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# What Is an Object File?

E. J. Green and Jake Quilty-Dunn

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The notion of an object file figures prominently in recent work in philosophy and cognitive science. Object files play a role in theories of singular reference, object individuation, perceptual memory, and the development of cognitive capacities. However, the philosophical literature lacks a detailed, empirically informed theory of object files. In this article, we articulate and defend the multiple-slots view, which specifies both the format and architecture of object files. We argue that object files represent in a non-iconic, propositional format that incorporates discrete symbols for separate features. Moreover, we argue that features of separate categories (such as colour, shape, and orientation) are stored in separate memory slots within an object file. We supplement this view with a computational framework that characterizes how information about objects is stored and retrieved.

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## 1. Introduction

A fundamental capacity of minds like ours is the ability to perceive and keep track of objects. The nature of this capacity has often been a fault line in philosophical debates about innateness, the perception–cognition border, and reference grounding. Descartes famously argued that the ability to perceive an individual object such as a piece of wax is a matter of post-sensory judgement that relies on innate concepts, while Berkeley and Hume maintained that object representation is built up from sensory representations of low-level features. Philosophers of mind and language in the twentieth century were often preoccupied with conditions for representation of objects, citing, for example, complex linguistic abilities (Quine [1960]; Sellars [1997]) and abilities to re-identify objects over time (Strawson [1963]). Philosophers of language have proposed that object perception plays a crucial role in grounding demonstrative reference (Kaplan [1989]) and chains of reference-borrowing for proper names (Kripke [1972]; Devitt and Sterelny [1999]).

These classic philosophical discussions typically proceeded independently of detailed scientifically informed theories of object representation. The past couple of decades, however, have witnessed a surge of research on object representation within both philosophy and psychology. The notion of an ‘object file’ has played an important role in many areas of this literature (Kahneman *et al.* [1992]; Pylyshyn [2007];

Carey [2009]; Jeshion [2010]; Jordan *et al.* [2010]; Recanati [2012]; O’Callaghan [2014]; Echeverri [2016]; Murez and Recanati [2016]; Green [forthcoming]). An object file is generally characterized as a representation that (i) sustains reference to an external object over time, and (ii) stores and updates information concerning the properties of that object. Beyond this, however, there is surprisingly little agreement about what object files are. In this article, we offer a theory of both the format and architecture of object files. We will defend two central claims. First, we argue that object files represent information in a non-iconic, propositional format. Second, we argue that object files store information concerning different feature categories in separate memory stores. We call the resulting picture the multiple-slots view of object files.

The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we’ll discuss some of the primary empirical reasons for positing object files. This motivation derives from work on multiple-object tracking (MOT), object reviewing, and visual short-term memory (VSTM). In Section 3, we’ll consider the issue of representational format. We’ll argue that an iconic view of object files cannot accommodate facts about object files such as the explicit encoding of individuals and abstract features, and the independent storage and forgetting of low-level perceptible features. In Section 4, we’ll turn to the issue of architecture. We’ll distinguish two views of object file architecture: (i) a single-slot view, on which various features of an object are all entered into a single memory store within an object file, and (ii) a multiple-slots view, on which features of different categories are entered into separate memory stores within an object file. We’ll argue that evidence clearly favours the latter position. In Section 5, we’ll enrich the multiple-slots view with an indirect-addressing model of memory storage and retrieval.

## 2. Empirical Support for Object Files

Many strands of experimental work have been taken to support the existence of object files. For present purposes, we’ll focus on two kinds of experiments. Experiments of the first kind examine our ability to maintain and update representations of objects as they move, while those of the second examine our ability to maintain representations of objects after they have disappeared from view.

### 2.1. Object reviewing and multiple-object tracking

In the object-reviewing task, a participant is shown a pair of objects on screen, and preview features (usually letters or numerals) briefly appear on those objects. After the preview features vanish, the objects move to new locations. Finally, a test feature appears, and the participant is asked either to categorize it to report whether it is the same as either of the preview features. A number of studies have shown that under these conditions, participants’ reaction times are faster when the test feature matches

one of the preview features (a case of general priming) and are even faster when it appears on the same object on which that preview feature initially appeared (Kahneman *et al.* [1992]; Noles *et al.* [2005]). This latter effect is known as the ‘object-specific preview benefit’ (OSPB).

Kahneman *et al.* ([1992]) proposed that the OSPB could be explained by appeal to object files. The idea is that when the preview feature appears on an object, it is automatically encoded in a stable representation—a file—associated with that object in VSTM. Subsequent responses to a test feature are facilitated when it matches information already stored in the file for the object on which it appears. Further work within the object-reviewing paradigm has found that object files ‘move’ with objects primarily on the basis of spatiotemporal continuity (Mitroff and Alvarez [2007]; Kimchi and Pirkner [2014]; although see Hollingworth and Franconeri [2009]).

In the MOT task, a participant is presented with a set of objects, and some of these objects are flashed on and off in order to mark their status as targets. After this, all of the objects move randomly about the screen for some period of time. At the end of the trial, the participant is typically asked, of a single object, whether that object was a target, or she is asked to report all of the targets. Most MOT studies have suggested that perceivers can reliably track up to about four objects, after which performance declines rapidly (Pylyshyn and Storm [1988]; Scholl and Pylyshyn [1999]; vanMarle and Scholl [2003]; although see Alvarez and Franconeri [2007]; Franconeri *et al.* [2013]).<sup>1</sup>

Work within both the object-reviewing and MOT paradigms indicates that we have a limited capacity mechanism for maintaining representations of a small number of objects over time. To account for this, Pylyshyn ([2003], [2007]) has introduced the idea of a ‘visual index’. A visual index is a demonstrative-like symbol that picks out an object and continues to pick it out across changes in its location or surface features. Pylyshyn ([2007], pp. 38–9) and Kahneman *et al.* ([1992], pp. 215–16) both suggest that visual indexes may be fruitfully integrated with the object file theory (see also Carey [2009], p. 72; Echeverri [2016]; Green [forthcoming]). The general idea, which we will adopt here, is that object files are complex mental particulars consisting of indexes and short-term memory stores in which features of the indexed object are encoded. The index is what ‘links’ the information in the store to a particular object. Such information is accurate or inaccurate by virtue of being about a particular object, and the index determines the object against which it is assessed for accuracy. Unfortunately, however, the nature of the connection between indexes and these short-term memory stores has not been clearly specified. We’ll offer an account of this connection in Section 5.

<sup>1</sup> Alvarez and Franconeri ([2007]) found that when participants were allowed to adjust the speed of the objects to a level that they felt comfortable with, they were able to track up to eight objects in parallel. It is thus possible that there is no strict set-size limitation in MOT (*pace* Pylyshyn [2007]). The ability to track objects in parallel may be primarily limited by either the speed at which the objects travel (Holcombe and Chen [2012]) or the spacing between targets and distractors (Franconeri *et al.* [2010]).

## 2.2. Visual short-term memory

The object-reviewing and MOT paradigms concern situations where an object is perceived as persisting through visible movement (or sometimes through brief occlusion). A different class of experiments has instead investigated object representations in the context of VSTM, also known as visual working memory. VSTM is distinct from earlier, higher capacity short-term memory stores such as iconic memory (Sperling [1960]) and fragile VSTM (Sligte *et al.* [2008]).

In VSTM studies, participants are briefly presented with a display of objects called a sample array, and asked to remember one or more features of those objects. The sample array then vanishes, followed by a blank screen or mask for a brief period of about one second, called the retention interval. Finally, during the testing period, the participant makes a response that indicates how accurately or precisely she encoded features of the objects in the sample array. In both paradigms, subjects are often instructed to engage in articulatory suppression (for example, repeating the word ‘the’ several times a second for the duration of the trial). The point of articulatory suppression is to place a load on verbal working memory, ensuring that information is encoded in VSTM rather than verbal working memory.

