The Foundations of Anti-System Protests in Democracy

by

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Abstract

Anti-system protests in democracy are a subcategory of political protests characterized by participants from diverse sectors or groups in society, wide-ranging demands, blame directed at the political system, and a context of representative democracy. This protest subtype raises a critical puzzle: why do protesters in democracy come to blame the political system for their grievances? I argue that common explanatory theories in the protest literature – such as relative deprivation, political opportunity, and resource mobilization – provide relevant background conditions that increase the likelihood of protest onset, but these variables are unlikely to produce anti-system protests in democracy without repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness across sectors. Iterative episodes of unresponsiveness lead sectoral movement organizations to accumulate unresolved demands, to prefer extra-institutional action, and to strategically update by escalating their targets of blame to the political system. With these foundations in place, democracies become vulnerable to anti-system protests, which can then be set off by seemingly insignificant triggers. I test this argument primarily through in-depth, historical analysis of two cases: 1) Chile 2006-2019, a case in which sectoral protests escalated to anti-system protests, and 2) Brazil 2003-2013, a case in which sectoral protests escalated to multi-demand and multi-sector but non-system protests. My project challenges literature that suggests that modern protests come together rapidly due to technological advances, supports literature that urges scholars to view protests as interconnected waves of contention, and adds to literature on blame attribution by showing how and why social movement organizations escalate their targets of blame over time and based on political experiences. Lastly, my project connects to the anti-system politics literature, exploring an alternative anti-system outcome to populism.

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Chapter 1, Section 1: Motivation

In October 2019, Chileans erupted in protest in response to an approximately four-cent increase in the cost of using the Santiago Metro. These initial protests triggered by a transportation fare increase became what Chileans called the *estallido social* (social outburst). Riots, looting, and the burning down of metro stations and bus stops throughout Santiago led President Sebastián Piñera to declare a state of emergency on October 19, bringing the Chilean military into the streets for the first time since the country's democratization in 1990. The government's attempt to repress the protests was unsuccessful, as was its package of issue-specific concessions that included minimum wage increases, pension increases, and decreased drug costs. Over one million people throughout the country participated in the most massive march in Chile's history on October 25, 2019, and sustained mobilization with broad citizen support continued for the following weeks. Following a national general strike organized by the central workers' union (CUT) and the umbrella organization, Social Unity Table, President Piñera and Chile's main political party leaders entered negotiations to find an institutional exit to the crisis. On November 15, 2019, Chile's main political parties signed the "Agreement for Social Peace and the New Constitution." The central component of the agreement was to establish the guidelines for a national plebiscite to give Chileans the option of replacing the country's constitution, which had been drafted during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

I began this project as a quest to understand and explain this puzzling protest case in a country where I had lived, worked, and researched politics since the country's student protest movement in 2011. Discontent with democracy and protest were not new to Chile, but Chile was often considered an exceptionally stable political system in Latin America. In fact, just days

before the riots broke out, President Piñera referred to his country as an oasis of stability and prosperity in the region, "Look at Latin America…Argentina and Paraguay are in recession, Mexico and Brazil in stagnation, Peru and Ecuador in deep political crisis and in this context Chile looks like an oasis because we have stable democracy, the economy is growing, we are creating jobs, we are improving salaries and we are keeping macroeconomic balance" (Mander and Stott 2019). Though his administration repeatedly proved to be out of touch with Chileans, Piñera was not alone in failing to predict Chile's social outburst. Almost every analyst, social movement leader, and activist who I spoke with in the months following the outbreak was surprised by the magnitude and intensity of the protests. As one Chilean political analyst related, "Nobody saw it coming. Not even a hint of someone predicting that something close to this would occur."[1] The protests drew millions of Chileans into the streets and politicized many who had never previously participated in politics.[2][3] By the end of 2019, Piñera's approval rating fell to 6 percent and Congress' approval fell to 2 percent (CEP December 2019). Many protesters wanted fundamental changes to Chile's "stable democracy," and the protests initiated an extended and ongoing process to replace the country's constitution.

The social outburst was an impactful political event in Chile, and it presented a complex puzzle at the country-case level. However, looking beyond Chile, I found that the Chilean case seemed to share some characteristics with protests that had occurred in various countries around the world in recent years and that presented particular challenges for existing theories on the emergence of political protests. I refer to this subcategory of protests as anti-system protests in democracy.

[1] Personal Interview, Political Analyst. January 29, 2020.
[2] Personal Interview, Territorial Assembly Leader in Santiago, Chile. December 2, 2021.
[3] Personal Interview, Territorial Assembly Participant in Santiago, Chile. December 1, 2021.

Chapter 1, Section 2: Outcome Variable – Anti-System Protests in Democracy

The Chilean protests occurred in what a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report referred to as "an age of global mass protests that are historically unprecedented in frequency, scope, and size" (Brannen et al. 2020). Among these global mass protests, Chile's 2019 protests are characterized by four key characteristics that place it in the subcategory of anti-system protest in democracy. I find that that many recent protests share some characteristics with Chile's social outburst, but few cases share all four characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy:

1. Participant Composition: Protesters represent diverse sectors or groups in society.
2. Demands: Demands are wide-ranging, spanning different issue areas.
3. Blame: Blame is directed at the political system.
4. Political Context: Protests occur in representative democracies or semi-democracies.

The table below, Table 1, codes a list of mass protest cases along the four characteristics of anti-system protest in democracy (Appendix A includes a more complete description of the cases not included in the empirical chapters). The list of protests in the table combines 1) the most massive protests in recent years around the world (generally >500,000 participants) that are included in the Carnegie Global Protest Tracker dating back to 2016, 2) other recent, important protests in Latin America that do not fit this massiveness cutoff, and 3) a couple of additional cases of interest (Spain's Indignados Movement in 2011 and Brazil's 2013 protests) that fall outside of this timeframe.

The cases of anti-system protest in democracy (5 out of 22) appear in bold in the table. This section will use the cases in the table to aid in describing anti-system protests in democracy and to differentiate them from the other protest cases. Chapter 3 and 4 presents the characteristics and causes of Chile's 2019 anti-system protest in democracy. Chapter 5 analyzes Brazil's 2013 protests: multi-demand and multi-sector protests in democracy that are considered non-system

protests because of a lack of blame directed at the political system. Chapter 6, Section 1 analyzes Colombia's 2019 and 2021 protest waves that, like Brazil in 2013, drew multiple sectors to the streets with wide-ranging demands but without the political system blame component.

Table 1: Evaluating Anti-System Characteristics of Comparative Mass Protests

Protest	Dates	Peak Massiveness	Multi-sector	Wide-ranging demands	Political System Blame	Representative Democracy
France Pension Reform	01/2023-06/2023	1.2-3.5 million	Yes	No	No	Yes
Israel Judicial Reform	01/2023-present	>500,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
Peru Boluarte	12/2022-present	>20,000	Yes	No	No	Semi
Mexico Electoral Reform	11/2022-03/2023	>100,000	Yes	No	No	Semi
Colombia Tax Reform	04/2021-09/2021	>100,000	Yes	Yes	No	Semi
India Farm Bill	08/2020-12/2021	>1,000,000	No	No	No	Semi
U.S. George Floyd	05/2020-09/2021	>1,000,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
Colombia 21N	11/2019-02/2020	>1,000,000	Yes	Yes	No	Semi
Chile Estallido Social	**10/2019-03/2020**	**>1,000,000**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
Bolivia Election	10/2019-11/2019	>10,000	Yes	No	No	Semi
Lebanon 17 October	**10/2019-present**	**>1,000,000**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Semi**
Ecuador Fuel Subsidy	10/2019-10/2019	>10,000	Yes	No	No	Semi
Czech Republic "Million Moments for Democracy"	04/2019-12/2019	>250,000	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Hong Kong Autonomy	**03/2019-07/2020**	**2,000,000**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Semi**
Algeria "Le Pouvoir"	02/2019-03/2020 and	>1,000,000	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

	02/2021-04/2021					
France Yellow Vest	**11/2018-05/2020**	**300,000**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
UK People's Vote	06/2018-10/2019	1,000,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
Romania Corruption	01/2017-08/2019	>500,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
South Korea Candlelight	10/2016-04/2017	>2,000,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
Brazil Impeachment	11/2014-07/2016	>6,000,000	Yes	No	No	Yes
Brazil 2013	06/2013-07/2013	>2,000,000	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Spain Indignados	**05/2011-08/2011**	**>1,000,000**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**

The first characteristic of an anti-system protest in democracy is that its participants represent diverse sectors or groups in society. These protests are instances in which discontent is relatively widespread across various parts of society and in which different groups manage to organize collectively, or at least simultaneously. Because the table generally only includes very massive protests (which necessarily have multiple groups to draw such high turnout), most cases above fulfill this requirement. India's Farm Bill protest movement in 2020-2021 offers a case that does not fit the diverse participant composition attribute. The case is coded as a massive, single-sector protest, as the protesters were primarily farmers.

Diversity in participant composition means that protesters may represent different organized sectors, like transportation unions protesting alongside student associations in Ecuador in 2019. The diversity can also mean different groups in terms of non-sectoral characteristics like income and geography. For example, France's Yellow Vest protests initially mobilized working- and middle-class protesters in rural areas but eventually also mobilized working- and middle-class protesters in urban areas. Certain groups can be overrepresented in anti-system protests,

like young people in Spain's Indignados Movement, but the protests must include significant cross-group or cross-sector participation.

The second characteristic of anti-system protests is wide-ranging demands. The purpose of this attribute is to focus on the more puzzling – and potentially more troubling for democratic stability – cases in which various issues are causing disaffection in the population at the same time. The comparative cases in the table are useful for demonstrating this point. In the case of France's pension protests (not coded as anti-system protest), a pension reform bill proposed by the Borne government to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 years drew millions into the streets from different sectors, including teachers, transportation workers, and dockers. The multi-sector nature is expected given that retirement age for collecting pensions affects different sectors. However, the case's single-demand nature makes it less challenging for democratic institutions to resolve than multi-demand protests. France's government could cancel the specific legislation, modify the legislation, or risk suffering at the polls among those who see this single issue as particularly important. On the demand component, this case contrasts with Brazil's 2013 protests, for example, in which a slight increase in public transportation fares caused Brazilians to take to the streets with grievances related to transportation, corruption, health, education, public security, and World Cup spending, among others (IBOPE 2013). Addressing this litany of demands through Brazil's political institutions presented a more challenging task than resolving pension legislation in France.

The third characteristic of anti-system protests is that blame is directed at the political system. This characteristic distinguishes cases in which protesters perceive that political actors at the subnational or national level are to blame for their grievances from cases in which protesters think that responsibility lies with underlying characteristics of the political system that transcend

specific actors. In the former cases, quicker fixes like voting out or impeaching the mayor, president, or congressperson can neutralize grievances, whereas the latter cases (system-blame protests) often require addressing problems with the political system. Thus, system-blame protests present a more fundamental challenge for democracies than other cases. For example, in the case of South Korea's Candlelight Demonstrations in 2016-2017, a corruption scandal involving Park Geun-hye and an unofficial presidential advisor drew millions of multi-group actors – farmers, trade unions, Buddhist monks, peasant associations – to the streets in demonstrations that lasted several months (Jung 2022). However, the source of the grievance was the specific president, so when President Park Geun-hye was impeached on March 11, 2017, the protests ended soon after. This lower-level blame allowed for a resolution that satisfied protesters without making changes to South Korea's democratic system. This type of resolution would be less likely to satisfy protesters in an anti-system protest in democracy.

The lower-level blame cases also include protests that focus on policies or laws that can be changed without changing the political system. For example, protesters during the protests over police brutality in the United States had demands that included changes to local police departments like reallocating funds (subnational-level actor responsibility) and broader calls for Congress to prohibit policies like chokeholds and the Supreme Court to end qualified immunity (national-level actor responsibility). Yet, most protesters did not call for a new constitution or changes to the democratic political system to resolve policing institutions in the United States. In contrast, in cases of anti-system protests in democracy, other demands are often combined with system-level demands but calls for political systemic changes are always present. For example, Yellow Vest protesters wanted national citizen-initiated referendums and recalls of elected officials because they saw direct democracy as more effective than their representative system.

The Spanish indignados called for people's assemblies and consensus decision-making institutions. The Hong Kong autonomy protesters called for universal suffrage for Legislative Council elections. The Lebanon October 17 protesters called for "the downfall of the entire political and economic power structure that has been governing the country since the end of the armed conflict in 1990" (Mandour 2021).

The fourth component is a political context of representative democracy or semi-democracy. The reason for this distinction is that anti-system protests pose a different set of puzzles for non-authoritarian regimes. For democracies and semi-democracies, there are two key puzzles. The first puzzle is: how and why do citizens come to perceive that their political system is to blame for their grievances? For example, how and why did Chileans who wanted pension reform or better wages come to see the need for changing their political system to address these needs? The second puzzle is: how and why do citizens in democracy accumulate so many unresolved demands that their representative democratic institutions have failed to address? For example, how did Chile reach a point in 2019 in which millions of citizens had such a laundry list of demands that their representatives had not resolved, despite the context of a highly-rated democracy for decades? In autocracies, these two puzzles are of secondary interest. The centralization of power behind a single figure or set of figures and the close link between the ruling regime and the overall rules governing the system makes it more straightforward to explain why citizens in autocracies would take aim at the system to resolve their grievances. Given that representing citizens is not the primary function of an autocratic system, an accumulation of unresolved demands is also less puzzling than in democratic systems. Instead, as I discuss in Chapter 6, Section 3 on the Arab Spring, the more central puzzle for anti-system

protests in autocracy is how and why citizens overcome fear and the impossibility of overcoming the regime to organize multi-sector protests against those in power.

Chapter 1, Section 3: Why Anti-System Protests in Democracy Matter

Building off this description of attributes, anti-system protests in democracy demand attention as a protest subcategory for several reasons. First, although protests can be a normal and healthy component of democracy, anti-system protests in particular raise significant concerns about the functioning of democracy because *many* groups have *many* grievances that their institutions have failed to address and that are significant enough to motivate mobilization. Some other protests outside of the anti-system category, like Brazil in 2013 and Colombia in 2019 and 2021, also raise concerns for democracy because of their multi-demand and multi-sector nature. However, anti-system protests present another unique challenge: protesters identify the underlying political system as the problem. In many cases protesters are calling for more or better democracy rather than authoritarianism, but fixing the system is often a greater challenge than fixing specific policy issues or voting out unpopular leaders.

Second, the multi-sector and multi-demand nature of anti-system protests leads to the question of why these diverse actors are protesting together, or at least simultaneously, despite the challenges of collective action for actors with different identities and interests. Understanding why citizens come together in anti-system protests in democracy can provide insights into coalition-building and collective action more broadly.

Third, some scholars point to the importance of specificity of blame in mobilizing for political actions like protest (Javeline 2003; Ketelaars 2016) and voting (Arceneaux 2003). Yet, anti-system protests seem to go directly against this literature, suggesting that massive numbers can be mobilized to the streets to take aim at something as broad as their entire political system.

Thus, studying anti-system protests in democracy can provide insights into the relationship between blame attribution and political action.

Finally, existing scholarship has argued that centralization of power in authoritarian regimes provides a common target of blame for aggrieved groups to unite and mobilize against (Javeline 2003; Foran 2005; Beissinger 2011), whereas diverse groups in democracy face greater challenges in formulating least-common-denominator targets and goals (Clarke 2011). Thus, how and why diverse groups of citizens in democracy decide to collectively target their political system is an important puzzle tied to the study of this protest subcategory.

Chapter 1, Section 4: Overview of Argument

Common explanatory theories in the protest literature – relative deprivation, political opportunity, and resource mobilization – provide relevant background conditions that increase the likelihood of sectoral protest onset, but these variables are unlikely to produce anti-system protests in democracy without repeated instances of political unresponsiveness. When multiple sectors across society face iterative episodes of unresponsiveness to their political action, it increases the likelihood that sectoral protest escalates to anti-system protest in two ways. First, sectoral movement organizations, and individuals who share their grievances, accumulate unresolved demands. Second, the political-institutional response affects how movement organizations strategically update – changing their tactics or targets of blame. Tactically, perceptions of unresponsiveness make movement organizations more inclined to pursue extra-institutional alternatives rather than attempting to channel demands through ineffectual institutional channels. In some cases, after exhausting tactical alternatives, movement organizations escalate targets of blame for their grievances from subnational or national actors to the political system. Unresolved demands, preference for extra-institutional tactics, and system-

level blame make democratic societies vulnerable to anti-system protests. With these foundations in place, anti-system protests can then be set off by seemingly insignificant triggers. Finally, the presence or absence of cross-sector coalitions – that form when there are both cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment – determine whether anti-system protests are coordinated (led in part by cross-sector coalitions) or uncoordinated (involving the simultaneous mobilization of distinct, unconnected groups).

Chile's Coordinated, Anti-System Protests: Starting in 2006, repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness in interactions between sectoral movement organizations (representing students, pension reform advocates, environmental groups, and others) and Chile's political institutions left various sectoral demands unresolved and led to two dynamic processes of change across sectors. First, after exhausting tactical alternatives, sectoral movement organizations updated their strategies by escalating their targets of blame from national actors to the political system. Second, and because of their target-based goal alignment, sectoral movement organizations that had previously fought separately for their own causes (despite the long-standing existence of cross-sector networks) were motivated to participate in cross-sector coalitions, such as the Broad Front and the Social Unity Table. In October 2019, a seemingly insignificant trigger – a minor increase in transportation fares – set off coordinated anti-system protests: these cross-sector coalitions and others took to the streets with their backlog of unresolved demands and with their learned ideas that extra-institution action aimed at the system was the only way to resolve them.

Brazil's Uncoordinated, Non-System Protests: A perceived decrease in the strength of representation through institutionalized channels for multiple groups (Autonomists/Anarchists, PT Defectors, and the Right) over the course of PT administrations beginning in 2003 created a

more conducive political opportunity environment for initial sectoral protest emergence in Brazil. Then, political unresponsiveness during multiple rounds of sectoral mobilizations left demands unresolved and motivated continued extra-institutional action by some sectoral organizations like MPL in São Paulo and the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro, while political responsiveness made other sectoral organizations (generally from the the Loyal Left) less inclined to protest. Because of varied experiences with political responsiveness across groups and Brazil's federalized system of policymaking that contributed to subnational blame attribution, Brazilian sectoral organizations did not escalate blame to the political system. Brazilian sectoral organizations did not form broad, national coalitions because of unaligned goals, greater ideological differences, and a decentralized political context. As a result, a similarly insignificant transportation fare increase trigger in 2013 set off multi-sector and multi-demand protests in Brazil. However, these protests lacked the system-level blame characteristic to be considered anti-system protests, and they were less coordinated than Chile's 2019 protests.

Chapter 1, Section 5: Methods

I test my argument for the emergence of anti-system protests in democracy primarily through in-depth, over-time analysis of two cases: Chile 2006-2019 and Brazil 2003-2013. As Table 1 indicated, Chile's 2019 social outburst meets all four requirements of an anti-system protest in democracy, while Brazil's 2013 protests are non-system protests because, for the most part, protesters did not direct blame at the political system. Employing process tracing in the two cases highlights the factors that led to protest outcomes with distinct characteristics.

My analysis of the Chilean case begins in 2006 because that year is a key starting point for increased protest action in Chile (Somma and Medel 2017; Fuentes 2020). I analyze three of the most important sector-specific movements in Chile from 2006 to 2019: the high school

student movement, university student movement, and No More AFP pension reform movement, as well as two coalitions that formed from these sectoral movements and participated in the 2019 anti-system protests: the Broad Front coalition and the Social Unity Table coalition. I also analyze the divergent case trajectory of the environmental movement organization Patagonia Defense Council (CDP) and its protests against the construction of hydroelectric dams (the Patagonia Without Dams campaign). Whereas the other sectoral movements examined in the Chilean case ended with a widespread sense of political unresponsiveness, Patagonia Without Dams provides a contrasting example of political responsiveness to a sectoral movement in Chile, as the protests led the government to decide to definitively close the dam project.

I conducted 76 interviews[4] with social movement leaders, protest participants, and academics during field work in Chile or over Zoom between 2020 and 2023. In Appendix B, I discuss the theoretical universe of interviewees for this project that I sought to sample from and detail who I was able to interview as well as noting any gaps in the sample. My interviews sought to representative perspectives from three groups: 1) sectoral movement organization and cross-sector coalition leaders, 2) participants in the protests who were unaffiliated with an organization or new to protests, and 3) academics and political analysts with expertise on the protests. From Group #1, interviewees included leaders of each of the different historical movements (high school student movement, university student movement, pension reform movement, and environmental movement) and coalitions (Broad Front, Social Unity Table) under study, as well as some representatives from other sectors. Given the leaderless and decentralized component of some of the 2019 protests, I also looked to gain the perspective of actors outside of these established organizations. From Group #2, I interviewed the frontline

[4] With the exception of a couple of interviews with academics fluent in English, all interviews were conducted in Spanish.

(*primera línea*) protesters who gathered in Santiago's central plaza each day and participants in territorial assemblies (*asambleas territoriales*) – decentralized, citizen-led assemblies where neighbors met to discuss their grievances and demands starting in October 2019. Lastly, Group #3 drew on the perspective of academics and political analysts with expertise on Chilean protests and politics. I generally identified these actors through my review of the existing literature.

The interviews provided information on the history of different sectoral movements, targets of blame of different actors, historical interactions with political institutions and perceptions of political responsiveness, cross-sector networks, motivations for protesting and forming coalitions, and the strategic thinking and political learning of movement leaders and activists over time. I have included an English version of my general interview guide in Appendix B, which was further tailored for each interview to incorporate questions based on the specific interview subject's background. The interviews were semi-structured. I used the interview guide to structure the interview and to ensure that I covered all key themes, but I also erred toward following up on interesting topics over completing each guide question.

Complementing the interviews, I draw on nationally-representative surveys from the think tank Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP 2019), a report on 1,233 territorial assemblies ("Demandas Prioritarias…" 2021), and surveys of protesters conducted by researchers at the University of Chile (Retamales et al. 2020). I accessed organizational documents and archival material from the No More AFP, Patagonia Without Dams Movement, Social Unity Table, Broad Front, and the Federation of Chilean Student (FECh)[5] movement organizations. I visited the physical archives of the FECh in Santiago during July 2022. I also conducted Twitter content analysis of No More AFP and FECh tweets over the time period to test whether sectoral

[5] This organization is the most important and largest university student organization in Chile.

movement organizations escalated their demands and blame over time when faced with political unresponsiveness. In addition to conducting an extensive literature review of protest theories that cuts across social science disciplines, this paper relies on excellent contributions on Chilean protests from Chilean scholars such as Sofía Donoso and Nicolás Somma.

I employed process tracing to analyze the 2013 Brazilian protests and the preceding period beginning with the first of three Workers' Party (PT) presidential administrations in 2003. I conducted 26 interviews[6] during field work in Brazil and over Zoom from April to July 2023. I spent two weeks in São Paulo and two weeks in Rio de Janeiro. As in Chile, I conducted interviews with representatives from three general groups: 1) leaders of sectoral movement organizations active between 2003 and 2013, 2) other unaffiliated participants in the 2013 protests, and 3) academics or political analysts. Interviewees included representatives of some of the most important sectoral organizations in Brazil: the Free Fare Movement in São Paulo (MPL), São Paulo's Popular Social Health Forum (Forum Popular Social de Saude de São Paulo), Mídia Ninja (an activist media organization formed in 2013), and the National Student Union (UNE). I also interviewed leaders of coalitions such as the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases (Forúm de Lutas Contra O Aumento das Passagens), the Popular Committee Against the World Cup (Comité Popular Contra a Copa), and the São Paulo branch of the Center of Popular Movements (CMP). In order to also hear the perspective of protesters in other parts of Brazil where I was unable to travel for field work, I also conducted Zoom interviews with activists and movement organization leaders in Joinville, Florianópolis, Porto Alegre, and Riberão Preto.

[6] With one exception of a fluent English speaker academic who preferred to speak in English, all interviews were conducted in Brazilian Portuguese.

The interviews served a similar purpose as interviews in Chile, providing information on the histories of sectoral organizations, targets of blame, historical interactions with political institutions and perceptions of political responsiveness, cross-sector networks, motivations for protesting and forming coalitions, and the strategic thinking and political learning of movement leaders and activists over time.

Apart from the interviews, I also reviewed organizational documents of some sectoral organizations (MPL and Popular Committee Against the World Cup) and historical Facebook content of others (NasRuas and Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases). A project by the organization, Escola de Ativismo, provided me with access to a compilation of Facebook posts by movement organizations in Brazil in 2013 (Escola de Ativismo 2023). I also analyzed surveys of protesters and the general population conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE) and Datafolha. I attended and observed the 7th National Congress of the Center of Popular Movements (CMP) in São Paulo on May 21, 2023. Finally, as in Chile, I relied on the outstanding contributions on Brazil's protests from Brazilian scholars such as Angela Alonso, Luciana Tatagiba, and Camila Rocha.

In addition to these primary case analyses, I use Chapter 6 to analyze another case of multi-sector and multi-demand but non-system protests (Colombia 2019/2021), a case that had some of the foundations for an anti-system protest but turned to populism (Venezuela 1980s and 1990s), and a case of anti-system protest in autocracy (the Arab Spring). I also offer a description of a wider set of anti-system and other protest cases in Appendix A. For all of these secondary cases, I rely on existing academic literature, media coverage, and other secondary sources rather than any independent field research.

Chapter 1, Section 6: Contributions

I make six contributions in this paper. First, I introduce an important and puzzling protest subcategory, anti-system protests in democracy. From a scholarly perspective, anti-system protests in democracy raise an important puzzle that I address in this paper: why do citizens in democracy come to blame the political system for their problems? From a real-world perspective, anti-system protests in democracy are important because they pose particularly acute challenges to policymakers: multiple sectors of society are mobilized around various issues at once, and to resolve these issues, protesters want political system-level changes.

Second, I challenge existing literature that suggests that modern protests and revolutions can come together overnight, without much need for formal organization, coalition-building, or collective framing of goals and targets. For example, Beissinger (2022) states that the old forms of revolution have been replaced by the "loose revolutionary coalition—a rapidly assembled and highly fragmented alliance of opposition movements, bloggers, and political figures united only by their common hostility to the incumbent regime. This trend has been further amplified by the rise of the internet as a medium for coordinating revolt: it dilutes the role of leadership within revolutionary movements and accentuates the speed with which diverse oppositional groups can be convened" (pp. 12-13). In a similar vein, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that some modern contentious action is better explained by the concept of connective action – "that uses broadly inclusive, easily personalized action frames as a basis for technology-assisted networking" – than by conventional collective action with formal organizations, brokered coalitions, and group-based action frames (p. 2). I argue that loose revolutionary coalitions or connective action fail to explain the underlying foundations that cause anti-system protests in democracy to emerge. This type of protest emerges as a result of organization, collective framing

and reframing of demands and targets based on interactions with institutions and political learning, and brokered coalitions.

Third, I build on an existing literature (e.g. Koopmans 2004 and Tarrow 2011) that urges scholars to view protests as interconnected waves or cycles of contention. Prominent explanations in the political protest literature often focus on ahistorical, proximate causes of protest emergence: newly-imposed grievances caused by changes in economic context or public policy, influxes in technological or organizational resources, or recent political context changes like the election of a new political leader. By only considering this collection of proximate variables, scholars are more limited in answering fundamental questions related to anti-system protests in democracy that are also important for other political outcomes, such as: 1) how do actors come to decide who is to blame for their grievances? 2) how and why do diverse sectoral organizations forge cross-sector coalitions? 3) how and why do movement organizations choose certain strategic alternatives over others?

Fourth, I contribute to the blame attribution literature. Most importantly, I develop an argument for what causes social movement organizations to change their targets of blame over time. My argument goes against some of the existing literature on blame attribution that suggests that specificity of blame is always more effective in motivating political actions such as protest (Javeline 2003; Ketelaars 2016) and voting (Arceneaux 2003). In instances of target escalation, I argue that the political learning by social movement organizations that results from repeated, unsuccessful efforts to demand political change can make *less* specific targets (such as the political system) more effective mobilizers because aggrieved individuals realize the inefficacy of targeting more specific political actors.

Fifth, my project connects to a broader literature that seeks to understand anti-establishment and anti-system politics. A common focus of this existing literature is to explain the emergence and success of populist candidates and parties. According to some arguments in the literature, crises of representation and political unresponsiveness – also present leading up to the protest cases in Chile, Brazil, and Colombia – are central factors in the rise of populists. Van Kessel (2013) states, "populist parties are likely to thrive when established political parties are perceived to be unresponsive to the demands of 'ordinary citizens'" (p. 179). Berman's (2021) review of the populism literature adds that supply-side explanations for populism "locate the main cause of populism in the decline of responsiveness and effectiveness of political institutions, which has made many citizens willing to vote for politicians and parties with anti-establishment, anti-status quo messages" (p. 78). My project shows that unresponsiveness in democracy and anti-system sentiment can also lead to an alternative outcome: anti-system protest in democracy. The Venezuelan section in Chapter 6 also looks at a case of political unresponsiveness leading to populism instead of anti-system protest. In the conclusion in Chapter 7, I offer some speculative discussion and suggest future research to analyze when these variables lead to anti-system protests versus populism.

Lastly, although my primary outcome of interest is the emergence of anti-system protests in democracy, I develop a generalizable framework for understanding variation in protest and political action trajectories over time after the initial emergence of sectoral protests.

Chapter 1, Section 7: Road Map

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 is dedicated to theory. The chapter considers competing theories for the emergence of anti-system protests, discusses existing literature that influences but differs from my theory, and then presents my generalizable

theoretical framework for understanding variation in protests over time after initial emergence. Chapter 3 presents the characteristics of Chile's coordinated, anti-system protests in democracy in 2019 and then uses empirical analysis of Chilean social movement organizations and coalitions between 2006 to 2019 to trace the process leading to escalation to anti-system protest. Chapter 4 uses historical Twitter content analysis of Chilean movement organizations to provide additional testing of my argument in the Chilean case. Chapter 5 presents the characteristics of Brazil's 2013 multi-sector and multi-demand protests, and then it highlights the role of the different variables presented in my theoretical model in causing this non-system protest emergence. Chapter 6 analyzes three more cases: 1) another case of multi-sector and multi-demand but non-system protests (Colombia 2019/2021), a case that shares some of the foundations of anti-system protests but instead turned to a populist alternative (Venezuela 1980s and 1990s), and a case of anti-system protest in autocracy (Arab Spring of 2011). Chapter 7 concludes by presenting an overview of my empirical findings, discussing research implications, and suggesting directions for future research.

Chapter 2: Theory

This theory chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 presents prominent alternative theories for protest emergence and escalation in the existing literature – grievances, resource mobilization, political opportunities, and repression – and then offers an initial analysis of how well these explanations hold up as alternative hypotheses for explaining anti-system protests in democracy. The section is complemented with a more comprehensive empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of alternative hypotheses in explaining the Chilean, Brazilian, and Colombian cases at the end of the respective empirical chapters and sections. Section 2 of this chapter looks at existing scholarship that motivates my theory, while highlighting the ways my theory differs and offers a unique contribution. Section 3 presents my generalizable theoretical framework for understanding variation in protests after initial emergence. The framework illustrates the processes of protest, political-institutional response, perceptions of responsiveness versus unresponsiveness, and strategic updating that can lead to anti-system protest in democracy or other outcomes. The framework also illustrates the role of networks and goal alignment in determining whether sectoral movement organizations form cross-sector coalitions.

Chapter 2, Section 1: Competing Theories

My theory offers an alternative to several prominent explanations for protest emergence in the existing protest literature. This section considers each of these competing theoretical camps: grievances, resource mobilization, political opportunity, and repression. In addition to presenting and analyzing the respective theoretical camps on protest emergence, I develop alternative hypotheses within each camp for the emergence of anti-system protests in democracy. I further evaluate these alternative hypotheses in the empirical sections.

I argue that grievances, resources, and political opportunities are all relevant to protest emergence, but they are unlikely to lead to anti-system protests in democracy without repeated instances of political unresponsiveness and the resulting processes of strategic updating. Political repression is a secondary variable that may contribute to grievances and draw some former bystanders into the streets during anti-system protests, but it is not a central factor in explaining the escalation from sectoral protests to anti-system protests in democracy.

Grievances

H_{AD} (Absolute Deprivation): The central factor behind the emergence of anti-system protests is worsening macro-level conditions that motivate protest action by the objectively deprived.

H_{RD} (Relative Deprivation): Relative deprivation is the central factor driving anti-system protest emergence. Factors like a growing economy, poverty alleviation, and increased access to education increase expectations while high levels of inequality and poor public services restrict capabilities for many. Those with heightened expectations and restricted capabilities feel frustrated and protest.

The general idea of the grievance literature is that individuals protest because they are dissatisfied. The first wave of modern social movement theories, generally grouped under the category of collective behavior theory (Tarrow 2011) or the classical model of social movements (McAdam 1999), highlighted the role of grievances. Theories within this paradigm – mass society, collective behavior, relative deprivation, and Davies' J-curve theory of revolution – share the idea that macro-level factors, what some authors refer to as "structural strains," are the direct source of protests (Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Davies et al. 1969; Gurr 1971). These macro-level strains, such as the introduction of new technologies, mass migration, industrialization, and economic crisis, create feelings of alienation, anxiety, or deprivation. Protesters go out in the streets as a means of coping with these negative feelings. Some of this scholarship is centered on the idea of **absolute deprivation**, predicting protest participants to be the worst off or most objectively deprived by worsening macro-level conditions. Though the

initial wave of scholarship on absolute deprivation is fairly dated, some recent studies have suggested a direct relationship between macro-level strains and civil unrest (Chassang & Padro i-Miquel 2009; Weinberg & Bakker 2015).

Still focusing on grievances as the primary cause of protests, an alternative idea – **relative deprivation** – is that the gap between expectations and capabilities is the central factor behind protest emergence. As Blumberg (2009) summarizes, "People typically become angry and feel that their situation is unjust when there is a significant difference between the conditions of their lives and their expectations. In other words, people judge the fairness of their social situation and of the society in which they live not against some absolute standard, but relative to the expectations that they have come to hold about themselves or their society" (p. 18).

Relative deprivation and other classical model-based theories propose an overly simplistic relationship between macro-level circumstances and individual perceptions. The causal chain runs from structural strain to psychological discomfort to mass mobilization with what Aslanidis (2012) rightfully calls "naive ease." Empirical research has failed to demonstrate such a conclusive, direct relationship between macro-level proxies for deprivation and protest (see review: De Juan and Wegner 2019). Similarly, while some scholars have argued that higher levels of inequality lead to greater demands for redistribution and participation in non-violent protests or political violence (Sen 2002; Boix 2008), the empirical results are mixed (Nollert 1995; Dubrow & Slomcynski 2008; Solt 2015). In Latin America, Justino and Martorano (2019) show a negative correlation between Gini coefficients and the frequency of protests across eighteen countries in 2010, 2012, and 2014; that is, greater inequality is associated with less protest in their sample.

Regarding the specific task of explaining anti-system protests in democracy, absolute deprivation offers limited utility given the diverse socioeconomic composition of protesters. For example, socioeconomic background was not associated with participation in Chile's estallido social. In other words, many non-objectively deprived individuals participated in the protests. On the surface, relative deprivation is more plausible because individuals representing different background and economic situations, even the somewhat well off, might feel relatively deprived if their capabilities do not match their expectations. However, relative deprivation offers no basis for understanding why social movement organizations or protesters change strategies or targets over time. For example, as I will discuss in the empirical chapter on Chile, the background conditions for relative deprivation existed for many years but did not cause anti-system protests until 2019. Relative deprivation does not explain why frustrated students in Chile would start out protesting their education system in 2006 and then eventually escalate their targets of blame to the political system. It also does not explain how and why sectoral movement organizations in Chile eventually decide to form cross-sector coalitions.

Resource mobilization

H_{RM} (Resource Mobilization): Resources are the primary factor that causes anti-system protest emergence. Factors like economic growth and expansion in educational access increase individual resources for protest, expansion in movement organizations in preceding years creates more organizational resources, and increased use of social media serves as a resource for decreasing the costs of mobilizing.

The resource mobilization perspective usually takes grievances to be relatively static and ubiquitous (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Lichbach 1998). Drawing on the logic of Olson (1965), this approach argues that rationally acting individuals, even the aggrieved ones, often do not have incentives to bear the costs of participating in collective protests. This approach emphasizes characteristics ***internal*** to a movement, namely the availability and mobilization of resources.

According to this paradigm, the primary source of variation in protest activity is whether individuals have the resources necessary to overcome collective action costs (Verba et al. 1995; Rainie et al. 2012). Those who participate are often not the most marginalized or aggrieved, but rather, the well-financed, well-educated, well-connected, and politically engaged. Emerging in the 1970s, resource mobilization theories continue to be used for explaining empirical cases of protest emergence in Latin America (Booth & Seligson 2009; Moseley & Moreno 2010; Boulding 2014), Europe (Anduiza, Cristancho & Sabucedo 2014), and the Middle East (Campante & Chor 2012).

Resource mobilization arguments can be further separated into arguments based on: 1) individual-level resources, 2) organizational resources, and 3) social media resources. The first focuses on resources like a person's time, money, and political interest (Verba et al. 1995). The second focuses on how organizations provide resources such as networks for recruitment, social rewards of participation among organization members, channels of communication, and established leaders (McAdam 1999). And the third focuses on how social media can substitute for other mobilizing factors. For example, Bennett and Segerberg's (2012) logic of connective action argues that "networks can operate importantly through the organizational processes of social media, and their logic does not require strong organizational control or the symbolic construction of a united 'we.'" (p. 748).

The varied socioeconomic characteristics and backgrounds of protesters in anti-system protests in democracy challenges the idea that individual resources are the central factor behind their emergence. While many participants are not the worst off (as absolute deprivation would predict), the Chilean case and cases in Appendix A show that they also are not overwhelmingly middle or upper class and that they also vary on other relevant resource metrics like age,

education levels, and prior experience participating in activism. Organizational resources contribute to the emergence of anti-system protests, but a key question that my argument seeks to address is why organizations decide to dedicate resources to sectoral objectives in one period and then divert resources toward forming coalitions or addressing broader demands in the next. Resource mobilization is limited in explaining this strategic change. For example, the No More AFP pension reform organization and various student organizations in Chile had sufficient resources for organizing massive mobilizations in the years preceding 2019, but resource mobilization as a theory does not explain why these organizations redirected some of their resources to extra-sectoral causes in 2019.

Finally, social media resources may facilitate protest organization, but social media is not a central cause of anti-system protests in democracy. Social media explanations do not consider that anti-system protests in democracy seem to pick up on demands from previous protest waves and that participants are often in the streets for long-standing, unresolved issues that they have protested before. Social media also does not explain why protesters target the political system, and in the case of coordinated anti-system protests, how different groups and sectors forge common political goals and targets to allow for cross-sector coalition formation and action.

Political Opportunity

H_{POS} (Political Opportunity Structure): Anti-system protests emerge primarily because of institutional political opportunity structures that create conducive conditions for protest. Specifically, ideal opportunity structures are characterized by strong protections of civil liberties that remove fear of repression combined with representative deficiencies through institutional channels that lead protesters to view extra-institutional political action as the most viable form of having demands resolved.

The political opportunities approach argues that protests should be studied with a focus on the broader political context in which they occur. The political environment and

institutionalized structures of the political system influence mobilization by opening or closing opportunities for collective action (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 2011).

Much of the political opportunities literature is hindered by its lack of specificity in defining the institutional factors that increase the probability of collective protest. For example, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) say that "any changes that shift the balance of political and economic resources between a state and challengers, that weakens the state's ability to reward its followers or opponents or to pursue a coherent policy, or that shift domestic or outside support away from the regime, increase opportunities" (cited in Tarrow 2011, pp. 182-183). Tarrow (2011) defined political opportunities as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics" (p. 32).

The vagueness of the concept makes it difficult to know exactly what political opportunity means and has also led to a laundry list of distinct variables for trying to capture the concept. Meyer (2004) and Aslanidis (2012) compile a list of some of these variables from the literature, which include: elite allies (to social movements organizations), divisions among elites, openness and ideology of political parties, changes in public policy, international alliances, state capacity, repressive capacity of the state, geographic scope of the state, organizations of previous challengers, activities of countermovement opponents, and the perceptions of political opportunity by activists. Such a laundry list of factors makes the political opportunity concept unwieldy.

Furthermore, scholars in the political opportunity camp do not offer clear predictions about what degree of political openness is most conducive to protest. Some scholars argue that open political systems (where political opportunity is high) are most conducive to mobilization because citizens can protest without much fear of repression and because citizens think decision

makers will be responsive to civic mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1995; Schock 1999; Rootes 2003; Dalton et al. 2010). Others argue that closed political systems (where political opportunity is low) are most conducive to protest activity because these systems close off opportunities for political action through institutionalized channels, thus forcing citizens to take to the streets to garner a response to their demands (Kitschelt 1986; Brockett 1991). Still others hold that there is a curvilinear relationship between the openness of the political system and protest activity: protest is too risky and unlikely to succeed in the most repressive authoritarian regimes, but citizens in open democracies can simply use institutionalized channels, like voting, to influence politics. Thus, this third set of scholars argue, protest emergence should be most likely in mixed regimes (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; Muller and Seligson 1987; Tilly 2006).

I argue that the conceptual vagueness and the laundry list of variables incorporated within political opportunity lead to these divergent conclusions about which systems are most conducive to protest. Scholars find different results based on which variables that they decide to focus on. For example, a political system may be open in terms of the political opportunity variable "state's capacity and propensity for repression" (McAdam 1996) while it is closed on variables like "the capacity of a political system to convert demands into policy" (Kitschelt 1986). Depending on which component of political opportunities that scholars decide to use, they might argue that low, medium, or high levels of political opportunity cause anti-system protests in democracy.

Thus, Cummings (2023)[7] proposes a recasting of political opportunity to improve the precision of the concept, organizing it along two dimensions: rights to protest and representation through other channels. The *rights to protest* dimension considers the extent to which political

[7] This is a working paper on recasting the concept of political opportunity.

institutions protect the civil liberties of citizens. I expect this dimension of political opportunities to affect protest emergence through two mechanisms. First, this dimension affects organizational resources. Where the state protects civil liberties, citizens should be able to more easily form social movement organizations that facilitate collective action. Second, this dimension affects protesters' calculation, "If I protest, what is the probability that I will face government repression?" In cases of strong rights, protesters should perceive a lower probability of repression and thus, on average, be less deterred from protesting. The *representation through other channels* dimension considers how easily citizens can resolve their demands without protesting. This dimension recognizes that protest is not the only form of political action and considers protesters' calculation, "Do I need to bear the costs of protesting, or can I get what I want through other means?" For example, in cases in which citizens feel like their political parties represent them well or that voting is an effective way to hold the state accountable, protest might not be viewed as necessary. The two dimensions have contrasting effects. I expect high levels of political opportunity in terms of rights to protest and low levels of opportunity in terms of representation through other channels to be most conducive to protest emergence. Table 2 presents the hypothesized conduciveness of different political environments to protest based on high and low levels on the two proposed axes of political opportunity.

Table 2: Axes of Political Opportunity and Conduciveness to Protest

	Low Rights	**High Rights**
High Representation	Inconducive environment to protest	Moderately conducive environment to protest
Low Representation	Moderately conducive environment to protest	Highly conducive environment to protest

To be able to precisely analyze how well political opportunity explains the emergence of anti-system protests in democracy, I use this recasting of the concept. As I will evidence in the

empirical chapters, Chile and Brazil both combined low representation and high rights. These highly conducive political environments contributed to initial protest onset in both contexts.

Yet, political opportunity still faces limitations in explaining the emergence of anti-system protests. The main limitation is that the concept offers no explanation for variation in protests over time, such as why some sectoral protests escalate to anti-system protests and others do not. For example, despite virtually the same opportunity environment of low representation and high rights, the No More AFP movement in Chile protested strictly for pension reform in 2013 and organized a coalition for broader system-level reform in 2019. Within a political opportunity framework, the most plausible explanation would be that multi-sector protests emerge as more groups begin to face the low representation but high rights political environment. But the summation of additional aggrieved groups over time was not the central factor in Chile's anti-system protest emergence. Rather, the strategic updating of the discontented and already mobilized was the relevant shift that facilitated the 2019 anti-system protests.

Political Repression

H_{PR} (Political Repression): *The central reason that lower-level protests escalate to anti-system protests is that illegitimate repression by the state intensifies grievances, adds to support for protests from the previously demobilized, and decreases trust in the government.*

A long-standing literature looks at the relationship between state repression and protests. Most importantly for this project's focus on explaining the emergence of anti-system protests and other multi-sector protests that escalate from previous protest waves (Brazil and Colombia), a subset of this literature looks at the question of when repression increases mobilization or drives additional participation in existing protests. Koopmans (1997) finds that situational police repression in response to mobilization had an escalating effect on mobilizations of the extreme

right in Germany between 1990 and 1994, whereas institutional repression like banning organizations and court rulings against activists decreased mobilization. Looking at the Arab Spring, authors reach different conclusions on the role of repression. Alimi and Meyer (2011) argue that where the state could more reliably depend upon brutal repression, like in Iran, dissidents were more effectively stifled. On the other hand, Lawrence (2017) argues that among those with social ties to first movers, regime efforts to brutally repress protests produce more support for new protests.

Most commonly, scholars within this literature argue that the effect of repression on mobilization is conditional on a set of additional factors. Opp and Roehl (1990) argue that repression has a direct negative effect on future protest because it introduces an additional cost. However, looking at the case of anti-nuclear protests in West Germany, the authors argue that if members of a group support a protest and consider the repression to be illegitimate, then repression can have an opposite, mobilizing effect. Similarly, Hess and Martin (2006) argue that repressive events can "backfire" (lead to more mobilization) when the repression is publicized and perceived as unjust. Aytaç and Stokes' (2019) costly abstention theory points out that repression drives up the costs of participating in protests, but it also drives up the costs of staying on the sideline or abstaining from protests. Thus, repression has a mobilizing effect on bystanders under conditions in which abstention is costlier: when bystanders share movement goals or feel an affinity with protesters. Their observational and experimental results in the cases of Turkey's Gezi uprising in Summer 2013, Brazil's protests in 2013, and the Euromaiden protests in Ukraine support the argument that repression only mobilizes bystanders who share the movement's goals.

Finally, Kang (2023) offers the most direct counterargument to this paper's argument about the causes of anti-system protests in democracy. Kang divides movements between reformist campaigns – that assume incumbent governments can resolve their problems – and maximalist campaigns – that do not think the incumbent government can respond to their demands and thus look to replace or overthrow the government. Not all maximalist campaigns are anti-system, but there is a clear escalation toward anti-system protest moving from Kang's category of reformist to maximalist campaigns. Kang's explanation for this escalation is, "movements are more likely to escalate their demands when the state responds to the initial nonviolent action with a disproportionate use of force, because such an action intensifies the grievances the protesters have against the state and betrays the remaining trust that people might have had in the government" (p. 1). Using a regression analysis of protests in all countries in the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) database between 1955 and 2018, Kang finds that in the aggregate, the odds of a movement escalating its demands increase significantly in response to disproportionate force (p. 10).

