


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**BOEIZOKU: DEFENSE POLICY FORMATION
IN JAPAN'S LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

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This essay is based largely on interviews and observations made while working with the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council and the Dietmembers' Council on Comprehensive Security from 1987 to 1989. Members and staff provided me with numerous interviews and analytical suggestions, for which I am grateful. In the end, of course, this essay represents only my *own* analysis (except where secondary sources are cited).

Over the last decade a number of scholars and journalists in Japan have identified an important transformation in that nation's policy-making process. According to their "*kotoseiteiron*" ("high party, low bureaucracy theory"), the initiative in policy formation has shifted away from the traditionally powerful bureaucracy and towards policy tribes – or "*zoku*" – in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).¹ What exactly these "*zoku*" are, however, has remained a point of some considerable confusion. American observers have been of two minds. In his famous *Atlantic Monthly* article "Containing Japan," for example, writer James Fallows identified the *zoku* as power centers in Tokyo's government-business-legislative triangle that keep Japan closed and are inimical to US interests.² The US State Department, in contrast, has often seen *zoku* as convenient pressure points for pushing intransigent bureaucracies to open markets – a classic example being the use of LDP Construction *Zoku* leaders to open the construction market to US firms.

One reason for all of this confusion is that the *zoku* defy categorization. Organizationally, they vary widely across policy areas, from the hierarchical *zoku* in the areas of agricultural or construction to the much more amorphous *zoku* for foreign policy. Moreover, the *zoku* are dynamic, extra-institutional organizations that have no set rules or consistent criteria for membership (except, perhaps, that *zoku* members are also members in the Diet and the LDP). Meetings and decisions take place behind closed doors and debates are almost never revealed to the public. There are no records, no votes, no roll calls...no paper trail. And that is precisely why the *zoku* have become so powerful.

¹See, for example, Sato Seisaburo and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, *Jiminto Seiken* (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1989) and Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Motaki, *Zokugiin no Kenkyu* (Tokyo: Nihonkeizashimbunsha, 1987).

²James Fallows, "Containing Japan," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1989, pp.40-54.

This essay will examine one *zoku* that is of particular importance to the United States: the Defense *Zoku*. By any definition, this particular *zoku* is smaller, newer and less powerful than its larger cousins in the fertile areas of construction or agriculture. But isolating the complex web of personalities, factional politics and ideological battles that led to the growth of a *zoku* for defense over the past four decades will help analysts better understand the larger postwar trend towards "high-party, low government" policy formation in Japan. Defense, as a small *zoku*, is easier to dissect. In addition – and perhaps more importantly from the perspective of policymakers – this examination of the LDP's core defense constituency will shed light on Japan's ongoing debate about defense and remilitarization, and its implications for the United States

In order to fully understand the membership, motivation and influence of the current Defense *Zoku*, however, it is necessary to begin with an examination of the reasons for the broader shift in policy making initiative from the bureaucracy to the LDP.

The LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council and the Zoku

The term "*zoku*" was first used regularly by journalists in 1980.³ However, the encroachment by politicians into the territory of the bureaucrats has a history in Japan stretching at least back to 1898, when the Yamagata-clan dominated the bureaucracy of Meiji and fought to retain its policymaking privileges from the rural-based *Kenseito*, Japan's first true political party. In the mid-1920's politicians attempted once again to exert influence in policy formation when the Constitutional Government Party developed a "Policy Affairs Research Council." According to the Party Constitution, the Chairman of the Council "was permitted to sit with the Executive Council and humbly present his views."⁴ Right-wing terror and two decades of

³I first found the term used with regard to defense in an interview with Mihara Asao in the *Asahi Shimbun* on January 25, 1981. In 1980, the *Asahi* tended to use the term "*boei giin*". Before 1980, the same types of politicians were generally referred to as "hawks", or "*takaha*."

⁴Kishimoto Koichi, *Politics in Modern Japan: Development and Organization*, Third Edition (Tokyo: Japan Echo, Inc., 1988), p. 10.

warfare cut short the Constitutional Government Party's experiment with policy-making structures, but a new institution was born when the Liberal and Democratic Parties created the Policy Affairs Research Council (*Seimuchosakai*) as a part of their merger in 1955. Under the LDP, policy formation was given a much higher priority than had been the case in the pre-war experiments. The PARC had formal committees and research commissions and its chairman was one of the LDP's three principal officers under the party president (the other two being the secretary general and the chairman of the Executive Council). The PARC provided the fertile ground for the growth of policy *zoku* in the post-war period.

In his classic 1969 study of the LDP, Nathaniel Thayer wrote that the PARC is organized "like a pyramid, with a welter of divisions, special committees and investigative commissions at the lowest level, a deliberative commission at the next level and a group of five vice chairmen (one from each faction) at the third level. At the top sits the chairman."⁵ The structure has changed very little in intervening years. In most cases policy decisions work their way up the pyramid Thayer describes and are then passed on to the Party's General Council where they are rarely modified or rejected.

The PARC divisions (*bukai*), of which there are 17 corresponding to the principal bureaucracies (industry, finance, defense, etc.), are usually chaired by a fourth- or fifth-term member of the Lower House who has served as parliamentary vice minister of a related agency. The divisions check legislation, hold budget hearings and act as "study groups" for members and their secretaries who are new to a policy area. The investigative commissions (*chosakai*) are usually led by a former minister and deliberate on long-term policy planning. The special committees (*tokubetsu iinkai*) address long-term problems that are tangential to a regular policy area, prime examples being housing, military bases problems and disaster prevention. Finally, there are subcommittees (*shoiinkai*) to the investigative commissions and divisions. These subcommittees are occasionally established under a former division director to address immediate crises or problems such as creating a new cabinet post or determining what to do about pensions

⁵Nathaniel Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 210.

for Taiwanese veterans of Japan's Imperial Army (and to take pressure off the division so that it can focus on the budget). Given the intractability of some of the problems addressed by the subcommittees, they often become permanent structures in their own right.

Typically, legislation begins working its way through the PARC under the umbrella of a *taiko*, or long-term policy outline, which is drafted by the relevant ministries under the supervision of an investigative commission. From the investigative commission, the outline goes back to the ministry where it is drafted into legislation and sent to the relevant PARC division. When the division approves the legislation (usually a point left to the chairman's judgement, since there are no actual votes) the bill moves through the PARC Deliberative Committee (*Seimuchosakai Shiingikai*) for *pro forma* review before going to the Executive Council (*Somukai*) to become party policy. From there the bill goes to the LDP's Diet Affairs Committee (*Kokkai Taisaku Iinkai*) where a strategy is developed for introducing it to the Diet for a vote.

The PARC also plays an important role in determining the annual budget. Initial budget proposals are submitted by ministries to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) each August, but before that point the budgets are reviewed by the relevant PARC division. Key members of the same division actively guide the budget through the LDP and muster forces to lobby for the ministry's budget when final decisions are made by the finance minister and party leaders in December.

These at least, are the policy-making patterns as established by LDP party rules, and from the outside this is certainly how the PARC appears to function. However, within the PARC committees there are no precise rules of order, no quorum requirements, no full-time policy staff and no public (or even private) records. Under long-term one party rule it was perhaps inevitable then, that extra-institutional decision-making organizations would develop under the leadership of certain politicians, if for no other reason than to avoid chaos.

