Japan could learn the bad guy's game and play it in a similar manner without being accused. Now, after World War I, China was awakened, Russia was revolutionized, and America asserted her idealistic principles. Japan was now surrounded by these 'abnormal' countries which reproached the 'ever power-political' Japan, while Japan saw the classical acquisitive imperialist game as perfectly 'normal' and thus justifiable. It is
this bewilderment seen in the face of the Japanese that led a per-
ceptive Britishman to observe in 1919 that the Japanese "in the
secret of their souls...think that no wickedness or aggression they
have been guilty of in respect of China comes anywhere near our
early aggression and conclusion of treaties with that country."
US: Power Perspectives

American perspectives were the direct corollaries of her dynamic economic expansion. She was basically very optimistic about her ability to expand peacefully by economic means. She was hostile not only to Bolshevism but also to 'old' imperialism. Both were thought to hinder free, open economic transactions, which were thought to be the cause and effect of peaceful international relations. The use of military force and the monopoly of the economic market and resources were to be avoided. The belief was that by economic expansion and cooperation with other countries, international conflicts were to be contained. This was the American belief long held thenceforward. The Wilsonian formulation of this belief was the first elaborate formulation in American foreign policy principles. 30

The difficulties that arose over the League of Nations have often blurred the fundamental similarity between those for and those against US participation in the League. The question was whether the League of Nations would be instrumental to the American objectives of containing international conflicts by economic expansion and cooperation. Wilson saw the League of Nations as a useful instrument for promoting American interests. He thought he could mobilize other countries for the US and the League by using the slogans of self-determination. Those who were against Wilson on this issue generally thought that the League of Nations would be a hindrance to the promotion of American economic interests and limit her freedom.
It is not that those who were against Wilson on this issue were isolationists. Quite to the contrary, they were as earnest as Wilson about economic expansion, international cooperation and containment of conflict through them. Indeed, the belief was "the dollar could conquer where bullets could not." 

This was particularly apparent with respect to the US policy toward Japan, China and Russia. The US wanted to contain Japan's potentially and actually aggressive role in China through restricted cooperation. The US tried to take care of Chinese anti-imperialist nationalist demands within the framework of cooperation with Japan. As evidenced by the US reactions to Japan's 21 demands toward China and her position on Shantung at Versailles, the US, in effect, favored Japan. At the Washington conference the US tried to help Japan save face by persuading her to withdraw her forces from Shantung 'voluntarily' rather than to face strong Chinese anti-imperialism.

At the same time, the US wanted to keep her principle of the Open Door and succeeded in winning support, if nominal, from the powers. The US desire to keep this principle intact, even if nominally and even if the principle could not be realized, "was to take the American government along the road to war twenty years later."
Britain: Power Perspectives

Before the Imperial Conference of 1921, Britain was inclined to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The decision was deferred until the Washington conference of 1921-1922. The basic factor in this decision was the growing independence and self-assertion of the Dominions. Especially Canada did not want to displease the US, which saw the alliance as anti-American. 35

Lloyd George, prime minister, wanted to renew the alliance and also was determined to compete with the US in the naval arms race, despite economic conditions strongly pointing toward the necessity of naval disarmament. Because of the declining naval power, it was thought detrimental to have a potential enemy in the Far East, which would only increase the burden of the naval arms race. 36 It also conformed to the British desire to retain the belief in their naval supremacy. As Winston Churchill put it, "Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious; no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends." 37

Strong American desire overwhelmed the British and the alliance was terminated. Instead, the Four Power treaty (Japan, US, Britain and France) was concluded with respect to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Naval disarmament was agreed upon in the Five Power treaty, which specified limitations on capital ships and the non-fortification of the Pacific. The agreed upon ratio of capital ships was 5:5:3 for the US, Britain and Japan in this order. This gave the US parity with
with Britain and also gave Japan local supremacy in the Western Pacific, given the non-fortification of the Pacific. Although Britain was to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance, there was no collusion with the US, as was thought by many Japanese who felt betrayed by Anglo-American powers.\textsuperscript{38} As for China, the most difficult problem, Britain was inclined to let Japan move into Manchuria, because Japan's meager resources and its large population, and the anti-immigration policies in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US, all made it easy for Britain to understand the necessity of Japan to expand. In Curzon's words to the Chinese Ambassador, "My own inclination, if I were a Chinaman, would be to allow the Japanese to expand, under reasonable conditions in that direction [Manchuria], rather than to bring them down upon the main body of China."\textsuperscript{39} This inclination was not shared as strongly by the US who wanted to keep the Open Door intact at least nominally even if she accepted the \textit{status quo} in China. After all, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was an epoch-making event.
Summary of Washington conference of 1921-1922

We have attempted to show: 1) that at the dawn of the Washington conference the Japanese economy seemed to grow steadily if less rapidly than during the war; 2) that the naval arms race was putting an extraordinary burden on the nation; 3) that Japan's international environment was far less favorable to her, surrounded by Soviet Russia, Wilsonian America, and the ever-chaotic but increasingly anti-imperialist China; 4) that Japanese social stresses and strains were becoming significantly severe during and after the war, due in large part to the failure of the 'established' political parties to absorb these elements into the normal political channels; 5) that because of the growing economic dependence on the US and Britain, Japanese rulers saw no viable alternative to the policy of cooperation with the Anglo-American powers, despite the problems of naval disarmament, China, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance; 6) that Britain was hit hard by the war and the arms race was too heavy a burden for Britain, though she still thought of herself as a world power; 7) that although Britain was inclined to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the self-assertion of Canada, which had become increasingly pro-American, led Britain to terminate the alliance and totally rely on the 'goodwill' of the Washington powers for peace in the Far East and the Pacific; 8) that the enormous expansion of the American economy and Navy during the war made the US presence strongly felt in the Pacific; 9) that Wilsonian ideology opposed both communism and old
imperialism and portrayed itself as a defender of free, open economic transactions, which would presumably lead to peace; 10) that in the Far East the US tried to keep Wilsonian principles intact, while in practice she tried to 'contain' Japanese imperialism even by compromise.
Chapter 24: Foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution of 1926–1928

Introduction

The Kuomintang, having kept its own government at Canton since 1917 with reliance on local warlords, transformed itself in early 1920's.¹ First of all, the growth of nationalism contributed to this. Many urban workers and disgruntled youth were attracted to the appeal of nationalism. The growth of Chinese native industries during World War I produced a sizable number of Chinese bourgeoisie in the big urban centers. Second, the reorganization of the KMT with the inspiration of the Russians saved the KMT from dependence on the warlords and helped to increase the recruitment of workers and peasants, through the dual membership retained by the Communist party since January, 1924. Amidst the culmination of anti-imperialist strikes in Canton and Hong Kong, responding to anti-imperialist strikes and demonstrations in Shanghai in 1925, the Canton government was transformed, preparing for a government for all of China. Factional struggles among the KMT itself grew pari passu with the intensification of anti-imperialist strikes in Hong Kong. Despite a sinister coup dealt against the leftist KMT members by Chiang Kai-shek in March, 1926, the Northern Expedition was begun in July 1926 for the task of building armed national unification. Unprepared and suspicious among themselves to the very last end, the warlords' forces were never able

¹ Notes to chapter 24 appear on pages 583-585.
to unite against the KMT forces and successively defeated or surrendered mainly in disguise. Just like a snowball, the KMT forces advanced to north quite rapidly. The existing social and political orders were undermined severely along the way of the KMT forces, owing in large part to the hard work of the Communist cadres on the way to the north.2

The arrival of KMT forces at big industrial centers in the Yangtze river valley inevitably brought about conflict with foreign powers' interests. Strikes were organized, mobs gathered, warlord forces routed before they retreated, and the KMT forces poured in. All the forces, KMT or warlord forces, Communist or non-Communist, engaged in intense anti-imperialist emotional outbursts and violent actions on these occasions. All the foreign concessions and factories were threatened by anti-imperialist assaults. More and more troops were sent. Violence begot violence. Most foreign powers resorted to force, an almost automatic reaction to disorders in China. Gunboat coercion turned out to be of limited power at best, however. So amorphous and so massive was the force of anti-imperialism that it was essentially futile. Foreign powers took basically uncoordinated policies vis-a-vis Chinese anti-imperialist forces, depending upon the circumstances they found themselves in. The years 1926-1928 did not bring about a repetition of the Boxer intervention of 1900-1901 or the Arrow war of 1856-1860. Gunboat coercion and other imperialist policies proved basically ineffective. Imperialist forces had to cope with this reality and reformulate and redirect their policies
with little coordination.\textsuperscript{3}

Meanwhile, the schisms already visible before July 1926 eventually erupted in 1927. The Communists' effective and skillful mobilization of urban workers scared the Chinese industrial bourgeoisie, who initially encouraged the anti-imperialist policy of the KMT forces. The rightist KMT forces allied themselves with this Chinese urban bourgeois class, most notably in Shanghai, and brutally suppressed the Communists and labor unions in Shanghai in April, 1927.\textsuperscript{4} After a short interim, the Expedition started again in 1928, reached Peking, and united China, despite Japan's military intervention.\textsuperscript{5}
China: Power Bases

Very slow but continuous economic growth was still going on at the dawn of the Chinese revolution in the 1920's, vindicating the persistent resistance of the Chinese agricultural economy to break away from its high level equilibrium. The expansion was largely due to pre-modern economic and technological innovations and intensive labor utilization. Since new land was almost impossible to obtain and the population was still increasing, per capita land was increasingly small. Furthermore, a lack of distinction in terms of hereditary class or status made it inevitable for everybody to compete for a richer and higher position. The Chinese rural order of the 19th and early 20th centuries was perhaps the most competitive in the world. The extremely rapid social mobility in the country attests to this. The landlords today could be poor peasants tomorrow, and vice versa. "It was a society that was egalitarian and riven with mutual jealousies. The economic closeness of exploiter and exploited, and the lack of any ideologically sanctioned inevitability in the social differences between them, made for hostility rather than harmony." This fact strengthened Chinese susceptibility to the Communist attempts for social revolution. Since the gentry achieved the height of their power in the countryside especially after the 1911 revolution, escaping the power of the officials, who had been checking their power, they became more and more parasitic. With the absence of counterveiling forces, landlords' profits were still rising, up until the turmoil of the 1920's. When there were frequent social and political upheavals
and economic calamities, the rural order was all the more fluid and unstable. The heyday of the gentry did not last long. Because of the absence of any local power other than the gentry and because of the absence of any authentic central power since 1911 or at the latest 1916, the society was increasingly susceptible to the mere existence of violence, both from within and from without. Warlords dominated politics. Imperialists penetrated deeply.

Imperialist penetration and the impotence of the warlords' government against imperialism were humiliating to many Chinese, and the appeal to anti-imperialism captured their hearts and minds. In coastal cities there was a sizable number of Chinese national bourgeoisie. There was a growing number of workers under bad working conditions. Also there was a great number of ambitious but largely frustrated youth. To all these urban dwellers, anti-imperialism had an appeal. Workers and students were organized by communist-led trade unions and youth organizations, especially since 1925. Peasants were mobilized by the communists by way of the KMT's Northern Expedition. Calls for anti-imperialism and social revolution were persistent and strong. The gentry had only the forces of the warlords for its protection. The warlords' forces were largely crippled and paralysed by their myopic power considerations vis-a-vis the KMT forces. Many of them surrendered in disguise and joined the Northern Expedition. To protect the interests of the warlords and the gentry, that was the only way. The KMT forces welcomed their surrender because of the KMT forces' military weakness.
Furthermore, the bourgeoisie, having been already scared by the growing influence of workers and communists, strongly urged the rightist KMT elements to put them down. The result was Chiang's coup d'etat in Shanghai in April, 1927. Now supported by the bourgeoisie, the KMT became reliant on the urban bourgeoisie to oppose the urban workers and students, ignoring the peasants. The KMT's reliance on cities for its power bases increasingly brought about its rapprochement with the imperialist powers, whose power bases lay in coastal cities. The KMT achieved its armed national unification at last in 1928. But it was a hodge-podge unification without a fundamental social and political transformation. The KMT regressed to increasing fetishism of military power for internal suppression with the neglect of anti-imperialism and social revolutions.
Britain: Power Bases

The mid-1920's were a period of relative stability and prosperity which were to be abruptly halted by world depression of 1929. Under Baldwin's second conservative cabinet (1924-1929) the British economy at the time of Chinese unification was seemingly in good shape. Industrial production regained its prewar level in 1924. However, there remained more than a million unemployed throughout the period. Three quarters of them were in old, large industries like coal, iron and textile. Unemployment was caused not only by the shrinking world trade but by the old British belief that their prosperity depended upon trade and that by increasing trade all problems would be solved. So reasoning, the employers underpriced export goods by reducing wages, which only weakened the home market and increased unemployment.¹⁷

Despite the problem of unemployment and strikes, everything seemed quiet. The events in China did not draw the attention of the British except those who worked in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and those in China. British economic interests in China increased significantly. Investments in China more than doubled from 1914 to 1931. More than 60% of them were concentrated in Shanghai.¹⁸ This was in good contrast to Japanese colonial interests, which had a similar amount of investments in China, but with two thirds of them concentrated in Manchuria.¹⁹

According to Sir Miles Lampson, the cities most important to Britain were Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton, in that order.²⁰
Britain was generally in a strong position to compete economically with other powers and with Chinese industries. Britain was also very stubborn about retaining excluded areas.\(^\text{21}\) On these two things, Britain was in a sharp contrast to Japan. Economically Japan was in a relatively competitive position with Chinese industries and with other powers. Japan resisted admitting tariff autonomy to China, which might jeopardize or at least weaken Japan's economic position. On the other hand, as far as China proper was concerned, Japan was less stubborn on extraterritoriality than on tariff privileges.\(^\text{22}\)

The principal architects of British China policy were two men in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, Sir Victor Wellesley and S.P. Waterlow, and a man sent to China in the midst of the turmoil created by the Northern Expedition, Sir Miles Lampson. Prime Minister Baldwin and Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson seem to have trusted them and delegated all the responsibilities to them. Despite the generally increasing roles played by prime ministers and foreign secretaries during the inter-war period, the Foreign Office seems to have maintained its grip of power over Far Eastern affairs. This may be because neither Baldwin nor A. Henderson was a Lloyd George, a Curzon, a Balfour, a Neville Chamberlain, or a Winston Churchill.\(^\text{23}\)
Japan: Power Bases

Japan's economic interests in China were extremely skewed in Manchuria. More than two thirds of Japanese interests were in Manchuria, mostly through the semi-governmental South Manchurian Railway Company.\textsuperscript{24} Besides Manchuria, Shanghai and Tientsin were important. The importance attached to Manchuria by Japan was not just economic. It was conceived as a quid pro quo for the blood of 100,000 soldiers, shed in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese war.\textsuperscript{25} In their mind, Manchuria was a 'special area', almost like a Japanese colony. The strategic value of Manchuria was also significant. The threat of communism from the north was only to be prevented by the existence of a solidly armed Manchuria, which only the Japanese could do, according to the predominant view of the contemporary Japanese. So long as China was in a state of flux, and so long as Chinese anti-imperialism did not spread to Manchuria, Japan was able to maintain her dominant position in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{26}

The economic growth of Japan during this period was unstable. After the post World War I depression in 1920, Japan experienced a disastrous earthquake in Tokyo in 1923. In 1927, the economic depression took place, originating from the misstatement of a finance minister, causing a financial crisis. The economic problems at home amplified the necessity of holding on to economic interests abroad. The world depression of 1929 spread to Japan in the same year and the South Manchurian Railway company experienced its first large-scale deficit in 1930, which only increased the concern of some Japanese
over solidifying the basis of Japan's control in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{27} There is no doubt that frequent economic depressions only aggravated the problems of handling anti-imperialist onslaughts in China.

Perhaps most directly important was the development of party politics. After the assassination of Hara in 1921, attempts were made to prevent party politicians from taking power for a few years. It was not until in 1924 that Kato, president of the Kensaito party, was nominated as prime minister. The Kensaito (later Minseito) party held power in 1924-1927 and in 1929-1931 being kept out of power in the interregnum of 1927-1929 by the Seiyukai party. The two parties took power alternately with the Seiyukai honto party alternately siding with one or the other. The patterns of party politics as developed since 1905 did not change fundamentally. Each party was frantically oriented towards getting 'power' in a narrow sense of the word. Three things were vital. One was to get the support of local notables in election. Another was politicking among elder statesmen, their associates and informants to be nominated to form a cabinet. And the third was the support of the military. Despite the male universal suffrage law passed in 1925, the patterns did not fundamentally change. New social forces were largely neglected. Among 'established' parties, mud-slinging was an everyday business. It was important for 'established' parties out of power to make elder statesmen believe that popular support was slipping away or lost from the incumbent party, which would provide an opportunity to form a new cabinet.\textsuperscript{28}

The Kensaito party had two important policies that can be
distinguished from the ones of the Seiyukai party. One was an 'orthodox' balance-oriented anti-inflation financial policy. The other was 'economic-oriented, peaceful' diplomacy led by Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara who held the position during the Kenseikai's tenure. Foreign policy provided good materials for mud-slinging. The 'soft' and 'weak-kneed' policy of Baron Shidehara was attacked by the Seiyukai party and the military. However, the foreign policy of the Seiyukai's Tanaka turned out not to be very different from his predecessor's, contrary to the expectations of many 'hawks'. During the 1920's the military increased its concern over Manchuria and Japan's security. Disarmament was humiliating to the military. Party politics seemed to them to be too erratic and barren to manage imperial policy. The military's conception of itself as the sole legitimate 'non-partisan' body to guide national policy was gradually created and reinforced. Military insubordination continually plagued the Foreign Ministry since as early as 1928, when a Kwantung Army officer bombarded and killed Chang Tso-lin. Constitutionally a truncated Leviathan, the Japanese imperial state could not help but manifest fragmentation and the lack of coordination when comrades-in-arms-cum-elder statesmen died and when political parties failed to provide competent political leaders from the beginning.
China: Power Perspectives

The KMT was an armed organization whose strongest appeal was nationalism. The KMT accused imperialists in 1926 of being "the ultimate cause of all the difficulties and sufferings of the Chinese people." These sentiments were almost unanimously shared by the politically relevant Chinese. The anti-imperialist upsurge during the Northern Expedition went to the extreme. It not only scared the Chinese bourgeoisie but also incurred vigorous imperialist retaliation. Until Chiang's coup in Shanghai, Britain was the major target of the Chinese anti-imperialist attacks, which reflected the predominance of British interests in the Yangtze valley area. As a slogan in the fall of 1926 put it, "Fight the British; be friendly to the Americans; and ignore the Japanese." Later anti-imperialist actions were increasingly directed at Japan, who, scared by the prospect of the KMT forces reaching and penetrating Manchuria, resorted to frequent military intervention. Unlike the British, who were psychologically prepared for tactical or partial withdrawal to minimize the loss, the Japanese stuck to what they got. Meanwhile, with the nationalist upsurge still not subdued, the KMT's position was to be increasingly undermined by calls for anti-imperialism. The KMT was to fail to 'domesticate' the force of nationalism by which they had come to power.
Britain: Power Perspectives

For more than a year, British interests were under heavy attack at Hong Kong due to anti-foreign strikes organized at Hong Kong and Canton in response to the incident on May 30th, 1925, at Shanghai. The British losses were so heavy as to cost 40% of the British trade at Hong Kong and 25% of the British exports to China. British interests were threatened especially in the Yangtze valley area in late 1926 through mid-1927, when the KMT forces poured into this area. An attack in Hankow on foreign concessions took place/ on January 3, 1927. Powerless, the British easily succumbed to the onslaught. Before this event, on December 18, 1926, Britain issued a memorandum to the effect that Britain did not have any intention of perpetuating imperialism in China and that she was prepared and willing to help the Chinese to establish their sovereignty. This memorandum was issued by Sir Victor Wellesley, who believed that "the only policy offering any chance of success given her absolute impotence was one which was 'morally unimpeachable'. What underlay the British thinking was, first of all, Britain's absolute powerlessness. As Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, put it, "Punishing China is like flogging a jellyfish." Or "To fire off naval cannon at obsolete Chinese forts, or worthless Chinese arsenals or ludicrous Chinese warships cannot lead to any lasting advantage." Second, if powerless, all she could attempt was to reform in order to preserve, perhaps in the very Burkean tradition. In other words, she should try to show her good will to the
Chinese by revision of the unequal treaties. Meanwhile, Britain should "plan an orderly retreat throughout China and hold the main line of defense of British interests at Shanghai." However, Wellesley met opposing views from S.P. Waterlow in the Far Eastern department and Sir Miles Lampson in China. Waterlow maintained in 1925, referring to the Special Tariff Conference, "There can be no satisfactory result unless the Chinaman is convinced that the foreigner is determined and that he has force somewhere in the background which, at the worst, will be used." Also, Sir Miles Lampson was of the view that "Britain should pursue a policy of force if all other methods proved futile." What these differences amounted to seems to have been vacillation between action and inaction, firmness and self-effacement, determination and appeasement. At Hankow in early 1927, Britain made an orderly retreat. To the surprise of other foreign powers, Britain abandoned the concessions of Hankow and Kiukiang, whereas Japan clung to her concessions at Hankow by force. To Shanghai in July, 1927, Britain sent 20,000 soldiers, the largest among impending powers. At Nanking in April, Britain, alongside with the US, resorted to gunboat policy, whereas Japan did not. After the failure to retain her vested interests by force against the anti-foreign assaults of the KMT forces, Britain was to redirect her policies toward accommodation with KMT China.

By mid-1928, when the KMT seized Peking, Britain was in friendly relations with China, whereas Japan was viewed as the top enemy among foreign powers. What made the difference? Whereas Britain was more inclined to resort to force before mid-1927, her failure enabled her
to redirect her course. Japan was able to be on the winning side of the KMT-CCP and Wuhan-Nanking splits without resorting to force, and by virtue of her watchful eyes on the scene until the conclusion of the first Northern Expedition at the Yangtze valley. This success perhaps made Japan overconfident that the KMT and other warlord forces could be appeased or forced to comply to Japan's will by less than direct or complete military confrontation. Besides this, there was a difference in the geographical concentration of vested interests, Britain's being in Shanghai and Japan's in Manchuria. Geographical proximity to China and military mobilization capacity seem to have affected the range of choices. Lastly, the presence or absence of directly strategic interests seem to be very important in explaining Japan's later large scale intervention in China.⁴⁷
Japan: Power Perspectives

Because of economic feebleness and vulnerability, and because of heavy psychological investments in Manchuria, Japan manifested a lack of flexible thinking. Vested interests in China and particularly in Manchuria were to be defended at all costs. The extraordinary value attached to the cost of maintaining these interests in Manchuria haunted the mind of almost every Japanese. They were so high as to forbid them from thinking flexibly about some other alternatives when threatened by anti-imperialist nationalist assaults from the south. Also their beliefs were so locally self-contained that cross-cutting considerations were harbored, their most notable manifestation being the optimistic belief in the coexistence of the cooperative policy with Britain and the US and the policy of retaining special interests in Manchuria as Japan's monopoly.

