

# Soft Skills and Hard Work

Organizing as a Political Behavior  
Rooted in Relational Labor

by

Gabriel Magnus Nahmias

*Master of Arts, Political Science*  
*Bachelor of Arts, Political Science & African Studies*  
Emory University (2013)

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Author .....  
Gabriel Magnus Nahmias, *Department of Political Science*  
Submitted: 08/01/2022

Certified by .....  
Evan Lieberman, *Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa*  
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by .....  
Fotini Christia, *Ford International Professor in the Social Sciences*  
Chair, Graduate Program Committee

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## Abstract

What qualities of individuals make them willing and able to organize? Healthy representative democracies depend on citizens consistently overcoming collective action problems. This quality makes organizing - systematic efforts by activists to recruit others and invest in their political engagement - a critical democratic practice. Existing explanations for organizing's emergence tend to focus on political organizations and available opportunity structures. However, organizing is a labor-intensive form of political advocacy which is dependent on the recruitment activity of individual activists. As a result, addressing what makes individuals choose to do the work of recruitment can help to expand our understanding of the conditions that will produce an active and engaged citizenry. I, therefore, evaluate how a potential organizer's disposition, skills, and positionality uniquely shapes their willingness and capacity to recruit compared to engaging in alternative forms of political activity. To this end, I draw on interviews, experiments, and original surveys in the United States and South Africa, as well as cross-national data from 57 countries. Perhaps, by centering those who bring others into the political process, we can better understand how to protect and strengthen our democracies.

**Thesis Supervisor:** Evan Lieberman

**Title:** Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa

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# Theoretical Propositions

**Proposition 1:** At the individual level, the decision to recruit is not primarily caused by perceptions of the importance of recruitment.

**Proposition 2:** Due to organizing's dependence on cultivating relationships, individual preferences for interpersonal interactions will affect the decision of whether to recruit. As a result, extraverts are more likely to organize as compared to alternative political activities.

**Proposition 3:** The more recruitment is associated with persuading individuals to change their beliefs, the less likely people are to choose to engage in recruitment. This negative effect is reduced when the social distance of the target from the recruiter, the organization, or the community affected is smaller. However, the effect is more significant when potential recruiters are more ideologically committed to individual agency or when they lack moral certitude.

**Proposition 4:** Organizing requires greater social skills than alternative political work. As a result, people with higher levels of social skills both believe themselves to be better at political recruitment and are more likely to pursue organizing experiences.

**Proposition 5:** Despite women having, on average, greater social skills than men, they report lower levels of recruitment capacity and less past recruitment activity. However, women's greater social skills do translate into an increased self-assessed recruitment capacity when they receive validation of their underlying social skills.

**Proposition 6:** Those with more civil society experience requiring interpersonal skills are more likely to believe they have the capacity to recruit and to have previous recruiting experience. A background in civic organizations does not augment recruitment activity when it is not accompanied by interpersonal labor in those spaces.

**Proposition 7:** People widely perceive organizing jobs as having a lower social status than alternative political work. This is in part due to organizing's social character,

which causes it to be seen as less skilled and lower paid than alternative work associated with traditional “cognitive” abilities. However, the social quality of organizing work also causes individuals to perceive themselves as comparatively more qualified for the job, increasing their willingness to engage in it.

**Proposition 8:** Positionality moderates which aspects of an organizing job’s social appraisal – skill, pay, and qualifications – are most determinative of people’s relative willingness to organize. In particular, high-income individuals and those with a greater baseline willingness to take political action are more negatively affected by perceptions of organizing as unskilled and poorly paid.

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# List of Abbreviations

<b>AFL-CIO</b>	. . . . .	American Federation Labor Congress of Industrial Organizations
<b>ANC</b>	. . . . .	African National Congress
<b>BLM</b>	. . . . .	Black Lives Matter
<b>CVM</b>	. . . . .	Civic Volunteerism Model
<b>EE</b>	. . . . .	Equal Education
<b>ERA</b>	. . . . .	Equal Rights Amendment
<b>ERAP</b>	. . . . .	Economic Research and Action Project
<b>GOTV</b>	. . . . .	Get-Out-the-Vote
<b>IAF</b>	. . . . .	Industrial Areas Foundation
<b>LASSO</b>	. . . . .	Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
<b>LOESS</b>	. . . . .	Locally Estimated Scatterplot Smoothing
<b>MIT GSU</b>	. . . . .	Massachusetts Institute of Technology Graduate Student Union
<b>NLRA</b>	. . . . .	National Labor Relations Act
<b>NRA</b>	. . . . .	National Rifle Association
<b>OLS</b>	. . . . .	Ordinary Least Squares Regression
<b>OSF</b>	. . . . .	Open Science Foundation
<b>PCA</b>	. . . . .	Principal Component Analysis
<b>PCR</b>	. . . . .	Policy, Communications, and Research
<b>RCT</b>	. . . . .	Randomized Controlled Trial
<b>SES</b>	. . . . .	Socioeconomic Status
<b>SEL</b>	. . . . .	Social-Emotional Learning
<b>SDS</b>	. . . . .	Students for a Democratic Society
<b>SMO</b>	. . . . .	Social Movement Organization
<b>SI</b>	. . . . .	Social Intelligence
<b>SSI</b>	. . . . .	Survey Sampling International
<b>STEM</b>	. . . . .	Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics

*List of Abbreviations*

<b>TOC</b>	. . . . .	Theory of Change
<b>TOP</b>	. . . . .	Theory of Power
<b>UDF</b>	. . . . .	United Democratic Front
<b>UE</b>	. . . . .	United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
<b>WVS</b>	. . . . .	World Values Survey
<b>WLEIS</b>	. . . . .	Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale

“Speaking to people that don’t realize history is made by people. I’ve explored it and concluded it’s fucking hard.”<sup>1</sup>

# 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Organizing as a Political Behavior Rooted in Relational Labor

Building the healthy democracies necessary to address climate change, racial injustice, patriarchal institutions, and economic inequality demands an informed and engaged citizenry. However, political science has long established that people have a rational incentive to disengage (Downs 1957; Olson 1965), and accordingly, for most, “politics is a remote, alien, and unrewarding activity” (Robert A. Dahl 1961, 279) for which they hold “inconsistent and weak preferences” (Converse 1962).<sup>2</sup> However, through mobilization into groups, organizations, and parties, otherwise disinterested citizens can engage effectively with democracy (Achen and Bartels 2016) and develop informed policy preferences (Iversen and Soskice 2015). It is no wonder then that “[t]he theory of collective action is *the* central subject of political science” (Ostrom 1998, 1).

---

1. All epigraphs are from original interviews conducted with South African activists in 2019. For more details on these interviews, refer to Chapter 3.

2. This observation should not be considered a critique. As expressed by Sabl, “Complaints about apathy are characteristic of students or full-time activists who lack ordinary responsibilities” (Sabl 2002, 12). Like the activist who turns to organizing, political scientists cannot assume people are as politically engaged as we are. Like that organizer, we must start “with people where they are” (Inouye 2021, 1).



## 1. Introduction

Yet, for those disengaged from politics, recruitment is often more than just being presented with information about issues or available actions. Many require someone to frame those issues in terms of their interests and values, to make the experience of taking part in collective action feel rewarding, to enhance their understanding of politics, and to build their sense of efficacy. Beyond a mere invitation, they need someone who pushes them to become the kind of person who shows up; pushes them to become “democratic citizens” (Han 2014a). Overcoming the collective action problem needs the intervention of organizers, people “willing to invest [their] own time and resources to coordinate the inputs of others in order to produce collective action or collective goods” (Popkin 1979, 259). Since citizens often need a push, we need “pushers” (Rooks and Penney 2015). In this dissertation, I interrogate where those pushers come from.

Given its positive effects on engagement in democracy, scholars regularly comment on organizing’s under-supply, either in comparison to historical levels or some normative ideal (e.g., Skocpol 2003; McAleve 2016; Hersh 2020a; Han and Kim 2022).<sup>3</sup> To explain variation in the production of organizing, existing research has tended to focus on organizing as an advocacy *strategy*.<sup>4</sup> Through this lens, the decision of whether or not to recruit is made by political entrepreneurs considering the expected return on investments in organizing activity compared to other advocacy strategies. In short, this analytical perspective centers on leaders and the opportunity structures they encounter.

While this research has significantly increased our understanding of organizing as a *collective* activity, focusing on the normative and strategic ends of organizing obscures its means: the people who must give their time to recruiting others. Therefore, rather than center the groups who adopt an organizing strategy or the institutional characteristics which promote its implementation, I consider the decisions of the individual activists to do or not to do the work of organizing. This reframing allows me

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3. I review this literature in more detail in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.

4. I review this literature in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.

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to draw on the paradigms and findings of the political behavior literature. Moreover, it shifts the focus from the qualities of what organizing does to the unique characteristics of its implementation.<sup>5</sup>

For this approach to be viable, I must demonstrate three related points. First, I must show that organizing is labor-intensive. Doing so is necessary because if political entrepreneurs can implement an organizing strategy without a large pool of ready and able recruiters, these leaders' decisions will be unaffected by how individuals relate to the work itself. Where that to be the case, investigations of the emergence of organizing should continue to focus on leaders and the characteristics of the political environments they are embedded within. To address this consideration, in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, I draw from the existing literature to establish the “stylized fact” that organizing is fundamentally relational labor reliant on thick individual interactions. The implication of organizing's dependence on this type of work is that it requires a large pool of organizers.

Second, I must show that strategic motivations do not primarily drive how individual activists choose to allocate their time. If they were acting chiefly from a strategic motivation, then the same logic that previous scholarship has shown to influence the priorities of leaders and organizations would cascade down to these on-the-ground actors responsible for implementing an organizing strategy. One might presume that

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5. While the strategic framing is undoubtedly dominant, viewing recruiting activity as a political behavior is not entirely novel. For example, as part of the *Citizen Participation Study*, Brady et al. consider how recruiters decide which targets to select (1999). However, to my knowledge, only one study uses this lens to systematically explain the decision to recruit. Heger et al. evaluate the impact of telling activists that other activists are engaged in recruitment. They found this treatment to result in decreased organizing activity, which they attributed to free-riding (2020). However, despite the relative dearth of such studies, hints of this idea are present in the literature. For example, a quote from one of Han's respondents discusses how frustrations from their experiences of trying to organize dissuaded them from the strategy: “I am not a very good organizer. I have tried and tried and tried. I have been involved with the [association] since 1976, so for 34 years. But in my efforts to get people organized and involved, I have found that I am deficient” (Han 2014a, 65). Han uses this example to demonstrate the costliness of an organizing strategy as a larger project of “understanding the strategic choice” to organize (67). While this is an accurate and valuable interpretation, within my framework, this person's experience would lead to different types of questions and answers. My approach would focus on why organizing was more challenging for this person and why the overall experience was negative.

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individuals engaged in political activity will choose the work they believe to be the most effective at accomplishing their goals. However, the behavioral literature provides psychological, sociological, and economic reasons to doubt this seemingly reasonable assumption. Indeed, empirically, that does not appear to be the case. In Chapter 4, I describe the experiences of activists who, despite believing organizing is a strategic and normative priority, choose not to do it. Then, in Chapter 5, I present experimental evidence indicating that individuals *do not* choose to recruit based on how important they believe this work to be.

Finally, the decision of whether to organize must be unique to the qualities of the task itself. If the choice to recruit and the decision to take political action are equivalent, then no analytical purchase on the question of organizing's production is achieved by thinking of organizing as a *unique* political behavior. In that case, scholarship could import political science's already robust understanding of political participation and call it a day. In this case, the sole contribution of this re-framing would be adding "supply of activists" to the opportunity structures leaders face. However, the evidence presented throughout this dissertation refutes the idea that organizing can be understood to be just another form of political engagement.

It is the same quality that validates the need for understanding organizing as a political behavior that also implies this research's primary theoretical expectations. Namely, unlike many forms of political engagement, organizing is deeply rooted in relational labor. From this insight, eight propositions emerge, enumerated on page 10. These can be clustered into four categories of claims, each comprising one of this dissertation's empirical chapters. First, as stated above, the individual decision to organize is not primarily driven by strategic concerns. Second, preferences for interpersonal experiences and comfort with instrumentalizing relationships will affect which members of society will be predisposed to the work. Third, individuals' assessment of their social skills – and their trust in that assessment – will determine who feels capable of recruiting. Finally, the socio-economic valuation of relational labor will impact the positionality of individuals prepared to become an organizer.

## 1.2 Review of Methodological Design

To develop and test propositions about how people make this decision, I adopted a mixed-methods approach described in more detail in Chapter 3. This process began with a series of semi-structured interviews with 42 South African activists, some of whom were engaged in organizing and some of whom were not. A consistent pattern emerged from speaking to these people about their experiences in advocacy. The same factor that makes organizing labor-intensive – namely its relational quality – also shapes people’s willingness and capacity to engage in that work. In Chapter 4, I present short profiles of a few of these activists, which motivate a series of claims tested throughout the remainder of the text.<sup>6</sup> By beginning with a thick understanding of these cases, I bolster the internal validity of the propositions then tested through quantitative analysis (Gerring 2006).

In subsequent chapters, I present evidence for these propositions drawn mainly from the United States. I conducted 11 original surveys and 11 survey experiments.<sup>7</sup> Nine of these surveys were on the general US population totaling 16,610 observations. The remaining two were of “likely organizer” populations, one in the US and another in South Africa. While South Africa and the United States are substantively important instances of democracy (Lieberman 2022; A. d. Tocqueville 1945, [1835]), they also have substantially different economic, social, and political institutions. Evaluating ideas generated in one subpopulation of one society (South African activists) in another sampling frame of another society with materially different institutions (the

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6. In February of 2018, I co-founded the MIT Graduate Student Union, which won recognition in April 2022. These four years of personal organizing experience undoubtedly influenced my understanding of the origins of an organizing practice in ways I cannot disentangle from this research project or the hypotheses I privileged. While I occasionally reference that experience throughout this dissertation and include quotations from an interview I conducted with a fellow co-founder of that organization, it is essential to note that this was not participant observation. The reader should therefore consider references to these personal experiences as framing anecdotes rather than systematic scientific research.

7. It is a potentially confusing coincidence that there were 11 of both. Three of the survey experiments were part of the same instrument. The US activist survey did not include an experiment, and one of the US general population surveys included an inconclusive experimental result.

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United States) increases our expectation of the validity of the original findings in both contexts. Moreover, it increases our expectation that these results will generalize beyond these contexts.<sup>8</sup> To further increase the external validity of these results, I evaluate whether the relationships predicted by my interviews and surveys are visible among the over 80,000 respondents from 57 countries who participated in Wave 7 of the *World Values Survey* (WVS).

### 1.3 Roadmap and Summary

In Chapter 2, I rely on existing literature to establish the first requirement of my framework, namely that organizing is labor-intensive. I provide evidence for the second in Chapter 5. I demonstrate the insufficiency of strategic considerations in explaining individual-level decisions to recruit. In addition to validating increased attention to recruitment as a political behavior, refuting this naive hypothesis has a practical implication. I have observed practitioners implicitly adopt the idea that if they can persuade people that recruitment is necessary, these people will invest their time in this work. If that is as ineffective as my evidence indicates, organizations and leaders must consider alternative approaches to motivating recruitment activity.

My research shows that the relationship-orientation of the organizing *experience* plays a far more significant role in the decision than the perceived importance of the work. Chapter 6 explores how the interpersonal nature of organizing interacts with the qualities of the recruiter, the task, and the target to shape activists' willingness to organize. I find that those disposed to interpersonal interactions – “extraverts” – are disproportionately likely to choose to recruit. Moreover, I demonstrate that perceptions of organizing as manipulative prevent some from recruiting, though this negative effect is ameliorated by how the task and the target are framed to potential recruiters. One of the implications of this hesitancy is that humanistic ideologies that privilege the sanctity of individual agency will be at a political disadvantage. In my

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8. This can be thought of as an implementation of a “cross-validation” strategy.

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concluding chapter, I further present cross-national evidence that having liberal values is a strong predictor of not engaging in organizing activity.

In addition to how they felt about the experience, respondents consistently indicated that their ability to recruit is critical in deciding whether to act. It follows from organizing's social character that the abilities central to the work are interpersonal. In Chapter 7, I show that respondents' underlying interpersonal skills substantially impact both self-assessments of their organizing capacity and their reported recruitment activity. These findings indicate that political science should add social skills to the catalog of civic skills and should further investigate the potential role of social-emotional learning (SEL) interventions to promote the organization of collective action.

Chapter 7 further explores gender differences in the interaction between social skills and organizing behavior. Existing research has consistently found that women have, on average, higher baseline social skills and make better political organizers. However, the association between social skills and self-evaluations of recruitment capacity among women is weaker than it is for men. This pattern is further associated with lower overall levels of recruitment activity reported by women. Nevertheless, experimental evidence shows that when women receive affirmation of their underlying social skills, the strong positive relationship between social skills and self-assessed recruitment capacity becomes consistent with that observed among men. This result implies that despite women tending to be socialized to have superior interpersonal abilities to men, they also tend to be socialized to have less confidence in those abilities.

Chapter 8 considers how organizing's relational quality impacts perceptions of its socioeconomic value. Respondents across contexts view organizing as having a lower social status than other work, at least partly due to its interpersonal quality. I show experimentally that the more an organizing job is associated with social qualification at the expense of cognitive abilities, the less skilled individuals presume the work to be and the less they expect the job to be paid. I find that this quality leads respondents to indicate a decreased willingness to do the work of organizing, particularly among

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higher-income respondents and those who have or would consider working for a civic organization. However, this effect is ameliorated when the social quality of organizing increases people's expectations of their qualifications to do that work, which is more common when people have more developed social skills.

The concluding chapter further expands the generalizability of these collective findings. Reiterating the main predictions explored in the other chapters, I test them again with data from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey. The results of these models are consistent with the expectations from my interviews and surveys, lending them increased credibility. I go on to discuss what this research implies for the production of organizing and what practices leaders might consider if they adopt organizing as a strategy. I end with recommendations for additional research which can shore up the limitations of my research design and build on my findings.

That these findings generalize well is perhaps unsurprising. Except for the irrelevance of strategic concerns, none of my significant predictions are particularly counter-intuitive once the practice of organizing is distilled from the literature. If organizing is relational labor, it is not surprising that people's preferences for interpersonal activity (Chapter 6), their skills in navigating relationships (Chapter 7), or their perceptions of relational labor (Chapter 8) should influence their decision of whether to organize. However, by explicitly stating and testing these ideas, we can better parse their implications, identify heterogeneity in organizing activity, and design novel interventions.

## **1.4 Cultivating a Democratic Garden**

We cannot explain collective action without explaining those people who create it. The bedrock of the research presented here is the simple proposition that activists are not strategic actors optimizing for a policy outcome. While their convictions may motivate them to step into the political arena, they do so vested with preferences, abilities, and ambitions. These individuals have a broad menu of political work they

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can do in service of their beliefs, and even if they could determine what actions are most important, they do not entirely discount their own welfare in this decision.

This project joins a growing segment of political science considering political actors as whole persons (Gulzar 2021; Lieberman et al. 2017; Baggetta et al. 2013). This dissertation asks, what makes someone choose to do the work of organizing? Because if we can answer that question, maybe we can figure out how to cultivate more organizers. If we can cultivate more organizers, maybe we can achieve more collective action. And, if we achieve more collective action, maybe we can build the democratic power necessary to take on the crises our society faces.



*“We’ve called ourselves activists for a long time, but we should have called ourselves organizers... activists raise an issue, organizers consciously get others to engage.”*

# 2

## Motivation and Analytical Framework

### 2.1 Why Don’t I Organize?

Between 2014 and 2016, I worked for Equal Education (EE), a social movement organization in South Africa. One of only a handful of middle-class White people at an overwhelmingly Black working-class organization, I worked in “Policy, Communications, and Research” (PCR) with most of the other middle-class White people. PCR was in a different office block, informally called “Constantia,” after the affluent suburb of Cape Town filled with vineyards and tourists. Organizers worked in “Khayelitsha,” named for the poverty-stricken township where most members lived. No one in the organization was comfortable with this division. Nevertheless, despite a widely shared faith in people-power and a conviction that changing the world required mass engagement, our solution to this partition privileged the non-organizing work. It was always, how do we train organizers in the skills necessary to work in PCR? and not, how do we get those desk-bound activists to organize?

In early 2018, I joined 16 strangers to start an underground graduate student unionization drive. Based on the advice of the veteran unionists and seasoned activists in our midst, the task at hand was clear: the only way we would win recognition

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was to recruit. Nothing else would matter if we did not recruit hundreds of highly engaged members and have thousands of organizing conversations. However, instead, we debated voting procedures, worked to “professionalize,” and agonized over our name. The result was that within two months of our first meeting, attendance of the organizing committee had dropped to six, and two months after that to four. These were MIT graduate students: rational, intelligent actors who gave of their highly limited free time to a cause they believed in and ostensibly wanted to succeed. Why were they ignoring the good advice they received?

This dissertation is motivated by an empirically justified belief, expanded on below, that building mass organizations, powerful movements, strong parties, and inclusive democracies requires organizing. However, it is also motivated by that personal contradiction I experienced while working for EE and as a member of the MIT Graduate Student Union (MIT GSU). Despite deeply valuing organizing as both an intrinsic democratic good and an instrumentally effective political tactic, despite being personally willing to make sacrifices for my political beliefs, I hid away in “Constantia.” Therefore, I ask, “Why do some people recruit, and others do not?” or, more pointedly, “Why do I, and so many of the committed activists I have worked with, who espouse the virtues of mass participation so often choose to avoid the work associated with organizing?”

This chapter reviews how organizing is thought of in existing scholarship, contextualizing these anecdotes and the conundrums they lay bare. From these works, I tease out three distinct and interrelated ways of thinking about political organizing. First, organizing exists as an ideological commitment to democratic practice: a means of manifesting a type of pluralistic “Tocquevillean politics” (Sabl 2002). This perspective, expanded on in Section 2.3, values organizing for its functions of bringing new people into politics, expanding associational life, and institutionalizing mass participation.

However, existing scholarship had tended to rule out these idealistic considerations as sufficient motivation to explain the emergence of organizing. Instead, previous

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work has emphasized organizing as a means of building political power: an advocacy strategy for achieving political objectives through the production of collective action (Section 2.2). In short, it is a means of building political power. In this framing, organizing's democratic implications are externalities of the machinations of political entrepreneurs jockeying for power (Section 2.4). Yet, this emphasis on leaders' strategic decisions constrained by opportunity structures leaves substantial variation to explain. In particular, it does not resolve the incongruity observed in my personal experiences: why do organizations and activists committed to a strategy of organizing fail to actually recruit?

To answer that, instead of focusing on how the institutional characteristics of an environment affect the value of organizing, I consider the experience of organizing for the individuals required to implement it. Making this shift from political strategy to political behavior requires linking the goals of organizing to a specific set of political acts. Therefore, I end this chapter by reviewing what academics and practitioners know about organizing in practice (Section 2.5). This review establishes that organizing is reliant on recruitment through thick interpersonal interactions. In acknowledging and centering this quality of organizing, I shift the focus from what organizing does to how it is done. In the process, I move the spotlight from the political entrepreneurs who choose whether or not to adopt an organizing strategy to the decisions of the individual activists required to implement an organizing strategy. By centering the organizing experience, it is possible to understand variation in the strategy's emergence above and beyond what is possible when considering only the opportunity structures available to political strategists. Moreover, focusing on organizing as an act, rather than an ideology or a strategy, allows me to adopt research methods (Chapter 3) and to develop theoretical propositions (Chapter 4) informed by political science's robust understanding of political behavior.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds in four main parts. In the next section, I introduce organizing as a strategy, as this is the most straightforward framing

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conceptually and the most common in the literature. From this, Section 2.3 explores organizing’s relationship with democracy, establishing organizing’s intrinsic value – that is why organizing matters. Newly motivated by concern over its production, Section 2.4 discusses existing theories for variation in the supply of organizing. This section ends with a consideration of the limitations of the strategic frame for explaining the emergence of organizing. This review justifies examining organizing as an individual-level political behavior. However, to do so, I must understand the day-to-day act of organizing. Section 2.5 briefly summarizes a broad set of theorists, practitioners, and scholars to describe what it takes to mobilize the disengaged.

## **2.2 Organizing is a Political Strategy**


Organizing is a political strategy focused on building political power by persuading disengaged people to participate in collective action. While practitioners have used the term “organizing” to describe this form of political advocacy going back to (at least) the 19th century, it has only recently entered mainstream political science.<sup>1</sup> When scholars discuss the practice, they commonly distinguish it from two other advocacy strategies: lobbying, which focuses on influencing the political elite, and activation, which relies on the mobilization of the already motivated (Schier 2000; Moses et al. 1989; McAlevey 2016; Han 2014a).<sup>2</sup> In this section, I elaborate on these distinctions, summarized in Figure 2.1.<sup>3</sup>

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1. A review of the conceptual history of organizing in and out of the discipline is available in Appendix B.

2. Confusingly, while the distinctions between these three underlying concepts are shared across authors, the actual terms used to denote them are inconsistent and occasionally in conflict. The term “mobilization” is used by some to denote what I call “organizing” (Schier 2000) and by others to indicate what I call “activation” (Han 2014a; McAlevey 2016; Moses et al. 1989). I adopt “activation” as it lacks the conceptual ambiguity of mobilization. Instead, I use “mobilization” as a category encompassing both organizing and activation. Similarly, what I call “lobbying” is elsewhere called “lone-wolf activism” (Han 2014a) or “advocacy” (McAlevey 2016) or is subsumed into “activation” (Schier 2000). I use the term “lobbying” as it is familiar to most political scientists, though often used more narrowly or broadly. Again, I use “advocacy” for the overarching collection of all these strategies. Fortunately, when scholars use the term “organizing,” it is almost always intended to

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**Figure 2.1: Organizing as a Strategy.** A typology of advocacy strategies building on frameworks introduced by (Schier 2000), (Han 2014a), (McAlevey 2016), and (Moses et al. 1989).

Substantial power to directly affect policy outcomes is vested with specific individuals and institutions, including politicians, courts, bureaucrats, foundations, and businesses. Through formal or informal procedures, policy advocates may *lobby* these actors to influence their decisions directly. There is a wide range of tactics available (J. L. Walker 1991) and a variety of potential decision-makers to target (Kingdon 2014). Nevertheless, for this dissertation’s purposes, these actions are grouped based on one essential quality: their relationship to existing power structures.

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carry a meaning similar to that adopted here.

3. Organizing is worth distinguishing from clientelism, which relies on material incentives or coercion rather than persuasion. Nevertheless, the line between these two practices is occasionally blurred. Clientelism’s intermediaries do adopt some of the persuasive techniques of organizers. Moreover, organizing may include providing recruits with some material goods - such as free food at events or mission-branded t-shirts. While often done for social or symbolic purposes, these can also, at times, have a quality of *quid pro quo*. For example, one stalwart member of Equal Education joined the organization because she could get a free ride home from school after meetings. It turns out free rides are not always a threat to collective action!

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When decision-makers are intransigent in the face of earnest appeals, they can require pressure to be made to take desired political actions. Few actors in society can produce sufficient pressure unilaterally, so achieving social change, in this case, will demand collective action and, therefore, *mobilization*.<sup>4</sup> In the mobilization process, activists can change what resources and voices are engaged in policy battles.

Collective action requires the coordination of many motivated people. If there exists a pool of already-engaged citizens, ready and willing to act, who solely face a coordination problem (Runge 1984; Taylor 1987), then activists can focus their attention on *activation*.<sup>5</sup> An activation strategy involves creating “mechanisms for coordination of expectations and the pooling of resources” (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1971, 25). It is most effective when activists can “identify those in the public most likely to become active” (Schier 2000, 8) who already have a “latent interest” (Han 2014a) and then target their messages to this population. Since these people are already motivated, activation can rely on “thin” forms of communication (Schier 2000) and “microtargeting” (Endres and Kelly 2018).<sup>6</sup>

However, people are often not motivated to engage in politics at all,<sup>7</sup> let alone prioritize action to affect an activist’s specific cause, regardless of how much they

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4. Motivated by re-election (Mayhew 2004), elected leaders are susceptible to the influence of those who control campaign contributions and voting blocs (Musa 2016). Similarly, firms are vulnerable to the demands of coordinated striking workers (Rosenfeld 2014) or consumer boycotts (Ganz 2000) and thus to collective action. Moreover, by generating collective action, activists can accomplish policy goals without involving existing decision-makers by creating cooperatives, mutual aid organizations, and other civil society institutions.

5. Adopting this strategy may be purposeful. However, activists often misunderstand how motivated potential participants are or what tactics are likely to inspire them to act. They might therefore adopt the tactics associated with activation, expecting the masses to respond enthusiastically. These activists will often then become disappointed by the indifference that follows.

6. As a result, both intention and practice distinguish activation from organizing. How these strategies differ in terms of practice is further developed in Section 2.5.

7. Engagement in politics is not a binary condition, and the level of engagement required for different political acts varies. As a result, while a campaign recruiter might need to merely “activate” someone to cause them to vote, they might have to “organize” them to push them to volunteer. Organizers will often categorize people by their relative engagement level and actively work to move them to higher levels. For example, in *Secrets of a Successful Organizer*, people are coded as “disengaged,” “supporters,” “activists,” and “core.” The organizing work is moving individuals along the chain from the disengaged to the core as much as it is getting them to take part in any specific act (Bradbury et al. 2016).

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“support” it. As Dahl wrote half a century ago, “It would clear the air of a good deal of cant if instead of assuming that politics is a normal and natural concern of human beings, one were to make the contrary assumption that whatever lip service citizens may pay to conventional attitudes, politics is a remote, alien, and unrewarding activity” (Robert A. Dahl 1961, 279). Mobilizing citizens generally requires subsidizing their political engagement. Activists must get in front of an elusive target and convince them that participation is neither alien nor unrewarding. They must inspire people to believe their participation can affect their interests - material or ideological. Ultimately, an activist must cause them to view engagement as more rewarding than free-riding. This practice is *organizing*.

Organizing is therefore closely related to “leadership development,” “political education,” and “consciousness-raising.” Because it focuses on the disengaged, its goal *must be* to transform and empower these recruits: “The organizer thus makes two choices: (1) to engage others, and (2) to invest in their development. The mobilizer [those who engage in activation] only makes the first choice. And the lone wolf [those who engage in lobbying] makes neither” (Han 2014a, 10).

None of these strategies are mutually exclusive; activists can decide they need to lobby a decision-maker, activate some people, and organize a few more to achieve a policy goal. Nevertheless, organizations tend to focus more heavily on one strategy or another. For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental organization founded by lawyers, relies heavily on lobbying: litigation, research, and elite persuasion (NRDC 2022). The Sunrise Movement, on the other hand, is focused on organizing “an army of young people” to fight for environmental justice (Movement 2022). These activists’ goals are entangled, but their strategies are distinct. As a result, so are the implications of their advocacy on the distribution of power in society.

## 2.3 Organizing is an Investment in Democracy

The form that political advocacy takes has spillover effects on the dynamics of power in a society. When activists look to the courts for policy change, they empower America’s 1.4 million lawyers (Ambrogi 2019), granting these professionals disproportionate influence on those and future policy debates (Tushnet 2004). If advocates rely on wealthy donors for resources, their mission becomes inexorably molded by the preferences of those funders (Francis 2019). The choice to micro-target engaged citizens increases the class bias of the electorate (Jackman and Spahn 2018) with predictable adverse effects on the representativeness of policy outcomes (Terry 2016; Pontusson 2013; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Franko et al. 2016). Advocates venue shop as they strive to win their political battles, forming and reforming strategies in response to the current configuration of opportunity structures. There is no one road to policy victory, but the path activists choose can be as important as the destination. This section discusses how organizing relates to three essential qualities of democracy: contestation, participation, and order.

Contestation is when conflicting visions and interests have space and opportunity to exist in the same polity. In his discussion of contestation, Dahl focuses on the liberties necessary for its manifestation (Robert Alan Dahl 1973, 3).<sup>8</sup> However, while liberty opens the possibility for contestation, organizing can help to make it happen. This is because, as Tocqueville pointed out, freedom without association produces democratic servility: “[C]itizens are independent and feeble... powerless if they did not learn voluntarily to help one another” (A. d. Tocqueville 1945, [1835], 115). It is only through association in groups, organizations, and parties that they can achieve the “moral and political force” to defend their shared interests (Sabl 2002, 7). The formation of these groups requires organizing. As Schumpeter commented, “...volitions do not as a rule assert themselves directly. Even if strong and definite they remain

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8. These forms of non-interference by the state are what Isaiah Berlin would call “negative liberty” (Berlin 1969).



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latent, often for decades, until they are called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors... by organizing these volitions, by working them up...” (Schumpeter 1942, 270).<sup>9</sup> This is how citizens actually engage in democracy: through faction (Achen and Bartels 2016).

By bringing people into parties, unions, and associations, organizing can produce powerful institutions representing new interests to vie for political, economic, and social outcomes: “Organizing is one of the few practices that explicitly pursues social change through mechanisms engaging individuals in participatory and democratic civic practices” (Speer and Han 2018, 747).<sup>10</sup> Part of this process is the generation of new social capital (Christens and Speer 2015), a fundamental component in the emergence of democratic organizations (Putnam 2000, 1994; Granovetter 1973).<sup>11</sup>

From the formation of political parties in the early United States (Schattschneider 1942, 49) to the new political parties of today (Poertner 2021), organizing is key to the emergence of new political factions. It is fundamental to the political influence of social movements (Schlozman 2015), and while many of the origins of democracy remain heavily debated, scholars consistently maintain the importance of organizing (Acemoglu

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9. Earlier in this quote, Schumpeter used the example of the unemployed seeking unemployment benefit. Indeed, one would imagine that unemployment would be a powerful motivating grievance, yet, as Schumpeter asserted, empirical research has found that it often fails to mobilize people to action (e.g., Schlozman and Verba 1979). However, when combined with mobilization, it does (Aytac et al. 2018). Examples are profligate: the US in the 1930s (Leab 1967; Lorence 2010), Argentina in recent decades (Mottiar and Bond 2015), and South Africa today (Petras 2001) have seen the occurrence of unemployed workers movements. Such movements depend on the availability of organizations able to mobilize the dispersed unemployed communities (Piven and Cloward 1977; Leab 1967; Lorence 2010; Giugni 2010; Bagguley 1991).

10. Out of the three forms of advocacy described in the previous section, organizing is the only one that *directly* invests in creating new independent power bases. Lobbying can indirectly affect contestation through policy reforms but only at the discretion of existing institutions. As a result, it is more likely to empower an existing contestant than change the contest (Teele 2015). Similarly, activation will reallocate actors engaged in contestation from one policy area to another and, in the process, can dramatically change which issues are represented. Nevertheless, this process has little direct impact on the amount of contestation.

11. A common critique of the social capital literature is that it often treats social capital as a “given characteristic” of an environment, removing the agency of the actors within that environment (Agre 2004). Indeed, in explaining the emergence of social capital in Italy, Putnam relies on the formation of institutions centuries earlier (Putnam 1994). Introducing organizing to this dynamic allows for that missing agency.

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and Robinson 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Teele 2015; McAdam 1986; Sabl 2002). Indeed, the South African activists I interviewed were in near-perfect agreement in crediting the end of Apartheid to “the power of organizing.”

The effect of organizing on contestation is contingent on the idea that political participation is not an inevitable product of political liberty: that “[m]ost people need to be directly invited into public engagements, contacted personally by leaders and folks they know” (Skocpol 2003, 176). This observation follows naturally from the “logic of collective action.” If the beneficiaries of a public good do not expect to be pivotal in its production, they have a rational incentive to free-ride, avoiding paying the costs of that collective good – meetings, dues, strikes, or protests (Olson 1965). This principle extends to even low-cost participation such as voting (Downs 1957). The result of this “shirking” is that the shared goal is not achieved. In the case of voting, that shared goal is a healthy democracy.

The reasoning of the collective action problem can extend to knowledge: it is rational to abstain from learning about political issues and the systems that govern their lives or even one’s own (Downs 1957).<sup>12</sup> Even if someone wants to join in collective action, they often will feel incapable (Abramson 1983) or expect the action to fail because others will attempt to free-ride (Levi 1989). Acting requires substantial faith in the political system, in the possibility of a better world, in the willingness of others to act, and in yourself (Lieberman et al. 2014).

Overcoming these distinct barriers is challenging using only shallow interventions. For example, between 2012 and 2017, a global initiative of 178 projects worked to understand how to increase citizen engagement using information and communication technology (ICT). One of the primary findings of this effort was that “providing new technologies or channels is not sufficient to engage, enable and hear from people

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12. This is in part linked to the Marxist concept of “false consciousness” (Lukacs 1971). Individuals will often fail to recognize the actual state of their social or economic situation and the *possibility* of a different life. While “[t]he most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed” (Biko 1987, 68), the oppressor rarely needs to foster this false consciousness. Rational citizens rarely have the incentive to challenge the “natural order.”

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whose voices have rarely been heard and never been recognised or heeded” (McGee et al. 2018, 20). ICT is just the latest in a long line of lackluster resource-focused interventions. Reforms intended to make it easier to vote generally do little to augment the participation of marginalized citizens and can even result in increased class bias of the electorate (e.g., Martinez and Hill 1999; Gronke and Miller 2012; Kadt 2019). Indeed, panel data shows that changes in resource constraints tend to have a negligible effect on political engagement, while increases in political interest and efficacy, on the other hand, do increase participation (Miller and Saunders 2016).<sup>13</sup>

Of course, this is not absolute: access and resources matter. Some people are just waiting for a text message inviting them to take action. Expanding suffrage has always been followed by increases in engagement because these barriers exclude many already motivated people. Indeed, many are chomping at the bit to participate in the political system, but many are not. In democracies with freedoms and fair elections, with only minor barriers to engagement, barriers should not be the focus. Instead, it is active political recruitment that can develop and maintain citizen engagement in electoral politics and civic life (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady et al. 1995; Schier 2000; Skocpol 2003; Han 2014a; Green and Gerber 2015; McAleve 2016; Lockwood 2017; Speer and Han 2018; Hersh 2020a).<sup>14</sup> This is especially true among the otherwise marginalized (Leighley and Nagler 2008; Boulding and Holzner 2021). For many, to engage, they need someone to subsidize their engagement: to do the work of framing political issues in terms of their interests and values, to make the experience of collective action feel rewarding, to enhance their understanding of politics, and to build their sense of internal and external efficacy. Many need more than just activation to engage; they need to be organized (Han 2014a).

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13. While centering resources in their explanation of political participation, Brady et al.’s seminal study nonetheless notes that interest is the single best predictor for all forms of political participation, except donations, for which access to money beat out interest (1995). Moreover, there is evidence that similar attitudinal constraints can help to explain collapsing participation in South Africa, particularly among youths (Berinsky et al. 2016).

14. Despite elections tending to have a negligible impact on interest in politics, a previous has found that when campaigns do engage in “organizing” style recruitment, the result is a durable increase in political interest (Nahmias 2019).

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Yet, Huntington warns that participation without institutionalization leads to political instability (1968). In the contemporary environment, where scholars fear for democracy's resilience (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), it is worth considering how organizing relates to political order. Despite being viewed as an instigation of "contentious politics," how organizing brings people into politics can reduce the risks of radicalism, political violence, and democratic backsliding.

First, while organizers agitate, they do so to channel frustrations into legible coordinated action creating opportunities for negotiation (Alinsky 1989). They do not create grievances; those are already bubbling under the surface. The "estrangement and detachment from society" (Belanger et al. 2019, 1) that organizing works to overcome can turn people to radicalism and political violence (Belanger et al. 2019; Moskalenko and McCauley 2009). When people lack political incorporation, when it is events rather than people that mobilize bubbling rage, the result is riots (Liebersohn and Silverman 1965; Meyer 2004).

Second, due to the thick interactions that are the hallmark of organizing (Section 2.5), organizing is better placed to speak to the nuanced concerns of people's daily lives (Alinsky 1989). When those striving for power cannot access citizens directly, they communicate in sound bites, broad generic appeals, and the easily measurable. This type of mobilization, by necessity, relies more heavily on identity than issues. When politics is kept local and personal, this tends to reduce polarization and group essentialism (Hopkins et al. 2022; Hayes and Lawless 2018; Darr et al. 2018; van Gils et al. 2020; Prummer 2020). Increased partisanship is widely associated with the erosion of democracy (Svolik 2019; Fish and Abrams 2020; Crimston et al. 2021; Arbatli and Rosenberg 2021).

Third, organizing's focus on coalition building augments this moderating effect. Han and Kim distinguish two forms of civic engagement: "expression of choice" and "negotiating for power" (2022, 176). When people are activated, they generally participate in some expression of their political interests: signing a petition, joining a

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protest, or calling an official. However, to organize, people must develop “relationships of action with other people, must learn to engage people who may not agree with them in action, and must strategize within those relationships” (Han and Kim 2022, 178).<sup>15</sup> It requires a politics of patience and empathy (Hersh 2020a, 131). A strategic focus on recruitment also changes the cost-benefit calculus of adopting more extreme political tactics. When building broad coalitions, activists tend to avoid more violent methods likely to alienate people from the cause (Phulwani 2016).

Given its role in democracy, many activists and scholars have lamented how little organizing is happening (e.g., Schier 2000; Skocpol 2003; McAlevey 2016; Speer and Han 2018; Hersh 2020a; Han and Kim 2022). In the US, recent upticks in engagement are encouraging (Skocpol and Tervo 2019). Yet the US remains a participatory laggard (FairVote 2022), with a third of eligible voters forgoing the polls in 2020 (Desilver 2021), and the mobilized tend to confine their participation to shallow forms of engagement, increasing polarization but not fomenting political change (Hersh 2020a). The situation in South Africa is even direr: turnout fell by 23% between 1999 and 2019 (IFES 2022), and union density fell by 22% between 1997 and 2021 (*The downward spiral of SA unions* 2014; Cloete 2021). There is a demonstrable need for organizers, which begs the question of where those organizers come from.

## 2.4 Explaining Organizing Within Existing Frameworks

The existing scholarship has typically dismissed democratic high-mindedness in its explanations for the emergence of organizing. Instead, research has tended to view organizing as the result of the strategic decision-making of leaders engaged in social

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15. Take, for example, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the quintessential case of civil rights organizing. Members had a hodgepodge of ideologies: socialists, humanists, populists, religious activists, and Black nationalists. However, because their power came from their numbers, they had to keep the internal peace: “So long as we were working on voter registration and public accommodations, there was a broad consensus under which everyone could move” (James Forman cited in Sabl (2002), 4).

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and political fights and constrained by available opportunity structures<sup>16</sup> (e.g., Trejo 2009; Skocpol 2003; J. L. Walker 1991; Han 2014a; Inouye 2021). As Theda Skocpol put it, “Looking for roads to power, strategically-minded leaders could not find easier ways, so they turned to popular engagement not just out of civic goodness but for political reasons... People-oriented strategies were not usually the first choice” (2003, 271). Hahrie Han gives a similar account: “Whether because of geography, the pressures of a presidential campaign, or leaders whose time was getting increasingly tight, many of the high-engagement chapters in the study first began organizing when they faced an external challenge... When leaders believed that power came from the chapter’s membership... (2014a, 87).

An emphasis on the strategic decision of political entrepreneurs lends itself to certain types of explanations. As a result, in its accounting for organizing’s historical prevalence and more recent decline, the existing research has tended to focus on identifying those structural factors that shape leaders’ cost-benefit calculations. While I explore this literature more deeply in Appendix A, a few key examples which are held responsible for organizing’s decline over the 20th century include the following:

- New technology that made activation a cheaper option: particularly, mass communication (Skocpol 2003; Schier 2000) and micro-targeting (Endres and Kelly 2018; Hersh 2015; Barocas 2012; Schier 2000; Jackman and Spahn 2018).
- The emergence of an educated middle-class who could staff and pay for technical and capital-intensive work advocacy strategies (Skocpol 2003; Speer and Han 2018; Alexander and Nownes 2008).
- Progressive reforms increased lobbying opportunities and the costs of organizing (Skocpol 2003; Schier 2000; Hersh 2020a).

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16. Opportunity structures are the “configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization” (Kitschelt 1986, 58).

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However, it is imperative to note that these changes did necessitate the abandonment of organizing. The emergent middle-class became the lawyers, researchers, program officers, publicists, and data scientists for DC-based advocacy organizations, but they could have become organizers, as so many did in the 1930s (Gornick 1978). Moreover, these changes do not necessarily imply that organizing was “objectively” the less effective strategy. While political campaigns have directed abundant resources to television ads rather than organizing staff, the evidence is weak that TV spots are effective for mobilization (Gerber et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Coppock et al. 2020; Green and Gerber 2015), though they are effective means of enriching political consultants (Dulio 2001).<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, the major flaw of this cost-benefit argument is that organizing is often the best available strategy and is not adopted (Green and Gerber 2015; Green and McClellan 2020; Han 2016; Hersh 2020a; Broockman and Kalla 2016; Ostrom 2009; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995).<sup>18</sup> As Eitan Hersh put it,

...if I were a wealthy donor or party leader, I would direct resources toward building a locally based network of organizers... [Would this work?] The experimental evidence we have in political science suggests it would. When campaigns and parties engage in more personalized, more genuine, more neighborhood-based electioneering, they get more votes. When they leverage personal relationships and social pressure, they get more votes... (Hersh 2020a, 212).

It is the case that the greater the need for organizing to succeed, the more leaders are likely to center this strategy (Kershaw 2010; Gershtenson 2003; Han 2014a; Trejo 2009). Yet, there are substantial idiosyncrasies in its adoption.<sup>19</sup> Skocpol described

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17. It is noteworthy that the choices of implementers – middle-class activists and political consultants – are crucial in these technological, social, and political explanations.

18. This has been known for at least 25 years (Verba et al. 1995; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995).

19. An interesting case is contrasting the campaigns of former community organizer Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton – a leader who refused an offer to work with Saul Alinsky because of her “belief that the system could be changed from within” (Clinton 2004, 38). In his campaigns, Obama adopted an organizing practice (McKenna and Han 2014) that won the White House, brought new citizens

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how during the late 20th century, despite most advocacy groups abandoning local organizing in favor of DC-based politics, conservative organizations like the National Right to Life Committee, the Christian Coalition, and the National Rifle Association (NRA) continued to invest in organizing (Han and Kim 2022; Skocpol 2003). Another group that managed to keep organizing was the Industrial Areas Foundation. “[I]n the decades following the criticisms of ‘new populism’ [‘meeting people where they are’]... it is IAF organizations and others deeply informed by them that have been remarkably successful at broadening and sustaining broad-based networks of democratic power...” (Coles 2006)

Furthermore, structural explanations do not explain my experiences well. The division of labor at EE was not based on variation in perceptions of the strategic importance of organizing. My fellow members of the MIT GSU were well aware of how essential organizing was to our success. Leaders of both organizations had explicitly adopted organizing. Yet, embracing an organizing strategy did not result in an organizing practice. Moreover, this gap is not unique to my advocacy; organizing is a popular strategy: “Organizations all over the world expend billions of dollars trying to build people power... Many - if not most - of these organizations claim to be doing community organizing, but few actually are” (Han 2014b).

In 1995, the AFL-CIO redoubled its commitment to workplace organizing, founding the *Organizing Institute*. Skocpol uses this case to demonstrate the strategic logic: “Only after decades of dwindling returns from insider lobbying did the AFL-CIO finally move toward new workplace campaigns, community outreach, and a combination of media politics and network contacting during elections” (2003, 271). However, this turn resulted in only “a slight increase in relative organizing effort” (Fiorito 2003, into politics (Nahmias 2019), and continued to mobilize people throughout his presidency (Milkis and York 2017). When Hillary Clinton ran in 2016, she did not continue this strategy. As Obama commented in a poorly veiled critique of her campaign: “...one of the issues the Democrats have to be clear on is, given population distribution across the country, we have to compete everywhere. We have to show up everywhere. We have to work at a grassroots level...” (quoted in Thrush 2016). This variation in strategy cannot easily be explained by differences in the structures these two candidates faced.



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206), and the organizers trained at the *Institute* spent remarkably little of their time doing actual organizing work (Fine et al. 2018). Despite a commitment to organizing, the unionization rate continued to fall.<sup>20</sup>

In 2015, two decades after the AFL-CIO recommitment to organizing, labor activist Jane McAlevey characterized the labor movement as “having a strategy that fundamentally avoided workers” (McAlevey 2015). She went on to describe what the labor movement needs to do to win. “We have to build an army of people in the field who can actually contend with capital on the local level” (McAlevey 2015).

## 2.5 Organizing is Relational Work

Understanding why we need an army of organizers first requires understanding what goes into the day-to-day practice of organizing. The best a social scientist can hope for is a stylized fact: an idea that summarizes a “broad tendency” so well established empirically (Kaldor 1961, 178) that it provides a valid “basis for theory building” (Kaldor 1985, 1). I reviewed academic research on campaign mobilization, union organizing, civil society, persuasion, collective action, and political theory to understand what it takes to organize.<sup>21</sup> From this literature, I identified the stylized fact that in practice *organizing is fundamentally relational work reliant on thick individual interactions.*<sup>22</sup> It is through these types of interactions – commonly referred to as “organizing conversations” – that organizers can “transform people’s understandings of themselves,

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20. In 1995, it stood at 14.9% (BLS 1996), today it is just 10.3% (BLS 2022).

21. I further perused a range of activists’ writings. The findings from this review were consistent with the academic literature. To organize, “Get close to the workers, stay close to the workers” (2016). To recruit someone, “You talk with them” (Bradbury et al. 2016, 33). Effective activism is “building relationships with people - genuine human relationships...” (Sarita Pillay quoted in Mlungwana and Kramer 2018).

22. It is impossible to entirely parse a practice intended to accomplish a purpose from the bare minimum of acts intersubjectively understood as necessary to accomplish that purpose. An author can say they are writing a dissertation and engage in dissertation-associated activities, but if they never put words to page, they did not write a dissertation. Yet, it is also true that the denotation of words and concepts is socially constructed. Combining these two ideas, I assert that organizing as a “practice” can only be divined from the shared understanding of the activities regularly associated with accomplishing the goal of organizing.

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each other, and their relationship to public life” (Speer and Han 2018, 749). From this stylized fact, I justify my focus on the behavior of individuals, derive the appropriate method of study, and inform the propositions tested throughout the dissertation.

In their evaluation of three decades of the Get Out the Vote (GOTV) experiments, Green and Gerber found that the more intimate a mobilization appeal, the more effective it was (Green and Gerber 2015; Green and McClellan 2020): “Mobilizing voters is rather like inviting them to a social occasion. Personal invitations convey the most warmth and work best. Next best are phone calls...” (Green and Gerber 2015, 156). The cutting edge of GOTV research is “relational organizing,” a practice in which individuals recruit through repeated personal interactions with people within their networks. An evaluation of this method had the largest intent-to-treat effect size of any GOTV study in two decades of research (Green and McClellan 2020). More qualitative evidence also supports this proposition. In *Politics is for Power*, Hersh introduces a variety of modern vote brokers and shows that “[b]y building real relationships, they won supporters and accumulated power” (2020a).

Aggregating from interviews with union organizers, Rooks and Penny describe organizing as reliant on “personal relationships, empathy, and pushing” (2015, 187). Recounting his own experiences with the United Farm Workers, Ganz similarly describes how “Interpersonal relations are... critical to forging the shared understandings, commitments, and collaborative action that constitute a movement” (Ganz 2010, 6). These works are consistent with Bronfenbrenner’s decades of quantitatively evaluating union drives (Bronfenbrenner 1993; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995; Bronfenbrenner 1996; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). She found that unions are most successful when they adopt a “rank-and-file intensive strategy” investing in “[h]ouse calling, representative committees... [and] one-on-one surveys” (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995, 1–4).

Moving to the civic space, a case study of the Industrial Areas Foundation’s continued success noted that “relationship building [is] at the heart of everything

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the IAF does” (Warren 2001, 34). Relatedly, in her comparative case study of advocacy organizations, Han describes how organizers reach people by “building relationships and community with them” (Han 2014a, 9). In later research, Han tested this experimentally, showing that civic organizations can increase engagement by “demonstrating responsiveness and openness towards their members, recognizing a shared past and implied future, and asking members to engage in reflection” (2016, 304). Indeed, in their review of community organizing research, Christens and Speer describe the first of organizing as “relationship development,” which emerges through one-to-one meetings (2015).

If recruiting the disengaged is fundamentally an act of persuasion, then a similar pattern would be expected to emerge in the research on political persuasion. The current gold standard in political persuasion is deep canvassing, developed by LGBT activists: “With a deep canvass, we want to figure out what’s relevant to voters... to help the canvasser build a good rapport with a voter” (Fleischer in James-Harvill 2017). A 2016 field experiment tested this method, finding that a 10-minute conversation with a transgender rights activist using deep canvassing tactics resulted in a durable decrease in anti-transgender prejudice (Broockman and Kalla 2016). Similar persuasive effects from short relational conversations have been observed in candidate choice in France (Pons 2018), perceptions of policing in both New Haven (Peyton et al. 2019) and Liberia (Karim 2020), and science communication in Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, and Ecuador (Levine 2019). Indeed, providing information alone to fulfill a perceived deficit in knowledge is ineffective without first building a relationship with the target (Cook and Overpeck 2019).

I have framed organizing as a solution to the collective action problem. In her review of collective action theory, Ostrom noted communication’s ability to solve free-rider problems even though predictions from rational choice models have been “replicated so many times... that contemporary scholars have to take it seriously” (2009, 191). Moreover, as observed in the GOTV literature, the more interactions can create

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a sense of connection, the more effective they are: the spoken word is better than written, and face-to-face is best (Ostrom 2009).

Finally, political theorists have elevated the ideas of three activist scholars. First, Sabl uplifted the thought of civil rights organizer Robert Moses. According to Moses, an effective organizer must create a relationship with the community in which they “trust one another on a personal level that does not require shared convictions or ends” (Sabl 2002, 10). Moreover, creating this relationship of “trust and action” requires a “face-to-face” society (10).

While Moses’s view of organizing is associated with Tocquevillian politics, Saul Alinsky’s is considered Machiavellian (Phulwani 2016). Yet, while framed pragmatically, Alinsky’s process is consistent with Moses’s. An organizer must learn “about the community’s values, interests, and identities in order to understand which virtues and what sort of character are esteemed by these particular people” (872). Given this, it is no wonder Alinsky commented, “One can lack any of the qualities of an organizer - with one exception... the art of communication” (Alinsky 1989).

Finally, Moses’s mentor, Ella Baker, has recently made her way into the *APSR* (Inouye 2021). While she is considered a radical, Baker’s process is much the same as Moses’s and Alinsky’s. It involves “starting with [people where they are] and trying to move them, gradually, somewhere else” (2021). Baker saw personal relationships as the “building blocks that led to solidarity and collective action” (Ransby 2003, 112). She believed that “the field organizer had to forge friendships, earn the trust and confidence of members at the branch level, and mobilize people on the basis of the relationships that held communities together” (117). According to Baker, “It was the force of personal relationships rather than ideological commitment or even self-interest that initially drew people into political activity” (Inouye 2021, 9).

## 2.6 Organizing Requires Organizers

An organizing strategy requires an army of organizers because the actual work of organizing, of having thousands of organizing conversations, is labor-intensive. Consider, for example, how many conversations were necessary to organize MIT’s roughly 7,000 graduate students. With a conservative estimate of 10-minutes per conversation, ignoring search time, and speaking to each student just once, it would take roughly 50 days of non-stop organizing for a lone activist. As Green and Gerber succinctly put it, “Perhaps the biggest challenge is bringing a door-to-door campaign ‘to scale.’ It is one thing to canvass 3,600 voters; quite another to canvass 36,000 or 360,000” (2015, 38).