The Rice Price and the Growth of an Agriculture Zoku

The first policy area to spawn a *zoku* was agriculture, and the issue that mobilized the politicians was the price of rice. Occupation authorities established a Rice Price Council (*Shakai Hoshō Seido Shiingikai*) in 1949 that drew on prominent bureaucrats, scholars, consumers *and* politicians to decide the government's price for rice. However, the council's membership was too diverse to allow easy consensus, and the Ministry of Finance tended to push its preference for a low rice price on the membership. For the conservative rural politicians this was unacceptable. The price of rice determined not only the welfare of their constituents, but the viability of their seat in the face of urban migration and possible redistricting. When the LDP was established in 1955, therefore, rural LDP politicians utilized the PARC Agriculture Division (*Norinbukai*) and a provisional PARC Rice Price Committee (*Riji Beika Taisaku Iinkai*) to assure that the LDP dominated the Rice Price Council in the future. Dietmembers' alliances and leagues were created within the party to protect the price of rice (and other commodities) and soon the PARC Agriculture Division's meetings were drawing hundreds of members.⁶

However, while the volume of LDP interest in maintaining a high rice price led to the conservatives' domination of the Rice Price Council, the agricultural members of the LDP still had to negotiate the final price with the powerful Ministry of Finance. This became particularly important in 1968, when MoF announced that rice surpluses meant that for the first time there would *not* be an automatic increase in the government's rice price to keep up with cost of living increases. Now deft political maneuvering was required, not mobs of LDP politicians.

Within the large group of pro-agriculture LDP politicians who had concentrated to lobby for the maintenance of a high rice price, a core group emerged to steer the LDP towards a compromise with the MoF that would be in the best interests of Japanese farmers. Extremist politicians continued to wrap headbands and wave banners insisting on unrealistically high

⁶Tsuji Takuya, *Seifu Kainyu no Seiji Keizai Kattei: Sengo Nihon no Bekka Kettei Kattei* (Unpublished PhD Dissertation) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, March 1992), Chapter 2.

prices, but the MoF and the LDP rank and file soon came to recognize those members who were most adept at staking out the *otoshidokoro* – the spot where compromise would inevitably fall. Three politicians in particular came to dominate the formulation of compromise between the LDP and the MoF: Watanabe Michio, Nakagawa Ichiro, Minato Tetsuro. All three were rough-hewn, populist rural politicians in the anti-mainstream tradition of the Meiji Period *Kenseito*.⁷ But all three also had the ability to work behind the scenes with MoF.

In order to maintain control of broader agricultural policy formation in the LDP, the "Three-chan Fleet" (as Watanabe, Nakagawa, and Minato came to be known) invited into their exclusive, but unofficial club five younger mid-term LDP members in the 1970's. These new members gave the "Three-chan Fleet" access to all five major LDP factions, and new connections to the US Congress – an important factor as agricultural market liberalization was emerging as a new threat to the LDP's rural constituency. Eight members proved the optimal number for steering the 250-plus members of the PARC's Comprehensive Agriculture Policy Investigative Commission (*Sogo Nogyo Seisaku Chosakai*) in its negotiations with the MoF and the rest of the LDP.⁸

Thus was the first *zoku* created in Japan. At its broadest circumference, it included hundreds of interested politicians. At its core, however, was a steering group that had the reach to negotiate with the rest of the party and the government (and occasionally the United States), but was small enough to meet informally and determine which direction policy should go. The official fora for the *zoku*'s decision-making were the PARC committees and commissions on agriculture, but since these committees did not vote, and since their chairmen were always drawn from the core group's membership, the *real* decision-making process shifted to the

⁷The term "anti-mainstream" is generally used in the study of post-war Japanese politics to describe those politicians who were not aligned with the faction of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. The "anti-mainstream" politicians tended to be more aggressive on agriculture and defense issues. Mainstream politicians' pacifist, pro-economic growth priorities, in contrast, often reflected the views of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs (from which many had been recruited, including Yoshida himself).

⁸Tasei Yasuhiro, et al., *Jiminto Seichokai* (Tokyo: Nihonkeizaishimbunsha, 1983), pp. 105-113.

members' private offices in Nagata-cho and their exclusive "snacks" and drinking clubs in Akasaka. This exclusive arrangement served the interests of faction leaders in the party, the agriculture cooperatives, the MoF and the Ministry of Agriculture. And of course, it served the interests of the hostesses in Akasaka.

The Expansion of Zoku

The pattern of *zoku* established by the LDP intervention in the determination of the rice price and agricultural policy spread to other policy areas, particularly construction and industry, in the early 1970's. Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, rising the flag of "*reito kaizo*" (Restructuring the Japanese Archipelago), set the standard for rural anti-mainstream politicians to use the PARC and the budget process for redistributing the national treasure to the countryside. The modern roads, bullet trains and bridges in Tanaka's sparsely populated home district in Niigata Prefecture are testimony to his skillful manipulation of the policy-making process.

But the development of *zoku* was not just the result of Tanaka's style of pork-barrel politics. Other trends and factors also played a part.⁹ Principal among these were:

- **The Debility of the Diet as an Institutional Actor**

Beginning with the formation of the LDP in 1955, the opposition parties in Japan were largely frozen out of the policy-making process (although they retained the ability to delay and confuse). The opposition parties' ability to delay controversial legislation in the hope of winning public and media support has often forced the LDP to accommodate, or co-opt certain of their views; but with a guaranteed majority vote in the Diet, the LDP could increasingly afford to do the fine-tuning of legislation in the PARC. Since the PARC lacked parliamentary rules, the *zoku*

⁹Several of the reasons given here for the rise of the *zoku* are outlined in more detail in Inoguchi's *Zoku Giin no Kenkyu* and Sato's *Jiminto Seiken*.

emerged. The opposition's control of the Upper House of the Diet since 1990 has forced more accommodation from the LDP, but has not changed the conservative *zoku*'s monopoly of basic policy-formation.

- **The High Turn-Over Rate of Bureaucrats**

Political scientists have also argued that after years of handling the same policy issues, LDP politicians have gained a level of expertise and influence over their colleagues in the ministries, who change posts every three years or so. To some extent this is true, but unlike the LDP politicians, the bureaucrats have large policy staffs, many of whom belong to a branch of the civil service that does *not* rotate. A more telling fact of the bureaucrats' relative loss of control to the LDP is the increasing number of mid and senior-level civil servants who have chosen to retire and run for office in recent years. In the last Lower House election, for example, a record 29 former bureaucrats entered the race in an effort to join the 80 already in the Lower House.¹⁰

- **The Limitations of Fiscal Policy**

Through the economic high-growth period of the 1960's, the ministries' budget pies were steadily growing. In the 1980's, however, fiscal restraint froze real growth in all budgets except defense and foreign aid. Increasingly, then, bureaucrats have needed the LDP to lobby the MoF on their own ministry's behalf.

- **The Growth of Policy Issues that Cut Across Ministry Lines**

Increasingly, policy issues are requiring coordination amongst several ministries at once, particularly in areas such as trade policy, telecommunications and export controls. Interagency cooperation does not come easily to Japan's highly autonomous ministries, however, and

¹⁰"Seikai Wa Dainiji Kanryohajidai", *Asahi Shimbun Weekly AERA*, May 31, 1988.

politicians are often called upon to build compromise, and frequently seize the initiative when there is a vacuum of leadership.

- **The Growth of New Interest Groups**

There has been an explosion of Dietmembers' leagues as new interest groups emerge that are not represented by traditional bureaucracies. Examples range from the Dietmembers' League for the Promotion of Gateball (lawn croquet) to the Dietmembers' League for Comprehensive Security. These groupings vary in size and intensity of purpose, but all have an agenda that they attempt to push on the bureaucracies by way of the LDP, strengthening the *zoku* in the process.

