## The Integrated State: Architecture, Planning, and Politics in Mexico, 1938-1958

by

Albert José-Antonio López

BArch, University of Southern California (2010) MS.CCCPArch, Columbia University (2012)

Submitted to the Department of Architecture in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture:

History and Theory of Architecture

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Signature of Author:

Department of Architecture
August 6, 2021

Certified by:

Arindam Dutta
Professor of Architectural History

Accepted by:

Leslie K. Norford Professor of Building Technology Chair, Department Committee on Graduate Students

Thesis Supervisor

# **Thesis Supervisor**

**Arindam Dutta, PhD** Professor of Architectural History

## and readers

**Mark Jarzombek, PhD**Professor of the History and Theory of Architecture

**Timothy Hyde, PhD** Associate Professor of Architectural History

Robin Greeley, PhD Associate Professor of Modern & Contemporary Latin American Art History University of Connecticut

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This dissertation focuses on the intersections of the professionalization of architecture, regional and national infrastructure planning, and Mexican politics during the first three decades following the Mexican Revolution. I especially aim to shed light on the political and managerial role of architects during a crucial period of pseudo state-corporatism, dominant party political "institutionalization," and ideologically fraught nationalist socio-economic development occurring between the late 1930s to mid-1950s.

I argue that architects became central figures in mid-century Mexican political society and the state's planning bureaucracy as Mexico's mode of governmentality shifted from an ideologically flexible post-conflict reconstructionist model to various modalities of governance ranging from socialist and nationalist interpretations of pseudo state-corporatism, increasing executive branch empowerment with varied levels of presidentialism, and eventually the embrace of a developmentalist, technocratic and bureaucratic authoritarianism.

An important faction of Mexican Architects argued their indispensability to political society and appealed to popular support via print journalism, but also public speeches, and use of other mass forms of media, in a broad and long-term collective mobility project. The key claim of this faction – and in particular the small handful of its most capable and already politically connected leaders – was that the architectural profession possessed not only artistic and creative defining qualities, but also technical and managerial capabilities that could serve the very particular constructive needs of post-revolutionary nation-state construction and socio-economic development. They additionally sought to differentiate their training, especially in regards to their expertise on urbanism, town and regional planning, and graphic projection in general so as to distinguish themselves from other technical professions, such as engineering, as they competed for primacy in the growing bureaucracies that held jurisdiction over the infrastructural organization of the national territory. However, some of the deepest inroads by architects into Mexican political society were made by those who proved to be equally capable in using the written and spoken word so as to characterize themselves as public intellectuals, visionaries, and moral reformers. These were powerful figures in the construction of a modern public and political consciousness at a time when Mexico was undergoing internal crisis and transformation due to outcries against corruption, uncertain developmentalist success, changing political dispensations, and the framing of new legitimizing, regenerative, and nationalist modernizing programs.

> Thesis Advisor: Arindam Dutta Title: Professor of Architectural History

### Acknowledgments

Nearly ten years have passed since I applied to PhD programs while a Master's student in the Critical, Curatorial, and Conceptual Program for Architecture at Columbia University's GSAPP. In retrospect, it was perhaps one of the most serious and life-changing decisions that I have ever made. Mary McLeod, Felicity Scott, Kenneth Frampton, and the late Brian Brace Taylor gave me significant encouragement to pursue my academic career and supported my decision to come to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and its program for History, Theory, and Criticism of Architecture, and for that I must thank them here at the beginning of my acknowledgments.

The faculty of HTC deepened my methodological frameworks and broadened my fields of inquiry, and have been key to my successes as a young architectural historian. I wish to thank my committee for their continuous support. Mark Jarzombek and Timothy Hyde, in their readings of my dissertation chapters, have provided me with many valuable insights; likewise, at the defense they posed many new questions that will serve to guide me as I take my research forward. I especially wish to thank my advisor and committee chair, Arindam Dutta, for being the necessary fire under my seat, a voice of reason and compassion, an at-times harsh critic, and above all a sincere supporter of my work. I furthermore wish to give special thanks to Robin Greeley of the University of Connecticut for agreeing to be on my committee, further instilling within me a deep appreciation for modern Mexican art and architecture, putting me in contact with numerous institutions in Mexico City, and for quite literally giving me a map to navigate myself around the city when I first began my research there in the summer of 2014.

I've considered this dissertation as having been a vessel that has carried me to many foreign ports far from the desk that I held in Cambridge; through this project I have been introduced to countless individuals whose knowledge and kindness cannot be thanked enough in just a single page of acknowledgments. The first persons that I met outside of MIT and my committee who helped steer me in the right direction were Luis Castañeda and Cristina López Uribe; in addition to encouraging me early on to pursue my topic, the former was essential to me in finding my home – the *Hotelito San Rafael* – in Mexico City, while the latter generously opened the door for me into the Facultad de Arquitectura of the Universidad Nacional Aútonoma de México.

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In the years that I frequented Mexico, I have been welcomed by many archival institutions and have met countless individuals within the academic, architectural, and professional world that have contributed in some shape or form to the completion of this dissertation. I am profoundly grateful to the countless persons who attended to my needs and inquiries at the *Archivo General de la Nación*. It has been my primary fount of new knowledge

and is a treasure to all researchers on things Mexican as well as to the Mexican Nation; I hope that its use and access remain open with integrity for generations to come.

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Mexico City is a place of chance encounters and generous introductions. On at least two occasions, I have received very generous connections to persons who furthered my knowledge on my topic. The first instance occurred at the bed and breakfast that I called home for a time and which was for years was a point of convergence for Mexicanists in all fields, especially within history and the arts. Over breakfast, I sat across from Barbara Mundy, the author of a fascinating book on Tenochtitlan and the early viceregal capital of Mexico City. While describing my research on the architect Carlos Lazo Barreiro, she recognized an affinity between my interests and those of a colleague. She put me in contact with James Oles. Oles and I were able to share a handful of very valuable conversations regarding the photomurals of Lola Álvarez Bravo and the work of *Editorial Espacios*; their art historical expertise contributed to expanding my perspectives and objects of inquiry in this architectural history. The second chance encounter and introduction happened one evening while I was attending a cocktail party held by the MIT Club de México. The event was being hosted at the house of the economist and former Secretary of Finance, Pedro Aspe. As he asked all of the student attendees to describe their scientific research, development-oriented plans, or business ventures in Mexico, I meekly said that I was an historian of architecture and studying the role of Carlos Lazo in the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works. "Lazo! Grande Mexicano! I went to school with his son!" He generously forwarded my name to his secretary who then passed it to the secretary of Lorenzo Lazo Margaín. I soon found myself in the living room of Mr. Lazo Margáin, where he served me a scotch while giving me a very personal view into the life of his father who passed away when he was only a child. I am extremely grateful for having had such generous and colorful experiences during my years of research in Mexico City.

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Introduction: Political Integration and the Technical State

#### I. State Institutionalization and Political Transition

The Mexican State of the early mid-20th century, as the product of a Revolution (1910-1920) best characterized as a civil war of protracted series of varied class-inspired reformations, factional reactions, regional power grabs, foreign interventions, and to an extent ideological struggles, was a heterogeneous amalgamation of interests. Likewise, within a span of a few decades and presidential administrations, its definition developed through several distinct phases in which its strength and structures shifted so as to accommodate the varied ebb and flow of both internal and external social, class-based, and ideological tensions, and a manifold political economic exigencies and imaginaries. More recent historical works have increasingly favored a narrative portraying the formation of the modern Mexican State as a complicated and at times bottom-up negotiation of these varied interests as opposed to older perspectives that favored a more hegemonic focused, top-down approach treating the major political parties, large state institutions, and elite powerholders as the primary movers that shaped the development of Mexico throughout the last century.<sup>2</sup> Though very much a product of a non-monolithic social and ideological conflict and constructive process, the dynamics of the State's formation lay somewhere in between these two historiographical models since the State and a dominant, though not unchallenged, political party undeniably developed into at-times highly centralized and increasingly bureaucratic apparatuses by the end of the 1930s. The intertwined if not wholly integrated relationship between the State, the dominant Party, and small and at times very

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Alan Knight, "The Modern Mexican State: Theory and Practice," in *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America*, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López Alves (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A valuable collection of essays reinforcing a non-hegemonic perspective of Mexican State formation can be found in: Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern México* (Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press, 1994).

cohesive ruling class meant that this governing system was able to maintain a comparably high standard of functionality, meaningful power, and to a somewhat lesser extent social control roughly until the late 1960s.<sup>3</sup> This dissertation focuses on the points of contact with these two models of State formation, analyzing the role that urban civilians and college-educated educated professionals played starting in the mid-1920s but especially between the mid-1940s through mid-1950s in the advocacy of creating new large-scale state institutions that could efficiently handle the socio-economic planning of the modern Mexican State. In this history, elite and professional members of Mexico's civil society actively engaged with members of the established political society, selectively were admitted into their ranks playing key roles in the construction of a modernizing, integrative, development-oriented State and furthering attempts to incorporate, institutionalize, and legitimize the authority of the dominant party.

The emergence of the modern and consolidated Mexican State in the wake of a lengthy and destructive period of political conflict has often been broken into at least two different periods. These two eras, for the sake of simplicity, have been referred to as "revolutionary," or "incorporative," for the first and "post-revolutionary," "institutional," and economically "miraculous," for the second. <sup>4</sup> The former era can be defined by the tumultuous aftermath of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A prolonged series of highly public acts of state violence as well as natural and man-made disasters irreparably broke public confidence in this arrangement of power, thus increasing efforts of various sectors of the Mexican public to seek and build new institutions amongst themselves so as to maintain the integrity of society. The traditional breaking point for this social and political arrangement has centered around the notorious incidents surrounding the 1968 Mexico City Olympics such as the Tlatelolco Massacre and mass arrests, torture, and murder of students and political dissidents. Arguably, the acts of public-confidence shaking state violence began much earlier than events of 1968. The violent suppression of the Railroad Worker's Strike beginning towards the end of the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) in 1958 and coming to a head in early 1959 during the presidency of Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) is a notable precedent. Other significant later examples demonstrating the loss of public confidence in the State and dominant political party can be found in the economic contractions after the 1970s, the Debt Crisis, and finally the 1985 earthquake and subsequent inaction of the government and the dominant party, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> These loosely defined political eras have been utilized to set apart distinct generations in Mexican political leadership. While I feel that the breaking up of social and political systems into rather neat generational blocks often times ignores the many continuities of power, mentality, and ideology that can exist within the *longue durée* of a political system, I nevertheless give some importance to this organization of Mexican political history. I do so on

Mexican Revolution, a period marked by persistent regional power struggles, instances of religion-inspired insurrection (1926-1929), and a resurgence of ostensible paternalistic, "strong man" governance during the term of Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) and the following period where he continued to exercise strong political power known as the *Maximato* (1928-1934).<sup>5</sup>

The supposed strength of this immediate post-conflict, revolutionary-period Mexican State, as an apparatus still in the early stages of coalescence, was in its still blatantly forceful strategies of neutralizing political threats followed by its first steps towards creating an effective political machine that could more formally build a cohesive political society. Despite these attempts towards the formation of a so-called "strong state," it was lacking as an apparatus for the strong management of the nation's political economy. To an extent it favored laissez-faire capitalism

account of the fact that many Mexican and foreign histories of Mexico have used such categorizations extensively since the events that I write about occurred. Though increasingly subject to criticism, these categorizations of eras still appear rather frequently in the day-to-day discussion of Mexican history. Finally, I find that the (at-least superficial) breaks in the continuity of Mexican political clientelism - the exchange of goods and services for political support - with the temporal phenomenon related to the political sexenio - or six-year presidential term – suggest that it is a means of historical and social organization not entirely worth disposing of. This clientelism within an expansive framing of the Mexican political machine is based not only on party-affiliation and economic interest, but also on complex professional, social, and personal loyalties. Within this system, the coming and passing of a generation (whether embodied by a social milieu or by a single person - in Mexico, the personaje) has real material consequences both for society at-large and upon the built landscape.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> After the major hostilities of the Revolution ceased and the various *caudillismos* – regional warlordships – that arose during that conflict were in some cases neutralized or incorporated to differing degrees into the systems of government, an ostensibly liberal, socially progressive, pro-capitalist republic was imagined and partially tested during the initial first two years of Plutarco Elías Calles's rule (1924-1928). Calles soon headed an unofficial dictatorship, however. After his presidency, Calles still largely controlled the political dynamics of the country. Known as the Maximato (1928-34), this semi-dictatorship was, according to political theorist and historian of Mexico Alan Knight, defined by the State acting in a manner that was largely autonomous from the interests of the broadly defined dominant class made up of non-military pre-revolutionary elites that were sympathetic or at least tolerant to the revolution and whose wealth had increased with the revolution's triumph. This iteration of the modern Mexican State, emerging on the heels of the conclusion of hostilities was, to be sure, an entity that largely operated by a revolutionary leadership made up of military men and their immediate social, familial, and business circles. Its political matters would eventually be administered through a single political party, the Partido Revolucionario Nacional (PRN), which was founded by Calles towards the end of his official presidency in 1929. Despite this, the Mexican State under Calles and the *Maximato* has been characterized in practice as a "weak" state: a paternalistic yet soft "night-watchman" mode of governance at best; a prematurely decadent, "laissez-faire" approach in leadership largely incapable of governing the fragile post-conflict amalgamation of divergent social and economic interests and newly arriving capital flow at worst. In contradiction to this weak characterization of the State, its putting down of the Cristero rebellion of 1926-1929 was a notable, brutal, and energy consuming exception. See: Knight, "The Modern Mexican State...", 186-189.

and when convenient it allowed for foreign investment, though the country's still shaky political stability coupled with the collapse of the global financial market beginning in 1929 limited this to an extent. Despite these political and state institutional shortcomings, the early postrevolutionary period created a very fertile environment for imagining strong executive institutions aimed at the development of the national economy. The visionaries of the State were not necessarily the military leadership; rather ideologues of various revolutionary paints conjured up cosmic prophesies, doctrines of forging a nation, and amongst the professional classes, more pragmatic visions at how to physically rebuild the ruined infrastructures of the country and rationally plan for an inevitable economic expansion. This was the period in which modern progressive yet pro-capitalist North American and reformist yet broadly socialistic European regional planning ideas first took root in Mexico, and were largely disseminated by a small group of relatively elite or otherwise noteworthy architects located in Mexico City. Their early advocacy made small but noteworthy inroads towards the State acknowledging these ideas, and prompted early legislation that would form the basis for future efforts towards regional and national planning. Together, these prompted the creation of the some of the earliest institutions and offices devoted to these disciplines, namely within the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (SCOP) – a federal institution with origins in the Porfiriato that was devoted to the national network of telecommunications, transportation, and other public works – as well as within a newly created regional entity, the *Departamento del Distrito Federal*. Though these

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> These "cosmic prophesies" belong to the philosopher, Secretary of Public Education, (1921-1924), and presidential candidate (1929) José Vasconcelos. They were published in his lengthy and influential essay "La Raza Cósmica" (1925). See, José Vasconcelos, *The Cosmic Race: A Bilingual Edition*, trans. Didier T. Jaén (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997). On the notion of forging a nation, I am directly referring to the anthropologist, Manuel Gamio's earlier but still highly influential work Forjando Patria (1916). See Manuel Gamio, *Forjando Patria: pro nacionalismo*, trans. Fernando Armstrong-Fumero (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2010). For a recent Spanish edition, see: Manuel Gamio, *Forjando Patria* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Note: The "Porfirian" dictatorship, also known as the *Porfiriato*, refers to the presidency-turned dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz (1830-1915). It lasted from 1876 to 1911. The Diaz administration created the *Secretaria de* 

institutions were open to members of the professional class, they did not necessarily empower them with the executive decision making reserved for the higher echelons of the State's leadership.

These professionalizing inroads and rationalizing imaginaries gained notable momentum in the period immediately leading up to the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).

Cárdenas rounded out the "revolutionary" or "incorporative" period with significant state-institutional reforms, a resurgent "revolutionary" attitude towards social reform, and the crafting of a modern presidential persona that left its mark on how the executive branch was portrayed in latter administrations. Significantly, he experimented with varying sorts of "socialism" during the first years of his term - especially visible in the administration's educational projects and laws for land reform; these political gestures strongly aided the political relevance of important left-wing ideologues within the highest bureaucratic positions within the Mexican executive branch, and notably aided in the incorporation of similar ideologically aligned professionals and technicians – including a small additional cadre of architects – into its more subaltern ranks. As it continued to develop, this administration proceeded to embrace economic nationalism through a series of expropriations and nationalizations by decree, the most significant of which were the key energy and transportation enterprises such as the railroads (1936) and the oil industry (1938).

Comunicaciones in 1891. It was renamed the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas in 1920. The Departamento del Distrito Federal was created in late 1928 in the beginning years of the so-called Maximato, and during the presidential term of Emilio Portes Gil (1928-1930).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Cárdenas came to power following the elections of 1934, though it's often noted that he had been essentially hand-picked by Calles. In a bold move, he asserted power and effectively neutralized the influence of the "Jefe Máximo." Under Cárdenas, the Mexican State continued to operate in a manner largely autonomous of the broadly defined ruling classes, but had over its progression continued to move more effectively towards being a so-called "strong" state. Knight, "The Modern Mexican State...", 186-189; Politically, the Cárdenas administration reorganized the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) - the dominant party under Calles and the Maximato - into the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM). The structure of the party make-up came to be specifically composed by four key sectors: industrial labor, campesinos, middle class (especially government workers), and the military. See: Charles H. Weston, Jr. "The Political Legacy of Lázaro Cárdenas," The Americas 39, no. 3 (January 1963): 388.

These factors, when coupled with the structuration of additional bureaucratic, technical-constructive, or otherwise managerial bodies, a more politically co-opted labor movement, and new essentially "official" organizations for the representation of class interests helped to characterize the Mexican State of the late 1930s as a "corporatistic" organism.<sup>9</sup>

The period stretching from the beginning of the Calles administration to the end of Cárdenas administration is critical to understanding many key political trends, class dynamics, and professional projects that shaped longer processes of state institutionalization and political consolidation in Mexico during the twentieth century. The first chapter of this dissertation looks back at that critical period as an incubator of ideas necessary for understanding the professional and political dynamics that produced the so-called "post-revolutionary" or "institutional" era. Of primary concern in this history are these same dynamics as they developed within the intermediary or transitional phase between these two chapters of modern state and political party formation in Mexico. The presidential term of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), Cárdenas's successor, was a critical period in the transition between the so-called "revolutionary" and "post-revolutionary" periods. Ávila Camacho presided over a six-year term, or sexenio, founded on a so-called movement for "National Unity." In contrast to the left-wing/socialistic, economic nationalist, and corporatist facets of governance under Cardenas, this "Unity" favored moderate, centrist to right-leaning policies that curbed the socialistic tendencies that marked the policies of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Cárdenas era state structure became highly corporatistic, with essentially "official" organizations for disparate class interests reinforcing an institutionalization of the selectively paternalistic and authoritarian behaviors of the Cárdenas government itself. The creation and expansion of bureaucratic bodies geared toward industrial development and requisite technical training for the managers of these new industries likewise appeared to elevate the interests of the middle class towards the latter part of his presidency. Cardenas's tenure reflected throughout similar, pragmatic series of political co-options and concessions that helped maintain the still relatively fragile revolutionary balance of power. See Alan Knight, "Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26, no. 1 (February 1994): 73-107.

previous administrations.<sup>10</sup> Without abandoning the corporatistic aspects of the Mexican State, certain aspects of Mexican economic nationalism were moderated, large-scale industrialization briefly deferred, and the Labor Unions were kept in check as the country gradually became more open to foreign influence and investment as well as the economic demands of the Allied Powers.<sup>11</sup> With the exception of a resurgent Post-WWII economic nationalism and a renewed focus on large-scale, import-substitution industrialization – key foundation blocks of the socalled "Mexican Miracle" - the general moderate-right shift embedded into the ostensible national-unitarian project of political incorporation continued to shape the general direction of state formation in the next two sexenios of Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952) and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958). Finally, in regards to the make-up of state functionaries, the waning years of the Avila Camacho sexenio was a particularly catalytic period in the transition between the socalled "revolutionary" and "post-revolutionary" cohorts of leadership. In this transition, the former, characterized by larger numbers of political figures of military origin, began to give way to a new group of politically vetted individuals characterized by their civilian and professional membership. This change to the prerequisite origins and qualifications of high-level Mexican State functionaries and political leadership became fully manifest in the Alemán and Ruiz Cortines administrations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For more on the politics of moderation during the period, see Chapter 2, "Avila Camacho's Moderation" in Stephen R. Niblo, *Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 75-148.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For information on the economic effects of the Second World War on Mexican economics, as well as the competing economic visions and political shifts under the Avila Camacho administration, see: Susan M. Gauss, "The Passion and Rationalization of Mexican Industrialism: Rival Visions of State and Society in the Early 1940s" in *Made in Mexico: regions, nation, and the state in the rise of Mexican industrialism, 1920s-1940s* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 94-130; For a thorough coverage on the authoritarian relation of the Mexican State to labor, and the process of co-option that was especially felt after 1948, see Kevin J. Middlebrook, *The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

This dissertation especially looks at the period roughly covering these last three presidential terms as a critical phase of political, professional, and economic transition that deserves an additional descriptive: integrative. This integrative and transitional phase of modern Mexican State construction was an amalgamation of many of the aforementioned descriptives used to define this transitional phase. The broadly defined concept of "integration" – more commonly understood in its sociological and economic sense – gives additional nuance in describing the variety of political, administrative, and professional projects that helped to define this particularly fluid period. How was this period of social, political, and administrative flux defined? This integrative period could be cast as just a semantic shift in the continuous processes of political consolidation and institutionalization that began when the dominant party – the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and its two institutional predecessors, the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) and the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) – was initially founded in 1929. To an extent, this is true with the existence of the already incorporative political party structure embodied especially by Cárdenas's PRM (1938-1946), and its more "institutionalized" successor the PRI (1946-). What sets this phase within the so-called transitional and early post-revolutionary period apart, however, was the State-Party apparatus's wrestling with internal and global ideological conflicts as well as varied developmentalist economic and political-administrative paths that were shaped by the Post-World War II environment. This fleeting period in Mexico was surely shaped by a global usage of integrationist economic logic as well as varied and contradictory "middle" or "third" way ideological and political visions of the interwar and immediate post-war. It briefly managed to demonstrate a degree of plasticity and measured willingness to integrate if not aggressively coopt or neutralize certain competing ideologies, political actors, and non-government institutional

bodies that sought – with varied success – differing means towards establishing the post-conflict consolidation of political power, the establishment of new social contracts and networks of patronage to suit a relatively dynamic socio-economic class structure, and the institutionalization of different entities and infrastructures to maintain an increasingly complex development-oriented State.

Especially starting with the Alemán administration, successive generations of new political actors, especially those whose political careers were bolstered by professional credentialization in various competing fields, sought integration into the existing mechanisms of the State or advocated the creation of new bureaucratic entities that could put their areas of expertise to use. 12 The State was seen by this small group of professionals as the most suitable modernizing structure for the manifestation of the nation that they envisioned. This protracted political evolution of the modern, or twentieth-century Mexican State, contributed to the gradual formation of what Alan Knight and other Latin American political historians have referred to as a both an "inclusionary" and "bureaucratic" authoritarian" state. 13 This transition into this politico-administrative model marked the beginning of an important shift in how power was exercised, governance was administered, and qualifications for leadership were determined by the Mexican State and the increasingly "institutional" party as it reached the heights of its political power and control. These processes were increasingly set into motion by a complex interplay between internal party decisions, civil (especially professional) input, as well as new

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For recent work focusing on the *sexenio* (six-year presidential term) of Miguel Alemán Valdés and the political generation that gained power during his term, see Ryan M. Alexander, *Sons of the Mexican Revolution: Miguel Alemán and his Generation* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For a thorough and nuanced definition of the modern Mexican State, see Knight, "The Modern Mexican State..." 177-218.

legal constructions that continued to define the relationship between the Mexican State and the dynamic classes and social groups of the Mexican People.

I additionally frame these years of political, administrative, and professional transition according to key shifts in architectural professional discourse – namely the evolution of the discourse of technical architecture and the architect as a managerial *técnico* – as well as the career trajectories of a small cast of critical actors that bridged the societies of the architectural profession and Mexican politics. I chose to emphasize how this complex array of forces and individuals contributed to imagining the formation and administration of large-scale bureaucratic agencies involved in infrastructure construction, regional socio-economic planning, and administrative rationalization and centralization. In addition, I focus on how these actors added nuance and vision – if not paths taken – to Mexico's winding road to authoritarianism, tritely defined to this day as a sort of "perfect dictatorship." 14

### II. Political and Civil Society during the Transition: Towards a New Leadership

The "strong" Mexican State that was in the process of coalescence during the 1940s was increasingly seen by its critics as serving the interests of a "dominant class." The political and social criticism of the period noted that the revolutionary leadership had become entrenched and was sustained by the increasingly institutionalized systems of political power. They formed a part of a "dominant class," or inchoate oligarchy, that in reality drew from various sectors within Mexican society. The empowerment of this class emerged out of a political system where ties to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This characterization was famously coined by the Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa in 1990 at a gathering of intellectuals organized by Mexican author Octavio Paz. The single party dominance of Mexico for nearly eight decades was, according to Vargas Llosa, a symbol of perfection since even with elections, it represented an essentially camouflaged dictatorship.

the revolutionary leadership could mean favors in exchange for political loyalty; non-military associated, regional, and other established elites that the "strong" state sought to keep in check with patronage and positions also belonged to this class. These are attributes of a political system shaped by a latent *caudillismo* – which refers to a situation in which a personalist leadership wields considerable military as well as political power – as well as *caciquismo* – which refers to the exercise of regional power by local "bosses" and strongmen. These factors contributed to a perceived decadent political culture described by its critics as an informal system of closely-knit revolutionary-era power circles where political impunity, bribery, graft, and other shameless conflicts of interest had become commonplace.

To be sure, the military sector dominated – with some notable exceptions – many of the key offices within the Mexican executive branch of government since the end of hostilities in the twenties. The presence of military members on the presidential throne or within the cabinet was the norm until the late 1930s-early 1940s when members of this group began to retire, die, or were otherwise politically neutralized. The union of blood could at times further cement membership in the inchoate oligarchy of the revolutionary period, case in point being President Ávila Camacho's older brother, General Maximino Avila Camacho. The notoriously autocratic, arrogant, and self-enriching governor of the state of Puebla had been given, or in other accounts simply claimed the cabinet position of head of the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* when Manuel came to office. <sup>17</sup> Elsewhere within this "dominant class," there remained

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> On *caciquismo* and the impediment it imposed upon "dominant party" reform, see Lesley Byrd Simpson, *Many Mexicos* (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 341-343.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For more on the subject of corruption in Mexican politics during the period see Chapter 5, "The Politics of Corruption" in Stephen R. Niblo, *Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 253-309; For the characterization of corruption as a critical component in the decline of Mexico's Revolutionary ethos, see "La Crisis" in Jesús Silva Herzog, *La Revolución en Crisis* (México City: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1944), 32-36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Maximino died suddenly in February 1945 shortly before the PRM's nomination - or *dedazo* - of its chosen presidential candidate. This occurred not long after he reportedly proclaimed his intent to kill Miguel Alemán

some older elite families whose, at times, opportunistic political alliances allowed for their wealth and power to increase. These prestigious families, many of whom were situated in Mexico City or at least maintained a residence there so as to have a physical connection with the nation's political power, varied in ideological leanings, possessed their own ostensibly autonomous institutional systems of power – most notably the University – and in various capacities proved themselves indispensable or at least loyal (at times as a sort of "loyal opposition") to the revolutionary leadership.<sup>18</sup> In addition, a small but growing number of foreign investors and ex-pats were drawn to the country by the onset of a post-WWII economic boom often referred to as the "Mexican Miracle." <sup>19</sup> These individuals could hold indirect political influence in particular if members of the autochthonous dominant class and political leadership stood to benefit financially.

The transition to the so-called post-revolutionary era was defined by a challenge to this loosely defined *junta*-cum-oligarchy. The critics of this sociopolitical arrangement – namely intellectuals and professionals both of various leftist tenors who sensed a betrayal of the socialist projects initiated by his predecessor as well as by varied liberal, reformist, as well as more right-wing tendencies that may have still been dissatisfied with the results of the previous election – made it a point to specifically cast the Ávila Camacho administration as well as much of the era

Valdés, his political rival, should he receive the nomination. How exactly his timely heart-attack occurred has caused much speculation – rumor, so common in political systems where information is tightly controlled, suggested it was not accidental and was perhaps a sign that the party was still willing to engage in decisive means of internally controlling its membership and future political course. Whatever the cause of his expiration, his death likely adverted a constitutional crisis. With him, the age of generals had at least symbolically come to a conclusion. Enrique Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 493.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For a study on Mexican political society and recruitment that largely looks at elite structures of power, especially those tied to the civilian and college-educated classes of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, see: Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Knight, "The Modern Mexican State...", 186-187.

of "revolutionary" leadership under a dark cloud of corruption.<sup>20</sup> These ideologically disparate groups – unified in their common identity as an ascendant, broadly pro-development professional class of varied middle- and upper-class origins – cited, in nationalistic and revolutionary rhetoric, that the Nation's socio-economic and moral progress had stalled or was in retrograde. Whether or not this was a wholly truthful assessment of the Ávila Camacho presidency was immaterial. This was a rhetorical move necessary for the discrediting of one generation of Mexico's political society so as to make the ingression of a new cadre of individuals into its close ranks possible.

In addition to highlighting a general perception of political decay, the critics that fanned the flames of the legitimation crisis of the mid-1940s honed their attacks into a questioning of the moral and intellectual qualifications of the current dispensation. This form of critique was integral to various professional projects already operating within civil society and in professionals' advocacy of their importance in modern governance as well as the expansion of posts within the increasingly bureaucratic and development-oriented state that specifically

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Manuel Ávila Camacho came to power in the violent and hotly contested elections of 1940. In this election he faced Juán Andreu Almazán, former revolutionary general and later the head of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas between February 1930 and October 1931 during the administration of Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Almazán represented a complicated mélange of right-wing or simply anti-PRM interests under the short-lived moderate-right Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Nacional (PRUN) and its coalition with the socialdemocratic Partido Laborista Mexicano (PLM) and the more conservative, Catholic-corporatist, regionalist Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) recently founded by the former rector of the Universidad Nacional de México, Manuel Gómez Morin (1897-1972). Despite the ideologically complicated coalition that gave rise to accusations of its populist and fascistic tendencies, during his bid for the presidency Almazán claimed to represent a more liberal and progressive ethos that was still framed according to the multivalent language of the Revolution and its contested legacy. Significantly, he condemned what he considered to be the socialistic and authoritarian extremes of Cardenismo. His loss was the source of meaningful political discontent especially amongst certain professional sectors, many of which had proportionally high electoral representation in Mexico City. For more on Ávila Camacho's election to the presidency and the political tensions of the period see: Chapter One, "Opportunity: The Election of 1940" in Aaron W. Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 13-120; Though perhaps motivated by political gain or positioning, critics' recognition of corruption was not out of place given Mexico's status as an emerging industrial economy rooted in a pre-industrial and colonial past now filled with numerous new sources of wealth accumulation. As can be gleaned from numerous global case-studies of development, claims of government corruption typically go hand-in-hand with the implementation of many industrializing or otherwise developmentalist policies and most importantly their failings. Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption" in *Political* Corruption: A Handbook, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 378-379.

required the expertise that they offered. This transition in the make-up of Mexican political society was significant in that it was defined by the emergence of a new and soon-to-be dominant body of civilian professionals (heterogeneously composed of the sons of powerful families and members of a middle class). As a critical step in the evolution of the Mexican State's bureaucratic-authoritarian nature, these individuals increasingly infiltrated the ranks of Mexico's administrative and governing bodies. Many of the new dispensation could be defined as an intellectual and professional elite. The traditional professions – law, medicine, engineering, and to an extent architecture – had pre-existing histories with the politico-administrative make-up of the Mexican State, and made up the more significant portion of this growing and now politically ascendant class. This ascendant class was also defined, however, in that its constitution was also made up of members of new and still ill-defined professional categories in México. Members of this vaguely defined group of intellectual elites were pulled at times from or co-existed within the traditional professions; others were drawn from new scientific, or scientific-leaning disciplines that were taking root in Mexico, such as economics. These gradually and unevenly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The professionalization of the political class along with the replacement of a majority of the military ruling class gained momentum with the close of the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946), a moment when the main political party (at that point the PRM) was reorganized once again to form the current Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The political dominance of the professional class was one of the defining features of the first presidency of the 'post-revolutionary' period, Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952). In contrast to the previous political generation that had emerged from the Revolution, the political cliques that formed the Alemán administration had higher numbers of college-educated individuals representative of various disciplines and professions. Individuals with legal backgrounds were still predominant amongst the members of the political society of the mid-century. Also of note, economists were increasing in number but had yet to attain their hegemony within the upper echelons of the political system. Being a técnico - a term that by the 1930s represented a general intellectual tenor representative of its largely heterogeneous professional composition rather than any specific profession or specialization - was increasingly becoming a pre-requisite for political consideration in certain administrative sectors. This political generation is often typified by the increase in college education by its members, its actors often trained and labeled as (licenciados). This term, in its broadest sense, usually connotes the completion of a *carrera universitaria* - professional career training with a university diploma. The diploma, especially in state-run institutions, was effectively a license to practice said profession. More narrowly, a licensiado came to define those with educations in law. On the major role played by the legal profession within the modern Mexican state see Smith, 89-90; On the rise of economists in Mexico see Sarah Babb, Managing Mexico. Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

became classified as *técnicos* - a term that often carried the connotation of being a "specialist."<sup>22</sup> These professional and technocratic leaning reformers came from varied political and ideological formations. They were largely positivistic in their approach to liberal trade policy and paternalistic labor relations, while some of these promoted an activist and autonomous state that would more strongly direct economic development and promote a particular understanding of social welfare that was partly inspired by Catholic corporatist responses to Marxist ideas of social revolution. Their ideological positions were at times blurred however, in as much as one can discern the influence of broadly leftist interpretations regarding the State's equally broad and varied "revolutionary" responsibilities to its citizens.<sup>23</sup>

In reaction to the criticism and professional advocacy that shaped the perceived crisis during the twilight of the Ávila Camacho *sexenio*, his administration began to usher in a series of ameliorative legal and administrative frameworks in the last full year of his presidency that were directed towards negotiating the conflict between Mexico's political and civil/professional societies. Most notable amongst these was the passing, in 1945, of the *Ley Reglamentaria de los Artículos 40 y 50 Constitucionales*, or the *Ley de Profesiones* (Regulatory Law of Constitutional Articles 4 and 5 – the "Law of Professions"), which further amended the constitution regarding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Note: Ironically, the role of *técnicos* as reformists and experts within a modernizing state echoed the technocratic and positivistic trappings of the last stages of the Porfirian regime that the Revolution had replaced. The controversial Diaz dictatorship admittedly did manage to bring a degree of political-economic stability to Mexico in contrast to the decades of frequent cyclical upheaval that had initiated after independence at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In its later years, the regime liked to define itself by its embrace of economic "progress," driven in part by a group of positivist technocrats, known as *científicos* (translated as "those scientifically oriented"), which served as key actors within the Porfirian leadership at the start of the twentieth century.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This characterization of Mexican technocrats is described in the introduction of Gauss "The Passion and Rationalization of Mexican Industrialism," 8. She notes the emergence of this breed of technocrats in the aftermath of the Revolution during the mid-1920s. However, these characterizations hold largely true for this group well into the 1950s. I add that the political and ideological turn to the left during the mid to later 1930s diversified the body of economic thought that this younger generation of technocrats would have been exposed to in their training. Despite the attempts to reign in the political left as well as the Post-WWII banning of Mexico's Communist Party, the influence of various interpretations of broadly socialist and at times abjectly Marxist economic theory can be found to various degrees within the belief systems and practices of the otherwise centrist, statist, and nationalist technocrats of the post-WWII period.

the classification and treatment of professionals, formed new professional colleges or societies that more specifically acted as formal interfaces with the State, and – in what can be interpreted as a sign of either their political integration or co-option - clearly stated that all professionals had an ultimate duty unto the Nation and State.<sup>24</sup> Of perhaps more symbolic significance was the passing of the Ley General de Bienes Nacionales (General Law of National Assets), which called for a professionally led financial oversight organization within the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit). By the administration of Miguel Alemán Valdés, this was its own cabinet-level dependency – the Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales e Inspección Administrativa (Secretariat of National Assets and Administrative Inspection).<sup>25</sup> These legal and formal gestures further contributed to the growing relevance and empowerment of the university-trained, civilian, professional, and to an extent, técnico dominated dispensation that was achieving more leadership roles at many different levels of authority within the bureaucratic state. More cynically, the move was a tactical gesture meant to ensure the peaceful transition from one generation of leadership unto another during the 1946 elections thereby ensuring the preservation of rule by the dominant party, itself undergoing a process of reorganization and rebranding from the PRM into the current Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).<sup>26</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> "Ley Reglamentaria de los Artículos 4o y 5o Constitucionales, Relativos al Ejercicio de las Profesiones en El Distrito y Territorios Federales," *Diario Oficial de la Nación*, May 26, 1945.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> For the text of the Ley General de Bienes Nacionales, refer to *Ley General de Bienes Nacionales* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección de Bienes Nacionales, 1945). Note: A copy of this document was in the possession of Carlos Lazo Barreiro. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The PRI was officially established on January 9, 1946. It was, like the PRM and the PNR before it, a structure of containment for the conflicts that arose amongst Mexican political society. It was an institution that, according to Aaron Navarro, presented a "unified front to the nation while brokering the political battles of the elite behind closed doors." A primary political battle of concern during this restructuring of the "dominant party" was the narrowing of viable paths to national political power. In the restructuring of the PRM into the PRI, the military's sphere of influence was decisively diminished. Navarro, 121-122. For more on the political dynamics of the 1946 election see: Chapter Three, "The Civilian Ascendancy" in Navarro, 121-149. In as much as political slogans can define a political brand, of note was the transition from the PRM's theme of "For a Democracy of Workers" to "Democracy and Social Justice." This change of themes is noted in Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* 

### III. Strategies for Political Integration: Technical Language, Jurisdiction, and Crisis

In the context of the first phase of political institutionalization (1920-1938), a select group of architects - mindful of being in competition with other professions such as engineers within the expanding bureaucratic state - sought to achieve greater agency in post-conflict reconstructive efforts via adopting a common professional identification with more technical and rational disciplines. They did this via their discourse and advocacy of architectural functionalism and technicism – eventually known as *arquitectura técnica*. Another area around which certain architects sought greater agency in the formation of the built environment was through the emerging practice of regional planning. This was adopted and described in Mexico as *Planificación.* These two discourses and practices became key sources around which some architects made claims for an expanded area of professional jurisdiction and expertise. By the second phase of political institutionalization (1938-1955) – the focus of this dissertation – a new generation of architects sought to affirm these areas of jurisdiction by more actively assuming the professional and administrative title of técnico and expanding the scope of planificación with terms and concepts such as *integral* and *integración* so as to make manifest their visions of reforming the organization of the State and Mexico's political-economy. By adding new politico-administrative meaning to these concepts, this select group of architects aimed at achieving greater executive authority so as to carry out their plans. Some skillfully utilized these terms as political rhetorical strategy so as to vie for positions of leadership, thereby formally becoming a part of Mexican political society. This position of power within the nascent post-

<sup>(</sup>Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 101. Arguably this change in official party rhetoric was reflective of the moderate to center-right, Catholic social doctrine leaning, and positivistic tendencies of some of the new technocrats that gained clout in the PRI during the Alemán years.

revolutionary state was out of keeping with their traditionally perceived social stature amongst a body of professional experts largely composed of lawyers, engineers, and, to an extent, economists. This dissertation thus attempts to offer a response to a begged question: how did architects achieve such prominence as members of this increasingly bureaucratized ruling class of the Mexican state and the dominant party? More importantly: how did architects - members of a profession of some privilege and respectability in Mexican society but not traditional recruits for public office – manage to *argue* their indispensability in the construction of Mexico's new managerial State?

I emphasize the systemic nature of professions and how the architectural profession has functioned and developed within this system. In relation to professional jurisdiction, which is to say the ability of members of a profession to claim a certain expertise via sanctioned formal knowledge and therefore authority over specific tasks, sociologist Andrew Abbott notes that professions exist within an interdependent system.<sup>27</sup> This system is governed by claims of jurisdiction. It embodies a complex means of social and cultural control. While Abbott privileges the location of shifts in jurisdictional claims within an arena exclusive to interconnected professions, to external regulatory, legal, and organizational factors, or to technology, I add that some of the most important causes of these shifts - at least in the aforementioned case of revolutionary and post-revolutionary Mexico - came from a complex yet relatively small political arena marked by interpersonal relations, loyalties, and its resultant competition and areas of exclusion. While Mexico's political class was ultimately small, elite, and exclusive, its larger professional class - the make-up of its "system of professions" - was closely tied to the shifts of power within its political society. This was due in part to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See Chapter Four, "The System of Professions" in Andrew Delano Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 86-113.

complicated process of post-revolutionary political reorganization that gradually led to what is referred to as the professionalization of politics. Being a politician - a career which lacked a professional organizational framework or process of credentialization in its own right, required that the new civilian political class attain what could be considered an academic form of political legitimization via following an established university career track, licensure, and affiliation with related profession organizations - apparatuses that allowed for socially and legally valid claims to a specific yet flexible area of expertise.

I argue that one of the strategies utilized by certain architects in their attempt to carve out a space for themselves within this political society was the construction and mobilization of a professional language that allowed for the abstraction and expansion of its traditional areas of expertise. Rather than focus entirely on the built works of architects in this dissertation, I privilege the written and spoken language of the Mexican architects participating in the discourse of the profession, since in the political field – to paraphrase Bourdieu – spoken speech and written text are actions possessive of a special symbolic power which in turn can increase the power of the user.<sup>28</sup> These words were critical in the definition and representation of members of the architectural profession before the general public and political society. Within the context of this period in Mexico, words along with strategic professional narratives and their associated visual aids, perhaps more so than the buildings of the architect, were deeply engaged in a labor of representation that sought to form and realize their professional visions by mobilizing a consensus and a vote of confidence. Because the Mexican government was ostensibly of a democratic-republican nature, this consensus still required members from a broad public, including non-political elites, other professionals including other architects, and to an extent the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and symbolic power*, trans. by J. B. Thompson, ed. G. Raymond & M. Adamson (Cambridge, England: Polity Press: 1991).

general electorate, as evidenced by the forums utilized by these architects to communicate their arguments for a more expansive (and perhaps not too disinterested) culture of political inclusion.<sup>29</sup> However, because inclusion within an exclusive group largely depends upon the will of its already initiated members, the language of politically driven architects primarily had to mobilize a vote of confidence from the pre-existing members of Mexican political society upon whom their rise to power ultimately depended.<sup>30</sup>

By adopting the word *técnico* in the description of the professional role of the architect, Mexican Architects began to identify their discipline as one of a technical, scientific, and above all rational nature. This was, to an extent, a rhetorical move paralleling the language games of coercion, cooption, and the struggle for power of Mexican politics in the decades that followed its revolution. While some architects adopted the professional title of *técnico* in a manner that distinguished them with an aura of modernity and a political-economical purpose that spoke to the nation's larger project of industrialization and socio-economic development, it also obfuscated the traditional and largely artistic boundaries of the profession's expertise that could impede lateral and upward professional and political mobility. Use of this designation was a critical component of a professional collective mobility project, which is to say that it was intended to increase the status of architects through the expanded definition of their work and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Note: Mexican architects from the 1920-50s made use of professional journals, professional conferences, magazines, newspapers, and by the 1950s, television, to share topics from architectural discourse to a wider audience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Note: While certain Mexican architects sought entry into Mexico's political and administrative organization, their desire for this level of inclusion did not necessarily mean that architects at large had no direct contact with political society or weren't already involved within Mexico's revolutionary and post-revolutionary projects of statecraft. The political figures that emerged out of the Mexican Revolution needed architecture for the construction of the symbolic and functional tools of the new Mexican State - one must only consider Mexico City's imposing *Monumento a la Revolución* or the large-scale campaign to build schools throughout the national territory for the educational plans of the *Secretaría de Educación Pública*. Likewise, large-scale architectural projects served the increasingly civilian political class and dominant political party during the post-revolutionary period as evidenced by the large-scale participation of architects in the *Ciudad Universitaria* of the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM).

body of knowledge. 31 This project was collective according to its scope and means. However, it was also elite and to an extent individualistic in regards to its direction by a small cadre of architects who functioned as its leading theorists and ideologues, as well by its real benefits which ultimately would only be felt by a chosen few from within the profession's ranks. The language in its argument for expanded architectural jurisdiction sought to qualify the profession as a whole both in the eyes of the established political leadership, civil society and to an extent a questionably enfranchised general electorate as being eligible if not critical actors in modern Mexican statecraft. However, divisions existed within the architectural profession that stemmed from the use of this term. While use of the somewhat vague term técnico by an emergent group of new professional elites was ostensibly performed in the name of expanding the definition and arguably the inclusiveness of the architectural profession, it demonstrated that in the process of constructing a profession's technical language - a fundamental means of controlling its discipline - new word choices and neologisms played a central role in the very political function of exclusion.<sup>32</sup> Professionals who adopted the term could work their way into a position of political advantage. Those who pushed against the adoption of the new terminology and the culture of professional and disciplinary restructuring that came along with it could potentially stand at a political or at least career-disrupting disadvantage.

The strategic use of this technical language in certain architects' efforts towards professional mobility and political inclusion were bolstered by a perception of political crisis. As noted previously, by the mid-1940s, the aging cadre that had come to power with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> For more on the role that discourse has on the shaping of a discipline and the role that language has in the acts of control and exclusion, please refer to Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

Revolution had entered a legitimation crisis that was tied into the growing public perception - likely felt most by the ascendant, pro-development middle-class - that the nation's socio-economic and moral progress had reached an inflection point. While the perceptions of a political culture guilty of graft, favoritism, and other forms of corruption during the Ávila Camacho administration were central to the perception of crisis, so too was the changing ideological tenor and perceived abandonment of critical revolutionary social projects that for some had come to a point during that administration. A number of goals of the Revolution – there had been many and they were at times contradictory – were revisited, recodified, and championed at the same time that they were portrayed as being in critical jeopardy.<sup>33</sup> Within architectural profession-oriented literature, as well as in more general content written for a broader Mexican public, a younger generation of architects took advantage of this crisis and offered very pointed opinions in regards to the perceived failures in revolutionary progress. Planning theory along with the increasingly technical discourse of architecture became vehicles of social and political-economic critique.

The architectural discourse that focused on the reformist and modernizing concepts of the *técnico/a*, *planificación*, and eventually *integral/integración* was, as already mentioned, inextricably connected with a broad, yet faction-defined, project of professional collective mobility. With certain voices within the architectural literature of the period focused on corruption and political scandal, it was evident that the collective professional mobility was not solely reliant on professionals' capability to argue the exceptional nature of their expertise and direct this towards claims for an expanded jurisdictional authority. This collective mobility project was, after all, a project that sought to direct architects into the very structures and seats of

<sup>33</sup> Niblo, 253-309; Herzog, 32-36.

government that it criticized. The rhetoric of denouncing corruption in their spoken and written speech was a critical device in the discrediting of competing individual professional and political agents, cadres, and parties. By sowing doubt in the efficacy of the present leadership as well as the rationality of the political structures that they operated within, such criticism aided the growth of a (largely elite) public perception of both a vacuum in qualified leadership and, to an extent, institutional decadence if not outright obsolescence. These strategies were applied within a changing political clime already marked by an incipient generational turn-over and the rise of new, professionally trained, political *camarillas* – or patron-client type social spheres of political influence and power - which taken together aided the aggrupation of a new professional bloc that could effectively wrest control of key administrative offices.<sup>34</sup>

This mode of critical architectural and planning discourse additionally made use of the rhetorical strategy of a particular code switching that acknowledged the ideological and factional divides in Mexican political society. This tactic was not uncommon to the general trends of Mexican political speech of the period. The reformation of aspects of architecture's professional language with the appropriation of the term *técnico/a*, the creation of the neologism of *planificación*, and increasingly through the late 1930s through 1950s of the related terms of *integración* and *integral* were symptomatic of the broader phenomena of political speech transformation that was occurring during the political shift that marked the beginning of a new "post-revolutionary" period for the modern Mexican State. While the importance of the many social, legal, and institutional aspects of political culture that underwent change during this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Arguably, the strategies employed by these architects and similar critics of the previous political dispensation followed a rhetorical strategy that is known as a "ritualistic deposition. For more on the act of "ritualistic deposition" in anti-corruption rhetoric, see: Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetoric of Political Corruption," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 175-180.

transitionary period in Mexico's long process of political consolidation cannot be understated, it has been argued that the political speech – defined here in a broad sense that includes verbal, written, graphic, as well as formal/physical forms of communication – used within these newly emerging frameworks and forums of political engagement must be considered as a critical and yet understudied element in the emergence of this modern Mexican political system. As noted by historian Aaron Navarro, by the first half of the 1940s, political speech – a term that he uses even more broadly to denote multiple modes of communication - was relying less on physical acts of violence that had characterized the county's especially problematic transitions of power. Instead, he argues that a more "modern" form of political speech was being adapted by the dominant political party and its post-revolutionary leadership that relied on new forums and technologies of political engagement, political restructuring, ideological improvisation, and rhetorical strategies to co-opt and neutralize the threat of opposition.<sup>35</sup>

As the Mexican State became more bureaucratic and increasingly dominated by university-educated civilians, these factors contributed the dominant party being more receptive to, if not immediately or entirely adopting, the professional terminology used by the newest interlopers into Mexican political society. This new technical-inspired political speech served a clear rhetorical purpose during this phase of changing political speech, namely in bolstering the credentials of key political institutions as well as reinvigorating public faith in the supposed qualifications of its leadership. While changes in the fora and technological modes of communication proved significant in the use and dissemination of language and words employed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> For more on "political speech" and its role in the organization of Mexico's ruling party and strategic use in electoral politics in the early mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, see: Navarro, 259-268. Note: While new technological forums and disseminators of political speech gained use in Mexico during the mid-20th century in the forms of radio, film, and television, the primary vehicle of presenting and disseminating the expanded "political speech" of the era was the printed mass media with newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and the like.

in these legitimacy-oriented rhetorical strategies, of equal importance to the transformations in the "political speech" of this transitional period was a certain ideological multivalency in the meaning of these new key political terms.<sup>36</sup> The political implications of the adoption of a protechnical multivalent political speech were manifold. Where the blur of positionality could be seen as the result of a sincere consonance of ideas between different sectors of Mexico's ideological spectrum, it also provided the dominant party with a more ideologically integrative rhetorical strategy that could be deployed in the formation of the new ostensibly protechnical and professional coalition. But in other cases where this rhetorical strategy was more a sign of a political pragmatism and improvisation, at once attempting to pronounce the inevitability of an ideologically neutral, synthetic, or syncretistic model of development and social justice under the aforementioned pretense of "Unity," while ignoring the still present deeper ideological contradictions in such a project as well as the convictions of its less integrated or orthodox members, it provided fertile ground for perhaps necessary polemic.

While incorporation into the Mexican political arena was by no means governed by liberal meritocracy, debate and conflict about divergent methodologies amongst strained coalitions within the party could contribute – though not necessarily determine - to decisions regarding membership and political paths taken. The dominant party's apparent embrace of this strategy was paralleled by similar rhetorical actions both by high-leveled allied as well as oppositionary political, civil, and professional bodies as they jockeyed for position within their own ranks as well as in the struggle to achieve standing within the restructuring state. Taken together, this process of navigation via speech and ideas through a dynamic, polemical, and transitional political environment further contributed to the already layered meanings of keys

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> For more on the ideological multivalency of words, please refer to J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), 19.

terms shared by the Mexican State and Dominant Party's political economic lexicon and the architectural and planning professions.

Chapter 1: Professionalism, Political Language, *Planificación*, and the rise of the *Técnico* in Mexico, 1920-1938

## I. The *Técnico*: Professional Language and the Emergence of a new Concept

What was a *técnico*? And more importantly, who could be defined as one? By the 1960s - that is to say, in the decade immediately following the scope of this history - the term in question had developed into a fairly specific job title. Raymond Vernon wrote in his 1965 book *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* of the "economic technician" and their capability "of holding up [Mexico's] end in [international] interchange" through their expertise in "esoteric matters." By then, *técnicos* were practically synonymous with economists - a designation within political discourse that persisted well throughout the twentieth century. This designation was an oversimplification. Despite the emergence of the professional economist as a key advisory figure in Mexico's global political-economic matters of the later mid-century, they had yet to dominate the political system - even in its more internal and national affairs - in the first half of that era (1940-50s). It is therefore a mistake to entirely equate economists with *técnicos* during this transitional period in Mexican history.

To answer the "what" and "who" in the definition of the *técnico* during this period it is important to stress that the word "*técnico*" was conceptually layered, re-brandable, and multivalent.<sup>39</sup> What the word meant in 1925 was different from what it meant in 1932 or 1938, and certainly from what it turned into by the early 1950s. To gain a sense of the complex political connotations of this word, why certain mid-century Mexican architects so strongly identified with it, and what changes to the profession that it implied, it is necessary to briefly

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 136.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Vernon, 137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> The rebrandable quality of words is discussed by Friedrich Nietzsche in "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense" in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The birth of tragedy and other writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 145; For more on the temporal nature of language and the ideological multivalency of words, see J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), 19.

expand the purview of this history. The development of the professional title and Spanish noun "técnico" (roughly equivalent to the term "technician") shares much with the semantic shifts of another noun: "técnica" (a term that is roughly equivalent to the term "technique," but can also imply the concepts of rationalization and technology); as well as with the adjective "técnica/o" (translatable as "technical"). A shift occurred in the use of the Spanish word during the first third of the twentieth century that in many ways reflected the evolution of the late nineteenth century German discourse of die Technik and its importation into the writings of early twentieth century social scientists from the United States. 40 In this shift, the connotations of individual technique or purely investigative and consultative functions in the adjective form of the word began to break down. Instead, the word took on a complex meaning that referred to the general rules, procedures, and skills required for achieving specific constructive goals, a systemic conceptualization of the individual utilitarian arts as a whole, as well as a concern for the material means of their production. 41

In a more localized context, the semantic development of this constructive term was significantly shaped by the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). The drastic upheaval caused by the Revolution created new conditions, demands, and roles within Mexican social, economic, and cultural systems. Powerful historical conditions such as industrialization or civil and political conflict were typical causes for what Leo Marx has referred to as "semantic voids" - an awareness of certain novel developments in society and culture for which no adequate name was yet available.<sup>42</sup> After the revolution and especially during the presidency of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Eric Schatzberg, "Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of Technology before 1930," *Technology and Culture* 47, no 3. (2006): 486-512.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Schatzberg. 487, 494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Leo Marx. "Technology': The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept," *Technology and Culture* 51, no. 3 (2010): 561-577.

Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) and his pseudo-dictatorship known as the "Maximato" (1928-1934), the semantic void that existed due to the urgency for a comprehensive reconstruction and industrialization of the war-torn country was gradually filled as new definitions were layered upon previous meanings of the word "técnica." 43

Técnica carried other connotations that lent themselves to the revolutionary leadership's constructive promises and the growing ethos of a general modernization that could be found in the language of its ideologues. Some of its adopters gradually applied a deterministic understanding of the concept of técnica that was already present in the American-English usage of the word "technology" by the late 1920s. This interpretation firmly linked all matters related to técnica with the idea of progress. 44 As exemplified by its usage in early mid-century Mexican architectural discourse, the new professional categorization of the técnico emerged out of this general technical discourse as the qualified steward of this material advancement, thereby linking them with an expanded interpretation of political economy.

Political economy was a much more general concern during the early mid-century, however. It was a matter of direct inquiry, projection, and construction for numerous disciplines and professional organizations in Mexico as they reassessed their priorities and areas of expertise after the Revolution and during the global depression. To be labeled a *técnico* provided a new means of professional prestige founded upon systematic training, expertise, registration, and licensing. By the mid-century as the Mexican state shifted towards a largely university educated civilian leadership, these credentials became prerequisites for entry into Mexico's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> For more on this period of reconstruction and its effects on architecture and construction, see Patrice Elizabeth Olsen, *Artifacts of Revolution: Architecture, Society, and Politics in Mexico City, 1920-1940* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Schatzberg, 488.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> On the role of professional prestige, or "gaining status through work," in a professional collective mobility project, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 67-68.

traditionally exclusive political society. As a result, numerous professions competed for inclusion within this emergent technical class as they sought the political ability to impose their idealized, and to an extent self-serving, conceptualizations of economy, governance, and reconstruction upon the early post-revolutionary Mexican nation. The early inclusivity of the concept and role of the técnico was therefore as broad in as much as a profession could argue that their skill sets contributed to the "scientific" and "technical" aspects of the planning projects necessary for modern state formation. Given the inextricable ties between the early theorizations of the technical with the utilitarian arts, industry, and engineering, it was of no surprise that the more successful amongst these professions were engineers. 46 Engineers usually held about ten percent of the nation's highest positions of leadership (within the cabinet, for example), and twenty percent of other upper-level posts (within the state's managerial bureaucracy). While engineers had proven themselves politically loyal to the revolution given their tactical role during the hostilities (fig. 1.1), their capacity for organization, management, and in turn leadership likely contributed to the situation where a member of the profession, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, the former Secretary of Communications and Public Works, briefly held the presidential throne during the Maximato.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Schatzberg, 494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 91. Despite his technical credentials as a topographic engineer graduated from the *Escuela Nacional de Minería*, his political expertise was cast in doubt by his contemporaries, some of whom considered him to be a "mild and ineffectual party hack." These opinions may have been colored by his running against former minister of education José Vasconcelos as well as his anti-corruption platform directed toward the political machine of the Maximato. Following an assassination attempt in 1930 on the day of his inauguration, Ortiz Rubio returned to the presidency and managed to modestly continue the state's social programs. By the end of his term, political ineffectiveness under the continued interference by Plutarco Elías Calles and the setting in of the crippling worldwide economic depression left the economy in shambles. He resigned in 1932. Olsen, 62-63. For more on the Ortiz Rubio presidency, see chapters 55-61 in John W.F. Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution*, 1919–1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961).

The conceptualization of the *técnico* gradually and unevenly included a loosely interpreted "cultural" component, particularly as Mexico's revolutionary leadership struggled to address issues of education, social responsibility, and national identity in the project of State reconstruction. Because of this, professions rooted in the social sciences gradually accrued technical merit. By extension, by invoking the notion of "technique" along with the arguments regarding the sociological merits of their work, artists and architects could be loosely affiliated with this technical identity so long as they could convince Mexico's established political society that their skill sets effectively contributed to the task of satisfying the demands of state-formation and economic development. The capability of these professions to make their arguments depended very much on the language that they used, however. For the architectural profession in particular, its interpretation, or rather, abstraction, of the word "técnico" was critical in this claim-making act of political speech.

## II. Arguing the Architect's role as a Técnico: Its "Revolutionary" Origins

The Mexican architect's claim of the professional title of *técnico* has its origins in the profession's traditional relation to the multivalent concept of *técnica*. This relation has its origins in the late nineteenth century when the word was yet to be adopted as an adjective describing the nature of architecture itself, but rather was used to describe the working environments in which architectural practice was expected to operate. It was still loosely connotative of individual specialization and cross-disciplinary study of the useful arts and applied sciences, as noted in a call in the March 1899 issue of *Arte y Ciencia* for the organization of a "*Junta Técnica de Bellas Artes y Obras Públicas*" comprised of architects, engineers, painters, and sculptors under the

direction of a "wise and honorable" general director. This article hinted toward the need for educated and moral managerial figures, thus contributing to a new and expanding definition of *técnica* in Mexico that valued general expertise, systemic organization of the individual utilitarian arts, as well as a vague concern for the ethics involved in their design and implementation. In this sense, architecture was but a component, or individual technique, within a larger project - an incipient conceptualization of systemic planning reflective of the technocratic tendencies of Porfirio Diaz and his *cientificos* during the final years of the *Porfiriato* (1876-1910).