Experiments differ with respect to the task performed during the testing period. In change-detection tasks, participants are asked to make a simple ‘same–different’ judgement. For instance, they might be presented with a test array the same size as the sample array and asked to indicate whether any of the objects in the test array differ from their counterparts in the same location of the sample array (Luck and Vogel [1997]; Vogel *et al.* [2001]). In continuous-report tasks, participants are asked to manually adjust a probe stimulus so that it matches some object from the sample array (Wilken and Ma [2004]; Zhang and Luck [2008]; Fougny *et al.* [2010]). For example, participants may be presented with an empty square at test, and asked to select a position on a colour wheel that matches the colour of the corresponding item in the sample array (that is, the item initially presented at that location).

An important study due to Luck and Vogel ([1997]) has been taken to support the view that VSTM stores object representations. Luck and Vogel asked participants to memorize either the colours, the orientations, or both the colours and orientations of a sample array of line segments. They found that change-detection accuracy in each of these conditions was essentially the same. In each case, participants could reliably recall about three to four objects, after which performance sharply declined. Luck and Vogel took this to suggest that VSTM is limited in the number of object files that can be simultaneously stored, but that there is no cost to encoding multiple features in the same object file. According to Luck and Vogel, once a file has been opened for an object, we can store both the colour and the orientation of the object just as easily as we can store its colour alone. As we’ll see in Section 4, this picture is oversimplified in certain respects. However, we’ll argue there that the overall body of evidence supports the view that VSTM stores object files.

Consistent with the view that object representations in VSTM are continuous with those deployed in on-line perception, there is evidence that representations held in VSTM are used in guiding saccades to targets, and in correcting errant saccades (Hollingworth *et al.* [2008]). Furthermore, there is evidence that representations in VSTM can interfere with MOT (Fougnie and Marois [2006], [2009]; although see Zhang *et al.* [2010]).<sup>2</sup> Finally, there is considerable neural overlap between VSTM and MOT tasks, both of which heavily recruit the intraparietal sulcus (Drew *et al.* [2011]).

### 3. The Format of Object Files

#### 3.1. Iconic format

Any comprehensive theory of some domain of mental representation must characterize its representational format. In this section, we consider the format of object files. Formats are structural features of representational vehicles that play a role in individuating general types of representations. More succinctly, Kosslyn *et al.* ([2006], p. 8) write, ‘A format is a type of code’.

The sentence

(1) ‘This is a large, yawning Siberian tiger.’

is structured differently from a picture of a Siberian tiger yawning (Figure 1).

There are, of course, differences in the contents of these representations. For example, Figure 1 represents specific and low-level properties of the tiger, such as the shape of its tongue or orientations of individual strands of fur, on which (1) is silent. (1) also explicitly represents the tiger as being a Siberian, while Figure 1 does not. But there are also differences in the structural features of the representations themselves, which are not simply differences in content. For example, pointing at a part of the picture that corresponds to part of the tiger’s ear and moving your finger to the right will result in you pointing at a part closer to the part corresponding to the tiger’s eye. No similar rule applies to any part of (1). This latter sort of difference arises purely from representational format.

A standard distinction between formats used in cognitive science is the distinction between ‘iconic’ (also called depictive or pictorial) and ‘propositional’ representations. Iconic representations figure in prominent theories of mental imagery (Kosslyn [1980]; Kosslyn *et al.* [2006]), mental-models theories of deductive inference (Johnson-Laird [2006]), high-capacity short-term memory stores in early perceptual systems (Sperling

<sup>2</sup> The situation here is complicated for two reasons. First, although Fougnie and Marois have documented dual-task interference between VSTM and MOT, it seems that an extra tracked object results, on average, in a 0.5-object reduction in the number of objects that can be stored in VSTM. Second, Zhang *et al.* ([2010]) found that VSTM interferes with MOT only when subjects are required to remember spatial information about the stored objects.



**Figure 1.** Yawning tiger.

[1960]; Neisser [1967s]; see also Fodor [2007]), and core cognition (Carey [2009]).<sup>3</sup> Propositional representations are most often invoked to explain logical inference (Braine and O'Brien [1998]) and the relation between thought and language (Fodor [1975]), but also figure in some theories of diverse mental phenomena including early perception and imagery (Pylyshyn [1984]).

Figure 1 is a prototypical case of iconic representation. Critically, the figure obeys two principles, which we'll call 'iconicity' and 'holism':

**Iconicity:** Parts of the representation represent parts of the scene represented by the whole representation.

**Holism:** Each part of the representation represents multiple properties at once, so that the representation does not have separate vehicles corresponding to separate properties and individuals.

Point at any part of Figure 1, and the selected part of the image will represent some part of the scene. Furthermore, that part will represent multiple properties at once. For example, the part of the image that represents the pinkness of the tiger's tongue is the very same part that represents its texture and spatial orientation.<sup>4</sup> There is also

<sup>3</sup> These high-capacity perceptual memory stores include iconic memory (Sperling [1960]) and fragile visual short-term memory (Slighte *et al.* [2008]), which may utilize iconic representations. As will become clear below, we do not think that this is plausible for object files in VSTM.

<sup>4</sup> Philosophers who hold that perceptual representation is iconic have often endorsed some version of holism. For instance, Burge ([2014b], p. 493) writes: 'Just as one cannot draw a line without drawing its length, shape, and orientation, one cannot visually represent an environmental edge as such without representing its length, shape, and orientation, as such'.

no separate part of the image that represents the individual tiger, over and above the parts of the image that represent its perceptible features.

In what follows, we'll take iconicity and holism to be the signature markers of iconic format. Variations on iconicity are employed by most of the theorists cited earlier (Kosslyn [1980], p. 33; Johnson-Laird [2006], p. 25; Kosslyn *et al.* [2006], pp. 11–2; Fodor [2007], p. 108; Carey [2009], p. 459). The 'parts' of represented scenes are spatiotemporal parts, while the 'parts' of the representations themselves are functional entities that are analogous to spatiotemporal parts. There need not be a literal image in the brain to implement an iconic format; all that matters is that the mental representation plays the right functional role.<sup>5</sup>

Iconicity leads naturally to holism (Kosslyn *et al.* [2006], p. 11), particularly when the representation needs to encode multiple properties of things in the represented scene at once. If parts of the scene instantiate multiple properties (such as colour and location), and parts of the representation correspond uniquely to parts of that scene and encode the properties instantiated there, then parts of the representation must represent multiple properties concurrently.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, if a representation satisfies holism, then it does not contain any part that stands for an individual separately from its properties. For if a representation *R* is holistic, then each part of *R* encodes multiple properties. Therefore, no part picks out an individual alone, independent of any properties. As such, icons lack a syntactic separation between representations of individuals and representations of features. Following Kosslyn and others, we will take iconicity + holism to characterize iconic mental representations.

Some notions of iconicity do not invoke iconicity + holism. For example, these principles may not play an important role in some philosophical accounts of the nature of pictorial representations such as paintings (Hopkins [1998]; Greenberg [2013]; Briscoe [2016]; but see Kulvicki [2015]; Quilty-Dunn [2017]). However, our present interest is in the notion of iconic mental representation that is operative within cognitive science. It is thus not crucial that the notion of iconicity at work here fits perfectly with philosophical accounts of pictorial representations outside the mind.

Propositional representations satisfy neither iconicity nor holism. For example, some parts of (1) do not represent parts of the scene (such as the word 'is'), and some parts do not represent at all (such as 'This [. . .] yawning'). Furthermore, distinct vehicles like 'large' and 'tiger' represent distinct properties. Instead, propositional

<sup>5</sup> There are other claims made about iconicity, such as the claim that icons preserve the structure of what they represent (Meir [2010]). Some version of this thesis is endorsed by Kosslyn, who holds not only that parts of the icon represent parts of the scene but also that distance relations between parts of the icon correspond to distance relations between parts of the scene, which seems to be a robust form of structural preservation (Kosslyn *et al.* [2006], p. 12). Structural preservation nonetheless will not figure prominently in our discussion of format simply because we are not aware of any evidence that bears directly on the question of whether object files preserve the structures of the objects they represent.

<sup>6</sup> If parts of representation *R* 'correspond uniquely' to parts of scene *S*, then no two distinct parts of *R* represent the same part of *S*.



representations are discursive: they comprise discrete constituents that compose in often highly constrained ways. Propositional and other discursive representations thus have ‘canonical decompositions’ (Fodor [2007], p. 108) into constituents. Icons, on the other hand, do not prioritize any particular segmentation into constituents. No matter where you draw a line through Figure 1, the parts of the image on both sides of the line represent certain parts of the scene (Kosslyn [1994], p. 5).