When the May 30th movement spread to Shanghai and other areas, it was Japan that was most alarmed by it. Japan sent the largest number of battleships to the Yangtze area among five powers. Japan was alarmed and became vigilant. When the KMT started the Northern Expedition, Japan kept a watchful eye on it. Japan was the first and the only foreign power which precisely and confidently predicted the schism in 1927 between the KMT and the CCP. Japan kept refusing a joint action against anti-foreign attacks proposed by Britain at such times as the Hankow incident of January, 1927, and the Nanking incident of April, 1927.
Having been informed beforehand of the impending rupture between the KMT and the CCP, Japan sided with the rightest KMT in exchange for political deals on Japan's special interests in China proper and Manchuria. During the First Northern Expedition from mid-1926 to mid-1927, it was not at all impossible to conjecture that she could retain her interests. However, that was a consequence of many lucky breaks. One was the rightest KMT's conciliatory policy toward Japan. A second was that the KMT government was not yet able to formulate and execute a policy of revising unequal treaties. A third and perhaps most important one was the fact that the anti-imperialist attack had not yet spread as far north as Manchuria, where Japanese interests were concentrated. 52

Alarmed by the KMT's plan to reach Peking, Tanaka, prime minister and foreign minister since April, 1927, sent in May a force of 2,000, for the alleged purpose of protecting Japanese nationals in Shantung province. This caused harsh protests from the three governments in China -- Peking, Nanking and Wuhan -- although it drew support from Britain and the US, both of which later sent their own forces to North China, too. Britain and the US had been disgusted by the previous Japanese refusal of a joint action earlier in the year. The battles between the KMT forces and the warlord forces ended in a serious defeat for the former. The Northern Expedition was temporarily halted and Chiang resigned. After the merger of the two governments of Nanking and Wuhan, the Second Northern
Expedition started in April, 1928. This time Japan intervened vigorously with a clear objective of preventing the KMT forces from reaching Peking and colliding with Chang Tso-lin's forces, which were then controlling Peking. The forces sent to Shantung in April and May amounted to 15,000. The clash between the Japanese forces and the KMT forces took place at Tsinan and killed about 2,000 Chinese soldiers and about 200 Japanese soldiers. Despite Japan's blocking, other forces from the west seized Peking in July, 1928, and Japan became isolated amidst the growing rapprochement between China and other powers, especially Britain and the US. Thus the picture which emerged from the Second Northern Expedition was the reverse of the position of Japan in China. Although Tanaka's scheme to force Chang Tso-lin back to Manchuria looked successful because of the avoidance of an armed clash between the KMT forces and the Chang forces, the murdering of Chang Tso-lin by a Kwantung Army officer nullified it completely and abruptly.  

Some of those in service in the Kwantung Army were already stricken by a crisis mentality and asserted that only by Japan's complete control could her vested interests in Manchuria be defended. The bombarding of the train which carried Chang was a political strategem by which the Kwantung Army could begin its military operation. To the dismay of the officer, the Chang forces were not provoked, nor were top officers of the Kwantung Army. However, the effects of the event were enormous. Chang Hsueh-liang, a successor of Chang Tso-lin, maneuvered between the pressures from
the KMT and Japan. Chinese anti-foreign attacks became increasingly strong and spread into Manchuria. Diplomatically, Japan was isolated from both China and Western powers. Isolated, Japan therefore began to solicit diplomatic support on Chinese problems from Western powers for the first time since 1925, only to be rejected.

At home, opposition attacked the Tanaka cabinet for its failure in handling the problems in China, particularly the murdering of Chang Tso-lin. Tanaka was forced to resign because of mounting criticism, including criticism from the emperor. What characterized the Japanese perspectives of the period of the Second Northern Expedition was the optimistic, myopic view as envisaged by Tanaka and others and the growing disparity between this view and the view held by those of the Kwantung Army in service. The latter saw the development in China in relation to other powers and foresaw the inevitability and crucial necessity of taking direct control of Manchuria. When these two views competed in a disjointed way, the result was worse. Both of these two views failed as of 1928. For the military takeover of Manchuria failed despite the murder of Chang. The separation of Manchuria through working with Chang Hsueh-liang failed when Chang made political dealings with Chiang, and Manchuria was officially incorporated into China under the KMT government.

Growing isolation forced Foreign Ministers Tanaka and again Shidehara to seek a cooperative policy with Western powers. This
policy, despite partial success as exemplified in the London disarmament agreement of 1930, only amplified the crisis mentality of those who did not see any fruits of Japan's cooperation with Western powers. The policy was to lead to an independent subordinate military action in 1931.
Summary of foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution of 1926-1928

We have attempted to show: 1) that in China the gentry became very parasitic, without the countervailing ruling power of district magistrates and very vulnerable to violence, having only the thin protection of the warlords' forces; 2) that the very competitiveness in the countryside at the height of high-level equilibrium only strengthened the calls for social revolution, which were to be connected with anti-imperialism and to be capitalized upon by the Communists during the Northern Expedition and thereafter; 3) that imperialist penetration in China and the impotence of the warlords' government only increased the humiliation of Chinese people, which the KMT had capitalized upon during the Northern Expedition but which it later failed to 'domesticate'; 4) that the Japanese economy experienced a relative decline of growth and frequent depressions in the 1920's, forcing cooperation with the Anglo-American powers on the arms race and on trade; 5) that the major objective of Japan's China policy was to safeguard her vested interests in Manchuria against the KMT's influence; 6) that Japan's China policy was rigid and inflexible in the long run, notwithstanding its success before early 1928, because of its *idée fixe* developed about Manchuria since 1905, and ultimately it failed to be reconciled with Chinese nationalism; 7) that party politics of the 1920's reached the height of mud-slinging tactics among 'established' parties, only to alienate the nation; 8) that the 'weak-kneed' policy of the 1920's alienated the military, which had been in disgrace because of disarmament since the Washington conference, and reinforced the military's sense of
frustration and urgent need to take independent action; 9) that the British economy suffered from chronic unemployment throughout the inter-war period, while new technological innovation slowly took place, helping to decrease the shock of the world depression since 1929; 10) that British interests in China were concentrated in the Yangtze valley, which made Britain the major target in the First Northern Expedition; 11) that Britain vacillated between action and inaction, firmness and self-effacement, determination and appeasement; 12) that out of the total ineffectiveness of gunboat coercion amidst anti-imperialist outbursts, Britain chose a policy of tactical retreat to minimize the loss.
Chapter 25: Japan's conquest of Manchuria of 1931-1933

Introduction

On 18 September 1931 the Kwantung Army of Japan started action at Mukden for Japan's conquest of Manchuria. The action was planned and executed by a small number of middle echelon officers within the Kwantung Army, most notably Lieutenant Colonels Ishiwara and Itagaki. Imposing faits accomplis upon the Kwantung Army's top authorities, the central military authorities in Tokyo and the government in Tokyo in this order, these officers succeeded in taking control of Southern Manchuria within a few months. A large part of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces (140,000) were then outside of Manchuria whereas inside Manchuria there were about 100,000 soldiers largely scattered throughout Manchuria. Chang did not want to provoke the Kwantung Army, which would in turn be very likely to crush the Chang forces. At that time the Kwantung Army amounted to 10,000. Chiang Kai-shek was absorbed in anti-communist extermination campaigns in south-central China. The Kwantung Army met almost no organized opposition from the Chinese in Southern Manchuria. After the fall of the cabinet, whose foreign minister was left impotent by the Kwantung Army's independent action, Northern Manchuria was also conquered and a puppet state, Manchukuo, was set up in March 1932. After the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932, Manchukuo was formally recognized by the Japanese government.¹ This action, together with Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, made Japan directly exposed to the formidable array

Notes to chapter 25 appear on pages 585-587.
of problems that she would have to face alone with her own military forces. A series of military action that started on 18 September signaled a bankruptcy of 'peaceful' interaction with the rest of the world, most strongly propounded and articulated by Baron Shidehara, foreign minister during 1924-1927 and 1929-1931. It also signaled the beginning of various disasters that would fall upon Japan during the following 15 years.²
Japan: Power Bases

The world wide economic depression starting in the US in 1929 hit Japan very hard. The Japanese economy of the 1920's was less dynamic than before and after that decade. The abrupt disappearance of the economic boom created by World War I brought about economic anomalies during the 1920's. The gold standard was not restored until very late -- indeed not until the Western countries again stopped the gold standard due to the World Depression. The 'orthodox' finance policy of the Minseito party government, which kept power during 1924-1927 and 1929-1931, contributed to the deflational trend of the economy. Less vigorous industrial expansion or industrial retrenchment was made possible without seriously affecting industrial management because of the large labor force from the countryside, which expanded or shrank according to the industrial needs of urban areas. In other words there was a large amount of semi-unemployed labor stored in the agricultural sector of the economy. The agricultural population stayed around 15 million throughout the former half of the 20th century, whereas the industrial population increased very rapidly. The fact that agricultural productivity did not increase so much as before only aggravated rural living conditions. The deteriorated rural conditions created a hotbed of radicalism of the 1930's.

Radicalism among young military officers was quite understandable given the psychological syndrome of the military developed after the Russo-Japanese war. The military developed and inculcated the belief that the military was directly linked to the throne and that the
military was the sole non-partisan, unselfish protector of the throne and the empire. During the 1920's the army shrank from 25 divisions to 14 divisions, due to financial overload and relative peace. This caused an accumulation of deep hostility against party politicians and 'political' military officers who executed the retrenchment policy of the military. They began to rally around the idea of a 'second Restoration.'

Party politics of the 1920's were often accused of being corrupt. 'Established' parties, with the sole concern of taking power, went to the extreme of denying the principles of their very existence for the sake of castigating the adversary party and undermining their power bases by introducing the voice of the military. Because of these three factors, i.e., economic distress, frustration of the military, and the self-indulgent games of party politicians, Japan's power bases were shaky. That is why a call for radical action was welcomed by so many. The Kwantung Army's action was one of the radical actions attempted abroad and at home.

Internationally, there were three important restraints which limited Japan's power bases. One was Chinese anti-imperialism. The latter half of the 1920's saw increasing anti-imperialist actions throughout China. Even in Manchuria, where the influence of the KMT had not been very strong, anti-imperialist actions became so strong by 1927 that many Japanese businessmen were forced to close their businesses. Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang gradually recovered various controls hitherto taken by foreign powers, especially by Russia. After
Hsueh-liang's unsuccessful coup failed to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway from the hands of the Soviets, he turned against the Japanese and steadily undermined Japanese interests and Japanese controls of the colonial privileges that were previously often ambiguously agreed upon or understood. The unification of Manchuria with China in late 1928 enabled the KMT's influence to be felt more strongly than before. In 1930 the South Manchurian Railway Company experienced a deficit for the first time in its life because of the increasing anti-Japanese boycotts aggravated by the world economic crisis. Secondly, the steady Soviet military buildup along the Manchurian border gave the Japanese a constant reminder of their menace. The Soviet repulsion of Chang Hsueh-liang's violent attempt to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway, very much impressed the Japanese, who had been extremely frightened and worried about the anti-imperialist attacks in China proper and Manchuria. It was the first successful military attempt to preserve colonial interests in China by foreign powers. Thirdly, American and British naval power became potentially menacing since the London treaty was perceived by the Japanese to have ended Japanese naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, which had been granted by the Washington conference. However, this was only a potential menace. Both the US and Britain were still recovering from the World Depression. Lastly and most importantly, as far as military action was concerned, none of Chinese, Soviet, American or British forces was able to deter Japanese military action, since each of their military capacities was basically too weak to be deployed in Manchuria when they were absorbed in their own problems.
China: Power Bases

Despite the formal unification achieved by December 1928, Nanking's grip of power was not solid at all. It was a hodge-podge unification with warlords and other power contenders within the KMT controlling their own power bases almost independently of Chiang Kai-shek's will. The Nanking government had only five provinces in Central China from which taxes could be collected. Not only was the financial basis of the Nanking government fragile, but also its military basis was not overwhelming at all. In 1930 in Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang kept his force of 250,000. Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shang together kept the force of 500,000. Chiang's forces amounted to 450,000. Although the Feng-Yen forces were severely damaged by the defeat in 1930 dealt by Chiang, the forces amounted to 130,000 in the summer of 1931. In Kwangsi and Kwangtung, defiant KMT members and local warlords kept their force of 150,000 intact. Chang Hseuh-liang kept a force of 200,000; the Communists kept a force of 80,000; Chiang Kai-shek himself kept a force of 300,000. Everybody was vying and jockeying for better power positions, using whatever resources and situations that they could take advantage of beneath a facade of unification. KMT members at Kwangsi revolted against Chiang in 1930. Also in 1930 a large battle between Chiang and the Feng-Yen forces erupted, with the result of the former's victory. In 1931, the defiant members in Kwangtung and Kwangsi revolted against Chiang and set up the Canton government. Feng and Yen also made clear their anti-Chiang stance. Chiang himself was busy with his second and third anti-Communist extermination campaigns in Central-South China,
mobilizing the forces of 150,000 and 300,000 respectively.\textsuperscript{13}

Exploitation of peasants became heavier along with other exploit-able resources in the war-torn society. Besides heavy reliance on maritime customs revenue, which amounted to 50\%, heavy reliance on in-direct tax on consumption goods only deterred the development of capitalism. Over-issuing of loans for heavy military appropriations only encouraged inflation and aggravated the economic depressions which were already affected by the World Depression. Further, big floods attacked 100 million people in Central China.\textsuperscript{14} In short, despite centralization and superficial efforts at national unification, Chiang was far from being in a position to execute anti-Japanese action in Manchuria. His power bases were too fragile to face other internal power contenders and Japan at the same time.
Britain: Power Bases

The world economic crisis had a severe impact on the British economy, although not so severe as on the US economy. Unlike the US economy which overshot itself, the British economy, troubled by large, outmoded industries, quite ironically saved itself from overheating. The economic impact was felt in 1929-1932 and the economy began to recover gradually in the autumn of 1932. However, the abruptness of the depression and the drastic measures taken against it including the abandonment of the gold standard and the untraditional direct intervention of the state in the economy, when combined with the political upheaval prior to a general election made the British take the depression much more seriously than was necessary. The large number of unemployed during the 1920's and 1930's only convinced the British of an imminent disaster comparable to the decline of the Roman Empire.

Military capacity was at its nadir since World War I. During the 1920's it looked as if there were no real enemies. Britain finally acquiesced to real parity with the US in the London naval agreement of 1930, and thus virtually ended the Anglo-American naval rivalry which had prevailed since World War I. The British Royal Navy found itself almost powerless in the Western Pacific. The fortification of Singapore had been delayed for many reasons. The Royal Navy was behind in naval technological progress and developments in strategic theory. Although Britain was first to have a separated Air Force, the need to cover fleets by military airplanes was not well realized because of inter-service rivalry and other reasons. Besides the preoccupation with
domestic affairs, trouble in India detracted British power and attention from the Far East.
Japan: Power Perspectives

Most salient among Japanese perspectives was the growing dissatisfaction with the national and international status quo as many Japanese perceived it. The economic muddle of the 1920's produced a distressed population which pooled semi-unemployed labor, an ambitious but frustrated youth whose suicidal rate (ages 15-34) doubled between 1910 and 1933, and an indignant military inculcated with a sense of mission and prepared its action. When transplanted to the international arena, dissatisfactions easily became the ideology of world anti-status quo, heavily colored in racial terms.

Furthermore, the panic among the Japanese in Manchuria caused by anti-Japanese actions provided a strong influence on the Kwantung Army, a spearhead of Japanese imperialism and a protector of Japanese imperial interests. A direct unilateral action, the murder of Chang Tso-lin, had already once been attempted in 1928, though without being able either to provoke the Chinese forces or to mobilize the Kwantung Army. However, the idea continued to live among some of the Kwantung Army officers. Defiance was so complete and so compelling that the Kwantung Army top authorities, the central Army authorities and the government in Tokyo were all forced to succumb to the fait accompli created by the defiant officers. One of the striking patterns of the decision making process was the strange combination of the effort to subdue defiance and the effort to protect unity and the consensus of each organizational unit vis-à-vis the outside. When middle echelon officers started action, what the commander-general of the Kwantung Army did was
to try to limit its action while taking all responsibilities for the central Army authorities. The central Army authorities too tried to limit its action and at the same time to forbid intervention by the government. The government, though opposing the action in the first place, tried to seek understanding from Western powers. The following sequence of events amounted to an *ex post facto* acceptance of *faits accomplis*. During the Wakatsuki cabinet military action was not allowed to spread to Northern Manchuria. After Inukai formed his cabinet, the Kwantung Army took control of Northern Manchuria and then the Manchukuo was set up. Under the Saito cabinet, after Inukai was assassinated, formal recognition was extended to the Manchukuo. And finally Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. 24

Quite aside from the admirable timing and skill exhibited in the action taken by as small a number of soldiers as 10,000, a shade of arrogance and hubris already marred the whole event. The airbombing of Chinchow, which infuriated world opinion as well as the Chinese, was intended to direct the government to take a more 'autonomous' position by isolating Japan internationally. The Imperial Navy's action in Shanghai in 1932 was prompted by inter-service rivalry, which prompted the Navy to prove itself vis-a-vis the Army. The Shanghai incident only increased the apprehension of the Chinese and Western powers about Japanese intentions. The Japanese action seemed to them to be only a solid confirmation of their suspicion of Japanese aggressive intent and plan. The inaction and the conciliatory attitude of the Soviets erased the initial, cautious attitude of the Kwantung Army, which would later
cause disastrous and humiliating defeats in the late 1930's along the Manchurian borders. The passivity and the disjointed, half-hearted protests of Britain and the US were largely taken as signs of tacit understanding compounded by weakness. Most importantly, Chiang's and Chang's passivity only encouraged Japan's greedy attempts at further aggression into Eastern Inner Mongolia and North China, and eventually led to the overall war with China.
China: Power Perspectives

When the Kwantung Army's action erupted, Chang watched and waited for peace to come, and Chiang was busy with his attempt to exterminate the Communists in South-Central China. The Communists were busy defending themselves against the KMT's anti-Communist campaigns. None except for the nationalist populace, especially the urban youth, were vigorously opposed to the Japanese and ready for anti-Japanese action.

With his forces split and scattered in North China and Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, then in Peking, did not dare to confront the Japanese forces, even if the latter were far fewer in number. His concern was how to preserve his independent position in Manchuria. Since his father's assassination in 1928, his behavior toward Chiang, the Japanese, and other power contenders within Manchuria evidenced this. He resisted unification for a while and obtained the virtual independence of Manchuria in exchange for the nominal incorporation of Manchuria into China under Chiang, playing off Chiang against the Japanese and vice versa. It was only in 1930, when Chang sent his forces to assist the Chiang forces against the Yen-Feng forces, that there began to be visible cooperation between Chiang and Chang. Within Manchuria itself Chang had many power contenders who could threaten Chang's position. He tried to consolidate his power bases by modernizing the army and encouraging industry, and by attacking Japanese colonial rights and privileges. However, he did not want to confront the imperialist forces alone. The disastrous, humiliating defeat in the 1929 clash with the Soviets made him more cautious toward the Soviets.
Although after 1929 Chang directed his efforts against the Japanese toward the regaining of colonial privileges, he was not willing to confront the Japanese military forces squarely. That was beyond his power.28

Chiang wanted Chang to be preoccupied in Manchuria, fighting the Soviets and Japanese imperialists, so that Chang would lose his power bases. Chiang could then show the Chinese people his own anti-imperialistic foreign policy without sacrificing any of his own resources. Chiang was of the view that China should first consolidate itself internally and then fight against imperialism. Despite his occasional anti-foreign statements made for domestic consumption, Chiang was well aware of his fragile power bases and knew that the spread of communism in South-Central China would endanger his power. However, he had to compromise himself to satisfy the anti-imperialist, nationalist populace, who demanded a die-hard confrontation against Japanese imperialism. The fact that every power contender used the strongest possible words against imperialism, irrespective of his readiness to take anti-imperialist action, only resulted in a competition of rhetoric. It is not difficult to conceive of Chiang's difficulties in coping with his situation since he represented China externally. His power would be used and thus diminished when he had to confront Japanese imperialism, only enhancing the relative positions of other power contenders. His awareness of the problems of internal consolidation led him to monopolize power and to depend on his entourage, given his authoritarian personality and 'personalistic' politics of
the KMT. The choice between internal consolidation and anti-imperialist action as a first priority was a dilemma that would continue to plague Chiang thereafter and finally bring his political life to an end.
Britain: Power Perspectives

The point of view that developed during the Manchurian affairs among the permanent officials of the Foreign Office was to "avoid involvement at all costs."³¹ Or to put it in Sir Victor Wellesley's words, "It would be the height of unwise for us to interfere."³² Indeed, the Foreign Office was strongly pro-Japanese with regard to Manchuria. There were several reasons for this. First, there was a common imperialist understanding of their interests. The oft-raised analogy to the effect that "the League had no more business in Manchuria than it would have in India."³³ attests to this. The view was consistent since the time of Grey, who was willing to admit Japan's special position in Manchuria in exchange for Japan's non-violation of Britain's corresponding position in the Yangtze valley.³⁴ Because of the absolute scarcity of resources and land and the extremely large population in Japan, and because all neighboring countries like the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia were forbidding Japanese immigration, Britain was concerned that unless Japan was given some outlet, she would blow up. Manchuria looked like the best outlet, according to British thinking.³⁵

Second, there was a military weakness in coping with a possible Japanese anti-British action. Britain would be simply impotent in that situation. The feeling was voiced by Baldwin in 1932: "The very people like Bob Cecil who have made us disarm, and quite right, too, and now urging us forward to take action. But where will action lead us to? If we withdraw Ambassador, that is the first step. What is the next? and the next?"³⁶ When the Shanghai incident occurred, Shanghai being the
place where the British interests were concentrated, "In London, the 'burden of resentment' which might fall upon Britain if she spoke out of turn began to assume greatly exaggerated proportions." 37 Though reluctantly anti-Japanese in defending British interests, British policy was essentially one of "passivity". 38 As MacDonald put it in 1933, "We ought to be thinking of the end of this [crisis], which is apparently Japanese victory, both military and political, for only upon that assumption shall we be safe." 39

Besides these internal factors, there were international factors. Most important among them was the inability to cooperate and coordinate with the US. There remained a feeling of disgust and misgiving about the US in the Foreign Office. 40 The US neutrality in World War I, debts, and naval parity, together with other frictions and hidden mistrust, were the source of British resentment vis-à-vis the US. 41 Vansittart summarizes the sentiment in June 1932:

We shall doubtless continue to hear much about idealism from across the Atlantic, and to be furnished with many facile but impractical recipes for expediting the arrival of the millennium; but we must recognize that there can be no active American participation in European political problems in the near future. There will be no teething of the Kellogg Pact, or, indeed, any activity which by any stretch of the imagination could be described as the assumption of an obligation or a responsibility. 42
Although both Britain and the US shared a similar fear of arousing Japan to an unmanageable degree, their approaches were completely different, each viewing the other's approach with disgust and suspicion. Stimson's fixed belief in the necessity for and efficacy of a major pronouncement of principle\textsuperscript{43} was, in the British view, "wholly out of harmony with the British tradition of international affairs."\textsuperscript{44}
Summary of Japan's conquest of Manchuria of 1931-1933

We have attempted to show: 1) that during the 1920's the Japanese economy experienced a relatively low rate of economic growth and frequent depressions and anomalies, resulting in a stagnant rural sector and a distressed military; 2) that 'established' political parties did not pay much attention to the problems of cities and countrysides, alienating both leftist and rightist elements; 3) that Japan's position in Manchuria was increasingly under severe attack by Chinese anti-imperialism, which only multiplied the frustration about Japan's international position and the sense of urgency to take unilateral action to defend Manchuria; 4) that all the powers including the Soviets and Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek were preoccupied with their own domestic affairs, which in effect favored and encouraged Japan's unilateral action; 5) that after the hodge-podge unification of 1928, China reached a height of fragmentation and confusion, revealing the fragility of Chiang's control; 6) that despite all the nationalist upsurge against Japan in China, especially in cities, Chiang, Chang and other major actors including the CCP were in too precarious a position to fight Japanese imperialism, which was aggravated by the power-jockeying and the antagonism among them; 7) that the British economy suffered from the World Depression less severely, due in part to the presence of large outmoded industries, although the Depression upset the British disproportionately because of a high rate of unemployment throughout the 1920's and various political
upheavals; 8) that general military unpreparedness in the 1920's reached the extreme, especially in the Far East and the Pacific; 9) that because of military impotence, and because of economic interests in China, Britain's policy was the one of understanding, tacit approval, and appeasement.
Chapter 26: Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945

Introduction

After its conquest of three provinces in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army went further to take control of Jehol in 1933. At the same time, the Kwantung Army poured out through Shanhaikwan to Hopei. The Tanku truce was concluded in 1933, formalizing the 'demilitarized zone' at East Hopei, which would become a seed of trouble in the subsequent years. The area played the role of spearhead in the subsequent Japanese policy of divide-and-rule in North China, whereas it also catalyzed anti-Japanese sentiments and activities throughout the rest of China. The Kwantung Army's maneuvering and strategem in North China, allegedly counteracting Chinese anti-Japanese actions, only brought about further Chinese resistance, which in turn brought about further Japanese military involvement. In 1935, the military forced the Chinese to conclude two agreements which could expel the KMT's influence in the provinces of Hopei and Chahar. This happened at the same time as the KMT's renewed rapprochement policy toward Japan. Anti-Japanese actions were intensified. The pro-Japanese faction within the KMT was rapidly losing power because of this Japanese coercion. Deceived by the military's success, the Foreign Ministry of Japan was not willing to accommodate itself to the KMT government, which in turn became tough and firm because of the increasing attacks on the government's conciliatory

Notes to chapter 26 appear on pages 587-589.
policy toward Japan. The military's divide and rule policy continued
to prevail as an attempt to control five provinces in North China.