The practice in architectural discourse of applying the adjective "técnica" to an administrative council made up of numerous scientific and non-scientific professionals had precedents in Porfirian Mexico. However, its application by architects to their own traditionally non-scientific profession did not really occur to a discipline changing extent in Mexico until after the Revolution. It was the mass destruction from the conflict and a new political imperative to address the daunting social issues of the Nation that most directly initiated a process wherein certain architects began to identify with contemporary transnational conceptualizations of what was meant by being "technical." Within time, some individual architects - most significantly those within the cadre that adopted structural rationalism and architectural functionalism - expressed a desire to expand both the praxis and areas of expertise of the architectural profession towards broader and more diverse ends. This practice was congruent with other "technical" and specifically constructive professions during the period - namely within the field of engineering as it expanded into the contested practice of building design. 49

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See "Junta Técnica de Bellas Artes y Obras Públicas" *Arte y Ciencia* 1, no. 3 (March 1899).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> For primary resources that elaborate on the professional expansion and claim making of engineering in comparison with architecture, two important essays - published in the same pamphlet by the Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos - come to mind: Alfonso Pallares, "¿Qué es Arquitectura y qué es Ingeniería?" and Nicolás

The application of técnica as an adjective to describe architecture was at first indirect, and reflective of a lengthy polemic of professional jurisdictions and regulation between architects, engineers, and unlicensed builders that had its origins in the nineteenth century. In this context, the Spanish word for engineering - ingenieria - was understood not only as a distinct professional label, but as a conceptual placeholder indicative of the defining attributes of técnica. 50 As successive revolutionary governments found themselves tasked with the major project of national reconstruction, a public dialogue emerged regarding a certain correlation: just as the organizational structure of the state needed to be repurposed or rebuilt, so too did its physical structures. This was a position that was volubly argued by Mexican architects. Expediency and efficiency became matters of concerns in the discussions of how best to rebuild the physically - as well as economically - damaged nation, however. Starting in the early 1920s, Mexican structural engineers and a small but vocal group of architects influenced by advances in industrialized construction techniques as well as by the theories of European functionalist architects offered opinions regarding the economization of building practices that eventually threatened more conservative interpretations of the role of architecture and statecraft.<sup>51</sup>

Mariscal, "No es la Arquitectura Rama de la Ingeniería" in *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos Pamphlet* (Mexico City: Imp. Manuel Leon Sanchez, 1924), 5-10; 11-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> There are precedents, outside of Mexico, to this conflation of the term *técnica* (technical, technician) and *ingeniero* (engineer), most significantly in Germany where, since at least the later part of the nineteenth century, engineers became so identified with the concept of *Technik* that German-English dictionaries began to offer "engineering" as a direct translation of the nominative form of this word. Schatzberg, 494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> The origins of Mexican functionalism, much like the broader international architectural movement, had both material and intellectual roots. It owed as much to advances in the cement industry in Mexico as it did to the importation of modern European architectural thought. Cement companies such as Tolteca S.A. advocated a structural rationalism through the relatively high dissemination of its magazine *Cemento*, in turn promoting their industrial interests. Meanwhile, the theory and language of modernist architecture was fomented by forward thinking practitioners/theorists as early as 1915 with the architect and instructor Eduardo Macedo y Arbeau's introduction of the writings of Otto Wagner to his students through the magazine *Moderne Bauformen*. A diverse range of foreign influences, mediated through imported journals such as *L'Architecte*, *Architecture Vivant*, and *Architectural Record*, as well as a variety of books that would have been available to them given the cosmopolitan and well-travelled culture of Mexico's intellectual elites, to which architects belonged. European architects such as Le Corbusier and Walter Gropius are the functionalist architects most typically cited by the first generation of Mexican functionalists - copies of Le Corbusier's *Vers une Architecture* were present in Mexico City by 1924 as attested by the architect Juan O'Gorman in his autobiography in his reminiscences of obsessively reading his first-

The most prominent Mexican architects of the period responded to what they saw as an intrusion on their professional jurisdiction in a small but forceful pamphlet published by the *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos* in 1924. (fig. 1.2) This pamphlet addressed the threats inherent in the claim that a technical profession was best suited not only for the post-conflict reconstruction of the country's critical infrastructures but also of the edification of its buildings. Architects Alfonso Pallares (1882-1964) and Nicolás Mariscal y Piña (1875-1964), strongly argued in their respective articles "¿Qué es Arquitectura y qué es Ingeniería?" (What is Architecture and what is Engineering?) and "No es la Arquitectura Rama de la Ingeniería" (Architecture is Not a Branch of Engineering) for the exceptional qualifications of a more conservatively defined architectural profession in contributing to the design of the nation's architecture.<sup>52</sup> The arguments made in these articles ran the gamut of traditional attacks made by adherents of the older generation of Beaux-Arts influenced architects against the radical and minimal designs of the younger cohort within the profession, especially the formulaic and

edition French copy. The architect, engineer, and urbanist José Luis Cuevas later translated this book into Spanish. The principle functionalist architects in this early phase of Mexican modernist architecture were José Villagrán García (1901-1982), professor of architecture at the Escuela de Bellas Artes, later the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura, and students of his such as the painter Juan O'Gorman (1905-1982), Álvaro Aburto, and Juan Legarreta. Together, they argued against academicism and economically wasteful projects in historicist styles. Eventually, many of these found work with the Mexican State, and can be regarded as a critical precedent for later generations of architects seeking integration into the Mexican government: Villagrán found employment as the chief architect for the Departamento de Salubridad Pública between 1924 until 1935; with the support of socialist ideologue, Narciso Bassols, Juan O'Gorman became Director of the Building Department for the Secretaría de Educación Pública between 1932 and 1935, and Juan Legaretta worked variously in the Construction Section for the Departamento del Distrito Federal and the projects section belonging to the Building Department of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (SCOP). For a rather comprehensive, often cited, though sparsely referenced book on the arrival of modernist and functionalist architecture, see Rafael López Rangel's La Modernidad, Arquitectónica Mexicana: antecendentes y vanguardias, 1900-1940 (Azcapotzalco, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1989). For recent work in English, see Chapter 1, "La Revolución Constructiva" in Olsen; and "Against a New Architecture: Juan O'Gorman and the Disillusionment of Modernism" in Luis E. Carranza, Architecture as Revolution: Episodes in the History of Modern Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010). For a brief, well researched, and informative synopsis, see María Fernández's entry "Architecture: Twentieth Century" in Concise Encyclopedia of México, ed. Michael S. Werner (Chicago; London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), 34-36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> While it was significant that the chief architectural professional society included both of these essays together in the pamphlet of 1924, these essays had previously been published separately on numerous occasions during that decade.

utilitarian interventions of their competitors outside the profession. We see in both Mariscal's and Pallares's essays a common argument that stresses the need for Mexico's citizenry to better understand architectural values, which is to say that the profession and its practices needed a clearer definition in the eyes of the public. Mariscal in particular contrasted this with his opinion of the vagueness of engineering; a vagueness he felt was due to its conceptual, disciplinary, and even professional abstractness in the eyes of the general public. In opposition to architecture's ostensibly more traditional and easily understood nature Mariscal emphasized that engineering was,

...[a] general modern idea that very few could clearly perceive....[it] is so abstract that different people, educated but without specialized study of the vocabulary, conjure up different images...every mind receives one or many species of engineering, never something that circumscribes the entire genre and which isn't essential and uniquely *utilitarian*...<sup>53</sup>

This critique of the abstraction of engineering was intended as a defense of what Mariscal and like-minded architects believed to be the profession's straight-forward and widely recognized jurisdictions of expertise - defined elsewhere in the pamphlet as artful design guided by "creative imagination," "good taste," and "mastery of drawing." These, in his view, were all encompassing and widely intelligible qualities that unified the whole of the architecture discipline. Engineering, in as much as it was abstract, esoteric, and purely utilitarian, was for him a disaggregated group of disciplines or individual professions with no viable unifying principles – not a tradition of ages with clear disciplinary demarcation and with varied artistic practices all unified under supposed timeless aesthetic and organizational absolutes.

<sup>53 &</sup>quot;…idea general moderna que muy pocos pueden percibir exactamente…Tan abstracta es la idea de Ingeniería que a diferentes personas, ilustradas pero sin especial estudio del vocábulo, les despierta diferentes imágenes…viene a cada mente una o várias especies de ingenierías, nunca algo que circunscriba al género entero y no sea esencial y únicamente utilitario…" Nicolás Mariscal, "No es la Arquitectura Rama de la Ingeniería" in Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos Pamphlet (Mexico City: Imp. Manuel León Sánchez, 1924), 12.
54 Mariscal, 13.

Mariscal's critique of the abstract nature of engineering combined with his characterization of architectural practice by rather vague absolutes carried with it a touch of irony. Irony was not his intention, however, since his writing reflected both his personal convictions as well as a conservative consensus regarding a perceived or desired permanence in the natures of taste and artistic expression. He wanted to firmly define the design aspects of architecture as an art rather than a science. However, the construction of rather dogmatic professional boundaries cannot save a profession when it is engaged in a struggle to achieve primacy and avoid redundancy. According to Andrew Abbott in his book *The System of Professions*, the more reliable strategy for the defense of professional jurisdiction within a competitive environment is precisely the abstraction of the profession via the abstraction of its areas of expertise.<sup>55</sup> In that manner, when social or economic transformations (such as the Mexican Revolution) cause either real or imagined jurisdictional vacancies (such as in this case where ownership of the expertise in building went up for grabs due to the idea that the nature of the required expertise had changed) a profession can be better armed to adapt to the new requirements expected of its traditional area of jurisdiction. Failing that, said profession, with an expanded definition of its qualities and capacities, can shift into the new jurisdictional vacancies that may have arisen during the process of social upheaval.<sup>56</sup>

The shortsightedness of criticizing the potentially opportune practice of professional abstraction was recognized by other Mexican architects who were not in total alignment with the more conservative members of the *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos* and who recognized the potential of defining the profession according to an emergent technical culture. Through the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Andrew Delano Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 9, 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Abbott, 3.

abstraction and expansion of the traditional practices of the architectural profession in Mexico, these architects eventually made an alternative set of claims regarding the profession's superiority and competence in the state project of rebuilding. The successes - and the pitfalls - of these alternative claims were predicated on the fact that Mexico's political economy was undergoing a significant process of transition. This transition created the new demands, occupational vacancies, and semantic voids that are the foci of a calculated strategy in the conflict zones of professional competition. Certain architects acknowledged these voids by inserting a new terminology based on a concept that was itself undergoing flux. This linguistic/rhetorical act would soon prove to have significant consequences on the architectural profession and in time on the institutional as well as physical structures of the state.

While the concept of "arquitectura técnica" is firmly associated with the rise of a

European influenced architectural functionalism in Mexico, a more relevant usage of the term

"técnica" in writings concerning a specific evolution of the architectural profession did not come

from the better-known vanguard Mexican architects from the 1920s who were initially only

concerned with the techniques of individual building construction. Rather, they came from a

parallel modern movement: planning. The architect and planner Carlos Contreras Elizondo

(1892-1970), one of the most important figures in the establishment of modern regional planning

in Mexico, based his interpretation of the qualifications of the architect precisely upon its

abstracted role within the new practice of planning. In a series of articles and talks given during
the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles, he echoed and transformed similar murmurings from the
end of the nineteenth-century by fiercely advocating the adoption of new areas of professional
expertise and an inter-professional collaboration that blurred the traditional boundaries of those
involved.

Parallel to the semantic voids that prompted the appropriation of existing words like *técnica*, Contreras felt it necessary to create a new word in the Spanish language to describe his specifically Mexican planning concept: *Planificación*. In a presentation that he gave at the 5<sup>th</sup> National Convention of Engineers held in the city of Puebla in September of 1926, Contreras claimed to have coined the term as early as 1921. Through the use of this neologism, Contreras intended to ameliorate the perceived misconceptions of the concepts and goals of "*planeación*" (a word that he felt had a less active connotation).<sup>57</sup> However, in so doing, he created a word that was new, perhaps even less fully understood, and in competition with a term already in general use. In sum, *Planificación* was an additional and extremely important example of word creation that served the process of abstracting professional knowledge as well as the expansion of a professional jurisdiction. In this respect it paralleled and contributed to the concepts that defined adjectives like "*técnica*" and noun/job-titles like "*técnico*" as they were adopted by the architectural profession.

As mentioned earlier, the development of the concept of *técnica* in Mexico had elements in common with the changing definitions of "*Technik*" in Germany and "technology" in the United States. Contreras's educational formation took place in the United States - initially as an engineer and then as an architect - at the architecture school of Columbia University in New York. While there he became exposed to a wide array of "scientific" regional planning theories especially through his eventual association with Ebenezer Howard's International Federation for Housing and Town Planning (IFHP). I argue that traces of the period's shifting conceptualization of *técnico/a* are evident in his early writing on *planificación*. His use of the adjective *técnica* to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Carlos Contreras, "Asociación Nacional para la Planificación de la República Mexicana" in Gerardo G. Sánchez Ruiz and Rafael López Rangel, eds., *Planificación urbanismo visionarios de Carlos Contreras: escritos de 1925 a 1938* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 60.

describe certain job titles within the collective activity of planning and his structuring of duties and organizational hierarchy in his recommendations for a future planning body for the Mexican Republic are the most telling examples of how the changing meanings of this concept and term informed Mexican planning and architectural discourse.

Early, expansive definitions of Contreras's planning concept appeared in, "La Planificación de la República Mexicana," published in the widely read newspaper El Universal in 1925, as well as his address to the 5th National Convention of Engineers in 1926. (fig. 1.3) His first reference to the planning and technical qualifications of architects appeared in the former. In his description of the posts that would be included in an ideal planning department he makes specific reference to two arquitectos planificadores - architect-planners - that would be retained on this body as "técnicos consultores" or "technical consultants." The role of these architects primarily served the control of interventions in the national landscape. During the construction of much needed arterial infrastructure they were expected to contribute to the "exploitation and conservation of the natural scenic beauty of Mexico." In addition, they would be tasked with the "appropriate treatment, composition, grouping, and planning of public and government buildings." These two important tasks both conformed to contemporary arguments that architects be defined as artists and that their art be characterized by its assemblage of elements derived from "good taste" and "natural beauty." However it was also a clear sign of a shift in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> The make-up of the planning office was to be comprised of one "*technical* director," one chief civil engineer, three or four draftsmen, a director of publicity, an employee in charge of statistics and functioning as an archivist, two stenographers, and two architect-planners acting as technical consultants. Carlos Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," in Gerardo G. Sánchez Ruiz and Rafael López Rangel, eds. *Planificación urbanismo visionarios de Carlos Contreras: escritos de 1925 a 1938* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," 54.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> A similar stressing of these qualities can be found in Mariscal, 13; An equally similar phrasing of these requirements in aesthetic sentiment and judgement can also be found in Alfonso Pallares, "¿Qué es Arquitectura y qué es Ingeniería?" in Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos Pamphlet (Mexico City: Imp. Manuel Leon Sánchez,

what the architect was and in what it meant to be "technical." That architect-planners' main design contribution to *planificación* primarily dealt with the composition of the nation's scenery reflected the strong influences being imparted on the definition of the architectural profession by a relatively new discipline of Anglo-American extraction in Mexico: landscape architecture.

Contreras's technical designation of his consultative "arquitectos-planificadores" alluded to the quasi-scientific and managerial roles adopted by members of this hybrid imported discipline. Fields of scientific analysis such as ecology, botany, geology, and hydrology all played into the Olmstedian definition of landscape architecture that Contreras would have been familiar with. In addition, this Anglo-American discipline was of a systemic nature that depended upon legal regulations, environmental procedures, and manifold skills for achieving its specific constructive goals. This systematized approach to design was best reflected in Contreras's strong emphasis on the role of the plan - documents of great importance to him and which were imbued according to his definition with not only a legalistic and regulatory function, but a physiological, vital, moral, and historical spirit critical to projecting the present and future state.<sup>62</sup> Through its interrelations with territory, law, biological, and social processes, Contreras's idea of "technical" architects made direct claims on their role in the formation of new polities.

The plan was only one way that architects were expected to apply their expanding areas of expertise to policy and politics. Echoing the conceptualization of the structure of a modern managerial planning office offered in *Wacker's Manual of the Plan of Chicago* (1911) by Walter Dwight Moody, planning promoter and managing director of the Chicago Plan Commission,

<sup>1924), 7;</sup> It is perhaps worth mentioning here the apparent importance to Contreras that his theories of planning be accepted by the more conservative architects of the *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos*, since he proudly noted that "planificación" was gaining currency even amongst architects such as Mariscal and Pallares. He also noted in his address to the 5<sup>th</sup> National Convention of Engineers that the neologism had been adopted by the *Revista de Ingeniería* - The Engineering Magazine (of Mexico), and was in use by the Mexican press. Contreras, "Asociación Nacional para la Planificación de la República Mexicana," 60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Contreras, "Asociación Nacional para la Planificación de la República Mexicana," 61-62.

Contreras also called for the two-part organization of his proposed National Planning Board.<sup>63</sup> The first part of Contreras's Planning Board was composed of the previously mentioned technical team of engineers, draftsmen, and statisticians to which architect-planners belonged. The other half was a consultative/promotional group - a consejo directivo - composed of architects, engineers, lawyers, bankers, businessmen, industrialists, and "men of good will."<sup>64</sup> While these individuals were intended to recommend the organizational, promotional, and financial policies to the group tasked with the actual carrying out of studies and the production of proposals and projects, it is difficult to not view them as liaisons with the forces of political power and private capital that made constructive work possible. It was a late example of the early technocratic proposals typical of late nineteenth-century American Progressive Reform that had found some renewed interest in the moderately progressive and pro-capitalist policies under Plutarco Elías Calles. It is safe to assume that Moody's concepts also colored other ideas in Contreras's initial publications on *planificación*, such as the former's designation of the promotional branch of planning as being equally "scientifically professional" in comparison to the technical branch of planning. This professional designation reflected American progressives' belief that social change could be achieved via use of the scientific method as guided by collaborative professional expertise.

Moody defined his Planning Board's promotional branch as the "dynamic power behind the throne of accomplishment." The same could have been said about the membership of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Contreras knew this text well, referenced it in the previously mentioned articles and speeches on *Planificación*, and included writings by Moody in his journal *Planificación*, which began publication in 1927. For a brief article on Moody's involvement in the Chicago Plan and his description of a planning board of directors, see Thomas J, Schlereth. "Burnham's *Plan* and Moody's *Manual*: City Planning as Progressive Reform," *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 47: 1 (1981), 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," 47-48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Schlereth, 71. This quote of Moody was taken from his text, *What of the City? America's Greatest Issue – City Planning, What It Is and How to Go About It To Achieve Success* (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1919), 3.

Contreras's *consejo directivo*, since these were individuals possessive of some creative and technical capacity but more importantly also held financial and political means. The "scientific professionals" involved in planning promotion in Moody's scheme and some of the managerial and consultative *técnicos* within Contreras's Planning Board therefore performed an important advocative and organizational function that directly placed them within the exchanges of power, policy, and construction in their respective polities. This conceptualization of the *técnico's* role as an advocate and general manager was clearly expressed by Contreras in his definition of the *"Director técnico"* who was intended to head the planning body. He cited and paraphrased Moody's description of the planning professional as a means of expressing the new requirements of *técnicos* serving in a directorial capacity:

...the role of the planner is complex...it is no longer simply that of an architect or engineer, but rather one of an individual of varied composition: Architect, Engineer, Promoter, Journalist, Educator, Speaker, Lawyer, Financier, and on top of all of that, a Diplomat.<sup>66</sup>

With this description of a twentieth-century Renaissance Man, it becomes clear that Moody was not particularly considering architects or engineers to be the ideal professionals for the constructive, advocative, and functional tasks in planning. His opinion reflected professional polemics regarding the question of who was best suited to direct planning efforts in the United States.<sup>67</sup> By the first decade of the twentieth century Moody already supported the idea that

<sup>66 &</sup>quot;...complejo es el papel del Planificador, que según el señor Moody, Director Gerente de la Comisión de Planificación de Chicago que lleva ya 16 años de funcionar con gran éxito, no es ya simplemente un arquitecto o un ingeniero, sino que es un individuo de composición variada: Arquitecto, Ingeniero, Promotor, Periodista, Educador, Conferencista, Abogado, Financiero y por encima de todo esto, Diplomático. Contreras, "Asociación Nacional para la Planificación de la República Mexicana," 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Herbert Croly claimed that architects should be in charge of planning, Frederick Winslow Taylor thought this to be the work of industrial engineers, while Louis Brandeis argued that it was a responsibility best left to lawyers and businessmen. Schlereth, 71.

planning be its own profession.<sup>68</sup> But did Contreras's citing of Moody also imply that he shared the latter's promotion of the creation of a new profession in Mexico? It is difficult to say given the very recent arrival of planning as a discipline in Mexico, its lack of institutions capable of training architects or otherwise suited professional-track individuals in administrative roles, and Contreras's own identification and self-interest as an architect. What can be said is that his application of the descriptive *técnica* to the existing job title of architect, and the labeling of a specific group of its professionals as *técnicos* implied not only the abstraction of a profession critical to its functional flexibility and survival in an evolving and competitive working environment, but also signaled the possibility of its fractionalization. To prevent a break-up of the architectural profession in Mexico, certain architects needed to create an argument that supported the social, economic, political, as well as aesthetic value of its varied disciplines within the technical and political practice of planning.

## III. Abstracting the Profession: Planning, Pedagogy, and the Bureaucratization of the Architect

The dissemination of Contreras's and other contemporary planning proponents' theories and the continued advocacy for the inclusion of architects in the planning bureaucracy expanded through numerous articles published starting in the early 1920s in the major newspapers *Excelsior* and *El Universal*, the formation of the *Asociación Nacional para la Planificación de le República Mexicana* in 1927, its publication of the magazine *Planificación*, and the organization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Others, such as Charles Mulford Robinson and John Nolen shared similar viewpoints to this respect, contributing texts that argued for the professionalization of the broad range of individuals engaged in the discipline of planning. Schlereth 71-72.

of the first *Congreso Nacional de Planificación* (elsewhere listed as *planeación*) in 1930.<sup>69</sup> (**fig. 1.4)** These structures of advocacy contributed to the Mexican State's passing of planning legislation that ultimately led to the expansion of state planning bureaucracies at various urban, regional, and federal levels.<sup>70</sup> New planning boards and pieces of planning legislation focused on regulation and administration at the urban level, such as the formation of the *Sección de Planificación en el Departamento de Arquitectura del Ayuntamiento de la Ciudad de México* in 1925 or the promulgation of the *Ley sobre planificación y construcciones nuevas de la ciudad de Monterrey* of 1927 and the *Reglamento de Planificación y Zonificación de Azcapotzalco* of 1928. Likewise, key legislation was passed for planning at the regional level with the formation in 1928 of a *Comité del Plano Regional de la Ciudad de México y sus Alrededores*, with none other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Note that the terms *planeación* and *planificación* were being used interchangeably at this early stage, despite Contreras's insistence of the superiority of the latter term to describe the scale of national and regional planning in his writings during the late 1920s. Gerardo Sánchez Ruiz notes that the ideological connotations of the terms were already in a state of shift and layering by the very early 1930s, with the latter term gaining acceptance amongst more left-leaning and socialistic ideologues and professionals. While I have noted that this trend was definitely more apparent towards the later 1930s, it is implied that apprehension towards using the latter term for the Law's title – despite the more statist but firmly capitalist definitions given to it by Contreras – may have stemmed from this incipient ideological bias. Gerardo G. Sánchez Ruiz, "El contexto que rodeó a las propuestas de planificación del arquitecto Carlos Contreras" in Gerardo G. Sánchez Ruiz and Rafael López Rangel, eds. *Planificación urbanismo visionarios de Carlos Contreras: escritos de 1925 a 1938* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Many of these proponents were architects acting as planners, some of whom were actively working and implementing their ideas in Mexico at the time. One of these was José Luis Cuevas Pietrasanta (1881-1952), noted for his design of the garden-city influenced layouts of the Lomas de Chapultepec (1922) and Colonia Hipódromo (1926) neighborhoods in Mexico City. Another notable architect who actively ventured into urbanistic and planning discourse was Alfonso Pallares, who had been writing and publicly presenting work reflective of the ideas of Ebenezer Howard, Tony Garnier, Camillo Sitte, and Arturo Soria y Mata on zoning and urban aesthetics as early as 1911. See: Elisa Drago Quaglia, Alfonso Pallares, sembrador de ideas (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2016), especially section "Principios de urbanismo moderno y la arquitectura cívica en México," 175-220. A third critical architect was of course Carlos Contreras Elizondo. Reflective of how a collective growth of professional prestige within what sociologist Magali Larson deems "collective mobility projects," can often be distributed towards individual benefits for particular members within the profession, it is important to note that Contreras's early proposals for a centralized planning commission were likely meant to further his own career as much as they were meant to abstract and expand the architectural profession's claim to expertise. His efforts led to him being named coordinator of the Comisión de Programa within the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (SCOP), then led by the engineer Javier Sánchez Mejorada - a position from where he was able to organize the nation's first planning congress. For more on Contreras's advocacy and early career trajectory, see Sánchez Ruiz, "El contexto que rodeó a las propuestas de planificación del arquitecto Carlos Contreras," 9-24. For more on the collective mobility project, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 66-79.

than Contreras as its director.<sup>71</sup> These measures towards the establishment of the practice of planning ultimately culminated in legislation at the national scale with the *Ley sobre Planeación General de la República* in 1930.<sup>72</sup> (**fig. 1.5**) The legislation outlined a need for technical expertise in a special "*comisión de programa*" operating within a pre-existing federal institution, the *Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* (SCOP), or Secretariat of Communications and Public Works.<sup>73</sup> With the establishment of these legal and institutional structures, there arose a real rather than hypothetical need for properly trained technical architects and planners.

Mexican architects during this period were for the most part strictly trained in architecture, which in early twentieth-century Mexico meant that they were coming out of Beaux-Arts inspired institutions such as the *Escuela de Bellas Artes* — an institution located within the 18<sup>th</sup> century building of the *Academia de San Carlos* that promoted a rich but nevertheless more narrow, artistic training. The planning movement and the State's response created a need for a new sort of professional that could function as a planner or synthetic "technical director." Because much of the planning movement was rooted in the advocacy of architects such as Carlos Contreras, these individuals supported the idea that members from their profession should fill this need. This argument was at odds with the reality that in Mexico, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Sánchez Ruiz, 18-20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> The law was largely drafted by Carlos Contreras Elizondo and the engineer Enrique E. Schulz following the *Primer Congreso Nacional de Planeación* and enacted in mid-1930 during the brief presidency of civil engineer Pascual Ortiz Rubio

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Sánchez-Ruíz, 20-22. Note: The full text for the *Ley General de Planeación de la República*, translated in English, was published as the *National Planning Law for Mexico, July 12, 1930* (Mexico, D.F: The Ministry of Communications and Public Works, 1930). A copy of this text in English is located amongst the papers of the architect-planner Carlos Lazo Barreiro: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 53, Exp 30. The Spanish text of the 1930 Planning Law was also published, along with the full text of the *Ley de Planificación y Zonificación del Distrito Federal y Territorios de Baja California* (1933) in a pamphlet for the "*Congreso Internacional de Planificación*" (16<sup>th</sup> Congress of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning) held in Mexico City in August 1938. See *Legislación Sobre Planificación en la República Mexicana* (Mexico City: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1938). A copy of this text is also located amongst the papers of the architect-planner Carlos Lazo Barreiro: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 53, Exp 30.

architect's collective jurisdiction of expertise, as formed by the established curriculum - was not sufficiently ample for the profession to take on the managerial task of scientific planning on an urban or regional scale. This lack of trained individuals posed an impediment for a new planning regime that was supposed to be led by architects during the *Maximato* with its large-scale designs for post-revolution reconstruction. The gradual institutionalization of planning set by the late 1920s through early 1930s may have given members of the architectural profession a window of access to the internal bureaucratic workings of various levels of the Mexican government and their respective state-building organs. But this did not necessarily give them the proper expertise necessary to claim these new positions as their own. To prepare the architectural profession for the new demands brought on with the incorporation of planning institutions into the State bureaucracy, significant transformations had to first occur in the direction and methods of architectural pedagogy.

The rapid social, economic, and technological developments of Mexico's revolutionary period placed new demands on "old" knowledge and skills, and in effect created a vacuum within its pre-existing bureaucracies (such as the SCOP) that could only be answered either by a new profession - which "planning" was not yet considered to be in Mexico - or a redefinition of an old profession, as architecture was just beginning to do. The redefinition of the architectural profession in this case required the abstraction of its preexisting qualities. Abstraction of a profession means the filtering of its practices and concepts to a certain level of essentiality. Following this process, the selection of the profession's most essential qualities by its practitioners or theorists (such as representing, ordering, synthesizing, and eventually managing) can be applied towards new, relevant valued purposes. In practice, some Mexican architects

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Larson, 178.

realized the need to imagine new contexts for the professions' normative tasks and its traditional labor output if they were to be guaranteed work in the new systems of state-building that emerged out of the Revolution.

The abstraction of a single profession - and by extension the capability to recontextualize and reimagine how this profession functions within a larger professional and political system enables it to defend itself and survive within these very competitive and interrelated systems.<sup>75</sup> This survival relies on the validity of a collective profession or its individual members' claims to expertise as well as how and where these claims are used. The directed use of these claims of expertise are in turn very much derived from the profession's ability to control the development and use of its systems of knowledge - otherwise, such claims could be viewed as unsubstantiated and therefore capable of being challenged. As Abbot points out, only a knowledge system governed by abstractions can redefine its problems and tasks. This sort of abstract knowledge (and by extension elastic and aggregating knowledge) combined with new professional vocabulary using loosely defined neologisms and multivalent words (such as *planificación* or técnico/a) was a powerful mechanism that could aid members of the architectural profession in convincing the bearers of political power of their belonging in the higher levels of the planning bureaucracy. In that manner, members of this interloping profession - assuming they weren't already members of the political elite with ease of access and state employment - could breach a government dependency like the SCOP which was dominated by the various professional branches of engineering and led either by engineers, or more typically during the revolutionary period, military generals.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Abbott, 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Note: It is important to recall that in Mexico, many higher-level bureaucratic posts are attained through appointment, typically by the President and executive branch of government, and can additionally reflect not only

This abstraction of a body of professional knowledge - key to the development of a profession within an interdependent system of professions - often results from their interrelations with other professions and their respective systems of knowledge. While these interrelations can occur in the workplace itself - such as the interaction between architects and structural engineers during construction - the very experimental nature of the abstraction of a body of knowledge is oftentimes contained within the university. The importance of education and pedagogy to an architectural profession responding to the exigencies of Mexico's new social and political circumstances explains why certain architects placed demands on the nation's established institutions of higher education for reforms that would enable the training of architects so as to be better equipped to handle the challenges of planning and sustain their entry into the state bureaucracy. While new technical institutions were being formed so as to provide

the importance of qualification (which can lamentably be of secondary importance in a government that has inherited a political culture formed out of centuries of clientelism), but of loyalty to said administration as well as the party in power. Needless to say social and familial bonds are of tremendous importance in this system of favors and loyalties, and are perhaps primary though not full-proof guarantors of allegiance in Mexico's revolutionary and especially post-revolutionary political systems where the ties of ideology have been recognized as conflicted or weak.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Abbott, 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Larson, 178.

<sup>80</sup> Broadly defined educational reform was a central focus of the Mexican State after the Revolution as its more idealistic members envisioned the creation of a new society. The creation of the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) in 1921 during the presidency of Álvaro Obregón and the appointment of politician-philosopher José Vasconcelos (1882-1959) as its first head set the tone for experimentality not only in the creation of various new curricula but in the special relationship that art, architecture, and construction would have in relation to the state: it was at this moment that modern Mexican muralism and its integration into architecture intended for state-building purposes was born. The influence of the SEP on architectural pedagogy would continue under various leaderships during this early period. Perhaps its most poignant influence on the broader socio-economic connotations of the concept of técnico/a occurred under the direction of lawyer and socialist ideologue Narciso Bassols (1897-1959), whose tenure under presidents Pascual Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo L. Rodríguez lasted between 1931 and 1934. The influence of the state on architectural or constructive practices functioned at times in harmony and at times in conflict with an architectural profession that was itself conflicted with the rise of a variety of modernisms that at once challenged its members as it did open new opportunities for them. The initiative to reform and expand the traditional bounds of architectural education by members of the profession were evident by the mid-1920s with an opening up to innovation by architects such as José Villagrán García, Carlos Obregón Santacilia, and Guillermo Zárraga. Villagrán García eventually occupied the seat of architectural theory at the Escuela de Bellas Artes, (later the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura) proposing and eventually gaining some control over its curriculum. Changes at this institution, a part of the larger Universidad Nacional de México (later the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), were slow however; the University was essentially a bastion of Beaux-Arts training through the early half of the mid-twentieth century. This meant that more revolutionary changes in Mexican architectural education had to

a broad class of planning functionaries, especially at the subaltern levels, pressure was equally being placed at the university level. This move anticipated its role in producing a new, politically recruitable managerial class. To this end, Carlos Contreras noted the importance of offering education in planning in his announcement of the impending inauguration of the First *Congreso Nacional de Planificación*, published on the 1930 New Year's Day edition of *El Universal.*<sup>81</sup> He made reference to the existence of a single class in planning and civic art at the *Escuela Nacional de Bellas Artes* (the nation's primary institution of architectural training) and how it was discontinued in 1929 due to its "many imperfections." According to Contreras, "higher authorities" felt that the now-discontinued course was insufficient and that a special three-year track needed to be created. In consequence, he felt it opportune to submit an outline for a new department - a *Facultad de Planificación* - that would train individuals in the composition as well as the administration of cities to Dr. Alfonso Pruneda and Antonio Castro

occur outside of the University. Reflective of efforts of reconstruction following the Mexican Revolution, new pedagogical missions emphasized the instruction of construction techniques (técnicas constructivas) often melding together the more utilitarian fields of knowledge held in common between the architectural and structural engineering professions. The state was directly involved in founding various schools with a more technical focus. Following the Vasconcelian reforms, the Escuela Nacional de Maestros Constructores was founded to provide "powerful auxiliaries to engineering" which was to say ten different tracks directed toward building design and construction. By 1927, this became the Escuela Técnica de Constructores, which offered the career license of "constructor maestro de obras" a position akin to master builder or construction manager. This school was by that time training its students in understanding architectonic form. The teaching of a specifically labeled "arquitectura" técnica" emerged out of the wake of the movement during the late 1920s to make the national university autonomous. Its architecture school was still reticent to abandon its ties to a humanistic and historically informed education, and a new practice controlled directly by the state needed to be defined. By 1932, the Departamento de Eseñanza Técnica of the SEP created the Escuela Superior de Construcción (much to the opposition of the Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos, or SAM) with young painter and early proponent of an "arquitectura técnica," Juan O'Gorman, as its head. Its creation of a track to train "architect-engineers" later influenced the curriculum of the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN) founded in 1937. López Rangel, La Modernidad, Arquitectónica Mexicana: antecendentes y vanguardias, 1900-1940, 88-129. For a more detailed investigation on the origins of the Escuela Superior de Construcción also see Rafael López Rangel, Orígenes de la arquitectura técnica en México, 1920-1933: La Escuela Superior de Construcción (Xochimilco, México: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Contreras, 81. This class likely was founded by the initiatives of architects such as Contreras as well as the architect Manuel Ortiz Monasterio in 1925. José Luis Cuevas was its first instructor followed by Contreras in 1927. Sánchez-Ruiz, 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Contreras, 82. Note: Contreras was still using the old name for the *Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura* since it had been renamed recently in 1929.

Leal, the rectors of the *Universidad Nacional de México*. This proposed program reflected contemporary preoccupations regarding architectural and engineering expertise within the planning process by establishing a formalized interrelation with the University's *Facultad de Ingenieria*, or School of Engineering. Finally, Contreras recommended that this program make an effort to send both architecture and engineering students to foreign institutions - specifically Harvard, the *Université* de Paris, and the University of Liverpool - on the condition that they return as professors for the proposed *Facultad de Planificación* or School of Planning. This last characteristic highlighted a persistent feature of Mexico's quest for acquiring technical expertise - a preference for the foreign training of its *técnicos*.

Contreras's proposed department did not take off as expected, but two key ideas from his proposal - the creation of a track that fed architects into the state bureaucracy, and the formation of educational programs that attempted to support both the interrelation of architects and engineers as well as the development of the architectural profession in relation to the new socioeconomic and politico-administrative conditions of Mexico were already established within the collective mentality of what could be defined as a pro-técnico faction within the architectural profession. In 1931, José Villagrán García, a notable professor and theorist at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura (renamed from the Escuela Nacional de Bellas Artes following the autonomy of the National University in 1929), as well as an early adopter of functionalist architectural language and construction techniques, offered his proposal for the reformation of architectural pedagogy and its direct application to government projects in his presentation "Educación profesional del arquitecto." His proposal, presented to the Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos (SAM) at its first convention of Mexican architects, was a response to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> José Villagrán García, "Educación profesional del arquitecto," in *Ideario de los arquitectos mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 80-81.

conditions brought about by the national planning law of 1930.<sup>84</sup> It went as far as to propose formalized interaction between state departments, secretariats, and the University in the design of state projects, as well as the creation of obligatory courses devoted to this end. This formalized interaction would have been especially embodied in a "junta" that was to be "integrated" by architects representing the construction offices of the Secretariats of Communications and Public Works, Public Education, Finance, Industry, as well as representatives of the University and its student organizations.<sup>85</sup> Such proposed inter-connected educational tracks suggested an education for architects that would have given them practical, on-site knowledge applicable to the constructions of state projects. More importantly, it suggested an institutionalized means of feeding architects into employment within any of these state institutions. Villagrán's bold educational proposal, like Contreras's, never made it to fruition.

While the failure to create new educational programs in planning and government administration for architects may have prevented the early institutionalization of architecture as a state construction oriented, managerial discipline, the call for pedagogical reform towards this end persisted for the remainder of the decade and remained a discourse through which the profession continued to test the validity of its claims to governance. Meanwhile, members of the profession continued to enter the design and construction offices of a variety of government branches via already established means. Villagrán's status as an important architect was ensured through his early successes in socially and politically prestigious medical-oriented architectural projects as well as his growing renown as an emerging theorist and influential at the University.

López-Rangel, La Modernidad, Arquitectónica Mexicana: antecendentes y vanguardias, 1900-1940, 95.
 Villagrán, 81. Note: It bears mention that use of the term "junta" - a word that often connotes authoritarian military rule - was used to describe a body of technical experts at a time when they were entering a bureaucracy still largely led by the generals and colonels of the Mexican Revolution. Also, this text contains the earliest use of a form of the word "integration" that I have found in the context of describing a collaboration of architectural professionals working in various technical capacities in a state bureaucracy.

Success in these roles maintained his relatively secure hold of state employment for decades (and to an extent translated to additional leverage in directing two of his most accomplished students, Juan O'Gorman and Juan Legarreta to government work). Additionally, for those who had foreign degrees and were powerful self-promoters (like Carlos Contreras) it was also feasible to claim the administrative or managerial expertise required of the modern planner since it had been learned both abroad and demonstrated - at least in written form in the press - to a broad public that also included members of political society upon whom the acceptance into a position of power rested. The positions attainable for these state-oriented professionals were limited or had to be created, however; Carlos Contreras made a position for himself by founding the Comité del Plano Regional de la Ciudad de México y sus Alrededores, and was fortunate that the Planning Law of 1930 that he authored and advocated translated into a post for him in the special "Comisión de programa" situated within the labyrinthine bureaucracy of the SCOP. However, within the *Maximato's* political culture of strong-men and crony capitalists, such commissions retained their status as a state consejo - or counsel - and the architects within remained as técnicos consultores.86

Neither really had the "teeth" that would have marked such a planning body as a true technocratic means of governance - which is to say that the heads of the Mexican state would have deferred to these *técnicos* in matters of political economic affairs. And yet, with the successes that Contreras did have in certain projects of urban beautification largely located within Mexico City, *planificación*, as envisioned by Contreras, was neither to be considered totally subject to an entirely decisionistic model of governance where only the political figures called the shots. Though ultimately subject to the *caudillos* and *políticos* of the revolutionary

86 Olson, 61.

leadership, *Planificación* - as practiced in the first half of 1930s - and the *técnicos consultores* who were involved in its process, leaned somewhat towards a pragmatistic model where a degree of dialogue was carried out with the political class in spoken and visual terms and where, on occasion, parts of a plan could be implemented.<sup>87</sup>

The spirit of *planificación*, as envisioned in Contreras's early definitions of the term, envisioned a regimen where design could actually turn into a reordering of the territory - after all, what was the point of drafting so many plans if they weren't going to be carried out? From the steadfast opinions and confident tone of language that Contreras shared in his lectures and articles published in the major Mexican newspapers, it is safe to assume Contreras and other early Mexican planners felt that they would eventually gain the means of seeing their plans carried out. The architect/planner as well as the planning commission were already being posited as a figure and a body with abilities in governmentality, which to paraphrase Foucault is a "disposing," or use of coercive tactics that can be of the law (and to some extent even in this institutional process, between and outside of the law) of "things" (goods, buildings, spaces, peoples).<sup>88</sup> But how was this claim of a profession's higher authority to be made when such claims were no longer just about inter-professional competition within a closed system of professions, but rather claims that sought to transcend said professional systems into the adjacent

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> My use of the terms "technocratic," "decisionistic," and "pragmatistic" are derived from Jurgen Habermas. See: "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion" in *The Habermas Reader*, ed. William Outhwaite (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 45-46; The weak character of a planning body during this phase of the modern Mexican State reflects that the state was still some years away from its full transformation into a so-called "bureaucratic-authoritarian" entity. It had to contend with traditional modes of patriarchal or patrimonial rule in Mexico, inherited as much from *Porfiriato* as it was from the age of *jefes* and *caudillos* of the Revolutionary period and the newly established entrepreneurial forces that wrestled for power in the building of the post-conflict built environment.

<sup>88</sup> Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 95.

but still difficult to penetrate system of national politics that in turn wielded the ultimate power of governance?

## IV. Redefining the *Técnico's* task: *Arquitectura Técnica* and the Claim to Governance

The architectural profession's claims to governance became more explicit after some of their members had already been given posts within various secretarias of the Mexican federal government. Throughout the early 1930s the young Mexican painter and architect Juan O'Gorman (1905-1982) contributed to the developing conceptualization of technical architecture. Pedagogical reform again remained a source for professional abstraction and expanding assertions of expertise. In 1932, during the presidency of Abelardo L. Rodríguez (1932-1934) and the tenure of socialist ideologue Narciso Bassols as head of the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP), O'Gorman drafted a Programa de Teoría de la Arquitectura, which outlined a technical curriculum for the new Escuela Superior de Construcción. In this brief document he emphasized a series of objectives for a new architecture that contributed to the evolving understanding of the concept of técnica and the role of a técnico by defining technicism as a praxis with specifically social ends. Keenly aware of the need for large-scale construction to satisfy the Revolutionary leadership's constructive promises, he echoed similar socially conscious inter-war European modernist architects' declarations that collective human utility was a fundamental principle for a technical architecture.<sup>89</sup> He elaborated his ideas regarding the new architecture publicly and within the forums of the architectural profession, such as his involvement in the *Pláticas sobre Arquitectura* (Talks on Architecture) that were organized by

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Juan O'Gorman, "Programa de Teoría de la Arquitectura: Escuela Superior de Construcción" in *Ideario de los arquitectos mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 49.

the *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos* in 1933. In his presentation, he elaborated on his previous arguments on the economization of architectural production and the idea of human utility by implying that the technical architect possessed rational judgment and a direct political-economic responsibility. He emphasizes a materialistic view of the world, the role of technology and its effect on constructive techniques, and the rationality of its human practitioners to economically resolve problems:

Life imposes economic, social, and material conditions. It falls upon *técnica*, with its means, to resolve it in the best manner: by the best way, the maximum of efficiency for the minimum of effort. This is to proceed reasonably.<sup>90</sup>

He went on to elaborate on the arguably political role of the technical architect (*arquitecto técnico*) in this matter and his responsibility to fulfill individual and collective needs as a public servant:

The *técnico* [is] useful to the majority...[he] serves the majority of needy individuals that only have material needs.<sup>91</sup>

While O'Gorman treated the technical architect as an international archetype, there is little doubt that when speaking of a *técnico* as a servant to a disadvantaged class, he was referring to himself and fellow Mexican functionalists and their recent projects of note -public schools and mass housing - and how these were completed as an ostensibly altruistic service to the "majority" of Mexico's citizenry. 92

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> "La vida impone sus condiciones económicas y sociales y sus condiciones materiales. A la técnica con sus medios le toca resolverlas de la mejor manera. Por la mejor vía, el máximo de eficiencia por el mínimo esfuerzo. Esto sí es proceder razonablemente." Juan O'Gorman, "Intervención en las Pláticas sobre arquitectura en 1933," in *Ideario de los Arquitectos Mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Víctor Arias Montes (Mexico City:

Instituto Nacional del Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> "El técnico [es] útil a la mayoría...[es] para servir a la mayoría de individuos necesitados que sólo tienen necesidades materiales." O'Gorman, "Intervención en las Pláticas sobre arquitectura en 1933," 150. <sup>92</sup> Carranza, 156.

The *pláticas* took place in 1933, and the texts were published in 1934 - an election year. While the value of the vote in Mexico was and remains in question today - Lázaro Cárdenas, after all was Plutarco Elías Calles hand-picked candidate - it is quite possible that the utilization of this mass political language (e.g. "majority") was related to similar political strategies that sought to win complex coalitions via broad but united support.<sup>93</sup> The definition of technical architecture as a collective practice aimed toward addressing the social realities of the majority of Mexico's citizens situated architecture - here narrowly defined as the edification of buildings as a discrete component of a state-building and political aggregating project of much larger scale. The architectural projects of Mexico's vanguards were being thought of not in terms of addressing the needs of individuals or smaller social groups, but in broader demographic terms such as labor sectors, social classes, and the broad national citizenry that relied on public services, as evidenced in O'Gorman's design and building of schools for the SEP and his rhetorical moves of invoking "the majority." In this sense, the idea of the "majority" may have indirectly translated to the notion of electoral constituencies, especially those consisting of the working classes, and was thus serving a complex rhetorical strategy of political aggregation. While O'Gorman's definition of arquitectura técnica was specifically intended to answer the needs of an historically disadvantaged majority of Mexican society, it also posited economical construction practices that would equally materialize the political promises of the broadly progressive forces that were on the eve of assuming leadership of the Mexican State.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Note: To be sure, O'Gorman was working at the behest of Mexico's more socialistic ideologues. On a personal level, his politic leaned specifically communist, at times paralleling the convictions of colleague and mentor in painting, Diego Rivera – who by the 1930s had become a Trotskyist. Leon Trotsky, notably, was a proponent of the working-class majoritarian doctrine of a "United Front," which advocated the communist joining of *workers* in differing parties so as to achieve working-class needs. This was in contrast to the idea of a "Popular Front" that advocated for aggregating forces and interests from far beyond the working class.

By the mid-1930s, during the sexenio of the left-leaning General Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934-1940), Mexico's increasingly younger generation of politicized architects began to conceptualize an arquitectura técnica with a broader constructive scope that equaled both the more managerial implications and integrative scope of *planificación* as envisioned by earlier generations of Mexican architect-planners. This paralleled a significant political boost for the general cause of large-scale regional and national planning during this presidential term. The administration embraced the ideas of a more centralized and large-scale planned economy. This courting of planners and socially oriented architects was part and parcel of the administrations broader strategy of social and political consolidation, one that sought to reconcile empowered executive authority, middle-class technical and industrial expertise with corporatist political structures with the objective of aggregating Mexico's manifold political, ideological, and regional interests into a cohesive power base. To do this, it established a new planning process, composed of Plan Sexenal or "Six-Year Plan." Fiscal planning efforts were accompanied by various physical planning gestures, leading to the promulgation of a new planning law for the Federal District, the Ley de Planeación y Zonificación del Distrito Federal (1936) and the formation of various "inter-secretarial" commissions to manage development in the Alta y Baja Sierra Tarahumara, the Valle del Mezquital (both 1936), and the Mixteca (1937).<sup>94</sup>

Japanese-Mexican architect and neo-Kantian influenced theorist Alberto Arai (1915-1959), a critical member of a young and ambitious cohort of architects that came of age towards the end of the 1930s, contributed to the increasingly philosophical as well as politicized conceptualization of *técnico/a* by elaborating on the existence and interdependence of multiple

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> For a brief synopsis on the regional planning efforts during Cárdenas's presidency as well as the rest of the twentieth century, see Francisco García Moctezuma, "La Planeación del desarollo regional en México (1900-2006)," *Investigaciones Geográficas, Boletín del Instituto de Geografia, UNAM* 71 (2010): 102-121.

constructive techniques within a broad concept of society. He tasked the ordering of these to architects in a conference titled *La Nueva Arquitectura y la Técnica* delivered to the *Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios* (LEAR) in November 1937. (**fig. 1.6**) He stated:

...the concept of *técnica* is dialectic, mobile, within the utilitarian space of a society. *Técnica* is therefore in this elastic sense the series of procedures, socially formed by each other, which are needed to do something, so that various distinct techniques can make up another greater technique, which in turn can be one that makes up an even more ample technique...<sup>96</sup>

For Arai, contemporary architecture was such a technical process, both made up of lesser techniques and also constitutive of what he labeled "the grand technique" of human life. (fig. 1.7 and 1.8) By being a part of the larger technique of human life, the structure of techniques within the architectural discipline were in turn divided into groups: one that concentrated on what he labeled "physical matters," the other which focused on "Man." Arai's definition of the new architecture's preoccupation with "Man" focused on a critical concept that would define the generation of Mexican architects and planners to which he belonged for the next two decades:

The human-focused techniques of the new architecture are interested in the whole man, and the latter desires to develop within the former all of his psychological and physical life, all of his moral and biological life. That is to say, the new architecture, more so than any other in time, is interested in [the whole] man as such, given that the conceptual and experimental techniques of our day allow for the most minute and disciplined analysis that has ever been able to be performed on man and his problems in any epoch. Because of that, the new architecture will always be an *integral* architecture.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Note: Key members of this younger cohort, many of whom graduated from the *Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura* during the last quarter of the 1930s and first of the 1940s, were amongst others Arai, Raul Cacho, Enrique Guerrero, Balbino Hernández, Enrique Yañez, Augusto Pérez Palacios, as well as Carlos Lazo Barreiro.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> "...el concepto de técnica es dialéctico, es móvil, dentro de la superficie utilitaria de una sociedad. Técnica es, por tanto, en este sentido elástico, la serie de procedimientos que se necesitan para hacer alguna cosa, los cuales socialmente se están constituyendo unos a otros, de modo que varias técnicas distintas constituyen una más amplia, la que a su vez puede pasar a ser una de las que constituyen una más amplia todavía..." Alberto T. Arai, *La Nueva Arquitectura y la Técnica* (Mexico City: DAPP, 1938), 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> La arquitectura actual es una técnica compleja formada por varias técnicas menores; ella a su vez es una particular de la gran técnica que es la vida humana... Las técnicas menores que forman el ángulo diedro de la arquitectura se dividen en dos grupos: técnicas que obran sobre la materia física y técnicas que obran sobre el hombre." Arai, 12-13.
<sup>98</sup> "A la técnica humana de la nueva arquitectura le interesa el hombre completo, pues a éste le toca desarrollar dentro de aquélla toda su vida psíquica y física, toda su vida moral y biológica. Es decir: a la nueva arquitectura,

The critical concept of a vital, *integral* architecture was given broad and abstract definition as a wide-reaching ordering system that sought resolution between material reality and human necessity:

In short, the dialectical connection of techniques, from the perspective of the new architecture, is called *order*. Because of that, order is the thread or perimetral ribbon that delimits the technical reach of architecture and, at the same time, is a concept that integrates its own being relative to each of its individual parts. The concrete application of order to a particular case is called composition."<sup>99</sup>

Because this new integral architecture's ultimate area of jurisdiction was "human life" - a term more reflective of biopolitical interrelations and processes - and this term was understood by Arai as the product of composition, he made a particularly poignant statement regarding the bounds of architectural expertise. While architects could still remain as technical "specialists" by focusing on any of a number of lesser techniques within the architectural discipline, he argued that this neglected a higher creative and organizational calling: "to perform the position as *governor* of the complete architectural order." 100

What were the boundaries of the "complete architectural order?" Arai's reference to the technical architect's governing function in matters of order had strong implications for how

más que a ninguna de otro tiempo, le interesa el hombre como tal, puesto que la técnica conceptual y experimental de nuestros días permite hacer los más minuciosas y disciplinados análisis que en época alguna se hayan podido hacer del hombre y sus problemas. Por eso, la nueva arquitectura siempre resulta ser una arquitectura integral." Arai, 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> "En suma: la conexión dialéctica de las técnicas, desde el punto de vista de la nueva arquitectura, se llama orden. Por eso el orden es el hilo o cinta perimetral que delimita el alcance técnico de la arquitectura y, al propio tiempo, es un concepto que integra su sér propio con relación a cada una de sus partes. La aplicación concreta del orden a un caso particular se llama composición." Arai, 14.

<sup>100 &</sup>quot;Por tanto, el progreso que deba operarse en cada técnica particular de la arquitectura debe estar encomendado a la investigación del ingeniero especialista más que al estudio técnico-general que del hombre hace el arquitecto. Lo que no quiere decir ni mucho menos, que el arquitecto no pueda convertirse en un momento dado en especialista de una técnica particular que necesita dominar por alguna circunstancia y de ese modo contribuir a su perfeccionamiento; pero en tal momento habrá dejado, naturalmente, de desempeñar el cargo de gobernador del orden arquitectónico completo." Arai, 15.

architects of his generation conceptualized the scope of their expertise, and in consequence the professional claims that they would make over the next two decades. Arai acknowledged the existence of discrete categories of discipline and their respective limits within the practice of architecture while at the same time placing value on the totalizing capabilities of an abstracted system of knowledge that was based on architecture's interrelations with other external disciplines and their respective "techniques." The value of this flexible and integrating system of knowledge could, in theory, allow a technical architect to transcend the traditionally narrow limits of the architectural profession. Arai's claim for architecture's specialized expertise in the abstract technique of "composition" carried with it governmental implications that furthermore invoked practices not only from the division of labor inherent to the collective nature of technical architectural design and construction and its hierarchical and managerial operations, but from the more general techniques of government bureaucratic organization.

Given architects' artistic skill to compose (a word that implies direction and authority) and arrange the lives of men - the principle objects of a "complete" or "integral" architectural order - it is evident that Arai was suggesting that architects could directly manage a body of specialists directed towards a humanistic social project. But given the ambiguity of his concept of a "complete architectural order," we can perhaps deduce this phrase's implications of the ordering of an even greater social body. In that light, this document, taken together with O'Gorman's language suggestive of a mass constituency, can be viewed as a specific call for members of the functionalist faction of the architectural profession to enter *politics* (which I define in this instance as the pursuit for a portion of power and leadership of a political

organization). <sup>101</sup> The claim that a technical architect had a duty to govern by means of their "integral" understanding of human matters (especially within a national context), and their capability to compose an order out of disparate parts set the groundwork for a shift in the definition of the architect as a political actor of Mexico's mid-century. As the Cárdenas administration evolved, however, the idea of the technical and managerial architect-planner as a political actor continued to be defined in an increasingly blatant ideological tone and within a growing climate of ideological tension.

In August 1938, President Cárdenas opened and attended the XVI Congreso

Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación (the 16th Congress of the International

Federation for Housing and Town Planning) – an event spearheaded by Carlos Contreras. 102 The

event was treated with great national importance being held at the Palacio de Bellas Artes, was

extensively covered in the press, and was even commemorated with official postage stamps,

signifying the State's embrace of large-scale planning. (figs. 1.9) It served as a propagandistic

tool not only for the architects who advocated a greater space within the state bureaucracy, but

for the State itself, as well as the president and the newly organized PRM. Arguably, the

administration's support of the event represented both Cárdenas's commitment to large-scale

territorial reorganization, a decidedly nationalist and corporatist political economic

management, and infrastructure construction as well as a much-needed public display of an

ostensible openness to broad international theories and proposals regarding the modes by which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> My definition of Politics is borrowed from Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification,* eds. Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2015), 135-136.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Note: This organization was originally founded by Ebenezer Howard, and Contreras had been a member since his graduate studies at Columbia University.

such projects could be accomplished. This latter part may have, to some degree, been a sign of international reassurance or good-will following the expropriation of foreign oil in May of 1938.

Did the Cárdenas administration's support of the large-scale international event sponsored by Contreras, a proponent of broadly Anglo-American, progressivist, pro-capitalist planning perspectives, signify the administration's willingness to incorporate his political and ideological take on *planificación*? (fig. 1.10) Not entirely. While Contreras represented one dominant ideological vein of large-scale urban and regional planning, the large international mix of attendees at the Congress, as well as the Mexican participants, shared a range of perspectives regarding the political and ideological nature of planning and its administration by members of the profession. Within the contingent of Mexican architects and planners represented at the Congress, its participants represented the growing ideological factions within the still inchoate modern planning movement, as was evident in a most notable case with the participation of a young group of radical functionalist architects known as the *Union de Arquitectos Socialistas*. <sup>103</sup> (figs. 1.11 and 1.12) Their presentation represented an ideological schism with many of the earlier conceptualizations of planning espoused by Contreras or promoted in his journal Planificación: Órgano de la Asociación Mexicana para la Planificación de la República Mexicana. The more liberal, pro-capitalist entrepreneurship, and consultative modes of planning supported by Contreras and his ideological allies at the congress were being more vocally

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> This group, made up of architects such as Enrique Yáñez, Ricardo Rivas, Balbino Hernández, Enrique Guerrero, Álvaro Aburto, and Alberto T. Arai, amongst others, inserted the critical language of worker-oriented social justice and technical leadership into the parlance of the Planning Congress. Selections from the presentation of the Union de Arquitectos Socialistas were reprinted as: "Doctrina socialista de la arquitectura," in *Ideario de los Arquitectos Mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 224-231. The full presentation was published as: Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas, *Proyecto de la ciudad obrera en México*, *D.F. Doctrina socialista de la arquitectura, México*, ponencia al XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, agosto de 1938 (Mexico City: XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, 1938); For more context of this group of young architects within the broader history of the Mexican architectural vanguard, see López-Rangel: La modernidad arquitectónica mexicana. Antecedentes y vanguardias 1900-1940, 172.

challenged as they faced the reality of being somewhat out of step with the *modus operandi* of the Cárdenas administration given that it had adopted both tools and rhetoric of socialistic and corporatist governance at different points throughout its existence.

