Generational Change in Japanese Nationalism

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ABSTRACT

A study of the historical development, traditional characteristics, and postwar generational changes of Japanese nationalism was conducted.

1.) The study reviewed 14 theoretical models of nationalism drawn from five disciplines and set them in a theoretical framework. It synthesized the three common definitional elements of emotive, rational, and ideological nationalism, and presented a definition of nationalism.

2.) The study analysed the developmental process and specific characteristics of Japanese nationalism through interpretive analysis of historical data from prehistory to 1986. And it defined a conceptual model of Japanese nationalism as a Core of nationalistic sentiment and two Layers of explicit nationalist ideologies.

3.) The study analysed generational changes in postwar Japanese nationalism through interviews and quantitative cohort analysis of Japanese survey data on nationalistic attitudes. It tested Mannheim's experiential-generation model against Eisenstadt's maturation model to determine which model had greater explanatory power in accounting for the generational response patterns.

4.) The study found that experiential effects significantly outweighed maturation effects, but that period effects were also pronounced. The Layers of prewar ideological nationalism were found to be weakening while the Core values were found to be gaining public opinion support.

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PRE FACE

On Monday, September 22, 1986, Americans were shocked to hear Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's statement that "Japan is a considerably intelligent society . . . on the average it is far more so than America."\(^1\) And they were particularly offended by the racial reasoning he gave: "(the intelligence level of) America is still very low on the average because there are a considerable number of blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and other people like them."\(^2\)

The Reagan Administration rushed to announce on Wednesday that "we take the Government of Japan's clarification at face value," almost before Japan's Washington Embassy had released its patent account that Nakasone had merely been "quoted out of context."\(^3\) But Nakasone's own "clarification" -- "What I meant was that the United States has achieved great results including the Apollo program and SDI, but there are things difficult for its reach because it is a multiracial society. I intended to say that (progress in all areas) is easier in Japan's monoracial society"\(^4\) merely clarified the grounds for negative reactions among Americans.
Nakasone did not issue an apology to the American people until the following Saturday, six days after his original statement, and even then only after emergency late-night consultations with Foreign Minister Kuranari Tadashi and top Foreign Ministry staffers upon their return from a harrowing reconnaissance mission to America. Their Japan Airlines return flight had been held up for three hours at New York's John F. Kennedy airport by a bomb threat.

Nakasone never officially retracted his statement. In fact, in the following weeks he frequently reiterated his assertion that Japan is a monoracial nation. He went so far as to rebuke one of his own cabinet ministers for stating that members of the Ainu race are Japanese of a different racial origin, even though this is accepted as a fact by physical anthropologists throughout the world. Months later he even stated that, "Persons of unclear nationality such as mixed-bloods cannot be respected." 

Foreign correspondents stationed in Japan were quick to point out that Americans should not have been surprised by these statements. Chung Kyong Mo, editor of a magazine dealing with Korean problems, said the statements expressed "the deep-rooted thinking that exists among the leaders in Japan." William Wetherall of the Asahi Shimbun opined that "Prime Minister Nakasone advocates a resuscitation of the ethnic morality which he believes is unique to Japan as a putatively monoethnic state . . . Yamatoism (sic.) which
spiritually fueled the Japanese Empire that educated many of Japan's present-day leaders, who are having nostalgic fits about the victor's version of the recent past."9 Peter McGill of the London Observer wrote that "For Nakasone and many of his generation (the nationalist impetus) has been recovery and revenge from the humiliation heaped upon Japan by the American victors, and what he calls the need to 'settle postwar accounts.'"10

Does the Japanese equating of their racial unity with uniqueness and superiority date only from the prewar Japanese Empire? Does it affect only the political leadership? Does "ethnic nationalism" only motivate Japanese of Nakasone's prewar generation who were schooled in it so strictly? These journalists' analyses make major assertions about Japanese nationalism and Japanese political generations that fall short of accounting for the facts. And the issue they purport to explain is not only this single diplomatic incident between Japan and the United States but a crucial variable in Japan's relations with all the nations of the world. This is the issue of Generational Change in Japanese Nationalism.

Three and a half centuries before Nakasone's statement, the famous Japanese scholar Yamaga Soko wrote: "In this realm, from the Age of the Gods to the present day, the blood-line of Amaterasu (the Sun Goddess), the true lineage, has never varied."11 A little less than two centuries before Nakasone's statement, Japan's ranking
Shinto Priest and an Imperial Advisor, Hirata Atsutane, wrote: "There is so immense a difference between Japan and all the other countries of the world as to defy comparison . . . we, down to the most humble man and woman are descendants of the Gods." One hundred sixty-one years before Nakasone's statement, Aizawa Yasushi, the scholarly formulator of Japan's first explicit nationalist ideology, wrote: "Our Divine Land is situated at the top of the earth. Thus, although it is not an extensive land spatially, it reigns over all quarters of the world, for it has never once changed its dynasty or its form of sovereignty. . . . As for the land amidst the seas which the Western barbarians call America, it occupies the hindmost region of the earth; thus its people are stupid and simple, incapable of doing things."

Nakasone cited only the unified Japanese race -- not Japan's unified geography, religion, and imperial line as well, as do these Japanese sages -- but their conclusions bear disturbing similarities. And the continuity of this attitude of Japanese uniqueness-cum-superiority stretches back into Japanese history far beyond the Japanese Empire and far beyond these feudal-era sages to the very roots of the Japanese nation: the tribal myths of the Yamato people.

What, then, of the second assumption in these journalists' commentaries: that such strongly nationalistic attitudes are characteristic of Nakasone's older generation who were indoctrinated in totalitarian prewar Japan -- not of the younger generations of
cosmopolitan, Westernized Japanese who were educated in democratic postwar Japan. A Japanese government survey in 1983 found that Japanese who agreed with the statement "Compared with other peoples (tribes, races) the Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics," amounted to 62.0 percent of the older generation, 76.5 percent of the middle-aged generation, and 69.0 percent of the younger generation. The ancient belief in Japanese superiority is predominant among each generation of Japanese living today, and the younger generations' feelings of racial/ethnic superiority are even stronger than those of Nakasone's wartime generation!

Postwar Japan has achieved over 40 years of peaceful, democratic government, and many Japanese are feeling that they have legitimate reason to express pride in their nation, as citizens of other countries do. Japan has become an economic superpower with the power to inflict and receive real harm in trade confrontations, too. The historic coincidence of this era of rising Japanese nationalism with an era of rising trade conflict bears an ominous parallel to the past: these crucial factors are not unlike those of the early 1930's which set the course towards World War Two. Japan and the West can pass the test which they failed to such disastrous consequence once before. But the process of fully integrating this vigorous and distinctive nation as a true partner of the community of developed nations and the Western alliance is entering a critical adjustment phase that is certain to try both sides' patience and prudence.
Mutual myths and illusions have served to buffer political opinion in each of these nations against the frictions of their postwar relationship -- the myth that Japan can gain full superpower status while still practicing import substitution, export dumping, and protection of "traditional" market sectors like a developing nation; the myth that the United States can remain the economic paragon of the world by blaming foreigners for its second-class industries and fiscal irresponsibilities. But these myths have outlived their usefulness and are becoming points of contention -- mere illusions in themselves, they are becoming bastions of nationalistic defensiveness involved in real bilateral differences of views. Economic integration between Japan and the United States has developed to the point where U.S. deficits are currently financed on recycled Japanese trade profits, and where each penny's shift in the yen/dollar rate can be measured in Japan's Gross Domestic Product. Diplomatically and militarily, too, the U.S. -- Japan alliance has grown stronger. The intensifying conflicts in this relationship are thus not symptoms of its failure but side-effects of its very success. They are the frictions of two supertankers mooring together in heavy seas -- ever more menacing as the vessels draw nearer, grinding before they achieve greater stability. The heightened tension of present relations is produced by the converging currents of economic integration and the divergent political directions of both ships of state.
The course towards greater stability in bilateral relations requires primarily the closer coordination of economic policies, but the achievement of this objective is seriously impeded by the lingering myths in both countries. Nakasone's oft-stated belief in the race-based superiority of Japan over America is a powerful example; it is an ancient and cherished Japanese nationalistic myth that has once again damaged Japan's international credibility. Nakasone's statements also raise doubts about one of President Ronald Reagan's favorite illusions: that America's future gains from a rearmed Japan are worth its long-term trade hemorrhage. These two leaders have cultivated a mutual illusion throughout their parallel tenures -- that "close friendship" at the banquet table is an acceptable substitute for tangible progress at the negotiating table and on the supermarket shelves -- and this illusion has delayed progress towards effectively harmonizing their nations' mutual economic benefits and costs. "Ron and Yasu" will soon go their respective ways, but the United States and Japan are moving into closer quarters, and if these countries are to coordinate their policies more successfully than in the past, their leaders and citizens will need understandings of both their own nation and their partner that depend less on myth and more on reality. The goal of this study is to help define a more objective understanding through research and analysis of a crucial force in Japan's evolving international relations: generational changes in Japanese nationalism.
As any reader familiar with Japan will soon see, the basic historiography of this study is not its original contribution. While a variety of sources were reviewed and used, the gist could have come straight from Edwin Reischauer. A similar point will become obvious in our discussion of theories of nationalism. There we review 14 different models of nationalism (from the disciplines of intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and political science), analyse three elements common to different clusters of the models (emotive nationalism, rational nationalism, and ideological nationalism), and offer a concise, synthesized definition of what we mean by the term:

Nationalism is a set of sentiments and an ideology
linking the individual rewards of identity
and advancement to the growth of a nation-state.

And the gist of this definition could have come straight from Karl Deutsch.

We rely on Deutsch so heavily in this dissertation because his theory of nationalism is by far the most powerful in explaining in universal theoretical terms the development and self-destruction of traditional Japanese nationalism that is recounted so insightfully by Reischauer. Our focus on the psycho-social power of myths in national development we likewise owe to Lucian W. Pye.
This study is deeply indebted to Lincoln P. Bloomfield for its fundamental structure framing the question of Japanese nationalism in an international theoretical context, and it profited repeatedly from Richard J. Samuels' expertise in political generations and Japan studies. In addition to acknowledging our debts to these professors at M.I.T. and Harvard, we would like to thank the Japanese professors who helped our research here in Tokyo: Dr. Furukawa Ichiro of the University of Tokyo Department of Economics Marketing Section Econometrics Group who gave considerable help, Professor Sato Seizaburo of the University of Tokyo Political Science Department, Professors Yokota Yozo and Saito Makoto of the International Christian University Political Science Department, and Professor Mizuno Kenji of the Japan National Universities' Joint Facilities Institute of Statistical Mathematics. While we cannot name them here, we would also like to thank the members of our interview panel who were willing to answer some probing questions and share some deeply personal accounts of their formative experiences -- several of which were obviously extremely painful to recall. We give thanks to all of these people for their generous help in framing and filling in our limited understanding of nationalism and nation-building in general and Japan in particular. Our belief is that this fusion of their thoughts casts a revealing new light on Japanese nationalism.
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION

In 1867, Japan was a diplomatically and culturally isolated, technologically and economically backward, politically and militarily weak feudal state -- poised for a nationalist modernizing revolution. Seventy years later, in 1937, the Japanese Empire, which that nationalism built, had absorbed Western diplomatic, cultural, and governmental forms, had reached the technological and economic levels of a European nation, and had become a major military power -- poised for national suicide in the fires of the Second World War. Fifty years later still, in 1987, Japan's technology and economy set world standards; its government is a leading democracy; its military is the seventh most powerful in the world; and diplomatically and culturally, Japan has passed the stage of passive reception and is poised to reach out to the world in a positive, contributory role. Neither this nation's unparalleled success nor its utter devastation could have occurred without the force of Japanese nationalism.
Why was Japan the first non-Western nation to modernize? How could a land with no asset but overpopulation mobilize, industrialize, and democratize so quickly? How could one country, in just 50 years, first provoke its near-total destruction, then rebuild itself into a leading nation of the world? Was Japan's Wartime fanaticism, aggression, and brutality merely an aberration on its predestined course to becoming a humane democracy? Or are there deeper commonalities between this nation's militarist and industrial exporter phases? How has Japanese nationalism changed amidst the dramatic social and economic transformations of the postwar era? And is there the potential that an extreme form of nationalism might spread in Japan once again? Most importantly, is Japan's national development a unique case that can only be understood in its own cultural context; or is it just one more exotic example of the universal phenomenon of nationalism? Are there still deeper commonalities between Japanese nationalism and the other nationalisms of the world? Finally, what does the analysis of Japanese nationalism imply for the practice of Japanese politics and for the practice of foreign policies directed towards Japan? Each of these questions are parts of the puzzle of Japanese nationalism: What makes it so powerful? And this is the puzzle that this study attempts to piece together.

The case of the Japanese nation's development seems so unusual in many ways that it can easily be cast as a mystery. And, in fact, many mysterious theories -- such as Japanese racial superiority due
to direct descent from the gods -- have been periodically advanced by Japanese leaders from the tribal myths of Japan's prehistory up through the propaganda of World War Two. Postwar Japanese scholars have shunned these tainted theories in favor of economic-based models of national development -- both Marxist and Keynesian. But the continuing appeal of mysterious explanations for Japan's success is demonstrated by the cult of "Japanese uniqueness," which forms an entire genre of Japanese popular literature and has recently been diffused in the West through sundry popular "Theories of Japanese Management."

This thesis uses the social scientific method to attempt to demystify this subject and to piece together the underlying puzzle of just what has made Japanese nationalism work. Throughout its lengthy analysis, this study keeps the simple two-part structure spelled out in its title: Generational Change in Japanese Nationalism. Its first half defines a conceptual model of traditional Japanese nationalism as it developed from prehistory to the end of World War Two. And its second half tests if, how, and on what points there are generational changes in postwar Japanese nationalism.

This study has two principal research objectives:

1.) to analyse the specific characteristics of Japanese nationalism through interpretive analysis of historical data, from an international theoretical perspective, and
2.) to analyse postwar changes in Japanese nationalism through interviews and quantitative analysis of Japanese survey data on nationalistic attitudes.

The study's two parts and six chapters follow these objectives.

Part One

1.) sets out research questions and hypotheses,
2.) reviews and synthesizes existing theories of nationalism,
3.) conducts interpretive analysis of the historical development of Japanese nationalism, and defines a conceptual model of Japanese nationalism.

Part Two

4.) reviews existing theories of political generations and methods of quantitative cohort analysis, and conducts in-depth interviews of a panel of Japanese respondents from different generations and political orientations,
5.) conducts quantitative analysis of the most reliable postwar survey data on Japanese nationalist attitudes, empirically tests and confirms its research hypotheses, presents empirical evidence supporting its conceptual model of Japanese nationalism, and finally,
6.) answers its research questions and concludes with a synthetic overview of what has made Japanese nationalism work, and how these factors might be changing.

Two sets of research questions further guide the study's inquiry.
Part One

1.) Can Japanese nationalism be analysed according to Western theories of nationalism?

Logically, an objective analysis must have a reference point which is independent from its subject of observation. If Japanese nationalism can only be measured with a uniquely Japanese yard-stick, there is little wonder if its measurements are always found unique, for this is circular reasoning. Yet the independent reference point must also be applicable to the subject of observation. Chapter Two of this study reviews and summarizes 14 conceptual models of nationalism drawn from the five academic disciplines of intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and political science, and lays them out in a simple theoretical framework. Chapter Three then informally tests these Western-based models of nationalism against the non-Western case of Japanese nationalism, with the null hypothesis that Western theories of nationalism cannot be applied to Japan. The frequency and variety and extreme closeness of the many parallels this analysis discovers -- between the historical formative processes and behavioral manifestations of Japanese nationalism, on one hand, and those posited by the Western theoretical models of nationalism, on the other hand -- make a strong *prima facie* case in support of what social scientists would normally suspect. The numerous commonalities between the Japanese and Western cases of nationalism tend to suggest
that nationalism is a universal social and political phenomenon with fundamental patterns that greatly outweigh the case-by-case variations. This study demonstrates that Western theories of nationalism can be applied to Japan, with fruitful results.

1.a.) If Western theories of nationalism are applicable to Japan, then on what specific points is Japanese nationalism similar to and different from the historically observed cases of Western nationalism?

1.b.) Can a cohesive and at least partially substantiable conceptual model of Japanese nationalism be defined in terms of the Western theoretical literature?

1.c.) If so, what form does this conceptual model take?

The investigation of these three subsidiary research questions comprise much of Part One in this thesis, but their answers can be summarized in a few pages. This thesis' conceptual model of Japanese nationalism views it in the image of a pearl -- as a phenomenon formed in layers around a core. Japanese nationalism from its earliest origins to the end of the Second World War developed through a cumulative process in which the Core values of the Japanese people's ancient nationalistic sentiments were redefined and carried on in two modern Layers of explicit nationalist ideologies.
The "core" of Japanese nationalism did not consist of the elements so often cited in place of it -- the unity and uniqueness of the Japanese geography, race, language, religion, government, and culture. Simple factual criticism reveals these elements to be not nearly as unique to Japan or causal of nationalism as most Japanese and Japanologists tend to believe; they are, rather, merely facilitative elements of national unity. The far more important "core" value of Japanese nationalism is found to be the myth of Japanese uniqueness these elements are still overwhelmingly cited to support. This myth of Japanese uniqueness expresses the common and continuing psychological need felt by the dominant inhabitants of these islands to assert their separateness from and superiority to each of the foreign peoples they have encountered throughout the ages. This Japanese collective will to find or make up reasons to be united and independent from foreign control is evidenced time and again from the divine-descent myths of the Yamato tribes up to the present day "Japaneseeness debate," and it was perhaps the fundamental associative force that bound the waves of multi-racial immigrants who reached Japan into a unified Japanese people and nation. Along with this motive there were two fundamental social and psychological traits of the Yamato-era Japanese people that strongly shaped their descendants' nationalistic sentiments: the stable paternalistic, hierarchical, social structure of the Japanese non-kin tribe (the uji heritage), and the flexible psychological perception pattern encouraged by philosophical dualism (the Zen heritage).
These core values of Japanese nationalism were reflected in the Ritsuryo-seido laws and regulations of the Nara and Heian governments (710 A.D. -- 1160 A.D.) but they lacked the popular incentives and intellectual condescension of a nationalist ideology.

Japan was fully unified as a state only in the Kamakura Period (1185 A.D. to 1333 A.D.), according to this study's definitions of peoples, states, and nations, which are largely derived from the work of Karl Deutsch. The core characteristics of Japanese nationalism developed into nationalistic sentiments during the seven ensuing centuries of feudal military rule, but Japanese nationalism at this stage was still a set of sentiments, not a clear nationalist ideology. It was generally aroused only among the elite and only during their occasional contacts with foreigners, while most people felt much stronger identification with their local feudal kuni (literally, "country") than with the state of Japan as a whole.

Discontent with the decay of Japanese feudalism, coupled with the increasing threat of the Western colonial powers, created a demand for a more vigorous form of post-feudal Japanese government by the 1850's. And the fusion of the reformist Confucian scholarship of Aizawa Yasushi of the Mito School with the wildly nativistic Shintoism of Hirata Atsutane provided the intellectual basis for Japan's first explicit nationalist ideology -- the Political Religion of the emperor/kokutai (national body) cult. This was the first layer of
conscious nationalist ideology formed over the ancient core values of traditional Japanese nationalism, and it inspired the Imperial Restoration of 1868. In terms of Carlton Hayes' typology of European nationalisms, it combined the fanatical, revolutionary mobilizing power of Jacobin nationalism with Traditional nationalism's emphasis on the symbols of national legitimacy: the emperor, the state religion, and the patriotic elite. The new nationalist elite dismantled the strong feudal barriers that had divided Japanese by class and fief and transformed the Japanese state into an integrated, modern nation. But without advanced means of propaganda the Meiji elite was unsuccessful in inculcating its nationalist Political Religion among the Japanese masses; it remained an elite ideology.

A backlash of nativistic discontent with the too rapid and too extensive Westernization of the early Meiji years, coupled with the continuing need to modernize along Western lines in order to avoid colonization, created a demand for a more balanced program of nation-building in the late 1880's. And the fusion of the Political Religion with a Modernizing Ideology provided the intellectual basis for Japan's second nationalist ideology. This doctrine of national modernization calling for "Our Spirit! Western Science!" was embodied in the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 and was used to indoctrinate the Japanese masses through compulsory public education until the end of World War Two. It, too, drew on and redefined elements of the core and preceding
layer of Japanese nationalism. The Modernizing Ideology of the Middle-Meiji era had clearly lost its Jacobin zeal. It was a conservative, paternalistic Traditional nationalism with elements of Liberal nationalism's emphasis on the common volk, and it was an explicit nationalist ideology of both elites and masses.

The Japanese were already a people and a nation before they experienced this first mass nationalistic ideology; and they were so suited for nationalism by the conditions facilitating their national unity (which undeniably existed to a very high degree) that nationalism took hold in Japan on an almost epidemic scale, and Japan achieved its incredibly rapid national modernization from the feudal ages to compulsory education, light industrialization, a parliament, modern military, and foreign colonies — all in less than 30 years. Nationalists of a progressive, outward-looking, democratic bent made considerable progress towards democratizing Japan from the 1880's to the 1920's. Nationalists of a traditional, inward-looking, authoritarian bent had always remained influential, and they advocated a more chauvinistic course through the economic, social, and political troubles that beset Japan from the middle of the 1920's. The balance of influence was tipped towards the chauvinistic side by the entry of a third force in Japanese politics — ultranationalistic agitators from among the masses of impoverished farmers and their brothers in the military who demanded access to benefits for all Japanese, at the expense of foreigners, through military means.
The fatal coincidence of the Great Depression and world-wide protectionism with this transition period of extreme vulnerability in Japan's developing economy and polity put greater stresses on its democratic government than the flawed institutions of the Meiji Constitution could bear, and democracy caved in to militarism despite its solid electoral victories. The Meiji Constitution was a Model-T chassis built on a rocket engine, and when mass ideological nationalism finally ignited in Japan, the government's braking and steering mechanisms were powerless to control it. This was an Integral nationalism, resembling fascism superficially, but all the more powerful for being grounded directly on the social and spiritual core of the Japanese tradition: the Japanese master race were Sons of Heaven; their emperor, God on Earth.

Part Two

2.) What parts of Traditional Japanese Nationalism remain alive among the postwar generations of Japanese?

This is the fundamental research question of Part Two. While the prewar era's lack of opinion surveys obliged reliance on interpretive analysis of historical data, the postwar era yields survey data that permits quantitative analysis. Thus, while Part One defines the conceptual qualities of Japanese nationalism, Part Two measures their quantitative changes, using numbers as well as words.
While many opinion surveys have been conducted in postwar Japan, only two surveys yield the longitudinal data-bases that are essential for rigorous measurements and tests of long-term changes in public opinion. Only the Japanese National Character survey (nihonjin no kokuminsei chosa) and the Structure of Modern Japanese Consciousness survey (gendai nihonjin no ishiki kozo chosa) have asked identically-worded questions to identically-selected samples of the Japanese population over many years. Part Two of this study takes advantage of these exceptional data bases not only to answer its substantive question of what points of Japanese nationalism have changed in the postwar era but to examine a major question of sociological and political theory in reference to the case of Japan.

2.a.) Are experientially-formed generations or simple maturation more powerful in explaining the postwar changes in Japanese nationalism?

The two major sociological models concerning generational changes in public opinion are Mannheim's experiential generation model, which holds that youthful socializing experience determines the unchanging lifelong attitudes of a political generation, and Eisenstadt's maturation model, which holds that age determines a biological generation's changing attitudes. While this question has been discussed in Japan -- the consensus being that maturation is more powerful than youthful experience in shaping a generation's attitudes -- this answer has never before been empirically tested
against Japanese longitudinal survey data. And empirical knowledge of which of these sociological mechanisms (formative experience or maturation) has more powerfully affected the postwar changes in Japanese nationalism would be of great value in any attempt to anticipate how Japanese nationalism might continue changing.

Chapter Four of this study reviews the theoretical literature on political generations. It reviews the methods of cohort analysis from Johnson and Niemi's operationalizations of maturation, generation, and period effects through the early non-quantitative attempts of Ike and Krauss to apply these tools to Japan. And it sets up a head-to-head challenge between these two contending theories in its general hypothesis that:

The experiential effect is more powerful than the maturation effect in accounting for the generational differences in postwar Japanese nationalism.

While there are several ways in which this hypothesis could be tested against an ideal data base, this study tests Mannheim's experiential model on its own terms, as a predictive model, using the following null hypothesis.

Even if different age-groups undergo different mass socializing experience in their youth,

No statistically significant differences between their long-term response patterns to survey questions on nationalism will occur.
Eisenstadt's maturation model assumes the near-opposite of Mannheim's experiential model—namely, that age determines generations' attitudes regardless of any differences in their youthful experiences. Thus, a confirmation of this null hypothesis would support the maturation model while its refutation would support the experiential model as the more powerful theoretical model in accounting for generational changes in Japanese nationalism.

2.b.) If experientially-formed generations exist in postwar Japan, what experiences formed them, and what age-groups constitute these generations?

There are two factors in the operational definition of Mannheim's "political generations," which underlies this null hypothesis. The first is the subjective manifestation of an intense socializing experience in the identities and perceptions of individual members of an entire age-group, and the second is the resulting objective manifestation of that formative experience in their lifelong attitudes towards issues such as nationalism. Establishing the independent variable of this null hypothesis thus requires consistent subjective evidence from the perceptions of individual members of the age-group in question that they experienced a similar formative experience. And it requires evidence from secondary sources that this formative experience was common to the entire generation. Chapter Four thus includes a summary of Japanese scholars' segmentations of
postwar periods and political generations as well as summaries of the predominant social and economic circumstances facing Japanese youth in these periods. Chapter Four then presents first-person accounts of the youthful experiences, processes of nationalistic attitude formation, and political maturations of a small, structured, interview panel of Japanese respondents, which was drawn from each of the hypothesized political generations.

The analysis in Chapter Four concludes that the predominant social, economic, and political conditions in three distinct periods of recent Japanese history meet its operational definition of mass socializing experiences. These formative experiences are, in diminishing order of salience:

1.) the cataclysm of ultranationalist indoctrination, the War, and total defeat and destruction, (from prewar to Occupation era),

2.) the surging hopes of the era of Japanese rapid economic growth, (the "miracle growth" decade of the 1960's),

3.) the luxury and indifference of the era of Japanese affluence, (economic security and ever-growing affluence from the 1970's to the present).

The facts that the reliable Japanese surveys are only conducted once every five years and that their data bases average the responses according to five-year cohorts oblige any study using this data to segment experiential generations using broad five-year units instead
of more precise one-year units. But this study segments three hypothetical generations whose formative experiences correspond quite closely to the time-frames of these three major formative experiences.

1.) The War Generation, born between 1909 and 1938, and aged 45 to 74 in 1983 (the time of the latest survey).


The interview data from the structured panel of respondents, which was selected according to these hypothetical generations, showed extremely strong agreement between members of each generation on the dominant formative experience of their youth, on their perception of common identity as members of a single generation formed by that experience, and (to a lesser extent) even on their segmentations and characterizations of the other generations. While this sample was too small to yield statistically significant findings, it was structured to cover the entire Japanese political spectrum from Leftists (Communist and Socialist Party supporters) through Centrists (Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party, and moderate Liberal Democratic Party members) to Rightists (conservative Liberal Democratic Party members). And its results showed strong commonalities in each generation's perceptions of their own and other generations' origins and identities, regardless of their differences in political views.
Chapter Four gives evidence demonstrating the independent variable of the null hypothesis: both a panel of interview respondents and a survey of secondary sources support the thesis that three mass socializing experiences occurred in postwar Japan.

Chapter Five then tests and refutes empirically the dependent variable of the null hypothesis by demonstrating in a quantitative cohort analysis the great preponderance of statistically significant differences between the long-term response patterns of these experientially-formed generations. In this analysis, 16 survey questions measuring attitudes that are explicitly linked with Japanese nationalism in historical evidence are selected. The survey data for each question is then retabulated according to the respondents' birth years and the survey years (not according to their current ages and the survey years as is found in the Japanese sources). This permits, for the first time, the tracking of specific generations' changing attitudes across the seven surveys (instead of "tracking" the changing attitudes of the entirely different generations who happen to fit, say, the same 40-to-45-year-old age-bracket in each of several survey years). Each of the 16 resulting data tables reveals two basic parameters: first, the percentage of each generation's population in each survey who agree with the attitude measured by the question (its "level" of "support" for that attitude), and, second, how this level of support has changed or remained unchanged over the years (its "trend"). A generation's trend of support for an attitude can be
rising, falling, constant, or fluctuating; and two or more generations' trends can be converging, diverging, or parallel.

Johnson and Niemi give operationalized patterns of the experiential, maturation, period, and hybrid effects of generational change in political attitudes, which are based on the converging, diverging, or parallel patterns revealed in plots of different generations' long-term survey response trends. This study tests the Japanese generations' patterns of attitude change on questions relating to nationalism against Johnson and Niemi's operationalized definitions in order to conclude which attitudes relating to Japanese nationalism show experiential, maturation, or period effects. But this study does not naively assume that any apparent trend or generational difference is statistically significant. Each link in its chain of evidence is rigorously tested.

The computer software package Statistical Analysis System (SAS) is used to calculate the mean and standard deviation of each generation's overall responses to a question (its "lifetime level of support" for that attitude). Then Student's T-test with p. = 0.025 is conducted to test the statistical significance of any differences in the generations' lifetime levels of support for that nationalistic attitude. Next, the long-term trend of each generation's support for an attitude is calculated on SAS by simple regression of the data sets consisting of the levels of each cohort comprising a generation which were
recorded in each survey (not generation averages). Extra statistical tests are conducted at this step to assure that the linear model is validly applicable to each of the generational data sets: F-test scores with \( p = 0.05 \) are required to conclude linearity of the data set and adjusted R-square tests are also conducted to determine the degree of variance in the data-set which is accounted for by the trend line. Regressions which do not meet these standards are rejected. But the \( X \)-parameters, standard errors, and sample sizes of the regressions which pass these tests are then tested against the regressions of the other generations' trends using Student's T-test with \( p = 0.025 \), in order to determine whether or not these generations' trends are or are not significantly different. These statistical tests reveal which of the apparently converging, diverging, or parallel patterns demonstrated by the three generations' trends are statistically significant at the high level of statistical confidence of \( p = 0.025 \).

The findings of this quantitative analysis reveal statistically significant differences between these generations' long-term response patterns (at T-test \( p = 0.025 \)) on 12 out of the 16 questions. There is thus extremely strong empirical evidence that this segmentation reveals clear experiential generations. The analysis in Chapter Five refutes the null hypothesis and confirms the study's general hypothesis that the experiential effect is more powerful than the maturation effect in accounting for the generational differences in postwar Japanese nationalism.
What substantive changes and underlying patterns of change in postwar Japanese nationalism are revealed by quantitative cohort analysis of Japanese survey data?

The patterns of changing responses to the 16 questions analysed show a predominance of experiential effects over maturation effects, but they also show nine cases in which period effects played a role and two clear cases of maturation effects. Sorting out the 16 questions according to the specific patterns of generational attitude change they demonstrate reveals an extremely interesting finding. The empirical classification of the questions into groups demonstrating experiential and maturation effects is identical to their conceptual classification according to this study's model of the Core and Layers of Traditional Japanese Nationalism.

On one hand, the response patterns to the questions that measured attitudes historically associated with the two Layers of Meiji-era nationalist ideologies showed strong generational differences. On the other hand, the response patterns to the questions that measured attitudes historically associated with the ancient Core values of Japanese nationalism showed a dominance of maturation effects. Period effects were observed in both categories, but they were "falling" period effects in the case of the Layers and "rising" effects in the case of the Core values. What overall pattern do these findings indicate?
Conclusion

The conclusion of this study draws on the convergence of its conceptual model of Traditional Japanese Nationalism and its quantitative analysis of postwar survey data on Japanese nationalism to present a clear and verifiable overview of generational changes in postwar Japanese nationalism.

This analysis shows that postwar Japanese public opinion has demonstrated strongly declining support for nationalistic attitudes relating to the Layer of the Middle-Meiji's Modernizing Ideology, both through period and experiential-generation effects. The feelings of national inferiority underlying the need to "catch up to the West," the belief that only Japan's happiness leads to individual happiness, and the will to live a diligent, orthodox "pure and correct life" are all declining, while the opposite value of living for fulfillment of individual tastes is rising. This study also shows strongly declining Japanese support for nationalistic attitudes relating to the Layer of the Meiji Restoration's Political Religion of the emperor cult, both through period and experiential-generation effects. Belief in adoption to maintain the family lines of the Japanese family-state, belief that the Prime Minister should perform Shinto state worship, belief in any religion at all, and even simple respect or affection for the emperor are all declining markedly in postwar Japan.
Yet, in dramatic contrast to these other findings, this study reveals strongly rising Japanese support for nationalistic attitudes relating to the ancient Core values of Japanese nationalistic sentiment. Willingness to yield to tradition "even when one would be right in opposing it," greater loyalty to the non-kin tribe than to one's own family, high respect for the traditional Japanese values of social obligation such as ongaeshi (obligation to repay indebtedness) and oyakoko (obligation to parents), low respect for modern democratic values such as "respecting freedom" and "respecting individual rights," and overwhelming preference for even an unfairly demanding paternalistic boss -- all of these ancient attitudes so typical of traditional Japanese society show very strong and yet still rising support among every generation of Japanese. As for the feelings of Japanese racial/ethnic superiority that form the very Core value of Japanese nationalism, all generations show rapidly rising belief that Japan is a first-class nation while 70.6 percent of all Japanese in 1983 felt that "compared to other peoples, Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics."

This analysis also yields a clear picture of the changing patterns of nationalistic attitudes among the postwar Japanese experiential generations. It finds that the older War generation (aged over 49 in 1987) shows strong and rising support for both the Meiji Layers and the Core values of Traditional Japanese Nationalism --
52.3 percent of this generation, for example, felt respect or affection for the emperor according to the latest survey in 1983. The Rapid Economic Growth generation, in contrast, shows much weaker and declining support for the Meiji Layers of ideological nationalism -- only 15.5 percent of this generation felt respect or affection for the emperor in 1983. Yet the Rapid Economic Growth generation shows strong and rapidly rising support for the Core values of Japanese nationalism. Finally, the Affluent generation shows the weakest support of all for the Meiji Layers of ideological nationalism -- only 7.8 percent of this generation in 1983 felt respect or affection for the emperor. Yet even this generation shows strong and rising support for the ancient Core values of Japanese nationalism.

The conclusion of this study in Chapter Six gives a synthetic overview of Japanese nationalism from its roots in the tribal myths and culture of the Yamato people, through its long process of cumulative development, and up to the end of World War Two. It recaps this thesis' conceptual model of Traditional Japanese Nationalism as consisting of a Core and Layers, like a pearl. The Core of Japanese nationalism consists of the ancient and powerful Japanese nationalistic sentiments. Elements of the Core were redefined into a Layer of explicit nationalist ideology in the Meiji Restoration's Political Religion of the emperor/kokutai cult. Then, in turn, elements of the Core and Layer were redefined into a new Layer of mass nationalist ideology in the Middle Meiji's Modernizing Ideology of
"Our Spirit! Western Science!" This study holds that Japanese ultranationalism was neither a new ideological Layer of Japanese nationalism, nor an imported foreign fascism, but the logical extension of the highest values of Traditional Japanese Nationalism to their deadly extreme -- it was not a foreign virus attacking the Japanese body politic but a cancer of that body itself.

Quantitative cohort analysis of survey data on postwar Japanese nationalism reveals a fascinating paradox. Japanese acceptance of the ideological Layers of prewar nationalism appears to be dying out, both with the passing away of the Wartime generation and with the passage of time among the middle-aged and younger generations. Yet Japanese belief in the Core values of Japanese nationalistic sentiment appears to be strong and surging. The feelings of nationalism are strong, and at present there seems to be no explicit ideology that expresses them.

The final pages of this study discuss the theoretical similarities and differences between Japanese nationalism and some European nationalisms in terms of the Western theories of nationalism, which were found to be clearly and fruitfully applicable to Japanese nationalism. Then it concludes with some practical observations on the potential implications of this analysis of Japanese nationalism for the practice of Japanese politics and foreign policies directed towards Japan.
Chapter Two

CONTENDING THEORIES of NATIONALISM

Nationalism is an ambiguous concept. In practice, there are the nationalisms of the 160-some nations recognized by the United Nations, a half-dozen pan-nationalist movements, dozens of self-proclaimed regional, religious, ideological, or linguistic nationalist movements within these states, and hundreds of smaller nationalistic ethnic movements of tribal groups throughout the world.

In the realm of theory, there are bibliographies of bibliographies on nationalism listing thousands of articles and books on the theory of nationalism, and a range of definitions including:

1. "exhaltation of self-consciousness through identification with the nation."

2. "a more or less purposeful effort to revive primitive tribalism on an enlarged and more artificial scale."

3. "a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state."
4. "an intolerant and aggressive instinct."\(^4\)

5. "patriotism . . . fused with the consciousness of nationality."\(^5\)

6. "an extension of the self-regarding sentiment typical of members of the nation."\(^6\)

7. "Exaltation du sentiment national; attachement passioné à ce qui constitue le caractère singulier, les traditions de la nation à laquelle on appartient, accompagne parfois de xenophobie et d'une certaine volonté d'isolement.

8. Doctrine, mouvement politique qui revendique pour une nationalité le droit de former une nation plus ou moins autonome."\(^7\)

9. "a type of social organization, with large-scale, unmediated membership, cultural homogeneity, etc.

10. a theory, formulated by critics of nationalism, to the effect that a state's rulers and boundaries should correlate with 'nationality'. This is a theory of government shorn of

11. accretions amounting to florid theories, formulated by the nationalists themselves, stressing race, folk, community, etc.

12. a sentiment corresponding to nationality -- an epiphenomenon."\(^8\)
13. "a generic concept of loyalty, or patriotism, which holds that a society is good because it is 'mine' -- an attitude which is common to all ages, and needs to be distinguished from its subspecies, nationalism proper." 9

14. "national character or 'nationality'

15. an idiom, phrase or trait peculiar to the 'nation'

16. a sentiment of devotion to one's nation and advocacy of its interests

17. a set of aspirations for the independence and unity of the nation

18. a political programme embodying such aspirations in organizational form

19. a form of socialism, based on the nationalisation of industry

20. the doctrine of divine election of nations

21. the whole process of the formation of nations in history." 10

22. "the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions . . . can be confidently labelled 'good' and 'bad.'" 11
This substantive variety and theoretical ambiguity forces researchers studying the empirical manifestations of nationalism to make one of four procedural choices concerning their definition of the concept:

1. to simply not define their concept of nationalism.
2. to pick one definition regardless of the others.
3. to list many conflicting definitions of nationalism.
4. to attempt to synthesize an integrated definition from the broad range of existing theoretical literature.

Unfortunately, there are painful difficulties attendant upon each of these procedures. The failure to define the key concept of a study sets it adrift of theoretical moorings. Picking one definition in spite of the others limits the validity of the findings to cases that happen to fit this definition. Listing many conflicting definitions turns scholars into scholiasts and in itself gives neither a theoretical foundation nor a focus to the inquiry. Finally, attempts to synthesize a single definition from a host of conflicting theories could claim to build empirical theory before our eyes, if they could escape the charge of compounding eclectic pots pourri from theories with higher-order inconsistencies: Hayward Alker gives an entire typology of ecological fallacies inherent to attempts to draw specific cross-level inferences from conflicting theories.
This dilemma of defining nationalism reflects a trade-off inherent to social scientific research on the whole: the trade-off between a concept's breadth and its conciseness. On one hand, in order to account for nationalism's numerous observable manifestations, a definition must be broad enough to allow for numerous patterns of interaction between the psychological, social, economic, and political elements of different nationalisms, which often appear in seemingly-contradictory combinations at different times and in different cultures. On the other hand, in order to be a workable concept, a definition of nationalism must be concise enough to be clearly stated, recalled, and used. With a subject of such universal variations as nationalism, the extremes of this continuum are so far apart that no "perfect mean" can exist: as can be seen from the sampling of definitions given above, attempts to achieve both breadth and conciseness overwhelmingly tend to be too simple to account for nationalism's complexity or too complex to recall or use.

In order to achieve its research objectives, this thesis will use two different types of definitions of nationalism: a broad definition to analyse Japanese nationalism in a comparative historical context, and a concise definition for summary and analysis. Its broad definition is an interdisciplinary typological framework drawn from 14 theoretical models or classificatory schemes of nationalism. Its concise definition of nationalism is an attempt to synthesize the broad commonalities of these models of nationalism into a single sentence.
The Broad Definition:
A Typological Framework of Nationalism

There are excellent comprehensive summaries of theories of nationalism, and this thesis has referred particularly to the 1983 work of Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, as well as to the classic anthologies of Deutsch, Snyder, etc. But the primary purpose of this thesis is the analysis of the specific case of Japanese nationalism, not building theory on nationalism in general, so its rather more limited selection of 14 models contains a large number with interesting and sometimes revealing applications to Japan—both by analogy and by contrast. It is a cumbersome process to attempt to apply 14 different models of nationalism to 1,500 years of Japanese history, and this is certainly not a task that can be achieved in a single chapter. In this present chapter we will first present these models in their original, usually European, settings, using direct quotes wherever possible to let the original authors "speak or themselves." Then, in the following chapter, we will apply these theoretical models to the historical case of Japanese nationalism.

Nationalism, the "ism" of the nation, can be considered a core topic in the study of politics. Yet its very complexity as a phenomenon, as compared to diplomacy, for example, makes its analysis in purely political terms a risky undertaking. As indicated
by the numerous differing definitions cited above, nationalism is a phenomenon that involves individuals' beliefs; the roles of small groups such as philosophical or political elites; the roles of larger social groups such as tribes, ethnicities, classes and masses; the roles of nation-states, once formed, in propaganda and education; and the role of the international system of states in ignoring, abetting, or crushing one country's nationalist movement. In short, nationalism is a complicated political phenomenon with important variables at every level of analysis: individual, small group, nation-state, and world system. It stands to reason, then, that the analysis of nationalism could profit from the concepts and methods of the other social sciences, and political scientists, in fact, have been drawing heavily on these sources in their analyses of this phenomenon. This thesis' typological framework of theories of nationalism is drawn from the five disciplines of intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and politics per se.  

But there is one more important difference between these theories of nationalism besides their different levels of aggregation and disciplines; this is the difference in their degrees of generalization. Some of these "theories" are comprehensive general typologies of numerous historically observed nationalisms while others are much more limited conceptual models of specific types of nationalism or even merely of one aspect of nationalistic behavior. Given the differing methods of the disciplines from which these
"theories" have arisen, it is not surprising that that more general models come from the discipline of intellectual history, while the more specific models come from the disciplines of economics, social psychology, communications, and political science. Nor is it surprising, given the postwar trend of social scientific research from the general to the specific, that the more general models were conceived at earlier times than the more limited and specific models.

This thesis' interdisciplinary typological framework will use Carlton Hayes' excellent typology of historical European nationalisms as the source of its four overall classificatory types: Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal, and Integral nationalism. And it will use the more recent and more limited models from the other disciplines as specific sub-types of nationalistic behavior which can play a role in one or more of these broad classificatory types of nationalism. Nationalist Mercantilism, for example, can and has been used just as easily by governments expressing both Traditional and Jacobin nationalist ideologies. Such a multi-levelled framework is certainly not very tight or neat, and, given the trade-offs detailed above, nor can it be. Its purpose is merely to provide a limited structure to a very broad spectrum of theories of nationalism against which the history and nature of Japanese nationalism can be more perceptively reviewed and analysed.
The four main analytic types of our typological framework are taken from the classic work of Carlton Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, which gives a broad spectrum of clearly defined types of nationalist ideology. Carlton Hayes summarizes his analytic approach in the introduction to *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* as "not . . . to treat nationalism either as a social process or as a popular movement, . . . (but) as an 'ism', a body of doctrines, as a political philosophy, and to discuss the successive schools of nationalist thought . . . ."\(^{15}\) His actors are thus primarily "the apostles and not the disciples . . . ."\(^{16}\)

Hayes' work is seminal in its clear analysis of the philosophical content differentiating various forms of nationalist ideologies and his broad historical perspective on their interactive process of historical development. Yet, we read here in his own words that his treatment of nationalism leaves out such vital aspects of its origin and expression as social processes and popular movements. And we must note that Hayes deals only with Western history and European nationalisms. In our typological framework we will borrow the breadth and clarity of Hayes' four major philosophical types of nationalism, but we will supplement its lacunae on the psychological, social, economic, and political aspects of nationalism with 13 more specific conceptual models of nationalism, and, in the following chapter, we will apply this framework to the distinctive non-European case of nationalism in Japan.
Hayes' overall vision is that nationalism is a modern revival of ancient tribalistic sentiments. "Primitive tribalism was a small-scale nationalism," he writes, but due to tribes' willingness to respect, and ally or confederate with other tribes, there was "no absolute antithesis between 'nationalism' and 'internationalism.'" The "internationalism" of the (Stoic, cosmopolitan) Roman and the (Christian) Holy Roman Empires thus predominated over the West until eighteenth century nationalism invoked a "revival of tribalism."

Hayes's schema cites three eighteenth century philosophies of "humanitarian nationalists," as the intellectual forbears of the three main philosophical traditions of nationalism. These were Bolingbroke's aristocratic, Rousseau's democratic, and Herder's cultural nationalisms: the respective intellectual ancestors of the Traditional, Jacobin, and Liberal traditions of modern nationalism.

**Jacobin nationalism** was the product of three centuries of conflict between the intellectual brilliance of the French philosophes and the Bourbons' masterful control of power. It was the gradual diffusion of the philosophes' democratic ideals, summed up as the Rights of Man, and the gradual weakening of the Bourbon's repressive power that produced the conditions for the French Revolution of 1789, which Hayes cites as the origin of the first modern nationalist ideology.
This new nationalism was marked from the start by its revolutionary origins. It was directly opposed to the traditional symbols of patriotism — the Church and the Nobility — which it had overthrown, and was based instead on the heady democratic ideals of Liberty! Equality! Fraternity! and the popular frenzy of bourgeois and peasant masses experiencing the first mass national mobilization in history. Diverted from Danton and the Girondins' more moderate course by the Montainists Barere, Robespierre, and Carnot, Jacobinism reached its political extreme in the Terror and its ideological extreme in the creation of a new civic nationalist religion.

"How are you to know a Republican?" asks Barere. The Republican speaks of "la Patrie with a religious sentiment," and of "the majesty of the people with religious devotion." Altars inscribed "The citizen is born, lives, and dies for the patrie," were erected in every township in the land. Religious ceremonies from patriotic baptisms to marriages and funerals were held before the patriotic altars along with regular holiday meetings where songs, exhortations, and mass oaths celebrated patriotic virtue.

The Jacobin ideology first aroused the masses to modern nationalism based on humanitarian principles, but, faced with armed intervention by the aristocratic powers and the outrage of popular apathy among the foreign peasants they sought to liberate, the Jacobins gradually turned toward "vindictiveness against foreigners,
to pride in and ambition for their own nation, to conquest, and eventually to a new imperialism." The democratic Rights of Man soon became the Rights of Imperial Frenchmen.

Traditional nationalism was developed by the Englishman Burke, the Frenchman Bonald, and the German Schlegel out of an aristocratic reaction to the excesses of revolutionary France. It was an attempt to harness the frightening power of nationalism, this new political mobilizing force, to the cause of the traditional symbols of legitimate power: "the crown, the landed aristocracy, and the national established church." Traditional nationalism was thus a conservative, establishmentarian, and essentially elitist ideology of nationalism. Traditional nationalism was used by the governments of England and Prussia to reinforce popular support for their traditional political orders and to raise national morale in these nations for their war to unseat the Jacobin revolution's unintended inheritor: Napoleon I, Emperor of the French.

Liberal nationalism, developed by Bentham, Guizot, Welcker and Mazzini, was derived from the German scholar Herder's benign love of the common language of a people and its ethnic cultural roots. Yet it was the fusion of Herder's ethnic consciousness of "a people" (a volk) with Kantian and Fichtean notions of "the collective will" that made Liberal nationalism a potent nationalist ideology. The Liberal nationalists had many ideas on the free, efficient, and mutually-
beneficial exchanges between nations, but their thinking took a revolutionary turn when it "rationally" defined the nation in ethnic, not monarchical, terms. The Liberal nationalist thinkers further gave this modern tribal nation a "unified will" of its own: they made the leap from the individual egotism of the Romantics to the national egotism of language-based states. It was no longer only the individual that was free to assert his will; it was the tribal nation that was bound to assert its unified will in the world. Liberal nationalism's call for the self-determination of ethnicity-based nations led to a new era of nationalistic revolutions and wars throughout Europe and in the Mideast and played an important role in the creation of such nations as Italy and Germany. But in these wars and revolutions, the "nationalism" in Liberal nationalism quite supplanted the original "liberalism": the young people's gymnastic leagues established to promote folk-dancing and sports soon became paramilitary training camps where youth in uniforms shouted nationalistic slogans and drilled with bayonet and sword.

Finally, Integral nationalism, was developed from a synthesis of the three preceding nationalist ideologies by the French thinkers Taine, Barres, and Maurras. Integral nationalism stressed above all else the organic unity of the nation and its transcendant right to total precedence and control over all physical and social elements in its territory. While Integral nationalism was primarily derived from the late Romantic versions of Liberal nationalism which stressed the
national will, it also incorporated important aspects of the etatism of Traditional nationalism, and, most importantly, the mass ideological indoctrination and mobilization of Jacobin nationalism. "A true nationalist," wrote Maurras, "places his country above everything; he therefore conceives, treats, and resolves all pending questions in their relation to the national interest." It goes without saying that this totalitarian Integral nationalism was the direct precursor of Fascism and Nazism.

Hayes's vision of the interaction of these nationalist ideologies in the history of modern nationalism is the vision of a classic tragedy. Again and again he traces the fatal paths from the human ambitions to achieve the highest ideals of democracy, legitimacy, or ethnic identity, to the conflict, coercion, and ultimate destruction of the nationalistic wars that resulted from these ideologies. Hayes' vision could be summarized in the brilliant and prophetic words that Grillpaerzer wrote in 1848: "The path of modern culture leads from humanity, through nationality, to bestiality." 

Beneath these four major analytic types of nationalisms -- Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal, and Integral -- our typological framework loosely arranges 13 more limited models of specific aspects of nationalism according to the five academic disciplines of: intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and politics.
I. The Intellectual History Approach

Traditional or "classical" analyses, whether they be of politics, history, mathematics, physics, sociology, or psychology, all share a similar method. The wise scholar reads, observes nature or his fellow man, reflects, then interprets phenomena according to a personal theory, either explicit or implicit. The astounding results that Machiavelli, Gibbon, Descartes, Newton, Weber, and Freud achieved with his method go far beyond compensating for their contemporary colleagues' forgettable contributions and establish interpretive analysis, conducted by gifted minds, as an extremely powerful tool of building theory.

To many scholars the writings of Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn are the seminal works of interpretive historical analysis on nationalism. The writings of Kedourie give a more recent example of what is essentially the same analytic approach: the interpretation of historical nationalist documents which Hayes summarizes for all three in his revealing phrase "(nationalism) can be distilled from the writings of varied . . . theorists."26 Yet unlike the broad, schematic work of Hayes, which we have already reviewed, Kohn and Kedourie each emphasize the universal impact of a single philosophical variable in their analyses of nationalism.
1. The Two Traditions Model

Hans Kohn's analytic approach is straightforward intellectual history. In his *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* he elegantly summarizes his theory of the intellectual development of the philosophy of nationalism from its origin in the traits of "the idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on a common stock of memory . . . , and finally national messianism,"^27 among the "ancient Hebrews and the ancient Greeks," to its "recrudescence" in the late 1960's.^28

As he acknowledges in *The Mind of Germany*, one of his many intellectual histories on different nations, "The writing of history is always selective,"^29 and in it complex social processes "must be broken up into single, and often what seems arbitrary (categories and divisions) in order to be in any way intelligible."^30

Kohn is famous for his dichotomy between "Western" and "non-Western" archetypes of nationalism. In a nutshell, "Western" nationalism is an enlightened, rational, liberal movement which produces self-confident, social-contract constitutional governments that respect other similar governments. "Non-Western" nationalism, on the other hand, is an irrational, reactionary, myth-generating, tribalistic movement which produces insecure, authoritarian states that vacillate between xenophobic defensiveness and insecurity-motivated aggression.^31
Kohn traces the development of Western nationalism from the cosmopolitan "stoic, world citizen" tradition of the Roman Empire, through the centuries of Christian universalism, through the Conservative then Liberal humanitarian nationalisms of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, and finally to the supranational integration movements of the recent era. He likewise traces the development of the tribalistic "messianic, chosen people" tradition of the "non-Western" countries (including Germany and Italy!) from "the ancient Hebrews and the ancient Greeks" to its revival in Jacobinism, German Romanticism, Integralism, Machtpolitik, and Fascist and Bolshevik totalitarian nationalism."^{32}

Kohn places modern nationalism's origin in seventeenth century England, in the tradition that Hayes calls "Traditional" and Kohn calls "Conservative." Kohn holds that from there nationalism "diffused" to the other Western and non-Western countries through the popularizing works of the French philosophers such as Voltaire. The actors in Kohns's analysis are primarily philosophers, who enunciate a philosophy of nationalism which then takes hold by some unspecified mechanistic operation. If a philosophy does not take hold, it simply goes "unheeded" until it turns up in another form somewhere some time later by some teleological operation.
2. The Vir's Model

Kedourie follows Kohn in the broad outline of his analytic approach. His approach is intellectual history; his actors are primarily philosophers with a supporting role for young proto-elites; and he uses historical data to support his propositions. But Kedourie's analysis differs from that of Kohn in its causal mechanism and scholarly temperament.

Where Kohn does not display emotion in his normative criticism of fascist and Bolshevik totalitarian nationalism, Kedourie is vehemently opposed to nationalism itself. His outspoken position is that nationalism "has created new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberless people innocent of all politics," in short, that nationalism is an unmitigated curse.

The original points in Kedourie's analysis concern his theory of nationalism's roots. He lays the original cause of nationalism not in distant tribalistic traits but specifically in the philosophic repercussions of Kantian dualism in early nineteenth century society. The philosophical argument, in brief, is that: Kant's rupturing of the link between objective and subjective reality meant that "we can never know things as they really are, as they exist in themselves independent of our observations." The ethical corollary of this epistemological dualism was that morality, too, to the extent that it
was knowable, was purely subjective and thus self-determined. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) then supplanted Kant's assumption of individual consciousness or ego with the universal or state ego -- thus resolving the Kantian dilemma of how the world can function if no two people can perceive objective reality in the same way. The result was the "organic state," "an organized body, (in which) each part continuously maintains the whole, and . . . (thus) . . . itself." 35 Fichte gave this national ego the right and duty to struggle and fight in total freedom on the basis of its subjective, internally-derived morality.

The gist of Kedourie's argument on the social setting is that the moribund nineteenth century society excluded young proto-elites (artisans, sons of clerks and pastors, etc.) from social or cultural advancement and made them highly susceptible to a radical romantic fantasy that justified and promised a new life for them in a renewed and glorious state. They were attacked and infected by this new philosophy and the old society succumbed to the philosophical epidemic that became the very "spirit of the time." 36

Kedourie follows Kohn's theory of the global diffusion of nationalism from its point of origin. But his focus on the necessary susceptibility of the host culture and the virulence of nationalism's attack permit one to call his model the "virus" model of nationalism.
II. The Economic Approach

Nationalism is an uncomfortable concept to many contemporary economists, who tend to see it, at best, as an attribute of political "superstructure" built on economic systems, or, at worst, as an emotional "error" factor which threatens the plausibility of the rational-actor axiom upon which their theoretical models rest. Neo-classical economists see national borders as a distortion to trade and are inclined to regard the study of trade flows across political units as a distraction because it all "comes out in the wash." Yet the phenomenon and study of political nationalism was integral to the origin of the study of economics and is implicitly present in many economic theories in the past and today. It is not for nothing that the discipline of Economics was and is still often called Political Economy.

The three examples of economic models of nationalism reviewed here all illustrate this point, and they are by no means isolated or insignificant examples. Mercantilism, the traditional specie-hoarding policy of medieval and early-modern governments, was propounded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the first structured economic theory, and its stated goal was to enrich the state by beggaring its neighbours. In contrast of means as well as goal, the Free Trade or Classical theory propounded by Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malhus, et al., in the eighteenth century aimed to enrich the state
through mutually-beneficial trade with other states. The contemporary Dependencia model, too, combines the strong nationalistic appeal of anti-neo-colonialist sentiment in the developing world with a hybrid variation of Marx-Leninist economic theory.

3. The Mercantilist Model

Mercantilism was the dominant economic philosophy and policy of European states from the Crusades to the seventeenth century. Its appeal to rulers lay in its intuitive equation of stocks of gold and silver with wealth, wealth with power, and power with security and prestige in a world of jealous, warring monarchies. Yet it was not a fool's theory. Its major economic assumptions were used in John Maynard Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, and have also been the inspiration of post-Keynesian schools such as Monetarist economics. According to Keynes:

"Mercantilist(s) . . . were emphatic that an unduly high rate of interest was the main obstacle to the growth of wealth . . . . They were concerned both with diminishing liquidity-preference and with increasing the quantity of money, and several of them made it clear that their preoccupation with increasing the quantity of money was due to their desire to diminish the rate of interest." 37

Gerard Malynes observed in 1622 that, "Plenty of money decreaseth usury in price or rate." 38 John Locke took this analysis one step further to lay the basis of Milton Friedman's post-Keynesian
Monetarist theory when he wrote in 1692 that the rate of interest depends, "not barely on the quantity of money but the quickness of its circulation." Thus, the mercantilists' distaste for trade was not based wholly on the simple fear of losing money to foreign traders; it was based on a well-developed economic theory that saw a diminishing money supply as the cause of high domestic interest rates and, therefore, of domestic economic stagnation.

The loss of money paid for imports not only caused higher interest rates that stifled domestic investment but the imported goods themselves led directly to unemployment in domestic industries. Sometime before the 1530's Clement Armstrong described this fear of imported goods:

"By reason of great abundance of strange merchandises and wares brought yearly into England hath not only caused scarcity of money, but hath destroyed all handicrafts, whereby great number of common people should have works to get money to pay for their meat and drink, which of very necessity must live idly and beg and steal."  

Thus, in the words of Heckscher (whose book Keynes uses as his major source), the mercantilist thought that the reduction or elimination of imports "killed two birds with one stone." On the one hand the country was rid of an unwelcome surplus of goods, which was believed to result in unemployment, while on the other the total stock of money in the country was increased."
Keynes concludes that, "The mercantilists were under no illusions as to the nationalistic character of their policies and their tendency to promote (commercial) war. It was national advantage and relative strength at which they were admittedly aiming." As Coke wrote in 1675, "If our Treasure were more than our Neighbouring Nations', I did not care whether we had one fifth part of the Treasure we now have."  

These various references from different authors in different centuries illustrate a definite cohesiveness and continuity to the theoretical tradition of Mercantilist thought. And we can see that one of the main points of this theory's continuity has been its crucial political assumption of a zero-sum world in which one nation's gains can only be obtained at the expense of other nation's losses. Historically, many governments expressing all four of the major types of nationalism have employed Mercantilist arguments and policies, and Mercantilism's fundamental assumption of a "beggar-my-neighbour" world is readily apparent in many neo-Mercantilist economic policies today.

4. The Free Trade Model

Mercantilism in its way had reflected the medieval and early modern trading pattern of raw materials and handicraft goods exchanged for silver and gold coin, but with the advent of the
industrial revolution and paper money in the eighteenth century the needs of traders changed dramatically and the mercantilist theory was called into question. While a school of French philosophes called the physiocrats led the way in the 1760's, it was Adam Smith who is generally credited with supplanting mercantilism with his Free Trade or Classical theory that shaped the minds of economists for almost two centuries.  

In contrast to the mercantilists who held that a nation's wealth was its total coinage, Smith held that, "The riches . . . of every country, must always be in proportion to the value of its annual produce, the fund from which all taxes must ultimately be paid." Where the English mercantilists held that other commercial nations were out to beggar them as surely as they were being beggared by England, Smith held that, "The wealth of a neighbouring nation . . . is certainly advantageous in trade. . . . in a state of peace and commerce it must . . . enable them to exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with the produce."  

Adam Smith's conclusion is that for all commercial nations, "The most effectual expedient . . . for raising the value of that surplus produce, for encouraging its increase and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations. . . . This perfect freedom of
trade would even be the most effectual expedient for
supplying them, in due time, with all the artifices,
manufactures and merchants, whom they want at
home, and for filling up in the properest and most
advantageous manner that very important void (of
scarce goods) which they felt."

Smith's theory was quickly taken up by the rising class of
industrial capitalists who, in Carlton Hayes's ironic observation

"readily perceived in it a reasoned justification for
the removal of governmental aids to agriculture and
handicaps to large-scale industrial production.
... If, in the name of liberty, customs duties on
the importation of foreign foodstuffs could be
repealed, the cost of living would decrease, and
industrial employers, enabled to pay smaller wages,
would obtain larger profits. If, in the name of
liberty, all tariffs could be abrogated and general
free trade established, foreign as well as domestic
markets would be available for surplus production
of the the new machinery and increasing
consumption would keep pace with increasing
production."