The defeat of a Japanese puppet force by the KMT force in
Suiyuan in late 1936 suddenly became a rallying point for anti-
Japanese nationalism throughout China. This victory was erroneously
conceived by the Chinese as their first victory over the Japanese and
encouraged them very much. With the upsurge of anti-Japanese sentiment
among his soldiers, who were ousted from Manchuria by the Japanese
conquest, Chang Hsueh-liang resorted to kidnapping and forced
Chiang Kai-shek to adopt a policy of anti-Japanese action with the
cooperation of the Communists in late 1936. Despite a more conciliatory
policy belatedly enacted in Japan since 1937, Chinese anti-Japanese
sentiment had already gotten out of Nanking's control. A small skirmish
near the Marco Polo Bridge in Hopei became a major war. Contrary to
the military's insistence, the government in Tokyo took this opportunity
to punish China. Similarly, contrary to the execution of a cease fire
by Sun Che-yuan's force, the government in Nanking overreacted. Though
neither side made a declaration of war, a major war did occur. The war
spread first to Shanghai. Then by December, 1937 Nanking fell. By
1938, the major cities and their vicinities in North and Central China,
and to a lesser degree South China, were under Japanese control.
Since 1939 military operations became more sporadic, and fighting and
negotiation alternated or occurred simultaneously, with Japan's eyes
fixed upon the European scenes. When finally Pearl Harbor took place,
Chiang Kai-shek rejoiced, convinced of his ultimate victory, whereas the Japanese felt far more strongly the sterility of the war, which had been felt after all from the beginning, especially by the Army Chiefs of Staff.
Japan: Power Bases

The economy of Japan was recovering from the shock of the World Depression by drastic changes in fiscal policy. There were continuous attempts to boost the economy by lowering interest rate, by large public spending including military spending, and by issuing deficit-covering bonds after the rewithdrawal from the gold standard; but these attempts had less and less effect. When the military’s voice became strong, a five-year plan for the period of 1937-1941 was formulated and executed, to the effect that the whole economy was mobilized for a war against the Soviets which was expected to erupt sometime after 1941. Despite the assumption and strong stipulation of non-involvement in a war during this period, Japan entered into hostilities with China in 1937 and thus fatally weakened the plan. By enforcing frugality and hardships upon the people, the government tried to run the economy with direct control. Relentlessly taut, the economy looked as if it would experience bankruptcy any time. With the atrocious slogan of 'feeding war by war', the Japanese war machines consciously led the economy and the nation to one campaign after another. First resources and labor in North China became its target; second, the rest of China and finally Southeast Asia. With the large scale conscription of soldiers from the young rural population, the landlord system and thus the agricultural sector of the economy were gradually undermined.

After the Manchurian conquest and especially after the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai on 15 May 1932, the voices of the military and
fanatical nationalist groups became decisively important. Prince Saionji's and the elder statesmen's criterion for appointing the prime minister was whether the candidates were not likely to antagonize the military. Party politicians were only sparcely represented in the cabinets since 1932. Dependence on bureaucracy and the military increased. Despite the name accorded to the subsequently formed cabinets, All-Nation cabinets, they did not have solid power bases of their own and thus were extremely vulnerable to pressures and vetoes coming from inside and outside of the cabinets. Independent action of the military became almost a normal act by 1935. The growing sense of urgency and crisis throughout the nation culminated in an abortive military coup d'etat in 1936 that shook the nation and paralyzed the capital. In a search for strong leadership, Prince Konoe was named to form a cabinet in May, 1937, as if he were a deus ex machina in a time of unprecedented difficulties. Like the preceding All-Nation cabinets, the Konoe cabinet only showed its disunity. What was most conspicuous was Konoe's opportunistically tough stand on China, which was taken in spite of the cautious advice of the Army Chiefs of Staff in July 1937 and thereafter. Konoe was more chauvinistic than the military or plus royaliste que le roi, believing that only by so doing he would/be able to contain the military. In the Foreign Ministry the pro-Anglo-American faction had lost the influence that it had had during the 1920's by the time of the Manchurian conquest. The Foreign Ministry now voiced strong support for Japan's tough stand on China and on the exclusion of Anglo-American influence from China.
National insecurity increased year by year after 1931, as Japan proceeded to isolate herself by her military actions. In 1932 she rejected a Soviet offer to conclude a non-aggression pact. In 1933 she withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1934 she abrogated the Washington Naval treaty. In 1935 she ventured to separate North China from the rest of China. In 1936 the other Washington treaties were abrogated. Also in 1936 a Japanese-German anti-Comintern agreement was concluded. All of these moves made her neighbors all the more hostile to Japan. The Soviet military build-up in the Far East became extremely menacing. The Soviet Far Eastern forces far surpassed the Kwantung Army in Manchuria by 1935 in terms of the number and quality of soldiers and equipment. The failure to have a disarmament conference in 1936 only encouraged the arms race between Japan and the US. Japanese actions in China only antagonized Britain and the US and led them to form an anti-Japanese alliance in the Far East, though slowly and in a limited way. Perceiving the hostility among her neighbors, Japan was driven to 'chastise' China, by the absolutely self-centered notion of establishing a joint Sino-Japanese, anti-Anglo-American and anti-Communist front. Over-extended in the vast terrain of China, Japan's power was significantly diminished before 1941.
China: Power Bases

Chinese economy had already reached what Mark Elvin calls a high level equilibrium trap by the early 19th century.\textsuperscript{11} The following century witnessed its process of decay. Agricultural productivity had reached its limit, and further labor investment did not bring about any further return. The rate of population increase began to stabilize in the mid-19th century. Despite the imperialists' onslaughts from the mid-19th century on, the Chinese stagnant agricultural economy did not change fundamentally.\textsuperscript{12} It was only in the 1920's that the basic socio-economic relationship sustaining the Chinese economy finally began to crumble. Political and social upheavals and disorders during the 1920's decreased the landlords' surplus so much as to degrade them often to the status of peasants.\textsuperscript{13} The consequence was an extremely competitive rural order, extremely vulnerable to the political upheavals then unfolding on a grand scale throughout China.\textsuperscript{14} Political fragmentation was a reflection of social and administrative decentralization throughout China. Nanking's control was little more than a facade in most places.\textsuperscript{15}

Government economic policy was extremely poor. Very low priority was given to economic reforms and development.\textsuperscript{16} Top priority was given to military budgets for national unification and consolidation. About one half of the government expenditures went to military budget.\textsuperscript{17} Government tax revenues were 85% dependent upon the coastal urban centers of the economy.\textsuperscript{18} Insecure political and
military control of the country by Nanking (only two provinces were under Nanking's complete control in 1937) was one of the most important reasons for this. Although in 1935 Nanking executed a currency reform, which helped extend Nanking's money more effectively than before, the government's economic policy in general aggravated the deep, built-in stagnation. Total dependence on commerce and banking and neglect of investment and industry produced what is called bureaucratic capitalism. Savings were diverted to hoarding, and speculation and investment in innovative enterprises were discouraged. Money circulated between the government and banks without stimulating the economy. Imperialists contributed significantly to the acceleration of the eventual destruction of the high level equilibrium trap. Internally crumbling, village orders were easily transformed by the Japanese invasions and the Communist-led social revolutions.

When the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred, nearly a decade had passed since 1928. However, the consolidation of Nanking was not easy at all. At the onset of the incident in 1937, only two provinces in Central China were under Nanking's secure control. Two provinces in North China were under the increasing influence of Japan competing intensely with anti-imperialist forces there. In Shensi Communists were steadily building up their power bases. Other provinces were under the control of various forces locally dominant and only superficially loyal to Nanking. After 1936 anti-Japanese nationalism spread like a 'fire in a prairie.' Anti-Japanese sentiments and actions were used by all the power contenders to outbid others.
Chiang opted for was to secure and consolidate his power bases in China and to fight against Japanese imperialism. He used Japanese aggressive actions skillfully and shrewdly to consolidate his own power, like the extension of Nanking's control over the Canton government in 1931-1932 and the repulsion of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces from North China in 1933. Besides these, Fukien (1933), Szechwan and Kweichow (1934-1935) and Shensi (1936) also fell under Nanking's control. By 1934-1935 the Communists in Kiangsi were expelled. About 100,000 fled and less than 10,000 reached Shensi, where they were to build their power bases and extend them during the Sino-Japanese war. When unification was almost completed in 1934-1935, Chiang now had to confront Japanese imperialism by action. When he had not quite finished his anti-Communist extermination campaigns, his conciliatory policy toward Japan stirred indignation from the nationalist populace and thus undermined his power significantly. He later moved toward a staunch anti-Japanese position, after his policy of rapprochement was not reciprocated by Japan. However, even after the war became fullfledged, Chiang's concern was always fixed upon the Communists now spreading in North and Central China, where the KMT's control was liquidated by Japanese aggression. 24 His method of power consolidation was extremely repressive. His excessive reliance on violence and personal connections hampered his efforts to broaden his control. 25

Diplomatically, Chiang was in no better position than on the domestic front. Japan's conquest of Manchuria made crystal clear not
only the impotence of Chiang's government but also the unreliability of Western powers toward China.²⁶ Chiang's rapprochement in 1934–1935 was the expression of his utter weakness, as well as of his awareness of the necessity to do so because of the top priority assigned to the consolidation of his power, which above all needed time. Even after 1937 the Western powers' diplomatic support of China was small, despite the fact that they antagonized Japan to an extreme degree. His optimistic expectation of Anglo-American support in case of a war against Japan was frustrated in 1937–1938. Only when the European front was coupled with the Far Eastern War, did Anglo-American support come.²⁷
Britain: Power Bases

Forced to liberate herself from the principles of laissez faire and free trade, Britain contributed to shaping the regional bloc formation of the world in the 1930's. She formulated and executed an imperial-preference tariff policy. Over-extended, the empire had to bear not only economic but also strategic difficulties. The Dominions wanted no trouble when Britain was able to send only one battleship to the Far East and the Pacific in case of emergency. It would be suicidal to make trouble. Within the empire itself, the conflict between the dominantly agricultural Dominions and industrial Britain was never fully resolved. Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods forced Japan to compete for a market with countries within the British empire: this greatly alarmed Britain and the Dominion countries. Japanese hysterical efforts to nullify or at least limit British activities in China for the effective execution of the war significantly weakened British commercial and other influences in China. A Japanese blockade of British concessions at Tientsin in 1939 dramatized the problem of Britain in China.

Despite all the problems in China, Britain's foremost problem lay in Europe. Growing tensions between Britain and Germany at a time when Britain was not prepared for direct interventions in Central and Eastern Europe only restricted the range of choices to Britain in China. Having had frictions with the US over debts and disarmament, and unable to trust the US on matters of Germany and
and Japan, Britain's international position was extremely weak. However tempting it was to replay a Far Eastern Munich, their awareness of the US' opposition deterred the British from doing it.\textsuperscript{33}
Japan: Power Perspectives

Deluded by a series of successes achieved for the preceding few years without inviting organized resistance from the Chinese and/or any substantial protests from the rest of the world, Japan saw in North China an immense opportunity rather than a danger. Aware of the menacing presence of the Soviet Far Eastern forces and of its own limited resources and forces, the Kwantung Army forced itself to believe in the necessity of utilizing the resources in North China by Japan's time-honored China policy of 'divide and rule'. After rejecting Chiang's new move of rapprochement in 1934-1935 and thus alienating Nanking, Japan attempted to set up areas free from direct KMT influence; this only stirred up anti-Japanese sentiments and actions and eventually gave rise to a full fledged Japanese military action. 34

Disdain for the Chinese had developed in the Japanese mind especially since 1895, and been reinforced since 1931, only helped to foster the belief that the Chinese could be easily overpowered. The gradual separation of the Hopei and Chahar provinces from the KMT's direct control was brought about by a very limited exercise of force. When the Marco Polo incident erupted, the military wanted to settle it by a big strike which was thought to be enough to force the Chinese to succumb. A series of big strikes did not make the Chinese surrender, contrary to Japanese expectation. With the prospect of a stalemate only too apparent, the Japanese tried to make peace in a manner which only increased Chinese suspicion. 35 However, physical and psychological
investments in the war prohibited Japan from disengagement and withdrawal. With the mounting menace from the north, which occasioned two disastrous Japanese defeats at the frontiers, and with mounting hostility from Anglo-American powers, which had already allied themselves with China by means of military and economic aid, the long pent-up grievances and animosity toward Western powers finally burst out. It was as if the more stubborn the Chinese resistance, the more intensely the Japanese felt their self-claimed mission to be leader of 'a New Order in East Asia.' It was also as if the more irritated and blocked the Japanese were in their attempts, the more militant and reckless they became. Already since September 1937 the most vigorous and outspoken military spokesman against the China war, Ishiwara Kanji was transferred out of the Army Chiefs of Staff. Gradually those against the China war in the Army Chiefs of Staff were all transferred to other places and their opposition was stifled. The entire war machine was being drawn into a quagmire, which both Chiang and Mao had correctly foreseen.
China: Power Perspectives

Chiang's policy was 'internal consolidation first.' It was a variant of the appeal to Burgfriede. His Burgfriede meant, however, that his power contenders must be silenced and suppressed. When most of his power contenders were more anti-Japanese than he was, his preach of Burgfriede meant restraining and/or repressing anti-Japanese actions and consolidating his power bases. He correctly foresaw that in case of war, the Nanking government would have to execute an anti-Japanese war. Total reliance on grass roots would be extremely dangerous from his viewpoint. To mobilize the village population, over which Nanking did not have solid control at all, would mean that anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments and actions would easily go out of the hands of the Nanking government. In other words, more dynamic and more organizationally capable political forces equipped by the appeal to nationalism and social revolution, the Communists, would capitalize on these sentiments and actions. Hence his slogan, "Jang-wai pi-hsu an-nei." (In order to repel enemies from outside, there must be peace within.) In July 1934 he delivered a speech emphasizing the overwhelming strength of the Japanese war machine, which could conquer major cities of China within 3 days, and the sheer absurdity of entering into hostilities against Japan at the time when China was not strong. His hope rested on the chance that Japan would enter into hostilities against the US, Britain and the USSR. According to him, that would be the best opportunity for China to regain her national vitality. Meanwhile the utmost efforts should be made to consolidate the Nanking rule. That meant to exterminate the Communists, to
get rid of local warlords, to promote economic reform and development, and to prepare the nation for a coming war effort. All these converged in his efforts to take dictatorial power into his own hands, according to his view.

On the basis of dictatorial power he attempted to make a deal with the Japanese. In mid-1935, however, the Japanese military forces began to separate North China from the rest of China. And not only was his effort rebuffed by the Japanese, but also it began to alienate the Chinese, who were now intensely anti-Japanese. In 1936 the Communists, already based in Shensi, transformed their policy radically from the previous 'anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese' policy to just 'anti-Japanese', now working in alliance with Chiang's policy. Although the Communists were the first to appeal for anti-Japanese resistance in 1931, they were not ready to take action at that time. For they were preoccupied with repelling Chiang's anti-Communist extermination campaigns. The defeat inflicted upon a Japanese puppet force in Suiyuan by a Chinese force in 1936 gave great momentum to anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese, who had continuously been dismayed by defeats of the Chinese forces. Chiang's sixth anti-communist extermination campaign, then being launched in the Northwest, experienced a dramatic event during late 1936 and early 1937. Chiang was captured by Chang Hsueh-liang's exile forces, which had been ordered to execute the campaign, and forced Chiang to initiate anti-Japanese, instead of anti-Communist, campaigns. When in July 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge incident took place, both forces in North China wanted to make a cease-fire.
However, both the arrogant Tokyo and the stiffened Nanking took tough positions. In August 1937 Chiang made a speech in which he quoted a Confucian epitaph, "A virtuous man is not alone; he must have neighbors [who extend helping hands]." Chiang expected firm support from the US and Britain. He noted, alluding to Sun-tzu's dictum, "In wars of modern times, it is not enough to know the enemy and to know oneself [to be victorious]. It is absolutely necessary to know the development of international situations." Even if he was painfully aware of the devastating effects of the war on the country, on the KMT, and most importantly on his own grip of power, he was not able to back down from the toughest anti-Japanese position. With the extraordinary upsurge of anti-Japanese nationalist resolve throughout the country, mere talk about peace would endanger his power. The only alternative left to him was to fight to the last with the support of the US and Britain and to a lesser degree of the Soviets. His concern over the Communists was best shown by his generous terms and friendly and cooperative posture toward the surrendered Japanese in the summer of 1945, in order to secure arms, major cities and major power bases against the Communists, then already menacing the KMT's control from the countryside.
Britain: Power Perspectives

Most important among British perspectives was her preoccupation with Europe. Most matters pertaining to the Far East were left to the Far Eastern specialists in the Foreign Office. Among them were Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir John Pratt, and Sir John Brennan, all of them China specialists who tended to be pro-Chinese rather than pro-Japanese. Furthermore, they over-estimated Chiang's power and underestimated Japan's power. 48 As Louis put it, British perspectives were summed up as "firmness toward Japan, generosity toward China." 49 There was a compelling consideration that British cooperation with the US was vital in Europe and in the Far East. "Not to alienate the US" 50 almost dominated the thinking of the Foreign Office's specialists in the Far East. Despite the friction and mistrust that had been manifested for years, it was indispensable. They appreciated the fact that the mere image of Anglo-American cooperation was able to limit or deter Japanese aggression. They were not optimistic about genuine Anglo-American cooperation since they thought Americans were fickle. As Neville Chamberlain put it, "It is best and safest to count on nothing from Americans but words." 51 Besides this, they tenaciously held on to their centuries-long belief that Britain was the greatest power in East Asia. 52 "With the lapse of the Extraterritoriality treaty of 1931, Great Britain continued to cling to the privileges of a 19th century imperial power; by refusing to negotiate with the Japanese, the British appeared to be in pursuit of maintaining the status quo." 53 It was this
stubborn clinging to age-old colonial privileges that, in part, intensified the Anglo-Japanese antagonism. Indeed, "Britain had little desire to pull back."\textsuperscript{54}

British policy, however, was less than complete antagonism to Japan. The British were not oblivious to what had happened in 1931-1933. As C.W. Orde, head of the Far Eastern Department of Foreign Office put it, "We know from 1931-3 that her [Japan's] recklessness is apt to grow the more when she is threatened."\textsuperscript{55} Or "The British resolved not to put Japan 'in the dock'."\textsuperscript{56} Activities derived from these perspectives, however, brought about the consequence that "Britain alienated Japan without assisting China," as Sir Robert Craigie put it.\textsuperscript{57} More subtly, Anglo-Japanese friction seems to have been taken advantage of by Germany and thus to have hampered British appeasement policy in Europe.\textsuperscript{58} When Japan finally declared war against the US and Britain, the British Empire disclosed its entire weaknesses and unpreparedness, leaving all British people with a sense of disgrace.
Summary of Second Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945

We have attempted to show: 1) that rapid economic expansion in the 1930's established the basis of Japan's war machine; 2) that the unexpected war in China, however, jeopardized the five-year plan for the period of 1937-1941, which was expected to prepare Japan for war after 1941; 3) that bureaucracy and the military had an increasingly big voice in the virtual absence of political actors which could articulate/aggregate social and political forces; 4) that Japan's diplomatic isolation had been extreme before 1937 and national insecurity prevailed in Japan; 5) that after the pro-Anglo-American diplomats were put in disgrace by the early 1930's, civilians and militaries alike sought a policy of autonomous defense and economy; 6) that Japan's successes in the first half of the 1930's in China only reinforced the belief that China's compliance could easily be achieved by a big, strong strike; 7) that, because of the pervasive national insecurity and a sense of urgency derived from perceived Anglo-American hostilities and the increasingly menacing Soviet threats, the non-compliance of the Chinese to the Japanese demands solicited a loss of temper on the part of the Japanese, who felt that they had a mission to be the Pan-Asian leader; 8) that the high-level equilibrium of the Chinese agricultural economy was crumbling in the 1920's and 1930's when fierce competition and jealousy over land reached their zenith, when the rural order was extremely vulnerable to organized violence, and when
imperialist penetration aroused patriotic sentiments in the urban population; 9) that the KMT government's power position was extremely fragile, financially relying on the urban bourgeoisie, militarily never dominant over other power contenders; 10) that from the very beginning the KMT government was in a dilemma between the vigorous anti-imperialist policies, which would further undermine their fragile power position, and the policies for internal power consolidation, which would undermine their power position by increasing the anger of the anti-imperialist nationalist populace; 11) that Chiang's diplomatic position was fragile because Britain, the US, and the League of Nations were reluctant to come to the rescue of China until Pearl Harbor; 12) that Britain was in an extraordinarily weak position, particularly in the Far East, with her economic interests being jeopardized by Japanese aggression in China while her military forces were tied up in Europe; 13) that to preserve what she had in the Far East without military forces available in the Far East, Britain took a policy of "firmness toward Japan, generosity toward China" and a policy of non-alienation of the US, which in effect only alienated Japan without assisting China.
Chapter 27: Pacific War of 1941-1945

Introduction

The Second Sino-Japanese war, which broke out in 1937, aggravated Japanese-American relations. Although strong isolationism still deterred the US from taking vigorous direct action in the Sino-Japanese war, American antipathy toward Japan increased pari passu with Japanese outright aggression in China. The US positions toward Germany and Japan were mutually reinforcing in the same way. When the Triple pact was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan, it was taken by the US as an anti-American front, whereas it was meant as a deterrent against US involvement in the wars in Europe and the Far East. The Japanese advance to Southeast Asia starting with northern French Indochina only convinced the US of the correctness of her image of Japan. Japan's action was taken as a challenge against the US. The US established an embargo step by step so that Japan would be compelled to make an all-out withdrawal from aggression in China and Southeast Asia. Dazzled by the initial dramatic victories of Germany in Europe, Japan tried compulsively not to 'miss the bus' for advancing further imperial influences, especially when the near-total economic embargo, including oil and scrap irons, forced Japan to search for alternative suppliers of resources. Refusing to liberate herself from the heavy psychological investment in the China war, Japan chose a national suicide. Compelled by the self-righteous doctrine of the Open Door, the US drove Japan into a corner and thus gave a Hobson's choice. 1

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Notes to chapter 27 appear on pages 589-590.
Japan: Power Bases

Contrary to Japan's expectations, China did not succumb. The war became a protracted war. Because of the war in China, the five year plan starting in 1937 caused extraordinary difficulties. More than half of the government's budget went to the military. Forced frugality went to the extreme, imposing extraordinary burdens on the nation. Despite the original prescription not to get involved in any war during the five year plan period, the principle of 'feeding war by war' had its heyday. Despite the originally intended objective of accumulating resources and equipment for a war expected to take place after 1941, the five year plan was only in mid-course when full fledged war developed in China. The heavy armed clashes with the Soviets in 1938 and 1939 which ended in humiliating defeats for Japan, were reminiscent of Japan's extraordinarily ill-prepared and ill-equipped, though once prestigious, Kwantung Army forces in Manchuria when the China war had tied large forces in China. Worsening relations with the US resulted in the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty in 1939 and subsequently the economic embargo stepped up. With access to materials and resources cut, the Japanese economy, already super-tight in operation, was shrinking day by day at the outbreak of the war which started in December, 1941.

