Immigration Policy
and Colombian Textile Workers In New England:
A Case Study in Political Demography
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IMMIGRATION POLICY

AND COLOMBIAN TEXTILE WORKERS IN NEW ENGLAND:

A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY

by

Eleanor E. Glaessel-Brown

Submitted to the Department of Political Science
on May 15, 1984 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science

ABSTRACT

It is widely recognized that United States immigration policy
does not match national needs, is subject to arbitrary interpretation,
and, in the case of illegal immigration, is simply ignored.

This project investigates an immigration policy issue from
several perspectives with the intent of contributing to the understanding
of how contemporary migration functions. As a study in political demog-
raphy, it focuses on the case of Colombian skilled labor migration into
New England textile mills. One set of research objectives involves de-
scribing the origin and evolution of the network and the immigrant's
characteristics and role in the local labor market, and documenting how
the immigration is perceived by governmental and managerial key inform-
ants in the countries of origin and destination. A second set of objec-
tives concentrates on policy issues: revealing the role of ostensibly
unrelated U.S. and Colombian policies and practices that contribute to
the migration flow, and examining policy implications.

The research views Colombian labor migration to the United
States as a logical response to structural differences between the two
countries. The main working proposition is that the failure of the
clearly restrictive immigration policy to curtail the flow of immigrant
labor can be understood by a series of independently formulated U.S. and
Colombian policies and practices that have no direct relationship to
immigration policy, but nevertheless interact in fundamental ways. It is
further proposed that the impact that these policies and practices have
on the migration is to stimulate emigration as a means of attaining
socio-economic mobility at the point of origin, and to attract skilled
and less demanding labor at the point of destination.
The research design includes a combination of historical study of documented materials, industrial case study, a sample survey of employee records, oral history interviews with migrant workers, and other key informant interviews.

It is concluded that there are indeed a series of industry and trade, labor, and immigration policies and practices deep within the traditions of both the United States and Colombia that have a direct impact on the migration by causing a wide spectrum of disequilibrium to which the workers respond. The indirect forces easily predominate over the explicit policy because of 1) the absence of a national population and manpower policy, and 2) the "policy" of non-enforcement of the current restrictive law. The implication is that any serious attempt to intervene in a contemporary labor migration situation must understand and take into account the entire context in which the migration occurs.

Thesis supervisor: Myron Weiner
Professor of Political Science
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What demographers so grandly call the "family formation" years of our lives have coincided brilliantly with the final paces of my doctoral studies, creating long interruptions in my work and small disruptions in our home life. While none of us has suffered interminably, neither can I leave these people to be mentioned last. And so, I heartily acknowledge the significant contribution of perspective, first from my Lebenskamerad, Joe, who by definition shared in the trials, ecstasies, and loneliness of the long-distance runner, and ran the final stretch along with me in great style; from our son, Alex, my artful companion during large portions of the research adventures; and from our daughter, Katherine, for whom I hope a life of domestic and career balance will be a natural undertaking.

As a project that spanned academic disciplines as well as years, I enjoyed the advice of several experts in the field of labor migration. My sincere thanks go to the members of my thesis committee: Myron Weiner in the Political Science Department at M.I.T., Mike Piore in the Economics Department at M.I.T., and George Masnick, at the Center for Population Studies and the Kennedy School at Harvard. No one could have had a more supportive, patient, and cheerful group of advisors.

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While all of these people, and many more, have shared their thoughts, experiences and talents with me, only I am responsible for errors and omissions.

This project is dedicated to the memory of my father, Ernst Edmund Glaessel, who knew I always finished what I started, and to the Colombian textile workers who, after all, took all the risks and did all the hard work.

Boston, Massachusetts
15 May 1984

Ellie Glaessel-Brown
There is something inherently interesting about people on the move. Like birth and death, migration arouses emotions and a sense of poignancy that can come only from experiencing life's major demographic events. But migration is a protracted process that results from a convergence of uprooting circumstances, and encompasses a host of dimensions. No matter who is doing the moving, decisions have been made based on some perception of reality. Motivation has been acted upon by will, a socioeconomic and cultural context has been left behind, and an individual, endowed with the trappings of much of what has been left behind, enters a new place to survive, to thrive, or to fail. This is human drama at its finest; in every case there is a story to be told.

Migration is not a new phenomena. In the roughly one million years since bipedal hominids first appear in the fossil record, prehumans and humans have been on the move in response to disequilibrium in availability of resources and levels of development. While the landscape has been altered beyond recognition, the human response to move to optimize chances for survival has not changed over the millennia. As nations carved themselves out of expanses of territory, as populations grew, and as international communication, economic and political relations became more complex, the rules and restrictions governing migration have become more frequent and explicit. In the modern world, it is the business of policy-makers to determine how inequality will be alleviated.
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SECTION I
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL HELP

WANTED OPERATORS
EXPERIENCED TEXTILE

Positions available in following classifications:

LOOM FIXER - 2 yrs. experience on Draper XD Looms with Dobby Motion, Unifi and auxiliary equipment including drag rolls, breast beams and various type temples. Familiar with weaving quality heavy-weight fabrics using continuous filament yarns and spun yarns in both warp and filling, able to set loom for proper timing to weave required constructions. $5.37 p.h. + .20c 3rd shift bonus plus quality and production bonus.

WEAVERS - 1 yr. experience on Draper XD Looms with Dobby Motion and Unifi winder. Skilled in the weaving of plain and fancy fabrics using filament and spun yarns with complete knowledge of end-and-end leasing arrangement, keep woven fabrics free of weaving defects. $4.64 p.h. + .20c 3rd shift bonus.

SLASHER TENDER - 1 year experience. Operate machine to saturate warp yarn with size, wind sized yarn on loom beams, able to position section beams onto creel, gather ends of warp together and tie warp to leaders left in machine, insert loose rods between alternate strands, to prevent yarn from sticking. $4.82 p.h. + .20c 3rd shift bonus.

UNIFIL TENDER - 3 mos. experience to tend winding units attached to Draper XD Looms, automatically winding yarn onto bobbins, transfer bobbins to loom shuttles, strip bunch yarn from expended bobbins. $3.71 p.h. + .20c 3rd shift bonus.

CREELER - 1 mo. experience on cotton warpers using continuous filament yarns, familiar with changing style of yarn, replacing exhausted yarn packages, repairing broken ends, maintain threads in position to warp yarns, setting reed positions to prepare a beam for slashing. $3.60 p.h.

KNOT TYER - 6 mos. experience. Tend automatic, warp tying-in machine, tying warp ends from full warp beam to warp in loom. Knowledgeable in handling of synthetic yarns, keeping warp ends in proper end-and-end lease order for knot-tying and observe operation of machine while tying knots. Will pull warp ends through drop wires of harnesses and reed to reduce jamming and breaking ends. $4.25 p.h. + .20c 3rd shift bonus.

Positions offer clean, safe and modernly equipped machinery & lighting and Benefits include Master Medical BC/BS and Vacation and Holiday pay.

Applicants must apply, in person, to:

WANNALANCIT TEXTILE CO.
562 SUFFOLK STREET
LOWELL, MASS.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

En realidad es un orgullo para mí decir que esta compañía está casi toda en manos de trabajadores Colombianos. (Really, I am very proud to say that this company is almost entirely in the hands of Colombian workers.)

Colombian textile worker in Lowell, Massachusetts
Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this project is to investigate a non-functioning population policy. The United States currently has a restrictive immigration policy, which limits the number of people who are allowed to enter the country each year according to clearly-defined, legal procedures and ceilings. And yet every year thousands more cross borders without inspection and overstay visa limitations, thus assuming the risks of being in the United States illegally. The thesis of this dissertation is that there are perfectly sound structural reasons why the explicit policy is ineffectual, and that there are probably even a number of policies and practices that directly and indirectly conflict with and undermine the restrictive immigration policy. The case of textile workers from Colombia, South America laboring in New England mills is used to illustrate the thesis.¹

The project is, in part, a policy analysis, which intends to appraise the match between policy goals and policy impacts. It is also a systematic exploratory case study, which attempts to explain why a particular result occurred and how the process that produced it worked.

The principal objective of the research is to contribute to the evaluation of policies that influence the immigration of labor from the
developing countries into the traditional sector of a modern, industrialized nation. While the project examines the social, economic and political determinants of public policy at the international level, it intends to emphasize the human dimension by documenting the hopes, expectations and actions of individuals involved with the migration, and comparing their perceptions and interests.

There are four specific research objectives:

1. To provide an historical context in which the process developed.

2. To describe a case of skilled Latin American labor migration into New England manufacturing.

3. To investigate the role and nexus of policies and practices that directly and indirectly influence the migration, and to assess their relative effect on determining its extent and direction.

4. To suggest a series of useful generalizations based on the findings, and to discuss their policy implications and domestic and international consequences.

Section I outlines the research, the debate to which it is related and the framework in which it was conceived, how the project was carried out, and an historical perspective on population policies and development in the migrant receiving and sending countries.
In Section II the case of textile workers from Medellín, Colombia who have gone to work in Lowell, Massachusetts is described in depth. After setting the stage of the cities and the mills, a description of the origin and evolution of the Colombian network, and a demographic analysis of the role of Colombians in the manufacture of textiles in Lowell are provided.

Section III concentrates on the policies and practices that the research found to be undermining the best intentions of U.S. immigration policy to control the entrance of workers such as the Colombians in Lowell. These policies and practices are divided into three groups: industry and trade, immigration, and labor. Finally, the conclusions and implications of the research are reviewed and discussed in the context of the new directions proposed by the Select Commission for Immigration and Refugee Policy, and by Congress.

Policy and People

When Humberto waded onto a Miami beach in the predawn murkiness of March 1, 1979, he felt elated that the worst of his ordeal was over. On February 26th he had left his family and job in Bello, on the outskirts of Medellín, and flown via Panama to the Bahamas. There he waited in a bar for over two days during a series of delays calcu-
luted to relieve prospective immigrants of their money and possessions. Early on the third day Humberto connected with the Cuban he had heard about in Medellín and was flown by light plane to Bimini, frightened by the stories he overheard in the bar. In Bimini he negotiated cautiously with another Cuban, and at 10:30 p.m. a tiny yacht appeared and took him alone for three hundred dollars on a terrifying night journey through treacherous seas to the Florida coast.

Humberto walked up from the beach and hailed a taxi. He had a little suitcase with one change of clothing, and about two hundred and fifty dollars in his pocket. He directed the cab to the train station and took the first coach bound for New York City. During the twenty-eight hour train ride his homesickness was alleviated somewhat by a Colombian who had been in the country for many years. When he missed his train connection to Boston, his new friend invited him home, had a party in his honor, and showed him around the city. Humberto arrived in Lowell, Massachusetts on March 3, 1979 and, after waiting a short time for a space to open, was hired as a unifil tender for the Wannalancit Textile Company. He was a new arrival in the Colombian migrant textile worker network that had been established over ten years earlier.²
It is worth the risk to come here, even though it is such a hard and frightening adventure...Now I have the opportunity to work in this company and (my) patrón knows that the Colombian is a great worker, especially the Antioqueño.

People like Humberto cause United States policy-makers a great deal of distress. Although his journey was a lonely one, Humberto was acting neither alone nor unnoticed. His activity is one focus of the great debate on immigration policy, and contradicts most conventional wisdom: that the United States labor market does not require his skills and presence, that he is taking a job which a local resident would assume, and that he should be deterred from coming by the sanctions designed to keep him out of the United States. Yet he comes anyway, and readily finds employment. How did he know where to go? Was he coming because of factors at home or in the United States? Why was he employed, and was he taking a job from a local applicant? How long did he plan to stay?

These and other questions suggested by this example of late 20th century labor migration to the United States can be combined as follows to organize the inquiry:

- Where does this type of migration fit in the spectrum of current U. S. immigration?
- What is the relationship between the migrant receiving and migrant sending nations, and to what extent does this relationship influence skilled textile labor migration?
- What function does the migration serve at the points of origin and destination?
- Does the relationship between the U. S. and Colombian textile industries influence the migration?
- How are the Colombian and U.S. textile industries organized? Where do the workers come from? Where do they go?
- How did the flow of Colombian textile workers begin? How does the network operate?
- Who are the migrants? What are their characteristics?
- What impact does the loss of skilled workers have on the sending mills?
- What role do the Colombians play in the receiving mills? Are they exploited?
- What are the advantages for the Colombians in the United States?
- What happens to these immigrant workers and to their families? How does the second generation differ from the first?
- Are there domestic or international policies and practices in the United States and Colombia that inadvertently influence the migration?

These are the questions policy-makers need to have answered.

It is one thing to devise a population policy based on rational economic information, but quite another to anticipate the human factor. The problem must be approached from a multidisciplinary perspective. This project will reveal the underlying structure to which people like Humberto respond.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Notes, Chapter 1, 1.

Policy making takes place within a highly politicized environment. It demands choosing a particular direction for action when various groups in the society might prefer action in different directions while other groups want no action at all. In terms of migration, it means trying to influence the rate, direction, or content of population movement - which translates into getting people to do things they otherwise would not have done.

Joel Migdal
"Policy in Context"
The Great Labor Immigration Debate

The United States currently admits approximately 500,000 immigrants and refugees annually. Although this figure represents only about half the number accepted each year during the period of greatest influx during the last half of the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th century, it is the largest number of legal entrants admitted by any single country in the world today.\(^1\) In addition to those who enter the United States as permanent resident aliens, about eight million visitors on temporary visas are admitted each year.

While the number of documented immigrants is relatively high, the number of actual newcomers far exceeds the 500,000 annual figure. Hundreds of thousands more cross borders without inspection or overstay their visas to take advantage of employment opportunities not available in their native countries.

Because of the clandestine nature of the movement, no one knows exactly how many people are residing and working in the United States illegally, although estimates range from four to twelve million. Migration statistics are estimates at best under ordinary circumstances because, whereas births and deaths can be tabulated as discreet and definitive events, there is little consensus on the definition of a "migrant,"
(with or without proper documents). At what point during an extended stay does a person actually become an immigrant? Different countries keep very different statistics based on their interpretation of that question and "immigrants" who return to their homeland are rarely taken into consideration. Attempts to estimate the number of people who evade checkpoints altogether can only be viewed as conscientious speculation.

The inexactitude of the data in no way obviates consideration of the problem, which is easily recognized as pervasive, and has all the potential for getting worse. Population growth is still rapid in the developing countries, the growth of the labor force far exceeds the pace of job creation, economic disparity and political instability are getting worse, not better, means of communication and transportation are increasingly efficient and accessible, and some countries are becoming less open to immigration. Throughout history, in times of economic and political stress, the presence of non-citizens, regardless of their numbers, becomes an issue. While there are distinct short-term advantages for the migrants and for some groups at the point of destination, it is unwholesome in the long run for any society to have a large number of disenfranchised participants in its midst.

The debate about how to deal with this problem has been raging for years. During the recent Select Commission on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy hearings almost everyone who has had anything to contribute to the topic was given an opportunity to do so. There is still little consensus on the most troublesome questions, and some aspects of the debate seem to be chronically mired in controversy. Three debate issues and the assumptions related to them have been selected for examination in this project: (1) the relative importance of factors at the point of origin and at the point of destination in motivating the migration, (2) the question of labor displacement, and, (3) the relative merits of temporary vs. permanent labor migration. Several areas of social science theory will be used as guides to understand contemporary labor migration to the United States, and the specific case of the Colombian textile workers.

First it is important to establish a working definition of migration and what motivates people to move. As William Peterson notes, "We are all born, and we all die, but only some of us migrate." He has defined migration as "...a relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance." (Peterson, 1970) Tomlinson adds an unspecified temporal element in stating that migration occurs whenever anyone moves for a "substantial amount of time." Everett Lee suggests that migration involves other than permanent moves because "for every migration stream a counterstream develops" due to improved communication between the origin and destination, the diminution of original attractions, and the initial
intention of many to return at some point. (Lee, 1966) For the purposes of this dissertation, migration has occurred, with or without proper documentation, when a person has moved for a long enough distance and time for the movement to have had some socioeconomic or political impact on the migrant and/or on the points of origin and destination.

Everett Lee's well-known migration model distinguishes plus and minus, and push and pull motivating factors that operate at the points of origin and destination with a series of intervening factors that can still deter the most determined will. (Lee, 1966)

Because of its simplicity, this model works well in the analysis of migration and the terminology is used frequently.

William Peterson defines five broad classes of migration in his typology: primitive, forced, impelled, free, and mass. He characterizes primitive migration as determined by an ecological push, and exemplified
by the wandering and ranging of hunters, gatherers and nomads. Impelled migration he distinguishes from forced in that the migrant has absolutely no power of decision in the latter (i.e., slave trade and displacement), whereas there is some element of decision-making on the part of the migrant in the former (i.e., coolie trade, emigree and refugee flight).

The distinguishing characteristic of "free" migrants, according to Peterson, is that the movement is innovative and that "the will of the migrant is decisive." They are the "trail blazers", who Willard Hansen would distinguish as the true "pioneers." The migration stream is small because there simply are not many individuals who fit that description. Once the network has been established by the trail blazers, mass migration takes over in the form of collective behavior and the migration becomes institutionalized. The activating force for mass migration is prior emigration; for free migration it is the innovating behavior of the migrant. In forced and impelled migration the activating agent is the state or an outside group, and in primitive migration it is the limits of the land.

It has been well documented in migration theory (Browning, 1971) that migration is highly selective according to such characteristics as age, sex, marital status, occupation and other personal traits.
A generalized migrant profile would be that of a young, single male with certain job skills or, at the very least, an exceptional degree of motivation. Clearly all migrants do not fit that description, but it is widely recognized that those who migrate are often potentially the most productive, in other words, individuals that the sending society can least afford to lose.

What motivates the migrant to move? It is generally agreed among observers that the expected income differential model developed by Harris and Todaro (1970) goes a long way in explaining contemporary labor migration; it is primarily economic migration motivated by expectations of increased income. Based on the push-pull model, contemporary observers try to extrapolate which motivating factors are most influential, those at the sending end or those at the receiving end. For example, Cornelius argues that Mexican immigration to the United States could be slowed by development programs in rural Mexico, (Cornelius, 1976, 1978), while Piore is convinced that the Latin Americans represent "the latest manifestation of the basic process through which industrial societies man positions at the lower end of their social structures," (Piore, 1973) and that the United States labor market will always require and attract workers such as the Mexicans.
What influence does the relationship between the sending and receiving societies have on international migration? Dependency theorists (Bodenheimer, 1971; Dos Santos, 1969; Frank, 1969; Stallings, 1972) argue that it is precisely the dynamics of the relationship between economically advanced and less advanced nations that perpetuate their relative status. Developing countries are excessively "dependent" on the beneficence, economic fluctuations and whims of their more industrialized trading partners for their own economic and political well-being.

The outstanding phenomenon of migration in the late twentieth century has been the exportation of labor from the lesser developed countries to more industrialized or economically advanced neighbors. The European Economic Community has facilitated the internationalization of capital, the product market and labor in Europe. In the United States - Latin American case, the relationship between labor importer and labor exporter has not been a simple one, governed by appropriate agreements. There is an interdependent relationship between the developing Latin American nations and the more industrialized United States in that unemployment is relieved and remittances are a significant source of income for the sending countries, and a tentative labor force becomes available in the receiving country.
Because of their historically high birth rates and falling infant and general mortality rates, developing nations are in a prolonged period of high population growth and urbanization rates, similar to the "demographic transition" that occurred in Europe just prior to the Great Migrations. Dependency theorists believe that the problem of surplus labor in emigrant countries in this century is aggravated by their close relationship with highly industrialized neighbors. In their search for markets, capital-intensive industries, which are labor-displacing by definition, have expanded into the developing countries where they dominate the modern manufacturing sector; local establishments, without a comparable ability to accumulate capital or enter markets, are either absorbed or become peripheral and concentrate in limited internal market manufacturing. The assumption here is that the resultant unemployed labor leaves to seek work elsewhere.

To appreciate the complete cycle of interdependencies and relationships, it is useful to consider the notion of labor market segmentation, and particularly the dual labor market hypothesis developed by Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore (1970). According to that theory, the internal labor market is divided into primary and secondary sectors, which are characterized by high wages, good working conditions, chance for advancement, equity and due process in the administration of work
rules and employment stability (primary sector), and conversely, less attractive working conditions, little chance for advancement, a highly personalized relationship between worker and supervisor, and high employee turnover (secondary sector). Secondary labor market jobs in a developed economy are generally in agriculture, service, and light manufacturing, with a disproportionate representation of recent migrants in the labor pool. For the international migrant the disadvantages of the secondary labor market are sometimes less vital. Although wages are low by local standards, they are higher than those in the country of origin, personal employee/supervisor relationships follow cultural traditions at home, and, since the job is often considered temporary, the vested interests of advancement, long-term benefits and improved working conditions are less immediate.

Thus, a profound international economic system, which encompasses the internal economic structure and the job and labor markets in both the labor importing and exporting nations, is at work.

This brings the discussion to the intensely debated displacement issue, that primarily concerns the employment of undocumented workers. As Portes and Bach (1979) have pointed out, the position on this issue depends on whether the immigrants are viewed as a supplement
to the U.S. labor force (Piore), or as a deterrent to advances in labor organization. Employers in the agricultural and traditional manufacturing sectors contend that local labor is unwilling to do the work or, at the very least, is too unreliable. Organizations such as the ALF-CIO, other unions, and the Urban League counter that the reason local workers are unwilling to accept the jobs immigrants assume, if that is in fact the case, is that the pay scale and conditions are unsatisfactory, and that it is precisely the presence of the illegal workers that allow those conditions to persist. If the undocumented workers were not available, employers would be forced to improve conditions and raise wages. Employers insist that the nature of their industries make the cost of extensive changes prohibitive. They claim that they would be forced out of business, to the detriment of U. S. citizen employees, many of whom are older and ill-prepared to change to new fields.

In their extensive report, "The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U. S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study" David North and Marion Houston examined the issue of displacement and concluded that "there is a domestic supply of low level job seekers" for all industries. (North and Houston, 1976:156) On the other hand, Wayne Cornelius found that illegal Mexican workers were not competing for jobs with local workers in his studies of Mexicans in California, Texas and
Illinois. (Cornelius, 1978) Other social scientists have come to the same conclusion in independent investigations, but in times of high unemployment, few people are willing to believe it. The prevailing assumption is that recent immigrants, particularly illegal aliens, take jobs from local applicants; that they are in competition on a one-to-one basis. The employers are continually described in the literature as "exploitative" and the immigrants as "cheap."

A related issue that can only be dealt with after a determination has been made regarding the displacement question is that of temporary vs. permanent migration. One school of thought believes that if the workers are needed, they should be allowed to enter the country for a temporary period to perform the specific required task. Their stay would be limited, they would not be allowed to bring their families, and they could not apply for permanent resident status while in the United States. There is little argument on this issue. Most observers feel that guest worker programs are ill-conceived, potentially abusive, and have failed to prove their worth. It is argued that if the workers are needed, they should be admitted with their families as immigrants with permanent resident status to prevent the potential exploitation of their services and discrimination of their countrymen, who have already become United States citizens.
Conceptual Framework and Propositions

At this point it is necessary to direct the conceptual orientation toward a framework designed specifically for the case of Colombian textile workers in New England manufacturing.

There is no question that there is considerable interest in the issues related to current Latin American-United States labor migration. Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens (1976) and National Council on Employment Policy (1976) and others, describe Hispanic migration patterns and raise broad policy questions, but specific research has focused on the southwestern part of the United States and on major U. S. cities where the influx of Hispanics has been concentrated and obvious. (Bus-tamante, 1976; Cardenas, 1977; and North, 1976, among many).

There is reason to believe that the eastern industrial immigrant labor situation is different from its southwestern agricultural migrant counterpart, and that it may require different policy responses. The majority of Hispanic immigrants in the East come from countries other than Mexico, they generally enter the United States in a different manner (with legally-obtained, temporary visas), they tend to stay longer, and they are involved in different sectors of the labor market. Dominguez (1976) has investigated Caribbean migration to the East; Cruz, Chaney and
Castaño (1976), and Urrúa (1980) have documented Colombian migration, and Hendricks (1974) and Ugalde (1978) have contributed to an understanding of the dimensions of Dominican migration, all primarily to New York City. Only Piore's immigration policy study (1973) of the role of Puerto Rican workers in Boston's industrial sector focuses on New England.

The immigrant recipients are the mill towns vital in American industrial history. These towns developed according to the classic model: capital was attracted by energy-supplying rivers, New England farm girls comprised the original labor force, increased mechanization and capital concentration followed and, finally, the massive European immigrations of the mid-1800s and early 1900s brought the mills to peak production. Since the mid-20th century, however, foreign import competition, a scarcity of skilled labor, and rising costs have plunged these "mature" industries into decline and the booming mill centers into museum towns. Those establishments that have survived have done so with the traditional dependence on an immigrant labor force. The Irish, Poles, Greeks, Portuguese, and French Canadians have moved to more stable jobs, and the most recent immigrant group, the Hispanic, has taken over. According to employers, counterparts to trained workers from Colombia in particular simply do not exist in the New England labor market.
This type of tradesman/operative is distinguished from two other immigrant groups prominent in the literature, the highly skilled professional, and the unskilled farm or service worker. For the labor exporting country he represents neither "brain drain" nor surplus unskilled and unemployable labor. In the receiving country he is highly employable and, although vulnerable, not as easily exploited as the agricultural worker, since the provisions of legislation and collective agreements apply to all workers in the industry. Nevertheless, he is involved in low wage work in conditions considered unattractive by local standards.

The major working proposition for this project is that the failure of the restrictive immigration policy intended to limit the flow of workers into the United States can be understood by a series of unrelated policies and practices that have no intuitive relationship to immigration policy but that, in fact, have a profound influence on the direction and extent of the migration.

It is further proposed that:

- The Colombian textile workers respond to a combination of push and pull motivating factors.
- The economic dependency of Colombia on the United States influences the migration.
- The marginal, competitive character of the New England textile industry contributes to the need for secondary labor market workers.

- The skilled Colombian workers are not displacing or competing with local labor in the manufacturing of textiles in New England.

- Proper visa allocation measures could be developed by understanding the function the migration serves for the migrant and for the receiving industry: for the migrant, a means of socioeconomic mobility, for the textile industry, a source of less demanding, skilled labor.

In sum, the research views secondary labor market migration between Latin America and the United States as a logical response to the structural disequilibrium between modern and traditional sectors, both within and between nations. The labor supply is "pushed" from the developing countries in part because the imported, modern industrial sector does not coincide with current demographic reality; new labor force entrants cannot be absorbed. That labor surplus is "pulled" to the United States by higher-paying jobs, even in the traditional sector, and by the demand created by local labor shortages.

A number of policies have reinforced this pattern, thus encouraging the labor flow. An apparently incongruous restrictive immigration policy has been superimposed on the underlying structure. Lack of policy coordination has prevented the stabilization of (1) local in-
dustry by creating a tenuous labor force, (2) the status of the migrant by making his presence in the United States illegal, and (3) the developing economies by syphoning off a major resource -- human capital.

**Methodology**

A combination of social science research methods were employed in order to approach the case from various perspectives. Documented materials were augmented by:

1. An in-depth case study of four textile mills in Lowell, Massachusetts and two companies in Medellin, Colombia
2. A demographic analysis of a sample of 958 employee records for workers employed between 1960-1979 in the U. S. mills
3. Extensive oral history interviews with three cohorts of immigrant workers, about 60 individuals in the U. S. and Colombia
4. Interviews with key informants who are involved with this specific case of labor migration in U.S. and Colombian public and private organizations

For the first objective (to provide an historical context in which the process developed) the researcher relied on documented materials such as official reports, published historical analyses, and public and private records offered by the companies, institutions, and committees contacted.
An industrial case study was done to provide the specific context within the textile industry, and to answer the questions related to the relationship between the U.S. and Colombian textile industry, their organization, and the role of the migrating workers. Lowell was chosen because of its former position as the most important textile city in the country and because of its proximity to Boston; Medellín was selected because it was the source of Colombian workers in Lowell. The companies in Lowell were chosen on the basis of recent past experience with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigations of illegal alien employees. In both the United States and Colombia, further criteria for selection included potential for cooperation, and availability of and access to information.

Two methods of data collection were used to fulfill the second objective (to describe a case of skilled Latin American labor migration into New England manufacturing). First, employee cohort data were collected from a random probability sample of about ten percent of all production workers in the four U.S. companies. These data were collected on a standardized, pre-coded form from active and inactive records for the years 1960-1979. (See Appendix IA). The purpose of the demographic analysis from these records was to document the origin and characteristics of labor force entrants in the textile industry over the past
twenty years, and to determine the role of the Colombians in the manu-
ufacturing of textiles in New England.

The second method designed to answer questions about the mi-
grants, their network, motivations, problems, and aspirations, was ex-
tensive oral history interviewing. The interviews were subsequently
divided into three cohorts of migrant workers. The first cohort included
members of the primer enganche (the first hook), the original group of
legal textile worker immigrants from which the Lowell network began.
Since they arrived in the United States prior to 1970, the group is
widely-dispersed; individuals were interviewed in various locations and
even by telephone. The second cohort involves two 1970s groups with
arrival dates between 1970-1979. The first group includes a twenty per-
cent stratified sample of Colombian workers employed in the four Lowell
mills at the time of data collection and interviewed in their place of
work in Lowell, Massachusetts; the second group had worked in Lowell at
some time during the 1970s, but had returned to Colombia and were inter-
viewed in a worker's residence in Medellín. The third cohort includes
workers interviewed in Medellín, Colombia in late 1979, who were "on the
list" to go to the United States if they could find a way to get there.
They had jobs waiting for them, but could only go as illegal aliens under
current immigration regulations. For convenience, their group is called
the "1980s new recruits."
The oral history interview followed a standard schedule of open-ended questions and took from one to two hours to complete, depending on the gregariousness of the respondent. All interviews were carried out in Spanish by the author; about two-thirds were taped, none were refused. The total sample includes about sixty individuals.\(^3\)

Information of an historical nature and migrant information were augmented by key informant interviews in order to fulfill the third research objective (to investigate the role and nexus of policies and practices that directly and indirectly influence the migration). The key informant interviews were carried out with officials in U.S. and Colombian public organizations involved with this specific case of labor migration, as well as with officials in the textile industry. They include sixty-one individuals in government, management and labor sectors who were interviewed in 1979 and 1980 by the author in Lowell, Boston, and Washington in the United States, and in Medellín and Bogotá in Colombia. The key informant interview followed the format of open-ended discussion based on an outline of interview questions designed specifically for the involvement and experience of each informant. The interviews were intended to collect direct observations and to give depth to the analysis by comparing the perceptions of individuals at different vantage points.
Cooperation during the fieldwork phase of the project was outstanding. At all levels of inquiry, the researcher encountered intense frustration with the current immigrant labor situation and an unexpected willingness to discuss the problem openly and at length.\textsuperscript{4}
FOOTNOTES

1. The proportion of immigrants to native-born population is higher in the other two major immigrant receiving nations, Canada and Australia.


3. See Appendices IB for copies of the interview schedules, and Notes, Chapter 2, 1, for a summary of the oral history interview groups. The informants and institutions with which they are affiliated are listed in Appendix II.

4. For specific information regarding the timing and mechanics of data collection and other matters related to the field work, see Notes, Chapter 2, 2.
The transfer of people and cultures...is one of the
great themes...of the history of man...but there has
never been anything like the movement that produced
the United States of America and generated continuing
complexes of change. It yielded a nation uninten-
tionally based upon the tensions of pluralism...a
land of hope and trial to its own people and to
people throughout the world.

from Peter G. Marzio et. al.,
A NATION OF NATIONS
The nature of a population can be affected by changes in size, composition and distribution. For governments interested in controlling the growth of a national population, policy instruments would include attempts to influence fertility, mortality, immigration or emigration. The composition of a population can apply to any characteristic such as: age, sex, ethnic, religious and racial background, education and skills, and physical and mental health, and be controlled through immigration policy. An attempt to influence population distribution within national boundaries involves policies designed to direct newcomers and rural-urban migration.

Any of these policies can be direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. For the purposes of this thesis, electing not to adopt a specific policy measure is also considered as a "policy" decision.

In response to the differences in their national needs, Colombia and the United States have exercised different population policy initiatives. While Colombia has outlined direct and explicit growth and distribution policies, the United States has relied primarily on immigration regulations to indirectly influence the size, composition, and distribution of the U. S. population.
The Politics of U. S. Immigration Policy

The most interesting aspect of immigration policy is what the policy reflects about the mood and tempo of the times. What changes in the political and economic life of a nation caused an expanding or contracting of the willingness to receive newcomers? What does the tenor of the policy reveal about the society that has devised it?

An historical perspective is particularly appropriate for understanding immigration policy in the United States precisely because there has never been a clearly-stated policy in this country. A sense of the principles underlying U.S. immigration policy can be obtained only by studying the cumulative development of immigration laws throughout U.S. history. These laws that purport to implement United States immigration policy have evolved by reformulating, building upon, reenacting, and amending prior legislation in response to national needs and popular sentiment.¹

The American continent was the last to be settled in the roughly four million years of human history. For centuries it hosted visitors who camped, hunted and departed, but it was not until some 20,000 years ago that Siberian hunters probably wandered over the Bering Strait into what is now Alaska, and began a more than 10,000 year southward expansion until the southern cone of the South American continent was reached.
By 5000 B.C., the Mayan, Aztec and other descendents of these hunters and gatherers had developed agricultural societies in Central and South America that flourished into prominent settlements of large populations, effective political institutions, and eventually states and empires. Although the North American Indians were peripheral to these sophisticated cultural developments, it has been estimated that by the late 15th century, just prior to the European discovery of the Americas, there were over one million natives living within the present boundaries of the United States. They comprised a tremendous cultural diversity, speaking over two hundred languages from several linguistic families, and were organized into several hundred different types of societies from family groups to "states" of affiliated settlements.

The arrival of the Europeans was devastating for the North American natives, as it was for those of Central and South America. They were virtually powerless to resist the newcomers and, although it would take another 115 years of expeditions and failed attempts before a successful colony was established, the New World had been discovered by the Europeans and it was open to all who came.²

First the Spanish came to North America in search of empires to plunder, but they soon left to exploit the more lucrative southern civili-
zations. It was the British who ultimately founded a permanent settlement in Jamestown, Virginia in 1607. New settlements developed rapidly throughout the 17th century. The Pilgrims arrived in Plymouth in 1620; The Dutch West India Company settled New Netherland in 1623 and New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island in 1624; Puritans migrated to the Massachusetts Bay Colony for a decade after 1630; The Swedish West India Company under Peter Minuit settled Delaware Bay in 1638, and Lord Baltimore founded Maryland in 1634; the first Jewish immigrants arrived in New Amsterdam in 1654. The Carolinas were settled by the British from 1670 on, and were joined by French Huguenots in 1680; Pennsylvania was settled by William Penn in 1681, and in 1683 the first German Mennonites became established in Germantown, Pennsylvania. During the first two decades of the 18th Century, two other sizeable pre-revolutionary immigrant groups arrived: large numbers of deported criminals from Great Britain, and the so-called "Scotch-Irish" or Ulster Scots who settled in Maryland, Virginia and New England.

Thus even before the Revolutionary War, although the British predominated, many groups were represented in the burgeoning population. By the time of the first census in 1790, from a total of 3.2 million people, 75 percent of the white population was of English and Scotch-
Irish origin, 8 percent was German, and the rest a mix of Dutch, French, Italians, Swiss, Spanish, Jews, Swedes and other Scandinavians, Portuguese, Greeks, and Belgians. Half a million black Africans and an equal number of native Americans were included in the first census.

In North America the Europeans came to stay. The British colonization and settlement were conceived as a basis for commercial exchange and coincided with Renaissance thinking. It combined the existence of a powerful merchant class and the British maritime tradition of commercial acumen and a cosmopolitan world view. Although commerce was restricted to Great Britain, England molded the future character of North America by envisioning the colonies as a trading partner, however inferior, and as a place to relieve population pressure - all imbued with the British tolerance for cultural diversity.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and the official recognition of an independent United States of America, immigration began in earnest. From that point to the present, four periods of immigration "policy" can be identified: no restrictions, qualitative restrictions, a combination of quantitative and qualitative restrictions, and liberalization attempts.
For almost one hundred years after independence, immigration continued unimpeded; the borders were open, anyone who could manage the crossing was still welcome. Although nativist sentiment began to rear its head during the late 1700s in response to the immense influx of Scotch-Irish, Irish Catholics, and Germans, and culminated in the passing of the Alien Act in 1798\(^3\), there were no restrictions to entry.

Those first one hundred years, however, were replete with events and legislation that would eventually cause Congress to take steps to restrict immigration. During the first two decades of the 19th century the number of newcomers was reduced somewhat by legislation to protect immigrants in passage, by the prohibition of the slave trade and by the war of 1812. But after 1814, the first major wave of European immigration reached the eastern shores. By 1819 the United States government began to require ships' captains to keep passenger lists, and counted newcomers as they arrived.\(^4\) In 1825 Great Britain responded to overcrowding by repealing laws that prohibited emigration. While it has been estimated that about 250,000 immigrants came to American between 1776 and 1819, 750,000 arrived during the twenty year period between 1820-1840 (Select Commission). Toward the end of the decade of the thirties, a poor economic situation led to the first serious nativist outcry: immigrants were lowering wage levels.
But that was just the beginning; 1840 was the eve of the Great Migrations from Europe, which lasted until the Depression of the early 1930s. The advent of the steamship lines designed expressly for transporting large numbers of passengers, multiple crop failures in Holland, Germany and Ireland, and political unrest in Europe fueled the movement. While it was true that the country was young and uninhabited and that it would be another ten to twenty years before the West was opened; the volume of newcomers was unsettling to those who had preceded them. In 1845 the Native American Party was founded, and later developed into the Know-Nothing Party, which was overtly nativist and politically successful until 1856, when its Presidential candidate, Fillmore, carried only one state.

Local initiatives to channel and control immigration developed by mid-century. In 1855, New York City established a Commission of Emigration and opened Castle Gardens to process immigrants. Sentiment toward newcomers continued to change considerably during the 1860s as the origins of the new immigrants shifted from northern and western to southern and eastern Europe. The anti-foreign feeling that had once been directed toward the Irish Catholics and Germans now was aimed at the Italians, Poles, Slavs, Jews and Asians. Finally, the federal government
was drawn into involvement in immigration regulation when, in the late 1860s, the Supreme Court declared state initiatives to control immigration unconstitutional. The hundred years of unlimited immigration were over.

Thus in 1875 the period of qualitative restriction began when Congress took its first tentative steps in barring "criminals and immoral persons." In 1882 the first federal immigration law added "lunatics, idiots, convicts, and those likely to become public charges," and imposed a head tax of fifty cents per person. From this first federal immigration law there followed a forty-year period of qualitative restriction, with the list of inadmissible persons being extended at approximately ten year intervals.5 Ironically, the Statue of Liberty, the symbol of unrestricted immigration, was dedicated in 1886, four years after the U.S. changed its immigration "policy" to one of qualitative restriction.

Once the government began to dabble with the notion of exclusion, popular sentiment propelled the legislation to new frontiers in attempting to influence the composition of the population of the United States. In 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, followed by the Gentleman's Agreement between the United States and Japan to limit
Japanese immigration, the Alien Land Law in California in 1913, and the Asian Barred Zone in 1917. All of these efforts were fueled by the crest of the wave of immigration during the years between 1905-1914 that brought over 10 million people to the United States (Marzio:129). Organizations such as the Immigration Restriction League, which distinguished between "old" and "new" immigrants, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, which protested the impact of coolie labor, and the aggressively anti-immigrant group, the Ku Klux Klan, reflected the anxiety of the times.

The extent of anti-foreign sentiment that had been intensifying during this period is demonstrated by the conclusions of the forty-two volume Dillingham Commission report issued in 1911, the inclusion of a literacy test in the new immigration law of 1917, and finally, in 1921 a dramatic change in immigration policy that added quantitative limits to immigration for the first time. In 1907 President Teddy Roosevelt had charged the Dillingham Commission with studying the impact of immigration on the United States. The conclusion was that immigration law should be restrictive, and should exclude "inferior" applicants. So much for sheltering the tired and humble masses. The literacy test for new arrivals was a requirement staunchly opposed by Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and
Roosevelt, but it was passed in 1917 over the second veto of President Wilson. This was the peak of anti-immigrant sentiment. During the post-war period there was a growing concern over the ability of the United States to assimilate all the newcomers; perhaps there would be no melting pot effect and the immigrants arriving from southern and eastern Europe would not be Americanized into "new men" adopting the ethics that were felt to be the norm. Two years later the Temporary Quota Act introduced the principle of numerical limitation by country of origin.

The Quota Act of 1921 limited immigration to three percent of foreign-born persons living in the United States in 1910, with a ceiling on European immigration set at 350,000; and it marked the beginning of a forty-year period of qualitative and quantitative restrictions. In 1924 the Johnson-Reid Act, or National Origins Act, established permanent quotas at two percent of the foreign-born living in the United States at the time of the 1910 census, with a 150,000 per year ceiling for the eastern hemisphere. An amendment five years later changed the census year to 1920 to eliminate a clear bias toward admitting a greater number of people from the "old" immigrant countries, since people from northern and western Europe were proportionately more numerous during the earlier census.
The 1924 Act was the major piece of immigration legislation and represented U.S. immigration policy through the Depression and Second World War and into the 1950s. In 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act, known as the Immigration and Naturalization Act, was passed. It codified existing legislation (the long list of excludable persons), reaffirmed the national origins quota system, left the eastern hemisphere ceiling intact, and allowed numerically unrestricted immigration from the western hemisphere. The 1952 INA was revised six times before 1963, amended three times through to the late 1970s, and is the foundation of immigration policy and law to the present.

In the early post World War II period public sentiment toward newcomers changed considerably. The period of massive European immigration was almost a generation in the past, Ellis Island closed in 1954, a relic forgotten by all except those who passed through its gates; economic times were favorable and attempts at liberalizing immigration policy returned to the notion that the good fortune of the United States could and should be shared with the downtrodden of the world.

In 1953 President Truman's Pearlman Commission on Immigration and Naturalization concluded that the national origins quota system
should be replaced by a numerical quota system. In 1963 President John Kennedy submitted a comprehensive proposal for the revision of immigration laws to Congress, and in 1965 the 1952 Act was finally amended to abolish the national origins formula by 1968. It also set a 20,000 per country limit with a 170,000 total ceiling for the eastern hemisphere, and a 120,000 ceiling with no country limit for the western hemisphere, and established the preference system for close relatives, needed occupational skills and refugees. In later amendments the 20,000 per country limit was extended to the western hemisphere, and a total worldwide ceiling was established.

The end of the "Good Neighbor Policy" with the implementation of a ceiling for western hemisphere immigration in the mid-1960s and imposition of country limits in the mid-1970s was in direct response to the growing numbers of Latin Americans entering the United States. Beginning with the Puerto Ricans, who legally entered from the forties on, the Latins became the latest group to inherit the contempt of those who had come before. The official closing of the gate to Latin America highlighted the new dimension of immigration history of the 1960s and 1970s. Primarily from Central and South America, but not confined to those areas, people kept coming, ignoring the ceilings and visa requirements.
Thus in 1978 Congress established the fourth commission in the history of the United States to study immigration policy, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Commission's report was submitted in December of 1980, during the last weeks of the Carter Administration. Since then Congress has debated and tried in vain to pass a new immigration law that would reflect a "coherent, efficient and humane immigration policy."

It is really little wonder that U.S. immigration policy has been incoherent, inefficient and less than humane in the past and is inappropriate for current needs. It is an eclectic collection of policy initiatives and measures gleaned from over one hundred years of reacting to circumstance and popular sentiment.

It was public initiative that finally forced Congress to abandon its position of tolerance and encouragement and enter the immigration arena in 1875. Since that time the Legislature has been firmly in control of immigration policy. The executive branch of the U.S. Government has consistently gone on record as being much more liberal in its interpretation of immigration policy. The literacy test was passed in Congress over four presidential vetoes, Truman's veto of the anti-Communist-
inspired McCarran Walter Act was overridden by Congress. Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all appealed for liberalization of discriminatory immigration laws, and it has been the executive that has historically allowed different groups to enter the United States for humanitarian reasons.6

Congressional action, on the other hand, has followed the fickle will of the "nation of immigrants." While the ethnic diversity and settlement patterns of successive immigrant groups has had an enormous impact on national politics, immigration legislation has, in turn, reflected national political policy. For a nation populated in large part by immigrants or close descendants of immigrants, that public memory has been very short indeed. At the behest of its constituency, Congress strongly controlled the quality and character of the immigrant population from 1875 to 1917. The change in policy to numerical limitations in 1924 followed what was meant to be a temporary measure to avoid an inundation of immigrants from devastated countries during the immediate post-war period, but eventually did significantly reduce the number of entrants from the southern and eastern parts of Europe. The restriction of Asian immigration from the early to mid-20th century had a profound effect on the Asian-born population of the United States.
At present, popular sentiment appears to be wavering near the end of a thirty year period of increased liberalization of immigration policy and a return to the notion of sanctuary for the oppressed, but it has been exceedingly difficult to arrive at a consensus. While it is clear that the days of unlimited immigration are long over, the questions of how many and whom to admit seem to be permanently mired in controversy between conflicting interests. The nation's labor requirements have always been in the center of that controversy.

Current U.S. Policy and Labor Migration

Labor migration has been a dominant theme in the history of the settlement and building of the United States since the earliest colonial years to the present. Two basic immigration policy threads have followed the development of labor issues in migration: encouragement and protectionism. It could be argued, however, that the United States has never really gotten over its long tradition of relying on imported immigrant labor, and that fact has caused one of the major immigration policy quandaries that plague the nation today: does the United States need to bring in people to do certain types of work, or should the U.S. protect its labor force from a continuous stream of new entrants.
The tradition of importing labor for certain highly skilled jobs and for totally unskilled manual labor is very old indeed. The year after Jamestown was founded, the first "immigrant" craftsmen were brought to the settlement. They were German and Polish glassworkers, and when the enterprise failed, they were replaced by another entrepreneur who recruited a group of glassworkers from Italy. 7 As early as 1609, two years after the settlement was established, the first group of twenty black African slaves were sent to Jamestown. That marked the beginning of the slave trade that would transport over 350,000 people from Africa during almost two centuries of forced labor importation. Although land in the South was originally divided into small parcels such as the sixty acres that would become common in the North, the superior agricultural terrain in the South and the type of crops planted made it expedient for land owners to acquire adjoining properties as soon as they became available. 8 The slavery system was the southern plantation owner's answer to the resultant acute agricultural labor needs. Another means of satisfying labor requirements throughout the colonies was indentured servitude.

Until the mid-1830s there was more than sufficient work for every man, woman and child who could reach these shores. Immigration continued to be heartily encouraged. By 1837, however, the first nativ-
ists began to complain that immigration lowered wage levels, contributed to the decline of the apprenticeship system, and generally depressed the conditions of labor. Coming on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the outcry was short-lived, but that theme has recurred during every economic crisis since then, and has achieved considerable press during the mid-1970s and early 1980s.

After the Civil War, labor needs in the United States soared. The country was mending its wounds, the Homestead Act of 1865 opened the West to settlement, and manufacturing had begun in earnest in the East. Then the pendulum swung the other way. By the late 1800s the railroads connecting the Atlantic and Pacific were completed, an economic depression had set in; hence, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 denying the entrance of Chinese laborers. The nation had extracted what it needed of the coolies' services and closed the gate. In 1885 and 1887, the Foran Act, or contract labor laws, ended the importation of cheap, unskilled labor altogether, but did not deny entry to skilled workers. In 1905, as anti-foreign sentiment increased, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League was founded to protest the impact of coolie labor on the "native" American labor force. This outcry resulted in the Gentleman's Agreement between Japan and the United States which stipulated that the Japanese
government would not issue passports to Japanese workers intending to immigrate to the United States.

During the First World War, labor again became scarce and the United States conveniently turned to Mexico to satisfy its manpower needs. Seventy-three thousand Mexicans were admitted between 1917 and 1921 to build railroads and work in agriculture. Labor shortages during World War II led authorities to resort to a similar solution, and the Bracero Program, which allowed unskilled workers from Mexico to enter on a temporary basis was conceived. The Bracero Program began in 1942 and was terminated in 1964 as a result of protests from Mexican-American labor.

The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 abolished the contract labor laws and, in setting up the preference system for visa allocations, established the promise that a skilled, needed worker could enter the U.S. unless the Department of Labor objected. This was a period of economic growth and liberalization of immigration law, and the country's welcome mat for manpower was out again. By 1965, however, the amendments to the INA changed the letter and intent of the law so that the Department of Labor had to agree first to any labor immigration. The
impact of these two legislative actions was to change what had become implicit protectionism up to 1952, to explicit policy statements. Workers could be denied entry into the United States if: (1) sufficient workers were available to do the task that the applicant intended to perform, or (2) if wages and working conditions would be adversely affected by their presence in the U.S. labor market.

Current U.S. immigration policy is the result of three centuries of cumulative process of adapting and reacting to changing economic, demographic and political conditions. The "policy" is guided by three basic notions: (1) denial of entry, which now includes thirty classes of excludable persons, (2) facilitated entry for individuals such as refugees, relatives and those with needed skills, and (3) numerical limitations such as the country quotas and hemispheric ceilings. The guiding principles behind these criteria for deciding who should be admitted are (1) family unification, (2) the provision of asylum for refugees, and (3) the recruitment of workers in skilled occupations.