These labor requirements are not just a matter of resource constraints. For example, by current campaign standards and given the relatively low price per vote of face-to-face canvassing, an organizing-style campaign is not cost-prohibitive: “A million dollars is not a particularly large sum by the standards of federal elections; media campaigns gobble up this amount in the production and distribution of a single ad that airs for only a few days. But a million dollars will hire an army of canvassers for GOTV work during the final weeks of a campaign” (38). Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.4, since the 1990s, the AFL-CIO has invested substantial resources in training organizers. Yet, those organizers are not spending much time organizing (Fine et al. 2018). While institutional constraints may play a role, there is also undoubtedly a principal-agent dynamic at play.

Regardless of an organization’s priorities, activists will always have a variety of potential tasks they could be doing. Since the political engaged are as susceptible to motivated reasoning as anyone else (Achen and Bartels 2016; R. Enos and E. Hersh 2017), they can undoubtedly justify how one of these alternative tasks is a better use of their time.<sup>23</sup> These micro-decisions aggregate, and it is hard for leaders to

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23. This situation is worsened if activists have the opportunity to free-ride off the anticipated organizing activity of others. Previous research has shown that telling activists that others are recruiting *reduces* their propensity to recruit (Hager et al. 2020).

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course correct them. In mission-oriented organizations, monetary incentives do not seem to corral the priorities of employees. Given the role of intrinsic motivation in civic behavior (Fiorillo 2011), people will generally put more effort into the task they prioritize (Gerhards 2015). This limitation is particularly problematic with volunteers, whom leaders have even less control over (Van Puyvelde and Vantilborgh 2015; R. D. Enos and E. D. Hersh 2015).

However, even if organizations could recruit an army of organizers, these organizers need to be competent. Organizing requires people ready to have the conversations it takes to change minds; that is, it requires people who are ready to listen. Ultimately, repeated face-to-face interactions with a “loudmouthed ideologue” will change few people’s minds – even if that ideologue happens to be in the right. In her account of *Why We Lost the ERA*, Jane Mansbridge described a paradox she observed. Deeply committed feminists were the only people willing to give their time to mobilizing for the ERA. However, according to Mansbridge, these volunteers’ “ideological purity” often made them unwilling as organizers to start with people where they are (1986).

The supply of organizing is not just a strategic question. Political entrepreneurs must find or make a pool of ready and motivated organizers to implement an organizing strategy. Therefore, to understand the production of organizing, we need to know what makes an activist able and willing to recruit.

## 2.7 **Democracy, Power, and Solidarity**

Despite its humble origins, in September 2021, the MIT Graduate Student Union announced its existence after three years underground. Within 24 hours, over a thousand people had signed a union card petitioning for an election. Within six months, the MIT GSU had won its election by a margin of two to one. To understand how this organization escaped its downward trajectory and created a union of thousands, I interviewed Amelie,<sup>24</sup> the facilitator of that lonely four-person meeting I mentioned in

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24. All interview subjects’ names are pseudonyms unless specified otherwise.

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the chapter's introduction. I asked her for her thoughts on the union's success, and she credited organizing. In the process, she provided a succinct overview of the practice:

We're trying to build a democracy. Right? People ought to have a voice... We do that because through, or with, solidarity, we have recognized that we have shared problems, and then in building solidarity, we build power, and power is how we build our democracy... And then... here's how you do it: you just meet with people. You just find person after person after person. And you look for signs of solidarity; you look for any problem they might share. And then, if you spot a problem, you ask them if they want to join you in solidarity... have meeting after meeting after meeting and bring in people to build this thing.

Disentangling organizing's three framings as I have in this chapter is analytically useful, but it is worth emphasizing that these are different faces of the same underlying concept.<sup>25</sup> The ideological perspective of organizing focuses on its normatively valued outcomes, particularly democracy. The strategic view centers on its instrumental value: the creation of power. Finally, the behavioral view emphasizes what organizing takes to do: the practice of building solidarity. All three aspects of the concept play a role in shaping the supply of organizing. However, the role played by the day-to-day practice of organizing as *relational work* in its production is under-theorized and lacks direct empirical investigation. This dissertation is a response to that gap.

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25. "Good concepts pick out the causally relevant factors in phenomena..." (Goertz 2012, 31) such as their impact and their origins.

*“If we are in our own silo, thinking about our own things, it is not easy to achieve our goals.”*

# 3

## Research Design

### **3.1 Mixing Methods Across Contexts and Populations**

This chapter establishes three inter-related components of the project. First is the population of actors I am considering. I must adopt a decision rule as to who makes up the population that I can reasonably expect to engage in the work of organizing. Most of the small- $n$  research presented in this dissertation focuses on “activists:” people who have already committed costly political actions. However, the large- $n$  studies instead turn to samples of the general population. This analytical strategy is primarily adopted because the decision to recruit and the decision to take political action are neither entirely independent nor entirely dependent. Anyone could potentially recruit, but the motivational distance that some must traverse to become an organizer for the relatively disengaged is much greater. I engage in a more robust discussion of the dual approach I adopt to adjust for this quandary in Section 3.2.

Second, this chapter establishes the contexts I am working on. In Section 3.3, I justify focusing on South Africa and the United States by considering three aspects of these contexts. First, these are both critical cases of democracy, making understanding



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the manifestation of organizing in these contexts significant. Second, they have rich histories of associational life and protections for freedom of assembly, making organizing a viable political option. Third, they are institutionally *different* contexts in many significant ways. The implication is that they have very different opportunity structures shaping leaders' decision-making. This third factor allows this project to adopt a cross-validation approach, increasing expectations of external validity. I further establish this third goal of generalizability by analyzing representative data from 57 countries as part of the *World Values Survey*.

Finally, this chapter reviews the four strategies adopted in the mixed methods approach for this project. First, I discuss the 43 semi-structured interviews with South African activists. While I did use these conversations to provide prima facie plausibility for various hypotheses I was already considering, the primary function of these interviews was theory development. I explored the biographies of these advocates to better understand their decisions and what aspects of their experiences shaped these choices. The depth of these interviews, lasting as long as four hours, allows for a greater sense of internal validity. Yet, based on these interviews alone, I would be careful to generalize beyond these 43 activists. The interview participants varied substantially by class, race, age, gender, organizing type, and advocacy role. The diversity of this sample provides confidence that these personal case studies represent a broad set of experiences, though not necessarily a representative one. In the next chapter, I present a selection of illustrative profiles from these interviews.

Second, I conducted several surveys with samples of South African activists, US activists, and the US general population. This data provides evidence for the descriptive relationships expected by the propositions developed during my interviews. These systematic associations significantly expand the likelihood that the patterns observed in individual cases are generalizable. They also provide some evidence for the limitations of the interview results.

Third, while descriptive associations are informative, a lack of identification strategy limits the ability to use these observations to speak to causal relationships. I

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conducted a series of survey experiments to better establish the mechanisms at work. Despite the limitations with respect to mundane realism, these randomized treatments provide a high level of experimental realism, which I demonstrate through manipulation checks. By triangulating these internally valid causal relationships with externally valid large- $n$  correlations and robust interviews, I can be more confident in the overall validity of the proposed theoretical relationships.

In the final chapter, I take this one step further by referencing evidence from the World Values. This analysis helps to establish the generalizability of the overall findings. Similar to the previous survey results, this analysis relies on observational data without a clear identification strategy. However, I do not have access to additional experimental studies at this level. Therefore, I adopt a more formal discussion of model-based inference.

None of these studies are alone a silver bullet. Yet, in concert, the observed consistency across populations, contexts, and methods allows for increased confidence in both the utility of the overall framework adopted and the plausibility of the individual propositions introduced.

## 3.2 Identifying the Appropriate Population

One of the most significant shifts between the framework adopted in this project and the structural framing more common in the literature is which actor's agency is centered. The leaders who preoccupy much of the existing literature are often "elites." They are people who have accrued some – albeit limited – power and resources. They are determining how best to use this capacity to win. They are board members, presidents, officials, managers, councils, committees, campaign directors, consultants, candidates, and coordinators. They are not always at the top, but they are part of important decisions about whether or not an organizing *strategy* is adopted. These decisions matter,<sup>1</sup> but so do the choices of individual activists.

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1. For example, I spoke with a leader of a social movement organization that had built a substantial membership base. The organization had developed a robust lobbying capacity to support its orga-

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Anyone can decide whether or not to recruit, with or without an organization. While writing this dissertation, I lived with an unemployed organizer. Every time we shared an Uber, he struck up a conversation with the driver about unionizing. He kept materials by the door for us to distribute if we ever took a rideshare without him. He peer-pressured everyone in the house to vote in local elections and talked to us about the virtues of specific candidates. He acquainted himself with our state representative and invited them to the house to gather our signatures and talk policy with us. He ran multiple political education workshops with a local chapter of his political party. He knew our neighbors, waved at strangers, and hosted block parties. Organizing, for him, was a daily practice, and it could be for anyone. The unit of analysis for thinking about organizing as a political behavior is *the individual*.

However, this unemployed organizer was politically not an average citizen. Politics was part of his identity: it was a hobby, a vocation, and a passion. He was an activist. As shown in Figure 3.1, three-quarters of the people across 57 countries worldwide who have recruited others into politics have above-average political engagement (WVS).<sup>2</sup> This is a larger share than any other political action. Yet, the opposite framing is also relevant: a quarter of those who have recruited others have below-average political engagement, and this ratio is not much lower than for other acts.


Acknowledging this quality creates tension for this project. Understanding the emergence of organizing as a form of political participation requires understanding the decisions of those who recruit and those who *could recruit*. To identify the “dog that didn’t bark,” I need to decide who the “potential recruiters” in society are. There is, unfortunately, no correct answer to that problem, only different answers with

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nizing. Now, the organization was discussing closing down its organizing operations. The leadership was debating whether they might better serve their mission by committing the organization’s limited resources to research and publicity activities. Should they decide to do so, without the support and training this organization provides, the overall quantity of organizing in that space would surely decrease.

2. Political engagement is measured as an index constructed using the first component of a PCA. This index includes political interest, political importance, external efficacy, frequency of political discussion, and consumption of news media (which is itself an index of consumption frequency of eight types of news sources).

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**Figure 3.1: Share of Respondents Who Have Completed Political Acts By Level of Political Engagement.** Compares the share of people who have done seven political acts (binary indicators) with above- and below-average levels of political engagement. Data from the *World Values Survey, Wave 7* (Haerpfer et al. 2022) for 57 countries. Political engagement is measured using an index of political interest, political importance, external efficacy, frequency of political discussion, and consumption of news media.

different shortcomings. Across this project, therefore, I adopt a variety of approaches. Fortunately, findings across these different strategies are generally consistent.

One approach, adopted primarily in the large- $n$  studies, is to treat the entire population as potential recruiters. This choice is intrinsically valid: anyone could potentially organize. For non-political purposes, people regularly engage in recruitment activities.<sup>3</sup> They host parties, form conference panels, and start improv troupes. Nevertheless, not all people do so at the same rate. A central claim of this project is that by paying attention to patterns in preferences, competence, and valuation of relational labor, we can better understand the decision to recruit. Since anyone could recruit, I should look at how people, in general, relate to relational labor and the influence of that on the decision to engage in the political behavior of recruitment.

3. Indeed, the term “relational labor,” which I adopt throughout this text, has its academic origins in studies of artists (Baym 2015). The related concept of emotional labor, managing one’s feelings to create an emotional state in others, comes from research on the workplace (Hochschild 2012, [1983]).

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However, organizing involves subsidizing the political activity of others. This dissertation explores variation in the personal cost of that subsidy. Nevertheless, regardless of the extent of that cost, individuals must have a baseline interest in politics to be willing to pay the subsidy. In other words, even the most socially skilled extravert requires some minimum level of political engagement to turn their attention to policy battles. This quality means that the “true” population of potential organizers is people with an underlying latent tendency to take political action. This distinction creates a problem for inference from large- $n$  studies if those with a latent tendency to take action are systematically different from the general population. Yet, to narrow in on “potential organizers” – to identify that “baseline interest” – requires that I adopt a strategy to distinguish those with and without this tendency.

Doing so presents the substantial methodological problem of identifying who constitutes a “potential organizer.” One option is to consider people affiliated with an advocacy organization: staff, members, and volunteers. This choice is particularly appealing as much of the discussion in the previous chapter and the overall literature focuses explicitly on formal groups. For example, Han used this standard in *How Organizations Develop Activists* (Han 2014a). Organizational affiliation is also the selection criterion for my interview population – though I include both formal and informal groups.

However, as my old roommate demonstrated, one does not need to be connected with an organization to organize. Indeed, focusing on this population may bias scholars to privilege certain types of explanations because the decision to take part in politics and the decision of what action to take are not independent. We know from existing scholarship that organizations provide spaces for different types of political activity to take place. If the spaces to organize as part of existing institutions are limited, potential organizers might prefer not to engage in politics at all.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand,

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4. Two interview respondents used their “advocacy job” as a morally neutral paycheck while they spent their “free time” engaged in their real political work of organizing outside of pre-existing organizations. Other potential organizers, feeling similarly despondent about the work of existing political advocacy institutions, might choose not to participate.

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if institutions particularly reward other types of work, people who prefer that activity might become more likely to participate in politics. In limiting the examination of political organizing to only the already involved, we privilege explanations focusing on organizations and their opportunity structures. However, the thesis of this dissertation rests on the proposition that we cannot fully explain the underlying potential of the population to produce organizing through this analytical lens.

An alternative to defining the population by organizational membership might be to use a measure of individuals' political engagement to distinguish viable potential organizers. Of course, this is a latent concept capturing a cocktail of political participation, knowledge, efficacy, and interest. Moreover, it is not a binary proposition; engagement exists on a spectrum. Eitan Hersh estimates that a third of Americans spend two or more hours daily on politically related activities. Yet, for most, this engagement is limited to shallow acts like the consumption of political television (2020a). Whether all these people should be considered potential organizers is unclear. Nevertheless, I check for heterogeneity in my large- $n$  studies by underlying political engagement, though the exact measure varies by study.

Perhaps the strictest standard in defining the population of study is to consider only those who have signaled some strategic interest in organizing. In the discussion of my personal motivation in the previous chapter, I comment on how members of the MIT GSU were well aware of the importance of organizing. We participated in organizer training sessions and bought into the theory of change. Yet, many of those trained organizers did not organize. This is the same problem observed for the activists trained at the AFL-CIO's Organizing Institute. Focusing on these specific actors is attractive since they already have some strategic buy-in with the method, which places them among those with the most potential to organize. I surveyed two samples of activists in both the US and South African contexts who meet this criterion.

None of the strategies to disambiguate the amorphous population of potential "organizers" is particularly satisfying. However, by triangulating between the laxest

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definition – all people – with more strict definitions, I can be more confident in the validity of my findings for that hard-to-define latent population.


## 3.3 Cross-Validating Findings Across Contexts

Another change when I shift from thinking of organizing as a macro-level strategy to micro-level behavior is an increased plausibility that identified predictors might travel between contexts. Of course, behaviors exist in relation to institutions and are therefore not context-independent. Yet, behavioral theories are not nearly as intrinsically related to institutions as theories which focus on structures. Drawing parallels between a working-class South African social movement organization and an American graduate student unionization drive might feel absurd from within a paradigm that privileges institutional explanations. However, while the opportunity structures activists have faced in these two contexts vary dramatically, the actual process of organizing itself is remarkably similar across arenas and issues. Therefore, the individual capacity and willingness to organize are plausibly similar across these polities.

Nonetheless, a few boundary conditions are worth considering. This research builds on, rather than refutes, the existing scholarship that has established the critical role of opportunity structures in determining the emergence of organizing. In spaces where opportunities to participate are constrained, the choice to organize may invoke a different set of concerns than those related to relational labor. As visible in Figure 3.2, there is some empirical justification for this idea. A clear pattern exists between the share of individuals who state they *would* encourage others to participate and the level of democracy. However, as Figure 3.3 shows, democracy is a far worse predictor of actual recruitment activity. This distance between an imagined possibility and actual action demands a behavioral explanation.

Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, organizing is widely seen as a democratic principle and activity. Therefore, the cases this study focuses on are limited to liberal democracies. These polities have sufficient freedom of association

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**Figure 3.2: Willingness to Encourage Others to Take Political Action.** Labeled points indicate the share of each country’s sample who indicated they have or would encourage others to take political action, using sampling weights. Data from the *World Values Survey, Wave 7* (Haerpfer et al. 2022) for 57 countries. The measure of democracy is “polyarchy” developed by the *Varieties of Democracy* project. This index includes measures of the quality of elections, levels of freedom of speech and association, and the extension of suffrage (Coppedge et al. 2021). The line indicates a LOESS regression with a 95% confidence interval.

that organizing is a plausible political activity. Conversely, these societies also do not have such limited opportunities for participation that organizing is the only viable form of activism.<sup>5</sup>


Limiting my cases to democratic polities, I draw most of my evidence from the United States and South Africa. These are two normatively and theoretically important democracies with substantially distinct political institutions.<sup>6</sup> Despite its

5. Iran and Venezuela’s surprisingly high levels of recruitment activity demand explanation. Unfortunately, constructing such an explanation is beyond the scope of this project.

6. Further justification for these two cases is in Appendix C.



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**Figure 3.3: Experience Encouraging Others to Take Political Action.** Labeled points indicate the share of each country’s sample who indicated they have in the past encourage others to take political action. Data from the *World Values Survey, Wave 7* (Haerpfer et al. 2022) for 57 countries. The measure of democracy is polyarchy, developed by the *Varieties of Democracy* project, which includes measures of the quality of elections, levels of freedom of speech and association, and the extension of suffrage (Coppedge et al. 2021). The line indicates a LOESS regression with a 95% confidence interval.

checked path, the United States is one of the most celebrated democracies (A. Tocqueville 1835), and organizing has played a fundamental role in its history (Skocpol 2003). The much younger multi-racial democracy of South Africa, born out of a century-long struggle for freedom, on the other hand, can be seen as a bellwether for the possibility and promise of democracy (Lieberman 2022).

Therefore, due to the significance of the two cases, inferences drawn from them are significant in their own right. More than that, these are politically, economically, and socially contrasting cases. As noted, South Africa’s democracy is far younger than that of the United States. With this youth comes a more liberal constitution, enshrining

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rights unheard of in 1776 and prioritizing decentralization of power. South Africa is a middle-income country with the highest rate of economic inequality globally, and a quarter of its workforce is unemployed. Unlike the United States, South Africa does not have a hegemonic ethnolinguistic group, and the historically disadvantaged racial group is now the electoral majority. Therefore, if there is consistency in the role of social skills in the production of organizing across these two cases, it is less likely that the association stems from available opportunity structures.

## **3.4 Mixing Interviews, Surveys, and Experiments**

### **3.4.1 Theory Development through Interviews**

I draw evidence from both South African and US societies; however, the type of evidence I use in these two contexts is somewhat different. My research process began with a series of 43 semi-structured interviews in South Africa in the fall of 2019. While I went into these interviews with hypotheses derived from the literature and personal experiences, I also went into them with an open mind as to what I would find. The primary function of these interviews was to provide me with a thick understanding of the experiences of activists and what led them to choose to engage in the form of advocacy they did. As I wrote in my prospectus, the primary purpose of the interviews is “theory building, establishing the face validity of the theories proposed [in the prospectus] and identifying other likely contenders.”<sup>7</sup>

I conducted these interviews in Cape Town and Johannesburg between late September and early November 2019. I intentionally recruited a highly diverse sample of

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7. These interviews certainly provided this function. I had already begun to think about the decision-making of individual activists rather than organizational leadership. However, my prospectus proposed a contradictory theory to that derived from the interviews. I had anticipated that people were strategically motivated but with limited ability to identify the “best” option. However, the interviews did not substantiate this argument. The results of my later experimental evidence, discussed in Chapter 5, validate the findings from these conversations. Similarly, the role of social skills, discussed in Chapter 7, was viewed as part of a strategic calculus in my prospectus rather than an aspect of the recruitment experience. Indeed, the focus on relational labor came from these conversations.

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respondents. Respondents varied by personal demographics, such as age, race, class, and gender.<sup>8</sup> They also came from formal and informal organizations, had various political roles, and worked for advocacy groups with different theories of change. In particular, in trying to understand the production of organizing, it was critical to speak to those currently engaging in organizing and activists who chose alternative work. While most of my subjects had at least some experience with organizing, many had chosen to no longer engage in that role.

I adopted two primary means of identifying interview subjects. As mentioned in Chapter 2, I worked for a social movement organization in South Africa for two years. I recruited a slim majority of my subjects through the network I had developed during that experience. From this pool, I recruited 23 activists. I avoided recruiting people from the same organization to increase the variety of experiences included in the study.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, one of the implications of this subject identification strategy was that it was biased towards formal organizations. Indeed, all subjects recruited this way worked for a civic organization when I interviewed them.

To supplement this sample, I partnered with Grassroots, a civic tech organization working to support the advocacy of local informal activists. Together, we conducted 20 semi-structured interviews using a jointly designed protocol. Of these, five I administered personally, and 15 more were conducted by research assistants I had trained.<sup>10</sup> In addition to being from more informal organizations, all of these subjects were working-class and non-White. Interestingly, they were also more likely to be active members of political parties.

While not representative, the resulting pool did draw from a wide range of advocacy experiences and backgrounds. I spoke with seasoned veterans of the Anti-Apartheid movement, including contributors to the *Freedom Charter* and the *1996 Constitution*,

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8. In the next chapter, I include summary statistics for this group. In Appendix D, I provide a more detailed description of each respondent.

9. The most people recruited from one organization was three. However, each came from a separate department and was engaged in a different type of work.

10. The guide for the interviews I did not conduct personally is available in Appendix E.

### *3. Research Design*

and I spoke to Born Frees<sup>11</sup>, who learned the craft of advocacy in the context of political liberty and relative stability. These activists have fought for freedom and pharmaceuticals, education and the environment, jobs and unions, housing rights, and indigenous rights. They have worked within the system and disrupted it. They participated at all levels: township street committees, unions, non-profits, social movement organizations, think tanks, and the government.

All of these interviews were semi-structured. I prepared a generic set of questions, available in Appendix E, which acted as a jumping-off point for my conversations. However, no two interviews were the same. Before each interview, I reformulated the questions to identify what would likely be most helpful to discuss with that particular respondent. Moreover, the order of questions, and the follow-up questions that arose, were highly contingent on the dynamic of the interview, as was the amount of rapport building necessary. As a result, the interviews ranged from 45-minutes to four hours. Furthermore, as the interviews progressed over the weeks, I continuously updated my expectation regarding which of my existing hypotheses were most plausible and what new hypotheses deserved further exploration.

I did not record the interviews themselves. I decided that I would only use handwritten notes to increase respondents' comfort, especially given the power dynamics at play. However, I did record some quotes verbatim, occasionally asking respondents to pause or repeat themselves to facilitate this documentation. For the 15 interviews I did not conduct directly, research assistants prepared reports which I reviewed, following up on any ambiguous points.

The evaluation of these interviews was a continuous process. The first "analysis" was during the interviews themselves. Adopting the epistemological framework of "belief-attribution-as-measurement" (Paley 2010, 112), one of my functions as the interviewer is to be the measurement tool. How the experience of conducting these interviews reformed my beliefs and understandings is a form of data aggregation. In

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11. Born Free refers to people born after the end of Apartheid.

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effect, the experience provided the most significant source of theory generation. After completing the interviews, I engaged in an initial systematic review of my notes, identifying critical patterns from which I teased out hypotheses.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, as new ideas arose over the three years following the interviews, I reviewed the corpus to find cases describing the mechanism under consideration to better theorize about the underlying processes.

#### **3.4.2 Using Survey Evidence to Identify Systematic Patterns**

While most of my theory generation came from South Africa, a significant portion of my theory testing is in the United States. I conducted 11 original surveys for this research. These included nine surveys of a diverse sample of the US general population, totaling 16,610 observations, a survey of 126 participants of an organizer training, and a survey of 151 South African activists affiliated with an organizing platform. Table 3.1 is an index of these surveys. Due to the number of surveys, they are each assigned a letter to ease reference throughout the dissertation.

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12. Importantly, given the recruitment design of the sample – optimizing diversity over numeric representation – quantification is not particularly useful. Though, in my discussion of interviews’ content in the next chapter, I occasionally note if a perception or finding is consistent across all or nearly all respondents.

**Table 3.1:** Original Surveys.

	Date	Sample	Source	Obs	Topics	Experiments	Ch
A	2019-07	US Diverse	Lucid	1,652	Social intelligence, organizing behavior, civil society organizing, theory of power, general political behavior	Social Intelligence I	7
B	2019-08	US Diverse	Lucid	1,509	Organizing behavior, theory of power	Theory of Power	5
C	2019-12	US Diverse	Lucid, SSI	2,239	Status, tactic qualities, understanding of organizing		8
D	2020-04	US Activists	Partner Org.	129	Social intelligence, organizing behavior, civil society organizing, theory of power, tactic qualities, leadership, narrative, teamwork, general political behavior		7, 8
E	2020-06	US Diverse	SSI	1,697	Perceptions of organizing (expanded)	Job Description I	8
F	2020-09	SA Activists	Partner Org.	151	Social intelligence, organizing behavior, civil society organizing, theory of power, perceptions of organizing, tactic qualities, general political behavior	Social Intelligence II	7, 8
G	2020-10	US Diverse	Lucid	1,532	Theory of power, perceptions of organizing (expanded), social intelligence, gender	Theory of Change Social Intelligence III Job Description II	5, 6, 7, 8
H	2020-12	US Diverse	Lucid, SSI	3,020	Perceptions of organizing, willingness to organize	Advocacy Task I	5, 6
I	2021-06	US Diverse	Lucid	1,550	Personality, perceptions of organizing, organizing experience, willingness to organize	Advocacy Task II	5, 6
J	2021-09	US Diverse	Lucid	1,910	Personality, perceptions of organizing, organizing experience	Job Description III	6, 8
K	2021-12	US Diverse	Lucid	1,501	Perceptions of organizing (brief)	Job Description IV	8

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As discussed in Section 3.2, there are two conceptual extremes in defining the appropriate population for this study. At one end is the general population, and the other is “likely organizers.” At the other extreme is people who have “signaled some strategic interest in organizing.” These are activists engaged with organizations, programs, or networks committed to an organizing practice. I conducted surveys with both of these types of populations.

For the “likely organizers,” I partnered with civic organizations in the US and South Africa to conduct the two surveys. For the US likely organizer population, I recruited 126 participants as part of a “baseline” for evaluating an organizer training that took place in April 2020. The training focused on organizing skills like constructing a “personal narrative,” “recruiting,” and “deep canvass.” These participants were members of a shared spiritual practice, were disproportionately highly educated,<sup>13</sup> and were uniformly Democrats. In other words, they are not “representative,” but in their uniqueness, are informative. They represent one familiar type of potential recruiter, those who are well-resourced and ideologically driven to the practice of organizing.

At the other end of the spectrum is my sample of South African “likely organizers.” I connected with this group of 151 activists through a partnership with Grassroots, the same civic tech organization I worked with for the local activist interviews discussed in the previous section. They had all participated in training programs through this organizing similarly intended to increase organizing capacities. Members of this sample were not systematically associated with each other through any existing institution. This group was a much more modest community than the high-status ideologically engaged American activists of the previous survey. More than half of the sample was unemployed at the time of the survey, and 42% did not identify with a political party. These were people primarily pursuing activism to improve the conditions of their local communities.

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13. Only 10 of 126 respondents lacked a college degree; 69% had a postgraduate degree.

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Neither of these surveys is representative. Nevertheless, this makes consistent patterns observed across these extremes more informative. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 8, differences between these two groups can be theoretically generative. Yet, this evidence faces significant limitations. First, these are surveys and not behavioral measures. Therefore, they inherit all the criticisms of surveys, such as response bias, the limits of reasoning about abstract conditions, and the boundaries of human memory. While different types of measures used in this research vary in the degree to which they are susceptible to these concerns, none capture actual behavior. The anecdotes described from the interviews, the summary statistics, experimental outcomes using hypothetical situations, and every other piece of evidence used in this dissertation are self-reported and therefore susceptible to this critique. In the conclusion, I consider designs that might mitigate these issues.

Second, most of the pieces of evidence from the South African activist survey and all the US organizer training survey findings are associational. To support a causal interpretation, I turn to the survey experiments discussed below. Third, these are small samples and often provide imprecise estimates. However, statistical tests generally observed significant associations with rare exceptions. Finally, while these results are informative, these two convenience samples draw from unusual, if interesting, populations. Therefore, any effort to generalize from these surveys without additional support would be suspect. I further draw evidence from general population surveys in the United States to compensate for this limitation.

I conducted nine original surveys of a diverse sample of the general US population.<sup>14</sup> Recruited by survey firms, the demographics of these respondents are balanced with population statistics on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and census region. Since a probability sample is necessary to estimate population rates of outcomes, any reference to descriptive statistics mentioned in this dissertation should be taken as indicative of trends and not as true estimates of the overall population average. However, when

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14. Additional general population surveys were planned but never executed in South Africa.



### *3. Research Design*

looking at the relationships between variables, non-probability samples similar to those recruited by online survey firms can be highly informative (Baker et al. 2013). As Coppock and McClellan state, “it is the rare theory whose scope conditions specifically exclude the sort of people who take online surveys” (Coppock and McClellan 2019).

#### **3.4.3 Establishing Causal Mechanisms through Survey Experiments**

The general population surveys provide several benefits: a more standard population increasing generalizability and a larger sample size increasing precision. But, most importantly, these surveys allowed for the inclusion of survey experiments and, thereby, the identification of causal relationships. Indeed, 10 of the 11 survey experiments were part of the US general population surveys. The final experiment, a replication discussed in Chapter 7, was part of the survey of South African activists.

I provide a detailed description of these experiments in the chapters in which I reference their findings. Nevertheless, it is worth considering a few general points here. First, the descriptive correlations observed are not necessarily causal, even with the thick contextual knowledge derived from the interviews. People have a well-developed ability to make meaning out of patterns and provide explanations where there are none (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 5, the connection between people’s stated motivations and their genuine motivations is imperfect. However, by randomly manipulating characteristics of situations or priming people with different considerations, it becomes possible to identify the causal mechanisms behind associations.

As a genre of experiment, survey experiments have a high level of “experimental realism” and internal validity. The treatment is known and consistent, the environment is generic, and measurement is nearly immediate. However, these experiments often lack mundane realism: an authenticity to lived situations. The implication is that the results of survey experiments do not always align with what researchers might observe under real-world conditions (Barabas and Jerit 2010).

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Best efforts are made to mimic authentic interactions: treatment primes are taken from actual articles (Chapter 5), hypothetical situations are described with substantial context (Chapters 5 and 6), honest scores are reported (Chapter 7), and job descriptions are pulled from real content (Chapter 8). Nevertheless, these treatments are artificial and experienced in an artificial context. Whether they translate to real life is uncertain. Nevertheless, since they generally corroborate otherwise identified associations, the patterns they reveal are informative and should increase our confidence in the causality of those associations.

An issue that plagues this entire research design, not just the experiments, is that it is reliant on self-reporting: self-reported political activity, self-reported willingness to take actions, self-reported preferences, and self-reported response to psychological batteries. While some of these indicators have undergone validation with alternative, more “objective” measures, most have not. The implications include response bias, the limitations of memory, and “cheap-talk.” People make “best guesses” as to what they want, what they believe, what they have done, and what they would do, but these guesses are biased by human psychology. Therefore, despite the breadth of corroboration included in this dissertation, in the conclusion, I make recommendations as to what research I think is necessary to overcome this shortcoming.

#### **3.4.4 Expanding Generalizability Through Model-Based Inference**

Also as part of the conclusion, I incorporate analysis from the most recent wave of the *World Values Survey* (WVS). In the most recent wave, surveyors asked participants if “encouraging others to take action about political issues” was an activity they have engaged in or might engage in (Haerpfer et al. 2022). Over 80,000 respondents from 57 countries answered this question. Ironically, this data excludes the US – where the question was not asked – and South Africa, for which data has yet to be released.

There are two primary benefits to the WVS. First, unlike the original surveys I conducted, the WVS uses representative samples of the underlying populations. This

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quality implies that I can incorporate descriptive statistics into the discussion with greater clarity regarding the underlying population it represents. Indeed, already in this chapter, I have made several references to these descriptive patterns. Second, the WVS is global. This analysis will increase expectations of the generalizability of these findings.

Nevertheless, using this data to provide reliable estimates of anticipated associations and bolster the plausibility of causal relationships requires diligent attention to underlying modeling assumptions. In particular, strategies to overcome sampling bias, inter-cluster correlation, and omitted variable bias.

## **3.5 Buckshot Not Bullets**

No component of this project is a slam dunk. Yet, by demonstrating consistency in the associations predicted across populations, contexts, and methods, this evidence collectively establishes confidence in both the viability of the framework adopted and the individual hypotheses it generates. However, this design is more than just triangulation. Each of the samples, contexts, and methods adopted compensates for the shortcomings of the others.

My activist interviews and survey allow me to speak to one conceptual extreme of the “potential organizer,” while my general population surveys corroborate those results with the other conceptual pole. Furthermore, by reproducing findings between South Africa, the US, and the WVS, I can better mitigate the risks posed by unknown domestic confounders while also increasing our confidence that these findings are generalizable.

The rich understanding of organizing made possible by my one-on-one discussions with activists provides fertile ground for theorization but a limited capacity for confident inference or bold generalization. The survey experiments create a high level of internal validity through robust experimental realism but have only tenuous mundane

### *3. Research Design*

realism. The surveys permit me to establish real-world associations but without causal identification. Each alone is a straw in the wind, but together they are a smoking gun.

*“Once you understand, you want to share it.”*

# 4

## South African Interviews

### 4.1 Learning from Activists and Organizers

Less concerned with the generals than with the foot soldiers, the logical first step in developing an understanding of organizing focused on the individual choice to organize is to talk to the activists who have made that decision. Therefore, in the fall of 2019, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a diverse set of 43 South African activists to better understand why they chose to do the type of political work they do.<sup>1</sup> The intended role of these interviews was to establish the face validity of the theories I went into this project with and to identify new ideas. I began this dissertation with expectations of strategic decision-making constrained by social narratives. Despite my best efforts, I could not substantiate this proposition in my interviews and, ultimately, in a series of experiments that I review in the next chapter. Instead, speaking to people engaged in advocacy made clear that the choice of whether to be an organizer was far more personal.

After reviewing the overall characteristics of my interviews, the majority of this

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1. I engage in a broader discussion of the process of conducting these interviews in the previous chapter (Section 3.4.1). In addition, the interview instruments are available in Appendix E.

#### 4. *South African Interviews*

chapter functions to illustrate the personal nature of this decision through brief profiles of some of these activists: eight organizers (Section 4.3) and five non-organizers (4.4). The presentation of the interviews functionally mimics the experience I had conducting them: soaking and poking in people's political biographies to understand what shaped their choices.<sup>2</sup> In the conclusion, I extract from these experiences four groups of claims, which inform the eight propositions<sup>3</sup> tested in this dissertation and comprise the subsequent four chapters.

First, neither an alignment of strategic aims with the objective of organizing nor a specific commitment to the practice of organizing is a *sufficient* motivator for activists to invest their time in recruitment activities. This somewhat surprising result is the primary subject of the next chapter. Second, the way activists relate to organizing and decide whether to engage in that work is instead associated with qualities of the experience itself and how it interacts with a person's preferred forms of existing with other people. In Chapter 6, I break this down into three sets of qualities that shape the experience; features of the activists themselves, the act, and the target.

Third, as relational labor, organizing is reliant on social skills. Therefore, activists marked by a sense of competence in interpersonal interactions will be more prone to engage in recruiting activities. This assertion is more fully established in Chapter 7, though I introduce a few gender-related caveats in that chapter. Fourth, and finally, while the goal of organizing is broadly valued, the kinds of work that constitute the act are not. As a result, activists experience a tension between personal ambitions and collective goals. This tension is particularly acute for those with a middle-class background.

These propositions stem from the same property of organizing. Compared to other forms of political work, organizing is unique in its degree of reliance on relational labor. This quality implies that how people relate to others and feel about those interactions

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2. This structure is adopted to maintain the coherence of the participants' experiences.

3. These prop propositions are enumerated at the front of this dissertation, on page 10.

#### 4. *South African Interviews*

is disproportionately relevant to the choice of whether to recruit. It causes the specific skills necessary to successfully navigate interpersonal relationships to be paramount in who becomes an organizer. It makes significant how we value those whose work is managing others' emotions. The total function of which is that the activist's decision of whether they choose the work of organizing is less about what they want to accomplish in the world than it is about how they want to live their day-to-day.

## 4.2 Overview of Interview Subjects

Before turning to the interviews and the ideas they generated, it is valuable to understand who the interview subjects are. While some engaged in rural advocacy, the subjects are drawn from an urban population of activists. They were recruited exclusively in Cape Town ( $n = 16$ ) and Johannesburg ( $n = 27$ ). As discussed in the previous section, I identified 23 respondents through personal networks developed while personally working in advocacy in South Africa. The remaining 20 were recruited in Johannesburg as part of a joint effort with Grassroots, a local civic technology organization that supports citizen engagement. Those personally recruited were more likely to work for formal organizations, be White, be middle class, and (by a slight margin) not currently work as an organizer.

Of these 43 subjects, 26 (62%) were doing organizing work when they were interviewed. Seven of these respondents also described their responsibilities as including other forms of advocacy. Overall, 24 participants (56%) were engaged in an alternative form of activism, either with or without concurrent organizing activity. Of the 19 respondents who were not currently engaged in any organizing, nearly half (47%) had previous experience with organizing. The range of alternative activities included research ( $n = 8$ ), management ( $n = 8$ ), and administration ( $n = 4$ ). Additional roles included training, law, ministry, and social work.

These activists worked for a variety of organization types. The most common current organization type was "local" ( $n = 13$ ). This category denotes all advocacy

#### 4. *South African Interviews*

groups that focus on soliciting improved conditions for a narrow community and that lack a formal structure. The second most common was “social movement organization” (SMO) ( $n = 10$ ). The major difference between a “local” organization and an SMO is that an SMO has generally expanded beyond a local community and formalized, usually filing with the government as a non-profit organization. Nevertheless, these organizations are still committed to social change through coordinating mass action.

Next most common were “activist support” organizations ( $n = 9$ ). These groups are not working to mobilize people directly but rather to support other, generally local, advocacy efforts. These organizations often conduct training, provide material resources, and produce media, content, and research. The remaining 10 were engaged with direct service ( $n = 4$ ), think tanks ( $n = 4$ ), party politics ( $n = 3$ ), litigation ( $n = 1$ ), spiritual community ( $n = 1$ ), and union activism ( $n = 1$ ).

Demographically, the sample was predominantly Black (79%). Six subjects were White (14%), and three were Coloured (7%). This make-up is roughly in line with the general population in which 79% of citizens are Black, 9% are White, and 9% are Coloured (StatsSA 2011). The only noteworthy difference from the overall population was the absence of Indian/Asian respondents. The absence of Indian activists is likely due to my focus on Cape Town and Johannesburg, as the Indian population is concentrated in KwaZulu Natal.

The sample contained a broad mix of age groups, with eight respondents in their 20s, 20 respondents in their 30s, and 13 respondents in “middle age.” I also had one “elderly” respondent, Ben Turok. An author of the Freedom Charter, Ben Turok, insisted that I refer to him without anonymization.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, while I did not explicitly ask respondents about their socioeconomic position, a rough estimate is possible based on the respondents’ biographies. Of the 43 respondents, 33 most likely identify as “working class” or “low income.” Seven are more likely middle or upper-middle class.

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4. Ben Turok passed just two months after this interview. One of the few old guard who remained in the South African activist space, I am incredibly grateful to this legend for taking the time to share his experiences and shape this project.



#### *4. South African Interviews*

Finally, three subjects made statements clearly indicating that they come from an upper-class background. Given the wealth inequality in South Africa, a sample in which 77% of respondents are identified as “working class” is relatively representative of the general population.

The one area with particular imbalance is gender. My sample includes more than twice as many male-identified subjects ( $n = 30$ ) as female-identified respondents ( $n = 13$ ). Moreover, these women were slightly more likely to be currently working as an organizer ( $n = 9$ ) than in an alternative task ( $n = 6$ ). This overall imbalance is almost certainly, in part, the result of my male-presenting positionality. However, it is also potentially reflective of patterns around gender and activism or organizing, which I discuss at length in greater length in Chapter 7.

### **4.3 The Organizers: Social, Savvy, and Low Status**

The social character of organizing is visible in how many rank-and-file activists describe their work. One radical organizer, a young Black working-class activist who had spent his whole life in the activism space, emphasized that this work differs from the logistical tasks often attributed to the role. Rather than orchestrating events or coordinating activities, an organizer’s main job is managing relationships: an organizer has to have an “understanding of where they [the recruits] come from.” He underscored that the organizer is often the one with real power because they are the ones that can get others to follow. Nevertheless, organizers often do not recognize that power because “people without degrees are organizers, and people with degrees are researchers.” In this particular case, the subject used to be a researcher – had worked hard to become one – but through his years in activism, he decided that power came from the ability to build and develop relationships, something he described personally enjoying doing.

A more seasoned activist from the Eastern Cape, who has played diverse roles in many of the significant South African movements of the last 35 years, touched on the social character of organizing by comparing it to churches. He argued that to organize

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successfully, activists need to be creative in “making people feel as if they are part of a community... this is why the churches beat us. They sing and dance; they give homage and warmth.” He says that organizing fails when it does not recognize that people are ‘complete beings.’” He commented on South Africa’s unions: “left-wing unions [fail because they] haven’t treated workers as holistic people.” He described his mostly logistical work as an “organizer” for a non-governmental organization as a way to support himself while he does his real organizing work in a local community.

Similarly, the head of organizing for an SMO, a young woman who had grown up in the organization, described what made her a good organizer: her passion, her ability to speak from her own experiences, and her commitment to connecting with people as peers. She also brought up her experiences with the church. Growing up, she did a lot of missionary work: “the church is a form of organizing...” in one, you talk about “the word of god;” in the other, you talk about “how you get policies.” This skill has to be cultivated: “first, you preach at home, so it becomes easy to go out and preach.” She emphasized how organizers have to make the issue present and tangible for the recruit: understand the recruit’s perspective, ask the recruit questions to help them draw their own conclusions, and then speak from one’s own experiences as an organizer to make the issue personal. Finally, she described how organizers are the “engine of the movement,” and so movements have to, in turn, organize them: build relationships with them, support them, and develop them. The organization grows, she says, when members feel like it is a home.

Another organizer, a woman in her 30s who identified herself as an introvert, was very cognizant of the importance of developing social skills to be successful in this work. She went through a training run by local NGOs focused on communication, which helped make her feel confident enough to organize. She also mentioned her church, where her positive experiences recruiting for her religious community helped her be a confident organizer. Nevertheless, it was the desire to be with people that made organizing her calling: “It is something that I love, I am passionate about, I do

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it in my sleep.” When asked why, she said she loved working with people, motivating them, and seeing how victories affect their members’ lives. She went on to say that organizers need this passion. She described organizers as having to answer the “what’s in it for me,” which means understanding their issues and goals. Moreover, organizers need to “speak [to people] from their own point of departure.”

The leader of another local SMO, a kind, soft-spoken Xhosa man in his early 30s, described how “a lot of people have given up on political life... [on] being part of a community.” He raised concerns with the current practice of activism: “we’ve called ourselves activists for a long time, but we should have called ourselves organizers... activists raise an issue, organizers consciously get others to engage.” He started in the movement as an organizer, going door-to-door and talking to people. He said he was not a natural organizer because the interpersonal nature of the work made him anxious. Nevertheless, he grew less anxious as he became comfortable with the subject and learned about the community and people’s feelings about issues.

One seasoned organizer talked about how her social personality made the work easy for her and how important it was that she thinks a lot about other people and likes to talk. She said that to be a good organizer, one must “love people and be a good listener,” must be “patient, disciplined, and respectful,” and cannot be shy to ask questions. She mentioned the role of her religious background in making her an effective organizer, how it helped her be disciplined and manage her emotions, and how it equipped her to engage people: “If you are a churchgoer, you talk to people, leave a pamphlet.” Beyond her disposition and religious background, she developed her organizing skills through training and workshops and modeled herself after her own organizer. The social aspect of the work drew her to it, as it helped her fill a need for community in her life, especially after her mother’s passing and several miscarriages. As she succinctly put it, “I am in this position because I need to be in this position.” This work is her path to making change with “love and a smile.”

Personality came up regularly. Another working-class activist in her 30s looked upon me with bewilderment when I implied that some people might be scared to

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talk to others and that this might prevent them from recruiting: “I don’t know why you would be scared... I can’t relate.” It is worth noting that this was my most extended interview, lasting approximately 3 hours. This woman loved to talk. Indeed, this respondent has a wide reputation for her chattiness. An extravert by nature, organizing was her home language.

When explaining what made him a good organizer, a local Khoisan activist in Johannesburg said, “I have this gift. I know how to talk to people.” He attributes this to studying psychology and his commitment to building a genuine connection with the people he works with: “If you are a people person, you will go the extra mile to understand people.” He says that his wife has commented to him, “I don’t have a husband; you belong to the community.” Another local activist in Johannesburg similarly commented that recruitment is easy because of how well networked he is. He described how essential it is to cultivate spaces, even if they are digital, as communities that people want to be a part of. He emphasized that meetings cannot be too serious; it is the organizer’s job to ensure that people enjoy them. He said that to keep people involved, you must build a relationship with them: “take them as your friends and family.”

A long-term organizer working for a well-established activist support organization was very introspective about the role of emotional intelligence in organizing: “People call these soft skills. They are hard skills, as hard as construction... [these skills] are what makes organizing possible.” According to him, organizers must identify and respect existing power structures in the community, display loyalty and ethics, be patient, have good communication skills, and make people feel important. He worries about whether people are becoming more atomized today and how disrupting social relationships may make organizing harder. Imagining a conversation with his daughter, he says to her, “you are unfortunate that you grow up in an era of minimal human interaction... as we progress... we are leaving certain things behind... [like] being forced to work together.”

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Moreover, getting people to organize is hard: “organizing is not a sexy job... it is treated as an afterthought.” He describes how originally he was uncomfortable organizing and convincing people to do something they did not want to. Nevertheless, today he is proud: “you might not have moved mountains, but the feeling that you matter to other people... I get satisfaction out of that... I feel like I’ve moved mountains.” An organizer, in his mind, “derives pleasure and excitement from seeing people come together for a cause.” Finally, “a good organizer is someone who can be an outsider and understand the complexities [of a community].”

### **4.4 The Non-Organizers: Ideological, Intellectual, and Middle-Class**

Yet, the reticence of some to do organizing work further indicates how essential feeling comfortable with building and *using* relationships is to organizing work. An example of this is Ben Turok, one of the authors of the *Freedom Charter*. Having joined the anti-Apartheid movement in his early 20s, he wanted to be a journalist for the struggle. But, the movement needed organizers, so he temporarily took up that work. Nevertheless, even as an organizer, he did not focus on recruitment. He called himself a committeeman, managing the logistics rather than recruiting himself. He attributed this to his inability to connect with people and his lack of community rootedness. His social distance prevented him, in his mind, from being an effective organizer. Fundamentally, where he was comfortable was “book learning,” which is the work he did as soon as the movement allowed. A committed activist, he saw his task as informing the revolution when it came rather than organizing it. As we spoke in the office of a think tank he founded, he commented, “in a way we are treading water... we want change, but we can’t make it... if there is combustion from below, I will not be sitting here.”

Another example is a 30-something middle-class activist who had cut his teeth as an organizer when he was 16 and never lost that spirit: “I would rather be an

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organizer than what I do now.” He described a good organizer as someone capable of building interpersonal relationships, being charismatic and able to connect with people, and having a tactical mind and strategic acumen. Yet, he too found his organizing work tended towards the managerial and strategic side rather than recruitment. He said it was because he was an outsider, because he did not speak people’s home languages, and because he was White. He said frankly, “it is not my role.” In his view, you have to figure out your place in the movement and your niche. Because of his perceived difficulty building the relationships necessary to organize the Black working-class communities he wished to support, that could not be his part to play. He commented that people would say, “We don’t want you to organize. We want you to tell us about x & z. You get funneled when you have a set of skills.” But, he also made sure to get those skills. He has a Ph.D. in economics, so he is valuable as a researcher, yet he was not obliged to obtain that Ph.D. Instead, he wanted to make a “specialist contribution,” both because it could be useful and because of his desire for professional qualification. He observed that organizers in the movement were not recognized as skilled, and he wanted to be skilled. As he quipped, “You get funneled, and you choose...” He recognizes that his positionality played a role, but so did his preferences.

One of my favorite interviews was with a chain-smoking middle-aged White man in a tribal print shirt who likened himself to a “useful idiot.”<sup>5</sup> A third-generation activist, he had worked for and led many activist organizations in his day but had never done any active recruitment himself. He attributes that to the fact that “middle-class kids always get saddled with the pamphlet making” instead of handing out the pamphlets. During the anti-Apartheid struggle, he often ended up in media and communications; he was a “silk-screening activist,” and today, he calls himself a “bureaucrat who sits behind a laptop.” However, taking up this logistical role was at least in part a choice: “Speaking to people that don’t realize history is made by people. I’ve explored it and

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5. A derogatory term for a person advocating a cause without understanding it, a pawn of Machiavellian leaders.

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concluded it's fucking hard." He works with organizations that rely on people power and the work of recruitment yet does none himself.

Another professional activist, a young woman in a research role, described her discomfort with organizing. Like many of the successful organizers described above, she had a background in missionary work. But, unlike them, that experience pushed her away from organizing. Having lost her faith in her early 20s, she now saw her religious experience as manipulative. Organizing was too close to that. Building and *using* relationships felt unethical. However, it was also her training that pulled her away. She had a background in journalism, so she got "pulled" into communications work when she joined the #RhodesMustFall movement. Moreover, she ultimately described her decision to be a researcher as choosing what "fit [her] personality and interests."

I will end with the responses of a young Black activist lawyer. He was highly critical of legal solutions to social problems. He described how there is a feeling that "once we bring it to the lawyers, they will sort everything out" and how this "demobilizes communities that have organized." He described how some problems are so intractable that one must march to pressure the powers that be. He described his theory of change as conscientizing people to build that pressure. That is how he believes Apartheid was defeated. And yet he is a lawyer – lawyers are professionals with only transitory relationships with communities. He described how they have tools to solve problems; people come to them and then go away. He spoke of how he was *trained* to see himself as elite.

These activists have dedicated their lives to fighting for a more just and democratic society. All five believe that mass mobilization is the path to political change and that activists must engage in political organizing to achieve it. Nevertheless, none spend much time recruiting. They proposed many rationales for this decision: Their social distance is too far from those they wish to recruit, and their privilege makes recruiting awkward or inappropriate. They have technical skills that make them more valuable to the movements they support in other roles or, at some level, they simply prefer

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the work that requires those skills. When explaining their hesitancy, they brought up aspects of the experience of doing the task itself and their self-perceived fit for that work. It was not due to their valuation of what work needed to be done. Moreover, in all their rationales, the relational qualities of the work, its focus on interpersonal interactions and social skills, weighed heavy on their decision-making.

### **4.5 Process Over Purpose**

These interviews' most crucial function was establishing the foundation for this project's central overall claim: organizing is fundamentally relational work reliant on thick individual interactions. These activists were nearly uniform in how they articulated the work of organizing. They described an organizer as a “social worker, a doctor, [and] a father,” all wrapped up in one. That organizing requires the gift of knowing “how to talk to people,” being willing to listen to them, working to make them feel valued, and constantly building trust. They described how organizers “belong to the community.” To be effective, they must take those they organize as their “friends and family.” They also described how work is fundamentally about “understanding human behavior.” From this basis, four groups of propositions emerged, which are then evaluated quantitatively in each of the subsequent chapters.

First, commitment to the goal of organizing did not seem to matter as much as might be intuitively expected. The five non-organizers described above, and most of the others non-organizers I spoke to, were committed to organizing as a theory of power, yet they did not do it. Ben Turok's case is particularly illustrative. He wanted to be a journalist for the anti-Apartheid movement, but the leadership told him the movement needed organizers. Therefore, he became an “organizer,” yet he did not recruit, calling himself a “party man” and focusing on the logistics of the work. Then, as soon the movement found other uses for him, he abandoned organizing. To the day I spoke with him, this devout communist was waiting for the people to rise up but did not think organizing was work he should be doing.



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Second, the qualities of the organizing experience – and how people relate to that type of experience – appear essential to understanding who does the work of recruitment. Organizers tended to be highly social extroverts who felt a need for community. Take, for example, the participant who spoke of how the relationship-building she experienced as an organizer helped to fill a gap in her life resulting from personal losses. She valued the experience of the work even more than what the organizing accomplished. However, for some, these interactions felt more manipulative rather than solidaric, creating a moral barrier to organizing. Importantly, I only heard this type of internal framing of organizing work from those who felt a social distance from the communities they were supporting.

Third, while for some, organizing came naturally, others had developed these skills. Sometimes as an auxiliary to other activity in their life – such as missionary work – and sometimes purposefully through training. Regardless, this was by all accounts a skill. Some chose to do the work because they felt competent, while others, such as the chain-smoking bureaucrat behind a desk, had given up because they had found it too hard.

Fourth, status concerns seemed to matter much more than I had anticipated. Indeed, only after my interviews did the “Khayelitsha / Constantia” divide I described in Chapter 2 seem relevant to this project. According to several respondents, activists and the public do not perceive organizing as high-status work. This created professional sorting along socioeconomic lines and the opportunities otherwise available to activists within the space. Indeed, some participants reported pursuing training experiences to shift to these more “skilled” and better paid work. Organizers are, as one respondent put it, performing “witchcraft.” And, as any witch can tell you, that does not always make you popular.

*“What you can do as an individual is limited. But, in a group you are powerful... so organize.” [Stated by a South African activist not engaged in organizing.]*

# 5

## The Limits of Strategic Motivation

### 5.1 The Inadequacy of Strategic Value in Explaining Recruitment Activity

As discussed in Chapter 2, the existing literature attributes the emergence of organizing to the strategic decisions of leaders responding to available opportunity structures. If individual activists are similarly motivated by these strategic concerns or are highly responsive to the priorities of their leaders, then the existing framework for understanding the organizing’s production would be sufficient. Therefore, to validate a focus on recruitment as an individual-level choice it is necessary to establish that people are unresponsive to variation in the relative importance of organizing. In other words:

**Proposition 1:** At the individual level, the decision to recruit is not primarily caused by perceptions of the importance of recruitment.

In this chapter, I show that strategic appeals to the efficacy of organizing are ineffective in motivating people to engage in recruitment. I employed four survey experiments that consistently shifted respondents’ beliefs about the importance of recruitment. However, this change in prioritization caused by the interventions did

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not translate into an increased willingness to recruit. This result emerged even though these studies were sufficiently powered to observe even relatively small effect sizes<sup>1</sup> and that I found that alternative interventions had notable effects on the decision to recruit.

The first study attempts to influence an individual’s strategic prioritization by targeting their *theory of power*. A theory of power is how someone understands the origins of political influence in society. In this experiment, I used two newspaper clippings about the NRA, modeled from actual articles. One describes their influence over politics as stemming from their access to financial resources. The second focuses on their ability to mobilize people. The logic of this treatment is that if “people power” is seen as more central to political success, participants should be more willing to engage in the types of political work that create this type of power. While I observed the expected shift in beliefs about the origins of the NRA’s political influence, this did not change their anticipated recruitment activity.

However, people potentially do not associate mass engagement with active recruitment. Indeed, they may have a people-oriented theory of power but not tie that to a recruitment-focused *theory of change*, explaining the null result in the first study. In this case, shifting a respondent’s understanding of political change would not be sufficient; there needs to be a shift in their conception of how individuals can create that power. In the second study, conducted in the wake of the George Floyd Uprisings, I used press clippings that discussed the emergence of those protests as either “leaderless” – the result of social conditions – or as purposefully manifested by political organizers. While this treatment shifted respondents’ ideas about recruitment’s importance, it did not affect their willingness to recruit.