After the abortive military coup of 26 February 1936, the military's voice was felt extremely strongly in politics. With the accumulation of military forces in China after 1937, the military reinforced its influence. Prince Saionji, the last genro, tried to have
prime ministers who were able to obtain support from, or control, the military after 1936. However, the influences of the military and the bureaucracy were increasingly strengthened. Party politicians lacking competent leaders played minor roles in the politics of the 1930's. In a search for a deus ex machina, Prince Konoe was appointed as prime minister, whose cabinet subsequently demanded the abolition of political parties, which were to be submerged into the catch-all Daiseiyokusankai. Poorly informed of situations and unskilled in administrative matters, party politicians had not much to do except become more and more chauvinistic, so strongly as to abash the most staunch supporters of Japanese military expansion among the military. After all, political parties themselves only regressed to their origin, i.e., parties out of power singlemindedly seeking for power by appealing to chauvinistic sentiments and policies. Especially based on local notables and bureaucracy, what Japanese political leaders could do for war mobilization was to establish a semblance of consensus devoid of meaning. The effort to create a consensus for war mobilization and execution was matched by fissiparity within and between organizational units. Rhetorical compromise on paper without any real bridging of differences only resulted in an extraordinary diminution of power, since efforts were made in all directions at the same time, with each group interpreting the paper compromise in its own way. Within each organizational unit, the tendency for an inferior to dominate the superior became rampant. Middle echelon officers and officials became real power centers in each organization, with top
men depending on them. Therefore, despite cries for consensus in a time of national crisis, directions in which national efforts were made were highly dispersed.\textsuperscript{5}

Strategically and diplomatically, the same picture was unfolded. There was no consensus on which was Japan's main enemy --- China, the Soviets, or Britain and the US --- or on which direction Japanese expansion should take.\textsuperscript{6} The result was all-out hostility and fighting, which were far beyond Japan's capacity to withstand or even imagine with a realistic mind.
US: Power Bases

The effects of the World Depression were still strongly felt in American society, despite the ambitious New Deal policy initiated by F.D. Roosevelt. As a relative late comer in industrial and technological innovation, American capitalism did not experience serious problems of technological outdatedness, unlike British capitalism. The American economy kept growing without being bothered by a large scale industrial rearrangement. When the American economy overshot itself in 1929, the effect was one of the most serious among industrial countries. Several million remained unemployed during most of the 1930's. One third of the population remained unaffected by and without the benefits of the New Deal policy. Before the New Deal could make its impact felt by the lowest strata of the society, the US economy shifted its emphasis to rearmament. It does not seem to be far-fetched to say that before the New Deal policy proved itself incapable to solve all the economic, social and political problems, the US government sought another solution. The war in Europe provided an excellent opportunity. Against the isolationists' almost insurmountable opposition to intervening in the European war, the government managed to send an impressive amount of arms to Britain and other anti-Axis countries. The war economy was built, and the economy turned upward. Whatever was the intention of FDR, the formal entry into the war after Pearl Harbor boosted the war economy and to make up for the shortcomings of American capitalism, the
leadership of the President was strengthened to the extreme of allowing him to take over many roles in foreign affairs which had been traditionally played by congress. This was made possible by war time emergency and was to be institutionalized thereafter. Vehement attacks on the President by isolationists were overwhelmed by the vigorous assertion of presidential power. 10

Diplomatically, the US' position was heavily tilted toward Britain. Germany was perceived as the US' utmost enemy, jeopardizing the US' actual and potential market for trade, investment and influence. American support for Britain was extended even in violation of the international principle of neutrality. Despite the then already visible propinquity of the US to enter the war, Hitler shrewdly and patiently avoided all provocation of the US to keep the US out of the war. By sending arms to Britain and other anti-Axis European countries, the US began to portray herself as an 'American Fortress'. As the tension and confrontation with Japan became imminent, the US position became embarrassingly similar to colonial imperialist powers such as Britain, France and Holland. French Indochina, British Malaya and Dutch East Indies, as well as American Philippines, were within a stroke of a probable Japanese invasion. All of these areas were extremely vulnerable to Japanese attack. The US Navy was usually located far away from the Western Pacific. The Royal Navy of Britain was totally preoccupied with the death-and-life struggle in the European war. France, Holland and Belgium were controlled by
Germany. The increasing American role in the Far East and the Pacific thus became colored by the defense of colonial empires, as well as by the struggle against Japan's domination over all of Southeast and East Asia.11
Britain: Power Bases

Since 1939 "the private war between Great Britain and Germany" was waged. Britain was in unprecedented difficulties. The Continent was controlled by the Germans. The British Isles had to be always alert against German bombing. The US was isolationist, as before. Britain was desperate. The over-extended British imperial territories were isolated from each other. Especially, British interests in the Far East were neglected. Even a number of warships in the Far East were withdrawn for service in Europe. Since 1937 Japanese aggression in China was detrimental to British interests in China. Singapore, the focal point for British defense in the Far East, was utterly unprepared. There were no warships until shortly before Pearl Harbor. There were no fighter airplanes. Without having the US on the battlefields, Britain was powerless in the Far East. In short, Britain was totally unprepared for a war in the Far East, which, after all, had been the case since 1902 and especially since 1922.
Japan: Power Perspectives

So long accustomed to adjusting herself rather passively to the 'trend of the world', which was mainly determined by Western power politics, Japan developed a skill at deciphering the 'trend of the world'. Rather than a highly integrated conceptual system, a set of more or less juxtaposed cues was used to identify the 'trend of the world'. Since the most important imperial foreign policy objective was to catch the best opportunity to exploit for imperial expansion when Western powers were preoccupied with themselves, the mentality of 'hop on the bus' at a right moment was developed. In the 1930's, when the desire to be militarily and economically autonomous dominated the thinking of Japanese rulers, this mentality was reinforced in a shrewd way. The dramatic victories that Germany won in the initial phase of the European war dazzled, fascinated and convinced many Japanese rulers that they could profitably make use of the situation. The result was the Triple Pact of 1940, intended by enthusiasts to be an alliance to ward off the US from the European and Far Eastern wars. The Pact only accelerated the process of Japan's being drawn into a global war, however. Despite the China war, despite the pro-German alliance, and despite the gradually escalating economic embargo by the US, the Japanese never really interconnected these three things. Despite their effort to take advantage of European situations for their conduct in the Far East, they did not take into consideration the fact that the potential enemies were thinking in more global terms and with a more integrated scheme.
Japan, a regional imperialist, was, after all, so conditioned.\textsuperscript{18}

With the accumulated frustration out of the drawn-out, indecisive war in China, with the insecurity from the economic embargo by Western powers becoming acute, and with the fear of having "wolves [the Soviets] in the back while fighting with dogs [the Chinese] in the front"\textsuperscript{19} becoming an actuality with the 1938 and 1939 clashes with the Soviets, the Japanese found a wizard in the German victory. Almost unshakable belief in Germany's swift and ultimate victory was born in the minds of many Japanese leaders, with the apparent result of wishful thinking. When Japan's advance into southern French Indochina triggered a total economic embargo by the US, many Japanese leaders realized, though belatedly, the toughness of the rivalry across the Pacific.\textsuperscript{20} Japan obstinately refused to liberate herself from the heavy psychological investment in the China war while considering a total surrender to the US as an utterly impossible alternative. Posed with a Hobson's choice, Japan resorted to war against the US and Britain.\textsuperscript{21} Her pent-up hostility, frustration, and anger at Western powers vented themselves in the war. The declaration of war was a telling summary of Japan's overtly ambitious but ultimately abortive century-old imperialism. Japan was portrayed as a country whose legitimate expansion was blocked by the pincer attacks from Western imperialist powers and nationalist anti-imperialist forces in China. There burst out the racial self-assertion so long suppressed by the necessity to 'modernize' the nation and to conform to the 'trend of the world', first as a small, non-industrial, non-Western country, and later as a parvenu middle power in
the Far East. The China war was _aufgehoben_ into the greater East Asia war in the Japanese mind. Ambiguities and a sense of guilt associated with the drawn-out, objectless China war were lost. It became a clear-cut anti-white crusade. Yet it was a suicidal crusade from the very beginning.
US: Power Perspectives

The US policy under Roosevelt and Hull was among other things rigid and self-righteous in its assertions. Staunch believers in America's innocence of power politics, imperialism and colonialism, and in America's crusading mission to the frontiers extended across the Pacific, these men at the top of the government moved the nation in the direction of war in the Pacific and the Far East. 23

Four issues were most important in the US-Japanese negotiation immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. 24 One was a proposed Hawaii summit between F.D. Roosevelt and Prince Konoe. Another was Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy. The third was Japan's withdrawal from China and Southeast Asia. The fourth was economic embargo. What most bothered Japan was the US demand that Japan totally withdraw her forces from China. Although to the Japanese this was a demand to turn the clock back 10 years, the Americans believed and acted as though they were compelling the 'outlaw' Japanese to succumb, with the gradual use of economic embargo. Thus believing in the effectiveness of compellence, the US only drove Japanese into a corner. The Japanese, in turn, felt that to fight back was the only way left, like a rat which, driven into a corner by a cat, challenges the latter in desperation. It was the policy of compellence, not of deterrence. 25

The US rejection of the presence of an exclusively dominant actor in any one region of the world was categorical and universal except for her own in Latin America. Though deeply and uniquely stemming from
her own historical experiences, the US believed in the universal applicability, validity and legitimacy in the world of its conception of world order most eloquently formulated and voiced by Wilson.26

The interventionist/internationalist drive was extremely frustrated by Hitler's cunning patience in not getting provoked by the US. It was only when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Hitler followed suit that the US was able to participate in the wars that had been separately fought in two areas. Optimistic about ultimate victory and its consequences, the victory over the enemies in battlefields became the ultimate objective. The world after the war was thought to be a utopia in which fascist devils were wiped out. It was as if they believed naively that where there is peace, things take care of themselves. The fact was that the US moved into the temporary power vacuum in the Far East only to confront directly the assertion of nationalism and Communism that Japan had faced without success.27
Britain: Power Perspectives

Despite all the difficulties Britain had to endure in Europe, Britain kept believing that she was still a world power. Despite all the advances of Japan on the Continent, the British confidently expected that Japan's feet of clay'would be exposed. The real strength of Japan was not well realized. Together with the US, Britain believed that Japan would be forced to withdrawn from China sooner or later, since Japan was not strong enough to sustain a long war in China. Thus they believed that strong measures taken by the US and Britain would be enough to compel Japan to withdraw.

British difficulties in Europe and the Far East led the British to win the support of the US. Churchill was so desperate that he went farther than Hull, the US Secretary of State, and the pro-Chinese Far Eastern Division of the State Department to drive the Japanese into a corner. Instead of seeking a modus vivendi, Churchill preferred a virtual ultimatum. Churchill was successful in getting the US to join the war. As Churchill later put it, "So we had won after all." However, the price was also high. In December, 1941, Japanese bombers attacked and sank the Prince of Wales and the Repulse with amazing ease. They had no fighter airplanes. Furthermore, Singapore was taken by the Japanese on 15 February 1942, again with surprising ease. The unprecedented number of 60,000 surrendered in Singapore. Indeed, "This was the greatest capitulation in British history, a blow, according to some judges, from which British prestige in the Far East never recovered."
As Taylor put it, "That British prestige had long rested on bluff. The British hoped to maintain it by the shadow of a great name and a fleet which was not there." 33
Summary of Pacific War of 1941-1945

We have attempted to show: 1) that prior to Pearl Harbor Japan was in an increasingly precarious position, both economically and militarily, because of the drawn-out China war, because of the humiliating defeats inflicted by the Soviets, because of the intensified economic embargoes by the US, Britain, and the Netherlands; 2) that, in Japan, despite all the cries of national unity, fissiparity and incoordination dominated political life throughout the war; 3) that in a state of intense insecurity and rapidly changing situations, Japanese rulers were alternately dazzled and confused so extremely as to misdirect the country; 4) that when, posed with a virtual ultimatum by the US, Japan resorted to force in desperation, being unable to liberate herself from her heavy psychological investment in China; 5) that the China war was aufgehoben into the Greater East Asian war in the Japanese mind, which was above all an anti-white crusade, if suicidal from the very beginning; 6) that the US economy was recovering from the World Depression by shifting its tactics from the New Deal to rearmament; 7) that as the tension with Japanese imperialism increased, the US position in Asia became like that of other colonial powers; 8) that the US policy was as rigid and self-righteous as Japan's or Britain's, believing in America's crusading mission to get rid of imperialist aggressive powers; 9) that the US seemed to believe that Japan could be compelled to comply with the US demands by an ultimatum, which in effect only drove Japan into a corner; 10) that Britain was increasingly
ill-prepared in the Far East, and this was manifested in her humiliating defeat in Singapore, where 60,000 surrendered; 11) that Britain hung on to the belief that she was a world power without preparing for a war in the Far East, relying on the shadow of a great name.
Part III

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from their names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.

Chapter 28: Does each case fit to the scripts?

This chapter is intended to set out the basis on which conclusions are drawn by a more systematic analysis in the next chapter. We have two related objectives in this chapter. First, we will attempt to check, if not in a strong sense, whether our scripts formulation approximately coincides with our case studies. If the scripts are not even approximately congruent to the case studies, then the way in which we have proceeded may be wrong. Since the scripts were stated as a hypothesis, we have to see whether and to what extent each case fits to the scripts. However, it must be noted that the scripts and the case studies are not entirely independent of each other. The scripts have been an important guiding force for drawing the case studies. And many of the works consulted to write the scripts are the same as those used for our case studies. Also since we have made our own interpretations in our write-ups of the case studies, sometimes independent of the historical works we have consulted, the views set forth in the scripts must have crept into the case studies. Therefore, this is not a test in the ordinary sense. This is better called an examination of the scripts. This examination can hopefully detect the deficiencies of the scripts and suggest some revisions of the scripts. The examination can also depict the appropriateness of the inclusion of each case in our study, and can establish more solidly the relationship of each case with the scripts, i.e., show to which script phase each case belongs. We will have two kinds of examination. One is an examination of the scripts

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Note to chapter 28 appears on page 590.
vis-a-vis the case study summaries. The other is an examination of the scripts vis-a-vis the case studies. Both will serve the same purpose of checking. However, the first examination will be simple and crude, whereas the second one will be more detailed and complex.

Second, it is necessary to code systematically the scripts and the case studies so that we can compare them for examination. Coding also enables us to attempt a systematic analysis of the case studies in the next chapter. Naturally the terms in which we compare them are the 13 aspects which we have already set out in chapter 2 on models. (Later we will describe in detail how the coding is made.) The checking and coding will also serve for the purpose of recapitulation. Since these two objectives are only a means to the larger objective of making generalizations, it is appropriate to make some brief remarks on the problems inherent in historical generalizations.

To make historical generalizations, we have to face at least two problems: the mode and level of generalizations. First, the mode of generalizations from historical cases has many varieties. It can be 'humanistic' in reaching generalizations, often based on a single case or at most a few cases. Many historical studies rely on this mode of generalization. Generalizations can also be based on many cases and reached by statistical methods. Many behavioral studies rely on this mode of generalization. Our mode of generalization tries to combine both. We will try to retain historical richness while attempting systematic analysis of the twenty-two case studies. In the case studies we have tried to conceive international conflicts within the
total framework of domestic and international dynamics, in a wholistic manner rather than overtly analytically. This strategy was taken in order to retain the historical wholeness and uniqueness of individual cases that might be overlooked if we set up a priori categories and rigorously analyzed cases in terms of these categories. In this chapter we will now introduce a more systematic mode of analysis. By systematic analysis we will attempt to establish more rigorous bases on which we can make more solid generalizations. We will, however, rely on disciplined and educated intuition, impressions, and insight throughout, without which higher level generalizations would be difficult.

Second, there is the problem of the level of generalization. If we are interested in the general mechanisms which are applicable to all the twenty-two historical cases, the level of generalization is bound to be high. On the other hand, if we are interested in establishing special mechanisms more or less unique to each imperial case and thereby contrasting the three imperial cases, the level of generalization is bound to be somewhat low. We have to recollect here that there are three levels of generalization in this study. The first level is that of case study summaries, given at the end of each case study. The second level is that of the scripts, set out in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The third level is the one on which portions of Introduction are stated, anticipating conclusions which will be set forth in more detail in
chapter 29. What we will attempt in chapter 29 is to establish, though not in a full-fledged manner, some specific mechanisms of empires (the second level) and will also try to establish high level generalizations across empires (the third level).

Examination I

Since the first examination concerns the relationship between the scripts and the case study summaries, it is appropriate for us to restate the summary sentences of the scripts for recollection. Each imperial script consists of the four themes.

Chinese script:

1) the metamorphosis from the 'barbarous' conquerors to the 'civilized' rulers of the Middle Kingdom.

2) the central dominance of the Ch'ing empire in East Asia, fostering and reinforcing their belief in the uniqueness and grandeur of Chinese hisotyr and culture.

3) the inability to win, leading to self-deception and the avoidance of reality.

4) the impotence of self-deception, turning into cultural despair accompanied by an emotional upsurge to revenge, humiliation and disgrace.
British script:

1) Britain's position as leading trader all over the world.
2) her avoidance of major wars with the consequence of perpetuating her self-image as the greatest power in the world.
3) an awkwardness caused by being no more than a primus inter pares.
4) a response to her heavy burdens by vacillation between self-effacement and firmness.

Japanese script:

1) Japan's fear of dependence, derived from her traumatic experience of Western gunboat coercion and her singleminded striving for diplomatic equality with Western powers.
2) the illusory transformation of Pyrrhic victories into great victories of willpower.
3) the continuous frustration of the late-comer's hasty expansive drives.
4) Japan's suicidal plunge into perceived pincer attacks both by other imperialist powers and by anti-imperialist forces.

Procedure:

The procedure of examination is straightforward. It is to find whether each case study summary is on the whole congruent to one of the four script phases. When a case summary seems to be congruent to two script phases to a similar extent, we will record it as 'phase-ambiguous'. Phase-ambiguity will be resolved in examination 2. We have four categories of correspondence. If a case study summary fits one
of the four script phases well, not only in overall theme but also in particular details, then it is called a 'good fit'. If a case study summary fits one of the four script phases fairly well but not in some details, then it is called a 'basic fit'. Those case study summaries which only partially correspond to a script phase are called 'phase-ambiguous'. If a case study summary is clearly contrary to the tone of a script phase, then it is called a 'non-fit'. Because of the crudeness of examination, we will only provide a gross summary of correspondence by empire. There are three tables, table 3.1 for China, table 3.2 for Britain, and table 3.3 for Japan. A comparison of tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 shows that there are many more phase-ambiguities in the Chinese cases than the others. On the whole, however, 83% of the case study summaries record either a 'good fit' or a 'basic fit'. We will now take a closer look at each case.