The Free Trade theory, like the Mercantilist theory, had the
nationalistic goal of increasing the wealth of the nation. But its
understanding of comparative advantage led it to view other states as
trading partners, not cut-throat foes. This difference of outlook
towards foreign nations was rooted in the difference between these
economic theories fundamental assumptions about the world: whereas
the Mercantilists viewed trade as the gambling of national treasure in
a zero-sum world, the Free Traders viewed it as a valuable bonus to
the nation's production in a variable-sum world.
Unlike Mercantilism, however, the theory of Free Trade has historically had difficulty in being accepted as a nationalistic policy. The Jacobin nationalism of revolutionary France quickly resorted to the mercantilist isolation policy of the Continental System to deny England its traditional European trade. Traditional English nationalism was content to preach free trade with its colonies -- where traders from foreign nations were not welcome. The Zollverien of Liberal German nationalism practiced free trade within its forming nation -- not with the outside world. And the Fascist, Nazi, and Bolshevik Integral nationalisms were eager to deny foreign capitalists access to their domestic markets -- making free trade the exception and not the rule. The postwar era saw the sweeping liberalization brought on by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and an era of unprecedentedly free trade existed over most of the non-communist world for four decades, yet even now the policies of free trade are subject to serious attacks in numerous nations and the nationalistic appeals to national advantage seem to be more frequently and effectively used by advocates of trade protectionism, not free trade.

5. The Marxist Model

A framework of theories of nationalism would not be complete without mentioning Marxist thinking on the question. And Marxist analyses are based on such different bodies of concepts and history that it would be equally incomplete to describe a contemporary
Marxist model with strong nationalistic overtones -- such as the Dependencia model -- without some reference to its intellectual roots.

Karl Marx was opposed to the state on personal as well as ideological grounds. He was a political exile from his homeland, and his ideological opposition to government itself fell short only of the anarchists in his era. In the Communist Manifesto he writes that the state is "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie," which will "wither away" when class struggle is abolished.\(^49\) Engles tried to answer the critical questions raised against this position, such as how the mail would be delivered, by stating that "public functions would lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over real social interests," and that "the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things."\(^50\)

While Lenin's *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* is sometimes cited as a Marxist-Leninist critique of colonialist nationalism or as an incitement to anticolonialist nationalism, it is in fact an economic analysis based on the imperatives of finance capital, not nations or peoples. Imperialism, to Lenin, is merely "a direct continuation of the fundamental properties of capitalism in general."\(^51\) It was left for Stalin to work out the non-contradictions between the need for intense, sacrificial, patriotic struggle to build up the Soviet socialist state and its eventual withering away, and

60
this he did through the doctrine of "Socialism in one country." This doctrine holds that "while the proletariat can and must build up a socialist society," in one country, this would not be "the complete and final victory of socialism." Under Stalin, Trotsky's early emphasis on promoting world-wide revolution as socialism's top priority was submerged by the policy of "defending socialism" in one nation, and World War Two became not the "great anti-fascist war" but the "Great Patriotic War."

The bridge between Marxism and nationalism was completed in the concept of the communist patriotic struggle by Mao, Tito, Ho and others, and in these forms it has had a wide influence among the anti-colonialist movements around the world. Whereas each of these three leaders were committed communists before the wars that brought them to power, the element of nationalism in their respective revolutions received an incalculable boost from the patriotic peasant wars they led against their countries' foreign invaders: the Japanese in China, the Germans in Yugoslavia, and the French, the Japanese, and later (to their perception) the Americans in Viet Nam. While the world brotherhood of the working classes was the goal of Marxism Leninism, its most successful practitioners around the world have linked the workers' oppressors to hateful foreigners, hitched domestic revolutions onto wars of independence against foreign invaders, and thus harnessed the tremendous force of Integral nationalism to the cause of communist revolutions.
Marxist intellectual analysis, as well as Marxist nationalism, has also prospered more outside of the one socialist state, particularly in its more sophisticated view of "economic imperialism," or trading systems between developed and developing countries. Ernesto (Che) Guevara was one who combined these developments in his treatise on Latin American revolution when he wrote:

"Our part, the responsibility of the exploited and underdeveloped of the world, is to eliminate the foundations of imperialism: our oppressed nations, from which they extract capital, raw materials, cheap technicians and common labor, and to which they export new capital -- instrument of domination -- arms, and every kind of article, submerging us in absolute dependence." 53

As explicit in the final word as it is implicit throughout Guevara's analysis is the Dependencia model. Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in Dependency and Development in Latin America present this theoretical model of neo-colonial economic and political domination of developing nations by the developed nations. The basis of this model is its distinction between the "core" of the world economy, the industrialized nations of Europe and North America, and the "periphery" of the system, the developing world. The economic relations posited are that the core countries send capital and limited technology to the periphery, and extract labor, raw materials, cheap manufactures, and more capital in return, through the help of peripheral elites.
Cardoso and Faletto define underdevelopment as: states within a definite structure of relations of domination to ensure an international trade based on merchandise produced at unequal levels of technology and cost of labor. They define dependence as conditions under which the (peripheral country's) economic and political system can only exist and survive through its connections with the world productive structure and cannot accumulate and expand capital within its peripheral structure. They see nationalism in the periphery as the desperately difficult struggle to escape the bonds of this dependency.

The Interdisciplinary Social Sciences

Having reviewed the distinctive analytic approaches of intellectual history and economics to the study of nationalism, we now turn to the interdisciplinary social sciences. This distinction is not meant to imply that economics is not a social science or that history is not used in interdisciplinary analyses but merely that the three remaining analytic approaches mentioned in this chapter -- Social Psychology, Communications, and Politics -- are much more closely linked together than the methodologically distinctive historical or economic disciplines.

Indeed, in the behavioral era the intellectual exchanges between these three approaches extends not only to concepts and
methods but to researchers themselves, who not only freely borrow theories and tools but sometimes produce significant contributions to knowledge in several disciplines besides their home discipline. Two fundamental reasons can be cited for this development: the impact of the behavioral revolution on research methods, and the impact of the developing nations on fields of research.

It was after the Second World War, and generally only from the 1960's, that significant numbers of researchers in the social sciences began to shift from interpretive to empirical methods of research. This shift sprang from researchers' frustration with the countless derivative studies that multiplied the classic insights of Weber and Freud into hybrid theoretical models as rapidly as postwar prosperity multiplied the numbers of graduate students. At some point the need was felt to return to facts that can be observed and counted. And once the emphasis of research was shifted from philosophical insight to conclusions about observable, preferably quantifiable, human behavior, the various social sciences were seen less as spurious competitors than as valuable allies in the common quest to understand the common subject: multifaceted human behavior.

But the discipline of the empirical method did not hamper conceptual development. To the contrary, it seemed to filter out less relevant or plausible models while rapidly raising a new host of theoretical questions that challenged researchers to replenish their
conceptual inventories by applying the knowledge of related disciplines. Means were found to integrate even subjective psychoanalytic insights into more structured explanations of objectively observable individual and group behavior.

The second factor affecting the growth of interdisciplin ary social science was the rise of the developing world. The rapid postwar decolonialization and the subsequent struggles of dozens of new sovereignties to develop into independent nations shook many traditional models in all of the social sciences. Here was a phenomenon involving three quarters of the world's population that frequently did not follow the historical Western European patterns. If the social sciences aimed to understand humanity, they needed to study more than one quarter of it.

The combined impact of the interdisciplinary, empirical approach and the challenging subject of the developing world produced exciting new fields of research in social science: Modernization, Communications, Political Culture, Political Development. And as the question of nationhood was central to these fields, researchers from the various disciplines applied their concepts to the study of nationalism.

The majority of the remaining models summarized in this chapter come from this body of research in which the disciplinary
boundaries overlap and the leading researchers pursue their analyses through a variety of approaches, frequently as teams of specialists. One influential example of such a team is the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics: Almond, Huntington, Verba, Ward, Weiner, and others, originally under the Chairmanship of Lucian Pye. The broad scope of this group's contributions leave no way of mentioning these and other scholars without ignoring some of their contributions and listing them under one or more approaches that are only part of their work.

III. The Social Psychological Approach

Social psychology studies how individuals relate to groups, and as the nation is the dominant group in the world today, it is not surprising that considerable effort in the field of social psychology has been devoted to the question of nationalism. A rudimentary but serviceable categorization of this work could divide it into negative and positive models: the negative models seeing nationalism as an unfortunate mass reaction to dislocation caused by disruption of traditional societies, and the positive models seeing nationalism as a beneficial socially integrating force that is essential to development. In this section we will first review two sociological models which see nationalism as a "negative" reaction to social dislocation (Kornhauser's Mass Society Model, and Smelser's Modernizing Ideology Model), then we will review one model of nationalism as a "positive,"
socially integrative force (Pye's Political Socialization Model).

6. The Mass Society Model

Kornhauser's model of nationalism, as given in The Politics of Mass Society, holds that "mass societies" are an analytic type distinct from "corporate," "pluralist," or "authoritarian" societies.\textsuperscript{57} The origins of mass societies lie in the uprooting of individuals from their emotionally secure traditional communities and their transfer to the rapidly industrializing cities. Here they have difficulty being absorbed by the modern contractual society for which they are totally unequipped in education, work skills, or social skills, and they drift in aimless anxiety among a faceless, frustrated crowd.

The characteristics of the mass society are that democratization undermines elite privilege and culture as non-elites penetrate former elite positions, while the faceless masses have no moral code or culture with which to supplant the elite culture. The traditional voluntary organizations that mediated between the individual and the state are broken down in these conditions, and society as a whole suffers from "major discontinuities in social process."\textsuperscript{58} The urban crowds suffering from Durkheim's "anomie" are easy prey to fanatical antidemocratic movements that seem to promise them some structure in their lives. Marginal members of the former elite culture -- unemployed intellectuals, clerks, and students -- are drawn to these
extremist groups along with the masses. And chief among such extremist groups are authoritarian nationalist movements.

As Kornhauser summarizes his causal mechanism, "People cannot be mobilized against the established order until they have first been divorced from prevailing codes and relations. . . . Thus it is that when large numbers of people are available, and when opportunities exist for the further creation of mass consciousness (as when pre-existing elites are inadequate to protect their institutions), Fascists and Communist movements alike gain support at the expense of political parties committed to the social order."\(^59\)

The key analytic variable in Kornhauser's model of nationalism is the widespread presence of anomic urban masses before the spread of an extreme nationalist movement.\(^60\) And as such urban masses only emerged as a result of the industrial revolution, it is not surprising that Kornhauser's model does not very convincingly apply to the historical European types of Jacobin and Traditional nationalism, which preceded industrialization. The Jacobin revolution was not made by anomic unemployed masses but by the socially integrated Parisian petit bourgeoisie who were animated by a well developed political and social ideology. As for Traditional nationalism, it is in itself the very antithesis of Kornhauser's model -- the nationalism of, by, and for an elite which is succeeding in maintaining and diffusing its elite culture. Kornhauser's model, like Smelser's model of the Modernizing
Ideology discussed below, applies most clearly to the origins of Liberal or Integral nationalisms.

7. The Modernizing Ideology Model

Smelser's modernizing ideology model is another model of nationalism based on the social psychological approach which takes an essentially negative view of nationalism. This model, elaborated by Smelser in his *Essays in Sociological Explanation*, gives a more precise definition of the role of nationalism in the transition from traditional to modern societies. According to Smelser, nationalism plays three different roles in the modernization process. First, it serves as a general motivation to start the process of modernization. Second, it tends to turn into an extremist movement in response to the "dislocation" caused in the transition phase. And third, it weakens and loses appeal in the modern phase as secular civic rationalism becomes a more productive social attitude.

The causal mechanism of modernization in Smelser's model is: differentiation, dislocation, reintegration. Modernization occurs when traditional societies are broken down and their various constituent units and functions are reintegrated in a modern structure. The key process in this transformation is "structural differentiation," in which: "one social role or organization . . . differentiates into two or more roles or organizations which function more effectively in the
new historical circumstances."62

Unlike Kornhauser, Smelser holds that traditional societies do not break down naturally: some powerful motivation is needed, and this force is usually nationalism. "In the early stages of modernization, many traditional attachments must be modified to permit more differentiated institutional structures to be set up. Because the existing commitments and methods of integration are deeply rooted in the organization of traditional society, a very generalized and powerful commitment is required to pry individuals from these attachments."63 But differentiation provokes dislocation, as is described by Durkheim, Kornhauser, et al., and nationalism comes to serve as a mass ideology to justify the individual's sacrifices for modernization. "With the world organized as it is, nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialization, because it provides people with an overriding, easily acquired, secular motivation for making painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the supreme goal, industrialization the chief means."64

The cost of using nationalism as such a modernizing ideology is that it must be exaggerated to seem to justify the people's sacrifices. The masses' nameless fears and hatreds must be given foreign faces. Their dreams of prosperity in a secure social order must be fed with promises of great rewards. Thus mass nationalisms of modernizing states tend to portray the environment "in terms of omnipotent forces,
conspiracies and extravagant promises, all of which are immanent." 65

8. The Political Socialization Model

Not all sociologically-based models of nationalism view it as a negative phenomenon, an extremist reaction to social stress. In research on political socialization the role of nationalism can be seen, much more positively, as a basic "associational sentiment" or socially integrating force. Robert Levine gives the following definition of socialization:

"Socialization in its most general sense is the acquisition of dispositions toward behavior that is positively valued by a group, and the elimination of dispositions toward behavior that is disvalued by the group. It is assumed that the valued behavior has some relevance to the maintenance of group functioning, as in the case of behavior required for performance in a social role. Within this general process, political socialization is the acquisition by an individual of behavioral dispositions relevant to political groups, political systems, political processes. Examples of the kinds of behavioral dispositions included are: attitudes concerning the allocation of authority, the legitimacy of a regime, and political participation; patterns of decision-making and deference; images of leaders and foreign nations; group loyalties, antagonisms, and stereotypes." 66

Numerous authors, including Hyman, Almond, Verba, Converse, Potter, Jennings and Niemi, have written on political socialization, and since this field emerged during the behavioral era their work has consisted more of limited hypotheses built on empirical studies than of
comprehensive theoretical models. One exposition is Lucian Pye's discussion of political socialization and nation building in Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.

Pye presents the political socialization model as a middle-road approach focussed on culture-specific processes of social change, as opposed to the extremes of the static culture model embodied in classical anthropology and the culturally blind rational model embodied in economics. He defines three stages in the socialization process: the basic socialization process through which a child arrives at an adult personality, a similar process of political socialization in which an adult arrives at a political identity, and finally the process of political recruitment in which a politicized person finds a role in political structures and functions.

The extent to which societies successfully modernize depends upon three classes of cultural values and attitudes "which are the consequences of the socialization process": technical skills and competencies ... motivational goals ... (and most importantly) associational sentiments and values affecting collective action." It is this human potentiality for collective enterprise, for creating associations and corporate organizations, which makes possible all higher forms of civilization."
This model puts a very valuable focus on the root motives for the association of families into peoples, the formation of nations, and the specific social psychological mechanism by which nationalism is inculcated. And as such this model has very broad application to all of our types of nationalism. Whatever the type of the nationalist ideology, it must be learned from others through the process of political socialization. But our model of Japanese nationalism in the following chapter draws particularly on Pye's concept of the **associational sentiment** as the core factor of Japanese nationalism.

IV. The Communications Approach

Communications was one the new analytic approaches that emerged in the behavioral era. It integrated the concepts of many social sciences through its focus on the flows of communication. This field owes an immeasurable debt to Norbert Weiner, whose manifesto "All sociology requires the understanding of communication," in *Cybernetics* greatly advanced the analysis of government through the study of information flows.73 Karl Deutsch, working with him at M.I.T. at that time, developed many of his concepts in other milestone works such as *The Nerves of Government*.74

Another major source of theoretical contribution came from efforts to apply the communications approach to the study of the developing nations. One such effort was the famous series Studies in
Political Development edited by Lucian Pye et al. and composed by members of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool, both of M.I.T., also made very significant contributions in this approach. As some of Pye's work has already been reviewed, this section will take up the theoretical models of Lerner and Deutsch.

9. The Transitional Man Model

Daniel Lerner's book The Passing of Traditional Society has inspired numerous studies along its lines in various countries. Building on the work of the Committee on Comparative Politics mentioned above, it helped established a genre if not a paradigm of modernization studies based on the role of communication. At the root of Lerner's model is the assumption that the universal pattern of modernization was revealed in the Western European experience, and "virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed" must follow it, more or less.

Lerner follows the familiar analytic structure of the traditional, transitional, modern stages of development. But he adds two major theoretical contributions. First, he views the crux of the modernization process as psychological shift occurring in individual members of a new, modernizing quasi-elite whom he calls transitional
men. Second, he defines the causal mechanism underlying this shift as exposure to the modern world primarily through the mass media. In his own words, Lerner's model is that, "Everywhere . . . increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)." 78

The first to respond to the new stimuli are "transitional" men. In Lerner's case study the Grocer of Balgat is given as a typical restless transitional personality who lives in a world that is populated "with imaginings and fantasies -- hungering for whatever is different and unfamiliar." 79 Such transitional men possess the vital trait of "empathy" or "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation," 80 which Lerner holds traditional personalities to lack. "Empathy" allows them to imagine a new life and to communicate their dreams to others, thus extending the modernizing influence.

Lerner holds an ambivalent attitude towards nationalism. To him it is "A complication . . . its own ethnocentrism -- expressed politically in extreme nationalism, psychologically in passionate xenophobia." 81 It is an atavistic urge to "do it their 'own way'" by trying "risky by-passes" to the proven road of modernization through communication and participation. Yet nationalism is necessary to the stage of transition; it is a "painful threshold" to modernity. 82
10. The Collective Advancement Model

Karl Deutsch's model of the formation of nations is unmatched in its combination of classical sociological insights with quantifiable analytic concepts. Unlike many theorists who view the nation as the product of nationalism, Deutsch traces the origin and development of communities, peoples, and nations step by step before introducing the notion of nationalism. His own definitions are worthy of direct quotation as they are used as this thesis' definition of a "people":

"a people forms a social, economic, and political alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupations, around a center and a leading group. Its members are linked by more intensive social communication, and are linked to these centers and leading groups by an unbroken chain of connections in communications, and often also in economic life, with no sharp break in the possibilities of communication and substitution at any link, and hence with a somewhat better probability of social rise from rank to rank." 83

Deutsch gives three basic factors promoting this alignment of a people: "complementarity of communication habits ... complementarity of acquired social and economic preferences ... the widespread preference for things and persons of 'one's own kind' in such matters as buying and selling, work, food and recreation, courtship and marriage. ... (and finally) the rise of industrialism and the modern market economy which offer economic and psychological rewards for successful group alignments to tense and
insecure individuals — to men and women uprooted by social and technological change, exposed to the risks of economic competition, and taught to hunger for success. For almost any limited group within a competitive market, both security and success can be promoted by effective organization, alignment of preferences, and coordination of behavior. Vast numbers have felt a need for such a group and have answered it by putting their trust in their nation."

Here we see Deutsch's communications-based model of nationalism clearly subsuming and integrating the concepts of several of the other models of nationalism discussed above. His three sets of motivations for the formation of national groupings — cultural communication compatibility, social psychological needs for security and order, and the economic need to maximise success — subsume the intellectual historian's concern for the Romantic volkgeist bases of Liberal and later Integral nationalism, the economist's concern with the rational interest-maximising benefits of the national unit, and the social psychologist's concern with the psychological rewards for insecure individuals uprooted by modernization. It is for this reason that this thesis' short definition of nationalism given in the introduction of this chapter draws most heavily on the thinking of Karl Duetsch.

But as of this point Deutsch has only spoken of nationality not of nationalism. To him, nationalism is an ideology that springs from
the same factors underlying nationality but which is something quite distinct from it. To Deutsch, nationalism is a clear ideology of collective advancement based on the exclusion of other groups which, carried to its logical extreme, leads to imperialism and national self-destruction. Deutsch's emphasis on the point that both the psychological and material benefits of nationalism are rooted in its exclusion of other nations is distinctive among the models reviewed in this chapter and is worthy of closer examination. He writes:

"In a competitive economy or culture, nationality is an implied claim to privilege. It emphasizes group preference and group peculiarities, and so tends to keep out all outside competitors. It promises opportunity, for it promises to eliminate or lessen linguistic, racial, class, or caste barriers to the social rise of individuals within it. And it promises security, for it promises to reduce the probability of outside competition for all sorts of opportunities, from business deals to marriage and jobs.

To the extent that the division of labor in a particular society is competitive and stratified, nationality can thus be used to hamper "horizontal" substitution from individuals outside the group, and to facilitate 'vertical' substitution within it. ... Once the pressures of uprooting and insecurity are then added to these horizontal and vertical barriers, the stage is set for the rise of the political movement of modern nationalism . . . ."

But instead of the security which the nationalist ideology promises, its end result can be a weakening of a people's security. "The more successful (the nation-state) has been in promoting its own members into privileged or controlling positions in society, the more it will now have to fear from the rise of other peoples and other
nationalist movements.\textsuperscript{86}

We have noted that several of the models of nationalism reviewed above had either positive or negative perspectives towards nationalism: some viewing it as a destructive and dangerous force, and others viewing it as a constructive force for modernization and development. What again marks Deutsch's model as distinctive is its view that encompasses both of these perspectives: Deutsch sees nationalism as a beneficial force in the collective advancement of nation-building which can easily turn into a threat-provoking force through nothing more than its continued successfulness. The fate of nationalisms are determined not only by their internal performance but by their performances relative to other nationalisms -- and here too much success can be just as dangerous as too little success.

Deutsch's concepts are broad enough to easily apply to each of the basic types of nationalist ideology in our framework. Deutsch's account holds plausible for all of the countries we have mentioned and for cases of the Jacobin, Traditional, Liberal, and Integral nationalist ideologies. Which of these types of nationalism is without its cases where overexpansion provoked reactions that left the nation less powerful than before? Examples that come to mind are the military defeat of French Jacobinism by the European powers, Traditional English nationalism's loss of its empire through the organized resistance of its British educated former colonials, Liberal
German nationalism's destruction by the very success of the German nation's unification and militarization that led to its attack in World War One, and, most strikingly, the rise and fall of Nazi Germany's Integral nationalism and the "master race" it sought to establish are all examples of nationalisms that became "too successful" for their own survival.

The degree of synthetic, interdisciplinary thinking behind Deutsch's work is truly impressive. He deals with individuals, groups, and nation-states as actors, taking account of linguistic, psychological, social, economic, and political behavior in terms that can be tested with quantified data to a high degree. And the thread with which he binds together this notable interdisciplinary analysis is communication in its many levels and forms.

IV. The Political Approach

It seems tautological to define the political approach to analysing the political phenomenon of nationalism. In a real sense all of the models reviewed above are political analyses made from or incorporating aspects of the analytic perspectives of other disciplines. Nevertheless, some expressly "political" aspects of nationalism can be cited, and these relate to the deliberate use of ideological nationalism as a tool to increase a state's power or achieve other political objectives. In this section we will list three
models analysing the role of political elites in the origin and control of nationalist movements. This is because the study of the conscious, directive use of ideological nationalism for political ends is an area in which the other analytic approaches are lacking and where the political approach, per se, makes a distinct and valuable contribution.

The Reformist Elite model of David Apter stresses the role of modernizing political elites who work within traditional cultural frameworks and use a political religion or ideology as a mass motivational force. The Anticolonialist Elite model of Franz Fanon, John Kautsky and others stresses the role of "assimilationist" elites who initially seek personal assimilation into Western cultural and political frameworks and attempt to modernize their country by replacing its traditional culture with imported Western cultural characteristics, but who are rejected by the West and turn into anticolonialists. Finally, Anthony Smith's "Rebound" model views the origin of nationalism as the point where former assimilationists "rebound" back to traditional values after being rejected by the West and join forces with the traditional-minded domestic reformists.
11. The Reformist Elite Model

David Apter, in his own words, is "interested in the big themes in human affairs . . . revolution, choice, political hope, the missed opportunity; . . . questions centering around . . . the consequence of development, (and) how to control development, shape it, and make it serve men's purposes." And he has "preferred global forms of systematization leading towards deductive propositions." While Apter has balanced his theoretical contributions (that center on integrating aspects of Marxian and Parsonian theories) with field work ranging from Ghana in the 1950's to Japan in the 1980's, we will deal with his theoretical model of the political religions of reformist elites which springs from his work on political development in Ghana.

Apter's analysis starts with the observations that the problems of increased productivity and material welfare, as well as role alteration and integration, which face all developing societies, identify crucial areas of social tension and political sensitivity around which a large number of other more secondary political problems arrange themselves. "States with autocracy, monolithic structure, and community imperatives are not wholly different from (other developing states in facing this task). All face the complexities resulting from increased productive capacities. All are troubled by the same need to create, fit, adjust, and integrate new role systems."
However, the states with a monolithic structure and autocratic government face a particular political problem. In order to achieve their objectives of increasing productivity and role integration they need to increase the scope of their authority into all aspects of social life. And in order to accomplish this task they need to "replace older belief about forms of allegiance. New political forms are developed that have the effect of providing for the continuity, meaning, and purpose of an individual's actions. The result is a political doctrine that is in effect a political religion."\(^9\)\(^1\)

A political religion, according to Apter, is the result of a conscious policy decision of traditional-minded elites bent on "reforming" their nation rather than subjecting it to a revolution in order to accomplish the modernizing imperatives to "achieve massive industrialization as a means of raising productivity, and . . . (to permit) new and modernizing roles (to be) regulated and integrated by central values."\(^9\)\(^2\) These reformist elites' ultimate goal is to "blend older roles and newer ones in the context of a modernizing autocracy."\(^9\)\(^3\)

As for the characteristics of the political religion, Apter says that since reformists come to realize quickly that no ordinary ideology can prevail for long in the face of obvious discrepancies between theory and practice, "A more powerful symbolic force, less rational, although it may include rational ends, seems necessary to
them." And it is this force that he calls a political religion. There are two aspects to a political religion, as is indicated by its name. Its "political" aspect assures that the political leaders of the state can direct national effort towards their political goals, while its "religious" aspect "affects the most fundamental needs of individuals by specifying through the state religion the permissible definitions of individual continuity, meaning, and identity."  

Apter frames his model of nationalism as a political religion in the context of contemporary developing nations, but as we have observed, the conscious use of political religions to advance nationalistic goals predates the current era by centuries if not millennia. The Jacobins raised patriotic altars and conducted quasi-religious rituals with hymns and oaths and exhortations to inculcate their nationalistic doctrine. Prayers are still said in the Church of England for the English crown, honored along with the church and nobility in Traditional English nationalism. While Liberal nationalists raised no altars, the flamboyant Romantic rhetoric of Mazzini or Fichte was designed to produce the emotions of exaltation, identification, and moral commitment that paralleled religious experience among the youth they sought to recruit to their ethnic nationalist causes. Finally, the Integral nationalisms' conscious, propagandistic inculcation of political ideology compounded with pseudo-science and racial myth in the Nazi and Fascist mass rallies was a grotesque mimicry of mass religion. Yet the use of
religion to advance national goals predates by millennia the advent of modern nationalism: Syme reports that the religious oracles of ritual entrail-readings in Imperial Rome were routinely rigged to support the Emperors' favored policies.96

12. The Anticolonial Elite Model

Nationalism as anticolonialism, is argued as a revolutionary credo by Franz Fanon and as a political theory by John Kautsky. Fanon's conviction grew from his experience treating the human debris of the Algerian Revolution as a French-hired psychiatrist in an Algiers hospital. Not surprisingly, his book The Wretched of the Earth concentrates on violence: "National liberation . . . whatever may be the headings used . . . decolonialization is always a violent phenomenon. . . . (it) is quite simply the replacing of one 'species' of men by another 'species' of men."97

But the struggle is a cultural as well as political and military war, and inbetween the "natives" and the colonialists stand the educated, Westernized "native" elite. Jean-Paul Sartre's Preface to Fanon's book contains a vivid evocation of many African and Asian students Sartre saw in Paris streets and cafes.

"The European elite undertook to manufacture a native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the principles of Western culture; they stuffed their
mouths full with high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to the teeth. After a short stay in the mother country they were sent home, whitewashed. These walking lies had nothing left to say to their brothers; they only echoed. From Paris, from London, from Amsterdam we would utter the words 'Parthenon! Brotherhood!' and somewhere in Africa or Asia lips would open '. . .thenon! . . .therhood!' . . . It was the golden age."

Fanon's own description of the assimilated colonial elites is a very mirror-image of Sartre's observations from the perspective of a non-assimilated "native." "The native intellectual accepted the cogency of these (European) ideas, and deep down in his brain you could always find a vigilant sentinel ready to defend the Greco-Latin pedestal. . . . (But) at the moment that the native intellectual comes into touch again with his people, this artificial sentinel is turned into dust. . . . All those speeches seem like collections of dead words; those values which seemed to uplift the soul are re-valued as worthless, simply because they have nothing to do with the concrete conflict in which the people is engaged." The psychological phenomena which both of these authors describe so eloquently is assimilation, the acceptance of a foreign culture's interlocking system of normative values and the intellectual processes that spring from and reinforce them. And the motive for this cultural assimilation is the perceived opportunity for greater advancement through assimilation into the ruling culture.
John Kautsky does not share Franz Fanon's revolutionary passion; but his far more developed theory of the anticolonial elite is essentially similar to Fanon's. Kautsky does not dwell on physical violence as Fanon does, but his understanding of the common motive that unites all members of anticolonial movements in developing countries is equally basic: it is "no positive factor at all, but rather the dislike of a common enemy, the colonial power." 100

Intellectuals trained in Western ideas -- whether at home or abroad, by themselves or by formal institutions -- are likely to absorb more than new knowledge. "They also absorb the values of an industrial civilization, above all the notion that continuing material improvement of the life of the mass of the population through continuing technological progress and popular participation in government is both possible and desirable, and they become admirers of the political systems and ideologies embodying these values..." 101

Yet prestigious employment opportunities for modern intellectuals -- openings for newspaper editors or film directors -- are extremely limited in traditional agrarian societies. And the assimilating "native" elites' expectations for dramatically increased opportunities for advancement eventually founder on the colonial regimes' refusal to permit "natives" to obtain positions of real power. This cadre of modernized and Westernized intellectuals is thus largely

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unemployed and the elite member becomes "an alien, a displaced person in his own society." Kautsky concludes his argument with the open-ended question "What could be more natural for (the Westernized intellectual elite) than to want to change that society to accord with his new needs and values, in short, to industrialize and modernize it?" And what more natural way could there be to advance this objective than to supplant the colonial or traditional elites with a patriotic modernizing elite?

One further point of interest in Kautsky's model of anti-colonial nationalism is that he does not confine it to actual or past colonial territories. "Quite similar movements have appeared in independent underdeveloped countries . . . ." And these anticolonial nationalisms in non-colonial countries can be termed "defensive" anticolonial nationalisms.

Kautsky's model deals with the closely limited subject of anticolonialism, or anti-neocolonialism, and as such it does not easily apply to many of the basic types of nationalist ideologies in our framework. It can hardly be stretched to cover Jacobinism because for all their differences the Bourbons, the philosophes, and the Pariasian fishwives were uncontestedly fellow Frenchmen. The European cases to which it does apply to some degree are those of the leadership of some Liberal nationalistic movements. The non-Austrian dominions of the Hapsburg Empire can be considered close European
parallels to the overseas colonies of the other major powers, and their elites experienced a similar process of assimilation into Austro-Hungarian culture.

13. The "Rebound" Model

The final theoretical model of nationalism reviewed in this chapter is the "Rebound" model of Anthony Smith. Its title is placed in quotes because its author terms it, more impressively, as the "'Dual Legitimation' Matrix of Ethnic Nationalism." Smith's book, Theories of Nationalism, is a scholarly attempt to synthesize an original theory of nationalism which can account for a great number and variety of nationalist movements. After his survey of theories, Smith gives a detailed discussion of definitions of nationalism and an elaborate taxonomy of nationalist movements covering several hundred cases ranging from major modern cases to arcane historical exempla such as the Kassites, Oirots, and Araucanians. 105

While it is his intricate definitions and typologies that are the most significant contribution of this work, in terms of the "conceptual breadth vs. conciseness" dicotomy we identified in the beginning of this chapter, Smith's conceptual framework is clearly far too broad to be remembered or directly used. His types of nationalism include, among others: "diaspora, developed, ethnic, ethnocentric, failed, irredentist, mixed, organic, pan, preservation, primitive,
polycentric, renewal, territorial, secession, (and) successful."\textsuperscript{106} And, as our trade-off posited, the greater his success in identifying numerous cases of such a broad spectrum of distinct types of nationalism the less we are certain just what he means by nationalism after all.

Smith, like us, copes with this inescapable dilemma by giving a "short definition" of nationalism. But his definition is given in a two-page concluding chapter which almost seems to have been tacked on to the study as an afterthought. And the definition itself is an intricate and extremely prescribed model which does not account for even the majority of his identified cases. In his own words, "Nationalism is born among the intelligentsia, when the messianic 'assimilationists' try to realize their former vision by adopting the ethnicity solution of the defensive reforming 'revivalists'."\textsuperscript{107} Smith explains this by adding that "What is vital is the convergence of the defensive reformists and the messianic assimilationists in a situation of 'dual legitimation'. \textbf{Only this fusion} produces the ideological spark of the nationalist movement."\textsuperscript{108}

It is interesting that Smith's model seems to combine the main aspects of both Apter's model of the traditional-minded authoritarian reforming modernizers and Kautsky's model of ex-assimilationist anticolonial elites. To use the mechanical metaphor, in Smith's model the assimilationists "rebound" from their rejection by the Western
and/or colonial system to rejoin the defensive, anticolonial reformers. What is disappointing in, however, considering the fascinating breadth of Smith's case material, is the extreme conceptual narrowness of his definition of nationalism. Smith's "rebound" model relies on such complex definitions of actors' characters and interactions that it resembles an intricate intellectual mating dance.

**The Concise Definition of Nationalism**

The Table on the following page summarizes the 14 widely-varied approaches to defining nationalism which were reviewed in this chapter, yet they are by no means devoid of major commonalities. We can first note that these models all view nationalism as a common, universal phenomenon with less significant national variations -- not as a collection of unique nationalisms. Secondly, we can note that while there are many different foci of the models' definitions of nationalism, they tend to touch on three basic themes -- three distinct types of relationships between individuals and nations (or nationalist movements).

The first theme is that of the emotive attachments of individuals to a nation. Kohn, Kedourie, Pye, Lerner, Deutsch and Kautsky all deal with aspects of the very basic and important human sentiments of association or belonging and the powerful influence of feelings of

belonging to a people and a nation. This feeling of belonging provides its own emotional reward: identity. The person who reflects with pride, "I am an Oirot!" is feeling emotive nationalism.

The second theme is that of the rational, interest-maximising association of individuals with a nation. Kedourie, Locke, Adam Smith, Smelser, Pye and Deutsch all deal with aspects of the objective, material, economic and social benefits which individuals obtain through grouping into a nation. The nation not only shuts out competition from "foreigners," but it makes possible the coordination and management of mass effort which is the very basis of development. The material reward for such rational nationalism is economic and social advancement, both collectively for the masses and individually for the more talented and ambitious elites. The person who reflects, "I'm certainly glad I have Araucanian social security!" is experiencing rational nationalism.

These two common themes among our models of nationalism focus on individuals' motives for associating with a nation, but the third theme of nationalism focusses on the nation's motivation for recruiting and mobilizing individuals: this is the theme of ideological nationalism. A nation is more than the sum of its citizens; it is a unit with the ability and responsibility to direct their actions more or less. And Hayes, Kornhauser, Smelser, Pye, Duetsch, Apter, Kautsky, and Smith all deal with aspects of this element of conscious
control of national citizens by the leaders of the nation (or nationalist movement). The means of control that distinguishes a nation-state from a feudal or absolute monarchy (and gives it such overwhelmingly superior power) is ideology. The reward of ideology for the nation-state is the power necessary to attempt to achieve national goals and deliver national benefits -- for citizens, ideological nationalism is sometimes just a way to explain the pain. The person who reflects that, "My sacrifice is necessary for Kassite national development," is expressing ideological nationalism.

Thus, we can analyse three central aspects of nationalism which are each common to several of the fourteen models of nationalism we reviewed. They are nationalism as associational sentiment, rational benefit-seeking, and ideological commitment.

But what makes these factors nationalism? The subjective human need for identity, and the objective human need for social and economic security and advancement, are timeless and universal. Throughout history, the need for and reward of group identity has been a pillar of tribes and peoples; the Hebrews observed that "Where there is no vision, the people perish," (Proverbs 29:18). The need for and reward of collective advancement has been the other pillar of tribes and peoples throughout history; the Romans noted the emigrant's motto: ubi panis, ibi patria, where bread, there homeland. If various types of organizations, ranging from the tribe
to the empire, from a shaman cult to a world religion, have met these needs in the past, what makes them nationalism? The defining attribute of nationalism (as opposed to tribalism or religion) is its assertion that the political unit of the nation-state is the best or only organization capable of delivering these rewards and thus deserves supreme allegiance.

So immersed are we in nationalism in the twentieth century that it is often difficult for us to see that the supreme allegiance to the nation that nationalism demands is no different from the supreme allegiances demanded by other social systems at different levels of aggregation: the family, the tribe, the ethnicity, the race, the sex, the religion. In fact, while we use a battery of pejorative terms against attitudes of exclusiveness and superiority based on these other social groupings, we reserve a scroll of accolades for the identical attitudes based on belonging to a nation. If I say "my sex is indisputably superior to yours," I am a chauvinist. If I say "my ethnic group (or religion) is indisputably superior to yours," I am a bigot. If I say "my race is indisputably superior to yours," I am a racist. But if I say "my nation is indisputably superior to yours," I am a patriot. The logic of these statements is strictly parallel.

This thesis' concise definition of nationalism draws most heavily on the thinking of Karl Deutsch, which subsumes to the greatest degree the content of the fourteen models reviewed: the social
psychologist's insight on the human need for group and cult; the economist's emphasis on the rational motivations of collective benefit; the role of communications in defining groups and peoples; and finally the political scientist's emphasis on the world of states and the power of a directed political ideology and apparatus in building up a nation-state. Put concisely, our definition is that:

Nationalism is a set of sentiments and an ideology linking the personal rewards of identity and advancement to the growth of a nation-state.
Chapter Three

JAPANESE NATIONALISM

The previous chapter has arranged 14 diverse models of nationalism from the disciplines of intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and political science into a simple but broad framework of contending theories of nationalism. It also analysed three fundamental commonalities between various clusters of these models -- emotive nationalism, rational nationalism, and ideological nationalism -- and synthesized from them a concise definition of what this thesis means by the term nationalism.

In this chapter we apply these theoretical tools to the analysis of traditional Japanese nationalism from prehistory to the end of World War Two. Then, in the three following chapters of Part Two, we statistically analyse 30-year postwar survey data to test for possible generational differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism, based on the conceptual model of traditional Japanese nationalism that this chapter presents.
Our approach in this chapter is that of an analytic summary, reviewing the historical data in chronological order according to our theoretical perspectives. In specific terms, the analysis follows a dual track. On one track, we use the broad framework of theories of nationalism to highlight and analyse specific characteristics of Japanese nationalism through comparison and contrast with the 14 models. Simultaneously, on the second track, we maintain a comprehensive overview of the stages of development of Japanese nationalism from the consistent theoretical perspective of our concise definition of nationalism.

The contribution of this chapter is an original analysis of Japanese nationalism, not original historical source material or historiography. For our historical data and general interpretations, we rely on established classics of the history of Japanese nationalism: primary sources from the documents of important Japanese historical figures, secondary sources from Japanese and American historians, particularly the synthesizing works of Edwin O. Reischauer. Tomes such as these already present the historical source material in detail and with authority. Our objective is to produce a clear conceptual model of Japanese nationalism by re-analysing this data against the theories of nationalism and then statistically testing it against 30 years of postwar Japanese survey data. The result is the first model of Japanese nationalism that can demonstrate support from both the interpretive and quantitative methods of analysis.
This analysis reveals Japanese nationalism to be a complex, evolving phenomenon that nevertheless centers around a core of enduring themes. To outline the conclusion before the analysis, our model conceives traditional Japanese nationalism in the image of an onion or a pearl: as a phenomenon in layers, as successive laminations of new patterns of perception around a core of values, social traits, and facilitating conditions. From ancient times some core elements of nationalistic sentiment were present among the Japanese. Later accretions developed this core into conscious nationalist sentiment, and then into two specific forms of modern nationalist ideology. But the past was not rejected; it was redefined and carried on. The deeper layers were coated over but carried forward in people's hearts. Traditional Japanese nationalism was built firmly upon the past: while modernization was destroying the traditional order, modern nationalism was built in its name. The development of Japanese nationalism was a cumulative process.

We first discuss at greater length the "core elements" of Japanese nationalism, critiquing the conventional Japan studies definition and proposing a modification. Then we trace the development of its layers of conscious, ideological nationalism using the fourteen perspectives.
I. Ancient Times to Late Tokugawa:

Core Elements of Japanese Nationalism

Delmer Brown, in his classic work *Nationalism in Japan*, makes a concise summary of the traditional wisdom of Japanese and Western Japanologists on the basic "elements" of Japanese nationalism. He cites the four objective elements of geographical separateness from the Asian mainland, a common race, a common language, and a "common and unique" religion.\(^1\) And he gives the conventional opinion that Japan possesses these elements to such a degree that "it is difficult to find nations where the elements are stronger."\(^2\)

It is undeniable that Japan is one of the closest observable approximations to an ideal-type nation state, as defined by these four elements of unified geography, race, language, and religion. But a more precise analysis of this commonplace might say at once more and less. Less, because these elements of national unity are not nearly as unique or causal as many Japanese and Western scholars believe them to be; and more, because an overwhelming majority of contemporary Japanese believe these elements of national unity to exist to a much greater extent than the scholars do -- to exist absolutely and to a unique degree in Japan. Indeed, to list these objective elements and omit their symbolic meaning to Japanese is to miss an obvious and far greater subjective core element of Japanese nationalism: the myth of Japanese uniqueness.
We have challenged a commonplace of Japan studies and called a widely held and deeply cherished Japanese belief a myth. We go further in suggesting that it is not these four elements themselves but Japanese belief in them that is the far more significant core value of traditional Japanese nationalism. It is worth examining the evidence on Japanese uniqueness -- reality and myth -- as the early historical basis of our analysis.

Be it fact or fiction, do the Japanese actually believe that they as a people are unique and thus superior to other peoples? The answer is an incontrovertible yes. The survey data we analyse in Part Two shows that 70.6 percent of the Japanese population in 1983 believed that "compared with other peoples, the Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics." But this belief in Japanese uniqueness is so interwoven in the fabric of Japanese consciousness that it is evidenced in countless situations besides opinion surveys. At the risk of seeming anecdotal, a few examples of this belief from Japanese scholarly literature, popular literature, newspaper editorials, and government statements are presented below.

The University of Tokyo library (which is quite small in comparison with major American university libraries) has no fewer than 43 standard-sized card-catalog files, each containing approximately 800 titles of scholarly books whose titles begin with Nippon or Nipponjin no, "... of the Japanese People." While every
nation's leading libraries could be expected to hold major collections of scholarly literature on their nation, even a short random sampling of the Japanese titles reveals a peculiar emphasis on "Japanese-ness" -- a fascination with the Japanese self, and the immediate placement in a Japanese context of abstract or universal subjects.

Nipponjin no kokoro: bunka mirai gaku e?
(The Japanese "heart": towards cultural futurology?)

Nipponjin no kimochi o eigo de arawasu ni wa
(How to express Japanese feelings in English)

Nipponjin no ningen kankei jiten
(Dictionary of Japanese human relations)

Nipponjin no seikaku
(Japanese character)

Nipponjin no saiakken
(Discovery of the Japanese people)

Nipponjin no seikatsu bunka jiten
(Dictionary of Japanese livelihood culture)

Nipponjin no seikatsu kukan
(Japanese Life "Spaces")

Nipponjin no seikatsu kachikan
(Japanese Life Values)

Nipponjin no seikatsu to bunka
(Japanese Life and Culture)

Nipponjin to shitsuke o kangaeru kai: kore ga shushin da!
(Committee to Think About Japanese Child-rearing: This is Morality!)

Nipponjin no tairyoku
(Japanese physical strength)

Nipponjin no tairyoku hyojunchi
(Japanese physical strength, with tables)
Nipponjin no tekiono, sono kenkyuho to seikai (Japanese adaptability: its research methods and findings)

Nipponjin-ron no kensho (Inspection of the "Japanese-ness" Debate)

Nippon minzoku (The Japanese Tribe)

Nippon jinrui iden gakkai (Proceedings of Japanese Anthropological-Genetics Society)

Nipponjin: sono shiso to kyodoryoku (The Japanese: their Spirit and Cooperative Power)

Nipponjin to "ma" (Japanese and "space")

Nipponjin no atama to shintai (The Japanese Head and Body)

Nipponjin to wa nanika (Who are the Japanese?)

Nipponjin to wa nanika: minzoku no kigen o motomete (Who are the Japanese: In Search of the Tribe's Origins)

As excessive as this list may seem, it is still only the barest indication of the extent of the Japanese literature on this subject: Kudo Masaki, in the introduction to his 1979 book Nipponjinrui-ron (The Japanese Anthropological (Origin) Debate) states, "One cannot fail to be struck, on entering almost any bookstore, with the great numbers of books titled 'Who are the Japanese.'" And he goes on to give a six-page bibliography, in fine print, of those he considers to be the more serious. His observation, if anything, held even more true in 1986, when Kinokuniya, a leading Tokyo bookstore, regularly
devoted 42 shelf-feet to popular books under the heading Nihonjin-ron (The "Japanese-ness" Debate).

As the sampling of scholarly titles illustrates, there is no dearth of topics in the Japanese Japanese-ness debate, but each topic is brought to bear on the same theme of Japanese uniqueness. This is the formula for commercial success in the popular genre of Japanese-ness books as well. For example, Nihonjin no aerobikku pawaa (Japanese aerobic power) is just a standard aerobic fitness text using data on non-Japanese subjects, but it decks itself with a few flattering truisms of the genre such as "The Japanese people are racially homogenous ... long-lived ... culturally and economically very active ... so foreign peoples have strong interest in information concerning the physical strength of the Japanese people."26 Naturally!

An epic of pseudo-science titled The Japanese Brain (unique, of course) enlivened after-hours chatter in drinking shops throughout Japan in 1986. Its author uses a rudimentary key-tapping test on a statistically insignificant non-random sample of Japanese and assorted "foreigners" to conclude that, "the Japanese brain houses the logical processes, emotional functions, and perceptual affinity with nature (sic.) all in the left hemisphere ... the non-Japanese brain is highly specialized in logical functions and there is no room for emotional elements to enter this sphere."27 (For connoisseurs of this
genre, this is the neurological reason for "the Japanese tradition of affinity between logic and emotion," as well as why Japanese "are keen listeners to cicada sounds in summer, and feel those sounds of insects to be soothing.") The author of The Japanese Brain, however, is perplexed, because, "Although my studies have received great attention from the public at large, researchers in my research field have shown only a cool interest in them."(Id.)

And popular Japanese interest in this genre seems almost unlimited. A scholarly 220-page book with illustrations of skeletons sold **10 printings** between 1963 and 1972. Its title? **Japanese Bones**.28 A book suggesting that the Japanese were in fact a lost tribe of Israel sold **49 printings** between 1970 and 1986. And **Nihonjin to yudayajin** (The Japanese and the Jews) opened such a profitable line of investigation that even an attempt to debunk it, **Nise-yudayajin to nihonjin** (The Fake Jews and the Japanese), ran into **5 printings** in its first year alone.29

Nor is the Japanese belief in their uniqueness limited to scholarly and popular literature. Japanese government representatives from the Prime Minister cited in the Preface to bureaucrats, government consultants, and expert witnesses make frequent allusions to this "fact" in negotiations with foreign governments and companies, and even Japan's finest newspapers recite it in their editorials. For example, for over a decade the Japanese Ministry of Health and
Welfare rejected drug safety studies concerning the contraceptive pill that were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, citing the grounds that women of the Japanese race might show different reactions. The Japanese government went as far as to reject data collected entirely from second generation Americans of 100 percent Japanese ancestry, apparently because it felt that the sample’s racial purity had somehow been polluted by its parents’ immigration to America. When the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare finally decided to permit a Japanese multi-year safety study of the contraceptive pill in 1986, an editorial of the Asahi Shimbun -- one of Japan's leading newspapers -- reiterated the Ministry’s racial assumptions by stating: "As a study team of the Health and Welfare Ministry stressed in its report . . . the use of the pill, even if it has the same components, could cause different reactions in its takers, depending on their races." (Asahi Shimbun, December 20, 1986). This Japanese racial statement is not a medical fact recognized by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration -- whose extensive studies on multi-racial samples indicate the contrary finding. This Japanese racial statement is the reflexive expression by Japan's government and press of the Japanese belief in their racial uniqueness.

The belief in Japanese uniqueness is so powerful, in fact, that Japanese government officials have used it to assert the uniqueness of Japanese natural phenomena -- even the uniqueness of Japanese snow. In 1986 the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
yielded to pressure from Japanese ski equipment manufacturers and agreed to scrap Japan's previous adherence to International Standards Organization ski safety standards. It agreed to establish, instead, a uniquely Japanese set of ski "safety standards" based on the Japanese manufacturers' recommendations, and to award a Japanese government "Safety Goods Seal" to products which met these unique specifications. When representatives of European Community nations, which had previously held large shares of the Japanese ski market, protested that this was simply another transparent Japanese non-tariff trade barrier, the Ministry held an official meeting to "explain" its decision. At this meeting, the Ministry's expert witness, Professor Matsui Hideji, delivered a one-hour lecture defending the Ministry's decision by asserting that Japanese Snow is Unique. (Asahi Evening News, October 6, 1986). Needless to say, this Japanese phenomenological statement cannot be demonstrated as a scientific fact. It is an example of the reflexive Japanese projection of their extreme consciousness of uniqueness even onto the physical objects of their surrounding natural environment.

Just where did this myth of Japanese uniqueness originate? Roy Andrew Miller, in his Japan's Modern Myth: the Language and Beyond, makes one of his more careless accusations in attributing the Japanese uniqueness myth to a conspiracy of Japanese scholars with lingering notions from the bible of wartime Japanese ultranationalism, Kokutai no hongi, whom he supposes to have first popularized this
myth "with the rise of Japanese economic power in the 1970's."\(^{30}\). It takes only slight effort to trace back the four main assertions of this myth -- geographic, racial, linguistic, and religious uniqueness -- through postwar English classics such as Brown \textit{supra}, prewar Japanese texts such as Okawa Shūmei's \textit{Nippon oyobi nipponjin no michi} (The Road of Japan and the Japanese),\(^{31}\) early twentieth-century English texts such as Sir Ernest Mason Satow's memoirs, \textit{A Diplomatist in Japan},\(^{32}\) to Tokugawa-era Japanese nationalist writers such as Hirata Atsutane and Aizawa Yasushi, and finally back to Japan's earliest religious/historical texts, the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki, which assert the Japanese people's racial uniqueness and superiority based on their direct descent from the gods. As the extensive citations in the rest of this chapter clearly demonstrate, the myth of Japanese uniqueness is neither a modern Japanese invention nor a foreign false impression but an ancient and abiding Japanese myth that was used to explain the apparent differences between the Japanese and foreigners in almost all of their historical encounters. Let us examine these four assertions of Japanese uniqueness point by point to sift the facts from the fiction.

1. Geographical separateness

The Japanese archipelago is hardly more isolated from its continent than Formosa, Luzon, Borneo, Java, New Zealand, Madagascar, Cuba, Dominica, Jamaica, Greenland, Iceland, or
Ireland are from theirs. Its Tsushima straits are only somewhat broader than the straights of Malacca (Sumatra) and Ceylon. Its seas are no more stormy than the North Atlantic or North Sea, and the Angles, Saxons, and Danes came to the British isles over the sea -- not across the channel at Dover like the Romans and Normans.  

In 1986 a Japanese newspaper published a photograph of seven young men in a traditional Tsushima island rowboat, who were sculling their way overnight to Pusan in Korea for a weekend trip. The small rowboat was open-decked with only one foot of freeboard above the waterline. The Tsushima town office was quoted as stating, "Travel by rowboat was very popular in the prewar days between Tsushima and the Korean Peninsula." Was Japan really as isolated by geography as so many are pleased to believe?

We have cited fourteen historic island nations, which are not difficult to find, and of which many have much greater geographic separateness from their continents than Japan has from Korea and the Kuriles. Many of these islands also have much greater geographic homogeneity (less "separateness" within themselves) than does Japan. With the exception of the Indonesian archipelago and Greenland, all of them have easier internal access than the rugged islands of Japan.

Most significantly, each of these islands was conquered and settled by continental peoples or nations. Norwegian Vikings
conquered Ireland in A.D. 795. In Iceland and Greenland the Vikings came in their open boats before the year 1,000, not from the closer continent but from the more distant one, an ocean voyage away across the stormy North Atlantic.

How much validity, then, is there to the claim that Japan was saved from continental invasion by its seas? A better set of reasons for Japan's independence would include: 1. Proximity to Korea and China, a non-expansionist and non-seafaring nation, respectively. 2. Distance from expansionist and seafaring nations (Greeks, Romans, Vikings, Arabs, post-Renaissance Europeans). 3. At least three instances of simple good fortune; two typhoons against the Mongol invasions, and the fact that Cheng Ho's seven ocean-going armadas (1405 – 1433) of 60 vessels bearing over 25,000 men sailed 5,000 miles to Southeast Asia, India, and Arabia instead of 500 miles to Nagasaki.

As for Japan's unification, this process was only completed by vanquishing the Ainu in northern Honshu in the ninth century, and northern Hokkaido was not fully unified with Japan until the nineteenth century -- the age when European powers were unifying not themselves but world-wide colonial empires in Africa and Asia. One of the prime reasons for the lateness of political unification in Japan, in fact, was precisely the geographical obstruction to domestic land travel and the extreme differences in climate.
There is a crucial difference between these facts and alternative explanations for Japan's independence and unification on one hand, and the traditional blanket explanation of "geographic isolation" on the other. **Contrary to myth, it is not what Japan was that kept it independent, but what the continent was not.** We have cited fourteen major island nations that were not protected from foreign conquest by their surrounding seas. It is a fact that Japan remained independent, but the geographical explanation for this fact seems to consist much more of myth than reality.

2. A common race

But in fact there were great invasions of Japan, in the pre-historic era. Ainu crossed south from Siberia via the Kuriles to settle in Hokkaido and northern and central Honshu; Southeast Asians (or a common ancestor group) sailed northeast to settle in Kyushu; Siberian peoples migrated east through Korea to settle in western and south central Honshu. The Japanese stock was made up of these races, with blood content analyses indicating a preponderence of marker chromosomes from the Lake Baikal region of Siberia.

From the fifth to the eighth centuries there were migrations of great numbers of culturally advanced Koreans and Chinese into Japan. This was the time of the Hun, Vandal, Gothic, Arab, and early Viking migrations in Europe which are considered to have left
Europeans racially "mixed." How did the Japanese remain racially "pure" despite these infusions of immigrants?

Of course centuries without significant immigration homogenized the racial strains somewhat in Japan, as it did in many parts of Europe. But the "sameness" of Japanese racial features is much more remarked upon by Westerners accustomed to multi-colored hair and eyes than it is by other Asians. As for nations with higher degrees of "racial purity" since the eighth century, there are the Icelanders, Koreans (lacking Ainu and Southeast Asian blood), and a few others. But if the same question is asked as of the eighteenth century instead of as of the present, many more "pure" races would have been found among primitive and isolated peoples. It is interesting that the only people scientifically recognized as a "unique" race on the basis of blood analysis are the Basque, whose overwhelming preponderence of type O rh-negative blood statistically demonstrates "separate" descent from all other races.  

The most telling critique of the myth of Japanese racial homogeneity, however, comes from the unusually candid study of Kanaseki Takeo, who concludes on the basis of physical-anthropological classifications of New (Ice Age, or Northern) Mongoloid, Middle Mongoloid, and Southern Mongoloid, and statistical tests of population skull-circumferences that Japanese are not racially homogenous. 36 He found, in fact, that the Japanese population of the
Kinki (Osaka-Kyoto) region are physically "far more closely related" to the Chinese population of Fukien province than to the Japanese population of the Hokuriku (Northern) region. By physical measurements these northern Japanese were determined to be much more closely related to Koreans than to the Osaka Japanese.  

3. A common language

The Japanese language is a beautiful language rich in subtleties, emotions, and evocative nuances. It is related to no other language in the comprehensive manner of the Indo-European or Semitic groups. Yet its grammar is essentially Altaic-Korean, its script is Chinese (even the kana are simplified Chinese characters kuzushi-ji), and a significant proportion of a modern Japanese speaker's vocabulary is of European origin. Japanese linguists' theories of the "purity and uniqueness" of the Japanese language are purchased at the cost of ignoring much of modern linguistic evidence and reasoning. Miller's book cited above elaborates this point with relish.

As with the case of geography, considerable internal "separateness" of language also prevailed in Japan. Excluding the Ainu (whose language nonetheless has left many place names including Mt. Fuji) and excluding the educated samurai and urban classes in later eras, the strength of dialects in Japan's isolated
population centers was such that commoners from distant regions would have had considerable difficulty communicating to one another. Both Buddhist and Confucian scholarship in Japan were conducted largely in Chinese until the last century. The national "standard" Japanese was melded only a century ago from the dialects of Satsuma, Choshu, and Edo, but even today this language is of little use in communicating to elderly fisher-folk in Akita or Oita Prefectures, and even the much lesser differences between the urbane Tokyo and Osaka dialects is standard material for comedians' sketches.

Again with the language element of Japanese "uniqueness," one must remember that language does not make nations: as Karl Deutsch clearly illustrates, the technical ability to communicate is of secondary importance to the need, will, and rewards of mutual communication. China was united not by conversations between the masses but by a writing system common to the educated classes -- and common to educated Japanese as well.

4. "Common and unique" religious beliefs

If religion is defined as the words of the chant and the costumes of the chanters it is easy to define Shinto as a unique religion -- and by the same token to define Roman Catholicism, Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and many Protestant denominations as unique religions each from the others. But by the more adequate analytic
criteria of a religious typology based on theology, these Christian sects can be seen as such and Shinto can be seen as a form of simple animism.

Animism, the belief that natural objects such as old trees or boulders have spirits that desire propitiation, is an elementary type of religion found in numerous forms among the tribesmen of Eurasia, Africa, and America -- each of whose cults is unique. Shinto falls into a sub-category of these animist religions that regard the Sun Goddess as supreme, and as such it seems to have had strong links to Altaic, Eastern Siberian cults. Its other theologically distinguishing feature is its myth of the Grandson of Heaven, which it shares with Korean mythology. At its base in Japanese village culture, Shinto has been a luck-bringing cult whose sake-fueled festivals express communal feelings of happiness with nature's blessings and desires to arrange for their continued provenance.

Shinto's base in ancient Japanese court culture was a compilation of the divine-ancestry myths of the Yamato people's leading families, with the imperial line assured political precedence and priestly duties as the direct descendents of the Sun Goddess. These myths of divine descent find many parallels around the world of which the closest is in the Korean Samguksa (Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms) and the most famous might be Julius Cesar's (post hoc) assertion that he was destined to rule by the divine
descent of the Julii line from Venus. In general, the division between
gods and humans in Shinto mythology is similar to that in
Greco-Roman mythology: it is a much more intimate and flexible
division than the awesome chasm between Yahweh and mortal man.

Shinto was unable to exclude Buddhism's entry, and even the
emperor was converted as early as 587 A.D., 125 years before the
first compilation of Shinto mythology, the Kojiki, was even written.
No less a Son of Heaven than the great Prince Shotoku commanded in
his "Seventeen Article Constitution" (604 A.D.) that his subjects
"Sincerely reverence the three treasures... Buddha, the Law, and
the Monastic Orders... the supreme objects of faith in all
countries."39

Shinto was formally absorbed by Buddhism from the twelfth
century until its ressurection as a political religion in the nineteenth
century. Its high rituals were practiced by the small and mostly
powerless court and the great ancient shrines at Izumo and Ise, and
the villagers kept their minor shrines to local dieties. But Buddhism,
and later Confucianism, dominated Japan's political, intellectual,
social, and organized religious life, with the four main Buddhist
sects gaining wide mass followings. Shinto may have survived for the
very reasons it did not prosper: a lack of complex theology and a
direct appeal to the positive emotions of nature-worship, tradition,
and communal solidarity.
Is this the "unique" religion that "unified" Japan throughout the centuries? The force of that argument fades rapidly under examination. If Shinto was "common" to all of Japan, so was Buddhism. If either, it was Buddhism, not Shinto, that did far more to strengthen Japanese culture, philosophy, arts, crafts, and education, and thus strengthened the Japanese state. The religion that is supposed to have rescued Japan from foreign domination was itself rescued from centuries of Buddhist domination by nineteenth century philosophers and the rulers of the Meiji restoration in 1868.

Finally, does world history give any adequate evidence to assume that a common religion causes a common nationalism? J. David Singer found that co-religionists were in fact more bellicose.\(^{40}\)

5. Other elements of uniqueness

In addition to these four main elements of geography, race, language, and religion, there are several other elements with less plausible degrees of apparent validity that are used to support the myth of Japanese uniqueness. Brown lists the element of central governmental control as one such factor, but he carefully qualifies it by stating that "a common government has not been a relatively constant factor in the growth of national unity in Japan."\(^{41}\) A "unique" culture is another such element that gains in apparent power to the degree that borrowing from China is ignored.
Thus, a point-by-point examination of the traditional "elements" of Japanese nationalism raises some very serious questions concerning their validity and sufficiency as explanations. If geographic isolation was a cause of independence that led to nationalism, why was Japan's case so rare among 14 other isolated island nations? If a common race was a cause of unity that lead to nationalism, why was Japan so long divided? If the common religion of Shinto led to nationalism, why did it need to be rescued from Buddhist domination and consciously revived and indoctrinated as a national religion?

