Implementing Flexible Response: The US, Germany, and NATO's Conventional Forces

by

JOERG FRANZ BALDAUF

S.M., Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1984)

Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

February 1987

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Signature of Author ____________________________

__________________________
Department of Political Science,
February 15, 1987

Certified by ________________________________

George W. Rathjens
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by ________________________________

Harvey M. Sapoisky
Head, Ph.D. Committee
Department of Political Science
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ABSTRACT

Public opposition against the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the early 1980s provides the background for renewed interest in strengthening NATO's conventional forces. The Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) launched in response to these calls is but the latest of a series of previously unsuccessful Alliance attempts to improve conventional capabilities.

The dissertation examines the reasons for success and failure of three different attempts to improve conventional forces during the 1970s. Focusing on decision-making processes in the US, the FRG, and NATO the research analyzes Allied Defense in the Seventies (AD70, 1970), Secretary Schlesinger's Basic Issues Initiative (1973) and the Long-term Defense Program (LTDP, 1977).

A comparative case study method is used to analyze differences and commonalities among all cases in order to identify parameters of success and failure for conventional defense improvement initiatives. The investigation is made at four different levels. First, differences between the US and the FRG are examined with regard to the bases of force planning (strategy, threat analyses, principles of force planning). Second, problems of establishing coherent processes to develop and implement the three special initiatives are examined in order to identify organizational problems. Third, at the planning level, formal force planning processes in the US, FRG, and NATO are compared in order to determine strengths and weaknesses of these systems and their relationship to the potential for conventional force improvements. Finally, an analysis of domestic and foreign policy aspects is undertaken.

The research focuses on the US and the FRG as prime actors in the debate over conventionalization because of the two countries' central role in the debate and their military and economic weight.

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. George Rathjens
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD70
Allied Defense in the Seventies

BA
Budget Authority

BMF
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Federal Finance Ministry

BMV(td)g
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Federal Ministry of Defense

CDI
Conventional Defense Initiative

CINCHAN
Commander-in-Chief Channel

CMEA
Council on Mutual Economic Aid

CMF
Conceptual Military Framework

CSCE
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DoD
Department of Defense

DOE
Department of Energy

DokZent
DokZent, Documentation Center of the FRG Defense Ministry

DPC
Defense Planning Committee

DPC/PS
Defense Planning Committee in Permanent Session

DPM
Draft Presidential Memorandum

DPQ
Defense Planning Questionnaire

DPRC
Defense Program Review Committee

DPWG
Defense Planning Working Group

DRC
Defense Review Committee

DSARC
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council

EDIP
European Defense Improvement Program

ET
Emerging Technologies

FAZ
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FO
Foreign Office

FR
Frankfurter Rundschau

FRG
Federal Republic of Germany

Fue H
Fuehrungsstab des Heeres, Army Staff

Fue L
Fuehrungsstab der Luftwaffe, Air Force Staff

Fue M
Fuehrungsstab der Marine, Navy Staff

Fue S
Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte, Armed Forces Staff

FYDP
Five-Year Defense Program

FYPBw
Five-Year Program of the Bundeswehr

GI
General Inspector

HB
Handelsblatt

IHT
International Herald Tribune

INF
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

IS
(NATO) International Staff

JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSOP
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

LTDP
Long-term Defense Program

LTPG
Long-term Planning Guidelines
MBFR  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC  (NATO) Military Committee
MCSSG  Military Committee Special Studies Group
MFP  Major Force Program
MFR  Militaerischer Fuhrungsrat, Armed Forces Council
MIT  Military Implications Team
MNC  Major NATO Commander
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MPM  Major Program Memorandum
MSZ  Militaerstrategische Zielsetzung, Military
      Strategic Objectives
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NAC/PS  North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATOGEMA  West German Mission at NATO
NMR  National Military Representatives
NSC  National Security Council
NSDM  National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM  National Security Study Memorandum
NZZ  Neue Zuercher Zeitung
OMB  Office of Management and Budget
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA & E  Program Analysis and Evaluation Division in OSD
PCR  Program Change Memorandum
PDM  Program Decision Memorandum
PE  Program Element
Perm Rep  Permanent Representative
PIT  Political Implications Team
POM  Program Objectives Memorandum
PPBS  Planning Programming and Budgeting System
PRC  People's Republic of China
R & D  Research and Development
RDF  Rapid Deployment Force
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAECLANT  Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SECDATAF  Secretary of Defense
SGM  Strategic Guidance Memorandum
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLOC  Sea Lanes of Communication
SSBN  Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine
STC  SHAPE Technical Center
SWP  Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Foundation
      Science and Politics, Ebenhausen
SZ  Sueddeutsche Zeitung
TFGM  Tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
TKBA  Teilkonzeption fuer bereichsuebergreifende
      Aufgaben, Subconcepts for Overlapping Tasks
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<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>Theater Nuclear Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Total Obligational Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNATO</td>
<td>US Mission at NATO</td>
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<td>USWB</td>
<td>United States Wireless Bulletin</td>
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<td>VPR</td>
<td><em>Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien</em>, Defense Policy Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEI</td>
<td>Weapons Effectiveness Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>WUV</td>
<td>Weighted Unit Values</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

That a thesis could not have been written without the support of a number of people is often said as a matter of politeness. In my case, to say so would be an understatement. So many people have provided invaluable support that, without it, I would have had to select a different topic.

At every stage, from conceptualization to the end-product, this study benefited from the comments and suggestions of many people. Since the start of this dissertation, I have greatly enjoyed and taken advantage of discussions with Hilmar Linnenkamp, who became a close friend in the process. His support, insights, and experience with West German defense planning were simply invaluable, so were the people and the information he was able to point me to. Heinrich Buch of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag was kind enough to give me time on several occasions and to direct me to important source material. Several colleagues and friends allowed me access to their private clipping archives, most importantly Stanley Sloan.

Money is an essential requirement not only in defense planning but also in graduate studies. My parents, the Fulbright Commission, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, the Fritz-Thyssen Foundation, and the Arms Control and Defense Program at the Center for International Studies at MIT provided direct assistance at various points. From 1984-1986, I was the recipient of a most generous Fritz-Thyssen-Fellowship at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen near Munich which provided the support for research and writing. I am grateful to Klaus Ritter for hosting me and giving me so much flexibility; and to Albrecht Zunker for providing advice and help on many issues. The encouragement of Enid Schoettle to visit Ebenhausen during a summer trip to Germany in 1984 helped initiate this arrangement for which I will always remain grateful.
Through an exchange agreement between SWP and the RAND Corp., I was able to spend a full year in Santa Monica (1985-86), working under the best conditions imaginable to a graduate student. James A. Thomson was a most generous and hospitable host. Support for my stay at RAND was provided by a grant from the Ford Foundation. Support for a number of research trips was provided by the Thyssen Foundation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in association with the Arms Control Association, the United States Information Service, and SWP. To all these organizations and people I will remain ever grateful.

Since so much of the material that this thesis requires remains classified, interviews were a most important source of information. I am thankful to many individuals who provided names of actors and analysts, all of whom (except one) were prepared to give me their time. In Germany, where officials and military officers are sometimes reluctant to grant interviews, such extensive conversations would have been impossible without the help of Hilmar Linnenkamp, Uwe Nerlich and Klaus Ritter who either called or wrote to interviewees on my behalf. I am especially grateful to Mssrs. Nerlich and Ritter for having made unique arrangements with the Ministry of Defense in Bonn which allowed me to carry out this research. In this context many thanks to Col. i. G. Manfred Rode for his most unbureaucratic support, time and hospitality. His help was of enormous use and a key to making this study possible. Catherine Kelleher, William W. Kaufmann and Jim Thomson gave much needed advice on organizations and people in the US. I owe much to Jim Thomson for generously giving his time going over the outline and contents of this thesis, and for comments on various sections.

Too many people gave direct or indirect research and secretarial support to name them all. The library staffs at SWP and RAND know best that I will owe them for a long time to come. Carol Cordier at RAND gave fantastic help and without protest typed and edited a larger number of tables than she probably cares to remember.
Since I am not a native English speaker, editorial changes were necessary. Jeffrey Starr, Joan Rohlfing, Michael Thompson and Marianne Jas (who also commented on various sections), Karen Murphy, and Margaret Wheeler were kind enough to provide these. I hope they all have to write in German some day, so that I can reciprocate.

There is one individual who deserves special thanks. Prof. Catherine M. Kelleher served as an external member of my committee. She would resist it, if I specified how much time she gave and what an experience it was to have her on my committee. She is a teacher one would wish every student to have on his committee.

I also very much enjoyed the freedom allowed by the Chairman of my committee, Prof. George W. Rathjens, whose philosphy appears to be that independent studies are most beneficial to his students. Many thanks also to Prof. William E. Griffith for much of his time spent in stimulating conversations on political developments in the FRG.

I hope all will find that what follows has justified their time, effort, and support. Of course, I alone remain responsible for any errors or omissions.
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INTRODUCTION

In December 1984, after reviewing NATO defense plans, the ministerial meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) decided to undertake a series of extraordinary steps to improve NATO's conventional capabilities. This initiative became known as the NATO Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI). The ministers called on the NATO staffs to identify critical areas of deficiencies and to recommend remedial actions. This is the latest attempt to improve conventional forces after a number of previous efforts in this direction were unsuccessful. This study seeks to explain the reasons for the failure of three such efforts in the 1970s in order to identify lessons learned which might be relevant to the success of CDI. These efforts included Allied Defense in the Seventies (AD70) which was started in 1970, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's Basic Issues Initiative of 1973, and the Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) initiated by the Carter administration in 1977.

As General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has pointed out, conventional force improvements are a long-standing issue in NATO:

Every SACEUR since the first has expressed a need for NATO to increase the number and improve the readiness of the conventional combat forces which would be available to defend West European territory against Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression. Eight military professionals over the course of 34 years have conducted independent, personal assessments of the threat. Each of these assessments has concluded that NATO's conventional forces available at the time were inadequate to the task. The need to improve NATO conventional forces has been a consistent and unfulfilled theme throughout the history of our Alliance.¹

In 1952, for example, the North Atlantic Council decided during a meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, that member states should provide for 50 active and 46 reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft. This goal was never reached.\(^2\) The shift in US doctrine to heavy reliance on nuclear weapons led in 1957 to the adoption of Military Committee (MC) document MC 14/2, the strategy of Massive Retaliation. Instead of providing the resources for a 96 division conventional posture, this strategy called for an escalation to nuclear weapons, including massive attacks on Soviet homeland, to defend against even a limited conventional attack. Because of increased reliance on nuclear weapons, NATO was able de facto to lower its force goals for conventional forces.

The emergence of a Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons over an intercontinental range in the late 1950s brought about new interest in strengthening conventional forces. These changes in the military balance led to another change in American strategy from 1960 onwards. Robert McNamara who briefed the NATO allies on the elements of the new American strategy pointed out that considerably more emphasis should be placed on conventional forces because it had become uncredible that the US would launch a major nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in response to a small conventional attack when faced with the risk of Soviet nuclear retaliation. After years of straining transatlantic debates and French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command structure in 1966, NATO finally adopted a compromise strategy, "Flexible Response," in 1967. This strategy, laid down in MC 14/3 called for a defense posture that enabled NATO to respond to any attack at an "appropriate" level. The first level defense would be direct in an attempt to defeat an attacker at the level chosen by him. If this proved unsuccessful, NATO would deliberately escalate the level of conflict, including -- potentially -- to nuclear first use. Finally,

the new strategy called for capabilities to respond with a massive nuclear counterstrike to a major nuclear attack.¹

The new strategy raised a number of important questions which were addressed in each of the cases under examination here. First, what exactly was the threshold at which a decision of deliberate escalation would be made? What did it mean in military operational terms to demonstrate to the attacker that his potential gains were outweighed by the potential damage inflicted upon him? How many forces, conventional and nuclear, were necessary to implement the strategy? MC 14/3 did not provide answers to these questions. The three conventional initiatives were attempts to come to grips with them.

These questions also raised important organizational and political issues. What was the best way to go about improving conventional forces? How much money was needed and what would the domestic political reactions be? What would NATO's actions imply in terms of the conduct of foreign policy vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact?

The answers to these questions were complicated by a number of problems. Regarding strategy, considerable differences existed between the US interpretation of Flexible Response on the one hand, and West German and British views on the other. The US regularly pushed for a more robust conventional posture than the Europeans thought desirable or feasible. Whereas the Europeans emphasized the necessity of the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation to compensate for conventional weaknesses, the US stressed the importance of placing the burden of nuclear escalation on the adversary:

The essence of the revised NATO strategy [i.e. MC 14/3] is to avoid situations in which we would have to choose between using nuclear weapons and giving up territory or other crucial political objectives. Although we believe this strategy is the best way to meet NATO's political objectives while keeping the risk of nuclear war to a minimum, its success depends upon having conventional military power roughly in balance with the Warsaw Pact. ²

---

¹See Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa Monica: The RAND Corp., R-2964-FF
The formulation of MC 14/3 was the result of compromises between the US and its European allies. As a result, the US views on strategy were not fully incorporated in MC 14/3. The major point of contention was the principle of deliberate escalation. The principle of deliberate escalation had been included in MC 14/3 upon European insistence, yet it did not reflect the US view that NATO should not be forced into nuclear escalation and that instead the burden of going nuclear should be put on the Soviet Union.

Yet because American policy-makers still believed in the logic of the original argument for stronger conventional forces, it was clear that the US would keep pushing the European allies toward stronger conventional forces.

[US strategic] objectives stop short of providing for a capability to deal successfully with any kind of nonnuclear attack without using nuclear weapons ourselves. Thus, there are some situations (which are highly unlikely) where if deterrence failed, we would have to initiate use of nuclear weapons. After years of effort, this is the most ambitious strategy we have been able to convince our allies to accept. Therefore, we would have to pay all the additional large cost of a full-scale nonnuclear option ourselves, even if it were feasible for the US to fill the gap. Nevertheless, we are not opposed in principle to a more ambitious nonnuclear strategy, and if our Allies' attitudes and the international political situation were to change, we would be willing to revise these objectives.\(^4\)

This view gained more prominence in the US as the Soviet Union achieved approximate strategic nuclear parity in the early 1970s. In the view of


most, including the Europeans, this nuclear balance increased the potential role of conventional forces because the US would be more constrained in employing nuclear weapons in conventional scenarios. Thus, the question was what shape NATO's plans should take to respond to these changes and pressures.

This study examines what the major factors were that determined NATO's conventional force planning during the 1970s and how the questions left open by MC 14/3 were approached. The study seeks to explain why the alliance seemed unable to procure forces sufficient to implement the strategy.

Approach and Structure of Study

This dissertation examines three distinct and special attempts during the 1970s to improve conventional defenses. The purpose is to analyze a set of issues common to all of them in order to identify factors that may be relevant for present or future improvement initiatives. The study uses four perspectives to answer the question: why was NATO unable to procure conventional forces sufficient to implement its strategy? The first part of the study examines the extent to which conventional improvements were strategically desirable and feasible from US and West German perspectives, given the size of the Warsaw Pact threat and the effect this threat had on the formulation of force requirements. The second part reviews the effects of the different planning approaches taken for the three initiatives and analyzes their impact on the extent of conventional improvements. The third part reviews in more detail the structural/organizational problems of defense planning system in the US, the FRG and NATO. Finally, the fourth part analyzes the effect of domestic and international political factors on national positions on conventional force improvements.

Differences over the Bases for Planning. In Part A the respective national positions on the foundations of force planning, i.e. strategy,

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6For a description of the cases, see below.
threat assessments and their implications for planning will be examined. Chapter I reviews the differing views on the objectives of NATO strategy and asks the question to what extent conventional force improvements were desired by the two countries. As will become apparent American and West German interpretations of the meaning and implications of MC 14/3 differed significantly. The US pushed for a stalwart conventional posture that placed the burden of escalation on the attacker whereas the FRG stuck to the concept of deliberate nuclear escalation and was reluctant at best to increase conventional forces beyond plans established nationally. Chapter II then examines how the Warsaw Pact military threat was evaluated in the US and the FRG. Again, substantial differences existed over the size of the threat and had a major impact on considerations as to the military and economic feasibility of conventional improvements. Chapter III reviews then the implications of the different national positions on strategy and threat assessments for military planning.

**Process and Approaches to Planning.** Part B compares the approach and process with which the initiatives were carried out in an effort to arrive at conclusions on whether the way in which these initiatives were set up had a major impact on outcomes. Chapters IV and V review the three cases respectively.

**Organizational Problems of Force Planning.** Part C focusses on organizational problems of force planning systems at the national and NATO level. This part will throw light on the question what the organizational and structural limitations of planning were. A comparison of the German (Chapter VI) and American (Chapter VII) planning system suggests interesting findings regarding strengths and weaknesses of different organizational set-ups. Chapter VIII examines the organization of defense planning at NATO and shows its limitations and problems.

**Political Aspects.** Part D will review political factors, domestic and international, that affected attitudes in conventional defense improvements. Chapter 9 first examines the domestic situation in the
FRG and concentrates on institutional constraints of defense planning, resource and public opinion constraints as they affected conventional defense improvements. The last part of the chapter deals with the relationship between foreign policy considerations and military planning. Chapter 10 then covers the US in a similar way.

**Focus on US and FRG.** Although reference to the positions of other countries will be made to explain outcomes, this study will concentrate on positions taken by the US and West Germany. There are four reasons for this limitation. The first is that the US and the FRG have been two key players in these initiatives. Second, the two countries are the most important NATO members in terms of military and economic capabilities. Their policies and action thus had a major impact on the outcomes of the initiatives. The third reason had to do with work economy. A trade-off would have had to be made between the level of detail covered in the study and the additional inclusion of Britain and other European countries. Finally, the level of information available to the author was greatest for these two countries and he had the comparative advantage of knowing these two countries best.

**Case Descriptions**

**Allied Defense In the Seventies (AD70).** AD70 was the first comprehensive examination outside of NATO's regular force planning procedure since the adoption of Flexible Response in 1967. Prompted by declining defense efforts in most NATO countries and under the threat of troop withdrawals from the FRG by Belgium, Canada and the US, Secretary General Brosio, SACEUR General Goodpaster and representatives for the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) decided in the spring of 1970 that NATO needed to take the initiative in order to avoid drastic reductions in capabilities.

By December 1970, NATO staffs and capitals had agreed on a report which listed seven major areas of deficiencies in conventional capabilities which should be addressed in NATO plans during the 1970s. The seven areas were: NATO's armor/anti-armor potential; the air
situation, including aircraft protection; overall maritime capabilities with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare capabilities; the force balance on the flanks; peacetime deployments of ground forces; improvements in allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities; and NATO communications facilities. Apart from a few short-term measures, follow-up definition of specific measures took until the spring of 1973 when force goals incorporating the AD70 findings were approved. Interest in AD70 by then had declined significantly, however. By the mid-seventies, special reporting on AD70 and references to the program had largely ended. The political threat of troop reductions was no longer imminent, other initiatives such as Basic Issues and SACEUR's Flexibility Studies, were taking up more staff time. By 1976, AD70 had ceased to be an identifiable program.

The Basic Issues Initiative. Aware of the slackening momentum in AD70, secretary-designate James Schlesinger proposed in June 1973 that NATO planning should focus on three main areas: war reserve stocks for 30 days, shelters for aircraft, and improvements in anti-tank capabilities. Schlesinger made these proposals in the context of a major speech on strategy. He argued that the advent of strategic nuclear parity and the dangers of nuclear escalation required that the alliance build a "stalwart conventional posture," i.e. a force structure capable of holding against a wide range of conventional attacks. In order to avoid the counter-argument that such a posture could not be afforded because of the prohibitive costs of massive force increases, Schlesinger argued that NATO already possessed the "basic ingredients" for such a posture and that in fact a balance of forces existed both at M-day and at M-plus-23.

Schlesinger's threat analysis and strategic logic threw NATO into a major debate over the size of the military threat. There was much skepticism and resistance against the creation of "Super-priorities" so soon after passing force goals responsive to AD70. Nevertheless, the US managed to focus attention on these Basic Issues and three more areas were added in early 1974. Despite much European resistance, special
reports were written by NATO staffs on the six priority efforts. Yet similar to AD70, Basic Issues reporting stopped by 1976. Secretary Schlesinger had been fired by President Ford in the fall of 1975 and, like AD70, the Basic Issues initiative was overtaken by other efforts.

The Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP). At the RAND Corporation, Robert Komer and associates during 1975/76 undertook a major review of earlier conventional defense improvement initiatives such as AD70 and analyzed their strength and weaknesses. Komer had come to the conclusion that one of the major problems was the lack of clear priorities, follow-through procedures and high level political attention. He also was convinced that an initiative that was left to the NATO bureaucracy and regular channels was bound to fade away after a few years. After getting the incoming Carter administration interested in his recommendation, Komer drew on the work he and staff in DoD had done to define nine conventional priority areas. At a heads of state summit in London in May 1977, the North Atlantic Council agreed to launch the LTDP and to work out specific measures until another summit in Washington in the spring of 1978. Special Task Forces working on recommendations were created and an Executive Working Group (EWG), initially created to supervise AD70, was reactivated and charged with the organization of the staff work. After a set of 123 specific measures were approved in 1978 at the Washington summit, so-called Program Monitors were designated to oversee implementation and the EWG produced semi-annual progress reports.

The LTDP began to vanish in 1981 after the Carter administration left office and the political pressure behind the initiative stopped. Despite Komer's original intentions, the LTDP measures were included in the force goals and progress was reported on in the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), NATO's main reporting document on planning activities. The last formal LTDP report was issued in 1983.
Commonalities and Differences

The Bases for Force Planning. The cases differed in the extent to which they made the bases for force planning an issue. In order to avoid divisive strategy debates which would have delayed agreement on the production of a quick program, a detailed analysis of the military requirements of Flexible Response was not undertaken for AD70. Similarly, there was no attempt to reassess the Warsaw Pact threat. Since the US was initially content with letting AD70 appear as a European initiative, the US did not make a major effort to press these issues. The rationale for action was mostly to respond to political pressure for troop withdrawals.

This was quite different in the case of Basic Issues. Secretary Schlesinger decided that the time was ripe to clear up some long-standing controversies and to make a major new effort at getting the Europeans to increase their defense efforts. The result was an extended debate over the feasibility of a robust conventional posture and divisive arguments over the objectives of alliance strategy.

In the case of the LTDP, strategy and threat matters were to be avoided. Instead the focus was laid on the need for a pragmatic set of proposals which would significantly increase NATO's capabilities. The emphasis lay on an action program. The main reason for avoiding such issues as strategy interpretations and threat assessment was to avoid political conflict in these highly sensitive areas. Action rather than debate was to be the focus of the LTDP.

These different emphases of strategy and threat issues in the various programs make for interesting comparisons regarding their influence on the motivations and rationales for special initiatives and their effect on follow-through.

Differences in Procedures and Organization. As will become clear in the case studies procedures played a major role in the formulation and implementation of the three conventional defense improvement initiatives. The three cases have in common that they were all
initiatives off-line from the regular NATO force planning cycle. They were launched either upon American initiative (Basic Issues and LTDP) or with strong US encouragement (AD70). All of them took a program approach. The initiatives first examined major deficiencies in NATO capabilities, then developed procedures to formulate remedial measures and insure implementation. AD70 and LTDP were comprehensive initiatives, taking on the entire scope of NATO deficiencies, whereas Basic Issues was highly selective. In the latter case, initially three and later six specific areas were chosen for special action. Whereas AD70 and LTDP had planning ranges of 10 and 15 years respectively, Basic Issues was aimed at short-term and mid-term improvements. The LTDP made much more rigid use of defining specific areas of deficiencies and priorities in order to create a compact program. AD70 was considered too wide-ranging and too expensive to lead to success by the initiators of the LTDP. AD70 and the LTDP also differed in the extent of advance preparation before launching the initiative. AD70 was an ad hoc initiative, whereas the LTDP had been prepared at the RAND Corporation a considerable period before its launch in 1977.

Organizational formats were rather different in each case. AD70 was worked on almost exclusively by NATO staffs. The only special creation was the EWG, made up of high NATO officials and headed by the Deputy Secretary General, that was put in charge to coordinate study groups. Specific measures were defined within the regular framework of NATO defense planning. The LTDP, by contrast, relied on a set of special organizational arrangements aimed at ensuring greater speed and more objectivity during both the study periods and the development of measures. At both the national and NATO level, so-called Task Forces were created that were to work out the details of the program. Similar to the AD70 exercise, these Task Forces were directed by the EWG. Because of the limited scope of the Basic Issues initiative, no special organizational arrangements were made there.
Progress of all three initiatives was reported on through special reports. Yet only in the case of the LTDP a special procedure was established. Because of an American perception that reporting within the regular DPQ would be insufficient to identify weak areas and to keep up the momentum, so-called Program Monitors were designated to supervise implementation. The LTDP also was to apply special reporting formats to facilitate implementation control. AD70 and Basic Issues progress, by contrast was reported on in the DPQ and EWG reports to the Defense Planning Committee.

The differences in rationales, size and comprehensiveness as well as follow-through procedures thus provide the basis for interesting comparisons of the effectiveness of various approaches to planning.

Sources

Because this study deals with a relatively recent period, American documents have not yet been widely declassified. Several attempts to obtain access to some key documents through the Freedom of Information Act were made for a total of some three dozen documents over the course of two years. For administrative reasons, release decisions have only been made on about one third of these documents, with the rest still pending. 7 Moreover, the author has contacted the various ministerial and departmental libraries in the FRG and the US with inquiries about open holdings. In some cases unpublished sources were found. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidential Libraries have all not yet opened the National Security Council Files which would be the most likely place for relevant documents. The Carter Library will only be open for research by the end of 1986. Due to pending litigation, the Nixon papers in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. can also not be made available to the public for research.

7Those documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act are listed under a special heading in the bibliography section.
The author had the privilege of access to various government background material on the basis that it would not be cited. The author also had opportunities to talk to many senior officials involved in the initiatives discussed here. The majority of interviews was held on a background, not-for-attribution basis.

The author also consulted a range of data banks and public archives to identify published material. He consulted the computerized reference systems of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., the United States Army Library at the Pentagon, the Documentation Center of the Ministry of Defense (DokZent), Bonn, the Research Institute of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen, (DOMESTIC), and the Library of the Bundestag. Lockheed's DIALOG system, the data bank of the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), and the Congressional Information Service (CIS) were also used for literature searches. Manual searches were conducted in the catalogs of the Research Institute of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik (DGAP) in Bonn.

The DGAP holds a number of unpublished papers resulting from its seminars with academics, journalists, and policy-makers and work done by visiting fellows. Extensive use was also made of the clipping archives of the DGAP, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) but, most importantly -- because of its superb quality -- of the SWP. Finally, the author was given access to a number of private clipping collections of friends and colleagues whose help and support was gratefully acknowledged earlier.

The clippings and other publications are held at the Ollenhauer Haus in Bonn.

The archive is held by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in St. Augustin near Bonn.
PART A: DIFFERENCES OVER THE FOUNDATIONS OF FORCE PLANNING

One of the main obstacles for conventional force improvements was disagreement over the desirability and feasibility of such improvements. There were basically three reasons for these obstacles.

**Strategy, Threat Assessments, and the Role of Analysis.** The first reason was that *NATO had not been able to agree on the exact meaning of flexible response and its implications for nuclear and conventional force planning.* MC 14/3, the document laying out flexible response, was ambiguous enough to allow different interpretations of its implications for defense planning and did not identify specific requirements for nuclear and conventional forces in terms of numbers of units, mobilization times, etc. Although all of the conventional defense improvement programs under consideration here repeatedly addressed the strategy issue in one way or another, it was not possible for Europeans and Americans to come to a consensus on specific military requirements that had to be fulfilled to implement the strategy. As a result of the political bargaining process, only incremental changes were possible and the strategic guidance continued to be imprecise. As will be seen, the US therefore continued to stress the importance of stronger conventional forces and the desire to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weakness continued to be a major motivation for renewed improvement initiatives. The West Germans, by contrast, were opposed to such an emphasis because of differing strategic convictions, resource and political considerations.

The second element responsible for the failure to develop and implement plans for significantly stronger conventional forces was the *difference over Warsaw Pact threat assessments between Europeans and Americans.* Differences about possible and probable scenarios and sizes of Pact attacks led to varying assessments regarding the feasibility of a conventional deterrent and therefore affected calculations of what was
desirable in terms of strategy. Chapter II examines the assumptions that went into these threat assessments and shows how they translated into different policies with regard to the objectives and the scope of conventional defense improvement.

A third obstacle to conventional force improvements was the lack of analytic capabilities, or will to use them, in the European capitals and at NATO. As Chapter III will show, each of the improvement programs under examination in this study was preceded by extensive debates over rationales for and specific program elements of the initiatives. To a certain extent these debates were the result of different policy priorities. But the debates often also reflected a lack of systematic analyses which would have helped to clarify costs and benefits of pursuing specific improvement programs. After a compromise on the concrete objectives of the program had been struck, long discussions took place on how the outcomes of the initiatives should be measured and assessed. Because detailed studies of NATO's overall nuclear/conventional requirements and specific implementation reports were expected to contain politically inopportune conclusions, such studies and reports were generally opposed by the European allies. They feared that such studies could be used by the Americans to raise requirements and point to lagging or deficient European implementation of force goals. For similar reasons systematic trade-off analyses could not be undertaken at NATO which examined the costs and benefits of pursuing different planning priorities or change existing ones. The danger was too great that the results would conflict with established national plans. To hedge against this danger, nations generally limited the amount of force planning data they made available to NATO and opposed effective planning control mechanisms.

Such program analytic capabilities did not exist in West Germany either and this made it often difficult for Bonn to understand and accept the rationale of the American proposals, independent of strategy, political or cost considerations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which had access to such program analytic capabilities,
was therefore frequently put in the inconvenient position of challenging established policies and planning rationales within the alliance or the European capitals.

The Relationship of Strategy, Threat Assessments, and Analytical Methods. Differences over military strategy, threat assessments and analytical tools of force planning were closely interrelated. Not only did the West Germans disagree with the Americans on the desirability of conventional deterrent, they also disagreed on its feasibility. Moreover, strategy options perceived available were heavily influenced by threat assessments because the latter suggested what was militarily required and hence economically possible for NATO. The fact that the West Germans and the British believed the Warsaw Pact to be able to field a considerably more powerful force than was thought in OSD made them more skeptical with regard to the feasibility of proposals calling for a considerably stronger conventional emphasis. From a West German and British perspective, such conventional emphasis required massive amounts of additional resources which were not available. Moreover, these conventional improvements might still not provide NATO with a deterrent qualitatively similar to the nuclear one. Conventional deterrence therefore was not desirable from both strategy and resources points of view.

On the other hand, perceptions of NATO's requirements and the Warsaw Pact threat were heavily influenced by differences in analytic methods on the two sides of the Atlantic. When -- as attempted by Secretary Schlesinger -- the US stressed that a stalwart conventional posture did not require massive increases in forces and outlays and was therefore both desirable and feasible, the debate shifted to the analytic foundations of the American threat assessment. These discussions then revealed fundamental European/American differences over the expected outcomes of various hypothetical war scenarios and reinforced the respective positions on the desirability and feasibility of conventional force improvements. Because studies of NATO's military requirements and implementation of force goals might have challenged
established national and NATO policies, they were politically sensitive and were frequently opposed by members. The LTDP is an example where an American attempt to analyze requirements, formulate very specific improvement measures and implement planning controls was opposed. The West Germans and others found it hard to accept the LTDP because they expected new priorities and additional financial burdens from the program, exceeding pre-established plans. Because of the fear of additional requirements, the West Germans objected against new binding program elements the implementation of which could be effectively measured through a detailed reporting mechanism.

It is the thesis of this section that the US and the West Germans as well as other Europeans had not only differing objectives regarding NATO strategy, but that they also disagreed with respect to the yardsticks and methods to evaluate these objectives and to translate them into policies. Because of these disagreements NATO was unable to formulate anything more but compromise programs bringing about only incremental change. Chapter I will show what the specific disagreements were on strategy grounds and what role they played in the three cases. Chapter II demonstrates how threat analyses --- as one important element against which to measure the performance and adequacy of strategy --- varied. Chapter III finally documents how differences over objectives and priorities made it politically difficult to determine even at the analytical level NATO deficiencies, precise requirements as well as programs to improve that situation.
I. NATO STRATEGY AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS

Background

The main reason why NATO strategy has been such a sensitive issue in alliance deliberations -- especially between Washington and Bonn -- lies in the fact that the relationship between the members are profoundly asymmetrical. West Germany lacks the strategic depth, resources and political maneuver room vis-a-vis its western allies as well as the East Bloc which would allow it to create an effective defense against Warsaw Pact attacks on its own. Instead, as was pointed out before, the American military presence in Europe and the creation of NATO served the purpose of both defending West Germany and West Europe from the East as well as constraining the FRG in its dealings with its western allies.\(^{18}\) The price of this deal was that the FRG would forego the production of an independent nuclear force and instead would be aided militarily by its western allies in war time. Since the United States was the only country able and willing to provide this protection by maintaining both a military presence in Europe and pledging to use nuclear weapons if NATO's conventional capabilities were to fail under attack, the FRG was put in a situation of dependence. The core of this relationship was defined by the question of credibility: Would the US in fact use nuclear weapons in defense of West Germany or not. This question became increasingly important as the Soviet Union developed a capability to strike American homeland with nuclear weapons and thus increase the risks for the American president to strike against Warsaw Pact or Soviet targets.

The official shift from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response in 1967 recognized the change of conditions. Secretary of Defense McNamara had announced during a May 1962 NATO meeting in Athens that the US, in

\(^{18}\) Cf. the eloquent article by Josef Joffe on this issue: "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, no. 54, Spring 1984, pp. 64-82.
response to its vulnerability against Soviet retaliation, was seeking to
decrease the risks of escalation to all-out nuclear war by reducing the
pressures that might force it into the use of nuclears.\footnote{See Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Athens (Greece), 5 May 1962, Restricted Session (declassified on 17 August 1979).} The main
instrument to reach that goal was an increase in conventional forces
that could sustain attack for a longer time. This would force the
attacker into the situation of having to decide whether he wanted to use
nuclear weapons. Faced with the choice of escalating or ceasing the
attack, the danger of all-out nuclear war would make it more likely that
he chose to halt his campaign because under nuclear conditions the
attacker would have more to lose than to win.

As this chapter will show, however, a number of differences
remained over the exact meaning of flexible response and its
implications for force planning. Attempts to clarify these ambiguities
during the 1970s proved difficult. Variations in strategy
interpretations remained a major obstacle to come to a consensus on the
need and scope for conventional force improvements.

The Ambiguities of Flexible Response

The new strategy, laid out in the Military Committee document MC
14/3, was only adopted after long and painful transatlantic discussions
and after the French, who were strongly opposed to the new strategy, had
pulled out of NATO's integrated military structure.

**The Principles of Flexible Response.** The question what kinds of
attacks were to be deterred by what forces was addressed only in a most
general way by the new strategy and left enough room for widely varying
interpretations on both sides of the Atlantic. The primary goal of the
strategy was defined to be deterrence against any aggression through the
maintenance of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear
forces, the so-called NATO Triad. Such a range of capabilities was to
allow an alliance response to any kind and size of attack. The response
to attacks short of general nuclear attack would be direct defense which would attempt to deny enemy advances at the same level of forces (conventional vs. nuclear) as used by the enemy. Should this prove impossible, NATO capabilities would allow a deliberate escalation in order to raise the scope and intensity of combat which would convince the attacker that the costs and risks of continued aggression were too high. The threat of nuclear use, or perhaps even a very limited demonstrative strike would be to cause the enemy to cease the attack. The third element of the strategy was the preparation of capabilities to respond, massively if necessary, to a major nuclear attack.¹²

Whereas communiques and other public announcements stressed the fact that the alliance had reached agreement on the new strategy, a number of differences and questions persisted. These were the major issues:

• What kinds of attack were to be deterred by what means?
• How early would NATO use nuclear weapons?
• How should the balance be decided upon between escalation as an effective deterrent and the control of escalation to minimize risk and destruction?
• What did the new strategy imply in terms of conventional force requirements?

MC 14/3 "resolved" the European-American differences on these issues by finding compromises, using ambiguous language, or not addressing them in detail.¹³


¹³ MC 14/3 remains classified. There is, however, a vast array of studies on it -- many by actors involved in the drafting process or with access to the document -- so that the contents of the document can be reconstructed with confidence.
Compromises, Ambiguities, and Open Issues. MC 14/3 contained compromises and ambiguities in three major areas. First, with respect to the objectives of the new strategy, the US was not able to obtain as much allied agreement on deemphasizing the nuclear element as Secretary McNamara had desired. The secretary had maintained in Athens that the US was not proposing conventional forces for NATO able to handle all possible attacks. However, the US wanted to make NATO conventional forces so strong as to force the pressure of nuclear escalation under conditions of less than all-out conventional attack onto the Soviets, and not NATO.\textsuperscript{14} But this point did not enter the official NATO doctrine of flexible response. Instead, in an effort to bridge differences between the European allies and the US over the utility of escalatory threats for deterrence, the notion of deliberate escalation on NATO’s part was incorporated into MC 14/3. This concept included the possibility of NATO’s first use of nuclear even if NATO was under less than an all-out conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc.\textsuperscript{15}

The second major area of compromise was closely related to the first. It concerned the conventional capabilities required to implement the strategy. The new strategy was a significant departure from then current plans, because upon American insistence the importance of direct conventional defense was much more strongly emphasized than in MC 14/2. But MC 14/3 did not specify division or aircraft requirements and thus did not address the issue of European-American differences over the threat and how much was needed to counter it.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}See McNamara’s Athens speech, p. 13 and 18.
\textsuperscript{15}See Legge, op. cit., p. 9; Roger L. L. Facer, Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa Monica: RAND Corp., R-3209-FF, January 1985, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{16}For details, see the section on the Schlesinger Initiative in this chapter.
A third major set of questions was not even addressed. If it was NATO policy to escalate deliberately, under what conditions exactly, and when and how much would it escalate; what kind of consent would be required from whom? This problem was only tackled in the years following the adoption of Flexible Response, and again differences would result in compromises and sandpapering actions. NATO policy documents on the political guidelines on initial and follow-on use of nuclear weapons, guidelines for the use of Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM), nuclear consultations and the role of theater strike forces under conditions of general release were worked out from 1968-1975. All the resulting papers contained ambiguities with regard to the scale, purpose and timing of employment and were carefully crafted compromises.\textsuperscript{17}

**Issues for Future Deliberation.** It was clear to all participants in the strategy debate in the 1960s that flexible response had been a compromise document. In a draft memorandum for the President, Robert McNamara pointed out in 1968 that

 [...] there are some situations (which are highly unlikely) where if deterrence failed we would have to initiate use of nuclear weapons. After years of effort, this is the most ambitious strategy we have been able to convince our allies to accept. Therefore, we would have to pay all the additional large cost of a full-scale non-nuclear option ourselves, even if it were feasible for the US to fill the gap. Nonetheless, we are not opposed in principle to a more ambitious non-nuclear strategy, and if our allies' attitudes and the international political situation were to change, we would be willing to revise these objectives.\textsuperscript{18}

The quote from McNamara's draft paper suggested that the US would not

\textsuperscript{17}This is not to suggest that no progress has been made toward clarification on these matters. The point is that the basic disagreements on the purpose of nuclear employment and the role of conventional weapons as described above have found their way into these documents and therefore limit their clarity and specificity. For a most informative account on the evolution of NATO nuclear doctrine, see Legge, op. cit., pp. 17-38.

\textsuperscript{18}See Robert S. McNamara, *Draft Memorandum for the President*, }
necessarily be satisfied with the compromise for the future. Similarly, Clark Clifford, McNamara's successor, pointed out in a memorandum to the President the importance of conventional forces and the need to push the allies to do more:

The essence of the revised NATO strategy is to avoid situations in which we would have to choose between nuclear weapons and giving up territory or other crucial political objectives. Although we believe this strategy is the best way to meet NATO's political objectives while keeping the risk of nuclear war to a minimum, its success depends upon having conventional military power roughly in balance with the Warsaw Pact.\(^{19}\)

Clifford saw the maintenance of adequate conventional forces threatened by two related kinds of political pressure. One was that "many Europeans and some NATO military authorities" believed that NATO could be easily overwhelmed conventionally and therefore led them to conclude that NATO's conventional forces had little significance. The second was the "growing sentiment in the US" that America was carrying too much of the burden in NATO giving rise to calls for troop withdrawals.\(^{20}\)

Whereas the former required continued strategic education, the latter made conventional improvements by the Europeans imperative.

This need was accentuated by the fact that the strategic conditions that had brought about the change from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response became more pronounced toward the 1970s with the emergence of nuclear parity between the superpowers. The conventional defense improvement initiatives examined here can be seen as attempts to fulfill the above tasks. They are also examples of continued American efforts, based on sometimes different motivations and using varied tactics, to push the Europeans to accept the American interpretation of the strategy and political constraints.


\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 4.
ALLIED DEFENSE IN THE SEVENTIES

It took several months of discussions before it was decided at the NATO level to what degree strategy considerations would be made a part of the AD 70 exercise. The range of strategy interpretations and political priorities within capitals, between the various NATO bodies and between the NATO members was too wide to allow a quick resolution as to how much consideration strategy matters were to be given.

The Official US View

When the Nixon administration came into power in January 1969, the outlines of a review of US military policy world-wide had already been prepared by components of the government. Although the internal as well as public discussion of military issues focussed mostly on Vietnam when the war had reached its peak in 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Henry Kissinger's personal interest in the Continent gave Europe renewed prominence. President Nixon was also keen to be perceived as trying to make a special effort at improving American-European relations which had suffered over the war in Southeast Asia.\(^{21}\)

The most comprehensive and direct statement of the administrations intentions vis-a-vis Europe were contained in President Nixon's first major foreign policy report to Congress.\(^{22}\) In it, Nixon noted that the continued support for NATO and US troop levels until mid-1970 raised several issues that should be analyzed in a "thorough study of our strategy for the defense of Western Europe, including a full and candid exchange of views with our allies." The President stated:


The need for this study is based upon several considerations:

First, at the beginning of the last decade the United States possessed overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. However, that superiority has been reduced by the growth in Soviet strategic forces during the 1960s. As I point out elsewhere, the prospect for the 1970s is that the Soviets will possess strategic forces approaching and in some categories exceeding our own.

This fundamental change in the strategic balance raises important questions about the relative role of strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, there are several views among Western strategists concerning the answers to several key questions.

-- What is a realistic assessment of the military threats to Western Europe that should be used as the basis for Allied strategic and force structure planning?

-- For how long could NATO sustain a conventional forward defense against a determined Warsaw Pact attack?

-- Beyond their value as a deterrent to war, how should our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe be used to counter specific Warsaw Pact military threats?

-- How does the contemplated use of tactical nuclear weapons affect the size, equipment and deployment of Allied conventional forces?

Third, even though the NATO Allies have reached agreement on the strategy of flexible response, there are disagreements about the burdens that should be borne by the several partners in providing the forces and other resources required by that strategy. Further, questions have been raised concerning whether, for example, our logistics support, the disposition of our forces in Europe, and our airlift and sealift capabilities are sufficient to meet the needs of the existing strategy.

These questions must be addressed in full consultation with our allies. This is the process we have followed in the preparations for and the conduct of the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. We are consulting our allies closely at every stage, not on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, but by seeking their advice on the whole range of options we have under consideration.

In assessing our common security, we must not be satisfied with formal agreements which paper over dissimilar views on fundamental issues with language that is acceptable precisely because it permits widely divergent interpretations. Disagreements must be faced openly and their bases carefully explored. Because our security is inseparable, we can afford the most candid exchange of views.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Variations Within Washington}

The United States was already in the process of undertaking a review of these questions on a national basis. Yet these studies did not produce consistent answers to the questions posed to US allies in President Nixon's \textit{Foreign Policy Report}. The new administration had ordered a number of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), dealing with specific questions of US military policy.\textsuperscript{14}

Allied observers of these study activities must have found it difficult to understand where they would lead and what exactly the American stand was on the questions raised by President Nixon. Assessments of NATO-relevant issues by different parts of the government varied substantially. Those in Europe that were thoroughly familiar with the American political scene and not used to these kinds of analyses in their respective agencies and organizations must have been surprised to see apparently contradictory options discussed which, if implemented, would have called into question the foundation of the transatlantic alliance. In NSSM 3, for example, which was a broad study on the US "Military Posture," the alternatives considered ranged from "a token American force in Europe to act as a trip wire" on the nuclear end of the scale to "a total conventional defense" on the other end which would allow [the US] to counter any attack by the Warsaw Pact under full

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., pp. 33-34.
\textsuperscript{14}John Leacacos, "Can One Man Do?" \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 5, Winter 1971-72, pp. 3-27.
mobilization." The size of the forces necessary to implement these alternative strategies varied greatly. On the one hand, 50,000 troops were believed to be adequate to support the nuclear trip wire strategy. On the other hand, substantial increases in the nearly 300,000 troops already stationed in Europe were seen as necessary to obtain a robust conventional deterrent. Given the political pressure in Washington to reduce US overseas commitments, observers in Europe were fearful that these studies might be rationalizations for decisions to cut its troops and mean additional financial burdens for Europe.

Confusion was not only sown by the range of options considered, but also by the apparent differences among the various components and officers in the executive branch on strategic preferences and forces necessary to implement them. While the President's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was known to see a role for tactical and theater nuclear weapons to compensate for insufficient ground forces, other parts of the national security bureaucracy, especially civilian officials in the Pentagon (the office of Systems Analysis in particular) were strongly opposed to that view. In the tradition of Robert McNamara's Athens speech of May 1962, OSD favored a design of ground forces that would help to delay a possible release of nuclear weapons as long as possible. In order to ameliorate European fears of American strategy shifts, official US policy tried to reassure the allies of the

26 See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 392.
28 See Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper, 1957; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 218: "One might have thought that if our strategic forces tended toward parity with the USSR and if at the same time we were inferior in conventional military strength, greater emphasis would be placed on tactical nuclear forces."
29 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 218.
continued validity of the US nuclear guarantee. During the December 1970 DPC meeting, for example, Laird emphasized that the United States intends to maintain this large and continuing presence in Europe because it is our firm conviction that a conventional deterrent is both essential and, indeed, feasible. Let me also emphasize that our stress on improvement of conventional forces should in no way imply that the United States is down-grading the nuclear deterrent. On the contrary, we believe that strong conventional forces enhance strategic and theater nuclear deterrence by ensuring more flexibility and a more deliberate, rational decision-making process, before nuclear weapons are in fact employed.\(^{30}\)

Not only did views differ among various government offices and officials, policy statements also sometimes contradicted each other. Kissinger for example pointed out a few months before Laird's statement that the credibility of the US nuclear was fading, thus shaking European reliance on the continuity of US policies. In an article for the conservative West German newspaper *Die Welt am Sonntag*, Kissinger stated that the increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities made it imperative for the NATO allies to stand firmly together and recognize the fact that "as much as the risks of a nuclear war have increased, the credibility of traditional promises of [military] assistance necessarily decreases. The more NATO relies on warfighting with strategic weapons in response to any kind of attack, the more incredible its promises of assistance become."

The State Department, conscious of the irritations such statements caused abroad, therefore stressed the need to maintain the strategic status quo in the alliance. It otherwise expected the allies to react harshly if the US tried to revise NATO strategy or pull out US troops.

\(^{30}\)For Secretary Laird's remarks see his *Speech before the NATO DPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, December 3-4 1970*, p. 4 (transcript released under Freedom of Information Act, 25 April 1986.

State also believed that the allies were unlikely to increase significantly the resources committed to defense.\footnote{The State Department cautioned that withdrawals might undermine allied confidence in United States continuation of its commitment to NATO. See \textit{NYT}, 9 November 1970. State also warned the President that any US cuts would be likely to touch off further cuts by the allies. See \textit{The Times} (London), 2 December 1970.}

What was at issue in the disagreements between various government agencies were the assumptions on the basis of which the US and its European allies should plan its forces, nuclear and conventional. According to the Kissinger school of thought it "was a counsel of defeat to abjure both strategic and tactical nuclear forces, for no NATO country--including ours--was prepared to undertake the massive build-up in conventional forces that was the sole alternative."\footnote{Kissinger, op. cit., p. 218.} The other opinion, supported by people like Alain Enthoven, the head of the Systems Analysis Office in the Pentagon until 1968, and Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford, maintained that the required build-up would not be so massive because the Warsaw Pact threat was not as large as frequently stated.\footnote{See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, \textit{How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969}, New York: Harper, 1972, especially Chapter 4 and the previously cited Presidential Draft Memoranda of 1968 and 1969 on NATO Strategy and Force Structure. See also Chapter 2.} Because the two schools disagreed on the nature of the threat and their assessment of NATO capabilities, their respective estimates of the costs of required force programs varied greatly.

Whereas the two schools disagreed on such essential questions as new force requirements and costs, they did, on one level, agree on the desirability of greater efforts for conventional defense and European contributions in order to decrease escalatory pressures on the US. The underlying reasons were different in each case. Pentagon analysts tried to work towards a posture that in fact corresponded to the "proper" and "logical" (American) interpretation of flexible response (robust against
at least all but all-out conventional attack, 90 day sustainability etc.). Kissinger, on the other hand, was interested in shifting burdens so as to pacify the political front domestically. This front had built up in the form of mounting internal political pressure against the US involvement in Vietnam. It was voiced in Congress through demands to cut budgets, force levels and commitments abroad. These demands made it imperative for the Nixon administration not only to give the appearance of reducing its overseas commitments and the number of contingencies for force planning (from the 2 1/2 war strategy to the 1 1/2 war strategy), but also to lean on its allies to increase their share of the common defense. Over several years therefore, the stability of US troop levels in Europe was linked to the European allies' willingness both to assume a larger share of defense expenditures for NATO and to compensate the US balance-of-payments problems related to troop stationing costs through so-called offset-payments.

Given this internal bureaucratic balance, the choice of strategic options and the political climate toward the end of the 1960s, the Nixon Administration's national security planning toward Europe focused on four elements. (1) It tried to deflect pressures to reduce forces stationed in Europe by pushing the allies to do more. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird proposed, for instance, at the DPC meeting on May 28, 1970 that the Europeans increase their contribution to NATO by an average of four percent annually from 1971 through 1975. (2) As

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37 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 393.
mentioned above, the US continued to try to get compensation for balance-of-payments deficits associated with US deployments in Europe. (3) In order to mollify those like Senators Mansfield and Fulbright who wanted to force a US troops withdrawal overseas, the Nixon Administration through Secretary of Defense Laird declared in December 1969 that it was prepared for reductions only if they were made on a mutual (NATO/WP) basis. (4) Regarding the question of the particular assumptions on the basis of which NATO planned its force structure, the Nixon Administration pushed not only for increased NATO contributions by Europeans, but made it also explicit that efforts should be directed especially toward the improvement of conventional defense.

The Response in Brussels

European officials analyzing the political situation and study efforts in Washington determined that it was important for them to try to influence the American decisionmaking process on troop levels. This meant that immediate action was required on three issues: first, balance-of-payments problems, which were a bilateral problem between the countries concerned, had to be resolved. Second, Europeans would have to show that they would shoulder a greater burden of the defense effort in helping to deflect congressional pressure from the administration. Third, all NATO allies had to agree that no unilateral reductions would take place on NATO's part unless associated with similar reductions by the Warsaw Pact in order to avoid giving Congress a pretext for reductions. That such European help action was necessary to help impress Congress was made clear by Secretary Laird when talking to allied colleagues in early Summer 1970.

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Kissinger, op. cit., p. 402.

It was therefore widely recognized that the outlines of the studies conclusions had to be presented to the December 1970 DPC meeting in order to have an impact on the American budget presentations for FY 1972. See USWB, 15 June 1970, p. 5.
The fourth issue which figured prominently in President Nixon's *Foreign Policy Report*, the assumptions on which NATO Planned its forces and strategy matters, was pushed aside by the more pressing political task to preserve the US presence in Europe. To the degree strategy issues were addressed, they led to the reconfirmation of the ambiguous formulas contained in the earlier documents, such as MC 14/3. Because of internal pressure, the US was in no position to make the strengthening of allied conventional capabilities the overarching issue. On the other hand, the Europeans succeeded in their goal of showing that the adopted NATO strategy continued to be valid and continued to require a strong American presence on the Continent.

Secretary Brosio took the messages contained in President Nixon's February 18 Foreign Policy Report as signal for action and proposed to undertake the review which was to become known as Allied Defense in the Seventies.\(^4^0\) He was encouraged and supported to do so by conversations during monthly lunches he had with SACEUR General Andrew Goodpaster, representatives of CINCHAN, SACLANT, and the Chairman of the Military Committee in late 1969 and early 1970. All participants agreed that it was imperative for NATO to become active in view of the political and military pressures surrounding the US administration.\(^4^1\) The need for this review had become more and more urgent in the view of these officials as the number of reports from Washington on the reduction of US commitments abroad increased from 1969 onwards.\(^4^2\) In briefings to the allies Laird and other US officials had repeatedly drawn attention


\(^{4^1}\) Interviews.

\(^{4^2}\) See for example *IHT*, 29 October 1969, p. 1/2. According to this article SECDEF Laird predicted that the "review of US global strategy will result in a very sobering recommendation that the United States cut back its various, vast commitments abroad." Laird also maintained that the Nixon administration would "reappraise our entire defense strategy and there will be a new policy in the decade of the 1970s."
to "four US realities" imposing constraints on policy: fiscal and manpower realities, global strategic realities and political realities, i.e. the role of Congress in setting US policy. \(^3\)

General Secretary Brosio intended to be responsive to the American requests. He proposed to the Permanent Representatives that, as part of the wide ranging review to be undertaken with AD 70, allied strategy and force levels should be analyzed. Yet he also suggested not to assume from the outset that allies would reduce their national forces and instead would only do so as part of mutual and balanced reductions. Brosio was also concerned that a strategy debate not develop in the alliance. Regarding the validity of MC 14/3, Brosio therefore suggested that the Permanent Representatives not rewrite the document or develop a new concept. The purpose should rather be, he argued, to review within the existing framework such issues as the role of tactical nuclear weapons, how NATO's flexibility could be increased, what the optimum force mix was and what role reinforcements played. From the General Secretary's perspective, the task was to strike a balance between the American push for increased conventional and European efforts, and the political limitations of the European allies.

Inputs from the Chairman of the MC were limited in substance. They reflected the military authorities' pessimism on the existing conventional balance and skepticism against the possibility of significant conventional improvements. The MC Chairman, British Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, was of the view that the then existing level of conventional forces was the minimum that could be accepted. He expected further rearward relocations of allied troops, however. Henderson maintained that conventional capabilities were essential for the deterrence of limited conflicts, but that NATO's capabilities were not sufficient to withstand a large-scale attack for more than a few days. Tactical nuclear weapons had an important role in support of conventional forces and restrained use against military targets on the

\(^3\)See USWB, 15 June 1970, pp. 4-5.
battlefield perhaps could prevent the escalation into strategic nuclear war. Confirming that the current NATO concept was to avoid the use of nuclear as long as possible, he suggested mobile alert forces be created for rapid deployment under quickly changing circumstances, to reorganize maritime responsibilities under one commander and to speed up equipment replacement.

Similarly skeptical on the feasibility of significant conventional improvements was a working group of the EWG on strategy and force levels. This group considered NATO's situation in various scenarios and estimated that attacks after short warning were the most likely ones. Like Sir Henderson, the group concluded that NATO could not contain large scale attacks without recourse to nuclear weapons. The group found that NATO's posture was perhaps so eroded that the continued validity of the strategy of Flexible Response was questionable. Yet no detailed conclusions were drawn with respect to possible improvements to redress that situation.

The only place where the implications of NATO's weaknesses were frankly analyzed, though perhaps in a self-serving, conservative fashion, was SHAPE. SHAPE had the staff and information to undertake detailed studies. There was little reluctance to evaluate from a military perspective the effects on NATO's relative standing in a war under assumptions of increased allied force contributions, additional mechanization, or the elimination of American dual basing. These proposals, however, would not pass the MC, in which all nations were represented to guard their positions and to make sure that no unacceptable requirements would be fed into the planning system. SACEUR, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, consistently warned in his public speeches that he needed more conventional forces to fulfill his mission without being forced into an early request of nuclear release. But unlike the supporters of the McNamara school, Goodpaster also thought that NATO did not have the option of a full conventional deterrent

because the forces necessary for such a strategy required much more than the alliance was prepared to spend.\textsuperscript{45}

In sum, the military authorities' reflection upon strategic matters and inputs into discussion was limited both in quantity and quality. The MNCs, except SACEUR to some degree, did review the effects of NATO capabilities on the implementation of NATO strategy. These reviews were generally pessimistic regarding NATO's ability to defend successfully against Warsaw Pact attacks. Although the military authorities were natural allies when calls for force improvements were made, the authorities were sceptical regarding the feasibility of NATO's ability to field a robust conventional deterrent, as Gen. Goodpaster's comments suggest.\textsuperscript{46} This and the realization that resources and political will were so constrained perhaps best explains why the Military Authorities were not stronger advocates of changing NATO's strategy toward a more conventional emphasis.

\textbf{West German Responses}

Not unlike its position in the early 1960s, the West German government was a strong proponent of the status quo regarding NATO strategy. It favored neither a significant raising of the nuclear threshold for fears that this would undermine the credibility of NATO's nuclear threat nor did it suggest a lowering of the threshold which would result from US or other allies' troop reductions. On balance, the West Germans sought to obtain a confirmation of their strategic views and force plans through AD 70 while perhaps allowing for some extra improvement measures to help the American administration politically. Like in the 1960s, yet with lower profile, the West German position continued to emphasize the role of tactical nuclear weapons and their irreplaceability by conventional forces.

\textsuperscript{45}See Goodpaster speech on December 16 1970 before the Royal United Services Institute, printed in \textit{RUSI Journal}, Vol. 116 (1), March 1971, pp. 31-41.

\textsuperscript{46}On how the Military Authorities' threat assessment affected these views, see Chapter II.
From the outset and throughout the study Bonn was of the position that the validity of MC 14/3 could not be questioned in AD 70 and that therefore not even implications of other strategic concepts should be examined in the study. The West Germans had some apprehensions about the AD70 study because of the possibility that it raised the risk of reopening extended discussions on strategy matters which had already been closed earlier. This attitude was prevalent during all discussions on such questions as study scope, terms of reference, staff papers etc. The underlying belief was that with the study of such alternatives, the first step toward revisions of Flexible Response was already made and that this should be avoided in any case. The ministries were also united in their belief that the concept of Flexible Response had been adopted only after painful debates and that it was much too early to begin calling it into question.

According to this view -- which Minister Schmidt presented also to the June 11 DPC meeting -- the strategy remained reasonable and credible.\(^7\) In internal communications between the FO/MoD and the West German Representation to NATO (NATOGERMA) the former issued corresponding instructions not to concede to anything that might call into question MC 14/3. West German officials were also instructed to propose that AD 70 should only be concerned with the question on what forces were required to implement 14/3, rather than to examine alternative strategies. However, it remained entirely unclear how that question could be answered without a clear definition of objectives and the exact operational meaning of MC 14/3, the discussion of which was resisted.

Another West German "essential" input was its traditional insistence on forward defense. As it had done earlier, the West German government argued that because of the FRG's lack of strategic depth, territory could not be given up.\(^8\)

\(^7\)See White Paper 1970, p. 28: "We believe that NATO strategy as it has now been revised offers the best available security for the Alliance."

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 40.
Similarly, the West German government was keen that AD70 avoid a number of very specific questions, the answers to which might be difficult or impossible to agree on. During the discussions on the terms of reference of the study, Bonn therefore opposed a list of questions that were contained in a British proposal. Included in that list of study items were such issues as

- How long can forward defense be sustained?
- What does the merging doctrine on the use of tactical nuclear weapons imply for the peacetime deployment of forces, their size and equipment?

For practical purposes, Bonn suggested wanted to remain within NATO's agreed policies, to summarize previously agreed positions on strategy issues.

During the staff meetings in which the papers on NATO strategy were written, the FRG tried to make sure that its strategic convictions were reflected in the final documents. The key feature of the German position was its continued emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weaknesses and to convey the alliance's political will to escalate. Although some of the views clearly differed from the perspective held in OSD, the FRG now interpreted this to be the essence of MC 14/3:

- a stronger emphasis on nuclear weapons was not desirable or credible for NATO strategy; conventional reductions by the US or other allies would undermine the validity of NATO's strategy;

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This follows from the point that the then existing force levels were considered "just sufficient." See White Paper 1970, p. 28 and 30.
with regard to strategic nuclear weapons, the FRG argued that NATO strategy relied on external (US, sea-based) nuclear forces. The FRG had also argued earlier that limited nuclear (battlefield) employment against Warsaw Pact forces on NATO soil "should only be an adjunct to strikes on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory." In the German view this increased the credibility of the threat and insured that there would be no nuclear war limited to the theater;

- tactical nuclear weapons had an essential role in supporting conventional forces against enemy breakthroughs (battlefield support);
- the objective of tactical nuclear employment should be to induce the enemy to cease his attack and withdraw; initially, employment should be restrained and limited to clearly identifiable targets in order to avoid escalation to general nuclear war. if the enemy's campaign continued, NATO would have to respond by escalating further in order to convey the increased risk to the adversary;

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50 See White Paper 1970, p. 28 (para. 43): "[... ] the threat of escalation to the strategic plane adds to the deterrent effect at [the tactical level], too; the close intermeshing of the tactical nuclear capabilities with the strategic forces of the United States lends credibility to this threat."


52 As Legge points out ibid., the Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO took the German concerns into account by agreeing that battlefield use should go "hand in hand" with employment in an extended geographic area.


54 See White Paper 1970, p. 28 points out that the "first [strategic] principle is to meet any aggression with direct defense at approximately the same level and the second is to deter through the possibility of escalation."
conventional forces did not have to reach numerical parity of strength with the Warsaw Pact; only "an adequate counterbalance" was needed; what "adequate" meant was left open, however. In contrast to beliefs held in some American quarters, the West Germans claimed that conventional defense against a large attack was not only too expensive but infeasible: "As things stand at the moment the odium of escalation to the first nuclear use will probably fall on our side, because a solely conventional defense cannot be successful against Soviet superiority in Central Europe."

The West German government was very interested in getting AD 70 finished in time to influence the American defense budget proposal for FY 1972 as well as the ongoing studies on US strategy. When presenting the West German view on AD70 to the Military Committee in May, the German GI, Gen. Ulrich de Maiziere therefore argued that the list of topics studied should remain limited and concentrate on those issues raised by the US studies. De Maiziere maintained that Nixon's Foreign Policy Report contained a good listing of items which were of American concern and proposed to consider those for the NATO study.

Outcome and Conclusions

After several months of internal discussions it became apparent that AD70 would not seek strategic revisionism. There were strong pressures from the allies as well as incentives for the American government not to have the exercise slide into a strategy debate. Parts of the American administration, notably segments of OSD, on the other hand kept stressing the need to do more in the conventional field. The

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emphasis during the elaborations on AD 70 was clearly to produce a study which would help the administration in Washington to show quickly that the Europeans were doing more. The main symbol of this increased burden was the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) which comprised additional European efforts of about one billion dollars over five years. It was to this effort that President Nixon's pledge in December 1970 to maintain US troops in Europe at existing levels was tied. Rather than reviewing the basic principles of NATO strategy and force planning, the AD 70 and EDIP exercises had resulted in a *quid pro quo* in which relatively marginal additional European efforts were linked to American guarantees not to reduce troops.\(^{56}\)

In sum, strategy matters played only a minor role in AD 70. The main reason was the need to produce quick and presentable additional European efforts. Whereas the US had tried to place the discussions on concrete measures into the context of the need for strengthened conventional forces, the language contained in the published AD70 report by no means suggested a radical departure. It contained instead the sybillian language of alliance compromise documents:

The present NATO strategy of deterrence and defense, with its constituent concepts of flexibility in response and forward defense, will remain valid. It will continue to require an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. [...]  

Allied strategic nuclear capability will in any event remain a key element in the security of the West during the 1970s. At the present time, adequate nuclear forces exist and it will be essential to ensure that this capability, which includes the continued commitment of theater nuclear forces, is maintained.

The situation in the field of conventional forces is less satisfactory in view of certain imbalances between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities. Careful attention needs to be paid to priorities in improving NATO's conventional strength in the 1970s. In the allocation of resources, priority will be given to measures most critical to a balanced Alliance defense posture in terms of deterrent effect, ability to resist

\(^{56}\text{See Williams, op. cit., p. 166.}\)
external political pressure, and the prompt availability of rapid enhancement of the forward defensive capability in a developing crisis. In addition to a capability to deter and counter major deliberate aggression, Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to be capable of dealing also with aggressions and incursions with more limited objectives associated with intimidation or the creation of faits accomplis, or with those aggressions which might be the result of accident or miscalculation. In short Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to deter and counter any kind of aggression.57

Instead of being an attempt to review the foundations of NATO planning and its implications for the 1970s as called for by President Nixon, AD 70 was little more than a pragmatic response to the threat of Mansfield's amendment. On the whole strategy considerations played only a marginal role in launching and executing AD70. Whereas the US made the attempt to link measures to an overall effort to improve conventional defense, the European governments -- the West German in particular -- were concerned about maintaining the status quo in alliance strategy and keeping US troops in Europe. The US case for stronger conventional forces was also weakened through reports that various NSSMs had excluded a conventional deterrent option as too costly for the US.58 This undermined the rationale for a more ambitious conventional NATO strategy developed by McNamara during the 1960s, and suggested that less reliance on nuclear weapons was beyond NATO's financial resources because these reports seemed to confirm long-held European views.

58By mid 1969, it had become clear in media reports that the most important purpose of the American studies was to decide on where to make cuts in the force structure. See the articles by Beecher in New York Times (NYT), 1 May 1969, p. 1/13; NYHT, 3 May 1969, p.5; IHT, 15 May 1969, p. 4; see also FAZ, 6 May 1969, p. 3. For evidence how cost considerations entered the NSSM on US NATO policy, see NYT, 9 November 1970.
It is an interesting question whether the absence of a strategic debate furthered, hindered or had no impact on a more ambitious AD70 program. The background for EDIP and AD70 was clearly to avert US but also allied troop reductions. Although US officials stressed on various occasions the importance of improved conventional capabilities, the strategic rationale did not dominate the launching of AD70. Although one can only speculate, the avoidance of a strategy debate may have been beneficial to producing a program relatively fast. Action had to be taken quickly to "impress the Congress," as Laird put it. An explicit strategy discussion might never have produced anything but calls for specific action and would perhaps have taken years to be resolved, if at all. The limited discussion of strategy that took place was necessary however, in order to at least keep the question alive what forces best implemented NATO strategy at a time when the situation was not opportune to have a full-fledged debate on that question then. But postponement the issue raised the question when and how such a debate should reasonably take place. The fact that the AD70 review of strategy resulted in little more than a confirmation of the compromise on alliance strategy was an important limitation of a document which was intended to guide NATO planning for an entire decade.

The persistence of the differences in interest between the Americans and their European allies made it more than likely that the issue would be taken up again in the near future.

The Schlesinger Initiative

When James Schlesinger accepted the President's nomination to become Secretary of Defense, he did this with the conviction that one of his major tasks would be to help the US armed services to make the transition out of Vietnam. Schlesinger, an economist by training, perceived himself as a "Europeanist" in orientation. He had long been concerned with and interested in defense matters in capacities as professor at the University of Virginia (1955-63). As a senior analyst
and director of strategic studies at the RAND Corporation from 1963 through 1969 he was thoroughly familiar with the strategy debates within the alliance. During his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, he had the CIA re-analyze the major assumptions regarding Warsaw Pact capabilities and, upon moving to the Pentagon in July 1973, intended to inject the conclusions of these analyses into the planning process. When secretary-designate James Schlesinger traveled to the June 7, 1973 DPC meeting he found it time to raise again in an explicit fashion, as McNamara had done before, -- but this time with some more diplomacy -- some of the fundamental alliance strategy issues and to move ahead with conventional defense improvements. At the Pentagon a series of large studies on the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance had been undertaken during the previous two years. These provided new substantiation for the point that NATO could afford a strategy with less reliance on nuclear weapons.

Schlesinger's speech marked the first time since McNamara had left office -- and perhaps even since McNamara had given the Athens speech in 1962 -- that an American secretary of defense would give such a high profile statement on NATO strategy. This high-profile approach was taken consciously after Schlesinger, as DCI, had briefed President Nixon on the balance and had raised the President's interest in the matter. Both Kissinger and Philip Odeen, the director of force planning at the NSC, were also convinced that these findings should be presented to the allies to make the point that a conventional deterrent was possible. As a result, one of the drafters of the speech, long-time Pentagon consultant William Kaufmann of MIT, was in close contact with Odeen on the contents of the speech. Since Kaufmann had been heavily involved in the drafting process for the 1962 Athens speech and it is not surprising that the Schlesinger's presentation was similar in structure, argument and rationale.

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59 Interview.
60 Interview.
61 Schlesinger originally secret speech has recently been declassified. See Secretary of Defense-Designate James R. Schlesinger, Principal Remarks at NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 7 June 1973, p. 2.
The main emphasis of Schlesinger's speech was to demonstrate both the desirability and the feasibility of a conventional deterrent as well as the relationship between those questions and the issues of burden-sharing and conventional arms control (MBFR).

Schlesinger argued that it was important in the "Year of Europe" declared by President Nixon that the assumptions on which joint undertakings are based, were reviewed. The secretary-designate argued that four issues needed resolution: "the appropriate strategy and defense posture for NATO, allied force improvements, burden-sharing, and MBFR." Schlesinger maintained that "[o]nly with a common understanding of [the] first programs in the other three areas of concern," and he therefore spent most of his time on it.62

His remarks on strategy were divided into four parts. The first dealt with the nature of deterrence; the second and third with the role of strategic nuclear and theater nuclear forces respectively; and the fourth part addressed the role of conventional forces.

The speech was premised on the statement that the "US has no desire to alter the basic principles of NATO strategy, namely flexible response, forward defense and deterrence based on a spectrum of conventional and nuclear capabilities," adding that the US government believed that the strategy is "sound and that it continues to serve the Alliance well, and we believe our allies share this view."63 But Schlesinger also added that there were widely differing interpretations of the implications of the strategy for force planning. The US, he maintained, was planning for conventional battles lasting 90 days or longer. Other allies, by contrast, expected much shorter engagements because of differing views on the use of nuclear weapons.64

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62Ibid., p. 2
63Ibid.
64Interview.
The secretary then went on to state that the "emphasis on each component [of the NATO Triad], and the way each underpins and supports the other, must necessarily change with time:

Confidence in our NATO triad of deterrents requires first of all that we have real capabilities to resist aggression. But confidence in our deterrents also requires that our proposed responses appear credible to our potential foes. Deterrence works only so long as there is no serious doubt about our willingness to use available forces.

Without being too explicit, these comments were clearly understood by the audience as questioning NATO's reliance on nuclear first use and responses to the speech in Europe were very critical.

Turning to the role of strategic nuclear forces, Schlesinger pointed out that the US was roughly at parity in missile and bomber totals to the Soviet Union and that both sides had developed options short of strategic bombardments providing some flexibility in targeting. Yet the secretary questioned the implications of this situation:

With these options not only do we gain the ability to conduct discriminating campaigns against targets other than cities and people, we can also prevent the Soviets from achieving any meaningful objectives with their strategic forces. The USSR, if it wishes, can eventually develop a somewhat similar capability against the United States. In that sense, we will be entering an era of strategic stalemate.

In such an era, the risk of mortal damage to all parties (including Eastern and Western Europe), would remain extremely high in the event that nuclear deterrence should fail. These circumstances ensure that strategic forces will reliably deter a narrowing range of contingencies. Their role will remain vital both for the deterrence of strategic attack and the reinforcement that they give to the other components of the NATO triad. But a major part of the burden of deterrence will fall increasingly on other forces. 65

The thrust of these statements was a shift in emphasis. The US, 

according to Schlesinger, did not revoke any of its nuclear guarantee or other promises of assistance. Nor did he propose to give up first use as a part of NATO strategy. The point was that the credibility of a strategy in which strategic nuclear forces had a role in compensating for weakness in other parts of the triad had significantly decreased.

The section of the speech addressing the role of tactical nuclear forces in NATO's strategy remains classified. Interviews suggested that the secretary, like McNamara in 1962, pointed out that it was unclear whether TNF employment was controllable. This warranted caution on the part of NATO's planners yet

we should not neglect [TNF]. Indeed, much work on this leg of the NATO triad remains to be done. We still need improved doctrines for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. We should strive to reduce the vulnerability of the systems we already deploy. And, if we can deal with these problems, we should consider whether, in the future, there are serious possibilities of replacing the existing stockpile with nuclear weapons and systems more appropriate to the environment of Eastern and Western Europe. Steps of this order should ensure that the tactical nuclear forces will serve both as a direct deterrent to a nuclear attack by the Pact and as a serious hedge against a major breakdown in our conventional defense.66

Finally, Schlesinger turned to the role of conventional forces. Here his point was that in the past the argument prevailed that NATO did not need to counter directly the conventional forces of the pact because of NATO nuclear superiority; and that NATO could not produce a posture able to counter Pact conventional might anyway. Both, he claimed was no longer true.

We have heard the argument in the past that NATO did not need a direct counter to the conventional forces of the Pact because of its tactical and strategic nuclear superiority. We are also familiar with the contention that NATO, in any event, could not provide a conventional counterweight to the Pact at anything like acceptable peacetime costs.

66My emphasis. Ibid.
Now, however, we have to face the fact that our nuclear forces no longer carry a dominant weight in the balance. But does that mean, at the same time, that we have to accept the premise of continuing Pact conventional superiority with all the risk that the Soviets might be tempted to exploit their possible advantage?"\(^7\)

This rhetorical question set the stage for Schlesinger's main point, that a conventional deterrent was a possibility:

There is no inherent reason why the Pact should have conventional superiority over NATO. Nor is there any reason to believe that such advantages as the Pact presently poses are insurmountable. We already program most of what is required to counter the Pact. What is at issue is the relatively small remaining margin."\(^8\)

The secretary went on to explain why there was no inherent reason for NATO conventional inferiority. First, he claimed that NATO's population was 54 percent larger than the Pact's and the alliance therefore had a greater manpower pool. Second, NATO's combined GNP exceeded that of the Pact by a factor of three. Third, he argued, NATO spent 35% more on defense than the Pact and had 18% more men under arms. In sum, "if NATO is inferior to the Pact in non-nuclear forces, it is not for lack of resources, manpower, or men in uniform. To the extent that the alliance is weaker, it must be for other reasons." Schlesinger added that NATO payed "more for its deployed forces than the Pact, quite independently of manpower costs." If this did not translate into direct combat effectiveness, he argued, NATO should find out why."\(^9\)

\(^7\)Ibid.
\(^8\)Ibid., p. 5
\(^9\)Ibid.
After having shown that the resources available to NATO exceed those of the Pact, Schlesinger reviewed the military balance in the Center Region as a "second measure of relative strength." As is pointed out later in this study, the secretary's point was that both at M-day and at M+23 a situation of rough parity existed between NATO and the Pact. Yet NATO had weaknesses in the areas of command and control, aircraft vulnerability, war reserve stocks, maldeployments and excessive redundancy in logistics systems and tactics. Although the Pact faced a number of problems of its own, these conditions implied that neither SACEUR could assure a successful defense in the Central Region, nor could "a prudent Soviet calculator [...] assure his leaders of the Pact's ability to break through NATO's forward defenses." 76

Based on these two assumptions, that NATO's resources exceeded those of the Pact and that a rough military balance existed both at M-day and M+23, Schlesinger concluded that NATO had the basic ingredients for "an effective conventional deterrent and a high nuclear threshold." Only some weaknesses had to be redressed and NATO would be in relatively good shape.

[D]espite important asymmetries between the forces of NATO and the Pact, it does not appear as though NATO need labor under any serious disadvantages on M-Day or M-Plus-23 with approximately its existing non-nuclear force structure -- provided always that a number of its less visible weaknesses are removed. Nor is it clear why the deficiencies that do exist cannot be remedied at relatively modest incremental cost.

The real issue was to have sufficient political will to strive for a conventional deterrent and in that the US and its European allies needed to unite. Further European opposition against such a posture would in the long run cause political problems in the US. Only if the Europeans actively supported a stronger conventional posture could the Congress be

76 Ibid.
convinced that continued large US deployments in Europe were sensible. The alternatives to a robust conventional would only be an increased reliance on nuclear weapons and a tripwire conventional force. To quote Schlesinger:

The real issues, in other words, have little to do with whether we can design an effective conventional defense. We already possess the ingredients of such a defense and are paying a considerable price for them. How we now deal with the resulting posture rests primarily in your hands. The United States simply cannot go it alone in supporting the conventional deterrent; Europe must want it and strive for it too. Indeed, and I am sorry to say this, I doubt that our Congress will long continue to appropriate the funds for large conventional forces in Europe if the US remains the only consistently serious advocate of non-nuclear deterrence. Change, in short, is pressing very hard on us all.

One response to the pressure could be to abandon the concept of a full-scale conventional deterrent in favor of a genuine tripwire posture, smaller forces, and a much lower nuclear threshold. But to this administration, such an approach is clearly unacceptable.

Nothing precludes us from having an effective conventional deterrent and a high nuclear threshold; both are well within our means. Accordingly, the US wishes very much to see the full non-nuclear option more wholeheartedly supported and the posture of the Alliance tailored to suit it.

When all is said and done, we certainly regard the Red Armies as a major deterrent force on the side of the Pact. It stands to reason that we should treat our own non-nuclear defenses in the same way. If we do so, we can give our citizens increasing confidence in these most crucial barriers to conflict. If we do so, we can also set worthwhile objectives to inspire the Alliance and look forward more hopefully to a decade and more of peace.71

Follow-up by Washington. This was too much to be the speech of an uninitiated newcomer to the NATO circuit, as some who were critical of it maintained. As usual in such cases, Washington followed up on the speech by giving its embassies instructions on the proper interpretation.

71See ibid., p. 7.
The follow-up emphasized that this was not an uncleared speech by a private individual (Schlesinger had not yet been confirmed; he traveled as Special Envoy of the President). Washington also emphasized that the US did not seek a change in NATO strategy, but intended instead to clarify some of the misunderstandings that had emerged in transatlantic discussions.

The State Department pointed out that a conventional emphasis was not only strategically desirable and militarily feasible, but also a necessity for political reasons. According to State, the affirmation of the possibility of an effective conventional option provided good arguments against Mansfield-type proposals. In contradiction to claims made by Mansfield and his followers, Schlesinger had established that NATO had more than a trip-wire conventional option. In contacts with allied embassy officials, the department also contradicted newspaper reports\(^72\) claiming that Schlesinger had given an uncleared speech and pointed out that it had been coordinated with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and State called the speech internally the "Schlesinger-Kissinger messenger."

British and West German official were invited to come to Washington to receive briefings on details of the American analyses and proposals and the CIA prepared a major presentation on the Warsaw Pact threat.

**Follow-up by the Defense Department.** Following his June 1973 speech, Schlesinger made the same points repeatedly over the next two years: That it was imprudent under conditions of nuclear parity to rely on nuclear forces to compensate for conventional weaknesses; that nuclear escalation raised many questions regarding controllability and that conventional forces, by comparison, were easier to control and would create less escalatory pressure; and that NATO's capabilities were not as bad as thought by some.\(^74\)

\(^73\)Interviews.
In response to a congressional requirement, Schlesinger also delivered a report on the purposes, structure, and possible improvements of US Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe. This document repeated some of the arguments Schlesinger had made in Brussels in 1973 and laid out in some detail the planning rationale for US TNF. This was the first report on TNF of this kind and was further evidence to the secretary's concern about the credibility of NATO strategy, nuclear and conventional and the foundations on which this credibility rested:

Some important general principles are associated with the NATO Triad.

-- The WP should not be allowed to perceive opportunities for successful military action at any point in the spectrum of potential conflict. A strong deterrent extending across this spectrum will discourage crises or minor conflicts which could escalate. In the event of major conflict, there will be downward pressures to contain the war and move to negotiations, rather than pressures for escalation, if the prospects are dim for successful military action by the Soviets at higher levels.

-- We would prefer where possible to deter through provision of direct defense and denial of WP military gains (e.g., seizure of territory), rather than deterrence only through the threat of escalation and all-out retaliatory attacks on WP resources -- though these latter options will be maintained.

-- In the interest of minimizing possible wartime destruction in NATO Europe, it is highly desirable to maintain a high nuclear threshold and use nuclear weapons only if absolutely necessary (e.g., in response to WP use of nuclear weapons major loss of NATO territory or forces if conventional defense fails).

-- US strategic forces continue to be coupled to deterrence of attacks on Europe, both through the threat of escalation of any conflict to general nuclear war and the provision of operational plans for limited use, as necessary, of strategic forces in support of theater conflict.

Stalwart conventional forces are an essential element of deterrence and the primary initial means of defense against
conventional attacks. US conventional forces are planned in concert with those of our NATO allies to provide a credible deterrent and a strong, immediate defense capability against conventional attacks considered most likely under current assumptions about the threat, mobilization, and other critical factors affecting the outcome of a war in Europe. A credible conventional capability is one perceived as sufficient to hold well forward without early recourse to theater nuclear weapons. Such a strong conventional defense raises the nuclear threshold and NATO continues to strive toward this goal. 75

Secretary Schlesinger then turned to the role TNF played in NATO's strategy and pointed out that the US maintained committed to use nuclear weapons if conventional defense failed.

Theater nuclear forces deter WP use of nuclear weapons in Europe by providing a capability for credible retaliatory responses. Theater nuclear forces, because they do not pose a major threat to the Soviet homeland, constitute a retaliatory capability which carries a perceptively lower risk of escalation than the use of strategic nuclear forces. Theater nuclear forces also help deter conventional attacks by posing a threat of nuclear use should the conventional situation warrant. NATO planning must also consider the possibility that conventional attacks against NATO could take place under conditions more favorable to the WP than are reflected in the planning assumptions. For example, NATO may not be able to mobilize as quickly as necessary or the Soviets may draw divisions from the Sino-Soviet border. Theater nuclear forces, in limited use, to complement conventional forces, could serve the political purposes of showing NATO's resolve and creating a situation conducive to negotiations, and could help avert major loss of NATO territory.

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76 My emphasis. Ibid., p. 177.
This report was evidence to the US commitment to NATO's existing strategy but it also made clear its preference to develop strong conventional forces to avoid nuclear escalation.

Schlesinger repeatedly briefed the results of American analyses and thinking about theater nuclear issues to the allies. Two working groups were set up in November 1973 to study the military and political implications of new technologies on NATO's nuclear posture (the so-called MIT/PIT studies).\textsuperscript{77} The conclusions reportedly were not startling, and in fact resembled the conclusions of the Draft Presidential Memoranda of the 1960s. The MIT study which concentrated on technical issues found that "in most cases there appeared to be no major difference in the way the introduction of such [nuclear] improvements would benefit the attacker or the defender."\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, the PIT report "indicated that the exploitation of the new technology was likely to be expensive, that it could not offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in conventional forces, and that the Soviet Union was itself likely to introduce more advanced and sophisticated systems of its own." The MIT/PIT work was considered to have wider implications and was therefore integrated into the work of Task Force Ten (Theater Nuclear Force Modernization) of the LTDP.\textsuperscript{79}

**West German and Other European Reactions**

The West German and other European responses were very critical on the threat assessment part of these remarks.\textsuperscript{80} The immediate repsonse to the Schlesinger remarks by the minister of defense Georg Leber was

\textsuperscript{77}The acronyms stand for the names of the groups, the Military Implications Team (MIT), which was under US chairmanship, and the Political Implications Team (PIT), led by the West Germans.

\textsuperscript{78}See Legge, pp. 29 ff (here p. 30).

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., p. 30/31.

\textsuperscript{80}See Chapter II.
one that showed understanding for the secretary's motivations. Yet Leber was more cautious about the implications. Public criticism focussed on the alleged feasibility and desirability of a conventional deterrent and the Schlesinger threat assessment.\footnote{Leber responded to Schlesinger's speech after remarks by the British defense secretary Lord Carrington. He pointed out that everyone in the room knew the contents of the Nixon Foreign Policy reports and Kissinger's speech in New York to the Associated Press Annual Dinner.} Leber expressed understanding that while the US considered MC 14/3 to continue to be valid, it also wished to stress increased roles for conventional forces. From a West German perspective, Leber continued, both strategic nuclear and conventional forces were important and that there were limits to how much could be done in the conventional area because of competing budgetary demands. The main problem Leber saw with Schlesinger's contribution was its effect on the public. It would be of no help to him as minister of defense if he publicically pointed out that NATO was outspending the Warsaw Pact and the US would have to recognize the limited margins of maneuver of his government.

This was a diplomatic response. Internally, the West German bureaucracy was much more critical. Although the strategic rationale of Schlesinger's comments was appreciated, the conclusions were not accepted. The main reason for that was that the speech was seen as further evidence that the US was trying to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons and that the US was perhaps trying to decouple its strategic nuclear forces from employment in European contingencies. There were also fears that the US was possibly moving toward a no-first use policy despite the secretary's assurances to the contrary.\footnote{The reactions to the threat assessment portion of Schlesinger's speech is dealt with in the next chapter.} The \footnote{See the German version of Henry Kissinger's speech on 23 April 1973 in \textit{Europa-Archiv}, no. 10, 1973, pp. D 220 ff.} \footnote{These fears existed already before Schlesinger's speech. See "Sorge um US-Atomschirm in Europa," \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau} (FR), 4 May
American-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 2
1973 had produced great concerns in Europe that the Americans were
moving in that direction. The French were fearful that the US had
concluded a bilateral agreement with the Soviet on world-wide crisis
control on the back of the nuclear middle powers. The critical issue
was the provision of the treaty which required the United States and the
Soviet Union to "act in such a manner [...] as to exclude the outbreak
of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other
countries."

There was a widely held conviction in the FRG that the deterrent
value of conventional forces was less than that of nuclear forces,
because conventional forces were not as capable to create damage to an
aggressor's homeland and that they therefore were less capable to
inflict punishment and risk. Unlike the perspective offered by
Schlesinger, which emphasized the need to deny the enemy's potential
military successes, West German strategic thinking emphasized punishment
and the element of incalculable risk.

To an attacker the type, scope and point of time of each form
of response must be incalculable. He must expect the conflict
to spread and be aggravated [i.e. increase in intensity, J.B.]
in a measure involving risks which he cannot estimate.

1973, p. 2; "USA: Den Wert der Atomwaffen herabstufen," Die Welt, 5 May
1973, p. 7. The fears were further accentuated by the speech.

"For an account of the strategy and arms control debates in the
summer of 1973, see Uwe Nerlich, Die Politik zur Verhuetung eines
Atomkrieges im Rahmen des amerikanisch-sowjetischen Bilateralismus,
Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-AZ 2019), November
1973. Nerlich concluded that the agreement could neither be interpreted
as a No-First-Use agreement, nor as driving Europe toward closer defense
cooperation, as Michel Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, had argued.
The actual agreement is printed in United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1973, Washington, DC: GPO,
1975, pp. 283-284.