The Cárdenas administration, though ultimately more corporatist in structure and pragmatic in practice, still contained strong socialist elements within its ranks as it sought to actively address the plethora of social promises that had been made during and after the Revolution. As such, proponents of this ideology within the architectural and planning professions saw the congress as a potentially useful vehicle for the dissemination of their ideas. With Cárdenas in attendance for at least a portion of the congress, the presentation of the *Union* de Arquitectos Socialistas at the Congress may have fallen on his receptive ears. Also within the orbit of the president's attention was the arrival of a notable Swiss architect in Mexico City. Hannes Meyer (1884-1954), former director of the Bauhaus and recently returned from the Soviet Union, was invited by the architect and urban planner José Luis Cuevas to give talks at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura in September and October of 1938. 104 He contributed to the already present dialogue regarding the need for a socially-focused architect as well as an architecture oriented towards the masses. More important to the ideological layering of the concept of planificación, however, was his recounting of his experiences with the massive projects of electrification, industrialization, and urbanization under Stalin's first years of rule. While he mentioned his discontent with his involvement in the planning of Moscow to his

<sup>104</sup> For more on Hannes Meyer's professional career in Mexico, refer to Raquel Franklin Unkind, "Hannes Meyer in Mexico, 1939-1949" (PhD diss, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 1997). Also see Susanne C. Dussel Peters, "La arquitectura de Hannes Meyer y Max Cetto: de la modernidad alemana a la mexicana," in *Mexico, el exilio bien temperado*, edited by Renata von Hanffstengel y Cecilia Tercero Vasconcelos (México City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Instituto de Investigaciones Interculturales Germano-Mexicanas, A.C.; Insituto Goethe México, A.C.; Puebla, Pue.: Secretaría de Cultura, Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 1995), 264-271; additionally see Jorge Francisco Liernur, "Hannes Meyer en México" *Instituto de Arte Americano y Investigaciones Esteticas* 2 (June 1988): 1-31.

Mexican audience, he offered little criticism of the two Five-year plans of Stalin. Instead, he somewhat opportunistically used this narrative to frame Mexico as a revolutionary country on the brink. In a published talk delivered at the *Academia de Bellas Artes de San Carlos* on October 4, 1938, Meyer extolled Mexican progress and more specifically the forceful socioeconomic policies of the Cárdenas administration:

In socio-economic consciousness, Mexico counts amongst the most advanced states in the world.

Every expropriation of railroads, energy sources, oil refineries, or sugar mills, every expropriation of lands that benefits the shareholder of common lands, reduces the opportunities for the speculation on national assets and the exploitation of mankind by means of real-estate usury.

Only this process of economic liberation of the Mexican People opens the way to an ordered national planning in which all vital necessities of the people, material and cultural, will be understood and plastically realized in democratic ways. 105

This activist framing of *planificación* as a tool of strong executive action and national economic sovereignty appears to have both reached and made an impression on the President. In 1939 Cárdenas appointed Meyer as director of the newly founded *Instituto de Planificación y Urbanismo* (IPU) at the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN). The Swiss architect was given

Cada expropriación de ferrocarriles, fuentes de energía, refinerías de petróleo o ingenios, cada expropiación de tierras en beneficio de los ejidatarios, reduce las oportunidades para especular con los bienes nacionales y para explotar a los hombres mediante usura inmobiliaria.

Sólo este proceso de liberación económica del pueblo mexicano abre paso a una planificación nacional ordenada, en que todas las necesidades de vida del pueblo, materiales y culturales, se encuentran comprendidas y plásticamente realizadas en formas democráticas." Hannes Meyer, "Experiencias de Urbanismo" in *Ideario de los Arquitectos Mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 266. This talk by Hannes Meyer was originally published in Spanish in *Arquitectura y decoración*, número 12, México, octubre de 1938, 252-257. It is possible that this talk was either presented in German by Meyer himself or delivered by a Mexican colleague. See the footnote after the next. <sup>106</sup> From its origins in 1936, the IPU was an ideologically charged counterbalance to Mexico's more conservative or autonomous schools, primarily the *Universidad Nacional de México* (later the UNAM). Meyer's presence in its early years only seemed to reinforce its ideologically inspired mission in providing both vocational and professional paths to Mexico's more "proletarian" classes as technicians and experts capable of carrying out advanced technological, infrastructural, and administrative projects in accordance to a national and socially oriented political will. Dussel Peters, 264.

<sup>105 &</sup>quot;En sentido económico-social, México se cuenta entre los estados más adelantados del mundo.

the specific task of training architects as urbanists and planners within a specific academic track. Of key importance to the project of professional abstraction, however, was Meyer's abstract definitions of the architect-planner that such a program would produce. Meyer created this new curriculum according to his convictions that the architect was both the orderer and configurer (*Gestalter*) of the life processes of his society as well as an organizer of specialists - a position that, as mentioned previously, was similarly held by other socialist Mexican architects such as Alberto T. Arai. 107

The layering of the definition of *planificación* with these elements of varied socialist frameworks along with the more concrete political realities that favored the increasingly executive role of the presidency in social and political economic matters would shape the public perception of planning. As a post-Cárdenas, and "post-Revolutionary" political climate developed in the 1940s – bringing with it an environment of ideological reaction, political moderation, and a growing rhetoric of "unity" such ideological associations would fuel various polemics within the architectural profession regarding the governing and executive role of *técnico* architect-planners in large-scale planning and perhaps more importantly the relationship of the profession, or at least a particular faction within – as a potentially invaluable political

<sup>107 &</sup>quot;El arquitecto es entonces un ordenador y plastificador del proceso de vida de su sociedad... El arquitecto es, por lo tanto, un organizador, un organizador de especialistas, ¡pero él mismo no es especialista!" Hannes Meyer, "La formación del arquitecto" in *Ideario de los Arquitectos Mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 248. This talk was originally written in German since handwritten copies of the text in this language were found by my HTC colleague Christianna Bonin. It was delivered in Spanish by the Mexican architect-town planner José Luis Cuevas Pietrasanta (1881-1952) at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura at the Academía de San Carlos on September 29, 1938. It was published in Spanish in *Arquitectura y decoración* 2, no. 12 (October 1938): 231-235. Note: the Spanish word "plastificador" was chosen as the translation of "gestalter" in the German text. Also, the final paragraphs of the Spanish text "La formación del arquitecto" which are – like "Experiencias de Urbanismo" - extolling of Mexican progress do not appear in Meyer's German draft and were either adlibbed at the conference or included by an editor for its publication. Whose decision it was to add such text is unclear, though as noted earlier in regards to the text "Experiencias de Urbanismo" these patriotic exclamations likely benefitted Meyer in his architectural career in México.

instrument and viable source of political recruits for an increasingly strong Mexican State and coercive dominant party.

Chapter 2: Planificación Integral and the Architect as Political Critic

## I. Political Criticism and Jurisdictional Claim Making

Mexican architects, particularly those shaping and espousing theories of architectural technicism or socio-economic planning at an urban, regional scale, and national scale, formed a relatively vocal and at times significantly powerful civic voice throughout the early midtwentieth century. Some of these actively advocated for inclusion into the existing mechanisms of the State or advocated the creation of new bureaucratic entities that could put their areas of expertise to use. The State was seen by this small group of early architect-planners as the most suitable structure for the broadest dissemination of architectural and planning ideas as well as their manifestation in vast socio-economic infrastructures and other physical constructions representative of the modern nation that they envisioned. This foray into Mexico's structures of governance was not only a professional move but also a decidedly political one. Though the ideological positions of the architects involved within this collective mobility project at times varied, a common factor unified them: the engagement of this practice with manifold disciplines and professions, a commitment to a managerial mode of architectural practice, and the identification of the architect as an administrator and expert - a técnico - capable of governance. 108 This process of arguing technical qualifications and justifying their inclusion within the state planning bureaucracies and even higher political office was often strategic and typically anticipated, or was in step with, important actions and events in presidential administrations as well as national election cycles.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> I expand more on the Magali Sarfatti Larson's idea of the "collective mobility project" and how it operates within Andrew Abbot's concept of the system of professions in the introduction and chapter one. "Collective mobility projects" are intended to increase the status and prestige of a group of professionals through the expanded definition of their work and body of knowledge. For more on the collective mobility project, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 66-79.

Reflecting the incipient post-revolutionary shifts of political speech and the nature of its public forums, Mexican architects and planners turned to various forms of media to publish and disseminate their profession-advocating arguments. At many levels, architects and planners played a critical role in the formation of the so-called "modern" form of political speech that was being adapted by the dominant political party and its post-revolutionary leadership. As Aaron Navarro notes, this modern political speech of the era relied on new forums and technologies of political engagement so as to further the dominant party's aims at political restructuring, ideological improvisation, and rhetorical strategies to co-opt and neutralize the threat of opposition.<sup>109</sup> Certain Mexican architects of the early mid-twentieth century, some of whom were already active agents of the state and dominant party, made use of magazines, newspapers, radio, and by the 1950s, television, to share architectural or otherwise aesthetic topics before a wider audience. Very often, their engagement with these media served to display to the public key projects accomplished by its more prominent members as well as those projects which both demonstrated Mexico's material modernity as well maintained the activist illusions of a State in need of bolstering its revolutionary and later developmentalist credentials. To that extent, certain Mexican architects were keenly engaged in a project of propagandistic political speech that both played upon the needs of the state and dominant party as well as the professional goals of either the architectural profession as a whole, or more often than not, the interests of a particular faction or clique.

At the more narrowly professional discursive level, architectural and technical professional journals served an equally important role in generating active and potentially

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> For more on "political speech" and its role in the maintaining of the integrity of Mexico's ruling party, see: Aaron W. Navarro, *Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico*, *1938-1954* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 259-268.

profession-redefining discussion amongst fellow architects regarding the changing nature of the profession in relation to the Mexican state. Arguitectura México, founded in 1938, directed by the architect Mario Pani Darqui (1911-1993) and "managed" by the engineer Alberto J. Pani – his uncle and Mexico's former Secretary of Finance and Public Credit is the single most monumental professional journal of the period in Mexico. Its contents were at times framed by its editors in a more constrained, mainstream, or even "official" narrative of modern architecture; it seldom delved into the politics and polemics of the Mexican architectural profession. While this journal has been cited as a primarily documentary project of Mexican architecture, it was also responsible for creating a general pro-modernizing narrative hailing an international selection of most significant modernist architectural, urbanistic, and design projects of the period. 110 (figs. 2.1-4) To that end, its content shared much in common with the French journal L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui, as well as numerous other contemporary architectural journals in its advancement of the cause of modernity as a particularly aesthetic, material, and technological movement. And yet its pages, though notable for their lavish display of architectural photographs and plans, did not always give high priority or ample space to the critical discussion of broader social, political, or economic issues, or professional discursive matters in their content. At the same time, Arquitectura México can also be viewed as a vehicle of promotion that protected the professional and political security of the journal's leadership not only before fellow Mexican architectural professionals, but to other Mexican intellectuals, interested members of the political class, as well as an international professional readership.

 <sup>110</sup> For a brief introduction to the journal Arquitectura, later known as Arquitectura México, see: Louise Noelle Gras, "Estudio Introductorio" in Raices Digital 6, Fuentes para la historia de la arquitectura mexicana: Revista Arquitectura México 119 números 1938-1978, ed. Carlos Ríos Garza (Mexico City: Facultad de Arquitectura – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2008), 17-37.

While the Mexican State of the mid-twentieth century was ostensibly "strong," increasingly authoritarian, and its political society composed of numerous powerful elite groups, the onset of the so-called post-revolutionary period during the early through mid-1940s quickened the revolutionary-era political leadership's diminishing hold of power. Very real cracks had appeared in the old dispensation's shield of patronage and protection, and the social acceptability of political retribution with impunity had – except for in extreme circumstances – greatly diminished. This, along with a likely political receptiveness and occasional strategic cooption of critique during this window of dominant party reform and renovation opened up - if only for a moment and in very exceptional cases – opportunities for greater liberty of critical expression amongst Mexico's intellectuals. This political dynamic created a relatively fertile environment for the diversification of architectural professional journals, prompting a small but nonetheless significant handful of new arenas for professional discussion and debate as well as open political commentary and criticism. These variously complemented and challenged the more mainstream architecture profession-oriented journalism of the period. The journal Construcción, founded in 1941, gave pro-técnico/a professionals a new place where they could publish and promote their visions of a technical and social-oriented architecture, national socioeconomic planning, and their arguments for a more active relationship with the state. (fig. 2.5) and 2.6) Meanwhile, Arquitectura y lo démas, founded in 1945, provided a similar platform that gave voice to these same issues but with a more-clear air of protest, polemic, and pointed – though sometimes anonymously authored – political criticism. <sup>111</sup> (fig. 2.7 and 2.8)

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<sup>111</sup> Arquitectura y lo demás and Construcción shared many of the same collaborators and directing staff. Lorenzo Favela, the editor-director of the former had previously been in charge of its architecture section between 1943 and 1944. Other collaborators shared by these journals included Álvaro Aburto, Enrique Guerrero, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Raúl Cacho, Alberto T. Arai, Enrique Yañez, Manuel Parra, Marcial Gutiérrez Camarena, Luis Barragan, Salvador Ortega and Carlos Solórzano. Also of note – many of these same architects were writers of the "Urbanismo y Arquitectura" page published in Excelsior since 1943. For more on the history of Arquitectura y lo demás, see: Carlos Ríos Garza, "Estudio Introductorio" in Raíces Digitales 2, Fuentes para la historia de la

To be sure, vehicles for open political criticism are vital components and infrastructures both for political systems that either endorse a participatory type of governance between varied interests across political and civil societies or for those systems that see the need in maintaining the illusion that some level of democracy and public discussion are open so as to maintain their fragile legitimacy. If we consider the latter condition to be a closer description of the laterevolutionary/early-post revolutionary Mexican state and political system, then the "critical" content of these journals would have at times played into a politically improvisational strategy that permitted if not out-right cultivated certain languages of opposition. In as much as criticism was being produced by the very professional classes that sought integration into the bureaucratic machinery of the State as well as the leadership of the dominant party, we can regard this form of critical journalism as an additional characteristic of the politically coercive "political speech" of the period. 112 To some extent, the small but not insignificant diversification of architectural professional journals provided special opportunity and protection for members of the profession to make claims of expanded professional jurisdiction and argue their political viability amongst themselves and a relatively small foreign – or non-architecture professional – audience, as well as openly air political grievances in a manner that was public, but controlled. 113 These journals had a relatively low circulation, which lessened their chances of wide dissemination where they

arquitectura mexicana: Revista Arquitectura y lo demás, 1945-1950 (Mexico City: Facultad de Arquitectura – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2004), 10-21. It is important to note that General Héctor F. López was a co-editor of Arquitectura y lo demás as well as a member of its directorial board. General López is a significant character in Mexican history during the 1940s on two accounts. He was in charge of Juan Andreu Almazán's presidential campaign for the 1940 election. He later became the vice-president of the Partido Democrático Mexicano, and by 1945 supported Ezequiel Padilla in his bid for the presidency. In addition to being a revolutionary military leader, and later a general, López was an historian and geographer. For more on General López see: Enciclopedia Guerrerense, s.v. "López Mena, Héctor F.," accessed June 10, 2021, https://enciclopediagro.mx/biografias/lopez-mena-hector-f/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Navarro, 259-268.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> For more on the forums of claim making, including the use of journalism, see Chapter Three, "The Claim of Jurisdiction," in Andrew Delano Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 59-85.

had the potential of producing mass-political provocation with far-reaching consequences; nevertheless, they were accessible to a smaller elite professional and political milieu that was very much involved in the political and economic restructurings of the period. <sup>114</sup>

Regardless of the political dynamics that directly and indirectly shaped the production of political criticism and its reception, the arguments and accusations contained within were often very real, or felt strongly by those who wrote them. They can be taken as important representations of the noticeable shifting power dynamics between the varied political, ideological, and professional interests that composed both the Mexican state and dominant party. As noted in the introduction, by the mid-1940s, the aging cadre that had come to power with the Mexican Revolution had entered a legitimation crisis that was tied into the growing public perception – likely felt most by both the ascendant, pro-development, professional middle-class as well as politically marginalized elites whose interests existed in opposition parties – that the socio-economic and moral progress of the nation had stalled or was in retrograde. Within the architectural profession-oriented literature, there was a very small handful of young architects that sought to directly engage with the perceived decay of the political system with very pointed criticisms towards a variety of topics ranging from the perceived weaknesses and ineffectuality of political leadership, their lack of political and technical qualification, mismanagement of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Taken together, the expanding middle-class preoccupation with professionalism and the role that professions were to play in Mexico's incipient industrialization and economic development along with a vocal oppositionary opinion nevertheless situated within a clear clime of political consolidation seems to have contributed to the existence of this small collection of heterodox profession-oriented publications without too much fear of repercussion of censorship. I emphasize, however, that this was a fleeting moment since censorship of certain political criticisms were on the uptick by the beginning of the late 1940s with the growing establishment of Miguel Alemán's presidency. See Roderic A. Camp, *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 194.

<sup>115</sup> For more on the subject of corruption in Mexican politics during the period see Chapter 5, "The Politics of Corruption" in Stephen R. Niblo, *Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 253-309; For the characterization of corruption as a critical component in the decline of Mexico's Revolutionary ethos, see "La Crisis" in Jesús Silva Herzog, *La Revolución en Crisis* (México City: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1944), 32-36.

construction industry, corruption and cronyism in the concession of contracts, as well as loftier topics such as the direction of the nation's political economy, the organization of Mexican society, and the spiritual and moral direction of the Nation.

The architect Mauricio Gómez Mayorga (1913-1992), assistant director of the short-lived magazine Arquitectura y lo Demás, authored a number of critical essays that addressed the decadent political climate and the relationship that the architectural profession had with the general public, the Mexican state, and political society. He was very clear in his opinion that architects needed to be more vocal in their critical opinions, as he himself performed as a reformoriented public intellectual and aggressive professional advocate in the changing political times. 116 In one article, Gómez Mayorga elevated the roles of writer, polemicist, and critic as fundamentally integral to the activist political architect of his age since they were engaged not only in shaping formal and spatial compositions but also in the broader battleground of political ideas that were equally if not more important to the shaping of the social and built environments:

...the modern architect, almost futuristic for being so modern, will leap to a plan of combat that will be inoffensively described as "political" by many, and that will oblige them to mix a private life as architect with a public life as an architectural fighter; that will oblige him to mix the workshop with the polemicist's platform and use both the pencil to draw and the pen to write.

These are different times (And if they weren't, we would have to work in order to make them so) and we aren't in the comfortable scholarly situation to be satisfied with "the architect's language is the drawing." The drawing is his language, but so too is the Spanish language because once you get off the ivory tower you have to talk to the people and you have to use the poster and written and spoken discourse to say many urgent things that can't be said by drawing. 117

intellectual formation. Though he was trained as an architect at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura like most of the leading architects in Mexico City, was also a noted literary author and poet who belonged to the same generation of Octavio Paz, Efraín Huerta, Alberto Quintero Álvarez, and Neftalí Beltran. For a brief biography, see: Enciclopedia de la literatura en México, s.v. "Mauricio Gómez Mayorga," by Aurora Sánchez Rebolledo, last modified April 17, 2018, http://www.elem.mx/autor/datos/106636.

<sup>116</sup> Gómez Mayorga's advocacy for both an expanded intellectual and political role for architects reflected his own

<sup>117 &</sup>quot;...el arquitecto moderno, casi futuro de tan moderno, saltará a un plan de combate que será inofensivame calificado de "político" por muchos, y que los obligará a mezclar una vida privada de arquitecto con una vida pública de combatiente de la arquitectura: que lo obligará a mezclar el taller con la tribuna del polemista y a usar tanto el lápiz para dibujar como la pluma para escribir. Pues estos son otros tiempos (pero si no lo fueran habría que

His exhortative language emphasized his view for further blurring between political and professional activity. It echoed similar arguments made by the socialist architects writing in the 1930s for a more popular role or positioning of practitioners by encouraging a more direct relationship with "the people." While "the people" referred to by Gómez Mayorga may not have been the same "majority" referred to by the leftist architect-painter Juan O'Gorman in his *Pláticas* nearly twelve years prior, we can assume the future "political" architect that he was defining was similarly still intended to carry out a similar plan of socially-oriented technical objectives in his professional practice and that these objectives would ideally be the product of a conversation with the public. In short, Gómez Mayorga's call for a new "political" architect was not only a call for architects to engage in political activism, but rather an exhortation for his fellow professionals to test their communicative and rhetorical skills while performing as a new public intellectual, socio-political visionary, and agent capable of both mediation and coercion — in short, a figure with an unambiguous, new political role in modern Mexican politics.

The flurry of pointed opinions that he produced in the magazine's first year of publication – 1945 – were deliberately timed. The Ávila Camacho administration was coming to close and the process of selecting the next generation of leadership was well underway both in backroom dealings amongst the dominant party's political elite as well as in the preparations for the general election. Political criticism and calls to action in Mexico, much like in almost any modern "democratic" political system, tends to uptick at politically decisive times and can be

trabajar para que lo fuesen) y no estamos en la cómoda situación escolar de conformarnos con que "el dibujo es el lenguaje del arquitecto". Es el dibujo su lenguaje, pero lo es el español también, pues una vez que se baja de la torre de marfil, hay que hablar con la gente, y hay que usar del cartel y del discurso escrito y hablado para decir muchas urgentes cosas que no se dicen dibujando." Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, "Posición del Arquitecto" *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 2 (June 1945): 25.

strategically launched *en masse* towards the end of an administration or at the perceived conclusion of a political generation. In some cases such as in Mexico, a country with a constitutional rule that states no-reelection for the presidency, these forms of criticism — especially in cases of anti-corruption campaigns — likely aided in the act of publicly discrediting the exiting leadership. In the case of Mexican politics during the height of the dominant party's power, this was often necessary in order to limit public support for and curb the inspirations of potential political candidates riding on the coat-tails of the previous administration that could pose a serious challenge to the party's chosen candidate.

In Gómez Mayorga's case, however, this process of accusation and discrediting was part of a professionally-interested rhetorical process necessary for arguing the need for a new dispensation. One part of this rhetorical process follows both the norms of professional claimmaking in regards to abstracting or expanding the definition of a profession's area of expertise and the investing of newfound status upon the profession because of the redefinition of its work and role within a society. With this expanded definition of its qualities and capacities, professionals can make a shift into new jurisdictional vacancies that may have arisen during the process of social upheaval. But in cases where vacancies are not willingly created during the process of upheaval, it becomes the task of a particular – and more often than not self-interested – advocate to contribute to the social or political upheaval. Shortly after Gómez Mayorga publishing of a professional call to political action, he followed up with an article making clear claims for the profession's worthiness for additional bureaucratic jurisdiction. In making these claims, he was also engaged in a politically provocative rhetorical strategy described by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Abbott, 9, 30. For more on the role of "gaining status through work" in collective professional mobility, see Larson, 67-68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Abbott, 3.

communication theorist Bruce E. Gronbeck as a "ritualistic deposition." This rhetorical strategy is critical to addressing and combating cases of corruption. <sup>120</sup> In the first step of the ritualistic deposition, there is a sociolinguistic process involving the verbal naming of acts that are variously stated by the author or left to other authorities or a public to judge as corrupt. Needless to say, Gómez Mayorga was not one to mince words in this stage of deposing. In the article "La Arquitectura Mañana" that was published in May 1945 he stated:

It will not be a matter of the State tolerating or allowing the presence of architects within the orbit of the minor bureaucracy, as it occurs now in Mexico because of our antiquated and ignorant authorities: it will be that the state will claim the architect and he will not have to avoid the fulfillment of his highest duty...It will not be then, as it occurs now, that the state uses architects as draughtsman and generals, contractors and engineers as directors and coordinators of architectural activities. No: the world of tomorrow will put everyone in his place.

But if it should occur, as we might object, that this world of tomorrow will only exist in civilized countries...and that everything here will continue as usual with politicians and bribe-takers and uneducated functionaries, then we will respond that our task today, to be able to fulfill that of tomorrow, is to make Mexico behave in the future like a civilized nation, so that one day architecture can be made. If this is doing politics, let us do politics as well if necessary.<sup>121</sup>

As we can see, his writing underscores a particular political decadence embodied by the networks of patronage and favoritism normalized by the current political dispensation.

Mayorga's writing emphasized the supposed ineptitude or lack of necessary expertise both of the military leadership as well as a cast of competing professionals and tradesmen connected to them

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> For more on the act of "ritualistic deposition" in anti-corruption rhetoric, see: Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetoric of Political Corruption," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 175-180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> No se tratará de que el Estado tolere o Permita la presencia de arquitectos dentro de la órbita de la burocracia menor, como ocurre en México por culpa de nuestras anticuadas e ignorantes autoridades: se tratará de que el arquitecto será reclamado por el estado y no deberá escapar al cumplimiento de su más alto deber....... No se trata pues de que, como ocurre ahora, el estado use a los arquitectos como dibujantes, y a los generales, contratistas e ingenieros como directores y coordinadores de las actividades arquitectónicas. No: el mundo de mañana Pondrá a cada quien en su lugar...... aquí todo seguirá como siempre con los políticos y los mordelones y los funcionarios iletrados, entonces responderemos que nuestra tarea de hoy, para Poder cumplir con la de mañana, es hacer que México se porte en lo futuro como nación civilizada, para que un día pueda hacerse arquitectura. Si esto es hacer política, hagamos política también si es necesario. Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, "La Arquitectura Mañana" *Arquitectura y lo demás 1* (May 1945): 22.

via the tangled webs of cronyism and clientelism. This form of political criticism addressed the issue of wrongfully assigned jurisdiction by both lamenting the abuse of the political powers of appointment and the repercussions of ignoring the expertise of a seemingly politically marginalized or mute body of qualified professionals. This political waste of expertise combined with the supposed indifference or ineffectiveness of the cadre of professionals that he was calling to action was perhaps the greatest affront to Gómez Mayorga. It was nothing short of a massive cultural impediment in the civilizational trajectory of a modern, forward-thinking Mexico. Mexico's incapacity to produce architecture, broadly defined, was both cause and effect of this perceived arrest of civilizational progress. The construction of Architecture would only be possible by architects taking direct political action so as to ensure the birth of a renewed state free of corruption and invested in the appointment of the appropriate experts in charge of its constructive activities.

As Gómez Mayorga's continued his ritualistic deposition in "La Arquitectura Mañana" with calls for political purification he initially left unanswered the precise ideological tenor of the

<sup>122</sup> The words that he used tapped into a central cultural trope in Latin America that had taken root in the mid-19th century and which continued to influence the discourse of Latin American modernity and development well throughout the first half of the 20th century. For many intellectuals of varied modernizing, progressive, and liberal inclinations throughout the Americas, the notion of "civilization" was perceived to co-exist uncomfortably with a socalled "barbarism," a binary most famously established in the widely read and referenced book, Facundo: Civilización y Barbarie (1845), originally written by the 19th century Argentine author Domingo Faustino Sarmiento during the military dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas. The key terms of this binary could be interpreted towards varied directions according to political necessity, but in their original context, they defined a political bipolarity where Enlightenment ideals in democratic governance, economic liberalism, and overall public education faced opposition from an autochthonous and especially rural-backed Caudillismo. For a recent English translation of this text, see: Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism, trans. Kathleen Ross (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); A similar binary was expressed in Mexican terms, most famously after the Mexican Revolution by the writer, philosopher, and statesman José Vasconcelos in his book La Raza Cósmica (1925). For this foundational figure in modern Mexican intellectual thought, the tendency towards barbarism was ideally only a phase in what he described as a social, cultural, and racial evolutionary (though in reality, eugenicist) process towards a similar Eurocentric-defined rationalism that was shaped by a western conceptualization of the rule of law while promising a supposed universal, or "cosmic" humanism. Gómez Mayorga channeled the gravity of these arguments as he championed the architectural profession and a well-educated leadership while condemning what he saw as Mexico's political and cultural depression under a perceived post-conflict *caudillismo*. See, José Vasconcelos, The Cosmic Race: A Bilingual Edition, trans. Didier T. Jaén (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997).

activist politics that would characterize the futuristic Mexican architect. As his arguments developed in additional essays published in Arquitectura y lo demás throughout the final year of the Avila Camacho administration, he continued to seize upon not only the public perception of broad political corruption, but also on the ideological and generational conflicts that defined the internal struggles and challenged the viability and relevance of both of PRM and the architectural profession. His call for more active or outright political architects at times echoed similar calls for activism expressed by the socialist professionals of the 1930s. His calls for reform and activism would have likely played into the passions and frustrations certainly felt by Mexico's more left-leaning architects with the general post-Cárdenas shift away from the socialistic policies that had irregularly but noticeably gained traction under his administration. Likewise, such writings contributed to an overall ideological anxiety that was resurgent amongst Mexican intellectuals at both ends of the political spectrum. This ideological anxiety was, of course, part of a global phenomenon that took hold of numerous individuals and institutions of varied tenors during the conclusion and aftermath of the Second World War with the growing realization that the next chapter of the conflict was to be waged between the primary victors – the United State and the USSR.

In light to the changing political and ideological clime of the period, use of the word "socialism" either in a positive or pejorative tone gained a particularly new charge, even within the scope of architectural journalism. Gómez Mayorga took advantage of the charged meaning of the word as well as its perceived abuse, using it to significant rhetorical effect in the September 1945 article "Arquitectura y Socialismo":

We could say that every architect is a socialist, using this statement almost as a flag; like a combat phrase. But an architectural combat phrase that doesn't lose its strength but rather gains in clarity if it is carefully cleaned of all demagogic color. Indeed, we believe so much in the value of this flag the more it piercingly

emphasizes its professional technical content, and so much less the more it symbolizes the opportune direction of a current policy...We know that the phrase exaggerates, simplifies, and will even provoke protests among some architects, who perhaps with very good reasons do not want to be classified among the socialists. So much the better: the clarification, the discussion, the commentary will then be even more opportune and will provide a place to see who protests and if he is a true architect he will necessarily be socialist, with seemingly implausible independence of his political convictions and religious creed....Every architect is socialist. Yes, if he is an architect with a contemporary mind; if he lives his profession intensely; if he reacts realistically, positively, and constructively in the absence of urbanism, in the face of bad urbanism; in the absence of housing, in the face of the counterfeit housing manufactured by the gangsters of the construction industry; in light of the chaos of public works; in light of the lack of expertise of the people and the authorities to respectively propose and resolve collective architectural problems; in the face of the spectacle of a country like ours that in so many ways would save an honest socialist architecture and that loses time in petty, bad, and false individual solutions; in vague unrealized projects; in old-fashioned provisional efforts; in works without destiny and future. 123

This article cemented the fact that Gómez Mayorga was a proponent of major political and state structural reform and was at odds with how the PRM had balanced ideology with political action and socially-oriented construction. Despite his apparent championing of socialism in this article, however, Gómez Mayorga was not making any serious affirmations about his own personal politics. To be sure, he was no challenger from the ideological left, having affiliation with the

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<sup>123 &</sup>quot;Podríamos decir que todo arquitecto es socialista, usando de ésta afirmación casi como de una bandera; como de una frase de combate arquitectónico, que no pierde nada de su fuerza y si gana en claridad, si se la limpia cuidadosamente de todo color demagógico. Creemos en efecto en el valor de esta bandera tanto más cuanto más agudamente se destaca su contenido técnico profesional, y tanto menos, cuanto más simbolice la oportuna dirección de una política vigente.... Sabemos que la frase exagera y simplifica y llegará inclusive a suscitar protestas entre algunos arquitectos, que acaso con muy buenas razones no desean verse clasificados entre los socialistas. Tanto mejor: la aclaración, la discusión, el comentario serán entonces aun más oportunos y darán lugar para hacer ver a quien proteste, que si es arquitecto de verdad será necesariamente socialista, con independencia aparentemente inverosímil de sus convicciones políticas y credo religioso... Todo arquitecto es socialista. Si, si es arquitecto de mente contemporánea; si vive intensamente su profesión; si reacciona en forma realista, positiva y constructiva ante la falta de urbanismo, ante el mal urbanismo; ante la falta de la habitación, ante la habitación falsificada que fabrican los gangsters de la construcción; ante el caos de las obras públicas; ante le impreparación de la gente y de las autoridades para plantear y resolver respectivamente, los problemas arquitectónicos colectivos; ante el espectáculo de un país como el nuestro al que en tantos sentidos salvaría una honrada arquitectura socialista, y que pierde el tiempo en mezquinas soluciones individuales, malas y falsas; en vagos proyectos irrealizados; en caducos intentos provisonales; en obras sin destino y futuro." Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, "Arquitectura y Socialismo" Arquitectura y lo Demás 5 (September 1945): 21.

conservative, Catholic leaning *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) – a notable and recent challenge to the dominant party. (fig. 2.9-2.10) So why champion "socialism"?

It appears that Gómez Mayorga was engaged in a complicated rhetorical strategy of codeswitching, terminological appropriation, and tongue-in-cheek criticism where he is pointing out
the degradation of the dominant party's political rhetoric amidst its often conscious failures to
uphold not only "socialism," but even notions of the "public good" or "social service." He
offered a critique of the, at times, hollow, mutable, and multivalent nature of political language,
he is utilizing its re-brandability in a manner that also obfuscates his own personal political
convictions so as to more successfully advocate for a unity between pro-technical and proplanning architects across the ideologically heterogenous profession. Gómez Mayorga
blatantly bent the meaning of the term "socialist" to the advantage of this particular faction of
architects so as to argue its exchangeability with the great buzz-descriptive of the age —
técnico/a. In this article, Gómez Mayorga attempted to convince a portion of his audience to
reduce the political use of the term socialism to mere opportunistic posturing and embrace
technicism — as a project of professional transformation translating to civilian-led political

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> It was well known that Gómez Mayorga had collaborated in the publication of the newspaper *La Nación*, which was the official mouthpiece of the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN). This political party was the largest organized opposition to the dominant party. At the time, the PAN was largely characterized by the Catholicism of most of its members; a critical stance against liberalism as well as individualism; a rejection of Marxist doctrine in favor of a fusion of Catholic and classical humanist social teachings as well as aspects of corporatist political organization; and a firm opposition to various socialist-inspired reforms that had been adopted by previous administrations. Gómez Mayorga appears to have pertained to a more Catholic developmentalist faction – a faction which was not wholly contained by the PAN, however. Some Catholic developmentalist intellectuals existed somewhat outside of Mexican partisan politics, or could find a political place within the newly formed PRI since this party relied on an incorporative, integrationalist, and co-optive strategy for much of its history. For a brief bio of Gómez Mayorga, see: "La Nación," Filosofía en Español, accessed May 14, 2021, http://www.filosofía.org/hem/med/m056.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> Note: On the one hand, this real degradation of official revolutionary party rhetoric was symptomatic of the center-right turn and politic of "national unity" of the PRM under the Ávila Camacho administration; on the other hand, the claim of semantic vacuity was a conservative commentary on the integrity of socialism in general. The rebrandable quality of words is discussed by Friedrich Nietzsche in "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense" in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The birth of tragedy and other writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 145; For more on the temporal nature of language and the ideological multivalency of words, see J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), 19.

reform - as a non-ideological concept or at least a point at which competing ideologies and political camps could find accord. In this light, we can understand that Gómez Mayorga was endeavoring in a strategy of coalition formation within the architectural profession. This admittedly conservative rhetoric attempted to reconcile at least some of the political differences between politically right-leaning technocratic professionals with the advocates of architectural technicism, managerialism, and political activism from the left. It was a strategy that echoed the broader political concerns and anxieties surrounding Mexico's ideologically complicated acceptance and eventual embrace of developmentalism. <sup>127</sup>

Carlos Lazo Barreiro (1914-1955) was another important architectural columnist and political critic of the period. (fig. 2.11) With his focus on reforms in government leadership, professional advocacy, pragmatic embrace of technicism, and national and regional planning, he is a central figure for understanding the integrative professional and political rhetorical strategies of architects during the mid-1940s through early-1950s. Lazo initially published his work in the magazine *Construcción*, a more-broad technical journal that focused on architecture, engineering, and planning and was run by Spanish-Basque Republican exile Almiro P. de Moratinos. Lazo provided equally pointed criticisms of the political and economic climate of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> The ideological anxieties and complex strategies of incorporating developmentalism were shared by both the right and left of Mexican politics. For a good examination into industrialization and the neutralization of the political left, see Chapter Five, "The Frenesi of Developmentalism" in Barry Carr, *Marxism & Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 142-186; For a more recent look at regional development, industrializing policies, and the politics of center-right nationalism, see Chapter Five, "The Politics of Nationalist Development in Postwar Mexico City" in Susan Gauss, *Made in Mexico: Regions, Nation, and the State in the Rise of Mexican Industrialism, 1920-1940s* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 169-204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Note: Almiro P. de Moratinos was a critical figure in the rise of Lazo's political career. He was an important Spanish Republican journalist from the Basque region and later served as the "Secretary of Propaganda of the Revolutionary Leftist Youth" during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). It is possible that he contributed to this architect/planner's intellectual formation in regards to the social role of technicians - he contributes numerous quotes of the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset in the margins of Lazo's essay "La Planificación y la Política: Programa de Gobierno (July 1946). More concretely, we know that he was regarded as exceptionally valuable due to his experience in political propaganda and was trusted enough by Lazo to be chosen to serve as the Public Relations Manager for the new Ciudad Universitaria in 1950. He was later brought into the SCOP in 1953 as the

the post-revolutionary period in Mexico, most notably in June 1946 – a month before the July 7th general elections – when he published an article titled "La Planificación y La Política: Programa de Gobierno." (fig. 2.12) Significant to the rhetorical strategies of claim making, jurisdiction expansion, and a professional mobility aimed at state bureaucratic and political integration, the title of "government program" alluded to the similarly named official statements of a candidate's political platform. In it, he somberly noted the state mismanagement, professional incapacity, and the self-enriching corruption that marked what he referred to as the caudillo-led governments in the decades following the Revolution.

Touch with your hands the effects of thirty-five years of incapacity in management, of the absence of concrete technical programs. The *caudillos* (military leaders), in reciprocal or successive elimination, disappear from the political commotion. The second-rank and third-rank, with seven more lustrums upon their backs, are old, tired...and rich. The old iconoclastic furors drifted towards comfortable conservative positions to which any abrupt change intimates risk of fortune and privilege. The problems of yesterday and those of today have no solution or direction in the old revolutionary literature, nor in the glib, foolish talk of *liderismo* (leader-cultism), nor in the hollow oratory of the commemorations, refuges for the people unprepared for the demands of the present hour, which call more for technical resolutions than for revolutions.

Except for a few honorable exceptions, the revolutionaries were, in effect, no more than revolutionaries, fit for fighting but inept for the tasks of governance, without clear ideas about what they would do following the day of triumph. Already victorious, but without confidence in their proper constructive capabilities, the mysticism that enlightened them in the struggle relaxed, and they became resolutely opposed to other hands taking the resources that Power had put into theirs. And since moral values are almost always supported by trust and faith, so began, for lack of faith and trust, the sensual debauchery of authority and lust that bordered on the limits of the unpredictable. The *Caudillaje* emerged. They imposed nepotism and sinecure. They rode freely on cushy positions and job-swapping. The shadow of the perversion of justice filtered through the doors of the officials' offices. The heroic camaraderie of the struggle degenerated into a pure give-and-take business. The immoderate anxiety of profit or growth prevailed over any other desire. Revolutionaryism was followed by Generalism

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Director of the Office of Promotion. Scant biographical information exists on this important figure in Spanish and Mexican history. However, his relation with Lazo is described in Alfonso Pérez-Méndez, "Conceptualization of the Settlement of El Pedregal: The staging of the public space in the Master Plan of the Ciudad Universitaria" in *Living CU 60 years*, edited by Salvador Lizárraga Sánchez and Cristina López Uribe (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2014), 65.

(*generalismo*), and this with cronyism (*amiguismo*), which expedited the letters of political authorization. The caste of the newly-rich emerged with dizzying parasitic proliferation. Once again, unfortunately, revolution meant to 'stir''...<sup>129</sup>

In similar fashion to Gómez Mayorga's criticisms of military generals at the helm of high-ranking bureaucratic and cabinet posts, Lazo's mention of bad faith, broken trust, managerial ineptitude, nepotism, and sinecure amongst extravagant *caudillos* was a not-so-indirect jab at the outgoing Avila Camacho administration. It had been unforgivable in the eyes of architects, planners, and engineers that the helm of the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas*, the ministry in charge of the nation's public works, was given to – or by some accounts taken by – General Maximino Avila Camacho, the infamously capricious, self-indulgent, and recently deceased brother of the president.<sup>130</sup>

Underscoring the perceived condition of moral and managerial chaos in the outgoing administration, Lazo strategically advocated his alternative to the plutocrats of the past.

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<sup>129 &</sup>quot;Tócanse con las manos los efectos de treinta y cinco años de incapacidad en la dirección, de ausencia de programas técnicos concretos. Los caudillos, en recíproca o sucesiva eliminación, desaparecen del tinglado político. Los segundones, y los tercerones, con siete lustros más sobre sus espaldas, se encuentran viejos, cansados...y ricos. Los añejos furores iconoclastas derivaron hacía acomodos conservadores frente a los que cualquier cambio brusco intima riesgo de fortuna y privilegio. Los problemas de antaño y los de hogaño no hallan solución ni cauce en la senecta literatura revolucionaria, ni en la facundia vanilocua del liderismo, ni en la hueca oratoria de las conmemoraciones, refugios de gentes impreparadas para la exigencia de la hora actual, que es de resoluciones técnicas más que de revoluciones. Salvo contadas y honrosas excepciones, en efecto, los revolucionarios no fueron más qe revolucionarios, aptos para la lucha pero ineptos para las tareas de la gobernacíon, sin ideas claras sobre lo que habrian de hacer a partir del día del triunfo. Ya victoriosos, pero sin confianza en su propia capacidad constructiva, se relajó en ellos la mística que les iluminó en la lucha y se opusieron resueltamente a que otras manos tomaron los recursos que el Poder ponía en las suyas. Y como los valores morales se sustentan casi siempre en la confianza y en la fé, se inició asi, por falta de fé y de confianza, el sensual desenfreno de autoridad y de concupiscencia que rayó en los linderos de lo imprevisible. Surgio el caudillaje. Se impusieron el nepotismo y la prebenda. Cabalgaron a rienda suelta la canongía y el cambalache. La sombra de la prevaricación se filtró por las puertas de los despachos oficiales. La camaradería heroíca de la lucha degeneró hacia un puro negocio de toma y daca. El ansia inmoderada de lucro o de medro prevalecia sobre cualquier otro afán. Al revolucionarismo siguió el "generalismo", y a este el "amiguismo", que expeditaba las patentes de corso político. La casta de los nuevos ricos brotó con vertiginosa proliferación parasitaria. Una ves más, desventuradamente, revolución era revolver..." Carlos Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política" in Construcción (July 1946); 36-44. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 53, Exp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> For more on the excesses of Maximino Ávila Camacho, see Niblo 281-291; also see Enrique Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 493.

Furthering the trajectory of the discourse, he emphasized that the *técnico* was the ideally qualified bureaucratic manager and capable author of technical programs. While his article echoed Gomez Mayorga's writings on the "socialist" architect by specifically advocating for new activist professionals that would serve as political reformer, his definition of this new state actor shared similar consonance with the rational managerialism of the *arquitecto técnico* advocated by Alberto Arai.

They are *técnicos*, not technocrats. Technocracy is discarded, but the aim is to install an administration with constructive sense and national inspiration, in which the politician fulfills his mission and *técnica* [specialized and rational knowledge] has its function and place...They have a practical and productive spirit. They are, in sum, the generation that is 'sufficiently' restorative....<sup>131</sup>

While the *técnico* was clearly being positioned as a critical functionary with greater administrative and executive capacity in the political dispensations to come, the details of this new political and structural administrative arrangement where the politician had a particular "mission" and *técnica* its "function and place" was not fully elaborated by Lazo in this essay. *Planificación* and *política* are not entirely intertwined, which suggests that the political relationships of power between the incoming generation of professional career politicians and the wave of technical state actors in the incipient, post-revolutionary and civilian-led government had yet to be fully defined.<sup>132</sup> In addition, Lazo's notion of the *técnico* clearly played into a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Son técnicos, no tecnócratas. Se descarta la tecnocracia, pero se aspira a instalar una administración de sentido constructivo y aliento nacional, en la que el político cumpla su misión y la técnica tenga su función y su sitio...Tienen un espiritu práctico y realizador. Es en suma, la generación "suficientemente' restauradora..." Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política," 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> Note: Lazo was clear to differentiate these new managerial actors from technocrats – a term with some apparent pejorative connotations at the time of Lazo's writing. A technocratic government would typically suppose a state in which bodies of experts would have more direct control over policy and other decision-making. Championing a technocracy posed two problems for Lazo. On the one hand, an exceedingly powerful technocracy could pose challenges to the structures of political power created after the Revolution which – at least according to the letter of the Law – were vested in a federal system with three major branches of government increasingly dominated by an empowered presidency. For this reason, Lazo was clear to state that his technical vision did not intend to challenge the Revolution. Making the new techno-managerial figures too weak, however, posed perhaps even greater problems to Lazo's government programs that echoed the problems of Mexico's prior experience with pseudo-

vision of a more activist and strong State, but he phrased this without wholly and somewhat cynically appropriating the language of any particular ideology, especially one with connotations of totalitarianism – a characteristic of his writing that he had developed and would continue to develop as he centered his planning theories within his own pragmatic and syncretistic political and ideological project. Lazo was clearly aware of the shifting political and ideological clime in which he was writing, however, and framed the technical state operative, much like his more bombastic colleague, as a restorative figure that would save "the Revolution" from the revolutionaries. Furthermore, he emphasized the characterization of this new technical state and its actors with an explicitly nationalist direction. Thus framed, the new *técnicos* were central to a new but still vague arrangement of *executive* power, and more importantly the critical torchbearers of an incipient post-Revolutionary and acutely nationalistic political society.

## II. The Consequences of Criticism: Additional Conditions of Professional Successes and Failure

While expanding definitions of work in professional "collective mobility projects" are aimed at the collective growth of professional prestige and status, and these can give particular symbolic power to professionals in their continuing advocacy for expanded jurisdiction within powerful institutions, the fruit of these efforts can often be distributed individually, granting

technocratic leadership during the *Porfiriato* with the *Cientificos*. Despite many cases of infrastructural progress during this period, it was perhaps still perceived that the real administrative role played by the *Cientificos* in the waning days of a military dictatorship was of a more ambiguous or ineffective nature – they had to contend with an autocratic leader, an entrenched oligarchy (to which some technocrats were born into), growing foreign investment, and other dynamic forces that curbed their effectiveness to both lead or manage. In as much as Lazo was defining the retrograde nature of the supposed *Caudillaje*, Lazo's use of the word "technocrat" was clearly defined by a longer political experience felt in Mexico. Under these broad circumstances, a technical advisor could at best offer detailed rational visions of a political-economic future but held insufficient means by which to make them a lasting reality according to the real exercise of political will in Mexico. This differentiation by Lazo reveals the process of negotiating like-minded professionals' demands and expectations regarding the relationships of power between the managerial and political sectors of the coming dispensation.

special benefits for particular members within the profession.<sup>133</sup> Those recipients are oftentimes the principal professional advocates themselves since they dominate the status-building language of professional mobility, and can therefore be seen as possessive of a particular symbolic power that can translate into real political power.<sup>134</sup> While engaging in a form of professional advocacy that likewise critiqued the state and sowed public doubt in the efficacy of a present leadership could pay off in future bureaucratic appointments for the occasional noteworthy architect, it was by no means a common path to individual professional advancement. For example, Mauricio Gómez Mayorga didn't – or perhaps couldn't – use his position as author and critic as an effective vehicle towards personally achieving a position of leadership, assuming that his call for architects to take action signaled his own aspirations for professional advancement and political relevance. While he had been one of the first and certainly one of the loudest architects of his generation to criticize the aging revolutionary leadership and the mismanagement of the Mexican State, his public voice – at least amongst architectural professionals – appears to have been gradually muffled for the remainder of the decade. Arquitectura y lo Demás was published with increasing infrequency after 1946 until its demise in 1950, likely reflecting the government's renewed focus on censorship. 135 At the same time, his friend and associate Lazo succeeded in finding himself engaged in an active and rapidly rising administrative career despite having also been an author of scathing critique against the political class. What were some of the causes for such divergent career trajectories for these two architect-cum-political critics?

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Larson, 67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and symbolic power*, trans. by J. B. Thompson, ed. G. Raymond & M. Adamson (Cambridge, England: Polity Press: 1991).

Rios Garza, 13; Camp, 194. Note: To be sure, Mauricio Gómez Mayorga did not completely disappear from the map of architectural journalism, and by 1950 reemerged as an occasional but vocal champion of political-economic reform and "Mexican Integration" in a new journal, *Espacios: Revista Integral de Arquitectura y Artes Plásticas*, This important journal ran from 1948 until 1957 and focused on architecture, the plastic arts, and planning. It was directed by Guillermo Rossell de la Lama (1925-2010), an architect who later had a political career as Mexico's Secretary of Tourism (1976-1980) and later as the Governor of the State of Hidalgo (1981-1987).

I have so far emphasized the importance of technical and planning-oriented language, its creation, and its mobilization in architectural professional environments as a means of jurisdictional claim-making and status-building in a long-term mobility project aimed at securing state-managerial employment. While I stress the importance of the manifold meanings in architecture's technical language and its use by activist professionals in rhetorical strategies of qualification and denouncement as a key component of arguing their political indispensability, it goes without saying that much of the success of this strategy depends on who the particular user is, how they are already received by the profession and political society, and who within that complex web is interested in their advancement and protection. The key difference between Mauricio Gómez Mayorga and Carlos Lazo Barreiro in that regard was that the latter possessed an especially privileged position to advocate for the profession and offer political criticism of the Mexican state and members of the dominant party. 136 When Lazo was writing his article "La Planificación y la Política: Programa de Gobierno" in July 1946 as a piece of political criticism he was already a member of the campaign team for Miguel Alemán Valdés, former governor of Veracruz and current head of the Secretaría de Gobernación, in his bid for the presidency. 137 He was a minor, but important working member of the newly organized PRI. According to the PRI's ostensibly renovatory politics of legitimization, an internalized voice critical towards previous government and party shortcomings was a valuable asset for an incoming administration intended to establish a symbolic break with the past in order to further the Party's

list of the say that Mauricio Gómez Mayorga was not a member of Mexico City's small intellectual elite circles and related to other notable intellectuals and artists. As noted previously, he belonged to a circle of notable authors that included Octavio Paz. Likewise, he was related to the noteworthy landscape painter, Guillermo Gómez Mayorga (1887-1962). In the relatively small and politically competitive environment of Mexico City — made up of distinct circles tied by familial relations, trade and professional identifications, as well as ideologies and partisan allegiances — it just happened to be the case that Lazo was more proximate to powers that could elevate him. The more on the political dynamics of the 1946 election see: Chapter Three, "The Civilian Ascendancy: The Election of 1946" in Navarro, 121-149.

hegemony. His politically pragmatic, moralizing, and pro-technical professional theories of governance complimented, to an extent, the early populist promises of modernization, political reform, civilian and professional leadership, and clean government that filled Alemán's speeches and campaign literature. In October of 1945, early in the presidential campaign period, Lazo had been named a member of the *Comisión de Programa*, or Program Commission, of the *Comité Nacional Alemanista*, a committee in charge of organizing the electoral tasks of the Aleman campaign – an appointment which undoubtedly gave the title to his own planning projects and articles. If (fig. 2.13 and 2.14) He was later named president of the *Quinto Comité Electoral*, or Fifth Electoral Committee, and apparently had a hand in the organization of the campaign's *mesas redondas*, or public roundtables, which provided forums for public discussion intended to test or at the very least create an illusion of consensus and approval of the proposed policies of Alemán's political platform. Lazo was therefore already established in official political-public dialogue, giving him the opportunity stimulate important discussions as well as

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> For a summary of Alemán's campaign promises see "Síntesis del Programa de Gobierno que sustenta el Candidato a la Presidencia de la República, Señor Lic. Miguel Alemán y que expone ante la Opinión Pública del País," *El Economista* (October 1945): 33-57. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 57, Exp 165. Note: While Lazo was officially brought onto the *Comisión de Programa*, or Program Commission, of the *Comité Nacional Alemanista* in October 1945, it is uncertain what he may have contributed to the initial *programa* that was published in the Mexican magazine, *El Economista*, in the same month of his appointment. A marked up copy of this document can be found in Lazo's archive, as well as a two-page copy of the index of Alemán's program that apparently suggests the inclusion of edits and reorganization of the published article for a future revised edition. For documents suggesting possible edits to the program's contents see "Programa de Gobierno Del Sr. Lic. Miguel Alemán: INDICE" (n.d.), AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 67, Exp 161.

<sup>139</sup> Letter from Comité Nacional Alemanista and Ramon Beteta to Carlos Lazo regarding joining the Aleman campaign and appointment to Comisión de Programa. October 1 1946. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 2, Exp 61. 140 The participation of Lazo in the *Mesas Redondas* is noted in Pérez-Méndez, 63. The proceedings of the Mesas Redondas were originally published along with an introduction by Manuel Germán Parra (*Secretario de Asuntos Tecnicos del Comité Nacional Alemanista*) in 1949. A facsimile of the original was recently republished: Miguel Alemán, *Conferencias de Mesa Redonda: Presididas durante su campaña electoral por el licensiado Miguel Alemán, 27 de agosto de 1945 – 17 de junio de 1946* (Mexico City: Biblioteca Mexicana de la Fundación Miguel Alemán, 2009).

perform critical soundings of opinion amongst the public so as to better gauge the construction of the reorganized party's platform.<sup>141</sup>

Lazo had become a political insider partly because of circumstance. Mexico's systems of professions during this period were deeply intertwined with its small and elite political systems. As such, we cannot discount an individual's social status – independent from their professional status – as a significant factor for political recruitment. 142 Carlos Lazo Barreiro was born into a particular network that gave him a measure of privilege and protection both within the architectural profession, and amongst other important intellectual and politic circles of the period. Lazo came from a respected family of upper-class intellectuals that positioned him uniquely within the architectural professional world in Mexico. His father was Carlos Maria Lazo del Piño (1871-1952), architect, doctor of sciences, and noted professor of drawing as well as history and theory of architecture at the Academia de San Carlos which later became the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura. 143 In 1910, along with Justo Sierra (1848-1912), the elder Lazo participated in the founding of the Universidad Nacional (which became the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, or UNAM). In addition, he was the founder and first president of the Sociedad de Arquitectos de México (SAM) the principal society for professional organization and advocacy.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> The project of gaining soundings of public opinion for political platform construction parallels the practice of pre-candidates engaging with the public so as to gauge their political viability. The later practice is referred to in Mexican politics as *auscultación*. Navarro, 206.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> For the role of family, father's position, and education as qualifiers or conditions for elite status and political inclusion, see Chapter Three, "Social Conditions of Rule," in Peter H. Smith, in *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 65-103. Also see "Family Background and Education" in Camp, 72-98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> For more on Carlos Maria Lazo del Piño, see Yolanda Bravo Saldaña, *Carlos Lazo: Vida y Obra* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2004), 11-12. Carlos Lazo Maria del Piño's father, Agustín Lazo Pérez Maldonado, appears to have also been an architect. Not mentioned in said biography but of interest to the topic of Mexico's close-knit elite intellectual circles, Carlos Lazo Barreiro was first cousin through his father with the noted Mexican surrealist artist Agustín Lazo Adalid (1896-1971).

Like many of Mexico's more influential architects of the period, the younger Lazo enrolled at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura — which as mentioned previously was tied to the *Universidad Nacional*, later the UNAM. 144 This institutional affiliation increased the younger Lazo's ability to cultivate key professional and political networks. Though less so now, this institution was at the time the most formidable incubator and recruitment ground for the new generation of civilian political cadres poised to enter the ranks of national leadership.<sup>145</sup> Many of these professional contacts, though not exclusive to him, served him well in establishing himself as a young architect as well as planner, which to be sure was still a relatively novel area of expertise in Mexico. In the latter years of his university education, he interned in the office of Carlos Obregón Santacilia (1896-1961), a friend and colleague of his father's as well as a relative to former Mexican president Álvaro Obregón (1880-1928), during the years in which this architect was involved in the construction of the Hotel Alameda – later the Hotel del Prado – and the Monumento de la Revolución. In addition, he had studied under José Villagrán García, the noted theorist and functionalist. Villagrán's imparting of a modern functionalist and rationalist architectural logic – a logic that above all emphasized the "technique" of conceiving both the programmatic and spatial aspects of buildings – helped encourage many of his students to focus on the social needs and infrastructural improvement of the Mexican Nation. 146 The younger Lazo's educational and professional pursuits followed in this direction with a focus on socially-oriented planning, professional organization, and the broader role that architecture could

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Note: The full physical and institutional integration of the *Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura* into the university setting of the UNAM occurred after Lazo's studies and once the Ciudad Universitaria was completed in the 1950s. The ENA is now the Facultad de Arquitectura de la UNAM.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Smith, 84-87; Camp, 92-93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> For a brief biography and concise collection of Villagrán's theoretical and professional writings, see Ramón Vargas Salguero, *Villagrán: Teórico de la Arquitectura Mexicana* (Mexico: Asociación de Instituciones de Enseñanza de la Arquitectura de la República Mexicana, Consejo Directivo, 1994).

have on the construction of the modern Mexican Nation-State.<sup>147</sup> In 1936, he fulfilled a social service project – a requirement for all Mexican architects in training – focusing on socioeconomic needs and town planning in the Valle del Mezquital. (fig. 2.15-18) He completed a planning-focused thesis titled "*Planificación y Arquitectura Rural en México*," or "Planning and Rural Architecture in Mexico." Lazo graduated in 1938, and his thesis project received honorable mention in the annual report of 1939, published by the rectory of the University.<sup>148</sup> Following his graduation, Lazo entered private architectural practice but maintained deep architectural-professional, political-economic, and other broad intellectual pursuits that directed his career towards large-scale planning and.

As noted, privileged circumstances contributed to Lazo gaining a foothold within important and highly competitive professional circles at an early age. This, along with his personal acumen, support by key professionals, and the global and local politics of the Second World War gave him an even greater edge in establishing a resumé that could serve to build a political future. This edge was made by Lazo gaining an international training in planning with a stint of post-graduate studies and extensive travel in the United States. Recall that in the late 1930s and early 1940s, a planning-oriented education was still a largely new, untested, and possibly suspect endeavor in Mexico despite Hannes Meyer's brief tenure of offering a planning program at the IPN and the various educational reforms that had been proposed at the *Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura*. A foreign education for an architect-planner was therefore still a necessary step in disciplinary qualification. In addition, it could be used – with the right skill in a nationalist and at times xenophobic society – as a professionally distinguishing mark of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Bravo Saldaña, 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Details of Lazo's academic, professional, and political career can be found in a lengthy curriculum vitae included in a later reprint of a book containing essays and speeches that he gave during his work on the Ciudad Universitaria. See Carlos Lazo, *Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad Universitaria de México* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1983), 217.

prestige and source of valuable foreign technical expertise shared only with a very select group of fellow elites.<sup>149</sup>

Lazo travelled abroad with the American Institute of Architects' (AIA) Delano-Aldrich Fellowship. (Fig. 2.19) Due to the Second World War and the difficulty in awarding the typically French recipients of the award, the AIA opened up the competition for the prestigious fellowship to Mexican architects under the age of thirty-five. The *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos* (SAM) held its own competition focusing on the planning of the city of Tampico - a critical deep-sea port and center of the newly nationalized production and export of oil in the Gulf of Mexico – in order to determine who would be sent to the United States. <sup>150</sup> It was judged by Carlos Contreras, then the president of the *Comisión de Planificación de la República Mexicana*, Carlos Tarditti, president of the SAM, and Mauricio Campos, director of the *Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura*. Lazo was selected as the primary recipient of the award along with three other young architects including Alberto T. Arai, the previously mentioned Japanese-Mexican practitioner. <sup>151</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Note: The most famous foreign-trained Mexican architect of the generation of professionals that emerged to prominence in the late 1930-early 1950s was Mario Pani (1911-1993) who received his degree in 1934 from the École de Beaux-Arts in Paris. His foreign degree was reevaluated and confirmed by the UNAM, though this was not done without some controversy. Also, recall that the most noteworthy planner that was practicing in Mexico at the time was Carlos Contreras Elizondo. He was both educated in the United States at Columbia University and had also advocated the foreign training of Mexican architects in planning so as to build a group of foreign-trained experts that he deemed necessary to the establishment of a future planning school.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> "Jovenes que Triunfan" *Construccion* 20 (September 1942): 15. Note: Lazo's "Planificación de Tampíco" was published a decade later in the journal *Espacios* and afterwards as a book.