As I will discuss in the empirical sections, in the cases most thoroughly analyzed in this paper – Chile, Brazil, and Colombia – repression was significant and viewed as disproportionate and illegitimate by many protesters and non-protesters. The question is whether repression was viewed as wrong and thus angered protesters and drew some additional former bystanders to the streets, or whether repression transformed what would have been sectoral protests into anti-system protests in the Chilean case and multi-sector protests in the Brazilian and Colombian cases. In all three cases, I find that it was the former: repression likely increased support for the protests and provided an additional motive for mobilization, but it was not the central factor in explaining these protest escalations. In Brazil and Chile, police brutality after the protests began

led protesters to incorporate repression-related grievances and demands, but survey and interview data suggests that these demands did not become the priority or central motive of protesters. In Colombia, grievances related to political rights and police reform became a more central issue following the repressive response to protests in 2019 and 2021. However, the major cross-sector protest coalition, CNP, formed and succeeded in mobilizing massive numbers of citizens in multi-sector and multi-demand protests before the repression provided additional fuel for grievances. In Chile I find that political system blame was the result of a process of repeated episodes of protest and political unresponsiveness that occurred in years prior to the repression in 2019. Repression did not drive system-level blame.

In short, grievances, resource mobilization, and political opportunity structure all contribute to initial sectoral protest emergence and serve as relevant background conditions in understanding anti-system protests in democracy. No anti-system protest in democracy emerges without multiple aggrieved groups with sufficient resources to protest, and conducive political environments increase the likelihood that these groups will turn to protest. Likewise, repression draws additional supporters and adds to the grievances of the already mobilized. However, as standalone hypotheses or jointly, these variables are unlikely to produce anti-system protests in democracy without repeated instances of political unresponsiveness that drive the processes of strategic updating across sectors. Escalations to massive, multi-sector and multi-demand protest (like the cases of Brazil 2013 and Colombia 2019/2021) are also unlikely to occur without repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness across multiple sectors or groups. Even when it does not drive target escalation, unresponsiveness is central to different sectors accumulating unresolved demands and developing a tactical preference for extra-institutional action.

Chapter 2, Section 2: Influencing Literature

In addition to challenging some existing explanations, my theoretical framework builds on the literatures on political learning, blame attribution, framing, and others. Though existing contributions in these literatures motivate the argument, this section also highlights specific ways that my argument differs or offers a unique contribution.

Political learning

My argument builds on political science literature on political learning from authors such as Bermeo 1992, Levy 1994, and Bennett 2005. Levy (1994) defines learning as a "change of beliefs (or in degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of experience" (p. 283). McCammon (2003) and Almeida (2008) provide examples of social movement actors learning from past protests. McCammon (2003) argues that women's suffrage organizations were more likely to change tactics after a political defeat. Almeida (2008) details how organizations in El Salvador and Costa Rica sought external allies following political defeats in previous protest rounds. Almeida adds that mutual awareness in the larger social movement sector and favorable public opinion allowed for this organizational adaptation over time (Almeida 2008, p. 183). The learning component of my framework, what I call strategic updating, advances these contributions by specifying: 1) what protesters learn from (past protest episodes, political-institutional response, and observations of other movements), 2) the constraints on learning or acting on lessons (ideology and mobilizational capacity), and 3) specific strategic alternatives that learning processes lead to (tactical or target updating). I also differ from Almeida (2008) in that I argue that "mutual awareness" is insufficient for coalition formation after past failed protest episodes unless there is also goal alignment.

Blame Attribution

Secondly, the target escalation component of my framework builds on the existing literature on blame attribution. Existing literature argues that externalization of blame is critical to politicizing a shared grievance; in order to effectively mobilize, movements must develop "adversarial attributions" that blame an external target (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Within political science, scholars also point to the importance of specificity of blame in motivating political actions such as protest (Javeline 2003; Ketelaars 2016) and voting (Arceneaux 2003).

I offer three novel contributions. First, I build a typology of potential levels of external targets of blame. Second, I argue that the political learning that results from repeated unsuccessful efforts to demand political change can lead to shifts in the target of blame over time. In the case of blame escalation, this learning process can make *less* specific targets (such as the political system) more effective mobilizers because aggrieved individuals realize the inefficacy of targeting more specific political actors. Thus, specificity in blame is not always more effective. Third, I develop an argument for how social movement actors come to see the political system as the primary target of blame in the context of representative democracies.

Framing

Framing is the "construction of an interpretive scheme that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). My argument aligns with the general framing perspective that protest motivations do not arise automatically from material conditions, but rather, are the result of "interactively-based interpretation or signifying work" (Snow et al. 2018, p. 393). Furthermore, a proponent of framing may argue that my idea of strategic updating is best viewed as a frame

alignment process: a strategic effort by movement organizations to link their interests and goals in order to draw in supporters and resources (Snow et al. 1986).

However, a key concern of my framework is to explain where these strategies come from, a shortcoming of the framing literature. Some scholars suggest that social movement leaders are simply able to develop the frame that will best mobilize followers. In these accounts, framing seems to depend largely on the ingenuity of movement elites. For example, Silva (2009) argues that issue framing was a necessary condition for rebuilding the popular sector ahead of anti-neoliberal contention in Argentina. The author's answer to how the Argentine Workers Central was able to build a mass movement despite lacking allies in organized labor centers is organizational brilliance, "Innovative issue framing solved the problem" (2009, p. 62). Other authors argue that the political, cultural, and economic context shape framing choices (Ferree 2003; McCammon et al. 2004; Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005; Aslanidis 2016). Yet, different Chilean movement organizations updated their framing multiple times without facing significant changes in economic or political conditions. Other scholars argue that the organization's ideological orientation is the primary factor affecting framing (Haines 2006; Downey and Rohlinger 2008). However, different movement organizations in Chile changed their framing of grievances over time despite maintaining a similar ideology. In short, while my framework incorporates ideology and the external environment like some framing scholars, I offer a novel, learning-based framework for explaining how and why movements update their strategies.

Other relevant contributions

Several other concepts and works influence but differ from my theoretical framework. I borrow from Ruud Koopmans' (2004) idea of "waves of contention" and Sidney Tarrow's (2011) idea of "cycles of contention" in the sense that I look at different protest waves as being

connected over time, rather than analyzing movements as unrelated to each other. Tarrow (2011) also argues that system-threatening claims are generally preceded by narrower and group-specific demands, but Tarrow's explanations for how protests move from the specific to the general differ from the arguments presented in this paper.

Rossi (2016) proposes that "repertoires of strategies", the set of available options for strategic action, are based on a collective actor's "stock of legacies", or "the concatenation of past struggles, which, through the sedimentation of what is lived and perceived to be lived as well as what is intentionally learned, produces an accumulation of experiences that adds or eliminates specific strategies" (p. 31). My framework shares the idea that movements develop strategies through historical learning processes. However, whereas my framework focuses on shorter-term processes of updating and learning that take place by the same organizations across iterative protest episodes, Rossi emphasizes longer-term historical legacies. Though these legacies likely influence strategic action, my framework seeks to show why and how protesters with the same long-term legacies adjust strategies based on more recent learning experiences.

Keck and Sikkink's (1999) concept of the boomerang pattern to explain the conditions that make international networks possible offers a somewhat similar dynamic to blame escalation as an institutional political response causes groups to escalate their claims, in this case from the national to international level. They state, "When a government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas. They may seek international connections to express their concerns and even to protect their lives" (p. 93). In other words, one could say that a sort of domestic political unresponsiveness is a motivating political context that drives international action in these

authors' theory. The difference is that political unresponsiveness in my theory escalates claims to higher levels domestically rather than moving from domestic to international.

Lastly, within the Chilean protest literature, Donoso's (2017) analysis of Chile's student movement from 1990 to 2014 shares with my paper a focus on movement strategies and the argument that past experiences, including interactions with institutional politics, help shape changes in strategies. However, whereas Donoso seeks to explain one movement's adoption of "insider" and "outsider" strategies, my paper seeks to develop a general theoretical framework for understanding how and why different movements strategically update, escalate blame, and develop cross-sector coalitions.

Chapter 2, Section 3: Theoretical Framework

The two parts of my argument diagram below provide my generalizable framework for understanding variation in protests over time after the initial emergence of sectoral protests. Figure 1 illustrates the processes of protest, political-institutional response, perceptions of responsiveness versus unresponsiveness, and strategic updating. It also points to other, secondary contributing factors to strategic updating: mobilization capacity, organization ideology, lessons from previous episodes of protest experience, and observations of other protests. Figure 2 illustrates how cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment affect whether strategic updating leads to more sectoral protest or cross-sector coalition protests. I will use the framework summarized in these figures as a basis for examining the Chilean estallido social in 2019 (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), the Brazilian protests in 2013 (Chapter 5), and the Colombia, Venezuela, and Arab Spring cases (Chapter 6).

Anti-system protests in democracy are one potential outcome that results from this framework, when multiple sectors perceive political unresponsiveness, accumulate demands, and

strategically update through extra-institutional tactics and blame directed at the political system. If different sectors share networks and goals, then cross-sector coalitions form and help lead the anti-system protests (*coordinated, anti-system protests, e.g. Chile*).[8] Sectoral protests can also escalate over time into multi-sector and multi-demand protests without blame directed at the political system. I look at such cases of escalation that fall short of anti-system protests with the cases of Brazil and Colombia.

Figure 1: Argument Diagram Part 1



Protests: This framework does not delineate the specific factors that lead to initial protest emergence. Theories in the existing social movement literature – relative deprivation, political opportunity, and resource mobilization – help explain the emergence of protests.[9] However, anti-system protests in democracy, and even multi-demand, multi-sector protests not directed at the political system, emerge out of previous protest episodes and provide greater challenges for existing theories. Thus, the framework focuses on explaining variation in protest trajectories after initial emergence. In the cases of Chile, Brazil, and Colombia initial protests started out at the sectoral or issue-specific level, and this framework expects this to often be the case because it is

[8] This paper does not offer a case of uncoordinated, **anti-system** protest. However, the Brazilian case illustrates the processes leading to uncoordinated protests of multiple sectors with wide-ranging demands.
[9] I consider the role of these variables in the alternative hypotheses section of the empirical chapters.

easier to start out mobilizing with the same group or around a specific issue that affects sectoral interests.

Political-Institutional Response: The second step in the model is the political-institutional response to protests. Institutional actors – presidents, congress, local officials, courts – have a range of options in responding to a protest movement: ignoring the protests, repressing, offering concessions, negotiating, or some combination of responses.

Perception of Political Responsiveness Versus Unresponsiveness: The dichotomous "perception of responsiveness versus unresponsiveness" variable represents the perception of movement organizations about whether their demands have been adequately resolved by their institutional counterparts through the political-institutional response to sectoral protests. The expectation is that these perceptions have distinct effects on strategic updating. For example, if the widespread perception is that institutions were responsive, then protesters are more likely to stop protesting, direct demands toward institutionalized channels, or move on to new issues. Even in cases in which a form of responsiveness, like offering negotiation, provides additional resources and power to protesters, this strategy is more likely to decrease protest action in the longer term. For example, Garay (2007), in discussing the Argentine unemployed workers movement, states that government negotiation "strengthened unemployed groups…and initially fostered more mobilization on the part of groups seeking benefits…" but "it gradually led to conflict resolution through institutionalized channels" (p. 308).

If there is a widespread perception of unresponsiveness, then protesters should be more inclined to keep protesting, avoiding the use of ineffectual institutional action channels while seeking alternative extra-institutional methods to have their demands resolved. One example of this is the pension reform movement in Chile engaging with Bachelet's Bravo Commission for

pension reform but then losing faith in this type of forum and turning to street protests when the commission led to no changes. The judgment of responsiveness within a movement is not always unanimous, and divisions can also affect strategic updating and subsequent actions. For example, members of Chile's main high school student movement organization in 2006 were divided in their opinions on the Bachelet administration's concessions (Donoso 2013). As expected, those that perceived political responsiveness decided to stop protesting. This division placed constraints on members who felt that the institutional response was inadequate because they did not have the support of many members to continue organizing mass protests (**decreased mobilization capacity**).

One potential counterargument to the prediction in this step is that repeated political unresponsiveness can potentially cause frustration among protesters, leading some to give up on demanding change *because of* political unresponsiveness. The framework addresses this point in two ways. First, **mobilization capacity** is included as a separate variable contributing to strategic updating. Whether affected by protest exhaustion or other factors, mobilization capacity is a separate force that may constrain strategic updating. Secondly, frustrated protesters may temporarily give up and decide to take a break from the next strategic action, but the framework is iterative. Frustrated former protesters are not as likely as responsiveness-induced appeased former protesters to stay on the sidelines of protest in the long term or to address future problems through institutional channels. Rather, they more often remain as a disgruntled group ripe for participation in future extra-institutional action once they overcome temporary frustration or exhaustion.

A second potential question related to this step is how the framework considers repression. First, as noted in the framework, **political-institutional response** may also have a

direct effect on **mobilization capacity** that is unmediated by perceptions of unresponsiveness. For example, the political-institutional response of mass jailing, disappearances, or killing of protesters may reduce mobilization capacity. In understanding anti-system protests in democracy, this direct effect should be lower given the scope of democratic and semi-democratic contexts. On the other hand, despite the risks for protesters, repression is a form of unresponsiveness and thus the framework predicts it to motivate more extra-institutional action through perceptions of unresponsiveness, conditional on restrictions related to mobilization capacity.

Strategic Updating: The two forms of strategic updating are 1) tactics and 2) targets of blame. Tactics are the form of political action that a movement organization employs to bring about change, including mass marches, strikes, sit-ins, or non-protest actions such as collectively voting for a political candidate or joining a political party. The target of blame is the political unit to which action is directed to bring about political change. Protesters may decide to adjust tactics, targets, both, or neither.

Perception of political responsiveness versus unresponsiveness is a key factor that affects strategic updating, but other factors also influence the variable. Strategic updating is also informed by the **lessons from past protest episodes** and **observations of other protests**. Furthermore, some organizations may be constrained in their strategic updating possibilities by, for example, opposition to violent tactics (**organizational ideology**) or may not have the supporters to organize mass marches (**mobilization capacity**). Conditional on flexibility in terms of ideology and capacity, the framework expects perceptions of political unresponsiveness to lead to more extra-institutional actions and/or blame escalation over time. Specifically, repeated

experiences with unresponsiveness may lead to a sense of exhaustion of tactical alternatives, leading to a shift in targets of blame to a higher level.

Table 3 below outlines the different levels of targets of blame. In part due to the centralization of politics in Chile, movement organizations under study in Chapter 3 and 4 directed blame at Level 2 or Level 3. However, the Brazilian case analysis, in Chapter 5, offers examples of Level 1 targeting.

Table 3: Blame Categorization Typology

	Level 1	**Level 2**	**Level 3**
Target	Subnational Political Actors (local or state government officials and policymakers)	National Political Actors (president, congress, courts, national political parties)	Political-Institutional System (political system or institutions in a broad sense are the source of injustices)

Protests: Strategic updating always has the potential to lead to additional protests. However, the model connects strategic updating back to protests with a dotted line because updated strategies may or may not include continued protests. Actors can also pursue institutional strategies and/or decide that the best strategy is to stop protesting.

Figure 2 focuses specifically on two variables – cross-sector goal alignment (motivation to build a coalition) and cross-sector networks (capacity to build a coalition) – that determine whether the next round of protest after strategic updating will be sectoral protest or cross-sector coalition protests.

Figure 2: Argument Diagram Part 2



Cross-sector goal alignment: The first necessary variable for coalition formation is goal alignment, the motivational component of coalitions. For example, if one organization is focused on environmental reform and another organization is focused on pension reform, then this goal divergence can impede coalition formation and lead to continued protest by sector. The process of strategic updating may lead organizations that previously viewed their goals as distinct to align. For example, political unresponsiveness eventually led No More AFP and many other organizations to escalate their targets of blame to Chile's political system. As a result, distinct groups were motivated to form the Social Unity Table in 2019 because they aligned in their goals of broader political system reform that traversed sectors.

Cross-sector networks*:* Cross-sector goal alignment is a necessary but insufficient condition, as cross-sector coalition protests also require cross-sector networks. Goal alignment may motivate different sectors to start building networks with each other, but these networks are not an automatic result of goal alignment. Brokers with connections to multiple organizations (Obach 2004; Borland 2010), interactions in previous protest episodes (Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke &

Amos 2017; Reich 2017), and preexisting social ties outside of movement organizations (Brooker and Meyer 2019) all help facilitate cross-sector networks.

As the case analysis in Chapter 3 discusses, cross-sector networks were less of a barrier for Chilean social movement organizations that formed coalitions, as they had the networks in place for many years. But Chile is a centralized context, with much of the protest activity since 2006 taking place in the capital city of Santiago. As one less centralized example, Arce (2015) discusses how geographically-segmented protests in Peru form spontaneously around specific grievances and lack coordinating bodies. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, Brazilians also lacked more national-level networks to faciliate broad, national coalitions. Cross-sector networks are more difficult to form in these less centralized contexts, even if the groups have aligned goals.

In short, this two-part framework explains the variation in political protest trajectories in democracies after initial emergence, showing the factors that cause some protests to end or find institutional outlets, while others continue in subsequent rounds as either sectoral or cross-sector protests. Critically, individual sectoral protest movements are each going through the processes in the first part of the framework (Figure 1). The perception of political unresponsiveness and subsequent continuance of extra-institutional action by one or two protest movements is unlikely to lead to anti-system protest if the government is politically responsive to other movements. A democracy becomes ripe for an anti-system protest when its institutions repeatedly lead distinct protest movements to perceive political unresponsiveness and thus cause these movements to all strategically update in the direction of more extra-institutional action and blame escalation.

Chapter 3: Chile's 2019 Anti-System Protests in Democracy

Section 1 considers the characteristics of Chile's anti-system protests in democracy in 2019. Section 2 provides my argument for the central causes of escalation from sectoral protests to anti-system protest between 2006 and 2019. Section 3 examines the Patagonia Without Dams movement as an isolated case of political responsiveness in Chile. Section 4 evaluates alternative hypotheses using evidence from the Chilean case. Section 5 summarizes my argument for the Chilean case.

Chapter 3, Section 1: Characteristics of Chile's Anti-System Protests in Democracy

Chile's protests that emerged in October 2019 represent a clear case of anti-system protests in democracy. First, the protests mobilized actors from diverse sectors and backgrounds. The Social Unity Table, an umbrella organization that organized citizen dialogues and protest events starting in October, brought together 182 organizations from labor, student, housing, environment, and other sectors. Cox, Gonzalez, and Le Foulon's (2021) analysis of national surveys of Chileans conducted in December 2019 finds that class, employment levels, and self-reported sense of economic insecurity and debt did not predict protest participation in the social outburst.

Second, the protesters had wide-ranging demands that included health reform, pension reform, education reform, water rights, better wages, housing, and a new constitution, among other issues (Paúl 2019; Retamales et al. 2020). One interviewee recalled a sign at one of the first protests in 2019 that read, "There are so many things that I don't know what to write."[10]

[10] Personal Interview, 2019 Protest Participant and Former Student Activist. December 10, 2021.

Third, many protesters took aim at the political system as the central target of blame. For example, different activists interpreted the common slogan of the 2019 Chilean protests, "it's not 30 pesos, it's 30 years," as meaning that the movement represented a crisis of the political system that had betrayed the demands of the masses for 30 years.[11][12] Reflecting on their own self-organized, citizen-led assemblies (*asambleas territoriales*), neighborhood leaders mentioned that many Chileans viewed systemic change as necessary, and a new constitution as a form of bringing about this change.[13][14]

Fourth, Chile was a representative democracy. Chile received high democracy scores across Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy indices in 2019 and the years leading up to 2019. According to Freedom House's civil liberties and political rights indices that range on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free), Chile was a 1 from 2004 to 2019 (Freedom House 2023). Likewise, the Varieties of Democracy project scored Chile above .8 out of 1 on its Electoral Democracy Index and Liberal Democracy Index from 2006 to 2019, scores that are well above regional and world averages (Coppedge et al. 2023).

Chapter 3, Section 2: Causes of Chile's Anti-System Protests in Democracy

The rest of this chapter presents an empirical analysis of Chilean social movements and coalitions between 2006 and 2019 based on the different components of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 – protest emergence, political-institutional response, perception of political unresponsiveness, strategic updating, cross-sector networks, and cross-sector goal alignment. I argue that these variables are critical to explaining the escalation from sectoral protests starting in 2006 to the emergence of coordinated, anti-system protests in 2019.

[11] Personal Interview, Workers' Movement Organization Leader. January 24, 2020.
[12] Personal Interview, Former Student Movement Organization Leader. January 24, 2022.
[13] Personal Interview, Territorial Assembly Leader in Santiago, Chile. December 2, 2021.
[14] Personal Interview, Territorial Assembly Leader in Santiago, Chile. December 2, 2021.

The analysis starts in 2006 because that year is generally regarded as a key starting point of increased protest action in Chile (Somma and Medel 2017; Fuentes 2020).[15][16] In 2006, high school students – known as Pingüinos for their black and white school uniforms – organized what was then the largest wave of protests in Chile since the return of democracy in 1990. Somma and Medel (2017) state that the Pingüino movement "pioneered large public demonstrations. In the years that followed, protest continued and expanded to other, hitherto passive social groups and constituencies" (p. 31).

I first analyze the evolution of three sectoral movements: the high school student movement, the university student movement, and the pension reform movement. Next, I look at the formation of two coalitions: the Broad Front and Social Unity Table.

Sectoral Protests: High School Student, University Student, and Pension Reform Movements

Sectoral Protests → Political-Institutional Response → Perception of Unresponsiveness

Beginning in 2006, Chile had various protest movements emerge at the sectoral or issue-specific level. This section focuses on three of the most massive movements: high school student movement in 2006, the university student movement starting in 2011, and the No More AFP pension reform movement beginning in 2013. These sector-specific movements in Chile were met by a variety of responses from political institutions, and in some cases the response to a protest movement changed over time. The idea of detailing the different forms of institutional responses to sectoral protests in Chile is to avoid oversimplification and to evidence the nuances in how Chilean governments dealt with demands for reform over the years. Yet, in all cases, political responses ultimately led to widely-held positions within each sector that Chilean political institutions had been unresponsive to their demands. Thus, the key dichotomous

[15] Personal Interview, Left-wing Movement Activist. November 12, 2021.
[16] Personal Interview, Former Student Movement Leader. November 11, 2021.

variable in the framework is coded as "perception of ***un***responsiveness" for all three sectoral movements.

The contrast between variations in responses (including some concessionary ones) and the uniform calls of unresponsiveness across sectors may seem to suggest that Chilean activists were simply playing the role of good activists and incessantly upping the ante to push for greater changes in their favor. If this were the case, it would be problematic for the theory because it would essentially mean that no matter how responsive the government may have been, Chilean activists would have cried unresponsiveness. However, this section makes the case that the protesters' perceptions that political institutions in Chile failed to effectively channel their demands are defensible in all three cases.

2006 Pingüinos Movement: Emerging in April 2006, high school student protest demands initially focused on particular issues like school infrastructure and transportation subsidies but expanded over time to include more fundamental changes still related specifically to the education system, such as replacing the Organic Constitutional Act of Teaching (LOCE) that had been implemented on the final day of the Pinochet dictatorship, developing a centralized, state-funded education system that focused on public institutions, and eliminating government subsidies to for-profit schools (Donoso 2013; Kubal & Fisher 2016).

In April 2006, high school student protests were initially ignored and downplayed by President Michelle Bachelet's government, and the students received negative media coverage for violent action at marches (Donoso 2013). However, by the end of May 2006, over 950 high schools were participating in protest demonstrations around these issues and nearly one million students and sympathizers turned out for nation-wide protests on May 30 (Ruíz 2007). Realizing the strength of the movement and its support from citizens, the Bachelet government offered

some concessions on specific demands of students (like the free student metro pass) and created a presidential advisory board on education to discuss broader reforms. In 2006, Bachelet's concessions created a split between students who judged institutions as responsive to their demands and those who viewed the concessions as insufficient. Education reform bills that emerged from the commission's recommendations were rejected in Congress by the right and some members of the Concertation coalition, leaving the bills short of the super majorities necessary for passage. Bachelet's administration ultimately passed a watered-down General Law of Education (LGE) in 2009.

In the case of the high school students, the 2006 presidential commission on education was an inclusive and participatory institution that incorporated voices from the education sector (teachers, students, parents, and administrators). The outcome of the commission included a set of policy recommendations. However, these policy recommendations ultimately were not effectively channeled through subsequent legislation. The General Law of Education (LGE) that passed in 2009 had to eliminate or moderate many of its key components to pass through Congress, making it so that the final version did not fulfill some of the main demands of students (Kubal and Fisher 2016). Consequently, the common perception among students (and most importantly, former Pingüino university students in 2011) was that student demands were not met by the first Bachelet administration.[17][18] Although the high school students were initially split on whether or not the immediate concessions and presidential commission dedicated to education reform represented an adequate response to their demands, by the time the process of transforming the demands into policy recommendations and legislation in 2009 arrived, former student protesters resoundingly felt betrayed by the outcomes. A former university student leader

[17] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 24, 2022.
[18] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. May 25, 2022.

added that at student organization assemblies and school sit-ins in 2011, university students spent time reviewing the history of the student movement to learn from the experience. Reflecting on 2006, she stated, "Despite all the work to mobilize bases, when you look at the methods of resolution of the protest, the political parties always had the power in the negotiations. And those negotiations were never beneficial for the student movement....In the end, there were not significant changes to the education model, which is ultimately what was being demanded."[19]

University Student Movement: In 2011, university students led a movement for education reform, calling for quality, free, public education, and an end to private profiteering in higher education. Historically, Chilean university student protests were limited to public schools, but this movement incorporated Chile's private universities into a public-private, nation-wide student movement organization (CONFECh). Furthermore, for the first time since the transition, social movement organizations coordinated strategies across sectors, as high school and university students, the labor union (CUT), teachers' union (Colegio de Profesores), parent organizations, and other groups cooperated (Silva 2017, p. 265). The movement included massive, citizen marches and drew broad-based citizen support. However, despite some participation by other actors, the movement was still focused on education reform.

Despite months of protesting, broad citizen support, and some negotiations with the government, the students did not gain the reforms that they wanted from Sebastián Piñera's administration (2009-2013). Piñera's government did not consider a significant overhaul of the education system. Rather, its proposals centered on additional funding for public education, a vague constitutional guarantee of quality education, and a reduction in government-backed student loan rates.

[19] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 24, 2022.

In contrast, Bachelet's campaign for president in 2013 called for free higher education and higher taxes on the wealthy to fund the reform (Bachelet 2013, pp. 16-19). Bachelet's second administration (2014-2018) succeeded in passing a reform that made it so that the poorest 60 percent of Chilean university students could have tuition paid for by the government.
The second Bachelet administration succeeded in passing legislation to partially fulfill the demand of free university education. However, the legislation falls short of universality because 1) not all universities participate because of for-profit status, accreditation requirements, or opting out (only 30 universities out of 60 participated in 2016), and 2) its income cutoff. One analysis finds that by May 2017, the free university program covered 22 percent of all undergraduate enrollments in the country (Delisle and Bernasconi 2018).

Students and former students also felt that the reform tried to provide a market solution to a demand for strong public education. Former university student leader and current president of Chile, Gabriel Boric stated in 2016, "What the government does with this scholarship is give families money to buy education. The education market is still there, the only thing that changes is that the family doesn't have to go into debt but can pay along with everyone else. […] Our struggle is to eradicate the education market and strengthen public education" (O'Boyle 2016). The president of the FECh at the time of the reform in 2016, Camila Rojas, explained in an interview that the students continued mobilizing and were unsatisfied with the outcome because Bachelet's legislation "does not come to be more than a scholarship. A scholarship that is good, that we can recognize that it is helping families and colleagues, however there is no change in the educational structure" (Dedes 2016). Former FECh leader interviewees also talked about how

Bachelet's reforms increased benefits and regulations without doing enough to strengthen public education institutions.[2021]

No More AFP Movement: The No More AFP movement formed as a cross-union movement in 2013 because a new, or increasingly widely-felt, grievance centered on pensions emerged that united the goals of different union leaders. More and more seniors began to retire under the AFP pension system that had been created in the 1980s, and these people began to face the reality of miserable pensions.[2223] One founding leader stated that in 2013, "Each one of us from their position, their union, their federation, had already begun to notice the poor benefits that retirees were receiving."[24] Explaining its basis, the No More AFP movement refers to a profound crisis in the pension system that had been established by Law 3.500 during the dictatorship, and cites specific statistics on the levels of pensions that Chileans received in preceding years (No More AFP 2016). In June 2013, pre-existing public and private sector union organizations formed the National Coordinator of Workers No More AFP. In May 2014, the coordinating body held its first national meeting in Valdivia, Chile, that brought together well-established unions from the public sector – ANEF, CONFUSAM, FENPRUS – and specific workers' organizations from diverse sectors of the economy like the Banking Confederation and Port Union. These different sectors were drawn together by a common, issue-specific grievance of pensions. The founding president of the organization stated, "The characteristic of this movement was to raise a single claim: restitution of social security."[25]

[20] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 24, 2022.
[21] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. July 21, 2022.
[22] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. November 22, 2021.
[23] Personal Interview, No More AFP Participant. May 18, 2022.
[24] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. July 21, 2022.
[25] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. September 13, 2022.

Pensions had been part of the political agenda before 2013, as the first Bachelet administration had passed a reform law in 2008 (Law 20.255). The second Bachelet administration's (2014-2018) response to No More AFP's demands for more significant reform to pensions was to create The Presidential Advisory Committee on the Pension System, also known as the "Bravo commission." The Bravo commission was a group of 25 experts led by the economist David Bravo that met between April 2014 and July 2015 to diagnose the problems with the pension system and propose reforms. The commission's report was released in September 2015, and provided three alternative proposals for reforming the pension system. Proposal A increased contributions to individual savings accounts (12 votes), Proposal B introduced a mixed system, diverting some contributions to a partially-funded alternative to AFP (11 votes), and Proposal C abolished the AFP system and created a new defined-benefit system (1 vote). Proposal C most closely aligned with the No More AFP movement, and with popular views expressed during the citizen participation component of the commission, in the idea that Chile needed a structural transformation of its pension system (Poblete 2015; Barr and Diamond 2016). The Bachelet administration promised to form a committee to review the commission's recommendations and to draft legislation, but this committee did not take shape until March 2016 (Bortzutsky 2019).

The massive August 2016 march led by No More AFP drove Bachelet to call for a national pact to reform the pension system (Bachelet 2016). In the address, she promised legislation to increase contributions by employers, administer funds through a public, autonomous entity, and regulate fees charged by AFP. Though these promises did not go as far as No More AFP's demands, the response may have helped appease some protesters. However, none of Bachelet's pension reform bills succeeded in passing. To explain this failure, Bortzutsky

(2019) points to the costs associated with passing and implementing education and tax reform, internal conflict within Bachelet's coalition about the scope of the pension bill, and external pressure from economic actors. For example, the AFP associations questioned the constitutionality of the legislation and threatened to take the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal if the bill passed.

President Sebastián Piñera took office in March 2018, promising pension reforms. However, the administration's proposed reforms centered on maintaining the current model and increasing employer and state contributions. No More AFP presented their proposal to the new government, but they had their proposal rejected.[26]

Thus, the No More AFP movement had perhaps the most straightforward instance of political unresponsiveness out of these three sectoral movements. The Bravo Commission's final policy recommendations during Bachelet's second administration were more piecemeal than what the No More AFP movement was calling for, as were the reforms by Bachelet in her call for a national pact for pension reform. But even if these proposals could have been considered partial responses, they did not succeed in passing. When the Piñera administration took over in 2018, it flatly rejected No More AFP's proposals.[27] Thus, it is no wonder that one of the founding leaders of No More AFP movement described the situation for the movement in 2019, asking, "For how long are we going to continue marching if we don't have a response?"[28] This remark hinted at the organization's eventual decision to unite with other sectors for change.

In short, the high school student movement that emerged in 2006, the university student movement that emerged in 2011, and the No More AFP movement that emerged in 2013 all

[26] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. November 22, 2021.
[27] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. November 22, 2021.
[28] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding member. July 21, 2022.

concluded their episodes of mobilization with perceptions of political unresponsiveness. The one exception was that a significant portion of high school students in 2006 perceived political responsiveness with the formation of the education commission. However, the commission ultimately led to an unsatisfactory piece of reform in 2009 according to many protesters.

My theoretical framework points to two forms of strategic updating that follow perceptions of unresponsiveness: tactical and target updating. The next two subsections look at the tactical and target updating that took place over time for each movement.

Perception of Political Unresponsiveness → Tactical updating

2006 Pingüinos Movement: When high school student marches were initially ignored by the first Bachelet administration in April 2006, students adopted a strategy of school sit-ins. By the end of May 2006, 320,000 high school students across Chile were participating in school sit-ins (Donoso 2017). These sit-ins provided addition pressure on the Bachelet administration to offer a substantive response to the movement. On June 9, following rounds of negotiation with the government, most high schools decided to end their sit-ins and mobilizations, and students agreed to participate in the newly formed Presidential Commission on Education.

Demonstrating that actors also adjust tactics based on **lessons from past protest episodes** (as indicated in the theoretical framework), one 2011 university student participant recalled the negotiations that high school students ultimately ceded to in 2006. Remembering an infamous photo of the presidents of political parties locking arms in front of the presidential palace after the education reform negotiations of 2006 (which ended up leading to unsatisfactory 2009 reform), she stated that the main lesson was that 2011 could not end the way that 2006 ended. In terms of how to avoid such an outcome, for some university students this meant that

the movement needed to continue pressuring from the streets for maximalist changes, rather than sitting down to negotiate concessions as quickly as the high school students had in 2006.[29] In other words, from this activist's perspective the students needed to focus on extra-institutional tactics rather than combining them with negotiation through institutional channels.

2011 University Student Movement: The actors within a single movement do not always make the same strategic changes to their tactics despite shared perceptions of political unresponsiveness. Following the 2011 protests, different sectors of the university student movement adopted different forms of tactical updating approaches, some of which involved protest and others that involved institutional political action. The former center-left Concertation coalition formed the New Majority coalition ahead of Michelle Bachelet's campaign for president in 2013, and the new coalition brought in the Communist Party. Former 2011 student leaders like Camila Vallejo and Karol Cariola ran for congressional seats through the Communist Party and sought to push for reforms from within Bachelet's coalition once she became president. Another group of former student leaders decided to run for office, but through new leftist parties that competed with the traditional leftist coalitions. For example, Giorgio Jackson founded the Democratic Revolution party in 2012 and ran for Congress, and Gabriel Boric ran for Congress from the Autonomous Left party. A third group that went on to lead the student federation in 2014 and 2015, adopted a strategy of "popular power and accumulation of forces," seeking to continue to pressure for change through popular mobilization.[30]

No More AFP Movement: The No More AFP movement illustrates that the tactics of a movement can be based on both observations of other protest movements (from theoretical framework) and the movement's own iterative experiences with political unresponsiveness. For

[29] Personal Interview, Former Student Activist. December 10, 2021.
[30] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 24, 2022.

example, Rozas and Maillet (2019) points out the organization's emphasis on autonomy from political parties. As one leader of the No More AFP reflected in an interview, the deteriorated image of the central workers' union in Chile (CUT) taught No More AFP to avoid political party affiliation. The leader stated, "political parties end up kidnapping social organizations, they end up discrediting them, which is like what happened to the CUT, which at some point was the largest organization in Chile. It was kidnapped by the political parties....And to save ourselves from that, we decided that we are going to be independent."[31]

No More AFP also updated its tactics in response to the lack of progress on pension reform (**perception of political unresponsiveness**). The movement initially engaged with the Bravo commission, publicly presenting its proposal for a publicly-funded system that would be administered by a public body and financed with contributions from employers, employees, and the state. Movement leaders also met with President Bachelet and called on the president to repeal the Law 3.500, the foundation of the current system, a reform which required initiation by the president and approval in Congress. The combination of the commission's overwhelming support for gradual measures that kept the AFP pension systeem in place, Bachelet's delays in taking legislative action, and the administration's outright rejection of movement proposals helped fuel a tactical adjustment to more street protests by No More AFP (Areyuna 2015). As one leader stated, after the failures of bringing about change through institutional channels, "We were left with nothing more than to continue fighting in the street."[32]

[31] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader and Founding Member. November 22, 2021.
[32] Ibid.

Perception of Political Unresponsiveness → Target Escalation

The other form of strategic updating is target updating. In the Chilean case, blame escalation – a shift in targets of blame to a higher level – occurred after failed efforts to bring about change through tactical alternatives in the student and pension reform movements. *University Student Movement:* Though tactical strategies differed, all three wings of the 2011 student movement began to escalate their targets to the political system during and after the 2011 protests. Replacement of Chile's constitution was already a secondary issue of students in 2011,[33] and former student leaders viewed the failure to elicit change despite massive mobilizations in 2011 as more evidence of the need to change Chile's political system. Giorgio Jackson stated, "in 2011, for us students it was evident, really tangible, that with each new demand we hit the walls of the Constitution" (Donoso 2017, p. 14). Once in Congress, both Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric advocated for a popular constituent assembly as a mechanism to draft a new constitution. The former student leaders from the Communist Party, Vallejo and Cariola, supported Bachelet's proposed constitutional reform process. And though the student leaders who continued in the streets offered less tangible proposals, the message was also one of systemic change. One student federation president in 2014-2015 stated that she felt, "it was not possible to change the model only in education, but rather we had to fight for this relationship between sectors and that deep down a popular movement would rise up to fight for the transformation of the political, economic, and social model in Chile."[34] As discussed in the following section, tactical and target updating to the political system level would lead some current and former students to form the Broad Front coalition.

[33] Personal Interview, Former Student Activist. December 10, 2021.
[34] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 24, 2022.

No More AFP Movement: Likewise, once No More AFP's variety of tactical alternatives failed across administrations, the political unresponsiveness led No More AFP to escalate its target of blame from specific presidential administrations and Congress to the political system. The coalitional effects of this target updating occurred in 2019 when No More AFP called on other social movements to form the Social Unity Table, a cross-sector coalition aimed at transforming the political system and economic model.

This strategic shift is remarkable because, from its formation in 2013 until 2019, No More AFP demonstrated a singular focus on eliminating Chile's current pension system. One No More AFP leader talked about how raising a single demand – restitution of social security – that different unions had in common and putting other political differences aside was key to forming the No More AFP movement in 2013. He stated, "It is a transversal demand that all unions in the country, and the majority of citizens, consider fundamental to restoring rights. Therefore, unions of different types came together, because the only thing we had in common was to fight to restore social security, rescinding the political colors that each of the members of different unions represents."[35] Reflecting on the success of the organization in drawing broad citizen support, one No More AFP leader emphasized that the clear focus on one issue was also a source of legitimacy and support for the movement, "We were an organization recognized by the people, we were an organization that began to attract people's sympathy because we were not a political party, because we did not have an ambiguous discourse. Our discourse was super clear: 'we will exist as long as the AFPs exist. The day the AFP ends, the Coordinator No More AFP will dissolve.'"[36] As late as 2016, organization documents state that No More AFP's "sole

[35] Personal Interview, Founding Leader of No More AFP. August 22, 2022.
[36] Personal Interview, No More AFP leader. November 22, 2021.

purpose is to fight for a Social Security System, which means ending the AFPs because they are the opposite of supportive pension systems" (No More AFP 2016).

No More AFP's strategies before 2019 indicate that its leaders did not think that broad-based changes to the political system were necessary to realize their pension reform goals. The organization targeted the national political administrations of Bachelet and congressional representatives in order to eliminate the Law 3.500. During the 2017 presidential election and following the election of Piñera in 2017, the organization managed a national plebiscite asking citizens to vote "yes" or "no" on ending the AFP pension system. Finally, the group also organized a national participatory campaign to educate Chileans about its proposed alternative pension system and to transform citizen input throughout the country into a citizen-initiated bill for a new pension system (Rozas and Maillet 2019). These participatory campaigns emphasized direct democracy strategies, but the end goal was still to pressure national political targets (Level 2) within the system to change legislation rather than to change the political system itself.

In an interview on Chilean television on September 25, 2019, a No More AFP leader and then spokesperson for the Social Unity Table coalition, Carolina Espinosa, talked about the pension movement's frustration with a lack of responsiveness despite the different strategies they employed across administrations. Espinosa talked about how in addition to protest strategies, No More AFP also put together a technical proposal for a better pension system, "we presented it to the previous government, and to the current government as well. However, notice that nobody listens, nobody listens."[37]

The failed attempts at political change, despite various tactics employed across administrations, led No More AFP leaders to update their strategy from targeting presidential

[37] Carolina Espinosa Interview on Agenda Pública, September 25, 2019. Available at: https://youtu.be/QpfSv_wujNU?si=AY3ZVnfQlklJM6TT.

administrations and Congress with specific, pension reform goals to attempting broader political change that traversed sectors when they led the formation of the Social Unity Table. In its manifesto, the Social Unity Table points to broad grievances with the democratic political system and economic model, "The political sectors, promoters and defenders of neoliberalism, imposed in dictatorship and maintain until today an illegitimate constitution and a social, institutional, and economic framework that prevents democratic changes and the recovery of fundamental rights. It is clear that the current democracy is increasingly inadequate and does not serve popular interests" (Social Unity Table 2019). With the convening of the Social Unity Table, No More AFP was no longer just focused on national-level pension reform.

Cross-Sector Coalition Formation – Broad Front and Social Unity Table

Following strategic updating, if sectoral organizations have both goal alignment and networks across sectors, then the framework expects the formation of cross-sector coalitions. The target escalation step in the iterative strategic updating process – induced by repeated political unresponsiveness – led to goal alignment among different Chilean sectoral organizations. Because many of these organizations already had the cross-sector networks in place to form a coalition in preceding years, the goal alignment represented the critical step to allow for cross-sector coalitions. The cross-sector networks formed through a process exogenous to the strategic updating framework, as many actors knew each other from overlapping in past sectoral groups or mobilizations in Santiago.

The Broad Front and the Social Unity Table were two critical movement coalitions in Chile that went through these processes. In January 2017, fourteen leftist parties and movement organizations met and officially formed the Broad Front coalition.[38] Their founding goals

[38] The fourteen parties and organizations were: Revolución Democrática, Partido Humanista, Partido Liberal de Chile, Partido Ecologista Verde, Movimiento Político Socialismo y Libertad (SOL), Movimiento Democrático

centered on 1) serving as a transformative political alternative to the duopoly (the right and the Concertation/New Majority coalitions) that had ruled Chile since the transition, 2) transforming the neoliberal model, 3) and creating a participatory and democratic force that maintains independence from business power (Manzano 2017; Mayol 2018; Sanhueza 2019). The Social Unity Table formed in June 2019 when No More AFP called on other organizations in diverse sectors of activism – education, environment, labor, feminism, housing, and others – to form a coalition, calling for changes to Chile's political system that "prevents democratic changes and the recovery of fundamental rights" (Social Unity Table 2019). At its peak in 2019 during the estallido social, the coalition included 182 social movement organizations.

This section discusses the role of cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment for each coalition. Then it discusses the role of the Social Unity Table in Chile's 2019 anti-system protests. The Social Unity Table was more directly responsible for organizing and influencing the 2019 protests than the Broad Front, but I discuss the formation of the Broad Front as well because many of the important social movement organizations in 2019 had many members from the Broad Front and legislators like Gabriel Boric from the coalition also pushed for political system change. Furthermore, the formation of the Broad Front provides an additional example of the processes that lead to cross-sector coalition formation.

Cross-sector networks

Broad Front: Ceresuela and Núñez (2017) divides the Broad Front into two main blocs. The first bloc came out of the student movement in 2011. This bloc includes 2011 student federations turned political parties led by the most well-known student leaders in Chile – such as the Autonomist Movement (MA) led by Gabriel Boric and Democratic Revolution (RD) led by

Progresista, Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP), Poder Ciudadano, Izquierda Libertaria, Izquierda Autónoma, Movimiento Autonomista, Nueva Democracia, Partido Igualdad y Partido Pirata.

Giorgio Jackson – as well as the Nueva Democracia, Izquierda Autonoma, and Izquierda Libertaria. One Broad Front militant and former student leader reflected that forming a coalition between these organizations was made easier by the fact that they had already coexisted and worked together as student federations since the 2011 protests. The interviewee thought that their familiarity helped generate trust between members of the coalition.[39] The second bloc, the "Group of Four," were parties that did not come directly from the student protests. Rather, they identified with social fights on environmentalism, defense of indigenous people, and housing rights. One key party in the coalition, the Equality Party, formed in 2010 as a collective group that drew most of its members from *pobladores* social movements of the 1990s and 2000s.[40] As the president of the Citizen Power party discussed, the unity of this bloc "had to do with their trajectories, with common histories."

Despite coming from different sectors and backgrounds, the two blocs had interacted with each other before 2017. One leader from the "Group of Four" pointed to histories of participating in social fights together with organizations that formed the Broad Front.[41] For example, university collectives coordinated actions for education reform with other sectoral movements and also participated in other movements like the *pobladores* movement in 2013-2014 and the pension movement in 2015.[42] But even in cases in which groups had not directly participated in social fights together, there were channels of communication through personal and political relationships.[43]

[39] Personal Interview, Former Broad Front Member and University Student Leader. July 21, 2022.
[40] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.
[41] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.
[42] Personal Interview, Former Broad Front Member and University Student Leader. July 21, 2022.
[43] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.

These collective experiences and channels of communication facilitated the initial meetings about forming a coalition. Boric and Jackson – close colleagues and former student leaders in 2011 who by 2016 were two of the most popular members of Congress – were two critical brokers as they began conversations about forming a coalition in early 2016. Throughout 2016, parties and organizations within and across the two blocs began meeting about the possibilities of forming a cross-sector political coalition. On January 21, 2017, the fourteen organizations held a meeting to make the coalition official and define its objectives.