Carey ([2009]) hypothesizes that object files are iconic. As aforementioned, she accepts something like the iconicity principle ([2009], p. 452). She also seems committed to holism, writing that object files have an iconic format ‘with size imagistically represented, as well as shape, colour, and other perceptual properties bound to the symbols iconically’ ([2009], p. 459; see also her Figure 4.9, p. 147). Since Carey seems to endorse the predominant notion of iconicity in cognitive science (iconicity + holism), we will assume this notion of iconicity in what follows. We will argue that the evidence suggests that the format of object files is not iconic in this sense, and that a propositional model easily explains all the available data.

Carey ([2009], p. 458) explicitly regards the thesis that object files are iconic as a ‘speculation’ rather than a confirmed hypothesis. She cites the fact that infants can sum over surface area represented in object files as evidence for their iconicity ([2009], pp. 146–7). Feigenson *et al.* ([2002]) showed infants crackers of varying sizes and then hid them in buckets. Infants crawled towards the bucket with more overall cracker (understood as surface area) independently of whether there were more individual crackers. However, this result only obtained for up to three crackers. This corresponds to the set-size limitations for object files standardly observed in infants (Zosh and Feigenson [2009]), suggesting that object files were involved in this task. We agree with Carey that the set-size limitation suggests the use of object files, but it is not clear that the mere capacity to sum over surface area implicates any particular format in which surface area is represented. Carey ([2009], p. 147) concedes that the argument is tentative. In any case, we think there is much more direct evidence concerning the format of object files, to which we turn now.

### 3.2. Object files and iconic format

As elaborated above, object files involve explicit indexes, akin to demonstratives. There is strong reason to believe that these indexes are syntactically separate from any feature representations used to attribute features to the object.<sup>7</sup> For example, indexes are plausibly maintained across changes in the feature representations held in an object file. Subjects can reliably track objects in MOT despite significant changes in colour, shape, and size during a trial (vanMarle and Scholl [2003]; Zhou *et al.*

<sup>7</sup> Note, however, that accepting the syntactic division between indexical constituents and feature representations does not require accepting that the former achieves reference wholly independently of the contents of the latter (see Green [2017a], [2017b]).

[2010]). Thus, we contend that, at minimum, there is a syntactic separation between indexical constituents and feature representations in object files. As discussed above, this is inconsistent with holism. A purely iconic model of object files is not feasible.

It is nonetheless possible that feature representations might be iconic even though the indexical constituents of object files are not.<sup>8</sup> Quilty-Dunn ([2016]) argues, however, that several object-reviewing studies indicate that object files encode abstract features in a fashion that tells against iconic format. For example, Gordon and Irwin ([2000]) showed an OSPB for categories like FISH, even when the preview stimulus was the word ‘fish’ and the test stimulus was a picture of a fish. Results like this (see also Gordon and Irwin [1996]; Jordan *et al.* [2010]) suggest that object files explicitly represent abstract features. For the OSPB to show up for a novel picture of a fish, for example, when the preview was only the word ‘fish’, the information stored in an object file that can be directly used for the experimental task must be in a format that is not tied to any low-level features of the word, or indeed even the fact that it is a word.<sup>9</sup> Holism requires that icons lack separate constituents for separate features. It is not clear how an icon could plausibly represent a feature like FISH in a way that is completely separable from low-level features without positing a discrete constituent that represents FISH—and thereby violating holism. The presence of a discrete constituent that represents FISH, on the other hand, could explain why the OSPB persists despite the preview and test features being related solely in virtue of their connection to the category FISH and otherwise lacking any relevant similarity in their low-level visible features. While an icon may represent a fish, explicit representation of the category FISH that abstracts completely from any low-level features may be best explained in terms of a non-iconic format.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Burge ([2010], [2014a]) argues that perceptual representation is iconic, but also that its contents can be modelled on complex linguistic demonstratives, such as ‘That F’, where F is some perceptible attribute. Perhaps for Burge the attributive elements of perception are iconic and the singular elements are non-iconic. We are hesitant to ascribe any such view to Burge ([2010], pp. 95–6), however, given his apparent scepticism of the existence of syntactic properties of perceptual or cognitive representations. We are unsure how to construe claims about representational format without appeal to syntactic properties of representations, since doing so would preclude characterizing the structures of representations themselves apart from structures of their contents.

<sup>9</sup> One might suggest that these findings are due to mere associations between iconic representations of word-forms and iconic representations of visual appearances. However, in a different experiment, Gordon and Irwin ([1996]) showed that OSPBs were not observed when the preview and test features were semantically associated words, such as ‘doctor’ and ‘nurse’, demonstrating that even strongly associated information does not get stored in an object file. The effect is thus category or kind-specific, and cannot be explained by simple association.

<sup>10</sup> Kosslyn *et al.* ([2006]) argue that iconic representations cannot explicitly represent general categories, such as FISH or BALL. Icons, they suggest, are limited to representing particular exemplars of such categories. Thus: ‘Depictions are not abstract: they cannot directly refer to nonpicturable concepts [...] they represent individual instances (not classes), and they are specific to a particular sensory modality’ ([2006], p. 11). Burge ([2014a], p. 575) claims both that perception is iconic and that it may represent higher-level attributes, but insists that ‘one can represent something as a pushing, as an instance of agency, as a pine tree, as a piano, or as one’s favorite movie villain—only by visually attributing low-level attributes’. Burge’s ([2014a], p. 576) iconic model of perception requires that perceptual representation of higher-level attributes is tied to representation of lower-level attributes, including ‘generic’ ones, such as canonical shapes; the evidence cited here thus seems to target his view as well as Carey’s. The relevant

If this argument succeeds, then at least some of the features stored in object files are plausibly represented by means of discrete symbols. Nonetheless, it is possible that object files contain non-iconic representations of high-level features while low-level features such as colour, shape, and orientation are represented iconically. Call this the ‘mixed-features model’. In what follows, we’ll argue that the iconic approach fails even in the case of low-level features, and thus that the mixed-features model is incorrect.

Since icons are holistic and therefore lack separate symbols for separate features, an iconic representation of the low-level features of an object should not allow independent encoding of separate low-level features. A prediction of the mixed-features model, then, is that object files should not represent, say, the colour of an object without also representing its shape and orientation. There is some positive evidence in favour of this prediction. As discussed above, Luck and Vogel ([1997]) tested the ability of subjects to recall either the colour, the orientation, or both the colour and the orientation of objects. They found no decline for storage of the conjunction of features as opposed to individual features, indicating that VSTM stores ‘integrated object percepts rather than individual features’ ([1997], p. 280). The mixed-features model can explain this result. An icon does not syntactically decompose into distinct feature representations, but rather represents low-level features together. Once you store an iconic representation of the colour of a line, therefore, information about its orientation comes for free.

Other results, however, cast doubt on the mixed-features model. In particular, the phenomenon of ‘independent forgetting’ raises serious difficulties for the view. Note that if a representation encodes two features holistically, then deletion or degradation of one feature would be expected, other things being equal, to disrupt encoding of the other feature as well. Accordingly, because the iconic model holds that features are bound together holistically, it also predicts that features should be maintained or forgotten together, rather than independently. Note that we are not assuming here that it is impossible for an iconic representation to be noncommittal about certain low-level features such as colour or size. To assume this would be to commit what Block ([1983]) calls the ‘photographic fallacy’.<sup>11</sup> Rather, the point is that when a holistic representation is committal about two such features, then, because of holism, degradation of one feature would be expected to disrupt the other feature as well.


There is strong evidence in favour of independent forgetting. Fournie and Alvarez ([2011]) used a continuous-report task in which participants first viewed an array of five triangles of various colours and orientations (Figure 2).<sup>12</sup> Then, in the test period, participants performed a colour response followed by an orientation

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object-reviewing experiments do not involve the persistence of any, even highly generic, low-level features from preview to test phases.