Arai was not permitted to travel, undoubtedly because of the racist reactions in the wake of the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor that prompted the US to relocate and concentrate nearly all of its Japanese and Japanese-American residents and citizens as well as urge its Latin American allies to monitor people of Japanese ancestry. He instead relocated to the isolated state of Chiapas. While there, he practiced his profession, focusing on rural and medical architecture, and conducted studies of the Mayan ruins of Bonampak for the remainder of the 1940s. For more on his career in Chiapas, see Louise Noelle Gras, "Alberto T. Arai y el Legado de Chiapas," in *Leer a Alberto T. Arai, reflexiones, ensayos, y textos,* ed. Elisa Drago Quaglia (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2019), 465-479

Between October 1942 and mid-1943 Lazo, along with his brother-in-law, future economist and diplomat Hugo B. Margáin, travelled through a country that had recently shifted nearly all of its productive efforts to the international conflict. 152 The prestige of the award from the AIA (along with the support of Julian Clarence Levi, member of the New York Chapter and Chairman of the Committee on International Relations and William Adams Delano, architect, benefactor to the award, and member of the prominent Delano family) aided in his access to numerous architectural institutions, individuals, and places of importance in contemporary planning. He attended planning seminars at Columbia University in New York, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and the Armour Institute of Technology in Chicago. 153 His travelling studies also included field research on the industrial architectures of the northeastern United States and the tropical architectures of the southeast, as well as various meetings with the many of the most important architects practicing in the country at that time. 154 Perhaps most inspiring to his planning interests, however, was his touring of the massive works of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This particular experience contributed to Lazo's appreciation for the centralized coordinating efforts of many New Deal-Era projects and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Note: Carlos Lazo Barreiro was related to Hugo B. Margáin Gleason (1913-1997) through his marriage to Yolanda Margáin Gleason. Hugo Margáin Gleason was a noted economist and academic. He was the head of the *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* in the final months of the administration (1964-1970) of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and remained at this post for the first three years of the administration (1970-1976) of Luis Echeverría Álvarez. Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 591.

<sup>153</sup> Note: The CV at the conclusion of *Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad Universitaria de México* refers to his visit to the Armour Institute during these travels, though after 1940 with its merger with the Lewis Institute this institution would have been referred to as Illinois Tech, or the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT). *Pensamiento y Destino*...217-218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> Lazo's architectural network was greatly expanded during this trip with his acquaintance with notable architects such as Frank Lloyd Wright, Walter Gropius, Paul Nelson (a noted modernist and designer-theorist of hospitals who was later involved in planning and reconstruction efforts for Post-War France), Roland Wank (Hungarian-American architect and the first chief architect of the TVA), and Albert Kahn. Lazo's biographer, Yolanda Bravo Saldaña, claims that the young architect desired to work with the renowned industrial architect Albert Kahn. Kahn passed away just a few days after his meeting with Lazo, however. Bravo Saldaña, 26.

institutions such as the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB). The TVA and the NRPB were consequential models for regional development, and inspired numerous planning projects in Latin America and throughout the developing world. The observations that Lazo made during this trip made him a critical source of information and expertise in regional planning. This especially would have made him indispensable to the incoming political dispensation as it relied on its experts to weigh differing Post-War, industry-oriented developmentalist economic strategies and their potential social, economic, and political repercussions.

Lazo's privilege contributed to his early professional navigation and his having gained exceptional learning experience. Both of these contributed to Lazo's particularly knowledgeable, and eloquent claims to socio-economic expertise. In short, this interplay between privilege, inclusion, and expertise make the divergence of Gómez Mayorga and Lazo's trajectories as professional polemicists and political critics obvious. While both advocated for architectural professional activism, and both equally called for a new technical and professionally trained political leadership during a period of crisis, Lazo's relatively unique intellectual-familial upbringing, and international educational background contributed to his acquisition of an expansive and politically useful language that distinguished his writing and speech from his contemporaries. In addition to stating the political, social, and economic problems which are key in any act of ritualistic deposition aimed at regime change, he addressed his fellow professionals and members of the new political and administrative class alike with seemingly more concrete and detailed contributions to the discourses of *planificación* and *arquitectura técnica*. In a process that led to up to his establishment as a planner, professional

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> Carlos Lazo had a copy of the NRPB's sizeable publication, *Transportation and National Policy*, that was heavily marked up with his notes. See: National Resources Planning Board, *Transportation and National Policy* (Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942); Lazo's copy located in: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 109, Exp 600.

advocate, and political insider and continued as became an expert advisor, manager, and political figure in his own right, Lazo would deeply elaborate the discourse of planning. He expanded not only its political economic scope, but also its intellectual base, and social direction. He began to refer to it as an ever comprehensive "integral" and "integrated" strategy. In doing this, he further contributed to a professional mobility-oriented rhetorical strategy, regarded by some as an experimental "doctrine," that embodied manifold development-oriented objectives held by a small group of particularly messianic modernists of an anticipated technical, integral, and integrated Mexican state. 156

## III. *Planificación Integral*: political economic coordination, pragmatism, and technomanagerial expertise

When Lazo returned to Mexico from his stint in the United States in mid 1943, he immediately became the co-director and head of the section on architecture and urbanism in the technical journal *Construcción*. This journal was, to be sure, a relatively modest rostrum but one where he was guaranteed extensive space. In a series of articles that he published between 1943 and 1946 he used it as a means of presenting the findings and conclusions of his sojourn as well as an arena in which to test his broader investigations into the theory of technical practice and multidisciplinary regional planning. This was his initial public forum for expanding on the discourse of *planificación*. How did Lazo define *planificación* and why was his discourse on the subject so critical for the advance of his professional career, his transition into a managerial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> For reference to the "doctrinal" nature of Carlos Lazo's integral planning theories, see by Elisa Drago Quaglia "Doctrina Lazo: política de planificación integral," in *Segunda Modernidad urbano arquitectónica, Proyectos y obras*, ed. Marco Tulio Peraza Guzmán and Lourdes Cruz González Franco (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2014), 95-115.

actor for the incoming Alemán administration, and his political qualifications for the reformed party: a newly established and still relatively dynamic PRI?

As previously noted, *planificación* initially built off of the imperatives of national reconstruction following the catastrophic infrastructural damages inflicted by the Mexican Revolution. This was a major reconstructive process that was prolonged by the economic downturn during the global depression and complexified by uneven attempts at social reform and the Mexican State's embrace of economic nationalism during the Cárdenas years. The discourse of *planificación*, as crafted over a generation with various proponents, was an attractive fount of inspiration that aided both architects and certain politicians in envisioning a progressive, economically modernizing, and at times socially revolutionary nation-state. In short, the broadly infrastructural connotations of *planificación* were accepted across ideological and generational lines as a rational and large-scale panacea for proposing and making changes in the physical environment. Its particular emphasis on communicational infrastructures could hypothetically serve a wide range of social objectives and most importantly lend itself to an economizing structuralization of the rapidly expanding political economy.

All theories of *planificación* in Mexico were concerned with the relationship between the design-oriented and managerial structures of planning institutions as well as the efficacy of said institutions to enact real change on the built environment within the prevailing political environment. Despite this accord amongst *planificación's* heterogeneous group of proponents, the nature of the power dynamics of its politico-administrative relationships, the social and professional make-up of its bureaucratic actors, its social objectives, and the viability of its projection and political-economic chances of success caused significant points of debate and contention amongst its advocates. This was especially the case after the mid to late-1930s when

Mexico was nothing short of a regional ideological crucible with the Cárdenas administration's decisive actions creating a renewed reckoning with the nature of executive power as well as a new assessment of how technical actors and other professionals would figure into a more powerful and corporate State.

While Lazo's work built upon two decades of planning discourse in Mexico, his work clearly differed from his colleagues and predecessors with its tone and broader objectives. <sup>157</sup> His views of planning represented a larger aggregation of concepts and concentrations reflective of over twenty-years of ideological progression and conflict, social revolution, and political-economic experimentation. The junior architect-planner's so-called doctrine reckoned with the new modalities of governance and party-politics that had emerged in the United States, Europe, and Latin America since the end of the First World War, through the global financial depression of the 1930s, and into the Second World War. By the mid to late 1940s, it had become clear that any new contributions to the theorization of *planificación* had to especially take into account the conclusion of the Second World War, realignment of the global economy, an incipient

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> During his life, Lazo made significant contributions to an already sizeable body of regional planning discourse that existed in Mexico since at least the mid-1920s. In many ways, his work owed a considerable debt to the ideas and efforts of his predecessor Carlos Contreras Elizondo. As is evident in a number of Lazo's writings on planificación integral, he shared with the elder architect-planner similar positions on the importance of regional infrastructure networks as well as the need for new, centralizing institutions preoccupied with the administration of planning at a national scale. The most comprehensive research on Carlos Contreras's career, architectural, and planning work to date has been produced by Alejandrina Escudero. For a broad look at his theorization of planificación see "El movimiento de planificación" and "La aplicación del método" in Alejandrina Escudero, Una Ciudad Noble y Lógica: Las propuestas de Carlos Contreras Elizondo para la Ciudad de México (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2018), 125-195, 196-254. In her analysis of a planning program authored by Lazo and published in the article "Ante el caos de la ciudad, habla Carlos Lazo y dice: El problema es de hombres en toda la plenitud de su grandeza," Escudero opines more negatively that Lazo very clearly took Contreras's planning theories and formulas for data collection, analysis, and administrative organization. For the article that she is referring to, see Oswaldo Díaz Ruanova, "Ante el caos de la ciudad, habla Carlos Lazo y dice: El problema es de hombres en toda la plenitud de su grandeza," Revista de América 132 (1948). While I suspect that this opinion reflects the somewhat competitive nature of current architectural biographical research in Mexico and the tendency to make historical figures into clear protagonists or antagonists, it does go without saying that Contreras was a clear influence on Lazo, and was also cited by Lazo in his early articles on planning, including one "Programa de Gobierno Nacional" that was published in 1945. For more on Carlos Lazo in the context of the later years of Contreras's career see: Alejandrina Escudero, "El Crepúsculo," Una Ciudad Noble y Lógica..., 376-412.

developmentalism, the beginning of an ostensibly new, post-revolutionary era in Mexican politics, and the onset of an ideologically polarizing "cold war." The planning theory and practice especially had to tackle with the shifting administrative dimensions and jurisdictions of the period while navigating through small, complicated, and transitioning professional and political societies. To this end, Lazo spelled out a theory of multi-disciplinary socio-economic, political, and cultural research; rational judgement and forecasting, centralized as well as regional levels of coordination, long term strategizing, and tangible construction. It was a significant doctrine under consideration by an incoming, reinvigorated political class increasingly integrated by the much lauded *técnicos* - architect/planners included. It was a prescription calling for the ostensibly logical mandarins of an incipient development-oriented economic regime.

In the earliest of Lazo's articles in *Construcción*, he was already establishing the fundamental importance of the qualifications of government employees and bureaucratic leadership as well as the need for new and more specific government bodies to handle planning. Critical to the conceptualization of these new rational state actors was the theorization of their mentality and moral roles - a preoccupation that stemmed in large part from Lazo's exposure to a wide range of both modern and classical utopian philosophical works as well as contemporary sociological, psychological, demographic, and political economic studies of industrial, industrializing, or otherwise modernizing nations.<sup>158</sup> To be sure, this supposed new way of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> This preoccupation with the individual new professional-type as well as a new, rational professional class in the collective processes of modern nation-building followed a common pattern in certain veins of late 19th and 20th century literature that bridge political-utopic and techno-transhumanist foci in the overlapping topics of civilization, modernization, nationalism, social revolution, industrialization, eugenics, and development. The critical mover and administrator of large-scale socio-political change in many of these literatures show a shift from the Platonic/classical-humanist and Catholic-humanist traditions that embraced a philosopher-king or monarch that allowed him to either know and understand the feasibility of a domain or world or interpret divine will over temporal matters, and bring about the necessary changes to the kingdom or world so that it would achieve a higher stage of rationality or perfection. The new trans-human individual of the 19<sup>th</sup> and twentieth century built off of this

thinking was part of a modern and international fascination with the products of new scientific discovery, technological innovation, and their effects on social organization, new divisions and roles in labor, as well as new relationships between man and machine or man-to-man via machine. Lazo's characterizations of the mentality of *planificación* was clearly interrelated with the socially-oriented discourses of technicism that many in his generation of architects focused on. In his writings during the period, there is clear consonance between his expanded description of *planificación* and the praxis of *arquitectura técnica* as described by his former classmate and colleague Alberto Arai. He defined *planificación* accordingly as a:

tradition but was less philosopher-king than modern engineer and technical scientist. These new actors were seemingly enhanced with the humanistic sagacity and executive capability of the older, utopic character, yet they were often infused with attributes derived from the new genre of North American science fiction and sometimes intertwined with the Euro-American romantic nationalistic heroism of the new nation-states of the period. They were variously described by contemporary authors as a homo faber (builder man), "new man," and at its extremes, an übermensch ("beyond," "over," or "super" - man). These are figures that translated into twentieth century Latin American discourses of nation-building such as the novo homen (Brazil), or a member of the aforementioned raza cósmica (Mexico). For more on these figures in humanist-utopic literature and tranhumanist techno-visions, see Richard Saage, "New man in utopian and transhumanist perspective," European Journal of Futures Research 1, no. 14 (2013). For a comprehensive collection of various interwar and WWII-era right-wing, post-liberal, and third-way "new man" projects in Europe, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan, see Jorge Dagnino, Matthew Feldman, and Paul Stocker, eds. The "New Man" in Radical Right Ideology and Practice, 1919-45 (London; Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). For more on the social and political project of the Nietzschean Übermensch, see Manuel Knoll, "The Übermensch as Social and Political Task: A Study in the Continuity of Nietzsche's Political Thought," in Nietzsche as Political Philosopher, ed. Manuel Knoll and Barry Stocker (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 239-266. On the influence of Nietzsche on José Vasconcelos's "Raza Cósmica" see Jeroen Dewulf, "The Cosmic Race: Friedrich Nietzsche's Influence on José Vasconcelos' Theory of Mestizaje," Interdisciplinary Journal for Germanic Linguistics and Semiotic Analysis 20, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 273-291.

Lazo's conceptualization of man's new relation to technology was based on the works of various widely-read authors on the subject. He included a bibliography in the 1950 edition of his "Programa de Gobierno" – a major project that elaborated his theory and intended implementation of *Planificación Integral* – that listed various works that he had read up until that point and which certainly colored and built up his views on the subject during the 1940s. The bibliography was published as "Programa de Gobierno: II, Programa y Método." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> The technical mentality described by Arai in his essays on *arquitectura técnica* shared much with the planning attitude of Lazo in his first writings on *planificación*. While these ideas were widely described in different manners by numerous authors, the literature of Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset as well as German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler have been emphasized as key sources of inspiration to Arai in his earliest writings from the 1930s. Both authors were also referenced by Lazo. For more on the philosophical thought behind Arai's understanding of a technical mentality, see Johanna Lozoya Meckes, "El Deseo Radical o un Elogio Temprano al Sujeto Técnico," in *Leer a Alberto T. Arai, reflexiones, ensayos, y textos,* ed. Elisa Drago Quaglia (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2019), 427-438.

...scientific and modern attitude, it is today's technical stance facing current and future life. 161

Similar to other "scientific" socio-economic planning strategies of the period, this "attitude" and "technical stance" translated into a process of inductive reasoning where a "problem" - typically formulated on statistical or immediately observable conditions - was stated. *Técnicos*, distinguished by this "scientific attitude" would attempt solutions to these "problems" according to the *técnica*, or rational technique, of planning:

To know, pose, and solve...problems, it is necessary to apply the current technique of *planificación*. <sup>162</sup>

Within Mexican architectural discourse, the description of large-scale socio-economic planning as a technique (*técnica*) reinforced a consonance between this discipline and the essentially engineering-led discourse of construction and building techniques/technologies (*técnicas constructivas*). Reducing planning to a technique reinforced its conceptualization as a materially constructive activity guided by specialists trained in the design and construction of building systems. The experimental and innovatory nature of modern building construction contributed to the scientific connotations in the word *técnica* – or technique - in this instance, further reinforcing the idea that the political-economic process of planning was ultimately a rational, scientific, and to an extent objective practice, therefore putting it in stark contrast with the perceived political and institutional corruption, inefficiency, and backwardness that were decried in the critical and reformatory rhetoric of the mid-1940s..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> "...es la actitud científica y moderna, es la posición técnica de hoy ante la vida actual y del futuro." Carlos Lazo, "Planificación," *Construcción* (January 1944): 23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> "Para conocer, plantear y resolver problemas semejantes, es necesario aplicar la técnica actual de Planificación..." Carlos Lazo, "Planificación: Ponencia presentada por el arquitecto Carlos Lazo Jr. como delegado de la Asociación de Arquitectos al Congreso Nacional de Asistencia," *Construcción* (September 1943): 20.

Lazo's outline of *planificación* emphasized that it was an expansive and coordinated process of empirical investigation, elsewhere described as a process of *reconocimiento* (translated into English in a 1943 introduction of Lazo's work by the architect Lorenzo Fabela as "survey-research").<sup>163</sup> This survey-research had to contextualize

...a country within the international, national, regional, and urban, in the physical, social, political, and economic, and in its fundamental bases: its land and its man.<sup>164</sup>

*Reconocimiento* was therefore a manifold research project that paralleled the Anglo-American, politically "progressive," and technologically inspired methodologies advocated by Lazo's predecessor, Carlos Contreras's. The elder planner submitted numerous articles advocating for multiple regional levels of survey, data collection, and use classification in national planning nearly two decades prior, and these were cited as influences by Lazo.<sup>165</sup> Likewise, the emphasis on the survey displayed Lazo's familiarity with various regional planning projects that he would have read about or visited in person during his trip through the United States.<sup>166</sup> The project of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Lorenzo Fabela in Lazo, "Planificación: Ponencia presentada...", 20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> "...es conocerse, un país en lo internacional, nacional, regional, y urbano, en lo físico, social, político, y económico, y en las bases fundamentales: su tierra y su hombre." Lazo, "Planificación," 22-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Note: The concept of the region and the regional survey largely originated in Continental Europe and thence to the United Kingdom and the United States during the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries where it took root and developed into specialized fields of study. Though owing much to earlier disciplines such as natural philosophy, geology, geography, and early plant ecology, it was later defined as a new concept and method for social study. Its originators have been variously named, though Frederic Le Play, John Ruskin, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Booth were significant contributors; the Scottish sociologist Patrick Geddes is perhaps the most critical contributor to this body of thought in regards to its application to the discipline of planning. Regions could be organized according to both existing geographic and political territories, but increasingly according to constructs based upon proposed or otherwise evolved social, cultural, and economic uses and relations. As noted previously, Carlos Contreras's theorization of regions was heavily influenced by the Anglo-American tradition of planning with their emphasis on broad empirical surveys often utilizing new technologies in data collection (e.g aerial photography by the mid-1920s). His study of David Burnham's Chicago Plan (1907) and reading of Walter Dwight Moody's Wacker's Manual of the Plan of Chicago (1911), his exposure to the Regional Plan of New York and its Environs (RPNY) during his studies at Columbia University and participation in the Conference for International Federation for Housing and Planning (IFHP) in New York in 1924, as well as his broader participation in Ebenezer Howard's IFHP figured highly into his work, Planificación de la República Mexicana.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Note: Contreras's undoubtable influence on Lazo, as well as the junior architect-planner's exposure to modern planning in his AIA sponsored trip through the United States, clearly shaped the concept of *planificación* and *reconocimiento*, described by Lorenzo Fabela in English as "survey-research." In addition to Lazo's exposure to the TVA as a model for regional planning, he cites in a bibliography attached to a 1945 article on his "Programa de Gobierno" a wide range of projects including the Regional Plan of New York, regional plans by the Chicago Plan Commission, the NRPB's "Regional Factors in National Planning and Development," Maxwell Fry's "A Plan for

reconocimiento (survey-research) and conocimiento (knowledge, or understanding) that made up so much of Lazo's theories of planificación were just as comprehensive as those outlined in the models that he researched. However, it is important to note that this comprehensive project of investigation was described by Lazo in a particularly philosophical tone, echoing various Enlightenment era essays of understanding. He emphasized the need for a more fundamental sort of data derived from studies of subjects that made up the base of a national reality: "land" and "man." Lazo's preoccupation with "man," in particular, echoed the writing of his colleague Alberto Arai when the latter underscored the biopolitical objectives of a new technical architecture. Likewise, these concerns reflected the imperatives of José Villagrán Garcia, their professor of theory, in his pedagogical approach stressing that each architect base their work on observation and "the perfectly real understanding of the social situation of our people...", and

Britain," and Lewis Mumford's The Culture of Cities as additional sources influencing his interpretation of this social, ecological, and territorial construct as well as the methods of surveying and researching its content. <sup>167</sup> Lazo's preoccupation with "knowledge/understanding" in particular reflected the neo-scholastic, neo-Kantian, and phenomenological currents of philosophy that were popular in Mexico and in the Spanish speaking world at that time. José Gaos (1900-1969), a notable Spanish philosopher and political exile of the Spanish Civil War who lived in Mexico was responsible for the translation of numerous works by Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Scheler, and Husserl into Spanish. He along with José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) were heavily responsible for the dissemination of these currents of philosophical thought in Latin American after the late 1930s. Mexican-born philosophers continued this exploration, with one of the most famous being Leopoldo Zea (1912-2004), who became a key proponent of Post-WWII Latin American Integration, and who founded the UNAM's Facultad de Filosofia in 1947. Another important author who was certainly within Lazo's intellectual circle was Miguel Angel Cevallos (1887-1973). He authored a sizeable text - Ensavo sobre el Conocimiento (Mexico: Antigua Librería Robredo de José Porrúa e Hijos, 1944) – that was in circulation amongst Mexican philosophical and intellectual circles at the same time that Lazo was first elaborating his theory of Planificación Integral. Miguel Angel Cevallos included Lazo as a character in the rather colorful and intimate semi-autobiographic novel. Un Hombre Perdido en el Universo (Mexico: Editorial Cultura, 1954). Cevallos was eventually placed in charge of the escuelas de capitación of the SCOP. The focus on knowledge/understanding and its relationship with experience in Lazo's definitions of planning had multiple parallels in contemporary architectural discourse. Of relevance to this general trend in architectural discourse is Jean Labatut's (1899-1986) focus on attentive experience. See Jorge Otero-Pailos, "Eucharistic Architecture: Jean Labatut and the Search for Pure Sensation," in Architecture's Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 25-99. <sup>168</sup> Alberto T. Arai, La Nueva Arquitectura y la Técnica (Mexico City: DAPP, 1938), 17.

that this understanding be gained from their reunion with other disciplines equally devoted to social investigation.<sup>169</sup>

The inclusion of new concepts and models indicative both of the architect's philosophical erudition and the profession's scientific and sociological aspirations would have been key to Lazo positioning the modern *arquitecto técnico* as a figure capable of socio-political reform and concerned with matters ranging from material political economy to the more sociological, psychological, and even spiritual aspects of the human subject. Lazo, however, was careful in balancing these lofty imaginings with clear affirmations that the *técnico* was above all a pragmatist concerned with real world matters. He emphasized that "*Planificación* must be practical, feasible, [and] in the scale of our needs and possibilities." His political-economic pragmatism found consonance in a broad, global, war-time economic consciousness shaped by realities or possibilities of scarcity as well as the productive possibilities of a command economy structured according to an "economy of means" and specific existential objectives. This conceptualization of pragmatism, in turn, framed *planificación* as a tool of accurate forecasting and economization in order to combat wasteful State expenditure — a central preoccupation in the

<sup>169 &</sup>quot;Mis proposiciones van por ahora a concentrarse en los tres puntos esenciales que llevo expuestos como fases de observación, a la investigación aquella que denominé continua y que sirve de base común para los problemas particulares: al conocimiento perfectamente real de la situación social de nuestro pueblo en las distintas regions de la República; pretendo fundar sobre este conocimiento, como base común, las soluciones que constituyan nuestra verdadera arquitectura nacional de hoy; cimiento solidísmo, inconmovible, porque estará apoyado sobre la realidad misma de nuestras exigencies sociales; propongo emprender una Obra de Investigación Social que reúna en un solo organismo de trabajadores a todos aquellos que se interesan por esta lenta labor de conquista cultural de que forma parte este programa de acción....Colaborarián en esta grande empresa cuyos resultados, como es obvio, no serían exclusivos para la arquitectura sino para todos los aspectos culturales del problema social, tanto arquitectos, como sociólogos, antropólogos, higienistas, geógrafos, geólogos, etcetera, en suma, todos aquellos representantes de los conocimientos humanos que atañen directamente al dicho problema de que nos ocupamos para esta labor de Reconquista del país a que estamos obligados todos estos universitarios mexicanos." José Villagrán García, "Educación profesional del arquitecto," in *Ideario de los arquitectos mexicanos*, ed. Ramón Vargas and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Belia Idra y Literatura, 2011), 3: 76-77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> "La planificación debe tener carácter práctico, realizable, en la escala de nuestras necesidades y posibilidades." Lazo, "Planificación: Ponencia presentada...", 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> For more on the effects of this war-time consciousness on architecture and planning in the United States, see Andrew M. Shanken, *194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

moralizing discourses on political corruption and administrative reform of the period. The attainment of "understanding" and pragmatic judgment would – according to the almost mystical modernist logic that Lazo followed – have created an element of moral and scientific authority that could aid in the processes of oversight and management that the Mexican state so dearly lacked. The repeated claim of the scientific objectivity of *planificación* lent itself to the argument that large-scale planning was less tied to ideologies and political interests than it was the product of an ostensibly neutral, scientific modernity. This project therefore helped paint an image of moral and political authority as well ideological neutrality that were useful to the dominant party as it began piecing together a new program and public image that could ensure the continuation of its viability into the next social generation and political era.

Better data, more accurate forecasting, and a new pragmatic leadership comprised of experts would, according to Lazo's argument, turn around the image of a state characterized as ineffectual by the mismanagement of past administrations. The alleged incapacity of previous generations of political actors to follow through on various promises – either given by respective administrations and political campaigns or spelled out in foundational documents such as the 1917 Constitution - meant that *planificación* had to be sold as a state-building process that would repair flawed communication and meaningless speech acts between its political actors and a broader Mexican constituency. Carlos Contreras had coined the term in the 1920s with similar intention, using it as a performative promising both pragmatic methodology and real actions in the built environment. Though Contreras had succeeded in popularizing the term and making meaningful interventions at an urban and regional scale, it was lacking – for various political and economic reasons – as a means of translating comprehensive national policies, when they existed, into coordinated and continuous building efforts. By the mid 1940s the term appeared to

be in danger of going stale, losing both its political rhetorical gravity as well as its expansive professional jurisdictional connotations, due to the perceptions that it had been a promise delivered in bad faith. Lazo strove to dispel the notion that planning was merely an investigative and discursive process by further emphasizing that it was a means by which "to proceed...a plan of action, [a] hierarchical sequence of work...<sup>172</sup> By the time that Lazo was using the term as member of the Alemán election team and internal dominant party critic, he continued in his attempts at convincing his small but politically interested public of architects, engineers, and other técnicos of a restoration of good faith in the rhetoric of a renewed political class. As a fellow technical and architectural professional aspiring to that class, he endeavored to seriously make a case that an equally renewed conceptualization of planificación could translate into a real, organic, and feasible means of delivering a backlog of social and economic goods that had been promised and would continue to be promised by political actors speaking on behalf of the state's various experts. 173 Planificación, in short, was now promised as the making of "concrete, organic proposals with national, long term scope, that would allow the giving of life to the postulates implied in its dialectic."174

Lazo's increasingly expansive definitions of *planificación* – a combination of interdependent programs of study, pragmatic and accurate forecasting, and a commitment to

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<sup>172 &</sup>quot;...es proceder, es plan de acción, secuencia jerárquica de trabajo..." Lazo, "Planificación," 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> For more on the theory of performative statements and promises, see J.L Austin, *How to do Things with Words*, ed. J.O. Urmson and Marina Shisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

<sup>174 &</sup>quot;...proposiciones concretas, orgánicas, con visión nacional, de largo aliento, que permitieran dar vida a los postulados que implicaba su dialectica." Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política," 37. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 53, Exp 29. Note: While we can imagine that "concrete, organic proposals" would have at least increased the believability of political promises regarding development, the broken trust relationship between state and constituent would only be repaired with tangible evidence of delivery on those promises. The next two chapters note at least two examples where large-scale architectural projects were completed under Lazo's supervision so as to contribute to the political strategy of making "good faith" statements — a rhetorical strategy that requires performative statements given in a serious manner, followed by symbolic and real gestures of material accomplishment within a prescribed amount of time.

action and execution – suggested both the original neologism's flexibility, multivalency, and ability to be semantically burdened as well as the existence of a similar semantic void that had necessitated the creation of this term in the first place. Rather than replace it with a completely new neologism or wholly appropriate an untranslated foreign term, Lazo opted for simple modification with the addition of a still relatively novel descriptive to the pre-existing term. He adopted the term "integral" to better suit his conceptualization of national planning for the Mexican State. Following in the similar vein of creative word building that had coined and shaped the meanings of the layered term "técnico," he chose a word with a history of use in European and American socio-economic, technical, and other scientific discourses and morphologically similar to an equally conceptually pregnant term – integración, or "integration." The term "integral" was clearly situated within a complicated semantic web that connected it to a group of interrelated but differing social, political, and economic projects, but Lazo's receptiveness and strategic use of the descriptive also reflected the fact that it already carried some currency amongst a small but influential minority of Mexican architects. Lazo's use of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> The idea of the semantic and conceptual void in technical and technological discourse is noted in Chapter 1, and borrowed from Leo Marx, "Technology': The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept," *Technology and Culture* 51, no. 3 (2010): 563.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Note: The preoccupation with multidisciplinarity in Villagran's proposals for an "integrated" architectural curriculum and socially-preoccupied regimen of construction, and the comprehensive managerial undertones in Arai's use of the word "integral" reveals that this type of integralism, in the context of how arquitectura técnica and planificación was being defined between the late 1930s and early 1950s was morphologically and to an extent conceptually similar to the idea of "integration." The concept of "integration" was multivalent, having been developed over at least two decades and across manifold discourses and disciplines. In short, the term had come to describe a paradigm that shaped multiple facets of the Western, industrial world. The concept of integration was born out of European and North American social sciences in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Concurrently, the term was also used to describe centralized approaches to corporate organization and industrialized production. Chief amongst these approaches was Fordism. This term was named after Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company, and described the corporation's industrial managerial and productive system of vertical integration where all components of the automobile were constructed in-house and materials sourced from areas under the corporation's control. Vertical integration was architecturally embodied by Albert Kahn's River Rouge Complex (1917-1928) located in Dearborn, Michigan. The industrial and modernizing implications of vertical integration had captured the cultural imaginary of Mexico's elite - both rapturously and critically - by the 1930s. This was most explicitly demonstrated in Diego Rivera's Detroit Industry Murals (1932-33) at the Detroit Institute of Arts. By the end of the Second World War the definition of integration had received a new layer of meaning having been carried over by American industrial managers, such as Paul Hoffman, former President of the Studebaker Automobile

the term echoed Villagrán García's ideas of a more socio-economically interested and multidisciplinary "integrated" technical committee and constructive "junta." Furthermore, it directly paralleled the conceptualization of the "integral" expressed by his colleague, Alberto Arai, when he described the new *technical* discipline as an *integral* architecture and how this discipline implied a rational framework by which to better understand, govern, and order the larger vital – which is to say, social, political, and economic – systems of man. <sup>178</sup>

Of critical importance to the professional mobility projects of a pro-technical, managerial faction of architects was the new term's implication of administrative and managerial reform

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Company, in their crafting of post-war economic strategies during the reconstruction of Europe. It was specifically used in the theorization and eventual construction of regional economic blocks based upon ideas of co-operation, solidarity, and amalgamation. The term became a sort of buzz-word in the re-imagining of what a postwar European economy would look like. Likewise, a number of economic theorists of the period felt that Latin America was similarly, if idealistically, poised to enter a phase of industrialization, agricultural reform, urbanization, and economic interdependence following the War - ideas that were critical to the foundation of the Organization of American States (OAS). Taken together, use of the word integral in as much as it had been conflated with the term "integration" signified that planificación integral was a theory that not only embraced elements of bureaucratic managerialism, but also a corporatistic model of national, state-managed economic production, and a more regional and international vision for the Post-War economic development of Latin America. Lazo's planning theories reflected many of these trends in integral/integration-related thinking, eventually becoming a centrally-administered yet regionally-focused federal corporatistic plan for social and political organization driven by renewed economic nationalism with a focus on new regional, vital, and productive socio-economic centers. An air of Pan-Americanism also colored his work by the late 1940s, and was partially shaped by the view that Mexico was emerging as a key point of continental entry and departure for global travel and communication. This reflected an increasingly international and proto-global concentration on human development, social justice, and systems thinking that marked almost all veins of developmentalism in the postwar period. Lazo, as the primary theorist of this newly phrased planning regimen in Mexico during the politically and ideologically turbulent 1940s, also used the concept of an "integral" project as a means of reckoning with the very relevant ideological tensions between fascism and communism both abroad and at home. At this end, Lazo's conceptualization of the "integral" as well as "integration" found inspiration both in neo-Kantian discourses that referred to immanence, integration, and perpetual peace as well as Catholic Integralism – a body of beliefs and doctrines that drove a number of 19th and 20th century movements, many of a far-right nature in predominately Catholic European countries as well as in Latin America. It is important to note that these movements were studied by Catholic political thinkers of the Partido Accíon Nacional (PAN), as well as by Lazo who has been described as a representative of Catholic interests within the very measured ideological integrational efforts that occurred under the PRI after the Second World War and during the early postrevolutionary period. For a comprehensive history on the theory of economic integration, see Fritz Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). For a brief introduction to developmentalist thought with reference to the concept of integration and its occupation within a rich and "incredibly powerful semantic constellation," see Gustavo Esteva, "Development" in The Development Dictionary, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London & New York: Zed Books, 2009). For more on developmentalist projects in architecture and planning in post-war period, see Aggregate, Architecture in Development (Routledge, Forthcoming)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> Villagrán, 81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Arai, 17.

with expanded jurisdictions of control and coordination for architect/planners as well as allied *técnicos* that were together coalescing into the dominant party's next generation of leadership:

...PLANIFICACIÓN INTEGRAL, everything, communications, electrification, water, industrial planning, agricultural, commercial...a [regulatory] plan in its forecast and execution.<sup>179</sup>

To be sure, the point of control for the *técnico*, architect-planner remained within a graphic, regulatory document:

...a national 'plan' that articulates and coordinates the vital resources of our economy and puts into motion the enormous potential of our wealth: railroads, roads, agrarian problems, extractive and processing industries, the incalculable treasure of fishing along the thousands of kilometers of our coastline, strategic geographic positioning for continental terrestrial, maritime, and aerial traffic, almost limitless possibilities of tourism, international relations, demographic policy.<sup>180</sup>

This plan was equally conceived as integral and integrated in its composition. Lazo's conceptualization of "integral" planning possessed morphological and conceptual similarities with a central architectural and artistic discourse that was beginning to take form in Mexico during the same time: *integración plástica*. This was an extremely important discourse in Mexican modern architecture that advocated for a coordinated integration of plastic arts (murals, mosaic, sculpture, photomurals) into functionalist or rational modern architecture, typically with didactic and nation-state formational ends. *Planificación integral*, as expressed in Lazo's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> "...un plan regulador de su PLANIFICACIÓN INTEGRAL. Todo, comunicaciones, electrificación, agua, planificación industrial, agrícola, comercial...un plan en su previsión y ejecución." Carlos Lazo, "Planificación" *Construcción* (January 1944), 23.

<sup>180 &</sup>quot;...un 'plan' nacional que articulase, coordinándolos, los recursos vitales de nuestra economía y pusiera en marcha el potencial enorme de nuestra riqueza: ferrocarriles, carreteras, problema agrario, industrias extractivas y proceso de transformación, tesoro pesquero incalculable en los millares de kilómetros de nuestro litoral, estrategia de la situación geográfica para el tráfico continental terrestre, marítimo y aéreo; posibilidades casi ilimitadas del turismo, relaciones internacionales, política demográfica." Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política," 37.

earliest proposals, was likewise a project of graphic synthesis. <sup>181</sup> (fig. 2.20) Critical to Lazo's praxis was the combination of the results of research in the form of succinct textual essays written in a political-economic, sociological, and mystical/philosophical language, numerically expressed demographic and economic data, suggestive photographic "evidence" influenced by visual sociology and anthropology, and planimetric visualizations – taking advantage of advances in aerial reconnaissance – with architecturalized overlays as potential solutions. Articulated as textual and visualized syntheses of data combined with plans of action requiring new bureaucratic interdependence and executive coordination, these documents expressed a methodology that was at the core of Lazo's increasingly expansive "Programa de Gobierno." While the Programa functioned as a document of architectural planning theory and strategic political-economic critique, as the 1940s played out under the new presidential administration, this project increased in its intensity not only as a vehicle of professional advocacy, but as tool of political *futurismo* for a technical class that increasingly emphasized not only its claims as manager and mandarin of the reformed and incipient developmentalist state, but as oracle and privileged speaker of a new and future Mexican reality. 182

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> It's characterization as a "síntesis gráfica" was noted in Lazo, "Planificación: Ponencia presentada...,", 20-21.
<sup>182</sup> Futurismo is a Mexican political term used to describe the informal practice of hopeful political candidates publicly gauging their political strength amongst unions, factions of the PRM/PRI, and amongst Mexico's many publics while angling for nomination. While the term is often used in connection with presidential candidates and the general elections, the practice extended to nearly all levels of political office, especially elected but also appointed. In addition, while it especially describes individual political viability, it can also be used to describe the collective viability of *camarillas* or political cliques since candidacies and campaigns were organized by committees and were driven by the efforts of cliques, class and profession-based organizations, and other networks of sociopolitical power, patronage, and debt. Navarro, 11; 198-200.

## Chapter 3: Programs, Polemics, and Power

## I. Professional Prestige, Political Theater, and Interrupted Plans

The discourse of *Planificación* in Mexico served multiple purposes for its proponents since its inception. For all of its proponents, it was a projection of rationalization, civic morality, and good government. It was conceived of at multiple scales, and turned into differing yet interrelated public campaigns towards political economic possibilities, whether progressive capitalist, socialist, integralist, developmentalist, or politically pragmatic and coercive syntheses of these. On these fronts, planificación was a central component to varied notions of mexicanidad (mexicanness), a concept which at once was used to describe a national essence, identity, or spirit necessary for the unitary nation-building project that immediately followed the conclusion of the Mexican Revolution. In the context of the new post-revolutionary project, the project of mexicanidad was deeply recast as one of political and social regeneration and broadly defined socio-economic development. Finally, planificación was part and parcel of a collective professional mobility project directed by pro-técnico/a architectural professionals. At the extreme end of this project, we can classify *planificación* advocacy as a form of political futurismo, with its demonstration of qualifications and vocal calls for the integration of a new generation of technical agents into the Mexican government, first as consultative functionaries but increasingly as more empowered actors that blurred the lines between técnicos and políticos. Carlos Lazo's planning articles were an exceptional example of this profession-oriented futurismo with its objectives aimed at convincing fellow professionals and select members of the new political class and party leadership of the viability of the new technical class and especially of the indispensability of the architect-planner as a necessary coordinator for the incipient and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> For more on *mexicanidad* in the context of economic development during the 1940s, see Susan Gauss, *Made in Mexico: Regions, Nation, and the State in the Rise of Mexican Industrialism, 1920-1940s* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 3-4.

still ill-defined managerial developmentalist state. Out of Mexico City's small and competitive architectural profession, Lazo emerged as a key recipient of new bureaucratic power with arrival of the political dispensation. Privilege and political connection notwithstanding, this was in no small part due to his advocative performance of special professional and intellectual qualification, strategic political critique, and positioning as a moralizing individual interested in restoring trust relationships between the political class and the public via not only a rhetorical projection of planning intention and promises, but also a sincere effort at making those very political visions manifest.

Lazo's service to the Alemán campaign, his broad and publicized areas of expertise and claims of new professional jurisdictional authority, his reformist calls for technical administration and oversight, his involvement in important planning projects in Mexico City, Tampíco, and Monterrey, and his politically useful developmentalist project of *Planificación Integral* made him viable enough for consideration by incoming President Miguel Alemán and the PRI leadership as a loyal and appointable *técnico*. Because so few architects had achieved meaningful administrative or political posts up until then, and possibly because of an acute awareness that a small handful of other architectural professionals would be seeking similar appointment, Lazo intended to seek further qualification and distinguishment amongst his peers. On January 3. 1947, Lazo drafted a letter to Dr. Salvador Zubirán, one of Mexico's most noted physicians and the rector of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México requesting – not for the first time – a doctoral degree. Arguing that the numerous planning studies that he had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Letter from Carlos Lazo to Sr. Dr. Salvador Zubirán, January 3, 1947. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 2, Exp 64. Note: Lazo had drafted earlier but less detailed requests to Dr. Zubirán for his work to be assessed and to be considered for a doctoral degree. These letters were sent to Zubirán immediately after beginning his tenure as Rector, on March 4, 1946. See Letter from Carlos Lazo to Sr. Dr. Salvador Zubirán, March 8, 1946. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 2, Exp 61. Dr. Zubirán acknowledged at least one of these requests to assess Lazo's planning work, and wrote to the Secretary General of the UNAM at the time regarding the architect-planner's request. See

completed or was currently working signified an above-and-beyond effort exceeding his professional practice and university designation as a *Maestro* in Architecture, he proposed submitting this work – which he considered a *tésis práctico-técnica* – to a committee of Dr. Zubirán's choice. He asked Dr. Zubirán to assess the work and designate the field for the doctoral degree as the rector saw adequate. Lazo was not granted the degree, for one reason or another. However, his overall qualifications were enough for President Alemán's decision in July of 1947 to name him as an *Oficial Mayor*, or senior official, of the newly created *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales e Inspección Administrativa*, or Secretariat of National Resources and Administrative Inspection.<sup>185</sup> (fig. 3.1 and 3.2) Within this new office in the Executive Branch of Mexican government, Lazo was also named president of its *Comisión Técnica de Arquitectos* (Technical Commission of Architects) and the *Comisión Federal de Planificación* (Federal Commission of Planning).<sup>186</sup> This political trajectory in the Mexican bureaucratic state afforded him ample titles that may have inflated the degree of power or authority that he truly exercised. Nevertheless, multiple modestly paid positions provided him with a staff that only furthered his

Letter to Señor Secretario General from Dr. Salvador Zubirán, March 19, 1946. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 2, Exp 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> Between 1945 and 1946, Lazo was involved in numerous planning projects. In México City, he was coauthor of a competition entry and technical co-advisor for the planning of the Río de la Piedad – a project that eventually led to the former river being placed into a canal/drainage pipe and turned into a freeway now called Viaducto Miguel Alemán. He was in charge of regional and urban planning studies for the port city of Tampíco. He was also the director of urban and planning studies of Monterrey. His involvement in these projects is noted in the curriculum vitae composed by the anonymous editors of the collection of speeches and essays given or written by Lazo during his involvement in the construction of the Ciudad Universitaria. See Carlos Lazo, Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad Universitaria de México (Mexico: Porrúa, 1983), 219. Regarding his appointment, see: Official letter to Carlos Lazo naming him Oficial Mayor, July 1, 1947. AGN, Archivo Miguel Alemán Valdés, Caja 0733, Exp 702.11/2. For the text of the Ley General de Bienes Nacionales, refer to: Ley General de Bienes Nacionales (Mexico: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección de Bienes Nacionales, 1945). Note: A copy of this text was in the possession of Lazo and can be found in: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129. <sup>186</sup> His appointment to the Comisión Federal de Planificación is noted in the curriculum vitae in Pensamiento y Destino..., 219. His appointment to the Comisión Técnica de Arquitectos is noted in Alfonso Pérez-Méndez, "Conceptualization of the Settlement of El Pedregal: The staging of the public space in the Master Plan of the Ciudad Universitaria" in Living CU 60 years, edited by Salvador Lizárraga Sánchez and Cristina López Uribe (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2014), 63. Note: these titles are included in various pieces of official correspondence that can be found in the AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo.

access to the resources needed for the research, publication, and dissemination of his critical planning proposals and architectural theories.<sup>187</sup>

As mentioned previously, this ministry was designed as a response to demands for better governmental financial oversight. As a sign that this new and ostensibly moralizing office would not be headed by old guard politicians or party men, Alemán decided to name the renowned anthropologist and archeologist Alfonso Caso, as its head. Caso was an internationally renowned figure, distinguished by his excavations at Monte Albán, and his discovery of numerous sites in the Mixteca region of Oaxaca. He held prestigious institutional and academic posts as the director of the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, or National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) between 1939 and 1944, the rector of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) between 1944 and 1945, and had been, since the 1920s, an ongoing figure in supporting the University's autonomy having most recently contributed authorship of its Ley Orgánica of 1945. His career of discovering, cataloging, and safeguarding national treasures as well as his successful advocacy of institutional autonomy within the leviathan of the modern Mexican State outwardly made him an ideal, even if symbolic, figurehead needed for this important civilian-professional state organization. His holding of a degree in jurisprudence from the Escuela Nacional de Jurisprudencia (later the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Lazo possessed a distinct bureaucratic political power that was based on his special access to data in the form of published as well as non-published government studies. In addition, this particular power of access relied on the purchasing powers that were afforded to Lazo by holding multiple government positions – and therefore having access to multiple if modest budgets – that allowed for his acquisition of new (and often foreign) materials for research. This access to materials is very evident in Lazo's archives, a vast fountain of resources which should be considered as a more complete and surviving archive for many of the public offices that he worked in. Boxes of translated and annotated planning studies from the United States, Europe, as well as Latin America, countless maps, and numerous receipts and correspondence related to book and survey equipment purchasing, conference attendance and expenses, and aerial photography services make up a majority of the content in the *Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro* which is located in the immense *Archivo General de la Nación* (AGN) in Mexico City.

Facultad de Derecho of the UNAM) likewise gave him added political eligibility due to the importance of the legal professions in the government.<sup>188</sup>

The efficacy of the new secretariat was quickly in doubt, partially because members of the Alemán administration proved to be no less corrupt than the previous and *Bienes Nacionales* was proving its incapacity to investigate members both from the current and the Avila Camacho cabinet. In addition, its role in convincing the public of the supposed moral and watchful State had not materialized partially due to the official perception that whatever positive work was being performed by the new government watchdog was not being publicized sufficiently by the institution and additionally was not receiving adequate attention from the press. <sup>189</sup> On July 30, 1947, a mere month after his official appointment, Lazo received a memorandum from an anonymous but politically knowledgeable and authoritative source giving clear warnings regarding the new dependency as well as politically useful information and instructions that were conducive to the strategy of political renovation that Lazo had so fervently championed. He was warned to stand by for eventual "modifications" and "transfers" in the presidential cabinet. In preparation for the shake-up, he was told to schedule a presentation for the President positing the political problem of the impending congressional elections. Lazo was to propose a strategy suggesting that the President and his administration support candidates that were "new, young,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> On the major role played by the legal profession within the modern Mexican state see Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 89-90. <sup>189</sup> An anonymous confidential memorandum was sent to Lazo explaining certain political problems, expressed especially by high-level functionaries within the *Secretaría de Hacienda*, with the efficacy of the *Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales*. Various issues were cited including a purported lack of internal organization and excessive paperwork that was delaying the processing of high-level government requests and impeding the constitutionally mandated expedited and rapid action of all federal offices, as well as Alfonso Caso's apparent lack of investigating and denouncing the illegal operations of the Ávila Camacho administration. The same memorandum notes that *Bienes Nacionales* had also hidden or failed to investigate the purchasing records for furniture acquisition from all public dependencies, noting that this oversight directly benefited industries belonging to Antonio Ruiz Galindo, the *Secretario de Economía*. "Memorandum" to Carlos Lazo, July 30, 1947. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129.

prestigious, and politically clean."<sup>190</sup> The strategy would, according to this source, help Alemán gain against the opposition in a seemingly democratic manner, and would be a "political coup with incalculable effects."<sup>191</sup>

It is unclear whether Lazo succeeded in acting on all of these politically opportune "suggestions," because by December of that year, a small but important institutional breakdown occurred that would mildly shake up, if not exactly change the overall trajectory, of Lazo's political career. For all of his experience, Caso lacked the necessary will or real power for this level of government. Caso – claiming illness – decided to resign. His replacement with an individual reportedly more interested in using the public office for personal gain signaled the loss of any moral authority that this new government department was intended to have. <sup>192</sup> The press was soon publishing reports of illegal sales of urban land at favorable prices - national assets that were meant to be protected by this government body. <sup>193</sup> Lazo intended to immediately follow his superior's move, drafting a letter of resignation to President Alemán on December 9, 1948. <sup>194</sup> His departure proved drawn out with Alemán rejecting his resignation, possibly – as it was

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Hugo Rangel Couto, the sub-secretary of the *Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales*, took charge following Caso's departure. See "Hoy entregará el Lic. Caso la Sria. De Bienes Nales," *Novedades*, December 31, 1948. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129. Note: further details of the problems within the *Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales* after Caso's departure are offered by the economist Jesús Silva Herzog who was president of its *Consejo Técnico*. Of note were the opposition of other dependencies to this new federal agency, the role of Hugo Rangel Couto in sacking the majority of its employees after Caso's departure, and the initial - and likely consistent - lack of cooperation of Rogerio de la Selva, the secretary of president Miguel Alemán, to remedy the situation. See: Jesús Silva Herzog, *Una Vida en la Vida de México: y mis últimas andanzas, 1947-1992* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México; Siglo XXI, 1993), 294.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> Note: Lazo saved an undated news clip (likely from 1949) pertaining to one such sale. Carlos Denegri, the well-known Mexican journalist who wrote for the newspaper *Excelsior*, published the article "Buenos Días: Fuera de Subasta." In the brief article he noted with outrage the report in the *Diario Oficial* – the official mouthpiece of the government – that 48,000 square meters of land belonging to the Federal Government and bordering the *Paseo de la Reforma* in Mexico City were going to be transferred to Hector Pantoja Avilés for the favorable amount of \$276,090 (in Mexican pesos). The *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales* authorized the sale. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Draft of letter of resignation of Carlos Lazo from Bienes Nacionales to President Alemán, December 8, 1948. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 141.

thought in the press – because he wanted Lazo to remain until a new *Secretario* could be named. Pressures from within *Bienes Nacionales* could not wait, however. Lazo's final letter of resignation to the President was sent on February 1, 1949, after the architect had received a most courteous telephone call notifying him that everyone in his office, save for a single typist, had been sacked. The reasons that Lazo gave to the press for his departure were simply stated: he wanted to focus on his professional practice – indeed the anonymous author of the informative memorandum noted that it was an opportune time to publicize his architectural activity, specifically referencing his work on the house for Dr. Palacios – the "cosmic-atomic" and subterranean "*cueva civilizada*" at Sierra Leona No. 374 in Lomas de Chapultepec. (fig. 3.3-6) The publicity of Lazo's private architectural practice, thus framed, was a convenient distraction from any unwanted public or political attention as well as a strategic buffer between the professional and political lives that the *arquitecto-técnico* lived and balanced.

Lazo's intentions to depart a bureaucratic office now proving to be a largely hollow symbol of political legitimization, the rejection of his resignation by the president, a clear signal from his superiors in the ministry of no longer being welcome, and the coverage that these events received by various outlets, taken together, reflected a complicated breakdown of co-operation, faith, and trust between the presidency, the press, and a key managerial bureaucracy. When we take these events into account along with the strategic political instructions that Lazo was receiving, it is evident that these were part of an at times strategic political theater.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> "Hipótesis sobre la sucesión del Lic. Alfonso Caso," *Excélsior*, December 31, 1948. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129. "La Renuncia de Caso, Aceptada a Partir del 1o," *El Nacional*, December 31, 1948. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 9, Exp 129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> Letter of resignation of Carlos Lazo to President Aleman, February 1, 1949. AGN, Archivo Miguel Alemán Valdés. Caja 0806, Exp 703.6/37 -

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Lazo's Cueva Civilizada started to receive coverage within the architectural press soon after. It was featured in one of the last issues of *Arquitectura y lo demás*, with extensive images and texts by Lorenzo Favela and an opinion essay by Diego Rivera. See "La Arquitectura Cósmico-Atómica o de la Cueva Civilizada de Carlos Lazo, Jr." *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 11 (May 1947-March 1948): 59-79.

In the midst of the potentially political-destabilizing situation caused by the compromised moral authority of a critical yet symbolic institution of oversight, President Alemán was depicted in private correspondence as a leader in crisis with ears open to suggestion. Lazo was informed to do his job as an apparently trusted technical advisor with a plan that simultaneously offered to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the administration while furthering Lazo's own mission – as well as a broad professional project – advocating for a new generation of clean and ostensibly pro-technical leaders. When that broader strategy was interrupted or obscured by crisis, Lazo immediately found himself being publicized as a momentarily indispensable figure in aiding the Alemán administration's claim to administrative control and political legitimacy. It was, however, a tenuous place to be held for long. Assuming that Lazo's long-term political importance was clearly recognized by the political leadership, his departure from *Bienes Nacionales* as soon as possible was a necessary act for his preservation of public appearance as a moral *técnico* that had only been caught up in, but not involved with the persistent morass of a trans-generational and systemic culture of political corruption.

Despite the apparent crisis in his political career, Lazo managed to send reassurances to his political superiors. Lazo was careful to have all important bases within the biggest factions of the PRI covered. He drafted a letter to Lázaro Cárdenas on February 7, 1949, thanking him for his attention, apologizing for his shortcomings of service due to the impossible working conditions of the *Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales*, meanwhile noting that he did manage to complete a Plano Regulador de Uruápan – the second largest city in Cárdenas's home state of Michoacán – and was ready to deliver it.<sup>198</sup> Likewise, he remained closely engaged with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Note: Correspondence such as this reinforces the argument that planning documents can serve as a sort of currency in the economy of political patronage. Letter from Carlos Lazo to Lázaro Cárdenas, February 7, 1949. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 3, Exp 70.

Alemán. By 1949, he was named a *Consejero de la Presidencia de la República Mexicana* - a close presidential advisor. <sup>199</sup>

## II. "Programa de Gobierno": Regional Organization, Technical Oversight, and Executive Power

In maneuvering through the expanding political mire and bureaucratic shuffles, Lazo took the tremendous amount of work that he and his staff had compiled during his tenure at *Bienes Nacionales* and put it towards the construction of a public campaign in favor of national planning, regional coordination, and central administrative reorganization. (**Fig 3.7**) His conceptualization of *planificación integral* and a rationally organized and executed *Programa de Gobierno* matured, however, with his recent experiences in the administration. By 1950, he brought this project to the attention of the newspaper *Excélsior*. At the time, this was the second largest news outlet based in Mexico City and was at that time known for being generally prodevelopment, socially moderate to conservative, and with an assortment of authors highlighting economic matters, planning, and architecture.<sup>200</sup> In the twenty, full-page format, Sunday articles that he published, he returned to the presenting a politically critical, exhaustively researched and planned "Programa de Gobierno."<sup>201</sup> (**Figs 3.8 and 3.9**) The articles, spread out over the course

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> Lazo was named a presidential advisor sometime in 1949, see: Lazo, *Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad Universitaria de México*, 223.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Excélsior was founded in 1917 and had historical ties to the Grupo Monterrey, a collection of industrial interests located within the city of Monterrey in the northern state of Nuevo León. By the 1940s, it was a cooperative run by Rodrigo de Llano. Stephen R. Niblo, *Mexico in the 1940s: Modernity, Politics, and Corruption* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 348.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> The articles were organized into fourteen sections covering: I. *Objetivo y Criterio* (Objectives and Guidelines); II. *Programa y Método* (Program and Method); III. *Antecedentes Generales* (General Precedents); IV. *Proposiciones Mundiales* (World Proposals); V. *Proposición para México* (Proposal for Mexico); VI-IX. *Datos Base* (Base Data); X. *Zonificación* (Zoning); XI. *Unidades Regionales* (Regional Unities); XII, *Ejes Nacionales* (National Axes); XIII. *Trabajo Nacional* (National Work); and XIV. *Servicios Sociales* (Social Services). Proofs and published articles of this series were taken from AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 7, Exp 79 and Caja 8, Exp 81 and Exp 82. The total number of twenty articles on this series is cited from a curriculum vitae included in Lazo, *Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad de México*, 222.

of several months, gave the readers a series of installments of information by which they could understand the process of large-scale planning, national and regional economic development, the role of Mexico within postwar geopolitics, as well as a proposal for government reorganization and political reform that was framed as a necessary first step in this project of regenerating the Nation-State.