- **The Use of Policy Access to Cement Support in Election Districts**

Traditionally, LDP politicians won election to the Lower House of the Diet by gathering support from local political bosses to build *koenkai* (supporters groups). In Japan's multi-seat districts, the politicians' *koenkai* were usually divided along regional lines, and local bosses would deliver votes. As Tanaka-style politics have provided the rural areas with bullet trains, roads and high-tech communications, however, the traditional political bosses have lost control of their wards. Increasingly, Dietmembers have had to appeal directly to the atomized electorate and impose organization from above. As a result, the *koenkai* have shifted from regional support groups within the district to support groups that mirror the Dietmembers own policy access in Tokyo. In typical districts, one LDP politician's *koenkai* will be dominated by construction, the second's by agriculture, and the third's by industry or health and welfare. The fourth and/or fifth politicians will usually be opposition members with support in the local labor unions. LDP politicians rarely debate policy issues in elections, but they must be prepared to provide service and access to the interest groups that make-up their *koenkai*, or risk losing them to rival LDP politicians.

- **Fund Raising to Win Support Inside the Faction**

As the LDP has settled in for long-term rule, the party's factions have become institutionalized. Once, LDP leaders such as Tanaka Kakuei, Ono Bamboku, or Kono Ichiro led factions that bore their personal stamp and were very much their personal political armies. Today, however, the factions are more like Japan's large companies, with various committees and bottom-up decision-making structures that tend to dilute the power of the man on top. For a politician to build the network necessary to work his way up the faction ladder requires a great deal of money. He must be able to pay, not only for his own election, but for those of his younger supporters within the faction as well. And money tends to flow to those with the greatest influence on the processing of budgets and legislation – the *zoku* leaders.¹¹

- *Policy Making to Develop Leadership in the Faction*

The institutionalization of factions has not only made financing more important. The same *zoku* politicians who draw support in their districts by providing services and access to their *koenkai* members also win support among younger politicians within their faction by providing the same kinds of access in Tokyo. Whether a member of the Construction *Zoku* helps a protege in the faction win budget support for a bridge in his district, or a member of the foreign affairs *zoku* takes a younger member on a junket to the United States, that member is building the bonds of *on* and *giri* that will win him support when it comes time for the faction rank and file to choose a new generation of leadership.¹²

All of these factors led to the growth of *zoku* in the areas of construction, transportation, industry, telecommunications, finance, education, labor, health and, of course, agriculture, in the 1970's. It took much longer, however, for a Defense *Zoku* to develop. By most accounts, it did not begin to play an influential role until the early 1980's. As one senior member of the

¹¹*Jiminto Seiken* gives the example of Kato Koichi raising far more money than his elders within the Miyazawa Faction in 1983 because he was Chairman of the Agriculture Division. See *Jiminto Seiken*, p. 19.

¹²One analyst suggests, for example, that the factions have become "*sogobyoin*", or "general hospitals" with the ability to help any member with any policy problem. See Iseri Hirofumi, *Habatsu no Saihensei* (Tokyo: Chukoshisho, 1988), pp. 51-80.

zoku related to the LDP's monthly *Liberal Democrat* in 1985: "When I was first elected in 1977, the Defense Division meetings would only draw four or five members, compared to 60 or 70 members at meetings today."¹³ Why the change? Before the trends that led to the growth of *zoku* in other areas could take effect in defense policy formation, the LDP had to settle its own ideological divisions over the question of remilitarization. The "Three-chan Fleet" created a powerful Agriculture *Zoku* by taming the extremists, reaching across factional lines, and finding the *otoshidokoro* – the point of compromise. Pro-defense Dietmembers eventually had to do the same thing to create a Defense *Zoku*.

Japan's Defense Debate

From the moment Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed the first Security Treaty with the United States in 1952, Japan has faced a dilemma between autonomy and dependence on the United States for its own defense. Yoshida was determined that Japan would not risk reawakening militarism by developing defense capabilities to help the United States win the Cold War. Yoshida's goal was for Japan to develop economic strength and rely on the United States to deter potential enemies. Yet to win the American security guarantee and financial assistance, Yoshida had to commit Japan to developing some level of self-defense capabilities.

Within the broad conservative camp behind the merger of Yoshida's Liberal Party and Hatoyama Ichiro's Democratic Party in 1955, there was no consensus on the level of autonomy in defense that Japan should develop as part of its alliance with the US, heavy industry, supported to some extent by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), wanted autonomous defense production as a buttress to its import substitution-oriented industrial policy. They were joined in the new LDP by right-wing hawks, many of whom had at one point been purged by the Occupation authorities. On the other side, Yoshida's mainstream supporters, with their ties to the MoF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), were opposed to

¹³Takemura Ken, "Jiminto Bukai no Kenkyu: Kokubobukai," *Gekkan Jiu Minshu*, October 1985, p. 60.

extensive autonomous defense production on fiscal and ideological grounds.¹⁴ The result was polarization within the conservative camp. The only point of consensus was that the alliance with the United States was to be a central component of Japan's defense policy formation – for the right wing the United States was a source of support for remilitarization, for the doves it was a break on autonomous remilitarization.

Within the PARC, the hawks took advantage of the vacuum resulting from this lack of consensus to dominate the Defense Division, where they rallied around a former Imperial Navy staff officer named Hori Takushiro and a member of the anti-mainstream Ono Faction from Tochigi Prefecture named Funada Naka. A third powerful figure was added to their ranks in the person of Genda Minoru in 1962. Genda's personal story is intriguing, and is representative in many ways of the early pro-defense members of the LDP. He had been Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's principal planning officer in the Pacific War and planned the Imperial Japanese Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor. As Chief-of-Staff of the post-war Air Self-Defense Forces, he reversed a standing decision to introduce the Grumman F-11 1F as the ASDF's next generation fighter in 1959, in favor of the Lockheed F-104. Lockheed had been pouring money into the pockets of leading anti-mainstream LDP politicians by way of kingpin Kodama Yoshio. A principal benefitter of Lockheed's generosity and opponent of the Grumman F-11 1F was Finance Minister Sato Eisaku. After he reversed the Grumman decision in favor of Lockheed, Genda retired from the ASDF and was elected to the Upper House national district as a member of Sato's Faction.¹⁵ It is no coincidence that all former JSDF officers who have run for the Upper House since have done so as members of the Sato Faction or its successors (Tanaka, Takeshita).

As a member of the Defense Division (and usually its chairman throughout the 1960's and 1970's), Genda intensified Funada and Hori's push for greater autonomy in weapons

¹⁴See Michael Green, *Kokusanka: FSX and Japan's Search for Autonomous Defense Production* (Cambridge: MIT-Japan Program, May 1990 Monograph) for details of the defense industry-LDP link.

¹⁵Other leaders of the Defense Division included Masuhara Kiichi, a conservative former Interior Ministry official in the Kishi Faction; and Kazuo Sasamoto, also of the Kishi Faction.

production and defense policy. The Defense Division strengthened its ties to the defense industry in 1961 with the establishment of the Autonomous Defense Production Consultation Committee (*Boeisobi Kokusanka Kondankai*). This committee was staffed by the LDP and the Defense Production Committee of Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations). The Consultative Committee also included representatives from MITI and the PARC's Industry Division, but the real enthusiasm came from industry and the hawks like Genda.¹⁶

Through the Consultative Committee, the LDP pro-defense hawks and the Defense Production Committee brought their combined weight to bear on the Defense Agency, pushing for increased defense R&D, the development of an indigenous early warning radar system, and the establishment of a rolling budget system to strengthen the defense industrial base. One early victory came in 1963, when the JDA acceded to the Consultative Committee's demands that production of the F-104 be extended by 30 jets. Industry's calls for increased R&D spending and the development of an early warning system were later met as well.