Even taken together these elements do not present a convincing account of the core elements of Japanese nationalism. They deal with mechanics — oceans and black hair and language and cult patterns; they do not deal with human motive, incentive, or will. At best they describe facilitative, not causative, conditions: how nationalism could occur, not why.

But the very fact that the uniqueness theory is almost unanimously and unquestioningly accepted by Japanese gives a powerful indication towards a sociological explanation of this social phenomenon. The appeal of the conventional argument is not rational and critical, comparative and empirical; it is the appeal of a national-origin myth. The significance of these elements lies only partly in themselves and far more importantly in how the Japanese came to view them: as "evidence" supporting the myth of Japanese
uniqueness. It is this belief of the Japanese in their uniqueness that is perhaps the most significant core element of Japanese nationalism.

One curious point, however, is the relative absence of this explanation in Western literature. If simple reflection from an international, interdisciplinary, empirical perspective can reveal this many flaws in the conventional "causes" of unique Japanese nationalism, why have not more Western scholars noted them? Whether hostile or sympathetic towards the Japanese, Western scholars of Japan have usually accepted the Japanese assumption that the Japanese are unique.

As suggested earlier, the promotion of the Japanese uniqueness myth into an international shibboleth occurred neither through deception or gullibility but through a genuine dymanic of cross-cultural shock and confusion during the Meiji period, when Japan and the West had their first large-scale encounter. The Western visitors received an overwhelming impression of Japanese unity, homogeneity, and foreignness, that was even more true then than today. There was ample evidence that the four conventional elements of Japanese nationhood did exist, and Japanese nationalism -- the "result" -- was also observable. Perhaps the Japanese simply grew tired of constantly having to explain to these Westerners why everything in Japan was "different," and began to shake their heads together with them in fatalistic agreement that Japan, indeed, must simply be unique.
afterall. Once Japanese and Western authors settled upon this solution, it was recited as received knowledge and gained strength with every echo back and forth across the Pacific. But perhaps the initial leap of inferring that these factors actually caused Japanese nationalism, instead of merely facilitating it, was simply made without examining whether these elements were truly causal, merely facilitative, just coincidental, or simply not true at all.

In any case, this thesis' position on the conventional elements of Japanese nationalism is that they are, in varying degrees, facilitative conditions; but that they are inadequate as causal explanations, and are primarily indicative of a more significant causal element of Japanese nationalism: the myth of Japanese uniqueness.

The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness

The myth of Japanese uniqueness is clearly a core value of traditional Japanese nationalism. It is strongly asserted in the Yamato nation's fifth century divine-origin myths written down in 712 and 720 A.D. It was revived in each period of cultural closedness and anti-foreign conflict in Japan's alternating cycle of openness and closedness to Sinic then Western influence. It was consciously indoctrinated as a political religion in Japan's modernizing century. And in the postwar era it has been the ritual formula for numerous
best-selling books ranging from Japan as Number One as far out as the (unique) Japanese Brain and statements by Japanese government expert witness as far out as "Japanese snow is unique." 

Why are Japanese so concerned with asserting their supposed "uniqueness"? Of the nations mentioned above, Iceland is closer than Japan to being the ideal-type of a nation-state, while the Koreans, Basques, and possibly the Tibetans would rank equally with Japan if they only had unified or independent states. But which of these peoples has invested such extraordinary thought and emotion as modern Japanese in a cult of their own uniqueness? Why is Japan uniquely obsessed with its own uniqueness?

If one searches among the nations of the nineteenth century instead of those of today, one finds a much greater number of ideal-type nation-states. Most were small, isolated island or mountain nations such as the Maori of New Zealand, the Marquesas islanders, and the Hopi Indians, each of whom could claim uniqueness of geography, race, language, and religion. But each were conquered and absorbed by the racially and culturally hybrid colonial powers. Uniqueness was not a source of power for these isolated nations, and the number of their cases is sufficient to permit generalization. Isolation and uniqueness correlate with weakness, not strength. Why has uniqueness been held up as a source of pride by the Japanese?
As with all of social science's most significant questions, the answer to the question of what needs this myth fulfills is not easy or clear. But of the various possible answers, one of the most plausible follows from Pye's social psychological focus on the role of *associative sentiments* in the formation and maintenance of nations. From Pye's pshychoanalytical orientation, the myth of Japanese uniqueness can be seen as an cumulative form of collective compensation.

The Yamato legend-weavers were not unaware of their primitiveness as compared to Sinic civilization. All three of the sacred imperial regalia were of continental origin. But myth made it clear that they were brought down to Japan straight from heaven by Ninigi-no-Mikoto, the Grandson of Heaven and first Emperor of the Japanese.

The subsequent history of Japan's alternating exposure to and isolation from the more powerful and more advanced foreign empires might be read on this level as a traumatic conflict in its leaders' minds between native pride and the humbling if not humiliating knowledge that Japan depended on borrowing from foreigners for its cultural and political advancement. If Japan were merely separate from China and needed Chinese trade and influence to progress, why should it not accept the established role a tributary state? But if Japan was divinely unique, and thus transcendently superior to other
countries regardless of material evidence, then borrowing could be conducted without subservience. That choice made, all that remained was to find the evidence of Japanese uniqueness, and for this the happenstance of geography, race, language, and religion was admirably suited.

Perhaps it was the Chinese unwillingness to conceive non-Han peoples as anything but tributaries or barbarians that helped shape the Japanese desire for independence into an assertion of superiority based on uniqueness. To be independent of China and not be barbarians, Japan would have to be equal with China as another center of the world. But as this was a little too difficult to assert, even in myth, Japan could at least be the center of itself: unique, descended from heaven, and, for lack of other virtues to boast about, the Land of the Rising Sun.

What evidence can we offer to support this hypothesis of the compensatory origin of the Japanese uniqueness theory? Compensation itself is a psychoanalytical concept, and its diagnosis in even one subject is dependent on the psychoanalyst's interpretation of the subject's behavior and statements. Psychohistory and group analysis are even more difficult and tenuous processes, and the attempt to interpret elite motivations in fifth-through-eighth-century Japan is exponentially so. What sort of primary source evidence could we hope to exist that would support this hypothesis? Historians do not possess
an original editor's manuscript of the eighth century Nihon Shoki showing comments by the Imperial Council on History Textbook Revision such as, "too much on China; cut Korea link; play up Japanese descent from the gods." \[1\] The objective evidence that exists on this question is some historical records of the behavior and statements of early Japanese elites, and all that we can do is to subject the discrepancies revealed in this data to inductive analysis. For example, the Japanese Imperial court had to import Korean scribes to even write down its "history" in the Nihon Shoki, because too few Japanese could write. Yet the Korean scibes were set to writing myths of transcendent Japanese racial superiority to Koreans and Chinese, derived from their direct descent from the Gods. Is this not a rather curious inconsistency? And what besides some psychological process of collective compensation could explain this inconsistency? The logical alternatives are to consider the early Japanese courtseans to be fools or arrogant chauvinists (which their judicious borrowing of foreign culture indicates they were not) or to consider this inconsistency as no inconsistency at all (which means accepting the Japanese people as Sons of Heaven afterall). Within the scope of conjecture permitted by the limited data available, the compensation hypothesis has the considerable advantages of normative neutrality and logical plausibility over these alternative hypotheses.

If the divine descent myths helped early Japanese elites cope with doubts of national status and feelings of inferiority during the
centuries of cultural borrowing from China, Japan's armed resistance and the two kamikaze (God Wind) typhoons that destroyed the Mongol invasion fleets were seen as clear proof of Japan's superiority and divine connections that added great confidence to these early Japanese nationalistic sentiments. And we can observe that in both these peaceful and warlike phases of interaction with foreign nations the Japanese expressions of national pride were couched in terms of their race's special relationship to heaven. This early Japanese nationalistic sentiment fits Kohn's "Eastern" type of "messianic, chosen people" nationalism very closely, and it finds all too striking a parallel in Anthony Smith's related definition of the Greeks' "ethnocentric nationalism." Smith writes that:

"For the 'ethnocentric' nationalist, both 'power' and 'value' inhere in his cultural group. ... My group is the vessel of wisdom, beauty, holiness, culture; hence power automatically belongs as an attribute to my group. Whatever the factual distribution of power at a given time, real strength, being God-given, is not to the mighty of the earth, but to those who stand in a special relationship with the divine. So much the better, of course, if the facts correspond to this belief; but the reverse, my group's suffering, is to be construed as evidence of nothing except divine displeasure for human folly or sin. In the Greek context, the hubris of Xerxes, not Greek prowess, brings about the Great King's debacle. It is Zeus, who in Aeschylus' Persae overthrows Xerxes — the Greeks being mere intermediaries of his will."\(^{46}\)

By merely changing the terms "Greeks, Xerxes, and Zeus," in Smith's definition to fit Japan we obtain, "In the (Japanese) context, the
hubris of (the Mongols), not (Japanese) prowess, brings about (the Mongol's) debacle. It is (the Sun Goddess) who overthrows (the Mongols), the (Japanese) being mere intermediaries of (her) will.\textsuperscript{11} The facts of the situations were similar and the ethnocentric nationalist interpretations of these invaders' defeats are palpably similar too.

So behind the conventional "elements" of Japanese nationalism we see the compensatory myth of Japanese uniqueness; and behind this myth, the universal analytic type of archetypically ethnocentric nationalistic sentiment.

Basic Social Characteristics

Affecting Japanese Nationalism

We have discussed six more-or-less objective facilitative elements of Japanese nationalism (geography, race, language, religion, government, and culture), and one of its core values: the myth of Japanese uniqueness. But in addition to this myth, there are several major cultural traits of Japanese society that have had a very strong impact not on the origin and existence of nationalism in Japan but on its nature and specific characteristics. As the common factors cited in support of the uniqueness myth deal with the necessary existence of Japanese nationalism to the virtual exclusion
of its characteristics -- beyond it being "unique," "divine," etc. -- they can be very profitably supplemented with a discussion of Japanese social traits that affect the characteristics of Japanese nationalism.

As the sampling of titles from the "Japaneseness debate" at the beginning of this chapter illustrated, there is no shortage of theories concerning the key characteristics of Japanese society. This thesis will radically concentrate these diffuse foci of the existing theories to their level of greatest salience based on the author's 20 years of experience within Japanese society and his previous Japanese government publications in this field.\(^ {47}\) This concentrated view is that there are two fundamental characteristics that distinguish Japanese society from other societies throughout recorded history: the social structure of the non-kin tribe, and the psychological perception pattern of dualism. What the best of the Japanese texts on this question have so incisively analysed can be seen as facets of this single social whole. What Murakami, Kumon, and Sato call the \textit{ie} (household) society, what Nakane calls the \textit{tate} (vertical) society, and what Doi calls the society of \textit{amae} (dependency) all refer to the same Japanese social structure derived from the Yamato tribe and, to a lesser degree of salience, the dualist perception pattern.\(^ {48}\)
1. Tribalism

Few are the nations that do not love their families, and fewer are those that cannot claim a clan, tribe, or extended-family structure at some point in their cultural heritage. But far fewer still are modern nations that have seriously claimed to be "one big family" with a hereditary emperor as the nation's father at the head of a vast, hierarchical pyramid of patriarchal families. Call it hierarchical groupism, undemocratic collectivism, paternalistic factionalism, or whatever else, the particular characteristics of this Japanese social group structure have had an incalculable influence on the course of development and ultimate characteristics of traditional Japanese nationalism.

The extreme, wartime Japanese ideology of the sacred family-state deserves to be compared to Mussolini's Third Rome and Hitler's Third Reich. But its millenial roots in Japanese society were far deeper and firmer, far more forcefully taught and internalized, than those of these European totalitarian ideologies. Indeed, if we discount national differences in human courage as a workable explanation, the tremendous socializing power of Japan's totalitarian family-state ideology can be considered a prime explanation of ordinary Japanese troops' greater propensity to perform suicidal combat against foreign forces than any of their allies or enemies. 49
The roots of the Japanese tribal structure in the Yamato-era uji are as ancient as those of the Scots clan or the Indian extended family. What makes this structure of great importance is the widespread prevalence and continuance of its key social patterns in Japanese society up to the present day. The uji group developed from a primitive tribe into a non-kin "tribe" with fixed hierarchical roles and a patron deity. Uji were ruled by chiefs drawn from hereditary leading families, but grew to contain similarly-structured sub-units for specialized functions called "be," and members of these units had no blood relationship. The Yamato state was built up from these uji through military influence and new uji were integrated into Yamato culture through the incorporation of the uji deity into an appropriate level of the Shinto mythological hierarchy. The earliest term for the Japanese nation indicates something of this relationship. The first character in kokka means country or nation, while the second can mean house, home, family, or tribe. The ideal the Yamato state sought to actualize was a family-like union of tribes under the paternal leadership of the leading imperial family.

The uji would remain a topic of purely historic interest except for the fact that many of its tribal characteristics such as 1) group precedence, 2) the leader-follower dyad, 3) hierarchy, 4) factions, 5) paternalism, 6) vertical permeability, and 7) out-group hostility, have remained powerful social forces in Japanese groups throughout the centuries of court then local temple or strong-man rule, three
feudal shogunal dynasties, modernization, and total war, up into the Japanese politics, management, and academic faculties of today.

Briefly, and in great generalizations, Japanese society is first of all collectivist: it is most strongly marked by the group. Individuals find their identity and role in relation to their group and are usually flexible enough to change dramatically if they are forced to shift to another group or the group's policy changes. It is a terrible social offense to sakarau (literally go against, but more closely rebel or betray) against one's group. Secondly, Japanese groups tend to be formed by dyadic leader-follower relations. Traditional Japanese politicians find even today that voters' decisions are based on repeated nurturing face-to-face encounters to a greater degree than on ideology, party identification, legislative voting records, or results. In voter studies here influential politicians have the "broad face" to influence others (kao ga hiroi).

Third, given the logistical limits to face-to-face leadership, Japanese groups have well-defined hierarchical structures that relate rank and file members to the top leader through intermediary leaders. This hierarchical emphasis is so great in Japan that even the single Confucian relationship that is not hierarchical -- the faithfulness of friend to friend -- has been given a vertical slant in Japanese society. Here this relationship is sempai/kohai, senior/junior, based on the respective obligations of nurturance and dependency. Japanese
go to great trouble to ascertain or define who is the superior and inferior in a relationship, and the five levels of politeness in Japanese language reinforce these rankings. Hierarchies are so quickly established even among rank and file members entering the group simultaneously that Japanese managers in April 1986 were advising new company recruits at entrance ceremonies to "not fall behind your peers," from their very first day on the job. 50

Fourth, this extended hierarchical structure eventually reaches the point where loyalty to more immediate leaders takes precedence over loyalty to the top leader in the group, and factions form within the group or break off from it. Even in the case of the legally-binding supremacy of the family head over collateral family branches in prewar Japan, the collateral branches eventually escaped to form main lines of their own.

Fifth, within these groups paternalistic virtues (reinforced by, but predating, Confucianism) bind leaders (oyabun, parent-role) to be paternally benevolent and followers (kobun, child-role) to be filially loyal. This results in, sixth, a surprisingly permeable social system, considering the hierarchical feudal structure of the group, in which juniors feel free to, and do, take considerable initiatives in the name of and under the protection of the senior leader, whose main function is not the practical control and direction of the group but striving for its transcendent goal: continued group unity.
Seventh, relations with outside groups, however, tend to form a negative mirror-image of relations within the group. Outside groups are essentially threatening competitors that must be distrusted and are not necessary worth keeping commitments with. In cases where efforts at mediation between competing groups fail, and the out-group is judged to be hostile, communication is largely frozen, hatred forstalls any compromise, and feuds to the second and third generation can be carried on. In these cases of extreme group conflict the outsiders can be dehumanized and all sorts of verbal abuse or even (in rare cases) the use of violence against them can be seen as justified. This in-group/out-group barrier is very high and virtually permanenet, even among groups that merge on friendly terms. One can still hear Japanese executives gossiping that their colleagues who joined the firm in a merger over 20 years ago are just definitely "different."

Finally, the Japanese tribalistic group structure has proven to be very flexible and diffuse. I has not only been adapted to feudal, transitional, and modern political structures but has dominated traditional farming and fishing villages, prewar military cliques, postwar radical groups, small and large Japanese companies, trade organizations, sports teams, student groups, craft-works and flower-arranging schools, local mother's clubs, even Marxist cells and Christian churches. In short, this group structure is the pattern by which Japanese tend to organize themselves in almost any group
situation: traditional, modern, or spontaneous and experimental.

It goes without saying that the socialization of Japanese, at home, in school, and at work, is primarily training to function in this sort of group. And such an overwhelmingly dominant pattern of social interaction can hardly escape significantly affecting Japanese attitudes towards nationalism. Indeed, the relationship between the Japanese non-kin tribal group structure and Japanese nationalism is so close as to raise "chicken-and-egg" questions of which originated first. Our response is that while ideological Japanese nationalism later utilized this traditional social pattern for the purposes of propaganda and control, the social pattern of the non-kin tribe pre-existed Japanese nationalism by centuries if not millennia.

2. Dualism

A second fundamental Japanese social trait that influences traditional Japanese nationalism is what could be called "dualism." This refers to the historic and current tendency of Japanese to be able to support in their minds what are, in strictly logical terms, contradictions without the level of dissonance that this would create in an educated Westerner. The Japanese express this trait in phrases such as omote and ura (colloquially translatable as "up front" and "behind the scenes") in which the hidden, back side to every story is the true one. Tatemaе versus honne ("in principle, official position"
versus "true intent") is another common expression for the same set of assumptions according to which: if only one story is available something else must be true, if two different stories are known, the "hidden" one is more likely to be true, but that since things are always shifting anyway one might as well go talk to the person again to intuitively grasp their "true intentions." It is another chicken-and-egg question as to whether the remarkable capacity and propensity for vagueness in the Japanese language sprang from or caused this dualist mentality.

While it would be difficult to trace the origins of this cultural attribute, it is obvious that it finds considerable support in the Taoist teachings of the irrational, inscrutable nature of life which were introduced to Japan through Zen Buddhism. If everything is a mystery anyway, then telling a story is not lying; who knows, it might turn out to be the truth and what one thinks to be the truth might be the lie. A long history of rigid, protocol-ridden, feudal social relationships might also be a causal element for this dualism as such strictures tend to encourage propriety and decorum at the expense of frankness. And, in practical terms, the basic lack of trust between competing tribes is a strong reason for such prudence.

This dualist philosophy gives Japanese a great capacity to support public fictions. If everybody knows that the official position is only a facade, then anybody crude enough to say so seems a fool
-- and for seven centuries such subversive fools had their heads cut off. Public fictions are by no means unique to Japan. Taboos, shibboleths, and sacred cows are characteristics of civilizations around the world, and the West had its Holy Roman Empire. But even in this context the Japanese case is extreme. There is absolutely no equivalent in Japanese culture to the reward of honesty in the ending of the European folk tale "The Emperor's New Clothes." Under Tokugawa law a subordinate who informed on a superior was crucified -- whether his accusation was found true or false.

At the risk of delving deeper in conjecture, it can be wondered whether this ultimate Japanese preference for the hidden, mysterious, non-rational, and intuitive side of truth was not a major influence in the shaping of the mystical, totalitarian form of Shinto nationalism. One of the philosophical fathers of Shinto nationalism, Yamazaki Anzai (1618 – 1682) spent five years as a Zen priest before studying Confucianism and Shinto, and these continental influences have affected far more Shinto thinkers than care to publicise this "impure" influence in their lives. The result in point is a brand of Shinto thinking that merges everything -- gods, nature, the emperor, ancestors, man -- into a mystical whole in which the individuality or distinctness of any part is denied. Ike puts it in the terms in which it was taught "the gods, man, and nature were born of the same source and are therefore kin;" more conceptually: "In many ways nature, society, and self continued as a symbolically undifferentiated
area." While this philosophy is discussed in greater detail below, it is important to note its strong connection with the non-rational, intuitive side of Japanese conceptual dualism.

The Feudal Formation of Nationalist Sentiment

The Yamato myths of Japan's divine origin were written down in the early eighth century, first in garbled then in pure Chinese, and the wholesale importation of culture from China marked the Nara period during the rest of that century. But the Heian period that followed (794 - 1160 A.D.) saw a tapering off of borrowing from China and a state pulled apart by the diverging development of an exquisitely effete imperial court culture and the robust martial culture of the rural fiefs. The gap between this refined aristocratic decadence of the old imperial order and the vulgar agricultural and military vigor of the rising feudal order grew to the point where central control of the country was lost in a series of civil wars culminating in the famous Genji/Heike war (1180 - 1185 A.D.).

In fact, by Karl Deutsch's definition of peoplehood, which we use, Japanese in this period hardly could be considered a united people, let alone a nation. The "center" and "leading group" of the Yamato, Nara, and Heian courts had broken into many smaller centers and groups. There were many "sharp breaks in the possibilities of communication and substitution" between Japanese by class and
locality. There was little "complementarity of communication habits" between the court and the rural aristocracy, let alone the masses who were primarily serfs.

In the end it was the military rulers of the rural fiefs, the bushi or samurai, that reunified Japan as a feudal nation, and the seven centuries of their rule saw traditional Japanese nationalism develop from a compensatory myth into a strong nationalist sentiment (but not yet a modern nationalist ideology) under the strong stamp of feudal military rule.

The high cultural virtues of the Heian court -- delicacy, refinement, subtlety, sensitivity, emotionalism, love of nature, perfection of form -- left a cultural heritage that was later merged with the austere aesthetics of Zen to create a Japanese tradition of aesthetic art which is truly one of the treasures of the world. This Japanese high cultural tradition later came to be regarded with nationalistic pride as evidence of Japan's ancient cultural heritage, but unlike the similarly emotional, intuitive, nature-loving philosophy of the Nineteenth Century European Romantics (whose role is so emphasized by Hayes and Kedourie as the source of Liberal nationalism) the Heian court culture was not directly linked to a form of Japanese nationalism. The Heian court culture was effete and conservative, contemplative and inward-looking, not a dynamic, even revolutionary, cultural movement of middle class youth quite given to
heroic deeds and causes. While the Romantics drew their inspiration from the spirit of the folk, the Heian courtesans felt scant common identity with the Japanese masses -- the Genji monogatari depicts scenes of mutual shock when the courtesans journeyed through streets filled with commoners. Exquisite though its achievements were, the Heian court did not provide sufficient cultural or political leadership to even maintain Japan's Nara Period unity, and its era was marked by social and political disintegration of the nation into the more dynamic and robust units of rural feudal dynasties whose leaders arose from the masses by their wits and swords. In the end it was this feudal military culture that shaped the development of Japanese nationalistic sentiments into a conscious nationalism.

Six principal points can be raised concerning the effect of the feudal, military, samurai culture on Japanese nationalism during the Kamakura, Ashikaga, and Tokugawa Shogunates: 1) the length of samurai rule, 2) the Shogunal fiction, 3) feudal group structure, 4) samurai ethics, 5) openness/closedness, and 6) mercantilism.

First, the samurai ruled Japan for 705 years from the Heian court's effective loss of power in 1160 to the Imperial Restoration in 1868. Samurai effectively ruled through periods of ceaseless warfare and three major shogunal dynasties for all but three years of this time (Emperor Go-Daigo's self-restoration cum rebellion from 1333 to 1336). If the samurai origin of the ruling Meiji elite is counted,
samurai ruled Japan for 750 years up into this century.

Reischauer finds that the length of this rule, and particularly its fully-developed latter stage, shows one of the world's rare cases of "late feudalism," in which economic and political development lays the foundation for modern free enterprise and democracy. An opposing perspective is that the samurai were a self-appointed military regime, which in modern terms is a junta, and that seven and a half centuries of rule by juntas could be expected to leave a strong foundation for authoritarian and military rule in a developing nation. Both aspects of the samurai's long feudal rule have been played out in Japanese nationalism's later history.

Secondly, the samurai ruled under the fiction of serving in the name of the emperors, with their leader taking the traditional title of the emperor's Sei-i-tai-shogun, or "Barbarian-Quelling Generalissimo." The emperors were powerless, often impoverished, and virtually imprisoned; yet their line was maintained by shogunal subsidies as a symbol of tradition and legitimate authority. In how many cultures would dynasties of absolute rulers refrain from seizing the throne for seven centuries? In how many countries would successful attempts to restore power to the openly-recognized legitimate ruler occur only twice in seven centuries?
The Japanese cultural proclivity for dualist perception made this fiction perfectly acceptable. In fact, several shogun followed the examples of the emperors and set their heirs up as puppet shogun so that they could rule from "retirement" in a fiction within a fiction. This historical pattern of ruling in the name of a figurehead emperor, which was easily supported by Japanese dualist perception, was to cripple the growth of democratic rule in Japan until its total destruction in World War Two. The merchant classes and the democratic parties of the prewar era could agitate for greater democracy and even achieve surprising gains, but as long as the Imperial Army had the right of "Autonomous Command" based on their "direct command" by the emperor, and the clique of Imperial Advisors had powers as great as elected officials, Japanese democracy was haunted by the feudal ghosts of those ruling "in the name of the emperor."

Third, during the feudal era the old uji tribal system was developed into a social group structure that converted Japan into a unified state. The samurai bands that fought the civil wars and unified Japan were essentially non-kin tribes with all of the attributes described above. The shogunal governments they created accomplished a gradual imposition of similar hierarchical, loyalty-based social structures on all levels of Japanese society. During the Tokugawa period, this national pyramid of social groups developed into such a integrated system that even ordinary farmers
were organized in gonin-gumi, "groups of five (family heads)" which were collectively responsible for each other's loyalty, law-abidingness, taxes, etc.

In the feudal era we see for the first time a truly united Japanese people and nation that meet all of this study's analytic criteria for peoplehood and nationhood. By the end of the Tokugawa period an integrated economy and communications infrastructure had helped develop a clear consciousness of Japanese nationhood among several sectors of society.

Surprisingly, given the barriers of the class system inherent in feudalism, the feudal era even gave Japanese the some degree of vertical mobility. The imperial courts were forever splitting off collateral lines that moved down the social scale to become local rulers. Under samurai feudalism, however, a good man with a sword could rise from the minor nobility to supreme power like Hojo Tokimasa, Ashikaga Takauji, Oda Nobunaga, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, or even rise to the top from peasant origins like (Toyotomi) Hideyoshi. 56 The samurai class became increasingly hereditary and exclusive in eras when fighting men were in lesser demand, and the Tokugawa made rigid laws enforcing class segregation in part to impede the rise of ambitious outsiders like themselves. But, ironically, the development of the money economy and the rise of the merchant/banker class in the Tokugawa era gave these commoners
confined to economic activity an even higher degree of general access to power in the later Tokugawa era. This combination of a rigid system of hierarchically social discipline with a degree of vertical permeability for scholars and the wealthy merchant class was an valuable asset in the Japan's economic and political modernization.

Fourth, the samurai themselves developed from a rough warrior class into an educated elite of bureaucratic managers during the feudal era. While there was great variation between the different eras and the different ranks of samurai, by the end of the seventeenth century an illiterate samurai was considered to be seriously behind the times. In a strategy to indoctrinate loyalty as well as keep his samurai occupied, Tokugawa Ieyasu encouraged his samurai to study, and his son Hidetada ruled in the Laws Governing Military Households that "'the arts of peace on the left hand, and the arts of war on the right,' both must be mastered."  

The Confucian education that resulted from this law gave the samurai a classical framework in which to identify and express their warrior ethic. And while the arts of war quickly gave way to the arts of peaceful administration, the ethics of the warrior class were refined and guarded in conviction and ritual. Some of their emphasis on loyalty, duty, honor, initiative, diligence, frugality, and education seeped down to the lower classes, and by the end of the Tokugawa period an estimated 40 to 50 percent of boys and 15 percent
of girls in Japan were receiving some formal schooling: an achievement well ahead of most European states of the time and another very valuable asset for national modernization.

Fifth, the feudal era saw Japan's earlier pattern of alternating openness and closedness to Sinic influence develop into clear national policies. China and Korea were always there to be raided or traded with, but by the late Heian period Japan had finally developed enough indigenous culture not to depend overwhelmingly on China for its progress as it had been in the Nara and earlier periods. Under the unified shogunal governments the question of trade with China became a question of national policy framed in a nationalist context -- should Japan accept tributary status in order to expand trade, or should follow its own course without the Chinese benefits?

In contrast to the Kamakura period's relative closedness, trade grew again during the Ashikaga era. The weaker Ashikaga shogunate at first accepted tributary status in return for trade benefits, then rejected it under the reign of Yoshimochi in a message to the Ming dynasty rulers that is rich in significant phrasing for our study of Japanese nationalism:

"... the gods of supreme power made a revelation through an oracle. They stated that from the time of the nation's founding, no person had ever degraded himself and his nation so far as to style himself 'a subject of a foreign nation.' Yoshimitsu ignored traditions and violated the laws of our sacred
sovereigns of former days. ... This (change of policy) is not because we depend upon the geographical advantage of our country's being surrounded by vast waters, but because we desire to obey the instructions of our gods."

The advent of European traders and missionaries added a new element to this dilemma, because the guns they brought were of far greater appeal to Japan's military leaders than the copper coins and artifacts from China. Oda Nobunaga imported guns, Christianity, and Western learning enthusiastically to aid his rise to power. But Hideyoshi and later Tokugawa Ieyasu sought to restabilize the situation by stamping out Christianity and limiting trade to a trickle through the narrow bridge-head at Dejima. The Tokugawa policy of near-total isolation helped create a stable, self-contained Japan for 267 years. And this was the final, feudal crucible in which the various core elements of early Japanese nationalist sentiment were forged.

The sixth and final major point on the feudal formation of Japanese nationalist sentiment can be mentioned almost as a note: Japan's trade policy during the feudal era was a mercantilist policy. Whereas earlier governments had traded anything available for China's cultural riches, the feudal Japanese governments had a great need for liquidity and went to great efforts to limit the export of Japanese specie while importing Chinese coinage. Oda Nobunaga reduced the need for Chinese coinage by minting Japanese gold and
silver coins from his new-found mines, and Tokugawa Ieyasu forbid
the export of this specie by imposing strict quotas on its use in trade
with the Dutch at Dejima and the Chinese at Nagasaki. Fine crafted
Japanese swords, raw sulfur, and later dried sea-goods from northern
Japan were used as Japanese commodity exports to obtain foreign
currency (and later, goods) while conserving the gold at home.

SUMMARY

In this section we have reviewed the high points of the
Japanese nation's political and economic development from a disunited
clustering of farming tribes in the fourth century A.D. into the
world's largest, longest-lasting, most peaceful, and (arguably) best
governed feudal nation in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. We have only touched on Japan's parallel cultural
development from illiteracy and cultural and technological dependence
on China and Korea, in the fourth to eighth centuries, into a nation
with one of the world's most sophisticated, distinctive, and
self-sufficient cultures by the end of the Tokugawa period. Such
outstanding achievements would not have been possible without some
sense of nationality among the Japanese leading classes -- but was
this nationalism?

Tokugawa Japan was undoubtedly a state by most criteria. And
it possessed the basic objective conditions that facilitate modern
nation-building: a clearly defined geographical area, a relatively homogenous people, a largely common language, and a common native religion. In addition, it posessed three fundamental social and psychological elements that directly encouraged and rewarded the mutual association of the Japanese people. First and foremost the Japanese people had a common associative sentiment expressed in their myths, which they believed to be both religion and history, of their direct descent from the gods through the Grandson of Heaven and the imperial line -- regardless of their diverse ethnic and racial origins the Japanese people believed themselves to have a common ancestor, and a god at that. Second, the Japanese people from the earliest times had the common social structure of the hierarchical, paternalistic, non-kin tribe -- regardless of their regional or class diversity they were able to work effectively together. Third, and to a lesser degree of salience, the Japanese tended to have a psychological perception pattern which was marked by its easy acceptance of dualist thinking -- their thought process was flexible and adaptable.

It is doubtful that Japanese had their great commonalities much in mind, except when exposed to foreigners. But then, whatever the time or situation -- cultural borrowing, defense against invasion, trading expeditions sent abroad and rejected from abroad -- they tended to reassert their separateness from all other peoples. And they expressed this separateness in terms of their native myths: their uniqueness as sons of heaven guaranteed not only their difference
from foreigners but their superiority to them -- regardless of any observable evidence. We can conclude, then, that the Japanese people had developed by the end of the Tokugawa period a clear nationalistic sentiment of separateness from and superiority to foreigners which was regularly revealed in their contact with non-Japanese.

But was this nationalism? By the definition of this thesis, it was not. Tokugawa Japan was certainly a state, but it was a feudal state composed of powerful hereditary feudal fiefs. Significant geographical separation, differences of dialect, and rigid laws on occupation and travel raised high barriers to the free vertical substitution of individuals within fiefs and to their free horizontal substitution between fiefs. In a strict class society there was supposed to be little hope for significant personal advancement; the fief's prosperity was not directly linked to the commoner's prosperity because about half of its annual revenue was spent in Edo (Tokyo) and the prosperity of other fiefs in the closed and competitive economic system of Tokugawa Japan was merely a threat to the relative standing of the home fief (and thus a threat of increased taxation). A commoner's identity was a class/fief identity -- if pushed, a "non-foreign" or Japanese identity -- but there was little connection between his personal fate and the fate of the fief or nation.
Thus, in Tokugawa Japan there was a strong, latent nationalist sentiment, but no conscious nationalist ideology "linking the personal rewards of identity and advancement to the growth of a nation-state." Even at this late and well-developed stage in Japanese history, we find only the Core Values of traditional Japanese nationalism: a nationalistic sentiment of uniqueness-cum-superiority, a tribalistic social structure, and a dualist perception pattern.

But this situation was increasingly altered with the gradual breaking down of the feudal system during the later years of the Tokugawa era. The rising merchant class escaped much control and financed innovative art and drama. Education spread, and educated commoners and samurai alike began to take interest in different regions of Japan. Travelogues and picture sets such as Hiroshige's "Fifty-two Scenes of the Tokaido (road)" met this rising interest and strengthened conscious Japanese national identity. Scholars began publishing nationalistic theories of government which were scarcely-disguised calls for liberalization and reform. Finally, young, educated, low-class-samurai from the rural fiefs chafed under outmoded feudal restrictions at home and perceived insults from abroad to the point of launching a nationalist revolution that opened a new era.
II. The Imperial Restoration

A Layer of Political Religion

It is easy to fix the date of the Imperial Restoration as January 3, 1868 and to attribute it directly to the arrival of Commodore Perry's ships off of Japan. But almost fifteen years elapsed between Perry's first visit and the fall of the Tokugawa bakufu, and it fell not to pro-foreign forces but to an anti-foreign army from two rural fiefs that rebelled in the name of an anachronistic nativist ideology. It is more plausible to view the foreign ships as a catalytic factor and the more fundamental causes of the bakufu's fall as its own decay and a revolutionary nationalist philosophy that had been developing for over a century. The parallels with Kedourie's Virus Model of the philosophical origins of nationalist movements based on the European experience are quite revealing.

1. The Virus Model

Kedourie argues that the root cause of nationalist movements was Kantian philosophy, and that all other nationalisms were "derived" from this European experience. While there is little evidence that Japan's Meiji restoration was inspired by the German Romantics, the parallels of the other factors with Kedourie's model are quite close: a revolutionary nationalist philosophy vitalizes a
group of romantic young proto-elites to sweep away the old order.

In Japan's case the philosophical revolution was not Kantian, but the work of the Kokugaku (national learning) school that developed a nativist reaction to Tokugawa state (Teishu) Confucianism during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. There is general agreement in both Japanese and Western intellectual histories of the Tokugawa era on the importance of this movement and the various Japanese sages who played important roles in it by first defending, then extending, the role of the Japanese emperor within the context of Tokugawa era philosophy. 62

Yamazaki Anzai (1618 - 1682) moved from Zen to Confucianist to Shinto belief during his lifetime and is famous for his statement that a Japanese Confucian's duty would be to defend his country even against Confucius and Mencius. 63 Kumazawa Banzan (1619 - 1691) argued that "In order for a man born without civilization to govern the land, he must respect the ancient rites, cherish the ancient music, hold the imperial court in reverence, and teach the duty of sovereign to subject to the land." 64 He died in exile. 65 Yamaga Soko (1662 - 1685) marked a further stage in the development of Japanese nationalist thought when he dared to state what his ancestors had not stated: Japan, not China, was the Middle Kingdom. He died in exile. 66 His reasons were that:
1) "In this realm, from the Age of the Gods to the present day, the blood-line of Amaterasu, the true lineage, has never varied even for one generation."

2) "While the valor of this realm is feared even in foreign countries, as for attempts by foreign countries to invade this one, not even one spot has ever been taken by them. This shows that foreign countries can not match our use of military equipment, cavalry, or weapons; nor the excellence of our troops, tactics, or strategy. Does this military prowess not excel all within the four seas?"

3) "Wisdom, Benevolence, and Courage are the three virtues of the sages. . . . Now, with regard to these three virtues, if we compare this land with foreign lands, minutely noting each item of evidence, this country is far superior."

Finally, Tokugawa Mitsukuni, the head of a Tokugawa branch family based in Mito, gathered a group a scholars in 1657 to begin the compilation of a massive history of Japan, Dai Nihon Shi, in competition with the official Tokugawa history of Japan by the Hayashi family of Teishu Confucianists. The Mito history, which was only completed by his distant descendents, also placed emphasis on the divine descent of the imperial line and (under the influence of a Chinese editor who was a loyal follower of the Chinese Ming emperor) the importance of loyalty to the throne.

These nationalistic Confucianists of the seventeenth century were followed by a group of anti-Confucian nationalist thinkers in the eighteenth century. Interest in commentaries on early Japanese literary texts sparked by the Mito school led Shinto priests such as Kada Azumamaro (1699 – 1736) and Kamo Mabuchi (1697 – 1769) to
study early Japanese writings such as the *Manyoshu* as a source of
the "pure" Japanese spirit "unpolluted" by Chinese influence. Kamo
blurred the idealization of Japanese mythology into an idealization
of early (pre-Sinic) Japanese society as well, writing that:

"While the Chinese for ages past have had a
succession of different dynasties to rule over them,
Japan has been faithful to one uninterrupted line of
sovereigns. Every Chinese dynasty was founded upon
rebellion and patricide. Sometimes a powerful ruler
was able to transmit his authority to his son and grandson,
but they in their turn were inevitably deposed and murdered,
and the country was in perpetual state of civil war. A philosophy which
produced such effects must be founded on a false system."

Kamo's ignoring of the 56-year rupture between the Northern
and Southern Japanese Imperial dynasties (in which the "legitimate"
Southern dynasty became extinct) and the equal if not greater
applicability of his description to the history of short and violent
Japanese samurai dynasties than to the millenial dynasties of China
comes from his belief that the "pure" emperors rule transcendentally
regardless of the actions of the shogunal dynasties. As such it is a
pure example of Japanese dualist philosophy. Kamo's disciple, Motoori
Norinaga (1730 - 1801) further developed this nationalist school's
thinking by stressing the non-rational, emotional sides of Japanese
character and advocating the myth-based ethic of the "True Way" of
the Japanese based on an idealization of Yamato life found in
Japanese literature.
The final stage in this slowly developing philosophical revolution, for which the simple tag is anti-bakufu and pro-emperor, came in the early nineteenth century from a scholar in the revived school at Mito. The "later" Mito school was started at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the sixth lord of Mito, Tokugawa Harumori, and its product of greatest influence was not its Dai Nihon Shi, then entering the third century since its production began (the project's founder had commanded "An excess of detail is preferable to excess brevity"). Its greatest contribution was a short book by Aizawa Yasushi in 1825, Shinron "A New Theory," based on the school's motto shinju-funi (Shinto and Confucianism are one).

In Shinron Aizawa made the innovation of combining the meaning of the early Yamato term kokka (literally "nation-family") with the later term kokutai (literally "nation-body") that was coined by Kitabatake Chikafusa (1295 - 1354). According to Aizawa, the emperor was not only the divinely-descendent head of the Japanese nation, but the supreme "father" of every Japanese family, and thus equally superior to every Japanese, regardless of feudal status. This application of the earlier tribal/ethnic conception of nationalism to the more structural term still in use today defined a new non-feudal relationship between Japanese. Japanese were no longer separated from the emperor and heaven by the feudal chain of command, but intimately and mystically united with everything in a "family-state" that included the gods as kin! Aizawa combined the Shinto role of the
Sun Goddess with the Confucian role of Heaven; the Shinto sacred emperor with the Confucian legitimate and virtuous emperor, all in the enveloping concept of the kokutai.

In view of the company his ideas were to come to keep, there is a tendency to characterize Aizawa's views as enlightened and sophisticated, but they had their share of raw nativist hubris. In the preface to Shinron Aizawa writes (emphasis added):

"Japan's position at the vertex of the earth makes it the standard for the nations of the world. Indeed, it casts its light over the world, and the distance which the splendid imperial influence reaches knows no limits. . . .

our Divine Land is situated at the top of the earth. Thus, although it is not an extensive country spacially, it reigns over all quarters of the world, for it has never once changed its dynasty or its form of sovereignty. . . .

As for the land amidst the seas which the Western barbarians call America, it occupies the hindmost region of the earth; thus, its people are stupid and simple, incapable of doing things.

These are all according to the dispensation of nature. Thus, it stands to reason that the Westerners, by committing errors and overstepping their bounds, are inviting their own downfall. . . .

(but) Unless great men appear who rally to the assistance of Heaven, the whole natural order will fall victim to the predatory barbarians, and that will be all."/4

Aizawa called for the emperor to assert his leadership over the shogun and added a specific plan for strengthening Japan's defenses
against the encroaching foreigners. In good Confucian scholarly tradition, Aizawa gave a motto summing up his point, and son-no-jo-i "revere the emperor, expell the barbarians" became the rallying cry of imperial loyalists in their struggle against the Tokugawa bakufu. Shinron was widely pirated from circulated drafts and became a manifesto for the restoration movement. Indeed, it was held that a shishi (loyalist) was not even serious unless he possessed a personal copy of Shinron.75

We should bear in mind that up to this point this discussion of the restoration's philosophical roots has reflected the intellectual historian's perspective that one eloquent iconoclast is worth ten thousand anonymous conformists, and that the thinkers and thoughts we have mentioned up until here had limited circulation and miniscule direct impact. But with Aizawa's Shinron this condition changed.

Aizawa's book had an intellectually catalyzing effect throughout the country. It more clearly set the followers of the Mito school against the supporters of the bakufu. It made the bakufu more suspicious than ever of the court. It was taught in han (fief) schools in many parts of Japan and significantly shaped the thought of key teachers such as Yoshida Shoin in Choshu and pupils (of his) such as future Prime Ministers Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, and councillor Kido Koin. Aizawa's Shinron had the effect of helping to awaken and give voice and direction to the long-latent sentiments of
dissatisfaction with the bakufu and a wish for the legitimacy of a stronger empirical role.

Point by point the Japanese case fits the sequence of the Virus Model quite tightly. (1) A philosophical revolution (2) in a moribund social order (3) fires popular feelings of discontent (4) into a revolutionary nationalism (5) that spreads like an epidemic and (6) sweeps the old order away. And what sector does Kedourie's Virus model predict will be first affected? It is a proto-elite of educated but fairly low-class boys with great hopes that could only be satisfied through the destruction of the repressive old social order. The very first statement of the new Meiji government's policy, the imperial "Five Articles Oath" of April 6, 1868, expresses this aspect of these ambitious young men's motivation for reform: "Article 3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may be no discontent."76

2. The Rebound Model

Let us look at such a young, rural, lower-rank samurai group that became Japan's reforming elite, through the perspective of Smith's Rebound Model. Ito, Yamagata, and Koin mentioned directly above were among the thirty to forty of Yoshida Shoin's eighty Choshu country-boy pupils during a four-year period that attained high
ranks of nobility or court after the Restoration, and the "best" students in the class mostly died in achieving the Restoration. Such astoundingly disproportionate achievements by a small, well-defined group marked by common origin and training is a phenomenon to which only Elite Analysis can adequately be applied.

Anthony Smith indicates that reforming elites, as opposed to "assimilationists," are frequently conservative and defensive. They are conservative because they strive to restore the old order to glory; they are defensive because their motive in tampering with the old order is to defend it against some threat.

What about the case of these Choshu proto-elites who led the Restoration with heroic zeal? They were from a rural, culturally backward fief, where the samurai's martial arts were still fighting skills, not aesthetic exercise routines. Goto Shojiro from Tosa, another vigorous rural fief, once leapt off his horse and decapitated a fleeing assassin with a single stroke of his sword -- "a feat," Sansom notes, that cannot "be performed without practice." 78

Were the reforming elite of the Restoration fanatical ideologues supporting rule by the imperial court? Or were they cynical pragmatists who used the nativistic son-no jo-i sentiment as a pretext to stage a modernizing revolution? Machiavelli would have praised them for their astuteness if they were the latter, for he advised all
princes that: "He who ... attempts to reform the government of a state ... must at least retain the semblance of the old forms; so that it may seem to the people that there has been no change in the institutions, even though in fact they are entirely different from the old ones." 79

But this dichotomy of sincere belief/cynical opportunism is too Western a dichotomy to impose on these late Tokugawa Choshu samurai. Their logic and ethics from both the Confucian and nationalist-Shinto sources stressed that ideals caused action, that right action came from right thinking. They applied the pragmatic distinction between what is and what ought to be, but the thought that true belief could lead to false actions or true actions result from false belief would have been heresy to them.

The actual mixture of ideology and pragmatism in their motivations must have varied with every man of them at every stage in his life, and its study will serve as a source of debate for ages. Within the Meiji elites we can easily identify leaders who seem to rather closely fit both of Smith's categories of tradition-minded reformers (i.e. Saigo Takamori of Satsuma) and Western-looking modernizers (i.e. Ito Hirobumi). But the best working answer to the question of whether the Meiji reformers were pragmatists or idealists seems to be that they, as individuals and as a group, were neither one nor the other, but very sincerely both.
They were essentially conservative reformers, reactionary rebels, rebelling against the old order in the name of even older virtues. And they posessed all the contradictions that these terms imply. Yoshida's curriculum was based on the ancient ethical principle of kun-shin no gi (duty of lord and subject) and the no less ancient trditional principle of ka-i no ben (discrimination of civilized and barbarian). The first principle demanded the restoration of the emperor to power in order to achieve the harmony of a legitimate state: it was looked back to the idealized Yamato era as the model for Japan. The second principle demanded modern coastal defenses and a modernized social system to support them in order to repel the barbarian incursions: it looked forward into the unknown when Japan would be able to defend itself.

What were they defending Japan against? Here we find clear answers. Yoshida wrote "But what sort of times are prevailing throughout the land? Kun-shin no gi has not been considered for some six hundred years; and now, in the present day, Ka-i no ben has been discarded along with it ..." The enemies of the Japanese state, as they saw them, were both the threatening foreigners and the hidebound bakufu that was impotent in stopping them.
3. The Mercantilist Model

But there was a far more objective, collective motivation for the Meiji Restoration than the subjective factors of a nationalist philosophical revolution and the dissatisfaction of excluded elites -- this was the threat of colonization by the Western Imperialist powers. An objective threat (as opposed to a subjective, perceived threat) is one that will produce material damages if left unopposed. And given the English, French, and German imperialist policies in China at the time of the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese had every reason to fear that a similar fate awaited them. Japan was no stronger militarily than the other Asian nations who suffered colonization, yet it was able to rapidly detect and comprehend the threat and take an astute policy of combining compromise and concession with armament and modernization in order to successfully protect its independence. What accounted for this difference in the conceptual preparedness of the Japanese to resist colonization? Its own long experience with Mercantilism is one factor which is difficult to deny.

News of conditions in the European colonies in China had long reached Japan by the closing years of the Tokugawa era, and curious Japanese could learn more than they wanted about the humiliations of the unequal treaties from the Chinese traders at Nagasaki as well as the Dutch at Dejima. Territorial cession, extraterritoriality, foreigner-fixed tariffs, foreign opium sales, the drain of specie, and
the flood of cheap manufactured goods all were known to be the regular consequences of failing to expel the barbarians.

The awareness of these economic dangers was perhaps even higher among the Choshu han because it was one of the few han to have developed a successful mercantilist economy. Tremendous economic development had occurred during the Tokugawa era, but much of it was despite, instead of because of, the bakufu's administration. The sankin-kotai system of forced alternating residence in Edo and the fief cost the Choshu han government about half of its expenditures throughout the Tokugawa era.² To finance these expenses the han needed cash, but the old system of measuring hans' wealth in rice and the relative difficulty for rural fiefs to convert it into money through the Osaka merchants led to cash shortages and over half of the han were in debt by the early nineteenth century.

One solution was to focus the han's economic efforts on the development of cash crops. And in this regard Choshu's monopolies on salt, oil, paper, wax, cotton fiber and cloth, indigo dye, etc., helped revenues. But the greatest source of the han's economic solvency (a rare strength at that time) was its accidental discovery of a primitive means of public sector capital formation and deficit financing. The Choshu bu-iku kyoku (samurai-nurturing office) was an independent financial agency within the han government which
managed a compulsory savings plan that invested its capital in the han monopolies as well as other businesses, made limited benevolent contributions to needy samurai families, and, most importantly, acted as an emergency fund for the han. At the same time it built up this fund, the han borrowed heavily to make further investments and merely kept servicing its debt. Its skillful use of the century-long inflation reduced the real value of its debts, while its combination of state capital with state monopoly privileges produced profitable investments.  

The success of the Choshu han's mercantilist policies was such that it accumulated a war-chest of silver and gold that was sufficient to buy Western cannons and warships for cash as well as pay for all the modern rifles and supplies that Ito, Yamagata, the other young samurai in their rifle brigades with the regular Choshu army put to use in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate. Even after this expense the han reputedly possessed a huge sum of 71,600 kan of silver of which it turned over 70 percent to the imperial court.

A successful mercantilist han (to the extent possible under the sankin-kotai system) that was astute enough to profit from combining its state capital with its economic regulatory power was certainly well aware of how its economy could be destroyed if foreign traders were allowed to fix tariffs low to dump their manufactures and extract without limits its silver and gold. And the fate of the
Japanese economy even under the non-colonial unequal treaties it was forced to sign attests to the objectivity of the Japanese nationalist fear that unless Japan reformed politically and modernized economically and militarily it would be exploited and damaged by the Imperialist Powers. Just as they feared, after the bakufu signed its first new commercial treaty with the United States in 1854 and a commercial treaty drafted by Townsend Harris in 1858, foreign traders exported huge amounts of Japanese gold by selling imported silver, arbitraging the Japanese rate of 1 for 6 and the world rate of 1 for 15. Their keen demand for specific products such as silk and tea disrupted domestic price structures. The most-favored-nation clause gave all foreign countries the benefit of a low, five percent Japanese tariff, and industrial manufactures such as cotton fabrics destroyed many traditional Japanese industries in an objective apparition of the threats of the centuries-old "fear of goods." 85

4. A Political Religion

Our review of the historical data on the events leading up to the Meiji Restoration from the perspectives of our framework of theories of nationalism has revealed several crucial factors which the Japanese nationalist revolution had in common with other nationalist revolutions. We have discussed the subjective factor of a nationalist philosophical revolution in terms of Kedourie's Virus Model. We have discussed the factor of the rebellion of a reforming traditionalist elite
in terms of Smith's Rebound Model. And we have discussed the objective motivation for national economic defense in terms of the Mercantilist model. What remains to be analysed is the specific form and content of the nationalist revolutionary doctrine that fueled the Meiji Restoration. And here we find both close parallels with European cases (in the form of the revolutionary doctrine) and great contrasts with the European cases (in the content of the revolutionary doctrine). We will now analyse this subject from the perspectives of the Political Religion in Apter's Reformist Elite Model, and Hayes' description of the Jacobin Political Religion.

David Apter points out that reforming elites of autocratic modernizing states need to "replace older belief about forms of allegiance," and that "A more powerful symbolic force, less rational, although it may include rational ends, seems necessary . . . ." A political religion can fulfill this need by affecting "the most fundamental ends of individuals by specifying . . . the permissible definitions of individual continuity, meaning, and identity."86

The Meiji Restoration elite's main purposes were to unite and defend Japan. To do this, six centuries of hierarchical feudal loyalties had to be replaced with a sense of Japanese national loyalty. The philosophical theory that achieved this transition was already there in the Shinron's assertion of unity in the person of the emperor. As discussed in the previous section on the Core Values of
Japanese nationalism, both the millenial Japanese nationalistic myths of the common Japanese folk ancestor and of the Japanese people's descent from the gods were tied up in the person of the emperor. But something happened that changed these long-latent beliefs into a firebrand revolutionary credo. Somehow the millenial Core of Japanese nationalistic sentiment was transformed into a conscious nationalist ideology. What gave this philosophy revolutionary force was a Political Religion that fused Aizawa Yasushi's nationalist political philosophy with Hirata Atsutane's radical nationalistic Shinto religion. And it was this nationalist Political Religion that spread like an epidemic among politically sensitive social strata and destroyed the 260-year-old Tokugawa shogunate in just a few battles and years.\(^\text{67}\)

Hirata Atsutane (1776 – 1843) was the leading expounder of this ultranationalistic form of Shinto religion. Although enrolled as a "posthumous pupil" in Motoori Norinaga's school of Shinto literature, Hirata came to be considered his leading pupil.\(^\text{68}\) He used the school's advanced scholarship on the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki plus an eclectic selection of books including Christian books smuggled from China to frame a set of Shinto principles that served to unify its two major branches that had been divided since the fifteenth century. His ideas were taught to all Shinto novice-priests from 1823, and as the closest doctrine to a theology that Shinto has posessed, they have had immense influence on traditional Japanese nationalism from their
enunciation at least until the end of World War Two.

Concerning Hirata's scholarship, Tsunoda, de Bary, and Keene state that

"Hirata's zeal at times was so great as to transgress the bounds of rationality and even of honesty. He seriously interrogated frauds who claimed to have visited the moon or to have lived among the mountain elves, noting with satisfaction whenever their statements confirmed Shinto doctrine. He declared that Japanese had writing before its introduction from China and produced as evidence a script which proved to be the fifteenth-century Korean alphabet. The fact that the ancient Japanese chronicles make no mention of the Flood, so prominently described in the Bible, led Hirata to assert that this was proof that Japan is situated higher than all the inundated countries. These and many other instances leave us wondering whether he was intellectually dishonest or merely over-credulous."

Be that as it may, Hirata's doctrines are in parts wildly nativistic (emphasis added):

"People all over the world refer to Japan as the Land of the Gods, and call us the descendants of the gods. Indeed, it is exactly as they say: our country, as a special mark of favor from the heavenly gods, was begotten by them, and there is thus so immense a difference between Japan and all the other countries of the world as to defy comparison.

we, down to the most humble man and woman, are descendants of the gods.

Nevertheless, there are unhappily many people who do not understand why Japan is the Land of the Gods and we their descendants . . . Is this not a
lamentable state of affairs?

*Japanese differ completely from and are superior to the peoples of China, India, Russia, Holland, Siam, Cambodia, and all other countries of the world...*  

It was the gods that formed all the lands of the world at the Creation, and these *gods were without exception born in Japan.*...  

This is a matter of universal belief, and is quite beyond dispute."  

Two of the four traditional elements of Japanese uniqueness -- geography and race -- are mentioned here, the language's purity and uniqueness is mentioned elsewhere, and the supreme and unique truth of the Way of Shinto, under the Son of Heaven, is the idee fixe running through Hirata's work.

This potent mixture of nationalist scholarship from the Mito school and pathetically chauvinist religion from official Shinto can be viewed as the political religion that fired the Meiji Restoration. It asserted the sacredness of the Japanese nation, explained the reasons for its current weakness, showed the course for its salvation, and, most of all, nurtured its adherents in an irrational, intoxicating, mystical union with society, nature, and the gods.

The "men of spirit," *shishi*, who cut down unarmed Westerners in the streets and sleeping Japanese leaders in their homes or inns were not criminally-motivated assassins, but fanatical ideologues who
were motivated by this political religion to sacrifice anything (especially their opponents' lives) to advance its cause: to restore the emperor and expel the barbarians. In this they were not unlike the French Jacobins (only 70 years earlier) who guillotined without mercy to establish liberty, equality, and fraternity, and to expel the aristocrats. In this they were not unlike the radical Shiite Fundamentalists of the Iranian Islamic Republic (only 110 years later) who have not spared lives to restore "true Islam" and to expel their various "satans."

But the elite leaders of the Restoration generally had more sophisticated understandings of the nationalist movement they were leading, and they quickly adapted their slogan to "restore the emperor, down with the bakufu," when they saw that Japan's long-term strength depended on initial foreign contacts -- especially importing guns. They were nationalists, yes, but not of the fanatical religious type. They were pragmatists prepared to make use of any weapon, native or imported, to succeed. The very tactics that won the war against the bakufu illustrate this pragmatic mixture: rifle corps trained and armed on Western lines fighting to restore the Son of Heaven.
SUMMARY

Thus, in the late Tokugawa period leading up to the Meiji Restoration, we can observe a new layer of nationalist perception and belief develop over the ancient core values of Japanese nationalism. An inward-looking philosophy abetted by isolationism laid renewed emphasis on Japanese "uniqueness" and reinforced this millenial metaphysical belief-system through which any contrary evidence could be denied. The concept of the Japanese tribal nation was revived and glorified in opposition to feudal society through the superimposition of Shinto concepts of the *kokutai* and the Son of Heaven on Confucian political and ethical philosophy. The same dualism that led Japanese masses to unquestioningly accept the rule of the shogun in the names of puppet emperors for seven centuries let them accept the contradictions that Japan was the ruling nation of the earth and at the same time in dire peril of colonization, that Japan's survival depended on "restoring" the legitimate imperial rule that had not existed for almost eight centuries. The mystical side of dualist perception gave religious power to this philosophy, and the reformers of the Meiji Restoration were sometimes wrapped in an almost euphoric sense of oneness with nature and society as they pursued with rational or fanatical devotion the goal to restore the emperor and destroy the *bakufu*. This layer of nationalist political religion, summed up in the emperor cult, capped the centuries of development of a Japanese nationalist sentiment with a clear, although not yet
widely-held, nationalist ideology.

Unlike the Core Values of Japanese nationalism, which were only nationalistic sentiments, the **Layer of the Political Religion was Japan's first conscious, nationalist ideology**. It was not only a set of sentiments but a clear ideology "linking the personal rewards of identity and advancement to the growth of a nation-state." The imperial loyalists of the Meiji Restoration were nationalists in the precise sense of our definition: they held that supreme loyalty to the Japanese **nation** (as opposed to the lower level of aggregation of the feudal Tokugawa fiefs) was the best and only means of defending Japan against colonization and giving all Japanese the opportunity for advancement.

This political religion of *kokutai* and the emperor cult that was formed during the late Tokugawa period and came to be established as Japan's official state religion of State Shinto after the Restoration. While the nationalist elites failed in their attempts to propagate it among the Japanese peasantry during the Meiji era's initial period of Westernizing modernization, they succeeded in reviving and strengthening this nationalist political religion through the use of modern propaganda tactics in order to support a nationalist modernizing ideology from the 1890's. Then, after another period of decline in the 1910's, this political religion finally recrudesced as Japanese ultranationalism and was Japan's official ideology up until
the end of World War Two. It was a central aspect of traditional Japanese nationalism which drew directly from the millenial core of Japanese nationalistic sentiment and was, in turn, redefined and carried on in the succeeding layer of Japanese nationalism, the Modernizing Ideology.

III. The Middle Meiji Era:
A Layer of Modernizing Ideology

The Meiji Restoration has been almost universally considered the dividing line between traditional and modern Japan. But as postwar Japan nears a half-century of stability, democracy, and unprecedented economic achievement, there will be an increasing tendency to place another dividing line at August 1945 and to view the 77-year period between the Imperial Restoration and Imperial Japan's surrender as a transition stage between traditional and modern Japan. The dominant theme of Japanese history in this period -- the struggle between traditional oligarchy and modern democracy -- will increasingly overshadow the vicissitudes of that struggle as Japan increases its decades of demonstration that stability and harmony, whether feudal or democratic, are the mark of its nationhood.
As with every other developing nation before and after it, Japan's development from a feudal to a modern nation involved difficult transitions in every aspect of its society, for it was Japan's experience of the universal transition between Toennies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, between Durkheim's *solidarité mécanique* and *solidarité organique*. But our focus in this study is on only one aspect of this comprehensive process: the development of Japanese nationalism. In this chapter we will survey the pendulum swings that took place between the two basic perspectives on Japanese nationalism -- the inward-looking and the outward-looking perspectives -- that were each represented among the Japanese elites from the Meiji Restoration to World War Two.