Numerous organizational and infrastructural concepts were brought to a higher level of refinement with serious implications on the political, economic, and administrative reorganization of the country. Chief amongst these were the *Unidad Regionals*, or "regional unities," the Zonas Vitales, "or vital zones," and the Ejes Nacionales, or "national axes." (Fig. **3.10)** Taken together, these were the core of an alternative, integralist/integrationist plan for national economic development. The integralist/integrationalist approach balanced a territorial strategy of ecologically defined re-delineation, regionally decentralized prioritization and investment, and a communicational strategy of major infrastructure trunks both independent from and centered upon the Mexican capital. This new tripartite rationalization of Mexico would in turn be used to plan the three key objectives, collectively designated by Lazo as the esfuerzo nacional, or "national effort" of a future developmentalist state. These objectives were simply defined as more transportation infrastructure, ample work, and accessible social services.<sup>202</sup> These newly rationalized territories, infrastructures, and services of the *integralist/integrationist* social contract, in turn, would have been managed by a new balance of power between stronger federal executive authority and increasingly large and well-trained bodies of técnicos.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> "Ejes," "Trabajo," and "Servicios Sociales." See "México: Programa de Gobierno, V. Proposición para México, B. Gráfica del Plan de México." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82. Lazo defines "Trabajo" or work, as the "integral coordination of the cycles of production, distribution, and consumption." He defines "servicios sociales" or social services, as the "Integral coordination of consumption: food, shelter, education, aid, demography, and defense." I give a translation for Lazo's definition of "Ejes" a few pages from here in the body of this text, but in short Lazo considered it an integral system that coordinates the national effort. See: "Programa de Gobierno, V. Proposición para México, C. Organización del Ejecutivo. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

Lazo's regionalism emphasized what he saw as the growing irrational nature of many pre-existing political borders and their lack of corresponding to what he deemed Mexico's social and cultural realities, as well as the obstacles these posed for the modernization of the Mexican economy. Framing this as a matter of an organic political evolution, he advocated for policy that would analyze and define separate regions according to geographies, demographics, natural resources, and centers of production. This in turn would serve to aid the production of new territorial divisions and amalgamations, or *unidades*, throughout Mexico which in turn would have facilitated the planning and administration of ostensibly homogenous economic areas of production and labor. Though the size of regions were flexible in these studies, and were defined as being areas as large as two or more states, Lazo significantly proposed dividing the country into three separate major regions: the north, central, and southeast. (fig. 3.10)

Various *Zona Vitales*, or Vital Zones of the country – a biological and philosophical rephrasing of earlier calls from Mexican planners for the *Zonificación* of Mexico were aggregated into these larger regions.<sup>204</sup> (fig. 3.11) The creation of vital zones as a fundamental

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Carlos Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política" in *Construcción* (July 1946); 40-41. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 53, Exp 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Zonificación was advocated by Contreras amongst others. He does so in "La planificación de la República Mexicana" (1925) as well as in "¿Qué cosa es la zonificación?" (1927). See: Carlos Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," and "¿Qué cosa es la zonificación?" in Planificación urbanismo visionarios de Carlos Contreras: escritos de 1925 a 1938, edited by Gerardo G. Sánchez Ruiz and Rafael López Rangel (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 53; 67-68. Lazo's vitalism echoes, in part, the writings of Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Lazo cited Bergson's L'Évolution créatrice (1907) amongst other works in a bibliography titled "II. Programa y Método" for the Programa de Gobierno published in Excélsior in 1950. The version of the bibliography that I have consulted was included in a proof that would have been submitted to newspaper prior to any necessary edits and printing. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82. It is highly plausible that Lazo's reading of Bergson was influenced by connections to Gerardo Murillo Cornado, or "Dr. Atl," a highly influential – and politically controversial - painter of Mexican landscapes. Dr. Atl was a close friend of Carlos Maria Lazo del Pino and the Lazo family, and the two older intellectuals shared an interest in the French philosopher. Dr. Atl attended Bergson's lectures at the turn of the twentieth century while living in Europe. The younger Lazo was gifted paintings and influenced by the vitalist, regenerative vulcanological mysticism of the artist – partially shaped by his study of the Paricutín volcano in Michoacán - especially as the architect was conceptualizing his vision for the Ciudad Universitaria which was built over an ancient lava flow known as "El Pedregal." For more on the role that Dr. Atl played on Lazo's thought, see Pérez-Méndez, 54-59. Dr. Atl's politics and ideological groundings were controversial, to say the least. He possessed visions of a cosmic and biblical socialism - an ideological aggregate or group of related mentalities of varied cohesion that were fairly widespread within Mexico as well as Latin America,

reorganization of the national territory was described early on as a system of categorization focusing on so-called vital energies and values, which would have been subdivided into reserves zones as well as regions classified according to their potential, immediate and secondary viability for development.<sup>205</sup> The vital zones of primary importance to the new national plan would have been encompassed by the central major region of the reorganized national territory, an area that radiated outwards on roughly linear paths to the major bordering bodies of water - the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. It was slated to be the first region to be fully reorganized due to there being a great deal of infrastructure already located in the area as well as its role as the national capital. In short, he would note that it was also an area with a high human and investment capital index.<sup>206</sup> This decision underscored the reality that an unevenly developed nation like Mexico would have to be developed piecemeal according to priority, urgency, or preestablished capital. And yet, for all of its advocacy for regional development, this choice

and much of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. Dr. Atl had a degree of collaboration with the Partito Socialista Italiano and contributed to the magazine Avanti during the early twentieth century. During the Revolution, he sided with Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist forces. By the 1930s, however, he voiced support for Fascism and Nazism – he held deep anti-Semitic convictions. He managed to be rehabilitated partially through his vital-telluric nationalist thought as expressed in his paintings and writings on volcanic landscapes. Lazo's association with Dr. Atl does not claim the indistinguishability between their individual projects of Mexican nationalism and futurity, rather this relation is emphasized as a point of contact in the complex web of Mexican nationalist thought and Political authoritarian imaginaries. Dr. Atl most likely read the "Programa de Gobierno" an unnamed political insider who claimed to have intimately "known the thought of Carranza, Obregón, Calles, and Cárdenas" sent a "Memoranda" to Dr. Atl praising Lazo's "Programa de Gobierno" in Excélsior. See "Memoranda para el Dr. Atl." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 57, Exp 101. <sup>205</sup> Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política," 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Note: Lazo emphasized what he understood to be a major impediment for many of Mexico's regions; he described this impediment as a lack of "human potential." This, along with the "restriction of financial resources," was perhaps the most critical factor in the determination of a timeline for national development. His emphasis of regional "human potential" unfortunately had partial rooting in the contemporary but racist perceptions of the supposed cultural underdevelopment of Mexico's largely agrarian and indigenous population. This was a common trope found both in earlier, civilization-focused Latin American literatures as well as in various Anglo-American, climate-deterministic schools of thought that shaped the study of human-economic geography and the discourse of development. However, this criticism also continued his line of argument focusing on the failures of the Mexican State and its education systems, and emphasized the still persistent lack of technical training amongst the workforce and how this posed problems to national integration. Ibid.

highlighted the seemingly inescapable political and economic dominance of Central Mexico and the national capital of Mexico City.

Connectivity between the vital zones and new regional unities was deemed necessary to the formation and control of these new political administrative areas of jurisdiction. This required a new complementary policy in communications. Here Lazo advocated another critical innovation: the adoption of new *Ejes Nacionales*, or national axes, which in sum was an "integral system of all types of communications that organically connect zones and centers for use of the national effort."<sup>207</sup> (Fig 3.12) His approach echoed the championing of transportation construction, namely roads, that had been central to Contreras's advocacy for *Planificación* nacional a quarter of a century earlier, yet strongly reflected his experience of the wartime coordination of multivehicular traffic in the United States.<sup>208</sup> This integral plan for organizational axes expanded on the previous foci of transportation and communication in Mexico - roads, railways, ports, telegraph/telephone lines, and increasingly aviation - which were the responsibility of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (SCOP). The national axes would have maintained and expanded pre-existing major roads centered upon the national capital, supplementing these with ringed and gridded networks of transportation across the entire Republic. These on the one hand reflected the need for structural redundancies in the networks of distribution, as well as structures supportive of a measured economic autonomy across the new vital zones in the North and South. Redundancies and measured autonomy could translate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> "Ejes: Sistema integral de Comunicaciones de toda indole, que conecta orgánicamente zonas y centros para el aprovechamiento del esfuerzo nacional." See: "Programa de Gobierno, V. Proposición para México, C. Organización del Ejecutivo, AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> For Carlos Contreras's proposal for a "Sistema Nacional de Caminos," see Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," 48-51. For Lazo's study of wartime era transportation policy, see his heavily marked up copy of *Transportation and National Policy* in Mexico's Archivo General de la Nación. National Resources Planning Board, *Transportation and National Policy* (Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942). Lazo's copy is located in: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 109, Exp 600.

into regional interdependency and the potential decentralization of economic control, power, and administration that had historically passed through Mexico City.<sup>209</sup> Still, with the established grand trunk of this system still in place, the new plan could also have served the gravitation of people and goods to and from the Valley of Mexico.

Lazo's regionalism provides a counterpoint to numerous arguments for decentralized, regional development during the period both abroad and in Mexico. His regionalism owed debts to a wide variety of contemporary sources, though from what we can tell he attempted to adapt these to what he considered to be realities of the post-revolutionary political era, the Post-War, and Mexico's incipient transition into a still-loosely defined developmentalist economy. Lazo directly built upon contemporary theories variously described as "integral" or integrated geography, human ecology, environmental geography, and human-economic geography, as well as projects of regional planning that he had studies during and after his post-graduate travels in the United States. His exposure to American regional planners and institutional literature espousing ideas of metropolitanism and trans-state zones of administrative control (evident in the work of the Regional Planning Association (RPA), New York City Planning Commission, as well as several New Deal-era commissions connected to the National Resources Planning Board such as the New England Regional Planning Commission), were in particular critical to the development of Lazo's strategy and were cited by the architect in the lengthy bibliography published along with the *Programa de Gobierno* in *Excélsior*.<sup>210</sup> Lazo was also involved in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> "Interdependency" is an implied theme in Lazo's work and is stressed in the *Programa de Gobierno* (1950), Chapter IV, "Proposiciones Mundiales," sec. C. "Planificación Internacional." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82, and is explicitly stated in Chapter V, "Proposición para México, no. 5: "Plan de México." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 7, Exp 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Note: During Lazo's tenure at the *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales*, he embarked on a research project that entailed tasking his employees with the translating of numerous Regional Planning studies and commissions from the United States. Numerous translated planning essays can be found in light blue folders with the letterhead of *Bienes Nacionales* in the Archivo Carlos Lazo.

discussions with Mexican intellectuals and experts on the subject of regional development, notably having a level of dialogue with the Hungarian-Jewish émigré, Dr. Laszlo Radványi, Chair of the *Escuela Nacional de Economía* at the UNAM.<sup>211</sup> Arguments for regional development were likewise offered by the technocrats of Mexico's *Oficina de Investigaciones Industriales* (OII) as well as Carlos Novoa, the Director-General of the Bank of Mexico.<sup>212</sup> Finally, Lazo's Regional Unities – as semi-autonomous, *técnico*-administered territories – pointed towards real Mexican precedents of regional economic development in Mexico. Foremost amongst these was the vast *Comisión del Papaloapan*, a hydrologic, sanitary, industrial, and agricultural project administered by the *Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos* and encompassing a total of 17,800 square miles including portions of the states of Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla. It owed its origin to a disastrous flood as well as the Avila Camacho administration's war-time focus on agriculture. This regional project was initiated in the early 1940s by the formation of a *Comisión Intersecretarial de Agricultura, Comunicaciones y Marina*, and was later transformed by Alemán's presidential decree of February 1947 into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Carlos Lazo appears to have attended a seminar on economic planning organized by Dr. Laszlo Radványi in 1949. Amongst various presentations, the topic of national planning was discussed within the context of global and regional planning. Correspondence between the two men existed at least up until 1952. The program for the multisession seminar "Planeación Económica" can be found in AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 3 Exp 70. Radványi, Mexican technocrats such as those working for the OII, as well as Carlos Novoa, the head of the Bank of México, formed part of a loosely defined group of intellectuals that favored an economic plan focused on regionally balanced development, thus optimizing the use of primary resources in basic industry and especially manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors. Notably, Radványi was also a communist, had ties to Georg Lukács, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Polanyi via the Budapest Sunday Circle. After brief detainment in Europe, he fled to Mexico in 1941, and remained until 1952. For mention of Radványi, see Gauss, 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> In the mid through late 1940s the OII was engaged in a debate with the *Cámara Nacional de Industria de Transformación* (CANACINTRA) regarding the geographical and productive foci of Mexico's impending development. CANACINTRA promoted the urban-centered manufacture of non-durable, consumer articles that could be spread quickly into these local consumer economies, thus generating wealth. The OII, believing wealth began at the moment of production, backed basic industry and the large-scale processing of primary materials. Their neglect, according to the OII, would exacerbate the growth of regionally based inequalities. Carlos Novoa, Director-General of the Bank of Mexico from 1946 to 1952, shared this concern, arguing for the rational, integrated, decentralized development of all regions of Mexico. See "Rival Visions of Mexico's Industrial Geography: Region Versus Center," in Gauss, 123-126.

Mexico's equivalent to the TVA.<sup>213</sup> And yet with Lazo's clear prioritization of decentralized regional development focused on Mexico's various telluric riches, natural and cultivated resources, his plan didn't ignore the importance of cities, especially those situated at the central hub of the country and already home to established and powerful development-oriented forces. *Planificación Integral* was an alternative plan for a decentralized Mexican development that took into account and sought to partially reconcile the very real tensions and debates between technocrats advocating either for regional investment, or urban-focused industrialization.

To be sure, while Lazo's delineation of new regional unities and their larger vital zones were a strategy for decentralized regional development, these new territorialities posed a significant challenge to the established structures and systems of regional authority. This redrawing of Mexico's territorial map would have necessitated an equal rearrangement of its political-administrative map that acknowledged the obsolescence of established arrangements of rule. In regards to how this rearrangement was to be made, Lazo posed a problem to the public reading *Excélsior* that was phrased as a referendum on the nature of Executive Powers. He called for the approval of a new relationship between *técnicos* and the presidency. He noted that the Mexican nation was a "daily plebiscite" choosing between reality and desire.<sup>214</sup> The Mexican reality that Lazo warned of was decadent. Instead, he projected a desired, alternative *Mexicanidad* that would overcome this crisis.<sup>215</sup> He described this as a national will that combined both a rational attitude that demanded planning, as well as a more emotional unifying

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Thomas T. Poleman, *The Papaloapan Project: Agricultural Development in the Mexican Tropics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Lazo cites Ernest Renan's "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" (1882) in "Programa de Gobierno, V. Proposición para México, A. Esquema Funcional de la Organización Pública." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

<sup>215</sup> For more on Lazo's alternative *Mexicanidad*, and how it both contributed to and contrasted from the official and Alemanista veins of Mexican nationalist thought via his involvement in the construction of the Ciudad Universitaria, see: Pérez-Méndez, 59-81.

sentiment that he calls a "passion for Mexico."<sup>216</sup> In describing how the desired Mexican reality could be brought about, Lazo stated that the organization of Mexico's publics – in short the relationship between political and civil society – and politico-administrative bodies were equally at a point of supersession and ready for renovation and regeneration. He supplied a new functional schematic for public order (**fig. 3.12**), urged a unified polity for its rational and ordered manifestation, and prophesied that with its manifestation, Mexico's chief source of political power – the executive – would finally have a suitable foundation and strengthened weapon by which to execute a single unified policy and politic amongst all levels of government, administration, public, and private interests:

If the current state of affairs is not accepted as a final solution, it is logical to try to overcome it, adopting a dynamic and constructive attitude that affects our physical, human, economic, and political environment. But we must overcome it by proceeding rationally, in a hierarchal sequence, with the components that man's science and technology put within our reach, at the scales and stages technically forecast by a national planning program....The basic structure of the county expressed in the schematic may suffer from flaws and errors, but it contains, as a potential reality, a highly forged and solid ingredient that is intended to transform it from being a mere pen stroke. The structure of a country is transformed through a political process that requires its scales and stages. *One politic* can only be carried out by the [Executive] Power according to the foundational structure on which it rests.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Ibid. Lazo mentions a "Pasión por México," in "Mexico: Programa de Gobierno, I. Objetivo y Criterio, 1. Objetivo. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 7, Exp 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Si el actual estado de cosas no se acepta como solución final, es lógico que se intente superarlo, adoptando una actitud dinámica y constructiva que repercuta en nuestro medio físico, humano, económico, y político. Pero hemos de superarlo procediendo racionalmente, con los elementos que la ciencia y la técnica del hombre ponen a nuestro alcance, en secuencia jerárquica, a las escalas y etapas previstas técnicamente por un programa de Planificación Nacional...La estructura básica del país expresada en este "Esquema" podrá adolecer de fallas y de errores, pero constituye, como realidad potencial, un ingrediente harto fraguado y macizo para que se pretenda transformarlo de un mero plumazo. La estructura de un país se transforma mediante un proceso político que requiere sus escalas y etapas. *Una política* solo puede llevarse a cabo desde el Poder, considerando la estructura básica en que se apoya." "Programa de Gobierno, V. Proposición para México, A. Esquema Funcional de la Organización Pública." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

Within that schematic, the aspect most indicative of the technical nature of Lazo's proposal for political-administrative consolidation and reorganization of presidential executive authority was his suggestion that a new cabinet post and secretariat be formed: a *Secretaria Técnica de Planificación*. (Fig. 3.13, and 3.14) Other Mexican architect-planners, namely Carlos Contreras, had stated the need for a more expansive and centralized administrative body within the executive branch in the previous two decades of planning discourse. Loosely echoing Contreras's proposal as well as some of the language of Fayolist administrative thought, Lazo's proposed new secretariat was to be functionally compartmentalized into three organizational branches whose responsibilities were 1) to plan (*planea*), 2) to coordinate (*coordina*), and 3) to monitor (*vigila*). A vigilant technical secretariat of the presidency would selectively distribute

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Note: The name of this institution would have sounded familiar to an educated and regionally aware Latin American audience – The government of Argentina's Juán Perón had a similarly named *Secretaria Técnica de la Presidencia* from 1946 to 1955. Likewise, the idea of executive branch reorganization and coordination would have been compared to the United States' *Reorganization Act* of 1939, a congressional act that gave the US President the authority to hire six assistants to aid in coordinating and managing the Federal Government and created the Executive Office of the President, a new organization that allowed the Roosevelt administration to temporarily consolidate various executive agencies as well as the Bureau of the Budget under a single watch. This point of reference would have been used especially by those who sought to model Mexico's future political and socioeconomic development along the lines of the New Deal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Neither Lazo nor Contreras ever mention the mining engineer and theorist of administration Henri Fayol (1841-1925) or his text Administration Industrielle et Generale (1916) directly. The strong consonance of Lazo and Contreras's planning language with this French managerial theorist bears mention, however. Fayol's theories, much like Frederick Winslow Taylor's, were well engrained in the minds of many 20th century advocates of modern scientific management and were read by many administrators in Mexico. If Lazo did not read Fayol directly, he would have been exposed to his ideas by a couple of sources. As noted, Lazo borrowed a great deal from the planner Carlos Contreras's writings on *Planificación*. Fayol's five elements of administrative organization were *La* prévoyance (planning); l'organisation (organization); le commandement (commanding); la coordination (coordinating); le contrôle (control). These five elements - or more correctly, functions - are not translated exactly in Contreras's early descriptions of a Department in charge of the Planning of the Mexican Republic, but he also lists five managerial functions for a planning office: 1) The planning of the nation's fundamental elements; 2) Organizing local planning groups or departments in various States; 3) Promoting planning in the press; 4) Preparing and presenting legal proposals related to planning to the Federal Government; 5) Guiding public opinion as well as well as directing and controlling the execution of works. See Contreras, "La planificación de la República Mexicana," 47. It appears that Lazo applied a similar Fayolist framework to another government agency a few years prior to publishing his proposal for a Secretaría Técnica de Planificación. A series of diagrams by Lazo were drafted after 1948 proposing a reorganization of the Departamento del Distrito Federal. These were apparently a response to a series of organizational schematics and texts for the same government department that were produced by the architect Manuel Chacón between 1948 and 1949. It is possible that Lazo's schematics were influenced by his knowledge of Contreras's proposals from two decades previous - Contreras had been a long time fixture in the Departamento del Distrito Federal. However, the language of Lazo's proposals also appear to have been influenced at least in part by ideas laid out by Lic. Gabino Fraga in his 1936 text Derecho Administrativo. Lazo's diagrams for

projects from the national plan and keep a watchful eye on their completion, therefore becoming an ostensibly moral guardian and decision maker in regards how work and political patronage was distributed and how enjoyment of the "national effort" was shared.<sup>220</sup> This last administrative duty was a reference to the necessity of oversight, and Lazo's proposal appears to be a commentary on the failures of the *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales* to create and execute viable national plans and – more importantly – effectively inspect the operations of past and current administrations so as to curb entrenched and "corrupt" networks of political patronage that were blamed as the primary source of underdevelopment.

His structural solution partially credited the failure in effectively executing socioeconomic infrastructural plans to an ostensible weakness of executive power over an expansive
federal bureaucracy as well as State, regional, and municipal governments. The proposed
secretariat was conceived of as a special agency of coordination and oversight – not control, as
Lazo was careful to point out in this iteration of his political program – between the office of the
presidency and the numerous *secretarias*:

By means of the Technical Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency, [the executive] plans, coordinates and monitors the fulfillment of its Government Program, which is done by transmitting it to the executing agencies classified in related activities: State Secretariats, Department of the Federal District (DF), Decentralized Organizations, Regional Commissions, Governments of States and Territories, Municipalities, etc.<sup>221</sup>

this project, Chacón's texts and administrative diagrams, and a six-page "Síntesis de las ideas expresadas por el Lic. Gabino Frago" by Lic. Francisco Liguori Jiménez can be found together in the same folder: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 60, Reg 243. Note: While Liguori Jimenez's synopsis of Fraga's work used an administrative terminology that also echoed Fayol, Fraga does not include Fayol's work on administration in the sources that he cites, but rather refers more generally to the "French doctrine" of public service, underscoring the ubiquity of this administrative terminology in French and Francophile Mexican discussions of state management.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> "Vigila el cumplimento del Programa de Gobierno que, debidamente clasificado, se distribuye entre las autoridades y organismos de ejecución para el aprovechamiento del Esfuerzo Nacional." Carlos Lazo, "Programa de Gobierno: V. Proposiciones para México, D. Secretaría de Planificación de la Presidencia," Excelsior (Date unknown, 1950). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> "Por medio de la Secretaría Técnica de Planificación de la Presidencia planea, coordina, y vigila el cumplimento de su Programa de Gobierno, que realiza transmitiéndolo a los organismos de ejecución clasificados en actividades afines: Secretarías de Estado, Departamento del D.F.., Organismos Decentralizados, Comisiones Regionales, Gobiernos de Estados y Territorios, Municipios, etc." Ibid.

This centralized office was in charge of the "national plan" as opposed to what Lazo referred to with contempt as the "partial plans" of the supposedly uncoordinated and unsupervised individual secretariats that made up the executive branch of the government. It was the source of the "One politic," which can also be translated to the "single policy." Lazo gave his public the "cleanest meaning" of his interpretation of the word "politic" defining it more as a unitary managerial ethic described as the "art, and also science and technique of good governance, coordinating the interplay of people and parties, appetites for command, and factional struggles." The "policy" was likewise a rational and integral process of firmly directing power while coordinating national and private efforts:

Any action from the Power via the state mechanism and unto the coexistence of the governed is *a policy*. Without ignoring the creative and beneficial importance of private initiative, any coherent and homogenous action of national scope that integrally encompasses its basic factors, can only be done from the Power; And that is why we say that Mexico is in need of a national planning policy capable of coordinating the work of the State and the effort of private initiative through a planned and technically implemented government program.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Note: "Política" in Spanish refers to both politic(s) and policy. There is consonance in Lazo's phrasing of "Una Política" and a book with of the same title published in 1932 by Manuel Azaña, Prime Minister of the Second Spanish Republic between 1931 and 1933, and again in 1936; he was President of the Spanish Republic from 1936 until 1939, almost the entirety of his term being marked by the Spanish Civil War. The text is cited in Lazo's bibliography for the *Programa de Gobierno*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> "Al decir *una política* se da al vocábulo su más limpio significado: arte, y también ciencia y técnica del bien gobernar, coordinando el rejuego de personas y de partidos, de apetitos de mando y de pugnas de bandería." Carlos Lazo, "Programa de Gobierno: V. Proposición para México, 3. Una Política," Excelsior (Date unknown, 1950). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 7, Exp 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> "Toda acción desde el Poder referida al mecanisimo estatal y a la convivencia entre los gobernados es *una política*. Sin ignorar la importancia creadora y benéfica de la iniciativa privada, cualquier acción de envergadura nacional coherente y homogénea que abarque integralmente a los factores básicos, solo puede hacerse desde el Poder; y por eso decimos que México está urgido de una política de planificación nacional capaz de coordinar el trabajo del Estado y el esfuerzo de la iniciativa privada mediante un programa de Gobierno previsto y realizado técnicamente." Ibid. Note: The Mexican executive branch, or *poder ejecutivo*, was an increasingly empowered branch especially towards the late 1940s and afterwards. In theory, the Executive, Judicial, and especially the Legislative Branches of government worked interdependently towards the resolution of authority and the production of legal frameworks that delineated the official norms of power, responsibility, and the structure of their administration. Taken together, Lazo refers to all three branches of government simply as "El Poder" or "the Power." However, there is a slippery use of this word in Lazo's "Programa de Gobierno," and given that he is an advocate for greater executive authority, "El Poder" at times appears to simply be a placeholder for "El Ejecutivo," or "El Poder Ejecutivo." To be clear, Lazo's conceptualization of "El Ejecutivo" is not simply a Presidentialist one, though it relied on an idealized sensible, modern, capable, and empowered leader to make his proposal work.

The proposed unitary or even supra-political managerial ethic of the new planning secretariat would have held the potential of shifting the balance of political power and decision making to a core of *técnicos* situated within an Executive Branch of government – Lazo does not explicitly state that the new *secretaría técnica* would have its own *secretario*, or in other words a new cabinet member.<sup>225</sup>

The new institution was to be an appendage to the office of the Presidency, designed to give more rational and articulated direction to presidential political action as well as checking on the potential excesses of other institutions and administrative leaders in the various executing dependencies and their relation with private initiative and capital. This structural change was a criticism of the recent complacency of the president's office – if not President Alemán himself, who remained as one of Lazo's primary patrons and benefactors – with addressing the abuses of its cabinet members. Additional critique of the failures of the executive branch in regards to corruption was given more bluntly with Lazo's reminder that it was the executives' duty

Rather, Lazo's conceptualization of a future Executive Branch was reliant on a techno-presidentialist dialectic and at the head of a receptive but still authoritarian state mechanism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Returning to the structure of ritualistic deposition as described by the late theorist of communications Bruce E. Gronbeck we can discern in Lazo's later "Programa de Gobierno" a transition from the first stage of the deposition which is a "a sociolinguistic process involving the verbal naming of acts," to its second stage, which is "a dialectical process involving the investing of those acts with seriousness by officially constituted role players who do not want to be viewed as political opportunists." Lazo's ritualistic deposition follows this process to an extent, and here he recasts himself as a técnico with special moral authority and political-economic expertise pleading a case before the public. While he displays his passions in this process, he also attempts to outwardly project political disinterest and technical objectivity. He states his interests as being both national and professional rather than self-interested – though considering that "polite words" are very important to Mexican political maneuvering, this public display of a lack of self-interest or blatantly suggestive role-creating may have been a strategic and politically tactful move. As noted before, collective mobility projects can often produce individually directed benefits to certain members, and with Lazo's proximity to the president and party leadership, it would seem almost unnecessary at this stage to publicly and more blatantly pander for the creation of a government role that only he and a couple of individuals would have been qualified for. For more on the act of "ritualistic deposition" in anti-corruption rhetoric, see: Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetoric of Political Corruption," in Political Corruption: A Handbook, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 175-180. For the individually directed benefits within a collective mobility project, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 67.

"Appoint and revoke the Secretaries of their dispatch" when these interfered with the integral national *plan* and unitary executive *politic* and *policy*. With the proposal that decisions regarding who could keep their jobs could be potentially subject to the influence the "moral," "scientific," and "technical" counsel of the technical secretariat, it was clear that adoption of this critical component of the government program spelt an existential threat to many of Mexico's stable networks of power.<sup>226</sup> And yet for Lazo, failure to adopt this spelt even greater existential threat; given the ordeal that he experienced at *Bienes Nacionales*, it was the only feasible solution to combat the corruption that prevented the making of the national plan a new reality. It was the necessary first step to restoring a vote of confidence in the State, the leadership, and the discipline of planning.

Excelsior had a wide readership. These articles - saturated with striking graphics, development-oriented and nationalist rhetoric, and appeals to reason – could be seen as critical expositions of the architect's power of persuasion and communication, key to establishing himself as a politically indispensable mouthpiece. Likewise, Lazo's Programa could be judged not only in its success of advocating for a political-economic futurity, but also in articulating public opinion towards an impending political reality. Within a year of these articles being published, the executive branch grew in its importance with the Mexican president being granted extensive regulatory powers in matters of foreign and domestic commerce with reforms to Articles 49 and 131 of the Constitution.<sup>227</sup> The meaningful political assessment of Lazo and his Programa would have been made by Mexico's highest levels of leadership: Lazo mailed copies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> "Promulga y aplica las leyes que avalan el Programa de Gobierno. Nombra y revoca los Secretarios de Despacho." Carlos Lazo, "Programa de Gobierno: V. Proposiciones para México, C. Organización del Ejecutivo," Excelsior (Date unknown, 1950). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> Jeffrey Weldon, "The Political Sources of *Presidencialismo* in Mexico" in *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 240.

of his articles to a number of fellow technocrats, established politicians, and former presidents such as Manuel Ávila Camacho.<sup>228</sup> At the same time that he was publishing and distributing these articles, he continued to maintain an active and cordial correspondence with Lázaro Cárdenas.<sup>229</sup> It is therefore likely that Lazo's relatively wide reaching and politically influential self-publicity and *futurismo* - a form of claim making in the pursuit of collective professional mobility, jurisdictional expansion, and personal political gain - aided in demonstrating to the established political class that *técnicos*, and especially *arquitectos planificadores* (planner-architects) such as himself were capable of theorizing the systems of rational political administration.<sup>230</sup> All that was lacking in terms of political qualification was a chance of putting theory into practice.

Strategic word use was critical to architectural professionals in arguing their central role in governance and their belonging to political society. In addition, pre-existing connections to political figures and powerful families were certainly of utmost importance in getting these arguments heard by the right people. But in the construction-frenzied late 1940s and 1950s, another important component of solidifying a more enduring relationship with those in power

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> In addition to being sent to former Mexican presidents, letters were sent to Alfredo Becerril Colín, civil engineer and former official of the Comisión Nacional de Irigación and the Comisión Nacional de Caminos; the engineer Carlos Ramírez Ulloa, founder of the Comisión Federal de Electricidad and director of the construction company Constructora el Aguila S.A.; and Alfredo del Mazo, governor of the Estado de México. See Letter from Lazo to Alfredo Becerril Colin, April 27, 1950; Letter from Lazo to Alfredo del Mazo, April 27, 1950; Letter from Lazo to Ing. Carlos Ramirez Ulloa, April 28, 1950; Letter from Lazo to Manuel Avila Camacho, April 28, 1950. <sup>229</sup> April 28, 1950; Letter from Lazo to Lázaro Cardenas June 8, 1950. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 3, Exp 74. <sup>230</sup> On claim making and professional jurisdictions, refer to Andrew Delano Abbott, *The System of Professions: An* Essay on the Division of Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 86-113. "Collective mobility projects" are intended to increase the status and prestige of a group of professionals through the expanded definition of their work and body of knowledge. The collective growth of professional prestige within the project can often be distributed towards individual benefits for particular members within the profession, however. I will add that this calls into question the role that such projects play in contributing to the already advantageous circumstances of elites within the profession as well as how much they benefit from the already established power of certain individual elite professionals. Likewise, it is important to question the sincerity of efforts by these elites to promote the more common professional welfare in contrast to the very real possibilities that individual or selective accumulation of power in the so-called "collective mobility project" instead contributes to intra-professional stratification. For more on the collective mobility project, see Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 66-79.

and even establishing membership in political society was attained through the political cachet of making and capitalizing off of real physical interventions in the built environment, the "edifice complex" as it has been described in other developmental arenas. In the second-quarter of the 20th century, real-estate construction and private development was a key source of self-enrichment both for the urban land-owning classes as well as an entrepreneurial class of architects in Mexico City. Lazo's planning theories were more abstract than physical, critical of corruption in its broadest sense and yet dealing only minimally with private capitalistic urban development. Their political capital rested on their capacity as a possibly useful re-imagining of bureaucratic managerial authority acting in concert with presidential power, an imaginary that usefully fed into the renovatory politics of the restructured PRI and the coalescing developmentalist ambitions of an increasingly interventionist State. Lazo was given the opportunity to transform these abstract proposals of planning and management into something more concrete in his subsequent involvement with what would become Mexico's most iconic architectural assemblage to emerge from this polity.

Towards the last two years of his presidency, President Alemán was concerned with the fact that construction of the new *Ciudad Universitaria* (CU) of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)—a project designed and led by the architects Mario Pani (1911-1993) and Enrique del Moral (1905-1987)—had stalled. He decided to push the CU to completion, a decision no doubt reflective of a desire for an additional legacy project that would soften criticisms of his socio-economic policies as well as deflect any accusations that corruption under his rule had impeded the material progress of the nation. He placed Carlos Novoa, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> The growing role of Latin American architects after the mid-1920s as private entrepreneurs allied with industrialists and investment capitalists in areas ranging from building materials to real estate development is briefly touched upon in Rafael López Rangel, *La Modernidad, Arquitectónica Mexicana: antecendentes y vanguardias, 1900-1940* (Azcapotzalco, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1989). 57-58.

Director-General of the Bank of Mexico, in charge of the university's construction. In April of 1950 - while Lazo was in the process of mailing copies of his *Programa de Gobierno* to high ranking members of the PRI, Novoa officially hired the architect-planner to be the *Gerente General*, or general manager, of the design and building of the new campus in April of 1950...with the expectations that it be completed in just under two years.<sup>232</sup> (Fig. 3.15-18)

## III. "Unity and Renovation": Professional Polemic, Political Rhetoric, and Co-option

Many of the challenges in completing the UNAM more quickly resided within the inner politics of the Mexican architectural profession. Not long after his appointment as general manager of the CU, Lazo's initiatives became a lightning rod for a major professional dispute that in many ways epitomized the generational conflicts indicative of the transition from military/revolutionary rule to civilian/professional leadership, the ideological battles that colored the contested adoption of developmentalist polices, and the slanderous denouncements that came with the fights for primacy amongst competing factions of elites within the new dispensation. The broad polemic grew to involve a multitude of related political and professional issues. These included resolving the still-present tensions that stemmed from the reorganization of the country's professional societies according to the rules set forth by the *Ley de Profesiones* of 1945, the managerial restructuring and creative changes imposed by Lazo on the architects of the CU during the rapid push for its completion, the questioning of Lazo's political and ideological

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> For more on Lazo's role in the construction of the Ciudad Universitaria of the UNAM and use of the construction and "completion" of this project as political propaganda for the Alemán administration, see: Pérez-Méndez, "Conceptualization of the Settlement of El Pedregal..."

motivations, and the apparent personal resentments amongst some of Lazo's fellow professionals that stemmed from his sudden appointment.<sup>233</sup>

Prior to the Ley de Profesiones the architectural profession in Mexico was largely organized, regulated, and promoted by the Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos, or SAM. As noted before, this society's origins began in 1905 with Lazo's father, Carlos Maria Lazo del Pino, as one of its founders and first president.<sup>234</sup> The new laws ordered all established professions to set up new *Colegios* as professional interfaces with the State. This prompted the creation of a competing professional society known as the Colegio de Arquitectos de México, or CAM. <sup>235</sup> The new Colegio was headed by Federico Mariscal (1881-1971), Mario Pani and others. Within the next few years, however, various conflicts arose regarding access to architectural commissions, state patronage, and the organization of the impending 8th Pan-American Congress of Architects (VIII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos). It was quite apparent that a professional rift had formed and that the two professional societies were in conflict. Further

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> The Ley de Profesiones of 1945, promulgated in the last year of the Ávila Camacho administration, sought to better regulate the exercise of professions, define their duties to the nation, and establish collegial organizations that served as an official interface with the state both as platforms of advocacy for their interests and – in the view of the law's critics - as apparatuses of government control. The president of the SAM at the time of the creation of the CAM was the architect Carlos Obregón Santacilia (1896-1961), author of Mexico City's Monumento de la Revolución, nephew of former president Álvaro Obregón, and a significant mentor to the younger Lazo. See: "Ley Reglamentaria de los Artículos 40 y 50 Constitucionales, Relativos al Ejercicio de las Profesiones en El Distrito y Territorios Federales," Diario Oficial de la Nación, May 26, 1945. A questionnaire regarding the law directed towards architects, and two architects' opinions on the law authored respectively by Carlos Obregón Santacilia, president of the Sociedad de Arquitectos Méxicanos, and Mauricio Gómez Mayorga were published along with the full text of the law in Arquitectura y lo demás 3 (July 1945). Mario Pani gave an oral history in the mid-1980s regarding his involvement in designing the CU. In one of the tapes, he speaks candidly about his personal resentments towards Carlos Lazo because of his sudden promotion to head the construction of the CU. Pani speaks somewhat disparagingly about Lazo's talents as an architect, criticizes his political-managerial inclinations as quasifascistic, and yet praises Lazo for being a "líder." The tapes have, as of this writing, not been digitized. They can be found in the archives of the Facultad de Arquitectura at the UNAM. See: Entrevistas a Mario Pani por Francisco Treviño, Fondo: Academia Nacional de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Facultad de Arquitectura, UNAM . Audio Etiqueta: Ciudad Universitaria. 1984-1987. Entrevistas MP/FT. ANA-AAM/FA/UNAM Audio CU

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Boletín Mensual de la Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos y el Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos de México, No. 1

<sup>(1959): 3.</sup> Archivo Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.

<sup>235</sup> Boletín Mensual de la Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos y el Colegio Nacional de Arquitectos de México, No. 1 (1959): 29. Archivo Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.

complexity arose with the formation of the *Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación* (Movement for Unity and Renovation). The movement's new leadership consisted of the architects Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Raúl Cacho, Augusto H. Alvarez, Juan O'Gorman, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Santiago Greenham, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, and Jorge L. Medellín. <sup>236</sup> The group issued a manifesto, (fig 3.19) which promised the membership of the SAM that under a new leadership, the professional society would be able to orchestrate a "practical plan of action" imbued with "national sentiment" and "professional consciousness" that would enable the profession to achieve a number of collective goals including "the inclusion of [their] concrete proposals into future constructive Government Programs that were to be realized within the country." <sup>237</sup> In addition, it also promised that with this newly reformed professional society all "future national projects of great inspiration, such as the *Ciudad Universitaria*, would be not be representative of the work of just one group, but of the whole profession"

These promises in the Manifesto shared much of the same anti-corruption language present in the political criticisms written during the same period by Lazo. Much in the same way that the self-enrichment of Mexico's political leadership had been characterized as the primary obstacle to socio-economic development, the manifesto took aim at a perceived decadence within the architectural profession. It claimed that this decadence prevented the activity and well-being of all its members as well as the completion of the nation's most important physical

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup>"A Los Miembros de La Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos: Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación, Noviembre de 1950." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> "a) Lograr que las proposiciones concretas del Gremio puedan inscribirse como una parte de los futuros Programas constructivos de Gobierno para realizar el país; b) Lograr la máxima representación del Gremio en los puestos de coordinación y regencia que está brindando ya el vasto panorama de México en todos los ordenes." Ibid. <sup>238</sup> "c) Lograr que obras nacionales de gran aliento, como la Ciudad Universitaria, sean tarea y representación no de un grupo sino de todo el Gremio, luchando para que tenga la máxima resonancia, tanto en lo individual y colectivo como en lo nacional e internacional." Ibid.

infrastructures.<sup>239</sup> The press gave significant coverage to the polemic, connecting Lazo's claim to the presidency of the SAM and his anti-corruption rhetoric to the monopolization of posts in Mexico City's planning office (an allusion to how it had become a bastion for Carlos Contreras and his close associates). The professional-politics motivated dialogue on corruption additionally brought back into the spot-light Mario Pani's supposed "theft" of two hotel commissions belonging to the architect Carlos Obregon Santacilia via the influence of his uncle, the engineer Alberto J. Pani, while he was the Minister of Finance.<sup>240</sup> The revival of the this controversy, which had happened back in the 1930s, reminded the public that many of the nation's most important architects had utilized political, familial, and financial ties to climb the professional ladder.

There was of course some irony here: Lazo had equal if not greater access to power given his belonging to Alemán's inner circle and the honored position that his father held in the SAM as well as at the UNAM. However, during his professional and political ascendency he had allied himself with a number of architects who either identified as *técnicos*, had affinities with the ideological extremes of the Mexican political spectrum, or otherwise belonged to non-

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http://www.uam.mx/difusion/casadeltiempo/47 iv sep 2011/casa del tiempo eIV num 47 52 55.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Ibid. Note: the Manifesto's author remained anonymous, and it is highly likely that the document was the product of collaborative authorship. There is a consonance in its writing style with that of the movement's leader, Carlos Lazo. However, it has been recently suggested by Elisa Drago Quaglia, an historian and archivist at the *Archivo de los Arquitectos Mexicanos* of the *Facultad de Arquitectura* of the UNAM that the text may be partly the work of Mauricio Gómez Mayorga who had significant experience in authoring anonymous and provocative texts in the magazine *Arquitectura y lo Demás*. He played an official role in professional advocacy, serving a secretarial role in the Colegio de Arquitectos following its formation in 1946 and in the Sociedad de Arquitectos following the success of the Movimiento in 1950.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> "Carlos Lazo: Candidato a Presidente," *Excelsior*, November 26, 1950. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145; "Legalidad y Unidad al Elegir la Planilla del Movimiento Unitario," *Excélsior* or *Últimas Noticias* (?), December 17, 1950. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145. Note: Newspaper references are generally collected from clippings that Lazo collected. In this case, the paper name was missing, but it was likely published in either of these newspapers which were published by the same entity (*Últimas Noticias* was the late-afternoon/evening edition of *Excélsior*); Unsigned essay regarding the incident between Pani and Obregón Santacilia and corruption within the architectural profession in Mexico, ca. 1950, AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145. For a more recent narrative of the episode between Pani and Obregón Santacilia see Jorge Vázquez Ángeles, "Historias Folletinescas," *Casa del Tiempo* 47 (Sept 2011): 52-55.

dominant groups and were thus subject to a degree of professional as well as political exclusion. In this light, we can read the manifesto of the *movimiento* and its call for "the maximum representation of the profession in coordinative and managerial posts" as a means of professional integration intended at bringing disparate groups of architects together in order to disrupt established professional cliques, entrenched social and political networks, highly guarded relationships of patronage, and the monopolization of architectural work. <sup>241</sup>

With questionable campaign tactics and a rushed election the *Colegio de Arquitectos* was merged with the *Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos* under Lazo's leadership.<sup>242</sup> Unsurprisingly, the professional coup was met with fierce opposition that included a classic Cold-War era attack with red-baiting that made front page news in *Últimas Noticias*, the afternoon edition of *Excélsior*.<sup>243</sup> (fig. 3.20) Responding to the personal political smear, Lazo promptly issued a statement to the press defending his reputation and the integrity and nationalist credentials of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación, "A los Miembros de la Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos," manifesto and petition delivered on November 14, 1950. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> The president of the SAM at the time was Guillermo Zárraga, one-time proponent of neocolonial architecture-turned early modernist as well as an author of Science Fiction novels. His ouster didn't appear personally directed, so we may therefore regard him as collateral damage in this professional coup. The manifesto proposed the formation of a new directorship including the architects Raúl Cacho, Augusto H. Alvarez, Juan O'Gorman, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Santiago Greenham, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, Jorge L. Medellín, and led by Carlos Lazo Barreiro. Invitations were extended to older members of the SAM such as José Villagrán García, Carlos Obregón Santacilia, Carlos M. Lazo, Federico Mariscal, Roberto Alvarez Espinosa, Carlos Contreras, and Manuel Ortiz Monasterio to form an advisory committee to the younger leadership.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> "El Comunismo Amenaza con Agrietar a los Arquitectos," *Últimas Noticias*, December 14, 1950, AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145. Note: Public denouncement with accusations of communist sympathies and Soviet alignment, were prevalent in México during the late 1940s and early 1950s within the broader discussions of political economic orientation and labor relations. As Susan Gauss notes in her book on the rise of Mexican industrialism, these arguments often pitted regional interests against more Mexico City centric, large or foreign industrial interests against smaller industry, and anti-labor against pro-labor alliance interests. While the arguments descend into the *reductio ad absurdem* of capitalism vs. communism, in reality the debate was between opposing economic nationalisms were one favored increased free trade and less regulation while the other leaned toward national industrial protectionism and a modicum of planning or economic structuralism. Gauss, 190-191. Mention of Carlos Contreras as being a primary denouncer of the *Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación* and its leadership appears in a letter by the architect Raúl Cacho. Federico Mariscal was a leader in the opposition to this movement. See Letter from Raúl Cacho to Sr. Cantú, December 11, 1950. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145.

Movimiento. 244 Given the ongoing purges of leftist ideologues at this time, the public scandal that subsequently erupted prompted an inquiry from the President's office. Given Lazo's apparent good rapport with the president and his private secretary Rogerio de la Selva, the latter offered to intervene.<sup>245</sup> Lazo refused, noting that such partisanship would cost him his legitimacy in the eyes of many of his fellow architects. In the end, Lazo's assertions to professional leadership prevailed. They were ostensibly legitimized by a more monitored election, a detente in the professional debate regarding the identification of architecture with technicism and engineering as opposed to the more conservative fine arts, and a public burying of the hatchet between Lazo and Federico Mariscal, one of the primary denouncers. (fig. 3.21-23) An architectural manifestation of this professional pact was erected: the Casa del Arquitecto Mexicano was established in a house renovated by Lazo on Avenida Veracruz, no. 24 in the Colonia Roma Norte of Mexico City. (Fig. 24 and Fig. 25) With a member of the PRI now installed as the head of a unified professional organizational society, Lazo's loyal supporters and others who at least signed on in support of the idea of professional renovation and inclusion, gained further access to critical State architectural projects and a role in its social, political, and economic planning.<sup>246</sup>

## IV. Manifestos and Programs: Linguistic Multivalency, Syncretic Politics and Catholic Humanism

While this polemical episode reveals the use of smear tactics as a means of impeding political and professional gain, it also reflects the language games that were critical to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> "Los Arquitectos Repudian a los Rojos y se Agrupen," *Últimas Noticias* (?). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> Letter from Carlos Lazo to Rogerio De la Selva, November 30, 1950. AGN, Archivo Miguel Alemán Valdés. Caja 1040, Exp 630/12306.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> "Arquitectos e Ingenieros Dieron fin al Pleito que Durante Muchos Años los Tuvo Separados," *Excélsior*, January 26, 1951. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Sección 2, Caja 1, Reg. 9.

integrative political and professional strategies during this period. In doing so, it also sheds light on the fragile, ambivalent, or vulnerable ideological moorings that a great deal of modernist architectural thought - especially in regards to large scale planning - often fell into during the first half of the twentieth century. The language of the movimiento's manifesto utilized a technical and aesthetic terminology that was very particular to the theories of arquitectura técnica (functional, rational design and managerial, collaborative practice of architecture), planificación integral (coordinated, multi-disciplinary regional planning with greater powers of execution) and integración plástica (the integration of rational modern architecture with murals, mosaic, sculpture, and other plastic arts - best represented in the architecture of the CU). As mentioned previously, these theories were derived from and developed into ideologically charged concepts, noteworthy in their criticism of individualism in architectural practice as well as in an unregulated national political economy. These were concepts that advocated for a dialectic, coordination, and interdependent systematization. Yet amongst some architects and professional allies to Lazo during this campaign, these concepts also held ideological connotations that favored of collectivization, socialism, and to an extent even communism.<sup>247</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> Towards the end of the 1930s, the term "planificación" became increasingly synonymous with socialism and at times with communism. See footnote in in Gerardo G. Sánchez, "El contexto que rodeo a las propuestas de planificación del arquitecto Carlos Contreras," in Planificación y Urbanismo visionarios de Carlos Contreras: escritas de 1925 a 1938, edited by Gerardo G. Sánchez (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 21. In light of the adoption of the term "planificación" by economists and sociologists to describe socialist state policies, it is important to note the introduction of concepts of social justice and morality to the Mexican architectural discourse by the late 1930s. The formation of the *Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas*, led by Alberto T. Arai, Raúl Cacho, Enrique Guerrero, and Balbino Hernández and their proclamation of a "Socialist Doctrine of Architecture" at the 16<sup>th</sup> congress of the International Federation for Housing and Planning in Mexico City in 1938, as well as the appearance of Hannes Meyer in Mexico with his preoccupations with the formation of the architect and architecture's role in public morality appear to have significantly shaped the direction that these concepts took during the period. See Union Socialista de Arquitectos, "Doctrina Socialista de Arquitectura" in Ideario de los arquitectos mexicanos, edited by Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 227-228; and Hannes Meyer, "La Formación del Arquitecto" in Ideario de los arquitectos mexicanos, edited by Ramón Vargas Salguero and J. Victor Arias Montes (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, 2011), 3: 249.

Clearly, the language and concepts that supported the argument of the manifesto were at once its strength and a source of its vulnerability

The manifesto was an argument marked by terminological and conceptual multivalency, capable not only of unifying, but also bringing conflicts to the surface. While stressing unity amongst a particular social formation has long had currency in the politics of the left, this was also the case of the centrist consolidating politics and mediating/obfuscating play on semantics critical to the rhetorical devices of the newly organized PRI. While the movement was concerned with disrupting pre-existing professional and political relationships and hegemonies of control, the text of the manifesto, if understood as a piece of political rhetoric inspired by or written by Lazo, a low ranking PRIista, was nevertheless aimed at creating a sense that it was building a unified coalition under a message of reform that was intentionally ambiguous in terms of its ideological leanings.<sup>248</sup> This ambiguity in the technical and aesthetic vocabulary of this message served the purposes of political aggregation, co-option, and the neutralization of opposition that was sought out by certain politically inclined members of the architectural profession as well as by the dominant Party that was in charge of the State.

This polemic additionally demonstrated the awkward complexity of the PRI's practice of political co-option during this period and the nuanced ideologies of those it sought to integrate. As the political power of the PRI further consolidated towards the end of the 1940s and the early 50s, it incorporated what elements outside of its centrist position that it could, while outlawing, smearing, and exiling whatever it couldn't – liquidation, in the ostensible turn from violence, had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> The rebrandable quality of words is discussed by Friedrich Nietzsche in "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense" in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The birth of tragedy and other writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 145; For more on the temporal nature of language and the ideological multivalency of words, see J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), 19.

become increasingly rare.<sup>249</sup> This strategy revealed clear tensions between the political and intellectual worlds. Much of the latter was shaped by a wealth of Leftist thought that was both autochthonous to Mexico – folded into many of the struggles of the Revolution – as well as imported – especially from Europe in the wake of the Russian Revolution, the collapse of the Second Spanish Republic, and the onset of the Second World War. Fueling the claims against the *Movimiento* was Lazo's close friendships with numerous artists, architects, and other intellectuals belonging to the political left, his frequent and publicized dialogue with Cárdenas, his employment as a planning professor at the *Instituto Politécnico Nacional*, or IPN – where one article accused him of heading an underground communist cell – as well as his inclusion of bibliographical sources of Soviet strategies of centralized planning and state-organization theory in his earlier writings on *planificación* and the *Programa de Gobierno*.<sup>250</sup>

As an architect, Lazo's wide range of social connections to various leftist intellectuals and institutions would have made him seem ideologically suspect and therefore politically

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> Sizeable opposition had formed, and was critical of the deemphasizing of previous social objectives and an economic liberal embrace of private capital and foreign investment. These merged with calls for a more virtuous leadership, and helped form part of the platform of the military-leftist Henriquista movement (which to an extent represented the twilight of serious Cardenista-style political contenders). Similar political criticism was echoed though interpreted towards different ends in the moralizing and anti-liberal campaigns of the PAN. These voices representing the left and the right were measuredly integrated into official political discourse. Voices that were deemed too extremist by the PRI-dominated government were silenced, as noted by the banning of the *Partido Comunista Mexicana* (PCM) and the *Partido Fuerza Popular* – the electoral arm of the extreme Catholic and fascist-leaning *Union Nacional Sinarquista* (or UNS) – in 1949. In a calculated move that internalized the platforms of the PRI's political opposition during the 1952 elections, promises of administrative moralization and honesty, slogans of "austerity and work," and tongue-in-cheek assurances that "everybody could fit" in the Revolutionary Homeland became powerful tools to aggregate support for the PRI's presidential candidate, former ex-governor of Veracruz and current Secretary of the Interior Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. Aaron W. Navarro, *Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico*, *1938-1954* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 226-228.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> For Lazo's positive mention of Soviet Planning See Lazo, "La Planificación y la Política," 37-38. Regarding his employment at the IPN and the accusation that he was creating a communist cell there, refer to "El Comunismo Amenaza con Agrietar a los Arquitectos." Note: The IPN was a technical school founded during the Cárdenas administration and between 1939-1941 had the second director of the Bauhaus, Hannes Meyer, as the head of its planning school. Contemporary references to the school in regards to its ideological orientation seem to imply that the school retained a degree of leftist affiliation despite the general political turn towards the center-right during the administrations of Ávila Camacho and Alemán.

unviable for the center-right direction of the newly organized PRI. However, alienating many of the great minds of the art and architectural worlds would have done Lazo a great disservice. Any serious attempt at successful professional renovation as well as launching a new national-integral project for the integration of art and architecture would have necessitated maintaining all of his intellectual alliances. Lazo therefore performed a strategic act of ideological balancing. This was most clearly evident in his *Programa de Gobierno* as far back as its earliest iterations. Lazo made positive assessments of both the Soviet *Gosplan* and New Deal planning bodies such as the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States. He likewise listed the works of various leaders of the interwar years in the *Programa's* bibliography: Stalin, Lenin, León Trotsky, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, and Manuel Azaña were all included as essential reading. While including this broad cast that included immensely (and some, terrifyingly) powerful leaders of the previous decade he was careful to condemn what he considered totalitarian as well as laissez-faire or liberal capitalist regimes and ideologies.<sup>251</sup>

Was Lazo, then, a mere politically-motivated ideological opportunist? A man who wanted to have all bases within the spectrum of authoritarian governance covered? While he was certainly becoming adept at incorporative political strategies, Lazo was a man with real convictions that reflected the existence of a more mystical and religious-tinged developmentalist block that was a major player amongst the wide range of Post-War political-economic projects in the developing world. Lazo, for the majority of his career as a planning advocate, was suggesting some sort of an ideological or political balance in this new discipline and its relationship to an empowered apparatus of execution, he was equally ready to warn of the danger of a condition of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Carlos Lazo, "Programa de Gobierno: IV. Proposiciones Mundiales, D. La Planificación como Medio." Excelsior (Date unknown, 1950). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 8, Exp 82.

ideological and geopolitical bipolarity. We can discern in the introduction of both the *Programa* of 1950 as well its book form published in 1952 an emphasis on what he considered the greater existential crisis underlying more than just Mexico's own political problems. Utilizing imagery reflective of the divisiveness of the Cold War, he emphasized a global "disequilibrium" between extremes: technological advances v. "social security"; materialism v. spiritualism; capitalism v. totalitarianism; as well as the individual v. a collectivity. <sup>252</sup> (fig. 3.26) For Lazo, this condition could only lead toward global entropy – which he saw clearly in the threat of mutual atomic annihilation. (fig. 3.27) This threat reinforced his argument for a new techno-messianic leadership, but also a type of "third-way" that was a common geopolitical strategy for many developing countries during the Cold-War. What becomes clear in his argument therein is the need for a leadership led by the ethos of Catholic scientific-humanism. <sup>253</sup> (fig. 3.28)

Modern Catholic humanism, for Lazo, was an integrative, but more importantly, an integralist ethos that recognized humanity's existence and purpose in relation to the will of the Christian God. Both spiritually and politically, it provided for him the "point of suture" and "equilibrium," the "constructive and vital synthesis," as well as the Aristotelian "golden mean" necessary for a socially oriented politic of *planificación integral*. <sup>254</sup> This call for an ostensibly practical political equilibrium through an empowered executive and technocratic, pseudocorporatist State in which God was immanent strongly certainly echoed the politics of Integralism - a body of concepts advocating a fully integrated social and political order guided by Catholic doctrine, in particular by papal encyclicals such as *Rerum Novarum* (1891) *and* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> See Chapter One, "Antecedentes," in Carlos Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno* (México, D.F: Editorial Espacios, 1952).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> The influence of Catholic thought on Lazo's planning is discussed by Yolanda Bravo Saldaña in her Master's thesis. See Chapter Three, "Carlos Lazo: Pensamiento y Religión" in "El Arq. Carlos Lazo y su labor dentro de la construcción de la Ciudad Universitaria: Una nueva lectura" (Master's Thesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2000), 103-157

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> "Antecedentes," in Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno*.

Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Integralism inspired conservative to far-right political movements around the world at the tail end of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth-century. It was a central ethos to various Spanish *integrista* political parties, where its anti-liberal and organicist interpretations of social organization attracted the support of varied groups within the very regionally defined nation, most notably amongst the Basque. Integralism additionally contributed to the formation of *Action française*, in France, as well *Ação Integralista Brasileira*, in Brazil. Finally, it was a vein of thought present in the founding doctrine of the *Partido Acción Nacional*, or PAN, a relatively recent political challenge to the dominant party.

Lazo's definition of integralism had evolved, however, since his early days of involvement in *Acción Católica* while still an undergraduate in Architecture. His Catholicism cites the telefinality described by French theistic biophysicist Pierre Lecomte du Noüy (1883-1947) in the terms of human history as a biological evolution that continued onto a spiritual and moral plane. This created a perspective that attempted to reconcile Catholic social teaching, classical humanist philosophy, and modern scientific thought to produce a developmentalist ethos that was at once teleological (reinforcing of there being design and purpose in the material world), as well as evolutionary (where the spiritual in addition to the material and physical would move towards an ever more perfect form).<sup>255</sup> The core of this vision paralleled a broader postwar architectural embrace of the biological, mystical, and spiritually symbolic. In this light, Lazo's outlook shares some commonalities with Constantinos Doxiadis's hierarchical and evolutionary theory of ekistics or Le Corbusier's highly symbolic, humanistic, and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>255</sup> There are clear correlations between this Catholic-humanist developmentalist vision and earlier Darwinian biological and evolutionary thought. See: Gustavo Esteva, "Development" in *The Development Dictionary*, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London & New York: Zed Books, 2009), 4.

communitarian designs visible in post war projects such as the Unité d'habitation in Marseille or the urbanism of Chandigarh.<sup>256</sup>

Lazo's embrace of theology, additionally pointed toward an internal Mexican debate that sought to address the political-religious schisms that had existed in the country since the Revolution, and of course the persistent debate regarding the nature of government corruption and the morality of public servants. One of the root causes of social crisis in Mexico, he argued, was its abandonment of the principles of Catholicism in the immediate years following the conflict. He therefore called upon future Mexican governments to "search, in a practical manner, for the Christian realization of society based upon the technics of *planificación*." This "practical manner" of Christian realization echoed his earlier call to fill government planning posts with *técnicos* and architects of high moral standing. However, Lazo went further in is proposals for a greater turn over in the state bureaucracy with its suggestion that all fields of activity in this moral state be realized by people of a "Christian sentiment of social service." The source of many of these new planners and state functionaries would have been none other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> The influence of this vein of theistic, evolutionary, and universalist thought on Le Corbusier during the Post-War period can be better understood through his readings of the work of the French Jesuit priest and paleontologist Père Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955). See Flora Samuel, "Le Corbusier, Teilhard de Chardin, and the 'Planetisation of Mankind'," *The Journal of Architecture* 4, no. 2, (Summer 1999): 149-165. The notion of a new urbanization as a form of salvation can be found in Doxiadis's writings on Ekistics, and is present in his essay "A City for human development" (1968). He makes mention of Teilhard de Chardin in this work, and this essay is contextualized within the history of Doxiadis's role in developmental planning in Pakistan. See Markus Daeschel, *Islamabad and the Politics of International Development in Pakistan* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 45. Note: While I mention the role of Pierre Lecomte du Noüy in Lazo's formulation of his "Programa de Gobierno" - the author's book *Human Destiny* is cited in a bibliography published in the *Excelsior* series in 1950 - it has been stated in Bravo Saldaña's thesis as well as in an interview that I conducted in the Summer of 2016 of Lazo's youngest son, Lorenzo Lazo Margáin, that the architect also based his ideas of an evolutionary and transcendent *planificación* on the writings of Teilhard de Chardin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>257</sup> "Antecedentes," in Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Ibid. As the Catholic Church's governing role in Latin America diminished throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it sought new ways to maintain its power and influence over political manners. While the role of the Church in Mexico varies greatly from its role in other Latin American nations, the particular case of Lazo highlights that the Church in Mexico likely followed a larger regional trend where the Church sought to exert its influence by allying itself with State bureaucracies. Enrique Dussel, "The Catholic church in Latin America since 1930" in *Latin America since 1930: Economy, Society and Politics*, Part 2: *Politics and Society*, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 547.

than a renovated UNAM, and new institution capable of producing highly qualified planners and managers. At the same time that Lazo was making this call, he was utilizing his position as the Gerente General of the construction of the Ciudad Universitaria to both propose a new Ley Orgánica that would have reorganized or reformed many of the existing departments and career tracks, as well as advocate the founding of an *Instituto de Planificación* for the UNAM.<sup>259</sup> If created, he proposed, this institution was to be in charge of coordinating the studies of all the universities departments and likewise would create a new track:

"planificación would be the final profession for the undergraduate university student, the coordinating synthesis of everything else; the ultimate discipline and ultimate synthesis and integration of all studies. This profession could have a doctorate that would be the highest degree given by the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México."260

The intended role that a modern, developmentalist Catholic-Humanist ethos would have played in this institution was not hard to discern. A telling indication of the imagined role that the *Instituto* would play in the construction of a Mexican Techno-Catholic future was its hierarchal schematic organized around a stylized framework suggestive both of a Christian centrality and Catholic integrality. (fig. 3.29-31)

Lazo's Catholic-Humanism and Integralism may suggest that while he was capable of supporting the professional and political inclusion of architects from the ideological left, he was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> The concept of a Ley Orgánica is somewhat difficult to translate into American or English speaking legal terms.