However, despite the momentum for a strong autonomous defense created within the Defense Division, the pro-defense hawks still did *not* constitute a powerful *zoku* of the sort that the "Three-chan fleet" was developing for agriculture. The ideological divisiveness of the defense debate limited the hawks membership to the anti-mainstream factions (in the 1960's: Kishi/Fukuda, Sato and Kono). And while Funada, Genda and company dominated the Defense Division of the PARC throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, they did not control the PARC's Investigative Commission on Security (*Anzen Hoshō Chosakai*), a new organization that Prime Minister Ikeda created in 1961 to contain the influence of the Defense Division.

Investigative commissions, it should be recalled, are chaired by former ministers, while divisions are chaired by former vice ministers. After the national battle over the 1960 Security Treaty with the United States almost toppled the LDP, Ikeda was eager to push a new theme for the party – *shotokubaizoron*, or "national income doubling." It was the kind of non-ideological

¹⁶"Boeiseisaniinkai Junenshi" (Tokyo: Keidanren, 1964), pp.265-281.

campaign pledge that no politician could oppose, but it necessitated a stifling of the overly vocal pro-defense members of the LDP. Ikeda appointed former Defense Agency Director-General Shuji Masutani as Chairman of the Investigative Commission on Security in 1961 for just that purpose. Masutani, like many Defense Agency Director-Generals, was a liberal appointed to that post in order to appease the left. He made the perfect candidate to supersede and contain the hawks of the Defense Division within the PARC.

The pro-defense hawks were not without their own heavy guns, however. Naka Funada headed his own faction in the 1960's and had served as Chairman of the PARC under Kishi in 1960. After seven years of Masutani's chairmanship, Funada seized control of the Investigative Commission himself in 1967, and used the position to reassert the Defense Division's agenda. Within the PARC, the defense policy making pendulum swung back to the right. The defense hawks goal of greater autonomous defense was given a particular boost by the appearance of US withdrawal created by the Nixon Doctrine and the anticipated return to Japan of Okinawa. Reflecting this change in international politics and perception, Funada drafted a bill in the PARC in 1969 that called for: 1) increasing the quality of Self-Defense Force personnel; 2) increasing autonomous defense production and defense exports; 3) introducing an early warning radar system for sea defense; and 4) increasing defense personnel to one million.¹⁷

The defense hawks received an unexpected boost in 1970 when Yasuhiro Nakasone became Defense Agency Director-General. Nakasone had never been active in the Defense Division, but as Director-General he prepared a defense plan (the JDA's Fourth Defense Plan) that would have doubled spending on weapons, mandated autonomous production whenever possible, and put, in Nakasone's words "autonomous defense in front and the alliance in the rear." Genda, Funada, Masuhara and the rest of the pro-defense LDP members were surprised by Nakasone's audacity, but enthusiastically threw their support behind him.

¹⁷Otake Hideo, *Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji* (Tokyo: Sannichi Shoten, 1983), p. 32.

Ultimately, however, the same ideological fault lines that prevented the pro-defense hawks from extending support throughout the LDP, also doomed Nakasone's initiative. His plan was assaulted relentlessly from the more liberal Miki and Ohira (formerly Ikeda) Factions and from Japan's Asian neighbors, and was cut-back when Nakasone moved out of the Director-General's post in 1971. Tanaka's elevation to Prime Minister in 1972 gave the hawks some hope for renewed support for their agenda of autonomous defense, but this ultimate of anti-mainstream leaders proved far less concerned with ideology as Prime Minister than pro defense-members of his faction like Genda. Tanaka's first goal in foreign policy was to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese were particularly incensed by Nakasone's defense plan, and to appease them and settle the internal LDP fight over defense, Tanaka announced that he would support only "peacetime defense capabilities" (*heiwaji no boeiriyoku*).

Tanaka's articulation of the "peacetime defense capabilities" concept led to a much-reduced Fourth Defense Plan and opened the way for Prime Minister Miki Takeo to put a permanent liberal stamp on defense planning in 1976 with the National Defense Plan Outline (NDPO). The NDPO reasserted the primacy of the alliance with the United States as the benchmark for all future defense planning. Japan only required the capability to deter a "small-scale limited invasion", according to the NDPO, and to guarantee that the hawks would not attempt another plan like Nakasone's, Miki's cabinet approved a spending cap for defense of 1% of GNP to complement the NDPO. After briefly siezing all the defense posts in the PARC and the government, the hawks were being put back in their cage.

The Birth of a True Defense Zoku

The NDPO and the 1% limit represented a body blow to the old defense hawks – in fact, many were voted out of office at the height of the debate of the early 1970's.¹⁸ At the same time, however, the NDPO and the 1% limit created conditions that were crucial to the

¹⁸Ibid., p. 97.

emergence of a true defense *zoku* of the type associated with agriculture and construction; *zoku* with the ability to forge consensus and advance an agenda within the party.

The first effect of the NDPO and the 1% limit was on the actual environment of Japan's defense debate. The central figure in bringing about this change was the pragmatic Sakata Michita (LDP/non-faction). As JDA Director-General and later as Chairman of the Investigative Commission on Security (under Fukuda from 1976 to 1978), Sakata took deliberate steps to assure that defense issues were not discussed by defense hawks and experts alone.¹⁹ To broaden the participation in defense planning, Sakata established a "Defense Thinking Group" (*Boei o Kangaerukai*) that included prominent academics and politicians from outside of the group that had traditionally dominated the PARC Defense Division. In 1980, the pattern towards openness in the defense debate was continued when Prime Minister Ohira established a broad-based commission to explore "comprehensive security," a concept that included issues beyond the narrow military focus of the Defense Division to include foreign aid, food security and disaster relief – issues that had appeal across ideological lines.

Ideological divisions were also bridged by the renewed emphasis on alliance with the United States, one of the issues that the founders of the LDP had used to build a conservative coalition in 1955. A year after the NDPO's rejection of autonomous defense policy, Japan and the United States reached an agreement on guidelines for defense cooperation (1977) that opened an unprecedented level of joint operations, planning and technology exchange.

Meanwhile, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia all combined to convince LDP Dietmembers of all ideological hues that Japan had to be concerned with international security issues. Dietmembers from the Miki and Ohira Factions who had previously been pro-foreign policy but anti-defense began to cross the lines and look at "comprehensive security issues" (reflecting also the Foreign Ministry's more conservative views on defense). Closer security cooperation with the United

¹⁹Ibid., p. 124.

States meant that "internationalists" who had worked for close economic ties with the United States could no longer afford to ignore defense issues, particularly given the growing calls for burden-sharing in the US Congress. In short, the definition of the national security debate was broadened by the NDPO and with it the constituency for increased defense spending.

The second effect of the introduction of the NDPO and the 1% limit was to create an arena for active Defense *Zoku* intervention in the budget process. Prior to the NDPO, defense planning had been based on five-year plans that were reviewed after three years of implementation. The targets and spending limits for these five year plans were agreed upon between MoF and JDA up front, leaving little room for the PARC Defense Division to lobby on an annual basis. Ironically, the 1% limit meant that long-term defense spending had to be reviewed every year, however. The pro-defense Dietmen, furious at having been circumvented in the debate leading to the NDPO, now focused their energies on these annual budget debates, and eventually on breaking the 1% limit. The annual budget battles from 1976 to 1985 gave the politicians a stage on which to play their policy roles. This changed somewhat in 1986, when a new five-year mid-term defense plan was introduced, but by then the Defense *Zoku* had been empowered and motivated by a range of policy issues that will be explored later.