The history of this transitional, developmental period shows that while the Japanese people were excellently equipped for modernization, they were less well equipped for democratization. A broad overview of this conflict between cosmopolitan, democratic nationalism and authoritarian nationalism from the perspective of Kohn's *Two Traditions* model could see in it an attempt to plant a "Western" type cosmopolitan, rationalist nationalism in an arch-"Eastern" xenophobic, emotive-religious culture and state. Kohn must have believed that such a radical cultural transformation was impossible, given the determinants of each type of civilization's history: he does not even discuss it.
An interesting point emerges from the attempt to classify the Japanese nationalism of the emperor/kokutai Political Religion according to the four overall classificatory types of nationalism in our framework of theories. This is that Japan's nationalist political religion contained elements of both Traditional and Jacobin nationalism. On one hand, there are strong parallels between the forms of the French Jacobin and the Japanese Loyalist movements in their fusion of a revolutionary political ideology with religious zeal, the resulting political mobilization, and their eventual establishment of patriotic religious cults with nationalistic shrines and rituals. But there the parallels end. The content of the Japanese nationalist Political Religion was far more closely related to the conservative, oligarchical content of Traditional nationalism than to the radical democracy of Jacobinism. The Meiji Restoration's Political Religion, like Burkean English Traditional nationalism, stressed the crown (emperor), the church (state Shinto), and the nobility (the bureaucracy). (The third parallel is weakest because the existing Japanese nobility, the Daimyo, were paid off and disposessed, to be replaced by a loyalist bureaucracy of any class origin that was an "intellectual aristocracy" or meritocracy). As is discussed below, this mixture of stable, traditional symbols of legitimacy with revolutionary reformist zeal may help explain the amazing power and successfullness of the emperor/kokutai political religion.
Several of the more specified models of nationalism in our typological framework spotlight specific aspects of nationalism's development in developing Japan. Apter's Reformist Elite model, Smelser's Modernizing Ideology model, Pye's Political Socialization model, Kautsky's and Fanon's Anticolonial Elite model, and Smith's Rebound model all reveal interesting insights on aspects of this complex phenomenon.

1. The Political Religion of a Reformist Elite

Apter suggests that there is an objective imperative for modernizing elites to supply their traditional peasant masses with a clear system of values that can explain and justify the inevitable stresses and dislocations of the process of modernization. And he suggests that such a system of values has all the more power if it recasts traditional symbols of legitimacy in the form of a political religion. The young reformist samurai from Choshu and Satsuma had seized power in the name of the emperor, but there was no question that 15-year-old Mutsuhito would rule the land. The imperial institution went from neglected figurehead status to worshipped figurehead status but is was a figurehead institution just the same. These young leaders knew that the success of their nationalist revolution depended on quickly unifying and modernizing the country, and their first strategy was to build up the Meiji emperor as a symbol of religious and political unity while eliminating their
opposition by buying off the Daimyo and destroying the former han.

In the first Constitution of June 17, 1867, a governmental organ called the Jingikan "Department of Shinto Religion," was established, and Article Three gave its Minister "supreme control in matters relating to the worship of the gods, and over the different orders of priesthood." In the modified "Nikan Rokusho" government structure from August 15, 1869 to Sept 13, 1871, the Jingikan was placed above the Dajokan (the Supreme Council of State) as the government's highest ranking unit.

But the symbolism of this formal structure could mollify only politically sophisticated strata, so the young leaders sent out Shinto missionaries to propagate Hirata's official doctrine of State Shinto. Shinto Shrines were split off from Buddhist temples, and anti-Buddhist, anti-Confucian sentiments were allowed to flourish briefly. But the power of State Shinto as an institution appeared to be much more limited among the masses than its force as a revolutionary political religion among reformist elites. The Shinto missionaries failed to convert Buddhists and Confucians to this simple nativistic cult, the Buddhist priests recruited to help them were predictably ineffective too, and the Meiji leaders decided to scrub the program in 1872 when they demoted the Jingikan to a common Ministry. By 1877 the Jingikan was reduced to a mere bureau under the Home Ministry, and political religion had taken a secondary role to state-building.
and national modernization. 94

The political religion of State Shinto was a force in the Imperial Restoration and laid the basis for an enduring emperor cult. It reinforced the emperor's role as the symbol of national unity and helped break down the feudal fief divisions by asserting an unbroken national unity from mythical times to the present. But without more effective means of political indoctrination it was not capable of sustaining popular support in the post-Restoration era. It remained quiescent during the early years of Meiji when Japan swung towards Westernization, and was only revived as a popular belief through the use of modern propaganda devices from the late 1880's. This revival and inculcation of the emperor cult was a direct response to the threats the Meiji oligarchs felt to their position from the party politicians in the unexpectedly vigorous House of Representatives. By building up the cult of the emperor, his handlers felt their power would be prolonged.

The relationship between this political religion and the Meiji leaders' modernizing ideology is a very significant one. The political religion that helped make the Restoration yielded priority at first to the modernizing ideology in the early Meiji era. Yet a combination of factors twenty years later in the late 1880's (including primarily a wide-spread elite backlash against excessive Westernization and the threat of rising party politicians to the Meiji oligarchs' secure
positions as spokesmen for the emperor) prompted a form of synthesis between the political religion and the modernizing ideology. Japan would modernize on a native pattern (Eastern ethics, Western science) that consisted of a centralized, authoritarian government run by an oligarchic elite and national bureaucracy, and it would motivate public cooperation through indoctrination of the emperor cult. The powerful propaganda mechanisms of public education and the press were used to build up the position of the emperor and thus of his handlers, the oligarchs.

Ito Hirobumi's arguments to the Privy Council supporting his draft Constitution clearly demonstrate this deliberate use of the emperor cult as a political unifying and mobilizing force. He wrote in 1888:

"In Europe the beginnings of constitutional rule go back for over 1,000 years; and not only are the people well versed in this system, but there is religion as a common principle. It penetrates deeply into the hearts of the people and unites them....

In our country religion is weak. There is not one that could serve as a principle of state. Buddhism today has fallen into decline. Shinto is based on the precepts of our forefathers and transmits them, yet as a religion it has little power to move men's hearts. In our country, as a common principle (literally, 'rotor of an engine') there is only the Imperial House.
2. The Modernizing Ideology Model

A political religion may be a motive or a tool, but it is not a policy, and the pragmatic leaders of the Meiji Restoration knew this better than anybody else. In a decade of maturing struggle from the bakufu's first foreign commercial treaty in 1858 to the Restoration in 1868 their balance of character traits had shifted from idealistic imperial loyalism to pragmatic nationalism, and their goal had shifted from expelling the barbarians to appeasing and learning from them in order to strengthen Japan's defenses against colonization. Fukoku-kyohei (rich country - strong army) was their new slogan, and modernization of every aspect of Japanese society was their overriding policy, once they came to power. The history of this modernization is well documented elsewhere. What interests us is the impact of this modernizing ideology on the development of Japanese nationalism.

Striking parallels can be observed on many points between Smelser's model of a Modernizing Ideology and the history of the Meiji leaders' rule. Smelser holds that modernization does not occur by itself, but that some strong motivating ideology -- such as nationalism -- is necessary to induce people to give up the security of their traditional society and face the dislocations of modernization, and this was definitely the case in Meiji Japan. Smelser argues that the essence of modernization is "structural differentiation," the
breaking up of traditional social structures and their reintegration into the more specialized units of a modern society, and again this process is readily apparent in Japan. The considerable dislocation suffered by the samurai class, amounting to about 10 percent of the population, who were deprived of their subsidies, and by the peasants, amounting to the bulk of the population, who were taxed heavily and subject to new market pressures were two extremes of the break-up of the feudal social classes and the reintegration of their members along modern functional lines. The strength and flexibility of the Core characteristics of Japanese society, the non-kin tribe and dualism, were demonstrated not by the absence of this disintegration but by the comparatively rapid and effective reintegration of the dislocated members into the new non-kin tribes of public stock companies, universities, newspapers, and the bureaucracy on one side and factories, mines, and the military on the other side. Smelser holds that "nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialization, because it provides people with an overriding, easily acquired, secular motivation for making painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the supreme goal, industrialization the chief means."96

The Meiji leaders were desperately seeking rapid modernization to build a strong, respected, modern nation, and the urgency of their policy rings clearly in their original pronouncements. The Imperial Proclamation of the Restoration of January 3, 1868 states:
"An imperial decision has now been made to recover political authority with a view to regaining national dignity.

Everything shall be decided through the reasonable deliberation of the people, without any distinction between civil and military officers, between nobles and common people.

It is the will of His Imperial Majesty to share happiness with the people of the empire; everybody should try to get rid of the long-ingrained evil habit of idleness and to serve his country with fidelity and sincerity.

The evil customs of the old times are to be shaken off and a channel for public opinion is first to be opened. Regardless of his rank, anyone may present his opinion without hesitation. As it is urgently necessary to recruit men of ability, it is requested that candidates be nominated."

Paradoxically, nationalist modernization required acceptance and assistance from the foreign states that the Meiji leaders had a first wanted to exclude. And this required them to discipline the more fanatical nationalists within the ranks of their followers. The fourth of the five notices of the Notification of the Five Notice Boards, April 7, 1868, states that (emphasis added):

"(people) are reminded that from now on those who arbitrarily kill foreigners or commit any crimes of the sort are not only violating the imperial order and putting the country in trouble, but also causing the venerable honour of our imperial country seriously to lose face . . . ."
After weakening the samurai class' privileges early on, the class distinction between samurai and commoners was effectively abolished by reintegrating young men of all classes into the modern functional unit of a national conscript army. The Official Instructions Concerning Conscription, of December 28, 1872 explicitly state the goals of abolishing the classes and reintegrating human resources for the transcendent purpose of national modernization:

"The way to level the upper and lower classes and to guarantee just human rights consists in combining the tasks of both warriors and peasants.

Everything in the land, without exception, is taxed and is to be utilized for the nation. In that case, every man should without fail serve his nation with all his heart and power."

The shocking pace of modernization in the early Meiji period and the extremity of the about-face from arrogant xenophobia to humble openness to the West are both apparent in the words of a speech made by Ito Hirobumi on behalf of the Iwakura Mission in San Francisco, on December 14, 1871. A mere three years after he commanded a rifle brigade that helped overthrow the bakufu for its failure to expel the barbarians, Ito was making speeches to them in San Francisco sounding like an eager exchange student:

"By reading, hearing, and observing in foreign lands, our people have acquired a general knowledge of constitutions, habits and manners as they exist, in most foreign countries. Foreign customs are now generally understood throughout Japan."
Today it is the earnest wish of both government and people, to strive for the highest points of civilization enjoyed by more enlightened countries. Looking to this end, we have adopted their military, naval, scientific, and educational institutions, and knowledge has flowed into us freely in the wake of foreign commerce. Although our improvement has been rapid in material civilization, the mental improvement of our people has been far greater."

While Ito's statement of Japanese progress in understanding Western customs still only applied to only a slim strata of Japanese society, there is no question that Japanese knowledge of the West virtually exploded in the Meiji era. Japanese leaders and people sought knowledge of the modern West almost indiscriminately in their effort to modernize their nation at a frightful pace.

Several technical factors such as high literacy help explain the Japanese people's success at such rapid absorption of Western knowledge. But deeper reasons must be sought to explain the inordinate success of the Japanese people from elites to peasants -- as compared to peoples in other developing nations then, and even today -- in rapidly adapting to their new social and economic roles. The force of the strong nationalist modernizing ideology discussed above is obviously the single biggest motivating factor. But the enduring Japanese cultural traits of tribalistic society and dualist perception helped significantly to ease the way. Dualist thinking's flexible acceptance of contradiction and dissonance might help explain why Ludditeism did not arise among Japanese workers, while
the hierarchical, paternalistic ethics of the farm town and factory alike made it easy for an impoverished tenant farmer to trade the hoe for the spindle or hammer without ever missing the presence of a paternalistic boss in his life. A Shinto shrine was erected to propitiate the spinning machine god just like the shrines to the rice-harvest god, and the work went on with their blessing. These factors affecting the social transformation that permitted Japan's rapid modernization are illuminated in the perspective of political socialization.

3. The Political Socialization model

Pye identifies three classes of cultural values and attitudes necessary for modernization which are the consequence of the socialization process: technical skills and competencies, motivational goals, and "associational sentiments and values affecting collective action."

If the Japanese were searching in the West for technical skills and competencies, and their motivation was a nationalist modernizing ideology, what made their success so fast and great was their sentiments and values affecting collective action. This "human potentiality for collective enterprise, for creating associations and corporate organizations, which makes possible all higher forms of civilization," is certainly one in which the social structure and psychological perception patterns of Japanese are remarkably strong.
As elaborated earlier in this chapter, the tribalistic social
group for which Japanese are socialized from childhood is an
extremely adaptable institution. It is not necessarily kinship-or-
village-based as many traditional social group structures are. Even
if its function or orientation is changed quite quickly its loyalty and
conformity ethics tend to assure that its members keep following on.
In the Meiji era hundreds of thousands of bright young peasants who
were socialized to high standards of group loyalty, hierarchical
roles, collective initiative, etc. moved to training schools, innovative
artisans' and merchants' shops, new industrial factories, etc., and
fit into those groups with limited difficulty. Socialization to accept
dualist perception also made the modernizing transition much easier
by suppressing, temporarily at least, widespread reactions to the
contradictions of Westernizing in order to defend Japaneseness.

The Meiji leaders built on these favorable social bases by using
the modern means of communication to socialize or resocialize Japanese
citizens for modern roles through indoctrination in their modernizing
ideology. As Scalapino puts it "Following Western examples, the Meiji
leaders quickly cultivated education, religion, and the press as
means of explaining state goals and enlisting public support."103
Aided by their very high rates of literacy, a few perceptive writers
who had been to the West, and a popular press that grew from less
than 3 million circulation in 1874 to over 50 million circulation in
1892, the Japanese government succeeded in using these channels to
politically resocialize mature adults and, more importantly, to indoctrinate a new Japanese generation. But the most important of these means was the system of public education.

The fifth point of the Meiji Charter Oath had early signaled the Restoration's emphasis on education: "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule." As the knowledge arrived, some of it was distributed to schoolchildren through a new system of public education. In 1872 public schools modeled on the very progressive French system were established, but these proved too expensive and too progressive. Then the American system was established in 1879 to shift payments to local communities, but attendance fell and locals voted to teach the traditional Confucian curriculum. Finally, in 1885, the Prussian system of centralized education geared directly to the state's manpower needs was adopted, and this remained Japan's basic pattern until the American occupation.

This system of hierarchically organized schools rigidly selected candidates for higher education and clearly indicated their field of usefulness to the state. The National Universities at the top of the system were to produce loyal, nationalist, elite bureaucrats, and at first almost nothing else. But by the middle Meiji period dissatisfaction with this narrow system had emerged and Okuma Shigenobu (expelled from the governing clique over his dissident
demand for greater democracy) opened Waseda University as a competing private university, stating: "Although the State expends a great deal of effort for common education . . . I feel that all kinds of schools are necessary -- governmental, public, private." And many other private universities were also quickly founded to supply trained talent for business and the press.  

4. The Anticolonial Elite model

The wholesale Westernization of Japan in the early Meiji years and its eventual swing back towards traditional culture in the "Japanization of the Middle Meiji" raise the debate on Japan's attempted cultural assimilation into the West and the eventual backlash towards nativism. Without treating the nation as a unitary actor, or even discussing masses or numerous leading individuals, the life of one exceptional man can serve as a canvas on which to sketch these general patterns. The Japanese House of Representatives itself recognized the contributions of Fukuzawa Yukichi, when it adopted a resolution of condolence on his death reading, "Mr. Fukuzawa Yukichi, who led the van (sic.) of civilized progress and contributed largely to the cause of education." The perspective from which we will view his work is Fanon and Kautsky's model of the Anticolonial Elite.
Both Fanon and Kautsky note that many anticolonial nationalist elites have adulation for the colonialists' Western culture. They were trained in modernizing skills by the West and were insidiously influenced by its cultural values until, shocked by contact with their true countrymen, they become anticolonial nationalist elites. Katusky adds the important observation that such a phenomenon can occur even in countries not subject to colonialism, such as Japan, if an elite feels it must emulate the West to "defend" against possible colonization.

Fukuzawa Yukichi had such a significant influence on the Japanese masses as a disseminator of Western knowledge through his popular books and on future Japanese elites through the graduates of his Keio-gijuku school (that later became Keio University) that he by himself is an appropriate subject against which to examine the broader notion of Japanese cultural assimilationism.

Fukuzawa was strongly anti-feudal since his childhood, and took the first chance to escape and study Dutch Learning. Later he taught himself English and worked as a servant to a Japanese ship captain in order to go to San Francisco in 1860. On the basis of his travels he started to write popular accounts of conditions in foreign countries that were widely read and widely influential among the middle strata of Japanese who were just beginning to be curious about the West and modernization and were hungry for information (as
in Lerner's Transitional Man model).

In one of his more influential books he reveals the extent of his early infatuation with the West's accomplishments and his sense of the great inadequacy of traditional Japanese society.

"If we compare the levels of intelligence of Japanese and Westerners, in literature, the arts, commerce, or industry, from the biggest things to the least, in a thousand cases or in one, there is not a single area in which the other side is not superior to us.

We can compete with the West in nothing, and no one even thinks about competing with the West. Only the most ignorant thinks that Japan's learning, arts, commerce, or industry is on a par with that of the West. . . .

While we are expounding on yin and yang and the Five Elements, they were discovering the sixty-element atomic chart. While we are divining lucky and unlucky days by astrology, they have charted the courses of comets and are studying the constitution of the sun and moon. . . . While we regard Japan as the sacrosanct islands of the gods, they have raced around the world, discovering new lands and founding new nations. . . .

In view of this fact, then, if Japan's most urgent need today is not intelligence, what is it? Let scholars ponder this question."^{112}

The difference between this self-critical perspective and the nativist doctrines of Hirata Atsutane could not be more clearly drawn. Fukuzawa in this sense epitomises a phase of self-abnegating envy for things Western that marked the early period of Meiji modernization, and culminated in the famous Rokumeikan Fancy Dress
Ball of 1887 when the Japanese elite (with their wives in public!) tried waltzing in Victorian formal attire and felt that this, at last, was simply too ridiculous.

But as open as he was to the West Fukuzawa was too balanced an individual to be considered an assimilationist. While he eloquently expressed Japan's open acceptance of Western ideas in the early Meiji period, he also maintained a sense of pride in Japanese virtues that was characteristic of almost all Japanese. In the same book as the previous quotation he wrote that, "the moral teachings of East and West are really evenly matched."¹¹³ This combination of Eastern ethics and Western science echoed the position of an earlier scholar of Western learning, Sakuma Shozan, who wrote before the restoration "Eastern morals, Western science,"¹¹⁴ and this came to be the consensus position that appealed to most Japanese from the 1890's. Fukuzawa wrote in plain Japanese, simplifying passages until his housemaid could understand them, and his works were Japan's first Meiji best-sellers. It was the wide effect of both his writings and the school he founded (which grew into Keio University) that earned him the accolade of the Japanese Diet and his portrait on the current ¥10,000 bill.
5. The Rebound model

By this point of our study the assertion of Smith's Rebound model that only the fusion of defensive reformists and messianic ex-assimilationists can produce nationalism appears highly questionable. But a domesticated version of its basic idea -- that an alliance of these forces could strengthen nationalism -- is not implausible.

We can note that in the Japanese case the actors with either tendency do not clearly fit these typologies. First, all Meiji Japanese figures, whether they advocated the Westernization of Japanese culture or the Japanization of Western knowledge, were essentially defensive. Whatever their course, their goal was to strengthen Japan in order to maintain its independence. Second, the degree of assimilationism itself was much more limited in Japan than what Fanon and Kautsky, who base their studies on other cases of modernization, seem to be considering. A mere self-critical openness to the West was enough to be accused of assimilationism in Japan, and as a matter of fact such charges were hurled back and forth between intellectual factions from the middle Meiji period onwards.  

Nevertheless, in the period following the Fancy Dress Ball of 1887, a consensus on Sakuma's and Fukuzawa's position of stressing traditional Japanese ethics and modern Western science and technology
developed, and the return to traditional, hierarchical, authoritarian Japanese social ethics that it marked was codified in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890.

The Imperial Rescript on Education was to public indoctrination what the Constitution of 1889 was to politics: the fusion of the political religion of Shinto/Confucian kokutai with the Meiji oligarchs' modernizing ideology. The influences of the conservative Confucian scholar Motoda Eifu and the modernizing Ito Hirobumi are visible in different ratios in each document. The emperor's status was emphasized as much as just before the Restoration, and this time -- twenty two years later -- his position was formally enshrined in a written Constitution and a Rescript on the walls of every school in the nation.

The Rescript, which was publicly revered to the point that in several instances teachers and principals risked their lives to save their school's copy from burning buildings, read:

"Know ye, Our subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herin also lies the source of Our education."
... thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth."117

The Constitution, in the same way, was "handed down" from the benevolent emperor, whose self-limiting character embodied in the document corresponded less to Western absolute monarchs than to the Western God.

The effect of the Meiji public education system on Japanese nationalism can hardly be exaggerated. This was not only the first compulsory education in Japan but it was a consciously designed tool of nation-building wielded by a highly intelligent national elite with a clear modernizing ideology. It not only trained youth for new roles in a modern society but it trained them in a neo-traditional doctrine of national unity through the imperial line. Rural students whose parents still thought of themselves primarily as members of a kuni (the land and society of the old feudal han) were taught that they were all members of a single Japanese people, united by blood through their common descent from the gods. This aspect of the Modernizing Ideology's curriculum has very strong parallels to Liberal nationalism, which laid similar emphasis on the patriotic potential of a cult of the common volk.
SUMMARY:

This major shift in the formulation of Japanese nationalist ideology which occurred around 1890 might best be portrayed by combining into a single scenario the various aspects which have been highlighted by the models in our theoretical framework. (1) In a transitional society wavering between liberal and authoritarian paths to modernization, (2) a phase of cultural assimilationism is followed by (3) a rebound to more traditional social ethics. (4) A by-now-traditional political religion is revived to buttress a conservative oligarchy and (5) it is indoctrinated to the masses to buttress a modernizing ideology. As Smelser predicts, Japan, too, turned to a more intense nationalism to cope with the social dislocations of its rapid modernization.

The 1890's saw the reintegration of the early Meiji period's hasty trend towards everything Western with the traditional Japanese nationalistic values of uniqueness and superiority. This reintegration was achieved through the fusion of a pragmatic Modernizing Ideology with the a revived and mass-inculcated Political Religion of the cult of the emperor and kokutai, the national body. The pragmatic Meiji rulers found it advantageous at this time to combine these apparently contradictory modern and traditional nationalistic ideologies in order to preserve their power and continue their program of building up the Japanese nation at any cost. The economic modernization of Japan
thus came to be accompanied by ethical and metaphysical anachronism.

Just as the first conscious Japanese nationalist ideology, the Meiji Restoration's Political Religion, had drawn closely on the millenial Core Values of Japanese society -- the uniqueness myth (centered on the emperor), the tribalistic social structure, and dualist perception -- so the Middle Meiji's Modernizing ideology drew on both the Core Values and the Layer of the Political Religion. It too was a partial redefinition of traditional Japanese nationalism that retained the ancient symbols and structures of legitimacy while pragmatically adapting them to meet the nation's current needs. It too was formed not as a rejection of the past but as a new Layer of conscious nationalist ideology formed over the preceding layer and core of Japanese nationalism.

Like the Political Religion, the Modernizing Ideology was a clear nationalist ideology, according to the terms of our concise definition. Through compulsory public education it cultivated sentiments and inculcated its ideology that the "identity and advancement" of each Japanese was inseperably linked to the advancement of the Japanese state.

Where would the Modernizing Ideology fit among the overall classificatory types in our framework? Its greatest similarities are to
the Traditional type of nationalism. The revolutionary, zealous, mass-mobilizing aspects of Jacobin nationalism which had been combined with the Traditional, hierarchical, socio-religious symbols of legitimacy in the Political Religion had faded away by the time of Modernizing Ideology. And thus the Modernizing Ideology was left with a distinctively conservative, elitist, legitimate character, stressing the Traditional nationalist trinity of the emperor, State Shinto, and the leadership. Yet we must note that, here again, the content of the modernizing ideology was different from that of Traditional European nationalisms. The emperor was still the Son of Heaven, the Japanese people were Sons of the Gods, and State Shinto was still the Japanese tribal cult, not a universal religion. This increased emphasis on the propagation of the concepts of Japanese peoplehood and their common folk ancestor bears strong similarities to Liberal type nationalism.

IV. Ultranationalism

Grillpaerzer's European prophecy that "The path of modern culture leads from humanity, through nationality, to bestiality." does not neatly apply to Japan, because Japan went from nationalism to militarism without even a significant hindrance from a humanist heritage. Mussolini said that Fascism had "stepped over the more-or-less putrescent corpse of the goddess of liberty, and, if
neccessary, would turn and step over it again,

but the gods of Japan only gave their blessing to Japan's attempted conquest of Asia. The Japanese militarist's Mein Kampf, the Education Ministry's Fundamentals of Kokutai, was framed on the diametrical opposition of Japan's integral national spirit to the inferior individualism of the West. Indeed, the very lack of significant public opposition to Japan's drift towards militarism (mass arrests of leftists, yes, but no battles between mass organizations of Brown or Black Shirts with Social Democrats in the streets, and no need for a burning of the Reichstag or a March on Rome) might actually have led the nation to be all the more united in fighting the ensuing War, and all the more eager after the War to exonerate all participants of any wartime wrong-doing.

The two dominant theories for the origin of the War in the Pacific -- the first that imperialism was inherent in Japan's imperial heritage, the second that Japan's imperialism was a belated mimicry of European imperialism -- both have strong points of evidence in their favor. Discounting intermittent pirate raids, Japan held parts of Korea from the fourth century to 562 A.D., kept attacking Korea to regain these until 663 A.D., briefly conquered Korea under Hideyoshi in 1592, and annexed Korea in 1910. The only period that Japan desisted from attacking Korea when it was strong and China was not stronger was during the Tokugawa era, when the lesson of Hideyoshi's disastrous defeat was still remembered and the threat of
European as well as Chinese powers had to be considered. With equal validity one can note that European imperialism was at its height of vogue when the Japanese opened their minds to Western civilization; that Social Darwinism made foreign conquest natural, just, and proof of a nation's abilities; and that having one's own colonies entitled membership in the Colonialist Club whose perks included alliances, naval treaties, and a guaranteed share of China plunder.

But our question here is not why Japan launched policies that led to the Pacific War, which did more to destroy and discredit Japanese nationalism than any event in history, nor even the history of how ultranationalism came to dominate Japan. Our question is how ultranationalism related to and affected traditional Japanese nationalism. In this section we will attempt to answer the question of whether Japanese ultranationalism differed from previous Japanese nationalist ideologies in nature or merely in degree.

The term "ultranationalism" in itself has no more meaning than the sum of its roots: "extreme nationalism." Conceptually, an individual's belief in the link between their personal identity and advancement, and the advancement of a nation-state can range in intensity on a broad continuum from a vague, lukewarm, or even subliminal idea to a berserk urge to kill all foreigners and sack their goods. The nationalist attitudes of most individuals and groups clearly fall towards the center of this continuum. But the judgement
of where to place the point at which the intensity of this belief
system becomes "excessive" is essentially a subjective, normative,
and variable process — nations at war normally demand much higher
levels of identification with the state to qualify as "patriotism" than
nations at peace, for example. Nationalism of the excessive kind is
usually assigned to nations that started wars then lost them, and in
the post-World War Two era it has been attributed to the former Axis
powers. In the case of Germany and Italy the specific and
substantive terms Nazism and Fascism are used to denote this concept.
But it is extremely instructive to reflect that in reference to Wartime
Japan we are reduced to using the vague and non-substantive term
"ultranationalism." We will present an explanation for this fact later
in this chapter, but for now we will merely define "Japanese
ultranationalism" as the standard label for the period and advocates
of an extreme degree of Japanese nationalism that led to World War
Two. "Militarism," in contrast, is a precise term that refers to a
domestic policy of giving highest priority to building up military
power and a foreign policy of preferring military solutions to
international disputes.

The Meiji elites were authoritarian oligarchs, and their supreme
objective was to build up and strengthen the Japanese state in order
to defend its sovereignty. They launched small military expeditions
(Formosa 1874, Korea 1876) and fought major foreign wars (China
1894-1895, Russia 1904-1905), but they were far too pragmatic to
harbour notions of Japan dominating the world. In building up the Japanese state they laid the foundation for a modern nation which had the potential for peaceable democratization (and indeed achieved decades of remarkable progress in this direction) but which also had the potential for authoritarian militarization and aggression. The Meiji elites thus enabled, but did not directly cause, later Japanese ultranationalism.

Japanese ultranationalism and militarism did not become dominant in Japan until the 1930's, but they sprang from the Constitution of 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 in two different ways: both structurally and spiritually. Structurally, the weaknesses in these documents -- the Diet's lack of supreme control and the military's freedom from civilian control in the Constitution, and the stifling of democratic education in the Rescript -- provided the means by which the military was ultimately able to legally seize power. In building up his own power as the chief imperial spokesman, Ito Hirobumi inadvertently lay the grounds for the military's future control. Ito's Choshu comrade Yamagata Aritomo had insisted as early as 1878 on the operational independence of the military chief of staff from cabinet control, claiming that the military acted on direct orders from the emperor. This doctrine was later legitimized in the Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, in which "the emperor" unequivocally stated that:
"The supreme command of Our forces is in Our hands, and although We may intrust subordinate commands to Our subjects, yet the ultimate authority We Ourself shall hold and never delegate to any subject.

It is Our will that this principle be carefully handed down to posterity and that the Emperor always retain the supreme civil and military power, so that the disgrace of the Middle and succeeding ages may never be repeated.

Soldiers and sailors, We are your supreme commander in chief. Our relations with you will be most intimate when We rely upon you as Our limbs and you look up to Us as your Head."

This total failure to establish the principle of civilian control over the military, combined with the later rule that the Cabinet Ministers of the military must be military officers (for most of the time the rule read active duty officers). . . . The Cabinets' traditional "tribalistic" hierarchical, paternalistic structure, combined with Ito's decision to build up the unilateral authority of those speaking directly for the emperor . . . all directly led to the military's ability to stymie any cabinet, and thus to eventually take control. In testimony to the prosecution in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, General Araki Sadao who had served two terms each as War Minister and Education Minister (!), surprised his interrogators by stating that:

"Yes, the full Cabinet was concerned with decisions made, but if the four principal ministers (Foreign, War, Navy, and Finance) and the Prime Minister decided on a line of policy, this would be pushed
through the Cabinet in spite of opposition . . . a vote would not be necessary . . . interference by other ministers was not relished." 122

But this should not be surprising in the least to those familiar with the hierarchical structures of Japanese group decision-making.

Yet on a deeper level, the political philosophy underlying these documents, and enshrined in them as the essence of Japan's national entity and cause, also spiritually encouraged ultranationalism and militarism by evicerating democratic opposition to these nativistic causes. The contradictions of using a mythological nativist political religion to justify and advance modernization hobbled the development of modern democratic politics and placed the tremendous powers of modern military forces in hands unbound by modern safeguards. The sacred kokutai could be used to gain acceptance of a modernizing ideology by fellow Japanese, but it could not be expected to gain the acceptance of escalating Japanese demands by nations that did not recognize Japan as the Land of the Gods.

Thus the order of the Meiji Constitution was not only politically unstable, but ethically unstable as well; so unstable, in fact, that it ultimately toppled into militarism almost like a chain of dominoes when a low-ranking ultranationalist clique shifted the military, which shifted the cabinet, which shifted the nation, into war. "The bulk of the people," largely excluded from access to power, voted
against militarism in 1937, "as in the elections of 1930, 1932, and
1936, (they) stayed with the two major parties, which although
severely factionalized, made a common front against militarism. These
parties received over 7 million votes and 354 seats in the Diet. Only
slightly more than 400,000 voted for the government-supported party,
which won only 19 seats." And yet those 7,000,000 docilely followed
the 400,000, as those saying kokutai and national duty led the
country bravely forward to its already-predicted doom. "How was this
possible?" many have asked, and the basic answer lies in the
weaknesses of the Meiji political system. The effective domination of
the government by the unelected elites of the military and the
bureaucracy was sufficient to cancel an overwhelming vote for peace,
and popular democracy was insufficient to resist.

The radical ultranationalists had only to take up the Meiji
reformers' own arguments against their successors. As "pure" young
patriots burning with loyalty and zeal, they had only to attempt to
launch another revolution in the name of the old order, a "Showa
Restoration," and assassinate the "evil advisors" around the emperor.
If this did not work, their comrades in the Manchurian and North
China Armies could arrange for "incidents" that would force the
military high command to take control to restrain the hotheads, then
administer their program in full accordance with constitutional
law.
If liberals and democrats could not refute the nativist doctrines that had modernized Japan without committing treason, they were morally powerless to argue against, let alone politically restrain, any excess that the ultranationalists and their militarist sympathisers might commit. The Minobe theory of the emperor as the "highest organ of the state" could influence bureaucrats without effect as long as the Imperial Rescript on the school-room walls and Hozumi Yatsuka's textbooks on the Shinto family-state assured that the masses would docilely submit to anything including self-sacrificial death in the name of the emperor.¹²⁵

The logic of the ultranationalists was clear and compelling and in full consonance with Japan's political religion; if Japan was unique and thus morally superior to the rest of the world, its emperor should rule all the nations: certainly, at least, all Asian nations. The notion that Japan was merely different from other nations and should thus merely take its place among them did not have backing in this political religion and in the 1930's it lost out in public opinion, just as Minobe Tatsukichi's constitutional monarch theory lost out to Uesugi Shinkichi's ultranationalist Shinto myth-history among intellectual opinion. The slogan of General Hayashi's Cabinet in 1937 was "The union of government and religion."¹²⁶

The absolute equating of the emperor not only with power but with morality in the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on
Education gave any and all of the military's unilateral actions the indisputable cachet of official morality. While Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo deserve great credit as architects of modern Japan, the inherent weakness of leaving the design of government to an oligarchic clique -- however talented -- is illustrated by the disastrous long-term consequences of these parochial decisions that they made before 1891.

The discussion of the shifting power-balance within the ruling elites that eventually led to the militarists' hold on power is too long and deep to summarize here. What is more germane to our study of Japanese nationalism are the changes that occurred among the Japanese masses in the forty years from the Imperial Rescript to the Manchurian Incident in 1931 that marked the beginning of the militarists' increasing control. Rural Japanese masses in this era were integrated into the modern national polity more than ever before, and their experiences came to play an important part in the development of traditional Japanese nationalism for the first time in history. Several important aspects the new role of the masses in the Japanese nationalism of this era are illuminated by the concepts of Kornhauser's Mass Society model, Lerner's Transitional Man model, Locke, et alii's Mercantilism model, and Deutsch's Collective Advancement model.
1. The Mass Society Model

Kornhauser's model of authoritarian nationalism's origin from the stresses of a mass society is extremely useful in analysing Japanese ultranationalism, but not because it directly explains this case. Kornhouser's model is edifying, rather, because it highlights the major differences between the causes of Japanese ultranationalism and the causes of German Nazism on which the model is based. These differences are extremely important in cautioning against the imprecise appellation of Japanese ultranationalism as "fascism" on the basis of the extensive but superficial similarities between their violent, oppressive, reactionary, totalitarian, national-supremacist, and territorial aggrandizing traits.

First, Japanese society in the 1930's was much closer to Kornhauser's "authoritarian" type than his "mass society" type. It was still primarily rural, agrarian, and traditional, with clear, hierarchical, paternalistic social structures and numerous "mediating" groups. Those who moved to urban industrial employment had some difficulties, and in the 1920's they suffered unemployment and urban misery, but these were nowhere near the scale or severity of Kornhauser's anomic malaise, and the urban masses were still better off than many of the villages they came from. The new Japanese industrial migrants were generally much more easily able to gain employable skills and were more easily accepted than in the case of
Germany (due to the Japanese social structure and perception patterns discussed at length here throughout) and they also maintained such close ties with their rural home-town furusato that in times of unemployment they could be reabsorbed into their extended family and village structures if they wanted to be.

Second, democratization in Japan did not destroy the traditional elite culture, but gave all commoners access to this formerly elite culture. This point is of extreme importance. Yamagata Aritomo held that:

"The virtues of the bushi were widely known among commoners through proverbs and aphorisms. However, since the Meiji Restoration, any person, regardless of his class of origin, is allowed to enter military service. This is a great privilege bestowed upon the three classes of commoners. Today's soldiers are undoubtedly bushi, even if their status is not hereditary. It is therefore beyond question that they should exhibit loyalty and courage as their prime virtues, according to the best tradition of the bushi of bygone days." 127

And Yamagata extended this principle of admitting the masses into elite culture beyond the army into areas such as local government as well. So in the Japanese case there was a curious pattern in which the elite class itself was destroyed while the elite culture was appropriated for the masses. Again contrary to Kornhauser's model, the Japanese masses before the War had a clear moral code and culture.
Thus, in the prewar years, Japanese industrialization had still not reached a sufficient scale, and traditional Japanese society was still strong enough to enable us to reject Kornhauser's criteria for an anomic "mass society," such as would lead to Fascism or Communism. (The League of Nations Statistical Yearbook for 1926 gives Japanese industrial workers as 19.4 percent of total population versus 35.8 percent for Germany and 39.7 percent for Britain). The Japanese case, in fact, seems to come from a reverse operation. It was not a revolution against traditional culture that later reached an accommodation with conservative social structures; Japanese ultranationalism was a revolution of the traditional, feudal, warrior culture against a modernizing democratic society and government. It stressed the samurai's own values of fanatical loyalty, moral "purity," martial skills, and an inordinate desire to die for one's master or cause.

Maruyama Masao as well as many Japanese Marxists insist on calling ultranationalism "fascism," but Maruyama's own arguments on the numerous and profound differences between Japanese and European fascism, if read from a non-Marxist perspective, would argue more for abandoning such an imprecise lumping of movements with highly divergent origins and underlying social characteristics under the rubric "fascism."
The fact that Japanese ultranationalism was different from fascism is of great importance in understanding its complex relationship to traditional Japanese nationalism and the development of Japanese nationalism after the War. West Germany, unlike Austria, has based its postwar nationalism on renunciation of its Nazi past to such an extent that it still prosecutes discovered Nazi war criminals. In Japan there is still strong opinion that since there was no personal responsibility in the hierarchical state system (every man just obeyed his superior and the emperor obeyed his ancestors in the cosmos)\(^{131}\) that there were no real Japanese war criminals, that everybody was just doing their patriotic duty, and that it is unfair to single out those who went too far in the Rape of Nanking, the Bataan march, or the human-subject plague experiments of the Ishii Unit in China.

Militarism is broadly rejected in postwar Japan, most vehemently by leftists, but the deeper nationalist principles on which it was founded, unlike in the case of Germany, have not been completely rejected. The most convincing reason for this is that Japanese ultranationalism was much more closely integrated with traditional Japanese nationalism than the revolutionary Nazi or Fascist doctrines and was thus much more difficult to reject in toto.
2. The Transitional Man Model

Japan's urban population grew rapidly in the early 1900's, but in 1920 51.7 percent of the Japanese labor force was still agricultural. This majority of Japanese masses in the prefectures were not all easily integrated into the modern system, and they did experience difficulties in adjusting to the new modernizing order. Lerner's Transitional Man model yields some good insights on the contributions of their experiences to the development of Japanese nationalism.

According to Lerner's definition of modernization and transitional men, Japan was already modernizing during the last decades of the Tokugawa bakufu. Such curious souls as Sakuma Shozan, Yoshida Shoin, and Fukuzawa Yukichi are outstanding models of Lerner's Transitional Men; they were starved for information of the modern, outside world, and learned and disseminated considerable knowledge from the limited Dutch Learning that came to Japan through its trading port in Dejima. They also possessed in no small measure what Lerner conceives as the irrational nationalistic urge to modernize "in their own way" with "risky by-passes" to the proven Western rule.

These early modernizing leaders were all of rural origin (the present Prefectures of Nagano, Yamaguchi, and Oita) but all studied
in the urban centers of Tokyo and Osaka. By the 1890's modern education and the economic demand of modern urban markets had reached back to all the rural regions themselves, and by the 1910's rural Japanese were experiencing major degrees of modernizing influence. But this lag time of several decades corresponded to two generations, and it left rural Japanese with a much more traditional outlook on society than their urban counterparts. In Lerner's sense they were still "transitional" when urban Japanese were already "modern."

This cultural gap between rural and urban Japanese was to have inordinate impact because of the pattern of recruitment to the Japanese military. Yamagata's inclusive policy had created a classless army in the Meiji era. This made the military a channel of upward mobility for the masses, and freed young sons of samurai to seek greater economic rewards in the now classless field of business. The result was a strong rural dominance among the career officers and soldiers in of the army. From 1920 to 1933, in fact, forty percent of first-year students at the Military Academy were from farming families and ten percent were sons of military officers.

These two classes of rural, transitional individuals -- farmers and soldiers -- were among the groups to which ultranationalism most strongly appealed and which became its greatest supporters. They were tough, loyal, and anti-intellectual, and they were the
self-stated core of the Japanese armed forces. Of the 299 convicted and executed Japanese War Criminals of whom the previous occupations are known, 92 were professional soldiers, 90 were farmers, and 117 were of all other occupations combined. Their brand of nationalism corresponds closely to the reaction that Lerner predicts among the transitional type: "ethnocentrism -- expressed politically in extreme nationalism, psychologically in passionate xenophobia."136

3. The Mercantilism Model

Although less is known at present about Japan's economy in the interwar period than in the Meiji or postwar eras, the social disruption caused by the boom and bust cycles of the Japanese economy from 1914 to 1931 can be cited as one of the most significant contributing factors to the rise of Japanese ultranationalism and the beginning of the Pacific War.

The differences of the growth rates of Japan's real net domestic product by decades rose and fell significantly in the half-century from the 1890 to 1940. They were:137

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890 - 1900</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 1910</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 - 1920</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 - 1930</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 - 1940</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the vigor of small-scale and traditional industries can account for the 1890's growth, and the surging export market for Japanese manufactured supplies during World War One accounts for the 1910's growth, the 1920's sharp decline in growth rate is accounted for by several factors besides businessmen's normal expectation of a deflationary period following the end of a booming war supplies market. Even in the context of this up-and-down pattern, the drop in economic growth during the 1920's is extreme.

Two domestic factors can be cited as causes for this severe slowing of economic growth. First, while investment in farming (land, labor, capital, and seed and fertilizer) maintained steady growth during the decade, the value of farm output grew at a slower rate. Harsh domestic deflation following the World War I boom depressed farm prices, and the domestic depression of 1926 depressed them further. The prices farmers received for their crops dropped 53.4 percent from 1925 to 1931. Rural cash income fell from an index of 100 in 1926 to 33 in 1931, and only recovered to 44 in 1934. Poorer and tenant farmers, far worse off than the statistical average suggests, were forced to sell their daughters into prostitution to survive, in times so recent that many of these women are still alive.

Industrial production did better than agriculture in the 1920's but it was hindered by the deflation and depression too. Led by
cotton textile exports, its average annual growth rate of production volume was 7.0 percent from 1925 to 1930. But the value of Japanese exports fell 50 percent from 1929 to 1931, and workers' wages fell from an index of 100 in 1926 to 81 in 1930 and 69 in 1931. The lower relative losses of industrial workers prompted an exodus of rural youth to the cities, but industry only absorbed 11 percent of the work force growth in the 1920's (as opposed to 74 percent in the 1930's) and the youth had to find jobs in small service sector enterprises such as retailing.

These statistics quickly bring to mind images of Weimar Germany, but there were fundamental economic differences between the German and Japanese cases besides the fundamental social differences already described. Japan in the 1920's was both economically and socially far less developed than Weimar Germany. First, over half of Japan's workers were in agriculture in the 1920's while in Germany this figure was less than one third; and the ratios for industrial workers had an inverse relationship. Second, the economic depression in Germany was even more severe than in Japan; German industrial production had dropped from an 1928 index of 100 to 61.2 in 1932, just before Hitler came to power, whereas Japan's industrial production had recovered and climbed higher than its 1928 index of 100 to 101.0 in 1932. Third, German unemployment rose to over 6 million in 1932 whereas Japanese unemployment had fallen to 480,000 by the same year. These indicators cast serious doubts on the
drawing of neat economic or social parallels between Weimar Germany and Japan in the 1920's and early 1930's.

Serious doubts would also exist in any attempt to neatly attribute Japan's economic difficulties to a conscious mercantilist strategy either by itself or its trading partners. There is clear evidence, in fact, that Japan's economic leaders at the time did not fully understand the operation of the international factors in their economy and did not pursue clear or consistent policies. Nevertheless, even more serious doubts can be raised against the notion that Japan's economic policies during the 1920's were as liberal and free-trading as the ideology of the liberal Party Cabinets implied.

First, the massive effect of World War One was a substitute for an economic policy. Export demand soared, and available supplies of Western imports with unbeatably-competitive prices shrank drastically. So while Japan recovered full control of its tariffs from the expiration of the unequal treaty clauses in 1911, there was no need for protection. The War market produced a huge exogenous demand for manufactures in Asian markets cut off from European suppliers as well as for munitions, and at the same time it kept competitive European and later American manufactures at home.

It is important to note Japan's reaction to these circumstances. It accumulated such massive foreign assets as payments for its
exports so as to exceed its previous foreign indebtedness. But the Japanese economic managers did not seem to have learned the economic lessons of post-mercantilist trading. The foreign assets were hoarded by the Bank of Japan, the Japanese money supply "virtually tripled," domestic prices and labor costs soared, and Japan was faced with the inevitable and unenviable choice between traumatic deflation or total loss of export competitiveness when the artificial War conditions ended.\(^{147}\) (The parallels to current policies are striking).

Second, when Japan chose deflation in order to restore its international competitiveness after the war, it deflated slowly and painfully, prolonging domestic misery, losing export markets, and losing all of its gains from wartime trading surpluses in an attempt to return to the gold standard at pre-war rates.\(^{148}\) Foreign manufactures made considerable headway and tariff protection was invoked. Iron and steel, and chemicals were protected immediately; 100 percent \textit{ad valorem} duties were imposed on 120 "luxury" manufactures after the Great Earthquake of 1923; and in 1926 a total revision of the tariff structure made raw material imports duty free while iron and steel, sugar, copper, dyestuffs, woolen textiles, etc., were protected.\(^{149}\) It was under the liberal and so-called free trading government at the "high water mark" of the Party Cabinets (Prime Minister Kato and Foreign Minister Shidehara known for his "Shidehara Diplomacy") that Japan had adopted this clearly protectionist neo-mercantilist policy of shutting out foreign
manufactures to try to keep the currency at home. 150

But the other side to Japan's more-or-less mercantilist trade policy was its relations with its colonies and with China, where it had significant influence. Japan's inequitable income distribution curve depressed demand from tenant farmers, and forced Japanese industry to seek foreign rather than domestic markets. The secure trading zones of Japan's colonies in Taiwan and Korea and its zone of influence in Manchuria provided captive markets for manufactured exports and a source of cheap raw materials and rice. Ironically, this cheap rice from Japanese colonists depressed domestic rice prices 18 percent, which further depressed domestic demand, and thus perpetuated the cycle of export-dependent demand. 151

Shidehara's "peaceful trade" diplomacy also had a keen mercantilist edge. For years he tried to thwart even the slightest increase in Chinese tariffs on Japanese manufactured imports, because Japanese cottons, etc., were only slightly more competitive than Chinese products. He succeeded by various means in forstalling any serious increase in Chinese tariffs on Japanese goods until 1933, long after his term in office. 152 The Shidehara Foreign Ministry's China policy of "co-existence and co-prosperity," meant official sympathy for China's "national aspirations" but also "maintaining our trade with China, planning the economic development of our people in China, and promoting economic cooperation between our two
countries."\(^{153}\)

When the results of the Japanese economic policies started to improve exports again in the late 1920's and early 1930's, protectionist sentiment was aroused in America and Europe and countervailing tariffs were established. And the Great Depression sealed this trend towards protectionist trading policies.\(^{154}\) It is important to grasp these underlying economic trends of the 1920's not only to see this clear element of mercantilist policies but to understand how domestic economic unrest, being directly linked to foreign trade, could be easily channelled into ultranationalist and militarist policies.

The 1920's saw the development of a new coalition in Japanese politics that eclipsed the Party/Bureaucracy/Zaibatsu coalition of the late 1800's and early 1900's. Its policies were opposed to these older elites' policies of paternalistic capitalism at home and military cooperation with the major powers abroad. The resurgence of mercantilist policies around the world was the international setting in which Japan opted for imperialism, but it was the domestic consequences of its own economic management that were the driving force behind the ultranationalist-militarist coalition that chose these policies.
4. The Collective Advancement Model

The period of the ultranationalists' rise is as difficult to classify in our historical scheme as it is in any other. Was Japanese ultranationalism an illogical, atavistic detour on Japan's road to a sensible, modern, democratic, polycentric nationalism? Or was it a fatally logical extension of the defining characteristics of traditional Japanese nationalism itself? Karl Deutsch's model of ideological nationalism as collective advancement illuminates both the practical question of how Japan's ultranationalists moved the militarists to supplant the liberal parties and this deeper question of how ultranationalism relates to traditional Japanese nationalism on the whole.

According to Deutsch's analytic criteria, the Japanese were a united people and a nation from the Kamakura era (1185 A.D.) onwards. But Deutsch defines nationhood and nationalism as different things. Nationalism is an ideology of vertical mobility, "the vast effort to convert the channels of culture into stormladders for masses of individuals to social advancement and economic privilege." 155

Viewed in this perspective, the conflicts between the rural villagers and their brothers in the army on one hand, and the urban politicians, capitalists, managers, bureaucrats, and academics, on the other hand, seem to fall along much clearer class lines than
Japanese Marxists, in their quest for the holy proletariat, are willing to acknowledge. The rural Japanese suffered much more than their urban counterparts during the economic disruption of the 1920's, and the army felt its share of pain in the budget cuts that eliminated four divisions. The urban economic suffering was felt by the most recent migrants from the countryside who were not in the factories but in small traditional service shops. The decreased divisions of the army also shut off the one ladder of vertical mobility that these classes had most successfully used. On top of it all the party governments' attention at this time was not on caring for this majority of the population but on deflating prices in order to recover export markets, for the benefit of their class strata.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the liberal, urban establishment was hated by rural Japanese, and that some of the more impassioned among them should revive the samurai custom (sanctioned by extreme out-group hostility) of assassination as a form of heroic, patriotic protest. The practice was still within living memory.

But the direct action of the ultranationalist groups was always ineffective. Maruyama Masao remarks that even their greatest success in the February 26 Incident, when 1,600 troops seized the heart of the capital, "resulted in nothing more than the murder of a few old men." One plotter of another failed coup stated at his trial: "We
thought about destruction first. We never considered taking on the
duty of construction. We foresaw, however, that once the destruction
was accomplished, someone would take charge of the construction for
us."¹⁵⁷ These ultranationalists were clearly inferior imitations of
the Choshu and Satsuma bands of revolutionary nationalists.

Thus the ultranationalists' success came not from their own
actions but from the appeal of their ideology to young militarist
officers in the army. These staged a series of incidents, not at home
but abroad, that were designed to force the general staff to step in
to save face and thus save the ultranationalist cause. These incidents
lead up to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 that forced the top
command to shift toward the militarists' side, and the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident of 1937 which forced the nation into war.

The liberal party governments were not legally impotent. At the
peak of their liberalism they strengthened the Peace Preservation Law
which allowed arbitrary mass arrests and sentences of up to 10 years
for membership in societies that opposed the kokutai, and they could
have legally applied these to the sympathisers of the rightist
assasination societies with as much vigor as they applied them to the
milder-mannered sympathisers of the Communist Party.¹⁵⁸

The government's defeat came rather from its fundamental
structural and moral vulnerabilities. It was fatally vulnerable to
this particular threat from this particular quarter. The Meiji Constitution had been built on the prerogatives of the spokesmen for the emperor, and with the passing of the last Meiji oligarch (Saionji) this mantle fell entirely to the military, who could claim a direct chain of command from the emperor. The Meiji government was built on the ethics of a political religion, and it was vulnerable to ultranationalist extremists' attacks made in the name of this religion.

The civilian governments tried, but were totally unable, to break the ultranationalists. The groups were diffuse and spontaneous; they had no central leadership. And at trial after trial the ultranationalist assasins denounced the government and received widespread public sympathy. Clearly their ideology had much broader effect than their assasination activities.

The ultranationalist ideology at first linked practical issues of economic security and opportunity for the farming and military class with traditional and sacred symbols. Later their claims were expanded to include the lower-class city strata. Gondo Seikyo, a utopian, agrarian nationalist wrote in a vein similar to American "prarie populists":

"In the present state of fear and apprehension the villages suffer most. Our villages are the foundation of the country and the source of our habits and customs."
But he went considerably further than the prairie populists when he broadly hinted that since:

"The bureaucracy, the zaibatsu, and the military became the three supports of state, the political parties attached themselves to them, and the scholars fawned upon them... the foundations of (this) regime cannot be secure.

To be sure, the military officers, men who hold office for life, are guaranteed an adequate living... but the soldiers who dutifully have to shed their blood are all sons and brothers of the common people. The great majority of soldiers were born in poverty and hardship... as sons and brothers of the common people, they will not under any circumstances forget that they themselves are common people.

If, then, we infer what goes on in their minds, and take this problem of the commoners' plight and the privileged classes as proportionate, think of the changes that will take place in men's hearts; look back on the labor and tenant problems -- from disturbance to struggle, and from struggle, what will come?

Granted, it is the army's duty to maintain peace and order, but... They are certainly not people who are serving to kill the common people... No, they are persons who offer their lives and bodies for the sake of the wider public morality."

This primitive agrarian class consciousness that built up pressure for an anti-democratic coup was justified in the name of defending the Japanese kokutai at home (where it had been polluted by Western thought -- particularly individualism) and defending the Japanese empire abroad (where the Chinese were becoming disrespectful). As such, this ultranationalistic policy was directly
linked to the sacred symbols of the political religion of the emperor cult, through which the Japanese state had been modernized and in which two generations in both city and village had been indoctrinated. The ultranationalist cause was powerful because it held true to the logic of the emperor cult itself: if the emperor was the Son of Heaven, he, through the Japanese nation, should rule all the earth. But whereas Ito Hirobumi had found this doctrine quaint but useful, the ultranationalists of the 1920's and 1930's, after two generations of indoctrination, had come to believed it literally.

The members of the Amur Society, a group supporting Japanese imperialism, launched a manifesto in 1930 giving as their principle:

"We stand for Divine Rulership. Basing ourselves on the fundamental teachings of the foundation of the empire, we seek the extension of imperial influence to all peoples and places and the fulfillment of the glory of our national polity (kokutai)."

Araki Sadao justified the Manchurian incident of 1931 with the easy slide of reasoning from mythical premises to contemporary policies which was exemplified in the Imperial Rescript on Education and became so characteristic of the ultranationalist writers. We can note in his exotic mixture elements of: appeals to the tribal family-state, economic and political insecurity in the world order (and a hint at troubles at home), the assertion of a unique native Japanese mind, a mixing of the modern propaganda technique of legalistic
justifications with a primitive appeal to national indignation, a for-
once-justified sense of international paranoia, and finally the implied
inevitability of a military solution.

"Since the Imperial line has continued uninterrupted
for 124 generations and the foundations of the state
have become stronger year by year. The great cause
of the Yamato people prospers from year to year
under the fatherly guidance of the succeeding
Emperors. . . .

The present international situation causes much
disquietude due to the open antagonisms among
countries, the oppression of the weak by the
powerful, and the world economic crisis which
brings the economies of various countries into
chaotic condition . . . .

Before beginning the study of one question or
another . . . we must firmly realize: 'I am -- a
Japanese.'

When the question is raised as to the causes of the
Manchurian incident, every Japanese seeks the
causes in the lawless violation of treaties by the
Chinese, in the impermissible ignoring by the
Chinese of international usages and their unjust
infringements upon the rights and interests acquired
by Japan.

It is indisputable that all these were reasons for
the arising of the incident, but, frankly speaking,
this incident did not grow out of such trivial
questions. At the basis of it there is a fundamental
question . . . that China has insulted Japan.

However, it may be said that not only China but
almost the entire world looks slightlying at Japan in
its present situation. . . . The sentiment of the
members of the League of Nations is characteris-
tically against Japan in connection with this
incident!

It is perfectly evident that sooner or later Japan
will lose its patience."
Araki gives a direct example of Smelser's observation that mass nationalisms tend to portray the environment "in terms of omnipotent forces, conspiracies and extravagant promises, all of which are immanent."\(^{163}\)

The final step in the development of Japanese ultranationalism was its formal indoctrination through the school system. *Kokutai no hongi*, "Fundamentals of Kokutai" was produced by the Ministry of Education in 1937 and sold 2 million copies. It begins with criticism of Western individualism, summarizes the traditional Japanese nationalist virtues, and concludes with the national mission. It is a strange document that drifts between half-plausible analysis and bizarre analogies, between tribal myths and facts of foreign policy. And it is permeated with a non-rational dualist mentality that hypnotically leads its readers from premises in a seemingly logical critique of Western individualism to conclusions that are skewed at best and sometimes clearly deranged. But this document accomplished its desired result: to socialize an entire high school generation for death in national service.

How can self-interest be reconciled with suicide? *Kokutai no hongi* and the thousands of Japanese who willingly sacrificed their lives believing it answer this question very clearly, and in so doing they give us a powerful lesson on the extremes of nationalism.
Self-interest is reconciled with suicide when the individual's identification of his own identity and advancement with that of a nation-state is so strong that he sees himself as a mere subsidiary unit of the nation -- as an ant in an anthill or a worker bee in the hive -- as a minor, disposable appendage that has meaning and even existence only through the existence and aggrandizement of the nation. If self is no more than the nation writ small, then death for the nation's growth is life, and "offering our lives for the sake of the emperor" is "the enhancing genuine life of the people of a state." This attitude is psychotic, but it is indisputably pure nationalism of an extreme intensity. Kokutai no hongi states:

"Loyalty and Patriotism

Loyalty means to reverence the emperor as (our) pivot and to follow him implicitly. By implicit obedience is meant casting ourselves aside and serving the emperor intently. To walk this Way of loyalty is the sole Way in which we subjects may 'live,' and the fountainhead of all energy.

Hence, offering our lives for the sake of the emperor does not mean so-called self-sacrifice, but the casting aside of our little selves to live under his august grace and the enhancing genuine life of the people of a State. . . .

An individual is an existence belonging to the State and (its) history which forms the basis of his origin, and is fundamentally one body with it.

Our relationship between sovereign and subject . . . (springs from) 'dying to self and returning to (the) One,' in which this basis is not lost.

This is a thing that can never be understood by individualistic thinking. In our country, this great Way has seen a natural development since the
foundation of the nation, and the most basic thing that has manifested itself as regards the subjects is in short this Way of loyalty."

The Martial Spirit

Our martial spirit does not have for its objective the killing of men, but the giving of life to men. . . .

Here lies the martial spirit of our nation. War, in this sense, is not by any means intended for the destruction, overpowering, or subjugation of others; and it should be a thing for the bringing about of great harmony, that is, peace, doing the work of creation by following the Way."

A review of the material on the ultranationalist era presented in this section from the perspective of Deutsch's theory of collective advancement reveals a clear pattern and a stark prediction that proved, in Japan's case, to hold true.

"At the end this road a successful career of nationalism might turn a whole nation into a class. All of its members in that event would become members of the privileged strata of society, for other peoples would be made to furnish the bearers of water and the hewers of wood." 165

Japan's success at modernization gave it the means to gain colonies and promote Japanese peasants, merchants, and petty bureaucrats into privileged positions in these societies. It gave it an exclusive economic zone for Japanese exports and later supplied it with Korean forced-laborers in Japan. But at the same time the colonial policy oppressed the Koreans, Taiwanese, and Manchurians, the cheap rice sent back by successful Japanese colonist farmers depressed the
livelihoods of their former village colleagues. This helped keep farm income depressed, which stifled the growth of domestic demand and, in a vicious cycle, made Japan all the more dependent on the export markets of China and its colonies. In contrast to the other colonial empires which had mature domestic economies, Japan's premature linking of its developing economy with colonial exploitation left it in an extremely vulnerable transition stage in the 1920's and 1930's. The loss of these secure export markets in addition to the loss of U.S. and European markets to protectionism would have led to its economic destruction. This gave some Japanese strata a strong economic stake in defending and expanding Japan's colonial possessions low-tariff access to the Chinese market by any means: diplomatic or military.

Deutsch's discussion also concisely describes the element of fear in Japan's predicament:

"The more successful (the nation) has been in promoting its own members into priveleged or controlling positions in society, the more it will now have to fear from the rise of other peoples and other national movements."  

Japan's strength in its economic zones was also its biggest weakness. Its population had grown on colonial grain beyond the homeland's ability to support it, and its domestic demand had not grown enough to sustain its domestic industries. Japan had much to fear from rising Chinese nationalism, and in choosing the militarist
solution of directly attacking anything that it took to be a threat, it followed the path of other imprudent empires of the past that kept expanding to "defend" themselves until they created countervailing alliances against themselves and collapsed from overextension within.

Detusch then describes the risks of the dangerous course towards national supremacy such as the ultranationalists goaded Japan into taking.

"every step towards this goal (becoming a master race) has to be paid for with an increase in danger . . . ever more cut off morally and politically from the majority of mankind, the would-be 'master race' would of necessity become the obvious target for all social and national processes of revolt and of destruction.