These two treatments were subtle with notable limitations, as discussed in Section 5.4. The link between people’s theories about politics and their ideas of what is strategically essential may be too muddled. Additional treatment effects on intervening

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1. A “small” effect size, as described in the literature on power analysis, is 0.2 standard deviations (Cohen 1988). Using a significance level of 0.05 and a power of 0.8, the studies were sufficiently powered to observe effect sizes ranging from 0.08 to 0.18, depending on the study.

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beliefs, such as internal and external efficacy, may prevent any effect on the outcome. Moreover, changes in abstract expectations or willingness to act may be too difficult to move in a survey experiment. Therefore, in Studies 2 and 4, I directly told respondents that recruitment was the most important action.

I created a hypothetical scenario where I asked respondents to choose between two different tasks for a civic organization they were volunteering for. They could either recruit or do a randomly assigned alternative. This forced-choice makes this experiment a more reliable measure of preferences as it anchors the decision to an actual choice rather than forcing them to quantify their intangible preferences on a Likert scale – a process more difficult for attitudes that respondents have not previously considered.

For the experiment, I varied whether the organization prioritized recruiting was randomly assigned. A manipulation check showed that respondents acknowledged that the organization considered recruitment the more critical task. Nevertheless, the treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on the respondents' task choice. Even a one-sided  $t$ -test of pooling across these two studies ( $n = 4,687$ ) was statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The general experimental design did result in significant effects for other treatment arms. Indeed, of the five characteristics manipulated in these experiments, importance was the least impactful.

This experiment was a “hard test” of the theory that importance is irrelevant precisely because it is hypothetical. In an artificial low-stakes survey experiment, people should be highly susceptible to social desirability bias. Even if respondents' actual preferences were not changed, it would still be surprising that they did not change what they said they would do despite getting clear instructions on what was most important. Indeed, I present evidence that response bias affects how respondents explain their decision, just not what decision they make.

Behavioral political scientists may not be overly surprised by these results. Rational choice theories provide clear theoretical expectations for the limitations of strategic

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political motivations. The free-rider problem, which creates the necessity to organize, extends from citizens to activists. A commitment to take some political action is not a commitment to any particular action or to take the most impactful action. Previous scholarship indicates that, for many, political behavior may function more like a hobby than a means of accomplishing political goals (Hersh 2020a). How people feel about the experience of doing a task is as critical in deciding what action to take as the task's strategic value.

It simply stands to reason that if people engage in advocacy, they would prefer to adopt the most effective available strategies, assuming they know what those are. In my experience, when leaders try to motivate members to recruit, they rely on this logic, making appeals to the work's importance and impact. Yet, those who do not perceive themselves as well-suited for recruiting or who simply do not like the experience will look for and find less taxing means of contributing, even if less impactful. If this happens often enough, which is likely since organizing is relatively unpopular, organizations will find it very hard to implement an organizing strategy. Therefore, if people are not strategically minded, we need to understand the origins of these biases, justifying a behavioral approach to understanding organizing.

## **5.2 Study 1: Reshaping Theories of Power**

Underlying all advocacy is a “theory of power,” an understanding of who can directly affect an outcome in society. As was commonly cited in the interviews, organizing as a strategy relies on the idea of “people power:” a belief that if enough people mobilize around an issue – if the “masses” are involved in politics – they will achieve their shared purpose. Organizing as a strategy is fundamentally reliant on people power. Therefore, how important a potential organizer thinks recruitment is may be a product of their beliefs about “people power.” In other words, if people are motivated to adopt an organizing strategy by strategic considerations, their faith in people power should impact how willing they are to recruit. As a result, increasing

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a respondent’s relative belief in “people power” as a source of political influence will increase their willingness to organize.

In August 2019, I surveyed a quota-based diverse sample<sup>2</sup> of 1,509 adult members of the US population (*Survey B*).<sup>3</sup> Embedded within this study was a vignette experiment.<sup>4</sup> I randomly assigned respondents to one of three groups: I presented the first group with an edited version of a genuine news article that emphasized the role of *money* in the political success of the NRA.<sup>5</sup> The second group read an edited news article emphasizing the NRA’s support from members: the power it gets from having the support of these *people*. The remaining respondents were in a *pure control* group and exposed to no treatment. The full text of these treatments can be found in Appendix G. Below is a representative excerpt from each:

**Money in Politics:** The NRA’s investment, which was more than any other outside group, paid for a slew of ads that directly targeted the same voters who propelled Trump to victory... The 2016 election results represent a continuation of the NRA’s impressive success rate when making substantial investments in closely-contested races.

**People Power:** Analysts and people who work in Virginia politics say the power of the NRA comes from the sheer number of voters who align themselves with the organization... “It’s a better strategy to have the grassroots support than it is to pump dollars in.”

The idea underscoring this experimental treatment is that presentations of theories of power – such as these – in the media will influence people’s understandings of where political power comes from. As a manipulation check of this underlying theory, I

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
2. The firm hired to conduct the survey recruited a sample balanced on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and census region.

3. A summary table of the 11 surveys conducted for this project is visible in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. In that summary, I indicate each survey with a letter of the alphabet. I refer to surveys by date (month and year) or assigned letter.

4. I pre-registered this study. The pre-analysis plan is available on the OSF website. The link can be found in Appendix F.

5. The NRA was selected because, at the time of the survey, its success in electing politicians and stymieing gun reform was particularly prevalent in the media. As a result, regardless of whether the respondents supported the organization, they were expected to believe it was an *effective* organization.

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**Figure 5.1: Theory of Power Vignette Experiment.** Three treatment conditions were tested: “people power” ( $n = 497$ ), “money in politics” ( $n = 475$ ), and “pure control” ( $n = 512$ ). The left panel indicates what percent of respondents, post-treatment, reported members (people power) to be responsible for the NRA’s success out of four options: members, money, both, or neither. The right panel shows the average reported likelihood of each group engaging in recruitment (canvassing) in the next two years on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 indicating extremely likely.  $P$ -values reported are for two-sided  $t$ -tests comparing the outcomes between the member group and the two other groups. Data from August 2019 survey (*Survey B*,  $n = 1,509$ ).

asked respondents after treatment what they thought was responsible for the political success of the NRA, with four response options: people, money, both, or neither. If the treatment is working in the way anticipated, I expect those who receive the *people* prime will be more likely to attribute the success of the NRA to its members. That relationship is visible in the left panel of Figure 5.1.<sup>6</sup>

Compared to the “money” treatment, the “people” treatment resulted in an 1210 (7.7, 16.5)<sup>7</sup> percentage point increase in the likelihood that respondents reported that mobilizing people was the cause of the NRA’s success.

6. Tables with details for models referenced in this chapter are available in Appendix K.

7. Parenthesis indicates the 95% confidence interval for the difference in estimated importance on a scale of 0-4.

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I then asked respondents about their willingness to engage in recruitment behavior – specifically canvassing. As the right panel of Figure 5.1 shows, there was effectively no treatment effect on individual willingness to canvass. Changing the understanding of the role of people power in the success of the NRA did not, in this experiment, affect willingness to do the work most associated with recruitment. This null finding was unaffected by subsetting the sample by race, party, education, gender, or level of political knowledge. Even if I included controls for these demographics to increase precision, it remained null. This study was powered to observe a minimum effect size of 0.18 standard deviations.<sup>8</sup> While this was the least powered of any of the studies included in this chapter, 0.18 standard deviations would still be considered a small effect size according to the literature (Cohen 1988). Collectively, this evidence contraindicates the idea that shifting faith in “people power” will result in increased organizing activity.

In this study, I asked respondents about six other political acts<sup>9</sup>, and the treatment had no impact on these either. Moreover, I directly asked about the influence that respondents believed these acts could have on politics and a more general external efficacy question<sup>10</sup>. For these questions, the treatment also resulted in no statistically significant difference. These results are indicative of a somewhat surprising contradiction. Despite respondents reforming their view of where political power came from, they did not change their beliefs about their ability to influence politics or their desire to try.

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8. Using a significance level of 0.05 and a power of 0.8. All power calculations use these parameters.

9. “Voting in an election,” “donating to a candidate for office or a political cause,” “door-to-door canvassing for a candidate or cause,” “being a member of a political organization,” “attending a peaceful protest or political rally,” “posting a political message on social media,” and “joining a riot or violent political protest.”

10. “Do you agree with this statement: People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.” Responses were reported on a 5-point scale.



### 5.3 Study 2: Varying the Origin of Collective Action

That shifting people’s underlying theory of power toward mass engagement did not lead to an increased desire to recruit might be because respondents do not feel they can influence mass engagement. This finding implies an alternative strategic consideration in an individual’s decision to organize: how mass action comes to be. This theory of change is hotly contested among activist scholars. On the one hand, thinkers such as Saul Alinsky view mass mobilization as the result of diligent organizing. This scholarship was well-represented in Chapter 2.

There is, however, an alternative view that emphasizes the *structural* origins of mass action. This perception is often associated with the scholarship of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (Piven and Cloward 1977). As activist scholars, they reviewed four cases of mass mobilization and attributed them to the “conditions of the day” rather than the work of any specific group. However, the debate over the role of agency versus structures has a long history among those seeking significant social change. When I interviewed Ben Turok, I was initially greeted with hostility because I made the mistake of indicating a belief that activists could influence politics. My attributing such responsibility to individual actors was anathema to his worldview as a Marxist of the historical determinist persuasion.

Perhaps it is not a belief about people power itself, but rather a belief about the origins of people power that may result in a strategic motivation to organize. If that is the case, then increasing an individual’s belief that mass political mobilization results from intentional organizing activity should result in an increased willingness to organize.

To evaluate how beliefs about the origins of mass mobilization affect organizing activity, I conducted a second vignette experiment, roughly similar in design to the NRA experiment described in Section 5.2 (*Survey G*).<sup>11</sup> In this case, I constructed

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11. The pre-analysis plan for this study is available on the OSF website. The link can be found in Appendix F.

## 5. *The Limits of Strategic Motivation*

two vignettes from news articles describing the origins of a prominent case of mass mobilization: the George Floyd Uprising. This survey was fielded in October 2020, just a few months after these protests exploded across the country, one of the most significant mass mobilization events in US history.

Respondents either read an edited version of an article describing the protests as spontaneous or emphasizing the agentic role of incremental organizing in producing these events.<sup>12</sup> The first sentence of these articles gives a flavor of their content:

**Structures:** Welcome to 21st-century activism, where spontaneous and leaderless movements have been defined by their organic births and guided on the fly...

**Agency:** Two young activists, who previously worked together on March For Our Lives Maryland, started brainstorming ideas to bring the nationwide Black Lives Matter movement into their own community...

Respondents were then asked, in a randomized order, two questions about recruitment on a 5-point Likert scale:

1. How important do you think it is for those who care about a cause to recruit others?
2. How willing would you be to recruit others to take action for a cause you care about?

As Figure 5.2 shows, the treatment effectively increased perceptions of the importance of organizing, but *did not* have a similar effect on willingness. It thereby indicates that variation in perceptions that organizing is the source of mass mobilization is unlikely to be a significant consideration for most people when deciding whether to organize.


Examining heterogeneous treatment effects strengthens this null finding. Being a woman, lacking a 4-year college education, not being a Republican,<sup>13</sup> being White,

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12. The exact wording is available in Appendix G.

13. Specifically, people who identify as either a Democrat or an Independent.

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**Figure 5.2: Theory of Change Vignette Experiment.** Two treatment conditions were tested: “spontaneous and leaderless” ( $n = 749$ ) and “incremental organizing” ( $n = 816$ ). The left panel indicates how important respondents considered organizing to be on a 5-point Likert scale. The right panel reports how willing the respondent would be to recruit on a 5-point Likert scale. Higher values indicate greater importance/willingness. As specified in a pre-analysis plan, reported  $p$ -values are for one-sided  $t$ -tests, comparing the outcomes between the treatment groups. Data from December 2020 survey (*Survey G*,  $n = 1,532$ ).

or working for an advocacy organization<sup>14</sup> increases the effect of the treatment on perceptions of the importance of organizing. However, I observe no derivative statistically notable increase in willingness to organize among these subgroups. Again, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect despite being powered to detect an effect of 0.13 standard deviations.

## 5.4 Limitations of Study 1 and Study 2

From these two experiments, one might begin to doubt that strategic importance plays a significant role in the choice to organize. Yet, while informative, it is hard

14. This includes people who work or volunteer either full or part-time for “social or political advocacy organizations.”

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to definitively demonstrate a null result with a hypothetical vignette experiment. Specific features of these experiments might further aggravate this skepticism. First, these studies tested treatments that targeted the underlying beliefs expected to affect perceptions of the importance of organizing. One indication of this is that in Study 1 (Section 5.2), the treatment failed to shift either the willingness to perform any political acts or respondents' perceptions of efficacy. These treatments may be too indirect or too weak to be a genuine test of the role of strategic motivation. While it is reassuring that the manipulation checks consistently showed these treatments did shift perceptions of organizing's importance, attempting to influence perceptions of importance directly would increase confidence in the overall argument.

Second, the outcome measures used in the previous studies have significant limitations. While expectations of future canvassing behavior and self-reported willingness to recruit are reasonable indicators for the desired outcome, they lack the context of real-world decision-making. They require that the respondent imagine their behavior under unclear circumstances with unclear costs and benefits. A stated willingness to do something is informative of, but not a measure of, what someone would do under real-life circumstances. How people respond to questions in a survey and their actions when placed in a real-life situation are not equivalent – especially when individuals report on actions they rarely engage in.

Moreover, even if they are accurately assessing their underlying “willingness,” this may not be capturing what they would *choose* to do under real-world conditions. For example, one might be willing to do a task but prefer alternatives, leading to never engaging in that work. In this way, such people obscure the trade-off associated with choosing what organizing activity to undertake. While a behavioral measure would be preferred, creating a hypothetical situation in which a choice between actions allows for a more realistic evaluation.

Third, and most importantly, people rarely organize alone. They almost always recruit as part of a group or organization. These organizations may be able to

## 5. *The Limits of Strategic Motivation*

influence members' priorities and understandings of what actions matter in a way that abstract beliefs may not. It is one thing to think power comes from the people. It is another for someone in a position of authority to tell you the most important thing for you to do is recruit.

### 5.5 Studies 3 and 4: Organizing *is* Important

To shore up these limitations, I conducted two additional studies (*Surveys H & I*) in December 2020 and June 2021. Both studies were run on a diverse sample of the US population, though the first study had twice the number of participants ( $n = 3,138$  and  $1,547$ , respectively). Because these studies were similar and exhibited consistent findings, I discuss them concurrently here. I specifically designed these experiments to evaluate as direct as possible a version of the strategic motivation hypothesis. Namely, the idea proposition that increasing belief in the importance of organizing will increase the likelihood of choosing to recruit.

I asked participants to imagine they were volunteering for a civic organization working to improve conditions in their community through advocacy. I then asked them to choose between two tasks, recruitment and one of five or three alternatives (*Surveys H & I*, respectively). I randomly varied five components of the hypothetical situations to assess their impact:

1. The stated importance of recruitment
2. The alternative task
3. The method of recruitment
4. The target of recruitment
5. The phrasing of the recruitment task

Figure 5.3 shows the structure of these two experiments. The primary outcome is the choice of which task to do.

## 5. The Limits of Strategic Motivation

### Advocacy Task Experiment 1: Survey H, December 2020

<p><b>Setup With Placeholders</b></p> <p>Imagine you are volunteering for a civic organization. The organization is working to improve conditions in your community through advocacy to the government.</p> <p>[Importance.]</p> <p>You are given a choice of which task you want to do. Both tasks are expected to take the same amount of time.</p> <p>You can either:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Do [Alternative] task</li><li>2. Recruit new members by [Method] [Target] to [Goal]</li></ol> <p>The organization would benefit from you doing either task. Which do you choose?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> [Alternative] task</p> <p><input type="radio"/> The recruitment task</p>	<p><b>Treatment Variations</b></p> <p><b>Importance</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Your volunteer coordinator comments that many different things need to be done for your organization to be successful.</li><li>2) Your volunteer coordinator comments that, while many different things need to be done for your organization to be successful, the most important thing is to recruit.</li><li>3) Your volunteer coordinator comments that, while many different things need to be done for your organization to be successful, the most important thing is to recruit. This is because recruiting more volunteers builds the organization's capacity to do more and to have a greater overall political influence.</li></ol> <p><b>Alternative:</b> (1) administrative, (2) logistical, (3) database, (4) publicity, (5) research</p> <p><b>Method:</b> (1) Text, (2) call, (3) host a group event, (4) have one-on-one meetings</p> <p><b>Target:</b> (1) strangers, (2) people identified as interested, (3) community leaders, (4) members of the community, (5) acquaintances from work and school, (6) friends and family</p> <p><b>Goal:</b> (1) persuade them to join the organization, (2) invite them to join the organization, (3) share information with them about the organization.</p>
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### Advocacy Task Experiment 2: Survey J, June 2021

<p><b>Setup With Placeholders</b></p> <p>Imagine you are volunteering for a local community organization whose goals you deeply believe in. The organization is working to improve conditions in your community through advocacy to the government.</p> <p>[Importance]</p> <p>You are given a choice of which task you want to do. Both tasks are expected to take the same amount of time.</p> <p>You can either:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. [Alternative]</li><li>2. A recruitment task: [Method] [Target] to [Goal]</li></ol> <p>The organization would benefit from you doing either task. Which do you choose?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> [Alternative] task</p> <p><input type="radio"/> The recruitment task</p>	<p><b>Treatment Variations</b></p> <p><b>Importance</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Your volunteer coordinator comments that many different things need to be done for the organization to be successful.</li><li>2) Your volunteer coordinator comments that, while many different things need to be done for the organization to be successful, by far the most important thing is to recruit. This is because recruiting more volunteers builds the organization's capacity to do more and to have a greater overall political influence.</li></ol> <p><b>Alternative:</b> (1) administrative, (2) database, (3) publicity</p> <p><b>Method:</b> (1) Text, (2) email, (3) call, (4) having 5-minute face-to-face conversations with, (5) having 20-minute face-to-face conversations with</p> <p><b>Target:</b> (1) community members, (2) community members identified as interested in the organization, (3) strangers, (4) strangers identified as interested in the organization, (5) acquaintances, (6) acquaintances identified as interested in the organization</p> <p><b>Goal:</b> (1) persuade them to volunteer with the organization, (2) share information with them about volunteering with the organization, (3) talk them into volunteering with the organization.</p>
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**Figure 5.3: Design of Advocacy Task Choice Experiments** The left two panels are the structure of the treatment text, with placeholders for the randomized variations. The right two panels indicate all the possible variations for each of the five treatment arms evaluated. The top two panels are from the December 2020 survey. The bottom two are from the June 2021 survey.

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The first experiment had three treatment arms related to the importance of recruitment. The first included no statement indicating that recruitment is the more important of the two tasks. In the second, respondents were told that their volunteer coordinator considered recruitment the most important task. In the third, they were told of recruitment's importance and given a brief explanation of why it was important. The result of this experiment is visible in 5.4. While the effect is in the anticipated direction, neither of the importance treatments was statistically significant at conventional levels. This insignificance remains even when the two variations of the "importance treatment" are pooled ( $p = 0.12$ ). It is worth pointing out that this experiment has a larger sample size, with 989 people in the control group and 2,149 in the combined treatment group. Power analysis indicates that if the treatment had an effect of at least 0.11 standard deviations, it would likely have been observed in this study (power = 0.8).

To maximize the potential effect size, in the second study, I only included the two polls from the previous experiment: the importance + explanation and the pure control. Moreover, I further included a manipulation check to confirm that respondents were receptive to the treatment.<sup>15</sup> As is visible in Figure 5.5, respondents given the importance variation were more likely to respond that the organization prioritizes recruitment. Nevertheless, importance again had no statistically significant effect on respondents' task choice.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, pooling across these two studies, increasing the  $n$  to 4,688 and thereby increasing the overall power,<sup>17</sup> the effect remains statistically insignificant.<sup>18</sup>

However, despite the manipulation check showing responsiveness from participants to the treatment, less than half of respondents in the treatment arm correctly iden-

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
15. Specifically, respondents were asked, "In the described hypothetical situation, which task do you think the organization believes is more important?" with the option to say the organization valued recruitment the most, the alternative the most, or that it valued both equally.

16. This study was similarly powered to identify an effect size of 0.13 standard deviations.

17. By pooling, this analysis has a power of approximately 0.08 standard deviations.

18. Pooling across studies, a one-sided  $t$ -test indicates the effect size is 0.005 standard deviations ( $p = 0.09$ ).

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**Figure 5.4: Impact of Importance in Advocacy Task Choice Experiment I.** Outcome is the proportion that selected the recruitment task in a choice between recruitment and an alternative task. Three treatment arms were compared: (1) recruitment is most important, (2) recruitment is most important with an explanation of why, and (3) no statement of importance (baseline). Both importance treatments were compared to the baseline using one-sided  $t$ -tests, as specified in a pre-analysis plan. Data from December 2020 survey (*Survey H*,  $n = 3,020$ ).

tified recruitment as the most critical task.<sup>19</sup> To compensate for this, I modeled the respondent’s susceptibility to the treatment using pre-treatment covariates as part of the second task choice study. I then subsetted the analysis to those most likely to be affected by the treatment. This procedure, developed by Liu and Markovich, allows for conditioning on the manipulation check without inducing post-treatment bias (2022). Figure 5.6 shows the results of this procedure using different cut-offs. A one-sided  $t$ -test produces statistically significant estimates only at very particular cut-off thresholds. However, it is not a consistent pattern, dipping in and out of significance.


The treatment procedure could produce statistically significant results just not for

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19. If it is assumed that only a randomly assigned 14.1% of the sample is responsive to the treatment, as the manipulation check indicates, this considerably weakens the power of these studies. I estimate using a simulation that, even if the data is pooled, this design would only be powered to identify an effect of two-thirds of a standard deviation or more.



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


**Figure 5.5: Impact of Importance, Including Manipulation Check.** The treatment group was told that the organization considered recruitment the most important task, including an explanation. The control group was not. The left panel is the results of the manipulation check. It shows the percentage of respondents who reported that the organization considered recruitment the most important task. The right panel indicates the proportion that selected recruitment in a choice between recruitment and an alternative task. As specified in a pre-analysis plan, all  $p$ -values are from one-sided  $t$ -tests. Data from June 2021 survey (*Survey I*,  $n = 1,549$ ).

importance. In fact, as visible in Figure 5.7, of all five treatments tested as part of the same study, importance was estimated to be the least impactful overall. While I explore these findings in the next chapter in greater depth, the main thing to note here is that the kinds of manipulations possible in this type of study, with this sample size, are sufficient to elicit a statistically significant effect. But, explicitly instructing respondents that recruitment is the most important task was not. Or, put another way, were I to sufficiently increase the sample size of this study to be powered to estimate even a trivial effect from the importance treatment, the magnitude of that estimate would still be anticipated to be less than for these alternative treatments indicating the relatively low substantive significance of the importance treatment.

Moreover, this null effect was consistent across various robustness checks. Subset-

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


**Figure 5.6: Estimated Importance Treatment Conditioned on “Attentiveness.”** Estimates the treatment effect of telling respondents that organizing is most important, eliminating participants predicted to have a low propensity to be responsive to the treatment (“attentiveness”). I estimate attentiveness to treatment using a causal forest with 41 pre-treatment covariates in which the outcome provides an accurate response to the manipulation check. The x-axis indicates the share of the sample removed, with lower *predicted* attentiveness respondents dropped first. It ranges from 0 (none of the sample dropped) to 0.8 (80% of the sample dropped). The thick black line indicates that the treatment is only marginally more effective among those modeled as more attentive. The dark gray indicates the one-tailed *t*-test, and the light gray indicates a two-tailed test. This procedure is outlined in (Liu and Markovich 2022). Data from June 2021 survey (*Survey I*,  $n = 1,549$ ).

ting to groups more likely to participate – such as those with above average political engagement or a college education – does not change the result, nor does the inclusion of controls for increased precision. No matter how you cut it, importance does not cut it.

A reasonable concern is that this is an unrealistic test since what people say and do is not always aligned. However, the lack of realism benefits the null finding in this case. One would expect that participants would be *more* likely under these hypothetical conditions to be susceptible to response bias – aligning their answers with those encouraged by the instrument. If response bias was influencing respondents’

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


**Figure 5.7: Comparing Treatment Effects in the Advocacy Task Choice Experiments.** Compares the maximum treatment effect in each category; specifically, the difference between the treatment conditions which resulted in the lowest and highest probability of choosing recruitment. Importance compares importance + explanation and no statement of importance. Phrasing compares “sharing” information and “persuading.” Target compares “strangers” and “community members identified as interested in the organization.” This method compares calling and short face-to-face conversations. Finally, the alternative task compares publicity and administrative tasks. Data from June 2021 survey (*Survey I*).  $n = 1,549$ .

choices, we would expect a larger estimated effect from the treatment on the choice to recruit than found under real-life circumstances where people have to then proceed to perform the task.

Moreover, using a hypothetical may be considered a conservative test of non-effect because there is evidence that response bias was impacting how people performed their motivations for their choices, despite not changing their minds. As visible in the blue bars of Figure 5.8, among those in the control group, those choosing the alternative task were less likely than those who chose to recruit to attribute outwardly

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**Figure 5.8: Association of Chosen Task and Reported Reason, by Treatment Condition.** Estimates the association between the choice not to recruit and the scaled reported importance of each of six considerations: the social status associated with the task, how manipulative the task was thought to be, the amount of social interaction involved, the importance of the task, self-assessed ability to do the task, and how much they would enjoy the task. Compares between those respondents told recruitment is most important and those who were not. Data from December 2020 survey (*Survey H*,  $n = 3,020$ ).

focused characteristics such as social status, manipulativeness, or the level of social interaction. Notably, there was no difference in how often people cited importance as a key consideration.

However, despite the treatment not changing the respondents' actual decision, it did change what they attributed their task decision to. The treatment caused those who chose the alternative task to become more likely than their recruiting peers to attribute their decision to sources outside of themselves: socialness, status, and perceptions of the manipulativeness of the task. Moreover, those who chose recruitment became more likely to say they considered the importance of the tasks. Again, participants exhibited this average change in response behavior despite the share of people having chosen to recruit not changing. This pattern indicates that

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participants performed their claimed motivation in response to the expectations created by the treatment.

### 5.6 The Unimportance of Importance

An NRA prime, emphasizing the role of the organization's members or their resources, increased the extent to which people valued mass action but not their willingness to recruit to create it. A #BLM prime, which elevated the responsibility of organizers in creating the *2020 Uprising*, did increase the amount people valued recruitment – but not their willingness to recruit themselves. In two experiments, I asked respondents to imagine a scenario where they volunteer for a local advocacy group and select between recruiting or doing another political act for that organization. Even in that *hypothetical* situation, telling them recruitment was the more important task did not make respondents choose to recruit. However, other minor variations in the *experience* did.

These results are consistent with the real-world observation that organizations have such trouble implementing an organizing strategy. The logic most readily available for getting someone to do something important is to tell them it is important. When trying to get others to recruit, leaders often talk about people power, the vital role of organizers, or how recruitment builds capacity. These appeals may work for those who already have an underlying willingness to organize, but the consistent result across experiments is that these strategic appeals are unlikely to be effective. Moreover, across all of the experiments, respondents' general tendency to engage in politics did not make the treatment more effective. In other words, caring more about political outcomes does not immediately seem to have an impact.

These findings would not cause concern among organizing-oriented leaders if people were generally disposed to recruit for alternative reasons. Unfortunately, when pooling across the two surveys in which respondents chose between recruitment and an alterna-

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tive task, only about a third of respondents (37.6%) chose to recruit (*Survey H & I*).<sup>20</sup> In a later study (*Survey K*), when I put the job of organizer head-to-head against three other common activist professions (communications, research, and programs), again, only about a third of respondents indicated a preference for the organizing job.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, a reasonable critique of these studies is that survey experiments and the shallow interactions they allow are insufficient to change what someone thinks is important. These experiments are brief, hypothetical one-off experiences. Despite manipulation checks indicating that participants do shift their reported expectation of how important organizing is, it may be the case that respondents are not internalizing these stated belief changes. Despite alternative manipulations in Studies 3 and 4 causing substantial shifts in respondents' choices, their underlying beliefs about what political work is essential may simply be too firm to shift through a survey experiment.

As discussed in Chapter 2, changing beliefs about what matters likely requires more substantial interaction with someone who has developed trust and understanding. The hypothetical “volunteer coordinator” means nothing to these participants. Indeed, the type of intervention possible in a survey experiment is more analogous to an activation strategy than organizing. It may be that when a leader talks face-to-face with an activist and makes a case for recruitment by tying it to their values and emotions, they can cause genuine changes in people's priorities. But another way to say this is that changing beliefs about politics and fitting people into political

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20. This varied slightly between survey and alternative tasks. For example, in the December 2020 survey, the most popular task was research (69% chose that task), and the least popular was publicity (54% chose that task). In the June 2021 survey, the administrative task was the most popular at 68%, while publicity remained the least desirable at 55%.

21. While the samples for these surveys are balanced on demographics, the types of people who complete online surveys may be systematically different from the general population, specifically regarding how eager they are to interact directly with people. Indeed, I detail the role of extraversion in the desire to recruit in the next chapter. Methodologically, this is more of a concern for descriptive statistics than experimental findings, leaving the main results discussed in this chapter on solid footing. Moreover, in *Survey I*, I measured the sampled extraversion using a standard inventory. This sample had a mean extraversion score of 50.9 as a percentage of the maximum possible scale (0 to 100). Using the same instrument, a 1999 study estimated the US/Canadian extraversion score at 54.6 (Srivastava et al. 2003).

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work requires a thorough understanding of a whole person and their motivations, more than just their policy preferences. In other words, we cannot rely on simple messaging about strategic importance.

I cannot and should not rule out entirely that an individual's understanding of the importance of recruitment plays a role. However, the evidence provided here should cause scholars and activists to question the idea that considerations of its strategic impact primarily drive the choice to recruit. Other motivations are plausibly at work and potentially play a far more substantial part in individual decisions of whether to recruit than its anticipated strategic impact. The remaining chapters explore these alternative motivations.

*“It is something that I love, I am passionate about, I do it in my sleep.”*

# 6

## The Experience of Organizing

### **6.1 Preferences for Interpersonal Interactions Shape the Decision to Recruit**

So far, I have demonstrated that even politically active people are not motivated to become organizers even when they are told how effective and necessary this work is for achieving political ends. That raises the question of what predicts who is willing to do this work. In this chapter, I show how qualities of the experience of doing the recruitment task interplay with individual-level characteristics to affect who is willing to do the work of organizing. I do this by building on the insight from Chapter 2 that effective organizing requires building and *using* interpersonal relationships. This insight suggests that how individuals relate to interpersonal interactions – to people – will heavily influence their decision of whether or not to organize.

In the following section, I establish the general fact that the way people feel about interpersonal interactions weighs heavily on the decision of whether or not to recruit. The interviews reviewed in Chapter 4 introduced several ways people relate to relationships that might impact the decision to recruit. Indeed, those interviews provided more than could be accounted for in that chapter. In this chapter, I narrow in on three



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of these ways. First, suppose recruitment relies on building relationships, especially if it requires *rapidly* building *many* relationships. In that case, the predisposition to seek out interpersonal interactions, “extraversion,” should increase one’s willingness to organize. Extraversion has a generally positive association with political engagement. However, with some caveats, I will present evidence that this association is robust for recruitment-oriented work.

However, organizing is not like other social interactions. Whether motivated by its instrumental function or not, organizing is instrumental. While the act of recruiting may be like “inviting them to a social occasion (Green and Gerber 2015, 156)” in method, it is very different in its purpose. An organizer does not build these relationships solely for the intrinsic pleasure of that relationship. The organizer may listen because they care, but they also listen to better understand how to influence. The organizer builds trust and then uses that trust to achieve a goal. This function means that organizing can feel *manipulative*; it can feel like an attack on agency and individuality. Chapter 2 expounds on the democratic virtues of organizing. This section notes that, for some, organizing has an undemocratic quality that can affect their decision to recruit.

Nevertheless, the degree to which recruitment feels like manipulation might be a function of how the potential recruiter sees the target. People are more willing to recruit someone if they already have a relationship with them, see them as interested in the issues, or believe them to be connected to the community. The implication of this is that the process of organizing will itself reduce manipulation concerns – as organizers invest in relationships, incite interest, and build community.

## 6.2 Relationships: Disposition Toward Interpersonal Interactions

In the previous chapter, I refer to a survey experiment fielded in December 2020 (*Survey H*), in which respondents chose between a recruitment task or an alternative task.



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- (1) To interact with other people and hear there [sic] opinion
- (2) Like talking to people
- (3) I would rather work with people
- (4) I am charming and usually have the ability to get others to follow.
- (5) My ability to like people

And among those who chose the alternative task:

- (1) I didn't want people in my home.
- (2) Mostly the trying to convince people to help out.
- (3) I hate people, period
- (4) I don't like receiving unsolicited texts.
- (5) I think that the logistical task would be a better use of my interests and skills

These comments well-demonstrate the central tenet of this chapter: the choice to recruit is shaped by how individuals relate to interpersonal interactions.


As part of the “Theory of Change” survey from October 2020 (*Survey G*), which included the George Floyd Uprising experiment, I asked participants which of six potential concerns were most important in preventing them from doing more recruitment than they currently are. I asked about three standard political engagement qualities: political knowledge, political interest, and political efficacy. In addition, I asked about recruitment-specific capacity, comfort with asking people to do things, and fear of hurting personal relationships.

As visible in Figure 6.2, fear of hurting personal relationships was the most important reason for respondents. This option was followed by feelings of comfort, another characteristic of the interpersonal quality of the work. The increased importance of the “relationship” barrier is statistically significant when compared to all other potential reasons (0.33, 0.47) and in a pairwise comparison to the following most important characteristic (0.17, 0.35).<sup>1</sup> These differences remain statistically significant, whether

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1. Parenthesis indicates the 95% confidence interval for the difference in estimated importance on a scale of 0–4.

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**Figure 6.2: Barriers to Recruitment.** Respondents were asked: “One way in which people can affect politics is by asking others to take political actions. Regardless of how much you are currently asking others to participate, how important are the following concerns in preventing you from asking people to participate in politics more than you are?” Six potential motivating factors were then evaluated on a 5-point Likert scale. Part of *Survey G* fielded in October 2020 ( $n = 1,499$ ).

narrowed to those with high willingness to recruit or low.<sup>2</sup> Whether people are willing to recruit or not, the thing they are thinking about is relationships.

As part of *Survey I* fielded in June 2021, I asked respondents to rank five different methods of reaching out to targets<sup>3</sup> by the degree to which they were considered “intrusive”<sup>4</sup> and “social.”<sup>5</sup> I averaged across these respondents to estimate the

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2. High levels refer to those who responded that they were “willing” (3) or “very willing” (4) to recruit. Low levels refer to all others (0-2). The difference between the relationships as a barrier and all other considerations is 0.31 (0.19, 0.43) for high willingness and 0.46 for low levels (0.37, 0.54). For the pairwise comparison, the estimates are 0.24 (0.19, 0.43) and 0.28 (0.37, 0.54) for high and low, respectively.

3. These are (1) texts, (2) emails, (3) phone calls, (4) 5-minute face-to-face conversations, and (5) a 20-minute face-to-face conversation.

4. As part of the question, I defined intrusiveness as follows: “if you were to initiate one of these activities with a person, which would most interrupt that person’s day?”

5. As part of the question, I defined “social” as follows: “personal engagement with another

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average “intrusive” and “social” scores for each method. Then as part of the later experiment, described in greater detail in the previous chapter, I randomly varied which method the recruitment task was associated with. A one-point increase in the average “intrusiveness” rank of a method associated with recruitment resulted in a 23.4 (0.80, 46.1) percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing to recruit. Conversely, a one-point increase in socialness resulted in an 19.2 (0.36, 38.1) percentage point increase in choosing to recruit.<sup>6</sup> Clearly, the quality of the act of recruitment itself shapes the decision of whether or not to recruit.<sup>7</sup>

### 6.3 Extraversion: Personality and Recruitment

It naturally follows that if the task of organizing is inherently social, the most socially-oriented people – extraverts – will be the ones most inclined to take on this responsibility. This is the second proposition of this dissertation:

**Proposition 2:** Due to organizing’s dependence on cultivating relationships, individual preferences for interpersonal interactions will affect the decision of whether to recruit. As a result, extraverts are more likely to organize as compared to alternative political activities.


A century ago, psychiatrist Carl Jung divided the world into extraverts and introverts (1976), and his work has been incorporated into modern psychology as one of the “Big-5” traits used to categorize people’s personalities. The *American Psychological Association* defines extraversion as an “orientation of one’s interests and individual.”

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6. This is part of a pre-registered model. The full model can be found in Appendix L. The link is available in Appendix F. While intrusiveness was expected to decrease willingness to recruit, socialness was not necessarily expected to increase it. The link to the pre-registration of this study which includes these predictions is available in Appendix F.

7. These effect sizes are so large because they are countervailing. A 20-minute face-to-face conversation is both the most intrusive and the most social. As a result, it has a combined effect of -3.4 compared to a 5-minute conversation. Conversely, email is both the least social and the least intrusive, so it has a -1.1 percentage point effect compared to a 5-minute conversation. Calling is by far the least popular recruitment method. Calling’s unpopularity is plausibly because it is considered intrusive – ranking neck in neck with a 5-minute conversation – but is not particularly personal. As a result, it has a comparative effect of -5.9 percentage points.

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**Figure 6.3: Association Between Extraversion and Recruitment Activity.** The point estimate is the coefficient on a scaled extraversion index in models of scaled past recruitment activity and choice of whether to recruit. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval. “Past Recruit” indicates whether the respondent encouraged others to participate in the last year. “Choice Recruit” indicates whether the respondent chose the recruitment or alternative task. (I) Indicates the survey from June 2021 ( $n = 1,550$ ) and (J) Indicates the survey from September 2021 ( $n = 1,910$ ). Models include pre-registered controls, with or without an index of other political participation.

energies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective experience... Extraverts are relatively outgoing, gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive” (APA 2022). If the choice to recruit is connected to its social quality, I anticipate that extraverts will have a greater willingness to engage in organizing thanks to their underlying preference and tendency for social interactions.<sup>8</sup>

In *Survey I* introduced in the previous chapter,<sup>9</sup> I asked participants to complete the standard eight-question extraversion battery used as part of the Big-5 inventory

8. Extraverts are generally considered more capable in social interactions as measured by likability (Eaton and Funder 2003). This result implies that they are potentially also more effective organizers. I address the role of capacity in Chapter 7.

9. This survey included the previous chapter’s second task choice experiment (Study 4).

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to create an index measure (John et al. 2008).<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, I asked respondents if they had “asked others to take action about political issues” in the last 12 months. I modeled the relationship between this outcome and extraversion using an ordinary least squares (OLS). I find that a one standard deviation increase in extraversion is associated with a 7.8 (5.8, 9.9) percentage point increase in the probability of having encouraged someone to participate in politics (top bar of Figure 6.3).<sup>11</sup> The inclusion of 15 controls<sup>12</sup> pre-registered<sup>13</sup> controls reduces the magnitude but not the significance of the relationship between extraversion and recruitment activity (Bar 2, Figure 6.3).

I repeated this in a second survey *Survey J*) in September 2019. I again asked people about their extraversion.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, I asked about whether or not they had “encourage[d] someone else to get involved in politics” in the last year. And again, a one standard deviation increase in extraversion was associated with a 4.1 (2.3, 5.8) percentage point increase in the linear probability of recruiting (Bar 4, Figure 6.3. The inclusion of eight pre-registered<sup>15</sup> demographic controls<sup>16</sup> attenuates this association, but it remains significant at a 2.6 (0.9, 4.3) percentage point increase (Bar 5, Figure 6.3). These correlations establish a descriptive relationship between extraversion and respondents’ propensity to recruit.

The general result that extraverts recruit more is expected given the well-established finding that extraverts are more likely to participate in politics (C. Dawes et al. 2014; Mondak et al. 2010; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). For example, in *Survey I* extraversion has a strong statistically significant positive correlation with all 14 other political

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10. Appendix I provides the questions exact wording for psychological batteries.

11. All models in this chapter are available in Appendix L.

12. Education, income, gender, age, state, race, student, working, political party, ideology, political interest, political knowledge, discuss politics, moral certainty (propensity to take extreme positions on moral questions), and party extremism. I pre-registered these control, along with an index of political participation. I excluded this index due to its substantial correlation with the outcome measure. The association between recruitment and these alternative political activities is visible in Figure 6.4.


13. Link to pre-registration is in Appendix F.

14. This time, adopting a short two-item measure for extraversion. This measure has been validated in the psychological literature (Gosling et al. 2003).

15. Link to pre-registration is in Appendix F.

16. Age, race, gender, unemployed, education, income, party, and political interest.

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**Figure 6.4: Relationships Between Recruitment and Other Political Behaviors.** Fifteen political behaviors were measured as part of *Survey I* fielded in June 2021.  $n = 1,550$ . These are binary outcomes in which the participant reports that they did or did not engage in the behavior in the last year. The plot indicates the correlation between 14 of these acts and having recruited someone in the last year. The acts apart from recruitment are (1) attending a rally, (2) attending a protest, (3) attending a meeting, (4) volunteering for a political organization, (5) having active membership in a political organization, (6) participating in collective action, (7) contacting an official, (8) signing a petition, (9) publishing a political editorial, (10) calling in to a political show, (11) making political comments online, (12) posting political media online, (13) sending texts about politics, and (14) donating to a political cause.

acts measured.<sup>17</sup> This relationship exists even with less social political activities, such as making a political donation or writing an editorial. As a result, extraversion may lead people to engage in more recruitment, but only because it is generally associated with increased engagement in politics. The more interesting question then becomes

17. These were (1) attending a rally, (2) attending a protest, (3) attending a meeting, (4) volunteering for a political organization, (5) having active membership in a political organization, (6) participating in collective action, (7) contacting an official, (8) signing a petition, (9) publishing a political editorial, (10) calling in to a political show, (11) making political comments online, (12) posting political media online, (13) sending texts about politics, and (14) donating to a political cause.



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whether extraversion is *specifically* predictive of the choice to recruit, more so than alternative political acts.

To evaluate this question, I returned to the forced-choice experiment from the previous chapter. Using a head-to-head choice, I can determine how extraversion influences the decision of what action to take from the decision to take any action. I further deepen this evaluation by manipulating the recruitment method, making it more or less social. The expectation is that if the social quality of recruitment is the aspect that draws extraverts to that task, then when the recruitment uses a more deeply interpersonal method, extraverts should be more inclined to this work.

Again, the binary regression performed as predicted. People who scored high on the extraversion index were more likely to choose the recruitment task than non-extraverts. A one standard deviation increase in extraversion was associated with a 5.4 (3.0, 7.8) percentage point increase in the linear probability of choosing the recruitment task (Bar 7, Figure 6.3). Including pre-registered controls,<sup>18</sup> I estimate that a one standard deviation rise in extraversion is associated with a 4.6 (1.9, 7.2) percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the recruitment task (Bar 8, Figure 6.3).

I theorize that this relationship is due to recruitment's social quality. To further demonstrate this point, I evaluated whether increasing perceptions of the level of socialness of a recruitment task interact with how extraversion affects the decision to do the recruitment task. The correlation of extraversion with the decision to recruit is expected to be stronger when the recruitment task involves more social contact.

In the task choice experiment in *Survey I*, I varied the degree to which the recruitment task was social by changing the recruitment method. As discussed above, five different methods were randomly assigned: contacting targets via (1) texts, (2) emails, (3) phone calls, (4) 5-minute face-to-face conversations, or (5) a 20-minute face-to-face conversation. The face-to-face conversations, particularly the longer iteration, are

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18. This included all experimental treatments. Link to the pre-registration of this experiment is available in Appendix F.

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theorized – and empirically validated<sup>19</sup> – to be more social than the alternatives.<sup>20</sup> If the social quality drives the increased preference among extraverts for the recruitment task, then there should be heterogeneous treatment effects from being assigned to the face-to-face interactions.

The left panel of Figure 6.5 visualizes the predicted linear probability of choosing the recruitment task by an individual’s level of extraversion subdivided into the experimentally assigned recruitment methods. No matter the method, extraverts are more likely to choose to recruit. While calling, email, and texting have different intercepts, their slopes are roughly similar, indicating that extraversion consistently relates to each of the variations. However, extraversion plays a far more substantial role in face-to-face recruitment, especially when it involves a more extended conversation, shifting the angle of its slope considerably. The interaction comparing the more extended face-to-face conversation with the three more impersonal methods is statistically significant at conventional levels.

While this model assumes linearity, it is not necessarily the case that the relationship between extraversion and recruitment choice is linear. One may need to be very extraverted to recruit, or it may be that low levels of extraversion prevent people from choosing to recruit. The right panel of Figure 6.5 examines the impact of extraversion bucketed into low, medium, and high. From this, two patterns emerge. First, for those with medium and high levels of extraversion, there is a slight increase when shifting from impersonal methods to a more intimate face-to-face interaction. However, the interaction length seems mainly irrelevant to these two groups.


On the other hand, for those with low levels of extraversion, a significant drop occurs when moving from a short conversation to a long one. This disinclination by introverts to have extended interpersonal interactions likely drives the pattern visible

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19. I asked participants to rank these five methods by the level of “social interaction” they involve. Unsurprisingly, the majority (59%) indicated that the long in-person conversation involved the most social interaction. Similarly, a majority (56%) considered the 5-minute conversation the second most social.

20. These acts are also closer to what I established constituted effective organizing in Chapter 2.

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**Figure 6.5: Association of Extraversion and Chosen Advocacy Task by Method of Recruitment.** Relationship between extraversion index and the decision to recruit, conditional on the method of recruitment specified. Five options were considered: calling, texting, email, 5-min face-to-face, and 20-minute face-to-face. The left panel indicates the association of extraversion with choosing to recruit, conditional on the method. The right panel buckets extraversion into three equal groups. It shows the share who chose to recruit, conditional on the method. Due to similar slopes in the left panel, calling, texting, and email are combined on the right panel. Part of *Survey I* fielded in June 2021 ( $n = 1,550$ ).

in the left panel. While this pattern was identified inductively and will require further investigation to validate, it is consistent with the overall evidence that extraversion predicts recruitment activity. Moreover, this result implies that it is the social component of recruitment that leads extraversion to play a more substantial role in the decision to recruit than it does in alternative political acts.

### 6.4 Manipulation: Framing the Act of Recruitment

Organizing is sometimes framed as truly democratic politics (e.g., Sabl 2002). After all, when political actors organize, they are doing *with* rather than doing *for* (Skocpol 2003). However, organizing fundamentally entails changing minds. Renowned civil rights organizer Ella Baker “saw her role as an organizer not as ‘meeting people

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where they were but as starting with them there and trying to move them, gradually, somewhere else” (Inouye 2021, 1). Organizing asks things of the people who are organized. The organizer works to reshape people’s priorities, willingness to act, and beliefs about the world. Organizing is done *with* the people, but also *to* people.

A good organizer builds genuine trust and respect. For many recruits, the experience can be incredibly liberating and validating. It can be profoundly empowering for them to have someone take their grievances seriously and give them hope. But organizing is still a political advocacy strategy and an instrumental project, even if it is not instrumentally motivated.

Ultimately, an organizer is a “pusher” (Rooks and Penney 2015). An organizer uses symbols, identity, social pressure, and listening and understanding to push past their rational self-interest to free-ride to disabuse themselves of their “false consciousness.” For some, like one of my interviewees in South Africa, a wayward child of the Evangelical church, the recruitment experience felt *manipulative*; too akin to the missionary work of her youth which she now derided. Organizing is antithetical to absolute respect for individual agency, the cornerstone of Western humanism. This idea informs my third proposition:

**Proposition 3:** The more recruitment is associated with persuading individuals to change their beliefs, the less likely people are to choose to engage in recruitment. This negative effect is reduced when the social distance of the target from the recruiter, the organization, or the community affected is smaller. However, the effect is more significant when potential recruiters are more ideologically committed to respect for individual agency or lack moral certitude.

In this section, I tackle the idea that organizing can be experienced as manipulative.<sup>21</sup> This ideological handwringing can stymie action as would-be organizers debate the morality of this work. For example, in the 1960s, the Students for a Democratic Society turned to community organizing, founding the Economic Research and Action

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21. In the next section, I will address the effects of social distance and in Chapter 9 I will further explore the role of ideology.

## 6. *The Experience of Organizing*

Project (ERAP). Yet, this organizing work had limited success (Breines 1989). Richard Rothstein, a member of ERAP, articulated the limiting role of activists' anxieties around manipulation:


The fall and winter of 1964-5 was marked by guilt-ridden, agonizing debates about the nature of democracy and organizing. "Manipulation" was an oft-heard term; ERAP students were committed to the notion that poor people have always had the big decisions made for them, and the thought that the students, too, might be making decisions for the poor in the guise of helping them was enough to turn the hardest stomach. To many, the very existence of the organizer had paternalistic implications. Why would an organizer be there if he didn't assume that he was better than the ghetto residents, had some superior knowledge about a movement which he was imposing (by fact of superior articulateness) on the innocent, unknowing ghetto residents? (Rothstein 1965)

Of course, many activists I spoke to scoffed at this concern. I should specify that I do not draw attention to this anxiety to imply the validity of its reasoning. The question is not whether organizing is manipulative but rather whether experiencing organizing as manipulative results in a reduced propensity to recruit. The evidence presented in this section indicates that this perception of recruitment may play a substantial role in deciding whether to engage in that work.

Organizing requires inducing participants to change their beliefs about what is needed and what role they have to play. The comparison to activation, as it is described in chapter 2, is relevant. Activation assumes that the target is willing to act but lacks information. Organizing is fundamentally constituted by persuasion, while activation is simply sharing knowledge. This intention to change minds makes some to perceive organizing as manipulative and which makes the act inherently uncomfortable.

In both task choice experiments, I varied the description of the recruitment task involved. Three conditions existed in both cases. In the first, recruitment involved (1) *persuading* targets to join the organization, (2) *sharing information* about the organization, or (3) *inviting* them to join the organization. Inviting was a less manipulative option that still involved making an active request. The second experiment retained

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**Figure 6.6: Effect of Recruitment Framing on Chosen Task.** Results from two recruitment task choice experiments. In both, the recruitment task was randomly assigned to one of three framings of recruitment. The treatment variations in the first experiment included persuade, invite, and share. In the second, the treatment arms were persuade, “talk into,” and share. Bars indicated 95% confidence intervals for the effect of the framing on the probability of choosing the recruitment task. Data for the left panel comes from *Survey H*,  $n = 3,020$  fielded in December 2021. Data for the right come from *Survey I*,  $n = 1,550$  fielded in June 2021.

the first two conditions but included “talk into,” with the prediction that this phrasing would be considered even more manipulative than persuasion.<sup>22</sup>

Figure 6.6 shows that, in both experiments, when recruitment involved persuasion, people were less willing to recruit than when it involved merely sharing information. The effect size was a 4.8 (0.7, 8.9) percentage point decrease in the linear probability of choosing to persuade (compared to share) in the first experiment and a 7.1 (1.1, 13.0) percentage point decrease in the second.<sup>23</sup>

As visible in the right panel of 6.6, the invitation treatment in the first task

22. The link to pre-analysis plan for this study is available in Appendix F.

23. The estimated effect size is 5.4 (2.0, 8.8) percentage points when pooled across the two studies.

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choice experiment behaves as expected, landing between the sharing and persuasion variations. However, surprisingly, the “talk into” variation had a smaller negative effect on task choice than persuasion.

While clear tests of the proposition, these experiments are only viable assessments of the larger question of the role of manipulation if one accepts that the framing treatment is capturing that concept. There are, unfortunately, two reasons to doubt this. The first reason is the weakness of the “talk into” treatment. This result is of particular concern because those in the “talk into” treatment were more likely than other treatment groups to say that “manipulation” was an important consideration in deciding whether or not to recruit. While this difference in stated consideration is nowhere near statistically significant, it does indicate that there might be something other than the manipulative quality at work in the effect of the “persuasion” framing on the outcome.

The second reason to doubt the persuasion treatment is *just* affecting expectations of the work’s manipulateness. Across all arms, respondents rated their ability to do the tasks as the most important consideration out of the six tested.<sup>24</sup> However, the importance of ability is even higher in the persuasion arm. Again, this is not a statistically significant difference. However, these two results combined – the smaller effect size of “talk into” and the “persuasion” groups increased attention to ability – indicate that part of persuasion’s treatment effect may be coming from a perception that persuasion is difficult. These findings lend themselves to centering the skills underlying organizing work, the next chapter’s subject.

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24. The social status associated with the task, how manipulative the task was thought to be, the amount of social interaction involved, the importance of the task, self-assessed ability to do the task, and how much they would enjoy the task.

## 6.5 Targets: Social Distance and the Decision to Recruit

In his treatment of the role of manipulation in the success of ERAP, Richard Rothstein discusses how ERAP overcame this angst by actually doing the work of organizing through building relationships based on mutual respect (Rothstein 1965). He brings up a distinction between the experiences of men and women in ERAP. While the men debated the morality of organizing, the women built the relationships that allowed for collective action: “Either because they were women and had been trained in skills that enabled them to talk and relate more easily on a personal basis and/or because they shared a common oppression with community women, the female organizers were more successful than the men in generating political consciousness and activity...” (Breines 1989, 143).

Again, the capacity issue arises, which I will discuss in the next chapter. However, the second insight of that quote is important. The connection organizers feel to recruits will affect their comfort with the work. This connection is shaped by the social distance between the recruit and the recruiter, the issue, and the community affected. As a result, it is expected that people will be more comfortable with recruitment when the target is described:

- as *interested* in the issue,
- as a member of the affected community, or
- as having an intimate association with the recruiter.

I again varied these qualities in the task choice experiments. The first experiment’s results, visible in Figure 6.7, demonstrate the expected patterns. When the target is “people identified as interested,” respondents were 12.66 (6.89, 18.42) percentage points more likely to choose to recruit than when the target was just a “stranger.” The affected community members, particularly leaders, were some of the most popular targets.



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**Figure 6.7: Effect of Recruitment Target (Task Choice Experiment I).** For Survey *H* fielded in December 2021 ( $n = 3,020$ ), the target of recruitment was varied between six potential targets. The bars indicate the share of respondents for each target category which selected the recruitment task. The  $p$ -values indicate whether the difference in probability of recruitment for that target and the base category of “strangers” is statistically significant.

Finally, while not having as substantial an impact as issue interest and community membership, it is possible to observe the anticipated pattern regarding recruiter intimacy. Friends and family make better targets than acquaintances, who are superior to strangers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to disentangle the magnitude of these effects in comparison due to the design. While everything, save acquaintances, has a statistically significant difference from strangers, this merely demonstrates the unpopularity of strangers!

In the second study, I implemented a factorial design, adopting three main categories of targets: strangers, acquaintances, and community members. I used acquaintance, in comparison, as a proxy for the relational distance between the recruit and the recruiter. Similarly, I used community membership as a signifier that respondents are more affected by the issue, increasing expectations that they are a beneficiary

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of the political engagement. Finally, across all three descriptors, I varied whether I described the target as interested in the issue. In this case, the prediction is that increased perceptions of the target’s interest will ameliorate respondents’ anxieties about imposing themselves on others, thereby increasing their willingness to recruit.<sup>25</sup>

The direction of the observed effects is consistent with what I expected for each variation. However, as visible in Figure 6.8, only the difference between community members and acquaintances/strangers is statistically significant: 6.7 (0.6, 12.8) percentage points. This lack of significant results may be because the three forms of “closeness” may act as substitutes. For example, being told that the target is interested increases a respondent’s decision to choose recruitment by an estimated 3.6 percentage points when the target is a “stranger.” However, when the target is described as a “community member,” the addition of being told that they are interested increases the likelihood of the respondent choosing to recruit by only 1.9 percentage points. In other words, if someone is already connected by their community membership, it is less critical to the potential recruiter that they also are connected in terms of issue-interest.