The specific law which governs U.S. immigration policy in 1984 is still the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. The Act allows for a fixed numerical limit of 290,000 immigrants a year;
170,000 from the Eastern Hemisphere, and 120,000 from the Western Hemi-
sphere, with a limit of 20,000 per year from any one nation. Three
groups of people are excluded from the numerical ceiling and account for
the remainder of the more than 500,000 annual immigrants. These include
husbands, wives, and minor children of U.S. citizens, the parents of
adult U.S. citizens, and refugees admitted under the parole authority of
the Attorney General.

The 290,000 immigrant applicants are subject to a seven prefer-
ence visa allocation system outlined below:

First: Unmarried sons and daughters, 21 years of age or older, of
U.S. citizens (20 percent).
Second: Husbands, wives, and unmarried sons and daughters of per-
manent resident aliens (20 percent).
Third: Professionals and people of exceptional ability in the
sciences and arts who will benefit the economy, culture,
or welfare of the U.S. (10 percent).
Fifth: Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens 21 years of age or
older (24 percent).
Sixth: Skilled or unskilled workers needed in the U.S. labor
market who will not displace citizens or legal alien
workers (10 percent).
Seventh: Refugees from Communist or Communist-dominated coun-
tries, the Middle East, or areas struck by natural disaster (6
percent).
Unused visa numbers are available to other potential immigrants.

Following is a summary diagram of the categories of aliens and immigrants:

```
aliens (non-citizens)

immigrants
  (permanent residence)
non-immigrants
  (temporary residence or visit)

290,000
annual ceiling
(seven preference categories and non-preference)

relatives and
"special" immigrants
```

The above is a very basic description of an exceedingly complicated law. Even if the systems appear reasonable on paper, it is a shambles in practice. One problem is that some countries never reach their ceilings, while others have a waiting list of several years. The waiting list problem is the point at which the system has disintegrated for Latin America, particularly Mexico. Faced with interminable delay from the point of view of an eager applicant, the law is simply ignored.
This brings the discussion to the crucial question of policy implementation and enforcement, which is indeed a grey area. It is widely known that the enforcement of explicit restrictive immigration laws has been less than effective. This may be due, in part, to the problems immigration had in finding an agency willing to be responsible for its administration. Before 1882, no federal agency supervised immigration matters. The 1882 Act charged administrative responsibilities to the Secretary of the Treasury and enforcement to state boards or officers under Treasury; later a Commissioner of Immigration was established in the Treasury Department. In 1903, Congress moved immigration matters into the Department of Commerce and Labor; in 1913 they were transferred to the Department of Labor and divided into two bureaus: Immigration and Naturalization. Finally, a consolidated service was moved to its present resting place in the Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General. Thus the responsibility for administration and enforcement of immigration and naturalization matters are currently shared by the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, the President, the State Department and Secretary of State, the Labor Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. No wonder there is confusion.
Population and Development in Colombia

The historical antecedents of the United States have produced a nation comprised of many ethnic groups, spread across the continent, and served by a government founded primarily on British institutions. Colombia's history affords a very different pattern, which plays no little part in the case at hand.

The area that was to become Colombia was originally inhabited by several groups of advanced native cultures when the Spanish discoverers arrived in the early 16th century. While there were no vast empires to vanquish, gold was plentiful, and the conquistadores lost no time in impressing the indigenous population to extract the mineral wealth. Similar to the northern example, the native population declined rapidly through brutal treatment and lack of immunities to European diseases, and the Spanish turned to imported slave labor from Africa to work in the mines. Since the South American continent contained the riches the conquerors were seeking, these developments took place a full century before they did in the North.

Because the Spanish were primarily interested in conquering and extracting, they did not initially bring women and children, households,
and craftsmen to the New World, but rather lived in centralized fortifications, laid claim to and wasted large areas of surrounding territory, and mixed freely with the indigenous population. This early colonial history had a profound influence on the future of the area. One consequence is that, not only is the basic stock of the Colombian population limited to three groups: the indigenous population, white Europeans of Hispanic origin, and black Africans, but also most of the population is mixed. In 1718 the Colombian population comprised 19 percent indigenous people, 26 percent white, 7 percent black, and 48 percent mixed. (Cardona:9)\(^{13}\)

A second consequence is that the early settlement patterns of New Granada continued in the cloistered, isolated, introverted mode as opposed to North America's open, decentralized development. Although Colombia's topography also clearly had a great impact on the evolution of staunch regionalism in the country,\(^{14}\) the tradition of isolationalism was international as well as internal. The Spanish crown, similar to Great Britain at the time, was very protective of the wealth and markets its colonies provided, insisting on being their exclusive trading partner and intentionally thwarting development independent from the mother country.\(^{15}\) But, unlike the British, they took the notion to the extreme by
preventing immigration to the colonies from anywhere other than Spain. While North America enjoyed the fruits of new ideas and energy brought by people from around the globe, Spain intentionally sapped the vitality of New Granada to keep the area as a dependency.

So it happened that in spite of being in the area of the focus of attention one century earlier than the United States, Colombia found itself at the beginning of the 19th century, on the eve of its independence, desperately in need of people to build the country, to generate economic development by farming the land, exploiting its natural resources, and developing a commercial base. Thus, in 1810 the new republic's first population policy was pro-immigration. In 1823 a law was passed to promote foreign immigration into Colombian territory. The law denounced colonial population policy, actively solicited immigrants specifically from Europe and North America, with their "great ability to foment the development of the country, improve the race...morals, etc." (Cardona:21) and offered State land and craft opportunities to those who would come. Two more pro-immigration laws were passed in 1847 and in 1871. By the end of the 19th century, however, the character of the immigration policy changed somewhat; in addition to the explicit preference for European and North American immigrants, a list of excludable
individuals, similar to that found in the U.S. 1882 Act, was added, and restrictions on immigrant activities in Colombia were imposed.

In spite of all the legislation encouraging newcomers, very few people accepted the invitation. It is possible that Colombia opened its gates too late. By the time the country achieved independence and was able to reverse the Spanish policy of only allowing Spaniards and slaves to enter, other countries in the New World had already developed reputations as immigrant havens; the networks were already established. (Cardona:15) The momentum of immigration itself develops opportunities for later arrivals. It is estimated that in 1860 two million Irish alone immigrated to the United States (Select Commission:6), while in 1882 only 226 immigrants from Spain, Italy and Germany entered Colombia. There were a mere 3500 immigrants from those countries during the last eighteen years of the 19th century, a period when emigration from Europe had almost reached its peak. During the period from 1905 to 1914, the crest of the wave of the Great Migrations, when Ellis Island processed more than ten million new arrivals, Colombia also welcomed more immigrants annually than it ever had before, but there were still only slightly over 4500 newcomers.
Colombia continued its policy of trying to stimulate immigration by offering incentives and protection to newcomers until 1957. During the one hundred and thirty years from independence to the mid-20th century, the country equated economic take-off with a large population to make it work: people to produce and people to consume. After about 1957, while there was still some mention in immigration law of accepting refugees, the pro-immigration prose had vanished. The only newcomers that have been promoted during the last twenty years of legislation are tourists.

One reason for this change in posture was probably the new focus on rapid population growth in countries that were still in the early stages of economic development. By the mid-1950s demographers all over the world had calculated that preindustrialized countries were poised for massive population explosions as they entered the so-called "demographic transition" at rates higher than their already-industrialized predecessors. During the first half of the nineteenth century in Europe, as rural and urban socioeconomic configurations were altered and health conditions improved, infant and general mortality rates began to decline. Fertility rates remained the same, however, and the resultant gap, the natural increase of the population, grew rapidly. Eventually,
as Europe continued through the socioeconomic transition to a point where women became involved in the labor force, education became available to more families, and it became clear that more children would survive infancy. The birth rate began to fall until the difference between birth and deaths was not so great and the population grew less rapidly.

Similar to other developing countries, Colombia entered the post World War II period with very high fertility ideals and rates, and rapidly declining mortality rates. By the early 1970s, natural increase in Colombia was an astounding 3.4 percent, with the prospect of doubling the national population within 20 years. A number of influential Colombians felt that it was true that rapid population growth would have an adverse effect on economic development, and Colombia became one of the first countries in Latin America to take direct and sustained action, and to develop a comprehensive population policy that included an effort at fertility control. PROFAMILIA, the highly successful private family planning organization founded by a group of concerned physicians, began its first family planning clinics in urban centers in 1968, and eventually moved out into rural areas in collaboration with the Association of Coffee Growers. The PROFAMILIA program became a model for family planning initiatives throughout Latin America, and appears to have played
some role in bringing the rate of natural increase to a manageable 2.0 by 1980.\textsuperscript{17} (See Table 1.)

Although the birth rate has declined in recent years, the age structure is such that there is still considerable fertility potential for years to come and the population will grow dramatically in spite of the availability of contraceptives. Availability does not necessarily equal use; rather it has been shown that contraceptive use is directly related to socioeconomic mobility. (Rich 1973) Once a family edges toward the ability to participate more completely in society, there are built-in incentives to limit fertility. Colombia appears to be at a point in its development where more people are able to embrace a fuller participation in society.

The actual and potential growth in population has an impact on other demographic variables. Increased population pressure instigates movement, both internal and international. Typical of developing countries, the problem of rapid urbanization is severe in Colombia. Like many former colonies, Colombia had become overly dependent on the exportation of raw materials to more developed countries and decided to concentrate its limited investment and infrastructure resources on developing
Table 1

Selected Population Data for Colombia, S.A., with the United States as Reference (1977 and 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-year estimate</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>216.7</td>
<td>234.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birth rate (per 1000 pop.)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1000 pop.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Natural Increase (annual percent)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years to double population</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population under 15 years of age (percent)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1977 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET and 1983 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET
urban centers for manufacturing, but at the expense of rural areas. On the one hand, the small farms could not absorb the increased population, and on the other, the opportunities in the cities seemed more promising. Another important factor in the Colombian case of rural urban migration was the long period of *la violencia*, the rural political violence that sent people fleeing to the cities. (Guzman and Fals Borda, 1963) From 1950 to 1980 Colombia has changed from a 35 percent to a 60 percent urban population.

The advantage of increased urbanization is that rural migrants quickly adopt the lower urban fertility patterns, but the problem in Latin America is that people are moving into the cities much faster than the creation of opportunities for their employment. Colombia, however, is in a better situation than most Latin American countries in this respect. Its topography has led to the development of more than the customary two major cities, and the government has long had a "growth pole" policy of actively encouraging and supporting industrial development in cities throughout the country and in rural areas.

Not unlike other developing countries, Colombia makes a policy distinction between two types of emigrants: skilled and unskilled. When
the country found itself in the position of training and subsequently exporting large numbers of highly skilled professionals, particularly physicians, it decided to restrict their ability to depart. On the other hand, when thousands of unskilled agricultural and light manufacturing workers spilled into Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, and the United States to compete in the secondary labor market, nothing was said or done to impede their departure.\textsuperscript{18} The implicit policy position was that if local job pressure could be relieved by means of the migration, then it would be tolerated.

It is a mistake, however, to hold population pressure, per se, accountable for international migration. During the 1960s, just as some analysts erred in isolating "Yanki" imperialism as the single, most limiting obstacle to national development in Latin America, demographers got carried away in blaming rapid population growth as the single, most detrimental trend in the hemisphere. There is no better illustration of the complex of less-than-obvious factors that influence population and development than the case of the textile industry and the emigration of its workers.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Appendix III for a detailed Chronology of Immigration to the United States and Related Policy Instruments.

2. See Notes, Chapter 3, 1.

3. See Notes, Chapter 3, 2.

4. Immigrants entering via Pacific ports were only tallied thirty years later, and at the Mexican and Canadian borders as of 1910.

5. The law was recodified in 1891, 1903, 1907 and 1917.

6. For example, the War Brides Act (1945), the Displaced Persons Act (1948), Refugee Relief Act (1953).

7. Their difficulties in adjusting to the new situation caused them to be described as "a more damned crew hell never vomited," and that effort of establishing a craft industry also failed in 1624.

8. In the North, the rocky soil combined with a larger proportion of craftsperson colonists led to an economic tradition that favored the development of textile manufacturing in New England.


11. There are twenty-five categories of non-immigrants.

12. The most quoted estimate is of about 850,000 indigenous people. (Rosenblat, 1954:306).

13. By 1963 the proportion was 72 percent mixed, 20 percent white, 6 percent black, and 2 percent indigenous. (Cardona:9).

15. In the Americas, Spain succeeded much later than did Great Britain.

16. In South America, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile were the primary recipients of European immigrants.

17. See Notes, Chapter 3, 3.

SECTION II

MILLS AND MIGRANTS
Chapter 4

TEXTILE CITIES AND THE MILLS

The mechanization of New England textiles set the pace for the American industrial revolution... Major themes of industrialization were introduced here: the machine as ally and tyrant, the integrated factory, the corporation, the separation of management from labor, the woman as wage earner, the exploitation of a permanent factory class, the monopoly, the conglomerate, and even the American dream itself—all were developed or elaborated by this industry. In the mill town the farmer met the machine and the immigrant discovered America.

from Steve Dunwell
THE RUN OF THE MILL
In its heyday, Lowell was the giant of textile cities in the United States. Medellín is still the textile center of Colombia, if not all of Latin America. But the similarities end there. After a brief description of textile manufacturing this chapter portrays the two remarkable cities and introduces the five textile companies included in the study. At the end of the chapter, textile labor in Lowell and Medellín is compared.

The Manufacture of Textiles

There is no other sound quite like that of a weave room. The thundering of hundreds of looms mashing metal against metal as the harnesses rise and fall, slightly out of syncopation, then some together, then out again, and the whack of the shuttle as it is propelled on its endless back and forth journey render conversation impossible and thinking confined to the task at hand. In the old wooden-floored, multi-level, brick-clad mills of New England, the relentless pounding of the machines reverberates not only through body and soul, but also jolts the building from foundation to ceiling rafters. It is impossible to be in a weave room and not focus on the manufacture of textiles.
Spinning, weaving and finishing are the three tasks required to transform raw material into cloth ready for some specified use. For the spinning of cotton yarn, for example, the material must go through several processes: cleaning to remove foreign particles, carding to align the fibers between two sets of teeth into a sliver, drafting to stretch and thin the slivers, twisting to pull the fibers still thinner and twist them into yarn, and, finally, winding the yarn onto a cone or bobbin for the next process.¹

Weaving fabric simply involves lacing two sets of yarn at right angles to each other. To do that the warp threads are arranged in parallel fashion onto a warp beam, which may then be slashed or sized, for extra strength. The entire beam fits onto the loom and individual threads are drawn-in through the eyelets of the harness, which selects the warp pattern, and the reed, which keeps the threads parallel and attaches them to the cloth beam. When the harness raises warp yarns, the shuttle carrying the weft yarn on a bobbin passes through the opening, or shed. The weft strands are beaten into place as the cloth beam turns, taking up the cloth, and finally the cloth beam is removed from the loom.

The resultant greige cloth is inspected and either shipped to a converter or finished in the same mill. Finishing can include washing to
remove the sizing, dyeing or bleaching, sanforizing and mercerizing, drying, printing or stamping, and tufting to soften fabric such as corderoy and flannel. The cloth is inspected again, packed and shipped.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics lists over one hundred and thirty occupational titles in the non-professional areas of the textile industry. While the noise, heat and dust are occupational disadvantages, textile workers have a few major advantages over their manufacturing colleagues: their duties vary and they can be relatively independent. In most jobs, each worker is responsible for a certain number of looms, so that he or she is able to move about and rest if everything is running well.

The story of how the age-old tasks of spinning yarn and weaving cloth evolved from a simple, small-scale cottage craft to a decidedly large-scale activity with thousands of looms operating under one roof and thousands of laborers spending long hours in the mills tending them, is a fascinating one indeed. A brief sketch will suffice for the purposes of this thesis.

The earliest attempts at mechanization were directed toward the spinning procedures. Since medieval times twisting yarn with a foot-
treadle driven flyer was common in households throughout the world, but in 1769 a barber, Richard Arkwright, took the flyer and another older invention, roller drafting, and successfully combined them into the first continuous, automatic spinning process.

Weaving technology lagged far behind. In 1833 John Kay added the first significant improvement to the hand loom since ancient times: the fly shuttle, which meant that cloth wider than the weaver's arm span could be made without the aid of two shuttle assistants. But it was not until 1785 that an English preacher, Edmund Cartwright invented the first power loom. In 1803 Cartwright's loom was improved by Henry Horrocks, who figured out how to advance the warp automatically, change the width of the cloth and take up the fabric as it was woven. A commercially viable power loom had been invented.

Advances in textile technology did not occur without violent opposition and intrigue. Each new labor-saving invention brought workers from small shops into the streets in a rage against the tide of impending unemployment. The public smashing of the new "water-powered" looms was a precursor of the agonies textile manufacturing would suffer as the pathfinder of the industrial revolution. Furthermore, the British were not
at all willing to share the secrets of their incipient industrial revolution. They preferred to keep the colonies dependent by forcing them to purchase finished goods from England and isolating them from the wealth generated by their inventions.

In the beginning even the American founding fathers were ambivalent about the rewards of actively seeking the new technology. John Adams was pessimistic that the new nation could ever achieve manufacturing self-sufficiency. Others felt that manufacturing would take scarce labor from agriculture. Jefferson even wrote, "Let our workshops remain in Europe." On the pro-industry side, Tench Coxe felt that self-sufficiency required both raw materials and the ability to process them. He and Alexander Hamilton spoke in favor of encouraging "manufacture," and since textiles was the only industry mechanized at that time, it was to that industry that attention turned. Although the existence of the Arkwright spinner and the Cartwright power loom was known in North America, no one had been able to successfully replicate either machine on this side of the Atlantic or invent another viable system. Although industrial espionage carried severe penalties in Great Britain, it was by that means that textile technology finally reached these shores.
In 1789 a successful retiree, Moses Brown, advertised in Providence, Rhode Island that he was interested in acquiring the knowledge to build a "water" spinner. Samuel Slater, who had worked with Arkwright for many years, slipped out of England disguised as a farmer and within several months was hard at work as a millwright setting up machines for Moses Brown. In 1810 a gifted Bostonian, Francis Cabot Lowell was convalescing in England while considering a new enterprise. Over a two-year period he toured textile mills throughout Great Britain, and upon his return to Boston was able to build a power loom from memory with the help of an able mechanic.

Once the technology had entered the United States, small spinning and weaving mills sprang up along most of the ideal river and fall sites scattered throughout New England. Because most of these sites were isolated, mill towns developed into one-activity enclaves which enticed workers from the countryside with cash wages and a bucolic setting, including housing, a school and a church. In fact, the companies provided for most of the workers needs and eventually tended toward crippling paternalism. Since their labor needs were so great, the fledgling companies advertised for men with large families to take advantage of as many nimble fingers as possible.
The potential of this new system was awe-inspiring. Francis Cabot Lowell and his friend Nathan Appleton were able to conceptualize the possibilities, and in 1814 began a large venture by setting up a power loom in a spinning mill in Waltham, Massachusetts. The Boston Manufacturing Company became the first integrated factory where yarn was spun and woven into cloth on the same premises. In ten years of astounding growth and prosperity, they began to leave the smaller family mills far behind and absorbed many of them. The manufacture of textiles had been organized on a commercial scale unknown in the United States up to that time.

Lowell, Massachusetts

Once known as the birthplace of "the Industrial Revolution", Lowell has seen many changes.

Two years after Francis Cabot Lowell died, it became clear that the Charles River in Waltham did not flow swiftly enough to support the Boston Manufacturing Company's burgeoning operations. Nathan Appleton and the Company's agent, Patrick Jackson, set out in search of a new site, and found the perfect situation for their grandiose scheme at the
convergence of the Merrimack and Concord rivers. The Merrimack River had its own fall, the Pawtucket Falls, and a canal had already been built in the area to support a series of small mills.

Jackson and Appleton bought up the canal and all the land around it and renamed the area "Lowell" after the man whose dream it had been to build a model industrial city. They spent several years improving the site and in 1828 opened the Merrimack Mills, complete with expansive brick mill buildings, boarding houses, church and school. All of this was laid out in what was considered utopian proportions to match the lofty ideals of an organized "manufactory", developed for the good of the nation, the people who would operate the spindles and looms, and the owners. The enterprise flourished, but that was only the beginning.

As owners of the canal and all the adjoining property, Jackson and Appleton established the office of Proprietor of the Locks and Canals, which in time enlarged and extended the canals, helped to set up other textile companies along the system and then leased the water rights to the new companies. Within ten years, more than a dozen very large, integrated cotton mills were flourishing on the banks of the Merrimack River in Lowell: The Suffolk, Hamilton, Appleton, Tremont, Lawrence, Boott, and Middlesex mills, to name only a few.
Lowell prospered and earned the fame of "Spindle City", the "Venice of the United States", and the "Workshop of the World". The flood of European immigrants that descended on Lowell during the period of the Great Migrations was absorbed by the mills, and the city began to take on the diverse international ambience it enjoys to this day. As a great textile center, Lowell was even able to start its own Textile School for training workers and management.

But times changed and Lowell changed with them. First the cotton and wool markets fluctuated wildly, then the Depression had a devastating effect on textile manufacturing and many mills closed. Lowell never fully recovered as a textile center after that. Operating expenses in the north had become prohibitive, and many operations moved south, or as one mill owner describes it,

It wasn't that they moved. They were buying mills in the south as well as the north. They were getting bigger, and all they would do was to stop their northern operations. They would just keep their southern operations running. You see? And this is really what is meant by moving south. Nobody really moved south; they were just expanding.

After a surge in business in the post World War II period, Lowell suffered rapid decline. The acres of majestic brick buildings
became still and dark, looms lay silent, rusting with the warp still in place, interlaced with cobwebs. Lowell, like so many of its New England neighbors, began to take on the grey pallor of a perpetual New England winter. The once-vibrant neighborhoods, The Acre, Little Canada and others, deteriorated and a generation of young people grew up with one driving ambition: to get out of Lowell.

But Lowell had a few advantages over its neighboring cities in distress: a spirit that would not die, a city government that could affect change, and a native son in Congress who was in a position to direct some lifeblood into the city. The recovery began in the late sixties with the Regatta Commission, a group of civic leaders and businessmen who made it clear that they were willing to fight for Lowell. While the fulltime, business-getting City Manager, in close cooperation with the City Council and Mayor's Office, devised a plan based on the advent of the electronics boom in New England and the preservation of Lowell's historic significance in U. S. industrial history, Paul Tsongas in Washington assured that forty million dollars would be earmarked for the Lowell Historic Park and downtown revitalization program.
By the mid-seventies Lowell had changed its course from a ghost city mourning the passing of its mature industry to a tastefully restored living museum with a bright future in the vibrant modern manufacturing sector. Wang Industries made Lowell its corporate headquarters; Avco, Raytheon, Union Carbide, Courier Citizen Publishing and others pumped vitality into the area. Although the redbrick mill buildings still dominate the cityscape, most have been converted to other industries, elderly housing, museums and retail space. Diverse and determined, Lowell has taken on a new character. Lowell is the history of manufacturing in New England: first as a textile leviathan, then as an ailing victim of changing times, and recently, but not finally, as a seasoned warrior regenerated with new ideas, strategies and purpose.

Yet the textile industry is not completely gone from Lowell. The remaining companies are clearly unique in that they have survived. Three of them were selected for study: the Ames Manufacturing Corporation which includes two of the remaining operations in Lowell (Lawrence Manufacturing and Synthetic Yarns), Joan Fabrics Corporation, and the Wannelscit Textile Company. Their common denominator is the feisty, resourceful independence that has become a trademark in New England.
Ames Manufacturing Corporation

The administrative offices of the Ames Manufacturing Corporation are located in a small, modern, single-storied building, neatly landscaped, sparse and functional. The atmosphere is pleasant and efficient. Management offices are simple, yet elegantly furnished, with photographs of generations of managing elite lining the walls.

President and Treasurer, Edward B. Stevens, appears very much the product of his Yankee upbringing and Groton and Harvard education, clearly at ease, trim and fit, thoroughly open and congenial. No need for pretense, no need for caution. His is the fourth generation of this venerable New England family to be managing the clan's holdings.

Ames Manufacturing Corporation traces its genealogy to Lowell's earliest illustrious citizen, the flamboyant General Benjamin Franklin Butler, who once ran for President of the United States. In 1865 the then-United States Senator Ben Butler helped to pass a law stipulating that American Flags be made of U. S., rather than British bunting. Shortly thereafter, he founded the U. S. Bunting Company in Lowell, and had a monopoly on the bunting market for years to come. Ben Butler also had followed the Jackson/Appleton model and started the Wamesit Power
Company, that owned canals and property, and leased buildings and water rights to many types of small and large industries. Not surprisingly, Benjamin F. Butler did very well.

Butler's grand-daughter, Edith Ames, married Charles Brooks Stevens, directly descended from John Stevens, who moved from Newburyport to North Andover in 1630. Two hundred years later one of his descendants, Nathaniel Stevens bore nine children. One, Horace Nathaniel, became the progenitor of the J. P. Stevens line, and another, George, became the founder of the Ames Stevens branch of the family.

C. B. Stevens and his brother, George, managed the U. S. Bunting Company for many years, changed the product line to worsted for menswear and were responsible for buying Lawrence Manufacturing. C.B.'s son, Ames Stevens, ran the Company from 1918 to 1945, and expanded it greatly by buying (and sometimes selling) new mills in Maine, Massachusetts and Georgia. Ed Stevens joined management after the Second World War, and became President in 1968. His two brothers, son, two nephews and innumerable other relatives are in the textile business.
To survive into the last quarter of the 20th century as a small closely-held textile corporation, the Company has had to be fleet-footed indeed. Edward Stevens attributes their survival to a combination of luck and enterprising moves. Foremost among the latter were: buying out the non-family stockholders who questioned being in textiles, and moving overseas, both in 1960.

We were always sort of experimenting, in and out of businesses. Some were more successful than others... In the old days, you were brought in and you were sent around through all the departments, and then you learned something about the manufacturing side of the business and the financial side of the business, and that's all we needed to know. But even at that time things were changing and that wasn't sufficient, and fortunately my brother Ames was sent to New York to learn something about the merchandising side of the business. Because it was the merchants in the textile business who survived, not the treasurers or the manufacturing people. A lot of the businesses failed because they didn't understand what their markets were or how important they were to the success of the business...Things have continued to speed up. Product life cycles are shorter and shorter and you have to be a lot more flexible and be able to change and move more rapidly.

Ames followed this advice by introducing to Europe as a knit-back vinyl a knit that they had been producing at Lawrence. The enterprise was a great success and business expanded from England to Ireland, into a joint venture in Holland, then France and Greece. With nine mills in Europe, a major share of the company's business is now overseas.
Ames has four operations in the United States. In the early 1950's they built the Cleveland Mills in Georgia to produce gabardine, which went abruptly out of style before the looms had even started up. At the same time, however, the Army changed to its "greens" and the company was in an excellent position to bid for that contract. In Lowell, Ames has two divisions, Lawrence Manufacturing and Synthetic Yarns, both with family members close to top management.

Lawrence Manufacturing is the only textile company in Lowell that has been in the same location and retained the same name since the earliest days of the textile boom. It was built in 1828 along the western canal and has been in operation ever since. For Ames the company had been manufacturing knit fabric for industrial use (primarily for General Tire Co.) for many years, but the internal pressures in the textile industry forced them to change their product. Lawrence imported its polyester yarn from Brazil at a lower price than domestic polyester. The southern U. S. spinners petitioned successfully for a tariff on imported yarn, and Lawrence could not sell its industrial fabric at the increased price. The company tried knit menswear fabric, and finally settled on cloth for women's outer wear.
Synthetic Yarns, which uses one corner of the old Lawrence building, was bought by Ames Manufacturing in 1975 and moved back to Lowell from Taunton. It is a small operation that buys yarn from Dupont, Monsanto and Celanese, twists and shrinks it, and packages it for clients who weave labels. Twisting is almost as noisy as weaving and knitting, "the whine without the whack of the shuttle", but a much more intense heat generator. At the time of initial data collection, Lawrence had 130, and Synthetic Yarns had 60 production employees.

Although Edward Stevens is a Republican by "history and inclination", he is just as likely to vote for an individual. Ames Manufacturing belongs to the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and the Association of Textile Manufacturers, and prefers to petition for its interests through these associations rather than as an individual company. Although the company has contributed to individual campaigns, most political donations are made through the "Good Government" section of the ATMI, whom the company allows to decide who needs their support. "Maybe I have a reluctance to be in someone's personal debt."
Joan Fabrics Corporation

Joan is the largest textile manufacturer in Lowell. The corporate offices are buried in one of the mazes of recently-acquired old mill buildings in the central and southeastern section of the city. The atmosphere at Joan is one of ardent production; the equipment is modern, the prevailing mood is upbeat.

President Lawrence Ansin is young, enthusiastic and totally involved. After completing a degree at the Wharton School of Economics, he assumed the presidency from his father, Harold Ansin, who with his wife Evelyn, owns all of the company's stock. The elder Ansins, Larry, his brother Joe, who is a Vice-President and a graduate of the Lowell Textile School, and a non-family Vice President of Merchandising are the entire senior management staff at Joan Fabrics and make all policy and operating decisions.

Larry Ansin's grandfather, David, began the business in 1918 as a textile waste material jobber in New York. After two years of high risk operation and extraordinarily hard work, he had earned enough to become a converter, buying cloth from mills and converting it to small furniture manufacturer specifications. Twelve years later, he and his
son, Harold, and son-in-law, Bernard Joslin, bought fourteen old looms and began a furniture upholstery weaving operation in Central Falls, Rhode Island: the Jo-An Plush Mills. The company expanded, and in 1914 Joslin's interests were bought out by the Ansín family, and the name of the company was changed to Joan Fabrics Corporation.

As households were being formed in record numbers after the Second World War, the demand for furniture filtered down to Joan. The company bought a mill in Hickory, South Carolina in 1952, another weaving operation in Rhode Island in 1955, and finally a defunct dyeing and finishing plant in Lowell in 1957. The corporate offices were moved to Lowell shortly after that. In the sixties, Joan bought four more plants in Lowell and two in New Jersey, one of which has since moved to Lowell. The corporation is integrated and performs all operations from design through finishing. The company boasts some state-of-the-art "water jet" weaving machines from Japan and Austria. Showrooms are maintained in five major cities in the United States.

In the early sixties Joan Fabrics had joined other small family-owned textile companies doing the product market shuffle. Anxious about the volatility of the furniture industry and intent on maximizing
the return on capital investment, Joan had diversified into specialized automotive fabric (for window channels), industrial fabric (for paint rollers, cameras and other items), apparel (pile linings), commercial carpeting (such as bathroom scatter rugs), and other commissioned weaving.

Then in 1968, Joan made a bold and unconventional decision. They would de-diversify and attempt to become the leading upholstery fabric manufacturer in the United States. The other areas they had gotten into were costly to manage and merchandise, and the innovation of furniture discount warehouses could be to their advantage. They decided to concentrate their design, manufacturing and merchandising efforts on one item and try to remain flexible within that market.

It took three years for the company to show a profit from the new strategy. The discount-warehouses did have a lot to do with their eventual success, because instead of showing samples and custom ordering each item, the warehouses stocked large inventories of fewer items. Joan was primed to fill large rush orders for the beleaguered furniture manufacturers. The company's sales went from 12 million in 1968-69, to 13.5 million in 1970 and 20 million in 1971. At that point the Ansins ser-
iously considered selling common stock in the company to the public, but just before the stock was issued in 1973, they were strongly advised against doing so.

At the time of data collection, annual sales at Joan were in excess of $50 million. The company had about eight hundred production workers on the payroll in the four active Lowell plants.¹⁰

Wannalancit Textile Company

To walk into the offices of the Wannalancit Textile Company is to take a long step back in time. The mill, just down Suffolk Street from Ames Manufacturing and once sharing the same section of canal system as the Lawrence Mill, was built in 1831. It appears as if not much has changed since then; the old counting house, the mill yard, memorabilia from other mills, the old bell announcing the arrival and departure of trucks laden with raw materials and cloth, all contribute to the old world atmosphere that envelopes the mill.

President Edward A. Larter, Jr. would have it no other way.¹¹ Perpetually dressed for work in the very bowels of the mill, this is a man whose heartbeat is in syncopation with the throw of the shuttle. He
calls the mill "mother" and will agonize with it to its last breath, leaving the details of the business to its able General Manager, the diminutive, unflappable and ever-loyal, Mozart Holmes. The third member of the management triumvirate is Ted's mother, who acts as Treasurer.

The Larter family also comes from old New England stock. Ted's ancestors, who can be traced to the *Mayflower*, finally settled as farmers in the Dunstable area. In 1929, Ted's father started the family business with three thousand dollars and six looms in the old Appleton Mill. In 1946 the company moved to its present quarters, which had been built as the Suffolk Mill, merged with the Tremont Manufacturing Company across the street in 1870, and purchased in 1915 by the National Manufacturing Company, who made blankets there until 1930 when the Depression forced them out of business.

Edward Larter, Sr. wove cloth that he personally drove to New York to sell. He tried unsuccessfully to interest one of his two sons in the business, but the boys had been raised on the family farm and Ted, Jr. felt that he was a "farmer at heart". On the fourth of July, 1957, two weeks after he returned from the service, fate intervened. His father died, and for Ted "there was no question about who was going to take over".
After an arduous period of proving himself to the company loy-
als, several of whom were still there in 1980, Ted managed to hold the
mill together. At the time of initial data collection, Wannalancit em-
ployed about 130 production people and had annual sales of about seven
million dollars. They primarily sold greige cloth to converters, who
finished the fabric to their client's specifications, but that business
was being undermined by the larger integrated companies.

The minute the converter shows the sample to the
mill, the mill sends missionaries out to find out
where he is selling it, and they'll go and sell it at
five cents less.

The company has also survived on government contracts to produce synthet-
ic fabric used for parachutes and space suits. In recent years Ted has
personally diversified his interests to a hydroelectric plant in Frank-
lin, New Hampshire.

Wannalancit is the last company in Lowell to have used the old
Crompton and Draper shuttle looms, which gave them some flexibility in
meeting specifications for small jobs, but also earned them a reputation
as a less than modern operation. Combined with Ted's hobby collection of
antique looms, generators and vehicles scattered throughout the mill
yard, the mood here is nostalgic; hopeful but struggling, determined and
proud. The Lowell Museum is aptly housed in one half of one of the mill's buildings.

Ted Larter is a Republican, who will vote, however, as he sees fit. Wannalancit does not belong to any textile associations, preferring to deal with problems directly, calling and writing government representatives personally when the need arises.

Yup, it's pretty low key around here. I do most of the doin'. I make policy as it's needed...I'm a product of the old school, where I believe in making the money before you spend it. I've never owed anybody anything and I never will.

Lowell and its mills were the migrant destination; their origin in Colombia was quite different indeed.

**Medellín, Antioquia**

Nestled high in the Cordillera Central de los Andes in the Aburrá Valley, Medellín's physical beauty and climate are unparalleled. Known as the "City of Eternal Spring", it is the capital of the department of Antioquia, and the second largest city in Colombia. Antioquia is
unique to Colombia, and there are few cities like Medellín in all of Latin America.

Although there is considerable controversy surrounding the origin of the original settlers of the region, Antioqueños are renowned throughout Colombia for being resourceful, enterprising, proud, hardworking and conservative. A visitor to Medellín could hardly think otherwise. It is a vibrant, thriving, diversified industrial center that has been a leader in the manufacture of textiles since the early 20th century. Medellín had long been the commercial and financial center for the rich mining and agricultural areas surrounding the city, and, after industrialization, became the nucleus of the nearby manufacturing subcenters of Bello, Itaquí and Envigado that are gradually being incorporated within its limits as the city extends around them.

The Valle del Aburrá was inhabited by the intelligent and fearsome Nutabe Indians when a lieutenant of the Spanish conquistador Mariscal Jorge Robledo discovered it in 1541. As they did throughout the southern part of the hemisphere, the Spaniards tortured the natives, took anything of value, destroyed the rest, and left with their plunder. It was not until fifty years later in 1616, that an outpost was established
by Francisco Herrera Campuzano in what is now the suburb of Poblado. Finally, in 1675 the settlement was moved to its present downtown area as the "Villa de Nuestra Senora de la Candelaria de Medellín" under the aegis of the Catholic priest, Father Gomez de Urena, who remained its leader for almost sixty years.

In 1813, Medellín received the title of "city", and in 1826 it replaced the colonial town of Santa Fé de Antioquia as the capital of the department. In spite of its growth in population and stature, Medellín continued as a predominantly coffee, sugar and gold mining center into the second half of the 19th century. When the mills were being built in Lowell, Medellín was still almost totally isolated high in the mountains, far from shipping ports, cut off even from other Colombian cities by treacherous roads circumventing impassable terrain. (See Table 2.) It was only in 1865 that the first telegraph office was brought to the city.

These were far from wasted years, however. During the 19th century, Medellín developed a solid base for its future industrial development as an active mining and agricultural center. Because the level of capital investment for mineral extraction and reaching markets beyond the Cordillera Central were so high, early entrepreneurs were forced to
Table 2
Comparative Profile of Lowell, Massachusetts and Medellín, Antioquia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lowell</th>
<th>Medellín</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altitude</td>
<td>93.74 ft.</td>
<td>4877 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean temperature</td>
<td>26.7 Jan. 73.6 July</td>
<td>70°F annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>6,474</td>
<td>8,382 (1835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>94,969</td>
<td>31,055 (1905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>112,759</td>
<td>51,951 (1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>101,389</td>
<td>143,952 (1938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>94,239</td>
<td>1,070,924 (1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>latest census</td>
<td>92,418 (1980)</td>
<td>''</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Number of textile establishments with more than five employees**/total number of production employees

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>10/8500+</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>10/12,500+</td>
<td>--***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>12/6000+</td>
<td>10/750+ (1925)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>24/2300</td>
<td>60/13,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>14/1500+</td>
<td>75+/34,000+ (1977)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* This refers to the City of Lowell and Medellín District only.

** This includes the greater metropolitan area for both cities, although the mills of Lowell were all located within the city limits. These figures are for very general comparative purposes only.

*** First Medellín textile mill established in 1870.

Sources: DANE ENCUESTA ANUAL MANUFACTURERA (1977), DAVISON'S TEXTILE BLUE BOOK.
collaborate. A strong commercial and financial bourgeoisie was formed, internal markets were secured because of the high cost of import transportation, and when the world-wide Depression of the early 20th century devastated cities such as Lowell, Medellín had just reached a point where its internal financial and commercial strength could reach out and join the industrial revolution.

The modern development of Medellín began in the early 1900s, when some enterprising citizens started small industries that took advantage of the mighty Medellín River and its tributaries that coursed through the valley. The beginning was modest. By 1870 Medellín's industry consisted of a small brewery, cigarette factory, a couple of printers and tanneries. In the same year the first cotton mills were started by Indalecio Uribe, who adapted and improved his looms with parts that he made himself. His textile operation was built in Bello, the former Hato Viejo, where it remains today, the second largest textile company in Colombia, the Fábrica de Hilados y Tejidos del Hato (Fabricato).

By 1930 Medellín boasted over fifty substantial companies and factories. There were seven textile mills, eight chocolate factories,
seven metal shops or foundaries, seven cigarette companies, four soft
drink factories and breweries, eight tile factories, and the rest dis-
tributed in companies involved in the manufacture of matches, drugs,
food, shoes, soap, and the processing of milk. Some of these companies
were the predecessors of large conglomerates today. In 1975 there were
over eight hundred establishments, mostly involved in the garment in-
dustry (128), textiles (94), food processing (89), metals (62), minerals
(54) and chemicals (47). Other significant industries include: tobacco,
beverages, leather, shoes, furniture, printing, plastics, machinery and
glass.\textsuperscript{13}

The city is now a mix of gracious colonial structures grouped
comfortably around verdant plazas, and imposing modern skyscrapers lining
pedestrian malls. Medellín boasts nine universities and very active
participation in the arts. For whatever reason, the Antioqueño today is
considered to be as restless, energetic and driven to hard work as his
forebears.

Medellín is the city of progress of Colombia. It is
the product of neither circumstance nor luck, but
rather of the respected effort of its inhabitants,
who as a group never shirk their responsibility, who
never stray from the path that is their destiny:
civic pride, hard work, and patriotism.\textsuperscript{14}
Coltejer

Textiles are the largest volume industry in Medellín, and the Compañía Colombiana de Tejidos (Coltejer) is the largest public corporation in Colombia. The ultramodern Coltejer building, designed as the point of a needle, dominates the Medellín skyline, already amply endowed with impressive towers. The top floors house the company's corporate offices where the surroundings is ultra-modern, friendly, efficient and cooperative. As an industrial giant and the pride of Colombia, Coltejer has nothing to hide. Management is busy, but more than willing to take time to share the firm's success story.15

The company was founded in 1907 by Don Alejandro Echavarría Isaza, who started a small operation with thirteen workers at the site of what is now one of the company's divisions, Coltehilos.16 When a more substantial building was constructed and inaugurated two years later, the looms were started by the President of the Republic via a telegraph line to Bogotá. "Perhaps they even sensed then what Coltejer would become in the future." In 1914, with 130 shuttle looms and some circular knitting looms, the company sold stock publicly. Even during the Depression era, Coltejer did well by buying discarded looms cheaply from the United States; all had to be brought in on muleback. In 1942 the company began
to buy up not only smaller mills, but also larger, established mills. Coltejer steadily continued to grow and diversify during the following three decades.

In the manufacture of textiles, Coltejer owns and operates ten mills located in Envigado, Itaquí and Río Negro. Coltefábrica produces primarily denim for export to the United States under the Levi and Lee brand names, and corderoy to the European market. Rosellón produces heavy fabrics; (canvas) Sedeco and Doña María make light cloths and blends such as satin, acrylics and polyester for shirt and dress material. Telaraña manufactures cloth for household items such as curtains, sheets, towels and carpets. Coltehilos spins yarn, Polímeros converts yarn to polyester, and the Planta de Acabados is a totally computerized finishing plant. Textiles Rionegro, located in a nearby village, "we can honestly say is the most modern mill in Latin America, with the most modern machinery available and the most modern construction." The Rionegro complex has circular knitting looms to produce synthetic fabrics for women's and men's apparel, sweaters and double knits, and a new finishing plant under construction. The company has 71 distributors around the country. At the time of data collection, Coltejer employed over 12,000 production workers in the manufacture of textiles. In 1978 tex-
tile sales totalled about 262 million dollars.\textsuperscript{17} The company owns its own energy plants, river systems and water supply.

In addition to its textile operations, Coltejer has diversified into \textit{Furesa} a machine company that makes automobile parts for Chrysler, looms, other industrial parts, and replacement parts for the almost six thousand looms the company operates, \textit{Futec}, a foundry, \textit{Vulcano}, which makes bricks for foundry ovens and glass products, \textit{Impormoto}, which produces motorcycles in conjunction with a Japanese company, \textit{Confeccciones}, a maker of women's apparel, \textit{Bochica}, a flower (carnations and chrysanthemums) exporter, \textit{Prosecolsa, Forestales y Cipreses}, a forestry, pulp and paper products plant,\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Delmaíz}, which processes by-products of corn, and \textit{Inyucal}, which processes culinary by-products from yucca.

In textiles, Coltejer exports approximately sixty percent of the finished cloth, and twenty percent of the greige cloth. In 1978 the total value of exports was thirty-six million dollars.

In 1977 a major change affected the corporation: one of the most influential stockholders, Ardila Lulle\textsuperscript{19} began buying out other stockholders and took control of the company. The Grupo Ardila Lulle
already owned major interest in two large soft drink companies (and the bottle cap factory), glass companies, sugar mills, air and land transportation companies, and radio stations; in short, a massive conglomerate, of which Coltejer was now a part. For Coltejer, survival is a question of independence rather than impending insolvency.

Tejicóndor

The offices of the Fábrica de Tejidos El Cóndor, S.A. (Tejicóndor) are located in a complex of single and two-storied structures located painfully close to one end of the Olaya Herrera International Airport runway. Don Jesús Mora Carraquilla, with six associates, built the mill buildings in late 1934 and the company has maintained its headquarters there ever since. The ambience of the architecture is Latin American, with pleasant courtyards, tiled walkways and graceful porches. The mood is friendly, and cooperative.

Tejicóndor began its operation in 1935 with one hundred Draper looms, Saco Lowell Spinners and one hundred and eighty-five employees. By 1942 the company had acquired 687 looms, and equipment for four finishing processes. Gradually over the next twenty years, Tejicóndor increased its manufacturing capabilities from the original cotton greige
cloth to finished and stamped fabric, cloth woven from imported synthetic yarn, sometimes blended with cotton or wool, fine shirt material, and wide fabric for household use. Tejicóndor was the first company to introduce the sanforizing process to Colombia in 1946.

During the period from the early 1940s to 1958 Tejicóndor was associated with the U.S.-based Grace Company, which controlled fifty-one percent of Tejicóndor's capital. Then in 1958, the Grace Company stock was completely bought up by Colombian stockholders, a move which assured that "Colombian capital recouped the total control of the administrative and technical aspects of the company."

In the early 1970s Tejicóndor built a modern plant in the rural area of Barbosa. Like Coltejer, the company is complying with the national government's policy of industrial decentralization. The Barbosa facility is a Planta de Acabados, or finishing plant, allowing the mill in Medellín to concentrate on spinning and flat weaving. The company has two other divisions; Textiles Prisma, which produces knit fabrics, and Comercial América, which markets Tejicondor's products. The company currently manufactures about seventy-five percent cotton and twenty-five percent polyester fabrics, all of which are finished in the Barbosa plant.
At the time of data collection Tejicónedor was the third largest textile company in Medellín (after Coltejer and Fabricato), and employed over two thousand production workers.

Comparative Profile of Textile Labor

The striking thing about the two cities just described is that in some cases their patterns of manufacturing are reversed from what would be expected of a modern, industrialized nation and that of a traditional, developing economy. A preliminary examination shows the personalized, eclectic management of a small-scale, single product company typical of traditional establishments to be functioning in Lowell, and the less personal, efficient management of large, diversified corporations doing very well indeed in Medellín.

One reason for this apparent disparity is the choice of mills. While there are no textile manufacturers as big as Coltejer in Lowell, there are in other parts of the United States, and there are many smaller mills operating in a manner similar to Wannalancit in Medellín. The companies studied were chosen because they were the origin and des-
tination of one of the first and most persistent migration flows of textile workers.

Then one must ask, "Why would an operative leave what is considered one of the best jobs available in his hometown to work as an outsider in a declining industry under inferior conditions in a place that, for all its revitalization, would be hard pressed to compete with a city located high in the mountains near the Equator?" The answer to this question is that the "modern" industries in Colombia are still more traditional in many aspects than the traditional industries in the United States. Even progressive Antioquia operates within the constraints of its colonial heritage outlined in the preceding chapter. The differences for the working man are significant.

The following are the areas of basic differences between textile workers in Colombia and the United States that will be outlined in this section:

1. Where do the workers come from?
2. How are they trained?
3. How are the jobs classified?
4. How are the jobs recompensed (wages and benefits)?
5. What organizations look out for their interests?
6. What are their prospects for upward mobility?
Origin

The United States textile industry has always depended on immigrant labor. The Lowell area was essentially farmland when the "money-men" came up from Boston, bought up everything in sight and built the Merrimack Manufacturing Company. There was a small canal and a smattering of mills employing few people, but there was no town, no existing population from which to draw mill workers for such a large enterprise, and for the other giant mills that were to follow. Thus, Jackson, Appleton and their agent, Kirk Booth, looked to the surrounding countryside for their source of labor and found the answer to their dilemma in the "farm girl" system.

Young women were brought to Lowell under a year's contract. They were paid wages, worked twelve to fourteen hour days, went to school in the evenings, were housed in company boarding houses in dormitory fashion, and were generally very closely supervised. This was not such a great departure from the earlier Rhode Island System of bringing entire families into the care of company-run enclaves. For the young women it was their only chance to earn wages, many were able to expand their horizons in this way, and some even found time for literary accomplishments.22 For the mills, the "farm girls was the best system there ever
was"; they were agile, intelligent, reliable, and cheap. They constitute the first group of imported labor.  

As some aspects of the manufacture of textiles became more complicated (box looms and pattern weaving) skilled weavers were recruited and brought to New England from the British Isles. Then, after the Civil War, the European immigrants began to arrive in large numbers: the Irish, later the Greeks and Poles, Italians and Portuguese. The labor market was flooded, and the newcomers were willing to work for less. In Lowell, each group, except the Irish, followed their predecessors into the tenements, and then into their own neighborhoods. The Irish were never allowed to live in company housing and camped in what is still known today as "The Acre."

Then, slowly, these people and their children began to move out of the mills by starting their own small businesses (restaurants, bake-shops, auto repair) and into other less arduous manufacturing. After the Second World War, the electronics companies, the "glamour industries", began to move into the Lowell area and the earlier immigrant groups gravitated toward them. Even before that happened another source of labor had come to take their places. French Canadians, who were being squeezed off
the land, filtered down from Canada and willingly assumed the mill jobs. In
the late fifties and early sixties, the Latin Americans began to ar-
rive in Lowell, first from Puerto Rico, then in small numbers from Bra-
zil, Mexico and Cuba. The use of immigrant labor in the textile industry
in New England is as old as the industry itself.