Nationalism, which set out to make the nation strong, may at this point begin to make it potentially weaker and more vulnerable." 67

And, finally, Deutsch describes the hardening of the "national will" that presages disaster. In this extreme form of nationalism a selective history is indoctrinated, myths and fantasies take on the semblance of facts through endless repetition, competing channels of information are closed off, and all remaining channels of communication -- from the mass media to intimate conversations -- are flooded with propaganda to the point that individuals are forced to close their minds to competing data to reduce the unbearable dissonance and come to actually desire to obey the purposes of the national will.
This entails "the refusal to accept communications conflicting with, or even merely different from, the national separateness, or the national unity, or the image of the national character adopted as a goal. The hardening of the 'national will' would mean the closing of the 'national mind.'"168 "The symbols of extreme will are hardness, imperviousness, inaccessibility to any information or consideration that might interfere with the relentless pursuit of the once chosen goal or of a course of action once embarked upon."169 And the ultimate symbol of will power is "the dead man returned from the grave to complete a mission left unfinished."170

The goals of the Japanese ultranationalists to "purify Japanese thought," and the propaganda stories in the wartime press of ghostly Kamikaze pilots returning to base to report a successful suicide mission fit tightly with this macabre plot. In wartime Japan as in wartime Germany "nationalism had become will, and this will had become a worship of death and a creed of suicide."171

Not just Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen but Japanese women and even children chose suicide over surrender time and again in the War in the Pacific. The ranks of Japanese wartime adolescents who resolved to, but fortunately failed to commit suicide before surrendering to the Americans some of the author's personal acquaintances.
"Let us not argue about the large or small number of persons who held this 'will' at some stage in the process. The trouble lies deeper than in the stock scenario of the crafty, small majority persuading the great, gullible majority of some wicked perversion of the truth.

Rather, what perversion of the truth there is, what suicidal thought patterns we find are all being reproduced over and over again, in large degree, in the minds of millions of individuals." 172

"Nationalism, at the end of its tether, becomes a force for the destruction of the nation." 173 -- Karl Deutsch.

SUMMARY:

Was Japanese ultranationalism and militarism a mere mimicry of European fascism? We have argued that it was not, concluding, rather, that it was a completely consistent development of a tendency inherent to traditional Japanese nationalism. Was Japanese ultranationalism and militarism a new layer of Japanese nationalist ideology? We have argued that its content was essentially not different from that of previous Japanese nationalist ideologies, and that the difference was more a matter of its degree of intensity.

Japanese ultranationalism was an Integral nationalism, in terms of the classificatory types in our framework of theories of nationalism. And like other Integral nationalisms in Europe, it drew
on aspects of the Jacobin, Traditional, and Liberal nationalisms that preceded it. Japanese Integral nationalism combined the great prestige and power of the Traditional symbols of Japanese legitimacy (the emperor, State Shinto, and the patriotic elite) with the Liberal nationalistic characteristic of folk-consciousness: the Japanese people's obsessive conviction of their racial uniqueness and superiority. And to this potent mixture it added the renewed Jacobin-like nationalist fanaticism of the frustrated, impoverished, dislocated Japanese rural masses seeking upward mobility into the national mainstream through the elimination of foreign competition and the military guarantee of advantages for all Japanese. The defining trait of Integral nationalism is its extreme assertion of the organic unity of the individual and the nation, and Japanese ultranationalism spelled this out definitively in its highschool textbook for nationalist indoctrination Kokutai no hongi: "An individual is an existence belonging to the State and (its) history which forms the basis of his origin, and is fundamentally one body with it."174

What is remarkable about Japanese Integral nationalism, as compared to Nazism and Fascism, is that none of its content had to be invented. Whereas Hitler and Mussolini had to concoct their own myths of their respective master races, the great majority of Japanese alive in 1939 had been taught all their lives that they were racially superior and unique: the very Sons of the Gods. This belief was not only a millenial Core Value of Japanese nationalism, but both of
Japan's modern nationalist ideologies, the Meiji Restoration's Political Religion and the Middle Meiji's Modernizing Ideology, had taken pains to further strengthen and inculcate it. If Japan was indeed "at the top of the world," why shouldn't its "sacred imperial radiance shine over all nations," . . . especially the weak Asian states that needed paternal Japanese "cooperation" to free them from European colonial bondage and to help develop their markets and natural resources?

It is also remarkable that Japanese Integral nationalism had its political structure already established. Whereas Hitler and Mussolini had to break up democratic political structures and violently crush strong Social Democratic resistance to establish their "new orders," the Japanese ultranationalists slipped into power almost easily after a assassinating a few old men and staging dramatic but rather bloodless domestic "incidents" -- despite their massive electoral defeats. Once in power they had at their disposal an already centralized authoritarian state: most of the leftist dissidents had already been locked up by the liberal, democratic, Party cabinets! And this bureaucratic, authoritarian structure of the Japanese government, too, was backed up by the millenial Japanese social system of the paternalistic tribal nation built up out of many hierarchically-arranged non-kin tribes. Whereas Hitler and Mussolini had to establish new systems of social control (Brownshirts, Blackshirts) outside of their nations' traditional political and social
structures, traditional Japanese society provided the government with "organic" social networks of top-down control based on centuries of training in obedience, obligations and collective accountability.

We have argued that Japan's late feudal heritage left precedents for both democratization and military rule. We have argued that the pragmatic policy choices of Japan's modernizing Meiji elite left open two paths for Japan's development -- an outward-looking path of democratic development, and an inward-looking path of authoritarian development -- and that Japanese policy swung back and forth between these options during the 77 years from the Imperial Restoration to Imperial Japan's surrender. Our conclusion is that Japanese ultranationalism was neither an imported foreign fascism nor an inexplicable aberration on Japan's smooth course towards the status of a peaceful, democratic, economic superpower. We conclude, rather, that it was the victory of Japan's long-inherent nativistic, authoritarian tendency over a weakened democratic tendency that led to Japanese ultranationalism, militarism, and Japan's total destruction. The causes of this disaster, we have noted, lay both in the legal and spiritual weaknesses of the Meiji government and the extreme stress produced by the coincidence of an international economic crisis with a vulnerable transition period in Japan's economic and social development.
Conclusion

This chapter's analysis of traditional Japanese nationalism from the perspectives of 15 different theoretical models of nationalism has been somewhat cumbersome but worthwhile. The 14 theoretical models from the five academic disciplines of intellectual history, economics, social psychology, communications, and political science in our framework of theories of nationalism have illuminated such a range of diverse insights as to make analysis based on a single model seem trite. Yet our own consistent definition of the emotive, rational, and ideological components of nationalism as "a set of sentiments and an ideology linking the personal rewards of identity and advancement to the growth of a nation-state," has provided us with a constant theoretical monitor against which we have summarized and analysed each stage in the development of Japanese nationalism.

This analysis has produced a simple model of Japanese nationalism, likening its development to the accretion of layers (as on a pearl) around a core. We have traced the development of traditional Japanese nationalism from its core value of the uniqueness myth and the shaping traits of a tribal social structure and philosophical dualism, up through its development into a conscious nationalist sentiment in the middle Tokugawa period. At this stage feudal regionalism was still strong, nationalist sentiment was not widespread, and no clear nationalist ideology with a popular
following existed in Japan.

We have then traced the accretions, as if in layers over this core, of a Political Religion in the Meiji Restoration movement, and a Modernizing Ideology in the Middle Meiji era that both stressed national unity and growth in the name of the emperor. While the Political Religion of the emperor/kokutai cult marked the birth of a conscious Japanese nationalist ideology, it was still confined to a small group of reforming elites. It had parallels with the Traditional type of European nationalism in its emphasis of the three conservative, elitist, religious symbols of legitimacy: the emperor, State Shinto, and the patriotic leadership. But it was not until the fusion of this Political Religion with the Modernizing Ideology and their nation-wide inculcation through public education and the press after 1890 that Japan had a mass nationalist ideology. The Modernizing Ideology inherited its parallels to Traditional type nationalism from the Political Religion, but it quite lost the former's early Jacobin aspects of egalitarianism and revolutionary zeal. Instead, the Modernizing Ideology educated virtually all Japanese through compulsory education in their common, unified peoplehood, much like the Liberal nationalists of Europe.

Finally, we have traced not the selective adaptation but the extreme intensification of this nationalism into the ultranationalist ideology of the Japanese militarists, whose wartime indoctrination
succeeded to a very high degree in instilling an aggressive nativist ideology and a cult of death and suicide in the minds of millions of Japanese. The parallels between other Integral nationalisms (notably Nazism and Fascism) and Japanese Integral nationalism are particularly strong in their common drawing on pre-existing elements of Jacobin, Traditional, and Liberal nationalism. But Japanese Integral nationalism was all the more fanatical in emphasizing the all-encompassing organic unity of the state because this doctrine fit extremely closely with its traditional society. The hierarchical, paternalistic social structure and the ability of its dualistic perception patterns to uncritically accept mystical, metaphysical concepts of the unity of self, society, nature, and the gods, made suicide for the emperor "not so-called self-sacrifice" but "the enhancing genuine life" of the people of this nation, only 41 years ago.

What links these diverse developments together? What common elements bridge the 1,600-year-process of the development of Japanese nationalism? What commonalities define each of these phases as phases of a traditional Japanese nationalism? In the end, the fundamental motivating factor of traditional Japanese nationalism -- from the divine ancestry myths of the Yamato legends to the aggression in World War Two -- might be the dynamic between the unspoken Japanese fear of inferiority to the outside world and the omnipresent Japanese compensating device, the assertion of Japanese uniqueness.
Chapter Four

QUANTITATIVE DATA and METHODS OF ANALYSIS
on GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN POSTWAR JAPANESE NATIONALISM

Over fifteen centuries of unbroken Japanese sovereignty came to an end in September 1945 when Japan was occupied by United States' troops. Millions of its soldiers and civilians had been killed in the War, its major cities had been burned to the ground, and its production and transportation systems had been so completely destroyed that the some U.S. analysts believed that Japan might never again feed itself. While the U.S. military debated the probable casualties of a conventional invasion of the Japanese main islands and the Japanese military persisted in refusing to give in to the unthinkable thought of surrender, the world's first nuclear attacks fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The emperor Hirohito cast a tie-breaking vote in the War Council for surrender.¹

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In a voice high pitched and quavering, the emperor called on the Japanese people to surrender and thus recalled them from the course towards suicide in his name that many were still prepared to follow. The Japanese ultranationalism that had led to the War had become for many a suicidal cycle leading from the closed-minded assertion of a world order that did not exist, to the destruction of those who cast doubt on it, to the destruction of self when forced to face up to the defeat that was considered impossible. The internal consistency and motivating power of this fanatical ideology is illustrated by the bizarre cases of the isolated Japanese soldiers Yokoi and Onoda who were still fighting World War II all alone on their isolated Pacific islands in 1975, 30 years after Japan's surrender, having noted U.S. jet warplanes heading for Korea in the 1950's and Vietnam in the 1970's as evidence that Imperial Japan's War with America was still being fought. As simplistic as it might sound to those unfamiliar with the emperor cult, the emperor himself was the only figure who could dispel this tragic doctrine. It was he who had been built up as the nation's infallible father and god-on-earth by the ultranationalist doctrine, and although they had never heard his voice, it was he that the Japanese people had been indoctrinated to follow. His call to surrender freed most Japanese, and forced all but the most obdurate, to accept the reality of Japan's defeat and the deadly falsehood of ultranationalism's premises.
The very structure of Japanese ultranationalism was quickly dismantled by the U.S. Occupation. The inviolable emperor placed himself in the hands of the Americans and denounced his divinity as a "false doctrine"; Japan's invincible military was disarmed and demobilized and its chiefs were tried as war criminals; the wartime politicians and press were purged en masse; the dreaded Japanese police were chastened and split up into provincial units; Shinto was disestablished and Communist and Christian political prisoners were freed; the Zaibatsu's assets were impounded then split up; ultranationalist textbooks were first censored then replaced and education was reorganized; and the staff of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers dictated the law and government of the land. Thousands of former ultranationalists at lowers levels of power quickly changed their colors under the Occupation and began covering up their pasts as they blended into the hungry crowds queuing for U.S. Army handouts of cornmeal and powdered milk in order to stay alive.

Yet stripped to the level of the struggle for food, the people were still Japanese. Their cleanliness, orderliness, cooperative community spirit, honesty, loyalty, intelligence, industry, and individual and collective ambition quickly won the respect and friendship of the occupying troops, and within seven years they had achieved the ambitious goal of rebuilding a self-sufficient, independent nation, and had yet still only started to succeed. So even if the ideology of Japanese ultranationalism was reduced to a
trace remnant by the defeat, surrender, and Occupation reforms, many elements of traditional Japanese nationalism obviously survived these experiences intact. A people so defeated that it could not even feed itself had remained a tight-knit and highly effective nation and state.

What parts of traditional Japanese nationalism were destroyed by the War and Occupation, and what parts survived the cataclysm? Does this traumatic experience divide the nationalistic feelings of the Japanese generation that experienced it from those of their children reared in security? What parts of traditional Japanese nationalism were strengthened or weakened by Japan's unprecedented rapid economic growth of the 1960's, and what parts are surviving the affluence of the 1970's and 1980's? Does this era of wealth divide the nationalistic feelings of those who experienced it from their parents who were reared in austerity? If parts of the old nationalism have passed away, what new elements have taken their place, and what new elements might follow?

Part Two of this thesis attempts to answer these questions through interviews of a structured panel of Japanese respondents from different generations and quantitative cohort analysis of postwar survey data. This chapter presents the concepts, logic, and mechanics of the analysis under seven headings:
1.) Research objectives
2.) Research hypothesis, and Theoretical models tested
3.) Operational definition of the models
4.) Data base: description and critique
5.) Null hypothesis
6.) Previous segmentations
7.) Interview panel and Hypothetical experiential generations.

Then, Chapter Five presents the statistical findings of the study question by question according to the conceptual model of the Core and Layers of Traditional Japanese Nationalism that was developed through historical and theoretical analysis in Part One. Finally, the overall conclusions to this thesis are presented in Chapter Six.

1. Research Objectives

This quantitative analysis has four objectives:
1.) To analyse postwar Japanese nationalism in comparison and contrast with the prewar Traditional Japanese Nationalism that was defined through historical analysis in Part One.

2.) To empirically confirm or refute the existence of consistent and statistically significant age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

3.) To test whether Mannhiem et al.'s experiential-generation model, or Eisenstadt et al.'s maturation model, is more powerful in
accounting for the 30-year patterns of change in these Japanese nationalistic attitudes. And, finally,

4.) To make a limited contribution towards the more precise delineation of postwar Japanese "political generations" based on the variable of their attitudes towards nationalism, as revealed by both interview material and survey data.

This analysis achieved each of its research objectives. To preview the overall findings:

1.) This study is the first to demonstrate that consistent patterns of statistically significant age-based differences exist in survey data on postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

2.) It finds that the patterns in which these attitudes have changed over 30 years' time overwhelmingly match the operationalized pattern of the experiential-generation model, not that of the maturation model.

3.) This study also makes a limited contribution towards the more precise delineation of postwar Japanese "political generations" by being the first to demonstrate, using both interview and survey analysis, that one likely segmentation of cohorts, which has been advanced by some Japanese scholars, does indeed reveal highly
significant differences between experiential generations on questions of nationalism.

4.) Finally, and most importantly, this study finds that its conceptual model of Japanese nationalism (as Core and Layers) offers a clear explanation of why some Japanese nationalistic attitudes show experiential effects while others reveal maturation effects. It finds that the values associated with the pragmatic, ideological adaptations that formed the Meiji Layers of traditional Japanese nationalism are fading away in postwar Japan, both by period effects and by experiential effects, especially among the middle-aged and youth. But it also finds that the values associated with the ancient tribal Core of Japanese nationalism are strengthening rapidly in postwar Japan, both by maturation effects and by period effects, especially among the middle-aged and youth. What this surge of as-yet-shapeless nationalistic feelings may mean for the course and nature of Japanese nationalism in the immediate to foreseeable future is discussed in this thesis' conclusion.

2. Research Hypothesis

and Definition of Models Tested

This thesis's research hypothesis sets up a head-to-head challenge between two influential models of "political generations"
which are drawn from socialization theory. Our hypothesis is that:

The experiential-generation model is more powerful than the maturation model in explaining the age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

Before operationalizing and testing the two models in this hypothesis against the statistical evidence, we must define the concept of political generations and the assumptions of the two models.

Samuel P. Huntington has noted that preoccupation with generations and generational analyses have historically correlated with periods of "social trauma and upheaval" since Plato's writings in fourth century B.C. Greece.\(^2\) And they certainly did so in the cases of Karl Mannheim and others, writing in the aftermath of World War One, and numerous scholars including Inglehart, Jennings and Niemi, and Samuels, writing during and in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.\(^3\) But some works on generations that were written in the context of a more stable society are also apparent, notably Eisenstadt and later Lane, who wrote in the 1950's.\(^4\)

While the concept that youthful experience shapes life-long character is as old as Proverbs 22:6, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it,"\(^5\) it was Karl Mannheim, in his 1928 essay "The Problem of Generations" in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, who first explicitly posited
that common experiences during youth could form political generations which would carry their experientially-formed attitudes throughout their lives.\textsuperscript{6} Mannheim's work laid the foundation for decades of study in several fields of sociology and was perhaps primarily responsible for the subsequently dominant focus on the formative effect of youthful experiences in studies of socialization and political socialization.\textsuperscript{7} This model predicts that a "experiential-generation effect" (put simply, an experiential effect), in which different generations will maintain their different attitudes across time, will be apparent in longitudinal opinion survey data stratified by age-cohorts. (This is sometimes confusingly referred to as a "cohort effect" but cohorts are simple biological age-groups that exist independent of common experiences).

Richard J. Samuels, in the introduction to \textit{Political Generations and Political Development}, cites as the origin of a second and opposing model of political generations, the maturation or life-cycle model, the 1956 work of S.N. Eisenstadt, \textit{From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure}.\textsuperscript{8} Eisenstadt's structural-functional analysis holds that individuals' attitudes change along with their stage in the life-cycle: as more responsible social roles are progressively allotted to youth their attitudes progressively shift towards more responsible ones. While Lipset and Ladd trace this idea back to Aristotle's \textit{Rhetoric} and the essays of Max Weber, it finds its most colorful expression in the words of
William Shakespeare: "all the world's a stage . . . and one man in his time plays many parts/ His acts being seven ages," (infant, school-boy, lover, soldier, justice, lean and slippered pantaloon, second childishness).9 This model predicts that a "maturation effect," in which each generation's attitudes changes with its stage in life in the same pattern as those of the generations before and after it, will be apparent in longitudinal or panel survey data (this is often called the "life-cycle" effect).

Samuels deftly points out the paradox of these generational hypotheses. In the maturation model "social change is minimal while individual change is maximal. In the experiential model individual change is minimal after the initial formative experience, but societal change is more likely."10 Heformulates the inference of Mannheim's model that "as change accelerates there is an accompanying acceleration of potentially socializing events; hence there is an increase in the number of politically significant generational groups."11 And this would further imply that a society that has experienced very dramatic social, economic, or political changes would be likely to have politically significant experiential generations.

Our research hypothesis on postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism is based directly on Samuels' inference that a rapidly-changing society such as postwar Japan would be likely to
possess experientially-formed political generations. It thus posits that the Japanese response patterns to survey questions dealing with various aspects of Japanese nationalism will demonstrate experiential effects much more frequently than they demonstrate maturation effects.

3. Operational Definitions of Models

The fundamental conceptual differences between the experiential model and the maturation model are clear, but the various specific patterns of age-based attitude change which each model predicts must further be defined in operational terms in order to test them against the survey data. Jennings and Niemi define a six-point typology of such specific patterns of opinion change (or "effects") that can be identified in cohort analyses of longitudinal data. The experiential and maturation models will be operationally defined in this study as the specific patterns of responses to longitudinal survey data which are defined below. Generational response patterns to specific survey questions that are found to fit one of these six patterns through the statistical tests listed later in this chapter will be judged to give supporting evidence to the experiential, maturation, or period models, respectively.

Two simple parameters can define all possible changes in a cohort's opinions over time: their "level," and "trend". First, the "level" of a cohort's agreement with a question (or choice of a
specific response option in a multiple-choice question) is simply the percentage of the cohort's members who selected that response in a given survey. Thus, if 70 percent of a cohort's members chose the response option "respect the emperor" in a question gauging feelings towards the emperor, we would say that the attitude "respect the emperor" has a 70 percent level of support among that cohort that year. In the surveys we used, each cohort is asked the identical questions once every five years, so their levels of support for various attitudes often change from survey to survey. We can average all of these various measurements of the cohort's level of support for a given attitude during its lifetime in the survey and call the resulting mean its "lifetime average level of support."

Second, the cohort's level of support for an attitude measured by a given question can rise, fall, remain constant, or show a scattered pattern of change over time. We can call these patterns of change in levels of support the cohort's "trend" on that question. However, we must be very careful to specify that, in this usage, the term "trend" refers only to the pattern of change that the cohort's responses have shown in the past surveys; we cannot infer that such a "trend" might continue into the future. We can plot the "trend" of a cohort's changing levels of support for a given attitude over the years on a scatter plot by plotting its level for each survey on the vertical axis and the year of the survey on the horizontal axis. This reveals a rising, falling, mixed, or constant trend that can later be
subjected to various tests of statistical significance.

The six specific patterns of age-based attitude change can all be expressed in terms of different relationships between the levels and trends of two or more cohorts' responses to a given question. The operational definitions of the experiential effect, the maturation effect, the period effect, and the three possible combinations of these effects, which are given by Johnson and Niemi, are stated below, with a small chart illustrating these ideal-types of each pattern. Statistical tests can be used to confirm whether or not apparent differences between cohorts' patterns are statistically significant, but these techniques will be discussed later in this chapter.

1.) Experiential effect

A pure experiential effect exists where two different cohorts (or generations) show diverging trends, or where they show constant trends (neither rising nor declining) at different levels. If their trends are going in different directions, they can be considered members of different attitude-groups or generations. The same is indicated if their trends are parallel and constant but they have consistently and significantly different levels of support.
2. Experiential/period effect

A mixed experiential/period effect exists where the generations' trends are diverging but are both rising or falling, and it exists where they are parallel but are both rising or declining. The differences between the two generations' levels of support remain constant or increase over time, but both generations' trends are rising or falling. In these cases there is clearly an experiential difference, but equally clearly the attitudes "change with the times" in a period effect.

Experiential/period effects

Parallel

Diverging
3.) Period Effect

A pure period effect exists where generations' levels are the same and are rising or declining together. There is no difference except the "changing times."

Period Effects

\[ \text{rising} \quad \text{declining} \]

4.) Simple Continuity

Simple continuity exists where the generations have the same constant, unchanging levels. There is no experiential, maturation, or period effect: no generational changes at all.

Simple Continuity
5.) Maturation effect

A maturation effect exists when: a) the older generation (over 45-50) holds a stable, "mature" attitude on a subject, and b) younger generations' attitudes converge towards this mature attitude so as to reach its level by the time they are over 45-50 in their life-cycle. The maturation model assumes that individuals change while society does not, so it predicts that the older generation's attitudes will be constant while young people mature towards them. Needless to say, depending on the attitude measured by a question, the "mature level of opinion" can be either higher or lower than that of "youthful" opinion.

We must note, however, that Johnson and Niemi's operationalizations -- which we are following -- assume that maturation-affected attitudes will follow straight line patterns of response change. While this fits the assumptions of the experiential model and the period model, it does not fit the assumptions of the maturation model well. The maturation model requires both a convergence of the younger generations' responses towards the older generations' constant level of response, and a levelling off of the slope of the younger generations' converging pattern when it reaches the age of "mature" opinion. (i.e. Not rising to a mature level of opinion, crossing this level, and continuing to rise to a
different level). We will thus refer not only to measurements of the convergence of these generations' slopes (regressions) but to the actual plots of the generations' trends and levels in testing for maturation effects.

Maturation effects

![Graph showing upward and downward maturation effects](image)

6.) Maturation/period effect

Since the maturation model assumes a stable society with essentially unchanging mature attitudes, there is a major conceptual contradiction in the maturation/period effect that is not present in the experiential/period effect. If everybody's attitude is changing with the times, how can one measure what is the "mature" attitude towards which the younger generations must converge? If all generations' (thus the entire population's) mean level of support for an attitude has risen 20 percent in 20 years, what would be the level at which a 20-years-younger generation is judged to have reached "mature" opinion; the level the older generation held 20 years previously, or the level it holds now? Neither option is
satisfactory, because the very presence of this period effect negates the maturation model's key assumption of attitude stability. In our definition of a maturation/period effect we will bend in favor of the maturation model, however, and choose the lesser of these two fallacies. We will compare the present levels of the two generations by assuming that the trend of the older generation ever since it reached maturity is a pure period effect, rather than comparing the present level of the younger generation with the 20-years-previous level of the older generation at the cost of ignoring the tremendous bias introduced by 20 years of marked period effects. But at the very minimum we will insist that a younger generation would have to converge with the opinions of the older generation before that generation passes away -- otherwise there is no convergence whatsoever and experiential differences are revealed to predominate.

"Convergence" can be operationally defined as cases in which the younger generation has lower levels but a more steeply inclining trend in questions where the older generation's trend is rising, and higher levels but a steeper decline in questions where the older generation's trend is falling.
Maturation/Period Effects

rising

declining

4. Data Base

A. Description of Data Base

In 1953, the year after Japan regained its independence, a group of researchers at the Ministry of Education's Institute of Statistical Mathematics conducted an opinion survey of "The Japanese National Character." Unlike the vast majority of postwar Japanese surveys conducted by the Japanese press, this survey was repeated every five years using the same scientific sampling procedures and the same questions with identical wording. The most recent survey was in 1983. The result of this sustained effort is Japan's only consistent longitudinal data base covering the 30 years of the post-occupation period, and it has the additional advantage of being a generally well-designed, rigorously-collected, and highly reliable data base as well. For these reasons the National Character polls form the bulk of this thesis' quantitative data.13
are then sent to the TS Institute, and the questionnaires are destroyed. The massive clerical task of breaking down and tabulating 5,000 to 6,000 responses to over 200 response options accounts for the pattern of three-to-four-year delays before the full results are released, and it also accounts for the paucity of cross-tabulations. This pattern still persists despite the recent introduction of computers.

In order to cut down on the length of the survey (which takes between thirty minutes and an hour and a half to administer) not every question is asked in every survey, leaving some gaps of over a decade in the data base. There have also been cases in which questions have been dropped from the survey over the years, and in many cases only two or three surveys' data (covering only five or ten years) are available on a given question.

In order to expand the range of questions while at the same time maintaining the continuity of the original questions, the Institute devised a new questionnaire from the 1973 survey and has distributed it in alternating series with the traditional questionnaire, giving two samples of roughly 3,000 for each type of survey form. This situation is complicated by the fact that the differing response patterns to some identical questions appearing on both questionnaires seem to reveal a strong measurement effect. The situation is further complicated because almost-identical questions appear in both
surveys, inviting confusion or erroneous cross-inferences despite the questions' accurate reference-numbers.

The sampling procedures for the NHK longitudinal survey's nation-wide random sampling of about 5,000 respondents is basically similar, with the exception that it selects 450 sampling points with 12 respondents each. Its surveys are again administered using the interview method by trained NHK survey staff attached to its nation-wide local offices.

B. Critique of Data Base

Researchers are indebted to the foresight of the original Tokai Suri survey team for having begun to collect this consistent longitudinal data base before many of the techniques of quantitative cohort analysis were even developed and before their requirements were known. Yet we must also regret that the constraints of funding, technology, and methodology prevented the team from building a more solid and complete data base. The facts are that while it is this data base alone that permits our analysis, it is its limits that primarily prevent our analysis from using a fuller range of statistical segmenting techniques. As so often happens in social scientific research, here too the data dictates the research techniques.
The issues in point are the fundamental question of how to test the research hypothesis and the lesser but closely related question of how to segment the birth-year cohorts into "generations" for testing. There are two valid lines of testing for experiential effects. The first is the \textit{a priori} historical definition of mass formative experiences and the "formed" generations, followed by statistical testing to see whether or not these hypothetical "generations" show significantly divergent long-term attitude patterns. The second approach is the statistical segmentation of cohorts into "clusters" (based on their covarying attitude patterns revealed in survey data), followed by the \textit{a posteriori} search for what historical experiences must have "formed" these generations. The first approach is more powerful in directly testing the experiential model -- if the cataclysm of militarism, total war, and total destruction did not form a Japanese political generation, what would? And the second approach is more powerful in defining exactly where the political generations divide.

The best method would be to "converge" both of these approaches: to conceptually define hypothetical "political generations" based on interview and historical data; to statistically define clusters of cohorts whose survey response patterns show the greatest internal cohesion and greatest contrast with other clusters of cohorts; and to see if these two segmentations match up. If the whole range of the TS survey's questions with political significance could be made into a "political attitudes" index, this approach could
possibly make a major contribution towards delineating the specific boundaries of postwar Japanese political generations. If the whole range of questions relating to nationalism could be made into a "nationalism index," then strong evidence could be produced indicating the best possible segmentation of the cohorts into clusters based on nationalistic variables.

But the Tokei Suri data base is not structured in a way that permits the use of powerful techniques of statistical segmentation and indexing. One reason why Japanese methodologists consider this survey unsuited for such techniques is that it is only conducted once every five years and its data are arbitrarily segmented according to 5-year cohorts. These procedures drastically reduce the number of samplings (measurements) of each age-group's responses, which lowers the degrees of freedom in tests of statistical significance and thus lowers the confidence with which we can accept any apparent differences between the attitudes of different generations as being statistically significant. Even if the survey covers 5,000 people over 30 years, it only measures the opinions of each 5-year cohort a maximum of 7 times, and seven is a small sample size for tests of statistical significance. Another reason why Japanese researchers have reservations about indexing this data base is that it does not record the correlation of individuals' responses to different questions. So the best that can be done with this data is to use the first approach discussed above: to introduce a hypothetical segmentation
based on historical and interview data, and to test it against a battery of questions to see if it reveals statistically significant differences between the hypothesized experiential generations.

Since this study's data base does not permit more powerful tests of statistical segmentation, the study makes no claims of having found the "real" or "best" segmentation of Japanese "political generations." Yet this study found that on 12 out of 16 questions relating to nationalism its hypothetical segmentation of cohorts based on interview and historical data revealed differences between the nationalistic attitudes of experientially-formed generations which had strong statistical significance.. And it was able to make a significant, if limited, contribution towards the study of Japanese political generations by being the first study to empirically demonstrate that consistent and statistically significant age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes actually exist, at least in attitudes towards nationalism.

5. Null Hypothesis

The general research hypothesis of this survey analysis sets up a head-to-head challenge between Mannheim's experiential model and Eisenstadt's maturation model. And in view of the rapid and fundamental changes that have taken place in postwar Japan's
economy and society, it hypothesizes that Mannheim's model of a society with changing attitudes will be more powerful than Eisenstadt's model of a society with more stable attitudes in accounting for the generational changes in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

The specific null hypothesis which this quantitative analysis tests and attempts to refute is thus framed against the key assertion of Mannheim's experiential-generation model. It is that:

**Even if** different age-groups undergo different mass socializing experiences in their youth,

**No statistically significant differences** between their long-term response patterns to survey questions on nationalism will occur.

Eisenstadt's maturation model assumes the near-opposite of Mannheim's experiential model -- that generations' opinions change in similar patterns as they grow older, regardless of the different experiences they might have had in their youths. So if this null hypothesis is confirmed by the statistical findings it would support the maturation model, but if this null hypothesis is refuted by the statistical findings it would support the experiential-generation model, as the more powerful theoretical model in accounting for the generational changes in Japanese nationalism.
There are two main factors in the definition of Mannheim's "political generation" which underlies this null hypothesis. The first is the subjective manifestation of an intense socializing experience in the forming identities and perceptions of a youthful age-group. And the second is the resulting objective manifestation of the attitudes formed by that socializing experience in the life-long survey response patterns of that age-group. The first of these factors corresponds to the independent variable of the null hypothesis, while the second factor corresponds to the dependent variable of the null hypothesis. Establishing the independent variable thus requires consistent subjective evidence from the perceptions of individual members of the age-group in question that they experienced a similar socializing experience. And it requires evidence from secondary sources that this formative experience was common to the entire age-group.

The rest of this chapter studies the evidence on the mass socializing experiences in postwar Japan. In the following section it reviews the various segmentations of political generations that Japanese researchers have advanced and the two major existing studies of Japanese political generations by American scholars. Then, in the final section, it defines this study's hypothetical experiential generations, drawing on two sources of evidence: a summary of the historical data on the economic, educational, and political environments that predominated in Japan during three periods, and interviews of a small, structured panel of Japanese respondents.
6. Segmentation

A. Japanese Researchers' Statistical Segmentations of Generations

Japanese researchers have certainly made many limited segmentations of the 5-year cohorts represented in the Tokei Suri and NHK data bases (generally pertaining to broad sociological constructs such as "associativeness" in personal relationships), but they are careful to specify these segmentations' limits. Thus, in Hikaku nihonjin-ron (Comparative Japaneseness Theory), Hayashi Chikio, the dean of the Tokei Suri team (and of Japanese survey researchers in general) used three broad biological-age-based generations (ages 20-34, 35-49, 50- ) and justified them simply by stating that differences between the responses of the 20's cohorts and the over 60 cohorts had been found in 62 percent of the questions. The NHK researchers in Dai ni nihonjin no ishiki (Japanese Consciousness, second edition) used segmentations of similar breadth (ages 16-29, 30-49, 50 - ) and confessed both of these data bases' statistical imperative for using such broad groupings, "so that the sample numbers do not become too small." It can be noted that these two segmentations are the same in terms of their division between a middle-aged and an older generation and that their division between the younger and middle-aged generation is only 5 years, or one cohort, apart.
The NHK segmentation of its "future orientation" index in Gendai nihonjin no ishiki kozo (The Structure of Modern Japanese Consciousness) divides the cohorts into the two generations of those born before or after 1937 (close to the previously-mentioned divisions between the middle-aged and older generations). Its index of "future orientation," in Dai ni nihonjin no ishiki kozo, however, places the discriminating line at birth-year 1933, five years earlier. To turn to the indices that are closer to our subject, NHK's index of "respect for the emperor" found that the upper of the two segmentation lines previously discussed (birth year 1933) revealed significant experiential differences between two broad generations. And the NHK index of "nationalism," of which the serious conceptual flaws are noted in Appendix D, divided the cohorts into three generations (ages -35, 36-49, 50-) in 1985.

Considering the conceptual and methodological problems inherent in averaging the arbitrarily-weighted averages of arbitrarily-segmented data, it is not surprising that the NHK researchers have scrupulously avoided combining these various indices into a single "political attitudes" index on the basis of which to segment Japanese political generations. But the closest that they have come to this broad-based analysis of generational differences in attitudes also segments the cohorts into three generations. In Nihonjin no ishiki, the NHK team combines various responses and indices into two broad, interpretive constructs: "social ideologies," and "life values." Their
resulting segmentation followed the general pattern of the more specific indices cited above with divisions by birth-years that correspond to ages -35, 36-49, 50- at the time of the latest survey in 1983.**21** This thesis' segmentation is very close to these Japanese researchers' groupings.

B. American Scholars' Studies of Japanese Political Generations

While leading Japanese researchers had long discussed period effects in changes in Japanese public opinion data and others have sometimes gone as far as to claim that maturation effects could be seen in the age-related distribution of responses in instantaneous, non-longitudinal survey data,**22** it was only in the 1970's that studies began to take the pains to investigate Japanese political generations using the longitudinal, cohort-stratified data in which, alone, generations can validly be identified. While Hayashi Chikio's Hikaku nihonjin-ron, and NHK's Nihonjin no ishiki, both of 1973, marked the beginning of rigorous Japanese treatment of this subject, non-Japanese scholars' interest was first marked by two studies also written in that year: one by Nobutaka Ike, and the other by Ellis Krauss (published in 1974). Huntington would find it more than coincidental that all of these studies were produced against the background the clear generational overtones of Japan's student radical movement in the 1960's.
Inglehart, in 1971, had followed the Mannheim hypothesis that social change will produce political generations and Abraham Maslow's hypothesis that human motivations result from a hierarchy of values. And he found that an increase in economic affluence brought about a decline in acquisitive "bourgeois" values among youth in six European countries. Ike tried to test Inglehart's hypothesis against the Japanese case, found that the results were not very convincing, and in the process published a simple cohort analysis of Japanese survey data. In 1973 he had access to the first half (15 years' worth) of the same TS longitudinal data base which we are using. But in his study Ike used no statistical techniques of analysis. His approach was merely to reprint the TS tables as they were published by the Institute -- that is, formatted by present age on the vertical axis and the year of the survey on the horizontal axis -- and to show how cohorts could be followed by reading the data diagonally across the rows and columns. No tests were made of the statistical significance of the various differences he discussed so the credibility of his conclusions rested entirely on the skill of his interpretation. Yet despite his limited methodology, Ike made the accurate and original observation that in postwar Japanese public opinion "different kinds of change -- intergenerational, life-cycle, adult -- appear to be at work."

Krauss' book *Japanese Radicals Revisited* was actually written as a doctoral dissertation in 1970 under Ike's supervision. It consists
of a seven-year tracking study of both highly politicized and politically apathetic Japanese in the radical student era from 1962 to 1969-1970. Its basic finding was that "a strong case can be made for the generational (experiential) model over the maturation model" for three reasons:

1. "the relatively small shift in the political characteristics of (the) activists,"

2. "the fact that the activists seem intentionally to have sought careers more compatible with the fulfillment and expression of their earlier values," and

3. "many of the orientations and behavior patterns acquired earliest seem to have been the least subject to change." However, it also found that the work environment significantly affected the views of politically apathetic respondents, with those entering professions becoming much like the former activists and those entering companies becoming more conservative.

Both the strengths and the weaknesses of Krauss' work come from its roots: the original sample that was non-randomly selected and interviewed by Tsurumi Kazuko of Sophia University, whose research on sociological and psychological changes in prewar, wartime, and postwar Japan are represented in her outstanding book Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War Two. Tsurumi intended her study to be a study of Japanese radical students, and that is exactly and only what Krauss'
study remained. Krauss frankly acknowledges this limitation of his sample, stating "the original sample was not selected randomly . . . (the) small size of the follow-up sample adds another reason for caution . . . the sample is a homogenous one (educational elite) . . . (and) consequently (it) does not represent students from all types of campuses throughout the country." 28

But while Krauss shows excellent scholarly reserve in qualifying his findings, there is a temptation for casual readers of Japanese Radicals Revisited to combine his finding of an experiential generation effect among radical activists with the popular knowledge of the "radical era" and to draw conclusions concerning an entire "radical" generation. This temptation can be laid to rest by placing Krauss' study in its true demographic context. Krauss' total sample of 53 consists half of former activists and half of less active or apathetic respondents, and this roughly corresponds to Tsurumi's segmented sample of 47 activists, 30 only "interested in" the movement and, and only 23 apathetic respondents. 29 But Krauss also cites Packard's estimate of Japanese students in the Tsurumi study era as 5 percent activists, 20 percent "aggressive", 40 percent apathetic, and 35 percent totally apathetic. 30 Even grouping Packard's 5 and 20 percent groups together as activists, then, half of Krauss' sample is selected from a quarter of the students and is skewed strongly to the left. It is the combination of the small number, 53 cases, and the skewed selection of this sample that prevents Krauss from testing and
demonstrating the statistical significance of most of his findings.

But the danger of drawing inferences from Krauss' small, skewed, elite sample to the generation or the period as a whole is far more dramatically illustrated by examining not the size of Krauss' sample but the size of the entire student radical population in the context of Japanese society as a whole. Krauss cites the figure of 100,000 as the highest turnout ever for a radical movement protest activity. Even if we assumed that each of these 100,000 were students (which they were not), and that each of them was a political activist (which they were not), and that each was marked for life by this experience (which they might have been), this 100,000 would still be less than 1 percent of the population of Tokyo, less than 0.5 percent of the population in their age group, and less than 0.1 percent of the population of Japan.

Political protest in Japan's era of rapid economic growth was a highly visible but highly marginal activity. Krauss thus made an excellent in-depth study of the formative processes and the subsequent patterns of change and continuity in the attitudes of a specific group, but that group was a miniscule group on the extreme fringe of the Japanese political spectrum. And there is at present no empirical basis on which to evaluate the degree to which Krauss' findings of experiential—generation effects -- as solid as they seem -- can be generalized to the entire generation that was young during the
era of rapid economic growth, let alone to the Japanese population as a whole.

The fundamental difference between our study and his is that we approach the same basic question -- whether the experiential or maturation effect is more powerful in explaining generational differences in Japanese political attitudes -- from the opposite levels of aggregation. Whereas he began with individuals and worked a short way towards generalizing about the generational group, we will begin with statistical data on the entire Japanese population and work a short way towards analysing specific generations. No two studies can adequately encompass this immense phenomenon, but by attempting to bridge it from opposite approaches we might succeed in reducing the gap that future studies are left to fill.

A secondary difference between Krauss' study and our own is that while they are both concerned with generations, his drew more heavily on sociological theory to deal with the process of attitude formation, while ours draws more heavily on the theory of nationalism and Japanese history to deal with the substantive field of Japanese nationalism.
C. Thesis' Segmentation Procedures

Samuel Huntington, in Political Generations and Political Development, gives three different definitional criteria of political generations, in ascending order of strictness. First, a generation must be a biologically-contiguous cohort or cluster of cohorts with the same formative experience and subsequent attitude patterns. A single group made up exclusively of 20 to 25 year olds and 50 to 55 year olds might share certain attitudes, but they could never be considered to be a single political generation. Second, Huntington suggests that in stricter terms a political generation is a cohort or cluster of cohorts "in which the members conceive of themselves as being distinctive," sharing not only political characteristics but "a consciousness of 'us' versus 'them'." 32 Finally, he defines a political generation in its strictest sense as one which possesses not only the two characteristics of common experientially-formed attitudes and a consciousness of commonality but "where there is interaction among the members." 33

Huntington does not pause to specify what he means by a "formative experience," and, indeed, this is a concept that is easier to use than to define. As long as its two logical reference points are the causal experience and the caused effect, there is something inherently tautological about the concept that: formative experiences form experiential generations -- which are formed by formative
experiences, *reductio ad absurdum*. A third logical reference point is thus needed to resolve this tautology by defining the cause independently from its effect — even if the hypothesized formative experience's subsequent *validation* is still dependent on producing the effect of statistically significant experiential differences in long-term attitude patterns.

On the basis of this reasoning we can operationally define a hypothetical "formative experience" as:

- a rapid and significant change in social, economic, or political processes that affects an entire age-group's daily lives and is documented by *historical evidence* and the *subjective perceptions of interview respondents* from the cohorts that underwent this experience.

Then we can operationally define an "experiential generation" as:

- a cohort or cluster of contiguous cohorts which has experienced a common formative experience and later demonstrates statistically significant differences in its long-term response patterns to survey questions from those of other age groups.

It should be noted that since this study only analyses survey questions dealing with nationalism it refrains from claiming to identify Japanese "political generations." It merely claims to study the Japanese "experiential generations" on questions of nationalism.
7. The Interview Panel and the Experiential Generations

The final section of this chapter gives this thesis' segmentation of the Japanese cohorts into hypothetical experiential generations based on their hypothesized formative experiences. It does this by highlighting the extensive historical evidence on the major stages in postwar Japan's dramatic economic, social, and political transformations and by referring to interviews with a panel of Japanese respondents drawn from each of the hypothesized experiential generations.

The Interview Panel

Subjective as well as objective evidence is required to test the null hypothesis of this study, and the subjective evidence of whether or not individual Japanese of different postwar age-groups actually experienced a common formative experience is best obtained through interviews. This study therefore conducted a series of in-depth interviews with a panel of Japanese respondents, which was selected from the three age groups whose years of youth corresponded to the years of the mass socializing experiences suggested by the historical data.

This interview panel was a small, structured panel. It was not designed to form a statistically significant sample, because this was
not its purpose in the study. Rather, its role was to provide important information which the study's survey and historical data could not provide -- the personal perceptions of individual Japanese concerning the factors which they feel shaped their own identities and attitudes towards nationalism. Indeed, without this subjective evidence that Japanese individuals from different age-groups actually believe that their generation experienced a common socializing experience during its youth, which bonded it together for life, there would be little ground on which to claim that these generations possessed the subjective attributes of the "common formative experience" or the "consciousness of 'us' versus 'them,'" which are key criteria for identifying Mannheim's experiential generations.

The interview data revealed by this panel made the important contribution of strongly suggesting the presence of widespread commonalities in the socializing experiences of three postwar Japanese generations. The unanimous agreement among the three generations' members on their common formative experiences, and their surprisingly strong generational identities and common images of other generations, also suggest that interviews with larger samples would be likely to yield similar results. In addition, these individuals' accounts of their personal lives serve as vivid illustrations of how real Japanese individuals (as opposed to anonymous cohorts) encountered and reacted to the formative experiences of their youth and how this has affected their subsequent
attitudes towards Japanese nationalism years and even decades later in their lives.

The panel of case-studies interviewed consisted of nine college-educated, urban, white-collar men living in the Tokyo Metropolitan District. They were selected non-randomly to fill nine categories designed to balance and broaden the spectrum of political views represented on the panel. Three respondents -- a politically leftist-oriented individual, a politically rightist-oriented individual, and a politically centrist-oriented individual -- were selected from each of the three major generational groups suggested by Japanese researchers and the historical data. The respondents' political orientations were primarily defined through their stated party preference ("Leftist" in the case of Communists, Socialists or self-identified leftists; and "Centrist" in the case of Democratic Socialists, Komeito supporters or self-identified centrists). As the Liberal Democratic Party contains both Centrist and Rightist members, they were categorized through a simple discriminant scale of three forced-choice questions, each with a follow-up question. This scale (which also included leftist responses) was also used on those who expressed no party preference, and it is given in Appendix C.

The interviews were all conducted in Japanese according to a standardized Japanese questionnaire, except in the cases of the older-generation centrist Mr. "B" and the middle-aged rightist Mr.
"F", who insisted on responding in English in order to practice their English conversation. This led to the sometimes comical situation of the American interviewer struggling to keep the interview in Japanese (so as not to introduce a biasing factor vis-a-vis the other interviews) while the Japanese respondent persisted in answering in English.

The interview questions used were designed to probe into personal memories and impressions, exploring the linkage between the "individual rewards of identity and advancement with the growth of the nation state," which is this study's definition of nationalism as developed in Chapter One. The questions were probing, and the respondents rarely answered them quickly. The interviews usually lasted between one hour and one-and-a-half hours, and where time permitted, they were used to lead into open-ended discussions. The questions were originally written in Japanese, and their English translation is given in Appendix B.

The interviews were conducted in any semi-private location that was convenient and comfortable to the respondents, who were mostly working "salary men" (some retired). The interviewer let the respondent take the lead in suggesting a time and place as a way of securing a situation in which the respondent felt at ease. As Krauss found in his interview research two decades earlier, the Japanese kissaten (coffee shop) was a common and convenient choice, as was
the office meeting room, but interviews were also conducted amidst the semi-privacy of noisy yakitori bars and even a financial district hostess club (hostesses not attending).

It might be added that the interviewer is an American born and reared in Japan whose Japanese is rarely taken for a foreigner's over the telephone. His foreign nationality could obviously have introduced a biasing factor to the interviews, but his suspicion is that, if anything, it made it easier for the Japanese respondents to share some of their deeply-held personal memories. They did not hesitate to tell him, for example, "The American military bombed my house," and "The bombs from the American planes . . . (killed my father and two older brothers)."

The Hypothetical Experiential Generations

What were the major formative experiences in postwar Japan? What should we look for in historical and interview data in attempting to identify them? Mannheim and later students of socialization have focussed on a generation's common experiences in its youthful "formative years" (to use the resulting cliche), and this focusses the search for a formative experience on changes in the basic socio-economic-political ethos of those years as well as any dramatic events such as revolutions. But Japanese sociologists are nearly unanimous in noting that the traumatic experience of
destruction and defeat in World War II was a formative experience that affected all generations living at that time -- regardless of their current ages.\textsuperscript{35}

The implicit image behind the youthful socialization model is that of a "blank slate" on which attitudes are written, while the implicit image behind the adult resocialization model is that of a "slate wiped clean" of previous attitudes on which new attitudes are written. We cannot reject the possibility that either or both of these types of formative experience occurred in postwar Japan, but we can infer that an adult resocializing experience would have to be much more dramatic than a youthful socializing experience because youths' attitudes are more easily formed than those of adults. This leads us to the inference that the trauma of the War might have influenced a much broader cluster of cohorts (including resocialized adults and adolescents or children whose attitudes were formed at younger ages through the traumatic experience) than the much less dramatic changes that followed this experience. Here we would expect to find narrower clusters of "blank slate" youth directly influenced by the social ethos of their respective eras.

Closely following the lines of the segmentations most commonly advanced by Japanese researchers (on the basis of both their historical and statistically indexed analyses), we have divided the cohorts represented in the Tokei Suri and NHK data bases into three
hypothetical experiential generations. These generations are:

I. The War Generation
   born between 1909 and 1938,
   over seven years old at the end of the War,
   over 14 years old at the end of the Occupation, and
   aged 45 to 74 in 1983 (the time of the latest survey).

II. The Rapid Economic Growth Generation
    born between 1939 and 1948,
    less than four years old or not yet born at the end of
    the War,
    less than 11 years old at the end of the Occupation,
    25 to 34 years old at the end of Japan's rapid economic
    growth at the 1973 Oil Shock, and
    aged 35 to 44 years old in 1983.

III. The Affluent Generation
     born between 1949 and 1963,
     not yet born at the end of the War,
     less than three years old or not yet born at the end of
     the Occupation,
     10 to 24 years old at the beginning of Japan's stable
     affluence (post Oil Shock), and
     aged 20 to 34 in 1983.
We statistically tested these three hypothetical generations' responses to 16 survey questions relating to nationalism in Chapter Five. And we found that these segmentations reveal statistically significant differences between the generations' responses (at T-test p. = 0.025) on 12 out of the 16 questions. There is thus extremely strong empirical evidence that this segmentation reveals clear experiential generations. However, we repeat that this study does not produce adequate evidence to conclude either that 1.) this is the best possible segmentation of the generations by statistical criteria, or that 2.) these experiential generations on questions of nationalism necessarily correlate with the broader phenomenon of Japanese political generations on the whole.

I. The War Generation

Socializing experiences that are widespread and powerful enough to shape the attitudes of entire populations for their lifetimes are not easy to overlook; and Japan's cataclysm of total defeat, destruction, and Occupation discussed at the beginning of this chapter is an example of the strongest order. The oldest cohort in our data (represented only until the 1968 survey due to the unfortunate practice of grouping the oldest respondents as "60 and older") would be 73 to 77 years old in 1986, but it was only 32 to 36 years old at the end of the War in 1945. It and the two cohorts junior to it experienced the surrender and Occupation as adults, while the two
cohorts junior to them experienced it at younger ages. While the supply of basic human necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, health care, and employment improved tremendously between the end of the War and the end of the Occupation, acres of burned-out homes and factories still remained in cities while American G.I.'s were highly visible throughout the land as occupying troops. No Japanese that lived or was reared in that era could escape the searing message that Japan had been totally defeated and would have to be rebuilt again. The extent of the economic deprivation was such that even today Japanese who were born or were young children during the end of the war and the first year of the Occupation still suffer a number of chronic health risks due to the latent effects of malnutrition.

The major reason why Japanese researchers and this study group this exceptionally broad cluster of six 5-year cohorts into one generation is the extreme intensity of the War and Occupation's socializing force. The near-total destruction of Japan as they had known it wrote its message on the minds of the Wartime youth and children and it also rewrote its message in the minds of adults. It is for this reason that we call this generation simply the War generation.

Yet these cohorts had far more than this single catastrophic unifying experience in common. All had been educated to some extent under the prewar Ministry of Education's ultranationalist curriculum
based on the Meiji nationalist modernizing ideology which was embodied in the Imperial Rescript on Education. There were obviously differences in the number of years the oldest and youngest of this generation's students were indoctrinated with state "morals" classes (dotoku), and the shift from more liberal curriculum materials to more propagandistic ultranationalist materials from the 1910's to the 1930's is well documented; yet even the very youngest cohort in this generation had still recieved from 2 to 7 years of formal indoctrination in the ethics of traditional Japanese nationalism at the peak of wartime propaganda policies.

Besides the factors of the defeat, economic hardship, and prewar education, the common political experiences of this generation were another factor that served to unite them. Even the oldest cohort of this broad generation first reached voting age between 1929 and 1933 -- right at the time of the Manchurian Incident (1931) when Japanese politics' long slide into ultranationalism and militarism was already well established. (This cohort, by the way, was the first to receive universal manhood sufferage. Women's sufferage was instituted by the U.S. Occupation.)

Finally, it is important to note that in the increasingly totalitarian state of prewar Japan the normal distinctions between various factors such as education and politics and military service were systematically blurred by government action. The totalitarian
control of the Japanese government -- that eventually even sent primary school children out of their schools to gather pine resin in the Chiba forests for distillation into aviation fuel during the final years of the War -- was already developing with the introduction of compulsory military training in Japanese Junior and Senior High Schools as early as 1922. Reischauer cites General Ugaki's diary entry written, "Even at the height of party power in December 1925:"

"More than 200,000 troops in active service, more than 3,000,000 in the veterans organization, 500,000 or 600,000 middle and higher school students, and more than 800,000 trainees in local units; all of these will be controlled by the army, and their power will work as the central force aiding the Emperor in war and peace alike.

The right of autonomous command over the Emperor's army is, in a time of emergency, not limited to the command of troops, but contains the authority to control the people."

The effects of this prewar and wartime ultranationalist indoctrination were vividly recalled by the interview respondents from this generation that -- alone -- experienced it. All three of the respondents from the War generation recollected that the first time they thought "I am a Japanese" was not a spontaneous thought of their own but was introduced to them through their Japanese public schools. While the others just said it was the wartime education or "environment," Mr. "A", a retired journalist, spoke clearly that "I didn't have a clear consciousness (that I was Japanese) but when I was young, from Jr. High to High School, Japan itself began heading
towards the War, and in that sense I was given an education that forced me to take the consciousness 'You are a Japanese!'" By the time he was in college, "the War was just about to start, so students existed totally within militarism, we were built into that ethic, we didn't have opposing opinions. . . . Not only Marxist books, of course, but books by the American author Dewey were gradually banned . . . the police came to my house and searched my bookcase when I was away. But there was no problem, I didn't have books like that."

The three respondents from this War generation were also unanimous in their expression of the trauma of the War and defeat. While Mssrs. "A" and "C" spoke in general terms of "the suffering of the war," Mr. "B" spoke at length of his personal loss. "In my case I lost my father and two elder brothers and we had the experience of just trying to escape from the fire (the fire bombing of Tokyo) . . . when I was 9, that was my experience, losing my father, brothers, house, and experiencing an almost-starving life." This traumatic experience led directly to his first thoughts on politics, "When Japan lost the War and when we had the time that was peaceful, I thought there were some leaders who will lead the directions of the nation so we must participate in making the nation towards the direction which we want . . . a peaceful country, not . . . (prolonged nervous laughter). I didn't know how to participate but I was determined to make my contribution in my way."
The one clear difference that was apparent in these three men's responses concerned the memory of a prosperous, non-militarist Japan. Only Mr. "A", presently 67, was old enough to have clear memories of this era in the 1930's. "Before the War was a time of fairly good living. Living in Japan was different from now but it was a relatively prosperous era. I remember feeling 'I'd like these times to continue.' In summer you could rent cabins in the mountains or by the sea fairly easily, all of our relatives were middle class and could do this. Back then even an ordinary salary-man if he had a minor management post could hire about one maid, now that's totally impossible. It was a calm era, I have good feelings about it. It was the 'good old days.'" Mr. "A" returned to this theme several times in discussing his differences with the younger generations. He felt that particularly those "in their 40's" who did not remember this era of prewar prosperity and who had suffered hunger and deprivation most as young children during and right after the War are still making up for it "eating lots of food because they couldn't eat, studying and having hobbies because they didn't have the chances when they were young."

All three of the respondents in this generation also agreed on its segmentation: those born before the War started (1939) are essentially different from those born after it. "They don't know War," "They don't know what it is to be defeated," and "They think that Japan 'will just go on being successful forever,'" were typical opinions
of the older about the younger generations. These three men did not differentiate between more than one younger generation: "the young people" were all different from them on the basis of the War experience. As for interaction with their own or other generations, the men did not express any particular pattern of communication with their own generation over communication with other generations.

Mr. "A", in the famous tradition of his newspaper, stated quite clearly that his political orientation was "the Socialist Party side." Mr. "C" not only identified the LDP but held solidly conservative views of the importance of continued LDP power and the rights of the state over the rights of individuals in a trade-off between the national electric power supply and possible local pollution. Mr. "B" gave mixed responses, stating that he could vote for either right or left.

II. The Rapid Economic Growth Generation

No other experience in Japan's long historical past or postwar history has come close to having the intensity of impact of its first defeat and occupation by non-Japanese forces. So we would not expect to find any other grouping of age-cohorts into an experiential generation of anywhere near the breadth of the War generation. Japanese researchers, as cited earlier in this chapter, lay the
heaviest emphasis on Japan's rapid economic growth as the experience that formed a generation from the 1939-1943 and 1944-1948 birth year cohorts. This is not surprising, given the extensive scholarly background on the social impact of economic forces, and given the fact that Japan's real GNP growth of over 10 percent per annum was sustained for an entire decade. Surely this "economic miracle" -- unprecedented in industrial history -- could be expected to influence the attitudes and expectations of young people escaping the austerity of their childhood years and coming of age amidst a new era's bright hope of rapid and seemingly limitless economic growth.

The education this Rapid Growth generation received was also extremely different from that of the War generation. The Rapid Growth generation was under six years of age and had not experienced Japanese primary school under the wartime propaganda system. It began its education under the liberal, anti-militarist education envisioned by the U.S. Occupation authorities (who had read that banned book by "the American author Dewey.") The Imperial Rescript was dis-enshrined from the schoolroom walls. There were no more banzai's for the emperor. Military factory work was ended for Junior and Senior High School students and rifle drill squads were replaced by baseball teams. Most importantly, the indoctrination of the political religion of kokutai and the emperor cult as "history" and "social studies" classes was ended. The Yamato national-origin myths were not merely put in perspective as myths; they were not taught at
all. One Japanese professor from the Rapid Growth generation described this dramatic difference between his early primary schooling and that of his older brothers: "I didn't even know about Amaterasu (the Sun Goddess/Creator of Japan), but my older brothers had been taught about it in school. I first heard about it from them."³⁸

Yet the political factors that separated the Rapid Economic Growth generation from the previous generation were not all bright and optimistic. Totalitarianism gave way to liberal democracy in postwar Japan, but liberal democracy gave way among a significant minority to the dictatorships of several contenting avant-gardes of the proletariat. The 1960's (more precisely from 1959 to 1971 inclusively) were an era of intellectual and political strife and turmoil caused by young, radical, Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary students' attack on Japan's political structure.

Only a minority of the youth in this era were radical. In fact the active members of the radicals' umbrella organization, the Zengakuren, were only a minuscule fringe among the minority of Japanese youth attending university. Yet this organization spear-headed a protest movement that mobilized tens of thousands of students and labor unionists for massive demonstrations that led up to the storming and virtual siege of the Diet and the riots that forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's intended state visit
to Japan in 1960. Their immediate issue was a protest against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, but some factions' objective was the destruction of Japan's capitalistic U.S.-aligned political structure and its replacement with a "neutral" communist state. 39

The protest movement flared up again in a new phase with a different set of actors and issues (the Vietnam War, Okinawa reversion, the 1970 Security Treaty renewal) but similar revolutionary objectives. And the radical students in this second phase of the protests did not see their movement as one confined to Japan. Around the world in the 1960's protests by the young against the old were raging. Protest against the Vietnam War fueled student radicalism in the United States, French students and workers staged a classic failed revolution in the streets of Paris, and Red Guards were rampaging across China. Young men around the world wore their hair long and boys and girls dressed alike in jeans. They listened for the "message" in the music of the Beatles and Bob Dylan, and what they heard was that the whole society of their parents was very wrong and had to be put away. The "generation gap" was not just a concept; it was taken as a given by the youth culture of the 1960's. And many radical Japanese youth saw themselves as part of this world-wide generational and political conflict. The radicals occupying the Nihon University building at Suidobashi flew a French flag from the rooftop in solidarity with the radical French students occupying the
barricades of Paris on the other side of the globe. Thus the dominant political ethos of the Rapid Economic Growth generation's formative years was one of radical protest with very strong generational overtones.

But by no means all of the changes in the political ethos of the Rapid Growth era were of a leftist character -- particularly the factors relating to nationalism. In this era the traditional Japanese nationalistic symbols were gradually reintroduced in redefined contexts by members of the great majority of conservative Japanese, as the force of the Occupation-era taboos against almost any display of overt nationalistic sentiment faded away. In education, the Shinto foundation myths started to find their way back into public school textbooks: as myths, not history, of course, but they had been entirely purged by the Occupation textbook censors. While school teachers, the majority of whom belonged to the leftist teachers' union, continued to vehemently oppose flag-raising ceremonies and the singing of the unofficial national anthem (Kimigayo: Thy Imperial Reign) in schools, school administrators and politicians -- particularly in rural areas -- quietly began to push for the reintroduction of these nationalistic rites. In public affairs the imperial family, the Japanese flag, and the national anthem were all played up by the Japanese media at the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo, which served as an great occasion to project these nationalistic symbols in addition to showing off Japan's amazing economic recovery.
and current growth.