Kaban, Kanban and Jiban

With the ideological divisiveness of defense diluted by the NDPO, and an arena for LDP intervention in the budget process created by the 1% limit, Dietmembers from all factions began looking seriously at playing a role in the new Defense *Zoku* in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Traditionally, defense had very little to offer politicians in the three areas that interest them most: *kanban* (literally "signboard"– ie. visibility); *kaban* (literally "briefcase"– ie. money); or *jiban* (literally "constituency"). This began to change after the NDPO, and politicians began entering the defense committees of the PARC for many of the same reasons they had previously entered those of agriculture or construction.

In terms of *kanban*, or visibility, the internationalization of defense issues and the hesitancy of the JDA to tackle difficult ideological problems created opportunities for Dietmembers to assert their policymaking skills in new ways. Defense *Zoku* members played an active role in bringing Japan into international security policy fora that the JDA was politically unwilling or unable to join. Examples include: the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians' Committee, formed in 1979 by Sakata to discuss security issues with Korea; the North East Asia Parliamentarians' League for Security (US-Japan-Korea-Taiwan), formed in 1980 by former Defense Agency Director-Generals Kanemaru Shin and Mihara Asao; and the Dietmembers League for Comprehensive Security, formed in 1982 by Mihara and Shiina Motoo to represent Japan in the North Atlantic Assembly. These Dietmembers' groups have usually received the full backing of the MoFA and the JDA for their activities, but they have not been able to advance Japan's position in areas where the ministries are constrained by public opinion or constitutional limitations (on collective security, for example) from acting on their own.

The Defense *Zoku*'s growing ties to the US defense establishment in turn increased their leverage on domestic defense politics in Japan. A powerful example of this new leverage came in 1980, when members of the Defense *Zoku* briefed Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko before his first trip to Washington. In Washington, the Prime Minister stated that Japan would be willing to defend its own sealanes up to 1000 miles from Japanese territory. Washington held Japan to Ohira's commitment. This position had never been agreed upon within the Japanese government, but was a policy advocated by the Defense *Zoku* in the PARC since the mid-1970's. A number of analysts have suggested that the Defense *Zoku* used their close ties to the United States to convince Suzuki to state a position on defense well beyond that recommended by the JDA or MoF.²⁰ The early pro-defense hawks would never have had this sort of influence on a mainstream Prime Minister.

The Defense *Zoku* also utilized its ties to the United States to push for increases in defense spending in the annual budget negotiations each December. Under Mihara's leadership

²⁰Chuma Kiyofuku, *Saigunbi no Seijigaku* (Tokyo: Chishikisha, 1985), pp. 108-120.

of the Investigative Commission on Security in 1982, for example, the *zoku* advertised the target defense spending goals of the JDA to Washington in the summer and fall, and then lobbied MoF for the same increases in the winter, arguing that to not meet the original target would create a problem in US-Japan relations.²¹

Another example of US ties enhancing the *zoku* members' policy influence came when the US Congress threatened to put sanctions on Japan for violations of COCOM in 1987 (the Toshiba Machine Tool Company had sold sensitive technology to the Soviets, enabling them to increase production of silent propellers). In response to US pressure, the LDP leadership called on the Defense *Zoku*'s Shiina to develop a program to strengthen Japanese COCOM adherence. MoFA, MITI and the JDA held diametrically opposed positions, but through Shiina's Investigative Committee on Improper Technology Flows, the Defense *Zoku* forced the three ministries to reach a consensus. As a result, Japan now has one of the tightest COCOM regimes in the world. Each of these successful policy conclusions advanced the careers of politicians like Mihara and Shiina, encouraging younger, ambitious Dietmembers to join the ranks of the *zoku*.

In terms of *kaban* (briefcase, ie. money), the growth of defense spending in the 1980's also made the Defense *Zoku* more attractive to politicians, at least in the initial stages. Genda's successors who have left the senior ranks of the Self-Defense Forces to run for a seat in the Upper House of the Diet have often received financial support from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and other defense contractors. In fact, many of these Dietmembers have worked as advisors or consultants for defense firms while preparing their campaigns. Other members of the *zoku* have attempted to tap into defense contracting money by creating the 1982 League for the Enhancement of Autonomous Production (*Boeisobi Kokusanka Sokushin Giin Renmei*).

Ultimately, however, the reality of the new Defense *Zoku*'s capabilities for political financing has fallen short of many Dietmembers' expectations. After the Lockheed scandals of

²¹"'82 Boeiyoosan no Henseikattei," *Asahi Shimbun* (A front page series lasting from February 16, 1982 through March 26, 1982).

the 1960's and 1970's, the close link between the Keidanren's Defense Production Committee and the LDP PARC was severed (specifically, the Consultative Committee was disbanded) and the LDP's Defense Division was discouraged from taking positions on specific procurement decisions. In part, the Defense *Zoku*'s loss of influence on specific procurement decisions was the price of the excessive intervention of early defense hawks like Genda. However, it was also the price of achieving a broad enough consensus to push for an increase in the *overall* defense budget in the 1980's. It should not have been a surprise to *zoku* members, therefore, when the League for the Enhancement of Autonomous Production fell into dormancy in the mid 1980's. By then, the Defense *Zoku*'s ranks were too broad for the group to be an effective lobbying agent for industries' goal of autonomous production. This is not to say, however, that leadership in the Defense *Zoku* brought no financial reward; the ability of the newly internationalized *zoku* to solve bilateral problems such as COCOM or defense technology cooperation issues has brought its members financial support from a broad range of companies, beyond just the defense industry.

Finally, mention should be made of *jiban*, or the electoral appeal of membership in the Defense *Zoku*. JSDF personnel and their families represent a body of over 500,000 "defense votes" throughout Japan. This number has usually been sufficient to keep two former JSDF officers elected to the Upper House of the Diet from the national constituency (Genda's successors). These two politicians have always been vocal advocates for a strong defense and for better pay, pensions and living conditions for their constituents – an important role since active uniformed personnel are rarely given an opportunity to appear in the Diet. Moreover, a growing portion of the defense budget is going towards "base countermeasures," a euphemism for the anti-noise pollution measures, service contracts and recreational facilities available for communities around USFJ and JSDF bases. In 1991 this budget amounted to almost half a trillion yen. Dietmembers whose districts contain bases ignore this budget at their own peril. Dietmembers have also found that civic and economic organizations, in particular the Junior Chamber of Commerce, have developed strong pro-defense positions since the NDPO. These

organizations have provided motivated, well-organized supporters for Dietmembers who focus on defense.²²

Who are the Defense Zoku?

Clearly then, the possible motives for participating in defense policymaking in the LDP increased after the NDPO eliminated much of the ideological divisiveness associated with defense. This is reflected in Mihara's comment in 1986 that attendance of PARC Defense Division meetings increased from "six or seven in 1977 to sixty or seventy in 1985" and the fact that the Dietmembers League for Defense (*Kokubogiin Renmei*) has had more than 140 members on its rolls since 1980.

However, as the case of the agriculture *zoku* has demonstrated, numbers of politicians reflect only the support for a certain policy area. In order to control policy formation, there must be a smaller steering group of politicians at the center. This steering group must be small enough to achieve consensus, but large enough to include membership from each faction. Why? Because the appointment of division, committee and commission chairmen in the PARC is balanced along factional lines and to control policy formation, the *zoku* must have control of (or at least influence on) the appointment of all chairmen in its policy area.