Overall, the evidence generally supports the idea that the greater the degree to which the target is connected to the cause – whether it be through the recruiter, the issue, or the community – the more comfortable activists will be to recruit them. However, further research is necessary to disentangle the possible forms of inter-connectivity and how these mechanisms interact.


### **6.6 Identifying Organizers and Connecting Communities**

While leadership cannot necessarily change who the target of organizing is, how they talk about these communities may still have an impact. To imbue would-be organizers with the gumption to recruit, organizers should see themselves as part of

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<sup>25</sup>. The link to pre-analysis plan for this study is available in Appendix F.

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**Figure 6.8: Effect of Recruitment Target (Task Choice Experiment II).** For *Survey I* fielded in June 2021, the target of recruitment was varied between three potential target groups. They were then assigned either to be told the targets are interested or to have level of interest unspecified.

the communities they are working to organize. When distance is created and reinforced between groups, reticent activists may choose to do alternative advocacy work for fear of “manipulating” those they work to help. However, while this may leave those people un-manipulated, it also deprives them of the subsidy for collective action that would-be organizers might provide.

Moreover, if a commitment to individual agency makes a person less willing to organize, this creates an unfortunate dilemma. Those people whose ideologies privilege agency will lose out to those whose ideologies are less tolerant. This result is because the methods that involve no infringement on agency are comparatively ineffective in building collective action in the long run. As a result, liberalism and tolerance are at a strategic disadvantage to collective-oriented ideologies – such as communism and fascism – in achieving collective action through organizing. I explore this phenomenon

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more in the concluding chapter.

Finally, if organizations push their staff and volunteers to recruit, they need to recognize the differential preferences among those potential organizers. If someone is not a natural people-person, that does not mean they cannot be a good organizer. However, they will require special support in developing alternative motivations to do the work and overcome initial hesitancy. The flip side is that just because someone is an extravert does not mean they have the skills necessary to recruit. That is the subject of the next chapter.

*“People call these soft skills. They are hard skills, as hard as construction... [these soft-skills] are what make organizing possible.”*

# 7

## The Role of Social Skills in Organizing

### 7.1 The Relationship Between Interpersonal Abilities and Recruitment Capacity

In the early days of the MIT GSU, when our numbers were still barely out of the single digits, several union members attended an organizer training. Amelia described how they came out of those sessions with “a mandate to go organize.” Comparing the experiences of Amelia and Brian,<sup>1</sup> another member, coming out of that training is informative. Both began to fervently organize in the wake of this training, having frequent conversations. Yet, while Amelia emerged from these conversations with several recruits and a passion for the work, Brian stopped organizing. In explaining this different result, Amelia speculated: “I don’t think it came quite as naturally to him...” Brian had motivation and training, but he did not have the underlying capacity.

The role of ability resonates with the experience of the self-ascribed “bureaucrat who sits behind a laptop” from Chapter 4, who commented on organizing: “I’ve explored it and concluded it’s fucking hard.” It is also visible in the open-ended responses from the task choice experiment in the previous chapter: both the person

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1. Pseudonyms.

## 7. *The Role of Social Skills in Organizing*

who chose not to recruit because “the logistical task would be a better use of [their] interests and skills” and the one who chose to because they are “charming and usually have the ability to get others to follow.”

This chapter focuses on the skills of organizing and how people’s relationship with those skills affects their capacity and desire to recruit. In particular, again drawing on the insight that organizing is fundamentally about interpersonal interactions, I emphasize the role of *social skills*. After briefly reviewing what I mean by social skills, I establish evidence for four interrelated points. First, I draw on evidence from all three populations surveyed<sup>2</sup> to show that organizing is descriptively understood as requiring social skills. I go on to demonstrate that those who self-identify as having greater social skills are more likely to describe themselves as having the capacity to persuade others to take political action and report having had regular recruitment experiences.

These descriptive correlations substantiate the deduction that organizing requires social skills. The question is then whether this widely held belief is affecting individual decisions of whether to recruit. To evaluate this possibility, I assess whether experimentally telling people that they had social skills results in an increased self-evaluation of their capacity to recruit. I find that this is the case both among the US general population and the South African activists. This result further supports the idea that social skills are fundamental to organizing and, perhaps more importantly, that personal beliefs about one’s social skills affect the decision of whether to recruit. The upshot is that a little positive reinforcement seems to go a long way.

I then discuss the role of socialization in developing social skills, re-confirming a repeated finding from the literature that women have greater average social intelligence (SI). This correlation helps to explain the well-documented phenomenon that women make more effective organizers than men. However, while increased SI is associated with an increase in both self-assessed capacity to organize and reported recruitment

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2. A diverse sample from the US population, a convenience sample of American activists participating in an organizer training, and a convenience sample of South African local activists.

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behavior across genders – the magnitude of the association between SI and these outcomes for women is roughly half what it is for men. This finding helps to explain the unfortunate paradox that despite generally making better organizers, women recruit at a lower rate than men. However, experimental evidence shows that when women are told they have above-average SI, the association between social skills and self-assessed recruitment capacity mimics men's. This finding indicates that women are aware of their social skills and the link between these skills and recruitment; they are just not as confident in their assessment of their skills as men.

Finally, I consider the part played by the social and economic venues in which people are taught recruitment skills. I demonstrate that it is not simply participating in a union, church, or workplace that endows recruitment capacity. Instead, it is having experiences explicitly related to recruitment and interpersonal skills that are predictive of an increased sense of capacity to recruit and past recruitment activity. Due to its role in the fundamental political act of recruitment, social skills may well deserve a more prominent spot in the civic skills literature.

In the previous chapter, I note that, on average, the most crucial consideration when participants were deciding whether or not to choose the recruitment task was an assessment of their abilities. In the next chapter, I show that this ability is associated with social skills and the experiences that allow people to develop them.

## **7.2 What are Social Skills?**

Social skills are a unique and essential civic skill. Theoretical scholarship suggests these skills allow individuals to intentionally create social capital (Agre 2004). They are akin to charisma, or the “extraordinary and personal gift of grace,” which Weber identified as one of the three forms of political power (1919). Some sociologists describe social skills as the origin of all collective action (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Nevertheless, they are typically left out of the pantheon of civic skills, which tend to favor more technical aspects of communication, such as language fluency, writing

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ability, experience with meetings, and public speaking (Verba et al. 1995). While many forms of engagement would likely benefit from social skills, organizing is unique in its heavy reliance on this ability. Different political acts require different resources and capacities (Verba et al. 1995). The most socially inept curmudgeon can still vote, donate, write an elegant letter, and speak at a town hall, but they will be hard-pressed to move their apathetic neighbors to action.

In its most abstract sense, sociologists Fligstein and McAdam describe social skill as “the ability to empathetically understand situations and what others need and want and to figure out how to use this information to get what you want” (2012, 178). The Occupational Information Network (O\*Net), favored by economists (Deming 2017), has categorized and standardized “occupation-specific descriptors on almost 1,000 occupations” (ONET 2022). This project describes four underlying dimensions of social skills:<sup>3</sup>

1. Coordination: Adjusting actions in relation to others’ actions.
2. Negotiation: Bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences.
3. Persuasion: Persuading others to change their minds or behavior.
4. Social perceptiveness: Being aware of others’ reactions and understanding why they react as they do.

Psychologists have long investigated the concept of social skills or “social intelligence.” The idea was introduced to the field in 1920 as “the ability to understand and manage [people]... to act wisely in human relations” (Thorndike 1920, 140) and is contrasted with “abstract intelligence,” the ability to think creatively and respond effectively to ideas, words, numbers, and symbols. Later multiple intelligences theory reintroduced the idea of “a person’s capacity to understand the intentions, motivations, and desires of other people and, consequently, to work effectively with others” (2000,

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3. O\*Net has added two more dimensions to the concept of social skills: instructing (teaching others how to do something) and service orientation (actively looking for ways to help people). I follow other scholars and reference only the original four dimensions (Deming 2017, 1615).



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43). Social skill has also been viewed as a dimension of “emotional intelligence,” a person’s capability to perceive, express, understand, use, and manage emotions in others (Mayer and Salovey 1997) and “to attune ourselves to or influence the emotions of another person” (Goleman 2001). Ultimately, while the exact name and wording have changed, none of these modern formulations stray too far from Thorndike’s century-old definitions.<sup>4</sup>

I operationalize social skills in two ways in this project. I sometimes provide respondents with a definition of social skills to inform their responses. Occasionally definitions are provided, such as “the ability to get along well with others and get cooperation from others” and the ability to “understand, persuade, and manage people.” I also measure participants’ social skills with the four “Others-Emotions Appraisal” items from the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS) (Law et al. 2004).<sup>5</sup> These questions are designed to capture a person’s sensitivity to and ability to predict the emotional responses of others – the empathetic understanding Fligstein and McAdam described as central to social skills.

### **7.3 Organizing is Widely Perceived as Requiring Social Skills**


In this section, I review people’s perceptions of organizing’s relationship to social skills, particularly in comparison to other political labor. I find that people widely perceive organizing as requiring more social skills than alternative political work.

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4. I interchange the phrase “social skills” with “interpersonal skills,” “social intelligence,” and “interpersonal intelligence” throughout this dissertation. However, the underlying idea concept is the same. Historically, psychologists emphasized skills as learned abilities and intelligences as inherent ones. However, scholars debate the degree to which that type of division is conceptually plausible. For the purposes of this project, I make no such distinction.

5. Appendix I provides the questions exact wording for psychological batteries.

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**Figure 7.1: Dependence of Seven Political Tasks on Social Intelligence.** Social intelligence is measured on a 5-point scale, with 4 indicating the most dependence and 0 indicating the least. Bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. Data comes from a diverse demographically representative sample of the US general population (Panel A), a baseline survey of participants in an organizer training in the US (Panel B), and South African activists recruited through a local civil society organization (Panel C). Samples were limited to those who reported perceptions for all or all but one job/task. The dashed line indicates the mean SI across all jobs/tasks.

I draw on evidence from three surveys:

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- *Survey A* – A diverse sample of 2,788 members of the US general population from August 2019.
- *Survey D* – 126 participants in an organizer training held in the United States from April 2020.
- *Survey F* – 151 South African activists in Johannesburg who I recruited through a local civil society network from September 2020.

In these surveys, I asked respondents to rate the degree to which seven different political jobs or tasks<sup>6</sup> were dependent on “social intelligence.” The exact wording of the question was as follows:

**Social Intelligence Question:** “Different kinds of work require different abilities. Social intelligence is the ability to get along well with others and to get them to cooperate with you. How much social intelligence do you think each of the following jobs require?”<sup>7</sup>

For most jobs and tasks, the assessment of which intelligence they relied upon tended to vary across samples. However, this was not the case for organizing. As shown in Figure 7.1, organizing is consistently perceived to be the most reliant on SI. Among the general population survey, I found that this result is maintained when narrowed to people who correctly identify the strategic aim of organizing (see Appendix M).<sup>8</sup>

Another way to establish that people link recruitment capacity to social skills is to see if there is a correlation between a person’s self-assessed capacity to recruit and their level of SI. The logic is that if people with higher self-assessed social skills believe they are more capable of recruitment, they have an internalized belief that these two factors


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6. In the US general population, I asked respondents about seven jobs done by activists: community organizer, journalist, lawyer, lobbyist, manager, politician, and researcher. Fearing that responses were driven by biases associated with the “jobs” rather than the “work,” for the two activist surveys, I instead asked respondents to compare seven tasks: directly mobilize a community affected by the issue (“organize”), produce media about the issue (“media”), work through the legal system to address the issue (“law”), advocate directly to politicians about the issue (“lobby”), manage an organization focused on the issue (“manage”), run for political office to directly address the issue (“public office”), and research to better understand the issue (“research”).

7. I included this definition translated into Zulu and Sotho for the South African survey.

8. None of the analyses in this section are pre-registered.

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


**Figure 7.2: Association between Social Intelligence and Capacity to Recruit.** Data comes from a diverse sample of the US general population ( $n = 1,652$ ), a survey of participants in an organizer training in the US ( $n = 129$ ), and a survey of South African activists ( $n = 151$ ). Social intelligence was measured using the WLEIS and then standardized to compare across surveys. Capacity is the first component of a principal component analysis from a subset of questions asking how difficult it would be to recruit either friends or strangers for various political acts. For the US surveys, I measured self-assessed capacity to recruit for five political acts. The South Africa survey excluded political donations. The greater this metric, the easier respondents believe it is to recruit. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient of social intelligence in an ordinary least squares model predicting the capacity outcome. Models including controls have filled in points. Samples are differentially colored.

are related. Therefore, I expect to observe that people with higher (lower) social skills believe it is easier (harder) for them to recruit others to take political action. I test this hypothesis on the same three samples. To measure respondents' social skills, I used their average score on a 5-point "Others-Emotions Appraisal" index from the *WLEIS*. I compared respondents' scores on this battery against an index measure of how easy the respondents' believed it would be to persuade people to engage in different political acts. The exact construction of this index varied slightly between contexts, but the result did not. Across contexts and populations, the greater an individual's self-assessed social skills, the easier they thought recruiting would be. However, the size and significance of this association varied slightly.

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In the US diverse sample and the US activist sample, the five political acts evaluated were voting, protesting, attending a meeting, donating, and volunteering. I asked respondents to assess how hard they thought it would be to convince two different populations – friends and strangers – to do these acts. This process created 10 individual measures. I then averaged across these metrics to create an aggregated measure.



**Figure 7.3: Social Intelligence Quartiles, Capacity to Recruit, and Recruitment Activity (US General Population).** Data comes from a diverse sample of the US general population ( $n = 1,652$ ). Social intelligence is measured using the WLEIS and then broken down into quartiles. Capacity is the first component of a principal component analysis from 10 indicators of the ease of recruiting friends and strangers for five different political acts. The greater this metric, the easier respondents believe it is to recruit. Recruitment frequency indicates how often respondents report having recruited in the last year on a 5-point Likert. Higher scores indicate more frequent recruitment activity. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

In OLS regressions of data from both of these samples, the higher someone’s SI, the easier, on average, they indicated it would be to convince others to participate in politics.<sup>9</sup> As shown in Figure 7.2, the relationship was substantial in both cases: a one

9. Regression tables for this chapter are available in Appendix M.

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standard deviation increase in SI was associated with a 0.17 (0.12, 0.22) standard deviation increase in capacity among the general population and a 0.36 (0.09, 0.63) increase among the activist sample.<sup>10</sup> The inclusion of basic controls<sup>11</sup> mildly attenuated but did not change the direction or, in most cases, the significance of the relationship.<sup>12</sup>

In South Africa, I asked about only four political acts (leaving out donations) and only for strangers. I chose to leave out donations because of the likelihood that the low socioeconomic status of the community these individuals worked with would make this measure too invariable to assess variation. I focused only on strangers to save survey space by avoiding redundancy. The two previous studies (US diverse and US activists) showed only a mild difference between these two types of targets. Moreover, in both cases, strangers had a weaker association with SI, making strangers the more demanding test.

The association, in this case, was not significant at traditional levels. However, the direction of the association aligned with expectations: a one standard deviation increase in SI was associated with a 0.10 ( -0.6, 0.26) standard deviation increase in self-assessed capacity. The lack of significance may be, in part, the result of the small sample size ( $n = 151$ ).

The association between SI and capacity does not appear linear in the US general population. As visible in the left panel of Figure 7.3, there is no notable difference between being in the first or second quantile of SI. The significant steps are from the second to the third and particularly from the third to the fourth quantile. This finding implies a threshold effect. Regardless of how far below average a person's

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
10. I used standardized estimates for two reasons. First, they improve comprehension for the reader. A one-point increase on an unfamiliar scale is challenging to interpret. Second, unfortunately, the Likert scales on some surveys are 1-5 and on others are 1-7.

11. Age, gender, race (White/non-White), education, and party. The exact formulation of these variables differs slightly between studies. In the South African sample, I substitute for party identification two measures: whether they identify with a party at all and whether they are a member of the African National Congress (ANC).

12. Separate aggregations of friends and strangers performed similarly, though people tended to believe it less challenging to persuade their friends. In the case of the US activists ( $n = 126$ ), the model of just strangers is not statistically significant at conventional levels ( $p = 0.097$ ).

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social skills are, the degree to which they think themselves incapable of recruitment remains consistently high. However, I observe no such threshold among the US (left panel of Figure 7.4) or the South African activists (see Appendix M. The principal distinction between these two groups and the general population is that they have already committed to political action.



**Figure 7.4: Social Intelligence Quartiles, Capacity to Recruit, and Recruitment Activity (US Activists).** Data comes from a survey of US organizer training participants ( $n = 129$ ). Social intelligence is measured using the WLEIS and then broken down into quartiles. Capacity is the first component of a principal component analysis from 10 indicators of the ease of recruiting friends and strangers for five different political acts. The greater this metric, the easier respondents believe it is to recruit. Recruitment frequency indicates how often respondents report having ever recruited on a 5-point Likert. Higher scores indicate more frequent recruitment activity. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.

Acknowledging a descriptive association between social skills and feelings of capacity, the question is whether this increased capacity translates into a greater tendency to recruit. As visible in the right panels of both Figure 7.3 and 7.4, the relationship between SI and frequency of recruitment activity<sup>13</sup> is nearly identical to that observed

13. The outcome measure between the two surveys was slightly different. For the general population,

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between SI and capacity. Estimates from OLS models, with and without demographic controls, show a statistically significant relationship between SI and the frequency of recruitment asks, both for the US general population and American activists.<sup>14</sup> The point estimates with and without controls were even larger and still significant. This result is perhaps unsurprising: the pairwise correlations between the capacity and recruitment frequency measures are 0.45 in the US general population and 0.56 among those in the organizer training.

This relationship may be the result of strategic thinking or an emotional response. Even if organizing is the most important thing, someone who is a poor organizer but good at another task might reasonably think they will achieve more by doing that alternative task even if they believe organizing is most important. Alternatively, it may be due to differences in how people experience engaging in tasks for which they feel competent or incompetent. Put simply, people like to do things they are good at more than things they are not. When people feel skilled at an activity, their experience tends to be one of control or flow. At worst, it is a feeling of boredom if the activity is too easy. However, when people feel inept, their emotions tend towards anxiety, worry, and, at best, apathy (Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura 2014). A sense of self-efficacy is (part of) why people in “politically impinged” fields – such as law or political science – are more likely to engage in political activities. People seek catharsis in their avocations, which comes from doing things they are good at (Hersh 2020a; Super and Kitson 1940).

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it was as follows:

“About how often, if ever, have you asked someone to get involved in a political activity? Examples include asking someone to vote, attend a protest or political meeting, donate to a campaign or cause, or volunteer for a campaign or cause.” (1) Never, (2) Rarely, (3) Sometimes, (4) Often, (5) Very Often.


While a shorter time frame was added for those in the organizer training, as I anticipated that they would have a higher baseline rate of recruitment:

“In the last year, about how often, if ever, have you asked someone to get involved in a political activity? Examples include asking someone to vote, to attend a protest or political meeting, to donate to a campaign or cause, or to volunteer for a campaign or cause.” (1) Never, (2) Once or Twice, (3) Occasionally, (4) Often, (5) Very Often.

14. Unfortunately, I asked no equivalent question of the South African sample.



## 7.4 The Effect of Telling People They Have Above-Average Social Intelligence



**Figure 7.5: Social Intelligence Experiment I.** Participants were evaluated for their level of “social intelligence” using a five-question battery. Those who scored above average were randomly told that they scored above average (treatment) or were not told (control). Those that scored below average were either told that they did so (treatment) or not (control). This experiment was on *Survey A*. The outcome is the first component of a principal component analysis of how difficult they would find persuading a friend or a stranger to do five different political acts (10 total measures). The population is a diverse sample of the US population ( $n = 1,642$ ). Estimates include 95% confidence intervals.

The entirety of the evidence described above constitutes descriptive associations. Those who report greater SI also report a greater capacity to recruit and to have recruited. The next step is to establish whether this relationship is causal. I therefore need to evaluate whether increasing people’s social skills cause them to self-assess as having a greater ability to recruit. Unfortunately, while teaching people social skills is possible, doing so in an experimental setting with a limited time frame is difficult. It is substantially easier to shift people’s *perceptions* of their social skills, at least temporarily. As part of the US general population survey discussed in the

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previous section (*Survey A*), I embedded an experiment in which I randomly told respondents if their SI score was above or below average. In this way, I temporarily affected their perceptions of their social skills. I then tested if their assessment of their capacity to recruit was affected by this treatment. The exact wording of the positive treatment was as follows:

Based on your answers to the previous questions, you have **ABOVE AVERAGE SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE**. This indicates that, compared to others, you are MORE able to understand, persuade, and manage people.

When I told participants who scored above average<sup>15</sup> that they did so, this substantially increased their self-assessed capacity to persuade friends and strangers to participate in politics, as is visible in Figure 7.5. The effect of being informed of high SI (compared to scoring high and not being told) is both statistically significant and substantively significant, causing an increase of roughly a quarter of a standard deviation ( $p < 0.001$ ).<sup>16</sup> This result is consistent with a world in which the capacity to do the work of organizing – asking others to engage in politics – is widely perceived as dependent on SI. Interestingly, I did not find evidence of the reverse: Telling people they had below-average SI did not negatively affect their perceptions of their ability to recruit. This finding implies a negative bias of people’s priors about their own social skills (discussed in more detail in the next section).

I then replicated this experiment with the South African activists (*Survey F*). I again randomly told respondents with an above-average SI score that they had scored above average.<sup>17</sup> For this version, I left off the “negative” treatment of a person being

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
15. I based “average” on a previous study (Law et al. 2004). However, participants in this survey scored higher on average than in previous research. As a result, 86% of respondents were considered “above average.”

16. Importantly, this is an assessment of respondents’ *attitudes* towards their capacity when completing the survey. From this data, it is impossible to assert that this would reflect an actual change in behavior, but it is indicative of the claimed relationship between SI and capacity.

17. Since no pre-existing study used the *WLEIS* to evaluate social skills in South Africa, the average, in this case, was based on a pilot of 10 respondents. However, this group appears to have had a substantially lower average SI score than the overall sample, as 63% of respondents scored above that average.

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told they have below-average social skills.<sup>18</sup> The result – as can be seen in the left panel of Figure 7.6 – was even larger, increasing the self-assessed capacity metric by half a standard deviation ( $p = 0.02$ ).



**Figure 7.6: All Social Intelligence Experiments.** Participants were evaluated for their level of “social intelligence” using a five-question battery. Those who scored above average were randomly told that they scored above average (treatment) or were not told (control). This experiment was conducted on two diverse samples of the US general population (*Surveys A and G*) and a sample of South African activists (*Survey F*). The outcome is the first component of a principal component analysis of how difficult they would find it to persuade a friend (*Surveys A and G*) or a stranger (all surveys) to various political acts. The sample sizes are 1,652, 151, and 1,532 for surveys A, F, and G, respectively. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for the estimated treatment effect for each study.

However, due to two considerations, I replicated the study a third time on a new diverse US sample in *Survey G* (October 2020). In both studies mentioned above, more than half of the respondents scored higher than the anticipated average. Indeed,

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18. When there was a plausible treatment effect from the negative variation, evaluating its impact was ethical as it furthered our understanding of the world. However, due to the findings from the earlier study, I expected no treatment effect. As a result, I considered even the minor harm of temporarily affecting someone’s evaluation of their social skills too great, given the low probability of gaining new information from such an experiment.

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86% were “above average” in the first US study compared to the estimate taken from the literature. The implication is that the treatment may only work on those who do not have an above-average level of SI. Therefore, a replication of the experiment with a more accurate break-up of the sample is worth pursuing.

Second, perhaps more importantly, neither of the previous two studies included a pre-analysis plan. I, therefore, replicated the experiment a third time on a new diverse US sample in *Survey G* (October 2020), this time stating ahead of time the anticipated effect.<sup>19</sup> The result was nearly identical to the first study: a quarter standard deviation increase in self-assessed capacity. Overall, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that social skills inform people’s assessment of their ability to recruit.

### 7.5 Gender, Social Skills, and Organizing

The existing literature has consistently demonstrated that women are better organizers than men (Verba et al. 1995; Carpenter and Moore 2014; Reed 1989; Skocpol 2003; Gose and Skocpol 2019). This finding is perhaps because women on average have more developed social skills (Gustavsen 2017; Petrides and Furnham 2000; Martinez-Marin et al. 2020; Petrides and Furnham 2000; Gomes and Pereira 2014; Martinez-Marin et al. 2020). However, this capacity is not translating into action as the results discussed earlier would predict. According to WVS data, across 57 countries, men are roughly 36.8% more likely than women to report having encouraged others to participate in politics.<sup>20</sup> However, when forced to select a task, as they were in the task choice experiment from the last chapter, women are 5.0 (1.0, 9.9) percentage points more likely to choose to recruit than men are.

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19. This pre-analysis plan is available in Appendix F.

20. In 50 out of 57 countries included in Wave 7 of the WVS, women recruited others at a lower rate than men (weighted mean). Five of the remaining seven are near parity only because less than 5% of either gender recruits. If no one does an activity, it is mechanically easier to achieve gender equality. The remaining two are Chile (7.8% of men, 9.9% of women) and New Zealand (26.3% of men, 28.6% of women).

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
Digging into my original surveys, these overall lower recruitment levels by women appear to be because underlying social skills are not translating into increased self-assessments of recruitment capacity by women at the same rate as they are for men. Further analysis of the survey experiment from the previous section indicates this inconsistency may be because women systematically lack confidence in their social abilities. In other words, despite women scoring higher on evaluations of social skills than men on average, these abilities do not result in greater reported recruitment capacity and activity. Indeed, I find nearly no association between social skills and self-assessed recruitment capacity among women. However, when women receive outside validation of their social skills, the association between their skills and their reported recruitment capacity becomes comparable to men's.

As mentioned, the existing scholarship has regularly found that women are better organizers across contexts. In their seminal 1995 work on civic engagement, Verba et al. found that women were better than men at recruiting people of either gender (1995). In a study of the US abolitionist movement of the mid-19th century, Carpenter and Moore (2014) found that women were more effective at collecting petition signatures. A 1989 study found that women outperformed men when recruiting for union drives (Reed 1989). In her history of American associational life, Theda Skocpol emphasizes the critical role of women with the “skills to make connections within and across places” (2003). Finally, women have dominated the organizing of the anti-Trump “resistance” (Gose and Skocpol 2019). Yet, despite this consistent pattern, no scholarship has directly established the theoretical origins of this repeated trans-historical gender gap.

If the arguments of the previous section hold, it may be that the reason scholars have regularly found women to be on average better organizers is gender differences in the socialization of interpersonal skills. Research has repeatedly shown that women score higher than men on psychometric (Gustavsen 2017; Petrides and Furnham 2000; Martinez-Marin et al. 2020), self-assessed (Petrides and Furnham 2000), and professional evaluations of social skills (Gomes and Pereira 2014; Martinez-Marin

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et al. 2020). I find this exact correlation in my data. As visible in the left panel of Figure 7.7, across all four of the studies referenced in this chapter, women reported higher SI – though the difference between the genders was not statistically significant in the smaller samples of activists.



**Figure 7.7: Gender, Social Intelligence, and Recruitment.** Left panel – association between identifying as female and social intelligence. Right panel – association between identifying as female and self-assessed organizing capacity. Estimates from bivariate OLS models. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

For my purposes, it is sufficient that this is a consistent empirical pattern, as I am more concerned with the implications of this gender difference than its cause. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that acknowledging this pattern is in no way affirming an essentialist view of its origins. Rather, I suspect this association originates from social biases which consider the “communal dimension” a component of the “stereotypically feminine role” (Martinez-Marin et al. 2020). During childhood and adolescence, individuals identify and internalize the kinds of behavior expected from

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their gendered self-concept. Furthermore, parents, teachers, and peers systematically cultivate these norms in young men and women. As a result, the ways that individuals then relate to others, and the capacities they develop to do so, will be shaped by the gendered expectations of their environment (Martinez-Marin et al. 2020).

Returning to my findings, given the results of the previous sections, one would expect women to view themselves as having a greater capacity to recruit, given their higher average scores on social intelligence batteries. However, that does not seem to be the case. Across all four studies, there is no relationship between gender and self-assessment of recruitment capacity (right panel of Figure 7.7). This lower evaluation of capacity corresponds to an overall lower level of reported recruitment activity.

Focusing on the US general population (*Survey A*), I find a weaker association among women than men between SI and both capacity to recruit and recruitment behavior. Higher SI is still associated with a greater self-professed capacity to recruit for both genders. However, the magnitude of the association for women (0.09,  $p = 0.004$ ) is half that of men (0.21,  $p < 0.001$ ). The differences by gender are even more notable for past organizing behavior. While a one standard deviation increase in SI scores is associated with a 0.18 (0.12, 0.24) point rise in past recruitment frequency for men, for women, the association is not distinguishable from zero (-0.02, 0.10).

I have proposed a causal chain connecting social skills and recruitment activity, mediated by self-assessed recruitment capacity. This pattern seems to be what is happening for men. But, for women, a link in this chain is broken. It might be that the capacity to persuade is not translating into activity due to other limiting factors – such as fears for safety or social norms. However, the association between capacity and activity is large, similar, and significant for men and women. For men, a one standard deviation increase in capacity is associated with a 0.46 (0.40, 0.52) increase in standardized recruitment frequency. That association is nearly identical for women at 0.44 (0.37, 0.50).

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The question, therefore, arises of why social skills are not translating into perceived ability. One option is that social skills do not matter for women. However, if that were the case, the treatment effects observed in the previous section from telling people they have social skills should evaporate when the sample is limited to women. Instead, I observed no notable difference between genders in the impact of the SI treatment on perceptions of capacity. Pooling US surveys *A* and *G*,<sup>21</sup> I estimate that the effect size of the treatment is 0.28 (0.17, 0.39) standard deviations for women and 0.23 (0.10, 0.35) for men. If anything, the experimental evidence indicates that the SI treatment is even more efficacious for women.

What is different, however, is how the treatment relates to underlying SI. As the left panel of Figure 7.8 shows, for men, the relationship between SI and capacity is roughly equivalent and positive in both the treatment and the control group. On the other hand, there is no correlation among women in the control group between their SI score and self-reported capacity to persuade. Yet, when I tell women they scored above average, I observe an association even greater than that observed for men. This same pattern is visible in the LOESS regressions in the right panel. For women not told they had above-average SI, their perceptions of their capacity were below average and unaffected by their underlying SI. At the same time, the control men show a steady increase in capacity assessments as social skills rise.


For men, the treatment behaves unsurprisingly. Near the average, it boosts a sense of capacity to a steady level. At high levels of SI, the treatment shifts the intercept but not the slope of the line. This result implies that the treatment directly affects male respondents' efficacy and that effect is largely independent of their degree of social skills.

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21. I limit both samples to only those with an above average SI score. This is because only those respondents were eligible for treatment on *Survey G*.



## 7. The Role of Social Skills in Organizing



**Figure 7.8: The Impact of SI Treatment on the Relationship between Social Intelligence and Recruitment by Gender.** The association of social intelligence scores and self-assessed capacity to recruit by gender and treatment status. The left panel indicates the standardized coefficient for each subgroup. The right indicates a LOESS regression with a span of 2 for each condition. Data comes from surveys A and G. For the left panel, data is limited to those potentially treated with the “above-average” social skills treatment in both groups ( $n = 2,280$ ). For the right, untreated respondents below average were also included ( $n = 3,073$ ).

For women, however, the relationship is far more interesting. It is not the same type of direct effect as visible among men. Instead, when I told women that they have above-average SI, it caused the relationship between their genuine skills and their sense of recruitment to look like that observed among the men in the control group. This pattern, remaining low when social skills are near the mean and then steadily rising as social skills increase, implies that it is not the direct effect of the treatment causing the increased sense of efficacy. Instead, it more plausibly signifies that the treatment is allowing underlying SI to have the type of effect it does for men. Given that women near the mean had far less of a treatment effect further signifies that women are aware of their skills and those skills’ relationship with recruitment. However, without the external affirmation of these skills, they lack confidence in their positive self-appraisal and the capacities it endows.<sup>22</sup>

22. An plausible alternative explanation is that women are simply expressing greater humility rather than a lack of confidence. The difference between this interpretation and that put forward above is

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It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why this is the case. Nevertheless, the key takeaway from these results is that considerable organizing talent is potentially being left underutilized. And, given that organizing is an effective way to amplify one's voice, this potential bias in self-assessments of recruitment capacity may have implications for which voices are heard in the political arena. Moreover, the experimental results imply that affirming women's social skills may be an effective way to empower this community to translate their existing talent into action. This is especially true given that the best-established literature, noted at the beginning of this section, indicates that women may be disproportionately effective organizers.

It is worth noting that the origin of this empirical difference in recruitment capacity deserves additional attention in its own right. While the evidence presented here is consistent with the theory that the origin of this differential ability is the gendered socialization of interpersonal skills, the results were certainly not definitive. It is important for future research to further solidify our understanding of the causes of this phenomenon. Indeed, a more systematic explanation of why there appears to be a gender bias in organizing ability might facilitate interventions to develop the recruitment capacity of both men and women.

## **7.6 Civil Society and Social Skills**

The idea that people's skills shape their interactions with politics is not new. It is a core tenant of the civic volunteerism model (CVM), which proposes that the skills people develop in school, work, and civil society shape political participation by influencing what capable feel capable of doing (Verba et al. 1995). However, the skills included in that model tend towards the "technical." For example, even when considering the more interpersonal act of communication, this model centers on items such as language

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that, in the case of humility, we might still expect greater social skills to translate into increased recruitment activity. Unfortunately, that is not distinguishable in the current data, and therefore future research should pursue disentangling these two interpretations.

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fluency, writing ability, meeting experience, and public speaking (Verba et al. 1995).<sup>23</sup> The question then becomes whether those same institutions teaching traditional civic skills also empower people with the capacity to recruit. I present preliminary evidence that they do, but with a significant caveat. This association only exists when these institutions engage people in relational tasks.

As part of *Survey A*, in addition to the questions about the frequency of political recruitment and persuasion capacity, I asked participants about their civic experiences. In particular, I asked about the three venues of civic education outside of school.

1. Religiosity: How often they attended religious services.
2. Union background: Whether they are currently or had ever been a union member.
3. Employed: Whether they are currently employed.

Modeling the relationships between these measures and the two key outcomes shows that all three measures were positively associated with capacity and political recruitment.<sup>24</sup> As visible in the red bars in Figure 7.9, this association is significant or near significant for both outcomes. I further asked participants about the relational components of their experiences in these spaces:

1. Missionary experience: How frequently, if ever, participants engaged in missionary activity.
2. Unions organizing: How frequently, if ever, participants engaged in union organizing activity.
3. Job persuasion: Whether their job frequently requires them to persuade others or bring people together.

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
23. This may be for practical rather than theoretical reasons. Social skills are more challenging to measure than technical skills. While informative, the self-reported scales used in this project fall short of the “objective” quantification common with other types of abilities. This problem of “rationalization” is discussed further in the following chapter.

24. Models include controls for age, gender, race, income, education, and political party.

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Including these variables in the models, as visible in the green bars, caused the previous indicators for participation in civic spaces to become far less substantively and statistically significant. However, the newly added measures of engagement in interpersonal tasks in these spaces are substantial.

Selection effects may be driving these associations. Indeed, I expect that more social people will be more likely to engage in civic spaces, more likely to engage in interpersonal tasks within those spaces, and – as established above – more likely to engage in recruitment. As a result, these results are not conclusive evidence of the causal effect of these civic experiences.



**Figure 7.9: Civic Experience and Political Recruitment Activity.** Data from Survey A ( $n = 1,652$ ). Outcomes are a 10-question index of capacity to persuade others to take political action and a Likert measure of the frequency of past recruitment activity. The red bars are estimates from a model that includes membership in civic spaces (religious, union, and workplace) alone. The green bars are estimates from a model that includes membership in these spaces and the amount of interpersonal work done (missionary, organizing, and persuasive tasks). Both models are OLS and include age, gender, race, income, education, and political party controls. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

This limitation does not mean that these correlations are not meaningful. Given the existing scholarship on the importance of the venues of civic education for political participation, the prior expectation from the literature is that their *should* be a relationship between political recruitment and organization membership (red bars). What is notable is the irrelevance of these factors when controlling for the interpersonal

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experiences they encourage. The CVM establishes that the skills and resources gained from civic engagement are contingent on the properties of the act. The evidence presented here helps to establish the nature of that relationship for recruitment.

### **7.7 Social Skills as a Social Investment**

Scholars have already demonstrated that having greater social skills improves many diverse aspects of life. Programs that teach these skills substantially improve overall academic achievement (Durlak et al. 2011). These skills lead to a greater sense of community and personal well-being (Demir et al. 2012). When empowered with interpersonal intelligence, people are less likely to commit crimes (Losel and Bender 2012) or develop a drug addiction (Pozveh and Saleh 2020). Yet, as discussed in the next section, social skills have been traditionally devalued. For example, over the last few decades, the teaching of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) has tended to dominate the curricular concerns of policymakers across the globe – often at the expense of social and civic education (Millar 2020).

That trend is beginning to change as evidence is mounting of the value of social skills in the marketplace, though typically only as a complement to analytical skills (Deming 2017; Blair and Deming 2020; Hansen et al. 2021; WEF 2016). Given the evidence from the previous section on civic skills, developing these skills in and for the workplace may positively affect political recruitment. Moreover, given evidence that social and emotional skills can be taught (Clarke et al. 2021; Durlak et al. 2011), economically motivated policy attention to social skills may mean that the education system better equips the next generation with this essential capacity. That would be a boon, not just for the economy or individual well-being but also for democracy.

Yet, for half the population, getting the skills might not be enough. For women, I found SI to be a far weaker predictor of both capacity to recruit and of reported recruitment activity. The experimental results indicate that this does not appear to be because SI does not relate to a sense of capacity for women or that women

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do not know their level of SI. Instead, it seems that women may be socialized not to trust their evaluations of their social skills enough to feel confident in tasks that require them. Given women's pre-existing tendency to have more developed social skills than men, an effective means of creating more organizing activity would be for organizations to invest in women.

“Organizing is seen as unscientific, it falls in the same category as witchcraft.”



## The Social Valuation of Organizing

### 8.1 How Perceptions of Relational Labor Cascade to Perceptions of Organizing

One of the things that became apparent during the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic was how disconnected a job being considered “essential” was from the socioeconomic value placed on a job. The *Urbane Institute* estimates that 72% of those doing essential jobs that exposed them to the pandemic made less than the mean income (Dubay et al. 2020). Society collectively considering work to be critical does not mean it will be concomitantly rewarded. When that happens, people – especially those with other opportunities – will be less willing to do that work. In this chapter, I discuss organizing as one of these undervalued jobs and identify patterns emerging from organizing’s social quality, which shape perceptions of that work and people’s willingness to do it.

After a brief theoretical discussion in Section 8.1.1, I return to my two samples of activists and another US general population survey (*Survey C*). Across contexts and populations, I find that, compared to seven political jobs, people see organizing as having one of the lowest social statuses. To explain this, I refer to the finding from the previous chapter that organizing is highly dependent on social skills. It is also relatively

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dependent on social skills. Looking at skills in comparative terms is important because of a general phenomenon in the labor market that relative dependence on social skills is associated with lower pay. I demonstrate that for political jobs, this same pattern holds. The more a job depends on social abilities over “abstract” ones, the lower that job’s predicted status and the fewer people expected to be willing to do it.

To establish if this relationship is causal, I conducted four experiments, which I describe in detail in Section 8.3. As part of these experiments, I provided respondents with a job description for an organizer position and asked them to assess various qualities of the job, including its relative skill, pay, status, and how willing they would be to do the job. To estimate the causal association of the work’s underlying skills and these qualities, I randomly varied the degree to which the job was associated with qualifications emphasizing “social skills” or “cognitive skills.”

In section 8.4, I show that the more a job is described as dependent on one’s social capacity, as opposed to cognitive abilities, the lower respondents’ assessments of the job’s “skill” level and the pay they expect it to have. However, surprisingly, this does not cleanly translate into perceptions of the work’s status or participants’ willingness to be employed in the task. Throughout the remainder of the chapter, I show that this inconsistent association is due to substantial heterogeneity in how people relate to relational work. Specifically, I explore three qualities that condition this causal connection: capacity, class, and political engagement.

As discussed in the previous chapter, people’s preferences for organizing depend on their underlying social intelligence and the translation of that ability into a sense of competency with the work. A mediation analysis, described in section 8.5, shows that the indirect effect of the social skills treatment on willingness through skill and pay is negative as expected. However, the treatment is not translating into an overall drop in willingness to organize because it is concurrently augmenting people’s view of their capacity to engage in the work. I further show substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effect by people’s underlying social intelligence. As expected, given



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the results of the previous chapter, those with low social intelligence scores are less willing to do the organizing job when it is described as more social. The reverse is true for those with high levels of social skills.

Section 8.6 shows a class element to this process, describing how those with a higher socioeconomic position are more reticent to engage in work viewed as unskilled. Descriptive evidence shows that people's willingness to do tasks dependent on social skills declines as incomes rise. To get more purchase on the role of socioeconomic position, I repeat the mediation analysis from the previous section but separate those with incomes above the median from those below. The effect on a sense of being qualified is roughly equivalent among these two groups. However, for those in the bottom half of the income spectrum, willingness is functionally independent of perceptions of skill and pay.

Conversely, the indirect effect of skill and pay on willingness to be an organizer was far more substantial among those with above-average incomes. This result is driven by the much more significant role of skill and pay in this group's decision-making. The implication is that, while the total effect of the treatment for below-average income respondents was positive, it was negative for those with incomes above the median. The unwillingness of the wealthier to organize due to its social quality is particularly troubling given their higher overall levels of engagement.

My first three experiments used as an outcome people's stated willingness to organize. However, as noted in Chapter 5, it is valuable to put organizing in direct contrast to other work. To this effect, my fourth experiment asked respondents their preference between two political jobs based on their job descriptions, one of which was organizing. Again, in this experiment, I varied whether organizing was associated with social or cognitive skills. The overall result of this study described in Section 8.7 is null: when head-to-head with another political job, people, on average, did not care whether the job was more social or more cognitive.

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However, there is significant heterogeneity. Specifically, among those respondents who report that they are currently doing work for or are willing to consider doing work for an advocacy organization,<sup>1</sup> I observe a strong and significant negative association between the treatment and preferences for the organizing job. Conversely, the population driving the countervailing positive effect is strong Democrats with no experience with or intention to engage in advocacy. This group is more willing to organize when it involves more interpersonal activities. The result may be due to this experiment's hypothetical quality, allowing people to report what they ideologically consider essential rather than what they would do under real-life circumstances. This process may be shaped by organizing's recent rise in the popular imagination. Further study is required to establish whether the study's findings indicate an unrealized latent preference or a misrepresentation stemming from praxis-free ideology.

At the 2008 Republican National Convention, Sarah Palin and Rudy Giuliani attacked soon-to-be President Obama for his lack of political credentials. In particular, they lambasted his years working as a community organizer. Palin mocked, "I guess a small-town mayor is sort of like a community organizer – except that you have actual responsibilities" (quoted in Baumann 2008). Giuliani used community organizing as a punch line: "...a resume from a gifted man, with an Ivy league education, he worked as a community organizer [audience starts to laugh]. What? [Giuliani giggles, crowd chants "zero"] Okay, okay, maybe this is the first problem on the resume" (Giuliani 2008). The "joke" only landed because it resonated. The results discussed in this chapter help explain the historically low esteem given to organizing and how it affects the overall supply of political recruitment.

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1. These are people who have "worked or volunteered for a group advocating around a political or social issue" either full-time or part-time and people who would "ever consider" doing so.

### 8.1.1 **Social Skills Lack Legibility Resulting in Decreased Socioeconomic Value**


While it is sufficient for this project that the anticipated relationships exist empirically, it is worth considering why I expect that organizing – and work disproportionately reliant on relation labor in general – will be viewed by the general public as lower-skilled and lower-paid. The key insight is that the degree to which people perceive a job as “skilled” is not intrinsically a function of its difficulty, rarity, or productivity. While there is an objective component to skill, skill is also a socially constructed phenomenon, biased in its attribution by context and power (Chang 2011). In a quintessential example, many forms of industrial work only began to be considered “skilled labor” after achieving collective power through unionization (Turner 2022, [1962]).

Skill’s quality of being socially constructed interacts with the fact that social skills, in particular, are not easily measured (Thorndike et al. 1926; Ainley 1993; Zhou 2017). Organizing has not gone through the same type of “rationalization” that turned astrology into astronomy and alchemy into chemistry. As one organizer put it, this lack of legibility results in “Organizing is seen as unscientific; it falls in the same category as witchcraft.” A standardized test cannot effectively capture the ability to manage social interactions. The implication, institutions have difficulty making them legible and accredited.

If a skill cannot be accredited, it cannot be easily signaled on a resume, and, more importantly, the wealthy cannot buy it in the formal education system. Given economic biases in education, this functions to make social skills comparatively uncorrelated with existing material power in society. The less a skill is the purview of the already powerful, the less it is valued in the economy. This process can help to explain why having social skills is widely understood as valuable but is only rewarded in the marketplace when accompanying traditional skills (Deming 2017; Blair and Deming 2020; Hansen et al. 2021). As shown in Figure 8.1, jobs relying on social skills are only rewarded in the labor market if they also demand the types

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of cognitive skills formalized into the education system.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, when cognitive skills do not complement them, increased dependence on social skills is correlated with less remuneration.



**Figure 8.1: Median Income by Reliance on Social Skills, Conditional on Cognitive Skills.** The unit of analysis is occupations, weighted by employment rate. The median income and employment rate are taken from 2020 estimates provided by *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. Measures of skill dependence are taken from the *Occupational Information Network 2020* release. Social skills are an aggregation of four traditional social skills. The cognitive skills (“ACT”) is an aggregation of five cognitive skills commonly used in US standardized testing (reading, writing, speaking, math, and science).

This process creates an equilibrium that is not easily remedied, even among mission-oriented organizations or ideologically-motivated employees. Since the privileged have increased exit options due to broader access to resources and opportunities, for organizations to recruit people with the skills concentrated among these more privileged

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2. These skills, which I collectively refer to as *ACT*, are science, writing, mathematics, reading comprehension, and speaking. These are the skills commonly found on the standardized tests for acceptance into US colleges.

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actors will require increased compensation. There is, therefore, a self-reinforcing sociological process: the skills that high-status people have are high status, and having high-status skills makes one high status. As demonstrated in the remainder of the chapter, the overall impact is that the relational labor of organizing is considered a low-skill, low-pay task. This base condition is despite the goal of organizing being highly valued and the work being difficult to do well.

In this section, I chose to focus on the social construction of skill in theorizing about the relative devaluing of organizing, as opposed to alternative theoretical processes. I chose to focus on this aspect because that is the underlying theory with which my evidence is most consistent. However, at least two other processes are likely also at work. First, the literature would expect the social standing of organizing to be affected by how relational skills and labor are normatively “gendered” (e.g., Touhey 1974; Bose and Rossi 1983; Baunach 2002; Valentino 2019). Since relational work is widely understood to be more feminine, patriarchal social norms are likely to translate these perceptions into less social standing and remuneration.

Second, one might expect that the social status of the target that organizing requires activists to socialize with may affect the task’s status. It follows that work more likely to place respondents in high-status spaces would be more high-status itself. In an experiment attempting to test this proposition, I was unable to recover a statistically significant effect. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out either of these alternatives. Indeed, I expect both are at work, and additional research is required to tease out which of these three processes is most impactful in affecting the decision to organize.

## **8.2 Comparing Organizing to Other Political Jobs**

I returned from my interviews in the late fall of 2019 with a comment from one of my interviews ringing in my ears: “people without degrees are organizers, and people with degrees are researchers.” This young radical described how in the civic spaces he occupied, despite organizing being widely understood as essential, organizers were not

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respected as much as advocates engaged in other political work. Inspired by this idea, I launched a survey that December (*Survey C*,  $n = 2,788$ ), asking a diverse quota-based sample of American respondents to evaluate various qualities of seven political jobs, including organizing.<sup>3</sup> I then repeated a variation of these questions with activists in the US (*Survey D*,  $n = 126$ ) and South Africa (*Survey F*,  $n = 151$ ).

The results of these studies substantiated what that South African activist had intuited: people see organizing as low status. The analysis described in this section further shows that this is likely connected to organizing's relative reliance on social skills. I find that people widely perceive organizing as having a lower social status than alternative political work. Moreover, they also see organizing as requiring more social skills compared to cognitive skills than alternative political work. I suspect that these two facts are connected because the more a job is seen as relatively reliant on social skills, compared to cognitive skills, the lower its anticipated status and the less willing people are to take that job.

For this evaluation, I asked respondents to rate the qualities of the following seven jobs/tasks:<sup>4</sup>

- Community Organizer - Mobilizing the community affected by the issue
- Journalist - Seeking media attention about the issue
- Lawyer - Fighting through the legal system to address the issue
- Lobbyist - Directly contacting politicians about the issue

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3. Recalling the discussion from Chapter 3, it is essential to note that this diverse sample cannot be thought of as representative (Yang and Banamah 2014). However, these types of samples do perform well when considering relationships and associations. Therefore, while these point estimates should not be taken as an unbiased approximation of the true population means, the patterns and associations observed can still be highly informative (Baker et al. 2013).

4. In the US General Population studies, respondents were asked about the job by name, while in the activist studies, they were asked about the job by function. This change stemmed from two related observations. First, only roughly half of respondents in the general population study (48%) could correctly identify what constituted the work of an organizer, defined as selecting “mobilize a community affected by an issue” on a five-question multiple choice. Second, while people generally feel pretty neutral about what a lobbyist does, they are very hostile to the term lobbyist. These seven job/tasks were:

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- Manager - Managing a non-profit organization focused on the issue
- Politician - Running for political office to directly address the issue
- Researcher - Researching to better understand the issue

I frame organizing as a job in this chapter, rather than the act of recruiting as I treated it in previous chapters, to better incorporate people's understandings of the work's social position. I specifically asked respondents to evaluate the "social status," clarified as "prestige," of these activities.<sup>5</sup> As visible in Figure 8.2, organizing had one of, if not the, lowest associated social statuses across the studies. This is despite organizing being often considered a priority.<sup>6</sup>

My evidence indicates that this mismatch may be driven, in part, by organizing's relative reliance on social skills as opposed to more technical skills. As Figure 8.3 shows, across all three populations, participants consistently viewed organizing as having the largest distance between the required level of social intelligence necessary for the task and the task's demand for abstract intelligence. This gap implies the possibility that biases associated with organizing's social skill-heavy tasks will likely impact the way that organizing is perceived.

Specifically, given the association observed in the US labor market and predictions from the existing literature in the previous section, organizing's dependence on social skills is likely to be translating into its relatively low status, pushing people away from this activity. The left panel of figure 8.4 shows a consistent negative relationship between a task's skill demand and its perceived status across samples.<sup>7</sup> This relation-


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5. 5-point Likert response to "What social status do you think each of the following jobs have? In other words, what is the prestige of the job compared to other jobs?"

6. For example, organizing was considered the third most important task in the US General Population, where organizing had the lowest status.

7. The associations shown in Figure 8.4 are bivariate correlations across a pooling of all tasks. If I further include individual and task fixed effects, as well as robust standard errors, the association for status is statistically significant at conventional levels across samples. For status, this more complex model does not change the magnitude noticeably. Among both activist samples, the model increases estimated magnitudes, while for the general population, it somewhat decreases it. However, using this more complex model for the willingness outcome, only the US general population survey result remains significant, and all magnitudes decrease by a third or more. It is worth recalling that the activist samples, as discussed in Chapter 3, were specifically selected for their existing proximity to organizing. Therefore, this is a particularly hard test.

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**Figure 8.2: Estimated Social Status of Seven Advocacy Jobs Across Samples.** Social status scaled by sample with positive numbers indicating greater status. The “US Gen Pop” survey is of a demographically representative sample (Survey C,  $n = 2788$ ). The “US Activists” sample is drawn from participants in an organizer training (Survey D,  $n = 126$ ). The “South African Activists” sample comes from activists connected to a civic tech organization focused on mobilization (Survey F,  $n = 151$ ). Bars indicated 95% confidence intervals.


ship applies to organizing specifically; those who see organizing as more reliant on social skills than cognitive skills perceive organizing to have a quarter of a standard deviation lower social status. In turn, the right panel shows that a respondent’s perceptions of a task’s relative reliance on social skills negatively correlate with their anticipated willingness to do the task.<sup>8</sup>

These findings speak to a more generalized perception that work reliant on social skills is less valued than work reliant on traditional cognitive skills. Given the nature of recruiting, this helps to explain why some people and not others choose to become orga-

<sup>8</sup> 5-point Likert response to “Assuming you had the capacity, how willing you would be to do any of the following jobs?”



## 8. The Social Valuation of Organizing




**Figure 8.3: Estimated Relative Reliance on Social Skills of Seven Advocacy Jobs across Samples.** Relative dependence is how a respondent considered a task to be reliant on social skills minus how much they considered reliant on abstract skills (both standardized). The “US Gen Pop” survey is of a demographically representative sample (*Survey C*,  $n = 2788$ ). The “US Activists” sample is drawn from participants in an organizer training (*Survey D*,  $n = 126$ ). The “South African Activists” sample comes from activists connected to a civic tech organization focused on mobilization (*Survey F*,  $n = 151$ ). Bars indicated 95% confidence intervals.

nizers. However, these are merely associations. In the next section, I describe a series of experiments I conducted to evaluate how organizing’s social quality affects perceptions of its skill, pay, and status – as well as respondents’ reported willingness to organize. Ultimately, these tests will help to explain why organizing is (or is not) valued.

### 8.3 Experimental Setup

While instructive, the descriptive evidence alone cannot establish a causal relationship between the social nature of organizing work and individuals’ willingness to do it. I,

## 8. The Social Valuation of Organizing



**Figure 8.4: Status of and Willingness to Be an Organizer by Related Intelligences.**


Both status and willingness are standardized within samples. Relative dependence is how much a task was considered reliant on social skills (scaled) minus how much it was considered reliant on abstract skills (scaled). The “US Gen Pop” survey is of a demographically representative sample (*Survey C*,  $n = 2788$ ). The “US Activists” sample is drawn from participants in an organizer training (*Survey D*,  $n = 126$ ). The “South African Activists” sample comes from activists connected to a civic tech organization focused on mobilization (*Survey F*,  $n = 151$ ).

therefore, conducted four survey experiments to assess how organizing’s social quality impacts perceptions of the level of skill it requires, its anticipated pay, the social status it is afforded, and people’s willingness to engage in the work. While the exact specifications of each study varied slightly, the overall framework was consistent.

I first told respondents, “Imagine you are considering applying to work for an advocacy organization whose mission and goals you care deeply about.” I then presented them with a job description for a hypothetical position as an organizer.<sup>9</sup> Within this description, randomly varied whether the job was associated with qualifications that emphasized the work’s interpersonal or cognitive aspects. Figure 8.5 shows the treatment conditions from the third experiment as an example.

9. To increase the mundane realism of these treatments, I based the content for these job descriptions on authentic postings from *Idealist.org*.

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**Figure 8.5: Example of Organizer Job Description Experiment.** Treatment conditions for the third job description experiment (*Survey J*). The text varies only slightly between studies.

For all studies, the position’s objective was consistent in both treatment arms. Only the qualifications differed. As visible in the left panel of the figure, the cognitive variations tended to focus on qualities like planning, administration, analysis, theory, and facts. The social treatment, however, emphasized interpersonal aspects of the work, such as motivating people, communicating, recruiting, empathy, and emotion.