China:

The Manchu-Korean wars are considered as a 'good fit' because the Manchus manifested all the peculiarly Manchu characteristics before they conquered China. This fits well to the first script phase. The Ch'ing-Russian war fits the category of phase-ambiguity. This is in part because the first script phase contains two different characteristics. The Ch'ing-Russian war can belong either to the first script phase or to the second. For instance, mobilizational difficulty in the Ch'ing-Russian war was different from the kind of mobilizational difficulty typical in the second script phase. In the former, the Ch'ing had to cope with the traditional enemy of the Mongols and the Han Chinese
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>phase number</th>
<th>degree of fit</th>
<th>positive points</th>
<th>negative points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1619-1637</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>non-Chinese style/power perspectives</td>
<td>qualitatively different mobilizational difficulty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685-1689</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>neither show of force nor acceptance of submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755-1759</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>imperial height</td>
<td>humiliating defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766-1769</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>imperial height</td>
<td>humiliating defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788-1789</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>imperial height</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1792-1793</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>self-centeredness and arrogance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814-1816</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>avoidance of reality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839-1842</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>persistent use of i-i-chih-i/containment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856-1860</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>bankruptcy of appeasement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862-1864</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>bankruptcy of militant conservatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>weak anti-imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>nascent anti-imperialist forces</td>
<td>anti-imperialism and the salience of i-i-chih-i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>anti-imperialist actions temporarily nullified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1922</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>growing anti-imperialist forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1928</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>anti-imperialist upsurge and drive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1933</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>source of later anti-imperialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>culmination of anti-imperialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Fit</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-fit</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
resistance. In the latter, the Mongols had been largely emasculated, and mobilizational difficulty stemmed from the overloaded imperial structure. The Ch'ing-Jungar war is considered as a 'basic fit'. The basic tone of the war is in perfect accordance with the second script phase, but in the war neither a show of force nor an acceptance of submission was observed. Hence a 'basic fit'. Both the Ch'ing-Burmese and Ch'ing-Vietnamese wars are considered to be 'phase-ambiguous.' This is in part because the second script phase contains two different characteristics. Thus, despite the basic congruence to the second script phase of these two wars, the simple fact of the devastating and humiliating defeats in these wars leaves them in the category of 'phase-ambiguity.' The British abortive mission is considered as a 'good fit' to the second script phase. The Ch'ien-lung emperor's self-centered and arrogant attitude very closely matches the second script phase. The Anglo-Nepali war is considered as a 'good fit' to the third script because the war revealed the avoidance of reality and occasioned the first loss of a tributary country because of Western influence. The Opium war, the Arrow war, and the Taiping intervention are all considered as 'good fits' to the third script phase. All of these cases revealed the Chinese persistent application of the time-honored policies of playing off barbarians against barbarians and containment. The First Sino-Japanese war is considered as 'phase ambiguous' because the defeat of the war occasioned a radical departure from the policy of appeasement. The Boxer intervention is considered as 'phase-ambiguous'
because the intervention occasioned the bankruptcy of militant conservativism. The First Sino-Japanese war and the Boxer intervention seem to constitute a distinctive period. Japan's 21 demands are considered as a 'basic fit' to the fourth script phase because anti-imperialist forces were not yet very strong. Yuan's skill of playing off barbarians against barbarians was very salient. The Siberian intervention is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase. Nationalist anti-imperialism grew during World War I and was manifested in relation to the warlord government's pro-Japanese policy. The foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase. All the upsurge and drive of anti-imperialism was there. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria is considered as a 'basic fit' because, despite all the later upsurge of anti-imperialist actions, all the Chinese actors were preoccupied with themselves, and organized anti-imperialist actions were temporarily nullified. The Second Sino-Japanese war is recorded as a 'good fit'; this war was the culmination of Chinese anti-imperialism.

Britain:

The British abortive mission is considered as a 'basic fit' to the first script phase. Although British interests were commercial and the British in the China trade were most important at that time, until 1795 the China market was not yet dominated by Britain. The Anglo-Nepali war is considered as a 'non-fit' simply because British India policy was very different from British China policy in its complexities and its deviation from the general preference for an 'informal empire.'
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>phase number</th>
<th>degree of fit</th>
<th>positive points</th>
<th>negative points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1792-1793</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>salience of commercial interests</td>
<td>China market not yet dominated by Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814-1816</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>non-fit</td>
<td></td>
<td>British India policy differs from British China policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839-1842</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>gunboat coercion</td>
<td>counterproductive effects of coercion not yet well appreciated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856-1860</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>salient unilaterality and concern for over-involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862-1864</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863-1864</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>disparity between large commercial interests and waning naval supremacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>awkwardness in adjustment</td>
<td>radical departure from naval supremacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1928</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>vacillation between firmness and effacement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1933</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>swing to understanding/appeasement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>swing to firmness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>zenith of firmness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total positive points</th>
<th>Total negative points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>phase status</th>
<th>count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-fit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Opium war is considered as a 'basic fit' to the second script phase because the devastating and counterproductive effects of gunboat coercion were not yet well appreciated at that time. The Arrow war, the Taiping intervention, and the Choshu-Western war are all considered as 'good fits' to the second script phase. These three cases reveal both unilateralism and the concern for overinvolvement, which characterized the second script phase. The Boxer intervention is considered as a 'good fit' because this intervention dramatized the dilemma of Britain in the Far East, i.e., the disparity between large commercial interests and waning naval supremacy. Japan's 21 demands toward China are considered as a 'good fit' for the same reason. Although Britain had virtually no military power in the Far East, she managed to retain what she had in China, depending largely on her great name and her diplomatic skill. The Washington conference is considered as a 'basic fit' to the third script phase because it signaled a radical departure from Britain's naval assertion. Britain finally reconciled herself in terms of naval supremacy vis-a-vis the US and Japan. The foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase because it exemplified vividly the vacillation between firmness and effacement. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase. This case represents the swing to effacement, understanding and appeasement. The Second Sino-Japanese war is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase. This case represents the rapid swing to firmness. The Pacific war is considered as a 'good fit' to the fourth script phase. This case represents the zenith of firmness.
**Japan:**

The Choshu-Western war is considered as a 'good fit' to the first script phase. This war illustrates Japan's extraordinary fear of dependence, which would dominate her conception of world politics. Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea is considered as a 'good fit' to the second script phase because this case illustrates Japan's quick learning of Western power politics and her metamorphosis. The First Sino-Japanese war is considered as a 'good fit' to the second script phase. This war was the first major international achievement to which Japan had long aspired, and the second major international humiliation (the tripartite intervention) which was to drive Japan further to the Wille zur Macht. The Boxer intervention is considered as a 'basic fit'. This case differs from the other two wars in this phase in that fear and timidity overwhelmed the desire to expand. The Russo-Japanese war is considered as a 'good fit'. In this war Japan's wish to catch up with white nations was realized. The extraordinary difficulty in winning the war was also congruent to the second script phase. The 21 demands toward China are considered as a 'good fit' to the third script phase. This case illustrates well the difficulties of expansion and the frustration derived therefrom. The Siberian intervention is considered as a 'good fit' to the third script phase. This case manifested not only the frustrated drive to expand but also many of the features, such as decisional disarray and the growth of anti-imperialism, which were to be disclosed later in a more painful way. The Washington conference is considered as a 'basic fit' to the third
### Table 3.3: Each Case's Script Phase and Corresponding Degree of Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Phase Number</th>
<th>Degree of Fit</th>
<th>Positive Points</th>
<th>Negative Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863-1864</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>fear of dependence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875-1876</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>quick learning of power politics and her metamorphosis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-1895</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>first major international achievement/second major international humiliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>drive to expand</td>
<td>fear and timidity overwhelmed drive to expand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-1905</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>perception of 'rendre l'honneur a son maitre' and Pyrrhic victory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>difficulty in expanding and frustration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1925</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>frustrated drive to expand/growth of anti-imperialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>basic fit</td>
<td>uneasiness about the arrangement</td>
<td>no viable alternative to cooperation with the US and Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1928</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>bankruptcy of Japan's unilateral policy toward China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1933</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>phase-ambiguity</td>
<td>consequence of accumulated frustration in the 1920's</td>
<td>the opening of the way to ultimate ruin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>anti-imperialist resistance against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>good fit</td>
<td>counterattack of other imperialists against Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
script phase. Although the Washington conference left a sense of uneasiness in the minds of Japanese rulers, the arrangement itself was opted for by Japan, who saw no viable alternative to cooperation with the US and Britain. In this sense, the tone of this case differs considerably from the other cases in phase 3. The foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution is considered as a 'good fit' to the third script phase. In 1928 this intervention occasioned the bankruptcy of Japan's unilateral policy toward China. Growing anti-imperialism in China forced Japan to seek cooperation with the US and Britain, and at the same time fostered an impulsive drive to military action; these two goals were incompatible with each other. The conquest of Manchuria is considered as 'phase-ambiguous'. This case is the result of frustration (the third script phase), and at the same time the opening of the way to ultimate ruin (the fourth script phase). The Second Sino-Japanese war and the Pacific war are both considered as 'good fits'. They illustrate the syndrome developed in the Japanese mind that other imperialist powers and anti-imperialist forces were trying to squeeze Japan.

On the whole, the examination seems to show a crude fit of the cases to the scripts. The Chinese cases fit worse than the others; this suggests some inadequacies in our formulation of the scripts. Inadequacies can be found in two points. One is that we have four phases instead of five or six phases. Because of the enormous temporal span covered, there are some crude groupings. For instance, phase 2 might
profitably have been divided into two phases. Also, phase 3 might profitably have been divided into two phases. The other, related point has something to do with the selection of cases. For instance, if we had included the Jungar-Khalkha-Ch'ing war of the late 17th century and the Jungar-Ch'ing war in Tibet in the early 18th century, phase 2 of the Chinese script would have been clearer. (There is some discussion of the selection of cases in the Appendix.)

**Examination 2**

In order to determine a script phase to which an ambivalent case belongs and, more generally, in order to examine the case more precisely, we have to turn to the next level of examination. We will see whether each case matches a script phase to which it is supposed to belong, by checking out 13 aspects. Though more detailed and systematic, this examination cannot be conclusive. But explicitly making such checks will help to point toward some weak points of our script formulation. We will match each case, coded in terms of the 13 aspects, to each script phase, likewise coded. Thus before we go into matching, we have to describe how we code each case and each script.

**Coding:**

Coding is based on my judgment, the outcome of an unspecified mix of my own case studies and other general impressions and guesses. Without relying on the latter, it is almost impossible to code every item, simply because the historical works on which our case studies are
based do not necessarily give us the specific information we want for
coding. Thus, there are some ambiguities in coding. In order to cope
with this problem, we choose the strategy of allowing a +1 deviance in
matching a case with a script phase. In other words, we do not treat
a +1 deviance as a significant deviance.

It must also be noted that we have not made a 'forced coding', by
which each aspect always has point 1 to point 5. Our coding is 'free
coding'. Thus there are aspects in which there is neither 1 point nor
5 points. This fact does not substantially affect the conclusions which
we will draw in the next chapter, for we are more interested in the
relative variation through time than the absolute value of each coding.

Coding is made on an ordinal scale (1 to 5). If a case or a
script manifests an aspect very strongly, then the case or script is
coded as 5 for that aspect. If a case or a script is very low in
terms of an aspect, the case or script is coded as 1 for that aspect.
4, 3 and 2 are assigned to cases or scripts which fall somewhere between
cases or scripts which are coded 5 and 1. In short, 5 means very high,
4 high, 3 medium, 2 low, and 1 very low, in terms of an aspect. Since
coding requires a narrower definition of an aspect than is loosely used
in the delineation of the models of chapter 2, it is necessary here to
specify in what terms we code aspects.

1) relative position in the international power distribution: We are
interested in an actor's position in a relevant international arena in
terms of largely militarily defined power. Thus this is actor-specific. For instance, 5 means that an actor was militarily very strong in a relevant international system, irrespective of international systemic attributes such as polarity and stability.

2) economic power bases: Economic power bases mean here the strength and vigor of economic bases. For instance, 1 means that an actor was economically very weak and fragile.

3) cultural, diplomatic, or organizational amplifiers of power gaps: Here we are interested in those factors which amplify, whether positively or negatively, the gaps in 'purely' military power. Those factors include, for instance, intense antiimperialism, inept leadership, and diplomatic skills. Thus, even if international power distribution and economic power bases are coded, say, 5, power gaps can be coded, say, 2.

4) economic interdependence: This means the importance of economic interdependence to an actor. Like international power distribution, this is actor-specific. For instance, 5 means that an actor was very dependent on foreign trade and/or tribute; 3 means moderate dependence; and 1 means little or no dependence.

5) vigor of expansion: Whether action was merely the retrocession of territory or real expansion does not matter. We are interested in the vigor of action required for expansion, preservation, or retrocession.

6) visibility of 'ideal-type' war and negotiation style: We are interested in the style of war and negotiation, as described in the
'ideal types' of chapter 2. To recapitulate the three war styles: the Chinese war style consists of a show of force, the policy of playing off barbarians against barbarians, and the obsessive concern for supremacy; the British war style consists of gunboat coercion and Dictat; and the Japanese war style consists of a well-prepared attack, a search for a swift/decisive victory by fighting a outrance; a slavish search for diplomatic support and quick settlement. For instance, if a show of force is not observed in a Chinese case, the case is never rated as 5.

7) efficiency of communication and transportation: We are interested in efficiency in executing required communication and transportation. For instance, 5 means high efficiency in executing required communication and transportation.

8) mobilizational capacity: We are interested in mobilizational capacity vis-a-vis required mobilization. For instance, 2 means that mobilizational capacity was not able to cope well with required mobilization.

9) self-confidence: We are interested in how an actor sees himself: with how much confidence and arrogance. For instance, 5 means that an actor was very confident and arrogant.

10) level of knowledge and attention: We are interested in the scope and breadth of knowledge of a state of affairs and the amount of attention given to it. For instance, 5 means that the scope and breadth of knowledge of something and the amount of attention given to it were very high.
11) efficiency of information processing: We are interested in the efficiency of information processing. For instance, 5 means that an actor shows very high efficiency of information processing.

12) visibility of 'ideal-type' decision-making style: We are interested in decision-making style. The styles described as 'ideal-types' in chapter 2 are rated as having the highest rank. To recapitulate the three decision-making styles: the Chinese decision-making style is conformity-oriented; the British decision-making style is argument-oriented; and the Japanese decision-making style is consensus-oriented. For instance, in a Japanese case, as long as concern for consensus was strongly observed, it is coded 5 or 4, even if fragmentation was observed.

13) efficiency of organizational management: We are interested in the smoothness of organizational or bureaucratic management required for executing policy. For instance, 5 means that an actor enjoyed very smooth organizational management.
Matching:

The matching procedure is straightforward and simple. We examine whether

\[ |x_{es}^i j - x_{es}^i c^j| \leq 2 \quad (e^i_c = 1, \ldots, e^i_s, \ldots, n; \]
\[ e^i_s = 1, \ldots, e^i_s, \ldots, 4; \text{ and} \]
\[ j = 1, \ldots, j, \ldots, l3), \]

where \( x_{es}^i j \) means a rank accorded to a script phase of an empire in terms of aspect \( j \), and \( x_{es}^i c^j \) means a rank accorded to a case \( c \) which belongs to a script phase of an empire.

Only when both \( e \) and \( s \) of \( x_{es}^i j \) match the \( e \) and \( s \) of \( x_{es}^i c^j \), is a matching of \( x_{es}^i c^j \) to \( x_{es}^i j \) achieved. For instance, the Manchu-Korean wars will be matched to the first phase of the Chinese script and not to others. The problem occurs in a case where a script phase to which a case belongs is ambiguous in examination 1. We adopt the following procedure. First, we match each case to the two relevant script phases. Then we count to see which script phase has less deviance, as defined above. The script phase which has less deviance is determined as the 'appropriate' phase. After this determination of the appropriate script phase for a previously ambiguous case, we are ready to consider the results of matching.

All cases combined record a 96.3% fit. The Chinese cases record a 95.6% fit; the British cases record a 98.1% fit; and the Japanese cases record a 95.4% fit. These high figures are due in part to the
procedure by which +1 deviances are not treated as a significant
deviance. They are due in part to the almost inevitable inter-
dependence in coding of cases and scripts---almost inevitable because
the scripts have influenced the case studies to a certain extent and
because both the scripts and the case studies are based on many common
historical works. Nonetheless, it must be noted that independence in
coding was preserved as strictly as possible. Thus despite all the
qualifications, it seems safe to conclude from these figures that the
cases demonstrate reasonably approximate fits to the scripts. What is
more important, we can 'explain' deviant cases with little difficulty.

Deviant cases:

We will 'explain' deviant cases one by one.

Phase 1 of the Chinese script: There are two deviances. The Manchu-
Korean wars deviate from the script in terms of economic interdependence
and visibility of 'ideal-type' war and negotiation style. The
Manchus' high economic interdependence merely reflects their peculiar
geographical position and economic bases (hunting, gathering, and
foreign trade). Their war style at that time was not the Chinese style
of a show of force. The Ch'ing-Russian war approximately matches to
the script---approximately as long as +1 deviances are allowed. In
examination 1, that war was considered as 'phase-ambiguous'. Matching
this case to both the first and second script phases shows that this
case belongs to the first phase. If the case belongs to the first phase,
there is no deviance. If the case belongs to the second phase, there are
three points of deviance (i.e., in terms of international power position,
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| script phase 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |

### Table 5.1: Coded Chinese case studies

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An underlined number signifies a deviance.
Table 5.2: Coded British Case Studies

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economic power bases, and level of knowledge and attention). Hence, it belongs to the first phase.

Phase 2 of the Chinese script: The Ch'ing-Jungar war deviates from the script in terms of power gap amplifiers, visibility of 'ideal-type' war and negotiation style, and level of knowledge and attention. Because of the enemy's weaknesses and blunders, the Ch'ing power was positively amplified to an extraordinary extent. The war style was notably different in this war. It was a war of extermination. There was neither a show of force nor an acceptance of submission. Because the Jungars were the traditional enemy, the Ch'ing knowledge of and attention to them were relatively high. These deviances make this war a little different from the other cases which belong to the second script phase. The Ch'ing-Burmese war and the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war were considered as 'phase-ambiguous' in examination 1. However, matching these cases to the second and third script phases show that the second phase is the appropriate phase for these wars. There are several points of deviance if they belong to the third phase, whereas there is only one point of deviance in the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war and no deviance in the Ch'ing-Burmese war if they belong to the second phase. Hence, they belong to the second phase. The Ch'ing-Vietnamese war deviates from the script in terms of vigor of expansion. The war was on a quite small scale and fizzled out early. This deviance might be better interpreted as an indication of a transition to phase 3.

Phase 3 of the Chinese script: The Anglo-Nepali war deviates from the third phase in terms of international power position. The Chinese
power position at that time was not yet entirely weak. Although the Anglo-Nepali war was part of British India policy which was very different from British China policy, the war itself revealed the Chinese attitude very characteristic of the third phase of the Chinese script. The First Sino-Japanese war and the Boxer intervention were considered as 'phase-ambiguous' in examination 1. Matching these cases to the third and fourth script phases shows that they belong to the third phase. If they belong to the fourth phase, each of them has one or two points of deviance, whereas if they belong to the third phase, both have no deviance.

Phase 4 of the Chinese script: There are two points of deviance. One is the foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution in terms of vigor of expansion. The other is the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in terms of power gap amplifiers. The foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution deviates from the other wars in that the Chinese Revolution achieved the military take-over of some concessions previously controlled by foreign powers. Although it was not expansion in an ordinary sense, it manifested the vigor and tour de force of the Chinese Revolution. In 1931 the Chinese were almost completely preoccupied with intense power jockeying and civil wars. Intense antiimperialism did not manifest itself in an organized way in 1931. Thus power gaps were rather amplified against China.
Phase 1 of the British script: The Anglo-Nepali war deviates from the script phase in terms of visibility of 'ideal-type' war and negotiation style. This is quite natural. The Anglo-Nepali war was part of British India policy but not of British China policy. The war style was bound to be different since this war was a land war.

Phase 2 of the British script: There are two deviant cases. One is the Taiping intervention in terms of vigor of expansion. The other is the Choshu-Western war, also in terms of vigor of expansion. The Taiping intervention was a collaboration with the Ch'ing government to put down the rebels. The scale of expansion was extremely small because of the British fear of overinvolvement, which would only be counterproductive to the British objective of having a strong, friendly central government for the expansion of trade. The Choshu-Western war was also small. This war revealed the same fear of overinvolvement.

Phase 3 of the British script: All the entrances fit approximately.

Phase 4 of the British script: All the entrances fit approximately.

Phase 1 of the Japanese script: All the entrances fit approximately.

Phase 2 of the Japanese script: There are four points of deviance. Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea deviates from the script in terms of international power position, vigor of expansion, and mobilizational capacity. The fact that Japan's international position in 1875-1876 was low does not contradict the script, because the
script phase deals with the growth of power and the metamorphosis in perspectives. Since military action in this case was a swift gun-boat coercion, the other two deviant points, i.e., vigor of expansion and mobilizational capacity, are easily understandable. Expansion and mobilization were bound to be low. The fourth deviance is the Boxer intervention, in terms of efficiency of organizational management. Organizational management in this case was bad, although matters were not yet too serious. This might better be interpreted as an indication of a transition to the third phase, when bad organizational management and decisional disarray became more salient than in the second phase.

Phase 3 of the Japanese script: There is one point of deviance: the Siberian intervention deviates from the script in terms of economic interdependence. There were hardly any Soviet-Japanese economic relations. Diplomatic relations were only established in 1925. Even thereafter, Soviet-Japanese economic interdependence was quite low.

Phase 4 of the Japanese script: In examination 1 the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was considered as 'phase-ambiguous'. Matching the case to the third and fourth script phase shows that, if the case belongs to the fourth phase, there are two points of deviance. Hence it belongs to the fourth phase. The case deviates from the script in terms of efficiency of communication and transportation, and efficiency of information processing. The first deviance is quite understandable since the conquest required good communication and transportation, which
the Kwantung Army was able to command due to its control of the South Manchurian Railway. The second deviance is easily explainable by the Kwantung Army officers' careful planning and their bold and swift execution of actions on the spot.

Now we can draw the overall picture of matching. We will take a look at points of deviance by aspect first and then by empire. There are as many as five points of deviance in terms of vigor of expansion. This is in part because the vigor of expansion varied from case to case more significantly than other aspects, depending on the particular situation that had to be dealt with. (The number of deviant points in other aspects ranges from 0 to 3— a fact which we think is not significant.) It might have been better for us to examine the style of expansion rather than the vigor of expansion under the heading of expansion; this would be likely to lessen the number of deviant points. The generally even distribution of deviance by aspect except for vigor of expansion seems to suggest that there is not any particularly inadequate formulation of the aspects dealt with, as long as we work within our system of models, scripts, and case studies.

The uneven distribution of deviance by empire seems to suggest some inadequacies in our formulation. There are 9 deviant points for the Chinese cases, 3 for the British cases, and 7 for the Japanese cases. As for the Chinese cases, the Manchu-Korean wars and the Ch'ing-Jungar war have more than one point of deviance. As for the Japanese cases, Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea and the
Japanese conquest of Manchuria have more than one point of deviance. The fact that the Manchu-Korean wars have more than one deviant point is due in part to our script phasing. Because the Chinese script had to cover an enormously long time span, each script phase tends to comprise more than one basic tone. This is the case with the first phase of the Chinese script. Thus the first phase may have profitably been divided into two phases. The Ch'ing-Jungar war was a very peculiar war, despite all the congruence to the second phase of the Chinese script. As was suggested before in examination 1, the second phase of the Chinese script might also have profitably been divided into two phases. Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea has more than one point of deviance. Like the first phase of the Chinese script, the second phase of the Japanese script deals with a drastic metamorphosis. Thus, the second phase of the Japanese script might profitably have been divided into two phases. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria has more than one point of deviance. Like the Ch'ing-Jungar war, this was a peculiar war, despite its congruence to the overall tone of the Japanese script.

On the whole, it seems safe to state that we have ascertained the approximate fit of the case studies to the scripts. However, there are four suggestions for splitting a phase into two. They are the first, the second, and the third phases of the Chinese script, and the second phase of the Japanese script. These revisions, if they are to be made, will affect the selection of cases. However, the basic tones of these
scripts will not have to be changed. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that there are not any particularly inadequate formulations of scripts, as far as we work within our system of models, scripts, and case studies. Naturally, this by no means implies that our system is the best conceivable system.