In summary, while its impact was far less universal than the War and Occupation experience, the era of rapid economic growth did have an impact that was sufficiently intense, wide-reaching, and distinctive enough to potentially form an experiential generation. The primary shaping factor was Japan's "miracle" of unprecedentedly rapid and sustained GNP growth over a decade, which gave rise to strong economic confidence and optimism, a surplus of jobs, and the beginnings of a consumer society. A second factor differentiating this period's generation from that of the War and Occupation era was the dramatically altered education system. And finally, the political conditions of radical protest with strong generational overtones also contributed to the distinctly different formative experience which the Rapid Economic Growth generation underwent in its youth.

In contrast to the responses of our interview respondents from the War generation, the three members of the Rapid Growth generation did not receive their first impression that "I am a Japanese" at school. Mssrs. "D" (a pharmaceutical manager) and Mr. "F" (an electronics entrepreneur) had no particular recollection of thinking "I am a Japanese" when young. As Mr. "D" put it, "When I think about it, I was never really conscious of being a Japanese." But as for Mr. "E", his consciousness of being Japanese came when Japan was occupied by the U.S. forces and "in comparison with the U.S. soldiers
I had the consciousness of 'I guess I am Japanese' but that was about it, but it wasn't anything like 'I am especially Japanese.' When I was in elementary school, too, the American School in Meguro was near by so I saw American children, and there were Chinese too... so I thought 'I guess I am different from them.'"

All three of the respondents from this Rapid Economic Growth generation had strong memories of the radical protest experience. As with Krauss' findings, there was a difference between the more politicized and the more apathetic former students even among our respondents. For Mr. "F", the engineering student who later became the President of his own electronics company, the disruption was a nuisance. But for both Mssrs. "D" and "E" it was an exciting period in which they learned about the world. When asked if his political opinions had changed or remained the same during college, the leftist-leaning Mr. "D" replied, "I was influenced by my friends, I guess, and by reading books. But I was more influenced by the environment of the people around me (than by books). In my case... you know there was the Zengakuren in 1960. All the schools were in a big uproar then, so at first I was influenced by the people around me and I demonstrated and so on, but that was the level of it." While Mr. "D" was the only respondent to state that he sometimes voted for the Communist Party and "look forward to an era when the LDP doesn't dominate politics," he also stated that his ideas had changed little by little as he worked in his company and now
accepted one of the three centrist positions: he felt that local citizens have the right to oppose the construction of a nuclear power plant near their homes, but that the state had a legitimate interest too and that money should be used to solve the problem. But for Mr. "E" the politicizing experience started much younger. When he was only one year old his home was bombed in the great Tokyo fire bomb raid. "My house was directly hit by a fire bomb from the American military, but fortunately it didn't blow up. It just knocked a big hole in the house." Later he remembers his parents talking about war and politics. The lingering effect of such experiences might be found in his earliest thoughts about politics, which directly related politics to war. In elementary school "I remember when the Korean War started. I thought about the effect of something like that, it was in a childish way, but I felt that it was very dangerous if there was a war, it was very bad if the war gets bigger -- things like that, but it left impressions or feelings."

As by far the most intellectual of the three Rapid Economic Growth generation respondents, Mr. "E" spoke at length of the politicization of his generation. "Japanese education taught irresponsible things. Like teaching that the reason why Japan was the only country of all the countries in the world that was not colonized by European and American economic imperialism and retained its independence was because of the superiority of the Japanese people . . . if you think about it qualitatively this is a
very difficult position to express, very difficult to accept." He answered the question, "When you were twenty, did others your age have the same sort of expectations or attitudes towards Japan as you did?" by saying, "Yes I think so. I think they were the same. Many of the people in my generation -- of course the non-political ones were more numerous -- but they would express direct political criticism or clearly express their opinions. Most of these people were being controlled by Marxism, by information that came from Minsei, the youth organization of the Communist Party." "As opposed to them, I thought 'it isn't like that' and I tried to go in a different direction. My sixth sense told me something was odd about this (communist) political campaign. And I have been studying and trying to open up my own path (politically)."

As factors that defined the "character" of his generation Mr. "D" cited the points "the escape from poverty, our generation all lived poor after the War," and "the Zengakuren, the U.S. - Japan security treaty, the militarization of Japan -- it was a clamourous (turbulent) era when we were in college." Mr. "F" noted the same factor of the rapid economic growth and the rising standards of living but not the radical politicizing factor that Mr. "D" noted. And Mr. "E" spoke in the more abstract terms of their generation as one that "was born and raised after the War and holds doubts about the ancient Japanese political and cultural values. Because of that our behavior sometimes tends to the fringes -- like the Kakumaru or
Minsei (violent revolutionary factions) -- but we have clearer political opinions."

All three of the respondents from the Rapid Economic Growth generation felt different from other generations, both those older and younger than them. They referred to "Sen-zen no hito" (people of before the War) as those older than them and "Ima no hito" (people of now) as those younger than them. The education of the prewar generation was different from theirs, and it is the economic affluence of the younger generation that is different from their formative years. Their three responses to the question of segmentation "When you think of 'my generation' what ages are the people you think of?" did not coincide exactly but centered on the two cohorts chosen in our study. But in their day-to-day communication patterns the respondents of the Rapid Economic Growth generation, like those of the War generation, did not communicate more with other members of their generation. The workplace determined the communication pattern, with Mr. "D" communicating "more to older people, you have to always keep communicating to seniors to get what you want done. The younger people don't have power." Mr. "F" gave the opposite indication for the same reason, as President of his company he is already the "senior" so his communication is "mostly with younger people in the company."
III. The Affluent Generation

The contrasts between the Rapid Economic Growth experience and any latter socializing experiences would tend to be less stark than the contrast between the Wartime near-starvation and the 1960's "miraculous" economic growth. Yet a less dramatic but perhaps even more fundamental social change has occurred in the years following the rapid growth era. This change is that Japan, for the first time in its history, has become one of the world's wealthiest nations. The term that Japanese researchers apply to this era and its experiential generation is yutaka: literally "affluent" but also "abundant, rich, copious, ample." To the members of the War era who sweated and saved during their entire lives, this era of plenty is more than they ever dreamed of; to the members of the Affluent generation it is still not as good as what they see on TV.

Without quibbling about the relative distributions of wealth, it can be accepted that Japan was poorer than China during the great length of their historical relations. Japan's shortage of specie during most of its history was notorious, and the relative lack of demand for its exportable products (besides its exceptionally fine swords) led to centuries of piracy off the Chinese and Korean coasts. While European traders and naval officers encountering Japan at the close of the Tokugawa era were very favorably impressed by the contrast of Japan's large, clean, and prosperous cities to the squalor of their
mid-nineteenth century cities at home, Japan's level of capital accumulation was still well behind that of the European powers and the United States, and the burgeoning industrial revolution in the West was widening the gap by the week and month.

Japan did not regain the per capita real income levels of its prewar peak in 1934–1936 until 1954, by which time the victorious powers, particularly the United States, were very far ahead of it indeed. Yet Japan more than doubled its per capita real income by 1962, even before its GNP growth accelerated to an average of over 10 percent per annum during the "economic miracle" years of the 1960's. By 1986, slower but steady growth combined with the strengthening of the yen against the dollar had boosted Japan's per capita real income to an estimated level of $18,000 as opposed to $16,000 for the United States. While 1986 figures based on comparisons of actual wealth put Japanese per capita income at 80 percent of the U.S. level, in dollar terms the Japanese people had finally earned more than Americans.

The result of this wealth, increasingly apparent throughout the 1970's and especially in the 1980's, has not been a dramatic shock. Rather, it has been the gradual diffusion of the consciousness that world-class luxury is attainable right here in Japan. The greatest musicians in the world from Vladimir Horowitz to the latest pop star, dignitaries from heads of state at the Western Summit to the Prince
and Princess of Wales, art collections from the world's greatest galleries, chefs from the world's greatest restaurants, and golf, tennis, and movie stars from the world championship links and courts and film festivals all find their way to Japan to receive the reflexive accolades and profit their national, institutional, or personal accounts.

Japan's marketing industry that struggled to promote the consumption ethic among older Japanese finds these youth to be its golden customers. The need to consume is not even a question with them as a group; it is only what, when, and how to finance it, and all three of these questions are answered daily through every communications media. The flash of glitter and color, high-pitched chatter, abrupt action, and ceaseless, instantaneous changes of images that are required to hold the attention of teenage Japanese television viewers even as long as to the next commercial make U.S. cable television's most adventuresome programming of rock videos in 1986 look as staid as reruns of Kenneth Clarke's BBC series "Civilization."

So if the era in Japanese history that followed the rapid economic growth era has any particular trait that might have acted as a formative influence on its youth, the rise of Japanese affluence and the passive, consumer mentality associated with it would be by far the most promising characteristic to observe and analyse. Japan's
affluence had been growing rapidly throughout the growth years -- the radical students who neither studied nor worked found food and drink somehow -- but it rose to levels of social prominence in the 1970's and 1980's that followed.

A change in the political ethos of the Affluent era also marked its differences from the Rapid Growth era. First, politics was no longer even an interesting topic to the great majority of Japanese youth. The radical student organizations that had even controlled simple physical access to all college campuses in the 1960's were unable to recruit new members to sustain themselves, and they became increasingly marginal, isolated remnants of the protest era -- frozen into their 10-year generational niche. (The radical faction members who are even now being arrested for their sabotage attacks against the public transportation network and union-related murders are almost invariably in their late 30's or early 40's -- not members of the younger, less politicized, Affluent generation.) Japanese researchers frequently note that apathy is this generation's major political attitude.\(^{46}\)

Second, in the education field, the gradual reintroduction of the traditional Japanese nationalistic symbols that had begun in some sectors during the 1960's was expanded and intensified from the mid-1970's into the 1980's. Not only are there calls in the Diet from conservative LDP Dietmen to reinstate mandatory flag-raising and
national-anthem-singing ceremonies at public school commencements, but local conservative administrators and politicians have begun to use disciplinary action and court cases to enforce these policies on the recalcitrant leftist teachers' union members. Further, in the 1980's case after case of right-wing revisionist textbooks have made factually inaccurate alterations in accounts of Japan's wartime history and atrocities that have been extreme and offensive enough to provoke sharp rebukes from Japanese imperialism's former victims at home and overseas -- and formal diplomatic protests from the Governments of South Korea and China. While the most controversial remarks of this genre made by high Japanese government officials will be discussed in this thesis' conclusion, the fact that is important to note for our argument here is the marked change in the political ethos of the Affluent era (shifts from intense left/right struggle in domestic politics to political apathy, from timidity in international affairs to a growing desire for self-assertion) which makes these actions possible.

The responses of the three members of the Affluent generation interviewed were similar to those of the Rapid Economic Growth generation and different from those of the War generation in regards to when they first thought "I am a Japanese." Mssrs. "I" and "J" said they were never particularly conscious of this, while Mr. "H", who grew up in a rural prefecture, remembered, "When the professional wrestlers came my father took me to see them and I was shocked at
how big and blond the foreign wrestlers were. I thought 'I guess they're different.' Also a Soviet fishing boat landed at the port and I saw the Russian sailors and they looked different. So I guess seeing how foreigners looked different made me think 'I am a Japanese.'"

As a group the three affluent era respondents seemed to have much less definite memories about politics in general and when they first thought about politics. Mr. "J" had grown up in a politician's family and thus saw it as a family occupation rather than as a personal conviction. Mr. "I" did not even think about politics until he graduated from High School and was about to enter dental school. Then "my father made me listen to this story about a politician he admired. I listened to him, but he was talking about politics as being all about power, and I thought it was a more pure thing than that." Mr. "H", the leftist-leaning respondent in this generation, was exposed to politics in college where he was influenced by "reading books and talking about all kinds of things with my friends" much like the leftist-leaning Mr. "D" in the Rapid Growth generation.

Besides Mr. "J" who was involved as a family member in political campaigns from his youth, neither of the other respondents had ever participated in any political activity besides voting. Nor did they have even general ideas of "which way (they) wanted the country to go." Their brief, repeated answers of "no," "no, not
particularly," "no, I didn't," to the bulk of the questions dealing with national or political affairs suggested a far lower degree of politicization compared to that of both of the preceding generations.

But, on the other hand, in the few years after leaving college these Affluent generation respondents seem to have begun to think about politics and develop some of their own attitudes. Mr. "H" returned to his native prefecture for some time before deciding to make a career as a securities broker in Tokyo, and he developed concerns for the issue of nuclear power and the need for a regional economic policy "so more young people can find good jobs in their hometowns and don't have to come out to Tokyo." Mr. "J" still maintains a more detached view of national politics, but in his job as a researcher for a major Japanese automaker "I have to research and summarize U.S. trade sanction moves so I am getting more interested in the international political problem of trade conflict." Instead of starting to earn money immediately as a dentist (as his father wanted him to) Mr. "I" chose to pursue graduate studies in zoology, and "as I read research information from around the world I realized that Japan is extremely passive (in basic research) and I became extremely troubled that Japan does not have the spirit of doing things vigorously (actively researching problems)." This work-related exposure to the attitudes and actions of counterparts in other countries that has grown in scale with the expansion of Japan's international economic activity may be another point separating the
Affluent generation from the older generations.

Another interesting point is that the respondents in this generation for once did not agree with the segmentation of their generation. They agreed that they had the consciousness of a generation and specific common characteristics, and their judgement of what constituted "the next older generation" fit closely with our Rapid Growth/Affluent line, but they all felt that they were essentially different from those even slightly younger than themselves. Since all three of these respondents came from the two older cohorts of the three cohorts we group as the Affluent generation (born 1949 to 1958) the new generational dividing line which these three individuals propose is between themselves and those in the youngest cohort. These young people turned twenty after 1978: just when the affluence became extremely apparent. When the next Tokei Suri and NHK surveys are published (around 1990) and increase the samplings from the younger end of the age continuum by one cohort, it will be very interesting to test if the newly entered cohort and the present youngest cohort form a distinct generation by themselves. But, alas, this cannot be tested with the existing data.

Thus even within the Affluent generation Mr. "J" felt that those younger than him "were raised in an affluent environment" which has made them less clear-headed and self-reliant than himself. Mr. "I" felt that his generation, "still has the 'good Japanese' traits that
have been handed down. For example, instead of deciding things rationally we still use *giri* and *ninja* to settle problems on an emotional basis." (*Giri* is the traditional ethic of mutual obligation, loyalty, and mercy to an associate, *ninja* the same to a fellow human being.) "And we don't express our likes and dislikes openly but try to get along smoothly with people." He felt that the generations older than him had had to "work hard to live so they are more confident." With those younger than him, on the other hand, "I feel a very big gap. In some ways I envy them, they judge things entirely on the basis of how they feel. With me and the people around me, we look at what the people around us think and then to ourselves, and we just try keep things moving along well. But the younger ones are self-reliant to a vice and regardless of the people around them they do what they want to do." Finally, again with the Affluent generation, the respondents' patterns of communication were diffuse, determined by work, and not dominated by communication with any single generation.

While it would be ridiculous to draw any "conclusions" from the responses of this non-scientific panel of interview respondents, we can make a few final observations of the questions on which they showed no variance in response at all. First, given the otherwise great diversity in age, experience, profession, and political orientation, it is extremely noteworthy that not one respondent believed that Japan as a country was fundamentally different after
the War from what it had been before. All of the respondents, in fact, expressed the opinion that Japan was fundamentally the same before and after the War with a great deal of firmness and confidence. This was something extremely definite in their minds. Secondly, all of the respondents felt a basic confidence in the future, and this confidence was grounded directly on their confidence that the future generations will still "be Japanese." As a group the respondents attributed the characteristics of "hard working," "smart," and "adaptable" to their successors. Their feeling was that come what may the future generations of Japanese would be as clever as they were and that they would solve any problems -- or at least get through some how.

Third, as for their worries about Japan's future, all six left-leaning and centrist respondents expressed the worry that Japan might once again "return to militarism," or "abandon the Constitution," while not one of the right-leaning respondents expressed these fears. The leftists had a clear conceptual vocabulary for their fears: "militarism," "fascism," (both used with "the revival of") and they noted the workings of uyoku "rightist power groups" in Japanese politics. One named Prime Minister Nakasone by name in this connection. The centrists did not use this vocabulary, or used it with qualifications and disclaimers such as "what some people call (although I wouldn't go that far)," but the issues that they mentioned were largely the same. The increase in Japan's military spending, the creeping violation of the Constitutional separation of
government and religion through Prime Minister Nakasone's leadership of official government worship at Yasukuni shrine, and the right-wing revisionist school history textbooks were issues that they mentioned, although it would impossible to give them any particular ranking.

Finally, one overall suspicion can be drawn from this panel concerning the degree of internal cohesion in Japanese political generations according to Huntington's three criteria. While there is of course not enough data to reach a firm conclusion, the responses of our nine panel interviewees do support the position that these generations have a clear consciousness of belonging to their generation and being different from other generations. In fact the specific characteristics each generation attributed to the other generations were close enough to lead one to believe that these generations might not only be quite conscious of themselves but of the other generations as well. Nevertheless, the responses of this panel did not at all support the third level of Huntington's definition: they responded that they did not communicate or interact to any greater extent with members of their own generation as opposed to members of other generations. It was the workplace that determined the dominant pattern of interaction. If this indication should be born out in more broadly-based data, it would indicate that in the Japanese case, just as Lucian Pye points out on the Chinese case in Political Generations and Political Development, various "cross-cutting organizations" may serve as socially integrating forces to counterbalance the potentially
disintegrating effects of political generations. In the Japanese case the strongest cross-cutting socializing organization by far would be the modern non-kin tribe: the redoubtable Japanese company.

Thus, in Japan's postwar history we can identify definitely one, possibly two, and perhaps even three mass experiences of sufficient distinctness, intensity, and mass socializing impact to be considered hypothetical formative experiences of political generations. Both the historical data on the distinct eras in postwar Japan's economy, society, and politics, and the interview data on the perceptions of a panel of respondents from each of the corresponding age-groups, gave evidence supporting the likelihood that experiential generations of Japanese youth might have been formed by these experiences.

This chapter has established the independent variable of the null hypothesis. The social, economic, and political conditions as well as individuals' subjective perceptions of experiential generations in postwar Japan have been found to be strong. The question of whether or not these likely causes actually resulted in the formation of experiential generations of postwar Japanese can only be answered through statistical analysis of these generations' long-term response patterns to opinion surveys. And this is accomplished in the following Chapter when the dependent variable of the null hypothesis is tested against the survey data.
Chapter Five

THE FINDINGS

The preceding chapter defined the concepts, reasoning, and mechanics of this study; this chapter presents the data, tests it, analyses the results, and states the findings. Before beginning the question-by-question analysis of the survey data, however, three further points will be specified: 1.) the overview of the findings, 2.) the list of the survey questions analysed and explanation of their grouping, and 3.) the explanation of the statistical tests used in this analysis.

1. Overview of the Findings

This thesis achieved each of its four research objectives.

1.) It is the first study in either Japanese or English to empirically demonstrate that consistent patterns of statistically significant age-based differences exist in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism (as revealed in survey responses).
2.) It is also the first study to empirically demonstrate that the patterns in which these Japanese attitudes have changed over 30 years' time overwhelmingly match the predicted pattern of Mannheim et al.'s experiential-generation model, not that of Eisenstadt et al.'s maturation model.

3.) This study also makes a limited contribution towards the more precise delineation of postwar Japanese "political generations" by being the first to empirically test and demonstrate that one likely segmentation of cohorts (which is commonly suggested by Japanese scholars and is conceptually supported by historical and interview data on socializing experiences) does indeed reveal highly significant experiential differences across an entire spectrum of questions relating to nationalism and traditional Japanese social values.

4.) Finally, and most importantly, this thesis combines a historical/typological analysis of the characteristics of Traditional Japanese Nationalism from prehistory to the Second World War (given in Part One), with these significant statistical findings on postwar changes in Japanese nationalistic attitudes (given in Part Two), to present a conceptual model of Japanese nationalism which seems to explain the central paradox of the recent generational shifts in Japanese nationalistic attitudes and suggests an original interpretation of current developments in this field.
2. The Survey Questions

What are the survey questions that reveal these specific generational differences? And how can they be grouped to reveal more general knowledge about postwar Japanese nationalism? The hundred-odd questions in the Tokei Suri and NHK data bases were reviewed and narrowed down by four criteria to leave sixteen questions (or specific response options in multiple-choice questions) with demonstrable relationships to Japanese nationalism.

The first criteria rejected structurally flawed questions (of which four major types are detailed in Appendix D. The second step rejected questions not directly related to nationalism (such as "Should sex be allowed before marriage?"). The third step rejected questions for which sufficient data had not been collected: some potentially interesting questions had only been included at uneven intervals in two or three out of the seven Tokei Suri surveys, whereas even the full samplings of seven surveys barely produced sufficient data for tests of statistical confidence. Fourth, questions with forced-choice yes/no response options were narrowed down to just one response option per question. The reason for this is that if respondents are forced to answer either "yes" or "no" to a question, their response patterns for "yes" will always form the exact inverse of their response patterns for "no", so there is no point in analysing both response options to the single question. Since our purpose was to test
the degree of postwar support for attitudes related to Traditional Japanese Nationalism, we chose either the "yes" or the "no" response pattern for these questions depending on which phrasing supported the traditional nationalistic view. This allowed clearer testing of whether or not that traditional attitude was still prevalent. Finally, as the short length (only 10 years) of the NHK data base severely limits its ability to demonstrate the longitudinal changes in cohorts' opinions which is this study's subject, TS questions were given preference over NHK questions in cases where their content overlapped.

The survey data on these 16 responses were then tabulated question by question according to the cohorts and the years of the surveys, and they were then statistically tested for experiential or maturation effects using our Johnson-and-Niemi-based operational definitions given in the previous chapter and the F-tests, R-tests, T-tests and linear regressions on the Statistical Analysis System computer software package.

The results of this analysis revealed that there were:

10 cases of experiential effects,
3 cases of period effects,
2 cases of maturation effects, and
1 case of simple continuity.
This finding clearly confirmed our research hypothesis that:

The experiential generation model is more powerful than the maturation model in explaining the age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

But what more could these data teach us? Why did some Japanese nationalistic attitudes show experiential effects and why did others show maturation effects? Statistics could not answer this question. This is a question for conceptual analysis.

We began by grouping the questions into two categories: those which showed experiential effects on one side and those which showed the maturation and period effects and the single continuity effect on the other side. This yielded two jumbled sets of concepts which, as they stood, did not seem to piece together or have any cohesive sense. But they gave a hint of a pattern that might make better sense.

First, two of the three questions that revealed period effects were opposite response options to one multiple-choice question: TS question #9.6 "Comparing Japanese with Westerners in one word, do you think that Japanese are superior or inferior." The response patterns to this question had not been rejected at step four of the question-selection process for two reasons. First, they did not come from a forced-choice yes/no question. As there were six possible
responses to this question including "can't say in a single word", "are equal", "write in your opinion", and "don't know," the "superior" and "inferior" response patterns to this question are not exact inverse patterns, so each pattern is an independent and valid set of data. Secondly, both feelings of superiority and inferiority to Westerners have been shown to be historically associated with different stages of Japanese nationalism. What if we took these two period-effect attitudes out of the maturation-effect group? In fact, what if we grouped all 16 of the attitudes around the historical stage of Japanese nationalism to which they were most strongly linked?

The overall pattern that emerged from this sorting out of the various generational response patterns according to the Layers and Core of our conceptual model of Traditional Japanese Nationalism matched the empirical distribution of the experiential and the maturation/period/continuity effects extremely closely. What had appeared to be a random distribution of the various effects among the questions without any discernible overall pattern first took on systematic form, then clear meaning. On one hand, the attitudes that were most closely associated with the explicit ideological values of the Layers of the Modernizing Ideology and the Political Religion showed a predominance of experiential effects. On the other hand, the attitudes that were most closely associated with the ancient Core elements of Japanese nationalism showed a predominance of maturation and period effects. The "theory" of Part One in this thesis explained
the "findings" of Part Two.

With one exception out of ten, the attitudes which demonstrated experiential effects were each historically associated with the Meiji "layers" of Japanese nationalism: the middle-Meiji's nationalist modernizing ideology, and the Meiji Restoration's nationalist political religion. And the response patterns indicating these attitudes showed declining support for these layers of Traditional Japanese Nationalism, especially among the two generations born after the War. And,

with the two exceptions mentioned above, the attitudes which demonstrated the maturation and period effects and the single continuity effect were each historically associated with the millenial "core" of Japanese nationalism. And the response patterns indicating these attitudes showed rising support for the core values of Traditional Japanese Nationalism, especially among the two generations born after the War.

This, then, is the central paradox revealed by our study's empirical findings and explained by its conceptual model of Japanese nationalism:

Compared to the attitudes of the older, War generation, the middle-aged and younger generations of postwar Japanese show
lower and declining support for the traditional ideologies of Japanese nationalism; yet at the same time they show equally high and rapidly rising support for the racial pride and the paternalistic tribal social values which have been Japanese nationalism's millenial core.

The 16 attitudes analysed are listed below, classified according to the two Layers and the Core of Traditional Japanese Nationalism with which they are most strongly linked by historical evidence. This criterion of classification requires a substantial amount of documentary evidence and some solid reasoning to apply to these 16 attitudes, and the bulk of this evidence and reasoning has already been presented at length in Part One of this study. For the reader's convenience, however, concise summaries recapitulating this historical evidence linking each attitude analysed with a specific Layer or the Core of Traditional Japanese Nationalism are given in the introduction to each of the three groups of attitudes in the question-by-question presentation of the findings which follows. There the justification of each survey question's classification is presented under the heading Questions and the findings are presented under the heading Response Patterns.
List of Attitudes Analyzed

I. The Layer of the Middle-Meiiji Nationalist Modernizing Ideology

1. Japanese are inferior to Westerners
2. Only Japan's happiness leads to individuals' happiness
3. Want to live a pure and correct life
4. (opposing attitude) Want to live for my own tastes without concern for honor or money.

II. The Layer of the Meiji Restoration's Nationalist Political Religion

5. Japanese are superior to Westerners
6. The Prime Minister must or should perform state worship at Ise Shrine
7. Believe in religion
8. Should adopt sons to maintain unbroken family lines
9. Respect the emperor

III. The Core Values of Traditional Japanese Nationalism

10. Will yield to tradition, even when knowing it is right to oppose it
11. **Ongaeshi** (repaying social obligation) is an important ethic. (**Oyakoko** -- filial piety -- is important too)
12. (opposing attitude) Freedom is an important ethic (Individual rights are important too)
13. Prefer paternalistic boss
14. More loyal to non-kin tribe than to family

(Two attitudes analysed together, relating to all levels)

15. Japan is a first-class nation
16. Compared to all other peoples, the Japanese people possess exceedingly superior characteristics

These data are only partial and incomplete indicators, but it should not be forgotten that these may remain the total of the longitudinal Japanese survey data that can be brought to bear on this subject until the next surveys' data are released in 1990 and 1995.
3. The Statistical Tests

The statistical tests in this study were calculated using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software package on the mainframe computer of the University of Tokyo. Before presenting the results, we will briefly explain which tests were used. As detailed in the previous chapter, our data base gives only one measurement every five years of each arbitrarily-grouped 5-year age-cohort's responses to a question. As the limiting characteristics of this data base, discussed at length above, prohibit clustering and segmentation by strictly statistical methods, we have segmented these cohorts into three hypothetical "generations" on the basis of conceptual criteria, and we are testing to see whether or not these "generations" subsequent attitudes reveal any statistically significant differences. The null hypothesis, which we must refute, is that these groupings of cohorts are not experiential generations, that they will not show significant age-related differences, or, in other words, that their true population means and slopes will be the same.

We call the percentage of a cohort's respondents who chose a given response option that cohort's "level of support" for the attitude measured by that response. If 70 percent of a cohort give the response "respect the emperor," we say that "respect for the emperor" has a 70 percent "level of support" among that cohort in that survey. If we take each measurement of the levels of support for a given
attitude from each of the cohorts making up a generation over the length of the survey, and then average all of these figures, we obtain the generation's "average lifetime level of support" or the generation's "mean" level of support for that attitude. As there are obviously differences between the levels of support shown by various cohorts within the generation, and each cohort's level of support rises or falls from survey to survey, we can also calculate the generation's standard deviation from its generation mean. And we can calculate the "degrees of freedom" from the total number of statistics on which the mean and standard deviation are based. Finally, we can take the means and standard deviations of two generations' lifetime response patterns on a given attitude and test to see if these means are the same (not significantly different) using Student's T-test. Since we have three generations, and the T-test is a two-sample test, we need to conduct three T-tests per question to see whether or not each of the generations has a mean level of support that is significantly different from those of the other two generations. The level of statistical confidence used for T-tests was $p = 0.025$.

But besides the question of how strongly or weakly a generation has supported an attitude, we want to know whether this support has increased, decreased, or remained constant over the years. We can envision this as the long-term pattern revealed on a scatter plot of a generation's total number of measured responses to a question over the length of the survey. The vertical axis is the level of support
(percentages) and the horizontal axis is time (five years between each survey). We can then calculate the simple least-squares regression that best summarizes the linear trend of the data points. The independent variable is the passage of time, and the dependent variable is the change in levels of support for the attitude measured. In addition to the slopes of these simple linear regressions, the SAS software package provides tests of their validity and explanatory power. The F-test tests the reliability of the linear model in summarizing the overall pattern of attitude change, and the adjusted R-square test measures the degree of variance in the data set that is accounted for by this regression line. The level of statistical confidence used for F-tests was $p_r = 0.05$. If the F-tests and R-tests show that linear regressions validly summarize two generations' respective data sets, we can use Student's T-test on the slope parameters and standard deviations to test if the two generations' slopes are significantly different or not. Here again three T-tests are required to test the three possible differences between the three generations. As some response patterns are non-linear and the maturation model predicts a non-linear convergence pattern, a graph of each generations' responses is also printed and referred to in making the final classification. These and other tests produced a four-inch pile of printout with 45 key variables per response pattern, which obviously does not belong in this thesis. So we will give the test results and the graph for each response pattern in the text and give the full data tables for each response pattern in Appendix E.
The Question-by-Question Findings

Overview

Our conceptual model of Japanese nationalism that is able to offer an explanation of these diverse patterns of attitude change was developed in Part One of this thesis through the application of the general theories of nationalism to the specific case of Japanese history from the gods of yore to the Pacific War. We can recall that this simple model posited a "core" of Japanese nationalism which has remained highly stable throughout at least fifteen centuries from the Yamato uji of the fourth century to modern times. This "core" of Japanese nationalism consisted of a fundamental sentiment of difference from (and hence superiority to) the peoples beyond these islands, the social factor of the non-kin tribalistic group, and the psychological and philosophical factor of dualist perception. The confluence of political and philosophical development in the Tokugawa period, catalysed by the threat of Western colonial domination, resulted in the formation of Japan's first widespread and well-defined nationalist ideology: the emperor-centered Political Religion of kokutai (the national body). This form of nationalism was based on the core values of Japanese society, but it was a more developed enunciation of these traditional elements -- it was as a "layer" formed over the "core." But nativist nationalism proved insufficient to
cope with the challenge of self-defense against the encroaching Western imperialist powers. And the pragmatic policy response of the Meiji leaders was then to adapt certain elements from the native core and layer of the political religion and combine them with seemingly contradictory new, imported elements in a Modernizing Ideology. This ideology equalized, mobilized, and industrialized Japanese in the name of the ancient agrarian religious virtues. This Modernizing Ideology was impressed upon Japanese through the powerful tool of compulsory education and resulted in a new layer formed over the preceding layer and core of Japanese nationalism. The conflicts inherent in this layer of pragmatic adaptation -- primarily the struggle between the nativist belief in Japan as the homeland of the gods and the modernizing belief in Japan as one competing nation among many -- resulted in forty years of simmering intellectual and political struggle from which ultranationalist militarism, as a descendent of the nativist tradition, emerged victorious, and from which Japan emerged defeated and destroyed.

We now review the 16 response patterns analysed in the order of their historically associated stages of Japanese nationalism, "peeling back" its layers, as it were, from the most recent accretion of the Modernizing Ideology to the Political Religion and finally to the ancient and enduring Core. In each of the three following sections we will first review the powerful historical evidence linking each attitude with its historically-associated Layer or Core of Traditional
Japanese Nationalism under the heading Questions, then present and analyse the response patterns under the heading Response Patterns.

1. The Modernizing Ideology

The modernizing ideology was the pragmatic means by which the Meiji leaders mobilized the Japanese masses and industrialized the Japanese economy. As described in detail in Chapter Three, this ideology was an adaptation of elements of the political religion mixed with elements of pragmatic modern nation-building policy and was based on the fear that Japan needed to "catch up" economically and technologically with the industrialized Western powers in order to defend its independence. Under its influence Western knowledge and technology were imported on a massive scale and the Japanese masses were indoctrinated through public education with ethics including: national collectivism (all Japanese one family with the emperor as head), diligence (a self-sacrificial work ethic), and stoicism (enduring hardship to do one's moral duty rather than seeking comfort or material rewards).

The framers of the Tokei Suri questions in 1953 did not do so with our present study's convenience in mind, so not all of their questions are framed to precisely "measure" the attributes of interest to us. Yet four of their questions relate directly to attitudes that
were historically related to the layer of modernizing ideology in traditional Japanese nationalism, and they can be taken to "measure" postwar support for these nationalistic attitudes in a quite straightforward manner.

Questions

1.) TS question #9.6: "Comparing Japanese and Westerners in one word, are Japanese superior or inferior?"

Response option: "Japanese are inferior."²

This response measures an attitude that is logically essential to the belief that Japanese must "catch up" to the Westerners, because why would one seek to "catch up" with inferiors? As such it is directly associated with the fundamental need for the modernizing ideology: Japan's need to "catch up" to Western science and technology. The litany of Japanese inferiorities form no less influential a Japanese leader than Fukuzawa Yukichi gives sufficient evidence in itself to link this attitude to the modernizing ideology:

"If we compare the levels of intelligence of Japanese and Westerners, in literature, the arts, commerce, or industry, from the biggest things to the least, in a thousand cases or in one, there is not a single area in which the other side is not superior to us.

We can compete with the West in nothing, and no one even thinks about competing with the West. Only the most ignorant thinks that Japan's learning, arts, commerce, or industry is on a par with that of the
It is important to contrast this statement by a Japanese patriot now honored on the ¥5,000 bill, with the statement of the honored patriot and Imperial advisor on Shinto, Hirata Atsutane: "Japanese differ completely from and are superior to . . . all peoples of the world." Both of these are intensely nationalistic Japanese statements.

2.) TS question #7.4, "Which of the following opinions do you agree with? Please give only one."

Response option: "When Japan becomes happy (gets better), only then will individuals be happy (better off)."

This response measures an attitude that was perhaps the prime goal for inculcation by the modernizing ideology: the attitude of national collectivism, the feeling that individuals are common subsidiary units of the state and dependent on the nation's success for their own success and happiness. The vast majority of Japanese commoners and samurai in the pre-Meiji period saw themselves as members of competing kuni or hereditary feudal fiefs, not as members of a united Japanese nation. The modernizing ideology's indoctrination of this nationalistic attitude is evidenced in the words of the Imperial Rescript on Education which promoted the emperor's role as the symbol of the new national unity through the myth of unbroken millennial imperial rule:
"Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting... Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herin also lies the source of Our education."

3.) TS question #2.4, "There are many ways of life, but which of the following is the closest to your feelings?"

Response option: "Want to thrust aside incorrect things in the world and live a pure and correct life."

This and the following question dealing with aspects of the modernizing ideology are actually different response options to TS question 2.4 which asks respondents to choose one of six philosophies of life that is closest to their own philosophy of life. While the attitude underlying this response option might seem vague or even slightly radical to Western readers reared in a society with conflicting definitions of social "correctness," the strength of the Japanese social consensus is such that to most Japanese there is no question at all as to the proper, conservative, conformist, traditional lifestyle implied by a "correct life." And this option can be taken to measure this philosophy of life based on strict morality and social duty that was officially enstated and inculcated as "moral education" in schools from the middle Meiji period to the end of World War Two. To quote the continuation of the Imperial Rescript cited above:
"Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents . . . bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; . . So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers . . . etc."

4.) TS question #2.4

Response option: "Want to live according to my tastes without thinking about honor or money."

The complete opposition between this individualistic, self-fulfilling philosophy of life, and the moralistic, public-spirited philosophy of life dictated by the previous quotation should be obvious.

Response Patterns

1.) "Catching up" to the West: declining with a period effect

The attitude that "Japanese are inferior to Westerners" was as high as 30.6 percent among the War generation represented in the immediate post-Occupation survey of 1953, but fell rapidly to a mean of 13.7 percent for it and the Rapid Economic Growth generation by the next survey on this question in 1963. And it has fallen slowly but
steadily ever since to a population mean of 7.9 in 1983. (See Illustration 1, below. Note: All data tables are given in Appendix E.)

Illustration 1. Japanese are Inferior to Westerners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Generational Response Patterns</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>100</td>
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The levels of the three generations are significantly different, with the differences between the War and Rapid Economic Growth generations on one hand and between the War and Affluent generations on the other hand both being significant at T-test p. = 0.025. However, concerning the difference between the Rapid Economic
Growth and Affluent generations, the T value of close to zero forced acceptance of the null hypothesis that the true mean levels of these groups were virtually identical.

The regression of the War generation's responses is extremely clear, at F test results significant at p. = 0.05, and the adjusted R-square test shows that this steeply declining line accounts for the high level of over 69 percent of the variance in the response pattern. The Rapid Economic Growth generation entered the survey in 1963 with a score only 0.8 percent lower than that of the War generation at 13.0 percent, and has subsequently declined at a similar rate, but its lack of the relatively high values the War generation recorded in the first two surveys lowers the slope of its regression to the moderate range. This regression's F test confidence interval is significant at p. = 0.05, and its adjusted R-square shows that it explains 54 percent of the variance in the data. Finally, the Affluent generation entered the survey in 1973 with a level of only 8.0 percent support for the belief that Japanese are inferior to Westerners, yet, its regression is totally worthless, however, as its F test score has p. as high as 0.72 and an adjusted R-square that is actually negative.

The differences between the trends of the three generations follow the same general pattern. The difference between the slopes of the War and Rapid Economic Growth generations was significant at T-test p. = 0.025, but the difference between the slopes of the Rapid
Economic Growth and Affluent generations and the difference between the slopes of the Affluent and the War generations could neither be tested or found significant as the Affluent generation's regression was statistically unreliable.

Overall, then, this statistical evidence would not indicate a maturation effect because the slopes are not sufficiently different. And it would seem to indicate a experiential effect as the levels are more different than the slopes. Yet a reference to the raw data, on which we rely to determine doubtful cases, reveals that it is only the first single survey result of the War generation in 1953 that raises its level and trend to the point where they are different from the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations' levels and trends. In fact, in this one question in our entire study, if we threw out the first survey's single result we would find that both the trends and levels of all three generations are almost identical (see Illustration 1). Thus, on this question we will classify the type of pattern as a clear period effect -- with the single qualification "since 1963."

2. National collectivism: a declining trend with an experiential effect

The population trend in the response pattern to the question "Only Japan's happiness leads to individuals' happiness" is not as clear as it is in many questions. As apparent in Illustration 2,
below, all three of the generations show both ups and downs in their responses across time: even the Affluent generation in the mere three times it has been polled. Yet this question shows strong experiential effects, in which the very significantly lower entry levels of the younger generations have tended to lower the entire population mean, despite 15 years of slightly increasing levels in the War generation.

Illustration 2. Only Japan's Happiness Leads to Individuals' Happiness

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The generations' levels have extremely significant differences, with each generation's levels of support being significantly different from the other two generations' levels at T test scores with p. = 0.025. But the variability of the generations' trends shows up in their regressions. All three of the generations' regressions are rejected due to their F test p. levels of 0.39, 0.38, and 0.16 for the War, Rapid Economic Growth, and Affluent generations, respectively. The actual T tests run on the differences between these regressions show significant differences, but since the differences between unreliable regressions are meaningless, we must accept the fact that the null hypothesis has not been refuted and that we thus cannot confirm any valid differences between the generations' trends.

Based on these two facts that 1) the levels are strongly different but 2) the trends cannot be shown to be different, we must conclude that the pattern of responses to this question on national collectivism shows a general decline with a clear experiential effect: it is the lower entry levels of each experientially-formed generation that lowers the mean response level of the population as a whole.

3. Duty and diligence: a sharp decline with strong experiential effect

If both the attitudes of inferiority to Westerners and national collectivism that are associated with the modernizing ideology have shown declining trends, what about the ethic of duty and diligence?
The population's support for the life-philosophy of "a pure and correct life" has also fallen steeply and significantly in the 30 years of the Tokei Suri survey, both by the sharply lower entry levels of the younger generations and by the strongly declining trend in each generation, as can be seen in Illustration 3, below.

Illustration 3. Want to Live a Pure and Correct Life

Percent Generational Response Patterns

All three differences between the levels at which the three generations support this ethic are significantly different. From oldest
to youngest, the generation mean levels are 17.7 percent, 10.8 percent, and 5.2 percent, respectively, and the differences between each of the generations and the other two are significant at \( T \)-test \( p. = 0.025 \).

But while these generations' responses all show declining trends, there is enough variation in some of the response patterns that their regression lines do not all pass our \( F \) test level of statistical significance. The War generation's regression is a strongly significant declining slope at \( p. = 0.025 \). But the Rapid Economic Growth generation's responses, after declining initially, have levelled off during the last two surveys at the low level of 9 percent and thus the regression comes to be rejected because its \( F \) test level is only \( p. = 0.08 \). The Affluent generation shows a constant but slower and uneven decline from the very low levels of 6 to 4.7 percent, and this regression is again not significant according to the \( F \) test, largely due to the limited number of three samplings.

Thus while the \( T \) test differences between these regressions are again extremely significant, we are left without statistical evidence sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that their trends are not significantly different. Our conclusion is therefore that the number of Japanese who support the modernizing ideology's ethic of moral duty and diligence is declining dramatically in the population as a whole, and in every generation at roughly parallel trends, and that this
question thus shows a clear experiential/period effect. The long-term patterns of responses to this survey question would seem to indicate that support for the nationalist modernizing ideology ethic of duty and diligence has almost withered away in postwar Japan.

4. Living for personal tastes, instead of by diligence and duty: an experiential-effect increase in the antithesis of collective duty

The individualistic definition of one's own lifestyle based on one's personal tastes is about as close to being the philosophical opposite to the modernizing ideology's ethic of "collective diligence to catch up to the West" as is possible to imagine. And just as support for the aforementioned elements of the modernizing ideology are decreasing notably through experiential and period effects, their opposite, the preference for an individualistic lifestyle of gratifying personal tastes, is rising.

On this question, as shown in Illustration 4., on the following page, the generations have extremely significant differences of levels. All possible difference between the War generation's level of 31 percent, the Rapid Economic Growth generation's level of 44.3 percent and the Affluent generation's level of 51.3 percent are significant at p. = 0.025.
Illustration 4. Want to Live According to My Tastes

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As with other questions, however, the limited number of samplings from the two younger generations have lowered the reliability of the regressions of their trends on this question too. The regression of the older generation's trend shows a steady moderate increase, with an F-test confidence level of \( p = 0.05 \). Neither of the younger generation's trends have statistically significant linear regressions, however.
The generations have demonstrably significant differences in levels of support, and while they appear to actually have trends in opposing directions, no significant differences between these trends can be empirically confirmed. We must conclude, therefore, that the force underlying the younger generations' significantly higher levels of agreement with this attitude is a clear experiential effect, and that whatever "period" forces there are affect each generation differently.

Let us now summarize our findings concerning the changing beliefs of postwar Japanese on these four questions relating to the layer of the Modernizing Ideology in traditional Japanese nationalism. Belief in three basic attitudes that were central values of this layer -- catching up to the West, national collectivism, and the ethic of duty and diligence -- have all decreased dramatically in postwar Japan: both by experiential and by period effects. And the basic attitude perhaps most strongly opposed to the Modernizing Ideology -- the individualistic lifestyle of living to gratify one's own tastes -- has shown a marked increase among postwar Japanese, particularly among the younger generations.

These are only four attitudes, but we have demonstrated that they are central values of the traditional Japanese nationalist modernizing ideology. These are only a few limited tests, but they constitute a rigorous quantitative analysis of a highly accurate
Japanese government data base covering 5,000 randomly-selected respondents over 30 years. This analysis gives a strong indication that popular support for key elements of the layer of the Modernizing Ideology in traditional Japanese nationalism has weakened dramatically, according to this Japanese public opinion survey data.

The Political Religion

If the layer of the Modernizing Ideology no longer has significant support in postwar Japanese public opinion, what about the layer of the Political Religion on which it was based? We can recall that, as explained in detail in Chapter Three, the political religion of kokutai and the emperor cult emerged from the fusion of Shinto and Confucian nationalist scholarship (by Aizawa Yasushi of the Mito School) on one hand, and the radical nationalist political agitation of disaffected young proto-elites in the Satsuma and Choshu fiefs (who later became the Meiji elites) on the other hand. Unlike the modernizing ideology that was to follow it, the political religion that fueled the fanaticism of the Meiji Restoration was not a pragmatic policy. It was a religious faith fused together with a political ideology by an intense will for radical national reform — not unlike the radical Shiite fundamentalism in recent Iranian history. As such, its elements consist of a much more diverse and loosely-linked network of concepts than the pragmatic policy mix of the modernizing
ideology. Nevertheless, five questions in the TS and NHK data serve as fair to very direct indicators of the beliefs associated with the political religion of kokutai and the emperor cult.

Questions

5.) TS question # 9.6, "Comparing Japanese and Westerners in one word, are Japanese superior or inferior?"

Response option: "Japanese are superior to Westerners."

It would be simple to assume that feelings of superiority to foreigners indicates nationalism, while feelings of inferiority to them indicates a lack of nationalism. But the historical analysis of Japanese nationalism shows that even the feeling of inferiority to Westerners was a motive for nationalism in Japan. While Japan's nationalist Modernizing Ideology held that Japan was inferior to the West in many technical and scientific fields, its nationalist Political Religion held that Japanese were racially, culturally, and morally superior to the "barbarians." The Japanese attitude of superiority to Westerners gave rise to the Meiji Restoration's nationalistic slogan "Expel the Barbarians!", while the Japanese attitude of inferiority to Westerners gave rise to the Middle Meiji's nationalistic slogan "Our Spirit! Western Science!" There is thus no incongruence in our analysis of these two opposite attitudes of inferiority/superiority to Westerners as central values of these two layers of Japanese
nationalism: the contradiction is there between the original Japanese nationalist ideologies themselves. As tempting as it may seem, this question is not suitable for a simple yes-or-no nationalism test.

As our numerous direct quotations of original sources in Chapter Three amply demonstrated, the political religion of kokutai had no doubts or qualms whatsoever about proclaiming the self-evident superiority of Japanese to all other peoples of the earth. Hirata Atsutane, the imperial household's advisor on Shinto affairs, crows:

"People all over the world refer to Japan as the Land of the Gods, and call us the descendants of the gods. Indeed, it is exactly as they say: our country, as a special mark of favor from the heavenly gods, was begotten by them... (and) we, down to the most humble man and woman, are descendants of the gods. Nevertheless, there are unhappily many people who do not understand why Japan is Land of the Gods and we their descendants... Is this not a lamentable state of affairs?

Japanese differ completely from and are superior to the peoples of China, India, Russia, Holland, Siam, Cambodia, and all other countries of the world...."

Yes, Japan was at "the top of the world," and the invincible Japanese samurai had only to be freed from Shogunal bumbling to set the encroaching "hairy barbarians" to rout. The propagandistic skill with which the Meiji elites were able to smooth over the transition from this nativist hubris to a more balanced acceptance of the need to
learn from the West does not in the least diminish this sharp contradiction between the two layers' fundamental assumptions on this important question.

6.) TS Question #3.9: "Some people, upon becoming Prime Minister, go and perform state worship at the Imperial Shrine at Ise. What do you think about this?"

Response option: "The Prime Minister must or should worship."

This second question measures the extent of support for another central belief of the nationalist political religion: the direct link between imperial Shinto religion and imperial national politics. We need only recall that the highest office of the first Meiji Government was The Office of Shinto Rites (Jingikan) and recite the later slogan of General Hayashi's immediate prewar cabinet --

"The union of government and religion!"?

-- to recap the evidence demonstrating that this belief was central to the nationalist political religion. As this question is a multiple-choice question, for our analysis here we have combined the responses to both positive options "must" and "should."
7.) TS question #3.1: "We would like to ask you about religion; for instance, do you have any belief or faith?"

Response option: "Do believe; have a faith"

Belief in religion might seem less germane to the study of the nationalist political religion; but we must take this doctrine seriously and on its own terms, in its own historical and social contexts. The political religion that formed the nationalism of millions of Japanese in the past — from the fanatical sword-wielding shishi of the Meiji Restoration to the suicidal Japanese peasant soldiers of World War Two — was based on the real religion of State Shinto. And their willing sacrifice of their very lives is an evidence of zealotry that takes more than mere scepticism to deny. A religious faith was overtly required to accept the emperor as a god on earth — as the Meiji Constitution put it "sacred and inviolable," as the Imperial Rescript on Education put it "coeval with Heaven and Earth," and as General Araki Sadao put it:

"the eternal culmination of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful throughout all ages and in all places."

And there is strong evidence that these beliefs were accepted by many more Japanese school boys than eventually advanced to the staff officer's corps.
8.) TS question #4.10: "If you have no children, is it better to adopt even a son that is of no blood relationship to you in order to have him carry on your family line, or is there no need to do this?"

Response option: "It is better to (have the adoptee) carry on the family line."

On the surface, this fourth attitude supporting the political religion might also seem to be of a lesser order of importance to the political religion. Yet few attitudes measured by questions in the TS survey have stronger or more direct links to the central values of the political religion.

As was elaborated in Chapter Three, Japan's nationalist political religion was based on a philosophical amalgam of which neither the sources (Shinto, Confucian, or Buddhist), nor the cosmology (gods, men, nature, religion, society, family, or government), were clearly differentiated. Concepts that seem distinct to late-twentieth-century scholars, both Japanese and non-Japanese, were indistinct and often mysteriously merged to believers of the State Shinto political religion. Thus we find many similar references to the "union of government and religion," "the union of the family and religion," "the union of the family and government," and "the union of the family with the past." What seems like a hopelessly confused philosophical pot pourri to us today was accepted as the mysterious
unity of eternal truth by believers in this doctrine.

We thus find the Yamato tribal, Nara Buddhist, Kamakura and Ashikaga feudal, and later Tokugawa Confucian concept of the family line linked closely with religion and the Japanese state in the Meiji political religion. The Meiji concept of kokutai (national body) was based directly on the earlier concept of kokka (national family), and in both cases the emperor of "a single lineage of 10,000 generations" (according to the Meiji Constitution) was the living link from the gods to earth, from the past to the present, and from the imperial head family to each family of Japanese. Reischauer cites two choice quotes to demonstrate this linkage. Hozumi Yatsuka, arguing on the basis of the Japanese tradition of the "family-state" against a proposed individualistic Civil Code and in favor of one which gave extensive legal powers to family heads (even over collateral branches), expressed the blending of family and religion, present and past,

"The family is a continual religious service for the ancestors. The family head . . . represents them in the world."

And Ishida Takeshi gave a later Meiji quote that melds even more together,

"the feeling of respect and love of the child for his parents comes from nature. The great virtue of loyalty—filial piety emerges from the highest form of
such feelings . . .

Our country takes as its base the family system: the nation is but a single great family, the Imperial family is our main-house. We the people worship the unbroken Imperial line with the same feeling of respect and love that a child feels towards his parents. Thus loyalty and filial piety are one and indivisible . . . The union of loyalty and filial piety is truly the special character of our national polity."

9.) NHK Question #35: "What feelings do you presently hold towards the emperor?

Response options: "respect" plus "fond feelings"

The final question in this section measures postwar support the most central value of the Meiji Restoration's nationalist political religion: love and respect for the emperor. We should not need to cite much more historical evidence supporting this linkage. The emperor and the imperial line were explicitly mentioned in each of the other four beliefs of the Political Religion that were discussed above. According to Japan's nationalist political religion: it was the imperial line that linked the Japanese people to the gods, (thus proving Japanese superiority to all foreigners, and making State Shinto the true religion); it was the imperial line that linked Japanese government to Japanese religion (thus requiring the head of government to perform state worship at the imperial shrine); and it was the imperial line that unified all Japanese families into a
national family as the "main house" and "common folk ancestor" of the nation. Yet these attitudes of the Japanese nationalist political religion are all fused together in the symbol of the emperor in the bible of wartime Japanese nationalism Kokutai no hongi.

"Loyalty and Patriotism:
Loyalty means to reverence the emperor as (our) pivot and to follow him implicitly. By implicit obedience is meant casting aside aside and serving the emperor intently. To walk this Way of loyalty is the sole Way in which we subjects may 'live'.

In our country, this great Way has seen a natural development since the foundation of the nation, and the most basic thing that has manifested itself as regards the subjects is in short this Way of loyalty."

Response Patterns

5. Native pride: rising rapidly with a pure period effect

The responses to TS question 9.6, "Japanese are superior to Westerners," is the only set of responses in this entire study on which not one difference between the three generations was found to be significant. Statistical analysis could not reject the null hypothesis that all three levels and all three slopes of the different generations were in fact just superficially different representations of single underlying population means. Exactly as can be surmised from Illustration 5., on this question there are no significant experiential
or maturational effects.

Illustration 5. Japanese are Superior to Westerners

What we can conclude with confidence is that the regression of the War generation's trend has the confidence level of F test scores with $p = 0.025$, and an adjusted R-square score which indicates that this regression accounts for 77 percent of the variance in the data. The regressions of the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations, however, were not significant at the F test $p$ level of.
0.05 and are thus considered unreliable. As is illustrated below, if we know the War generation's slope to be rising this rapidly and cannot reject the null hypothesis that the other two generations' true levels and slopes are the same, we must conclude that the responses to this question reveal a pure period effect. The fact that this change is purely a period change without any detectable maturation or experiential effects, however, does raise an important question concerning its relationship to the layer of political religion in traditional Japanese nationalism. This postwar growth in native pride picks up in 1963 and soars between 1973 and 1983 --- in strict correlation with Japan's entry into the era of rapid economic growth and Japan's arrival as a global economic superpower whose performance outshined those of all the Western economies. It is possible, then, that as is suggested by many Japanese scholars, this new feeling of Japanese superiority is based on Japan's economic achievement --- not on the political religion's belief that Japanese blood descends from the gods.

But, as our historical references amply demonstrate, Japanese in the past have been perfectly capable of feeling superior to Westerners without notable economic achievements on which to base their racial pride. In fact, their assertions of uniqueness and superiority which were stressed in the Meiji Restoration's political religion can be clearly traced deep back into the ancient, millenial core of Japanese nationalism. We will thus leave the interpretation of
this attitude to a latter point in this Chapter where it can be examined in the context of other response patterns.

6. The union of politics and religion:

**strong decline by experiential/period effect**

The attitude that "The Prime Minister must or should perform state worship at the Imperial Shrine at Ise upon assuming office," is an indisputable measure of postwar attachment to a fundamental belief of the layer of political religion in prewar Japanese nationalism. As is apparent in Illustration 6., on the following page, this belief has been losing ground steadily, both by the declining trends of each generation and the far lower entry levels of the younger generations.

The levels of the three generations' support for this belief are all different at levels of statistical significance much higher than p. = 0.025. The slope of the War generation's trend on this question is significant at F test scores with a p. value of 0.025, while the Rapid Economic Growth generation's regression is not significant, and the Affluent generation's regression is rejected for its F test score with p. = 0.07 as against our F test level of confidence of p. = 0.05. We are left, then, with clearly different levels of support for this question and trends that are declining but cannot be shown to be different from each other -- thus revealing another experiential/
period effect.

Illustration 6. The Prime Minister Must or Should Perform State Worship at Ise Shrine

But as the frequency of our finding experiential effects might lead one to suspect some bias inherent in this study's methods, let us play the maturation model's advocate for the sake of an example. Let us assume that all three of the generations' trend regressions on this question were significant. What would our conclusion be then?

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If all three linear regressions were significant, they would have two highly significant differences of slope. The difference between the slopes of the War and Rapid Economic Growth generations, and the difference between the War and the Affluent generations would be significant at $p = 0.025$. The difference between the slopes of the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations would not be significant by our standards, because its $p$ level of 0.05 is above the $p = 0.025$ level that we require for our T test results. So then, according to this hypothetical case, we would have three generations with two significant differences of slopes and three significant differences of levels. Furthermore, these slopes are converging, so could this not indicate a maturation effect?

But, alas for our maturation model in this hypothetical exercise, there is still not enough evidence to indicate a maturation effect. First, the older generation does not have a stable view -- in fact its declining slope is the steepest of all. Second, it is not the younger generations that are converging towards the older generation's level but just the opposite: it is the older generation that is rapidly converging towards the levels stably held by both of the younger generations. Is this "reverse maturation" then? Is the War generation "keeping up with the times?" This clear pattern of an older generation's opinions converging towards the opinions of younger generations is a fascinating case that the maturation model simply cannot account for. Third and finally, the degree of
convergence in this question is so gradual that even if we break even more basic rules of inference in favor of the maturation model and assume that these "valid" regression trends continue linearly into the future, it would still take 35 years before a convergence point was reached in the year 2018. Thus, even if our standards in rejecting statistically weak linear regression lines were not so strict, or if all these regressions happened to be valid by strict standards, the survey data on this question would still clearly support a experiential/period effect and not a maturation effect.

7. Belief in a religion: relatively constant, moderately low level

experiential effect

The responses to TS question 3.1, "Have or believe in a religion" do not present a very clear pattern. While the older generation's level is significantly different from the younger generation's level, the only trend with any constancy is the Rapid Economic Growth generation's marked increase. Even the population mean meanders up and down from year to year on this question, ending in 1983 only 1.5 points below its 1953 starting point and having gone both over and under that level in the years inbetween, as is apparent in Illustration 7., given on the following page.
The generational dividing line in terms of levels of belief in a religion falls between the oldest generation on one hand and the middle-aged and youngest generations on the other hand. This difference is significant at T test scores with p. levels stronger than p. = 0.025 both between the oldest generation and the middle-aged generation and between the oldest generation and the youngest generation.
But as for the trends, this is one of the rare cases in this study in which the War generation -- with the strongest formative experience and a full 35 samplings in the survey -- still does not reveal a significant regression of its trend. Its F test p. level is as high as 0.13 simply because its values are scattered too widely. The Rapid Economic Growth generation, in contrast, has a highly significant regression of its rising trend. The regression's F test p. level is much more significant than p. = 0.025, and its adjusted R-square accounts for 81 percent of the variance in its response pattern. The youngest generation, like the oldest generation has no valid linear regression of its trend, which has risen then fallen off again.

It is tempting to speculate that the older generation's unreliable regression line might actually represent considerable waffling around some stable "mature" level towards which the middle-aged generation was now rapidly converging. But the data do not allow us to assert this interpretation. Such a conclusion would require the unallowable assumption of past trends' straight linear projection into the future. And there is the fundamental question of why the maturation effect -- if such it were -- has not equally affected the Affluent generation. They entered the survey at the same age as the Rapid Economic Growth generation entered it, and they have shown a trend that -- were its regression valid -- could not be shown to be different from either the "mature" generation's trend or
the "maturing" generation's trend.

In short, all that we can conclude with confidence from these response patterns is that the levels of these three generations divide into two distinct groups at high levels of significance, but that only one slope has a reliably rising trend, and that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the true slopes of all three generations are actually the same. The present data thus indicate an experiential effect.

8. Maintaining the family line: strong decline, strong experiential/period effect

The belief in the necessity of maintaining the "family line" even by adopting strangers' sons, as measured by TS question 4.10, shows a steep decline with strong experiential/period effects. The levels of the three generations are each significantly different from each other at \( p. = 0.025 \). Illustration 8., given on the following page, charts these levels.

The response pattern of two of the three generations have reliable linear regressions on this question. The regression of the War generation's trend is declining sharply and is significant at the F test \( p. \) level of 0.025. Its adjusted R-square test shows this regression to account for 76 percent of the variance in this data set.
The regression of the Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend is also declining, albeit slightly less sharply. It is significant at an F test p. level of 0.025, and its adjusted R-square test shows that this regression accounts for the extremely high level of 80 percent of the variance in this data set. These are two extremely reliable regressions, and their extreme difference from each other is demonstrated by the T test scores on the test of their difference which are significant at p. levels many times less than 0.025.

Illustration 8. Should Adopt to Maintain Unbroken Family Lines

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The regression of the Affluent generation's trend is not significant, as its F test p. level is only 0.3, but were it valid it could still not be demonstrated by the T test to be different from the Rapid Economic Growth generation's regression at the p. = 0.025 level of confidence.

This response pattern thus clearly reveals a experiential/period effect. Each generation enters the survey with a significantly lower level (70.4 percent for the War generation, 39 percent for the Rapid Economic Growth generation, and only 24 percent for the Affluent generation) and each generation declines steadily throughout its lifetime in the survey. In addition, the slopes of the declining trends are very significantly different between the oldest and middle-aged generation, while no difference can be demonstrated between the middle-aged and youngest generations.

9. Respect for the emperor: extreme declines with strong experiential effect

The strongest experiential difference in our entire study is found on the question with by far the most importance to our thesis of postwar Japanese nationalism. Reverence for the emperor was what formed and held together the layer of Political Religion in traditional Japanese nationalism. And we can conclude with shocking precision that this belief and attitude has been virtually abandoned among the
middle-aged and younger postwar Japanese.