It is a substantive, foundational, and key organizational document. In this sense, it parallels a Constitution, or Charter. The approval of a Ley Orgánica for the UNAM was a process of negotiation. The organizational structure was ultimately worked out by the University's internal structures of governance, but approval was a formal process that included the Mexican Congress and the presidency. For Lazo's full proposals for academic reform and the rewriting of the UNAM's Lev Orgánica, see Carlos Lazo, "Lineamientos para la redacción de una nueva Lev Orgánica de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México," and "Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México," in Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad de México (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1983), 72-136, 141-163.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Carlos Lazo, "Instituto de Planificación de la Universidad Autónoma de México: Proyecto de Creación," in Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad de México (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1983), 222.

serving to advocate for a broader political-administrative restructuring and an alternative development equally aligned to the corporatist political economy and doctrine of social justice of the Catholic right. And yet, even when clearly expressing his own faith and integralist/unitarian convictions, he managed to keep a tone of inclusivity and integration in his rhetoric – at least for the first two years of the new decade – which was key to maintaining the cooperation of those whom he sought to bring into coalition. By late 1950, Lazo wasn't overtly subscribing to any one ideology or system of beliefs, though he was for sure a professional and public intellectual with many deep seated convictions. Taking these convictions together, even with their occasional contradictions, we can argue that Lazo was an avowed statist, proponent of greater executive authority, a scientific pragmatist, and an ideological syncretist that attempted to balance the two global ideological extremes and their manifestations in Mexico at the time. These attributes, combined with his passionate, palingenetic nationalism, and integral regionalism, and catholic-humanistic as well as proto-global developmentalist worldview make Lazo the author of an alternative *Mexicanidad* – an idea, conviction, and set of claims that gave him real political power and influenced political decision-making and economic thought during the first years of the so-called post-revolutionary period. Inspiring and controversial as they may have been, Lazo's project was ultimately not the developmentalist path chosen by Mexico's leadership and more powerful mandarins.

There is no doubt that Lazo meant for these lofty objectives to be read by people of considerable power. A very fine leather bound presentation copy of a *Programa de Gobierno* dating from between 1948 and 1950 was clearly prepared for people of import. (**fig. 3.32**) A professional portfolio-like compilation of materials from his *Programa de Gobierno* was also published in very small numbers by *Editorial Espacios* and distributed in 1952 – an election

year.<sup>261</sup> His political vision was also strategically mounted in an exhibition that was one of several large scale presentations and ceremonies of the *VIII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos* which was held at the nearly complete *Ciudad Universitaria* in the final months of the Alemán presidency.<sup>262</sup> (fig. 3.33-3.35) His inclusion in the cabinet of President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines as the head of the SCOP should therefore not come as a surprise, aside from the fact that he was the first architect to hold this post traditionally reserved for either Engineers or Generals. (fig. 3.35 and 3.36) A flood of letters and telegrams were sent to Lazo congratulating him on his appointment. Out of all of them, two stood out. One was a begrudging congratulations from Mario Pani that acknowledged Lazo's achievement for the profession.<sup>263</sup> Another was a telegram from a civil engineer by the name of Francisco Novoa. His message perhaps best summed up the public's high expectations – and possible doubts – in the relatively young man that was set to take charge of a bureaucracy synonymous with graft and inefficiency. In the short statement he wished that "God grant [Lazo] plenty of success and a good broom." <sup>264</sup>

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and Latinx Visual Culture 2, no. 1 (January 2020): 101-114.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Note: Editorial Espacios published the architecture and art journal Espacios: Revista Integral de Arquitectura v Artes Plásticas. It was directed by Guillermo Rossell de la Lama (1925-2010). By 1953, Rossell was employed by Lazo as the head of the Gerencía de Promoción (Publicity Office) of the SCOP. The editorial, now as a productive appendage to the ministry, published several lavishly illustrated *Memorias*, or year-end reports, for the SCOP. Arguably, this relationship between Lazo's political office, the SCOP, Rossell, and the Editorial, was of a highly propagandistic nature and the works produced from this relationship also qualify as a form of political futurismo that in this case was highly embellished with visuals and informational data. For more on Espacios, see: Carlos Ríos Garza, ed., Raices Digital 13, Espacios: Revista integral de arquitectura y artes plásticas, 41 números 1948-1957 (Mexico City: Facultad de Arquitectura – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011), 17-37. <sup>262</sup> Recent work by Cristobal Jácome-Moreno, correctly asserts that Carlos Lazo utilized the VIII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos as a platform both for his political ideas as well as for the Alemán administration. Lazo's Programa de Gobierno accorded perfectly with the theme of the congress: "Planificación and architecture in the social problems of America." Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, a close colleague of Lazo's, member of the Movimiento, and the subsequent president of the SAM, similarly was given space within the Congress to favorably position himself both within the profession and the political world. See Cristobal Jácome-Moreno, "Construcción y persuasion: El VIII Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos en México como plataforma política," Latin American

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> Telegram from Mario Pani to Carlos Lazo, December 1, 1952. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 2, Exp 40.
 <sup>264</sup> Telegram from Francisco Novoa to Carlos Lazo, December 3, 1952. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 4, Exp 98.

Chapter 4: Bureaucratic Integration in the Centro SCOP

## I. Institutional Renovation: Moving the SCOP

Upon his appointment, Carlos Lazo had to confront the detritus of the past few decades of corruption within the *Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas*. He had to reckon with numerous discrepancies inherited from the Alemán administration. His predecessor at the SCOP, Agustín García López, was notoriously corrupt.<sup>265</sup> According to some accounts, there existed some 80 million pesos of debt along with cases of paid-for highways that existed only in name and on the papers that requested payment for their construction.<sup>266</sup> President Adolfo Ruiz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Agustín García López, a *licensiado* and former law professor at the UNAM, was specifically targeted after the Alemán *sexenio* for his supposed mismanagement and graft. He retired from the SCOP with over 200 million pesos. He lost much of it in speculative ventures, often because the government would strategically nationalize the properties that he had invested his money into. See: Peter H. Smith, "Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime" in *Mexico since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, University Press, 1991), 347; also see Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Century Mexico*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 273-274.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> Jesús Silva Herzog, in *México visto en el Siglo XX*, ed. James W. Wilkie and Edna Monzon de Wilkie (Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Económicas, 1969), 685; Enrique Krauze, Mexico: a Biography of Power: a history of modern Mexico, 1810-1996 (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 604. Note: Archival evidence of this claim – that highways could exist only in name, on maps, in political declarations, and on receipts – appears to be confirmed by dozens of telegraphed messages and letters sent by concerned constituents to their political leaders regarding the incompletion of roads during this period. The phenomenon of imaginary or "ghost" roads was a clear matter of political and economic concern during the Ruiz Cortines administration. In one case manifold telegrams, some of which appear to have been drafted off of a template, made their way to his office as well as the infrastructure-oriented dependencies in his administration between December 1954 and February 1955 regarding the federal highway from Puerto Ceiba-Huimanguillo (also referred to as the Carretera Chontalpa) in the Mexican state of Tabasco. The majority of these pieces of correspondence note that the road was unpaved and intransitable, therefore causing loss of business and revenue at the port city and the surrounding agricultural lands. A number of these telegrams decry actions by "thieves" and "anti-patriots," implore Ruiz Cortines to not let himself be fooled like previous presidents, note that political promises dating back at least fourteen years had previously assured its construction and completion, and decry the false declarations - supposedly made by the SCOP itself - that the highway had already been completed. These telegrams support Dip. Ernesto Brown Peralta for having denounced the misinformation. The actions of the Ruiz Cortines administration and the SCOP were apparently quick. A letter from Carlos Lazo Barreiro to Enrique Rodríguez Cano, the President's secretary, dated February 10, 1955, noted that Lazo had received a phone call from Lic. Raúl Salinas, the president of the Comisión de Inversiones (Investment Commission) directing him to supply President Ruiz Cortines with graphic material demonstrating the monitoring of federal highways and the progress of constructive activities. Lazo concluded the letter noting "This documentation doesn't exhaust the topic - rather, there exists a great abundance regarding the overseeing of the progression of works in our archives." In addition, correspondence between the office of the president and General Miguel Orrico de los Llanos, the provisional governor of Tabasco on August 10, 1955 noted that funding for road repair had been secured, and on March 23, 1956 that a visit by the engineer and SCOP sub-secretary, Luis Bracamontes, took place. A large folder containing all of the materials regarding this episode can be found in AGN, Archivo Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Caja 0669, Exp 515.1/360.

Cortines, a former accountant, campaigned on public financial accountability, personal political austerity, and restoring the image of the hard-working, patriotic, honest, and intelligent civil servant.<sup>267</sup> This image was perhaps idealized, and yet it described Lazo's reckoning with impossible numbers, passion in restoring faith in government leadership, and zeal in following through on promises of building upon the expansive yet very incomplete system of public works that the regime had inherited.

In addition to receiving accounts in disarray, Lazo inherited an architectural and institutional layout that both by his and his colleagues accounts was antiquated. The original headquarters of this government dependency was known as the Palacio de Comunicaciones and is located on Calle Tacuba in the heart of the old City - an area now simply referred to as Centro. (Fig. 4.1) It was built between 1904 and 1911, in the final, technocratic-leaning years of the dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz. The stately, eclectic, renaissance-revival gray stoned edifice was designed by the Italian architect Silvio Contri (1856-1933) and decorated by members of the Coppedé family – notable artisans of Tuscan origin that had settled in Mexico during the *Porfiriato*. It was a spacious and relatively innovative construction for Mexico at that time, with four floors and four wings organized around a central courtyard, with workspaces organized so as to give some autonomy to the various sub-dependencies that were incorporated into the SCOP. (Fig. 4.2) Contemporary photographs that were published by the SCOP in the magazine *Espacios*, as well as in the SCOP's yearly *Memorias* – or institutional yearbook,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Smith, "Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime," 347; Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> The institution of the *Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* was created as a separate and independent entity during the Porfiriato in the *Ley de Secretarías de Estado* on May 13, 1891. Prior to that, its functions had existed within the *Secretaría de Fomento*. *Memorias de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas 1953-54* (Mexico City: Gerencia de Promoción de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones, 1954).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Miguel Angel Gutiérrez Vázquez, et al, "Palacio de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas," Espacio Arquitectónico en México, accessed February 5, 2021,

https://espacioarquitectonicoenmexico.wordpress.com/palacio-de-comunicaciones-y-obras-publicas/

showed that it had become incredibly crowded with employees and towers of paperwork, all contributing to a rather dark and cluttered environment. For Mexico's architectural modernists, it was the environmental antithesis of any renovatory and modernizing movement. (Figs. 4.3-5) With such constrictions of space, it was immediately deemed unsuitable to the task at hand: it could not house and adequately integrate all of the administrative, investigative, coordinative, and constructive dependencies necessary for an all-encompassing integral planning effort, and as such it could not implement an ambitious *Programa de Gobierno*.

Despite the notoriety of the past two secretarios of the SCOP, The problems of political corruption and institutional inefficiencies in the administration of public works in mid-century Mexico were understood of as a broad systemic issue not unique to a particular presidential administration or individual bureaucrat. It was perceived to be endemic within political society and at various levels of the Mexican State's administrative hierarchy. Lazo understood this as part of the undesired Mexican "reality;" in short, he thought of it as a matter of broadly-defined socio-cultural decadence brought about by various deterministic factors in the environment. In various iterations of Lazo's *Programa de Gobierno*, the problem was defined as being exacerbated by an inadequate structure of political administrative control and oversight. Lazo understood the problem with the current SCOP both as an organizational and programmatic problem as well as a task for architectural design. A direct correlation was drawn between this matter of institutional disorder and the perceived spatial inadequacies and organizational inefficiencies of the physical secretariat that housed the SCOP. Institutional corruption was understood in part as a spatially-determined phenomena. To address this, Lazo initiated a broad institutional overhaul of the SCOP that was rationalistic as much as it was symbolic; pragmatic as much as it was political.

The overhaul of the ministry reflected the impressive-sounding anti-corruption and state modernizing reforms made by the Ruiz Cortines administration in its first year as it sought to restore legitimacy as well as the President's strong commitment to Public Works and Telecommunications expressed in his own "Programa de Gobierno." 270 Lazo's objectives were manifold. They included a renewed commitment to the accountable utilization of public funds towards a political economy of "integration" and "social justice" comprised of a very broad interpretation of transportation infrastructures and telecommunication networks in light of the new and rapidly advancing technologies of these utilities (fig. 4.6); the architectural centralization of its many scattered offices throughout the Mexican nation's capital into a new "integral" headquarters (fig. 4.7-10); as well as the architectural and artistic monumentalization of a new, renovatory politic of development defined by its commitment to empowered technical expertise, rational socio-economic planning, and a hybrid nationalist-integralist and humanistintegrationalist ethos. Finally, Lazo's reformist efforts continued to aim towards expanding the SCOP's established institutional jurisdiction into the affairs of other government bodies variously occupied with the social and material development of Mexico; for the while that he was at the SCOP and the professional and political jurisdictions of planning remained indeterminate, he was the country's most vocal advocate for a structural and centralized socioeconomic planning regime at the direction of the executive branch responsible for the heavy physical infrastructures necessary for national development.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Smith, "Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime," 347. I am not completely certain that Lazo had as strong a hand in Ruiz Cortines's "Programa de Gobierno" as he did in Alemán's. Some scattered notes in Lazo's archive show that he studied the official presidential program, though to what effect remains to be ascertained. For a mass-distributed synopsis of the Ruiz Cortines administration's "Programa de Gobierno" see Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, *Por el Progreso de México: Síntesis del Programa de su Gobierno* (Mexico City: Grupo Acción Económico-Social, 1952). For a more thorough list of Ruiz Cortines's campaign promises, including his prioritization of public works, read his announcement and speech for candidacy given at the old Estadio Olímpico de la Ciudad de los Deportes, October 14, 1951. It was published by the PRI as a campaign pamphlet: Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, *Mensaje al Pueblo de México* (Mexico City: PRI, 1952).

The construction of a new Centro SCOP was – at least in Mexico City – the greatest embodiment of this process of rationalizing institutional restructuration. Between 1953 and 1954, the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* was relocated into a massive building in the then-new neighborhood of Narvarte, south of the old administrative nucleus of Mexico City.<sup>271</sup> A lengthier look of the very drawn out history of this building's construction serves, however, as an illustrative narrative of the at-times ersatz nature of modern Mexican State construction.<sup>272</sup> We can find in its completed state evidence of the adaptive and experimental

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Note: Colonia Narvarte is located to the south of the traditional political and economic center of Mexico City. It was subdivided and developed during the early 1940s. A portion of this neighborhood was occupied by the Hacienda de Narvarte and the village of La Piedad, which in turn bordered the Río de la Piedad, a notable waterway which was later enclosed in concrete and covered by the Viaducto Miguel Alemán – a major thoroughfare/freeway constructed during the administration of Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952). This modern neighborhood was filled with larger homes, as well as multi-unit residences for the new middle and upper-middle classes. It notably became home to Japanese, German, and Lebanese immigrants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> There were at least three earlier, major proposals for the reorganization and relocation of the SCOP dating back to the late 1930s. These three separate projects by Alfonso Pallares, Mario Pani, and Enrique de la Mora are significant in terms of scale, organization, and possible inspiration for the eventual Centro SCOP. Pallares, in collaboration with recently graduated architect Porfirio Alcántara, offered several proposals adjacent to and including the site of the old Palacio de Comunicaciones between 1938 and 1947. These projects were responses to an administrative program that was originally formulated by Secretary of Communications Francisco J. Múgica (1884-1954) during the Cárdenas administration (Múgica was an ideological mentor to Lázaro Cárdenas and an ardent socialist from the left of Cárdenas's political coalition). The architectural project intended to link the SCOP with the offices of a relocated Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, Departamento Forestal y de Caza y Pesca, and the newly incorporated "Petromex" (Pemex) - the entity of the newly nationalized Mexican oil industry. For an exhaustive elaboration on Alfonso Pallares's projects and thought, see Elisa Drago Quaglia, Alfonso Pallares, sembrador de ideas (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2016). For information on his project for an administrative core, see the section "Un corazón administrativo. 1938-1947," 272-289. Later projects to expand the SCOP marked a new focus to place government institutions outside of the already crowded old city center. Avenida de los Insurgentes, the principle north-south axis of Mexico City, was the focus of tremendous private real-estate development during the administration of Miguel Alemán. Along with the new upscale and middle-class neighborhoods, or colonias, that sprung up alongside it, it was seen by some as an ideal corridor upon which to place new civic and state offices. The project of de la Mora, situated at Insurgentes 300 in Colonia Roma, was a response to the need to relocate the offices for the SCOP's postal services. Delays in its completion lasted well into the next presidential administration, long after the SCOP's new headquarters were completed, and the tower would eventually be completed in 1958 as a high-end residential complex known as the Condominio Insurgentes, or Edificio de la Canada. The information on Enrique De la Mora's project was shared in a talk by Elisa Drago Quaglia at the Meeting of DOCOMOMO at the Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, UNAM, on June 7, 2018. Pani's project - unbuilt - was drafted during the same time and appears to have envisioned a much larger complex likely intended for a complete relocation and reorganization of the SCOP to be located within the same general area along Avenida de los Insurgentes. The Pani project has not been extensively published or written upon. I have only seen one image – a perspective – located in the collections of UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos. I mention it here because of the high profile of the architect who proposed it, the exceptionally large scale of the project, and the fact that Pani was a significant professional rival to Lazo.

nature of formalizing large-scale planning and administrative organization; the lofty efforts of professional mobility and jurisdictional expansion; and the shifting interpretations of managerial and institutional executive authority and their corresponding textual, visual, and formal proposals that sought to contribute to the ethos of Mexico's inchoate techno-bureaucratic and authoritarian State.

## II. An Abandoned Structure: Integrated Hospitals and the Programming of Healthcare

Lazo's placing of the new headquarters for the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* in the new Colonia Narvarte followed Mexico City's centripetal urbanization and the development towards the southerly neighborhoods belonging to the expanding upper middle classes.<sup>273</sup> Carlos Lazo had previously considered other locations, namely in the *Ciudadela* - very much in the city's center - as well as in the more southerly Parque Delta. He even considered utilizing an unoccupied structure within the expansive complex of the Centro Médico located in the Colonia Doctores which at the time was being further expanded and poised to become the nation's largest medical campus.<sup>274</sup> He eventually negotiated a large land swap

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> A lengthy and detailed report documenting the history and duties of the SCOP, the beginning of Lazo's tenure, the relocation of the ministry, and the design and construction of the Secretariat were featured in a specially devoted edition of the planning, architecture, and art journal Espacios. By 1953, this magazine was in many ways a vehicle for the promotion of the ministry's activities since one of its directors, Guillermo Rossell de la Lama, held the position of Manager of Promotion for Communications and Transportation within the coordinating branch of the newly reorganized SCOP. Likewise, the magazine's board of directors included Carlos Lazo, Raul Cacho, and Augusto Pérez Palacios - the architects responsible for the Centro SCOP in Narvarte, as well as a number of others who had recently been appointed by Lazo to posts within the planning bureaucracy. For more on the Centro SCOP, see the "Editorial," the anonymously authored introductory sections, the essay "Algunos Aspectos del Nuevo Centro de Comunicaciones" by Pérez Palacios in the section on "Urbanismo," and the essay "El Nuevo Centro de Comunicaciones y el Arquitecto Raul Cacho," by Jorge Guillermo Reynolds in the section titled "Arquitectura" in Espacios: Revista Integral de Planificación, Arquitectura y Artes Plásticas 21-22 (October-December 1954). Note: This issue's pages are unnumbered making references to the exact location of content slightly difficult. <sup>274</sup> Note: The Centro Médico complex in Colonia Doctores is the location of numerous architecturally significant medical buildings. Up until the early 1950s, the majority of its facilities had been designed by José Villagrán García. These included the National Institute of Cardiology (1937); the Children's Hospital (1938-1943); and the "Arturo Mundet" Maternity Hospital (1952). The complex expanded, taking up a massive urban block during the

prompting a sort of bureaucratic musical chairs. He offered up the SCOP's old offices to the *Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social*, or Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), *Departamento del Distrito Federal*, and *Secretaría de Gobernación*, which in turn opened up former offices belonging to *Gobernación* to the *Secretaría de Agricultura*.<sup>275</sup>

The exchange allowed for the SCOP's utilization of another unfinished medical building belonging to the IMSS and designed by Lazo's colleague, the architect Raul Cacho. The unfinished medical building that Lazo chose to house the SCOP stood on a massive block bordered by Calle Xola, Calle del Niño Perdido (part of today's Eje Central), and Avenida Universidad. It had been abandoned since the mid-1940s. Its massive reinforced concrete skeleton loomed over the Narvarte as testament to an ambitious hospital building program launched shortly after the IMSS was created in 1943.<sup>276</sup> However, it was also a testament to the problem-ridden nature – whether financial, political, or otherwise – of many of the Mexican State's modernizing and development-oriented endeavors.

The history of the programming, architectural design, and failed completion of this IMSS hospital serves as a necessary prequel, parallel, and undoubtable influence on Lazo's theories and decisions on administrative integration and institutional renovation. Likewise, this brief focus on the first life of the eventual headquarters of this arm of Mexico's planning bureaucracy serves to our better understanding of key disciplinary and institutional

mid-1950s, and it is likely that there were numerous unfinished structures on the site at the time when one of them was being considered as the headquarters for the SCOP. Notable amongst these were the School and Conference Hall of the National Medical Center (1956), also by Villagrán García; as well as the Pulmonology Hospital (1958), Oncology Hospital (1958), and the massive General Hospital (1958) all works by Enrique Yañez. Sadly, many of these buildings collapsed or were seriously damaged with great loss of life in the Earthquake on September 19, 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> "SCOP Introductory text," *Espacios: Revista Integral de Planificación, Arquitectura y Artes Plásticas* 21-22 (October-December 1954).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Note: The Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) was created by presidential decree during the administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho in January of 1943, and began operations in the following year. It was a dependency of the then *Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia*.

isomorphisms that occurred at a critical moment when regional planning in Mexico was still in a very formative stage. The IMSS hospital campaign was started by its then-director, Ignacio García Téllez. Garcia Téllez invited Hannes Meyer, who was then an employee of the Secretaria de Trabajo – or Secretariat of Labor - to join the campaign, the latter receiving a letter of appointment on July 15, 1944 as the Secretary Architect of the Department of Construction and Planning of Hospital Services.<sup>277</sup> Meyer led an integrated technical commission of medical professionals, engineers, and architects. He, along with the Medical Secretary of the commission, Dr. Neftalí Rodríguez, were the primary figures responsible for the development of a detailed program of over 1000 pages that stated the functional and spatial requirements for the new Hospitales de Zona, or "zone hospitals" of the IMSS. The program, as drafted by Meyer and Rodríguez, was vast for the time. They apparently emphasized a need to establish archetypal medical services as well as a hierarchal system of medical establishments; the plan was just as concerned with the archetypal zone hospital as it was with the broader urban/regional survey and planning of the IMSS medical system.<sup>278</sup> The program reflected that the IMSS had around 900,000 policy-holders by its first year of operation, and imagined a series of zone hospitals that could accommodate this large and expanding membership. The zone hospitals were to have a bed capacity of 10,500 patients per year and a clinic capable of 700,000 consultations in the same timeframe. The program included a sizeable hospital filled with large wards, 550 maternity beds, and isolation pavilions; a medical school capable of training 150 students; and a medical

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> For more on Hannes Meyer's work for the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), refer to Raquel Franklin Unkind, "Hannes Meyer in Mexico, 1939-1949" (PhD diss, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 1997), 199-204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> Guillermo Fajardo Ortiz, "Hitos en la Planeación Médica," *Revista Médica IMSS* 41, no.1 (2003): 85-88. This short article offers a very brief synopsis of the IMSS program. Authorship of the program is solely attributed to Dr. Neftalí Rodríguez. Additional information on IMSS hospital construction during the period that was cited by this author can be found in: Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, *México y la seguridad social. Construcciones y sistemas de protección social. Tomo III.* (México City: IMSS, 1953).

center housing the poly-clinic.<sup>279</sup> As for its formal recommendations, the functional diagram for the First Zone Hospital – which was to serve as a model for future IMSS hospitals – displayed a roughly tripartite grouping of the main programmatic elements, with one cluster of spaces/functions at the head, a series additional functions grouped along a central spine, and an additional cluster of spaces – the manifold external consultancy offices of the poly-clinic – at the base.<sup>280</sup> (fig. 4.11)

The program that Meyer and Rodríguez had crafted was part of an even larger dialogue between doctors and architects in modern hospital design that had been ongoing for the better part of the first half of the twentieth century. The outlining of a standardized functionalist hospital program was already a focus of Mexican State prioritization under a campaign by Dr. Gustavo Baz, head of the Secretaria de Salubridad y Asistencia – The Secretariat of Health and Welfare, and the parent organization of the IMSS – during the Ávila Camacho administration. During his tenure, Baz had vowed to "elevate the level of [Mexico's] medical culture by means of scientific investigation and instruction." <sup>281</sup> This project of social development came in the form of a massive state effort to modernize and expand Mexico's medical facilities. Baz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> Unkind notes that during his drafting of the program, Meyer requested from the Swiss consulate a large amount of design material including information on recent medical projects such as the "new hospital" in Basel – almost certainly referring to the Universitätsspital Basel, or University Hospital, whose Klinikum 1 was designed by the architect Hermann Baur and built between 1937 and 1945. Likewise, he requested material on recent projects being completed in the United States, and to a lesser extent France, Sweden, Russia, and England. Unkind, 202. <sup>280</sup> Note: a poor reproduction of the functional diagram for the First Zone Hospital can be found in Unkind, 218 (Fig. 6.14). The text on the reproduced image is nearly illegible, aside from the clear labeling of the "Consulta Externa," but the basic organization of the program is clear and corresponds to the more readable plans of the zone hospitals discussed in this chapter. As of this writing, I have yet to locate a copy of the 1000-page program authored by Meyer and Rodríguez. References in Unkind's work suggest that either a full draft of this program exists and is titled Servicios Hospitalarios, or that only portions of the program – namely the functional diagram – are extant and are included with Meyer's correspondence with Heinrich Starck. These materials are located in the Deutsches Architekturmuseum Archiv Frankfurt/Main, (DAM), and will be researched at a future date. <sup>281</sup> "...la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia Pública se ve obligada a crear la especialización en arquitectura para tomando en cuenta también nuestra idiosincracia, pero aprovechando los conocimientos más recientes obtenidos por

construir hospitales modernos, de acuerdo con nuestras posibilidades, según las distintas regiones del País y la experiencia científica; conocimientos modernos que tienen como objetivo constante mejorar la situación de los enfermos y elevar el nivel de nuestra cultura médica por medio de la investigación científica y de la docencia." Dr. Gustavo Baz, "Hospitales en México," Arquitectura 15 (April 1944): 259

specifically called for a new architectural design track specializing in modern hospital design, thus prompting an official interdisciplinary dialogue at the start of his tenure in 1941.

A notable article that detailed the incipient effort towards this end was written by Dr. Salvador Zubirán, professor at the Escuela Nacional de Medicina (the current Facultad de *Medicina* of the UNAM), and future Rector of the UNAM. <sup>282</sup> It was published in the April 1944 issue of Arquitectura México, a special volume entirely devoted to the design and construction of hospitals. As noted earlier, Arquitectura México was the most well-known architectural journal in mid-century Mexico, had an international readership, represented a dominant portending on "official" perspective of Mexico's architectural modernization, and was a part of a broad – though at times exclusive – professional project very much under Mario Pani's control. Dr. Zubirán offered a criticism of Mexico's current hospitals and offered another forward-looking general program – this one based on three years of dialogue between a number of doctors and architects, one of whom Zubirán mentioned by name and with substantial praise: José-Villagrán García. The program that he laid out included the theoretical modern hospital's basic functions, fundamental parts and corresponding services, as well as a general schematic for the formal organization of these parts. His disdain for the layout of existing hospitals, many of which dated to the turn of the twentieth century, was primarily directed towards their "functional defects" in general services primarily stemming from their lack of centralization and efficient circulation. <sup>283</sup> He noted how the old *Hospital General* in Mexico City was still organized around non-adjacent, autonomous units that functioned independently from each other – a formal and functional attribute that lent itself to excessive specialization in the treatment of patients' maladies rather

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> Dr. Salvador Zubirán, "Los Nuevos Hospitales de México, Consideraciones sobre la Técnica de su Planeación y Funcionamiento," Arquitectura 15 (April 1944): 261-272.

than general attention to or study of their conditions.<sup>284</sup> He noted with equal concern that this formal impediment to general study was detrimental to medical education. In sum, his critique noted that the primary obstacle to Baz's imperative to elevate the medical culture of the country was to be found in the irredeemable architecture of Mexico's existing hospitals.

As an institution, Dr. Zubirán noted, a modern hospital needed to be conceived of as a "harmonic whole, whose different parts within conserve a close union" that would permit the "efficient and uniform action" of medical services. He went on to emphasize that this harmonic approach would ideally allow for a multilateral form of treatment since, ideally, a "concurrence" of scientific labor would occur within an institution that spatially unified its technical personnel. For this institutional harmonization, concurrence, and centralization to function properly, however, Zubirán similarly emphasized the utmost importance of elaborating a "perfectly specified program" that would "describe the institution in all of its aspects, giving it the most efficient, economic, and adequate organization possible within México's cultural means" prior to a hospital's actual edification. 286

Dr. Zubirán's program divided the hospital, as an institution, into three basic functions – something also shared by Meyer and Rodríguez's program which was being drafted around the same time. For Zubirán, these functions were defined as medical attention, instruction, and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Zubirán, 261.

<sup>285 &</sup>quot;...concebir la institución hospital como un todo armónico, cuyas diferentes partes conserven entre sí estrecha unión y que su coordinación de funcionamiento sea planeada en tal forma que permita conservar una acción eficiente y uniforme en la que todos los servicios generales, administrativos y técnicos, converjan a proporcionar al enfermo no solamente los beneficios de la Ciencia Médica, finalidad principal, sino también un albergue humanitario, amable; que la atención médica que el enfermo reciba, deje de ser unilateral y para ello, que sea al resultado de la concurrencia del trabajo científico de todo el personal técnico ahí reunido." Zubirán, 262.
286 "Plan revolucionario en nuestro medio, que habría de transformar no sólo las técnicas funcionales de la futura institución, sino en forma importante los procedimientos de la construcción, dejando establecido un principio substancial, básico, que ha sido fijado ya con ferreos moldes, a manera de verdad incontrovertible: ANTES QUE PENSAR EN EL HOSPITAL EDIFICIO, ES PRECISO CONCEBIR EL HOSPITAL INSTITUCIÓN; haber elaborado un programa previo perfectamente especificado, que describa la institución en todos sus aspectos, dándole la organización más eficaz, más económica y más adecuada posible en nuestro medio cultural." Zubirán, 262-263.

investigation.<sup>287</sup> (fig. 4.11) The range of services and operations within the tripartite schema of functions could differ across various hospitals according to location, climate, capacity, equipment, personnel, and the limits of their construction. Variations notwithstanding, however, Dr. Zubirán proposed a standard architectural layout for Mexico's modern hospitals. Formally, each hospital was to be conceived of in the design process as a "compact whole...integrated by four fundamental parts."<sup>288</sup> The three functions would be broken down into specific services, and distributed amongst these four integrated parts.<sup>289</sup> The location of these parts was noted in a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Zubirán, 263-264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> "El hospital, con las características del hospital mexicano y basado en las anteriores consideraciones, se concebió como un todo, compacto, pero integrado por cuatro partes fundamentales, a saber: Servicio de Consulta Externa, Servicios Intermedios, Servicios de Hospitalización y Servicios Generales." Zubirán, 266.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> Note: Much of the architectural organizational vocabulary utilized within the discourse of modern Mexican hospital design owed as much to modern functionalism as it did to the Beaux Arts principles that were still part of the curriculum at the Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura up until mid-century. Villagrán García's compositional elementarism, in particular, reflected the teachings of Julien Guadet, whose theories on architectural elements were taught to students at the Escuela Nacional (later the Facultad de Arquitectura at the UNAM) into the mid-twentieth century. Guadet was a master at the Beaux-Arts and instructor to Tony Garnier and Auguste Perret. The latter employed the young Charles Edouard Jeanneret (Le Corbusier) in his office. It is important to stress here how Le Corbusier played a major influence in the development of Latin American modernist architecture, and how his theories shaped the design vocabularies of many first-generation Mexican functionalists such as Juan O'Gorman and José Villagrán García. While the multiblock method or architectural volume organization is the product of dialogues between various first generation modernists, the elementarist approach to designing large-scale institutional architecture was quite notably pioneered by Le Corbusier in the competition for the League of Nations project in Geneva that required the subdivision of the complex into two separate units, a stipulation that allowed Le Corbusier to first establish a set of "elements" that could be manipulated and rearranged in order to establish a series of unique variations that achieved similar programmatic and functional relationships. See: Kenneth Frampton, Modern Architecture: A Critical History (London: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 159. One of the most influential buildings designed by Le Corbusier according to these principles is his Centrosoyuz (1928-1932) in Moscow. This building appears to have been well known by many Mexican functionalist architects by the 1930-40s, appearing on the cover of Alberto T. Arai's La Nueva Arquitectura y la Técnica (1938). The formal composition of that bureaucratic center appears to bear a strong, though not necessarily intentional, influence on the hospital plans of Yañez and especially that of Cacho's. That a design for a bureaucratic center of coordination and control could serve as an archetype for a hospital reflects on the one hand, the general bureaucratization modern medicine, but also Le Corbusier's life-long concern with light and air in his architectural and urban projects. This concern, shared by many of his generation, was directly affected by the Tuberculosis outbreaks of the 19th and 20th century, and was also a guiding principal in modern hospital design. As a purist painter, Le Corbusier's establishment of independent elements in composition was also directly related to the Purist theories set forth in La Peinture Moderne, coauthored with Amédée Ozenfant. In this text, elementarism was conceived of as a linguistic and syntactic exercise. They noted that each "...purist element issued from the purification of standard forms is not a copy, but a creation whose end is to materialize the object in all its generality and its invariability. Purist elements are thus comparable to words of carefully defined meaning..." These discrete elements would be defined as objects of "prime necessity" which respond to a set of "imperative needs," while at the same time "subject to the modifications demanded by the composition." See: Le Corbusier and Amédée Ozenfant, "Purism" in Modern Artists on Art: Ten Unabridged Essays, ed. R.H.L. Herbert (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 58-73. In architectural composition, however, Le Corbusier noted in a contemporary essay in Cahiers d'Art that a building's formal elements - based

diagram labeling the major elements of a generic, H-shaped multiblock hospital plan.<sup>290</sup> (fig. 4.12) One of these parts, housing the hospital's external consultation services, was to be located along the lower parallel wing of the 90°-rotated, H. Two other parts, or functional units, filled the other parallel wing: hospitalization services, and general services - the latter being primarily devoted to the hospital's administration. Amongst these were the hospital's medical archives as well as an office devoted to information and control, the later located in such a manner that it could still monitor activity within the offices for external consultation. Finally, a critical service to the medical functions of both parallel wings was situated within the perpendicular wing that bridged these two. This central section housed the intermediate services of the hospital, which Zubirán defined as the principle locale of scientific investigation.<sup>291</sup>

The program that Zubirán – with the help of Villagrán-Garcia – articulated was published in the months leading up to the IMSS's selection of projects. Zubirán and Villagrán-Garcia's work was highly influential and would have been read by most of Mexico's small community of practicing architects. Though not the official source of the IMSS's own hospital program, it would have been treated as an additional point of reference for those involved in designing the zone hospitals. An architectural competition for the First IMSS "Hospital de

upon such artistic principles - ought to be readable as "...types – office types, assembly-hall types, etc." that composed an "architecture [that] consists of moving relations." Jean-Louis Cohen, *Le Corbusier and the Mystique of the USSR: Theories and Projects for Moscow, 1928-1938* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 84. Thus, elementarism can be conceived of as a syntactic system based on a pragmatic economy subject to rapid change and repurpose. However, it is still a language based on ostensibly "pure" or archetypal forms - the words in the system - that must remain both invariable and to an extent identifiable yet also remain flexible in function if not fully multivalent and layered in the meaning that they are meant to convey. This preoccupation with architectural archetypes and their relation to matters of pragmatic economy was shared by many first-generation modernists. Judging from his hospital designs, this was a likely concern for Villagrán García, and was also an apparent point of preoccupation for Hannes Meyer and Dr. Neftalí Rodríguez in their hospital program.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Note: The suggestion that the administrative offices in charge of "control" be situated in a manner that they could observe the activity within the offices for external consultation suggest that some of the building's administrative functions be placed outside of the block or wing that contained the institution's general services, and rather at the central connecting element of the architectural project - the perpendicular wing housing the intermediate services.

Zona" was held in September 1944. The winners were Alberto T. Arai who came in third; Raul Cacho, second; and Enrique Yañez, first place (The last of these being noted as most present – and therefore a significant contributor - to the IMSS program commission meetings). <sup>292</sup> The design project submitted by Yañez for the projected First IMSS "Hospital de Zona" – the present day *Hospital de la Raza* – was selected as the winner for the competition (Figs. 4.13-16); Cacho's project won second place and became the basis for the design of the Second IMSS "Hospital de Zona" in Narvarte. (Figs. 4.17 and 4.20) Cacho's and Yañez's hospital designs were similar in design. <sup>293</sup> The tripartite programmatic organization dictated in the competition guidelines and differentiating separate areas for hospitalization, medical school, and clinics was not followed exactly in either project, though each of these could be easily recognized in the massing of the projects. Cacho's organizational parti additionally included the specific differentiation of areas for hospitalization, intermediate services, external consultant offices, and general services. Both proposed complexes were roughly H-shaped, with two parallel wings of differing heights joined by a central block. <sup>294</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> The three projects that won the competition, belonging to Enrique Yañez. Raúl Cacho, and Alberto T. Arai can be found in "Tres Arquitectos Triunfan en el Concurso de Anteproyectos para el Primer Hospital de Zona Convocado por el Seguro Social," "Anteproyecto Yañez," "Anteproyecto Cacho," and "Anteproyecto Arai," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945): 29-67

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Note: Arai's defined his project as a massive uniblock, placing the hospitalization services atop the consultation offices and clinic. Though largely functionalist in design, it was adorned with a stylized pre-Colombian parapet. This reflected a turn in Arai's designs following his time in Chiapas and his study of the Mayan architecture there. He afterwards became concerned with creating a "Functional Mexican Architecture." This turn in Mexican modernism, occurring by the late 1940s and especially throughout the 1950s-60s, reflected a general exploration of Pre-Columbian cultures and the interpretation of indigenous design themes within a modernist architectural vocabulary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Note: Both hospital designs were of an H-shaped configuration, and the parallel blocks of both designs were of differing sizes. The larger of the parallel blocks rose up to nine floors on Cacho's project and eleven floors on Yañez's. This larger block contained the hospitalization services for both projects, with Yañez including an auditorium and the educational and residential spaces of the medical school here. The shorter parallel blocks reached six floors on the formers and eight floors on the latter. The use of this shorter block differed significantly in either project. A very spacious medical school and library was located in Cacho's project. Yañez placed general services, additional consultant and specialty offices, labs, the maternity ward, and the operating room in this block. Stemming perpendicularly from the shorter of the two parallel blocks, Cacho's project had four fork-like wings originally designed to three stories, while Yañez placed three similarly designed wings of similar height. In both projects, these smaller wings contained the offices for external consultations and offices for medical specialists. For

The distribution of services in Cacho's entry for the first IMSS hospital, with its more discrete groupings of services and emphasis in the ease of circulation through the complex, demonstrated his criticism of the Meyer-Rodríguez program. Cacho took liberties such as the diminishment of certain general services spaces like the pharmacy, laundry, kitchens, and other auxiliary spaces. He also decided to dispense of the nurse's club and spaces for employees' free time in favor of adding a separate section for the admittance of tuberculosis patients and an "archivo muerto" or passive archive that could contain medical records not in active use.<sup>295</sup> Above all, he emphasized the need for a more thought-out parti for the circulation of medical staff and the adjacencies or separation of particular services. He argued that medical services sharing an intimate relation to each other required even greater proximity.

Cacho's argument for the proximity of interrelated services was best expressed in his articulation of the hospital competition entry's central block. His critique on how the program dealt with this organizational element was manifested in the changes that he made to the central block's housing of "intermediate services" – an additional functional label not noted in the other IMSS competition entries that demonstrated his knowledge of the organizational language used in Zubirán and Villagrán-García's dialogue on hospital rationalization. He decided to situate his hospital competition entry's intermediate services – which included the maternity ward and the

reasons that we can only speculate, this smaller wing of the proposed Second Zone Hospital never reached its proposed height by the time that the project plans were reutilized and the building completed as the Centro SCOP in 1954 – it was completed to only two floors, or the same height that the adjoining wings designed for the clinics were finished to. The two parallel blocks of the proposed hospital were bridged by an intermediate wing of six floors on Cacho's competition entry and ten floors on Yañez's. This wing of Cacho's Second Zone Hospital was eventually built higher to nine floors. The central connecting block also differed in length in either project; Cacho's connecting wing was significantly longer. His central wing contained the hospital's intermediate services, which is to say the managerial and administrative offices. The hospital's general services were also included within and directly behind this wing on the ground floor. Also included was a large auditorium to serve the medical school. The maternity ward, labs, and operating rooms were located above the intermediate services. The central block in Yañez's project similarly contained the administrative offices, general registry, and archive. On the upper floors were spaces for general medicine, sterilization wards, and nurses offices. <sup>295</sup> "Anteproyecto Cacho," 41.

operating rooms – and general services within the same elongated central block; medical work of the highest work and risk, general administration, and maintenance required easy access to hospitalization services, labs, and the more specialized consultation offices in the clinic whether because of their dependency on these services or because of their role in controlling and maintaining the functions of these medical spaces.<sup>296</sup> These changes were carried over from the competition entry project that he presented and into the hospital structure that was eventually constructed. Based upon early programing sketches from the structure's conversion into the Centro SCOP by the architect Augusto Pérez Palacios from January 1953, the hospital building in Narvarte largely followed the original project's general distribution, varying from his competition entry only in total size and with the elimination of the upper floors of the block intended for the medical school, and the relocation of the hospitalization ward for infectious patients to a separate wing perpendicular to the main hospitalization block.<sup>297</sup> (Fig. 4.21)

The three winning projects were published in March 1945 in the first issue of *Arquitectura y lo demás*. The construction of two of these projects as the IMSS's first and second zone hospitals was fraught by difficulties that were as much professional as they were political. This unfavorable reality was either foretold or already understood at the onset of the project by the cynical and pessimistic tone of the author that introduced these projects in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> "Anteproyecto Cacho," 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> I use Cacho's project for First IMSS "Hospital de Zona" in these comparisons because detailed plans of the Second IMSS "Hospital de Zona" have not come to light in my research, possibly because its incompletion and structural deficiencies prevented their publication at the time. Cacho's winning of second place in the competition for the first IMSS hospital, and the nearly identical configuration and size of that projected building to what was eventually taken over in 1953 by the SCOP strongly suggests that the project was reused with only minor changes. See Raul Cacho, "Anteproyecto Cacho" *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945): 41-53. Augusto Pérez Palacio's sketch comparing the basic footprint of the unfinished hospital in Narvarte and its original functional distribution with a preliminary study for the building's reuse provides further evidence of the similarity between the initial project from the mid 1940s and the hospital building that was started. SCOP. I.53, Manzana Narvarte (Narvarte Block). UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Croquis, Caja 5, Exp 1.

Arquitectura y lo demás. The author noted that the design competition was set up in the first place by Lic. García Tellez in order to avoid the IMSS's building campaign from falling into the hands of a group of architects that he simply referred to as the "hospital mafia." The article on the projects also made little mention of the competition itself, and did not name Meyer nor Rodríguez whatsoever. Though its author stated a desire to publish the full proceedings of the competition, they listed a lack of space due to the length of the published projects as the ostensible reason for this omission.<sup>299</sup> To be sure, Hannes Meyer's spatial and functional program for the IMSS hospital campaign was the principal document that set the guidelines of the competition.<sup>300</sup> However, the exclusion of Meyer in the publicity for this project likely reflected his fraught relationship with many key Mexican architects as well as the general deteriorating political situation especially felt by certain foreign leftists who found themselves increasingly under threat by varied "reactionary" forces operating within the Mexican State.<sup>301</sup> This situation led to Hannes Meyer's resignation from his post in January of 1946, at the end of the Avila Camacho administration and not more than a year into the construction of the first two Zone Hospitals. His letter of resignation was only accepted by the IMSS because of Meyer's insistence.302

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> "Tres Arquitectos Triunfan en el Concurso de Anteproyectos para el Primer Hospital de Zona Convocado por el Seguro Social," 29. Note: The large influence of Villagrán García on modern Mexican hospital design and his command of numerous projects was such that he surely fell within the so-called "hospital mafía" noted by other disenchanted architects who found themselves incapable of getting commissions in this lucrative field.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> Unkind, 199-204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> Note: As noted earlier, depending on their particular ideological stances and factional affiliations, a number of Mexican leftists likewise began feeling the same antagonistic political pressures of the period. Enrique Yañez and Raúl Cacho appear to have been momentarily affected by this reaction, though their careers – especially that of Yañez – would enjoy success in the decade to come. Recall that Yañez and Cacho had been affiliated some years prior with the Union de Arquitectos Socialistas, a group strongly influenced by its study and emulation of the German Bauhaus and other Socialist-inspired vanguard architectural movements of the 1920-30s.

<sup>302</sup> The letter was dated January 3, 1946 and submitted to engineer Miguel García Cruz, the IMSS General Secretar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> The letter was dated January 3, 1946 and submitted to engineer Miguel García Cruz, the IMSS General Secretary. Unkind, 204.

Hannes Meyer was in many ways a victim of the ideological shifts and the political reality of Mexico during this period. Though he found inclusion in many projects during his more than ten years in Mexico, he had been beleaguered by nationalist and xenophobic tendencies within the profession throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, was nearly implicated by rival leftist political rivals in the fallout that occurred after the death of Leon Trotsky in 1940, felt increasingly disheartened by the rampant corruption and bribery within the State, and finally fell further and further out of place as the "outbreak of reaction" that characterized the post-Cárdenas administrations became more and more a reality in the lives of many leftist intellectuals.<sup>303</sup> The change of administrations was also a probable cause for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>303</sup> The "outbreak of reaction" that Meyer referred to in a letter to Paul Artaria from October 2, 1945 may have been within the broader institution of the IMSS, though to be sure political reactionary attitudes characterized many sectors of the Ávila Camacho administration. Ibid. Though Meyer had his professional allies in Mexico, he also appears to have been subject to professional rivalry and exclusion. A starting point for his consideration as a serious professional rival appears to have stemmed from the founding of the *Instituto de Planificación y Urbanismo* (IPU), its separation from the Escuela Superior de Ingeniería y Arquitectura (ESIA), and its relocation as a dependency of the Instituto Polítécnico Nacional (IPN). His reforms to the curriculum came under strong opposition from the ESIA, largely fomented by Juan O'Gorman. A significant case of professional enmity existed between Meyer and Juan O'Gorman. This rivalry with O'Gorman affected Meyer's impression of these educational institutions and may have been motivated to an extent by their differing pedagogical programs and approaches to education, but quite frankly appear to have been the product of political distrust and envy. See: Unkind 148-151. Meyer was likewise subject to a general xenophobic culture present in Mexico at a time when Spanish and foreign European refugees were regarded as competitors in an already scarce labor market and were also viewed with intellectual and ideological suspicion – right-wingers viewing them as potential carriers of communism and left-wingers seeing them as potential fascists. See: Unkind, 131. By Meyer's account, this xenophobia and political intrigue was present at the IPN where some colleagues viewed him as a possible foreign agent due to his previous employment in the USSR. The intrigue only worsened with Trotsky's arrival to Mexico in 1936 and his assassination in 1940. Meyer in general sided with the Mexican Communist Party and Stalinism. Within the artistic worlds, this alignment placed him at opposite ends with Diego Rivera and Juan O'Gorman (who apparently took political cues from the elder painter). Meyer noted in a letter to Paul Artaria (date unknown) that Rivera and O'Gorman had inscribed his name along with 25 other intellectuals on the American DIES Committee list which was utilized during the Second World War to investigate "un-American activities," which is to say it was a tool to suppress communism. Meyer suspected that O'Gorman labeled him as a member of the "GPU" - an acronym for the old Soviet State Political Directorate which he was apparently conflating with the NKVD, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, which was its superseding agency and the institution in charge of foreign espionage. He was implicated for a time in the murder of Trotsky. Though these charges were dismissed, the fallout caused his dismissal – decided by President Manuel Ávila Camacho himself – from the directorship of the IPU. The IPU was subsequently closed for "budgetary reasons." These political and professional factors have contributed to the various omissions of his name in many narratives of modern Mexican architectural history, a lacuna that stems in part from cases of his exclusion from the professional journals of the period. His not being mentioned in the journal Arquitectura y lo demás was certainly intentional and likely political or ideologically motivated. See: Unkind 151-154. Meyer had a very pessimistic attitude towards what he saw as a general and endemic culture of corruption. His reflections fall into stereotype, though as early as December 1939 he derided the presence of "slackers...fraudsters, swindlers, spies...that [began]

stalled completion of the hospitals. The Alemán administration was held responsible for the lack of priority given to the hospital program initiated by the previous administration. The incoming dispensation was disinterested in promoting or publicizing the public works from the Avila Camacho administration because its renovatory rhetoric and logic of justification and legitimacy was based in depicting it as irreparably corrupt.<sup>304</sup> It took thirteen years for the completion of Yañez's design for the First IMSS "Hospital de Zona" to be completed.<sup>305</sup>

Cacho's project in Narvarte similarly languished but for additional reasons. According to one of the authors writing on the then-newly completed Centro SCOP in the October-December 1954 issue of *Espacios: Revista Integral de Planificación, Arquitectura y Artes Plásticas,* the second IMSS hospital had been left incomplete due to a number of faults only taken into

with the Minister and ends at the lowest." His misgivings towards the government often dealt with his failure to receive adequate compensation stemming from its inability to "sustain its word." Unkind, 132. He noted in a letter to Otto Nathan on July 30, 1939 that during his directorship of the IPU at the IPN he decried the various "bureaucratic-formalistic" tricks that were conducted in order to undermine his authority and his capacity to conduct his professorship. In a letter to Dr. R. Grosheintz-Laval from January 19, 1940, he claimed that a Minister of Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública) was trying to cheat him out of his salary. He noted that his immediate superiors would solicit "mordidas" or bribes. Unkind, 151. Despite his qualms with the political and professional culture that surrounded him, he continued to work in the public sector – opportunities made possible to him by allies that he continued to have within the state. In addition to his work for the IMSS, he was also employed by the Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare) from 1942 to 1944 and the Comité Administrador del Programa Federal de Construcción de Escuelas (CAPFCE), or the Administrative Committee of the Federal School Construction Program, from 1945 to 1946. At the end of his stay, however, his opinions regarding the culture of corruption had only solidified. In a letter to Brigid Youngday from March 8, 1949 that emphasized an economic downturn and rising inflation, he noted "Corruption here is growing too, and everybody outside of those gangs, especially in between specialists in technique or economy, will lose his job. You are fighting against corrupt tendencies...and you have the whole gang of any institution against you!" Unkind, 262. In a letter to Hans Berger dated April 5, 1949 he also stated, "For me corruption is a difficult obstacle to overcome. Either you take part, body and soul, in this system (and you will be morally crazy) or you will be boycotted. These are the present circumstances and perspectives here!! You could not imagine the diversity of forms of such corruption: politic, economic, and naturally, moral...The moral problem is then the preponderant in our present life, and then to find means to return to Europe." Unkind, 263.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> The Alemán administration's lack of interest in promoting or publicizing the work of the Ávila Camacho administration was noted by Meyer in a letter to Heinrich Starck from April 3, 1949. In this letter he referred specifically to the refusal to distribute 3000 albums on the work of the CAPFCE from 1944-1946. This book, a 420-page document, was referred to as the "Memoria CAPFCE 1944-1946."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> Note: The First IMSS "Hospital de Zona" is referred to more commonly as Hospital de la Raza. It is located just north of the City Center adjacent to the pyramidal monument dedicated to "La Raza" in an area bordered by Avenida Río Consulado and Calzada de Vallejo (and along the axis of Insurgentes at a point where it connected to the international highway to Laredo).

consideration after construction was well underway.<sup>306</sup> At the time - in the mid-1940s - it was still felt that the newly built Colonia Narvarte was too far from the more working-class areas of Mexico City that the IMSS was intended to serve. In addition, the enormous size of the building in progress was, after some belated consideration or calculation, deemed too large for the needs of the institution and would additionally be too costly to finish and equip as a fully functional hospital. More detrimental in the longer history for this unfortunate building, however, was that the foundations of the building were discovered to be seriously faulty.<sup>307</sup> This condition was no doubt exacerbated by the location of the building near the old Rio de la Piedad (at the time recently embanked, covered, and integrated into the Viaducto Miguel Alemán) and the fact that much of Mexico City is built upon very recent landfill on the former lake of Texcoco.<sup>308</sup>

## III. Adapting "A Perfectly Specified Program": Architectural Reuse, Political Symbolism, and Institutional Isomorphisms at the Centro SCOP

In the years that followed the hospital structure's abandonment, various reutilization schemes had been floated. Amongst these were studies for its conversion into a multi-family housing block, a new home for either the *Archivo General de la Nación* or the *Biblioteca Nacional*, and finally for the presses and offices of the periodicals *El Nacional* and *El Diario Oficial*. Carlos Lazo was aware of these previous proposals for adaptive reuse during his tenure

<sup>306 &</sup>quot;SCOP Introductory text."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>307</sup> Note: Mention of the collapse of the building's foundation structures during construction was made by Elisa Drago Quaglia in her DOCOMOMO presentation in June 2018, citing correspondence belonging to the architect Enrique de la Mora that are in his papers in the *Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos*, at the UNAM's *Facultad de Arquitectura*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> Note: In the days following the earthquake of September 19, 2017, I had a casual conversation with two groundskeepers on the property of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT), the institutional occupant of the damaged Centro SCOP. They noted that excavations on the property typically reach water within just a few (5-6) meters from the surface.

in the *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales*. These proposals never came to pass, but Lazo's familiarity with them were contributing factors to his decision to direct the SCOP to acquire the property. The decision to utilize the building was judged according to its particular viability within the current political moment. Out of other possible architectural solutions to the problem at hand, the incomplete structure was deemed a viable candidate for rapid completion. Likewise, it was judged as offering a suitable organizational structure for optimal institutional performance. Taken together, completion of the unfinished hospital into the new Centro SCOP provides a valuable and nuanced case study of adaptive reuse and institutional isomorphism in the context of bureaucratic and socio-economic development-oriented institutions of the mid-twentieth century. The secretarian secr

There are clear isomorphic relationships reflected in where the offices of the SCOP were placed and the original technical and medical occupants of these spaces. The isomorphisms that planning-bureaucracy coordination and national plan projection shared with hospital management and life-saving services was indicative of a general process of homogenization of non-related bureaucratic institutions, itself a component of the general phenomena of mass

<sup>309 &</sup>quot;SCOP Introductory text."

Note: The concept of institutional isomorphism describes a situation where a set of organizations – typically run by the state and managed by professionals – emerges as a field or new structured entity. In this case, both pre-existing departments of the SCOP and newly created entities developed by architect-planners were brought together not only as an administrative and functional restructuring of the SCOP but as a physical, institutional manifestation of the new field of *planificación integral*. As this process of structuration occurs, rational actors – here, a technical collaboration between the architects rehabilitating an abandoned hospital into the new Centro SCOP – make the organizations under their watch increasingly similar to other successful institutional models as they attempt to change, or in this case, modernize them. Due to the newness of the discipline, this process of rationalization can be full of uncertainty and constraint. This was all the more real with a planning institution being moved into a suitable pre-existing but foreign bureaucratic, institutional structure. Under these circumstances, an expected conservative condition of homogeneity in structure can occur with expectations that the isomorphic institution's culture and output will perform with similar rationality and efficiency. My use of the concept of institutional isomorphism is derived from Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 2 (April 1983): 147-160.

rationalization and irreversible bureaucratic expansion in the modern age. <sup>311</sup> More specifically, however, this case study was also the product of immediate pragmatic decision-making responding to the exigencies of government austerity and the opportunities offered by a structure's abandonment. And to be sure, many of decisions contributing to the institution's isomorphism were the product of varied forces of political coercion. The political pressures of meaningful and symbolic reform exerted by the administration influenced design decisions favoring a rapid reutilization of the structure in Narvarte in accord with any political deadlines established both by Lazo and the broader presidential administration. <sup>312</sup> Likewise, the rapid completion of the Centro SCOP demonstrated how programmatic multivalencies and institutional isomorphisms can contribute both to the legitimacy of institutions, whether professional or political, as well as the perceived qualification and viability of individuals that are at the head of these processes of structuration.

It was reported that the previous proposals for reuse all came to naught due to the excessive loads they would have placed on the compromised structure. As a result, Lazo presented a list of critical interventions that would render the building safe for occupancy in order to convince other members of the Ruiz Cortines administration of the feasibility of his project of adaptive reuse. In addition to promising the building's future safety, these proposed interventions were also projected as being conducive to managerial efficiency and economy – priorities that were well suited to the new administration's political promises of austerity,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>311</sup> Note: the premise of mass rationalization and irreversible bureaucratic expansion in the modern age is asserted by Max Weber in his work on bureaucracy and is the point of departure for DiMaggio and Powell's work on Institutional Isomorphism. Homogeneity in institutional structuration is its inevitable consequence. DiMaggio and Powell, 147.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>312</sup> Note: This can be considered an example of "Coercive isomorphism" which "results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations" – and in this case specific individual agents – "by other organizations" – as well as specific individual agents in a position of power – "upon which they are dependent." Professional and political systems of patronage, loyalty, and duty are certainly at hand in processes of institutional – and in this case functional and architectural – structuration. DiMaggio and Powell, 150.

moralization, and integrity. He suggested the retention of the hospital's unfinished and therefore still open plan. (fig. 4.22) To this, he advocated the addition of light-weight metallic partitions only where the compartmentalization of the SCOP's internal departments was necessary. (fig. 4.23 and 4.24) In addition, he called for a study looking into the minimization of furniture use as well as determine the organization of equally minimal yet functionally adequate workplaces for the proposed 6,000 employees that were to be transferred to the new building.<sup>313</sup> (fig. 4.25) and 4.26) It was determined that each floor contain an expansive distribution of these minimal workplaces along wide areas of circulation. (fig. 4.27) Upon calculation, it was determined that such a layout would reduce the initially proposed 100,000 m<sup>2</sup> of floor usage to approximately 60,000 m<sup>2</sup>. Another critical suggestion was the modernization and relocation of the SCOP's archives. These were both a fundamental resource for the increasingly data-heavy processes of the socio-economic planificación integral espoused by Lazo as well as a critical part of government record-keeping – a practice understood by political reformers such as Lazo as necessary in maintaining a level of accountability in the administrative processes and political battles of the State.<sup>314</sup>

Lazo's proposal also took into account Cacho's addition of an "archivo muerto" to the original hospital program.<sup>315</sup> This concept of archiving called for the separation of the archive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>313</sup> While general aspects of Lazo's suggested interventions can be found in the anonymously authored introductory text on the new Secretariat in the October-December 1954 issue of *Espacios*, particular details and quotes from Lazo's proposals can be found in the same issue under "El Nuevo Centro de Comunicaciones y el Arquitecto Raúl Cacho" by Jorge Guillermo Reynolds in the section titled "Arquitectura."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>314</sup> In the previously cited letter from Carlos Lazo Barreiro to Enrique Rodríguez Cano, the President's secretary, dated February 10, 1955, Lazo alluded to the SCOP archive's role as a depository of evidence that could be used in maintaining the accountability of individual functionaries and the ministry in the administration and execution of public works. Likewise, the archive could aid in the construction of political strategies that included the defense of the dependency and its leadership. In what appears to be his defense from a political attack that implied both the inaction of the SCOP on completing highways and his use of misleading statements, he noted very pointedly: "This documentation doesn't exhaust the topic – rather, there exists a great abundance regarding the overseeing of the progression of works in our archives." AGN, Archivo Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Caja 0669, Exp 515.1/360.