After having ascertained that the case studies are basically congruent to the scripts in terms of the 13 aspects, we can now draw conclusions from the inspection of tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, i.e., the coded case studies.
Chapter 29: Conclusions

Imperialism thus is atavistic in character. It falls into that large group of surviving features from earlier ages that play such an important part in every concrete social situation. In other words, it is an element that stems from the living conditions, not of the present, but of the past—or, put in terms of the economic interpretation of history, from past rather than present relations of production. It is an atavism in the social structure, in individual, psychological habits of emotional reaction. Since the vital needs that created it have passed away for good, it too must gradually disappear, even though warlike involvement, no matter how non-imperialist in character, tends to revive it. It tends to disappear as a structural element because the structure that brought it to the fore goes into a decline, giving way, in the course of social development, to other structures that have no room for it and eliminate the power factors that supported it. It tends to disappear as an element of habitual emotional reaction, because of the progressive rationalization of life and mind, a process in which old functional needs are absorbed by new tasks, in which heretofore military energies are functionally modified.

Chapter 29: Conclusions

After having established the approximate fits of the cases to the scripts, we will now draw conclusions in terms of two larger variable clusters, i.e., power bases and perspectives, in terms of which we have drawn our case studies. Power bases include such variables as 'international environments', 'economic capacity', and 'communication and control', which were largely dealt with in the models of chapter 2. 'International environments' cover international power distribution, and, to a lesser degree, power gaps, economic interdependence, and expansion. 'Economic capacity' covers economic power bases, and, to a lesser degree, economic interdependence, expansion, communication and transportation, and mobilization. 'Communication and control' cover communication and transportation, mobilization, knowledge and attention, information processing and organizational management. Power perspectives are concerned with 'self-conception' or conceptions of imperial status and stakes, which were briefly touched upon in chapter 2, but mostly dealt with in chapters 3, 4 and 5. We will first turn our attention to the styles with which nations expressed themselves in war and, to a lesser degree, to the style of decision making. Then we will proceed to examine power bases and perspectives as we have done in the case studies. We will focus on the crucial period to each of the three empires to contrast the changes and non-changes in power bases and perspectives. The crucial period is generally the period which covers the second to third or fourth phase of each imperial script. Thus for the Chinese it is the period from mid-18th century to mid-19th

Notes to chapter 29 appear on page 590.
century. For the British it is the period from mid-19th century to mid-20th century. For the Japanese it is the period from the fourth quarter of 19th century to mid-20th century to the Japanese. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 will be constantly consulted. See table 5.1 for the Chinese cases, table 5.2 for the British cases and table 5.3 for the Japanese cases.

Style

Victor Klemperer's words about the style of self-expression as a key to understanding a man, which we quoted at the very beginning, have led us to examine how each of the three protagonists in East Asian life expressed itself in war. As was hypothesized, we have found that each protagonist had its own style of war and showed an extraordinary tenacity in clinging to its own style.

Chinese style: The Chinese style consisted of a show of force, i-i-chih-i, or the policy of playing off barbarians against barbarians, and an obsessive concern for supremacy. A show of force was seen in such cases as the Ch'ing-Russian war, the Ch'ing-Burmese war, the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war, and the First Sino-Japanese war. The i-i-chih-i policy was seen in such cases as the Ch'ing-Russian war, the Ch'ing-Burmese war and the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war, the British abortive mission to the Ch'ing, the Anglo-Nepali-war, the Opium war, the Arrow war, the Taiping intervention, Japan's 21 demands toward China, and the Second Sino-Japanese war. The obsessive concern for supremacy was seen in
such cases as the Ch'ing-Burmese war, the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war, the British mission, the Opium war and the Arrow war. Most striking is the tenacity of the Chinese war style in the crucial period. From the time of ascendancy in the Ch'ing-Russian war of 1685-1689 down to the mid-19th century, the Chinese basically kept the same style. When the defense of supremacy could not be kept up, it degenerated into the defense of ritualistic supremacy. When i-i-chih-i failed to work well, the Chinese resorted to the policy of containment in the 19th century, allowing the Westerners to share power in major coastal urban centers, with the consequence of arousing humiliation, which would in turn generate anti-imperialism.

The column for the style of war and negotiation shows that there was not a sharp decline in the Chinese style during mid-18th century and mid-19th century. The column for decision making style, conformity oriented decision making, shows that there was no discernible change in their style during the whole period except in the Manchu-Korean wars and the Arrow war, in which clan-oriented decision making dominated or was partly revived. Whether it manifested positive or negative features of this style, the style remained the same.

**British style:** The British style of war consisted of gunboat coercion and Dictat or a dictated settlement. Gunboat coercion was seen in such cases as the Opium war, the Arrow war, the Taiping intervention, the Choshu-Western war, and the foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution. Besides these cases, the Boxer intervention attested to the strength of
the voice for gunboat coercion among the British in China. Dictat was seen in such cases as the Anglo-Nepali war, the Opium war, and the Arrow war. Again the style did not change much during the mid-19th century and the mid-20th century. Gunboat coercion did not work well by 1900. However, they wanted to use it in the Boxer intervention. They most hastily used it against the Chinese Revolution of the 1920's, only to realize belatedly that "punishing China is like flogging a jellyfish." Immediately before Pearl Harbor Churchill sent two warships to Singapore, without air cover, intending to give 'a vague menace' to Japan, only to be sunk in a most humiliating manner. The column for decision making style shows that there was no discernible change in their argument-oriented decision making style. Whether it manifested positive or negative features of this style, the style remained the same.

Japanese style: The Japanese style of war consisted of a well-prepared attack preferably at a time when Western powers were preoccupied with themselves, a search for a swift and decisive victory by fighting a outrance, and a slavish search for diplomatic support and quick settlement, in order to avoid intervention by third parties. A well-prepared attack preferably at a time when Western powers were preoccupied with themselves was seen in such cases as Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea, the First Sino-Japanese war, the Boxer intervention, the Russo-Japanese war, the Siberian intervention, the conquest of Manchuria, the Second Sino-Japanese war and the Pacific war. A search for a swift and decisive victory by fighting a outrance was seen in such cases as the First Sino-Japanese war, the Boxer intervention, the Russo-Japanese war, the 21 demands toward China, the Siberian intervention, the conquest of
Manchuria, the Second Sino-Japanese war, and the Pacific war. A slavish search for diplomatic support and quick settlement to avoid intervention by third parties were seen in such cases as Japan's gunboat diplomacy towards Korea, the First Sino-Japanese war, the Boxer intervention, the Russo-Japanese war, the Siberian intervention, the Washington conference, the foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution, the Second Sino-Japanese war, and the Pacific war. The style came to encounter increasing obstacles, especially after World War I. However, the Japanese clung to the same method. What was successful in Korea in 1876 was not successful in China in 1915. What was successful in Korea in 1894-1895 was not successful either in Siberia in 1918-1925 or in China in 1926-1928. What was successful in Manchuria in 1904-1905 was not successful either in China in 1937-1945 or in the Pacific in 1941-1945.

The column for war and negotiation style shows that the style did not change from the fourth quarter of the 19th century to the mid-20th century. With the exception of the conquest of Manchuria, all the cases we dealt with in the 20th century were a failure. However, the style was basically the same. The column for decision making style shows that it was almost constant. Whether it manifested its positive or negative features, it kept the same style.

Thus, in all three imperial cases, the unique styles did not alter remarkably during the crucial period. An empire expressed itself in its unique way and continued the same style despite all the changes that seemingly unfolded before its eyes. The question to be asked is: what can explain the tenacity of the styles of self-expression? To answer
this question, we proceed to examine the changes and non-changes in power bases and perspectives as summarized in tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

**Power Bases**

First, we will look at the changes and non-changes in power bases. The aspects that bear on power bases include international power distribution, economic power bases, power gaps, economic interdependence, expansion, communication and transportation, mobilization, knowledge and attention, information processing, and organizational management. Again we will concentrate on the crucial periods, i.e., the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century for the Chinese, the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century for the British, and the fourth quarter of the 19th century to the mid-20th century for the Japanese.

**Chinese power bases**

The column for international power distribution clearly shows that China's international position was constantly deteriorating. Even before the onslaughts of Western powers in the mid-19th century, deterioration was evident.

The column for economic power bases shows that economic power bases were deteriorating during the same period. The Chinese agricultural economy was reaching its high-level equilibrium.

The column for power gaps shows that instead of Chinese power being positively amplified, it came to be negatively amplified by the mid-19th century. Even in the mid-18th century China's power was not effectively mobilized, as was shown in the Ch'ing-Burmese war and in the Ch'ing-Vietnamese war.
The column for economic interdependence shows that there was not much change throughout the whole period, despite the increasing commercial intercourse with the West since the mid-19th century. It was generally low.

The column for expansion shows that there was no exception as far as we limit ourselves to the cases we dealt with.

The column for communication and transportation shows a marked decline. The decline started in the mid-18th century. It is evident that territorial expansion was already overloaded.

The column for mobilization shows a gradual decline. The fact is that even at the imperial height, mobilizational capacity was never very high.

The column for knowledge and attention clearly shows a sharp decline after the Ch'ing-Jungar war. Poor knowledge of and low attention to things barbarian were constant and conspicuous, especially from the nullification of the Jungar empire until before the time of anti-imperialism.

The column for information processing shows a similar picture. Information processing was inefficient from the mid-18th century until before the time of anti-imperialism.

The column for organizational management shows that during the crucial period there was a gradual decline in the efficiency of organizational management. The decline was detectable immediately after the Ch'ing-Jungar war.

These changes can be summarized in terms of the larger variables, i.e., international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control.
**International environments:** There were several factors which sustained Chinese international dominance in the mid-18th century. First, the traditional northern enemy was nullified or exterminated during the early 17th and mid-18th century. Third, the Japanese were secluding themselves from the outside world, in great contrast to the 16th century when their piracies and invasions troubled China. Fourth, British and other Western influences were well controlled until the 19th century. However, by the mid-19th century, Western influence came to overwhelm China.

**Economic capacity:** China's agricultural expansion from the late 17th century to the early 19th century was extraordinary. Since there were no major technological innovations, the expansion was made possible by many minor technological innovations and diffusions, extremely labor-intensive agriculture, the import and diffusion of sweet potato and maze, which transformed hithertofores uncultivated land and, not least importantly, the enforced peace at home and abroad. Although agricultural expansion during the Ch'ing period was perhaps less vigorous in terms of technological innovations than the expansion during the period of the Five Dynasties and the Sung, the scale of agricultural and demographic expansion during the Ch'ing period was unprecedented in non-modern, non-industrial economic history. Enormous agricultural expansion enabled the empire to generate societal surplus or, to use the terms of Shmuel Eisenstadt, free floating resources, which could be used for imperial expansion.
However, perhaps by the mid-19th century, the Chinese agricultural economy reached the high level equilibrium trap. The consequence was that productivity declined, land became increasingly fragmented, and anti-social elements multiplied because the population kept increasing.

**Communication and control:** Although the number of soldiers did not change very much until the mid-19th century, morale and discipline were constantly deteriorating. The conscription of soldiers and bearers for campaigns caused an enormous strain on society. If conscription was too severe, it even caused disorder and riots. The problem of post-campaign unemployment often transformed soldiers into anti-social elements which undermined the officials' control of the local communities. Most basically, societal surplus was increasingly tighter during the reign of Ch'ien-lung. Even at the height of Ch'ien-lung, budgetary constraints were one of the major considerations for terminating or not executing campaigns. Despite all the Chinese imperial success in maintaining unity through thousands of years due to its good communication and transportation for military purposes, it was not enough for the Ch'ing empire. Institutional overload was too high. First, its territory and population were vast and the largest of the historic Chinese empires. Second, military and administrative personnel were very thinly scattered throughout the empire. Third, there were no major technological innovations which could ease communication and transportation and mobilization.
British power bases

The column for international power distribution shows that there was a sharp drop during the last forty years of the 19th century in the British position in the Far East.

The column for economic power bases shows a picture similar to the one for international power distribution. Britain's economic bases came to lose their early vigor and dynamism in the fourth quarter of the 19th century.

The column for power gaps shows a picture similar to the ones for international power distribution and economic power bases. As China's anti-imperialism became intense and as other imperialist powers challenged British dominance, positively amplified power gaps ceased to exist and Britain had to face a thin disparity of power.

The column for economic interdependence shows that during the crucial period there was a gradual rise in economic interdependence. However, between the mid-19th century and the early 20th century, there was no remarkable rise at all.

The column for expansion shows that there was a noticeable fall in the vigor of expansion during the crucial period. There were even cases in which power was paralyzed, as the foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution and the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.

The column for communication and transportation shows a sharp decline. Since naval supremacy was called into open question, this was an inevitable consequence.
The column for mobilization shows a picture similar to the one for communication and transportation. There were several cases in which the British did not resort to force.

The column for knowledge and attention shows that there was a slow and gradual decline.

The column for information processing shows a picture similar to the one for knowledge and attention.

The column for organizational management shows a picture similar to the ones for knowledge and attention and for information processing.

These changes can be summarized in terms of the larger variables, i.e., international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control.

**International environments:** There were two factors which contributed to British supremacy in the Far East in the mid-19th century. One was the disparity of power between Britain and Far Eastern countries. The other was the disparity of power between Britain and other Western powers. The first factor had to do with the absence of anti-imperialism in China. During the 19th century there were anti-foreign outbursts and disturbances, which differed from the anti-imperialism of the 20th century. First, the leaders of the anti-foreign disturbances were the gentry or secret society leaders. Second, they did not have identity to the Chinese nation. Their opposition was to the immediate political, social, economic, and cultural damage to the local communities dealt by foreigners and Chinese converts. In
the 20th century, most important was the young urban population which was in a social limbo because amidst the political confusion there were no stable social ladders which they could aspire to climb. With anti-imperialism spreading throughout China, gunboat coercion could not be effective. Hence Churchill's lament: Punishing China is like flogging a jellyfish. The second factor will be dealt with together with the aspect of economic capacity, immediately following this paragraph.

**Economic capacity:** The Industrial Revolution brought British industrial and technological dominance in the Far East. Although industrial and technological dominance over Continental Europe and the US was gradually undermined during the 19th century, their industrial power and navies were not strong enough to threaten the British position in the Far East until very late in the 19th century.

**Communication and control:** The British victory in the Napoleonic wars was the basis of British naval dominance, which made it possible for the British to utilize their power bases in England very effectively in the Far East. British naval dominance was due in part to the great name it had acquired by then. The British were often behind in navigational and naval technological innovations since the mid-19th century. The Americans involved in China trade surpassed the British at least in the effective use of smaller, faster ships for tea trade in the first half of the 19th century. The Frenchmen moved ahead of the British in navigational and naval
technology in the mid-19th century. However, these developments
did not threaten British dominance in the Far East. Threats came
only when Germany, France, Russia, the US, and Japan emerged in
industrial, military, and naval terms in the late 19th century.
The role of the sole arbiter in the Far East, which Britain had
so long enjoyed, came to an end.

**Japanese power bases**

The column for international power distribution during the
crucial period between the fourth quarter of the 19th century and
the mid-20th century shows that there was a gradual decline in
Japan's international position. Although the decline was not
sharp, it was discernible.

The column for economic power bases shows that there was a
slow rise in Japan's economic power bases.

The column for power gaps shows that there was a gradual de-
cline. The fact that power gaps were positively amplified in the
early wars was due largely to the presence of imperialist rivalries
and internally torn, weak neighbors.

The column for economic interdependence shows a sharp rise
after World War I, which caused significant economic interdependence
with the US and Britain.

The column for expansion shows that there was a lull between
the Russo-Japanese war and the conquest of Manchuria. However, the
general trend of the vigor of expansion was upward.
The column for communication and transportation indicates that there was not a clearly discernible trend except the temporary lull during World War I and the rapid deterioration in the two wars of the 1930's and 1940's.

The column for mobilization shows that there was a strong rise in terms of mobilization.

The column for knowledge and attention shows that despite a slight decline after the Russo-Japanese war, they were continuously high.

The column for information processing shows a picture of a general decline and frequent fluctuations.

The column for organizational management shows a picture of a general decline and frequent fluctuations.

These changes can be summarized in terms of the larger variables, i.e., international environments, economic capacity, and communication and control.

**International environments:** There were two main factors which enabled Japan to do things well in the early wars despite all of her handicaps. They were the presence of weak, internally torn neighbors without anti-imperialism. A tiny country, Japan had to learn how to take advantage of Western powers' rivalries during the latter half of the 19th century. For instance, Japan had to maneuver between Britain and France and between Britain and Russia in the mid-19th century, and in the latter case, even thereafter. Although Japan was not always successful, the existence of imperialist rivalries was indispensable for Japan to exert its influence. Furthermore, Korea and China were easy targets for Japanese expansion.
Internally torn, China and Korea provided Japan with excellent opportunities for its strategem and political maneuvering. When anti-imperialist forces grew, Japanese efforts to keep China fragmented became increasingly difficult since cooperation with the Japanese came to mean the kiss of death. The decline of European powers, the emergence of the US in the Far East and the Pacific, and the growth of intense anti-imperialist forces in China, Korea, and Russia all presented Japan with an entirely different and far more difficult situation.

**Economic capacity:** The growth of the Japanese economy was accompanied by increasingly difficult problems; because Japan was a small country, because Japan was almost barren in terms of minerals, foods and other resources (which made the modernizing of the Japanese economy very vulnerable to international influences), and because industrialization was not rapid enough to catch up with her extremely rapidly swollen aspirations and ambitions. Japan could confidently wage only wars that were limited in scale, short in time span, but concentrated in mobilization and intense in fighting. However, Japan eventually had to face anti-imperialist China and counter-imperialist America, who fought the total war against Japan.

**Communication and control:** Good organizational management and information processing were very important in the Japanese system because Japan's expansion was like a performance on a tight rope. Since chance factors were abundant, good coordination was indispensable.
Because Japan was neither militarily dominant nor economically powerful, and because the Japanese war style of decision making was consensus-oriented, good coordination was all the more necessary. Because the small ruling clique of the Meiji was a self-defeating institution, and because political parties were able to grow neither as a pool for leaders with their own stands, nor as an institution to articulate and aggregate rapidly diversifying social interests, good coordination steadily deteriorated.

We have so far seen that the various aspects of the power bases on the whole declined during the crucial periods of the three empires. In the Chinese cases, international environments deteriorated steadily. Economic capacity declined very slowly. Communication and control were not very good even at its imperial height and declined steadily.

In the British cases, international environments deteriorated rapidly in the fourth quarter of the 19th century. Economic capacity had a similar fate. It is noteworthy that communication and transportation and mobilization declined faster than knowledge and attention and information processing.

In the Japanese cases, international environments showed a slow decline. Economic capacity grew steadily in absolute terms although, compared to aspiration, it steadily declined. Communication and control declined slowly and especially information processing and organizational management showed frequent fluctuations and difficulties.
Despite the differentiated emphases on some aspects or others of power bases, they all experienced decline during the crucial periods.

**Power Perspectives**

If power bases steadily declined during the crucial periods, then what can explain the tenacity of their styles in war? In the Introduction of chapter 1 we hypothesized that changes in power perspectives tend to lag behind changes in power bases, and that this fact can explain the tenacity of style. We will validate this hypothesis. The column for self-confidence represents the changes in power perspectives, although other aspects related to self-conception are also included in our present discussion.

**Chinese self-conception**: The column for self-confidence shows that during the crucial period between the mid-18th century and the mid-19th century their self-esteem did not change fundamentally. Chinese self-conception had always been high since time immemorial. A larger imperial territory and population than ever experienced by any other historic empire contributed to the Ch'ing's high self-confidence. Furthermore, the Manchus' metamorphosis from barbarians to the civilized ruling class of the Chinese empire made the self-confidence of the Ch'ing all the more high and invincible. The Manchus had to demonstrate their qualification to rule the Chinese empire by behaving as most Chinese-like rulers. Acculturation was perhaps overdone. The theoretically unshakable belief in China's
supremacy and the institutional need to defend this supremacy at any costs wrought enormous impacts upon the Chinese society and mind. If imperialism could be contained in the 19th century and the early 20th century, it was not done without causing two important consequences, which were to be crucial to the fate of China. One was the acceleration of the breakthrough of the high-level equilibrium. The other was the gradual accumulation of humiliation and disgrace, which were to be metamorphosed into anti-imperialism. Because competition over land became so intense, many had to leave their village communities and became anti-social elements. Imperialist aggression brought about a great number of anti-social elements by uprooting. All sorts of anti-social elements prompted the self-defense of communities led by the gentry, who were increasingly independent of local officials. Both imperialists and anti-social elements contributed to this trend. The price of the gentry's independence from official control was the gentry's parasitism on the peasantry and the vulnerability of the community to violence. The rise of warlords and the confusion it brought about only inflamed anti-imperialism. Both the structural demand for social revolution, because of the breakdown of the high level equilibrium trap, and the intense call for anti-imperialist actions pari passu with imperialist penetration and aggression in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, brought about the end of old China.

British self-conception: The column for self-confidence shows a picture similar to China's. Their self-confidence did not show a marked decline during the crucial period between the mid-19th
and the mid-20th century. British self-confidence had always been
high since Waterloo. Gradualism in the 19th century helped to
maintain the enormous confidence and self-assurance of the British
ruling class. The gradual incorporation of new social elements,
_i.e._, commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, was slow enough not to
alter social and political maps drastically. With the workers
largely neglected or repressed, political cooptation worked well and
social equipoise was achieved. International dominance further
enhanced their confidence and arrogance. Mid-Victorian confidence
was inherited for a long time by the ruling class because of its
social- _cum-_ educational eliteness, and because of a social gradualism
and the success of political cooptation. The British policy in the
Far East was more or less immune to domestic social and political
development because of geographical remoteness and because of the
preponderance of specialists in the Foreign Office, one of the last
bastions of the aristocratic elite, in determining and executing
the policy. The industrial and naval emergence of Continental
European countries during the late Victorian period did not affect
much of the British policy in the Far East. The First Sino-Japanese
war, the following scramble for concessions, and lastly the Boxer
intervention, caused confusion and reconsideration of the basis of
the British Far Eastern policy. However, the conclusion of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance contributed to maintaining the old self-
confidence without being radically altered. Britain could count
on Japan, with the assumption of her being a world power jeopardized. In the meantime, British naval power in the Far East decreased significantly vis-a-vis other powers because of her lethal involvement in Europe. Even if British economic penetration in China increased, it was devoid of naval presence, the weakness of which had been apparent since 1895. After the Washington conference it was more evident. Despite the voices of a Cassandra being occasionally heard, no serious rethinking of British foreign policy was made. Business in China significantly increased during the 1910's and 1920's. When Chinese anti-imperialist attacks fell upon British interests in China, Britain suffered, effaced herself, and finally successfully reemerged as a new friend of China by the late 1920's. When Japanese imperialism began its unilateral military action, Britain again succeeded in defending her interests for a while by directing Japan in a different direction from the Yangtze river valley, where British economic interests were concentrated, with the thought that Japan was thinking in similar economic terms. However, as Japanese aggression in China became intense, pro-Chinese policy dominated the Foreign Office, but the policy only jeopardized the British interests in China. Then, when Continental Europe fell completely under Hitler's control, Churchill desperately tried to draw the reluctant America to the war, even by provoking Japan. Since there were almost no significant naval forces in the Far East, Britain was very easily crushed by Japan. Rhetoric destroyed the empire.
Japanese self-conception: The column for self-confidence shows that their self-confidence kept rising during the crucial period between the fourth quarter of the 19th century and the mid-20th century. Japanese self-confidence was constantly growing as the compulsion to catch up with Western powers drove the Japanese to expansionism. It was not only the success of Japanese expansion that caused further expansion. Japan's constant failure to expand fully, as in the First Sino-Japanese war, the Boxer intervention, and the Russo-Japanese war, inflamed their will to power and desire to expand. Their frustrated attempts to expand in the 1911 Chinese Revolution, the 21 demands and the Siberian intervention wounded their pride. The 'uneasy' cooperation with Anglo-American powers in the 1920's, while retaining as much independence as possible in their China policy, died an abrupt yet almost inevitable death, leaving the impression of a totally barren decade. As a reaction to the preceding decade of disarmament and economic expansionism, military unilateralism was executed in the 1930's and 1940's with less care and insight, resulting in further intense anti-imperialism and a collision with hegemonic counterimperialism. The role played by subjective factors in determining imperial fate seems to have been more important in the Japanese case than the two other empires dealt with in this study. The very short time span within which the Japanese empire rose and fell made the role of subjective factors stronger than the other cases. Absolute inferiority in industrial and military capacity led the Japanese too easily to adopt the dogma that their determination and willpower to catch up with the white people, by
industrializing the country, by building a strong military force, and by dominating weak neighbors, could compensate for their weaknesses. The relative inadequacy of their political and social institutions to cope with the rapid economic and social changes aggravated the international insecurity of a middle power driven toward international achievements. Highly geared toward achievements, their aspiration and ambition went ahead for their capacity. Ambition destroyed the empire.