There are no established criteria for membership in *zoku*. Tokyo University Professor Seisaburo Sato suggests that to be a core *zoku* member a Dietmember must be: a former parliamentary vice-minister; a fourth-term Lower House member or higher (second term for the Upper House); and a regular attendee of all relevant PARC meetings. In the case of the Defense *Zoku*, this definition is close, but not complete. *All* members of the Defense *Zoku* are fourth term or higher; *most* members are former parliamentary vice ministers; and *some* members

²²Otake, pp. 318-330. One active member of the Defense Division told me that he built his first *koenkai* entirely around pro-defense members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce in his district.

attend all the meetings. Many do not attend the meetings, however, because much of the agenda is decided upon by the steering group beforehand.

The central steering group is therefore the key to understanding the *zoku*. For all intents and purposes it may be considered the *zoku*, because that is where most decision-making actually takes place.

The following tables (Tables 1 and 2) outline the defense steering group as it stood in 1988. The group had 15 members (larger than it would be the year before or after, since eight to ten is a more manageable number). Its members represented all factions, and were brought together to determine how certain bills or budgets would be advanced through the party. Mid-level JDA and MoFA officials, usually *kacho* (Division Directors), consulted with the steering group regularly. The members' profiles give an indication of the breadth and depth that a *zoku* required to manage defense policy formation in the PARC.²³

The membership of the 1988 steering group (known to its members as the *Boei Sewaiinkai*) demonstrates the ideological and structural reach pro-defense Dietmembers required to create a real *zoku*. Former MoF officials gave the *zoku* leverage during budget negotiations. The Deputy Chairman of the PARC gave the *zoku* input into the assignment of defense-related posts in the party. Former JDA Director-Generals from the various factions gave the *zoku* further control of personnel assignments in the party (covering the changes as the allotment of posts move from one faction to the next).

However, the diversity represented in the membership of the 1988 steering group also reveals the ideological fault lines that have prevented the newly-formed *zoku* from pushing for all of its original agenda of the 1960's and 1970's. To the extent that the *zoku* has broadened

²³Membership in the 1988 *Sewaiinkai* was confirmed for me by separate staffers from the JDA and the PARC who are responsible for distributing invitations to the meetings, in addition to certain members of the *sewaiinkai* itself. Membership in the steering group of any *zoku* is exclusive, and lists are rarely made public by the Party. I had to promise to embargo this particular list for several years before publishing as a part of my research.

Table 1

The PARC Defense Policy Steering Group: 1988

Member	Faction	District	Terms	Comments
Fujinami Takao	Nakasone	Mie 2	9	Chairman, Investigative Commission on Security No Previous Defense Portfolio
Horinouchi Hisao	Nakasone	Miyazaki 2	5	Chairman, Defense Division Previously Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense (Pre-War Naval Academy)
Omura Joji	Takeshita	Okayama 1	8	Chairman, Special Committee on Military Bases Former JDA Director-General
Shiina Motoo	Unaffiliated	Iwate 2	4	PARC Deputy Chairman in Charge of Defense and Foreign Affairs
Arima Motoharu	Tanaka (Nikkaido Group)	Kagoshima 2	6	Director, Investigative Commission on Security Former Parliamentary Vice Minister for Defense (Pre-War Naval Academy)
Horie Masao	Takeshita	Upper House Nar ¹	2	Chairman, Subcommittee on JDSDF Pensions Problems Former Chief of Staff, GSDF
Ishikawa Yozo	Miyazawa	Tokyo 11	5	Director, Special Committee on Military Bases (Major base in his district)
Tsushima Yuji	Miyazawa	Aomori 1	6	Former MoF Official and Diplomat (Fulbright Scholar)
Miyashita Sohei	Abe	Nagano 3	4	Former MoF Official Aid to Shigeru Hori (First Chairman, Defense Division)
Yamazaki Taku	Nakasone	Fukuoka 1	6	Director, Investigative Commission on Security Former Parliamentary Vice Minister for Defense
Minowa Noboru	Takeshita	Hokkaido 1	8	Former Parliamentary Vice Minister for Defense

Table 2

The PARC Defense Policy Steering Group: 1988 (continued)
(Former JDA Director-Generals Without Current Defense Portfolios
Who Are Included in Steering Group Meetings)

Member	Faction	District	Terms	Comments
Mihara Asao	Unaffiliated (Retired)	Fukuoka 2	7	Instrumental in mobilizing the new defense <i>zoku</i> in the 1980's and is still a central figure though retired.
Tanikawa Kazuo	Komoto	Hiroshima 2	8	LDP Deputy Secretary General
Kato Koichi	Miyazawa	Yamagata 6	6	Acting Chairman, PARC Former Diplomat
Kurihara Yuko	Miyazawa	Shizuoka 2	6(UH) 2(LH)	
Hosoda Kichizo	Abe	Shimane	10	

its membership to the more liberal mainstream Komoto and Miyazawa Factions, it has developed an internationalist agenda often at odds with the original "defense autonomy" goals of the past. Moderation has been the price of increased influence.

The End of Ideology: Busting 1% and Catching Spies

The effect of the Defense *Zoku*'s stretch across ideological and factional lines on its agenda is reflected in the activities of two of the PARC's defense subcommittees. The Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities and the Subcommittee on Anti-Spy Legislation:

- **The Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities**
(Boeiryoku ni kansuru Shoiinkai)

The Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities was established in the early 1980's to review the JDA's proposals for the first five year defense plan since the NDPO was introduced. When the Subcommittee released its first report in 1984, however, it soon became apparent, that the *zoku* had greater ambitions than simply overseeing the preparation of the JDA's plan. As the 1984 report indicated, the *zoku* leadership intended to use the Subcommittee as a vehicle for attacking the NDPO itself, as well as the 1% limit it spawned.

The *zoku* had a powerful ally in this effort in the person of Prime Minister Nakasone. Nakasone followed the recommendations of the Subcommittee, and in 1985 began a high-profile attack on the 1% limit, which he viewed as a barrier to Japan's acceptance of full and equal partnership with the United States. High profile attacks on defense issues tend to fail in Japan, however, and, the leadership of the LDP – with the full concurrence of the Defense *zoku* leadership – decided that the focus of the attack on 1% should be moved outside the LDP. Accordingly, Nakasone established a non-partisan Peace Research Commission under Kyoto University professor Kosaka Masataka to make recommendations on the 1% problem. There was some risk in this move for the Defense *Zoku*, since independent-minded academics were not entirely predictable. But the *zoku* worked closely with the Kosaka Commission and used the

Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities as a headquarters for building support within the Party for breaking the 1% limit.

The Kosaka Commission eventually recommended that the government break the 1% limit but maintain the NDPO as the main "break" on remilitarization. Three days after the Kosaka Commission's recommendations were released, the PARC's Subcommittee on Defense Capabilities released its own recommendations, which went further to recommend abolishing the 1% limit *and* the NDPO. According to PARC staffers, the timing of the two reports' release was a deliberate effort to deflect negative reaction from the Opposition and the press.

In the end, the Nakasone Administration followed the lead of the Kosaka Commission, and established a five-year Mid-Term Defense Build-Up Plan based on the NDPO. The plan itself would act as a "break," according to the JDA, and the incremental increases of the plan increased spending to 1.004% of GNP in 1986.²⁴ For the Defense *Zoku*, this result was expected, since support in the Party for breaking the NDPO was proving much more difficult to achieve than support for breaking the 1% limit.