Social Unity Table: Previous years of mobilization also allowed No More AFP to develop cross-sector networks with other groups to facilitate the formation of the Social Unity Table. According to one founding member of the coalition, many of the leaders of sectoral organizations knew each other from before, dating back to the uptick in sectoral protests around 2011. Some of the organizations had formed smaller-scale, temporary alliances or supported each other in their sectoral fights.[44]

One significant predecessor alliance to the Social Unity Table in 2019 was the Social Table for a New Chile, formed in 2011. The 2011 Social Table included far fewer organizations than the 2019 coalition, but it did draw actors from the workers, student, and environmental movements. Multiple interviewees, including the ones representing other organizations within the Social Table, recognized the students as the key actor who brought together the Social Table with its mobilizations in 2011 and calls for solidarity across sectors.[45][46][47] Apart from showing up to support marches led by other sectors, collective activities of the Social Table included a summit in September 2012 to debate and construct policy proposals and a participatory

[44] Personal Interview, Social Unity Table Member, No More AFP Activist, Feminist Activist. May 4, 2022
[45] Personal Interview, Social Table for a New Chile Leader and Social Unity Table Participant. July 14, 2022.
[46] Personal Interview, Social Table for a New Chile Leader. July 26, 2022.
[47] Personal Interview, Labor Movement Leader and Social Table For a New Chile Participant. August 16, 2022.

consultation to allow citizens to vote for their programmatic priorities ahead of the 2013 elections. The Social Table also supported the launch of the 2013 campaign, "Plebiscite for a New Constitution" that began on July 20, 2013. Finally, the Social Table sought to directly influence the agendas of presidential candidates. The Social Table sent its proposals to each candidate, met with specific candidates (including Bachelet), and published a report evaluating the alignment between the different candidates' proposals and the proposals of the Social Table ("Mesa Social Para Un Nuevo Chile," pp. 12-15).

The Social Table only lasted for a brief period of time after 2011. The groups came together in a moment of high mobilization, but the different sectors quickly returned to focusing on their own agendas and interests.[48] The Social Table shared some characteristics of the later Social Unity Table coalition, particularly in identifying the constitution as a problem. However, the group differed in that it emphasized Level 2 targets (the 2013 presidential candidates) and included far fewer sectoral organizations. Furthermore, those who did participate also continued advancing their sectoral interests from within the coalition and quickly returned to sectoral-level actions and goals after its disbandment, indicating that they had not yet reached the point of seeing cross-sector action and system-level change as the only path to reform in Chile.[4950]

Nonetheless, networks built across sectors through previous years of mobilizations and through the Social Table alliance proved important in facilitating the Social Unity Table in 2019. On June 10, 2019, No More AFP submitted an invitation to other sectoral organizations, calling for each of them to send two members to a meeting on June 13 – to take place in the headquarters of the FECh student organization – to discuss the formation of a cross-sector

[48] Personal Interview, Social Table for a New Chile Leader. July 26, 2022.
[49] Personal Interview, Social Table for a New Chile Leader and Social Unity Table Participant. July 14, 2022.
[50] Personal Interview, Social Table for a New Chile Leader. July 26, 2022.

coalition. In the invitation, No More AFP states, "social and political convergence of social movements and organizations is urgent to defend and recover fundamental rights and deepen this democracy that today it is insufficient. There is no time to remain separated, each one fighting for their own demands."[51] Asked about who they sent the invitation to, one of the No More AFP leaders charged with drafting the letter said that they invited organizations that they had some type of bond or relationship or had worked with in the past.[52] In some cases, invitees had even participated in No More AFP along with other organizations that joined the Social Unity Table, serving the important role of brokers with connections across multiple organizations, as highlighted in the coalitions literature (Obach 2004; Borland 2010). Over 25 organizations attended the initial meeting, creating the Social Unity Table and signing the cross-sector coalition's manifesto.

Cross-sector goal alignment

However, even with these networks in place, it is difficult to explain the motivation for organizing across sectors without a set of common goals. After all, as stated above, No More AFP leadership was motivated by and drew credibility from its singular focus on pension reform. And even for the average sectoral movement organization, perhaps not as focused on singular objectives as No More AFP, the primary goals are often to improve the conditions for the sector that the organization is representing first. As one student activist interviewee reflected, if you were to go to the leadership of various movement organizations in Chile before 2019, "most of them would say that they are anti-neoliberal. But their slogans weren't that they want to change the entire model of the country because, as sectoral organizations, their first objective had to be

[51] Invitation shared by No More AFP and Social Unity Table Leader Interviewee. July 21, 2022.
[52] Personal interview, No More AFP and Social Unity Table Leader. July 21, 2022.

group objectives like free education [in the case of students]."[53] Thus, there needs to be some change that causes groups to put broader demands over sectoral objectives. Target escalation caused by political unresponsiveness provides one pathway to this change, and it was a critical pathway for both the Broad Front and Social Unity Table.

Broad Front: Independently of sector, the actors that decided to form the Broad Front shared a common diagnosis that sectoral street mobilizations had been insufficient for garnering change in Chile. As Campos' (2018) research on the Broad Front concludes, "There's a relative consensus among interviewees in the interpretation that the Broad Front, as a political alternative, has its genesis in the general loss of confidence in the current political system and its representatives as a result of the inability to provide a guarantee or response to social demands, emanating both from unorganized citizens in pressure groups and from social movements of the last decades" (Campos 2018, p. 18). In line with this idea, one Broad Front member reflected, "We began to realize that there was an increase in social conflict since 2006 and particularly since 2011, however, these social conflicts, despite their massiveness and in some sense radical nature, without an assault on institutional politics...they had a fairly low ceiling" (Campos 2018, p. 20). In other words, the actors felt that given their sense that the political system blocked demands originating from civil society, continuing to protest for non-systemic policy changes as they had been doing in previous years would yield limited results.

These past experiences were not unique to the student movement. Thielemann (2018) states, "the different generations of militants who gave shape to this new Chilean left share the fact that their social struggles – for public education, against student debt, against the job insecurity of teachers, for housing debts, etc. – were partially or totally defeated again and

[53] Personal Interview, 2019 Protest Participant and Former Student Activist. December 10, 2021.

again." One coalition member from the *pobladores* movement stated that since the 1990s, "we did marches, land occupations, protests, roadblocks, whatever you can imagine as protests, we did...but we realized that it wasn't enough."[54] Given that the failures of social mobilization were the motivation for the political coalition's formation, Luis Thielemann – historian, former student protester, Broad Front member, and interviewee – considers that the Broad Front "represents a successful birth of a progressive alternative that took place in the middle of a funeral home of social struggles" (Thielemann 2018). Thus, a key motive for forming a multi-group political coalition was the fact that all these groups had faced political unresponsiveness, failing to get what they wanted through years or in some cases decades of employing mostly sector-based street action for change.

However, when Bachelet's New Majority coalition came to presidential power in 2014, some had not yet given up on bringing about change through the existing institutional options. Discontent with the Bachelet government's reforms over the course of the administration (2014-2018) pushed more actors to pursue the formation of a new political coalition. A leader of the Equality Party that went on to join the Broad Front stated, "the New Majority did not meet the expectations of transformation that we had been fighting for over many years. So it was necessary to have a power block outside of the New Majority."[55]

Former student leader, Giorgio Jackson, who led the Democratic Revolution (RD) party in Congress, was initially part of the Bachelet administration's coalition. RD withdrew from the coalition in May 2016 primarily because of frustration with the result of the education reforms. This point again indicates that political responsiveness versus unresponsiveness is a long-term variable. RD was initially coopted by the Bachelet administration, but then ended up leaving

[54] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Activist. June 3, 2022.
[55] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.

because the final policy outcome did not satisfy the student federation turned political party's education demands (Lamb 2020). Months later RD would be one of the founding parties of the Broad Front coalition.

Thus, political unresponsiveness to years of protest and through the second Bachelet administration contributed to goal alignment of different leftist parties and movement organizations. Due to their past failures in sectoral politics, different groups on the left escalated their goals to offering an alternative to the duopoly that had ruled the political system and, through this political alternative, changing Chile's neoliberal model and policies. The president of the Humanist Party, Tomás Hirsch summarized in 2016, "Today we are experiencing a general crisis in the political, cultural, judicial, and institutional system. There is no doubt that the vast majority of Chileans are demanding a profound change in pensions, health education, quality of life, and salaries. We are here to start building a new option for Chile, because we know that the vast majority wants something new. Chileans are tired of the duopoly, which has led us to this situation" ("Revolución Democrática…").

But to pursue their lofty goals of taking on the system, these organizations realized strategically that they needed to form a single, unified front. According to one Broad Front member, the logic that these different groups agreed upon was that taking on the system with smaller coalitions did not make sense strategically and risked leading to the perpetuation of the status quo.[56] As another interviewee reflected, "to confront the two monsters, the right and the Concertación, which had dominated politics since Pinochet... to face those two monsters the need for unity was super evident."[57] Gabriel Boric (IA) and Giorgio Jackson (RD) also had these strategic considerations in mind when they began initial talks about forming the Broad Front in

[56] Personal Interview, Former Broad Front Member and University Student Leader. July 21, 2022.
[57] Personal Interview, Broad Front Member. July 7, 2022.

early 2016, one year before the official formation of the coalition. Despite representing a different political party than Jackson, Boric saw the strategic need to unite to accomplish their goals, "The Izquierda Autónoma (IA) alone is insufficient to confront the advance of those who have inherited the conduct and installation of post-Dictatorship politics. To contest these spaces, it is essential to ally with other actors" (Moreno and Rodríguez 2016).

At the same time, strategic necessity did not mean that these actors would have allied with anybody. According to multiple interviewees, common political objectives and enemies allowed the coalition to form.[58] As a leader of the Equality Party reflected, his party knew that it did not have the political power to accomplish their goals alone, but it also viewed other Broad Front organizations as sharing opposition to neoliberalism, support for participatory democracy, and opposition to both the Concertación and the Right.[59]

The coalition still faced sources of friction and disagreement. During 2016, Gabriel Boric's Autonomist Left (IA) party divided into two parties over disagreements, with Boric's wing breaking away to form Autonomist Movement (MA). One wing of the original IA party, led by former student leaders like Andres Fielbaum (FECh president in 2013), faced backlash from some members for meeting with then Education Minister Adriana Delpiano about advancing on Bachelet's reforms despite the student federation, Confech, calling for a freezing of dialogues due to a lack of advances by the government on reforms aligned with student demands. Fielbaum argued that IA should try to influence the education reform as much as possible, even if the reform was less than what they wanted. On the other hand, Fielbaum's wing accused the Boric wing of the party of focusing too much on broader electoral interests ahead of

[58] Personal Interview, Former Broad Front Member and University Student Leader. July 21, 2022.; Personal Interview, Broad Front Member. July 7, 2022; Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.
[59] Personal Interview, Broad Front Founding Member and Pobladores Movement Leader. June 3, 2022.

the municipal elections rather than continuing the fight for education reform, the issue that had mobilized them all in the first place (Parra 2016).

Apart from these specific frictions, the 14 groups that went on to form the Broad Front in 2014 had some ideological diversity within the left.[60] These sources of friction and disagreement did not go away after the initial formation of the coalition. For example, after the New Majority candidate from the Chilean Communist Party, Alejandro Guillier, advanced to the run-off against right-wing candidate Sebastián Piñera in the 2017 presidential elections, the parties of the coalition could not decide on whether to publicly support Guillier and ended up making individual endorsements rather than a collective choice (Thielemann 2018). The Broad Front would also have some member parties and organizations enter and exit the coalition from its founding in 2017 to the time of the 2019 protests.

Yet, the Broad Front formed a coalition with 14 parties and movements in 2017 and remained intact through the October 2019 protests and beyond. Though a party coalition itself, many members of the Broad Front also participated actively in various social movement organizations involved in the 2019 protests like the Social Unity Table, No More AFP, FECh, MODATIMA, and Ukamau. Gabriel Boric from the Broad Front played an important role in negotiating the agreement to hold a plebiscite for a new constitution.

Social Unity Table: Political unresponsiveness and target updating were also critical to the cross-sector goal alignment of members of the Social Unity Table in 2019. As one No More AFP leader related, "We said it is not enough to continue marching, we have no response from the institutions, we have no response from the power...when we march, they [politicians] applaud us, 'how great that they are marching!'...but they have been useless. That's how we decided that we

[60] Ibid; Personal Interview, Broad Front Member. July 7, 2022.

can't continue fighting alone. And in July of 2019 as No More AFP we called on the rest of the social organizations in the country, who had other demands, to unite."[61] No More AFP continued to organize its own events to push for pension reform as well, but they no longer thought that a sectoral fight for a specific demand was sufficient to resolve their grievances.

Critically for the formation of the Social Unity Table, other sectoral organizations besides No More AFP held the same perceptions of unresponsiveness from political institutions. This lack of responsiveness led these organizations to unite. One leader of the environmental group MODATIMA, one of the initial organizations that joined the Social Unity Table, talked about how the "we're tired, let's unite" (*nos cansamos, nos unimos*) slogan of the coalition reflected the reality that each group had been participating in very sectoral fights over the years, and they were always getting defeated.[62] The spokesperson for the Social Unity Table, Carolina Espinosa, pointed to the March 2019 women's march as the latest example of protester and citizen demands being ignored, "On March 8, we had a wonderful demonstration…in which all the regional capitals of the country went out to march with great force….And just as we have a march for women, we have a march for housing, a march for water and territory…but we are not being represented." The coalition member added that these failures of responsiveness made it "common sense" for the different sectors to unite.[63] The convening manifesto of No More AFP references the failures of groups protesting without unity, and states "we will not remain immobilized and resigned, nor will we each continue marching on our own, with little or no results" (Social Unity Table 2019). Political unresponsiveness was a central factor in uniting the coalition because it made continued sectoral mobilizations seem unviable.

[61] Personal Interview, No More AFP Leader. January 27, 2020.
[62] Personal Interview, MODATIMA Leader and Social Unity Table Member. October 5, 2020.
[63] Carolina Espinosa Interview on Agenda Pública, September 25, 2019. Available at: https://youtu.be/QpfSv_wujNU?si=AY3ZVnfQlklJM6TT.

Furthermore, interviewees pointed out how the past unresponsiveness led to escalation of blame to the political system. For example, one coalition participant, originally part of a smaller environmental group called the Free Seeds Network, stated that different sectors had realized through their consistent failures to bring about change that the problem was not a specific policy or president, and that even having institutional political allies was insufficient, "these social movements all advance, advance, advance, grow, march…until they collide with the constitution. And the majority of the times that Congress or presidents try to resolve the problem, they reach legislation, and the Right stops them declaring that these changes are unconstitutional. The laws to resolve education, health, AFP, and so on begin to collide with an impenetrable constitution."[64] An education sector activist and Social Unity Table member added that the decision to take aim at the system was the result of a long-term learning process resulting from specific sectors failing to garner change on their own and through lower-level targets.[65] This desire to change the system was a key issue that separated sectoral organizations that decided to join the Social Unity Table from those who did not join the coalition.[66]

In terms of why the coalition settled on the constitution specifically as the system-level target of change, social movements in Chile had disputed the legitimacy of the constitution since its drafting in the 1980s.[67] As one analyst put it, for many the dictatorship-era constitution was viewed as the original sin of Chile's flawed democracy.[68] Over the years, social movements recognized the constitution as being used as a key mechanism for striking down potential reforms. For example, the MODATIMA environmental leader reflected that every time they

[64] Personal Interview, Environmental Activist and Social Unity Table Member. December 21, 2021.
[65] Personal Interview, Parent Organization Activist and Social Unity Table Member. August 4, 2022.
[66] Personal Interview, No More AFP and Feminist Organization Activist and Social Unity Table Member. May 4, 2022.
[67] Personal Interview, Parent Organization Activist and Social Unity Table Member. August 4, 2022.
[68] Personal Interview, Political Analyst. December 9, 2021.

achieved a massive mobilization and pressured for reform legislation regarding the environment, "there was an entity called the Constitutional Court that each time said that our reform was unconstitutional."[69] Others found that specific statutes within the constitution made other changes impossible. For example, a CUT labor leader talked about how it was impossible to change the "plan laboral" – laws dictating labor and union rights – without changing the constitution, making constitutional reform the "mother of all battles."[70] Thus, the Social Unity Table took aim at the system and the more concrete political system target was the constitution.

In sum, to explain how the Broad Front and Social Unity Table were able to put together an anti-system political coalition, cross-sector networks and goal alignment are fundamental. For the Broad Front, the majority student bloc of the coalition was built out of student federations and shared experiences that began with the 2011 student protests. Others, like representatives from the *pobladores* movement had also built relationships with students and other sectors through decades of mobilizations. These movements and parties decided to begin conversations about forming a coalition in 2016 because shared experiences with political unresponsiveness led them to escalate to a common set of system-level goals. Groups like the university student federations started out by mobilizing for the sectoral objective of education reform in 2011. But when multiple administrations – including the most progressive presidential administration since Chile's return to democracy (Bachelet II) – failed to effectively channel their demands, they decided that they needed to provide a political alternative that would take on the political system and economic model that was preventing political change. This common political objective, and the strategic understanding that a broad coalition was necessary to have any chance of success in taking on the system, led the Broad Front members to put aside differences and overcome

[69] Personal Interview, MODATIMA Leader and Social Unity Table Member. October 5, 2020.
[70] Personal Interview, Labor Leader and Social Unity Table Member. August 16, 2022.

frictions to participate in an anti-system coalition. For the Social Unity Table, the initial organizations that convened in June 2019 were organizations that had built relationships with No More AFP and each other through previous years of mobilizations. As with the Broad Front, political unresponsiveness motivated the actors of the Social Unity Table to escalate their targets of blame to the political system and to unite in forming a cross-sector coalition.

Role of Social Unity Table in Chile's 2019 Anti-system Protests

The Social Unity Table did not lead the initial protests against transportation fares in 2019. However, the coalition and its member organizations played an important role in organizing and promoting protest events starting on October 18, the day widely-recognized as the first day of the estallido social. The Social Unity Table was also the central social movement actor advancing and popularizing the demand for a new constitution.

The Instituto Nacional in Santiago, Chile's most emblematic high school and a key actor in past student protests, organized the first metro evasion protest on October 7, 2019, in response to the government's fare increase. With coordination support from the Coordinating Assembly of High School Students (ACES) – founded in 2006 and an original member of the Social Unity Table – high schools throughout the city of Santiago replicated the metro evasions in the following week. These same students began organizing more massive evasions on October 14, which began to include participants besides students (EMOL 2019).[71] Other social movement organizations affiliated with the Social Unity Table helped coordinate the metro evasions that occurred on October 18. The image below shows one in a series of posts replicated on social media platforms from ACES, which calls on students and workers to participate in metro protests on October 18 and indicates the time that protests will occur at each metro station across the

[71] Personal Interview, Student Leader. January 22, 2020.

entire city of Santiago. The image on the right shows that other social movement organizations that form part of the Social Unity Table, in this example the Coordinadora Feminista 8M, helped distribute information about the protests to their own networks through social media, indicating the time and place for the metro protests that were to occur throughout the day.

Similarly, the most massive march on October 25, which some estimates suggest mobilized 1.2 million in Santiago and over 3 million throughout the country, was aided by the networks and leadership of the Social Unity Table and its member organizations. The Social Unity Table published social media posts and appeared in the press calling on Chileans to join in the march in the preceding days. The Social Unity Table also directly organized and led national strikes on October 23, October 24, October 30, and November 12. The November 12 strike was the most important workers' strike in the past 30 years in Chile. Three days later, Chile's political parties reached an agreement on offering a plebiscite for a new constitution.

The Social Unity Table also played a central role in advancing the demand for drafting a new constitution. One of the six objectives of the October 23 and October 24 strikes was, "To advance to a National Constituent Assembly that participatively develops a new structural framework of Chilean society that opens the way to a new model of national development that

puts an end to the current unfair and abusive neoliberal model" (Colegio de Profesores 2019). The coalition continued to raise this objective in subsequent protest activities.

On October 23, 2019, the Social Unity Table began organizing and promoting "cabildos abiertos," or open assemblies, to take place throughout the country from October 2019 to March 2020. The coalition would not preside over each discussion, but rather urged citizens to self-organize small groups discussions locally and then submit the results to the Social Unity Table. In a Facebook post from October 23, pictured below, the Social Unity Table presents the general framework for the assemblies and the proposed questionnaire to guide the discussions, including: "What is the origin of the current conflict? What are the priority demands for citizens? Is a Constituent Assembly necessary to transform Chile? What actions can citizens and organizations take to realize their objectives?" By raising the issue of the constitution as a key question in the cabildos, the Social Unity Table helped advance public discussion about this demand. The 2021 report summarizing the results from 1,233 citizen assemblies states that 70 percent of Chileans viewed a new constitution as a priority demand (second to education at 73 percent) ("Demandas prioritarias…" 2021). While it is not clear how many citizens would have mentioned the constitution as a priority without the Social Unity Table's prompting, the prompting about a constituent assembly in the questionnaire likely helped to increase the saliency of the demand for citizen participants throughout the country.

In short, the first marches in October 2019 were not led by the Social Unity Table, but the coalition was a central actor in organizing mass protests during October and November 2019, and in advancing the demand for a new constitution. Evidence from social media shows that Social Unity Table and its member organizations promoted the protests leading up to October 18, and also promoted, organized, and in some cases led massive marches and strikes after October 18. The coalition raised a constituent assembly as a key objective of its protests and also helped to organize nation-wide citizen discussions about the origins and demands of the protests, with reference to the constitution.

Chapter 3, Section 3: Divergent Case Trajectory – Patagonia Without Dams Movement

The student and pension reform movements followed similar trajectories: they started out with sectoral protests, changed tactics in response to political-institutional responses, escalated targets of blame after exhausting tactical alternatives, and, due in part to goal alignment created by target escalation, formed cross-sector coalitions. The Patagonia Without Dams movement

followed a different trajectory. First, due to a common goal of defeating a significant environmental-based threat – the construction of a major dam project in Patagonia – and a powerful broker for building networks, the movement formed a cross-sector coalition, the Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia (Patagonia Defense Council, CDP), at the outset of the campaign. Second, the campaign was a triumph, ending with the closure of the Hidroaysén dam project (**political responsiveness**), an action that precipitated the end of the environmental coalition. Third, however, at the conclusion of the campaign, some key leaders of the Patagonia Without Dams movement still perceived the need for political system changes to protect the environment in the future, based on **observations of other movements** and the unlikely, favorable factors necessary for their isolated victory (blame escalation despite responsiveness). The Patagonia Without Dams movement was a decade-long campaign with various political responses and tactical changes, but this section will focus on these three points.

Protest emergence as coalition-based campaign

The main organization behind the Patagonia Without Dams movement, the CDP, was constituted in February 2007. Over 70 national and international organizations formed part of the CDP, including Chilean environmental NGOs and foundations (IEP, Chile Sustentable, Fundación Pumalin, Codeff), international NGOs (Greenpeace, International Rivers Network, National Resources Defense Council), the archbishop of the Aysén region, tourist companies, and neighborhood groups (Ulianova and Estenssoro 2012). The ultimate objective of the organization was to stop the mega dam project, Hidroaysén, a project that aimed to construct five hydroelectric power plants in Chile's Aysén Region in the Chilean Patagonia. According to the CDP's documents at the time, the campaign's strategic objectives also mention putting an end to,

"environmental destruction of the Chilean Patagonia, electric monopoly, and centralism, that implies the imposition of these megaprojects."[72]

Cross-sector goal alignment: First, to allow for the creation of this broad coalition, the CDP had the benefit of a common goal and common enemy for different actors to get behind. As one interviewee put it, even in the cases of environmental leaders in Chile who had "tremendous distrust between them," everyone could get behind the common objective of stopping Hidroaysén. Hidroaysén was a straightforward sell: a multinational company owned by the Matte-Larraín families (recognizable elite families in Chile) was threatening a symbolically important territory in southern Chile.[73] Even if Chilean environmental organizations and Patagonia tourism companies did not share the same views on all environmental issues, the megadam projects presented a common threat to their industries.

Though working together toward this common goal, organizations were also able to maintain their own identities, which movement leaders argue helped keep the coalition together. The general secretary of the CDP stated that many organizations did not want to participate at first because they were concerned that they might lose some of their identity as an organization by participating in the multi-group coalition. However, the CDP helped overcome these concerns by allowing organizations to maintain their autonomy. In fact, the first principle listed in the founding document of the CDP is independence: "Each participating institution or association freely and voluntarily accesses it and expresses itself independently within a framework of equality, respect and tolerance for the diverse visions and interests that it represents."[74]

[72] Organizational document obtained from CDP leader: "Estrategia y Plan de Acción CDP" (CDP Strategy and Plan of Action).
[73] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 8, 2022.
[74] Organizational document obtained from CDP leader: "Bases Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia"

Interviews suggested that this arrangement brought diverse organizations in and limited the level of conflict within the coalition.[7576]

Cross-sector networks: Second, the CDP depended on networks. Many Chilean environment organizations had participated in previous environmental protest campaigns, such as Ralco, Pascua Lama, Celco-río Cruces-Mehuín, Cascada, Trillium, and Campiche (Rodrigo 2014, p. 121). In many cases, the different actors in the CDP knew each other from these past campaigns, but they had often chosen not to work together.[77] A key to forging a connection and making the organizations work together on the Patagonia Without Dams campaign was one exceptionally important broker, Douglas Tompkins.

Interviewees identified Douglas Tompkins as the key broker for the success of the Patagonia Without Dams campaign. Tompkins was a billionaire, American businessman who moved to the Patagonia region in the 90s and ran a foundation and participated in conservation campaigns. In addition to being respected by many, an excellent marketer, and an able visionary for the campaign, Tompkins was a green billionaire with power in the network through his resources. Tompkins drew people into the Patagonia Without Dams campaign because he was a key funding source for many existing environmental organizations in Chile.[78] As one leader and founder of the CDP put it, "We said that those who wanted to could join. If they didn't want to, they were free to not join. But they ultimately joined because Douglas financed many organizations. Thus, if they didn't join, they could lose their funding."[79] In other words, some

[75] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 8, 2022.
[76] Personal Interview, Leader of CDP. August 26, 2022.
[77] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 8, 2022.
[78] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 8, 2022.
[79] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 17, 2022.

familiarity between movements may have helped, but Douglas Tompkins' presence as a broker and the common goal across groups seemed to be the keys to the formation of the CDP coalition.

Political Responsiveness: Closure of the Hidroaysén Dam Project

The definitive closure of the Hidroaysén project occurred during the second Bachelet administration in 2016. However, Bachelet's Energy Minister, Máximo Pacheco, did not indicate that the administration was altering Chile's general policy towards large-scale hydropower generation (Silva 2016). In isolation, the effect of the dam project closure followed exactly what my theoretical framework expects when movements enjoy political responsiveness: the triumph led to the almost immediate separation of the CDP. By offering a satisfactory policy response, Chilean institutions disbanded a multi-actor protest coalition. As one leader of the coalition stated, "It was a very nice period, but then [with the closure of the project] there was a separation and we have not managed to rejoin forces."[80] The leader noted that the passing of Douglas Tompkins also made things more difficult in terms of brokerage and that other campaigns have struggled to develop clear goals that different actors agree upon as much as defending the symbolic region of Patagonia against a major dam project.

Target Escalation Despite Responsiveness

Yet, despite the experience of political responsiveness in the Patagonia Without Dams campaign, the experience of participating in this and other movements in Chile over the years led some environmental leaders to the same process of blame escalation as it did for students, pension reform advocates, or other sectoral movement actors. Two of the leaders of the Patagonia Without Dams movement even participated in two smaller-scale movements calling for broad political system changes that preceded 2019, the Social Table for a New Chile and the

[80] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 8, 2022.

Plebiscite for a New Constitution, and these leaders were still advocating for these broader system changes when interviewed in 2022.

The key reason is that protests do not occur in isolation: actors observe other movements and the general political context in determining their next course of political action. One of these leaders explained his target escalation despite the success of Patagonia Without Dams in the following way, referring to the political battle for a new constitution, "It's a national issue, knowing that here are the key cogs that stop changes that might favor vulnerable social groups, the poor, the dispossessed, the marginalized, and the defense of the environment. In other words, if we don't change these things, everything is going to stay the same. We won a battle, but there might be 100 more battles and with companies that have a lot of power. We can't win 100 battles. We don't have 100 Tompkins [Douglas Tompkins], who was financing that battle. But if we change the rules of the battle, then we won't need to fight because the rules will stop these problems from coming about. For that, the rights of the environment, and the motive to put these rights in the constitution….If we don't change the rules that are the origin of these problems, we are few and we have few resources, they are very powerful with many resources. We don't have any way of winning."[81]

In other words, this leader sees the Patagonia Without Dams movement as an outlier case that benefitted from favorable circumstances like having a billionaire on their side and thus did not expect similar victories in the future under the current political system. Therefore, he joined other movements in taking aim at changing the political system.

One of the leaders of Greenpeace Chile, who had been involved in multiple campaigns since Patagonia Without Dams, shared a similar perspective, "The achievements that they have

[81] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CDP. August 17, 2022.

had as the environmental movement, in general, are achievements that have managed to stop a project. In other words, Hidroaysén, you did not defeat hydroelectricity nor did you defeat Chile's model of electricity generation based on hydroelectricity. What you did was stop a project. In Chile this is much easier than structural changes." To illustrate the point that Patagonia Without Dams didn't represent a lasting change, this leader pointed to the Alto Maipo hydroelectric project that is being constructed just outside of Santiago – affecting the water supply of a much greater population of Chileans – that the environmental movement has not yet been able to stop. She added, "I feel like we're putting out fires with a water gun. You managed to say no to a project, and 30 more projects appeared."[82]

In short, the Patagonia Without Dams movement is useful for highlighting three components of the theoretical framework. First, cross-sector coalitions rely on both goals alignment and networks, the latter of which can be forged either through previous familiarity and interactions (like with the Broad Front) or through powerful brokers (Patagonia Without Dams). Second, when political institutions effectively respond to social movements, it takes people off the streets and makes it more difficult to organize future protest action. Third, the process of strategic updating does not depend on singular movements in isolation. Despite their successes with Patagonia Without Dams, some leaders who had observed or participated in other environmental and non-environmental movements (**observations of other movements**), viewed Patagonia Without Dams as an outlier victory and perceived institutional barriers to change and thus escalated their targets of blame.

[82] Personal Interview, Leader of Greenpeace Chile. August 9, 2022.

Chapter 3, Section 4: Evaluation of Alternative Explanations

This section uses empirical evidence from the Chilean case to evaluate alternative hypotheses for explaining the emergence of Chile's anti-system protests in democracy. These alternative hypotheses, developed in Chapter 2, are based on leading explanatory theories for protest in the existing literature. As stated in my argument, relative deprivation, political opportunity, and resource mobilization (three of the hypotheses presented here) provide relevant background conditions that increased the likelihood of protest onset in Chile, but these variables – standing along or combined – are unlikely to produce anti-system protests in democracy (in Chile or elsewhere) without repeated instances of political unresponsiveness. I argue that absolute deprivation is not an important contributing factor in the Chilean case, and political repression was not a key factor in the protest escalation in Chile.

H_{AD} (Absolute Deprivation): The central factor behind the emergence of Chile's anti-system protests was worsening macro-level conditions that motivate protest action by the objectively deprived.

Given this hypothesis, one would expect evidence of macro-level strains or depriving circumstances that worsened conditions for Chileans in the period leading up to October 2019. However, in terms of objective macro-level indicators, circumstances in Chile were generally improving in the period leading up to October 2019. Chile experienced a 155 percent increase in GDP from 1990 to 2019 and average years of schooling increased by 2.5 years. Poverty rates fell around thirty percentage points, to 8.6 percent, from 1990 to 2017 (Cox, Gonzalez, and Le Foulon 2021). Looking at more recent trends, Chile's unemployment rate hovered around 7 percent from 2017 to the third quarter of 2019, and inflation stayed between 1 and 3 percent (ECLAC 2019). Chileans also did not perceive the economy to be in dire shape leading up to the

October 2019 protests. In the most recent CEP survey that preceded the unrest, only 18 percent of Chileans thought that the economy was in bad or very bad shape, and 9 percent thought that the economy would be in worse or much worse shape in the next 12 months (CEP May 2019).

Absent broad-based, macro-level sources of deprivation that affected the country as a whole, this hypothesis would expect significant representation of the absolutely deprived, individuals from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, at the protests. Disadvantaged Chileans were indeed part of the protests that began in October 2019. This sector seemed to be particularly strongly represented in the group of "front-line" (*primera linea*) protesters, a relatively violent wing of the movement that gathered in Santiago's central plaza and had regularly confrontations with police. A photographer of the front-line protesters stated that within the group, "There were many people who did not have a home and lived on the street....They were not afraid of losing anything because they had nothing. And the children there were also many times from SENAME [Chile's orphan service] or from the street."[83] Front-line protester interviewees talked about direct, depriving experiences that motivated their actions. One stated that he was protesting because of the unlivable pension that his mother received that did not cover rent and food, and that required him to provide for her.[84] Another told me that if I want to know why they were protesting, I should go to a public health clinic (*posta*) to see the sick people sleeping in the hallway as they wait in long lines for care.[85]

Yet, these specific protesters are not representative of the average protester who took to the streets in 2019. CEP surveys from December 2019 indicate no significant relationship between socioeconomic class and participation in the protests in the preceding months (Cox,

[83] Personal Interview, Feminist Activist and Photographer of Front-line Protesters. November 22, 2021.
[84] Personal Interview, 2019 Front-line Protester. January 26, 2020.
[85] Personal Interview, 2019 Front-line Protester. January 29, 2020.

Gonzalez, and Le Foulon 2021). The protests occurred in the wealthy areas of Santiago and the poorer, peripheral sectors of Santiago and smaller towns across Chile that had not participated much in previous mobilizations.[8687] For some, participation in the protests was not motivated by personal experiences with deprivation. A young professional with a degree from one of Chile's top universities, who protested on a daily basis from October through December 2019, indicated that he decided to participate because he felt that he has lived a life of privileges, but that the Chilean economic model leads to injustices for others.[88] In short, the macro-level economic data, survey data on protest demographics, interviews with protesters, and public opinion surveys suggest that absolute deprivation was not a primary cause of the 2019 protests.

H_{RD} (Relative Deprivation): Relative deprivation was the central factor driving Chile's anti-system protest emergence. Factors like a growing economy, poverty alleviation, and increased access to education increase expectations while high levels of inequality and poor public services restrict capabilities for many. Those with heightened expectations and restricted capabilities feel frustrated and protest.

The expected macro-level components of relative deprivation are evident in the Chilean case. First, Chile experienced economic growth, poverty alleviation, and increased access to education. Poverty rates fell from 68 percent to 12 percent since the return of democracy (UNDP 2017, pp. 19-20). From 1990 to 2015, the number of students accessing higher education quintupled to over one million, and many of these students came from middle- and working-class socioeconomic groups (UNDP 2017, pp. 19-20). Thus, out of poverty and better educated, many Chileans in 2019 may have had more demanding perceptions about "the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are rightfully entitled" (Gurr 1971). In line with relative deprivation, one political analyst interviewee said that the social explosion was in part a "crisis

[86] Personal Interview, Political Analyst. December 9, 2021.
[87] Personal Interview, Political Analyst. January 24, 2020.
[88] Personal Interview, 2019 Protest Participant. January 25, 2020.

of successes," arguing that expanded access to education increased the demands of young people who then passed along these demands to their families.[89]

Chile's high levels of inequality may have exacerbated the tension between expectations and capabilities, as Chileans saw a privileged few benefitting more than themselves from the country's growing prosperity. According to a 2017 report, the top one percent of Chileans control over 26.5 percent of the country's wealth, while the poorest 50 percent control 2.1 percent of the wealth (Paúl 2019). Chile is towards the middle of the pack in Latin America in terms of its Gini coefficient, but it is the most unequal country in the OECD, with an income gap 65 percent wider than the OECD average (Barría 2019; Laing, Sherwood & Cambero 2019). Furthermore, the Chilean state does relatively little to alleviate inequities through public services. Chile's public-school option is inferior, contributing to comparatively high differences in educational performance on standardized tests based on wealth (UNDP 2017, p. 302). The Chilean state contributes little support in pension funds, as eighty percent of retirement-age Chileans receive less than the monthly minimum wage in pensions (Lustig 2020). Differences in quality between the private health system and the public system used by 85 percent of the population is also significant. The public system suffers from a lack of specialists, long lines for care, and extensive wait times for medical operations (Sehnbruch and Donoso 2020).

Chileans clearly perceived these high levels of inequality: 86 percent of Chileans in CEP surveys from 2019 indicated that inequality in Chile was too high (CEP December 2019). In response to a survey question that did not offer any political system or constitutional option, 38 percent of respondents selected inequality as a primary motive for protesting in October and

[89] Personal Interview, Political Analyst and Former Public-Sector Employee. November 11, 2021.

November 2019, the highest response followed by pensions (16 percent), high cost of living (16 percent), and bad quality of health and education (12 percent) (CEP December 2019).

This evidence is all expected by the relative deprivation hypothesis. However, relative deprivation fails to explain two key questions about Chile's 2019 anti-system protests: 1) what led Chileans to act on their discontent through protest action?, and 2) what explains the particular characteristics of the 2019 protests?

As stated in Chapter 2, empirical results outside of Chile have failed to find a conclusive relationship between inequality or other macro-level proxies for relative deprivation and protest (De Juan and Wegner 2019; Nollert 1995; Dubrow, Slomcynski, and Tomescu-Dubrow 2008; Solt 2015; Justino and Martorano 2019). These inconclusive empirical results suggest that it takes more than inequality to drive individuals to protest. Second, Chile 2019 was a case of anti-system protests in democracy, which means that protesters had multiple demands and that protesters directed blame at the political system. A relative deprivation theory offers no explanation as to why sectoral organizations like the pobladores movement went to the streets with demands that they had been protesting for since the 1990s (not just a new sense of frustration with inequality), nor does it provide an explanation for why political institutions had failed to resolve these demands in past protest waves. Regarding blame, extensive interview data cited in this chapter with members of the Social Unity Table, the Broad Front, and others suggests that sectoral movements decided to come together in targeting the political system because of political unresponsiveness, not because they developed a new shared sense of relative deprivation.

Thus, relative deprivation is likely a relevant background condition that helps explain the high levels of discontent and grievances in Chile despite the country’s economic and social

progress. However, relative deprivation alone does not explain why an anti-system protest in democracy emerged in Chile in 2019.

H_{RM} (Resource Mobilization): Resources are the primary factor that caused Chile's anti-system protest emergence. Factors like economic growth and expansion in educational access increased individual resources for protest, expansion in movement organizations in preceding years created more organizational resources, and increased use of social media served as a resource for decreasing the costs of mobilizing.

In evaluating the evidence for this hypothesis, it is useful to divide up resources into three categories: individual demographic, organizational, and technological. Drawing on the same evidence used in the relative deprivation hypothesis above, following decades of economic growth and increased access to education, Chileans as a whole were wealthier and more educated than ever in 2019. Thus, this theoretical camp could argue that Chileans were in a better resource position to protest. However, the evidence that participants varied significantly in socioeconomic background (CEP December 2019) is surprising in the context of a resources drives action hypothesis. Some of the most resource-poor Chileans were committed to risky, daily protests on the front-line of the movement.

The second component of resources is organizational. Pre-existing movement organizations provide "infrastructure that can be used to link members of the aggrieved population into an organized campaign of mass political action" (Oberschall 1973). According to McAdam (1999), pre-existing movement organizations contribute in four ways: 1) providing networks for recruitment, 2) social rewards of participation among organization members, 3) channels of communication, and 4) established leaders.

Chile's social movement organizations were "depleted and disarmed" after the dictatorship and went through an extended process of reconstructing organizations, building

networks, and validating protests as a viable form of political struggle.[90] As would be expected by this hypothesis, multiple interviewees talked about how extended processes of organization and political struggle over the years made the estallido social possible.[91][92][93] During the 2019 protests, pre-existing organizations contributed to the protests. The Coordinating Assembly of High School Students (ACES), founded in 2006, helped coordinated the high school student metro evasions that transformed into the mass protests. As mentioned in this chapter, the umbrella organization, Social Unity Table, and its members organizations also helped contribute to convening and promoting protest events to their members and followers.

The key limitation of the organizational resource mobilization hypothesis is that, although Chile's social movement organizations may have been depleted after the transition to democracy, they were strong enough to lead major mobilizations well before 2019. The protests for education reform (2006 and 2011), environmental protection (Patagonia Without Dams 2006-2014), and pension reform (No More AFP since 2013) are some examples in this chapter that proved strong organizational capacity before 2019. Furthermore, in considering the causes of cross-sector coalition formation, leaders of coalitions in Chile emphasized changes in strategy based on past failures of their mobilizations rather than an increase in organizational resources leading up to 2019.

The third component of resources is technological. As expected from a technological resources hypothesis, social media played a role in coordination and in empowering individuals who were outside of traditional movement organizations to organize and gain information about the protests. Interviewees talked about how some of the largest protests in 2019 were organized

[90] Personal Interview, Social Unity Table Representative January 28, 2020.
[91] Personal Interview, Health Sector Social Organization Leader. January 28, 2020.
[92] Personal Interview, Former University Student Leader. January 19, 2020.
[93] Personal Interview, Leader of Coordinator 8M Feminist Organization. November 17, 2021.

through social media. One former student leader recalled that the organizing for the largest march on October 25 was started through a Whatsapp photo that circulated with nobody knowing who originally sent it. Some social media posts included the logo of recognizable organizations, but the others were unsponsored calls to action by anonymous citizens who had been empowered by technological tools to call others to action. Consistent with interviews, Cox, Gonzalez, and Le Foulon (2021) find that 80 percent of individuals who participated in more than one protest received a good deal of information about the estallido social from social media, and two-thirds shared information about the protests through social media.

Thus, social media clearly facilitated the mass protests in 2019. But some authors argue that social media was a primary causal variable. Cox, Gonzalez, and Le Foulon (2021) states that leaderless protests like Chile's "are the result of this new logic of 'connective action' (Bennet 2013) based on self-organized networks without preconstructed collective identities or clear demands" (p. 2). In contrast to collective action, connective action does not require developing common interpretations of identity and grievances because individuals have personal reasons for protesting and technology allows them to self-organize without organizational support.

I argue that this understanding of the 2019 protests in Chile overstates the individualized nature of the protests and underplays the role of previous waves of social protest. Although Chileans had a plethora of reasons for protesting, many of the main demands drew on issues that were made salient in previous protest waves that had been organized by long-standing sectoral organizations. A total of 74 percent of the protesters who attended multiple events in 2019 had attended a protest demonstration prior to October 18, 2019, suggesting that many of these individuals were directly involved in previous collective action campaigns.

As I detail in my argument, the failures of past movements also provided motivations and goal convergence. Sectoral organizations that were previously unwilling to form coalitions came together to form the Broad Front and Social Unity Table in 2019. Both of these coalitions, as well as the overwhelming majority of interviewees for this project, shared the perception that the political system was to blame for their specific grievances. Based on information collected on 1,233 citizen-led assemblies held around the country between October 18, 2019 and March 8, 2020, Chileans highlighted many themes in common. A total of 73 percent of the meetings raised demands in education, 70 percent for a new constitution, 69 percent demanded pension reforms, and 68 percent raised demands related to healthcare ("Demandas prioritarias…" 2021). Two-thirds of Chileans supported the pact for a new constitution at the end of 2019 (Senbruch and Donoso 2020). By October 2020, 80 percent of Chileans voted in favor of writing a new constitution. This evidence pointing to convergence around common targets and goals is surprising if newfound technological capabilities were the central factor linking these diverse actors that protested in 2019. Thus, though technology helped facilitate mass action, a complete explanation for the protests in 2019 need to consider the role of organizations, previous protest waves, and the factors that caused different groups to converge around common ideas.

In short, the evidence suggests that resource mobilization variables likely facilitated Chile's anti-system protests. Out of poverty and more highly-educated, Chileans had more monetary resources and education. Pre-existing organizations that developed in preceding years contributed to organization of the 2019 protests, and social media further facilitated protest action. However, resources are insufficient as the central factor explaining the emergence of the 2019 protests in Chile.

H_{POS} (Political Opportunity Structure): Chile's 2019 anti-system protests emerged primarily because of institutional political opportunity structures that created conducive conditions for protest. Specifically, ideal opportunity structures are characterized by strong protections of civil liberties that remove fear of repression combined with representative deficiencies through institutional channels that lead protesters to view extra-institutional political action as the most viable form of having demands resolved.

Chile's political opportunity structure in 2019 combined the characteristics of strong protections of civil liberties and representative deficiencies through institutional channels. However, the main problem for political opportunity as a standalone hypothesis for explaining the 2019 protests is that Chile also had these favorable protest characteristics for many years prior to 2019. First, Chile had strong protections of civil liberties. According to Freedom House's civil liberties and political rights indices that range on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free), Chile was a 1 from 2004 through 2018. Likewise, the Varieties of Democracy project scored Chile above .9 out of 1 on its political liberties index, based on indicators of government repression, for the entire period from 1990 through 2018. Second, Chile had representative deficiencies. Already in 2010, only 34 percent of Chileans identified with a political party and the number dropped to 17 percent by July/August 2016 (De la Cerda 2022; CEP May 2019). Trust in representative institutions was also low. For example, in the CEP surveys between 2012 and 2014, trust in Congress fluctuated between 10 and 12 percent and trust in political parties fluctuated between 6 and 8 percent.

Thus, Chile had a favorable political opportunity environment for protest for years before 2019. Political opportunity alone does not explain why this environment led to sectoral protests for many years and then escalated to an anti-system protest in 2019.

H_{PR} (Political Repression): The central reason that lower-level protests escalated to anti-system protest in Chile is that illegitimate repression by the state intensified grievances, built support from the previously demobilized, and decreased trust in the government.

The Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy scores above suggest that Chileans did not face significant repression leading up to 2019. Thus, it seems unlikely that repression in response to previous sectoral mobilizations escalated the protests. Alternatively, this hypothesis could hold that the police violence in response to the protests that began on October 18, 2019 is the central factor that escalated the protests. Freedom House's 2019 report did drop Chile's civil liberties scores due to the government's response to the 2019 protests, noting in the report, "The INDH, HRW, and Amnesty International accused the carabineros and the military of perpetrating serious human rights violations during the protests, including excessive use of force against protesters, as well as torture and sexual abuse of people held in detention." More specifically, the report from Amnesty International states that Chile's National Institute of Human Rights "filed 1,370 complaints against state officials for incidents that occurred between 19 October and 30 November 2019. Of these, 1,145 complaints were for torture or cruel treatment and 179 for torture and sexual violence." For comparison, in the nine years before October 18, 2019, only 174 complaints of torture or cruel treatment had been filed against Carabineros (Chilean police forces) (Amnesty International 2020). The report finds that state agents were responsible for at least 4 of the 31 deaths that occurred in the context of the 2019 protests.

Protesters cleared viewed the state's use of force as illegitimate. According to Cox, Gonzalez, and Le Foulon's (2021) analysis of CEP survey data from 2019, 93 percent of strong protesters – those who participated in more than one demonstration – and 78 percent of weak protesters – those who participated in one demonstration – believed that "the police or military always or almost always abused human rights during the 2019 social upheaval" (p. 25).