The point was that conventional forces were simply not able to defend against a massed attack and therefore could not deter conventional war. Because of that, nuclear weapons would have to be used in a war involving major conventional forces. First, if the defender wanted to defend conventionally, he would need superior forces which were too costly to field. Second, a protracted conventional battle, even if successful for the defense, would cause large numbers of casualties and damage and therefore be unacceptable. The White Paper 1975/1976 left no doubt in this respect. The goal was not to allow a longer battle on German soil:

NATO's response must be such as to preclude sustained combat operations in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, for any such prolonged combat would end by destroying the substance of what was to be defended.  

This almost sounded like adding another criteria for the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO. Not only was first use to hedge against breakthroughs; rapid termination of conventional engagements seemed also to be among the objectives of NATO nuclear strategy. Third, Schlesinger's balance assessment was not credible and contradicted

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\(^{66}\)Cf. White Paper 1970, p. 29 for evidence: "Against a massive attack launched along a broad front, however, there cannot be an adequate conventional capability; in such an event NATO would have to rely on the functioning of nuclear deterrence." A later example includes the statement by Gen. Johannes Steinhoff who as Chairman of the MC was present when Schlesinger gave his speech: "Of course NATO-Europe cannot be defended conventionally against a massed attack by the Bloc [...] The troops maintained by NATO in Central Europe are just barely sufficient to insure that the nuclear guarantee remains valid, i.e. that one can use nuclear weapons at one point and that one can defend conventionally over a certain period of time [until then]." See his interview with Lothar Ruehl in the "Zeitgenossen" broadcast, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), 7 April 1974, 21:15 hours, as transcribed by Bundespresse- und Informationsamt, Abteilung Nachrichten (Referat II/4, Deutsche Gruppe).

\(^{67}\)See White Paper 1975-76, p. 85.
NATO's own estimates. These opinions implied that if Schlesinger ideas were to be translated into capabilities and operational plans, NATO would have to spend much more while facing the same casualties and damage as under conditions of limited nuclear employment.

These concerns about the Schlesinger speech were largely confined to the executive. There were no direct reactions to the strategy aspects of Schlesinger's speech in the press, not least because the remarks remained classified until recently. However, the rationale of the speech neatly fitted with other Nixon administration statements on strategy which were also received with skepticism. Apart from that, however, there was very little discussion on strategy matters. Later discussions of Schlesinger's contributions to the strategy debate focussed on the secretary's promotion of Limited Nuclear Options and their implications for NATO. The increases in American targeting flexibility and the greater selectivity of nuclear strikes was seen as helping to couple theater and strategic nuclear employment plans more closely together.

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88See Chapter II on this.
90A notable exception lamenting this fact is Hans Ruehle's article "Braucht die NATO eine neue Strategie?" Europäische Wehrkunde, Vol. 22 (10), 1973, pp. 514-519. Ruehle made the (correct) case that the US was moving toward conventional emphasis and demanding greater contributions from the European allies and that these trends remained unnoticed or misunderstood in West Germany.
Reactions at the NATO Level

The reaction to Schlesinger's speech within the NATO hierarchy was sceptical to hostile. SACEUR Gen. Goodpaster supposedly found the speech too didactic in style and a reversion to an outdated American attitude of pretending to know better than everybody else of what is best for NATO. Goodpaster also allegedly thought that Schlesinger's speech did not reflect his mastering the facts about the situation in NATO and what had been achieved toward the implementation of flexible response. Goodpaster saw the speech as politically damaging because the trans-atlantic atmosphere was already heated and the speech could only further suspicions rather than promote understanding.\textsuperscript{92} The Chairman of the MC, Gen. Johannes Steinhoff, a West German, responded to Schlesinger's remarks during the meeting and affirmed that there were different interpretations of strategy which were in need of reconciliation. Yet Steinhoff pointed out that NATO faced serious manpower problems and that static comparisons of demographic and economic data did not describe accurately the situation in the central region.\textsuperscript{93}

The International Staff was tasked to take a look at the speech and evaluate its premises. Here as in the European capitals, the criticism of the comments on strategy focussed on Schlesinger's assumption that a conventional deterrent was well within reach because NATO was not as inferior as frequently stated.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{92}Interview.
\textsuperscript{93}Interview.
\textsuperscript{94}Interviews. See the next chapter for details on the IS opinion of the threat analysis.
Outcome and Conclusions

The Schlesinger speech highlighted the importance of a consensus on strategy and force capabilities as the basis for NATO planning. Yet the speech is a classical example on how the alliance systematically attempts to blend out such a discussion. There was virtually no discussion during the meeting on June 7 or on the strategic logic presented by Schlesinger. Speakers such as Steinhoff criticised the assumptions on which the speech was made, Georg Leber asked for American understanding of the political situation in the FRG which would not allow an open discussion of the military balance because as presented by Schlesinger, expenditures for defense might be cut instead of increased. Leber also suggested that Schlesinger's proposals would cost significantly more money when he stated his hedge that there were competing demands on the West German budget which would not allow to allocate more money for defense. All these reservations and considerations led to efforts by European MoD and NATO staffs to undermine the rationale of Schlesinger's speech. It took a major American effort in the form of briefings, visits and further speeches, to repeat the point. The result can only be called a limited success. Because of the controversial character of the speech and the sensitivities it touched upon, it did also not help promote as much as intended the rationale for specific measures Schlesinger found to be of particular importance in NATO force planning: increases in war reserve stocks, additional aircraft shelters and anti-tank weapons. Since there was no agreement on the basics of strategy, the allies could also not immediately be convinced how important these measures were. Subsequent criticism of these "Basic Issues" concentrated on the fact that allied resources were limited, that priorities had already been set within the AD 70 process. As a result, the argument continued Basic Issues should not be brought into the planning process as "Super-Priorities" which might unbalance the overall planning effort.95

95For details, see Chapter IV.
THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

Not only DoD had gained a renewed interest in strategy matters and the relationship between nuclear and conventional force planning in the 1973-1976 time-frame. In the context of the debate about US troop deployments in Europe the rationale of US and NATO strategy came also increasingly under scrutiny in the US Congress.

A series of reports were written and hearings were held in those years which examined the bases of US policy and to some degree forced the administration to take up strategy with the allies.96 The most notable of these efforts were probably those of Senator Sam Nunn who had made NATO policy his personal hobby horse. Nunn had forced DoD through an amendment to report publically in 1975 on US TNF policy and force structure in Europe, for example.97 He later issued well noted reports in which he claimed that NATO strategy relied too much on nuclear first use and that it became increasingly incredible as the Warsaw Pact improved its capabilities.98


97See the previous section for details of Schlesinger TNF report.

At the RAND Corporation, Ambassador Robert Komer, had for several years been working on NATO issues. In that capacity he was cognizant of the various ongoing initiatives in Brussels and was thoroughly familiar with the political pressures in Washington, as well as in the capitals of the major allies. Komer had been working with others on a comprehensive package of proposals contained in a still-classified RAND report on conventional defense improvements which took the concerns and suggestions of military commanders, civilian officers in DoD (his main contract offices were OSD/ISA and PA & E) and Congress into account and synthesized them into a package.

In two letters to the Carter Policy Planning Group, Komer had summarized his suggestions for US and NATO policy with the idea that in case President Carter was elected, the new administration might pick up on them.\(^99\) In January, Komer became a consultant to Secretary of defense Harold Brown and was given the task to work out his suggestions into a policy initiative for the administration.

**Komer's Strategic Considerations**

Komer argued that the main strategic reason why NATO's posture needed to be extensively revamped was to compensate for growing Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities and decrease NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons.\(^100\) The possibility of the Pact launching a short-warning attack and the fact that nuclear parity "makes it dubious for NATO to rely so much on nuclear deterrence," demands greater stress on conventional means.\(^101\) Whereas the Kennedy/Johnson administrations had started to

\(^99\) Letter of Robert Komer to W.A.K. Lake (Carter/Mondale Policy Planning), August 31, 1976 (with appendix); Letter of Robert Komer to W.A.K. Lake, September 20, 1976 (with appendix). I would like to thank Ambassador Komer for allowing me to cite from these letters and Lynn Davis for directing my attention to them and making them available.

\(^100\) Letter, August 31, 1976, Appendix p. 1.

\(^101\) Appendix to letter of September 20, 1976, p. 1.
emphasize conventional forces in the early sixties,"the allies have been slow to make the needed conventional force improvements" and the US diverted massive resources in the order of $150 billion to Vietnam. Taken together, this "practically dictates a new look at NATO policy."\footnote{Ibid., my emphasis.}

But what options were available to the administration of President Carter? The choices reflected different emphases on the role of nuclear and conventional weapons and took into consideration aspects of political feasibility to actually implement an alternate policy. The first option, a reversion to a nuclear tripwire strategy, was not acceptable because of "the serious risk that nuclear deterrence is becoming ever less credible" when:

(1) the US loss of strategic nuclear superiority makes the linkage to our US strategic deterrent far less meaningful; (2) the Soviets are now developing a comparable theater nuclear stance; (3) they could exploit their conventional superiority, while relying on their own nucs to deter us from escalating. This option would also tend to undermine our non-proliferation policy and run counter to our efforts to strengthen nuclear arms controls. Would we really prefer another nuclear arms race to a conventional one?\footnote{Appendix to letter of Robert Komer to W.A.K. Lake (Carter Policy Planning Group), September 20 letter, p. 2, Komer's emphasis.}

The nuclear option thus being excluded, a second alternative would be to have "More of the Same". However, for the reasons cited above, this choice was also excluded.

If the only viable (third) alternative, thus, was to improve conventional forces, the critical question was how to do it. Komer saw essentially two possibilities here. The first was to urge the Europeans themselves to do more since the US was already contributing more than its share. Even combined with a threat to withdraw portions of the US force in Europe would not improve the prospect for success because the
threat of withdrawal would be more likely to tempt the European allies
to cut their forces as well - "except for the Germans who might rearm -
thus creating a new set of problems." Moreover, reductions of forces
deployed overseas would be counterproductive. They would need to be
moved to CONUS, thus increasing air-, sealift and POMCUS requirements.
They would also make NATO still more vulnerable to a short-warning
attack, strengthen European gaulists and have "adverse repercussions on
US-European ties.... We would probably have to reverse the policy after
2-3 years at most."\textsuperscript{104}

Another, and due to its higher political acceptance, \textit{better}
possibility would be to improve NATO's conventional posture \textit{with} the
assistance of the United States. This option, if adopted, would make a
call to "rationalize NATO's conventional posture to optimize it for
halting any blitzkrieg. Instead of weakening the conventional
deterrent," Komer continued,

\begin{quote}
this option would strengthen it, thus reducing over-reliance on nuclear
deterrence of non-nuclear attack. It is the only one which would raise the
nuclear threshold rather than actually lowering it, by concentrating on
better conventional capabilities. While preserving nuclear deterrence, it
puts highest priority on convincing Moscow that a conventional blitzkrieg
would be as unpromising as a nuclear strike.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

This course of action, Komer asserted, was the only acceptable one for
the other NATO allies if the US could demonstrate that the improvements
were "realizable at affordable cost." The critical factors, therefore,
were that (a) resources had to be used much more effectively so as to
avoid massive budget add-ons and (b) that the "US and key allies" can
marshal sufficient political will to make the hard choices of priorities
within their defense budgets to realize this option. In Komer's view

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 3
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
the issue of political will was the absolutely crucial factor because only it would guarantee" (1) the elimination of waste and duplication; (2) enforcement of tougher priorities; (3) restructuring NATO forces, including US and (4) the generation of an optimum collective posture via more common-funded programs and interoperability/standardization." Such a policy would bridge the gap between two apparently contradictory goals, namely, to enhance (conventional) deterrence at politically acceptable costs. An emphasis on rationalization would also offer "the President and fellow leaders powerful tools to control undue escalation of defense budgets in favor of more efficient use of constrained resources.\textsuperscript{106}

The Rationale for the Allies

The meeting on May 10, 1977 in London provided Carter the first opportunity to exchange views personally with the other heads of state and government and it was an American initiative to hold it on this level. The allies had been prepared both through diplomatic channels and public speeches of American government officials that the US would try to inject a number of new initiatives into the alliance. As to strategic matters Secretary Brown had pointed out the week before the London Summit that the administration would seek to emphasize conventional forces:

My main message will be that, with the advent of rough parity in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, we cannot rely solely on nuclear weapons for NATO deterrence. We should in my judgment, be able to present a credible conventional military capability to meet either a surprise attack -- or a larger and more protracted one preceded by mobilization and reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces.\textsuperscript{107}

Carter's 20-minute speech during the Summit on May 10 was intended to be

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., Komer's emphasis.
an important milestone in the definition of US-allied relations during his tenure, reviewing the principles of the relations within the alliance as well as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, especially the Soviet Union. Carter pointed out that the realization of arms control depended critically on the credibility of defense and deterrence. Although the conclusion of a mutual and balanced force reduction agreement was "our first priority" NATO's defensive capabilities had to be maintained in the absence of such an agreement, especially as the offensive threat to the alliance continued to grow unabatedly. Deterrence, he said, was effective but NATO capabilities had to be improved in order for this to remain the case. Since resources were constrained because of difficult economic conditions in the member nations, the primary task was to make optimal use of the available financial means through a better combination and coordination of national programs, to find better ways to incorporate new technologies into the armed forces and to increase the readiness of these forces.

West German Reactions

Carter's speech was followed by remarks of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt was appreciative of the comments regarding cooperation in defense production and the broadening of defense related trans-Atlantic trade. The main part of his speech, however, was devoted to a review of the changes in NATO strategy from the late fifties until the mid-seventies concluding with an emphasis on improving conventional forces. After a review of the merits and problems of massive retaliation and flexible response under changing geo-political

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conditions, Schmidt argued that the alliance was now entering a third
phase in strategy development. This phase was characterized by rough
parity in the strategic nuclear realm, stabilized by an anticipated SALT II agreement which would "make it necessary [...] to reduce the
political and military role of strategic nuclear weapons as a normal
component of our defense and deterrence" to a relatively mi­nor role.
Increasingly, these weapons would be "regarded as an instrument of last
resort, to serve the national interest and protect the survival of those
who possess these weapons of last resort." 110 Unavoidably, this
development would increase the necessity to look at possibilities for
conventional defense, Schmidt argued:

This development must inevitably direct our attention even more towards strengthening our conventional defense potential,
and towards the essential task of being capable of deterring
and repelling military pressure or even military aggression by
means of our conventional defense force, if pressure and
aggression are mounted by non-nuclear, conventional forces.
In other words, the more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity
- an effort my government has supported from the beginning,
and I have just stressed this again - the more it becomes
necessary to achieve a balance of conventional forces as well.
This would include not only land forces and their composition,
their weapons, their fighting capability and their offensive
and defensive elements; it would also include, in particular,
tactical air forces, logistics, mobility, dislocation, etc. 111

There are, I believe, two theoretical possibilities to
establish a balance or a parity of conventional forces. The
first is to increase our own strength by pushing up the number
of weapons and soldiers; the second would be to reduce forces
on both sides, so that we arrive at an equation on both sides
of equal, lower and collective military strength. That is why
I favour the mutual and balanced reduction of forces on both
sides, or MBFR, as it has now been called for a number of
years. I very much welcome the fact that President Carter has
placed so much emphasis on MBFR here half an hour ago. 111

The two speeches were marked by much agreement between Carter and

110 Ibid., p. 178.
111 This excerpt stems from an IISS translation of the speech, as printed in Survival, Vol. 19 (4), July-August 2977, pp. 277-278 (178).
Schmidt, which was not superficial. The entourage of both leaders later interpreted the reception of the speeches very favorably. Media reports quoted officials on the German side as saying that Carter's speech was "the clearest and strongest that has been heard in the Atlantic Council in many years. British, French and West German diplomats also said that Carter's speech contributed to a "relaxation of tensions in NATO and produced a new feeling of confidence." Carter himself was also very positive about Schmidt's and others' contribution, telling journalists that he felt "the common sharing toward NATO in the US - which was endangered a few years ago - has been restored." Given such agreement and a generally positive atmosphere, the final communique of the NAC meeting reflected the proposals made by Carter to develop the LTDP. Commentators on the London Summit realized that the American initiatives were not entirely unselfish. A report by the senior defense correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, reported the view of some observers at the meeting who maintained that Carter's proposals contained a hidden ultimatum. If the Europeans did not keep up their efforts and follow the American example, the US might be forced to reassess its strategy and reduce its forces.

The exchange between Carter and Schmidt suggested that Americans and West Germans were in agreement over the desirability of stronger conventional forces. Even if this was so, the years following the London summit showed that the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe was given considerably more attention. Similarly, as will be seen later on, the philosophical agreements between Carter and Schmidt did not mean that the West German government would change domestic priorities to accommodate the LTDP in its entirety.

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114 See "Die NATO-Minister eroertern Carter Vorschlaege," FAZ, 16 May 1977, p. 3.
115 See the budget section of Chapter IX.
 Whereas Schmidt's comments in London suggested that he considered a conventional equilibrium of a primary objective, he gave his arguments a slightly different twist five months later in a speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In it the West German chancellor pointed out another emerging imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of what he later called "Euro-strategic weapons." This imbalance was magnified in Schmidt's view because of the codification of a strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers decreased the deterrent effect of the American strategic arsenal for European conventional and theater nuclear contingencies.

At the meeting of the heads of State and Government in London last May I said that the more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between East and West, which my Government has always advocated, the greater will be the necessity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.

Today, again in London, let me add that when the SALT negotiations opened we Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons on the other, or if we did, we did not articulate it clearly enough. Today, we need to recognize clearly the connection between SALT and MBFR and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

At the same meeting in May I said that there were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One would be for the Western Alliance to undertake a massive build-up of forces and weapons systems; the other for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. I prefer the latter. 116

Although the NPG had for some time been reviewing NATO's nuclear posture, this speech touched off a long-lasting public debate over Alliance strategy. It prompted the decision on December 12, 1979 to

deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles in Europe if arms control negotiations were not able to reduce the Soviet medium-range nuclear threat against Europe before the deployments which were anticipated for 1983. Before the background of this "double-track decision" the nature of NATO's nuclear strategy and posture became increasingly the focus of the debate and overshadowed all discussions over conventional force improvements. It was accentuated by public discussions over the possible introduction of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), or neutron bomb. News about the possible introduction to Europe created stormy West German responses in Europe in 1977 and President Carter's sudden and uncoordinated decision to cancel the weapons program caused considerable tensions in the security relationship between the America and West Germany.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Follow-up in Washington}

Back in Washington, the strategic rationale for NATO improvements was repeated publicly at several occasions. These statements, delivered in speeches, reports, and congressional testimony reaffirmed the essence of the American position on strategy:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The US continued to support NATO's strategy of flexibility in response, including an option to use nuclear weapons first.\textsuperscript{118}
  \item US policy called for improvements of conventional and tactical nuclear forces for NATO. Conventional improvements included proposals to field more forces (standing and reserve), to
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{117}There are countless publications on these issues. One of the best for the purposes of this study is chapter 7 of David N. Schwartz's book \textit{NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas}, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1983.
improve and increase their equipment and supplies, as well as their training.\textsuperscript{119}  
- Forward defense continued to remain an integral part of NATO strategy.\textsuperscript{120}

Reference to the strategic rationale for defense improvements did not play a key role in the US presentations. Instead of trying to provoke a strategy debate, the American approach focused on creating a consensus on NATO weaknesses, making specific proposals for remedies and convincing the allies that these remedies were affordable. Strategy played a relatively minor role in substantiating the US case vis-a-vis the Europeans. President Carter, Secretary Brown, Komer and other high officials were careful not to sow distrust in the American nuclear commitment, but this was not always managed.\textsuperscript{121} In order to avoid a protracted debate on strategy, there was no explicit discussion about most crucial aspects. Issues such as the links between the strength of conventional forces and nuclear first use and escalation, the scope of initial and follow-on employment etc. were not raised so as to avoid a theological debate.\textsuperscript{122} The calls for conventional improvements played on European perceptions of the alliance's conventional inferiority and the need to bolster these forces in a time of nuclear parity.

\textsuperscript{119}See, for example, SECDEF Harold Brown's interview on Italian National Television on October 15, 1977 in USWB, 18 October 1977, pp. 12-18. See also the statement by Robert W. Komer before the US Congress (House), \textit{Western Europe in 1977: Security, Economic, and Political Issues, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East}, Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st session, 3 October 1977, pp. 200-216. For a listing of these proposals, see Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{120}See President Carter's message to the ATA, loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{121}See below.

\textsuperscript{122}A number of important aspects of nuclear strategy were raised, however, in the context of Task Force 10 of the LTDP which dealt with Theater Nuclear Force modernization. See Legge, loc. cit.
Irritations Over US Strategy: The PRM-10 Incident

Although Brown and Komer had attempted to not let strategy or threat assessments become an issue in negotiating conventional defense improvements with the allies, a leak in the summer of 1977 caused major irritations in German-American relations. Just as the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War shook Europe in mid-1973, a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the Washington Post disturbed relations and trust in the transatlantic relationship in the summer of 1977.123

Written in the usual sensationalist style, the article opened with an introductory paragraph stating that

President Carter late this week will be presented by his national security advisors with a new defense strategy that secretly concedes one-third of West Germany to a Soviet invasion rather than seek increased defense spending which these advisors say would provoke Moscow and divide Washington.

The upshot of the article was that a Carter administration global strategy and force level study, conducted under the terms of Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, had allegedly concluded that not enough political support could be mustered in the United States to raise the funds to improve the US contribution for NATO and defend against an attack at the inner-German border. Evans and Novak claimed that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's National Security Advisor, intended to conceal the findings of the study from the allies "by simply not admitting its implications." Citing from "verbatim notes" they had allegedly seen or obtained, the authors claimed that Brzezinski had stated that "it is not possible in the current political environment to gain support in the United States for procurement of the conventional forces required to assure that NATO could maintain territorial integrity

123 The article entitled "Carter Faces Defense Shift on Western Europe" was published simultaneously by the International Herald Tribune (IHT) and the Washington Post on August 3, 1977.
if deterrence fails. Therefore we should adopt a *stalemate strategy*. That is a strategy of falling back and leaving the Soviets to face the political consequences of their aggression." No dissent was reportedly registered by any of the other attendees -- Vice President Mondale, DCI Stansfield Turner, ACDA Director Paul Warnke, and the Chairman of the JCS, Gen. George Brown -- when Brzezinski claimed that "we agree there must be a gap between our declared strategy and actual capabilities. We cannot for political reasons announce our strategy."

The rationale for such action according to the authors was that the administration feared that increased spending might hinder arms control negotiations and be politically too costly at home. Evans and Novak therefore concluded that the President was "about to adopt a policy boiling down to this: Instead of seeking greater defense spending to defend Central Europe, rely on political pressure to deter Moscow while secretly conceding military defeat."

**Reactions in Europe.** In West Germany and elsewhere the publication of the article raised important questions. Was the US about to give up the NATO-agreed principle of forward defense because of insufficient conventional forces? The second question immediately following was why there seemed to have been no reference in the study to theater nuclear forces employed to halt an attack before so much territory was seized? More specifically, was this leak an attempt by hawks in the US to push the production and deployment of the controversial "neutron bomb?"\(^{124}\) Although Evans and Novak were known by European journalists for their sensationalist approach, and despite the fact that the article itself was highly contradictory and apparently speculative, concerns arose in the media and parts of the government that there might be some truth to the story.

Only a limited amount of research could have revealed that newspaper reports on PRM-10 in July gave very different and much more adequate accounts about the scope and findings of the study. PRM-10 had actually reaffirmed the gist of most previous internal study on the military balance and Secretary Brown was quoted as saying as a result, "that there is no reason for immediate alarm about our ability to deter major military actions by the Soviet Union." In no major departure from previous study findings, PRM-10 had concluded that the alliance did not have sufficient forces to implement with confidence its agreed-upon strategy, and that certain remedies had to be taken. A previous column by Evans and Novak themselves had actually argued a week before the publication of their infamous item that PRM-10 contained a "cheery view of US-Soviet strength" and that the NSC had moved to suppress a pessimistic study on the military balance done by John Collins for the Congressional Research Service. One element of the study which might have still been more controversial than the alleged findings reported by Evans and Novak, but was not discussed in the August 3 column, had to do with the utility of nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weaknesses. Similar to Draft Presidential Memoranda in the 1960s, the report questioned that nuclear employment would be to the advantage of the alliance: "If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, rather than terminating hostilities, provoked a Soviet nuclear response, the consequences are not clear, but it is doubtful that [the West] would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing

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situation." Yet the remedy, conventional defense improvements, remained controversial too, the PRM-10 noted. If the US tried "to induce its allies to rely less of nuclear weapons by upgrading their conventional forces," this might provoke a wide debate over strategy. "If a strategy debate should develop, it would be divisive and might guarantee that the United States would not be able to persuade the allies to make further force improvements."128

Denials by the White House spokesman Jody Powell, that the President would accept a strategy or posture described by Evans and Novak helped to calm the waves quickly and there were good chances that the whole episode might not take longer than a week to be forgotten. Even in Europe where suspicions about the lack of American reliance is never far below the surface, the gist of the article seemed too radical to be credible. However, Evans and Novak published a follow-up article a few days later which attempted to substantiate the story.129 This news item claimed that PRM-10 was amended to include declaratory language that the US would seek to reconquer territory lost in an initial defensive period, yet that a posture to implement such a goal would cost much more than the administration was ready to invest in defense.

These reports and alleged leaks, as distorted and wrong as they were, could all but undermine the administrations efforts to work for conventional defense improvements and its argument that a conventional deterrent was feasible. Secretary Brown personally wrote to Georg Leber in late August to reassure him of the administration's continued adherence to its NATO commitments, and Brzezinski telephoned Foreign

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128Ibid. Interviews have confirmed that the article was an adequate description of PRM-10. Burt claimed that he had obtained a 117-page study entitled "Military Strategy and Force Posture Review," which was sent to President Carter as part of the PRM-10 package. This was thus not the entire document since the package is reported to have consisted of some 500 pages.

Minister Genscher to reassure him also. A major effort was made to publicise a few weeks later the President's signature under the decision document that resulted from PRM-10, i.e. Presidential Directive (PD) 18. This document reaffirmed the President's decision to seek real increases of 3% for the US defense budget, that the US continued to be committed to forward defense and strong conventional forces, as well as to the maintenance of parity in the strategic nuclear field. 

The PRM-10 incident is another example of how a distorted leak can cause the eruption of European suspicions about the reliability of the US commitment. It sowed distrust between the US and its allies by suggesting that the administration would not aim at the 3% increase in defense spending that the London summit had agreed on upon American urging. The leak finally presented as hypocritical the American commitment to forward defense, so important to the West Germans who fought long and repeated battles to have this concept incorporated in NATO's defense plans.

Outcome and Conclusions

Because of the decision to not make NATO's strategy the explicit subject of discussion, there was initially no abstract debate about the requirements of flexible response. While aiming at the same goal as previous administrations -- to create a robust conventional deterrent -- the Carter administration's approach to the LTDP was pragmatic and focussed on piecemeal progress. The concentration on concrete measures was a key factor in avoiding a philosophical debate about the desirability of the improvements. But it shifted the center of discussion to the question of feasibility, given allied resource

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constraints. The resource problem, however, which is heavily dependent on political judgment and decision could not be tackled without reference to strategy. As long as the American nuclear guarantee, especially first use, was not revoked, there was no reason to do anything dramatic in the conventional field.

The realization of the change in the geo-strategic situation had been slow in Europe. In the latter half of the 1970s Europeans began to concentrate on the grey area problem, as was shown with the reference to Helmut Schmidt's IISS speech in October 1977. Initially, the West German concerns about the exclusion of TNF in the SALT II talks took on considerably more political prominence than the improvement of conventional forces. This changed only at the beginning of the 1980s, after a painful debate about NATO's nuclear strategy and rising public dissatisfaction with the nuclear emphasis of the strategy.

The blending-out of strategy matters at the outset of the LTDP is likely to have helped the passage of the program. But it is also likely to have deprived the initiative of a sense of urgency, despite reference to the deterioration of the military balance. This is especially important as European officials and publics had grown accustomed to American calls for increases in resources and capabilities. Because so much time had passed without any directly observable increase of wartime risks for the alliance, these European officials could argue, cynically, that there was no reason for major reevaluations. They would try to do their best to make improvements but other things might have priority.
II. THE ROLE OF THREAT ANALYSES IN
CONVENTIONAL FORCE PLANNING

The preceding section established the point that from a US
perspective the establishment of a robust, stalwart conventional posture
was desirable. European allies, most prominently the FRG and Britain
(not examined here), had reservations about this strategic logic mainly
because nuclear deterrence was seen as weakened by an emphasis on
conventional forces. The arguments against a stronger emphasis on
conventional forces was not limited to desirability aspects, however.

This section will show that European reservations regarding a
conventional deterrent were also based on the conviction that it was not
feasible. Because the Warsaw Pact had such superior numbers of forces,
as well as geographical, operational and tactical advantages, the
argument ran, such a posture would require dramatically larger, and by
implication, extremely costly conventional forces for NATO. Such
increases would by far exceed what the alliance could muster.

As will be seen, the feasibility argument was addressed with
different intensity in all of the cases examined here. The main
question this section will address is how the feasibility problem
affected the formulation of the conventional defense improvement
initiatives. In answering it, the following analysis will first examine
the scope of differences in the assessments between the US, its allies
(mostly the FRG, to some degree Britain), and NATO staffs for each of
the three cases. This examination will compare positions on the
conventional order of battle, readiness, and mobilization and warning
times, as well as the relative importance of certain scenarios. Where
appropriate views on the nuclear balance will be taken into account. At
the end of the discussion of each case the role of threat analyses for
the formulation of the initiatives will then be evaluated.
ALLIED DEFENSE IN THE 1970S

Because the major motivation behind AD70 was political, i.e. to deflect pressures on the Nixon Administration to withdraw troops from Europe, there was no major American emphasis to reevaluate the threat NATO faced. The focus of the initiative lay on producing a presentable set of measures which helped justify the American presence in Europe by demonstrating that the European allies carried their fair share of the defense burden.

However, the AD70 exercise did touch upon the fundamental question of the Warsaw Pact threat because it was considered the basis for the subsequent analyses of NATO's major weaknesses. Since the AD70 report was to provide the basis for planning over a decade, the attempt was made to produce an estimate about the likely development of Soviet military capabilities over the course of the seventies.

The balance assessment undertaken for the AD70 report was very broad, however, and therefore only of limited utility for specific planning purposes. The AD70 report reviewed the military situation in the strategic nuclear as well as the theater nuclear and conventional field. The measures, however, were static and therefore only of limited use. In the strategic nuclear field, for example, the report reviewed the broad trends in the number of launchers and warheads, concluding that significant growth could be observed on the Soviet side. The analysis of these trends did not go beyond what could be concluded from public sources: that the Soviet Union had more launchers than the US but significantly less warheads (see Table x). The report pointed out that at the time "adequate nuclear forces exist and [that] it will be essential to ensure that this capability, which includes the continued commitment of theater nuclear forces, is maintained."\(^{132}\) In internal discussions at NATO and public statements elsewhere, the US made clear that strategic nuclear "sufficiency" would be maintained.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{133}\) See, for example, Richard M. Nixon, A New Strategy for Peace, pp. 92 ff.
Table A-1

US-SOVET BALANCE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADS IN 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>US</th>
<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td>Warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBM</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-range bombers</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2215</td>
<td>4652</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
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For the conventional and theater nuclear balance the December 1970 DPC ministerial meeting received a separate report. Both the summary in the AD70 report and the more detailed separate report used merely static measures, comparing manpower levels, equipment, supplies etc. These comparisons were not balanced because they used uneven counting rules. In the Central Region, NATO's manpower seemed to be less than that of the Pact because only forces deployed in the FRG and Denmark were counted for NATO, while on the Pact side all forces in the GDR, CSSR and Poland were included. At the same time forces in Belgium, the Netherlands and France were excluded. The tactical air situation, to
cite another example, also looked rather precarious for NATO because the comparison included on the Soviet side air defense districts as far away as Baku, Tashkent, and Sverdlovsk, for example, while not including on NATO's side reinforcements from Britain and the US. Thus, NATO appeared outnumbered almost 2:1.134

The summary conclusion of the threat assessment was little better than the gross figures allowed. The conclusion was that a further expansion of Warsaw Pact capabilities was expected and that NATO needed to maintain adequate capabilities to offset this growth. Not surprisingly, no attempt was made to define what "adequate" meant.135

Summary

For detailed planning purposes the broad findings of the AD70 report were not particularly relevant. They could only point to general trends and provide additional support for the necessity of extra efforts in such broad areas as air defense, ASW, etc. For the subsequent planning of specific measures, internal studies by the committee of officials developing the draft AD70 report were perhaps more important. They had more detail, analyzing NATO's situation in functional areas and under different scenarios. Yet no study attempted, or was authorized to do a net assessment of Soviet vs. NATO capabilities. Because of that "the threat" as an analytical variable for planning had merely the role of setting accents, showing trends, and creating atmosphere.

Much of the AD70 effort was to demonstrate the need and seriousness of allied efforts. The US government, which had an interest in letting AD70 appear as a European exercise, did not focus in any special way (briefings, secretarial speeches etc.) on demonstrating that a conventional deterrent was within reach. This was seen at the time as divisive and counter-productive. After all the main purpose was to demonstrate the continued need of US troops in Europe.

134For actual numbers, see Allied Defense in the Seventies, p. 23 and 27.
135Ibid., pp. 11-13.
THE SCHLESINGER INITIATIVE

This was quite different when Secretary Schlesinger briefed the allies in June 1973. The major premise underlying Secretary Schlesinger's remarks was that there was no reason why NATO could not have an effective conventional deterrent, given NATO's overall resources and military forces already in place. According to Schlesinger

NATO outweighs the Pact by a considerable margin in basic assets. The population of the Alliance is greater (by 54 percent). Our combined gross national product is greater by more than a factor of 3. Even our military expenditures are larger (by 35 percent) and despite the concern about Pact manpower, we have more men under arms (18 percent more). In other words, if NATO is inferior to the Pact in non-nuclear forces, it is not for lack of resources, manpower, or men in uniform. To the extent that the Alliance is weaker, it must be for other reasons.

In a second step Schlesinger argued "that NATO pays more for its deployed forces than the Pact, quite independently of manpower costs."

The secretary-designate continued that if these higher expenses did not translate into "a level of combat effectiveness at least commensurate with that of the Pact, we should certainly find out why. The resources for a powerful non-nuclear defense at M-day have been for the most apart made available."

Turning to NATO's military capabilities already in place, Schlesinger argued that the situation in the Central Region was not as bleak as some would claim when one considered manpower and the number of divisions:

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116 I would like to thank Patrick Allen, Michael Thompson, and Jim Thomson for very helpful conversations about the Schlesinger Initiative and comments on this section.
117 Schlesinger's speech, op. cit., p. 5.
118 Ibid.
119 Schlesinger focussed on the Center Region because the MBFR negotiations concentrated on that area as well.
Although we may question the effectiveness of NATO's defense in the Center Region, the ratio of forces deployed there does not put us at any great disadvantage. The Pact Order of Battle contains 58 stationed and indigenous divisions in the Center Region west of the USSR (not including Hungary), compared with only 29 1/3 divisions and 12 brigades in a comparable area on the NATO side (including Denmark and France). However, Pact divisions, even at full strength, are substantially smaller than their NATO counterparts. When we count men in combat and support units instead of adding up divisions, we find that the Pact deploys about 730,000 men, while NATO fields around 685,000 in a comparable area.\footnote{140}{Ibid.}

In a third step toward building his point of rough parity between the two alliances, the secretary then went on to present his statistics on major weapons categories as a further indicator of relative strength.

Depending upon what is being counted, the Pact has numerical superiority in tanks (14,500 to 6,100) and total aircraft (2,800 to 2,750), but NATO possesses important quantitative and qualitative advantages in tank destroyers, anti-tank weapons, armored personnel carriers, trucks, logistic support, and -- most important of all -- modern offensive aircraft.\footnote{141}{Ibid.}

These indicators led Schlesinger to conclude that a "situation of rough parity at M-day" already existed. Yet Schlesinger pushed his argument still further and checked his finding against different mobilization assumptions. Even if the Pact had thirty days of mobilization time and NATO would delay its mobilization for seven days (the so-called 23/30 scenario), the picture did not dramatically change to NATO's disadvantage.

\footnote{140}{Ibid.}{Interview sources noted that this annoyed the MBFR negotiators because the troop numbers did not square with the official US negotiating position on MBFR.}

\footnote{141}{Ibid.}
This situation of rough parity at M-Day does not change significantly even if Pact mobilization begins a week before that of NATO and what we consider the full Pact threat is deployed to the Center Region. We estimate that on that date (NATO M-Plus-23) the Pact could muster ground forces totaling about 1.3 million men in 90 division forces, along with about 23,000 tanks and 3,700 aircraft, of which a large percentage would consist of short-range, low-payload interceptors.

By M-Plus-23, NATO could deploy ground forces of 1.8 million men in 36 division and 30 brigade forces (including 6 French divisions), as well as 7,900 tanks (with more in storage) and about 3,600 aircraft containing a preponderance of fighter bombers. After M-Plus-23 the strength of the Alliance would increase still further relative to the Pact as additional reinforcements and supplies arrived from the United States. ¹⁴²

These indicators suggested to Schlesinger that there was no reason for NATO to be in a defeatist mood, as he would continuously make clear in the aftermath of his speech. ¹⁴³ Nor did the secretary-designate want to pretend that NATO could be complacent about its military programming and existing deficiencies. The purpose of his presentation was to put allied and Pact capabilities in perspective and to make a forceful point that with limited additional efforts, NATO could have a robust conventional deterrent:

I do not want to pretend that these quite aggregate comparisons reliably forecast the outcome of a non-nuclear conflict in the Center Region. Other factors in addition to the numerical force balance will heavily influence the result. In fact, it is precisely in these less visible areas that NATO's weaknesses are greatest. We continue to have problems with our command-and-control. Many of our high-cost aircraft remain vulnerable on the ground. We lack sufficient war reserve stocks to outlast the Pact. We still suffer from maldeployments and excessive redundancy in our logistical systems. Our tactics appear to stem more from internal doctrines than external threats.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 6
But in the course of recognizing our own weaknesses (as we must) we should not overlook the many problems faced by the USSR and its possibly reluctant Allies. If they attack, they must cross a more difficult terrain than we generally concede. They suffer from serious logistic deficiencies and vulnerabilities of their own. Their conventional airpower is critical to, but inadequate for, the kind of campaign the Soviet marshals seem to prefer. The success of their strategy -- to the extent that we understand it -- also turns on a second echelon of ground forces drawn from the USSR, the bulk of which would have to depend on reserve call-ups to reach combat strength. And the Soviets themselves must entertain serious doubts about the reliability of their Allies and the security of their lines of communication from internal threats.¹⁴⁴

What did this analysis imply for NATO's confidence in its capabilities? The upshot of the argument was that NATO needed to improve its situation, yet not be pessimistic about its ability to do significantly better.

The result of our analysis must, in these circumstances, be somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand SACEUR, quite understandably, cannot assure us of being able to withstand a heavy fast-moving Pact assault on his central front. On the other hand, a prudent Soviet calculator cannot assure his leaders of the Pact's ability to break through NATO's forward defenses.

To sum up, despite important asymmetries between the forces of NATO and the Pact, it does not appear as though NATO need labor under any serious disadvantages on M-Day or M-Plus-23 with approximately its existing non-nuclear force structure -- provided always that a number of its less visible weaknesses are removed. Nor is it clear why the deficiencies that do exist cannot be remedied at relatively modest incremental cost.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴Schlesinger speech, op. cit., p. 6.
¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 6/7.
Irritations

As if the secret speech of the American Secretary of Defense was not enough to launch a transatlantic debate on the nature and size of the threat, an article in the *Washington Post* on the same day of Schlesinger's speech provided further ammunition for such a debate. The report by Michael Getler was on a DoD internal systems analysis study done under the direction of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation, PA & E) Dr. Gardiner Tucker. The article contained a long and detailed description of the findings of several year-long studies on the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance with inputs by the US Army, Air Force and Navy. The major conclusion of the study as reported by Getler was almost identical to those of Schlesinger's speech. Yet the article went further in claiming that the studies had also found that NATO had enough capabilities to halt even a augmented Warsaw Pact attack close to the border without recourse to nuclear weapons and that NATO air and naval forces would do much better than commonly expected.

Getler cited government officials calling the study "the most thorough and careful analysis ever made" and made clear that its conclusions "sharply challenge[d] a common view that NATO armies would be routed by a massive Warsaw Pact ground attack in Europe and would be forced to escalate the battle to nuclear warfare." In addition the study was reported to cast doubt on the "commonly held view" that Pact air forces would quickly gain supremacy over NATO air forces and that the Pact had a good chance on disrupting allied sea lanes of communications.

The study was reported to have estimated the designated Warsaw Pact threat (i.e. those forces certain to be committed to battle in Central Europe) to consist of 85 divisions of category I-III readiness, or 48-52 US Army division equivalents. The augmented threat which, according

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147 The article defined a Division Equivalent (DE) to consist of 17,000 men and 325 tanks. Warsaw Pact divisions of Cat. I were said to
to Getler, consisted of strategic reserves and some reinforcements and possible from the Far East, was reported to amount to perhaps 126-128 divisions, or 72-78 division equivalents. On NATO's side the article did not give a number for NATO divisions to meet the designated threat. Instead, Getler reported NATO to have 44-52 division equivalent to face the augmented threat, consisting of forces already in Europe, some ready reserves in Europe and US-based reinforcements.

This order of battle suggested that NATO would need an additional 8-14 armored division equivalents to meet the augmented threat. Yet according to the study even the existing NATO forces could hold for about 70 days and cause "serious doubts about a positive outcome for the Warsaw Pact because of allied air power and behind-the-lines-reserves." The findings were still more optimistic regarding NATO's ability to hold off a lesser threat for 90 days or more.

What were the underlying factors leading to this reassessment? The first factor according to Getler was the inclusion of forces not listed in the DPQ, most notably the French forces and "for the first time" the German territorial force. This new count increased the total of NATO's forces by 15 division equivalents. It is likely, however, that this

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be 80-90 percent filled with men and equipment. Similarly, Cat. II divisions were about at 50 percent strength and Cat. II divisions at 25 percent. See ibid. As will be seen later, these percentages were not entirely accurate.

\(^{146}\) An Armored Division Equivalent (ADE) is a standard measure developed on the basis of assigning a Weapons Effectiveness Indicators/Weighted Unit Value (WEI/WUV) score to the weapons inventory of a unit in a division. The scores of all the units in a division are then aggregated by category by yet another scoring system. This aggregate score is subsequently divided by the score of a standard US Army division. In the early seventies the standard unit was the US 1st armored division. ADE, by comparison was a simpler measure. The measure consisted of the typical number of brigades and regiments divided by the typical number of brigades/regiments in a division. Thus, three brigades would be counted as one division on NATO's side, while on the Warsaw Pact four maneuver regiments were counted as equivalent to one division. For a discussion of various counting methods and scoring systems, see William P. Mako, *US Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe*, Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1983.
count also included Danish forces and British territorial reserves.\textsuperscript{149} The second major factor was a revision in mobilization assumptions. Soviet Cat. III divisions were no longer assumed to be at full strength and fully trained and equivalent to a Cat. I division after two weeks, but only after 3 months; this was expected to slow the Warsaw Pact build-up and provide more time for US reinforcements to arrive in Europe. Like Schlesinger in his speech, the study assumed that the Pact would take thirty days to get ready for an attack, with NATO mobilization lagging about a week behind. A third contributing factor was an apparent reassessment of Warsaw Pact and NATO weapons effectiveness indicators. Instead of using mere Fire Power Potentials (FPP) as indicators, the new analyses used Weapons Effectiveness Indicators (WEIs) which took into account a greater number of weapons characteristics and performance measures.\textsuperscript{150} The new estimate substantially lowered the previously assumed Soviet advantage in effectiveness, mobility and survivability, and also took into account US advantages in anti-tank weaponry. Fourth, the study also used more constrained assumptions about Soviet supply and maintenance capabilities. Fifth, the systems analysis study revised previous estimates on the degradation of NATO SLOCs due to attrition of Soviet submarines, assuming that 70-90 percent of the attackers could be neutralized in the first thirty days, while only eliminating 25-50 percent of NATO's resupply. Regarding air forces, the study included French, British and US assets on NATO's side to compensate for the inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union on the Pact's side.

Getler had two suggestions regarding the implications of these findings. The first was that NATO might engage in MBFR talks and agree to troop reductions without a net loss to its security. The second was

\textsuperscript{149} Interview.
\textsuperscript{150} For details, see the section on the 1973 ministerial briefings in this chapter.
that the administration might use the study to counteract what Secretary Elliot Richardson had called "a tendency on the part of some people not only among our allies but within the United States to cling to the tripwire theory" of rapid escalation to nuclear war. Getler also used quotes from officials who suggested that the European allies worried about the US backing away from its nuclear commitment and therefore tended to down-play the potential of conventional defense. This problem was made more difficult still, according to these officials because of a fear that defense budgets might be cut if it was acknowledged that the existing force was enough. From the US point of view, however, it was worse to say that the situation was hopeless, because this would really strengthen the calls for cutbacks.

All this sounded very similar to Schlesinger's speech and it is therefore not surprising that a major debate was prompted in NATO trying to sort out the "facts" about the military balance and to identify US objectives behind these assessments.

Differences over the Threat

As was mentioned earlier, there were marked differences between the thrust of Schlesinger's presentation and Getler's article on the one hand, and allied and NATO intelligence assessments on the other.

The NATO Intelligence Estimate. The official version of the NATO estimate which covered the developments from 1968 to 1973, was briefed to the June 7 ministerial meeting by the Deputy Director of the IMS and Chief of Intelligence, Admiral Poser at the beginning of the meeting.151

The major difference between Poser's and Schlesinger's briefing lay in the thrust and purpose of the presentation. Poser used broad static

measures as a unit of comparison for the military balance without making an attempt to qualify these numbers. In doing so, the estimate seemed to imply that NATO was hopelessly outnumbered and had virtually no chance of doing anything about it.

For example, Poser pointed out in his briefing that the Warsaw Pact had at its disposal against NATO's Allied Command Europe almost 100 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in addition to 60 non-Soviet divisions. Not included in this count, but mentioned separately by Poser, were an additional 30 divisions of the Soviet strategic reserve. Poser stated that the Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia as well as the other East European countries, were "practically fully manned and equipped." He made no reference to the fact, however, that Soviet divisions in the three western military districts were manned and equipped at considerably less than full strength, as were many divisions of the East European Pact members. Poser also did not make reference to the fact that the divisions in the western military districts were also better manned and equipped than the remainder of the Soviet divisions. Nor did he point out the wide geographical spread of these divisions, or mention the implications of space and manning factors for mobilization capabilities.

Turning to equipment aspects, Poser stressed that the Soviets had increased the number of tanks of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) by 30 percent, adding 1500 to the already existing inventory of 5,000 tanks. The admiral also noted the replacement of 50 percent of the artillery tubes in Soviet divisions as well as quantitative and qualitative improvements in many other weapons categories, stocks and logistics support for ground forces to support his claim of drastic modernization efforts on the Pact side. Regarding air forces, Poser noted a fifty percent increase in tactical aircraft, increased multi-role capabilities, and improved training for pilots. For the Navy he noted the marked attempt toward a global presence and the construction of "a first of perhaps several aircraft carriers." More significant still in the admiral's estimate were the advances in the Soviet
submarine assets, especially in the category of attack submarines and SSBNs. ¹⁵² For further evidence of the Soviet strategic nuclear build-up, Poser also made reference to the doubling of Soviet ICBM launchers, Soviet efforts toward MIRVing and the construction of an ABM system around Moscow. Taken together, he concluded, this meant that the Soviets had reached strategic nuclear parity.

The sum of these developments prompted Poser to conclude that the conventional capabilities of the Pact had "significantly increased." Although non-Soviet forces were improved also, according to the admiral, they were still less developed. Yet they constituted an important additional asset for the Soviets. At the strategic level, the Soviets had made "spectacular improvements" although the speed of these improvements had slowed down. The estimate suggested that this could be taken as strong evidence that the Soviets considered powerful forces to be the backbone of a "Grossmachtpolitik." At the same time improvements in the European area could be interpreted as an attempt to improve the Pact position to have additional bargaining power in the MBFR talks.¹⁵³

There was nothing in this presentation to the DPC which directly contradicted what Schlesinger said a short time thereafter. Yet the difference in tenor of the two speeches could hardly be more marked. Schlesinger attempted to convince the allies that NATO had a good potential to do something about the Pact threat and, in fact, match it. Not necessarily weapon for weapon and division for division but in overall capabilities. Poser's presentation on the other hand spoke of 160 Pact divisions without any attempt to qualify that number. The presentation by the Chief of Intelligence of the IMS was a correct, though not very telling assessment of the situation. The admiral made no attempt to provide an assessment of Pact mobilization capabilities relative to NATO's or to rate Soviet equipment relative to those of NATO. The implications of his findings regarding the balance and probable battle outcomes was implicit and suggestive at best.

¹⁵²Ibid. pp. 7 ff.
¹⁵³Ibid., p. 11-13.
Reactions to the Differing Assessments by NATO Staffs and Allies.

The differences in the thrust of the NATO and the American view of the threat was not only a presentational matter. During the meeting already, the chairman of the MC, Gen. Johannes Steinhoff argued that the balance was increasingly unfavorable to NATO and that a continuation of this trend would put into question NATO's ability to execute the strategy of Flexible Response. Steinhoff made clear that he disagreed with Schlesinger's threat assessment with regard to the numbers mentioned and pointed out that the numbers did not take into account the Pact's total equipment standardization, 24 months military service etc.\footnote{Interview.}

In Steinhoff's view "NATO-Europe [could] of course not be defended conventionally against a massed attack by the Bloc, and [could] not be defended a long time. The troops available to NATO in Central Europe [in 1974] were just about sufficient to secure the continued credibility of the nuclear guarantee; in other words they are sufficient to make sure that one can use nuclear weapons at a certain point in time and can defend conventionally over a certain period of time."\footnote{Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, "Zeitgenossen" broadcast, \textit{Interview mit General a. D. Johannes Steinhoff}, 7 April 1974, 21:15 hours, cited in transcript of Bundespresse- und Informationsamt (BPA), Abt. Nachrichten, Bonn, 8 April 1974, pp. 14-16 (14).}

The fact that Schlesinger's order of battle contained about 38 fewer Warsaw Pact divisions than the NATO assessment by excluding divisions in Hungary and forces in the Soviet Union beyond the three western military districts from the order of battle reportedly threw NATO "into a tizzy."\footnote{See Charles L. Sulzberger, "Isolationism Has Two Faces," \textit{IHT}, 13 June, 1973.} There appears to have been little immediate argument beyond the comments by Steinhoff about the facts during the ministerial meeting. Both Georg Leber and his British colleague, Lord Carrington, cautioned that the allies could not do considerably more and
Leber reportedly argued that a realistic comparison of capabilities would also have to take into account geographical and psychological factors.\(^{157}\)

On the specifics of Schlesinger's briefing staffs in NATO and European capitals were subsequently asked to analyze the assumptions underlying the report. These reviews reaffirmed strong differences between the American and NATO assessment because of major differences in assumptions.

The NATO military staffs were charged to do a quick analysis of the assumptions leading to Schlesinger's and Getler's conclusions.\(^{158}\) The findings should not have come as a surprise to anybody in the capitals because Schlesinger had stated his assumptions rather clearly: He had included in his M-day assumptions the forces of France and Denmark on NATO's side and excluded the forces inside the Soviet Union and Hungary from the Pact order of battle. This M-day threat amounted to "58 stationed and indigenous divisions in the Center Region west of the USSR." His mobilized M+30 threat included Soviet reinforcements from three western military districts and amounted to 90 divisions.\(^{159}\) He also used more optimistic assumptions about US reinforcement capabilities, as well as Pact mobilization. The reason for assuming fast US deployment was that the US in its assessment had used more than DPQ-assigned or earmarked lift forces in its calculations. A third factor was his use of Army Division Equivalents (ADEs). The military staffs questioned whether the additional heaviness of NATO's divisions translated directly into additional combat power, as assumed by the ADE measure. Another difference lay in the fact that the NATO staff counted Pact Cat. I and Cat. II divisions as fully manned and "ready," thus not requiring mobilization. In addition the NATO staff used equipment standards of the elite GSFG force for those divisions in Cat. II or III

\(^{157}\)See Atlantic News, No. 537, 9 June 1973, p. 3.
\(^{158}\)See FAZ, 12 June 1973, p. 1/4
\(^{159}\)Schlesinger speech, p. 5/6.
that it had no full intelligence on. Moreover, it did not degrade the effectiveness of mobilized Cat. II and III divisions as the US analysis had done. Because of these differing assumptions, the Pact could be expected to mobilize much faster. This, in sum, led the military staff to conclude that it could not agree with the M-day estimate of rough parity.¹⁶⁸

However, NATO military staff also claimed that Schlesinger's M+23 estimate was used because it was most favorable to NATO. The authorities pointed out that the Pact could fight from peacetime locations while NATO had to move its troops toward the battle area. Regarding other quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Schlesinger assessment, the staffs' response stated that the American assessment underestimated or neglected Pact strength in artillery and multi-rocket launchers, amphibious and landing capabilities and higher standardization of equipment. The staff also was unable to find what it would consider "reliable data" on defense expenditure comparisons to support Schlesinger's view that NATO outspent the Pact.

Taking all these differences into consideration the NATO military staffs concluded that they could not agree with Schlesinger's statement that NATO "already program[med] most of what is required to counter the Pact."¹⁶¹ While military staff agreed that there was no reason for defeatism on NATO's part regarding its ability to provide an effective defense, the NATO staff was not willing to accept the US claim that rough parity existed at M and M+23.

The West German MoD at Hardthoehe which, through regular diplomatic channels, was cognizant of the NATO staff findings, reviewed the balance assessments and came to similarly critical conclusions. Gen. Goodpaster, the SACEUR, who strongly disagreed with Schlesinger's findings and who found the speech ill-advised and didactic in style, publicly reaffirmed SHAPE's position on the balance and stated that the

¹⁶⁸ Interviews.
¹⁶¹ Interviews. See Schlesinger speech, p. 5.
Pact had a 2:1 superiority over NATO when counting divisions, firepower and unit strengths. Regarding air forces, Goodpaster noted that the Pact had twice as many aircraft and substantially more airfields, protective buildings, better air defenses and command and control facilities. The general also noted that the Soviets were now in possession of the largest Navy in the world.\textsuperscript{162} Despite the fact that all these statements were correct in a sense, they did not present the fuller picture that Schlesinger wanted to get across to the allies.

A Second Attempt to Convince the Allies: The Summer 1973 Ministerial Briefings on Conventional Forces

In his previous position as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Schlesinger himself took great interest in having the CIA reanalyze the assumptions on which the military planning for the European theater was based. He planned to follow up with the injection of the findings into NATO after becoming the secretary of defense. When his presentation encountered opposition from various NATO quarters and national staffs, a decision was made to brief the revised US assessments to the allies and NATO staffs.

This originally secret briefing contained a detailed explanation of the analytical base of Schlesinger's remarks and was given to allied defense ministers, SHAPE, AFCENT, and the MC.\textsuperscript{163} It underscored the analytical differences that existed between the US and NATO assessments and examined the reasons for these differences.\textsuperscript{164} The main factors for

\textsuperscript{162}See \textit{FAZ}, 12 June 1973, p. 1/4
\textsuperscript{164}The relevant parts on NATO assessment were deleted from the declassified document. They could partially be reconstructed through interviews and published sources.
the differences were (1) variations in the assumed order of battle; (2) differences in readiness and mobilization estimates, and as a result, different warning time assumptions; (3) varied views on the outcome of the air war; and (4) dissimilar assumptions about the effect of logistics degradation. The sum of these factors led to wide variations in assessments of likely war outcomes between NATO staff and European allies on the one hand, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) view on the other.

**Order of battle assumptions.** Instead of merely counting the number of Soviet and East European divisions facing ACE, the ministerial briefing analyzed the implications of deployment patterns, equipment and manpower status for the balance. This more differentiated perspective helped to change the balance significantly toward showing more of NATO's relative strengths.

Unlike Admiral Poser's broad NATO/Warsaw Pact comparison, the *Briefing* provided a regional balance assessment for NATO's Central Region. On the Warsaw Pact side the order of battle oriented toward this area included 86 divisions. 58 of these divisions were deployed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 27 were Soviet; the remainder of 28 divisions was assumed to be in the three western military districts of the Soviet Union and available for reinforcement.\(^{165}\) Table A-2 shows what must have been the division count of the order of battle presented to the ministers.\(^{166}\) On NATO's side the *Briefing* used a

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\(^{165}\) Ibid., p. B-1 and B-7.

\(^{166}\) No breakdown by category (I-III) is available in the declassified document for Pact forces in 1973, yet a chart was included in the presentation. (Interviews.) After his retirement, Poser published a book on the Warsaw Pact in 1977 which listed the readiness status of Soviet forces similar to the NATO standards which combine Cat. I and II ("A" and "B") into one category "ready", and a third category (C), not ready." According to this breakdown, the Soviets had 27 Cat. A/B divisions (14 tank divisions and 13 motorized rifle divisions) in Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. For the three western military districts, he listed a total of 32 divisions (4 more than the US sources cited above -- presumably for reinforcement in the Balkans). 25 of these were Cat. A/B (14 tank divisions, 9 motorized rifle divisions, 2 airborne) and 7 Cat. C (motorized rifle divisions). See Guenter Poser, *Militärarmacht Sowjetunion 1977 -- Daten, Tendenzen, Analyse*, Muenchen: Olzog, 1977, p. 151.
Table A-2

WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS FACING THE CENTRAL REGION IN 1973

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>10 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Forces/ E Europe</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Western Military Distr.*</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>86 1/3</strong></td>
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* Since the total number of divisions in Eastern Europe is 58 (of which 27 are Soviet), the Briefing accounted for 28 divisions as reinforcements from the western military districts. See pp. B-7 and B-8 of the Briefing.


Notably different count than usually used in NATO. Instead of counting only those allied forces reported on in the Defense Planning Questionnaire as "assigned" or "earmarked" -- which would bring the count for the Central Region to 32 2/3 divisions\textsuperscript{167} -- the US analysis...

\textsuperscript{167}The "DPQ" force excluded the US Marines but included some British and Canadian forces planned for use in AFNORTH. With the AFNORTH reinforcements, the DPQ force was brought at 34 1/3 divisions. See Briefing, p. C-1.
also included 18 2/3 divisions of other forces under national control. For example, major additions came from including US reinforcements and French forces on NATO's side and a total of 51 1/3 divisions was assumed to be available to NATO.\footnote{Ibid., p. C-1/2.} However, the assessment consciously did not include all forces available to NATO allies, such as European forces deployed elsewhere, US reserve divisions, US Marines, and the US division in Korea.\footnote{The total of all these forces would have amounted to 72 1/3 divisions. See p. C-2.} The rationale for using these different numbers was that it was more reasonable to include a number of forces not assigned or earmarked to NATO in peacetime which would nevertheless probably be committed during war.

This order of battle was thus not only more differentiated than the one used by NATO but it stood in still starker contrast to the "official" balance provided in the \textit{White Paper} published by the West German MoD for 1972s./73. That publication listed on NATO's side 28 2/3 divisions (excluding France and external reinforcements) and 90 divisions (60 in Eastern Europe and 30 in the Soviet western military districts) for the Warsaw Pact. No mention was made of the fact that the Pact required considerable time to mobilize these forces, in turn allowing NATO to mobilize additional forces also (eg., US reinforcements).\footnote{See Weissbuch 1973/74, p. 13.}

The \textit{Briefing} also contained a "high threat estimate" consisting of 128 Warsaw Pact divisions. These were the 86 divisions of the designated threat plus divisions redeployed against the Central Region from the Southern Flank, the strategic reserve, and from the Sino-Soviet border. This threat would have left "holding forces on other Soviet and Pact borders roughly equal to the forces of other potential enemies."\footnote{This information was contained in the section on "Warsaw Pact Land Forces. See Briefing, p. B-4 and F-2.}
Differentiated Assumptions on Readiness, Mobilization and Warning

Time. According to the declassified speech, Admiral Poser's presentation to the ministers on June 7 did not touch at all on the question of necessary mobilization times and warning. The American briefing given to allied ministers, by contrast, made clear that the Soviets were faced with a choice between assembling a heavy attack at the cost of discovered mobilization versus achieving surprise at the cost of a foregone mobilization. The primary reason for this was that the Pact's divisions were of unequal readiness and had to be partially filled with personnel and equipment.\textsuperscript{172} The US analysis suggested that it was conceivable for the Warsaw Pact to attack without reinforcement from their peacetime posture during a period of little or no tension. But we consider such an eventuality highly unlikely. Should they do so, evidence of military preparations would be minimal, and strategic warning if given at all would be a few hours or at most a day or so prior to the attack.\textsuperscript{173}

For such a "bolt out of the blue" the Soviets would have to rely on their own and allied category I forces. In addition, they might perhaps be able to field some category II and III forces without bringing them up to full combat strength. This "deployed threat" which was not discussed in detail in the Briefing but mentioned by Schlesinger in his June 7 briefing consisted of 27 Soviet divisions deployed in East

\textsuperscript{172}For briefing purposes the analysis divided the Pact divisions into three groups. Category I divisions which had 75-100\% of their equipment and personnel and were "essentially combat ready as they [stood]." Category II divisions had between 50-75\% of their equipment and personnel and required about five days for mobilization and deployment in assembly areas. Category III divisions were at 20-35\% strength which were believed to be for longer-term mobilization, requiring probably several weeks of preparations. See ibid., p. B-3. For a breakdown of Soviet division readiness in 1977, see Poser, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{173}Briefing, p. B-5.
Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 31 East European divisions fielded by the East Germans, Czechs, and Poles, plus some 2800 aircraft. The US believed that in such a situation, an approximate balance would exist. In planning against the larger, "designated threat," US planners did expect that some strategic warning was likely to be available:

We believe Warsaw Pact preparations would be dictated by these features of their doctrine and strategy.

The Soviets emphasize the value of surprise, but they also emphasize, equally or perhaps more, the importance of the initial period of war - the initial attack - and the need for a preponderance of forces with strong reserves.

The coordination required by these other concepts would also militate against maintaining the element of tactical surprise and would afford opportunities to acquire indications of Soviet preparations.

The idea of assuring the stability of the rear - a concept stimulated by World War II experience - also calls for preparations likely to be detected.

Therefore, considering all these factors, we conclude that the USSR would reinforce in Eastern Europe prior to an attack.

It is from these preparations that we would derive indications of Soviet intentions for an attack against NATO.  

Although it might prove difficult to have unambiguous indications and to convince the political leadership in the West that an attack was probable, US intelligence was rather confident that some warning could be provided to the leadership: "[S]ome of the indications of Pact increased military preparations would probably be sufficient for NATO to make certain precautionary preparations of its own."  


Ibid., p. B-5.

sources it is known that US intelligence suggested for force planners to assume about a one week delay between receiving information on a beginning Pact mobilization of a "designated threat" magnitude (86 divisions) to hedge against intelligence uncertainties and failures. US force planning calculations on Pact mobilization capabilities were based on the further planning assumption that it would take the Pact about 30 days to mobilize the 80-90 divisions necessary for such an attack, given the readiness of its forces. If the Pact would choose to attack earlier, it would have to do so with significantly less effective forces because Cat. II and III divisions could not be properly built up and incorporated in the force. Because of the uncertainties involved in interpreting, transmitting and acting upon strategic warning, the US/NATO was assumed to be able to mobilize for about 23 days.\footnote{A discussion of these matters without specific warning time numbers is presented in James Schlesinger Annual Defense Department Report to Congress for FY 1975, Washington, DC: 1974, pp. 89-90. The warning time numbers are based on Les Aspin's article "A Surprise Attack on NATO -- Refocussing the Debate," NATO Review, Vol. 25 (4), August 1977, pp. 6-13 (7); for a very useful discussion, see also Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack -- Lessons for Defense Planning, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982, pp. 179.} These parameters were not predictions about likely beginnings of war but were used as planning criteria only, so as to produce sufficiently conservative planning margins when developing a posture.\footnote{This point is reemphasized in a very clear and instructive study on these issues by James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance, Washington, D.C.: CBO, December 1977, pp. 20-25.}

Analytical Differences and Expected Battle Outcomes. Admiral Poser in his briefing had not attempted to evaluate how his findings about the Warsaw Pact armaments efforts translated into net capabilities during wartime. Such an estimate would have had to lay open assumptions regarding the opposing forces and discuss models used to predict battle outcomes. None of this was attempted, however.
The briefing on land forces, by contrast, was an attempt to do exactly that. It aimed at scrutinizing assumptions and examined the impact of interactions and effectiveness of the forces in order to determine NATO Center Region land force requirements.

Regarding assumptions, the *Briefing* differentiated between various mobilization times and the resulting forces brought to bear on the front. It cautioned that

> [c]omparing numbers of divisions is nearly meaningless because the size and compositions differs markedly. When we compare men, we get a different picture of relative strength; comparing weapons, some would favor Pact, some would favor NATO. Large assets exist on both sides and there is no reason to conclude that the Pact has overwhelming superiority.\footnote{\textit{Briefing}, p. E-1.}

The results of the study hinged importantly on a set of assumptions. One of them was that the Pact would replace entire units after they had been attrited or ran out of supplies\footnote{Interview.} whereas NATO would replace individual losses as they occurred. This assumption reduced the "combat life of Pact divisions, and thereby reduces the average number of Pact divisions on line."\footnote{\textit{Briefing}, p. F-2.} Moreover, the initial effectiveness of reduced strength reserve and cadre units was reduced and estimated ranges were used to reflect uncertainties regarding readiness, for example. The model would thus downgrade the effectiveness of a mobilized Cat. III division, for example, to reflect its lesser combat strength because of lack of training etc.

The analysis of these comparisons showed the "well known Pact numerical superiority in tanks," and NATO's superiority in anti-tank weapons. The Pact was also superior in artillery pieces, yet NATO was
found to partially offset its disadvantage with higher lethality, accuracy, and responsiveness. NATO was also superior in small arms and mortars and was able to field more men than any threat.\footnote{182}

According to the \textit{Briefing}, these comparisons did not give a clear picture of the balance because "[t]hey do not reflect the relative contributions of different weapons types, nor do they reflect the quality differences which exist among weapons of the same type."\footnote{183} Two different measures were therefore used for a more detailed analysis. The first used "Firepower Potentials (FPP)," a measure "proportional to the lethality of a weapon's munitions and the expected expenditure of ammunition by each weapon," and used by the Army, JCS, and SHAPE. The second set of measures was the so-called Weapons Effectiveness Indicators (WEIs) which counted mobility, survivability, as well as firepower; this measure slightly biased toward giving more weight to lighter systems. Both measures adjusted for the fact that NATO and Pact divisions differed in size and thus added weight to NATO. When the two measures were used to score the low Pact threat of 86 divisions against NATO's 51 1/3, the FPP measure gave the Pact 9 division equivalents more than the WEIs because of NATO's greater reliance on light weapons systems.\footnote{184} Using dynamic analyses of force ratios (with a 1.4:1 Corps sector ratio as stalemate criterion),\footnote{185} the study concluded that NATO could hold at the border against the designated threat without recourse to nuclear weapons for about 90 days. Against the high threat, however, much of the FRG would get lost in the same time frame if no more forces were added on NATO's side.\footnote{186} Although not discussed at detail in the

\footnote{182}{Ibid., p. F-4.}
\footnote{183}{Ibid.}
\footnote{184}{Ibid., pp. F-5/6.}
\footnote{185}{Ibid., p. F-6.}
\footnote{186}{Getler, op. cit. Interviews confirmed the adequacy of the Getler piece in that regard. Getler's article suggested that NATO needed 8-14 more armored division equivalents (ADEs) to hold against the high threat too, not taking into account the effect of tactical air.}
Briefing, Schlesinger was also convinced that NATO had a good chance of halting an unreinforced attack of 58 Pact divisions in the GDR, the CSSR, and Poland.\footnote{187}

These findings stood in sharp contrast to similar NATO studies. The Briefing directly addressed this point.\footnote{188} A comparison of the PA & E analyses with NATO studies showed stark differences in the following areas. First, NATO (SHAPE) counted those forces on NATO's side which were listed in the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ).\footnote{189} On the Pact's side a larger threat was due to the inclusion of Hungary in the order of battle (10 divisions) on the Pact side and might have brought the total to 96 divisions for the Pact.\footnote{190} Second, the NATO study used equipment holding numbers based on GSFG standards for those divisions it did not have sufficient intelligence on, yet the GSFG was the best equipped force -- in fact, the elite of Soviet forces. The changed order of battle and differences in assumptions regarding equipment holdings thus translated into a significantly larger threat than used by the US, even when calculated in ADEs. NATO analyses, unlike the American study, did also not account for the fact that Cat. II and III Pact forces might be fully mobilized yet still not be as effective as Cat. I forces. For one thing, the reservists will not be as well trained as active duty officers, secondly their equipment will be older and more deficient, it will take longer to build up command, control and communications links etc. Other differences included assumptions regarding logistics, the role of tactical air, and warning time.\footnote{191}

\footnote{187}See his Annual Report, FY 1975, pp. 87-88.
\footnote{188}This section was deleted from the declassified document. The broad outlines of the differences could be reconstructed from interviews.
\footnote{189}See Getler, loc. cit.
\footnote{190}See The Military Balance 1972-1973, London: IISS, 1972. It lists 6 indigenous divisions and 4 Soviet divisions for Hungary. These 10 divisions plus the 86 listed in the American Briefing which probably had excluded Hungary (as Schlesinger had done) add up to 96 divisions.
\footnote{191}Interviews.
Varied Views on the Outcome of the Air War. Another major difference in US and NATO threat assessments concerned the tactical air situation in the Central Region. Admiral Poser had merely pointed out that the Pact had increased its aircraft inventory by about 50 percent since 1968. The US briefing, by contrast, attempted a more detailed balance assessment, although an integrated air-land war could not be gamed.

The *Briefing* pointed out that "it has been customary to ascribe to NATO only those aircraft listed in the Defense Planning Questionnaire, and only those located in the Federal Republic, the Benelux countries, and the United Kingdom [deleted]. These counting rules gave the Pact about a 2:1 advantage in aircraft." This count excluded on NATO's side non-DPQ forces, the French and Danish aircraft. Yet these aircraft were only 1-2 flying hours away from the potential battle area. Adding them to the balance would produce at least the 2,750 aircraft mentioned by Schlesinger on June 7 and bring NATO in rough numerical parity with the Pact.

None of these counts took reinforcement capabilities into account. The *Briefing* also mentioned that tactical aircraft in the three Soviet western military districts could be deployed for a Central European war. On the other hand the US would also reinforce Europe. The *White Paper 1975/76* counted some 1300 aircraft in the western military district available for redeployment. It can be assumed that the US would redeploy at least as many aircraft from US bases also, balancing the Pact threat. In sum, a similar comparison of M-day and reinforcement

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193 See Schlesinger, p. 5; *White Paper 1975/76*, p. 33. That French and other air forces must have been included in the *Briefing* also follows from the counting logic used for ground forces, which included French divisions and other national assets of allied countries.
194 At M+23 Schlesinger expected the tactical air situation to be roughly balanced with 3,700 Pact aircraft versus 3,600 aircraft on NATO's side and more arriving from the US with longer mobilization. (See Schlesinger's June 7 speech, p. 6.) An unclassified 1974 study concluded that the US might redeploy as many as 1410 aircraft from the
assets must have been the underlying reason for the briefer to conclude 
"that NATO in general has as many tactical air assets as does the Pact."\textsuperscript{195}

If analyzed by designated mission, the \textit{Briefing} argued that NATO had superiority in designated attack aircraft and the Pact had superiority in air defense. Considering another measure of relative strength, ordnance delivery, the declassified \textit{Briefing} did not give specific numbers but an independent study published in 1974 suggests that NATO had about a 50-90 percent higher payload/lift capacity than the Pact.\textsuperscript{196} In addition, the \textit{Briefing} used range and combat air patrol times as further indicators of relative capabilities. Again relying on open sources for lack of declassified figures, one can assume the analysis concluded that NATO had significant advantages in all these categories.\textsuperscript{197}

There were also a few notes of caution contained in the \textit{Briefing}. Rapid (re-) deployment capabilities and resulting base overloading, the necessity for timely decision and the degree of mobilization, the number of available shelters and defense of bases, as well as employment policies were mentioned as possible constraints on NATO's side which could change the balance. In sum, however, the \textit{Briefing} concluded "that the general tactical air balance in Europe is better than has been commonly thought."\textsuperscript{198}

\textbf{Dissimilar Assumptions about the Effect of Logistics Degradation.}

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Briefing}, p. H-3.
\textsuperscript{196} See White, p. 115 and 120.
\textsuperscript{197} No good numerical data could be obtained here. For a qualitative discussion, see White, passim, and Record, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Briefing}, p. H-5/6.
capabilities. The Pentagon studies demonstrated that NATO interdiction campaigns actually did have an effect on front movements, that is, after about a month of fighting when increased amounts of replenishment were needed at the front as the battle progressed. NATO analyses had traditionally degraded NATO's capabilities because of Pact interdiction of its logistics assets and supply lines while not using similar standards in assessing Pact capabilities.\textsuperscript{199}

The Military Committee Special Studies Group on the Conventional Balance

In the days following the speech by Mr. Schlesinger to the DPC, the Military Committee decided that the disagreements between American and NATO assessments were significant enough to analyze the conventional balance with greater detail also at the NATO level.\textsuperscript{200} For that purpose, the MC set up a Special Studies Group (MCSG). The group consisted of delegates of the FRG, Britain, and the US; toward the end of the study, the SHAPE Technical Center (STC) staff also joined in the effort.\textsuperscript{201} The purpose of this study was to analyze the reasons for the conflicting assessments and to try to reconcile them. Another aim was to compare national methods of assessing the balance and to produce estimates of the military balance and battle duration under various assumptions. For some participants, the study also apparently was to provide an opportunity to shoot down the American analysis by showing that it was based on false premises.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{199}See \textit{Briefing}, p. G-3 and interview.
\textsuperscript{201}This section relies mostly on interviews and Patrick D. Allen, \textit{The Pace of War in Gaming, Simulation, Doctrine, and War}, Santa Monica: RAND (P-7229), May 1986, p. 7 and passim.
\textsuperscript{202}Hauser, loc. cit. quotes NATO sources as saying that "Penatgon is using wrong assumptions."
The project consisted of several phases. During the first, a database with static measures was built on such indicators as manpower, equipment, etc. In the second phase these measures were aggregated into higher level indicators (WEI/UVs), and the third phase used computer simulations for dynamic analyses.²⁰³ This study encountered many analytical as well as political problems because of the sensitivity of the subject and the study was terminated four years after its launch without succeeding in a general reconciliation of views.

The major reasons for this failure were essentially the same ones that underlay the differences which became evident upon Schlesinger's briefing and the US follow-up. The countries, i.e. the FRG and Britain on the one hand, and the US on the other had substantially different assumptions regarding the order of battle, Pact readiness and mobilization times, warning time, NATO reinforcement capabilities, as well as a large array of other technical factors (the role of tactical air, logistics, models etc.).

The Scope of Differences. On the issue of the assumed order of battle, the FRG and Britain pressed that the study use the same counting principle as previous NATO studies, and include only earmarked and assigned forces, thus holding down forces available on NATO's side. The JCS which had the lead action on the MCSSG argued that its assumptions (including the French forces and increased national contributions, excluding forces in and for Hungary) should at least be gamed as excursions.²⁰⁴ The FRG and Britain considered France's commitment as too uncertain to allow its inclusion and argued strongly not to base the study on further uncertain national contributions.

²⁰³ Interviews.
²⁰⁴ The fact that the JCS had the lead action caused some officers in OSD/PA & E to closely follow the MCSSG to insure that the US military would not use grossly different assumptions than those used in the PA & E studies briefed to the ministers. According to participants, this led to very tedious debates between these offices and compromises on many details. This implied that the JCS/PA & E compromise assumptions decreased somewhat the sharp differences between NATO and OSD studies.
This line-up of only using earmarked and assigned forces thus produced the foregone conclusion of Pact superiority in various mobilization scenarios because this order of battle deprived NATO of the reinforcement capabilities that the US had assumed for its study. In the context of reviewing mobilization assumptions, the studies also revealed that the US -- despite internal haggling between OSD and the military -- was using significantly more constrained mobilization assumptions for the Pact than were the West Germans and the British. The main reason for this were differences in readiness assessments of individual divisions for second echelon forces and differences in the models used to estimate logistics capabilities. The US, trying to convince especially the British analysts of its assumptions argued along the line used in the ministerial Briefing; namely that the effectiveness of Pact Cat. II and III divisions should be downgraded because of constraints in the transportation network. Yet this also found the resistance of the Germans who made the reasonable argument that in that case some of the highly cadred NATO divisions needed to be treated in the same way.

No solution could be found to synchronize the models themselves because of major differences in the level of detail treated by the models. As a result the readiness assumptions were averaged to obtain identical inputs for calibration purposes. US assumptions were to be used for excursions. Similarly, a US request to analyze these effects of unreliability of Soviet satellite countries was turned down by the FRG because of the argument that this issue could not be quantified.

Despite identical readiness inputs, the German and British models still assumed faster mobilization times and this implied a higher emphasis on rapid attack and more negative force ratios for NATO forces. Another important contributing factor was the US use of degraded effectiveness criteria for Cat. II and III divisions. This degradation was aimed at taking into account the fact that it would take more than just mobilization and movement of the Pact divisions to raise their
readiness level. They also would need to be trained for some time and integrated into the rest of the force before they could be given the same effectiveness as forward deployed Cat. I divisions.

Whereas the US analysis concluded the 23/30 scenario to be the most demanding, the two European analyses were more focused on and concerned about the possibility and effects of an earlier attack with significantly less than half of that mobilization time. The major reason for this was that the German and British models allowed the Pact to reinforce faster than the American system and these models did not degrade the effectiveness of Cat. II and III divisions. Adding to NATO's inferiority in these analyses were assumptions about slower reinforcement of US forces deployed in the continental US. The OSD/PA & E studies had been found to have decreased the deployment time and the German and British participants stressed that (higher) NATO figures should be used instead.

The dynamic phase of the studies analyzed on the basis of computer models how long engagements were expected to last and where breakthroughs might occur. The foundation of these examinations was a set of calibrated assumptions about the forces available to either side under various mobilization time assumptions developed in long and tedious discussions. The results, however remained very disparate. There was a magnitudinal difference in some measures between the US assessment on the one hand and the British and West German assessments on the other. The main reason for this had to do with inputs and technical differences. To begin with, the models assumed different intensity factors for the battles, leading to different estimates for front movement, casualties, and cut-off points. The second problem

\[286\] On how dramatically intensity factors and assumptions about the pace of war can alter simulated advance rates and war outcomes, see the sensitivity analyses undertaken by Allen, loc. cit. On movement rates and the MCSSG experiences see the most interesting paper by Rex Goad, "The Modelling of Movement in tactical Games," in Reiner K. Huber, Klaus Niemeyer and Hans W. Hofmann, *Operational Research Games for Defense*, Munich/Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1979, pp. 190-214.
was the differences in the level of aggregation in the models. Whereas
the US model was played at the corps level, the German system went down
to the division and brigade level. Significant differences developed
also over the effects and allocation of ground and air assets. The US
wanted to use the majority of assets for close air support, while the
West Germans gave priority to offensive counter air missions. A fourth
problem was related to the game cut-off criteria. Here the countries
used different force ratios to determine a breakthrough or a cut-off,
resulting in significant differences on the expected duration of the
battle. Another factor was operational style. The US model allowed
NATO forces to move across a deeper battle area and establish rear lines
of defense. The German model in accordance with the principle of
forward defense, by contrast, fought the battle very close to the border
even at the cost of a much more intensive and costly battle.

**Study Conclusions.** Several attempts were made in 1975-76 to
develop an improved dataset for calibrating purposes and to produce
better criteria for comparative purposes. The analysts discussing their
findings came to the conclusion that differences over the time and
commitment of forces, battle intensity etc. were the result of different
treatments of uncertainty which could not be resolved analytically. The
study therefore had to conclude that a major goal, to determine the
likely length of a conventional engagement could not be estimated with
certainty. The FRG studies produced movement rates about four times as
fast as the US and two times faster than the UK (see Fig. A-1). Army
staff in Bonn took this conclusion as evidence to argue that the study
should be terminated because its major political purpose, to show the
questionable validity of US assumptions had been established.

A follow-up study analyzing the expected Warsaw Pact/NATO
conventional balance in the Center Region which was suggested in the
Fall of 1977 met the resistance of the lead office in the Armed Forces
Staff (Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte, or Fue S) in Bonn. That office
argued that years of study had been spent in the MCSSG on a question
that finally turned out to be unanswerable and that the head of the
policy division had decided already a year earlier that follow-on studies should be avoided. The reason for this was the cumbersome previous negotiating process over data and methods -- primarily with the Americans -- the costs involved, and the limitations of the results. Moreover, it was argued that it would be difficult to obtain sound data on future trends.

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206 There were a number of adamant opponents to these kinds of studies. See, for example Col. Franz Uhle-Wettler, "Computer-gestuetzte Studien und militaerische Erfahrungen," Soldat und Technik, No. 4, 1975, pp. 167-180. (Toward its end, Uhle-Wettler was the head of the lead office for the MCSSG study.)
Positive results which followed from these multi-year exercises were the development of a better sense of national methods of analysis and a test of the significance of altered assumptions on the military balance. Whereas agreements could still be reached in the initial phases of the study (static and WEI/WUV comparisons), this proved to be increasingly difficult in the dynamic analyses. The resolution of these differences became mainly a problem of the analysts whose findings did not make it back up to the ministerial level. By 1977, Schlesinger had already been fired for two years and Harold Brown, the secretary of defense in the Carter administration was immersed in an entirely new set of studies, PRM-10 among them. The political interest in the results had faded after the WEI/WUV comparisons had shown that the US analysis presented to the ministers in the summer of 1973 had been too optimistic; that these "results" were based on different assumptions was lost. At the top echelons of the political and military hierarchy, interest in the study had completely dissipated by the time the computer-aided dynamic examinations began in early 1975.

It is interesting to ask why the US participants allowed assumptions to be used in the MCSSG which were not used in other national analyses. The main reason is that even within the US government views about the conventional balance varied greatly by institution. The US military services traditionally disagreed with the systems analyses studies and they objected to the use of the more conservative assumptions. The military services and DIA had traditionally been opposed to these types of studies and frequently attempted to obstruct them by withholding information, or by providing inaccurate or incomplete data. Only after major fighting within and among the administration and the services was an agreement reached on the assumptions used in the OSD/Schlesinger analyses. In a number of cases the military services continued to have reservations about these

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287 Interviews. See Enthoven/Smith for 1960s examples on this issue.
assumptions and therefore used their own. The use of more conservative assumptions in the MCSSG was facilitated by the fact that the JCS had the US lead over MCSSG and PA & E was not always successful in getting its approach accepted internally. Thus various components of DoD could come to different conclusions on the state of the military balance and inject these conclusions independently to NATO.

Another factor explaining the lack of a single DoD view had to do with bureaucratic attention. The fact that the MCSSG was not a highly visible group relieved it to a degree from the scrutiny of the secretary's office, especially after Schlesinger had left in 1975. Moreover, there was a tendency in OSD to think that the secretary had his own channels and ways to make his point about the balance. The use of different threat assessment and assumptions by subordinate segments of DoD could be tolerated from the secretary's perspective as long as it did not directly interfere with policy, which in the case of the MCSSG it didn't. Schlesinger had made his point directly with the ministers and the lower visibility of the MCSSG work escaped his attention for lack of importance. From the secretary's perspective, the battle had already been won and the war was over; skirmishes of lesser importance might reoccur from time to time but could be neglected. The fact, however, that there was no single view of the balance in the government made it likely that the problem might have to be taken up again with the Europeans who could continue to point at more pessimistic US assessments.

**Political Repercussions of the Intelligence Disagreements**

The open political debate over the balance was limited to an immediate response to the Schlesinger briefing. The ministerial *Briefing* did not make it into the newspapers because of classification reasons, their smaller audience and a more specialized subject. Since the MCSSG work took years to accomplish, it did no longer stand in the direct context of the strategy debate of 1973. Because of the lower
level of the staff, it had very little if no effect beyond the working
groups themselves.

What was at stake in the arguments over the proper analysis of the
balance in the Central Region as provided by the US in the Summer of
1973 was more than a question about facts. The Schlesinger briefing,
reinforced through the publication of the Getler piece, made European
allies fearful that the underlying reason for the differences in the
assessments were political. One interpretation in West Germany saw the
purpose of the Briefing and the reinforcing Getler piece to serve as
rationale to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy.
Commentators in the FRG-media were also suspicious that the "phony
mathematics" (Milchmaedchen-Mathematik) resembled tactics of Robert
McNamara in the 1960s when optimistic balance assessments were used to
prepare the stage for American withdrawals from the continent.\textsuperscript{208} In
some corners it was understood that the public release of some of the
findings in the Getler article also was aimed at helping the
administration to argue vis-a-vis Congress that the US forces in Europe
were more than a tripwire triggering a nuclear response. The
demonstration of the fact that the US divisions actually contributed
substantially to the military equilibrium in Europe would help to make
the argument that they should not be reduced. Yet this was a more rare,
more sophisticated analysis.\textsuperscript{209} Fears that the US was preparing the
allies for a disengagement from Europe were not limited to the West
Germans. The Belgian defense minister van den Boynants also speculated
that the briefing was either evidence for a major intelligence failure
or an introduction to American withdrawals.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{208} This was the analysis of the staff reporter on defense issues,
Wolfram von Raven in his article "Pentagon Studie stiftet Verwirrung in
der NATO," Die Welt, 12 June 1973, p. 4. A more cautious analysis with
the same tenor was published by the well-reputed staff writer on defense
issues of the SZ, Christian Potyka. See his article "Die NATO kaempft

\textsuperscript{209} See Adelbert Weinstein, "Der Kampf um die amerikanischen
Divisionen in Europa," FAZ, 16 June 1973, p. 2. See also Peter Jenkins,
p. 4.

\textsuperscript{210} See Adelbert Weinstein, "Europa nur noch ein amerikanischer
An adequate interpretation of the US position on the balance as an
equation of how variations in assumptions could change assessments and
impact on strategy formulation was made more difficult for the West
Germans because of conflicting reports the government received from
Washington via diplomatic channels. Some reports lacked professional
depth and reported rumors when suggesting that Schlesinger had presented
his personal views by deliberately playing down the threat and that he
had not cleared his speech within the executive, especially the NSC and
Kissinger. Others understood the bureaucratic politics better but did
not present the entire picture when reporting that the views presented
were not new but representative only of certain segments in the
government. These reports claimed also that the speech was put together
hastily and that Schlesinger was not accustomed to the spotlight. Other
information was misleading in doubting that the Pentagon studies
reported on by Getler actually existed and that the article therefore
was a coincidence with no relation to intentions of White House or
Pentagon. Again other reports were accurate. They suggested that the
speech was a carefully devised "messenger" by both Kissinger and
Schlesinger in consonance with the Nixon administration's previously
stated policy in the *Foreign Policy Reports*. According to this
interpretation, the speech emphasized the importance of conventional
forces and burden-sharing consciously.