On the whole, we have observed that power perspectives did not change very much during the crucial periods of the three empires. Our inspection of tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 strongly suggests the crucial importance of imperial self-conception. High self-confidence as developed in its ascending days did not alter easily, despite all the changes in power bases. At the same time, the ways in which imperial stakes were perceived were largely determined by the conditions in which an aspiring/ascending empire found itself at the historic moment when it was shaping its high self-confidence and its imperial drive. This historic moment was ordinarily the time of early wars, victorious or shameful. The consequences were obvious. A fixation on the way in which imperial stakes were conceived produced a biased picture of the world. Whether imperial stakes were cultural, commercial, or racial, the fixation tended to lead an empire, when faced with difficulties, to see in all surrounding it a Eumenides assaulting it. The imperviousness and tenacity of high imperial self-conception provided an overload
on the empire when other supporting conditions were slipping out of its hands. Thus, the same condition of high self-confidence and imperial drive worked against the sustenance of an empire. In these senses, wars contributed to the shaping of the fate of an empire in a very significant way. The historically and structurally differentiated learning from wars, or more importantly, the conceptions of imperial status and stakes, are crucial to determining the fate of an empire.
<table>
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<th>Chinese</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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<tr>
<td>style</td>
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<td>gunboat coercion</td>
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<td>obsessive concern for supremacy</td>
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<td>power bases</td>
<td>disappearance/nullification of</td>
<td>acquiescence of other powers and absence of</td>
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<td>international environments</td>
<td>enemies</td>
<td>antiimperialism</td>
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<td>other imperialists' assaults</td>
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<td>economic capacity</td>
<td>central dominance of the largest</td>
<td>industrial/commercial predominance without</td>
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<td>Chinese empire supported by</td>
<td>rivals</td>
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<td>high-level equilibrium trap or</td>
<td>loss of early industrial dynamism</td>
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<td>bankruptcy of economic growth</td>
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<td>without technological progress</td>
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<td>communication and control</td>
<td>limited but-enough mobilizational</td>
<td>naval dominance in the Far East without rivals</td>
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<td>capacity</td>
<td>to intercept</td>
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<td>mobilizational bankruptcy</td>
<td>loss of naval dominance</td>
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### Table 6: Styles, Power Bases, Power Perspectives and Consequences (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Perspectives</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Stakes</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Racial</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Self-Conception
- Invincibility of belief in the uniqueness and grandeur of Chinese culture.
- Impermeability of self-deception and metamorphosis into intense anti-imperialism.

#### Consequence
- Radicalism of impotence.
- Happy belief in progress and liberty through coercion of free trade.
- Pretension of her being the greatest and the burden of great name.

*1 means change.
2 means that high self-esteem resisted transformation with the consequence of the syndrome described below arrow.*
Conclusions

Having been led by Victor Klemperer's astute observation that the style of self-expression reveals a man, we have proceeded to examine in the case studies the ways in which the three protagonists expressed themselves in a concentrated, collective, and violent action called war. For that purpose we have examined how each of them developed its power bases and how each of them shaped its power perspectives. We have found that in order to understand the culturally differentiated rise and fall of an empire it is vital to examine the ways in which an empire learnt from its early war successes. How an empire developed its power bases and perspectives from its early successes is crucial for determining the manner in which they handled problems in later days. The historically and structurally differentiated learning from wars, more specifically, the conceptions of imperial status and stakes, are crucial for determining the fate of an empire.

More specifically, we have found that each of the three protagonists had its unique style and its unique conception of imperial stakes. Cultural aspects were pervasive in the Chinese style of war and diplomacy, and their stakes in its cultural uniqueness and greatness continued to dominate their thinking. Commercial aspects dominated the British mind and determined their style of intercourse with Far Eastern countries. The stakes they thought they had in commerce determined the course of their actions in the Far East. Racial aspects occupied a prominent position in Japanese thought and action. This preoccupation characterized their style in the international arena, and their investment in racial
aspects of their power assets and liabilities became a crucial driving force for their expansion. The ways in which metamorphosis unfolded also reveal a style unique to each of them. When the centuries-old presupposition of Chinese cultural supremacy was crushed by imperialism, it was transformed into intense antiimperialism. Even when British naval dominance became no more than a facade, the British acted to defend their commercial interests as if they were still a world power, only to be expelled from the Far East. When the Japanese racial compulsion to stand on equal footing with white people was felt to have been realized, they only found themselves caught by attacks by antiimperialist forces and other imperialist powers. In a profound sense they destroyed themselves by attempting to sustain the self-conception and the imperial stakes which had originally elevated them to a great power status.

Out major emphasis has been on the autonomous importance of subjective factors and their persistent 'lag' carried over to following periods of history. We have also emphasized the necessity of taking into account historical-structural factors that helped to shape subjective factors. These two emphases do not necessarily preclude other explanations. However, any attempt to find the single, simple cause of war, empire or imperialism is bound to fail. For instance, it is impossible to explain by imperialist penetration alone why the Chinese manifested the most intense antiimperialism in the world whereas China was the ideal case of an 'informal empire' to the British. We have to look at how the Chinese were conditioned to treat barbarians when they were not strong enough to repel barbarians. We also have to
look closely at the increasingly competitive rural order in 19th and early 20th century China. It is also impossible to explain by British industrial or naval decline alone why Britain holds the record for the longest involvement in World Wars I and II combined. We have to look at how the British clung to and attempted to live up to their great name, even when they had virtually no naval forces in the Far East. It is also impossible to explain Japanese militarism and its reckless adventures by agricultural stagnation or by the country's poor resources alone. We have to look at how the Japanese shaped their racially overtoned and highly rank-conscious self-conception. We have also to look at the rise of American imperialism to counter Japanese imperialism.

If our main conclusion can be reduced to one sentence, it would be that an empire, like a man caught by an ignis fatuus, is the captive of its experience and the slave of its past, trying, for the sake of psychological comfort and emotional satisfaction, to believe in its being a master of its fate and to act so as to bring this belief to reality, even at the risk of ultimate self-destruction. Then this will have extraordinary implications. It implies that the examination of the early experience of a nation is indispensable for a better understanding of war, empire, and imperialism. Furthermore, it also implies that the historical-structural forces that drive a nation cannot be easily controlled, at least in the long run. This is perhaps what Stanley K. Hornbeck in the Far Eastern Division of the US State Department meant
when he wrote in 1940:

The Far Eastern policy of the United States will undergo neither a rapid nor a gradual 'reorientation' unless and until-- the whole world becomes an utterly different world from that which it has been ever since the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth and the Cavaliers at Jamestown. 4

What we saw in the examination of the twenty-two cases is that a nation did not change, that a nation did not alter its imperial style and its conception of imperial status and stakes, and that a nation was able neither to get out of itself nor to see others in any way other than from its own angles and against its own mirrors, even when the whole world became a very different world. Even when China became no more than the Middle Kingdom reigning over the barbarians due to the onslaughts of imperialists, even when British naval dominance became no more than an illusion because of other imperialists' catching-up and intense antiimperialism, and even when Japan could no longer take advantage of Western imperialist rivalries because of the decline of European powers, the rise of the US and intense anti-imperialism, they kept playing their favorite roles—as Marcel Proust put it 5—relying on their similar memory systems and similar social systems. They were indeed like generals always fighting the last war.

Then what does this study imply for the present and for the future? What has emerged from this study is the great importance of competing, aspiring imperial systems, rather than the balance of power
situations or systems or its revised forms like collective security. If there was relative tranquility, it was largely attained by force. It was *sui generis* imperial peace. What looked like a balance of power or coexistence was in fact the competition for an imperial order tailored to the preference of a particular empire. And the very peace and order that replaced war and chaos were often the foundation of miseries, not only for the present--because they were largely enforced--but also for the future--because they brought about enormous disruptive effects on following periods of history. If the pax Sinica had not been so complete, the disruptive effects of imperialists' onslaughts would have been slighter. If the pax Britannica found an ideal 'informal empire' in the Far East, it was not without causing enormous disruptive effects on China and Japan. If Japan had not attained two major victories around the turn of the 20th century, her imperial drive would have been considerably mitigated. It is not far-fetched to state in the same vein that, if the US had not attained so great a victory in World War II, the US would have been significantly different during the quarter-century after the war. Since actual and aspirant empires claimed their own imperial definitions of peace and order, the outcomes tended to be not so much a struggle between the god and the devil as the type of struggle in a Greek tragedy. Perhaps war goes on endlessly. Yet cognizance of this fact should not lead us to revert to the belief that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. Rather, untiring and perhaps tragic efforts like that of Antigone must and will go on, vindicating the human conscience, which inspires our hope for survival.
Appendix: Case selection

The selection of cases is critical for this kind of work. We focus primarily on cases that are both revealing and interesting. Our selection is guided by the following criteria. First, there must be a reasonable number of secondary works on which we can draw for our analysis. How much is enough depends on the case. Second, there must be a roughly comparable number of cases in which each of the three empires was a protagonist. Third, a case study must not be a mere repetition of other cases. These are the major criteria besides the obvious criterion that cases must be limited to East Asia, as broadly conceived, during ca. 1600-1945.

Now we will provide short notes on each of the twenty-two cases we selected.

1. Manchu-Korean wars: Although there are not many works on these wars, they are revealing and interesting. Because of the similar characteristics of the three wars in 1619, 1627, and 1637, they were treated as one case.

2. Ch'ing-Russian war: The war manifested a transition in the Manchu rulers' style. This was also an important war for the delineation of the Sino-Russian border.

3. Ch'ing-Jungar war: Although there were many wars between the Manchus and the Mongols since the early 17th century, this war was chosen to illustrate the zenith of the Ch'ing. Perhaps another war or two between the Ch'ing and the Mongols in the late 17th century or
9. Arrow war: The war reveals very clearly a dilemma of British China policy at the height of British predominance in China. It also signaled the rise of the synarchy in coastal urban centers. As a case of anti-foreign disturbances, the Margary incident of 1875 might have been profitably included.

10. Taiping intervention: This case represents a British 'informal' intervention in China.

11. Choshu-Western war: This case is very important to the shaping of Japanese perspectives. Also it illustrates the difference between British China policy and British Japan policy. The Satsuma-British war of 1863 might have been profitably included.

12. Japan's gunboat diplomacy toward Korea: This case reveals Japan's quick learning from the West. Japan's intervention in Korea in 1881 and in 1884 might have been profitably included.

13. First Sino-Japanese war: The war is both revealing and important. The war signaled the failure of the self-strengtheners in China.

14. Boxer intervention: The case reveals both the positive and negative aspects of the Japanese war style. It also reveals the British dilemma very well.

15. Russo-Japanese war: The war was extremely important to Japan in shaping its basic orientations and subsequent actions.

17. Siberian intervention: The case reveals virtually all the weaknesses that Japan was to manifest 20 years later. Thus this case is extremely important.

18. Washington conference: The case was included because of its importance. It was a formal debut of the US in the Far East and the Pacific. Since our study does not include the US as one of its foci, interesting cases in which the US was deeply involved were not included other than this case and the Pacific war. Otherwise we would have included many cases, from Commodore Perry's coercive diplomacy toward Japan in 1863-1854 through the American-Spanish war and the anti-immigration law of 1924 to the present Vietnam war.

19. Foreign intervention in the Chinese Revolution: This case reveals Chinese, British and Japanese behavior very well. Especially the British and Japanese contrasts are very interesting.

20. Japan's conquest of Manchuria: This case is extremely important to Japan. This was the beginning of an end.

21. Second Sino-Japanese war: The war is very important and interesting. The war was the culmination of Japanese imperialism and Chinese anti-imperialism.

22. Pacific war: The war is very important. To Japan and Britain the war was the end of an era. To the US the war was a beginning. The Soviet-Japanese wars of 1938-1939 might have been profitably included.
Notes

All the notes are located here together. For the sake of simplicity, all the references in the notes are done by author, year of publication, and page, chapter or part specification. The sole abbreviation we use in the notes is: NKSG, which stands for Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (Japan Association of International Relations), ed., Taiheiyo Senso eno Michi (The Road to the Pacific War), 8 vols., Tokyo, 1962-1963.

Notes to Chapter 1
2) For a succinct summary of the historical-structural conditions for a balance of power, see Hoffmann, 1968.
3) For an important exception, see Bozeman, 1960.
5) For an important recent exception, see Thorne, 1973.
7) For important exceptions, see Wright, 1942; Singer/Small, 1973.
9) Haas, 1970. This study is concerned largely with international power distribution, is largely quantitative in treatment, and does not go deep in its analysis.
Notes to chapter 2

2) Fairbank/Teng, 1960; Fairbank, 1968.
6) For the contrast between the territory and treaty systems, see Fairbank, 1953.
22) For the Siberian intervention, see Hosoya, 1972; on the second Sino-Japanese war, see Usui, 1967; NKSG, 1962–63.
37) Fairbank, 1968.
38) R. Lee, 1970.
39) For an account of the transition of the Ch'ing frontier policy in Manchuria, see Ho, 1959, pp 158–163; Rupen, 1964; R. Lee, 1970.
40) Pritchard, 1936.
49) Fairbank, 1953.
50) Fairbank, 1968.
55) Williams, 1972, p. 95.
62) Most notable was the Twenty-one demands. See Lowe, 1969.
69) See L.K. Young, 1970, for the time of the Boxer intervention. See Louis, 1971, for the time of the KMT's northern expedition.
70) Most typical was the Russo-Japanese war, see Furuya, 1966; White, 1964.
71) Morley, 1957, p. 266.
73) NKSG, 1962-63.
80) It was in 1821 that China and Europe were connected by cable. (Banno, M., 1970b, p. 305)
88) The Crimean war, the Indian Mutiny and the Boer war were among such wars. See Huard, 1967; Banno, M., 1964; Fox, 1969; Beasley, 1951; L.K. Young, 1970.
89) Hindmarsh, 1936.
94) Fairbank, 1968.
100) Pritchard, 1936; Suzuki, 1962.
103) Fox, 1969; Beasley, 1951; Ishii, 1966.
113) Suzuki, 1962, e.g., p. 179.
116) Steiner, 1969.

117) Similar themes are found in Hosoya, 1955; Morley, 1957; for the Siberian intervention, and Ogata, 1964; Thorne, 1973; for the Manchurian affairs. In the early days the picture was different. See Jansen, 1968, pp. 163-4. When the leadership was a more or less homogeneous, small group, the problem of disintegrative information processing did not take place.

118) Maruyama, 1961, ch. 3.
120) Banno, M., 1970a, ch. 3; Suzuki, 1967.
122) For the latter, see Eastman, 1967; Chang, 1964; Ichiko, 1971, pp. 207-221.
127) M. Young, 1958; Moore, 1966, ch. 1.
130) Duus, 1968, p. 244.
131) Duus, 1968, p. 244. See also Okamoto, 1970.
135) Watt, 1972, ch. 4.
138) Steiner, 1969.
139) See L.K. Young, 1970, for the Boxer intervention, and Louis, 1971, for the KMT Northern Expedition.
141) Austin, 1970. See also Hosoya, 1974, for Japanese foreign policy decision making system.
142) Austin, 1970.
143) Austin, 1970.

Notes to Chapter 3
1) As for the best account of the Manchu rise to power from the early days, see Michael, 1942.
2) Michael, 1942.
3) Michael, 1942.
4) As for the Manchu-Korean relations, see Inaba, 1933; Chong, 1970; Hatada, 1944.
5) Michael, 1942.
7) Fairbank, 1953, p. 42.
12) For barbarians' sinification, see Eberhard, 1965; Wang, 1963; Wittfogel/Feng, 1949; Michael, 1942.


14) See, for example, the Manchu negotiator, Mala's comment on a tributary system as quoted by Mancall, 1971, p. 108.


20) Kahn, 1971, p. 5. The ten great campaigns were three Jungar campaigns, two campaigns to Szechuan to suppress Miao tribes' rebellions, a Burma campaign, a campaign to Taiwan to suppress a secret society's rebellion, a Vietnam campaign and two Nepal campaigns.

21) Michael, 1942.


27) See Watt, 1972, for an excellent analysis of economic expansion and transformation from the late M'ing period through the mid-Ch'ing period.


30) For a big picture of imperial development and decay, see Watt, 1972; Elvin, 1973.

31) Ho, 1959.


33) For growing anti-social elements, see Suzuki, 1951; Kuhn, 1970; Chesneaux et al., 1970; and Chesneaux, 1972. For social mobility, see Ho, 1962; Eberhard, 1962.


36) For the suppression campaigns of the White Lotus rebellion of 1796-1804, see Kuhn, 1970; Suzuki, 1952.


39) See Ho, 1959, for the statistical appendix on the population.


41) Kahn, 1971, p. 5.


43) Suzuki, 1967; Kahn, 1971. In fact, except the three Jungar campaigns all the ten great campaigns had extraordinarily difficult times and cannot be called in any sense great except for the fact that they mobilized many soldiers and spent much money.

44) Wills, 1968.


46) As for a general process of imperial decline, see Cipolla, 1970, Introduction.

47) A most vivid description of foreign impacts on social processes are found in Wakeman, 1966. As for missionaries' disruptive effects, see Lu, 1966. For the Chinese view of foreign impacts, see Hu, 1954.

48) A point by point analysis of foreign impacts on economic processes is found in Nathan, 1972.

49) This holds for the period before 1920's when political and social upheavals began to disrupt the equilibrium fundamentally. As for Chinese economy's robustness and resistance to break out of the high-level equilibrium trap, see Hou, 1965; Myers, 1970; Potter, 1968; Schrecker, 1971. As for social and economic disruption and equilibria, see Wakeman, 1966; Wright, 1962. A contrasting picture is portrayed by, for instance, Bergere, 1969, focusing largely on the urban 'modern' economic sector.


53) See the arresting statistics on landlords' declining profits in the 1920's; see Muramatsu, 1966 and 1970, p. 41.
57) For the KMT, see T'ien, 1972; Domes, 1969. For the warlords, see Sheridan, 1966; Gillin, 1967; Pye, 1971; Kapp, 1973.
58) For traditional social mobility, see Ho, 1962. As for the transformation of educational system, see Franke, 1960; Biggerstaff, 1961; Ayers, 1971.
59) On student nationalism, see Chow, 1960; Israel, 1966; Lutz, 1971. Also see Balazs, 1964, ch. 11.
60) Iriye, 1965, p. 93.
61) See Balazs, 1964, ch. 11. Details are found in Eastman, 1972; Domes, 1969; T'ien, 1972.

Notes to Chapter 4
4) Kissinger, 1957.
6) See Pritchard, 1936.
7) See Pritchard, 1936; Costin, 1937; Greenberg, 1951.
8) The most succinct presentation of this thesis is found in Gallagher/Robinson, 1953. See Also Semmel, 1970; Barratt Brown, 1970; Robinson/Gallagher/Denny, 1961.
12) Burn, 1964.
14) Burn, 1964; G.M. Young, 1937; Kitson Clark, 1962. For the picture
of early Victorian period as being more explosive, see E.P. Thompson, 1963; Hobsbawn, 1962.
24) For the strikingly persistent rejection of the self-claimed China helpers, see Spence, 1969.
31) Williams, 1967, p. 95. Also see Gallagher/Robinson, 1953.
38) Kitson Clark, 1962, ch. 7.
40) P. Cohen, 1970; Wright, 1957.
41) Fairbank, 1957.
47) L.K. Young, 1970.
50) L.K. Young, 1971, p. 143.
51) F.A. Johnson, 1960, p. 213.
54) Yoshimura, 1968.
55) Lowe, 1969, ch. 6; Nish, 1972, ch. 7.
57) Nish, 1972, chs. 18-22; Louis, 1971, ch. 2; Lowe, 1969, ch. 8.
58) Louis, 1971, chs. 2-3; Buckley, 1970, ch. 2.
59) Buckley, 1970.
61) W.I. Cohen, 1971; Iriye, 1967. The most conspicuous difference between American and British views of China is the importance of missionary influences. American religious-ideological sense of mission in China was lacking in the British counterpart.
64) Chesneaux, 1968, ch. 11; Louis, 1971, ch. 4.
65) Louis, 1971, ch. 4.
66) Louis, 1971, ch. 5.
67) Louis, 1971, ch. 5.

Notes to Chapter 5
13) Umetani, 1965.
26) Hirakawa, 1971, pp. 155-171. The fact that the 'yellow man's burden' was propounded by some should not obscure the important fact that the government carefully tried to avoid giving the impression of a war of the East against the West in order not to scare the West, which might repeat the tripartite intervention of 1895. Instead, the government skillfully tried to portray Japan as the defender of Western interests on the East Asian continent. (Jansen, 1968, pp. 184-85.)
33) Okamoto, 1970; Duus, 1968; Masumi, 1965-68, chs. 5, 6 and 7.
40) Yoshimura, 1968.
44) Ikei, 1966.
47) Nish, 1972, chs. 7 and 8.
50) Usui, 1972; Chi, 1970.
55) See the contrasts drawn by Bamba, 1972, with respect to the Tanaka and Shidehara diplomacy.
64) Iriye, 1965.
68) Most revealing is the Japanese representative's farewell address to the League of Nations in 1933, as quoted by Miwa, 1971, p. 103.
75) quoted in Mushakoji, 1963–64.
85) Crowley, 1966; Russett, 1972; Chomsky, 1969.
87) Takeuchi, M., 1966, pp. 43-44.