Yet, this chapter has shown that organized actors in Chile had other motives for protesting in 2019 that preceded this increase in the illegitimate use of state force. I have detailed

the process by which sectoral movements in Chile escalated to anti-system protests between 2006 and 2019. But most importantly in disputing this alternative hypothesis, demands related to police violence did not become the main reason for protesting over the course of the 2019 protests.[94] The 2019 Ground Zero survey of 886 protesters – administered multiple times in November in Dignity Plaza (the central place for clashes between police and protesters in downtown Santiago) – found that "human rights and impunity" (the survey item closest to representing repression) was the seventh most important demand, mentioned by only 10.2 percent of respondents as one of the top 3 demands motivating them to participate in the protests. Of the 1,233 citizen assembly meetings held around Chile between October 2019 and March 2020, 15.4 percent raised the issue of "justice related to human rights," the 16th most frequently raised demand from these decentralized citizen discussions that emerged from the protests.

Interviewees also tended to raise other issues besides repression as the motivation for the protest escalation. When I asked one neighborhood organizer of assembly meetings in a working class Santiago neighborhood why she thought so many people showed up, she stated, "I think that everything that occurred in the past added up…the students, the Mapuche, the environment issues, No More AFP…they were, during all these years, putting these themes more and more in public opinion….I think it was an accumulation of these for many years."[95] Another neighborhood organizer, in another Santiago neighborhood, added that at assembly meetings that she attended – that brought together both people who had never participated in activism and others with ties to a movement or political party – people pointed to problems with health, debt, serious environmental issues, and undignified retirement, and attendees generally identified

[94] CEP's 2019 surveys do not offer police violence or human rights as a survey option in its question on protest motives, but the closest item, "public sector abuses," is only chosen by 4 percent of Chileans as the main motive for the protests.
[95] Personal Interview, Citizen Assembly Organizr and Participant. November 15, 2021.

Chile's modell as the underlying problem.[96] Another interviewee, representing the Social Unity Table from the health sector added that "there was a lot of anger accumulated over many years."[97] This sentiment aligned with the common slogan at the protests and reiterated in interviews, "it's not 30 pesos, it's 30 years."

In short, Chile's state forces violated protesters' rights during the 2019 protests, and most protesters viewed the violations as ubiquitous. But police violence was rarely referenced as a primary motive for protest or as a priority problem to resolve by citizens, suggesting that it was not a central cause of protest escalation in 2019. Rather, organized activists and regular citizens often pointed to long-term, accumulated demands that had gone unresolved in Chile as the reason for protesting. This evidence goes against the idea that the central reason for protest escalation was police violence that occurred following the initial protests on October 18.

Chapter 3, Section 5: Summary of Argument in the Chilean Case

In short, starting in 2006, repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness in interactions between sectoral protest movements – such as Chile's high school students, university students, No More AFP pension reform movement, and environmental movement – and Chile's political institutions left various sectoral demands unresolved and led to two dynamic processes of change across sectors. First, after exhausting tactical alternatives, sectoral movement organizations updated their strategies by escalating their targets of blame to the political system. Second, and because of their target-based goal alignment, sectoral movement organizations that had previously fought separately for their own causes (despite the existence of cross-sector networks) were motivated to participate in cross-sector coalitions, most importantly the Broad Front and Social Unity Table.

[96] Personal Interview, Citizen Assembly Organizer and Participant. December 2, 2021
[97] Personal Interview, Social Unity Table Member and Health Sector Activist. January 23, 2020.

These processes are central to explaining the emergence of Chile's anti-system protests in democracy. By 2019, various groups and sectors in Chilean society had an accumulation of unresolved demands and a preference for extra-institutional tactics. Many had escalated their targets of blame to the system, and various sectoral organizations formed cross-sector coalitions in the period preceding October 2019 with goals of changing the political system. As a result of these long-term processes of movement-institutional interaction and strategic updating, a seemingly insignificant trigger – a minor increase in transportation fares in October 2019 – set off coordinated, anti-system protests: cross-sector coalitions and others took to the streets with their backlog of unresolved demands and with their learned ideas that protest action aimed at the system was the only way to resolve them.

Chapter 4: Twitter Content Analysis of Chilean Movement Organizations

This chapter uses Twitter content analysis to provide additional testing on whether sectoral movement organizations in Chile escalated their demands and blame over time when faced with political unresponsiveness. In this analysis, I focus on two sectoral movement organizations: 1) the most important university student organization: University of Chile Student Federation (FECh), and 2) the national pension reform organization: No More AFP. In order to carry out the analysis of these tweets I first applied for an Academic Research account in Twitter's Developer Portal, which, once accepted, allowed me to access the entire archive of tweets posted by these organizations with no tweet limits. I use R to analyze the tweets in the archive.

To develop word dictionaries for analyzing the content of tweets by these organizations over time, I took a random sample of 1,000 tweets (out of 10,520) from the FECh Twitter page and 300 tweets (out of 2,848) from the No More AFP Twitter page. The universe of tweets that I'm drawing from start when the Twitter accounts were created (July 28, 2009 for FECh; July 2, 2013 for No More AFP) and end the day before Chile's estallido social started on October 18, 2019. In line with methodological guidance outlined in Grimmer et al. (2022), I used these smaller samples as training sets to create the rules for coding the tweets, namely, identifying key words to create topic dictionaries. I then excluded the training set and applied the created dictionaries to the test set of tweets (9,520 FECh tweets and 2,548 No More AFP tweets).

The goal of this content analysis is to test whether the content of tweets changed over time in the period from 2006-2019 as social movement organizations faced a lack of responsiveness to their sectoral protests. In particular, my argument expects that social movement organizations will escalate their demands and blame attribution over time. In terms of

demands, an escalation would involve referring to issues that go beyond a particular sector. For example, students calling for social rights or dignity (rather than student rights or education reform) is an example of broad demands. In terms of blame, escalation would involve referring to the political system, the way democracy works or should work, and political actors that transcend a particular administration (rather than focusing on specific politicians, policies, and laws). As social actors expand beyond their particular sector in terms of demands and blame, I also expect that they will talk about themselves and their movement in broader and more inclusive ways and seek to include a broader set of followers within their movement.

Chapter 4, Section 1: Topic Dictionaries

My strategy for testing whether the content of tweets matches these expectations is to create topic dictionaries in R. Each dictionary is based off recurring words from the training sets of tweets from the student and pension reform organization Twitter accounts. Each of the four dictionaries captures a different category of the demand or blame escalation.

Dictionary 1- Political System: These are words that refer to a political system (e.g. political system, democracy, dictatorship) or words related to how the political system works or ought to work (e.g. agreements, dialogue, transparency, popular sovereignty, corruption). The dictionary also includes some popular hashtags and phases related to this subject that were identified in the training set (e.g. "#AquiTuVotoImporta" #HereYourVoteMatters, "Para que la sociedad decida" So that society decides).

Dictionary 2- Broad Actors: These are words that refer to political actors who transcend specific administrations, such as political parties/coalitions (e.g. New Majority, Concertation) or institutions (e.g. political parties, constitution, Congress). The dictionary also includes words that suggest that there is a continuation in the way that politics works over time (e.g. 30 years, inherited, complicit governments).

Dictionary 3- Broad Demands: These are words that refer to demands that are broader than a specific sector or issue (e.g. social rights, dignity, solidarity, transversal).

Dictionary 4- Inclusive Actors: These are words that refer to actors or participants who are not unique to a specific sector or group (e.g. everyone, the people, Chileans, majorities).

Table 4 provides the full list of words that are included in each category with English translations in parentheses.

Table 4: Topic Dictionaries

Dictionary 1: Political System	**Dictionary 2: Broad Actors**	**Dictionary 3: Broad Demands**	**Dictionary 4: Inclusive Actors**
Sistema político (political system)	Nueva Mayoria (New Majority)	Derechos sociales (social rights)	Todos/as (everyone)
Diálogo (dialogue)	Nm (abbreviation of New Majority)	Derechos (rights)	Chilenos[98] (Chileans)
Transparente (transparent)	Concertación (Concertation)	Vida digna (dignified life)	Movimiento social (social movement)
Transparencia (transparency)	Derecha (the Right)	Digno/a (dignified)	Familias (families)
Democráticamente (democratically)	Congreso (Congress)	Dignidad (dignity)	Unidad (unity)
Democracia (democracy)	Partidos (parties)	Solidario (solidary)	Unidos (united)
Democrática (democratic)	Partidos politicos (political parties)	Solidaridad (solidarity)	Actors sociales (social actors)
Reforma democrática (democratic reform)	Pinochet	Transversal (transversal)	Mayorías (majorities)
Democratizar (democratize)	Constitución (constitution)	Neoliberalismo (neoliberalism)	Ciudadanos (citizens)
Dictadura (dictatorship)	Tribunal constitucional (constitutional tribunal)	Necesidades sociales (social needs)	país (the country)
Acuerdo (agreement)	Politica chilena (Chilean politics)		pueblo (the people)
Acuerdos (agreements)	Gobiernos cómplices (complicit governments)		
Consensos (consensus)	30 años (30 years)		
Binominal (binomial)	Heredar (inherit)		
Corrupción (corruption)	Heredó (inherited)		
Soberanía popular (popular sovereignty)			
#quechiledecida (that Chile decides)			

[98] Note that I input the words with feminine/masculine or singular/plural with the base and an asterisk so that it captures all of the possible variations of the word. For example, chilen*, in R, captures (chilenos, chilenas, chilena, chileno, and chilen@, which is sometimes used in Chile.)

#queelpueblolegisle (that the people legislate)			
#quelegislenparalagente (that they legislate for the people)			
#aquituvotoimporta (here your vote matters)			
Para que la sociedad decida (so that society decides)			
La forma de hacer política (the way of doing politics)			

Chapter 4, Section 2: Results and Analysis

The basic process for analyzing the frequency of words in these dictionaries was to input the words into R dictionaries and then apply the dictionaries to the test set of tweets, so that R tallies each time that a word within one of these dictionaries appears in a tweet from FECh or No More AFP. I then ran multiple different analyses of the data. I look at both the total number of system words and the proportion of system words to overall words,[99] and I analyze by month, quarter, biannual, and annual period. I also include results both for combining all of the dictionaries together and separating the dictionaries. For simplicity, in cases in which I aggregate data across all four dictionaries, I call words from any one of the dictionaries "system words." This section will analyse the various plots of these outputs for No More AFP and FECh separately to consider movement-specific details.

Before doing so, Figure 3 summarizes the most important results. Looking at two of the most important sectoral movement organizations on an annual basis from the creation of their

[99] Overall words is actually a subset of substantive words. To eliminate commonly used articles and words in the Spanish language, I used a prexisting R package to remove Spanish stop words like "un", "una", "la", "el", "ser", "estar." I also excluded words with less than three letters to eliminate any articles or non-substantive words that the package did not catch.

Twitter accounts until the final full year before the October 2019 anti-system protest emergence shows that both movements increased their proportion of system words over time. Though the FECh results are less steadily climbing, the proportion of system words to overall words for both movements increased over time from the initial emergence of sectoral protests. This general result suggests support for my argument that these movements did not emerge with anti-system ideas, but rather, they developed these ideas over time. Analyzing in more detail in this section, I argue that the over-time changes shown in the graph below were caused by political unresponsiveness.

Figure 3: System Tweeting by Chilean Sectoral Organizations



The following two subsections provide more details and analysis of each movement organization's system tweeting over time to test my political unresponsiveness argument.

No More AFP

No More AFP shows a clear upward trajectory in system tweeting over time leading up to 2019. Figure 4 below presents the overall number of system words used by No More AFP, showing the results using different time intervals of aggregation.

Figure 4: No More AFP System Tweets by Time Interval



The start date of these graphs is when the No More AFP organization Twitter account posted its first tweet. There is a gap from the middle of 2013 to 2014 because No More AFP posted one tweet in July 2013 and then did not tweet again until May 2014. This first tweet in 2013 shows the sectoral objectives at No More AFP's origins that organization leader interviewees alluded to in Chapter 3. The tweet on July 2, 2013 states, "Ending AFP and repealing DL3500 is the objective of this Coordination of Workers. We introduce ourselves to you." DL 3500 was the specific legislation that established the framework of the pension system, and the "Cooordination of Workers" alludes to the fact that No More AFP was formed by various sectoral workers' unions coming together around this pension issue. The end date of the graphs is the last full period before October 18, 2019, which varies depending on the time-period interval: September 2019 (monthly), Q3 of 2019 (quarterly), first half of 2019 (half year), and 2018 (yearly).

These graphs indicate that, over time, No More AFP was using more of the words that appear in the four system topic dictionaries that seek to capture a movement's organization demand and blame escalation. Moving from monthly to yearly intervals, the graphs smooth out and offer a clearer picture of this escalation. Given my interest in medium-term changes in a movement organization's messaging, the longer time periods are more adequate for capturing these trends. The month-to-month variation in tweeting within a given year is less relevant to my general argument. However, I will use the monthly graphs in this analysis to pinpoint specific moments of peak system tweeting and attempt to explain what was driving these specific peaks.

The set of graphs below, Figure 5, looks at the proportion of system words to overall words over the same time period.

Figure 5: No More AFP Proportion of System Tweets by Time Interval



These proportional representations of the data help to show that the upward trend in overall system words is not simply reflecting an upward trend in the overall number of tweets and words posted by No More AFP. The language of No More AFP was shifting to more discussion of system issues; No More AFP was not just tweeting more.

There are some unexpected peak periods in the proportional graphs. The half-year plot shows peaks in the first half of 2014 and the first half of 2015. My argument does not predict these peaks to occur. The Bachelet II administration began in March 2014 and the Bravo Commission on pension reform was created in April 2014. Thus, No More AFP still had hope that the institutionalized channels offered by a more progressive presidential administration could lead to change. By the first half of 2015, the Bachelet administration was in its second year, but No More AFP had not yet turned to the strategy of organizing more massive street mobilizations to push for change. Thus, the organization had not exhausted tactical alternatives, which I argue precedes target escalation.

Closer evaluation of the data indicates that these higher proportions of system words are driven by a low level of overall words, rather than due to a clear target escalation. Table 5 below shows that No More AFP tweeted 125 overall words[100] in the first half of 2014 and 252 overall words in the first half of 2015. Thus, a very small number of words appearing in any of the four topic dictionaries drives up the proportions. The second half of 2015 is when No More AFP began to tweet more frequently, increasing to 1,334 overall words.

[100] As noted previously, these word counts exlclude Spanish stop words.

Table 5: No More AFP Overall Words Tweeted

AFP_semester <chr>	overallwords <dbl>
2013 H2	9
2014 H1	125
2014 H2	477
2015 H1	252
2015 H2	1334
2016 H1	1199
2016 H2	2106
2017 H1	3054
2017 H2	3394
2018 H1	2250
2018 H2	3086
2019 H1	3656

In general, my argument is not particularly concerned with why No More AFP had more system tweets in one month versus another month within a certain year. However, the graph of number of system words per month, Figure 6, helps to identify particular periods in which the organization was tweeting a lot about the system to identify any specific escalation triggers.

Figure 6: No More AFP System Tweets by Month



The largest peak in system tweets for the movement was in September 2017. Notably, August 11, 2017 was the day that the Bachelet administration announced its proposal for pension reform, a proposal that left the pension system intact. This final proposal indicated that the Bachelet administration would conclude without responding to No More AFP's sectoral demand for a new pension system. In September 2017, No More AFP was also in the middle of its national campaign for a self-organized plebiscite vote asking Chileans whether they wanted to keep or replace Chile's pension system. The organization held the plebiscite on September 29

and October 1, 2017. Over one million Chileans voted in No More AFP's plebiscite, and, rather unsurprisingly in a vote organized by the social movement, the vast majority of participants (97 percent) supported the option of ending the current AFP system (Rozas and Maillet 2019).

Thinking in terms of anti-system politics, the plebiscite was a clear attempt by No More AFP to bypass the standard channels of representation in Chile's democracy. A popular hashtag during the plebiscite campaign, #AquiTuVotoImporta (#HereYourVoteMatters) **[political system]**, suggested that voting in Chile's normal representative political system was useless. In short, the plebiscite campaign was both a case of tactical and target updating, and it was one of the reasons for the increase in system tweets during September 2017.

Two other peaks for the movement – in terms of system words – were in June 2018 (54 system words) and May 2019 (55 system words). June 2018 was the beginning of the new Piñera administration, a right-wing government that replaced the most progressive administration since Chile's transition to democracy. More specifically, June 2018 was the month after the first annual presidential address of the new administration. Chilean presidents give an annual address to the nation each year on May 21, in which they discuss accomplishments and talk about their legislative priorities for the coming year. In line with the idea that escalations follow political unresponsiveness, No More AFP drafted a letter in reaction to Piñera's May 21, 2018 address, complaining that, "nothing was said, only generalities."[101] June 2018 was also the month that No More AFP began its campaign for a popular bill (*iniciative popular de ley*) to change the pension system in Chile. This initiative was a national citizen campaign, where citizens could join popular assemblies around the country to discuss and construct a bill for a new pension system that could eventually be converted into legislation (Rozas Maillet 2019).[102] Some of the system-

[101] No More AFP Timeline, published by Loreto Lopez
[102] Personal Interview, No More AFP Founding Leader. November 22, 2023.

related tweets from June 2018 reference this campaign. For example, on June 13, 2018, the organization tweeted,

> "Now it will depend only on us that this demand, which has achieved **majority** [inclusive actors] support in the country, becomes a reality. Let **the people** [inclusive actors] legislate on pensions. #IPL[103] #NOmasAFP https://t.co/hwTA7IWrOa"

Furthermore, the phrase "let the people legislate on pensions" is a phrase rather than a specific word that my dictionaries could capture, but it indicates a desire for a different type of political system that allows for citizens to more directly influence legislation.

Finally, the peak in May 2019 likely reflects an escalation in reaction to an accumulated perception of unresponsiveness through the years of protesting. No More AFP did not have much belief in pension reform change during the Piñera administration (2018-2022). At the end of 2018, No More AFP released a public declaration indicating that the Piñera administration's proposed reform to the pension system was "absolutely insufficient" and accused it of establishing "more obstacles and locks so that no reform designed against the individually funded system can be discussed in congress."[104] In May 2019, No More AFP was calling on Chile's congress to vote against Piñera's proposed bill that did little, in their view, to reform the pension system.

Apart from discussion of this particular bill, May 2019 No More AFP tweets also used language of broad demands and inclusive actors and also talked about general problems with the way of doing politics in Chile. On May 20, 2019, the organization tweeted, "Coordinators of the social world are convoking a Day of Indignation and Protest for this Thursday May 30. Enough

[103] IPL is the abbreviation for iniciativa popular de ley (popular bill).
[104] No More AFP Public Declaration from October 29, 2018. Available at: https://www.colegiodeprofesores.cl/2018/10/29/declaracion-publica-coordinadora-nacional-noafp-ante-reforma-al-sistema-previsional-del-gobierno/.

of policies tailored to the business community to the detriment of **citizens [inclusive actors]**! #NationalProtestMay30." In addition to talking about citizens in general terms, No More AFP was also talking about general policies tailored to business, not just pensions. On June 10, 2019, a couple of weeks after this general day of indignation with other coordinators of the social world, No More AFP sent its invitation to other sectoral organizations that called for a meeting about forming the Social Unity Table.

Finally, the last No More AFP graph, Figure 7, further breaks down the system word trends by each of the four dictionary categories.

Figure 7: No More AFP System Tweets Over Time by Category



In most cases, the peaks of system words across categories occur later on in the No More AFP movement, particularly starting after 2015 when the Bachelet administration's Bravo Commission, tasked with coming up with a pension reform solution, offered what No More AFP viewed as an inadequate proposal following months of deliberations.

One exception to the rule of system words appearing later is that there is a peak in discussion of **broad demands** in June 2015. However, upon going back through the tweets, the reason is that No More AFP uses the term *reparto solidario* "solidarity distribution" 9 times during this month to describe a priniciple of the pension system that it wants. The variations of the term solidarity in the **broad demand** dictionary are meant to capture social movement organizations discussing their solidarity with other social causes. Thus, the distinct context of using solidarity leads to a misrepresentation of how frequently No More AFP was referring to broads demands in June 2015. Given that the term "solidarity distribution" was only used 23 times in total outside of June 2015 during the five-year coding period and 4 times during 2018 and 2019, I am not concerned that this term led to an overall misrepresentation of No More AFP expanding its discussion of **broad demands**.

Two other relatively surprising peaks in the category-specific data occur with **broad targets** in April 2016 and **inclusive actors** in July 2016. In Section 1 of this chapter, interviewees and organization documents suggested that in 2016, No More AFP was still primarily focused on Level 2 (national political actor) targets and pension-related objectives. The **broad targets** peak in April 2016 is driven by the term *congreso*. I included this term to capture when No More AFP referred to "congress" in general terms as blameworthy for their pension grievances. But the organization was not referring to the national legislative congress in April 2016. Rather, No More AFP held a national assembly, which they called the 2nd National

Congress of No More AFP[105] (congress is used as synonym for conference in this case). No More AFP refers to this event with the term "congress" 12 times in April 2016. No More AFP also referred to its 1st National Congress 2 times in May 2014 and its 3rd National Congress 9 times across December 2017 and January 2018, but besides that, the congress tweets usually refer to Chile's national congress.

The peak in **inclusive actors** in July 2016 seems to be driven primarily by No More AFP's promotion of its family march on July 24th, 2016. I include this term in **inclusive actors** because this dictionary seeks to capture messaging for actors "who are not unique to a specific actor or group." No More AFP refers to its "family" march 27 times throughout July 2016. This usage reflects what the inclusive actors category seeks to capture, and it indicates that No More AFP was attempting to appeal to broader audiences even before it escalated its demands and targets of blame and began using language related to the political system. As one leader of No More AFP reflected in an interview, he thought that even with specific pension objectives, No More AFP was able to appeal to successfully appeal to a broad audience because everybody knew somebody immediately affected by low pensions in retirement; for example, young people went out to protest for their grandparents.[106]

In short, the Twitter content analysis shows that No More AFP increased system tweeting over time and following episodes of political unresponsiveness. Overall usage of system words and usage of system words in proportion to overall words show an upward trend leading up to 2019 when the organization created the cross-sector, anti-system Social Unity Table. This analysis has further demonstrated that the over-time increase occurred across the four

[105] According the No More AFP timeline shared by a No More AFP leader, the national congresses were held on the following dates: May 15th-May 16th, 2014 (First National Congress); April 28th, 2016 (Second National Congress); January 12th-January 13th (Third National Congress).
[106] Personal Interview, No More AFP Founding Leader. November 22, 2023.

dictionaries: political system, broad actors, broad demands, and inclusive actors. However, the analysis of the inclusive actors category suggests that No More AFP was appealing to an expansive audience in earlier stages when it was still focused on pension reform, suggesting that the other three dictionary categories may be better indicators of target escalation.[107]

FECh

Unlike No More AFP, FECh's total usage of system words did not steadily increase over time. However, drawing on additional analysis of the data, I argue that the trends in the FECh Twitter data provide some support for the argument that political unresponsiveness led to blame escalation.

Figure 8 below presents the total number of system words used by FECh over time, using different time intervals for aggregating the data.

[107] To complement my own interpretations of the social media results, I reached back out to a No More AFP leader interviewee, went over the content analysis and result figures with her, and then asked for her interpretation. One thing she added was that as more movements with new demands sprung up over time (she mentioned sexual diversity and pobladores movements, as examples), there were more groups to coordinate with and demands to talk about, and that No More AFP made an effort to coordinate and build ties with these newer groups. Thus, some of the increase in language related to broader demands and inclusive language may also relate to the expansion in number of organizations and demands over time in Chile from 2013 to 2019.

Figure 8: FECh Total System Words



This initial set of graphs suggests an increase in system word usage leading up to 2012 and then again leading up to 2015, and then a decrease in system words from 2015 to 2019. However, the table below, Table 6, suggests that a decrease in overall tweeting by FECh may be a better explanation for this decline than a specific decrease in system-related tweeting. The table shows that, within the test dataset (representing 9,520 of the 10,520 FECh tweets from 2009 to

2019), FECh tweeted 2,277 times in 2015 versus just 160 and 108 times in 2018 and 2019, respectively.

Table 6: Number of FECh Tweets in Test Set

Year	Number of Tweets in Test Set
2009	16
2010	266
2011	1037
2012	1864
2013	1293
2014	1238
2015	2277
2016	699
2017	562
2018	160
2019	108

The decrease in Twitter presence by FECh coincides with a decline in the overall strength and influence of the organization. In annual elections in 2016 and 2017, the federation barely reached the minimum level of student voters required to validate its elections. Only 40.3 percent and 40.1 percent voted, and the federation requires 40 percent to reach quorum (Ramírez 2019a). The federation then postponed the November 2018 elections for several months to give it time to reformulate the underlying rules and principles of the organization (Ramírez 2018). In May 2019, only 25.9 percent of students voted in the election, not reaching the minimum required participation. Thus, an interim government took over for six months and was in power when the *estallido social* emerged in October 2019.

Several factors seemed to contribute to FECh's decline. The 2019 interim president of the FECh, Emilia Schneider, talked about the low participation being part of the crisis of representation that affected all of Chilean politics, as the FECh is an established student federation with over 100 years of history (Ramírez 2019b). A former journalist for the FECh and

participant in student protests since 2006 said that he thought students were fed up with political parties taking advantage of the federation to develop leadership for future congressional posts.[108] Lastly, internal scandal decreased the credibility of the organization leadership. The 2017-2018 president of the FECh, Alfonso Mohor, resigned in July 2018 after being accused of covering up a case of workplace harassment (Bustos 2018).

This organizational context is important for a couple reasons. First, given the stark differences in quantity of tweets over time, it is useful to look at the proportion of system words to overall words to have a clearer idea of the specific trends related to system language. I present this data below. Second, given the decline in influence, internal disorder, and harsh drop in Twitter presence of the FECh from 2017 to 2019, the later years may not be the best period for analyzing the organization's messaging content. I will provide some analysis of this later period. However, the FECh also faced two earlier episodes of political unresponsiveness: the immediate response to the 2011 protests and Bachelet's education reform period 2014-2016. I will look at the effect that these episodes had on system tweeting.

The following graphs, Figure 9, present the proportion of system words to overall words from FECh's Twitter account, using different time intervals.

[108] Personal Interview, Former Journalist of FECh and 2006 and 2011 protest participant. October 6, 2020.

Figure 9: FECh Proportion of System Words



The proportion graphs do not show a clear and steady upward trend, but the relative usage of system language also did not plummet after 2015 as the previous graphs on total system tweets suggested. Additional analysis of the tweets and contextual information on the student movement help to explain more specific patterns in the data.

The most favorable graph for an argument for target escalation leading up to the estallido social is the yearly aggregation because it shows an increase from 2017 to 2018 and excludes 2019 and the drop in the proportion of system words to overall words that occurred in the several months leading up to the estallido social in October 2019. The decline in the proportion of system tweets is particularly steep from May 2019. The organization only used 6 system words from May 2019 to October 2019.

As mentioned, an interim FECh leadership team took over in May 2019 after the 25.9 percent student turnout at the federation elections. Much of the tweeting from this date forward involved the FECh supporting and promoting other sectoral movement events and causes rather than discussing its own demands and targets of blame, perhaps because the organization did not have independent mobilization capacity. The FECh voiced its support for high school students, teachers, the Mapuche, feminists, and environmental groups. Below are three examples:

> "From the FECh we send all our support to our secondary school classmates and their fight against repression and criminalization. Tomorrow we will see you at 11 a.m. in Plaza Baquedano to join the Secondary Block rally against violence and in defense of public education! https://t.co/oiXU8FcKJa" [June 24, 2019 Tweet]

> "We share with you the statement of the Coordinator of Mapuche Student Organizations regarding the murder of Lemuel Fernández Toledo in Tirua. We ask you to spread this information, in addition to remembering the wake organized by Coem at 7:30 p.m. in Plaza Italia. See you there. https://t.co/8ProOxGfu3" [July 19, 2019 Tweet]

> "We join the mobilization for this Friday for climate change. Participate in your assembly and vote to participate in the global climate strike https://t.co/ebkyOBIXFf" [September 24, 2019]

The few instances of system word usage are also generally in the context of supporting other sectors. For example, on June 6, 2019, FECh tweeted:

> "We continue to mobilize as a Federation together with our colleagues from the Interim table in support of the mobilization of teachers. The strength of the social movement for education is in **unity [inclusive actors]**. https://t.co/EtVcfsFKh9"

In short, FECh – without much organizational strength to lead its own protests and campaigns – seemed to play a complementary role to other movements in 2019. For the most part, FECh was not posting on Twitter about its own list of demands or discussing targets of blame for its grievances. Yet, its Twitter activity promoting various other sectors in 2019 suggests that the organization had developed cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment during preceding years. Indeed, FECh's interim leadership joined the Social Unity Table as one of its founding members in June 2019.

The rest of the Twitter content analysis of FECh will focus on two critical episodes of political unresponsiveness in earlier periods, 2011 and 2015, that contributed to demand and target escalation by the student organization.

First, the most massive university student protests in the period under study (and at the time the largest wave of protests by any sector in Chile since the transition to democracy) occurred in 2011. The protests regularly drew tens or hundreds of thousands of Chileans to the streets, and the University of Chile's Casa Central, the most emblematic university building in the country, was occupied by students for seven months. The key question for my political responsiveness argument is whether university students had already developed system-level demands and blame that motivated the 2011 protests, or if the students' escalation was caused in part by a lack of change resulting from the 2011 protest wave. The Twitter evidence suggests that the escalation was driven in part by lack of change, or political unresponsiveness.

The first student march of 2011 occurred on April 28th, 2011 and drew approximately 10,000 students. By the end of June, the students had led various marches and protest activities, including a march on June 30 that drew as many as 200,000 participants.[109] Yet, during the first

[109] Timeline of the 2011 Student Movement, Repertorio Visual del Movimiento Estudiantil de 2011 project. Available at: https://movimientoestudiantil2011.com/linea-de-tiempo/.

half of 2011 – January 1 through June 30 – FECh only tweeted 17 system words across the 328 tweets in the test dataset.

The shift to more system language does not occur until after protests are met with inadequate political responses. The Piñera administration's first proposal, on July 6, involved the creation of a fund to alleviate student debt. The Piñera administration's second proposal, on August 1, included 21 points for reorganizing education at all levels, including a reformulation of the credit and scholarship system for university students (Chilean Ministry of Education 2011). The students immediately voiced their discontent with these proposals and continued protesting, while the Piñera administration refused to offer anything more (El País 2011).

As the aggregated data by half year in Figure 10 below shows, the increase in system messaging began in the second half of 2011, after the political unresponsiveness to the protests. The monthly data focused on this period shows that the first escalation in system tweets was in August 2011, following the two Piñera proposals. More escalations occurred at the end of 2011, when protests began to die down due to exhaustion after months of protest activity, and in 2012, after the unprecedented 2011 wave of protests failed to garner significant reform proposals from the government.

Figure 10: FECh System Tweets After 2011 Wave



In the half-year graph, there is a clear escalation in proportion of system words to overall words from 2011 H1 to 2011 H2. And in the monthly graph showing January 2011 to December 2012, there is a marked increased in the proportion of system words starting in August 2011 and peaking in November 2011, with additional high points during 2012. This data suggests that the system tweeting increase occurred after an episode of political unresponsiveness.

Specific tweets help to illustrate the escalation in student organization language. In November 2011, after 7 months of intense protests failed to lead to change, the students seem to escalate blame to Chile's political system and broader political actors while also using inclusive language. The following tweets offer a couple of examples:

> "If we are as we are it is thanks to the politics of **consensus [political system]** of the **Right [broad actors]** and the **Concertación [broad actors]**, that doesn't listen to society." [November 4, 2011 Tweet]

> "No more politics of **consensus [political system]** between four walls. They have only governed for their interests and not for those of the **people [inclusive actors]**." [November 5, 2011 Tweet]

These tweets blame Chile's political of consensus and the coalitions that governed the country in the 21 years since the transition rather than the Piñera administration, and they speak of the students representing the interests of society and the people.

In 2012, the FECh continued to use inclusive language in talking about the student movement and also began connecting the problems in education with problems with Chile's democracy.

> "The lack of a real **democracy [political system]** that serves the **majority [inclusive actors]** of the **country [inclusive actors]** is being felt." [August 4, 2012 Tweet][110]

> "The fight is to recover education and a new **democracy** in Chile @camilavallejo." [August 28, 2012 Tweet] [111]

> "We have **united [inclusive actors]** to advance more and better public education, **democracy [political system]** and an end to profits. We will not accept more evasions." [September 6, 2012 Tweet]

[110] This was a quote from the high school student organization, ACES, Twitter account that FECh reposted subsequently.
[111] The original quote was from Camila Vallejo, former president of FECh in 2011.

In short, the data on system tweeting over time and the content of tweets evidence that target escalation by the FECh occurred following an important episode of political unresponsiveness in 2011.

Looking at the system tweet proportions graph, Figure 11, shows another clear escalation occured in the first half of 2015.

Figure 11: FECh Proportion of System Tweets by Half Year



The system words divided by category graphs, Figure 12, show that the first half of 2015 was a peak year for three out of the four topic dictionaries: political system, broad demands, and inclusive actors.

Figure 12: FECh System Words by Category



A couple of factors contributed to increased system language usage in the first half of 2015. One factor was the newly-salient issue of corruption. Three major cases of corruption implicating Chilean politicians emerged in 2014 and 2015: the Penta case, the SQM case, and the Caval case. The Caval case – the most damaging for the Bachelet administration – broke in February 2015 and alleged that Bachelet's oldest son and his wife engaged in insider trading and influence peddling in a major real estate deal (Simon 2019). Corruption is included as one of the **political system** dictionary words because it indicates discussion about how the system works. However, if all the system-level discussion in the first half of 2015 related to corruption, it would not necessarily be a sign of political unresponsiveness driving blame escalation. Corruption was not a central theme for Chileans before the emergence of these cases and thus represented a relative new grievance unrelated to historical educational or other sectoral demands. In this case, corruption only explains a small part of the escalation. Corruption accounted for 14 of the 261 system words used in the first half of 2015, suggesting that it was not the primary contributor.

The most important contributor to the escalation was discontent with the course of the Bachelet administration's education reforms. In the first half of 2015, the Bachelet administration was still in the process of seeking to pass a moderated version of free higher education. The student discontent was caused by a perceived sense of unresponsiveness in two ways: 1) the FECh and many former student protesters from 2011 thought that Bachelet's reform did not go far enough, and 2) the students felt they did not have a voice in the reform. This second point explains much of the system language in the first half of 2015. The FECh escalated discussion to Chile's political system regarding students' and other social actors' lack of voice in decision-making.

> "It is necessary to strengthen **democracy [political system]** and not replace it with technicians. **Social actors [inclusive actors]** are the guarantee of legitimate reforms @vale_saave." [March 18, 2015 Tweet]

> "The current educational system is a product of the **dictatorship [political system]**. We are demanding the minimum: that education is constructed **democratically [political system]**" [June 10, 2015 Tweet]

Education and democracy were the motives for a massive march called by university student organizations, high school student organizations, and the teachers' union on May 14, 2015.

> "To conquer a new education and build a **democracy [political system]** for **all [inclusive actors]**! See you on the 14th in the streets!" [May 4, 2015 Tweet]

In some instances, the FECh also used the cases of corruption as a way of speaking about broader problems with the political system.

> The crisis of legitimacy in politics is not just the result of cases of **corruption [political system]**. It is because **society [sociedad]** is not included in the transformations @vale_saave [June 27, 2015 Tweet]

Finally, some of the tweets using language from the broader demands dictionary were posted in the context of supporting mobilizations alongside other sectoral movements.

> "Social organizations **united [inclusive actors]** for the recovery of our **rights [derechos]**. Tomorrow march for water in Valpo." [April 21, 2015 Tweet]

> "Great day of protest by **Chilean [inclusive actors]** workers. It's time to recover our **rights [broad demands]**!" [April 22, 2015 Tweet]

In short, the FECh frequently used language that covered multiple system dictionary categories in the first half of 2015, indicating escalation that was in part explained by perceived political unresponsiveness from the Bachelet administration.

This section has provided evidence that the FECh had two peak periods of system tweeting that were driven by episodes of perceived political unresponsiveness, first by the Piñera administration and then by the Bachelet administration. As discussed in the case narrative in

Section 1 of this chapter, after the first half of 2015 the Bachelet administration's reforms stayed on the course of falling short of the demands of many students, former students, and FECh leaders. Although FECh's proportional system tweet usage never rebounded to the levels in the second half of 2011 or first half of 2015, the data has shown that the organization continued to post a relatively high number of system tweets from 2015 to 2019. Despite internal organizational problems after 2015, the proportion of system tweets to overall tweets never fell to the levels in the first half of the protests in 2011, before the first major episode of political unresponsiveness to university student demands.

Furthermore, as discussed in the section of this chapter on coalition formation, political unresponsiveness to student demands also helped to drive the formation of the Broad Front, an anti-system coalition led principally by former university students. To name a few examples, Giorgio Jackson (president of the Catholic University student federation 2010-2011), Gabriel Boric (president of the FECh 2011-2012), Andrés Fielbaum (president of the FECh 2012-2013), Valentina Saavedra (president of the FECh 2014-2015), and Camila Rojas (president of the FECh 2015-2016) all became leaders or members of the Broad Front. In other words, other former student leaders were taking aim at the system in the leadup to 2019, but they were doing so from outside of the FECh through a cross-sector coalition.

Chapter 5: Brazil's 2013 Non-System Protests

The 2013 Brazil protests emerged during the Dilma Rousseff administration, the third straight Workers' Party (PT) presidential administration since 2003 when President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected for the first time. In contrast to Chile's Piñera administration, that had only a 15.5 percent approval rating the month before the estallido social in 2019 (Lara 2019), Dilma's government had a 57 percent approval at the beginning of June when the protests emerged (Datafolha 2013).[112] Protests over transportation fares had been occurring in preceding months in Brazilian cities such as Porto Alegre, Goiânia, and Natal. However, most place the origins of the protests – sometimes referred to as the "Jornadas de Junho" – in São Paulo in the first week of June.

In response to a 20-cent increase in bus and metro fares announced in São Paulo, the Free Fare Movement (MPL) of São Paulo organized a march of approximately 5,000 protesters on June 6, 2013 with the slogan, "If the fare doesn't drop, the city is going to stop" [Se a tarifa não baixar, a cidade vai parar"] (Gondim 2016; Carvalho 2023). Smaller protests around transportation fares continued during the first half of June in São Paulo and other cities. The protests markedly escalated and took on a national character on June 17, when protests simultaneously occurred in 14 capital cities around Brazil (Alonso 2023, p. 180). On June 20, the protests peaked as over a million protesters with diverse grievances took to the streets across Brazil, marking the largest protests in the country since at least the Fora Collor protests in 1992 (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2014; Conde and Jazeel 2013).

This chapter considers the characteristics and causes of the Jornadas de Junho. The first section analyzes the protests based on the characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy

[112] This approval rating would fall 27 points in three weeks during June.

that were outlined in Chapter 1. Then, the chapter considers the causes of the Jornadas de Junho, evaluating the usefulness of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. In terms of characteristics, the chapter finds that the protests had diverse protester composition and wide-ranging demands and occurred in a representative democratic context. However, the 2013 protests are not a case of anti-system protest in democracy because most protesters did not target the political system. Brazil's federalist system of policymaking and the diverse experiences with political responsiveness across movement organizations help explain why some movement organizations did not escalate their targets of blame to the political system. In terms of causes of the protests, the chapter finds that a favorable political opportunity structure provided a conducive environment for protest emergence and political unresponsiveness contributed by creating unresolved demands for some groups, motivating multiple sectors to take extra-institutional action. Regarding the part of the theoretical framework on coalitions, Brazilians did not form broad, cross-sector coalitions to help lead the 2013 protests for three reasons: 1) a lack of cross-sector goal alignment, 2) differences in ideology and perspectives on the PT, and 3) a decentralized political context.

Chapter 5, Section 1: Characteristics of Brazil's Protests

The four characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy are the following: 1) *Participant Composition*: protesters represent diverse sectors of society, 2) *Demands*: demands are wide-ranging, spanning different issue areas, 3) *Blame*: blame is directed at the political system, and 4) *Political Context*: protests occur in representative democracies.

As an outcome, Brazil's 2013 protests share three of four characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy with Chile's *estallido social*, the exception being that a significant contingent of key actors in the Brazil protests did not direct blame at the political system.

Because all four characteristics are necessary to what makes an anti-system protest, Brazil is coded as a non-system protest in democracy.

First, the composition of protesters in Brazil included diverse sectors of society and socioeconomic backgrounds (Sweet 2013; Saad-Filho and Morais 2014; Antunes 2013; Estanque 2015; Gondim 2016). Tatagiba and Galvao (2019) add that while the popular or working classes more traditionally mobilized in Brazil, the novel aspect of protests in 2013 and throughout Dilma Rousseff's administration was the participation of middle and dominant classes. Surveys of over 2000 protesters conducted by The Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE) in eight capital cities in Brazil on June 20, 2013 support this diversity of participant composition in terms of income. Of the protesting respondents, 15 percent earned family incomes of up to two minimum wages, 30 percent between two and five minimum wages, 26 percent between five and ten minimum wages, and 23 percent more than ten minimum wages (IBOPE 2013). The IBOPE surveys also show some diversity in terms of age and education levels, though the majority of participants were young (63% between ages 14 and 29 years old) and most had either finished high school (49%) or completed a higher education degree (43%). In terms of ideology, interviewees for this project who participated in the 2013 protests included anarchists, militants and former militants of the PSOL, PSTU, and PT political parties, individuals unaffiliated with a party or specific ideology movement, and conservatives.

Brazil's protests also had diverse demands spanning different issue areas. Brazilian protesters' grievances included transportation fares, World Cup spending, corruption, poor public services, police reform, and education, to name a few (IBOPE 2013; Snider 2017; Saad-Filho and Morais 2014, Alonso and Miche 2017). As in Chile, the first protests in São Paulo in June 2013 began with specific protests about transportation fares, but these demands quickly

expanded to other issue areas (Conde and Jazeel 2013). One protest participant from Florianópolis pointed out that transportation fares were always a secondary issue there and that the local protests achieved a critical mass of participants because they talked about middle class themes like education and healthcare.[113] A key protest organizing group in Rio de Janeiro, originally called the Forum of Fights against Fare Increases (Forum de Lutas Contra o Aumento da Passagen) when it formed in October 2012, decided to shorten its name to Forum of Fights (Forum de Lutas) in June 2013 because participants kept arriving to their plenary sessions with new demands from indigenous rights to demilitarization of the police.[114] One of the main slogans of the protests in Brazil was similar to Chile and indicated broader concerns than transportation, with Chileans chanting, "It's not 30 pesos, it's 30 years," and Brazilians shouting, "It's not just 20 cents!" (both referring to the slight increase in fares that set off the protests). In the IBOPE surveys on June 20, 37.6 percent of respondents indicated public transportation as their primary demands, 24.2 percent corruption, 12.1 percent health, 5.5 percent again the PEC 37[115], 5.3 percent education, 4.5 percent World Cup and Federations Cup expenses, with several other issues of importance for smaller minorities (IBOPE 2013).

In contrast to Chile, many of the 2013 protesters in Brazil did not target the political system as the central source of blame for their political grievances. As in Chile, many Brazilians were disaffected with their political elites and institutions. Various authors point out that in 2013, Brazilian protesters vocalized their opposition to the existing institutions, political parties, and system of political representation (Sweet 2013; Saad-Filho and Morais 2014; Alonso and Mische

[113] Personal Interview, 2013 Protest Participant in Florianópolis. April 18, 2023.
[114] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases. May 30, 2023.
[115] A proposed constitutional amendment that would have limited the power of federal prosecutors in investigating crimes. The demand was another corruption related grievance for many since some protesters thought that the legislation would make it more difficult to jail politicians for corruption. See article for additional discussion: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/latest-brazil-protest-draws-streets.

2017). The protesters chanted things like, “We don’t have a party. We are Brazil!” (Alonso and Miche 2017). And as one participant in the Forum of Fights in Rio put it, the protests were “a rejection of the representative politics that we had in Brazil, a discontent with representative politics.”[116] Another participant in 2013 added that he saw the protests as being more anti-political class than anti-PT because no parties escaped the wrath of the protests.[117] Likewise, Antunes (2013, p. 42) states about the 2013 Brazilian protests, “They were not demonstrations specifically against Dilma, or against Alckmin, or against Haddad, Eduardo Paes, Cabral. But they were, at the same time, against everyone.”

Yet, unlike in Chile, discontent with representative politics among social movement organization leaders and protest participants did not translate into widespread targeting of the representative political system as the means of political change. Instead, in many cases protesters’ demands focused on specific public policies, and their targets of blame were the corresponding authorities in charge of that policy. For example, a leader of the Popular Committee Against the World Cup (Comite Popular Contra a Copa) in Rio de Janeiro stated that the most relevant target for their movement in 2013 was the municipal government, because this authority was most directly involved in carrying out the stadium projects that were displacing locals.[118] For a founding leader of the MPL in São Paulo, the main demand was lower public transportation fare prices and thus the responsible parties were those who set the rates: municipal (for bus) and state (for metro) governments.[119]

Though not a comprehensive set of social media posts from 2013, an initiative by a group called Escola de Ativismo (Activism School) called “2013: The Social Networks Tell About the

[116] Personal Interview, Leader of Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases. July 3, 2023.
[117] Personal Interview, 2013 Protest Participant in Florianópolis. April 18, 2023.
[118] Personal Interview, Leader of Popular Committee Against the World Cup in Rio de Janiero. June 1, 2023.
[119] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of MPL São Paulo. June 15, 2023.

Streets" (As Redes Contam as Ruas) offers a collection of posts – almost all from Facebook[120] – by movement organizations in Brazil from January to the end of June 2013. The posts support the idea that key organizations were focused on sectoral issues and subnational targets.