All reports contained *some* accurate information but the appropriate
interpretation of the speech fell somewhere in between. Schlesinger had
not been aware of the systems analysis study when preparing and
delivering his speech although his predecessor Elliot Richardson had
made brief mention of it to Schlesinger in a conversation.\(^{211}\)

Schlesinger retrospectively found the report by Getler a not completely

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\(^{211}\)See Schlesinger's remarks before Congress on June 18, 1973: US Congress (Senate), *Nomination of James R. Schlesinger to be Secretary of Defense*, Armed Services Committee, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973, p. 34.
accurate description of the balance as perceived by Schlesinger. In that sense it was a coincidence.\textsuperscript{212} However, the information was given to Getler by Tucker himself upon approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements. The study results, even though described in somewhat too optimistic a way, were in fact not surprising to the PA & E analysts who had produced similarly challenging results during much of the 1960s. The West German media and government, however, with few exceptions, prematurely and inadequately equated motivations for additional conventional efforts and less reliance on nuclear weapons to a US response to domestic pressure for withdrawals.

Summary

The Schlesinger Initiative and the various follow-ups are a striking example how differences in threat assessments resulted in the focus on different priorities. Whereas the US administration believed that NATO’s in-place forces were generally sufficient, the NATO, German and British analyses came to opposite conclusions. Similarly, the US found reinforcements and adequate war reserve supplies of high importance because its studies suggested that a war might well last weeks and months instead of the days assumed by the Europeans. Regarding certain improvements of the conventional posture, the analytical difference mattered quite a bit. As Allen argues,

\begin{quote}
[t]he results were so different that any small improvement in NATO conventional capability appeared to have no effect except when using the United States assumed pace of war. This implies that if NATO assumes a high attrition rate, there is a tendency for self incapacitation: a little is no good, so do nothing.\textsuperscript{213}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{212}Interview.

\textsuperscript{213}Allen, p. 7. The concentration on intensity factors is definitely too narrow an explanation as was shown above. But the gist of the argument still seems to hold true.
The analytical disagreement also raised important political questions especially for the West German government, making it difficult to take a straightforward position on the suggestions made by Schlesinger. The interpretation and fear that Schlesinger's speech might be the pretext for American withdrawals and imply additional European burdens as a result brought government policy into a dilemma. On the one hand, improvements in conventional forces and the maintenance of a stalwart conventional deterrent might be desirable and deserve West German governmental support. On the other, however, accepting the call for increased European efforts might support those elements in the US Congress that favoured withdrawals and thus be counter-productive for the overall efforts. From a German point of view this required the formulation of a careful balance. Minister Leber, who reportedly was in basic agreement with Schlesinger on strategy matters, pointed out in his reply to Secretary Schlesinger during the June 7 meeting, that it would not be easy for him to lay open the facts on the balance as suggested by the secretary without running the risk of having to fight off budget cuts at home. However, in the eyes of Americans involved in these matters, Leber did become convinced that Schlesinger was genuinely interested in strengthening conventional forces in Europe rather than trying to prepare the allies for US withdrawals. Yet below the ministerial level doubts persisted and continued to affect the public discussion.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

Threat assessments had no direct impact on the formulation of the LTDP in the sense that a balance assessment was done in NATO to determine needs and the scope of the LTDP. Yet the feasibility of a conventional deterrent was continuously stressed, though with much less fervor to avoid a prolonged debate. Threat assessment did therefore not become an important issue, except for a short time. That they did not
become a major point of contention in transatlantic relations had to do with a somewhat changed nature of the debate.

**The Focus on a Short-Warning Attack**

Komer's proposals to the Carter administration were developed in a new atmosphere of debate among defense experts on trends in the military balance and Komer's proposals were to some degree tailored before that background. This changed debate centered on the question of what was the most appropriate planning scenario.

The first distinctive element in Komer's analysis was the conviction that the Soviets were planning for a short decisive *Blitzkrieg*-type battle which would start after very little warning. Though not entirely different from the doctrinal analysis underlying the ministerial *Briefing* in 1973, the *emphasis* on the short-warning scenario was new.

The idea itself that the Pact might get a standing start attack or begin a campaign with very little or a well concealed mobilization was not new. The JCS for a long time had warned of that possibility but its motivation was based on the fear that the political leadership might not respond in time upon receiving strategic warning and it had used more conservative threat assessments than OSD. The issue that arose in the early 1970s was whether the Pact had so far advanced its readiness standards and mobilization capabilities that a standing start or scrambling mobilization of a few days would give it a decisively superior force ratio over NATO. In 1973 the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had produced a revised mobilization estimate for Pact forces based on the *Greer* model which argued that the Pact could mobilize the designated threat in about one third of the time previously estimated, i.e. about one week. The findings of this report also suggested that the Pact could mount an un reinforced attack of the 59 East European divisions in ca. 4 days and that a surprise attack could be staged within one day. Within PA & E, where this study was referred to as the *Magic Carpet Study*, the model as well as the inputs to it were
reanalyzed and by mid-1974 the estimates for the mobilization of the
designated threat were revised to 14 days. 214

Another element in the debate over mobilization times was a study
prepared in response to a new National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM
186). This study was directed by Philip Karber and begun in 1973. One
of the key elements of this study was its attempt to demonstrate that
the Pact had undertaken a massive modernization effort of its forces in
Eastern Europe and that -- if these trends continued -- NATO would be in
a very serious position over the mid-term. It also argued that the
"old" 23/30 scenario was no longer relevant for planning purposes
because its analytical base rested on data inputs of the mid-to late
1960s, when the modernization trends were not yet clearly visible.
Drawing on the revised PA & E estimates, it argued that now the more
challenging scenario was one that assumed about two weeks mobilization
on the Pact's side and, after a four day delay, 10 days mobilization for
NATO. Under these circumstances the reinforcement requirements for the
forces based in CONUS became much more stringent because of dramatically
decreased deployment window before the beginning of hostilities. Unless
the US was able to move its reinforcing divisions in ten days or less,
NATO would be far outnumbered.

A similar argument was presented in an influential report by
Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett. Based on a classified study by
retired Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth which in turn drew heavily on the
alarming findings of NSSM 186, this report argued that NATO faced a
"dramatically altered Soviet threat in Eastern Europe." 215 Because of a
major expansion of Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe, 216 rapid
ground force modernization, 217 and the shift toward offensive tactical

214 Interviews.
215 See Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat,
p. 2.
216 100,000 men in 5 divisions in Czechoslovakia in 1968, several
thousand to round out existing divisions.
217 Eg., the introduction of the T-72 main battle tank, the BMP-60
APC, the shift from towed to self-propelled artillery, the proliferation
of tactical air defense systems and the addition of "impressive anti-
tank capabilities.
air operations, the Pact now was in a much better relative position according to the authors. These trends resulted in Pact capabilities sufficient "to launch a potentially devastating conventional attack in Central Europe with very little warning. Such an attack might be unattended by the telltale prior call-up and transfer to the Central Region of Soviet divisions stationed in the western military districts of the U.S.S.R."\textsuperscript{218} NATO's force posture, by contrast, remains predicated upon the presumption that, for the Pact forces to have any reasonable chance of overwhelming NATO, they would require, prior to hostilities, substantial augmentation by Soviet reinforcements drawn from the U.S.S.R.'s western military districts. Based on this assumption, these transfers, and the likely accompanying mobilization of less ready divisions throughout Russia, would take weeks.\textsuperscript{219}

In other words, NATO was still counting on long Pact mobilization times and relied on American reinforcements when, in fact, the Pact was getting into a potential position to launch an attack out of the garrisons. The study therefore argued that "the significance of a Pact capability to launch such an attack from virtually a standing start cannot be exaggerated." At best, NATO could expect a few days warning.\textsuperscript{220} To remedy the situation, the report suggested that crisis decision-making procedures be tightened and streamlined, that forward deployments might perhaps have to be increased and mal-deployments changed, that reinforcements had to be brought in much faster, that NATO forces needed more firepower and higher readiness, increased anti-tank capabilities, air defenses and improved command, control and communications.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., pp. 4-6.  
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{220} My emphasis. See ibid., p. 6/7.  
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., passim.
Komer shared the basic philosophy behind the Nunn/Bartlett report and was cognizant of the PA & E work. His letters to the Carter/Mondale policy planning staff argued that

our current NATO-committed forces are poorly tailored to help halt the armor-heavy blitzkrieg for which the WP forces are obviously configured. Thus they don't help deter as well as they should. Most (especially ground force) are inadequately ready. We are poorly postured for essential quick reinforcement; most of our ground forces probably couldn't even get to Europe before a WP breakthrough made this academic.\footnote{222}

Komer concluded in his memoranda to the Carter/Mondale staff that the Pact posture warranted an initial focus on averting a fast Pact success, even if this had to be achieved at the expense of posturing for a longer war. He therefore suggested that as much as possible should be done to optimize our NATO committed forces for an anti-blitzkrieg response. [...] We need strong -- and readier -- US forces in Europe and CONUS, though not larger ones. Investing in greater readiness for a short high-intensity counter-blitzkrieg effort (thus countering the preferred Soviet option), even if at the expense of hedging against a longer war in Europe, will be congenial to our allies. Since they simply won't posture (as yet) for such a protracted conflict, we're wasting our resources if we do so alone. This is not a theological issue of short vs. longer war, but simply a matter of first things first.\footnote{223}

**West German Views on Warning.** Such a concentration on a short warning scenario was close to the West German perception of the greatest challenge to NATO. West German doctrinal analysis long fashioned the idea that the Pact would seek a blitzkrieg-type attack. West German and

\footnote{222}{See Appendix to *September 20, 1976 letter of Robert Komer to W.A.K. Lake*, p. 6.}
\footnote{223}{Ibid., p. 7.}
other European officers and military analysts therefore put a high emphasis on very short warning scenarios.\textsuperscript{224} The White Papers, to cite another -- "official" -- example, also frequently mentioned the possibility of extremely short warning attacks. The 1975/76 version, for example, listed among the Pact's "strategic options" the possibility of using its conventional superiority in a standing attack:

\begin{quote}
The superiority of its conventional forces enables the Warsaw Pact to launch a major aggression on Western Europe after a brief preparation period, even without nuclear weapons. A surprise attack could be launched by the Warsaw Pact with practically no preparation and without any build-up -- from manoeuvre situations for instance.\textsuperscript{225}
\end{quote}

Sometimes underlying these assessments was also the conviction that NATO


\textsuperscript{225} See \textit{White Paper 1975-76}, p. 17. The \textit{Weissbuch 1969}, p. 13 argued that Pact might be able to mobilize secretly and that, depending on the size of the mobilization, NATO would have only "a few days or perhaps hours of warning, if any at all." There was no mention at all that the Pact would have to make a trade-off between the weight of the attack and surprise, a point which the ministerial \textit{Briefing} stressed strongly in 1973. Nor was there any discussion of relative force ratios under various mobilization scenarios, thus implying that the Pact had good chances to succeed in a surprise attack. The fear of a surprise attack may stem from the successful use of it by Adolf Hitler and expectations that the Pact might wish, and be able, to replicate the
would not react in a timely fashion to strategic warning indicators and therefore miss important mobilization and preparation time, giving still better chances to the attacker. In any case, a focus on the possibility of a short-warning attack was much closer to West German perception of the most challenging scenarios than the previous emphasis on the 23/30 scenario. In the late seventies, the 23/30 scenario had not been forgotten altogether, however, and it continued to have its place among the set of planning scenarios used to test the US force structure. Yet it was no longer the main sizing scenario.

Competing Planning Priorities and the Feasibility Question

A short warning attack was not necessarily the most likely or most dangerous form of possible attack. Komer argued that it should have a high planning priority. His motto was: "First Things First." If the alliance could not halt against such an attack, there was no reason to program large forces for reinforcements which would arrive after the battle was already over. Hedging against a surprise attack was not an insurmountable task:

Our force levels [to respond to a surprise attack] are generally adequate, but there is a pressing need for better training and equipment -- and increased readiness in general.

tactic in reverse. The surprise attack scenario was alluded to a considerable time before the American debate on the issue arose again in the mid-70s. The White Paper 1971-72 argued that all the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and most on Soviet territory "are capable of attaining full operational readiness within 24 hours." (See p. 16.) As an exception, however, the 1979 version of the White Paper argues, however, that movements of Pact force could be detected early on and used as indicators for warning. See Weissbuch 1979, p. 115/116.

NATO command and control mechanisms need both modernization and hardening. Our forward intelligence watch and covering forces are professionally effective but offer no margin for complacency. But our NATO forces are acutely aware of the problem of short-warning attack, and many of the remedial measures underway in NATO are designed to meet it.\textsuperscript{227}

The Carter administration was careful not to overemphasize the short-warning attack scenario. This planning scenario was too limited in scope to justify drawing all attention and resources away from planning against other sorts of attack.

Short-warning unreinforced attack is only one of the threats against which NATO must prepare. NATO must be prepared for a range of possible threats and cannot select any one threat as an exclusive basis for planning. It would make little sense to plan only against the contingency of a fully mobilized, fully deployed Warsaw Pact attack if this would not afford NATO the capability to respond appropriately to a short warning attack aimed at securing a quick decision. Conversely, it would make little sense to concentrate all NATO defense effort on meeting an initial short-warning thrust if there were no provision for coping with subsequent operations. So what NATO needs, in addition to improved intelligence capabilities in support of warning, is a balance of capabilities permitting it to face up to a range of threats. In other words, NATO needs both readiness and reinforcement, along with rationalization of forward defense planning.\textsuperscript{228}

Although Komer had strong views about what was needed and what the conventional balance was, he had not commissioned, or done himself, a detailed threat assessment, as was mentioned earlier. He relied mostly on findings he had access to when working at RAND, and his strong personal instincts. His views about the conventional balance were not dramatically different from those of Schlesinger; in continuity to the Schlesinger policy, the feasibility of a conventional deterrent was

\textsuperscript{227}\textit{See Komer's testimony in US Congress (House), Western Europe in 1977: Security, Economic, and Political Issues, p. 209}

\textsuperscript{228}\textit{Ibid., p. 210.}
stressed repeatedly but in the form of a low-profile approach which emphasized avoiding conflict with the Europeans. Komer was able to draw on the same people in PA & E who had aided Schlesinger to help him out analytically. Despite their recognizing significant Pact advances in manpower and certain equipment categories, these people did not see reasons to ring alarm bells. In the view of these analysts, including Komer and Harold Brown, consistent improvement of NATO's capabilities was needed. The trends were worrisome according to these officials but it was not beyond NATO's reach to pull even. As maintained by Schlesinger four years earlier, the new administration clearly was convinced that a successful conventional defense was feasible:

[...] an adequate conventional capability is within our reach[;] if we work hard at it, [...] we can adequately meet the threat of short warning attack -- at a cost the Allies can readily afford if all members of the Alliance pull together more effectively than before.

In certain respects, such as tactical aircraft, anti-tank weapons, and more modern munitions, NATO still retains significant advantages over the best of the Soviet forces. However, these comparative advantages are waning, and the conventional balance in Europe -- while not badly tilted against NATO -- is more precarious than it should be. While the Pact cannot be confident of breaking through NATO's forward defenses, NATO cannot be confident of preventing a major breakthrough. Moreover, the trend is worrisome -- unless NATO pulls up its socks.229

That a conventional deterrent was feasible was also repeatedly stressed by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. When explaining and justifying the administration's NATO policies to Senator Nunn's Senate Armed Services Subcommitte on Manpower and Personnel in August 1977, Brown laid out his views that adequate conventional forces were feasible. Arguing that during the first 25 years,

229Ibid., p. 209.
NATO depended mainly on US nuclear superiority. Any move against alliance forces would have risked nuclear disaster for the attacker. Today, we need a more flexible range of responses. Our nuclear forces remain a key element in the deterrent, but in an era of nuclear equivalence we must also have a credible level of conventional defense. We must not let ourselves get in a position where conventional thrusts might penetrate rapidly into NATO territory in a way that would compromise both conventional and nuclear defense.

I am convinced that an adequate conventional leg of the NATO tripod -- I use the word "tripod" to distinguish it from the triad of strategic, theater nuclear and conventional forces -- is within our reach, if we work hard at it. The defense has a considerable advantage if it is ready and properly equipped. We need not match the prospective enemy tank for tank. If properly managed, new techniques for target acquisition, delivery systems, and precision guidance should make our task of defense even easier.

We can adequately meet the threat of short-warning attack [...] We can retain a qualitative edge. And we can do all this at a cost the Allies can readily afford in economic terms, if all the members of the alliance pull together more effectively than before.\footnote{See Brown's testimony in US Congress (Senate), \textit{NATO Posture and Initiatives}, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 1977, pp. 3-4.}
capabilities. The third contingency was an attack by all deployed forces in Eastern Europe plus reinforcements from Western military districts of the Soviet Union. This contingency represented a test for the entire NATO and US force structure which necessarily would be involved at this level.\textsuperscript{231}

The crucial factor in these contingencies was warning. Brown pointed out, similarly to Schlesinger and others before him, that the Warsaw Pact faced a trade-off between surprise and weight of attack. Brown estimated that the Soviets could attack with very little preparation and additional forces could then possibly be brought in after a little more time. If NATO interpreted the warning indicators in a timely fashion, however, "NATO could have the forces in the Central Region to halt these attacks." The report cautioned, however, that "there are enough vulnerabilities in the posture of the Alliance so that we could not count on that result with confidence."\textsuperscript{232}

Regarding mobilized attacks, the gist of the report was similar. NATO had the basic assets to halt such attacks, yet it needed certain improvements.

It is conceivable that the Warsaw Pact, with more time, could make ready all of its forces in Eastern Europe and bring in additional divisions from the western military districts of the Soviet Union and more aircraft from reserve and training establishments. However, many of the Pact divisions would probably be at less than full combat readiness. Although NATO might receive considerable warning of preparations for this attack, the Soviets would probably seek to achieve tactical surprise.

NATO has the inventory of ground and tactical air forces necessary to stop even this attack, at least by most of the measures available. However, the Alliance would encounter serious problems in bringing its basic power to bear in this short time [...].\textsuperscript{233}


\textsuperscript{232}Ibid., p. 88.
This was due to a number of deficiencies, namely shortages of direct and indirect firepower (anti-tank weapons and heavy artillery); shortages in combat consumables; shortages in allied ready reserves during the early days of mobilization; weaknesses in the US reinforcement arrangements.\(^{233}\)\(^{234}\)

Since Komer and others had made the conscious decision not to get into a debate over the desirability or feasibility of a conventional deterrent, the US government pursued a low-profile approach vis-à-vis the allies not only regarding strategy, but also regarding the threat and how to address it. Consequently, no major attempt was made to demonstrate the feasibility of a conventional deterrent to the allies directly by means of a balance assessment. Komer and others knew that this had not worked well in the past. His plan, therefore, was to assume that agreement existed on the desirability of conventional improvements and to avoid a theological debate as to whether these improvements were to lead to a conventional deterrent or not. The point was to have a program ready for immediate action rather than to ask first what should be done, debate and wait for allied agreement. Nevertheless, inputs to presidential and secretarial speeches would always point to the broader strategic rationale and the feasibility of considerably improving NATO's conventional posture and Komer would stress the same points personally.

The Carter administration's analysis was very similar to Schlesinger's. It concluded that the alliance had the basic resources for an effective conventional defense against a range of possible contingencies, given that certain improvements were made. Yet the tactics applied to achieve the desired allied agreement on improvements were rather different. Instead of trying to convince the allies on analytical grounds, they were drawn in on a seemingly self-explanatory program.

\(^{233}\)See ibid., p. 88/89.
\(^{234}\)Ibid.
Brown's *Annual Reports* did not receive much attention in Europe. Threat assessments became an important irritant beyond the usual squabbling at the staff levels over scenarios, mobilization and warning times etc. only when a leak to a newspaper revealed the "findings" of a classified US government study.

**Confusion of the "Threat" and PRM-10.** Another example of such an irritant was the previously mentioned PRM-10.\(^{235}\) Apart from the alleged strategy implications of PRM-10 the reports by Evans and Novak suggested that the US government considered the military threat to Europe as much more severe than acknowledged in open publications and public speeches by administration officials. According to a follow-up article to the first report,\(^{236}\) PRM-10 supposedly suggested that the US needed 17 more divisions, i.e. a total of 33 active divisions, to support the strategy and that "even a 27 division force structure" would not be able to recapture the one-third of West Germany lost initially.\(^{237}\) That much more was needed was also suggested by misleading reports suggesting that the Pentagon had responded to Rep. Les Aspin's request to cost out all of the measures contained in the Hollingsworth/Nunn/Bartlett reports. DoD had responded that the price tag for a truly forward defense which would not give up NATO territory even in an initial defense would require an additional $ 30 billion over five years.\(^{238}\)

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\(^{235}\)See Chapter I.  
\(^{236}\)Evans and Novak, "Carter Faces Defense Shift on Western Europe" loc. cit.  
\(^{237}\)Evans and Novak, "The US Commitment to Defend Europe (Amended), *WP*, 8 August 1977, p. A23. How 27 divisions could be expected to recapture the lost territory of the FRG if, in fact, the strategy required 33 divisions was left open. This is another example of the contradictory and sometimes confused articles by Evans and Novak.  
\(^{238}\)See *USWB*, 22 August 1977; see also Lothar Ruehl, "Kampf um jeden Grashalm?" *Die Zeit*, 26 August 1977 for a further example of mirror-image interpretation. Ruehl argued that this debate about the additional cost of NATO defense was a sign of America's insecurity since it had become vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. This insecurity, so Ruehl, prompted the US to look for help from its allies instead of "assuming the risk itself."
Unlike June of 1973 and after the publication of Getler's piece, fears arose in Europe this time because the US was seen to abandon NATO principles due to a lack of adequate conventional forces. These suspicions make it hard for any administration to convince the European allies of the sincerity of its approach. The Evans and Novak distortions caused damage not only in that regard. It also spread insecurity about previous reports on the findings of the PRM-10 by spreading the rumor that the US government had concluded that the conventional defense of Europe as agreed by NATO was either hopeless or that it would require an exorbitantly larger force structure. The article thus undermined the administration's attempt to subtly convince the allies that the contrary was true.

That the PRM-10 leak was seen by the Europeans as a blow to the foundation of NATO policy is therefore only natural. Swift denials by US government spokesmen helped contain the damage, but contradictions in these denials and new reports prolonged the confusion for several weeks. At the top political level, personal contacts between Harold Brown and a phone call between Brzezinski and Genscher, clarified the matter quickly. However, in the long-term, the leak left additional distrust behind and, given prior "experiences" with US studies, suspicions of US studies grew. Leber, for example, down-played the importance of the entire study by arguing that it was based on extrapolations from hypothetical cases. He further degraded its worth by adding that it was not a "general staff study" but directed by a "31 year-old lady."239

Given prior disagreements and confusions over the intentions and bases of US threat analyses, PRM-10 did not contribute to clarify the planning base for NATO forces but reinforced previously existing stereotypes and anxieties about US political disengagement.

Summary

The main new element underlying the formulation of the LTDP was a focus on revised assumptions and the possibility of a Blitzkrieg-type attack. This emphasis squared with West German views of likely scenarios and therefore did not cause a major debate. However, the bulk of Komer's proposals focussed on areas previously identified in the AD70 report and by Schlesinger. The underlying analyses for these proposals had not changed significantly. The atmosphere of the public debate over the East-West military balance had changed, however, and Brown and Komer were able to capitalize on that. The Carter administration was relatively successful in avoiding a theological discussion on the feasibility and desirability of a conventional deterrent by not pushing the issue as Schlesinger did and by focussing on pragmatic improvements and assuming consensus on these. Yet this did not mean that the proposals were simply accepted by the West Germans and the other allies. After having agreed in principle to the need for the LTDP, the question became how important a commitment should be made to bring it into life.240 This was partially a result of the fact that confusion existed in the FRG as to what US motivations behind the plan were and whether the LTDP would in fact buy a strategic (conventional) option. In that sense the feasibility question persisted.

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this chapter the question of how feasibility affected the formulation and execution of the three initiatives was posed. What can be learned from the analysis of the three cases?

Threat Analyses and the Feasibility of a Conventional Deterrent.
The role of threat analyses differed in each initiative. For AD70, it was argued, they did not play a major role beyond the estimate that the

240 In Chapter IX the argument will be made that the FRG's resource strategy was not synchronized with the rhetorically adopted strategy priorities.
Warsaw Pact was expected to continue its build-up. The US did not push the point that a conventional deterrent was possible because McNamara's high profile approach was not considered helpful. In addition, the argument that a rough conventional balance existed carried the political risk of increasing calls for US troop withdrawals. The working groups therefore quickly came to the traditional NATO conclusion that the conventional balance was to NATO's disadvantage. From this it then followed that nuclear weapons would continue to have a prominent role against conventional attack and that conventional forces could not be reduced.

Schlesinger, by contrast, tried to demonstrate that a conventional deterrent was feasible, and for the most part already in place. This, however, was misunderstood as the pretext for American withdrawals and the analysis remained politically as well as analytically controversial.

In case of the LTDP, the US had made a conscious decision not to raise the feasibility issue in order to avoid a protracted debate. This worked to a large degree. Yet the absence of steady high profile repetitions (major presidential or secretarial speeches) of NATO's strategic choices -- nuclear vs. conventional emphasis -- and the associated risks involved with each, took away some of the bite of the proposals. When resource commitments were beginning to lag behind, there was thus not much more to say than that an ally had not fulfilled an adopted goal.

The Conventional Threat Paradox and NATO Strategy. The Schlesinger Initiative and the PRM-10 episode reveals another major problem. No matter what the result of (alleged) US threat analyses is, there is always a tendency on the part of the West Germans to interpret these analyses as a threat to existing NATO policies. If, as in McNamara or Schlesinger's case, a US analysis maintains that NATO is in a position in principle to halt a range of conceivable Warsaw Pact attacks, it is very likely that this will be interpreted as creating the pretext for conventional force withdrawals and a request for the Europeans to shoulder a larger part of the burden; or it might be seen
as the pretext for American disengagement from the nuclear defense of Europe. If, on the other hand, an analysis (eg. as reported by Evans and Novak) concluded that NATO's conventional posture is in such poor shape that in all likelihood the bulk of the FRG would be lost in war, it is interpreted as an American attempt to change the operational principles of NATO defense, to push for particular nuclear hardware (eg. the neutron bomb) or to again shift additional conventional burdens on the European allies. In either case Europe would be less secure because of too high or too low a reliance on nuclear weapons.

Yet from a logical perspective the two interpretations are mutually exclusive. The argument in the first case rests on the belief that strong reliance on nuclear weapons and first use is crucial for deterrence and early war termination. From this perspective a high nuclear threshold is not desirable. If a conventional balance in fact existed and nuclear weapons would not be involved, according to this view, war would again be more calculable and therefore more likely. The argument in the second case, by contrast, fears that nuclear weapons might have to be used too early for lack of adequate conventional forces. If conventional forces were to be improved to the point of creating a balance, the problem would again be too high a threshold. The two positions represent thus a circulus vitiosus.

The difficulty in reconciling these seemingly paradoxical views comes from the abstract nature of the argument. What nuclear threshold is too high or too low cannot be decided in the abstract. In order to decide what is too high or too low, clear criteria are needed as to how many days or weeks NATO forces are expected to hold conventionally, how much space may be lost in the course of battle, and what kinds of scenarios are considered conceivable. Only within these parameters could one then consciously decide on the trade-offs and mixes between nuclear and conventional in strategic, operational and cost terms. Yet because neither NATO nor the FRG has ever developed a document that gives clear guidelines regarding the sizing criterion for conventional forces, no answer can be found within the parameters of a vague
strategy. Not only are the scenarios against which NATO forces should be planned unclear, but views differ markedly on how well the existing forces would actually do under various circumstances. As a result, no solid criteria for the role of nuclear weapons can be developed. To some, NATO seems able to hold for several weeks even against a fully mobilized designated threat; others expect NATO to hold for a few days at best. Not even the US administration could agree on a single assessment of the Warsaw Pact threat.

To the present day, these issues have not been resolved and are unlikely ever to be resolved. The principal reason for this is that NATO's policies are carefully crafted compromises.

The Politics of Threat Assessments. Political solutions to NATO's analysis problem are encouraged by a number of analytical difficulties that are otherwise difficult or impossible to resolve. First, from an analytical perspective it is not unproblematic to produce meaningful statements about military capabilities in the absence of actual war-time evidence. Second, evidence about adversarial forces remains limited and incomplete and is often controversial, even among intelligence staffs. Third, these staffs and their respective governments are frequently reluctant to share information among themselves. A focus on "bean counting," therefore, often reflects the lowest common analytical denominator. Fourth, intelligence is a very important source to justify military requirements and therefore tends to be protected by those stating these requirements. Fifth, threat assessments have a political utility not only for bargaining within governments but also between governments and parliaments as well as the general public when used to justify resource claims. In NATO, threat assessments also have the purpose of justifying resource commitments. If the conclusions about the East-West military balance suggest that NATO is by far outnumbered conventionally, this may have serious implications for the desirability of fielding more nuclear weapons and the choice of a strategy that stresses their first use. If, on the other hand, the balance suggests that a conventional deterrent is
feasible within reasonable resource constraints, it may become more desirable to pursue such a conventional deterrent. For these reasons, then NATO threat assessments are carefully crafted compromise documents reflecting all of the above aspects.

**Analytical Problems.** Threat assessments at the NATO level suffer not only from political and intelligence barriers. The MCSSG is a good example on how important analytical differences are. The variations in results of the tri-partite study varied only to a certain degree because of different inputs, force allocation etc. Results also varied significantly because of differences in the models. These models were built in the three countries on the basis of significantly different approaches to tactics and operations. Each employed different levels of aggregation (corps vs. brigade level) and reflected different conceptions of war as the problem of intensity assumptions showed. The models also reproduced internal political balances between military services, for example. Only this can explain why there could be a debate between the American participants and the German analysts over the "proper" allocation and mix of close air support and interdiction aircraft.

The close interrelationship between assumptions (explicit and implicit), methods to evaluate and assess them, and results explains why it was very difficult to reconcile views between the national analyses. In a way, these models were the most complicated and rational way to replicate national conceptions of reality. To translate between these models would be necessarily difficult, if not impossible. Yet one of the advantages of a multilateral exercise was to sharpen the sensitivity of the analysts to implicit assumptions and idiosyncrasies of their models which beforehand were considered self-explanatory and normal.
III. DIFFERENCES IN PLANNING BASES
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE PLANNING

The differences over strategy and threat assessments made it very
difficult to agree on concrete planning assumptions regarding warning
time, the size of the expected attacks, length of time during which NATO
was supposed to fight conventionally, and, by implication, the exact
role of nuclear force in conventional scenarios. The differences over
strategy and threat had resulted in compromise formulas, along the lines
of using nuclear weapons as early as necessary and as late as possible.
Yet what the standards of "necessary" and "possible" were, and whether
"early" meant within hours, days, or weeks, remained vague.

Differences over Planning Objectives

As a result of these differences, planning assumptions varied and
reflected the respective national strategy interpretations and threat
analyses. Whereas the US believed in the early part of the 1970s that
an attack after one month of Warsaw Pact mobilization and a one week
delay in a NATO mobilization decision was most demanding on NATO forces,
for example, the West Germans put higher emphasis on fast attack
scenarios and considered surprise attack a most dangerous
possibility.\textsuperscript{241} This West German emphasis gave high importance to front
line strength and quick mobilization capabilities.\textsuperscript{242} West German
military planners also did not consider it useful (and feasible), for
example, to plan ammunition stockpiles on the assumption, as the US did,
that the stockpile should suffice for at least 90 days of fighting and
that it would best be so large as to last until war-time production

\textsuperscript{241}See Chapter II.
\textsuperscript{242}This difference in emphases to a considerable degree stemmed
also from the German emphasis of forward defense and the lack of
maneuver depth.
would insure adequate resupply (D-to-P-day stockpiling). German stockpiles for most critical items remained even below 30 days, not least because there was a conviction that any major war in Europe would have to turn nuclear in less than 30 days, making additional stockpiling inefficient. For the same reason, the build-up of reserves mobilizable after a month or longer was not given high priority. These assumptions about the expected length of conventional engagements stood in sharp contrast to US planning criteria which, as put forward by James Schlesinger, argued for the concept of a stalwart conventional defense which would have required manpower, stockpiles, and equipment sufficient to outlast the Pact in battle.

Differences in NATO over the size of the threat and the purpose of nuclear weapons therefore caused major problems for the definition of planning objectives for conventional forces. In the absence of clear criteria defining the most demanding attack scenarios, which ones were most likely, and how NATO was planning to react, no clear guidance could be given to the military authorities for force planning. As a result, differing assessments of NATO's needs persisted between nations as well as bureaucracies. These differences also affected national evaluations regarding the feasibility of a robust conventional posture. The American planning criteria which suggested that NATO conventional forces should be planned on the assumption of withstanding a conventional Pact attack, required many more forces in the view of German planners, who used more conservative assumptions about the threat than calculated by analysts in OSD. Since the forces for a robust conventional posture believed necessary by the West Germans would require substantially

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243 The calculation of stockpile sizes was further complicated by differences in national assumptions about the expected intensity of combat activity.

244 Because of the lack of strategic depth and the expectation that Warsaw Pact troops would advance well into the FRG if breakthroughs occurred and were not countered with nuclears, planners believed that there would be no space to train and assemble reserve forces. (Interview.)
higher defense expenditures, such a force structure was not believed possible and nuclear forces therefore continued to have an important function in compensating for perceived conventional weaknesses.

The differences over the assumptions that should go into NATO force planning made assessments of NATO overall requirements a highly political issue. National positions on strategy and the Warsaw Pact military threat were reflections of elaborate national discussions reflecting the best judgment that the defense establishments of the US, West Germany as well as other countries could come up with. These positions were the result of balancing external military and political pressures and internal constraints such as money and political acceptability of the implications of a particular strategy interpretation. NATO studies or planning activities that threatened to undermine those positions were considered undesirable because they might undermine the credibility of the position.

Except for special planning initiatives as examined here, these differences over basic assumptions for the most part remained in the background. Nevertheless, they had noticeable effects on the planning process. Because of the differences, this process was geared toward strong national influence and compromising. This guaranteed that NATO plans would be in consonance with national plans. The prime mechanism of national influence was the review of the military commanders' force proposals and measures considered in special planning initiatives by the capitals in the bi-annual force planning cycle. If these proposals exceeded national plans, they would be reduced in the review process to match them roughly with existing national plans.245

Problems of Determining Planning Effectiveness

Uncertainties and compromises over the basic planning objectives for NATO were not the only problem. NATO planning was further complicated by insufficient information on allied planning options and

245 For details, see Part B and C.
planning performance. The main problems were the lack of adequate information, and program-analytic capabilities.

Insufficiencies of the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). The DPQ listed units, assignment status, location, personnel and equipment strengths etc., but it did not break down national assets by functional categories, such as close air support, reconnaissance capabilities, etc. Moreover, the DPQ did not contain information crucial to determining wartime capabilities. Although readiness was reported in the DPQ, a number of indicators determining combat capabilities were lacking. The firepower and effectiveness of various weapons systems, measures of mobility, and survivability could not be determined from the reports. This was further complicated by the fact that the national DPQ replies were made on a service basis rather than a mission-oriented, functional basis. Also various nations interpreted data categories such as "Headquarters," "Fighting Units," and "Support Units" differently. No uniform definitions and no standardized lists of kinds of units existed and it was up to the nations to classify units. The nations, however, had a natural interest to report their troops in highest status.²⁴⁶

In the absence of such information, it was almost impossible to evaluate quickly beyond intuitive guesses what impact changes in NATO or national policies had on capabilities. The NATO Force Planning Data Base (NFPDB) which was assembled on the basis of DPQs and additional reports by nations, could not aggregate data on a functional basis because of the format problems and definitional problems. It could therefore not be used as the input source for models which simulated the performance of NATO forces under war time conditions. In the absence of such data it was very difficult to analyse the effect of improvement programs or slippages in implementation. The lack of such data also made it difficult to establish a baseline from which the success and

²⁴⁶These problems are listed in Hans-Chr. Hartig, "NATO Force Planning Data Base -- Ein Weg zur besseren Nutzung von Streitkraeftedaten in der Allianz," *Soldat und Technik*, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 3-7.
failure of special planning initiatives or NATO's planning cycle could be measured.\textsuperscript{247}

**Problems with Special Reporting Procedures.** All of the improvement initiatives examined here made efforts to improve the information available to planners and special reporting procedures were initiated to achieve that goal.\textsuperscript{248}

Special reporting and implementation procedures were of particular importance in the LTDP. The special emphasis on reporting reflected the experiences with data problems in the DPQ and the AD70 and Basic Issues initiatives. Therefore, elaborate LTDP reporting formats which allowed a quick assessment of the status of all measures in all countries were developed by the Pentagon for use by the US government. This demonstrated that the US considered both the NFPDB and the DPQ as insufficient.

For the quantifiable part of the 123 measures, the DPQ Annex contained a form with matrices for the period 1979-95 forcing the countries to report on future plans in certain areas. This was to make sure that the element of *joint* long-term planning got introduced into national plans. However, not all of the 123 measures were specific enough so that reporting formats could be standardized.\textsuperscript{249} Another difficulty was the data provided by countries concerning mid-term requirements was only reliable and definitive for one year. The five-year forecasts, however, were subject to change based on revisions in national plans.

\textsuperscript{247}This problem was recognized in the mid-1970s and work began to improve the NATO Force Planning Data Base. The system was scheduled to begin full system test by the end of 1979. See Hartig, op. cit., p. 3.

\textsuperscript{248}See also Part B.

Another major innovation in the reporting format was the emphasis on functional as opposed to national and service perspectives. This approach aimed to identify defense requirements based on need and then established how the need could be fulfilled. This was supposed to rationalize the planning process and reduce redundancy of national contributions as the focus shifted from national requirements and programs to the needs of NATO as a collective. Once the DPQ Annex was filed and the Program Monitors' Reports written, the latter were condensed into a progress report ("Key Issues Report") for consideration by the ministers during the December DPC meetings. These reports were written by the International Staff and provided the basis for an attempt to reconcile and propose remedial measures until the Spring DPC meetings where shortfalls became evident.

Despite a major effort to condense findings of the monitors into reports digestable to the ministers, papers were still too voluminous to attract ministerial attention on details of planning. The bulk of the work remained at the staff level whose task was to iron out controversies prior to the ministerial meetings. In addition the summary reports were not able to relate lagging implementation and costs. Since no quickly available planning data base existed at the NATO level, it was not possible to demonstrate what direct effects delays in fulfilling agreed-upon force goals had on combat capability. Without clear yardsticks of the marginal utility of such expenditures, arguments as to why a country should do more had to rest more or less on intuitive insights and value judgements, providing ample space for political debate.

The complexities of NATO's planning process made it also very difficult to track in a meaningful way what the trends in NATO capabilities were over time. Because standards of measurement were vague, baselines lacking, and information was hard to come by it was difficult for NATO staffs to assess the effectiveness of special initiatives with the effectiveness of the regular planning cycle. Data
on outyear plans was very sketchy making it therefore next to impossible to assess whether special planning initiatives made any differences.

**The Politics of Providing Adequate Planning Data**

The lack of adequate planning information was not unavoidable. Yet it had the political advantage of papering over differences by blurring the clarity of the planning process. The case of the LTDP demonstrates best that there existed considerable disagreement within NATO over the scope of desirable implementation control, and thus by implication the amount and quality of information available on LTDP effectiveness. The fact that European governments resisted the level of detail proposed by Washington documents that there was serious concern that rigid implementation controls might be potentially embarrassing.\(^2\)\(^5\)\(^6\) European opposition centered on the level of detail required in the various reports, the kinds of information, and the time within which reports and inputs were to be produced.

**Disputes over Reporting: The Case of the LTDP.** The US government had proposed to use form sheets developed by it which contained information on the nature of the measure to be taken (for example quantities to be purchased over time), to what degree the measure was already programmed in national plans, what portion remained unprogrammed, and an explanation for delays (see Table A-3). In addition, the US proposed to report LTDP cost data with the same level of detail, using 1977 constant US Dollar prices as a base.\(^2\)\(^5\)\(^1\) This was opposed by the West German and other European governments and therefore the US-proposed reporting format was only made optional for the 1979 DPQ Annex on LTDP. The FRG, for one, did not provide much optional

\(^{250}\)See Chapters IV and V for details on European resistance.

\(^{251}\)The US proposal of December 1978 suggested to use 1977 *exchange rates* for the conversion of local currencies to US Dollars. Since the US Dollar continued to decline relative to US currency until the middle of 1979, this standard would have resulted in lower dollar figures than reflected by actual purchasing power of local currencies.
Table A-3
PROPOSED US TABULAR FORMAT FOR LTDP SECTION OF DPQ

(1) Country ____________  (2) Program Area ________________

(3a) Serial Number and Measure Title __________________________

(3b) Submeasure/Subelement Title ______________________________

(4) Quantity Measured (Unit of Measure) ________________________

(5) Quantity - Requirement

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(6) Quantity - National Program/Plan:

(a) Year

(a) Incremental

(b) Total, Inventory

(7) Cost: (National currency unit in Millions; Price base)

Year

(a) Requirement

(b) National Program/Plan
information exceeding the regular DPQ format. However, the US continued
to push for its proposal because it felt that implementation control was
crucial to the success of the LTDP. Two American monitors (SACLANT for
Task Force 4 -- maritime measures -- and SACEUR for Task Force 7 -- EW)
supported the US position and the need for a yardstick of success and
failure was continuously emphasized. In the Fifth Report on
Rationalization/Standardization Within NATO (Fifth RSI Report),
Secretary Brown pointed at the need for such a yardstick:

NATO needs to establish an LTDP baseline against which
progress in implementation can be measured. Without such a
baseline, it will be difficult to ensure coordinated action
and to monitor implementation. The action bodies responsible
for implementing the LTDP measures must spell out in greater
detail the implementation actions required, e.g. specific
program definition to include quantities, milestone dates,
costs, and set realistic time schedules for those actions; and
track implementation and report progress. Program monitors
must be provided the information they require to carry out
their responsibilities to measure and assess progress, to
facilitate coordination of NATO and national LTDP efforts, and
to assess priorities and intensify problem years, providing
appropriate recommendations for Ministerial decisions.252

A 1979 December report on the 1979 Defense Review, for example, also
noted that an evaluation of the LTDP was difficult to make because the
lack of data in national replies complicated that assessment. In
response the US Mission to NATO prepared another paper on reporting
formats which was circulated in January 1980. It suggested that the
LTDP reports contain a narrative and a tabular section along the lines
suggested earlier. This paper adopted some of the force goal language
on implementation status253 but added reporting categories which forced

252See Fifth RSI Report, January 31, 1979, as printed in American
Defense Preparedness Association (ed.), Reference Book on NATO
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI), Vol. 1,
Arlington, VA: ADPA, 1979, pp. 6-1 - 6-140 (here 6-19 f).
253"Full implementation," "partial implementation," "will not
implement."
countries to indicate whether they included measures in plans, when they would take action, whether they had established timescales, milestones etc. In addition they had to argue, when appropriate, why they would not take action on measures. This format would have provided the information necessary to establish a baseline from which the impact and success of the LTDP could have been measured. Toward that purpose, the USNATO paper also contained a listing of measurement units for some two-thirds of the 123 measures.

In meetings of the EWG over a two month period in which the reporting format was debated, the US made clear that the reporting format used for the force goals was not sufficient because the Force Goals and the DPQ could not accommodate all the LTDP measures. The Force Goals' planning horizon extended only over six years while some LTDP measures ran over more than ten years. The US representatives also left no doubt that they considered the LTDP measures too important to letting them be "submerged" into the force goal cycle. At various other occasions the US made absolutely clear that it considered reporting the yardstick of the seriousness with which the allies supported the LTDP. The US position was that nobody who was serious about the LTDP could deny wanting to find out how well the program was implemented. In fact, the Penatgon had developed a computerized data base which allowed it to input all the data it suggested nations submit and thus gain instant overviews of the status of measures and programs.

**West German Reactions.** By contrast the West German government -- supported by almost all participating allies -- maintained that such an effort would disturb the overall balance in defense planning, that the political identity of the LTDP did not hinge on an annex to the DPQ, that the LTDP was selective only while the force goals were comprehensive, that this would divert attention away from the force goals, that the LTDP should not be the single yardstick for planning, and that is should gradually be integrated into the regular force goal process. Staff officers (desk level) in the West German MoD interviewed by the author mostly did not follow the US insistance on implementation
control because they felt that it did by no means contribute to the standing of the LTDP as a whole and that it only caused tremendous work while facilitating the work on the Pentagon's data base. The political importance of implementation control as a yardstick for the European allies's seriousness on conventional defense got almost completely lost, not the least because most of these officers felt that their government already did its utmost in providing resources for defense. With Assistant Secretary General (Defense Planning) Mumford siding with the US and the British having a nuanced position, the Deputy Secretary General suggested that he try to reconcile these sharply opposed views. The British representative indicated that he expected some compromise in order that the mailing of the 1980 DPQ not be delayed because of unresolved questions on the annex.

Although a compromise was made, the parameters of success and failure were not comprehensively defined for all measures. In addition countries were sometimes not forthcoming in outlining their plans in detail. Program Monitors complained that the 1980 DPQ contained more information than the previous one but that "national plans in many cases did not detail the specific actions planned or programmed by countries, making it impossible for monitors to render complete, valid and fair assessments." 

Resistance on the part of the West German and other European governments arose also over US time pressure and staff necessary to produce reports and national inputs into monitors' reports, comprehensive reports etc. in less than the usual time. A frequent complaint was that the data required was so detailed that staffs were overburdened and could not produce adequate inputs. The Armed Forces

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254 See The Implementation of the LTDP, op. cit., p. 2: "[...] while many specific measures contained in the LTDP are easily quantifiable, others are vague, with great discretion as to what constitutes implementation left to each participating nation."

Staff responsible for planning (Fue S VI), for example, which had been given overall responsibility for LTDP implementation and the management of the MoD's position in 1980, announced internally that it could no longer pursue the LTDP work at the same speed without delaying work on the Force Plan for 1993. Apart from causing dissatisfaction in European MoD staffs, reporting quality also suffered at times and thus offset some of the advantages gained through speedier process. The complaint that staffs were overburdened was not limited to the capitals, however. The NATO military authorities also let it be known that they needed about 100 more staff positions for LTDP monitoring.

The resistance against the definition of clear planning objectives and the lack of information on the effectiveness of NATO's planning also was a problem for AD70 and Basic Issues. Requirements analyses which produced conclusions suggesting a major change of the status quo, such as increasing or decreasing NATO's forces, was politically highly sensitive. Nations therefore watched carefully over the terms of reference for any study which had the potential for such conclusions and made sure that no surprises would develop that might be politically embarrassing. As will be seen in the cases studies, the study groups working on the specifics of measures to be incorporated in the improvement initiatives were given guidance to insure that they would not create programs that went significantly beyond prior force and resource commitments.\footnote{See Chapters IV and V for examples how this affected the definition of terms of reference for study groups.} Many study groups therefore emphasized measures that cost little or no money.

Regarding reporting there were arguments over the level of detail that should be given in the reports, their frequency, and the conclusions that should be drawn. The basic point was that countries who did not desire to fulfill planning goals, or were unable to do so for financial and other reasons, tried to be as restrictive as they could in releasing information on their activities so as to limit political embarrassment and damage.
Technical Problems

Apart from substantive differences on the bases of force planning and the lack of information, planning was also made difficult by a number of technical planning problems.

Definitional Problems. One difficulty was the partial lack of agreed planning standards and definitions which translated into different national objectives and different levels of implementation. Ammunition stockpile guidances and planning criteria for some hardware items such as ammunition loading vehicles had not been agreed upon at the NATO level, sometimes because of continued debate over the appropriateness of criteria and at other times because nobody had made a planning criteria an issue. Some of the LTDP measures therefore remained vague and open to interpretation. In these cases countries were able either to follow their national standards and definitions, or criteria of accomplishments simply remained vague.257

Methodological Problems. The determination of NATO's overall capabilities did not only depend on a clear definition of strategy, military threats, and information about NATO capabilities. A methodology that put this information in a conceptual framework designed to determine requirements was also needed. Whereas it is relatively simple to identify performance requirements for single weapons systems or platforms in given threat environments, the analytical problems become much more complicated when dealing with entire force structures in which various forces (land, air, sea) interact.

As the previous chapter showed, national styles of analysis differed markedly. The MCSSG example demonstrated that even identical inputs into models can lead to very different results. The development of military requirements which relies on these sorts of results thus is subject to similar sensitivities.258 As has been shown above, this

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257See The Implementation of the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, p. 5.

258On the question of the adequacy of various models to simulate war time engagements and outcomes and assist in the formulation of
methodological issue was compounded by the resistance of European allies to do everything possible to obtain the best planning data available.

For organizational and analytical reasons it was difficult for NATO staffs to evaluate how much increases or decreases in off-line planning initiatives had on NATO overall capabilities. First of all, the systems analysis group in the IS was too small to undertake big studies of that nature. Second, appropriate baselines were lacking and there were no agreed-upon measures of combat effectiveness. Third, to the degree that such measure existed they were very sensitive to the models employed. For similar organizational and analytical reasons, the International Staff was limited in its capacity to evaluate the effects of re-prioritizing force goals and to undertake comprehensive cost-effectiveness studies.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to show that NATO force planning suffered from four different factors. First, the basic assumptions necessary to determine requirements, such as the size of the threat, expectations about the length of a conventional battle and by implication, the relationship between conventional and nuclear requirements remained vague, allowing differing interpretations of strategy and definitions of requirements. Because of the political sensitivity of strategy and threat questions, discussions about these fundamentals of force planning were avoided by the Europeans.

Second, the planning information available at the NATO level did not easily lend itself to analyses of combat capabilities. The DPQs data was not transparent and organized in a way to allow such analyses, and it did not contain all the necessary indicators. This made it difficult for NATO staffs to track planning performance and to translate

planning activities into measures of combat effectiveness. The absence of such measures, however, made it difficult to demonstrate the utility of changing priorities or making additional efforts. Special reports improved the situation somewhat, but for political reasons they frequently lacked bite.²⁵⁹

Third, related to this, European countries -- the FRG prominently among them -- were reluctant to provide planning information that would help NATO authorities (or perhaps the US) make detailed analyses of NATO capabilities and evaluate risks associated with various strategies and postures. This was primarily due to (a) the absence of such information nationally, (b) the time and staff required to produce it, and (c) the political sensitivity of such information.

Fourth, even if all the necessary data at NATO were available, the problem of developing a methodology which would be accepted by all countries, help define requirements, analyse planning trade-offs, and assess program effectiveness would still remain.

The difficulty in agreeing on a substantive basis for force planning -- strategy, military threats, and cost-effectiveness of programs -- had a clear impact on the process of developing conventional defense improvement programs. On the one hand, the process was complicated by these differences in that much effort was required to define objectives, procedures, and yardsticks. At the same time the process was a tool to avoid conflict, paper over differences and define compromises and insure national influence on NATO plans.

The differences on the bases of NATO planning were partially caused by and had an effect on the organizational/institutional set up for planning. As Part C will show, an organizational perspective helps to illuminate why the US continuously pushed for conventional improvements, why the FRG had difficulties to understand and adapt to these pressures and why the NATO bureaucracy had only limited influence.

²⁵⁹The LTDP is an exception to this.
PART B: ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS: THE EXPERIENCE WITH AD70, BASIC ISSUES, AND THE LTDP

Differences over the objectives, assumptions, and methods of force planning were, of course not the only barriers to conventional defense improvements. This section's argument is that differences over strategy and threat assessment also affected the way in which NATO organized its planning process. As the case studies will show, the FRG was very reluctant to agree to undertake special studies and improvement initiatives outside the established NATO force planning cycle because of fears that they might lead to additional military requirements, as well as additional political and financial burdens. The US, by contrast, became increasingly alienated with a NATO force planning process that seemed designed to insure that national force plans, rather than a more unified and rational NATO plan, dominated the planning activities. The main criticism was that the regular NATO planning process allowed long-standing deficiencies in NATO's posture to persist. From the US perspective, this called for special initiatives aimed at redressing these deficiencies.

Because of the underlying differences of opinion concerning the objectives of NATO planning between the US and its European allies, it proved to be very difficult to come to agreements regarding the scope, priorities, and implementation of conventional defense improvements. Although attempts were made to cut the bureaucratic red tape through the creation of special committees and working groups, as well as special procedures for the definition of improvement measures and implementation control, each of the improvement initiatives analyzed in this study fell short of its intended goals.

The underlying reasons for this were two-fold. First the nations jealously guarded against those requirements that exceeded established plans. The main reason for this was their unwillingness to commit more
resources to defense than what they had already established on a national level. Secondly, it was difficult to change existing priorities. Flexibility in national plans was too constraining to allow for short-term adjustments. This was a concern more for the FRG than the US because the substance of the initiatives mostly reflected already existing US requirements. Because these initiatives, with the exception of AD70, originated in OSD, US planning, usually, already incorporated the US share in the initiatives. In those instances where it did not, the secretary of defense had the instruments with which to change service planning by his wielding his control over the planning, programming, and budgeting system.

This was not the case in the FRG. For the FRG most of the initiatives meant additional requirements. Bonn, therefore, put a high emphasis on seeing the scope of the improvement efforts reduced to fit its own plans. It was very difficult for the top-leadership in the MoD, both civilian and military, to change plans on short notice. They lacked the staff and instruments to do so, and since the military services dominated the planning process, it also made it difficult to economize by cutting back overlapping or cost-ineffective programs.

This section is organized into two parts. In the first, the three improvement initiatives are reviewed in order to identify the organizational problems that reduced their effectiveness. In the second part, the structure of US and FRG planning processes are analyzed in more detail in an effort to explain the origins of US proposals and FRG planning constraints. Finally, the structural problems of NATO's planning cycle will be reviewed.
IV. AD70, EDIP, AND BASIC ISSUES

AD70 was the first effort to make a major special initiative to improve NATO defenses after the adoption of Flexible Response. NATO's force planning cycle had been adopted a few years earlier, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia, US involvement in Vietnam, and declining financial efforts of the European allies were found to warrant a special effort. This need was underlined further by calls in the US Congress to reduce US troop commitments overseas, including Europe as well as pressures on European allies to reduce their military manpower.

Apart from these political motivations there were also military reasons for a special initiative. Despite the agreement among allies in 1967 on MC 14/3, force plans had not changed significantly as a result of the new strategy, although it emphasized conventional forces. Nor had a detailed study been undertaken on the military requirements of flexible response. The Nixon administration, which came to office in 1969, had begun a series of national studies on strategy and force postures. Aware of these, Europeans official became convinced that it was important for NATO to undertake companion studies in an attempt to influence US decision-making on these issues.

Unlike the two other initiatives examined in this study, Basic Issues and the LTDP, Allied Defense in the Seventies did not originate in Washington. As will be seen, a number of senior NATO official, most prominently Secretary General Manlio Brosio and SACEUR Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, had come to the conclusion that adverse trends in allied defense efforts needed to be halted. AD70 and the associated European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) did not result in major changes in NATO's planning machinery. In the program development phase special studies groups and an Executive Working Group (EWG), consisting of high level NATO officers, were created. The EDIP was formulated during special meetings of the majority of European defense ministers who met
as the so-called EUROGROUP. It can be argued, however, that the EUROGROUP had reached its peak activity with the EDIP and did not have a lasting impact on NATO planning. Both AD70 and EDIP were developed with the assistance of the office of International Security Affairs (ISA) in the Pentagon as well as the State Department. 266

As in the case of Basic Issues and LTDP, the emphasis in AD70 was on the rapid development of a program that would help the administration in Washington justify its troop deployment policies vis-a-vis the Congress. Therefore, except for the EDIP, no concrete measure were developed initially. As in the case of the LTDP, staff work concentrated first on the identification of areas of greatest deficiencies and submitted a list of priority improvement areas to the ministerial meeting in December 1970. Concrete force goals were subsequently developed within the regular force planning cycle and reported on both in the DPQ and in special reports.

This chapter will also include a section on the organizational problems of Secretary Schlesinger's Basic Issues Initiative. Unlike the AD70 and LTDP, Basic Issues was an attempt to improve allied capabilities in only three and later six areas within a relatively short period of time (2-5 years). It was therefore not as comprehensive as the other two examples. Because of its limitation to very specific areas, Basic Issues is an interesting example of a specialized program. It can therefore be used for comparative purposes with the two other major efforts. Since Basic Issues was an attempt to regain lost momentum in the AD70 process and fell in a relatively early phase of the AD70 this chapter will treat the two initiatives together.

The Origins of AD70

There were three main reasons why Brosio, Goodpaster and others felt NATO needed to seize the initiative with an improvement program. The first was the perception that the decline in NATO's defense efforts needed to be brought to a halt. Secondly, a political response was felt necessary to counter both the danger that the Nixon doctrine might be applied to Europe and the threat by Senator Mansfield to introduce an amendment which would substantially reduce the number of US forces in Europe. Third, officials in Brussels and other European capitals felt that the growing conventional threat posed by the Warsaw Pact after the invasion of Czechoslovakia needed to be balanced.

Declining Non-US Defense Efforts. Political pressure to reduce military efforts existed both in Europe, the US, and Canada toward the end of the 1960s. The Canadian government, for example, had proposed to cut its European deployments by two-thirds. The Belgian government was also on the record for favoring a reduction of its troops in Germany by a brigade with 3,000 men. Only the invasion of Czechoslovakia postponed that reduction. Due to an economic recession in 1967, the West German government had reduced its defense outlays in an effort to balance the federal budget. It had therefore imposed a limit of 455,000 men for the Bundeswehr. However, the number of active troops had remained even below that target by 13,400 in 1968. The 1967 ceiling of 455,000 imposed additional reductions over the previous year for budgetary reasons and thus suggested that there might be a persistent trend. This fear was accentuated when the 455,000 ceiling remained in effect in 1969 despite government plans in response to the Czechoslovak crisis to provide an active force of 460,000 men from 1969 until the end of 1971.

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262 The White Paper 1969, which is available in German only, is contradictory on this point: On p. 41 it argues that the government "intends" (beabsichtigt) to create a stable peacetime presence of 460,000 men in the armed forces from 1969 until the end of 1970; the paper also indicates on pp. 69-70 that the 1969 budget baseline assumed
Pressure for Troop Reductions in the US. The political pressure to further reduce forces in Europe was of particular significance in the case of the United States.\textsuperscript{263} As frustration grew with the increased involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War and growing balance of payments deficits, a number of Senators and Congressmen, notably Senator Mansfield, introduced or threatened to introduce resolutions or legislation requiring a reduction of US overseas deployments.\textsuperscript{264} The Nixon administration responded to this political pressure in various ways. First, it reduced the Johnson defense budget projection for FY 1970 by $4.6 billion or 5.6 percent to mollify the opposition against the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{265} Second, it proposed in July 1969 a reduction of 10 percent in the number of American employees overseas, to be implemented by June 30, 1970. None of 5,100 civilian and 14,900 military positions under the reduction plan affected the Central Front. As a mostly symbolic and political move, it was limited to US forces in Japan, Spain, and Turkey.\textsuperscript{266} Third, the administration concluded a new offset agreement with the FRG in July 1969. In this agreement the West German government committed itself to cover the bulk of US currency expenditure an unchanged number of troops as compared to 1968 (i.e. 455,000), independent of later personnel strengthening programs. See Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung (ed.) Weissbuch 1969 zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bundesregierung, Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1969.

\textsuperscript{263}Two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division (33,000-35,000 people) plus four squadrons (about 70-100 and 600 men) were redeployed starting in April 1968 but continued to be assigned to SACEUR (see SZ, 13 January 1968, p. 1).


\textsuperscript{265}See FY 1971 Annual Report, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{266}IHT, 11 July 1969, p. 1.
through a mix of German credits to the US, military and nuclear fuel purchases and an investment fund in US-dollars for Germans who wanted to undertake business ventures in the US. However, Congressional critics of both the agreement and troop deployments in Europe were not satisfied. Senator Mansfield announced on the same day as the German-American Offset Agreement was signed (July 9, 1969) that he wanted to reintroduce his "Sense-of-the-Senate Resolution" to withdraw a "substantial" number of US troops from Europe. Due to other pressing business, however, the resolution was not to be voted on before the spring of 1970. Evidence for the rising political pressure on the Nixon administration was also seen in the spring and summer Congressional hearings on US forces in Europe. Repeated reports in US and German newspapers about alleged withdrawal plans, ambiguous and contradictory statements by high US officials added to the uncertainty despite occasional reaffirmation of American commitment for the duration of the July 1969 Offset Agreement until June 30, 1971.

This uncertainty was increased by yet another factor. In a background briefing on his way to Asia, President Nixon had stated on July 25, 1969, that with regard to US-Asian relations "the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that the problem of military defense will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves." In combination with

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267See Thiel, loc. cit., p. 81, and Tresper, loc. cit., p. 43.
268IHT, July 11, 1969.
the general tone in Washington that the US had to limit its commitments, the Nixon Doctrine was seen to be applicable -- at least in its spirit -- also to NATO. This line of interpretation found additional support in President Nixon's January 1970 State of the Union Address. The President noted that it would be necessary for the US to reduce its involvement and presence in other nations without explicitly excluding Europe.271

The Increased Warsaw Pact Threat. The Soviet Union had increased its forward deployment of forces in the Central Region by five divisions through the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This increased the pressure on the southern part of the West German border with the Warsaw Pact. It also increased the danger of a surprise attack which might now be undertaken with more troops at the Pact's disposal initially. During the second half of the 1960s, the Soviets had also pursued a rapid build-up of their nuclear arsenal; by 1970 they and were approaching parity in the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers with the US.272

NATO's Attempt to Seize the Initiative. AD70 was initiated in response to a call by the NATO Secretary General, Manlio Brosio on March 10, 1970.273 The General Secretary wished to undertake a study in reaction to President Nixon's call for a major policy review in his February 18 report to Congress on his administrations foreign policy.274

272For data, see Table A-1 in Chapter I.
In this report which reflected the concerns about troop reduction and the development of the East-West military balance, Nixon argued that the change in strategic conditions raised a series of questions that warranted study. The President proposed

- to undertake a "realistic assessment of the military threats to Western Europe" as the basis for force planning;
- to examine how "tactical nuclear weapons in Europe [should] be used to counter specific Warsaw Pact military threats;"
- to study the fair sharing of the financial and military burdens between the allies and the adequacy of the force structure.275

Nixon maintained that formal agreements between the allies were not sufficient as long as they "paper over dissimilar views on fundamental issues with language that is acceptable precisely because it permits widely divergent interpretations." Nixon continued in his report that "[d]isagreements must be faced openly and their bases carefully explored. Because our security is inseparable, we can afford the most candid exchange of views."276

**Special Committees and Procedures**

Broso suggested adoption of a British proposal for the organization of the study. The British delegation in March of 1970 suggested a format according to which a Special Committee was to be created at the NATO Council level, consisting of the Secretary General, the Permanent Representatives, the Military Representatives as well as representatives of the Major NATO Commanders. This committee was to draw on and use the assistance of an Executive Working Group (EWG) of civilian as well as military high-level defense specialists who would

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275 See Ibid., pp. 33-34
276 Ibid.
run the day to day activities with the assistance of the IS and the IMS. According to this proposal, the Special Committee was to produce a report for ministerial consideration in December of 1970 and take into account President Nixon's desire for a thorough study of the premises of alliance strategy and forces which he had called for in his Spring 1970 report on US foreign Policy.

Bonn, by contrast, had some reservations about a Special Council Committee because this would give the exercise too much publicity, and mean additional staff work. It therefore proposed that the Perm Reps be tasked with the management role for AD70.

At a meeting at Perm Rep level on April 30, 1970, the NATO Council made a compromise on the varying proposals regarding organization and content. The NAC decided that it would lead the study and seek the assistance of the Military Committee and a so-called open-ended EWG which was headed initially by the Deputy Secretary General, Baron von Dungern, a West German. The EWG was aided by staff groups which were assembled on an ad hoc basis to work on specific papers commissioned by the EWG. These staff groups consisted of civilian and military officers drawn from the NATO staff ranks.

An important consideration for the decision to deal with the AD70 study at the level of the NAC was to make it possible for the French government to participate in it. This was an idea supported particularly and early on by Secretary General Manlio Brosio. Although Brosio clearly understood the problems which might result from the fact that NATO strategy would be touched upon in the study, he nevertheless wanted to attempt to include the French. Questions as to whether the French would participate lingered on until the April 30 NAC/PS meeting. On that day the French ambassador made it clear that his government considered the nature of the study to be mainly military and that France therefore did not wish to participate in it. The French ambassador pointed out that, in his government's opinion, the study would be based

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277 Mr. von Dungern was soon replaced by the Signore Paolini, an Italian.
on basic NATO documents which France had previously rejected. However, the ambassador also stated that his government would be interested in cooperating on the political aspects of AD70.

With attempts to include the French thus being largely fruitless, the DPC, which included all countries but France, was charged with the control and management of the study. The DPC was to issue instructions to the EWG and receive reports from it. The EWG on its part consisted of members of the staffs of the national delegations to NATO, the Military Committee and MNCs. Playing to the West German desire for flexibility, the group was given only a minimum of guidelines. These terms of reference met the West German desire for lesser specificity especially with regard to touchy issues of strategy and force levels. At the same time broad terms of reference had the advantage of not unduly limiting the scope of analysis and and delaying the beginning of the studies. In keeping with West German essentials on strategy and forces, however, it was agreed that forces, especially American ones, should not be reduced except in the context of a broader agreement between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and that no basic change in strategy would be considered.

Follow-up Procedures. After AD70 was adopted in December 1970, the question arose of how the study should be followed up and how specific measures would be developed. The procedural specifics, including the relationship between the EWG, which had been charged with AD70, and the MC, which was normally responsible for the development of force proposals, were decided upon during meetings of the EWG in February 1971. The EWG emphasized that all follow-up work should be integrated into the regular NATO defense review process of force goals and DPQs. In addition, the EWG recommended that the 1971 Ministerial Guidance for force planning in the 1973-1978 horizon, to be issued in May 1971, should reflect the recommendations of the AD70 Report and that the MNCs also should incorporate these recommendations when preparing their force proposals. The EWG suggested also that the DRC should work out suitable questions to be inserted in the annual DPQ in order to
obtain feed-back information on the implementation of the program. The emphasis of follow-up action was put on the short-term, not only because the EWG had been asked to produce a first progress report already by May 1. The decisions of the February EWG meeting also contained a provision that within each of the AD70 improvement areas mentioned in the Ministerial Guidance the expected outcome was to be specified. The EWG proposed that financial assumptions should be spelled out with regard to the AD70 program and that the Ministerial Guidance reflect the priorities of the recommendations.

The International Staff was tasked to produce a guideline paper for the military authorities to work on the six priority areas which identified by the EWG and sent to the MC in early March.\textsuperscript{278} With regard to timing, it laid out that the military authorities should classify their measures according to implementation horizons and distinguish (1) short-term ad hoc measures, (2) measures whose implementation would run over the mid-term, i.e. ca. 1973-77, and (3) long-term measures which would be implemented at the end of the 1970s/early 1980s. As regards scope, the IS required the MC to break down its proposals on a regional basis and give priority to those measures which became most critical early in a conflict. In order to gain better control over implementation, the IS paper asked the MC to designate military authorities which would make recommendations in their area of responsibility or expertise. MC input was requested for a first EWG progress report to the DPC/PS on May 1 and the MC was asked to emphasize on on-hand data and activities as well as measures to be implemented in the short-term (1971 force planning cycle). A final report on recommendations was requested from the MC by October 1 1971. The IS requested a report format which first identified problems, then suggested possible remedies, determined priorities among these remedies

\textsuperscript{278}The six priority areas were armor and anti-tank capabilities, the air situation and aircraft protection measures, maritime forces flexibility of sea power, mal-deployments in ACE, as well as a mobile multinational force. See the section on "Priorities" in this chapter.
and developed alternatives, as well as designated the responsibility of authorities supervising execution.

Reporting on these activities and procedures, the EWG obtained approval from the DPC/PS to continue at the end of March, 1971. Integrating most of the suggestions of the IS, the EWG follow-up paper contained both a timetable as well as a breakdown of topics which were to be addressed in follow-up studies. The EWG had selected six main areas mentioned before plus another 22 sub-themes for which concrete measures had to be developed in its opinion.

Summary. The creation of the EWG was a first in NATO's history. The timely production of the AD70 report for the December 1970 ministerial meetings showed that under pressure, the NATO bureaucracy was indeed able to identify deficiencies and develop a comprehensive report. The discussions about the terms of reference, however, had foreshadowed a serious limitation of the EWG report. For political reasons it had little influence. Since AD70 was supposed to demonstrate the unity of the alliance and provide evidence for the military and financial efforts of the European allies, the US remained in the background and did not push to seize the initiative in the development of AD70. As a result, the AD70 report listed deficiencies, yet it remained vague with regard to the remedies. Proposals of report language that might have implied or called for specific contributions beyond those already committed to NATO were resisted. As will be seen, an exception was the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP). With additional financial commitments by the European allies of only $1 billion over five years, the size of the program was very limited indeed.

The division of labor between the EWG, which was responsible for the identification of areas that needed special attention on the one hand, and the MC, responsible for developing specific measures, on the other, turned out to be not without problems. First, the EWG had difficulties getting the military authorities to concentrate on the EWG's set of priorities. Second, the military side was reluctant to
rank its proposals according to priority because it was felt that all priority areas warranted equal attention. Finally, it turned out to be very difficult to distinguish which of the force proposals by the military authorities responded specifically to AD70 and which were already planned in any case.

Scope

Differences concerning the scope and objectives of AD70 existed both in the initial phase during which the AD70 report was developed (until December 1970), and the follow-up phase when concrete measures needed to be developed. The main sticking points were fears that the report might lead to calls for additional and new national commitments that exceeded set financial parameters and that procedures were established that would allow close monitoring of compliance. If compliance with the program was not good, such close monitoring would lead to political embarrassment.

In the development phase of the AD70 report during the spring of 1970, various proposals existed with regard to the objectives and scope of the study. Secretary General Brosio had initiated this discussion by issuing a list with possible themes that should be addressed.

AD70 Development: The Brosio Proposals. According to Brosio's thinking, the NATO study was to be a wide-ranging review of NATO policies and options against the politico-military situation likely to emerge during the 1970s. Brosio detailed his suggestions in a memorandum to the Permanent Representatives (Perm Reps) in late April, 1970. He pointed out that the AD70 study should review the threat NATO was facing, as well as allied strategy, force levels, the relationship between the superpowers, the nature and effectiveness of deterrence in view of then existing capabilities, and the distribution of defense efforts within the alliance. Brosio further suggested that the study be based on the assumption that force reductions would not occur, unless they took place in the context of mutual and balanced reductions both in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Second, he did not want to reexamine from
scratch NATO's strategy of flexible response but, at the same time, he
did not want to exclude the evaluation of aspects of strategy or
questions of its implementation. A third major point was that the study
should not make any preliminary assumptions about national force levels.

Regarding concrete areas of analysis, Brosio suggested five themes:
First, to review the politico-military balance likely to emerge in the
1970s. Second to produce an estimate on technological trends over a ten-
year period. Third, an analysis of aspects of strategy aspects such as
the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense concept, possibilities for
increasing NATO flexibility in force employment, reinforcement and
optimal force mixes. The fourth theme dealt with questions of economic
resources available for defense in East and West, and the fifth aspect
was concerned with the problem of improving support of public opinion.

A British Proposal. The British also circulated suggestions
concerning the possible scope of AD70 with the intention to be
responsive to the Nixon Foreign Policy Report. The British proposal
suggested to study (1) the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union,
(2) the political relationships between Eastern and Western Europe, and
(3) the military threat NATO was facing including a list of
deficiencies. The British government also suggested discussing a number
of specific questions:

- How long could a conventional forward defense be sustained by
  NATO?
- Were the deployments of NATO forces optimal in view of NATO's
  best judgement of likely avenues of a Warsaw Pact attack?
- What implications did the emerging consensus on tactical
  nuclear employment have on the size of the conventional force,
  their deployment and equipment?
- Was a better force mix feasible between air and land forces and
  among each of these forces themselves?
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- Were the existing arrangements for allied contributions to the
defense of Central Europe equitable?

**West German Reactions.** The West Germans pointed out in
deliberations about the organization and Terms of Reference for the
study that the questions addressed in it should be general, rather than
specific as proposed by the British. Strong emphasis was given to the
point that under all circumstances questioning and undermining MC 14/3
should be avoided. Similarly, as much use as possible should be made of
existing documents, such as MC 161/70, the official NATO threat
assessment, because this and other agreed upon NATO documents were
already discussed and agreed upon by allied governments. Although these
were acknowledged to be compromise documents, the West Germans
considered them as the best that could be achieved. Any subsequent
discussion would therefore degrade their worth and imply additional
debates. The government in Bonn also did not wish to pay as much
attention as the U.K and Brosio proposals to the issue of burden
sharing.

**American Inputs.** The United States government was basically
satisfied with the idea that the European allies would conduct a review
of NATO policy with the goal of helping the Nixon administration to
justify the American presence in Europe against mounting opposition
against overseas deployments primarily due to the domestic conflict in
the US over the Vietnam war. Although the study was strongly encouraged
by the administration, it did initially not play a major role in the
formulation of the program so as to preserve the character of AD70 as an
alliance initiative of the Europeans. Behind the scene, however, the
American delegation and SACEUR strongly encouraged the study and
assisted it. US inputs and efforts to influence AD70 changed
significantly, however, after AD70 was approved in December 1971 and
more concrete measures had to be developed in the follow-up phase.
A Compromise. A compromise was struck between the proposals by Brosio and the British government on the one hand, as the West German ideas on the other. It was decided that the working groups on AD70 were to be "open-ended" and that the terms of reference for their work would be kept very general.²⁷⁹

During the actual study phase, the work of the EWG which began in May, 1971 was dominated by the development of a specific list of topics that were to be examined in the more detailed studies, and a timetable. The ministerial DPC meeting on June 11 approved a EWG report which called for study inputs by the nations as well as civilian and military authorities of the alliance. Some fifty study areas had been selected for which these inputs were sought (see Table B-1). In the fall, the EWG created four separate sub-groups, each of which was concerned with different parts of the final report. Sub-group 1 dealt with the section on the "East-West Balance" and was aided in this by the IMS. Sub-group 2 worked on the subjects "Strategy and Force Levels" whereas sub-group 3 produced the parts on "Resources and Burdensharing." The fourth sub-group examined the question of "Public Presentation," i.e. how and to what degree the findings of the study could be made available to the public. The sub-groups had to compress the detailed studies into a total document of about 150 pages by September 21. This draft report was then abbreviated in further editorial round by late October. By that time the comments of the MC were in and the first results of the October Eurogroup meetings on the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) were incorporated.²⁸⁰ In another round of revisions, the draft document also reflected the conclusions of the EUROGROUP meeting on November 10 and the report was reduced to 60 pages. This draft was then reviewed by civilian and military NATO staffs as well as national

²⁷⁹"Open-ended" meant that the tasks and subjects addressed by the EWG were not pre-determined in the Terms of Reference for it.
²⁸⁰For details on EDIP, see below.
Table B-1
SAMPLE OF AD70 TOPICS STUDIED BY EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP

I Politics and Intelligence

Political Evaluation of East West Relations
A Military Assessment of the Situation
The Condition of Warsaw Pact Forces
Regional Threats
The Soviet Navy
Financial Resources of the Warsaw Pact

II Strategy

The Role of Conventional Forces
The Nuclear Problem
Crisis Management
Forward Defense
A Concept for Armed Forces in Europe
Strategic Mobility
Reinforcement
Defense of the Flanks
Air Defense
Maritime Situation and Possibilities for Cooperation in Weapons R & D
The ACCHAN Area
The Importance of Sea Lines of Communication for Europe

III Finances and Resources

Defense and the Economies
A Hypothetical Estimate of the Percentage of GNP Devoted to Defense
Equal Burdensharing

IV Public Information

delegations and capitals and refined in response. This was the point at which capitals made sure that no language would be included that would bind them to objectives which were not already included in the plans, or otherwise exceeded the set financial ceilings. These constraints meant that the report had to become more general and change concrete calls of necessary additional efforts to expressions of des ability. Shortly before the full NAC meeting, the document was approved by the DPC Perm Rep meeting on November 30, and passed by the ministerial meeting of the Council during its meeting December 3-4.

EDIP: A Special European Effort. Under the pressure from the United States to increase their share of the contributions to defense, the European countries participating in the EUROGROUP also agreed upon a special set of improvements under the name of the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP). Designed on the basis that the United States would maintain her forces at substantially current levels, the program was meant to take off some pressure from the Nixon administration to reduce forces deployed overseas by countering the impression that the European NATO members were not shouldering more of the defense burden.

EDIP had three elements, directly related to the priority areas later identified in the AD70 study. The first element consisted of infrastructure initiatives worth about $420 million. These funds were to be used for the accelerated construction of a NATO Integrated Communication System (NICS) and additional shelters to increase survivability of NATO's aircraft. The second set of program elements was made up of "substantial additions and improvements, not previously planned, to national forces all of which would be committed to NATO. These measures included one Belgian, three British, one West German, and one Norwegian project. The cost of all these national measures over

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281 The group consisted of the BeNeLux countries, the FRG, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Norway, Denmark and Italy.
283 This section relies above all on Gerretsen, op. cit., pp. 244-246.
five years (capital and operating costs) was estimated between $450-500 million.\textsuperscript{284} The Germans had committed themselves to increase their order of 80 CH-53 transport helicopters by 53, for a total of 133 aircraft. This measure cost roughly $173 million for acquisition and $83 million in operation and maintenance over five years.\textsuperscript{285} The third program element was the transfer of 16 C-160 (Transall) transport aircraft from West German inventory to Turkey over two years to insure Turkish participation in the infrastructure program. This was estimated to cost the Bonn government about $78 million.\textsuperscript{286}

**The American Position on the Scope of AD70/EDIP.** The US considered the report on AD70/EDIP a good start, but not enough. Secretary Laird noted in his speech to the DPC on December 2, 1970, that the report "present a sober and realistic analysis of where we stand and where our efforts should be directed in the next few years."\textsuperscript{287} Yet the Secretary cautioned that the AD70 measures considered during the meeting were not certain to still critics of NATO and European commitments in the US. Because in Laird's view, "a conventional deterrent was "both essential and, indeed, feasible," he suggested that NATO could do even more than AD70 at moderate costs. According to American studies:

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- the tank imbalance could be markedly improved for $350 million to $1.1 billion a year, depending on the selected mix of tanks and anti-tank weapons;
- additional reserves, sufficient to ensure satisfactory mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, could be trained for $140 million a year;

\textsuperscript{284}Cf. the Communique of the EUROGROUP meeting December 1, 1970. The document emphasizes that these measures "will also give rise to very substantial further costs in subsequent years."


\textsuperscript{286}See *FR*, December 3, 1970, p. 1, and the EUROGROUP communiqué of the December 1 meeting, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{287}See Laird's *Remarks*, op. cit., p. 2.
-- all stocks of war reserve materials and equipment should be brought up to 30-day levels, and can be brought up to 30-day levels for an expenditure of $500 million. We believe even a higher goal should be established;
-- shelters for 1,500 aircraft would cost a total of $210 million.  

Although no specific measures had as yet been developed in the AD70 framework, the comments suggested that the US would push for substantially more than what had been agreed to in EDIP.

Follow-Up: Development of Measures. The AD70 document had merely outlined the politico-military situation the alliance was facing, identified its economic situation and listed a number of general areas for potential improvements. Only a small number of recommendations contained in AD70 could be immediately implemented. The bulk of the recommendations contained in the report were too broad to be useful for detailed planning purposes. From January through March of 1971 the EWG therefore was working on procedures for this follow-up and developed a process leading to the definition of concrete measures. As regards the substance of the proposals, the EWG proposed six areas requiring further study: armor and anti-tank capabilities, the air situation and aircraft protection measures, maritime forces flexibility of sea power, maldeployments in ACE, as well as a mobile multinational force. In addition to these six main areas, the EWG had also listed 22 sub-themes for which concrete measures were to be developed.

The development of measures in these 28 areas was assigned to the appropriate NATO authorities. As a result, 13 of the 28 topics were assigned to the Military Committee which in turn passed on nine of these to the MNCs. The remaining fifteen topics were assigned to such

288 My emphasis. See Ibid., p. 6.
289 See Gerretsen, op. cit., p. 248. No information is available which recommendations could be implemented quickly.
290 Gerretsen, op. cit.
291 Ibid. SACEUR was the designated authority in the following exemplary areas: external reinforcement of the flanks, including reception, reinforcement and reception in ACE, the armor/anti-armor
bodies as the DRC,\textsuperscript{292} and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee.\textsuperscript{293}

**Problems.** The resulting spring 1971 papers were still preliminary in nature due to the short time period allowed for preparation. They further suffered from the inability of the designated authorities in many cases to obtain or find relevant information. The DRC, for example reported, that the main problem with reserves was not their numbers but a lack of information on their assigned roles and training. The DRC therefore suggested that the 1971 DPQ contain additional questions how home defense units could be made available and better used. On the issue of war reserve stocks the DRC found that some countries had less than the recommended 30 day minimum. But it also noted that it was difficult to determine the right balance between old and new munitions because often there were no supply standards to compute the correct stock numbers. Moreover, qualitative parameters such as age, condition and location were not reported. Another major disadvantage was that the spring studies *did not contain any cost data* on the recommended measures. However, these data would have been difficult to obtain in any case because many measures were phrased in very general terms such as "improve a certain system...," replace obsolete aircraft...," or "improve ammunitions for ..." Moreover, in providing information for these studies, the nations guarded jealously against any wordings from which new commitments on their part might be derived and this hedging contributed to the sometimes very unspecific character of the measures under consideration.

situation, air defense and logistical support (with the other two MNCs). SA CLANT/CINCHAN worked on those measures related to maritime flexibility, such as ASW. The MC/IMS staffed the studies on multinational training, NBC warfare and defensive measures, the review of the staff structure and personnel level at the NATO HQs and had inputs on the ACE reinforcement study.

\textsuperscript{292} The DRC was assigned areas such as war reserve stocks, strengthening of Greek and Turkish forces, training and equipment for reserves of M to M+15 reserves, earlier assignment of forces, conscript/regular personnel mixes.

\textsuperscript{293} Charged with examining the contribution of civil preparedness to alliance defense.
During this time when concrete measures were developed in the spring of 1971 the US government indicated that it considered all of these initiatives of high priority and therefore pushed strongly to determine actions as soon as possible. The main instrument in that regard was the preparation of draft papers on specific issues which set the stage for discussion in working groups and intended to "accelerate the discussions." The US also tried to extend the scope of the measures and suggested additional efforts. The American NATO delegation, for example, during the spring of 1971 circulated one paper in the EWG which contained cost estimates for additional logistical measures to be taken by the Bundeswehr worth $500 million. Similar suggestions plus the creation of a EWG sub-group on logistics had been made during the US-West German Chiefs-of-Staff talks at the end of February. Other examples relevant to the West German Bundeswehr included the acceleration of the entire modernization process, the creation of two tank brigades in addition to those planned at the time, and the acceleration of the introduction of modern anti-tank weapons.

This American insistence and focus on additional measures after the passage of the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) came as a surprise to the Europeans because the opinion was widely spread in the first months of 1971 that the EUROGROUP had succeeded in helping to convince both administration and Congress in Washington that they had actually approved an additional program with EDIP. In March, however, it had become clear that the American delegation was seeking more and attempted to use AD70 as a vehicle to reach that goal.

When it became clear that the Americans were determined to not let AD70 remain a paper exercise, time and priorities quickly became a critical factor. The studies and developments of follow-up measures assigned to the military authorities alone resulted in the recommendation of "several hundred" improvements which the ministers could not possibly digest during their meeting or approve individual or as a combined package. This many measures also exceeded the financial resources that were programmed by the allies.
Priorities

The problem of prioritization figured also prominently in the EWG's spring report to the DPC meeting on May 28, 1971. The EWG therefore suggested that the ministers should focus with their Ministerial Guidance 1971 on the AD70 priorities. The report also urged that the ministers decide during their next meeting in December 1971 on priority packages in order to aide the military authorities to develop accordingly the force proposals for 1973-77 due in January of 1972.294

By fall of 1971 the military authorities had produced their recommendations. Attempts of the EWG to have the military authorities draw up a "shopping-list" of three to five recommendations met the military authorities' opposition because they felt that such a prioritization would give undue weight to some areas and lead to the negligence of other equally important areas.295

After it had become clear that the measures could not be implemented without a sense of priorities, the MNCs tried to work out a yardstick to determine which measures were most important. Yet this proved to be difficult. The problem of establishing priorities was partially an organizational problem of the MNCs. On the one hand the naval commanders SACLANT and CINCHAN had to cooperate with the regional naval commanders reporting to SACEUR (in the Northern and Southern European Commands) while on the other SACEUR also had to deal with the land and air aspects. This led to difficulties in determining priorities between these bodies and was eventually resolved only two weeks before the reports were due through a study trip of top military officers. When the matter was discussed in the MC, it too emphatically

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294 The DPC communique reflected these suggestions: "A comprehensive report, which would also address further recommendations for specific measures and the question of relative priorities, was called for by ministers for their meeting next December." Texts of Final Communiques 1949-1974, pp. 255-257 (256)

295 See Gerretszen, op. cit, p. 249.
opposed the idea of a "shopping list" prioritization and determined that each of the 13 substudies assigned to it had equal weight. The matter was resolved when the MC decided to categorize the implementation of the measures into time periods (long-term, mid-term, short-term). The urgency with which a measures was to be implemented was determined by its effect on combat capabilities. According to Gerretsen, the MC was careful to avoid a situation where "a number of smaller measures blocked the implementation of important and valuable large-scale measures." Although evidence could not be found, it is likely that this rule gave priority to big-ticket procurement items. The MC also categorized its measures according to their contribution to improving deficiencies in five geographical areas. In each of these areas, two major deficiencies were to be addressed, bringing the total of priority areas to ten. These areas, however, remained very broad (see Table B-2).

With some hesitation the EWG accepted this approach in its report to the December 1971 ministerial meeting, after the International Staff had added to the list an emphasis on mobilization, equipment and training of reserves for M-day forces, as well as the strengthening of Greek and Turkish local forces. The EWG criticized the MC studies for not containing any feasibility criteria such as economic or other non-military constraints. The MC report was also criticized for not distinguishing already planned programs (sometimes already funded) from new requirements. It also pointed out that priorities continued to be a main problem. The MC had not responded to the task of setting priorities between the five regional areas. Thus it was difficult to produce a short list of items from the MC input with recommendations which should receive additional money (i.e. beyond that already committed). The MNCS' priority criteria of first seeking to improve

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296 Ibid. 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid.
Table B-2

AD70 FOLLOW-UP PRIORITIES AS PROPOSED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

I NATO Wide
Improvement of ASW and Increased Forward Storage Sites

II ACE Wide
Improvement of Armor/Anti-armor and Airfield protection

III Northern Region
Improvement of Anti-Invasion and Reinforcement/Reception Capabilities

IV Central Region
Improvements on Mal-deployment and Aircraft (attack, reconnaissance, air defense, ECM capabilities)

V Southern Region
Improvements of Tactical Air, Reconnaissance, and Air Defense Capabilities

survivability where it would have an impact on the force as a whole, second of strengthening combat effectiveness, and third to seek longer-term improvements of combat effectiveness, did not provide good yardsticks for discriminating among recommendations because they were too broad.