The differences between the levels of the generations on this question tell the entire story. Those in the War generation who either respect or have positive feelings for the emperor amount to 52.3; in the Rapid Economic Growth generation they are only 15.5 percent, and in the Affluent generation, only 7.8 percent. The differences between all three of these levels are significant at the T test confidence level of p. = 0.025.

This question is a NHK question, which means that the generations' responses were only sampled the three times this survey was conducted: in 1973, 1978, and 1983. This short length of the longitudinal survey decreases sampling numbers and weakens all three of the linear regressions to below our study's required level of confidence: F test p. levels of 0.05 or less. So as we are unable to test the significance of the regressions, all we can do is to refer to the plotted data, and here we see a steady increase in the level of the older generation, a decline followed by an increase in the level of the middle-aged generation, and a steady decline in the level of the youngest generation.

As Illustration 9., shows dramatically, with differences as great as these between each generation's level of respect for the emperor, even if the trends were converging an experiential effect
would be apparent, and given that the trends cannot be shown to be different or the same (even by T tests conducted assuming they were valid regressions) we can only conclude that a strong, purely experiential effect determines these widely differing responses.

Illustration 9. Respect the Emperor

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One technical point also emerges from the analysis of this question: the danger of interpreting survey data on Japanese public opinion as it is usually presented -- without generational
break-downs. If we had looked only at each survey's population mean, we would have concluded that the level of respect for the emperor was low but slowly rising among Japanese at the levels of 33.3, 34.0, and 35.4 percent for each of the survey years. But this indicator is blind to the fact that most of the respect and most of the increase in respect comes from the older generation of Japanese, which will pass off the scene as the middle-aged and younger generations come to center stage. Any projections drawn about the continuing "stability of respect for the emperor" from this data would be folderol.

Thus, in conclusion of this section, we can confidently state that with one uncertain indication the attitudes which are most closely linked to the layer of the Meiji Restoration's Nationalist Political Religion, as measured in the TS and NHK data bases, all show trends away from the basic elements of this layer of traditional Japanese nationalism. The rising sense of superiority to Westerners could indicate several different things -- postwar economic confidence, a revival of religious nativism, or a deeper, more enduring attitude based on the myth of Japanese "uniqueness" -- and this will be discussed in the following section. We can conclude here that public support for a Prime Minister's official Shinto worship has declined sharply to very low levels. Belief in any religion has no clear overall trend and is at low levels. The belief in the need to maintain the family line again shows a strong decline to low levels.
Finally, and most importantly, respect for and simple positive feelings towards the emperor -- even taken together -- show tremendous experiential differences in which the youngest generation's level of support has fallen as low as 7.8 percent.

The patterns of change in the responses to these questions also show a high degree of similarity. There was one rising pure period effect, two declining experiential/period effects (Prime Minister's official Shinto worship, and maintaining family line), and two declining pure experiential effects (belief in religion and respect for the emperor). As with the results on the indicators of the Modernizing Ideology, our analysis of the indicators of the political religion reveals not one case with demonstrable maturation effects.

The Core

We have observed a marked decline -- both by experiential and by period effects -- in postwar support for the most recent layer of traditional Japanese nationalism: the Modernizing Ideology which was created through the Meiji elite's pragmatic adaptation and harnessing of pre-existing elements of religious/political nationalism to meet the crisis of rapid modernization. We have further observed a marked decline -- both by experiential and by period effects -- in this next deeper layer of Japanese nationalism: the Political Religion
of *kokutai* and the emperor cult, which arose more spontaneously from the Japanese intellectual classes through a centuries-long process of philosophical and political struggle and synthesis. Let us now examine the ancient "core values" of traditional Japanese nationalism that underlay both of these "layers" of explicit nationalist ideologies.

The "core" of Japanese nationalism, as described in detail in Chapter Three, is the social residue of the millenial development of Japanese culture. It was not created or innovated by political faith or pragmatism; it grew unconsciously from the life of the Japanese people over the centuries as they absorbed many cultural influences from the Asian mainland yet adapted almost everything to suit several distinct and enduring cultural values which were distinctly their own. What were these values? How can we tell? As confessed in Chapter Three, the portrayal of millenial values is necessarily broad-brush and impressionistic, and the clarity of the images diminishes the further into the background we go. Yet there are several basic elements in the "prehistory" of Japanese nationalism which we can hardly fail to observe.

The first and most basic core value of Japanese nationalism is the belief that the Japanese people are unique and thus superior to all other peoples. Advancements of Sinic civilization too numerous to number were eagerly absorbed by the early Japanese, but their foreign origin was quickly forgotten and soon resoundingly denied.
The Yamato people's assertion of their racial uniqueness and superiority -- that was first buttressed by their tribal myths of descent from the sun goddess and was later buttressed by the chance developments of relative racial and linguistic homogeneity and a nominally unbroken imperial dynasty\(^\text{12}\) -- became the very core value of Japanese national identity and pride which was reasserted like a reflex after every wave of borrowing from abroad up until 1945.

Thus, when the institutions of Tang dynasty Chinese government were imported to Japan en toto during the Taika period (645-709 A.D.) the original Jingikan or office of Shinto rites was created to "foster the native traditions of the divine descent."\(^\text{13}\) Thus, when common scribes had to be imported from Korea by the Nara court for lack of Japanese who could write, these Koreans were set to writing down the "history" of the Japanese people's uniqueness and superiority derived from their direct descent from the gods: "to preserve the true traditions from oblivion."\(^\text{14}\) Thus, after two centuries of systematically importing Sinic court civilization, the courtesans of the Heian Court suddenly invented the unique Japanese arts of Japanese court poetry and scroll painting. Thus, when the Ashikaga shogun Yoshimitsu opened tally-trade with China in 1404, his son Yoshimochi cut it off just seven years later in 1411 with the statement that:

"... the gods of supreme power made a revelation through an oracle. They stated that from the time of the nation's founding, no person had ever degraded himself 'a subject of a foreign nation.' Yoshimitsu
ignored the traditions and violated the laws of our sacred sovereigns of former days. . . ."15

And thus, when European trading and military vessels began to expose the impotence of the Tokugawa isolation policy, the scholarly and spiritual leaders of Japan reacted with statements such as:

"our Divine land is situated at the top of the earth. Thus, . . . it reigns over all quarters of the world, for it has never once changed its dynasty or form of sovereignty."16 - Aizawa Yasushi, Shinron

And,

"we down to the most humble man and woman are descendants of the gods . . . Japanese differ completely from and are superior to . . . these gods were without exception born in Japan . . .

This is a matter of universal belief, and is quite beyond dispute."17 - Hirata Atsutane

A second core value, besides the myth of uniqueness, that shaped the Japanese nation was the social ethics of its non-kin tribe. The social values of hierarchy, obligation, paternalism, and group loyalty, to name a few, are all values which developed from the borrowing of Chinese Confucian concepts to describe the distinctly Japanese heritage of the Yamato uji tribe. Finally, a pattern of dualistic philosophical perception which can easily support seeming contradictions is a borrowed Daoist concept that gives form to a underlying perception pattern that is fully Japanese.
While no questions in the TS and NHK surveys deal directly with the last of these elements, there are five questions that directly measure attitudes very closely connected to the second core value of Japanese nationalism, the Japanese social structure of the paternalistic non-kin tribe. And finally, two questions, analysed together, give a strong indication of the strength of the most important Japanese nationalistic attitude of racial uniqueness and superiority.

Questions

10.) TS question #2.1: "If you think that you are right, will you carry through (your belief or action) even if it is opposed to social custom, or do you think that it is better to obey social custom anyway?"

Response option: "Obey"

This is a direct and excellent measure of the acceptance of social conformity -- the individual yielding to group and tradition -- that has marked Japanese society from time immemorial to today. The question's framers have even excluded the element of rationalization ("well, if I am the only one who thinks this way, maybe I'm wrong") from this question and forced the respondents to face a situation in which they must either follow their beliefs or obey tradition anyway.
11.) TS question #5.1d: "If you were asked to please raise two on this list, which would they be?" (Important principles)
Response option: "Ongaeshi (filial piety)" is an important principle.

12.) TS question #5.1d: (Same question on important principles)
Response option: "Freedom" is an important principle

TS question #5.1d asks respondents to choose two out of four moral or ethical principles which they believe to be important. Two of the options are traditional Japanese moral principles of social ethics: "oyakoko" (filial piety, caring for one's parents and traditionally succeeding to their occupation), and "ongaeshi" (attempting to -- but in a strict sense never succeeding to -- repay "obligation" or moral indebtedness for some favor received from a social superior). And two of the options are modern, democratic social ethics: "respecting freedom" and "respecting the rights of the individual."

As the patterns of responses to both of the traditional options are very similar, and the patterns of responses to both of the democratic options are very similar, we will discuss only one of each. We include "ongaeshi" because the ethic of broad social obligation has distinctive strength in Japanese culture as opposed to the omnipresence of filial piety among all the cultures of the Sinic, Confucian world. And we include "respect for freedom" because it is a
slightly less foreign concept to Japanese culture than the offensively "selfish" concept (to the traditional mind) of "individual rights."

13.) TS question #5.6 "A certain company has two section chiefs of the two following types. If you were to work for this company, which of the section chiefs do you think it would be better to work under? Please list one."

Response option: "(The section chief who) sometimes bends the rules and makes one do unreasonable work, but who looks after people very well (in things) outside the job."

This question is another good indicator of the behavioral code of the Japanese social tradition. The respondents selecting this answer prefer a sometimes unfairly demanding but warm-hearted, paternalistic boss. Their alternative is a boss who "does not bend rules to demand unreasonable work, but (sic.) does not look after people outside the job": a strictly fair but emotionally neutral, work-by-the-rules non-paternalistic boss.

14.) TS question #5.1c-1: "Suppose you are the president of a company. Your company conducted an examination in order to hire one new employee. The section chief you left the employment examination up to reports back to you, 'Your relative placed second. But I think that either the person
who placed first or your relative would be good. What should I do? Which would you tell him to hire?"

Response option: "The person placing first." (not the relative)

This is a more general question than the preceding question, and it has strong implications concerning the conception of the membership of "the group" whose tradition Japanese may or may not follow. This question directly examines the relationship between loyalty to the kin group and the non-kin group in Japanese society by testing the degree to which Japanese are willing to show even the slightest favoritism for a relative. Here again the Tokei Suri question framers largely excluded the reaction "what will my superiors think" by making the respondent the president of the company (who is in a much more secure position in a Japanese company than in an American company). The question is reduced to whether the respondent would place loyalty to a non-family group over loyalty to the family group in a situation where it was totally in their power to do so.

Response Patterns

10. Yield to tradition even when right in opposing it:

steady increase, strong maturation/period effect

In contrast to all the results analysed up until now, the responses to TS question 2.1 at last provide a clear example of a
maturation effect. The "mature" older generation has a steady, slightly rising level of support for yielding to social custom, while both the middle-aged and younger generations have lower levels but are converging rapidly on the older generation's level. In fact, their levels have already converged to the point where there is no significant statistical difference between them at the $p = 0.025$ level of confidence on any of the three $T$ tests. Illustration 10., on the following page, shows the close levels and convergence of trends.

Two of the linear regressions of the three generations' trends are significant. The significance of the War generation's slight increase is confirmed by its $F$ test $p.$ level of 0.025 and an adjusted $R$-square test score that shows this regression to explain 49 percent of the variance in the data set. The Rapid Economic Growth generation, in contrast, has a trend whose rising slope is twice as steep as that of the War generation, and the reliability of this regression is confirmed by an $F$ test $p.$ level of 0.025 and an adjusted $R$-square that shows the regression to account for fully 76 percent of the variance in the data set. Finally, the Affluent generation's trend has too much scatter for too few data points to permit a valid linear regression. The $T$ tests between these very reliable estimates of the slopes of the War and Rapid Economic Growth generations show them to be significantly different at $p = 0.025.$

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Illustration 10. Will Yield to Tradition, Even When Knowing it would be Right to Oppose it

![Graph showing generational response patterns over time.]

The War and Rapid Economic Growth generations' trends have converged rapidly and have already reached a degree of proximity at which their mean lifetime levels of support for this attitude are statistically indistinguishable. In short, the pattern of responses to this question satisfy all the criteria for a maturation effect: the younger generations start at lower levels and move at a steeper angle...
towards convergence with the relatively stable "mature" attitudes of the older generation. The slopes of the generations (at least two) are significantly different and converging. And finally, the convergence has or seems extremely likely to occur within a time frame that meets the maturation model's basic assumption that generations should reach similar attitudes at similar ages. In addition, we can note that all of the trends are rising. Thus, on this question, we have a clear case of a maturation/period effect.

11.) "Ongaeshi" as an important moral principle:

strong increase, maturation/period effect

Only twenty years of data, from 1963 to 1983, are available on TS question 5.1d, but the responses to the answer supporting ongaeshi (returning social obligation) still show a clear maturation/period effect, as is observable in Illustration 11, on the following page. The entry level of the War generation on this question was 43.5 percent, while both the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations entered the survey at the same ages with the very similar levels of 28 and 29 percent, respectively. The differences between their lifetime means follow this pattern of clear generational differences, with T test scores significant at p. = 0.025 demonstrating the differences between the War generation and the Rapid Economic Growth generation on one hand and the War generation and the Affluent generation on the other hand. But the differences between the levels of the Affluent
and Rapid Economic Growth generations were not significant.

Illustration 11. **Ongaeshi** (Repaying Obligation) is an Important Principle

![Graph showing generational response patterns over time.]

This is one of the rare questions in our study in which all three of the linear regressions of the respective generations' trends have F test scores that are significant. But all this signifies is that the responses of the youngest generation, which has only been represented in the survey three times, happened to follow a straighter
line on this question. The addition of even one more data point to the
youngest generation's trend in the next survey should vastly improve
the number of its regressions that show statistically significant
trends. In any case, the War generation's trend on this question has
a steadily climbing regression line with an F test p. level significant
at 0.05. The regression of the Rapid Economic Growth generation's
slope is more than twice as steep as that of the War generation, and
its F test p. level is 0.025 with an R-square result indicating that
this line accounts for an amazing 94 percent of the variance in the
data set. The Affluent generation's trend can be regressed as an even
steeper rising slope than that of the Rapid Economic Growth
generation, and it too is significant at F test p. = 0.025 and an
R-square score showing that the regression explains 79 percent of the
variance around this line. The T tests on the differences between
these slopes show that, as with the levels of the three generations,
there is a significant difference at the T test p. level of 0.025
between the slopes of the older and the two younger generations, but
that there is no significant difference between the slopes of the two
younger generations.

What is the relationship, then, between these highly significant
regression lines? First, all three are climbing steeply: there is
clearly a period effect at work. Second, the slope of the youngest
generation is the steepest, followed by that of the middle-aged
generation, and finally by the much more moderate slope of the War

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generation. The trends are thus on a clearly converging course, but when would convergence occur? The extreme shift of the Rapid Economic Growth generation towards the level of the War generation during the most recent five-year period, as shown in Illustration 11, seems to suggest that if the same pattern continued, convergence would be imminent. But we cannot predict what might happen in the future. There is thus some hesitation in our conclusion, but there is more evidence tending to support a classification of this response pattern as a maturation/period effect than as a experiential effect.

12. Respecting freedom:

  steady decline, by experiential/period effect

In addition to the traditional social ethic of repaying obligation, which was discussed above, the TS survey revealed similar results on the traditional ethic of filial piety. But its question 5.1d also measured the Japanese public's support for two modern, democratic social ethics. As the responses to these options of choosing "respecting freedom" and "respecting individual rights" as "important principles" showed patterns that were similar to each other but very different from the responses to the two traditional options, we will merely analyse "respecting freedom."

As was argued in Chapter Three, respect for freedom and individual rights was never an important social ethic in traditional
Japan's strictly hierarchical, group-centered society. Yet instilling this ethic was one of the prime objectives of the U.S. "reform" of Japanese education in the Occupation era. Did the Occupation reforms produce an effect and is it lasting? The responses to this question answer that "yes" there was a strong initial effect in the Occupation-era-educated Rapid Economic Growth generation, but that "no" this effect has not been lasting. The general pattern of response to this question shows a steady decline in postwar Japanese belief that "respecting freedom" is an "important principle." And the changing response pattern reveals a experiential/period effect.

In the responses to this question, the level of the War generation, which was born and mostly educated before the Occupation, has maintained a steady, slightly declining trend with a lifetime average level of 37.4 percent -- not an unduly high level of support from a population given two chances to select from four options the fundamental principle of their democratic government as an ethic which they respect. But the Rapid Economic Growth generation, educated during the Occupation and in college during the radical era turmoil, entered the survey with a resounding 57 percent support for respect of freedom and increased this level to 63 percent in 1968. Since then, however, its level has fallen very steadily and rapidly, leaving it with a lifetime level of 51.1 percent. The Affluent generation entered the survey after the peak of the radical unrest with levels of respect for freedom only slightly lower than the Rapid
Economic Growth generation and then has followed its pattern of steady and rapid decrease. Its lifetime mean level is 52.1 percent. These patterns are shown in Illustration 12., below.

Illustration 12. Respecting Freedom is an Important Principle

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The responses to this question again reveal the grouping of the prewar-born War generation on one side and the largely postwar-born Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations on the other side. The differences between the War generation's level and each of the
younger generations' levels are both significant at T test scores with p. = 0.025, while there is no significant difference between the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations' levels.

As for the regressions of these generations' respective trends: the War generation's regression is not significant, while the regression of the Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend is significant at F test p. = 0.025 (with an adjusted R-square of 79 percent). The Affluent generation's trend regression is just a fraction short of our F test level of confidence of p. = 0.05 at p. = 0.056. Again with the regressions as with the levels, the trends of these generations fall into two groups: the trend of the War generation being significantly different from those of both the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generation at T test levels of p. = 0.025, with no significant differences between the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations' slopes. This last statement is actually quite an understatement because the slope parameters of these two generations are practically identical at -6.035 and -6.000, which is the closest correspondence among any of the paired regressions in this study.

What overall pattern does this reveal, then? The significantly different levels strongly suggest a generation effect. But the regressions seem to show a tendency of the outlying younger generations to converge towards the more stable level of the War generation, which would suggest a maturation effect. The most
obvious interpretation of these patterns, however, is that there is clearly a strong period effect, particularly in the past ten years, where parallel declines at different levels would indicate a generation/period effect, and this is what we conclude. Respect for freedom is declining steadily from its only moderate levels, and is declining rapidly among the middle-aged and younger Japanese.

13. Prefer paternalistic boss: very high level, simple period effect

Another aspect of the core social values of traditional Japanese nationalism is paternalism. The leader-follower relationship of the traditional Japanese group demands loyalty and self-sacrifice from the subordinate and paternalistic benevolence from the superior. And the responses to this question in postwar Japan show that not once in any year or generation has the overwhelming Japanese support for this attitude wavered. Illustration 13., on the following page, shows the superimposed generational lines.

The generation’s levels vary only 3.9 percent from 84.5 to 88.4 percent. But the stability of each generation’s longitudinal response pattern to this question gives even these proximate levels significant statistical differences. The War generation’s level is different from the levels of both the Rapid Economic Growth generation and Affluent generation at T tests with p. = 0.025, and the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations show no significant differences.
Illustration 13. Prefer Paternalistic Boss

Percent | Generational Response Patterns
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Two of the generations' trends have statistically significant regressions: the War generation's trend and the Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend both show linear regressions significant at the F test p. level of 0.025. And both of these regressions show a very slow increase. As the margins of error are so small in the responses to this question, even differences of as low as the 0.8 difference in the slope of these two regressions can produce T test differences that are significant. The responses to this question, then,
show a pure period effect. *Paternalism is actually a more popular social ethic among the Affluent youth today than it was among the War generation in 1953.*

14. **Loyalty to the Non-kin tribe: high level, simple continuity**

We have analysed the enduring and even increasing support among postwar Japanese attitudes towards many aspects of the traditional social group, but just what constitutes these powerful groups? One of Japan's most commonly noted exceptions from the general pattern of Sinic civilizations has been its consistent subordination of family units to the non-kin group from the times of the 4th century Yamato *uji* to the modern Japanese corporation. Japanese, in other words, have long formed and been loyal to "tribes" based upon other factors than blood. Is this still true in postwar Japan?

According to the responses to TS question 5.1c-1, the chances of Japanese relatives receiving the slightest favoritism from their kin in obtaining a job seem as poor in postwar Japan as ever. Over 70 percent of Japanese in every generation would place strict loyalty to their non-kin group over doing a relative this favor. These results can be seen in Illustration 14., on the following page.
Illustration 14. Greater Loyalty to Company than to Family

On this question the differences between the levels of the War and Rapid Economic Growth generations, on one hand, and between the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations, on the other hand, are not significant. It is only the difference between the War generation and the Affluent generation's slightly lower level that is significant at the T test p. level of 0.025.
Only one of the regressions of the three generations' trends is significant on this question. While the War generation is constant and the Affluent generation declines away from the War generation's level to a lower level, the Rapid Economic Growth generation starts at a higher level than the War generation and declines to below it on a trend whose regression is significant at an F test p. level of 0.025 and an adjusted R-square of 83 percent.

What sort of effect can this pattern possibly indicate? It is certainly not a maturation effect: the Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend starts above and cuts right across the War generation's stable trend while the Affluent generation starts at the War generation's level and diverges on a yet lower course. There is only one significant difference in levels, and the lack of more than one significant regression makes it impossible to conduct a T test. Thus there is insufficient evidence to make any firm conclusion. While the statistical conclusion for such a question would be that the null hypothesis of no systematic differences is confirmed, in the concepts of cohort analysis we would say that these lines at present can only be interpreted to indicate simple continuity at a very high level of support. The great majority of Japanese in every generation still attribute greater importance to the non-kin tribe than to the family group.
Thus through the analysis of five different questions we have seen that many ancient Japanese social values that were distinctive "core values" of prewar Japanese nationalism are still vital and popular attitudes in Japanese life today. Specifically, we can conclude with very high levels of confidence that postwar Japanese still strongly support the ancient and sometimes quite distinctive Japanese social values of:

1) yielding to group custom,
2) highly valuing the ethics of social obligation,
3) not highly valuing freedom and individual rights,
4) preferring paternalistic leadership, and
5) holding unswerving loyalty towards the non-kin tribe.

On each of these questions postwar Japanese are either strongly and stably supporting the traditional values or are rapidly increasing their support for these traditional values, as is especially notable among the middle-aged and the youth.

Yet one point is still lacking in this analysis. There still remains the crucial question of the belief that might even be considered the seed around which the "core" values of Japanese nationalism formed: the unshakable belief that, whatever the apparent facts, the Japanese people are unique and thus superior to all other peoples. As discussed at some length in Chapter Three, it is plausible to conceive that this earliest and most basic assertion of Japanese independence from the Sinic world became an assertion of
metaphysical **superiority** to it through some process of collective compensation: the psychological difficulty of asserting equality with China while being patently dependent on China for most of its material and cultural advancement could only be resolved by the assertion of some other grounds besides culture or technology on which Japanese could base their national pride. The Yamato myths of Japan's divine creation and the direct descent of its tribal family-state from the gods served this psychological function and eventually led to the faith-based assertion of Japanese superiority to all other peoples, regardless of the objective evidence. As traced in Chapter Three, the tremendous force and continuity of this core value of Japanese nationalism is evident throughout its history from Izanagi and Izanami to August 1945, and throughout this time this core value led to alternating cycles of openness to foreign ideas then reassertions of nativist isolationism. Our final question, now that we have peeled back both the layers and the core of Japanese nationalism to reach the seed around which it grew, is to see to what extent this metaphysical, perhaps compensatory, assertion of Japanese uniqueness and superiority is supported by postwar Japanese.

It is a fact worthy of serious reflection that even given the voluminous instances in which the uniqueness myth plays a key role in the most influential and well-known Japanese nationalist documents (such as we have quoted from above), neither the TS nor NHK researchers saw fit to compose a single direct question on this topic.
In all of their hundreds of questions and response options on matters both significant and not, not one question directly measures how many Japanese believe that they are a unique people. The thousands of Japanese book titles beginning with "Nihonjin no . . . " ( . . . of the Japanese people), of which just a few were cited towards the beginning of this study, still only begin to measure the extent Japanese interest in this subject. And this myth makes daily apparitions in the statements of Japanese citizens and government officials, such as the Japanese government expert witness testimony to foreign trade representatives that "Japanese snow is unique." Could it be that even the highly competent TS and NHK researchers did not see fit to ask a question on Japanese uniqueness because they too took it for granted that of course the Japanese people is unique?

But while we are thus unable to analyse a direct question on the Japanese belief of their own uniqueness, we are able to analyse the differing responses to two NHK questions that between them give some indication of the continuing strength and vitality of this most ancient Japanese nationalistic belief. These questions are NHK question 34d, "Japan is a first-class nation," and 34d, "Compared to other peoples Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics." As both questions are yes/no questions with minute "don't know" response rates, and both questions appear printed close to each other on the very same survey forms, it is permissible to draw cross inferences between them: first from their differing levels, then from
their differing trends.

To most educated Europeans or North Americans in 1986, the question of whether or not Japan is a first-class nation seems inane. With the world's second highest GNP and perhaps its best-managed large-scale economy, the world's highest life expectancy, some of the highest levels of education and lowest levels of poverty and crime in the world, an ancient and distinctive culture rich in both the exquisitely subtle and the robust and flamboyant, the seventh most powerful military among all nations, and a proven record of extremely rapid and skillful adaptation to rapidly fluctuating world economic conditions -- in addition to all of the trappings of a first-class world power such as membership in the OECD, the Western Summit, and sundry "Groups of five, six, or seven" -- there is no doubt in most educated Westerners' minds that Japan is at least a first-class nation as well as a global economic superpower. And to Asians and Africans from developing countries who look up to Japan from far less privileged economic and social situations, the question of whether or not Japan is a first-class nation seems like a bad joke. Yet how do Japanese answer this question? Their level of belief that Japan is a first-class nation is still shockingly low.
15. Japan is a first-class nation: moderate level, strong rise

strong experiential/period effect.

Illustration 15. Japan is a First-Class Nation

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It was not until 1983 that more than 50 percent of Japanese in each generation would agree that Japan was a first-class nation. And even then only the 10-year average level of the War generation was over 50 percent at 55.6 percent, while the Rapid Economic Growth generation's level was 47.0 percent and the Affluent generation's
level was a mere 38.9 percent.

The differences between the level of the War generation and the two younger generations are significant at T test p. levels of 0.025. While the difference between the younger generations was not statistically significant. A full decade after Japan accomplished its "miracle" economic growth to arrive at world-class affluence, and despite its continuing economic success and ever-rising world position, hardly half of the Japanese people in 1983 felt that Japan was a first-class nation.

Most educated Westerners would probably be surprised at this, but given this fact they would then be likely to assume that if only half of the Japanese population agreed with the mildly nationalistic sentiment that their nation was a first-class nation, that a much smaller number would support the extreme if not outright pungently-worded statement "Compared to other peoples, Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics" (kiwamete sugureta sonshitsu).

Yet how do the Japanese answer this question? Their level of agreement that they as a people are "exceedingly superior" to all other peoples is almost shockingly high.
16. Japanese are "exceedingly superior": high level, strong rise

strong experiential/period effect

Characteristics Compared with Others

Percent

Generational Response Patterns

In the 1983 NHK survey 76.5 percent of the Rapid Economic Growth generation felt that they were superior to all foreign peoples, followed by the Affluent generation at 69.0 percent and the War generation at 62.0 percent. All three generations' ten-year average
levels were over 60 percent, with the Rapid Economic Growth generation believing in Japanese superiority at 68.8 percent, the War generation at 64.9 percent and the Affluent generation at 61.7 percent. T tests on these figures reveal that there are no significant differences between the levels of the War and Rapid Economic Growth generation, on one hand, or the Rapid Economic Growth generation and the Affluent generation, on the other hand, but that the War and Affluent generations' levels are different at p. = 0.025.

We thus see a major gap between the high levels of Japanese in each generation who have strong ethnic or racial pride in the Japanese people and the much lower levels in each generation who have even moderate pride in the Japanese nation. And how are these patterns of responses changing over time?

On the responses to NHK question 34b "Japan is a first-class nation," all three of the generations' trends have significant regressions. And this is a particularly rare finding because the NHK data set has only three surveys, which drastically reduces the number of possible samplings. On this question the War generation's regression slope is climbing sharply and is significant at an F test p. level of 0.025 with an adjusted R-square of 63 percent. The Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend regression has a very steep climb of ten percent between each survey, and it is significant at the F test p. level of 0.025 with the extremely high adjusted R-square of
92 percent. Finally, the Affluent generation's trend regression is climbing the steepest of all, and it is significant at F test \( p = 0.025 \) with, again, an extremely high adjusted R-square of 51 percent. We thus see three extremely reliable linear regressions that are all climbing very steeply, and the T tests on the differences of these three regression lines shows that each of them is significantly different from the others at the \( p = 0.025 \) level.

Both the entry levels and subsequent trends of these generations are significantly different. The Rapid Economic Growth generation has already crossed the War generation's level while the Affluent generation would seem very likely to do so before the next survey given its extremely strong and steady increase over the past 10 years. These factors allow us to reject the maturation model and classify this pattern as a revealing a clear experiential/period effect. Pride in Japan as a nation is rising very rapidly from low to moderate levels, especially among the younger two generations.

In contrast, the pattern of change in the generations' responses to NHK question 34d "compared to other peoples, Japanese possess exceedingly superior characteristics," shows much higher levels but slower growth, and even more marked experiential effects. The generations' trends on this question again show three statistically reliable regressions. According to these regressions: the War generation's trend is rising only moderately and is significant at F
test $p. = 0.025$ (with an adjusted $R$-squared of 56 percent), the Rapid Economic Growth generation's trend is rising almost twice as rapidly as that of the War generation, and it is significant at F test $p. = 0.025$ (with an adjusted $R$-square of 88 percent), and the Affluent generation's trend is rising just slightly faster than that of the Rapid Economic Growth generation, and is significant at F test $p. = 0.027$ (with an adjusted $R$-square of 51 percent). Thus all three trends have rising slopes, and the $T$ tests reveal that the differences between the more moderate increase of the War generation is different from the sharp increases of the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations at $p. = 0.025$, while the two younger generations have slopes that are not significantly different.

We thus see a case where the levels of each generation are quite similar -- only the oldest and youngest generations have a significant difference -- but where the rapidly rising trends of both the two younger generations are significantly different from, and have crossed, and are diverging further from, the trend of the War generation. This is thus another clear example of an experiential/period effect.

Therefore, while support for both nationalistic statements rose rapidly in each generation (especially the younger two), the gap remained: hardly half of Japanese felt that their nation was a first-class nation, while over two thirds of them felt that as a people
they were exceedingly superior to all foreigners. Something powerful must lie beneath this dramatic incongruity. Such highly disproportionate results — showing relatively weak nationalism where almost every known fact and reason would argue for it, and very strong nationalism where there is no basis for rational judgement — could not normally be anticipated. The case of Japanese nationalism seems to stand out and apart from other nationalisms of the developed countries in terms of this apparent contradiction.

What reasons can be offered to explain this contradiction? Is this abnormally weak feeling of first-class nationhood due to lack of confidence in Japan's economic power? This 10-year NHK data covers the period after the Japanese nation had attained world-class economic power in 1973 and the pattern was still strong in 1983.

Is this strong feeling of Japanese racial superiority merely the effect of justifiable economic pride? If this rapidly growing attitude of racial superiority can be explained away as "economic confidence" (as so many Japanese like to do) why is belief that Japan is a first-class nation so low? Surely economic confidence ought to relate more closely to first-class rank among the community of nations than to the Japanese race's "exceedingly superior characteristics" to all other races and peoples of the world. This is not another pungent quotation from Hirata Atsutane in 1804 that we are discussing here; the attitude expressed by these very words was supported by 70.6
percent of all Japanese in 1983, with strong indications that these figures are still rising.

What other reasons can be offered to explain this contradiction? Lingering trauma from defeat in World War Two? The gap between tribal pride and national confidence is least among the War generation that experienced the defeat and over two and a half times as great among the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations of whom most were born and educated after the War or even after the end of the Occupation. It is the generations that have known nothing but Japanese success which show much greater gaps between their high levels of racial pride and low levels of respect for their nation.

Is it -- as conservative members of the Liberal Democratic Party so frequently allege -- the nefarious and debilitating influence of the U.S. Occupation's democratic reform of Japan's totalitarian wartime education system that has crippled the nationalistic feelings of postwar youth? The generation that shows the highest levels and the most dramatic increase in both racial and national feelings of superiority is the Rapid Economic Growth generation: the very generation that experienced postwar education in its most liberal, most American-influenced, and most explicitly anti-nationalistic eras -- Occupation era public schools and Radical era universities. Their nationalism hardly seems crippled by this education. What other easy explanations can be offered?
We consider this paradox in Japanese nationalist attitudes to be an indirect indication of the millenial core value of Japanese nationalism itself: the enduring belief in the transcendent uniqueness, and thus superiority, of the Japanese people. The root of this belief may well have been the psychological need to compensate in native pride for reliance on foreign inventions, and during the long periods when Japan was isolated from foreign states, such as during the Tokugawa era, its ethnic and national pride could remain undifferentiated. But ever since the late Tokugawa period when they were forced to deal with the Western powers on their own commercial and military terms, Japanese have been confronted with areas in which they felt their nation was inferior to the Western powers. The reflexive reaction, as in times past when exposed to foreign prowess, was to reassert Japanese racial pride enough to compensate for feelings of inferiority about the Japanese nation's technological weakness. This nativist compensatory reaction is visible as a clear policy both in the Political Religion's credo "Revere the Emperor! Expel the Barbarians!" and in the Modernizing Ideology's pairing of the modernizing slogan "Rich country! Strong Army!" with the reassertion of ancient tribal values in "Preserve the National Way!" Eventually even this balance between "Eastern ethics. Western science." proved too impure for fanatical Japanese ultranationalists, and their unleashed tribal hubris led Japan over the cliff to its destruction.
The War's lesson of the penalties for confusing feelings of ethnic pride with objective national capabilities remains strong among most postwar Japanese from various generations. Perhaps it is in consequence of that former over-confidence that Japanese judgements of their country's current capacities against those of other nations are too humble to be realistic. In the realm of metaphysical native pride, however, no such adjustment was necessary after defeat in the War. The islands were still beautiful; fellow Japanese, still friendly; and working hard together to rebuild Japan made everybody more proud than ever of their tremendous collective abilities as a people. And rich country or poor, strong army or none, Japan was always the land of the rising sun. Of course Japanese could feel that they belong to an exceedingly superior people.

But in the postwar era two sets of factors were fundamentally changed, setting in motion the dymanics which have produced this paradoxical gap between racial and national pride could also be speculated to be changing. First, the Occupation's reform of Japanese politics finally granted the long-held dream of Japanese democrats for an truly democratic government (universal suffrage, direct election, Diet as supreme organ, ministerial accountability) without the Meiji constitution's treacherous flaws such as the military's right of "autonomous command" and the non-accountable powers of imperial advisors. At the same time the reform of education introduced the ideals of democracy which encouraged political criticism, instead of
the undemocratic prewar ideals of the "national way" enforced by a vicious "thought police" which held criticism to be sedition. The second set of altered factors was in the communications and economic fields, where the abolition of government censorship and the advent of television brought home the images of American consumer affluence to a generation of Japanese youth who had never known anything but war and the struggle up from poverty in Japan.

These two sets of factors alone might account for no small share of the underlying discontent with Japanese society that found expression in the Rapid Economic Growth era's curious combination of fanatical radicalism among a student and labor union minority and equally energetic industriousness and savings among the working majority. As opposed to the isolated intellectual or agrarian protesters of the past, the Rapid Economic Growth generation youth were the first nation-wide Japanese generation that was both sufficiently informed and intellectually free to criticise Japanese life both for its political policies and for its lack of consumer richness. The fact that the radicals' Marxist leaders channelled this basic discontent into anti-capitalist anti-bourgeois slogans does not in any way detract from the psychological plausibility of this hypothesis. Which evidence should we weigh more heavily in judging a generation's real motivations: the Marxist slogans shouted by 1 percent of them twenty years ago, or the acquisitive, petty-capitalistic, bourgeois behavior the rest have been demonstrating
throughout those twenty years?

Thus while the masses of the prewar Japanese generations could only judge Japan's standing vis-a-vis the Western powers on the basis of military rivalries (in which the Japanese military had done very well), the postwar generations of Japanese could and did judge Japan on the basis of the American consumer affluence they saw on television (and consumer affluence is far more costly for a government to provide than a small but gallant military). The great expansion of university education and the concomitant exposure to various democratic ideals (both liberal and collectivist) gave these generations higher expectations for a responsive democratic government, as opposed to the largely unquestioning prewar acceptance of bureaucratic/authoritarian rule.

This hypothesis of a sense of national inferiority engendered by a shift in standards of judgement from the metaphysical or propagandistic prewar standards to more objective standards of international comparisons of consumer affluence and responsive democracy could help to explain the fact that the Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations' 1973 levels of both confidence in the state and in the Japanese people were much lower than that of the War generation. The older generation's higher levels of nationalism could have been buoyed up by the lingering effect of their propagandistic, ultranationalist prewar education, while the postwar
generations' lower levels of nationalism could have been depressed by more objective exposure to living conditions around the world. The older generation's indoctrinated belief in the modernizing ideology's principle of national collectivism could have made them take personal pride in Japan's collective achievements (its auto, steel, and electronics industries, for example), while the more individualistic, lifestyle-oriented postwar generations could be more likely to make judgements on the basis of how much of this abstract affluence they personally partake of. While the older generation found the political structure of the postwar Constitution such an immense improvement over the prewar structure that their support for it has remained strong, the younger generations with broader and more objective exposure to international standards of participant democracy are more easily disillusioned by the lingering prewar Japanese politics of bureaucratic rule, political factions, and "money power" politics.

So while the two younger generations' levels of ethnic pride were not far below that of the older generation in 1973, their levels of pride in their nation were considerably lower. The "gaps" between their levels of ethnic and national pride were actually much greater than that of the older generation, due, we surmise, to their shift from the millenial compensatory assertion of metaphysical Japanese superiority to the objective evaluation of Japan's global standing by comparing the relative material standards of living and pragmatic democracy: the real degree of the Japanese government's responsive-
ness to Japanese citizens voices. This view tends to be supported by
the subsequent developments in the two younger generations' levels of
ethnic and national pride. As Japan's consumer standard of living
soared, a decade after its industrial manufacturing economy soared,
the postwar generations' levels of confidence in the Japanese people
and nation also began to soar.

But the most significant factor is not that these two types of
pride both rose, but that the gap between them narrowed. The
Japanese of the two younger generations have noticeably reduced the
unusual "gap" produced by the Japanese assertion of exceeding tribal
superiority in the face of their self-judged second-class nationhood.
Over the decade of the NHK survey, this "gap" fell from 23 percent to
19 percent in the Rapid Economic Growth generation and, even more,
from 28 percent to 17 percent in the Affluent generation. While the
anomaly is still strong, this steady reduction, especially in the
youngest generation, could indicate that a new form of Japanese
nationalism, a new ethnic and national pride based not on
compensatory myth but on competitive achievement, is being born. If
so, this would be a change of a revolutionary nature that would
replace the tribal myth at the very "core" of traditional Japanese
nationalism with a value that accepted Japan's place as a leading
nation in the community of nations, subject to the full respect and
the full responsibilities of its status.
Thus, this section has found that the elements of the "core" of traditional Japanese nationalism are thriving in postwar Japan. Yielding one's own beliefs and behavior to social custom in an obligation-centered, non-freedom-loving, paternalistic, non-kin tribe remains the strong choice as the preferred social pattern of postwar Japanese, just as it was that of their forefathers since time immemorial. Likewise, the millenial tendency to assert a Japanese racial and ethnic uniqueness—cum—superiority over foreign peoples also remains very strong: much stronger even today, in fact, than the surprisingly low levels of Japanese pride in their globally-respected nation. Far from losing these "core" elements of traditional Japanese nationalism, postwar Japanese are increasing their support for these traditional values, and the strongest and steadiest growth of support for the traditional core of Japanese nationalism comes from the middle-aged generation that was formed through the experience of the era of rapid economic growth in the 1960's, and from the younger generation that was reared amidst unprecedented Japanese economic affluence from the mid-1970's.

Our finding in this section on the "core" of traditional Japanese nationalism is in direct and dramatic contrast to our findings in the two previous sections concerning the two "layers" of traditional Japanese nationalism.
There our findings were that postwar Japanese support for the basic elements of both the layers of the Modernizing Ideology and the Political Religion is **withering away**: both by period effects and by strong experiential effects, especially among the two generations born after the War. But here in our analysis of the distinctive Japanese belief and social system that shaped the "core" of traditional Japanese nationalism we have found that postwar Japanese not only still support every traditional ethic and attitude we studied but that their support for traditional "Japanese-ness" is **growing**: both by period effects and by maturation effects, especially among the two generations born after the War. And, finally, there might be an indication that the rapidly rising non-ideological nationalistic sentiments of the younger Japanese generations is being based more and more on Japan's objective economic political and social achievements (measured in consumer terms) instead of on the metaphysical assertion of Japanese racial superiority.

We can only make such strong assertions on the basis of strong evidence and rigorous analysis. And the powerful statistical tools and strict levels of confidence that we have used in analysing our highly reliable data bases produced by Japanese government agencies fully justify the confidence with which we draw these conclusions.
Chapter Six:

CONCLUSION

Thus we have come to a privileged position from which we can look back over the millenial development of Japanese nationalism, look closely at its characteristics today, and look ahead towards potential changes in its form as the Japanese nation seeks to define a new international identity and role. The theoretical basis for our examination of this subject was a broad survey of the leading theoretical analyses of nationalism as a global social and political phenomenon. Using these models as a theoretical framework, this study examined the growth of Japanese nationalism from its roots in the tribal myths of the Yamato people up through its centuries of development, into nationalistic sentiment, into nationalist ideologies, and finally into Japanese ultranationalism, which ended in World War II. Part One of this thesis defined this conceptual model Traditional Japanese Nationalism as the Core and Layers model.

In Part Two, this study examined the changing characteristics of Japanese nationalism in the postwar era, from 1946 to 1986,
according to Eisenstadt's maturational and Mannheim's experiential theories of generational change in political attitudes. It defined hypothetical experiential generations through in-depth interviews with a panel of Japanese respondents whose formative years corresponded to the periods of three potential mass socializing experiences in postwar Japan: the War and Occupation, the era of Rapid Economic Growth, and the era of Affluence. Then it statistically tested these hypothetical generations' long-term response patterns to survey questions that relate to Japanese nationalism, in order to determine:

1). If these three age-groups actually constitute Japanese experiential generations,

2.) How their attitudes towards Japanese nationalism differ, and,

3.) What specific points and concepts of Japanese nationalism they agree and disagree about.

This study gives definite, substantive answers to each of these questions. It supports its answers with the statistically-significant findings of a quantitative cohort analysis of Japanese survey data as well as with theory, historical evidence, and interviews. And it is the first study of Japanese nationalism to do so.

But perhaps this study's greatest contribution is its broad overview of Japanese nationalism's birth, growth, upbringing, and changing character as one of many nationalisms in the world. In this
concluding chapter to this dissertation we will tie together the main points of our wide-ranging findings in the form of a chronological summary of *Generational Change in Japanese Nationalism*.

In the process of analysing Japanese nationalism from an international, interdisciplinary theoretical perspective we found strong, even striking, parallels between the pattern of nationalism's development in Japan and its pattern of development in other countries. For one instance, as in most countries of the world, ideological nationalism is only a modern phenomenon in Japan. But Japan's case is distinctive in that perhaps no other country in the world had the depth, intensity, and long unbroken history of the Japanese people's underlying nationalistic sentiment: the belief that they possessed a uniform and "unique" ethnic identity that made them distinct from all other peoples in some metaphysical sense. In addition to this fundamental associational sentiment, two other factors are notable for having had primary effects on the nature and course of subsequent Japanese nationalism. These are the distinctive Japanese social structure of the non-kin tribe and the Japanese dualist perception pattern. Taken together these three factors -- a core value, and one social and one philosophical shaping characteristic that channelled this value's expression -- can be considered to be the ancient and abiding "core" of Japanese nationalism.
The Core of Japanese Nationalism

The Belief in Japanese Uniqueness

The Japanese assertion of their metaphysical uniqueness and superiority to all other peoples is clearly apparent in the fourth century Yamato tribal myths' central emphasis on Japan's unique and original creation by the gods Izanami and Izanagi and the direct descent of the Japanese blood from these Japanese deities through the Grandson of Heaven and the Japanese imperial line -- even if, that is, the three sacred Japanese imperial regalia that were "brought down from heaven" by the first Japanese emperor were made by artisans trained in Sinic arts if not actually made in Korea and these Japanese superiority legends themselves were first written down in Chinese by imported Korean scribes some centuries later. Our thesis is that the gross anomalies between these early Japanese assertions of superiority and their behavior as borrowers of basic civilization were due to a psychological process of collective compensation through which Japanese seeking an independent identity within the Sinic world were forced to assert metaphysical values as grounds for ethnic pride because they obviously lacked the cultural and technological achievements on which to base their assertion of equality with China. This is a controversial and essentially unverifiable interpretation of the historical facts, but it has the respective advantages of normative neutrality and logical plausibility over the more common
and equally unverifiable theses that 1) these contradictions merely reveal Japanese tribalistic arrogance, or 2) that no contradictions exist at all. It should also be remembered that compensatory nationalist feelings are by no means uncommon among other nations of the world.

This assertion of Japanese uniqueness from, and thus metaphysical superiority to, the more culturally advanced Chinese and Korean peoples was the earliest and strongest element of Japanese nationalism which, more than anything else, can be considered to be the "core value" of all subsequent forms of Japanese nationalism -- at least up until the Second World War. The numerous "theories" of "Japanese uniqueness" which sprang up over the centuries as rationales for this feeling (and are still in vogue today) can be in plain terms debunked, as we have demonstrated in Chapter Three. But the Japanese belief in their metaphysical "uniqueness" that underlies these numerous theories is a fact of the greatest importance in understanding Japanese nationalism, for it was this unshakable native pride that allowed the Japanese people to swamp themselves with imported cultures and technologies, first Sinic then Western, and yet still retain their strong identity and heritage as a distinct and independent people.

But this "core value" of Japanese ethnic uniqueness did not predestine what form the Japanese nation would take. An early period
of centralized rule by the chief Yamato tribe gave way to the diffused power of regional collateral tribes; aristocratic imperial courts re-established at Nara and later Heian gave way to the vigorous military government of the Kamakura shoguns; and for seven centuries until the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867 Japan alternated between rule by feudal military dynasties and periods of civil war with the emperors reduced to the delicate captivity of ceremonial function and all but forgotten by the illiterate masses of the Japanese peasantry. It would be transparent simplicism to attempt to find any single factor that could explain this tremendous range of experience in the historical development of the Japanese nation, but it is simple, objective observation to note that two essential factors remained constantly present and influential throughout these great changing eras.

The Non-kin Tribe

The earliest Japanese developed a very persistent form of social organization. Whatever the fate of the Yamato tribes' overall political structure, the internal social structure of the Yamato tribe itself has remained the basis for all succeeding Japanese social groups and thus has had immeasurable influence upon the nature of Japanese nationalism. The Yamato uji in its developed stage was a hierarchical, paternalistic, non-kin tribe that rewarded the total loyalty, obedience, and mutual obligation of its members with the
guarantee of a secure social position and face-to-face rapport and emotional support found elsewhere only in family groups. This fundamental Japanese social structure was later embellished with the more sophisticated concepts of Chinese Confucianism, but the fact that the native Japanese tradition took precedence over the imported theory is demonstrated by the several otherwise inexplicable twists that the Confucian virtues have received in Japanese society (i.e. not one equal-to-equal relationship in Japan). The social ethics of this non-kin tribe have permeated Japanese society since its origin and formed the model on which the Japanese national family-state (kokka) and integral national body (kokutai) were eventually founded.

Dualist Perception Pattern

Below the undeniable level of salience of these two above-mentioned factors -- the Japanese belief in their uniqueness from all other peoples, and their social system of the non-kin tribe -- the elements that may have affected Japanese nationalism form ranks of diminishing influence. But one more factor is sufficiently important to be counted as a "core" characteristic of Japanese nationalism. This is the Japanese religious and philosophical pattern of dualist perception. Patterns of perception, of course, are less apparent and easily verified than basic beliefs and behaviors, but the Japanese pattern of dualist perception is observable behind many of the most perplexing paradoxes in the development of Japanese nationalism. To
repeat but one of the many examples we cited in this study: in what other culture in the world could seven centuries of generalissimos hold absolute power without once usurping the throne from their captive emperors? And in what other culture in the world could this fiction of shogunal rule "in the name of the emperor" continue unchallenged for seven centuries except for two attempts to restore real power to the throne? The historical era and the political structure of feudalism were basically the same in Japan and Europe when the Japanese nation behaved this way and the European nations quite another. There was no legal, political, or military force in Japan that could have stopped the shoguns from seizing formal power as well as their real power: we must therefore look to a difference in motive as the explanation for this unique record of behavior. And not far below the surface of the entirely unbelievable shogunal loyalty to the captive emperors we find the Japanese pattern of dualist perception: things are often not what they seem, the truth is usually hidden, everything -- and thus nothing -- is a contradiction anyway, and, besides, power held from behind a legitimate figurehead has that much more deterrence. As with the case of Japan's basic social system of the non-kin tribe, this dualist perception pattern was given form by the sophisticated conceptions of imported Zen Buddhism, but in view of Japan's amazing acceptance of Zen as compared to other religions one can do far more than speculate if Zen's success was not due considerably to its consonance with this pre-existing Japanese perception pattern.
Thus, stripped of all the significant details, our analysis of the history of Japanese nationalism up to its first enunciation as an explicit political ideology reveals three fundamental and enduring factors that made up the "core" of all later forms of Japanese nationalism. These factors were:

1. the "core value" of the compensatory assertion of Japanese uniqueness from, and thus superiority to, all foreign peoples -- regardless of material evidence.

2. the "core" characteristic of Japanese society's fundamental social structure -- the hierarchical, paternalistic, non-kin tribe. And

3. the "core" characteristic of Japanese philosophy and religion's dualist perception pattern.

These three factors, more than any others, formed the premodern basis of Japanese nationalism: the first defined the Japanese as an inviolable group, the second shaped their form of interrelation, and the third, to a lesser degree, accounted for many major perceptual paradoxes that marked the development of later Japanese nationalism.

The First Layer of Japanese Nationalism:

**The Political Religion**

As with the cases of many European nations, philosophers who tried to conceive some sort of post-feudal nationalism arose during the latter, decadent stages of Japanese feudalism. And they wrote at roughly the same periods as their European counterparts.
But while Montaigne wrote,

"Not because Socrates said so, but because it is in truth my own disposition -- and perchance to some excess -- I look upon all men as my compatriots, and embrace a Pole as a Frenchman, making less account of the national than of the universal and common bond."

Yamaga Soko wrote,

"In this realm, from the Age of Gods to the present day, the blood-line of Amaterasu, the true lineage, has never varied even for one generation. . . . Wisdom, Benevolence, and Courage are the three virtues of the sages. . . . Now, with regard to these virtues, if we compare this land with foreign lands, minutely noting each item of evidence, this country is far superior."

And while Montesquieu wrote,

"If I knew something that could serve my nation but would ruin another, I would not propose it to my prince, for I am first a man and only then a Frenchman . . . because I am necessarily a man, and only accidentally a Frenchman."

Aizawa Yasushi wrote

"our Divine Land is situated at the top of the earth. Thus . . . it reigns over all quarters of the world, for it has never once changed its dynasty or its form of sovereignty. . . . the Westerners, by committing errors and overstepping their bounds, are inviting their downfall . . . But unless great men appear who rally to the assistance of Heaven, the whole natural order will fall victim to the predatory barbarians."
The tempering influence of the European Enlightenment's liberal, cosmopolitan, humanism on the subsequent character of some European nationalisms was totally absent from the raw nativism that marked the origin of Japanese nationalism. While the nationalism of the French Revolution was born under the universalistic banner of the "Rights of Man," the nationalism of the Japanese Imperial Restoration in 1868 was born under the nativistic banner of "Revere the Emperor! Expel the Barbarians!"

One certainly could not claim that the practices of the Jacobin nationalism that emerged from the French Revolution were any more enlightened or humane than the practices of the Political Religion that emerged from the Meiji Restoration. Quite to the contrary, the total number of political victims slashed down by assassins' samurai swords in the 60 years that followed the Meiji Restoration was much smaller than the 1,400 heads that rolled off the guillotine in just 60 days of the Reign of Terror. And the policies that both of these new nationalist regimes put into practice were actually extremely similar: dispossessing the feudal aristocracy, conscripting a peasant army, modernizing landholding and taxation, encouraging industry, and instituting public education, to name a few.

But it is extremely important to note the tremendous differences between the philosophical foundations underlying these first modern nationalisms in their respective countries. In Hans Kohn's typology of
"Western" and "Eastern" nationalisms:

"in the early stage of nationalism in the West, the common standards of Western civilization, the survival of the Christian and Stoic traditions, the regard for the universally human, the faith in reason, one and the same everywhere, and in common sense, -- all these were too strong to allow nationalism to develop its full potential and to disrupt the society of man."

Kohn's "Eastern" nationalism, on the other hand, was the "messianic, chosen-people" tradition untempered by liberal, rationalistic humanism, and this form of nationalism was fated to the extremes of national tribalism only hinted by the passages emphasized in the preceding quotation. As the contrast between our quotes from the French philosophes and the Japanese sages have illustrated, the first Japanese nationalist ideology was a prime example of a xenophobic, emotive-religious arch-"Eastern"-type nationalism.

This religious nationalism, which was synthesized by scholars of the Latter Mito School in the period leading up to the Meiji Restoration, drew directly and powerfully from the traditional "core" values of Japanese nationalism. Exposed to the threat of Western trading ships backed up by warships with heavy cannon, the scholars' reflex was the millenial compensatory assertion of the Japanese divine origin myths and all the reassuring inferences that direct descent from the gods bestow. The young, forward-looking samurai who achieved the Meiji Restoration echoed this native
religious nationalism in their nation-building policies when they put into practice the ancient tribal political virtues of returning power to the emperor (although it was still largely symbolic) and strengthening central control of the nation in the form of an integral tribal body: kokutai. The nationalist doctrine that emerged from the Meiji Restoration was the fusion of these two forces into the Political Religion of kokutai and the emperor cult.

The emperor was the central figure of this first Japanese nationalist ideology. It was his uncontestably legitimate claim to the throne that allowed the daring young Satsuma and Choshu reformers to overthrow the moribund shogunate without committing the Confucian travesties of disloyalty and rank rebellion. It was the magic of the emperor's ancient line that linked these reformers' dreams of Japan's ancient glory to their hopes for its glorious future. The emperor was also the political key to overthrowing feudalism and re-integrating the nation because he was equally superior to all Japanese regardless of their former rank in the feudal chain of command. His return to the throne justified post-feudal national integration with the symbolism of Japan's ancient tribal society, except that this time all the nation would constitute one organic tribe.

The two aspects of the Meiji Restoration's nationalistic Political Religion deserve examination apart, for while each on its own has strong parallels with certain cases of European nationalism, the
particular combination of the Meiji Japanese political structure with the character of its religion gave a distinct cast to the subsequent form of Japanese nationalism. First, while the characters that played the roles in this new Japanese nationalism were uniquely Japanese, the basic political form of Meiji nationalism had strong similarities to that of the Burkean English nation-state. Carlton Hayes' summary of Burke's three roles in what he calls "Traditional" English nationalism could with one minor exception be applied directly to Meiji Japan: the Japanese emperor corresponding to the English crown, the Meiji government's State Shinto corresponding to the Church of England, and the new Meiji aristocracy of an elite business/bureaucratic class corresponding to the English aristocracy. Only the last of these parallels is somewhat weaker than the others, because the traditional landed Japanese aristocracy were paid off and dispossessed by government fiat while the character of the English aristocracy was gradually transformed by the economic forces of the industrial revolution. So the political form of Japan's nationalistic Political Religion was not extremely different from that of the traditional, monarchic/religious nationalism of a European state such as England -- the overwhelming difference lay in the content of the two states' religions.

The Meiji reformers were consummate realists, and when they saw the emperor Mutsuhito in 1868, they saw a 15-year-old boy. But they also saw his ancient, hereditary religious role as a tremendous
asset to Japanese nationalism. Partly from faith, partly from necessity, they decided to promote a political religion centering around the emperor as a means of mobilizing Japan. The purpose of the State Shinto religion that they created was explicitly to promote nationalism through reverence for the emperor and the imperial line; it was meant to replace the long-dominant Buddhist mysteries and Confucian reasoning — that were considered un-nationalistic because of their universalistic content — with a simple nationalistic cult. The reformers had experienced the power of the fanatical religious-political conviction that had brought them and their small bands of rural riflemen to the center of national power, and now, faced with the daunting tasks of building up a modern nation while defending it from foreign incursions, they strongly believed that a religious cult modeled on these convictions was needed to instruct and mobilize the masses. The emperor as both head-of-state and god-on-earth fit both their conceptions of a just order and a practical one (as they would remain in control from behind the scenes anyway — vis. dualism) and the benefits of indoctrinating the Japanese peasantry with this political religion seemed limitless. Thus, the policy of the Meiji reformers in establishing State Shinto can be seen as the deliberate linking of the ancestral Yamato tribal religion with the apparatus of the modern nation-state.

So while the form of the Japanese nationalistic political religion was similar to that to Traditional English nationalism, the differences
in the content of their respective religions gave the resulting nationalisms entirely different casts. The English crown was head of the national church but that church was still universalistic; the Japanese emperor was god-on-earth of the Yamato tribal religion. Hayes notes that "primitive tribalism was a small-scale nationalism," and that the most extreme and destructive latter European nationalisms were marked by a "revival of tribalism." The Meiji reformers' explicit revival of the Yamato tribal cult as the opponent of cosmopolitan Buddhism and Confucianism had a tremendous effect in setting Japan on a course towards "modern tribalism as a large-scale nationalism," which Hayes -- with reference to purely European cases -- predicts can lead to "vindictiveness against foreigners, to pride in and ambition for their own nation, to conquest, and eventually to new imperialism."^8

Japan's first nationalist ideology, the Political Religion of the kokutai/emperor cult, was therefore a perhaps-unique mixture of different elements of nationalism that occurred separately in Europe. And in the context of the nationalisms of the world, Japan's first nationalism was an unprecedentedly potent mixture of nationalistic elements. It merged the strength and legitimacy of ancient, conservative, Traditional nationalism with the mass-mobilizing, potentially radicalizing, fanatical tribalism of a popular political religion such as seen in the extreme stages of Jacobinism. The fact that the explosive consequences of this mixture did not emerge until
decades later was not due to its lack of explosive potential; it was
due to the initial presence of three fundamental inhibiting factors:
1., the unreconciled contradiction between preaching nativism while
practicing modernization on foreign lines, 2., the lack of propaganda
mechanisms sufficiently powerful to rapidly inculcate the new
political religion's doctrines, and 3., the lack of military power to
inflict major harm overseas.

The Second Layer of Japanese Nationalism:

The Modernizing Ideology

The Meiji elites had initially hoped that replacing the
ineffectual shogunate with an imperial administration staffed by
loyalists (such as themselves) could in itself improve the organization
of Japanese coastal defenses enough to repel the foreigners. But it
did not take many lessons for them to learn the extent of pre-modern
Japan's military weakness while the peril of colonization by the
foreigners loomed ever larger. In the end these factors forced them to
reach the painful conclusion that Western technology had to be
imported to defend Japan against the Westerners. But technology
without science is an unreliable tool, and so Western science was
imported, then Western philosophy to understand science . . . and
so-forth until anything Western came to be imported too. Every
Western process from handicrafts to statecraft was studied in great
earnestness: the Meiji elites themselves mastered everything from

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international finance to railway transportation while introducing
dairy agriculture and building modern coal mines and warships -- it
was more than enough Westernization to mature the elites well beyond
their years, and too much Westernization, it emerged, for many
Japanese to accept. In 1887 the perennial nativist reaction to
excessive foreign influence recurred, and a reckoning was reached on
a middle course to modernization between isolationist nativism and
indiscriminant Westernization. This doctrine was summarized by
Fukuzawa Yukichi's popularization of Sakuma Shozan's slogan "Our
Spirit! Western Science!" and it was the basis of Japan's nationalist
modernizing ideology.

Just as the Political Religion had drawn upon certain elements
in the "core" of Japanese nationalism and adapted them to meet the
pragmatic requirements of the young reformists in the Meiji
Restoration, so the Modernizing Ideology of the Meiji Oligarchs (whom
the young reformists had become) drew upon elements from both the
"core" and the "layer" of Political Religion to create a new "layer" of
Japanese nationalism. Here again the role of the emperor was
paramount. As in the "core" and the "layer" of the political religion,
the person of the emperor in the modernizing ideology symbolized the
spiritual and racial continuity of the Japanese state from time
immemorial, as well as the organic unity of the newly integrated
nation. His infallible wisdom and will as the temporal and spiritual
ruler of Japan made moot the contradiction of building a modern,
industrial, parliamentary nation staffed by the sons of heaven and their god on earth. And for 60 years this ideology justified and commanded public acceptance of the wrenching dislocations that destroyed centuries of feudal stability but were necessary to mobilize the Japanese masses for industrialization and warding off foreign encroachment.