Each of the four experiments differs slightly, allowing me to explore different aspects of how the social qualities of the work impact people’s relationship to it. Table 8.1 summarizes the studies: which survey it was a part of, when I implemented it, the number of treatment arms and sample size per treatment, and unique measures. In addition to the supplemental measures noted in Table 8.1, Studies 1-3 all include measures of these four outcomes:

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- **Skill:** "Different jobs require workers with different levels of skill. How skilled do you think someone would need to be to do this job?" (1) Unskilled, (2) Semi-skilled, (3) Skilled, (4) Highly skilled.
- **Pay:** "About how much do you think someone who is employed full time in this job would be paid a year?" 11-point scale ranging from less than \$30,000 to more than \$120,000.
- **Status:** "What social status do you think this job would have in your community? In other words, what is the prestige of this job compared to other jobs?" 5-point Likert scale ranging from "low status" to "high status."
- **Willingness:** "Assuming you were qualified and looking for a job, how willing would you be to take this job?" 5-point Likert scale ranging from "very unwilling" to "very willing."

In Study 1, the organizer treatment arms were almost identical to those in Figure 8.5.<sup>10</sup> This study incorporated a two-by-two factorial design to demonstrate that the mechanism – the affiliation of a job with relational labor – worked across job types. Half the respondents were randomly given the organizer job description, while the other half were assigned a researcher job description. Then, both groups were each split into the social or cognitive skills treatment arms. As consistent patterns are observed for the two jobs in this study, I used only the organizer job description in all subsequent studies.

For the second study, the qualifications were nearly identical to those in Figure 8.5. The most notable difference is that, in this case, I randomized each qualification individually to be either the social or cognitive variation. This variation created a "dosed" treatment ranging from 0 (no social variations) to 5 (all social variations). Unfortunately, the assignment strategy was pure randomization for each qualification.

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10. An additional difference is that, instead of referencing "project administration," the cognitive job description described referenced "project management." I changed this wording due to concerns that the word "management" inherently indicated a higher status.

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**Table 8.1:** Job Description Survey Experiments.

Survey	Date	Observations by Treatment Arm	Unique Measures
E	20-Jun	Organizer-Social: 415 Organizer-Cognitive: 382 Researcher-Social: 377 Researcher-Cognitive: 436	
G	20-Oct	0 Social Quals: 47 1 Social Quals: 201 2 Social Quals: 501 3 Social Quals: 467 4 Social Quals: 236 5 Social Quals: 47	Social Intelligence, Activism
J	21-Sep	Social: 755 Cognitive: 729	Qualified Activism
K	21-Dec	Social-Research: 249 Social-Comms: 249 Social-Programs: 249 Cognitive-Research: 256 Cognitive-Comms: 244 Cognitive-Programs: 254	Activism with Follow-up

As a result, 65% of the sample received a balanced social/cognitive treatment (2 or 3 social qualities), and relatively few got a very high or very low dosage. Due to non-linearity in the treatment effect, this substantially weakened the precision of estimates in this study.

This survey also included some critical additional controls. First, I measured respondents' social intelligence using the same index from the previous chapter. I incorporate this variable into analyzing how capacity moderates the treatment effects in Section 8.5. For this study, I also asked respondents if they had experience working or volunteering for an advocacy organization. This question is included in Studies 3 and 4 as well and is used as a control.

The third study returned to a binary, rather than the dosed, treatment. To further estimate the way that perceptions of capacity influenced the treatment effect,

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in this study, I further incorporated a measure of the degree to which respondents felt qualified to do the job:

- **Qualified:** "Thinking about the organizer job description you just read, how qualified do you think you would be to do this job?" 5-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all qualified" to "completely qualified."

The final study was the most different from the other three. I still exposed participants to either a social or cognitive variation of an organizer job. However, instead of rating various qualities of that job, they were asked to indicate their preference for the organizing job compared to an alternative job, which they were also provided a description of. The alternative was randomly assigned from three options: researcher, communications specialist, and program associate.<sup>11</sup> As part of this study, in addition to measuring people's actual experience with working or volunteering for collective action, I also asked whether they would consider doing so in the future. This study primarily informs Section 8.7.

### **8.4 Main Effects: Skill, Pay, Status, and Willingness**

In this section, I experimentally demonstrate that the more a job is perceived as dependent on social abilities, absent other more technical requirements, the less "skilled" it is seen to be and the lower pay it is expected to have. I will then evaluate whether this quality of the work is having a similar effect on people's evaluations of its status or their willingness to hypothetically become an organizer. I find mixed evidence for these outcomes, which I will disentangle throughout the rest of the chapter.

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11. Again, to maintain mundane realism, the description drew from authentic postings from *Idealist.org*.

### 8.4.1 Social Qualities Decrease Organizing’s Perceived Skill Level

The first aspect of organizing’s social valuation I tested is a straightforward implication of the theoretical discussion in Section 8.1.1: The more respondents associate organizing with social qualities, as opposed to cognitive abilities, the lower the skill respondents attribute to the job. As the left panel of Figure 8.6 shows, across the three experiments, I find repeated evidence that the degree to which a job is associated with social qualities. While not all variations achieve statistical significance at conventional levels, their direction and magnitude are consistent across studies. In Study 1, pooling across the researcher and organizer job descriptions, the treatment resulted in a -0.12 (-0.2, -0.04) point decrease in skill – more than a seventh of a standard deviation. The effect size was larger for the organizer position (-0.15,  $p = 0.01$ ) than the researcher position (-0.08,  $p = 0.13$ ). As a result, the effect size for the researcher position was insignificant at conventional levels. This difference is likely because people’s prior expectations as to the relative reliance of a position as a researcher on cognitive abilities are stronger than their expectations of an organizer position.<sup>12</sup>

Study 2 estimates a similar overall effect size. Due to an error in the implementation of the treatment, the distribution of the treatment dosage is heavily biased towards a more balanced cognitive/social variation, reducing the study’s overall power.<sup>13</sup> If the relationship were linear, this would not affect the ability to recover significant results. However, as shown in Figure 8.7, the dosage treatment appears to follow a step function instead. The first drop in the perceived skill seems to occur after the addition of the second social qualification, with a second drop occurring when the job is entirely social. In other words, the uneven treatment assignment up-weights the same region of the treatment exposure for which the effect is the least strong.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, the pattern


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12. Tables with details for models referenced in this chapter are available in Appendix N.

13. 65% of the sample received 2 or 3 (out of 5) social qualities.

14. If I re-weight the sample by the inverse probability of each treatment group, the estimated effect of moving from 0 social qualifications to 5 is an estimated -0.20 (-0.32, -0.08) point decrease in skill level. Re-weighting would not have this kind of impact on the estimate if the dosage effect were linear.

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
**Figure 8.6: Effect of a Job’s Social Quality on Expected Pay and Skill-Level.**

Effect of a job description focusing on the social, rather than cognitive, aspects of a job on its estimated skill-level (left) and anticipated pay (right). Skill is on a 4-point scale from “unskilled” to “highly skilled.” Pay is on an 11-point scale ranging from less than \$30,000 to more than \$120,000. Both outcomes are standardized. Data comes from surveys *E* ( $n = 1,987$ ), *G* ( $n = 1,532$ ), *J* ( $n = 2,178$ ). Surveys *E* and *J* used a binary variation of the treatment in which respondents were given a job description including 5 social qualifications or 5 cognitive qualifications. Survey *G* was a “dosed” treatment in which respondents received a job description in which 0 to 5 qualifications were social as opposed to cognitive. The treatment in Survey *G* was rescaled to match that in the other treatment groups (min = 0, max = 1). Surveys *G* and *J* evaluated just an organizing job, while for Survey *E* respondents received either an organizing or a researcher job description. Estimates include 95% confidence intervals.

is what I expected. As the share of the qualities of the job description that are social (not cognitive) increases, respondents’ perceptions of the job’s skill level also increase.

Study 3 merely replicates the findings from the original study with minor variation in the treatment and a larger sample size. The result is consistent with previous studies, though slightly reduced: a 0.10 (0.02, 0.18) drop in perceived skill for those in the social job description treatment group.





**Figure 8.7: Dosed Effect of a Job’s Social Quality on Perceived Skill-Level.** Effect of a job description focusing on the social, rather than cognitive, aspects of a job on its estimated skill. Skill is on a 4-point scale from “unskilled” to “highly skilled.” Data comes from *Survey G* ( $n = 1,532$ ). Respondents received an organizer job description in which 0 to 5 qualifications were social as opposed to cognitive.

### 8.4.2 Social Qualities Decrease Organizing’s Expected Pay

The observed decrease in the estimation of organizing’s skill level resulting from the treatment is consistent with respondents’ expectations of how organizing’s remuneration is affected by its social quality. I find that the more respondents associate organizing with social qualities, as opposed to cognitive abilities, the lower the compensation respondents anticipate the job receives. The right panel of Figure 8.6 again finds a consistent pattern across studies. In Study 1, the estimate pooled across the organizer and researcher job descriptions showed a  $-0.3$  ( $-0.59, 0.0$ ) decrease in expected pay. The pay scale was in \$10,000 increments, which implies the treatment decreased expected pay by approximately \$3,000. The estimates for the organizer and researcher jobs are in the same direction with similar magnitudes, but the estimates in these separate samples are not sufficiently precise to be significant.

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As before, the dosed variation in Study 2 was too poorly estimated to be significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude and direction of the overall effect are also nearly identical to those observed in Study 1. Finally, Study 3 found the most significant effect size. In this study, shifting from the cognitive to the social treatment variation resulted in an anticipated pay drop of -0.51 (-0.82, -0.2) points, or roughly \$5,100. The question then is if this process is affecting the overall status of organizing and people's latent willingness to engage in the work.

### 8.4.3 **Social Qualities Have an Ambiguous Effect on Organizing's Status and Enthusiasm for the Job**

From these findings regarding the skill and pay of organizing, one might then expect the more respondents associate organizing with social qualities, as opposed to cognitive abilities, the lower their evaluations of its social status. In turn, the more respondents associate organizing with social qualities, as opposed to cognitive abilities, the less they are expected to report being willing to work as an organizer. However, the results described in this section are surprisingly inconsistent with these straightforward predictions.


Comparing the left panels of Figures 8.6 and 8.8), Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate a nearly identical pattern to that observed for skill. The standardized effect sizes are roughly equivalent, and all the caveats regarding precision apply. However, Study 3 found no relationship.

Similarly, Study 1 observes a standardized negative effect of the treatment on willingness to be an organizer (-0.17,  $p = 0.02$ ), nearly identical to that observed on perceptions of organizing's relative skills (-0.19,  $p = 0.01$ ). But, as the right panel of 8.8) shows, in Studies 2 and 3, this effect entirely disappeared. This overall null result is despite the treatment passing a manipulation check.<sup>15</sup> The remainder of this

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15. In Study 3, receiving the social variation increased the likelihood that respondents considered organizing more dependent on social skills than cognitive skills by 0.19 (0.09, 0.30) standard deviations.

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**Figure 8.8: Effect of a Job’s Social Quality on Social Status and Willingness.**

Effect of a job description focusing on the social, rather than cognitive, aspects of a job on its estimated social status (left) and respondents’ willingness to do the job (right). Status is on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “low status” to “high status.” Willingness is on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very unwilling” to “very willing.” Both outcomes are standardized. Data comes from surveys *E* ( $n = 1,987$ ), *G* ( $n = 1,532$ ), *J* ( $n = 2,178$ ). Surveys *E* and *J* used a binary variation of the treatment in which respondents were given a job description including 5 social qualifications or 5 cognitive qualifications. Survey *G* was a “dosed” treatment in which respondents received a job description in which 0 to 5 qualifications were social as opposed to cognitive. The treatment in Survey *G* was rescaled to match that in the other treatment groups (min = 0, max = 1). Surveys *G* and *J* evaluated just an organizing job, while for Survey *E* respondents received either an organizing or a researcher job description. Estimates include 95% confidence intervals.

chapter will discuss why perceptions of skill and pay are not cleanly translating into evaluations of organizing's status and individual's willingness to engage in that work.

## 8.5 Mediation by Perceived Qualifications and Moderation by Ability


In the previous chapter, I reiterated the strong relationship shown in the previous chapter between the degree to which someone feels competent in organizing and their willingness to engage in the work. However, this chapter shows that the “capacity” mechanism may, on average, function *in favor* of the decision to organize. From the theoretical discussion in Section 8.1.1, it is plausible that more people feel qualified to do work contingent on social skills than specific technical capacities. Indeed, a logical corollary of people seeing work as less skilled – the finding of the previous section – is that they may therefore see themselves as better able to do it.<sup>16</sup> As a result, I expect that when an organizing job is framed as requiring more social capacity, those with higher social intelligence will be more willing to recruit.

The actual share of the population who know how to “work with people from diverse backgrounds” and “tell persuasive narratives based on emotions and values” is not necessarily that much greater than the proportion comfortable with “theoretical approaches to power building” who can “construct persuasive arguments based on facts and logic.” Nevertheless, “power building” and “facts and logic” may feel more daunting or alien than the related experience of interacting with different populations and telling stories. Thus, I conjecture that despite organizing's relational quality decreasing its expected skill level – with negative implications for respondents' reported willingness to do the work – this same interpersonal quality increases respondents' expectations of their capacity for the job, thereby increasing their enthusiasm for the task. In other words, the more a job is contingent on social skills, the lower respondents' perceptions of its skill and pay but the greater their perceptions of their qualifications

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16. This is effectively an alternative framing of the theory discussed in the previous chapter.

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**Figure 8.9: Effect of Social Job Framing by Social Intelligence.** Effect of a job description focusing on the social, rather than analytical, aspects of a job on willingness to do the job by social intelligence. Respondents received an organizer job description in which 0 to 5 qualifications were social as opposed to cognitive. Willingness is on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very unwilling” to “very willing.” Social intelligence is measured using the *WLEIS* index and then standardized. Dosed treatment effect is estimated for the mean SI (blue line), approximately 1 standard deviation above the mean SI (green line), and approximately 1 standard deviation below the mean SI (red line). Data come from Survey G ( $n = 1,532$ ).

to do the job. These processes will mediate the relationship between organizing and willingness to recruit, with respondents being more willing due to the increased sense of capacity but less willing due to the decreased perceptions of skill and pay.

This mediation by perceptions of capacity is further contingent on an individual’s genuine capacity for the work. As a result, I expect that social intelligence will *moderate* this relationship. As part of the survey that included Study 2, I measured respondents’ social intelligence.<sup>17</sup> In a model of the effect of the job description treatment conditional on this SI index, the interaction between these two variables is statistically significant ( $p = 0.003$ ).<sup>18</sup> This relationship, graphically represented in

17. This survey measured social intelligence using the *WLEIS* index.

18. This model includes controls for gender, income, and activism experience based on observed heterogeneity conditional on those parameters observed elsewhere in this dissertation. Excluding

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Figure 8.9, is consistent with the experimental findings of the previous chapter.

Respondents with average social intelligence are functionally unaffected by whether the organizer position is contingent on social qualities. However, for those with social intelligence one standard deviation above the mean, I estimate that moving from the fully cognitive to the entirely social variation of the treatment<sup>19</sup> causes a 0.28 standard deviation increase in hypothetical willingness to take the organizing job. Conversely, for those respondents with an estimated SI one standard deviation below the mean, shifting all five qualifications from the cognitive to the social variation results in a 0.42 standard deviation decrease in reported willingness. This result maintains the anticipated predictions.

Having established that social intelligence is moderating this relationship, I next examined how the effect of the treatment on willingness to engage is mediated by respondents' evaluations of the job's skill, its remuneration, and their qualification for it. To test this, I turned to Study 3, which included a post-treatment measure of the degree to which respondents considered themselves qualified for the job as described. Figure 8.10 shows the relationship between the treatment and willingness to recruit mediated by skill, pay, and qualification – all standardized to facilitate comparison.

As discussed in the previous section, when I describe organizing as having social qualifications, it has a deleterious effect on expectations of skill and pay. Declining skill and pay is, in turn, resulting in a decreased hypothetical willingness to take on the job of an organizer. The treatment causes expected pay to decrease by 0.09 standard deviations and a standard deviation decline in expected pay results in a 0.10 decrease in standardized willingness to organize. The combined indirect effect is relatively small but statistically significant ( $p = 0.008$ ). Similarly, the treatment results in a 0.06 decrease in standardized skill level. And a one sd decrease in assess skill results in a 0.04 sd decrease in willingness to recruit. However, while all the

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these controls, the interaction term is just shy of significance at conventional levels ( $p = 0.08$ ).

19. Recall that this study involved the dosed variation of the experiment.

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individual links in this causal chain are statistically significant at conventional levels, the overall path is not ( $p = 0.14$ ).


Moreover, these two pathways are entirely overshadowed by how the treatment relates to how qualified respondents feel they are for the job. The treatment's impact on qualification is an increase of 0.6 standard deviations, roughly the same magnitude as the other mechanisms. However, a one standard deviation increase in respondents' belief that they are qualified for the job causes a 0.55 standard deviation increase in their willingness. The result is that the indirect effect through this pathway is 4-times that of pay and 13-times that of skill ( $p = 0.02$ ), entirely erasing effects through these alternative paths.

### **8.6 Heterogeneity by Income**

In the theory section, I noted that social skills are potentially devalued because they are not as concentrated among those with high socioeconomic status as technical skills. Higher SES people have more outside options in the labor market compared to low SES people, driving up the cost of their labor and skills unique to them. An implication is that high SES may be more responsive to concerns over prestige qualities like pay and skill. If one does not expect to earn a high salary or be employed in skilled work, then thinking a job is poorly paid or unskilled is less likely to affect the decision to take the job. Conversely, as the opportunity cost increases, the impact of perceptions of skill and pay are anticipated to increase commensurately.

The expected outcome of this process is that when an organizing job is framed as requiring more social capacity, the negative effect on perceptions of skill and pay will decrease willingness to be an organizer for high-income participants more than for those with lower incomes. To test this, I repeated the mediation analysis from the previous section, dividing the sample by income. I find that those with incomes above the median are far more affected by pay and skill concerns than those below are. I present additional analysis from other studies corroborating the role of economic


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**Figure 8.10: Mediation Analysis of the Effect of Social Job Framing on Willingness.** Multiple mediation analysis of the treatment effect of the “SOCIAL” job description treatment on “WILLINGNESS” to be employed in the job, mediated by effect on the anticipated “PAY” the job would receive, the level of “SKILL” the job is perceived to have, and how “QUALIFIED” the respondent feels the would be to do the job. outcome variables are standardized to ease comparison. Data comes from *Survey J* ( $n = 2,178$ ).




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**Figure 8.11: Mediated Treatment Effect of Social Job Framing by Respondent Income Group.** Multiple mediation analysis of the treatment effect of the “SOCIAL” job description treatment on “WILLINGNESS” to be employed in the job, mediated by effect on the anticipated “PAY” the job would receive, the level of “SKILL” the job is perceived to have, and how “QUALIFIED” the respondent feels the would be to do the job. outcome variables are standardized to ease comparison. Respondents are separated into those in households making less than \$50,000 (top panel, (n) = 856) and those with household incomes greater than \$50,000 (bottom panel, (n) = 768). Data comes from *Survey J*.

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**Figure 8.12: Willingness and Income by Skill Type.** The left plot shows the association between willingness to do a job and income by perceived skill type, pooled across seven political jobs. Data comes from (Survey C,  $n = 2788$ ). Willingness is on a scale of 1 to 5. Jobs were considered more social (cognitive) if they respondents reported the job had a higher demand for social (cognitive) skills than it did for cognitive (social). The right plot indicates the association between willingness to do a job and income by treatment group. Data comes from surveys E ( $n = 1,987$  and J ( $n = 2,178$ ). Willingness is on a scale of 1 to 5. Those who received the "social" variation of the job description are indicated with 1, those who received the cognitive with 0

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class in shaping the relationship between relational labor and willingness to take on an organizing job.

Comparing the mediation analyses between socioeconomic groups (Figure 8.11) shows that separating the samples by income does not substantially moderate the relationship between the treatment, respondents' sense of being qualified for the work, and the role of feeling capable in willingness. The overall pathway remains significant, resulting in a 0.10 and 0.12 standard deviation increase among high- and low-income respondents, respectively.

However, for low earners, shifts in expected pay and skill caused by the treatment were more substantial than for high earners. However, as visible in the top panel, low-income respondents' reported willingness to become an organizer is functionally independent of perceptions of skill and pay. Moreover, the direct effect – factors unaccounted for by the mediators – is negligible. Due to the substantial increase in the efficacy pathway, the treatment's total effect for this group is roughly a 0.10 standard deviation increase.

Conversely, as the bottom panel shows, high-income earners are much more responsive to changes in perceptions of skill level and, particularly, pay. Combined, these two pathways have a collective indirect effect of decreasing willingness by 0.04 standard deviations. In addition, the direct effect is far more substantial, indicating that the social treatment decreases willingness through an alternative identified pathway for this group. The total effect is also 0.04 standard deviations, with the direct effect and the increased sense of being qualified for the job canceling each other out.

This result is consistent with how income moderates the descriptive association between relative skill dependence and willingness to organize from Section 8.2. As the left panel of Figure 8.6 visualizes, when a job is considered more dependent on cognitive skills or is equally dependent on cognitive and social skills, respondents' hypothetical willingness to take on the job is positively correlated with their income. The reverse

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is true when respondents perceive the job as more dependent on social skills.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, I find that the treatments, pooled across studies 1 and 3,<sup>21</sup> are also moderated by income. The right panel of Figure 8.6 shows a generally positive correlation between income and willingness to be employed as an organizer. This association likely stems from income's overall positive correlation with political engagement. However, when respondents receive the social variation of the treatment, rather than the cognitive one, this positive association is notably diminished. While this interaction is not statistically significant ( $p = 0.11$ ), it aligns with both of the aforementioned results and paints a consistent pattern. It also introduces the possibility that a respondents' overall political engagement increases the detrimental role of social skills on their organizing activity.

## 8.7 Heterogeneity by Political Engagement

In the design chapter, I discussed the different ways of defining the appropriate population for this study. This conversation revolved around a dilemma. Conceivable, anyone could choose to become an organizer. However, given that a baseline engagement in politics is likely necessary for this decision to arise, where more engaged citizens behave differently than those less engaged, inferences from the overall sample will be biased. As a result, I have looked for heterogeneity by underlying political engagement throughout the previous chapters, finding nothing of particular note. The role of preferences and capacity for relational work does not notably vary by interest in politics. However, in this section, I show that the relational quality of organizing disproportionately negatively affects those likely to engage in organized collective action.

To explain this finding, I propose that this is due to differences in how authentic the experience is for respondents. For those who have never participated in an advocacy

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20. The interaction between a job being more social and income is statistically significant, including job fixed effects ( $p = 0.004$ ).

21. The treatments and design in Studies 1 and 3 were similar enough to pool across these two samples. Because of Study 2's dosage quality, I did not include it in this analysis.

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organization and report that they would never do so, the question of taking on a job as an organizer is abstract and irrelevant. As a result, willingness may not function as a barometer of what they would do under real-life circumstances, under which considerations of organizing's social esteem would matter. Conversely, if deciding what advocacy task to take on is either an experience the respondent already has or anticipates, then status anxiety may become more relevant. In short, when an organizing job is framed as requiring more social capacity, those with higher greater engagement will have a decreased preference for that job.


As discussed previously, Studies 3 and 4 fail to replicate Study 1's negative treatment effect of the social job variation on willingness to be an organizer. In Study 4, rather than use the abstract measure of willingness, I adopt a forced-choice structure similar to that used by the task preference experiments of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. I presented respondents with a job description for an organizer job and an alternative.<sup>22</sup> However, again, the overall effect is null.

To better understand this result, I implemented an "honest tree" to evaluate heterogeneity in the treatment effect. This machine learning technique allows for the identification and estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects and is "honest" in that "one sample [of the data set] is used to construct the partition and another to estimate treatment effects for each sub-population" (Athey and Imbens 2015, 1). By splitting the data, this strategy avoids some traditional "data mining" concerns when identifying heterogeneous treatment effects. I include in this data-driven exploration of heterogeneity respondents, assessing the potential role of education, employment status, gender, age, race, income, party ID, whether they have worked/volunteered for an advocacy organization, and whether they ever would. In addition, I included the order in which the organizing and non-organizing job descriptions were presented and what the alternative job was.

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22. They were randomly assigned a communications, a research, or a programs position.

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**Figure 8.13: Causal Tree of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Social Job Framing.** A causal tree estimating heterogeneous treatment effects of the social qualifications job variation on preference for the organizer position. This model evaluates nine variables and identifies two significant cut points. “Potential Advocates” signifies whether the respondent has experience with, or expressed that they would consider working for, an advocacy organization. Party indicates party affiliation on a scale from 1 (strong Republican) to 7 (strong Democrat). The ovals contain the estimated effect size for the subgroup and the share of the sample in that subgroup. The tree uses a minimum weighted sub-sample size of 150 and 20-fold cross-validation for this analysis. Data comes from *K* ( $n = 1,501$ )

The algorithm split the sample into roughly three groups, visible in Figure 8.13. For people with no experience with or aspirations of engaging with an advocacy group, party identification seems to be driving stated preferences for the work of organizing. Those who identify as Democrats indicate an increased preference for organizing when it is more relational – conditional on no expectation of ever actually taking an advocacy position. Independents and Republicans experience no effect preference. Among those without advocacy aspirations, there is a statistically significant positive interaction between political party and the treatment (with controls  $p = 0.002$ , without  $p = 0.003$ ).<sup>23</sup> However, for those considering collective action, the interaction term is negative, close to zero, and statistically insignificant (with controls  $p = 0.91$ , without  $p = 0.63$ ).

One interpretation of this cross-section’s preference is that when these Democrats

<sup>23</sup>. Controls are education, employment status, gender, age, race, income, party ID, the alternative treatment, and job description order.

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make their hypothetical decision, they are driven by more ideological commitments than practical considerations. Returning to *Survey C* from 2019, I descriptively find that Democrats' assessment of the importance of "mobilizing the community affected by the issue" is more than a quarter of a standard deviation higher than that of Republicans and Independents ( $p < 0.001$ ).

On the other hand, the treatment effect in this fourth experiment is negative among those with experience with or aspirations of working for an advocacy group. The interaction between the treatment and being a "potential advocate" is substantively and statistically significant with or without controls (with controls  $p = 0.04$ , without  $p = 0.02$ ). This finding implies that for those for whom the choice is most "real," organizing's social quality is undermining preferences for this work, while for those unlikely to ever make the decision, the effect is positive or neutral.

It is important to note that these findings emerged from the data inductively, and theorization to explain them was introduced post-analysis. While I had anticipated in the pre-analysis plan for this study (see Appendix F) that the treatment effect would be negative among this subgroup, I had also anticipated it would be negative among the general population. As a result, additional studies are necessary to confirm that these differential findings by political experience and party are genuine.

## 8.8 The Rising Value of Organizing

I am not the first to acknowledge that society does not hold organizers in great esteem. In the late 1980s, before he became president, Barack Obama wrote a passionate treatise entitled *Why Organize?* In this piece, he recounts a personal experience he had as an organizer:

Over the past five years, I've often had a difficult time explaining my profession to folks. Typical is a remark a public school administrative aide made to me one bleak January morning...

"Listen, Obama," she began. "You're a bright young man, Obama. You

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went to college, didn't you?"

I nodded.

"I just cannot understand why a bright young man like you would go to college, get that degree, and become a community organizer."

"Why's that?"

"Cause the pay is low, the hours is long, and don't nobody appreciate you." She shook her head in puzzlement as she wandered back to attend to her duties (Obama 1988)

As I showed in Section 8.2, this administrator's perception is generally accurate: organizing is viewed among the US general population as low-paid and under-appreciated. This result helps to explain why Obama's work as an organizer was an effective punchline at the 2008 Republican National Convention. However, while the role of extraversion or interpersonal intelligence in organizing is plausibly universal, the type of social valuations described in this chapter are not. Given the social construction of status, skill, and value, it is perhaps unsurprising that this chapter included the most heterogeneity. In fact, over the course of this study, I have witnessed an evolution in the social and political value placed on organizing in the general population.

In the year proceeding Study 1, which took place in June of 2020, Lexis Nexus reports 2,454 articles referencing "community organizer" and 445 referencing "union organizer." In the year proceeding Study 3, fielded in September 2021, references to "community organizer" had increased by 15% and "union organizer" by 23%. For comparison, the word politician increased by only 2% during this period. Since the beginning of this project, the prevalence of organizing in American politics has palpably increased.

My data shows that this rise in prevalence is also associated with rising prestige. In Study 1, I estimated the average status given to organizing across both treatment arms to be 3.24 on a scale from 1 to 5. Just four months later, this had risen to 3.38 in Study 2. By the third study, it had increased to 3.43. I estimate that during these three studies, organizing's social status linearly increased by 1.25% of a standard



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deviation every month. Nevertheless, over the same period, perceptions of the work's pay decreased, and respondents' willingness to be an organizer barely budged.

These trends must be caveated: I did not design my studies to evaluate change over time, they are not drawn from probability samples, and they are only three surveys. Nevertheless, in conjunction with increased media reporting, they potentially signify that organizing is rising in its standing as a political strategy. If this trend is real, assigning responsibility for this change is also beyond the scope of my evidence. However, plausible candidates include the resurgence in the labor organizing (Marcus 2022), the tireless work by BLM activists (Jackson 2021), the widely acknowledged role of grassroots organizers in 2020 senate elections in Georgia (Narea 2022), or the tireless advocacy of citizen-scholars to change improve how politicians understand politics (e.g., Han and Kim 2022; Ganz 1996; McAlevey 2015; Hersh 2020b; Skocpol 2021).

*“You might not have moved mountains, but the feeling that you matter to other people... I get satisfaction out of that... I feel like I’ve moved mountains.”*

# 9

## Conclusion

### 9.1 Politics as a Lifestyle

To close this project, I will summarize the main results of the previous chapters while demonstrating their generalizability. I then consider six notable implications of this dissertation’s findings, including how they speak to political systems, the ongoing work of policy advocates, and future research they inspire.

In Section 9.2, I establish the external validity of the arguments presented in the previous pages by corroborating them with cross-national data. I model observational data collected by the World Values Survey to assess key predictors of recruitment activity which speak to the role of organizing’s relational quality in its production. I pay particular attention to the structure of the data and the modeling strategy adopted to address its analytical limitations. As part of this process, I review the central findings of this project, summarizing them in their most general formulation so as to apply them to this alternative data source.

In Section 9.3, I then introduce six implications of my research:

- (1) Civic organizations are unlikely to be successful in implementing an organizing strategy if they focus solely on motivating volunteers to

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recruit by emphasizing the work's importance. Alternative strategies informed by the qualities of the experience, the necessary skills, and socioeconomic valuation of recruitment should be tested using a partnered field experiment.

- (2) The experiential qualities of organizing suggest that belief systems which promote interpersonal experiences and those which do not privilege individual agency may be comparatively prosperous. Researchers could evaluate moments of ideational turbulence to assess how these qualities of worldviews affect their success in the marketplace of ideas.
- (3) Structural factors which influence the distribution and production of social skills will in turn effect the supply of capable organizers. For example, economic demand for interpersonal abilities may impact when and where organizing emerges. This expectation could be validated by evaluating variation in the demand for social skills in local markets or workplaces and how this influences the production of collective action.
- (4) Educators have developed effective curricula for teaching social skills. Given the benefits of these skills for the production organizing, as indicated by my evidence, groups seeking to implement an organizing strategy may be well served by investing in developing members' social-emotional abilities. Researchers could test the efficacy of such a strategy through an RCT involving SEL training.
- (5) Women's higher social intelligence is not translating into recruitment activity at the same rate as men's. However, an innocuous intervention reflecting these women's genuine skills back to them seems to mitigate this discrepancy. Civic organizations engaged in relational organizing might increase female-socialized members' recruitment activity by reminding them of their underlying social intelligence, an intervention which lends itself to experimental evaluation.
- (6) Those with a greater propensity for political engagement are more negatively affected by perceptions of organizing as unskilled and poorly paid doing to its social character. This helps to explain low overall political organizing compared to the importance given to it by these same actors. By systematically analyzing political job postings, it would be possible to better understand how individuals become employed in advocacy positions and opportunities for intervention to ameliorate this bias.

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Following this call for future research, I return to those dilemmas from Chapter 2. If people deeply believe organizing is important, why are they not doing it? My answer is both trivial and, hopefully, insightful: because they are just people. When people choose politics as their vocation, they begin to live off politics as much as they live for it (Weber 1919). Yet, the remuneration they get is not limited to the material conditions typically considered. They live off the quality of experiences this work allows, the sense of competency it permits, and the feeling of esteem from it that they accrue.

## 9.2 Replicating Findings Using the World Values Survey

This section expands the external validity of my findings by testing them with global data collected by World Values Survey. I first discuss the data itself and my modeling strategy. By relating these tools to what the “ideal” identification strategy would be, I consider the limitations that using this data poses and the strategies I adopt to mitigate those concerns. I then connect the results of this model to the central arguments discussed in the previous chapters. Overall, this large- $n$  cross-national evaluation is consistent with the results observed in my South African interviews, my surveys of activists, and experimental findings. As a result, along with increasing the plausibility that these arguments will travel across contexts, this new evidence bolsters expectations of the validity of the original studies within their own context.

### 9.2.1 Data and Identification strategy

The World Values Survey Project began collecting data for its seventh wave in 2017 and completed this process in 2021. As part of this international project, researchers implemented a 290-question survey of adults in 65 countries using random probability samples. At the time of writing, the WVS has released data from 59 countries. Respondents in 57 of these 59 countries were asked whether they have “Encourag[ed] others to take action about political issues (Haerpfer et al. 2022).” In this section, I

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model respondents' probability of reporting they have engaged in recruitment activity. This exercise aims to evaluate how well the predictors described throughout the previous pages impact this organizing behavior. In other words, I hope to demonstrate that the qualities I emphasized – strategic objectives, experiential preferences, capacity, and status – have the anticipated association with people's decision to recruit rather than engage in alternative political activities.

To begin, it is worth considering the components necessary to establish a high level of measurement validity, internal validity, and external validity. First, strong evidence would rely on a *behavioral* measure of choosing whether to recruit, and this would need to be independent of the decision to engage in politics in the first place.<sup>1</sup> In addition to a valid measure of organizing, I also need accurate measures of the predictors tested with the model.

To achieve internal validity, I would need to establish that the “treatments” – the predictors I wish to assign causal responsibility – are independent of confounding variables. This is generally impossible without some form of randomization of the treatment assignment, the motivation for the experiments adopted in previous chapters. However, such as strategy is practically impossible when qualities like an individual's personality, professions earning potential, or contextual norms are the explanatory variables. Finally, to speak to global generalizability, even if I limit theorizing to the contemporary world, I would need a random probability sample of the world population.<sup>2</sup>

Using the WVS survey data alone, no modeling strategy allows for the ideal validity of measurement, inference, and generalization. However, by being explicit


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1. It is undoubtedly the case that factors that increase overall political engagement will also increase the likelihood of recruitment behavior. However, as discussed previously, for the behavioral framework I adopt here to be analytically useful, it must explain recruitment activity above and beyond simple psychological engagement. It is trivial to say that political recruitment is more likely to be done by people engaged in politics. Moreover, political science already has a thick literature on the origins of overall political engagement.

2. Even this global sample faces epistemological challenges if one considers all the worlds that “could be.”

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about the limitations of using the WVS data, it is possible to introduce strategies to limit the bias introduced by these constraints. Ideally, data would allow for a clean estimation of the effect of individual predictors identified previously on respondents' specific propensity to recruit. However, as 9.1 visualizes, the data's structure and the underlying relationships between variables pose substantial risks to making inferences about this relationship from the correlations between *measured* individual predictors and *reported recruitment* activity.



**Figure 9.1: World Values Survey Data and Limits to Causal Inference.** Reviews the actual data generation process of the WVS data used to estimate the association of individual level characteristics with the specific propensity to recruit.

The indicator – reported recruitment behavior – presents theoretical and methodological concerns regarding measurement validity. Theoretically, the outcome measured is recruitment behavior. However, the true outcome of interest is not absolute recruitment activity. It is instead recruitment activity *independent* of the decision to participate in politics: the “specific propensity to recruit.” Moreover, this is not a direct measure of propensity to recruit but rather a measure of the respondents’

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propensity to *report* that they have recruited. Using a self-reported measure, as I do here, runs the risk of response bias in which individuals will over or under-report their actual behavior. If this is purely idiosyncratic, it will decrease precision by adding to the measurement error but will not increase the bias of the model and therefore is not a threat to inference. However, if it is systematically correlated with the predictors of interest, it will bias estimates.

To address both of these concerns, in addition to estimating the propensity to report having recruited, my model – written out formally below – includes the propensity to report having taken alternative political actions as well and then identifies which predictors are unique to recruitment. The WVS measures six other political behaviors using the same format as the recruitment question. To prepare the data for this model, I stack the WVS dataset on itself seven times, once for each of these forms of participation. The predicted outcome of the model is thereby no longer just recruitment. Instead, the outcome is whether, for each political act, the respondent reports having done the act ( $Y_{ij}$  in the below model). By then also including individual-level fixed effects ( $\alpha_i$ ), this strategy allows me to condition on “general propensity for activism,” i.e., the unobserved individual-invariant predictors of taking political action.

Note that given the structure of the model, both the predictor of interest and any controls must be interacted with a recruitment-act indicator to recover recruitment-specific associations ( $\beta$  for predictor of interest,  $\theta$  for observed individual-level confounders). Moreover, I incorporate act-specific fixed effects ( $\gamma_j$ ) to account for substantial differences in reported behavior by act.

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$$Y_{ij} = D_i Z_j \beta + X_i Z_j \theta + Z \lambda_k + \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

Where:

$Y_{ij}$  = act-specific individual-level indicator of having done political act (binary)

$D_i$  = predictor of interest

$Z_j$  = recruitment-specific act indicator (binary)

$\beta$  = recruitment-specific estimated marginal effect of predictor of interest

$X_i$  = recruitment-specific observed individual-level confounders (double-lasso)

$\theta$  = recruitment-specific marginal effect of observed individual-level confounders

$Z \lambda_k$  = unobserved recruitment-specific country-invariant confounders

$\alpha_i$  = unobserved individual-invariant confounders for taking political action

$\gamma_j$  = unobserved act-invariant confounders for taking a specific political action

$\epsilon_{ijk}$  = idiosyncratic error

A third measurement concern is that the predictors are not equivalent to the underlying concepts for which I use them as indicators. Despite the WVS including nearly 300 variables, these questions were not necessarily designed to capture the concepts under investigation. For example, based on Chapter 6, I expect extraversion to predict recruitment behavior, but the WVS does not contain a measure of extraversion. Instead, I use how important respondents consider friends to be in their life. These are not equivalent measures, but they are potential indicators for the same overarching concept of “affinity for interpersonal interactions.” As I work through each theoretical argument, I justify as best as possible the measure adopted. Moreover, whenever possible, I introduce alternative measures of the exact mechanism and use indices constructed from multiple related measures to better approach the underlying latent variable. Nevertheless, the quality of the available measures for the desired concepts varies substantially.

Turning to internal validity, the primary threat to causal inference using this type of observational data is omitted variable bias causing the misattribution of causal responsibility to included predictors. For this data structure, there are three



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categories of confounders to be considered: context-specific confounders, observed individual-level confounders, and unobserved individual-level confounders. Beginning with context-specific confounders, I introduce country fixed-effects. Due to the model's structure, I interact these with the recruitment indicator to adjust for recruitment-specific confounding ( $Z\lambda_{kj}$ ).<sup>3</sup>

Focusing on the observed potential confounders, the question becomes how to select appropriate controls among the 290 available questions. I both need to avoid oversaturating the model<sup>4</sup> and excluding any potentially important confounders. To do so, I implement a “double-lasso.” A process for principled variable selection, a “double-lasso,” is designed to “identify which covariates have sufficient empirical support for inclusion in analyses of correlations” (Urminsky et al. 2016, 2). It is like a traditional OLS, except it includes a penalty term that reduces coefficient estimates, some of which are reduced to zero and dropped from the model. For this strategy, both the outcome and the predictor of interest are modeled using separate lasso regressions. The variables that survive either are then included in the final model. I implement this process independently for each predictor tested.<sup>5</sup>

While this process is “principled,” several parameters are still controlled by the researcher. First are the properties of the lasso model itself: the number of cross-validations (to decrease the risk of over-fit) and the size of the penalty adopted (to determine appropriate sparseness). I adopt the standards from the literature of 10 folds with a one standard error penalty. Second, there is still the question of what variables to include in the initial saturated lasso model. I maximally saturate the lasso

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3. This strategy adjusts for national-level contextual variation. It does not, however, adjust for characteristics of the environment that are subnational. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the individual level controls, it is plausible that the significant confounding contextual variation has been accounted for.

4. Oversaturated “kitchen-sink” models lead to overfitting and results which merely interpolate the data.

5. “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”

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regressions, selecting and constructing 157 measures.<sup>6</sup> One potential concern with this approach is that if two variables are highly correlated, which one the lasso drops is idiosyncratic. However, since I am not using this process to estimate the effects of these individual variables but rather to reduce confounding while maintaining sparsity, I am indifferent to which are chosen, minimizing this concern. Nevertheless, when I identify that multiple questions are measuring a similar underlying concept, I combine these variables into indices using principal component analysis.<sup>7</sup>

Third, not all variables are available for all individuals. Since missingness is uneven across indicators and respondents, I cannot limit the sample to only those for whom there are low levels of missingness. I, therefore, use an “HMLasso.” Introduced by Takada et al., this strategy allows for the estimation of a lasso, including missing observations (2019). Fourth, to increase computational efficiency, I adopt a simpler alternative model which controls for latent reported “general activism propensity” through an index of political participation measures.<sup>8</sup> This modeling strategy is theoretically equivalent and empirically produces similar results, though less precisely estimated. Finally, to ensure country fixed-effects are incorporated in a computationally efficient way, I demean all variables by their sample-weighted country average.

This process leaves only the unobserved individual confounders as potential sources of omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, the procedure outlined above, in addition to the breadth of data available for each participant, substantially reduces this risk.

To establish external validity, the sample needs to be representative of the population I wish to generalize to. Fortunately, the WVS uses a random probability sample, increasing confidence that this sample is representative at the country level. The WVS further provides demographic weights, which I implement across all stages of the process, to improve balance in age, sex, education, and the subnational region. To make

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6. This includes all the predictors of interest. However, for a lasso predicting an independent variable, I exclude that variable from its model as well as any controls correlating with that predictor at a level of 0.5 or more.

7. Specifically, I implemented a “nonlinear iterative partial least squares” PCA, which avoids dropping observations for which a subset of the variables are missing.

8. I construct this using a PCA of all seven political acts.

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the sample appropriately representative across nations, I also weigh the observations by their respective country populations, again using the WVS-provided weights. As a result, I have substantial confidence in the representativeness of the results in the 57 countries – accounting for 4.3 billion people – in which my outcome was measured.


One should be careful extrapolating beyond these contexts. This is particularly true because, while the overall estimates are valid *on average* across contexts, they may be less accurate for any specific context. My current modeling strategy does not attempt to predict in which contexts these effects will be stronger or weaker. For future research, a multilevel model including random intercepts and slopes would allow for the estimation of sources of country-level variation in the magnitude of predictors' effects. This would facilitate the appropriate application of these results to out-of-sample contexts.

In addition to these three validity concerns emerging from the data, a few model specifications require attention. While the outcome is binary, I adopt a linear model. The implication is that this model is not estimating the outcome directly but rather the best linear approximation of the probability of the outcome. While alternative models, such as probit and logit, attempt to account for any non-linearity, linear probability models have become the standard procedure for binary outcomes due to the model's comparatively high interpretability (Angrist and Pischke 2009). However, this model ensures heteroskedasticity. Therefore, it is crucial to include robust standard errors.

Moreover, due to the structure of the model, there will, by construction, be correlation in standard errors at the individual and act level. Furthermore, due to likely non-independence in predictor assignment, I expect there to be additional correlation in standard errors at the country level. To adjust for this, I cluster errors at all three levels. Finally, to facilitate comparison between predictors, all variables of interest have been standardized.

Having established the model used in this analysis, the remainder of this section will review each variable considered in the context of the theoretical proposition for

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**Figure 9.2: Estimated Effect of Key Predictors on Probability of Having Recruited.** Estimated recruitment-specific associations of key predictors with the linear probability of respondents' reporting they have done a political act. Model includes individual, act, and country fixed effects and robust three-way clustered standard errors. Control variables are selected using a double-lasso. All predictors are standardized to facilitate comparison. Data comes from the Wave 7 of the WVS (2019-2021). More detail regarding the model specifications are discussed in the body of the text.

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which I use it to evaluate. The structure of the following four subsections, therefore, parallels that used for chapters 5 - 8: dispelling the importance of strategic objective, demonstrating the role of the relational experience, developing an understanding of the underlying skills, and considering political recruitment social valuation. The results for all estimated predictors are visualized in Figure 9.2.

### 9.2.2 The Limits of Strategic Objectives

In chapter 5, I presented experimental evidence that concern over strategic objectives did not well predict the decision to recruit. Beliefs about how vital recruitment is to political goals simply do not appear to matter as much as one might expect. To further test this cross-nationally, I employ two proxy measures that plausibly capture the degree to which recruitment is necessary for the respondents' political objectives to be successful. As visible in the top two bars of Figure 9.2, I find neither to have correlations distinguishable from zero. I further find that commitment to democracy is also not an influential predictor, reestablishing the literature's expectations of the limits of idealistic motivations.

There is no direct measure of perceptions of recruitment's political importance in the WVS. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, organizing is understood by the literature as a strategy of last resort by those who do not expect victory working exclusively through existing power bases. Therefore, measures that convey the degree to which respondents are excluded from existing power structures or think those structures are insufficient should be associated with an increased strategic need to mobilize collective action (Phulwani 2016). I test two indicators of this quality.

First, the WVS asked respondents whether they endorse adopting revolution to achieve political change, as opposed to reformism or conservatism.<sup>9</sup> The assumption

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9. Specifically, respondents chose among three phrases to describe which they thought best fit their beliefs: (1) "The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action." (2) "Our society must be gradually improved by reforms." (3) "Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."

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is that those who see revolution as necessary will perceive functioning in existing institutions as less viable. Nevertheless, I find that those who endorse revolution are no more likely to have recruited others: the estimated association is statistically insignificant and in the wrong direction.

I construct a second measure using respondents' reported ethnicity, from which I identify if the participant is from the majority ethnic group. The assumption here is that those from an ethnic minority are more likely to be politically excluded and thus will require greater collective action to be represented politically. While the direction of the association is correct, the estimate is barely distinguishable from zero and statistically insignificant.

Due to the positive externalities of organizing on democracy, it is plausible, though not expected by the literature, that a commitment to democracy will increase recruitment activity. The WVS asks respondents four questions related to this concept, from which I constructed a latent measure of support for democracy.<sup>10</sup> As visible in the third bar of Figure 9.2, the estimated role of this latent variable is also indistinguishable from zero.

According to my model, none of the estimated measures are compatible with the idea that citizens decide to recruit based on their political goals. They are, however, consistent with the conversations I had with South African activists and the experimental results from Chapters 5.

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10. The questions are: (1) "Do you think that honest elections play an important role in deciding whether you and your family are able to make a good living?" (2) "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?: Having a democratic political system." (3) "Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means 'not at all an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means it definitely is 'an essential characteristic of democracy:' Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression." (4) "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is 'not at all important' and 10 means 'absolutely important' what position would you choose?"

### 9.2.3 The Relational Experience

One of the central propositions of Chapter 6 was that individuals with a stronger preference for interpersonal interactions – then measured by extraversion – have an increased preference for organizing activity.

The WVS does not include a measure of extraversion. However, it does ask to indicate how important “friends” are in their lives.<sup>11</sup> A reasonable assumption is that, in aggregate, those who consider friendship more important to their lives are more socially orientated. Thus, I use this indicator as a proxy for an experiential preference for interpersonal interactions. I expect that people who indicate that they believe friendship is an important part of their life are more likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

A reasonable assumption is that, in aggregate, those who consider friendship more important to their lives are more socially orientated. Thus, I use this indicator as a proxy for an experiential preference for interpersonal interactions. I expect that people who indicate that they believe friendship is an important part of their life are more likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

As the fourth bar of Figure 9.2 shows, the anticipated relationship between this measure and recruitment activity is visible in my model. A one standard deviation increase in the importance placed on friendship results in a 2.25 (0.10, 4.39) percentage point increase in the linear probability of having recruited.

In Chapter 6, I also found that those who experience organizing as manipulative are less willing to engage in that work. I proposed that, as a result, “liberal values” have a strategic disadvantage compared to other belief systems due to their prioritization of

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11. This question was part of a series of questions that included family, leisure time, politics, work, and religion. These questions were all included as potential controls. The phrasing of the question was: “For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is very important, rather important, not very important or not important at all?”

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individual agency.<sup>12</sup> The WVS includes eleven measures of “liberal” values from which to construct a latent measure of commitment to ideological tolerance.<sup>13</sup> From these I test whether people who endorse the beliefs of a liberal ideology are less likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

My results are consistent with this expectation. A one standard deviation increase in my measure of latent liberalism is estimated to result in a 7.81 (0.83, 14.80) point decline in the linear probability of having recruited. This is the largest standardized point estimate of any of the predictors considered.

Another approximation of this agency-centered attitude is the degree to which individuals ascribe control over their lives to themselves. People who endorse a belief in their own free will may be less likely to have recruited others due to a general tendency to view people as informed, independent actors in their environment.

The WVS asked respondents to estimate the degree to which they felt they controlled their own lives.<sup>14</sup> I find that a one standard deviation increase in respondents’ assessment of their control over their lives was associated with a 3.22 (0.33, 6.11) point decline in the linear probability of having recruited. Again, this evidence is consistent with agency-centered perspectives causing decreased recruitment activity.

Finally, a derivative expectation is that those who are more assured in the veracity of their value system will be more willing to recruit. I expect that those people who are more confident in their worldview are less likely to have anxiety imposing that perspective on others. If you sincerely believe in the gospel, it is not manipulative to impress it upon others. Quite the contrary, it is a moral duty to do so.

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12. By liberal values, I mean those which focus on non-interference and tolerance. I do not intend liberal in the American political context or liberal as laissez-faire economic policy.

13. Respondents’ were asked whether eight different acts were “justifiable:” homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, premarital sex, suicide, euthanasia, and casual sex. And whether the government has a right to surveil people in public, monitor the internet, and clandestinely collect information on residents.

14. “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”



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To measure this, I first constructed indices capturing 17 categories of beliefs present within the WVS.<sup>15</sup> I then estimated a PCA using these 17 beliefs and a measure of moral uncertainty.<sup>16</sup> Given the disparate nature of these belief systems, I consider the first component of this PCA to be a measure of the underlying tendency to wholeheartedly endorse a belief system. I denote this “moral certitude.” A one standard deviation increase in this measure of moral certitude results in a 3.36 (2.08, 4.64) point increase in the linear probability of having recruited.

The consistency across these three measures suggests that an ideological commitment to agency is likely to result in a decreased propensity to recruit. This fact places the open-minded at a strategic disadvantage compared to firebrands.

### 9.2.4 Social Skills Bolster Recruitment Activity

Chapter 7 presented evidence that interpersonal skills underly peoples’ sense of capacity to recruit and their recruitment activity. The WVS lacks any direct measure of social skills. Nevertheless, I can still test a variety of implications of social skills’ significance. First, I assess an alternative venue where people cultivate and demonstrate these interpersonal skills – specifically working in sales. Second, given differential socialization of social skills by gender, it is plausible that after accounting for overall engagement, women’s underlying capacity will shine. Third, I proposed in Chapter 7 that women’s skills were not translating into recruiting activity due to patriarchal norms depressing women’s evaluation of their own abilities. I, therefore, assess how believing in gender equality affects respondents’ recruitment activity.

The WVS records respondents’ occupations, including a category for “sales.” Sales work is highly dependent on the same types of social skills which undergird organizing.

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15. I label these clusters of beliefs as: political voice, law and order, political violence, sexual liberation, statism, environmentalism, socialism, feminism, tolerance, work-ethic, radicalism, authoritarianism, communitarianism, nationalism, futurism, liberalism, leftism, democratic values, and theocratism. The number of underlying indicators for each of these beliefs varied dramatically, from 1 to 15.

16. “How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that nowadays one often has trouble deciding which moral rules are the right ones to follow? [1 to 10].”

## 9. Conclusion

I, therefore, expect those in this profession to be more likely to have comparable skills for political recruitment, and the model is consistent with this hypothesis. Those employed in sales have an estimated 0.77 (0.08, 1.46) percentage point increase in reported recruitment activity.<sup>17</sup> However, given that sales work is likely to also attract people who enjoy interpersonal interactions, harkening back to the role of extraversion, it is not a clean proxy. Nevertheless, the result is consistent with what would be expected if social skills play a role in the decision to recruit.<sup>18</sup>

In Chapter 7, I reviewed literature indicating that women are, on average, better organizers. I attributed this transhistorical result to the gendered socialization of interpersonal skills. I found, however, that despite social skills increasing respondents' likelihood of having recruited others overall, women were not more likely to have engaged in past recruitment activity. I attributed this to patriarchal socialization stymying the translation of women's perceptions of their social skills into their perceptions of their political skills. Indeed, the raw bivariate association between gender and social skills in the WVS is a substantial and statistically significant negative correlation ( $p < 0.001$ ).

However, controlling for underlying political engagement, as the model here allows, may sufficiently reduce the effect of this constraint as recruitment is not the only political skill that patriarchal socialization may be undermining. The association does switch to being positive in the model, with identifying as a woman resulting in an estimated 0.58 (-0.21, 1.37) increase in recruitment activity.<sup>19</sup> However, this result is not statistically significant.

If patriarchal norms undermine the realization of women's social skills into political recruitment activity, then those who believe that women should be as involved in


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17. In Figure 9.2, sales is standardized to facilitate comparison to alternative predictors. As a result, the magnitude on the plot is 2.9 times this estimate.

18. I also tested employment in the service industry. This occupational category did not have the anticipated effect.

19. In Figure 9.2, gender is standardized to facilitate comparison to alternative predictors. As a result, the magnitude on the plot is 2.0 times this estimate.

## 9. Conclusion



**Figure 9.3: Country-Level Gender Differences in Recruitment Activity Conditional on Women's Empowerment.** The y-axis indicates gender differences (%men - %women) in the share of each country's sample who report having encouraged others to take political action, using sampling weights. Data from the *World Values Survey, Wave 7* (Haerpfer et al. 2022) for 57 countries. The x-axis shows those countries' scores on the "Women's Empowerment Index" developed by the *Varieties of Democracy* project. The line reflects a bivariate OLS regression with a 95% confidence interval.

politics as men<sup>20</sup> should be more willing to recruit. As Figure 9.3 shows, overall, the distance between men and women's rate of reporting that they have recruited declines as a country's estimated political gender equality increases. Therefore, I expect that those who endorse gender equality in politics are more likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

I do observe the anticipated association. A one standard deviation increase in the endorsement of political equality of women is associated with a 2.74 (0.70, 4.78) point rise in reported recruitment. This result is despite this feminist ideal having a relatively high correlation with the detrimental latent measure of liberal values (0.33).

However, if this effect were driven by women being "liberated" to translate their

20. "For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? - On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do."

## 9. Conclusion

underlying abilities into political change, then it should be concentrated among women. I find, however, that men are more affected by holding feminist values than women. Among men, the association is 3.50 (0.35, 6.66) percentage points, while it is only 2.05 (-0.48, 4.57) and is no longer significant. This result is instead more consistent with the idea that patriarchal values reduce the social status of relational labor, especially among men. This argument was not discussed at length in the main text due to inconsistent evidence.

### 9.2.5 Social Value of Relational Labor

Chapter 8 introduced the idea that recruitments' social character might influence peoples' willingness to engage in the work. The logic behind this claim was that interpersonal abilities tend to be viewed as low-skill and poorly paid due to difficulty in rationalizing these abilities into the formal educational system. This lack of formalization limits the capacity of the economically advantaged to monopolize these skills. I did find consistent evidence that the more a job is perceived as social, the less skilled it is thought to be and the lower its anticipated pay. However, the impact of this evaluation on peoples' willingness to engage in the work is moderated by respondents' underlying abilities, socioeconomic status, and overall political engagement.