From its Facebook post on May 26 calling for the first June march against the fare increase to the June 20 Facebook post in response to the local government revoking the fare increase, the MPL São Paulo account's messaging was focused almost exclusively on public transportation and subnational actors. The May 26 post starts by pointing out that the mayor has confirmed the bus increase, and the governor has talked about raising the metro costs along with the busses. The post ends with the slogan, "EVERY INCREASE IS AN INJUSTICE! FOR A LIFE WITHOUT TURNSTILES!" In its post on June 20, the day after the fare increases were revoked in São Paulo, the organization does not shift its focus to broader demands outside of transportation. Instead, the organization states, "The Free Pass Movement's journey, which neither begins nor ends today, continues towards fare-free public transport." In other words, the organization was moving on to a new sectoral demand – public transportation without fares – rather than escalating its objectives or targets. Posts from Rio de Janeiro's branch of the Popular Committee Against the World Cup also targeted local actors. For example, in a post on February 21, 2013 states, "The mayor of Rio de Janeiro wants to naturalize the sale of public spaces….MAYOR, WE WILL NOT ACCEPT! RIO IS NOT FOR SALE!"[121]

Multiple interviewees also placed emphasis on subnational targets. Neither the Forum of Fights in Rio nor the MPL in São Paulo, the two most important organizations driving the

[120] Multiple interviewees talked about how Facebook was the primary social media network that movement organizations in Brazil used during the June 2013 protests and survey information cited later in this chapter suggests the same.
[121] Facebook posts compiled by Escola de Ativismo are available here: https://escoladeativismo.org.br/2013asredescontamasruas/.

protests in these respective cities in the first half of June 2013, were focused on system-level targets.[122][123] When pressed on whether the organization also pursued broader goals beyond public transportation, one 2013 MPL leader asserted that they are not a political party that has a stance on every issue and questioned why they should move on to other issues before achieving all their transportation-related goals. The leader said that while 90 percent of left movements want to unite forces, hegemonize, and take power, their movement wasn't interested in that.[124] Given its issue-specific focus on transportation, the organization targeted subnational governments.

This targeting distinction between Brazil and Chile also affected the course of the protests for some groups following government concessions. For example, after Mayor Haddad and Governor Alckmin of São Paulo announced that they were revoking the transit fare increase on June 19, 2013, MPL São Paulo was effectively neutralized, as the political-institutional response responded directly to its immediate demands. The organization ultimately decided to go forward with its mobilization scheduled for the following day on June 20 as a sort of commemoration of their victory, but the organization did not organize any more acts in 2013.[125]

In other words, political responsiveness through a specific public policy change put MPL protests to a halt. In contrast, Piñera's suspension of fare increases on October 19, 2019 and his series of concessions related to pensions, minimum wage, health, and utility fees on October 22, 2019 were unsuccessful in neutralizing th Social Unity Table or any of the key movement organizations behind Chile's protests. One reason for this difference in the effects of concessions

[122] Personal Interview, Leader of Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases. July 3, 2023.
[123] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases. May 30, 2023.
[124] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of MPL São Paulo. May 20, 2023.
[125] Personal Interview, Leader of MPL São Paulo. May 19, 2023.

is that organizations in Chile were targeting political system change while some in Brazil were only looking for specific policy adjustments.

Exceptions to the rule of sub-system-level targeting existed in Brazil. Some organizations involved in the 2013 protests, especially on the right, focused more on the political-institutional issue of corruption, voiced their indignation with aspects of the political system, and made calls for institutional reforms. For example, in a campaign that began in March 2012 and continued throughout 2013, various groups (mostly on the right) [126] put together a Popular Bill, "Estatuto Popular Contra Corrupção" (Popular Statute Against Corruption, EPOCC). In line with the rules on *Popular Bills* in Brazil, they sought to gather the necessary number of signatures, one percent of the electorate, to have the bill voted on in Congress.[127][128] In the justification for the bill, the drafters state that despite "incessant denunciations of corruption," decades of impunity have led to "a collective perception of the State's inability to combat this almost generalized metastatic corruption that involves everyone from city inspectors to State ministers." As a solution, the popular bill proposes various measures to "expand the types of crimes for practices of diversion of public assets; worsens with extreme rigor the penalties for these crimes; creates mechanisms to reduce the occurrence of cases of impunity and takes other steps to prevent these crimes through education in schools, criminalization of electoral fraud and criminal liability of legal entities and political parties involved in cases of corruption and others of the same type."[129] Among the list of other political reforms championed by the right-wing group, NasRuas, and its

[126] Though not exclusively right-wing groups, one interview involved in drafting the popular bill stated that many of the groups were right-wing. Indeed, many of the most prominent supporters of the legislation included right-wing movement organizations, such as: Brasil Contra a Corrupcao e a Impunidade (BCCI); Movimento Contra Corrupcao (MCC); Revoltados Online; NasRuas; Brasileiros de Honras.
[127] They did not reach the necessary signatures. One interviewee estimated that they reached approximate ten percent of the needed signatures before the campaigned lost strength in 2014.
[128] Personal Interview, Anti-Corruption Activist and Leader of EPOCC Campaign. July 27, 2023.
[129] Draft of EPOCC Bill shared by interviewee.

allies in 2013 were: 1) Open Vote: approval of PEC 50/2006, which provides for the end of secret voting in the Federal Congress, 2) a plebiscite to decide between closed list, pure district vote or mixed district voting, and 3) a plebiscite to decide between a presidentalist or parliamentary system.[130] All of these proposals are, at least to some extent, related to changing the political system.

For some of the right-wing groups voicing corruption concerns and proposing political reforms, the real target of blame seemed to be Dilma and the PT more so than the political system and its laws. In fact, one of the less partisan crafters of EPOCC lamented that after many months of collecting signatures in 2013, the movement lost force at the beginning of 2014 as many of its key members redirected their energy to what he called the "fora Dilma, fora PT" [Out with Dilma, Out with PT] movements. He felt like attacking the PT had always been the goal for some groups working on the EPOCC campaign.[131] Yet, the discourse and proposals of the anti-corruption wing of the 2013 protests had some degree of political system blame for corruption.

As a second exception to characterizing the Brazilian case as focused on sub-system-level demands, President Dilma responded to the protests by proposing a popular plebiscite to authorize a process for a new constitution on June 24, 2013. In a meeting with mayors and governors, she called for the plebiscite as a way "to carry out the political reform that the country so badly needs" (Mendes et al. 2013). One day later, following critiques of the idea and a meeting with the Order of Attorneys of Brazil (OAB), Dilma backed out of the plan (Quero 2013; Castro 2013). However, inspired by Dilma's initial proposal and by their own views that

[130] Note published on the NasRuas Facebook page. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/notes/706060196684468/.
[131] Personal Interview, Anti-Corruption Activist and Leader of EPOCC Campaign. July 27, 2023.

some aspects of Brazil's political system were undemocratic, some of the traditional social movements in Brazil – including the MST, CMP, and the CUT – started meeting about writing a new constitution in 2013 and organized their own popular plebiscite for a new constitution in September 2014.[132] A fringe movement critiquing the Brazilian political system had existed for many years,[133] but it was Dilma's proposal for a constitutional assembly that motivated these movements to organize their own plebiscite.[134] However, as discussed later in this chapter, the groups organizing the plebiscite were part of the Loyal Left in June 2013 and were not the central actors who initiated the protests.

Thirdly, a couple of interviewees, both participants and analysts, reflected on Brazil's 2013 protests as being anti-system in nature.[135][136] Another analyst referred to the 2013 protests as an "all-out assault of the political system as a whole" (Roman 2013, p. 140).

Yet, despite these considerations in favor of coding Brazil 2013 as an anti-system protest, many of the key actors and organizations – such as MPL and the Forum of Fights – leading protests in 2013 were focused on targeting specific public policy changes rather than changing the system. In this sense, Brazil's 2013 protests are distinct from Chile 2019.

Lastly, the Brazilian case does align with the fourth characteristic of protest *in* democracy as Brazil's political system in 2013 was democratic. Freedom House regarded Brazil in 2013 as a free country and gave the country a "2" rating on political rights and civil liberties (1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating) (Freedom House 2023). Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) rates across different democracy components rather than offering an aggregated rating. But,

[132] Personal Interview, Activist and Member of Central de Movimentos Populares (CMP). May 22, 2023.
[133] The Plataforma Pela Reforma Do Sistema Político (Platform for Reform of the Political System). The group originally formed in 2004. A link to their website here: https://reformapolitica.org.br/.
[134] Personal Interview, Activist and Member of Central de Movimentos Populares (CMP). May 22, 2023.
[135] Personal Interview, Political Science Graduate Student and Participant in 2013 Protests. June 14, 2023.
[136] Personal Interview, Social Science Professor. May 22, 2023.

for example, V-dem gave Brazil a high score of .8 out of 1 on Liberal Democracy Index of V-dem and relatively high scores on all components of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2023).

In short, Brazil's 2013 protests are not a case of anti-system protest because of lack of blame directed at the political system. However, my theoretical framework offers a generalizable framework to explains the trajectory from sectoral protest to different alternative outcomes. In the next section, I discuss how political opportunity made protest onset more likely for three key groups in Brazil. Then, I examine how political unresponsiveness led to unresolved demands and inspired protest action for some groups, while responsiveness dissuaded others from protesting.

Chapter 5, Section 2: Causes of Brazil's 2013 Protests

Political Opportunity

Political opportunity is a relevant background condition for political protest onset. In Chapter 2, this paper lays out two dimensions of political opportunity: rights to protest and representation through other channels. I argue in Chapter 2 that contexts with strong defense of rights to protest and weak representation through other channels are the most conducive environment to political protest. Protections of rights to protest make it easier for movements to organize and decrease fear of repression, while representation through other channels provides potential protesters with effective institutional outlets for channeling their interests. As noted in the discussion on democracy characteristics, Chile and Brazil had strong protections of rights to protest leading up to their protest movements. In Chile, representation through other channels in democracy was weakened from the start by the dictatorship-era constitution and pacted transition to democracy that favored governability over seeking to effectively channel citizen and civil society voices. Institutions provided few formal avenues for citizens to participate in political decisions. In contrast, Brazil in the 1990s and during the first Lula administration starting in

2003 had strong representation through institutionalized channels. However, over time from 2003 to 2013, the strength of representation through institutionalized channels weakened, making Brazil more conducive to protest onset ahead of 2013.

Brazil's early years of redemocratization were marked by various avenues of participation and possibilities for social movement actors to influence policy. Silva (2015) states, "One of the remarkable characteristics of the Brazilian redemocratization was the creation of several processes/channels of access to state spaces for the formulation and implementation of public policies" (pp. 6-7). Article 14 of the 1988 constitution discusses direct participation, mentioning the use of plebiscites, referendums, and popular initiatives as forms of exercising popular sovereignty (Avritzer 2016). Starting in the 1990s, Brazil began implementing an institutional, participatory infrastructure that included participatory budgets, public conferences, and public hearings. These participatory avenues created opportunities for social movement organizations to influence decisions, to act as implementers of public policy, and to access resources (Silva 2015; Avritzer 2016). Thus, already in the 1990s (as evidenced in the graphs discussed below), Brazil provided more linkages to citizens and channels to process citizen demands than Chile. This distinction between Brazil and Chile became even more pronounced when the Workers' Party (PT) reached national power through the presidential election of Lula in 2003. Historically, the PT was a strong proponent of social participation and had strong historical linkages with Brazilian unions and various social movement organizations (Avritzer 2016; Hochstetler 2008).

Indicators from Varieties of Democracy support the idea that Brazil had a more participatory democracy than Chile before 2003 and that the distinction became more pronounced after 2003. Figure 12 compares Brazil, Chile, and the Latin American average on the

variable of CSO consultation, a variable that captures the extent to which policymakers consult civil society organizations on policies relevant to the organization. The scale ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 meaning that government is highly insulated from CSO input and 2 meaning that "important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues." (V-dem 2021 codebook, pp. 193-194; 3.10.0.3).

Figure 12: V-Dem CSO Consultation

As the graph indicates, throughout the 1990s, Brazil was rated higher than Chile and the Latin American average on CSO consultation, and this rating increased to almost the maximum score when Lula came to power in 2003.

Since not all citizens participate in major civil society organizations, the participatory component index offers another indicator to measure participation more broadly. In particular, the index captures engagement in CSOs, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies (V-dem 2021 Codebook, p. 51; 2.2.12). The scale goes from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating the most participatory democracy. Figure 13 compares Brazil to Chile and the Latin American average.

Figure 13: V-Dem Participatory Component Index

Though the difference is not as significant as in CSO consultation, Brazil had a more participatory democracy than Chile (and higher than the Latin American regional average) throughout the 1990s, and its rating increased when Lula came to power. These indicators suggest that Brazil was somewhat different than Chile in having stronger avenues for participation and representation of CSOs and citizens through institutionalized channels during much of the period beginning in the 1990s.

More detailed case evidence helps illustrate this point. Lula's first administration had an open-door policy with CSOs, facilitating far more dialogue and negotiation than any previous Brazilian administrations (Gomez Bruera 2013). Almost two million CSO members had participated in the Lula administration's consultative processes during its first three years (Hochstetler 2008, p. 43). In addition to dialogue and consultation, CSOs gained government positions and resources through the Lula government. A survey of the state apparatus showed

that 46 percent of the highest officials in the first Lula administration (from directorate level upwards), belonged to a social movement (Gomez Bruera, p. 144). Gomez adds that Lula's first administration allocated massive, unprecedented sums of state funding to civil society (p. 146). Initially, this increased consultation, dialogue, and funding of civil society contributed to social movement support of Lula. In a first phase of the administration, many activists (particularly the ones that had historically worked with the PT) viewed Lula's presidency as representing a possibility for significant change in Brazil (Hostetler 2008).

Though the institutional infrastructure for consultation and citizen engagement remained through 2013 in Brazil, there was a marked negative shift in the relationship between some social movement organizations and the ruling PT party after Lula came to power. Evidence from internal meetings of groups with historical ties to the PT evidence that a key point of internal debate as early as August 2003 was whether these organizations still shared a political project with the PT government. These discussions and doubts led some historical allies of the party like the MST to begin to form parallel participatory spaces that didn't include the PT, like the Coordination of Social Movements (Coordenação dos Movimientos Sociais). Others created coalitions in direct opposition to PT policies. For example, in March 2004, eighteen hundred union and social movement activists formed a national coordinating body, Conlutas, to oppose Lula's economic policies. Another prominent movement conglomerate, Projeto Mapas, concluded in 2005 that the administration had opted for a parliamentary governing strategy based on allying with various parties rather than the participatory governance for radical change that those movement organizations favored (Hochstetler 2008, pp. 44-47).

The linkages between the PT and social movement organizations deteriorated even more after Lula's first years in office. Maricato (2009) argues that the PT moved away from the social

movements at its origins because electoral competition demanded that party leadership create an internal bureaucracy that was disconnected from its base (p. 206). Silva (2015) states that the negative evaluation from some social movements of the PT intensified during the second Lula government (2007-2010) and Dilma government (2011-2014), due to the growing involvement of the PT in traditional Brazilian party dynamics. The Mensalão scandal – a bribery scheme in which members of the PT were paying members of Congress in exchange for support for their legislation – broke in 2005, confirming the perceptions of some that the PT was partaking in corrupt, politics-as-usual. Others add that the system of coalitional presidentialism in Brazil led Dilma to pursue a more moderate and elite-centered strategy and avoid a more ambitious agenda (Gomez Bruera 2013; Von Bülow and Lassance 2012; Sweet 2014).

Indicative of the deteriorating relationship between institutionalized politics of the PT and some Brazilians in civil society, state participative mechanisms saw a decline in participation. For example, the participation in the National Conference of Cities went from 200,000 people in 2005 to 140,000 in 2010 (Omena de Melo 2020). According to one leader of São Paulo's Social Health Forum (Forum Popular Social de Saude de São Paulo), a healthcare reform social movement that allied with MPL during the 2013 São Paulo protests, members of his movement felt like the *conselhos*, state-led participatory councils, were formed in a manipulative way and did not actually channel demands.[137] Thus, his movement organization became less inclined over time to participate in these state-run participatory mechanisms and turned to protests and other methods of bringing about change.

The perceived failures of representation were not a PT-specific problem. Rather, the PT's increasing disconnect from movements left a void in Brazilian politics (Maricoto 2009; Friendly

[137] Personal Interview, 2013 Protester and Leader of São Paulo Social Health Forum. May 23, 2023.

2017) because it used to be the party linked to civil society and it had a "monopoly as the political instrument of the Left for twenty years" (Hochstetler 2008, p. 34).

The perceived failures of representation are evidenced in public opinion as well. Roman (2017) points out that between 2006 and 2012, public confidence in political parties dropped from 21 percent to 10 percent (p. 138). Vieira et al. (2018) also finds evidence that the percentage of Brazilians who did not feel close to any party had increased, and argues "the low sense of representation could have been responsible for creating a potent fuel for the protests" (p. 53). Roman (2017) concludes, "In the absence of a crisis of political linkages, Brazil's June 2013 cycle of escalation could not have taken place following the same pattern of an all-out assault of the political system as a whole" (pp. 140-141). In favor of this argument, IBOPE surveys of protesters on June 20, 2013 indicate that 89 percent perceived that no political party represented them (IBOPE 2013).

In short, due to a perception of worsening representation through institutionalized channels in an environment that already protected civil liberties, Brazil's political opportunity context became highly conducive to political protest leading up to 2013.

Political Opportunity for Social Movement Groups in Brazil

The political opportunity environment under the PT was not perceived to be the same by all groups. Specifically, three key groups – that went on to become key protagonists of the protests in 2013 – perceived ineffective representation through institutionalized channels: PT Defectors, Autonomist/Anarchists, and the Right (Alonso 2023).[138] In some cases, protesters did not fit neatly into any of these groups, but the groupings help to roughly categorize the most important and numerous actors in the streets in 2013. Lastly, a fourth group, the Loyal Left, felt

[138] Alonso (2023) refers to the three styles of activism guiding these groups: neossocialist, autonomist, and patriot. The author goes into some more detail on the thematic emphases and mobilization strategies of each group.

more effectively represented by governments of the PT and thus were less inclined to participate in protests.

PT Defectors: The first group included social movement and political party actors that had formerly allied with or participated in the PT. These actors became fed up with the concessions of the PT once in power and with the non-combative, negotiations-based approach that some "old left" social movement organizations took with the governments of the PT (Alonso 2023, p. 17). Some of this subgroup of the 2013 protesters were affiliated with left-wing political parties like the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) and the United Socialist Workers' Party (PSTU), or with social movement organizations like the Homeless Workers Movement (MTST). The defectors held ideological differences with the PT administrations and largely perceived deteriorating representation to have emerged through the process of the PT transitioning from social movement-based opposition party to governing party. For example, one interviewee talked about how he disaffiliated from the PT in 1999 because he felt like the party was becoming distant from its base and that the social movements on which it was founded lacked independence from the party.[139] These left-based defectors of the PT were still a rather small group when Lula became president for the first time in 2003, but they grew over the course of the decade of PT presidencies (Alonso 2023).[140] For example, the PSOL party was founded in 2004 by former PT militants who were expelled from the party for voting against what they viewed as a neoliberal pension reform proposed by President Lula. As one interviewee summarized, the process of the PT moderating and abandoning some of the key principles of its base to pursue an electoral strategy, left "orphan children of the PT" who went elsewhere to

[139] Personal Interview, Former PT and PSOL Militant and MPL Activist. May 19, 2023.
[140] Personal Interview, 2013 Protester and Leader of São Paulo Social Health Forum. May 23, 2023.

pursue their left agendas.[141] Likewise, Alonso (2023) argues that the movement-government characteristic of the PT changed after the Mensalão scandal broke and left an opening for new competing actors on the left (Alonso 2023, p. 17, pp. 22-23).

Autonomists/Anarchists: The second key group on the left that protested in 2013 were the autonomist/anarchists. This group includes both self-proclaimed autonomists like MPL in São Paulo and anarchists because of similarities in their perspective on Brazilian politics and their distinct origins from the PT defectors. Though some PT defectors would join these groups, many of the autonomists/anarchists represented new generations of activists who had never formed part of the PT orbit. Silva (2015) talks about how a new generation of activists that had not been socialized during the redemocratization process did not feel that the PT allowed for more radical changes to take place. Alonso and Miche (2017) add, "Unlike their parents' generation, they do not view Brazil through the prism of dictatorship and inflation; rather, they see the PT government as the status quo, and as unable to respond to their rising expectations regarding the quality of public policies and services, especially related to education, urban mobility and access to consumption" (p. 147). Indeed, one of the leaders of the 2013 MPL movement in São Paulo was 15 years old when the movement was founded in 2005 and recalls that, with a few exceptions, the oldest members of the movement in São Paulo at that time were 18-20 years old.[142] The autonomists/anarchists called for new forms of conducting politics outside of the traditional institutional channels. For example, in its founding "Letter of Principles," the Free Fare Movement (MPL) defined itself as "horizontal, autonomous, independent and non-partisan" and stated, "The parliamentary path should not be the mainstay of the MPL, on the contrary,

[141] Personal Interview, Political Science Graduate Student and Participant in 2013 Protests. June 14, 2023.
[142] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of MPL São Paulo. May 15, 2023.

force must come from the streets."[143] In other words, the autonomists/anarchists had ideological differences with the PT and also believed that the parliamentary channel of representation was inherently ineffective.

The Right: The third group consisted of social movements on the right of the political spectrum. Alonso (2023) refers to this group as the "patriots," as a communality between them was the use of the flag and national symbols. However, movements within this group are also distinguished from the other two by their calls for less government intervention and lower taxes, pro-military, and defense of traditional values (Alonso 2023, pp. 63-63). Though discontent with corruption was not entirely unique to the Right, this group was distinct from the other two groups in emphasizing corruption as a central motive for the protests. For example, a NasRuas[144] leader used the slogan, "it's not 20 cents, it's the billions diverted through corruption" to point out the importance of corruption as an issue over public transportation demands (Alonso 2023, p. 233).

For the Right, perceived lack of effective representation did not stem from a falling out with the PT due to its concessions, presidential governing style, or lack of radical left reforms. Rather, the Right had clear ideological differences with the PT and also lacked adequate, right-wing institutional alternatives to the PT to channel their discontent. As one interviewee from the right-wing MBL movement reflected, the left had dominated institutional politics in Brazil for the preceding years, often leaving conservatives like him with the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), not a right-wing party, as the only viable electoral alterative to the PT.[145]

The Loyal Left: In contrast to the three other groups, the Loyal Left did not sense a complete lack of effective representation by PT governments, partly explaining why this was group was not a

[143] MPL Letter of Principles, Available at: https://saopaulo.mpl.org.br/apresentacao/carta-de-principios/.
[144] A far-right movement that supports Bolsonaro and defines itself on its social media page as a "Movement to combat corruption and impunity, founded in July 2011."
[145] Personal Interview, MBL Activist. May 16, 2023.

key protagonist in the June 2013 protests. One member of this group, from the historically PT-allied Central de Movimentos Populares (CMP) umbrella organization, stated that the CMP had some issues that they disagreed with regarding the Dilma government, but at the same time, she said, "it was *our* government."[146] Another called it an "ambiguous relationship" given that they wanted to have more dialogue and more of a say in the Dilma administrations' decisions and saw some shortcomings in its policies, but they were still close to the government and recognized the progress that the PT had made.[147]

Political Unresponsiveness

Political opportunity is a background condition that increases the likelihood of initial protest onset. If political groups perceive an environment of strong protection of rights to protest and ineffective representation, then initial protest emergence by these groups is more likely. Political responsiveness is a separate concept. My theoretical framework argues that once social movement organizations begin mobilizing around sectoral demands, their perceptions of political responsiveness – the adequacy of the political-institutional response to their demands – affect how they subsequently strategically update. Faced with political unresponsiveness, I argue that groups are more likely to continue pursuing extra-institutional tactical alternatives. Upon exhaustion of tactical alternatives, social movement organizations may escalate their targets of blame. In Brazil, the MPL – the autonomist/anarchist social movement organization that led the initial 2013 Jornadas de Junho protests in São Paulo – and other organizations centered on transportation fares had faced repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness in preceding years. Other participating organizations in 2013 – like the Popular Committees Against the World Cup and the anti-corruption organizations on the right – had relatively shorter protest histories (and

[146] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CMP. May 25, 2023.
[147] Personal Interview, Leader of CMP. May 22, 2023.

thus less experiences with political unresponsiveness) and had new political developments that motivated their demands. Finally, a significant contingent of social movement actors in Brazil experienced political responsiveness to their sectoral demands during the Lula and Dilma administrations from 2003 to 2013 and were thus less inclined to participate in the 2013 protests. In short, in contrast to Chile, Brazilian sectoral organizations did all share the same lengthy histories of political unresponsiveness that could have motivated a sense of the inefficacy of lower-level targeting to drive collective blame escalation.

The MPL clearly fits the theoretical framework's expectation that movement organizations will continue to pursue their unresolved demands through extra-institutional tactics when they face political unresponsiveness. Following its founding as an organization in 2005, the São Paulo branch of the MPL organized mobilizations against local public transportation fare increases in 2005, 2006, 2010, and 2011 (Spina 2016). These protests did not lead to revocation of the fare increases or other changes in public transportation policies in any of the years.

According to movement leaders, the 2011 protests were the most important antecedent to the 2013 protests. MPL São Paulo succeeded in increasing the size of its movement after a period of exhaustion and decreased participation between 2007 and 2010.[148][149] The organization led weekly protest events for several months against the 2011 bus fare hike enacted by Mayor Gilberto Kassab, but the fare increase was not revoked.

In spite of these preceding years of protests against fare increases, the incoming mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad, declared on December 10, 2012 that a fare increase would be inevitable in the upcoming year. On the same day of the declaration, MPL São Paulo submitted a letter demanding that fares remain at 2012 levels and began organizing for protests against a

[148] Personal Interview, MPL Leader. May 24, 2023.
[149] Personal Interview, MPL Leader. May 15, 2023.

potential fare increase ("Aumento do ônibus…" 2013). In Facebook posts leading up to June 2013, the São Paulo organization repeated the slogan, "If the fares increase, the city will stop" (Escola de Ativismo 2023).

At the end of 2012, the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro also formed around the historic issue of fare increases. As one founding member of the organization related, every year the local government announced fare increases in September or October, and every year student-led protests took place in the city. Towards the end of 2012, the local government in Rio announced plans to increase fares again. This time a broader group of activists decided to organize against the fare increases through local networks and connections through activist Facebook groups.[150] The organization would eventually shorten its name to the Forum of Fights and incorporate other demands in June 2013, but public transportation fares were the central demand that motivated the organization's formation. Public transportation in Rio de Janeiro was a clear case of political unresponsiveness as the local government raised fares despite various episodes of protest against the measure in previous years.

Other key 2013 movement organizations had relatively shorter histories of facing political unresponsiveness. The Popular Committees Against the World Cup formed in 2010 ahead of Brazil's hosting of the FIFA Confederations Cup (2013) and FIFA World Cup (2014). According to one leader of the Rio de Janeiro committee, four national housing rights organizations initially formed the organizations over concerns about evictions and communities being threatened by stadium construction and new infrastructure projects related to the events.[151] In 2012, the National Articulation of Popular Committees Against the World Cup published a dossier on "Megaevents and Human Rights Violations in Brazil" in which it outlines concerns in

[150] Personal Interview, Forum of Fights Leader. May 30, 2023.
[151] Personal Interview, Representative of Popular Committee Against the World Cup in Rio. June 1, 2023.

eight issue areas: housing, work, popular representation, environment, access to public goods and services, mobility, and public security. Thus, long-standing housing organizations helped form the committees and demands reference some more general issues in Brazil, but newly planned megaevents in Brazil were what motivated the formation of the committees. Nevertheless, the group faced unresponsiveness in the sense that the demands that the popular committees began protesting for in 2010 had been met with unresponsiveness through 2013, as the government continued to move forward with stadium construction and infrastructure projects for the events.

The organizations on the right protesting corruption also seemed to be motivated by new developments that increased the saliency of the corruption demand ahead of 2013. Some anti-corruption movement organizations in Brazil had formed following the Mensalão scandal in 2005, but Alonso (2023) points out that more recent events increased attention to the issue and led to the emergence of new movements. Indeed, one interviewee who founded an anti-corruption organization in 2005 talked about he began more active mobilization with other anti-corruption groups in 2010 and 2011.[152] NasRuas, a key right-wing movement in the 2013 protests, was formed by Carla Zambelli in 2011.

There were several developments that placed corruption on the political agenda ahead of 2013. First, in the first year of Dilma's presidency in 2011, the press broke news of scandals involving several of Dilma's ministers, leading to the resignations of the Chief of Staff, Minister of Cities, and Minister of Transportation, among others (Moreira 2012). Second, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) in Brazil was hearing the case of the Mensalão scandal in nationally televised hearings during 2012. And third, new accusations of corruption came to light relating to public spending on projects for the Confederations Cup and World Cup. Thus, while corruption

[152] Personal Interview, Anti-corruption Movement Leader. July 27, 2023.

may have been a long-standing problem in Brazilian politics, these newly-formed movement organizations on the right were motivated by recent developments regarding corruption. And corruption motivated their agenda in 2013. In the manifesto of Movements #ContraCorrupcão (#AgainstCorruption), published on the NasRuas Facebook page on June 26, 2013 and supported by other key groups on the right, corruption is central theme with proposals of popular laws for combatting corruption and investigations of World Cup spending, complementing other proposals such as tax reform and public security reforms.[153] Thus, as with the Popular Committees Against the World Cup, these anti-corruption groups were met with political unresponsiveness and had unresolved demands, but they also had not been protesting for very long in many cases.

Finally, political **responsiveness** preceding 2013 made a significant set of movement organizations in Brazil less inclined to participate in the 2013 protests. Organizations within the Loyal Left already had historical ties and affinity to the PT, and the specific actions that Lula and Dilma administrations took to resolve sectoral demands of organizations within this group were also critical to deterring protest. The Unified Workers' Central (CUT), the main trade union in Brazil, offers one example of an organization whose demands were met with political responsiveness. The National Labor Forum (Foro Nacional del Trabajo), which convened between 2004 and 2008, offered a space for dialogue between union representatives, government officials, and company representatives. In addition to providing a forum for the CUT to discuss its grievances, the Lula administration's forum and labor policies led to clear victories for the sector. Iglesias (2021) highlights a significant minimum wage increase and decrease in work hours per week as two victories for the CUT that resulted from the forum. In an interview in

[153] Note published on the NasRuas Facebook page. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/notes/706060196684468/.

January 2013, the president of the CUT recognized the advances regarding his organization's sectoral objectives and broader societal improvements over the past 10 years of PT governments, "This is a decade of transformation of society, with a reduction in inequality, the removal of more than 40 million Brazilians from extreme poverty, expansion of the labor market, advancement in the capital-labor relationship with more rights and more achievements, appreciation of purchasing power of the minimum wage" (Federacão Metalúrgicos 2013).

The National Confederation of Workers in Education (CNTE), an organization that brings together 50 union affiliates in the education sector, also recognized sectoral progress during the PT governments leading up to 2013. One 35-year member of the CNTE talked about how the demand for a national salary floor for teachers was something that the teachers' unions had been fighting for during their entire existence. She referred to Lula's creation of a salary minimum for teachers in 2008 as one of the greatest achievements in the CNTE's history. This interviewee thought that the Dilma administration had a style of less dialogue with social movements than Lula, but she still thought that it was possible to advance reforms in her sector during the Dilma administration.[154]

A leader of the CMP urban reform organization, another Loyal Left group, said that the organization was not completely satisfied with the Minha Casa, Minha Vida public housing program. However, in response to pressure from his organization and others, the PT added on the Minha Casa, Minha Vida Entidades program, which grants subsidized financing for urban housing to families that are organized through non-profit entities. This addition was viewed as an important victory for the CMP.[155]

[154] Personal Interview, CNTE Member. May 4, 2023.
[155] Personal Interview, Leader of CMP. May 22, 2023.

Due in part to the political responsiveness of the PT to their sectoral demands, interviewees from the Loyal Left talked about being completely caught off guard and surprised by the massive protests that emerged in June 2013.[156] Movement organizations like MST, CUT, União dos Movimentos de Moradia, CMP, and Movimento dos Antingidos por Barragens (MAB) had doubts about what actions to take after the June 2013 protest emergence and held internal discussions about what to do. The organizations and their individual members ended up being divided. Some actors in these groups did not participate in the protests at all to avoid going against the PT, while others went to the streets with their red-colored movement or even PT party flags to show some degree of allegiance to the governing party while voicing dissent about particular grievances.[157]

Chapter 3 noted that the Patagonia Without Dams movement in Chile also experienced political responsiveness with the definitive closure of the Hidroaysén dam project. However, it is important to underscore the difference in size of these two groups. In Chile, the Patagonia Without Dams movement was advanced by a specific set of national environmental organizations and regional actors in the Aysén region of Chile. And even these groups viewed their campaign victory as an outlier within the broader environmental movement in Chile; some had even participated in other campaigns that failed more recently. In contrast, the movement organizations that perceived political responsiveness by the PT in Brazil included some of the most massive, national social movement organizations and unions in Brazil (CUT, CTE, MST), and these organizations could point to various victories and cases of political responsiveness during the years of PT governance. Thus, political responsiveness had a far greater effect in

[156] Personal Interview Leader and Founding Member of CMP. May 25, 2023.
[157] Personal Interview, Leader of CMP. May 22, 2023.

deterring potential protesters and even garnering allies for the government in Brazil's 2013 protests than in Chile's 2019 protests.

In sum, political unresponsiveness was a causal factor in the 2013 Brazil protests, contributing to unresolved demands and preference for continued extra-institutional action by some groups. However, the degree of political unresponsiveness in Brazil varied. Some key organizations that led the initial protests in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro – MPL and Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases – were driven to continued extra-institutional action by repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness over many years. These experiences were most similar to the experiences of Chilean sectoral organizations like FECh and No More AFP. Other organizations centered on corruption and the World Cup were motivated by recent political developments and though they had unresolved demands, they had shorter histories facing unresponsiveness. Finally, a significant contingent of organizations in Brazil had enjoyed political responsiveness to their sectoral demands across three PT administrations.

The more varied picture of political unresponsiveness in Brazil contrasts with the near uniform perception of repeated political unresponsiveness among key movement organizations in Chile leading up to 2019. The next sections in this chapter will discuss how this variable and others led to important differences in the protest characteristics of Brazil 2013 and Chile 2019.

Chapter 5, Section 3: Explaining the Differences Between the Chilean and Brazilian Cases

Limited Target Escalation

Two factors help explain why Brazilian protesters did not escalate blame to the political system like Chileans in 2019. First, my theoretical framework argues that repeated instances of political unresponsiveness may ultimately drive target escalation due to a sense of exhaustion of tactical alternatives. As the previous section details, some of the key organizations in the 2013

protests in Brazil had not experienced long histories of political unresponsiveness. Activists from groups like the Popular Committees Against the World Cup were not satisfied with the PT's initial response to their demands leading up to 2013, but these committees had also formed relatively recently. It is not surprising that relatively new activists or causes had not reached the conclusion by June 2013 that lower-level targets were impossibly unresponsive and that the only way for change was targeting the political system. The second reason for the lack of target escalation is that target escalation to the political system is a greater leap in a federalized system like Brazil than in a centralized context like Chile, where many sectoral organizations are focused on national issues as a starting point. For some Brazilian activists, it did not make much sense to blame the national government or take aim at the system for policies set at the subnational level. For example, MPL was persistent in its targeting of subnational actors despite years of political unresponsiveness to its demands.

As noted in Section 1 of this chapter, some groups did take aim at the system in 2013, and more Brazilians would seem to take aim at the political system in subsequent years with the popular support for the Bolsonaro movement. Thus, repeated political unresponsiveness did ultimately seem to lead to blame escalation for some groups in Brazil.

Limited National, Cross-Sector Coalitions

The first reason that Brazilian protesters did not form national, cross-sector coalitions like the Social Unity Table or Broad Front in Chile is that movement organizations did not have aligned goals. For example, the MPL was entirely focused on transportation fares in June 2013, and thus did not have any interest in creating an umbrella organization with broader objectives.[158] No More AFP in Chile was also, at one point, completely focused on sectoral

[158] Personal Interview, MPL Leader. May 20, 2023.

objectives. However, unlike No More AFP and others in Chile, sectoral organizations in Brazil did not go through a process of target escalation that could have united disparate sectors around common goals or enemies.

Second, Brazilian organizations had more significant ideological differences, particularly regarding their views on the ruling PT party. Though the Broad Front in Chile incorporated a spectrum of leftist parties, they were all opposed to the Concertación. In contrast, Brazil had autonomist organizations like the MPL – that considered autonomy from political parties to be a key principle of its organization – and organizations that critiqued aspects of PT governance but had many members who still considered themselves allies of the PT (CUT and CMP are two examples). These differences placed barriers between the organizations. For example, one Loyal Left leader talked about how movement organizations in this group reached out to MPL multiple times to start a dialogue, but MPL refused to engage with them.[159] Furthermore, most of the protesting organizations in Chile in 2019 were on the left of the political spectrum. Brazil in 2013 had organizations on the left and right, making broad-based coalitions even more challenging ideologically.

The third reason that Brazilian did not form national, cross-sector coalitions is that Brazil was a more decentralized organizational context than Chile. Thus, the coalitions that did form often organized and mobilized at the local level. The Forum of Fights Against the Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro was built through both pre-existing local networks and Facebook groups that drew together activists with a common concern about the increase in local public transportation fares. One leader talked about how there were no restrictions on activists outside of Rio de Janeiro joining the organization, but because the demands mostly had to do with local

[159] Personal Interview Follow-up, Loyal Left Leader. Whatsapp Audio Correspondence on November 2, 2023.

government, the organization's base was almost entirely local.[160] The Popular Committees Against the World Cup was a nation-wide movement, but according to one member, the committees functioned differently in each city.[161] In other words, even in cases in which different organizations found common goals, they mostly organized locally.

Chapter 5, Section 4: Underscoring the Importance of Political Unresponsiveness in Driving System-Blame Coalitions

Thus, the the Brazilian protests in 2013 were a non-system protest because protesters did not direct blame at the political system. However, looking at attempts at coalition formation outside of 2013 in Brazil, the case also helps underscore the point already argued through evidence in the Chilean case that perceived political unresponsiveness is fundamentally important in the formation of multi-sector coalitions aimed at political system change.

From its foundation in 1993, the Center of Popular Movements (CMP) is an umbrella organization that has sought to bring together diverse urban popular movements – in housing, health, women's rights, and other issues – to articulate broader fights and goals. The organization's current objective is rather vaguely stated as, "to articulate urban popular movements in their common and general struggles, as a way of overcoming the existing fragmentation…."[162] Leaders of CMP point out that the extent to which member movements are open to pushing for political system-based changes rather than focusing on their specific public policy issue areas has shifted over the years depending on which government is in power. If it is a government seen as friendly to reform, member movements focus on advancing their own causes. For member movements, overwhelmingly consisting of historical PT allies, a friendly government means a PT government.

[160] Personal Interview, Forum of Fights Leader. May 30, 2023.
[161] Personal Interview, Popular Committees Against the World Cup Leader. June 1, 2013.
[162] Information from CMP website. Available at: https://cmpbrasil.org/about/.

One leader of the CMP talked about the challenges of pushing for broader system-level changes, such as a new constitution, during PT administrations. He stated, "When there's the possibility of changing personal politics, everything is directed toward that. One knows it's important [in this case talking about a new constitution], but you don't see any opportunity [to push for that]. In the Dilma and Lula governments, there was the possibility of '*conquista inmediata*' (immediate victories)…so the tendency is for each movement to go after its specific interests. This is the challenge of CMP, it was launched to articulate more general fights, but that can be very difficult."[163]

This leader and another leader of CMP since the 1990s reflected that the organization actually had a more fundamental role within the urban social movements landscape during Jair Bolsonaro's presidency (2019-2022) because movements related to health or housing or other sectoral issues needed to come together for a broader fight about democracy and defense of rights.[164] The Bolsonaro point brings in an additional variable because threats to existing rights is combined with the issue of political unresponsiveness. However, the challenges for the CMP in bringing organizations together to push for broad-based system changes during PT governments helps illustrate how political *responsiveness* can obstruct blame escalation and thus interfere with system-based protest coalition success. This point aligns with the Chilean case, in which groups like No More AFP preferred to focus on their issue-specific demands related to pension reform until they reached a point of perceiving that reform was impossible without system-level change.

Chapter 5, Section 5: Alternative Explanations

This section considers how well the alternative explanations discussed in Chapter 2 help to explain the emergence of Brazil's 2013 protests.

[163] Personal Interview, Leader of CMP. May 22, 2023.
[164] Personal Interview, Leader and Founding Member of CMP. May 25, 2023.

H_{AD} (Absolute Deprivation): The central factor behind the emergence of Brazil's 2013 protests was worsening macro-level conditions that motivated protest action by the objectively deprived.

The survey data of protesters cited in Section 1 of this chapter suggests that absolute deprivation did not drive protest participation in Brazil. The IBOPE surveys of protesters finds that 49 percent had family incomes of five minimum wages or more (IBOPE 2013). Economic deprivation was decreasing in the country leading up to 2013. World Bank data shows that Brazil's poverty headcount ratio (at $2.15 per day, 2017 PPP) steadily decreased from 12.6 percent in 2003 to 3.7 percent in 2013 (World Bank 2023). Furthermore, Brazilians' perceptions of their economic situation were relatively favorable. Polls from the beginning of 2013 found that 92 percent of Brazilians expected their economic situation to stay the same or get better during 2013 (Winter 2013). All of this evidence indicates that absolute deprivation was likely not a cause of mass protest emergence in Brazil in 2013.

H_{RD} (Relative Deprivation): Relative deprivation was the central factor driving Brazil's 2013 protest emergence. Factors like a growing economy, poverty alleviation, and increased access to education increased expectations while high levels of inequality and poor public services restricted capabilities for many. Brazilians with heightened expectations and restricted capabilities felt frustrated and protested.

Relative deprivation is a far more likely contributing factor to the 2013 Brazilian protests than absolute deprivation. Government programs started in 2003 by the Lula administration like Bolsa Familia, Fome Zero, and Minha Casa, Minha Vida helped to address poverty, hunger, and housing needs of Brazilians. Winter (2017) argues that the 40 million Brazilians that came out of poverty due to economic growth and PT policies had heightened expectations. The author's argument is based on public opinion polls that show that Brazilians referred to more basic needs like unemployment, hunger/misery, and violence/crime as their primary concerns in 2003 and more advanced issues like healthcare, education, and corruption as their top concerns in 2013. In

other words, a relative deprivation argument might hold that as more Brazilians had their basic needs met, they developed greater expectations and became frustrated with deficiencies in issue areas like healthcare, education, and politics. Thus, they went to the streets and protested.

The relative deprivation argument in the Brazilian case faces two problems. First, as argued in Chapter 2, existing evidence suggests that there is not a clear and direct link between proxies for relative deprivation and protest. Relative deprivation does not explain, for example, why Brazilians chose street protest over institutionalized political action or how they organized and overcame barriers to collective action. Second, the sequencing of events in Brazil does not align with a standalone relative deprivation argument. Relative deprivation suggests that individuals become so frustrated with their situation that they reach a critical threshold and flood the streets in protest. In the case of Brazil's 2013 protests, the multi-sector and multi-demand protests of 2013 were preceded by years of sector-specific protests and political action. The clearest example in this chapter was the MPL organization's annual protests against public transportation fares since 2005. Another example is organizations like the São Paulo Social Health Forum (Forum Popular Social de Saude de São Paulo) that formed in 2009. Originally this movement engaged with the *conselhos*, state-led participatory councils to resolve their sectoral demands. However, over time the organization felt that the councils were formed in a manipulative way and did not channel demands, so the organization turned to street protest. Relative deprivation does not consider the role of these previous protest waves and interactions with political institutions.

In short, relative deprivation was likely a relevant factor that increased the likelihood of protests, but relative deprivation does not tell the whole story of why Brazil's massive protests occurred in 2013. It must be combined with political unresponsiveness and other variables.

H_{RM} (Resource Mobilization): Resources are the primary factor that caused Brazil's protest emergence. Factors like economic growth and expansion in educational access increased individual resources for protest, expansion in movement organizations in preceding years created more organizational resources, and increased use of social media served as a resource for decreasing the costs of mobilizing.

As in the case of Chile, at the individual level economic growth and the movement of Brazilians out of poverty meant that Brazilians had increasing resources for protest in the years leading up to 2013. As one indicator, Brazil's GDP per capita rose from $3,057 in 2003 to $12,259 in 2013 (World Bank 2023). As another indicator, according to the "Report: Education for All in Brazil, 2000-2015," secondary education access and adult literacy rates increased from the first Lula administration to 2013 (Brazil Ministry of Education 2014). Organizationally, Brazil had a strong civil society for a long period of time before 2013. Varieties of Democracy's Core Civil Society Index – "a measure designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society" – found that Brazil was rated above .9 on a 0 to 1 scale from 1989 to 2013 (Coppedge et al. 2023). As noted in this chapter, Brazil's political institutions created opportunities for social movement organizations to access resources, and the ascendence of the PT in 2003 increased the favorability of the environment for social movements. Finally, interviewees and analysts talked about how social media helped activists to organize and coordinate events in 2013 (Coelho 2022).[165] Surveys of protesters at the event on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo on June 20, 2013 found that 93 percent of protesters learned about the mobilizations through social media (80.5 percent Facebook, 5.1 percent Twitter/Whatsapp, and 7.4 percent others) (CESOP 2013).

Thus, as in Chile, resources likely facilitated the 2013 protest emergence. However, resource mobilization leaves out the political processes explaining why many Brazilians had unresolved demands in 2013 and why sectoral movement organizations representing some

[165] Personal Interview, 2013 Protest Participant. April 18, 2023.

groups in Brazil (Autonomists/Anarchists, PT defectors, and the Right) directed their resources to protest around these grievances in 2013, while others did not (Loyal Left).

H_{POS} (Political Opportunity Structure): Brazil's 2013 protests emerged primarily because of institutional political opportunity structures that created conducive conditions for protest. Specifically, ideal opportunity structures are characterized by strong protections of civil liberties that remove fear of repression combined with representative deficiencies through institutional channels that lead protesters to view extra-institutional political action as the most viable form of having demands resolved.

This chapter already discussed the role of political opportunity in Brazil as a cause of sectoral protest emergence. The changing political opportunity context (worsening perceptions of representation through institutionalized channels) from the beginning of the first Lula administration in 2003 to 2013 created a more favorable environment for protests.

H_{PR} (Political Repression): The central reason that sectoral protests escalated to multi-demand, multi-sector protests in Brazil was that illegitimate repression by the state intensified grievances, increased support for the protests from the previously demobilized, and decreased trust in the government.

As in Chile, there was significant police repression during the protests. An Amnesty International report from 2014 summarizes, "The police response to the wave of protests in 2013 was, in many instances, violent and abusive. Military police units used tear gas indiscriminately against protesters – in one case even inside a hospital – fired rubber bullets at people who posed no threat and beat people with hand-held batons. Hundreds were injured, including a photographer who lost his eye after being hit by a rubber bullet. Hundreds more were indiscriminately rounded up and detained, some under laws targeting organized crime, without any indication that they were involved in criminal activity" (Amnesty International 2014). From the perspective of citizens in general, views on the excessiveness of police force were mixed. In Dataholfa national surveys conducted on June 20, 2013, 12.7 percent said that police "acted with

violence," 41.3 percent of Brazilians said that the police "acted violently, but not excessively" and 42.4 percent said they acted "with a lot of violence" (CESOP 2013).