The Defense *Zoku*'s success in breaking the 1% limit and failure to abolish the NDPO had much to do with its new character and merits attention. Achieving the defense capabilities outlined in the NDPO had been an important symbol of Japan's commitment to the US-Japan Alliance. Internationalists in the *zoku* were motivated to join the battle against 1% by their desire to ameliorate US-Japan friction and demonstrate Japan's willingness to shoulder international responsibilities. The NDPO, on the other hand, was not considered a major obstacle to smooth defense relations with the United States. In fact, abolishing the NDPO would have helped Japanese defense producers and established greater autonomy for Japan, but this was not a goal that the internationalists were willing to commit their political resources.

²⁴For a short summary of the breakin of the 1% limit in English, see: *The United States and Japan in 1988: A Time of Transition* (Washington, D.C.: The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for Asian Studies, SAIS, 1988), pp. 25-28.

- **The Subcommittee on Anti-Spy Legislation**
(*Supai Boshi Koan ni kan suru Shoiinkai*)

The Subcommittee on Anti-Spy Legislation further demonstrates the marginalization of ideologically-charged issues within the Defense *Zoku* as it internationalized and entered the mainstream in the 1980's. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the pro-defense members of the LDP pushed an agenda to create a complete national security apparatus in Japan. Their legislative menu included measures for emergency preparedness, civil defense, and the institution of martial law in times of crisis. Given Japan's historical experience with internal repression in the name of national security, however, most of these measures were handily defeated by the press before they even became legislation. The outlook changed when a broad-based defense *zoku* emerged in the 1980's, though, and the old right wing attempted to ride the wave of support for defense within the LDP to push through one part of its legislative agenda: an anti-espionage law.

Strictly speaking, espionage in Japan is not illegal, and when a former JDA official passed security secrets to the Soviet Union in 1980 and received only a one-year sentence under the Civil Service Law, the right wing of the LDP was incensed. The new Defense *Zoku* established a PARC subcommittee and introduced legislation to the PARC Deliberative Commission within the year of the espionage case. The legislation was rejected as too broad, however, and the subcommittee went back to work to narrow the definition of espionage, working meanwhile on building a grass roots support network out of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and other conservative national organizations.²⁵

As with its attempts to abolish the NDPO, however, the Defense *Zoku* was again working in isolation. The US Government did not express a strong position on the Miyayama Spy Incident and the JDA was quietly opposed to the anti-espionage legislation, fearful that such a heated ideological controversy would interfere with efforts to break the 1% limit on defense

²⁵Inoguchi, pp. 230-232.

spending. As a result, while LDP leaders have promised from time to time to introduce the anti-spy bill into the Diet, they have kept the legislation circulating within the LDP since the early 1980's. The senior members of the Defense *Zoku* from the more liberal Miyazawa and Komoto Factions, meanwhile, have quietly declined from lending their support to the legislation.

The examples of these two subcommittees demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Defense *Zoku*'s movement to the center in the 1980's. On the one hand, the *zoku* successfully gained control of defense policy formation within the LDP for the first time in the party's history. The successful breaking of the 1% limit was a direct result. Yet when the *zoku*'s actions did not complement the agenda of either the US-Japan alliance *or* the JDA (as was the case with anti-spy legislation and the NDPO), the result was isolation within the LDP. The images associated with the *zoku* as a "steering" group may be appropriate therefore. Like a tugboat, the *zoku* controls the passage of defense policy into the LDP's harbors, but on stormy political seas a tugboat has very little control at all.

The Emergence of a Post-Cold War Defense Zoku

One important element in the emergence of the Defense *Zoku* in the 1980's was the intensification of US-Soviet confrontation. With the relaxation of East-West tensions in the late 1980's and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Defense *Zoku* lost a great deal of its momentum within the LDP. However, the trend towards expanding the security debate from autonomous defense to alliance and then to comprehensive security has continued, and a new organization has emerged from the dormant shell of the original Defense *Zoku*. This new group is now addressing Japan's security policy in its broadest possible framework.

The first blow to the Defense *Zoku* at the end of the Cold War was the FSX episode. After the experiences of the Lockheed Scandal, the LDP was extremely careful to prevent the Defense Division from actively intervening in the FSX decision. The members of the *zoku* also avoided taking action on FSX because the issue highlighted the ideological fault lines that still

existed within the *zoku* between the internationalists with close ties to the Bush Administration and the nationalists with close ties to the defense industry. Consensus was not possible on FSX, and a fight over the issue of indigenous development versus codevelopment with the United States would have undermined the *zoku*'s ability to act on other issues.²⁶

The *zoku* instead focused its energies on working with the JDA to develop the next Mid-Term Defense Plan, scheduled to begin in 1991. Members were still interested in doing away with the NDPO, or at least the order of battle guidelines (*beppyō*) which had been attached as an appendix to the NDPO. But then the *zoku* was hit with a second blow in the 1989 Recruit Scandal and the February 1990 Lower House elections. The Recruit Scandal knocked Fujinami Takao, Chairman of the Investigative Commission on Security, out of the LDP. Then in the national elections that followed, five of the principal members of the steering group were defeated or retired from office (Shiina, Omura, Arima, Horinouchi and Minowa).

The defeat of so many Defense *Zoku* members was not the result of a public backlash against defense spending at the end of the Cold War. Each member had his own electoral weakness that were coincidental to, but not the result of, membership in the Defense *Zoku* (that is to say; had they been members of the Agriculture *Zoku*, they would have weathered the Recruit storm a little better). However, within the LDP, many took the devastation of the pro-defense politicians in the 1990 election as a signal that the *kaban*, *kanban* and *jiban* advantages of defense policy were as dead as the high-growth defense budgets of the 1980's. Throughout the LDP a complacency grew on security issues and the Defense committees of the PARC grew dormant. Until, that is, the Gulf War exploded in the LDP's face.

Few politicians in Japan were prepared for the world's condemnation of Japanese inactivity during the conflict with Saddam Hussein. Many of the former *zoku* members who had been defeated in 1990 argued for a more proactive Japanese role in the Gulf, but were not in

²⁵It is worth noting that Ishihara Shintaro, one of the most vocal opponents of FSX and an advocate of greater Japanese autonomy was *not* a member of the Defense *Zoku*'s *Sewaniinkai*.

a position to facilitate policy formation within the party. Prime Minister Kaifu's strong anti-JDA feelings further isolated those in the party who wanted action. When the new members of the Defense *Zoku* visited Washington in September of 1990, they were shocked by the US Government's criticism of Japanese inaction. The *zoku* members relayed the American concern to the Prime Minister, but they were no longer equipped to initiate proactive policy measures of their own.²⁷

Instead it was left to MoFA, in particular the Treaties Bureau, to draft the first of Japan's Peace Keeping Operations bills, which Prime Minister Kaifu then introduced to the Diet in October of 1990. The bill was doomed to fail, largely because it could not gain support from all of the factions of the LDP. The party itself then prepared a second bill together with MoFA and the JDA that further curtailed the role of the JSDF, but this bill stalled when the opposition Democratic Socialist Party withheld support, insisting on Diet approval for the dispatch of all Japanese forces on UN peacekeeping operations. The PARC Defense Division played only a peripheral role in the second bill, arguing for a broader role for the JSDF.

To many in the LDP, it has since become clear that Japan was attempting to define its security responsibilities to the international system in short-sighted and reactive ways during the Gulf Crisis. Security issues did not die with the Cold War and a number of leaders in the LDP realized that a new Defense *Zoku* was required – one which could build consensus behind the scenes and bridge the ideological fissures that were beginning to open within the party over the PKO issue.

