

FROM BAD TO GOOD GOVERNMENT:
THE CASE OF THREE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CEARÁ, BRAZIL

by

Sandra Beatriz Zarur

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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Signature of Author _____

Department of Urban Studies and Planning

May 20, 1993

Certified by _____

Professor Judith Tandler

Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by _____

Professor Ralph Gakenheimer

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ABSTRACT

The Brazilian Northeast has striking problems such as illiteracy and infant mortality. This research shows how three successful local governments were able to cope with those problems within their scarce resources. Although Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte set health and education as their priorities, they followed different paths to achieve common goals.

The findings showed that a long struggle for emancipation taught inhabitants to stay mobilized around demands. This inflicted steady pressure on mayors for tangible and quick administrative results. The government used simple and imaginative ways to improve public sector performance: 1) clear criteria to hire public employees such as public contests; 2) investments on career and salaries by intensive training efforts, improved working conditions, and payment of above average wages; 3) information evenly distributed among civil servants and between population and government; 4) introduction of participatory mechanism in the administration such as municipal councils resulting in decentralization of decision power; 5) use of institutional framework to explore untapped sources of municipal revenue; and 6) municipalization of health and education services.

Thus, in less than five years these local governments drastically reduced illiteracy, obtaining 100% of school enrollment and 50% reduction of school dropout rates by adopting new educational methods and techniques, providing free transportation to school, adapting the school calendar to the communities' needs, and improving teachers' qualifications. They reduced the infant mortality rate and the incidence of work-related diseases by assuring universal coverage of medical assistance. Consequently, the three municípios gained the necessary legitimacy to push further reforms.

Although these three cases showed contrasting ways of decentralizing decision power locally, and different levels of participatory mechanisms included in their public management, all three improved significantly education and health, setting patterns that are already being emulated by other municípios in Ceará and Brazil.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Judith Tandler
Title: Professor of Political Economy

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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

- ACICA - Cultural Association of Icapuí,
(Associação Cultural de Icapuí, founded in 1980).
- AEUA - Aracatí Students Association,
(Associação de Estudantes de Aracatí).
- ARISA and Mar d'Espanha - Enterprises from the state of São Paulo.
- APRECE - Mayors' Association of the State of Ceará
(Associação de Prefeitos do Estado do Ceará).
- ATMSC - Municipal Technical Advisers,
(Assessoria Técnica Municipal S/C Limitada).
- BNH - National Housing Bank
(Banco Nacional da Habitação).
- CIC - Industrial Center of Ceará
(Centro Industrial do Ceará).
- CIDADANIA - Citizenship Planning Advisers for Public Policy,
(Planejamento e Assessoria em Políticas Públicas S/C Ltda.).
- COPAM - J. Macedo Enterprises.
- CPO-D - Ratio of cavities, lost, and treated teeth,
(Cariados, Perdidos, Obturados - Dentes)
- EDUCAR - Educational Foundation
(Fundação EDUCAR).
- FAE - Students' Assistance Foundation
(Fundação de Assistência ao Estudante).
- FCBIA - Brazilian Center for Assistance to Child and Youth Foundation
(Fundação Centro Brasileiro para a Infância e Adolescência).
- FNDE - National Fund for the Development of the Northeast
(Fundo Nacional para o Desenvolvimento do Nordeste).
- FPE - State Participation Fund
(Fundo de Participação dos Estados).
- FPM - Municipal Participation Fund
(Fundo de Participação dos Municípios).

IBAMA - Brazilian Institute for the Environment
(Instituto Brasileiro do Meio-Ambiente).

ICMS - Commercial and Services Taxes
(Imposto de Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços).

INAMPS - National Institute for Medical Assistance and
Social Security
(Instituto Nacional de Previdência e Assistência
Social).

IPLANCE - Ceará Institute for Planning Foundation
(Fundação Instituto de Planejamento do Ceará).

IPTU - Urban Property Tax
(Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano).

ITR - Rural Property Tax
(Imposto territorial Rural).

MASA - Edson Queiroz Enterprises.

PDS - Social Democratic Party
(Partido Democrático Social).

PETROBRAS - Brazilian Petrol Company
(Companhia Brasileira de Petróleo).

PMDB - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
(Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro).

PPE - Publicity, Promotions, and Events
(Publicidade, Promoções, e Eventos).

PSDB - Brazilian Social Democracy Party
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira).

PT - Workers' Party
(Partido dos Trabalhadores).

SESP - Foundation of the Special Service of Public Health
(Fundação do Serviço Especial de Saúde Pública).

SIA - Ambulatory Information System
(Sistema de Informação Ambulatorial).

SIH - Hospital Internment System
(Sistema de Internamento Hospitalar).

SILOS - Local Health Systems
(Sistemas Locais de Saúde).

SOCEMA - Ceará Society for Culture and Environmental
Protection
(Sociedade Cearense de Defesa da Cultura e do Meio
Ambiente).