Compared to Chile, interviewees placed greater emphasis on the role of police violence in causing an escalation in the scale of the protests. Several interviewees talked about June 13 as the first day of intense police repression. Interviewees thought that the repression had the effect of changing the way the media covered the protests: the media went from treating the protesters as vandals and criminals to treating the protests as legitimate and supporting protesters.[166] Others thought that the repression created indignation and generated greater solidarity for the protesters.[167] Analysts, like Alonso (2017), also share the perspective that the repression drew more favorable media coverage and brought in previously demobilized Brazilians.

Thus, it seems unlikely that the protests in Brazil would have escalated to over one million protesters on June 20 without the police violence. On the other hand, the variables that preceded June 2013 were still critical to explaining the massive, multi-sector, and multi-demand protests in Brazil in 2013. First, according to Alonso (2023), movement organizations in Brazil organized 77 protests between June 1 and June 12, the day before the significant police repression. These protests were organized by multiple sectors and touched on various demands, and the protests took place in more than 22 cities around the country. (Alonso 2023, p. 160). In other words, the protests were multi-demand, multi-sector, and national-wide before the police repression. Second, Brazilians did not just spontaneously head to the streets because they saw the repression. The organized sectoral actors, who were in the streets in June 2013 because of political unresponsiveness, continued to play a key role in organizing and calling protest events after June 13. As one example, the right-wing NasRuas movement organization (formed in 2010)

[166] Personal Interviews with Protest Participants: May 5, 2023; May 15, 2023; May 22, 2023.
[167] Personal Interviews with Protest Participants: May 23, 2023; June 1, 2013.

used 54 Facebook groups covering cities throughout Brazil to mobilize for protests. According to the leader of the movement, these groups had about 110,000 members overall (Alonso 2023, p. 225). Lastly, following repressive action by Brazilian police forces, repression or rights to protest did not transform into a key demand of protesters. Protesters were still primarily motivated by other, unresolved political issues from previous years of mobilization. IBOPE surveys of protesters in seven states across Brazil on June 20, 2013 (the peak of the protests) found the following issue categories to be the first reason motivating protest participation: public transportation (37.6 percent), political environment (category that included corruption, 29.9 percent), health (12.1 percent), against PEC (5.5 percent), education (5.3 percent), World Cup and Confederations Cup spending (4.5 percent), **reaction to violent actions of police (1.3 percent)**. Police violence was the primary motivation for 1.3 percent of respondents at the protests (IBOPE 2013).

In short, political repression after the June protests in Brazil started – particularly beginning on June 13 – likely played a role in escalating the scale of the protests. However, June 2013 in Brazil would not have occurred without other variables. Background conditions like relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and political opportunity increased the likelihood of protest onset in Brazil leading up to 2013, and political unresponsiveness drove sectoral organizations and others to the streets with wide-ranging, unresolved demands.

Chapter 5, Section 6: Brazilian Case Conclusion

To conclude, the 2013 Jornadas de Junho were significant multi-sector and multi-demand protests in a representative democracy. However, they are not characterized as an anti-system protest due to many key movement organizations and protesters directing blame at non-system targets. This paper's theoretical contributions still help explain the 2013 Brazil protests. A

perceived decrease in the strength of representation through institutionalized channels for multiple groups created a more conducive political opportunity environment for protest emergence. Political unresponsiveness left demands unresolved and motivated extra-institutional action by key organizations like MPL in São Paulo and the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro, while political responsiveness deterred some sectoral organizations on the Loyal Left from joining in the 2013 protests. Brazil did not experience target escalation because some groups had not given up on activism directed at lower-level targets and because Brazil's federalized system of policymaking motivated subnational blame. Brazil lacked broad, national coalitions because of unaligned goals, greater ideological differences, and decentralized politics. Finally, analysis of the relative success of a cross-sector coalition in Brazil after June 2013, during the Bolsonaro administration, underscores the importance of political unresponsiveness in driving the formation of coalitions aimed at system-level change.

Chapter 6: Other Comparative Cases

This chapter analyzes three cases. Section 1 looks at the characteristics and causes of protests in Colombia in 2019 and 2021, two waves of multi-sector, multi-demand protest that are not considered an anti-system protest because of a lack of system-level blame attribution by protesters. Section 2 examines the alternative pathway of political unresponsiveness leading to the election of an anti-system populist, using the case of Venenzuela in the 1980s and 1990s. Section 3 uses the case of the Arab Spring to illustrate the similarities and differences in the causal processes of anti-system protest in autocracy.

Chapter 6, Section 1: Colombia's Non-System Protests in Democracy

This section considers the characteristics and causes of Colombia's protests that had their first wave in 2019 and then reemerged in 2021. Colombia's protests lacked the system blame characteristic of an anti-system protest but mobilized multiple sectors with wide-ranging demands and occurred in the context of a representative system of semi-democracy. In terms of causes, political unresponsiveness was a central contributing factor to escalation of protests to this scale: without unresponsiveness, the numerous, multi-sector actors would have been unlikely to take to the streets with a wide-ranging set of unresolved demands. Colombia's protests were also coordinated by a cross-sector coalition. Cross-sector goal alignment and cross-sector networks built in previous years explain the formation of the CNP coalition that was a key leader of the 2019 and 2021 waves. Unlike Chile and Brazil, economic grievances were also an important contributing factor in the emergence of Colombia's protests. Due to high levels of inequality and poverty, exacerbated by the pandemic and by Duque's "paquetazo" in 2019 and tax reform proposal in 2021, economic grievance was a central motivator for protest. The

emergence of multi-sector and multi-demand protests in Colombia are primarily explained by political unresponsiveness and economic grievance.

Colombia's 2021 protests began following President Ivan Duque's announcement of a tax reform that many Colombians felt would make their situation worse after months of struggling through the pandemic. On April 28, tens of thousands of Colombians across the country joined a national strike called by the multi-sector National Strike Committee (Comité Nacional de Paro, CNP). The protests continued for several months across the country, well after the withdrawal of the tax reform bill that sparked the mobilizations. The 2021 protests were a continuation of a protest wave started by a national strike in November 2019, when different social movement sectors originally came together to form the CNP in response to Duque's "paquetazo," which referred to a set of unpopular labor and pension reform proposals that the Duque government was considering at the time. The 2019 protests were the largest in Colombia since the 1948 "Bogotazo" riots (Franz and Suarez 2019). As with 2021, the 2019 grievances went beyond the president's specific reform proposals; at one point, the CNP presented a petition with over 100 demands (Veloza et al. 2021). Dialogues with the Duque government at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020 didn't make much headway in resolving these demands, but the protests eventually died down due to the pandemic in early 2020 (Veloza et al. 2021).

Characteristics of Colombia's 2019/2021 Protests

Like Brazil in 2013, Colombia's 2019/2021 protests were multi-sector and multi-demand protests but lacked widespread system-level blame. Furthermore, though the context was representative democracy, Colombia in 2019 and 2021 was generally considered a weaker democracy than Brazil in 2013 or Chile in 2019.

Firstly, the protesters in 2019 and 2021 represented diverse sectors of Colombian society. According to one analysis, the 2019 national strike broke with the "sectoral logic" that had characterized protests in Colombia, "While the previous mobilizations involved the participation of certain social sectors, these were intersectoral and interclass, articulating actors from the middle and upper-middle class, students, women, environmentalists, the unemployed and, mostly, young people"(Cruz-Rodriguez 2022. pp. 2-3). The 2019 protests were led by the CNP, at the time bringing together the main union organizations (CUT, CTC, CGT, and Fecode), along with 100 other organizations of students, agrarian groups, peasants, and other social organizations.

In 2021, the protests were led in part by the CNP, but also drew even more participation from actors outside of the umbrella organization than in 2019. Even CNP leaders recognized that their multi-sector umbrella organization did not cover all the interests of the masses of individuals who protested in 2021 (Gonzalez 2021). As the protests went on in 2021, the CNP had a fairly limited and decreasing power of convoking mass protest activities (Garcia and Garces 2021). Other groups of non-CNP members joined the protests and brought with them their own group-level demands including truck drivers, tax drivers, informal miners, football fans, firefighters, butchers, and indigenous groups (Garcia and Garces 2021). Reports on the 2021 protests indicate that "rarely before have thousands of people from such diverse urban and rural constituencies joined a single national protest" (International Crisis Group 2021, p. 2) and "articulation of so many social sectors had not been achieved in a long time" (Garzón et al. 2021, p. 7). Thus, both waves of protest drew actors from differet sectors and backgrounds.

Along with diverse sectoral participation, demands were wide-ranging in both 2019 and in 2021. In addition to national-level issues related to labor, taxes, health, pensions, education,

implementation of the Peace Accords, environmental protection, and police violence, among other issues, different territories protested the lack of investment in public services and infrastructure in their specific localities (Garzón et al. 2021; Másmela 2021). The 2019 protests were triggered by the Duque government's "paquetazo" economic plans that included unpopular labor and pension reform proposals. According to primary source documents posted on social media, the CNP and its member organizations convened the November 21 strikes to protest ten key issues: 1) against the labor reform, 2) against the pension reform, 3) against the financial holding, 4) against the privatizations, 5) against corruption, 6) against the "tarifazo nacional" (energy tariff), 7) against the tax reform, 8) for a minimum wage, 9) for fulfillment of agreements, and 10) for the defense of social protests.[168]

The 2021 protests had a second Duque government trigger, this time with a tax reform. The most controversial aspect of the Duque reform proposal was the "Sustainable Solidarity Law," the application of an income tax on those who earn more than 663 dollars per month (Benotman 2022), whereas previously taxes were placed on those earning over $1,050 (International Crisis Group 2021). According to International Crisis Group's interviews with over 60 protesters from 2021, socio-economic concerns and anger at security forces were the two most common, primary motives bringing people to the streets, in urban and rural areas of Colombia. For the CNP, its list of demands had expanded from 2019. The CNP wanted the government to respond to its "pliego de emergencia", a list of six emergency demands emerging from the pandemic and the topic of smaller-scale protests in 2020: 1) state intervention in the health system and formalization of health workers, 2) basic emergency income for those in poverty, 3) defense of national production and employment with rights, 4) support for the public

[168] Facebook post on CUT Colombia page from November 21, 2019.

education system that includes zero enrollment costs for public higher education, 5) protection of women's rights and rights of sexually diverse populations, 6) non-privatisation of Ecopetrol's pipeline transportation network (Agencia de Información Laboral 2020). However, the CNP also pointed out in 2021 that its new list did not imply that they were renouncing the 194 points that motived the protests in November 2019 that had not been resolved in responses to the 2019 protests (Garcia and Garces 2021). In short, during both waves, protesters had a wide range of demands that drew on historical and recent grievances.

Third, Colombia shares with Brazil the characteristic of having widespread discontent with representative democracy and institutions that did not translate into system-level demands. Thus, Colombia's 2019 and 2021 waves of protests were non-system protests in democracy. Analysts like Gonzalez (2022) talk about how the recent protests in Colombia represented a crisis of representation. Likewise, Currea-Lugo (2019) argues that the 2019 protests "were not just a rejection of Duque but, mainly, of the way of doing politics in recent decades" (p. 14). This crisis of representation was also evidenced through Americas Barometer surveys that indicated that 84.6 percent of Colombians thought that citizens should decide the laws of the country through direct vote rather than by electing representatives, making Colombians the least supportive of representative democracy in Latin America (Lupu et al. 2021). According to a survey conducted on young people in Colombia – a study by the Javeriano Laboratory of Youth and the Foundation SM – only 7 percent trusted in political parties, 10 percent in Congress, and 15 percent in the judicial system (Gonzalez 2021, p. 4). Through interviews during 2021, researchers find that protesters expressed indignation with the entire political and economic class (International Crisis Group, p. 5).

Yet, as in Brazil, the discontent with the representative system and political class did not translate into targeting of the political system through protesters' demands or concrete calls for system change. In a letter published on June 15, 2021, the CNP talks about one of its action items being to present initiatives related to its list of demands to Congress along with continuing to organize protests and extra-institutional activities.[169] The letter offered no action items related to changing the system. More broadly, the CNP raised several economic-based demands like the removal of the tax reform and labor reforms, demands related to the state's use of force like disbanding of the ESMAD riot police, and demands that the government follow through on various previously-made agreements with students, workers, campesinos, agricultural sector actors, and others. The only political system related agenda item was to process anti-corruption bills through Congress. But given the faith placed in Congress to correct this specific problem within the political system, this agenda item indicates Level 2 (national-level) targets rather than systemic targets. This proposal contrasts with Chilean movement organizers' insistence that citizens be responsible for drafting a new constitution.

More broadly, the Social Mobilization Database compiled by the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz) does not find system-level changes among the top ten most prevalent issues in the 2021 Colombia protests (Garzón et al. 2021). Jorge Saavedra points out in comparing the Colombian and Chilean cases that whereas Chile had a clear enemy with the Pinochet constitution that was the basis for their change-based goals, there was not a clear target or mechanism for changing the future in Colombia (El Tiempo 2021). Natalia Ángel Cabo adds that one clear difference and barrier to making the Colombian constitution the enemy was

[169] "DECLARACIÓN POLÍTICA DE ORGANIZACIONES Y PROCESOS SOCIALES DEL COMITÉ NACIONAL DE PARO CNP." June 15, 2021.

that the social contract was drafted in democracy and with a focus on social rights and democratic values (El Tiempo 2021).

Thus, while it may be the case that some Colombian protesters wanted "a new relationship between the Colombian state and its citizens," as Archila et al. (2020) suggests, this aspiration did not translate into system-level targets. Colombians mostly called for specific policy changes at the national and subnational levels.

Lastly, though Colombia in 2021 was not as strong of a democracy as the cases of Brazil in 2013 and Chile in 2019, it is generally considered at least a semi-democratic country. For example, Freedom House rated it as "partly free" in 2021 with a score of 65/100 on political rights and civil liberties and stated, "Colombia is among the longest-standing democracies in Latin America, but one with a history of widespread violence and serious human rights abuses. Public institutions have demonstrated the capacity to check executive power, and the country's main left-wing guerrilla group signed a peace accord in 2016. Nonetheless, Colombia faces enormous challenges in consolidating peace and guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties outside of major urban areas" (Freedom House 2023). The Freedom House report details the reasons that Colombia is best coded as a semi-democracy. For example, the constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but as demonstrated with the police violence in 2019 and 2021 protests, in practice violence sometimes restricts these rights. In terms of electoral process, elections are competitive and credible but with relatively few cases of criticism for ineffective electoral law enforcement, vote buying, and fraud. Varieties of Democracy also rates Colombia as a less-than-perfect democracy towards the middle of the pack worldwide. For example, Colombia is rated .47 on its Liberal Democracy scale (0-1), ranked #74 between Indonesia and Nepal and eight spots ahead of Mexico (Coppedge et al. 2023).

Causal Factors for Colombia's Protests

My theoretical model focuses on the factors that determine protest trajectories after the initial onset of sectoral protests. However, the framework also notes that certain background factors identified in the existing protest literature – such as resources, grievances, and political opportunities – can make the initial onset of protests more likely. As in Brazil, changes to political opportunities – punctuated by the Peace Accords – made Colombia's political environment more conducive to protests.

After looking at political opportunity as a background factor, the section argues that political unresponsiveness was a central factor in the emergence of the 2019 and 2021 multi-demand and multi-sector protests, as it led to an accumulation of unresolved demands across sectors and helped motivate extra-institutonal action against the Duque government. Also in line with the theoretical framework, cross-sectoral goal alignment and cross-sector networks led to the formation of important coalitions that preceded 2019 – the students' UNEES coalition and the Cumbre Agraria – and the National Strike Committee (CNP) that led the 2019 protests and also played an important role in 2021. In the alternative explanations section, I argue that, unlike Chile and Brazil, economic grievances also played a fundamental role in driving the Colombian protests. Duque's economic reform proposals in 2019 and 2021 galvanized cross-sector action by posing a common threat to multiple sectors and groups, many of whom already faced circumstances of absolute and relative deprivation.

In short, two factors were critical in driving massive, multi-sector protests in Colombia. Without widespread political unresponsiveness, less sectors and organizations would have had unresolved demands and sectoral motives to drive protest. However, Duque's economic threats were a critical part of the cross-sector goal alignment of the CNP and also provided common

protest motives for unaffiliated citizens who were less concerned with specific sector-based objectives. Finally, the alternative explanation sections argues that police brutality was a secondary factor in escalating the protests.

Background Condition for Protest Emergence: Favorable Political Opportunity Context

Considering the two dimensions of political opportunity outlined in the Chapter 2 – rights to protest and representation through other channels – Colombia was not quite as conducive of a political environment as Brazil or Chile in the years preceding its protest outbreak on the rights to protest dimension. As Figure 14 below shows, Colombia had slightly lower scores on V-Dem's Civil Liberties Index ahead of their protest waves than the other two country cases, indicating weaker protections of civil liberties.

Figure 14: V-Dem Civil Liberties Index



On the other hand, Colombia was weak and becoming weaker on the second political opportunity dimension, representation through other channels. The political opportunity theory presented in this paper expects weak representation through alternative channels to increase the

political environment's conduciveness to protest. In each of the Americas Barometer surveys between 2012 and 2018 (the last survey that preceded the 2019 protests), over 70 percent of Colombians did not identify with a political party. In 2018, only 24.6 percent trusted in Congress, and only 26 percent were satisfied with the functioning of their democracy, a decrease from 55 percent in 2012. In the 2021 Americas Barometer surveys, 84.6 percent of Colombians thought that citizens should decide the laws of the country through direct vote rather than by electing representatives, making Colombians the least supportive of representative democracy in Latin America (Americas Barometer 2023).[170] Adding to these indicators, Cruz-Rodriguez (2022) argues that Colombians protested despite risks of repression during the Duque administration because "there was no other way to process their demands" (p. 13).

Furthermore, the Colombia peace agreement signed in 2016 is another background factor that likely influenced the emergence of protests by changing the political opportunity context. One report states, "It is not a minor fact that the recent cycle of mobilizations —without recent precedents in terms of their scale and intensity— occurred after the signing of the Peace Agreement and the (partial) disarmament of the FARC. In the midst of the armed conflict, social protest in Colombia was stigmatized under the argument of being promoted and influenced by illegal armed groups" (Garzón et al. 2021. P. 54). The national political agenda also shifted after the peace agreement. Botero and Otero (2019) argue, "During the peace negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC, the intensity of the conflict drastically decreased, having a powerful effect on the political agenda: for the first time in decades, the internal armed conflict receded into the background, and the country began to talk about corruption, poverty, inequality, health and education." Other authors agree on this point (Cruz

[170] The 2021 AmericasBarometer fieldwork took place between March 19 and May 26, 2021. Because the protests began in April, respondents may have been influenced in their responses by the ongoing protests.

Rodriguez 2022; Bravo et al. 2022). The peace agreement decreased the stigmatization of protests and made issues outside of the armed conflict more salient to the Colombian population.

In short, the political opportunity environment in Colombia leading up to 2019 and 2021 was a moderate to highly conducive environment to protest because Colombia had medium levels of rights to protest and low levels of representation through non-protest channels. The Peace Accords also facilitated protests around new issues. However, a key goal of the theoretical framework is to go beyond the protest emergence step and explain why protests escalate from the sectoral level to anti-system protest, or, in the case of Brazil and Colombia, to multi-sector and multi-demand protests that do not target the political system. The rest of the section analyzes how political unresponsiveness and economic grievances contributed to the escalation from sectoral protests in Colombia.

Sectoral Protests

First, the Colombian case fits the patterns in Chile and Brazil of various sectoral protests preceding the emergence of multi-sector, multi-demand action. Specifically, Másmela (2021) and Cruz Rodriguez (2022) refer to a cycle of protests starting in 2011 and ending with the 2021 protests. Table 7 outlines the important events in this cycle, according to Másmela (2021) and Cruz-Rodriguez (2022):

Table 7: Sectoral Protests in Colombia

Protest	Description
2011 Truck Driver Protests	Sectoral protest against increase in freight rates.
2011-2012 University Student Protests	University student protests to stop bill to reform Law 30 of Higher Education.
2013 National Coffee Growers Strike (February-March 2013)	Sectoral strike calling for greater support to industry following increased taxes on coffee exports.
2013 Catatumbo Campesino Strikes (June-July)	Regional, campesino protests against coca eradication measures.

2013-2014 National Agrarian Strikes (August 2013, April-May 2014)	Massive strikes that mobilized half a million throughout the country with demands including state protections of domestic agriculture, land redistribution, extractivism, rural wages, etc. Different groups did not come together with a single list of demands or negotiate with government together (Sankey 2022).
2016 Peace Accord Protests	Marches in favor of peace agreement (single issue but multi-sector).
2016 Indigenous, Peasant, Ethnic, and Popular Minga	Protests that united different agrarian groups and also brought in participation by more indigenous groups. Main motivation was government not following through on agreements that came out of 2013-2014 strikes.
2018 (October-November) University Student Protests	University student protests for defense of public education and greater financing by State.
2019 National Strike ("21N" Protests in November and December)	Multi-sector protests with multiple demands that started in response to Duque labor and pension reform proposals.
2020 Pandemic Protests	Covid-19 protests in the second half of year demanding economic protection, access to health services, etc.
2021 Tax Reform Protests	Second wave of multi-sector protests: Months-long protests starting on April 26 in response to tax reform proposal.

A history of recent sectoral protests does not necessarily set the stage for the emergence of subsequent multi-sector, multi-demand protests or anti-sytstem protests. Rather, sectoral protests plus perceptions of political unresponsiveness to these protests increases the likelihood of an escalation.

Repeated Political Unresponsiveness

Colombian sectoral organizations faced repeated instances of political unresponsiveness both leading up to 2019 and in the period between the 2019 and 2021 waves. Social movements did have some victories to point to in preceding years. Two clear examples are the university

students stopping the Ley 30 of Higher Education bill and the passage of the peace agreement. But as in Chile leading up to 2019 with Piñera's election, Colombians faced a new presidential administration, Iván Duque (2018-2022), that appeared less responsive than its predecessor and that threatened any progress that had been made.

Discussing the long list of demands included in the official petition of the CNP and in signs from the 2019 protests, Archila et. al. (2020, p. 19) says that "the demands presented on 21N have a long history. Some showed fatigue due to unresolved or aggravated issues, but of long standing." Likewise, according to Juan Carlos Guerrero, the 2021 protests represented a crisis "generated by the government's inability to meet a series of social demands that have been accumulating for a long time in the country" (Veloza 2021, p. 93). One 2021 Bogotá protester indicated that the protests reflected an "accumulation of decades of injustice" (International Crisis Group 2021). Thus, multiple analyses of the Colombian case view the 2019 and 2021 protests as coming about due to an accumulation of unresolved demands (Garzón et al. 2021).

The lack of responsiveness to previous protests is further evidenced by the CNP's list of demands and agenda in 2019. One of the main points on the CNP's agenda for negotiating with the Duque government surrounding the November 21, 2019 national strike was, "The government will reactivate and immediately begin with the respective sectors, processes, and organizations the implementation and compliance of agreements signed by these groups and the current government.…" The statement then lists 22 diverse organizations and groups that were looking to have the Duque government follow through on previous sectoral agreements, including university students, indigenous organizations, transport workers, the Colombian Association of Campesinos, human rights organizations, and the FECODE teachers' union.[171] In

[171] CNP Document published on December 13, 2019: "AGENDA DEL COMITÉ NACIONAL DE PARO CON PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA."

other words, a central agenda item for the leading organization of the 2019 strikes was to have the government respond to the previous demands of their member groups. Bravo et al. (2022) points out that previous rounds of protest had ended, in many cases, with a series of promises made by Santos' government that were then broken by the Duque government due to a lack of will or resources. One example was promises made to the peasant sector in 2013 that included implementation of protections for domestic production against imports and extension of the coffee subsidy.

As noted in Table 7 on predecessor protests above, various sectors in Colombia had also protested in favor of the Peace Accords. Protesters in 2019 and 2021 referenced the lack of fulfillment of stipulations in the Peace Accords as motivates for the protests. The movement Defendamos La Paz (We Defend Peace), which brought together leaders that participated in the peace negotiations, was an ally of the 2019 strike movement and called for Duque to follow through on the agreements in the accords (Agencia de Información Laboral 2019c). In rural areas, citizens had expected sweeping transformations as part of the agreement – including better access to roads and reductions in land inequality – but saw slow fulfillment of these changes (International Crisis Group 2021, page i.) Duque's ambiguous stance on implementation of the accords, in terms of discourse and actions, became an important motive for protest participation (Rodriguez Pinzon 2020).

The Duque administration also failed to follow through on protest resolutions that occurred during its own administration before November 2019. Student groups who had led various protests in 2018, were back in the streets in 2019 asking the government to follow through on agreements from the 2018 wave. The same was the case for teachers represented by the teachers' union, FECODE (Agencia de Información Laboral 2019c). Students and teachers

together led protests in September 2019 centered on "non-compliance with agreements agreed upon a year earlier with the national government" (Garzón et al. 2021, p. 25). Thus, these agreements that temporarily ended previous rounds of sectoral protests were not ultimately honored by President Duque, which then served as a trigger for the 2019 protests. Political unresponsiveness was a central factor in the 2019 wave.

The 2021 protest wave is also clearly connected to a lack of responsiveness in the 2019 wave. Though the CNP participated in various dialogues with the government immediately following the November 2019 strikes, it refused to participate in the Duque government's "national conversation" (conversación nacional) initative to discuss the country's problems. In a declaration in January 2020, the CNP and various other organizations and sectors that participated in the 2019 protests, called for more protests and stated that the national conversation was a way for the government to deceive the Colombian people through listening sessions that would not resolve the country's problems. For those who did participate in the national conversation, the common view was that results were limited. According to the final report of the moderators of the Employment Table of the conversation, "Many of the initial promises never materialized. Instead of being a space that would have allowed a substantive dialogue regarding how to grow equitably, in the end languor ended up taking over" (Duque 2020). In the table on "peace with legality" the moderators did not even turn in their final report to the government. The Education Table participants discussed integration of the education system and teacher training but did not receive any follow up from the government on these plans (Duque 2020). Thus, the national conversation led to perceptions of unresponsiveness by participants and confirmed the suspicions of non-participants.

In 2021, one of the central goals for the CNP was for the government to respond to its "pliego de emergencia," a list of six demands emerging from the pandemic that motivated smaller protests during 2020 (Agencia de Información Laboral 2020). However, the CNP also pointed out that its additional list did not imply that they were renouncing the unmet demands that had motived the protests in November 2019 that had not been resolved in responses to the 2019 protests (Garcia and Garces 2021).

In short, the Colombian case follows the general pattern expected by my theoretical framework that perceptions of political unresponsiveness contribute to the emergence of multi-sector, multi-demand protests. Various sectors in Colombia did not have their demands resolved following sectoral protests and Peace Accords protests prior to 2019. Protesters took to the streets again in 2021 with a longer list of unresolved grievances from the 2019 wave and pandemic protests.

Coalition Formation

The factors for coalition formation outlined in the theoretical model – cross-sector networks and goal alignment – are demonstrated through a couple of the processor movements to 2019: the student and agrarian movements. Both coalitions that formed from these movements would go on to form part of the cross-sector CNP coalition. For the CNP, the most important umbrella organization in the 2019 and 2021 protests, key actors had built networks through previous organizations and waves of mobilizations, and cross-sector goal alignment was driven both by political unresponsiveness and specific legislative proposals by the Duque administration that threatened various sectors economically.

The 2011 university student protests were led by the National Student Broad Table, MANE, an organization that brought together the main student organizations and proposed a

broad space where any student could participate (Cruz-Rodriguez 2012). The different organizations that formed part of the MANE were all on the left, but they also had ideological differences. However, the students decided to come together because 1) they had learned from experiences during the Uribe administration when divisions impeded action and 2) there was a common threat of a proposed reform by the Santos government that many students viewed as harmful (Cruz-Rodriguez 2012). Thus, the students had goal alignment that was influenced by past failures, but they had also formed networks through efforts since 2007 to coordinate national student actions through National University Student Meetings (ENEU).

After the 2011-2012 movement that ended with the removal of the Law 30 reform proposal, the students did not come together again for a national protest movement until 2018. In the first semester of 2018, many public universities participated in the National Meeting of Higher Education Students (ENEES); this eventually led to the creation of the National Union of Higher Education Students (UNEES) (Ussa 2022). In the declaration about the ENEES, the students state that the motives for the meeting were that "higher education in Colombia is going through a prolonged and deep crisis as a result of the neoliberal model…."[172] This statement suggests an escalation since 2011, as the goal alignment driving the coalition was centered on system-level characteristics rather than repealing a specific bill. The UNEES would go on to become a founding member of the CNP in 2019.

The agrarian reform movement went through a similar learning process that led to coalition formation in 2016. In 2013 a diverse set of campesinos and farmers participated in the agrarian strikes. At the beginning of the mobilizations, there was a brief period of unity, as the different sectors sought to unite as many protesters as possible to be more disruptive. However,

[172] Organization document from student coalition. Available at: https://comosoc.org/declaracion-enees-01-2018/.

the sectors had different goals in protesting, and each of the major agrarian sector organizations (Dignidades, MIA, and CAN) produced their own petition of demands. As a result, the Santos government was able to selectively negotiate with some sectors (the mid-sized farmers) and exclude others from the negotiating table (poorer and landless campesinos) (Sankey 2022).

The changes when the agrarian sectors returned to protest in 2016 follow a pattern in line with the theoretical model. First, the return of protests was motivated by failures of the government to follow through on the negotiated agreement from 2013 (political unresponsiveness). Secondly, the agrarian movement escalated its demands since 2013, connecting their grievances with broader problems related to the economic development model and peace building (Cruz-Rodriguez 2019). And lastly, the movement united around a common set of goals, "Between the agrarian strike of 2013 and the Minga of 2016 there is a framing process that can be understood as the transition from various demands of particular sectors of the peasantry to a unitary framework present in the list of demands built by the Agrarian Summit" (Cruz-Rodriguez 2019, p. 113). This framing around broader, common goals (cross-sector goal alignment) occurred in response to the failures of the past strikes, and the different groups already had some connections in place from past mobilizations (cross-sector networks). Thus, various groups were able to unite in a broad umbrella organization called the Agrarian, Peasant, Ethnic, and Popular Convergence, known as just the Cumbre Agraria. This national organization included peasant movements, indigenous people, Afro-Colombian groups, and civic organizations (cross-sector coalition). The Cumbre Agraria would go on to become a founding member of the CNP in 2019.

The key umbrella organization behind the 2019 and 2021 protests was the National Strike Committee (CNP). The CNP formed in 2019 and included trade, labor, agrarian, and student

organizations.[173] As in Chile with the Social Unity Table, observers point out that there were also many protesters outside of this committee who did not feel represented by the CNP, but the CNP called the initial strikes in 2019 and played a central organizing role in both years.

Various organizations within the CNP had built cross-sector networks through previous mobilizations. The "pro-peace" networks that formed during the later stages of negotiations between the Santos government and the FARC served as a form of cross-sector network before 2019 (Franz and Suarez 2019). The National Unitary Command (Comando Nacional Unitario) – that included the three main labor unions (CUT, CGT, CTC) and the pension reform organization (CPC) – had been periodically coming together to lead protests going back to at least 2003.[174] University students and teachers had protested together in the preceding months of 2019 and in 2018 (Garzón et al. 2021; Manetto 2018).

The CNP also relied on cross-sector goal alignment. The CNP initially formed several weeks before the November 21 strike at the National Social Movement Union Emergency Meeting on October 4, 2019. The meeting was attended by some of the organizations discussed above – National Unitary Command, UNEES, and Cumbre Agraria – as well as over 100 other social organizations and unions. The declaration from the meeting pointed to the two key factors leading to goal alignment across sectors: the threats posed to different sectors by Duque's "paquetazo" reform legislation and shared experiences with political unresponsiveness.
The declaration begins by identifying the Duque government's proposals as a source of grievances, stating that the government has announced, "the need for labor and pension reforms,

[173] The organizations included were: Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), la Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), la Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC), la Confederación de Pensionados de Colombia (CPC), la Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Fecode), Cruzada Camionera, Dignidad Agropecuaria, la Asociación Colombiana de Representantes Estudiantiles (ACREES) y la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes de Educación Superior (UNEES).
[174] Protests by this coalition date back to at least 2003: https://www.eluniverso.com/2003/08/12/0001/9/61EB08CB71BC452F91DDBA02F8227623.html/.

complying with the orders of the OECD, both reforms seek to worsen the conditions of workers, they intend to increase the profits of businessmen at the expense of decrease in the value of labor, guarantee the strengthening of private pension funds at the cost of eliminating or withering Colpensiones." The declaration goes on to point to broader problems with the Colombia government's economic policies, "They intend to correct the erratic economic policy of these governments with more of the same, which implies cuts in State spending to meet education and health needs, among others, as well as imposing new taxes on the population and persisting in the treaties of free trade."

Then, the declaration turns to the topic of unresponsiveness, "Added to this is the government's failure to comply with the agreements signed with the state unions and Fecode. We demand compliance with the peace agreements and guarantees so that this process is consolidated….many sectors have taken to the streets, students, farmers, teachers, employees, transporters, indigenous people, environmentalists, human rights defenders and entire communities; their just requests have not been resolved by the government. The constant has been repression, police violence, stigmatization, and the campaign to legislate its prohibition." The declaration concludes by calling for protests events in October leading up to the national strike on November 21, with the goal to "defeat the government's intentions to continue destroying the country, peace, and the basic rights of the workers and the people."[175]

In short, the declaration highlights the role of both newly-imposed grievances and threats caused by the Duque government's proposal and longer-term political unresponsiveness as driving factors in the goal alignment of groups forming the CNP and motivating the November

[175] The full declaration, published on October 7, 2019, is available at the CUT Colombia website: https://cut.org.co/declaracion-del-encuentro-nacional-de-emergencia-del-movimiento-social-y-sindical-4-de-octubre/.

21, 2019 protests. The same CNP umbrella organization would reunite and help lead demonstrations in 2021, following a new threat from the Duque government and a continued accumulation of unresolved grievances.

Though somewhat speculative since I did not interview CNP organization leaders or other Colombian protesters from the 2019 and 2021 waves to learn about their motivations and strategies, the direct threats posed by the Duque government seemed to be one reason for the non-system targeting by the CNP coalition. The coalition may have perceived problems with the political system overall, but the Duque government in particular had ignored previous sectoral agreements and was proposing specific tax, labor, and pension legislation that threatened these groups. In comparison to Chile, another reason for the non-system targeting may have been that Colombians facd more pressing economic challenges and more significant deprivation. Thus, it made more sense for social movement organizations to fight off economic threats and seek more immediate relief rather than pushing for a slower, long-term political system transformations.

Alternative Explanations

I argue that economic grievance was another important explanatory variable for the emergence of multi-sector, multi-demand protests in Colombia in 2019 and 2021. Police brutality was a secondary factor that contributed to the escalation in scale of the protests.

Economic grievances

In the case of Colombia's 2019 and 2021 protests, I argue that political unresponsiveness combined with economic grievances as the two most important explanatory variables. First, many Colombians in 2019 and 2021 faced absolute or relative deprivation, and in some ways, circumstances were worsening. One proxy for absolute deprivation is poverty rates. In Colombia, poverty rates increased from 34.7 percent in 2018 to 35.7 percent in 2019, meaning that an

additional 662,000 people fell into poverty. Another proxy, unemployment rate, had been increasing since 2015 and reached 10.5 percent by 2019 (World Bank 2021). In terms of relative deprivation, Colombia was one of the most unequal countries in Latin American and the world, and by some measures the context was worsening in 2019. Colombia's Gini index for income inequality increased to 52.7 in 2019. Ahead of the 2021 protests, economic circumstances had worsened considerably. As an effect of 13 months in pandemic, Colombia's GDP had dropped by 6.8 percentage points by April 2021 and unemployment had increased to above 16 percent (Benotman 2022). The pandemic amplified economic precarity and inequality (Álvarez-Rodriguez 2021; Gonzalez 2021), and it was even worse for the urban poor who worked in informal jobs in Colombia (International Crisis Group 2021). Thus, many and increasing numbers of Colombians faced absolute and/or relative deprivation in 2019 and 2021.

In this context, the Duque government exacerbated economic grievances through economic proposals that threatened to cause a negative economic impact for Colombians facing unfavorable economic circumstances. Interestingly, in 2019, some of the reform proposals never reached the point of being formally announced by President Duque. The protesters' suppositions about Duque's plans came from Duque's Plan de Desarrollo 2018-2022, declarations by his ministers, and proposals presented in Congress by the leader of Duque's party, former president Álvaro Uribe (Faiola and Krygier 2019). The plans that protesters gleaned from these sources included labor reforms that worsened conditions for workers, privatization of the pension system, and lowered taxes for large companies (Amaya et al. 2019). Regarding the second wave trigger, in April 2021 the Duque administration proposed a tax reform. The most controversial component of the reform was the "Sustainable Solidarity Law," the expansion of income tax to those who earn more than 663 dollars per month (Benotman 2022), whereas previously taxes

were placed on those earning over $1,050 (International Crisis Group). Notably, many of the demands of the CNP and protesters in 2019 and 2021 referred to these economic policies.

In short, many Colombians faced worsening economic circumstances leading up to 2019 and 2021, and the Duque government's reform proposals were perceived to be significant threats that exacerbated economic grievances. Thus, I argue that unlike Chile and Brazil, economic grievances served as a central contributing factor – along with political unresponsiveness – that drove the multi-demand, multi-sector protest waves in 2019 and 2021.

Police Brutality

Police significantly repressed protesters during the 2019 and 2021 protest waves. In 2019, the Inter-American Commission On Human Rights (IACHR) denounced 112 detentions and 40 injuries to demonstrators caused by excessive use of force by Colombia's riot police, ESMAD (Amnesty International 2019). ESMAD also fired a projectile that fatally injured Dilan Cruz, an 18-year-old protester during the November 2019 demonstrations (Yuhas 2019). A United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) report found that between April 28 to July 31, 2021, at least 28 Colombians were killed by police in the context of the protests (United Nations 2021). Human Rights Watch's 2022 report found that police arbitrarily detained hundreds of protesters during the 2021 protests (Human Rights Watch 2022).

As noted in a CNP letter detailing the agenda items to negotiate with the Duque government, guarantees on the right to social protest were a key issue after the initial November 2019 protests.[176] Likewise, according to FIP's Social Mobilization Database, the actions of the security forces were one of the most prevalent grievances for protesters in 2021 protests (Garzón et al. 2021).

[176] CNP Document published on December 13, 2019: "AGENDA DEL COMITÉ NACIONAL DE PARO CON PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA."

However, even in the case of brutal police repression in Colombia, it is not clear that police brutality was necessary for the emergence of multi-sector, multi-demand protests. Although the actions of state security forces were among the top issues over the course of the 2019 and 2021 protest waves, it was not a prevalent grievance at the beginning of the 2019 strikes (Garzón et al. 2021, p. 33). The CNP was able to bring together over 100 social organizations to form a coalition and lead a massive national strike in November 2019 before the violence against protesters began in this wave of protests. And the lists of demands highlighted in this section point to plenty of motivations for joining forces and protesting apart from the police violence. Thus, I argue that police brutality in Colombia likely increased the massiveness of the Colombia protests even more, but Colombia likely would have had massive, multi-demand, multi-sector protests even without the unjustified police brutality.

Conclusion of Colombia Section

In short, Colombia's 2019 and 2021 protests were multi-demand and multi-sector protests that occurred in a semi-democracy, but they lacked the system-level blame of anti-system protests in democracy. My theoretical framework is useful for explaining why protests escalated to this level of multi-demand and multi-sector protest, even though the two waves did not reach the anti-system category. From Diagram 1 of my theoretical framework, repeated political unresponsiveness was a central factor in the escalation because it left various groups with unresolved demands and motivated them to strategically update toward continued extra-institutional action. From Diagram 2 of my framework, cross-sector networks (through connections built in previous mobilizations) and cross-sector goal alignment (through shared experiences with unresponsiveness and common goals to combat new policy threats by the Duque administration) allowed for the formation of a multi-sector coalition, the CNP, that led the

2019 protests and played an important role in 2021. A second primary factor in explaining the emergence of these protests in Colombia was economic grievance. In contrast to Chile and Brazil, economic circumstances meant that many Colombians faced worsening situations of absolute or relative deprivation. Rather than a slight transportation fare increase, the Duque government's proposals presented significant policy threats to various sectors and groups, thus exacerbating economic grievances and motivating protest action. Police brutality likely increased participation in both protest waves.

Chapter 6, Section 2: Venezuela's Caracazo and the Subsequent Rise of Chávez

Venezuela's 1989 Caracazo looked a lot like an anti-system protest in democracy: a minor increase in transportation fares triggered national protests that brought in other grievances. On February 27, 1989, a series of riots emerged in cities across Venezuela in response to an economic adjustment package implemented by newly-elected president Carlos Andrés Pérez. The package sparked an increase in petrol prices that led to increases in public transportation fares, serving as the initial spark for the riots. The riots began with students protesting student transportation fares, but soon the general public joined in, with a concentration in working-class, urban areas (López-Maya 2003, p. 125). Despite emerging in what was regarded as a democratic context, a curfew and brutal repression of protesters led to the fairly swift end to this wave of protests (López-Maya 2003).

Unlike anti-system protests, the short-lived demonstrations were mostly concentrated within the popular sectors (not multi-sector) and demands were not especially wide-ranging. Though some protesters discussed other grievances like economic policies and lack of say in policymaking (Silva 2009), the Caracazo protests focused on the immediate effects of the economic reform package on public transportation. Furthermore, though protesters indicated

disaffection with their political representatives, they did not take aim at their political system (Silva 2009).

Hoewever, the protests were part of a years-long series of demonstrations and political unresponsiveness that shared the trajectory leading to anti-system protest in democracy. Repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness, both before and after the Caracazo, left expanding groups of Venezuelans with unresolved demands and a disposition to participate in protest action. The difference is that before social movements were able to build the cross-sector networks and goal alignment to form cross-sector coalitions aimed at political system change, a populist political leader provided a political institutional alternative for unmet demands and political-system change. Many strategically updated from decentralized street protests to voting for Hugo Chávez for president in 1998 and then, once he was elected, participating in state-led participatory forums for change.

The rest of this section discusses this trajectory in Venezuela of political unresponsiveness, protest, unmet demand accumulation without cross-sector coordination, and then strategic updating in support of an anti-system, institutional alternative.

Political Unresponsiveness to Repeated Protest Episodes

During the 1980s, Venezuelans' discontent with their political representatives increased due to a deteriorating economic situation, but it was exacerbated by corruption and a lack of responsiveness to citizen demands. In 1983, the Venezuelan economy went through a devaluation of its currency, recession, and subsequent cuts in state expenditures (López-Maya 2002). At the same time, Venezuelan politicians faced corruption allegations, and citizens became increasingly fed up with elite-negotiated politics that excluded citizens from decision-making (Silva 2009; López-Maya 2002; Coppedge 1994).

In response to increasing protests, the Lusinchi administration (1984-1989) created The Presidential Commission for State Reform in 1984. However, by the end of his term, Lusinchi failed to enact the promised political reforms (López-Maya 2002). For example, the commission developed a proposal for increased democratization of internal party procedures and regulation of party financing, but Lusinchi's party, Democratic Action, publicly rejected these reforms for being too radical (Penfold-Becerra 1999).

In 1988, Venezuelans elected Carlos Andrés Pérez from the same traditional Democratic Action Party. Venezuelans were hopeful of change because Pérez's previous administration in the 1970s had increased social spending and public sector investment, and his campaign promised renewed prosperity for the masses. However, just a couple weeks after taking office, Pérez announced his neoliberal economic austerity and structural adjustment plan called "The Great Turnaround," which included cuts in public spending. Popular and middle-class sectors that had voted for relief from economic problems bore the costs of economic adjustment under Pérez's plan (Silva 2009).

Later in February, soon after the announcement of the Great Turnaround, Venezuelans took to the streets with the Caracazo. Though only lasting a week, the Caracazo did not end because the government had resolved the demands of protesters. Rather, the brutal state repression and imposition of a curfew temporarily demobilized protesters (López-Maya 2002), as the theoretical framework discusses as a possibility (**political-institutional response → decreased mobilization capacity**). Indicative of this lack of resolution, 5,000 more protests occurred in the three years that followed the Caracazo, including regular student and labor strikes (Silva 2009; McCoy 1999). While the Caracazo riots were more concentrated in popular sectors, subsequent protests were carried out by different groups and sectors including middle-class state

employees like teachers, doctors, and transportation workers, students, the federation of labor unions (CTV), independent unions, and community-based groups (Silva 2009).

Following the impeachment of Pérez, and in part due to changes in electoral rules that allowed for a multi-party system to replace the long-standing, two-party system, Venezuelans elected Rafael Caldera of the newly-formed Convergencia party, in hopes that he would be more responsive to their demands than the two traditional parties that had governed Venezuela for decades. Caldera campaigned on an anti-neoliberal platform, but as Silva (2009) recounts, "when economic crisis and mounting fiscal deficits forced him to reintroduce orthodox stabilization and free-market structural adjustment policies, a second wave of even more decentralized anti-neoliberal contentious politics ensued" (Silva 2009, p. 219). Caldera was further constrained because he was a minority president and the traditional Democratic Action and COPEI together still maintained a majority in Congress to strike down legislation (Silva 2009).

Accumulation of Unresolved Demands But Uncoordinated Action

From the Lusinchi administration (1984-1989) through the Caldera administration (1994-1999), multiple groups of Venezuelans protested and were met with inadequate institutional responses. Indicating an accumulation of demands caused by political unresponsiveness, Silva (2009) points out that many of the demands during the Caldera administration wave focused on the same issues from the 1980s, such as pay, poor quality of public services, economic policy, high cost of living, police violence, and crime (pp. 221-222). Exclusion from the political system also motivated protesters. As one looter stated about the Caracazo, "something like this has to happen for them [the government] to notice us" (Silva 2009, citing an El Nacional 2 March 1989 article).

Yet, protesters remained disunited due to a lack of goal alignment and lack of organizations that could build networks across the different groups. Rather than escalating blame, protesters focused on material grievances that were specific to themselves and their group. Furthermore, organizations like the federation of labor unions (CTV) failed in serving as a broker between diverse groups. Despite being a long-standing, national union with significant membership, it was somewhat discredited due to its ties to the Democratic Action party and the limits of deals it negotiated. Many Venezuelans disassociated with CTV and preferred to mobilize through their individual public sector associations, independent unions, or through decentralized organizations in their communities (Silva 2009). Movement organizations did not effectively build cross-sector coalitions.