The review of the MC proposals by the EWG concluded, therefore, that the completion of all recommended measures was unlikely because of financial constraints and that implementation of as many recommendations as possible was now the crucial issue. It also suggested that the
DPC/PS would serve as a monitor of implementation and advisor on ministerial action. It further recommended that a comprehensive report on implementation should be reviewed by the ministers during their winter 1972 session and that the spring meeting should review a shorter report focusing on the question of balance and priority between the proposed measures.

The bulk of the AD70 measures concerned concrete materiel requirements that the nations were expected to meet within the NATO force planning cycle, yet others called for additional studies or organizational and procedural changes. The ministerial meeting of the DPC passed the report submitted to it and welcomed improvements already made, with particular emphasis on EDIP, as the entire AD70 exercise was to be a symbol of increased European and alliance efforts. The communique stated that the ministers endorsed the priority areas which were proposed to them for further implementation of the AD70 70 recommendations. Within these areas they identified for early action certain fields such as additional anti-tank weapons and modern tanks; advanced electronic equipment for certain combat aircraft; improved all-weather strike, attack and reconnaissance air forces; improved air defenses and aircraft protection; better maritime surveillance and anti-submarine forces, more maritime patrol aircraft and seaborne missile systems; the replacement of over-age ships; the strengthening and modernization of local and reinforcement forces on the Northern and Southern-Eastern Flanks; and larger ammunition stocks for land and air forces.399

399 Although NATO force goals continue to remain classified, there are some clues as to what the nature of the AD70 goals was. Gerretsen cites examples of a study of the Dutch minister of Defense, den Toom, analyzing the implications of the AD70 study for Dutch forces. Measures for the Navy focussed on ASW, reconnaissance, and air defense. Those for ground forces included the introduction at brigade and battalion level of anti-tank weapons for the I Dutch Corps, the acquisition of motorized air defense artillery in the mid-term and the preparation of storage sites near the war time deployment areas of the Dutch forces. See Gerretsen, op. cit., pp. 256-257.

388 See the communique of the December 9-10 NAC/DPC meeting in NATO Final Communiques 1949-1974, p. 271.
With these decisions the ministers themselves had set further priorities which the MC was not able or willing to propose. The experiences of the fall 1971 had shown that the military authorities had major difficulties agreeing to any special program that would require them to make recommendations on a selective priority basis. The civilian side which dominated the EWG had to compensate for this deficiency by proposing selective areas for ministerial endorsement. Yet the EWG or the civilian authorities at NATO did not have all the necessary information and staff to make decisions about force planning that normally were the military's. In order to be acceptable by the political leadership, however, the force proposals by the military authorities had to be limited. Mostly because of financial constraints, the 1973-78 Force Goals, subsequently passed during the May 24, 1972 DPC meeting, thus contained only a portion of the original measures. However, as in the years before, even these reduced goals still contained a "challenge" to the countries.\(^{301}\) It is therefore likely that not all of the force goals were incorporated into the 1973-78 Force Plan, which passed during the Winter 1972 DPC meeting: after the Defense Planning Questionnaire 1972 had indicated what the actual commitments of the countries were for the next year.

**The Schlesinger Initiative: Priority of "Basic Issues."** The watering down of force planning objectives and continuing deficiencies in NATO capabilities was the background against which the US government decided that the time was ripe in June 1973 to attempt again a refocussing of NATO planning on a number of key areas.

The Secretary of Defense-designate, James Schlesinger, presented an American initiative to improve NATO conventional forces during the June 7, 1973 DPC meeting. As described in chapters I and II, the secretary-designate briefed the attending ministers on the findings of recent Pentagon threat analysis with the intention of demonstrating to them

\(^{301}\)See Gerretsen, op. cit., p. 250.
that the situation was by far not as hopeless as was sometimes suggested and that it merely required a set of well-defined and executed priority measures to achieve a substantial increase in NATO's capabilities.

Schlesinger's speech on June 7 created quite a furor in European capitals, mostly because of its alleged optimism about NATO's capacity to halt a Warsaw Pact attack.\(^{302}\) The secretary's speech, however, caused also dissatisfaction because he proposed to reorient the agreed-upon priorities of NATO force planning within the AD70 context and thus threatened to undermine the planning prerogative of both civilian as well as military authorities.

In the afternoon of the June 7 DPC meeting, Schlesinger outlined the areas for improvements which would bring NATO closer to what he referred to as a "full-scale conventional deterrent." He proposed to focus the additional defense efforts on three specific areas, so-called Basic Issues. The first area to be covered concerned improvements in anti-tank capabilities, the second called for a continuation and enlargement of the aircraft shelter program, and the third issue concentrated on the stockpiling of at least 30 days of war reserve stocks.

The EWG was charged in July 1973 with preparing a report on these issues by December for review by the ministers. In a second study phase beginning in January 1974, the US -- against the background of the mid-East war -- suggested including in this list studies on (1) mobile air defense systems, (2) electronic warfare, and (3) the possible introduction of sophisticated air-delivered munitions. This brought the number of Basic Issues to six.

**Responses at the NATO Level.** The Secretary General requested that report of the EWG to be submitted by March, in time for consideration by the Spring DPC meeting. The EWG deliberations on this new project reflected European uneasiness with yet another special project besides AD70 and the appraisal of the implications of the mid-

\(^{302}\)See Chapters I and II.
East war. They suggested therefore that the Schlesinger package should be incorporated in these other initiatives and reported on within the set framework.

The MC on its part was equally critical of the Basic Issues Approach as a separate activity and claimed that the required reports (AD70, force proposals and force goal preparation, lessons from the mid-East war, Basic Issues) overloaded the system and created confusion. Moreover, nations, West Germany among them, as well as NATO staffs feared the creation of super-priorities that would divert attention from other efforts. The MC claimed that foci shifted too fast and these activities had contradictory purposes and that their relationship remained unclear and made reporting redundant. The MC therefore suggested clearly subordinating Basic Issues to the other activities and that progress on some elements should not come at the expense of the rest.

SACEUR, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, is said to have had misgivings about the substance as well as the tone of Schlesinger's speech. Goodpaster thought the speech reflected a lack of knowledge about already ongoing NATO activities in the context of AD70 and that the presentation was too didactic. He feared that this might be seen as a fall back into times where the US came across as always knowing best, especially so as 1973 was the ill-fated "Year of Europe" during which the atmosphere in US-European relations was already strained. The International Staff also noted the overlap of the Basic Issues with other activities and stressed that the difference of Basic Issues and AD70 lay in the fact that the former took a country-by-country perspective whereas AD70 had a regional approach.

West German Reactions. Substantively, the West German military services had no serious problems with the areas specified in the Basic Issues initiative. The Army especially pointed out that its Five-Year Plan stressed armor and anti-armor (anti-tank) capabilities and expected

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Interviews.
to greatly increase its holdings of anti-tank weapons as well as provide funds for an anti-tank helicopter (PAH 1).

However, the services had reservations about other aspects of the Basic Issues initiative. Both Army and Air Force argued strongly against a further prioritization as planned through Basic Issues and were against anything that looked like creating super-priorities. The argument was that existing procedures and studies, the force goal process and AD70, could take care of the deficiencies and that a shift of focus to Basic Issues as the primary determinant of priorities would be one-sided. With regard to Basic Issues-related sustainability and stockpile studies the Army also suggested the study not focus on the question of what period of time NATO's conventional defense could hold, because it expected negative psychological effects (even at the classified level) from the findings. Moreover, the analytical tools were said to be too unrefined and the entire exercise would require a uniform threat assessment, which, by implication, the Army staff must not have believed to exist.

For a similar fear about an inconvenient debate, the Army Staff also suggested avoiding the problem of equitable burden-sharing. It suggested studying instead present level of security. The Fue S on the other hand, also warned of super-priorities and the fact that the US might succeed via Basic Issues in creating a new and effective instrument to steer the NATO force planning process, curtail the planning prerogative of the MNCs, and draw away attention from AD70.

At the same time however, the Fue S pointed out that, from a politico-military point of view, the initiative to strengthen conventional forces was welcome in principle. The US initiative was placed in the context of increasing inflationary pressure on US (and other nations') budgets, which increased the incentives for the US to shift defense burdens onto the Europeans. Basic Issues was seen as an attempt to bind the Europeans to concrete goals for the next planning horizon as well as to possibly advance American economic interests.
When Minister of Defense Georg Leber met James Schlesinger in May 1974, Leber summarized the West German position along these lines in stating that the FRG supported the US initiative to strengthen conventional forces and to reexamine established priorities. At the same time Leber pointed out, however, that he supported the view of the majority of the DPC members that Basic Issues threatened the importance of AD70 as a basic policy document in questioning its priorities. Leber cautioned that a concentration on Basic Issues would go at the expense of improvements in other critical areas and that additional resources for the realization of the Basic Issues program were not available or insufficient. Finally, Leber argued that long-term armament efforts did not allow for sudden changes in priorities and that new goals should not be set forth before old ones were met. Having said this, Leber also mentioned that Basic Issues might have a useful impact on keeping up AD70 momentum and that the FRG had already incorporated similar priorities in its plans by adapting to AD70.

Despite such reservations by the West Germans and others and mainly due to American insistence, Basic Issues did enter the force planning cycle and special reports were made. The Basic Issues Initiative revealed yet another weakness of the NATO planning system. Not only do national plans dominate the planning cycles in NATO; countries also used the weakness of that cycle to argue against any changes. When Leber argued with Schlesinger that new programs should not be begun unless old ones were complete, the German reservations missed almost entirely the American point. From the Washington perspective, Basic Issues was initiated because NATO took too long to finish existing programs and let too many deficiencies persist. Therefore special action was required to impress upon the Europeans the need for such improvements.

Those who argued that priorities should not be changed too fast had a point. But the American insistence on a few selected areas was equally understandable given the frustration with the slow progress and compromising over objectives.
Timing and Phasing of AD70

Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt had emphasized during the June 11 DPC meeting in Brussels that it was imperative that NATO could produce a study until fall 1970 in order to obtain ministerial approval in December. The main reason for this urgency were the increasing calls in the American Congress for troop withdrawals from Europe, the upcoming elections in the US in November, and finally the possibility for the AD70 study to influence ongoing studies in Washington which broadly reexamined American military strategy and force levels. With the passage of AD70 in December President Nixon could consider his condition for continued and unchanged US troop deployments fulfilled. AD70 enabled the President to argue vis-a-vis Congress that the allies were doing more and that the US should thus not withdraw any forces. Secretary Laird made this linkage between European efforts and continued deployments very explicit:

Under [President Nixon'] policy, and given a similar approach by our Allies, the United States will continue its present commitment of force capabilities in Europe and in the Mediterranean. Barring reciprocal actions by our adversaries we intend to maintain this commitment for the foreseeable future, despite severe budget constraints. If our NATO Allies pursue means to maintain and strengthen their forces, I believe our legislature will support the President's proposed course of action.  

During the spring of 1971 the US government became more involved in the AD70 follow-up. This was the phase of priority definition and the US pushed strongly to determine specific measures as soon as possible. The main instrument for accelerating the process was the preparation of

\footnote{For details, see Chapter I.} \footnote{My emphasis. See Melvin Laird, Remarks Before the NATO Defense Planning Committee, Brussels, December 2, 1970, p. 4 (declassified on April 26, 1986).}
draft papers on specific issues which set the stage for discussion in working groups. As was pointed out above, another indication of the importance the US attached to these measures was the fact that the US fed a constant stream of additional improvement suggestions into the staff work in efforts to broaden the scope of the measures and raise the objectives.

As we will see, AD70 took considerably longer to formulate than the LTDP. Because, in the latter case, considerable advance work had already be done by the principal proponent of the LTDP, Robert Komer, the priority area formulation took only some 4 months for the LTDP and did not involve much NATO staff. AD70 took until the spring of 1973 (two years) until the broad suggestions of AD70 were translated into concrete force goals. In the case of the LTDP it took only somewhat more than a year in total to reach that level of detail. In the latter's case, more emphasis was also put on a quick start with short-term measures and an emphasis on strict implementation schedules. Since AD70 remained in the force planning cycle and was run by NATO staffs, there was no pressure to adjust plans on short notice. The price of this slower pace was slower implementation of the recommendations. But this made the AD70 exercise also less controversial politically.

Because of the lower political profile and less external (American) pressure, the initiative could also dissipate more easily. By the time it had been incorporated in the plans the political circumstances which had it brought about had changed. There was, therefore, a lesser incentive to continue with a special initiative.

The Implementation of AD70 and Associated Measures

Procedures for Implementation Control. In order to gain information on the implementation of these AD70 measures, the ministers agreed during their December 1971 meeting to adopt a special reporting procedures on AD70 progress. According to a proposal by the EWG, the spring meetings of the ministers were to discuss a brief EWG report on specific AD70 problems. This report was to identify areas which
warranted ministerial attention or decision, such as the question of priorities. A more comprehensive report was to be submitted by the EWG for the winter meetings. This report was to contain a detailed account on AD70 progress and implementation in the various areas.

A first brief report was considered by the ministers at their May 28, 1971 meeting. It was rather general in nature, provided no or only diffuse data on measures being implemented and did not make clear to what degree implementation was actually attributable to AD70. For example, the report mentioned as accomplishments improvements that were actually planned before AD70 was even initiated. For example, it noted the activation of a West German airborne brigade and three additional tank regiments as well as the introduction of the Leopard II tank by the end of 1975. The additional units however, were the result of previously planned reorganizations and were thus hardly attributable to AD70.\textsuperscript{306} In other cases, such as anti-tank weaponry it is difficult to establish to what degree national programs were actually accelerated because no attempt was made to identify a baseline against which the success or failure of the LTDP could be measured.\textsuperscript{307} The DPC in its May 1971 communique "welcomed the substantial and concrete progress reported in the development and implementation" of EDIP and noted that with the help of this program NATO would obtain an integrated communications network (NATO Integrated Communications Network, NICS) by the mid-1970s and be able to carry through a "greatly expanded" aircraft shelter program. Despite of the lack of specificity and rigor of the EWG report the DPC noted with regard to AD70 that

\textsuperscript{306}On the previously planned reorganizations, see the \textit{White Paper 1970}, p. 53 which explains where these additional units came from.

\textsuperscript{307}An attempt was made to do so retrospectively for this study but proved infeasible. Classification problems are a major hurdle, planning data tends to be unavailable or have major gaps, and the task of comparing several hundred line items, or only a representative sample of the most important line items over a ten year period would be immense and involve dozens of man-years in labor. According to interviews no such studies have been attempted on a systematic basis even within NATO, or the US
a starting point had already been established, in that certain measures to improve the defense posture of the NATO countries were already in hand. [...] Ministers agreed on the need for countries to begin implementation of further improvements in accordance with the report before them. A comprehensive report, which would also address further recommendations for specific measures and the question of relative priorities, was called for by the Ministers for their meeting next December.  

A major point of criticism against the Basic Issues initiative was the additional reports required by it. The MC pointed that if the already existing reporting requirements were all met, the ministers would have to review 14 different reports in the five year planning cycle, each related to AD70 one way or another. The Basic Issues would add another 13 papers although all 27 reports only dealt with four interrelated planning areas. Similar to the MC, the IS suggested that perhaps the three add-ons (mobile air defense systems, electronic warfare, and sophisticated air-delivered munitions) to the Basic Issues originally mentioned by Schlesinger should be reported on in the mid-East appraisal which was under preparation.

**The Degree of Implementation.** The ministerial meeting also agreed that the reporting on AD70 and EDIP progress should take place in the DRC context. Beginning in early 1972, the emphasis of AD70 shifted toward the incorporation of the recommendations into the NATO force planning cycle. The 1971 Ministerial Guidance had charged the military authorities to take the AD70 measures into account when preparing their force goals. Yet due to financial constraints, the force goals approved by the ministers during the spring 1972 meeting could not accomodate all of the proposals made by the military authorities. Although no comprehensive information is available what the exact relationship between force proposals and force goals is, NATO authorities estimated

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that the force goals did not incorporate more than 80% of the high
priority AD70 recommendations even by 1975.

Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt had already indicated in the
1972 DPC Spring meeting that, like the Federal Republic, other nations
were also probably unlikely to be able to fully implement the goals.
Although he pointed out that only about 4 out of some sixty goals went
beyond West German means, he identified a trend toward markedly
increased manpower costs and budgetary crunches which reduced the
original optimism associated with AD70.169

Subsequent NATO communiques, however, generally pointed out that
progress was made in the implementation of AD70 and that instructions
for further priorities were given. It is impossible to differentiate to
what degree this progress was due to AD70 or whether national plans
programmed the improvements anyway. Because no baseline was established
against which progress or lack thereof could be measured, no standard
existed to judge the effects of AD70 systematically.

There is evidence which suggests that AD70 implementation was
partial at best. MNC and IS reports pointed out that important
shortfalls continued to exist and reported on these. A SACLANT/CINCHAN
report to the EWG in Spring of 1973 compared the AD70 requirements and
actions taken where possible in a tabular format and concluded that
improvements had in fact been made but in many cases momentum was
lacking. Similarly, SACEUR/SHAPE drew attention to the fact that even
though AD70 was not intended to correct once and for all the mismatch
between declared strategy and available forces, the implementation of
the AD70 did not proceed as hoped for. SACEUR pointed out that manning
levels, training standards and anti-armor continued to be problematical
areas.

Similarly, a spring 1974 EWG report on Basic Issues which was
prepared by the International Staff broke down the AD70 measures
relevant for the Basic Issues Initiatives and reported on their status.

169Expenditure trends and breakdowns are provided in Chapter IX.
It found that only the US and the UK were planning to provide funds for the sheltering of the remaining 30% unsheltered aircraft assigned or earmarked to NATO. Germany was examining its possible contribution and Belgium was reported to perhaps considering funding more than the 70% shelters for assigned/earmarked aircraft that had been agreed on in the AD70/EDIP context. With regard to war reserve stocks, the report stated that the US had stockpiles far in excess of the required 30 days whereas the FRG would only reach that goal by 1977. The armor/anti-armor efforts of the FRG were considered good.

To achieve the additional improvements specified by the Basic Issues such as war reserve stocks, aircraft shelters etc., the EWG paper proposed to use the existing NATO force planning cycle and the DPQ to better document in the future how well progress was made in the AD70 and Basic Issues areas. It proposed to eliminate special reporting on Basic Issues and to incorporate its monitoring into the AD70 December reports. With this set of proposals, the EWG suggested, the NATO force planning cycle would regain its due status of the primary planning mechanism and clarify the relationships between the priorities, force proposals and force goals. In order to satisfy American demands for stricter monitoring, the EWG suggested that perhaps the structure of the DPQ and force goals might be adapted to allow better review. Taken together, the EWG proposals implied a reduction of otherwise due reports by 8 over the next few years.

The Implementation of EDIP. Despite some embarrassing haggling among the EUROGROUP members over the minor amount of $30 million in infrastructure funds, implementation of EDIP was good overall. The bulk of financial contributions for EDIP had been made already in late 1970. Lacking was an amount of $30 million which was not contributed due to reluctance on the part of Belgium, Norway and Greece, which did not feel capable of contributing their share.318 This attracted the criticism of

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird during the May 29, 1971 NATO ministerial meeting. Only after this criticism threatened to offset the positive elements of the entire EDIP package was it possible for Lord Carrington, the British Minister of Defense heading the effort, to raise the lacking amount after months of struggle.

The West German government, which had been instrumental in pulling the EDIP package together, did not quite fulfill its previously set goals for EDIP. Although the FRG exceeded its share of the infrastructure fund slightly and provided four more aircraft to Turkey than anticipated, it purchased 23 fewer CH-53 helicopters than planned. The prime reason for this reduction given by the defense ministry was an "unforeseen cost increase."

The Dissipation of AD70 and Basic Issues. The spring 1975 report on AD70 and Basic Issues implementation made a major effort in summarizing what had been achieved. With regard to the review machinery, it concluded that whereas in 1971 it was decided that the DPQ was adequate for program monitoring, it had now become clear that support programs needed to be monitored separately. Since the DPQ was merely oriented on static outputs, focusing on numbers of units, manpower, equipment inventories etc., there was a need to measure and monitor combat capabilities.

To add weight to this argument the spring report reviewed NATO capabilities on a regional basis and produced a rather gloomy picture. In the Northern region it noted low manning levels, a very significant reduction in British reinforcement capabilities, and slow equipment replacement. In the Center Region, the report stressed the lack of land force units and reserves, while also pointing out that the

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311 Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), 29 May 1971, p. 3; see also SZ, 30 May 1971, pp. 1-2; and the Communique of the 29 May 1971 DPC meeting in Brussels, in NATO Final Communiques, 1949-1974, op. cit., p. 256.
312 Interview; see SZ, 30 May 1971, pp. 1-2; Rode, op. cit., p. 60, and the communique of the EUROGROUP meeting on December 7, 1971, p. 1.
313 See BMVG (ed.), Aktuelles Stichwort, Nos. 77 and 94.
reorganization of the Bundeswehr added to its combat capabilities. The situation in the South was characterized also by low manning levels, obsolete equipment and the decrease in ASW capabilities due to the restructuring of British naval forces in the Mediterranean. Finally, the report noted problems with ASW in the Atlantic.

A second review area was the implementation of Basic Issues programs. Here, a mixed picture emerged also. The report noted that the program to build shelters for 70% of the assigned and earmarked aircraft would be implemented by 1977 and that the DPC had agreed to provide infrastructure funding for US rapid reaction forces. Programs for the air defense of airfields were in progress in the UK, the FRG and Norway, while others had no plans. Anti-armor capabilities were reported to be satisfactory in the North and Center Regions, but not so in the South. With regard to war reserve stocks, the EWG pointed out that countries fell short of their goals. In December 1973 ministers had agreed to reach stockpiles for 30 days of combat by 1975 yet these goals had to be deferred to 1977 and in some cases even to 1980.

Similarly, the implementation of EW programs proceeded too slowly and the measures related to mobile air defense were only taken up in Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic. With regard to modern air ammunitions, the report criticized that the advantages of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were not exploited sufficiently. Turning to the infrastructure component of the force plans, the EWG stated that only 50% of the high priority measures could be funded and that the remainder had to be deferred to the 1980s because the DPC only approved half of the funds requested by the MC. This meant, for example, that NICS Phase I would only become operational in the early 1980s.

The discussion surrounding the formulation of the Spring report demonstrated significant uncertainty as to how the AD70/Basic Issues initiatives should be pursued. Proposals ranged from eliminating the separate reporting (EWG Chairman Paolini) to (American) calls for a new report on supporting programs. The FRG rejected the latter idea because of the additional work involved and its suspicion of duplicative
reporting, yet it agreed to continue the yearly AD70 reports. Bonn was
of the opinion that new reports would not create new impulses due to the
limitations of funds and because previous efforts in this direction
(AD70) had shown that even special efforts only led to moderate success.
Overall Bonn, similar to views held in London, was not planning to
resist if AD70 reporting ceased because other initiatives such as
SACEUR's Flexibility Studies and the Long-range Defense Concepts could
incorporate the outstanding questions and measures. 314

1975 was the last year in which AD70 reports were written.
Although later initiatives referred to some of the priority areas of
AD70, the exercise ceased to be of prime concern in NATO planning. For
more than a year there had existed a number of new initiatives aimed at
improving conventional capabilities. One of them, the effort to
rationalize allied defense efforts, standardize weapons systems and
increase interoperability (Rationalization, Standardization,
Interoperability -- RSI) was again prompted by the US, but this time due
to a congressional requirement. 315 Similarly, Gen. Alexander Haig, the
new SACEUR, had begun to study potentials for increasing NATO force
flexibilities. Finally, Secretary Schlesinger himself proposed to

314 On the Flexibility Studies, see Wendt/Brown, op. cit., pp. 13 ff.
315 The RSI effort was prompted in 1974 by the Nunn Amendment to the
"Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, [FY] 1975" (P.
L. 93-365). The amendment stipulated that the "Secretary of Defense
shall undertake a specific assessment of the costs and possible loss of
nonnuclear combat effectiveness of the military forces of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries caused by the failure of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, including the United States,
to standardize weapons systems, ammunition, fuel and other military
impedimenta for land, air, and naval forces." The law required the
secretary to report to Congress and NATO bodies on the results and make
proposals for remedial action. In 1975 the Culver-Nunn Amendment to P.
L. 94-106 declared the sense of the Congress that equipment procured for
US forces in Europe be standardized or interoperable with allied forces.
For a complete history and documentation on RSI, see American Defense
Preparedness Association (ed.), Reference Book on NATO Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI), 2 vols., Arlington, VA:
ADPA, 1979.
extend the time period covered by NATO planning in order to be better able to influence national plans and the ministerial guidance given in 1975 specified a "Long-Range Defense Concept" which was intended to guide the military authorities in the plan preparation. These and other activities such as the formulation of a program to deploy Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, drew attention away from an initiative that was five years old and whose main rationale no longer existed. The threat of American troop withdrawals seemed no longer imminent, the Czech crisis had more or less faded from immediate memories and political solutions to the military problem seemed to be given greater attention.

The Impact of AD70, EDIP, and Basic Issues

It is not easy to assess what the actual impact of these initiatives was on NATO capabilities. A systematic study would require analysis of NATO and national plans before the launch of the special initiatives and after their execution. This is not possible, however, for several reasons. First, country plans are not static over several years and change in response to changes in the political and economic situation, technological advances, and industrial capacities. Second, the problem of classification does not allow detailed examination of procurement plans, financial data etc. As was pointed out earlier, the exact scope of the special initiatives cannot be known because the measures associated with them are not publicly known in detail. Third, the special initiatives themselves changed in the course of the years and especially the Basic Issues Initiative can be seen as an effort to refocus efforts made under AD70. Fourth, NATO itself has an insufficient reporting mechanism which causes a lack of critical data.

\footnotetext[316]{See Texts of Final Communiques, 1975-1980, pp. 24-29.}
\footnotetext[317]{See Wendt/Brown, op. cit.}
Nevertheless, attempts to assess the status of NATO capabilities were attempted repeatedly, mostly upon the initiative of the US, military commanders, or the EWG. One such attempt of the EWG to assess the impact of AD70 and associated initiatives in the spring of 1974 was to analyze funding trends within the AD70 priority areas. In the Central region for example, total expenditures rose almost 50% from 1970-1974 and the shares of national GNP devoted to defense also rose. Inflation was assumed correctly to be in the region of 25-30% during that period (see Table B-4).

Much slower nominal growth was expected for the period until 1980, however, and expected to be in the neighborhood of 2% per year. Because of the increases in prices for defense related equipment, the report noted that although equipment spending had gone up, procurement plans only went up slowly.\textsuperscript{318} Analyzing expenditures by major equipment categories in the Center Region, the report found that funding of air defense, armored personnel carriers, and antitank weapons went up, yet with slowdowns expected by 1976 as these programs neared completion. At the same time, resources for major platforms, such as tanks, aircraft and ships had decreased. For the Northern Region, the report noted that resources had been increased only slightly more than necessary to compensate for (GDP) inflation and that perhaps about 2% real increases could be expected until 1980. Major improvements were said to be visible. In the South, funding rose much faster than inflation and translated into important improvements in the equipment area. Aircraft replacement took much of those increases but proportionally resources for the navies went up the fastest.

A functional analysis of expenditure trends for the Central Region, for example, showed that expenditures for anti-tank weapons as share of the overall outlays for equipment had almost doubled. Funding for tanks and armored vehicles, however, was almost down by half, indicating that

\textsuperscript{318}For comparative procurement data, see the budget sections in Part III.
a shift of resources had taken place from the latter to the former, coupled with an overall decrease in the tank/anti-tank category. The share of funding of aircraft went down about 20%, as did funds for ships. Air defense and armored personnel carriers received largely increased monies, along the line with a 50% increase of resources for Army command, control, and communications.

With regard to the general economic outlook, the report noted that GNP growth could be expected to slow down to perhaps 2% annually through 1980 and that this was a much lower forecast than the 1972 OECD forecast of 5% per year for the same period. Inflation was expected to be high with about 10% annually. As shown in Table B-3, the growth forecast was about one half point too low. Actual GDP growth (average) was in the neighborhood of 2.3% for the European OECD members and 2.7% for the US. Regarding the inflation forecast no data is available for the NATO area specifically. As Table B-4 shows, inflation actually ranged from an average 12% per year for European OECD members to 7.5% for the US.

Conclusions:
Organizational Impediments to Conventional Defense Improvements

The leading issue for Part B of this study was the question whether organizational problems created a barrier to conventional defense improvements. The review of AD70, EDIP, and the Schlesinger Basic Issues Initiative suggests that a number of organizational problems existed.

External Pressure and Special Initiatives. AD70 is an example where a credible threat of US troop reductions led to an improvement initiative. The main reason for launching AD70 and EDIP was the threat of a successful Mansfield Amendment, which would have reduced the number of US troops deployed in Europe. An additional element was the declining budgetary trends and the need for the Europeans to assume a greater share of the defense burdens. AD70 and EDIP represent the only examples for 1970s improvement initiatives where NATO or the European allies started a special initiative. This political pressure to hedge
Table B-3
REAL GROWTH IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
(Percent Change)

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<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
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Table B-4
IMPLIED PRICE INDEX OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
(Percent Change)

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Note: Since no aggregate figure for all NATO members combined could be obtained, various country groupings are listed for approximation.

*US, Japan, FRG, France, UK, Italy, Canada

against troop reductions appears to have been more successful prompting additional efforts than previously existing analyses of NATO deficiencies. Once the American troop presence was at stake, the threshold was crossed after which action was necessary. This suggests that the US presence in Europe might be a useful American lever for additional allied contributions.

**Reservations about the Scope of Improvements.** As the review of the development of the AD70 organizational and procedural framework has shown, there was a strong incentive to use the initiative as a political vehicle to document additional efforts. Despite rhetorical commitment to AD70 and EDIP, the West German and other European governments tried to limit additional commitments to a minimum. The EDIP is a prime example of this. The entire program only comprised additional expenditures of $1 billion over five years, i.e., a minimal increase of the combined European budgets. There was also resistance against specificity in background studies which might have substantiated the need for additional efforts. For political reasons the FRG and the General Secretary were keen to not reexamine in depth problems with MC 14/3 and NATO's posture as a whole. If such a debate had been opened, the fear was, this might lead to a similarly divisive debate as that over strategy in the 1960s. As a result, existing compromises were reaffirmed and the scope of the initiative limited largely to already planned efforts and political repackaging such as the annual EUROGROUP listings of European efforts.

**Problems of Prioritization.** Because of the limitation of resources and commitments the problem of priorities became a major problem. First the FRG and other countries were reluctant or opposed to agree to priorities that were not already included in their plans. Moreover, they were opposed to changes of priorities. They argued that flexibility to alter existing plans was very limited because of contractual constraints and the rigidities of the planning systems, which required them to make long-term decisions very early. Although these appeared to
be legitimate concerns, these arguments also served the useful purpose of hedging against a shift in emphasis such as the Basic Issues Initiatives.

A second problem of prioritization existed at the NATO level. The military authorities were very reluctant to rank their recommendations for AD70 by importance. As was noted, the EWG and the ministers had to make choices about AD70 priorities because of the MG's unwillingness or inability to do so. The civilian authorities were not properly equipped to make these choices in the best possible way, however. Unlike the military authorities, they did not have the staff and information to work on these issues in detail.

Resistance Against Implementation Controls. A review of the discussions about the procedures to insure implementation and reporting on the AD70 and Basic Issues efforts gave further evidence for the thesis that European countries had major reservations about the special initiatives and therefore obstructed its procedures. It turned out that the US was consistently pushing for a detailed and strict reporting mechanism to monitor implementation of the agreed-upon objectives. The Europeans, the FRG prominently among them, frequently argued against such procedures because of fears that negative reports might be politically damaging and legitimize American calls for new and additional measures.

For the same reason, many of the measures were phrased in a way that made implementation control difficult ("increase number of ...," "improve ..."). Baselines against which success or failure could be measured were not set. This allowed no systematic conclusions about the ultimate success of the initiatives in terms of combat capabilities and left wide room for political judgements. That close monitoring was resisted can also be concluded from the fact that the European allies resisted detailed special reports and frequently cited duplication in reporting procedures, staff limitations and work loads as arguments. At the same time it was very difficult to get them to agree to DPQ formats which would assess NATO capabilities in an informative way, rather than listing equipment numbers, personnel etc.
Other Problems. It appears from the analysis of AD70 that process also served to delay improvement action. Although the initial development of the AD70 report and EDIP took less than a year, it took another two years until the bulk of the proposals had entered the force planning cycle as concrete force goals and were approved in December 1973 as the 1973-78 Force Plan. By then the political pressure (Mansfield) that had brought the initiative about had passed its peak and, because of the delays in implementation, the US had already launched the Basic Issues initiative.\footnote{319See Williams, *The Senate and Troops in Europe*, op. cit., chapters 7 and 8.}

Delays were not always voluntary or intentional. Lack of information also caused some delays and problems in defining measures and objectives clearly. Sometimes European countries were reluctant to provide planning data because they did not want to be held to it in order to preserve their freedom of decision. In other instances, data was simply not available or it was too cumbersome to produce it.

The most important constraint on the initiatives was the level of resources available for defense. Resources were the most direct and measurable constraint against full implementation and very much drove the organizational set-up. It is interesting, however, to note that the resource situation was used to legitimate almost all shortfalls. Resource constraints appeared as unchangeable parameters, removed from political decisions, military threats, strategy, and risks. Because no net assessment existed on NATO's part and consensus on NATO strategy was vague, it was difficult to determine the marginal utility of added financial efforts in terms of military capabilities. The absence of such standards did not allow for the formulation of optimal resource levels.
V. THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

Introduction

The LTDP was consciously developed against the background of prior attempts to improve the conventional forces of NATO both within existing planning structures as well as through special initiatives, such as AD70 and Basic Issues. The LTDP therefore was designed to avoid the problems of these prior initiatives.

Robert Komer, who both conceived of the program and then initiated and carried it out was a skeptic regarding the NATO defense planning cycle. He therefore had made an early decision in favor of a special initiative that would frequently and consciously largely circumvent existing procedures and offices at NATO.

Because of Komer's prior analyses of the success and failure of previous initiatives, the LTDP can be seen as the result of a learning process which tried to incorporate past experiences and avoid the same errors. As will become clear, this was not always possible.

The LTDP had four major characteristics. First it was a major American initiative and Washington remained the main force behind it until the Carter administration left office. AD70 had been more an activity that came from Brussels and European capitals as part of an attempt to fend off a Mansfield amendment. Second, like AD70 (and unlike the relatively narrow Basic Issues) it was a large scale effort to improve alliance defenses in ten areas over a 15-year period. A major emphasis lay on defining more clearly and rapidly than in AD70 what the specific objectives and program goals were. Third, the initiative was an effort to improve on the follow-through of the nations to implement alliance force goals as adopted in the LTDP. Previously this had been found to be a weak area in NATO planning. Finally, the LTDP was coupled closely with a resource guidance which specified that the NATO allies should seek to increase their annual outlays for defense by three percent in real terms.
Origins: The Need for a Special Initiative

Three main elements contributed to the launch of yet another special NATO planning initiative. The first was the ongoing attempt by SACEUR and SHAPE to improve NATO conventional improvements, the second was the congressional effort to improve NATO capabilities through improved rationalization and standardization of allied equipment and procedures; third and most important was the work done under Ambassador Komer at the RAND Corporation during the mid-1970s and Komer's ability to interest the incoming Carter administration to pull all these efforts together into an administration program aimed at improving NATO's defenses.

Efforts at the NATO Level. The substance of the actual LTDP was the result of studies sponsored by Gen. Alexander Haig, the then-SACEUR, and SACLANT Adm. Kidd. concerning the area of command, control, and communications, as well as the capabilities for readiness, reinforcement, and rationalization (SACEUR's "three Rs"). According to the principal proponent of the LTDP, Robert Komer, these studies -- known as "Flexibility Studies" -- were the "intellectual well-spring from which much of the Long Term Defense Program has been constructed."^{320}

Congressional Pressure. In Washington, legal action by Senator Nunn forced the DoD to assess the implications for NATO's combat effectiveness and defense budgets of the failure to standardize weapons systems. The Nunn-Amendment, contained in Public Law 93-365 on the "Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization" for 1975, also asked the Department to make proposals for joint activities with the allies based on this assessment and report to the Congress periodically on its efforts. In the following year, Senators Nunn and Culver succeeded in passing another amendment (to P.L. 94-106, the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976) which noted the sense of the

Congress "that equipment, procedures, ammunition, fuel and other military impediments for land, air and naval forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or made interoperable with that of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the maximum extent feasible."\(^{22}\)

Within DoD's office for International Security Affairs (ISA) this Nunn/Culver amendment led to the creation of a steering group under the direction of MG Richard Bowman whose major task was to develop and supervise DoD's RSI policy.

**The Komar Factor.** The origin of the idea to pull these different initiatives and programs together lay elsewhere, however. Starting in the early 1970s individuals in the DoD and the RAND Corporation studied the possibilities of rationalizing of NATO's defense posture and implications of an MBFR-agreement on NATO force structure.\(^{32}\) The last of the RAND studies undertaken under the direction of Ambassador Robert W. Komar who was later to become Secretary Brown's personal advisor on NATO affairs, was finished close to the November 1976 Presidential Election and can be seen as providing the rationale for the specific organizational approach taken in the LTDP.

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Proposals: Catching the Carter Administration's Interest

Komer's attempt to introduce the new president to these ideas started in the final days of Jimmy Carter's campaign. In two letters to the candidate's Policy Planning Group, he offered some "gratuitous thoughts" and a "theme" for the wide variety of defense issues to be considered by the candidate and future president. In order for the President to appear both cautious and positive, Komer proposed that the theme should be "The Need for a More Rational Defense Posture," implying that enormous budget increases were not necessary to improve the efficiency of defense programs. In view of Carter's emphasis to limit military spending while at the same time providing for a strong defense, this theme would help to bridge an apparent contradiction which could be exploited by the political competitor.\textsuperscript{323} Because US General Purpose Forces were planned primarily for NATO contingencies, he argued, NATO should not be one issue among many others but that "the rationalization of NATO's posture (should be put) high on our agenda."\textsuperscript{324}

Improving US forces would not suffice to address the NATO problems because the US alone could not close the "conventional gap." In Komer's view any attempts to make required improvements could be generated only by US leadership. "This has traditionally been the case in NATO, where the Europeans wait for (and respond only to) US initiatives." An initiative would have to be geared toward NATO's posture as a whole. Past national parochialisms needed to be replaced by collective, cooperative efforts. Neither the US nor any of the allies -- "except the FRG" -- had "ever optimized their posture for the NATO scenario, despite it being the chief justification for most of our current force structures," Komer claimed. The reason for this deficiency could be


\textsuperscript{324}August 31, 1976 letter.
found in the inadequate "management emphasis" given to the US NATO contribution by DoD although over 75% of our budget goes for General Purpose Forces, including a pro-rated share of R & D plus overhead." On the other hand, most of the allies were "equally short-sighted" and maintained forces in reasonable sizes yet "poorly configured, inadequately ready, and too slow-responding." 325

In order for the US to lead, a continuation of the present Nixon/Ford policies -- to do "more of the same" in Komer's words -- was not adequate although that administration had been gradually "pushing NATO toward a more credible deterrent posture. [...] The trouble is that (the administration) has not enough steam behind them." In addition, the United States itself had not restructured its force in an exemplary way "to make our proposals credible to others." Komer noted Sen. Nunn's amendments to improve the teeth-to-tail ratio of US forces in Europe as one significant, yet too slowly paced improvement and added that it was important that the US government itself seized the initiative. 326 Because of the 4-8 year time lag with which improvements would lead to visible results, action was required immediately. 327

Organizing to Overcome European Resistance

Two major tools were to overcome expected resistance domestically and on the part of the European allies. One was political highlighting at various levels, the other a carefully crafted process.

Political Highlighting. Attention to the US initiative could be gained according to Komer if the new president gave an early major speech in which he outlined his policy on Europe and NATO as suggested in Komer's submissions. In parallel, the President should send personal messages to key allies and NATO's Secretary General. The themes as

325 Appendix to letter of August 31, 1976, p. 1 and appendix to letter of September 20, 1976, pp. 1 and 4, Komer's emphasis.
326 Ibid.
outlined by the President should then be repeated and elaborated on by administration officials on various levels. Another element was the use of special high level committees and reports which would be concerned with the development and implementation of the initiative. At the Congressional front, Komor suggested to advertise the initiatives as "part of a broader effort to enhance NATO conventional deterrence" which will "ask similar steps from our allies and will not require massive increases in the US defense budget."328

Process. With regard to the appropriate process to assure success, Komor suggested strongly that the United States take the lead because the initiative was aimed at overcoming deficiencies for which mostly the allies, but not they alone, were responsible. The stress of collective efforts was meant to produce allied momentum. Another important element was the packaging of the American proposals. Komor's papers made clear that the proposals had to be specific, yet comprehensive, and that they should be presented in the form of a 4-year action program implying that accountability and implementation controls were important aspects.

In order to get a head-start, he proposed that task forces be already created before the inauguration to provide back-up studies and briefings for the President-elect. The spring ministerial NATO-meetings were given as a convenient and opportune target date for which to design and introduce the American proposals, because the allies would still be curious about the administration policies toward Europe. Also a new issue of the bi-annual Ministerial Guidance was due then. This document could for the first time then reflect American ideas and set the stage for follow-up work.

Within the United States government, Komor intended to streamline policymaking on NATO issues. He suggested to establish two new Deputy Secretary posts with a primary responsibility for NATO affairs among other things. He also urged an upgrading of the Program Analysis and

328Ibid., p. 9.
Evaluation (PA&F) office in OSD to assist the Secretary in making trade-offs by providing back-up studies and options. He also proposed to clearly separate the positions of service chiefs of staff from Joint Chiefs positions, partially because of the massive workload, but more importantly, to create an institutional structure more likely to establish truly joint policies. The attractiveness of the American initiative was to be further increased through a coordination of it and the NATO position on MBFR. This would facilitate the allies to sell the program at home and provide a convenient stage for "gambits" complementing the arms control position.

A final element of reshaping the planning process was aimed at NATO directly. To create attention and political pressure for his initiative, Komer suggested to establish a "small NATO Wise Men's Group of selected senior statesmen to recommend overhaul" of NATO similar to earlier such groups in the 1950s and 1960s. Komer maintained that the NATO force-planning cycle had to include not only force goals, but also parameters of overall resource allocation. Second, he suggested to extend the time period covered by armament planning; in order to get a better handle on standardization and interoperability the planning horizon had to be moved forward to ten years in order to compensate for long procurement lead times. Third, a 10-year common C³ plan should be designed to avoid "wasteful duplication in this very costly field." Fourth, NATO's infrastructure program should be strengthened with the US to offer a coverage of twice its previous share of 20% if the allies agreed to double its size. Fifth, to create a "Center Region LOC Command and a commonly funded SACEUR munitions stockpile." Sixth, a NATO-wide policy of no-cost cross-licensing for new equipment ought to be established. In Washington NATO policy preparation and execution was supposed to be improved through the creation of second Deputy Secretaries at DoD and the State Department. ³²⁹ To back these proposals politically in Washington, he urged to get the Congress to pass a Joint

³²⁹ App. to Sept. 20 letter, p. 16.
Resolution urging standardization, and totally eliminate "buy American" provisions as a "sign of good faith." Such a resolution would "help to commit the reluctant House" to go along. 330

From Theory to Practice: The Long-term Defense Program Takes Shape

Tony Lake and Lynn Davis of the Policy Planning Group compiled the papers provided by Komor and others into an "issue book" which was given to Jimmy Carter the day after the election. This issue book was then reviewed by the Transition Team of which Lynn Davis again was a member. However, with regard to the papers on NATO, no additional work was done so that it is unclear whether anyone except Lake and Davis read the papers. 331 However this may be, Komor succeeded in getting the new administration interested in his suggestions and the development of the administration's NATO policy demonstrated unmistakably Komor's signature.

In January 1977 he was named consultant to the new Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. Komor's prime responsibility was to advise the Secretary on NATO affairs. This was a first step toward creating a high level position in DoD in charge of NATO policies. Building on the work he did at the RAND Corporation, especially his last study on "Alliance Defense in the 80s (AD 80)," which contained a great number of suggestions and measures to be taken by NATO, Komor drew largely on the staff input provided by a two-star level working group headed by Major General Richard Bowman (the "RSI working group"). Although this group did not start to work on the LTDP proper for the Carter Campaign, as Komor had urged, it provided the staff and analytical back-up from the very earliest days after the inauguration. This insured that no time would be lost in formulating a proposal quickly and making sure that political support would not dissipate before the initiative was

330 Tbid.
331 Letter from Lynn Davis to author, 11 January 1985.
incorporated in national force plans. The pace of these preparations thus reflected Komar's plea for "steam."

The RSI group produced papers on each of the topics originally suggested by Komar. He collected these documents as a basis for his report to the Secretary of Defense, entitled "Improving NATO Defense." In this report, he outlined the envisaged program in a way similar to the background papers sent to the Carter/Mondale Policy Planning Group. The focus was on a functional (as opposed to a country-by-country) approach, and discrete initiatives whose results could be measured. The RSI group was then organized into separate task forces which were to deal with the topics considered of primary importance. Within a year, i.e. until spring of 1978 a concrete program was to be developed that could be passed during the spring NATO meetings. Such a rapid process was intended to avoid a weakness of AD70: it had taken almost three years to formulate specific force goals, by which time the political pressure that had led to its inception had largely dissipated.

The London Summit in May 1977

The Komar report was approved by the Secretary of Defense and almost all of his ideas found their way into official policy. After Harold Brown's approval, the report was reviewed by an inter-agency group. The idea of an early summit of NATO heads of state and government had also been picked up from Komar's list of proposals and the inter-agency group used Komar report to Brown to prepare the President's speech to the North Atlantic Council meeting on May 10 of 1977 in London.

In that speech Carter presented to the allied Heads of State two proposals.\textsuperscript{332} The first part of the proposal suggested for the Council to undertake "a special alliance review of East-West relations" assessing the impact of the visible political and military trends within

the two blocs and analyzing the implications for the West. Second, he proposed that the defense ministers -- who were to get together the week after the Heads of State meeting -- should begin to develop a long-term defense program that could help the alliance to make choices and set priorities in defense planning, thus ensuring that the combined means would be used most effectively. This program, he said, should make full use of the work already done in the alliance, but a mere plan would not suffice:

We must insure that our alliance has an adequate means for setting overall goals in defense, for measuring national performance against these goals, and for devising and carrying out these programs. I propose that our Defense Ministers, working closely with the Secretary General, consider how best to strengthen the alliance's ability actually to fulfill agreed programs. After an interim report to the December 1977 meeting, I hope the Defense Ministers will submit their program to the Spring meeting, which might be held at the summit to review their recommendations. I also hope the defense administrators will agree next week to make high-priority improvements in the capabilities of our forces over the next year.\(^\text{333}\)

With this speech, Carter seized most of the arguments and points prepared by Komer and others. Carter had used the summit to highlight the need for an action program. He had urged that it be passed quickly and emphasized that follow-through should be a major element. Carter had also used Komer's arguments to make the case for an LTDP. The President had argued that NATO in fact had the means to muster an effective defense posture within the agreed framework of flexible response.

As noted before,\(^\text{334}\) Carter's speech was followed by remarks of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who welcomed Carter's remarks regarding cooperation in defense production, the broadening of defense-related

\(^{333}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 600}\)

\(^{334}\text{See Chapter I.}\)
transatlantic trade and, above all, the strengthening of conventional forces.\textsuperscript{335} The two speeches were marked by much agreement between Carter and Schmidt, also on the need for an initiative, contributing to the generally positive atmosphere which was reported to have dominated the session. Carter himself was also very positive about Schmidt's and others' contribution, telling journalists that he felt "the common sharing toward NATO in the US -- which was endangered a few years ago -- has been restored."\textsuperscript{336} The Final Communique of the NAC meeting reflected this atmosphere and the proposals of President Carter were agreed on:

Leaders of states taking part in the integrated defense structure of the Alliance requested their Defense Ministers to initiate and develop a long-term program to enable NATO forces to meet the changing defense needs of the 1980s and to review the manner in which the alliance implements its defense programs to ensure more effective follow-through.

[...] the Allied leaders requested the Council in permanent session to make a fresh study of long-term trends in East-West relations and to assess their implications for the alliance.\textsuperscript{337}

Follow-up

The communique of the London summit thus set the stage for the development of the organizational structure and program elements of the LTDP. The specifics of the program were worked out a week later during the meeting of the NATO ministers of defense (DPC) in Brussels on May 17-18. The program itself was to be reviewed by a second summit in


spring 1978 to which Carter had invited ministers and heads of state and governments to Washington. The defense ministers in turn asked the DPC in Permanent Session
to prepare a time-phased defense action program concentrating on a limited number of areas where collective action is urgently required and to review means for strengthening NATO programming and implementing machinery, for Ministerial approval in the Spring of 1978 and to be transmitted to Heads of State and Government at their meeting in Washington. To complement this effort, Ministers agreed to initiate on a more immediate basis a program of short-term measures in areas of anti-armor, war reserve munitions, and readiness and reinforcement.38

This brief paragraph contained the key words for the follow-up. The DPC/PS had to work out a time-phased action program in priority areas, i.e. make suggestions regarding the scope of the measures and the timeframe within which they were to be implemented. The DPC/PS was also to propose changes to the programming and review machinery. This meant that special committees and procedures were to be developed to insure proper definition and execution of the program measures. The following sections will review each of these elements in more detail.

**Special Committees and Procedures**

A major feature in Komor's conception of the LTDP was the creation of special committees and procedures to insure the success of the program and to highlight its objectives and importance. As was pointed out before, summits at the head of state and government level were crucial for this concept because they were used to create the political commitment of the allies to the LTDP and to make it harder for any minister or member country to argue that there was not sufficient political support in his country to join in the LTDP.

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38 See the DPC Final Communiqué op. cit., pp. 68-70 (68).
New groups and committees were also created at the staff level. The US had proposed establishing Task Forces in charge of studying NATO defense problems and possible remedies in preparation for the LTDP during the Spring 1977 DPC ministerial meeting. Task Forces were established by the DPC in Permanent Session two weeks after the ministerial meeting for each of the ten priority areas that had been identified of particular importance. The main rationale for this American proposal was to avoid long delays in program definition which Komor believed likely if the LTDP handling was left to the traditional channels of the NATO bureaucracy. Each of these Task Forces was chaired by a "Director" chosen either by SACEUR or the NATO International Secretariat in order to avoid too much conflict with existing bodies. They came either from international staffs at NATO or were sent by nations. All the Task Forces, except Task Force Ten on Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, were placed under the direction of an Executive Working Group (EWG), chaired by Ambassador Pansa Cedronio who was NATO Deputy Secretary General. (For a listing see Table B-5.) Task Force Ten was under the aegis of the Nuclear Planning Group which in turn created both a High Level Group to study the force requirements and equipment options and (later) a Special Group to develop an arms control policy to accompany the modernization initiative.

The EWG had originally been created to run AD70 and was now revitalized for the LTDP. It consisted of senior national and international officials and sometimes met reinforced by top officers from the capitals when the subject matter required heightened attention. The chairman of the EWG was charged with reporting to the DPC at the ministerial level during the winter meeting.

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Table B-5
TEN TASK FORCE AREAS OF LTDP

I. Readiness
II. Reinforcement
III. Reserve Mobilization
IV. Maritime Posture
V. Air Defense
VI. Command, Control and Communications
VII. Electronic Warfare
VIII. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)
IX. Consumer Logistics
X. Theater Nuclear Forces

and then again to the NAC during the Washington Summit in the Spring of 1978 on progress in the individual Task Forces concerning the development of specific measures. These task forces were staffed by military as well as civilian officers recruited from NATO or capitals and also included consultants and experts, all in an international capacity as the entire exercise was to be a multilateral in nature.

At the national level Harold Brown on May 27, 1977 ordered the establishment of parallel groups to "support (the Task Forces') work by providing advice and data." This group which was recruited mostly from the RSI-working groups was at a 1-2 star level and headed also by Maj.

Gen. Bowman. These national Task Forces authored the fourth and subsequent RSI reports which were to be almost entirely devoted to the emerging LTDP. In addition, Ambassador Komer was appointed Advisor to the Secretary of Defense (a promotion from his previous consultant status) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs on September 12, 1977. Eight months after the inauguration of the Carter administration, the core of Komer's staff proposals had thus become policy.

Similar "shadow Task Forces" had been created in the West German MoD by delegating responsibility for the various priority areas to the specialized desks in the Armed Forces Staff and the service staffs.

About two months after that North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington in May 1978, and after the submission of condensed Task Force reports, NATO also identified special Action Bodies which were to develop in greater detail specific programming steps in each task force area, propose detailed implementation plans and supervise the execution of the measures. The task forces had not prepared remedial measures but only identified areas of greatest deficiencies and options for improvement. The responsibility for developing the more specific programming proposals was left with the Action Bodies. Based on the Task Force reports the action bodies made suggestions as to the timing and phasing of remedial measures depending on their feasibility. Altogether 123 specific measures were proposed for implementation in July 1978.

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With the exception of the first and the eighth RSI Report none of the documents are classified. They are, therefore, an excellent source on LTDP measures and progress.

Interview.

Interviews.

The US also proposed to designate Program Monitors who were responsible to oversee the implementation of the measures. Such monitors were designated for the ten task force areas and were either senior NATO commanders or senior civilian officials in the IS.\textsuperscript{346}

It is difficult to evaluate the net effect of the creation of these new groups, but a few general observations can be made. Because of the many issues and the degree of detail involved in NATO force planning, the ministers could not but approve previously agreed agenda items. Although the instruments to actually influence the planning activities were made somewhat stronger by creating higher level staff groups and political support, the process remained within the existing organizational framework.

The attempt to circumvent the inertia of the existing organizations through the creation of special committees such as the Task Forces, Action bodies and Program Monitors was important to shake up standard operation procedures. Yet there might have been too high an expectation on Komer's part on how much could be gained by creating special bodies. It is an open question whether the potential gains through faster initial action and more clearly defined program elements did not in fact outweigh the disadvantages of organizing the effort outside the regular cycle and thus causing frictions with it. In the end, the same people and institutions that are usually responsible for planning took the LTDP in their hands and the same governments had to approve the measures. The only big difference lay in the fact that the heads of state and governments met twice on the subject of the LTDP to highlight its importance. Yet in the final analysis all of these individuals could only question countries concerned about certain aspects of their plans and performance. They could point at problems but had to rely on the cooperation of the countries to resolve them.

\textsuperscript{346}For details, see the section on implementation in this Chapter.
Timing and Phasing of Measures

A second interesting feature of the LTDP was its long-term emphasis coupled with a set of short-term initiatives. In order to get a head-start with NATO improvements, Komor had suggested that the US government propose the initiation of "Short-term Measures" which could be implemented quickly without much added cost. Long-term measures were to complement these and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan time-schedules for the implementation of some measures were compressed.

With this timing and phasing procedure, the planning process was supposed to be made more controllable by extending its horizon and tracking planning goals in more detail and over a longer time. The longer planning horizon also was intended to allow greater influence on long-range national plans which before were beyond the reach of NATO's six-year planning horizon. A final reason for these timing and phasing provisions was to accelerate implementation of the measures and to not let them be submerged into the regular planning process which would have taken much longer to define objectives.

The decisions of the ministerial meeting of the DPC May 17-18, 1977 called

1. for the preparation on a short-term basis of remedial measures in the area of anti-armor, war reserve munitions, and readiness and reinforcement; a list of possible measures was to be drawn up before June 30, 1977 by the Military Committee and the military commanders (especially SACEUR and SACLANT) according to an order of the DPC in permanent session. These proposals would then be reviewed by the DPC-PS and sent to capitals in order to implement "concrete and localized improvements in men and equipment in the three areas in question."347 These improvements were to take effect within a year or so after

\[\text{347 Atlantic News, no. 938, 8 June 1977, p. 1.}\]
being passed and were concentrated in the northern part of Central Europe (NORTHAG). 348

2. for the development of a long-term defense program to improve the long-term planning and the more efficient use of resources by the allies. This program was developed by the Task Forces which were created in July of 1977. 349

The Speed of Program Definition. SACEUR had a long list of measures that he considered crucial for NATO defenses. He was thus able to produce a list of short-term measures quickly for the deadline in the summer of 1977. The LTDP measures were to be developed until the spring of 1978, when both the DPC meeting and the Washington summit would take place. The December 6-7, 1977 DPC meeting reviewed the progress made by the task forces in preparing LTDP measures and confirmed that the list with final proposals should be ready in early March. The twelve month period between the London and Washington summits gave the capitals of member nations time to review and comment on the proposals and, if necessary, suggest revisions to be included in the final LTDP.

The long-term program required substantial work by civilian as well as military staffs in NATO as well as in the capitals of the countries in the integrated command structure (i.e. less France, Greece and Iceland). Considerable resistance arose on the part of the West German and other European governments over US time pressure to define measures, provide data and reports in less than the usual time. A frequent complaint was that the data required was so detailed that staffs were overburdened and could not produce adequate inputs. The planning division in the Armed Forces Staff (Fue S VI), for example, which had

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348 NZZ, 19 May 1977, p. 2. That most of the measures were to be implemented by the end of 1978 is also stated in Robert W. Komor, Statement Before the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Oct. 3, 1977, printed in USWB, Sept. 4, 1977, pp. 16-28 (20).

been given overall responsibility for LTDP implementation and the management of the MoD's position announced internally that it could no longer pursue the LTDP work at the same speed without delaying work on the Force Plan 1993. Apart from causing dissatisfaction in European MoD staffs, reporting quality also suffered at times and thus offset some of the advantages gained through speedier process. The complaint that staffs were overburdened was not limited to the capitals. The NATO military authorities also let it be known that they needed about 100 more staff positions for LTDP monitoring.

Despite these difficulties, the goal definition phase of the LTDP was about 2-3 times faster than in the case of AD70. It had only taken four months to agree to the ten areas the LTDP should concentrate on. One year later the 123 measures were adopted for implementation. For AD70, eight months were necessary to define the areas of main deficiencies. It took then two years until force goals had been defined in these areas which were passed in 1973. It can thus be argued that Komor's call for the rapid initiation of a program had been realized while political support for it was still at a peak. As will be seen below, this support faded in the implementation phase.

**Phasing of Long-term Measures.** 123 LTDP measures were eventually approved during the May 30-31 1978 Washington summit. They were categorized into four classes depending on how soon they could be implemented. Group A contained measures that were defined to the extent possible, i.e. where hardware or regulations were available or formulated. The measures in Group B were those that needed further elaboration before they could be implemented. Group C measures needed additional studying before they could be made more specific for implementation. In the last group, D, all other measures were included, that is, those that were completed or dropped as infeasible. This categorization was a useful way to make the LTDP a dynamic exercise. The categories insured that an objective in the definition phase would not be dropped simply because it was not yet fully defined. Once clear requirements were set, a study objective could be pushed up to Category
A. The pattern of movements of the measures between the various categories also provided an indicator on the fate of objectives, since the categorization allowed the tracking of measures in various phases of development. As it turned out, countries that objected to a Category A measure, for example, frequently proposed to downgrade them to Category B, or even C.

The distinction of short and long-term measures helped the alliance to get a quick political start for conventional defense improvements. Implementation of the short-term measures could be reported on as early as in the spring 1978 DPC meeting. They thus "served as a demonstration of unified allied resolve" and responded to Komor's plea for rapid action.\(^{350}\) At the same time, the long-term emphasis filled a gap between NATO and national planning horizons.\(^ {351}\) For the first time NATO planning focused systematically on objectives exceeding the horizon of the regular defense planning cycle and thus had an opportunity to affect national plans. This was particularly relevant to the procurement of new weapons and equipment which took more than a decade from the study phase to Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Because such plans could not be handled within NATO planning, this resulted in a lack of standardization, rationalization and interoperability. The spring 1980 ministerial DPC meeting agreed on a provisional procedure to extend the planning horizon. The ministers agreed to extend the Ministerial Guidance over a longer period and also called for the development of Long-term Planning Guidelines (LTPGs).

The Ministerial Guidance was to assist in developing LTPGs by outlining a set of political, military, technological and resource parameters. LTPGs were to concentrate on specific functional areas, such as air defense, and specify requirements for the long term while insuring that the LTPGs together would fit into a coherent conceptual


\(^{351}\) See David Nicholls, "Long Term Defense Planning," loc. cit.
framework. The development of these procedures took several years and the first LTPG was only issued in 1983.\textsuperscript{352}

**Scope of the Measures**

A third main emphasis of the LTDP initiative was to achieve a high degree of specificity of the adopted measures. Combined with the political commitment of the heads of state and government, as well as specific time schedules and implementation controls, such specificity was intended to insure that the LTDP would result in noticeable improvements.

In order to define clearly the scope of the program, not only rhetorical commitment to its objectives was needed. The negotiations over the measures showed that the various countries had a different sense of the degree of their commitment, costs involved, and program priorities. As a result measures frequently had to remain unspecific, or be reduced in scope through bargaining.

**Program Guidance: The Ministerial Guidance 1977.** The May 17-18, 1977 DPC meeting passed what could be considered the planning reference, or programming guidance, for the period 1979-84. The meeting issued a Ministerial Guidance to the military authorities and the Task Forces outlining the areas that should be paid specific attention during the development of force goals and LTDP measures.

The guidance document, published in a summary form as annex to the DPC communiqué, pointed at increased Warsaw Pact efforts in many areas.\textsuperscript{353} The guidance emphasized Soviet modernization of the MRBM force, Pact air forces, enhancement of maritime capabilities and steep increases of about 5% in resources allocated for defense. Before this background, ministers concluded that NATO had to make a special effort in order to change the adverse trend of widening disparities in conventional military capabilities.

\textsuperscript{352}Ibid., p. 31/32 and interviews.
The prescription for NATO improvements contained in the Ministerial Guidance was based on the view that improvement in the conventional area was of special importance if NATO wanted to avoid being forced into the use of nuclear weapons "at an early stage of a conflict." Priority was to be given to capabilities that would allow NATO to respond to attacks by Warsaw Pact forces after very little warning, although it was also intended that NATO should be able to deal effectively with the entire spectrum of threats. This priority implied that NATO needed "adequate, fully trained and exercised in-place forces, with the ability to mobilize and reinforce quickly. Therefore, "special emphasis should be placed on prestocking, on the timely provision of sea and airlift capabilities and on adequate reception facilities." However, the document stressed also three areas -- defense against armor, the maritime situation, and air defense -- as well as regional aspects and new technologies to be of crucial importance.

Like the guidances before, this document was not very specific. What were the standards to decide which capabilities "contribute[d] directly to deterrence" and best increased NATO's ability to "withstand the initial phases of attack?" Nor did the document define standards what "special emphasis" meant and how the priority areas should relate the rest of the goals. The specification of the measures was the task of the military authorities, but the guidance did not provide concrete yardsticks on how the military authorities' responsiveness to this guidance could be measured. This left the military authorities in the inconvenient situation of having to argue with the member countries themselves over what the specific priorities, trade-offs, and program targets should be. But the mandate contained in the Ministerial guidance was too vague to affect national plans which for the most part already existed. This vagueness was not undesired, however, for it left the member countries room for maneuver to decide nationally on their interpretation of priorities.
On the resource side, the 1977 Ministerial Guidance was similarly vague. It stated that the timely identification of necessary resources for programs was important and that economies of scale and multiplicative effects should be sought through allied cooperation. The Ministerial Guidance indicated that annual budget increases of the member nations should be in the region of 3%, recognizing that for some individual countries:

-- economic circumstances will affect what can be achieved;
-- present force contributions may justify a higher level of increase.\textsuperscript{356}

The 3% figure was further specified by the provision that individual target figures would need to be established for different countries and that "nations should provide the compensation for the inflationary impact of rising pay and price levels to ensure that planned real increases are achieved." The guidance also stated that it was "imperative that nations increase the cost-effectiveness of their defense expenditures, in particular, the percentage of such expenditure devoted to major equipment, but without detriment to combat readiness. The effective use of resources will depend to a large extent on progress in Alliance co-operation."\textsuperscript{355}

Three percent was the lowest common figure that could be agreed to with some, though limited commitment. It could serve as a multilaterally endorsed yardstick for national budget processes and it had important symbolic value when compared to increases in Soviet defense expenditures. But although affordability was one of Komer's main selling points, escape clauses were already in place which might bring the program to fall early on. The language allowed each country

\textsuperscript{356}Ibid., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{355}Ibid.
to take recourse to the argument that economic circumstances dictated a lower level of increases. The resource section was also too unspecific to underline the commitment to the LTDP because the 3% increases were not tied specifically to the program. Nor was the LTDP costed out in the spring of 1977 because the measures had not been developed in detail.\footnote{On the 3% issue, see Uwe Nerlich, \textit{The Making of a NATO-Priority}, unpublished manuscript, Ebenhausen: December 1979, pp. 7 ff.}

\textbf{The Development of Specific Measures}

\textbf{Short-term Measures.} Since work had already been done previously in various NATO staffs on necessary measures to improve certain shortfalls, SACEUR Gen. Alexander Haig was able to forward his recommendations for the short-term program to the Military Committee already in mid-July 1977. The MC, in turn, sent the proposals to the capitals for action on July 26. Altogether Haig submitted 140 measures in the three priority areas of (1) anti-tank capabilities, (2) war reserves, and (3) reinforcements (see Table B-6).

Some twenty measures of the package dealt primarily with anti-tank capabilities, particularly allied anti-tank guided missiles, ground-to-ground-missiles and air-delivered anti-armor munitions. In the second category of proposed improvements, war reserves, some forty measures were aimed, according to Haig's statement in a press conference on the package, at alleviating existing deficiencies in agreed-upon goals for war stocks. The remaining 80 measures fell in the third area of improvements, i.e. reinforcement and readiness of forces. Increases in readiness standards for in-place and mobile forces, improvements in the positioning of allied forces were the most significant examples mentioned publicly. This, and a large number of exercises, were intended to improve allied reaction and immobilization capabilities. Haig emphasized specifically that the short-term program included not only the Central Region and certain sectors therein as reported in some papers, but that the measures also applied to the flanks. With regard to the problem of costs, Haig stressed that the package was moderately
Table B-6

OVERVIEW OF MEASURES UNDER THE NATO SHORT-TERM IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM OF 1977

I. Anti-Armor
- Increase of modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) by 47,000 from end 1976 - end 1978 (=increase of about 1/3). About 23,000 of these TOWs.

- Deployment of an additional TOW-equipped US aviation company to Europe.

- Expeditions equipment of NATO reinforcing US-based divisions with Dragon.

- Equipment of Marine Amphibious Forces which are ear-marked as part of NATO's Strategic Reserve with modern (M-60A1) tanks, TOW-helicopter gunships, and Dragon AGMs for certain units.

II. War Reserve Munition
- Increase in ASW stocks.

- Increase in 105 mm tank gun and 155 mm howitzer rounds.

- Upgrade of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles from AIM-9B to AIM-9J.

- US increases of stocks of Sidewinder, Phoenix, Harpoon missiles, and Captor mines.

- Increases in Dutch Mark 46 torpedoes.

- Enlarged storage capacity for munitions in Central Europe and Italy.

III. Readiness and Reinforcement
- Encouragement for further forward deployment of land combat formations (considered by Netherlands and Belgium) and reduction of (deployment) times.

- Increases in prepositioned equipment and munitions for reinforcement units by Canada and US

- Improvement of reception facilities for external reinforcements.

- Higher efficiency of mobilization machinery, enhanced training for reservists and increases in manning levels of active duty Alliance forces.

priced, and that it would not lead to "drastic" additional expenses.\textsuperscript{357}

These comments by Haig also suggested the limitations of the short-term measures. In case the measures were not already included in the national plans, they had to be no-cost/low cost measures to be implemented. Because the budget ceilings of the ongoing and the next year were already firmly set, new funds could only come from shifting priorities. In the West German case, for example, this was difficult to achieve institutionally because of the lack of centralized planning authority.\textsuperscript{358}

**The Long-Term Defense Program.** Upon recommendation from the United States, the May 1977 ministerial meeting selected ten areas to be given priority attention by the Task Forces (see Table B-7 and B-8). These priority areas were intended to

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(1)] be designed to remedy a serious deficiency in NATO defenses, 
  \item[(2)] identify national or multilateral contributions required to remedy the deficiencies, over the long-term (1985-1990) as well as mid-term (1979-1984), 
  \item[(3)] establish timings for the critical phasing of these contributions, 
  \item[(4)] exploit all opportunities to achieve greater interoperability and standardization, and 
  \item[(5)] recommend machinery to facilitate greater Allied cooperation.\textsuperscript{359}
\end{itemize}

The specific measures of the LTDP were then worked out by the Task Forces under the guidance of the EWG until March 1978. As one American participant points out, the Task Forces were semi-autonomous in their work. But their reports had to be submitted to the capitals a few months before the Washington summit May 17-18, 1978. It was during that phase that measures and objectives were "watered down" to arrive at a document which was acceptable by all member nations.

\textsuperscript{357}The information on the short-term measures is based on the following articles: *Atlantic News*, no. 948, 13 July 1977, p. 1; *IHT*, 13 July 1977, p. 1; *NZZ*, 15 July 1977, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{358} Cf. Nerlich, *The Making of a NATO Priority*, p. 8 and Chapter IX.
\textsuperscript{359} See *Fourth RSI-Report*, p. 18.
Table B-7
OVERVIEW OF LTDP MEASURES, TASK FORCES I-V

I. Readiness
- Increase responsiveness of standing forces and selected reserve units.

- Improve NATO's alert machinery, including early commitments of national forces; orienting NATO exercises more heavily on common standards for effectiveness of reserves.

II. Reinforcement
- Program to improve air/sea reinforcement capabilities, taking into consideration possible increased use of wide-body aircraft, prepositioned material etc.

- Program to improve reception facilities.

III. Reserve Mobilization
- Primarily a European action; main emphasis on ground forces reservists and reserve units and improving European rather than American reserves.

IV. Maritime Posture
- Improve families of surface and air-launched anti-surface ship missiles, gun ammunition interoperability plus over the horizon targeting capability.

- Better ASW through lightweight torpedoes and defensive capabilities.

- Attain improved data link and tactical communications interoperability.

- Improve mine, mine laying and mine counter-measures capabilities.

- Improve joint defense missile system/close-in weapon systems capabilities.

V. Air Defense
- Develop family of surface-to-air missiles and guns, including a phased procurement program.

- Develop family of air superiority and air-to-air missile systems including a procurement program.

- Achieve "full Stage B" aircraft cross servicing.

- Procurement of full-scale integrated airborne early warning system (AWACS).
VI. Command, Control and Communications
- Adapt NATO capabilities to needs for 1980s and beyond, aiming at compatibility/interoperability of NATO C³ down to corps level.

- Improve survivability, mobility and transmission security.

VII. Electronic Warfare
- Agree on EW concept for NATO.

- Establish programs for ground, sea, and air forces including self protection and EW and EW training.

VIII. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)
- Improve mechanisms to achieve improved standardization/interoperability.

- Streamline requirements definition phase and priority setting.

IX. Consumer Logistics
- Improve consumer logistics structure, logistic support for NATO operational plans and civil-military links.

- Develop a program for a Central Region Alliance Communication Zone.

- Establish a common logistics reserve.

- Preposition stocks.

- Build full cross servicing capability for aircraft.

X. Theater Nuclear Forces
- Provide overall concept for long-term modernization.
In the case of many of these [123 measures], however, commitment to implement the actions required had been circumscribed by caveats. "Agreed" LTDP measures were endorsed "in principle," remanded for study, or deferred, pending further elaboration and refinement. As with all major NATO decisions, Allied leaders accepted a consensus document, with adequate maneuver room built in to preserve national prerogatives and make monitoring of compliance difficult.\textsuperscript{360}

The main sticking points in the negotiations about the LTDP measures were those that were not already contained in national plans and might require additional funds. The US proposed that the FRG, for example, increase its force commitments to NATO by assigning home defense brigades to NATO. These brigades were to remain under national command to protect the rear and insure that NATO troops could maneuver freely behind the front. A decision on such an increase in assigned forces required high level political decisions which had not been reached yet because the new Army structure was still under discussion. Before a decision on the new structure had been reached the FRG was reluctant to make any commitments.\textsuperscript{361} Another requirement which called for an increase in ready reserves would have had adverse budgetary implications because of necessary increases in War Authorized Strength (WAS), peacetime equipment holding units, reserve training slots etc.

In those cases where national plans and procedures already fulfilled requirements, there was of course no debate. The FRG had no problem, for example, accepting a requirement which called for a synchronization of alert procedures among the allies to insure that there would be no delays in the handing over assigned forces to NATO


\textsuperscript{361}In the early 1980s two such home defense brigades were categorized "earmarked for NATO;" the remaining four were categorized as "other forces for NATO."
commands during a crisis. The West German alert system to a large measure already corresponded to the NATO alert stages and did thus not require adaptation. No or low cost requirements were also easily met. The earmarking of merchant ships or wide-body civil aircraft, for example, was approved by the West German cabinet without significant debate as early as November 1977.

In sum, agreement could easily be reached on requirements that were already contained in national plans, or were not financially or politically costly. When only partial approval could be obtained on measures, the arguments held usually that the national program was considered sufficient, that system performance was not proven in procurement decisions, that data was not available, or that the measure exceeded the financial ceilings. When a measure was turned down entirely, nations claimed that they were still studying the problem, that national legal restrictions could not be overcome, or that there were no resources available.

During the Washington summit the leaders approved the program submitted to them by their Defense Ministers, and welcomed in particular US willingness to preposition equipment for three additional US divisions in the Central Region by 1982. The infrastructure support for this material was to be financed by the European allies. The meeting also reconfirmed the pledge of the allies to increase their defense expenditure by 3% annually and noted "that almost all countries had indicated their intention to adjust their financial plans for defense in accordance with this aim." As President Carter pointed out in his speech to the Council, one of the unresolved aspects of the LTDP was follow-through action. The President stated that a situation should be avoided in which "bold programs [are] heartily endorsed -- then largely

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ignored." He pointed out that both the task force leaders and the US government had made proposals on implementation control such as establishing the post of a new Assistant Secretary General for Logistics, and "the clear assignment of responsibility for each program to one NATO body. Where appropriate, we would prefer a major NATO command." Following the president's suggestion, the matter was not discussed further during the meeting. Instead, the summit participants agreed to join Carter in calling "for vigorous follow-through action to be taken by national authorities and at NATO and international military headquarters."\textsuperscript{164} The Secretary General was asked to study possible modes of implementation control, including the question how the international staff could be strengthened.

Despite the difficulty in obtaining firm national commitments on measures that exceeded existing national plans and budgets, the development of the LTDP measures was a useful exercise. It pointed at weaknesses in NATO defenses and proposed measures to redress those, even though in a vague form at times. The procedure for determining the goals had proven to be effective, given the political constraints in the alliance. It could simply not be expected that a program could be approved that would produce major new demands on the countries without raising their objections. One of the major areas of emphasis was no cost/low cost measures. Some had significant effect on the effectiveness of allied defenses. The development of a comprehensive reinforcement plan and corresponding earmarking of additional lift capabilities is one example. A similar force multiplier was the 1982 agreement between the US and the FRG on Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS). According to this agreement the FRG will provide 93,000 support personnel during wartime to facilitate US reinforcements to Europe.\textsuperscript{365}

\textsuperscript{164}\textit{Ibid.}

With this higher degree of specificity, more streamlined procedures and higher level political support, the LTDP did not suffer from the same problems as AD70. Because there existed a dedicated machinery for the LTDP its momentum was more easily controlled, however. Like AD70 and Basic Issues, the LTDP could not change the financial and political constraints that underlie NATO planning.

**The Post-Afghanistan Measures.** This was no different after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. This instance of Soviet use of military power outside WP area was seen as reinforcing the need to accentuate and accelerate certain provisions in the LTDP and force goals. Unlike the package of measures that was adopted after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, no significant effects on budgets were attributable to the Post-Afghanistan measures.

On March 6, 1980 the DPC met in Permanent Session and proposed that the allies should develop "a balanced program of action to accelerate already agreed Alliance defense measures." The steps were intended to improve the NATO posture and to "signal to Soviet decision-makers that Soviet actions outside of NATO, but against NATO's interest, would not go unanswered." In subsequent meetings during April and May, the DPC agreed to proposals by the NATO Military Authorities and a US suggestion forwarded in a letter of SECDEF Brown in April, to proceed in a two-step manner with an emphasis on short-range measures in the first and longer-range items in the second stage. In May, the DPC agreed on near-term measures that consisted mostly of "earlier or augmented implementation of urgently required defense measures designed to improve force capabilities in the NATO area. These measures were derived largely from existing national plans and were based on comprehensive allied defense planning." (See Table B-9.)

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367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
Table B-9
OVERVIEW OF ACTION AREAS,
AFGHANISTAN PHASE I MEASURES

Acceleration and Augmentation of Programs for:

1. War reserves stocks of ammunition
2. Command, control and communications
3. Electronic warfare
4. Air defense
5. Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense
6. Readiness and availability of units
7. Training
8. Aerial refueling
9. Mining and other maritime assets
10. Land-based tactical air support of maritime operations
11. Aid to Turkey and Portugal

Source: Seventh RSI Report, pp. 76-77.

Defense ministers also called for a report until their next meeting in December which would identify, again on a country-by-country basis, further "specific measures for prompt or accelerated implementation." The entire exercise stood under the impression, emphasized by the United States, that the European allies had to take into consideration -- and adjust plans to the possibility of -- a diversions of US forces to Southwest Asia which were earlier earmarked for European reinforcement.\(^36^9\) The first part of the two-phased response was thought

to be implementable within a relatively short period of time. The measures were selected by NATO. Military authorities in cooperation with the respective countries executing the measures. Implementation was reported for the first time already in the 1980 DPQ and the DPC ministers noted the positive response of member nations in the communique of their meeting in December 1980. Yet this statement was more an expression of political intent than fact; the drafting of the 1980 DPQ had actually begun before the May ministerial meeting charging countries with these accelerations.370

Phase II measures were designed to fill gaps which might result from the diversion of US-NATO forces to theaters outside the NATO area. Again, the DPC in Permanent Session prepared the list of proposals for adoption by the Ministerial Session in December (see Table B-10 for an overview). During that meeting, ministers also reviewed the findings of a report commissioned in May which studied the effects of the situation in SWA on reinforcement. Proposals made by countries responding to this problem were included into the Phase II program, along with measures developed by the NATO Military Authorities. Again, the source of these proposals were mostly existing plans, force goals and the LTDP.

Follow-through on these measures was arranged within established procedures of NATO defense planning, i.e. the DPQ and Annual Reviews or under the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. Insofar as the measures were based on force goals, these force goals would be annotated as Phase II measures. Implementation of those measures outside the force goals was to be reported in a separate section of the DPQ.

A third set of measures were those developed by countries directly, outside the NATO planning cycle. They comprised actions such as military and economic assistance, deployment of forces and provision of transit facilities for reinforcements.371

370 Cf. loc. cit., pp. 148-152.
371 If not otherwise noted this section relied on the Seventh Seventh RSI Report, pp. 76-79.
Table B-10
OVERVIEW OF ACTION AREAS,
AFGHANISTAN PHASE II MEASURES

I. Readiness

Recategorization of national forces; improvement of deployment times; assignment of additional units; improve uploading times and improve equipment; for some countries earlier transfer of command authority; acceleration of procurement of anti-armor weapons for Central Region countries.

II. Reserve Mobilization

Acceleration of programs to provide additional reserve units; replacement of obsolete equipment; improvement of reserve training so as to increase number and availability of reserves.

III. War Reserve Stocks

Increase in stocks for critical ammunition items such as anti-armor artillery, TOW missiles, torpedoes, mines, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface anti-ship missiles, as well as air-to-air missiles and cluster bombs.

IV. Reinforcement Airlift

Compensation for possible diversion of US airlift resources through commitment of civil cargo and long-range passenger aircraft by other countries.

V. Maritime Measures

Acceleration of various modernization programs and enhancement measures.

VI. Host Nation Support

Acceleration of plans for reception and onward movement of reinforcements; conclusion of agreements on host-nation support and lines of communications arrangements, as well as combat service support.

VII. Aid to Portugal and Turkey

Acceleration of financial and material assistance in force modernization efforts of these countries.

Source: Seventh RSI Report, pp. 77-79.
The main point of undertaking the Afghanistan measures was to show that NATO was not doing anything substantive in response to the Soviet use of force outside its borders. The Post-Afghanistan measures were not much more than political symbolism that glossed over the intra-alliance disagreements over the interpretation of the implications of this Soviet action for East-West relations.

It could even be argued that the measures attracted attention away from the core of the LTDP by creating additional reporting requirements and sidetracking from Central Region concerns and shifting attention of alliance planning to "out-of-area" questions. This is not to say that these were not important. Rather the point is that, with the invasion of Afghanistan, a considerable amount of Washington's attention was drawn away from its primary alliance initiative, the LTDP.

**Controversies over Priorities**

A major subject of discussion between the US government and its European allies as well as with various NATO and national bodies was the problem of prioritizing the LTDP measures and their impact on national plans. At issue was the question of what the relative importance of the various LTDP areas was, as well as the question of how the LTDP should be ranked in the overall planning effort.

The US wanted to make the LTDP the top priority for alliance planning and subsume other measures under it. This was resisted by other countries when it meant that they would have to change their plans. For example, when Secretary Brown complained during the Spring 1979 ministerial meeting that implementation of the LTDP did not proceed as fast as he had hoped, the West German Defense Minister Hans Apel replied that he and his government made all efforts possible yet there existed too many priorities, that planning emphasis at the NATO level changed too often and that national planning could not always reflect these new emphases. In order to hedge against new demands on national contributions, the argument that a balanced defense plan was important
was repeated by the West German MoD at various other instances, such as
the discussions on the Afghanistan measures, in which the US was pushing
for stronger emphases on specific goals. 372

Warnings also came from the inside of the International Staff that
the LTDP was too selective an initiative to legitimate a rechanneling of
substantial funds away from other major areas. The Assistant Director
of Force Planning in the IS, Rolf Brabant, for example pointed out that
the LTDP did not address major platform procurements and thus was too
selective in nature. Moreover, Brabant criticized that the LTDP was not
costed out and that not even the realization of 3% increases across the
board would have paid for all the LTDP measures and essential force
plans. Brabant also noted that the high priority attached to the LTDP
by the Americans in combination with the high costs made the European
allies more reluctant to commit themselves in the regular force goal
cycle because of uncertainties about costs. 373 This shift of commitment
may have been desirable, if the LTDP had been an all-comprehensive
program. But because it did not address a number of planning areas,
platform procurement among them, the LTDP in fact disrupted NATO
planning to a considerable degree. This was one of the reason why
nations as well as NATO staffs had pled early on to incorporate the LTDP
in the regular planning cycle. Yet Komor's skepticism about the
effectiveness of that procedure did not allow this until the very end of
the Carter administration, when attention in Washington had shifted to
the Persian Gulf and European insistence continued. 374

Another problem of setting priorities was the relative importance
of the nine conventional task force areas which were to be given special
attention. The nine areas were not differentiated in importance
primarily because it was felt that they required equally urgent

372 Interviews.
373 See Rolf Brabant, "The Long-term Defense Program," NATO's
374 Ibid. and interviews.
improvement. A certain degree of prioritization was achieved through the categorization of the measures (from "Ready for Immediate Implementation" to "Further Study Required" and "Dropped/Implemented"). As mentioned before, nations resisted placing a measure in the first category if they could not fully implement it and/or when it was not already in their plans. Prioritization of the measures thus ultimately depended on national priorities and available resources. However, the LTDP, by its mere existence, highlighted the importance of certain measures and thus may have resulted in more attention being paid to these measures in the mid-term.

The timing of the various elements of the initiative -- Short-term Measures, the LTDP itself, Post-Afghanistan I and II Measures -- also created stirs. As they did during the Basic Issues initiative, the allies complained that the Post-Afghanistan measures should not be allowed to become super-priorities. They emphasized instead that balance was necessary in NATO planning and that priorities could not be changed as quickly as the US proposed without cutting into other vital planning areas. Partially this was a hedge against new demands, yet to a large degree this reflected valid concerns. On the West German side for example, it was difficult to reprogram funds allotted by Parliament and the military services were jealously watching over the budget shares. Moreover, the General Inspector did not have the institutional power to change an existing plan. The civilian side of the MoD, on the other hand, was not involved deeply enough in the intricacies of planning to press for adaptation.

In the context of the Post-Afghanistan measures, resistance against renewed prioritization existed also on the part of the Military Committee and the NMCs. When the Carter administration pushed for the acceleration of various LTDP measures, the MC and the commanders argued, as they had done before, that it was important to keep the existing and agreed upon plans in mind. They emphasized that the force proposals developed by them were carefully crafted and balanced, and that the LTDP already emphasized certain measures. Therefore, further accelerations
should be developed from the *force proposals* rather than the LTDP itself and for this additional resources should be made available.

The problem of setting priorities reveals a severe constraint for NATO planning. Priorities which add to the efficiency of the planning effort can only be imposed up to a limit. This limit is defined by national resource commitments and existing national priorities. If new elements are attempted to be superimposed beyond that limit, political resistance arises. This resistance is not only caused by the lack of political will but important institutional problems, such as the bureaucratic balance of power between military services and the top leadership, legal constraints regarding budgeting flexibility and the like. (This raises the important question how national priorities - military vs. others - can be changed.)

**Insuring Implementation**

Much of Komor's emphasis was laid on insuring effective implementation of the LTDP and the LTDP was therefore accompanied by an elaborate reporting and control mechanism. This mechanism was especially important as there existed a perception in the US government that the allies did not realize agreed-upon force goals within the NATO planning cycle and that, therefore, special implementation provisions had to be made. As Komor himself had pointed out frequently, and very much in line with his past experience as special advisor to President Johnson on the Pacification Program in Vietnam, the LTDP must focus not just on what to do but on how to do it - on strengthening NATO's machinery to follow through on what had been agreed, [...]

What the [LTDP] concept really adds is a coherent management framework for pulling together key NATO requirements.\(^{376}\)

This view of lagging allied implementation of force goals was not limited to ISA or Komer. President Carter himself alluded to this problem in his speech to the May 1978 NAC meeting where he said that "hearty endorsement" was not enough to guarantee the success of a program. The LTDP was intended to improve this situation by a clearer definition of program goals, implementation schedules and the close monitoring of execution by special program monitors.