The best available approximation of ability, employment in a sales occupation, was already evaluated in the previous section. Moreover, this model's design purposefully controls for respondents' propensity to engage in politics, preventing an appropriate test of heterogeneity by political engagement. However, it is possible to cleanly evaluate the role of socioeconomic status. I test two variations of this mechanism:

Those respondents with incomes above the median for their context will be more likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

Those employed in high-status occupations ("professionals" and "executives") are less likely to have recruited others after adjusting for their overall propensity to take political action.

## 9. Conclusion

I find evidence supporting both conclusions. Those with incomes above the median are 1.25 (0.41, 2.08) percentage points less likely to have recruited others and those in high-status occupations are 0.82 (0.14, 1.49) percentage points less likely.<sup>21</sup> While just one of the three proposed mechanisms, this finding is consistent with the overall proposition that the social valuation of relational labor affects the decision of whether to recruit.

### 9.3 Implications and Next Steps

This cross-national evidence aligns with my previous qualitative, survey, and experimental evidence. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the relational quality of organizing is more likely to be driving the decision of whether to engage in recruitment than the work's strategic value. The studies included in this dissertation hardly exhaust the insight gained from considering organizing as a political behavior. Nevertheless, they introduce several noteworthy implications beyond the micro-mechanisms discussed which deserve additional attention in future research. In this section, I review six of these implications, their impact on political advocacy, and strategies which future research may adopt to expand our understand of how the personal decision to recruit is shaping overall organizing. These proposed studies would also help to compensate for the major limitation of my research design, which is that it relies solely on *reported* activity and *hypothetical* decision-making.

- (1) Civic organizations are unlikely to be successful in implementing an organizing strategy if they focus solely on motivating volunteers to recruit by emphasizing the work's importance. Alternative strategies informed by the qualities of the experience, the necessary skills, and socioeconomic valuation of recruitment should be tested using a partnered field experiment.

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21. On the plot, both these measures are standardized, despite being a binary treatment, to allow for comparison. As a result, the magnitude visualized in Figure 9.2 is 2.0 times that referenced in the text for the income estimate and 2.8 times the estimate for the high-status occupations estimate.

## *9. Conclusion*

The findings of Chapter 5 suggest that asserting the strategic virtues of recruitment is unlikely to motivate people to organize. This tendency creates a high barrier for groups hoping to implement an organizing strategy, even when committed to the strategy. This result implies that those attempting to recruit recruiters may be better off focusing on identifying what components of the experience appeal to the target. Alternatively, they may consider adopting strategies to identify individuals likely to have a pre-existing preference and capacity for organizing.

Moreover, the studies in that chapter were collectively both an unrealistically easy and an informatively hard test of the role of organizing's strategic value in respondents' decision-making. It was easy because it was entirely hypothetical. Respondents faced no actual cost in aligning their choice with the organization's stated priorities. Yet, despite that, they did not (though they did change why they claimed to have made their choice). This result is damning, particularly of the shallow treatments common in modern politics. In a mundane sense, the conditions of a survey experiment are most comparable to the type of appeals that political campaigns email to purchased contact lists.

Yet, this was also a relatively superficial treatment. I asked respondents to imagine a cause they cared deeply about; I did not attempt to convince them of the merits of that cause, identify what issues they prioritize, or link recruitment's impact directly to their values. There is reason to believe this would not work either. Republicans were no more susceptible to the NRA variation, nor were the Democrats to the BLM treatment, and, overall, the politically engaged were no more likely to be affected. Nevertheless, a talented organizer, speaking face-to-face, might still be able to make a strategic petition land. Therefore, the next step in testing the efficacy of different motivational appeals will have to be a field experiment allowing such organizers to implement that type of appeal.

Given the parameters of such a test – active one-on-one organizing relating recruitment strategically to authentic personal values – such a study could only be

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implemented realistically in partnership with an organizing-focused institution. A partnered randomized controlled trial (RCT) would make it possible to more directly demonstrate the inadequacy of strategic appeals and to compare that form of mobilization head-to-head with appeals addressing the experience, skills, and social esteem of organizing. Doing so would further facilitate the development of specific guidance for civic organizations hoping to implement an organizing strategy.

- (2) Results related to the experiential qualities of organizing suggest that belief systems which promote interpersonal experiences and those which do not privilege individual agency will be comparatively prosperous. Researchers could evaluate moments of ideational turbulence to assess how these qualities of worldviews affect their success in the marketplace of ideas.

In the mid-19th century, the Shakers – a millenarian Christian sect – numbered 6,000 with dozens of settlements from Maine to Florida. By all accounts, they were prosperous communities, manifesting the protestant work ethic (Stechler and Burns 1984) and credited with inventing clothespins, the circular saw, and the washing machine (Hillinger 1988). However, today, there are just two Shakers remaining (Harris 2022), as the faith’s founder predicted (Stechler and Burns 1984). After all, they do not evangelize, and their members take a vow of celibacy (Harris 2022).<sup>22</sup> Cultures and ideologies require a means of social reproduction.

The implication is that if any community of faith – whether religious or political – has a systematic bias in its production of organizing, it will be at a social disadvantage.<sup>23</sup> Chapter 6 introduced two potential biases, one cultural and the other ideological. Extraversion or, more generally, openness to interpersonal interactions makes individuals more willing to recruit. While commonly thought of as a personality trait, this quality varies substantially by culture and the practices of different societies

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22. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, the Shakers largely filled their ranks through adoption. Increasing restrictions on adoption were the death blow to this sect.

23. The idea that ideologies have embedded in them strategic advantages or disadvantages goes back to at least *The Protestant Work Ethic* (Weber 1905).

## 9. Conclusion

(McCrae et al. 2005). My research implies that groups with a bias towards the fostering of extraversion, or the attraction of extraverted members, will see their beliefs overtake those peoples with a greater propensity towards introspective.

In addition to developing the role of openness to interpersonal interactions in the choice to recruit, Chapter 6 discussed how a commitment to individual agency might be a strategic liability in the battle of ideas. The results from the WVS study above further showed that those with a liberal ideology and those who lacked moral certitude had a lower propensity to recruit. In the wake of WW2, Popper described how tolerance has embedded in it a strategic weakness, “If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them” (1945, 668).

For fear of tolerance’s suppression, Popper turns his eye to the suppression of the intolerant. However, the practical limitation that tolerance and open-mindedness have in political battles is not well understood. If liberty is the superior ideology, it is not apparent why tolerance needs to be defended with coercion. My evidence suggests that it is not merely a matter of whether “tolerant” leaders are willing to censor intolerance. Instead, my evidence indicates that it is the tolerant citizen’s unwillingness to evangelize liberty, to organize open-mindedness, that may cause democracy to go the way of the Shakers. As Yeats wrote, “the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity” (1919).

While both these implications are grounded in a micro-level mechanism, I expect them to also exist at the macro level. Therefore, one option to better understand this proposed implication of my research would be to study the emergence of ideological and religious sects, evaluating how the dogma and the rituals involved in that belief system might foster openness to and comfort with interpersonal interactions.<sup>24</sup> In

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24. One potentially interesting case is the rise of Pentecostalism. Emerging from the *charismatic* movement of the 1960s, Pentecostalism is thought to be one of the fastest-growing religions in the



## 9. Conclusion

particular, moments of schism within existing philosophies or periods of Knightian uncertainty could be exploited to identify whether the anticipated characteristics help to explain the ideological victor.<sup>25</sup> Such instances might include competing parties in the wake of democratization, ethnic groups after decolonization, economic ideologies during a crisis, and sectarians within social movements.

- (3) Structural factors which influence the distribution and production of social skills will in turn effect the supply of capable organizers. For example, economic demand for interpersonal abilities may impact when and where organizing emerges. This expectation could be validated by evaluating variation in the demand for social skills in local markets or workplaces and how this influences the production of collective action.

If social skills matter to the supply of organizing, as I claimed in Chapter 7, it follows that those communities empowered with these skills will be better able to manifest collective action due to the greater availability of competent organizers. As discussed in that chapter, several institutions may play a role in producing these skills. These included churches, unions, and the workplace. Focusing on the third institution, the demand for social skills in the labor market varies by context and industry (Deming 2017). The derivative expectation is that communities with industries that require greater social skills will have more robust individual engagement.

This implication may be tested by evaluating how local-level variation in the structure of the economy influences the emergence of collective action. For example, to systematically examine these patterns, one could evaluate a county-level panel incorporating industrial data on occupational demand, occupational skill requirements, and

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world (Vijgen and Haak 2015). Indeed, despite existing for less than a century, 1 in 4 Christians are Pentecostal or another Charismatic denomination (Vijgen and Haak 2015). That this movement is termed “Charismatic” is by no means a coincidence. Unlike most Christian denominations, which limit themselves to the four Gospels, Pentecostals center the *The Acts of the Apostles*, an account of early Christianity’s organizers who spread the *Word* across the Mediterranean (Devine 2013). Moreover, the sect’s practice of “speaking in tongues,” and the space of social interconnectedness these communities create to facilitate that practice – including physical touch – is associated with increased extraversion (Piedmont 2005).

25. This strategy has been well established by other scholars engaged in the sociological analysis of ideas (e.g., Blyth 2002).

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overall recruitment activity. By matching the overall skills needed in a physical space with the level of recruitment that occurs, the causal connection between the production of social skills and this political act would be better validated. Alternatively, scholars might investigate how the social skills of different jobs affect the propensity of workers employed in that profession to unionize. The logic in both cases is that the social skills developed in the workplace may be producing more collective action, given the findings of Chapter 7.

- (4) Educators have developed effective curricula for teaching social skills. Given the benefits of these skills for the production organizing, as indicated by my evidence, groups seeking to implement an organizing strategy may be well served by investing in developing members' social-emotional abilities. Researchers could test the efficacy of such a strategy through an RCT involving SEL training.

The cutting-edge tools for organizing are public narrative spearheaded by Marshall Ganz (2011) and deep canvassing developed within the LGBTQ movement (Broockman and Kalla 2016). These tactics show the power of building community through compelling stories and establishing connections through active listening and genuine vulnerability. Therefore, their theory of change is consistent with my dissertation's bedrock claim that organizing is fundamentally relationship building. My research diverges from this work in its focus on the organizer, their abilities, and their confidence in those abilities, as opposed to what tactics the organizer adopts. My research suggests that by capacitating activists with generalized social skills, we can enable them to be successful under a variety of organizing conditions.

Psychologists and educators have recently made considerable progress in developing curricula for "social and emotional learning" to improve these skills (Durlak et al. 2011; Fink et al. 2017). While generally targeted at youth, these training programs have also proven effective for adults (Jones et al. 2021). Political organizations could embrace this programming to empower their members to recruit. In partnership with a civic organization, researchers could evaluate the efficacy of such an intervention on the abilities and willingness of members to engage in political organizing.

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- (5) Women's higher social intelligence is not translating into recruitment activity at the same rate as men's. However, an innocuous intervention reflecting these women's genuine skills back to them seems to mitigate this discrepancy. Civic organizations engaged in relational organizing might increase female-socialized members' recruitment activity by reminding them of their underlying social intelligence, an intervention which lends itself to experimental evaluation.

Previous scholarships have consistently found that, on average, women make better organizers. I attribute this result to women's comparatively high degree of socialization to develop interpersonal skills. Nevertheless, I also found that women tended to be less likely to engage in political recruitment, both in my original surveys and cross-nationally in the WVS.<sup>26</sup> This result is plausibly due to the fact that women were not translating their scores on social intelligence batteries into their self-perceived capacity to recruit in the same way men were – a gender difference that leaves considerable organizing talent on the table. However, I also found that when I told women that they had higher-than-average social skills, their genuine capacity began to shine through. The estimated treatment effect of this innocuous intervention was surprisingly strong. Indeed, given how minor the treatment is, this may be a case in which activation – simply sharing information – could prove an effective means of increasing organizing activity.

In the wake of recent research on relational organizing, many civic groups have begun to ask the people they contact to mobilize others in their communities. It would be trivial to include in these communications to women a reminder of the importance of social skills to successful recruitment and the disproportionate ability of women to organize. Given the estimates from Chapter 7, even such a nominal treatment may be sufficient for these women to recognize their own capacity and direct

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26. Adjusting for overall lowers levels of political participation did eliminate the difference between men's and women's organizing activity in the model described in Section 9.2. Nevertheless, given expectations of their comparatively high capacity, one would expect that adjusting for this consideration would lead to women having greater rates of recruitment activity than men. Thus, some social force is thought to be countermanding this expected association.

## 9. Conclusion

that ability to political organizing. By randomizing this intervention, scholars could effectively estimate the size of its impact, modeling a similar procedure as adopted in Green and McClellan (2020).

- (6) Those with a greater propensity for political engagement are more negatively affected by perceptions of organizing as unskilled and poorly paid doing to its social character. This helps to explain low overall political organizing compared to the importance given to it by these same actors. By systematically analyzing political job postings, it would be possible to better understand how individuals become employed in advocacy positions and opportunities for intervention to ameliorate this bias.

Socioeconomic status (SES) is a well-documented precursor to political participation. Unfortunately, I found these high-engagement individuals were more detrimentally affected by general perceptions of organizing work as low-skill and poorly paid. I also showed evidence of heterogeneity by whether respondents claimed they would consider working or volunteering for advocacy organizations. Those who would were substantially more negatively affected when the job emphasized its relational components.<sup>27</sup>

This result leaves organizations with two options. First, they may be able to increase organizing by focusing on those with lower SES who are less affected by the work's low economic valuation. However, as mobilizing these marginalized people is a significant motivation for organizing in the first place, it can hardly be viewed as a comprehensive solution. In addition, efforts could be made to raise the status of this work through alternative means – preventing those capable, engaged activists from being drawn into other forms of advocacy activity. Finally, for some, it may be that simply telling them that their decisions are affected by this bias may short circuit their excuses not to organize.

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27. An additional implication is that this may help explain why even those employed as organizers tend to do work other than organizing. This may stem from their preference, within the job, for the tasks they perceive as more valued.

## 9. Conclusion

Nevertheless, before evaluating these interventions, it is worth remembering that there is a gap between attitudes recorded on surveys and people's actual behaviors. Indeed, how the tendency found in my surveys translates into the job search process is ambiguous. Therefore, the next steps for this research agenda should be to bridge that lacuna by using data with greater mundane realism and experimental outcomes involving actual behavioral change. One promising direction is to work with repositories of job postings for advocacy jobs, such as *Idealist.org*, to identify trends in application behavior. In addition to analyzing this data directly for descriptive associations, these postings could be used in an experiment in which the behavioral outcome is applying for the job.

## 9.4 A Personal Dilemma Revisited

Existing scholarship has identified two stylized facts about organizing: (1) that there is not enough of it for the vibrant democracy we desire, and (2) that it is relational work. This dissertation proposed that those two facts are linked: that it is precisely the nature of organizing work that causes its under-supply. Using interviews, survey evidence, and experiments, I demonstrate that organizing is not driven by strategic considerations, explaining the misalignment between what outcomes people value and what work they are willing to do. Instead, I found evidence for the significance of preferences for the interpersonal experience, self-assessments of capacity for interpersonal work, and expectations of how relational labor is valued.

One of the more bizarre statistics emerging from my surveys was that if someone knows what an organizer does – if they report that an organizer is responsible for mobilizing a community affected by an issue – they are a fifth of a standard deviation less willing to be one.<sup>28</sup> When I put recruitment up against other political acts –

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28. This association among the US general population is statistically significant (*Survey C*). Moreover, even controlling for how willing someone is to do six alternative political jobs, knowing what an organizer does decreases willingness to be an organizer by 10% of a standard deviation.

## *9. Conclusion*

logistics, admin, research, data analysis, or publicity – people were on average less willing to recruit than any of them, sometimes by a margin of 2 to 1. In the WVS, only 6.9% of respondents report encouraging others to take action about political issues. Of the seven acts I considered, only participation in a wildcat strike was less common (5.7%). Whether committed to democracy or revolution, recruiting others is beyond the pale. These results feel like a paradox.

Indeed, this dissertation is full of paradoxes. Recruitment requires greater psychological engagement with politics, as shown in Figure 3.1, yet, those most inclined to political action are the most negatively affected by the low social valuation of relational work (Chapter 8). Women are more likely to be talented organizers due to gendered socialization of interpersonal skills, yet they are less likely to have recruited, again due to gendered socialization (Chapter 7). Those who care about individual agency are disinclined to do the work of empowering people's voices out of respect for that agency, while those endowed with moral certitude are investing in others' participation (Chapter 6).

The greatest paradox is the space between how essential people see organizing to be and how willing they are to do it. It is the would-be unionists avoiding recruitment. It is the social movement organization investing in communications specialists and researchers rather than organizers. It is the anti-Apartheid activist who denied the role of individuals in fomenting social change after committing his life to advocacy. It is the ideological graduate student who wrote his dissertation lamenting the underproduction of organizing and proceeded to pursue a career in research rather than recruitment.

These paradoxes exist because activists are just people and do not purely strategically. Politics is a series of decisions made by people constrained by their preferences, abilities, and self-conceptions. While they will often make considerable sacrifices for their ideological convictions, in the process of satisficing their moral convictions, activists will still seek joy, competency, and esteem.

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What work an activist engages in during their pursuit of social change is fundamentally a personal choice and, as such, is largely above reproach. And it is even harder to condemn these choices when they achieve their desired policy outcome. Nevertheless, these personal decisions aggregate, resulting in the loss of organizing's positive externality of building civic culture. By understanding the role of activists as political labor, by centering their choices, we can better understand what political work gets done.

# Appendices





## Extended Discussion of Institutional Causes for Decline in Organizing Activity

*Note:* This appendix is an extended version of the discussion in 2.4. As a result, it includes some repetition from that section.

The primary explanation within the existing literature for the production of organizing is that it results from *strategic* choices made by *leaders* constrained by available opportunity *structures*. Variation in the supply of organizing is the result of structural causes – new technology, social and economic changes, and political reforms – which changed the relative cost of organizing compared to alternative strategies and, thereby, influenced leaders’ decision-making. Yet, embedded in these causes identified from the literature are hints of the role of all the potential *organizers* who individually decide whether or not to do this work.

Two significant technological developments have reshaped the relative costs of advocacy strategies. The first is the rise of *mass media*. Radio, television, and the internet made the shallow contacts, which are effective for activation but not organizing, significantly cheaper (Skocpol 2003; Schier 2000). Historically, communication often required meeting with someone face-to-face. For example, during WWI, President Wilson created an army of 75,000 volunteers called the “Four Minute Men,” who traveled the country to spread information about the war effort (Mastrangelo 2009).<sup>1</sup>

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1. Wilson created the Four-Minute Men as a direct response to the absence of mass media. The Associate Director of the Four Minute Men commented: “How can we reach [the people]? Not through the press, for they do not read; not through patriotic rallies, for they do not come. Every night eight to ten million people of all classes, all degrees of intelligence, black and white, young and old, rich and poor; meet in the moving picture houses of this country, and among them are many of these silent ones who do not read or attend meetings but who must be reached” (quoted in Mastrangelo

### *A. Extended Discussion of Institutional Causes for Decline in Organizing Activity*

These orators were ubiquitous: “it became difficult for half a dozen person to come together without having a Four-Minute Man descend upon them” (contemporaneous journalist Mark Sullivan quoted in Blakey 1970, 57). If the infrastructure for activation is nearly equivalent to that of organizing, the work of one will more easily bleed into the other. But, today, those seeking to influence politics no longer need to rely on these in-person forms of communication; they can buy a TV spot (Skocpol 2003; Schier 2000).

Moreover, the ability to target those with a latent interest has also increased due to technological shifts. It requires the availability of micro-level *data*, the apparatuses to process it, and the data scientists to do that work (Endres and Kelly 2018; Hersh 2015; Barocas 2012; Schier 2000). Activation requires knowledge of whom to activate. In the past, one did not have that knowledge without building comprehensive local networks, which is part of the necessary organizing apparatus. Again, the line between activation and organizing was thin. Now, a wonk in Cambridge can tell you exactly which blocks to canvass and which doors to knock on (Haenschen and Jennings 2019). Reliance on data-driven activation is biased against recruiting disengaged and marginalized people (Jackman and Spahn 2018).

However, television ads have an ephemeral effect on voter preferences (Gerber et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2013; Coppock et al. 2020) and a null effect on voter turnout (Green and Gerber 2015). This tactic is not necessarily the ideal choice for those working to build the strength of a political party, especially since door-to-door canvassing is one of the most cost-effective strategies available (Green and Gerber 2015). However, media campaigns are desirable to the political consultants who take a 15% commission on each media buy (Dulio 2001). The decision is not made just by strategic leaders. The preferences (and pressures) from the strategies’ implementers also matter (Serazio 2014). Similarly, the data for micro-targeted activation had been available for decades before it was widely adopted. As Nickerson points out, “the biggest impediment to wider adoption of data-driven campaigning was simply that statistical thinking and the human capital that produces it had not yet taken root in the world of political consulting” (2014, 52).

Turning from technology to culture, perhaps the most established challenge to effective organizing is heterogeneity among the target population. Ethnic differences, race, and racism have been held responsible for a wide range of failures of collective action (Alesina et al. 1999); from gridlock at city hall (Beach and Jones 2015) to a politically impotent working-class (according to Marx and Engels as discussed in Lipset and Marks 2000). Scholars theorize that the detrimental effect of diversity on collective action is due to differences in preferences, increased transaction costs, decreased ability to sanction free-rider (Habyarimana and Humphreys 2007), and, of course, prejudice (Fullerton and Dixon 2009).

However, while union drives in more diverse workplaces are less successful (Ferguson 2016), unions also increase racial solidarity, facilitating collective action (Frymer

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2009, 607).

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and Grumbach 2020). As discussed in the previous section, organizing tends to focus on local issues and concerns over ideological symbols (Phulwani 2016), allowing for cross-identity coalitions. Indeed, ethnic differences may result from a lack of a history of collective action rather than be its cause (Wimmer 2016). Moreover, identity often is constructed or reinforced by strategic actors who manipulate shared symbols. While there is a limited menu of available symbols, the political entrepreneurs have agency in which ones they choose to center (Kaufman 2001). Both the Knights of Labor and the CIO successfully organized across color lines by focusing on alternative shared identities (Lipset and Marks 2000; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, while Skocpol argues that the taint of racist legacies left American associations unpalatable (2003), a history of fighting for racial justice (Siegel 2013) and disproportionate support among people of color (Bronfenbrenner and Warren 2007) has not allowed the labor movement to weather the decline in civic life.

An often-cited structural change is widespread economic development, resulting in the emergence of the middle class and the broader availability of large-scale donations. Lobbying and activation strategies require technically skilled professional staff: lawyers, researchers, program officers, publicists, and data scientists. As the middle-class rose, such a staff became easier to recruit (Skocpol 2003; Speer and Han 2018). This type of staff also needs to be well paid. The more money available in the social space - due to foundations and middle-class donations - the more advocacy can professionalize.

Moreover, the relative availability of capital made it possible to adopt expensive marketing strategies (Alexander and Nownes 2008) rather than labor-intensive organizing strategies. At the same time, the cost of organizing increased as civic organizations could no longer rely on the unpaid labor of educated women after they entered the workforce (Skocpol 2003). Furthermore, relying on donors made organizations less dependent on dues-paying members, reducing the need to recruit members to fill the coffers (Skocpol 2003). However, why is it inevitable that activists with degrees will choose to become researchers rather than organizers? Why is it inevitable that advocacy organizations use donor funds to hire lawyers rather than organizers?

In addition to social and economic changes, political reforms over the 20th century altered the cost-benefit analysis of different strategies, particularly by increasing opportunities to lobby and constraining existing mobilization structures. The principal among these is the expansion of government. Since the 1930s, the size of government in the US and worldwide has grown immensely. The result is an increase in the number of actors with power available for advocates to lobby. These political openings drew advocates to capitals, where they could vie for a piece of the pie (Skocpol 2003). However, those actors are still governed in democracies by power in the electorate (Mayhew 2004). Thus, organizing should still be a plausible strategy.

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2. The president of the Knights of Labor proclaimed in 1886: “In the field of labor and American citizenship we recognize no line of race, creed, politics or color” (quoted in Powderly 1889).

### *A. Extended Discussion of Institutional Causes for Decline in Organizing Activity*

On the other side of the equation, anti-corruption reforms sapped the strength out of the party machines increasing the relative costs of organizing (Schier 2000). By banning the corrupt spoils and tender practices, which made being a precinct captain in charge of turning out voters<sup>3</sup> a lucrative activity, these reforms reduced individual incentives to organize (Hersh 2020a). However, money did not leave politics, so why did the precinct captain? Campaigns in 2020 paid media companies \$8.5 billion (*Expenditures 2020 Cycle* 2021). That is enough to hire over 100,000 precinct captains at \$80K a year. Political parties could be paying people to organize their communities, likely with more bang for their buck than they get from these media campaigns (Green and Gerber 2015).

Another implication of the change in the funding model is that, reliant on donors, those seeking social change must deliver fast and focus on short-term solutions (Watkins et al. 2012). Organizing is a long-term strategy. It is like compounding interest: each recruit becomes a recruiter. In the end, it is a fortune. But, the curve is exponential. Sitting on the long tail of the curve, leaders, under pressure to deliver, are likely to become impatient. “Those victories that come through mobilizing without organizing may be satisfying in the short term but may ultimately prove to be, in large part, pyrrhic” (E. T. Walker 2015).

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3. While they did engage in vote-buying and coercion, the precinct captains, like patrons worldwide, also did genuine organizing activity: building relationships and trust, helping communities identify needs and generate collective action, and mobilizing voters for policies that benefited them (Hersh 2020a).

# B

## Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing

The language of political organizing goes back at least to the late 19th century (Davies 2010), when academics and journalists described the role of capable political organizers in turning grievances into political action and winning elections. One such example is Henry Demarest Lloyd's study of *Labor Copartnership*: "They wanted relief, and their demands took a political shape because there was a political organizer of unrivaled capacity and persuasiveness, who made them believe that political remedies would set everything right" (1898, 53). Similarly, there are many references to political organizer's role in campaign work, such as: "...an effort is being made to induce Mr. Harrity, of Pennsylvania, to take charge of the political campaign work. Mr. Harrity would be equally efficient, for he has no superior as a political organizer and his success in Pennsylvania is a guarantee of excellent work in the national campaign" ("A Trio of Rascals" 1892). While it was common to use the phrase to refer to mass mobilization activities, it was also used to refer to the political kingmakers who orchestrated powerful coalitions. For example, "There he demonstrated his success as a political organizer, as a director of political campaigns and a maker of governors" (Garner 1926). Given the strategic influence of effective organizing, the association between the two uses of the phrase is not unsurprising.

As can be seen in Figure B.1, the use of the phrases "organizing" and "organizer" in public discourse as a reference to political actions boomed around the Great Depression, primarily driven by an uptick in labor organizing.<sup>1</sup> But, each new social

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1. To avoid contributing to the erasure of socialist activism from American history, it is also important to note that the early 20th century was a period of significant organizing by socialists and

## B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing

movement that hit the American stage brought organizers or at least talk of them. This pattern is visible in the figures at the end of this appendix which present the lexical usage in the US of political organizer phrases for various US movements. A few lay theorists<sup>2</sup> are particularly responsible for the spread and conceptual adaptation of organizing from the labor movement to alternative spaces – particularly civil rights organizer Ella Baker and community organizer Saul Alinsky.<sup>3</sup>

Despite being a longstanding and fundamental form of political advocacy, and the election of a community organizer to the presidency in 2008, the study of “organizing” has only recently entered mainstream political science.<sup>4</sup> As Phulwani wrote in 2016,

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
communists, as visible in B.7. Before the “Second Red Scare,” these activists contributed considerably to the expansion of the labor movement (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Gornick 1978) as well as the struggle for Black Freedom (Kelley 1990). Nevertheless, in the words of CIO President John L. Lewis, “Who gets the bird? The hunter or the dog?” The communists built industrial unions and organized sharecroppers but were then hung out to dry (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Indeed, in perhaps the most ironic turn, during World War 2, the federal government recruited communists as spies due to their skills as organizers and then indicted them for their communist beliefs after the war. “Every government agent in America knew that the Communists were the best organizers in the country and for this reason many were impressed into wartime intelligence work; when the war was over the lot of many of these Communists who had served America hard and well was that of the spy who came in from the cold” (Gornick 1978).

2. It is undoubtedly academic gate-keeping to describe thinkers like Baker and Alinsky as “lay” political theorists, given the breadth of their scholarly activities outside of the academy (Ransby 2003; Phulwani 2016). Amusingly, while Alinsky never earned a Ph.D., he did begin one. He won a Social Science Fellowship to conduct a two-year ethnographic study of Al Capone’s mob. During that research, he learned “lessons that stood [him] in good stead later on, when [he] was organizing” (Norden 1972, 65). Organized crime is, after all, relatively well organized.

3. Ella Baker studied with radical labor organizers at Brookwood Labor College (Inouye 2021) and worked with the CIO to organize shipyard workers in Virginia (Ransby 2003). Alinsky similarly cut his teeth with the CIO and deliberately applied the same strategies “to the worst slums and ghettos, so that the most oppressed and exploited elements could take control of their own communities and their own destinies. Up till then, specific factories and industries had been organized for social change, but never entire communities. This was the field I wanted to make my own - community organization for community power and for radical goals” (Norden 1972, 65).

4. In *the American Review of Political Science*, excluding book reviews, there are only eleven articles out of roughly 6800 articles that make direct reference to political “organizing” or “organizers” in their title or abstract; of which more than half were published in the last decade. These include three theoretical treatises (Inouye 2021; Phulwani 2016; Gilbert 1979), three studies of the historical use of organizing to achieve collective action (Carpenter and Moore 2014; Skocpol et al. 2000; Miller 1938), two references to organizing as a necessary strategy to address normative political issues (Dragu and Przeworski 2019; Bracic 2016), an evaluation of organizing as a solution to the collective action problem (R. M. Dawes et al. 1986), the role of organizing in rebellion (Parkinson 2013), and one study of the incentives for institutions to organize (Wallerstein 1989). Usage of these two phrases in the discipline’s flagship journal merely indicates a trend and certainly does not include all studies of the subject. In particular, this method excludes studies that evaluate organizing under an alternative moniker, such as Hahrie Han’s “The Organizational Roots of Political Activism” (2016). Nevertheless, that only 0.2% of articles reference organizing is surprising, especially since the *APSR* published a review of five practitioner guides for organizers – including Alinsky’s *Rules for Radicals* – in 1976, demonstrating an awareness of the practice (Marshall 1976).

B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing



**Figure B.1: Estimated usage of the terms “organizing” and “organizer” in political contexts by decade between the 1910s and the 2000s.** Data from the *Corpus of Historical American English* (Davies 2010), the largest structured corpus of historical English. This text repository includes over 115,000 texts produced between 1810 and 2009, 475 million words, and 7 million bigrams. All bigrams in which the second word was “organizer,” “organizers,” or “organizing” were evaluated for their likely political connotation. 27 bigrams of those 112 bigrams were considered political. Of those, six were clear references to labor organizing (60.5% of political references over the whole period), and four were to community organizing (11.4%).

“the figure of the organizer has been conspicuously absent... [the discipline] remains bewitched by the figure of the Weberian statesman” (Phulwani 2016). The recent empirical boom has been spearheaded by the groundbreaking work of Theda Skocpol and her collaborators (2000; 2003, 2004; 2011; 2019) and, more recently, Hahrie Han and her collaborators (Han 2009; McKenna and Han 2014; Han 2014a, 2014b; Han et al. 2015; Han 2016; Speer and Han 2018; Han and Barnett-Loro 2018).<sup>5</sup> Fortunately, while organizing’s presence in political science is relatively recent, many related areas of established scholarship touch on the practice: mobilization and recruitment, political entrepreneurship, political participation, social capital, social movements, and collective action. Moreover, political organizing has a much more developed scholarship in

5. Additionally, the contributions of organizers Alinsky and Baker, as well as Baker’s prot’eg’e Robert Moses, to ideas of politics, civil society, and democracy have recently received attention from political theorists (Inouye 2021; Phulwani 2016; Sabl 2002).

## *B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing*

practitioner-oriented disciplines such as social work, public policy, and labor studies. Therefore, despite its relative novelty, a rather comprehensive understanding of organizing, its practice, and its significance can be pieced together from existing research.

### **B.1 Usage of organizer phrases from 1900 to 2019 for various political movements**


The below plots estimate the usage of “organizer” as a political term for eight political contexts in the United States. Usage was evaluated for “organizer” or “organizer” with a relevant prefix (in the singular and the plural) – such as a movement name, the names of key organizations, or common descriptor for members of that movement. Efforts were made to be comprehensive, but some relevant terms may have been missed.

The y-axis indicates usage as a percent of the maximum usage of labor movement organizer phrases during the same period to establish a comparable standard, as the overall frequency in the corpus has little resonance. For each plot, the prefixes included are indicated. Additional prefixes were tested and excluded if absent from the dataset. All data runs from 1900 to 2019. Significant dates are indicated to contextualize usage patterns, not to indicate causality. These events were identified after the fact by looking for potentially related events corresponding to inflection points.


Data comes from the *Google Ngram Viewer* using the US English corpus and retrieved via the “ngramr” package (Carmody 2022).



B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing




**Figure B.2: Black Freedom Struggle Usage** with the prefixes: abolitionist, civil rights, black, negro, colored, NAACP, UNIA, BCSP, CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and Black Panther.



**Figure B.3: Community Organizers:** Usage with the prefixes: community, grassroots, IAF, ACORN, and NWRO.

*B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing*



**Figure B.4: Labor Organizers:** Usage with the prefixes: labor, union, industrial, trade-union, strike, worker, steelworkers, teamster, AFL, CIO, AFL-CIO, IWW, ACWA, AFSCME, AFT, BCSP, CWA, IAM, IBEW, IBT, ILGWU, NEA, SEIU, UAW, UE, ILWU, SWOC, TWU, UFW, UMW, and UMWA.

B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing




Figure B.5: LGBTQ Movement Organizers: Usage with the prefixes: gay, lesbian, LGBT, queer, gay rights, and AIDS.






Figure B.6: Peace Organizers: Usage with the prefixes: peace, war, anti-war, antiwar, draft, anti-draft.

*B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing*



**Figure B.7: Left/Socialist Organizers:** Usage with the prefixes: communist, communist party, CPUSA, socialist, anarchist, social democratic, leftist, and left.



**Figure B.8: Student/Youth Organizers:** Usage with the prefixes: student, youth, college, university, SDS, Yippie, and New Left.

B. Historical Usage of the Term Organizing in Scholarly and Public Writing




Figure B.9: Women's Rights Organizers: Usage with the prefixes: suffrage, feminist, and women's rights, NAWSA, CU, and NOW.



## Extended Discussion of US and South African Case Selection

The United States has long been considered the exemplar of civil society (A. Tocqueville 1835). Associational life there is deeply valued and highly studied, as is evident in the reliance on the American case in the existing literature on political organizing. Yet, despite a recent resurgence in civic activism (Skocpol and Tervo 2019) and voter turnout (Desilver 2021), associational life is far from its pre-Watergate highs (Skocpol 2003; Putnam 2000; McDonald and Popkin 2001; Schier 2000) and particularly working-class activism remains in free fall (McAlevey 2019). The US is therefore an important case, both to understand empirically and because it allows this research to be in active dialogue with current scholarship (e.g. Han 2014a; Ganz and McKenna 2018; Skocpol 2019; Hersh 2020a).

South Africa has one of the most vibrant civil societies in the developing world (Lehman 2008). These civic organizations took down Apartheid, mobilized an overwhelming majority for the ANC, and successfully took on international pharmaceutical companies (Friedman and Mottiar 2004). Yet, today South Africa has seen a worrying deterioration in civic engagement. Voter turnout has slipped by 23% between 1999 and 2019 (IFES 2022). This was in part a political decision. As one interview subject who spent over a decade as part of the ANC government and helped draft the 1996 constitution, commented that after the end of Apartheid, the “ANC government wanted to confine its own forces to barracks.” But that decision was made, in part, due to the opening up of alternative avenues to political influence – which do not require investing in the engagement of citizens. Understanding agents who might be investing in engagement in this context, where participation is slipping and inequality remains

### *C. Extended Discussion of US and South African Case Selection*

high, yet where democracy has demonstrably improved peoples lives (Lieberman 2022), is undeniably important.

Both these countries have robust civil liberties and strong legacy of association and organization. Indeed, South Africa had roughly 2,700 “law, advocacy, and politics” non-profits registered with the government, 1 organization for every 20,000 people (Lehohla 2015) and the US has more than 48,000 “social advocacy” and “civic” associations, employing more than 600,000 people, one organizations for every 6,800 people (BLS 2020) There are plenty of potential organizers around.

Yet, while similar in this way, South Africa and the US differ on many important political, economic, and social structures. It is a new democracy, with constitutional rights unheard of in 1776, and yet where power has never changed hands between parties at the national level. It uses proportional representation, as opposed to a majoritarian system. It maintains “traditional authorities” alongside democratic governance, facilitating “clientalistic” structures. It is a middle-income country with the highest level of economic inequality in the world and a quarter of its workforce unemployed. Finally, the country has no clear ethnolinguistic hegemony, and, unlike the US, the historically disadvantaged racial group is now the electoral majority. As a result of these highly distinct characteristics, if I observe similar behavior in these two contexts, this variation is less likely to be driven by some unconsidered opportunity structure.

# D

## South African Interview Subjects

I orchestrated 43 original interviews in Cape Town (CPT) and Johannesburg (JHB). Interviews were conducted by either the author (Self = Yes) or research assistants trained by the author (Self = No). Subjects were recruited either through personal networks of the author (GR = No) or via a collaboration with Grassroots (GR = Yes), a South African civic tech organization. All interviews relied exclusively on handwritten notes.

Key demographics of interview subjects are reported below, including race, class, gender, age, current role, current organization type, former roles, and former organizations. Categories are generalized to allow for maximum anonymity. For race, the category “coloured” is a common designation in South Africa, indicating both those of mixed White and Black heritage and descendants of the Khoisan. All respondents identified their gender as either male or female.

Current and former organizational affiliations among subjects include:

1. Litigation: Social justice law firm
2. Local: Informal community based advocacy organization
3. Media: News media
4. Party: Political party
5. Religious: Religious or faith-based organization
6. Service: Direct service organization
7. SMO: Social movement organization
8. Support: Advocacy support organization
9. Think Tank: Advocacy research either within academia or a think tank
10. Union: Trade union



Table D.1: South African Interview Subjects.

Loc.	Self	GR	Race	Class	Gender	Age	Current Role	Former Role	Current Org.	Former Org.	
1	CPT	Yes	No	Coloured	Middle	Male	30s	Researcher, Trainer	Researcher, Organizer, Management	Support	SMO, Service, Think Tank
2	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Female	30s	Researcher	Lawyer, Organizer, Trainer, Researcher, Management	SMO	SMO
3	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Female	30s	Organizer		SMO	
4	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Male	Middle	Organizer		SMO	
5	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Male	20s	Management, Organizer	Researcher	SMO	SMO
6	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Middle	Male	30s	Lawyer		Litigation	Litigation
7	CPT	Yes	No	White	Middle	Female	30s	Researcher	Journalist	SMO	Media
8	CPT	Yes	No	Coloured	Upper Working	Male	20s	Researcher, Organizer		Support	
9	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Upper Working	Male	Middle-Age	Management, Organizer	Organizer, Trainer, Researcher, Management	Support, Local	Party, SMO, Union
10	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Upper Working	Male	30s	Management	Organizer	SMO	SMO
11	CPT	Yes	No	White	Upper	Male	20s	Trainer	Organizer, Management, Researcher	Service	Think Tank, Local
12	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Female	20s	Management	Organizer	SMO	
13	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Female	Middle-Age	Organizer		SMO	

**Table D.1:** South African Interview Subjects. *(continued)*

Loc.	Self	GR	Race	Class	Gender	Age	Current Role	Former Role	Current Org.	Former Org.	
14	CPT	Yes	No	White	Upper Middle	Male	Elderly	Researcher	Organizer, Management, Politician	Think Tank	Party, Union
15	JHB	Yes	No	White	Upper	Male	30s	Researcher		Think Tank	SMO, Think Tank
16	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Female	30s	Organizer		Local	Party
17	JHB	Yes	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Local	
18	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Female	20s	Organizer		Local	
19	JHB	Yes	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Male	30s	Management	Organizer	Party	Local
20	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Party	Local
21	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Female	30s	Organizer		Service	
22	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	40s	Minister		Religious	
23	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Male	20s	Organizer		Service	
24	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Upper Working	Male	30s	Social Worker		Service	
25	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	30s	Admin		Local	
26	JHB	Yes	Yes	Black	Working	Male	Middle-Age	Organizer		Support, Local	
27	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	40s	Organizer, Admin		Local	
28	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Party	

**Table D.1:** South African Interview Subjects. *(continued)*

	<b>Loc.</b>	<b>Self</b>	<b>GR</b>	<b>Race</b>	<b>Class</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Current Role</b>	<b>Former Role</b>	<b>Current Org.</b>	<b>Former Org.</b>
29	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Upper Working	Female	50s	Organizer, Admin		Local, Union	
30	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Local	
31	JHB	Yes	No	Black	Middle	Male	Middle-Age	Organizer		Support	Service
32	JHB	Yes	Yes	Coloured	Upper Working	Male	Middle-Age	Organizer		Local	
33	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Upper Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Local	
34	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Working	Female	40s	Admin		Local	
35	JHB	No	Yes	Black	Upper Working	Male	Middle-Age	Organizer, Management		SMO	
36	JHB	Yes	Yes	Black	Lower Working	Male	Middle-Age	Organizer		Local	
37	JHB	Yes	No	Black	Lower Working	Male	20s	Management	Organizer	Support	Local
38	JHB	Yes	No	Black	Lower Working	Male	30s	Organizer		Support	Local
39	JHB	Yes	No	Black	Lower Working	Female	30s	Organizer		Support	Local
40	JHB	Yes	No	Black	Middle	Female	Middle-Age	Organizer	Admin	Support	Service
41	CPT	Yes	No	White	Upper Middle	Male	30s	Researcher	Management	Think Tank	SMO
42	CPT	Yes	No	White	Upper	Male	Middle-Age	Researcher	Organizer	Think Tank	SMO, Union
43	CPT	Yes	No	Black	Working	Female	20s	Management, Organizer	Organizer	SMO	SMO
											*



# Protocol for South African Interviews

## **Consent**

- Participation is voluntary.
- Subjects may decline to answer any or all questions.
- Subjects may decline further participation, at any time, without adverse consequences.
- Confidentiality and/or anonymity are assured.

## **My Project:**

- am trying to understand how policy advocates select the strategies they use.

## **Personal background**

- Can you tell me a little about your background in activism?
  - How did you end up working in advocacy?
  - How did you end up working in advocacy at [current org]?
  - Have you worked for any other advocacy organizations?
  - Do you have a background in your church community? A union
- Did you go through any “political education programs” yourself?
  - What impact do you think these had on you?
  - On the way you think change happens?
- How do you think social and political change happens in society?

### *E. Protocol for South African Interviews*

- Who do you think has power in society?
  - How do you think power changes in society?
- Do you identify with any particular political ideologies?
  - How does this effect your understanding of power?
- When you think of cases of successful activism what comes to mind?
  - Why do you think those were successful?
  - Why do you think Apartheid ended?
- How comfortable are you talking to people you don't know about politics / the campaign?
  - Why do you think you feel this way?
  - Have you done that in previous activism?
- What type of work do you do at [current org]?
  - What type of work do you like to do?
  - What other types of advocacy work happen at [current org]?
  - How do you think these activities create change?
- How would you describe the way [current org] creates change?
  - What kinds of strategies do you use in your policy advocacy?
  - Why do you use those strategies?
  - How does [current org] decide on the strategies they adopt?
  - How do you decide when to stop using a tactic or strategy?
- Do you ever recruit people to participate in political activities either for your work at [current org] or other activities?
  - What kinds of actions do you ask of them?
  - Who do you target?
  - How do you recruit?
  - Do you ever ask volunteers to recruit?
- How important is getting new members to accomplish your advocacy goals?
  - Should you do more recruiting?
  - [If Yes...] Why aren't you?
  - Are other people recruiting? Why do they do it instead of you?

## *E. Protocol for South African Interviews*

### **Logistics**

- Snowball: I am trying to get an understanding about how these decisions get made, is there anyone else or any other organizations you would recommend that I chat with?
- One thing I am potentially hoping to do is attempt to do a broad survey of activists working in South African politics – from rank & file members to leadership. Do you think this is something you all might be interested in.
- Another thing I am trying to do is assess the impact of different types of organizer trainings and political education on activists willingness to adopt different strategies. This could be overlaid onto an existing program and/or a program evaluation of a program. Do you think that is something you all might be interested in?
- Have you done any of its own evaluations of the activist community?
- Has [current org] gone through a reevaluation of its strategies that might have records?

# F

## Index of Experiments with Links to Pre-Analysis Plans

**Table F.1:** Index of Experiments

Section	Experiment	Description	Survey	Date	Sample	Pre-Analysis Plan
5.3	Theory of Power	Vignette experiment comparing effect of exposure to media attributing the success of the NRA to membership or to campaign contributions.	B	2019-08	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/9gnzh">https://osf.io/9gnzh</a>
5.4	Theory of Change	Vignette experiment comparing effect of exposure to media attributing the emergence of the BLM protests to organizers or events.	G	2020-10	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/7hfvk">https://osf.io/7hfvk</a>
5.6, 6.4 - 6.5	Advocacy Task I	Hypothetical decision of whether to do a recruitment task randomly varying components of the choice.	H	2020-12	US Diverse	
5.6, 6.3 - 6.5	Advocacy Task II	Hypothetical decision of whether to do a recruitment task randomly varying components of the choice.	I	2021-06	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/9ck3r">https://osf.io/9ck3r</a>
7.4 - 7.5	Social Intelligence I	Priming experiment randomly informing respondents whether their genuine social intelligence scores are above / below average.	A	2019-07	US Diverse	
7.4 - 7.5	Social Intelligence II	Priming experiment randomly informing respondents whether their genuine social intelligence scores are above average.	F	2020-09	SA Activists	
7.4 - 7.5	Social Intelligence III	Priming experiment randomly informing respondents whether their genuine social intelligence scores are above average.	G	2020-10	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/xf86a">https://osf.io/xf86a</a>
8.4, 8.6	Job Description I	Exposure to job description of organizer or researcher job varying whether it emphasizes requirements for social skills or cognitive skills.	E	2020-06	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/x8h64">https://osf.io/x8h64</a>



**Table F.1:** Index of Experiments (*continued*)

Section	Experiment	Description	Survey	Date	Sample	Pre-Analysis Plan
8.4 - 8.5	Job Description II	Exposure to job description of organizer job varying the degree to which it emphasizes requirements for social skills or cognitive skills.	G	2020-10	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/j3an9">https://osf.io/j3an9</a>
8.4 - 8.6	Job Description III	Exposure to job description of organizer job varying whether it emphasizes requirement for social skills or cognitive skills.	J	2021-09	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/3kvha">https://osf.io/3kvha</a>
8.7	Job Description IV	Hypothetical decision to choose organizer or alternative job varying whether organizer job emphasizes requirements for social or cognitive skills.	K	2021-12	US Diverse	<a href="https://osf.io/d7ktq">https://osf.io/d7ktq</a>



## Vignette Experiments

### **G.1 Section 5.2 - Study 1: Reshaping Theories of Power**

#### **G.1.1 “People Power” Prime**

##### **It’s Not the NRA’s Money that Sways Politics: It’s the Members**

Before the short special session in Virginia on gun control earlier this week, hundreds of gun rights advocates poured into the city block around the state capitol and legislative building. They wore shirts and hats with the National Rifle Association’s logo and sported bright orange “Guns Save Lives” stickers.

And when Republicans abruptly voted to adjourn until November while the State Crime Commission studies proposed gun legislation, it was the Fairfax-based NRA that was the focus of Democrats’ ire. “The Republicans in this state are totally controlled — I mean 100 percent — controlled by the National Rifle Association,” Senate Minority Leader Dick Saslaw, D-Fairfax, told *The Washington Post*.

Analysts and people who work in Virginia politics say the power of the NRA comes from the sheer number of voters who align themselves with the organization and show up at the polls and in front of lawmakers, especially in solid red districts where politicians’ biggest fear is a primary challenge from the right. “It’s their capacity to mobilize people at election time,” said Bob Holsworth, a longtime Virginia political analyst. “It’s a better strategy to have the grassroots support than it is to pump dollars in.”

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The NRA has donated less than a million dollars total to state lawmakers since 1996. “The National Rifle Association’s strength comes from our nearly 5 million members,” said Catherine Mortensen, spokesperson for the NRA.

**Original Source:** Hankerson (2019)

### **G.1.2 Money in Politics Prime**

#### **The NRA Placed Big Bets on the 2016 Election, and Won Almost All of Them**

The 2016 election results mark a continuation of the NRA’s impressive success rate when making large investments on candidates. The gun rights group placed multimillion-dollar bets on Donald Trump and six Republican Senate candidates locked in highly competitive races. It poured \$50.2 million, or 96 percent of its total outside spending, into these races, and lost only one.

The NRA’s investment, which was more than any other outside group, paid for a slew of ads that directly targeted the same voters who propelled Trump to victory. In October alone, according to the Center for Public Integrity, roughly one out of every 20 television ads in Pennsylvania was sponsored by the NRA. That same month, the group paid for one in nine ads in North Carolina, and one of every eight in Ohio. Trump won all three states, and the NRA’s preferred Senate candidates also swept to victory.

The 2016 election results represent a continuation of the NRA’s impressive success rate when making substantial investments in closely-contested races. Over the three prior election cycles, the group disbursed \$1 million dollars or more toward 14 congressional races, and achieved its desired outcome 11 times. To help Republicans win back the Senate in 2014, it spent \$20.6 million dollars on five key races in the upper chamber, and in each of them, its preferred candidate won.

**Original Source:** Spies and Balcerzak (2016)

## **G.2 Section 5.3 - Study 2: Varying the Origin of Collective Action**

### **G.2.1 The “Organizer” Prime**

#### **Youth-led group behind Columbia’s Black Lives Matter protest**

Two young activists, who previously worked together on March For Our Lives Maryland, started brainstorming ideas to bring the nationwide Black Lives Matter

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movement into their own community. They started making calls and sending texts. Recruiting 15 other activists, the group organized the largest protest in Howard County history. Many of the organizers knew each other from previous inclusion and diversity events. It only took five days for the first text about organizing to become a march that thousands joined.

During a Zoom training the night before the protest, an activist who has organized protests and large-scale events in the past, trained the organizers in crowd control. The group also brainstormed ways to maintain social distancing due to coronavirus concerns; they lined up medics to be available to assist, they purchased first aid kits for the organizers and they got the support of urgent care in the area just in case.

For now, the organizers are moving on to next steps.

**Source:** Faguy (2020)

## **G.2.2 The “Spontaneous” Prime**

### **Today’s Activism: Spontaneous and Leaderless**

Welcome to 21st-century activism, where spontaneous and leaderless movements have been defined by their organic births and guided on the fly by people whose preferences, motivations and ideas may not always align.

But the absence of organized leadership does not mean the movements — from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street to Black Lives Matter — are rudderless. Leveraging technology that was unavailable to earlier generations, the activists of today have a digital playbook. Often, it begins with an injustice captured on video and posted to social media. Demonstrations are hastily arranged, hashtags are created and before long, thousands have joined the cause. “This is much more than an organization. This is much more than an individual.”

These days, social media is the strongest, most prominent leader. Young activists announce the location of an action or protest on Twitter or Instagram, and within an hour, scores of people are there. Today’s young activists avoid leaders.

**Source:** Eligon and Freytas-Tamura (2020)

# H

## Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment

As part of the advocacy task choice experiment, respondents were asked: “Were there any other considerations that influenced your choice of which task to do?” I processed these responses to remove answers that lacked content. The removed responses included non-answers (e.g., blank, NA, do not care, yes/no), descriptions of general affect (i.e., like/dislike task), incomprehensible answers, and meta-responses about the survey. After processing, there are 245 viable responses among the 1,134 people who selected the recruitment task and 531 responses from the 2,004 who selected the alternative. Below are the responses after processing.

### **H.1 Chose Recruitment Task**

1. To interact with other people and hear there opinion
2. Like talking to people
3. I would rather work with people
4. I am charming and usually have the ability to get others to follow.
5. My ability to like people
6. I think for a recruiting position you need someone that is right for the job. A people person someone that is able to read people go out communicate and find people that are great for the job. While they themselves are representing the company are basically selling the company to these people and the tasks and the demands and requirements of these peopl3s
7. Closer procsimity to the people

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

8. Working with others was more comfortable to me
9. I'm a great recruiter and have a lot of friends that would love to help me
10. Not any one thing, but I thought, on the whole, I could perform this task with little problems.
11. No I just thought the recruitment one would be more fun
12. What would I feel more comfortable doing and could it be done with E-Mail or a similar method ?
13. I like to avoid publicity.
14. I am not technically savvy so my attempts would not generate significant results in this area. I have worked in Human Resources executive positions and have sat on numerous volunteer community boards, currently volunteering in a non-profit in our local community, so feel the would be my best option.
15. I'm not sure honestly
16. would rather not perform publicity acts
17. It seems easier to Do This
18. Not really. It just seem like the best choice to include everyone in the community
19. I have done recruiting in my previous career and I think it would be best for me
20. yes I am n ot tech saavy
21. Not really. How good I think I am at it, how effective I could be, the important of it.
22. People need to be involved and hands on approach
23. don't work with computers well
24. Yes, I figured that if I picked recruiting that I would be able to use my personable skills and persuasive abilities
25. You can't just jump to logical tasks you need people for what ever reason it is
26. if i joined of course id want others to be in something i believe in
27. I thought the recruitment tool was more important and would make my supervisor think my priorities were in order.
28. No except the research should be done prior to the recruitment process so that the most accurate and thorough information to disseminate.
29. I want to get things done properly
30. Although I would do either task successfully, I want to maximize my impact and do what is the more important job.
31. Im afraid talking in public id be better talking to people one on one to ask them to join our cause i could do that best
32. Its very importantly
33. I am a people person but not a showman
34. not to computer savy and I think one on one is a great way to determine if the person is qualified or not.
35. Having the correct and true knowledge of the organization asked about and not hear say.
36. Think recruitment would be more active

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

37. The person that asked me to make the choose felt that recruiting was the more important task.
38. It was one-on-one, not public speaking.
39. I have a lot of charisma and am a very likeable, persuasive person. And modest, too.
40. Have to go with what is going to make my task stronger and solid.
41. I'm not sure if I can ask people to help. That is unless I know them somewhat
42. The more people involved the more ideas will surface.
43. That the article said by recruiting more, more could get done.
44. I like talking to people so my choice was very easy
45. None. I am a people person. I am very comfortable talking to large and small groups even if they are strangers.
46. Group effort is most effective
47. I think being a leader is good. But if you can do a job where you are recruiting people to enter the workforce I think that is also good.
48. Because i was advised that this was the most important factor
49. I have excellent people skills.
50. It just sounded like the task that I could best handle
51. The requirements for each.
52. I think that the more people involved with the same frame of mind can get more done
53. My family and friends would be bothered
54. I would consider the recruiting acquaintances as a first avenue and if not successful, perhaps go to a publicity task.
55. I thought that was the most effective way to spend my time.
56. Interactions with others
57. its very good and nice, people like it alot
58. My manager said that it was the more important of the two tasks
59. yes, it also depends on the topic
60. I like to work with people
61. I think I would better help by interviewing people
62. I like the freedom offered in recruiting people; it's basic social interaction with others and depends a lot on your ability to interact with others.
63. I don't do publicity
64. I like working with people and being in recruiting will let me do this.
65. influenced
66. My knowledge and work experience in recruiting individuals very successfully.
67. Gathering people together and getting them motivation is very important for a project
68. more people its better to get organized
69. I'd rather do over phone
70. I get along with people and think I could do well in this project.