<sup>315</sup> "Anteproyecto Cacho," 43.

into sections: an "active" archive that could be largely transferred to microfilm and housed within the main Secretariat; and a "passive" archive that would be located outside of the pre-existing structures. This practice of record keeping – common in the document-heavy processes of modern health care and similar highly bureaucratic public services – facilitates the organization of materials by keeping files pertaining to matters at hand within easy access. Less used materials could be relocated, compressed in size by transfer to another media, or both as a space saving measure. In this case, this practice was also intended to be a weight saving measure so as to put less stress on the foundations of the building. As a final sales pitch on the proposal, Lazo noted that the cost of any structural reengineering for the former hospital could be easily covered over time with the savings on rent that the SCOP no longer had to pay to the various urban landlords providing office space for the overgrown government dependency.

While the reuse of this pre-existing structure was ostensibly done in the interest of administrative and economic pragmatism, its rapid conversion served an additional and critical political purpose. The fact that Lazo considered at least two large medical structures already under construction demonstrated the speed with which he wished to complete the SCOP's new headquarters. Their potential for quick completion promised not only the almost immediate ability to initiate both his and the administration's infrastructural agenda, but also an opportunity to make good on ample political promises within the narrow constrictions of the six-year presidential and administrative term.

The viability of Lazo's political career was judged according to his arguments regarding the national existential necessity for regional and national planning, and the advocacy of technical expertise and management in governance. Prior to his arrival at the SCOP, he had additionally structured much of his professional and planning advocacy according to a lengthy,

political and institutional corruption-oriented, act of "ritualistic deposition." His anti-corruption rhetoric included various verbal and visual acts particular to the discourses of regional planning and technicism and were delivered to varied publics by the platforms he was afforded in the print media as well as in his growing role as a public speaker and statesman. This particular process of deposition progressed from his individual voice via the media and unto more dialectical processes amongst intellectuals, experts, political figures, and others parts of an interested society that had already expressed support of political reforms and national renovation. The dialectical process engaged by Lazo became, to his advantage, especially present amongst sympathetic and perhaps opportunistic members of the architectural profession with equally vociferous calls for internal renovation and claims for political and administrative inclusion.<sup>316</sup> With his firm acceptance into the highest levels of political society, and under pressure from an administration that promised infrastructural development but under the conditions of hedging government largesse and the imminent threat of economic slow-down, Lazo had to quickly and dramatically engage in the final acts of this process of "ritualistic deposition." <sup>317</sup> The last acts of this rhetorical process are considered to be the most ceremonial processes of the ritual and can involve acts of symbolic execution and purification. In situations where this rhetorical process extends into the built environment, execution and purification are architecturally manifested.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>316</sup> For more on the act of "ritualistic deposition" in anti-corruption rhetoric, see: Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetoric of Political Corruption," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 175-180.

<sup>317</sup> Mexico's economic slowdown in 1953-54 was due to various factors. Purchasing power in Mexico had stagnated for years due in part to Alemán's economic strategy of pro-business class industrial protectionism driven in part by high tariffs and devaluating the peso from 4.85 pesos to 8.65 pesos per dollar in 1948. In addition, an international inflationary period began during the Korean War in 1951 lasting through at least 1952. A short, demand-driven, recession occurred in the United States in the second quarter of 1953 and lasted until the first quarter of 1954. The cost of living soared in Mexico, the government sought direct intervention, and the business sector promptly reduced investment and initiated capital flight. The Ruiz Cortines ultimately caved into the demands of local capitalists, offering incentives for increased production and finally taking the serious step of further devaluating the peso from 8.65 per dollar to 12.50 in mid-April – the so-called "Crisis de Semana Santa," or "Holy Week Crisis." Smith, "Mexico since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime," 347-348.

While plans to expand or relocate the SCOP had been conjured up by previous administrations, the act of abandoning the *Palacio de Comunicaciones* on Calle Tacuba for a sizeable and easily completable edifice was a visible and much publicized act that suited the political crises of corruption and legitimization.

The rehabilitation of the hospital structure was viewed favorably by the administration at large and the arrangements for taking over the structure were worked out with the IMSS's director at the time, Lic. Antonio Ortiz Mena, and supported by President Ruiz Cortines.<sup>318</sup> Lazo orchestrated a team that included himself, Raul Cacho, and Augusto Pérez Palacios (all key members of the Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación) to rehabilitate the building for its new purpose; Carlos Obregón Santacilia was cited as an additional consultant. In just under two years, these architects, working alongside a team of engineers, artists, and other technicians, managed to adapt this structure to the needs of the SCOP. The rapid reorganization and adaptive reuse of the former hospital still involved a complex process of architectural and institutional adaptation and various forms of professional and political coercion. The speed in which this process of reprogramming was done owed a significant debt not only to the spatial openendedness of the building's incomplete formal architectural vocabulary but by the fact that it was already organized around a highly articulated yet functionally multivalent bureaucratic program. The reutilization of the former hospital was also aided by the significant amount of pre-existing work accomplished by Lazo with his Programa de Gobierno and schematic for a Secretaría Técnica de Planificación and their elaboration of a similarly hierarchical administrative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>318</sup> A request to publish the government decree that ordered the move of the SCOP from its headquarters on Calle Tacuba as well as its offices in other locations to the new building on Calle Xola was sent by Lic. Fernando Suárez del Solar to the director of the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on December 7, 1953. AGN, Archivo Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Caja 865, Exp 545.2/78.

framework outlining the division of labor, departmental function, and jurisdictions of oversight and coordination.

Lazo, now tasked with a substantial number of political and administrative duties, delegated substantial portions of the architectural work to the team that he assembled. Augusto Pérez Palacios appears to have been largely responsible for much of the initial functional reprogramming of the hospital building.<sup>319</sup> To be sure, some of this process of allocation and adaptation was subject to a fair amount of change and improvisation throughout the first year of the project. In March of 1953, Pérez Palacio's sections of the building's primary blocks revealed that the areas intended to house the unfinished hospital's offices for external consultation were to be repurposed for a núcleo de laboratorios y proyectos - the principle grouping of scientific and construction-material focused laboratories - as well as the center of operations for the postal service.<sup>320</sup> (fig. 4.28) By the following month, an axonometric sketch noted that the postal offices were to be replaced by workspaces for the departments in charge of roadways and railways. 321 (fig. 4.29) By October, a final diagrammatic sketch more clearly defined the function of this block as a space for the projection and execution of Public Works - one of the two halves of the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas. 322 (fig. 4.30) The same early sections show that the block for hospitalization was to be converted to a núcleo de oficinas - a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Note: I make this assertion fully aware that there is a relative dearth of surviving architectural drawings documenting the early diagramming and conversion work on the Centro SCOP. The only materials related to this stage of architectural design that I have so far located are a handful of detailed sketches carried out in ink and colored pencil on cardstock in the archive of Augusto Pérez Palacios. It is commonly held by a number of architectural historians in Mexico City that many of the architectural drawings of the SCOP were in the archives of its successor institution, the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes* (SCT), and that much of these were lost in the earthquake of 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>320</sup> SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. III/53. Núcleo Laboratorios, Proyectos, Correos. UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Croquis, Caja 5, Exp 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>321</sup> SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. IV/53. Distribución, Dependencias, Superficies. UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Croquis, Caja 5, Exp 1.

<sup>322</sup> SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. VIII/53. Esquema de Organización y de los Servicios Centrales Generales (con delegaciones). UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Croquis, Caja 5, Exp 1.

primary nucleus of offices that was to be largely occupied by the telecommunications, civil aeronautics, railways, roads, and tariff dependencies. The later axonometric sketch noted that the offices of the postal services were to be relocated into that block, and by the final program sketch it was noted that the projected function of this wing was more succinctly listed as "operations" of the Communications branch of the SCOP.

Other aspects of the reprograming of the former hospital structure appear to have been settled upon more rapidly. Of these, the most important to be reconfigured by Pérez Palacios was its central block – an area originally designated to house the medical institution's intermediate services. The reprogramming of the central block didn't stray far from the its original intended purpose. Cacho's original hospital plans labeled the central, intermediate services block as a privileged workplace of "first rate administrative and technical personnel." Evidence for a centrally located area of upper-level technical work and administrative coordination appeared in Pérez Palacios's earliest sketches of a section of the building's central block – dated March 1953 – for the reuse of the hospital structure in Narvarte. (Fig. 4.31) We can see that at this stage, the Secretariat's proposed center for coordination was already located within a double-height space occupying the *planta principal* and overlooking a double-height vestibule and reception area on the *planta baja*. This area directly corresponded to the space

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>323</sup> "Anteproyecto Cacho," 44. Note: Cacho's emphasis of the central role that these personnel would play in the administration and higher order medical tasks of the hospital generally reflected the established hierarchies of work within the two main hospital programs being developed in Mexico at that time. This broader concern regarding the integral nature of investigation and knowledge and its role in a development-oriented program appears to have been shared by Hannes Meyer and Neftalí Rodríguez since an equally integrated medical college was a key component to their hospital schematic. Also, recall that the central location or interconnected nature of the intermediate services block was stressed by Dr. Zubirán. He deemed this area in the architectural composition as the prime location for intermediate services such as the laboratories for scientific investigation. Its role in scientific investigation was critical to the goal of the *Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia* in "elevating the level of [Mexico's] medical culture." To Zubirán, the functionality of the block containing the intermediate services was nothing less than an indicator of national development.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>324</sup> SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. III/53. Núcleo Administrativo, Proyectos, Correos. UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios, Croquis, Caja 5, Exp 1.

labeled "gobierno," or government, in Cacho's IMSS hospital competition entry. Pérez Palacio's decided to simply insert the offices belonging to the head of the SCOP into this directly correlating space. Cacho had originally designated all of the floors above the governing offices of the hospital for birthing, surgery, x-ray, and laboratory facilities. Pérez Palacios allocated similarly high qualified technical work in these areas. Above the offices of the head of the SCOP he situated a large office for the elaboration of a "plano regulador" or regulatory plan directly above the offices of the head of the SCOP; in Cacho's hospital plan, this area had originally corresponded to birthing rooms for the adjacent maternity ward and important laboratories. The offices of the SCOP's communications and public works sub-secretaries were above this central planning office, therefore situating the central planning office in between the highest level executives of the dependency, thus implying their expected present role in the surgical and regenerative processes of planificación integral.

The location of the SCOP's administrative services and main planning office within the central part of the architectural composition was intended to improve the performance of this government dependency. Institutional optimization by means of centralized coordination and surveillance was, according to Lazo's earlier plan for the hypothetical *Secretaria Técnica de Planificación*, critical to addressing the problems of political and institutional inefficiency, corruption, and poorly planned and executed constructions. Because these were key (and reoccurring) political campaign issues, the further rationalization – and in this case, integration – of government dependencies in charge of physical and infrastructural development was a critical tool for achieving state and government legitimacy. In addition, by equating the performance-optimizing institutional organization of the medical sciences of healing and childbirth with the national-regenerative processes of planning and infrastructural execution, the architects of the

Centro SCOP charged their architectural solution for their institutional problem with a particularly potent symbolism well suited to the palingenetic nationalist and developmentalist ethos of post-revolutionary *Mexicanidad*.

Assuming that the modeling of the work spaces intended for Lazo's institutionalization of planificación integral was done not only out of expediency but rather with the intent of making planning space similar to the facilities used in modern scientific medicine, this was because institutions and disciplines – particularly new or relatively novel ones as integral regional and national planning was still considered – tend to shape themselves after organizations that are perceived to be successful, trusted, and most importantly legitimate.<sup>325</sup> (fig. 4.32) While the mimetic structuration of a particular institution is often done with a sincere intent of optimizing the functions of said institution, there exist numerous cases when this adoption holds less consequence for the institution's real improved performance than for its claims to legitimacy.<sup>326</sup> The rationalizing results of a particular isomorphic structuration are in such cases often presumed – with presumptions based upon either the prior positive performance of the modeled institutional structure or said structure's anticipated success. The rationalizing results of the mimetic institution can be advertised before being proven, with this prophesied optimization taking on the rhetorical function of a political promise with all its ceremonial or symbolic attributes. Lazo's spearheading of the institutional renovation of the SCOP according to a rational architectural archetype adopted and made common by two largely successful government medical programs would have reinforced a political message that the federal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>325</sup> DiMaggio and Powell, 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>326</sup> DiMaggio and Powell, 148.

institutionalization of large-scale planning was an equally scientific endeavor with vital promise and universal merit for Mexican society.<sup>327</sup>

The architectural legitimization of large-scale, state-institutional planning was interconnected with other legitimizing objectives. The crediting of Lazo with significant responsibility for this architecturalized institutionalization of integral planning, contributed to his political-administrative legitimacy before the eyes of the public and especially political society. His legitimization in turn further aided the prestige of architects and planners in their collective mobility project towards broad and secure state-employment and social situation within the relatively new and increasingly powerful technical and managerial professional class – the técnicos. In turn, the SCOP's highly integrated corps of various rationalizing technical professionals – architects, planners, engineers, as well as scientist and doctors – played critical roles in further contributing to the legitimacy claims made by the institutions – the SCOP, the State at large, the Presidency, and the PRI - that they served. The SCOP and its technicalmanagerial leadership were seen, at least for a time, as a vital component in addressing the political needs of a State and dominant political party that still felt the threat of eroding public confidence and political cohesion in the wake of the perceived crises of moral leadership. Situating these new technical managers – architect-planners – accordingly within a centrally located and highly symbolic part of this layered architectural ensemble reinforced their indispensability to the Mexican State and society as a whole.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Note: While it is true that the IMSS program was fraught with difficulties, those were largely perceived to be of a political nature, and not indicative of any inherent problems in that program's rationalization of medicine. The IMSS later became a hugely successful program. Furthermore, the modern hospital building efforts of the Mexican government during this period were regarded, at least at that point in time, as a significant sign of progress in the state's administration of social justice.

As noted, much of this initial symbolic legitimization relied on public and political presumptions based upon both the prior positive institutional performance of the modeled institutional structure as well as the isomorphic structure's anticipated success. While this imbued the SCOP with a special symbolic power within the federal government, it said nothing of real institutional authority which more often than not is a question of laws, statutes, and their real exercise within governments and society. Lazo's newly institutionalized integral planning had to quickly prove its capacity to uphold the fulfillment of manifold infrastructural political promises. This was not only a matter of effective coordination, but rather a question of integral planning's real jurisdictional authority and the necessary powers tied to control and execution.

## IV. Dirección de Planificación: Expanding the Jurisdictions of Planning

Lazo's lofty desire to situate a national planning body within the office of the Presidency did not come to pass neither under the Alemán nor the Ruiz Cortines administrations. The idea of this new type of federal agency with overarching authority in terms of coordination and oversight over all other secretarial dependencies within the executive branch - which is what the Secretaria Técnica de Planificación in the Programa de Gobierno of 1950 was proposed to do – did have an afterlife in the SCOP, however. What Lazo attempted to negotiate in its stead was an empowered Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas whose proposed functions reflected the organizational structure, functions, and expansive area of jurisdiction for this unrealized dependency.

The SCOP's *Memorias* for the years 1953-1954 claimed that a *Dirección de Planificación* was functionally in existence since December 1952 - the first month of the Ruiz Cortines

administration and Lazo's appointment as head of the SCOP.<sup>328</sup> Despite its existence in name, its functions, areas of jurisdiction, and spatialization would not be fully worked out until well into Lazo's tenure – if at all. At the same time that the Centro SCOP was being hurriedly brought to completion, the legal framework for the jurisdiction and duties of its central planning office were also being written. The framework came in the form of a Presidential decree draft that was likely created towards the end of 1953.<sup>329</sup> (Fig 4.33) The document states that it was authored by President Cortines, Lazo, and Lic. Angel Carvajal - the *Secretario de Gobernación* - and their respective staffs.<sup>330</sup> Changing the functions and managerial structures of the SCOP by presidential decree was not necessarily unusual in the organization of the Mexican State. It followed various norms set by the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado* that permitted the President to have the final word on the assignment of tasks, judgment of capability, and designation of official jurisdiction of all executive dependencies – though clearly, the authors of this "final word" in political and legal speech could come from dependencies themselves.<sup>331</sup> In extraordinary situations where a political or economic matter without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>328</sup> "Tesis. - Dirección de Planificación," *SCOP Memorias 1953-54* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 1954). Note: The pages of this large book are not numbered. The general location of the section devoted to the works of this department is noted in the table of contents, and it appears roughly just prior to the middle of the book.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>329</sup> "Decreto que Crea la Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 59, Exp 193. Note: The date of publication is not present on the draft. Instead, the date of publication is given in blank template form for the dates to be written in. The year is present and stated as 1953. That the document is from late in that year is based on conjecture since a similarly structured document creating a *Dirección General de Proyectos y Laboratorios* was published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* of April 15, 1954. 2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>330</sup> Note: At the end of the presidential decree draft, three names and three spaces for signatures identify official authors. However, given that the *Secretarios* of executive dependencies had in past legislation, such as the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado*, supplied "*rúbricas*" - guidelines, or possibly whole drafts - for the sections outlining their official duties, it is likely that this document - which was located in Lazo's archive - was largely written by him and/or his staff. It is likely that such documents would have passed through the "Departamento Jurídico" of the SCOP, an internal dependency directed by Lic. Tomás Noriega.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> The Presidential authority to determine the competency and issue the regulations that determined the function and jurisdiction of the various executive dependencies was stated in Article 18 of the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado*. The law was published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on December 21, 1946. For the text of Article 18, see page 3 of this edition of the DOF:

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precedent arose prompting jurisdictional uncertainty, the President - in conjunction with the *Secretaria de Gobernación* - also had the authority to allocate or transfer specific matters to the secretariat deemed most appropriate or convincing of its capabilities to handle said matter.<sup>332</sup> The extraordinary circumstances of the onset of the Ruiz Cortines administration were manifold, but the most relevant in this case was the continued effort to restructure the national economy towards a suitable developmentalist model that accounted for the complex political, economic, and social needs of the Mexican nation, the equally critical building of communicational infrastructure to assist this economic effort, and the pressing need to do so in fulfillment of the anti-corruption and austerity promises during the campaign.

The draft restated key areas of administrative jurisdiction for the SCOP that had been enacted at the onset of the presidential administration of Miguel Alemán with the 1946 *Reglamento de la Ley de Secretarías y Departamentos de Estado*. This executive dependency was critical to the expansive and at times flexible developmentalist aims of the Alemán and Ruiz Cortines administrations. It was therefore granted fairly broad authority over a wide range of operations that included the organization, management, and use of communication services on land, air, and internal waterways as well as the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of federal roads, public buildings, monuments, and works of public utility and beautification.<sup>333</sup>

copy of the *Ley de Secretarías y Departamentos de Estado* was republished in the *Revista de Administración Pública* 71-72 (July-December 1987), 317-320. https://revistas-colaboracion.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/revadministracion-publica/article/view/18617/16739

<sup>332</sup> The joint authority between the President and his *Secretario* de Gobernación to resolve issues of jurisdictional uncertainty was stated in article 28 of the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado*. Ibid.
333 "Considerando: - Que en los términos de la Ley de Secretarías y Departamentos de Estado y de su Reglamento, la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas tiene a su cargo la jurisdicción administrativa sobre la organización, manejo, y explotación de los servicios de comunicación terrestre, aérea, y fluvial; así como la contrucción, reconstrucción, y conservación de caminos federales, edificios públicos, monumentos y obras de utilidad y ornato...", Draft of "Decreto que Crea la Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas," 1. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 59, Exp 193. Note: This text is from the preamble of the Decreto draft. It paraphrases sections I, VI, VII, and VIII of Article 9 of the 1946 *Reglamento de la Ley de Secretarías y Departamentos de Estado*. The amended law was published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on January 2, 1947. For the text of Article 9, see page 6 of this edition of the DOF:

However, the *decreto* draft added and emphasized the need for an empowered central planning office to better fulfill the manifest responsibilities that the SCOP's broad areas of jurisdiction entailed. The *decreto* draft explained in its preamble the new planning office's role in the organization and management of this particularly massive and multi-bodied *Secretaria*:

...to harmonize and coordinate the labors of its diverse dependencies it is necessary to establish a special body with suitable powers to carry out the planning and supervision of the elaboration of the annual program of the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* - a program that contains and regulates administrative policy in terms of communications, transports, and public works - remaining under the watchfulness and direct, immediate orders of the Head of the Secretariat so that they can study and resolve the issues that affect the execution of said annual program with rapidity and sufficient information.<sup>334</sup>

The *decreto* draft's laid out a central coordinative function for this office and placed it ultimately under the direct authority of Lazo.<sup>335</sup> As stated above, its authority extended over internal matters in the SCOP pertaining to the annual elaboration of its particular program. Returning to the preamble of the draft, however, it appears that its authors sought to extend the *Dirección de Planificación's* coordinative authority across individual secretarial boundaries. Given the paramount goal stated in the preamble of achieving "technical unity" for the development of the national economy, it was considered necessary to create an office that would not only "coordinate and harmonize the diverse labors of its [internal] dependencies" but would also aid the,

http://dof.gob.mx/nota\_to\_imagen\_fs.php?cod\_diario=198770&pagina=6&seccion=1; and page 7: http://dof.gob.mx/nota\_to\_imagen\_fs.php?cod\_diario=198770&pagina=7&seccion=1

<sup>334 &</sup>quot;Considerando: - Que para armonizar y coordinar las labores de sus diversas dependencias es necesario establecer un organismo especial con facultades propias, que lleve a cabo la planificación y vigilancia de la elaboración del programa anual de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, programa que contiene y regula la política administrativa en materia de comunicaciones, transportes y obras públicas, quedando bajo la vigilancia y órdenes inmediatas directas del Titular del Ramo a fín de que este pueda estudiar y resolver con rapidez y suficiente información las cuestiones que afectan la ejecución de dicho programa anual." Draft of "Decreto que Crea la Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas." Note: This text is from the preamble of the *decreto* draft.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>335</sup> Note: In practice, the *Dirección de Planificación* had its own director, though this did not necessarily diminish the intended role that the head of the SCOP would have had in its internal decision making.

...coordination of labors of the *Secretaria de Comunicaciones* with those of the other Dependencies of the Government and with private initiative in order to integrally plan the system of federal highways, waterway communications, airlines, postal and telecommunication systems, the function of rail ways, and the lending of services to auto-transports.<sup>336</sup>

Coordination was not the only cross-institutional power granted to the *Dirección de Planificación* in the *decreto* draft, however. The power to monitor, or supervise (*vigilar*) remained a constant theme through much of the text - reflective of a general preoccupation held by certain administrative reformers with the sometimes limited powers of policy enforcement held by various government agencies, the presence of endemic political corruption and patronage via contract, and other obstacles to the concretization of plans. In an environment where large federal expenditures could be made across numerous branches of government, but buildings, roads, and infrastructures could still be missing despite their existence on paper, it was judged prudent by the authors of the *decreto* draft to give the *Dirección* the authority to "monitor the completion of the respective programs elaborated by the Federal Government." 337

The expansive powers outlined for the *Dirección de Planificación* were at the core of the integral planning methodology that Lazo continued to refine and propose throughout his political career. And yet, the authority to coordinate, collaborate, and monitor certain projects between the *secretarías* - even if their infrastructural nature legally placed them within the jurisdiction of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>336</sup> "Por último, la conveniencia de la coordinación de labores de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones con las de las otras Dependencias del Gobierno y con la iniciativa privada – para planificar integralmente el sistema de carreteras federales y comunicaciones fluviales, líneas aéreas, sistemas postal y de telecomunicaciones, el funcionamiento de vías férreas y la prestación de los servicios de autotransportes, para lograr la unidad técnica que será importantísima para el desarrollo de la economía nacional..." See Draft of "Decreto que Crea la Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas," 2. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 59, Exp 193.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> This is quoted from section III of the first article of the decree, proper. Said section reiterated the cross-departmental coordinative authority of the SCOP. See Draft of "Decreto que Crea la Dirección de Planificación del Programa de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas," 3. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 59, Exp 193.

the SCOP – would have created points of jurisdictional tension and perceived threats to institutional and individual political authority and power. This was the greatest struggle in the institutionalization and execution of a policy of *planificación integral*. The broad area of jurisdiction that the *decreto* draft outlined for this planning office expanded across the boundaries of jurisdiction that the SCOP had been endowed and suggested the absorption, at least in part, of certain responsibilities granted to other executive dependencies as defined in the 1946 *Reglamento*. The dependencies that could have potentially been affected included the *Secretaria de Economia, Secretaria de Agricultura, Secretaria de Gobernación, Secretaria de la Marina, Secretaria de Recursos Hidraúlicos*, the as well as still-extant *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales e Inspección Administrativa*.<sup>338</sup> Depending on how we read the meaning of "coordinate," "collaborate," and "monitor/supervise," this presidential decree would have created a situation setting the grounds for these dependencies to cede certain powers to the rapidly restructuring SCOP.<sup>339</sup> All of this strongly echoed the proposed powers of the hypothetical

draft's Article 1, Section II, Clauses a - e. These echo responsibilities conferred on said dependency in art. 6, Sec. I. of the 1946 Reglamento. Likewise, the fourth point of consideration in the preamble gives the SCOP a great deal of data collection and organizational capability that could have been at odds with the *Secretaria de Economia's* official primacy in the direction and control of statistics as stated in Article 24 of the 1946 Law. Possible tension, overlap, or redundancy with the *Secretaria de Agricultura* can be inferred in art. 1, Sec. I, cl. c of the *decreto* draft when compared to responsibilities conferred upon said dependency in art. 7, Sec. I of the 1946 Reglamento. A similar situation with the *Secretaria de Gobernación* is present in art. 1, Sec I, cl. d. when compared to art. 1. Sec. XXVI of the 1946 Law. The general duties of oversight and planning that are conferred upon the SCOP through the *Dirección de Planificación* appear to absorb many of the functions that the *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales e Inspección Administrativa* was supposed to perform when it was created, but as mentioned previously, had failed to do during the Alemán administration. Possible jurisdictional overlap with the *Secretaria de Marina* and the *Secretaria de Recursos Hidraúlicos* can be inferred only in regards to the SCOP's jurisdiction over water transport. The general history of the SCOP in the Memorias of 1953-54 suggest that there was already an ongoing relationship with these dependencies, however.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>339</sup> Or, it is possible that with the *Decree* in force, the powers of management and oversight may not have been ceded, thus resulting in a fairly common situation in the history of Mexican state administration and even political and popular organization, of jurisdictional overlap or even institutional redundancy. This process of redundant agencies has precedent in the history of planning of Mexico City. See Chapter 4, "Balancing Party Sectors Through Urban Administration," in Diane Davis, *Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 102-136. In addition, I wish to emphasize that the *Decreto* draft specifically called for "coordination" and "technical unity" - terms that suggest a greater consolidation and oversight of management - as opposed to "technical cooperation." The looser inter-departmental "technical cooperation" was already legally

Secretaría Técnica de Planificación in Lazo's earlier Programa de Gobierno. But the creation of this proposed office, with its broad implications towards imposing a technical unitary politic across much of the executive bureaucracy would have been extremely difficult to achieve according to preexisting law since it potentially posed a challenge to article 20 in the 1946 Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado which prohibited the unequal rank or preeminence of any one executive secretariat or department.<sup>340</sup> The significant powers of oversight and management proposed for this integralist body of planning and coordination, and the resting of those powers under the authority of the head of the SCOP would have been seen by many as a serious challenge to the supposed equal scale of power and autonomy (in reality there was an established hierarchy) amongst members of the president's cabinet.<sup>341</sup> The jurisdictional tensions that this decree draft could have created within the Ruiz Cortines administration was apparently cause for some trepidation. While a similarly structured decree creating and specifying the duties of a new Dirección General de Proyectos y Laboratorios - the SCOP branch housed in the two storied, four pronged block originally designed as the hospital's wing for external consultation - was promulgated and published in April of 1954, it does not appear that the decree draft creating this empowered version of the Dirección de Planificación was ever enacted.<sup>342</sup> While this document stated that it was to be published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación -

expected of executive dependencies in regards to the sharing of data and expertise as designated in Article 29 of the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>340</sup> See Article 20 of the 1946 *Ley de Secretarías y Departamentos de Estado* in *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, December 21, 1946, 3, http://dof.gob.mx/nota\_to\_imagen\_fs.php?cod\_diario=198494&pagina=3&seccion=1 <sup>341</sup> Note: To be sure, there was a real hierarchy of power within the cabinet. The *Secretaría de Gobernación* was a significant locus of much of the State's internal political management. On more than one occasion during this period of state and political party consolidation, the PRI selected the head of this office as its presidential candidate, as was the case with President Alemán and President Ruiz Cortines. The political primacy of the *Secretaría de Gobernación* during the early post-revolutionary period is the focus of Navarro's work. See: Aaron W. Navarro, *Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico*, *1938-1954* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>342</sup> Decreto que crea la Dirección de Proyectos y Laboratorios de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, April 15, 1954,

http://dof.gob.mx/nota to imagen fs.php?cod diario=189163&pagina=2&seccion=2

the principal official government publication in Mexico - it does not appear in the record of this official government mouthpiece.<sup>343</sup>

Despite the legal dead end of this document, the *Dirección de Planificación* still existed at least according to contemporary material published by the SCOP. Lazo appointed the architect Manuel Pizzaro to direct it and by 1954 it was given its own institutional space within the building in Narvarte. It occupied the same place that Pérez Palacios had earlier labeled "*Plano Regulador*" – an entire floor directly above Lazo's office. Its location within the architectural layout and programmatic hierarchy still reinforced the expected presence and institutional power to *internally* regulate granted to the head this major federal dependency.<sup>344</sup> Without the presidential decree having been promulgated, to what extent - if any - this planning body had across the jurisdictional boundaries that separated the dependencies that comprised the Federal Government is subject to debate and further investigation. It does appear, however, that the functional natures of "coordination" and "vigilance" were given new interpretation sometime between 1953 and 1954. (fig. 4.34-4.35)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>343</sup> Note: The record of the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* is public and online. It can be accessed at: http://www.dof.gob.mx. In this research, there have been numerous instances where I have searched in vain for published *Decretos* on this site based on drafts of these government documents found in the archives of Carlos Lazo Barreiro and President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. I have come to the conclusion that many of these drafts were never officially enacted by the President - despite evidence that content from an unenacted *Decreto* draft could end up as informal, unofficial, but nevertheless established practice, a case where at least some of the "spirit" of a law could be in motion without there being any official "letter" to that law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> The *secretarios*, as authoritative heads of their respective departments, had full power to handle and resolve all issues legally under their charge. The internal organization of their respective offices was up to them, as was the delegation of duties to subaltern functionaries. The creation of the *Dirección de Planificación* was apparently transferred from a presidential responsibility concerned with the general competency of his executive ministries and the specific assignment of jurisdictions, to an internal affair of the SCOP concerning the division of labor strictly within the dependency. Lazo would have had the power to create this *Dirección* according to article 24 of the 1946 *Ley de Secretarias y Departamentos de Estado*. Said law did not give the head of a dependency the power to expand its areas of jurisdiction outside of what it was granted by either the Law or Decree of the President – though as just noted when a Presidential decree was lacking, some jurisdictional flexibility, overstepping of boundaries, and other informal practices could be suggested or attempted up to a certain degree.

In the October-January 1954 edition of the journal *Espacios* a diagram of the new Centro SCOP in Narvarte labeled the entire central wing with the functions to plan (*planea*), coordinate (*coordina*), control (*controla*), and administer (*administra*) the construction and operation of communications and public works. (**fig. 4.36**) The first three functions had been developed from those originally assigned to the proposed *Secretaria Técnica de Planificación* and as well as the *Dirección de Planificación* per the dead-ended decree, but with a notably semantic shift: the more acutely vigilant and moralizing sounding function of "monitoring" was replaced with the more mechanistic sounding "control." Significantly, these functions where no longer assigned to a single dependency. Instead, the functional framework of planning, coordinating, and controlling the SCOP's general program and works was gradually spread out to pre-existing bodies within the institution as well as new departments that were housed in the building's administrative nucleus. 346

The function of planning was still in the jurisdiction held by *Dirección de Planificación*. However, part of the jurisdiction of planning now fell to the *Oficina de Difusión*, the Dissemination Office, which was a more technically focused office aimed at keeping the SCOP's personnel informed, trained, and patriotic. 347 It was run by Almiro P. Moratinos. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> Note: This renaming had apparently not occurred by the printing of the previous edition of the Memorias (Memorias 1953) for the SCOP.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>346</sup> Note: Additionally, this separation of functions was apparently applied to every department within the SCOP as noted by a series of schematics published in the Memorias of 1953-1954.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> "Difusión" could also be translated as "broadcasting." This connotation is somewhat revealing in that this office had an internal function of "orienting and training" the personnel regarding the work in their individual departments as well as across the entire Secretaría. One of its primary objectives was to create a "new spirit of public service, patriotism, and teamwork within a common and national work." The Oficina de Difusión wasn't only an internal apparatus of planning information dissemination, coordination, and control, however. It had a connection to the public that was supposedly broader than what could be provided through the press – which is what the Oficina de Prensa was mainly in charge of. Difusión played a strong and more informative part in planning advocacy. It was supposed to "inform the public of the labors of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones with more amplitude and greater technical precision than journalist coverage" and "serve the country by informing, seriously, apolitically, and impersonally about the projects and accomplishments of the Secretariat." This public was undoubtedly made up of educated specialists, intellectuals, and even the professionally-trained political classes. See: "Tesis. – Oficina de Difusión" in SCOP Memorias 1953-54 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 1954)

jurisdiction of control and execution of projects went to the aptly named *Oficina de Control*, an internally focused office that was run by the engineer Fernando Espinosa. However, control – in its trace connotations of vigilance – was now a responsibility partially shared between the SCOP's apparatuses of information production and a broadly defined interested public. The SCOP bestowed part of the jurisdiction of control upon its *Oficina de Prensa*, or press office, which was the institution's interface with Mexico's many news sources. It was run by the historian, and journalist Prof. Arturo Arnaiz y Freg.

The Coordinative powers of the SCOP – perhaps the most essential component of planificación integral - were shared with various technical offices, most important amongst these being the Gerencia de Promoción – the SCOP's more visually propagandistic Publicity Office, which was under the direction of the architect Guillermo Rossell de la Lama. The Publicity Office appears to have formed a central part of the reorganized SCOP since early 1953, though at that early stage it may have still been conceived of as an internal dependency of the indeterminate Dirección de Planificación. Publicity and promotion were practically synonymous with the more authoritative and coercive conceptualization of coordination that was defined by the SCOP. Recall that they were a fundamental part of modern planning at least since Walter Dwight Moody had noted in What of the City? that a planning board's promotional branch was the "dynamic power behind the throne of accomplishment." The SCOP's 1953-54 Memorias underscored the dynamism of "promoción," defining it as a "valuable concept of modern politics" that "sought the cooperation of all national sectors so as to express a true government plan." To that end this apparatus was charged with coordinating and relating the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>348</sup> Walter Dwight Moody, What of the City? America's Greatest Issue – City Planning, What It Is and How to Go About It To Achieve Success (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1919), 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> See: "Tesis. – Gerencía de Promoción de Comunicaciones y Transportes" in *SCOP Memorias 1953-54* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 1954).

SCOP's work – via heavily illustrated publications – with other major government offices and key areas within the private sector. This was done increasingly by the journal *Espacios* which was largely directed towards architects. However, it was done most lavishly by the publication of several large and undoubtedly costly, end-of-year *Memorias* which were presented to key members of the administration as well as to members of the Mexican Congress in accordance with Article 97 of the Constitution. President Ruiz Cortines also received these spectacular tomes in the form of a personal gift from Lazo.<sup>350</sup>

The continued evolution of this dependency as well as Lazo's integralist/integrationist politics suggest the existence of a complicated and contested process of continued advocacy, negotiation, and assumption of increased jurisdiction. While presidential action had not conferred additional jurisdictional breadth upon the SCOP, its mission and objectives, the practice and demonstration of an integralist and integrative methodology by its planning department, and the visual representation of this dependency in its architecture, art, and the exceptionally graphic publications produced by its apparatus of propaganda were nevertheless suggestive of a broadly defined desire for further growth of institutional authority of the SCOP as well as the political administrative primacy of *técnicos* in the new political era.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>350</sup> Carlos Lazo personally gifted these on at least one occasion, leaving them along with his personal card, note, and signature, with the President's personal secretary. Letter from Prof. Humberto Celis Ochoa Jr. to Carlos Lazo, January 19, 1954. AGN, Archivo Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Caja 1115, Exp 606.3/249.

Conclusion: The Técnico Represented and the Breakdown of Integration

## I. The Técnico at the Crossroads: Representations of Management at the SCOP

Carlos Lazo was eager to make the new Centro SCOP programmatically and formally representative of the new rationalizing, integralist/integrationist mission of the expanding planning, communications, and public works bureaucracy. He was also keen on making the new headquarters visually representative of this same mission. In similar fashion to his support of the *integración plástica* movement during this tenure as manager of construction of the *Ciudad Universitaria*, he advocated for the integration of the plastic arts into the overall architectural ensemble. This last task was given to a team of artists including the architect-painter Juan O'Gorman, José Chávez Morado, Jorge Best, Arturo Estrada, Rodrigo Arenas Betancourt, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>351</sup> To be clear, the integration of murals into the modernist buildings of the Ciudad Universitaría was not Carlos Lazo's idea. Discussion of integrating murals and other plastic arts into modern architecture has a long and varied list of precedents in the international modernist movement. In the case of the CU, a strong dialogue towards this end was largely initiated by the architect Raúl Cacho and his close colleague, the muralist José Chávez Morado. By 1949, these two founded the Taller de Integración Plástica. The foundation of this organization was partially made possible by the Alemán administration's recent cultural directives, namely the foundation of the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, or INBA, in 1947. As Gerente General of construction at the CU, Lazo became a leading proponent of integración plástica, and is portrayed as being the figure with sufficient authority to implement the integration of murals into the campus design despite the initial protests of Mario Pani and Enrique del Moral. After 1950, Lazo was in charge of commissioning many of these works. By 1952, Lazo was apparently already in dialogue with Raúl Cacho regarding the integration of mosaic murals into the SCOP, since the two were responsible for founding the Taller de Artesanos – the workshop responsible for the execution of the Centro SCOP's murals – in the Ciudadela of Mexico City. This organization has been referred to as one belated attempt to create a Mexican version of the German Bauhaus – Cacho had also discussed with Hannes Meyer the possibility of such a project in the 1940s. This organization was eventually pushed out of existence due to growing political pressures against communism and leftist politics in general – a political direction that Lazo, as head of the SCOP, took with increasing seriousness after the first year of his tenure. For the role played by Lazo in the inclusion of muralism in the CU, see Alfonso Pérez-Méndez, "Conceptualization of the Settlement of El Pedregal: The staging of the public space in the Master Plan of the Ciudad Universitaria" in Living CU 60 years, edited by Salvador Lizárraga Sánchez and Cristina López Uribe (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2014). 62-63, 72-73. For more information on "integración plástica," mention of the idea of creating a "Mexican Bauhaus," and the polemics that evolved in this movement see sections "Taller de integración plástica" and "Taller de artesanos 'Carlos M. Lazo" in Pilar Maseda Martín, "Los Inicios de la Enseñanza Profesional del Diseño" in Cuestiones esenciales prospectiva del siglo XXI, ed. David Piñera Ramírez in La Educación Superior en el Proceso Histórico de México (Mexicali: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California; México City: Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior, 2001), 3: 385-390.

Francisco Zúñiga. All were commissioned to incorporate their plastic arts - including 6000 m2 of mosaic murals over the building's principle facades.

The Centro SCOP has often been cited as one of the paragons of the Mexican mural movement. Modern Mexican muralism has often been regarded as a didactic interface pregnant with content reflecting the manifold and often contradictory facets of the Mexican Revolutionary project as well as the particular political perspectives of its artists. By the mid-twentieth century, however, it increasingly came to represent a more coercive turn in the relationship between the Mexican State, architecture, and the plastic arts, a shift that has contributed to the characterization of late-stage Mexican muralism's evolution into an "official" mode of artistic production.<sup>352</sup> The complicated devolution of the Mexican State's politic of "National Unity" with its multivalent connotations of center-right authoritarianism and watered-down popularfrontism and the nationalist-developmentalist focused cultural initiatives of the Alemán administration with its founding of the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes (INBA) did much to conform the artistic output to the goals of various state and political actors. However, it is incorrect to state that all of the large-scale artistic output in Mexico City's major public and state institutions were equally engaged in the post-revolutionary nationalist coercive project and the product of a uniform or successful political co-option. The complicated and ideologically diverse relationships to Mexican nationalism possessed by the varied actors – both creative, managerial, and political – that participated in the *integración plástica* movement instead made this coercive transition in cultural output a moment of experimentation and contradiction. With the key role that *integración plástica* played in Mexico's complex mid-century project of modern

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>352</sup> Mary K. Coffey, *How a Revolutionary Art Became Official Culture: Murals, Museums, and the Mexican State* (Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press, 2012), 1-24; Robin Adèle Greeley, "Muralism and the State in Post-Revolutionary Mexico," in *Mexican Muralism: A Critical History*, ed. Alejandro Anreus, Leonard Folgarait, and Robin Adèle Greeley (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012), 13-36.

state construction, its patriotic content took on various new meanings, especially in regards to the construction of new legitimizing cosmogonies of nation-state producing actors. While the hallowed characterization of the historical and revolutionary figures critical to the mythos of the revolutionary Mexican Nation-State persisted and continued to be embodied by the figural representation of the *jefes*, *caudillos*, *campesinos*, and *obreros* of the so-called "revolutionary family," this pantheon expanded over time so as to extoll an emergent hero for a modernizing and industrializing country: *técnicos*.

It is important to note that the earliest representations of the building's possible mural treatment were the work of an architect. Material from the process of the SCOP's early stages of adaptation and re-design portrayed both the shifting perceptions of the arquitecto-técnico in the capacity of planner, constructor, and manager in Mexico as well as the claims to authority made by this new class of managers in the nascent bureaucratic-authoritarian state. The concept of the scientific, authoritative – and heroic – vision of the técnico is fully present in the preliminary sketches for the Centro SCOP's facades by the architect Augusto Pérez Palacios. On an elevation sketch showing his treatments for the northern facing facades dating from February 1953, Pérez Palacios envisioned a nearly nine-story figure covering the terminating face of the building's central north-south block – the location of the Centro SCOP's centers for planning, administration, coordination, and control. 353 (Fig. 5.1) This is the same façade over the Xola Street entrance upon where Juan O'Gorman's mosaic mural, Canto a la Patria, was actually placed. Palacio's sketch was not without its precedents in Mexican muralism, evoking both earlier and very recent heroic, large-scale representations of constructive actors – be they architects, structural engineers, or managerial técnicos – in a state of creative or directive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> SCOP. II.53, Fachada Norte. UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios, (S.C.O.P Croquis) Caja 14, Exp. 42.7.

activity such as José Clemente Orozco's Constructores (1926) - one of the murals completed for the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria; Juán O'Gorman's Ciudad de México (1949) – an outward facing depiction possibly showing us the gaze of an architect or planner; as well as José Chávez Morado's La Ciencia y el Trabajo (1952) – a mural that prominently featured Lazo as Gerente General and is located beneath the auditorium of the Facultad de Ciencias at the CU.<sup>354</sup> (Fig. **5.2-5)** In addition, it was vaguely reminiscent of the central character of Diego Rivera's mural El hombre controlador del universo (1934) in its situation of a crucially important técnico at the controls of a cosmic, scientific, modernizing, and human-development oriented enterprise. 355 (Fig. 5.6 and 5.7) Before the male figure in Pérez Palacios's sketch and under his outstretched muscular right arm are the tools and product of his work: a drafting triangle and multiple construction plans. (Fig. 5.8-10) His head, cast over his right shoulder, is backlit by rays of light. The proposed mural appears to be praising individual might. The person portrayed arguably embodied Mexican conceptualizations of machismo (the practice and social reinforcement of a masculine pride connotative, in this case, of a certain acumen, strength, and vitality), personajismo (a not so easily translated practice that resembles hero-worship, personality or celebrity cult formation, as well as the assignment of impossible capabilities and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>354</sup> Note: This mural is sometimes referred to as "Los Constructores de la Ciudad Universitaria." The Facultad de Ciencias was the work of Raúl Cacho, Eugenio Peschard, and Félix Sánchez. It has been repurposed and is the current-day Torre de Humanidades II and edificios de posgrado, or grad student offices, of the UNAM. <sup>355</sup>For the record, O'Gorman claimed to have devoted nearly all of 1953 to the design of the murals on the Xola Facade, and two facades on either side of the building's central block. More conceptually worked out drawings for this facade exist from between the years 1953 and 1954, unfortunately with no month or day given. It is not certain if any earlier concepts existed that paralleled what Pérez Palacios's quick sketch depicted. It is compelling to think that Pérez Palacios's very early sketch was at least partially inspired by earlier heroic depictions of technical figures such as Diego Rivera's Man at the Crossroads/El hombre controlador del universe; of note, the architect had a very recent working relationship with Rivera during the construction of the Estadio Olímpico at the CU. In addition, at the time of the composition of this sketch, Rivera was the only artist that Pérez Palacios listed by name for a number of commissions throughout the building. In an early check-list written by the architect, Rivera was listed as having two commissions: one for a painting and pavement in the building's vestibule, and another for a sculptural mural to be placed on one of the building's external staircases or ramp-ways. None appeared in the finished building, SCOP. II.53, Calendario General (General Schedule). UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios, (S.C.O.P Croquis), Caja 14, Exp. 42.7.

responsibilities upon a single, typically male figure), and *liderismo* (an appropriated term from English that connotes strong, authoritative leadership). In the foreground of this depiction of a heroic planner, a spherical - either atomic or planetary object - sits upon a table. This was a frequently reappearing sign in the global and atomic age, and one that reoccurs in Lazo's different iterations of the *Programa de Gobierno*. It would have referred both to Lazo's notion of "el sentido actual," which in short was a post-war, socio-economic integrationist, world consciousness as well as the "summa cósmica," which for him was a Vasconcelian and Catholic-Humanist-Evolutionist vision of physical and moral telefinality for the rationally planned society. (Fig. 5.11-5.13)

Compelling though this imagery may be, especially in that it conveyed continuity with a cosmic, scientific, and constructive theme in Mexican muralism that had existed since the early days of the Mexican muralist movement, it nevertheless was possessive of a visual language reflective of both the real and imagined changing dynamics of authority of the planner within the political discourse of technicism. This representation hailed this new professional figure's supposed elevation within Mexican political society to the level of an exceedingly powerful manager, at the service and yet with the ear of a President that was expected to have a certain level of respect for expertise. This image strongly conveys the extent to which managerial architects saw themselves as members of the foretold techno-messianic leadership – moral and empowered coordinators with direct access to executive power and the ability to help will telecommunication and transportation infrastructures - explicitly described as the new tools of "social justice" in contemporary SCOP literature - into existence. This is unknown if Pérez

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>356</sup> "Las Comunicaciones - Instrumento de Justicia Social: Discurso pronunciado en representación del señor Presidente de la República, por el señor arquitecto Carlos Lazo, Secretario de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, en la asamblea anual de la Asociación Mexicana de Caminos, en el Hotel del Prado, el día 20 de abril de 1953." AGN,

Palacios' sketch represented any real design taken into consideration for the building's facade. However, it is a highly valuable, politically symbolic piece of the design process that prompts us to ask similar questions to the ones posed when assessing the presidential decree draft outlining the proposed empowered *Dirección de Planificación*. While the failure of the decree draft reflects a position taken by Mexico's *political society*, given the proposed monumentality of this mural it is important that we question: to what extent was the *arquitecto-técnico/arquitecto-planificador* taken seriously by a general Mexican public as the key heroic, national-regenerative figure of meaningful and transformative administrative and political authority during this period? In addition, with this sketch representing – much like the decree draft – projections of politico-administrative power not taken, what managerial and administrative solutions and ideals were depicted in its stead?

Much as the functions of the proposed unitary and coordinative *Dirección de*Planificación shifted to different actors and internal dependencies in the SCOP between 1953

and 1954, we see a similar functional shift and distribution of roles in the representations of the *Técnico* at the SCOP. If the architect Pérez-Palacios's heroic imagery evoked a vision of a more personalistic techno-authoritarian state, the artist and photographer Lola Álvarez Bravo offered a more techno-dialectical representation of managerial authority and control. Around 1954,

Alvarez Bravo was commissioned directly by the SCOP – likely via the *Gerencia de Promoción*– to produce a series of photomontages/murals. These works, *Computadora I, Computadora II*, and *Abriendo Caminos* were said to have been displayed on a larger scale within the public spaces of the new ministry building shortly after it was opened.<sup>357</sup> *Computadora I* is the most

Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Caja 87, Exp 88. Note: Augusto Pérez Palacios was the head of the SCOP's Department of Social Service.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> Note: A great deal of insight in regards to the possible way that these murals were commissioned and displayed has been offered by James Oles in a number of conversations that we have shared during my research trips to

significant of these in regards to its treatment of the *técnico*. (Fig. 5.14) The photomural's composition moves counterclockwise from right. Its montage starts with a depiction of the southern and eastern facades of the new Centro SCOP. Emerging from the top of the SCOP is a sectioned model of the human head, brains fully exposed; it is nose-to-nose with another sectioned head. Out of these two, rises a massive radio tower. Alongside the entire left side of the photomontage are numerous machines for tabulation and data processing. In the lower center foreground of the photomontage is a man's hand holding a Parker 51 fountain pen, and following that a depiction of two workers. One holds onto a pneumatic hammer, both heads are turned towards each other as if in the process of exchanging verbal communication. Behind them, we can make out a shipment of raw materials being delivered to the project at hand. It is safe to assume that the sectioned human heads, and the large hand holding the pen belonged to a higher-level administrator or planner within the SCOP - a *técnico*.

The photomural likens the processes of computation to the human brain's ability to intake, calculate, and respond. However, while the work ostensibly praises the advent of early

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Mexico City between 2014-2017. Thus far, documented proof of a formal commission by the SCOP is lacking. The existence of these photomontages as large-scale photomurals was, however, confirmed in a later catalogue of Alvarez Bravo's work that Oles had viewed in his research. At the time that these photomontages were created, the artist was assembling large photomurals that were being mounted within other architectural spaces that were being constructed. This was part of a practice known as "visual integration" which in many ways is an expansion of the artistic movement of "plastic integration." Two notable examples of her photomurals were located in the Auto-Mex office building (1952-54) by Guillermo Rossell de la Lama and Lorenzo Carrasco - the general director, and head administrator respectively of the magazine Espacios - and her contributions to a space designed by Ricardo Legorreta in José Villagrán García's Centro Inmobiliario América (1954). The depictions of the new Centro SCOP and the public infrastructural works being completed by the ministry in Computadora I, Computadora II, and Abriendo Caminos, and her role in the magazine Espacios - which was increasingly being utilized as an instrument of propaganda with its general director also serving as the SCOP's Manager of Promotion - point to probable State patronage. As for the claim that these photomurals were displayed within the finished Secretariat, evidence is only anecdotal - Oles made mention that an elderly employee who had worked at the ministry in the early 1950s recalled its existence, possibly in a more public lobby space. For more information on these particular photomurals see Johanna Spanke, "The Photomontages of Lola Álvarez Bravo," in Lola Álvarez Bravo and the Photography of an Era, ed. James Oles (Mexico City: RM/Museo Casa Estudio Diego Rivera y Frida Kahlo, 2013), 138-139. For more on Álvarez Bravo's collaboration with architects see Cristóbal Andrés Jácome, "Model Kit Architecture," in Lola Álvarez Bravo and the Photography of an Era, ed. James Oles (Mexico City: RM/Museo Casa Estudio Diego Rivera y Frida Kahlo, 2013), 130-131.

computerized processing and its role in contributing to the rationalizing processes of bureaucratic management and infrastructure construction, it is also a statement of the integrality of the highest level managerial functionaries involved in the planning process. Illuminating the context in which this imagery was produced is a 19-page summary of Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics* amongst Lazo's personal papers. 358 Though not labeled as such, it appears similar to other memorandums in his archive that would have circulated throughout the ministry. Assuming that the SCOP upper management was familiar with cybernetic theory, and judging by the content of Alvarez Bravo's photo murals, we see an incipient appreciation of the possibility of creating an efficient feedback loop between technical experts and employees. The notion of the técnico as a heroic, cosmic, and divinely inspired *lider* that can will things into existence is diminished, though not dispensed with, in this representation. While the sectioned heads and hand still convey the authority implicit in "know-how" and planning, this imagery also depicts the técnico as a receptive operator utilizing manifold, technologically processed data in order to adjust and regulate a system from designated areas along its circular causal chain. This depiction of administration points towards a less centralized and partially shared - though not necessarily democratic – means of coordination and control of an otherwise centralized state planning body in charge of infrastructure construction. The perfection of this system was predicated on worker communication and the collection and processing of this data by manager and machine, which ultimately translated to the optimization of the SCOP as an institution that could both produce more public works and supply more jobs. These two products were part and parcel of the SCOP's integralist/integrationist promise of social justice. The value of worker information in this optimized system was a common theme throughout much of 1954 and into 1955, and was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>358</sup> "La Cibernética: Comunicaciones y control en el animal y en la máquina,' Basada en el libro escrito en inglés por Norbert Wiener, entitulado: *Cybernetics*." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Caja 54, Exp 101

additionally depicted – albeit in a somewhat cartoonish manner – in a contemporary promotional poster encouraging SCOP workers to share their ideas with the ministry. (fig. 5.15) In similar fashion to the Álvarez Bravo images, the poster featured a vivisected head. The head belongs to a worker, however, rather than a higher-level *técnico*. He is a caricaturized indigenous or mestizo man. Out of his open head jumps a Mexican five-Peso coin with the face of Miguel Hidalgo, a central hero of Mexican Independence. This particular coin was struck in 1953, the bicentenary of Hidalgo's birth, and therefore known as "El Año de Hidalgo." The coin drops, quartered, into four waiting hands – an irony no doubt lost on those who viewed the poster considering that the peso was devalued around the time of the poster's production. 359

Both the imagery of Alvarez's Bravo's photomural and the SCOP promotional poster were reused and re-edited for use in other publications by the SCOP. Notably, Álvarez Bravo's work was present on the cover of a series of bulletins titled "Coordinación y Superación de las Labores de Operación, Administración, Planeación, [y] Construcción" (Coordination and Improvement of the Tasks of Operation, Administration, Planning, and Construction) that were produced in mid-1955 for the Consejo General de Promoción de Productividad, or General

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<sup>359</sup> Note: This image prompts one to recall the popular expression in Mexico relating to the mass expenditures that occur in Public Works typically in the last year of a political term such as a presidential administration. Such a year is often referred to as an "Año de Hidalgo." Given the relationship between public works, networks of patronage, and lamentably cases of graft and fraud, the popular expression goes "El Año de Hidalgo, ¡Chingue su madre el que deje algo!" This particular usage of the phrase "Año de Hidalgo" are unclear – though it is possible that it dates as far back as 1953 or the general era when these coins were struck to commemorate the centenary of Miguel Hidalgo's birth and the phrase had a clear connection to a common medium of currency. Of note, 1953 – "El Año de Hidalgo" was neither an end of term year nor significantly close to a general election – the next elections were for the legislative body in 1955. The period between 1953 and 1954 was however a complex economic period in which inflation had risen significantly, the cost of living soared, workers demanded living wages, private investment was down, and the nation risked capital flight. Ruiz Cortines responded by devaluing the Peso in April 1954. These were the same factors that likely pushed the rapid completion of the Centro SCOP and fed Lazo's sense of urgency in completing the capital and foreign-import intensive public works such as railways and major highways that were already underway when he entered office.

Productivity Promotion Board, of the SCOP.<sup>360</sup> (figs. 5.16 and 5.17) Bulletin no. 2 of this series contained a questionnaire formulated by Dr. Jorge Jiménez Cantú, the head of the SCOP's medical services during Lazo's tenure.<sup>361</sup> (figs. 5.18-5.23) It was not necessarily meant to be filled out and returned, but rather was intended for employee self-reflection and improvement. The pamphlet asked employees a variety of questions that highlighted a certain level of awareness by the *Secretaría's* technical leadership that any aspirations to perfect the responsiveness of the human workforce within the governing agencies of a technologically advanced integral and integrated state could be complicated by certain entrenched practices — otherwise regarded more deterministically as the culture of the workplace. With questions such as,

Was it only due to the circumstance of you being a good person that determined that you be invited to collaborate as a boss, or did your training, talent, and aptitudes also serve as the basis for you to perform your position with dignity?<sup>362</sup>

and,

The position that you perform - Is it the right one for your mental and physical possibilities and your knowledge?<sup>363</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>360</sup> Note: The graphic design and high standards of publication quality point to this pamphlet being designed and published by members of *Editorial Espacios*, which as noted was largely integrated into the SCOP under Guillermo Rossell de la Lama during his tenure as *Gerente de Promoción*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> Dr. Jiménez Cantú was a notable surgeon, founder of the UNAM's University Militarized Sports Pentathlon, and a former secretary in the National Campaign of School Construction between 1948-1951. He subsequently became an important PRI politician, participated as a secretary in the organizing committee for the XIX Olympic games held in Mexico City in 1968, was the head of the *Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia* during the presidency of Luis Echeverría Álvarez, and later was the Governor of the State of Mexico from 1975-1981.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> "Fue solo la circunstancia de ser buena persona la que determinó que te invitaran a colaborar como jefe o además sirvieron de base tu preparación, talent, y aptitudes para desempeñar tu cargo con dignidad?" Jorge Jiménez Cantú, "Sumario Interrogante de Nuestra Productividad" in *Boletín no. 2 "Coordinación y Superación de las Labores de Operación, Administración, Planeación, [y] Construcción*" (Mexico City: Consejo General de Promoción de Productividad SCOP, 1955). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 108, Exp 378.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> "El cargo que desempeñas, ¿Es el adecuado a tus posibilidades mentales y físicas y a tus conocimientos?" Ibid.

The role and value of merit and expertise were called into question - perhaps justly so given the past cases of patron-client favoritism and nepotism in the awarding of government posts in previous administrations.