**Program Monitoring.** The December DPC 1977 meeting approved the proposal that Program Monitors (see Table B-11) were to be selected from among major NATO commanders or high civilian officers in the IS that would track and report on progress on the various LTDP measures. The monitors for the LTDP areas were required to submit to the Secretary General annual reports on October 1, examining progress in their areas of responsibility. They were asked to include in their critical assessment suggestions for remedial action where progress lagged behind. Since execution was in the national domain the necessary data for these reports had to be provided by the member nations in an annex to the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), yet in a different reporting format than the main DPQ. Not least for time reasons, these national replies were -- unlike the DPQ -- not discussed and examined by the NATO civil and military authorities before circulation by the Program Monitors. However, another rationale for this revised

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378For the debates about these reporting formats and their analytical content, see Chapter III.
379This information is largely based on an article by a US officer who during the time of the LTDP was assigned to the Policy Branch, Plans and Policy Division at SHAPE. Cf. Lieutenant Col. David Jablonsky, "NATO's Long-Term Defense Planning: Will it Work?" Parameters, Vol. 11 (2) June 1981, pp. 75-82 (79). Additional information is based on interviews.
### Table B-11

**MONITORS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF TASK FORCE MEASURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force #</th>
<th>Functional Area</th>
<th>Monitor Office/Organization</th>
<th>Monitor Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Bernard W. Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reinforcement</td>
<td>Ass. Sec. General, Defense Plans &amp; Policy</td>
<td>William F. Mumford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reserve Mobilization</td>
<td>Director of IMS</td>
<td>Sir Allen Davies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maritime Posture</td>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Harry D. Train, III and Isaac Kidd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Air Defense (Planning Group)</td>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Bernard W. Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Communications, Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Bernard W. Rogers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>CINCHAN</td>
<td>Sir James Eberle/Sir John Fieldhouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rationalization</td>
<td>Ass. Secret. for Defense Support</td>
<td>Dr. Walsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Consumer Logistics</td>
<td>Ass. Secret. for Installations &amp; Logistics</td>
<td>John Heiser (under Contract)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
procedure was that the Monitor's Reports did not have to undergo preliminary reviews which might result in their being less frank while attempting to avoid conflict with nations over lacking implementation. The monitors were therefore charged with fulfilling their duties without prejudice to existing procedures and organizations. Nevertheless, the EWG, which used the monitors' report to write its own Comprehensive Report for the Winter ministerial meetings, noted in early 1979 that the monitors had been less scrutinizing with nations than originally expected. The Comprehensive Reports of the EWG were designed to bring the ministers up-to-date on the implementation status of the LTDP. This was intended to give the ministers an opportunity to reemphasize the importance of measures where progress lagged behind. If issues remained unresolved, the EWG included those in a Key Issues Report for ministerial consideration during the spring meeting. These key issues were items that warranted special ministerial consideration because of their importance or financial/political delicacy. Both the Comprehensive and the Key Issues Report were instruments to insure ministerial attention in case of lagging implementation.

In practice, however, these reports underwent several drafts before their submission. A major problem was that there was no uniform agreement on the desirability of the special reporting. As a result, countries that were singled out as lagging behind in specific areas regularly objected to what they considered too much detail in these reports; they therefore tried to water down the language. Thus even the implementation reports, i.e. the yardsticks of success and failure which were supposed to be objective documents, were the product of political bargaining.

Another limitation of this elaborate reporting procedure was that it produced too much paper without a uniform framework of evaluation.

\[380\] Ibid.
The program monitor reports for the nine Task Force areas could amount to more than 1,000 pages. Although the monitors sometimes undertook a major effort to track implementation systematically by using tables, statistics etc., the performance measures varied significantly. This was accentuated by the lack of data when countries were reluctant for political reasons (or unable, because of the lack of staff) to provide the necessary inputs. Moreover, neither the monitors nor anybody else in NATO had a common framework to assess the significance of these reports in terms of net capabilities, i.e. fighting power under wartime conditions.381

Special reports were also produced on the Short-term and Post-Afghanistan Measures, sometimes as special sections in the DPQ and sometimes as special reports. Overall the multitude of reports and their interrelationship caused considerable confusion at the staff level. Because of the mass of papers involved -- the regular DPQ replies were not given up -- the LTDP and associated measures agonized staff throughout European MoDs, just as the AD70 reports had. This created not only psychological opposition against the program but it also increased the calls to have the LTDP integrated into the force goal cycle. Yet that was what Komer had tried hard to avoid from the beginning.

Political Elements

The organizational effectiveness of the LTDP was further limited through a number of political developments. These developments tended to attract attention away from the primary purpose of the program, the improvement of NATO's conventional capabilities.

The first factor was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the Carter administration's defense policy had made NATO a principal priority next to nuclear arms control, the invasion of Afghanistan attracted more and more bureaucratic attention, including that of Komer.

381 See Stafford, loc. cit., p. 165. See also Chapter III for further details.
to the Persian Gulf. The administration shifted its concerns to building the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and because of constraints on the US budget, it was only natural that Washington expected the European allies to help offset the diversion of resources associated with the RDF. The Post-Afghanistan Measures were the most direct influence affecting NATO plans. As has been mentioned above the attempted re-prioritization of some measures caused considerable debate within the alliance.

A related development was the change in transatlantic political climate that was associated with Afghanistan. The West German SPD/FDP government was interested in not letting the Soviet use of force affect West German efforts to continue its policy of detente vis-a-vis the East and found it important for domestic reasons to encourage the US to continue a dialogue with the Soviets. A demonstrative shoring up of defense efforts in the aftermath of Afghanistan was not considered opportune. Unlike the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the argument was not used that the Soviet threat had increased to justify higher outlays and special programs. As a result there was little incentive to give the LTDP higher priority.

For economic reasons, this would have been difficult anyway because of slowing economic growth from 1980 onward. In real terms European governments reduced their budgets substantially as a result. The West German government let the Federal Budget grow less than the GNP in 1979 and 1980. Although this affected all other departments more than defense budget, the latter grew at a mere 1.5% after inflation in 1979 and 2.2% in 1980. After reaching 3.3 growth in 1981, it declined by 0.8% in 1982. This limited growth severely constrained the government's flexibility to fulfill NATO plans. The US had not managed to realize the 3% goal in 1978 but did so in the years thereafter. These growth

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Interviews in West Germany suggest that the developments in Poland in the summer of 1980 also prompted the West German government to favor a low-key approach in NATO so as to not provide the pretext for a Soviet military intervention in Poland.
differentials caused further political frictions because the US would argue that its European allies were not contributing their fair share. This was especially so after the Reagan administration had taken office in 1981 and increased the US defense budget still beyond the average of 5% real growth planned by the outgoing Carter administration for the FY 1982-86 period.\footnote{The budget data herein stems from the tables exhibited in Chapter X.}

A final factor that decreased the importance of the conventional improvement aspects of the LTDP was the evolving nuclear debate in the alliance. After NATO had decided on December 12, 1979 that it would modernize its long-range TNF in Europe if an arms control agreement was not able to limit the number of similar Soviet systems, nuclear strategy aspects came much more to the foreground. The publics in Europe had been aroused by the decision which coincided with a cooling in Soviet-American relations and the request by President Carter to the Senate to delay ratification proceedings on the SALT II treaty. The TNF issue and NATO's nuclear strategy became still more important after the change of government in Washington. Harsh rhetoric about possible demonstrative use of these weapons and the generally tougher attitude toward the Soviet Union increased fears of war in Europe. This made it still more difficult for a troubled SPD/FDP coalition in power in Bonn to increase outlays for defense. This coincided with a relative disinterest of the new Reagan administration in the LTDP which was considered a creation of the Carter presidency and therefore of limited value at best.

The LTDP was slowly incorporated into the NATO force goals and by 1983 the special reporting on it had stopped. Although some force goals were still referenced to the LTDP, the program had lost its distinctive features.
Outcome and Conclusions

According to most participants, the staff work for the development of the LTDP reflected objective work, relatively independent from national influence and politics. Even the critics of the program conceded that the original LTDP as well as the Task Force reports reflected a good analysis of NATO's deficiencies and needs.³⁸⁴

Reviews of the implementation of the LTDP have come to conclude that the program had a number of deficiencies, however. First of all, a number of measures lacked specificity. As was argued above this was partially because of national reservations against too much detail and fears about over-commitment or additional requirements. In some cases data was lacking to be precise about ammunition requirements, for example, because standards had not been agreed upon, or operational test data was unavailable.

The procedure for the development and review of LTDP implementation seemed to fulfill American desire for better control over the planning process and more information. One of the most interesting lessons of the LTDP is that this attempt to rationalize the planning process was resisted by the allies because it was considered politically inconvenient, too much work, or an undesirable attempt of the Americans to control allied planning. All of these counter-arguments, save the ones which claimed that reporting was redundant, and not sharp enough analytically, missed the crucial point. The LTDP was aimed at defense improvements. One of the critical factors in achieving such improvements possessing the necessary data to evaluate one's own planning. The fact that the procedure were resisted by the European allies, the West Germans, British and BENELUX governments in particular,³⁸⁵ raises severe doubts about the seriousness of their original commitment to the initiative. The fact that they did not

³⁸⁴See, for example, Braband, op. cit.
³⁸⁵See Stafford, op. cit., p. 165 and interviews.
propose any alternatives raises the question whether they were seriously interested in conventional improvements at all.

This is not to say that the LTDP itself did not have weaknesses. As was mentioned before, reporting requirements were redundant and massive. It still came as news to some in the Pentagon that the development of measures and reporting on the initiative had to be done sometimes by a handful or less officers in the smaller countries. Moreover, there was perhaps too much optimism on Komer's part to what degree priorities could be changed among the major allies who all had existing planning processes that did not allow much flexibility. Realism should also have suggested that there was not much of a political constituency to change that flexibility. While Komer had realized the importance of high level political commitment to get the program started, he was either too distracted or not alert enough to realize that the LTDP needed perhaps even more commitment in the implementation phase. It might therefore have been wiser to save one of the two summit meetings for some years later, or to call a third summit three or four years into the program to give it new momentum.

The LTDP experience also reveals how vulnerable the program was to shifting political sands. The program had already lost momentum in the final year of the Carter administration due to new and more pressing business regarding the RDF. Yet the program was virtually dead when the new administration did not pick up on it in 1982.

Despite all these weaknesses, the LTDP must be seen also as a limited success. In terms of preparation, procedural arrangements and initial political consensus, it was much more developed and went further than AD70 or the Basic Issues initiatives. The LTDP was developed by Ambassador Komer against the background of prior US experiences with special initiatives. To a large degree the lessons of these earlier initiatives were worked into the LTDP and the program therefore was more sophisticated. Substantively, the LTDP is led to several major improvements, such as SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Program and the US commitment to reinforce with ten divisions in ten rather than thirty
days, as previously planned. The LTDP was also the prime force leading
the conclusion of a Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement between the US
and the FRG which would facilitate the war-time reception of US
reinforcements in the FRG. Further areas of notable improvement were
airborne early warning (AWACS), the NATO infrastructure program,
munition stockpiles and the introduction of a long-term planning
perspective into NATO through the Long-term Planning Guidelines.

However, the LTDP had a major effect as an "off-line" initiative
only for about three years. After that the steam was out and it
suffered a similar fate as AD70. This raises the question how the
planning process at NATO could be changed to improve the continuity in
planning while at the same time achieving at least some of the
advantages of an off-line program that shakes up the process. This
question will be dealt with in the concluding chapter of this study.
PART C: ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS -- FORCE PLANNING SYSTEMS IN THE US, THE FRG, AND NATO

Differences over the substantive bases of NATO force planning and problems of process do not alone explain the origins and outcomes of the conventional defense improvements analyzed here. As alluded to on previous occasions before, there were also major organizational barriers to improved NATO force planning.

One of the findings of the preceding sections was that the US constantly introduced proposals for conventional improvements into NATO. To a considerable degree these proposals were motivated by strong views as to what NATO strategy should be and how changes in NATO's planning process might make planning more effective. The following chapter will show that the specifics of the organization of DoD and the US force planning process were also major factors.

Previously, repeated references were made to the fact that the FRG, in contrast to the US, was unable to adjust its national plans as quickly to new initiatives; that it had different planning priorities; and difficulties in understanding the motivations of US initiatives.

A third conclusion of the previous discussion was that the NATO planning process itself was not much more than a collection of pre-established military plans of the allies who used the process to exert maximum national influence over NATO plans.

Part C of this study will review in greater detail the organizational aspects underlying these findings and examine their organizational causes. A sequential review of US, FRG, and NATO force planning systems reveals interesting communalities and differences of organizational effectiveness.\textsuperscript{386} The main argument of this section is

\textsuperscript{386}A conscious decision was made to review the formal organizational structures in this section. The case study format could not be used here because of the lack of detailed information on the handling of the initiatives by the various organizational units. The
that the greater involvement of the American secretary of defense has several organizational/institutional advantages over his West German counterpart. First the American secretary is more deeply involved into the planning process and can therefore more easily steer planning and determine priorities. Second, the availability of analytical staffs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense help him shape and change priorities, and help the secretary review the cost and effects of (alternative) policies. Third, his greater weight within the cabinet hierarchy gives him greater influence on budget matters and better opportunities to propose his strategic views directly to the President. The position of the West German minister of defense is weaker on all these counts.

The main organizational problem at the NATO level is the lack of real planning mechanism. NATO merely attempts to coordinate the largely pre-established plans of the member nations. The organization has very little budgetary authority, and, therefore, no direct influence and control over national programming. These problems are compounded by organizational weaknesses. The military side of NATO has no effective mechanisms for joint planning between the three Major NATO Commanders. The civilian side on the other hand suffers from personnel constraints. The International Staff is therefore unable to examine in detail the force proposals and plans of the military and to develop alternative plans. To a large degree these organizational problems are the result of national reluctance to grant NATO effective planning and control authorities.

The effect of the organizational problems both at the NATO and national level were reduced efficiency in defense planning and the lack of systematic review of planning alternatives. Especially in the FRG and at NATO, the conceptual relationship between nuclear and

major emphasis of this part of the study is to describe in greater detail the NATO and FRG planning systems on which little published material exits. The US is dealt with rather briefly because it is better known. It is included, however, for reasons of contrast and completeness.
conventional force levels were not reviewed systematically and regularly in terms of their implications on strategy, force levels, and budgets. Organizational structures were thus another major barrier to conventional defense improvements and changes of strategic priorities.
VI. FORCE PLANNING IN THE US

There are two main elements which explain why the US government continuously has been pushing the improvement of conventional forces in NATO. The first was the greater concern since the 1960s of the civilian secretaries of defense for the implications of conventional-nuclear trade-offs. A second factor was the deep involvement in, and for a long time, the actual domination of, the civilian DoD leadership over all the details of the military planning process. In contrast to the situation within NATO and the FRG, the US debate on the substance of defense policy and the organization of defense planning were usually closely related.387

Since the changes in the defense planning process during the tenure of Robert McNamara in the early 1960s through the adoption of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), the secretary of defense was much more involved in details of military planning than his German counterpart. This change in the US planning process coincided with, and was partially prompted by, a concern for adequate conventional capabilities when the Kennedy administration shifted US strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response.388 Not unlike the West German military, there was a long-held view in the US military that it would be impossible, due to it being prohibitively expensive, to mount adequate conventional forces against the Eastern Bloc; and that therefore strong reliance on nuclear forces and first use were crucial.389

387A recent example is the defense reform debate. See, for example, Asa A. Clark (ed.), The Defense Reform Debate, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.
McNamara and his aides questioned this assessment, and in the process revamped the planning system which had brought what were considered unrealistic postures. Through the introduction of the PPBS the secretary became deeply involved in the details of planning. Although differences of degree of secretarial influence have developed over time, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has for long periods set planning priorities virtually alone and controlled follow-through by the military services in much detail. To insure compliance of the military branches to policy and in order to aid the secretary in planning, OSD grew to some 1,800 people during the Carter administration. It was this office which provided the institutional base for policy analysis and was the source of a constant flow of proposals to improve US and allied force postures.

The argument of this chapter is that the organizational framework of defense planning in the US, despite considerable weaknesses, provided a useful framework to relate military requirements to costs and allowed civilian scrutiny of service plans. A comparison to the West German system will show that such a framework did not exist in the FRG, despite apparent similarities in the planning processes. Within the ministry itself, the minister did not have information independent from the services; he had no effective means to force priorities into the plans; or to make systematic trade-offs between competing programs. Most important perhaps, he did not have the staff which could provide him with advice independent from the services. In relation to his ministerial colleagues, especially the finance ministry, the defense minister frequently lacked the analytic rationale and institutional weight to overcome fiscal concerns. These organizational differences are another important factor which explains why a conventional deterrent seemed beyond reach to the West Germans and why American initiatives were seen as disturbing European national plans.
Background: The Rationale for a PPBS in the Early 1960s

In order to understand the significance of the introduction of the PPBS, it is important to recall what the rationale for it was in the early 1960s. As will be seen in the chapter on the West German planning process, a number of problems which existed in the US in the 1950s existed in the FRG during the 1970s. A brief historical recount of the American experience therefore follows.

The group around Robert McNamara who analyzed the problems in DoD planning during the 1950s had identified three major problem areas and their possible solutions.

- Military plans were prepared without regard to resource constraints and they were not sufficiently coordinated between the services. PPBS was to integrate financial and force planning; whereas the financial planning used to fall under the province of the Comptroller, the latter was the responsibility of the JCS. Both bodies acted on asynchronous rhythms and motivations. The JCS planned forces for a five to ten year period. The actual budget process only extended over one year, however.\textsuperscript{390}

- The military services were found to plan in a duplicative and uneconomical way. The new planning system therefore took away the services' power to establish program priorities. This function was henceforth fulfilled by the secretary of defense, who became much more involved into the detailed management process. This was to insure a better balance in the

fulfillment of various mission needs and the balance between investment and operating expenses, for example. The management tool to achieve this was the grouping of force and weapons systems in relation to their primary military mission and determining their overall cost.

- *Service planning was also found to be lacking transparency in assumptions and underlying rationales.* The new planning system would provide the secretary of defense (SECDEF) with information for such rationales. It would allow decisions on resource allocations *between* services rather than invoking such decisions on the basis of fixed budget shares, as was the practice in the 1950s. Along with the introduction of the PPBS grew the amount of data on mission performance, cost effectiveness, etc., so that resources and dollar costs could be tied to the forces and weapons systems, allowing for an analysis of the financial implications of decisions over a period of years.

**An Overview of the PPB System**

Although significant changes have been made over time, the broad structure of PPBS remained in tact during much of the 1970s. What has changed over time, though, is the distribution of influence between the civilian and the military side of the Pentagon over program decisions, and the importance of some of the documents used in the PPB system. The most important permanent feature of the system compared to the West German PPBS is the much larger degree of OSD involvement in the details of planning and, as a result, a greater involvement of the civilian political leadership in military planning aspects. Because of this deeper involvement there was a greater interest in reviewing the political, military and financial ramifications of strategies. The reason for this greater civilian involvement is threefold.
Overboarding JCS/Service Requirements. During the planning phase the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continually proposed force structures that exceeded budgetary constraints by a wide margin. Volume I of the JCS' Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP I), assessed the military threats against the United States, and US security commitments, over a five-year period. This document was drafted without taking into account guidance from other DoD or Executive Branch agencies. In the next step, the preparation of Volume II of the JSOP, the national strategies and commitments were matched with the necessary forces to support that strategy. On the basis of JSOP I, the services and unified commands made their suggestions about force levels to the JCS, which in turn produced JSOP II with what the military considered the optimum force levels.

JSOP II was seen by OSD as a mere collection of overlapping and hence redundant service plans whose implementation would be unrealistic within the existing budget constraints. The secretary therefore began to develop his own plan, known as the Major Program Memorandum (MPM), for each of the ten program areas into which the budget was divided.\textsuperscript{391}\ The MPM represented the OSD view on force levels and major programs, and thus contained similar information as the JSOP II. Because the JCS documents were highly suspect to the secretary, the MPM in fact was the major planning paper.\textsuperscript{392}\ The the MPM also contained financial

\textsuperscript{391}\ These program areas were 1) Strategic Forces, 2) General Purpose Forces, 3) Intelligence and Communications, 4) Airlift and Sealift, 5) Guard and Reserve Forces, 6) Research and Development, 7) Central Supply and Maintenance, 8) Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities, 9) Administration, 10) Military Assistance. See Theodore W. Bauer, \textit{Requirements for National Defense}, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1973, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{392}\ That the JSOP was in fact "largely unread and almost totally ignored" by McNamara and his aides is pointed out by several participants and observers of the process. See, for example, the article of a former Director of Special Studies in OSD, William A. Niskanen, "The Defense Resource Allocation Process," in Stephen Enke (ed.), \textit{Defense Management}, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967, pp. 3-22 (here p. 11).
information and rationales for alternatives and was therefore also a programming document.

**Programming Shift to OSD.** The second factor was that because of the problems with JSOP and the structural inability of the services to economize the main action of the programming cycle proper also shifted to OSD. During the programming phase the secretary had received both the JSOP and the MPM, reviewed them for about a month and then issued guidance, based on the MPM, to the services for the preparation of the so-called Program Change Requests (PCR). The PCR were the documents which allowed for the alteration of a previously approved Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Because the services tried to restore parts of their program not reflected in the MPM through the PCRs, OSD developed analytical techniques to review them in the OSD Office for Systems Analysis. During McNamara's tenure service PCRs were usually turned down because of their lacking analytical foundation, priorities, or a sense of cost.

The services and OSD each had a chance to review the other's planning documents, the MPM, and JSOP I and JSOP II, respectively. Yet the services had to do so at a time when they also had to submit Program Change Requests. Thus, they de facto had no impact on the MPM except than perhaps to voice their opposition. Since McNamara and the Systems Analysis Office did not particularly care about what they perceived as predictable comments and proposals, this asymmetry in the process did not concern OSD. However, McNamara and the Chiefs would meet in late summer to discuss PCRs. But since the secretary "was not interested in the JCS opinions [...] he used these meetings to attempt to persuade the chiefs to accept his position or to divide the JCS."³³³

**OSD Adjustments of Service Budgets.** During the *budgeting phase* the military branches still submitted inflated cost estimates which in the view of OSD exceeded the cost of the MPM and approved PCRs. The McNamara team stressed that this stage was guided only by the MPM and

³³³See Korb, op. cit., p. 337 who bases this observation on interviews with four members of the JCS serving under McNamara.
approved PCRs, and that the budget had no fixed ceiling. The secretary in fact asked to simply determine the cost of approved programs. Yet the service requests were about one third higher then the finally OSD-approved budgets and the Comptroller who reviewed the service requests had to cut an average of $18.1 billion each year from these service submissions. In the process of cutting down the service budgets, the Comptroller's office had to cut funding for some 600 budget items.

A major difference to the West German planning system was that the secretary of defense reviewed most of the subject items himself before sending his budget to the President, who in turn would discuss the entire package both with McNamara and the JCS. The secretary's standing within the cabinet hierarchy was much stronger than that of his West German counterpart. The President regularly sided with the SECDEF when the JCS objected. It is interesting to note that McNamara's standing with the President was so high that even the President's primary budget managing office, the Bureau of the Budget, was, unlike in the case of all other agencies, not allowed to make changes in DoD's budget submission to the President. In a striking contrast to the West German case, where planning was initiated with a fiscal guidance, fiscal policy in the American case reportedly had to "adapt to defense spending, rather than vice versa."  

Management Techniques for Secretarial Control. The main instruments used to exert control over military planning were changes in the staff structure, a new budget system, and a large increase in documentation (information) to lay open planning assumptions and to allow the review of planning alternatives.

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394 In practice however, the service shares of the overall budget remained stable at roughly 27, 32, and 41% for Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively and the defense total was within a one percent range of $46 billion for each of FY 1963-1966. See Korb, op. cit., p. 337/538.  
395 Ibid.
In order to implement his new management style, McNamara greatly increased both the staff and roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His main instrument to provide the secretary with data, issue briefs, and decision options was the Systems Analysis office in OSD. Staffed with a group of economists and operations researchers strictly loyal to the secretary's approach, these "whiz kids" would challenge service decision rationales and force the new system onto the military.

Through a breakdown of DoD and military activities into mission oriented program areas, the parallel introduction of so-called program elements (PEs), and the requirement to provide systematic cost information, the PPBS allowed for an evaluation and comparison of the "productivity" or output of programs in terms of their cost. The PEs were the building blocks for the 10 missions, or program areas, and all of this information was aggregated into a Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) which contained all of DoD's planned forces and projects.

In the prior system, each service submitted its budgets mainly in categories of manpower and equipment needs without specific reference as to what these capabilities were to perform or how much certain elements (tactical air forces, Army ground forces in Europe) would cost. Although the congressional appropriation categories, and as a result the service planning categories, were slightly changed in the 1950s toward more performance oriented groupings (research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, military construction, personnel, and

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396 See above.
397 E.g. tanks, helicopters, buildings, divisions etc. -- all forces, activities and support required to accomplish a mission, including cost.
398 Thus the FYDP was structured into ten Major Force Programs (MFPs) which in turn consist of Program Elements and their respective costs. This format was primarily used for internal DoD review. The FYDP, however, also contained a breakdown of costs by appropriation account, and thus was the bridge between the internal programming system and congressional appropriations.
operation and maintenance), the main purpose of the activities were not becoming significantly more transparent. Moreover it was difficult, if not impossible, to assemble cost data from these appropriation categories because large items such as construction, military pay and administration were allocated centrally to the services and a distribution of these funds per mission category or command was very difficult to establish.  

This also made it difficult to compare on the basis of cost the effectiveness of competing service programs, such as the Polaris submarine missiles vs. land-based ICBM, airlift vs. sealift, or close air support vs. ground forces, for example.

The Weaknesses of PPBS under McNamara

Despite apparent advantages regarding transparency of plans and greater involvement on the part pf the civilian side into details of military planning, the McNamara system had a number of important weaknesses. First of all, it created tension within the Department of Defense because the military felt that civilians had moved into their domain without having sufficient military experience or expertise to pass judgement. A major point of contention was the role of Systems Analysis. McNamara had used the planning tool as a way of reaching decisions between conflicting programs, or to impose onto the services a particular OSD perspective. This resulted in considerable resentment among the military. Instead of fostering competition and rational debate about options and alternatives between the services, McNamara's style provoked defensiveness and caused the chiefs of the military services to unite their forces in opposition to the secretary and his


aides. This resulted in an antagonistic working style, cut the military virtually out of the planning and programming phases and caused an overburdening of OSD with decisions and activity.\textsuperscript{401} The second major disadvantage was that the analytical tools employed by the Systems Analysis Office were alien to the military professionals and seriously downgraded the importance of experience, leading to severe problems in some programs such as the joint Air Force/Navy Fighter program TFX, or F-111.\textsuperscript{402} The third weakness was the incredible time pressure imposed on decision-making in the McNamara DoD. Ideally, planning, programming, and budgeting would take place in distinct and successive phases. However, a frequent practice of the 1960s was that program decisions were made after budgets had been decided upon. For FY 1968 and FY 1969 it is reported that

ninety percent of the (program) decision documents were written after December 28 [the deadline for the budget submission, J.B.]. The reason for this "piling" of key decisions toward the end of the budget cycle is because the Secretary of Defense cannot afford to commit himself early on major decisions and still maintain any flexibility. He has to see how the wind is blowing on the federal budget, particularly in regard to total. He has to see what the price tag on the hard core of the defense budget looks like.\textsuperscript{403}

With this procedure, however, a basic principle of the McNamara


\textsuperscript{403}April 1968 Interview with a DoD official cited in John P. Crecine, Defense Budgeting: Organizational Adaptation to External Constraints, Santa Monica: The RAND Corp., RM-6121-PR, March 1970., p. 41.
philosophy was abolished in practice: that the nation's military needs were only based on a rational determination of military requirements, and not on the basis of budget ceilings. According to this philosophy the nation could afford anything necessary for its security; budgets were balanced with programs, programs with force requirements, force requirements with military missions, and military missions with national security objectives."**44** Practice was different, however.

Fourth, according to this philosophy, the secretary was prohibited from giving financial resource guidance to the military planners. Yet, it turned out that the secretary and his aides had a very clear idea about how much money the United States should devote to defense. Over a period of a couple of months each year, the Comptroller's office had to cut an average of 18.1 billion dollars from the service requests. Several commentators on the McNamara legacy comment that it was no coincidence that defense expenditures from FY 1963 through 1966 (before the Vietnam built-up), as noted before, remained within a one percent range of 46 billion dollars and that the budget shares of the services remained stable. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the Kennedy administration rhetoric about its more "systematic" and "rational" approach to defense budgeting which, it claimed, was based only on the principle of providing all of the resources that the security of the nation required. The Eisenhower administration by contrast was said to have determined the DoD budget through the "remainder method." This "method" defined budgets as the remainder of total government revenues after subtracting costs of domestic programs and acceptable deficits.**45** According to the PPBS proponents this approach did not take external conditions, namely "the threat," sufficiently into account. Fiscal


conservatism and a balanced budget were considered as higher priorities.

Finally, the JCS, which was in charge of developing plans, consistently came up with proposals which the McNamara OSD found unrealistic and lacking in analytical substance. They were, therefore, largely disregarded by OSD and deprived of their input into the decision-making process.

Changes under Secretary Melvin Laird

The first notable changes in the PPBS occurred when Melvin Laird assumed the office of Secretary of Defense in 1969 under President Nixon. Despite a shift in planning responsibilities back to the services, the secretary still had a central role in the planning process.

As much as McNamara had been determined to play a more active role in defense planning through the centralization, Laird was convinced that the military services had to be given back their traditional role as the principal military planners in DoD. The new catchwords, therefore, became decentralization and participatory management.486

Fiscal Guidance as Management Tool. Since the Major Program Memorandum (MPM) and later the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) were the main instruments for McNamara to achieve control over service programming, it was only logical that Laird would abolish that document. The second change was related to resources. Laird was determined to help service planning with the timely provision of fiscal guidance so as to give planners an idea under what constraints they could design US forces. The changed role of the secretary was also reflected in another change of procedure. Whereas the JCS still started the planning process

with the development of the JSOP I, Laird, unlike McNamara, reviewed JSOP I and then promulgated a Strategic Guidance Document (SGM), reflecting the secretary's reviews and his position on the threat and US commitments.⁴⁰⁷ Roughly at the same time as the SGM was issued, Laird also made available a Tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (TFGM) which indicated the financial resources likely to be available over a five-year period. By the time the TFGM was issued, the JCS work on Volume II of JSOP was already underway and, therefore, did not reflect the secretary's fiscal guidance. Thus the chiefs' preferences for a US force structure continued to be fiscally unrestrained in the planning phase. After the secretary's review of both comments on his TFGM and the JCS' JSOP II, the planning cycle was brought to an end with the issuance of a (firm) Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (see Fig. C-1). This document required the military to submit a Joint Forces Memorandum and Program Objective Memoranda during the programming stage (see below). These memoranda would reflect a specified base program with funding levels outlined in the fiscal guidance for strategic forces, general purpose forces, research and development, intelligence and security, and support to other nations.⁴⁰⁸

Reducing OSD Programming Activities. The JCS then began the programming cycle in April by drawing up a force plan within the fiscal constraints set out by Laird in the FGM. This plan -- the previously mentioned Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM) -- contained those programs that were considered feasible by the JCS under the economic and fiscal conditions defined by the secretary. It also made a statement about the risks associated with the plan. The fact that the JFM, compared to the earlier JSOP, contained less then the chiefs considered prudent made this assessment necessary. In May, the services submitted the so-called Program Objective Memoranda (POM) for each of the mission and support

⁴⁰⁷ The services had a chance to review the SGM before it became final.
⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Olewine, op. cit., p. 2.
Fig. C-1 -- The PPBS Cycle in the Nixon/Ford Administrations
functions assigned to them. The POMs were to serve a purpose similar to the Major Programs Memorandum or the Draft Presidential Memorandum of the McNamara period. During McNamara's tenure, however, this document was developed in OSD.

Several elements insured secretarial control of the programming cycle. First, POMs had to be justified if they deviated from the FYDP. The POMs laid out the requirements for personnel and money. OSD then reviewed the JFM and the POMs and prepared what became known as "Issue Papers" on subjects which the analysts determined warranted the secretary's attention. The SECDEF responded with a decision on the Issue Papers during mid-summer in the form of a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which the services were allowed to review and comment on. In case of disagreement, the chiefs could request meetings with Laird on controversial topics. Overall, however, responsibility for programming was back once again in the hands of the services and the JCS. The systems analysis office continued to watch over service planning though now its role in the programming phase was limited to writing the Issue Papers.409

Budget Cutting through Negotiations, not Fiat. The budgeting phase also was changed. Under Laird, the OSD (Comptroller) no longer forced cuts into the program; instead he negotiated with the services. The budgeting phase also involved the White House in more of these negotiations. An issue that could not be resolved among the Comptroller, OMB, and the services, was sent to the White House (NSC) for a final decision. During the previous two administrations, in contrast, the White House would either not be involved at all, or only become involved on the rarest occasions.410

409See for example Moot, op. cit., p. 38.
410President Johnson is known to have overruled McNamara's recommendation on an ABM system. See Korb, op. cit.
Increased Role of the White House. The White House's larger role was not limited to budget negotiations. Through the so-called National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and subsequent decisions (National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM) either by President Nixon or his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, the NSC become a much more important player in defense decision-making. As reported earlier, the NSC had ordered studies to be taken on a range of NATO issues and became a much more active player in preparing US positions.411 Kissinger also attempted to gain better control over administration decision-making through an elaborate committee structure under the umbrella of the NSC. Especially relevant to DoD was the creation of the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) under the chairmanship of Kissinger.412 The DPRC obtained formal DoD briefings twice in the planning cycle. The first occurred briefly after the Strategic Guidance was issued and the second was given at the end of the programming phase before budget plans were to be drawn up.413 Judgments as to how much influence the DPRC actually had on DoD planning vary, however. The significance of NSDMs as a bureaucratic instrument decreased rapidly after 1972, by which time some 130 NSDMs had been issued. Due to time constraints the DPRC's capacity to deal with larger issues, such as the defense budget, was also very limited. Initially, the committee reviewed the defense budget before it was submitted to the President for approval. However, the DPRC had only two weeks to comment

411As noted in Chapter IV, AD70 was an attempt to influence ongoing NSSMs on US troop levels in Europe.
412The committee included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State, the Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Directors of Central Intelligence and OMB.
413See Philip A. Odeen, "The Role of Systems Analysis in PBP," Armed Force Comptroller, Vol. 16 (2), 1971, pp. 24-28 (here p. 27). When writing this Odeen was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis.
on the budget, hardly enough time for a thorough examination. Kissinger repeatedly attempted to outflank the Pentagon, thus getting the planning cycle several times "badly of the track." The Pentagon therefore tried systematically to limit possible NSC influence.\(^{14}\)

**Advantages and Disadvantages of the PPBS Revisions**

The system adopted by Melvin Laird had the advantage of involving the services in more program decision-making at a time when the US defense budget began to take a nose-dive in response to decreased US military activities in South West Asia. It forced the military branches to make the hard choices of budget cuts themselves. This method helped to overcome much potential resistance for cuts that would have been "imposed" by OSD. Laird was also able to improve some of the atmospheric disturbances in civil-military relations. He not only downgraded the role of OSD in developing programs and objectives, but also scaled back OSD's analytic capability for systems analysis which previously had put the services under so much pressure to justify their activities.

However, Laird's changed planning system continued to receive criticism for extending over too long of a period. From the initial drafting of the JSOP to congressional appropriations, more than two years had elapsed. The process was also considered confusing to many, because, within the same month, papers would be circulated that dealt with different planning years. In May, for example, the JCS published both JSOP I and the Joint Forces Memorandum, each covering a different fiscal year. The second criticism centered on the disparities between the military and the civilian planning systems. Ideally, the secretary would issue strategic and resource guidance after his review of the military's submission of its list of requirements; JSOP II, i.e. the forces to implement the national strategy, should be based on that secretarial guidance. In practice, however, the secretary continued to

\(^{14}\)See Odeen, op. cit.
be skeptical about the JCS recommendations in JSOP and didn't even comment on them. The JCS plans were not seen as an integrated and balanced set of optimized service proposals; instead they were considered a compilation of service POMs. Moreover, the secretary's strategic guidance was often published too late to be taken into consideration for JSOP II preparation, and, as a result, SECDEF and the JCS gave conflicting guidances. Program decisions continued to be made after the budget ceilings were firmly set. This can largely be attributed to the fact that the services had too many opportunities to request additional reviews of decisions and program changes. Another criticism focused on the fact that PPBS did not provide any tools to achieve control of program elements after the passage of the budget because Congress appropriated money not by program element but by account.\textsuperscript{4,15}

Other PPBS Developments Since the Early 1970s

The successors to Melvin Laird in the Nixon-Ford era, Elliot Richardson, James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld, were either in the office too briefly or too preoccupied with other issues, such as the termination of US involvement in Vietnam and overall defense budgets, to pay much attention to organizational improvements. They accepted the organizational framework as designed by McNamara and subsequently revised by Laird, and similarly to Laird, they played a less interventionist role in the resource allocation process.\textsuperscript{4,16}

Increased Role of the Congress. An important change did, however, occur with the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The Act required the executive branch to submit a so-called current services budget which lists the expected budget

\textsuperscript{4,15} These accounts included: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, research, development, testing and evaluation.

authority and outlays of previously established programs for the next fiscal year on a policy neutral basis, i.e. if no changes were to be made. This made it considerably easier to distinguish between the prior year commitments and future costs of altered policies, and thus made it considerably easier to compare policies.\footnote{This and the following is drawn from The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976, Washington, DC: GPO, 1975, pp. 161-167, and Donald B. Rice, op. cit., p. 4 f.} In addition, the Act required the president, beginning in 1976 (for Fiscal Year 1977), to submit to the Congress a four-year projection of major expenditures for such functions as national defense, international affairs, agriculture, etc. This requirement ensured that Congress would have a similar, though not necessarily identical, set of figures beyond the next fiscal year as the administration, which used the FYDP for internal planning purposes. The longer-term planning horizon made the financial implications of federal programs more visible. The third new element was that the Department of Defense was required to submit its budget broken down by full cost of missions, including support functions. This functional break-down allowed for a better tracking of policy shifts and made the emphasis given to the different missions more transparent. Fourth, the 1974 Act now formally structured the congressional budget cycle. Before the adoption of the Act, the Congress had no clearly established process or schedule for making budget decisions. By April 1, all congressional committees had to report their estimates of the budget to the newly established House and Senate Budget Committees. The also newly established Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported with a fiscal policy analysis also by April 1 and helped the Congress with an independent analysis of the Executive's budget. By May 15, the Congress was required to pass a First Concurrent Budget Resolution which set expenditures targets (in budget authority) for each major function of the budget. Within these financial boundaries, the Appropriations Committees would then decide on the specific allocations of funds (ceilings) for each program and by September 15, these individual
appropriations were aggregated in a Second Concurrent Budget Resolution. The beginning of the fiscal year was changed correspondingly from July 1 to October 1, extending through September 30 of the next year.418

Changes During the Carter Administration

President Carter had entered office with the goal to gain better control over the government's budget and implemented Zero-Based-Budgeting (ZBB) as a tool to prioritize programs.

A New Budgeting Philosophy. The basic idea behind this managerial approach was to identify separately financial commitments from prior years as well as future years and thus to achieve better scrutiny of ongoing programs, and trade-offs between old and new programs. ZBB also required program managers to justify their entire request from "the ground up," and was designed to discontinue the practice of almost automatically extending programs approved in prior years. Programs also had to be analyzed in terms of cost-effectiveness and at three different funding levels, so as to obtain more information as to possible alternatives and priorities. Program Elements (PEs) were aggregated to so-called decision packages for review by the secretary. ZBB was seen by some as a better instrument for the secretary to identify areas where cuts would do the least harm, but Secretary Brown in his FY 1979 Annual Report to the Congress also made it clear that, for the first time, the program managers also had a chance to present the benefits of substantially higher funding to be used in analyzing the impact of the three alternative funding levels.419

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418 FY 1976 thus began on October 1, 1975 and ended on September 30, 1976.

Organizational Changes. President Carter also initiated a major study on the organization of the Department of Defense. Known as the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80), it consisted of five individual analyses of organizational issues.\textsuperscript{420} These studies questioned the ability of the DoD to plan effectively and noted - like the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel almost ten years earlier -- that OSD and the service departments were the dominating organizations in DoD and the JCS did not play the role it was assigned, namely to provide military advice beyond individual service perspectives.

Harold Brown implemented both organizational and procedural changes in DoD, although a major reorganization which might have been expected considering the scope and level of studies in the framework of DOS 77-80, was not undertaken. Procedural changes included:

- early SECDEF and presidential involvement in the PPBS process;
- expansion of the role of the JCS and the military departments by involving them more into the drafting process of the secretary's Consolidated Guidance;
- development of a Consolidated Guidance as the policy document dealing with the fundamental defense policy and strategy issues which would also contain specific guidance for the initiation and development of DoD programs;\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{420}The most important from an overall planning perspective were the Departmental Headquarters Study (the Ignatius Study), the Defense Resource Management Study (the Rice Study), and the National Military Command Study (the Steadman Study). The other two were the Defense Agency Review, directed by Theodore Antonelli, and the Combat Effective Training Management Study, directed by Donald E. Rosenblum. There was no DOS 77-80 Final Report. For a discussion of the findings of these reports see Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization, Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1983.

\textsuperscript{421}This new document thus consolidated into one paper the former Defense Guidance, the Planning and Programming Guidance, and the Fiscal Guidance.
the creation of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a response to the Rice Study recommendations to improve programming and budgeting activities;\textsuperscript{22} 

the replacement of the JSOP and the Joint Forces Memorandum by a so-called Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and a Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).\textsuperscript{23} (See Fig. C-2.)

Organizational changes during the tenure of Harold Brown centered mostly on the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A number of assistant secretary positions were abolished and the functions assigned to other such positions. Significantly, however, Brown strengthened the role of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA & E, formerly Systems Analysis) by elevating its chief again to the level of Assistant Secretary. As Fig. C-3 shows, he also abolished one of the two deputy secretary positions and created the post of an "Advisor on NATO Affairs" which was filled by Ambassador Robert Komer, the chief protagonist of the LTDP. Komer initially reported directly to the secretary and his deputy, but then in a second set of changes in November 1979 was "realigned" to report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to this, the secretary had already felt it necessary to

\textsuperscript{22}Other members of the DRB were the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, and --\textit{ex officio}-- the Chairman of the JCS. See\textit{FY 81 Annual Report}, pp. 283-284.

\textsuperscript{23}The JSPD "consider[ed] the views of the Unified and Specified Commanders in recommending military strategy to achieve national objectives and provide[d] advice on the force levels necessary to execute this strategy." The JPAM, by contrast, was to provide the secretary with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views before the secretary's review of the service POMs and OSD's Issue Papers. The JSPD was preceeded a few months earlier of the JCS Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP).
Fig. C-2 -- The PPBS Process in the Carter Administration
Fig. C-3 -- The Organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Harold Brown, 1978
concentrate all matters related to politico-military affairs in the office of that undersecretary, thus consolidating "under a single advisor all of the closely related international military policy functions within the Department." Thus Komer was given an institutional and organizational base from which he could push the LTDP priorities into the service plans. The LTDP and Komer's role were further emphasized through Komer's access to Armed Forces Policy Council meetings, and his membership in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), the secretary's most important advisory group on defense acquisitions.⁴²⁴

The Linkage of US and NATO Planning Processes

A key difference between the West German and American PPB systems is the degree to which the top civilian leaders are involved in the process. Since the PPBS development in the 1960s, the American secretary of defense has at his disposal the necessary staff and a process tailored to give him detailed influence over service planning. Because of the differences in planning approaches between the civilian and military parts of DoD a tension persisted in the planning process that brought about continuous reviews of planning assumptions, scrutiny of methods to determine military requirements and a focus on optimizing plans. This difference in the "planning culture" had important effects on NATO planning.

First, the American secretary of defense had probably more analytic capabilities at his disposal than the entire NATO bureaucracy plus the national planning staffs combined. He also had considerably more and more detailed intelligence available to him. The size and structure of his office, his powers to direct analyses of subordinate agencies, and

commission studies of outside institutions provided the secretary with a great number of examinations of NATO problems. These studies could be sharper than NATO studies because they are not subject to diplomatic negotiations. Thus the outlines of Komor's LTDP, for example were developed in a study that RAND did for OSD (PA & E). Similarly, the Office of Systems Analysis had done many analyses of the military balance and the effects of the size of war reserve stocks, passive air defenses, and tank/anti-tank mixes which laid the ground work for Schlesinger's Basic Issues initiative.

Second, the power of the secretary of defense over the DoD planning process also gave him greater control to make sure that his list of priorities was included in service plans. The MPM under McNamara, the STGM and the Issue Papers under Laird, and the Defense Guidance (Consolidated Guidance) and PDMs under Harold Brown were all instruments used to steer the planning and programming process. In the early 1960s and late 1970s this guidance was so specific as to deprive the services of major planning inputs. Through these guidance documents and his involvement and domination of the planning process, including the details of budget cuts, the secretary, unlike his West German counterpart, had the basic instruments to enforce his sense of priorities. This offset the partial ignorance of service planners to whom NATO requirements seemed very alien.

Third, because of the weight of the US contribution to NATO and the traditional American leadership role, the US government has long considered it as its task to lead NATO and to steer the planning process. This military and political weight coupled with the analytical might of OSD and other agencies led to a great influence over NATO planning.

Fourth, two of the three major NATO commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, have always been American officers. These officers do not only influence NATO planning through the regular planning mechanisms within NATO, but also indirectly through their inputs as national commanders into the DoD planning process, which in turn then may be fed back as US proposals into the NATO planning system.
Since the US had such an important role in alliance planning and because it de facto set the standards against which allied performance and planning were measured, it was easier for the US to fulfill NATO requirements: they were often just an extension of American requirements to NATO. Thus it frequently appeared that the US was pushing NATO requirements, such as the introduction of new equipment (new generations of anti-tank missiles, AWACS, EW equipment, etc.), not so much because the US was convinced of its military utility but as part of an effort to sell US equipment to the Europeans.
VII. FORCE PLANNING IN THE FRG

The major difference between the US and West German force planning system is that the West German system operates within greater constraints. The German force structure was broadly defined through the NATO admissions criteria for the FRG. West German observers of FRG defense policy would hesitate to speak of "West German military force planning" as being an independent national activity. These individuals would argue that the history and present organization of the West German defense effort demonstrate that external factors have always played a very important role in West Germany's foreign and defense policies, leaving little room for national control. They would maintain that the period after the war until 1955 (Paris and Bonn Treaties) left virtually no room for independent decision-making on foreign and military matters, and that the decision-making situation that has evolved since can be characterized in such terms as "penetrated," "interdependent," or lacking a distinct "national defense profile." There can be no doubt

425 For details see Chapter IX.
that the Federal Republic indeed thinks about, plans, and deploys military forces only in the context of an allied response to aggression, even if attack was limited to the territory proper of the Federal Republic. As many observers of West German military affairs have noted, this continues to serve both as internal as well as external legitimation for the rearmament of West Germany.\footnote{See, for example, the various White Papers, published by the Federal Ministry of Defense since 1969, the quasi-official history in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Verteidigung im Buendnis. Planung, Aufbau und Bewaehrung der Bundeswehr 1950-1972, Munich: Bernard & Graefe 1975, and the documents published by Klaus von Schubert (ed.) Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumentation 1945-1977, (2 vols.), Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978.}

There is a widely held perception in the FRG that Bonn in fact is so integrated into alliance planning that

\[\text{in all questions concerning training and equipment, armament, organization, logistics, dislocation, and leadership of the troops, NATO's recommendations are binding.}\]

The case studies have shown, however, that the FRG had rather distinct views on such issues as strategy, threat assessments, planning processes etc. By no means did Bonn simply adopt NATO policies developed without its own critical input. If anything, the previous analyses have shown how important FRG positions were for NATO planning rather than vice versa.

This view is supported by other case studies attesting to the distinct "German" approach on a wide variety of military and security

issues ranging from force structure and operational planning to nuclear strategy and arms control. During the last one or two decades, the Federal Republic has neither solely depended on decisions made by other members within NATO, nor only reacted to them. Instead it played an active role, helping to shape, advance and, if necessary, resist proposals. The Atlantic Alliance and its policies therefore cannot be seen as having absolute decision-making power in regards to West German defense planning, on which the latter had no influence.

The following section will review what the organizational structure of German military planning was, compare the FRG force planning system to that of the US, and assess effects of the West German system on NATO planning. The thesis of this chapter is that in addition to the external constraints on the size and broad structure of the West German armed forces, there were major organizational problems that limited West German flexibility to wholeheartedly adopt conventional defense improvement initiatives.


The Ministry of Defense

There are four key organizational differences between the American and German planning systems. The first is that military planning in the FRG is far less centralized. The main task of the minister of defense is political control of the military. Planning, in contrast, was considered a military domain, as long as it remained within the boundaries of political guidance on resources and operational principles (forward defense). The minister was therefore much less involved in the details of planning. He lacked the information and organizational base from which to steer the planning process when deciding on priorities and trade-offs.\textsuperscript{33} For historical reasons, planning was also not centralized on the military side. Although efforts were made toward giving the General Inspector a greater role in coordinating service planning, his powers and organizational effectiveness in terms of setting resource guidance and shaping priorities remained limited. It can be argued that planning was and continues to be dominated by the services. They originated or had to be consulted in the drafting process of almost every planning document and had all relevant planning information themselves.

The second difference is that since the inception of the planning system in the MoD, the planning phase has always been limited by financial guidance which set the maximum resource limits within which the force structure had to be planned. Unlike the US military in JSOP I and II, the West German military was unable to establish in the planning phase what it considered to be optimal force levels given the military threat. Instead, it had to determine what it considered the optimum distribution of resources within a largely fixed force structure.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} Naturally, the minister could decide on priorities and trade-offs by political fiat. Examples for this are the so called White Paper Measures developed under Helmut Schmidt in 1969/1970, and planning revisions during the 1980 Tornado crisis.

\textsuperscript{35} For details how this force structure was limited by international treaties and agreements, see Chapter IX.
A third difference in comparison to the American system was the longer-term perspective in West German planning. Whereas US force structure planning became very vague beyond the five-year horizon of the FYDP, the West German military developed a force plan projected over more than ten years. This long-term perspective, coupled with and the fact that the force plan appears to have been incorrectly costed out, limited the FRG's flexibility in adjusting plans within the short to midterm range.

This lack of flexibility was limited by another difference: the minister of defense had a less influential role in the cabinet hierarchy than his American counterpart. The finance minister had seniority in negotiations over resources available for defense. The foreign office had the lead when it came to arms control. Finally, the chancellor had less power than the American president when it came to the day-to-day ministerial action.

The Organization of the MoD. The fact that the minister does not have the institutional base from which to steer the planning process is evident from the organizational structure. In terms of political control the minister of defense is aided by four civilian state secretaries responsible for armaments, administration, and policy. The parliamentarian state secretary acts as a political deputy and as liaison with the Bundestag (see Fig. C-4). None of the state secretaries have staffs who support them in their work. Therefore, the task of the state secretaries is mainly administrative and to counsel the minister in the decision-making process. The only personal staff directly associated with the minister's and state secretaries' office is the planning staff (Planungsstab) with some 20-30 professional officers, which report directly to the minister. Moreover the minister has at his disposal a press and information staff (Presse- und Informationsstab), and an organizational staff for data processing and management.\footnote{The organization staff was moved to the armaments division in}
Fig. C-4 -- The Organizational Structure of the West German MoD
staff size than the Pentagon, the Office of the Minister is still miniscule in comparison, numbering about fifty officers, including the support staff.\textsuperscript{437} Except for very limited and occasional study activities by the planning staff, the minister has no personal staff for his own use. In particular he has no independent staff to analyze the military plans, or the submissions of the General Inspector, his military advisor.\textsuperscript{438}

Under the top-echelon of the MoD there are six civilian divisions\textsuperscript{439} and five military departments, each headed by a so-called Inspector (\textit{Inspekteur}).\textsuperscript{440}

At the top of all these military departments is the General Inspector who, in some respects, is comparable to the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. Both the civilian and the military divisions have a supporting staff organized according to functional criteria, though frequently overlapping. Of particular interest for military planning are the staffs of the individual services. Except for the Medical and Health Corps, the military service staffs (\textit{Fuehrungsstaeben Heer/Marine/Luftwaffe}, \textit{Fue S}) and the staff of the General Inspector (\textit{Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte}, \textit{Fue S}) consist of seven sections. Section I deals with internal leadership (\textit{Innere Fuehrung}), personnel later secretary of state for armaments in the ministry. See Siegfried Mann, \textit{Das Bundesministerium der Verteidigung}, Bonn: Boldt Verlag, 1971.\textsuperscript{437}The Pentagon has circa 35,000 officers assigned to the building directly. There are about 5,000 people on \textit{Hardthoebe}. OSD has about 1500 to 2000 people depending on administration, or about 4-6\% of the total staff. The office of the minister of defense has about 1\% of the MoD staff.\textsuperscript{438}The minister can, however, directly task any division -- military or civilian -- to provide him with a paper.\textsuperscript{439}They are the division for Personnel, Budget, Administrative and Legal Affairs, Quartering and Facilities, Social Services, and Armaments.\textsuperscript{440}The Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Medical and Health Corps.
and training, section II with military intelligence, section III with command issues (Fuehrung), section IV with organization, section V with logistics, Section VI with planning, and section VII with armaments. Unlike in the United States, the West German military services are not responsible for acquiring the equipment specified in the force plans. This task is the responsibility of the armaments division and the Federal Defense Technology and Acquisition Agency (Bundesamt fuer Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung, BWB) located in Koblenz. Outside the immediate ministry there are also a number of defense agencies dealing with personnel matters, etc.

The officers assigned to joint duty in the Fue S still hold their primary allegiance to their service since promotions are made by the services. The Fue S is also too small to be a counterweight to the service planning staffs. Fue S VI (Planning) has only about 50 staff members, including support, with no independent sources of information and analysis. The Fue S is thus limited to reviewing service plans in broad terms, insuring that resource parameters, for example, have not been exceeded.

The strong role of the services and the lack of ministerial control over planning is most obvious when analyzing the planning structure as defined since 1968 in a series of so-called planning decrees.

The Planning Processes

The has a decades' jump on the FRG in terms of experience with the planning process, which may explain some of the shortcomings of the FRG system. The requirement to establish a cyclical planning process in the West German MoD emerged only in the early to mid-sixties. By that time the Bundeswehr was facing its first major investment in second-generation equipment and the number of personnel were leveling off at about 450,000 soldiers.442 Resources were virtually no longer

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441 Section VII of the Fue S, however, is responsible for communications and electronics, not armaments.
unconstrained, since the reserves built up by the Minister of Finance in the 1950s had been depleted. In addition, the build-up of the West German economy made it more attractive, if not imperative, that national suppliers be found to equip the Bundeswehr. Yet the new size of the Bundeswehr and these economic priorities required strategies for investment and operating expenses very different in scale from those of the early years. As a result, a process had to be developed within which decisions such as future weapon mixes or the balance between operating and investment costs could be obtained.

The planning system was developed with active American input, but it was not a direct copy. Secretary McNamara had offered a team of experts to meet with MoD staff to present the American experience with the Planning-Programming-and-Budgeting System (PPBS). An initial Memorandum of Understanding laying the basis for this cooperation had been signed between the German and the American government on 14 November 1964. Ten staff members from the California-based Stanford Research Institute (SRI) subsequently traveled to West Germany and advised the MoD planners on the outlines of a planning system. The Zentrale Operations Research Stelle (ZOR, Central Operations Research Agency) was built in Trier in order to develop there the West German version of a PPBS system.

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Cf. Ibid., pp. 58 ff.

On the development of the West German PPBS system, see Bapistella, H. and D. Fischer, "Das Planungssystem des BMVtg," Wehr und Wirtschaft, Jg. 13 (11), 1969, pp. 594-599. How prominent the American experience with the PPB system figured among German planners is demonstrated with the articles by the same authors in the previous issue of the same journal where they report on the evolution of the American planning system. See Bapistella, H. and D. Fischer, "Die Entwicklung des Systems der Planung, Programmierung und Budgetierung," Wehr und Wirtschaft, Jg. 13 (10), 1969, pp. 533-537.
The Planning Decree of 1968

The deliberations led to a first planning decree issued by Minister Schroeder on 19 September 1968.\(^{445}\) This decree was preliminary in character and was due to expire on 31 March 1971. The General Inspector, who had been assigned the chief coordinating responsibility for the planning process,\(^ {446} \) was asked to submit a report on the experience with the system by 1 November 1970.\(^ {447} \)

The goal underlying the planning system was to provide the instruments for "anticipative leadership and administrative activities related to the continued and systematic development of the Bundeswehr." The process was geared toward the achievement of "optimal efficiency in the fulfillment of the mission under given constraints and with acceptable risk."\(^ {448} \) This objective marked a major difference to the US system in the 1960s which, in theory at least, did not constrain the planning process financially, but instead was geared toward determining force levels to meet global threats.\(^ {449} \) The decree was intended to lay down the rules for the tasks, processes, methods, and deadlines for

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\(^{445}\) The exact title of the document is: [Verteidigungs-] Minister [der Bundesrepublik Deutschland], [Abteilung] Org[anization] 2, Az. 10-02-01, Betr.: Bundeswehrplanung im BMVg, Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 19 September 1968. The actual planning process is outlined in the attachment to the cited document; it bears the same file number and title. The document is henceforth cited as "Planning Decree 1968."

\(^{446}\) The term used in the minister's cover letter on the decree was "pilot task."

\(^{447}\) Interestingly enough, this report of the de facto chief of plans was to be "coordinated" (abgestimmt) with all other divisions involved in the planning process. This fact foreshadowed the constrained maneuver space of the General Inspector in the planning process. A report that all actors had to sign off on could hardly be the medium for a critical review of the process and the role of the various players.


\(^{449}\) As the previous chapter showed financial limitations were introduced in the programming and budgeting phases under McNamara.
planning," and to "provide those responsible for decisions with reliable
documents and alternative solutions."450

Scope

A major difference in the scope of the German planning process was
its longer-term perspective and the fiscal guidance that underlay even
the planning phase.

As shown in Fig. C-5, the first planning decree established that
the development of a document called "Military Strategic
Objectives/Concepts (Militäerstrategische Zielsetzung/Konzept, MSZ)
would be the first step in the planning process. This document aid out
the basic purposes, strategies and tasks to be addressed by the military
planner. The document was based on so-called Security Policy Goals
(Verteidigungspolitische Zielsetzung) and a "comprehensive assessment of
the situation" which evaluated the factors bearing on fulfilling the
Bundeswehr's mission in the planning period.451 This guideline paper
was considered the "basic document governing Bundeswehr planning." It
laid out the principles of security policy for a period of 12-15 years
and defined the planning environment with respect to social, economic
and technological conditions and trends.452 The MSZ was implemented into

450 Ibid.
451 The Security Policy Goals were not mentioned in the 1968 decree
but were referred to both in briefings by West German officers to NATO
seminars as well as the White Paper 1971/1972, p. 131. See also Lt.
Col. Gerhard Will, "The Planning System of the Bundeswehr; With
Particular Emphasis on Long-term Planning," paper presented to 15th
Seminar of NATO Defense Research Group on Methodology for Long-Term
Planning of Force Structures, Copenhagen, October 2-4, 1974. This paper
calls the Security Policy Goals more elegantly "Defense Policy
Guideline."
452 Input papers for the Military Strategic Objectives/Concepts
covered trends of the threat, future alliance concepts and approaches, a
study on the nature of a possible war (Kriegsbildstudie), strategic-
operative analyses, psychological warfare, the personnel situation,
defense technology, resources and the development of the national
economy, infrastructure, and administration.
Fig. C-5 -- Planning Procedure According to the 1968 Planning Decree
actual plans in three phases, distinguishing long-term (8-12 years), mid-term (3-7 years) and short term (1-2 years) plans. The MSZ was developed by the FueS in cooperation with the services. Input studies were produced by the specialized military and civilian divisions of the MoD. A draft was submitted annually to the minister for approval, and finally promulgated by the General Inspector.

A major difficulty of the MSZ was that the General Inspector had to rely on staff outside his own for input. Moreover, from the beginning, planning was constrained by fiscal guidance, personnel constraints, etc. This limited the General Inspector's ability to plan what he considered necessary. If he and his military colleagues did consider the resource guidance as insufficient, it would have pitted them against the political leadership, which had the potential of causing a civil-military crisis given the fragile state of civil-military relations.

Another problem was that the planning process did not proceed according to plan. The first Army Concept was issued before the first MSZ. Yet the first MSZ was also issued much later than originally planned: namely five years after the promulgation of the planning decree (see Table C-1).

**Long-Range Planning: The Force Plan**

The development of the long-term plan, known as the Force Plan (*Streitkraefteplan*), was launched by the General Inspector with the issuance of a Planning Guideline (*Planungsleitlinie*). This paper set the services' focus and priorities for program development from the "perspective of the overall mission" (*Gesamtaufgabe*) of the Bundeswehr. However, the first planning decree stated specifically, that the General Inspector would decide on the planning direction with the "cooperation of the Fuehrungsstaebe" of the individual services. Thus the General Inspector was not entirely free to decide on priorities, and the services were given an opportunity to push for their planning preferences. The Planning Guideline also contained a financial guidance
### Table C-1

**SEQUENCE OF FRG PLANNING DOCUMENTS, 1968-1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Issued</th>
<th>Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 1968</td>
<td>Planning Decree 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 1969</td>
<td>Army Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5, 1970</td>
<td>Five-Year Program 1970-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 1972</td>
<td>Five-Year Program 1972-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7, 1972</td>
<td>Defense Policy Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30, 1973</td>
<td>Military Strategic Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10, 1974</td>
<td>Five-Year Program 1974-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 1975</td>
<td>Army Concept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


which set the parameters for the programming phase. Although this insured that the planning proposals would not go overboard, the fiscal guidance did not encourage a risk analysis of the implication of different funding levels and thus led to a narrowing of options for the civilian side.

Based on the Planning Guideline, the services and other defense agencies and divisions developed Planning Proposals (*Planungsvorschläge*). After these were submitted, the resource-supplying divisions prepared comprehensive overviews.

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This and subsequent planning decrees divide the MoD into those divisions which have a need for resources (personnel, materiel, etc.); they are called *Bedarfsträger* (users). They included the military departments, the Central Military Agencies, the Medical and Health Corps, the *Bundeswehr* territorial Administration, and the Federal
(Querschnittsuebersichten) which provided solutions tailored to the concepts of the services and agencies. These solutions were to contain information on the kind, number, organization, and strength of the units to be created and maintained. Precise numbers of required personnel, equipment and supplies, and infrastructure, as well as projected costs were to be developed cooperatively by the users and the resource suppliers.

The Force Plan (Streitkraefteplan) which was compiled from the planning proposals by the Fue S presented the broad structure of the Bundeswehr and contained cost estimates to implement the service programs. Yet the Fue S was unable to do much more than stapling together service proposals and insuring compliance with the resource guidance. Since the Fue S had neither the staff nor the expertise and information with which to evaluate the proposals in terms of combat effectiveness, the Force Plan was little more than the service proposals stapled together. On several occasions, the need to submit alternative suggestions was emphasized, but neither the Fue S nor the services were required to submit alternative plans. According to interviews, a systematic examination of alternatives was not made because such study capabilities were non-existent in Bonn.

The Force Plan figured as the basis of further planning. It provided the general outline of the desired force structure. The absence of sufficient staff to review the service submissions resulted in the Force Plan containing questionable assumptions, the Force Plan contained questionable assumptions regarding the personnel situation, funding levels, and the cost of equipment. Since the major criterion

Defense Technology and Acquisition Agency (BWB). Those divisions, on the other hand, that provide the resources are called Bedarfsdecker (resource suppliers). This category included the MoD's Personnel Division, the Budget Division, the Armaments Department, the Administrative Affairs Department (Administrative Affairs Department, Administrative and Legal Affairs Division, Quartering, Real Estate and Construction Division, Social Services), and the Organization Office. See Will, "The Planning System of the Bundeswehr," op. cit., appendix. Interviews.
was to bring it in line with the resource guidance, a review of the assumptions was considered less critical. The development of a Five Year Plan would provide another opportunity for these assumptions to be scrutinized.

Mid-Range Planning: The Five-Year Plan for the Bundeswehr

The Force Plan which encompassed more than a ten-year period was rather broad in character due to the uncertainties inherent in predicting the threat and general resource situation. The planning process was aimed at achieving greater detail in the short- and mid-term through another set of more detailed and specific documents.

The actual planning phase began with the publication by the General Inspector of a Program Guideline (Programmleitlinie). This document contained the most up to date information on the planning environment and the intentions of the MoD's top echelon. The document was written from the perspective of overall Bundeswehr needs with the purpose of guiding the services and defense agencies. The document was considered to be a product of compromise, since the General Inspector had to seek the inputs and cooperation of the services for its formulation. In outlining the planning process, the planning decree specifically protected the prerogatives of the services by stating that the Program Guideline "does not preempt/forestall (vorgreifen) the proposals for optimization by the users; [the Program Guideline] limits itself to laying down the criteria from an overall perspective."455 This put the General Inspector in a difficult situation. In fact, the planning decree required him to insure joint planning of the services, but deprived him of the authority to change service plans.

455The German sentence reads as follows: Die Programmleitlinie greift als Planungsrahmen den Optimierungsvorschlägen der Bedarfsträger nicht vor, sondern beschränkt sich auf die Festlegung der aus der Gesamtsicht erforderlichen Kriterien." Cf. Planning Decree 1968, p. 6.
Based on the Program Guideline and the service-specific Sub-Concepts of the military departments, the services to develop the Program Proposals (*Programmvorschläge*) for the planning years 3-7. These proposals were required to contain information on the necessary personnel, materiel, and infrastructure, as well as cost categories (R&D, T&E, investments, and operations. The decree required that the numbers used in the program submissions be identical to those used in the cost estimates. In other words, the resource supplying divisions were required to cost out the programs as submitted and it fell upon the Fue S to coordinate the proposals with the services and agencies and obtain updated budgeting information, if necessary. The endproduct was the *Bundeswehr* Five-Year Plan (FYPBw). Based on this document the MoD submitted its input to the Federal Government's Mid-Range Financial Plan. This plan also provided the basis for the national inputs of the FRG into the NATO planning process, as well as reports to the WEU.

**Short-Term Planning: The Budget Proposal**

Based on the Five-Year Plan of the services and the defense agencies, the MOD's budget division drew up a more detailed budget proposal for the annual budget submission to Parliament. When program changes became necessary the budget division coordinated these with the Fue S. The final budget estimate was then approved by a planning conference of division chiefs (*Abteilungsleiterausschuss*) -- civilian as well as military -- and then submitted to the minister's office for approval.

These procedures illustrate the major difference between the US and FRG planning systems. In the West German case the minister was only involved at the very end of the budgeting cycle and at this point had little influence on the specifics of the plan. Only in those cases where major differences existed, would the minister be directly involved in planning matters. The primary considerations in those cases would be
political, i.e whether budget figures had to be readjusted, or programs with high visibility such as aircraft procurement needed change.

The minister had little involvement in the control of program implementation. The responsibility for implementation and control rested with the users, while the budget division had overall responsibility for such issues as cash flow. If changes in the program became necessary, then the decree required the services and the agencies to discuss these with Fue S, once again bypassing the minister.

The 1968 decree called for the establishment of an office designed to aid the minister in handling the planning of activities more efficiently. A Planungsreferat, or Planning Staff was established in December 1969, and assigned the following tasks:

- to support the minister and his aides through "constant information";
- to continuously examine whether the planning and programming system corresponded to the needs of the minister's office;
- to quickly make available the submitted planning documents and background information.

While the responsibilities of the offices developing and submitting plans were not changed, they were now required to inform the planning office about all planning activities. The Planning Staff in turn was given the right to request data on the planning activities at any time and without any limits. The Planning Staff was very limited in size, however (20-30 people) and was quickly transformed into being the sole support structure for the minister. Its emphasis lay less on planning than on preparing speeches, the White Papers, agendas, and the like.

After deciding on the first planning decree the minister of defense also decided on the format of the programming activities. In order to have transparent plans, it was necessary that all the users provided comparable numbers from which the budget estimate could be developed. So-called program elements (mission-oriented) were developed in order to
allow comparisons between programs and to evaluate cost-effectiveness. For each such program element specific personnel, materiel and infrastructure requirements had to be given in order to make cost estimates. Expenses for research, development, testing and evaluations were to be associated with specific program elements.

There was no office in MoD, however, which could make use of this data to undertake the cost-effectiveness analyses suggested by the decree. Neither the General Inspector nor the minister possessed the necessary staffing.\(^6\)

Reorganization under Helmut Schmidt and the Blankenese Decree of 1970

The election of a new government in the Fall of 1969 brought Helmut Schmidt into office as the Minister of Defense. He was known for his long-standing interest in defense matters and he was eager to reorganize and streamline the management of the ministry. Assisted by a panel of experts, the Social Democratic (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) had agreed in October 1969 on a set of principles which were to be the guidelines in reorganizing the top-military leadership. Schmidt and these experts agreed that a clearer definition and delineation of the responsibilities of the General Inspector and the service Inspectors needed to be reached.

These discussions and initiatives were the result of a series of organizational and political crises in the mid-1960s surrounding the management of the F-104 "Starfighter" procurement, and personnel matters. The crises had brought to the surface severe management problems and led to several resignations of high officers and strained civil-military relations. Since the SPD and the FDP had both criticized the handling of these problems by the Erhardt government, the new government under Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel now had an opportunity to correct and improve the situation.\(^7\)


\(^7\)Probably the best detailed account of the problems, debates and
Upon resuming office in 1969, he initiated the intended changes by reorganizing first the top-level of the ministry.\textsuperscript{458} The reorganization was geared toward clearer delegation and separation of management responsibilities by establishing regular meetings between the state secretaries, the minister and, by special invitation, the General Inspector and the Chief of the Management Staff (\textit{Leitungsstab}). Top-management was also to be improved through the creation of separate staff directorates for management (\textit{Leitungsstab}), organization (\textit{Organisationsstab}), planning (\textit{Planungsstab}), and information (\textit{Informations- und Pressestab}).\textsuperscript{459}

Of higher importance for the actual military planning was a second organizational change. The Blankenese Decree of 21 March 1970,\textsuperscript{460} named after the town where it was signed, changed the distribution of responsibilities among the military chiefs. It separated more clearly the role of the General Inspector for the overall tasks of the armed forces and the tasks of the service chiefs for readiness. The General Inspector was given the responsibility of the principal military advisor to the minister of defense and the federal government and officially became the highest military representative of the \textit{Bundeswehr}. The decree charged the General Inspector with the \textit{development and implementation of the overall concept of military defense} and the planning of the armed forces. To help him in this task, the Armed Forces Staff (\textit{Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte}), was put at his disposal. The General Inspector was also given the right of inspection and the authority to issue orders to the service inspectors with regard to

\textsuperscript{458}For Schmidt's position on these matters prior to the Fall 1969 Bundestag election, see \textit{Die Welt}, 28 April 1969, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{459}Cf. Hornung, pp. 335-337.

\textsuperscript{460}See Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, \textit{Betr.: Umgliederung des militaerischen Bereichs im BMVtdg} (with 4 attachments), Hamburg-Blankenese, 21 March 1970 (declassified).

\textsuperscript{457}For the evolution of the organizational structure up to the late 1960s is written by Klaus Hornung, \textit{Staat und Armee}, op. cit, especially chapter V.
questions concerning the overall concept of defense. Specifically the responsibility for and control of the Fue S was important. Under the previous arrangement, the General Inspector's deputy was the chief of the Fue S. This meant that within the ministry's bureaucracy, the Deputy General Inspector was equal to a division chief. 461 Within the approved overall concept of defense the General Inspector was also given the right to issue orders directly to the troops in matters which concerned all services.

However, administrative control over the services was given to the respective service inspectors. The Blankenese Decree thus enabled the service chiefs to give orders to their military personnel in their own right. They were given disciplinary authority and made directly responsible to the Minister of Defense for operational readiness, leadership and training. The Chiefs were to transmit any decisions from the ministry's administrative channels directly down to their troops. This step was taken in response to prior difficulties with the command structure. Under the former arrangement, civil offices from within the ministry could issue orders to the troops without having to involve the service staffs or the inspector in the development and release of such orders. 462

Although the Blankenese Decree was intended to streamline the command and planning system, a number of organizational tensions remained or were built into the new structure. While the General Inspector was now formally given the "overall responsibility" for

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461 Gen. Buechs who was de Maiziere's deputy concluded from this that he had the right to see the Minister personally like any other division chief and present him with dissenting views, causing considerable friction with his chief over the issue of the army's fusion with the territorial defense forces. See de Maiziere, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

planning (*Gesamtverantwortlicher fuer die Bundeswehrplanung*), the decree also stated that the service inspectors were to contribute (*mitwirken*) to the development of an overall concept of military defense. Moreover, the responsibility to make resource requests was not clearly defined in the Blankenese Decree. It assigned the General Inspector *and* the services to make resource requests for the overall concept. This in fact reduced the General Inspector's role to stating the broad requirements while the detailed requests would be made by the services.463

For all practical purposes this meant that the General Inspector would have to insist on a very specific overall concept if he wanted to force the services to comply with his set of (overall) priorities. Yet the Blankenese Decree did not give the General Inspector any new instruments to force these priorities onto the services and control implementation other than threatening to inform the minister. Since the services had to be involved in the development of the overall concept, the end-product would almost certainly have to be a compromise if one or more service insisted on its parochial interests. Therefore, although the decree defined more clearly the division of responsibilities, it left the services in a very strong position.464

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463 See attachment 2, p. 3 of the Blankenese Decree on the role of the services and attachment 3, p. 1 for a definition of the overall tasks of the armed forces.

464 The former Inspector General de Maiziere, during whose tenure the Blankenese Decree was signed, concludes his review of the impact of the decree in a more guarded yet similar fashion: "When one compares the position of the General Inspector before and after the Blankenese Decree, one finds that the General Inspector did not gain anything but also had not lost anything he had in 1966 or which was given to him thereafter. An indirect weakening of his position could perhaps be inferred from the fact that the service inspectors emerged strengthened from the "battle" on the administrative authority within their services." See de Maiziere, op. cit., p. 94. Views as to whether the General Inspector was strengthened, or not, vary. See Hornung, op. cit., pp. 338-340.
The tension built into the decree was also the result of the dual-hat responsibilities of the service chiefs and their staffs. On the one hand they were recipients and transmitters of orders and instructions from the minister, and to some degree the General Inspector. On the other, the service chiefs acted as ministerial agencies advising the top echelon of the ministry and doing business on its behalf. Their responsibility for advice to the minister included a right to directly request appointments with the minister. This was especially important since it allowed the service chiefs to present the minister with any views which they were not able to get accepted by the General Inspector or the Chiefs of Staffs Council (Militärischer Fuehrungsrat, MFR), thus making the General Inspector's position further dependent on his personal relationship to the minister.

The Planning Decree of 1981

Except for a revision of the procurement planning in 1971, the planning system remained essentially unchanged until 1981. Before the background of serious financial and political problems associated with the procurement of the Tornado aircraft, the then minister of defense Hans Apel decreed a new planning guideline. The Tornado procurement focused the attention of the ministry's top echelon in its involvement with the planning process. The unpredicted early outflow of funds to pay for the new aircraft had caused severe problems for other programs and damaged the minister's political position. The new decree intended to incorporate the experiences with the prior planning system and to adjust the planning decree to the division of responsibilities as stated in the Blankenese Decree.

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465 See Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fue S VI 1 - Az 09-01-20, Betr.: Bundeswehrplanung im BMVg (with 1 attachment), Bonn: 25 September 1981. Unless otherwise noted, the following is based on this document.

New Policy Documents and Procedures

As can be seen from Fig. C-6 the main procedural change was that the basis for planning was no longer the Military Strategic Concept drafted by Fue S with the help of the services and approved by the minister. Instead the new decree codified a procedure that was practiced informally throughout the seventies: the Defense Policy Guideline (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinie, VPR) drafted in the ministerial office (Planning Staff) and issued by the minister became the formal basis for planning.467 This document identified and elaborated on the constitutional tasks (Aufgabe) of the federal armed forces for a period of 15 years or longer. The Guideline was to assess the general politico-military situation, define the military and political interests of the government and identify the factors bearing upon the long-term development of the armed forces. There was no specific requirement to update the Defense Policy Guideline. The decree simply stated that the Planning Staff would revise the document when necessary.468

Based on this document, Fue S III 2 (Military Strategy) developed the Military Strategic Objectives (Militäerstrategische Zielsetzung, MSZ) on behalf of the General Inspector. Like the previous one, this paper identified which goals were necessary in order to fulfill the constitutional task. A later guideline specified that the document had to outline

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467See p. 2 of the 1981 decree. The 1968 decree did not mention the Defense Policy Guideline. According to interviews, the minister had made clear in the early 1970s, however, that the military had to base its planning on it. The Guidelines were issued for the first time in 1972 after Cabinet approval. A new Guideline was issued in 1979. The latter was not formally channeled through the cabinet.

468"Der Planungsstab schreibt die VPR [Verteidigungspolitische Richtline] entsprechend der Lageentwicklung fort." See ibid.
Fig. C-6 -- Planning Procedure According to the 1981 Planning Decree
the goals of the security policy of the Federal Republic;
the task of the armed forces according to the Defense Policy
Guidelines;
the national, alliance political, geo-strategic, and
technological conditions as well as constraints imposed by
international law bearing on the fulfillment of the task;
a description of the threat;
an interpretation of the military-strategic concept of NATO
from a German position.\footnote{See Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fue S VI 1 - Az 09-01, Betr.: Erlass "Bundeswehrplanung im BMVg" (Planungserlass) vom 15.09.1983; hier: Durchfuehrungsbestimmungen (with 1 attachment), Bonn: 12 July 1984, section II a. From here on the document will be referred to as "Procedural Guidelines." The 1984 guidelines which supplemented the Woerner planning decree did not contain any changes regarding the nature of the planning documents discussed here. They are therefore an appropriate source for additional information.}

The MSZ set the broad goals for Bundeswehr planning and was the
base for the development of the Bundeswehr Concept (Konzeption der
Bundeswehr). After passing through the Chiefs of Staff Council and the
division chief level, it had to be approved and promulgated by the
minister.\footnote{This was no change from the 1968 decree.}

The Defense Policy Guidelines and the Military Strategic Objectives
in turn served as the basis for drafting a number of more detailed
conceptualizations on how the broad goals should be translated into
force structures, operational doctrines, etc.

The broadest conceptualization is laid down in the the so-called
Bundeswehr Concept (Konzeption der Bundeswehr, KdB). Functions which had
to be fulfilled by several services were identified in it and then
elaborated on in the Sub-Concepts for Overlapping Tasks
(Teilkonzeptionen fuer bereichsuebergreifende Aufgaben). The military
branches of the ministry developed so-called Services' Concepts (Konzeptionen der Teilstreitkräfte), which were even more detailed.

**The Bundeswehr Concept.** The first of these three documents, the Bundeswehr Concept, contained the guidelines for resource allocation based on the goal definition as set out in the Policy Guideline and the Military Strategic Objectives. The Bundeswehr Concept described and prioritized the missions and tasks of the armed services assigned them to one or more organizational units (services, defense agencies, etc.). Those tasks (Aufgaben) assigned to one service were packaged into the mission (Auftrag) of that service. The paper outlined the overall operational concept (Operatives Gesamtkonzept) for defense in Central Europe and also contained the rationale for the West German force structure, including infrastructure and procurement.

It was drafted by Fue S VI 3 (Planning/Bundeswehr Concept) on the basis of an Assessment of Long-Term Developments (Beurteilung der langfristigen Lageentwicklung). This assessment identified the factors relevant for long-term planning such as the military threat, alliance developments, military strategy, economics, demography and social developments, technology, international law, and arms control. Like the final document, the Bundeswehr Concept, the results of all the individual studies on long-term developments were put together by Fue S VI 3.471

After coordinating the draft with the services, the Bundeswehr Concept was discussed in the Chiefs of Staff Council and later at the Bundeswehr Planning Conference of the Division Chiefs (Abteilungsleiterausschuss fuer Bundeswehrplanung). Having passed both bodies, the General Inspector would present it to the minister who, in turn, would review and eventually promulgate it. The 1981 planning decree stipulated that the Bundeswehr Concept would have to be updated

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471 The overall assessment also was used as a basis to draft the Defense Policy Guidelines, other planning documents defining overall goals, as well as the more specific Planning Guideline. See the Procedural Guidelines, section III b.
only if the Assessment of Long-term Developments changed to a degree that made revisions necessary.

As in the previous degree there was a tension built into the 1980 decree with regard to the duties and powers of the General Inspector. On the one hand he was charged with setting priorities and developing joint concepts. On the other hand, however, he was required to seek the cooperation of the services which had a natural interest in opposing such external influences on their planning.

Sub-Concepts for Overlapping Tasks. For those joint tasks which had to be dealt with by several services, the planning decree required the production of the above-mentioned Sub-Concepts for Overlapping Tasks (Teilkonzeptionen fuer bereichsuebergreifende Aufgaben, TKBA). These subconcepts can be understood as the links between the overarching policy statement of the Bundeswehr Concept and the more specific Service Concepts. The subconcepts would "usually" be drafted by the Fue S in cooperation with the service staffs and the budget division.472

Rewritten rewritten only when significant changes were recognized in the Long-Term Developments Assessment, the service inspectors had to actually sign-off on these subconcepts before the General Inspector could promulgate them. This requirement to get the services' formal approval made it necessary for the General Inspector to compromise and cut deals with the services. It undermined the General Inspector's independence to decide on priorities and put him in the awkward position between the minister and the services. Since the minister remained largely outside the planning process, it was therefore hard to mobilize him on particular issues against the services.

472 Where exactly in the Fue S the document was drafted depended on the subject. If it had to do with personnel matters, for example, the paper would in all likelihood be drafted by an office within Fue S I (Internal Leadership, Personnel & Training); if the subject was related to intelligence matters, it would presumably be dealt with by Fue S II (Military Intelligence), etc.
Service Subconcepts. Missions and tasks relating to individual military branches were laid down in more specific plans, the so-called Services' Subconcepts (Konzeptionen der Teilstreitkraefte). Based on the Bundeswehr Concept, its Assessment of Long-term Developments and strategic-operational requirements of the responsible NATO commanders, the services were asked to draw up special assessments reflecting their particular roles and tasks. The subconcepts were intended to define more precisely the assigned tasks and identify the goals for the long-term development of the services.

Suggesting a degree of higher specificity but remaining still vague, the planning decree stated, that the Services' Subconcepts were

• the yardstick for decision-making (Fuehrungsentscheidungen) concerning the service;
• the basis for further service planning;
• the basis for the presentation of service positions and interests in the alliance;
• the basis for the work of service study groups;
• the basis for the application and use of military and scientific planning aids.  

The Services' Concepts were developed by the service staffs and the budget division assigned an advisory role. The final drafts had to be sent to the other inspectors for information and for approval by the General Inspector. Having passed that hurdle, they would be promulgated by the service inspectors.

\[\text{\footnote{73} See the 1981 decree p. 6.}\]
The Planning Phase

Whereas the policy documents discussed above might well deal with time horizons of 15 years or so, they were not specific enough to tackle the more detailed problems of equipment numbers and operation of the armed services. The planning decree of 1981 spoke of a planning phase in which decisions on these matters would be taken for a period of up to 15 years. The main purpose of this phase was to examine necessary structural changes in their entire context and to make changes in an evolutionary fashion. It was also the phase were the policy goals were to be translated into cost-effective and implementable plans.

The planning phase was divided into three steps. In step 1 the actual planning process would be initiated with the Planning Guideline (Planungsleitlinie) by the General Inspector. This guideline was the first document that translated the policy goals into specific costestimates, manpower, and equipment. Besides defining the substantive planning parameters, the guideline set areas of special emphasis, planning priorities and other requirements, such as deadlines. The Planning Decree stated specifically that the guideline had to be based on the financial parameters provided by the budget division and that the General Inspector could demand of the services to examine and analyze the effects of alternative planning parameters. The submission of the findings of such an analysis would have been be a highly political undertaking. If the conclusion of the analyses were that more money was necessary to assure the security of the FRG, this might have resulted in a major political upheaval and would have complicated the issue further. The fact that resource guidance was given to the services at the beginning of the planning phase insured that their proposals would not be excessive, yet long history of civil-military tensions made it extremely difficult for the military to request more more.

The Planning Guideline was to be issued on an annual basis. If changes in conditions made it necessary, it would be issued more often. It was drafted by the Fue S and coordinated (abgestimmt) with the
services. The final draft had to be discussed with all relevant and concerned services and divisions before being forwarded to the Minister for approval and issue by the General Inspector.

The response to the Planning Guideline (step 2) was called a Planning Proposal (Planungsvorschlag). It was the solution of services and the defense agencies -- within the parameters set by the General Inspector -- to the tasks and missions defined in the policy statements. The planning proposal contained information on nature, number, and organization of units and infrastructure, the number of personnel, resources to be devoted to research and development, materiel (nature, stocks and acquisition), infrastructure, and operations for the planning years 3-15. The proposals had to be coordinated and discussed with regards to feasibility and alternatives with the resource supplying divisions. Subsequently the proposals were submitted to the General Inspector whose staff examined whether the proposals were adequate responses to his guideline and were feasible within the overall planning parameters.

The sum of the (revised) planning proposals in turn was the basis for the development of the Bundeswehr Plan (step 3). This document provided a year-by-year basis for the planning years 3-15 the structure of the Bundeswehr and the planning goals which were to implement the overall concept for military defense. The plan was updated every year and based on uniform wage, price, and legal assumptions. Since the Bundeswehr Plan was by nature a synthetic, overarching document, it was drafted by the Fue S and coordinated with the resource-supplying divisions. The final draft, done by Fue S VI 4 (Planning/Bundeswehr Plan) with evaluation inputs by Fue S VI 3 (Planning/Bundeswehr Concept), was discussed in the Bundeswehr Planning Conference of the Division Chiefs and could be promulgated by the General Inspector only after he had obtained approval from the minister.

474Planning year 1 is the current budget year, planning year 2 is the year for the budget proposal and planning year 3 is the first actual planning year.
The Bundeswehr Plan was the document which drew upon the German input in the formulation of the NATO force proposals, force goals and the Defense Planning Questionnaire. Similarly, the German response to the Western European Union (WEU) on the "National Forces for the Common Defense" was derived from the Bundeswehr Plan. Finally, the Bundeswehr Plan was the MoD input to the Federal Government's Mid-range Financial Plan and the annual budget submission.

The General Inspector's planning authority remained weak, however. If a Bundeswehr Plan was no longer feasible because of a change in financial resources, it fell upon the General Inspector to seek an understanding (Einvernehmen) with the concerned service staffs and prioritize the various parts of the plan. In practice, this meant that the General Inspector could not simply order cuts. If he insisted on an issue and could not get the respective division chiefs (inspectors) to agree, the General Inspector could either use his own authority to decide, or he could seek the aid of the minister if he had to fear continued opposition by the service chiefs.\textsuperscript{475} Presumably, a rejection of the General Inspector's recommendation by the minister -- or a decision without the General Inspector's involvement -- would probably result in the resignation of the former.\textsuperscript{476} This arrangement thus reduced the institutional strength of the General Inspector to the quality of his personal relationship with the minister. While it was hardly a stable design, it nevertheless corresponded very much to the principle of ultimate ministerial control of all critical issues.