<sup>11</sup> Relatedly, we also do not assume that iconic representations ‘must be determinate with respect to every visual feature’ (Block [1983], p. 653).

<sup>12</sup> Half of participants were instructed to engage in articulatory suppression by repeating ‘the’ three times per second. There was no significant difference in task performance between those participants and the



**Figure 2.** Experimental paradigm from (Fougnie and Alvarez [2011]). Grayscale version of colour image.

response, or vice versa. An array of squares appeared where the triangles were, four of which were outlines and one of which was completely white. The location of the white square indicated which of the previewed triangles was to be reported on. Participants used a mouse to click locations on a colour wheel (for the colour response) and a black wheel centred around the test item (for the orientation response) in which location on the wheel indicated the direction that the triangle was pointing.

Fougnie and Alvarez examined ‘guess trials’, in which the subject’s degree of error in indicating an object’s colour or orientation was more than three standard deviations away from the target value. The mixed-features model would predict that participants should either remember both features together or forget both features together. However, Fougnie and Alvarez found that colour guess trials and orientation guess trials were only weakly correlated. Specifically, subjects retained information about colour

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ones who were not instructed to use articulatory suppression, suggesting that the task engaged VSTM rather than verbal working memory.

in more than 40% of orientation-guess trials, and retained information about orientation in more than 30% of colour-guess trials (see also Bays *et al.* [2011]).<sup>13</sup>

These results show that participants often fail to store information about the orientation of an object in VSTM while storing information about its colour, and vice versa. Representations of low-level perceptible features must therefore be able to come apart and be stored separately, exactly as the mixed-features model denies. Object files must have discrete representations for distinct low-level perceptible features.

Note also that these results make a stronger case against the iconic view than familiar demonstrations of illusory conjunctions (Treisman and Schmidt [1982]; Vul and Rich [2010]). The latter work indicates that individual features from separate objects can be misbound in perception, but does not settle whether the resulting representations—the outputs of binding—encode features holistically within a single symbol (an icon), or instead utilize discrete symbols for each feature. On the other hand, the independent forgetting evidence shows that representations of individual features can be peeled away from representations of the other features after perceptual binding is complete.

The proponent of the mixed-features model may make a final retreat and claim that each individual feature is represented iconically. However, it is unclear how the colour of a triangle might be represented iconically without specifying its shape and orientation. Indeed, Kosslyn *et al.* ([2006], p. 11) stress that the contents of icons must be in some sense ‘picturable’, and there is no remotely intuitive sense in which one can picture the colour of a triangle separately from its spatial features.

However, it is perhaps more plausible that an icon may represent spatial features without surface colour (Kosslyn *et al.* [2006], p. 41). (Think, for instance, of a simple line drawing.) As such, one might claim that object files represent spatial properties via an icon, but use distinct representations for colour. Consistent with this view, spatial properties do sometimes appear to bundle together. Fougne and Alvarez ([2011]) did not find the same sort of independent forgetting for height and width of rectangles. Nonetheless, this result may simply be due to the fact that specifying an object’s shape requires specifying values along both of these dimensions (similar to how specifying an object’s colour requires specifying values along dimensions of hue and saturation), and does not demand explanation in terms of iconic format.

A mixed view of this sort, of course, faces the puzzle of spelling out how representations of colour and spatial features compose with indexes, given that they are in

<sup>13</sup> Fougne *et al.* ([2013]) found a similar result while also demonstrating a same-object benefit. One condition involved five triangles with different judgements and orientations while another involved ten objects: five judgemented circles (which have no orientation) and five black triangles with different orientations. Participants showed better performance for both judgement responses and orientation responses in the five-object condition than the ten-object condition, suggesting that they were forming object files that encoded features of each object and facilitated a same-object benefit (we will consider the phenomenon of same-object benefits in more detail below). However, participants also showed independent forgetting, since again judgement guess trials and orientation guess trials were weakly correlated. The observation of independent forgetting and same-object benefits in the same experiment suggests that even though features were independently forgotten, they were nevertheless encoded in object files.

completely different formats. Moreover, it is clear that standard icons such as Figure 1 represent shape and colour together, and that they do not do so by combining separate vehicles together. As such, an iconic model clearly does not predict independent encoding of colour and spatial features, even if a view can be tailored to accommodate this fact while retaining certain iconic elements.

There is, in any case, suggestive evidence that even spatial properties are stored independently of one another in VSTM. Hardman and Cowan ([2015]) showed subjects arrays of rectangular bars, and compared change-detection performance for four kinds of features: colour (red or green), length (long or short), orientation (vertical or horizontal), and the presence or absence of a black 'gap' in the middle of a bar.<sup>14</sup> Note that even an achromatic, purely spatial icon should arguably encode the latter three features, since they are characterized solely by an object's visible contours.<sup>15</sup> Hardman and Cowan, however, found that when cued to encode just a single feature during a sample array of six objects, subjects could remember an average of 4.0 colours, 3.0 gaps, 1.7 lengths, and 2.3 orientations. Thus, it is plausible that there are differences in storage capacity even within the class of spatial features, indicating that an object file may encode one spatial feature (such as gap presence or orientation) without encoding another (such as length).

### 3.3. Object files and propositional format

The empirical evidence seems to indicate that object files do not represent in an iconic format. We think the evidence supports the hypothesis that object files represent in a propositional format. Like propositional representations, object files consist of distinct representations for individuals and their separate properties. Furthermore, like propositional representations, object files arrange those constituents into a larger, accuracy-evaluable structure. Camp ([2007], p. 157) notes that the signature property of propositional format is that 'some sort of functional relation among syntactic constituents maps onto some sort of logical or metaphysical relation among the semantic values of those constituents'. In that case, object files seem canonically propositional.<sup>16</sup>

There may be more fine-grained distinctions among formats according to which object files are not propositional in the same sense as propositional attitudes (though see Quilty-Dunn [2017]). We view the claim that object files are propositional as a working hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is no small argument for this hypothesis is that it predicts all of the data surveyed above, while the competing approaches that we have considered do not. A propositional model allows individuals and features to

<sup>14</sup> These were the same features examined in Luck and Vogel's ([1997]) seminal study.

<sup>15</sup> Note that even if a spatial icon can be noncommittal about the precise judgement of the gap in a rectangle, it should nevertheless register the presence of such a gap.

<sup>16</sup> In criticizing the claim that object files are iconic, we leave open the possibility that some of the constituents of propositional object files represent via syntactic magnitudes (sometimes described as analogue). We do not think the empirical evidence demands this view, but we have not ruled it out here (though see Carey [2009], pp. 143–7).

be represented via separate vehicles. This separability of constituents enables propositional representations to peel apart separate features in encoding and storage, to peel feature-representations apart from representations of individuals, and to encode and store discrete symbols that stand for abstract categories such as FISH independently of low-level features. The experimental literature on object files seems to implicate precisely this sort of apparatus. Moreover, in Section 5 we will outline a computational theory of how object files store propositional representations in the same way that propositional beliefs may be stored in long-term memory.

There may, for all we know, be non-propositional formats that accommodate the data as well or even better than a propositional one. We view this question as entirely empirical. Given the empirical success of the propositional view, however, we will assume it in what follows.

## **4. The Architecture of Object Files: A Multiple-Slots Model**


### **4.1. Independent memory stores**

The architecture of a psychological system consists, roughly, in the stable functional organization of that system. More precisely, a system's architecture consists in those aspects of its functional organization that remain fixed despite changes in the information that the system processes and stores (Pylyshyn [1984]). For example, if there is a genuine boundary between two psychological subsystems that prevents one subsystem from accessing information stored by another (regardless of the specific information contained in either system), then this is a feature of architecture (Fodor [1983]; Firestone and Scholl [2017]).

Object files are memory mechanisms. They are representations in VSTM that store information about the properties of objects and carry that information forward in time (Gallistel and King [2009]). A central question about the architecture of any memory mechanism concerns whether it is structured into independent information stores, and if so, what differentiates those stores from one another (Baddeley [2012]).

Memory stores can differ most obviously in terms of either their capacity or their duration of information retention. Some memory stores can hold more information than others, and some can hold information for longer than others. Differences in capacity or retention for two kinds of information can thus make it plausible that the two kinds of information are associated with separate memory stores (think, for instance, of the classic distinction between working memory and long-term memory). However, there are other ways besides these to motivate independent memory stores.