Likewise, other questions pointed toward abusive leadership, the disrespect of employees and their freedom of thought, and the barriers that closed off the possibility of a functioning feedback loop. These were apparently regarded under threat by a broader work culture that still respected or permitted the absolute authority of the *jefe* or boss:

Have you been blind and deaf to initiatives and new ideas, slowing down progress?<sup>364</sup>

Is it desirable that your satisfaction be based on being a leader of free, intelligent, worthy men and on healthy and enthusiastic joy at work? Or do you prefer to be a ruler of beasts?<sup>365</sup>

To be energetic and effective, is it necessary to be a despot?<sup>366</sup>

Will you be indifferent to a call that is inspired by a faith in a fuller life, which demands the best use of your energies; the contest of your ideas and the dynamic of your concerns; the rectification of your mistakes; the harmony and brotherly enthusiasm of a job where there are no supermen nor little men, bright nor dim; where we will all try to be great in effort, pure in intention, strong in constancy, clear in logic, instructed in experience, prompt and vigorous in action, leaders in truth and victorious in the struggle of today and tomorrow?<sup>367</sup>

Administrative reform was therefore a reform of personnel. Interpersonal work relationships were of equal importance to the more rationalized structural reorganizations of the SCOP.

Despite the new architectural and institutional orderings of the SCOP's working environment,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> "¿Has sido ciego y sordo a las iniciativas y a las nuevas ideas frenando con ello el progreso?" Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>365</sup> "¿Es deseable que tu satisfacción estribe en ser dirigente de hombres libres, inteligentes, dignos y de sana y entusiasta alegría en el trabajo? ¿O prefieres ser regidor de bestias?" Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> "Para ser enérgico y efectivo, ¿Es necesario ser despota?" Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> "¿Serás indiferente a un llamado que se inspira en la fe de una vida más amplia, que reclama el mejor aprovechamiento de tus energías; el concurso de tus ideas y la dinámica de tus inquietudes; la rectificación de tus errores; la concordia y fraternal entusiasmo de un trabajo donde no hay superhombres ni pequeños, iluminados ni obscuros; donde todos trataremos de ser grandes en el esfuerzo, puros en la intención, fuertes en la constancia, claros en la lógica, instruidos en la experiencia, prontos y vigorosos en la acción, líderes en la verdad y victoriosos en la lucha de hoy y de mañana?" Ibid.

the varied personalities within could still impede the optimization of a system designed to coordinate, control, and above all rationalize the exercise of authority. The campaign for collecting worker information was an early cybernetic attempt of rationalizing an internal "quotidian plebiscite" within the ranks of the SCOP. However, the fate of this plebiscite – a legitimizing component upon which nothing less than the future of the SCOP as an integral institution and Mexico as an integrated nation-state depended – still largely rested on the receptive behavior of the bosses. According to his official document, neither superheroic leadership nor despotism were the answer to gaining the public's good faith and trust as well as inspiring the minds of the workforce. Instead, the SCOP management's reception of input from all individuals no matter their rank or perceived mental faculties – so long as this input was conducive to the so called "expansion of life" – was emphasized here as the key to planning for the present and future struggles of the ministry and nation-state at large. The vagueness of what qualified as nation revitalizing input, however, held the potential for a certain – and undoubtedly ideological and political – selectiveness.

#### II. Contested Unity and the Breaking Down of the Integralist/Integrationist Project

During Carlos Lazo's tenure as head of the SCOP, it is clear that the professional and political jurisdictions of planning were in a state of contestation. With the nature of architecture's techno-managerial authority both at a high point and at a crossroads and with the distribution of administrative control, coordination, and coercion in a state of technological and propagandistic experimentation, innovation, and transition, we can be certain that Lazo's SCOP was an incubator for a social and political-economic system that was at once seen as politically

compelling as well as provocative to various forces within the state and party leaderships. And yet despite the apparent importance given to Lazo's planning policy of *planificación integral* and the broader political and professional integrationist project that it was a part of, it is difficult to assess the meaningful success of its implementation during his tenure or their long-term effects. Instead, in assessing his last years at the SCOP, it has generally been decided that he, like many of the PRI's politicians, was, politically speaking, simply "institutionalized." There is truth to this, and yet there are also doubts.

While political pressures from President Ruiz Cortines and the PRI's leadership may have affected the success or direction of some of his proposed administrative reforms, we also know that this general pressure was a contributing factor in the breakdown of Lazo's former ability to successfully craft a synthetic language of broad ideological consensus that had been critical to his initial campaigns for national and professional unity and renovation. Despite Lazo's personal syncretistic, pro-development and at times right-wing politics, he had also once been regarded by some of his architectural peers as a "sympathizer and stimulator of the extreme left in art." While this politically risky alliance had much to do with a common so-called "ultranationalism" shared between Lazo and many of the artists that he integrated into large-scale state architectural projects, it had also been central to his professional-leadership message of unity and was a significant enough approach to Mexico's political tensions that it had garnered both the attention and support of the highest levels of national leadership. By the end of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> Note: Ruiz Cortines was a man who once promised his constituents that "For the Revolution, the homeland is one; All Mexicans fit within it" and who had personally warned Lazo of his "reiterated respect of the beliefs and political ideology of all citizens." However, throughout his term, he became increasingly intolerant of political movements that strayed from the center-right. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, "Para la Revolución la Patria es Una Dentro de Ella Caben Todos Los Mexicanos," *Excélsior*, October 15, 1951. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 57, Exp 165. For his "reiterated respect of all beliefs" and request of Lazo's "technical" – and "apolitical" – views on socioeconomic planning, see: Letter from Adolfo Ruiz Cortines to Carlos Lazo, April 15, 1952. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 3, Exp 87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, "La Arquitectura Contemporánea en México," Artes de México 9, no. 36 (1961): 9.

1953 and into 1954, however, this "unity" – a fragile coalition from its onset – had become all but impossible; Lazo began to alienate many of his leftist colleagues, some of whom were even close personal friends, with his diminished institutional and political support for their creative projects.<sup>370</sup> This trend in his political and professional alliances only seemed to become more acute amidst growing rumors of his political ambition and possible eligibility in receiving *el dedazo* – or selection as the PRI's presidential candidate.<sup>371</sup>

At this period in which Lazo's political actions seemed most salient with the growing anti-communism of the local and global Cold War, his best known role in creating political speech came from a case in which he acted as redactor and censor. His increasingly ambivalent politics translated to a surgent power of veto over the creative output of individuals that had, along with him, ostensibly achieved greater agency in official state projects. In describing his working collaboration with Lazo on the new secretariat building between 1953 and 1954, Juan O'Gorman – a leading member of the "Movimiento de Unidad y Renovación" a few years prior – bluntly summed his political opinion of Lazo in these words:

I had a conflict with Lazo because on the principal wall of the building, facing Xola Street, I planned a sign that read 'Anti-imperialist Democratic National Unity.' This apparently didn't suit Lazo because he was secretly doing politics in order to make it to the Presidency of the Republic, for which reason he ordered the taking down of the lettering on the sign previously mentioned. That attitude demonstrated his bad faith and political stupidity. Luckily for Mexico, he never realized his golden dreams. He died in an accident in the mud of the ex-lake of Texcoco.<sup>372</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>370</sup> The *Taller de Artesanos*, which was led by Raúl Cacho – a left-wing architect and close friend of Lazo's – was gradually pushed out of existence with diminishing institutional support from Lazo. For more information on the ideological turn and the fate of this institution see "*Taller de artesanos 'Carlos M. Lazo*," in Maseda Martín, 385-390.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> Spoken rumors of Lazo's eye on the nomination may have started as early as 1953, if not earlier, if we are to take O'Gorman's following anecdote at face value. A published rumor of his future presidential candidacy appears in "¿Carlos Lazo candidato a la Presidencia?" *Atisbos*, September 29, 1955, 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>372</sup> "Tuve un conflicto con Lazo, porque en el mural principal del edificio, frente a la calle de Xola, había proyectado un letrero que decía: 'Unidad Nacional Democrática Antiimperialista.' Esto, aparentemente, no le convino a Lazo, porque andaba haciendo política bajo el agua para llegar a la presidencia de le República, por lo que ordenó quitar el letrero de la cartelera citada. Esta actitud demostró su mala fe y su estupidez política. Por suerte para México, no

While a very worked out and nearly finalized preparatory drawing of the facade by O'Gorman from 1953 shows that a more neutral placard stating simply "National Unity" had also been proposed, (fig. 5.24) the lettering on the facade, as built, was demonstrative of the greater political breakdowns and transformations in post-revolutionary Mexico. The spot of the placard remained unfilled for a brief period of time until it was simply covered up with blank mosaic panels.<sup>373</sup> (fig. 5.25-27) The aforementioned rhetoric of "National Unity" that in many ways shaped the political conditions that made the formation of the PRI possible had finally been exhausted.<sup>374</sup> While Lazo had been the deciding – and possibly not disinterested – political force in prohibiting the usage of this slogan, the solution to the problematic facade would also seem to reveal a tactful pivoting, under the guise of being the administration's foremost "apolitical"

realizó sus sueños dorados. Murió en un accidente en el fango del ex lago de Texcoco." Juan O'Gorman, *Autobiografía* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonóma de México, 2007), 166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>373</sup> The facade drawing that was consulted is a photographed reproduction within a large binder assembled for a retrospective on O'Gorman in the 1980s. Papeles O'Gorman, Fondos Especiales, Biblioteca de las Artes, Centro Nacional de las Artes (CENART). The phrase "Unidad Nacional" was placed onto panels on this façade only after the building's reconstruction following the earthquake of 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>374</sup> In truth, the complex notion of "Unidad Nacional," as the Ávila Camacho's administration's centrist and incorporative tactic of superficial popular-frontism, had been under attack since the Alemán years, especially as his administration embraced capitalist modernization at the expense of labor, and furthered the breaking of the organized political left. National Unity remained an ideologically fluid concept, however, and Mexico's various disaggregated Marxists still found use in the expression throughout much of the late 1940s, especially since their unity was seen as necessary in achieving broad political balance in an increasingly anti-communist Mexico. Lazo, as a close ally of Alemán and leader of the Unity and Renovation movement in 1950, also conceived of Unity in terms of its implications of National development. However, his conceptualization of this was predicated on a project of broad ideological coalition and syncretism, a vaguely defined popular will, the unity of technical expertise, and empowered executive authority. In the early 1950s, he understood these four components as the key unifiers for the single national politic, policy, and effort that was central to his "Programa de Gobierno"; technologically processed worker feedback appears only later as a possible fifth component of this project. Judging by the rest of the content of the mural, O'Gorman clearly thought of it as a nationalist and anti-imperialist slogan that more importantly focused on the broad unity of the Mexican workers. Also of note in further layering meaning onto this slogan, when "National Unity" was originally conceived in the early 1940s it was imbued with a political assurance: that there would no longer be a threat of nationalization towards non-strategic manufacturing enterprises. For a better understanding of the break-up and various reinterpretations of "National Unity" see Chapter Five, "The Frenesí of Developmentalism," in Barry Carr, Marxism & Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 142-186.

technical manager, away from providing alternative ideologically characterizing words for the institution in its stead.

Carlos Lazo Barreiro died in a plane crash on the morning of November 5, 1955, shortly after departing Mexico City's airport. He was on a flight with technicians from the SCOP as well as several family members bound for Acapulco. The DC-3 belonging to the SCOP was said to have been modified with special plexiglas or perspex windows that allowed both its passengers and crew a better view of the landscape; the purpose of the flight had been to survey the new roads leading to the growing tourist mecca on the Pacific coast. Within the first three minutes of flight, the left engine began to "cough" until it gave out; the pilot, who survived, was quoted in the hospital as assuming the mechanical failure had either been due to a sticking engine valve or a fault in a jet – a thin tube that helps regulate the flow of gasoline into the carburetor of a piston-engine.<sup>375</sup> The pilot and co-pilot decided to bring the plane back to the field, but with one engine operating, only a couple hundred feet of altitude, and low foggy conditions, it was an attempt in vain; the left wing struck ground, the plane violently skipped across the shallow lake's surface, and the fuselage finally smashed and sank into the mud. The crash knocked Lazo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>375</sup> The pilot, Carlos Varela Landini, gave a detailed account of the crash to Eduardo Tellez V., Police reporter to *El* Universal. Varela Landini's opinion as to the causes of the crash were based on his personal opinion and experience as a pilot. Sticking valves occur due to lack of maintenance and oil change, corrosion such as that caused by humidity, impurities in the fuel, or failure to warm up an engine long enough before operation. The jets on a carburetor can get clogged due to impurities or degradation in the fuel. The pilot stated that he warmed the engine sufficiently, that the mechanics at the airport had checked the motors, and that the plane had passed a general inspection on October 30th of that same year. Eduardo Tellez V., "El Piloto Carlos Varela Landini Explica Cómo Ocurrió el Accidente," El Universal, November 6, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45. The pilot's defense of his actions in El Universal are in stark contrast to the coverage given in Zócalo, which sought to blame pilot error and negligence. This later article notes more than once that the engine failure was due to water being mixed with the gasoline. It is common knowledge amongst mechanics that this is something that happens fairly frequently due to improper fuel storage or moisture condensation in vented fuel tanks, etc, The author of this article also noted that such planes were equipped to test for water in the tanks, and in addition noted that the DC-3 was equipped with a dual tank system; a press of a button would have cut off fuel from one tank and opened up the line from another. The article goes on to blame the pilot for his overreaction during the initial failure of the engine, criticizing that the correct course of action would have been to take the plane to higher altitude on the one functioning motor and to not direct the plane into a turn on the same side as the failed engine since that would have directed the plane's weight into the side with less lift. See: Diaz del Villar, "Al Piloto, Dicen se le Olvidó Todo," Zócalo, November 9, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 43.

unconscious, and he died by asphyxia.<sup>376</sup> Foggy conditions briefly delayed recovery, but nearby workers on a public works project made it out to the wreckage extracting both survivors as well as the cadavers of Lazo, his eldest son, and two others.<sup>377</sup>

News of his death was delayed by a few hours for various reasons, but when it was revealed latter that day, it was said to have gripped the nation.<sup>378</sup> 1955 had already been a year clouded by many high-profile political passings.<sup>379</sup> The day after his death, all radio stations fell silent for an entire minute. Mournful tributes flooded the front pages of all of the nation's major papers. Telegrams of condolences flooded in from all sectors of the political, industrial, and architectural world both to his widow, Yolanda Margaín de Lazo, Walter Buchanan – the new and sudden Head of the SCOP – and President Ruiz Cortines. Lázaro Cárdenas expressed his sorrow to the President.<sup>380</sup> Miguel Alemán, who was visiting Baja California at the time, was reported to have been troubled and saddened by the news.<sup>381</sup> Lazo's funeral mass took place in the Metropolitan Cathedral facing México City's Zócalo. His cortege later made its way from the architect's home at Avenida Sonora nu. 80 in the Roma Norte neighborhood to the Panteón

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>376</sup> "3a Baja Del Equipo: Cayó El Visionario de la Patria Magna," *Zócalo*, November 6, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>377</sup> Of the plane's sixteen occupants, there were four immediate fatalities: Carlos Lazo Barreiro, his son, Carlos Lazo Margáin, the photographer Emilio Murguía, and the crewmember Rafael Marín Vivanco. "Víctimas del Lamentable Accidente Aéreo en el ex-Lago de Texcoco," *El Nacional*, November 6, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> A lengthy and detailed account of the crash that pointed many fingers, especially at the authorities of Mexico City's *Aeropuerto Central* and General Alberto Salinas Carranza, *Director General de Aeronáutica Civil de la SCOP* in regards to their supposed "absolute ineptitude" in the response and handling of the incident was delivered in a rather low-budget and not widely circulated publication that featured political criticism and supposed insider information. This publication was called "...y le llaman POLÍTICA: Información Confidencial." Lazo was a regular subscriber to this publication. See: ...y le llaman Política: Información Confidencial 2, no. 24 (November 14, 1955). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> Notable deaths of public figures that year included those of General Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, Enrique Rodríguez Cano, Adolfo de la Huerta, Former *Secretario de Hacienda* Alberto J. Pani, former President Manuel Ávila Camacho, and Ramon P. De Negri. Salvador Calvillo Madrigal, "Tres Minutos," *El Nacional*, November 7, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>380</sup> Telegram from General Lázaro Cárdenas to President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, November 6, 1955. AGN, Archivo Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Caja 0157, Exp 132.2/38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>381</sup> "Alemán, Apenado por la Muerte de Carlos Lazo," *El Sol de Guadalajara*, November 7, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45.

Frances on Avenida Cuauhtémoc amidst numerous onlookers and individuals who had come out to pay their final respects. A visibly grief-stricken President Ruiz Cortines, accompanied by his cabinet members and foreign representatives of state, escorted the devastated and sobbing widow. (fig. 5.28) Despite the presence of the Archbishop, Msg. Luís Maria Martínez, Catholic prayers at the tomb were variously said to have been brief or almost non-existent. The gravesite ceremony most remembered, however, was of a military nature. Before the moment of silence as the bodies of Lazo and his son were lowered into the earth, a trumpeter from the Second Infantry Battalion played; Ruiz Cortines had ordered that the architect be honored as a *General de Divsión* – the next to highest level of Mexican military rank. In his political prophecies of technical regeneration, he had been a critic of military generals being in command of Public Works; ironically he returned to the earth as one.

Despite the outpouring of public grief, tributes in the press, and prestigious symbolic honors bestowed upon Lazo at his funeral, the sentiment of loss was not felt equally across all sectors of Mexican society. It is hard not to be taken aback by O'Gorman's bitter criticism and a certain schadenfreude that came with his recounting of Lazo's sudden death. While his feelings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> René Eclaire, "Hondo Respeto del Pueblo al Pasar el Cortejo Fúnebre," *El Nacional*, November 7, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> A journalist writing for *La Prensa*, noted that the full rite of Catholic burial was omitted, surmising that Lazo's widow, Yolanda Margáin, may have requested only a military ceremony. They then noted that the archbishop only said an abbreviated set of prayers out of respect for Lazo's widow and her condition of immense sorrow. See: "Verdadero Impacto Constituyó el Deceso del Titular de SCOP," La Prensa, November 7, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45. Carmen Baez, writing for El Nacional, said that there were no prayers and no need for any since the "thousands" of people congregated already knew of Lazo's "rich life, his constant work in favor of Mexico, his patriotism, and his ambitions." She also confirmed the military ceremony and posthumous naming of Lazo as a General de División. See Carmen Baez, "La Trágica Muerte del Srio. de Comunicaciones Produjo Duelo Nacional," El Nacional, November 7, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 44-45. Note: President Ruiz Cortines conferred this high military title on Lazo. Curiously, it seems that Lazo had already received an uncommon honorary military appointment since photographs of him bearing the insignia of Coronel exist. Likewise, he carried a military title in a pamphlet produced, most likely by the Gerencia de Promoción, for a military parade organized by the SCOP and held in front of the Palacio Nacional on September 15, 1955 and featuring the Policias Federales de Caminos – the Federal Highway Patrol – a police force that was specifically under the jurisdiction of the SCOP. "Policia Federal de Caminos: Orden Particular para el Desfile," (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 1955). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 81, Exp 1.

were likely shaped by a very specific incident and what he perceived as the failed promise of Lazo's integralist/integrationist project as a potential framework for meaningful ideological and artistic inclusion, there are arguments that his apparent pleasure echoed similar sighs of relief for manifold reasons across both the architectural profession and Mexico's political society.

Rubén Salazar Mallén, a notable – if controversial – political critic, essayist, and law professor, offered valuable though at times speculative insights regarding the political reception and fall-out of his passing. Salazar Mallen noted that the most bitter articles on Lazo's death came from *La Nación* – the main organ of the conservative and right-wing press; he explained that this was due to Lazo being "the representative of *Acción Nacional* and the militant Catholics within the current government." To be sure, this assessment simplified the complexity and dynamic of Lazo's syncretist political and ideological positions and how these variously operated as he interfaced between powerful Catholics, representatives of the PAN, and the PRI's leadership. However, this observation by Salazar Mallén importantly pointed out a broader political pattern that merits more serious contemplation. He was fully convinced of a special popular appeal in Lazo and went so far as liken his presence in Mexican political society to the experience that Mexico had with Juan Andreu Almazán in the elections of 1940.

Almazán was a former revolutionary general with a complicated history of alliances. Eventually he became loyal to Plutarco Elías Calles, and he served briefly as *Secretario de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas* during the presidency of Pasqual Ortiz Rubio. In 1939, he challenged the dominant party – then the PRM – and its candidate Manuel Ávila Camacho in a coalition formed by the newly founded right-wing PAN and the much diminished in power, left-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>384</sup> Rubén Salazar Mallén, "La Muerte de Carlos Lazo," *Quién Es?* (November 1955). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>385</sup> Salazar Mallén, 9.

wing turned social-democrat Partido Laborista Mexicana (PLM). Almazán's coalition lost, though claims of electoral irregularities prompted protests of fraud, wide spread bloodshed, and fear of rebellion. Salazar Mallén was yet another individual who confirmed the existence of the rumor that Lazo was being considered as a potential presidential candidate. He suggested, however, that the veracity of the rumor was not important; the real threat lay in the public perception that his candidacy was a possibility. The comparison to the previous Almazánista threat was most salient in the reality that other powerful candidates were surely under consideration; but what was to be done if "the people" wanted Lazo? He repeated a common sentiment "...in Mexico, the people do not make the elections; but the people can complicate the mechanism of imposition, the people can make the task of bringing to power the one chosen by the ruling camarilla more arduous." <sup>386</sup> Almazanismo had failed not for lack of public support, he went on, but due to the lack of experience of the Almazanistas. Now, he continued, there existed a potentially different dynamic in a right-wing but also syncretistic populism due to the public having been "experimented with." That social environment, made more acute by the success of Lazo's constructive achievements as well as the highly skilled intellectuals, experts, and propagandists that supported him, posed a potentially serious problem to the political machine.

The same essayist was quick to point out how a strange quiet and relegation to oblivion took hold in the press in the weeks that followed Lazo's death. While the crash that killed him was declared an accident, the presence of cautiously insinuative reports of the incident pointed to speculation regarding the possibly suspicious nature of the death of such a prominent government official. Proof of any wrongdoing has never come to light. But rumor, much like rhetoric and speech, carries special weight in the formation of the social and political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>386</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> Ibid.

consciousness.<sup>388</sup> The existence of these sentiments represented yet another breach of trust between the general public and political society that ominously foretold future and more damaging breakdowns of the period's fragile yet still viable political consensus. The sentiment that "political speech" in Mexico no longer relied on physical violence was seriously challenged.

As the month of November progressed, discussion of the circumstances of Lazo's premature passing became an increasingly inappropriate concern for the press. Instead, a more newsworthy story was a professional polemic regarding the characterization of his professional legacy. The polemic managed to once again resurrect the debate regarding the "creative" nature of architecture, the status of technicism, and the validity of the claim that managerial architects deserved the rights of authorship. On November 14, 1955, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, a close ally of Lazo's and the second president of the unified Colegio de Arquitectos de México-Sociedad de Arguitectos Mexicanos (CAMSAM), put forth the idea of honoring Lazo with a monument at the Ciudad Universitaria, which he called the architect's "obra cumbre" or "masterpiece." A challenge to his proposal was delivered on November 25, 1955 in the form of a letter signed by a large group of architects involved in the design of the home for the UNAM. The challenge was manifold, but the key points noted that the honor of an architectural "masterpiece" could only be tied to the architect that designed said masterpiece. The letter writers emphasized that authorship was not an honor to be given to the person that "efficiently administered the work, nor to the one who quickly brought it to completion; nor to he that ordered its material execution in a prudent and timely manner, controlling and organizing the work of contractors and suppliers."389 The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>388</sup> Claudio Lomnitz, "Ritual, Rumor, and Corruption in the Formation of Mexican Politics," in *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 145-164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>389</sup> Note: The letter was signed by Enrique de la Mora, Fernando Fineda, Enrique del Moral, Mario Pani, Salvador Ortega F., José Hanhousen, Enrique Landa, José Villagrán García, Juán O'Gorman, Gustavo Saavedra, Enrique Yañez, Enrique Guerrero, Fernando Barbara, Antonio Pastrana, Hilario Galguerra III, Luis Martínez Negrete, José Luís Certucha, Enrique Carral, Augusto Álvarez. The letter was reprinted in a major newspaper, possibly *Excélsior*,

authors of the letter went on to accuse Ramírez Vázquez's claim as arbitrary and inflictive of serious damage to the architectural profession in that it robbed *designers* of authorship and instead placed it in the hands of government appointed administrators. In the same column where the newspaper published the letter of protest, three of its co-signers then went on to ask Ramírez Vázquez more pointed and insinuative questions: "Was there motive to cause polemic with this proposal?" "Was it a lack of respect to the memory of their distinguished and recently deceased colleague in making this proposal?" "Did he think that the figure of Lazo needed farfetched merits so that his memory persisted?" "390"

The idea for a monument to Lazo existed more than just in Ramírez Vázquez's words, however. A design had been projected by Augusto Pérez Palacios in December of 1955. (figs. 5.29 and 5.30) The monument that he designed was a continuation of similar themes in the aforementioned depictions of the *arquitecto-técnico* as a manager, coordinator, and thinker of complex works and administrative tasks. The monument was to have been situated into a rocky volcanic outcropping very near and to the southwest of the *Estadio Universitario* of the CU. The project proposed a curving ramp descending from the top of the rock formation, around and into a small plaza. The plaza was partially sheltered by the ramp, shade trees, and the almost cavelike volcanic formation. In the center of the curving wall of cragged lava, Pérez Palacios intended to erect a colossal head of the architect, between six to seven meters in height, worked in concrete, and floating over a reflecting pool. In one sketch of the project, it was proposed that a large inscription be placed to the viewers' left. It would have said "To Carlos Lazo, the

and a clipping exists – sans any information of the publisher – in a file in Lazo's archive. See Letter to Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, November 25, 1955. AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>390</sup> Note: The questions were posed by the architects Enrique Yañez, Enrique Guerrero, and Salvador Ortega in the same newspaper column as the letter, under the title "Los Proyectos de la Ciudad Universitaria." AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo, Caja 5, Exp 43.

Mexican *técnicos*, collaborators; the contractors and workers." (fig. 5.30) Within the contemporary Mexican context, the scale of such a visage would have evoked the colossal pre-Colombian Olmec heads found in the states of Tabasco and Veracruz as well as some of the iconography of the Revolutionary Period, notably the sculptures of Oliverio Martínez and Francisco Zúñiga on Carlos Obregón Santacilia's *Monumento a la Revolución*. If it had been constructed, the memorial would have been a rarity in early post-revolutionary Mexico in the sense that massive busts of actual political leaders were an imagined but unspoken language of figural political representation. Though less vital and dynamic than the anonymous *arquitecto-técnico/arquitecto-planificador* in his sketch for a proposed facade treatment of the Centro SCOP, the enshrined bust of Lazo projected a similar, if much more solemn, impression of heroic ingenuity and authority. Taken together, the monument was suggestive of either a real or desired leader/personality cult – certainly grounds for both professional and political concern.

Ramírez Vázquez didn't give in to the protester's demand of naming the "true" authors of the project, and neither did he chose to judge the so-called "neo-paters" of the CU.<sup>391</sup> He preferred to not stoke any further polemic about Laz, especially so soon after his passing. While the ramp in the project appears to have existed at some point, it was likely a pre-existing feature for crowd-flow leading spectators from higher ground into the esplanade surrounding the stadium entrances. No work on the actual monument appears to have ever been started. The professional legacy of Lazo never received any major and monumental commemoration aside from the occasional bust, statue or plaque.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> "No debe haber polémica sobre Lazo" *Últimas Noticias de Excélsior, primera edición*, November 30, 1955. <sup>392</sup> Note: A noteworthy example is a memorial and statue to him in Pachuca de Soto, Hidalgo, which was built in 1957.

The political-administrative legacy of Lazo at the SCOP appears to have been equally contested. So, too, were his policies that promoted an exceptionally broad-scoped approach to communications modernization and both regional and national socio-economic development. Walter Cross Buchanan (1906-1977), an engineer, promoter of radio transmitter development and construction, and sub-secretary of communications of the SCOP under Lazo, assumed the post of his former boss for the duration of the Ruiz Cortines administration. While the basic organizational structure of the SCOP appeared to remain unchanged throughout this period, the focus of the secretariat shifted more and more towards the area of specialization of this particular engineer. Capital intensive road construction slowed down and import intensive railroad projects were abandoned, reflecting both the economic turbulence of the early years of the so-called "Mexican-Miracle" as well as a changing set of budget priorities for the Ruiz Cortines administration in the wake of the currency devaluation; socio-economic integration gave way to economic stabilization. The breadth of authority that the SCOP once possessed was diminished after 1955 with the branch in charge of constructing costly public works largely defunded in favor of focusing attention on operations and telecommunication infrastructure.<sup>393</sup> The propagandistic and highly visual campaigns of the SCOP via their use of the artists and architects within its Gerencia de Promoción diminished in scale and scope, with the notable publication of large-scale and graphic-intensive "Memorias" or public reports, concluding in 1956. In one of his memoires, Guillermo Rossell de la Lama, a protégé of Lazo's and a future political figure in his own right noted with a mixture of sadness and (perhaps self-promoting) heroism and optimism,

Lazo being dead, the dynamics of the Secretariat changed. Although we had the very valuable support of Luis Enrique Bracamontes as the Undersecretary of Public Works, it wasn't the same. But from then on, my group [of fellow

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> Guillermo Rossell de la Lama, Caminos Andados del Politico Arquitecto (México City: Porrúa, 1996), 106.

architects] and I made the ideas belonging to whom we considered our teacher, ours. We reclaimed the staff, and with a more realistic and substantial stance, set out to nurture the supposed 'mapism' of Lazo, translating *planificación* as an inventory of resources for the achievement of specific objectives.<sup>394</sup>

At the beginning of the presidency of Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) – a figure considered by some as an ideological equilibrialist as well as another great orator of his generation – a new Ley de Secretaría y Departamentos de Estado was passed. The integral, cross-jurisdictional institutional claims that had been deemed necessary for the construction of the broadly defined socio-economic infrastructures of the integrated state was definitively cut out of the government's developmentalist plans by the next administration. Claiming a new "demand for the constant capability of public services, as well as a rigorous technical forecast of the material circumstances that determine balanced adjustment of the factors of the collective Mexican existence," the administration faulted – whether correctly or not – the manifold jurisdictions and integral organization of the SCOP as being too diverse and complicated to efficiently or effectively manage the regime's new project of collective equilibrium.<sup>395</sup> The administration split the SCOP, forming two institutions: the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes and the Secretaría de Obras Públicas. During the same administration, the idea of broad socioeconomic and government planning and coordination was ostensibly maintained as a useful tool of political power, though the concept of planning appears to have been interpreted somewhat differently, focusing less on the skills of design, planar projections, and infrastructural visualization and more on technical economic modeling. National planning was no longer

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> "Muerto Lazo, la dínamica de la Secretaría cambió. Aunque tuvimos el muy valioso apoyo de Luis Enrique Bracamontes como el subsecretario de Obras Públicas, ya no fue lo mismo. Pero yo y mi grupo hicimos nuestras las ideas del que, a partir de entonces, considéranos nuestro maestro. Retomamos la estafeta y nos propusimos nutrir, con un ingrediente más realista y sustancial, el supuesto 'mapismo' de Lazo traduciendo la planificación como un inventario de recursos para lograr objetivos concretos." Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> Memoria 1959 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1959), 21

conceived as an institutional appendage of Public Works; not unlike Lazo's propositions at the onset of the 1950s, the authority to plan and coordinate the economy was maintained as a key executive power function but within the purview of a newly created *Secretaría de la Presidencia*. For much of the existence of this *Secretaría* and the broad Mexican consensus on statist economic policies, this institution would be home to more left-leaning economic "structuralists," "Keynesians," and "quasi-populists." 397

Rossell de la Lama and Ramirez Vázquez, who saw themselves as carriers of the legacy of Lazo, remained critical actors in the Mexican State, but in different capacities. Largely speaking, they lost their claim to other professionals as the most indispensable of *técnicos* as the highest-level managers of state administration as Mexico transitioned from its state-corporatist, national integralist/integrationalist model and into a later phase of its developmentalist, technobureaucratic authoritarianism.<sup>398</sup> Ramirez Vazquez's direction of the 1968 Olympics, a little over a decade later, matched in terms of the scale and totality the state-legitimizing and politically propagandistic objectives of the integralist/integrationist projects of the late 1940s and 1950s. <sup>399</sup> But by then, it appeared that the key to such-large scale administrative success, architectural and artistic agency, and service to both the International Olympic Committee and the PRI was predicated on a new institutional and professional model that balanced different capacities of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>396</sup> See Chapter 3, "The Passion and Rationalization of Mexican Industrialism: Rival Visions of State and Society in the Early 1940s," in Susan M. Gauss, *Made in Mexico: regions, nation, and the state in the rise of Mexican industrialism, 1920s-1940s* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> Sarah Babb, *Managing Mexico. Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> By the 1960s, the professional scope of the term had narrowed, as noted by Raymond Vernon's mention of the "economic technician" and their capability "of holding up [Mexico's] end in [international] interchange" through their expertise in "esoteric matters." Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 136-137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>399</sup> Pedro Ramírez Vázquez (1919-2013) is the most iconic and best remembered of these. See: Luis Castañeda, "Pre-Columbian Skins, Developmentalist Souls: The Architect as Politician," in *Latin American Modern Architectures: Ambiguous Territories*, ed. Patricio del Real and Helen Gyger (New York: Routledge, 2013), 93-114; also, *Spectacular Mexico: Design, Propaganda, and the 1968 Olympics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

authority across a corporate-sized private architectural practice, powerful international entities, and various – and at times violent – state institutions.

Images:

### **Chapter 1:**



**Fig 1.1:** José Clemente Orozco, *Los Ingenieros*, 1926, fresco Antiguo Colegio San Idelfonso, Mexico City. Image Source: http://ermundodemanue.blogspot.com/2011/12/jose-clemente-orozco-obras-murales.html







Fig 1.2: Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Pamphlet, 1924. Image Source: Personal Collection.



**Fig 1.3:** Carlos Contreras, National Planning Project for the Republic of Mexico (Reprinted from *City Planning*, July 1925. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 1.4:** Planificación: Órgano de la Asociación Nacional Para la Planificación de la República Mexicana, 1927. Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 1.5:** National Planning Law for Mexico, July 12, 1930. Publication of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works (Correspondence Office). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 1.6:** Alberto T. Arai, *La Nueva Arquitectura y la Técnica*, 1937. Image Source: Personal Collection.




**Fig 1.7:** Alberto T. Arai, "Distribution and Circulation of Physical Matter and Human Matter," 1937. Image Source: Personal Collection.



**Fig 1.8:** Alberto T. Arai, "Graphic comparison of primitive and modern technical thought," 1937. Image Source: Private Collection.



**Fig 1.9:** Letter to the United States with Mexican Air-Mail stamps commemorating the XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y Habitación (1938). Image Source: https://jf-stamps.dk/en-GB/lot/17296/mexico-1938-xvi-congreso-international-de-planificacion-y-habitacion-air-mail-6



**Fig 1.11:** Carlos Contreras Elizondo and Justino Fernández, *Mexico City and its Environs*, VI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y Habitación, (1938). Image Source: Carlos Contreras, *La Planificación de la Ciudad de México*, *1918-1938* (Mexico City: VI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación; Fundación Mexicana de Planificación, 1938).



# UNION DE ARQUITECTOS SOCIALISTAS MANIFIESTO A LA CLASE TRABAJADORA

## CAMARADA:

OMO tu salud física y el rendimiento económico de tu trabajo depende en gran parte de las condiciones en que se encuentra la habitación en que vives y el local donde trabajas, es deber tuyo contribuir a la solución de estos vitales problemas.

- 1 Las enfermedades originadas y transmitidas por la insalubridad de lu vivienda y de lu fábrica.
- 2 Tu imposibilidad económica de sostener una habitación cómoda e higiénica.

La mejor manera de resolver estos problemas de primera importancia está en que des un apoyo decidido a los trabajadores técnicos de arquitectura "Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas", cuya misión consiste en resolver los problemas de la habitación obrera y campesina y de los locales de trabajo y esparcimiento de la clase trabajadora. El individualismo de tu vida presente impide que te organices en casas colectivas, lo que transformación de la labor doméstica y menor gasto de sostenimiento familiar. La transformación social exige la mejora del lugar donde se vive.

La nueva casa del trabajador debe tener estas características:

- 1 Asoleamiente, iluminación, ventilación e instalaciones sanitarias oficientes.
- 2 Economía como resultado de la industrialización de la vivienda y del aprovechamiento colectivo de sus servicios.

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**Fig 1.11:** Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas, *Manifesto to the Working Class*, VI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y Habitación, (1938). Image Source: Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas, *Proyecto de la ciudad obrera en México, D.F. Doctrina socialista de la arquitectura, México, ponencia al XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, agosto de 1938 (Mexico City: XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, 1938).* 






Fig 1.12: Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas, Distribution Schematic of the parts of the Workers' City, VI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y Habitación, (1938). Image Source: Image Source: Unión de Arquitectos Socialistas, Proyecto de la ciudad obrera en México, D.F. Doctrina socialista de la arquitectura, México, ponencia al XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, agosto de 1938 (Mexico City: XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación, 1938).

### **Chapter 2:**



**Fig 2.1-4:** Mario Pani, Alberto J Pani, Vladimir Kaspe, *Arquitectura*, vols. 1-2, 12, 19. Image Source: Raíces Digitales.





**Fig 2.5-6:** Lic. E. Diáz Garcia, Ing. José A. Cuevas; Almiro P. Moratinos, Ing. Alberto Dovali, *Construcción: Revista de la Producción Nacional / Revista de Ingenieria, Arquitectura, Arte, Decoración, e Industría.* Image Source: Raíces Digitales.






**Fig 2.7-8:** Lorenzo Favela, Gral. Héctor F. López, Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, *Arquitectura y lo démas*, vol. 1, no. 1; vol. 1, no. 3. Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 2.9-10:** *La Nación: Síntesis Semanaria de la Vida Nacional* (Weekly Synthesis of National Life). On image at right, Mauricio Gómez Mayorga can be seen at the lower far left of the page. Image Source: https://www.filosofia.org/hem/med/m056.htm

## JOVENES QUE TRIUNFAN A la hora de entrar este número en caja nos enteramos de que se ha otorgado la beca Delano Aldrich, creada por el Instituto de Arquitectos A:nericancs. Antes esta beca se otorgaba para Europa, pero las circunstancias actuales han obligado a pasarla a México. La Sociedad de Arquitectos Mexicanos convecó por med'o de la Prensa a los arquitectos nacionales menores de 35 años para participar en el concurso, que consistía en lo siguiente: a) Prueba de composición, "Urbanización de Tampico", b) Antecedentes estudiantiles y profesionales. c) Itinerario para aprovechamiento de la beca, por un mínimo de seis meses. El jurado lo constituyeron el Sr. Carlos Contreras, arquitecto presidente de la Comisión de Planiticación de la República Mexicana; Sr. Carlos Tarditti, arquitecto presidente de la Sociedad de Arquitectes; Mauricio Campos, director de la Escuela Nacional de Arquitectura. Se inscribieron 12 arquitectos y concursaron 10, seleccionándose los cuatro siguientes: 1e., Carlos Lazo; 2e., Alberto T. Arai; 3e., Parra; 40., Alonso Mariscal. Se destacó la simplicidad de la solución de Carlos Lazo en cuanto a la resolución del problema urbano externo (urbanización de las zonas externas de la parte poblada). La única modificación en la pobla-Nos complacemos en felicitar cariñosamente al ción ya construída consistió en el trazo de las avejeven arquitecto Carlos Lazo por el triunfo obtenido. nidas y calles de ligazón, marcando perfectamente El becario saldrá para América en los primeros días las diferentes zonas de habitación, fabriles, etc. de octubre.

**Fig 2.11:** Photo of Carlos Lazo Barreiro in *Construcción* 20 (September 1942). AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 2.12:** Carlos Lazo, "La Planficación y la Política" and "Anthology of José Ortega y Gasset" compiled by Almiro P. Moratinos, in *Construcción* (July 1946). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.






Fig 2.13: Synthesis of Government Program for Miguel Alemán. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.

	TE NACIONAL ALEMANISTA  OFICINAS GENERALES: PASEO DE LA REFORMA NUM. 19  MEXICO, D. F.
	Al contestar sírvase citar: Dependencia Oficialía Mayor. Exp. Núm.
CONTRAL: Depart	Of. Núm
LIC. RAMON BETETA	
SIGN DE GROANIZACIONI  LIC. ESTEBAN GARCIA DE ALBA SIGN DE CONTES DE ESTADO: LIC. GESTAVO CARDENAS HUERTA DO. DE DELEGACIONES NACIONALES: DO. DE DELEGACIONES NACIONALES: DO. DE COORDINACION INTERIORI LIC. ANTONIO MARTINEZ BAEZ SIGN DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES: DR. IGNACIO MORONES SEO. DE PRODAGANDA: LIC. ALEJANDRO CARRILLO SIGN DE ASUNTOS ETECNICOS MILITARES: GRAL E ING. JOSE T. GARCIA SEO. DE ESTADISTICA: LIC. ÁCUSTIN GARCIA LOPEZ SIGN. DE ACCION SOCIALI: LIC. ERNESTO P. URUCHURTU SIGN. DE JIRAS: GRAL. RAUL MADERO	El señor Licenciado Don Miguel Alemán, candidato a la Presidencia de la República, tomando en cuenta la adhesión de usted a su candidatura y los antecedentes de preparación que le distinguen, ha tenido a bien conferirle nombramiento como miembro de la Comisión de Programa en el Comité Nacional encargado de dirigir y de - orientar los correspondientes trabajos electorales.
	Al comunicarlo a usted, significándole mi personal complacencia por la designación mencionada, espero que prestará al Comité Nacional que presido su entusiasta colaboración para el logro del mejor éxito en nuestras comunes y arduas labores.
Oncial Mator:  SANTIAGO DE LA VEGA TIMORERO:  SEALTIEL ALATRISTE JR.	Afectuosamente.
Consultores Juridicos: Lic, Gabriel Garcia Rojas Lic, Manuel Ramirez Vazquez	México, D. F., a lo. de cotubre de 1945.
LIC. CARLOS FRANCO SODI COMISSIONES:	El Secretario General.
De Finanzas: Lic. Aaron Saenz Cultural: Maestro Carlos Chavez	21-
Educativa: Lic. Alfonso Caso	Ramon Beteta.
	Al C. Ing. Carlos Lazo. Presente.
	SRV/rzg.  MORALES REGIRAN NUESTROS ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS IGUAL MORALIDAD A  MORALES OUE INTERVIENEN EN LA VIDA DE LA NACION". LIC. MIGUEL ALEMAN
"PROCEDIMIENTOS TODOS LOS SECTORES	MORALES REGIRAN NUESTROS ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS IGUIL MORALES ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS Y RECLAMAREMOS ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS Y RECLAMAREMOS ACTOS Y RECLAMAREMOS Y RECLAM


**Fig 2.14:** Letter from Ramón Beteta to Carlos Lazo regarding his adherence to the Program Commission, October 1, 1945. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 2.15:** Carlos Lazo, General Circulation Plan for the town of Debode, (Valle del Mezquital), State of Hidalgo, Mexico (1936). Image Source: *AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro*.




**Fig 2.16:** Carlos Lazo, Plan of town center and unidades for the town of Debode, (Valle del Mezquital), State of Hidalgo, Mexico (1936). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 2.17:** Carlos Lazo, Plan for growth of town of Debode, (Valle del Mezquital), State of Hidalgo, Mexico (1936). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 2.18:** Carlos Lazo, Zone no. 1, Municipio del Cardonal, (Valle del Mezquital), State of Hidalgo, Mexico (1936). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 2.19:** Coverage on Lazo's receipt of the Delano-Aldrich Award in Lorenzo Favela's column, "Urbanismo y Arquitectura" in *Excelsior* (1943). Reprinted in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 11 (1948). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 2.20:** Carlos Lazo, *Planificación*, Presentation given by Carlos Lazo Jr. as delegate of the Society of Mexican Architects at the National Welfare Congress (1943). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.


## **Chapter 3:**



**Fig 3.1:** Ley de Bienes Nacionales (Law of National Assets). Image Source: *Ley General de Bienes Nacionales*. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Dirección de Bienes Nacionales, 1945). Image Source: *AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro*.




**Fig 3.2:** Lazo's letter of Appointment as Oficial Mayor in the *Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales*, July 1, 1947. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Miguel Alemán Valdes



AUNQUE LA PLANTA DE LA CASA FUE TRAZADA CON UNA VARITA, LA CURIOSIDAD DE TENA ENCONTRO SU TRAZO ESQUEMATICO Y ASI HUBO RETORNO A LA GEOMETRIA. NO PUDIENDO HABER FUGA TOTAL, UNA CASA COMO LA DE SIERRA LEONA AL MENOS PERMITE HUIR DE LA CIUDAD EN LA CIUDAD.


**Fig 3.3:** Carlos Lazo, Barreiro, Plan of House for Dr. Palacios – the "cosmic-atomic" and subterranean "*cueva civilizada*" at Sierra Leona No. 374 in Lomas de Chapultepec. Published in "La Arquitectura Cósmico-Atómica o de la Cueva Civilizada de Carlos Lazo, Jr." *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 11 (May 1947-March 1948). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 3.4:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Section of House for Dr. Palacios. Published in "La Arquitectura Cósmico-Atómica o de la Cueva Civilizada de Carlos Lazo, Jr." *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 11 (May 1947-March 1948). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 3.5:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Exterior of House for Dr. Palacios. Published in "La Arquitectura Cósmico-Atómica o de la Cueva Civilizada de Carlos Lazo, Jr." *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 11 (May 1947-March 1948). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 3.6:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Interior of House for Dr. Palacios. Published in "La Arquitectura Cósmico-Atómica o de la Cueva Civilizada de Carlos Lazo, Jr." *Arquitectura y lo Demás* 11 (May 1947-March 1948). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 3.7:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro (drawn by J. Gonzales Naranjo), "Programa de Gobierno" schematic conceived during his tenure at the *Secretaría de Bienes Nacionales* (1948). Image Source: Carlos Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Editorial Espacios, 1952).




**Fig 3.8:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, "Programa de Gobierno" (1950), General Plan and outline of articles in *Excélsior*. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 3.9:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, "Programa de Gobierno" (1950), Index of article topics in *Excélsior*. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 3.10:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, "Programa de Gobierno" (1950), Schematic of plans (including those for *Ejes, Zonas Vitales*, and *Unidades Regionales* for the synthetic "Plan de México," Proof sent to *Excélsior*. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro



**Fig 3.10:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (c. 1948; reprinted in 1952), Earlier study for larger "Unidades Regionales" that shows the subdivision of the national territory into three regions. Image Source: Carlos Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Editorial Espacios, 1952).



**Fig 3.11:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (c. 1948; reprinted in 1952), Earlier study for larger "Zonas Vitales" that shows the categorization of the zones into organic and inorganic material. Image Source: Carlos Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Editorial Espacios, 1952).



**Fig 3.11:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (c. 1948; reprinted in 1952), Earlier study for larger "Ejes Nacionales" showing networks for roads, railways, airways, rivers and other waterways, oil and electrical grids. Image Source: Carlos Lazo, *México: Programa de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Editorial Espacios, 1952).





Fig 3.12: Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (1950), Funcional Schematic for Public Organization. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.13:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (1950), Organization of the Executive Branch. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.





Fig 3.14: Carlos Lazo Barreiro, *Programa de Gobierno* (1950), Secretariat of Planning for the Presidency. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.15:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, Administrative Schematic for the Ciudad Universitaria de México (c. 1950-51). Image Source: Archivo Pedro Ramírez Vázquez.







**Fig 3.16-17:** President Miguel Alemán visiting the Ciudad Universitaria under construction (c. 1951). Image Source: AHUNAM, Fondo Saúl Molina/Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.18:** Carlos Lazo presenting model to students (c. 1951). Image Source: Carlos Lazo, *Pensamiento y Destino de la Ciudad Universitaria de México* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1983).



**Fig 3.19:** "To the Members of the Society of Mexican Architects: Unity and Renovation Movement," (1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.20:** News clippings of redbaiting Carlos Lazo and the Unity and Renovation Movement in *Ultimas Noticias*, December 14, 1950. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.


Los A<del>rquit</del>ectos Repudian a los Rojos y se Agrupan

Ninguno de nosotros estamos inmiscuidos a ideologías o finalidades que no sean las estrictamente del gremio de arquitectos y consideramos mezquinas las imputaciones que de comunistas se nos han hecho, y nuestro objeto no es otro que el de colaborar por el prestigio de la profesión y por la grandeza de México.






**Fig 3.21-3.23:** Various news clippings of ideological refutation, renewed elections for the movement, and an accord made between architects and "engineers" as well as between Federico Mariscal and Carlos Lazo (1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 3.24:** Plans and facades showing the adaptive reuse of a house on Avenida Veracruz, no 24 for the Casa del Arquitecto Mexicano (c. 1951). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.25:** Detail of CAMSAM pamphlet showing the location of the Casa del Arquitecto Mexicano (mid-1950s). Image Source: *Archivo Pedro Ramírez Vázquez* 




**Fig 3.26:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, "Planning as a Means" in *Programa de Gobierno* (1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro




**Fig 3.27:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro, "The Atomic Age," in *Programa de Gobierno* (1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 3.28:** Carlos Lazo Barreiro at a formal dinner with fellow architects. A Mexican baroque crucifix is in the background, and a mirrored globe is used as a centerpiece at the table. (c. 1952). *Archivo Pedro Ramírez Vázquez* 



**Fig 3.29:** Organizational Schematic for proposed Instituto de Planificación at the UNAM (c. 1950-51). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.30 and 3.31:** Carlos Lazo, Drawings of Crosses possibly connected with his affiliation with *Acción Catolica* while completing his university studies (late 1930s). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.32:** Carlos Lazo, Mexico: Programa de Gobierno, Cover of Presentation Copy (c. 1948-1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.33:** Carlos Lazo, Mexico: Programa de Gobierno, Exhibition at the VIII *Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos* (1952). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.34:** Carlos Lazo, Mexico: Programa de Gobierno, Exhibition at the VIII *Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos* (1952). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.35:** Carlos Lazo, Mexico: Programa de Gobierno, Exhibition at the VIII *Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos* (1952). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 3.35:** Cabinet of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines with Carlos Lazo on left page at center. (1952/3). Image Source: https://www.facebook.com/carloslazobarreiro




**Fig 3.36:** Act of appointment and assumption of duties, Ruiz Cortines embracing Lazo (1953). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.


## **Chapter 4:**



Fig 4.1: Silvio Contri, Palacio de Comunicaciones, (1904-1911), Photograph c. early 1950s




**Fig 4.2:** Plan of Palacio de Comunicaciones, (1904-1911), Entrance on Calle Tacuba, *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.3:** Workspaces in Palacio de Comunicaciones, Published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.

LA FALTA DE ESPACIO ORIGINABA, SEGUN SE APRECIA EN LA FOTOGRAFIA DE ABAJO, UN COMPLICADO Y LENTO SISTEMA DE TRABAJO QUE CONTRASTA CON EL ORDENAMIENTO DEL NUEVO CENTRO DONDE CADA ELEMENTO DE TRABAJO TIENE UN LUGAR DETERMINADO.




**Fig 4.4:** Workspaces in Palacio de Comunicaciones, Published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.5:** Workspaces in Palacio de Comunicaciones, Published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.6:** "Plan Nacional de Comunicaciones," published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.7:** Aerial photo showing dispersion of numerous offices institutionally, but not physically, connected to the Palacios de Comunicaciones, published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.8:** Map showing the relocation and centralization of offices into the new Centro SCOP in Narvarte, published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.9:** Schematic for Centro SCOP with administrative functions and rationalized placing of formerly dispersed departments, published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.10:** Aerial photo showing new Centro SCOP with administrative functions, published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.11:** Hannes Meyer, Dr. Neftalí Rodríguez, Functioning diagram for the First Zone Hospital (1944), Image from: Raquel Franklin Unkind, "Hannes Meyer in Mexico, 1939-1949" (PhD diss, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 1997.




**Fig 4.12:** "The three main functions of a hospital," in Dr. Salvador Zubirán, "Los Nuevos Hospitales de México, Consideraciones sobre la Técnica de su Planeación y Funcionamiento," *Arquitectura* 15 (April 1944). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




Las cuatro partes fundamentales de un Hospital.


**Fig 4.13:** "The Four fundamental parts of a Hospital," in Dr. Salvador Zubirán, "Los Nuevos Hospitales de México, Consideraciones sobre la Técnica de su Planeación y Funcionamiento," *Arquitectura* 15 (April 1944). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.13:** Enrique Yañez, "Yañez Competition Project" General perspective. "Anteproyecto Yañez," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.14:** Enrique Yañez, "Yañez Competition Project" Site plan with building footprint (1944). "Anteproyecto Yañez," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.15:** Enrique Yañez, "Yañez Competition Project," Facades, (1944). "Anteproyecto Yañez," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.16:** Enrique Yañez, "Yañez Competition Project," Plans and Axonometric Perspective, (1944). "Anteproyecto Yañez," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.17:** Raúl Cacho, First Zone Hospital Project, General perspective. "Anteproyecto Cacho," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.18:** Raúl Cacho, First Zone Hospital Project, Site plan with building footprint. (1944). "Anteproyecto Cacho," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945) Note that the plan was published 90 deg. counterclockwise from the Yañez plan; both shared the same orientation. Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.19:** Raúl Cacho, First Zone Hospital Project, Facades (1944). "Anteproyecto Cacho," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.20:** Raúl Cacho, First Zone Hospital Project, Aerial View (1944). "Anteproyecto Cacho," in *Arquitectura y lo demás* 1 (May 1945). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.21:** Augusto Pérez Palacios, SCOP. I.53, Manzana Narvarte (Narvarte Block). At lower right, there is a labeled diagram of the hospital building. Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios.



**Fig 4.22:** View of open plan of the Centro SCOP, in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.23:** View of open plan of the Centro SCOP with metal partitions, in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.



**Fig 4.24:** View of open plan of the Centro SCOP with metal and glass partitions, in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.25:** "Minimal Workspaces," of the Centro SCOP in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.26:** "Minimal Workspaces," of the Centro SCOP in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.27:** Wide circulation paths of the Centro SCOP in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig 4.28:** Augusto Pérez Palacios, SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. III/53. Núcleo Laboratorios, Proyectos, Correos. Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios.




**Fig 4.29:** Augusto Pérez Palacios, SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. IV/53. Distribución, Dependencias, Superficies. Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios.




**Fig 4.30:** Augusto Pérez Palacios, SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. VIII/53. Esquema de Organización y de los Servicios Centrales Generales (con delegaciones). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios.




**Fig 4.31:** Augusto Pérez Palacios, SCOP. Nuevo Edificio. III/53. Núcleo Administrativo, Proyectos, Correos. Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Augusto Pérez Palacios.



**Fig 4.32:** Clockwise from bottom left: section of Augusto Pérez Palacios's Núcleo Administrativo (1953); section of Raul Cacho's Proposal for Intermediate Services (1944); Floorplans from Cacho's Intermediate Services; Floorplans of Centro SCOP as published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954)






**Fig 4.33:** "Decree creating the SCOP Program Planning Management Office" (1953). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig 4.34:** Schematic showing internal organization of the *Dirección de Planificación* from the *Memorias* 1952-53, vol. 1 (1953). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 4.35:** Schematic showing reorganization of departments and functions from the *Memorias* 1953-1954, (1954). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig 4.36:** Diagram of SCOP functions as published in *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.


## **Conclusion:**



**Fig. 5.1**: Augusto Pérez Palacios, sketch for north facade of the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works (February 1953). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios.




**Fig. 5.2**: José Clemente Orozco, "Los Constructores," (1926) Escuela Nacional Preparatoria, Antiguo Colegio de San Idelfonso. Image Source: https://jorgalbrtotranseunte.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/dsc\_8563.jpg



**Fig. 5.3**: Juán O'Gorman, "La Ciudad de México," (1949), Philadelphia Museum of Art. Image Source: https://www.trbimg.com/img-5833905f/turbine/la-cknight-1479774326-snap-photo





**Fig. 5.4 and 5.5**: José Chavez Morado, "La Ciencia y el Trabajo," (1952), *Facultad de Ciencias* at the CU. Image Source:

https://twitter.com/CulturaUNAM/status/1256307299510960129/photo/1





**Fig. 5.6 and 5.7**: Diego Rivera, "El Hombre, Controlador del Universo," (1934), Palacio de Bellas Artes. Image Source: http://conservacion.administromuseo.com/imagenes/el-hombre-en-la-encrucijada.jpg



**Fig. 5.8**: Augusto Pérez Palacios, Detail of sketch for north facade of the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works (February 1953). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios.



**Fig. 5.9**: Carlos Lazo presenting plans at the Palacio de Comunicaciones, 1953. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig. 5.10**: Carlos Lazo working from his office, c. 1948-1950. Image Source: AHUNAM, Fondo Saúl Molina/Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig. 5.11**: Carlos Lazo working from his home office at Avenida Sonora, no 80, c. 1950-52. A drawing of the "Summa Cósmica: Evolution of Evolutions" is in the background. Image Source: Fondo Saúl Molina Barbosa/Carlos Lazo Barreiro, IISUE/AHUNAM





**Fig. 5.12 (Left)**: Augusto Perez Palacios, Detail atomic or cosmic object in sketch for north facade of the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works (February 1953). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios. **Fig. 5.13 (Right)**: Carlos Lazo, "Sentido Actual" – diagram of an atomic earth as well as an aerially interconnected earth in *Programa de Gobierno* (1950). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig. 5.14**: Lola Álvarez Bravo, *Computadora I* (1954). Image Source: http://designworklife.com/2014/02/12/lola-alvarez-bravo/




**Fig. 5.15**: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, "¡Díganos sus ideas!" (c.1954-1955). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.







**Fig. 5.16 and 5.17**: Coordination and Improvement of the Tasks of Operation, Administration, Planning, and Construction (1955). Image Source: *AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro* 








**Fig. 5.18-20**: J. Jiménez Cantú, "Questionnaire of our Productivity," Coordination and Improvement of the Tasks of Operation, Administration, Planning, and Construction (1955). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.








**Fig. 5.21-23**: J. Jiménez Cantú, "Questionnaire of our Productivity," Coordination and Improvement of the Tasks of Operation, Administration, Planning, and Construction (1955). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig. 5.24**: Juán O'Gorman, "Canto a la Patria," (1953). Image Source: *Papeles O'Gorman, Fondos Especiales, Biblioteca de las Artes, Centro Nacional de las Artes* (CENART).






**Fig. 5.25-5.26**: Construction of the Centro SCOP; Juán O'Gorman's unfinished "Canto a la Patria," with missing panels for the sign/banner. (1954). Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.




**Fig. 5.27**: Calle Xola entrance of the Centro SCOP; Juán O'Gorman's "Canto a la Patria" with blank mosaic panels for the sign/banner. *Espacios* 21-22 (1954). Image Source: Raíces Digitales.




**Fig. 5.28**: "The Tragic Death of the Secretary of Communications produced Nacional Mourning," *El Nacional*, November 7, 1955. Image Source: AGN, Archivo Carlos Lazo Barreiro.



**Fig. 5.28**: Augusto Pérez Palacios, Perspective of Monument to Carlos Lazo (After December 1955). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios.



**Fig. 5.29**: Augusto Pérez Palacios, Plan of Monument to Carlos Lazo (December 1955). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios.



**Fig. 5.30**: Augusto Pérez Palacios, Monumental bust of Carlos Lazo (December 1955). Image Source: UNAM Facultad de Arquitectura, Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos, Fondo Augusto Pérez Palacios.

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