\textsuperscript{475}See p. 15 of the 1981 decree.
\textsuperscript{476}For a good summary of the strained relationship between civil leaders and top military officers, see Nina Grunenberg \textit{et al.} "General ohne Truppen. Der hoechste deutsche Militaer - ein Himmelfahrtskommando?" \textit{Die Zeit}, No. 51, 15 December 1978, pp. 45-52.
Implementation and Control

If in the course of program implementation major changes in the parameters of the plans became evident, the services were required to notify the General Inspector immediately. This would allow him time to make adjustments to the plans in cooperation with the respective services.

This requirement to inform the General Inspector was based on his responsibility of plan implementation and control. However, the General Inspector was again not given any instruments of his own with which to effect this implementation control: his sole source of information were the services.\textsuperscript{477} When the General Inspector detected deviations of "major importance -- especially political importance" -- he was to inform the minister, the state secretaries, and the Chiefs of Division Conference for Bundeswehr Planning. If deviations from the original plan were major, the reserved the right of decision for himself.\textsuperscript{478}

The decree also charged the service staffs and other functional units to supervise implementation in their area of responsibility and to forward such information if it had a bearing on the overall plan. Moreover, the General Inspector was charged with the responsibility of briefing the ministerial leadership on the planning issues of the past budget year.

\textsuperscript{477}The decree states: "The basis of [the General Inspector's] planning control is the information on deviations from the plan parameters provided by the respective inspectors and division chiefs [...]" Cf. ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{478}Ibid. No definition of "major" was given, however. This provision was a precautionary measure after the experience with the Tornado procurement, where the top leadership learned too late of the financial strains that the project caused on the budget.
Procedural Provisions

Issues of major importance, and those matters which could not be dealt with within the responsibility of a single service or agency, were discussed at the level of the Chiefs of Division Conference on Bundeswehr Planning (Abteilungsleiterausschuss fuer Bundeswehrplanung). The General Inspector was designated as Chairman, members were all service inspectors and division chiefs, the deputy of the General Inspector, the Chief of Staff for Planning (Chief of Staff Fue S VI), the chief of the Organization Staff, as well as the head of the Planning Staff.

With regard to the parameters of planning, the decree stipulated that the MoD's Budget Division would furnish the General Inspector with a "realistic estimate on financial resources" on which the Bundeswehr Plan could be based. With that guidance, the Fue S had to determine the specific financial parameters for investments and pass them on as the upper ceiling for the Planning Proposals. After the Federal Government's vote on the Financial Plan, the Budget Division updated its estimate and notified the General Inspector of any changes. It then fell upon the Fue S to analyze whether the planning proposals had to be changed in view of new financial guidelines and, if necessary, induce .ul ("veranlassen") the services to make adjustments in their programs, according to the priorities set by the General Inspector. In an additional provision, however, the planning decree required the General Inspector to forward the revised plan to all the services and agencies, as well as the budget division for co-signature (Mitzeichnung). This again constrained his power to independently steer the process.

This provision of the decree, as so many others, was contradictory. On the one hand it gave the General Inspector and his staff the responsibility to "set priorities" and "require adjustments in the planning proposals." On the other it stipulated that an understanding

<sup>479</sup>See p. 16.
had to be reached with the concerned parties, and that concerned services have to co-sign any adjustments. Elsewhere, however, the decree stated that the General Inspector could decide in his own right or refer the issue to the minister. Such complicated and contradictory language suggests that the provisions were the result of a careful compromise between the minister, the services, and the General Inspector. As a result, ambiguity and contradictions were an intrinsic part of the decree.

The 1983 Decree

Like Helmut Schmidt, Manfred Woerner had entered office (in October 1982) with the intention of making changes in the organizational structure of the ministry and also the planning process. His attention focussed on strengthening the position of the General Inspector within the framework of the Blankenese Decree and involving the top-echelon of the ministry more closely with the planning process. The intention was, above all, to give the General Inspector more ministerial backing to enforce planning priorities even in opposition to the services. The prior distribution key for investment funds which allocated about 50% to the Army, 30% to the Air Force and 20% to the Navy was to be given up. The new minister also gave stronger emphasis on reestablishing a proper planning cycle within the MoD. During Hans Apel's tenure valid long-term plans, such as the Bundeswehr Plan, did not exist. Because the minister did consider the cost estimates for the draft Bundeswehr Plan to lay outside the previously established resource guidance, he refused to sign the relevant documents.

Woerner, like Schmidt, intended to strengthen the position of the General Inspector and aimed at a closer involvement of the ministry's top-echelon in the planning process. However, the latest of the West

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488 See p. 12.
481 See p. 16.
482 See paragraph 39 on p. 15 of the decree.
German planning decrees, issued by Woerner in 1983,444 did not change the process dramatically. Three quarters of the decree text was identical to the previous document and the cycle for planning documents remained unchanged. What did change, however, was the division of responsibilities and the cooperation between the various top-players in the process. Thus, the 1983 decree has to be seen, on the one hand, as an attempt to clarify some of the confusing language of the 1981 decree and, on the other, as having streamline and better integrate the top-echelon into the decision-making process.

Clarifications

The Woerner decree and the subsequent Procedural Guidelines (Durchfuehrungsbestimmungen)445 are most notable with respect to their clarification of the involvement of the services in the development of planning papers, the responsibilities of the General Inspector to set planning parameters and priorities, the delineation of implementation control and oversight duties between the General Inspector and the services, as well as the definition of reporting formats.

Continued Dominance of Services. With regard to the role of the services in the development of planning papers, the decree now stated explicitly that all planning documents originating from the General Inspector needed to be co-signed by the services after deliberation in the Chiefs of Defense Council. Thus, the Military Strategic Objectives document, the Bundeswehr Concept, the Subconcepts for Overlapping Tasks, and the Bundeswehr Plan have to be approved by the services. This strengthened the services' domain since the Services' Concepts, for example, merely have to be "shared" among the branches; the General Inspector only approves them, while the service inspectors themselves

444 See Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fue S VI 1, Az 09-01-20, Bundeswehrplanung im BMVg, Bonn, 15 September 1983.
445 See Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Fue S Vi 1 - Az 09-01, Betr.: Erlass "Bundeswehrplanung im BMVg" (Planungserlass) vom 15.09.1983; hier: Durchfuehrungsbestimmungen (with 1 attachment), Bonn: 12 July 1984.
promulgate the concepts." Perhaps still more significantly, the Planning Guideline, which is considered the foremost planning instrument of the General Inspector's, has to be discussed in draft by the Chiefs of Defense Council; subsequently it needs to be co-signed by the service inspectors.

This severely limited the role of the minister and the General Inspector, and calls into question the degree to which Minister Woerner and his aides were actually interested in strengthening the top military advisor. It appears that the Woerner decree was in certain respects a step behind the centralization efforts specified in the Apel decree. With one exception, the 1981 decree mentioned merely a consultation/discussion process (*Beratung*), for those documents that now require formal co-signature of the services." The only exception to this was the provision in Apel's decree on the development of the Subconcepts for Overlapping Tasks. They had to be co-signed indeed by the service inspectors. The fact that the decree here speaks explicitly of co-signature suggests that consultations/discussions in the other cases were in fact to imply less than some form of written approval. Cf. p. 5 of the 1981 Decree.

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486 The charts for the paper flow do not indicate any role of the minister in the development and promulgation of the Service Concepts.

487 The only exception to this was the provision in Apel's decree on the development of the Subconcepts for Overlapping Tasks. They had to be co-signed indeed by the service inspectors. The fact that the decree here speaks explicitly of co-signature suggests that consultations/discussions in the other cases were in fact to imply less than some form of written approval. Cf. p. 5 of the 1981 Decree.
service proposals in line with the General Inspector's original Planning Guideline, the Fue S could thus not impose cuts but had to negotiate them with the services. The 1981 decree, in contrast, simply stated that the Fue S would make adjustments and bring Planning Proposals in line with overall parameters, not stating whether the Fue S had to involve the services or not.

**Implementation Control and Oversight.** The latest revision of the planning decree clarified a third area -- the division of responsibilities for implementation control and oversight. The new decree charged the inspectors with "implementation control" (*Ueberwachung der Durchfuehrung*) and the General Inspector with "planning control" (*Planungskontrolle*). The inspectors were charged with reporting any important findings -- especially when relevant to the financial plans -- to the General Inspector. At the end of the year, the inspectors were to report general progress to the General Inspector.

With regard to the responsibility for the implementation of programs cross-cutting service boundaries, the Procedural Guidelines made the following stipulations: Personnel matters, such as the proportion of draftees vs. longer-term soldiers, are managed by Fue S I 2 (Personnel Planning). Various acquisition programs for non-consumables and munition are overseen by Fue S V 3, and the annual research and technology guidance as well as the development and acquisition programs are promulgated by the Armament Planning Division (Rue P1 5). In order to coordinate cross-cutting programs, so-called planning instructions (*Planungsrichtlinien*) were to be developed by the Fue S in cooperation with the services.

It is worth noting that the Procedural Guidelines did not contain any additional provisions on how implementation control actually was to be achieved. It merely recited the provisions of the decree which charges the services with implementation control and the General Inspector with the responsibility for the implementation of overall concepts.
Clearer Planning Yardsticks. Planning control was also to be clarified, namely the improvement of the reporting formats of various planning documents. Both the Planning Proposals and the Bundeswehr Plan had to be structured into data, descriptive, and evaluative sections. The data section in the service proposals had to present programs in a comparable way providing such data as unit strength, equipment numbers, etc. The descriptive section part would describe special features of the proposals and explain how the programs correspond to the priorities set forward in the Planning Guideline. This part was also to compare the current situation with the anticipated effects of the implemented programs and identify critical areas and risks as well as actions and resources necessary to remedy them.

The planning categories used in the proposals ranged from information on unit organization, personnel, and armaments (research, technology and development, materiel investment) to infrastructure investments, and operating costs. Any changes from the approved and established force structure had to be noted separately and explained. For planning years 3-6 all ongoing and new weapons systems and component developments had to be listed separately, along with listings of all equipment developments whose cost exceeded 1 million Deutsche Mark. Materiel investments had to be analyzed with respect to techno-economic feasibility, necessary overall resources, outlays over time, number of systems acquired over time, as well as effects on bi- and multilateral agreements. This assessment had to be made in cooperation with the armaments division in the MoD.

Whereas these new reporting formats could help to provide a database for evaluation, there were no provisions on how planning was to be evaluated and who would undertake such a review. There were no agreed-upon standards from which to evaluate planning performance; no yardsticks existed with which one could assess what difference particular programs made. The MoD did not have an in-house systems analysis capability which could have reviewed potential trade-offs
alternatives. This made it very difficult for Bonn to follow many of the American proposals on re-programming and additional efforts.

Integration and Streamlining of Top-Leadership

The most significant changes in the planning decree were related to the steering mechanism for the planning process. Previously, it was the responsibility of the General Inspector to oversee the implementation of both the Bundeswehr Concept and his own Planning Guideline. Compared to the previous planning decrees, the involvement of the civilian top-echelons in the ministry had markedly increased.

The latest decree made provisions for a new top-level Planning Conference (Planungskonferenz) which had a smaller set of attendees than the previous Chiefs of Division Conference on Bundeswehr Planning. Meeting usually four times a year, the new Planning Conference was to consist of the General Inspector or his deputy, the Division Chiefs for Armaments, and Budget Matters, and the Head of the Planning Staff. The participation of the inspectors or other division chiefs was to be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the subject matter of the agenda. To insure the closer involvement of the minister in the planning process, the decree put at the top of this conference, the minister was given the chairmanship of the conference. The minister can ask the General Inspector to act in his stead when he is unable to attend. Interviews suggest that these provisions remain theoretical. The service chiefs have regularly attended the Planning Conferences. De facto the institution of the General Inspector was thus not strengthened and the personal relationship to the minister remained the key source of bureaucratic strength for the GI.

The main purpose of the Planning Conference is to discuss the broad parameters for planning. The Draft Planning Guideline, for example, is discussed for the first time in the Planning Conference under the chairmanship of the minister. Financial and manpower resources, as well as large acquisition projects with a significant impact on the budget, are among the primary issues on the agenda.
Below this top-level body, the planning decree was a remnant of the previously existing old Chiefs of Division Conference on Bundeswehr Planning, renamed as "Planning Consultations" (Planungsbesprechungen). It was to be chaired by the General Inspector and include his deputy, the service inspectors and division chiefs, the Head of the Organization and the Planning Staff, as well as the Chief of Staff/Fue S for Planning (Stabsabteilungsleiter, Fue S VI). The main purpose of this consultative body, according to the decree, was to mutually inform the participants about planning document drafts and to coordinate these among them, as well as to prepare for the Planning Conference. Since the service inspectors were given regular access, these Planning Consultations never took place.***

In theory, the creation of another high level planning conference would have strengthened the position of the General Inspector. He would have attended, almost as a Deputy Chairman, a meeting of the three most important individuals in the ministry concerned with planning, in addition to his ultimate chief. Actual practice did not allow the General Inspector to assume this new role, however. The new decree institutionalized the review and approval function the involvement of the minister beyond the function of reviewing and giving approval to the planning documents. The minister no longer acts only as a final arbitrator over planning issues, conflicts, and provider of final approval to documents essentially developed without his input: The minister now takes more actively part in the development of the plans.

Another addition was the provision that in case of changing resource conditions, the Head of the Budget Division is required to inform the General Inspector if the Bundeswehr Plan is no longer financially feasible. In this case the General Inspector -- after discussion with the respective service inspectors -- has to propose program cuts in order to bring plans and resources back into line.

***Interviews.
Conclusions

Several conclusions emerge from this review of the evolution of the West German defense planning system. First, despite attempts to strengthen the role of the General Inspector, the top military officer of the Bundeswehr remains weak. Even the latest West German planning decree requires him to coordinate almost all important planning documents with the services. The services can use this right to be consulted to inject their special interests and projects into the planning cycle. The General Inspector has no other recourse to overrule the services but to present his case to the minister. Since the services hold most of the relevant planning information and because they have sizeable planning staffs themselves, they are in an equal if not better position to defend their cases than the General Inspector.

Given this balance of power in the top military leadership, the General Inspector had to take recourse to arbitrary resource distribution principles between the services. In case of conflict with the services, the General Inspector had to rely on the strength of his personal relationship to the minister. This arrangement did not give the General Inspector sufficient institutional strength, however, to effectively set and enforce planning priorities.

Lack of Ministerial Planning Control. Despite the fact that the minister was formally responsible for all defense plans, he lacked the formal control over their development. The main problem was that he was not sufficiently involved in the development of the plans. Ministerial control over the planning process was only formal because until 1983 the minister merely signed planning documents that the military side had

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developed. At this stage, changes were virtually impossible. The 1983
decree was aimed at improving this situation through the creation of
so-called Planning conferences. The ministers, the state secretaries
and the General Inspector were to be regular participants. This was to
highlight the role of the General Inspector and strengthen his position.
At the same time the minister was to be involved more closely in the
development of the plans. The Planning Conference was to meet four
times a year and discuss the basic planning parameters. In practice,
however, the Planning Conference has always included the the service
chiefs and the minister still has not increased his own staff to follow
or actively participate in the development of plans from the beginning.

Lack of Analytic Capabilities and Quantification. There was a
widely spread view in the ministry of defense in Bonn, both on the
military and the civilian side, that the strategic concept of NATO could
not be quantified and translated into measurable force requirements.490
Many planning documents, such as the Bundeswehr Concept, therefore were
mere qualitative descriptions. Neither the Fue S nor the minister's
Planning Staff had the in-house analytic capability to review service
program proposals. Similarly, there was no office which could examine
planning alternatives from a disinterested joint perspective. The
Planning Staff did not have the personnel and the Fue S had neither the
personnel nor the bureaucratic power to get the information it needed.

Implications. Despite attempts toward improvements, the West
German defense planning process lacked the basic ingredients for
effective planning. First, there was no central planning authority with
control over the entire process. Second, the strategic concept of NATO
was not seen in terms of quantifiable force goals. By implication this
meant that changes in the strategic concept from the West German
perspective did not necessarily have direct effects on overall

490 Manfred Emcke argued against this view: "I cannot follow the
opinion of the [civilian leadership] that strategic planning is
unimportant or difficult to define because of a lack of continuity in
the NATO concept." See op. cit., p. 10/11.
requirements. Third, since there was neither central control nor much quantification, the review of planning alternatives was given relatively low priority.

A major underlying reason for these problems was the top-down approach in West German planning. Financial parameters of West Germany's defense efforts were set largely independent from the strategic concept and developments of the threat, at the beginning of a planning cycle. This relieved the service of much of the need to justify expenditures and to prepare planning documents that argued for larger outlays. Because expenditures levels were set by the civilian side, military opposition against them could have been interpreted as insubordination.
VIII. FORCE PLANNING IN NATO

Although some similarities between the NATO planning and a PPB system exist, the differences are perhaps more important. To begin with, the fact that NATO is an international organization consisting of 16 sovereign member nations, imposes serious limitations in terms of the scope of planning activities. NATO plans have to be coordinated between all member nations. This requires complicated negotiations between the NATO bodies and countries as part of an effort to coordinate national and NATO plans. The main mechanism for deciding plans is less rational analysis of military requirements than "consensual decision-making" based on political bargaining.\textsuperscript{491}

The second difference is that NATO bodies do not have control over allied financial resources for defense and, as a result, are not involved in programming activities. Military and civilian authorities can only make proposals with regard to certain programs. These have to be approved nationally, however, and are therefore subject to change depending on the willingness and ability of a country to support such proposals.

Third, with regard to budget levels, NATO bodies can only provide rationales for certain expenditure levels, it can not set them. Depending on how convincing their case is and what the economic situation is, NATO recommendations may have an influence on national budget decisions. The best that can be achieved through NATO planning is to rationalize and support a political commitment to certain defense efforts.

Because of the multinational character of NATO, its organizational structure reflects the tensions between the recognized need for joint allied defense planning on the one hand and persistent national claims of sovereignty on the other. While NATO staffs do exist whose major function is to coordinate national plans, their responsibilities are often very constrained to insure national control. The staffs often do not have the information, manpower, or authority to plan efficiently, due to a lack of interest on the part of the nations to see NATO planning strengthened which could imply a decrease of national control.

Thus, in the strict sense, NATO does not plan if that term means the independent definition of objectives, programs, and follow-through procedures according to rational analyses of the threat and military requirements to counter it. Although at the rhetorical level this is what NATO does, planning in practice is the balancing of different national priorities in terms of economic, foreign, and domestic policy requirements.

As the previous two sections have already shown, the main decision centers for military planning are the capitals. This section identifies the way in which countries are influenced by the NATO planning process. As will become clear, NATO's role is largely limited to providing advice and coordination of national plans. NATO as an organization can encourage cooperation among allies but it has no effective means of control and its function is mainly a political one. NATO thus serves as the political consciousness of the allies and provides a forum to remind them of their joint responsibilities.

The following section will first give a brief overview on the principal actors involved in NATO's defense planning process. Together with an analysis of the planning process a number of organizational and

\[492\] Examples for how countries fend off additional obligations and how compromises are struck, see, for instance, Edward L. Rowney, Decision-Making in NATO, Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, American University, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. chapter IV and passim.
structural weaknesses will be identified which hinder NATO from assuming a more effective planning role. The third step examines the connections between NATO and national planning processes are examined in an effort to identify the processes and means of national influence on NATO plans.

ACTORS

The Civilian Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization consists of both a civilian and a military structure.493 As can be seen from Fig. C-7 the top decision-making body in the alliance is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Chaired by the Secretary General of NATO and consisting of members of all sixteen NATO nations, this civilian body meets at various levels. Occasionally, the Council convenes at the Heads of State/Heads of Government level, as during the London and Washington Summits in 1977 and 1978 respectively, which led to the Long-term Defense Program.494 Generally, though, the Council meets twice a year at the level of the foreign ministers of the member states, sometimes reinforced by the defense and finance ministers. Most frequently, however, the Council meets at the level of the Permanent Representatives (Perm Reps) of the member countries who all hold ambassadorial status. When convening at this level, at least once a week, the conference is called Permanent Council. The Perm Reps are aided by national staffs of various sizes and act upon instructions from their capitals.

Committees. The Council has established a large number of committees to deal with special problems and to prepare for meetings of

493 Unless otherwise noted, the following, including the organizational charts, is drawn from various official NATO publications. See North Atlantic treaty Organization (ed.) NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, various years; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (ed.), NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984.

Fig. C-7 -- The Civilian and Military Organization of NATO
the full Council. A recent listing included 19 major committees, not accounting for ad hoc committees on special questions which may be created at any time.\textsuperscript{495} The most important of the major committees is the Defense Planning Committee (DPC, see Fig. C-8). It addresses all the issues relevant to defense planning and arms control problems and has practically the same rights as the full Council. France, which decided to leave the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966 is not part of this committee, and Spain, which has not yet assigned any forces to the alliance, only observes the discussions of the committee. Like the Council, the DPC meets at least once a week and has de facto the same rights as the Council minus France.

Another important committee dealing with nuclear aspects of alliance defense is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). This committee can be considered as a subcommittee of the DPC and usually meets at the ministerial level shortly before the full DPC meetings. The NPG is the result of an initiative by then-Secretary of Defense McNamara who after the failure of the proposal to create an allied naval nuclear force (the Multilateral Force, MLF) felt it necessary that a selected number of allies be more closely involved in NATO nuclear planning. McNamara's motivation was both to inform and educate the allies, and to commit them through participation to thinking more intensely about nuclear problems and then to take positions.\textsuperscript{496} McNamara's original idea was to keep the membership down to at four or five (including the US, Britain, Germany and Italy and perhaps one smaller ally) but after some trials with a mix of permanent members\textsuperscript{497} and rotating members,\textsuperscript{498} participation was

\textsuperscript{495}See \textit{NATO Facts and Figures}, pp. 94. The total number of committees approximates 200. (Interviews.)


\textsuperscript{497}The US, U.K., FRG, and Italy.

\textsuperscript{498}One each of the three pairs Greece and Turkey, Belgium and the Netherlands (and later Norway), Canada and Denmark.
Principal Committees of the Council

- The SHCI is a Joint Civil/Military Committee which reports both to the Council or Defence Planning Committee and to the Military Committee.
- Command, Control and Information Systems and Automatic Data Processing Committee

Fig. C-8 -- The Committee Structure of the North Atlantic Council
eventually opened to all interested allies and today includes all but France and Iceland. Spain is not yet a formal member, but has participated as an observer since the March 1983 NPG meeting in Vilamoura, Portugal. There also still formally exists a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) dealing with similar subject matter, but its importance declined with the broadening of the NPG membership in the late seventies. For planning purposes the NDAC is now almost negligible.\footnote{See Legge, op. cit., Appendix.}

Also of particular importance to the defense planning process is the Defense Review Committee (DRC). As is explained in more detail below, the DRC is the main committee responsible for the review of country contributions to the alliance and the implementation of NATO Force Goals; it reports to the DPC. The Economic Committee provides inputs to the main DPC guidance paper for military planning, the Ministerial Guidance, in the form of advice on resources likely to be made available during the planning period. Membership in these committees is open, and with the exception of France (not participating in the integrated military structure), all countries participate in these committees.\footnote{Iceland, which has no defense minister, participates at the ambassadorial level.}

The General Secretariat and the International Staff. Coordination and staff work for the committees is provided by the Secretary General and his aides in the International Secretariat (or International Staff, IS). As mentioned before, the Secretary General acts as chairman of the NAC at all levels of meetings (ministerial or Perm Rep) and also presides over the sessions of the DPC, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, the NPG, and the Environmental Affairs Committee, as well as a number of other committees. The General Secretary has at his disposal a personnel office as well as the Office of the General Secretary. The
latter consists of an Executive Secretariat whose head is the Secretary of the Council and the DPC, as well as its subordinate committees. The Executive Secretariat's main role is to manage meetings, write minutes and decision-papers. The deputy of the Executive Secretary is Secretary to the NPG and coordinates its work.\footnote{See NATO Facts and Figures, p. 92.}

Below the immediate Office of the General Secretary stands the International Secretariat (see Fig. C-9). It is divided functionally into five main divisions, each headed by an Assistant Secretary General plus an Office of the Financial Controller and an Office for Management, Personnel, and Administration. Division I (Political Affairs) has three Directorates covering the areas of political affairs, economics, information, plus an office for press affairs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary General leading this division is head of all the political committees and is responsible for the preparation of the political discussion of the NAC at the Perm Rep and staff level. The division also prepares notes and reports for the Secretary General on politically important topics and keeps liaison with the political directorates in the member governments as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations. The other two Directorates and the press office have similar charters.

Division II (Defense Planning and Policy) is the most important one for defense planning. The head of this division, usually a British national, chairs the meetings of the Defense Review Committee (DRC), and is deputy chairman of the Executive Working Group (EWG) of Perm Reps, concerned with special tasks assigned to it by the NAC, and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. This Assistant Secretary also supervises the staff work for the NPG. His division is made up of three directorates. The first is the Force Planning and Policy Directorate. It prepares all the papers for the Defense Review in coordination with the Permanent Representations and conducts its own analyses of national plans and programs. This Directorate also serves as the connecting
NATO International Staff

Fig. C-9 -- The Organization of the NATO International Staff
point between the Defense Planning Committee and the Military Authorities, helping them to translate the DPC's guidelines and policies into military programs. It also helps the EWG with special studies and maintains a Force Planning Database with relevant planning information. Directorate II (Nuclear Planning) coordinates alliance planning in the nuclear area and assists in the preparation of NPG and NDAC meetings. Finally, Directorate III coordinates all alliance efforts in the area of Civil Emergency Planning.

Division III (Defense Support) is mainly concerned with questions of armaments, that is, research and development, production and acquisition of defense materiel. The Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support is the chairman of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and advises the Secretary General, the NAC and the DPC on all of the above issues. In that capacity, he is the principal promoter of defense cooperation, standardization and rationalization of defense systems among member nations by encouraging and undertaking studies, the exchange of information, and supporting cooperative agreements. The Division is divided into four directorates. Directorate I works on armaments and defense research and is responsible for the promotion of cooperative concepts and projects in the alliance through the harmonization of research and acquisition plans and national requirements. Directorate II for command and communications systems supports cooperative projects in the communications area and coordinates the basic concepts of civilian and military communications systems. This Directorate supports the NATO Integrated Communications Systems Agency (NICSMA) and the various committees of the NAC concerned with communications matters. Directorate III for air defense supports the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC) and focuses its activities on the improvement of integrated air defense. Directorate IV for planning and support is responsible for overall planning in armaments cooperation including rationalization concepts for planning. It advises all NATO organs interested in the basic questions (not systems) for defense support.
Division IV for Infrastructure, Logistics, and Council Operations promotes allied cooperation in the area of consumer logistics, rationalization of national logistics systems and emphasizes the exchange of information to improve cooperation. It also develops the basic structure of future NATO infrastructure programs and their implementation. With regard to Council activities, this Directorate makes operational preparations for NAC crisis management activities and exercises such as WINTEX and provides advice to relevant committees.

Division V is primarily concerned with scientific affairs. The Assistant Secretary General heading it is the chairman of NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), a conference which dates back to an initiative by President Nixon. The Division also develops and supervises NATO supported scientific research, advises on technological as well as environmental issues.

Apart from these five divisions there is an administrative division and an Office of the Financial Controller which oversees the financial affairs of the alliance. The bookkeeping is checked independently by the International Board of Auditors.

Comments. The organizational framework on the civilian side is geared toward maximum political control. On the one hand, it allows political control of NATO's military authorities; on the other nations, through a large number of committees, have many opportunities to give input on decisions. These committees, however, not only allow for a maximum degree of influence but are also convenient to deflect politically sensitive topics into the labyrinth of a complex organizational structure.

The emphasis on political and national control also limits the potential efficiency of the civilian staffs. Much of their activity concentrates on balancing the divergent political interests of the alliance members. All planning papers go through numerous drafts which have to be coordinated with the capitals. This diplomatic activity far outweighs analytical staff work. From a political perspective this is
desirable to those allies that are interested in blocking decisions yet it is not efficient from a rational planning perspective.

Another limitation of the civilian structure is that the key committees (NAC, DPC) meet too seldom to involve the national top decision-makers in the details of the planning process. Ministers spend no more than a few hours per year with documents on NATO plans and the bulk of the work is done by the DPC in Permanent Session. Given the fact that the West German minister of defense, for example, is not deeply involved in the planning process even at the national level, this severely limits the knowledge and influence of the top leadership on NATO defense planning.

The Military Organization

Military Commands. The three Major NATO Commanders (MNCs), i.e. the regional commanders for the Channel area (CINCHAN), the Atlantic (SACLANT) and Europe (SACEUR) are of major importance in military planning (see Fig. C-10). One can compare the military commanders as having a role similar to strong military services in national contexts, with SACEUR being the most senior of the three. The planning activities of the three services are coordinated through the Military Committee (MC). In addition to the three MNCs, so-called National Military Representatives (NMRs) of the Chief of Staff for each of the nations participating in the integrated military structure of NATO take part in MC meetings on a permanent session-basis.  

As a result of the multi-national composition of the committee, the MC has to keep a low, "internationalist" profile. The three MNCs, by contrast, are heads of military hierarchies which require them to bargain much less within their commands. This greater independence of the MNCs is also emphasized by the fact that the nationality of the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{502}}\text{France only maintains a military representation to keep liaison with the MC, and Iceland has sent a civilian official.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{503}}\text{See E. VandeVanter, Jr., Some Fundamentals of NATO Organization, Santa Monica: RAND RM-3559-PR, April 1963.}\]
Fig. C-10 -- The NATO Military Structure
commanders reflect historical predominance of their country in the command area. SA CLANT is always an American naval officer, whereas the position of CINCHAN has traditionally been held by a British admiral and SACEUR, since the days of Eisenhower, has been an American general. Until 1978, SACEUR had only one deputy, a post held by a Briton; since then a second deputy-SACEUR position has been created and filled with a West German officer. 504

Each of the three MNCs is responsible for a defined area and specific defense functions. SACEUR's Allied Command Europe (ACE) extends from the northern tip of Norway to the southernmost part of Italy and from the Atlantic coast to the eastern border of Turkey. 505 SACEUR is responsible for the defense of this territory by coordinating national defense plans, strengthening allied forces in peace time and to plan for their use during war. In war, SACEUR would be in charge of all land, air and sea operations. Internal and coastal defense, however, would remain in national hands. SACEUR's charter includes responsibility during peacetime for organizing, training, and equipping allied forces, preparing and finalizing defense plans, and also act as an advisor to the MC on all these matters. Despite of his having to report to the MC, SACEUR has direct access to the national Chiefs of Staff and depending on circumstances, to Defense Ministers and Heads of State. SACEUR is helped in executing his task by three subordinate commands, covering the northern, central and southern parts of ACE (see Fig. C-11). Two other commanders, the Commander Allied Command Europe

504 In 1978, a second deputy post was created after the West Germans had complained that they were being represented by many less "stars" than the other allies. The West German argument was that this did not appropriately reflect the role of the FRG in allied defense. Gen. Haig, then SACEUR, had offered to create a second Deputy SACEUR position for a German officer and it was first filled with Gen. Gerd Schmueckle. For a personal account, see Gerd Schmueckle, Ohne Pauken und Trompeten. Erinnerungen an Krieg und Frieden, Munich: Heyne, 1982, pp. 380-381.
505 Britain and Turkey do not fall under the command of any single MNC. See NATO Facts and Figures, p. 106.
Fig. C-11 -- The Structure of Allied Command Europe
Mobile Force (Land Component) and the Commander United Kingdom Air Defense Region, are directly subordinate to SACEUR.

The Allied Command Atlantic, headed by SAACLANT, extends over the maritime area from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer in North-South direction and from the coast of Europe and Africa to the US in East-West direction. The main mission of SAACLANT is to develop plans for the defense of that area against disruption of Sea Lines of Communication between the US and Europe, conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases, and support SACEUR's campaigns. During peacetime, SAACLANT's role is defined similar to that of SACEUR, to prepare and finalize defense plans, conduct joint and combined exercises, to lay down training standards, determine the establishment of units, and provide advice to NATO authorities. SAACLANT has similar access to national Chiefs of Staff and civilian officials as SACEUR, although he has less visibility due to the distance of his headquarters from Europe. His command consists of five subordinate commands, as Fig. C-12 shows. SAACLANT was the first to have a standing force under his command in peacetime: NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). Except for situations when the force is operating in European waters, STANAVFORLANT is under SAACLANT's direct control.\footnote{When in European waters, command is automatically delegated to the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic.}

Excluded from SAACLANT's area are the British Isles and the Channel. The latter falls under the command of CINCAN whose command area covers the southern part of the north sea and the English Channel. The principal mission for this command area is to protect merchant shipping and to defend against all military attack. During wartime, CINCAN will seek to establish and maintain control of the area, including air defense of the channel in cooperation with SACEUR. The command has no peacetime forces assigned to it and during wartime the forces would consist mostly of naval forces and maritime air forces. There are four
Allied Command Atlantic

Fig. C-12 -- The Structure of Allied Command Atlantic
major subordinate commands, with the area and defense functions divided up among them, as Fig. C-13 shows.

The Military Committee and the International Military Staff. The primary organ through which they exert this influence on planning is the Military Committee of NATO. The MNC plans and recommendations mentioned above are submitted to the Military Committee for approval and then transmitted to the civilian authorities of the alliance. The MC meets at least once a week in the NATO Headquarters in Evere near Brussels as the MC in Permanent Session (MC/PS). This meeting takes place at the level of National Military Representatives (NMRs) who relay the positions of their Chiefs of Staff to the Committee. These representatives usually have between two and three stars (or their equivalent in other services), whereas the Chairman is a four-star officer. Twice a year, the Military Committee meets at the level of the Chiefs of Staff. The main task of the MC is to recommend in peacetime the measures necessary for the joint defense of the NATO-area.

The MC is also responsible for a number of military agencies. The presidency of the MC rotates among its members on an annual basis. However, the chairmanship of the MC meetings at the Chiefs of Staff level remains with the Chairman of the MC in Permanent Session. The chairman is elected for a two-year, renewable term and acts as the spokesman for the Committee. He is aided by a deputy who handles nuclear questions, arms control and MBFR issues, and the Director of the International Military Staff, an officer at the lieutenant-general level.

The International Military Staff (IMS) consist of some 150 officers, about the same number of non-commissioned officers, as well as 100 civilian employees. The Director of the IMS has seven assistants in the rank of generals or admirals. Six of those each head a division and

597 The Military Agency for Standardization in Brussels, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development and several other conferences, committees and the NATO Defense College.
Fig. C-13 -- The Structure of Allied Command Channel
another Assistant Director acts as the Secretary of the IMS. Division I is responsible for military intelligence, Division II for plans and policy, Division III for operations, Division IV for management and logistics, Division V for command and communications, plus a personnel and administration office.

**Comments.** The MNCs have a very important role in the NATO planning process. They make the initial planning proposals for forces in their area -- called the Force Proposals -- and thus provide a critical input into the NATO planning process. In developing these proposals they have considerable freedom. The force proposals are a reflection of the commanders interpretation of NATO's strategy and supposed to take into account the Ministerial Guidance issued every two years by the ministers. Because the MC has only a small staff, the MNCs' proposals usually pass the MC without much change, and interviews suggest that the force proposals traditional exceed the financial guidelines laid out in the Ministerial Guidance. The nations' attention increases considerably, however, in the process of developing force goals from the proposals because these force goals are the yardstick against which national contributions are measured.

The MNCs control the planning data for their command areas and their direct access via the chain of command to subordinate commands gives them an advantage over the civilian side of NATO's defense planning staffs. Because MNC planning is done in the framework of a military hierarchy, MNC work is less politically constrained. Since the MNC papers will be revised in any case in the course of the planning process, they are not initially scrutinized as much by the nations as the later final drafts. Moreover, responsibility to backstop MC work remains with the national military staffs who have no inherent interest in seeing force proposals constrained for political or financial reasons.

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588 See also the following section on "The Force Planning Process."
The militaryconventional being weak, there is no organization on the military side which would help prioritize programs proposed by the MNCs. The military commanders are equal and there is no established decision criteria to decide between proposals submitted by the commanders. The weakness of the IMS does not improve that situation and the civilian authorities in NATO are therefore forced to establish priorities themselves. Illustrative of these problems were the difficulties during the AD70 exercise to get a ranking from the military of the most urgently needed improvements on a functional and regional basis.  

THE FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

**Background.** NATO's force planning process for decades has suffered from three major problems:

- a mismatch between resources and military requirements;
- national unwillingness to give NATO effective planning responsibilities, including necessary staffs, information, and resources;
- controversies over the implications of the strategic concept for force planning.

Several times, these problems gave rise to revisions in the planning procedure. Already in 1950, the NAC had noticed a gap between military requirements and financial resources and realized the importance of coordinating financial and defense efforts. As a result, it created the "Defense Financial and Economic Committee" based in London to work on these matters. Yet it was not until further committees had studied the problem and a special Temporary Council Committee (TCC) headed by "Three Wise Men," under the chairmanship of

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509 See Chapter IV.
Averill Harriman was created, that a first NATO-wide review of economic conditions and force plans was undertaken on the basis of a detailed questionnaire. During the 1952 Lisbon conference, the NAC considered the Wise Men's report, accepted a new Force Plan (the Lisbon Force Goals) and decided that in the future such a review of economic capabilities and military plans was to be undertaken by the International Staff/Secretariat under the direction of the Secretary General on an annual basis. This "Annual Review" established firm goals for the following year, provisional goals for the subsequent year, and planning goals for the third. Provisional and planning goals were reviewed before they became firm targets to which countries were then committed for a year.

Lasting until 1961, these reviews were subsequently replaced by a "Triannual Review" for reasons of simplification. In 1963, under the influence of Robert McNamara's attempts to base US defense policy-making on new, more systematic planning grounds, the NAC instructed staff to examine again the relationship of strategy, forces and budgets. These reviews which became known as "Stikker-Exercises" after their principal director, NATO Secretary General Dirk H. Stikker were not only

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510 The two co-chairmen were Sir Edwin Plowden of the UK representing Hugh Gaitskell (whose government faced reelection) and Jean Monnet of France.
511 The Lisbon Goals envisaged ground forces of 50 divisions by the end of 1952, strong naval forces and 4,000 aircraft. For the end of 1954, the goal was 90 divisions and 6,000 aircraft. See Verteidigung im Buendnis, p. 46.
513 See NATO Facts and Figures, p. 147.
geared to develop a machinery which could determine a proper mix of forces and resources, but were also a vehicle for the US to follow up on Secretary McNamara's plea in Athens 1962 for a more flexible strategy. The revision of

the force planning process offered a vital opportunity for the "exposition of the US approach to perennial Alliance questions of strategy, force posture and burden sharing." Moreover, the process of determining acceptable NATO force goals was regarded as "the most timely opportunity for de facto modification of NATO strategic doctrine." The US now pressed for "goals which will give the Commanders the opportunity to make forces available for larger conventional military missions, without being shackled by general or tactical nuclear war requirements."518

Secretary General Stikker was assisted by a group of RAND analysts under the direction of Gus Shubert, and later Jim Digby, who had been sent to Paris upon personal request of Secretary McNamara. McNamara was sympathetic to Stikker's efforts and wanted to use them to promote US interests in revising NATO strategy and to adopt a planning system similar to that in the US Department of Defense.

Apart from the goal to change the strategic doctrine on which the alliance had based its planning thus far, the initiative by Stikker and McNamara was aimed at closing a gap between the force goals developed by the NATO Military Authorities and the actual resources provided by the nations. In the past SACEUR had a very strong position in developing these force goals and could not be forced to consider civilian resource guidance. The group of analysts working out of the US Representation to NATO devised a planning scheme under which a Defense Planning Committee at Perm Rep and ministerial level would be created plus a Defense Planning Working Group (DPWG) at the staff level. Both reported to the NAC and were to direct the force planning activities. According to Jane Stromseth and interviews, the DPWG's main function was to assemble data

\[518\] See Jane Stromseth, op. cit., p. 97 and the original sources cited therein.
on national force plans until 1970. The DPC "would use these studies, along with the alternative force goals submitted from the Military Committee, to recommend force goals for NATO that would be both economically viable and politically acceptable." The Military Committee had drafted a basic strategic appraisal (MC 100/1) and by the end of 1963 the French representative to the MC and announced that France would no longer participate in the work on MC 100/1:

The French Military Representative stated that his authorities disagreed with the basic ideas contained in MC 100/1, would not agree to merely amending the document to include the French view, would not agree to its being forwarded with French reservations attached, and, in fact, were prepared to "veto" further development and consideration of the document.\footnote{According to interviews, the RAND group had to make a special effort to at least introduce the notion of numerical planning into NATO circles. The Turks for example could not even provide figures on their actual troop strength and there were many unresolved accounting problems and great deficiencies in available data. See also Stromseth, op. cit., pp. 99-100.}

Because of the French refusal to accept any change in NATO strategy further development of MC 100/1 was stalled. For pragmatic reasons, the US government found it therefore advantageous to shift focus away from revisions in strategic doctrine to "specific shortcomings of forces and the cost of fixing them up in relation to feasible budgets."\footnote{See *Chronology of Actions by Military Committee/Standing Group Concerning NATO Long Term and Force Planning (Background Paper)*, p. 2, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Box 30-34, NATO Defense Policy Conference, 12/2/63, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, cited in Stromseth, p. 100.}

The US thus attempted to use the force planning process to inject its strategic views into alliance planning. With such a tactic, US

government officials calculated, the US ran less of a risk that the UK, France and West Germany would come closer to a joint opposition to strategic revisions or that a confrontation with France would be disruptive. The US proposed that "NATO military authorities [...] produce alternative sets of force goals covering the range of strategic views in the alliance." The US also suggested that the DPWG and SHAPE conduct as comprehensive studies of budgets and forces as possible. Finally, the US made clear that it favored moving ahead with these activities even against French opposition. In December 1964, NATO defense ministers endorsed the continuation of the exercises resulting from this proposal and McNamara emphasized that he wanted to avoid a discussion over strategic concepts (MC 100/1), arguing that it was more useful to examine what forces were "required to respond effectively to typical situations representative of the full spectrum of likely contingencies." Upon the recommendation of Jim Digby, the US also proposed in the latter half of 1965 that every two years the Defense Ministers pass a guidance to the NATO military authorities with regard to the broad parameters of force planning, so as to break SACEUR's traditional predominance in force goal developments without civilian guidance.

Whereas the Stikker Exercises did not lead to an immediate adoption of Flexible Response, mainly because of French opposition, the force planning exercises served as an important tool for the de facto modification of NATO strategy and doctrine. They also helped to iron out differences between the allies, save France. The latter's announcement in March of 1966 to withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure, however, removed the final obstacle and opened the

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520Interview, and Stromseth, op. cit., p. 105.
way both for the adoption of the new planning system and the strategy of Flexible Response.\textsuperscript{521} At a meeting of the Defense Ministers in Paris, July 25, 1966, the new defense planning system was formally adopted:

Ministers also reaffirmed the principle of an annual defense planning review on a 5-year basis. They adopted measures for the initiation in January 1967 of procedures which, by projecting Alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year, will improve the annual process of reviewing the defense efforts of member countries and agreeing upon their contributions.\textsuperscript{522}

But the first formal Five Year Plan covering the period 1968-1972 was not adopted until after the DPC on 9 May 1967 approved the new strategy of "Flexible Response" and gave guidance to the military authorities to draw up plans.\textsuperscript{523}

The Current Planning Procedure

According to the current planning process civilian authorities give the broad political, economic, technological and strategic guidance which is then translated into military program proposals by the military.\textsuperscript{524} The actual force planning process starts with a military

\textsuperscript{521}Interview and Stromseth, op. cit. p. 105 and pp. 206-210.
\textsuperscript{523}The first Five-Year Plan was adopted at the December 1967 meeting of the DPC. Cf. the communiques of the spring and winter meetings of the DPC in Texts of Final Communiques, 1949-1974.
\textsuperscript{524}The process is defined in NATO document DPC/D (71) 10, 19 May 1971, which remains classified. For a recent description of the process, see the article by the present NATO Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy, J. Moray Stewart, "How NATO Force Planning Works," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 3 (26), 29 June 1985, pp. 1281-1283. Another practitioner's account is given by Roy W. Stafford, op. cit. For a description of the very similar situation in the early 1970s, see the authoritative description by O. Caracciolo di Forino, "Planning NATO's Forces," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 16 (6), 1971, pp. 74-81 (when writing this article, Caracciolo was Head of the Plans and Policy Section within the Defense Planning and Policy Division of the IS); see also Juerg von Kalckreuth, "Der Verteidigungsplanungsszyklus der NATO,"
appreciation which is drawn up by the International Military Staff and then revised and approved by the the Military Committee in January (see Fig. C-14). Upon approval the document which analyses developments over an eight-year period, it is passed on to the DRC. Aided by resource advice from the IS, the DRC drafts the Ministerial Guidance which is subsequently approved by the DPC at ministerial level during the spring conference. The political and economic appreciations on which the Ministerial Guidance is based are provided by the elaborate committee structure of the DPC/DRC. Responsible for the Economic Appreciation due in January and covering also a period of eight years, is the Economic Committee of the DPC, whereas the political appreciation is drafted by the Political Committee. Both receive inputs from other specialized committees on matters in which they have more expertise. The actual staff work is provided by the appropriate directorate/desk of the International Staff.

A year prior to the actual issuance of the spring Ministerial Guidance, the Major NATO Commanders have already started developing the Force Proposals, i.e. the forces that the military suggests as desirable and necessary for the defense of the alliance. The IS again provides its advice on resources likely to be available during the planning period. In autumn of the year in which the Ministerial Guidance is issued, the MNCs pass their proposals on to the Military Committee which reviews them and coordinates proposals with the MNCs. In addition, the MC issues an assessment of risks associated with the implementation of the revised proposals. The MC then forwards the Force Proposals and the risk assessment to the DRC. The DRC reviews the proposals and may alter them, taking into account new IS resource advice, thus leading to the Draft Force Goals. These are then forwarded to the Defense Planning Committee at the level of Permanent Representatives which makes recommendations to the ministerial meeting in the spring. By that time the force goals will have been coordinated among all parties and can no

_Europäische Wehrkunde_, Vol. 25 (11), November 1976, pp. 541-543. For the official description see NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 146-151.
Fig. C-14 -- The Force Planning Process in NATO
longer be changed. After passage, the Force Goals are the planning goals theoretically guiding national planning within defined political, economic, and technological constraints. Yet it is well understood and accepted in NATO that the force goals are also to pose a "reasonable challenge" to the member countries.525

The force Goals cover a period of five years. After they have been approved, a more detailed coordination between them and national force plans begins. Member nations of course have intense inputs into the force goal definition process. In all likelihood these inputs were coordinated with national plans. But revisions of national plans in response to changing economic conditions, for example, make it necessary to receive formal, more detailed and updated reports on the country's plans to implement force goals. The report that countries are asked to submit is called Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). By the end of March, the DRC begins developing questionnaires based on the force goals, which ask for information on past, current, and future planning years. The information requested has to be broken down by service and presented both in verbal descriptive as well as tabular form. The countries are also asked to include a Memorandum "explaining [the country's] overall policy and financial aims."526

Reports on "National Forces and Financial Plans" are due for delivery to the DRC by the end of July. Upon arrival in Brussels, the International Staff in Evere, the International Military Staff, and the MNCs review the country plans and the IS prepares drafts of so-called country chapters which assess the member's contributions to alliance defense and estimates the likely implementation of force goals. In the fall, a group of officials from the IS and the MNCs travel to the capitals of the alliance members to check their country chapters with the nations and to resolve possible differences. These meetings, known

525 Interviews.
526 See Stewart, p. 1282.
as "Trilaterals" serve as the first opportunity for the countries to explain peculiarities that might have developed with regard to their plans. During these Trilaterals, the countries also get a first hand feeling for what the gist of the NATO evaluation of its plans will be. The talks thus give the NATO staff and the countries an opportunity to better prepare themselves for the subsequent multilateral review in November, when the DRC, on the basis of revised Country Chapters, evaluates allied contributions. During these Multilateral Examinations, the allies, aided by NATO staff and NATO military authorities, review their partner's contributions. According to a former Assistant NATO Secretary General for Force Planning and Policy whose division had primarily responsibility for the country chapters, this examination of the countries' contributions "is a searching and detailed one. A team with a poor story to tell or inadequate preparation can usually count on a difficult session." \(^{527}\)

The NATO Force Plan comes at the end of this review. This force plan is based on the DPQ, the country plans over a five year period, and the various reports on allied contributions by the DRC. It gives the alliance and the military authorities a sense of what is politically, militarily, and economically possible. When the Force Plan is on the agenda of the December ministerial meeting of the DPC, the ministers also have before them an analysis by the MC on the force plan with regard to mission suitability and the degree of risk associated with the plan. Thus the major parameters on NATO's side for the MC's Military Appreciation due out in January are at hand for the new planning cycle.

**Conclusions.** The effectiveness of NATO planning is severely constrained by strong particularistic interests of nations, as well as military components of the NATO organization itself. As this section has shown, NATO plans tend to be more a reflection of previously established national plans than vice-versa. The organizational structure of the alliance and the planning process are geared toward

\(^{527}\)Ibid.
maximum national control to insure that countries are not faced with military requirements that they are not willing or able to implement. Countries establish resource levels for defense on different grounds than NATO commanders. The latter's primary objective and responsibility is to procure the forces necessary for a successful defense, largely independent of cost considerations. Political leaders who decide on resource allocation at the national level have to consider a larger number of non-defense priorities and therefore may come to different conclusions regarding the level of defense expenditures. NATO force planning reflects these potential tensions and is geared to insure that national considerations can ultimately dominate.

Planning at the NATO level can therefore not be analyzed in terms of a rational actor model in which military threat is evaluated, and military strategy and force programs are devised in a logical sequence. Although NATO and member governments sometimes claim this to be the fact, reality is very different. NATO planning is more adequately described in terms of a political bargaining process in which differing national interests and priorities are related to the military situation and interpretations of strategy. NATO itself has no authority to do independent alliance planning. All plans are merely the result of complex negotiations between countries through NATO organizations and channels.

The Relationship between National and NATO Planning

Flowcharts alone do not adequately describe the importance of the connecting points between national and NATO planning. Since virtually all planning involves detailed consultation and cooperation between allied staffs on the committees concerned, organizational charts do not fully grasp the importance and significance of inputs or documents. However, a review of the formal linkages between NATO and national planning gives important clues with regard to the possible areas of interaction and interdependence.
The organizational principles of decision-making by consensus and participation in decision-making by all the allies integrated into the military structure imply intricate network of linkage and communication among the allies. As Fig. C-15 indicates, the principal relay points between Brussels and the capitals are the national representations, or embassies, on the civilian side and the National Military Representatives (NMRs) on the military side. The main responsibility both of the civilian as well as the military representatives is to make sure that no decisions are prepared which are unacceptable to their nation. Both the civilian and military sides rely on formal and informal reporting from their staff and fellow officers serving in IS, the IMS or the integrated commands in order to obtain information.\footnote{One critical account speaks of an "old boy net" of officers who "use national contacts at various staff levels to expedite, block or emasculate a staff action which is contrary to a parochial or national position." See Colonel Fontainebleau (pseud. for Col. Gordon A. Moon II), "NATO Handicap: The Integrated Staff," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 11 (5), Oct.-Nov. 1966, pp. 31-34 (here p. 34). For an (unsophisticated) rebuttal, see Lt. Col. Paul G. Graham, "NATO Asset -- The Integrated Staff," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 12 (1), Feb.-Mar., 1967, pp. 81-82.} As in any bureaucracy, this reporting is considered an integral part of the work within integrated staffs.\footnote{The account by Brigadier General Helmut Liebeskind couches this function in much more diplomatic terms than "Colonel Fontainebleau," op. cit. and speaks of a "special responsibility of the [German] officer [in an international staff function] for the national side of defense planning" and claims that it is a misunderstanding to believe that "with beginning service in a NATO staff staff one's nationality is necessarily left in the wardrobe." See Helmut Liebeskind, "Die Arbeit deutscher Heeresoffiziere in internationalen Staeben dargestellt am Beispiel SHAPE," Jahrbuch des Heeres, Vol. 9, 1982, pp. 70-79. See also Vandevenanter, op. cit. on these issues.} This includes the exchange of papers on a confidential or background basis which may then be distributed -- selectively depending on the subject -- within the reporting officer's national representation and in the capital of his respective country. These papers are then used to prepare rebuttals,
Fig. C-15 -- The Interaction Between National and NATO Planning: The FRG Example
positions and plans so as to advance subsequent negotiations as much as possible in the national advantage.

In regard to the formal relationship between NATO planning papers and national documents, Fig. C-15 shows a close inter-connection. However, a closer look reveals that although there are theoretically many relationships, the actual influence of NATO documents, such as the Military and Economic Appreciations, on West German plans remains doubtful for systematic reasons.

First of all, these NATO papers are consensus products and therefore tend to have no edges after having been watered-down in the drafting process to accommodate differences of opinion.\(^5\)\(^3\)\(^8\) Although one can argue that NATO force goals play an important role in guiding national planning, one has to bear in mind that these force goals were developed jointly by the member nations based on their anticipated national plans. In a way the national planning process thus feeds itself through NATO planning and vice versa.\(^5\)\(^3\)\(^1\) Secondly, as in the case of West Germany, basic policy documents (e.g. the Defense Policy Guidelines, the Assessment of Long-term Developments, and the Military Strategic Concept) are redrafted too infrequently and irregularly to take into account new NATO documents issued every two years.

Third, these West German documents remain vague because of their long-term nature and NATO guidance, which is often vague itself, and can therefore hardly be used for detailed planning purposes.


\(^5\)\(^3\)\(^1\) See di Forino, op. cit., p. 75 who notes that "throughout these various [planning] stages, there is a continuous dialogue between not only the political, economic and military authorities but also between the international and national levels, so that it may be said that the overall NATO plan is realistically based on national defense plans and these in turn reflect the needs of NATO-wide plans."
Fourth, the planning horizons both in the US and the FRG, as well as in other countries, exceeds the time frame under consideration by NATO authorities by up to ten years. This implies that important conceptual decisions are being made by member countries outside the NATO planning process. These countries will thus have set accents that they will hardly want to withdraw when the NATO force planning cycle finally catches up in a particular planning year. In a sense then, some of the most important member nations are creating a planning heritage which is being fed back into NATO planning. Long-range decisions are thus by definition moved beyond the reach of the organization.532

This problem had been recognized when the NATO planning system was first revised in 1971. But resistance against a longer planning horizon was too strong to allow major changes. Apparently, the smaller countries often had neither the staff nor the analytical capabilities to provide inputs for such planning and were resistant to grant NATO planning such a significant influence on national plans.

Related to this issue are the problems of the NATO staff to receive timely answers to the DPQ and other requests for information necessary for planning. NATO authorities have only from August until November to check facts and analyze the country plans before making recommendations for the NATO Force Plan which the ministers adopt in December. However, the bulk of the DPQ responses arrive late in Brussels -- some only in October, November or even December -- and practitioners consider the remaining examination time much too short. In theory this analysis is

532This was recognized already in 1973, when the Nineth Oberammergau Defense Planning Workshop devoted itself to this issue. For a discussion of the problem, see Heinz von zur Gathen, "Laengerfristige strategische Planung und Studien in der NATO," lecture delivered to the Ninth Oberammergau NATO Defense Planning Workshop, 5-9 March, 1973 (DokZent L 4642, OPEN). The problem was addressed again in the LTDP which purposefully extended the range of the measures to up to 15 years in some cases. NATO has since moved to improve the range of its planning by developing so-called Long-term Planning Guidelines (LTPGs) and a Conceptual Military Framework (CMF).
meant to provide a comparison of plans and actual forces before moving on to the initiation of a new force planning cycle. In practice, however, time constraints limit the amount of detailed consideration that is necessary for the DPQ analyses.

The main reason for delays in DPQ responses are heavy workloads on national staffs and asynchronous budget and planning cycles within the member countries and NATO.533 This asynchronicity is also the reason why it is difficult in some cases for national planners to take NATO policies into account in a timely fashion. As Fig. C-15 indicates, not only were some of the West German papers (the Defense Policy Guidelines and the Military Strategic Concept, for example) redrafted too rarely to incorporate changed policies but some documents, such as the DPQ, were due before the national programs were ultimately decided upon. These problems were compounded by the fact that, as mentioned before, the West German MoD did not follow its own planning schedule in the late 1970s and for a few years was lacking approved planning papers.534

Fifth, if some of the NATO guidance papers contradicted FRG, US or other countries' planning bases, ministers of defense would make every effort at appropriate meetings to have the national parameters accepted or else opt out from a particular proposal. It was inconceivable, for example, that the Ministerial Guidance contained binding language suggesting that countries would achieve specified increases in defense outlays if these numbers contradicted national plans. In the German case, the coordination process both within the MoD as well as between it, the Foreign Office and the Finance Ministry insured that the defense minister could not possibly go along with NATO policies that contradicted West German government policy.

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534 See Chapter VII, Force Planning in the FRG.
Sixth, it was very hard to undertake systematic comparisons of capabilities based on defense functions rather than force categories.\textsuperscript{535} Up until the early 1980s the basic counting rules of NATO Force Goals and their implementation as reported in the DPQ were national units, equipment numbers etc. These counting and reporting formats did not contain readily usable information on combat capabilities. The value of weapons platforms, for example, in terms of their firepower, mobility, or survivability was not assessed in the DPQs. NATO staffs therefore had to obtain that information either directly from the nations or needed to make assumptions for analytical purposes. The absence of immediately useable and standardized data on combat effectiveness severely limited the ability of the IS to make cost-effectiveness comparisons and to propose alternative levels of funding. The contributions of the member nations were also not aggregated in functional terms so that program budgeting was virtually non-existent, further limiting sophisticated analyses.

A final problem was that NATO planning documents did not cover all of the forces of all the allies. Sizeable amounts of ground forces and certain categories of nuclear forces, most significantly American strategic nuclear forces, remained beyond the direct influence of NATO bodies although these forces would be crucial for the implementation of the strategy of Flexible Response. Uncertainty over the national commitment of forces during war-time and differences of judgment were a major factor contributing to the gross differences in NATO and US analyses of the military threat.\textsuperscript{536}

\textsuperscript{535} The LTDP was aimed to improve on this problem as well. For a discussion of the problems see Chapter V.  
\textsuperscript{536} See Chapter II.
PART D:
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS

The analytical bases of force planning, organizational and procedural questions only partially explain NATO's problems with conventional force improvements. Each case stood within a specific political context, both domestic and international. The fourth part of this dissertation addresses the question of how the political environment affected NATO's attempts at improving conventional forces.

The political environment can be analyzed in terms of five dimensions. On the domestic side, especially in the case of the FRG, it is important to note the political constraints imposed by "history," i.e. the specific experiences with military instruments of politics and the loss of the two world wars.

Secondly, debates and decisions on defense issues were influenced by the institutional framework. This institutional structure shaped the terms in which defense matters were discussed, that is whether conventional defense improvements were seen primarily in terms of their military and strategic importance, budgetary implications, or their effects on foreign policy and public opinion.

A third important factor was the dynamics of public opinion. The West German public was considerably more skeptical of defense improvements as an instrument to improve the security situation than the American public. Throughout the 1970s West German public opinion favored a political approach to the East-West confrontation, deemphasizing armament programs over arms control. The American public, by contrast, had more confidence in security through military strength. The differences in attitudes were also reflected in party discussions and opinion line-ups. Whereas concerns grew in the US about increases in Soviet military capabilities from the mid-1970s onwards, there was a growing sentiment especially in the SPD that the FRG should not follow what Washington considered a confrontationist approach.
Fourth, resource considerations have played a central role in determining what the scope and degree of implementation would be for NATO's force goals, as the case studies in Part B have shown. In this section the question how defense budgets were set at the national level and how resource considerations interacted with strategic views and proposals for conventional force improvements will be asked in more detail. A comparison of the US and West German experiences reveals interesting differences. Neither in the public debate nor in government-internal discussions were strategic concepts evaluated in terms of their budgetary implications. This had structural as well as historical reasons. On the one hand, the Bundestag majority had no interest undermining the policies of the government. The military, on the other hand, considered it politically inopportune to take an opposing stand to the civilian leadership, as this would have strained the precarious state of civil-military relations. Yet this political self-restraint came at the cost of blocking internal as well as public debates over the relationship of strategic choices and force postures.

Fifth, German and American positions on conventional defense improvements differed with respect to the role foreign policy considerations played. The two countries had very different philosophies regarding the importance and utility of military force in foreign policy. The FRG was in a more precarious situation in comparison to the US. West German military programs were closely watched by neighbors East and West who were wary of renewed West German military strength. This required Bonn to keep a low profile on defense matters. For reasons of historical experience, West German policy makers -- like the public -- were more skeptical about "military solutions" to their security problem. Throughout the 1970s there was tension between the need to maintain strong defenses while at the same time seeking conciliation and detente with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. In the US, by contrast, the military competition with the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact in general was made the explicit subject of debates.
Conventional defense improvements not only had potential repercussions for East-West relations alone, but when viewed from the West German perspective, such improvements had important implications on the relationships within the Western Alliance. West German policymakers perceived a political dilemma between increasing West German (European) defense efforts and the danger of encouraging with such increases the American troop withdrawals from Europe. For administrations in Washington, on the other hand, it was important to demonstrate greater European willingness to share the military burden and to decrease the risk of nuclear escalation for the US. From the West German perspective, increases in conventional strength raised the specter of the denuclearization of Europe. In West Germany, this increased the fear of a drift in US-European relations which would make West Germany politically more vulnerable to Soviet political pressures.
IX. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

Allied control and influence, the Weimar and Nazi experiences, the nature of the parliamentary system, as well as the peculiarities of the German and Prussian military tradition left a distinct and traceable imprint on the cast of actors and the way they approached matters of defense planning. The main feature of the post-war system was the imposition of tight political controls and the subordination of the military to civilian leadership. In terms of staff work, however, the military remained the principle organization dealing with military planning.

Political control was aimed primarily at insuring civilian dominance of the chain of command for peace and war time operations and to insure the social integration of the soldiers in society. Thus, political control meant that the overall size, structure, budgets and operational principles of the armed forces would be decided by the civilian authorities. Yet within that framework, the responsibility to develop specific proposals for force planning (shares of army, navy and air forces, personnel structure, equipment numbers and types, etc.) remained almost exclusively a responsibility of the Fuehrungsstaebe of the military services and the Fue S. Civilian political authorities saw their role mostly as examining the plans with regard to their compatibility with broad political guidelines, and not so much in terms of professional merit, i.e. cost-effectiveness, military value etc.

To a large degree this division of labor between the civilian and military leadership was the result of different agendas. For a long time the problem for the civilian leadership was not so much how well the posture fit strategy, the structure of the planning system and other such technical problems, but rather it was more important to insure the integration of the armed forces into the democratic system as part of an
effort to legitimize the creation of the Bundeswehr and to firmly establish political control. The principle of "Innere Fuehrung" was meant to help overcome the social and political isolation of the armed forces after World War II. Innere Fuehrung emphasized the importance of the moral and political consciousness of the individual and was to help protect the civic rights of the soldiers. The new army was to be an army of the people and its soldiers were to be "citizens in uniform," according to the father of the idea, Lt. Gen. Wolf Graf von Baudissin, with a deeply felt obligation and appreciation for country and constitution.\textsuperscript{537}

\textbf{Actors in the Planning Process}

\textbf{The Role of Parties}

Because of the concerns of the civilian leadership primarily with political matters, it is not surprising to find that although political parties have a central role in West German political life, they played virtually no direct role for the conventional improvement initiatives examined in this study. Of course political parties shaped the debate on defense issues, but conventional defense improvements were never an important issue on the political agenda. Only a few people in all the major parties were interested in defense policy until the late 1970s when INF began to have a major impact. Instead, most of the attention focused on strategic-nuclear issues; discussions of Flexible Response and implications for NATO's posture remained the exception.

\textbf{Background.} Since the late 1950s when the electoral system had crystallized, three parties dominated the scene: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). With regard to defense and foreign affairs, the CDU/CSU has been the party of "West integration" and alliance with the

\textsuperscript{537}For an overview of Baudissin's ideas see his \textit{Soldat fuer den Frieden. Entwuerfe fuer eine zeitgemässe Bundeswehr}, (ed. by Peter von Schubert), Munich: Piper 1969.
US since the days of Konrad Adenauer. Critical of the SPD/FDP
governments Ostpolitik, the party tried to give itself the image of
standing for West German reliance in NATO and a strong defense. Up
until 1959 the SPD, on the other hand, opposed the concept of German
membership in NATO because it felt that participation in the alliance
would make moot the possibility of reunification. With Herbert Wehner's
famous speech in the Bundestag in 1960, the SPD officially accepted
Adenauer's policy. The party thus created the precondition for it to be
considered eligible by the public as a government party. Although the
party had a record of supporting the Bundeswehr when in power as well as
in opposition, the SPD traditionally favored a more conciliatory policy
towards the East with an emphasis on negotiations and arms control as
instruments to achieve security. The FDP, attracting only 5-10% of the
vote over the last three decades, has always favored a more flexible
foreign policy than that of the CDU/CSU, yet also a slightly more
pragmatic and conservative one than the SPD, especially when internal
debates in the latter cast doubt on the SPD's steadfastness on defense.

The stability brought about by this dominance of three parties
lasted until the early 1980s and was achieved primarily through
electoral engineering. Because of the requirement for any party to gain
at least 5% of the national vote or three direct seats through the mixed
system of proportional and majority voting, the entrance barrier for
small or new parties was high and effectively kept new parties out until
1983 when the first members of the Green party were elected to the
Bundestag. The party system, however, is also characterized by strong
party identification and factionalism. It is extremely rare that a
member would vote for an issue against the majority of his own faction,
especially since all parties have an elaborate system of controls
through benefits and punishments and any such deviation would create
major difficulties for such a member.

Impact on Conventional Improvement Initiatives. As mentioned
before, parties or party politics did not have a direct impact on the
defense improvement initiatives analyzed here. Defense policy was of
concern only to a handful of deputies and aides from the parties, and expertise about the technicalities and potential trade-offs in force structure planning was very limited. However, discussions in the parties, or the lack thereof, created another important backdrop against which the internal debate in the FRG was set. Four areas are of specific importance. First, with regard to the analytical foundations for force planning, what were the preferred strategy choices that the parties supported? Second, how was the threat perceived? Third, what were the political considerations, both domestic and foreign, that influenced West German attitudes toward conventional defense improvement? And fourth, how was the organizational framework for defense planning viewed?

Party Views on Strategy. Regarding the first question, preferred strategy choices, perhaps the most striking feature was the absence of a debate about the exact meaning of flexible response or the implications of alternate strategies in terms of military requirements (manpower, equipment, mobilization requirements, etc.), operational policies (e.g. forward defense), and financial resources. A survey of primary documents, such as speeches, party pamphlets, and platforms reveals that with relatively little differences in emphasis, flexible response was the only conceivable NATO strategy to SPD and FDP, as well as the CDU.\footnote{The CSU continued to have a significant gaullist element. See below.} What is more, there was never an attempt to rationalize this choice and to define its meaning.\footnote{The absence of a debate about defense policies was deplored before the INF crisis by SPD/FDP and CDU/CSU alike. See for an SPD example the article by Erwin Horn (a member of the Defense Committee), "Sicherheitspolitik zwischen Apologie und Ignoranz," \textit{Neue Gesellschaft}, Vol. 20 (9), 1973, pp. 679-682. For an example from the CDU, see Hans Ruehle, "Braucht die NATO eine neue Strategie?" \textit{Europäische Wehrkunde}, Vol. 22 (10), 1973, pp. 514-519.} Flexible Response was simply seen as the best and optimal choice.\footnote{To be sure, there were some demands from the margins that would call for rather different policies. The Youth Group of the SPD, the Young Socialists, for example, when rediscovering defense policy, focussed mainly on political aspects, such as the creation of a}
the platforms of the CDU and the FDP suggesting that conventional improvements should be given priority in order to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{541} The CDU was prepared to increase the defense budget and to introduce rapidly precision-guided munitions to achieve a higher nuclear threshold. The CDU also argued that front line strength was most important, that reservists needed to be used more extensively, and that the 36 brigade force structure should not be a "magic number and a tabu."\textsuperscript{542} The SPD and FDP focussed on modernization of the conventional components. The CSU's platform in the mid-1970s was an interesting example of strong remnants of "gaullist" attitudes. Under the leadership of Franz-Josef Strauss, the party favored an integrated West European force with a nuclear component.\textsuperscript{543}

Estimates of the Military Threat. With regard to the second area, threat assessments, there existed relatively little disagreement as to the basic "facts." Most party statements stressed that the Soviet Union was approaching (or in the late 1970s: had achieved) strategic nuclear parity and that NATO was outnumbered conventionally, thus emphasizing the need for a first-use policy and conventional modernization. All of the parties believed in parity, both nuclear and conventional as a desirable condition.\textsuperscript{544}

\textsuperscript{541}See the synopsis of party positions on defense issues produced by the \textit{Deutsche Bundeswehr-Verband} under the title "Parteien zur Verteidigungspolitik," in \textit{Die Bundeswehr}, no. 9, 1976, pp. 426-429.


\textsuperscript{544}See "Parteien zur Verteidigungspolitik," op. cit. and "Parteien
Political Approaches to the Security Problem. Differences were notable, however, in the third area, the political approach to security matters.\textsuperscript{545} The SPD/FDP emphasized a negotiation approach to achieving parity, whereas the CDU/CSU, though prepared for negotiations, was more pessimistic whether the perceived existing asymmetries could be dealt with successfully through negotiations. The SPD, by contrast was skeptical about equating increased military efforts with increased security.\textsuperscript{546} Even a moderate security expert of the SPD, such as Alfons Pawelczyk, argued that the LTDP had to be structured allowing flexibility so that each individual program step could be given up in case of Warsaw Pact concessions.\textsuperscript{547}

A consensus among the parties existed, however, on the basis of the Harmel Report of 1967, which stated that military security and detente were not contradictory concepts but rather complementary. Differences in emphasis also existed with regard to the interpretation of the military threat to the FRG. The White Papers, which are the government's principal instrument of stating defense policy, stressed during the time of the socialist/liberal SPD/FDP coalition that the military threat was significant and that NATO was at a disadvantage, yet the White Papers also suggested that an attack was not imminent and that political elements were important in an overall balance assessment.\textsuperscript{548}

\textsuperscript{545} An interesting synopsis of SPD,FDP and CDU views on this issue in the mid-1970s is given in Klaus-Dieter Schwarz (ed.), Sicherheitspolitik. Analysen zur politischen und militärischen Sicherheit. Bad Honnef-Erpf: Osang Verlag, 1976, pp. 341-364.

\textsuperscript{546} See, for example, the article on Hans Koschnik's speech before a security conference of the SPD in Berlin under the title "Die Grenze wuertet verwischt," Berliner Stimme, 8 October 1977.

\textsuperscript{547} This showed a thorough lack of understanding of the LTDP as well as its potential connections to ongoing arms control negotiations which did not even touch the bulk of the measures of the LTDP. Yet Pawelczyk’s requirement reveals an interesting facet of the philosophical approach in the SPD. See Alfons Pawelczyk, "NATO Programm hat eine Signalwirkung," Sozialdemokratische Sicherheitspolitik, no. 4/5-78, June 1978, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{548} See, for example, the White Paper, 1975/1976, pp. 68-77. See also the article of then State Secretary of Defense Andreas von Buelow,
Parties and the Central Defense Organization. Regarding the fourth issue area, the organizational framework for West German defense decision-making, party discussions focussed mostly on issues of command and control, and less on planning aspects. Each of the three parties had different proposals on the organization of the top leadership in the MoD, but due to the specialized subject matter, no widespread debate took place. All of the proposals focussed on the role of the General Inspector in the chain of command and the distribution of command power between the General Inspector, the minister and the chancellor, as well as the need to coordinate defense efforts (civil and military) between various government agencies. As was shown elsewhere, Helmut Schmidt and the SPD in 1970, for example, intended for planning purposes to clarify and strengthen the role of the General Inspector, but did so half-heartedly. The CDU and the FDP have traditionally favored further strengthening of the General Inspector and his staff. As was shown previously, Minister Woerner, after coming to office, also did not fully succeed in this regard.\footnote{See Chapter VII, \textit{Force Planning in the FRG}.}

At various times, the FDP proposed to give the General Inspector power of command over all services, yet for constitutional as well as historical reasons, these proposals never found much support.\footnote{See \textit{FAZ}, 28 December, 1977, p. 1/2; \textit{FAZ}, 15 February 1984, p. 2. \textit{Die Welt}, 13 November 1970, p. 6, \textit{Christ und Welt}, 16 January 1970, p. 4; and \textit{SZ}, 22 January 1970, p. 5.}

The CDU did not go as far as to give the General Inspector power of command across the board, but traditionally did favor the strengthening of him and his staff.\footnote{See \textit{Die Welt}, 13 November 1970, p. 6, \textit{Christ und Welt}, 16 January 1970, p. 4; and \textit{SZ}, 22 January 1970, p. 5.}

None of these proposals have led to the Law on the Organization of the Defense Establishment, as required by the Constitution, however. Moreover, the discussions so far have mostly been concerned with the

"Problematik eines Ost-West Vergleichs," \textit{Sozialdemokratische Sicherheitspolitik}, no. 3/4-77, May 1977, pp. 9-19. This article was considerably more balanced than von Buelow's later contributions in this area. This may not be surprising since it was drafted by two members of the Planning Staff.
rationalization of the bureaucracy and responsibilities within it, as well as the command structure. Only rarely, however, have links been made between the organizational framework and outputs. The underlying problem is two-fold. On the one hand, it is unclear what the expected outputs of a changed institutional/organization structure are. The call for "better" or a "more rational" defense policy will hardly suffice. Without a clear definition of what difference a changed institutional set-up is supposed to make, it is hard to define the requirements for one. The likely reasons for the failure to have developed such a structure in the past are the lack of broad based efforts, the unwillingness to raise the issue (and money) at politically inopportune moments and differences in outlook between parties on what the broad purposes and approaches to security are.

**Summary.** The emphasis on the role of political solutions, the relative confidence in nuclear first use as an instrument to offset conventional imbalances, the low salience of defense in the national political discussion, the lack of knowledgeable individuals and an institutional structure, explain why there was no active discussion on strategy and posture issues. The domestic discussion on defense issues has traditionally focussed much more on such issues as the integration of the armed services into society, the welfare of the soldier, and equality of the draft (*Wehrgerechtigkeit*). The overarching questions of strategy and posture played only a minor role and from a military perspective there was no conceptual framework within which alternatives were discussed.

Of course there were occasional skirmishes within the parties over the right course. Minister Leber or his successors were at times prompted to dampen some of the hopes in the left wing of the SPD that the continued pursuit of detente meant that the military efforts of the FRG could be lessened and the monies used for other purposes.\(^{552}\)

Similarly, there were a few in the CDU who had very bleak opinions of

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\(^{552}\)For a most interesting study on the SPD in this regard, see Jeffrey Boutwell, *External and Domestic Determinants of West German Security Policy: Adenauer, Schmidt and Nuclear Weapons*, Ph.D.
the military balance and were in favor of considerably larger outlays for defense. These factions would usually provide the ammunition for political disputes over government and opposition policies, yet these feuds did not become an important issue until the late 1970s when the INF crisis erupted. Overall, however, defense policy was discussed in the mainstream of the parties within rather narrow and stable political and financial parameters without systematic exploration of alternatives and their implications.

Parliament

In theory the West German parliament, like any other parliament, exerts its influence on defense and security issues mainly through two processes. First, it can influence the debate on particular issues by raising public attention and bringing the government under pressure to act. This may be done either by forcing a debate onto the agenda, or by individual members or groups of members asking questions during the question period (Fragestunde). Groups of members can also shape debates by introducing laws which then have to be discussed at the committee level if sufficient number of deputies support the bill. Second, as in any parliament, the Bundestag controls the purse and can thus reorder priorities.


Some in and around the CDU/CSU, such as Alfred Dregger, continued to criticize the SPD for not being serious enough about defense; not devoting enough resources to it; having too high hopes for detente and arms control negotiations; giving too much priority to other policy fields, such as education social welfare, etc. See, for example, Karl Feldmeyer, "Die Union besorgt ueber die militaerische Lage in Mitteleuropa," FAZ, 16 January 1976, pp. 1 and 5; Wolfram von Raven, 'Sicherheitspolitik -- mit Fragezeichen," in Horst Keller (ed.), Das Jahrzehnt der Utopisten, Bonn: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1979, pp. 74-78; see also the article of the then chairman of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag, Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU), "Mit der deutschen Ruestungsplanung steht es nicht zum besten," DUD, No. 189, 5 October 1970, pp. 2-6;
To facilitate its work in the defense and security areas, the Bundestag relies mainly on two specialized committees. The foreign affairs and defense committees are two of three committees that the constitution mandates the Bundestag establish; thus they have particular weight. The defense committee advises on all defense matters and can require the MoD to involve it in such issues as procurement decisions, manpower etc. The defense committee also reviews the government's budget proposals and makes recommendations (including changes) to the Budget Committee on how the budget should be passed. It has, however, proper jurisdiction over neither procurement decisions nor the budget; instead it can make unbinding recommendations to the budget committee. The latter is free to act on the proposal, although the two committees do coordinate their action between them. The defense committee does have an absolute power of decision in the negative sense. Once it has said "no" on an issue, the budget committee cannot override the defense committee. The budget committee, after taking the recommendations into consideration, is also forced to take into account the broader aspects of the federal budget and the state of the economy and revenues. Therefore it may at times apply different standards of priority than the defense committee. The foreign affairs committee has no direct

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554 The third committee is the Standing Committee "which shall safeguard the rights of the Bundestag as against the Federal Government in the intervals between any two legislative terms." (Art. 45.)

555 Interview. This right is rarely used, however.

556 Unfortunately there is no empirical study of this process, evaluating the changes inflicted on government procurement and defense budget proposals. Descriptions and opinions on this process are given in Hans-Joachim Grieß, "Die Einflussmöglichkeiten der Parlamentsausschüsse fuer Verteidigung und Haushalt auf die Ruestungsbeschaffung," in Wehrdienst, Beilage zur Ausgabe 199/69, 27 January 1969; see also the article by the then defense spokesman of the CDU in the Bundestag, Manfred Woerner, "Parliamentary Control of Defence: The German Example," Survival, Vol. 16 (1), January-February 1974, pp. 13-16. The only two books on this subject deal with the defense committee only and not the entire Bundestag. See Hans-Joachim Berg, Der Verteidigungsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages. Kontrollorgan zwischen Macht und Ohnmacht, Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1982; Heribert Schatz, Der Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozess.
involvement in matters of FRG military planning. It is concerned mostly with security issues in the context of arms control negotiations and the broad impact of defense on the country's foreign policy.

Art. 45b of the constitution establishes the position of a Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag whose job it is "to safeguard the basic rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control." The main role of the Defense Commissioner is to be approachable for complaints and petitions by soldiers regarding their basic rights. Each year, the Commissioner issues a report to the Bundestag which is widely viewed as a barometer of the integration of the forces into society and its internal mood, especially the implementation of the principle of Innere Fuehrung.\(^{557}\)

With regard to the conventional defense improvement initiatives analyzed in this study, the degree of actual Bundestag influence was limited. Unlike the American Congress, the Bundestag did not take any initiative independently of the administration to improve conventional forces or to force a debate about strategic trade-offs. Through references in briefings and documents it can be ascertained that the Defense Committee of the Bundestag was cognizant at a general level of ongoing AD70 efforts and the Basic Issues initiative through references in briefings and documents. But at no point was there any session of the committee devoted to these initiatives. This was slightly different in the case of the LTDP. Robert Komor, who was very interested in talking to the parliamentarians directly, was invited to give a briefing to the Defense Committee and discussed LTDP-related matters for almost

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\(^{557}\)Bedingungen der verteidigungspolitischen Willensbildung im Deutschen Bundestag, Meisenheim/Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970. The book by Berg approaches the problem from a perspective of constitution and decision theory and has almost no empirical data. The book by Schatz is an interesting analysis mixing decision theory and behaviorist approaches but again contains no case studies to validate and establish the significance of its findings.

two hours on June 6, 1978. The discussion was more about the two-way street, rather than focusing on the rationale and importance of the LTDP as a whole.

There are a number of other reasons which help explain why the Bundestag, like the parties that were represented in it, did no play an active role in shaping defense plans. First, the Bundestag does not have a staff structure that could support an active control of the executive. Second, it has to rely on the bureaucracy for information. The fact that most of the relevant information is classified prohibits public discussions and thus limits outside input into the defense and budget committees work since security clearances are given out very restrictively. The government has also been charged with using the classification laws to steer discussion of defense issues in its favor.558 Parliamentarians therefore complain that in the absence of an appropriate staff and relevant information it is impossible for the opposition to propose valid alternatives to government policies. Third, differences on defense issues tend to be more on the rhetorical rather than the substantive level, when measured in terms of support for the defense budget, for example.560 Lacking alternative propositions and

558 The problem of secrecy in parliamentary and public debates is discussed in Peter F. Krogh and Werner Kaltefleiter (eds.), Geheimhaltung und Öffentlichkeit in der Aussenpolitik, Bonn: Eicholz, 1974.
559 See Woerner, op. cit., p. 16. This statement by Woerner was made while he and his party were in the opposition. The 1964 survey by Schatz -- a time when the CDU/CSU was in office -- on the defense committee members' opinion of the information they obtained from the executive/bureaucracy, 89% of the CDU/CSU members felt that the information was sufficient. Only 17% of the SPD, however, felt that way. A similar pattern emerges from a survey of members of the foreign affairs committee in 1964. Although there is no time-series data, Schatz' survey and Woerner's observation suggest that the opposition party in each case feels insufficiently informed. This thesis is also supported by circumstantial evidence that committee members of the governing party receive preferential treatment by the executive and the bureaucracy (advance briefings, background material etc.).
560 See the budget section in this chapter for details.
clear-cut government majorities, parliament's role was practically reduced to rubberstamping the government's policies. This can be traced to a fourth factor, namely that since party discipline is very strong and since shifting majorities are practically non-existent, much of the bargaining is done at the internal party level before an issue is raised formally. The defeat of a government or majority party-sponsored law is thus practically unknown.

For these reasons, the Bundestag did not play an active role. Lacking an adequate staff structure and expertise, requiring information from the executive, and the need to be loyal to the executive limited the flexibility and scope of activities of the Bundestag. Although the parliament in principle has of all the necessary means to control the executive (power of the purse, power to interrogate the executive and its officials, specialized committees etc.) it has not seized the role of an active scrutinizer. Moreover, the Bundestag has made very little use of outside experts in defense. To a large degree this is because there are very few; on the other hand, hearings are not made wide use of in other policy areas either, thus substantiating the claim that for traditional and structural reasons, the Bundestag as an institution is satisfied with a relatively passive role.

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561 The defense committee or groups of deputies can put questions to the executive and require detailed, report-like replies. Mostly these questions and requests are tailored to force the executive to make a policy statement. The nature of the questions tends to be less investigative than providing an opportunity for the government to clarify its position. It is very rare that a law would be passed requiring the administration to justify policies or to provide alternatives. In the case of the AWACS deal, the opposition in the defense committee pushed strongly that the FRG government insist that the US not charge for administrative and development costs and that as part of a compensation package, the US buy the license for the 120 mm smooth bore gun, German communications equipment ("European Telephone System"), as well as wheeled vehicles. The CDU/CSU also succeeded in convincing the government that Army Structure Model 4 be tested first in selected brigades before deciding to fully implement it. See Manfred Woerner, "Die Zusammenarbeit der Fraktionen kann als gut bezeichnet werden," Wehrtechnik, Vol. 11 (2), 1079, pp. 26-28 and Manfred Woerner, "Thesen zur Sicherheitspolitik," loc. cit., p. 24.
The Role of the Public in the Defense Debate

It has long been considered a truism that discussions of defense and security matters were confined to the federal bureaucracy, a handful of outside experts at a few research institutions, and the media.\footnote{See for instance Helga Haftendorn, "West Germany and the Management of Security Relations," op. cit., pp. 16, 17, and 27. On the state of strategic studies in the FRG see also Gebhardt Schweigler, "Strategic Studies in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Trends in Strategic Studies. Universities, Armed Forces and Industry Between Antagonism and Collaboration, Proceedings of a Meeting in Turin (Italy), Dec 9-12, 1982, pp. 27-30; Hans Ruehle (now Head of the Planning Staff in the MoD), "Schweigen im Lande von Clausewitz. Vom Elend der strategischen Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik," in Deutsche Zeitung, 18 July 1975, p. 4; Werner Link, "Aussen- und sicherheitspolitische Forschungsansatze in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Karl-Dietrich Bracher et al., Entwicklungslinien der Politikwissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Melle: Knoth Verlag, 1982, pp. 41-59; and Albrecht Zunker, Bericht zur Ausbildungs- und Nachwuchsfrage im Bereich "Internationale Politik, Sicherheitspolitik," manuscript, Ebenhausen, 1984.} Extended public debate of security matters, such as that surrounding the question of equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons in the mid to late 1950s and in the early 1980s in the context of NATO's dual track decision, were the exception. In both cases the controversies focussed on nuclear aspects. When considering the involvement of the public in discussions about conventional forces, the situation is even bleaker. Questions of conventional force structure, operational doctrine, and acquisition policies were almost not publicly discussed at all until the debate about the American Air-Land Battle doctrine and Gen. Rogers' concept of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) erupted.\footnote{Examples for the nature of the debate are given in K.-Peter Stratmann, "AirLand Battle" - Zerrbild und Wirklichkeit, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP-AP 2397), September 1985; Heinz Magenheimer, "Rogers-Plan, AirLand Battle und die Vorneverteidigung der NATO," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. B48/84, 1 December 1984, pp. 3-17; for a critical review, see Eckhard Luebkemeier, Air-Land Battle und Rogers-Plan. Eine kritische Bewertung, Bonn: Forschungsinsttitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Issue Paper No. 8, November 1984.}
The Profile of Public Opinion. For the cases analyzed in this study public opinion had no immediate impact. The public's competence on defense issue is comparatively low and the intricacies of NATO strategy are poorly understood at best. However, West German public opinion has a distinct profile which helps illuminate the character and political parameters of the West German defense debate.

Similar to previously discussed government views, the Warsaw Pact is considered superior. The West German public perceives the Soviet Union as a military threat, but significantly less so than the American public feels threatened by the Soviet Union. As Table D-1 shows, "the East" has been perceived as growing in military strength vis-a-vis "the West."

At the same time, the confidence of the West German public in NATO's ability to successfully defend against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack was very limited, yet it did not correlate clearly with the trend of increased eastern military strength. Taking into account that more than one third of the respondents do not know whether NATO was strong enough to repel an attack and that another 30-40% of the respondents were sure that NATO could not successfully defend itself, it can be argued that there was relatively little trust in NATO's military capabilities (see Table D-2). This lack of confidence in NATO's

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55 If the question is asked whether the US or the Soviets are ahead of each other, the trends become still more marked. In 1969, 41% of respondents believed that the US was ahead of the Soviet Union and only 26% believed that the Soviets were ahead; 25% thought the two were roughly of equal strength. By 1981 only 15% believed the US was still ahead, whereas 38% of survey respondents thought that the Soviets were ahead. 29% believed that the two superpowers were about equal. See Bruce Russett and Donald DeLuca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.98 (2), Summer 1983, pp. 179-196 (190).
Table D-1

WEST GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE
EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE

Question: "A Question regarding armaments in East and West: According to what you know or have heard -- how do you judge the present balance of power? Is the East stronger, is the West stronger, or are both equally strong?"