Medellín's case is very different. The textile industry was
founded two hundred years after the town was established and sixty years
after it had been elevated to "city" status as a thriving financial and
commercial center supporting vast agricultural and mining activities.
There was an established population from which to draw labor. Colom-
bia's, and particularly, Antioquia's, consistently high birth and popu-
lation growth rates assured ample internal labor availability from Medel-
lín proper, and from the nearby towns and countryside. Since textile
jobs are so prestigious in Medellín, there are few serious competitors
for talented labor.

Training

When Lowell was a thriving textile center, the large companies
had their own training programs; a few large centers in the South still
do. But for many years Lowell has not had enough textile activity to
support such a school, and the companies are left to their own devices to meet their training needs. The once-renowned Lowell Textile School offering vocational and management textile education has been replaced by Wang Institute for training in the electronics field. The problem of training textile workers in-house in Lowell is seriously compounded by the fact that labor shortages make it difficult to free a person to teach others, and the extraordinarily high turnover rates render the effort all but futile anyway.

Medellín's textile manufacturers have manpower training covered on two fronts: by public and private programs. First, there is the *Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje* (SENA), the Colombian National Vocational Training Service, that has schools throughout the country to train people to become anything from secretaries and chefs, to auto mechanics, weavers and loom fixers. The prestigious schools offer day and evening courses in a highly organized program. In Bello the SENA operates a modern textile operative training center in a pleasant college campus setting, which reflects Colombia's high regard for manual work. In addition to the outstanding national training program, each of the large companies has its own extensive Centro de Capacitación, or training center, where workers are regularly sent during working hours to complete
six month courses in order to elevate their position to the next *escalafón*. These mandatory training courses are paid for jointly by the government and the companies.

Job Classification

The *escalafón*, or job mobility ladder, is the basis of internal textile job organization in Medellín. Every worker enters at the bottom of the ladder (as a sweeper) and moves up to more responsible jobs according to a clearly-defined set of standards. The criteria for promotion include the completion of courses at the SENA or *Centros de Capacitación*, years of experience, and a merit/demerit system, that records delitos such as absenteeism and tardiness. With a virtually unlimited labor supply, there is considerable motivation to stay in line. To give an example from the ranks of the loom fixers, who are already the cream of the textile labor force: there are six categories of *mecánicos*, from beginners doing heavy work such as setting up looms to loom fixer supervisors.24 The job classifications are standard throughout the industry and are known to all workers.

In present-day Lowell, this is not the case at all. A loom fixer, for instance, is simply a loom fixer.25 Because they are in such
short supply, they may be called on to do any number of tasks, from setting up looms, repairs, or training — all in the same week.

Wages

Take-home wage recompense in Colombia is as structured as job classification and mobility; each job title has an associated wage. Since all workers begin at the same level and are given the same opportunities for advancement, seniority generally means a higher classification and wage, and when this is not the case, it is assumed to be related to performance. Very simple, very neat. All textile companies in Medellín have the same wages to prevent workers from moving back and forth in search of wage differentials.

In the United States the general rule for textile wages is that they are "in spittin' distance from the minimum wage." Period. In a labor intensive industry with such a painfully low profit margin, wages constitute the major overhead expense, particularly in Lowell, where the mill buildings have long since been depreciated and paid off. Prices are held down by intense foreign import competition, and wages absorb the squeeze. Among the companies studied in Lowell there was considerable variation in wages, all just slightly above union wages. One company
simply looks at the biannual Berkshire-Hathaway agreements and adds ten cents per hour.

Take home wages in Lowell are four times higher than they are in Medellín. For every hour worked in Medellín in 1980, a loom fixer made just over one dollar; while in Lowell he earned about five dollars; in less than one day of work in Lowell, a Colombian loom fixer can make what it would take him more than a week to earn in Colombia. There is one more vital difference in the ability to earn cash income. While textile workers in Colombia are paid a premium for the late-night third shift, their overtime hours are limited by law. In the U. S. overtime hours are paid time-and-a-half, even in the smaller establishments, and, because of the labor shortage, extra hours are often available.

Benefits

The comparison of textile labor in Medellín and Lowell takes on new dimensions at this point. Benefits are the second measure of recompense. In the United States, wages and benefits vary considerably from industry to industry and between companies within industries. Similar to wages, benefits in the textile industry are slim indeed. All of the companies studied in Lowell offered minimum health insurance coverage,
limited vacation pay, and no pension programs. All workers were entitled to workmen's compensation in case of injury, and employment compensation for ninety days in case of layoff.

The Colombian benefits package is staggering by U.S. standards. In Medellín, the textile employer must provide: full health and dental coverage, maternity leave, severence pay (two weeks for every year employed), cash bonuses twice a year (cesantías), transportation to and from work, one full hot meal per shift, and premium pay for certain shifts and days. Furthermore, the company must contribute to family recreation, elementary education, cooperative stores, and provide innumerable extras such as eye glasses, work shoes, overalls and more. These benefits represent over one hundred percent above wage overhead cost per employee. Hence, the cash wage remains low. What this situation represents for the company will be explained in Section III. What it means for the worker is that even if he is unable to take advantage of many of the benefits (i.e., if he is single), he has no way of increasing his cash income.

Unions

Colombian labor laws leave nothing to the imagination. They are closely monitored by the labor unions, of which there are two types:
national industry unions (sindicatos de industria), and internal company unions (sindicatos de base). For example, Tejicóndor has three labor unions; one de base in each of the two plant locations, and one de industria, which is a member of the National Workers Union, the Unión de Trabajadores Colombianos (UTC).

In the United States, textile workers are represented by the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWV), a member of the AFL-CIO and CLC. The textile industry has been traditionally and notoriously resistant to unionization, and none of the three companies in Lowell had union representation.

Prospects

The New England textile worker's prospects are dim indeed. By a North American worker's standards the pay is, and always will be, low, and the conditions less than desirable. Because there is no protection against layoffs, the jobs are insecure, reflecting the market instability of the industry itself. Most important, there are other less taxing and more lucrative jobs available in the New England area. This calculation has been made by thousands of job seekers in New England. Most do not go into the mills, some go for a short time while they look for something
else, and the few who stay do so either because they like the nature of
the job, have done it all their lives and know nothing else, feel loyal
to the company, or find the job convenient (shift hours, part-time work,
or four-day weeks). But there are never enough of these people.

In Medellín, the jobs are highly secure; layoffs are not per-
mittted, and it is difficult to fire a worker. The pay is very good in
the Colombian context, and the benefits are substantial. There is only
one problem: once they arrive at the status of loom fixer, which is
relatively easy to do, given continuous and reasonably diligent service,
there is nowhere else to go, no way to increase earnings, in short, up-
ward mobility is over. Because the workers begin their career course at
such a tender age, they arrive at this uncomfortable plateau relatively
young; most are about forty years of age when they have completed their
career development. Dreams of becoming ardent consumers and providing
children with higher education are threatened by untimely demise.

It is little wonder, then, that skilled textile workers from
Medellín, Antioquia would eventually find their way into the textile
mills of Lowell, Massachusetts.
1. To complete these processes, the material actually has to be worked by seven to nine different types of machines.

2. In Lowell about seven looms per weaver, 100 per loom fixer and a full section per yarn or cloth doffer, depending on the type of loom.


4. Dunwell, p. 11

5. See Notes, Chapter 4,1.

6. Ames Manufacturing was closely related to and sold its products through J. P. Stevens until the latter went public in the late 1940s.

7. See Notes, Chapter 4,2.

8. One is a merchandising office in New York City.

9. This case has been used by the Harvard Business School as one of its case studies.

10. They had just dropped down from about 1200 a month earlier.

11. He was written up in FORTUNE MAGAZINE as an avid collector of antique machinery.

12. Some experts say the Extremadura area of Spain, others maintain that the Antioqueños are descended from French Basques.

13. Dane, MEDELLIN EN CIFRAS (Medellín: Departamento Administrativo de Estadística, 1975, p. 200.)

15. See Appendix III for a list of officials interviewed in Colombian companies.

16. Coltehilos presently employs 1400 workers.

17. For comparison purposes, J. P. Stevens had 40,000 production employees during the same year.

18. The forest was initially planted to protect the terrain around the hydroelectric plant in Rio Negro.

19. See Notes, Chapter 4,3.


21. This subject is covered in much greater detail in Chapter 8.

22. The Lowell Offering, a periodical of poems and stories written by the young mill women.

23. See Notes, Chapter 4,4.

24. In the U.S. they are classified by type of loom.

25. For a loom fixer in 1979, the range was from $4.50 to $5.39 an hour.
Chapter 5

EL "PRIMER ENGANCHE"
(THE FIRST HOOK)

I found out they were interviewing through Jaime, who was working at Fabricato at the time. Jaime's former supervisor, who had gone north as a weaver, was helping Mr. Sam. (The Supervisor) initiated the enganche. He told his boss, 'If you can get the contracts, we can find qualified people in Colombia who could start the machinery right away. They don't have to be trained. They would come ready to work.'

Pastor
Colombian Loom Fixers in New England

The story of how Colombian textile workers were introduced to Lowell is best told by the people who lived the events. The following is Wannalancit Textile Company president, Ted Larter's, account of the arrival of the first Colombian loom fixer in Lowell.¹

It has been a hell of a job the last ten years. I looked at my list of people working here and I could see they were all getting a little older, and there weren't really many young ones coming in at all, and some of the middle-aged ones I had were getting off onto other things. There were more glamorous businesses in town. And they were good men, too.

What happened was this. Most of my people ten years ago were Lowell native people basically made up of French Canadians, Polish, Greek and a few Irish. That was it. And they had worked in the mills all their lives. They started in the mills. They really knew no other type of work other than mill work, which there was nothing wrong with. I mean, good God, the mills were the things that built this city. But like most mill towns and such things, father to son, and father to son, and father to son, they started to preach, 'You kids do anything you want to, but you are not going into the mills.'

And then one at a time they would dwindle away, slowly — due to a friend or somebody else who built up their courage to get them to go. And I saw this all happening. So I started a training program of my own, a little training program. I put ads in the paper, and I would try to get young people in here to want to learn to be weavers and loom fixers and all
those things. I was just trying to create, I suppose, the same kind of atmosphere. Well, I put an ad in the paper and I get a hundred people show up for the job. I give every one of them a job; every god-dam one of them had a job. Now some of them would never even get into the front door of the mill. All right? Others would get into the front door, listen to the noise, turn around and walk out. But at the end of the day, out of a hundred, I might have twenty-five left. The end of the second day, I might have four out of twenty-five. The end of the third day, I had nothing left.

They were native Lowellians. High school dropout types. People that didn't have a job. I used to be the best place in the world for the high school dropouts. They'd come right over here and go to work — once.

I've got some that are still here with me. The menial jobs. No problem in the world filling the menial jobs. Something where they don't have to do much of anything. Shipping, receiving. Carrying this over there; carrying that over here. They love that. Sweeping the floor and back. You know, little menial jobs, not the ones that had any responsibility. I used to bring all my supervisors out of the mill. I'd look at a guy; see he's doin' good. Nurture him along. Talk to him. You know, bring him along. Make him a supervisor someday. You don't do this anymore. Nobody wants to be a supervisor anymore. Why? They don't want it. They really don't want it. Sense of responsibility. What else?

The weaver. A weaver still has to be a weaver. She's got the responsibility — or he's got the responsibility — of all his looms for the quality, for the production, for the running of the loom. The loom fixer has got to fix them all. All right? Fine. Well, the loom fixer takes about a year to be a loom fixer if you're mechanically inclined.
So, all of a sudden instead of having weavers, I'm now having loom starters. There is a lot of difference between a person with two weeks training who knows how to start a stopped loom and a weaver. Big difference. 'Cause I told you it takes me six months to train a weaver.

The troops, the older people that were in the mill, came to me and said, 'Hey, I don't want any more students. I'm through teaching.' So I got 'em together, I sat 'em down in the back room and said 'How come? What's the matter?' They're thoroughly disgusted that people don't want to learn. They're wasting their time; and they're wasting my money and they don't want to have any part of it. O.K. Then comes along the time when my first Colombian came in here.

Oh Christ, it must have been 1970. Can't remember. It must have been 1970, maybe '69, '70 - somewhere in there. He was legal. His first name was Mario, his last name was Quiceno - Mario Quiceno. I'll never forget the guy as long as I live. He drove up in a car, he spoke English, he asked me if I needed a Draper loom fixer. And I said, 'Buddy, I'll give you a kiss if you know how to fix a Draper loom.' He says, 'Let me show you.' He takes out his coveralls, he puts on a set of coveralls, takes his toolbox out, walks out in the mill and shows me that this man knows what he's doing. I said, 'Jesus Christ, you've got a job.' He said, 'Would you like some more Colombian people?' I said, 'I sure as hell would.'
Mario Quiceno had been one of a group of twenty hand-picked loom fixers recruited and hired in Colombia by Samuel Crupnick, then Vice President of the Ponema Company in New York City.

The Company owned five textile mills, among other assets, and in 1969 found itself in a labor position similar to that described by Ted Larder. But the Colombian connection was already known to them. They secured twenty H2 visas\(^2\) and a Colombian supervisor, Fabio Agudelo, accompanied "Mr. Sam" to Medellín to select experienced workers. Fabio had been a supervisor for one of the largest textile companies in Medellín; he knew many of the workers, and those he could not reach by telephone, he waited for outside the mill gates as they emerged from their shifts.

One day I left work at noon, tired and all that. I was going out the main gate when I saw a tall man, an American, one of those big guys that they have up there. He was standing on a corner in front of the mill and next to him was a Colombian fellow who worked for him up north. Well, I saw that this fellow was looking at me and motioning to me. I knew him, Fabio Agudelo. He came up to me, took my arm and asked 'Do you speak English?' I said 'No.' Then he took out a card and gave it to me. Fabio told me, 'The card is to visit this man, who wants to talk to you. Go to the Hotel Nutibara. He's there and wants to talk to you. 'About what?' I asked. 'No, go on and get out of here, don't let them see you.' Be-
cause in the mill they didn't like it that the good
loom fixers were being taken away. Sometimes they
even called the police to get rid of these people who
were taking workers away. Fabio said, 'Just go to
the hotel at two o'clock in the afternoon on Friday.'
I took the card and went home.

Rubén

Each recruit received a card that burned in his pocket until
the appointed interview. Rubén continues,

On Thursday I showed the card to some of my friends
at work. Everyone knew about it. 'A man came to get
people to go to the United States.' Many workers
said, 'Man, I didn't get a card, they didn't give one
to me.' Well, I had a card. I spent all day Thurs-
day thinking about it; all Friday too at work. I
went home, had lunch, and told my wife, 'I'm going to
go.' I left for the hotel.

When I got there the place was mobbed. You couldn't
get in if you didn't have a card. A lot of people
had found out about it and just went; a lot of tired
people went to try their luck and offer their serv-
ces. At the door there were some men who said
'0.K., those who have cards can go in.'

We had an interview about mechanical things; like a
test. There were fifty of us but they only wanted
twenty. When the test was over they said, 'Give us
your telephone numbers. Those whom we call on Tues-
day are the ones we have chosen.'

I went home and told my wife what I had done. As
soon as I got home from work on Tuesday... my wife
said, 'They called.' I said, 'What?' 'They called
you here.' I said, 'Hmm, I made it.'
I went back, and the man had a girl as interpreter. He talked and the interpreter said, 'O.K., you passed the test. Now we'll start doing the paperwork. Bring your passports here.' I started to think about the whole thing. 'Should I go or not?'

The decision process was different for each individual; each man had to weigh his achievements in Medellín, his future under the Colombian labor system, his particular family needs, the range of sacrifices, and the potential advantages of taking such a great risk. With few exceptions they were eager to go to the United States. Some had waited a long time for this opportunity.

At one time my wife didn't want me to leave Colombia; she wasn't in agreement with my going away. But I always wanted to work here.

Before I came I knew that the textile industry in the United States was in decadence. I read it in the paper, but I had always wanted to come. I said, 'The first opportunity I have to get a work contract, I'm going.'

Once some of my in-laws arranged the trip for me, but I didn't go because of the children's studies. Then when the enganche of loom fixers of '69 came up I didn't want to ignore it, because I thought maybe later there wouldn't be another one.

Pastor

In the end, even those with reservations could not disregard the opportunity.
I had never thought of coming to the United States. I wasn't making any money, but living on what I earned. I really didn't want to go. I called a compadre who was living in New Jersey. I told him, 'Jorge, this is what happened to me. What do you think?' He asked about the arrangement. I said, 'He says that he'll take us with an H2 visa and that we are certain to get residency.' He said, 'Well, come on then. You can live peacefully here. It's not the same cheerful ambiente as Colombia, but you can make money.'

My wife and I talked about it. Then we got excited because I had begun to build a big house and had no hope of fixing it up soon. Maybe if I went up there I could earn enough to finish the house and then return here for good. (My wife) told me, 'I have to stay here with all these children. It will be hard, but if you don't forget about me... because if you leave and forget about me, I'll die with so many kids. How can I support seven people?' I said, 'O.K. I'll go. What I earn we'll split, and we'll both try to save.' My brothers and father said, 'Close our eyes and go!' So I accepted.

Rubén

The primer enganche, as the close-knit group refers to itself, left their jobs and families in Medellín and flew to the United States in September 1969, labor certifications in hand, expenses paid by their sponsor. They landed in Providence, Rhode Island at three in the morning and were driven directly to Taftville, Connecticut, too tired to know where they had been or where they were going.
All twenty men began working at the Ponema Mills in Taftville. Their contract was for eighteen months, after which they could continue, return to Colombia, or seek other employment in the United States. They were paid $2.71 an hour, with time-and-a-half after 40 hours in one week. The understanding was that they would work 10 to 12 hours a day, but there was no limit; they could work as many hours as they wanted.

Two months later, the Ponema Mills buckled under the pressures endemic to the textile industry in the U.S. during the second half of the 20th century. In this case the fabric was not selling. There was a layoff and eight of the Colombians were transferred to the Florence Mills in Greenville, New Hampshire. Within another two months the mill in Taftville closed permanently, and the rest of the primer enganche moved to the company's Greenville mill.

In mid-summer of 1970, nine months after they had come to the United States, the group's permanent resident applications were approved, and the workers went back to Medellín in small groups to arrange their affairs for the final move. Every one of the twenty men returned to the United States, now with the legal clearance to begin bringing their families as well.
Before the year ended, however, Florence Mills also closed and
the primer enganche began to disperse. Most were taken by their sponsors
to other mills in New Hampshire and Rhode Island; several went to New
York. Mario, on a tip from one of his supervisors who had once worked at
Wannalancit, set out for Lowell. Ted Larder recalls,

I didn't even know these guys were around. I don't
know they're up there. Some of them went over to
Manchester to work and some headed down here on their
own. Mario was one. Now Mario was a leader. All
leaders have a certain number of followers. 'Do you
need any more?' 'Oh yes.' Well he just happens to
have six more right there—boom. Great. They're
legal. Now you got seven people working for you and
all of a sudden you say 'By Jesus, maybe we do have a
future.' Now you've got what you need to run a mill.

The First Years

Sam Cruppnick and Fabio Agudelo had done a magnificent job.
The nineteen workers they recruited were among the most experienced,
diligent and dedicated loom fixers available in Colombia. Their skill,
sense of purpose, devotion to textiles, and loyalty must have been awe-
inspiring as new arrivals in North American mills; ten years later they
were still without peer in the U.S. textile labor market. In the be-
ginning they were as homogeneous as the criteria by which they were
chosen. When they were recruited all but one were over thirty years of
age; the average age was 39.5 years old. All but two of the men were married; only one came to the United States leaving no dependents in Colombia. Among the eighteen men who had children in Medellín, the average number was 4.8 children.

While most of the group had withdrawn from formal education after the first five or six years, and none had finished high school, all had completed numerous textile courses, either at the SENA or at their company's training center. They had all begun working in textiles in their teens, and most, with the exception of two years of military duty, had worked in textiles all their lives. Therefore, with the exception of the three youngest, they all had at least twenty years of textile experience; about a third were even either retired or about to retire after twenty-five years with the same company. Seven were recruited from Coltejer, seven from Fabricato, four from Tejicóndor, and one from Pantex. In spite of the strong influence of textiles in their lives, very few came from what could be considered traditional textile families; only a few had fathers who had preceded them in the textile mills.

Although one or two of the recruits had a rudimentary knowledge of English, none of them could speak the language upon arrival. Mario
quickly distinguished himself as the leader of the group by being the first to become proficient in English, and the first to unravel the mysteries of day-to-day living in the United States.

In an incredible display of endurance, the Colombian loom fixers spent most of their time working. Cash accumulation was their principal motive for coming to the United States in the first place. To a man they felt that they had been blessed with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and should take as much advantage of it as was physically possible. That they did. All of them worked at least ten to twelve hours a day, most worked six or seven days a week, and many worked double shifts at least several days a week. In one marathon week, Pastor reported working a total of ninety-three hours.

In contrast to the harshness of the work, they lived a comfortable two or three per apartment, costing about seven dollars a week for each person. The eight who were first sent to New Hampshire lived together in a pleasant company farmhouse for a minimal rent. To save money, they eschewed outside entertainment entirely.

We suffered a lot, especially the first month. The cold was terrible, but I hardly ever went out, just to do errands, buy food, and go to work. Otherwise I was always in my apartment.
Then we started to get accustomed to everything. We made coffee with Nescafe. All we had to do was boil water, very practical. We survived on sandwiches, scrambled eggs, and bread.

I asked my mother how to cook because I didn't know how to order in a restaurant. The only thing I could order was a sandwich, coffee or a coca cola. That was all.

We took English lessons from an Argentinian woman. We learned a little; some more easily than others.

Gerardo

Slowly they managed solutions to the problems of daily living in a foreign country.

I liked the work. Nobody bothered me, but it was so lonely. I didn't speak English. When I went out people made signs at me. I didn't know anything. I ate at one restaurant, and they had to take me to the kitchen so that I could point out what I wanted to eat because they couldn't understand me. Fortunately, I met a very nice lad. She couldn't speak Spanish and I didn't know Eng.'sh, but she wanted me to know what I was getting, so she took me by the hand. I showed her, this, this, and this. I didn't know how much it cost, but she took what it was and faithfully gave me back the change. We became friends; without talking we became friends.

Rubén

Living in abject austerity, the men were able to send substantial remittances back to Colombia, as well as establish savings accounts
in the United States. They all sent money home once a week. They re-
ported initially sending from forty to fifty dollars to their families
per week. By the end of a couple of months the amount generally reached
sixty dollars, and a few even reported sending as much as one hundred
dollars a week once their settling-in expenses had been met. How to go
about sending the remittances was another learning process.

In the beginning we sent all the money in cash. The
first December we lost a lot of money, and the people
in the post office just said that the letter hadn't
arrived. December is the most dangerous month to
send giros. Then we sent money orders or bought bank
checks where we had savings, instead of sending cash.
Then it was harder for them. In Manchester it was
most difficult. Mario learned English quicker than
the rest of us, and he asked around for the best way
to send money; first the money order, then the bank
checks.

Gerardo

Toward the end of the first year their permanent resident pa-
pers began to come through. The men were allowed to return to Medellín
in groups of three to six to receive their papers at the U.S. Consulate
at their place of origin.
Once back in Medellín, their suppressed loneliness and a more relaxed life in a warmer climate eroded their resolve for economic gain at any price. They lingered, their arrivals overlapped, and soon the whole group was reunited in Medellín. Sam Cruppnick began making frantic calls to the Consulate in Medellín. "But it wasn't the Consulate, it was us. We wanted to stay with our families."

They struggled with the alternatives, but in the end they all returned to the path they had chosen a year earlier. Some who wavered found that it would not be easy to pick up their lives again in Medellín; others were overtaken by events.

I had been in Colombia for about two weeks, and began losing interest in returning to that lonely little town, so cold, all that snow, because in Medellín it is always Spring.

So I told (my wife) 'Ah, I'm going to see if they will give me a job again at Fabricato!' I went to Fabricato and talked to Dr. C. 'I want to come back and work here.' And he started in, 'No, who told you to leave?' He started to scold me. 'Who went craving dollars? Dollars are going to be the end of you.' I told him, 'No, doctor, I did that and look at all that I could do with the house. If I had stayed here, I never would have been able to do all that. I lived, I ate, and things were not bad, but it was such a sacrifice here, and my house was ugly, and look at all I can do now, and I was only there for ten months. It's true that I killed myself, no diversion, nothing, but now I have money to finish
the house.' 'Yes, but you are corrupted by the dollars.' 'O.K., doctor, forget it, forget it.' I left and went to Tejicóndor.

Rubén

At Tejicóndor he fared only slightly better. After another scolding and being accused of going to the States de turista and overstaying his visa, he was sent away with the vague possibility of a job if he got his working papers in order.

Francisco R. also did not want to return to the U.S. Together they decided to call the Consul's secretary, Beatriz, and tell her that they were not going.

'Hi fellows, are you ready to travel? Mr. Sam calls every night to find out when you are leaving. 'I need those men. The mill has slowed down again.'

Then I told Beatriz everything. 'If you have someone else to give those papers to, get rid of them. We're not going back to the United States. Forget about us.'

But that was not the end of it. Several days later the two men received a call to appear at the Consulate. They went.
We sat down and began talking. Suddenly Beatriz came in and said, 'Stand up the Consul is coming.' We got up. He appeared with some long envelopes. 'Where are Rubén C. and Francisco R? Raise your right hands.' We raised them. 'Swear to this...' We took the oath to follow the law and everything else. We took the envelopes and he said, 'I wish you good luck in my country that needs you. Behave yourselves. Don't cause the authorities any trouble.' He went back into his office, and we stood there looking at each other.

Rubén

The two men went home stunned. In short order they reasoned that since they had been unable to secure jobs in Medellín, had the papers in hand, and could linger in Colombia for up to ninety days, they would try another sojourn in the U.S. anyway. Francisco R. returned to Rhode Island. Rubén resigned himself to the cold solitude of Manchester, New Hampshire, where he worked for four more years before his house in Medellín was completed to his satisfaction.

Shortly after receiving permanent resident status, some of the men began to arrange for family members to join them. This was a costly enterprise since, in addition to airfare, they had to pay $1,000 for each person they intended to sponsor. A workable pattern developed. The oldest son was sent for first. Once that family member was established in a job, other siblings were brought over, in small groups, until it was possible to sponsor the mother and school-age children together.
I was alone here for five years. I waited for the older boys to finish high school in Colombia. When the first one finished, I brought him, later two more, and then my wife and daughter. I brought them in three groups.

Pastor

To date, Pastor has brought twenty-eight family members into the United States. That is many more than anyone else in the group. Five of the nineteen loom fixers never brought their families at all. Three more brought their wives and perhaps one older child, but the wives returned. The average number of people sponsored by the primer enganche, including Pastor's very extended family, is a modest 4.7 people, mostly wives and children.4

Very few of the men had intended to stay permanently in the United States when they signed Ponema's contract. Pastor vowed that he would never subject his family to the decadent mores of the North. Most, like Rubén, had specific cash requirements intended to change their destinies in Medellín: cash to build a house, start a business, or provide their children with an education they themselves had not been able to attain. But life in the U.S. was addictive.
The first three months are very hard, and you think you won't adapt. But then you are offered many comforts, and you get too used to them.

Jaime

Near the End of the Rainbow

It has been almost fifteen years since the primer enganche began its odyssey in the United States, all with similar credentials, all bound for New England, all almost painfully determined to change the course of their lives and the lives of those who depended on them. As a group their progress has been remarkably consistent, slow and steady; as individuals they have encountered most of the inconsistencies that life offers.

Now in their mid-forties to late-fifties, thirteen of the nineteen loom fixers have ended or will end their working years in textiles. To stay in their field, most have kept just ahead of the creeping mortality of the textile industry. Even by the end of their first year in the United States, all had experienced the closing of two mills. All of the men worked in at least three mills before the end of the first two years, and some have been employed by as many as eight mills in the fourteen year period. When they were able to find mills that were solvent, their longevity has been remarkable in the U.S. context; several have
worked for eight years or more for the same company. Until mid-1981,
more than ten years after their arrival in the country, none of the nine-
ten had been unemployed for more than a month at a time.

Jaime's case is representative. He went from Ponema Mills in
Connecticut to Florence Mills and Concord Mills in New Hampshire. After
the last closing, he spent one month unemployed, and went to New York
City, where he worked in a restaurant. Mario found him in New York in
late 1971 and introduced him to Wannalancit. Jaime worked there for more
than eight years, and became a supervisor and recruiter of Colombians for
Wannalancit. While in Lowell, Jaime remarried, to a Colombian woman, and
had two children. (His former wife and three children stayed in Manches-
ter.)

Jaime left Lowell in 1980 for Troy, Michigan. He had answered
an advertisement in a Rhode Island newspaper and was relocated to become
the head of the weaving operation in a glass fibre factory, a thriving
business in the age of electronics. His wife works part-time in the same
factory. They report living very comfortably in a pleasant neighborhood.
While they have owned a car for many years, they do not own their home.
All but one member of the primer enganche owns at least one car, some as many as three. In Colombia owning a car would have been an outrageous luxury for them. While several of the men own homes in Colombia, which they either provide to family members or put up for rent, only about half are homeowners in the United States.

Only two of the seven members of the primer enganche who worked in Lowell at one time are still there. Saúl, who brought his wife and four children to the United States, worked at Wannalancit after Manchester, and then at Joan Fabrics, which he left in 1980 because of a back injury. He is the only one of the group who is officially retired because of poor health. Pastor, who went from Ponema to Florence to Concord Mills, worked at Concord for five years before it closed, and then Chicopee Mills for four months before it too closed. At Jaime's behest, Pastor moved to Lowell in 1978, worked at Wannalancit for almost three years and is now at Joan Fabrics. In his spare time he reads voraciously, listens to classical music, and writes political articles for magazines.

Four members of the group are living in the Providence-Pawtucket area of Rhode Island. Gilberto, one of the two unmarried men
in 1969, married an American, a former nun from Manchester. They have one son born in the U.S., and in 1979 they arranged for Gilberto's three sons from Colombia to come to this country after their mother died. While it has been a difficult adjustment to acclimate three teenage boys to the United States, Gilberto and his wife live cheerfully in their own home in a solid middle class neighborhood. Gilberto works the night shift at Cooley Mills, and tends the home while his wife works during the day as a visiting nurse.

The other three men in Rhode Island also work in textiles; Miguel has worked at Pontiac Mills for five years, Roberto has been at Cadillac Mills for the same number of years, and Nevardo is at Cooley, with Gilberto. All of them went to Rhode Island directly after Manchester and have experienced numerous closings and layoffs.

In total, only seven of the nineteen are still in New England. The last is Rafael, who is the only one who never left Manchester, and apparently one of the few who abandoned his family in Medellín. He is one of three in the group who has experienced long-term unemployment during the last few years. He has been living on welfare, with no address, no possessions, no family. He is the oldest of the group and was
reported to be seriously ill. In recent months Gilberto went to Manchester at the request of Rafael's family, also desperately poor in Medellín, and was unable to find him.

Outside of New England, Miami, Florida was the most popular destination for members of the primer enganche. Rubén, who thought snow was "pretty to look at, but terrible to live with" was a likely candidate. On a vacation to Medellín from Manchester he met Fabio Agudelo who had moved to Miami. They arranged a visit, and one week later, while touring the city, Rubén heard looms. They parked the car, went into the small factory and were offered jobs. Rubén accepted; he and the suitcase full of ruanas and aguardiente for the supervisors and their wives in Manchester never left Miami. That was in 1974. Two years later, he moved to another company, where he has been working ever since. Rubén is a happy man. His company just installed state-of-the-art machinery from Austria, he is responsible for the new equipment eight hours a day, seven days a week, he owns his own home, his wife and children are all employed, and Miami is Latin America to him.

Jorge Z. is also living comfortably just outside Miami, and working as a loom fixer in a stocking factory. Neftalí and Francisco G.
have not been as fortunate. Neftali, after being laid off in 1972, spent three months touring the United States with his two sons. He has seen more of the country than any of his colleagues and most Americans. After the trip he settled in Miami and worked for the Charles Company for about nine years. Francisco G. stayed at the Concord Mills in Manchester for five years, did a short tour at Wannalancit, and then joined Neftali at Charles. But Charles Company made fabric for automobile seatbelts, and they closed in mid-1981. Both men were separated from their wives; one before coming to the United States; the other in Miami. They have been drifting together in search of work for almost a year. Recently contacted in Greenville, South Carolina, where he had worked at Grendal Mills for three months before it closed, Francisco said, "We haven't done very well, have we?" He reports that he would return to Colombia if he could afford the passage.

Interestingly, only one member of the group, Francisco R. has settled in South Carolina, the current center of the U.S. textile industry. He went from Manchester to Rhode Island, from there to Miami, and finally to South Carolina.
All of those who stayed in textiles reported 1983 hourly wages of between $6.30 and $7.50. Although several work second and third shifts, only one works more than a regular eight-hour day; the rest have left their ardent overtime days far behind.

None of the current loom fixers, except Gilberto, have mastered English. For the three who expressed an interest in changing to another, more stable field, language continued to be the most serious barrier to job mobility. Age, lack of transferable skills, time and money for training courses, and a dearth of contacts in other industries were mentioned as other obstacles.

Only two members of the group are living in Colombia. Jorge P. stayed in New York after leaving Manchester, and only recently returned to live in Medellín. Gerardo, who followed the route from Ponema to Chicopee to Wannalancit and back to Chicopee, returned to Colombia in 1978 to visit his ailing mother. His wife had already returned to have their youngest child at home. With his brother-in-law, he invested his North American earnings into a thriving bus company. He returns to the United States periodically to keep his residency status active.
I prefer the United States. Everything is easier; everything is possible. Even though you live in debt, you can see the results of the effort quickly.

I communicate with all my colleagues in Rhode Island. The hour I return, I have a place to stay, and they would help me find work.

Of the seventeen who stayed in the United States, only three left textiles. Aníbal moved to Chicago after Manchester and worked in an auto assembly plant. He had twelve children and only brought his wife to the United States. They separated shortly after her arrival in Chicago. In 1980, Aníbal returned to Bello and died quietly of lung cancer.

Leonardo owned property in Colombia and went to New York City after Manchester. He is the wealthiest of the group, now owning and operating several buildings, taxis and other concerns.

Mario, acknowledged by all as the brightest and boldest of the group, was the first to learn English and the first to become independent. Younger than any of the other men by ten years, he moved to Miami in 1975 after working in Manchester, Lowell and Pawtucket. In Miami he studied while working in textiles, became a master electrician, started his own business, married a Colombian woman, and had a child. But life
in the fast track careened him into deep trouble. In early 1981, he was murdered in Medellín, mired in the swell of illicit U.S.-Colombian activities that make some men rich and end others' lives.

Nineteen men. Fourteen and-a-half years later two have died, two have returned to Colombia, one has retired, one is destitute, ten have continued their careers in textiles, two are unemployed but searching for work in textiles, and one has succeeded in a business in the United States. A third of the marriages did not survive the transition; thirteen new households were set up in the United States with a total of fifty-one off-spring.5

While most members of the primer enganche have achieved the modest middle class lifestyle to which they aspired, their major accomplishment has been to change the life trajectory for their children. Like generations of children of immigrants before them, these people will not be confined to the secondary labor market. The loom fixers and their wives generally continue in small, traditional textile and apparel establishments, hotel laundries, and other light industries and services. Their adult children are working as bank tellers, hotel receptionists, and in sales and less arduous light manufacturing. Those sons who work
in textiles are generally the oldest, who initially went to work with their fathers to help bring the rest of the family to the United States.

The middle and younger children appear to be the ones who will reap the greatest benefits. After cash accumulation, education was mentioned most frequently as a reason for immigrating to the U.S. Motivated by family expectations, it appears likely that most of the children will complete high school. Many are well into college careers. Rubén's second son is in his fourth year in architecture, Neftalí's sons are at the International University in biology and business administration, and Pastor's second son is on a scholarship at the University of Lowell. His third son went to Groton Academy for three years on a full scholarship and is now in his third year at Georgetown University. All the children have a great advantage over their parents: they speak English.

Jaime, Rubén, Pastor, all of these men are known only within the confines of their own, small circle of colleagues and families. They are neither famous nor powerful, yet they are the economic warriors of the 20th century. Like so many before and after them, uprooting, moving, enduring, adapting, and entrenching was an effective way to achieve socioeconomic mobility, to redress the disequilibrium between what was
available to them in their native country and what they knew was within their reach under different circumstances. Perceived status inconsistency is a powerful motivator.
FOOTNOTES

1. Related during the summer of 1977.

2. Labor certification permits.

3. See Notes, Chapter 5,1.

4. See Notes, Chapter 5,2.

5. See Notes, Chapter 5,3.
CHAPTER 6

THE COLOMBIAN NETWORK

Colombians would seem, then ... to be one of the ... middle class. The truth is, however, that the middle class ... does not work in the secondary labor market as Colombians do (or other immigrants for that matter), nor must they work as hard and as long for their incomes as the Colombians.

from Fernando Urréa G.
"Life Strategies and the Labor Market: Colombians in New York in the 1970s"
Even before the first members of the *primer enganche* began to move on, the hook for Lowell's Colombian network was firmly set in place. It was only a matter of time before the pressures of a foundering industry, the unexpected availability of an eager workforce, and the cessation of H2 visa allocations for foreign textile workers would converge toward a slow, predictable deterioration of events.

**The Mills Respond to Labor Shortages**

During the mid to late 1960s, all three textile companies, Ames Manufacturing, Joan Fabrics, and the Wannalancit Textile Company, were faced with serious labor shortages. Each mill experimented with a variety of solutions in a desperate effort to fill their labor needs. Their ultimate responses to the crisis set them upon three widely divergent paths into the future.

Ted Larder continues the tale at Wannalancit,

I brought Mario in one day and I said 'Mario, got any more of you people around?' 'Maybe. Maybe. I'll see what I can do.' He went down to New York; fools around somewhere, comes back with three or four. Don't speak a lick of English. Give 'em a job. Say 'Hey, how about down in Colombia - a lot more of your
people down there?' 'Oh, of course. Yes...' Well, how about that. So I said, 'Well, I'll tell you what we'd better do. We'd better get ourselves an airplane ticket and we'd better go down there and start interviewing some good people, because I want to bring some people in.' Fine. So I went down there and I interviewed people. Real good people. I got all the information on them and came back and then I went and started to make out the MA 750A's and B's, which back then was called 575. I went to the local unemployment office and I got 'em there and turned them in over there. I didn't even know that Boston existed at the time. Well, they didn't even want to take 'em. 'I don't know what you're supposed to do with them, but I know I'm supposed to turn them in over here. So I think you'd better take them.'

I had had a standing order with the unemployment office over there. Right at this time. All the weavers, all the loom fixers, all the smash-piecers they could send me. I'd take 'em. We wrote a return receipt requested, certified letter to every unemployment agency in Massachusetts asking for people, and we got these sad answers back that 'We're sorry that we cannot supply you any.' We never got one affirmative answer from any employment agency. We wrote a letter to everyone of them. I've got copies of 'em all. I was putting together a portfolio. I was talking to the unemployment people. It was all left up to Boston. Boston made all the decisions, but I said 'Don't they make the decisions on the information you give them?' 'Oh yes.' Well, Lowell couldn't see how they could help but authorize those people to come here.

I had an order in with the United States government. U. S. Department of Labor. Twenty-five thousand dollars was set aside for me to start a training program for what they called at the time the 'hard-core' out of Boston and wherever. All right? I got a letter from the government de-obligating them from this little contract that they could not find me one
single student for one minute of one day to come to that school. These were derelicts, these were prisoners, these were people that were the hard, hard, hard business, you know, whatever that is. Not one. They de-obligated themselves. Just after that, I get a letter from the U. S. Labor Department telling me that I hadn't tried hard enough to service my needs and that there must be something wrong with the way I do business or something else and that they were denying me all of those requests I'd turned in.

Mario comes in and says, 'Hey, don't worry about that. We'll get the people up here anyway.' One by one they came. Some walked all the way and thumbed a ride. Some flew. They came by all different ways, but they came. Mario apparently took them over to the unemployment office. They got their social security cards, all the papers they needed, and I could legally give them a job. I'm not stupid or naive. I have to admit that I sort of knew what the score was. Maybe I sort of rationalized to a point and said that maybe this is all happening with everybody's blessing. Maybe they can't authorize me to bring in these people, but maybe they're just not going to say anything if I do it anyway. You know, sometimes your poor judgment overrules the things you can do legally. But anyway, it went on, and I kept the mill together with these people.

Thus, Wannalancit continued a long tradition of relying on recently-arrived immigrants, and eventually became entirely dependent on the Colombian network.

Joan Fabrics was also having a difficult time finding people to repair and operate its looms during the late sixties. First they tried advertising.
There was a time in 1969... in that time frame. We had to resort to radio advertising. We had a regular series -- like a serial type thing. It was kind of unique. You had Alice and Fred and they were talking to each other in the morning, and they were talking about coming to work at Joan. That type of approach... it wasn't very successful at all.

It was difficult to see what kind of response you get to an ad like that, but we were able to get adequate numbers of people to work even during that time. Of course, we had to resort to newspaper ads. We tried ads in Manchester and Nashua and Lawrence because those were predominantly textile towns. We weren't too successful in trying to get people from out of town because of the pay scale. It was difficult to entice somebody to drive a hundred miles, - if he did come from Manchester and had to go around trip it would be about seventy miles, I guess - but even a loom fixer, he'd have to do pretty well to support that kind of activity.

Another approach Joan used was employee referrals.

We did implement a savings bond (program). If an employee referred a fulltime employee and (the referral) stayed for three months or more, then they would be entitled to a twenty-five dollar bond. We encouraged that. Some people will go out of their way to get a friend who's out of work referred to us.

The Company does have what we feel is a favorable reputation in the area, and the only thing we have a problem with is rates, because, you know, textiles are not notorious for high wages, and we have some electronics firms and other industries that pay a lot more than we do. We would pay more if the market could bear the brunt, but we have to sell at competitive rates, and that's why textile rates are usually lower.

Richard Cote
Personnel Director
Joan's ultimate response to its textile labor shortage problem emanated from the Company's history. Having operated in the greater New York - New Jersey metropolitan area, Joan was tied into the Puerto Rican network. When mills in New Jersey closed, some of the workers were transferred to Lowell departments. The pump had been primed; by the late 1970s about half of the workers at Joan were of Puerto Rican origin.

While Joan Fabrics is unique among the three companies in using the perfectly legal Puerto Rican labor market as its main source of workers, the company also employs more Portuguese workers than either Ames or Wannalancit.

Joan has also succumbed, on a much smaller scale, to the lure of the Colombian textile worker. At the time of data collection, about ten percent of the production workers were Colombian. All of them had come to Joan via Wannalancit and were considered by the department heads to be "essential" to the operation of the mills in which they were employed. The supervisors still have considerable influence over hiring at Joan because they signed people on directly for work in their departments before the Personnel Department was established in 1973.
I'll tell you, most of the Colombians, in our experience, have a knack for finding their way to the department head of the weave room. And the department head calls us and says 'Look, we don't have a job, but we want to hire this guy as a trainee. He has got all kinds of experience in textiles and we want him to work for us.' It's a job that might be if the right person comes along...(The department head) gets a better return on his man-hours report, less training dollars, all these things considered, we can't blame them for using that approach... And since that time we've had (Colombian) husbands and wives come and work for us; the husbands first and the wives would follow.

The fact that the Colombians had experience with shuttle looms was important to Joan Fabrics. Although the company has new state-of-the-art water jet equipment, they also have weave rooms that are filled with older model looms. Wannalancit's operation was entirely comprised of old Draper shuttle looms, and the Colombians knew how to fix them.

At Ames Manufacturing, experienced loom fixers still came from England after World War II. Eventually they stopped coming and those who were in this country became supervisors or left the labor market. By the late 1960s, Ames was also desperate for help. President Edward Stevens describes a now familiar scenario.

You talk about a semi-skilled job, and that's true, but there are a lot of very subtle parts of the skill that make a difference between a successful operator
and a non(successful operator). Any person can learn how to run a knitting machine in a short time, but to be able to spot defects as they're happening, and to be interested enough to do something about it, that's very important too, and to understand the importance of letting someone know that the machine isn't running correctly before it makes a whole lot of bad fabric. All those things.

The Company could not keep anyone, much less skilled workers. One drain was the burdeoneering electronics industry. "We tend to be at the lower end of the wage scale...The way it competes is, that our best people go." Ed Stevens continues,

...our biggest problem, frankly, is the inconsistency in demand for our product. We find ourselves going up and trying to employ people, and we get them in, and we train them, and then business falls off, and we have to lay them off, and, you know, I don't blame them. They want a steady job, and so they're going to go someplace (else), because Wang Company and some of these other businesses are always increasing their business. The only way he loses a job there is because he isn't doing his job properly. And they don't have that sort of fear hanging over them.

Ames Manufacturing also tried a series of unsuccessful approaches to lure workers into its mills. First they attempted to perpetuate the old French Canadian network by going to Newfoundland and New Brunswick to solicit people, but the few who did come stayed only a short time. The structural impetus of that migration flow had changed. For
the mill in Maine, Ames even tried to seduce workers from Georgia to try life in the North. The men came alone at first to see if it held any promise, and when the temperature dropped, they all returned South. Fine jobs were available right at home. To Ames the effort of housing and managing a recalcitrant, imported labor force was not worth the effort.

Ames Manufacturing remained undaunted. "There is always some way to solve the problem eventually...There will always be people who will be willing to work in our place." The problem was attracting and keeping them. Yankee ingenuity and pragmatism prevailed. Edward Stevens describes the novel approach the Company finally devised.

I remember one period (in the late sixties) when we were so desperate for help that we decided to do something unusual, and so we put in the four-day work week. And we were one of the first that did it... It was astounding. We couldn't get anybody. I mean, if we'd call the employment security office, or advertised or did whatever, we might get one or two people. They'd come down, take one look and, 'Oh, that's too much for me,' and go.

So we put an ad in the paper saying that we were going to work for four days. Ten hours a day, and anybody who was interested please apply. We had four hundred telephone calls between five o'clock in the afternoon when the paper hit the streets and the next morning at nine o'clock. And we couldn't handle it. We couldn't handle the demand of people who were calling and inquiring about it. And we spent the
The first five months trying to weed out the people who were really interested in working and those (who) just wanted the idea of a long weekend. And we still have that four-day week in the knitting department.

The Ames solution developed into a highly complex and not altogether convenient or efficient program of catering to the needs of the native Lowellian secondary labor market: women and youth. The plan featured:

- the four-day work week
- the hiring of part-time workers and summer-only help
- the ability to be called-in as unscheduled, substitute help
- the flexibility for the workers to select their own hours from two ten-hour shifts, regular eight hour shifts, (five days) or two to four hours' student after school split shifts (five days)

Lawrence Manufacturing has been operating within the constraints of this program since the early seventies. They do what they can to accommodate all serious job-seekers, all the while wishing that they could rely on fulltime labor. Did the innovative program obviate the need for tapping into the Colombian network? Not really, because there always was that interest in skilled, reliable workers.
The Colombians began to filter into the Ames companies from Wannalancit, just down the street, shortly after they arrived in Lowell, and they distinguished themselves as they had elsewhere. Joshua Miner at Lawrence relates,

We've had some excellent experience with Colombians in particular. If I had to pick a South American employee, it would be a Colombian, only through our experience here. They've done very well...To put it bluntly, they don't mind working. They put in a full day's work, and they work hard. And they expect to. Whereas I can't feel sure in my mind that any other employee group feels that way - white, black, Puerto Rican or otherwise. Maybe it's because they've had to work so hard to get here that it's worthwhile for them to try to stay here. There definitely aren't people sitting on a park bench who have those qualifications.

Jonathan Stevens at Synthetic Yarns had a similar view.

Our experience in Synthetic Yarns, whenever we've advertised, (is that) the bulk of people coming for applications are Hispanics...we have found that, especially among the younger generation, we find it difficult to employ ... English-speaking, born and raised...in the mill. (They) have higher expectations than to be working in the mill.

(The Colombians) take pride in their job. They have skills. Some of them have worked in textile plants in Colombia and are familiar with the operations.
As of today the Colombians are an essential part of the workforce. We could not operate without them. We would be very hard-pressed if we lost our Colombian workforce at this point. We did not create any new jobs for them. These are jobs that we had to fill. They filled positions where we had very high turnover, and they stayed... that's good for us because training costs are reduced that way.

But the Colombians also had their drawbacks as far as the Ames companies were concerned. One was the language barrier. Jonathan Stevens reported, "They can't speak English, so they can't do the higher skill jobs," in particular, being promoted to leadmen and supervisors. Another problem was that many of them were in Lowell without proper documentation.

Thus, while Ames Manufacturing set out to woo the local labor market, Joan Fabrics taped the Puerto Rican and other recent immigrant groups, and the Wannalancit Textile Company settled into a deep commitment with the Colombian workers. The results of the Employee Record Survey show what impact these decisions had on the production labor force in those three companies, and corroborate the extent to which they were successful in carrying out their plans.
Employee Record Survey (1960-1979)

Data for the survey were collected by the author in each of the four companies from the employee inscription files and recorded on the form shown as Appendix IA. The total sample included 958 production workers who were on the rolls between the years 1960-1979. All information was not always available for each case, either because the records were incomplete or because a particular question was not asked of all applicants. Because they vary so much, the Ns (number in the base) are provided in each column.

Before launching into a detailed discussion of worker characteristics, it is interesting to get a feeling of life in the mills. Table 3 presents several indicators of hours, mobility and turnover in each of the four textile mills.