This role of the Emperor was not new at all; it was exactly what had been envisioned in the Meiji reformers' political religion. What was different about its emergence in the modernizing ideology was that this time its mass inculcation worked. The religious aspects of the political religion had started with highest priority in the early days of the Restoration: the first and supreme organ of government the Meiji reformers created was the Jingikan or office of State Shinto. Yet their attempts to inculcate this religion on a mass basis had failed repeatedly due to a lack of modern propaganda mechanisms. Now, in the 1880's, the establishment of public education gave them the means to accomplish what they had failed to do before. The political religion of the kokutai/emperor cult was inculcated to the masses through public education to support of the rulers' modernizing ideology, and the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 were both the prime content and symbol of this development.
Whether it is viewed in pragmatic political terms or the broader terms of political philosophy, the middle-Meiji's modernizing ideology was a curious mixture of policies. On one hand it instilled a traditional, nativistic political religion in the masses, and on the other hand it modernized them along Western economic and political lines. Observers' judgements of this ideology's merits are frequently determined by which of these two perspectives they use, so let us instead examine this issue from both the pragmatic and philosophical political perspectives in order to attempt to grasp its internal contradictions and the blessing and curse it produced.

First, the examination of the pragmatic political context in which this nationalist ideological mixture was formed shows that its creation was a highly skillful and successful political strategy, which, far from being quaintly Japanese, has later been unknowingly copied by numerous nationalist regimes in young, developing African and Asian nations. In the push and pull of actual politics a policy may start as the expression of an abstract ideal, but it usually becomes a compromise between groups with different ideals and is then subjected to all kinds of unexpected or unintended pragmatic modifications before it is carried out. In this context of day-to-day politics, which is so easily lost in historical accounts, the Meiji elites accomplished several of their long-held objectives through what could be viewed as a masterful ruse of a compromise. They had long wanted to, and had often tried to, inculcate their political religion
on a mass basis. Now the reviving nativist criticism of excessive Westernization could be channelled towards accomplishing this long-held objective while modernization on Western lines could proceed apace with its nativist critics diverted to promoting the political religion. In practical political logic this policy was not a contradiction at all, but merely diverting opponents' criticism to one's further advantage. In this way, the contradiction between the two aspects of the modernizing ideology can be seen as resulting from a sophisticated, pragmatic strategy on the part of Ito Hirobumi to strengthen the Meiji oligarchs' political position and buttress their modernizing policy in the very name of the traditional native political religion it was thought to oppose.

The fact that this modernizing ideology of the Meiji elites was a rational, pragmatic response to the objective political needs of their nationalist regime at that stage of economic development is choicely illustrated by its unwitting repetition in many young African and Asian nations. While we have compared the elements of Japan's political religion to those of some early European nationalisms on the basis of their similar lengths of political history, we must never forget that in economic terms Japan in the 1880's was very much a technologically dependent, developing nation such as many young nations in the world today. As David Apter concludes from his study of Ghana and other young African nations, "States with autocracy, monolithic structure, and community imperatives are not wholly
different (from other developing countries). All face the same need to create, fit, adjust, and integrate new role systems. But in the case of autocratic nationalist regimes, "authority needs to replace older belief about forms of allegiance. New political forms are developed that have the effect of providing for the continuity, meaning, and purpose of an individual's actions. The result is a political doctrine that is in effect a political religion." Japan's modernization required new role systems to motivate traditional, rural peasants to become modern, urban industrial workers; and the continuity, meaning, and sense of purpose that these Japanese workers needed in order to make the shocking transition to their modern economic roles was provided by the comforting traditional symbols of the native political religion. The Meiji Japanese political solution to this objective and universal problem of nation-building was thus practically identical to that adopted by many African and Asian developing nations in the 1960's. But here again, the content of the Japanese political religion was different. While the twentieth century developing nations used secular-based political religions such as pan-cultural concepts of "Negritude" or Marxist/indigenous hybrid "socialisms," nineteenth century Japan used a true tribal religion as its base.

As with many young nationalist movements that are still developing their yore, the Meiji elites used the propaganda tactic of projection on the past. They made purely pragmatic decisions of what
form Japanese nationalist ideology would take, then they projected this ideology back onto the past as if it had been the unbroken order of the centuries. The imperial line in the Meiji Constitution and Rescript on Education, we can recall, had ruled for "10,000 generations," even though it had recently required restoration to the throne by insurrectionary force. This technique of projecting nationalist ideology onto the past is found in most nations -- how many generations of German, Jewish, Italian, and Polish immigrants to America had their children taught in school that their ancestors were Pilgrims? But the Meiji "history" was so thoroughly installed in Japanese public school textbooks that its images are still accepted without question by the overwhelming majority of Japanese.

So much can be said from the pragmatic political perspective to explain the objective, underlying necessities and the statesmanlike solutions that resulted in the mixture of the modernizing ideology that it is easy for some to overlook the nature and eventual consequences of the philosophical contradictions that were nonetheless inherent in this ideology. The fundamental contradiction of this nativistic modernizing ideology -- that Japan was simultaneously a divinely superior, racially unique nation, and at the same time a full member of the modern international order -- was to fester for 60 years as an impediment to the Japanese nation's broad-based acceptance of either itself or the outside world in objective terms.

This philosophical combination of the modern state mechanism
with the primitive tribal will that was attempted in Japan's modernizing ideology was also attempted in the Integral nationalisms of Mussolini and Hitler. But the tremendous depth and strength of Japan's tribal myths, as opposed to Mussolini's and Hitler's short-order concoctions of their respective "master races," has made the fundamental philosophical choice between Japan's unique "national way" or the modern "way of the world" a question that still casts its shadow in Japan -- even now, 40 years after the Second World War. In issue after issue of the ongoing battle to bring Japan's market access standards closer to those of the industrialized world, the Japanese official forced to deal with the foreigners demanding reciprocal market access gives a shocked, then bewildered, then finally defensive reaction that reduces to "your demands are not the Japanese way," and a Japanese Prime Minister attributes Japan's "superior intelligence" to the unified Japanese race.

Thus, a pragmatic political solution to the universal problems of nation-building and modernization resulted in Japan's adoption of a nationalistic modernizing ideology that embodied an philosophical contradiction -- a contradiction that was to lead to the eventual self-destruction of more than one nationalist regime in the world. And here again it was the distinctly Japanese content that the Meiji leaders put into the universal form of nationalist modernizing ideologies that accounted both for the later Japanese Integral nationalism's soaring rise and for its crashing fall. The distinctive
content on which Japan's modernizing ideology drew as the "layer" of the nationalist political religion underlying it, just as that political religion, in turn, had been drawn directly from the millenial "core" of the Japanese tradition.

Traditional Japanese Nationalism

The development of Japanese nationalism, then, from its earliest beginnings in Yamato tribal myth to its shaping by Japanese culture and philosophy, from its first enunciation as a nativist political religion in the Imperial Restoration to its more stable formulation in the modernizing ideology of the middle-Meiji period, can be seen as a cumulative, almost organic, process. Its "core" characteristics of the belief in Japanese uniqueness, the non-kin social tribe, and dualist perception that had persisted for at least fourteen centuries were adapted and carried on in the succeeding "layers" of ideological Japanese nationalism: the political religion of the kokutai/emperor cult and the modernizing ideology of "Eastern ethics. Western science." While the outward forms of this Japanese nationalism often match those of other nationalisms in other countries, what has distinguished Japanese nationalism is the distinctive content it has placed in these forms -- its emperor of divine descent and unbroken lineage in the role of the crown, its Yamato tribal religion of Shinto in the role of a universal church, and its political religion based on these ancient core concepts in the role of a modernizing ideology.
When analyzed case by case, the formulations of the Meiji oligarchs that produced Japan's political religion and modernizing ideology are revealed to be masterful examples of pragmatic nationalistic government. But in the deeper historical and broader international perspectives, it is the amazing consistency and internal consonance between the parts of this Japanese nationalism that is revealed. This entire multi-layered complex of nationalistic values is what we refer to as "traditional Japanese nationalism."

This tremendous continuity of the development of traditional Japanese nationalism has a very strong bearing on the debate concerning the causes of Japanese ultranationalism and the origins of the War in the Pacific. And its strongest inference is that Japanese ultranationalism was not some foreign philosophy that "hijacked" healthy, democratic, Japanese nationalism, nor some inevitable dialectical consequence of world-wide finance capital, but, rather, that it was the logical if extreme outgrowth of the basic nature of traditional Japanese nationalism itself.

It is easy to cite the technical weaknesses of the Japanese Constitution of 1889 -- primarily its failure to establish the principle of civilian control of the military and its establishment of unchecked powers for those "speaking for" the emperor -- as the factors that allowed the Imperial Army to eventually take control of the government. But in the broader debate of what causes led to Japanese
militarism, the weaknesses of the fundamental concepts of political philosophy underlying this document must also be taken into consideration. If the struggle that led to Japanese militarism was between Japanese democratic forces and Japanese ultranationalistic forces, it is important to inspect on which side of the balance the monolithic weight of traditional Japanese nationalism fell.

The Japanese Constitution of 1889, like the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, was "handed down" from the emperor to the Japanese people. Both of these documents not only enshrined the emperor but were significantly directed towards enhancing the prestige of the imperial institution. The Constitution "granted" the Japanese people some rights, but its thrust was far from democratic. It was an outgrowth not of the Japanese democratic movement but a limited concession made to it by the authoritarian Meiji oligarchy. This document itself made concessions to the form of democracy, but it was based on the traditional, un-democratic Japanese values of centralized, hierarchical, paternalistic control on one side, and docile loyalty and obedience on the other. The fundamental values on which democracy is based -- respect for freedom and individual rights -- were not the fundamental values of Japanese society or the Japanese nation.
Given this context it is surprising that the liberal political parties made such great headway in gaining democratic political power -- indeed, it surprised Ito Hirobumi, who had calculated otherwise, a great deal that they did. But given this context it is not surprising that when domestic economic and social conditions failed to improve evenly, when public faith in democracy was weakened by the liberal political parties' corruption and lack of concern for ordinary citizens, and when conflict with other nations aggravated -- that a group stressing one more return to the millenial nativistic principles of traditional Japanese nationalism should succeed in gaining power.

Herein lies the fundamental difference between the origin of Japanese ultranationalism and European Fascism: Fascism differed in quality from its countries' pre-existing nationalisms; Japanese ultranationalism, only in degree. Italy and Germany had had the experience of a more humane Liberal nationalism which Fascism and Nazism overthrew: Japan had only had the experience of its nativistic traditional nationalism which ultranationalism claimed to defend, not overthrow at all. Mussolini wrote that Fascism had, "stepped over the more-or-less putrescent corpse of the goddess of liberty, and, if necessary, would turn and step over it again," but the gods of Japan only gave their blessing to the Japanese ultranationalist's crushing of Japanese democracy and the Japanese militarists' attempt to conquer Asia.
Thus Fascism can be seen as a virus or a plague, a foreign corruptive substance that overcame the weakened defenses of the German and Italian bodies politic; but Japanese ultranationalism was the product of the Japanese body politic itself. It was the uncontrolled growth, the carrying to the logical extreme, of that body's very own highest principles -- the myth of native Japanese uniqueness and superiority, the hierarchical, authoritarian group, and the dualist perception (that in Kokutai no hongi could make war of aggression "peace" and suicide "true life") -- that grew without limit until it destroyed the Japanese body politic itself. Japanese ultranationalism was thus not an alien virus: it was a cancer of the body itself.

Postwar Japanese Nationalism

The depths of ultranationalism's roots in the Japanese tradition can be seen in the degree of punishment that Imperial Japan absorbed in the Second World War before it would abandon this fatal ideology. The destruction of Imperial Japan had finished and the systematic nuclear annihilation of Japanese population centers had begun before the emperor Hirohito was able to sway the will of the militarist leaders and call on the Japanese people to "bear the unbearable" and accept surrender to superior force.
The massive revulsion of the Japanese people who had suffered and survived the War against the ultranationalist regime that led them into it, combined with the radical reforms of the allied Occupation, destroyed the basis of ultranationalism within months of Japan's surrender. But did this process also destroy Japanese nationalism altogether? Nationalism did survive, as Japan's miraculous economic recovery indicated, but what form did it take? Specifically, what elements of traditional Japanese nationalism still receive strong public support in the postwar years and what elements of it have weakened? Finally, what differences are there between the attitudes towards nationalism of Japanese from before and after the War? These are the questions we asked in Part Two of the thesis.

Quantitative Cohort Analysis of Postwar Survey Data

While our analysis of traditional Japanese nationalism from prehistory to the Second World War relied on historical evidence, our study of the postwar years was able to use highly reliable survey data. The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (Tokei Suri Kenkyujyo or TS) of the Ministry of Education has conducted a strict 30-year longitudinal poll using the very large sample size of over 5,000 randomly-selected respondents. The Nihon Hoso Kyoku (NHK) has also conducted a large-scale longitudinal survey, although it only covers a 10-year period. Between these two data bases we have covered the only existing Japanese longitudinal surveys with data on nationalism.
This study's general hypothesis was that: "The experiential generation model is more powerful than the maturation model in explaining the age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism." This research hypothesis was based directly on the body of socialization theory drawn from the work of Karl Mannheim which argues that youthful experience determines adult attitudes. The hypothesis against which we tested this model is the maturation model, drawn from the work of Eisenstadt and others, which argues that age determines attitudes. As Samuels has pointed out, the experiential model assumes minimal individual change over their lifetimes and maximal social change, while the maturation model assumes maximal individual change and relatively less change in overall social attitudes.

Our first step in testing this hypothesis was to define our concepts. Following Johnson and Niemi, we operationally defined the six possible patterns of longitudinal attitude change: maturation, maturation/period, experiential, experiential/period, simple period, and simple continuity. Then we examined the TS data base and found that its characteristics precluded the use of indexing for segmentation. Thus, in accordance with the assumptions of the experiential model, we first defined the periods of most likely mass socializing experiences in postwar Japan from historical and interview data, then statistically tested the long-term response patterns of age-groups socialized during these periods for experiential or
maturational effects. These periods were, in decreasing order of intensity, the War, the era of Rapid Economic Growth, and the Affluent era.

We first defined the specific Null Hypothesis that the statistical tests would attempt to refute. This was framed against the experiential model (thus for the maturation model) and it was

Even if different age-groups undergo different mass socializing experiences in their youth,

No statistically significant differences between their long-term response patterns to survey questions on nationalism will occur.

While the dependent variable of this study could be rigorously tested with statistical tests against the 30-year survey data base, the independent variable had to be tested against deeper evidence. The validation of the a mass socializing experience -- the very causal mechanism of Mannheim's experiential model -- requires the systematic subjective evidence of members of an experiential generation that their political attitudes were formed by this experience, and that they hold a resulting generational identity of "us" versus "them." Without the validation of this causal mechanism, the mass socializing experience, this study would be analysing the statistical variations in response patterns of Japanese age-groups pulled from a hat. In-depth interviews with Japanese from each of the
hypothetical generations concerning their personal formative experiences and life-long attitudes, and secondary source data on the widespread diffusion of the social, economic, and political conditions that formed these individuals' attitudes was required to test this independent variable.

A series of in-depth interviews with members of a structured panel of Japanese respondents from each of the cohorts who had experienced their youth in these respective eras found that each of the respondents from each age-group had a distinct memory of the common formative experience of the era of their youth as well as a strong consciousness of common identity with other people of their age who had gone through the same experience. This and the data on the widespread effect of the basic economic and socio-political conditions which they cited as their formative experiences validated the independent variable of the null hypothesis.

To conduct this quantitative analysis we first gathered the survey responses from their various sources and cross-tabulated them not by the year of survey and the respondents' present age (as the previously published Japanese analyses had done) but by the year of survey and the year of birth, thus allowing us to easily trace the cohorts' varying response patterns over the course of the 30-year longitudinal survey. Following this, we calculated generational mean

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levels of support for the attitude measured by each question, as well as simple least-squares regressions of the trends in generational response patterns using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software package. We used F and R tests to determine the significance and explanatory power of the regressions, and T tests, where appropriate, on the statistical significance of the differences between the responses of the various generations to each question. In these T tests we required the very high level of statistical confidence of \( p = 0.025 \) to reject the null hypothesis that there were no experiential differences and thus to make the firm conclusions that significant experiential differences do exist.

**The Findings**

The two principal findings of our statistical analysis were that the 30-year longitudinal survey data on postwar Japanese nationalism support both our research hypothesis and our model of Japanese nationalism to a very high degree of statistical confidence.

Statistical analysis of these hypothetical experiential generation's long-term response patterns to the survey questions on Japanese nationalism revealed that these experientially-classified groups did indeed have attitudes that were significantly different from those of other groups at the \( p = 0.025 \) level of statistical confidence on 12 out of the 16 response patterns analysed. This finding gave empirical evidence refuting the null hypothesis, and
thus confirming this study's general hypothesis that the experiential effect is more powerful than the maturation effect in explaining the variance in age-based response patterns to questions of Japanese nationalism.

Further data and analysis will be needed before it can be concluded whether this study's segmentation is 1) the best possible segmentation of experiential generations, or 2) an indication of more generalized "political generations" in postwar Japan. However, this study was the first to empirically test and demonstrate that such experiential generations are evident in Japanese survey data on questions of nationalism.

In specific terms, the findings revealed only 2 questions showing a maturation effect while 10 questions showed experiential effects out of the total of 16 questions analysed. Of the remaining 4 questions, 3 questions showed pure period effects and 1 question showed simple continuity. Thus, by the overwhelming margin of ten to two, our study has demonstrated that experiential effects are more powerful than maturation effects in explaining the age-based differences in postwar Japanese attitudes towards nationalism.

An interesting related finding was that a surprising number of Japanese response patterns revealed strong period effects. In addition to the 3 cases of pure period effects mentioned above, there were 4
cases of combined experiential/period effects and 2 cases of combined maturation/period effects, making a total of 9 out of 16 questions in which period effects were evident. The important inference of this finding is that postwar Japanese public opinion on nationalism is quite malleable. On many questions even the oldest generation is even changing its views towards those of the youngest generation -- a "reverse maturation" or "keeping up with the times" effect.

Concerning our model of Japanese nationalism developed in Part One, the findings of our empirical analysis tend to support this thesis' model of Japanese nationalism to a very high degree. In fact, it is only through the classification of these questions according to the stages of traditional Japanese nationalism's development that the mixed patterns of changing responses were sorted out to reveal this thesis' clear picture of the fundamental changes in postwar Japanese nationalism.

Our findings on questions relating to the Modernizing Ideology show that the feeling that Japanese need to "catch up" to the West (Japanese inferior to Westerners) is low and declining steadily in all generations through a pure period effect. Support for the Modernizing Ideology's key element of national collectivism -- working together to build up Japan -- is declining by a experiential effect. We found the diligent, industrious values of the Japanese work ethic declining in all groups with an experiential/period effect. And, finally, a
question diametrically opposed to the values of the modernizing ideology "Want to live according to my own tastes without regard for honor or money," shows a strong increase with an experiential effect. Thus, postwar Japanese public opinion shows strongly declining support for every element relating to the "layer" of the modernizing ideology, both by period and by experiential effects.

Our findings on the questions relating to the layer of the Political Religion likewise reveal strong overall declines. Japanese belief in their "superiority to Westerners" is rising with a pure period effect, but all of the other evidence in our study indicates that this attitude is more likely due to a deeper "core" value of the uniqueness myth than to due to a reviving political religion. Second, public support for a Prime Minister's official worship at the Imperial Shrine at Ise shows a strong overall decline in every generation, with a marked experiential effect. Third, belief in any religion, including Shinto, is relatively constant at quite low levels but is particularly lower among the youth in a pure experiential effect. Fourth, the traditional practice related to the concept of the family-state of adopting in order to maintain the family line shows a strong decline both by experiential and by period effects. Finally, and most significantly of all, respect for the emperor, defined broadly to include both "respect" and "have positive feelings towards", shows an extremely sharp decline with a strong experiential effect. Thus, postwar Japanese public opinion shows
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If postwar support for these basic elements of both of the "layers" of traditional Japanese nationalism has weakened so dramatically, what has happened to support for the traditional "core" of Japanese nationalism? The practice of yielding to group custom even if the individual feels right in opposing it is rising in postwar Japan, with a clear maturation effect bringing the younger generations up towards the higher level of the older generation, and all generations, including the older generation, increasing their support for this traditional concept over time. Second, belief that ongaeshi, the traditional ethic of indebtedness and repaying obligation in hierarchical relationships is also rising strongly in postwar Japan by maturation and period effects. Third, "respect for freedom," never a traditional Japanese "core" social value, is steadily declining in postwar Japan through a experiential/period effect. Fourth, preference for a paternalistic boss has remained extremely high at over 80 percent in every generation throughout the survey yet even still is managing to rise into the low 90 percent support levels in a pure period effect. Finally, the traditional Japanese social trait of greater loyalty to the non-kin group (i.e. company) than to the family is at high levels in the 70 percent range and shows simple continuity: no differences between generations and no change in the strong support. Thus in dramatic contrast to the declining postwar support for the "layers" of traditional Japanese nationalism, postwar Japanese public opinion is maintaining or is actually increasing its levels of support for the elements of the "core"
social system underlying traditional Japanese nationalism.

These changes were particularly pronounced in the cases of the middle-aged and younger generations of postwar-born Japanese. The Rapid Economic Growth and Affluent generations of Japanese, who will be coming into political power in the near future, show the greatest rejection of the Meiji symbols of Traditional Japanese Nationalism and, at the same time, the greatest and fastest rising support for the ancient core values of tribalistic Japanese nationalism. They are beginning to experience a surge of as-yet-shapeless nationalistic sentiments, and tremendous consequences hang on their choice of new concepts to define the expression of these nationalistic feelings.

In conclusion to our quantitative analysis, then, we can state with extremely high statistical confidence that:

1. experientially-formed generations do exist in postwar Japan and the distinct differences between their life-long generational attitudes account for far more of the changes in Japanese attitudes towards nationalism than the effects of maturation.
2. Japanese public support for both of the "layers" of traditional Japanese nationalism -- the modernizing ideology of the collective collective work ethic, and the political religion of kokutai and the emperor cult -- has declined dramatically in the postwar years to the point where these "layers" of traditional Japanese nationalism can be considered to no longer have significant public support among the middle-aged and younger generations that comprise the majority of Japan's population.

3. However, the "core" values of traditional Japanese nationalism are alive and strong and growing stronger among all generations of postwar Japanese. While rejecting the forms of nationalism inherited from before the War, Japanese today of every generations have lost none of their "Japanese-ness."

In addition to these original findings on substantive questions of Japanese nationalism, this thesis demonstrated that Western theories of nationalism are indeed applicable to the non-Western case of Japanese nationalism, and its basic method of analysis may well be applicable to the study of other non-Western nationalisms. This thesis' author was born, reared, and lives in Japan and is not unacquainted with Japanese society. This thesis thus studies the distinctive features of Japanese nationalism in some depth, treating
all the major points on which the Japanese feel they are fundamentally different from other peoples as well as several original points on which the author feels the Japanese people and nation are different. Yet this thesis challenges from its beginning to end the notion of Japanese uniqueness. And it demonstrates, time and again, how theoretical models of nationalism developed by Western scholars from predominately Western case materials are validly and fruitfully applicable to the analysis of Japanese nationalism.

The diffusionist theories of nationalism (notably Lerner's), which hold nationalism to be a Western phenomenon that diffused to all the East, were revealed to possess an element of ethnocentrism by the case of Japanese nationalism, which is an Eastern nationalism with markedly non-Western indigenous origins. But Lerner's specific model -- of atavistic nationalism as a by-product of the transitional stage in modernization through media exposure -- fits some aspects of the development of Japanese nationalism like a glove. And a similar conclusion can be drawn concerning many of the Western models of nationalism used in this study. On the whole, the specific aspects of the models -- their various causal mechanisms of nationalism -- were found to be much more applicable to the analysis of Japanese nationalism than the general aspects of these models -- their theories concerning nationalism as a global phenomenon. The exceptions to this pattern were the works of Karl Deutsch and Lucian Pye, whose treatments of the sociological motives and means of nationalist
movements possessed much more universality, and Carlton Hayes, who described different types of nationalism and did not deal with causal mechanisms at all. This thesis therefore used these more universal theories of nationalism as the basis of a simple theoretical framework under which the more specific models were arranged.

This method yielded two important advantages in the analysis of the distinctively non-Western case of Japanese nationalism. First, it cut through the cultural-relativist conundrum that speaking of Western theory and Eastern evidence never the twain shall meet, by successfully conducting precisely such a syncretic analysis. Second, it was able to pursue this analysis with fidelity to both the distinctive aspects of the Japanese case and the universal aspects of the Western theories by filtering out the ethnocentric elements of some of the Western models while retaining their valuable substantive and theoretical contributions. This analysis revealed the overwhelming similarities between the processes by which various forms of Japanese and Western nationalisms originated and aids the case of Japanese nationalism to the body of data supporting the social scientific view of nationalism as a universal social and political phenomenon. If this method revealed such universalities in the isolated and somewhat peculiar case of Japanese nationalism, it might be expected to reveal even more universal aspects in the nationalisms of less isolated non-Western nations such as those that underwent Western colonialization.
CONCLUSION

The postwar data on nationalism reveals nothing less than the most recent and ephemeral manifestation of Japan's millennial national development. From the core of a tribal myth of racial superiority, a close-working group structure, and a flexible, adaptable pattern of thought, the Japanese people have built up a global superstate that for the first time has factual accomplishments to substitute for its ancient myths as the basis of its national pride. We believe that the future of Japanese nationalism, and thus of its fate in the world, will be decided within the forthcoming years through its choice between these current facts of excellence or the ancient myth of superiority as the basis for its national confidence and a new form of Japanese nationalism.

Nationalism is a potent drug of which the benefits can be great and the side-effects catastrophic; and the leaders of modern Japan administered nationalism on a massive scale. Because Japan's premodern potential for national mobilization was exceptionally (although not uniquely) strong, the early formulations of Japanese nationalism were extremely successful. A political religion of revering the emperor as head of the "national body" swept a zealous band of loyalist country boys to triumph over the world's largest and longest-lasting late-feudal regime. A modernizing ideology that fused these ancient nativistic motives with modern Western means swept
Japan from its peaceful feudal backwater into the turbulent currents of the global struggle for power as a major industrial and military force. But then the side-effect of the miracle drug emerged: its dosage had been overcalculated, or its formulation flawed. Fooled by the self-flattery that its new power was proof that its tribal myths were true, Japan plunged into a war of racial aggression which it could only hope to lose. Then, purged of its hubris at a terrible price, Japan recovered through forty years of postwar peace, democracy, and industry to a status of nationhood envied around the world.

Postwar Japan has achieved and exceeded every peaceful ambition of its modernizing leaders while giving up the forms of nationalism they used. With both the passage of time and the change of generations, the Japanese people have come to reject the elements of nationalism with which the layers of the political religion and the modernizing ideology were formed over the ancient core of Japanese nationalism. The prewar virtues of diligent, self-sacrificing effort for the all-embracing nation, of belief in religion, maintaining family lines, supporting state worship by the head of government, and even simple respect for the emperor have all decreased to small minority views in postwar Japanese public opinion. If this is Japanese nationalism, then those who bemoan its passing away are correct in fearing its demise.
But Japanese nationalism is more than these pragmatic political formulations of the Meiji-era leaders; it has deeper and more powerful roots in the millennial common life of the Japanese people. And support for this millennial core of Japanese nationalism is rising dramatically in postwar Japan. With both the passage of time and with the maturing of younger generations, the Japanese people have come increasingly to support the traditional Japanese virtues of subordinating individual views to group custom, and respecting the ethics of obligation over freedom, in hierarchical, paternalistic, non-family groups. Support for these ancient Japanese social values, as for the ancient Japanese nationalistic belief that they are an exceedingly superior people, has risen to levels ranging from strong pluralities to near-total majorities in postwar Japanese public opinion. This is Japanese nationalism today, and it is alive and strong and growing rapidly.

So Japanese nationalism is neither expiring, as feared by some Japanese rightists; nor is Japanese ultranationalism reviving, as feared by some Japanese leftists. The right does have a legitimate fear, in comparing Japan with other countries, that Japan without a modern nationalism will not be able to accept its responsibilities as a global superpower. And it can cite the shockingly low statistic that only 57 percent of the Japanese people currently believe that Japan is a first-class nation. The left also has a legitimate fear, in comparing Japan's current practice of government with that of the liberal party
governments of the Taisho era, that Japan without a healthy respect for responsive, representative democracy and Constitutional safeguards might not be able to withstand the pressures of international trade and military conflict without attempting the authoritarian, military road to superpower status . . . again. And the left, for its part, can cite the shockingly low statistic that only 38 percent of the Japanese people currently "respect freedom" as "an important ethic," as well as the disturbingly high statistic that 76 percent of the Japanese people currently feel that the people's hopes and opinions are reflected "only slightly or not at all" by the current Japanese democratic government. Thus, while the Japanese people's nationalistic sentiments are rising strongly, the Japanese are searching for a new and historically untainted form of nationalism through which to express their fully-merited national pride.

Yet a still deeper division lies beneath this Japanese political dichotomy of left and right, and this is the millennial division between the inward-looking and outward-looking philosophies of Japan's fundamental nature. Is Japan essentially a nation unique -- a modern-day land of the gods -- and thus set apart from and above all other nations of the world? Or is it but one nation among many on earth and thus able to take its place of honor among them? This not a choice between political orientations: neither left nor right has a monopoly on nativism or internationalism in Japan (the Japan Communist Party has heaped the most abuse on the Liberal Democratic
Party for taking steps to reduce protectionism and open Japanese markets to the world). The choice, rather, is between basic universal types of nationalism: a cosmopolitan nationalism leading to full partnership in the world community, or a tribalistic nationalism leading to isolation, ostracism, and eventual destruction. The fundamental question of how to define a new Japanese nationalism reduces to a choice of which of these two grounds to cite as its basis: Japan's putatively "unique" racial and spiritual heritage, or Japan's truly unique success in rapidly becoming a modern, democratic, economic superpower.

Unfortunately for Japan, it can no longer have it both ways. The world can sense the difference between these two fundamental attitudes, for it can tell pride from arrogance. And the world is no longer willing to tolerate the sometimes naive, sometimes cynical Japanese double standard that Japan is both a full-fledged member of the community of nations and yet still entitled to special concessions because it is also a "unique" nation. But, more importantly, the Japanese people themselves can also sense the difference between these contradictory attitudes. They know that Japan's prewar nationalism was based on a myth of racial superiority, and the memory of where that tribal nationalism led them still inhibits them from accepting the untainted, temperate nationalism they desire.
This question may be the most significant question Japan has faced in its postwar half-century. It is the question of whether the Japanese people are finally confident enough in their truly great accomplishments to give up their millennial compensatory myth of racial uniqueness and superiority, admit their commonality with other peoples, and accept the place of honor in the community of nations which their tremendous achievement has already earned. This may be no easy task for the older generation who associate their love of country with the old Japan of their youth, but it is an easy, natural, and yes, inevitable step for the middle-aged and younger generations of Japanese born after the War. What they love with greater ardor than the older generation is the new Japan of their youth.

The question of a new Japanese nationalism, then, is merely the question of when and what form; and this will be answered through politics. The forces in favor of the old Meiji symbols -- the emperor and State Shinto -- will doubtless keep attempting to revive these symbols through inch-by-inch offensives on subsidiary issues such as producing revisionist history textbooks and enforcing the singing of Kimigayo in schools. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's appointment of the notoriously opinionated revisionist Fujio Masayuki as Minister of Education seems to have been clearly directed towards this end. But not only are these tactics counterproductive in that they provoke far more anti-nationalist protest at home and abroad than their token gains are worth -- consider the firing of Minister of Education Fujio
Masayuki and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's own humiliating apology to the American people due to their unguarded statements about racial superiority -- the whole strategy of attempting to revive the traditional ideological nationalism despite its popular demise also has scant chance of success because it is grounded on the highly dubious assumption that the affluent, cosmopolitan, media-conscious youth of the Japanese 1990's will be as easy to indoctrinate in public schools as were the shaved-head farm boys of the Japanese 1930's. Any residual doubt that traditional Japanese nationalism is doomed would need empirical evidence more compelling than that presented in this dissertation to make a claim to credibility.

Yet the converse is starker still: the Japanese forces opposed to rising nationalism have even smaller chances of success. As support for the old Meiji nationalistic symbols drop, so does the salience of protesting against them; and public apathy is the very nemesis of protest movements. The Japanese public has fallen away from traditional Japanese nationalism, and its reviving pride is now directing it towards some new and most probably innocuous form of nationalism. But the anti-nationalist forces are too paralysed by fear of the past to celebrate this present victory or to offer a positive option for an inoffensive cosmopolitan Japanese nationalism of the future. In this sense they are gravely out of step with the phase of growing ethnic pride and economic confidence among the great majority of Japanese. Unless these anti-traditionalist groups can
break out of their ethos of negativism, their chances of succeeding at anything more than fighting endless last-ditch stands against the Kimgayo forces' inch-by-inch offensives seem dim.

Final Analysis

What does this thesis Japanese nationalism imply for the practice of Japanese politics, as the Japanese political process struggles to define a new form of nationalism? Its recommendations are based on its solution of the puzzle of Japanese nationalism: What makes it so powerful.

Japanese nationalism is one of the most potent nationalisms the world has ever witnessed. In observable terms, its cumulative process of development gave it extreme apparent consistency and legitimacy. Japan's nationalist revolution was conducted to "restore" the ancient political and religious authority of the Japanese tribal emperor -- not to depose the Bourbon King as in the case of the French Jacobins' nationalist revolution. Japan's national modernization was conducted directly upon the basis of its ancient nationalistic sentiments and its traditional, paternalistic, hierarchical social structure -- while Liberal nationalism's revolutionary rejection of traditional society formed the basis of German and Italian modernization. The same flexibility of Japanese perception that permitted the Core sentiments of nationalism to be redefined into the new ideological Layers can be
expected to lend to any new Layer of Japanese nationalism a similar legitimacy and power.

In theoretical terms, Japanese nationalism is exceptionally powerful because it was able to combine aspects of nationalistic ideologies which only occurred separately in the European experience. The Political Religion of the Meiji Restoration combined the fanatical, revolutionary, mobilizing characteristics of Jacobin nationalism with the conservative, legitimate, elitist, monarchical characteristics of Traditional nationalism -- whereas the European exponents of these competing nationalist ideologies, France and England, waged ideological as well as military wars throughout the Napoleonic era. The Modernizing Ideology of the Middle Meiji was able to combine the elitist, monarchical values of Traditional nationalism with the Liberal nationalism's populist concepts of the collective will of the common volk through the ancient symbol of the common folk ancestor (the Japanese Emperor as head of the Japanese family-state) -- whereas the Liberal nationalisms of Europe, notably in Germany and Italy, struggled against the Traditional states of the Church and the hereditary rulers. The Japanese Modernizing Ideology was also able to make and inculcate the logically incredible combination of paternalistic, tribalistic, nativistic Japanese ethics with the forms of modern democratic government; it created an industrialized parliamentary democracy staffed by a master race of Sons of Heaven and their God on Earth.
The form of nationalism that combined these diverse elements of Jacobin, Traditional, and Liberal nationalisms was Integral nationalism — exemplified by Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Spanish Phalangism in the European experience. But whereas the Integral nationalists in Italy, Spain, and Germany had to violently suppress domestic democratic forces opposed to this uniranationalistic synthesis, the ultra-nationalists of Japan already had their work largely accomplished for them. Not only were the ancient tribalistic bases of Japanese nationalism extraordinarily strong, the synthesis of ideological elements in its nationalist ideology was exceptionally well-suited for the extreme form of nationalism: Integralism.

It is logical to suppose that Japan's nationalism should be different somehow from other countries' nationalisms, because it was the first non-Western nation to experience national modernization. But this study finds Japanese nationalism to be special in a deeper and more general sense. The primary characteristic of Japanese nationalism, as opposed to the nationalisms of other nations, is the power it derives from the exceptional continuity of its historical development. It was this cumulative development that gave Japanese nationalism its monolithic, tribalistic character; and it is this nationalistic heritage that Japanese must confront today as they try to adjust to an increasingly pluralistic world.
In the final analysis, the fundamental practical implication of this study is that Japanese nationalism has historically demonstrated and is likely to still possess a strong potential for extremism. Some counterforces to tribalistic nationalism have existed in the West. Some "braking" forces have impeded the growth of national pride from accelerating uncontrolled into arrogance, aggression, and national self-destruction. The universalistic stoic/Christian philosophical tradition, the costly history of frequent wars and the rewarding history of large-scale and uninterrupted trading relations, a firmly-rooted democratic tradition that makes the state the tool of the people -- not people the tools of the state . . . all of these factors have been suggested as possible "braking mechanisms" in this study. But none of these "braking mechanisms" to runaway nationalism have historically existed in Japan.

Only now, in 1987, are the Japanese people truly confronting the concept of international interdependence. The notion that Japan is "dependent" on trade has led to the exports-only economic mentality; but the notion that Japanese export markets might "depend" on Japanese importing is only now becoming a serious topic. Talk and dreams and fantasies of "internationalism" have long circulated in Japan, but the implicit content in much of these has been the inter-nationalism of increasing Japan's power and prestige vis-a-vis other nations. And the concept of a cosmopolitan, less exclusive, low-barriers nationalism -- towards which only a few nations of the
world are even evolving -- is still far beyond the scope of Japanese policy. When Japanese think of "nationalism" they still tend to think of the Meiji symbols -- the emperor, Shinto, Kimigayo -- and the political debate on what form a new Japanese nationalism should take is still centered on these prewar symbols, even as they continue to decline in popularity.

In its parting words this thesis moves from analysis to prescription and dares to make a few practical suggestions concerning two issues of this Japanese controversy. First, Shinto will not be a very useful element in a new Japanese nationalism. Shinto will always survive and be an important part of the Japanese tradition, but as a symbol of nationalism its usefulness has been outlived -- at least since the end of the War. There are three reasons for this fact besides the Constitutional guarantee of the separation of politics and religion. First, belief in any religion has fallen so low among the middle-aged and younger generations that linking nationalism with an unpopular religion would not benefit nationalism at all. Second, the state-Shinto connection has been a strong point of anti-nationalist opposition second only to the Security Treaty. The victory of establishing a new and stronger Japanese nationalism could far more easily be won by abandoning this deadlocked battle over enshrined War Criminals and offering the anti-traditionalists a modern non-religious nationalism that would eliminate their anti-state-religion raison d'être. Third, Shinto is, in its essence, a tribal cult, a
particularistic, non-universal religion of a race, and as such it would be an obvious contradiction to the more cosmopolitan nationalism that is Japan's only survivable option in the world. As Japan becomes more powerful, its government will come under greater scrutiny, and neither the modern Japanese nor the modern peoples of the world are likely to be fooled by attempts to pass off a State Religion as colorful local cultural ceremonies.

In place of the symbol of security once provided by religion, the symbol of the postwar Japanese people's real faith and security could be used as a key element of a new nationalism: a redenominated yen as symbol of Japan's economic power. The deutschmark has served as such a symbol of security, economic power, and prudent fiscal management in West Germany that the anniversaries of its establishment are still celebrated. A new and "heavier" yen would more appropriately reflect the international power and prestige that Japan's superpower economy deserves. Dropping the two decimal places that hark from the postwar days when the fixed exchange rate was 360 yen to 1 dollar, and letting the yen show its newfound strength in 1-to-1 parity with the deutschmark, pound, and dollar, would dramatically demonstrate to the Japanese people the extent of Japan's economic power. This new consciousness that Japan is no longer a poor and struggling nation is frequently cited by Japanese sources as an essential factor to the expansion of Japanese consumption of imported goods and the expansion of Japanese foreign
economic assistance. Thus a redenominated yen could serve as a nationalistic symbol with the cosmopolitan connotations of Japan's new international responsibilities as an economic superpower.

Second, the imperial family will continue to seem appealing as a symbol of a new Japanese nationalist ideology. They are the ultimate traditional symbol of legitimacy and yet obedient to the Cabinet; and in a new, more human, and more visible role -- on the lines of the British royalty -- they could probably recoup their falling popularity as new "idols" of the younger Japanese generations who idolize celebrity.

But Japan has suffered far too much, far too recently, to risk a revival of this nationalistic idolatry. The potential for extremism in Japanese nationalism is now latent but still very strong. And there is no straighter channel back to the source of Japanese ultranationalism than the cult of the Japanese emperor. The emperor's role is distinctive in Japan in that its power and legitimacy as a nationalistic symbol derive from its institutional continuity, which derives, in turn, from its malleability at the hands of the hidden Japanese political rulers. The imperial family -- in itself -- has long been decontaminated of ultranationalism; but the imperial institution as a nationalistic symbol was used for so long as a tool for the manipulation of the Japanese people that it will take much longer to be decontaminated.
The imperial household is also the straightest channel back to the very sources of Japanese tribalism. Despite their thoroughly modern sentiments, its members are indisputably the direct descendants of the very Yamato tribal chiefs who coined the myths of their personal heavenly ancestry and thus established the earliest and most enduring Core value of Japanese nationalism -- the myth of Japanese racial superiority. And throughout the centuries up to today the emperor has performed the ancient Shinto religious rites as the head of the Japanese nation and its intermediary before the Shinto gods. While this is an awe-inspiring instance of historical continuity, it is hardly an appropriate symbol of Japanese cosmopolitanism. And since much of the respect the imperial household enjoys derives from this tribal religious heritage, no degree of sophistication among the future emperors can guarantee that they will not be used as a symbol of yet another modern Japanese tribalism.

Unlike the case of Shinto and the redenominated yen, however, the Japanese people are not yet ready to replace the emperor as a symbol of Japanese nationalism. The logical, modern, democratic substitute for this symbol of hereditary sovereignty is the Japanese Constitution, which has vested sovereignty in the Japanese people, the beginning and end of the Japanese nation's strength and prosperity. But the malleability of Japanese political support for the Constitution -- from Liberal Democratic Party members who persistently press to revise it to Socialists and Communists who use it
as the minority's shield yet leave doubts as to their ultimate commitment to its parliamentary principles should they come to power -- make its use as a nationalistic symbol unlikely in the near future.

There is nothing sinister about national pride based on national achievement. But the roots of Japanese nationalism run back to deeper and darker attitudes than Olympic competition. Even today Japan's tribal myth of racial/ethnic uniqueness-cum-superiority is not only on the lips of its leaders -- it is alive in tens of millions of Japanese hearts. It is there behind the "internationalization" (sic.) of politicians who seek greater global power. It is there behind the "internationalization" of managers who seek to rule the industries of the world. It is there behind the "internationalization" of young consumers who feel cheated if they do not enjoy the greatest pleasures of the planet. And with the modern growth of Japan's economic strength, the ancient Japanese belief in their racial/ethnic superiority has spread to over 70 percent of the Japanese population.

Japanese nationalism is still so strongly tied to myths of its "unique" people and their "unique" character, qualifications, and entitlements, that for some time yet it will run the risk of slipping back into a tribal nationalism. And the symbol of the Japanese emperor, like the Japanese Shinto religion, is still too closely tied to this tribal heritage to serve as a symbol of modern Japanese cosmopolitanism.
The way has been long and difficult for Japan from the Yamato tribes' settlement on the "fertile reed plains" to its current status as a global economic superpower. Bright periods and dark periods have alternated in Japanese nationalism's development, and this century's record alone has mixed one of nationalism's greatest successes with one of its most catastrophic failures. But Japan may be only one step away from a momentous change in the ancient core of its nationalism. And if its new form of nationalism could only make the conceptual shift from basing its pride on the myth of racial uniqueness to basing it on the facts of its truly unique national achievements, then the prospects for a strong, peaceful Japan with a temperate nationalism are as bright as for any nation. We can conclude, at least, that if such a change comes to pass, it will most likely occur through the process of generational change in Japanese nationalism.
FOOTNOTES

PREFACE

Nota: 1. All Japanese names in this text are given in the Japanese manner: surname first.
2. Emphasis in all quotations is added, unless specified otherwise.

2. Id.
4. Id., Nakasone Yasuhiro.
5. Ibid., September 27, 1986.
6. Ibid., September 26, 1986.
7. Ibid., December 26, 1986. Nakasone Yasuhiro
8. Ibid., October 1, 1986, Chung Kyong Mo.

Nota: This study segments the Japanese age-cohorts are into the three experiential generations of (birth-years) 1909-1938, 1939-1948, and 1949-1963, by theory and methods laid out in Chapter Four.
Chapter Two
Nationalism


9. Id.

10. Ibid., pp. 167, 168.

11. Definition of nationalism by George Orwell, Such, Such Were the Joys (New York: 1953) pp. 73, 74.


14. Social anthropology tends to deal with primitive nationalisms, so it was not used.


16. Ibid., p. vi.

17. Ibid., pp. 1, 2.

18. Ibid., p. 2.

19. Ibid., p. 10.


23. Ibid., p. 92.

24. Ibid., p. 204.


27. Kohn, op. cit., p. 11.

28. Ibid., p., 89.


30. Jacob Burckhardt, cited id.


34. Kant, cited Ibid., p. 31.


41. *Id.*


Nota: On Sociological Models of Nationalism

Most sociological models of nationalism rely to varying extents on the classical sociological distinction between traditional and modern societies. Ferdinand Toennies was the first to express this distinction in 1887 when he made a dichotomy between the ideal types of a traditional "community" and a modern "society" in the now-famous words Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Basically, the Gemeinschaft was the non-rational, affective relationship of man to society found in small, traditional kin-and-neighbour communities. The Gesellschaft was the rational, non-affective relationship of a self-aware, individual-goal-maximizing man to an impersonal modern society. (Ferdinand Toennies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887, trans. Charles Loomis, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, (New York: American Book Co., 1940).) Five years later, Emile Durkheim expanded this concept in De la Division du Travail Social with the Gemeinschaft corresponding to his "solidarite mechanique," in which repressive laws stifled individual opportunity, and the Gesellschaft corresponding to his "solidarite organique," in which benign laws allowed a more perfect union of individuals, each maximising their own potential. (Emile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social (1893).) This dichotomy was further developed by sociologists including Max Weber, who posited a transition phase between the two social types, and by Talcott Parsons, who developed the attributes of the two types more fully. Yet the dicotomy model began to lose its popular appeal in the academic community with the new insights from studies of contemporary cases of political development and modernization which stressed that development was a gradual process in which some elements of traditional societies are carried on.


58. Ibid., p. 125.

59. Ibid., p. 123.

60. Kornhauser's model is based on Weimar Germany, but efforts by Halpern and others to apply similar models to non-European countries have proved fruitful. Q. v. M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, (Princeton, 1963), cited in Smith, op. cit., pp. 57, 58.


78. Id.
79. Ibid., p. 23.
80. Ibid., pp. 49 - 51.
81. Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
82. Q. v. Smith, op. cit., p. 106.
84. Id.
84. Id.
85. Ibid., pp. 102 - 103.
86. Ibid., p. 105.
88. Ibid., p. 61.
90. Id.
91. Ibid., p. 59.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ibid., p. 61.
95. Id.
96. Robert Syme, Caesar, the Senate, and Italy, (Rome: British School, 1938), passim.
99. Fanon, ibid., p. 47.

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101. Ibid., p. 46.

102. Ibid., p. 47.

103. Id.

104. Ibid., p. 38.


106. Ibid., p. 343, list of Types of Movement.

107. Ibid., p. 255.

108. Id.

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Chapter Three

Japanese Nationalism


2. Ibid., p. 9.


12. Nihon kanko bunka kenkyusho, Nipponjin no seikatsu to bunka (Japanese Life and Culture), (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1982).


On blood types, Robert Berkow, M.D., ed., The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy (Rahway, N.J.: Merck, Sharp & Dohme Research Laboratories, 1982) p. 1730. The normal caucasian incidence of rh-negative blood is only 15 percent. As most men and women are rh-positive, and all but the first born of a union between an rh-positive male and rh-negative female have a
miscarriage rate rising progressively from 50 percent to over 90 percent (due to blood group incompatibility between mother and fetus) the only way in which a population such as the Basque could escape progressive extinction due to their high incidence of rh-negative blood is if almost all of the fathers were rh-negative too -- in other words, with almost no cross-breeding outside the group since the "beginning."


37. Id.


MITI's expert witness was Prof. Hideji Matsui of the Martial Arts University. Despite strong and repeated European protests, MITI has refused to suspend the new MITI "Safety Goods" sticker now placed exclusively on Japanese makers' merchandise.


46. Smith, op. cit., p. 158.


50. Asahi Evening News, April 2, 1986


52. Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., p. 537.

53. Deutsch, Chapter 2, supra, p. 57.


56. The founders of the Kamakura, Ashikaga, and Tokugawa Shogunal dynasties, respectively. Hideyoshi, as a peasant, had no family name, so he later chose Toyotomi.


59. Dore, op. cit., p. 100.

60. Ashikaga Yoshimochi, cited in Brown, op. cit., p. 34.
Unlike paintings, woodblock prints could be produced in lots, and this disseminated their art and information among a wider, merchant class clientele.

The Japanese writers we quote in this chapter, for example, are all featured in the major Japanese multi-volume historical works such as: Uemura Katsumi, ed., Dainippon shiso zenshu (Collection of Thought of Great Japan), (Tokyo: Dainippon shiso zenshu kankokai, 1932), etc. But we generally rely on the reputable published English translations because there is no point in retranslating documents already translated in these authoritative source books.

Brown, op. cit., p. 52.


Brown, op. cit., p. 56.

Reischauer, et al., op. cit., p. 664.


Brown, op. cit., p. 32.


Earl, op. cit., p. 91.

Five Articles Oath, cited in Reischauer, et al., op. cit., p. 228.

Earl, op. cit., p. 132.


81. *Id.*


84. *Ibid.*, p. 48. Craig fails to give equivalencies for silver kan in this book, but calculations based on his statistics yield an exchange rate of 1 kan of silver to 40 koku of rice, and as 5 koku of rice was considered one man's keep for a year, the Choshu savings could still have fed 572,800 people for one year -- a very considerable sum.


86. David Apter, *supra*, see Chapter 2, here.

87. My argument here conflicts with the assertion of Robert N. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) which, I feel, builds up the role of religion in the Tokugawa era too much by defining it too broadly.

Bellah's theory is logically developed from his definition of religion as "man's attitudes and actions with respect to his ultimate concern," but his basic failure to accept the distinction between a worldly-philosophical and a faith-based, otherworldly religious mode of coping with "ultimate concern" ground his analysis on a fault. Bellah notes that Tokugawa Japanese were rationalistic "this-worldly ascetics," but he insists, for example, that Confucianism's appeal was not as a secular philosophy of harmony on earth but as a magical, metaphysical religion. He notes that in Japan political values took precedence over other values, that Japanese religions supported political values, and that political values resulted in economic development. But from this he derives the conclusion that Japanese religion caused economic modernization, demoting politics from the dominant
factor to a mere intermediate variable. "Because of the nature of Japanese society with its strong political emphasis it is impossible to show (!) the connections between religion and economy without also discussing in some detail the connection of the polity and its structure with them both." (page 9). In the end his application of Tillich's broad definition of religion (which would classify Utilitarianism, Existentialism, Nihilism or even simple gluttony, etc., as religions) lets Bellah find exactly what he set out to discover: a "functional analogue to the (Weberian) Protestant ethic in Japanese religion." The voice of his master did not bid him search in the admittedly more dominant realms of politics and worldly philosophy.

There are many good points in his analysis, but on the whole his picture of Japanese religiosity in the Tokugawa era seems overdrawn. Certainly there were some isolated Shinto literary scholars, but Bellah treats them with the intellectual historian's predilection to make of one man a school and of a school a mass movement.


89. __.


On the personal and social relations within the ruling clique see Albert M. Craig, "Kido Koin and Okubo Toshimichi: A Psychohistorical Analysis," in Craig, ed., op. cit., passim.


93. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 2.


95. Ito Hirobumi, cited in Reischauer, et al., op. cit., pp. 532, 533

96. Smelser, see Chapter 2, supra.


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101. Lucian Pye, see Chapter 2, supra.

102. Id.


109. A common title for articles.


111. Ibid., p. 6, et passim.


115. Pyle, op. cit., passim.

118. Grillpaerzer, Chapter 2, supra.


129. Moral "purity" in Japanese culture is very different from its Judeo-Christian conception. It is mostly a sense of singleminded dedication to some object or ethic, not abstinence from adultery or murder. In fact, crimes of passion such as murders or lovers' double suicides are typically "purely" motivated in Japan. The popular concept of "pure" has the nuance of "simple or direct" and is often used in reference to hot-headed youth. Shinto
"purity" is ritually achieved, in order of convenience -- by bathing outdoors, preferably in something painfully cold, rinsing the mouth and hands, or having a priest wave a wand with cut white paper strips on it.

130. Maruyama Masao, op. cit., passim.

131. Well documented in Maxon, op. cit., pp. 8, 9, et passim.


133. Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., p. 493.


136. Lerner, Chapter 2, supra.


139. Ibid., p. 217.

140. Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., p. 582.

141. Patrick, op. cit., p. 220.


145. Id.

146. Id.

    Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., pp. 496, 497.

149. Ibid., pp. 237, 238.


151. Furthermore, the domestic price of rice would fall 1.75 percent for each 1 percent increase in the supply of imported rice. Jung-Chao Liu and Daniel B. Suits, "An Econometric Model of a Rice Market," Tunghai Journal, (Taiwan, July, 1962), cited in Patrick, op. cit., p. 218.


153. Ibid., p. 247.


155. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 103.

156. Maruyama Masao, op. cit., pp. 54 - 56.

157. Id.

158. Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., p. 575.


163. Smelser, Chapter 2, supra.


165. Deutsch, Chapter 2, supra.

166. Id.

167. Id.


170. Id.

171. Id.


FOOTNOTES

Chapter Four

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN POSTWAR JAPANESE NATIONALISM


8. Eisendstadt, op. cit.


Shakespeare, As You Like It, 11, vii, 139 et seq.

10. Samuels, op. cit., p. 2.
11. Ibid., p. 6.


NHK data is cited in footnotes 16, 17, below.

Also see: H. Yoshida, et al., eds., Gendai seinen no ishiki to kodo, (Tokyo: NHK, 1982)


Public opinion polling has been something of a fetish in democratic postwar Japan, and many newspapers, journals, research institutes and government agencies have also conducted numerous polls every year since the end of the occupation. There is wide variation in the quality and reliability of these polls, but they have the common trait of focussing on specific issues of current topical interest to their sponsoring organizations. Even among the finest research institutes, the importance of longitudinal surveys does not seem to have been widely appreciated in Japan until very recently, and even now many books draw sweeping inferences from responses to different questions asked of samples selected by totally different methods in dozens of dissimilar surveys.


16. NHK Survey Research Section, Dai ni nihonjin no ishiki (Tokyo, Shiseido, 1980) p. 72.

17. NHK Survey Research Section, Gendai nihonjin no ishiki kozo, second edition (Tokyo, NHK, 1985) p. 36.


20. Id.

21. NHK Survey Research Section, Nihonjin no ishiki (Tokyo:

22. i.e. Gendai, op. cit.

23. Inglehart, op. cit.


26. Ibid., pp. 125, 126.


29. Ibid., pp. 24, 25.


33. Id.


35. vis. Tsurumi, op. cit., passim.

36. i.e., Fairbank, Reischauer, Craig, op. cit., pp. 535, 536.


38. Professor (anonymous).


Chapter Five

THE FINDINGS

1. In this regard, the author wishes to particularly acknowledge the great help and assistance of Mr. Furukawa Ichiro, of the University of Tokyo, Economics Department, Survey Research Methodology Program.


5. Id.


9. Hozumi Yatsuka, id.

10. Late Meiji article cited by Ishida Takeshi, Meiji seiji shisoshi kenkyu, ibid., p. 535.


12. The "unbroken lineage" of the Japanese imperial household is another Japanese nationalistic myth. The emperors had from ancient times been frequently traded at short intervals among fathers, sons, and occasionally daughters of the imperial family, and this prevented any strict, single-blood lineage from being established. There were too many collateral branches with claims to an ancestor on the throne. It is a monument to the imperial family's diplomatic ability that fewer wars of succession did not occur (or that more court imbroglios were not recorded). But there is no disputing of the fact that the imperial brothers Go-Fukakusa and Kameyama and their descendants began a dispute of succession in the 1260's which flared into open warfare with Go-Daigo's refusal to follow the throne-rotation to the other pretending line in 1331.

The two Japanese imperial dynasties (styled the "Northern and Southern Dynasties" after the Chinese dynastic wars) made competing claims to be the unique and true descent and engaged in intermittent warfare from 1336 to 1392.

Reischauer states: "While Go-Daigo's line is considered by Japanese historians to have been the legitimate one between 1336 and 1392, it never again occupied the throne and eventually disappeared into obscurity." op. cit., vol. 1, p. 557.

Shinkokai, 1941) p. 73, cited in Brown, op. cit., p. 15.


15. Ashikaga Yoshimochi, cited ibid., p. 34.


18. Asahi Evening News, October 6, 1986, "Conflict Snowballs Over Why Skiing is Dangerous," statement made by MITI's expert witness Professor Hideji Matsui from International Martial Arts University who gave an entire lecture on "the uniqueness of Japanese snow."

The situation was that Japanese ski equipment manufacturers, after having endured decades of European dominance in the Japanese ski, ski boot, and ski binding markets, persuaded MITI to reject International Standards Organization safety specifications for ski equipment (which had hitherto been accepted by Japan) and to institute instead a unique Japanese "Safety Goods" seal which is awarded by a committee of Japanese ski manufacturers to products meeting their self-determined "Japanese safety" specifications. The trade commissioners of Austria and the European Community protested this as a transparent ploy by the Japanese ski industry to benefit from its own "Johnny-come-lately" non-tariff trade barrier, under MITI's protection. As of October 1986, MITI had conceded that Japanese snow might not be unique, but the new Japanese non-tariff barrier remained in place nevertheless.

19. The NHK Index of "sense of political efficacy" puts 79 percent of the Japanese population in 1983 as having a "weak sense of political efficacy," especially among the youth. Gendai nihonjin no ishiki kozo, op. cit., p. 155.

Chapter Six
CONCLUSION

1. Montaigne, Essays, book III, Chapter 5


3. Montesquieu, Pensees et Jugements.


APPENDICES
APPENDIX B

English Translation of Interview Questions

1. Where were you born (what region to you come from)?
2. And what year were you born?
3. An elementary school near by?
4. What about your Jr. High School and Sr. High School?
5. Do you remember any time when you were young when you particularly felt "I am a Japanese?"
6. When was that?
7. And what was the situation?
8. Can you remember when you first thought about politics?
9. How old were you then?
10. What was the situation?
11. Did you attitudes (opinions) change or become more set when you were in college?
12. Have you engaged in any political activity besides voting?
13. What political party do you support now?
14. (If LDP or no party preference, to Discriminant Questions)
15. Would you think back to the time you were 20?
16. What was your biggest personal hope (expectation) then?
17. Did you have some sort of hope (expectation) for Japan then? If so, what was it?

18. As you have grown as an individual have your feelings or expectations towards the nation changed, or have they remained the same?

19. Did other people your age have the same expectations of the nation as you did, when you were all twenty?

20. When one says "the same generation (as you)" what ages are the people you think of?

21. Do you think that people a little older or younger than you are also in your generation?

22. Did your generation have a distinguishing characteristic when it was (is) young?

23. Do you think that this came from your generation's experiences or was it the general conditions (ambiance) of the times?

24. What were the general conditions (ambiance) of the times?

25. What were your generation's experiences?

26. Do you feel that the effects (of the experiences) have still remained despite the passing of the years, or have they faded away?

27. Does your generation have any characteristics now?

28. Of what sort?

29. Does the generation older than you have any characteristics?

30. Of what sort?

31. What about the generation younger than you?
32. Of what sort?
33. Are there times now when you feel "Wow, that's sure a different generation!" (about somebody)?
34. In what sort of circumstances (do you feel this)?
35. Do you think that feelings and expectations towards the nation are different depending on the generation, or are they the same?
36. At what points (are they different or the same)?
37. Comparing now with before the War, do you think that Japan is fundamentally a different country, or is it fundamentally the same as long ago?
38. Has Japan changed fundamentally in the 40 years since the War?
39. At what points (has it changed or remained the same)?
40. The generations of Japanese will keep coming and going (trading place), and how do you think that Japan will change?
41. Good points? Bad points?
42. What makes you feel at ease (about the changes)?
   What worries you (about the changes)?

Then into open-ended discussion of major themes, time permitting.
APPENDIX C

Discriminant Question for Left/Center/Right

Political Orientation

1. Do you think the Nakasone Cabinet's official worship at Yasukuni Shrine is proper or not?

    No                Yes, or don't know

    Does this (state worship) violate the Constitution?

    yes          don't know          don't know   no
        Left                   Center          Right

2. It is said by some that the LDP "new leaders" are going as far as to plan coalitions with the centrist opposition parties in a bid to topple the Nakasone Cabinet. Do you think that this is proper or not?

    yes                  no

    don't know

    Why?

    weakens LDP          weakens left

    Center               Right              Left
3. Do you think that local people would be right in raising a protest movement against the construction of a nuclear power plant that the state considers necessary?

   yes  no, don't know

What if they demanded enormous compensation in return for their cooperation?

   wrong to  fine  fine  wrong to
   Left        Center        Right
Appendix E

1. Japanese are Inferior to Westerners

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11. 'Ongaeshi' (Repaying Obligation) is an Important Principle

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Population mean weighted by 10 cohorts | 75.1 | 78.4 | 74.6 | 71.8 | 70.3 |
15. Japan is a First-Class Nation

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Population mean
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