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East stronger (%)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Stronger (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Equal (%)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know (%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Table D-2

PERCEPTIONS OF NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF

Question: "Suppose, the Russians would start a war. Do you believe that together with NATO we would have enough troops and would be sufficiently armed to repel a Russian attack and to not let the Russians in, or could we defend against the Russians?"

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We couldn't defend (%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficiently armed (%)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Noelle-Neumann/Piel, p. 628
capabilities was matched by perceptions that NATO as an alliance did not do enough for its own defense. Although the available data has gaps and trends are broken, it is evident from Table D-3 that there was an increasing tendency in the late seventies to perceive European defense efforts as being insufficient. Moreover, the public's preparedness to accept NATO's nuclear first use as a viable option against a Warsaw Pact conventional attack decreased dramatically in the late seventies, perhaps as a result of the increased public discussions about NATO strategy. Whereas in 1977 60.5% of respondents flatly answered "No" to

Table D-3

THE SUFFICIENCY OF NATO DEFENSE EFFORTS

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<tr>
<td>SUFFICES (%)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not Suffice (%)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know (%)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: "In your opinion, does it suffice or not what Western European countries are presently doing for their military security?"

Source: Noelle-Neumann/Piel, p. 632
the question whether they would support the use of nuclear weapons in
defense of the FRG, this number increased to 71% in early 1980. Less
than 20% of those surveyed between 1977 and 1983 agreed to first use.\textsuperscript{566}

What did these responses imply for public attitudes toward defense
spending and improving NATO's capabilities? As the data displayed in
Table D-4 shows, the number of people who would accept an increase in
NATO increased rather steadily from 1971 to 1980. Similarly the West
German public continued to support US troop deployments in West Germany
by a sizeable majority of 50-60% and during most of the seventies, less
than 20% favored American withdrawals. When asked, however, whether a
respondent was prepared to pay an additional tax to preserve the
fighting power of the Bundeswehr, between 39 and 58% of the respondents
answered no.\textsuperscript{567}

How should this data be interpreted? The figures suggest that the
perceptions of the threat NATO faces, the rating of NATO's capabilities
to withstand an attack, as well as the acceptance of nuclear first use
have deteriorated in public opinion. Although this is coupled with
perceptions that Western Europe is not doing enough for its defense and
although objections to increased NATO troop strengths would be likely to
be modest, there is no clear trend that the public favors increased
defense spending to counteract the perception of an increasingly
unfavorable balance.

\textsuperscript{566}See Ralf Zoll (ed.), \textit{Sicherheit und Militaer -- Genese, Struktur
und Wandel von Meinungsbildern in Militaer und Gesellschaft}, Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981, p. 64. In a 1983 Allensbach poll only 17% approved of the statement that "the Russians are so superior in other
weaponry that NATO could not defend itself. NATO therefore has to keep
its right to use nuclear weapons first if need be." See
Noelle-Neumann/Piel, op. cit., p. 634.

\textsuperscript{567}Between 10 and 14% of the respondents in the same 1979, 1980
polls answered that they would support an additional tax regardless of
the circumstances. Some 30% declared that they would support such a tax
to a limited extent. See Zoll, op. cit., p. 63, and
Noelle-Neumann/Piel, p. 630.
Table D-4

ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO TROOP STRENGTH

Question: "Would you be in favor or against if NATO increased/decreased its forces?"

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<tr>
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<th>71</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
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<tr>
<td>For increase</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know What</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>71</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For decrease</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know what</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
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Source: Noelle-Neumann/Piel, op. cit., p. 632.

One can speculate about the reason underlying this apparent contradiction. As will be seen in the budget section of this chapter, there is no clear linkage in the public debate between defense spending and its effect on NATO strategy (first use) and capabilities relative to the Warsaw Pact. As long as there are no pre-structured political opinions that could be subscribed to, the public is unlikely to develop such opinions independently. This points again at the importance of the national political leadership formulating the costs and benefits of alternative policies and to make clear the relationship between defense expenditures and military capabilities. There is no data that conclusively suggests that support could not be mobilized for stronger
defense spending or additional forces. As was suggested above, the
basic ingredients of a rationale for such increased spending were there
toward the late 1970s/early 1980s: the military balance was perceived
as deteriorating, Western Europe was perceived as not doing enough, and
NATO's capabilities were seen to be decreasing.

Another reason for the absence of strong support for increased
defense spending has to do with political belief structures. The polls
cited above suggest that the public was more supportive of political
solutions to the security problem. Arms control and disarmament were
seen as more viable approaches than increasing NATO's military
capabilities.\footnote{668} This is also plausible because of the more prominent
historical experience that superior military forces do not prevent
either an attack or war.

A third reason why increases in Warsaw Pact capabilities did not
translate into calls for additional NATO efforts had to do with the
nature of the threat estimate. The West German public tends to see
political intentions as more relevant in estimating "the threat" than
military capabilities. This explanation is the only rational reason why
the majority of survey respondents could believe in the superiority of
the Warsaw Pact on the one hand, while a majority also either feels not
threatened or uncertain about it.

\footnote{668}When asked to choose between those who subscribe to the slogan
"We want to live free of fear - Therefore, disarm!" versus "We want to
live free of fear -- Therefore, arm!" 56% of the respondents chose the
disarmament path to peace, 14% choose the path which would strengthen
military capabilities, 20% would choose neither, and 10% didn't have an
opinion. See Noelle-Neumann/Piel, p. 640. See also the data on p. 638.
USIA analysts have come to similar conclusions in an examination of data
for several West European countries. See Ken Adler and Douglas Wertman,
"Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes," Public Opinion,

\footnote{668}See Noelle-Neumann/Piel, p. 626 and p. 628 as well as Zoll, p.
50 and p. 52 for evidence that perceptions of Warsaw Pact superiority do
not translate directly into threat perceptions. Unfortunately, no
systematic analysis appears to be available on this issue.
Finally, defense issues traditionally have had rather low salience in West German politics and this is likely to have contributed to the absence of debate and the search for alternatives. A ranking of issue areas considered important by survey respondents usually reveals that defense issues have only minor priority when compared to issues such as employment, economic growth, and social security.\textsuperscript{570}

Conclusions. This opinion profile suggests several interesting conclusions. There seems to be more support given to NATO to strengthen itself conventionally. NATO is considered to be inferior, nuclear first use is not widely supported at all, and there is a perception that Western Europe is not doing enough. However, this opinion profile did not translate into support for stronger military efforts. Instead, political solutions such as arms control and disarmament were preferred.

The above profile suggests that there might be room for change here. The biggest problem is a conceptual one. It might be difficult to convince the public that increased military capabilities would provide more security, given the preference for political solutions. This might change if it were shown that political solutions had only limited success in the past and that military improvements would bring benefits, such as decreased reliance on nuclear first use. A credible argument would have to be made that strengthening NATO's conventional forces would be clearly linked to helping redress NATO's perceived military inferiority and dependence on nuclear weapons and that such a course of action might have a positive effect on bringing about the desired political solutions in a second step. To this day, however, such a debate has not taken place.

\textsuperscript{570}See Zoellner, p. 81, Table 11.
The Executive

Apart from those rare occasions when security matters became a very sensitive political issue as, for example, in the 1950s when the possibility of equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons was discussed, or in the late 1970s with INF, defense policy remained an issue of very low salience. The executive could with relative ease define the debate. However, as noted before, parliament and those outside the bureaucracy lacked the information to scrutinize the military planning of the administration.

Yet even within the executive, the details of military planning, i.e. knowledge about planning assumptions and trade-offs, were very limited. Yet strategy matters were rarely discussed in terms of their implications for West German force structure planning.

The organizational structure of the executive helps explain why this is so.\footnote{The structure of the Ministry of Defense is not covered here. Its organization and planning procedures have been described in Chapter VII, Force Planning in the FRG.}

The Chancellor and His Office

The position of the chancellor is strong for three reasons.\footnote{This and subsequent sections on actors in German security planning greatly profited from John Van Oudenaren's expertise on this subject. Unfortunately his most relevant RAND study on FRG policymaking remains unavailable to the public. For a good overview on organizational aspects of West German security policy under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt, see Ernst W. Gohlert, "An Organizational Perspective on German National Security Policy," in Frank B. Horton, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner (eds.), Comparative Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 146-155.}

Upon his election by the Bundestag, he has first the unilateral power to recommend the appointment and dismissal of the ministers to the Federal President; second, he has the power of organization which allow him to establish and abolish federal ministries; third, he has the
constitutional power to set policy guidelines for his cabinet.\textsuperscript{573} Of course the chancellor will be guided in all of his choices in these three areas based on his assessment of the political impact of appointing a minister, creating ministries and which political direction his government will take. Given the prominent role of the parties, platforms, and factional politics, the chancellor will weigh his decisions carefully against the general political background. How much flexibility he has in practice depends upon his stature within the party and his ability to gain public support, thus making it harder for the party to oppose him.

The chancellor's main policy directing tool is the Statement of Government Policy (\emph{Regierungserklärung}), which is presented at the beginning of a legislative period or at any time that an important subject needs clarification before parliament. Comparable to the American State of the Union Address, this statement gives the chancellor an opportunity to publicly state, set, and explain policies. The second instrument of directing policy is based in the chancellor's chairmanship of cabinet sessions. The constitution states that "each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department autonomously and on his own responsibility" within the framework of the chancellor's set policy (Art. 65). It also determines that in case of differences of opinion between ministers the federal government (i.e. the cabinet) shall decide. The chancellor is, however, presiding over these cabinet sessions not as a \textit{primus inter pares} but with a constitutional right to set policy which gives him an overriding advantage. This legal advantage is, however, counterbalanced by the fact that sofar all governments of the FRG have been based on a coalition between two or more parties.\textsuperscript{574} In practice this means that as chairman of the cabinet

\textsuperscript{573}The German term for this right is \textit{Richtlinienkompetenz}.
\textsuperscript{574}This classifies the relationship between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union also as a coalition. If the CDU/CSU relationship were to be considered as a single entity, then the period 1957-61 would be the only time that a non-coalition government was in power.
the chancellor may make the ultimate decision, but if disagreements cut across party lines then he will have to seek a compromise with the other party involved.

Apart from cabinet meetings and memoranda, the chancellor has at his disposal for purposes of information gathering, coordination, and policy planning, a staff of some 400 in the extended Chancellor's Office. This office is divided into five divisions dealing with legal matters and administration (Division 1), external security, foreign affairs and intra-German relations (Division 2), internal affairs (Division 3), economic, financial and social policy (Division 4), and planning (Division 5). After assuming office in October 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl abolished the planning section and reintegrated some components into Division III and created a new Division V dealing with communications and documentation.\footnote{See Thomas Ellwein, Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983.} Division 2, which deals with foreign and security affairs, is divided into three sections. Section 21 is responsible for foreign affairs and staffed mostly with officers on assignment from the Foreign Office; section 22 is responsible for intra-German relations, and section 23 for security, defense, arms control and disarmament. The latter is almost made up entirely of military officers on loan from the Fue S. The degree of the chancellor's office involvement depends heavily on the personality and weight of the chancellor and the distribution of offices between the coalition partners. During Konrad Adenauer's tenure (1949-1963), the chancellor controlled all foreign and defense policy and during his first six years simultaneously held the post of foreign minister. It was not until the admission of the FRG into NATO that the MoD was established, yet the seeds of that department already were in existence as the Dienststelle Blank, named after its head, Theodor Blank, the later minister of defense. During the 1960s, defense policy ceased to be controversial in party politics after the SPD adopted a pro-NATO policy with its formulation of the Bad Godesberg Basic Program. In
addition to that Adenauer's successor Ludwig Erhard was a weak chancellor, who relied heavily on his ministers and hence this brought about the decline in the chancellors office.

After the creation of the Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in 1966, Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, had to share the responsibility for foreign and security affairs with the SPD and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt. When Willy Brandt himself became chancellor three years later he planned to start new foreign policy initiatives, directed mainly toward the East. To assist him in that his aide, Secretary of State (with cabinet rank) Horst Ehmke tried, to upgrade the control and coordinating functions of the chancellery and established a new policy planning system in the office.\footnote{For an overview of the role of planning in the executive, see Ernst W. Gohlert, "Planning in German Foreign Policy," International Journal, (Toronto), Vol. 32 (4), 1977, pp. 769-790, and Ernst W. Gohlert, German National Security Organization and Process: A Preliminary Report, Manuscript, prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco, March 22, 1973. For a contribution by Horst Ehmke himself, see his "Planen ist keine Suende," Die Zeit, 10 December 1971, p. 48. See also Adolf Theis, "Political Planning in Western Democracies," Aussenpolitik, (English ed.), No. 4, 1970, pp. 434-454; Adolf Theis, "Reorganization im Regierungsbereich," Aussenpolitik, No. 3, 1971, pp. 171-182.} Helmut Schmidt, in turn continued in this tradition and increased the office staff. Having both a strong interest and being an expert on security matters, it was only natural that the Chancellor would seek to play an important role in decision-making. Chancellor Kohl was drawn into the middle of a political debate centered on the INF defense issue. Helmut Schmidts office was heavily involved in the formulation of German arms control positions and maintained direct communication with presidents Carter and Reagan, as well as the various US negotiators, particularly Paul Nitze. Apart from his managerial and representational functions, the chancellor can steer the direction of government policy through the cabinet.
The Cabinet

In sharp contrast to heads of governments in presidential systems, the federal chancellor is in no position to issue directives or orders to his ministers. As mentioned earlier, he is limited to setting the policy guidelines. However, the chancellor can make use of his hiring and firing powers to create loyalties, yet these are of course limited by the political realities of coalition and factional politics. The constitution states in Art. 65 that the cabinet is a collective decision-making body, acting on such issues as legislative proposals, budgets, and financial plans (including amendments), as well as appointments within the bureaucracy. Yet evaluations of the importance of the cabinet vary. On the one hand it is argued that the cabinet is too large and unwieldy to serve as a "collective decision-making body that is in effective control of government policy." /** This appears to be a plausible observation with respect to decisions made on day-to-day issues, but it may not necessarily be valid for subjects of key importance. Cabinet approval, even if it means cutting across party lines, is required on all important matters, such as legislative and budget proposals. The cabinet is the only group of coalition politicians that meets on a weekly basis (usually every Wednesday), thus making cabinet an important forum for establishing coalition policy. 

There is little doubt however, that the cabinet as a decision-making body per se cannot closely supervise the implementation of its own policies. Once a subject passes the cabinet, then the responsibility for its execution is transferred to lies with the respective ministry. The federal chancellor, for instance, has no institution at his disposal like the US Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB), which would provide

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577 Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf, Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy, Amsterdam/New York: Elsevier, 1975, p. 42. The authors do not provide empirical evidence for this conclusion.

him directly with important financial and budget information. The West German head of government has to rely on his minister of finance for information on these matters.

With regard to security issues, the cabinet's most important role is the passing of the budget, providing the financial resources for the armed services, etc.\textsuperscript{579} The cabinet does involve itself when changes in the basic direction of a previously established ministerial policy is at issue. Minister Apel, for example, briefed the cabinet and the Federal Security Council on the LTDP. The pledge to increase the West German defense budget 3% over a number of years also had to be cleared through the cabinet.

\textbf{The Federal Security Council}

As the need to coordinate policies among various departments grew, an increasing number of cabinet committees were formed. The Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat, BSR) was created to handle the decision-making of security affairs. Working under utmost secrecy, public reports about its agenda, decision record, and role in the decision process are extremely rare or non-existent.\textsuperscript{580} BSR staff is ordered not to speak to outsiders without prior clearance by the Chief of Staff of the Secretariat of the BSR (Group 23, with the division title "Security-political and Defense Questions, Disarmament and Arms Control") who usually is a general staff officer in the rank of full colonel, or the chief of Section 2.

\textsuperscript{579}Helga Haftendorn, "Das aussen-und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in \textit{Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte}, No. B43/83, 29 October 1983, p. 6 claims that the cabinet also approves the Defense Policy Guidelines issued for force planning purposes within the MoD. This was only true for the Guidelines issued in 1972. Later versions were not passed through the cabinet.

\textsuperscript{580}The best exception to this rule is Ulrich de Maiziere, \textit{Fuehren im Frieden, 20 Jahre Dienst fuer Bundeswehr und Staat}, Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1974, pp. 44-50.
Created as the Federal Defense Council (*Bundesverteidigungsrat*) on 10 September 1955, the BSR consists of the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, finance, trade, and the interior as permanent members. Other ministers may be invited if their advice is being sought, or, if their area of responsibility is being discussed. Among the most frequent participants falling under the latter category are the ministers of justice, transportation (*Verkehr*), communications and postal affairs. Since January 1959, the General Inspector also participates as a permanent member in an advisory, non-voting capacity. Other regular, though not permanent, members usually include the Chief of the Chancellor's Office, the State Secretary in the Office of the Federal President, and the Head of the Press and Information Office. The list of invitees may also include experts such as the Head of the Federal Intelligence Agency (*Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND*). The state secretaries in the foreign, defense, and interior ministries may join their ministers in the meeting. The sessions of the BSR are held about once a month, or more frequently when necessary. They were chaired by the chancellor until 1970; since then the minister of defense presides over most meetings.

Gen. de Maiziere reports that all chancellors until Brandt (with the exception of Erhard) chaired the conferences themselves. Erhard had delegated the chairmanship to his Minister for Special Affairs Heinrich Krone, who was not always able to solve differences of opinion among participants, thus forcing the issue to be reconsidered by the Chancellor. A new set of business rules issued by the SPD/FDP government in 1970 made the minister of defense the executive chairman of the BSR and charged him to propose the agenda and to approve the minutes before they went to the Chancellor for final approval. The new rules also officially sanctioned a prior practice allowing the BSR to make final decisions on agenda points as long as laws did not require the approval by the cabinet and the importance of the issue did not warrant cabinet approval.\(^{881}\)

\(^{881}\)De Maiziere, loc. cit.
With regard to the topics discussed by the BSR, a former participant notes that its focus can lie both on military questions of principle as well as detailed problems. In the period of 1966-1972 the BSR regularly prepared for upcoming NATO Council and NPG conferences by issuing instructions to the minister of defense. Other agenda points included questions of financial offsets for allied troop deployments in the FRG, the German position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the SALT negotiations, as well as CSCE and MBFR. In the area of armaments the BSR discussed arms exports to NATO and non-NATO countries and the armament plan of the Bundeswehr with special emphasis on the MRCA aircraft and the Luetjens-class destroyers, two costly projects launched during that time. Issues primarily of domestic concern included the length of the basic service for draftees, service justice (Wehrgerechtigkeit), conscientious objection, and civil service, as well as civil defense, follow-up measures to the emergency laws, and the MoD White Papers.\[^{552}\]

Since early 1970 the General Inspector has given a 15 minute briefing at the beginning of each meeting on the global security situation and its impact on the central region of Europe. The BSR is not able to act as a crisis management center because it lacks the necessary staff structure and communication facilities. It is therefore not comparable to the American National Security Council (NSC). Gen. de Maiziere notes in his account that he felt a reluctance within the council to discuss the operational bases for defense of Central Europe.

The fact that the Federal Republic from the beginning has left operational planning and command of joint defense to the integrated NATO commands, has had the effect on German politics that there usually is less interest in the actual conduct of defense than in other allied countries.\[^{553}\]

As will be seen this lack of interest is not confined to the ministerial level in the BSR.

\[^{552}\]Ibid.
\[^{553}\]Ibid., p. 50/51. On the role of the BSR in the context of international negotiations (CSCE and MBFR) see also Haftendorn, "West
The Foreign Office

According to the Business Rules of the Government (Geschaeftsordnung der Bundesregierung), the Foreign Office (FO) is responsible for all external affairs of the FRG. This responsibility includes security-related issues and all negotiations with other governments. Most cables involving negotiations at the civilian NATO level (e.g. NAC/PS, DPC/PS) between the German Representation at NATO ("NATOGERMA" in bureaucratic slang and cable traffic) and Bonn are sent directly to the FO. When military matters are involved, copies are forwarded to the MoD.584

The organizational structure of the FO is similar to other ministries. At the top is the minister, aided by four deputies. Two are parliamentary state secretaries, so called State Ministers, and two are from the diplomatic service. They form the political leadership of the department. Among the eight divisions of the FO, two stand out in their importance for decisions on security matters. The first is division 2 which, among other things, handles Western Europe, North America, and Defense. The second is division 2A, responsible for disarmament and arms control negotiations, which holds little bearing on the focus of this study.

With respect to defense planning the FO can exert its influence on day-to-day affairs mostly through its NATO desk in Division 2. This office (201, NATO Affairs) prepares for BSR meetings, such as NATO ministerial meetings and FRG-US bilaterals. It is this office which cooperates most closely with the MoD's section in the Armed Forces Staff (Fue S III 3). With regard to arms control, Division 2A is divided into three desks: section 220 for "World-wide Disarmament and Arms Control,"

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584 This does of course not apply to the communications between German military officers at SHAPE, etc. reporting back to the MoD. Nor does it apply to the National Military Representative to the MC who reports directly to the MoD.

All cables concerning the official position of the FRG that the MoD wishes to send to NATOGERMA need to be coordinated with the FO; any such cables state explicitly that they have been coordinated between the two ministries. With regard to the substantive input to MoD military planning, however, the FO has no direct input into the planning, programming and budgeting process of the MoD.  If a NATO issue were to affect relations with other countries, the FO would immediately take a stance and request to be heard in the BSR, or by the cabinet if necessary.

The Ministry of Finance

The minister of finance exerts his influence on German defense decision-making mainly through his control of the budget and the governments financial planning. The constitution assigns the minister of finance a particularly strong role in government policy when it states in Art. 112 that "expenditures in excess of budgetary appropriations and extra-budgetary expenditures" require the consent of the minister of finance who may only approve such expenditures in the "case of unforeseen and compelling necessity." The role of the finance minister has also been strengthened as a result of the first federal financial crisis 1967/68. Since then, the ministry of finance prepares a so-called Mid-Range Financial Plan (Mittelfristiger Finanzplan, MifriFi) which serves as a five-year expenditure plan for the government as a whole as well as the individual ministries. The ceilings for the departments are negotiated and updated between the ministers and the minister of finance on an individual basis in so-called Chefgesprächen (head-of-department talks) and approved by the cabinet in the context of the annual budget decisions.

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555See the section on planning in the MoD further below.
With a staff of about 1800 the ministry of finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, BMF) is able to exert considerable influence and control over MoD expenditures. The divisions within the ministry of finance are organized similar to the budget. Broad budgetary planning for the federal government is done in Division IA (Basic Questions of Financial Policy). Division II (Federal Budget) has four sections, each dealing with particular parts of the budget. Section II D is responsible for defense related matters as well as civil defense. The four desks within this section have the MoD budget (Einzelplan 14) divided up among them. The MoD budget proper is handled mostly by Desk II D1 and II D2; the budget for FRG contributions to NATO and the WEU is handled at Desk II D3. The civil defense budget and expenditures associated with the deployment of foreign troops in the FRG are controlled by Desk II D4.  

The Finance Ministry works most closely with the budget division of the MoD and analyzes MoD plans, flow of funds, and contracts. In practice, BMF reexamines the underlying assumptions for every line item and raises objections if they do not concur with them. Interviews with officers in the BMF indicate that "nowhere else is the involvement of BMF as strong as in the defense area." For example, without prior coordination with the BMF, no instruction can be issued to the German NATO delegation if financial obligations are only potentially involved. According to these sources, there is a trend to increase the involvement of BMF especially after the frustrating experience with the Tornado procurement. BMF has the right to involve itself when, after analyzing cable traffic (to which it has immediate access), it comes to the conclusion that it has to give input to an issue. The form of the BMF participation varies. In the case of the NATO AWACS procurement, for

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555 The organizational layout is described in detail in "Gliederung des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen," Sonderdrucke fuer die Wirtschaft, No. 57 (Kennziffer 0801), 2 February 1970. The organizational structure described here has remained essentially stable until today.
example, BMF acted from the very beginning as a participating program manager. As a general rule, however, BMF has to be involved before any financially binding agreements can be made; yet bureaucratic practice suggests that BMF enters into any issue when it suspects financial impact. The role and importance of BMF is also underlined by the fact that it has a representative at the German NATO delegation. This individual makes sure that BMF has an input into any relevant negotiations, while also helping to keep the home office informed. In the same fashion, BMF obtains copies of all the cable traffic between Brussels and Bonn.

Conventional Defense Improvements and Defense Budgets

As was mentioned earlier, the arguments against acquiring a stronger conventional defense hinged on the critical point that, allegedly, a stalwart conventional defense would be prohibitively expensive. In Part A and B it was pointed out that significant disagreements persisted as to how much was needed to acquire a stalwart conventional defense posture. These disagreement translated into different estimates of the expenditures necessary to field such a force. US efforts to convince the allies of the feasibility of a stronger conventional posture therefore addressed not only the requirements issue, but also emphasized that it was a political decision how and how much of the national resources should be devoted to defense. The point was not only that resources should be spent more rationally, but that they should also be augmented. As Table D-5 shows, most European countries (the FRG among them) committed considerably less of their GDP to defense than the US.

This chapter will examine how the budget process incorporated force requirements and financial resources. The argument will be made that resource allocation decisions had very little to do with the strategy/threat debate. First of all, fiscal considerations and

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Interviews.
Table D-5
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS PERCENTAGE
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN PURCHASER’S VALUES

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Notes:

a. France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.
b. These percentages have been calculated without taking into account the expenditures on Berlin.
- - Information not available.
e. Estimate

budgetary incrementalism limited the possible increases of the West German contribution. Second, for institutional and bureaucratic reasons, severe limits existed regarding the rationalization of defense efforts.

In a first step, the following analysis will outline the formal budget process. Here the question is asked who the actors are and where the planning parameters are set. In a second step, the planning figures and budget trends will be reviewed in order to obtain indicators for planning constraints. Finally, the reasons for the perceived financial constraints will be examined and the question will be asked as to whether and how planning alternatives were evaluated.

An Outline of the Budget Process

A key element in West German defense budgeting is that it is based more on fiscal control than on military requirements, resulting from the evaluations of strategy and threats. Since the Bundeswehr reached full strength in the early 1970s, the size of the overall force structure has remained basically stable, and all restructuring was done within set manpower and financial levels. 

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The source for fiscal guidance are the five year financial plans (Mittelfristige Finanzplanung, MifriFi) of the Ministry of Finance. First developed in 1967 and updated annually, the MifriFi projects the outlines of the federal budget over five years. The numbers in this financial plan are broken down by agency and provide the ministries with a relatively reliable planning basis over this period of five years. Internally, the MoD used (and continues to use) assumptions to cover the entire planning period of 12-15 years. With this fiscal guidance in hand, the GI develops his planning guidance in which he lays out broad planning priorities, and manpower, and organizational targets. On the basis of this planning guidance, the services produce planning proposals which are reviewed by the Fue S and the Budget Division in MoD regarding such issues as quantities, pricing assumptions, and procurement schedules. The Fue S consults with the Budget Division, then cuts back the planning proposals, if necessary, to correspond to the guidance.

The internally coordinated MoD budget is then sent over to the Finance Ministry for review and synchronization with the other submissions and economic assumptions, before being opened for discussion in the cabinet. Before that, the Finance Minister and the Minister of Defense meet (in so-called Chefgesprächen) to resolve outstanding issues, such as overall budget levels for out-years, distribution of defense budget shares, large procurement projects, etc. The Cabinet then approves the federal budget and submits it to the Bundestag. Here the defense budget is first reviewed by the Defense Committee. The

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599 Actual figures are provided in the next section.
699 It should be noted that not all defense related expenditures are in the MoD budget proper ("Einzelplan 14"). Other defense related budgets (Einzeplan 35 -- Expenditures Related to Foreign Troop Deployments -- Einzeplan 36 -- Civil Defense -- and Einzeplan 60 -- Finance Adminstration) are prepared by the Finance Ministry in cooperation with MoD and other ministries. See Hans Clausen Korff, Haushaltspolitik -- Instrument oeffentlicher Macht, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1975, pp. 106-111
committee appoints rapporteurs for the twenty or so chapters in the defense budget and upon deliberation makes recommendations to the budget committee to cut or increase line items. Following committee action and deliberation before the full parliament, the budget is then passed into law.

At no point in this budget process is there any systematic review of the relationship between short and long-term budget trends and alternatives on the one hand and strategy and threats on the other. Budget levels are instead decided on incrementally. This approach allows sufficient flexibility to accommodate fiscal control, moderate modernization, and a relatively stable force structure. Parliament is not provided with a real five-year plan. The MifriFi indicates how much the individual ministries are supposed to be funded, but there is no functional or other breakdown of these planned expenditures. Moreover, the MifriFi has only an effective planning range of three years.\footnote{Formally, the MifriFi covers five years, but the first year covered is the current budget year t. Since it is passed simultaneously with the budget of the next fiscal year (t+1), it has a de facto planning range of three years.}

\textbf{The Financial Planning Parameters}

\textit{Fiscal Guidance}. As mentioned before, planning in the MoD is constrained by strict fiscal guidance. This guidance is explicit for a five year period and is laid down in the MifriFi, which serves as the basis for the development of five-year plans in the MoD. Theoretically, this fiscal guidance is the upper limit against which the services can plan their budget submissions. In practice, however, plans as well as the government's final budget submission to parliament are usually somewhat higher (1-2\%) than the original fiscal guidance and at times additional funds for personnel and procurement have been made available from other accounts.\footnote{In 1972-73, the Financial Management Budget (Einzelplan 60), for example, contained funds for helicopter procurement in the the context of EDIP. \textit{Einzelplan 60}, for example contained DM 350 million and DM 550 million in 1972 and 1973 respectively to pay for EDIP. See Richard C. Eichenberg, \textit{Defense/Welfare Tradeoffs in West German Budgeting}, Ph.D.} The MifriFi does not take into account...
inflation for outyears.\textsuperscript{593} This is done intentionally in order not to "pre-plan" inflation.\textsuperscript{594} The plans are updated annually on the basis of the price levels of 31 December of the previous year and thus inflation only partially reflected for the first fiscal year. As Table D-6 shows, planned growth for the outyears was in the neighborhood of 3-4\% for most of the early 1970s but then slowed down in the second half of the decade to an average of 1-2\%. From 1978-1982 when force goals began to be formulated in the context of the LTDP, planned \textit{MifriFi} growth rates went up to 2.5\% before declining again after 1983.

Long-term fiscal guidance had always been a goal of the military. Yet the budget division in the MoD, as well as the Bundestag's defense and budget committees were traditionally strongly opposed to giving \textit{firm} guidance beyond the mid-range financial plan. In point of contrast, in 1970 the military side had been given to understand that they could expect annual real term increases of 3\% throughout the seventies and into the early eighties; the military was also cautioned, however, that increases might only be 1.8-2.0\% depending on economic and revenue developments.\textsuperscript{595} Although the \textit{MifriFi} did not officially take future

\begin{flushright}
Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: 1981, p. 158. In the late seventies the same account contained money to support increases for certain personnel slots.\textsuperscript{593} I am grateful to Achim von Heynitz at SWP and Michael Thompson at RAND for helpful conversations on the issue of inflation and cost estimates.\textsuperscript{594} See BMVg (IP-Stab), "Kosten und Finanzierung der Ruestungsbeschaffungen der Bundeswehr," \textit{Material fuer die Presse}, no. VII/23, 30 July 1979, pp. 3 ff.\textsuperscript{595} These numbers were communicated to the Deputy General Inspector by the Budget Division. The lower growth rate assumed (1) to hold the personnel account constant after 1974 because of constant personnel numbers and (2) a decline in infrastructure expenditures. For the remainder of the budget 3\% growth was assumed. Holding personnel constant effectively meant that no progress could be made toward obtaining a higher percentage of professional soldiers as envisaged in the force structure plans. (Interviews.) The 3\% growth figure for the 1970s is also mentioned by Minister of Defense Gerhard Schroeder in a speech to the Bundestag on 6 December 1967. Schroeder argued that it was a mid-term goal to increase the share of the procurement account to 25\% of the defense budget. See Gerhard Schroeder, "Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung in der Debatte des Deutschen
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Source: Ministry of Defense (Budget Division), Bonn and Author's calculations

Note:
1) The first year of the Mid-range Financial Plan is the current budget year. Because Mid-Range Financial Plans and budget submissions for year t are passed simultaneously by the Cabinet, the first actual planning figure in the plan is that for t = 1, i.e. the 11th plan, for example, passed in mid-1977 and contained a projection of expenditures for 1977, was identical with the budget submission for 1978 and gave a first planning figure only for Budget year 1979. Thus the effective planning horizon of the financial plans is only three years.

2) The Mid-Range Financial Plan does not reflect inflation in the outyears. The Plan is calculated on price levels of December 31 of the year prior to release of the plan.
inflation into account, there remained some uncertainty on how inflation would be treated. The budget division argued that future price increases would be adjusted for in the annual updates of the fiscal guidance. This suggested that the growth figures for the outyears were calculated in real terms. On other occasions, however, the budget division cautioned that inflation would have to be adjusted from within the mid-range financial plans. As Table D-7 shows, the average growth of the defense budget (NATO criteria) was 2.1% in the period 1970-1984, thus falling within the 1.8-3% forecast. Einzelplan 14, by comparison, grew slightly less with an average of 1.8% during the same period.

The General Inspector's Planning Guideline. One of the major internal limitations in rationalizing defense efforts through the reordering of priorities, and roles and missions, lay in the resource allocation principle empl oyed by the general inspectors. During the 1970s, the Force Plan contained a provision on what the share of each service in the overall budget was. According to that distribution key, the Army obtained approximately 50%, the Air Force 30%, and the Navy 20% of the budget. For lack of more functional allocation rules, Planning Guidelines referred to those quotas and the fiscal guidance laid out in the MifriFi.

Because of strong fiscal and implicit political control, the GI was also de facto unable to develop alternative plans which would exceed budget guidelines. Gen. de Maiziere, for example, stated in his 1969 Guidance (for the 1970 budget) that the program proposals could exceed the MifriFi by up to 3% in order to create some planning flexibility.

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596 Growth rates calculated by using GNP deflators.


598 Interviews.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (1)</th>
<th>Nominal Increase (%)</th>
<th>Real Increase (%)</th>
<th>Federal Budget (2)</th>
<th>Nominal Increase (%)</th>
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<th>Share of GDP (%)</th>
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<th>Nominal Increase (%)</th>
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Sources:
(2) Data provided by Budget Division of MoD, Bonn.
(3) Author's calculations using GDP deflators provided by Budget Division of MoD, Bonn.
* Estimates
** No data available
when the proposals would be cut back to conform with the fiscal
guidance. This MifriFi-plus-3% guidance provided the financial
parameters for the services to develop program proposals within the
framework of the Force Plan, which contained force structure goals and
equipment objectives, etc. Wherever the services departed from the
Force Plan they were asked to justify changes. Yet the guidance made
clear that the services could not expect to obtain larger resources than
specified in the fiscal guidance. The military adopted the politically
mandated resource ceilings and would not publicly question it, or
submit proposals that would far exceed the guidance.

Service Program Proposals. Detailed data on the program proposals
is not available. It is known from interview sources, however, that the
program proposals came in 1-4% above the planning guideline and needed
to be cut back. The cut-backs affected mostly the procurement and
infrastructure accounts and led to stretch-outs of programs not
considered to be of highest priority (transport vehicles, logistics
support etc.). Some money was also saved by cutting back on operations
and maintenance expenses. Only in cases of severe budgetary strains
(e.g. in 1980/81) were entire projects canceled.\(^5\)\(^\text{99}\) Trade-offs between
personnel and investment accounts were limited since manpower was fixed
at approximately 495,000 soldiers.\(^6\)\(^\text{99}\)

\(^{599}\) After a review of the armaments plans in 1969/70, the new
SPD/FDP government decided to reduce the number of CH-53 transport
helicopters, the MRCA and various shipbuilding programs. See BMVg
(IP-Stab), "Das Rüstungsprogramm der Bundesregierung," Mitteilungen an
die Presse, no. VII/73, 13 July 1970. After a 1981 review of the
procurement plans, a seventh and eighth frigate had to be deferred, the
number of flying hours for the air force had to be sharply reduced, air
force and navy had to give up plans for the procurement of the Roland
air defense systems, and the introduction of the Patriot was also
defferred. See NFT, 8 March 1981, NZZ, 10 March 1981, p. 1; FAZ, 29 May

\(^{699}\) What could be changed, however, was the mix of relatively cheap
regular draftees and more expensive longer-term career soldiers. The
Force Plan called for a certain mix in the personnel structure between
professional officers, draftees that voluntarily spend extended terms,
and regular draftees. The gap between the planned personnel structure
When the service proposals came in too high, the GI, through the Fue S, had the opportunity to impose some priorities but since the amounts to be cut were rather small (1-4% of the budget), there was a natural limit to this reordering of priorities. The General Inspector and his staff were limited to making more or less across the board cuts because the Fue S was institutionally unable to successfully fight for such things as a trade-off of investment vs. operating costs, or one procurement item against another. Because the services themselves had the relevant information, they were usually the ones who prepared proposals for cuts which were then coordinated among the services. The Fue S did not have the power to impose decisions; the Fue S could only try to negotiate with the service staffs and convince them of their proposals' merits. The main reason for the inability of the Fue S and the General Inspector to impose priorities was that the service inspectors were responsible for readiness. The service chiefs thus could easily oppose changes in plans on operational and readiness grounds. For institutional and bureaucratic reasons, it was thus very difficult for the General Inspector or civilian bodies to impose planning priorities (e.g. certain NATO force goals) at this stage.

The Government's Budget Submission. After a final round of MoD internal negotiations and coordination with the Finance Ministry resulting in marginal changes, the cabinet approves a budget in September or October and transmits it to parliament. At this point, the MoD shares can be up to 4% lower than in the original MifriFi, although

in the force plan and the actual mix is a good indication for trade-offs in the personnel area. Relatively cheap regular draftees can be used to fill the slots envisaged for more expensive longer-term personnel. In the early 1970s the gap between the plan and actuality was about 30,000 men. There is some evidence that in the early seventies personnel improvement measures (the so-called White Paper measures) were made at the expense of procurement projects. See White Paper 1970, pp. 87-99. The overall personnel situation improved during the late seventies due to a number of remedial measures (increased benefits, better training opportunities, etc.). See Weissbuch 1979, pp. 218-223.
in the early seventies the submission was up to 5.2% higher than the
 Ministério (see Table D-8). When deciding on budget submissions, the
cabinet does not review any alternative budgets and does not get into
discussions about strategy and posture alternatives. Nor does the
cabinet while discussing mid-range financial plans concurrently evaluate
alternative budget proposals for defense. The main consideration in
determining the defense total are fiscal and economic considerations.

Due to a lack of staffing and bureaucratic inertia, the Federal
Security Council did not serve the purpose of reviewing alternatives of
military policy either. For example, it met several times to discuss
the LTDP and the German position on it, yet the discussion, did not
touch on the broader strategy issues, nor were studies undertaken which
analyzed the implications of budgetary strategies for West German and
NATO military capabilities. Instead the BSR focussed on the political
implications of the program and laid out the national problems in
meeting NATO requirements.

Budget Laws and Final Expenditures. A comparison of the
governments defense budget submission and the approved budget reveals
that parliament only slightly changed the defense budget. From 1974 to
1983 the Bundestag always increased the defense budget, often restoring
it to the level envisaged by the mid-range financial plans and sometimes
even going slightly beyond that (see Table D-8). Given the nature of
the parliamentary and party system in the FRG, it is not surprising that
parliament changed the budget only slightly, i.e an average of +1.0%
over the government request. Since the Defense and Budget Committees
reflect the seat distribution in the full house, the executive always
has a majority in these committees. High voting discipline and party
loyalty of the deputies always insure the incumbent government a
majority. The staff structure of the Bundestag is also such that
parliament has no intitutional base from which to change the budget
submission in a major way. For this reason, the Bundestag also has no
capabilities to systematically scrutinize the planning performance of
the government in relation to national plans or NATO force goals.
Table D-8

THE EVOLUTION OF FRG DEFENSE BUDGETS (EP 14) FROM FISCAL GUIDANCE TO ACTUAL OUTLAYS, 1970-1984

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<td>43.8</td>
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<td>+3.9</td>
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<td>+4.0</td>
<td>+3.9</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Change From Budget Law</strong>&lt;br&gt;Actual Outlays in year t (Billions)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Since the mid-range plan of t-2 is calculated at price levels of December 31 of t-1, the figures had to be converted to the same price levels as used in the Budget Submission (December 31 of t-2). GNP deflators were used for this conversion, as provided by the Budget Division of MOD.

1970-1984 average annual increase/decrease of government's budget, submission over mid-range financial plan: +0.4%

1970-1984 average annual increase/decrease of Parliament's budget over government's budget: +1.0%

1970-1983 average annual increase/decrease of actual outlays over budget law: 1.2%

Sources: The Mid-Range Financial plans and figures for actual outlays for EP 14 were provided by the Budget Division of MOD, Bonn. The EP 14 figures of the Budget Laws were extracted from Der Bundeshaushalts Plan, for respective years. Price conversions were calculated by the author on the basis of GNP deflators provided by the Budget Division of MOD, Bonn. The author also calculated the changes in percent and the summary statistics.
The parties do at times make it difficult for the incumbent government to get its programs approved. The 1980/81 financial crisis in the MoD is an excellent example demonstrating how some parliamentarians in the SPD threatened not to vote for the government's defense budget because they disagreed with the proposals for relatively large increases to finance the Tornado procurement.\textsuperscript{681}

Overall Budgetary Trends. Table D-7 shows that the defense budget (NATO and Plan 14) grew faster than the Gross National Product (GNP) and the total federal budget in the period from 1970-1974. During that period, the GNP rose by 12.7% and the federal budget by 18.2% in real terms, NATO defense expenditures grew by 22.1%. This asynchronous rise also shows up in the increased GNP share of defense expenditures in that same period, going up from 3.3% in 1970 to 3.6% in 1974. From 1976 to 1979, this trend was reversed. Both the total federal budget and defense expenditures grew generally slower than the GNP and the defense share in the GNP declined to 3.2% in 1979. The growth of the defense related outlays then picked up quicker than the real GNP growth in the period 1980/81 when the defense budget had to be augmented to accommodate additional expenditures for the procurement of the MRCA/Tornado aircraft and then showed only little change in the early 1980s. Defense expenditures (NATO criteria) remained at 3.3-3.4% of the GNP.

Another measure of change is the share of the defense budget within the total federal budget. The dissimilar growth rates referred to above increased that share from 25.7% in 1970 to 26.6% in 1974. From 1975 to 1979 the share declined to 22.3%. In 1980 and 1981, the defense budget consumed a slightly larger part of the budget before dropping to a low of 22.2% in 1982. The change of government in the fall of 1982 and the CDU/CSU's commitment to higher defense expenditures increased the defense share of the budget slightly, approaching 23%, but there is no clear pattern of straight increases.

\textsuperscript{681}See SZ, 7 May 1981, pp. 1/2.
Various analyses in recent years have examined the question whether a trade-off can be found between welfare and other domestic spending on the one hand, and defense expenditures on the other. Patterns of systematic trade-offs do not emerge clearly in patterns spending, apparently because the budget process is fragmented and decisions in one area are made in isolation of other programs.\textsuperscript{602} There is some evidence that party preferences on defense spending are reflected in the total requests. Eichenberg has made the argument that "[a] cautious conclusion [would be] that the CDU/CSU shows a slightly stronger propensity than the SPD to restrain civilian spending in the face of defense spending needs."\textsuperscript{603}

Whatever the cause may be, one fact remains: the share of the defense budget within the total federal budget has declined in the latter half of the 1970s. One possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that the force structure remained very stable after all of the 12 divisions were fielded by 1974 and that the growth of the federal budget since then was sufficiently able to accommodate a moderately paced modernization program. It would have been politically difficult for the SPD/FDP to increase defense expenditures for a marked improvement of overall capabilities. This had party-internal and public opinion reasons. Also important was the focus of West German foreign policy on arms control and perceived constraints, and how much the FRG could or should legitimately do in the framework of the alliance. The CDU/CSU, which came to power in the midst of an intense debate over NATO nuclear strategy and defense, was also unable to dramatically change defense


\textsuperscript{603} Eichenberg, op. cit., pp. 179-188. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis against the trends of the period after 1982 onwards when the CDU had come to power.
budgets, even if it so desired. Moreover, the new government had promised fiscal conservatism and reduced deficits, which locked it in politically. Incremental increases were therefore the only possibility.\footnote{684}

Constraints

The flexibility of the Ministry of Defense to fully implement NATO force goals or to agree to additional financial burdens beyond those already planned for was constrained by several factors. The first had to do with gross budget ceilings. The overall budget showed rapid growth in the first half of the seventies yet all of the increases were planned for specific projects, many of which were personnel measures. In the second half of the decade, flexibility was further reduced by slower growth. Within the fixed financial parameters, new projects could only be funded by reordering priorities and making trade-offs. The defense budget had little maneuvering room during the planning periods of AD70, Basic Issues, and the LTDP. As previously mentioned, a number of procurement projects had to be deferred or cancelled and the manpower ration of draftees vs. career soldiers remained lower than the goals set forth in the force structure plans.

In order to fully implement the NATO force goals it was necessary to increase the overall budgets due to the cost estimates being too low to accommodate all those programs envisaged in the force plan, despite average real growth in the procurement account from 1970-1985 of 2.5-3.2\%, depending on what deflator is used.\footnote{685} Although good data could not be obtained on this, the likely underlying planning problem was that the force plans (Streitkraefteplan) in the 1970s were based on

\footnote{684}The defense budget for 1987, developed in a year with considerably less public debate about defense matters, was also determined largely under tight fiscal constraints. It will not grow as fast as the overall budget. This policy demonstrates the weight of Minister of Finance Stoltenberg's efforts to continue the incumbent government's policy of fiscal conservatism. See FAZ, 4 July 1986. 
\footnote{685}For sources and details, see next paragraph.
growth figures that could not be maintained in the annual budget cycles, thus necessitating cuts.

Cost estimates seem to have suffered from two problems. The first was that real costs were probably underestimated, leading to force plans that could not be fully implemented even if all of the planned growth were allocated. Another problem was that, on the average, inflation in the defense sector, especially procurement and R & D, grew slightly faster than in the rest of the economy. From 1970 to 1985, for example, cumulative real growth in the procurement account amounted to 45.5%, or an average of 2.5% when calculated on the basis of special armaments deflators. When GNP deflators are used to calculate real growth, the cumulative figure goes up to 59.4% over the 15-year period, or an average of 3.2% per year (see Table D-9). This is likely to be another reason why, despite real growth in the procurement account, the budgets did not seem to be sufficient to implement the force plans.

Difficulties in implementing the goal to increase defense expenditures by 3% in real terms arose also because of changes in economic assumptions. For 1980, for example, the defense budget was projected to grow at about 2% in real terms, based on a GNP deflator of 3%. Yet the deflator for 1980 turned out to be 4.5%, thus reducing the real increases to 0.8%. The West German government argued in NATO that defense expenditures should be measured over an extended period of time instead of a single budget year. It further argued that it was more important to look at specific accounts, such as R & D and procurement and to develop better output measures. The underlying rationale in each case was to propose yardsticks that would help improve the track-record of the FRG.

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For the late 1970s this finding is still more striking when the fact is taken into account that the O & M account consumed a lesser share of the budget and that within the investment account R & D, construction and infrastructure funds went down while procurement went up, thus suggesting potential trade-offs. The R & D funds and procurement were actually traded-off despite the objections of the military, a fact confirmed in an interview with a participant in these decisions.
### Table D-9

#### Nominal and Real Growth in West German Military Procurement, 1970-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nominal Growth</th>
<th>Real Growth</th>
<th>Nominal Growth Increase (%)</th>
<th>Real Growth Increase (%)</th>
<th>Nominal Growth Deflator (%)</th>
<th>Real Growth Deflator (%)</th>
<th>Nominal Growth Outlays in Millions DM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,910</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>3,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,173</td>
<td>+ 6.1</td>
<td>+ 15.9</td>
<td>+ 14.6</td>
<td>+ 3.6</td>
<td>+ 5.4</td>
<td>4,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4,833</td>
<td>+ 17.7</td>
<td>+ 15.6</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>4,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,370</td>
<td>+ 11.1</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 6.1</td>
<td>+ 7.9</td>
<td>+ 4.0</td>
<td>5,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>+ 17.7</td>
<td>+ 12.8</td>
<td>+ 5.1</td>
<td>+ 3.3</td>
<td>+ 2.3</td>
<td>6,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>+ 11.6</td>
<td>+ 11.1</td>
<td>+ 1.7</td>
<td>+ 5.4</td>
<td>+ 4.3</td>
<td>7,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7,963</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>+ 12.8</td>
<td>+ 5.1</td>
<td>+ 3.3</td>
<td>+ 2.3</td>
<td>7,963</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8,440</td>
<td>+ 10.4</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>8,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10,646</td>
<td>+ 20.4</td>
<td>+ 12.8</td>
<td>+ 5.1</td>
<td>+ 3.3</td>
<td>+ 2.3</td>
<td>10,646</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,940</td>
<td>+ 11.0</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
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<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>11,940</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>12,128</td>
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<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>12,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>12,355</td>
<td>+ 2.2</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>12,355</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>13,072</td>
<td>+ 3.0**</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>13,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>13,441</td>
<td>+ 3.0**</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>13,441</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13,985</td>
<td>+ 3.0**</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>13,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-85</td>
<td>+ 59.6%</td>
<td>+ 2.5</td>
<td>+ 15.8</td>
<td>+ 8.0</td>
<td>+ 6.5</td>
<td>+ 8.7</td>
<td>+ 59.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Nominal Growth Increase (%) = 100 * (Nominal Growth - Nominal Growth in 1970) / Nominal Growth in 1970

* Real Growth Increase (%) = 100 * (Real Growth - Real Growth in 1970) / Real Growth in 1970

* Nominal Growth Deflator (%) = 100 / (Real Growth Deflator in 1970)

* Real Growth Deflator (%) = 100 / (Real Growth Deflator in 1970)

* Nominal Growth Outlays in Millions DM = Nominal Growth Increase (%) + Nominal Growth Deflator in 1970

* Real Growth Increase (%) = Planned Growth

** = Estimate

Source: Budget Division, M010, Bonn.

*) = Planned

**) = Estimate
Another budgeting problem was the disparate growth of the investment, and operations and maintenance accounts. Up until the mid-seventies the latter consumed an increasingly larger share of the budget, eating up the available investment resources. Through changes in the force structure, this trend was slowly reversed toward the latter half of the seventies, a time when second-generation equipment began to enter the force structure (see Table D-10).667

The West German defense budget not only had to be balanced against other domestic programs but also against political pressures from the outside. AD70 and EDIP, and to some extent the Basic Issues Initiatives are examples of this. As has been pointed out elsewhere in this study, AD70 and EDIP were launched to preempt American troop withdrawals from Europe. The primary tactics to do so were to show (1) that US conventional forces in Europe had an important military purpose; (2) that NATO had just begun to make an important attempt to fit forces to strategy and that the US could therefore not pull out; (3) that conventional arms control negotiations were imminent and unilateral withdrawals on any ally's part would weaken NATO's negotiating position; and (4) that the European allies had agreed within the framework of AD70 to increase their share of the NATO defense effort and actually planned to increase their budgets to finance EDIP. Similarly, the Phase I and II post-Afghanistan measures were designed in part to have the European allies compensate for a diversion of US assets to the Gulf area.

The issue of the US presence and commitment to Europe and its linkage to burden-sharing issues raised the important question to West German policy-makers of how much they would be willing to increase their own efforts without prompting a decrease in American efforts toward Europe. This question in turn raised a panoply of very difficult policy questions, such as to what degree European allies wanted to be seen by their own publics and the Soviet Union as compensating for US

667See also the chart in White Paper 1985, p. 124.
### Table D-10

**FRG OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES AND INVESTMENT TRENDS, 1970-1984**

*(Billion DM)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Outlays (EP 14)</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
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<th>81</th>
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<td>Operating</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
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<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
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<td>31.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Total Budget</td>
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<td>69.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>69.9</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Military Construction</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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<td>26.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
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<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Budget</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* E.g. fuel, food, rental of data transmission lines, etc.

** NATO infrastructure, etc., purchase of real estate, vehicles for administrative purposes, etc.

Source: Budget Division, MOD, Bonn, and author's calculations.
resources diverted to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the Gulf area. The West German government was first and foremost concerned about the military situation in Central Europe and had a high priority in seeing the US commitment unchanged or, better still, increased. From the West German perspective, the assumption of greater burdens by them and other European allies would not be without danger. The West German stance held that it could only be agreed upon if it were certain that the US commitment to Europe was thoroughly secured, or if American pressure on burden-sharing was too strong to be worth the political price of resisting it.  

A final problem area in West German defense budgeting was an institutional one. Neither in the military nor on the civilian side were there offices or individuals that had the manpower, analytical tools, and decision power to continuously re-analyze the implications of altered budgetary environments on force plans, individual programs, and the like. This prevented the preparation of early trade-offs and the establishment of priorities. Neither the Fue S nor the minister's planning staff, nor the Budget division, had independent sources of information. All had to rely on the services' honesty and cooperation. Because of the statutory and bureaucratic weaknesses inherent to the role of the General Inspector, the effective fulfillment of his overall planning responsibilities and effective setting of were never completely accomplished. Even within his own staff, the Fue S, there were sometimes month-long bureaucratic battles over such things as the obtaining of lists that showed the degree of West German coverage of LTDP force goals, suggestions for trade-offs, and better packaging of German follow-through. Because of the lead-time needed to prepare budgets, at least two years were needed to adjust plans to new requirements. On the other hand the West German government, like other allies who wanted to retain flexibility in their budgetary policies, did

686AD70 is an example for the latter case and the LTDP one for the former.
not want to commit itself firmly to specified increases over the long term. This prompted Hans Apel in the spring 1978 DPC ministerial meeting to clearly state that he could neither go beyond the already internally agreed upon budget, nor firmly commit himself to fixed increases in the future.

A further planning constraint was that the Bundestag authorizes procurement projects on the basis of fixed numbers and budgets. When a projected extended over several years then the margins of manoeuvre could become very tight, else program cuts had to be made if inflation was not correctly anticipated. At the same time, federal budget guidelines (Bundeshaushaltssordnung) did not allow planners to adjust budget figures for future inflation. There was thus a built-in tension between parliamentary interests to tightly control programs and the inherent uncertainty to accurately forecast nominal costs.

Summary

This section demonstrated the West German defense budget was guided by strict fiscal control. There were no institutional structures or planning procedures that would help in evaluating trade-offs or the implications of budgetary strategies on force capabilities and military strategies. The budget debate did not focus on military requirements; instead it focused on defense totals and the broad distribution of resources for defense. American proposals for conventional defense improvements therefore could not be systematically examined from the military or strategy point of view; they were almost always analyzed in terms of additional burdens and disruption of established plans. Within the existing budget levels and procedures, NATO force goals could not always be fully implemented. Force goals were considered both by military people and civilians to contain a challenge and were therefore not taken entirely seriously.

This explains much of the West German resistance to new initiatives in NATO. If the reordering of priorities were difficult or impossible for bureaucratic reasons, then the only alternative would be to fulfill
new military requirements by increasing outlays. As a whole, the military establishment felt that it was inappropriate to request major increases in the budgets, and instead remained thoroughly committed to the principle of fiscal guidance and civilian control. For historical and political reasons it would have been inappropriate for any officer to question the wisdom of civilian overall resource allocation decisions. At the same time the minister of defense was constrained by cabinet discipline and the strong position of the Minister of Finance. Since neither the CDU/CSU nor the SPD had a strong constituency favoring substantially increased outlays for defense, incrementalism was the only viable approach for any minister of defense.

This list of deficiencies is not to suggest that the FRG did the poorest job in adjusting to NATO programs. On the contrary, as is frequently noted by SACEUR and other NATO (and US) officials, the forces of the FRG are among the best in the world. Because this study has focused on the US and the FRG, it may appear that West Germany was the only European country resisting American attempts to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. Many of the constraints identified for the FRG also applied to all other European countries.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The attitude and position of the Federal Republic concerning conventional force improvements have to be seen in the context of distinct foreign policy considerations and external influences. Bonn's military policy had a rather different conceptual base and accents than that of the US. Whereas Bonn emphasized political and diplomatic elements in its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland and other East European countries from the 1970s onwards, US policy formulated an explicit though not always consistent, linkage between US-Soviet relations and US defense policy. For Washington, the military competition was an explicit, part of foreign policy. Bonn, on the other hand, emphasized politics and negotiations as a means to overcome the military competition. The geographical remoteness and
isolation of the US allowed the US to chose between a cooperative or a more confrontational approach. The division of Germany and the vulnerability of Berlin were the prime reasons why the FRG, by contrast, had a different approach to detente with the East. The atmosphere of East-West relations was perceived to have a direct impact on Bonn's relationships with the GDR and other East European countries.

The differences in approaching foreign policy toward Warsaw Pact countries was only one dimension of the relationship between foreign and defense policy. Conventional defense improvements also had important West-West dimensions. Bonn's policy toward the East was based on the assumption that the FRG was solidly incorporated into NATO. Any signal that might suggest a lessening NATO role by the west European neighbors or the US due to increased West German efforts was seen as being potentially undermining to Bonn's position toward the East. The international character of West German defense policy and posture was an important anchor for Bonn's diplomatic initiatives of the early 1970s.

Bonn was conscious, therefore, that it had to balance its defense efforts not only with regard to its Ostpolitik but also within NATO. After all the FRG was only admitted to NATO contingent upon its agreement to limit the size of its force and to fully assign all forces to NATO commands. Although the FRG had regained full sovereignty and considerable flexibility in its foreign relations, the "deal" -- sovereignty in return for controlled rearmament -- had left a deep imprint on policy-makers. Continued adherence to the spirit of the deal was a major element of the foreign policy codex. Conventional defense improvements thus were evaluated in terms of their effect on this political balance within the West.

The following will first present a brief review of the foundation the FRG's foreign policy. This will be followed by an analysis of the relationship between the FRG's realtions toward East and West and defense planning. The thesis of this section is that during the 1970s the FRG desired to abstain from substantially increasing its military programs and force structure not only for strategy and budgetary reasons
but also because of fears that political disadvantages would outweigh any potential gains in physical security.

The Bases of German Foreign Policy

West German foreign policy had three main bases.\textsuperscript{609} The first was to insure political conditions, internal and external, that would allow for the economic well-being of the population. Security against military attack and political pressure was to be provided by the solid integration of the FRG into the Western Alliance and close relations with the United States. Second, the FRG sought reconciliation with its neighbors in the West, both in order to rally support against potential aggression from the East, as well as for economic reasons. The political cohesion of NATO in its European and trans-Atlantic dimension was intended to help avoid a situation where the FRG could be blackmailed politically by the East. Developing close relations with France and efforts toward a European unification were the cornerstones of this policy.

A third major interest of the FRG was to overcome the division of Germany. During the 1950s the belief held in Bonn was that the East German regime would crush under the weight of the political and economic competition with West Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall helped to consolidate the power of the regime in East Berlin and the thaw in East-West relations following the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the hollowness of this belief; West Germany slowly began to rethink concepts of reunification.\textsuperscript{610}


\textsuperscript{610} The shift away from the focus of actual reunification of the two states is probably best captured in Egon Bahr's thesis of "change through rapprochement."
Ostpolitik and Defense

This change culminated in 1969/70 when the newly elected SPD/FDP government made a series of diplomatic approaches to Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin, and other Eastern European capitals. The aim of this policy, which became known as Ostpolitik, was to negotiate treaties that ratified the status quo in order to open the way for improved relations, especially with the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other East European countries. The treaty with Moscow (1970) in which the FRG and the Soviet Union acknowledged the territorial status quo in Europe opened the way for the conclusion of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1972. In it and corollary agreements with East Germany, free access to West Berlin from West Germany was guaranteed; the treaty also reconfirmed the four power status of the city.611

The philosophical base of Ostpolitik -- the renunciation of force and acceptance of the territorial status quo -- was the major reason why Bonn did not want to draw attention through massive increases in its defense budget which were thought necessary in order to achieve a significantly stronger conventional posture. Apart from their questionable value in terms of strengthening deterrence, such increases were seen as having negative political effects. A West German build-up beyond the limits set in the 1950s would have sent the wrong signal to the negotiating partners in the East. Moreover in the early 1970s, the FRG was already significantly increasing its defense budget and therefore did not feel compelled to do more.

Domestic and foreign policy considerations were important reasons why Bonn favored arms control negotiations -- MBFR in the conventional area -- to achieve a balance within Europe.\textsuperscript{612} In the absence of such agreements, Chancellor Schmidt pointed out, NATO had to rely on the traditional means of deterrence. Yet his focus was on the nuclear element. Although Schmidt had agreed with President Carter during the London Summit in May 1977 that conventional forces had gained much more importance, his government did not make a major effort to push the LTDP or other conventional improvement programs. Apart from the reasons listed in the previous sections of this study, efforts to preserve the "fruits of detente" appear to have been important considerations.

\section*{Political Straints and Constraints: The Western Dimension}

**Strains Between Ost- and Westpolitik.** The interest to insulate Ostpolitik against negative effects from a hardening in US-Soviet relations brought the FRG into conflict with its main ally, when Washington was attempting to rally support for its tougher attitudes toward Moscow. Bonn was very reluctant to follow the American argument, for example, that Afghanistan required a visible response in NATO planning. For Bonn (and Schmidt) Afghanistan had little direct relevance for European military planning and it seemed that Bonn considered the formulation of an active response to the invasion an American responsibility. The SPD/FDP government also was careful not to be dragged into the dynamics of harder US-Soviet relations and was reluctant to agree to programs which would have resulted in European compensation for American resources directed to the Gulf. NATO's post-Afghanistan measures were therefore a shallow compromise glossing over differences in European and American assessments of the significance of

\textsuperscript{612}Indicative of this is Helmut Schmidt's famous Alastair Buchan speech before the IISS in 1977. For an analysis, see Boutwell, op. cit., pp. 185 ff.
Afghanistan. The post-Afghanistan measures were not much more than declarations of intent to do more.\footnote{For an analysis of American proposals to Afghanistan and European responses, see US Congress (House), \textit{NATO After Afghanistan}, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 27, 1980.}

An earlier example of Bonn's efforts to insulate its \textit{Ostpolitik} against the effects of the deterioration of US-Soviet relations in the latter part of the 1970s is the debate over the neutron bomb. After the \textit{Washington Post} had published an article in the summer of 1977 according to which the administration was planning to acquire Enhanced Radiation Warheads (ERW) for deployment in Europe, opposition in the left-wing of the SPD voiced their objections against the deployment of such "inhumane" weapons in Europe.\footnote{The opposition was led by Egon Bahr, the architect of Chancellor Brandt's \textit{Ostpolitik} and Herbert Wehner. For details, see Boutwell, op. cit.} A main concern of this faction within the SPD was that such deployments would upset stability in East-West relations. After months of internal haggling the FRG finally agreed to ERW deployments, if, for two years following the production decision, the US would try to exploit arms control negotiations that would make deployments superfluous. Moreover, the FRG was not to be the only country where such weapons were to be deployed; a production decision would have to be an American decision alone and Bonn's relations toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would have to be taken into consideration.\footnote{See Lothar Ruehl, "Die Nichtentscheidung ueber die Neutronenwaffe -- Ein Beispiel verfehlter Buendnispolitik," \textit{Europa-Archiv}, 10 March, 1979, pp. 137-150; George A. Glass, "The United States and West Germany: Cracks in the Security Foundation?" \textit{Orbis}, Vol. 23 (3), Fall 1979, pp. 535-547.}

The emphasis of the FRG to pursue arms control negotiations prior to modernizing NATO's long-range theater nuclear weapons is another
example of differences in priorities. Bonn was eager to leave nothing untried to preserve the progress made in the relations between the FRG and its East European neighbors, especially the Soviet Union. The reasons for this were both domestic and external. The Schmidt government had to preserve an internal balance in the SPD and was trying at the same time not to let the US and the Soviet Union drift apart so far that it would have adverse effects on the security of Europe.

Given the increasingly critical American view of Soviet armament efforts and foreign policy activities in Angola, Ethiopia etc. from the mid-1970s onwards, Bonn was perceived by Washington as being too sympathetic to Moscow's policies. One commentator, Pierre Hassner, who echoed these criticisms which did not come from the US alone, argued that Bonn's "extreme empathy" with Soviet reactions

leads [the SPD] to use a double language -- giving maximum publicity to its concern about President Carter's blunders and minimum publicity to its concerns over Soviet military efforts and political expansionism. All this is done in order to reassure (some would say to appease) Moscow and it all does seem to justify Brzezinski's quips about the "self-Finlandization" of Germany.616

The SPD and the Schmidt government were interested in preserving the progress in human relations between the two states, in addition to protecting significant trade interests. In 1979, 8 million West Germans travelled to visit relatives in the GDR. In 1980 the trade volume with CMEA617 countries amounted to approximately $8 billion.618

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617Council for Mutual and Economic Aid.
As Hassner points out, however, Ostpolitik not only wrought advantages for the FRG, but also fragilities and dangers since the FRG's relations to the East continued to be vulnerable to "general tension" and "specific blackmail." Since the FRG was (correctly) seen by its Eastern neighbors as having vested interests in detente they also gained some leverage over West German behavior.\footnote{Ibid.}

Ostpolitik as well as domestic factors thus made it opportune for the Schmidt government to keep the FRG's defense policies low-key. Any prominent efforts to increase NATO capabilities created the potential for Soviet and East German to carry out their threats to cool-off relations because such changes in the posture were "not in tune with efforts to relax tensions." Some argued that detente gave the Soviets a de facto veto over West German and NATO military efforts, but this argument is certainly overdrawn. As the budget section of this study has shown the FRG consistently increased its defense efforts in real terms. It is clear, however, that the foreign policy of the FRG was sufficiently vulnerable to make it inopportune for the FRG to play a leading role in increasing NATO capabilities. In order to reduce its political vulnerabilities vis-a-vis the East it was of extreme importance that any defense efforts were clearly identifiable, not only as coordinated within NATO, but also matched by other countries, especially the United States.

**Constraints on Force Structure**

Ostpolitik was not the only foreign policy factor constraining the FRG from a larger role in NATO defense. Vis-a-vis its western allies, the FRG also felt limited in its force planning by the letter and the spirit of the restrictions on the overall size of the FRG standing forces and on certain weapons and equipment categories. Because these limitations\footnote{For provisions, see below.} were the basis of West Germany's integration and
rehabilitation in the West, the limits had gained axiomatic status in internal discussions and were internalized by policy-makers as virtually unalterable facts. A conventional deterrent, from the West German perspective, would require a massive increase in forces to be credible, and this was simply not considered feasible legally or politically.

Demands or implications that the West German active forces should be increased beyond 500,000 men were opposed by Bonn with reference to the statutory limits on these forces and the political costs of such increases. Although no concrete demands were apparently made by the US, West German defense minister Helmut Schmidt, during the December 1971 DPC meeting, for example, emphasized that, in the interest of balance within and without NATO, the FRG should not field additional large units (Grossverbaende). Similarly, he argued that he would only examine the possibility of extending the operations area of the German Navy beyond the Baltic with much reluctance.\(^{621}\) Schmidt's implicit reference to the Paris treaties substantiated his hedge against continued American emphasis that his country, as well as other European nations had to do more to compensate for possible US troop reductions, and to achieve a more favorable military balance.

Schmidt's underlying point was that the provisions of the treaties with which the FRG had acceded to NATO represented a careful political and military balance that disallowed the FRG any major build-up. However, the Paris treaties did not constrain the size of the West German reserve force, or the quality and number of all weapons systems. The constraints cited by German official were therefore also convenient arguments against demands for additional efforts.

The origins of these constraints turned self-limitation lay in the fact that, as Catherine Kelleher points out, the German membership in NATO was based on a bargain.\(^{622}\) The essence of the bargain was the


\(^{622}\) See Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," op. cit., p. 268. See also her lengthier treatment in Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit.
linkage of four treaties into a package that conditioned regaining sovereignty (laid down in the revised [1954] version of the **Deutschlandvertrag**, the Treaty on Allied Troop Presence in the FRG, and the Saar Treaty) on the admission of Germany into NATO and the Brussels Treaty (since then called the Western European Union, WEU). Crucial to this package were two elements. First, Protocol II of the WEU Treaty specified that the Federal Republic would only be allowed to raise its **peacetime** military forces to a maximum level of roughly 500,000 men.\(^{623}\) Protocol III, on the other hand, put limits on the kinds of armaments that West Germany could produce. By agreeing to the latter provision, the FRG pledged to forego any German production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as certain other kinds of strategic weaponry (certain categories of ships, long-range bombers, etc.) and submitted itself to the supervision of an WEU armament controls agency.\(^{624}\) In addition to these constraints, the FRG in joining NATO, pledged that it

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\(^{623}\)The reference to this number is relatively hard to trace back. A 1954 Protocol to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 admitted the FRG and Italy to that alliance, since called WEU. With it the FRG and Italy also accepted the overall force strengths laid down in Protocol II of the Brussels Treaty on the forces of the alliance. Art. 1 of Protocol II then specifies that the FRG may not exceed the overall strength and number of units laid down in the special agreement accompanying the treaty on the creation of the European Defense Community, signed in Paris on 27 May 1952. The EDC treaty defined in its Military Protocol the size and structure of units. Based on these definitions and agreements, the number for the **Bundeswehr** came to about 500,000. See the various treaties printed in Klaus von Schubert, *Sicherheitspolitik*, op. cit. For a somewhat tendentious account, see also Mathias Jopp, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der deutschen Sicherheitsproblematik: Politische Interessen und militärische Planung bei der Integration der Bundeswehr in das NATO-Buendnis, in Reiner Steinweg (ed.), *Unsere Bundeswehr? Zum 25-jaehrigen Bestehen einer umstrittenen Institution*, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, pp. 15-51, here pp. 28-29. On the legal evolution both at the international and the national level, see Wolfgang Besslich, "Die Verteidigungsgesetzgebung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1979," (Part I and II) in *Zivilverteidigung*, No. 2, 1979, pp. 47-54 (Part I) and No. 3, 1979, pp. 54-61.

would abstain from any action not in accordance with the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finally, the FRG assigned all its standing forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and agreed not to have a separate, independent national command structure (outside of the NATO command system). This was to stress that the forces were only intended for defensive use in concert with the allies. While the standing force would be under national control in peacetime, operational command, except for the territorial army, would pass automatically to SACEUR.  

The second element of the package, in return for these West German agreements on controlled rearmament, was the lifting of the occupation status through a revision of the Deutschlandvertrag and granting the FRG "the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs."  

This legal and political framework defined the broad scope of West German defense planning. Whereas all restrictions on conventional (i.e. non-NBC) weapons production were eventually lifted from the FRG, the limits on the peacetime size of the force, its structure of 12 divisions and specified numbers of units for army, air force and navy, 

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626 Some allied reservations remained, however. They concerned the three victorious powers' rights concerning matters involving Berlin, Germany as a whole and a peace agreement. Article 5 (2) of the Deutschlandvertrag also reserved rights involving the security of the allied forces in Germany to the three powers until West German authorities had passed appropriate laws. These were enacted with the package of the so-called Emergency Laws in 1968. See von Schubert, Sicherheitspolitik, op. cit., Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., p. 23; and on the Emergency Laws, see Wolfgang Besslich, "Die Verteidigungsgesetzgebung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1979 (Teil II)," Zivilverteidigung, No. 3, 1979, pp. 54-60.
627 This abbreviation stands for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
its operational command during war, were not touched. The spirit of these limitations continued to influence FRG decision-making. The historical origins of these limitations explain why there was a certain reluctance to push against the limits of these constraints, whether actual or perceived. Strict adherence to them was the *sine qua non* for the FRG's diplomatic rehabilitation and defense policy; and therefore had to be defined not only within the legal limits, but also the spirit of the treaties. As a result, every military issue was considered in light of its possible implications on the foreign policy of the FRG and its international standing.

One can argue, however, that with the passage of time and adherence to these external constraints the FRG had not only regained its sovereignty, but that the limitations increasingly lost their importance. This is reflected in the fact, for example, that all limitations were removed, save those on NBC weapons, and that the FRG was largely rehabilitated as an actor on the diplomatic scene within the alliance. This rehabilitation offered security and the spring board for new foreign policy initiatives, such as *Ostpolitik*. Defense policy, however, continued to be very constrained. As mentioned earlier, adherence to the spirit of earlier limitations served as a convenient rationale to limit the defense efforts of the FRG. Moreover, of at least equal importance were fears in Bonn that increases in West German efforts would encourage decreases in other allies' contributions.

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Illustrative for these changes is perhaps most prominently the *Ostpolitik* by the Brandt/Scheel government in the early 1970s. This policy was carried through despite American criticism, such as Henry Kissinger's, that the pursuit of *Ostpolitik* might "turn into a new form of classic German nationalism." See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 408-410. Examples include also the West German positions on American economic sanctions against the Soviet Union after Afghanistan and the attempt by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to mediate between the two superpowers in the aftermath of Afghanistan. For a review of these developments, see Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson (eds.), *The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations*, New York: Crane Russak, 1985, especially the articles by Schweigler, Platt, and Van Oudenaren.
Concerns about Troop Reductions and Burden Sharing

In the early 1970s, American calls for conventional force improvements stood in the context of congressional threats to withdraw US troops from Europe. Washington repeatedly made clear that the European allies would have to carry a larger burden of NATO's defense efforts. In the FRG this raised the concern that increased FRG efforts would prompt other allies, including the US, to do less and would therefore be counterproductive overall. At the same time, however, the FRG needed to respond to the threat of troop reductions. This raised the difficult problem of defining the balance between the minimum effort necessary to keep US troops in Europe, and the maximum effort that might tempt other allies to do less.

The question for the FRG and other European countries was: what level of effort was required to maintain the US presence? (See Table D-11). Confusion over US policies and intentions made an answer difficult. Before Congress, the administration had acknowledged that Europe needed to do more to ease the burden on the US. Vis-a-vis the allies, on the other hand, it had argued that additional joint efforts were necessary to impress the Congress and the American public.

With these contradictions, proposals for conventional improvements were seen in ambiguous terms. Was their intent to shift the burden to the Europeans, thus allowing the US to decrease its efforts, or was the goal a net increase in capabilities? Because Washington apparently used both arguments at various times, reluctance arose in Europe toward undertaking additional efforts that might provide the springboard for American withdrawals which in turn would offset European increases.

American Requests for European Compensation. In contrast to the LTDP initiative, AD70/EDIP clearly stood in a burden-sharing/troop-reductions context. Secretary Laird and President Nixon had pointed out on various occasions that the US could not be expected to continue in its role as a "world policeman" providing convenient and cheap
Table D-11

US TROOP STRENGTH IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND WESTERN EUROPE, 1950-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strength in the Federal Republic of Germany (thousands)</th>
<th>Strength in Western Europe including the Federal Republic of Germany (thousands)</th>
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<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>261</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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</table>

protection to the allies.\textsuperscript{629} This was the message, for example, of Nixon's interview in Guam where the President formulated what became known as the Nixon Doctrine.\textsuperscript{630} Congressional pressure in Washington to cut the size of the US forces, reduce overseas commitment and to end the draft were interpreted in the FRG and elsewhere as pressure that would cause the administration to decrease its military commitments not only in Vietnam but perhaps also in Europe.\textsuperscript{631}

Secretary Laird alluded to this congressional pressure in his December 1970 DPC speech when he commended the allies for having agreed on AD70 and EDIP, thus helping to ease some of the pressure on the Nixon administration. Laird made the point that there was a direct relationship between the level of European efforts and US force levels on the old continent.

Politically, what the United States Administration will be able to tell Congress about our partners' defense effort will indeed have a significant effect upon the US force levels which our Congress will support. There now seems to be a consensus in NATO that my country, the United States, has borne an undue share of the Alliance defense burden. With that recognition came a determination to do something about it. My colleagues in the United States Government and I have been impressed by and are grateful for the unprecedented initiative which our European Allies have taken in facing up to this important problem. [...] I cannot say with any degree of certainty that these measures which we discuss here today will still all of the critics of our European commitment in my country. However, gentlemen, the spirit, the efficiency and the speed with which the European effort is carried out will certainly have a considerable influence on American public opinion and on support which we receive from our legislative branch.\textsuperscript{632}

\textsuperscript{630}See Chapter I.
\textsuperscript{631}See, for example, FAZ, 12 June, 1970., p. 2.
Washington did not give any firm indication what level of additional European effort would be necessary to satisfy Congress. No-one in the administration or in Congress had clear criteria for what "fair burden-sharing" meant. Comparisons of GNP, defense outlays, per capita defense burdens, shares in total NATO expenditures etc. were all problematic measurements. Different countries pursued different objectives with defense outlays; exchange rates varied over time; and the value of some defense efforts, such as the draft, providing real estate for exercises etc., could not be quantified.\textsuperscript{633}

Some Senators were cited in 1970 as demanding that the Europeans increase their expenditures by $1 billion per year to decrease the burden on the US. The EDIP package, however, only came up with about $200 million per year. When criticized that this was considerably less than what was demanded, West German minister of defense Schmidt reportedly answered, "We can't satisfy every American Senator -- not even Nixon can. This is not the yardstick."\textsuperscript{634} This illustrates that the size of the package was a political and symbolic compromise. Washington had not clearly defined the financial demands for the Europeans. Therefore, from a West German and European perspective, the point was to come up with a proposal that would not be so comprehensive that it would make US troops superfluous, and thus actually instigate their reduction. What was needed instead was a package that could be sold to the Congress. The size of this package reflected the political balance between the perceived seriousness of the reduction threat, national budget constraints, US lobbying, and an intra-European political balance.

\textsuperscript{632}See Laird's speech, loc. cit., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{633}On these issues, see, for example, James Golden, op. cit.
The balancing between national economic priorities and foreign policy goals was also at work implicitly in the negotiations over the specific measures of the AD70 initiative. Balance would be achieved if troop cuts and divisive political disputes between the European capitals and Washington could be avoided.

**Troop Levels and Offset Agreements.** Force improvements were neither a direct, nor the sole vehicle through which demands for greater burden-sharing in the early 1970s in the 1970s could be accommodated. Another important American concern was the US balance of payments deficit. This deficit was partially caused by the transfer of funds to US serviceman in Europe. From the early 1960s onwards this had been a problem between Washington (and London) and Bonn. The US and the FRG concluded 8 agreements between 1961 and 1975 in which West German purchases of military equipment, nuclear fuel, and US securities, and the provision of loans and direct German investments transferred dollar funds back to the US.

The relationship between these offset agreements and US troop strengths in Europe was articulated most directly in the Jackson-Nunn Amendment of 1973. This law stipulated that the US was to reduce its force by a percentage equal to the shortfall in any balance of payments agreement. But unlike the Mansfield Amendments, the Jackson-Nunn Amendment was sponsored by pro-NATO members of the Democratic party whose goal was to deflect some of the political pressure that had powered the Mansfield efforts. After 1973, the offset problem faded away as the US balance of payments deficit turned into a surplus.635

**Shifting from Compensation to Joint Efforts.** The improvements in the balance-of-payments problem, and the winding-down of the Vietnam war allowed the US to focus less on the need for European compensation of US efforts. The Schlesinger Basic Issues initiative is an example of this change. After arguing that NATO already possessed the "ingredients for

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635See Williams, op. cit., p. 220.
such a defense and [was] paying a considerable price for them,"
Schlesinger pointed out that it was now up to the Europeans to
demonstrate that they were serious about a conventional deterrent.
Financial compensation of the US was less important to the secretary
than the serious pursuit of a conventional deterrent:

How we deal with the resulting posture rests primarily in your
hands. The United States simply cannot go it alone in
supporting the conventional deterrent; Europe must want it and
strive for it too. Indeed, and I am sorry to say this, I
doubt that our Congress will long continue to appropriate the
funds for large conventional forces in Europe if the US
remains the only consistently serious advocate of non-nuclear
deterrence. Change, in short, is pressing very hard on us
all."\(^{36}\)

Schlesinger' plea was more directed toward the common goal of a stalwart
conventional posture than were the comments by Laird, which had
emphasized that European defense efforts had a direct impact on US force
levels. Rather than focussing on levels of expenditure, Schlesinger
concentrated on the substance of a conventional deterrent: aircraft
shelters, war reserves and ammunition stockpiles. Now that the war in
Vietnam was coming to an end, the administration became free to ask less
for offsets of expenditures and currencies, and to place more emphasis
on the quality of the posture.

The trend of shifting US concerns from budget offsets to joint
improvement efforts was continued with the LTDP. The 1977 Ministerial
Guidance, which called for increases in allied defense budgets of three
percent in real terms, was to apply to all members alike. Like the
Schlesinger initiative -- but still more pronounced -- the LTDP was an
attempt to undertake joint improvements in the conventional field."\(^{37}\)
As a result of this emphasis on joint efforts, American demands on

\(^{36}\)See Schlesinger speech, loc. cit., p. 7.
\(^{37}\)See also Helga Haftendorn, "Lastenteilung im Atlantischen
Europe were no longer formulated in terms of shifting burdens, but in terms of fulfilling commitments. The 1977 Ministerial Guidance served as a convenient yardstick to measure compliance with agreed goals. Burden-sharing gained a new meaning because it now emphasized that all allies should make equal commitments toward a common goal.638

**West German Responses.** In the FRG, however, Schlesinger's call for greater exertions on the part of the Europeans was misunderstood as serving as a pretext for US withdrawals. The balance assessment presented in Schlesinger's speech was not credible to many in West Germany and Britain: the strategic convictions were not shared uniformly, and Mansfield was far from forgotten. As recent as spring of 1973 had the Senator announced that he would reintroduce his amendment.639 As noted before, some defense commentators in the media found the arguments resembling those of Robert McNamara in the 1960s.640 McNamara's claim that the forces could be brought back quickly to Europe in times of crisis or war was not credible to many, and there was persistent skepticism on the part of the West Germans about the real agenda behind the withdrawal of troops.641 The perception was that they were withdrawn because of Vietnam requirements and that the reductions, therefore, reflected a shift in American defense priorities.

The shift of American demands from European compensation in the early 1970s to joint initiatives in the latter part of the decade had an impact on the West German positions. In the early 1970s the concern was that increased European efforts might lead to a further slackening of US defense outlays. By the late 1970s, the West German government could

639See Williams, op. cit, p. 211 ff.
641This skepticism repeatedly came through in the White Papers which noted how long it would take to reinforce Europe, thus putting NATO at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact.
point out that it and its Western European allies had increased their defense budgets during a period in which the US decreased its own.\textsuperscript{642}

Another argument against additional demands on the FRG was that it already had the highest density of troop deployments and nuclear weapons, and had more exercise activities than any other NATO country. Moreover, it was contended that FRG could not be overburdened for domestic political reasons and because of its exposed position between the two blocs. Helmut Schmidt, supporting this stance, was reported to have compared the danger in overburdening the FRG with the danger of overloading an aircraft carrier.\textsuperscript{643} Schmidt, like others of his government, stressed that West Germany's politico-military efforts reflected more than mere quantifiable budgets, and argued that all burdens had to be distributed evenly among the Alliance members. West German approval of its contribution to EDIP, and to the infrastructure funds; its participation in projects such as AWACS; and the deployment of nuclear missiles were, therefore, linked to the participation and the contributions of other allies. This was to insure that the FRG could not be singled out either as NATO-Europe's banker or as a target of eastern accusations of militarist revanchism.

Summary. No objective yardsticks existed for a definition of what "fair burden-sharing" was. The three examples of efforts to improve NATO's conventional forces each addressed the question of fairness implicitly or explicitly, but no clear-cut answers were, or, indeed, could be found. The balances that have been struck were the

\textsuperscript{642}Indicative of this is an interview with Helmut Schmidt on the results of the May 1977 London summit. Asked whether President Carter's call for an improvement in conventional forces meant "additional burdens on the Federal Republic," Schmidt answered: "As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned I think I should answer all this with a clear no." See Schmidt's interview with Lothar Ruehl of the ZDF (the FRG's TV Channel Two) on 10 May 1977, \textit{Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Western Europe)}, Vol. VII (91), pp. C-1 - C-2 (C-2). (My emphasis.)

\textsuperscript{643}See Lothar Ruehl, "Germanisierte Verteidigung?" \textit{Die Zeit}, 19 May 1978, p. 4.
result of offsetting the pressures between national budget priorities and constraints; American threats of troop withdrawals; and the political need to maintain an unchanged presence.

It is hard to judge whether Europe was inclined to invest more under the threat of US troop withdrawals, or with the incentive of joint US-European efforts to improve capabilities. On the surface, it appears that the threat of US troop withdrawals in the early 1970s was more effective in producing additional European efforts than was the emphasis on joint programs. West German and other Europeans' share in total NATO outlays increased most rapidly in the period 1970-1974. From 1971 to 1979, the non-US NATO nations increased their defense expenditures by 17.8% and thus reduced the US share in NATO expenditures from 61% in 1971 to 56% in 1974, and to around 54-55% in 1979. To a considerable degree, the trend toward larger European responsibilities was so marked in the first half of the decade because at that time the US cut back its defense budget. Nevertheless, because the cuts in the US budget were mostly, though not completely, related to the the withdrawal from Vietnam, the significance of this shift in burden-sharing toward the European allies is reduced.

On the basis of the evidence available, it is not possible to say whether the pressure of possible US troop reductions or general economic developments were responsible for these trends in the 1970s. It is likely however, that a more detailed analysis of burden-sharing during this decade would reveal that US investments in Europe did not change as significantly as is implied by a comparison of gross contributions to NATO. Such a finding would reemphasize the points presented here: that all along the successive US administrations' emphasis was on overall

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improvements rather than on actual shifts in the burden; and that fears in the FRG about decreased American commitments were less real than imagined.
X. POLITICAL ASPECTS: THE UNITED STATES

A truly comparative study would analyze the political process, the institutions, and the foreign policy considerations in the US with the same level of detail as was used in the previous chapter on the FRG. The comparative interest of this study, however, is more limited. It seeks to compare, in detail, the processes and organizational aspects of defense planning in the executive branches and various NATO bodies. Systematic comparisons of the political dimensions of force improvements in the two countries and NATO, though not less important, are of secondary interest here. Because it can be assumed that most American readers are familiar with the structure of the executive and legislative branches, a close examination of the institutional structure of the American political system with a focus on defense would not be productive. Similarly, many references have been made in previous sections to domestic aspects of the political debate over conventional defense improvements in the US, and therefore need not be repeated here.