For the total sample, forty-three per cent of the workers are gone before the end of two years. Actually, most of the attrition takes place within the first six months, and employers feel that a worker is hooked if he/she stays longer than three months. Wannalancit had the highest attrition, with almost sixty percent leaving before the end of two years. This could be because of the more traditional working con-
Table 3
Life in the Mill, for Total Sample
and by Company (in percent)

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<th>Termination status</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Synthetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Joan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>layoff</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leave</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resignation</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discharge</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other**</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(453)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Underreported
** Retirement, death
ditions and practices, because of the large number of foreign-born employees, or even as a result of repeated INS raids. Synthetic Yarns had the lowest percentage of drop-outs, which may have to do with the company's more recent inception or with its small size.

The hours available to workers are directly related to the company's labor policy. Joan Fabrics was determined to maintain fulltime shifts exclusively. That could only be done by depending on the Puerto Rican and recent immigrant labor markets. Almost one hundred percent of Joan's workers are fulltime. Wannalancit did essentially the same thing by depending on the Colombians. Lawrence, and to a lesser extent, Synthetic Yarns, had to open their jobs to part-time workers to make their policy to hire locally feasible. Almost a third of Lawrence's operatives work on a part-time basis.

For the total sample, half of the textile workers were employed on the first shift (usually about 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.). Only the Ames companies offered weekend shifts, and even then, only to a limited extent. Both Ames and Wannalancit offered a "day" shift of eight hours to a small group of women who had to be home a little longer to get children off to school. Joan shows the most even distribution of employees among
the three shifts as they attempt to keep the machines running to maximize productivity. Synthetic Yarns has only a skeleton third shift because the twisting machines can run through the night unattended. It is not a coincidence that the companies with the largest number of recent immigrants had the most populous third shifts.

The indicator of in-house training and promotions was probably grossly underreported. According to the records, ninety-five percent of all the workers did not receive any in-house training, and eighty-six percent were never formally promoted. Joan Fabrics was the only company that showed about a fifth of its employees experiencing promotions but this may have been due to diligent record-keeping. In any event, moving up the occupational ladder in a formal, predictable fashion is clearly not a major part of the textile workers' experience in Lowell.

Interruptions in work can be part of that experience, however, varying with the place of work. While layoffs were a common experience to about a quarter of the employees, Synthetic Yarns reported no layoffs, leaves or resignations. Wannalancit prided itself in "never" having a layoff, and, in fact, had a very low incidence, with people being kept on the rolls to paint and do other odd jobs during slow times. For those
who had been laid off, almost half were back at work again before the end of three months. Leaves of absence accounted for less than six percent of the interruptions for the total sample, but there was considerable activity due to resignations. Lawrence Manufacturing had the highest incidence of resignations (and returns), about a quarter of the cases, probably because of its liberal summer employment policy and general willingness to accommodate known workers.

When people left the mills definitely, they usually initiated the separation themselves; for the total sample, almost three-quarters resigned. Joan Fabrics differed somewhat in this area, being clearly more willing to fire or lay off a worker, twice as often as for the sample in general. Wannalancit only discharged or laid off twelve percent of its workers, while eighty-six percent left on their own account. The more traditional conditions at Wannalancit possibly reduced their need to actively discharge employees, whereas Joan probably had to take a firmer stand.

The reasons for leaving were very similar between all four mills. If the employee voluntarily separated (quit) it was generally to go to another job or back to the country of origin. If they were dis-
charged (fired), it was because of absenteeism more than for any other single reason.

It is clear that high employee turnover, endemic to the textile industry in New England, is common among all four companies. The differences in the life of the companies are the result of policy decisions that were devised to maintain a certain standard of operation or to attract a particular labor market.

Table 4 shows the general characteristics for the Lowell textile workers for each mill. In all cases there are more men than women in the mills, with the proportions about forty percent women to sixty percent men. Joan Fabrics has the highest percentage of male operatives, and Lawrence Manufacturing has the highest number of female workers, as expected, but the range is within ten percentage points.

There are greater differences between mills in the age of the workers. For the total sample, almost sixty percent of the workers were under thirty years of age when they entered the mills. At Wannalancit the reverse was true; almost sixty percent entered over age thirty, reflecting the large number of experienced Colombian workers. Lawrence
### Table 4

Characteristics of Textile Workers in Lowell, Massachusetts, Total Sample and by Mill, 1960 - 1979

(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Joan Yarns</th>
<th>Lawrence Yarns</th>
<th>Synthetic Yarns</th>
<th>Wannalancit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex - Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(958)</td>
<td>(254)</td>
<td>(259)</td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td>(315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(889)</td>
<td>(254)</td>
<td>(259)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>married</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other*</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(888)</td>
<td>(253)</td>
<td>(256)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(275)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education**</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Synthetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Joan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school incomplete</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school complete</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical/vocational</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(787)</td>
<td>(225)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Separated, divorced, widowed.

** Primary = fifth grade or less; secondary = eighth grade or less, first through third bachillerato; high school incomplete = anything less than finishing high school and receiving a high school or bachillerato diploma; technical/vocational and college = one year or more of formal training beyond the high school level.
showed a preponderance of 15-19 year olds with about forty-five percent of its labor force in the high school age group. That figure compares to a relatively low eleven percent high school aged workers at Wannalancit. Where the workers tend to be younger, the group of never-marrieds is, understandably, higher. At Lawrence over sixty percent of the sample was single; at Wannalancit almost sixty-five percent was married.

There are also considerable differences between mills in the educational attainment of the workers, although the Ames companies were almost identical. At Lawrence, eighty-five percent of the workers were at the high school level, had completed high school, or had received some formal training beyond high school. Wannalancit, on the other hand, showed about half of its workers at the high school or beyond levels, with about a third having stopped formal education in secondary school. Ten percent of the operatives at Wannalancit had dropped out of school at the primary level.

In very general terms, then, the workers at Joan Fabrics most resembled the profile of workers obtained from the total sample, predominantly male, under thirty years of age, approximately half unmarried, and with about a high school education. Most workers at Lawrence Manu-
facturing were clearly younger, and had a higher tendency to be female, single and more educated than the total sample. Workers at Synthetic Yarns tended to resemble those at Lawrence Manufacturing more than either of the other two companies. The Wannalancit Textile Company employees had a typical sex balance, but were an older, more stable, and considerably less formally educated group. Thus, the individual decisions made by each company in response to labor shortages in the sixties are clearly reflected in the profiles of the labor force actually working in the mills.

Four indicators were used in an attempt to determine the next question: the origin of the workers. The indicators are (1) whether or not they were U.S. citizens, (2) where they applied for their social security cards, (3) the origin of their surnames, and, for the foreign-born, (4) where they were born. Table 5 shows the results for the total sample, and by mill.

First, about a quarter of the total sample was comprised of non-citizens. The Ames companies had the fewest non-citizens, with about seven percent at Lawrence and twelve at Synthetic Yarns. Joan Fabrics employed almost twenty percent non-citizens, and Wannalancit was not far from having half its workers U.S. citizens and half non-citizens.
### Table 5

**Indicators of Employee Origin, by Mill**

(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Joan</th>
<th>Lawrence</th>
<th>Yarns</th>
<th>Wannalancit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. citizens</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(925)</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td>(301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Security origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other New England</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other U.S.</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(946)</td>
<td>(253)</td>
<td>(259)</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>(305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surname</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(917)</td>
<td>(247)</td>
<td>(231)</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>(307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign born</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other L.A.</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(322)</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent of sample)</td>
<td>(33.6)</td>
<td>(40.2)</td>
<td>(10.0)</td>
<td>(20.0)</td>
<td>(53.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About seventy percent of the social security cards for the total sample were obtained in Massachusetts.\footnote{10} The data show that, while most of the workers are from New England, or begin their working careers in New England, more come from Puerto Rico than from any other part of the United States outside of New England, even including other U.S. textile centers. New York, it can be assumed, is not necessarily an origin of textile workers, but rather a way station for Puerto Rican and other non-U.S.-born cardholders.

In the mills, Lawrence had the highest percentage of New England and the lowest percentage of Puerto Rican and New York cardholders. Joan, as anticipated, had the highest percentage of Puerto Rican social security cardholders, almost twenty percent, and the lowest number from New England. Wannalancit had the lowest percentage of Massachusetts, and the highest other New England and New York cardholders. This is because many of the Colombians came to Lowell via mills in New Hampshire and Rhode Island, or via New York City.

Although surname, in this case, does not indicate specific place of birth or citizenship, it does provide a broad sense of the original national origin of the workforce.\footnote{11} For the total sample, the
proportion of Anglo and Spanish names is essentially identical, almost a third of the workers in each case. French Canadian surnames were not far behind, representing almost a quarter of the sample. The remainder of the surnames are composed of small groups of Portuguese, Greeks, Asian and others (European and African). These data show that by the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the Greeks were really cut of the textile mills in Lowell, even though they represent a large proportion of the greater Lowell population. Descendents of French Canadians are still very active in the mills, although they tend to be the "old-timers," and the Hispanic population, still relatively small in Lowell, was already highly represented in the textile mills.

There was considerable divergence between mills in the tally of surnames. Consistent with the other data, Lawrence had the lowest number of Spanish surname workers, about ten percent, and the highest number of Anglo surname workers. Clearly Lawrence also drew workers from the large Lowell-born, French surname population of Canadian ancestry. Again, Synthetic Yarns followed in that pattern, but with double the percentage of Hispanic surname employees. Both Ames companies had a small group of Asian surname workers on the rolls. Joan Fabrics had almost thirty-five percent Spanish surname workers, by far the highest incidence of Portu-
guese surname employees, fifteen percent, and the lowest number of French surname workers, thirteen percent. At Wannalancit less than twenty percent of the employees had Anglo surnames, while over forty percent of the surnames were of Hispanic origin.

For the foreign-born, the last and perhaps the best indicator of origin, the percentages refer to the frequency of each country, or area, relative only to the one-third of the total sample that was born outside of the United States. A third of the foreign born for the total sample were from Puerto Rico and a third were from Colombia, while a little less than twenty percent came from Portugal. With less than five percent each, it is clear again that newly-arrived Canadians and Greeks were not entering the textile mills in large numbers by 1960.

Of Joan's forty percent foreign-born population, more than half were from Puerto Rico, and a third from Portugal; a little less than ten percent were from Colombia. At Lawrence, where only ten percent of the labor force was born outside of the United States, two-thirds were of Hispanic origin, primarily from Puerto Rico and a small group from Colombia, and a quarter were born in the Far East. Synthetic Yarns showed twenty percent of its workers born outside the United States. Of those,
almost two-thirds were of Hispanic origin, with a quarter from Colombia; the remaining third were born in Asia and in Greece. At Wannalancit, more than half of the workers were born outside of the United States. Almost seventy percent of the foreign-born were of Hispanic origin, with over fifty percent of those born in Colombia alone. More than fifteen percent of the foreign-born were from Portugal, and, finally, the only group of textile workers born in Canada was to be found at Wannalancit. They were the last vestiges of that mighty migration flow of previous decades.

It can be concluded from these data that the Ames Manufacturing companies had the greatest tendency to hire local labor; Lawrence Manufacturing appreciably more so than Synthetic Yarns. Joan Fabrics hired heavily from recently-arrived Puerto Rican and Portuguese immigrant groups, and Wannalancit drew its workforce also from the "new" immigrants, but primarily from the Colombian network. It is clear that the Colombians had found their way into all the mills: ten percent of the foreign-born at Joan, fifteen percent at Lawrence, more than twenty-five percent at Synthetic Yarns, and over fifty percent at Wannalancit.
In light of the divergent paths taken by each of the companies in solving the labor shortage problem, it is interesting to know how the different populations rate in textile experience. Were the Colombians, in fact, more experienced textile workers than their New England counterparts, and how experienced were the fully documented Puerto Ricans embraced by Joan Fabrics? Table 6 shows five variables intended to indicate experience and interest in the manufacture of textiles, for the entire sample and for selected areas of origin: New England, Puerto Rico, Colombia and Portugal.

The total sample did not reflect vast experience in terms of years in the mills; two-thirds of the workers had worked in textiles for less than a year, and fewer than ten percent had been in textiles for more than ten years. The Puerto Rican and Portuguese groups had even less experience than that. About three-quarters in both cases had less than a year of experience in textiles, while neither group showed anyone with more than ten years of experience. The New Englanders had more years of textile experience than the total sample: a little more than half were in their first year of working in textiles, while almost fifteen percent had been in the mills for more than ten years. The Colombians, however, had by far the most years of textile experience. A third
### Table 6

**Indicators of Textile Experience, by Area of Origin (in percent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Total</th>
<th>New England</th>
<th>New Puerto Rico</th>
<th>New Colombia</th>
<th>New Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in textiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 1 year</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-10 years</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 25 years</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Previous job**     |           |             |                 |              |              |
| in textiles          | 31.6      | 36.1        | 26.4            | 74.6         | 21.9         |
| (N)                  | 657       | 72          | 59              | 71           | 32           |

| **Learner**          |           |             |                 |              |              |
| yes                  | 21.5      | 13.1        | 28.0            | 14.2         | 22.8         |
| (N)                  | 934       | 92          | 93              | 106          | 57           |

| **Job title at hiring** |           |             |                 |              |              |
| fixer/mechanic         | --        |             |                 |              |              |
| weaver/twister/knitter | 4.4       | 0.0         | 16.2            | 1.8          |
| (N)                    | 90        | 91          | 105             | 57           |

| **Job duration**      |           |             |                 |              |              |
| more than 2 years     | 56.9      | 47.4        | 27.7            | 67.6         | 33.3         |
| (N)                   | 580       | 57          | 47              | 68           | 24           |
of the Colombians had worked in textiles for over ten years, while only one-quarter had less than a year's experience. The latter figure is quite high considering the nature of the Colombian migration, and reflects the number of family members who have joined their more skilled spouses in the mills, and the fact that the network had been in existence long enough to attract non-textile workers.

A third of the total sample came directly from other textile industry jobs. This was true for only about one-fourth of the Puerto Rican and Portuguese workers, a little more than a third of the New Englanders, and almost three-quarters of the Colombians. These figures are notably consistent with those of the first variable, and together indicate that for most of those who had worked in textiles for less than a year, the current job was their first one in the mills.

The question about being hired as a "learner" was under-reported, but in relative terms, the same trends shown by the other experience indicators are evident. Members of the non-English-speaking groups may have been hired at a lower level than their qualifications indicated because of the language barrier, yet the Colombians were hired as non-learners at about the same proportion as their New England coun-
terparts. Furthermore, looking at job title at hiring, forty percent of
the Colombians were hired directly into the more skilled jobs (loom fix-
ers and weavers). The Portuguese group had about twenty percent hired in
skilled jobs, mostly weavers; and the New Englanders and Puerto Ricans
each had fewer than fifteen percent enter the mills as skilled textile
workers.

Finally, the Colombians had the highest proportion of workers
who had been on the job for two years or more. That figure is a full
twenty percent higher than the New Englanders, twice as high as the Por-
tuguese group and forty percent higher than the Puerto Ricans. The Colom-
bian perserverance in the mills may be due in part, to their perceived
lack of mobility as illegal aliens, although more than half of them were
documented, and many of the Portuguese workers were not.

From the employers point of view, it is clear that a Colombian
job applicant is generally an excellent candidate indeed; the worker
probably has spent many years in the textile industry, comes directly
from a textile job, can be hired into a skilled position, in spite of the
language problem, and will stay longer than his/her New England, Puerto
Rican or Portuguese counterparts. For the Ames companies, particularly
Lawrence, and Joan Fabrics not to have chosen to rely on the available
Colombians was definitely a sacrifice in the short run; they clearly made a trade-off of production efficiency for legality.

**Working in Lowell**

By 1976, the Colombian immigrant textile worker network was firmly established. All the companies in this study had experienced their unique talents, and even the mills that had taken an active stand to eschew the Colombians' services in favor of local labor or, at the very least, documented workers, found that they had a small percentage of Colombians on the rolls and were in many ways dependent upon them.

Wannalancit's case was exceptional; the company was totally involved with the Colombian network.

I started to get real panicky over the thing... You know I take a contract for cloth and I have three months to produce it. If immigration comes here today, I'm out of business tomorrow.

"I'm worried about it. Time goes on and nothing happens and no one comes. And one day the immigration inspector came. Sat down at this table right here. He showed me a picture of a guy, and said, 'Is this man working for you?' And I said, 'No.' He said, 'O.K.' And he came back again another time. And said, 'Is this man working for you?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'I want him.' I said, 'All right.' And then he asked me the question 'Do you have any

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other illegal aliens working here or Colombians?' I said 'Yup.' He said, 'About how many?' I said, 'I don't know, but probably between fifty and sixty.' He said, 'Oh my God.' He called Boston, tells his boss, and he says, 'Well, get me a list,' and mailed it to him. I never made the list; he never asked for it. And I would guess that probably a year to a year and a half went by. Then one day he came here. They started picking 'em up out in town here. Right out of their apartment houses. And all of a sudden they came in that afternoon about four o'clock. Bob Hurley and Russ Walker, and I sat down with 'em over here in the back office. Said, 'They're here.' 'How many?' 'Fifty to sixty.' 'Well, we want them.' I said, 'O.K. Fine. You can have them. I'm going to give you something else. I'm going to give you the whole goddam thing. All the keys to the mill too. They're all yours too. If you take those fifty to sixty people out of here, mister, then you shut this mill down. And they're going to put about 120 or 30 Americans out of work too. Some of them worked here all their lives; they've never had another job. Worked no other place but here, who are fifty-five to sixty years old, and you also tell them why they don't have a job anymore, because they aren't going to understand. But you can tell them. We'll have a meeting and you boys tell them just exactly what you're doing and why.'

No Colombians left the mill that day, but they were all interviewed and identified before the Immigration officials returned to Boston.

Ted Larter then took the direct approach. He appealed to the then-Congressman, Paul Tsongas, who arranged a meeting between himself, Larter, Pat Coombey, then District Director of Immigration in Boston, and Gayle Bachus, then the Certifying Officer for the Labor Department. A
short time after that meeting, Mr. Bachus went to Lowell to inspect the mill.

I showed him everything. I talked with him just like I'm talkin' to you now, and he understood the problem. But you see, he really can't do what he wants to do either because of this goddam federal bureaucracy that we've got here. Statistics show that we're in a high unemployment area for labor. So, when you're in a high unemployment area for labor how do you justify having to bring in more aliens, foreigners, to do the jobs that these unemployed could do? Why can't the unemployed do these jobs? Well, the labor market today pretty much has got things pretty well straightened out where the craftsman is a thing of the past. There is no more craftsman. If you can't learn a job in ten minutes, you'd better buy a new machine. Now these Colombians come out of here. They were making thirty bucks a week in Colombia for doing the same goddam thing. Now they're making three hundred bucks a week. All right?

But remember, these people don't even have green cards yet. All these people are on docket control. Means immigration can shoot them out of here tomorrow. O.K.? I've made out all their papers. They've got their labor clearances now. I've filed their 140's. I've filed their 485's. All the papers are filed.

No one has left here yet and this was now a year ago last April. A year ago last April, so they've been here over a year. They've been here a year and six months, four months, six months, something like that. It's very unusual, but never have they gotten with a situation like this before. They've gone into factories, they've gone into restaurants where there were three and four. Cleaned 'em out, but they brought three and four in the next day. They re-
placed them. You cannot replace these people.
That's the point. I brought out my payroll records.
I laid it right out on the table. Everybody looked
at it. What these guys are making. They're making
three or four hundred dollars a week. These aren't
menial people, these aren't menial jobs. These are
loom fixers and weavers and smash-piecers. They're
the upper. U.S. citizens don't want those jobs.

Apparently, the Labor Department agreed with Ted Larter, up to
a point. The first round of labor certification applications began to
come through. The political intervention had served Wannalancit well.

Fifty applications for green cards had been submitted for this
first group, including thirty-eight men and twelve women. The females
were creelers and unifil tenders; in the male group there were twelve
loom fixers, ten weavers, seven smash piecers, four unifil tenders, two
drawing-in operators, one slasher tender, a warp rigger and a doffer.
While most of the workers waited and labored patiently at Wannalancit as
the Labor Department processed their applications, others returned to
Colombia to see their families, whom they had not seen for periods of
three to five years. Ultimately sixteen of the applications were denied
for one reason or another. At least three of the men had had a falling
out with Larter and the applications were not completed or sponsorship
was withdrawn. Some applications were approved while the workers were in
Colombia, others had their status adjusted in Lowell.
Most of the thirty-four newly-documented workers stayed on at Wannalancit for some time, and included four loom fixers and six weavers. But three years later in 1979, only fifteen Colombian workers from the original group of fifty applicants in 1976 were still in the mill.  

The other two companies were also visited by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. At Ames, Lawrence Manufacturing found the encounter entirely unpleasant. They let the Colombians go, but later tried to get seven back, because "...they could do the work of ten. They could run a shift themselves." The company knew from having forwarded their W2 forms that all seven workers had gone to South Carolina; none returned. Lawrence decided not to knowingly hire any more illegal aliens, no matter how valuable they were to the company. Synthetic Yarns was also embarrassed by having to admit that undocumented workers had slipped through their inscription process, but they were much more dependent on the skilled Colombians, never let them go, and initiated the long and arduous labor permit application process on behalf of their key Colombian employees.

In contrast to Wannalancit's aggressively pro-Colombian worker stance and Ames' uncomfortable predicament, Joan Fabrics assumed a rela-
tively casual position. Dick Cote describes how they eventually were brought into line.

Six years ago, 1974 in there... 1973, that's when we first started to formalize this (the Personnel) department. Prior to that we had some Colombians working that were already in-house, and we didn't really know the immigration rules. See... when we first started here. But, eh, we started to learn them and then we were even approached by the immigration people. I think in 1977, and they said that they had reason to believe that we had some illegal aliens working for us...

Of course, prior to that we did ask for a green card from people that put in their applications that they were naturalized citizens. That's the only question that we could ask them. If they put down that they were citizens, we weren't really obliged to question that, because if we found they weren't, then they would be subject to dismissal for falsifying statements on their applications.

But the immigration people wanted us to clean house, so to speak... So, we really weren't receptive to that approach. We... felt we had some loyalties to our employees and we weren't going to cooperate (laugh). So the next time we saw him (Bob Hurley) he had a subpoena, and he subpoenaed our records, and he did a check on our files and found that there were about ten people that he felt were questionable. I think three or five we were obliged to tell... that unless they supplied us with proper documentation we were going to have to let them go, and all the others had their green cards... Yeah, they left, but they never did get deported as far as I know.

Because of our cooperative approach with immigration, if someone does come in and doesn't have a green
card, and now if it's questionable and he says he has a guy coming in we can call immigration to see if, in fact, these are true statements. Yeah, we do that. Yeah, we changed our approach...

So, we don't go out of our way to do it if... a department head says that this person will be starting right tomorrow (and) we don't have all these things, then we won't go ahead and sign him up unless we're sure that what he's saying is true, and this is how we do it...

I'm sure there's still some that slip by us, but we do what we can to prevent that. And, of course, Mr. Hurley says that from the application you can analyze them and know that they're illegal aliens. You know, he says from their school, from their dialect... and I say ... that's really not our job to do his job ... and, you know, he's accepted that. We feel confident ... there might be a small percentage now (of illegals), but we haven't been bothered for two years by immigration. We have to feel that they know who's working for us. And there's a lot of informants that they get their information from.

In the meantime, Wannalancit had continued to fill the mill with Colombians. They were so willing and able, the network was so well established, the flow so persistent.

Then one day in early June of 1979 the INS came calling again. There were sixty-eight Colombians on the payroll: thirty-two documented, and twenty-four undocumented. By this time the government was not at all convinced that Wannalancit, or any of the other mills in New England
that employed illegal Colombians, could not manage without these workers. Twenty-one Colombians were ordered to appear in Immigration Court in Boston on the thirteenth of July.

Ted Larter brought the whole group to Boston in vans. He went in first to talk with the judge alone. Then the workers, looking very serious and contrite, entered as a group. The judge addressed them together.

The purpose of this hearing is to determine if you are to be deported, or if you are to be excused from deportation...

He read them their rights, and then handled the allegations against the workers in groups of four and five, depending mostly on how and where they had entered the country.

You are not a citizen or native of the United States; you are a citizen or native of Colombia...

Most of the workers had overstayed their visas, some had entered without inspection. One individual, who had entered the country on a thirty day visa in 1972, had been working quietly for over seven years and thus had the right to apply for citizenship. At the suggestion of the government
counsel, and with Ted Larter's acquiescence, the remaining twenty were given six months to straighten out their affairs or be deported. Did they have anything to say?

I am disposed to grant six months extension at my discretion, until January 13, 1980... Extensions can be obtained from the District Director. If an extension is not granted and you do not leave, you will be deported to the country of your choice... the verdict can be appealed to the Immigration Board... This case is closed.

Wannalancit immediately sent in another round of labor certification applications, the 1979 group. Of the twenty who had appeared in court and were subject to deportation, one returned to Colombia and seven were denied labor permits or extensions. All of the seven who were withdrawn from the documentation process left Wannalancit, but not one left the country by the thirteenth day of 1980, and not one had arrived in Medellín by April of 1980. They eventually disappeared from Lowell, but not overnight. A few of them even signed on at Lawrence Manufacturing, just down the street, for a short time before leaving.

There had been a total of thirty-four applications submitted in the 1979 group. (Including two Portuguese.) Twenty-seven labor certifi-
cations were finally approved, but by that time thirteen of the appli-
cants had returned to Colombia. Thus, at the end of the six-month peri-
od, Wannalancit continued with fourteen newly-certified workers, who had
received further extensions, and filed twelve visa applications in
February of 1980. Almost one full year of filing, waiting, and more
paperwork, and the net gain was twelve workers from the 1979 group.

To find out more about the Colombians who were working in the
mills ten years after the first group arrived, seventeen male Colombian
workers were interviewed at length: fourteen at Wannalancit and three at
Joan.17

All of the respondents had been born in the Department of
Antioquia, more than half in Medellín and its environs. A third of the
men had terminated formal schooling at the primary level, but most had
stopped before completing high school, and two had a year or two of uni-
versity training. Two-thirds of the group had received some form of
technical training, either at the SENA or the training center at the
company where they were employed, this at the government's or company's
expense. Only two paid for courses (in non-textile fields) themselves.
All of the elementary education occurred in public schools, and the higher
education in a combination of public and private institutions.

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This generation of workers had received more formal schooling than their parents. Of those who knew how many years their parents had gone to school, most reported five years or less; three fathers and two mothers had gone as far as the high school level. While almost all of the mothers had not worked outside the home, the fathers' occupations varied broadly. Only six had spent their lives in the mills; four had been farmers.

The Lowell workers did come from large families. Two-thirds of the group had ten or more siblings. At the time of the interview, nineteen of the combined 155 siblings, or a mere 12.3 percent were working in textiles. Even though the immediate families were not totally involved in textiles, all but two had extended family members in the mills, and some had many. "About fifty (family members) are working in textiles, no more. Just the whole family."

For the first job after leaving school, only four of the seventeen went directly into textiles. The others began their working lives as auto mechanics, salesmen, waiters, and there was even a musician. Subsequent employment gravitated to the same fields, but eleven more of the men added textile mill experience to their work histories; some never
changed again. Thus fifteen of the seventeen had worked in textiles before coming to the United States. Even at this later period in the life of the Colombian network, the mills in Lowell were drawing primarily experienced workers, although, unlike the primer enganche, not all of their entire careers had been spent in the mills.

This was not a group of men that had travelled widely before coming to the United States. Only two had worked in other Colombian cities, one in Bogotá and the musician in Barranquilla. Three others had been out of their country once: one to work in textiles in Venezuela, and two in Canada, one of whom worked with his resident brother for only two days before being caught and sent back to Colombia.

At the time they decided to try their luck in the United States, all but the one in Canada were living in the Medellín metropolitan area. Three of the seventeen were younger than twenty years old, most were between twenty and forty, and none were over forty-four. A little more than half were married. Eleven of the men had children in Medellín, mostly between one to three children, only two had more than five. Almost all of the men had gotten the idea to seek their fortunes in the U.S. from family and friends. Two were the sons of former immi-
grants; they were the oldest, joining their fathers to increase the family earning power.\textsuperscript{18}

The arrival dates in the United States of these seventeen men spanned the decade of the seventies. One arrived as early as December of 1971, and one to four came every year after that, including three in 1979, within six months before the interview. All of them left their families in Medellín. The three youngest had their passage paid for by their parents, all the rest, except for one contracted worker, paid for the trip themselves.

Most of the men came by airplane, either directly Medellín-Boston, or any number of variations via Bogotá, Miami and New York City. Two came by boat via the Bahamas, as described at the beginning of Chapter 2, and the fellow who was living in Canada prior to coming to the United States also took the Bahamas route to reach Montreal. From Montreal he traveled by bus via Plattsburgh, New York to Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Two others came via Mexico, one over the Tiajuana - San Diego route, and then by bus to New York City. The other, who insisted in the interview that he had made the whole trip by airplane, did, in fact, fly from Medellín to Mexico City and from Mexico City to Ciudad Juárez, cov-
ered a small section of the trip "a pie" to El Paso, and then resumed his airplane travel from El Paso to New York. "Todo por avión." Most of the men travelled by themselves, but the Tijuana traveler went with three companions, and the worker who had been contracted by the Cadillac Mills in Rhode Island was a member of a group of twenty-three.

The tally of type of visa with which the seventeen men entered the United States is: one H2 labor certification, two permanent resident alien visas (the two sons), ten tourist visas, and four no visa, or "entered without inspection" in INS terms. Only two of the men admitted to having paid someone to make the arrangements, two hundred and three hundred dollars respectively.

At the time of the interview in June of 1979, there was only one loom fixer in the group, but there were six weavers and six others with skilled textile jobs (smash piecer, knot tier, slasher tender); only three were employed in jobs requiring little former experience. Four of the workers had been at the mill where they were interviewed for less than a year, but six had been there for five or six years. As a group they had been quite mobile in the U.S. job market. For all but three, the current job was not the first since they had arrived in the United
States. They had worked in New York, Rhode Island, Miami, New Jersey, South Carolina and New Hampshire, mostly in textile mills, but also in restaurants or mechanically-oriented jobs.

By 1979 only five had been able to bring family members to the United States; one had only his wife join him, and the largest group was a spouse and four children. Only one of the bachelors had married in the United States (to a Colombian woman he met here) and he was the only one who had children (two) born since arriving in this country. At the time of the interview all four of the wives and one of the children were working in textiles in Lowell. If other than immediate relatives were included, only five of the seventeen had no relatives working in the United States.

Only three of the men had children in school in Lowell: two children in vocational school, and one each in pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, primary and elementary schools. Almost half of the group had taken advantage of educational opportunities in the United States, primarily formal English courses, at places such as the Skill Center, community colleges, high schools in Lowell and Haverhill, and other adult education centers and international institutes in the greater Lowell-Lawrence-Haverhill area.
The 1970s immigrants did not have much time during the week to attend classes. Like their colleagues in the *primor enganche*, these men worked long hours in their quest to amass capital. All of them worked more than forty-hour weeks at least some of the time, most worked overtime consistently, and several just worked all the time; Iván had been working twelve-hour days, six days a week and a half day on Sunday for years, Jairo had been working two full eight-hour shifts at two different companies for over six months.

Because of the different hours and variations in their base and incentive pay, the workers' wages differed considerably. The lowest weekly earnings reported (in 1979) was $150 for a regular forty-hour week, but most of the men earned about $200/week, and some could clear as much as $350 to $360 a week or about $1,400/month. One worker moon-lighted in a bakery and earned about $300/week with forty hours in the mill. These earnings compare to a range of about $12 to $30 U.S. dollars a week in Colombia, or $50 to $120/month. That is why they came.

From their hard-earned wages, all but one of the seventeen men sent remittances to Colombia at one time. Three more had stopped sending money since their families had joined them in the United States. Of the
thirteen men who were sending money to Colombia at the time of the interview, half were supporting households in Colombia and sent remittances regularly, while half were only "helping out" and sent money sporadically. The smaller amounts of $50 to $70 a month were sent by the latter group, while most sent over $100 a month and half sent $50 to $70 a week "ever since I got here," "always," and "all the time." That means that in addition to their modest expenses and some ardent saving in the United States, many of the workers were able to send home more than twice the amount that they would have earned in Colombia. In one week in 1979, this group of thirteen textile workers would have been responsible for sending an average of $500 from the United States to Colombia, or about U.S. $26,000 a year.

It was a little difficult for the textile workers to talk about the future. Most were noncommittal about how long they would stay at their current jobs, for obvious reasons. A couple were ready to move on, several more were going to wait to see what transpired with their papers, only one planned to stay indefinitely because he was happy, and two had targeted between three and seven more years.
When asked if they planned to return to Colombia, a third said they had no idea, but more than half said they would only go back to visit. One had almost exhausted his final extension and was leaving imminently, but would have stayed if allowed. If they were to return, hypothetically, only one mentioned looking for a job in textiles, but doubted that he would be hired; the others would only be satisfied if they could establish their own small business and work for themselves.

What if their current place of employment were to close? The Colombians were optimistic to a man. "In truth, there are many places where one can work." They would all look for another job, either in Lowell, Miami, or somewhere else in the United States. They were certain that they could get other textile jobs. Some expressed an interest in trying something else, but none were concerned that they would be unemployed for any length of time.

When asked what they would like to be doing in five years, four could not respond or answered "work less," or "just sit." More than a third of the group, however, wanted to be working for themselves as truck owners, electricians, taxi drivers, or restaurateurs. The rest talked about computer programming, the air force, and electronic engineering.
They also had professional careers in mind for their children, and four responded emphatically that they did not want their children to work in the mills. Finding qualified textile workers in the next generation seems no less bleak than it has been for previous generations.

Finally, all the workers agreed with their employers that they were not in direct competition with local labor.

There's no competition. The American doesn't know and doesn't want to understand textile work. You never see a young American who wants to learn to weave or be a loom fixer... Maybe it's because we come from a textile center... Here there was a shut down weave room, and fifteen of us came and got it going again.

Hugo

We are respected in the whole country as good workers. There is no competition.

Marco

Within less than a month, seven of these seventeen men were standing in front of the Immigration judge in Boston and became part of the 1979 group of visa applicants. Six had been in the 1976 group and had their documents in order, and four others had entered the country
with permanent resident alien visas or acquired them since arriving in
the United States. 22

Some excerpts from the recorded interviews portray the 1970s
immigrant experience through the workers own observations and in their
own words.

Practically speaking, there are very few opportuni-
ties in Colombia. Of course, if I like to brillarle
la corbata of the powerful, I could rise, but I'm no
good for that, and therefore I prefer to start from
the bottom, without having to make a fool of myself.
So that's why I wouldn't have any opportunity in
Colombia. If I had continued my life there I
wouldn't have gotten anywhere.

Humberto

Lamentably, in Colombia the proletariat has neither
voice nor power. There power exists only for people
with money, and is in the hands of only a few fami-
lies... You would notice that in Colombia because it
is a palpable thing. About twenty years ago there
was a president at Coltejer who fed his dogs with all
the best things there were to eat. So everyone there
said: it's better to be a rich man's dog than a poor
man's son. One shouldn't speak badly of one's own
country, but it's worse if you paint everything beau-
tiful when it isn't that way.

I earn here in one week what it would take me a month
to earn in Colombia, but here I spend dollars and
there I spend pesos... The dollar is worth more
there, because it goes a lot farther... that's why
all the immigrants come here.
I think that in the United States all the prestaciones are included in the hourly wage, and here the money is spent, whereas in Colombia it is saved. For example, if you work for twenty years at Coltejer and you haven't taken any of the money out, when you do take it they give you a lot of money. But because the worker there lives so poorly, he has to take the money out every year to pay his debts. In July you get a bonus. In January you start to borrow money that you will pay back with the July bonus, and in July you start to borrow money to pay back with the December bonus. And that's the life of the Colombian worker.

Ignacio

The American in Lowell does not like textile work because the noise bothers him. Furthermore, he's unreliable. I think that is because since he has so many opportunities, he doesn't have to dedicate himself to this job only... Young Americans don't show any love for work; they always look for easy jobs... textile jobs are always hard, either here or there (in Colombia)... Because this is a great and wealthy country... the American worker doesn't need to work more than his forty hours, and I ask myself why in the United States does even the one who doesn't want to work earn money? In other parts of the world, anyone who doesn't work doesn't earn money... I think that the American government should analyze this problem of why the American youth doesn't want to serve or work at anything.

Humberto

...the boss of the third shift (at Joan) is an American, but he gets along very well with us, with the Hispanics... He knows that we have worked hard for him because of the production. Knowing that the third shift has very few people... and in spite of
that we have higher general production than the second shift, and sometimes even the first.

Here in this company we get along very well with the Puerto Ricans. They help us and we help them, in this company. Of course, there have been some bad feelings, but out in the street, because even though we speak the same language, we don't have the same customs as they do. We are very different from them in customs, care of the family and all those things... They don't agree that we're better than them and there have been problems... But in the mill we get along well... we help each other to defeat the Portuguese, to speak frankly, because the Portuguese are really against us... I see that there's a lot of discrimination against us... Hispanics here, because there are a lot of Portuguese working in this company. There is a lot of support for the Portuguese, and, truthfully, they work very hard; those people work as many hours of overtime as they want... A Colombian never gets beyond weaver here... if a new Portuguese comes in, even though he doesn't know the movement of the machinery, they put him in as a loom fixer right away... The boss of the first and second shifts also likes the Portuguese a lot... If a Portuguese comes in he's sent to the first or second shifts, never the third, but you can be sure that all the Colombians that work in this mill have passed through the third shift, all of them.

Jaime P.

It's not that I'm very happy working the two shifts, but often it's the economic situation that makes one have to work like that. I'm thinking about in which of the two mills I will continue. I like the work here, it's a little cleaner, a little more relaxed. There's another Colombian on my shift but I don't know him very well. I like the work and it seems as if I have done well, they have said so. I like this company because it's a little more organized. But I
like Wannalancit too because the boss has a lot of trust in me, right? I get along well directly with the boss. There are many Colombians and the Colombians have more force there than here... If a Colombian comes in here, Good, you go there... whatever they tell you do do. But over there from the time you arrive you have someone to tell' O.K. I know how to do this.' Not here. I'm telling you, my work is loom fixer, but I don't have anyone who says, 'Yes, he's a loom fixer.'

Jairo

The second generation is doing very well, especially here in Lowell, because we, the young ones who arrived first, only threw ourselves into textile companies, and now we're thinking of better things. For example, now we see young men working in banks, in stores, looking for jobs in electronics, at General Electric, studying electronics, or studying in universities. Before, we just thought about making money, we just thought about work. Now we think that in this country you can do many things if you want, and I see a lot of hope that the Colombians will begin to progress, not only here in Lowell, but in many parts of the country.

Jaime P.

I would like my children to be professionals more than anything else, so that they don't have to work so hard, and in that way they could choose the work they liked and make a living at it. No, I don't want my children to work in textiles, because this work is very hard.

I would go back to Colombia when I have some money together, so that I could live differently, because in Colombia the situation is different, very difficult. Yes I am thinking of living from my own busi-
ness. What I never wanted to do was return to Colombia to continue working in factories, because in that case I would be better continuing here, because the pay is better. If I return to Colombia, I would like to be a businessman.

Colombia is a beautiful country... It's a great country, but only for tourists.

Jorge

Waiting in Medellín: Returnees and New Recruits

While the preceding section dealt with Colombian textile workers who were in Lowell at the time of data collection, this section focuses on two groups of other workers who were waiting to go to the United States. One is the group of returnees who had at one time worked in Lowell, and the second is a group of new recruits, a new enganche, that had been formed by one of the returnees.

First the returnees. All members of the 1976 group of applicants had been advised to return to Colombia to await their appointments and get their visas. Some did go back to Medellín, primarily because they had not seen their families for years and felt it was now safe, and some decided to stay and wait in Lowell so that Wannalancit would not be left without personnel. All thirty-eight of the men were granted labor certifications, as described in the last section, but when the immigrant
visa applications were finally processed, some were approved and some were denied, either in Medellín or in Lowell. While members of the 1976 application group were always coming and going: with papers and visiting Colombia, or without papers and going back to the United States anyway, twelve of the thirty-eight were not in the United States during the summer of 1979; those twelve are considered here as the returnees. One had his permanent resident alien visa, but had decided to return to Medellín. The others had been denied the visa while in Colombia, had been living there for between one and three years, and were still very interested in emigrating to the United States with their families. All were totally confused as to why they had been denied the visa.

At the time of data collection, five of the twelve were working in textile mills in Venezuela until further word reached them about the status of their U.S. immigrant papers. Going to work in Venezuela was clearly a popular temporary response for the returnees. The remaining seven were interviewed by the author, using a version of the original oral history questionnaire adapted specifically for the returnees (See Appendix I, B2.) Their general characteristics were very similar to those of their colleagues, the older members of the "working in Lowell" group. What is unique about these workers is what they had to tell
about coming full circle; what happens to the Colombian textile workers if they do not stay in the United States, as did most of the primer enganche. Their experiences are interesting in part because of their frustrations in dealing with United States immigration procedures but primarily how they chose to invest their hard-earned savings after returning to Medellín.

Augustín was a loom fixer, who had saved three thousand dollars beyond what he had needed to maintain two residences. He bought a house for his family with his earnings and was working as a loom fixer for a small mill in Medellín. Iván L. was working as a weaver for the same company, Confección de Colores. He had saved about four thousand dollars in Lowell and bought a restaurant in Bogotá several months after returning. Within a year he sold it because it was not doing well. Julio had also bought a business, a liquor store, with his earnings and sold it at the end of a year for a profit. He was living from the profit of that sale, and was not in a great hurry to find other work. Luis, on the other hand, was looking very hard for a job. He returned with some savings, but had to pay off an old debt and ended with nothing. Luis, and then Juan, Héctor and Rafael tell their own stories.
Well, I really didn't have any savings because I had to pay back a debt that I had here. I brought back less than $3,000... I paid a debt of about $1,200. I had tried to do a little small business and it didn't work. I lost everything I brought back. I like working on locksmith soldering, so I got into this crazy thing of forging tools. I bought about 50,000 pesos ($1,300) worth of tools and lost the money. So I had to go to work again. Finally I had to go to Venezuela, and I was there for about two and a half years... When I came back I went to work with a friend in a small factory... I earned a small salary and, little by little got moving again. Actually, I've been out of work for eight or ten days. (The factory) was sold and I ended up without work... We were six people in the mill and it closed. I've struggled to place myself somewhere else, but it has been very difficult, even though I have my qualifications, it's difficult. Coltejer doesn't rehire personnel that left to go abroad... at Tejiconder they told me to come back... I was at Fabricato and took the exams. I did very well, but they had a fire and more than two hundred workers were stopped, so those people have to be divided into the other mills, and because of that they haven't called me... If I don't find work here, I won't have any choice but to go abroad again...

Well, to stay here I would have to get some money so that I could set up a business. I really like industrial mechanics, above all forging, but you need capital to get organized.

Luis

We thought the visa was all set. We never thought that the Consul would deny the visa, simply because we all believed that he knew we had been working. Coming here with a labor certification and having filled out all those papers... We all had to put down where we had entered the United States, the
places where we had worked, all of that was in the paperwork that we filled out to apply for the labor certifications... Later they send you letters saying, 'We have all your correspondence here, we hope you won't write us again until we tell you when you should come into the office.' When I did go in on the fifteenth of January, the Consul said, 'I'm very sorry but I can't give you the visa because you are covered by code 19, section 12, which permanently denies you a visa because you went to the United States with intentions of working...'

We went by bus and returned by bus, the whole family. I lost 60,000 pesos (about $1,600 at that time) between medical examinations for the whole family, travel costs, staying there three or four days, the fees for seven people, the paperwork, proof of baptism, proof of matrimony, clothes, because you can't look bad in front of the Consul; those are loses that they don't even know about. They don't have anything to do with that.

I can't get work (at Fabricato) because of my age. Here after you're thirty years old they don't give you a job, and if you have children it's worse. The policies of the companies are very different from those in the United States. There, an old man of seventy-five or eighty years of age can get a job as long as he can move. At my age of forty years, I can't get a job in a factory; even if I were thirty I couldn't get work. The only way to get work here at my age is to be certified, like Ivan L., who is a loom fixer.

Juan

I was born here in Medellín, in Bello, in 1945. I have six brothers and sisters... My father was a furniture maker all his life, my mother never worked, she was a housewife... I finished my bachillerato here, then I entered a textile company, Fabricato... and I worked in the same mill from 1963 to 1972.
From there I went directly to the United States, to Lowell. When I left I was a loom fixer... and I worked for Mr. Larter for six years.

Another colleague of mine initiated the trip. He was also a loom fixer... there were three of us... we went by way of a guy, Jaime C. (from the primer enganche). Jaime and others sent word that they had a good job for us, that the mill where they were working always hired personnel if they were qualified. So the three of us got excited and wrote to him... He said we could come, that after arriving in New York we had to go to a town called Lowell that was about five hours away, to call him from New York, and he would meet us at the bus... We went by plane to Puerto Rico... We had gotten tourist visas in Bogota. We flew Medellín - Bogotá - Puerto Rico, then from Puerto Rico to New York...

In Lowell the mill had a large air-conditioned hall with beds and so we slept there on the second floor, above the offices... There was an electric hot-plate and we cooked there. There were eighteen of us... it was a little uncomfortable to cook because we all got out at the same time, but for a new arrival it was comfortable because you would leave work, leave the weave room, and you'd be right there in the same building... then we moved to apartments. I don't know... they had problems; I don't know if it was the hygiene or something, but they didn't want more people there, so they recommended apartments for us.

In the beginning I could send $120/week because we didn't have to pay... of course our food was bad, and we slept poorly because we all slept in the same room... we earned more because we worked so many extra hours, generally twelve, but there were people who worked fourteen, sixteen and eighteen... since it was in the same mill you only had to change clothes. We didn't pay rent, food yes... but mostly canned food, bread and sausage, very bad. We suffered, but one is very stuck on dollars...
I returned in December of 1978. They gave me the visa in July of '78 and I came back in December to visit the family. I came and I stayed. I haven't gone back because I've had support to work. I wanted to experiment a little here also, particularly working for myself. In the beginning I worked with a sister, in a small business she had. I left that and bought a taxi, I'm driving a taxi, and now I want to go back again. With the earnings you can start to work here. I had about U.S. $12,000 in cash when I returned. I bought some sewing machines together with my sister; later I sold my interest to her and went to work for myself in public transportation. Now I'm bored in that. That's all I invested in.

By the week, you can earn about $200 driving a taxi, working hard, not eight hours, but ten or twelve... You also have to count on the car demanding expenses. You can make that money in a week, but in the same week you have to put $50 into the car, not including gasoline... you never know when the car needs a tire, a battery, an inspection.

I got married this past November... she wants to go very much, but it's a little difficult with this problem, her pregnancy; it's better to wait until that passes. It's very strange, I haven't wanted to work in textiles here again, and there I know if I go, it will be to work in textiles. There's one thing, they don't like it here if a person leaves directly... worse still as happened with me, I quit from Fabricato... they won't take him back because he quit... they really need people here too, but they don't look well on those who leave. There's another problem, on the other hand, and that is... knowing that you can arrive and find a job and it's much better... working for the money there, than working for the money here... there a loom fixer earns $250 to $300 a week, while here he earns that in a month...
When I came back it was to visit one or two months. I had never had the chance to work for myself, and I wanted to experiment. But actually I don't see any better guarantees, and I really haven't adapted at all.

Héctor

I left Colombia in search of new horizons and a new future for my family... When I returned from the United States we had about four thousand dollars in cash... The savings I had I invested in a house here in Colombia, the one I just sold. What I made on the house I put into another house that there is a deal on, but nothing is signed yet... I also bought a restaurant, the International Restaurant. In the beginning everything went badly in the restaurant business, but later I got a little more organized. I made about a hundred and fifty dollars a week... But the restaurant was too much work... Now that I'm out of it, I've changed my job. I sold the restaurant to get this car... It's a taxi and I'm thinking of working it. I've started driving it and fixing it up because it was in very bad condition... I bought the restaurant in July 1978 and sold it in May 1979.

I'm also a merchant. I work in business counseling in real estate. The jobs that I've been doing lately have gone well for me... I also like buying and selling coffee. Now I'm concentrating on real estate and the wholesaling of coffee. No, the taxi isn't functioning now because it's broken... I made about eight hundred dollars this last month... This month was very good, but we'll see what happens next. Business is never constant, it falls and rises.

Rafael
Several things are clear from these experiences. The returnees did try to become independent, gravitated toward similar enterprises, and turned over their businesses quickly. It appears as if the main obstacles to sustained success were lack of experience and undercapitalization. The new entrepreneurs would probably have benefited from some kind of investment counseling and small loan capabilities. While most were able to extract some benefit from having gone to the United States, their futures were not as secure as those of the members of the primer enganche, who stayed in the United States.

Rafael was the returnee who was in charge of forming the new group of recruits in Medellín. There were twenty-two names on the list: eleven loom fixers and eleven weavers, two-thirds from Coltejer mills and one-third from Fabricato. Rafael organized a meeting at his home in early fall of 1979. Eighteen of the twenty-two came; they were interviewed, using the previous interview formats as guides.