Critically for present purposes, one way to motivate independent memory stores is to examine how two kinds of information compete for storage (Klauer and Zhao [2004]). For example, suppose that a person is able to remember at most four items of type X, and at most four items of type Y. If she is also able to remember four X-items and four Y-items concurrently, then this provides strong evidence that there



**Figure 3.** VSTM architecture on the single-slot view. ‘x’ and ‘y’ are directly referential visual indexes (after Pylyshyn [2007], p. 38).

are separate memory stores dedicated to X and Y. In this case, there is substantial within-category competition, but no across-category competition. While each category happens to exhibit a capacity limit of four items, these are really independent limits that constrain different memory stores.


In what follows, we consider the question of how object files organize information from separate feature categories (such as colour, shape, orientation, and size).<sup>17</sup> We have already argued that separate features (such as colour and shape) are encoded by distinct symbols. However, this does not yet settle the question of storage. Are multiple features bound together in an object file, and if so, how are they bound?

We can distinguish three views about the manner in which VSTM stores collections of features. According to what we will call the ‘single-slot view’, all the features of an object, regardless of category, are entered into a single memory store (Figure 3). On this proposal, the capacity limit on parallel feature storage—if there is one—applies to an object file as a whole. Of course, there are a number of ways that one might understand such capacity limits. Perhaps, for example, there is a limit on the raw number of feature values that can be simultaneously entered into the slot. Alternatively, there may be a limit on the amount of information that can be simultaneously entered. On this view, more complex features may take up more file space than simpler features, due to their higher information load. Similarly, more determinate features may impose a higher information load than less determinate features (for example, RED<sub>37</sub> may impose a higher information load than RED).

According to what we will call the ‘multiple-slots view’, on the other hand, features from different categories are entered into their own category-specific slots within a file (Figure 4). In addition to countenancing a limit on the number of object files that can be concurrently stored, this view allows that separate feature categories may have their own object-specific capacity limits. For example, we may have a limit on the number of colours or texture features that can be simultaneously stored

<sup>17</sup> These categories are sometimes referred to in the VSTM literature as separate feature ‘dimensions’. However, we avoid that label here, since most are in fact multidimensional (and, in the case of shape, highly multidimensional; see Pizlo [2008]).






**Figure 4.** VSTM architecture on the multiple-slots view.

for a single object. Again, such limits could be understood either in terms of a raw number of feature values or in terms of information load.

The single-slot view is arguably neutral on representational format, since it neither requires nor precludes holistic feature encoding. The multiple-slots view, however, requires separate symbols for separate features, since these features must be entered into distinct memory stores. The multiple-slots view therefore suggests a non-iconic, propositional account of object file format.

We can distinguish both of these approaches from a ‘pure feature-based view’ (Bays *et al.* [2011]). The pure feature-based view agrees with the multiple-slots view in holding that separate feature categories have separate memory stores in VSTM, but also holds that these memory stores are not consolidated into object files (Figure 5). On this view, we have separate capacity limits on the number of colours, shapes, sizes, and orientations that we can simultaneously store at a time, but these limits are insensitive to whether pairs of features belong to the same object or to different objects.

The pure feature-based view can accept the evidence discussed in Section 2 that object files are formed in on-line perception, but denies that they are stored in VSTM. Furthermore, the pure feature-based view is consistent with many of the central results from Luck and Vogel ([1997]). Recall, for instance, that Luck and Vogel



**Figure 5.** VSTM architecture on the pure feature-based view.

found that subjects could recall four colours and four orientations simultaneously just as accurately as they could store four colours alone. While these results can be explained in terms of object files, a pure feature-based theorist could argue that VSTM maintains parallel memory stores for colour and orientation, and that is why the two features do not compete for storage. Finally, because the pure feature-based view holds that features of separate categories are stored independently, it can readily accommodate the phenomenon of independent forgetting.

Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence against the pure feature-based model, and in favour of the view that VSTM stores information in an object-based fashion. Most critically, it is significantly easier to store a pair of features when they are bound into the same object than when they are distributed across separate objects. For example, Olson and Jiang ([2002]) found that participants were significantly more accurate in recalling four colours and four orientations when the features were bound together into four objects (four oriented rectangles) than when they were

distributed across eight objects (four coloured squares and four oriented line segments). Similarly, in a continuous-report paradigm, Fougnie *et al.* ([2010]) found a significantly higher rate of random guess responses when participants were asked to remember colour and orientation features distributed across six objects than when the features were bound together into three objects. *Prima facie*, these results fit poorly with the pure feature-based view, because the model fails to predict any advantage of object-based organization. As such, we will put the pure feature-based view aside in what follows.

In what follows we will frequently use the language of ‘slots’ to characterize VSTM. However, a prominent dispute in the recent VSTM literature concerns whether VSTM capacity is better characterized by a fixed number of discrete slots or, instead, by the flexible distribution of resources (for discussion, see Fukuda *et al.* [2010]; Ma *et al.* [2014]; Gross and Flombaum [2017]). A pure version of the slot model would hold that perceivers can store information about at most four objects at a time, and that this number of slots is the sole limitation on VSTM performance. Once an object is in VSTM, one can store multiple features of the object without any loss of precision or accuracy. A pure version of the flexible-resource model, on the other hand, would hold that perceivers can store information about any number of objects in parallel, but that the precision with which each feature is represented drops as more objects and features are stored.<sup>18</sup> Certain tenets of this view have compelling empirical support. For example, Fougnie *et al.* ([2010]) have found that memory precision for an individual feature is reduced when multiple features of an object must be stored. Likewise, Bays and Husain ([2008]) found that memory precision for both location and orientation decreased with larger sample arrays.

While we cannot address the issue in detail here, we believe that the most plausible position will combine elements of both the slot-based approach and the resource-based approach (Alvarez and Cavanagh [2004]; Barton *et al.* [2009]; Suchow *et al.* [2014]). More specifically, we believe that VSTM organizes information in an object-based manner, but that there are limits on the precision with which information about an object can be represented, and these limits are characterized well by flexible-resource models. Thus, while VSTM architecture contains discrete files for separate objects, the amount of ‘space’ within a file (that is, the amount of information the file can hold) is determined by the proportion of resources allocated to it. As a result, memory precision will plausibly be reduced when multiple features of an object are stored, and reduced further when features of multiple objects are stored. Moreover, the nature of

<sup>18</sup> It is admittedly unclear how best to understand memory ‘resources,’ but there are some sensible options. For instance, suppose that the VSTM representation of a feature results from averaging the noisy estimates of a number of separate neurons or neural populations. In this case, as the number of estimates increases, the precision of the resulting VSTM representation will also increase (assuming that sources of noise are independent across circuits). On this conception, then, we might think of the ‘resources’ dedicated to a feature in terms of the number of separate estimates (neurons or populations) available for determining the VSTM representation of that feature (Bays *et al.* [2009], p. 8).

resource division across files may vary depending on the demands imposed by the current context (Bays and Husain [2008]). For example, certain objects may be stored with greater precision than others when they are more task-relevant (or perhaps due to random variability in resource distribution; see van den Berg *et al.* [2012]), and the same will likely be true for different features within an object.

Finally, while slot-based models typically claim that there is a fixed upper limit of three or four object files, we do not commit ourselves to this claim in what follows. We are concerned here with the functional architecture of object files, not with how many object files there are. Thus, although we call our position the ‘multiple-slots’ view, we do not accept a pure slot-based characterization of VSTM capacity limits. Rather, we believe that the view defended here can be fruitfully supplemented with insights from the flexible-resources approach.

#### **4.2. Within-category versus across-category conjunctions in visual short-term memory**

If the single-slot view is correct, then the VSTM capacity limit for a particular object should be sensitive simply to the total load imposed by the features to be stored for that object. As such, if we assume that the information load of each feature value is roughly the same, the view fails to predict any difference between storing a pair of colours for an object and storing a colour and an orientation for that object. (Below we’ll consider the possibility that features of different categories impose different information loads.) The multiple-slots view, on the other hand, does predict such a difference. For if two features of an object belong to the same category, then they should both draw on the capacity of the same feature slot, while features from different categories should not. For similar reasons, the pure feature-based view would also predict greater difficulty for within-category than across-category conjunctions.