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

71. How much information would have been needed
72. I like the option of recruiting and my history provides that to me
73. That the supervisor said recruiting would be the most beneficial.
74. Like the idea of a personal approach to this
75. I can research and give out instructions and information on what zi need fairly well.
76. preferring the logistical task but knowing most people also do, in pref we ence to recruiting!
77. If i believe in what they are doing
78. just have to think of whats best
79. That I enjoy doing things outside the box
80. It was the most important job
81. I have been President of a few different organizations so I am very comfortable talking to people and persuading people to do things. I would rather interact with people than sit at a desk and do data entry. I am a people person and that is where I think those skills could be used.
82. I am a people person
83. I think numbers are very important
84. Recruiting was more important
85. Recruitment was the most important task
86. Good to
87. I wanted to the option that would lead to a bigger and better outcome
88. Time
89. more people brings more voices to the cause
90. I am not comfortable with technology , but I am comfortable with people
91. I would decide based on what the group needed to be successful as a group and use my talents towards achieving that. That is the main important thing in working in a group.
92. Seems easy to try to recruit people if they are aware of what it's for an already show interest
93. People tend to listen to a person who can speak clearly and with passion.. That's me.
94. I have lots of experience hosting big parties
95. Recruiting helps more with more than people doing more tasks.
96. recruitment was the prime objective, so I chose to recruit
97. Re suiting helps meet new people and getting to learn their abilities
98. I am a people person
99. Not technical minded. Have done recruiting duties in the past with much success.
100. I am not computer savvy so working on databases would be a struggle for me. It is not something I would want to do.
101. I think more people helping out would be of great benefit and I would be able to recruit them.



*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

102. I used to hire people to work in a bank. So, I think I would be qualified to recruiter.
103. I'm more of a socialized people person
104. To be honest I wouldn't participate in such a project because I wouldn't want to recruit people to advocate for something that I don't believe in
105. I dont like publicity
106. It just seemed like the less peopley, public speaking option.
107. Not sure what the publicity task would entail.
108. It would be easy to email people.
109. No just how I feel about certain things after I read them
110. People have power, and can make a bigger difference
111. Money
112. I am not a public speaker. I like to work behind the scenes. I am a very good talker and I am good at persuasion when I believe in what I am doing.
113. I have a large group of friends and acquaintenances that I think I could recruit.
114. After reading the scenario, I determined that recruitment was more important than research.
115. Challenges people to do something
116. i am not leaving the house so it has to be done by the internet
117. None really just my preferred method
118. Effective management
119. I strongly believe that one on one interview will be more reliable than use of any databases
120. Recruiting seemed to be simple
121. I like talking to people
122. If recruiting people bolsters the organization's ability to do good work for the community, then it's worth trying to recruit the right people.
123. It is better to be part of the recruiting to give voice to my own opinions as well as others around me and can find out what is needed in the community so our leaders can know.
124. I am a people person! I am very convincing and respectfully argumentative and factual.
125. I love been in the midst of people
126. When you talk to someone in person you can judge by their emotions and how they really feel.
127. Their qualifications
128. Get people that need jobs to join the organization, because I think they will get the job done and it will help them out in the future.
129. I choosed recruiting more staffs is better and safer in exchange of good ideas to move the organization forward
130. My upbringing
131. I enjoy both things but think i could make a bigger difference recruiting than

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- administrative
132. I would not want an administration task.
  133. Family
  134. I like to talk to new people
  135. I'm a people person
  136. I like socializing
  137. influence others to publicly show to people how covid is scary.
  138. No there weren't any other considerations that influenced my choice.
  139. I love people's company and I enjoy meeting new people
  140. It's easy to talk to people
  141. Public speaking
  142. Educating united people
  143. I like recruiting people
  144. It's just so unique for me. I love it
  145. Making decisions is something we do every day, so I wanted to find out more about how this process works and what affects the choices we make. It turns out, there are some really interesting ways our decisions are affected that I never would have guessed. Luckily, we can take action to improve most of these.
  146. Because I am satisfied with this
  147. I considered that if I recruit more people to join the organization, that the task would be carried out easier and faster. I believe in division of labor
  148. Always a people person.
  149. I believe up close is the most effective way to recruit.
  150. I want to help out my friends and family
  151. call people to ask for their help
  152. Yes. The fact that I got to give people a chance to do more for the community
  153. I love talking to people and I love recruiting people and telling them to do something
  154. I like Recurrent task. I am alarmed by reports of poor performance at these public schools. Education is a top priority for me, and I will continue to fight for good education in my community. I am proud of all that my office has accomplished on education, but ultimately, I am not responsible for the poor performance in this school district.
  155. I enjoy working with the public that is why I chose this task other than that being out of an office setting is a plus
  156. The person asking me to do the task.
  157. It would help better the company/project.
  158. The recruiting is what gets the word out.
  159. No I love communication with people love meeting and greeting
  160. Considering the fact of truth
  161. I think I can be persuasive, hence choose the job that I am good at.
  162. Yes: someone within the company in a position of authority said recruitment

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- was important, so I chose that task.
163. I feel people need to be educated on what the government goes about it's business. There is no one side that causes gridlock, intact it is the result of multiple parties and interests gumming up the works.
  164. who would help me from the group - maybe they had done this before
  165. Meeting up with given details and awesome for more to deal with
  166. it seemed like a better fit for me
  167. TALKING TO PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERSTED
  168. I feel talking to people personally for recruiting works better than publicity tasks.
  169. I enjoy teaching people ways to help their community
  170. I'd like to have people that are honest
  171. I feel that the computer is impersonal. I feel more comfortable talking to people physically.
  172. Recruiting the right people with the required skillset plus remuneration to enhance the motivation of the workforce
  173. in my home i complete my tusk there
  174. Recruitment would really boost the organization
  175. How it helps the impact on our environment
  176. No, because I've been in leadership positions and have done good jobs in completing goals with people.
  177. i am interested
  178. Recruiting gives more opportunity to know different opinions in camera
  179. I like to lead
  180. Offers reward
  181. I am not very good with numvers and reading figures upon figures or pages upon pages is not my thing as I grow older
  182. I can approach people and give them opportunities they've been searching for
  183. I just feel more confident doing the recruiting task.
  184. That I am very good at recruitment and discussing issues that are important to me and being persuasive
  185. Recruitment allows you to see the applicant for who they are and what they stand for, as well as accessing the roles perfect for them in the organization
  186. The political system is broken.
  187. Didn't want to do a publicly task
  188. Based on my personality I chose the task.
  189. What would give the most realistic outlook of the community.
  190. First of all I am not that good on database and I'm very good around people I could convince people and give them the choice to either go with it or not
  191. Research is very important to gather information
  192. Love talking with people
  193. I think it's always better to follow your organization's advise sometimes
  194. I love discussing with people to hear their views

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

195. I personally feel like recruiting other people is very good especially when you need others opinion about something It's always good to work with other people you learn a lot and you will find out that there's more into Working all alone I'm having different types of mindset
196. I felt it was important to give others a voice.
197. politics
198. I need to move around and not do the same things every day. Recruiting means communicating with different people.
199. You have to still believe the goodness in people overall unless it's somebody like trump
200. Majority should rule
201. Yes better to do hands on
202. More people involved more ideas can help
203. Yes. Just not thinking about it and just getting it done.
204. People are always needed to help organizations.
205. I was afraid that the publicity task would involve speaking to people that I do not know.
206. I think if you believe in the idea you should proceed. To recruit new members and you believe in the company it would be an advantage to recruit new members
207. The boredom and repetitive nature of data base work
208. I am more of a behind the scenes person. I love people and talking with them, but I am not a person who likes to be front and center. I can be a leader just as much behind the scenes.
209. I like to plan events.
210. I considered my ability to adequately express myself and communicate the need for their participation
211. I think we have a big task in front of us but I think if we come together and think about the task at hand things will come together in the end
212. Understanding and communication skill between each other and communication skill
213. I like to give parties and have people enjoy themselves.
214. It was the most important task.
215. I was not sure what the administrative tasks would be and if I were qualified
216. My fear of public speaking.
217. My usual work involves substantial administrative tasks. I need a break from these and prefer the recruitment aspects.
218. Experience
219. The courage and relation with others
220. People need to know the facts and they probably don't ,you know the Media doesn't want you to know anything important that doesn't go with their agenda
221. I thought I would do a better job of talking to people who were already interested because I could explain the advantages derived from them becoming participants.

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- 222. I have done such work in the past involving other disenfranchised groups such as homeless people, substance abusers, and psychiatric disabled.
- 223. you must consider the available pool of available people
- 224. I felt that recruiting was a helpful choice.
- 225. the more people active are important for the cause
- 226. I just enjoy getting people to join a good cause
- 227. To vividly know those i will be working with
- 228. I do have a hard time asking people to get involved
- 229. Yes . It was known that more hands were need on deck so it was very important to recruit additional team members.
- 230. The interest factor of the task.
- 231. It seemed easier
- 232. I like to communicate so i'd recruit more.
- 233. The administration task could wait, while the recruiting would be more beneficial to be done first
- 234. I'm not sure what logistical tasks are
- 235. Since I was told that recruiting would be the most helpful thing, I wanted to do that to be as helpful as I could.
- 236. I just don't like to do publicity stuff, but do enjoy talking to people and encouraging them
- 237. I am always willing to assist people and organizations who improve our country
- 238. I thought talking to people might be interesting.
- 239. I have always enjoyed hiring and recruitment in my careers so I felt it was a good fit
- 240. Helps people
- 241. I believe knowing a person and knowing about them is the best way to recruit a person
- 242. I have people skills so i should do what i am best at for my team....
- 243. Recruiting people that have skills
- 244. meeting with people in person is better
- 245. no just my age'

## **H.2 Chose Alternative Task**

1. To interact with other people and hear there opinion
2. Like talking to people
3. I would rather work with people
4. I am charming and usually have the ability to get others to follow.
5. My ability to like people
6. I think for a recruiting position you need someone that is right for the job. A people person someone that is able to read people go out communicate and find people that are great for the job. While they themselves are representing the company are basically selling the company to these people and the tasks and the demands and requirements of these peopl3s
7. Closer procsimity to the people
8. Working with others was more comfortable to me
9. I'm a great recruiter and have a lot of friends that would love to help me
10. Not any one thing, but I thought, on the whole, I could perform this task with little problems.
11. No I just thought the recruitment one would be more fun
12. What would I feel more comfortable doing and could it be done with E-Mail or a similar method ?
13. I like to avoid publicity.
14. I am not technically savvy so my attempts would not generate significant results in this area. I have worked in Human Resources executive positions and have sat on numerous volunteer community boards, currently volunteering in a non-profit in our local community, so feel the would be my best option.
15. I'm not sure honestly
16. would rather not perform publicity acts
17. It seems easier to Do This
18. Not really. It just seem like the best choice to include everyone in the community
19. I have done recruiting in my previous career and I think it would be best for me
20. yes I am n ot tech saavy
21. Not really. How good I think I am at it, how effective I could be, the important of it.
22. People need to be involved and hands on approach
23. don't work with computers well
24. Yes, I figured that if I picked recruiting that I would be able to use my personable skills and persuasive abilities
25. You can't just jump to logical tasks you need people for what ever reason it is
26. if i joined of course id want others to be in something i believe in
27. I thought the recruitment tool was more important and would make my supervisor think my priorities were in order.
28. No except the research should be done prior to the recruitment process so that

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- the most accurate and thorough information to disseminate.
29. I want to get things done properly
  30. Although I would do either task successfully, I want to maximize my impact and do what is the more important job.
  31. Im afraid talking in puplic id be better talking to people one on one to ask them to join our cause i could do that best
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  33. I am a people person but not a showman
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  40. Have to go with what is going to make my task stronger and solid.
  41. I'm not sure if I can ask people to help. That is unless I know them somewhat
  42. The more people involved the more ideas will surface.
  43. That the article said by recruiting more, more could get done.
  44. I like talking to people so my choice was very easy
  45. None. I am a people person. I am very comfortable talking to large and small groups even if they are strangers.
  46. Group effort is most effective
  47. I think being a leader is good. But if you can do a job where you are recruiting people to enter the workforce I think that is also good.
  48. Because i was advised that this was the most important factor
  49. I have excellent people skills.
  50. It just sounded like the task that I could best handle
  51. The requirements for each.
  52. I think that the more people involved with the same frame of mind can get more done
  53. My family and friends would be bothered
  54. I would consider the recruiting acquaintances as a first avenue and if not successful, perhaps go to a publicity task.
  55. I thought that was the most effective way to spend my time.
  56. Interactions with others
  57. its very good and nice, people like it alot
  58. My manager said that it was the more important of the two tasks
  59. yes, it also depends on the topic

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

60. I like to work with people
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77. If i believe in what they are doing
78. just have to think of whats best
79. That I enjoy doing things outside the box
80. It was the most important job
81. I have been President of a few different organizations so I am very comfortable talking to people and persuading people to do things. I would rather interact with people than sit at a desk and do data entry. I am a people person and that is where I think those skills could be used.
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83. I think numbers are very important
84. Recruiting was more important
85. Recruitment was the most important task
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87. I wanted to the option that would lead to a bigger and better outcome
88. Time
89. more people brings more voices to the cause
90. I am not comfortable with technology , but I am comfortable with people
91. I would decide based on what the group needed to be successful as a group and use my talents towards achieving that. That is the main important thing in working in a group.
92. Seems easy to try to recruit people if they are aware of what it's for an already



#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- show interest
93. People tend to listen to a person who can speak clearly and with passion.. That's me.
  94. I have lots of experience hosting big parties
  95. Recruiting helps more with more than people doing more tasks.
  96. recruitment was the prime objective, so I chose to recruit
  97. Re suiting helps meet new people and getting to learn their abilities
  98. I am a people person
  99. Not technical minded. Have done recruiting duties in the past with much success.
  100. I am not computer savvy so working on databases would be a struggle for me. It is not something I would want to do.
  101. I think more people helping out would be of great benefit and I would be able to recruit them.
  102. I used to hire people to work in a bank. So, I think I would be qualified to recruiter.
  103. I'm more of a socialized people person
  104. To be honest I wouldn't participate in such a project because I wouldn't want to recruit people to advocate for something that I don't believe in
  105. I dont like publicity
  106. It just seemed like the less peopley, public speaking option.
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  108. It would be easy to email people.
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  110. People have power, and can make a bigger difference
  111. Money
  112. I am not a public speaker. I like to work behind the scenes. I am a very good talker and I am good at persuasion when I believe in what I am doing.
  113. I have a large group of friends and acquaintenances that I think I could recruit.
  114. After reading the scenario, I determined that recruitment was more important than research.
  115. Challenges people to do something
  116. i am not leaving the house so it has to be done by the internet
  117. None really just my preferred method
  118. Effective management
  119. I strongly believe that one on one interview will be more reliable than use of any databases
  120. Recruiting seemed to be simple
  121. I like talking to people
  122. If recruiting people bolsters the organization's ability to do good work for the community, then it's worth trying to recruit the right people.
  123. It is better to be part of the recruiting to give voice to my own opinions as well as others around me and can find out what is needed in the community so our

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- leaders can know.
124. I am a people person! I am very convincing and respectfully argumentative and factual.
  125. I love been in the midst of people
  126. When you talk to someone in person you can judge by their emotions and how they really feel.
  127. Their qualifications
  128. Get people that need jobs to join the organization, because I think they will get the job done and it will help them out in the future.
  129. I choosed recruiting more staffs is better and safer in exchange of good ideas to move the organization forward
  130. My upbringing
  131. I enjoy both things but think i could make a bigger difference recruiting than administrative
  132. I would not want an administration task.
  133. Family
  134. Ilike to talk to new people
  135. I'm a people person
  136. I like socializing
  137. influence others to publicly show to people how covid is scary.
  138. No there werent any other considerations that influenced my choice.
  139. I love people's company and I enjoy meeting new people
  140. It's easy to talk to people
  141. Public speaking
  142. Educating united people
  143. I like recruiting people
  144. Its just so unique for me. I love it
  145. Making decisions is something we do every day, so I wanted to find out more about how this process works and what affects the choices we make. It turns out, there are some really interesting ways our decisions are affected that I never would have guessed. Luckily, we can take action to improve most of these.
  146. Because am satisfy with this
  147. I considered that if I recruit more people to join the organization, that the task would be carried out easier and faster. I believe in division of labor
  148. Always a people person.
  149. I believe up close is the most effective way to recruit.
  150. I want to help out my friends and family
  151. call p[opl3e to as for there help
  152. Yes. The fact that I got to give people a chance to do more for the community
  153. I love talking to people and I love recruiting people and telling them to do something
  154. I like Recurrent task. I am alarmed by reports of poor performance at these

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- public schools. Education is a top priority for me, and I will continue to fight for good education in my community. I am proud of all that my office has accomplished on education, but ultimately, I am not responsible for the poor performance in this school district.
155. I enjoy working with the public that is why I chose this task other than that being out of an office setting is a plus
  156. The person asking me to do the task.
  157. It would help better the company/project.
  158. The recruiting is what gets the word out.
  159. No I love communication with people love meeting and greeting
  160. Considering the fact of truth
  161. I think I can be persuasive, hence choose the job that I am good at.
  162. Yes: someone within the company in a position of authority said recruitment was important, so I chose that task.
  163. I feel people need to be educated on what the government goes about it's business. There is no one side that causes gridlock, intact it is the result of multiple parties and interests gumming up the works.
  164. who would help me from the group - maybe they had done this before
  165. Meeting up with given details and awesome for more to deal with
  166. it seemed like a better fit for me
  167. TALKING TO PEOPLE WHO ARE INTERSTED
  168. I feel talking to people personally for recruiting works better than publicity tasks.
  169. I enjoy teaching people ways to help their community
  170. I'd like to have people that are honest
  171. I feel that the computer is impersonal. I feel more comfortable talking to people physically.
  172. Recruiting the right people with the required skillset plus remuneration to enhance the motivation of the workforce
  173. in my home i complete my tusk there
  174. Recruitment would really boost the organization
  175. How it helps the impact on our environment
  176. No, because I've been in leadership positions and have done good jobs in completing goals with people.
  177. i am interested
  178. Recruiting gives more opportunity to know different opinions in camera
  179. I like to lead
  180. Offers reward
  181. I am not very good with numvers and reading figures upon figures or pages upon pages is not my thing as I grow older
  182. I can approach people and give them opportunities they've been searching for
  183. I just feel more confident doing the recruiting task.
  184. That I am very good at recruitment and discussing issues that are important to

#### *H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- me and being persuasive
185. Recruitment allows you to see the applicant for who they are and what they stand for, as well as accessing the roles perfect for them in the organization
  186. The political system is broken.
  187. Didn't want to do a publicly task
  188. Based on my personality I chose the task.
  189. What would give the most realistic outlook of the community.
  190. First of all I am not that good on database and I'm very good around people I could convince people and give them the choice to either go with it or not
  191. Research is very important to gather information
  192. Love talking with people
  193. I think it's always better to follow your organization's advise sometimes
  194. I love discussing with people to hear their views
  195. I personally feel like recruiting other people is very good especially when you need others opinion about something It's always good to work with other people you learn a lot and you will find out that there's more into Working all alone I'm having different types of mindset
  196. I felt it was important to give others a voice.
  197. politics
  198. I need to move around and not do the same things every day. Recruiting means communicating with different people.
  199. You have to still believe the goodness in people overall unless it's somebody like trump
  200. Majority should rule
  201. Yes better to do hands on
  202. More people involved more ideas can help
  203. Yes. Just not thinking about it and just getting it done.
  204. People are always needed to help organizations.
  205. I was afraid that the publicity task would involve speaking to people that I do not know.
  206. I think if you believe in the idea you should proceed. To recruit new members and you believe in the company it would be an advantage to recruit new members
  207. The boredom and repetitive nature of data base work
  208. I am more of a behind the scenes person. I love people and talking with them, but I am not a person who likes to be front and center. I can be a leader just as much behind the scenes.
  209. I like to plan events.
  210. I considered my ability to adequately express myself and communicate the need for their participation
  211. I think we have a big task in front of us but I think if we come together and think about the task at hand things will come together in the end
  212. Understanding and communication skill between each other and communication

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

- skill
213. I like to give parties and have people enjoy themselves.
  214. It was the most important task.
  215. I was not sure what the administrative tasks would be and if I were qualified
  216. My fear of public speaking.
  217. My usual work involves substantial administrative tasks. I need a break from these and prefer the recruitment aspects.
  218. Experience
  219. The courage and relation with others
  220. People need to know the facts and they probably don't ,you know the Media doesn't want you to know anything important that doesn't go with their agenda
  221. I thought I would do a better job of talking to people who were already interested because I could explain the advantages derived from them becoming participants.
  222. I have done such work in the past involving other disenfranchised groups such as homeless people, substance abusers, and psychiatric disabled.
  223. you must consider the available pool of available people
  224. I felt that recruiting was a helpful choice.
  225. the more people active are important for the cause
  226. I just enjoy getting people to join a good cause
  227. To vividly know those i will be working with
  228. I do have a hard time asking people to get involved
  229. Yes . It was known that more hands were need on deck so it was very important to recruit additional team members.
  230. The interest factor of the task.
  231. It seemed easier
  232. I like to communicate so i'd recruit more.
  233. The administration task could wait, while the recruiting would be more beneficial to be done first
  234. I'm not sure what logistical tasks are
  235. Since I was told that recruiting would be the most helpful thing, I wanted to do that to be as helpful as I could.
  236. I just don't like to do publicity stuff, but do enjoy talking to people and encouraging them
  237. I am always willing to assist people and organizations who improve our country
  238. I thought talking to people might be interesting.
  239. I have always enjoyed hiring and recruitment in my careers so I felt it was a good fit
  240. Helps people
  241. I believe knowing a person and knowing about them is the best way to recruit a person
  242. I have people skills so i should do what i am best at for my team....
  243. Recruiting people that have skills

*H. Open-Ended Responses from Advocacy Task Choice Experiment*

244. meeting with people in person is better

245. no just my age'

# I

## Psychological Batteries Used to Measure Extraversion and Social Skills

### I.1 Extraversion Big-5

**Source:** John et al. (2008)

Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

I am someone who...

- Is talkative
- Is reserved [reverse]
- Is full of energy
- Generates a lot of enthusiasm
- Tends to be quiet [reverse]
- Has an assertive personality
- Is sometimes shy, inhibited
- Is outgoing, sociable

*Answer options:*

- Disagree strongly
- Disagree a little
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree a little
- Agree strongly

## **I.2 Extraversion Brief**

**Source:** Gosling et al. (2003)

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement:

- I see myself as extroverted, enthusiastic.
- I see myself as reserved, quiet.

*Answer options:*

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

## **I.3 Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale**

**Source:** Law et al. (2004)

How much do you agree with each of the following statements?

- I always know my friends' emotions from their behavior.
- I am a good observer of others' emotions.
- I am sensitive to the feelings and emotions of others.
- I have a good understanding of the emotions of people around me.

*Answer options:*

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree



# J

## Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
1	General	Interested During Interview
2	Demographics: General	Age
3	Demographics: General	Age Squared
4	Demographics: General	Woman
5	Demographics: General	Married
6	Demographics: General	Have Children
7	Demographics: General	Town Size
8	Demographics: General	Rural
9	Demographics: General	Citizen
10	Demographics: General	First Generation Immigrant
11	Demographics: General	Second Generation Immigrant
12	Demographics: General	Level of Language Skills
13	Demographics: General	Ethnic Group
14	Demographics: General	Member of Majority Ethnic Group
15	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Education Level
16	Demographics: Socioeconomic	College

*J. Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model*

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos (*continued*)

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
17	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Father's Education
18	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Mother's Education
19	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Highest Education of Either Parent
20	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Upper Class
21	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Lower Class
22	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Income Level
23	Demographics: Socioeconomic	High Income
24	Demographics: Socioeconomic	Income in Top Half
25	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Head of Household
26	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Employed
27	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Retired
28	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Student
29	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Never Employed
30	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Sector: Government
31	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Sector: Private
32	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Sector: Non-Profit
33	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Clerical
34	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Exec
35	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Farm Owner
36	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Farming
37	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Professional
38	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Sales
39	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Semiskilled
40	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Service
41	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Skilled
42	Demographics: Workforce Participation	Job: Unskilled
43	Demographics: Workforce Participation	High Status Profession
44	Demographics: Workforce Participation	People Oriented Profession
45	Political Engagement	Political Interest
46	Political Engagement	View Politics as Important
47	Political Engagement	Discuss Politics
48	Political Engagement	Political News Consumption (Index)

*J. Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model*

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos (*continued*)

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
49	Political Engagement	Political Efficacy
50	Political Engagement	Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)
51	Ideology	Authoritarianism (Index)
52	Ideology	Democratic Values (Index)
53	Ideology	Value Duty (Index)
54	Ideology	Environmentalism
55	Ideology	Feminist (Index)
56	Ideology	Futurist (Index)
57	Ideology	Pro Immigrantion (Index)
58	Ideology	Left Ideology (Index)
59	Ideology	Liberal (Index)
60	Ideology	Revolutionary Values
61	Ideology	Socialist (Index)
62	Ideology	Value Tolerance (Index)
63	Ideology	Unambiguous Values
64	Ideology	Value Work-Ethic (Index)
65	Ideology	Okay to Break Laws (Index)
66	Ideology	Political Violence is Okay (Index)
67	Ideology	Okay with Surveillance State (Index)
68	Ideology	Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)
69	Ideology	Moral Certitude (Index)
70	Ideology	Value Political Voice (Index)
71	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Businesses
72	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Civil Society Orgs
73	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Democracy
74	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in International NGOs
75	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Justice System
76	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Media
77	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Non-Governmental Orgs
78	Institutional Confidence	Confidence in Politics
79	Institutional Confidence	General Confidence
80	Institutional Confidence	Perceive Vote Buying

*J. Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model*

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos (*continued*)

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
81	Institutional Confidence	Perceive Vote Coercion
82	Institutional Confidence	Corruption (Index)
83	Institutional Confidence	General Trust
84	Institutional Confidence	Average Trust (Index)
85	Civic Participation	Member of Orgs (Index)
86	Civic Participation	Active Member of Orgs (Index)
87	Civic Participation	Member of Union
88	Civic Participation	Active Member of Union
89	Civic Participation	Confidence in Unions
90	Religious Engagement	Religion Important
91	Religious Engagement	God Importance
92	Religious Engagement	Member of Religious Community
93	Religious Engagement	Active Member of Religious Community
94	Religious Engagement	Regularity of Prayer
95	Religious Engagement	Attendance Religious Institutions
96	Religious Engagement	Confidence in Religious Institutions
97	Religious Engagement	Identify as Religious
98	Religious Engagement	Commitment to Doctrines
99	Religious Engagement	Earthly Religious Interpretation (Index)
100	Religious Engagement	Tolerant Other Religions
101	Religious Engagement	Want Theocracy
102	Religious Engagement	Religion: Buddhist
103	Religious Engagement	Religion: Catholic
104	Religious Engagement	Religion: Christian Other
105	Religious Engagement	Religion: General Other
106	Religious Engagement	Religion: Hindu
107	Religious Engagement	Religion: Jew
108	Religious Engagement	Religion: Muslim
109	Religious Engagement	Religion: Orthodox
110	Religious Engagement	Religion: Protestant
111	Religious Engagement	Religion: None
112	Religious Engagement	Religious Denomination

*J. Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model*

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos (*continued*)

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
113	Religious Engagement	Religious Denomination (Detailed)
114	Religious Engagement	Average Religious Engagement (Index)
115	Wellbeing	Feel Anxious
116	Wellbeing	Feel Connected
117	Wellbeing	Feel Efficacy
118	Wellbeing	Feel Happy
119	Wellbeing	Feel Healthy
120	Wellbeing	Feel Safe
121	Wellbeing	Feel Satisfied
122	Wellbeing	Personal Finances
123	Wellbeing	Perception Things Important (Index)
124	Wellbeing	View Friends as Important
125	Welzel Values Indices	Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)
126	Welzel Values Indices	Post Matieralism Index (4-Item)
127	Welzel Values Indices	Individual Autonomy Index
128	Welzel Values Indices	Secular Values Inded
129	Welzel Values Indices	Emancipative Values Index
130	Welzel Values Indices	Respect for Authority
131	Welzel Values Indices	Nationalism
132	Welzel Values Indices	Devoutedness
133	Welzel Values Indices	Defiance Index
134	Welzel Values Indices	Irreligious
135	Welzel Values Indices	Religion Unimportant
136	Welzel Values Indices	Religion Important
137	Welzel Values Indices	Disbelief Index
138	Welzel Values Indices	Norms Conform 1
139	Welzel Values Indices	Norms Conform 2
140	Welzel Values Indices	Norms Conform 3
141	Welzel Values Indices	Relativism Index
142	Welzel Values Indices	Trust Army
143	Welzel Values Indices	Trust Police
144	Welzel Values Indices	Trust Courts

*J. Variables Used in Saturated Lasso for WVS Model*

**Table J.1:** Variables Used in WVS Lassos (*continued*)

<b>Num.</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>
145	Welzel Values Indices	Scepticism Index
146	Welzel Values Indices	Value in Children: Independence
147	Welzel Values Indices	Value in Children: Imagination
148	Welzel Values Indices	Value in Children: Obedience
149	Welzel Values Indices	Child Autonomy Index
150	Welzel Values Indices	Gender Equality: Workplace
151	Welzel Values Indices	Gender Equality: Politics
152	Welzel Values Indices	Gender Equality: Education
153	Welzel Values Indices	Gender Equality Index
154	Welzel Values Indices	Homosexuality Allowable
155	Welzel Values Indices	Abortion Allowable
156	Welzel Values Indices	Divorce Allowable
157	Welzel Values Indices	Free Choice Index

# K

## Model Results Referenced in Chapter 5

### K.1 Section 5.2 - Study 1: Reshaping Theories of Power

Table K.1: Two-Sided T-Test of “People” vs “Money”

Outcome	DF	Mean: People	Mean: Money	Difference	Conf. Int.
<b>Manipulation check (Percent):</b>					
view members as cause	890	21.17	9.05	12.12***	(7.68, 16.55)
<b>Willing to... (1-5)</b>					
canvass	969	2.10	2.01	0.09	(-0.07, 0.24)
vote	958	4.14	4.09	0.05	(-0.12, 0.21)
donate	965	2.48	2.41	0.07	(-0.10, 0.24)
join org.	967	2.53	2.47	0.06	(-0.11, 0.23)
protest	968	2.61	2.57	0.04	(-0.14, 0.21)
post online	968	2.65	2.65	0.01	(-0.18, 0.19)
join riot	968	1.72	1.63	0.09	(-0.06, 0.23)
<b>Influence of... (1-5)</b>					
canvass	965	2.61	2.63	-0.01	(-0.16, 0.13)
vote	960	3.72	3.65	0.06	(-0.10, 0.22)
donate	961	2.77	2.87	-0.10	(-0.24, 0.05)
join org.	965	2.82	2.84	-0.02	(-0.17, 0.12)
protest	961	2.69	2.66	0.03	(-0.12, 0.19)
post online	969	2.43	2.36	0.07	(-0.08, 0.22)
join riot	966	1.85	1.83	0.01	(-0.13, 0.16)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

*K. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 5*

**Table K.2:** Two-Sided T-Test of “People” vs “Pure Control”

Outcome	DF	Mean: People	Mean: Pure Control	Difference	Conf. Int.
<b>Manipulation check (Percent):</b>					
view members as cause	893	21.17	9.36	11.81***	(7.41, 16.21)
<b>Willing to... (1-5)</b>					
canvass	1006	2.10	2.07	0.03	(-0.13, 0.18)
vote	1007	4.14	4.09	0.05	(-0.11, 0.21)
donate	1007	2.48	2.53	-0.05	(-0.22, 0.12)
join org.	1004	2.53	2.57	-0.04	(-0.21, 0.12)
protest	1000	2.61	2.60	0.01	(-0.16, 0.18)
post online	1004	2.65	2.67	-0.02	(-0.20, 0.16)
join riot	998	1.72	1.72	-0.00	(-0.15, 0.14)
<b>Influence of... (1-5)</b>					
canvass	1005	2.61	2.57	0.04	(-0.10, 0.19)
vote	1005	3.72	3.74	-0.02	(-0.18, 0.13)
donate	1006	2.77	2.80	-0.02	(-0.17, 0.12)
join org.	1002	2.82	2.83	-0.01	(-0.15, 0.13)
protest	1004	2.69	2.67	0.02	(-0.12, 0.17)
post online	999	2.43	2.36	0.07	(-0.08, 0.22)
join riot	1006	1.85	1.87	-0.02	(-0.17, 0.12)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

**Table K.3:** Two-Sided T-Test of “People” vs “Money/Pure Control” on Willingness to Canvass by Subgroup

Subgroup	DF	Mean: People	Mean: Money/Pure	Difference	Conf. Int.
Full sample	987	2.10	2.04	0.06	(-0.08, 0.19)
Women	487	1.92	1.93	-0.01	(-0.19, 0.17)
No college degree	695	1.99	1.95	0.05	(-0.11, 0.20)
Non-Republican	645	2.17	2.08	0.08	(-0.09, 0.25)
White	664	1.97	1.92	0.06	(-0.10, 0.21)
Above avg. pol. knowledge	424	2.04	1.90	0.14	(-0.06, 0.33)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001



*K. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 5*

**Table K.4:** Effect of NRA Treatment on Theory of Power and Willingness to Canvass

	Members Cause NRA Success	Willingness to Canvass
Money Treatment	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.035 (0.083)
People Treatment	0.142*** (0.023)	0.052 (0.083)
Female	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.353*** (0.070)
College	0.003 (0.022)	0.399*** (0.078)
Republican	0.006 (0.029)	0.164 (0.104)
Democrat	-0.012 (0.028)	0.390*** (0.099)
Black	0.007 (0.054)	0.162 (0.193)
White	0.021 (0.048)	-0.120 (0.171)
Latinx	0.014 (0.056)	0.277 (0.201)
Middle Easter	0.461** (0.156)	0.292 (0.557)
Native American	-0.021 (0.091)	0.029 (0.326)
Other	-0.091 (0.088)	-0.125 (0.313)
Political Knowledge	-0.040 (0.035)	-0.514*** (0.124)
Constant	0.100 (0.056)	2.190*** (0.199)
N	1,223	1,223
R <sup>2</sup>	0.049	0.081
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.072
Residual Std. Error (df = 1209)	0.332	1.187
F Statistic (df = 13; 1209)	4.788***	8.239***

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## K.2 Section 5.3 - Study 2: Varying the Origin of Collective Action

**Table K.5:** One-Sided T-Test of “Organized” vs “Spontaneous” Treatment on Importance of Recruiting (Likert 1-5)

Subgroup	DF	Mean: Organized	Mean: Spontaneous	Difference	Conf. Int.
Full sample	1489	2.51	2.39	0.12*	(0.02, Inf)
Women	735	2.45	2.30	0.16*	(0.01, Inf)
No college degree	790	2.36	2.21	0.16*	(0.02, Inf)
Non-Republican	816	2.68	2.43	0.25***	(0.12, Inf)
White	1089	2.49	2.35	0.14*	(0.02, Inf)
No activism experience	1061	2.38	2.23	0.16*	(0.04, Inf)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

**Table K.6:** One-Sided T-Test of “Organized” vs “Spontaneous” Treatment on Willingness to Recruit (Likert 1-5)

Subgroup	DF	Mean: Organized	Mean: Spontaneous	Difference	Conf. Int.
Full sample	1485	2.09	2.04	0.05	(-0.06, Inf)
Women	736	1.96	1.92	0.04	(-0.12, Inf)
No college degree	781	1.90	1.82	0.08	(-0.07, Inf)
Non-Republican	816	2.17	2.06	0.10	(-0.05, Inf)
White	1088	2.04	1.98	0.06	(-0.08, Inf)
No activism experience	1055	1.82	1.75	0.08	(-0.05, Inf)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

### K.3 Section 5.5 - Studies 3 and 4: Organizing *is* Important

**Table K.7:** T-Tests of Importance Treatment Effect on Percent of Respondents Who Choose the Recruitment Task (“Choice”) and on Share Correctly Answering the Manipulation Check (“Check”)

Treatment	Outcome	DF	Mean: Treatment	Mean: Control	Difference	P Two-Tail	P One-Tail
<b>Study 3</b>							
Importance	Choice	2085	36.74	34.18	2.57	0.218	0.109
Importance + explanation	Choice	2011	37.37	34.18	3.19	0.135	0.068
Pooled treatments	Choice	1951	37.04	34.18	2.86	0.118	0.059
<b>Study 4</b>							
Importance	Check	1519	32.04	17.94	14.10	< 0.001	< 0.001
Importance	Choice	1543	41.55	39.20	2.35	0.346	0.173
<b>Study 3 and 4 Pooled</b>							
Pooled treatments	Choice	3675	38.26	36.34	1.92	0.189	0.094

**Table K.8:** One-Tailed T-Tests of Various Task Experiment Treatments on Percent of Respondents Who Choose the Recruitment Task

Treatment	DF	Mean: Treatment	Mean: Control	Difference	Conf. Int.
Importance	1543	41.55	39.20	2.35	(-1.75, Inf)
Goal	987	43.59	38.87	4.72*	(0.32, Inf)
Target	1052	43.67	38.73	4.94*	(0.59, Inf)
Method	1091	45.32	37.75	7.57**	(3.25, Inf)
Alternative	459	42.19	32.88	9.30**	(4.24, Inf)

**Table K.9:** Two-Sided T-Tests of Importance Treatment on Percent of Respondents Who Choose the Recruitment Task by Subgroup

Subgroup	DF	Mean: Treatment	Mean: Control	Difference	Conf. Int.
Full sample	1543	41.55	39.20	2.35	(-2.54, 7.25)
Women	788	44.74	40.74	4.00	(-2.90, 10.89)
No college degree	915	45.99	39.78	6.22	(-0.19, 12.62)
Non-Republican	1019	41.70	40.40	1.29	(-4.74, 7.33)
White	1261	40.60	37.95	2.65	(-2.73, 8.03)
Above avg. pol. engagement	787	40.25	38.82	1.43	(-5.41, 8.27)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

*K. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 5*

**Table K.10:** Effect of Importance Treatment on Linear Probability of Correctly Responding to Manipulation Check and of Choosing the Recruitment Task

	Manipulation Check	Recruitment Choice
Importance Treatment	0.140*** (0.022)	0.025 (0.025)
Female	-0.041 (0.023)	0.036 (0.026)
College	0.065** (0.024)	-0.065* (0.028)
Republican	-0.025 (0.037)	0.004 (0.043)
Democrat	-0.030 (0.038)	0.030 (0.043)
White	0.053 (0.029)	-0.045 (0.033)
Political Engagement	-0.012 (0.014)	0.013 (0.016)
Constant	0.155*** (0.044)	0.420*** (0.050)
N	1,546	1,549
R <sup>2</sup>	0.038	0.009
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.427 (df = 1538)	0.490 (df = 1541)
F Statistic	8.684*** (df = 7; 1538)	2.009 (df = 7; 1541)

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table K.11:** Average Reported Reason for Task Choice by Actual Decision Interacted with Importance Treatment

	Ability	Status	Enjoy	Manipulative	Social	Importance
Chosen Task	-0.009 (0.075)	0.336*** (0.074)	-0.102 (0.075)	0.197** (0.075)	0.151* (0.075)	0.118 (0.075)
Importance Treatment	0.043 (0.066)	0.094 (0.066)	0.048 (0.066)	0.150* (0.066)	0.095 (0.066)	0.019 (0.066)
Interaction	-0.011 (0.104)	-0.249* (0.103)	0.005 (0.104)	-0.320** (0.103)	-0.254* (0.104)	0.113 (0.103)
Constant	-0.016 (0.047)	-0.131** (0.047)	0.016 (0.047)	-0.088 (0.047)	-0.055 (0.047)	-0.082 (0.047)
N	1,548	1,547	1,549	1,548	1,549	1,549
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.014	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.009
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.002	0.012	0.001	0.005	0.002	0.008

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

# L

## Model Results Referenced in Chapter 6

### L.1 Section 6.2 - Relationships: Disposition Toward Interpersonal Interactions

**Table L.1:** Comparing Reported Barriers to Engaging in Recruitment Activity (Survey G)

Alternative	DF	Mean: Personal Relationships	Mean: Alternative	Difference	Conf. Int.
All Other Reasons Pooled	2206	2.41	2.01	0.40***	(0.33, 0.47)
2nd Most Common (Comfort)	2995	2.41	2.15	0.26***	(0.17, 0.35)

**Table L.2:** Modeled Effect of the Socialness and Intrusiveness of a Task on the Choice of Whether to Recruit

	Choose Recruitment
Socialness of Task	-0.047 (0.027)
Intrusiveness of Task	-0.005 (0.006)
Education	0.037 (0.028)
Income	-0.002 (0.001)
Female	0.065 (0.045)
Year of Birth	0.107 (0.074)
Black	-0.025 (0.067)
Native American	-0.187 (0.177)
Asian	-0.005 (0.078)
Pacific Islander	0.003 (0.045)
Other Race	-0.089 (0.082)
Latinx	0.011 (0.032)
Student	-0.009 (0.007)
Working	0.009 (0.008)
Party ID	0.135*** (0.031)
Ideology	0.087** (0.032)
Alternative Option: Publicity	0.047*** (0.013)
Alternative Option: Research	0.192* (0.096)
Extraversion	-0.234* (0.115)
Political Interest	-0.001 (0.014)
Dicuss Politics	-0.014 (0.014)
Political Participation	0.009* (0.004)
Moral Certainty	-0.088 (0.054)
Party Extremism	-0.128 (0.103)
Target: Interested	0.012 (0.012)
Target: Community Member	0.017 (0.025)
Manipulative	0.066* (0.027)
Importance	-0.052 (0.027)
Constant	0.007 (0.025)
Constant	3.576 (2.123)
State Fixed Effects	Yes
N	1,528
R <sup>2</sup>	0.084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.483 (df = 1448)
F Statistic	1.692*** (df = 79; 1448)

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Base Categories: Gender - Male, Race - White, Alternative - Administrative Task

## L.2 Section 6.3 - Extraversion: Personality and Recruitment

**Table L.3:** Association of Extraversion with Past Recruitment Activity (Survey I)

	Past Recruitment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Extraversion	0.078*** (0.011)	0.027* (0.010)	0.008 (0.009)
Education		0.049* (0.021)	0.007 (0.018)
Income		0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Female		-0.036 (0.021)	0.016 (0.018)
Year of Birth		0.003*** (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Black		-0.023 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.029)
Native American		0.139* (0.057)	0.050 (0.048)
Asian		-0.102* (0.052)	-0.052 (0.043)
Pacific Islander		0.054 (0.138)	0.047 (0.115)
Other Race		0.069 (0.061)	0.052 (0.050)
Latinx		-0.042 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.029)
Student		0.011 (0.064)	0.076 (0.053)
Working		0.001 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.021)
Party ID		-0.007 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)
Ideology		-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)
Political Interest		0.053*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.009)
Dicuss Politics		0.048*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)
Political Knowledge		-0.137*** (0.041)	0.060 (0.035)
Moral Certainty		0.236** (0.078)	0.026 (0.067)
Party Extremism		-0.001 (0.010)	-0.016* (0.008)
Political Participation			0.072*** (0.003)
Constant	0.231*** (0.011)	-6.287*** (1.622)	-0.058 (1.371)
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No
N	1,544	1,539	1,529
R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.234	0.474
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.197	0.448

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Base Categories: Gender - Male, Race - White

**Table L.4:** Association of Extraversion with Recruitment Task Decision (Survey I)

	Past Recruitment	
	(1)	(2)
Extraversion	0.054*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.014)
Education		-0.049 (0.027)
Income		-0.006 (0.006)
Female		0.034 (0.028)
Year of Birth		-0.001 (0.001)
Black		0.073 (0.045)
Native American		0.093 (0.074)
Asian		-0.021 (0.067)
Pacific Islander		-0.179 (0.178)
Other Race		-0.008 (0.079)
Latinx		-0.002 (0.046)
Student		-0.097 (0.083)
Working		0.006 (0.032)
Party ID		-0.009 (0.007)
Ideology		0.009 (0.008)
Political Interest		-0.004 (0.014)
Dicuss Politics		-0.010 (0.014)
Political Knowledge		-0.096 (0.055)
Moral Certainty		-0.132 (0.103)
Party Extremism		0.012 (0.012)
Political Participation		0.009* (0.004)
Constant	0.405*** (0.012)	3.293 (2.129)
State Fixed Effects	No	No
N	1,544	1,528
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.063
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.017

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Base Categories: Gender - Male, Race - White



**Table L.5:** Association of Extraversion with Recruitment Activity (Survey J)

	Past Recruitment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Extraversion	0.041*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.009)	0.020* (0.008)
College		-0.019 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.020)
Income - High		-0.031 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.026)
Income - Low		-0.019 (0.022)	0.002 (0.021)
Female		0.029 (0.018)	0.035* (0.017)
Age		-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Black		0.017 (0.027)	0.012 (0.026)
Native American		0.116 (0.061)	0.093 (0.059)
Asian		-0.009 (0.039)	0.003 (0.038)
Middle Eastern		0.016 (0.032)	0.029 (0.031)
Other Race		-0.103 (0.201)	-0.113 (0.192)
Latinx		0.044 (0.070)	0.055 (0.067)
Unemployed		-0.034 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.027)
Party ID		-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Political Interest		0.096*** (0.007)	0.060*** (0.008)
Political Activities			0.085*** (0.007)
Constant	0.162*** (0.009)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.051 (0.043)
N	1,659	1,654	1,654
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.122	0.194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.114	0.186

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Base Categories: Gender - Male, Race - White

**Table L.6:** Association of Extraversion with Task Choice by Recruitment Method

	Choose Recruitment					
	All (1)	Text (2)	Email (3)	Call (4)	F2F (5 min) (5)	F2F (20 min) (6)
Extraversion	0.054*** (0.012)	0.034 (0.029)	0.041 (0.028)	0.033 (0.028)	0.062* (0.026)	0.100*** (0.028)
Constant	0.405*** (0.012)	0.392*** (0.028)	0.436*** (0.029)	0.329*** (0.027)	0.434*** (0.027)	0.429*** (0.028)
N	1,544	296	298	294	345	311
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.017	0.039
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.014	0.036

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

### L.3 Section 6.4 - Manipulation: Framing the Act of Recruitment

**Table L.7:** Two-Sided T-Test of the Effect of “Invite” vs “Persuade” Treatments on the Probability of Choosing Recruitment Task

Sample	DF	Mean: Invite	Mean: Persuade	Difference	Conf. Int.
Survey H	2073	38.19	33.40	4.79*	(0.68, 8.90)
Survey I	1024	43.59	36.52	7.07*	(1.09, 13.05)
Pooled	3114	39.89	34.48	5.41**	(2.02, 8.79)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

**Table L.8:** Two-Sided T-Tests Comparing Effects of All Framing Treatments on the Probability of Choosing Recruitment Task

Sample	A	B	DF	Mean: A	Mean: B	Difference	Conf. Int.
Survey H	Share Info	Persuade	2073	38.19	33.40	4.79*	(0.68, 8.90)
Survey H	Share Info	Invite	2147	38.19	36.55	1.64	(-2.45, 5.74)
Survey H	Invite	Persuade	2028	36.55	33.40	3.14	(-1.00, 7.29)
Survey I	Share Info	Persuade	1024	43.59	36.52	7.07*	(1.09, 13.05)
Survey I	Share Info	Talk Into	1023	43.59	41.23	2.36	(-3.70, 8.42)
Survey I	Talk Into	Persuade	1039	41.23	36.52	4.71	(-1.21, 10.64)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

**Table L.9:** Comparing Reporting Reason for Choice by Recruitment Decision and Framing (Survey I)

Reason	DF	Mean: Choose Recruit	Mean: Choose Alt	Difference	Conf. Int.
<b>Framing - Persuade</b>					
Ability	392	3.88	3.98	-0.09	(-0.28, 0.09)
Status	416	3.04	2.61	0.42***	(0.18, 0.67)
Enjoy	372	3.68	3.75	-0.07	(-0.26, 0.12)
Manipulative	402	2.90	2.85	0.05	(-0.19, 0.29)
Social	411	3.59	3.50	0.08	(-0.12, 0.29)
Importance	427	3.81	3.54	0.27**	(0.07, 0.47)
<b>Framing - Share</b>					
Ability	476	3.89	3.95	-0.06	(-0.23, 0.11)
Status	498	2.98	2.83	0.15	(-0.08, 0.39)
Enjoy	479	3.64	3.78	-0.14	(-0.32, 0.04)
Manipulative	484	2.84	2.97	-0.13	(-0.36, 0.10)
Social	473	3.52	3.68	-0.16	(-0.36, 0.03)
Importance	488	3.66	3.60	0.06	(-0.13, 0.25)
<b>Framing - Talk into</b>					
Ability	464	3.92	3.81	0.11	(-0.07, 0.29)
Status	457	2.97	2.69	0.28*	(0.03, 0.52)
Enjoy	431	3.66	3.75	-0.09	(-0.28, 0.09)
Manipulative	444	3.08	2.89	0.19	(-0.04, 0.43)
Social	473	3.71	3.58	0.13	(-0.07, 0.32)
Importance	498	3.79	3.50	0.28**	(0.09, 0.47)

## L.4 Section 6.5 - Targets: Social Distance and the Decision to Recruit

**Table L.10:** Comparing Reporting Reason for Choice by Recruitment Decision and Framing (Survey I)

Reason	DF	Mean: Choose Recruit	Mean: Choose Alt	Difference	Conf. Int.
<b>Framing - Persuade</b>					
Ability	392	3.88	3.98	-0.09	(-0.28, 0.09)
Status	416	3.04	2.61	0.42***	(0.18, 0.67)
Enjoy	372	3.68	3.75	-0.07	(-0.26, 0.12)
Manipulative	402	2.90	2.85	0.05	(-0.19, 0.29)
Social	411	3.59	3.50	0.08	(-0.12, 0.29)
Importance	427	3.81	3.54	0.27**	(0.07, 0.47)
<b>Framing - Share</b>					
Ability	476	3.89	3.95	-0.06	(-0.23, 0.11)
Status	498	2.98	2.83	0.15	(-0.08, 0.39)
Enjoy	479	3.64	3.78	-0.14	(-0.32, 0.04)
Manipulative	484	2.84	2.97	-0.13	(-0.36, 0.10)
Social	473	3.52	3.68	-0.16	(-0.36, 0.03)
Importance	488	3.66	3.60	0.06	(-0.13, 0.25)
<b>Framing - Talk into</b>					
Ability	464	3.92	3.81	0.11	(-0.07, 0.29)
Status	457	2.97	2.69	0.28*	(0.03, 0.52)
Enjoy	431	3.66	3.75	-0.09	(-0.28, 0.09)
Manipulative	444	3.08	2.89	0.19	(-0.04, 0.43)
Social	473	3.71	3.58	0.13	(-0.07, 0.32)
Importance	498	3.79	3.50	0.28**	(0.09, 0.47)

**Table L.11:** Modeled Effect of the Recruitment Target on the Decision to Recruit with Pre-Registered Controls

	Choose Recruitment
Socialness of Task	-0.047 (0.027)
Intrusiveness of Task	-0.005 (0.006)
Education	0.037 (0.028)
Income	-0.002 (0.001)
Female	0.065 (0.045)
Year of Birth	0.107 (0.074)
Black	-0.025 (0.067)
Native American	-0.187 (0.177)
Asian	-0.005 (0.078)
Pacific Islander	0.003 (0.045)
Other Race	-0.089 (0.082)
Latinx	0.011 (0.032)
Student	-0.009 (0.007)
Working	0.009 (0.008)
Party ID	0.135*** (0.031)
Ideology	0.087** (0.032)
Alternative Option: Publicity	0.047*** (0.013)
Alternative Option: Research	0.192* (0.096)
Extraversion	-0.234* (0.115)
Political Interest	-0.001 (0.014)
Dicuss Politics	-0.014 (0.014)
Political Participation	0.009* (0.004)
Moral Certainty	-0.088 (0.054)
Party Extremism	-0.128 (0.103)
Target: Interested	0.012 (0.012)
Target: Community Member	0.017 (0.025)
Target: Stranger	0.066* (0.027)
Manipulative	-0.052 (0.027)
Importance	0.007 (0.025)
Constant	3.576 (2.123)
State Fixed Effects	Yes
N	1,528
R <sup>2</sup>	0.084
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.483 (df = 1448)
F Statistic	1.692*** (df = 79; 1448)

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Base Categories: Gender - Male, Race - White, Alternative - Administrative Task

# M

Model Results Referenced in Chapter 7

## M.1 Section 7.3 - Organizing is Widely Perceived as Requiring Social Skills

**Table M.1:** Association of SI with Capacity to Persuade Others to Take Action (US General)

	Combined		Friends		Strangers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Intelligence	0.173*** (0.025)	0.184*** (0.025)	0.200*** (0.025)	0.206*** (0.024)	0.119*** (0.025)	0.133*** (0.025)
Age		-0.013*** (0.001)		-0.013*** (0.001)		-0.010*** (0.001)
Female		-0.070 (0.049)		-0.031 (0.049)		-0.101* (0.050)
Education		0.057** (0.017)		0.061*** (0.017)		0.043* (0.018)
Party ID		-0.001 (0.011)		-0.004 (0.011)		0.003 (0.011)
White		-0.081 (0.056)		-0.065 (0.055)		-0.085 (0.057)
Constant	0.0003 (0.025)	0.470*** (0.101)	-0.0003 (0.025)	0.464*** (0.100)	0.001 (0.025)	0.408*** (0.103)
N	1,599	1,598	1,596	1,595	1,599	1,598
R <sup>2</sup>	0.030	0.087	0.040	0.100	0.014	0.053
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.083	0.039	0.097	0.014	0.050

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001



*M. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 7*

**Table M.2:** Association of SI with Capacity to Persuade Others to Take Action (US Activists)

	Combined		Friends		Strangers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Intelligence	0.230** (0.087)	0.228* (0.096)	0.259** (0.087)	0.245* (0.095)	0.150 (0.089)	0.162 (0.097)
Age		-0.003 (0.008)		0.002 (0.008)		-0.008 (0.008)
Female		0.147 (0.193)		0.112 (0.191)		0.151 (0.195)
Education		-0.019 (0.119)		0.046 (0.118)		-0.082 (0.120)
Party ID		-0.023 (0.108)		-0.057 (0.107)		0.016 (0.109)
White		-0.027 (0.377)		-0.061 (0.374)		0.018 (0.382)
Constant	0.000 (0.087)	6.381 (16.429)	0.000 (0.086)	-4.722 (16.289)	-0.000 (0.088)	16.260 (16.630)
N	126	124	126	124	126	124
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.055	0.067	0.064	0.022	0.037
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.045	0.007	0.060	0.016	0.015	-0.013

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table M.3:** Association of SI with Capacity to Persuade Others to Take Action (SA Activists)

	Strangers	
	(1)	(2)
Social Intelligence	0.100 (0.083)	0.134 (0.091)
Age		-0.016 (0.012)
Female		-0.432* (0.187)
Education		0.032 (0.084)
Party Member		0.302 (0.238)
ANC Member		0.104 (0.244)
Constant	-0.001 (0.083)	0.521 (0.460)
N	148	122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.105
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.058

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table M.4:** Association of SI with Frequency of Asking Others to Take Political Actions (US General)

	Frequency of Recruitment Asks	
	(1)	(2)
Social Intelligence	0.117*** (0.025)	0.068*** (0.019)
Age		-0.007*** (0.001)
Female		0.008 (0.038)
Education		0.007 (0.014)
Party ID		-0.019* (0.008)
White		-0.033 (0.043)
Political Participation		0.702*** (0.021)
Constant	0.0003 (0.025)	-1.277*** (0.089)
N	1,594	1,589
R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.467
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.465