Strategic Updating Through An Anti-System, Electoral Alternative

In July 1997, Hugo Chávez and his political allies succeeded in building hopes for an institutional political alternative for a portion of the discontented masses through the creation of the Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement) political party. The name of the party was a reference to the idea that his administration would mark the fifth constitutional period in the country's history (McCoy 1999). During the presidential campaign, Chávez ran on a platform of expanding economic and social programs for the popular sectors, eradication of the old political parties, and holding a constitutional convention to write a constitution that would provide greater representation in the political system (Silva 2009; McCoy 1999). Chávez's message resonated because significant portions of the population had unresolved economic grievances and because "the vast majority of the public had become convinced that the 'puntofijista system' was corrupt, inept, unstable, and rigid" (Corrales & Penfold-Becerra 2011, p. 16). Though it is not clear how many of the voters for Chávez were former participants in the

waves of protests discussed above, many Venezuelans seemed to strategically update toward supporting Chávez as he carried 20 of 23 states and won by more than a million votes over his nearest challenger.

Once Chávez was in power, much of the formerly disunified populace backed his constitutional convention and viewed it as an opportunity to resolve the country's ills (McCoy 1999). A whole 88 percent voted "yes" in a referendum that asked whether they wanted to convene a National Constituent Assembly "with the purpose of transforming the State and create a new legal system that allows the effective functioning of a social and participatory democracy." Through Chávez's election and constitutional proposal, many aggrieved Venezuelans who had been focusing their efforts on decentralized protests to resolve immediate grievances, now participated in an institutionalized political initiative to change the system.

Thus, it seems plausible that Venezuela was ripe for anti-system protest in democracy during the period leading up to Chávez's election. The country experienced repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness that had led to near-constant protests throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (López-Maya 2002)[177] by different sectors of society with a growing list of unmet demands. But in this case, institutions – through the formation of an anti-institutional political party – created an outlet for channeling discontent before social movement organizations were able to do so. As a result, Venezuela's anti-system action involved the election of a populist and participation in state-led initiatives for dismantling the old political system rather than non-state-led, cross-sector coalition protests taking aim at the political system. The conclusion of this paper offers some additional discussion on when political unresponsiveness leads to anti-system protest in democracy versus populism.

[177] The López-Maya paper includes more detailed data on number of protests during the period.

Chapter 6, Section 3: The Arab Spring – Anti-System Protest in Autocracy

How well do anti-system protests in democracy and my theoretical model to explain them translate to authoritarian contexts? This section uses the Arab Spring to explore this question. I argue that there a couple of similarities as well as one key difference that make anti-system protests in democracy categorically different from anti-system protests in autocracy.

First, one of the key background conditions for protest onset, political opportunity, functions in similar ways across regime type: contexts with greater rights to protest and less effective representation through non-protest channels should be more conducive to protests. I demonstrate this point briefly with the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Second, the dynamics of coalitions are similar across regime types: cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment are both necessary to form cross-sector coalitions regardless of regime. I briefly illustrate this point with the Egypt case.

The main difference between anti-system protests in democracy versus autocracy is that the key causal puzzles for explaining their emergence are different. In democracy, the primary puzzle is: How and why do citizens come to perceive that their political system is to blame for their grievances? I argue that repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness to protest action across sectors causes this target escalation. A second puzzle is: How and why do representative democracies repeatedly fail to respond to protests and channel demands? The cases suggest several possibilities: institutional barriers (Chile), presidential governing style (Brazil), dominance by the Right (Colombia), macroeconomic constraints and restrictive party systems (Venezuela). In autocracy, neither question is particularly puzzling. The centralization of power behind a single figure or set of figures, less frequent or non-existent rotations of power, and the close link between the ruling regime and the overall rules governing the system make it more

straightforward to explain why citizens in autocracies would draw the connection between their grievances and the system. And authoritarian regimes are not necessarily designed to respond to the demands of citizens. A more relevant puzzle in autocracies is: How and why do citizens overcome fear and the impossibility of overcoming the regime? I do not resolve this authoritarian protest puzzle, but I use the Arab Spring case to briefly illustrate the distinction. First, I go over the anti-system characteristics of the Arab Spring.

Arab Spring Anti-System Protest Characteristics

The Arab Spring shares three of the four characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy, with the clear exception of occurring in an authoritarian context rather than in representative democracy. The Arab Spring uprisings had multi-sector protest composition. Durac (2015) states that protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen encompassed "a wide range of actors, including youth, established and formerly proscribed opposition political parties, Islamist movements, as well as individuals and groups of all ideological orientations (and none)" (p. 249). Observers of the Moroccan case described the breadth of the coalition as remarkable, in terms of ideologies, social backgrounds, and status (Hoffman and Konig 2013, p. 15).

Second, these diverse actors had wide-ranging demands. Because protesters had such diverse perspectives on public policy (Beissinger 2022), they were only able to agree on minimal, common denominator demands, namely "the fall of the regime and the establishment of a new political order" (Durac 2015). However, some of the specific demands expressed by protesters in different Arab Spring countries included: equal rights for minority groups, material improvements in food and housing, better employment opportunities, and improved public services (Rosiny 2012).

The regime change/new political order common denominator of the protesters relates to the third characteristic of anti-system protests: blame is directed at the political system. In authoritarian contexts, it is a bit more difficult to separate the ruling regime from the political system, as centralized authorities often determine the rules of the political game. However, multiple authors agree that the common denominator of demands in the Arab Spring was to overthrow the ruling regime and/or existing political order (Durac 2015; Beissinger 2022; Dalacoura 2012, p. 67; Alimi and Meyer 2011). In other words, protesters were not simply taking aim at specific laws or policies that could be reformed while keeping the existing structures of power in place. Even when discussing more specific issues, like grievances related to poverty, protesters directed blame at the regime. In Tunisia, a key slogan was, "We can live on bread and water alone but not with RCD [Ben Ali's ruling party]" (Dalacoura, p. 67) In Egypt, the common slogan was, "The people want to bring down the regime!" (Beissinger 2022, p. 300). In Morocco, the "disparate members of the movement…managed to agree on a common denominator that serves as the basis for their cooperation," which one member summarized as "'a collective of those who wish to end the Makhzen system[178] in Morocco'" (Hoffman and Konig 2013, p. 8). Moroccans "blamed the system in place for the political and socio-economic grievances" (Hoffman and Konig 2013, p. 15).

Thus, aside from not emerging in representative democracy, as an outcome the Arab Spring shares key characteristics with the emergence of an anti-system protest in democracy.

[178] Referring to the Moroccan monarchy and the powerful elites connected to it.

Similarities Between the Arab Spring and Anti-system Protest in Democracy

Favorable Political Opportunity Environment Contributes to Protest Onset

The recast concept of political opportunity discussed in Chapter 2, with dimensions of rights to protest and representation through other channels, is useful for understanding the conduciveness of democratic and authoritarian regimes to political protest. As in democracies, contexts with greater protection of civil liberties increase conduciveness to protests and environments with greater political representation through non-protest channels decrease conduciveness to protests. Representation is not a central principle of authoritarian regimes, but it is still possible to gauge how effectively authoritarian regimes represent citizens. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) consider authoritarian use of institutions like partisan legislatures to broaden the constituency with a stake in the regime, a potential form of increasing representation through other channels. China offers one case of an authoritarian regime creating channels to respond to societal demands (Truex 2016 and Qiaoan and Teets 2020).

The Tunisia and Egypt cases demonstrate how changes in these two dimensions contributed to protests in authoritarian contexts. The Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes went through liberalizing processes in the 1990s and 2000s that allowed for the emergence of semi-autonomous organizations in civil society. These organizations were semi-autonomous in the sense that they were allowed to exist outside the state, but the state would often intervene to control them. Permitting the creation of these organizations is an example of increasing rights to protest.

At the same time, the Mubarak and Ben-Ali regimes also took actions that increased citizen perceptions of poor representation through institutionalized channels (Joffe 2011). In 2004, Mubarak revealed plans to pursue a fifth term as president and to make his son his

successor. This unprecedented action led to the formation of a diverse opposition political movement, Kefiya ("Enough!"), in which members were "united by their anger at the misuse of the electoral process" (Joffe 2011, p. 520; Beinin 2014). Similarly, in the 2000s the intensification of Ben Ali's grip on power and his alienation of subsections of his constituent base (such as women, the business community, and journalists) reduced the number of Tunisians with a stake in the regime and helped spur the unification of some opposition groups in the 2000s (Angrist 2013). By July 2009, the US Embassy reported to Washington that "[Ben Ali] and his regime have lost touch with the Tunisian people" (Beissinger 2022). In 2011, the semi-autonomous groups that these regimes had allowed to organize (greater rights to protests), and that were motivated in part by alienation and individual abuse of power (ineffective representation through other channels), played a central role in the uprising (Joffe 2011; Clarke 2014; Kaboub 2013; Beinin 2014). Thus, Egypt and Tunisia became more conducive to protest outbreak on both dimensions of political opportunity in the years preceding 2011.

Also in line with the political opportunity concept, Arab Spring regimes that could either channel discontent or crack down effectively were less threatened by protest. Alimi and Meyer (2011) state, "Although episodes of unrest appeared in more than a dozen countries, sustained, visible and disruptive activism that threatened the government emerged in only about half of them. Where the state could depend upon repression (Iran), dissidents could be stifled. Where activists could find other ways to make claims (Algeria), protests fizzled and institutionalized." In other words, less rights to protest through crackdowns and more representation through other channels to process claims both worked to deter protests.

Coalition Formation

A second way that the Arab Spring uprisings relate to the anti-system protest in democracy cases is that formation of coalitions relied on both cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment. In the Egyptian case, Beinin (2014) highlights "three largely parallel social movements" that existed before the 2011 uprisings: the workers' movement, the oppositional middle classes, and educated, middle class youth. The workers' movement was not national before 2011 because of the local character of networks that limited their ability to organize nationally (lack of networks) (Beinin 2014).

However, even the existence of cross-sectors networks and brokers was insufficient without common motivations driving a willingness to unite. For example, groups well-positioned to serve as intermediaries across different groups, such as the labor NGOs in Egypt that had ties to both the labor movement and political opposition, had been unwilling to unify protest movements before 2011. Explaining the lack of alignment, Clarke (2014) points to "reticence toward cross-partisan collaboration" as one of the causes (lack of goal alignment).

This lack of willingness to unite different groups shifted in 2011. Clarke (2014) identifies the Cairo-based political opposition consisting of a collection of labor and human rights NGOs, the informal labor movement, and the Society of Muslim Brothers as three key brokers that connected different sectors and helped provide initial momentum for the 2011 protests. Another key broker, the April 6 Movement, drew on its links to the Kifaya Movement, El-Ghad political party, and Khaled Mohamed Said movement in coordinating Cairo demonstrations in 2011 (Joffe 2011, p. 521). To align goals across sectors, these brokers relied on a unifying, master frame, in this case around the narrative of human dignity (Lynch 2014).

Barriers to Anti-System Protest in Autocracy: Impossibility of Overcoming the Regime and Fear

In democratic cases, I point to a process of strategic updating that can lead to anti-system protest. Repeated instances of political unresponsiveness in response to sectoral protests leads to an accumulation of unmet demands, preference for extra-institutional action, and ultimately can lead different groups to escalate their targets of blame to the political system. This target escalation can contribute to anti-system protests because actors, previously unmotivated to participate in cross-sector coalitions, develop a common goal of taking aim at changing the political system. In authoritarian contexts, the blame escalation process is less of a puzzle: protesters have a clearer reason to blame their political system or the ruling regime that controls it from the outset.

However, protesters in authoritarian contexts face two other, interrelated barriers that they need to overcome to motivate cross-sector action and anti-system action against their rulers: the impossibility of overcoming the regime and fear. For example, the Egyptian uprising in 2011 was motivated by a new sense of possibility for political system change that Egyptians did not think was possible before. Although Egypt had some different sectors of society confronting the state in the 2000s, the different sectors were independently too weak to challenge the regime and did not have very strong ties between them (Clarke 2014). However, these protest sectors changed their thinking about the possibility of overcoming the regime due to the revolution in neighboring Tunisia. Clarke (2014) states,

> "the revolution in Tunisia that culminated in mid-January 2011 had a profound effect on the perceptions and strategic calculations of many Egyptians, including these potential brokers and their interlocutors. In the aftermath of Ben Ali's departure, **the Egyptian political atmosphere became charged with a sense of possibility that these actors had**

never experienced before. **As their attitudes toward mobilization and the possibility for radical change shifted, so too did their stances toward coordination and cooperation**. Suddenly they were willing to take new kinds of political risks, transforming themselves in a matter of days from marginal players at the periphery of established networks into active brokers facilitating first-time coordination between otherwise autonomous social sectors" (p. 380).

Fear was also a more significant barrier in Egypt than it was in Chile, Brazil, or Colombia. As the director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center stated, "Tunisia is what changed our attitudes and the reason everyone was able to overcome the barrier of fear. It gave us hope and changed our whole mentality" (Clarke 2014, p. 389). In other words, fear and the idea that overthrowing the regime was impossible stood in the way of acting for systemic change. In this case, a revolution in a neighboring country helped citizens to overcome these barriers.

The variables of lack of hope for success and fear also support the contributions in the revolutions literature that argue that the revolutionary bandwagons that form to take on authoritarian regimes are often difficult to predict (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994). For example, on the Tunisian case, Kaboub (2013) argues that various instances of grievance, protest, and regime abuse in preceding years, "created a sense of hopelessness in the face of injustice and abuse by the regime, that turned into a collective sense of unity in suffering, that turned into a general sentiment of fearlessness" (p. 8). However, the analysis is less clear about what exactly led to the transformation from hopelessness to fearlessness. Many point to Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation on December 17, 2010 as the catalyzing event that united his town and then ultimately united the country once the video spread through social media. However, it would have been difficult to predict that this specific event would set off the Arab Spring uprisings.

In short, whereas repeated instances of political unresponsiveness seem to be a key variable that escalates blame and contributes to anti-system protest in democracy, I do not identify a precise variable that removes the sense of impossibility in authoritarian contexts and feaar. This paper aligns with Kuran (1991), Lohmann (1994), and others in their contingent view of authoritarian revolutions in which seemingly insignificant events can set off revolutions.

Nonetheless, this section has made some arguments for helping to understand these anti-system protests in autocracy. First, a shift on either axis of political opportunity – decreased representation through other channels or increased protection of civil liberties – increases the conduciveness of the political environment to protest. Second, the Arab Spring, like an anti-system protest in democracy, was characterized by multiple sectors coming together, which required both cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment. The common goal was to reestablish human dignity by bringing down the regime. For an anti-system protest to occur in democracy, institutions must repeatedly fail to respond to protesters' demands across groups, thus driving widespread system-level blame. For a revolution to occur in autocracy, protesters need to overcome the barriers of impossibility of change and fear.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

To conclude, I first provide an overview of empirical findings from the primary case chapters that analyze the foundations of Chile's 2019 protests (Chapters 3 and 4) and Brazil's 2013 protests (Chapter 5), and then an overview of the findings from the comparative case chapter that covered Colombia (Chapter 6, Section 1), Venezuela (Chapter 6, Section 2), and the Arab Spring (Chapter 6, Section 3). Next, I discuss the broader research implications of this project's findings. Finally, I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for future research.

Chapter 7, Section 1: Overview of Empirical Findings

Chile's estallido social in 2019 was the original impetus for this project. As I looked beyond Chile, I found that other international cases seemed to share the characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy. Thus, I set out to develop a comparative research project centered on the emergence of this category of protests. Interested in comparing to other Latin American cases of anti-system protest in democracy, I selected Brazil's Jornadas de Junho in 2013 and Colombia's protests in 2019 and 2021. However, through my field research in Brazil and secondary source research on Colombia, I found that neither case fit the blame characteristic of anti-system protests: for the most part, movement organizations and protesters were not directing blame at the political system for their grievances. Thus, the Brazil chapter and Colombia section focus on slightly different outcomes than the Chile chapter, but all three represent escalations from earlier waves of protest. Chile escalated from sectoral protests to an anti-system protest in democracy, and Brazil and Colombia escalated from sectoral protests to massive, multi-demand and multi-sector protests in democracy. My theory, offering a generalizable framework for variation in protests over time in democracies after initial onset, helps explain the outcomes in

each of the three cases. This section discusses these findings, and then briefly discusses the Venezuela and the Arab Spring sections.

Chile

Chapters 3 and 4 detailed the empirical findings in Chile over the period from 2006 until the estallido social's emergence in 2019. First, the chapter shows that Chile's 2019 estallido social had all the characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy: 1) diverse participant composition, 2) wide-ranging demands, 3) blame directed at the political system, and 4) context of representative democracy. Beginning in 2006, Chile saw the emergence of various sectoral protests. Chapter 3 focuses on the high school student movement, university student movement, and pension reform movement. Over time, Chile's political institutions offered a range of responses to these sectoral movements and others, but in most cases the response did not include policy changes aligned with the sectoral organization's demands. As a result, sectoral movement organizations developed perceptions of political unresponsiveness, or perceptions that demands were not being resolved through their institutional counterparts. Thus, sectoral movement organizations strategically updated. In line with the theoretical framework, Chilean organizations first strategically updated by employing extra-institutional tactical alternatives to seek change through national-level (Level 2) political targets. Over time, after sensing an exhaustion of tactical alternatives without achieving desired results, Chilean movements eventually escalated their targets of blame to the political system (Level 3).

The second part of the analysis of the Chilean case focused on cross-sector coalition formation. My theory argues that cross-sector coalitions form when there are both cross-sector networks and cross-sector goal alignment. Through interactions during previous years of mobilization, brokers with ties to multiple sectors, and personal and political connections,

Chilean sectoral organizations had networks in place well before 2019. What changed leading up to 2019 was that target escalation, caused by political unresponsiveness, created cross-sector goal alignment for sectoral organizations that had previously focused on sectoral objectives. The Broad Front (established in 2017) and Social Unity Table (established in 2019) formed around common political objectives related to changing the political system.

All of these processes are relevant to explaining the emergence of Chile's 2019 anti-system protests in democracy. Political unresponsiveness led Chile's sectoral organizations, and individuals who shared their grievances, to accumulate unresolved demands (**anti-system characteristic: wide-ranging demands**). Repeated political unresponsiveness also drove multiple sectoral organizations to pursue extra-institutional tactical alternatives because they lost faith in institutional channels for resolving their demands (**anti-system characteristic: diverse participant composition**). Ultimately, political unresponsiveness also caused sectoral organizations to escalate blame (**anti-system characteristic: political system blame**). The formation of cross-sector coalitions in Chile also meant that Chile was a case of coordinated anti-system protest. The chapter details how the Social Unity Table in particular helped organize the protests and advance the political system demand for a new constitution.

Chapter 3 also looked at the Patagonia Without Dams movement as a divergent case of political responsiveness in Chile. Perceptions of responsiveness led to the disbandment of the Patagonia Defense Council: the organization accomplished its objectives and thus struggled to organize subsequent protest action. However, because the case of responsiveness was such an outlier even within the environmental sector, this responsiveness case was not enough to lead activists in Chile away from the idea that national-level targeting was ineffective and political system change was necessary to allow for social movement victories in the future. Finally, the

chapter considered alternative explanations. Grievances due to relative deprivation, a favorable political opportunity environment, and resources were relevant factors that increased the likelihood of protest onset, but these factors would not have led to an anti-system protest in democracy in Chile without political unresponsiveness and the resulting strategic updating process by sectoral organizations.

Chapter 4 presented findings from Twitter content analysis of two sectoral organizations: the No More AFP pension reform organization and FECh student organization. The Twitter findings provide some additional evidence in favor of escalation in demands and blame by these organizations over time and following episodes of political unresponsiveness.

Brazil

Chapter 5 analyzed Brazil's 2013 protests and the processes leading up to the protests since the first PT presidential administration took power in 2003. I refer to the protests as uncoordinated, non-system protests because the protests lacked national, cross-sector coalitions and did not meet the political system blame requirement of anti-system protests in democracy. Yet, Brazil's protests were massive, multi-sector protests characterized by wide-ranging demands. Thus, the case raised the question: why did protest escalate beyond single-sector, single-issue protests but without target escalation and without cross-sector coalition formation?

First, drawing on my revised concept of political opportunity, I found that over the period from 2003 to 2013, representation through institutionalized channels weakened in Brazil from the perspective of various groups (PT defectors, Autonomists/Anarchists, and the Right), creating a more conducive environment for initial sectoral protest emergence. Second, repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness left demands unresolved and motivated continued extra-institutional action for key sectoral organizations that participated in 2013 like the MPL in São

Paulo and activists who went on to form the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro. Other groups like the Popular Committees Against the World Cup and the mostly right-wing movements against corruption had shorter protest histories; their actions are better explained by new political developments that contributed to their grievances rather than by long histories of political unresponsiveness. Finally, a sizable group, the Loyal Left, included various sectoral organizations that did not perceive political unresponsiveness as they could point to various examples of PT governments resolving their demands in recent years.

These differences in perceptions of political responsiveness across groups are the first reason that Brazil lacked target escalation to the political system. For sectoral organizations in Chile, the widespread perception – based on movement organizations' years and sometimes decades of sectoral fights without adequate policy changes – was that seeking change through national-level policymakers had failed, necessitating an escalation in targeting to the political system. The Loyal Left and the relatively new movement organizations in Brazil like the Popular Committees Against the World Cup did not have such clear reasons to give up on change through lower-level targets. Second, Brazil's federalist system of policymaking made subnational targeting (Level 1) more common in Brazil. Even for organizations like MPL that had faced repeated episodes of unresponsiveness, it did not make sense to these actors to blame national actors or the system for public policies like transportation fare increases that were set by the mayor or state governments.

I found that three factors deterred the formation of national, cross-sector coalitions to help lead the 2013 Brazil protests. First, lacking the target escalation process that occurred across sectors in Chile, Brazilian sectoral organizations did not develop a common set of political objectives or enemies to motivate coalition-building. Second, Brazilian organizations had greater

ideological differences than Chilean ones. The PT defectors and Autonomist/Anarchists were strongly opposed to the PT while the Loyal Left was allied with the party, and Brazil also had various groups of protest organizations on the right (the protest organizations that mobilized in Chile in 2019 were almost all on the left). Finally, in Brazil the organizational context was more decentralized than Chile. Thus, even cross-sector actors that developed a common set of objectives, like the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Rio de Janeiro, organized using local networks of activism.

Looking at alternative explanations, the chapter found that grievances driven by relative deprivation, favorable political opportunity environment, and resources were relevant background conditions as in the case of Chile. Furthermore, political repression contributed to the escalation in scale of the protests starting on June 13, 2013.

Colombia

Chapter 6, Section 1 evaluated the characteristics of Colombia's 2019 and 2021 protests and tested my theory in explaining the causes of these two connected waves of protests. Like Brazil, Colombia's protests involved an escalation to multi-demand and multi-sector protests but lacked the political system blame component of anti-system protests in democracy. Changes in political opportunity helped to explain the initial onset of sectoral protests in Colombia. Leading up to 2019 Colombians had decreasing confidence in institutionalized channels, and the peace agreement in 2016 decreased stigmatization of protests and opened up the political agenda to non-conflict issues. After initial protest onset, political unresponsiveness was a central factor in creating an accumulation of unresolved demands and in motivating continued protest action. The Duque government failed to follow through on various sectoral agreements leading up to 2019, and then protesters were largely unsatisfied with the response after the 2019 wave, helping to

cause the protest's reemergence in 2021. Cross-sector networks built through previous mobilizations, shared experiences with political unresponsiveness, and new threats posed by the Duque government drove the formation of CNP cross-sector coalition that helped lead the protests in 2019 and 2021. In analyzing alternative explanations, I found that economic grievances were an important factor in explaining Colombia's protest emergence. Unlike in Brazil and Chile, Colombians faced more significant economic deprivation, and policy triggers by the Duque government exacerbated their economic grievances. Lastly, police brutality likely contributed to escalation in the scale of participation in the protests in 2019 and 2021.

Venezuela (1980s and 1990s) and Arab Spring

The final two sections of the comparative analysis looked at Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s (Chapter 6, Section 2) and the Arab Spring (Chapter 6, Section 3). I chose the Venezuela case because it provides an example of an alternative trajectory following repeated episodes of political unresponsiveness. The section on Venezuela found that perceptions of unresponsiveness across multiple presidential administrations created an accumulation of unresolved demands and drove increased protest action. Venezuelan social movement organizations did not build cross-sector networks or develop a common set of goals for cross-sector coalition protests, leading to multiple years of dispersed protest. Finally, a populist institutional alternative, Hugo Chávez, stepped in to create an outlet for discontented Venezuelans around anti-system political action.

The Arab Spring provided an example of anti-system protest in autocracy. The goal of this section was to illustrate the alternative dynamics in authoritarian regimes that I proposed in Chapter 1. The case suggests that the role of political opportunity and factors leading to coalition formation are similar across regime types. However, the key difference is that the central puzzle for explaining the emergence of anti-system protest in democratic regimes is how and why

citizens come to perceive their political system is to blame for their grievances, while the more pertinent puzzle in authoritarian regimes is how and why citizens overcome fear and the impossibility of overcoming the regime.

Chapter 7, Section 2: Research Implications

My research findings suggest the importance of distinguishing between different categories of protest as an outcome. First, these distinctions are important because causal explanations for the emergence of protest differ based on the category of the protest outcome. Existing research suggests that prominent theories in the protest literature like relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and political opportunity can help explain the emergence of single-sector, single-demand protests in democracies, but my research has shown that these theories face significant limitations in explaining the escalation to anti-system protests and other protests that mobilize multi-sector around multiple demands in democracies. Political unresponsiveness is fundamental in explaining the latter two categories of protests. I also find that the relevant causal variables and puzzles differ for protest outcomes across regime type.

Second, the protest category distinctions matter for understanding what the protests say about the functioning of democracy in a particular context. Non-system protests that identify an unresolved grievance and demand change from representatives are a component of a healthy democracy. But anti-system protests are concerning for democracy because they indicate that various sectors of society have many unresolved demands, and protesters are not confident that their subnational and national representatives can resolve these demands without changes to the political system.

Third, and relatedly, differences in categories of protests matter from a policy response perspective. The local government in São Paulo was able to appease MPL by revoking fare

increases in June 2013 because the organization prioritized a single-issue, sectoral demand, while the Piñera government's issue-specific concessions were ineffective in placating the Social Unity Table because of the organization's broader system-change objectives. Understanding the demands and targets of protesters helps inform effective policy-based resolutions.

Another implication of my research findings is that previous protest waves and historical political processes are central to understanding the escalation to anti-system protests in democracy. The Chile chapter demonstrated that lessons from previous protest experiences informed the target escalation of sectoral movement organizations and the strategic shift in their willingness to form cross-sector coalitions. Historical analysis and process tracing is also important to understanding other protest trajectories and escalations. For example, differences in historical responsiveness to sectoral demands in Brazil helped explain why MPL was in the streets in the beginning of June 2013 while the CUT was on the sidelines. Thus, as stated in Chapter 1, this paper's findings build on an existing literature that urges scholars to study protests as historical cycles of contention. The findings challenge research that suggests that technological advances like social media platforms allow modern contentious action to come together rapidly and without much basis in long-term historical processes. Furthermore, the methodological implication is to employ process tracing and historical research to effectively explain the emergence or escalation of political protests.

The findings offer two research implications related to blame attribution. First, blame directed at specific actors is not always more effective in mobilizing for political action. Political protest literature contributions like Javeline (2003) suggest that protest participation is more likely among individuals who can identify specific culprits for their grievances. Arceneaux (2003) finds that voters are more likely to turn out to vote against the incumbent party when they

identify the the government as blameworthy for economic outcomes. My findings are in line with this literature in suggesting that identifying causal responsibility is critical to political mobilization. However, the Chile chapter suggests that the identified responsible party does not need to be a specific actor or administration. Chilean protesters in 2019 identified the political system and constitution as the culprit and effectively mobilized against this target. Second, blame attribution is a dynamic variable and is driven in part by political experiences. I find that in Chile from 2006 to 2019, blame escalated over time due to sectoral organizations' experiences with political unresponsiveness. In other words, political learning was a more central factor than elite-driven blame shifting or manipulative framing by social movement leaders.

Lastly, my research finds that building coalitions requires both networks and shared political goals. The three main cases in this project suggest that a couple key factors help align the goals of social movement organizations. In the Chilean case, a common idea of the political target of blame united distinct sectors. Members of the Broad Front and Social Unity Table overcame ideological differences and sectoral prioritization because of their shared sense that the political system needed to change. A common threat is another factor that can unite otherwise disparate groups, as evidenced through the CDP in Chile's Patagonia (threatened by the Patagonia Without Dams project), the CMP in Brazil (threatened by Bolsonaro's government)[179], and the CNP in Colombia (threatened by the Duque administration's reform proposals).

Chapter 7, Section 3: Directions for Future Research

The first direction for future research is to explore additional cases of anti-system protest in democracy. Table 1 in Chapter 1 (with additional details in Appendix A) identifies four other

[179] Discussed in Chapter 4, Section 6, CMP leaders found that it was difficult to form cross-sector coalitions during PT administrations (like in 2013), but they were able to do so during the Bolsonaro administration because of the threat that the administration posed to all left-leaning sectoral organizations.

cases that seem to fit the characteristics of an anti-system protest in democracy: Spain's Indignados Movement, France's Yellow Vest Protests, Lebanon's 17 October Protests, and Hong Kong's Autonomy Protests.[180] These other cases underscore that anti-system protests in democracy are not a uniquely Latin American phenomenon and even occur in developed countries with long histories of democracy. Research into these cases would provide additional tests of my theoretical framework in other regions and political contexts where anti-system protests in democracy have emerged.

A second potential extension of this research would be to study the underlying sources of political unresponsiveness in democracy. A central goal of my project was to address the puzzle of why protests escalate in representative democracies. In the Chilean, Brazilian, Colombian, and Venezuelan cases political unresponsiveness was a central factor in explaining protest escalation or support for a populist alternative. A second puzzle that merits exploration is how and why representative democracies become unresponsive. I briefly mention several factors that seem to contribute to political unresponsiveness in the cases in this paper: institutional barriers (Chile), presidential governing style (Brazil), dominance by the Right (Colombia), macroeconomic constraints and restrictive party systems (Venezuela). However, these variables do not represent an exhaustive list. For example, Berman (2021) points to other possible sources of political institutions becoming less responsive and effective, such as private funding of campaigns. Exploring these and other barriers to effective representation could help scholars to understand the puzzle of representative democratic systems that are repeatedly unable to process the demands of movements and citizens, which leads to outcomes like anti-system protest in democracy.

[180] The protests in Lebanon and Hong Kong occurred in semi-democratic regimes, like Colombia, rather than full representative democracies.

Lastly, political unresponsiveness in representative democracies also sometimes contributes to an alternative outcome: the rise and success of populist candidates and parties. Future research should investigate the question of when political unresponsiveness (and other contributing factors) leads down a path to anti-system protest in democracy versus populism. The cases in this project suggest that the formation of cross-sector social movement coalitions aimed at political system change may serve as a substitute for populists. For example, Chileans who were discontented with the political establishment or overall system could vote for the Broad Front in Chilean elections starting in 2017 and take to the streets with the Social Unity Table beginning in 2019. Though the Broad Front sought to serve as an alternative to establishment parties, its candidates like Gabriel Boric did not promote a divisive "us" versus "them" discourse or seek to dismantle liberal democracy in support of the popular will. Likewise, the Social Unity Table protested for a new constitution, but it supported institutionalized processes of drafting a new constitution rather than putting forward populist candidates to dismantle Chile's existing political system. In contrast, Brazilians in 2013 and Venezuelans in the 1980s and 1990s had mass protests but never formed cross-sector protest coalitions aimed at political system change that could serve as an organized outlet for masses that were discontented with the establishment or system. Protest waves ended without resolution of grievances for many and without the formation of broad-based social movement organizations to channel discontent going forward. This contrast with Chile seemed left a greater void for populist candidates to fill in subsequent years, contributing to the success of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Further exploration into this question of anti-system protest versus populism in contexts of representative crises and unresponsiveness offers a fruitful agenda for future research.

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Appendix A: Additional Comparative Protest Cases

France Pension Reform (01/2023-06/2023)

General Description:
A series of protests and strikes that started in January 2023 and continued for several months in response to a pension reform bill proposed by the Borne government to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 years old.

Duration:
January 19, 2023-June 2023 (seemed to have most recent significant protests in June)

Massiveness: According to the trade unions the protests reached as many as 3.5 million protesters, while according to the interior ministry the highest number was 1.28 million. The Carnegie Protest Tracker says >1.2 million.

Composition of protesters:
Fairly diverse. Various unions have coordinated protests against the reform, incorporating energy workers, teachers, dockers, and public sector workers. Furthermore, black bloc groups took part in some demonstrations.

Demands:
The protests were focused on the cancellation of the pension reform legislation.

Blame:
The protests targeted the government seeking to implement the reform. (Level 2)

Democracy:
Yes.
89/100 Freedom in the World 2023
The French political system features vibrant democratic processes and generally strong protections for civil liberties and political rights. However, successive governments have responded to terrorist attacks and the COVID-19 pandemic by curtailing constitutional protections and empowering law enforcement to infringe upon personal freedoms. The government has also imposed states of emergency in recent years, enabling it to infringe on rights to privacy, assembly, and movement.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2023

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_French_pension_reform_unrest
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Israel Judicial Reform (01/2023-10/2023)

General Description:
The protests are a response to Israeli Justice Minister Yariv Levin's announcement of plans to make various changes to the judicial system, which protesters fear will weaken checks on the executive branch.

Duration:
The protests began in January 2023 and have paused following October 7 attack.

Massiveness:
Since the beginning of the year, the protests have occurred on a weekly basis, and by July were drawing hundreds of thousands to the streets across the country (BBC article). The Carnegie Protest Tracker says the peak size of protests was greater than 500,000.

Composition of Protesters:
According to opinion polls, the proposed reforms face significant opposition in the general public. Composition of protesters and opposition is diverse. Protests have been organized in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Beersheba, and other cities. Particular groups such as the Israeli Medical Association, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) reserve pilots, military veterans, and trade unions have all threatened actions against the reforms. Various political parties have also opposed the reforms.

Demands:
Protesters have called for all of the proposed judicial reforms to be halted and for the resignation of Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Blame:
Blame seems to be pretty clearly centered on Prime Minister Netanyahu and the members of his governing coalition. (Level 2)

Democracy:
Yes. 77/100
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system and independent institutions that guarantee political rights and civil liberties for most of the population. Although the judiciary is comparatively active in protecting minority rights, the political leadership and many in society have discriminated against Arab and other ethnic or religious minority populations, resulting in systemic disparities in areas including infrastructure, criminal justice, education, and economic opportunity.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/israel/freedom-world/2023
Sources:
https://www.ynetnews.com/travel/article/b10e2ktt3
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https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israelis-massive-protests-government-controversial-judicial-reform-netanyahu/

Peru Boluarte Protests (12/2022-present)

General Description:
The protests emerged in response to the ouster of Pedro Castillo as president and the ascension of Dina Boluarte.

Duration:
The protests went on from December 2022 until the end of March 2023 and then reemerged in July 2023.

Massiveness:
The peak size of protests was over 20,000 people.

Composition of Protesters:
Many of the protesters are on the left and far-left, supporters of Castillo, and many indigenous, rural, and poorer communities who feel disenfranchised in Peruvian politics.

Demands:
Protesters want Boluarte to step down and to have new elections.

Blame:
Levels 2 and 3. Much blame is directed at Boluarte's government, but there is also broader discontent with the political class and institutions like Congress, who some protesters want to dissolve. Some have also called for a new constitution.

Democracy:
70/100
Partly Free
"Peru's status declined from Free to Partly Free because the president was impeached and arrested after attempting to dissolve the legislature and rule by decree, and protests by his supporters led to deadly clashes with police. Peru has established democratic political institutions and undergone multiple peaceful transfers of power. However, high-profile corruption scandals have eroded public trust in government, while bitter divides within a highly fragmented political class have repeatedly produced political turmoil. Indigenous groups suffer from discrimination and inadequate political representation."
https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2023

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Mexico Electoral Reform (11/2022-03/2023)

General Description:
Protests took to the streets to oppose Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador's plan to overhaul the country's electoral commission.

Duration:
Protests went on for 3.5 months.

Massiveness:
The protests peaked with over 100,000 protesters.

Composition of Protesters:
General public, but especially opponents of AMLO.

Demands:
Overturn the changes to electoral laws.

Blame:
Level 2. Blame is directed at Lopez Obrador, the national politicians threatening democratic institutions.

Democracy:
60/100
Partly free
Mexico has been an electoral democracy since 2000, and alternation in power between parties is routine at both the federal and state levels. However, the country suffers from severe rule of law deficits that limit full citizen enjoyment of political rights and civil liberties. Violence perpetrated by organized criminals, corruption among government officials, human rights abuses by both state and nonstate actors, and rampant impunity are among the most visible of Mexico's many governance challenges.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/mexico/freedom-world/2023

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https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicans-protest-presidents-electoral-reform-plan-2022-11-13/#:~:text=MEXICO%20CITY%2C%20Nov%2013%20(Reuters,the%20hands%20of%20the%20government

Indian Farm Bill Protests (08/2020-12/2021)

General Description:
The protests, led by farmers' unions, called for repeal of three agricultural reform laws that were passed in India's parliament in September 2020, which would have removed protections for farmers from free market forces.

Duration:
The protests went from August 2020-December 2021 (ending soon after the farm bills were repealed).

Massiveness:
The Carnegie Protest Tracker says that greater than 1 million participated at the protest peak. On November 26, 2020, millions participated in a 24-hour strike against the farm law reforms and proposed changes to labor laws. Between 150,000 and 300,000 farmers blocked Delhi border roads between November 28 and December 3, 2020.

Composition of Protesters:
The main protesters were farmers. The Samyuky Kisan Morcha (Joint Farmers' Force), formed in November 2020, was a coalition of over 40 farmers' unions that coordinated protests against the farm legislation. The protest began mostly in the Punjab state, but also included a national general strike in support of the farmers.

Demands:
The key demand was to repeal three agricultural reform laws, called the Farm Bills, passed in India's Parliament in September 2020.

Blame:
Blame was directed at the national government that passed the reform legislation.

Democracy:
Semi-democracy
67/100
While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and increased violence affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021

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U.S. George Floyd/Police Brutality Protests (05/2020-08/2021)

General Description:
All over the United States, protesters mobilized around the issue of police brutality and systemic racism following the murder of George Floyd during an arrest in Minneapolis.

Duration:
Protests around the country continued for many months. According to the Carnegie Protest Tracker, the protests lasted 15 months.

Massiveness:
Protests drew crowds in hundreds of cities across the United States. Carnegie Protest Tracker puts the peak size at 1,000,000. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 7,750 demonstrations linked to the Black Lives Matter movement occurred across more than 2,440 locations between May 26 and August 22, 2020.

Composition of Protesters:
General public. The Black Lives Matter movement was the most important organization leading the protests, and the protests drew people from the general public and many new activists. Surveys indicate that half of the people who protested said it was their first time getting involved with a form of activism.

Demands:
The demands varied from local changes to police departments to broader national ideas like defunding the police. Protesters also urged Congress to prohibit chokeholds, eliminate programs that offer military equipment to local law enforcement, and end qualified immunity.

Blame:
Level 1 and Level 2.
Though some activists point to systemic concerns with racism and policing, the entire political system was not a common target of blame. It was more common to take aim at policies that dictate how policing works at the local and national level.

Democracy:
83/100
Free
The United States is a federal republic whose people benefit from a vibrant political system, a strong rule-of-law tradition, robust freedoms of expression and religious belief, and a wide array of other civil liberties. However, in recent years its democratic institutions have suffered erosion, as reflected in partisan pressure on the electoral process, bias and dysfunction in the criminal justice system, harmful policies on immigration and asylum seekers, and growing disparities in wealth, economic opportunity, and political influence.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2021

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Bolivia Election Protests (10/2019-11/2019)

General Description:
The protests emerged immediately following the presidential election, in which opponents of then President Evo Morales took to the streets saying the election was fraudulent. After Morales resigned on November 10, his supporters organized protests alleging that he was victim of a coup and in opposition to Jeanine Áñez becoming acting president.

Duration:
The first wave of protests lasted from the day after the election, October 21, until November 10 when Morales resigned. And the pro-Morales protests lasted about 10 days.

Massiveness:
The peak size of protests had over 10,000 people.

Composition of Protesters:
The first round of protesters included members of opposition parties to Morales, labor groups, middle-class citizens, and some indigenous groups. The second round was organized by Morales supporters.

Demands:
Grievances centered on fraud and protesters called for either new elections or ouster of Morales.

Blame:
Level 2. Blame is centered on Morales and those responsible for the fraudulent election. Not much evidence of citizens generally calling for changes to Bolivia's political system.

Democracy:
63/100
Partly Free
Bolivia is a democracy where credible elections have been held regularly. However, electoral manipulation in 2019 prompted mass protests and violence that led to the resignation of long-time president Evo Morales, with new general elections expected in 2020. Child labor and violence against women are persistent problems, independent and investigative journalists face harassment, and the judiciary is politicized and hampered by corruption.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia/freedom-world/2020

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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50178188

Lebanon 17 October Protests (10/2019-present)

General Description:
The national protests were triggered by financial measures that included an introduction of taxes on tobacco, petrol, and Whatsapp voice calls, but they expanded to include wide-ranging, long-term issues such as economic stagnation and high unemployment, corruption, poor public services, and sectarian rule.

Duration:
The protests began in October 2019 and protests have occurred in waves since then.

Massiveness:
Carnegie Protest Tracker says over 1 million. On October 20, 2019, hundreds of thousands gathered in cities around the country, marking the most significant protests since at least 2005 in the country.

Composition of Protesters:
The protesters represented diverse sectors of Lebanese society, and massive protests took place in cities throughout the country. The protesters lacked a clear centralized authority.

Demands:
The grievances covered various issues such as new taxes, corruption, unemployment, currency crisis, political nepotism, failures in basic services, and the explosion in the Port of Beirut, among others.

Blame:
Level 3.
The protests were aimed at the political system and ruling class.
“On Oct. 17 2019, the people took to the streets across Lebanon with an unprecedented sense of unity, calling for the downfall of the entire political and economic power structure that has been governing the country since the end of the armed conflict in 1990” (Amnesty International article).
“The protest signaled a new collective awareness that the ruling class and its power sharing scheme are the source of ailments the country suffers from” (Khatib 2022).
The rallying cry of the protesters was “all of them means all of them” to denounce the ruling class.

Democracy:
Semi-democracy
44/100

Lebanon's political system ensures representation for its many sectarian communities, but suppresses intracommunity competition and impedes the rise of cross-sectarian or secularist parties. Residents enjoy some civil liberties and media pluralism, but grapple with the government's inability to address pervasive corruption and inconsistent support for the rule of law. Lebanon has also struggled to support the refugees who make up over a quarter of its population, with refugees from Syria facing especially difficult circumstances as they face unemployment, restrictions on movement, and the risk of refoulement.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/lebanon/freedom-world/2020

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Ecuador Fuel Subsidy Protests (10/2019-10/2019)

General Description:
This series of protests emerged in opposition to austerity measures, particularly an end to fuel subsidies, adopted by President Moreno and ended in just a couple weeks after protesting groups reached a deal with the government to reverse austerity measures.

Duration:
The protests lasted for two weeks.

Massiveness:
Over 10,000 protesters, according to Carnegie Protest Tracker.

Composition of Protesters:
Multi-sector. Key labor unions, indigenous organizations, student groups, transportation unions, and human rights organizations took to the streets.

Demands:
The demands were centered on specific economic policies, the austerity measures adopted by President Moreno. Some also called for the resignation of Moreno, which seemed tied to the unpopularity of this policy.

Blame:
Level 2. The blame is centered on the national government administration that set the unpopular policies. Indicative of this not being a systemic issue, protesters celebrated and stopped protesting when Moreno reversed the policy.

Democracy:
65/100
Partly Free
"Elections take place regularly, and the National Electoral Council (CNE), considered a politicized body for many years, has begun to display greater independence. A leftist government has ruled the country since 2007. The new administration of President Lenín Moreno, which came to power in 2017, has taken steps to fight corruption, bolster security, remove restrictions on civil society, encourage the free press, and strengthen democratic governance. A 2019 protest movement against austerity measures prompted a harsh crackdown that marred the administration's progress. However, the situation calmed after Moreno canceled the austerity program, following negotiations with protest leaders."
https://freedomhouse.org/country/ecuador/freedom-world/2020

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Czech Republic "Million Moments for Democracy" Protests (04/2019-12/2019)

General Description:
In the largest protests since the fall of the Iron Curtain, protesters called for the resignation of Prime Minister Andrej Babis rooted in corruption scandal involving subsidy fraud from his time before being Prime Minister.

Duration:
The protests lasted for 8 months.

Massiveness:
250,000 at peak according to Carnegie Protest Tracker. Hundreds of thousands signed a petition for the prime minister's resignation.

Composition of Protesters:
Members of the general public participated including people of different ages and political ideologies.

Demands:
The demands are not wide-ranging, but they focus on the resignation of a prime minister and his justice minister.

Blame:
Mostly Level 2. The protests, though called a Million Moments for Democracy, are mostly focused on keeping Prime Minister Babis and his administration from disrupting the country's democratic values rather than calling for a new system. As one leader of the movement stated, "We are not protesting against the system but we are trying to prevent Babis changing it."
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/14/million-moments-can-czech-protest-movement-regain-momentum/

Democracy:
91/100
Free
"The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy in which political rights and civil liberties are generally respected. However, in recent years, the country has experienced a number of corruption scandals and political disputes that have hampered normal legislative activity. Illiberal rhetoric and the influence of powerful business entities in the political arena are increasingly visible."
https://freedomhouse.org/country/czech-republic/freedom-world/2020

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Hong Kong Autonomy Protests (03/2019-07/2020)

General Description:
The largest demonstrations in Hong Kong's history emerged in response to a bill introduced by the Hong Kong government that would allow extraditions to China, but the protesters soon escalated to five demands: 1) withdrawal of the extradition bill, 2) retraction of "riot" characterization of protests, 3) release and exoneration of arrested prisoners, 4) establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into police conduct and use of force during the protests, 5) Resignation of Carrie Lam and the implementation of universal suffrage for Legislative Council elections and for the election of the chief executive.

Duration:
The protests lasted from March 15, 2019 until 2020 with most of the protests dying down with the pandemic.

Massiveness:
According to Carnegie Protest Tracker, 2 million at peak.

Composition of Protesters:
The protesters included a wide range of actors from the general public, and pro-democracy groups, localist groups, pro-independence groups, student unions, trade unions, and the Civil Human Rights Front umbrella organization that started in 2002.

Demands:
The protesters had five demands: 1) withdrawal of the extradition bill, 2) retraction of "riot" characterization of protests, 3) release and exoneration of arrested prisoners, 4) establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into police conduct and use of force during the protests, 5) Resignation of Carrie Lam and the implementation of universal suffrage for Legislative Council elections and for the election of the chief executive.