Recall that Luck and Vogel ([1997]) proposed that VSTM capacity is limited only by the number of objects stored in parallel, allowing unlimited storage of features for each object without loss of precision or accuracy. This is an extreme view that is not widely held in the current literature, and the authors themselves no longer endorse it (Zhang and Luck [2008]; Fukuda *et al.* [2010]). However, Luck and Vogel performed an additional experiment to test whether there is a difference between within-category and across-category conjunctions in VSTM. The objects in this experiment were squares composed of a centre and surround portion differing in colour, and subjects were asked to remember both colours for each object. Critically, Luck and Vogel failed to find a significant difference between change-detection performance (as a function of set size) in this ‘colour-colour’ conjunction condition and in the other conditions they examined. This result supports a single-slot model, since it apparently suggests that there is no cost to encoding multiple features of the same category.

Note, however, that Luck and Vogel reported a null effect. They failed to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between capacity for within-category conjunctions and across-category conjunctions (such as colour and orientation or colour and shape). While null effects can be informative, especially when they are found across multiple experiments, this particular null effect has not been replicated. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, every subsequent experiment that has examined within-category conjunctions has failed to reproduce Luck and Vogel's results (Olson and Jiang [2002]; Wheeler and Treisman [2002]; Xu [2002]; Delvenne and Bruyer [2004]; Parra *et al.* [2009]; Luria and Vogel [2011]).

Wheeler and Treisman ([2002]) found that, in terms of sample array size, change-detection performance for bicoloured items was approximately half that for unicoloured items. That is, we can remember the colours of three bicoloured objects about as accurately as we can remember the colours of six unicoloured objects. This was true for a variety of different stimulus types (Figure 6). Olson and Jiang ([2002]) reached a similar conclusion, although they found that with high-saturation stimuli, performance was slightly better for three bicoloured items than for six unicoloured items (though still significantly impaired relative to three unicoloured items). Luria and Vogel ([2011]) also reported a small advantage for two bicoloured items relative to four unicoloured items. On the other hand, one of Delvenne and Bruyer's ([2004]) experiments actually revealed worse performance for two bicoloured items relative to four unicoloured items. In any case, despite some subtle differences, these studies provide converging evidence that within-category conjunctions are costly.

In contrast, several subsequent change-detection experiments have confirmed Luck and Vogel's finding that across-category conjunctions can be encoded at little




Figure 6. From (Wheeler and Treisman [2002]).

cost beyond encoding the individual features of the conjunction. For instance, Olson and Jiang ([2002]) and Fougne *et al.* ([2010]) replicated this finding for colour-orientation conjunctions, while Riggs *et al.* ([2011]) found comparable results with seven- and ten-year-old children. Moreover, Delvenne and Bruyer ([2004]) found the same pattern for shape-texture conjunctions.<sup>19</sup>

On balance, then, the evidence indicates that features from the same category compete with one another to a much greater degree than features from different categories, even when the features are bound to the same object. This finding is hard to explain on the single-slot view, but is predicted by the multiple-slots view, since the latter holds that separate feature categories have separate slots within an object file.

However, there are some responses available to the defender of a single-slot position. A first response (anticipated above) would be to claim that a pair of colours is more difficult to encode in an object file than, say, a colour and a shape because colours have a higher information load than other features. However, we know of no evidence to suggest that this is the case. If anything, recent work suggests that colours are easier to store than other kinds of features. Recall that Hardman and Cowan ([2015]) found that VSTM capacity was significantly higher for colours than for other features (orientation, length, and gap presence). Similarly, Cowan *et al.* ([2013]) found that VSTM capacity was significantly higher for colours than shapes. Thus, it is unlikely that the selective deficits observed for colour-colour conjunction conditions are due to a systematically higher information load for colour.

A second response to the studies cited above in favour of within-category competition would be to claim that early Gestalt processes parsed the centre-surround stimuli into separate objects on the basis of colour discontinuity, and later object file deployment was forced to respect this parsing (Parra *et al.* [2009]). This kind of parsing would, for instance, be delivered by Palmer and Rock's ([1994]) principle of uniform connectedness, which states that regions that are homogeneous with respect to some surface property (such as colour or texture) tend to be parsed as individual units. If these stimuli were indeed assigned object files in accordance with uniform connectedness, for example, then the findings could be accommodated by a single-slot view. For if separate object files needed to be assigned to the centre and surround portions of the stimuli, then the display with three bicoloured objects would require six object

<sup>19</sup> Two qualifications are in order. First, some studies have found that participants are less accurate when asked to memorize across-category conjunctions than when asked to memorize single features (Oberauer and Eichenberger [2013]; Hardman and Cowan [2015]). These studies have primarily tested across-category conjunctions of more than two features. We do not quarrel with the results of these experiments, however, because our claim here is only that there is a greater cost associated with within-category conjunctions than across-category conjunctions. To our knowledge, every experiment (with the exception of Luck and Vogel [1997]) that has tested this hypothesis has confirmed it. Second, while Fougne *et al.* ([2010]) replicated Luck and Vogel's results in the change-detection paradigm, they also found results using a continuous-report paradigm that indicate that there is some cost to encoding across-category conjunctions. Specifically, memory precision is reduced in across-category conditions relative to single-feature conditions. However, our view is consistent with this result. Separate feature slots within an object file will plausibly draw on the same stock of memory resources. As such, storing multiple features of an object may result in losses of precision for each feature.

files. This is plausibly beyond the capacity limit of VSTM. This proposal could thus explain impairments in the colour-colour conjunction condition without positing separate feature slots within object files.

If bicoloured stimuli are obligatorily parsed into two objects on the basis of uniform connectedness, then changes in how the colours of such stimuli are arranged (specifically, changes that result in more or fewer uniformly connected regions) should produce changes in the number of objects into which they are parsed, and so in the number of object files assigned to a stimulus. However, there is evidence that this is not the case. Wheeler and Treisman ([2002]) used seven different arrangements for their bicoloured stimuli (Figure 6). Some of these, like the stimuli in Luck and Vogel's ([1997]) study, involved just two uniformly coloured regions. As is clear from Figure 4, however, they used various other stimuli that seem less likely to lead to a Gestalt of precisely two items. In some of these (such as Conditions 5, 6, and 7) the same-coloured regions of the object were spatially discontinuous, leading to more than two uniformly connected regions. The Gestalt-based interpretation predicts that the bicoloured objects with spatially continuous same-coloured regions should more likely be parsed into two objects, while bicoloured objects with spatially discontinuous same-coloured regions should more likely be parsed into more than two objects (for example, four objects in Conditions 5 and 6). However, Wheeler and Treisman found no significant differences across these various stimuli. If the Gestalt-based interpretation were correct, however, we would expect to see differences across these conditions, since the stimuli should have demanded different numbers of object files. The Gestalt-based interpretation is therefore highly doubtful in this experiment.<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, we do not claim here that perceivers never assign two object files to a bicoloured stimulus. We claim only that this strategy is not obligatory in all cases, and that in certain experiments there is good reason to think that it was not adopted. We suspect that perceivers are most likely to assign two object files if the differently coloured regions are perceptually segmented as distinct parts of the object (Xu [2002]). This is, however, perfectly compatible with the multiple-slots view.

We conclude that the single-slot model is incorrect. Features within a category compete with one another to a much greater degree than features from different categories, but the single-slot model lacks the architectural flexibility to implement this constraint. The multiple-slots view, on the other hand, offers a unified explanation of all the data discussed in this section. The view explains why features of the same category should compete with one another to a greater degree than features of different

<sup>20</sup> There is, furthermore, suggestive neurophysiological evidence that bicoloured centre-surround stimuli are treated as individual objects by VSTM. Contralateral delay activity (CDA) is a signal detectable in electroencephalography recording that has been found to be a reliable marker of the number of objects currently held in VSTM (Vogel and Machizawa [2004]; Ikkai *et al.* [2010]). Luria and Vogel ([2011]) recently compared CDA while subjects stored either bicoloured or unicoloured objects. They found large and stable differences in CDA between memory arrays of one bicoloured object versus two unicoloured objects, but only a small difference in CDA (which disappeared later in the retention interval) between memory arrays of two bicoloured objects versus two unicoloured objects.

categories, and it also explains why features of different categories are more easily encoded and stored when they belong to the same object than when they belong to different objects.