All but one of the eighteen, who was from Manizales, were born either in Medellín, or in small towns in Antioquia. The youngest was twenty-four years old, and the oldest fifty, but most were in their mid-thirties. The two oldest had left school after the fifth grade, but
the younger ones had gone on to the seventh and eighth grades, and almost a third had finished high school. They all had taken additional courses in textile production and mechanics. Two were single; the others married, mostly with one to three children. Only two of the wives worked, and they were teachers.

All of the new recruits had considerable textile experience in addition to their course work. One had been at Coltejer for thirty-one years, more than half had ten years or more experience, and the one with least experience was a fellow who had worked in textiles for five years. Most had worked in Medellín only, but three had worked in other Colombian cities, one had been contracted for two years in the Dominican Republic and one had worked in the United States in South Carolina for two and a half years. Others thought and rejected the idea of going to Venezuela, and one almost went with an enganche as far as Australia. Almost half of the men had relatives working in the United States.

The group shared one thing in common: they were all most eager to go to the United States, based on what they had heard from their friends and relatives.
...because they have told me that it's an organized
country, which Colombia is not. In many way... in
the raising of children, the way of life; even though
they've told me that it's expensive, yes, but then
you get paid well. Yes, studies are expensive, but
at least you know your children will go to school,
which isn't true here.

Roberto

In Colombia it's a problem to get a job. You have to
have good palancas (connections) in the mill, or
political advantage, if you aren't specialized.

Jesús E.

We are going to exchange work for dollars and not for
Colombian pesos.

Oscar Y.

When asked what they would like to be doing in five years,
several unspecifically talked of a better future, but three specifically
mentioned progressing in textile technology in the United States, and two
more envisioned themselves and their families in the States. Four men-
tioned returning to Colombia, with the familiar refrain,

I would come back to work in Colombia, but for my-
self; I wouldn't go back into the mills... I would
get a store.

Hernando
One intended to buy a farm with his cache; another would go into a vegetable store business with his brother. One had all-encompassing goals,

To be independent, have a source of money, and be my own boss.

Jesús E.

And one was considerably more philosophical,

You know that man always lives dreaming, and at this moment I see that I'm entering a stage at fifty years of age, not that I feel old, but within five years, where one has to say 'Man, old age has caught up with me, and without a peso.' So one has to look at the other side, that things don't get to a point where one has to be waiting for one of your children to give you a hand. I think that would be very difficult.

Ramón

Ramón, a cheerful, balding fellow, was the only one who admitted that he would go illegally if the enganche did not work out. The others insisted that it would not be in their best interest.

If this enganche doesn't work, I'll continue here until I find a way to move myself there. Of course I would like to go legally.

Luis E.
So, it's better for me to stay here with this job where I am instead of throwing myself into an adventure, only to lose my job and wreck my family.

Francisco R.

I would never do that. I would have left a long time ago. I want to go legally, with no problems, and not have to hide.

Luis G.

These men were looking for the kind of arrangement that the primer enganche had fallen into, but that was no longer possible: not since textile workers had become ineligible for H2 visas in the mid to late 1970s. One of their few hopes, in fact, was the Wannalancit Textile Company, that had spent a decade of mixed success importing Colombian textile workers.

To conclude the chapter, there are two tables that compare the three Colombian textile worker cohorts included in this study: the primer enganche that arrived in the United States in the late 1960s, the Colombians working in Lowell in the mid to late 1970s, and the group of new recruits in Medellín, who aspired to go to the United States as the first enganche of the 1980s.\(^{27}\)

Table 7 shows that the workers found in the mills in the 1970s were younger than either of the two recruited groups. They tended more
Table 7

Comparison of General Characteristics of Three Colombian Textile Worker Cohorts (in percent)

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<td>6.3</td>
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Marital Status -

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Children -

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<th>Number of Children</th>
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<th>Waiting in Medellín (1980s recruits)</th>
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<td>29.4</td>
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Education -

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* Forty-two percent were separated and divorced ten years later.
Table 8
Comparison of Indicators of Textile Experience for Three Colombian Textile Worker Cohorts (in percent)

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<td>(17)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
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<td>38.9</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52.9*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
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<td>(18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job title at hiring -</td>
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<td>weaver</td>
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* Some had done other work (i.e., restaurant) in between; 70.6 percent could not be considered as "learners".

** Colombians usually hired as weavers at Joan.
to be single, have fewer children and more years of schooling than the primer enganche of the late sixties, but the enganche that was forming in the early eighties had fewer children relative to their high incidence of marriage, and had stayed in school much longer than either of the two earlier groups.

From Table 8, which compares the textile experience of the three worker cohorts, it is clear that the primer enganche had the most experience in terms of years in textiles and qualifications. The 1980 new recruits, although contacted directly in the mills, were younger and thus reflected less experience. Finally, it can be seen that the workers who were actually in the mills in Lowell, few of whom originated from recruited groups, had considerably less textile experience. This is because many had a wider range of job experiences since leaving school, and because many had entered the Colombian textile worker network via other jobs, even though many of the contacts had been original network founders.

Caught in the Pipeline

It is clear that the first group of Colombian textile workers would not have entered the U. S. labor market or stayed in this country
and brought their families, or been able to institutionalize the migration network had there not been a labor demand, for whatever reason, that they were able to fill. The primer enganche was solicited, recruited from successful jobs in their own country, to fill a perceived gap in the U. S. labor market.

Had their followers in the Colombian pipeline met with no employment the newly-established network would have dissolved. That is not what happened. It was widely known that the jobs were available, and so they came. Even after it was no longer legally possible to come, they came. They kept coming and were hired because they had been tapped as the most recent source of immigrant labor to supply the demands of the textile industry.

For more than a decade the skilled Colombian textile workers and their often less skilled relatives entered the Lowell textile labor market at a quiet and steady pace. Wannalancit Textile Company was the main conduit, and from there the workers filtered to other companies in Lowell and throughout the United States, particularly to Rhode Island, New York, South Carolina, and Florida.
Then the inevitable, that no one could imagine would ever happen, actually did happen. In December of 1980 the yard gates at Wannalancit closed for the traditional all-mill holiday vacation as they had every Christmas for over fifty years. They never opened again. Ted Larter had finally decided that there was no future for the Wannalancit Textile Company as it entered the decade of the 1980s. The struggle was over. The Boston Globe reported Wannalancit's general manager Mozart Holmes as saying, "When you've been in the business so long, it simply hurts."29

Since the end of the summer no new employees had been hired, some had drifted off, and so by early fall only ninety-nine production workers were still on the job. Of those, about a third were at least second generation Lowellians. They were the "lifers," old-timers, who had spent thirty, forty, even fifty years in the mills, mostly at Wannalancit, who thought they would die in front of their looms, and who had names such as Biro, Bettencourt, Wyderka, Turcotte, Bindas, Teixeria, Boisvert and Paraskos. About twelve were of Portuguese origin, and fifty-three, well over half, were Colombians.30 The last twenty-two, who stayed to the very end included ten Colombians (even several from the 1976 group), three Portuguese, and nine Lowellians.
What became of the Colombians who kept the looms running at Wannalancit for so long? By the end of October, at least three of the Colombians had joined other former Wannalancit employees and gone over to Joan Fabrics, at least six more had moved to other textile companies in Lowell, Lawrence and other cities, at least four had found jobs in Lowell outside of textiles: one at Wang, one at Western Electric, one in a plastics company, and one for the city of Lowell. At that time, about seventeen were thought to have returned to Colombia, mostly those who had been specifically denied the visa. The remainder, about twenty Colombians, were either lingering at Wannalancit among the loyal last to leave, or still believed to be looking for work, either in the Lowell area or somewhere else in the United States.

The Colombian immigrant textile worker network to Lowell had experienced a severe jolt. For one, those who had not received a visa during Wannalancit's eleventh hour efforts, had little hope of adjusting their status without a sponsor. Any illusions that the two groups waiting in Medellín had of making a legal entry into the United States were devastated.
None of the six "returnees," whose visa applications were rejected while they were in Colombia, ever returned to the United States; even the one visa-holder remained in Medellín. Héctor went back to working with his sister in their small apparel factory, Juan continues as an independent taxi driver in Envigado, Agustín works as a professional chauffeur for the Department of Antioquia, and Rafael is doing well in his real estate business. Julio has moved out of the area, no one knows where, Luis is living in Sincelejo, and Ivan died of a heart ailment in 1980.

Of the eighteen "new recruits" who were interviewed in Medellín, four were not able to be reached. Eleven of the men are working in the Medellín area in textiles; two at Fabricato and nine at Coltejer, three as weavers and eight as loom fixers. One has left textiles and works at Sofasa, the Renault assembly plant. Two of the men are living in the United States with permanent resident alien visas: Héctor L., who had been recruited in South Carolina is now in New Jersey, and the other, who else but the jovial Ramón, is working in Lowell at Joan Fabrics.

Humberto, who risked so much to begin a career in the United States, has been working in Venezuela for several years.
There were still a handful of Colombians at Lawrence Manufacturing and Synthetic Yarns, and a good-sized group at Joan Fabrics who would gradually add to the Colombian population in Lowell, but none of those companies were ardent suitors of the textile workers from Medellín, and the consistent flow of new migrants that had filtered through Wannalancit for over a decade would be no more. The Colombian textile worker network to Lowell had come to an end.

That is the story of the mills and the migrants. In the third section the policies and practices that shaped these events will be examined in greater detail.
FOOTNOTES

1. Pellon Corporation in Lowell also hires large numbers of Puerto Rican workers.

2. Joan Fabrics was able to get a labor certification for a Salvadorean worker based on the fact that he could operate a shuttle loom.

3. The old Draper Company loom works in Hopedale, Massachusetts closed in 1978, making the Colombians' ability to improvise even more valuable.

4. Although the shift hours remain the same, the ability to select working hours has been abandoned. (See Notes, Chapter 6, 1 for shift hours for all companies.)

5. Synthetic Yarns has yet to adopt the full program because of different labor requirements.

6. Synthetic Yarns does have a bilingual Puerto Rican female supervisor, who is, understandably, a key employee.

7. See Notes, Chapter 6, 2.

8. See Notes, Chapter 6, 1 for a full accounting of the different shifts at each of the four mills.

9. Lawrence had a small group (5) of college-educated Asians in the sample.

10. This could include anyone from a Lowell-born teenager to an illegal alien, who has connections in Lowell. Only a handful (12) of worker records did not include a social security number; eighteen numbers had multiples, and seven were issued in the Virgin Islands.

11. The author coded all surnames that were of obvious national origin. Individuals, of course, could be second or third generation "Americans," or married to someone of recent immigrant origin. (See Notes, Chapter 6, 3.)
12. There are indications of under-reporting for this variable. The results should be considered in very relative terms only.

13. That would have been in April 1976.

14. Interestingly, the fifteen included three of the four approved loom fixers and four of the six approved weavers, so that the gain in skills was high relative to the numbers.

15. There were also fifteen Portuguese workers, most of whom were undocumented. Of the thirty-two documented Colombians, two were from the primer enganche and eighteen from the first group of 1976 applicants.

16. It is clear to the researcher that Lawrence was never aware of the status of these workers, although undoubtedly they were not asked to reveal much either.

17. See Notes, Chapter 6, 4.

18. One was Pastor Flórez's son. At least three others in the group had direct connections with the primer enganche.

19. Others were qualified loom fixers, but had been hired as weavers.

20. That would be for a unifil tender. The equivalent minimum wage earnings for a forty-hour week would have been $116 at that time.


22. In the latter group, two were sons of early H2 immigrants, and two were older men who had been contracted by other mills in the early 1970s and had their status adjusted later.

23. See Notes, Chapter 6, 5.

24. See Notes, Chapter 6, 6.

25. He was given a visa and took his whole family. They were given a living stipend and a salary, but the company closed and they all returned.

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26. See Notes, Chapter 6, 7, for Héctor L.'s story.

27. Because the Ns are so small, the categories in these tables have been collapsed more than in the preceding tables.

28. Of course cities in Rhode Island and other states developed their own Colombian textile worker networks in much the same way that Lowell did after the arrival of Mario Quiceno, and many of the networks were connected by certain key individuals.


30. There were also five other Latin Americans.
SECTION III
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Immigration Policy
and Colombian Textile Workers In New England:
A Case Study in Political Demography

by

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The buyer buys at the best price, and in Colombia costs have risen a lot. Now we don't have such a cheap labor force, the country has been mired in a very high inflation, and Colombia is not outstandingly competitive in the international market. So that no... there is no possibility that Colombia will become an alternate supplier for the United States. The Department of Commerce can relax on that issue. Colombia will never be a threat to North American industry.

Industry Official
Medellín
The major premise of this thesis is that there are hidden, yet identifiable and perfectly understandable structural reasons that make people such as the Colombian textile workers come to the United States, often in spite of explicit regulations that prohibit them from doing so. This section explores which specific industry and trade, labor, and immigration policies and practices provided the indirect influences that pre-empted the direct immigration restrictions in this case.

The Constraints of Maturity

It is clear from the preceding section that the constraints on the textile industry in New England had a tremendous impact on the inception and perpetuation of the Colombian textile worker immigration network.

The textile employer's lament was echoed in all of the companies studied in Lowell: the demand for our product is unstable; our production costs are high compared to our foreign competitors; as a labor intensive industry, labor costs are high relative to total production costs so our wage scale has to remain low; other labor practices have to absorb the perturbations of market demand, making our jobs less secure

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relative to other industries in the area, and thus, it is hard for us to attract and keep good, qualified workers. This has to be examined more closely. What are the peculiar characteristics of the textile industry that make it a secondary labor market employer.

First, one has to look at the position of the textile industry in the context of the United States economic order. Textiles have been produced in every area of the world for centuries. Organizing the making of yarn, cloth, and clothing has been the first step in manufacturing history in almost all industrialized and industrializing nations. There are very good reasons for this: textiles, along with food and beverage products, could count on a strong domestic market for consumer goods, textile technology for mass production was the first to become available, and the capital investment was within reach of early entrepreneurs: machinery could be added or replaced gradually.

The relative ease of entry accounts, in part, for the textile industry's renowned conservative character. Many early textile mills were started by individual families. To this day, even some of the largest companies in the United States are family-owned or controlled. They tend toward traditional management styles and resist intrusion by
outsiders; communication tends to be personal, and decisions, however
adept, are made by a few people; under current conditions it becomes a
personal and emotional challenge to keep the business in operation.

All three companies in Lowell fit this pattern. It is that
kind of legacy that probably contributed to Wannalancit's tenacity in the
face of insurmountable odds.1 These are men who have obvious business
interests, but who also enjoy making fabric, and imbue their livelihood
with a mild sense of mission.

The early development of the textile industry in the United
States, which took place in New England and redefined its majesty in
Lowell, has been amply described in Chapter 4. As the earliest manifes-
tation of industrial development, the textile industry's position was
destined to change. Using Raymond Vernon's concept of the product cycle
(Vernon, 1971), James Kurth has described how industries go through
stages approximating life cycles of growth, stagnation, saturation and
decline. The four phases of the product cycle are:

1. Innovation of a product and growth of its sales in the domestic
   market.
2. Saturation of the domestic market and export of the product to foreign markets...

3. Manufacture of the product within foreign markets, i.e., direct foreign investment... Within the home country, the manufacture of the product reaches a plateau.

4. Export of the product from foreign countries into the original home market. Eventually... there will be export of the product from the latest foreign countries to manufacture it into not only the original home market but also into other foreign countries which had once been the latest manufacturers. Within the home country and these earlier producers, the manufacture of the product goes into decline.¹

The textile industry in the United States passed predictably through the first two stages of the product cycle, but has never been particularly active in direct foreign investment in the manufacture of textiles in other countries. This is probably because the level of capital investment is within the reach of local entrepreneurs in developing countries.²

By the 1950s, the United States textile industry had reached stage four, or the status of what has been termed a "mature" industry of low and declining growth rates. The industry had suffered stagnation and major setbacks during the recessions and Depression of the 1920s. It was gradually eclipsed by the steel and automobile industries, and in the 1970s and early 1980s, by the electronic industries. In no region of the
country is this transition of industrial life cycles more evident than in the Northeast; and Lowell, Massachusetts is the perfect example.

In a 1940 study of industry in Lowell, Margaret Parker, not surprisingly, concluded that there were many factors involved in the "move" of the textile industry to the South. First, once electrical power became available anywhere in the country, Lowell's choice location at the confluence of the Concord and Merrimack rivers was no longer a determining asset. This was true of all New England water sites so important during the earlier stages of industrial development in the United States.

Second, Massachusetts labor laws, intended to protect local workers, increased the costs of production in several ways. For example, wages were raised to about twenty-two dollars a week in Massachusetts in 1924,\textsuperscript{4} compared with fourteen dollars per week in South Carolina, and the weekly number of hours was reduced to forty-eight, compared with fifty-five in South Carolina. A "ix o'clock" law nobly prohibited women from working late, but also made it impossible for Massachusetts mills to operate a second shift.\textsuperscript{5}
That Massachusetts has suffered loss of more of its cotton industry than have other New England states must be laid, at least in part... to its stricter labor legislation; it is unfortunate that the state has been forced to pay this penalty for leadership in efforts toward social improvement.

A third contributing factor was that taxes in Massachusetts had become much higher relative to states in the Southeastern part of the country and added to the differential costs of production. Finally, competition with other fabrics such as rayon and silk, and changing styles added to the demise of Lowell's predominantly cotton textile industry.

Lowell's cotton industry continued to expand until 1890... before that date Lowell had been surpassed as a cotton manufacturing center by Fall River, and... by 1899 (by) New Bedford... In subsequent years the industry declined sharply in each of the three cities, reaching minima in 1932, after which there was some revival... the decline was greatest proportionately in Lowell. Lowell lost 77 percent of its workers in the cotton industry between 1919 and 1936... The loss for Massachusetts as a whole was 65 percent... In 1919, 28 percent of all cotton goods manufactured in the United States was made in Massachusetts. In 1935 the production of Massachusetts accounted for only 10.7 percent of the country's total product.

During the same period, Lowell increased its relative share of woolen and worsted production, in part because new companies took over
the old mills vacated by cotton manufacturers, the production of wool is better suited to cooler climates and requires more skilled labor, and the South did not produce yarn other than cotton, even though being closer to the cotton market is not generally considered as one of the main reasons for the "move" South.8

It should be remembered that the changes in Lowell occurred within the context of a stagnation in the textile industry in the nation as a whole. If that had not been the case, the relative costs of production would not have been so important as to require a move. As it happened, the lower labor costs and the ability to establish modern, single-story mills with more efficient equipment probably did extend the United States textile industry's ability to compete.9

It was not the loss of spinning and weaving operations alone that devastated the textile industry in Lowell. Companies left, and the jobs went with them, but so did the industrial concentration to support a textile training school, the need for foundries to forge replacement parts for looms that were disappearing, and the whole unquantified faith in the textile industry as an industry with a secure place in Lowell's future. The economies of scale were gone; the spirit of the industry had vanished and would never return to its former glory.
If one spends much time contemplating the textile industry from the vantage of downtown Lowell, in spite of the courageous efforts of the survivors, the future of the industry looks bleak indeed. While it may be steadily disappearing from the industrial landscape in New England, the final curtain is not about to drop on the United States textile industry.

First of all, about seventy percent of U.S. textile production is centered in the South Atlantic states, primarily in the Carolinas. The United States is the third largest cotton producer in the world, after China and the Soviet Union, and a world leader in the production of synthetic yarns. This is not an industry that is going to disappear overnight. The *U.S. Industrial Outlook for 1980* gave the textile industry a good prognosis in spite of impending high cost increases in fibers, energy and labor. It reported a trade surplus of $837 million for 1979, compared with a $139 million deficit for 1978, and record high capital expenditures for 1979: $1.4 billion, up five percent over 1978. Technical innovations being introduced in the large companies include: automatic bale feeding, improved high-speed carding, open-ended spinning with resultant efficiencies in winding, high-speed, shuttleless weaving and texturing of yarns, electronically-controlled knitting machines and optical scanners for quality control, all requiring less labor.10
Nevertheless, one of the industry's main strengths is that it is still highly labor intensive. The figure touted in all quarters is that one in eight jobs in the United States is in the combined textile and apparel industries: it was the second largest manufacturing employer after non-electric machinery in this country, employing 2.2 million people in 1978. Even in the Northeast (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania included) it ranked first, in New England fourth, and in Massachusetts third (23,000 people) behind electrical and electronic equipment and non-electrical machinery. 11 

As such an active employer, the United States textile industry still wields considerable power in Washington. The American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) boasts about 200 member companies, and has twenty-four active committees intent on influencing policy and improving the industry's image. The 1980 annual report began with the President's message, 

"As the textile industry enters the 1980s, I view the past ten years as the decade of decision - the realization that the American textile market has reached its peak of growth and the decision to think internationally and reach out to the development of new world markets." 12
While there is some agreement, even among textile manufacturers, that a large part of textile production will eventually be left to foreign manufacturers, there is a strong sense that there will always be a minimum of textile production on these shores. Only the most ardent subscribers to the notions of free trade and comparative advantage are ready to concede that all United States-consumed fabric and apparel could be left out of U. S. producers hands, that every yard of fabric would have to be imported. Interestingly, one concept was voiced repeatedly in discussions with members of the textile-producing establishment. The following is one printed version:

The textile industry remains a key industry in mobilization planning, and must be in place in this country prior to any emergency that would interdict overseas supplies. The Quartermaster General of the Army has stated that textiles were second only to steel in strategic importance during World War II.13

You cannot fight a conventional war without clothes, parachutes and other textile products.

To conclude this section, it is interesting to explore two areas where the textile industry in New England appears to have been remiss in taking measures in its own behalf: manpower training and
modernization. Because the textile industry expanded so quickly during periods of intense immigration to the United States, it was lulled into thinking that labor was cheap and expendable; with a false sense of security it was never forced to explore ways to make the jobs interesting or attractive to people who were neither desperate nor inclined to view the making of cloth as spiritually fulfilling.

The industry could have initiated apprenticeship programs, with a clear route to upward mobility, seniority and other indications of success and security. This was never done. The Colombian textile industry did institute such a system, and it is very effective as every Colombian textile worker attests. Even in the absence of adequate monetary compensation, the Colombian system encourages a sense of pride and accomplishment, with a clear path to rewards and prestige. The United States textile industry, at least in the Northeast, long ago abandoned efforts to support prestigious training programs to supply manpower needs. In a curious lapse of self-sufficiency, the industry has allowed itself to rely on government programs to alleviate its labor shortages.
It is doubtful that trainees would have been forthcoming, in any event, if the jobs were below what has become standard in the modern job market. To have remained competitive, the New England textile industry would have had to have modernized its equipment. Shuttleless looms are less noisy, less dirty and faster-paced. Since textile jobs are not the lowest-paying ones to be found, it is hardly conceivable that there would be no one interested in producing cloth on state-of-the-art, intricate and clean machinery. In addition, fewer people are needed to operate the new equipment. There are some hidden constraints, even here. Years ago Wannalancit brought ten high-speed, water jet looms, but found that the looms were inappropriate for the small-order jobs in which they specialized.

It appears that the United States textile industry will stabilize at current or lower production levels, with the major activity concentrated in the South Atlantic states. Few companies will survive in New England, and those that do will have done so by being very clever and very flexible. The choices are to find an alternate labor source, as Lawrence Manufacturing did; modernize slowly and find an alternate labor source, as Joan Fabrics has been doing; or modernize radically to appeal once again to the local secondary labor market. This latter pattern was
not followed by any of the Lowell companies studied, but it has been done by the Cadillac Mills in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Faced with the same labor shortages as the Lowell mills, Cadillac launched a major capital improvement program in the early 1970s. They actively recruited Colombian workers during the period of modernization, but, when business picked up again after the mid-1970s recession, Cadillac offered the Pawtucket labor market good jobs under improved conditions. When the Colombians were no longer permitted to come legally, Cadillac was able to recruit from the local labor force.

At some point in the future the southern mills will probably face labor problems similar to those of the past two decades in New England, and will be forced to go through the same transition of consolidation and job improvement. At that point the industry will level off and perhaps become stronger, and the role of the Colombians in the United States textile industry will be understood in perspective: as a transitional labor force during a time of transition in the industry.

Problems of Youth

The textile industry in Colombia is in a similar position in the product life cycle to that of the industry in the United States, but
it arrived there via an entirely divergent route. The innovation stage began in Medellín almost forty years after the Merrimack Manufacturing Company started up its looms in Lowell, and the industry has developed under radically different circumstances.

Within the context of a country that is still in the early stages of industrial development, the Colombian textile industry occupies a position of major importance: it is the largest industry in the manufacturing sector, the largest employer in a country that requires labor intensive industry, and the largest manufacturing exporter in a nation where hard foreign currencies are needed to finance capital improvements. In spite of such a powerful appearance, the Colombian textile industry suffers many of the same problems that plague its U. S. counterpart, and has managed to create some unique dilemmas of its own.

Similar to the United States, the textile industry in Colombia is traditional and conservative, and it is even more concentrated. Eighty-nine percent of the total national textile output is produced in one valley in and around the city of Medellín, not unlike the seventy percent of U.S. textile output that is produced in the southern Atlantic states, but in Colombia only two companies\textsuperscript{16} manufacture almost seventy
percent of the national textile output. These companies are as large as
the biggest U.S. producers, they are not dominated by family interests,
not as tenacious and sentimental, and more diversified than most textile
companies in the United States. In short, they could not be more differ-
ent from the small, informal, single-product companies studied in Lowell.

The textile industry in Medellín has been able to avoid the two
specific problems that torment the industry in New England: manpower
training and modernization. In the Colombian context the policies as-
sociated with these two areas are interrelated. For example, the
Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA), the highly effective national
vocational training service mentioned in Chapter 4, was established for
very practical reasons.

Colombia is a country in which it is very expensive
to bring in new equipment, to be changing cars every
two or three years. Here one tries to make durable
consumer and capital goods last a long time. There
is very little capital, so people try to maximize the
life of those things. That .... creates a demand for
mechanics... so to meet this demand the government
created the SENA... in response to a real need.
People had to be trained because of the demand that:
there was for that type of... qualified worker to
operate automobile mechanic shops, farm machinery
shops, and industrial mechanic shops.

Government Official
Bogotá
The Colombian textile companies did not rely on the government to provide trained personnel for all their manpower needs. The scale of their operations was great enough to establish fulltime, in-house training centers, and with high population and urban growth rates, there, historically, has been no shortage of new recruits into the industry. This is true despite the presence of many other industries in the area because the textile industry is dominant and prestigious and because Colombian labor laws keep wage differentials low. In fact, textile positions pay relatively well. For all these reasons, skilled textile manpower is abundant in Medellín.

In spite of the fact that labor is plentiful, the large Colombian companies have put a lot of emphasis on modernization since the early 1970s. This too has a history. During the postwar period, and for the same reason (the shortage of foreign exchange) that made it expedient for the government to train skilled mechanics, the textile industry was an avid buyer of used textile equipment. In addition to the fact that the United States government encouraged this activity with trade concessions, the savings were substantial. Cortés and Escandón (1979) report that the textile industry has been the principal user of second-hand equipment in Colombia, and that the United States has been the main sup-
plier. Table 9 shows a few of the examples they gave to demonstrate the savings in buying second-hand equipment.

Colombia had a clear advantage when contemplating the costs and benefits of purchasing used versus new equipment: its skilled mechanics.

The availability of local technical skills allows Colombian producers to modernize old equipment instead of replacing it (with) a new version, and to produce locally spare parts that are difficult to acquire in the supplier country. Cortés and Escandón reported that reconstruction costs of used equipment could be as low as one percent of the purchase price, and that the Colombian mechanics were able to keep the old equipment operating close to their original rated capacity. "In some of the large textile firms, looms of thirty to forty years are working at about 95 percent of their original capacity."}

It is obvious that the acquisition of second-hand equipment would be beneficial to small operations just starting out, and for people such as retired loom fixers who wanted to begin a business of their own, using their severance pay from the large companies to make the down payment; but even the large companies filled older mills with used Draper
Table 9

Selected Examples of Price Differences Between New and Second-Hand Textile Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Second-Hand</th>
<th>Second-Hand as Percent of New Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circular loom (double)</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texturizer</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dryer (1971)</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuttle loom (6-10 yrs.)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comber (Saco-Lowell)</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carding Machine</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and Crompton looms. It was, in fact, the experience that the Colombian immigrant textile workers gained in working with the old looms in the Sedeco and Doña María mills that made them so valuable to Wannalancit, the last textile company in Lowell to use shuttle looms exclusively, and to the other Lowell mills.

By the mid-1970s, however, the large companies in Colombia began to increase the proportion of purchases in new textile equipment, and by the end of the decade the policy had been completely reversed. The rapid increase in other costs of production made it imperative that the machinery be as efficient as possible.

Until a few years ago, we had a very mistaken policy to buy a lot of used equipment from the United States at very low cost, because the machinery was in pretty good condition. But the investment savings had very unfavorable repercussions in the costs of operation, they got to be very high. Financing costs and depreciation were very low; the costs of production were very high, maintenance, lowered productivity, very high labor costs, and the quality of the product, well, it wasn't good... So we are now embarking on a modernization program that, considering the size of the company, is gigantic. That is to say, it is practically to change all the old equipment for new machinery.

Coltejer Official

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Of course, one reason that Coltejer can risk such a large capitalization program is that it is highly diversified compared with a company such as Cadillac Mills, where the costs of modernizing had to be absorbed by the same textile production.\textsuperscript{21}

Even Tôjicómôdor has managed to steadily improve its inventory of spinning, winding, weaving and finishing equipment with the assistance of the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). International lenders provide one of the few ways that small companies can finance capital programs. Credit within Colombia is almost impossible to obtain, and when it is available, the interest rates are so high that they are prohibitive.\textsuperscript{22} Maintaining high interest rates is one policy initiative used by the Colombian government to curb inflation, which peaked at almost thirty percent in 1977, but has been below twenty percent since then. The Colombian government also follows a policy of crawling peg devaluation of the peso, tied to the dollar, so that any borrowing from a foreign entity still costs more for the Colombian than it would for a borrower with a stronger currency. Even with loans from the World Bank and the IBRD, which are for capital goods exclusively, the machines are paid for in U.S. dollars, but the interest payments revert to Colombian pesos.\textsuperscript{23}
The modernization of the textile industry in Colombia will be increasingly labor-displacing in the sense that fewer people will be needed to operate the looms, but no one envisions a rapid decline in the need for manpower.

We think that the substitution of machinery will displace about thirty percent of our workers over the next three to four years. However, that is in textiles, but we are opening sources in (other areas)... the positions that we are reducing here are being opened up in other areas.

Coltejer Official

Even if there were serious job displacement, it would have been at the initiative of the Colombian textile industry itself, not as a result of foreign intervention in exporting technology. In any event, demographic reality suggests that there will be fewer labor market entrants in the future.

Although the Colombian textile industry has escaped the pitfalls of failing to meet its manpower needs and exchange obsolete machinery, it has not managed to avoid the vicissitudes of market competition. Contrary to what one would expect, Colombia is struggling to remain competitive; the main reasons are the same as always: price and quality.
Why would prices be high in a labor intensive industry where workers earn a quarter of what they do laboring at the same jobs in the United States? With labor costs so low in Colombia, the costs of production could not be uncompetitively high. Not so. In the first place, labor is not cheap in Colombia. Although real wages are substantially lower than those in the United States and comparable to those in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea, the extensive Colombian labor benefits package adds over one hundred percent to the costs of each worker, thereby increasing the costs of labor to a level below those of a country such as the United States, but generally above competitors in the Far East.

Material costs are also high in Colombia. Imported synthetic yarns are met with a tariff of up to seventy percent above the costs of purchase and transportation; domestic synthetic fibers are also expensive because of increased petroleum costs. In the manufacture of cotton cloth, the situation is not easy either, despite of the fact that Colombia produces almost all of the cotton that the industry consumes. Because of problems in obtaining a steady supply of cotton in Colombia, the textile companies have collaborated in the establishment of the Diagonal. Officials in Medellín describe how the organization functions.
Diagonal is a large cotton buyer for the textile companies... it doesn't store the cotton, the mills do that. The only thing it does is negotiate; it serves as an intermediary.

Cotton here has one peculiarity. If you're situated in a mill in the United States, you can buy your cotton and it will be delivered every month; you buy a future and every month the cotton is delivered. Here a company has to go out and buy seven months worth of cotton and pay for it right away. It's seven months because there are two harvests here: one in the North and the other in the South...

If the textile industry doesn't buy the cotton, there is a risk that it will be exported... not because they can get a better price, but because... it is a commodity that has to be sold quickly... If the cotton producers export the cotton, then the textile companies have to bring it in and it ends up being more expensive. Last year they exported ten or twelve thousand tons, and the companies went back and imported ten to twelve thousand tons...

The financing systems are very rigid, and it's hard to come up with enough money... Often the government has to step in... The government finances an entity such as the Diagonal during the period of storage to maintain a sustained price; that is the only way.

Finally, production costs are increased and the quality of the product is adversely-affected by the still-incomplete substitution of equipment in Colombia. Here again, the textile industry in the Far East is a post World War II phenomenon and, having been established forty years later than the industry in Medellín, was able to begin operations with the latest in technology housed in ultra-modern facilities. For all
the reasons mentioned before, it is extremely difficult for Colombia to catch up to such vibrant opponents; Colombia's industry is younger than the United States, but its ability to finance modernization is limited.25

The Colombian textile industry is assisted somewhat in its struggle to compete on the world market by government export subsidies. In 1967 the Colombian government adopted an ardent export diversification program because almost ninety percent of its foreign exchange was generated by the coffee industry. As long as the price of coffee remained high on the world market, there would be no problem, but if it did not, and there was no reason to assume that it would, the Colombian economy would be in deep trouble. The Decree 444 was intended to escape the dangers of a one product economy. The textile industry could provide many jobs, use and add value to cotton produced in the country, and thus increase the value of exported goods instead of exporting primary products only. The Decree established Proexpo, the Fund for the Promotion of Exports, and the Taxpayers Certificate of Allowance (CAT). The CAT is an incentive of about ten percent that allows exporters to pay some transportation costs, taxes, and import tariffs.
Everyone has said that (the CAT) is a subsidy, but it really isn't... It's an acceptance by the government that the Colombian infrastructure makes it very difficult to export; it's so difficult to export that the exporter should even be given a kiss... the government says, 'You're going to export? Are you so stupid that you want to export? Here I'll give you this so that you can... survive the transport, the roads, the lights... the port regulations, the shipment to Hamburg or Great Britain, and a mountain of things...'

Industry Official

Finally, one of the Colombian textile industry's biggest problems appears to have been almost self-inflicted and has been the topic of ardent debate since the late 1970's: the issue of contraband goods.

It is estimated that for every yard of cloth imported legally, eight to ten yards are bought in de contrabando. This activity has become so sophisticated and pervasive that weave rooms have been shut down because of it. Everyone agrees on the seriousness of the situation, but not on the causes. The following are a few contrasting versions from the public and private sectors.

It is very hard to explain the contraband issue, but... the truth of the matter is that there is a very large importation of fabric that is having a great impact on the sale of textiles here. There are many
reasons... for it, but one thing that had a great influence... is the government's policy regarding the amount of fabric entering the country. The government thought that we, the textile companies, were either inefficient or not trying to absorb the increasing costs of production... that we were directly transferring all those costs to the consumer, maintaining high prices. That is not true. Every time we have a collective convention, we increase salaries in an amount more than the increases in sales price. We try to absorb the cost increases through better productivity, looking for other products... not just... selling at a higher price, but we do transfer some of the costs...

So to protect the public, it occurred to the government that a great solution would be to import fabric and that would stop the textile producers from raising prices; it would make them compete with foreign products... Before that, textiles were in the category of prohibited imports... except for a couple of special cases under the Plan Vallejo... But once they permitted the importation of fabric... (we have to sell our cloth at a higher price because of high material costs... we cannot sell at international prices, that which is costing us more)..., the imports are coming from places where production is cheap... and where there is a great incentive to export... In Brazil, for example, export incentives are in the order of forty percent... Many of the Asian countries have high subsidies...

There is another problem that has to be taken into account, and that is the celebrated drug problem that we are experiencing... That money from the drug trade cannot enter the country; there is no legal way to bring it in, so a lot of this money is coming in via other products... A man who has large earnings from the drug business can buy fabric cheaply... hire a boat and bring it in... he can even sell it for less than it cost him. If he has a million dollars of drug money that he can't bring into Colombia, and
converts it to eight hundred thousand dollars that he can bring into the country, he's doing a good business.

Industry Official

Internally, (the textile industry) is protected by tariff barriers in the order of seventy percent... with such high tariffs the incentive for contraband goods is very high... It appears as if the small apparel shops... prefer to buy contraband instead of importing legally because it respresents much lower costs for their cloth.

The problem is basically this: that the protection, the tariffs that are put on imports, makes it so that textile products in Colombia can be sold within the country at a price that is much higher than the international price, because the (buyer) knows that any imported textile will have an extra charge of seventy percent plus transportation, insurance and other things. Being a little behind, the Colombian textile industry is very concentrated... there are really two companies... that produce seventy percent of the national cloth value, so obviously there is a group of two, three or four companies that can fix the prices domestically... that have an oligopolistic power over the domestic market...

Because domestic prices are so high compared with international (prices)... the national market began to stagnate... instead of buying four shirts a year, people buy one or two... consumption cannot grow at the same rate as the prices.

Government Official

There are various explanations for the contraband here. The first is... that we are a country of contrabandistas; in the same way that (the United
States) has developed a technological expertise, we have developed an expertise in illegal traffic. Contraband textile is very easy. A lot of people export marijuana and are paid in fabric; it is a business going and coming. Also everything associated with customs is corrupt.

Because fabric is easy to store, it has a high value relative to its size. A small roll of cloth is worth one or two million dollars, and it is easy to transport. In addition, the fabric that is brought in illegally is better and cheaper than that which we make here... Cotton costs a lot, labor costs a lot, transportation costs a lot... because of the accelerated inflation, one improves efficiency and all that, but the costs keep rising.

Last year, due to the contrabando, we lost sales of about 1.2 billion pesos; this year it will probably be more than two billion pesos... that is about twenty percent of total sales. We have shut down sections of the mills and tried to look for new foreign markets to keep the mills operating. If they are going to bring fabric in, then we are going to have to export more.

It is possible to stop the traffic, but with methods that the government is not willing to use... they could finance a special police force (as did France once) and go to the stores that are selling the illegal fabric, confiscate it, and publicize the respectable gentleman in the paper as 'so-and-so, contrabandista,' make a public scandal.

Industry Official

The Colombian textile industry appears to have reached a period of stagnation, neither sales nor employment are increasing. While it is
still influential in the context of a developing economy and does not share New England's problem of labor shortages, its ability to compete on the world market is affected by high and spiraling production costs. Although more modernized than some New England mills, textile equipment is in need of replacement, labor costs are too high to compete with Far Eastern countries, and the series of government policies intended to assist the industry are unable to make up the difference. Some even hinder their efforts.

Furthermore, the Colombian textile industry has reached a premature and artificial saturation of the domestic market; it cannot compete with the illegal traffic in fabric. The industry has reached the fourth stage of the product cycle without progressing gradually through the preceding stages. Because of these problems, it appears as if the Colombian textile industry will "mature" faster than did its counterpart in the United States. The large textile companies appear willing to move on to other pursuits already. Although the industry will not be abandoned entirely, neither will it continue to be Colombia's most powerful growth industry.
International Trade Agreements

Textile manufacturers in Lowell and Medellín mentioned fluctuations in the demand for their products and poor market competitiveness as the major factors that limit their ability to make jobs attractive to local labor in Lowell, and influence the trend toward diversification in Medellín.

In the domestic market, price, quality and changes in style generally affect the ability to sell textile products, but in the world market there are many "imperfections" which influence a country's ability to compete. The costs of production (labor, age of equipment, energy, taxes, transportation etc.) vary widely between nations; many countries give their textile industries a competitive advantage through export subsidies.

At the risk of gross generalization, there are basically two schools of thought on this issue: the free trade adherents, or those who believe in a liberal international economic order whereby each country competes on an open market as best it can; if it cannot compete, then it relinquishes its market share to those who can. The alternative school of thought, the protectionists, believe that domestic markets should be
protected from import penetration through a structured system of quotas and tariffs. It is no surprise that the textile industries in both the United States and Colombia are firmly entrenched in the latter camp.

In recent decades the trend in international trade has been toward increasing protectionism, and many nations have become involved in trade agreements intended to correct market disruptions caused by imports. The textile industry has even achieved a unique status within the realm of international trade agreements; less developed and industrialized countries, even both political parties in the United States, have historically treated the protection of the textile industry as a special problem, to be negotiated separately from general trade agreements.

In the United States, the Roosevelt administration was concerned with the problem of textile imports as early as 1935. A Cabinet Committee comprised of the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Labor and Commerce recommended that the United States enter into a voluntary agreement with Japan to limit the export of cotton into the U.S. market. After the Second World War, the U.S. cotton industry flourished, but by the mid-1950s textile imports began to encroach on the industry again, with cotton still the major product and Japan still the major supplier.
The Eisenhower administration entered a five-year export restraint agreement with Japan. But it was at that time that Hong Kong burst onto the scene as a major producer, and Hong Kong declined to enter into any voluntary agreements. The introduction of man-made fiber textile competition aggravated the situation, and at the 1960 Tokyo Round of the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) a definition of market disruption was devised to include:

(1) a sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from particular sources

(2) these products are offered at prices which are substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the importing country

(3) there is serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof

(4) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from governmental intervention in fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices

The Kennedy administration also adopted the cause of the textile producers and arranged the Geneva Conference of 1961 (two years prior to the GATT's Kennedy Round) at which the Short Term Arrangement for the Cotton Textile Trade (STA) was negotiated. That agreement was renewed at five year intervals by the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Then in 1974 a new multifiber GATT arrangement included man-made fibers,
wool, cotton and blends. Almost fifty countries participated in the negotiation of that agreement; Colombia was not among them.

During Nixon's first administration, the United States also entered bilateral agreements with Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea. The United States arranged a textile trade agreement with China in 1978 and currently uses bilateral agreements as the major implement of its trade policy.

As rational as all this may appear, international trade agreements are not trouble-free. In the first place, they do not necessarily work in the manner intended. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the United States steadily lost its market share of world textile exports, while import penetration increased. In 1976 the U.S. textile trade deficit was over three billion dollars, and it was only in 1979 that a surplus was evident. In the second place, market imperfections can never be totally eradicated: governments use import/export regulations to achieve foreign policy and other non-commercial objectives, international lending organizations provide substantial assistance to less developed countries to improve their textile industries, and participants simply do not have the same perspective on the benefits and
disadvantages of the agreements, as illustrated by the following excerpts from memos and interviews.

The GATT multifiber arrangement provides a long-needed structure of stability for world textile trade. Its acceptance by forty-seven countries, in both developed and developing areas of the world, is the best indication that it is in the public interest to continue to implement the arrangement forcefully and completely. The United States' method of implementation is, of course, through bilateral agreements.

U.S. Textile Industry

The (GATT multifiber) agreement attempts to organize the market... because a chaotic market is not good for the importer or the exporter... Now the agreement has been ignored to a great extent by developed countries that have imposed their own conditions. The United States negotiates bilaterally... more or less ignoring the structure of the world agreement. The Europeans openly rejected the agreement in 1977, and said that they didn't want to have anything to do with it... and that if the United States would not allow them to introduce modifications... well then, let the agreement be broken. The United States had no recourse but to accept that... and they introduced some modifications which allowed the Europeans to negotiate bilaterally also. Thus the Agreement is a general standard that no one follows, that was written, that has good intentions, but that is not very definitive in the sphere of textile commerce. There is a clause in which the country that claims that damage is being caused has to demonstrate... how the damage is caused. Neither the United States nor the Europeans have ever put that into practice. So that's the history; a series of pacts to reach only a
point of bilateral agreements in which the force and power of each country reign supreme. The developed countries are stronger politically than the developing nations, and they make their criteria prevail.

The negotiations have very little negotiation and a lot of imposition... the negotiators... are very well trained... very familiar with the topic, with very rigid instructions; people really removed from the reality of developing countries... They simply come to execute orders... They don't make decisions of any kind... They are typical international bureaucrats who travel a lot, are only interested... in how quickly they can cheat the people in the country... It is a process for which we have lost all interest... We recognize it for what it is and really don't want to participate anymore in these negotiations. We know that they don't allow a real play of interests, and don't allow any kind of development... and we have said this to the North American negotiators: that they tell us what it is they want so that they'll go quickly and leave us alone, because we are very busy and they take a lot of time... We have told them to send the details in a letter, and we will resolve the problems by mail. There is no need for them to come.

The quotas are small for the possibilities that Colombia has... they have been calculated to limit rather than help Colombia. However, we have passed the stage... of psychological trauma that the imposition represents... it used to be a tragedy... but we have accepted it... We think it's unjust, that it is discrimination... The United States doesn't have quotas with the economically strong countries... only with the weak ones.

Industry Official
In its report on the textile industry, the ANDI, the National Association of Manufacturers, affirmed its disillusionment with trade with the United States and stated that the European Common Market had negotiated "an agreement so open, in contrast to the detailed and restrictive pact subscribed to by the Americans, that the Colombian textile exports would be transferred to Europe in search of new markets that would provide an outlet for the new productive capacity, that is not allowed into the United States." There is, however, another perspective.

The (textile agreements) certainly (are) used frequently by the Colombians as an indication why their industry doesn't prosper as much as it could, because they would like to have us think that they could sell us a lot more stuff, if we didn't have this limit on it, and therefore, in effect, we're preventing them from increasing the jobs here which might keep some of these people at home, and they wouldn't go to the States...

The problem with that argument, and one which you will not find many people knowledgeable about in Colombia, because they like to think of these agreements as things which really hurt them, (is that) except for two categories out of a couple of hundred in the agreement, do they ever meet their quota. In other words, they don't even fill the quota that's established under the agreement... Why? Because it's not competitive, that's the first reason. Their prices are not controlled... They don't compete in the world market, because they're too expensive. They can't compete with the Far East... They are competitive with U.S. manufacturers in most textiles and in garment items. It costs them more here to
produce cotton stuff. You go to one of their outlets for terry cloth for toweling; you can buy from Sears Roebuck much better quality at a lower price.

U.S. Government employees in this part of the world are kicked very hard on every possible occasion when we talk with the local industry people... They're always beating me over the head... Boy, who do you people... this protectionism... keeping out all this stuff... If it were not for the U.S. textile quotas, which in effect may put a limit on them, but also guarantees them the ability to sell a certain amount, and keeps their other competitors from flooding the market. It gives them, it's a kind of protection for them, just the contrary of what they're always saying, that we're keeping them down... If we kept the limits on the other producing countries, and took theirs off, sure they would sell more, but, I mean, even the most warped mind would say, that's kind of unfair, isn't it. So, if we do away with textile agreements, then they're out of business tomorrow, because the Poles and Roumanians are big now doing this sort of thing, and we have the Far East people. Well, just ship it all in, and there will be no Colombian suits being sold to anyone.

Buyers will buy if you've got a quality product at a good price. Nobody wants this stuff anymore, because they're producing things which are no longer of interest in the U.S. market, or somebody else in the world is producing it more cheaply, and they're equivalent in quality... They have kind of priced themselves out of the market. This is true in the European markets, too... They like to find scapegoats, and we're one of them, because we've got a textile agreement.

Two Colombian studies came to the same conclusions, and even the textile manufacturers interviewed in Medellín agreed that Colombia did not meet its quotas.
Colombian exports have not been higher... because of market characteristics and because of our ability to export. We could be given higher quotas... and I really think that the exports would not be higher. We have never reached, except in particular cases, the point where the quota limits us.

Industry Official

... the quota is not filled. Just because there is a quota doesn't mean that you will sell... If the American buyer finds a better price, better quality, better conditions, he'll buy there... I don't think the quotas are good, but it would be worse without them... If Japan opened the barriers, they would open them to Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong and they would be drowning in textiles within half an hour. Competing in textiles is very difficult.

Industry Official

If Colombia didn't have quotas it wouldn't sell anything?... That could be true, it could be true.

Government Official

Thus it is the idea of the restriction, more than the fact, that angers the Colombians, and that resentment may very well stem from what is certainly a weak bargaining position. For example,

I'm convinced that it's easier for textiles from Asia to enter the United States, even with a mountain of agreements, that competitiveness is not only a matter of price. If Hong Kong promises to buy an important
part of North American cotton, that gives them reciprocity for other things. We produce cotton, but the way in which we protect the industry leaves us nothing to negotiate... In Latin America we have nothing to negotiate... We don't even have a war like Korea. Korea has a war that they are still charging up to the United States.

Industry Official

Summary

Thus, unlike the classic relationship of dependency that might have been expected between the United States and Colombia in the textile industry, both countries are dependent on their performance in the world market; they are competitive with each other, and are both at a disadvantage compared with other nations that are able to produce fabric for much less. The United States is not displacing labor in Colombian mills through the export of advanced technology. The U.S. is not involved in textiles in Colombia at all, rather it is the international lending organizations that have provided modernization assistance. However, because the textile industry has already reached a level of stagnation due to a number of other factors, it is difficult to blame the displacement on modernization alone. If anything, the modernization could work to make the industry more competitive and thus increase or at least maintain jobs.
Both textile industries are highly protected by tariff barriers and, in the U.S. case, by import quotas. Some Colombians feel that the quotas and international trade agreements stifle their ability to reach maximum production. Many Americans feel that their protection is inadequate, however, it is conceivable that United States protection policies artificially maintain textile jobs in this country, even those held by illegal Colombian workers. In the Colombian case, the protection of the domestic market may have contributed to the highly competitive illegal textile trade.