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table M.5:** Association Between SI and Frequency of Asking Others to Take Political Actions (US Activists)

	Frequency of Recruitment Asks	
	(1)	(2)
Social Intelligence	0.236** (0.087)	0.164* (0.074)
Age		0.003 (0.006)
Female		-0.184 (0.148)
Education		0.067 (0.091)
Party ID		-0.124 (0.083)
White		-0.439 (0.288)
Political Participation		2.213*** (0.248)
Constant	-0.000 (0.087)	-6.266 (12.563)
N	126	124
R <sup>2</sup>	0.056	0.456
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.423

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## M.2 Section 7.4 - The Effect of Telling People They Have Above-Average Social Intelligence

**Table M.6:** Effect of Social Intelligence Treatment on Recruitment Capacity

	Self-Assessed Recruitment Capacity			
	Survey A: Below Avg.	Survey A: Above Avg.	Survey F	Survey G
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SI Treatment	0.132 (0.133)	0.272*** (0.053)	0.242** (0.075)	0.504* (0.212)
Constant	-0.186* (0.095)	-0.119** (0.038)	0.058 (0.053)	-0.254 (0.158)
N	221	1,378	835	94
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.018	0.012	0.058
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0001	0.018	0.011	0.048

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

### M.3 Section 7.5 - Gender, Social Skills, and Organizing

**Table M.7:** Two-Sided T-Test of the Difference in Social Intelligence Scores Between Women and Men

Survey	DF	Mean: Male	Mean: Female	Difference	Conf. Int.
US Gen Pop 1	1549	5.25	5.63	-0.38***	(-0.49, -0.27)
US Gen Pop 2	1490	3.75	3.91	-0.15***	(-0.24, -0.07)
US Activists	80	2.80	2.89	-0.09	(-0.33, 0.16)
SA Activists	142	3.81	3.97	-0.16	(-0.44, 0.12)

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

**Table M.8:** Association of SI with Recruitment Capacity and with Experience by Gender

	Recruitment Capacity		Recruitment Frequency			
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Intelligence	0.091** (0.032)	0.212*** (0.030)	0.037 (0.032)	0.178*** (0.030)		
Recruitment Capacity					0.423*** (0.031)	0.481*** (0.032)
Constant	-0.511** (0.181)	-1.112*** (0.160)	-0.210 (0.182)	-0.934*** (0.162)	0.0003 (0.031)	0.0004 (0.032)
N	841	758	839	755	842	755
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.063	0.002	0.044	0.179	0.232
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.061	0.0005	0.043	0.178	0.231

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table M.9:** SI Intervention Effect on Recruitment Capacity by Gender Among Above Average SI (Survey A and G Pooled)

	Self-Assessed Recruitment Capacity	
	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)
SI Treatment	0.281*** (0.057)	0.227*** (0.062)
Constant	-0.145*** (0.041)	-0.112* (0.044)
N	1,198	1,015
R <sup>2</sup>	0.020	0.013
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.012

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table M.10:** Association of SI and Recruitment Capacity by Gender and Treatment Condition

	Self-Assessed Recruitment Capacity			
	Female / Control	Female / Treated	Male / Control	Male / Treated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Intelligence	0.039 (0.044)	0.215*** (0.043)	0.120* (0.050)	0.132** (0.050)
Constant	-0.211 (0.239)	-1.151*** (0.234)	-0.615* (0.258)	-0.690** (0.266)
N	579	619	514	501
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.039	0.011	0.014
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0003	0.037	0.009	0.012

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## M.4 Section 7.6 - Civil Society and Social Skills

**Table M.11:** Association of Civic Engagement and Recruitment Capacity

	Self-Assessed Recruitment Capacity	
	(1)	(2)
Religiousness	-0.013 (0.031)	0.082** (0.025)
Union Experience	-0.033 (0.028)	0.061* (0.025)
In Workforce	0.060* (0.027)	0.060* (0.027)
Female	0.001 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.025)
Party ID	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.026)
Income	0.008 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)
Education	0.009 (0.028)	0.038 (0.028)
Age	-0.148*** (0.028)	-0.206*** (0.027)
White	-0.006 (0.042)	0.015 (0.042)
Black	0.038 (0.038)	0.069 (0.038)
Latinx	-0.008 (0.033)	0.016 (0.033)
Missionary Experience	0.086* (0.033)	
Union Organizing Experience	0.165*** (0.031)	
Job Involves Persuasion	0.146*** (0.026)	
Social Intelligence	0.163*** (0.022)	0.162*** (0.022)
Constant	-0.889*** (0.123)	-0.882*** (0.122)
N	1,478	1,541
R <sup>2</sup>	0.165	0.111
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.157	0.104

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001



**Table M.12:** Association of Civic Engagemennt and Recruitment Frequency

	Frequency of Past Recruitment (5-Point Likert)	
	(1)	(2)
Religiousness	0.016 (0.031)	0.209*** (0.027)
Union Experience	-0.020 (0.028)	0.144*** (0.026)
In Workforce	0.041 (0.027)	0.046 (0.028)
Female	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.026)
Party ID	-0.089*** (0.026)	-0.115*** (0.027)
Income	0.050 (0.028)	0.081** (0.029)
Education	0.092** (0.028)	0.124*** (0.029)
Age	-0.073** (0.028)	-0.153*** (0.028)
White	0.069 (0.042)	0.098* (0.045)
Black	0.071 (0.038)	0.119** (0.039)
Latinx	0.047 (0.033)	0.081* (0.035)
Missionary Experience	0.191*** (0.033)	
Union Organizing Experience	0.278*** (0.031)	
Job Involves Persuasion	0.159*** (0.026)	
Social Intelligence	0.102*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.023)
Constant	1.443*** (0.123)	1.417*** (0.128)
N	1,478	1,536
R <sup>2</sup>	0.277	0.167
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.269	0.160

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

# N

Model Results Referenced in Chapter 8

## **N.1 Section 8.1.1 - Social Skills Lack Legibility Resulting in Decreased Socioeconomic Value**

**Table N.1:** Median Income by Reliance on Social Skills, Conditional on Cognitive Skills

	Median Income of Job
Social Skills	-2,346.686*** (230.711)
Cognitive Skills	-279.884 (202.512)
Interaction	117.967*** (9.080)
Constant	48,914.980*** (3,941.394)
N	684
R <sup>2</sup>	0.665
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.663

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## **N.2 Section 8.2 - Comparing Organizing to Other Political Jobs**

**Table N.2:** Status of and Willingness to Be an Organizer by Related Intelligences (Survey C and Survey D)

	Status of Organizing (1)	Willingness to Organize (2)
Social - Abstract Skill	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.090*** (0.006)
Constant	0.006 (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)
N	17,302	17,325
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.012
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.011

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.3:** Estimated Association of SI with Capacity to Persuade Other to Take Political Action (SA Activists)

	Capacity PCA: Strangers	
	(1)	(2)
Social Intelligence	0.100 (0.083)	0.134 (0.091)
TRUE		-0.016 (0.012)
Age		-0.432* (0.187)
Female		0.032 (0.084)
Education		0.302 (0.238)
Party Member		0.104 (0.244)
ANC Member	-0.001 (0.083)	0.521 (0.460)
N	148	122
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.105
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.058

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

### **N.3 Section 8.4 - Main Effects: Skill, Pay, Status, and Willingness**

**Table N.4:** Effect of a Job's Social Quality on its Perceived Skill Level of Job

	Skill Level					
	Survey E (1)	E - Researcher (2)	E - Organizer (3)	Survey G (4)	Survey J (5)	Combined (6)
Treatment	-0.123** (0.040)	-0.085 (0.055)	-0.149** (0.057)	-0.146 (0.093)	-0.097* (0.042)	-0.113*** (0.028)
Constant	3.145*** (0.028)	3.185*** (0.038)	3.099*** (0.041)	3.032*** (0.051)	3.194*** (0.030)	3.119*** (0.018)
N	1,565	789	776	1,498	1,474	4,537
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.003	0.009	0.002	0.004	0.004
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.002	0.008	0.001	0.003	0.003

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.5:** Effect of a Job's Social Quality on its Expected Pay of Job

	Expected Pay					
	Survey E (1)	E - Researcher (2)	E - Organizer (3)	Survey G (4)	Survey J (5)	Combined (6)
Treatment	-0.295* (0.149)	-0.356 (0.208)	-0.180 (0.212)	-0.273 (0.365)	-0.509** (0.156)	-0.400*** (0.105)
Constant	5.618*** (0.104)	5.898*** (0.142)	5.302*** (0.153)	4.772*** (0.201)	5.234*** (0.111)	5.235*** (0.069)
N	1,564	789	775	1,499	1,475	4,538
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.0004	0.007	0.003
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.002	-0.0004	-0.0003	0.006	0.003

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.6:** Effect of a Job's Social Quality on its Perceived Social Status of Job

	Social Status					
	Survey E (1)	E - Researcher (2)	E - Organizer (3)	Survey G (4)	Survey J (5)	Combined (6)
Treatment	-0.102* (0.043)	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.135* (0.063)	-0.149 (0.110)	0.027 (0.048)	-0.046 (0.031)
Constant	3.292*** (0.030)	3.354*** (0.040)	3.222*** (0.045)	3.455*** (0.061)	3.417*** (0.034)	3.372*** (0.021)
N	1,565	789	776	1,499	1,475	4,539
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.0002	0.0005
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	-0.0003	0.005	0.001	-0.0005	0.0002

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.7:** Effect of a Job's Social Quality on Willingness to do Job

	Willingness					
	Survey E (1)	E - Researcher (2)	E - Organizer (3)	Survey G (4)	Survey J (5)	Combined (6)
Treatment	-0.173** (0.064)	-0.110 (0.089)	-0.215* (0.091)	0.010 (0.161)	0.014 (0.071)	-0.072 (0.046)
Constant	2.987*** (0.045)	3.069*** (0.061)	2.896*** (0.065)	3.160*** (0.089)	2.924*** (0.051)	3.035*** (0.031)
N	1,563	788	775	1,499	1,474	4,536
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.002	0.007	0.00000	0.00003	0.001
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.001	0.006	-0.001	-0.001	0.0003

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## N.4 Section 8.5 - Mediation by Perceived Qualifications and Moderation by Ability

Left Hand Side	Operation	Right Hand Side	Est	Conf. Int
Willingness	<-	PAY	0.04***	(0.02, 0.06)
Willingness	<-	SKILL	0.07*	(0, 0.14)
Willingness	<-	QUALIFIED	0.56***	(0.52, 0.61)
Willingness	<-	SOCIAL	-0.05	(-0.17, 0.06)
Pay	<-	SOCIAL	-0.51**	(-0.82, -0.21)
Skill	<-	SOCIAL	-0.09*	(-0.17, -0.01)
Qualified	<-	SOCIAL	0.17*	(0.03, 0.3)
Willingness	<-<-	WILLINGNESS	1.23	(1.15, 1.32)
Pay	<-<-	PAY	8.99	(8.34, 9.64)
Skill	<-<-	SKILL	0.63	(0.59, 0.68)
Qualified	<-<-	QUALIFIED	1.72	(1.6, 1.85)
Social	<-<-	SOCIAL	0.25	(0.25, 0.25)
Pay_indirect	==	a1*b1	-0.02**	(-0.04, -0.01)
Skill_indirect	==	a2*b2	-0.01	(-0.02, 0)
Qualified_indirect	==	a3*b3	0.09*	(0.02, 0.17)
Social_direct	==	c	-0.05	(-0.17, 0.06)
Total	==	c+(a1*b1)+(a2*b2)+(a3*b3)	0.01	(-0.12, 0.15)

**Table N.8:** Mediation of the Effect of Social Job Description on Willingness to be an Organizer by Perceived Skill, Expected Pay, and Self-Assessed Qualifications (Significance: \* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001. Operations: <- implies regressed on, <> implies covariance, and == implies defined as.)



**Table N.9:** Effect of Social Job Framing Moderated by Social Intelligence

	Willingness to do Job	
	(1)	(2)
Dosed Social Treatment	0.001 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.023)
Social Intelligence	-0.037 (0.064)	-0.064 (0.065)
Female		-0.131* (0.054)
Income		-0.022 (0.016)
Activism		0.693*** (0.060)
Treatment / SI Interaction	0.041 (0.023)	0.070** (0.023)
Constant	-0.003 (0.065)	-0.040 (0.083)
N	1,499	1,363
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.108
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.104

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## N.5 Section 8.6 - Heterogeneity by Income

Left Hand Side	Operation	Right Hand Side	Est	Conf. Int
Willingness	<-	PAY	0.1***	(0.07, 0.13)
Willingness	<-	SKILL	0.16**	(0.06, 0.27)
Willingness	<-	QUALIFIED	0.55***	(0.49, 0.61)
Willingness	<-	SOCIAL	-0.1	(-0.26, 0.06)
Pay	<-	SOCIAL	-0.33	(-0.75, 0.09)
Skill	<-	SOCIAL	-0.03	(-0.14, 0.08)
Qualified	<-	SOCIAL	0.18	(-0.01, 0.38)
Willingness	<-<-	WILLINGNESS	1.17	(1.05, 1.3)
Pay	<-<-	PAY	7.93	(7.1, 8.77)
Skill	<-<-	SKILL	0.56	(0.5, 0.62)
Qualified	<-<-	QUALIFIED	1.7	(1.52, 1.88)
Social	<-<-	SOCIAL	0.25	(0.25, 0.25)
Pay_indirect	==	a1*b1	-0.03	(-0.08, 0.01)
Skill_indirect	==	a2*b2	0	(-0.02, 0.01)
Qualified_indirect	==	a3*b3	0.1	(-0.01, 0.21)
Social_direct	==	c	-0.1	(-0.26, 0.06)
Total	==	c+(a1*b1)+(a2*b2)+(a3*b3)	-0.04	(-0.24, 0.16)

**Table N.10:** Mediation of the Effect of Social Job Description on Willingness to be an Organizer by Perceived Skill, Expected Pay, and Self-Assessed Qualifications Among Higher Income Respondents (Significance: \* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001. Operations: <- implies regressed on, <> implies covariance, and == implies defined as.)

*N. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 8*

Left Hand Side	Operation	Right Hand Side	Est	Conf. Int
Willingness	<-	PAY	0	(-0.04, 0.03)
Willingness	<-	SKILL	0.02	(-0.08, 0.11)
Willingness	<-	QUALIFIED	0.54***	(0.48, 0.61)
Willingness	<-	SOCIAL	-0.02	(-0.18, 0.15)
Pay	<-	SOCIAL	-0.51**	(-0.83, -0.18)
Skill	<-	SOCIAL	-0.15*	(-0.27, -0.03)
Qualified	<-	SOCIAL	0.21*	(0.03, 0.4)
Willingness	<-<-	WILLINGNESS	1.22	(1.09, 1.34)
Pay	<-<-	PAY	4.87	(4.36, 5.37)
Skill	<-<-	SKILL	0.67	(0.6, 0.74)
Qualified	<-<-	QUALIFIED	1.59	(1.42, 1.75)
Social	<-<-	SOCIAL	0.25	(0.25, 0.25)
Pay_indirect	==	a1*b1	0	(-0.02, 0.02)
Skill_indirect	==	a2*b2	0	(-0.02, 0.01)
Qualified_indirect	==	a3*b3	0.12*	(0.02, 0.22)
Social_direct	==	c	-0.02	(-0.18, 0.15)
Total	==	c+(a1*b1)+(a2*b2)+(a3*b3)	0.1	(-0.09, 0.29)

**Table N.11:** Mediation of the Effect of Social Job Description on Willingness to be an Organizer by Perceived Skill, Expected Pay, and Self-Assessed Qualifications Among Lower Income Respondents (Significance: \* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001. Operations: <- implies regressed on, <> implies covariance, and == implies defined as.)

*N. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 8*

**Table N.12:** Association of Willingness to do Job with Income By Perceptions of Relative Skills, Pooled Across Jobs (Surveys C)

Willingness to do Organizer Job	
Income	0.024*** (0.006)
Social Skill Dependent	-0.057 (0.060)
Interaction	-0.038*** (0.011)
Constant	2.057*** (0.030)
N	10,899
R <sup>2</sup>	0.008
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.13:** Association of Willingness to do Job with Income By Treatment Group (Pooled Across Surveys E and J)

Willingness to do Organizer Job	
Income	0.145* (0.073)
Social Variation	0.048 (0.083)
Interaction	-0.194 (0.103)
Constant	2.872*** (0.060)
N	2,910
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.001

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

## N.6 Section 8.7 - Heterogeneity by Political Engagement

**Table N.14:** Effect on Preference for Organizing Job of Social Treatment Interacted with Being a Potential Advocate

	Preference for Organizer Job	
	(1)	(2)
Social Treatment	0.229* (0.091)	0.209* (0.089)
Potential Advocate	0.310** (0.102)	0.275** (0.104)
Alt: Program Assoc		-0.182* (0.085)
Alt: Researcher		-0.203* (0.085)
Job Description Order		0.468*** (0.070)
College Educ		-0.167* (0.078)
Unemployed		0.112 (0.117)
Female		-0.133 (0.071)
Age		-0.004 (0.002)
White		0.067 (0.117)
Black		0.249 (0.139)
Latinx		0.150 (0.121)
High Income		0.075 (0.118)
Low Income		0.056 (0.123)
Soc. Var. * Pot. Adv	-0.334* (0.145)	-0.291* (0.143)
Constant	2.660*** (0.064)	2.766*** (0.183)
N	1,501	1,501
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.055
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.045

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.15:** Effect on Preference for Organizing Job of the Social Treatment Interacted with Being a Democrat

	Preference for Organizer Job	
	(1)	(2)
Social Treatment	0.067 (0.090)	0.052 (0.088)
Democrat	-0.001 (0.103)	-0.053 (0.102)
Alt: Program Assoc		-0.180* (0.086)
Alt: Researcher		-0.205* (0.085)
Job Description Order		0.471*** (0.070)
College Educ		-0.148 (0.077)
Unemployed		0.096 (0.117)
Female		-0.143* (0.071)
Age		-0.005* (0.002)
White		0.078 (0.117)
Black		0.257 (0.140)
Latinx		0.161 (0.122)
High Income		0.087 (0.118)
Low Income		0.050 (0.123)
Soc. Var. * Dem	0.082 (0.147)	0.116 (0.144)
Constant	2.783*** (0.064)	2.928*** (0.178)
N	1,501	1,501
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.051
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0004	0.041

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.16:** Effect on Preference for Organizing Job of the Social Treatment Interacted with Being a Potential Advocate and Being a Democrat

	Preference for Organizer Job	
	(1)	(2)
Social Treatment	0.067 (0.090)	0.062 (0.108)
Democrat	-0.001 (0.103)	-0.301* (0.134)
Potential Advocate		0.077 (0.133)
Alt: Program Assoc		-0.183* (0.085)
Alt: Researcher		-0.207* (0.085)
Job Description Order		0.462*** (0.070)
College Educ		-0.173* (0.078)
Unemployed		0.122 (0.117)
Female		-0.132 (0.071)
Age		-0.004 (0.002)
White		0.061 (0.117)
Black		0.240 (0.140)
Latinx		0.150 (0.121)
High Income		0.086 (0.118)
Low Income		0.062 (0.123)
Soc. Var. * Dem	0.082 (0.147)	0.449* (0.191)
Dem. * Pot. Adv		-0.034 (0.186)
Soc. Var. * Dem. * Pot. Adv		0.519* (0.206)
Democrat		-0.693* (0.294)
Constant	2.783*** (0.064)	2.870*** (0.188)
N	1,501	1,501
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.060
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0004	0.048

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

**Table N.17:** Effect of Social Treatment and Party Interacted, Subsetted by Advocacy Potential, on Preference for Organizing Job

	Preference for Organizer Job			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Treatment	-0.265 (0.186)	-0.302 (0.183)	-0.0002 (0.252)	-0.096 (0.247)
Party ID	-0.048 (0.028)	-0.063* (0.028)	0.058 (0.034)	0.031 (0.034)
Alt: Program Assoc		-0.236* (0.106)		-0.098 (0.142)
Alt: Researcher		-0.205 (0.106)		-0.231 (0.141)
Job Order		0.305*** (0.087)		0.712*** (0.116)
College Educ		-0.324** (0.099)		0.052 (0.127)
Unemployed		0.135 (0.132)		0.168 (0.235)
Female		-0.105 (0.088)		-0.173 (0.119)
Age		-0.001 (0.003)		-0.007 (0.004)
White		0.079 (0.146)		0.008 (0.196)
Black		0.334 (0.176)		0.076 (0.230)
Latinx		0.344* (0.170)		-0.026 (0.176)
High Income		0.111 (0.157)		-0.008 (0.180)
Low Income		0.086 (0.147)		-0.010 (0.222)
Soc. Var. * PID	0.123** (0.041)	0.125** (0.040)	-0.024 (0.049)	0.005 (0.048)
Constant	2.857*** (0.129)	2.980*** (0.251)	2.711*** (0.174)	2.890*** (0.314)
N	915	915	586	586
R <sup>2</sup>	0.017	0.065	0.008	0.083
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.050	0.003	0.059

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001




**Table N.18:** Stated Importance of Mobilizing Community by Party (1-5) (Survey C)

<b>DF</b>	<b>Mean: Dem</b>	<b>Mean: Rep</b>	<b>Difference</b>	<b>Conf. Int</b>
846	3.00	2.66	0.34***	(0.20, 0.48)

*Significance Levels*

\* < .05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001



## Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

### **O.1 Section 9.2 - Replicating Findings Using the World Values Survey**

The tables below report the estimated organizing-specific association. For the procedure used to create these models, please refer to Section 9.2.1. Note, due to missingness the total sample size varies between models. Estimates are followed by a 95% confidence intervals.

The tables below report the estimated organizing-specific association. For the procedure used to create these models, please refer to Section 9.2.1. Note, due to missingness the total sample size varies between models. Estimates are followed by a 95% confidence intervals.

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.1:** Estimated Effect of 'Majority Ethnicity' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Member of Majority Ethnic Group	-0.0052 [-0.0179; 0.0075]
Average Trust (Index)	-0.0078 [-0.0242; 0.0087]
Age Squared	0.0205 [-0.0039; 0.0449]
Level of Language Skills	0.0120 [-0.0149; 0.0390]
Confidence in Religious Institutions	0.0291 [0.0038; 0.0545]
Religion: Catholic	-0.0167 [-0.0309; -0.0025]
Religion Important	0.0075 [-0.0175; 0.0324]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0231 [-0.0412; -0.0051]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0148 [-0.0360; 0.0065]
General Trust	0.0238 [0.0039; 0.0436]
Citizen	0.0003 [-0.0072; 0.0078]
College	0.0291 [0.0153; 0.0429]
Political Interest	0.0472 [0.0367; 0.0576]
Discuss Politics	0.0891 [0.0549; 0.1232]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0168 [-0.0408; 0.0073]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0438 [0.0268; 0.0607]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0340 [0.0138; 0.0542]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0217 [-0.0011; 0.0446]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0099 [-0.0257; 0.0059]
Feel Safe	0.0112 [-0.0070; 0.0294]
Post Materialism Index (12-Item)	0.0177 [-0.0069; 0.0422]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0295 [-0.0455; -0.0134]
Defiance Index	0.0089 [-0.0127; 0.0305]
Trust Police	0.0236 [-0.0120; 0.0593]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0246 [0.0085; 0.0407]
High Status Profession	-0.0302 [-0.0420; -0.0183]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	290,744
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40822
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01225

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, KEN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.2:** Estimated Effect of 'Believe Need Revolution' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Revolutionary Values	-0.0114 [-0.0285; 0.0058]
Okay to Break Laws (Index)	0.0105 [-0.0116; 0.0325]
Environmentalism	-0.0069 [-0.0198; 0.0059]
Authoritarianism (Index)	-0.0173 [-0.0422; 0.0076]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0073 [-0.0299; 0.0153]
Corruption (Index)	-0.0043 [-0.0249; 0.0162]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0485 [0.0261; 0.0708]
Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0012 [-0.0212; 0.0237]
Want Theocracy	0.0241 [-0.0049; 0.0532]
Feel Safe	0.0065 [-0.0154; 0.0284]
Feel Connected	0.0142 [-0.0116; 0.0400]
Feel Satisfied	0.0223 [-0.0073; 0.0520]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0179 [-0.0149; 0.0507]
Secular Values Inded	-0.0398 [-0.0777; -0.0019]
Nationalism	0.0013 [-0.0174; 0.0200]
Child Autonomy Index	-0.0058 [-0.0246; 0.0130]
Democratic Values (Index)	-0.0104 [-0.0371; 0.0163]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0326 [0.0062; 0.0590]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0146 [-0.0380; 0.0087]
General Trust	0.0281 [0.0068; 0.0494]
Citizen	0.0055 [-0.0069; 0.0178]
College	0.0253 [0.0089; 0.0418]
Political Interest	0.0438 [0.0265; 0.0611]
Discuss Politics	0.0899 [0.0516; 0.1282]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0094 [-0.0352; 0.0165]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0308 [0.0065; 0.0551]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0092 [-0.0192; 0.0376]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0215 [-0.0567; 0.0136]
Defiance Index	0.0192 [-0.0083; 0.0467]
Trust Police	0.0300 [-0.0039; 0.0638]
High Status Profession	-0.0189 [-0.0284; -0.0094]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	317,776
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40871
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01298

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.3:** Estimated Effect of 'Value Democracy' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Democratic Values (Index)	-0.0068 [-0.0347; 0.0211]
Okay to Break Laws (Index)	0.0253 [-0.0037; 0.0542]
Okay with Surveillance State (Index)	0.0206 [-0.0020; 0.0431]
Authoritarianism (Index)	-0.0158 [-0.0396; 0.0080]
Pro Immigrantion (Index)	0.0091 [-0.0090; 0.0271]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0178 [-0.0479; 0.0123]
Confidence in Politics	0.0220 [-0.0117; 0.0557]
Job: Service	-0.0070 [-0.0176; 0.0037]
Sector: Non-Profit	0.0008 [-0.0155; 0.0171]
Perceive Vote Coercion	0.0135 [-0.0114; 0.0383]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0037 [-0.0269; 0.0195]
Tolerant Other Religions	0.0085 [-0.0136; 0.0306]
Attendance Religious Institutions	0.0223 [-0.0050; 0.0495]
Want Theocracy	0.0107 [-0.0151; 0.0365]
Feel Safe	0.0022 [-0.0285; 0.0328]
Feel Connected	0.0067 [-0.0159; 0.0294]
Feel Happy	-0.0302 [-0.0469; -0.0134]
org × Q289CS9_s	0.0120 [-0.0007; 0.0247]
Nationalism	0.0057 [-0.0120; 0.0234]
Defiance Index	-0.0083 [-0.0264; 0.0098]
Norms Conform 1	-0.0191 [-0.0499; 0.0117]
Norms Conform 3	-0.0597 [-0.0805; -0.0388]
Relativism Index	0.0170 [-0.0192; 0.0531]
Abortion Allowable	-0.0180 [-0.0397; 0.0038]
Revolutionary Values	-0.0111 [-0.0297; 0.0075]
Woman	0.0046 [-0.0214; 0.0307]
Gender Equality: Politics	0.0377 [0.0188; 0.0566]
Income in Top Half	-0.0219 [-0.0382; -0.0055]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	0.0204 [-0.0085; 0.0492]
General Trust	0.0262 [0.0017; 0.0508]
Citizen	-0.0014 [-0.0125; 0.0097]
College	0.0290 [0.0125; 0.0455]
Political Interest	0.0501 [0.0299; 0.0704]
Discuss Politics	0.0932 [0.0511; 0.1353]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0199 [-0.0428; 0.0030]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0459 [0.0214; 0.0704]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0295 [0.0018; 0.0572]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0044 [-0.0282; 0.0370]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0379 [0.0097; 0.0661]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0660 [-0.0884; -0.0436]
Trust Police	0.0278 [-0.0122; 0.0680]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0236 [-0.0030; 0.0502]
High Status Profession	-0.0135 [-0.0256; -0.0014]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	229,419
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40501
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01385

Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets

Countries included: ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.4:** Estimated Effect of 'Friends Important' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
View Friends as Important	0.0225 [0.0012; 0.0437]
Futurist (Index)	-0.0023 [-0.0350; 0.0305]
Average Trust (Index)	-0.0111 [-0.0292; 0.0070]
Education Level	-0.0242 [-0.0505; 0.0022]
Employed	0.0035 [-0.0093; 0.0163]
Student	-0.0016 [-0.0187; 0.0154]
Rural	-0.0077 [-0.0253; 0.0099]
Mother's Education	-0.0046 [-0.0313; 0.0221]
View Politics as Important	-0.0293 [-0.0980; 0.0395]
Discuss Politics	0.0911 [0.0522; 0.1299]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0089 [-0.0372; 0.0193]
Religion Important	-0.0039 [-0.0382; 0.0304]
Confidence in Religious Institutions	0.0376 [0.0097; 0.0655]
Religion: None	0.0100 [-0.0164; 0.0365]
Personal Finances	-0.0186 [-0.0453; 0.0081]
Feel Healthy	0.0013 [-0.0173; 0.0198]
Feel Anxious	-0.0184 [-0.0370; 0.0003]
Feel Happy	-0.0181 [-0.0330; -0.0031]
Individual Autonomy Index	-0.0222 [-0.0429; -0.0015]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0040 [-0.0442; 0.0362]
Child Autonomy Index	0.0012 [-0.0255; 0.0280]
Homosexuality Allowable	-0.0098 [-0.0473; 0.0278]
Feel Efficacy	-0.0382 [-0.0650; -0.0114]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0354 [0.0131; 0.0578]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0309 [-0.0615; -0.0002]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0132 [-0.0390; 0.0126]
General Trust	0.0253 [0.0023; 0.0483]
Citizen	0.0130 [-0.0177; 0.0438]
College	0.0438 [0.0274; 0.0602]
Political Interest	0.0166 [-0.0545; 0.0877]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.1002 [-0.0126; 0.2131]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0381 [0.0123; 0.0638]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0131 [-0.0195; 0.0456]
Member of Orgs (Index)	$3.99 \times 10^{-6}$ [-0.0238; 0.0238]
Feel Safe	0.0038 [-0.0145; 0.0221]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0173 [-0.0159; 0.0505]
Defiance Index	-0.0031 [-0.0267; 0.0205]
Trust Police	0.0347 [-0.0057; 0.0751]
High Status Profession	-0.0189 [-0.0316; -0.0062]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	277,442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41036
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01312

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

*O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9*

**Table O.5:** Estimated Effect of 'Liberal Values' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Liberal (Index)	-0.0781 [-0.1474; -0.0089]
Okay to Break Laws (Index)	0.0197 [-0.0040; 0.0434]
Political Violence is Okay (Index)	-0.0233 [-0.0468; 0.0001]
Feminist (Index)	0.0114 [-0.0146; 0.0373]
Value Tolerance (Index)	-0.0062 [-0.0306; 0.0181]
Futurist (Index)	-0.0167 [-0.0397; 0.0064]
Discuss Politics	0.0913 [0.0511; 0.1315]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0138 [-0.0383; 0.0106]
Secular Values Index	-0.0348 [-0.0978; 0.0282]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0313 [-0.0527; -0.0098]
Devoutness	0.0097 [0.0003; 0.0192]
Norms Conform 2	0.0205 [-0.0028; 0.0439]
Norms Conform 3	-0.0286 [-0.0483; -0.0089]
Relativism Index	0.0022 [-0.0467; 0.0512]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0334 [0.0096; 0.0571]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	0.0705 [0.0044; 0.1367]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0107 [-0.0357; 0.0143]
General Trust	0.0283 [0.0038; 0.0528]
Citizen	0.0136 [-0.0015; 0.0286]
College	0.0251 [0.0073; 0.0429]
Political Interest	0.0469 [0.0291; 0.0647]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0489 [0.0269; 0.0709]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0316 [0.0048; 0.0583]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0104 [-0.0199; 0.0408]
Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0040 [-0.0179; 0.0259]
Feel Safe	0.0103 [-0.0145; 0.0351]
Post Materialism Index (12-Item)	0.0222 [-0.0048; 0.0493]
Defiance Index	0.0166 [-0.0075; 0.0406]
Trust Police	0.0277 [-0.0112; 0.0667]
High Status Profession	-0.0172 [-0.0281; -0.0062]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	334,740
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40848
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01310

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.6:** Estimated Effect of 'Personal Control' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Feel Efficacy	-0.0322 [-0.0609; -0.0036]
Feminist (Index)	0.0236 [-0.0079; 0.0551]
Futurist (Index)	-0.0051 [-0.0317; 0.0215]
Unambiguous Values	-0.0140 [-0.0333; 0.0052]
Corruption (Index)	0.0007 [-0.0198; 0.0211]
Education Level	-0.0229 [-0.0438; -0.0020]
Income Level	-0.0091 [-0.0232; 0.0049]
High Income	-0.0024 [-0.0150; 0.0101]
Head of Household	0.0026 [-0.0191; 0.0244]
Employed	0.0022 [-0.0108; 0.0151]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0055 [-0.0315; 0.0206]
God Importance	0.0073 [-0.0314; 0.0460]
Personal Finances	-0.0178 [-0.0402; 0.0046]
Feel Healthy	0.0016 [-0.0126; 0.0158]
Feel Happy	-0.0112 [-0.0242; 0.0018]
Perception Things Important (Index)	0.0076 [-0.0164; 0.0315]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0338 [0.0112; 0.0564]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0278 [-0.0468; -0.0088]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0142 [-0.0396; 0.0112]
General Trust	0.0280 [0.0042; 0.0519]
Citizen	0.0131 [-0.0030; 0.0292]
College	0.0400 [0.0245; 0.0554]
Political Interest	0.0399 [0.0292; 0.0505]
Discuss Politics	0.0875 [0.0457; 0.1292]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0537 [0.0309; 0.0765]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0369 [0.0108; 0.0631]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0148 [-0.0187; 0.0482]
Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0011 [-0.0231; 0.0252]
Feel Safe	0.0023 [-0.0155; 0.0201]
Post Matierialism Index (12-Item)	0.0199 [-0.0056; 0.0455]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0274 [-0.0466; -0.0081]
Defiance Index	$8.41 \times 10^{-5}$ [-0.0232; 0.0234]
Trust Police	0.0153 [-0.0135; 0.0440]
High Status Profession	-0.0174 [-0.0273; -0.0074]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	321,902
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40791
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01309

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE



O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.7:** Estimated Effect of 'Moral Certitude' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0336 [0.0209; 0.0463]
Value Political Voice (Index)	-0.0266 [-0.0507; -0.0025]
Okay to Break Laws (Index)	0.0073 [-0.0095; 0.0242]
Political Violence is Okay (Index)	-0.0242 [-0.0488; 0.0005]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	0.0444 [-0.0484; 0.1373]
Okay with Surveillance State (Index)	0.0096 [-0.0064; 0.0256]
Environmentalism	-0.0090 [-0.0234; 0.0053]
Socialist (Index)	0.0135 [-0.0048; 0.0317]
Pro Immigrantion (Index)	-0.0043 [-0.0227; 0.0142]
Futurist (Index)	-0.0203 [-0.0447; 0.0041]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0203 [-0.0430; 0.0024]
Unambiguous Values	-0.0273 [-0.0453; -0.0093]
Confidence in Civil Society Orgs	0.0230 [-0.0018; 0.0479]
Confidence in Democracy	-0.0089 [-0.0348; 0.0171]
Corruption (Index)	-0.0083 [-0.0334; 0.0168]
General Trust	0.0400 [0.0112; 0.0688]
High Income	-0.0073 [-0.0210; 0.0064]
Head of Household	0.0126 [-0.0050; 0.0302]
Rural	-0.0021 [-0.0188; 0.0146]
Job: Farming	-0.0006 [-0.0154; 0.0141]
Job: Farm Owner	-0.0180 [-0.0378; 0.0019]
Level of Language Skills	-0.0110 [-0.0412; 0.0193]
Interested During Interview	-0.0256 [-0.0516; 0.0004]
Upper Class	0.0121 [-0.0035; 0.0277]
View Politics as Important	-0.0681 [-0.1334; -0.0028]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.1616 [0.0498; 0.2734]
Confidence in Unions	-0.0304 [-0.0487; -0.0122]
Perceive Vote Coercion	0.0046 [-0.0124; 0.0215]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0155 [-0.0136; 0.0446]
Attendance Religious Institutions	0.0065 [-0.0141; 0.0271]
Want Theocracy	0.0102 [-0.0158; 0.0361]
Religion: None	0.0128 [-0.0088; 0.0344]
Religion: Jew	-0.0059 [-0.0163; 0.0045]
Religion: Muslim	0.0139 [-0.0071; 0.0349]
Feel Healthy	-0.0098 [-0.0274; 0.0077]
Feel Happy	-0.0146 [-0.0302; 0.0011]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0187 [-0.0109; 0.0483]
Respect for Authority	-0.0043 [-0.0270; 0.0185]
Nationalism	-0.0109 [-0.0295; 0.0077]
Defiance Index	0.0057 [-0.0178; 0.0293]
Religion Important	0.0018 [-0.0290; 0.0326]
Trust Army	-0.0288 [-0.0550; -0.0026]
Value in Children: Imagination	0.0079 [-0.0131; 0.0289]
Child Autonomy Index	-0.0323 [-0.0596; -0.0050]
Homosexuality Allowable	-0.0237 [-0.0547; 0.0072]
Abortion Allowable	-0.0210 [-0.0447; 0.0027]
Member of Majority Ethnic Group	0.0053 [-0.0107; 0.0214]
Revolutionary Values	-0.0171 [-0.0341; $-4.58 \times 10^{-5}$ ]
View Friends as Important	0.0134 [-0.0059; 0.0327]
Liberal (Index)	-0.0513 [-0.1405; 0.0379]
Feel Efficacy	-0.0383 [-0.0643; -0.0123]
Woman	0.0134 [-0.0038; 0.0306]
Citizen	0.0111 [-0.0046; 0.0268]
College	0.0317 [0.0097; 0.0537]
Political Interest	-0.0294 [-0.0938; 0.0350]
Discuss Politics	0.0888 [0.0522; 0.1254]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0192 [-0.0498; 0.0114]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0300 [0.0047; 0.0552]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0072 [-0.0288; 0.0144]
Feel Safe	0.0038 [-0.0154; 0.0231]
Emancipative Values Index	0.0216 [-0.0324; 0.0757]
Trust Police	0.0290 [-0.0081; 0.0660]
High Status Profession	-0.0346 [-0.0537; -0.0154]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	208,581
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40545
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01379

Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets

Countries included: ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, CYP, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, KEN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TUN, TWN, UKR, VEN

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.8:** Estimated Effect of 'Sales Job' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Job: Sales	0.0224 [0.0026; 0.0423]
Age	0.0204 [-0.0090; 0.0500]
Have Children	0.0164 [-0.0010; 0.0339]
Employed	0.0005 [-0.0183; 0.0192]
Retired	-0.0146 [-0.0343; 0.0052]
Sector: Non-Profit	0.0007 [-0.0160; 0.0175]
Interested During Interview	-0.0165 [-0.0424; 0.0094]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0181 [-0.0470; 0.0107]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0141 [-0.0332; 0.0051]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0175 [-0.0469; 0.0118]
General Trust	0.0223 [-0.0043; 0.0489]
Citizen	0.0092 [-0.0123; 0.0307]
College	0.0257 [0.0059; 0.0455]
Political Interest	0.0592 [0.0367; 0.0818]
Discuss Politics	0.0810 [0.0360; 0.1261]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0422 [0.0210; 0.0634]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0341 [0.0039; 0.0644]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0079 [-0.0293; 0.0451]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0020 [-0.0274; 0.0234]
Feel Safe	0.0074 [-0.0206; 0.0355]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0227 [-0.0087; 0.0542]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0318 [-0.0537; -0.0098]
Defiance Index	-0.0049 [-0.0284; 0.0186]
Trust Police	0.0107 [-0.0195; 0.0409]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0299 [0.0073; 0.0525]
High Status Profession	-0.0097 [-0.0237; 0.0042]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	234,783
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39943
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01315

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.9:** Estimated Effect of 'Woman' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Woman	0.0116 [-0.0041; 0.0272]
Value Political Voice (Index)	0.0083 [-0.0070; 0.0236]
Socialist (Index)	0.0113 [0.0014; 0.0212]
Feminist (Index)	-0.0195 [-0.0425; 0.0035]
Value Work-Ethic (Index)	-0.0130 [-0.0253; -0.0006]
Authoritarianism (Index)	-0.0183 [-0.0367; 3.57 × 10 <sup>-6</sup> ]
Confidence in Politics	0.0381 [0.0142; 0.0621]
Confidence in Media	-0.0265 [-0.0512; -0.0017]
Confidence in Civil Society Orgs	0.0170 [-0.0072; 0.0411]
Age	0.0192 [-0.0077; 0.0461]
Have Children	0.0080 [-0.0073; 0.0233]
Never Employed	0.0053 [-0.0067; 0.0174]
Job: Professional	-0.0291 [-0.0682; 0.0100]
Job: Clerical	-0.0135 [-0.0301; 0.0030]
People Oriented Profession	-0.0055 [-0.0192; 0.0081]
View Politics as Important	-0.0545 [-0.1133; 0.0043]
Perceive Vote Coercion	0.0104 [-0.0071; 0.0280]
Religion Important	-0.0129 [-0.0693; 0.0435]
Active Member of Religious Community	0.0125 [-0.0185; 0.0435]
Commitment to Doctrines	0.0100 [-0.0207; 0.0407]
Tolerant Other Religions	0.0043 [-0.0137; 0.0223]
Regularity of Prayer	-0.0138 [-0.0510; 0.0235]
Identify as Religious	0.0186 [-0.0077; 0.0449]
Earthly Religious Interpretation (Index)	0.0082 [-0.0032; 0.0195]
Want Theocracy	0.0145 [-0.0158; 0.0449]
Religion: Orthodox	0.0100 [-0.0081; 0.0282]
Average Religious Engagement (Index)	0.0194 [-0.1437; 0.1825]
Feel Safe	0.0073 [-0.0094; 0.0240]
Feel Anxious	-0.0120 [-0.0252; 0.0013]
Feel Happy	-0.0227 [-0.0352; -0.0103]
Perception Things Important (Index)	0.0062 [-0.0114; 0.0238]
org × 1_RELIGPRAC_s	0.0041 [-0.0252; 0.0335]
Norms Conform 1	-0.0056 [-0.0158; 0.0047]
Norms Conform 3	-0.0296 [-0.0408; -0.0185]
Trust Army	-0.0254 [-0.0461; -0.0047]
Value in Children: Independence	0.0080 [-0.0041; 0.0202]
Gender Equality: Workplace	0.0008 [-0.0185; 0.0200]
Gender Equality Index	0.0041 [-0.0209; 0.0292]
Homosexuality Allowable	0.0027 [-0.0330; 0.0384]
Divorce Allowable	0.0044 [-0.0198; 0.0286]
Free Choice Index	-0.0287 [-0.0761; 0.0188]
Member of Majority Ethnic Group	-5.43 × 10 <sup>-5</sup> [-0.0165; 0.0164]
Democratic Values (Index)	-6.75 × 10 <sup>-5</sup> [-0.0192; 0.0191]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0238 [0.0089; 0.0387]
Job: Sales	0.0207 [0.0024; 0.0389]
Gender Equality: Politics	0.0364 [0.0225; 0.0504]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	0.0220 [-0.0089; 0.0529]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0136 [-0.0331; 0.0058]
General Trust	0.0219 [0.0089; 0.0349]
Citizen	0.0050 [-0.0013; 0.0113]
College	0.0300 [0.0151; 0.0449]
Political Interest	-0.0003 [-0.0576; 0.0570]
Discuss Politics	0.0924 [0.0596; 0.1252]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0179 [-0.0399; 0.0042]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.1247 [0.0316; 0.2178]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0386 [0.0200; 0.0572]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0096 [-0.0218; 0.0411]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0022 [-0.0199; 0.0155]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0129 [-0.0111; 0.0369]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0483 [-0.0710; -0.0256]
Defiance Index	0.0010 [-0.0207; 0.0227]
Trust Police	0.0425 [0.0039; 0.0810]
High Status Profession	-0.0035 [-0.0390; 0.0321]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	250,691
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40665
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01337

Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets

Countries included: ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, KEN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TUN, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

*O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9*

**Table O.10:** Estimated Effect of 'Support Political Gender Equality' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Gender Equality: Politics	0.0274 [0.0071; 0.0476]
Value Tolerance (Index)	-0.0064 [-0.0360; 0.0232]
Pro Immigrantion (Index)	-0.0002 [-0.0177; 0.0174]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0109 [-0.0375; 0.0158]
Age Squared	0.0137 [-0.0131; 0.0406]
Religion: Orthodox	0.0183 [-0.0064; 0.0431]
org × Q289CS9_s	0.0129 [-0.0072; 0.0330]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0427 [-0.0650; -0.0204]
Respect for Authority	-0.0092 [-0.0408; 0.0224]
Devoutedness	0.0020 [-0.0135; 0.0176]
Woman	0.0003 [-0.0228; 0.0234]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0135 [-0.0333; 0.0064]
General Trust	0.0333 [0.0088; 0.0579]
Citizen	0.0120 [-0.0066; 0.0306]
College	0.0286 [0.0103; 0.0469]
Political Interest	0.0419 [0.0182; 0.0655]
Discuss Politics	0.0928 [0.0516; 0.1340]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0135 [-0.0381; 0.0110]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0538 [0.0260; 0.0816]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0312 [0.0034; 0.0590]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0096 [-0.0210; 0.0402]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0007 [-0.0240; 0.0226]
Feel Safe	0.0045 [-0.0203; 0.0293]
Post Matierialism Index (12-Item)	0.0236 [-0.0044; 0.0516]
Defiance Index	0.0143 [-0.0269; 0.0555]
Trust Police	0.0135 [-0.0190; 0.0461]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0306 [0.0080; 0.0531]
High Status Profession	-0.0188 [-0.0302; -0.0073]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	302,423
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40879
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01293

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:**ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9

**Table O.11:** Estimated Effect of 'Income Top Half' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Income in Top Half	-0.0250 [-0.0417; -0.0084]
Okay to Break Laws (Index)	0.0229 [0.0068; 0.0390]
Political Violence is Okay (Index)	-0.0351 [-0.0654; -0.0048]
Authoritarianism (Index)	0.0089 [-0.0190; 0.0368]
Unambiguous Values	-0.0249 [-0.0427; -0.0071]
General Trust	0.0130 [-0.0216; 0.0477]
Average Trust (Index)	-0.0050 [-0.0300; 0.0200]
Married	0.0113 [-0.0010; 0.0236]
Education Level	-0.0187 [-0.0474; 0.0100]
High Income	-0.0063 [-0.0187; 0.0061]
Employed	0.0054 [-0.0111; 0.0219]
Student	0.0100 [-0.0123; 0.0324]
Town Size	0.0009 [-0.0188; 0.0205]
Job: Exec	0.0092 [-0.0138; 0.0321]
Job: Clerical	-0.0093 [-0.0331; 0.0146]
Father's Education	-0.0274 [-0.0424; -0.0124]
Mother's Education	-0.0050 [-0.0312; 0.0212]
Upper Class	0.0137 [-0.0025; 0.0298]
Political News Consumption (Index)	0.0043 [-0.0316; 0.0401]
Political Efficacy	0.0138 [-0.0092; 0.0368]
Commitment to Doctrines	0.0134 [-0.0181; 0.0450]
Want Theocracy	0.0073 [-0.0224; 0.0371]
Religion: Catholic	-0.0119 [-0.0341; 0.0103]
Personal Finances	-0.0054 [-0.0311; 0.0204]
Feel Healthy	-0.0048 [-0.0210; 0.0114]
Feel Happy	-0.0173 [-0.0378; 0.0033]
Post Matieralism Index (4-Item)	-0.0039 [-0.0224; 0.0145]
Norms Conform 3	-0.0380 [-0.0544; -0.0215]
Gender Equality: Workplace	0.0026 [-0.0220; 0.0271]
Homosexuality Allowable	-0.0085 [-0.0434; 0.0264]
Democratic Values (Index)	-0.0042 [-0.0328; 0.0243]
Feel Efficacy	-0.0445 [-0.0779; -0.0111]
High Status Profession	-0.0312 [-0.0574; -0.0050]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	0.0024 [-0.0284; 0.0332]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0176 [-0.0402; 0.0050]
Citizen	-0.0024 [-0.0144; 0.0095]
College	0.0482 [0.0250; 0.0713]
Political Interest	0.0592 [0.0389; 0.0795]
Discuss Politics	0.0925 [0.0507; 0.1344]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0340 [0.0063; 0.0617]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0449 [0.0129; 0.0770]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0212 [-0.0145; 0.0569]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0074 [-0.0314; 0.0167]
Feel Safe	0.0077 [-0.0198; 0.0352]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0086 [-0.0316; 0.0487]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0245 [-0.0515; 0.0024]
Defiance Index	-0.0154 [-0.0400; 0.0091]
Trust Police	0.0233 [-0.0159; 0.0626]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0251 [0.0045; 0.0458]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	197,547
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39802
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01722

Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets

Countries included: ARG, ARM, BGD, BRA, CAN, COL, CYP, ETH, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, SGP, TUN, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

*O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9*

**Table O.12:** Estimated Effect of 'Elite Profession' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls.

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
High Status Profession	-0.0232 [-0.0421; -0.0042]
Value Tolerance (Index)	-0.0049 [-0.0340; 0.0241]
General Trust	0.0248 [-0.0027; 0.0523]
Age	0.0113 [-0.0212; 0.0438]
Married	0.0057 [-0.0049; 0.0163]
Have Children	0.0144 [-0.0067; 0.0356]
Education Level	-0.0180 [-0.0465; 0.0105]
Income Level	-0.0174 [-0.0340; -0.0008]
Employed	0.0125 [-0.0036; 0.0286]
Town Size	-0.0015 [-0.0212; 0.0182]
Job: Exec	0.0149 [-0.0053; 0.0352]
Sector: Non-Profit	-0.0005 [-0.0178; 0.0169]
Interested During Interview	-0.0164 [-0.0416; 0.0088]
College	0.0383 [0.0210; 0.0556]
Upper Class	0.0166 [-0.0005; 0.0336]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0133 [-0.0335; 0.0068]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0189 [-0.0484; 0.0105]
Citizen	0.0076 [-0.0144; 0.0296]
Political Interest	0.0581 [0.0360; 0.0802]
Discuss Politics	0.0814 [0.0359; 0.1269]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0138 [-0.0408; 0.0132]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0418 [0.0199; 0.0637]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0349 [0.0051; 0.0646]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0041 [-0.0340; 0.0422]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0028 [-0.0300; 0.0244]
Feel Safe	0.0079 [-0.0209; 0.0367]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0226 [-0.0089; 0.0542]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0286 [-0.0516; -0.0056]
Defiance Index	-0.0052 [-0.0290; 0.0186]
Trust Police	0.0122 [-0.0185; 0.0429]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0268 [0.0049; 0.0488]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	227,911
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39978
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01388

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KEN, KOR, LBY, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MNG, MYS, NGA, NIC, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

*O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9*

**Table O.13:** Estimated Effect of 'Support Political Gender Equality' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls(Women Only).

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Gender Equality: Politics	0.0205 [-0.0007; 0.0417]
Value Tolerance (Index)	-0.0118 [-0.0336; 0.0100]
Pro Immigration (Index)	0.0006 [-0.0179; 0.0191]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0078 [-0.0268; 0.0113]
Age Squared	0.0009 [-0.0181; 0.0199]
Religion: Orthodox	0.0269 [-0.0032; 0.0571]
org × Q289CS9_s	0.0105 [-0.0151; 0.0360]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0219 [-0.0526; 0.0089]
Respect for Authority	-0.0067 [-0.0504; 0.0370]
Devoutness	-0.0115 [-0.0457; 0.0228]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0169 [-0.0434; 0.0096]
General Trust	0.0579 [0.0327; 0.0831]
Citizen	0.0116 [-0.0036; 0.0268]
College	-0.0111 [-0.0340; 0.0118]
Political Interest	0.0306 [-0.0050; 0.0662]
Discuss Politics	0.0766 [0.0524; 0.1009]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0177 [-0.0386; 0.0032]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0455 [0.0100; 0.0810]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0292 [0.0094; 0.0489]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0026 [-0.0260; 0.0208]
Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0080 [-0.0119; 0.0279]
Feel Safe	-0.0067 [-0.0246; 0.0113]
Post Matierialism Index (12-Item)	0.0126 [-0.0085; 0.0337]
Defiance Index	0.0338 [-0.0223; 0.0898]
Trust Police	0.0136 [-0.0065; 0.0336]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0255 [0.0038; 0.0472]
High Status Profession	-0.0146 [-0.0380; 0.0088]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	149,470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.40294
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01249

*Clustered (Respondent) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:**ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE

*O. Model Results Referenced in Chapter 9*

**Table O.14:** Estimated Effect of 'Support Political Gender Equality' on Probability of Having Recruited Including Controls(Men Only).

Dependent Variable: Model:	Political Act:Organizing (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Gender Equality: Politics	0.0350 [0.0084; 0.0616]
Value Tolerance (Index)	0.0062 [-0.0340; 0.0464]
Pro Immigration (Index)	0.0001 [-0.0185; 0.0188]
Left Ideology (Index)	-0.0126 [-0.0410; 0.0157]
Age Squared	0.0236 [-0.0101; 0.0573]
Religion: Orthodox	0.0111 [-0.0148; 0.0370]
org × Q289CS9_s	0.0134 [-0.0016; 0.0284]
Emancipative Values Index	-0.0581 [-0.0859; -0.0303]
Respect for Authority	-0.0120 [-0.0416; 0.0176]
Devoutedness	0.0152 [-0.0023; 0.0326]
Pro- Sexual Liberation (Index)	-0.0143 [-0.0347; 0.0060]
General Trust	0.0108 [-0.0147; 0.0363]
Citizen	0.0106 [-0.0090; 0.0301]
College	0.0588 [0.0305; 0.0870]
Political Interest	0.0497 [0.0142; 0.0852]
Discuss Politics	0.1066 [0.0670; 0.1461]
Political News Consumption (Index)	-0.0085 [-0.0396; 0.0225]
Psychological Engagement with Politics (Index)	0.0616 [0.0230; 0.1002]
Perceive Vote Buying	0.0342 [0.0033; 0.0651]
Active Member of Orgs (Index)	0.0190 [-0.0131; 0.0510]
Member of Orgs (Index)	-0.0055 [-0.0322; 0.0211]
Feel Safe	0.0158 [-0.0145; 0.0462]
Post Matieralism Index (12-Item)	0.0330 [0.0005; 0.0655]
Defiance Index	-0.0013 [-0.0420; 0.0394]
Trust Police	0.0132 [-0.0231; 0.0494]
Moral Certitude (Index)	0.0374 [0.0114; 0.0633]
High Status Profession	-0.0260 [-0.0433; -0.0088]
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
Respondent	Yes
Political Act	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	152,953
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41128
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.01433

*Clustered (Respondent & Political Act & Country) co-variance matrix, 90% confidence intervals in brackets*

**Countries included:** ARG, ARM, BGD, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CYP, DEU, ECU, ETH, GRC, GTM, HKG, IDN, JPN, KOR, MAC, MAR, MDV, MEX, MYS, NGA, NIC, NLD, NZL, PER, PHL, PRI, ROU, RUS, SGP, SRB, THA, TJK, TUN, TUR, TWN, UKR, VEN, ZWE



## **O.2 Country-Level Gender Differences in Recruitment Activity Conditional on Women's Empowerment (Section 9.2.4)**

**Table O.15:** Country-Level Gender Differences in Recruitment Activity Conditional on Women's Empowerment.

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	Difference in Recruitment Activity by Gender (Men - Women)
Women's Empowerment Index	-0.070** (0.023)
Constant	0.083*** (0.018)
N	54
R <sup>2</sup>	0.150
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.133

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\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

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