This chapter will concentrate on a few interesting differences between the US and the FRG. After a brief summary of the differences between the US and the FRG at the level of domestic politics, the first section deals with differences in public opinion attitudes. The American public has markedly different attitudes on a number of issues, and this data illuminates interesting aspects of political culture. The second section deals with budgetary matters. It is included here because of the central importance of resource considerations for conventional defense improvements. The final section reviews some of the underlying principles of foreign relations and their connection to military policy. As will be seen, the FRG and the US are separated by significant conceptual differences regarding the relationship of foreign and military policy.
THE DOMESTIC SETTING

Highlights of Differences

Parties. The political decision-making process in the US is considerably more decentralized than in the FRG. On the one hand, the two major political parties in the US do not have the same cohesion as the German parties. Neither the voting behaviour of the public, nor that of elected officials is predictable merely on grounds of party affiliation. Deputies vote on issues rather than on ideological grounds formulated by parties. Because of the lesser role of parties, platforms play much less of a role. Although the parties, as well as presidential candidates, formulate and publish platforms, they have much less of a programmatic character than West German party platforms. 645

The Congress. The second difference is the greater role of the American Congress. Within the system of checks and balances gives Congress considerably more power than the West German Bundestag to review and control the executive branch. Congress has considerably more resources for the implementation of this control. There are some twelve to thirteen thousand people in the immediate congressional staff supporting the work of the representatives and committees. Several hundred of these deal exclusively with defense matters. 646 Congress also has at its disposal various research organizations supplying it with expert analysis on policy issues. Most prominent among these are the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the General Accounting Office (GAO). 647 The staff structure and analytical support

647There are about 1300 staff members in those organizations concerned with foreign affairs and defense matters. See ibid., p. 85.
for the Congress allow the deputies to thoroughly prepare for hearings in which administration policies come under close scrutiny. Similarly, the budget is more closely examined by the Congress and its agencies than by the individual rapporteurs in the West German Bundestag. The Armed Forces Committees of the House and Senate have stronger legislative authorities since their decisions are largely binding for their respective full houses.

These differences in the institutional structure and political practice explain why Congress has played a considerably more active role in determining US defense policy than has the West German parliament. The series of hearings on nuclear weapons policies in the first half of the 1970s; the concentration on overseas troop deployments; and individual efforts to improve NATO capabilities, such as those of Senator Nunn, document that role.

The Executive. As has been pointed out earlier, the role of DoD in the executive structure was a more dominant one than that of the MoD in the West German governmental structure. DoD had more control over the budget total, and was able to out-maneuver OMB. Although the Treasury played an important role in negotiations over West German offset payments during the 1960s and early 1970s, it had almost no role in the DoD planning process. The personal proximity between the President and the Secretary of Defense insured that DoD had a weightier input on defense issues than any other institution.

The President's involvement in executive decision-making was facilitated by the existence of the National Security Council (NSC). This group of around 100 staffers prepared the President for decisions in the security area and helped him to control the various agencies.

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**Public Opinion**

Unlike in the FRG, where there are still rudiments of the attitude that the public should stay out of politics and governmental affairs,\footnote{See, for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York/London: W. W. Norton, 1979; Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, The Civic Culture, Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.} there has been a long tradition in the United States, as Hans Speier points out, of considering public opinion as a positive and decisive influence in government.\footnote{See Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969, pp. 323-338.} There are also structural reasons why public opinion is considered more important in the US. A comparatively larger share of public offices are filled by elections, and this increases the pressure on candidates and incumbents alike to justify
their actions and positions to the constituencies. Shorter terms of office for representatives at the federal, state and local levels also contribute to closer relationships between the electorate and public representatives. Finally, unlike in the FRG, the American party system does not provide or impose the same degree of ideological guidance and voting discipline on representatives; the potential of the constituencies is thereby increased.

While elected officials often refer to the "pressures of public opinion," it is questionable whether and how a clear cut causal relationship can be established between specific public attitudes and policy outputs such as the size of the military budget. For the purpose of the discussion here, it suffices, however, to provide a mere profile of public opinion. As will be seen, this profile was often closely related to actual policies on the defense budget, etc. It may, therefore, help explain intuitively some of the pressure policy-makers in Washington face when dealing with European defense issues.

A Profile of American Public Opinion on Defense Issues. The American public, to an even greater degree than the public in the FRG, has relatively little knowledge about NATO, European defense issues, and NATO strategy matters. The direct impact of public opinion on the cases examined in this study was also low to non-existent. Yet the mood set by public opinion was important as the background against which decisions were made. Knowing that the US government had to be responsive to the domestic atmosphere in the US, Europeans carefully watched and analyzed the sentiments on American involvements and troop deployments overseas, etc.

Regarding public perceptions of the US-Soviet military balance, opinion polls in the US produced similar, but not identical, findings to those in the FRG. In the course of the 1970s, the number of people who

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652 There seems to be no broadly tested and workable model that can establish such a link. A possible exception is the work of Benjamin I. Page and Robert V. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77 (1), 1983, pp. 175-190. The study has a number of serious methodological problems, however.
believed that the US was either equal or inferior militarily to the Soviet Union increased. The number of people who believed that the Soviets were superior militarily was relatively larger in the US than in the FRG. This trend may have leveled off towards the early 1980s, when the Reagan build-up began to have its impact on the public (see Table D-12).

Although time series data is not available, there is sketchy evidence that the American public consistently tends to believe that the US and her allies are better able to defend against a Warsaw Pact attack than the West German public. 48% of the respondents in a 1979 poll in the US believed that America and her allies could successfully defend against such an attack, whereas a poll in the same month in West Germany counted only 38% with this opinion. A 1978 poll shows 45% of the West Germans having serious questions over whether defense was possible, but in a similar poll only 33% having such doubts in the US. The group of those believing that defense is infeasible was also twice as large in the FRG (11.6%) as it was in the US (6.0%). (See Table D-13).

Table D-14 demonstrates that, similar to rising West German public opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons, the US public over time increasingly turned against such a policy. In the German case, the underlying reason for the opposition may have been the growing realization of the probable devastation of the FRG; in the US it is more likely that there was an the increasing awareness of the probability of the involvement of the American homeland in even a limited nuclear exchange, and this resulted in a sense of vulnerability.

How did the perceptions of military balance and of the fairness of the NATO burden's apportionment,\(^{65,3}\) the opposition against first use,\(^{65,3}\) and the questions regarding the West's ability to defend itself translate into attitudes on defense spending? American opinion on these

\(^{65,3}\)No detailed time series data was available. For information on public attitudes in the early to mid-1970s, see Gebhard Schweigler, *Politikwissenschaft und Aussenpolitik in den USA*, Munich/Vienna: Oldenbourg 1977, pp. 254 ff.
Table D-12
THE US-USSR MILITARY BALANCE

Question (CBS/NYT Polls): "Right now would you say that the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA superior (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About equal (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA inferior (%)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion (%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NBC/AP Polls): "As of now, do you think the United States is stronger militarily than Russia, do you think that Russia is stronger than the United States, or are both countries about equal in military strength?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>78</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>81 a</th>
<th>82 a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US stronger (%)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia stronger (%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About equal (%)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure (%)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a "Soviet Union" instead of "Russia"

Table D-13

AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
OF NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF

Question:
If there is a military attack on West Germany by the East/the Soviet Union, do you believe that the United States and her allies can defend themselves against such an attack, or are their defense capabilities questionable, or do you believe that defense against such an attack is impossible?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Capability</th>
<th>Population USA (in %)</th>
<th>Population FRG (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 79</td>
<td>Dec. 77/Jan 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can defend</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defense is questionable</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defense is not possible</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Analagical, not identical, wording of questioning

Source: Zoll, op. cit.
Table D-14

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR FIRST USE

Question: Do you approve or disapprove the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States in case of attack?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (NORC poll) "If one of our allies in Western Europe was attacked by the Russian Army, do you think the US would be justified in using atomic bombs against Russia?"

** (NORC poll) "Suppose the Russian Army should attack one of our allies in Western Europe, would you approve or disapprove of our using hydrogen bombs against Russian cities?"

*** (CBS/NYT poll) "Do you think the United States would be justified in using nuclear weapons first to prevent Western Europe from being taken over by the Soviet Union?"


issues fluctuated with time and with changing perceptions of the threat, the international situation, and domestic politics.
Throughout the 1950s public support for military programs was strong. During the 1960s, when the Kennedy Administration began a large military build-up, support for increased defense spending was also strong. A turning point came around 1967/68 when it became evident that the US could not win the war in Vietnam militarily. In 1969, public support to cut the defense budget peaked above 50% for the first time. 52% of Gallup survey respondents were in favor of cuts. Through 1974 this number remained at about 40% (see Table D-15). Not until all US forces had withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975, did support for Administration budgets grow. From 1976 onwards, opinion polls showed a trend toward increased support for higher defense spending, probably reflecting the heightened debate over Soviet activities in Africa, and the continued Soviet build-up, which was well-publicized by a number of generously-funded and visible groups, such as, the National Strategy Information Center, the Committee on the Present Danger and the American Security Council. This trend came to a climax in 1980 after the seizure of American hostages in Teheran in November 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, when 60% of the respondents supported increased outlays. Such strong support for defense spending led Congress in 1981 to increase the administration's defense request for the first time since 1967.

Since 1981 the margin of wide-spread public support for increased defense spending has again declined, reflecting the Reagan Administration's large increases in outlays for defense. While in the three groups of people supporting increased, decreased or the same budget levels were about equal in 1982, the situation switched in 1983, when almost 50% were of the opinion that the military budget was too high.

An interesting difference between public attitudes in the US and the FRG is the apparent relationship between threat perceptions and military spending. The correlation of the trends between the perceptions of the military balance and attitudes toward defense
Table D-15

AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE SPENDING

Question (wording differed slightly): "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right amount." (Table extracted.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Too Little</th>
<th>Too Much</th>
<th>About Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gallup and NORC Polls, respective years; courtesy of Thomas Graham, MIT.

spending can be inferred from comparing Table D-12 with Table D-15. Such a comparison suggests that the trends are rather closely related. Unlike in the FRG, where political solutions to the security problem
seem to have been preferred, American public opinion apparently related military security rather closely with the level of defense spending. There are other indicators supporting the accuracy of this thesis. About twice as many American survey respondents (21.7%) favored a special tax to maintain the capabilities of the armed forces under all circumstances than did West German respondents (9.9%). At the same time, 44% of American respondents favored a limited tax increase, yet only 30.7% of the West German would even have favored that. The American public also seemed to consider armed forces more important for the country. A 1979 poll revealed that 87% of polled Americans considered armed forces either very important or important; in the German case this group consisted only of 69.7%. Almost one fourth of the German respondents considered armed forces either unimportant, or neither important nor unimportant. Only 7.4% belonged to this category in the American poll. Finally, to Americans the military seemed not to be as ambiguous a symbol as to Germans. In the 1970s, the military continuously ranked third in esteem after the Church and banks, and immediately before public schools, the US Supreme Court, newspapers, organized labor etc.

654 See Zoll, table 13, p. 63.
655 Ibid., table 10, p. 59.
657 Except for 1978, 50% or more respondents answered that that they had "a great deal, quite a lot of confidence" in the military as an institution. See George Gallup, Public Opinion Index, for respective years. These findings stand in contrast to claims by some that the US military suffered a severe credibility problem after the end of the Vietnam war. See, for example, Sam Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, Civil-Military Relations, Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1977, pp. 5-26.
Conclusions. A number of interesting phenomena have emerged from this brief and sketchy survey of public opinion data. First, the American public apparently saw a more direct relationship between defense outlays and security. There was an obvious correlation between perceptions of an increasingly unfavorable military balance and a rising sentiment for additional defense expenditures.

No data could be found that would suggest that the American public was more aware of the financial and strategic implications of nuclear-conventional trade-offs. Because the average American citizen lacked interest and information, defense issues were not subject to intense public discussion, and the intricacies of NATO policies simply escaped their attention.

Public opinion seems to have figured more prominently in the minds of policy-makers in the US, and there were a number of structural reasons that reinforced a closer relationship between constituencies and politicians. This may have been an advantage as well as a burden, depending upon whether the preferences of public opinion coalesced with those of the policy-makers or not. In the early 1970s, sentiments against overseas involvement and troop deployments created heavy pressures on those who continued to favor strong involvement in European affairs and security. In the latter half of the decade, both President Carter and Reagan profited from sentiments to increase defense budgets. Although no detailed case study can be provided here, it seems plausible to assume that the existence of important political groupings (e.g. around presidential candidate Ronald Reagan) that called for increased spending to meet the "increasing Soviet threat" helped to create public support for increased defense expenditure. In the FRG, by contrast, no such debate existed.
**Conventional Defense Improvements and the US Budgets**

The initiation and follow-through of the three cases in this study were not only closely linked to strategy considerations, threat assessments and planning management questions. A key factor for both the initiation and implementation of the special conventional defense improvement initiatives were budgetary pressures and politics.

In the case of AD70, a primary consideration on the part of the European allies was to help alleviate pressure on the US administration to withdraw troops from the Continent in order to save money. Similarly, James Schlesinger pointed out in his June 7 speech that it was unlikely that the US Congress would continue to support large US overseas deployments if the Europeans did not show more commitment to a strong conventional posture. As mentioned in the case study on the LTDP, Robert Komer was also very much motivated by the idea of gaining more support for NATO in Congress if it could be shown that the funds were well spent.

Over the course of the 1970s, the debate within Washington over the budgetary implications of the American presence in Europe changed. In the first few years of the decade, the administration was concerned with fending off amendments, such as those by Senator Mansfield, to withdraw troops from Europe in an effort to save money and to shift the burden to the allies. By the mid-70s, when the US involvement in Vietnam had come to an end, the mood in Congress began to change slowly. Europe again became the focus of attention for military planners, not least because it was the theater to which a major part of the US defense effort was directed, and because it provided a convenient rationale to increase expenditures after the Vietnam decline. Increasingly, the debate focused on the possibilities of strengthening NATO's defense and of creating an equitable burden-sharing arrangement. Especially the efforts of Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and Secretary Schlesinger to clarify the meaning of NATO strategy and the relationship between the nuclear threshold and conventional strength resulted in a number of
measures aimed at strengthening conventional forces. By the late 1970s, skepticism had grown in Washington about the success of detente and concern over the Soviet military build-up was widely spread.

The purpose of this section is to analyze the budgetary pressure the successive American administrations faced and to relate them to the cases under examination. This section will ask how budgetary politics affected the US contribution to NATO's conventional strength; or, in other words, how NATO requirements were related to budgetary constraints.

The following analysis will first review a number of definitional and conceptual problems with respect to measuring the US contribution for NATO. In a second step, the US budgetary process is briefly outlined to give an overview of the actors involved. The third section then analyzes the budgetary trends and their relationship to the force plans. A concluding section assesses the budgetary constraints -- political, financial and structural -- to conventional defense improvements.

The US Contribution to NATO - Definitional Problems

An analysis of the US defense budget and its relationship to NATO conventional force improvements requires a definition of how much of the US defense budget actually is spent on NATO. To specify the exact amount, or even an approximate figure, of the US defense budget that attributable to NATO is very difficult, however. Estimates for the late seventies ranged from 32 to 83% of the total.\(^{658}\) Unlike the FRG, the US maintains military forces not only for NATO contingencies. Of the 28 or so active and reserve divisions, for example, only 13 division equivalents are committed directly to NATO.\(^{659}\) The remainder of the US

\(^{658}\) See the testimony by Ellen L. Frost, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international economic affairs: US Congress (House), Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, March 14, 1978, p. 577.

forces are planned for use in other regions or as strategic reserves. But depending on the situation, it is conceivable and likely that more would actually be deployed to Europe in wartime.\footnote{During his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers argued before Congress that "[t]here is no clear dividing line between what directly and what indirectly supports our NATO commitment. Any assumption would be arbitrary and the ensuing analysis would not be particularly meaningful and could possibly be misleading. In the event of extreme emergency, virtually the entire Army would be used directly in support of NATO." See US Congress (House), \textit{Overview of FY 1980 Budget for Defense and International Affairs}, Hearings before the Task Force on Defense and International Affairs of the Committee on the Budget, 96th Congress, 1st Session, March 1979, p. 72.} Similar allocation and counting problems exist for air forces, US naval capabilities and nuclear forces.

Another definitional problem has to do with the question of what comprises the defense budget. The budget of the Department of Defense is listed under Functional Code 051 and is entitled "Department of Defense-Military." It contains most of the defense-related expenditures but not those of the Department of Energy (DoE) for atomic energy for military purposes and expenditures of other agencies pertinent to defense. The total of DoD, DoE and other defense expenses efforts is listed separately in the budget under Functional Code 050, "National Defense." Neither one of these two categories fully captures the NATO definition of defense expenditures, however. The NATO definition also includes military assistance programs to other nations (including equipment and training), military pensions, NATO infrastructure costs and civilian staff costs, some of which are again listed in accounts other than 050 or 051.\footnote{See IISS, \textit{The Military Balance, 1985-1986}, London: IISS, 1986, p. VI; Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, \textit{Budget of the United States Budget, Fiscal Year 1986}.}

An additional definitional difficulty arises from the peculiarity of the US budget system. Unlike in the FRG, for example, there are three measurements of US defense expenditures. The broadest one is the \textit{Total Obligational Authority (TOA)}. This measurement represents the
value of the direct defense program for each fiscal year, regardless of the method of financing. Included in this measurement may be balances available from previous years or from the sale of inventory items. A second measurement is the Budget Authority (BA). The BA permits the obligation of funds for immediate and future disbursement. It is associated with the year the authority takes effect. In other words, BA is the value of the new spending authority. The difference between TOA and BA stems from the application of receipts that offset total budget authority. Finally, there are Outlays. They represent actual expenditures which may also have been incurred on the basis of the budget authority from previous years. Because of the long-term nature of some programs in the defense budget, such as the procurement of ships, there is a lag between the authorization of programs and actual outlays for them. In consonance with NATO definitions, the following analysis will, for the most part, use outlays as the measurement of the US defense effort.\textsuperscript{662}

The Budget Process

The American defense budgeting process is different from the West German in four respects. First, within the Executive, DoD has a more dominant role in budget matters relative to other agencies such as OMB, than does its West German counterpart. Therefore, DoD has a greater influence on setting the defense totals according to its own needs. This has been compounded by the fact that the secretaries of defense have often had a close relationship with the presidents who, as

\textsuperscript{662}It would go beyond the scope of this study, and be only of marginal utility, to reconstruct defense expenditures by the NATO definition and track the development of the US budget on that basis. The data for such a construct is scattered in a number of accounts and is sometimes incomplete. NATO sources only provide actual expenditures and would not allow analysis of internal debates about plans and priorities. For this reason, the following analysis concentrates on Account 051 (DoD-Military) and Account 050 (National Defense). Where appropriate and useful, budget numbers using NATO criteria will be used as well.
Commander-in-Chiefs, have usually given national security and military affairs a good deal of attention. A second major difference is the stronger role of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in shaping and reviewing the budget. OSD has both the personnel and the analytical capabilities to put pressure on the armed services to implement the secretary's priorities and policies. Third, the existence of the NSC system further facilitates government-wide review and the debate over alternative postures and strategies by providing a forum to scrutinize defense policy. Fourth, the balancing and more powerful role of the Congress, vis-a-vis the Executive, forces the Executive into a more open debate about defense matters and creates pressure on it to constantly rationalize its policies. These factors do not necessarily lead to better policy, but at least to more open debate, and more clearly defined choices.

A detailed description of the US PPB system has been provided elsewhere in this study, and only a brief summary will be given here. The planning phase starts with an appreciation of American security commitments and military strategy through the JCS. After receiving preliminary guidance from the secretary of defense regarding objectives and resources, the services prepare force plans (Program Objectives Memoranda) which are subsequently reviewed by OSD regarding their responsiveness to the guidance. The secretary then issues decision memoranda on the individual program proposals after having given the services an opportunity to comment on them. Upon review, the decision memoranda are used to evaluate the cost of the program and further adjustments may be made to accommodate the immediate budget year and the Five-Year Plan (FYDP) within expected financial constraints. Upon completion of the costing phase and negotiation with OMB, the President decides on his administration's budget about a month prior to

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663 The fact that the President has the National Security Council, a personal assistant for national security affairs and a staff of at times up to 100 people at his disposal emphasizes this involvement.  
664 See Chapter VI Force Planning in the US.
transmittal of his proposals to Congress in early February. According to the 1974 Budget Act, Congress reviews the budget for 2 1/2 months and then establishes its own preliminary authorization targets by mid-May. Within these ceilings, the specialized committees develop draft appropriation bills that are approved by House and Senate, and coordinated in a conference session between the two. A final vote on the budget is due in mid-September, about two weeks before the beginning of the new fiscal year.665

The nature of this budget process helps explain why the American government, and especially OSD, has repeatedly made proposals for conventionalizing NATO strategy. Since the days of Robert McNamara, the secretary has been deeply involved in all stages of the planning programming and budgeting phases. This involvement has led to a thorough scrutiny of plans and has helped express more clearly the trade-offs and risks associated with varying strategies. The existence of the NSC system involved the chief executive into this process, and focused the attention of the top-echelon of the administration on defense matters. Finally, Congress played a more active role in reviewing the policies of the executive than the West German Bundestag, because of differences in the constitutional and political systems which gave the Congress broader responsibilities and powers of control.

Budgetary Trends

The motivations for American initiatives to improve conventional defenses cannot be explained with differences in strategic convictions, analytical assumptions, planning philosophies and process alone. As in the West German case, an important factor underlying all of the initiatives under examination here were national resource constraints (i.e. the problem of the relationship between overall commitments), competing priorities, and limited resources. During the early 1970s, 665This process is more detailed in reality and has changed over time. Planning, programming and budgeting phases actually overlap and Congress has usually not met deadlines.
the US still had commitments in Vietnam, and continued to have obligations in other regions of the world. But new commitments were also taken on toward the late 1970s in Southwest Asia, raising the burden-sharing issue anew. Domestically, there was political pressure to fund expensive social programs and to decrease overseas troop deployments. At the same time taxes could not be raised indefinitely to pay for all commitments simultaneously. These factors, therefore, produced constant pressure on the administration by the Congress and the public to rationalize the amount of money devoted to NATO and to defense in general. This raised the issue of allied burden-sharing.

Resource allocation problems existed not only at the national level but also within DoD. Here the question was how General Purpose Forces (GPF) could be optimized for the various planning contingencies. Since the allies contributed forces in some contingencies, allied contributions had a direct effect on the overall force structure and required capabilities.

Absence of Firm Long-term Fiscal Guidance. Perhaps the most important difference between the US and West German cases is the fact that the development of force level was not constrained a priori by specific resource levels. The examination of the question, How Much is Enough? has a long tradition, and different actors in the American planning system have come to different answers. As has been pointed out above, the JCS produced an appreciation of US military commitments and strategy in the planning phase, and developed forces to meet these external threats. Traditionally, these forces have been much larger than could be supported even within flexible budgetary constraints. Since the early 1960s, OSD has critically reviewed the adequacy of the assumptions made in such studies. The JCS's account of the forces necessary to support the new American strategy of flexible response in 1962, for example, produced the staggering requirement of 55 US divisions and 82 fighter attack wings. Yet it was based on the assumption that war would break out in eleven theaters simultaneously. OSD reduced the number of simultaneous planning contingencies to three
(the 2 1/2 war strategy), and by increasing the mobility requirements for the force was able to lower the total force structure requirements to 28 1/3 active and reserve divisions, and 41 tactical fighter wings. To this day, there is an active debate between military and civilian components of the Department as to how much is required to meet US commitments within stated strategy principles.

The apparent inability of the military services and of the JCS to remain within reasonable budgetary limits dramatically increased the role of OSD in planning. Since the political leadership was interested in both optimizing the defense posture and keeping down the defense budget, it fell upon the secretary of defense to find a procedural solution. Because the military services and the JCS seemed unable to submit to the civilian leadership what the latter considered efficient plans, OSD itself increasingly took on the task of setting priorities and cutting out entire programs. This gave OSD many more opportunities to shape military programs according to its views.

**Negotiations over the Budget Total in the Executive.** Unlike the German Ministry of Defense, DoD appeared to be more successful in out-maneuvering OMB (formerly the Bureau of the Budget) on the defense totals. DoD's weight in the budget process at times disrupted the government-wide budget planning process because OMB had set out lower budget targets than were actually planned by DoD. As a result, the rest of the agencies had to adapt their plans to a new set of figures that took DoD's unanticipated larger share into account. This fact also held true in the late 1970s. Whereas OMB wanted to base 3% real increase of the defense budget only on the NATO portion of the budget (and outlays in that category), DoD fought to have the 3%-figure

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calculated from the entire budget. After extended bureaucratic
infighting, DoD won.668 The primary reason for the greater influence of
DoD is that DoD had significantly more personnel, information and
expertise than other components of the executive. It thus had an
advantage in arguing that a particular budget level represented the
minimum acceptable without jeopardizing national security. Secondly,
OMB and DoD's attempts to reconcile their defense totals were
complicated by the fact that the OMB focused its calculations on
outlays, whereas DoD concentrated on BA. DoD could manipulate the
outlay estimates easily within plus or minus 10% of the same level of
budget authority, and thus withdrew itself from effective OMB
controls.669

Budget Trends. As is evident from Table D-16, the US pressure on
the European allies to increase their share of the defense burden came
at a time of declining American defense expenditures. A detailed
analysis of how the budgetary trends affected the most relevant American
deployments in Europe, however, goes beyond the scope of this study.670
The American disengagement from Vietnam decreased the need to maintain
the large manpower pool that was created in connection with the war in
Southeast Asia, and also significantly decreased operating costs.
Expenditures from Account 051 decreased from a GNP-share of 8.0% in 1970
to 5.4% in 1976. The first real increases in the budget came in FY
1977, yet the rate of increases was still slower than that of GNP. Only
in FY 1980 did the GNP share of military expenditures go up again. The
pressure on the Europeans to do more, however, was, in fact, more
politically than cost-driven. The American administration was forced by

668See Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), The Three Percent
669See Crecine, loc. cit., p. 77/78.
670Such an analysis would need to cost out the expenditures
associated with the troop deployments in Europe, as well as support,
infrastructure (as far as it is not provided by European governments)
etc.
## Table D-16
### DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 1970-1985

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*Deflators not available

**Note:** Real increases in GDP and Federal Budgets have been calculated on the basis of GDP deflators. Real increases in military expenditures were calculated on the basis of specific military deflators, as used by DOD in cited sources.

**Sources:**
- Calculations by the author on the basis of data provided in cited sources.
Congress to demonstrate that US allies were actually doing more for their own defense and that the administration was serious about the Nixon Doctrine.

The Schlesinger Initiative of 1973 still fell in a period of declining defense budgets, but the secretary had made it his task to revert the declining trends. Interviews suggested that DoD had consciously decided to focus its effort for defense improvements on Europe. Vietnam had caused severe political strains with the allies and eroded US capabilities in Europe. The concentration of investment efforts on conventional improvements in Europe was convenient because US engagement there was less controversial, and it was a theater to which large US assets were committed. Moreover, it allowed OSD to tackle the strategy problem that hung over the alliance for more than a decade.

It is not possible from the available data to analyze, on a program basis, how American investment trends for European defense changed over the period covered here. Yet a number of qualitative statements can be made nevertheless. Although President Carter had campaigned to lower defense expenditures, actual policy was different. There was a strong group within the administration, Harold Brown and Robert Komer among them, who felt the need to strengthen US defense, and sought to increase selective budget items. Komer had pointed out in his memoranda to the Carter Policy Planning Group that savings made in the strategic nuclear and several other areas should be shifted to general purpose forces. Komer's effort was clearly oriented toward Europe. It was not until FY 1979, one year later, however, that the administration had committed itself to increase outlays by the three percent agreed to during the 1977 London summit (see Table D-16).

\[^{671}\] He was ultimately fired in the fall of 1975 largely because of his insistence on greater increases in the budget than President Ford was willing to agree to.
Furthermore, the US had planning criteria that were different from those of the Europeans. US stockpiles, weapons inventories and densities were frequently higher. As the initiator of both the Basic Issues program and the LTDP, the US was in a position to shape the programs, and to adjust its own plans and budgets already in the development phase of the initiatives. This required fewer adjustments in plans retrospectively than was the case for those European countries that faced new or altered requirements.

On the other hand, the administration faced a more difficult problem in Congress. As is clear from Table D-17, the Congress regularly cut the Budget Authority during the 1970s. Changes (in percent) of planned outlays were often only about half of the decreases in BA, however. A comparison of actual outlays shows that DoD was very flexible in its outlays planning, probably because of backlogs in the prior budget authority. Table D-17 shows that outlays were mostly higher than projected at the time of the passage of the budget bill. The underlying reason for this was, as mentioned before, that DoD had a manoeuvre room of almost 20% in calculating its outlays projections.\footnote{See Joshua Epstein, \textit{The 1987 Defense Budget}, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1986, pp. 59 ff, for a rough outline of the methodology to calculate outlays on the basis of budget authority.} Since the Congress merely legislated BA, DoD had considerably more leeway in adjusting plans and programs to changes of priorities and funding levels than the West German MoD.\footnote{Money left over in accounts can be transferred to the next budget year only to a very limited extent. Parliament thus has much better control over expenditures. This is emphasized by the fact that the principal measure for appropriations in the FRG are outlays. Budget Authority (\textit{Verpflichtungsermaechtigungen}) does exist, it is used, however, for specific procurement items. But it does not amount to a large portion of the budget.}

A comparison of US and FRG expenditure trends for operations and maintenance on the one hand, and investments on the other, shows similarities (see Table D-18). Both the FRG and the US had rather
### Table D-17

CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES IN THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE BUDGET (051) AND ACTUAL OUTLAYS

(\text{Billion \$})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
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<td>77.7</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>111.3</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>125.6</td>
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<td>158.2</td>
<td>222.0*</td>
<td>257.5</td>
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<td>75.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>84.6</td>
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<td>-1.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
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(3) Outlay estimates based on approved Budget Authority. See \textit{DOD Annual Reports to Congress, FY1971-FY1985}.

(4) As in (1), Table 6-11.

Notes:

Table based on President's first budget submission and all congressional actions on that budget.

NA - not available

Table D-18


(Outlays in Billion $)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
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<td>115.0</td>
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<td>8.9</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>88.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Total Budget</td>
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<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Defense Budget Estimates, FY 1986, Table 6-11, and author's calculations.
rapidly rising expenditures for operations and maintenance. In the case of the US, an important reason for the rise was the end of the draft, and associated increases in personnel costs despite large cuts in manpower. The share of O&M expenditures of the total budget increased from 57.8% in FY 1970 to 60.4% in FY 1975. It then began a continuous decline through the latter half of the 1970s and reached 52.1% in FY 1984. These O&M trends reduced the funds available for investment in the early 1970s and led to decreases in real terms in the procurement and RDT & E accounts (see Table D-19). These trends compounded the budgetary squeeze imposed by congressional cuts to enforce a US disengagement from Vietnam. It was, therefore, only natural that the administration push the Europeans to do more during that period.

Flexibilities and Constraints for Conventional Force Improvements

Flexibilities. As was the case in the FRG, the US faced budgetary and political problems that disallowed it to fix the conventional posture in Europe unilaterally. The US had several advantages, however, that made it easier for it to adjust to NATO requirements. First, as frequently noted before, the US was a prime actor in defining NATO requirements. It had the advantage of being able to inject national planning standards into the NATO system. This made it much easier for the US to plan and budget for such requirements nationally because the standards emerged out of the national planning system. For countries such as the FRG, in contrast, NATO requirements frequently meant add-ons, whereas the US had already incorporated them on a national basis.

Secondly, the structure of the US budget process allowed for considerably more flexibility to adjust and reshape existing plans. Since Congress appropriated funds in the form of Budget Authority often on a multi-year basis, programming could be adjusted more easily. The American budget law also made it easier to reprogram expenditures and shift monies from one account to another. In addition, the size of the US budget was so vast in comparison to the West German defense
Table D-19

GROWTH IN U.S. MILITARY PROCUREMENT, FY 1970-1984
(Outlays, $ Billions)

| Fiscal Year | 70  | 71  | 72  | 73  | 74  | 75  | 76  | 77  | 78  | 79  | 80  | 81  | 82  | 83  | 84  | 85  | 1970-1985 change |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|
| Military Procurement | 21.6| 14.9| 17.1| 15.7| 15.2| 16.0| 16.0| 18.2| 20.0| 25.4| 29.0| 35.2| 43.3| 53.6| 61.9| 69.7 |
| % nominal increase | -10.0| -12.5| -9.5| -8.2| -3.2| 5.3| 0.0| 13.8| 9.9| 27.0| 14.2| 21.4| 23.0| 23.8| 15.5| 12.6| 222.7 |
| - in const. 1986 prices* | 64.4| 53.9| 46.7| 41.2| 37.8| 37.3| 35.0| 37.0| 37.9| 44.7| 45.9| 50.1| 54.6| 62.8| 68.2| 73.5 |
| % real increase | -13.4| -16.3| -13.4| -11.8| -8.3| -1.3| -6.2| 5.7| 2.4| 17.9| 2.7| 9.2| 9.0| 15.0| 8.6| 7.8| 14.1 |

expenditures that much flexibility could be gained from mass. Whereas a virtual raid on the West German R & D budget would at most produce 500 million to a billion dollars, US accounts were so much larger that savings in individual categories could go long ways if priority improvements were to be made for forces in Europe.

Thirdly, the structure of the American planning process allowed a considerably larger degree of secretarial control and priority setting. This made it possible for OSD to issue defense guidance to the services in such a way as to insure that a high-priority program such as the LTDP would have to be dealt with in service planning. Since OSD had another opportunity to review service plans after the submission of program proposals, there were several layers of controls allowing the secretary to steer the planning process.

**Constraints.** The US faced problems of prioritizing at a different scale. Not only did priorities have to be set between weapons systems, services, etc., but because of the global responsibilities of the US, there was also a priority conflict in resource allocation for different theaters. Vietnam is a prime example for this, and its effects on the budget situation during the 1970s have been referred to above.

From a political point of view, the greater budgetary and planning flexibility of the US caused considerable headaches in European countries not used to these kinds of frequent changes and fluctuations. Often American suggestions to reprogram expenditures, increase budgets or change priorities simply did not reflect an appreciation of the budgetary realities in Europe, both in terms of process and resource levels. Since the West Germans felt that there was essentially no redundancy in their procurement program, for example, they concluded there also was no room for "savings."

The consistency of US policy was further undermined by congressional decisions. Since the US Congress had considerably more influence and decision power than European parliaments, the Congress could change individual line items and has frequently done so. As the
data presented above has suggested, except for in a few exceptions, there was a tendency to cut budgets. Amendments and special legal provisions attached to US budget laws also often constrain the administration politically. In the context of the LTDP, the Carter administration sought to lift certain "Buy-American" provisions, but faced substantial opposition.

Conclusions. Because of the dominant role of the US in NATO planning, US planners did not face the same problems as allied planners with regard to the adjustment of national plans to NATO requirements. The US was often able to inject national planning standards into NATO. This made it considerably easier for the US to fulfill goals, especially if in the process of defining program force goals, initial US proposals were reduced in scope.

There are examples for cases, however, where DoD could not document implementation of force goals. The Carter administration, for example, had increased the requirements for Prepositioned Oversized Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) as part of its contribution to the LTDP. As announced by DoD in 1978, the US was to have forward-deployed an additional three division sets by 1982. Yet because of cuts imposed by Congress, the goal had to be deferred to the mid-1980s.

Because of serious methodological problems, time and data constraints, no aggregate analysis of the impact of budgetary trends on US implementation of NATO requirements can be provided in this study. Yet circumstantial evidence and structural analysis reasons suggest that the US had fewer problems conforming to NATO requirements, not least because it has more power than other allies in defining them itself.

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Whereas AD70, and to a lesser degree Basic Issues, were motivated by budgetary constraints imposed by the Vietnam build-down, the LTDP was an effort to shift the concentration in DcD budgeting to European contingencies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 led to the rechanneling of resources to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and led the US to encourage its European allies to fill resulting gaps in capabilities in Europe.

Similar to the situation in the West German MoD, the American secretary of defense had to make sure that his sense of priorities were reflected in the military plans and budgets. Yet a comparison of the ability of the two offices to influence decision-making showed that the secretary of defense had many more instruments and opportunities to steer the planning process than his West German counterpart. Analytically, he was presented with more programming alternatives. Institutionally, he was able to gain the support of the President with regard to budget totals even against the opposition of OMB. Bureaucratically, the civilian leadership, even the President, was more involved in the planning process and, therefore, was more conscious of the conventional/nuclear planning alternatives and their budgetary implications.

A wide-spread discussion of planning alternatives and their military and budgetary implications was also insured throughout the role Congress played in decision-making on the budget. Although US planning suffered from the tedious, decentralized and sometimes chaotic process on Capitol Hill, the level of debate generally profited from the pressure coming from Congress. Without that congressional pressure, it is hardly conceivable that the various administrations would have pushed so hard to get larger European contributions. The scrutiny of theater nuclear policy and the emphasis on improving conventional forces were an important factor in launching the three initiatives discussed here.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

US defense policy, like that of the FRG, was guided by a number of important foreign policy considerations. Because of the geographical position of the US, foreign policy considerations played perhaps an even more important role. Defense policy was understood not only functionally as a means to insure the physical integrity and survival of the nation, but also as an important instrument of diplomacy. Unlike the FRG, the United States was not limited in its military programming by external constraints on its force structure.

The significance of the changes in the relationship between the requirement for physical security and foreign policy considerations can only be fully understood if contrasted to the pre-war period. In the 1920s and 1930s, the US was lacking a global orientation, or the perception of a threat. The post-Wilsonian disenchantment with the use of force led to an isolationist retreat and the reliance on the country's mobilization potential in the case of attack. The nation's forces were designed only for the defense of the homeland, not for intervention; and due to the lack of funds the ground force structure remained rudimentary. During that time, the US Navy had to give up Alfred Thayer Mahan's dream of US naval supremacy as the US moved to agree to a freeze on capital ship production in the Washington Treaties of 1922 -- a trend which was reinforced in 1930 when the US joined the London Naval Treaty, which put limits on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. By the end of the 1940s, in contrast, both internal and

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external conditions had changed. The Red Army had advanced into Central Europe. American public and elite opinion had grown suspicious of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, and was not willing to trust, yet again, in the merits of the isolationist approach. With the adoption of NSC-68, the strategy of containment had become the major force driving American force structure planning. Perhaps still more important in this context, was that the perception of the "fortress America" had decline as a viable concept. There was no reason to believe that the Soviet Union did not have the capability of developing, like the US, the atom bomb and the long-range bombers to deliver them. Soviet action in Germany and Eastern Europe suggested that the Soviets, in an expansionary drive, seized targets of opportunity and that active -- and if needed military -- resistance was required. The realization of an external threat to the survivability of the nation, and the emerging internal support to contain communism toward the late 1940s and early 1950s led to a major change in strategy from an approach relying on mobilization, to one relying on deterrence. This military force became a political instrument.

This globalization of US interests also significantly changed the purpose of the existence of the military establishment, and was the cause for major organizational changes. Gradually, as the Soviet Union developed its strategic nuclear delivery means, the emphasis in planning changed from total war to limited war. Expanded interests brought with

them an expansion of the post-war size of the establishment, a worldwide system of bases and an increased need for planning, advice, and implementation. As conflict between the Soviet Union and the US became less likely, the focus shifted to a concentration of the protection of superpower influence in other areas.

At the center of US foreign policy after World War II stood the establishment of alliances, regional security arrangements, and bases around the globe whose goal it was to contain the expansion of communist power. This concentration on the military was supplemented by a network of arrangements for economic and technical assistance on the assumption that economic progress would favor national independence and resistance against external political pressure.

This phase of bloc building came to a symbolic climax on the Eastern side with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, however, made the dangers of the confrontation between the US and the USSR obvious. A phase of reduced tensions began with agreements to establish a Hot Line between Washington and Moscow, end atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and to begin the first grain sales by the US. Selective coexistence did not prevent the United States form a vigorous military intervention in Vietnam where Moscow and Peking were believed to encourage and support the North Vietnamese aggression. When Richard Nixon came to office in 1969, he began a diplomatic offensive toward the communist world leading to the American opening toward the People's Republic of China and to the first strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT I) in 1972.

Increases in Soviet military power made it necessary for the US to try to coordinate American and Allied detente policies during the 1970s: Only a coherent and joint western policy would allow the carrot-and-stick approach inherent in the American concept of detente. The growing independence of Europe, especially of the FRG, and differences in political interests and vulnerabilities made this a difficult task, however.
The US and Europe were also divided by differences in conviction regarding the utility of armed forces for diplomatic purposes. Philosophically, the realist school of international relations dominated policy-making in the post-war period. Military force and strategic doctrine were seen as instruments to "translate power into policy."\(^{683}\) Toward this end, the use of force was considered a central element in exerting influence. To quote Kissinger:

In a society of "sovereign" states, a power can in the last resort vindicate its interpretation of justice or defend its "vital interests" only by the willingness to employ force. [...] A renunciation of force, by eliminating the penalty for intransigence, will therefore place the international order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible member.\(^{684}\)

The two World Wars provided policy-makers with an experience of being able to employ force successfully toward just purposes. Experiences with limited interventions (e.g. Lebanon 1958, Dominican Republic 1961) aimed at achieving political objectives were also positive, even though their price, political and material, may have been high, and their success short-lived.\(^{685}\)


\(^{684}\) Ibid., p. 4/5.

\(^{685}\) After studying 180 cases of US intervention and conducting ten detailed case studies, Blechman and Kaplan come to the conclusion that "[t]he weight of evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that discrete uses of armed forces are often an effective way of achieving near-term foreign policy objectives. The aggregate analyses showed clearly that, when the United States engaged in these political-military activities, the outcomes of the situations at which the activity was directed were most often favorable from the perspective of US decision-makers -- at least in the short term." Op. cit., p. 517. US intervention in Vietnam was excluded because "US armed forces were used in these conflicts primarily as a martial instrument -- that is, to wage war. [...] The symbolic value of the military force, the effect of its use on the perceptions and expectations of decision-makers, was relatively unimportant." Ibid., p. 14.
In terms of political culture, the use of force thus had positive connotations for US policy-makers since the concept was associated with positive experiences. Their German counterparts, in contrast, had no such heritage. There, the military had historically been the instrument of a repressive state (Prussia), independent of control (under Bismarck), or accomplices of a dictator (Hitler). Military force had always been used for questionable purposes, mainly to conquer for economic or nationalistic reasons. In no instance of German history was military force used toward a positive and, retrospectively, justifiable end. The deligitimation of the use of force, except for defensive purposes, and the threat of total destruction were the main reasons for the exclusive West German emphasis on deterrence. Except as an insurance against political blackmail, force had no direct utility in foreign policy.

The physical security of the nation was only one major aspect of US national interest. Defense policy was also determined by the intention to apply military force toward the enhancement of political objectives. The establishment of alliances were key elements to support US aims of containing the expansion of communism. When relations between the US, the Soviet Union and China began to improve toward the late 1960s, an explicit linkage was established between progress in the development of these relationships and defense planning. The most visible change in US strategy was the shift in planning from 2 1/2 to 1 1/2 wars associated with the improvement of relations with the PRC, which resulted in the formal dropping of one major contingency.

The Concept of Detente and Conventional Defense Planning

Detente, as conceived by President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, was primarily intended to reduce the risk of nuclear war, yet there were other important goals. In the broadest sense, detente was to "reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence." Detente was to moderate and control conflict with the
Soviet Union, in sum, it was to "manage the emergence of Soviet power." The method of managing the emergence of Soviet power was to tie the Soviet Union into a network of relationships with the West. The US sought a careful balance by inducing the Soviets into agreements combined with conditions of restraint that were to increase interdependence and control of Soviet behavior.

He [Kissinger] sought to induce the Soviet leaders to enter into mutually advantageous ties involving increasing interdependence, to build the Soviet stake in maintaining cooperative relationships and in eschewing confrontations that would imperil or disrupt them.

The creation of conditions under which the Soviets would be convinced of loss if they did not cooperate with the US and its allies was the main feature of the American concept. In order to be credible, the relaxation of tension and promotion of detente in one area had to be linked to certain requirements of restraint in others. A clear code of conduct needed to be established that could either be accepted or forced upon the Soviet Union by the US. The calculation also assumed a correct analysis of Soviet interests and constraints, and the ability of the US to control the process, i.e. within the Executive Branch, Congress, public opinion, but also relative to allies.

As previous parts of this study have made clear, the build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear power was a major factor that prompted the US government to emphasize conventional force improvements. However, from a foreign policy perspective, it was also necessary to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that its continued military improvement did not remain unanswered by the US and its allies, and that it could not simply force

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667 Ibid.
668 Ibid., pp. 31 ff.
strategic choices upon NATO. If NATO wanted to preserve flexibility in its strategy, conventional forces had to be improved so as to avoid being forced into nuclear escalation early on.

A strong conventional posture was also needed to make NATO's conventional arms control policy credible. In the early 1970s, it was all too clear that the proposal to negotiate an agreement in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) served the purpose of putting pressure on American and European proponents of unilateral force reductions. By engaging Warsaw Pact countries in such talks, the argument could be made that the West should not make unilateral reductions in advance.\textsuperscript{689} In order to make MBFR attractive to the Soviets and their allies, a strong NATO conventional posture was required.

American and allied force improvements were considered by Washington as an instrument for raising the material and political costs for the Soviet Union if it did not follow the explicit or implicit American code of behavior under conditions of detente. In the strategic nuclear field, research and development programs initiated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974 were to serve as hedges and inducement for the Soviets not to exploit the asymmetries in the SALT I agreement.\textsuperscript{690} These programs would provide procurement options for the US toward the late 1970s or early 1980s if the Soviets chose not to show restraint in their strategic nuclear build-up.\textsuperscript{691}

\textsuperscript{689}This argument was used by President Nixon to fend off the various Mansfield amendments. See the section on force reductions in the previous chapter and Chapter IV for details.

\textsuperscript{690}The US was allowed a lower number of land-based strategic nuclear delivery vehicles because of its advantages in MIRV technology. Schlesinger warned that Soviet advances in this technology could -- combined with the higher limit on land-based launchers -- result in serious imbalances in that force category in the mid to long-term.

\textsuperscript{691}These new projects included requests for funds for a new, large fixed-based ICBM (later known as the MX) which would be launched from Minuteman silos, and a new mobile missile launched either from the ground or air. Although the US considered the deployment of operational mobile ICBMs as inconsistent with the objectives of the Interim Agreement (SALT I), a Soviet deployment of the SS-X-16 was not excluded as a possibility. Thus, R & D for an American missile of this type was
Increases in US and allied defense budgets were also intended by the US as measures to increase the Soviet costs for the invasion of Afghanistan. As the budget section indicated, the US accelerated various procurement programs and embarked on increased long-term growth in the US budget. These increases were as much prompted by Afghanistan as by growing concerns since the mid-1970s that the Soviets were exploiting detente for a one-sided military build-up. The Carter administration had, in fact, faced opposition in Congress about its military budget, not because it was too high, but because it was too low. In 1980, riding on the wave of disenchantment and resentment over the invasion of Afghanistan, the Congress appropriated more funds than were requested by the administration.

**Allied Cooperation**

The American conception of detente required a similar approach by the allies in order to be successful. For geographic, political and historical reasons, the interests of the West Germans were quite different from those of the United States. Whereas the US tried to rally support for a tougher attitude toward the Soviets, the West Germans tried to distinguish between the global superpower relationship

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**Footnotes:**

and detente in Europe. An important point of contention in the foreign policy concepts of two countries was the fact that the FRG, unlike the US, did not wish to engage in the game of inducements and punishments of the Soviet Union for which the US was rallying support. These considerations were major reasons why the FRG did not agree to review burden sharing arrangements after Afghanistan, and to take on a larger effort to compensate for American diversions of resources. Differences were not limited to military matters. The West German-European/American rifts over the participation in the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and the West German/Soviet gas pipeline deal of 1982 are only two examples how differences in goals and interpretation resulted in alliance disputes.

Conclusions. Foreign policy considerations had a more immediate impact on US military planning than in West Germany. Military forces were considered in Washington as an integral part of foreign policy, and as a means to influence Soviet behavior. This view of military capabilities as an instrument of foreign policy became especially important in the phase of increased US-Soviet interaction, as the Americans tried to use military programs, economic measures, and human exchanges etc., as a tool to affect Soviet international behavior and to "manage the emergence of Soviet power." West Germany differed on the objectives and methods to pursue detente with the Soviet Union, and thus was reluctant to fully support Washington in its approach to detente and military planning.

West Germany felt more constrained than the US in its ability to use defense policy as an instrument of foreign policy. It felt too dependent on a continued and unaltered US presence in Europe to compensate for a diversion of American resources to other areas of the world. Nevertheless, the FRG did not want to jeopardize its efforts toward improved relations with the Soviet Union and the GDR by making itself the direct instrument of US foreign policy and its oscillations. Philosophically, the US and the FRG were divided by history and experience over the utility of force in foreign policy.
CONCLUSIONS

This study set out to explain why, despite apparent agreement on the need to strengthen the conventional element of the NATO Triad, the alliance seemed to have difficulties to achieve that goal.

The three initiatives examined here were distinct attempts to address the question of what the appropriate balance between conventional and nuclear forces should be in the alliance. The mere existence of special initiatives suggested that the normal procedures and outputs of NATO defence planning were considered insufficient to produce an adequate force posture. Despite improvements in NATO defense capabilities, the alliance has not been able to resolve the differences in national interpretations of NATO strategy and the military threat that would be necessary for an agreement on specific force improvement measures. The scope and success of conventional force improvements also suffered from differences in the political and military importance of such improvements, as well as from resource constraints.

Differences over the Planning Bases

A major problem for alliance military planning was the absence of clearly defined military objectives for NATO's intended posture in wartime. The main reason for this was the continuation of differences over strategy. Although a new strategic guidance had been adopted in 1967 with Military Committee Document MC 14/3, this guidance was too vague to be used for sizing conventional forces. The American interpretation of MC 14/3, on balance, put a considerably higher emphasis on the ability to handle Warsaw Pact conventional attacks without recourse to nuclear escalation. Depending on the way the US presented its rationale, the West Germans were concerned, and sometimes openly opposed, to the US strategy interpretation on both philosophical and practical grounds.
With respect to strategic philosophy, Bonn did not believe that conventional forces had the same deterring effect on the Soviet Union as nuclear forces. As a result, West German policy-makers emphasized the importance of first use, and a close connection between the conventional and nuclear element by stressing that *deliberate escalation* had to remain part of NATO's strategy. Moreover, they were concerned that a "conventional" deterrent would be construed as NATO's unwillingness to risk the threats of nuclear escalation, and would thus undermine the credibility of the American strategic nuclear umbrella extended over Europe.

On practical grounds, the West Germans were concerned that an emphasis on conventional deterrence raised the prospect of extended conventional warfighting on (West) German soil. Because of the lack of depth of the FRG, and the fact that a considerable portion of the population and industry was located close the bloc border, the German fear was that the land would be completely destroyed in the course of such a battle. The hope was that the threat inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons, and the determination to use them, if necessary, would make the aggressor more aware of his risks, and thus contribute to early war termination.

MC 14/3 and subsequent guidelines on the initial and follow-on use of nuclear weapons had not resolved the question of exactly when and in what numbers NATO would initiate nuclear use. For conventional force planners this left open a difficult question: On what basis should they plan their forces? If it was not clear how long they should sustain a conventional attack, neither the size of the overall force structure, nor the size of the stockpile, necessary reserves, etc. could be decided upon.

To various degrees, AD70, Basic Issues and the LTDP raised these issues. In the case of AD70 and the LTDP they were raised more implicitly. The AD70 exercise was intended by OSD to adapt NATO military requirements to MC 14/3 by raising conventional requirements.
Because of the apparent differences between the West Germans and the US on this issue, as well as the pressure against US troop deployments exerted by Senator Mansfield, it was concluded that strategy considerations and their implications should be dealt with in a low-profile manner to avoid long and divisive debates. It was important for the Nixon administration to be able to show that the Europeans were making a special initiative to ease the congressional pressure both on the defense budget and troop deployments in Europe. As a result, the strategic debate was quickly pushed in the background, and the focus of AD70 became the drawing up of a list of deficiencies in NATO capabilities. The final AD70 study, passed in December 1970, made only general reference to the need to strengthen conventional forces. No major new force requirements came out of the study.

Three years later, Secretary Schlesinger started on an offensive to convince the European allies that a conventional deterrent was both desirable and feasible. Schlesinger pointed at the growth in the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal and argued that the emerging strategic stalemate increased the role of conventional forces. He emphasized that a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact was well within reach, if NATO improved its stockpiles, bought more anti-tank weapons, and built protective shelter for aircraft. The West German defense minister was appreciative of the strategic logic of Schlesinger's argument but strongly disagreed with the secretary's point that a conventional deterrent was possible. Leber earlier also came to Schlesinger's conclusion that strategic nuclear parity increased the role of conventional forces. But this qualitative judgement was not translated into proposals for major changes in planning. Moreover, the strategic debate was overshadowed by debates over the threat assessment and European fears that the US was in the process of reducing its nuclear commitment to Europe by concluding the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War which was widely (but falsely) seen as a prohibiting the first use of nuclears. All in all the strategic debate seemed muddled by too many issues and suspicions. If judged by changes in West German
planning, it would seem that Leber's acquiescence to the Schlesinger logic was largely rhetorical. At the staff level, in any case, the MoD worked to shoot down Schlesinger's threat assessment, to put at least a dent into his argument.

Aware of the potential divisiveness of American attempts to convince the allies of the merits of American strategic logic, Robert Komer and others in the Carter administration chose not to make strategic considerations a main point in arguing for the launch of the LTDP. Instead, the Carter administration built on the rhetorical commitment by the allies, built up over the 1970s, to stronger conventional forces, and proposed a very specific action program. Strategic debates could not be avoided altogether, however, because of bureaucratic mismanagement in the context of PRM-10. In addition, the decision to modernize NATO theater nuclear forces in the absence of an arms control agreement led the strategy debate to focus on the nuclear component in the early 1980s.

Each of these approaches to dealing with the strategy issue had its specific advantages and disadvantages. Avoiding debates over strategy within the context of AD70 prevented the opening of the wounds left from the debates in the 1960s. It also helped produce a quick study that could be used by the Nixon administration vis-a-vis Congress in an effort to avoid troop reductions. Yet avoiding the issue did not help efforts to strengthen conventional forces in a major way. Schlesinger's bringing the strategy issue into the open, similar to McNamara's efforts in the 1960s, had the potential of instigating force strengthening. Despite a much more measured and conciliatory approach, the allies were unable and unwilling for economic, political and strategic reasons to accept the implications of Schlesinger's logic, however. Because his emphasis on the feasibility of a conventional deterrent, ample material for disagreement was offered, and helped to sidetrack the larger issue. In the case of the LTDP, the careful attempt to avoid divisiveness could not be maintained after the PRM-10 and neutron bomb incidents. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had brought progress in arms control into
jeopardy and accentuated the fragility of the so-called dual track decision.

These experiences lead to the conclusion that no matter whether strategy issues are avoided or confronted openly, transatlantic debates over the purpose and objectives of NATO strategy are unavoidable.

The history of the strategic debate has shown that it was partially caused by misunderstandings, as in mid-1973 when European leaders were concerned that the US had negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union that prohibited the first use of nuclear weapons. Misunderstandings and disinformation were also the reason for the confusion surrounding the PRM-10 and later INF. To a certain extent, these misunderstandings seemed intentional by the Europeans; their purpose was to provoke a strong denial and reaffirmation of policies from Washington. However, the lack of understanding of the ins and outs of Washington politics was a problem for the West Germans. The proper reading of American policy was made more difficult because the US government lacked a unified voice on military matters, and interests and attitudes on the issues shifted. The Nixon administration had attempted to pursue a more gentle approach on strategy matters than the preceding democratic administrations, and then Robert McNamara, and James Schlesinger, in particular, decided to become somewhat more direct again.

To a considerable degree, the debates were driven by differences in strategic interests. OSD pushed with varying degrees of intensity, the point that NATO needed to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons, and this hit a sensitive point in the FRG. With the emergence of the strategic nuclear balance, decreased reliance became desirable in principle to policy-makers and officers in West Germany. Yet this gave more prominence to the question of what should be done to redress the perceived conventional disequilibrium. Since Bonn did not feel flexible enough to redress the situation because of its more conservative assumptions regarding the threat, the debate shifted to feasibility issues. Despite these subtle changes, the element of deliberate escalation remained an integral part in German strategic thought. Any
effort, such as Schlesinger's, that was believed to question this concept, raised concerns that too strong a conventional focus would undermine the effectiveness of Flexible Response.

It remains an open question whether the West German defense community fully understood the American motivation for stronger conventional forces. The main American motivation was not to formally do away with first use and deliberate escalation to the nuclear level. From a US perspective, it was preferable to plan conventional forces sufficiently strong to defend against a wide range of possible attacks. If, because of false estimates or miscalculation, NATO's conventional force could not halt an attack, recourse to nuclear weapons would always remain as an option. From this perspective, nuclear weapons provided insurance against NATO's own miscalculations regarding its conventional capabilities. It is unclear whether the West Germans ever fully supported the idea of creating a defense posture on the same set of assumptions. It seems that deliberate escalation to nuclear weapons was considered an integral part of any major scenario.

**The Feasibility Question**

A critical factor in the discussions over the objectives of NATO strategy and the forces to implement this strategy was the size of the threat. As in the 1960s, Europeans -- foremost the West Germans and the British, but also the NATO bureaucracy -- estimated the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to be considerably more severe than the American secretary of defense. Because of this more conservative European estimate, the West Germans were much more skeptical about the feasibility of a posture and strategy with conventional emphasis. To achieve a more robust conventional posture, in their calculation, required considerably more forces. These NATO did not have and, in the view of the West Germans, NATO would not be able to muster them because of perceived economic constraints. These constraints implied that nuclear forces continued to play a crucial role in compensating for conventional weaknesses.
OSD Challenges of Threat Assessments. The US occasionally challenged this. Melvin Laird did so when pointing out in December 1970, that a few billion dollars invested in certain key areas would result in significant improvements. The strongest plea since McNamara's Athens speech, however, was made by James Schlesinger in 1973. Schlesinger had intended to portray as mistaken the view that NATO was not able to muster a strong conventional defense because of the "overwhelming" Pact superiority. With the exception of Georg Leber (privately), then West German defense minister, the argument was lost in the ensuing debate over the threat assessment on which, from the European perspective, most of Schlesinger's logic appeared to hinge. The designer of the LTDP, Robert Komer, hoped to be able to avoid a discussion on this issue and on strategy, "and just do" what was "necessary." The credibility of the US rhetorical emphasis on the feasibility of conventional defense was badly shaken by the PRM-10 leak, however. The incident solidified views in Bonn that Washington used threat assessments to manipulate its allies into doing more by arguing that marginal improvements would result in big overall gains, while behind the scenes Washington did not believe so itself.

If the US pursued the line that NATO needed to do more because of negative developments in the conventional balance, it ran into the danger of spurring defeatist moods. If on the other hand, it argued that the conventional threat was manageable, there was no need for special efforts, this would lead to a separate, "decoupled" conventional deterrent. Thus, the US was in a catch-22 situation. Increased efforts would be considered either hopeless because of the overwhelming threat, or they would be considered unnecessary because the balance was not so bad after all. This leads to the conclusion that threat analyses had a limited utility in documenting the need for conventional improvements. They were used by the US as well as by the Europeans to underpin their positions on strategy and force plans. Because so many different views existed in the US government, even in the defense community alone, such
analyses were controversial both domestically and in transatlantic debates.

**Analytical Problems.** The US had far more, and more detailed intelligence, than any other NATO member, yet it was highly selective in making that information available. The US also made a considerably larger effort to analyze intelligence and to examine the implications for US/NATO capabilities. Neither NATO nor the FRG had net assessment capabilities, and for the most part NATO intelligence assessments relied on static measurements. Another cause for the differing results of threat estimates was the wide difference in analysis techniques. Even though after much debate inputs into computerized war games were eventually standardized, the West German and the British still came up with results very different from PA & E studies. The analytical techniques reflected national operational experiences during war time as well as intricacies of the command structure, scenario types and the state of the operational art. There were major differences between analysts on what constituted appropriate force ratio thresholds for cutting off war games; and important differences existed with respect to the allocation and effect of close air support.

**Lack of Criteria to Size NATO's Force Structure.** The combination of these factors -- differences and vagueness in strategic principles and threat assessments -- were no adequate base for NATO planning. Questions remained on what strategic objectives conventional and nuclear forces should be planned, what the scenarios were against which NATO's capabilities should be sized, and how long conventional forces were expected to sustain.

The absence of clear guidance on what basis and toward what objective NATO forces needed to be planned caused a major problem. To begin with, NATO did not succeed in having a centralized, joint planning system that could optimize the efforts of all members. The assumptions on which national forces were planned differed too much, and, for this and other reasons, countries guarded against the possibility that NATO would develop requirements for them that differed from their national
ones. Secondly, NATO planners neither had the planning authority, nor
the necessary set of inputs to develop a posture. It remained unclear
how early, and in what numbers, nuclears would be used; their
assumptions about the most likely and demanding scenarios differed from
US analyses.

Implications for Planning Process

The lack of clarity and the differences in the foundations of force
planning led to delays in the planning process, the avoidance of
potential areas of conflict, and major difficulties in devising an
effective planning process.

Time Delays. The lack of clarity in the planning assumptions
severely muddled the process of devising conventional defense
improvement initiatives and planning in general. It took several months
in the cases of AD70 and LTDP to formulate what the agenda was. When
American pressure for immediate action was high, such as with Basic
Issues or the LTDP, delaying was not an efficient tactic. In those
cases, the emphasis shifted to either blocking certain stipulations
entirely from entering the agenda, or to agreeing to the objectives
without intentions of fulfilling them fully. Because of fears that new
requirements not contained in national plans might embarass countries
politically if they could not be fulfilled, the FRG worked with other
European NATO members to keep the scope of concrete proposals as narrow
as possible. As a result, tedious discussions took place on the terms
of references for study groups tasked with drawing up lists of
deficiencies and recommendations. These study groups were frequently
used as a barrier to quick action because they provided an opportunity
to delay activities by calling for further information etc.

Lack of Specificity. Another instrument to avoid new requirements
was to keep lists of deficiencies broad and/or vague. This made it
either difficult to formulate concrete remedial measures or it allowed
countries to point at ongoing programs which addressed the problem
"already".
Avoiding Strict Implementation Reports. In order to avoid criticism if follow through on agreed-upon measures was insufficient, the West Germans and other countries also resisted firm implementation control procedures. The argument was that existing reporting in the DPQ would be sufficient, or that staffs were already overwhelmed with work. These arguments had some validity. But the LTDP is perhaps the best example demonstrating that they also served the more important purpose of avoiding solid documentation of national planning performance. If it could be shown beyond doubt that countries did not implement agreed-upon force goals, this would have given the United States political leverage to ask for additional efforts. Lagging implementation by European allies was also of potential danger in US congressional deliberations. Every American administration was under pressure over its troop deployments in Europe. The continuation of these deployments critically hinged on making it appear to Congress that the Europeans were carrying their "fair" share. Continuous failure to live up to agreed plans and programs would, therefore, be politically damaging.

Planning Cycle vs. Off-Line Initiatives. The three cases analyzed in this study differed with regard to the organizational approach taken to define their scope and follow-up procedures. AD70 was devised and implemented by relying largely on existing planning procedures. The creation of the EWG and special reports were the only exception to that. This meant that lists of deficiencies and possible remedies were drawn up by NATO bodies normally charged with such planning matters. Basic Issues was introduced to NATO planning from the outside, i.e. OSD. The measures proposed were intended to override the existing plans and were to be given highest priority. The approach chosen was to select a very small set of measures that would have a significant and immediate effect on combat capabilities. Implementation was reported in special documents submitted to the ministers. In the case of the LTDP, the scope of the program was also developed outside (at RAND and later in OSD) and injected in NATO by the US. Here, the idea was to create an
organization for the LTDP that would circumvent the inertia of NATO's bureaucracy as much as possible by setting up special NATO groups, backed up by shadow groups in the capitals. Measures were to be clearly defined and, if possible, quantifiable to allow detailed assessments of the degree of implementation. The US emphasized that the LTDP measures should take priorities over force goals and be treated separately from other ongoing activities.

A comparison of AD70 and the LTDP in terms of organizational effectiveness shows that it took almost an entire year longer to produce concrete measures in the AD70 process than for the LTDP. Because the development of these measures were part of the two-year planning cycle, specific force goals were only adopted in 1973, two years after the initiation of the program. By then, much of the political energy that had brought AD70 to life originally had dissipated. Advance preparation in Washington for the LTDP was more extensive, and the designation of Komor as special advisor on NATO affairs insured higher speed for program definition. The organizational set-up for LTDP (Task Forces, Program Monitors, EWG) gave the program higher visibility and increased the speed of the program definition process. But the emphasis on special reports and implementation checks by the US backfired bureaucratically because countries either did not have the staff to prepare all necessary documents, or were not willing to do so for political reasons.

The incorporation of AD70 measures into the regular force goal process was less controversial politically, but it decreased the effectiveness of the program because there were more opportunities for nations to water down the measures and to delay action. Because of the higher political and organizational visibility, this was not possible in the case of the LTDP. There was major resistance to LTDP, however, from European nations and the NATO bureaucracy, which were not enthusiastic about undertaking another "special" initiative outside the regular planning cycle later on.
The focus on a very limited set of high priority areas in the Basic Issues initiative had the organizational advantage of compactness. The timing of its introduction, however, just after AD70 measures had been adopted into the force goals, caused conflicts of priority and overwhelmed the capacity of the West Germans to adapt to yet another special initiative.

Organizational Problems

NATO planning also suffered from a number of organizational problems both at the national and NATO level. To a certain extent the organizational arrangements were the result of the differences between the nations on the objectives of the alliance's military plans and forces. The Nuclear Planning Group is the prime example of this. On the other hand, however, the particular organizational arrangements also had a direct impact on planning.

Lack of Flexibility in FRG Planning. Most of the detailed proposals for conventional defense improvement came from the US. Because the measures were often already incorporated into US plans, they therefore required less reprogramming and/or additional resources for the Americans than they did for most European nations. The FRG often found it difficult for structural reasons to include new requirements into its plans on short notice. Because of mid-range fiscal guidance (5 years) and a generally longer-range perspective in planning, West German military planners built on the expectation of stability. Personnel was largely fixed, the budget ceiling was rather firm over several years, and as a result resources were planned out, leaving very little or no room for maneuver. In addition, NATO's planning horizon was only six years, and did thus not capture the outyears of German planning. Planning priorities were thus set in the FRG years before NATO plans would reach that year.
Budgetary flexibility was also very limited. For the minister to ask for increases in the budget ceiling was a politically costly undertaking and use was only made of it under severe pressure to accommodate high visibility projects such as AWACS, or the Tornado. Since cuts in personnel expenditures could only be made in the mid-term by trading off slots for professional soldiers and conscripts, reordering of priorities was very limited and funds could not easily be freed to accommodate new or different programs.

Moreover, no office existed in the MoD in Bonn that had both all necessary planning information and the authority to rearrange plans on short notice. The General Inspector was too weak to do that. He lacked staff with sufficient analytical capability, as well as the information which was held by the services. The minister and the planning staff were too remote from the planning process to implement such changes themselves. At the cabinet level, no effective organizational set-up existed to deal with details of military planning either, making it harder for the minister to argue his case for extraordinary (i.e. previously unplanned) expenditures.

Organizational Advantages of US. In the US, in contrast, the organizational structures for flexibility existed in OSD. The secretary and his office were prime players in the PPB process. With PA & E, OSD had analytical support to review and, if necessary, change service requests. Unlike the office of the minister of defense, the planning process was steered de facto by OSD. In addition, DoD could outweigh OMB on budget issues through its control of information, weight in the cabinet, and often SECDEF's proximity to the President. The NSC structure insured the involvement of the top civilian echelon of the executive in politico-military matters. NATO matters also were given more attention in the legislature. Because of a different self-understanding, and staff and committee structure, the Congress

693This differed in degree by administration.
scrutinized executive policy much more aggressively than the West German Bundestag. This brought about a more transparent debate and a clearer formulation of the relationship between budgetary decisions and conventional-nuclear trade-offs, as the series of hearings and amendments requiring reports, imposing troop ceilings etc. document.

**Limited Role of NATO Planning.** As an organization, NATO had major problems in handling alliance planning. The main reason for this was that it did not have any independent authority to set requirements for countries. The fulfillment of plans was ultimately dependent on the willingness of nations to agree to plans and make funds available. The portion of commonly funded projects was small in comparison to overall expenditures, and thus gave NATO little de facto planning authority. AD70 was a notable exception to a generally reactive attitude in the bureaucracy. It was the only major planning initiative started by NATO bodies, in this case SACEUR, the Secretary General and SACLANT. The other programs were designed upon American initiative and introduced through NATO and bilateral channels. LTDP was an explicit attempt to circumvent regular procedures. Komor's view was that any initiative that was incorporated into the regular planning cycle would be watered down beyond recognition. As this study has shown, many of the criticisms were found to be valid.

The main reason for the limitation in NATO's own planning capacity was the fact that countries looked at the force planning process less as a planning activity than as a political bargaining process. This political bargaining process balanced off differing perceptions of the alliance's needs with what nations were prepared to make available, and was thus the result of the differences on strategy and threat. What was considered necessary militarily was less the product of a determination of the requirements by NATO, than through *national* planning. NATO plans were much more the result of national plans than vice versa. Because NATO agreed on forces in a *bargaining* process rather than through *planning*, there was considerable objection to creating a planning procedure that would allow the clear definition of objectives and
measures, implementation schedules and reporting formats. Whereas political bargaining helped to preserve national prerogatives, true NATO planning, including the authority for NATO to allocate money, would have diminished national control.

**Organizational Problems at the NATO Level.** NATO planning was further hindered by a number of other organizational problems. All three initiatives showed that it was very difficult to get the military authorities to agree on priorities or to change them. One of the causes of this problem was the independence of the MNCs, and the lack of a forum in which the plans of the commanders could be effectively coordinated. The MC and its military staff were not able to do so because they lacked the mandate and the instruments to insure compliance. The civilian International Staff's capacity was also constrained by a lack in staff, information and authority. These staffs were limited in their capacity to undertake cost-benefit analyses of programs and to examine areas of potential trade-offs.

These organizational limitations were very much on the minds of those who favored special initiatives such as AD70, Basic Issues, and the LTDP. Officials interviewed estimated that military requirements formulated by the MNCs were reduced by 25% in the process of formulating force goals. Even the force goals, however, were not fully implemented. A 1981 congressional study pointed out that "in 1975, nations fully achieved only about half of the established force goals, partially addressed about a third, and did not implement the remainder." See The Implementation of the LTDP, p. 12.
Bureaucratic Problems

Washington did not speak with a single voice on issues of strategy and threat. This made it difficult for Europeans to understand what US policy was. President Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was known to be skeptical about the feasibility of a stalwart conventional posture. OSD, on the other hand, thought this was possible within reasonable financial constrains. The military services added to the problem with their requirement studies, which were even more conservative than Kissinger's views.

In Bonn, there was no conventional defense constituency that could make itself heard in the political and strategy debate. The minister did not have sources of analytic advice independent of the services, and this made him the captive of his own bureaucracy. There was no tradition, unlike in the US, of challenging established truths analytically, and very limited use was made of external study capacities.

The constant flow of frequently unorchestrated proposals from various corners of the American administration made it difficult for Bonn to react. Staffs were very small and every new initiative meant additional reports and work.

Bureaucratically it was also very difficult to get 14 nations (all of NATO except for France) to agree on one particular set of plans. Each nation had its own peculiarities in terms of military priorities, technological strengths and weaknesses, as well as political and economic considerations. To mold all these into one coherent program and set of plans was necessarily a very complicated task.

On many issues involving the understanding of American initiatives, expert knowledge was lacking in the FRG. Staff officers in the MoD were on their job too short a time to develop long-term memories, and the government made very little use of outside expertise. For the taste of most in Bonn, US policies simply changed too frequently, and apparently without well thought-out rationales. US policy also could seem
uncoordinated between the various government agencies involved, and it was hard for any officer new on the job to find out what exactly went on. The change of plans that accompanied American initiative in each case also required complicated renegotiations of the internal balance between the military services on the distribution of efforts. In any case, the American initiatives certainly meant more work.

Political Factors

On NATO matters, the US was not as politically constrained domestically as the FRG was. Although the Nixon administration was under severe pressure to reduce deployments overseas toward the end of the Vietnam war, the debates about US military policy were direct and not as burdened by history. The US traditionally had a leadership role in NATO, and military matters could be and were discussed freely in congressional debates. Military planning was not as dominated by political self-restraints because the US was less sensitive to foreign criticism and accusations of militarism than the FRG was. Military matters were also more widely discussed in the US, partly because of a more open bureaucratic and political culture, and partly because civilians had very little reservations about working on military matters. In the FRG, very little knowledge existed in the public about NATO policies and plans, and the management of the transatlantic security relationship traditionally was the concern of a small and stable group of people. The German experience of total war cast a shadow over all thinking about military affairs, and deeply affected positions on deterrence. There was little difference in the minds of many Germans between the effects that a limited nuclear war in Europe and those of a protracted conventional engagement would have for the FRG. Because Germany had no recent experience with limited war, deterrence of total war figured most prominently on German minds, and to that end, nuclear deterrence was considered the most effective.
Differences in Political Systems. West German defense policy was very stable over the years in terms of outputs. To a large degree this stability was the result of continuity in the political leadership. All of the initiatives examined here fall into the period in which an SPD/FDP coalition governed in Bonn. Chancellorship changed once (in 1974) and the MoD was run by only three ministers from 1969-1982. Moreover, because of differences in the civil service systems, there was very little change in the bureaucracy during that period. During the same time period, the US had four different Presidents and six secretaries of defense, with frequent changes among the top political appointees in the national security area. Because of differences in the constitutional systems, public officials in the US were more sensitive to changes in public opinion which, in turn, had more confidence in military security than the German public. West German public opinion emphasized the need for political solutions to the security problem.

Resource Considerations. Resource constraints were one of the most important factors limiting the scope of conventional defense improvements. A conclusion that has emerged at several points in this study is that the German defense budget was not set after lengthy examinations of the requirements of defense and the risks associated with various budgets, but mainly by fiscal considerations and continuity. Military planning was done on the basis of strict fiscal guidance, and the military, for historical and political reasons, felt constrained to settle with this guidance. Unlike in the US, the German military was not an active and outspoken lobbyist for increased defense outlays. To do so would have damaged their credibility and perceptions of political reliability. At the same time, no civilian political constituency of sufficient size and importance existed in the public that argued for increased outlays. In the perception of the political leadership, this made it difficult to significantly increase budgets. This, again, contrasts with the situation in the US where, by the late 1970s, a majority of the population favored increased defense spending, which was subsequently delivered by the Reagan administration.
The perceived constraints on raising the budget in West Germany stand in contrast to data suggesting that the West German parliament did not reflect public opinion favoring decreased spending. For most of the 1970s, the Bundestag has increased the defense budget requests of the executive, even though increases have been modest. During the 1970s, there was very little controversy between government and opposition parties on defense outlays, and budgets were mostly approved unanimously with few changes. In the absence of a constituency in parliament to actually lower the defense budget, it appears that there was political room for higher executive requests. The situation was quite different in the US, where during the 1970s the Congress cut DoD budget authority between 2.3 and 7.6%. Only in 1980 and 1981, did Congress actually increase the defense budget beyond the executive requests.

Flexibility to adjust budgets in the US was greater. There were no firm ceilings on manpower levels, allowing a greater range of funding trade-offs between investment and operating expenditures. The fact that the US budget was more than ten times larger than the West German defense budget provided many more opportunities to reshuffle funds, stretch programs and reallocate monies from one theater to another. At the same time this greater flexibility put expenditures for NATO purposes in competition with other expenditures, such as those for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or strategic programs.

In the budgetary debate in the US, a greater range of alternatives were reviewed and their implications on strategy and risks analyzed on a regular basis. All new administrations from Nixon to Reagan undertook comprehensive studies of their strategic options and budgetary implications. These analyses included hypothetical options such as trip-wire strategies that would have allowed the withdrawal of substantial numbers of US troops because of higher reliance on nuclear capabilities on the nuclear end of the scale. On the conventional side, these studies repeatedly analyzed the requirements for a stalwart conventional
defense. These studies made clear the connections between defense expenditures, force levels, and risks, and thus allowed for a more transparent set of decisions on force levels and strategies.

Foreign Policy Factors. The politics of conventional defense improvements was closely intertwined with foreign policy considerations in both countries. Throughout the 1970s, the FRG was careful to keep a relatively low profile on defense matters both within the alliance as well as vis-a-vis its neighbors to the East and West. Lobbying to increase its own forces would have raised fears of German military strength in France and other western countries; and would have been potentially damaging in West Germany's effort to build bridges to Warsaw Pact countries in the early 1970s. Because of the fragility of the FRG's relations with East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, West Germany could not pursue a high profile military policy since this would have raise suspicions about Bonn's intentions. Thus a careful balance needed to be struck between efforts to improve relations with the East and maintaining strong defenses. This was even more necessary as the deteriorating relationship between the US and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1970s caused dissatisfaction and rising opposition in the SPD to what was perceived as an increasingly confrontationist US. Defense policies that appeared like being part of the overall US strategy were therefore met with increasing skepticism.

To maintain the legitimacy of the military effort domestically, and for foreign policy reasons, it was therefore necessary to complement military policy with an active arms control policy. The German notion of Sicherheitspolitik (security policy) incorporated this dual approach. From the West German perspective, it was equally important that NATO provide for adequate defense as well as seek political conciliation with the Warsaw Pact. This dual approach was laid down in the Harmel Report of 1968, and served as a convenient reference for Bonn to remind Washington that NATO was more than a military alliance.
For Washington foreign policy concerns were different. The direct competition on military grounds with the Soviet Union was an explicit element of the global bloc competition. Europe made an important contribution to the global military balance and had the potential to relieve the US of responsibilities, allowing the reallocation of resources to other theaters, such as South West Asia. Both because of domestic opposition to large troop deployments overseas and these foreign policy considerations, fair burden-sharing was an important issue for the US government. As the debate about "out-of-area" contingencies in the context of the Post-Afghanistan measures demonstrated, Europeans, and West Germans in particular, were not at ease with this strategy conceived in these global dimensions: conflicts outside of Europe potentially threatened to undermine the progress made in relations with the East by drawing Europe directly into US-Soviet haggling. Measures taken by NATO were thus mostly symbolic and of very little military consequence. The connection became apparent when President Carter decided to delay ratification of the SALT II treaty and imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in the context of a set of other sanctions. This harsher attitude taken by Washington contributed significantly to rising European public opposition against NATO nuclear policies in the early 1980s, and to weariness toward US military policy.

Conventional defense improvements had an important West-West dimension too. The magnitude of the European defense effort had a direct effect on the risks of escalation the US would face in case of war. Since the US was not able to create a stalwart conventional posture in Europe itself for political and financial reasons, the US faced a trade-off between nuclear risk vs. increased allied responsibilities. The flip side of this concern, on the West German side, was that the American security guarantee would be somehow diminished if the conventional component gained a greater role. A careful balance had to be defined: the Europeans feared that by assuming too many of the responsibilities for the NATO defense they would provide
the US with a pretext for withdrawing troops or the US nuclear guarantee. Bonn thus faced a dilemma between greater European efforts, which could provide a pretext for American withdrawal on the one hand and insufficient efforts which also might lead to withdrawals on the other.

Outcome and Outlook

This study has made the attempt to identify how well NATO performed in its planning and sought to explain why NATO seemed unable to achieve a significant improvement in its conventional posture despite repeated attempts. The study comes to the conclusion that both the desirability, the feasibility, and specific extent of such conventional improvements was disputed, and could be resolved only through political compromise. At issue for NATO planning was the question, how much more effort should be made NATO-wide to decrease NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. No clear standards existed, however, to decide this problem.

As a result, new attempts were made to redefine the balance between the military risks and resource commitments. The definition of this balance involved a complicated political bargain. Because of changing administrations and different transatlantic agendas, insufficient resource commitments and the lack of political will, follow-up faded away and gave rise to new proposals. This was not a repetitious circle without any progress, however. As has been pointed out, implementation of the measures was at least partial in every case. There was also some progress on the nature of the Atlantic debate.

Improvements in Capabilities. Modernization programs proceeded at modest pace, and overall personnel levels remained stable in the FRG and actually increased in the US after the mid-seventies. The US undertook to increase the number of prepositioned divisional equipment from 2 1/2 to 6 divisions and redeployed an active brigade to the NORTHAG area in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{695} The FRG adopted a new force structure in the early

\textsuperscript{695}The prepositioned materiel is so-called POMCUS equipment. POMCUS stands for Prepositioned Oversized Materiel Configured in Unit Sets. This program was to be completed by 1981, but slipped for budgetary reasons.
1980s that increased the number of brigades from 33 to 36, adding firepower and mobility to the force. The FRG also increased the number of its NATO committed forces by earmarking two additional Home Defense Brigades, and giving four more the status of "Other Forces for NATO." Moreover, a Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) agreement was concluded with the US according to which the FRG will earmark more than 90,000 soldiers to facilitate the reception of US reinforcements. This will have a major effect on the speed with which such reinforcement can be brought into battle. Other changes included the enlargement of the operating area of the West German Navy in the North Sea, and plans for the use of civil aircraft for military lift purposes.

**Strategy.** In the early 1970s, the West Germans were far less outspoken on the desirability and need to strengthen conventional forces they were by 1984. A slow evolution in strategic thinking can be observed in West Germany that now concedes the need for stronger conventional forces. General Altenburg, General Inspector of the Bundeswehr until September 1986, pointed out repeatedly that NATO needed the ability to withstand a conventional attack for longer than a few days. In this context, ammunition accounts have received significantly more money, for example. At least in the public debate it is still unclear, however, what the exact sizing criteria are for conventional forces, and whether they have in fact changed. No major departures are apparent; the idea of deliberate nuclear escalation in conventional scenarios still figures prominently in the official West German position, and the maintenance of the status quo is portrayed as a success by the government in Bonn.

**Threat Assessments.** Regarding the question of the feasibility of a conventional deterrent, rhetorical and analytical levels need to be distinguished. The Reagan administration significantly changed the rhetoric on the military balance. The Soviets were portrayed as superior in most categories of the military balance, and high emphasis was put on American as opposed to NATO preparedness to counter a Warsaw Pact attack with any means available, including nuclear first use. The
boldness with which Washington made its statements backfired politically in Western Europe, and a role reversal took place. The West German and other European governments now tried to lower Washington's profile on the nuclear issue, reassuring the public that NATO did not have a policy of automatic and rapid escalation.

At the analytical level, the fronts calmed down after the MCSSG experience and Harold Brown and Robert Komer's decision to avoid a debate. But the fronts seemed to have moved relatively little on the question of what the "correct" balance assessment is. Bonn continues to emphasize the superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces and presumably for domestic political reasons, OSD analysts appear not to push the issue in NATO.

Planning Process. Several changes in the planning process at the NATO level have emerged as a result of the 1970s experience. First, a gradual move toward longer-term planning has taken place from the mid-1970s onwards. This was in response to the experience that national planning was well ahead of NATO plans and had set priorities before they could be discussed NATO-wide. Since the early 1980s, NATO military authorities have been working on Long-term Planning Guidelines (LTPGs) that are to provide long-term guidance for national planners. To facilitate the setting of priorities and trade-offs between planning areas and also to provide long-term guidance, the West German government proposed in 1984 to develop a Conceptual Military Framework (CMF). This was an attempt to put the multitude of planning initiatives such as SACEUR's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), and Secretary Weinberger's Emerging Technology (ET) initiative into a coherent planning context.

Changes have also been made in the format of the DPQ to facilitate implementation control. Upon US initiative, the DPQ is now more functionally oriented and places higher emphasis on output, i.e. capabilities, rather than static measures.

Higher emphasis is now also placed on cooperative R & D as well as procurement programs to achieve greater economies of scale. Amendments have been passed in the US that require parallel testing of US and
European defense systems, when possible to support a more balanced armaments trade between the US and Europe.

**Organizational Changes.** Some modest staff increases were made at the NATO level as a result of the review by Secretary General Luns in the LTDP context. In West Germany, Minister Woerner undertook to strengthen the position of the General Inspector and ministerial participation in planning capacity, but these changes were not major and do not seem to have had the desired effects. The minister is somewhat more involved in planning, but the services still seem to dominate the process.

Secretary Weinberger has not retained the position of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs in DoD's organizational structure; the position, which during the Carter years was held by Robert Komor. Much of the planning responsibility has also been moved back to the military services. It is as yet unclear how these organizational arrangements will work under conditions of budgetary stringency.

**Political Changes.** After two decades of public disregard of defense issues, NATO's double track decision of 1979 gave rise to sometimes violent opposition to NATO nuclear policy. The debate over this issue has led to a breakdown of the long-standing consensus between the parties on defense issues. Whereas the CDU/CSU/FDP government parties continue to support the deployment of INF systems, the SPD has reversed its original position and has come out in opposition to INF deployments. Both government and opposition favor a strengthening of conventional forces, however. Yet, the budgetary projections for defense expenditures in the late 1980s show a decline share of the federal budget earmarked for defense. Similarly, the SPD has at times favored a freeze in defense expenditures. At the same time, it has recently adopted a policy platform that calls for a restructuring of the Bundeswehr and other NATO forces toward a "structurally non-aggressive posture" and gradual denuclearization of Europe. However, it is unclear how significant increases or a restructuring of conventional capabilities are to be achieved with stagnant budgets. The FRG will
also face a deficit in conscript manpower after 1988, and is thus constrained by demographic factors as well. In sum, it seems that the rhetorical commitment to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons that was made in the context of the INF debates, will not be met in practice.

After congressional action on the FY 1986 budget, it became clear in the US that the "Reagan build-up" had come to an end and that DoD was not exempted from making a contribution toward the reduction of the budget deficit. The administration's policies in the first years focused very much on the nuclear balance. Because of preoccupations with nuclear issues, the Weinberger Pentagon to date has failed to leave a major imprint on NATO's conventional planning activities. The Reagan administration did not capitalize on the European emphasis on conventional forces in the context of the INF debates. Instead, the administration was eager to reconfirm its commitment to nuclear first use to the point that it alienated the European public and its leaders. With no, or very slow, defense budget growth in the future, the administration will increasingly face a competition between its strategic offensive and defense programs, as well as Navy programs, on the one hand, and Army conventional improvements, on the other. At the same time, a Democratic Senate and the democratic control of both House and Senate Armed Services Committees will increase the pressure on the administration to demonstrate that the Europeans are in fact serious about the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI).

**Foreign Policy Aspects.** There are also a number of other factors that will ensure that the conventional-nuclear balance in NATO's posture will remain an issue. First, with increasing indications that the US and the Soviet Union might conclude an arms control agreement on INF, Bonn became concerned that a possible zero solution would again raise the issue of coupling between central strategic systems and theater nuclear forces. The FRG, therefore, stressed that any agreement on INF needed also to address the problem of the short-range nuclear weapons and the conventional imbalance. Secondly, Bonn has made public its concerns about new conventional options that emerge from the
increasing accuracy of short-range missiles and the possibility of arming these missiles conventionally.

Both concerns raise difficult questions regarding US negotiating concepts and necessary NATO responses to Soviet efforts. Addressing these problems will require a clear understanding of the nature of NATO strategy and objectives, and agreement on the military threat and its implications. Experience shows that this will be hard to achieve.
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