In spite of their different positions relative to other industries in their respective economies, the textile industries in both countries are in decline and will probably level off at lower production levels, with more efficient equipment and with a lower demand for labor.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Notes, Chapter 7, 1.


3. The main involvement of U.S. producers in other countries in the postwar period has been in the exportation of synthetic fiber technology by the large chemical companies (Monsanto and DuPont). There was no U.S. involvement in the textile industry in Medellín at the time of data collection. (See Notes, Chapter 7, 2.)

4. That is about the same wage that a Colombian textile worker earned in Medellín in 1979.

5. Parker reports that the repeal of the "six o'clock" law in 1936 "...definitely stopped the textile migration from Massachusetts." Parker, Margaret T., LOWELL: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1940: 159.)

6. Ibid., p. 177.

7. Ibid., p. 172.

8. See Notes, Chapter 7, 3.

9. Even though the companies usually owned their mills outright in New England, they were inefficient to maintain.


11. Bureau of Labor Statistics, State Divisions of Employment Research Reports, November 1978. (By the end of 1983 it had dropped to 1.9 million behind electric and non-electric machinery.)


15. See Notes, Chapter 7, 4.


18. Ibid., p. 16.

19. One of the returnees, Héctor, invested his earnings from Lowell in this manner.

20. From Western Europe, primarily Switzerland. (See Notes, Chapter 7, 5.)

21. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Cadillac's massive capitalization program was followed in short order by the mid-1970s recession.

22. Twenty to thirty-six percent in 1980.

23. For Tejicóndor in 1973, the rate was twenty-three percent. (See Notes, Chapter 7, 6.)


25. "The rhythm of change in machinery is in relation to investment (capabilities); when the United States replaces 10,000 looms, we replace one," reported one textile official in Medellín.

26. The Plan Vallejo is an export diversification incentive program that exempts import products from customs duties if they will be used for the development of exports.

28. Ibid., p. 8.

29. The ANDI is the Colombian counterpart of the NAM. It represents all industry, but was founded by the textile manufacturers and has its main offices in Medellín (in the Coltejer building.)


32. Corderoy and denim, and some of the apparel categories.
Chapter 8

LABOR

The role of Colombia, really, is to train manpower for industry in other countries.

Humberto
The Worker in Colombia

It is clear from the preceding chapter that the reason the Colombian textile industry has lost its competitive advantage over other developing countries is that the cost of labor is not necessarily low. If wages are a quarter of what they are for comparable work in the United States, one would expect labor costs to be appreciably lower. But the difference is in the entire system of labor compensation between the two countries.

Manufacturers in the United States subscribe to an integral wage system in which the worker earns most of his compensation in cash wages. He is also entitled by law to certain additional benefits that contribute to his well-being and offer some financial protection, such as unemployment compensation, paid holidays, life and health insurance for the worker and his family, and social security and other retirement programs. For the average manufacturing worker in the United States, the wage supplements add about thirty-five percent additional cost above what is paid out in wages.1

The Colombian system pays a smaller proportion of the total compensation in cash and retains a larger proportion to be distributed
through various institutions in a vast array of benefits. When it is all added together, the Colombian benefits package reaches a labor overhead cost of between 130 to 160 percent above payroll costs. For the worker, it means exchanging his labor for a low wage and for participation in a variety of programs that have been designed to protect him and his family.

To what exactly is the Colombian blue collar worker entitled? Both the Coltejer and Tejicóndor collective convention booklets guarantee the worker a specific trial period after which, if hired, he will be given a contract that places him on a mobility curve with a set wage scale. That job is difficult for him to lose. Layoffs are not permitted by law, and if he is let go without "just cause", he is entitled to a hefty indemnification. For this security, the worker agrees to extend full loyalty to the company and to perform according to a highly proscribed set of standards and rules clearly defined in the handbook, and he is entitled to the following list of benefits:

- health care for the worker and participation in Seguro Social (public health program) for wife and infants
- pension program through the Social Security Institute (ISS); also a special pension for disability
- a company pension program (*jubilación*) with an additional one-time payment at retirement
- health insurance and limited workman's compensation
- participation in a joint management/labor program of occupational health and industrial security
- participation in an occupational training program
- under the heading *prestaciones extra-legales*, the worker is entitled to:
  - a two-week bonus upon getting married (after six months employment)
  - *subsidio familiar*, or a bonus for each child born (about $100; a little less in case of miscarriage)
  - *primas* in the event of the death of a spouse, child, parent or sibling, or the worker
  - the full cost of eyeglasses
  - two weeks paid vacation, plus a vacation bonus
  - a transportation subsidy
  - a bonus in December (*aguinaldo*) and in June (equivalent to twenty-one days wages)
  - bonuses at five year intervals from fifteen to forty years
- paid leaves of absence for domestic calamity (also two month maternity leaves), and a domestic calamity loan program
- scholarship lottery for primary, secondary and university education, and an educational loan program
- under the heading *servicios al personal* are included:
- a commissary
- sale of used equipment and imperfect textile products
- restaurant with full meals at nominal cost
- loan program to purchase land or home
- the provision of work clothes and shoes

- finally, under varios the worker is guaranteed

- full holidays (mills closed) on May 1, December 25, and half day on December 31, with extra pay Sundays and other holidays

- cesantías, which is a kind of severance pay from a fund that accumulates for the worker in the event of his termination

- union participation and representation

Some of the benefits are managed by the unions, some by the company, some by the ISS, and others are administered by one of several cajas de compensación, (compensation offices). These are private organizations, established by the companies, but supervised by the Ministry of Labor. The director of the Caja de Compensación Familiar (COMFAMA), the oldest and largest of these organizations describes the origins of the system, which helps to explain its content.

The idea of the Caja was born in Antioquia twenty-five years ago. At that time about forty companies associated with the ANDI resolved to help those workers who, because of their children, had a larger family burden. They looked for a way to balance income and the companies decided to voluntarily give what is called a subsidio familiar, because it really
is a subsidy, for each child that was in the worker's charge. Naturally, they needed an organization to collect the money and later to distribute it... Three years later the government of the military junta saw that the system was beneficial and regulated the founding of similar institutions all over the country... At the moment we have 4,000 affiliate companies with about 160,000 workers, or about 500,000 people.

Later it was seen that the collection and distribution of quotas was not a complete job and the offering of services was authorized, without specifying which kind, so that each caja designed its own programs, but there are five fronts on which they all coincide: distributing the subsidy, and providing services in health, education, recreation and commerce...

It is a kind of 'capitalist socialism' because the financing comes entirely from the company, which gives us six percent of its payroll monthly. We give two percent of that directly to the SENA to run its programs of training the workers. (The system, including the prestaciones extralegales and servicios) tends to favor people who are in the worst condition, those who are least protected... it helps the weakest through the sacrifice of the strongest... but I think that it has gotten out of hand... I insist that it is a way of disfiguring the salary... and think that the integral salary is much better.

In fact, there are many critics of the diversified salary system. Representatives in management, government and organized labor, after carefully explaining that these were personal opinions, not those of the organizations with which they were affiliated, reported
This is a continuation of the feudal system... They never really got out of feudalism. The Spanish colonial empire transmitted that from Europe to Spanish colonial areas. People were removed from serfdom, but they still remained on the land as workers, with almost no pay... Many times no pay but a place to live and all of that sort of thing. And with industrialization in this country the mentality didn't change. They simply switched the patron who is no longer the hacendado, (but) is now the president of XYZ corporation.

Government

The policies of the conventional guarantees have very old roots... in what is called the patriarchal company, where the owner of the company, in addition to doing the business of the company... thought of all the workers as his children. Since he was a man who did everything, he thought his children didn't know how to do anything well, so he gave them a little money and kept the rest to give them in the form of benefits. That was the origin of all these benefits... When we entered the industrial era, all those old benefits were covered by collective conventions which were extensions of the contract signed by the companies and representatives of the workers' unions, and all those things that had been agreed to over many years were dragged along from convention to convention... They haven't even just been maintained, they have been increased.

Coltejer Management

There has been a lot of paternalism here... we've tried to help people a lot, but not allow them much freedom. For example, the transportation subsidy; the way I see it, it's like a little boy who's going to take the bus to school... This is more or less what the worker is told, 'Because you aren't able to
get organized, we won't give you money to take the bus, we'll just pay it for you.' It's ridiculous, it's absurd. You have to tell people, 'Here, take this money and manage it yourself.'

Tejicónedor Management

The practice of the cesantías alone adds forty percent above salary costs, but has veered from its intended purpose. It was supposed to be an emergency fund for the worker in the event that he became cesante (stopped working) and to this day there is no counterpart to unemployment insurance in Colombia. It is now possible by law to withdraw the cesantía to make a downpayment on a house, but it is used by the migrants for one purpose only: to obtain passage to the United States. Almost all of the workers interviewed had paid for the trip themselves, and they had used their cesantías to do that.

Other benefits, such as transportation and meals, are remnants of a time when public transportation was so undeveloped that it was impossible for employees to get to work, go home for the customary noon meal, and return. Because of the different rates at which costs have advanced through the years,... "the worker now consumes a complete, balanced meal for the price of one egg."
The last government made a proposal to the country to discuss the integral salary in various sectors... that is ... that which the worker is going to get once and know what he can count on, instead of the mountain of rivets that have been added on. In the United States... they don't have that, but it's worse to have it here, and I'll tell you why; because it comes from company paternalism, which impedes the development of authentic unionism... At first glance it looks like a triumph, great generosity and an important achievement that the wife of the worker is given ($125) when she has a baby. What I want to know is, how is she going to educate that child all its life with ($125)? The same thing happens with the family subsidy. We know cases where workers get more from the family subsidy, because they have so many children, than they do from their wages. None of this pile of things represents a real breakthrough, or protection of the worker... Most of the time the sub sidio familiar doesn't even get to the women and children; it stays in the first corner bar that it finds. This type of thinking contributes more to a lack of discipline in the worker than being an effective achievement for his just aspirations...

You look at the collective convention that has a hundred clauses, and ninety-nine talk about the divine and the human, and there's only one that talks about the worker's salary. That is not a real benefit for the worker... 'If my wife has a baby, well, thank God the convention assures me ($125) to take care of her because I can't do it on what I earn.'

A lot of these prestaciones were created by the bosses at the time that the unions were being initiated, to prevent the workers from getting organized. The first union leaders got used to this system and developed it, but we are in the process of studying the situation and finding ways of getting rid of all the prestaciones extralegales in order to give the worker the real wage that he deserves to earn for his work.

Organized Labor
Yet whenever discussions of abandoning the current system of compensation come up, the idea is soundly rejected by everyone, particularly the workers.

The idea of the integral salary was talked about two years ago in the López-Michelsen administration and everyone cried out, the workers, the unions, even the companies... because this is a paternalistic society. The administration is paternalistic, not scientific; it's a clientist society... the economy is dependent, not only on outside powers, but internal ones as well.

People like to be given things; glasses, money to go see a doctor, to deliver a baby, to get four or five days off to help the wife after the birth... people here are notighters.

Management

This is exactly where the potential migrants distinguish themselves. For many workers and their families the system must work very well, but since it is designed to help those in greatest need, it is a source of frustration to those who have achieved a modicum of success and aspire for more. And that describes the potential migrant.

All eighteen of the new recruits were asked to what extent they use the benefits available to them, and if they would rather receive most of their compensation in cash, or in the customary combination of cash
and garantías and prestaciones. All eighteen stated emphatically that they would prefer the cash. Only one reported that he had made ample use of the company benefits; many could name one or two programs from which they had benefited, but most were very negative, even if they had participated in some of the programs. The following is a sample of their responses.

In my opinion one should obtain whatever it is in exchange for labor on a daily basis; pension, benefits, all of it, so that one has cash at all times; so that one doesn't have to be imploring all the time, or standing in one of those terrible lines. That happened to me once when my wife was sick. They made me stand in an enormous line, about two blocks. Then the social worker appeared and said 'Take this ticket to the store and they'll give you two little pounds of panela (brown sugar cake) and a little kilo of potatoes...'. That made me angry and I said 'No, man, I'm not asking for handouts,' and I didn't go to the store. I'd rather have the money in cash...

Fabio G.

If I had the money in cash I could solve problems easier. Waiting for someone else to solve them is no good. One has to solve his problems himself.

Jairo G.

Everything that I have gotten has been from my efforts... For me to get my own house, I have to do it outside the company, because of personal pride. I won't say more; only that I would have applied for a
loan from the company, and with the time I've been there I would have gotten it, but I have my pride and I didn't want to do that, I'd rather get it from my own sacrifice.

Luis S.

I would prefer to have the money in hand. As the saying goes: 'A bird in the hand is worth a hundred in the air.' If she (wife) needs a specialist, she goes and asks for an appointment and she gets it. But to get one from the Seguro takes five or six months. If I have the money, I go and they start work right away.

Luis V. G.

Benefits? Well, none really, because the little house we have I got through saving, although it is something you can get there. But it's a false benefit because they sell you a house at auction, and you spend the rest of your life paying for it.

Luis G. R.

I would say that at this time we haven't had any benefit from the company... Here the money is taken out whether we need it or not... The ones who have families now, yes. I also used it during that time...

Ramon V.

I would rather have the high salary, with no benefits, because we're really paying for them anyway... We are being charged for them and they don't work at all... like the Seguro, they promise a lot, but it doesn't work. Practically the only benefit I get...
is the wage... Transportation, yes, it's the best transportation system in Medellin; they pick people up for all shifts, take them to work and then bring them back home again. The prices in the cooperatives are commercial prices. It's better to buy at the corner store and not have to carry it all home.

Hernando H.

Let's say that the benefits we get are to work for subsistence, no more, just to eat, right? There is no benefit because the rent has to come from the salary, or you can make yourself a little house from the pension money, like I did. Fourteen years of work and I have it. It's not that the benefits are stupendous or the greatest thing in the world.

Oscar H.

They talk about benefits in the company... but we are 8,000 employees. Let's say with an average of four children per worker. No matter how capable they are, the company isn't going to be able to put them all through school, so they have a system of raffling scholarships. Let's say there are 32,000 children and 1000 or 2000 scholarships, how many are left out? I've never won one. The courses to train personnel, that is a benefit, yes, because we gain from it ourselves. At least they offer the opportunity to become trained... The members of COMFAMA have a right to go to the club and we do use that. It's even very nice and economical. The co-operative is neither cheap nor of first quality. The prices are equivalent or higher and since it's by credit, the interest payments make it even higher... I don't think that's such a great benefit.

José J.
I think that the benefits to which all Colombians have a right are, more than anything, a way to put us to sleep, to make us feel agreeable, relaxed. Why substitute a bonus in six months when the money is needed now because the wage doesn't go far enough? It would be much better if the Colombian government or some organization would take that money and accumulate it in a salary.

Francisco R.

In addition to the major differences in the system of remuneration, there are several other labor practices in Colombia that contribute to the "push" factors. Some have to do with the way in which labor is protected. For example, it is very difficult for the Colombian textile worker to supplement his low cash wage, because by law he is only allowed to work four hours of overtime. Moonlighting is not allowed between the large companies because of the vast supply of labor, and difficult in smaller mills for the same reason. But there is an additional factor here. In this cradle to grave context, the Colombian enters the workforce before the age of twenty. He is guaranteed a pension after serving the company for 500 to 550 weeks and/or reaching the age of fifty-five or sixty. The time requirement can be met within twelve years, so that at about forty years of age the worker has a very clear view of his future: to spend fifteen or twenty more years waiting for bi-annual minor increases in pay negotiated through collective conventions. Secure, yes; but very limited in the minds of some. Why not
spend at least some of those years waiting for the pension in the United States working for a higher wage? And that is why many of the textile worker immigrants were in the older age groups.

**Textile Labor in the United States**

For many of the Colombian labor policies and practices that are perceived as disadvantages to the potential migrant at his point of origin, there are perceived counterpart advantages to attract him to the United States labor market.

Again, the most important factor is the wage differential. Take home wages for textile workers were four times higher in Lowell than in Medellín. It is clear that the Antioqueño earns more money in the United States than he does at home, although it is diminished somewhat by the fact that he pays withholding taxes to finance part of the U.S. benefits program, and by the fact that he must maintain two households while he is living away from home. Even though the Colombians were expert at minimizing living costs in Lowell, rents and market baskets were higher than in Medellín, and the worker was responsible for many items that were paid for him in Colombia. 8
It was really through leaving the family at home, living ascetically and working consistent overtime, or by adding wage earning members to the family income force that the textile worker immigrants could achieve their cash accumulation goals and even amortize the living and travel costs. This is clear from the experience of the primer enganche compared with the less consistent savings capability of the returnees.

The fact that the benefits package was not among the best to be found in the context of United States industry was of less importance to the Colombian workers who did not bring their families or plan to stay. They preferred the cash, the worst emergencies were covered, and many had their pensions waiting for them at home.

Other practices in the New England textile industry that are decided disadvantages to local labor were not so terrible for the Colombians. For example, the paternalistic, traditional nature of a Wannalancit was something to which they were accustomed. Even the ease of entering and terminating were considered an advantage.

One of the good things about the companies here is that the boss can tell somebody 'You're not working out, you're finished.' or one can say 'I'm not going
to work for you anymore,' and the contract is instantly cancelled. In Colombia the worker has to give two weeks notice... or pay the two weeks.

Pastor

One of the greatest advantages for the Colombians was the ability to work as much overtime as body and soul would allow. For the immigrant textile workers, the less protected labor environment gave them more freedom to achieve their goals.

This is not to say that the Colombians, who were accustomed to very explicit industrial organization in the large Medellín mills, to knowing exactly how to behave in every work situation, and to working six-day weeks, were not appalled at the level of disorganization in New England mills. Jaime describes some of the differences and frustrations,

Textiles could be much more here, but there is no organization of any kind. I was a supervisor at Wannalancit, but I resigned because you can't organize anything or control the workers. You go crazy. It's because of the labor shortage; you practically have to let them do what they want and if you correct them, they leave. The important things are control and quality, and that's very difficult to get there now.

In Colombia it's different, control in the textile industry is very organized. The worker is at his machines and if the supervisor sees that he is ten or
fifteen minutes off, he brings it to his attention... In quality, if there is a loom that is producing defective fabric, he immediately brings it to the attention of the loom fixer and weaver and tells them that he doesn't want to see anymore bad fabric, and even suspends them for one or two days, because they're trying to do the best. Here no one is interested in his work. Even the Colombians. The Colombians come to work in organized mills, and they know how to work, but they get here where nobody bothers them, and they start to work as badly as the others...

(Management) knows that these problems exist, but they can't do anything about it, because if they start to put in some discipline, they'll be by themselves. That's the big problem.

The quality of the product suffers one hundred percent... They have to sell the fabric as seconds and they get half the price... If they were organized, they could make four times more than they do now. If there were greater production and better quality, the worker would benefit. The pay would be better. They have even established a bonus for quality and no one ever gets it. When I first got here I was a loom fixer on the night shift. I was in charge of 100 looms and I got production bonuses all the time with an American weaver, but that was a long time ago, seven years ago. You need complete harmony between the supervisor, the equipment and the conscience of every worker.

Yes, I think that there are organized mills here, maybe in Carolina. Cadillac is the only organized one here, the rest are like Wannalancit. It scares me because (some of the practices) were learned from the United States, and they aren't used here. They aren't practiced because of the labor shortages.
It is well-known that the textile industry in the United States has been highly resistant to union organization. There are several reasons for this. Some are traced to the history of the industry as concentrated in ideologically conservative, paternalistic and primarily family-owned mills; even some of the largest companies, such as Roger Milliken and Burlington Industries, are dominated by one family.

Unionism is considered to be a personal threat and taken in a very personal way, rather than as a clash of interests... It's not the one step removed like most public corporations... (that) could deal with trade unions on a more... professional basis.

Union Official

Another problem for the unions is that, in moving to the South, the industry is in a strong "anti-union" area; although it seems doubtful that "that was the primary reason for moving." And, finally, there are the economic reasons. From the point of view of a union official,

The industry, I'd say, has looked at the wrong numbers to evaluate itself. They always look at profit margins as based on a percentage of sales rather than return on equities. And if you look on percentage of sales, the numbers, of course, are very low, much lower than most other manufacturing industries in the United States. But if you look at it as a percentage of equity, of course, it's quite equivalent to most manufacturing industries.
I think it has a great deal to do with your perspective. How you see how well you're doing, or how well you're not doing. And if you keep saying that your profits are only 1 percent or 2 percent, instead of maybe 15 percent, then right away, you're thinking 'Oh my God, the labor costs are killing me'... I mean you become much more hard-nosed about your costs of production.

The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union views immigrant textile workers as part of the whole tradition of the union movement, and think of themselves as,

...an effective voice and protector of these people, cause we always sensed that they've been the ones who have been most exploited and most taken advantage of ... they have real problems in terms of our society: lack of language skills, lack of education. This still is an entry industry in the sense that people come, and can become very productive and high earners, despite their lack of language ability, education and experience and so on.

The union is willing to organize illegal as well as legal immigrants from Latin America, but reports that,

The employers deliberately hire them (illegal aliens) and frankly they are harder to organize into a union. They don't trust people, we can't go after work and talk to them, to explain to them what a union is about and how it functions. Many of the countries
they come from... the trade-union movement there is either non-existent or corrupt, so they have a very bad taste when one mentions unions.

The textile unions are not represented at all in Lowell, and seem to have abandoned their efforts in that area as the importance of the textile industry has declined. Two studied companies were clear in their positions.

No Ma'am, we're not union. We have no reason to need a union. People in the mill don't need a union. We have never even had any talk of a union, ever. And I think that it's because of the closeness that we have.

Unions did a ... lot of good when there were no governing rules on how labor should be handled. In that sense they've outlived their usefulness. I think we still need a regulating force to make sure the companies are not really putting it to the worker... I think in the larger sense they served an immeasurable purpose then, and now they're over-stepping their bounds in a lot of ways.

Because the textile industry is not organized, it does not assure the protection from layoffs, overtime, non-standard pay practices and benefits programs, and health hazards that most American production workers have come to expect. It is this disorganization in combination with many of the other characteristics of the industry that make the jobs

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fit squarely in the secondary sector of a segmented labor market. It is not that it is impossible to get out of this sector, at least for second generation immigrants, but that the demand for the jobs is so low that it is easy to get in and begin a career in the U.S. labor market.

The employment that I've observed, and I've been to a couple of these plants myself, ... the machinery is 1920 vintage, for the most part, and, when it wasn't manufactured then, they made it in 1950 out of the same mold. Oversimplification, but the technology is just old, old, old. Therefore, the working conditions, the noise, the dust etc., they're bad places to work. It's not a desirable place to work, if you have an option. The parents of youngsters in Lowell and other areas who have worked in the textile industry tell their kids 'Don't work there,' and they're not because there's the electronics option ... in that same general area.

If you have proper wages, working conditions, and fringe benefits that are competitive with your local labor market and with the industry that you happen to be in, then you'll attract workers to it... Of course they might price themselves out of the market... If you invest in the technology that will improve your worker productivity fifty percent, you can afford to give the worker forty percent of that and put the ten in your pocket. But from my observations, in a couple of places, it's old stuff. My grandmother had a sewing machine that was more up-to-date than the kind of looms they have there... You've got to plough a little bit of money back into research and development and into the more efficient and more productive machinery if you're going to keep up in this kind of an economy, and they have not done that...
When the Labor Department has tried to run training programs in places such as Lowell, it has not worked out very well, because we couldn't get anyone to fill the slots. We could not attract the unemployed to take the training.

Labor Department Official

The conditions, the noise and dust, are one reason, but wages, again, are the key issue. Add to that the fact that the electronics industry and service sector are expanding in New England and the textile industry is declining, and it is clear which way a young local job-seeker would turn. Even if a more competitive industry were not in the area, the U.S. labor market has progressed to the point where workers have alternatives to accepting what they consider to be jobs unworthy of their efforts. Unemployment compensation and the welfare assistance program provide the unemployed with a safety net; the CETA and trade assistance programs can help former textile workers and others move into alternative jobs.

Despite of all this, it is important to remember that there are about 750,000 textile workers in the United States, and only a very small percentage of them are Colombians. The jobs are still in the U.S. labor market and people do still take them, because some aspect of the work is appealing (flexible hours, being responsible for a range of functions) in
addition to the reasons immigrants gravitate toward them (reduced need to speak English, informality). This strongly suggests that there is a local secondary labor market, but the nature of that workforce is somewhat unclear. The last section of this chapter begins with that topic.

The Consequences of the Transfer

The main question for most observers of labor migration is whether or not the Colombian textile workers, particularly the illegal immigrants, take jobs from native-born workers. This is not an easy question to answer.

Are there lines of local job-seekers being by-passed in favor of less demanding immigrants who are willing to work for lower wages? No. These mills have always been filled with recent immigrants and local applicants have always been welcome. In the New England context, it is difficult to envision there ever being high interest in textile jobs again. The Colombians were willing to work under less than ideal conditions, but they were paid the same as all textile workers. Yes, unemployment in Lowell has tended to be high, particularly during economic downswings, but it does not necessarily follow that an unemployed person
makes a good weaver or loom fixer. It is an incorrect and unfair assumption, for both the employer and the employee, that people temporarily out of work will be automatically suited for these jobs. To be a weaver or a loom fixer requires a certain level of interest and skill, and it is unrealistic to think that large numbers of people with alternatives will be dedicated to learning the trade.  

There are those who feel that if local labor is not interested in the jobs, then the positions should not exist. Perhaps it is true that some of these jobs in their most desperate form should be allowed to gracefully age out of the U.S. employment landscape. Those would be the mills that have become terminally marginal and face relying almost exclusively on recent immigrants, who are not supposed to be in the labor market in the first place. Conversely, the less marginal mills can still provide opportunities for people who currently comprise the secondary labor market: those who are considered to be too old by some employers, women and students who need flexible hours to schedule with other pursuits, young people and recent, documented immigrants who are just beginning their careers in the U.S. labor market. Joan Fabrics had room for recent immigrants from Puerto Rico, and Lawrence Manufacturing accommodated the female and youth job-seekers from Lowell.
It is interesting to speculate whether Lawrence and Joan would have increased the number of Colombians on the payroll if the Labor Department had not ceased issuing H2 permits for textile workers, and if the INS had not made overtures to enforce the policy. They probably would have, simply because the Colombians were more competitive in many ways; not just because they were eager and docile, but also because they were highly competent. The hiring function in the personnel office is clearly to sign people up in a high turnover industry, not to police the backgrounds of the applicants. At Joan, the practice of hiring through department heads made the company even more susceptible to signing on qualified workers with minimal emphasis on their origin. In that sense jobs may have gone to Colombians rather than local labor had the companies not been forced to examine their payroll and hiring practices. In the case of Lawrence Manufacturing, it appears as if the policy to restrict the entry of foreign competitors, particularly undocumented workers, to the labor market might have worked, but just barely. It was not because "there is a domestic supply of low level job seekers" that is not marginal to the labor market, but because the company changed its practices to suit the local secondary labor market and entice people into the mills for short periods. These were not necessarily people who would become the kind of long-term, skilled employees textile companies would prefer to hire.
Another series of questions of major interest is whether or not the Colombians are exploited as they labor in textile mills in the United States, and whether or not their presence undermines efforts to improve wages and working conditions for legal residents.

Jobs lure the illegal aliens and many employers will hire them because illegal aliens are willing to work hard for long hours and little pay. The result, of course, is serious undermining and undercutting of wages and working conditions for United States citizen workers and permanent residents.\textsuperscript{15}

The central point is that the presence of substantial numbers of additional, usually hardworking, often docile, often exploited workers can only serve to flood already overstocked labor markets, thereby causing working conditions and the reward for work to remain stable, or perhaps decline relatively.\textsuperscript{16}

There is a tendency to make these statements as if all jobs were the same in all sectors: agriculture, service and manufacturing. But that is one distinction that has to be made in this case. The other is between legal and illegal immigrants.

The legal immigrant, can leave the job whenever he wants.\textsuperscript{17} He is motivated to do the work because he is competent, and enjoys the challenge of making cloth or keeping the looms running. He will bear the conditions, which are usually inferior to those in Medellín, because the
pay scale is so much higher. He does not mind some of the traditional aspects of mill life, because that is what he is accustomed to at home, although he does mind the lack of organization when there is no clear recourse for problem-solving. It is that same disorganization, or lack of standardization in the U.S. workplace, that does allow for some abuses, such as not including a half hour lunch break in the daily wage, paying overtime after forty hours instead of eight, and "allowing" workers to work twelve to sixteen hour days on a regular basis. There is every reason not to abuse the Colombian worker, however, because his skills are greatly needed. He is, in fact, treated with respect for his dedication and competence; he is not a worker that the company wants to lose, and he can leave.

The illegal immigrant does not have that freedom. Even if he is not overtly mistreated, which he usually is not, the potential for exploitation is there by definition. Should a problem arise, his status alone puts him at a disadvantage; he is vulnerable and has no leverage for arbitration or redressing grievances. At Wannalancit the Colombian workers were somewhat captive during the long process the company had to go through to sponsor them for immigrant visas,¹⁸ even though most of the workers were not necessarily unhappy about that situation, and many even
felt fortunate that they had the opportunity. Taking advantage of the Colombians' zeal and innocence is a good description of the level of exploitation that took place. Members of the primer enganche, having come through the rites of passage, were very cheerful indeed. Jaime had become so valuable to the company as a trouble-shooter that he was even paid more than his colleagues.

I earn more because I've been here a long time, and because, really, I do a lot for the company. There have been times when they've had trouble getting certain kinds of looms to work... and I have been able to resolve the problems.

The last question to be discussed here in relation to the consequences of the transfer is what impact the loss of skilled workers has on the textile mills in Colombia. There are essentially two types of responses to that question. One is primarily from the workers, who report that the damage to the Colombian textile industry is such that retired and even dismissed former employees have been recalled. There was also a rumor that entire weave rooms were filled with apprenticos.

Management in Colombia agreed that there were considerable costs associated with the steady loss of experienced manpower, but also pointed out some of the positive consequences in terms of opening spaces
for upward mobility, helping to draw personnel from weave rooms that were being modernized with labor displacing looms, and reducing some of the overhead costs.

When a person with a lot of experience and knowledge, gained from many years working with the company, emigrates, there is a great cost to the company... that cannot be denied. However, if another person with many years of service, but less ability, leaves, you could think that there is an economic benefit for the company because he can be replaced by someone who comes in with lower social overhead that is mandated by Colombian law.

Company Official

What influence has the emigration had on us? This is where I may differ from some of my colleagues... I have always thought that the emigration, even when it costs us a ton of money - because we have to replace the personnel that leaves, has been 100 percent favorable for us for two reasons. First, at the internal company level, generally the employee who goes to the United States or Venezuela... is highly qualified, and that has allowed us to promote the people who are coming up from below. As long as people feel that they are promoted quickly, they are happy in their work. One of the (sources) of discontent at the work place is the feeling of stagnation, so the migration has been a benefit for us in that sense; we have been able to promote a lot of people. Second, on the national level... it is a great benefit because the money that they save there, they don't spend there. That money comes back to this country... I have friends who own three or four buildings, transport trucks, and small businesses here from their earnings.

Company Official

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If the transfer of skilled Colombian textile workers to New England mills had been studied at its inception, it could have been assessed as a short-term phenomenon during a period of transition. It could have been viewed as an opportunity to allow skilled workers and their families to immigrate to the United States in entry level positions, and it could have happened with the full understanding and cooperation of representatives of both governments. Then some of the workers and their families may have elected to stay for a short time, accumulate savings to realize goals in Colombia and resume their lives in Medellín. Others would stay, but the choice would have been theirs.

Summary

The textile industries in both the United States and Colombia have been described as being in transition; neither was experiencing growth, labor was not expanding in Medellín, and the mills were not attracting local labor in Lowell.

The context of the New England labor market is one in which jobs unacceptable to the applicant do not have to be taken in order to survive. In Massachusetts the failing textile industry had been eclipsed
by the electronics industry, which offered more secure and comfortable jobs at better wages. Textile training programs and the whole climate necessary to entice eager applicants had long since vanished. As the textile industry groped for a course correction, the labor vacuum created the "pull".

Because of its cash deficient and inflationary economy, Colombian manpower policy emphasized the development of a mechanically skilled labor force, but experienced textile workers in Medellín labor in a context that makes it difficult to realize goals that involve cash accumulation and socioeconomic mobility for all family members. The resultant frustrations comprised the "push".

The transferability of the Colombian skills into the U.S. labor market concluded the cycle and provided the impetus for the migration flow. The way in which United States immigration policy deals with this type of situation is discussed in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES


2. Except by petitioning through the government. This is rarely done, no matter how slow business is. (See Notes, Chapter 8, 1.)

3. See Notes, Chapter 8, 2 for outline of Coltejer and Tejicon'dor rules and regulations.

4. Overtime is paid at 25 percent of the regular rate, night shifts at 70 percent, and sundays and holidays at 200 percent.

5. Each large company has at least two unions; one national and one internal, and some have an industrial union as well.

6. Two percent also goes to the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF), which primarily operates a series of day care centers.

7. In the United States, the worker is entitled to ninety-days coverage if he has been let go.

8. Transportation not included; most Colombians lived so close to the mills in Lowell that they could walk. Lawrence Manufacturing did provide work shoes, and all mills provided safety gear.

9. See Notes, Chapter 8, 3.

10. The Trade Assistance Program was designed to help workers who have lost their jobs because of import competition. It offers retraining and placement assistance for people such as unemployed textile workers.

11. With sixty percent of the workers in a mill speaking Spanish only, it would be very possible for a young applicant to conclude that the jobs were "Immigrant work."
12. That is what the later members of the textile worker network became once the H2 visas were suspended.

13. In Medellín, there is high motivation to be trained to be skilled textile workers because textile jobs are considered as good jobs in that context.


15. Statement of Rudy Oswald, Director, Department of Research, AFL-CIO, before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S2250, May 17, 1978.


17. If his English is poor he will probably still have to search for another job in the secondary sector, but he is able to flee an abusive employer. As Chapters 5 and 6 showed, the Colombian textile workers, and particularly their offspring, are not restricted to the secondary sector.

18. Many of the workers from the 1976 group stayed at Wannalancit even after they received all their papers. Ted Larter offered the following assessment, "They will stay here as long as it takes them to learn English."

19. Remember that the flow of textile workers to the United States is small in comparison to the exodus to Venezuela. (See Notes, Chapter 8, 4 for estimates and sources.)
Chapter 9

IMMIGRATION

They know that once they get their foot in the door they always have some avenue of relief to them, whether its suspension of deportation if they're here over seven years... There are a number of things, let's face it. If they can save their money, they can hire a lawyer, and a lawyer can completely boggle the Immigration Service for years. Or if they just escape undetected for awhile; it's better than nothing.

INS Inspector
At this point in the narrative it should be clear that there were intense motivations for both the workers and the employers to participate in the Colombian textile worker network. The apparent advantages for both participants would have required great forebearance to resist.

However, there are other observers of labor migration who are not at all pleased with this type of arrangement. They look at the larger picture and see seven million unemployed American citizens; then they look at the more than 400,000 annual documented newcomers, plus the eight or so million undocumented alien workers who are thought to be fanning out over the countryside, and conclude that the flow of new arrivals must be stopped. Even those observers who feel that the United States needs a steady supply of secondary labor market workers to do jobs that American citizens shun, are in favor of controlling immigration. The long-standing, unresolved question, however, is what kind of immigration policy should be used to monitor the entry of newcomers to the United States labor market at this point in its history, and how it should be enforced. The ambivalent conceptualization of those questions is evident throughout this chapter.
Procedures and the Real World

It is not that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) leaves much to the imagination, but rather that the outlined procedures must be carried out in a less than perfect world. The law is really quite explicit on the admittance of workers such as the Colombian weavers and loom fixers. There are two legal ways for an alien to enter the United States: as a temporary non-immigrant visitor or worker, or as a permanent immigrant. To apply for an immigrant visa, all Colombians, who are unrelated to United States citizens or permanent resident aliens living in the United States, become part of the group of applicants vying for the 120,000 Western Hemisphere visa allocations with a 20,000 per country ceiling.

The textile workers from Medellín would come under the sixth preference category of the provisions of Section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

Skilled or unskilled workers needed in the U.S. labor market who will not displace citizens or legal alien workers.

A limit of ten percent of the worldwide annual number of 290,000 visas can be issued to sixth preference applicants, and, in order to be con-
sidered as a candidate, the applicant must obtain a labor certification under Section 212(a)14 of the INA. The candidate must also show that he/she is financially solvent, will not become a public charge to the people of the United States, and does not fall into one of the current inadmissable categories. That is the policy of the U.S. Department of State for issuing visas.

The mandate of the Department of Labor is clear: to protect the United States worker. In issuing labor certifications, Labor Department officials have to be convinced that the immigrant will not be in direct competition for a job with a legal resident who is already in the labor market, and that the immigrant's presence will do nothing to depress wages or adversely affect working conditions. That is the policy of the U.S. Department of Labor for issuing labor certifications.

Labor certification officers base their judgments on regional labor market studies, occupational analyses distributed by the government, and general determinations of the difficulty of the job and the time required for training. The officers are provided with specific guidelines via two periodically updated schedules: Schedule A, which lists occupations for which there is an insufficient supply of U.S. resi-
dent workers, and Schedule B, which lists about fifty occupations for which it has been determined that there are sufficient "able, willing, qualified and available" workers in the United States, and which would suffer adverse impact on wages and working conditions "by the employment in the U.S. of aliens". Skilled textile operatives are on neither schedule.

If an occupation is not listed, the procedure for petitioning for a labor certification places the burden of proof on the employer and the applicant. The sponsoring employer submits the application at the local state employment office. Then there is a thirty-day recruitment period during which time the job is advertised widely by the employment office to be sure that there is no able and available job-seeker in the local area. If no suitable candidate is forthcoming, the documents are forwarded to the regional office of the Labor Department, where the case is reviewed. Six to eight weeks later a determination is sent directly to the employer. The employer has thirty-five days to affirm the application and, if the request is denied, to apply for a review of the case. The Director of the New England regional office of the Labor Department reported,
Our role in this is really quite limited. The Labor Department will act on a request to provide a labor certification to workers when the request is presented to us through the appropriate procedures.

We have had a few requests over the last five years or so. Not very many. But I'm under the impression that there are an awful lot of Colombians in textiles in New England just from the little bit of certification work we've had, especially through the Immigration Service folks, and just (by) being around.

The Labor Department had heard from the Immigration and Naturalization Service about textile workers in New England because so many had not followed the proper procedures, but rather had either overstayed tourist visas or had entered the United States "without inspection" (EWI). In Colombia tourist visas are issued by Consular offices in four cities, including Medellín. (All Consulates have been closed since the time of data collection. Applicants must now go to Bogotá.) They cover single or multiple entries and generally are valid for up to one year. Tourist visas are not sufficient documentation for textile workers to work in the United States, but they are not sought with that stated motive, and it is difficult to screen actual tourists from potential employees. The U.S. Consul in Medellín explained,

It's all just based on fact... They may be asked to show their tax declaration, what their annual income is, and what their family situation is. And do they
own property; have they travelled before? What is the purpose of this trip? How long are they going to stay? Where are they going? That sort of thing. And they'll decide, on the basis of that... whether he believes that they are going as a tourist, or to Disney World, or visit their cousin Gertrude in Brooklyn or whatever, and if he doesn't think that that's really the situation, regardless of whether he has any notion of precisely what it is they are really going to do, he will deny them a visa.

We don't think of (textile workers) as any special or separate group. We have a lot of people. As a matter of fact, the times that I've done the interviewing myself, and talking with people who do it, (we don't) have any impression that there's any special number, any significant number of textile workers who come. In other words, we would generally think of people, for example, who worked for Coltejer or Fabricato as more likely than not, good candidates for tourists visas, because their income is, generally speaking, better than many other people who apply for tourist visas. Again, it will depend. Our profile of a person who is less likely to obtain a visa is not based so much on their profession, as it is on things like age, marital status, employment status, and financial or economic situation and their solvency.

They don't understand the concept of the burden of proof. They kind of think that by saying 'I'm going as a tourist,' that if you say, 'I'm sorry, I don't believe you.' They say, 'Well, you tell me why you don't believe that'. You know. 'No, no, you don't understand. I don't believe you are,' and as a matter of fact, we do go ahead and say, 'Because see your income here, you've declared no income this year.' There's a little pink form for people who put zero zero. 'You have no income. You have no bank account. You don't own any property, but yet you want to convince me that you have this ability somehow, money from somewhere, to go fly to Disney World,
and spend two weeks there, and a trip to New York. How much does that add up to, initially? 'Yeah, but I'm going to do that.' 'I don't believe that.' And there you stay. They don't believe you have to say, 'No'.

The United States consulate in Medellín has a fairly good idea of how many people slip through their screening process when the Immigration and Naturalization Service sends the blue form identifying visa overstayers back to the post where the visa was issued. By the time the INS is filling out forms, the visa overstayer has either been granted voluntary departure, is deportable, or is in the process of attempting to "adjust status" to permanent resident alien.

To adjust status, the applicant has to go through the same procedure outlined above to obtain an immigrant visa, usually returning to the place of origin. If an alien departs voluntarily, he will be eligible to apply again for a visa; if he is deported that is rarely possible, but there are exceptions to every rule. At the time of data collection, the only part of this process that was computerized was a list of people who had been denied a visa by the consulate in Medellín and all other posts.
The INS doesn't have a computer system yet. They're in the process of getting one. Well, it makes it almost impossible for them, or anyone else, to try to tell much about what they've done, these guys who go around, find people and deport them and all that, and no one knows it. We won't know it unless the person who gets deported is still using the same old passport. If he's got a new passport, you can't tell. It has no stamps in it.

That is an overview of the policies and procedures that were designed to govern the movement of people such as the Colombian textile workers into the United States. In the real world, however, policies are more than a little difficult to administrate, and practices develop that seem to have a life of their own.

It is not difficult to trace the unraveling of the best intentions of immigration policy and procedures in the case of the loom fixers and weavers from Antioquia. Remember that until 1971, H2 non-immigrant visas were available to skilled textile workers. An alien can apply to enter the United States as an immigrant, or as a non-immigrant on a tourist visa, or a temporary visa for short-term work or study. Section 101(a)(15)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act defines three categories of admissible temporary entrants: (i) persons of distinguished merit and ability (ii) other temporary workers, (iii) trainees, (iv) immediate families of first three categories. It is the so-called H2 provision that applies to the textile workers.
(H) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning*** (ii) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such services or labor cannot be found in this country...

The view from the Labor Department in Boston was that during the mid-1960s someone had convinced headquarters that there was a shortage of loom fixers and weavers in the Northeast, and they were allowed to bring in groups of workers on H2 visas. But it is possible that the Labor Department primed the pump itself. Hard at work as Consul, chief of the immigrant visa section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá in 1980, was one of the men who had done some of the initial groundwork.

Well, in 1964, '63, '64, I worked for the U.S. Department of Labor. When I was there... one of the things was to pinpoint those particular occupations that would be coming in short supply. You do a short-term or a long-term. And one of the things we noticed... (was that) the thing completely shifted... There's still some (textile) firms (in New England), but it's nothing like it was in 1920. And Greenville, South Carolina, in that area, that's now the textile industry of the United States... You did find in certain areas, especially in the repair of the machines, as I recall - I'm going back now fifteen or sixteen years - shortages cropping up where they weren't expected to crop up. And the industry was considered to be at least in terms of New England, defunct... They didn't find enough people around who wanted to learn the trade. There was no one around to teach them anyway, so they had to look elsewhere... Labor checks into this, and they have a knowledge of this. They O.K. the labor certifications...
There's a whole bunch of them... these are skills that we apparently don't teach in the United States, and yet we have a need for them...

This business of demand for a particular skill, it's a local picture, not a national picture... If in Greenville, South Carolina they need a loom fixer, let's say there's fifty-one fixers unemployed... two hundred and fifty miles north. That doesn't count. The fact is, the man is needed in Greenville, he's not needed in North Carolina or Virginia. So that's what decides it... which is really much more realistic, come to think of it... If you can't get the worker you need, and you have a man down in South America, O.K. We'll approve it.

This was our main thing we did every year... We put into (the report) what we'd seen over the past three months. We'd identify it by area, by industry, and by occupation.

Thus, the first groups of textile workers from Medellín entered the United States with H2 visas during the last years of the 1960s. As is known from the primer enganche, their experiences were very similar to those of immigrants in the past: they worked incredibly hard, brought their families to the United States, assimilated the lifestyle of their new home, and launched their children on life paths very different from their own backgrounds. Unlike past immigrants they were admitted for a period of one year, had to adjust their status here, and only brought their families in slow stages after they had achieved permanent resident alien status.
The members of the primer enganche and one or two other Colombian textile workers encountered in Lowell during data collection were the only ones who benefited from the H2 visa allocations. By the first years of the 1970s someone had decided that skilled textile workers were not legitimately needed in the U.S. labor market, and the policy changed. It was in 1964 that the much-debated Bracero Program was abandoned for good, and the whole concept of admitting temporary workers was subjected to painful scrutiny. Did the United States need to import a labor force? If so, should people not be allowed to come as legal permanent immigrants? Temporary worker programs fell into disfavor and H2 visas for textile workers vanished as well.

No one really had an argument with that change in policy. Loom fixers, after all, have nothing in common with Jamaicans who come in the fall to harvest apples. Even Ted Larter had no great fondness for the H2 visa program.

There should be a way of getting an alien into this country for his field of work regardless of it being seasonal or not... They all wiped out on that. The minute the job is temporary or seasonal in nature, which the H2 is, my work is not that way, so I do not qualify for a temporary type of visa. The only way I could do is to go in for permanence.
What the mills in Lowell needed were enough skilled workers to keep the looms running long enough for them to retrench, gain strength, modernize or whatever, and perhaps be able to train locally if their position improved.

That is not what happened. Instead, now that the migration network had been established but the H2 visa policy had been changed, there was no longer a legal way for the very "able, willing, qualified, and available" Colombian textile workers to get from Medellín to Lowell. Many still wanted to come, but at the time of data collection there was a two-year waiting list for sixth preference immigrant visa numbers. That left two illegal means of entry: obtaining a tourist visa and staying in the United States until detected, or foregoing any contact with the Consul's office and arranging to cross the border without inspection. And those are just the routes that many took.

This new method of "selecting" immigrants forced an employer like Wannalancit into a curious position.

Understand this, that although I have personnel here now, that I'm putting in applications for, if you would give me my choice I won't take those people. I don't want them. Because in most part they are not
that well-qualified. I'd rather have them say to me 'We'll give you six months' extension on these people, you go to Colombia and find some very well qualified people, and see if they want to come and we will approve them and you let these go back. Problem is, I don't get to choose what I want... The only option I have is that there is a red-blooded one that comes into the door, he's alive and kicking, and he has been in a mill. And he knows a little about it, but I don't have a selection to get the best... I am going to legalize, if I'm allowed to, people that I shouldn't be legalizing, who are less qualified.

And that brings the discussion to the problems of enforcement.

Enforcement

Suspending the legal avenues for the immigration of textile workers merely opened the network to illegal movement. For almost ten years after it was no longer legal for the Colombian textile workers to come into the United States, they did come, and they did find employment as illegal aliens. There are some general reasons and some specific reasons for this apparent non-enforcement of immigration policy.

The main problem is that current United States immigration policy, except for the most serious situation along the U.S.-Mexican border, has been a policy of non-enforcement, or what Michael Teitlebaum
has called a "policy of delay" and "active support for the status quo". There is a serious conflict of interest in the United States between the needs of a capitalistic society that has always welcomed enthusiastic workers precisely because they are such tough competitors, and the views of the people with whom they compete and those who are charged with protecting them. If immigration policy does indeed reflect how a society views itself, then the United States is further hampered by its long tradition of providing refuge and opportunity for less fortunate people from many areas of the world. Within its borders, this is a society that does not want to compromise its hard-won principles of freedom and self-determination by instituting an identity card system. It is a country that would rather tolerate large numbers of uninvited guests than construct impregnable barriers at its borders. And it demonstrates these feelings by totally underfunding its enforcement institutions.

The danger in this kind of laissez-faire approach to a serious problem is that the time may come when drastic measures will need to be taken because the nation was unable to agree on a policy that would ensure a gradual flow early enough. In the meantime, some industries such as the textile industry enjoy a "subsidy of non-interference", are able to continue a little longer, and perhaps even keep some local residents employed.
What would the Wannalancit Textile Company have done if the Colombians had not come along when they did? The company probably would have closed several years sooner than it did, but this is a very interesting case. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had known all along that Wannalancit was a heavy employer of Colombian textile workers and that at least half of them were illegal aliens. Why did they wait so long to take action? The author can only guess at why Wannalancit was visited when it was (complaints, changes in INS personnel, increased funding), but there are some apparent reasons for why the company was left alone for so long.

One reason is insufficient operating funds at the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The regional investigator knew exactly where illegal aliens were working all over New England. There was, however, no money to process all the cases, much less to deport those who would not depart voluntarily. Better not round everyone up just to have to let them go again. And so Ted Larter pointed out,

They have had a list... that they ran through their R & I, that if there had been any bad names on the list they would have come up here and zonked 'em out of here, such as... that they were a national threat... or number one ace criminal of the country, or something else. They would have gotten them out of here.
But I don't have really any in that category... Oh, Immigration knows who's here. That's why they've let it go so long, cause they weren't any definite threat to them.