## 5. Multiple Slots and Indirect Addressing

In this section we show how the multiple-slots view can be supplemented with an indirect addressing model of information storage and retrieval. While we are not committed to any particular information-processing model, getting clearer about the computational details will enable us to highlight some computational virtues of the multiple-slots view. It also allows us to develop our view of the connection between visual indexes and the feature representations stored in object files. This provides a more thorough characterization of the way object files implement propositional format.

Modern computers possess a random-access memory. This means that information stored anywhere in the system's memory can be accessed using a 'pointer' symbol directed to the address of that information—that is, to its location in memory.<sup>21</sup> Addresses are to be understood functionally. The address of an item in memory is, roughly, its place in an ordered sequence to which the system's read-write operations are sensitive.<sup>22</sup> Adjacent addresses do not need to be implemented by physically adjacent regions of the system's hardware.

Thus, suppose a system stores information about the current date, time, and temperature. Each of these variables is associated with an address. The content of an address—in the ordinary, pre-theoretical sense of what the address holds or contains—is a symbol structure encoding the value of the variable:

Address	Content
100,100	'6/27/2016'
100,101	'2:35 pm'
100,102	'86°F'

For a procedure to retrieve the current date, it probes memory using a pointer that corresponds to the relevant address. We'll symbolize this pointer with '100,100'. (In what follows, whenever an address is enclosed in quotation marks, we are denoting a

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed discussion of random-access memory architectures, including the theoretical framework that follows, see (Gallistel and King [2009], Chapter 9); see also (Gallistel [2008]). Random-access memory marks an important respect in which the architecture of a modern computer differs from a Turing machine. A Turing machine accesses information serially. For it to retrieve information from memory, the machine head must traverse every cell between the one it is currently reading and the one that encodes the relevant information.

<sup>22</sup> 'Read' operations retrieve information from memory in order to use it in computation, while 'write' operations enter new information into memory to be retrieved at a later time.



pointer to the address, rather than the address itself.) It is unimportant for present purposes just how this operation works. We stress only that pointers are symbols that, when entered into read/write operations, grant access to a particular location in memory. Critically, although the pointer plays the computational role of calling information from a particular address, it can be semantically interpreted as representing the variable associated with that address.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the symbol ‘100,100’ represents the variable current date, while the symbol ‘6/27/2016’ represents one of the many values that the variable may adopt.

This example is a case of ‘direct addressing’. Direct addressing occurs when a system accesses the value of a variable by using a pointer to the address of that value. However, in most cases a computer does not call the value of a variable directly via a pointer to the address of that value, but instead via pointers to addresses that themselves contain further pointers. This is known as ‘indirect addressing’. Indirect addressing confers substantial computational advantages, to be described below.

Suppose that our system needs to encode the dates, times, and temperatures from multiple locations at once, and that it also needs to remember the bindings between dates, times, temperatures, and locations. One way to do this is as follows (see Gallistel and King [2009], p. 161):

Address	Content
100,000	‘100,100’
100,100	‘6/27/2016’
100,101	‘2:35 pm’
100,102	‘86°F’
200,000	‘200,100’
200,100	‘6/28/2016’
200,101	‘3:35 am’
200,102	‘68°F’

The system is organized in such a way that all information stored at addresses 100,100–199,999 pertains to one location (New York), while all information stored at addresses 200,100–299,999 pertains to a different location (Beijing). The way the

<sup>23</sup> This may lead to some confusion, because pointers are sometimes described as having internal referents. On this construal, the referent of a pointer is simply the address that it ‘points’ to. However, this is not obligatory. A pointer may represent an external variable, while playing the functional role of granting access to an internal memory location (see Gallistel [2008]). This point is especially important to keep in mind in the case of visual indexes, which (we contend) represent objects in the world despite ‘pointing’ to (that is, enabling computational access to) memory locations. Note, furthermore, that pointers in our sense are not equivalent to what Eliasmith and colleagues have called ‘semantic pointers’ (Blouw *et al.* [2016]). On the semantic pointer model, pointers are compressed versions of more detailed lower-level representations (analogous to JPEG files). In contrast, the only constraint we place on pointers is that they enable access to other representations stored in memory. They need not be compressed counterparts of the representations whose access they enable.

system retrieves the value of a specific variable associated with New York (for example, the current date) is via ‘pointer arithmetic’. This is an operation performed on a pointer, which returns another pointer. When the second pointer is returned, it serves as a probe to its corresponding memory location.

This works as follows. When the system probes its memory, it sends a pair of signals. One is a pointer to a particular address—call it X—and the other is a numeral—say, ‘1’. Pointer arithmetic is an operation performed on the pointer stored at address X as a result of these signals. The operation then returns a different pointer, which in turn causes the system to access a second memory location. Suppose, then, that our system sends the following memory probe: (‘100,000’, ‘1’). The first element of this probe (‘100,000’) tells the system which address to access first. It thus causes the content of address 100,000—namely, the pointer ‘100,100’—to be retrieved. The second element of the probe (‘1’) tells the system what to do with the symbol retrieved from the address pointed to by the first element. Specifically, the symbol ‘1’ serves as an instruction to transform the pointer ‘100,100’ into a new pointer, ‘100,101’. This pointer in turn serves as a probe to its corresponding memory location—namely, address 100,101. When this happens, the symbol stored at 100,101, ‘2:35 pm’, is retrieved.<sup>24</sup>

The pointers ‘100,000’ and ‘200,000’ (which we may assume are stored elsewhere in the system) have the computational role of enabling access to the encoded properties of New York and Beijing, respectively. We can usefully interpret these symbols as referring to New York and Beijing. Note that it is arbitrary in this example which pointers we store at the addresses 100,000 and 200,000 (the addresses that these pointers ‘point to’), since there is no natural ordering among date, time, and temperature. The important feature is simply that the memory is arranged to enable access to any of a location’s characteristics by means of pointer arithmetic.

Pointer arithmetic is formally akin to addition. However, we do not call it addition, because we take the symbols ‘100,100’ and ‘100,101’ to stand for variables, rather than numbers. Strictly speaking, then, we take pointer arithmetic to be a function mapping pairs of variables and numbers to further variables. In the case above, pointer arithmetic was performed on the symbols ‘100,100’ and ‘1’, yielding the symbol ‘100,101’. Semantically, this computes a function mapping a variable (current date in New York) and number (1) to another variable (current time in New York). The value of using numeral strings as pointers is that we can exploit the formal properties of arithmetic in order to efficiently access the information that we need from memory. However, pointer arithmetic is not the same as ordinary arithmetic.

Indirect addressing is a very useful information-processing tool. Suppose, for example, that in the system described above there is an operation that can be applied

<sup>24</sup> Critically, because the instruction specified by ‘1’ in the original probe has already been discharged, the second pointer (‘100,101’) is not sent along with an additional numeral signal. Accordingly, the system is not directed to perform a second pointer arithmetic operation on the symbol retrieved from address 100,101.

to numerous locations, and in each case needs to take into account the date, time, and temperature in that location. If the system had to find each location's date, time, and temperature directly, the operation would need access to explicitly stored pointers to each of these values. With five locations, this means fifteen explicitly stored pointers. In contrast, if the system utilizes indirect addressing, then it can store just five pointers along with a general rule specifying how the information associated with each pointer is organized (for example, date in the first slot, time in the second, and temperature in the third). For regardless of which location is probed, the operation 'knows' that the time in that location can be accessed through a probe consisting of the pointer to that location along with the numeral '2'. Obviously, as the memory arrays associated with each location grow larger, the advantages of indirect addressing become even more pronounced.