The Ozawa Commission

The structure for that *zoku* was formed in June of 1991 when the party established the Special Research Commission on Japan's Role in International Society (*Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru*

²⁷Asahi Shimbun Gulf Crisis Reporting Team, *Wangan Senso to Niho* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991), pp. 104-112.

Nihon no Yakuwari ni kan suru Tokubetsu Chosakai). As Commission Chairman, the party appointed former LDP Director-General Ichiro Ozawa.

Newspaper accounts and interviews with PARC staff indicate that the Ozawa Commission has co-opted the role of the Defense *Zoku*. Although, the Ozawa Commission is outside of the usual PARC structure (it is a *sosai chokuzoku* – LDP Presidentially appointed commission), it is able to generate legislation. Using this unique platform, Ozawa has not only absorbed the Defense *Zoku*, but by many accounts the mission of the Investigative Commission on Foreign Affairs (*Gaiko Chosakai*) and the long dormant Investigative Commission on Constitutional Affairs (*Kempo Chosakai*) (which the LDP once created to prepare a new Constitution).

The Ozawa Commission's broad agenda, with its international emphasis and cross-ministerial focus, is in many ways the culmination of Sakata's effort over a decade ago to widen the Defense *Zoku's* ideological net. In 1991-92, the Commission has five principal areas of concern:

- 1) the question of collective security;
- 2) the issue of arms control and weapons export control;
- 3) Japan's position on nuclear weapons (in particular the policy that no nuclear weapons may be brought into Japan);
- 4) international security (the role of the UN; Asian regional security arrangements);
- 5) the flexibility of the US-Japan Security Treaty.²⁸

Interestingly, the Commission is ignoring the issue of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (the non-right of belligerency clause), which has been the stumbling block for all previous Diet debates about defense policy and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Instead, Ozawa has used the preamble of the Japanese Constitution as the baseline for developing

²⁸"Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari ni kan suru Tokubetsu Chosakai:Kento Komoku (Special Research Commission on Japan's Role in International Society: Topics of Investigation," LDP Planning Document, January 1992.

policies that span defense foreign affairs. In particular, the Ozawa Commission is focusing on the second paragraph of the preamble of the Constitution, which states:

We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth...

On February 21, 1992 the Ozawa Commission released the first draft of its proposals to the press. The Commission called for "an international security policy" for Japan and called for:

- a) active Japanese participation in international arms reductions through the mechanism of export control;
- b) Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations;
- c) strengthen the UN's ability to deal with international problems;
- d) Japanese cooperation in the economic development of the Asian-Pacific region;
- e) and the maintenance of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The Commission also announced its findings that JSDF participation in peacekeeping operations would be constitutional. The Commission is expected to at least influence the current PKO bill of the LDP, and probably prepare legislation of its own by the summer of 1992. Future areas of examination for the Commission are said to include topics such as the control of natural resources and the role of ODA.

The Ozawa Commission must force political scientists to rethink their definition of *zoku*. Like other *zoku*, the Ozawa Commission's members are primarily former ministers or vice ministers of defense or foreign affairs (See Table 3). They represent all factions and seem able to regulate the flow of relevant legislation through the party. And like *zoku* the Commission acts as an umbrella for bureaucracies divided over a certain policy issue; in this case the JDA and MoFA. But unlike other *zoku*, the members of the Ozawa Commission do not lobby for a particular ministry's budget, nor do they have complete control over the appointment of the various defense or foreign affairs committee chairmen.

Table 3
The Special Commission on Japan's Role in International Society (Ozawa Commission)
(Kokusaishakai ni okeru Nihon no Yakuwari ni kan suru Tokubetsu Iinkai)
Fall 1992

Member	Faction	Terms	Comments
Ozawa Ichiro	Takeshita	8	Chairman
Kakizawa Koji	Watanabe	4	PARC Defense Division Chairman
Nakajima Gentaro	Mitsuzuka	7	PARC Vice Chairman for Foreign Affairs and Defense
Funada Hajime	Takeshita	7	Son of Naka Funada, Chairman of the PARC Foreign Affairs Division
Murakami Masukuni	Takeshita	2	Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense
Kato Koichi	Miyazawa	7	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Former JDA Director-General
Nakamura Kishiro	Takeshita	6	
Yamazaki Taku	Watanabe	7	Former JDA Director-General
Moriyama Kayumi	Komoto	2 (UH)	Former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Former Environmental Agency Chief
Kajino Michihiko	Mitsuzuka	6	
Hatoyama Kunio	Takeshita	5	
Harada Yozo	Miyazawa	6	PARC Vice Chairman
Imazu Hiroshi	Komoto	1	
Machimura Nobutaka	Mitsuzuka	3	
Okano Yutaka	Takeshita	2 (UH)	
Ota Seichi	Miyazawa	4	
Murai Jin	Takeshita	2	Former Director, JDA Procurement Bureau
Maejima Eizaburo	Watanabe	3 (UH)	Upper House National Representative
Nakagawa Shoichi	Mitsuzuka	3	
Nakaya Gen	Miyazawa	1	Former GSDF Officer

Note: Table 3 represents the full membership list of the Ozawa Commission, not a steering committee. Thus first- to fourth-term members are also included.

As in most structures of the LDP, however, the bottom line is personality. Ozawa is the principal lieutenant in the Takeshita Faction, and that faction holds the Miyazawa Administration in place. The peculiarities of the Commission are a reflection of Ozawa's high position within the party. Should Ozawa move to another major party post, or lose his influence within the party, it is not clear whether his commission would relocate its mission to the defense, foreign affairs and other committees in the PARC, or whether it would survive in its current form. All that can be said is that, while the *zoku* structures described in this essay are useful constructs for understanding LDP security policymaking, the metamorphosis in defense policy formation represented by the Ozawa Commission suggests that observers of Japan must retain some flexibility in their analysis.

Conclusions and Implications for US-Japan Relations

American observers should be reassured by the tendency of *zoku* to become more moderate as they mature. The cartelization of decision-making by the *zoku* acts as a fire-break against sudden changes in leadership at the top of the LDP or rebellions by Young Turks at the bottom. Similarly, the cross-factional balance of the *zoku* prevents demagogues from taking control of the steering groups behind the scenes. In addition, the *zoku* are also useful points of contact for moving intransigent bureaucracies or buttressing bureaucracies that are more cooperative with US policy.

There are problems with the *zoku* that must also be considered, however. The lack of institutionalization and transparency in decision-making in the LDP can only create mistrust. If the Ozawa Commission initiates a more assertive security role for Japan, other nations in the Pacific Rim may tend to view the process that led to those policies with suspicion, instead of taking the policies on their own merits or demerits. The flow of campaign funds to *zoku* leaders from the private sector will create even greater suspicion. The *zoku* are equipped to steer policies through the LDP, but they still lack the ability to publicly articulate the reasons for

policy. That requires leadership in the Prime Minister's office, something that few political observers expect from Japan any time soon.

For the interim then, it is vital that US policymakers and academics be well connected with the activities of policymaking groups such as the Defense *Zoku* and familiar with their leadership. However, the *zoku* should not preoccupy our attention to the exclusion of other institutional actors such as the bureaucracy or the Prime Minister's office. In the end, Dietmembers spend very little time with policy making. Through the *zoku* they have come to contribute substantively to the conceptualization of the framework for policy at the working level, and they have come to play a major role in steering policy and lobbying for the budgets required to implement policy. The "high-party, low-government" theory is largely accurate. But in the end, *zoku* remain only one piece – although, perhaps the best hidden piece – of Japan's policy-making process.