Another reason may have been the type of orders Wannalancit was filling. They were not competing with the big companies at all, because they specialized in small contracts; none of their work was for speculation, they kept no inventory.

We have about a dozen customers... mostly industrial cloths, such as going into industrial diaphrags, rubber-coated both sides, military life rafts. A lot of cloth for that. These are staple items, though, these are good running items. Another fabric is a satin we make that goes into the Air Force life jackets, Navy flight jackets. We once in awhile get an order from the Post Office Department for mail bags... heavy. We sometimes get a few yards, maybe ten, fifteen thousand yards of what they call bullet-proof ballistics cloth, that's a fabric that is woven out of heavy yarns that are laminated together for bullet-proof vesting. You never know. We wove the first "no-mex" ... uniforms of the astronauts. The first yards that were ever woven... It was all experiment, big hush-hush thing. Yup, we've done a lot of things, a lot of things.

If that were not enough to keep the government from interfering too hastily, Wannalancit probably also extended its grace period by petitioning directly through political representatives rather than trade associations. The ATMI and Northern Textile Association would have been
of little help on a specific case such as this, but there is evidence that Wannalancit's personal appeals were at least heard and caused considerable delay. The meetings borrowed time, and even in Bogotá the Consul in charge of the immigrant visa section reported,

There was also a letter... from Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., ... in which he was asking for our help in something that is trying to preserve a particular mill in Lowell. This mill is the last one there, and this is of an historical value for the Commonwealth. They were looking for some federal funds or something... to preserve it. And, of course, Tsongas, being from the Lowell area, he was... certainly behind it... They wanted the company to be kept in existence, and I think the main thrust of the thing was that certain workers... they weren't able to get them in New England. In fact, they probably weren't even available... down in South Carolina. So for that reason they had to go overseas, and they were asking for our cooperation in trying to ease, I don't know. I remember, it sort of trailed off. I couldn't figure out specifically what he was asking for at the tail end of it."

When immigration policy was enforced in this case, it sometimes appeared arbitrary, and the lessons to be learned were surely not those intended by the law. The returnees are a good example. About two-thirds of the weavers and loom fixers from the first applicant group of 1976 were able to adjust status. Almost all of them were men who stayed in the United States instead of returning to the country of origin, so that
it could be concluded that the different decisions were simply handed
down by different officers with different interpretations of the law.

Section 212(A)(19) states,

Anyone obtaining a visa by means of fraud or meaning-
ful misrepresentation of a material fact cannot
thereafter have a visa.

That is open to interpretation. An official reports,

So what they do is come in and apply for tourist
visas, when in fact they're not tourists. They go to
the States and stay up there for five, six years, and
then they come down here... My own viewpoint is to
try to be reasonable. I don't want to use the word
lenient. Alright, we'll use that word too... rea-
sonable and lenient with someone like that. I don't
try to beat somebody over the head with that. I try
to avoid any possibility of refusing, but I'm afraid
that prior to my time here there was a great deal
of... I cannot say they were wrong, because they had
the law on their side.

First of all you have to warn them that anything they
say could in fact be incriminating, and it could
result in not getting the visa... that they could be
found ineligible and permanently ineligible. Then
you start talking to them, and often you'd be sur-
prised how many times they say, 'O.K. here's what
happened,' and they tell you the whole story. They
tell you exactly what happened... I almost feel like
telling them...

The fact that telling the truth can get you in trouble had not occurred
to the weavers and loom fixers who had been denied the visa while in

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Medellín. Neither did they know that they could have lied and perhaps advanced their case.

Now, if that person then says 'O.K., what I said here is not true.' O.K., that in fact would be a 'timely retraction.' Definitely, and it wouldn't count. I mean what happened initially wouldn't count.

What did not escape the textile worker returnees in Medellín was that you were much better off if you entered without inspection via Mexico or the Bahamas than if you entered with a tourist visa. All the "EWIs" were granted permanent resident alien documents. Why?

Because the law of (19) says specifically... a man who applies for... a visa, or attempts to obtain a visa and lies and this sort of thing, used fraud. The guy doesn't bother with that. He decides, 'The heck with it. I know a guy on the border there who can get me across for fifty dollar,' and this sort of thing. He didn't apply for a visa. So, I mean, according to the wording of the law, you cannot hit him with a nineteen.

The man who doesn't have a fraudulantly-obtained visa on his passport, will never have "212(A)(19)" stamped on his passport.

The current immigration policy enforcement system therefore unwittingly tells the prospective migrant worker: you know that your
chances of entering the United States legally to work for several years are slim. If you decide to risk going illegally and you are caught, be sure to lie and tell them that you never planned to work, but that you "ended up working", otherwise you will be forever ineligible to apply for a visa. But, actually, you would be much better off just crossing a border so that you do not have a document that can be held against you.

If United States immigration policy was not a sufficient deterrent, was there any policy that did make the textile workers think twice about risking a sojourn in the United States? Yes, there was, but it had nothing to do with U.S. policy. In fact, the one thing that the Colombian textile workers mentioned most frequently as something they had to consider seriously, and even kept them from leaving Medellín was the Colombian textile company policy of not rehiring employees who had left the company to work outside the country.

We don't accept re-enganches for the following reason: when a vacancy occurs... in any position in the industry, there is an automatic shift in the promotion pyramid, or the internal career track. Someone has been in line for that position, he stayed, became experienced, suffered for it and got it. When the other one comes back tired, bored, exhausted, the place is taken by the one who stayed.

Industry Official
The workers understood their obligation of loyalty to their company; they rarely doubted that the company would enforce the policy, it had happened to many people they knew personally. That was a policy that emanated from a cultural context with which they could identify; it had nothing to do with obscure rulings such as a "right to remain silent", with which they were simply totally unfamiliar.

New Directions in U.S. Immigration Policy

The problems just outlined are only too well-known to the stout-hearted individuals who have been involved in the ponderous undertaking to reform U.S. immigration and refugee policy. These problems are a small part of the seemingly insoluble and conflicting issues that have defied resolution in the past; but not for lack of effort.

It has been recognized for many years that U.S. immigration policy is inadequate, primarily because the number of people who actually enter the United States each year far exceeds the number that are allowed to come by law. Immigration reform has been on the agenda of several administrations, and congressional committees have studied the issues for years. Under the Carter Administration, Congress established the Select
Commission and Immigration and Refugee Policy to work toward a "coherent, efficient, and humane immigration policy." In December 1980, after two years of public hearings, special studies, and ardent debate, the Commission submitted its report. The recommendations included provisions for:

- employer sanctions
- a forgery-proof ID
- amnesty
- temporary worker programs
- rigorous enforcement
- an increase in ceilings

Variations of these elements have appeared in all subsequent proposals. The Select Commission also recommended that the United States government consider programs such as job creation schemes, direct foreign assistance, and preferential trade policies to reduce "push" factors in the sending countries. These ideas do not appear in current pending legislation.

Employer sanctions are intended to heavily penalize an employer who knowingly hires illegal aliens, because, as Senator Alan Simpson has noted, it is now implicitly "legal to hire an illegal, but illegal for the illegal to work." This proposition assumes that since the main incentive for illegal migration to the United States is to work, making employ-
ment inaccessible will stop the flow. Several states already have employer sanctions on the books, but in New England the law has never been enforced. In some parts of the country, the fine is so low as to be considered by employers as part of "the cost of doing business." The main problem with employer sanctions is the inherent danger that employers will be afraid to hire any foreigners, particularly Hispanics; even newcomers who do have proper documents, since those documents have been easily forged in the past.

The tamper-proof identification is supposed to prevent such employer discrimination against foreign-born and other legal residents, and also to protect the employer, who is required to request identification at the time of hiring. Critics of the ID plan point to the exhorbitant cost of issuing forge-resistant identification to all U.S. residents who are legitimately in the labor market, the repugnance of a national identity system in the United States, and the ultimate possibility that counterfeit cards could become available anyway.

Amnesty provisions are directed at the reality of a situation where there are already at least several million illegal workers in the United States. Rounding up all illegal aliens and allowing them to de-
part voluntarily or deporting them to start with a clean slate would be difficult at best, if not totally impossible. The argument against an amnesty program is that it rewards people who have broken the law and may, therefore, encourage others to do the same.

Temporary worker propositions vary considerably but, in general, address the fact that after all the other new immigration policy provisions have been established, there still may be a need for extra workers in certain sectors of the economy and at specific times of the year. These propositions would leave the H2 visa program intact for people such as the Jamaican apple pickers, Canadian lumbermen, and possibly some Mexican agricultural workers. As with the other provisions, there is a great deal of disagreement on the need for guest worker schemes. Some maintain that these programs have proved unsatisfactory over the long-term in Europe, that the new immigration policy is intended to obviate the need for additional temporary workers, that people should either be allowed into the country with full rights as legal immigrants or not at all, and that the country has already experimented with and rejected that kind of arrangement.14
There is little argument with the notion that increased enforcement is necessary, no matter which policy measures are eventually adopted. The current situation along the Mexican border, where thousands of people from all over Central and South America pour in unchecked every day, leads to sardonic comments such as, "Well, on the assumption that it becomes national policy to enforce our own laws on the subject..." How the laws are going to be enforced is totally unresolved, however. The height and style of fences are the subject of great sensitivity to the Mexicans, and most observers agree that, under current conditions, no barrier would be impregnable. Still there is considerable room for improvement between abandoning the Border Patrol and INS investigators to be compassionate observers of the illegal movement, and funding them to a point where they could begin to discharge their duties.

Finally, most proposals have included some element of altering the current ceilings for legal immigration. These are, again, aimed at dealing with reality, and tend to acknowledge the "special relationship" that the United States has with its contiguous neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Juggling those figures within a reasonable worldwide total would be quite impossible to do to everyone's satisfaction.
The most recent legislation attempting to control immigration was introduced in Congress as a bipartisan bill in March 1982 by Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.), the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, and by Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ken.), chairman of the counterpart House subcommittee.16 That plan eventually passed in the Senate by a vote of 80-19, but died in the House, mired in a sea of controversy.

In the Spring of 1983 a new Simpson-Mazzoli bill was introduced. S.529 on Immigration Reform and Control again passed in the Senate with a similar vote, but, as of this writing the House bill appears to be running out of time during the current congressional session. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill includes provisions for:

1) Civil and criminal penalties for employers of illegal aliens, particularly active recruiters and repeat offenders. The normal penalty would be $1,000 per illegal worker for the first offense and a possible $2,000 per worker for subsequent violations. Criminal penalties would be imposed in situations of "a pattern or practice of violation."

2) The government to produce a tamper-resistant identification as proof of citizenship, legal resident status, or legal admittance for the purpose of employment. Employers would be required to request the ID of every job applicant at hiring only.
3) Amnesty in the form of permanent resident status for some illegal aliens who have been living in the United States prior to January 1, 1977, and legal temporary resident status for those who entered prior to January 1, 1980, with the ability to adjust status within three years.

4) A modification of the H2 worker program for "employers who can demonstrate a genuine need for a foreign worker for temporary services or labor..."

5) A recognition or a "sense of Congress" that funding for enforcement must be increased, although the bill concurs with the opinion that conventional enforcement alone will not solve the problem.

6) Reform of legal immigration, which divides all applicants into "family reunification immigrants" and "independent immigrants." Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens would remain numerically unlimited, but would be tied in with the new worldwide annual ceiling of 425,000 immigrants and would affect the numbers of numerically limited preference relatives, thus reserving family reunification visas for the closest family members. Per country ceilings would remain at the 20,000 level, but would be "charged" for previous year's excesses of immediate relatives and special immigrants. The ceilings for Mexico and Canada would be increased to 40,000 immigrants.

Further modifications of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill include a narrowing of the fifth preference to unmarried siblings of adult United States citizens, labor certification based on general labor market information rather than on the specific impact of an individual worker, and the prohibition of adjustment of status for visa overstayers.

In sum, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would somewhat reduce the emphasis on family reunification of current U.S. immigration policy, and
make it easier for independent or "seed" immigrants to obtain a visa. It would double the number of legal immigrants from Canada and Mexico, strengthen and streamline the ability to enter on a temporary non-immigrant visa such as the H2 program, and end the vagaries of the futures of visa abusers. To deter the hiring of illegal aliens, the bill would heavily penalize employers and require a national worker ID system. Finally, it would make provisions to legalize those aliens who are currently working in the United States and then hold legal immigration to the current annual level of 425,000 (except for refugees), and attempt to enforce the prevention of illegal entry.

The bill has been endorsed by the AFL-CIO and is supported by the Reagan Administration, but has encountered stiff opposition from Hispanic and business groups, who fear discrimination and are not interested in policing the activities of illegal aliens, respectively. Some oppose restrictions on the family reunification premise of current U.S. immigration policy, while others (including the AFL-CIO) are concerned about "a backdoor Bracero Program," that would continue the competition and erosion of U.S. working conditions presently blamed on the illegal aliens. Many people are appalled at the staggering administrative obstacles and costs of implementing the amnesty and worker ID programs.
Yet behind all these obvious horrors of enactment and enforcement is a serious underlying deficiency: there is no clear understanding or statement of immigration in the context of a broad population policy. There is no assessment of the current and future needs of the United States; not only in terms of the number of people to which the country should ultimately aspire, which can become a spurious exercise in gross speculation, but mainly in terms of manpower needs. The question of whether or not the United States requires, and is willing to welcome with full, legal rights, a modern counterpart to the immigrants of the past who built this country remains unanswered. It may be enough to state that 425,000 people is an appropriate number of annual newcomers for this country's needs, but it leaves no system for reevaluating those needs or giving the impression that United States immigration policy is a clear component of a rational, workable, national plan.  

Summary

Under current immigration laws, a loom fixer or weaver from Medellín could only enter the United States with the intention of working by queueing up for the long wait for sixth preference immigrant visas. Since the transfer had once been much easier by means of H2 temporary
non-immigrant visas, the wait seemed inordinately long to many textile workers who were eager to join their colleagues in an eminently rational scheme toward cash accumulation. When the H2 visas became unavailable, the network went underground and they came as tourists and border crossers.

The conflicting agenda of U.S. immigration policy created an implicit policy of non-enforcement to the extent that the Colombian practice of not rehiring workers who had once departed for foreign employment became as great a deterrent to emigration as did the risk of getting caught in the United States.

In the absence of more explicit manpower policy guidelines, the needs of the U.S. labor market for groups such as the Colombian textile workers and other secondary labor market employees, will continue to be dealt with in a piecemeal manner. It appears to be more convenient for this country not to identify areas of manpower needs.
1. They could also, theoretically, be admitted as "nonpreference, or other immigrants," who are issued visas if the available numbers are not used by the seven preference categories. Since non-preference numbers are rarely, if ever, available, the textile workers have a much better chance higher on the list.

2. See Notes, Chapter 9, 1.

3. All immigrants who are not parents, children or the spouse or sibling of a U.S. resident require a labor certification.

4. See Notes, Chapter 9, 2 for summaries of schedules A and B.

5. Some of the textile workers at Wannalancit were allowed to adjust status from Lowell.

6. Occasionally they will appear on the State Department computer.


8. See Chapter 5. The primer enganche was one of the first groups of Colombian textile workers in the Northeast, and, as far as the author has been able to determine, the first group to arrive in northern New England.

9. The H2 visa does allow a worker to bring his family, but the costs were too high and they were unwilling to uproot their families without knowing how long they would stay. It is possible that the company also discouraged bringing families.

10. The author went to the INS offices first to select a case to study.

11. Including the weaving of parachute fabric during World War II.

12. The letter had little actual impact. (See Notes, Chapter 9, 3.)
13. Many were also included in previous plans. A fascinating study, which will no doubt be done, would be to trace the development through Congress and over the years, of what will finally become the new U.S. immigration policy. Immigration procedures have been compared as second only to IRS regulations in their complexity, and few, if any, pieces of legislation cut so deeply into the divergent interests that make this country what it is.

14. The Bracero Program that was in effect from 1942 to 1964.

15. William F. Buckley, Jr. in a "Firing Line" television interview with then Commissioner of Naturalization and Immigration Leonel J. Castillo, January 1979.

16. Senator Simpson has half-jokingly pointed out that only a Senator from Wyoming and a Representative from Kentucky had constituencies that would allow them to introduce such a sensitive bill.

17. At this point, most policy-makers would probably forego any further discussion just to get something passed to avoid what Senator Simpson described as "compassion fatigue," and a resultant inappropriate reaction.
Chapter 10

POLICIES IN CONTEXT

In these years of human rights, one of the fundamental issues has to be the human rights of the migrant worker, because it really is something about which, intentionally or unintentionally, many groups in the receiving and sending countries close their eyes.

Lelio Mármora
IL0 Official
One of the major policy issues in the United States today is the extensive involvement, both legal and illegal, of Latin American workers in the U.S. labor market. Are these workers taking jobs from local labor or do they represent "the latest manifestation of the basic process through which industrial societies man positions at the lower end of their social structures," and is the dependence on foreign workers a fact with which manpower and social policy will have to come to terms. If the forces that affect the supply of and demand for foreign labor are institutionalized and inevitable, then how can the process best be regularized and controlled to the interests of both employers and employees.

In the realm of current labor migration to the United States, the case of the textile workers from Medellín, Colombia is a very small one indeed. Yet that is exactly what makes it comprehensible and highly informative. In this concluding chapter, the case is reviewed, the findings are discussed in the context of existing structural theory, and in terms of the debate issues and assumptions presented in the first section of the report, and, finally, a series of broad policy-relevant conclusions are drawn.
A Review of the Case

The task of this project has been to describe a case where the explicit instruments of United States immigration policy have been ignored, to document how the case is perceived by individuals involved at different vantages, and to reveal the role of indirect policies and practices as factors contributing to the disequilibrium that sets people in motion.

The manufacture of textiles provided the perfect context for the study of a contemporary case of secondary labor market migration. As the first example of modern industrial organization, it epitomizes the structure of the capitalist system. Throughout the world it is a high labor turnover industry that has always needed a large pool from which to draw. The United States historically relied on recurrent flows of immigrants during periods of industrial growth. There has always been immigrant labor in the textile mills. Mill jobs have been stepping stones for countless labor market entrants and have readily been vacated by those who have gained a foothold in the United States labor market.

The constraints endemic to the textile industry affect labor in every way: in wages and benefits, working conditions, employment prac-
tices, and, ultimately, in the prospects for upward mobility. These are not jobs that easily satisfy the minimum standards expected by United States society in the last quarter of the 20th century, and there are safeguards to prevent local labor from being forced to accept what are perceived as less than desirable jobs. In the U.S. context, mill work is assumed when all other avenues are temporarily or permanently closed and rarely as a career tract. There is nothing to give it legitimacy, neither scale, nor training, nor benefits.

The small, competitive New England mills are in a particularly difficult position since they have not only become marginal to the national textile industry, but also have been eclipsed in the region by the electronics boom. There is no question that since textile mill jobs in New England offer less than their competitors, they require a less demanding labor force. The mills depleted every fresh supply of newcomers to the area, and probably thought that the flow would never end. But it did, and by then it was too late for some to make up for generations of omissions in improvements and manpower training.

Colombia could count on high population and urban growth rates to provide labor, but also recognized the need to train technical man-
power and established institutions to do so. The Colombian manpower training programs command considerable respectability; mill jobs are among the finest to be had in Medellín, where textile companies are dominant. Textile operatives are trained to work their way up the occupational ladder; completing courses and moving up the ladder is a matter of pride and achievement.

But Colombian labor policies and practices tend to be overly paternalistic for the enterprising worker, whose ability to set out on an individual path is limited by the effort to set minimum standards for everyone. One of the only ways for more aggressive individuals to achieve their goals is to leave the system.

It is not clear if the first Colombian textile worker just arrived in the United States and began working, or if U.S. employers first went to Colombia in search of skilled labor, but the origins of the network in Lowell are very clear. In that case, a lone worker from one of the early recruited groups of legal immigrants presented himself at the mill gates of one of the more desperate New England textile companies. Within days there were almost a dozen skilled Colombian textile workers picking up the pieces at the Wannalanacit Textile Company. It
hardly seems a coincidence that the Colombians would get a foothold in Lowell at Wannalancit, the company probably most susceptible in its search to resurrect the past.

Even if there had been no chronic textile labor shortages, U.S. employers would have been captivated by the first group of skilled Colombian workers who offered their services. They had all of the characteristics of the immigrant pioneers. Their twenty years of experience would have been sufficient. The fact that they were economic warriors with a staggering sense of mission that made them content to work in less than optimum conditions at the going rate, shift after shift without distraction, was more than a beleaguered employer could refuse. Nothing like this had been seen since the last wave of immigrants began moving out of the mills more than thirty years earlier. But there was more than that. The Colombians enjoyed their work. They brought their sense of legitimacy with them, and that had rarely been seen in the mills of Lowell. In a curious twist of what is developed and less developed, the Colombians were grossly underutilized, but by their own standards the rewards were sufficient for suffering the indignities of the United States textile labor market.
The first Colombian loom fixers and weavers to come to this country were courted and given full documentation for themselves and their families. Then, because of a peculiar lack of commitment in the system, the policy was changed, but not enforced. Less skilled textile workers took advantage of the network set in motion by their more experienced colleagues; they came without proper documentation, and the illegal flow was allowed to continue for almost ten years unchecked. When the restrictive policy was ultimately enforced it was done in a somewhat inconsistent manner. Because they were already here, many were allowed to adjust status, even if they had walked across the border, but not if they had lied to obtain a tourist visa and had failed to make a "timely retraction".

The Colombians generally went to work first at the Wannalancit Textile Company, but eventually there were Antioqueños attending looms in mills throughout Lowell. All of the companies studied depended on the secondary labor market to fulfill their labor needs. The Colombians were the most capable of all applicants, but they became the weakest alternative when the United States changed its position on the certification of immigrant textile labor. Two of the companies shifted emphasis to other members of the secondary labor market, Puerto Ricans, women
and youth, and paid a high price in terms of lost efficiency, but, in the end, Wannalancit paid the highest price of all.

**Implications for the Debate**

What are the specific implications of these findings for the ongoing debate about the nature and function of secondary labor market migration to the United States?

The first issue was whether "push" factors at the point of origin or "pull" factors at the point of destination were most influential in originating and perpetuating the migration. On the sending (supply) side, the assumption was that the Colombian textile industry was dependent on the United States and that labor-displacing technology imported from the U.S. was "pushing" people to work outside of Colombia. This was not the case. The Colombian textile industry is competitive with, rather than dependent on, the United States; North American textile entrepreneurs are not at all involved in Colombia. Some of the problems that plague the textile industry in Colombia are similar to those experienced in the United States, but there are others that have been caused by internal Colombian policies and practices. In this case, there would be
no value in adopting job-creation schemes to keep the workers in Colombia. The immigrants were skilled and employed. This is not an instance of exporting unemployment as is true in other cases. Neither is it a case of U.S. import quotas hurting a developing industry and forcing people to seek employment elsewhere. The Colombians were "pushed" because of the lack of advancement opportunities. They had gone as far as they could within the Colombian textile manufacturing context, and were unable to move into other areas because of their inability to accumulate capital. The supply was ample because of the Colombian emphasis on manpower training.

On the receiving (demand) side, the argument was made that the jobs that the legal and illegal Colombian textile workers were taking were jobs in the so-called secondary sector of a segmented labor market. The assumption made by those who do not believe in the need for new entrants to the United States labor market is that the jobs would be taken by average United States workers if they were made attractive enough and that the presence of less demanding labor deterred efforts to improve the jobs. This case raises grave doubts that, under current conditions, the textile industry in New England could ever be in the position to entice large numbers of long-term workers. Even the mills that have been able
to modernize considerably are still dependent on members of the secondary labor market, such as recent legal immigrants, women and youth. The product cycle theory and the description of the textile industry as a "mature" component of the United States economy cannot explain the chronic labor shortages. It is an industry that has always relied on imported labor and the secondary labor market.

In the end, and not surprisingly, both "push" and "pull" factors were important. The way in which textile labor was protected was paramount at both the sending and receiving ends: in Colombia, the highly protected worker had to leave to break away from his determined fate. In the United States, the lack of protection left the jobs open to the immigrants, but gave the Colombians the freedom they needed to realize their goals.

This case sheds particular light on the hotly-contested debate issue of labor displacement. In the unskilled occupations of the textile industry (shipper/receiver, material handler) there could be job competition if those were the jobs that the Colombians were assuming. Even in the more skilled occupations, such as unifil tender, if a fulltime Colombian were hired when several part-time workers were available, that could
be considered as job competition; that has been shown by Lawrence Manu-
ufacturing's successful program to hire local secondary labor market work-
ers. However, it is very clear in this case that a person, simply by
virtue of being unemployed, is not qualified for the more skilled posi-
tions of loom fixer or weaver. There has been a grave failure to recog-
nize that some of the jobs in light industry which are taken by immi-
grants cannot be assumed by individuals who have no commitment to the
occupation. Dual labor market theory does not point out that there is
stratification even within the secondary sector. The presence of some of
the more skilled workers can actually help to maintain jobs for local
workers at the less skilled levels. Therefore, there can be a benefit in
allowing skilled workers to enter the labor market where there is no
local interest in developing the "human capital".

Two popular assumptions that need to be qualified in this case
are the prevailing views of employers of recent immigrants and illegal
aliens as greedy, exploitative slave drivers, and immigrants as duped,
"cheap" victims. Recognizing full well that there have been and still
are instances where the descriptions are apt, they appear as gross exag-
gerations in this case. The employers were men who were trying to manu-
ufacture textiles in New England long after the conditions for doing so
had entirely changed. The more desperate the company, the more inclined to take advantage of one of the few positive factors that had become available to them, but the companies were not in the business of abusing their employees. They were, after all operating within the structure of an often exploitative, capitalistic system.

The workers were not "cheap"; they were all paid slightly more than the union rate, and the most experienced were paid quite well for an otherwise low-wage industry. The Colombians may have been less demanding, but they were not at all stupid. They recognized full well when their eagerness was being exploited, and were also able to take advantage of the system. They were skilled craftsmen, highly valued at least by their employers, if not by the public at large. It is definitely true, however, that the method for their recruitment and employment was less than ideal for all concerned.

That brings the discussion to the final debate issue, which is that of temporary guest worker programs. The assumptions here are the same: if the pay is good and the working conditions are decent, local labor will take the jobs. The findings of this project do not support that assumption, because it ignores almost the entire context that makes
the jobs less desirable. All occupations in the United States economy are not going to be attractive to all people all the time. Until such a time, and while there are protective provisions for unemployment, as well there should be, this country will have vacancies in the secondary sector. The only way to prove this contention, of course, is to make the jobs available, and then watch and see if thousands of unemployed people do or do not flock to them. The evidence from dismal programs attempting to do just that is discouraging for all the reasons already discussed.

If it were established that, similar to this case, there were a need for a level of skilled secondary labor market workers, who were available in other countries, and whose presence in U.S. manufacturing could maintain jobs for the real local secondary sector labor market, then perhaps those workers should be allowed to come. There is a provision for that type of migration in United States immigration policy, but it is very weak relative to other categories of applicants. The preferred mechanism for that type of migration is through legal immigration for the worker and his immediate family; admit the need for skilled workers and accept the full responsibility. A poor second, but still preferable to what has been happening over the past fifteen years, would be to issue temporary visas, again for the whole family and with full legal
rights, for periods of three to five years. The visas would be renew-
able, but overstayers would not be allowed to adjust status. Again the
need for manpower would be officially recognized, and people such as the
Colombian textile workers would be welcomed as craftspeople with a skill
to offer this country, rather than being allowed to wash up on a beach in
the dead of night, paying the full cost and living as fugitives. One
need only look at the comparative experiences of the primer enganche and
those who came later to see that even the limited H2 visa program worked
better in this case than did the confusion that replaced it.

Conclusions

The policy implications that emanate from this study are clear.
It will be difficult to reform or control the immigration of people who
come to the United States to work without a general understanding and
consensus of what the nation's labor needs actually are. Current immigra-
tion policy is not consistent with the labor requirements of the United
States economic system, particularly in the more traditional sectors.
There is still no satisfactory explanation in economic theory that helps
policy-makers understand why this country cannot put all its people to
work, but can accommodate millions of illegal aliens. In theory we say
that we do not need new secondary labor market workers, but in practice we let them come anyway. Pending legislation will fail to affect major improvements unless this issue is resolved.

Based on the findings of this study, if the United States wants to support a textile industry (at least in New England) it will need to continuously replenish the labor supply; it is not a static labor market; people do move out of it. This case supports the notion of intergenerational shift, most of the Colombian worker's children did not continue in textiles. Furthermore, demographic and social changes in the United States will make it increasingly difficult to find women and youth to fill secondary labor market jobs.

As far as the specific provisions of the new immigration policy are concerned, the findings would argue against employer sanctions if it is the employer who must decide if an applicant's credentials are valid. Only at Wannalancit did the employer do the actual hiring. In the other two companies, hiring was done by well-intentioned personnel staff who would be totally miscast as INS investigators. They are fully occupied with the business of keeping positions filled in a high turnover industry and would be hardpressed to distinguish between a legal Puerto Rican and
an equally convincing Dominican, or even an enthusiastic Colombian. A more inappropriate place to put the onus of policy enforcement could not be found, and it would be hard not to envision discrimination against Hispanic applicants as one recourse from this untenable situation. A legal worker identification card may be helpful, but only if it actually were tamper-resistent and used with all the indicated precautions. If the employer need only report the ID numbers of all new hires to the Labor Department and the burden of proof were to rest with that department, then the employer should be fined for not reporting all new hires.

The new legislation does shift the emphasis of U.S. immigration policy slightly toward independent or "seed" immigrants, and does have provisions for temporary worker programs. The textile workers from Medellín were excellent "seed" immigrants as the primer enganche has shown, and that is precisely the way they should be allowed into the United States. If the worldwide and country ceilings were raised, as intended, and the relative numbers for family reunification decreased somewhat, it would be possible for more of these people to be admitted. If not, the use of temporary programs for skilled workers in some manufacturing and other sectors might be explored further.
Even with the understanding that policy can only provide general guidelines to be effective, it is not too specific to recognize the different needs of different sectors of the economy and even different regions of the country. The textile company employer in New England has little in common with the lettuce grower in California or the restaurateur in New York City, but he does have a lot in common with the shoe manufacturer and a number of other employers in low technology manufacturing. He needs at least some employees who are either skilled in the trade or willing to invest the time to learn the skills in less than glamorous work; an experienced loom fixer is neither a physician nor an unskilled farm worker. Policy distinctions must be made.

Finally, it can only be agreed that once the convictions of United States immigration policy are determined they should be enforced. The thesis of this project has been that the underlying structure propels the migration, and that people can only be expected to do what is in their best interests, even when the activity is clearly restricted. The policy would be easier to enforce if it were designed with full knowledge of the context in which the migration is taking place. Short of that ideal situation it bears pointing out that the current policy of non-enforcement exposes a high tolerance in the United States for waiving
rules and accepting the human factor, which is among this country's best and worst features. On the one hand, the permissiveness allows for ample latitude in interpretation and avoids hasty judgements. On the other hand, it allows abuses to go unchecked, and permits too much arbitrariness and ambiguity.

In the case of the Colombian textile workers in New England, the lack of policy commitment allowed the employers to continue with a tenuous labor force, and the immigrant network to flourish underground. This is a society that may need a constant supply of newcomers to do its less attractive work, but it is not a society that should allow those individuals to offer their service with fewer rights than any other participant in the labor force.
Epilogue

Several years after closing, the Wannalancit Textile Company mill facilities were almost predictably reopened as the "Wannalancit Office and Technology Center." Gone were the looms, the noise and the dust; replaced by a trendy decor of exposed brick, geometric rugs on shining hardwood floors, and lacy potted plants.

There is little to remind a casual visitor of the long period in history when these expansive buildings meant all the world to the men and women who were determined to succeed at all costs within their walls. They were people like the sturdy, greying man, who worked long hours with pride and dignity so that his children would know a different future, and so that one of his sons would even graduate from the same distinguished prep school as the neighboring textile company's President, the son of a long-established New England family.

One does not have to travel too widely to recognize what an extraordinary statement that is about the United States. Despite all its' faults, that is why people throughout the world still want to come to this country. If immigration policy is handled with the attention and wisdom it requires, those opportunities will never be lost to future generations of newcomers.
NOTES

Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Objectives

1. The Colombian case was selected in the following manner. I had written a paper on policy prescription vs. policy implementation using the case of Haitian sugar cane cutters in the Dominican Republic (Glaessel-Brown, 1979), and hypothesized that similar contradictions were functioning along the Caribbean-United States route.

I began work on the research proposal by going to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Boston and asking where Hispanics were employed in New England. As anticipated, the INS knew precisely where different groups were working throughout the area, including a fair estimate of their numbers, which employers hired them (knowingly or unknowingly), where they lived, and a good deal about their lifestyle.

The Colombian case was chosen over other available situations because it was an example of skilled labor migration, the flow was of fairly recent origin so that there was a possibility of tracing its inception and the numbers were relatively manageable, and, finally, because I was warned against prying into some groups that were heavily involved in drug traffic.
Chapter 2 - THE RESEARCH

Methodology

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

1960s Cohort
  ↓
PRIMER ENGANCHE

(Interviewed in Lowell, Pawtucket, Miami, Medellín and by telephone, 1977-1983)

↓
Total - 19

1976 visa application group
  6
  ↓
RETURNEES

(Interviewed in Medellín, Summer 1979, Spring 1980 and by assistant in January 1984)

↓
Total - 7

1970s Cohort
  ↓
WORKING IN LOWELL

(Randomly selected and interviewed in Lowell mills, June 1979)

↓
Total - 18

1980s Cohort
  ↓
NEW RECRUITS

(Interviewed in Medellín, August 1979 and by assistant in January 1984)

↓
Total - 17

visa application group
  7
  ↓
other*
  4

*1 Cadillac Mills recruit, 1 other H2 visa holder, 2 second generation
2. The initial work for the project began with several exploratory visits to one of the textile mills in Lowell shortly after isolating the Colombian case in mid-1976. After a two-year leave of absence, the research proposal was written, based on informal interviews with the mill owner, the leader of the Colombian community, and the New England area INS investigator.

It was not until late April of 1979 that the fieldwork actually began. I selected the four textile companies, interviewed two executives in each and began the laborious data collection from employee records in each mill. A considerable amount of time was spent in company offices collecting this information, but the time was well spent in gaining rapport with employees as well as an insight into the daily operations and practices of each firm.

The possibility of tracing the origins of the Colombian network to Lowell became apparent during the first visit in 1976. Although widely-dispersed, the group had remained in contact and interviews with members of the primer enganche, the pre-1970s cohort, were done whenever possible throughout the period of fieldwork. In June of 1979, I did the oral history interviews with the random sample of Colombian immigrant workers (who arrived after 1970) in their place of employment. Their cooperation was exceptional. One set of interviews had to be done right next to the weave room during the 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. shift as this was when all the Colombian employees in that plant worked. The first interviewee had just come off the afternoon shift at one of the other factories and, with painfully bloodshot eyes, gave an excellent two-hour interview.

Interviews with other industry and government key informants in Lowell and Boston were scheduled intermittently during the first phase of fieldwork in Lowell.

The first phase of Colombian fieldwork began during the summer of 1979. Most of the time was spent in Medellín, but while in Bogotá, I enjoyed an informal affiliation with the demographic research organization, the Corporación Centro Regional de Población (CCRP).

In Colombia the fieldwork included key informant and immigrant interviews only. Because I was not collecting employee data, I was able to complete more interviews than in the United States. For the key informant list I selected institutions and individuals who were
counterparts of those already interviewed or scheduled to be inter-viewed in the States. There were, however, some institutions in Colombia (SENA, CONFAMA) that have no U.S. counterparts, yet play a major role in the lives of Colombian workers.

The interesting pattern of cohort groups that surfaced in Lowell, became even more intriguing in Medellín. The leader of the returned workers happened to be organizing a group of twenty new immigrants for one of the Lowell employers, thus adding the "1980s new re-recruits" cohort.

Finally, I toured several of the Coltejer plants, as I had done in each of the Lowell companies. (On one occasion I shared the visitor's pass with the fellow who was recruiting workers for Lowell, one of the long-term Coltejer workers who had his bags packed, and the very distinguished, and slightly suspicious Director of Public Relations.)

Clearly, during the first six months of data collection, I received tremendous cooperation, which I attribute to sincere interest in the research topic, and good luck.

The officials in all Lowell textile companies readily gave their permission to conduct the study in the factories, in spite of the fact that I promised no tangible benefits in return for cooperation. In most all cases all the records were made available and in three mills I was able to meet with the Colombian workers, none of whom refused to be interviewed.

The companies in Lowell are generally more concerned about intra-industry competition than they are about the Immigration and Naturalization Service, yet nothing I asked was denied. (Although some of the more sensitive data were accompanied with strong admonitions for discretion.) Coltejer is so big that they are not particularly concerned about the competition and keep few secrets.

This is not to say that there were no uncomfortable moments. After spending a week burrowing through company files in one of the factories that depends on Colombian labor, I was informed in a Boston interview that a raid on that factory was imminent. After considerable thought I took the research policy position to let nature, or history, take its course and assume the role of independent ob-
server. The raid fortunately occurred after I had finished almost all of the Lowell fieldwork and, although I was quite sure that management would allow the study to continue, I was amazed on subsequent trips that I had not lost the confianza of the workers. I tried to frankly explain the project to each informant, while not sharing any information between individuals or organizations.

In Medellín, the U.S. Consul, who was very enthusiastic about the study as a recipient of State Department memos reminding him of the number of Disney World visitors who end up in the mills, offered to arrange several high level interviews. This was a tremendous help. The leader of returnees most efficiently organized all the immigrant interviews for me (even offering to get former Lowell workers back from Venezuela for an interview), as well as arranging the Coltejer plant tours. My guess is that he never could quite believe that I did not work for a U.S. textile company.

During the second six-month phase of fieldwork in early 1980, I made periodic visits to Lowell to renew contacts and assess the changes that had occurred during the intervening five months. There had been many in this highly unstable and unpredictable industry. Two companies had developed serious difficulties, while the other two were thriving. They had all experienced massive employee turnover.

Then came a very long and tedious period of coding and processing the employee record data, which also involved several trips to Lowell to locate missing information. All computer runs were completed before we began travelling again.

Several months prior to beginning a second leave of absence we stopped in Washington, enroute to Colombia, to consult with key informants in government and industry and in Miami to interview several members of the primer enganche presently living in that city.

In Colombia I was able to amplify the data collection considerably. I added Fabricato and Tejiendor to the study (interviewing officials, touring the mills, etc.), contacted some workers who had been in Venezuela during my previous trip, expanded the list of key informants, and returned to many of my former contacts to clarify information. As in the U.S. case, many things had changed in the intervening months. A second look at the situation of the returned
migrants proved to be particularly enlightening. Individuals previously contacted remained loyal, and new informants were universally helpful. Fabricato and Tejicóndor were as gracious as Coltejer had been on the first trip; government officials were busy, but available (perhaps curious). Unfortunately, I was not able to interview the deportees from Lowell as planned. Not one of them had returned to Colombia, even four months after the mandatory departure date. (Later I discovered that most of them had not even left Lowell.)

Although there was a considerable delay between the fieldwork and writeup phases of the project, that made it possible to take the long view of a contemporary issue that has been continually unfolding. It eliminated some of the guesswork, such as the predicted closing of the Wannalancit Textile Company. The questions associated with Latin American labor migration to the United States are not much closer to being answered than they were in 1976.
Chapter 3 - DESTINATION AND ORIGIN

The Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy

1. The interface of Europeans and American Indians has been described as the "most painful of divisions in America's multiethnic society." (Marzio:23) Instead of increasing, as it normally would, the native population was decimated by half during the next three centuries and is only now, in the second half of the 20th century, reaching the pre-discovery numbers.

2. Part of the Alien and Sedition Laws, the Alien Act empowered the President to deport resident aliens suspected of engaging in subversive activities. It was unpopular, never actively invoked, and allowed to expire after two years.

Population and Development in Colombia

3. In an area that is expected to double its population by the year 2000, Colombia is one of only a handful of countries with high growth rates (Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela) that have managed to control population growth.
Chapter 4 - THE TEXTILE CITIES AND THE MILLS

Lowell, Massachusetts

1. In 1978 DAVISON'S TEXTILE BLUE BOOK listed fifteen "mills, dyers and finishers" in Lowell, Massachusetts. (Ames Manufacturing, Lawrence Manufacturing and Synthetic Yarns are listed separately.) Some companies had fewer than ten employees, and the only other larger mill, Pellon Corporation, produced nonwoven textiles. Thus, the four companies included in the study covered the field as destinations for loom fixers and weavers.

2. Edward Stevens relates an interesting story about foreign competition.

We had a mill up in Maine where we made a very special product that was a top-dyed yarn for men's and women's sweaters... Our biggest customer then was the Villager, and they had all these heathers... and we had skirt and sweater matchings with these heathers. (The buyer) came up to our lab and put all these colors together on a pad, and said, 'That's going to be my persimmon number 24.' That was in August, and by the time we got producing on the thing it was October or November. Anyway, at Christmastime I said to one of my salesmen, 'How about getting a persimmon skirt and sweater combination for my wife for Christmas.' So he did. And he said, 'Would you like two sweaters?' and I said, 'Sure, We'll have a cable as well as a regular.'

When she opened up the box at Christmastime, the regular sweater was O.K. and the skirt was O.K., but the cable sweater was made in Hong Kong! They just send the colors to Hong Kong, match them and make them up, and make these cable sweaters which are the more expensive ones and (take) more hand labor.

That was the first time that I really realized how fast exporters from other countries can move and penetrate markets here... because we really thought we were special with (the heathers).
Medellín, Antioquia

3. Ardila Lulle is not an Antioqueño, and a real anomaly in a region that prides itself in keeping industry in the hands of native sons. That is one of the main reasons that there is so little foreign investment in Medellín; Antioqueños generally prefer not to accept outside investment to retain control of local industry.

A Comparative Profile of Textile Labor

4. In the Introduction to the LOWELL OFFERING, Benita Eisler writes,

... the Boston Associates resolved to create a labor force that would be a shining example of those ultimate Yankee ideals: profit and virtue, doing good and doing well. This they accomplished for more than a generation by attracting a special class of temporary help. From the farms of Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine came robust young women, lured by the highest wages offered to female employees anywhere in America - from $1.85 to $3.00 a week... This seemingly generous scale represented a considerable saving for the mill owners, since male mill workers were paid twice as much. However, ...the Boston Associates had established the existence of women as wage earners, an economic force to be reckoned with and a phenomenon new to American society.

Later Eisler notes,

Whether they left the mills for health or husbands, in protest, or with the certainty of better jobs elsewhere, by the beginning of the Civil War the presence of the Yankee farm girls was mere memory. Of 7,000 women operatives in 1836, less than 4 percent were foreign-born. By 1860, 61.8 percent of Lowell's work force were immigrants, almost half... were Irish. The first generation of Lowell mill workers, the farm girls) was also the last WASP labor force in America.
Chapter 5 - EL PRIMERO ENGANCHE (The First Hook)

The First Years

1. Although twenty labor certifications had been obtained by the Ponema Company, the primer enganche in this section refers to nineteen loom fixers. The twentieth visa was given to Fabio's brother-in-law, Oscar Bustamante, who was a manager with a leather company in Medellín. Oscar worked as a manager for Ponema for a few years and then moved to Puerto Rico where he has lived ever since as owner of his late father's gift shop.

2. While bringing the families to the United States was generally a carefully orchestrated procedure, for Rubén,

   That was another thing I did without really wanting to. One day I took a fellow to Immigration. Nothing more than to get him a month's extension. He got in line, and I stood against a wall watching, when I noticed a large form that said, 'If you want to solicit your family, fill out this form.' While he was standing in line I started to fill out the form. I left it there; never gave it to anybody. Then we left and I forgot about it. About three or four months later I got a letter that said I had to go to Immigration as soon as possible to meet some other requirements. The girl said that I had to sign the form. They had sent it back from Bogota for my signature.

   Accepting as ever, Rubén wrote to Colombia and began to send money for the trips to Bogota to get the papers. All seven family members received them immediately. Then Rubén warned,

   Don't come until I have a house because I don't have any room; I live in a small room. On Saturday I came home and found the oldest boys sitting on their suitcases by the door waiting for me. 'Mama said to come.'
Then they followed the pattern. The two boys worked, one with Rubén and the other in an aluminum factory, until they could bring the rest of the family.

3. There is a possible "Foreign Legion" effect in the divorce/separation figures. Some men in troubled marriages may have welcomed the idea of leaving the country. One man has established two households in the United States; both wives are Colombian.
The Mills Respond to Labor Shortages

1. The following are the shifts and hours available at each of the four mills:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Joan</th>
<th>Lawrence</th>
<th>Synthetic Yarns</th>
<th>Wannalancit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knitting</td>
<td>Dye House</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>6 am-2 pm</td>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>7-3</td>
<td>6 am-2 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>2 pm-10 pm</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td>2 pm-10 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>10 pm-6 am</td>
<td>8-6</td>
<td>11-7</td>
<td>10 pm-6 am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7:30 am-3:30 pm</td>
<td>7 am-3:30 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8:00 am-4:00 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6:00 am-2:00 pm (or 5:00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 pm-8 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 pm-10 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employee Record Survey (1960-1979)

2. When the data were collected in 1979, some of the employees were no longer with the mills (inactive), and others were still "active." The following is a breakdown of cases for each mill:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joan Fabrics</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Mfg.</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic Yarns</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wannalancit</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>471</strong></td>
<td><strong>487</strong></td>
<td><strong>958</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. It was possible to verify the accuracy of the surname tabulations in the crosstabs. Three of the workers with Portuguese surnames were Brazilians, one person with an Anglo surname was born in Canada, and a couple of "New Englanders" had Spanish (probably married) surnames. Otherwise the results of the tabulation indicated what one would expect, i.e., Portuguese - surnamed individuals were from Portugal.
Working in Lowell

4. I had planned to interview one of the Colombians at Synthetic Yarns (there were none at Lawrence Manufacturing at the time), but the company had recently begun discussions with the INS regarding their undocumented workers, felt that they were in a sensitive situation, and preferred that I wait until those talks were over. I went to Colombia, and it was only six months later that I could have done the interview. That seemed like too long an interval to add only one more interview, and I felt that the ones I had were representative enough.

The workers were interviewed by the author in the mills, either before or after their regular shifts. The interview schedule is shown as Appendix IB1; nine of the interviews were recorded in full. They varied in length from one to two hours. No one refused to be interviewed; on the contrary, the respondents were extraordinarily cooperative. The interviews took place between the 13th and 21st of June 1979.

Waiting in Medellín: Returnees and Aspirants

5. Only the 1976 returnees are included in the thesis because members from the 1979 group did not return until after the field work was completed; during the summer of 1979 they still had several months left on their extensions; by the Spring of 1980 they were still in the States. By the end of 1980, however, Wannalancit reported thirteen more workers in Colombia waiting for papers (a total of twenty-five). I did see and interview one member of the 1979 application group (not one who had gone to court), but he had been in Medellín for such a short time that he had very little to report.

6. All of the returnees were born in the Department of Antioquia between thirty-four and forty-six years before the interview. Five left school after the fifth grade; one started and one finished bachillerato (eleventh grade). All but one were married and had between one and eight children; all had between nine and thirty-two years of textile experience, all but two had more than twenty-four years, generally with the same company, before going to the United States. None had worked in another Colombian city, but one had gone to Ecuador and another to Nicaragua to work in textile mills. In this particular group of seven, all flew to the United States and all overstayed tourist visas; their arrival dates were between early 1970 and early
1976. Finally, all of them had worked at Wannalancit for all or part of the one to six years they had been in the United States.

7. Héctor L. related the following in his interview:

In 1973... a manager from the Stevens Company in South Carolina... came here. He came with an assistant, a Colombian guy who had been a U.S. citizen for ten years. He was helping the company to engage char weavers, loom fixers and some spinners. I don't know how, but somehow they got visas... The manager talked with us, took all the information and we quickly got the visas... We went legally with a contract for two years... There were ten of us. We were the first and the last also... because we were taken with the objective of doing an apprenticeship to later work in a mill they were going to open here (in Medellín)... But that wasn't true... Those of us who went knew absolutely nothing, but that was the means that the company's assistant used.

I worked for that company for two years... I should have returned then, but I stayed and worked for different mills all over South Carolina for two-and-a-half more years, until December of 1977.

Well, I'll tell you frankly... in the place where I worked there was a woman who fell in love with me... The man who had assisted the company to get me there told me that I could get my resident visa if I married her. I said that I couldn't do that because I was already married in my own country, right?... but when one travels from one country to another and doesn't know the language, so I let myself be guided by him... So I did it... with the understanding that she would help me get my papers. She made a million promises.

When it came time to get the papers, she said, 'No more, no more letters, no more South America,' that I was hers, and that I had to forget about my country. But I couldn't do that; that wasn't the agreement. She changed her mind after we were married and didn't want to leave me.
Then the problems started... I would go to work for one company or another. They liked my work. But what would happen? That woman would come and find me... She knew someone on the Highway Patrol and she would find my car in the mill parking lot... So that is why I changed jobs a lot, because wherever I was working, she would come and cause problems and I would lose my job. In the end, I sold the car and I worked a year-and-a-half without problems.
The Constraints of Maturity

1. Ted Larter voiced unabashed sentiment as an element of his motivations, and went on to describe a thoroughly traditional workplace.