The indirect-addressing architecture also offers a natural implementation of the multiple-slots model of object files. Suppose that, for each object, we store a record of colour, shape, size, and orientation. Here is a model of such a memory containing two object files:

Address	Content
100,000	'100,100'
100,100	'is red'
100,101	'is square'
100,102	'is 3 inches'
100,103	'is 60° from vertical'
200,000	'200,100'
200,100	'is blue'
200,101	'is triangular'
200,102	'is 1 inch'
200,103	'is 25° from vertical'

To retrieve, say, the shape of the first object, we would send the following probe: ('100,000', '1'). Through pointer arithmetic, the symbol '100,100' is transformed into '100,101', which then serves as a new probe to memory, returning the symbol 'is square'. The memory is organized so that information pertaining to the first object is differentiated from information pertaining to the second object, but is also organized into separate slots on the basis of feature category.

These slots (addresses) associated with an object file are assumed to be limited in capacity. As mentioned above, this limitation could take two forms. First, it is possible that each address stores a maximum number of feature values—perhaps just one. Another possibility is that each address is limited in terms of the total information that it can hold. On the second option, it may be possible to represent an object as instantiating multiple values for a single variable (such as colour or texture),

although we know of no compelling evidence that this occurs. Thus, although we have no strong views on this issue, we are inclined towards the position that object files are limited to representing only a single feature value per category.<sup>25</sup>

The symbols ‘100,000’ and ‘200,000’ serve to enable access to the first and second object’s features, respectively. On our view, these are visual indexes. A visual index, we propose, plays the computational role of a pointer. It allows retrieval of an object’s features from memory. However, it does not represent any of those features, and in that sense it is akin to a directly referential expression in natural language. Furthermore, we propose that to occurrently attribute a feature (such as red) to an object denoted by an index just is to call the symbol for that feature from VSTM using the index as a pointer.

To appreciate the computational advantages of the indirect-addressing architecture we espouse, let’s consider an implementation of the single-slot model of object files. On this view, all of an object’s features are entered into a single memory store, rather than being arranged into separate category-specific slots. The following organization accomplishes this:

Address	Content
100,000	‘is red’; ‘is square’; ‘is 3 inches’; ‘is 60° from vertical’
200,000	‘is blue’; ‘is triangular’; ‘is 1 inch’; ‘is 25° from vertical’

On this view, the memory slots associated with the two objects store a collection of feature representations. Again, this information could be retrieved via the pointers ‘100,000’ and ‘200,000’, which can be construed as visual indexes. However, the system now accesses the stored features of an object via direct addressing, rather than indirect addressing, as on the multiple-slots model.

Notice the clear drawbacks of this approach. When the system reads or writes from object file memory, it is forced to access an address that contains all of the object’s features, rather than merely its colour or shape. This means that whenever the system needs to retrieve information about, say, the colour of the object, it is forced to also call information about all of its other properties. Furthermore, there is no clear mechanism in this architecture for the system to update only information about an object’s colour. Finally, it is hard to see how, within this framework, one could implement even relatively trivial operations across objects, such as determining whether one object is larger than another. This is because the system does not organize information in a way that makes explicit whether a given stored feature value

<sup>25</sup> One caveat is in order. It may be possible to represent an object as having multiple compatible values for a given feature category. For instance, it may be possible for an object file to represent an object as both square and quadrilateral (Green [2017a]). Unfortunately, we know of no experiments that directly address whether object files concurrently represent features at multiple levels of abstraction.

concerns an object's size or, instead, its shape or orientation. Thus, in addition to its superior fit with the evidence, we suggest that the multiple-slots view offers a highly efficient model of how information in object files can be encoded, retrieved, and used in computational operations.

The indirect-addressing architecture also provides a more detailed account of the way in which object files instantiate a propositional format. The tokening of a (non-quantified) propositional representation minimally requires (i) a symbol representing an individual, (ii) a symbol representing a property, and (iii) a syntactic operation of concatenating those two symbols such that the property expressed by the latter is predicated of the individual picked out by the former. The symbol '100,000' constitutes (i), a symbol like 'is square' constitutes (ii), and the pointer arithmetic performed as a result of the probe ('100,000', '1') implements (iii). The result of this operation is a token propositional representation with the content  $\langle o_1 \text{ is square} \rangle$ , where  $o_1$  is the referent of '100,000' (in the relevant context). The feature symbols in other slots, which are not occurrently yoked into a propositional structure with the visual index, still stand in a predicative, propositional relation to the index in virtue of their being poised to figure in the construction of a token propositional structure.

Compare the case in which one acquires the belief that Cormac McCarthy is the author of *Blood Meridian* and then stores the propositional structure 'McCarthy is the author of *Blood Meridian*'. Explicit propositional storage would consist in storing a token of that very structure at some address in memory. Implicit propositional storage, on the other hand, would consist in maintaining a certain capacity to construct a token of that structure out of the explicitly stored concepts 'McCarthy' and 'is the author of *Blood Meridian*'. It is crucial to note that the mere capacity to token the structure, such as is facilitated by the mere co-presence of the concepts 'McCarthy' and 'is the author of *Blood Meridian*' in a single mind, is not sufficient for implicit storage of the propositional structure. If it were, then every possible propositional structure that can be composed out of the set of concepts in a mind would count as implicitly stored in that mind. Making sense of implicit storage of propositional structures thus requires a principled way of distinguishing it from mere co-presence of concepts in memory. We propose that this distinction can be drawn in terms of the way that information about the referent of a concept is organized and retrieved from memory.

One popular characterization of conceptual organization appeals to mental files (Fodor [2008]; Recanati [2012]; Murez *et al.* [unpublished]). Fodor ([2008], pp. 92–100), for instance, argues that concepts should be understood as constituting the addresses of files, the access of which facilitates the access of stored information pertaining to the referent of the concept. A natural way to think about this file architecture is that the propositional structure 'McCarthy is the author of *Blood Meridian*' is explicitly stored in a way that is accessible via the pointer 'McCarthy'. Another possibility, however, is that concepts are stored without being constituents of token propositional structures. A system might store the concept 'is the author of *Blood Meridian*' in a way that makes it poised to be connected with 'McCarthy' into the propositional

structure ‘McCarthy is the author of *Blood Meridian*’. In this case, accessing ‘McCarthy’ can facilitate the access of ‘is the author of *Blood Meridian*’. Critically, this computational relationship implements predication. The propositional structure ‘McCarthy is the author of *Blood Meridian*’ is tokened when ‘is the author of *Blood Meridian*’ is accessed via a pointer that refers to McCarthy, and it is implicitly stored in virtue of the accessibility of the predicate concept via this pointer.

The file architecture, understood in terms of indirect addressing, enables a concept to be accessible via a memory pointer such that any concept in the file is poised to be predicatively connected with the pointer in question. A propositional structure ‘o is F’ is implicitly stored by virtue of the way that ‘is F’ can be retrieved from memory (namely, via a pointer that refers to o), and it is tokened when such a retrieval operation takes place. The architecture thus allows for a substantive characterization of propositional storage that does not require the explicit storage of complete propositional structures. We do not claim, however, that all propositional representations in the mind are realized in this way. We certainly do not intend to deny that there are token propositional structures explicitly stored in long-term memory. Nonetheless, the coherence of the proposal shows how predication and propositional format can arise out of addressing without explicit storage of token propositional structures.

## 6. Conclusion

Many authors have recently appealed to object files in characterizing our basic capacities to perceive, think about, and re-identify objects. Nonetheless, few have attempted to clarify the precise nature of these representations. In the current article, we have offered accounts of the representational format of object files (that is, how they are syntactically structured) and the architecture of object files (that is, how they organize information). We claim (i) that object files are propositional representations consisting of discrete symbols standing for individuals and features, (ii) that feature representations are organized into separate, category-specific slots within an object file, and (iii) that representations of individuals (that is, indexes) function computationally as pointers that enable access to these category-specific slots.

Developing the consequences of this model for philosophical views about singular thought, the perception–cognition border, and the emergence of objective representation is beyond the scope of this article. The model provided should, however, enable a richer characterization of these topics. Object files are a key developmental and phylogenetic locus of propositional structure and objective reference. A detailed, scientifically informed model of object files is therefore crucial in achieving a deeper understanding of core features of the human mind.

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