Blame:
Some of the demands focused on specific laws and against Carrie Lam, but the protesters were opposed to the underlying political system with mainland China.

Democracy:
55/100
Partly Free
The people of Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, have traditionally enjoyed substantial civil liberties and the rule of law under their local constitution, the Basic Law. However, the chief executive and half of the Legislative Council (Legco) are chosen through indirect electoral systems that favor pro-Beijing interests, and the territory's freedoms and autonomy have come under threat in recent years due to growing political and economic pressure from the mainland.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/freedom-world/2020

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Algeria "Le Pouvoir" Protests (02/2019-03/2020 and 02/2021-04/2021)

General Description:
The protests were sparked by then-president Abdelaziz Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fifth term and were also motivated by other issues like economic downturn, corruption, and lack of freedom.

Duration:
The initial wave of protests lasted from February 16, 2019 to March 20, 2020, and a second wave lasted from February 18, 2021 to April 30, 2021.

Massiveness:
Carnegie Protest Tracker says over 1 million at the protests peak.

Composition of Protesters:
The protests mobilized a wide range of sectors and groups, including bankers, teachers, students, Arabists, Feminists, and Berberists. Various citizen organizations were formed in 2019 such as the Civil Forum of Change and the National Committee for Liberation of Detainees.
"One of the remarkable aspects of the Hirak is that it represents citizens from all socio-economic classes of society–the unemployed, poor, middle classes and wealthy. While a plurality of protesters is young men, all age groups and genders are represented and entire families frequently participate in the marches" (Parks et al 2019 merip.org).

Demands:
The underlying demands of protesters was for a new system of government.

Blame:
Level 3
The blame was directed at the political regime. After Bouteflika resigned, many vowed to continue in the streets until the underlying structure of ruling elite (Le Pouvoir) were expelled from power.

Democracy:
No.
34/100
Political affairs in Algeria have been dominated by a closed elite based in the military and the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). While there are multiple opposition parties in the parliament, elections are distorted by fraud, and electoral processes are not transparent. Other concerns include the suppression of street protests, legal restrictions on media freedom, and rampant corruption. The rise of the Hirak protest movement in 2019 has put pressure on the regime, with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigning and the armed forces moving to maintain their grip on power in response.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2020

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France Yellow Vest Protests (11/2018-05/2020)

General Description:
The protests, sparked by an unpopular fuel tax, involved weekly protests centered on taxes, social inequality, and political system reforms.

Duration:
The protests lasted for 1 year and 6 months, according to the Carnegie Protest Tracker.

Massiveness:
Carnegie Protest Tracker says 300,000 was the peak size. Others refer to it as the most serious social uprising in France since May 1968 (Chamorel 2019).

Composition of Protesters:
The protests were multi-sector but with higher representation among rural and small town residents and lower and middle-class in terms of income. Urban working and middle class protesters joined in later. Most protesters were first-time activists with no political or union affiliation. The protests were mostly organized horizontally through actions like Facebook groups.

Demands:
Wide-ranging. On November 29 2018, a list of 42 demands was circulated on social media. The main issues on the agenda were taxes, social inequalities, and direct democracy.

Blame:
Level 3. Though some called for Macron's resignation, multiple factors suggest that it was a system-level protest. Protesters indicated significant mistrust with political system, with 81 percent distrusting politicians. A whole 70 thought democracy was failing and 69 percent trusted neither the right or left to govern. Second, even after Macron offered significant concessions like cancellation of the fuel tax and wage increases, the protesters called for the institution of national citizen-initiated referendums and recalls of local elected officials, seeing direct democracy as a better way of expressing citizen opinions. Thirdly, the problems in France were seen as long-term, mounting problems that has not been resolved over the last couple decades (Chamorel 2019).

Democracy:
90/100
Free
"The French political system features vibrant democratic processes and generally strong protections for civil liberties and political rights. However, due to a number of deadly terrorist attacks in recent years, successive governments have been willing to curtail constitutional protections and empower law enforcement to act in ways that impinge on personal freedoms. Anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment continue to be rife."

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United Kingdom People's Vote Protests (06/2018-10/2019)

General Description:
The protests centered on discontent with Brexit negotiations and calls for a second Brexit referendum, beginning two years after the UK voted to leave the European Union.

Duration:
The protests went on sporadically for over one year, dissolving in January 2020.

Massiveness:
Carnegie Protest Tracker says 1 million at peak.

Composition of Protesters:
The protesters were multi-sector. Key participants included the People's Vote campaign, pro-EU groups, and broad swaths of the public. For Our Future's Sake was a student-led group involved, and other campaign groups included European Movement UK, Open Britain, and Our Future Our Choice (OFOC). Overall, there were more than 100 grassroots groups.

Demands:
The demands didn't touch different issue areas. They were centered on Brexit negotiations and demanding a second Brexit referendum.

Blame:
Blame was leveled against national-level actors such as Theresa May and Boris Johnson. Though calling for the people to be able to vote on Brexit (a democratic issue), the demands weren't really for broader changes to the political system.

Democracy:
93/100
"The United Kingdom (UK)—comprised of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales—is a stable democracy that regularly holds free elections and is home to a vibrant media sector. While the government enforces robust protections for political rights and civil liberties, recent years have seen concerns about increased government surveillance of residents, as well as rising Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. In a 2016 referendum, UK voters narrowly voted to leave the European Union (EU), through a process known colloquially as "Brexit," which will have political and economic reverberations both domestically and across Europe in the coming years."
https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2019

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https://nationbuilder.com/peoples_vote

Romania Corruption Protests (01/2017-08/2019)

General Description:
The protests took place in response to an executive order to decriminalize some corruption offenses and block future investigations, and subsequent protests centered on corruption and further attempts by the government to weaken judicial independence and anti-corruption laws.

Duration:
The protests went on sporadically for two years, from January 18, 2017 to August 10, 2019.

Massiveness:
The peak size was on February 5, 2017, when over 500,000 people protested.

Composition of Protesters:
The participants varied across the different protests, including urban young people, Romanian diaspora, and magistrates (Carnegie Protest Tracker).

Demands:
Repeal of governments decrees regarding abuse of power, stopping the attempts by government and parliament to weaken fight against corruption, and resignation of government.

Blame:
Level 2. Protests were provoked by government decrees taken by a specific administration and the mistrust and anger generated by these actions. Others though that the fight against corruption had weakened since the ruling Social Democratic Party took power.

Democracy:
84/100
Free
"Romania's multiparty system has ensured regular rotations of power, and executive authority is often divided between a president and prime minister from different parties. Civil liberties are generally respected, though ongoing concerns include police brutality, discrimination against Roma and other vulnerable groups, and corruption and political influence in the judiciary. Key media outlets are controlled by businessmen with political interests. While political corruption remains an entrenched problem, prosecutors have made major progress in holding senior politicians accountable in recent years, raising tensions between investigators and elected officials."
https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/freedom-world/2017

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South Korea Candlelight Demonstrations (10/2016-04/2017)

General Description:
A series of protests that emerged following a political corruption scandal involving President Park Geun-hye and an unofficial presidential adviser.

Duration:
The first candlelight protest took place on October 26, 2016, and the final protest took place on April 15, 2017, one of just two protests that occurred after Park Geun-hye was impeached on March 11.

Massiveness:
Carnegie Protest Tracker says 1.5 million at peak. According to Jung 2022, the largest candlelight vigil took place on December 3, 2016, when 2.3 million people participated nationwide. Largest since pro-democracy demonstrations of thee 1980s.

Composition of Protesters:
Multi-sector.
The first candlelight vigil "was organized by a pre-existing coalition of social movement organizations called the Protest Headquarters for People's General Rallly….It was composed of fifty-three trade unions, peasant associations and student movement organizations and led by radical groups. The Protest Headquarters was established a year earlier to mobilize popular resistance against the government's neoliberal economic policies."….(Jung 2022, p. 779)
"After the second candlelight rally, a broad-based umbrella organization, the Action for Resignation, was established. It was launched by 1,553 civic groups and later expanded to 2,382 groups. The Action for Resignation included a broad range of moderate groups….It also encompassed local branches of various civic organizations to expand the geographic coverage of mobilization" Jung 2022, p. 779-780)
Also included many unaffiliated individuals (Jung 2022, p. 780).
Farmers, Buddhist monks, and university students all involved.

Demands:
The main demand is for the resignation of President Park Geun-hye.

Blame:
While the protesters also brought up some broader issues outside of the scandal, such as inequality and lack of social mobility, the blame was centered on President Park Guen-hye and her presidential administration.

Democracy:
Yes.
82/100
"South Korea's democratic system features regular rotations of power and robust political pluralism, with the two largest parties representing conservative and liberal views. Personal freedoms are generally respected, though the country continues to struggle with minority rights and social integration, especially for North Korean defectors, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and

transgender) people, and immigrants. The population is also subject to legal bans on pro–North Korean activity, which have sometimes been invoked to curb legitimate political expression." https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2017

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https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/asia/korea-park-geun-hye-protests.html

Brazil Impeachment Protests (11/2014-07/2016)

General Description:
Motivated by the Petrobras corruption scandal, these protests took aim at corruption in Brazil but centered on the ruling government of Dilma Rousseff, drawing millions into the streets to call for impeachment and political reform. There was a counter-movement led by supporters of the PT.

Duration:
The protests began at the end of 2014 and continued until Dilma's impeachment in the middle of 2016.

Massiveness:
The protests drew millions into the streets multiple times, with the peak on March 13, 2016 having almost 7 million.

Composition of Protesters:
The protests included a broad coalition of actors mostly under the coordinated leadership of conservative and right-wing organizations. Alonso refers to the general group as the "patriotic" wing in Brazilian politics, as a right-wing nationalist sentiment united the protesters.

Demands:
The demands included impeachment of Dilma, as well as political reforms, ending corruption, and arresting political actors involved in Petrobras scandal.

Blame:
Level 2 and Level 3. Protesters called for political system-level changes like ending corruption and bringing about political reforms, and the corruption scandals implicated politicians across the political spectrum. But much of the focus was on impeaching the PT President Dilma Rousseff. In favor of Level 2 coding, the protests completely lost steam after Dilma was impeached.

Democracy:
79/100
Free
"Brazil is a democracy with competitive elections and vibrant civil society engagement. However, a severe economic and political crisis has significantly challenged the functioning of

government. Corruption, crime, and economic exclusion of minorities are among the country's most serious difficulties." https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2017

Sources:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/24/pathways-after-protests-case-of-brazil-pub-80151
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015%E2%80%932016_protests_in_Brazil

Spain Indignados Protests (05/2011-08/2011)

General Description:
A series of protests that emerged around Spain's local and regional elections of 2011 and 2012 were triggered by economic crisis and austerity measures but focused on problems with their representative political system.

Duration:
May 2011-August 2011, though some sources suggest that some version of the movement continued on through subsequent protests in Spain.

Massiveness:
Estimates suggest that between one and three million participated in the multi-month campaign.

Composition of Protesters:
Multi-sector. Young people initiated the movement with participation of many in the age 20-35 group, but they were joined by people from all social backgrounds and ages.

Demands:
Grievances pointed to high unemployment rates, welfare cuts, two-party system, political system in general, capitalism, banks, and corruption.

Blame:
Level 3. System. The most popular slogans of the movement were "they do not represent us" and "real democracy now!". The protesters rejected their political and economic systems. Though there were other demands, the movement focused on lack of effective democracy as the underlying source of problems.

Democracy:
Free; perfect scores on civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House.
https://www.refworld.org/publisher,FREEHOU,,ESP,504dad703c,0.html

Sources:
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/spanish-indignados-protest-austerity-measures-2011
Castells 2015, *Redes de indignación y esperanza*. Madrid: Alianza editorial.

Appendix B: Methodological Appendix

As discussed in the Methods section in Chapter 1, I employ multiple methods in studying the empirical cases presented in this paper. For the comparative cases on Colombia, Venezuela, and the Arab Spring in Chapter 6, I draw primarily on existing academic articles, media articles, reports by policy and human rights organizations, and other open sources of information that I was able to access online. For example, in the case of Colombia, I was also able to use social media and web searches to find publications that the CNP had drafted in 2019 and 2021 that provide insight into some of their central demands and messaging at the time of the protests. However, I did not conduct field research for any of the cases in Chapter 6, so this appendix will focus on my research strategies for the Brazil and Chile cases.

For the cases of Chile and Brazil, I also drew on sources of information that were available online, such as academic articles, media coverage, and publications on social media and organization websites. I was also able to find publications by important movement organizations from different points during the period under study. In some cases, interviewees also shared organization documents or archival materials that were useful in understanding the organizations' thinking, strategies, targets, and demands over time. I detail my strategy for conducting Twitter content analysis of two social movement organizations, No More AFP and FECh, in Chapter 4. In Brazil, interviewees and other sources pointed out that the primary platform used by social movement organizations in 2013 was Facebook. Due to the more common use of Facebook than Twitter in Brazil in 2013, I did not replicate my Twitter content analysis in Brazil. However, I drew on Escola de Ativismo's "As Redes Contam As Ruas," a project that compiled Facebook posts by activist organizations from the 2013 protests in Brazil, to analyze some historical social media content in the Brazilian case (Escola de Ativismo 2023).

Interviews were my primary method for the Chilean and Brazil cases. I conducted 76 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in Chile and 26 in-depth, semi-structured interviews in Brazil. I conducted field research in Chile from January 19-31, 2020, November 5-December 15, 2021, and July 2-August 20, 2022. I conducted field research in Brazil from May 13-June 9, 2023 in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. I also conducted Zoom interviews in both cases. The rest of this appendix centers on detailing my interview strategies. First, I will discuss the target universe of interviewees based on the research question of my project. I will detail the sampling process and who I was and was not able to interview in each category of interview subjects. Next, I will talk about the logistics of the interviews.

Targets Interviewees, Sampling Process, and Who I Did/Did Not Interview

For the interviews that I conducted for the dissertation project, I sought to define a theoretical set of target interviewees based on my research question. This process began after an initial, exploratory phase of interviews that I conducted in Chile in 2020. Three months after the initial outbreak of the estallido social in Chile, I traveled to Santiago from January 19 to January 31, 2020 and conducted interviews with social movement activists, academics, and protest participants. My primary goal on this initial trip was to gain a basic understanding on the ground relating to the estallido social: What had happened over the past couple months? Who were the key actors? Why were people protesting? What were their motivations? On this short initial trip, I drew on a couple of strategies. First, I relied on activist and academic contacts that I already had from previous experiences living and researching in Chile. I talked to the people who I knew, and I asked them if they recommended talking to anybody else. Second, I went to the main plaza of protests in Santiago (Dignity Plaza), and I talked to people who were there. Third, I reached out to a couple of people who were associated with movement organizations that seemed

to be actively involved in the 2019 protests, like the Social Unity Table. Overall, I interviewed 18 individuals on this initial trip. These individuals included seven participants in the plaza, two other participants unaffiliated with specific organizations, five leaders of social movement organizations, and three political analysts.

After this initial phase of interviews, additional case analysis, and development of my research question, I developed a theoretical universe of target interview subjects, divided into three primary groups: 1) leaders and members of sectoral movement organizations and cross-sector coalitions that formed prior to the protest emergence, 2) unaffiliated/new participants in the protests (Chile 2019 and Brazil 2013), and 3) analysts and academics with expertise on the protests and political context. The following sections detail the sampling approach for each group, the categories of actors that I tried to represent, high leverage interview subjects in each group, and interview subjects who I did not interview.

Group #1: Sectoral movement organization and cross-sector coalition leaders/members

Chile

The first category of interviewees was undoubtedly the most important for my project. Through my initial research in Chile, I hypothesized that the protest emergence in 2019 was related to previous waves of mobilization in the country. In this paper, I argue that anti-system protests (Chile) and multi-sector, multi-demand protests (Brazil) emerged as a result of historical processes of political unresponsiveness and strategic updating by sectoral movement organizations. I also develop an argument regarding the factors that lead to the formation of cross-sector coalitions. To test my hypothesis against alternatives, it was critical to gain the perspective of leaders of social movements in recent protest waves in Chile and leaders of cross-sector coalitions.

Existing academic research on Chile and initial interviewees indicated that 2006 was the year of increased sectoral protests, so I focused on the historical period from 2006 to 2019. Furthermore, the pension reform movement and the student movement are widely considered to be two of the most massive and important sectoral movements in the period, so I prioritized interviewees from these two movements. The environmental and feminist movements were also active and important in the period, so I also sought interviewees from these movements. In terms of cross-sector coalitions, the Social Unity Table (formed in 2019) was the central cross-sector coalition involved in the 2019 protests. The Broad Front was a cross-sectoral electoral coalition that emerged from the student movement and challenged the political system in 2017, so it was also important to explain the factors involved in this coalition's formation.

Thus, my initial priorities in Group #1 in Chile were representatives from the pension reform movement, student movement, Social Unity Table, and Broad Front. However, as I advanced in my research, I noticed two key gaps that I needed to fill. First, all of the sectoral organizations that I was speaking with had little in the way of political victories and perceived political unresponsiveness. Thus, I sought to identify an organization that had a clear policy victory, or was met with political responsiveness in the period, in order to test how it affected strategic updating. Tellingly, cases of political responsiveness in Chile were few, but my interviewees directed me to the case of the Patagonia Without Dams movement as an exception. I sought interviewees from that movement and from the environmental sector. The second gap that I found was that I learned about another cross-sector coalition that had formed in 2012 in Chile, the Social Table for a New Chile, so I sought out interviewees who had participated in that coalition in order to compare and contrast with the later cross-sector coalition formed in 2019.

Overall, I was able to interview several high leverage actors in this group. I interviewed three founding leaders of the No More AFP movement in 2013, two of whom went on to help lead the Social Unity Table in 2019. One of these interviewees agreed to speak with me on two separate occasions and share No More AFP and Social Unity Table documents and archival materials. Within the student movement, my most important interview subjects were leaders of the Federation of Students of the University of Chile (FECh). I spoke with central leaders of the movement from different years between 2011 and 2019. I also interviewed several subjects who had participated in both of the key student protest waves, the high school student protests in 2006 and university student protests in 2011. From the Social Unity Table, I sought to interview representatives of the coalition from different sectors and succeeded in interviewing members of the coalition from the education, environmental, feminist, pension, and health sectors. I interviewed leaders and members of the Broad Front coalition who came from the two main blocs of the coalition: from the student movement and the "Group of Four" formed from other sectors. I interviewed four leaders of the Social Table for a New Chile from 2012. And I interviewed three founding leaders of the Patagonia Without Dams movement.

Within Group #1 in Chile, there are also some actors who I was unable to interview who could have provided additional perspectives. First, although I did speak with participants from the 2006 high school student protests, it was more challenging to track down a couple of the key leaders of that protest wave because 15 years had passed and my interviewees in the student movement did not have their contact information. Thus, in discussing 2006 in particular, I was more reliant on Donoso's (2013) field research analysis of the protest wave and on interview subjects who were high school students in 2006 but did not lead the movement. Second, Gabriel Boric and Giorgio Jackson are two very high leverage interviewees because they helped lead the

university student movement in 2011 and then helped form the Broad Front coalition. During my field research stint in fall 2021, they were in the midst of a Boric's political campaign for president and during my summer 2022 stint, Boric was president and Jackson was a high-ranking cabinet member. In this context, I did not succeed in interviewing either. I was relatively successful in filling this gap by speaking with various other university student leaders and founding members of the Broad Front.

Brazil

In Brazil, I was similarly interested in interviewing leaders and members of social movement organizations involved in the 2013 protests as well as protest waves and political action in preceding years. My background case research – secondary source materials and initial conversations at MIT or over Zoom before traveling to Brazil – indicated a few sectoral organizations and groups of actors within Group #1 that I sought to include in my sample. My initial conversations were based on convenience, using my existing contacts through professors and colleagues. A critical sectoral organization that I identified was the Free Fare Movement (MPL), a sectoral movement organization that led the initial June 2013 protests in São Paulo and other cities in Brazil. Two important coalitions in 2013 were the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases (a local coalition in Rio de Janeiro that had an active role in the protests) and the Popular Committees Against the World Cup (another important group with branches in different cities around the country that drew together actors from different sectors). Beyond these specific organizations, Alonso (2023) and previous publications identified three key groups of actors in the 2013 protests, which I refer to as the Autonomists/Anarchists, the PT defectors, and the Right. I targeted some additional actors in these groups. Finally, in contrast to Chile, Brazil had a significant number of social movement organizations that were allies with the ruling PT party, a

group that I call the Loyal Left. I wanted to gain the perspective of organizations from this group because they were less active in the protests than the other groups.

Rather fortunately drawing on an MIT contact with a connection to MPL, my first interview in São Paulo was with a leader of the MPL São Paulo movement in 2013. I interviewed this leader twice, and through this leader, I was able to connect with and interview three other leaders of the MPL organization in São Paulo. In Rio de Janeiro, I contacted a leader of the Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases through Facebook. This leader agreed to an interview and also provided me with contacts that he thought had a different perspective than him from within the coalition. Thus, I interviewed four leaders of the coalition, representing Autonomist/Anarchist and PT Defector perspectives. I used a dossier published by the Popular Committee Against the World Cup in 2012 that included a list of members at the end to find interviewees from this movement. I went down the list contacting members that appear in the dossier. Only a few from the list responded, and I interviewed two of them.

From the Loyal Left, my most high leverage interviews were with two leaders of the CMP organization in São Paulo, one leader of the CNTE from Porto Alegre (over Zoom), and one leader of the student movement in Rio de Janeiro who was allied with the PT (over Zoom). I was able to interview a leader of MBL, a major right-wing organization. And, as another high-leverage interviewee, I interviewed a participant in the mostly right-wing movement coalitions against corruption who was active in the movement since 2010.

One limitation of my interviews in Brazil is that, due to time constraints, I was only able to conduct in-person research in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. I conducted some interviews over Zoom in order to increase representation from other cities. To this end, I interviewed activists

from Joinville, Riberão Preto, Floriaópolis, Porto Alegre, and Joinville. However, perspectives from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have greater representation in my sample.

Group #2 Unaffiliated/New Participants in the Protests (Chile 2019; Brazil 2013)

In most cases, interviewees representing sectoral organizations and cross-sector coalitions (Group #1) were also participants in Chile's 2019 protests and Brazil's 2013 protests. The reason for creating this second group within my theoretical universe of interviewees was to ensure some representation from interviewees who did not have histories of participating in sectoral movements or cross-sector coalitions. The main goal of this smaller group of interviews was to ensure that motivations and primary goals of unaffiliated or new protesters were not different from what I was hearing from the organized group representatives. For example, in Chile interviewees from organized sectors targeted the political system and wanted a new constitution, and I wanted to check whether this demand and target were also relevant to other participants in the protests.

For this group in Chile, some of my most important interviews ended up being my very first interviews in the Dignity Plaza in Santiago in January 2020 because many of the people who I met in the plaza were not affiliated with social movement organizations and/or were protesting for the first time in 2019. Another strategy that I used to hear the perspective from this group was to reach out to representatives from territorial assemblies (asambleas territoriales) in different neighborhoods in Santiago. The territorial assemblies were mostly self-organized neighborhood groups that met around the country after the initial October 18 protests to discuss political issues, and they were composed of a mix of activist and non-activist citizens. I was able to interview representatives from seven different territorial assemblies from around the city. Information from these interviewees, as well as reports on the nation-wide territorial assemblies that took place

throughout the country, indicated that the targets and demands of the unaffiliated were often aligned the organized actors in Chile. However, I did find that, on average, the individuals who I interviewed in the plaza were more working-class and seemed to have more immediate, deprivation-related grievances related wages, health, and pensions than the broader pool of interviewees.

In Brazil, given the smaller overall number of interviews that I was able to conduct, I generally sought interviews with representatives from Group #1: subjects who were both participants in the protests and representatives of key sectoral organizations in previous years. However, I did work in some representatives from Group #2. A few of my Zoom interviewees from across Brazil and the activist interviewees that participated in the Forum of Fights in Rio de Janeiro did not have a history of organized activism or participation in sectoral organizations before 2013.

A limitation of my interviewees in this group is the limited representation from outside of Santiago and, with some exceptions, a couple of cities in Brazil. As noted in the interview list, my interviews in Chile did include some individuals from cities across country: Valparaíso, Concepción, Temuco, and Aysén. But these interviewees were generally part of organized groups. However, my paper does complement geographically-concentrated interviews with references to national territorial assembly reports ("Demandas Prioritarias" 2021), national surveys of protesters in Chile (CEP 2019), and IBOPE's national surveys of protesters in Brazil in June 2013 and general population surveys (IBOPE 2013; CESOP 2013). In Chile, I did not notice significantly different responses based on location. In Brazil, one major difference was that, based on the city, the protesters were part of different local coalitions or organizations.

Group #3: Academics and Political Analysts

My third group of interviewees was academics and political analysts. I did not have as strict of sampling procedures for this group of interviewees. I generally reached out to academics whose work I had come across while reviewing literature about the protests before field research, or to academics recommended by colleagues or interviewees. These interviews, generally more informal, were particularly useful at the beginning stages of field work in each country to learn other perspectives and arguments for the protests, and to ask for recommendations on other sources to review and key actors to contact. In most cases, I found that this group was responsive, open to meeting with me, and willing to offer suggestions for my project.

Interview Logistics

I personally prepared for, scheduled, conducted, took notes on, and analyzed each of the 102 interviews for this project. Before beginning to contact interviewees, I developed a plan for my interviews and prepared my interview guide. I then submitted my project to my institution's Institutional Review Board (IRB). The project was deemed minimal risk and thus exempted from full review by IRB.

After processing my project through IRB, I began reaching out to potential interviewees. I generally reached out to potential interviewees through email or WhatsApp messages. However, in some cases in which I did not have the contact information of the individual or organization, I submitted private messages through social media platforms, Facebook and Instagram. My introductory message included a brief description of my background as well as a brief description of my project. I always offered to provide additional details about the project or respond to questions in these initial exchanges. Although my interview guide provides a general structure for my interviews, each individual interview also required some additional background

research to personalize my questions to each interview subject. I would generally try to find out which organizations or movements that the individual had participated in so that I could do some research into histories of the organization or movement and add in some more specific questions.

I conducted almost all interviews in Spanish in Chile and Brazilian Portuguese in Brazil. In a couple of instances, interview subjects from Group #3 were completely fluent in English and seemed to prefer speaking in English, so I conducted the interview in English. The interviews generally lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour. A couple of clear outliers were an interview that I conducted over Zoom that lasted for about 2 hours and 30 minutes. The interview subject, Group #3, was an expert on the Mapuche movement in Chile and wanted to give me an extended background and history after discussing the pertinent questions for my project. And in another similar case (this time in person), an environmental activist who had been participating in the movement since the 1970s wanted to discuss the history of the environmental movement and current issues. In some cases, I went back to some interview subjects multiple times. I generally did this because over the course of my research, I developed some additional questions. For example, when I interviewed a student leader in November 2020, I had not yet decided that I was going to include a detailed analysis of the formation of the Broad Front coalition. This student leader was a founding member of the coalition, so I conducted a second interview with the same person but focused more on questions about the Broad Front.

I have included an English version of the general Interview Guide at the end of this appendix. The interview guide provided a general structure for the interviews, but I sometimes went off script to pursue interesting themes that came up over the course of the interview. From the script, each interview always included 1) a reintroduction to the project that I had provided when initially contacting the interviewee, 2) asking if the interviewee had any questions or

concerns about participating, and 3) asking for permission to record. I also always included more or less the same conclusion to the interview in which I asked the subject several questions: 1) if they wanted a copy of the recording, 2) if they wanted a copy of the dissertation once it is completed, 3) if they recommend additional contacts, and 4) if I could reach out to them again. Almost all interview subjects were fine with being recorded. A few interview subjects asked for a recording, and many interviewees asked to see my dissertation once it is finished. I plan to share this paper with them once it is complete.

The sections of the attached interview guide outline some of the key themes that I tackled in these interviews. In the sections on the protest outbreak (2019 in Chile and 2013 in Brazil), three of the main issues that I wanted to understand were: 1) most important demand(s) for the interviewees, 2) who they were targeting/blaming, and 3) (in Chile) whether they saw the constitution as a resolution. For the question on blame attribution, I always started with a general question about who the interviewee blamed for the grievances that motivated their participation in 2019. If it was not clear how to code their response based on this initial answer or if they did not elaborate much, I would usually follow up with something along the lines of Question 8, "8. Categorizing your last response, if you were to choose one of the following, in which category would you place blame for your grievances?"

For interviewees from Group #1 (sectoral organization and coalition members), three other important themes that I covered were: 1) perceptions of political unresponsiveness, 2) strategic updating over time (tactics and targets), and 3) (for coalition members) the factors that led to the decision to join a cross-sector coalition. All of these themes required some more extended discussion on the history of the sectoral organization. For example, I did not think that it would be very useful to just ask a No More AFP leader whether Chilean institutions had been

responsive to their demands. They would likely say "no," but it would not tell me much about what really led them to their perception. Rather, I would go through some of the key moments and waves of protest for the movement, and then I would ask the interviewee follow-up questions like, "How were the protests resolved, or how did they reach a conclusion? What concessions were gained? Do you feel that your goals or objectives were met?" Given the challenges of asking interviewees to remember events from several years ago, I would arrive to the interviews with my own information about the movement's history, which allowed me to more assertively intervene to clarify different points. Drawing on multiple interviewees from each sector was also important to avoid relying on the accuracy of the memory of any one actor.

I took handwritten notes during each interview or typed notes if over Zoom. After each interview, I went back through and listened to the recording to complete my notes. In most cases, I took detailed notes without transcribing each interview word for word. However, if there was an interesting quote that I wanted to include in the paper or just remember for future reference, then I would often make a note of the time in the recording during or after the interview and then transcribe that section of the interview.

One final note in terms of interview details is that I had to conduct much of my field research during the Covid-19 pandemic. In the table of interviewees, I note the format for each interview: in person or over Zoom. I followed MIT's institutional guidelines regarding field research during the pandemic. Furthermore, even after I was permitted by my institution to restart in-person field research, I still gave my interviewees the option of participating in interviews over Zoom or in person. I found that during my field research stints in Chile in late 2021 and summer 2022, some interviewees still preferred remote interviews over meeting in

person. I did not find a significant difference in the quality of interviews that I conducted over Zoom versus in person.

Below I am providing two tables (Table 8 for Chile and Table 9 for Brazil) with the full list of interviewees for this project that includes: the date of the interview, a description of the interviewee's background, and the format of the interview (Zoom or in person). In the Chilean case, I also included which sector that they represented (since I sought representatives from student, pension, environmental, feminist, and other sectors in particular) and whether or not they were a part of national, cross-sector coalition. After the table, I have included a general version of my interview guide.

Table 8: List of Interviewees in Chile

	Date	**Background description**	**Sector**	**Coalition**	**Format**
1.	1/19/20	University student activist since 2011; student leader in Valparaíso in 2019	Student		In person
2.	1/22/20	High school student leader in 2019; organization CONES	Student		In person
3.	1/23/20	Participant in Dignity Plaza in 2019			In person
4.	1/23/20	Health sector organization leader and participant in Social Unity Table	Health	Social Unity Table	In person
5.	1/24/20	Left-wing party and labor activist	Labor		In person
6.	1/24/20	Political analyst			In person
7.	1/24/20	Political analyst			In person
8.	1/24/20	Health sector organization leader and participant in Social Unity Table	Health	Social Unity Table	In person
9.	1/25/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
10.	1/26/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
11.	1/27/20	Founding Leader of No More AFP and Social Unity Table	Pension	Social Unity Table	In person
12.	1/29/20	Political analyst			In person
13.	1/29/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person

14.	1/29/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
15.	1/29/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
16.	1/29/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
17.	1/30/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
18.	1/30/20	Participant in 2019 protests			In person
19.	3/3/20	Political science academic			Zoom
20.	10/5/20	Leader of environment sector organization MODATIMA and member of Social Unity Table	Environment	Social Unity Table	Zoom
21.	10/6/20	Journalist for FECh; 2006 and 2011 protest participant	Student		Zoom
22.	10/7/20	Leader of Fundación Chile Movilizado; Comunes party member			Zoom
23.	10/13/20	University student leader at University of Concepción	Student		Zoom
24.	11/11/20	2006 Pingüino movement participant. University student leader 2012-2017	Student		Zoom
25.	11/17/20	University student leader 2015-2018; Broad Front member for 7 años	Student	Broad Front	Zoom
26.	11/19/20	Student protest participant 2011, student leader 2014-2015, feminist movement leader, Broad Front member	Student; Feminist	Broad Front	Zoom
27.	11/11/21	Political analyst; Former government official with expertise on student movement 2006-2011			In person
28.	11/11/21	Political Scientist; Feminist movement participant	Feminist		In person
29.	11/12/21	Territorial Assembly Representative			In person
30.	11/15/21	Territorial Assembly Representative			In person
31.	11/15/21	Sociology Professor			Zoom
32.	11/17/21	Feminist Leader; Former No More AFP participant; Former Social Unity Table member	Feminist	Social Unity Table	In person

33.	11/17/21	Feminist Activist; Political Science Professor	Feminist		In person
34.	11/18/21	Political Analyst; Former government official; Expert on Mapuche movement			In person
35.	11/20/21	Political analyst; Former government official with expertise on student movement 2006-2011			In person
36.	11/22/21	Participant in feminist organization; Photographer of Front-line protesters	Feminist		In person
37.	11/22/21	No More AFP founding leader; Social Unity Table	Pension	Social Unity Table	In person
38.	11/23/21	Leader of environmental organization, MAT	Environment		Zoom
39.	11/24/21	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP leader; former left-wing activist during dictatorship	Pension		In person
40.	11/26/21	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP participant; Feminist Organization Participant; No al TPP-11 participant (anti-foreign trade group); Social Unity Table member	Pension; Feminist	Social Unity Table	In person
41.	11/29/21	Sociology Professor			Zoom
42.	12/1/21	Territorial Assembly Representative			In person
43.	12/2/21	Territorial Assembly Representative; Environmental organization leader; Feminist organization participant	Environment		In person
44.	12/6/21	Leader of group for families of victims of the dictatorship; Social Unity Table member	Human Rights	Social Unity Table	In person
45.	12/9/21	Political Analyst			In person
46.	12/9/21	Political Analyst			In person
47.	12/9/21	Political Analyst			In person
48.	12/10/21	Journalist for FECh; 2006 and 2011 protest participant	Student		In person

49.	12/10/21	Leader of feminist organization	Feminist		In person
50.	12/14/21	Political Analyst; Former government official			In person
51.	12/21/21	Environmental activist; Social Unity Table member	Environment	Social Unity Table	Zoom
52.	1/7/22	Political Science Professor			Zoom
53.	1/24/22	Participant in 2006 Pingüino movement; university student leader 2011-2014	Student		Zoom
54.	5/4/22	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP participant; Feminist Organization Participant; No al TPP-11 participant (anti-foreign trade group); Social Unity Table member	Pension; Feminist	Social Unity Table	Zoom
55.	5/18/22	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP participant; Feminist Organization Participant; No al TPP-11 participant (anti-foreign trade group); Social Unity Table member	Pension; Feminist	Social Unity Table	Zoom
56.	6/3/22	Pobladores movement leader; Broad Front leader	Housing	Broad Front	Zoom
57.	7/7/22	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP participant; Feminist Organization Participant; No al TPP-11 participant (anti-foreign trade group); Social Unity Table member	Pension; Feminist	Social Unity Table	In person
58.	7/7/22	Student movement participant since 2001; Broad Front Member	Student	Broad Front	Zoom
59.	7/12/22	Political researcher with expertise on environmental movement in Chile			In person

60.	7/14/22	Former National journalism Organization Leader; Social Table for a New Chile Member; Social Unity Table member;	Journalism	Social Table for a New Chile; Social Unity Table	In person
61.	7/19/22	Participant in 2006 Pingüino movement; university student leader 2011-2014	Student		In person
62.	7/21/22	Student protest participant 2011, student leader 2014-2015, feminist movement leader, Broad Front member	Student; Feminist	Broad Front	Zoom
63.	7/21/22	Health sector organization leader; No More AFP Founding Leader; Social Unity Table Leader	Pension; Health	Social Unity Table	In person
64.	7/25/22	Environmental activist and leader since the 1970s	Environment		In person
65.	7/26/22	2011 university student protest participant	Student		In person
66.	7/26/22	Social Table for a New Chile Leader; Social Unity Table member		Social Table for a New Chile; Social Unity Table	In person
67.	8/1/22	Environmental activist and leader since the 1970s	Environment		In person
68.	8/4/22	Leader of parent organization for education reform; Social Table for a New Chile member; Leader of Education Bloc of Social Unity Table	Parent	Social Table for a New Chile; Social Unity Table	In person

69.	8/8/22	Environmental activist; Former Leader of Patagonia Without Dams movement	Environment		Zoom
70.	8/9/22	Environmental activist and Leader of Greenpeace Chile since 2015	Environment		In person
71.	8/16/22	Historian on Social Movements and Broad Front Member		Broad Front	In person
72.	8/16/22	CUT leader; Social Table for a New Chile Leader; Social Unity Table leader	Labor	Social Table for a New Chile; Social Unity Table	In person
73.	8/17/22	Leader of Patagonia without Dams Movement; Leader of Social Table for a New Chile	Environment	Social Table for a New Chile	In person
74.	8/22/22	Former banking union leader; No More AFP founding leader; Social Unity Table leader	Pension; Banking	Social Unity Table	Zoom
75.	8/26/22	Leader of Patagonia Without Dams Movement; Social Table for a New Chile Leader	Environment	Social Table for a New Chile	Zoom
76.	7/7/22	Territorial Assembly Representative; No More AFP participant; Feminist Organization Participant; No al TPP-11 participant (anti-foreign trade group); Social Unity Table member	Pension; Feminist	Social Unity Table	In person

Table 9: List of Interviewees in Brazil

	Date	Background Description	Format
1.	4/18/23	Participant in 2013 protests in Florianópolis	Zoom
2.	4/19/23	Student movement leader and protester in 2013	Zoom
3.	4/20/23	Founding member and leader of MPL São Paulo	In person
4.	4/21/23	Leader of Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL) since 2015; involved in right movements since 2000s; participated in 2013 protests independently	In person
5.	4/22/23	Sociology Professor	In person
6.	4/23/23	Political Science Professor	In person
7.	4/24/23	Leader of MPL São Paulo 2006-2014	In person
8.	4/25/23	Founding member and leader of MPL São Paulo	In person
9.	4/26/23	Political Science Professor	In person
10.	4/27/23	Leader of Centro de Movimentos Populares (CMP) São Paulo	In person
11.	4/28/23	Leader of Health Sector movement, Forum Popular de Saude do Estado de São Paulo (Popular Health Forum of São Paulo	In person
12.	4/29/23	Leader and Founding Member of MPL in São Paulo (2005-2015); Centro de Midia Independente São Paulo (independent media group) activist since 2003/2004	In person
13.	4/30/23	Leader and Founding Member of CMP	In person
14.	5/1/23	Midia Ninja (activist media platform), part of the movement since before 2013	In person
15.	5/2/23	Political Science; Participated in 2013 protest in Riberao Preto.	Zoom
16.	5/3/23	Political Analyst	In person
17.	5/4/23	Leader of Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Río de Janeiro; Student Movement activist since 2007/2008; former militant of PT (2002) and PSOL (2007/2008)	Zoom
18.	5/5/23	Leader of CNTE in Porto Alegre	Zoom
19.	5/6/23	Participant in 2013 protests in Joinville; MPL Joinville participant 2005-2010; anarquist	Zoom

20.	5/7/23	Popular Committee Against the World Cup Member in Rio; Professor and Researcher of Urbanism	In person
21.	5/9/23	Founding Member, Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Río de Janeiro	In person
22.	5/10/23	Forum of Fights Against Fare Increases in Río de Janeiro; member of an anarchist organization in Rio	In person
23.	5/11/23	Forum of Fights Against Far Increases Activist	In person
24.	5/12/23	Leader of Housing Movement, MLB	In person
25.	6/14/23	Government official during Dilma administration; Political Analyst	Zoom
26.	6/27/23	Anti-corruption Activist and Leader of EPOCC Campaign	Zoom

General Interview Guide: English Version

Introduction

Hello, it is a pleasure to meet you in person. As I mentioned in my email correspondence, my name is Peter Cummings and I am a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the US. Before starting my PhD, I spent some time in Chile: I studied abroad at La Católica in 2012 as an undergraduate, wrote my undergraduate thesis on the Chilean student protests, and worked for 2 years at a consulting firm in Santiago. During my time here in 2015, I met my wife and have returned multiple times since. Santiago has been a second home of sorts.[181]

For my dissertation project, I am researching the protests in Chile starting in 2019. I want to understand these protests in particular, but I also look to draw broader lessons on "estallidos" in democracy, and I look to compare the case to other recent protests in places like Colombia, Brazil, France, and the USA. I'm also interested the evolution of protest movements and politics, so you will notice that some of my questions are about your previous experiences with social movements and protests before 2019. One particular topic I want to cover is where you place responsibility or blame for the grievances that have motivated you to protest in the past and present.

I would like to inform you that participation in this interview is completely voluntary, and you may choose not to answer some questions or choose to end the interview at any time. Do you have any questions or concerns before we begin?

Recording Permission

Before we begin, I would like to ask if I can record our conversation? The recording will be used so that I can be sure not to miss any of the content. I will not use your name directly in my project. I might

[181] To be helpful, sometimes Chilean interviewees offered a lot of background on politics and history in their country, as if I knew very little. I'm hoping a more extended intro into my Chile background will help counter the tendency to provide a lot of basic background info on the country's politics.

describe you as "university student leader" or "protest participant in 2016 pension protests and 2019 estallido" rather than giving your name. If you prefer that I don't record, I can take notes by hand. Is it fine with you if I record?

Political Background and Social Movement Experiences

1. (**Social movement leader**) I reached out to you in part given your role as in XXXX organization, but could you tell me a bit more about you and your background? I'm particularly interested in your political and social movement experiences.
   (**Protest participant**) I understand that you participated in the protests in 2019. Is that correct? Could you tell me a bit more about your participation, and also about your other social movement and political background?
   a) Did you participate in any protests or social movements before 2019?
   b) Are you a member of any social movement organizations?
   c) Are you affiliated with a political party?
   d) Did you vote in the most recent presidential and legislative elections?

2019 Protests (for all interviewees)

2. In general, how would you characterize the events that began in October 2019?
   a. Would you use the term "estallido social" or another term? Why?
   b. Do you feel that the protests were similar to other protests you had seen or participated in, or were they different?
      i. What makes you say that?
3. I imagine it would be pretty difficult to be in Chile and not know about the 2019 "estallido social" in general terms, but do you remember how you became aware of specific protests that were happening, both on the first days of the movements and in the subsequent weeks and months?
   a. Were you invited to participate in any of the events?
   b. **[for leaders]** Did your organization convoke any of the events?
4. In what ways did you participate in the 2019 protests? Were you on your own or did you generally participate with a specific group (established organization, friends, family, etc.)
5. What motivated you **[and organization, if they are a leader]** to participate in the movement?
   a. **[If they mention multiple motivations]**: Could you try to rank these motivations in order of importance?
   b. Do you think that others, perhaps people you know or just participants in general, had similar motivations?
6. One result of the protest was a plebiscite to write a new Constitution…Do you feel that this was an adequate resolution? Why or why not?
   a. Did other changes occur that you feel helped resolve your demands?
   b. Did you have other objectives, things that you hoped to see change by protesting, that didn't change?
   c. Looking to the future, how might it be possible to resolve your grievances and the grievances of others whom you know?
7. To what or to who do you most attribute your grievances that led you to protest in 2019? In other words, who or what do you see as the primary cause of your grievances in 2019?
8. Categorizing your last response, if you were to choose one of the following, in which category would you place blame for your grievances:
   a. **Level 1:** Individual politicians or specific policies
   b. **Level 2:** Groups of actors like a political party or party coalition.
   c. **Level 3:** System-level forces like the economic model, political institutions, or Chilean democracy.
   d. None of the above captures your level of blame. (Explain)

9. If not answered in 7 or 8…what leads you to think that **[their response]** are to blame for your grievances?

Past Protest Experiences (for all Interviewees who participated in protests before 2019, which will be most interviewees)

10. You mentioned at the beginning that you also participated in the **[XXXX]** movement. Thinking back, what was that movement about? How would you characterize it?
11. What motivated you to participate in the movement?
    a. **[If they mention multiple motivations]**: Could you try to rank these motivations in terms of importance?
    b. [If not answered above] What were your goals/what did you hope to gain through these protests?
12. In what ways did you participate in the movement? Were you on your own or did you generally protest with a specific group (established organization, friends, family, etc.)
    a. **[If an organization]** Was this the main organization driving the movement or were there others?
    b. **[If organization not mentioned]**, do you remember which specific organizations were involved?
13. How were the protests resolved, or how did they reach a conclusion?
    a. What concessions were gained?
    b. Do you feel that your goals or objectives were met?
14. To what or to who did you most attribute your grievances? In other words, who or what do you see as the primary cause of your grievances at the time of those protests?
15. Categorizing your last response, if you were to choose one of the following, in which category would you place blame for your grievances at that time:
    a. **Level 1**: Individual politicians or specific policies
    b. **Level 2**: Groups of actors like a political party or party coalition.
    c. **Level 3**: System-level forces like the economic model, political institutions, or Chilean democracy.
    d. None of the above captures your level of blame. Explain.
16. **[If response different than the blame question for 2019]** What has led to your change in perspective on who is to blame for grievances?
17. For you personally, do you feel that the experience of participating in the **[XXXX]** movement influenced your political perspective in any way? If so, how?
    a. Do you feel that it influenced your decision to participate in the 2019 protests? If so, how?

Conclusion

18. Is there anything that I did not ask that you think is important?
19. Would you like to have a copy of the recording or see my notes?
20. Would you like for me to send you my dissertation once it's completed?
21. Is there anyone else that you recommend that I speak with?
    a. Would you mind sending me their contact information?
22. If I think of any additional questions, do you mind if I reach out to you again?

Additional block of questions for social movement leaders

23. How many members participate in your organization?
    a. Do you have a national or local following?

24. What are the objectives of your organization?
    a. What factors does your organization consider when formulating its demands and goals during a specific wave of protests?
    b. What does the process look like?
25. How has your organization changed over time…perhaps from the time you became involved until today?
    a. **[If not addressed]** Has the organization's strategies, goals, or messaging changed in any way? If so, how?
26. Does your organization have any linkages with other social movement organizations?
    a. In what ways did your organization coordinate with these others in 2019?
    b. Has the degree of coordination changed over the years at all?
27. The message from Unidad Social in 2019 was "Nos cansamos, nos unimos," calling for civil society unity against the common enemy of Chile's neoliberal model and democratic system.
    a. Did your organization advance a similar message or different one in 2019?
    b. What strategies did your organization use to advance this cause?