   My father started the mill in 1929. He had three thousand dollars and six looms. And '29 was the damnest time to start in the textile business. He started weaving. He did everything himself and put together what we've got here now. I mean, I've got the easy job; all I've got to do is run it. He built it.

   My father was like me, in a way, or maybe I'm a little bit like him. You can only do what you want to do and you'll never be able to do what you don't want to do. He wanted to do, so Christ he did it... So that's why we're still in business today. Because I'm too goddamn stubborn to lay down. My father tried to get me interested in textiles and he sort of gave me a mandate that I was going to come down here in the summer and work. Well, I'll tell you that that was one of the most difficult situations for both (of us) because I didn't want to come. I wanted to work on a farm. I'm a farmer at heart.

   On the Fourth of July of 1957, I got hit by lightning when my Dad died. When all of a sudden I finally realized what made the world tick... You don't know what it is to be foot loose, fancy free, sort of do what you want... And then all of a sudden somebody throws something like this place right at you. All right, buddy boy, it's yours now. You carry it. And you don't know the first damn thing in the world about it. Nothing. I didn't know the difference between a warp thread and a pick. That is as basic as you can get. I came in here the following day, walked around the mill, introduced myself to every-
body and automatically they immediately put you to
the test. If you are not accepted, no way are you
accepted as their leader.

There was no question about who was going to take
over. Well, I thought about it and I said to myself,
You know, there's two ways I can go in there: like a
tiger and tell everybody what's going to be, or go in
there and keep my mouth shut and ask each person to
show me what they know.' And I did that... I went
through to everybody in this mill; I didn't miss one.
I wanted to know everybody by their first name. I
wanted them to know me. I wanted them to come to see
me if there was anything ever bothering them... We
had a few tough moments here and there...And then
after I saw a little bit about how they did it, I
went up in the attic and got a carcass of a loom; a
loom that had been stripped. Everything was gone off
it except just the frame. I brought it downstairs.
You see, the test of all of this learning process is
to see if you can weave a piece of cloth... If you
can weave a piece of cloth, you've made it...

I took this old loom down near the front door. And
all it was was the two side frames, cross girts;
didn't even have a lay in it, didn't even have arches
on it, and I started scavenging parts from the
parts bin myself - no-one helped me - and I started
putting this loom together... I put it right near
the time clock so that all shifts coming and going
could see the progress if anybody cared to see it.
They were almost betting on me after a while, I
didn't realize it at the time, as to whether the old
man would make it, you see. Now you know that was
twenty years ago and I must have been twenty-five
years old... Well, I started working on that loom
and piece by piece it started going down and finally
the grand old day came when I turned on the power and
let the goddam thing run. And you want to know some-
thing? It ran. And I have never felt so proud in my
life as I did that day when I started that loom. I
still have that loom out here. I'll never get rid of
it. I still have it and I go up and look at it every once in a while... You know everybody was so happy to see it run too And from that time on I never had any trouble with anybody. Well, I shouldn't say that.

2. Burlington Mills had a forty-nine percent interest in Pantex at one time, but was bought out by Fabricato when they acquired the company. The main foreign presence in Medellín is the forty-nine percent Dutch interest in Enka, Colombia's leading synthetic fiber producer. Dupont sells patent information to Polímeros, but has no direct investment in Coltejer; a twenty-five year investment by United Merchants in Polímeros was bought out in 1975, leaving a technical assistance arrangement only.

It is ironic that the antecedents of severe import competition from the Far East began with the U.S. chemical company-assisted establishment of man-made fiber production in Hong Kong in the early 1950s.

3. Parker does mention the addition of knit goods to cotton production at Lawrence Manufacturing in 1864, and the advent of the rayon-producing Wannalancit Textile Company in a building vacated by the cotton-producing Appleton Company in 1929. "A good labor supply" and "quick access to the New York market" were mentioned as the "chief advantages which Lowell offers these companies." (Parker, 1940: 191.)

4. In Colombia, loom fixers are paid by categories. A newcomer has to go up the ladder until he gets to the first position, which is experimental loom fixer. Here any loom fixer earns five dollars an hour (1978). But (in Colombia) there are loom fixers who earn more than others doing the same job, but they have more experience. They've been doing the work for years. The ladder is according to exams that are given by inspectors. Each mechanic is given a section and he is checked. He gets points according to how well the looms are maintained, and if he doesn't get bad points, he goes up the ladder. (Jaime)
The Problems of Youth

5. The United States had begun to drop its production and exports of textile machinery by this time. From 1976 to 1979, the U.S. went from a 32.8 percent market share of imports to Colombia to 8.3 percent. Switzerland went from 11.9 percent to 45.1 percent of the market share during the same period. (U.S. Embassy, "Size of the Import Market for Textile Equipment in Colombia 1976-1979," unpublished Table, Bogotá, 1980.)

6. Coltejer had purchased machinery through the World Bank and the IBRD for a number of years, but was not doing so for its major capital development program in the late 1970s. Bank policy restricted the amount of money that could be borrowed in order to remain a lender for smaller establishments. Coltejer, because of its size and prominence as an exporter, maintains credit lines with four or five U.S. banks, including the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Bank of America.
Chapter 8 - LABOR

The Worker in Colombia

1. A wonderful man who had been a Coltejer employee for many years described this situation.

We had a recession in '74-'75 during which 42 percent of our looms were stopped. Of course, no one was let go... We gave them other activities and provided cultural programs. We would bring them into the theater and give them classes, concerts. There was no work to give them, so we had to develop a series of programs to keep them busy.

2. The Coltejer collective convention booklet for 1978-1980 lists very explicit performance incentive and review mechanisms. Every six months each worker is evaluated and moved along one of the career curves according to an elaborate point system based on the six previous evaluations. Workers are judged on the basis of job performance (competence, efficiency, quality, etc.) and personal performance (punctuality, attitude, etc.).

There is also a very clear table that lists thirty offenses, the number of times they will be tolerated, and the corresponding sanctions. For example, falsifying documents in order to be hired, damaging equipment or fabric by leaving machinery unattended, theft, and espionage or sabotage are grounds for immediate dismissal; absenteeism is met with written warnings four times and dismissal for the fifth offense; fighting, wasting time or being away from the job for more than 1/2 hour, and endangering other workers prompt a written notice, a warning and then dismissal.
Textile Labor in the United States

3. The twenty-year struggle with J. P. Stevens has become the symbol of the tensions between union organizers and an industry that is very different from the automobile or steel industries. The author is unfamiliar with the situation in the South, but it is very hard to see malicious intent in the surviving Lowell mills. They are not bad places to work and management is far from insensitive. Even at Wannalancit, where a half-hour lunch was not included in the eight-hour payday, where overtime pay was calculated at the end of forty instead of eight hours, and where the yarn residue hung from the looms, there was an esprit d'corps that would baffle union organizers.

The Consequences of the Transfer

4. Some Colombian textile workers have been recruited by Colombian entrepreneurs who operate mills in Venezuela. Others just go legally and illegally to fill a tremendous need for trained workers. The case is not unlike that of the United States textile worker network, but the numbers are much greater because of Venezuela's proximity and shared language. Estimates for 1979 ranged from a low of 500,000 to a high of 1 million illegal Colombian immigrants living in Venezuela. Cardona et. al., EL EXODO DE COLOMBIANOS (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1978, 51.)
Chapter 9 - IMMIGRATION

Procedures and the Real World

1. In general, the categories include people who have:

- a contagious disease, such as tuberculosis
- suffered a serious mental disorder
- a criminal record
- a drug addiction or have been involved in the traffic of drugs
- been deported from the United States
- tried to obtain a visa through fraudulent means
- been or are a member of certain organizations, such as a communist organization.

There are always exceptions, and waivers can be obtained.

2. Schedule A includes applicants in four occupational groups: (1) advanced degree holders in dietetics and physical therapy; (2) teachers and others with exceptional ability in the arts and sciences, but not in the performing arts; (3) those intending to follow a religious occupation; and (4) managers and executives with international corporations.

Schedule B lists occupations individually, but they can be grouped to include: assemblers, attendants, all restaurant, hotel and bar workers, all domestic help and groundskeepers, cashiers, keypunch operators, laborers in all sectors, material handlers, all types of hands, packers, aides, and drivers, lesser skilled typists, and sales personnel.

Exceptions can be made here, as well.
Enforcement

3. The immigrant visa Consul continued,

There's no way that you can move a man out of turn. It would certainly be quite unfair if, in fact, because of the discretionary power that we have you could say 'Well, this guy, move him to the head of the line, even though he's way back.' I mean it's quite unfair to the people who have been waiting a bit longer, and the law doesn't permit us to do it anyway... If the person's ineligible for a visa, again, it's a matter of the law. It's not a matter of getting the letter in from some congressman, or a couple of congressmen. That doesn't really change things.
APPENDIX I

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

A. Employee Record Card

B. Colombian Immigrant Interview Schedules
   1. Working in Lowell
   2. Returnee in Medellín
**Employee Cohort Card**

**Card Number**

**Date of data collection** —/—/79

**Establishment** /_

**Social Security No.** ——

**Employee Number**

**Sex**
- Male 1
- Female 2

**Date of birth** —/—/___

**Place of birth**

**Marital status**
- Single 1
- Married 2
- Separated 3
- Divorced 4

**Number of dependents** 0

**Citizenship**
- U.S. 1
- Colombian 2
- Dominican 3
- Other 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. (con't)</th>
<th>10. Job category at hiring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. If other than #1, type of visa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— H2 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Pref. Imm. 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 11. Job title and history: |
| a. At hiring |
| b. Change —/—/88 |
| Date —/—/88 |
| Mo Yr 8888 |
| 9999 |
| c. Change —/—/88 |
| Date —/—/88 |
| Mo Yr 8888 |
| 9999 |
| d. Change —/—/88 |
| Date —/—/88 |
| Mo Yr 8888 |
| 9999 |
| e. Change —/—/88 |
| Date —/—/88 |
| Mo Yr 8888 |
| 9999 |

**Employer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>——</td>
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<td>—/—/88</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Starting date** —/—/___

**Termination date** —/—/88

**Reason for termination**
- Leave of absence 1
- Layoff 2
- Discharge 3
- Retirement 4
- Resignation 5
- Death 6
- Other 7

**Still employed** 8

**Still employed** 8
ESTUDIO DE TRABAJADORES LATINO AMERICANOS 
EN LA INDUSTRIA DE NEW ENGLAND 

Trabajadores Colombianos de Textiles

Estimado Sr./Sra:

Usted ha sido escogido (a) al azar entre 50 personas para realizar una entrevista. Esta forma parte de un estudio que se está haciendo para comprender mejor el papel de los trabajadores hispanos en la industria de New England. Su cooperación es muy importante para el buen resultado del estudio.

Su nombre no aparecerá en ninguna parte del cuestionario y sus respuestas serán absolutamente confidenciales. Aunque su patrón está enterado del estudio, nadie en esta fábrica, ni en ningún otro lugar leerá este cuestionario ni las respuestas individuales. Usted puede rehusar contestar cualquier pregunta, pero, por favor, aquellas preguntas que conteste hagalo con la mayor exactitud posible.

¿Tiene usted alguna pregunta?

¿Está usted de acuerdo con ser entrevistado?

De acuerdo ( ) Número de la entrevista _______
Fecha_____________________

Rehusa ( ) Fábrica_____________________
1. ¿Puede usted decirme qué clase de trabajo desempeña en esta fábrica?

____________________________

Clase de trabajo

____________________________

a. ¿Cuántos talleres (hiladoras, etc.) maneja usted por sección?

____________________________

2. ¿Cuándo empezó usted a trabajar en esta empresa?

___________________________   _________________________

Fecha                      Años/Meses

Ahora quisiera saber algo acerca de su vida en Colombia antes de llegar a los EE.UU.

3. ¿Donde nació usted?

___________________________   _________________________

Ciudad/Pueblo               Departamento

4. ¿Hasta qué año cursó usted sus estudios?

____________________________

5. ¿Ha tenido usted un entrenamiento técnico?

1. Sí     2. No

a. ¿Dónde?

___________________________   _________________________

Centro/Escuela               Lugar
b. ¿Podría describirme un poco los cursos que usted realizó?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curso</th>
<th>Fecha</th>
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</table>

c. ¿Había que pagar por los cursos?

1. Sí  2. No

¿Quién pagó?

6. ¿Cursó la mayor parte de sus estudios en establecimientos públicos o privados?

1. Públicos  2. Privados

7. ¿Ha hecho usted algunos estudios en los EE.UU.?

1. Sí  2. No

a. ¿Qué tipo de estudios?

b. ¿Dónde?

8. ¿Cuál es la ocupación actual de sus padres?

Padre

Madre
9. ¿Hasta qué año cursaron ellos sus estudios?

Padre

Madre

10. ¿Tiene usted hermanos?

1. Sí

a. ¿Cuántos?

b. ¿Qué clase de trabajo desempeñan sus hermanos?

11. ¿Tiene usted otros familiares que trabajen en textiles?

1. Sí

a. ¿Quiénes?

12. ¿Cuál fue su primer trabajo después de terminar sus estudios?

Clase de trabajo al comenzar (calificación)

Lugar de trabajo

a. ¿Cuánto tiempo trabajó allí?

Años/Meses

b. Por qué razón dejó usted ese trabajo?
c. ¿Qué clase de trabajo desempeñó usted al dejar este trabajo?

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<th>Lugar</th>
<th>Clase de trabajo</th>
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<th>Razón por la cual dejó el trabajo</th>
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13. ¿Si usted desempeñó otros trabajos en Colombia podría contarme algo acerca de ellos?

14. ¿Ha vivido usted en algun otro sitio en Colombia que no ha mencionado hasta ahora?

1. Sí   2. No

a. ¿Dónde?

15. ¿Ha trabajado usted en algún otro país fuera de Colombia y los EE. UU.?

1. Sí   2. No

a. ¿Qué hizo usted allí?

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<th>País</th>
<th>Clase de Trabajo</th>
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16. ¿Dónde residía usted cuando decidió emigrar a los EE. UU.?

Ciudad/Pueblo       Departamento       País

17. ¿Estaba usted casado antes de salir de Colombia?

1. Sí
   a. Cuál era su estado civil?

2. No

18. ¿Tenía usted hijos?

1. Sí
   a. ¿Cuántos?

2. No
   a. ¿Qué edades tenían ellos?

Fecha de Nacimiento

Ahora quisiera saber qué hizo usted para venir a trabajar en Lowell, Massachusetts.

19. Por ejemplo: ¿Podría contarme por qué vino y cómo llegó?
(Si no menciona pregunte):

a. ¿En que fecha vino por primera vez a los EE. UU.?

b. ¿Qué edad tenía usted cuando llegó por primera vez?

c. ¿Cómo se enteró de que había trabajo en los EE. UU.: averiguó o alguien le informó?

d. ¿Qué medio de transporte utilizó usted para llegar a los EE. UU. ¿Qué ruta escogió?

e. ¿Quién vino con usted?

f. ¿Algunos de sus familiares vinieron con usted?

1. Si

¿Quién?

2. No

¿Quién?

g. ¿Quién pagó el viaje?
h. ¿Qué familiares dejó usted allá?

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

i. ¿Qué tipo de visa tenía usted?

________________________________________
________________________________________

j. ¿Cuántos viajes a hecho entre Colombia y los EE. UU.?

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<th>Fecha</th>
<th>Medio de transporte</th>
<th>Acompañantes</th>
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k. ¿Le ayudó alguien a hacer los arreglos?

1. Sí  
2. No

¿Quién?

________________________________________________________________________

¿Pagó usted a esa persona algún dinero?

1. Sí  
2. No

¿Más o menos cuanto?

________________________________________________________________________

20. ¿Es este su primer trabajo en los EE. UU.?

1. Sí  
2. No

a. ¿Qué otros trabajos ha tenido?

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<th>Razón por la cual se retiró</th>
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</table>
21. ¿Ha podido traer otros familiares a los EE. UU. para reunirse con usted?

1. Sí
2. No

   a. ¿Quién?
   ____________________________________________  Fecha
   ____________________________________________  __________________________
   ____________________________________________  __________________________
   ____________________________________________  __________________________
   ____________________________________________  __________________________
   ____________________________________________  __________________________
   ____________________________________________  __________________________

22. ¿Se ha casado aquí en los EE. UU.?

1. Sí
2. No

   a. ¿Qué nacionalidad tiene su esposa (o)?
   ____________________________________________

23. ¿Ha tenido hijos aquí en los EE. UU.?

1. Sí
2. No

   a. ¿Cuál es la fecha de nacimiento?
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________

24. ¿Quién en su familia trabaja aquí?

   ____________________________________________  Clase de Trabajo
   ____________________________________________  _________________________
   ____________________________________________  _________________________
   ____________________________________________  _________________________
   ____________________________________________  _________________________
   ____________________________________________  _________________________
25. ¿Tiene hijos en la escuela en los EE. UU.?

   1. Sí  
      a. ¿Cuántos?
      __________________________ 
      Escuela/Centro
      __________________________
      __________________________
      __________________________
      __________________________
      __________________________

26. ¿Envía usted algún dinero a Colombia de lo que gana mensualmente?

   1. Sí  
   a. ¿Más o menos cuánto?
   __________________________
   __________________________
   __________________________
   __________________________
   __________________________
   __________________________
   __________________________

   b. ¿Ha podido usted enviar dinero continuamente o esporádicamente?

      1. Continuamente  2. Esporádicamente

   __________________________
   __________________________
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   c. ¿Durante cuántos años estuvo enviando dinero a Colombia?
   __________________________
   __________________________
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   __________________________

   d. (Si la respuesta a la pregunta 26 es "NO")
   ¿Enviaba usted dinero antes y dejó de hacerlo?

      1. Sí  2. No
      __________________________
      __________________________
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e. ¿Más o menos cuánto gana usted por mes (o por semana) actualmente?

__________________________

f. ¿Cuánto ganaba usted por mes (o por semana) en su último trabajo en Colombia antes de venir a los EE. UU.?

__________________________

27. ¿El trabajo que usted hace en los EE. UU. es más satisfactorio (ventajas) en alguna manera de lo que hizo en Colombia?

1. Sí  
2. No

a. Por favor, explique__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

28. ¿El trabajo que usted hace en los EE. UU. es menos satisfactorio (desventajas) en alguna manera de lo que hizo en Colombia?

1. Sí  
2. No

a. Por favor, explique__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

29. ¿Ha tenido usted dificultades para trabajar en los EE. UU. por no tener papeles?

1. Sí  
2. No

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________
30. ¿Podría usted decirme cuánto tiempo piensa estar en este trabajo?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

31. ¿Piensa usted regresar a Colombia algún día?

1. Sí  
2. No

a. ¿Cuándo?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

b. ¿Si usted regresa a Colombia qué trabajo le gustaría desempeñar?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

32. ¿Si esta empresa se cierra que haría usted?

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

a. ¿Piensa que podría conseguir otro trabajo aquí en los EE. UU.?
33. ¿Si usted realiza sus sueños, que le gustaría hacer dentro de cinco años?

34. ¿Qué clase de trabajo de gustaría para sus hijos?

35. ¿Qué piensa usted sobre el papel de los trabajadores colombianos en la industria textil de los EE. UU.? (sondeo, opinión sobre 'problemas' relacionados con el aumento de trabajadores en la fuerza laboral en Lowell)

36. ¿Qué recomendaciones haría usted si perteneciera a un comité gubernamental de los EE. UU. que se dedica a la política de inmigración de trabajadores, como usted, en el mercado de trabajo norte americano?

   a. Permitiría usted la inmigración de trabajadores calificados a los EE. UU.? (no calificados)

      1. Sí  
      2. No
b. ¿Qué condiciones establecería?


37. ¿Qué piensa usted sobre la emigración de trabajadores textiles de Colombia? (sondeo, opinión sobre "problemas" relacionados con la pérdida de trabajadores en Medellín)


38. ¿Qué recomendaciones haría usted si perteneciera a un comité gubernamental de Colombia que se dedica a la política de emigración de trabajadores, como usted, en el mercado de trabajo colombiano?

   a. ¿Permitiría la emigración de trabajadores calificados de Colombia? (no calificados)

      1. Sí       2. No


b. ¿Qué condiciones establecería?
39. ¿Cree usted que el futuro de la industria textil será más fuerte en Colombia o en los EE. UU.?

1. Colombia 2. EE. UU.

¿Por qué?

40. Yo visitaré pronto Bogotá y Medellín ¿Conoce usted a alguna persona que haya trabajado en los EE. UU. con quien yo podría comunicarme?

1. Sí 2. No

Quisiera usted agregar algo a la conversación que hemos tenido?

¿Tiene usted alguna pregunta?
ESTUDIO DE TRABAJADORES LATINO AMERICANOS

EN LA INDUSTRIA DE NEW ENGLAND

Trabajadores Colombianos de Textiles

Estimado Sr.

Usted ha sido escogido entre 50 personas para realizar una entrevista. Esta forma parte de un estudio que se está haciendo para comprender mejor el papel de los trabajadores hispanos en la industria de New England. Su cooperación es muy importante para el buen resultado del estudio.

Su nombre no aparecerá en ninguna parte del cuestionario y sus respuestas serán absolutamente confidenciales. Usted puede rehusar contestar cualquier pregunta, pero, por favor, aquellas que conteste hagalo con la mayor exactitud posible.

Tiene usted alguna pregunta?

Está usted de acuerdo con ser entrevistado?

De acuerdo ( ) Número de la entrevista__________
Fecha _______________

Rehusa ( ) Lugar______________________
1. **Puede usted decirme qué clase de trabajo desempeñó en Lowell, Massachusetts?**

2. **Cuánto tiempo trabajó usted en la Empresa?**

   
   Fechas
   
   Años/ Meses

   Ahora quisiera saber algo acerca de su vida en Colombia antes de ir a los EE. UU.

3. **Dónde nació usted?**

   Ciudad/ Pueblo
   
   Departamento

4. **Hasta qué año cursó usted sus estudios?**

   

5. **Ha tenido usted un entrenamiento técnico en Colombia?**

   1. Si  
   2. No
a. Dónde?

Centro/ Escuela

Lugar


b. Podría explicarme un poco acerca de los cursos que usted realizó?

Curso

Fecha


c. Había que pagar por los cursos?

1. Sí 

2. No

Quién pagó?


6. Cursó la mayor parte de sus estudios en establecimientos públicos o privados?

1. Públicos

2. Privados


7. Hizo usted algunos estudios en EE.UU.?

1. Sí

2. No
a. ¿Qué tipo de estudios?

b. Dónde?

8. ¿Ha hecho usted algunos estudios después de regresar a Colombia?

1. Sí  2. No

a. ¿Qué tipo de estudios?

b. Dónde?

c. Cuánto tiempo duró el curso?

9. ¿Cuál es la ocupación actual de sus padres?

Padre

Madre

10. Hasta qué año cursaron ellos sus estudios?

Padre

Madre

11. Tiene usted hermanos?

1. Sí  2. No

a. Cuántos?
b. Qué clase de trabajo desempeñan sus hermanos?


12. Tiene usted otros familiares que trabajen en Textiles?

1. Si       2. No

a. Quienes?


13. Cuál fue su primer trabajo después de terminar sus estudios?

Clase de trabajo al comenzar (calificación)

Lugar de trabajo

a. Cuánto tiempo trabajó allí?


Años / Meses

b. Por qué razón dejó usted ese trabajo?
c. ¿Qué clase de trabajo desempeñó usted al dejar este trabajo?

<table>
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<th>Lugar</th>
<th>Clase de trabajo</th>
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14. Si usted desempeñó otros trabajos en Colombia antes de irse para los EE.UU. podría contarme algo acerca de ellos?

15. Ha vivido usted en algún otro sitio en Colombia que no ha mencionado hasta ahora?

1. Sí  
2. No

a. Dónde?

16. Ha trabajado usted en algún otro país fuera de Colombia y los EE.UU.?  

1. Sí  
2. No

a. ¿Qué hizo usted allí?

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<th>Clase de trabajo</th>
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17. Dónde residía usted cuando decidió emigrar a los EE.UU.?  

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<th>Ciudad/Pueblo</th>
<th>Departamento</th>
<th>País</th>
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</table>

18. Estaba usted casado antes de salir de Colombia?  

1. Sí  
2. No

a. Cuál era su estado Civil?  

19. Tenía usted hijos?  

1. Sí  
2. No

a. Cuántos?  

b. Qué edades tenían ellos?

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Ahora quisiera saber qué hizo usted para venir a trabajar en Lowell, Massachusetts.

20. Por ejemplo: Podría contarme por qué se fue de Colombia y cómo llegó a Lowell?
(SI no menciona pregunte):

a. En qué fecha se fue por primera vez para los EE.UU.? 

b. Qué edad tenía usted cuando llegó por primera vez?

c. Cómo se enteró de que había trabajo en los EE.UU.: averiguó o alguien le informó?

d. Qué medio de transporte utilizó usted para llegar a los EE.UU. Qué rumbo ecogió?

e. Quién viajó con usted?

f. Algunos de sus familiares se fueron con usted en el primer viaje?

1. Sí 
2. No

Quién? 

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

g. Quién pagó el viaje?

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________
h. ¿Qué familiares dejó usted en Colombia?


i. ¿Qué tipo de visa tenía usted?


j. Cuántos viajes ha hecho entre Colombia y los EE.UU.?

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k. Le ayudó alguien a hacer los arreglos?

1. Sí  
2. No

Quién? __________________________________________

Pagó usted a esa persona algún dinero?

1. Sí  
2. No

Mas o menos cuánto?

________________________________________________________________________

21. ¿Cuál fue su primer trabajo en los EE.UU.?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

a. ¿Qué otros trabajos tuvo en los EE.UU.?

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</table>
22. Logró usted traer otros familiares a los EE.UU. para reunirse con usted?
   1. Sí  2. No
a. ¿Quién?

________________________________________
Fecha

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

23. Se ha casado usted en los EE.UU.?
   1. Sí  2. No
a. ¿Qué nacionalidad tiene su esposa?

________________________________________

24. Tuvo usted hijos en los EE.UU.?
   1. Sí  2. No
a. ¿Cuál es la fecha de su nacimiento?

________________________________________
________________________________________

25. Quién en su familia trabaja ahora en los EE.UU.?

________________________________________
Class of work

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________
26. Algunos de sus hijos atendieron la escuela en los EE.UU.? 

1. Sí 
2. No

a. Cuántos?

_________________________ Escuela/Centro

_________________________

_________________________

_________________________

27. Enviaba usted algún dinero a Colombia de lo que ganaba mensualmente? 

1. Sí 
2. No

a. Más o menos cuánto?

_________________________

b. Enviaba usted dinero continuamente o esporádicamente? 

1. Continuamente 
2. Esporádicamente

_________________________

_________________________

_________________________

c. Durante cuántos años estuvo enviando dinero a Colombia? 

_________________________

d. (Si la respuesta a la pregunta 26. es "No")
Enviaba usted dinero por un tiempo y dejó de hacerlo? 

1. Sí 
2. No
e. Más o menos cuánto ganaba usted por semana en Lowell?

f. Cuánto ganaba usted por semana (o por mes) en su último trabajo en Colombia antes de ir a los EE.UU.? 

28. El trabajo que usted hizo en los EE.UU. era más satisfactorio (ventajas) en alguna manera de lo que estaba haciendo en Colombia antes de emigrar?

   1. Sí   2. No

29. El trabajo que usted hizo en los EE.UU. era menos satisfactorio (desventajas) en alguna manera de lo que estaba haciendo en Colombia antes de emigrar?

   1. Sí   2. No

a. Por favor, explique ___________________________________________________________________

b. __________________________________________________________________

c. __________________________________________________________________

d. __________________________________________________________________

e. __________________________________________________________________

30. ¿Qué dificultades tuvo usted (o sus familiares) para adaptarse al medio ambiente estadounidense?
31. En qué sentido le fue fácil a usted adaptarse al medio ambiente estadounidense?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

32. Tenía usted dificultades para trabajar en los EE.UU. por no tener papeles?

1. Sí
2. No

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

33. Podría usted decirme cuánto tiempo pensó estar en los EE.UU. al llegar por primera vez?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

34. En aquel tiempo pensaba usted regresar a Colombia algún día?

1. Sí
2. No

a. Cuándo?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

35. Por qué decidió usted regresar a Colombia?
36. En qué fecha regresó?

37. Dónde fue usted a vivir al regresar a Colombia?

38. Después de regresar a Colombia, qué tipo de trabajo consiguió?

a. Cuánto tiempo se demoró en conseguirlo? (Cuánto tiempo pasó usted sin empleo?)

b. Este trabajo que consiguió fue lo que buscaba, o quería hacer otra cosa?
   1. Lo que buscaba
   2. Quería otra cosa

   c. Más o menos cuánto dinero ganaba (ba) por semana en este trabajo?

39. Ha cambiado usted el trabajo después de este primer empleo?
   1. Sí
   2. No

Cuáles otros trabajos ha tenido?

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40. Trajo usted algunos ahorros de los EE.UU.? 

1. Si  
2. No  

a. Más o menos cuánto?  ____________________________  

b. En qué manera ha invertido usted los ahorros aquí en Colombia?  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

41. Qué dificultades tuvo usted (o sus familiares) para adaptarse nuevamente al medio ambiente Colombiano?  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

42. En qué sentido le fue fácil a usted adaptarse al medio ambiente Colombiano nuevamente?  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

43. Quiere usted volver a los EE.UU.?  

1. Si  
2. No  

a. Por qué?  ____________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

__________________________________________________________________________  

b. Cuándo?  ____________________________
c. Cómo piensa usted volver a los EE.UU.?

44. Si usted realiza sus sueños, qué le gustaría hacer dentro de cinco años?

45. Qué clase de trabajo le gustaría para sus hijos?

46. Qué piensa usted sobre el papel de los trabajadores Colombianos en la industria textil de los EE.UU.?
(sondeo, opinión sobre "problemas" relacionados con el aumento de trabajadores en la fuerza laboral en Lowell)

47. Qué recomendaciones haría usted si perteneciera a un comité gubernamental de los EE.UU. que se dedica a la política de imigración de trabajadores, como usted, en el mercado de trabajo norte americano?

a. Permitiría usted la imigración de trabajadores calificados a los EE.UU.? (no calificados)
1. Si

2. No

b. Qué condiciones establecería?

48. Qué piensa usted sobre la emigración de trabajadores textiles de Colombia? (sondeo, opinión sobre "problemas" relacionados con la pérdida de trabajadores en Medellín)

49. Qué recomendaciones haría usted si perteneciera a un comité gubernamental de Colombia que se dedica a la política de emigración de trabajadores, como usted, en el mercado de trabajo Colombiano?

a. Permitiría la emigración de trabajadores calificados de Colombia? (no calificados)

1. Si

2. No

b. ¿Qué condiciones establecería?
50. Cuáles considera usted son las circunstancias actuales de Colombia (internas o internacionales) que contribuyen al movimiento de trabajadores Colombianos hacia los EE.UU.?

51. Cuáles considera usted son las circunstancias de los EE.UU. (internas o internacionales) que contribuyen al movimiento de trabajadores Colombianos hacia los EE.UU.?

52. Ahora, como hemos conversado, los sueldos básicos en los EE.UU. son más altos que en Colombia, pero algunas fábricas en Colombia ofrecen una cantidad en beneficios para los empleados y sus familiares, que representan costos para la empresa.

Usted trabajó en una fábrica que ofrecía beneficios? (Colombia)

1. Sí  2. No

a. De cuáles beneficios obtuvieron logros usted y su familia?
b. De qué tipo de beneficio no pudo usted obtener logro y por qué?

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c. Qué tipo de beneficios recibió usted en su trabajo en Lowell, Massachusetts?

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( Otros trabajos en los EE. UU. )

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d. Prefiere usted tener un salario alto con un mínimo de beneficios como en los EE. UU. o un salario más bajo pero con un mayor número de beneficios como en Colombia? O sea, tener el dinero en efectivo para poder disponer de él, o tener la seguridad de contar con los beneficios que brindan las empresas.

__________________________________________________________________________

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__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

53. Cree usted que el futuro de la industria textil será más fuerte en Colombia o en los EE. UU.?

1. Colombia 2. EE. UU.
Por qué?


Tiene usted alguna pregunta?

MUCHAS GRACIAS POR SU COLABORACION
APPENDIX II

LIST OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED IN
THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA

UNITED STATES

Boston

Northern Textile Association
- Director of Research, James Murphy

U.S. Department of Labor, Regional Office
Employment and Training Administration
- Regional Director, Gayle Bachus

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Regional Office
- Investigator (Lowell), Russell Walker

Lowell

Ames Manufacturing Corporation
- President, Edward B. Stevens

Lawrence Manufacturing (division of Ames Manufacturing)
- Personnel Director, Joshua Miner

Synthetic Yarns (division of Ames Manufacturing)
- General Manager, Jonathan Stevens

Joan Fabrics
- President, Lawrence Ansin
- Personnel Director, Richard Cote

Pellon Corporation
- Personnel Director, Thomas O'Hagan

Wannalancit Textile Company
- President, Edward Larter
- Vice President and General Manager, Mozart Holmes

Lowell City Hall
- Assistant Mayor, Michael Gianotis

Lowell Museum
- Director, Lewis Karabatsos
Massachusetts Division of Employment Security
- Alien Labor Certification Specialist, Mrs. Molinaux
- Hispanic Labor Specialist, Gerry Rodriguez

UNITAS
- Executive Secretary, Father Daniel Crahen

Washington

AFL-CIO, National Office
- Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, Art Gundersheim

American Textile Manufacturers Institute
- Director, Communications Division, James A. Morrissey

National Association of Manufacturers
- International Economics Affairs, John Starrels

New Transcendence Foundation
- Director, David North

Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
- Career Officer, INS, Lisa Roni

U.S. Department of Labor, National Office
- International Labor Affairs Bureau, James Orr and Kyle Johnson (Marion Houston)
- Labor Certifications, Nandor Kertai

Employment and Training Administration
- Office of Manpower Research and Development, Ellen Sehgal

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, National Office
- Office of Planning, Evaluating and Budgeting, Linda Liner and Jerry Brighton
COLOMBIA

Bogotá

CCRP (Corporación Centro Regional de Población)
- Director Asociado, Ramiro Cardona
- Investigadora, Carmen Inez Cruz

Departamento Nacional de Planeación
- Jefe, de Estudios Industriales, Gonzalo Giraldo E.
- Jefe, División de Trabajo, Mauricio Pérez

Embajada de los Estados Unidos
- Consul (immigration visas), Joseph P. Malone
- Analista de Mercados, Sección Económico/Commercial, Consuelo Alarcon G.

Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (SENEALDE)
- Director, Proyecto OIT-PNUD de Migraciones Laborales, Lelio Marmora
- Investigador, Carlos Arturo Patiño

Universidad de los Andes
- Director, Departamento de Ciencias Políticas, Gabriel Murillo

Medellín

ANDI (Asociación Nacional de Industriales)
- Vice-Presidente Industrial, Carlos Wolf
- Asistente del Vice-Presidente Industrial, Santiago Peláez
(formally from CIE)
- Coordinador de Textiles, José Correa

Asociación Colombiana de Relaciones Industriales y Personal
- Gerente, William Jarce

Consulado de los Estados Unidos
- Consul, Joseph Smith
Camera de Comercio de Medellín
  - Jefe, Departamento de Investigaciones Económicas, Diego Luís Otero

Coltejer, (Cia. Colombiana de Tejidos, S.A.)
  - Vice-Presidente, Planeación, Luis Carlos Uribe Jaramillo
  - Vice-Presidente, Relaciones Humanas, Vivienda y Servicios, Gabriel Jaime Morales
  - Director, Selección, Simeón Lozada
  - Sub-director, Personal, Ana Eugenia Penagos
  - Superintendente Coltehilos/Doña María/Sebedo, Girardo Ríos Hernández
  - Directora de Capacitación, María Teresa Echavarría
  - Encargado Capacitación Técnica, Hugo Restrepo M.

COMFAMA (Caja de Compensación Familiar de Antioquia)
  - Director, Ramiro Mejía Restrepo

Fabricato (Fábrica de Hilados y Tejidos del Hato)
  - Jefe Selección de Personal, Emma Bedoya Rodríguez
  - Jefe de Selección y Enganche, Adriana Palacios
  - Jefe del Centro de Entrenamiento, Mario Ospina

SENA (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje)
  - Jefe, Unidad Textil, Gerardo Domínguez Giraldo (also Secretary of Apet, Asociación Colombiana de Profesionales y Expertos Textiles)
  - Promotor de Centros, Alonzo Román

SENALDE (Servicio Nacional de Empleo, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social)
  - Migraciones Laborales, José Manuel Bello F.

Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil de Colombia
  - Presidente, Gustavo Builes

Tejicóndor (Tejidos el Cóndor, S.A.)
  - Vice-Presidente, Planeación, Guillermo Garces Arboleda
  - Gerente, Relaciones Industriales, Oscar Tirado
  - Jefe de Personal, Juan Luis Botero
  - Director de Formación Profesional y Seguridad Industrial, Alvaro Gomez Alzate
UTRAN (Unión de Trabajadores de Antioquia)
- Presidente, Mario de J. Valderama (also Vice-President of UTC, Union de Trabajadores de Colombia)

UTRATEXCO (Unión de Trabajadores Textiles de Colombia)
- Presidente, Alberto Gómez Villa

Universidad de Antioquia
CIE (Centro de Investigaciones Económicas)
- Economistas, Ponciano Torales, Fernando Botero, Hugo Vélez
APPENDIX III

CHRONOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED POLICY INSTRUMENTS

about 22,000 B.C. Siberian hunters probably discover "Americas" by crossing land bridge over Bering Strait; southern cone settled some 12,000 years later.

5000 B.C. Cultural and agricultural revolution in Central and South America; Mayan civilization develops, declines after 800 A.D.

Vikings and other groups probably camp on North American soil during expeditions.

by late 1400s North American Indians split into several hundred societies, some developed as small states; estimates of one million "native" inhabitants within present boundaries of United States just prior to European discovery.

Aztec and Incan empires flourish in Central and South America.

1492 Christopher Columbus reaches "Hispaniola" in the Caribbean and becomes the European discoverer of the New World.

1497 John Cabot and eighteen men land on Cape Breton and claim land from Newfoundland to Chesapeake Bay for England.

1519 - 1521 Hernando Cortez discovers and devastates Aztec Empire, and rebuilds Mexico City into capital of New Spain; ten years later Francisco Pizarro destroys Incan Empire.

1528 Panfilo de Narvaez begins ill-fated, eight-year expedition from Cuba to Mexico over what is now southern United States.
Jacques Cartier claims Labrador, St. Lawrence River, and Gaspe Bay for France.

DeSoto scourges from Florida to Arkansas.

First group of French Huguenots settle in Florida under Jean Ribant; settlements fail, in 1564 Fort Caroline destroyed by Spanish who established St. Augustine.

Sir Francis Drake reaches west coast and claims "New Albion" for Elizabeth I.

Sir Walter Raleigh leads expedition to Roanoke Island off North Carolina.

Sir Richard Grenville attempts settlement on Roanoke; colonists all return to England with Drake, who stopped for supplies in 1586; fifteen men left behind disappear.

Colonists settle on Roanoke once again; all 150 disappear by 1588.

First successful settlement founded at Jamestown by British colonists under the auspices of the Virginia Company; becomes crown colony in 1624.

Samuel de Champlain establishes trading post at Quebec; St. Louis and New Orleans are descendants of that French outpost.

First group of twenty black slaves reach Jamestown; beginning of 200 year slave trade, which brings more than 350,000 people from Africa.

Pilgrims arrive on Mayflower and settle Plymouth under the Massachusetts Bay Company charter.

Dutch West Indian Company establishes settlement of "New Netherland" (including Philadelphia and Albany) by Dutch colonists interested in trading; taken over by English in 1663.
1626 Dutch found "New Amsterdam" (Manhatten Island).

1630-1640 Massachusetts Bay Company charter reorganized under John Winthrop in Boston; English Puritans, dissidents of the Church of England, migrate in larger numbers to New England.

1634 Lord Baltimore founds Maryland with grant from Charles I as refuge for English Catholics, although most colonists are Protestant.

1638 Swedish West India Company under Peter Minuit settles lower Delaware Bay; includes group of Finns; taken over by Dutch in 1655.

1654 First Jewish settlers arrive in New Amsterdam fleeing Portuguese persecution in Brazil; others come from Germany and Eastern Europe.

1660 Charles II officially discourages emigration from England.

1670 Carolinas settled by English; Charlestown established in 1680; joined by French Huguenots.

1681 William Penn founds Pennsylvania for his Quaker group and all others seeking refuge and religious tolerance.

1683 First Germans, Mennonites under Francisco Daniel Pastorius, settle Germantown, Pennsylvania.

1685 Large numbers of Huguenots join settlements in South Carolina.

1707 German Palatines settle in Pennsylvania and gradually spread southward; joined in 1730s and 1750s by Pietists, Lutherans and Moravians.

1717 English Parliament legalizes deportation of criminals to colonies (30,000 mostly to Virginia and Maryland).
1718 Scotch-Irish (Ulster Scots) immigration begins in earnest; settle in New England, Maryland and Pennsylvania.

1732 Georgia founded by James Oglethorpe as trusteeship and buffer between Spanish south, French and English north; becomes colony in 1751.

1740 Parliament enacts Naturalization Act that confers British citizenship on alien immigrants in colonies.

1741 Vitus Bering lands in Alaska; in 1783 Russian colonies established along the coast, and in 1799 Alaska became a Russian colony, until it was purchased by the United States in 1867.

1759 British victorious in Quebec; New France surrendered to Great Britain.

1771-1773 Economic and agrarian crisis in Ireland sends 10,000 Scotch-Irish to America annually.

1775 British government suspends emigration to American colonies at outbreak of hostilities.

1783 Signing of Treaty of Paris ends Revolutionary War and officially recognizes the United States of America; immigration, mostly of Scotch-Irish, increases.

1789-1793 French Revolution; many groups flee to the United States.

1798 Alien Act (part of Alien and Sedition Laws) empowers President to deport resident aliens suspected of engaging in subversive activities; never actively invoked; unpopular and allowed to expire after two years.

1803 British Passenger Act limits number of passengers on emigrant ships; first legislation to protect immigrants in passage; slows Irish immigration.

1807 Congress prohibits importation of slaves to the United States; several states had prohibited the slave trade earlier, but it had not ceased altogether.
1812  War of 1812 halts immigration.

1814  Treaty of Ghent; first major wave of immigration begins; approximately 5 million immigrants arrive over the next 45 years.

1819  United States government begins to count immigrants; ships' captains keep lists; for Pacific ports immigrants are tallied as of 1850, for Mexican and Canadian borders in 1910, and all other ports of entry in the early 20th century.

1825  Great Britain officially recognizes that England is overcrowded and repeals laws prohibiting immigration; beginning of massive influx; first Norwegians arrive.

1830  Refugees from Polish Revolution receive land in Illinois.

1837  Economic crisis causes first nativist outcry that excessive immigration lowers wage levels.

1840  Eve of the Great Migrations from Europe which continued to 1930; beginning of era of steamship lines designed for large-scale transport of passengers.

1845  Native American Party founded; precursor of nativist Know-Nothing Party, which peaked in 1855 by electing six governors, and dominating several state legislatures; failed in 1856, when Presidential candidate Millard Fillmore carried only one state.

1846  Crop failures in Germany and Holland and potato famine in Ireland cause massive surge in emigration.

1848  German Revolution; political refugees flee to United States.

1855  Commission of Emigration established in New York City; Castle Garden opens to process immigrants.

1861-1865  Civil War.
1860s - 1870s  New immigrant origins shift from northern and western to southern and eastern Europe.

1864  Congress passes pro-immigration legislation to facilitate importation of contract labor; repealed four years later.

1865  Homestead Act opens the west.

late 1860s - early 1870s  Supreme Court declares state initiatives to control immigration unconstitutional; led to federal involvement in regulation of foreign commerce.

1875  Congress takes first steps to restrict immigration by establishing qualitative restrictions barring "criminals and immoral persons."

1882  First federal immigration law bars "lunatics, idiots, convicts and those likely to become public charges", and imposes head tax of 50 cents.

Chinese Exclusion Act denies entry to Chinese laborers; act renewed in 1892 and finally repealed in 1943; Chinese immigration suspended in 1902.

Russian Jewish immigration increases; also in 1891.

1885-1887  Contract labor laws (Foran Act) end importation of cheap, unskilled labor, but not skilled labor, domestics, and artists among other groups.

1886  Statue of Liberty dedicated.

1888  Amendment to contract labor laws allows for deportation within one year of entry of those who enter in violation of laws.

1890  Frontier closes.

1891  Codification of General Immigration Law includes health inspection requirement and more categories of exclusion such as "loathsome diseases, polygamists, paupers, and moral criminals"; those who enter illegally can be deported within one year.
1892  Ellis Island replaces Castle Garden to process immigrants.

1893  Boards of Inquiry established to pass on immigrant admissibility; passenger manifests required.

1894  Immigration Restriction League organized by nativist movement which distinguishes between "old" and "new" immigrants; active for over twenty-five years.

1894-1896  Armenian Christians flee to United States.

1897  President Cleveland vetoes first attempt to impose literacy test on immigrants.

1903  List of excluded immigrants extended to "epileptics, insane, professional beggars, and political radicals", the last a direct result of President McKinley's assassination by an anarchist.

1905  Japanese and Korean Exclusion League formed by organized labor to protest impact of coolie labor on American workers.

1907  Teddy Roosevelt establishes Presidential Commission to study the impact of immigration on the United States; Dillingham Commission issued forty-two volume report in 1911 concluding that immigration law should be restrictive to exclude "inferior" applicants.


Head tax increase; additions to exclusions include: those afflicted with tuberculosis and "defects that affect ability to earn a living", and children not accompanied by parents.

1914-1918  World War I.
1917  New immigration law codifies all exclusions and adds literacy test in any language for those over 16, and the Asian Barred Zone (except Japan).

1917-1921  U.S. admits 73,000 Mexicans to alleviate railroad building and agricultural manpower shortages.

1919  Big Red Scare, peak of anti-foreign sentiment; many revolutionaries deported.

Temporary Quota Act introduces principle of numerical limitation of persons from each nation.

1921  Quota Act limits immigration to 3 percent of foreign-born persons living in United States in 1910; ceiling on European immigration set at about 350,000; immigration decreases.

1923  Anti-immigrant group, Ku Klux Klan, reaches peak activity.

1924  National Origins Act (Johnson-Reid Act) establishes permanent quotas at 2 percent of foreign-born living in United States in 1910, 150,000/year ceiling for eastern hemisphere, including Japan, and a visa requirement; national origins system abolished 41 years later by 1965 Immigration Act amendments.

1929  Amendment to National Origins Act uses 1920 census as base for setting quotas.

Stock market crashes, increasing demand to limit immigration.

1933  U.S. admits German Jews fleeing Europe, but only within quota limitations; six years later Congress defeated a refugee bill to admit 20,000 Jewish children with U.S. sponsors.

1934  Philippine Indian Act restricts immigration from the Philippine Islands.
1939-1945  World War II; United States enters in 1941.

1940  Alien Registration Act expands deportable classes.

1942  Japanese-Americans evacuated to detention centers.

U.S. and Mexico adopt Bracero Program that allows Mexican laborers to work temporarily in the U.S.; abolished in 1964.

1945  Beginning of large-scale economic migration from Puerto Rico, primarily to New York.

Gruman admits 40,000 war refugees.

1946  War Brides Act (Fiance's Act) admits foreign-born wives, husbands and children of U.S. military personnel, about 120,000 people.

1948  Displaced Persons Act allows for entry of 400,000 war refugees over a four-year period and under a system that mortgages quotas into the future for Germans, Greeks, Poles, Italians and others; amended in 1950.

1952  Immigration and Naturalization Act (McCarren-Walter Act)
- codifies existing legislation.
- reaffirms national origins quota system with 1920 census as base.
- sets eastern hemisphere ceiling at 150,000; western hemisphere unrestricted.
- grants token quota to Asian-Pacific triangle.
- establishes preferences for skilled workers and relatives of U.S. citizens.
- specifies administrative procedures for deportation.
- adds to excluded classes by incorporating Alien Registration Act.
- changes to ability to adjust status without leaving U.S.
- excludes laws related to contract labor and barring of immigrants on racial grounds.

Truman appoints Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (Pearlman Commission); report issued one year later.

1953
Refugee Relief Act admits 214,000 refugees from behind the Iron Curtain (Hungarians and others); expired in 1956; more refugees admitted under special legislation.

1954
Ellis Island closes.

1960
Cuban refugees paroled into United States. Special permission granted to refugees from Hong Kong.

1963
President Kennedy urges Congress to eliminate National Origins Quota system; submits comprehensive proposal for revision of immigration laws.

1965
Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments under Johnson alters 1952 Act to:
- set 20,000 country limit with 170,000 total ceiling for eastern hemisphere.
- set western hemisphere ceiling for first time at 120,000, with no country limit and no preferences.
- establish seven preferences for close relatives, needed occupational skills, and refugees.
- restrict labor migration.

1976
Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments
- extend 20,000 per country limit and preference system to western hemisphere; hemisphere ceilings left intact.

1978
Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments
- combine ceilings for both hemispheres for world wide total of 290,000.

Congress establishes Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to work toward "coherent, efficient, and humane immigration policy;" report submitted to executive in December 1980.

1980
125,000 Cubans paroled into United States.

1982
About 1800 undocumented Haitian immigrants languish in detention camps throughout the country.
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