Notes to chapter 6
1) See Kanda, 1968, for a brief overview of East Asia during the Ming and Ch'ing periods from a perspective free from a sinocentric bias or emphasis.
2) For a general account of the Manchu development, see Michael, 1942; Inaba, 1935; Kanda, 1968.
3) See Hatada, 1944, for a succinct account of the Manchu-Korean early relations.
4) See Hatada, 1944, for the Ming policy toward the Manchus.
5) Michael, 1942.
6) Michael, 1942, ch. 7.
7) See Wu, 1970, for an excellent account of the differences between and mutual influences on the Manchu and Chinese communication and decision making systems.
8) Inaba, 1933, p. 112.
9) Inaba, 1933, p. 166.
13) For a detailed account of local private educational institutions, see Watanabe, 1969.

14) See the statistics in Hatada, 1951, p. 146.

15) Inaba, 1933, p. 50.

16) Inaba, 1933, p. 165.

17) For a detailed description of the 1619 war, seen from the Korean viewpoint, see Inaba, 1933, chs. 4 & 5.

18) See Tagawa, 1932, for the role played by Mao Wen-lung, who controlled the island.


20) See Michael, 1942, ch. 7, for an account of the Manchu clan organization.


22) For an account of the Korean policy toward the Manchus during this period, see Inaba, 1933; Shinoda, n.d.

23) Inaba, 1933, p. 133.

24) See the description of the debate in Shinoda, n.d.


26) See Inaba, 1934, for the Korean forces sent to Amuria. As for the anti-Russian campaign in the 1650's itself, see Mancall, 1971, ch. 1.

Notes to chapter 7

1) See Zlatkin, 1964, for the most detailed account of the rise and fall of the last nomadic empire in history. See also Saguchi, 1966, ch. 3.


4) See Mancall, 1971, for the most solid account of the early Sino-Russian relations. Also see Chen, 1966.


7) Mancall, 1971, ch. 5.
8) Mancall, 1971, chs. 6-8.
9) See Vernadsky, 1953, for a detailed account of early modern Russian history.
10) See Fisher, 1943, for an account of Russian fur trade and Lantzeff, 1943, for an account of Russian development and administration of Siberia. See also Kerner, 1942, 1943; Lantzeff and Pierce, 1973.
11) Fisher, 1943, pp. 118-120.
12) See Lantzeff, 1943, for a detailed account.
16) Mancall, 1971, ch. 1. For an account of the primarily strategic consideration of Manchuria rather than its importance as the homeland of the Manchus, see Lee, 1970, esp., p. 184.
20) See Inaba, 1934, for the Korean expedition to Amuria. Also see Mancall, 1971, 1971, ch. 1.
21) See Wu, 1971, for an excellent account of the differences between the Manchu and Chinese decision making system.
23) The Manchus were able to arm themselves by guns and artillery after 1619 when they captured a large number of guns and artillery together with Chinese technicians and soldiers who could deal with them.
28) Kanda, 1968, p. 229. See Mancall, 1971, p. 154 and pp. 345-6. 500 was the number of soldiers agreed upon before the negotiations. 10,000 included non-soldier members for negotiations, such as servants and mandarins.

Notes to chapter 8
1) For an overview of the Jungars during this period, see Zlatkin, 1964; Saguchi, 1966, ch. 3; Courant, 1912; Baddeley, 1919.
3) Bawden, 1968a, ch. 2.
6) See Zlatkin, 1964, chs. 5 & 6, for the most detailed account of the process.
8) Bawden, 1968b.
9) See Saguchi, 1963, ch. 1, for an excellent account of the gradual decay of the Jungar society.
13) See Haneda, 1954, for the best account of the imperial decaying process due to these effects. Also see Saguchi, 1963, ch. 1; 1966, pp. 132-161.
16) See Perkins for the statistics of agricultural growth. See Suzuki, 1951, ch. 1, for an excellent account of the economic and demographic expansion and the imperial budget surplus.
17) See Watt, 1972, part II, for an account of this evolution and its consequences.


19) See Wu, 1970, for the best account of this evolution.

20) See Michael, 1942, for an account of the clan oriented Manchu organization.


24) As a detailed account, see Zlatkin, 1964.

25) The following account is based on Zlatkin, 1964, ch. 6.

26) Perhaps the Ch'ing-Jungar wars were the only major case in which the Ch'ing did not accept the enemy's submission.

27) See Mancall, 1971, pp. 1-8, for a lucid account of the Ch'ing organizations for dealing with two different kinds of barbarians.


Notes to Chapter 9

1) For an overview of Burmese history, see Hall, 1968, chs. 6, 20, & 22; Steinberg et al, 1971, chs. 7 & 12; Htin Aung, 1967.

2) Hall, 1968, ch. 6.

3) Hall, 1968, chs. 20 & 22.

4) Steinberg et al, 1971, p. 98.


7) As for border peoples' shifting and multiple loyalties, see Yano, 1928; Obayashi, 1970.

9) See Fisher, 1964, for this point as generally applied to premodern Southeast Asian countries.


11) Steinberg et al, 1971, p. 32.

12) Steinberg et al, 1971, p. 33. For the following account of the ruling machinery in Burma, we draw on Steinberg et al, 1971, ch. 4.


14) Steinberg et al, 1971, p. 98.


17) See Wu, 1971, for the concentration of power in the emperor and the Grand Council.


19) Jung, 1971, pp. 75-76.


22) Jung, 1971. See also the similar case of 1788-1789.

23) The details of the Chinese difficulties in Burma are described in Jung, 1971.

24) Steinberg et al, 1971, p. 98.


29) Jung, 1971,


31) Kahn, 1971, p. 5.


33) Jung, 1971, p. 95.
Notes to chapter 10

1) As for the significance of the Tay-Son rebellion of modern Vietnamese history, see Woodside, 1971; Nguyen, 1970, pp. 229-231; Minh, 1963. For the sequence of events in the Ch'ing intervention, see Suzuki, 1967. This chapter draws heavily on Inoguchi, 1973, sections 3, 4 and 5.


4) In Vietnam the Vietnamese ruler called himself emperor, whereas vis-a-vis the Chinese emperor he called himself king, in deference to the Chinese emperor.


7) Suzuki, 1952. Also see Kuhn, 1970.

8) Zlatkin, 1964.


13) Suzuki, 1952. Also see Ho, 1959.


15) Kuhn, 1970.


17) Katsuta, 1971. For the underlying economic causes of piracy, i.e., the Chinese demand for Vietnamese rice and the Chinese demand for Vietnamese metals, see note 72 of Suzuki, 1967.

18) Hoshi, 1971.


22) See Kahn, 1971, for an account of Ch'ien-lung.


29) It is indicative of the newly emerging, non-rural strata that before they were involved in banditry and later rebellion, Nguyen Nhac was an official at the customs service. (Fujiwara, R., 1965; Ch'en Ching-ho, 1965), and Nguyen Hue, his brother, was a comedian attached to a prestigious military chief. (Nguyen, 1970, p. 147).
30) See Lamb, 1970, for contemporary British observation of the Tay–Son politics in 1788 and 1793.
32) See Whitmore, 1968, for a detailed account of the short-term success of the Le dynasty in retaining the power of the Thanh–Hoa military oligarchs, with the skillful cultivation of the newly generated bureaucratic influence in the late 15th century. See also Whitmore, 1969.
35) We have borrowed the terms from Wills, 1968.
36) We depend heavily on Suzuki, 1967, in this section.
38) Suzuki, 1967; Deveria, 1880. Many others including Lam, 1968, and Maybon, 1920, claim that the number was 200,000. Suzuki gives 30,000–40,000 as the number of bearers for the campaign which was usually three to four times the number of soldiers. If 200,000 had been the number of soldiers, the number of bearers would have been 600,000–800,000. This number would have been impossible to take, given the population of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces and the extremely limited mobilizational capacity of the Ch'ing empire. Even if 200,000 was the number including both soldiers and bearers, it would have been extremely difficult to conscript 130,000–160,000 bearers in these provinces without risking riots, since the campaign was not well prepared in the first place. Thus, given the whole situation of China and Vietnam around 1789, 12,000 is more plausible than 200,000.
39) The Chia-ch'ing emperor once noted that since even barbarians came to see him for his virtue, the White Lotus rebels, too, should do so. Suzuki, 1967, p. 324.
40) Kahn, 1971, p. 49.
41) Kahn's account is extremely telling of the atmosphere of the Ch'ien-lung politics. See Kahn, 1970, p. 5.
42) We depended heavily on Suzuki, 1967, in this section.

Notes to Chapter 11

1) The best account of the increase in foreign commerce is given in Pritchard, 1929 & 1936.
2) Pritchard, 1936, ch. 2; Fairbank, 1964(1953), ch. 3; Suzuki, 1951, Introduction.
4) We draw heavily on Pritchard, 1936, for the following account of the Macartney embassy.
6) Pritchard, 1936, ch. 3.
7) For the formation of the Second British empire, see Harlow, 1952 & 1964.
9) Hobsbawn, 1968, p. 27.
13) For an account of the 18th century British policy especially under King George III, see Plumb, 150, part 3; Briggs, 1959, chs. 2 & 3; Pares, 1953.
14) Foord, 1952.
16) Pritchard, 1936, p. 213; Briggs, 1959, ch. 2.
18) For a history of the East India Company, see Plumb, 1950, pp. 171-178; Furber, 1948.
20) The following draws heavily on Pritchard, 1936, chs. 3, 4, and 5.
21) Pritchard, 1936, p. 141.
27) See a telling account of Ch'ien-lung by Kahn, 1971, p. 5.
28) As for the deception, see Kahn, 1971, p. 5. As for the corruption, see Nivison, 1959.
29) This paragraph draws heavily on Pritchard, 1936, chs. 3, 4 and 5.
33) MacNair, 1938, p. 28.
34) Pritchard, 1936, p. 382.
35) As for the Dutch case, see Wills, 1968.

Notes to chapter 12
1) Suzuki, 1962, p. 27.
2) Suzuki, 1962, chs. 2, 3 and 4; Rose, 1971, ch. 2. We draw heavily on Suzuki, 1962; Rose, 1971; Pemble, 1971; Chaudhri, 1960; for the account of this war.
3) Suzuki, 1962, ch. 2.
5) Rose, 1971, ch. 2; Suzuki, 1962, ch. 3.
8) Suzuki, 1962, ch. 3; Rose, 1971, ch. 3.
9) Suzuki, 1962, ch. 3; Rose, 1971, ch. 3.
15) Rose, 1971, p. 79.
17) Rose, 1971, pp. 79-82.
18) Pemble, 1971, p. 82.
21) Rose, 1971, ch. 4; Suzuki, 1962, ch. 5.
24) Suzuki, 1962, pp. 91-93. See also Mukherjee, 1958; Moon, 1947.
33) See Pemble, 1971, for the details of the campaigns.
34) Chaudhri, 1960, ch. 10, esp. p. 150.
37) Suzuki, 1951, p. 10.
40) The costs amounted to 120 million silver taels, according to
Suzuki, 1951, p. 23.
44) Pemble, 1971, ch. 3.
45) Pemble, 1971, parts 2 and 3.
49) Rose, 1971, ch. 4.

Notes to chapter 13
1) Pritchard, 1936, ch. 4.
6) For the East India Company, see Phillips, 1940.
7) Greenberg, 1951, ch. 7.
9) Eto, 1968a(1952), pp. 143-152.
12) Gash, 1953.
14) Chang, 1964, ch. 3.
17) Chang, 1964, ch. 7; Fairbank, 1953, ch. 5.
18) Fairbank, 1953, part 2.
33) Ho, 1959, p. 282.
34) Suzuki, 1951.
37) Wakeman, 1962, p. 32.
40) For the best account of the social effects of the Opium war, see Wakeman, 1966.
50) Wakeman, 1966, p. 82.
51) Fairbank, 1953, p. 137.
52) Fairbank, 1953, p. 150.
54) Greenberg, 1951.
55) Wakeman, 1966, p. 34.
56) The details of the controversy and Lin's rise to power are found in Chang, 1964.
57) Wakeman, 1966, p. 36 and p. 94. Also see Kuhn, 1971.
58) Pritchard, 1936.
59) Greenberg, 1951.

Notes to chapter 14

1) See Costin, 1937, for the account of the Arrow war. Also see Huard, 1967; Banno, M., 1964, 1970a.
2) Costin, 1937, p. 344.
3) Costin, 1937, ch. 5.
4) The best account of the Chinese political scene during the period is given by Banno, M., 1964.
6) See Kuhn, 1970, for the best account of militarization.
10) See Wakeman, 1966, for the loss of the balance between gentry power and bureaucratic power in the former's favor.

12) Banno, M., 1964, p. 56.
13) Banno, M., 1964, p. 36.
14) Banno, M., 1964, p. 36.
18) Fox, 1969, pp. 15-16.
19) Costin, 1937, ch. 7.
22) Banno, M., 1964, e.g., p. 36.
24) Fairbank, 1957, pp. 204-231.

Notes to Chapter 15

7) Gregory, 1969; Spence, 1964, ch. 3.
33) Gregory, 1969, ch. 7.
38) Fairbank, 1957.
41) Strang, 1961, p. 117.
42) Strang, 1961, p. 117.
47) Gregory, 1969, p. 46.
49) Gregory, 1969, p. 46.
52) Banno, M., 1970b, p. 274.
56) Gregory, 1969, pp. 120, 121, 126.
60) Gregory, 1969, pp. 130-1.
Notes to chapter 16

1) Beasley, 1951, p. 86.

2) For British-Japanese relations, see Beasley, 1951; Fox, 1969; Nish, 1974. The basic reference used for Japan's foreign relations during this period is Ishii, 1966, 1972.

3) Beasley, 1951, chs. 4-7.


6) Fox, 1969, ch. 5; Ishii, 1966, ch. 3; Tanaka, 1963.

7) Ishii, 1966, ch. 4.

8) Ishii, 1966, chs. 3 and 5.


17) Sansom, 1950.


23) Beasley, 1951, e.g., p. 72, p. 200, passim.

24) Beasley, 1951, e.g., p. 45, p. 86, passim.

25) Beasley, 1951, ch. 7.

26) Fox, 1969, pp. 538-9; Beasley, 1951, p. 54.
27) Beasley, 1951, p. 72.
28) Beasley, 1951, chs. 2-5.
29) Beasley, 1951, chs. 6 and 7.
31) Beasley, 1951, p. 199.
32) Beasley, 1951, p. 165.
33) Beasley, 1969, p. 94. Other instances are found in Fox, 1969, pp. 117, 119, 123.
37) Shibahara, 1965, ch. 3.
39) Shibahara, 1965, p. 244.
41) Eto, 1968a(1956); Pelcovits, 1948.
43) Ishii, 1972, p. 388. Also see Nakamura, S., 1968.
44) Beasley, 1951, ch. 5.
47) For the British attitude toward Japan, see Ishii, 1966. For the Japanese perception, see Beasley, 1951, ch. 2 and p. 202.
49) Fox, 1969, pp. 76-77.
50) Fox, 1959, ch. 5, esp. p. 150.
52) Ishii, 1966, chs. 3 & 4.
53) Fox, 1969, ch. 21.
54) Ishii, 1966; Fox, 1969; Beasley, 1951.
55) Ishii, 1966, chs. 7 & 8.
56) Fox, 1969, chs. 7, 8, and 9.
57) Fox, 1969, ch. 21.

**Notes to Chapter 17**

1) For the Kanghwado incident, see P'eng, 1969, chs. 1 & 2; Shin, 1966, chs. 1 & 2; Tabohashi, 1930(1963); Kim, 1966.


3) For the Taewon'gun's reform efforts, see Choe, 1972. It must be noted, however, that Choe tends to overevaluate the Taewon'gun's efforts.

6) For the most detailed study, see Han, 1970.
8) See P'eng, 1969, ch. 2.
9) Choe, 1972.
11) Han, 1970.
13) For a general survey of this period, see Hatada, 1951, ch. 6; Yi, 1967, chs. 12, 13 & 14; Henthorn, 1971, ch. 9.
24) Banno, M., 1964, pp. 244-246. Also see Kierman, 1939.
31) P'eng, 1968, ch. 2.
39) This inclination of his was to be disclosed more markedly later in the Ili controversies. See Hsu, 1965.
41) P'eng, 1968, pp. 82-104. Also see Chien, 1967, ch. 4.

Notes to Chapter 18
2) Choe, 1972.
4) Kang, 1970; Han, 1964; Pak, 1962.
9) Hsu, 1965.
20) Fujiwara, A., 1961, ch. 3.
27) Ichiko, 1971, pp. 207-221.

Notes to Chapter 19
1) For anti-foreign and anti-Christian riots, see P. Cohen, 1963; LDL, 1966.
2) For the Boxer rebellion, see Purcell, 1963; Tan, 1967; Muramatsu, 1953; J. Ch'en, 1960; Horikawa, Tetsuo, 1964; Ichiko, 1971.
3) Ichiko, 1968.
5) Ichiko, 1968.
18) Wright, 1968, p. 3.
25) See L.K. Young, 1971, for the most solid study of British China policy during the time of agonizing transition.
Notes to Chapter 20

1) For the Japanese side of the story, see Furuya, 1966; Okamoto, 1970; Shinobu/Nakayama, 1972; White, 1964. For the Japanese conception of the victory as a victory of the non-white over the white, see Hirakawa, 1971. Also see Oka, 1961.

2) For the Russian side of the story, see Romanov, 1952(1928); Malozemoff, 1958; White, 1964.

3) L.K. Young, 1971; Nish, 1966.

4) We draw heavily on Kochan, 1966; von Laue, 1963; Faulkus, 1972, in this and the following paragraphs.


8) Oka, 1961, p. 34.


12) We draw on White, 1964; Galai, 1965; Furuya, 1966; in this and the following paragraphs.


15) Okamoto, 1970, e.g., p. 28.


Notes to Chapter 21


3) Ichiko, 1968.

4) Gasster, 1968.

5) Ichiko, 1968.


14) Duus, 1968, p. 244.
15) This theme is stressed in Okamoto, 1970; Duus, 1968.
19) For Yuan's handling, see Chi, 1970; Lowe, 1969, ch. 7.
21) Yim, 1965. For Yuan's half-successful attempt to become emperor, see J. Ch'en, 1972; Chi, 1970.
25) Lowe, 1969, e.g., p. 175.

Notes to Chapter 22

3) Hosoya, 1972, chs. 2 & 3.
5) Yoshimura, 1968.
10) For the Bolsheviks in Harbin, Manchuria, see Seki, 1966, part 1.
22) Levin, 1968, ch. 7.
24) Hosoya, 1972, chs. 2 & 3.
26) Hosoya, 1972, chs. 2 & 3.

Notes to Chapter 23

1) For the conference, see Sprout/Sprout, 1940. For the British policy, see Louis, 1971, chs. 1 & 2. For the American policy, see Buckley, 1970. For the Japanese policy, see Asada, 1961; NKSG, 1962-1963; vol. 1, part 1; Sato, 1970.
5) For instance, Vice Chief of Army Staff Tanaka Giichi, who had been a superhawk and responsible for the execution of the Siberian intervention in its early phases, changed his position considerably after he became minister for war in the Hara cabinet. See Hosoya, 1972, p. 92; Masumi, 1965-1968, vol. 4, p. 344.
6) Masumi, 1965-1968, chs. 9, 10, & 12.
7) Nish, 1972.
8) Yoshimura, 1968.
33) Levin, 1968, ch. 7.
34) Buckley, 1971, p. 189.
36) Buckley, 1971, ch. 2.
37) Buckley, 1971, pp. 24-5.
38) Nish, 1972, p. 351.

Notes to chapter 24

1) For the KMT's development, see Yu, 1966; Domes, 1969.
3) Iriye, 1965, ch. 3; Louis, 1971, ch. 4; Borg, 1968(1947). On the problem of whether the great powers agreed on a collective China policy in the Washington conference, Iriye and Borg are diametrically opposed. Given the totally conflicting imperialist powers' interests in the Far East, and given the uncompromising nationalism of China, the Washington system seems to have been doomed to fail, even with incessant efforts to reformulate the Washington system.
5) Usui, 1971.
11) For imperialist economic penetration, see Remer, 1933.
12) For the Chinese cotton industry, see Teng Chung-hsia, 1954. Also see Nakamura, T., 1971, pp. 276-332.
16) Eastman, 1972; Balazs, 1964, ch. 11.
21) Louis, 1971, chs. 4 & 5.
26) Iriye, 1965, chs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
34) Iriye, 1965, p. 98.
36) Louis, 1971, chs. 4 & 5.
38) Iriye, 1965, p. 82.
41) Louis, 1971, p. 133.
49) Iriye, 1965, p. 184 and passim.
52) Iriye, 1965.
54) Iriye, 1960.
55) Iriye, 1965, ch. 7, e.g., p. 244.
56) Iriye, 1965, ch. 7.

Notes to Chapter 25
1) For a detailed account of the Kwantung Army's actions, see Ogata, 1964; NKSG, 1962-1963, vol. 2. For a history of the Kwantung Army, see Shimada, 1965.
2) For Japan's search for national security and economic autonomy, see Crowley, 1966.
3) The Japanese economy seems to have suffered from the world depression less severely than the US and British economies. See Kindleberger, 1973, p. 280. This was due in part to the relatively low-rate growth of the Japanese economy in the 1920's and the recurrent depressions before the World Depression.
14) T'ien, 1972; Pauw, 1957.
20) Hindmarsch, 1936, p. 81.
22) Prince Konoe was an example. See Oka, 1972.
31) Louis, 1971, p. 28.
40) Louis, 1971, p. 185.
44) Sir John Pratt quoted by Crowley, 1966, p. 156.

Notes to Chapter 26


15) T'ien, 1972; Domes, 1969.

16) This paragraph draws on Paauw, 1957.

17) T'ien, 1972, ch. 4.


23) For the politics of nationalism in the 1930's, see Van Slyke, 1967.


31) Louis, 1971, ch. 7.


33) B.A. Lee, 1971, p. 204.


49) Louis, 1971, p. 239.


52) Louis, 1971, p. 207.


56) Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, as quoted by Louis, 1971, p. 242.

Notes to Chapter 27

9) For isolationism, see Jonas, 1966.
13) Clifford, 1972, p. 133.
25) The view that the US policy was the one of deterrence catches only a part of the story. (Ike, 1967; Hosoya, 1968; Russett, 1972). It was a policy of compellence. The most important point of the US demand was to turn the clock back 10 years, i.e., status quo ante Japanese aggression in East and Southeast Asia. As Iriye notes, "the Japanese-American conflict was a struggle between two different definitions of peace and order in the Far East." (Iriye, 1974, p. 459). For the distinction between deterrence and compellence, see Schelling, 1960 and 1966.

Notes to Chapter 28
1) See, for example, O.R. Young, 1968; George/Hall/Simons, 1971.

Notes to Chapter 29
2) Eisenstadt, 1969.
4) Quoted by Thomson, 1973, p. 81.
5) See the quote for chapter 1, p. 9.
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