SUS - Health Unified System
(Sistema Único de Saúde).

UNE - National Students' Union
(União Nacional dos Estudantes).

UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund
(Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Criança).

WHO - World Health Organization
(Organização Mundial de Saúde).

INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents three cases of outstanding local governments in small municípios¹ in the state of Ceará, Brazil. Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte used ingenuity and simple measures to solve common public sector problems within constraints such as a scarce budget, an adverse political structure, and restricted managerial and professional expertise. Although the new Constitution of 1988 conferred greater autonomy and resources to all 4,493 municípios in the Brazilian federation, only a few local governments (around 10%) improved their efficiency as quickly as these three.

I looked at how these municípios dealt with institutional innovations, decentralization of services, and how their local governments introduced participatory mechanisms in their bureaucracy. Just prior to this study all three municípios had recently gone through a process of splitting from bigger municipalities, which led to an interesting pattern of pressure for good performance in

¹ Brazil has three administrative levels, federal, state, and municipal. The Município is the lowest administrative unit. It includes the municipality seat, districts, and the surrounding county. The local government administers both the urban areas and the rural zone. Municípios have a certain degree of autonomy, they can decide about their budgets without approval of the other two higher levels: the state and the federal governments. Each four years their inhabitants elect mayors and city councilmen (named vereadores), who share the responsibilities of the local government. Mayors administer the município with their secretariats, and the city council takes care of legislative matters, such as elaborating city's laws, and approving the municipal budget. The judiciary has a different subdivision from the legislative and executive branches of government. There are 4,493 municípios distributed among Brazil's 27 states and the federal district. Ceará has 178 of these municípios, 4% of the Brazilian total.

general, and in particular for better provision of public services. The reasons underlying their success will be explored using the fields of education and health as illustrations.

Education and health services seem unlikely to bring popularity to local governments. These programs are rarely a priority with any local administration because Brazilian politicians typically regarded them as difficult to conduct successfully. Politicians restrict services just for their proteges, and use the very lack of services to increase their manipulative power. Similarly, the planning literature considers these as "soft sectors" because they take longer to show tangible results.² Instead, municipal politicians prefer to invest in big infrastructure projects: roads, bridges, public squares (usually with luminous water-fountains), or huge public buildings. Yet in contrast to politicians' ambivalence toward these sectors, Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte stand out precisely because they picked exactly education and health as their main focus.

Ceará has 4% of the country's total population, and 10% of the two million Brazilian children do not go to schools, (which are 200,000 illiterate children). Yet, in the last four years none of the children out of school lived in these municípios.³ The level of health care is also outstanding

² See Hirschman (1988), Ostrom, Schoeder & Wynne (1990), Sanyal (1990), and Tendler (1991).

³ Jornal Nacional 01/20/1993.

in the municípios I studied. The 1992 cholera epidemics tested the health care structure of Croatá, Horizonte, and Icapuí. Although the Northeast situation was serious, with more than 23,856 cases reported by November, these three municípios had none.⁴

Within four years, these three municípios also brought, among other things, electrification, water, and telephones to serve their towns and districts. Furthermore, these administrations improved road conditions, using local labor to pave them with materials locally available (stones or bricks are more affordable than asphalt or concrete).⁵ These achievements are even more striking because until recently, the public sector had been performing poorly within the region's archaic political structure of clientelism and patronage. The state of Ceará had the strongest trend of influence peddling, corruption and nepotism in Brazil.⁶ The power of entrenched oligarchies extended to the state's remotest places. Traditional political leaders from important land-owning families had a pervasive hold on politics: they served as members in the National Congress, or as Ministers of the Federal

⁴ Jornal Nacional 11/19/1992.

⁵ Horizonte, for example, invested simultaneously in many sectors. Electrification grew 350%, and, since 1987 consumers of electricity jumped from 700 to 2,500. The communication system installed 370 new telephones, which is impressive because most small towns have only a public post. Croatá built from 89 to 91, eight wells, five public water sources, four reservoirs, 12,200m of water connections to residences and business, 44,000 m2 of roads' pavements, and other urbanization works in the last five years.

⁶ See Furtado (1975) for an overview of the Brazilian economic and political situation, and Johnson (1971) for rural relationships in the Brazilian Northeast, and Fox (1992) for a good description of the Mexican situation of change in traditional practices due to the lack of mechanisms against non-compliance to previous patron-client type of relationships.

Government. Local political chiefs and landowners--"the colonels"⁷--dominated over the whole state of Ceará.

How were the municípios of Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte able to successfully challenge and resist this traditional trend of nepotism and corruption? How was good government possible in these cases? Moreover, why did these three administrations choose the "invisible" sectors of health and education as administrative priorities? This study identifies and explains the features of local government in Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte that contributed to their success. The study then draws lessons that may be more generally applicable to local governments elsewhere.

The thesis will demonstrate how and why the municípios of Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte carried out good management exactly in those sectors where the traditional patronage politics of Ceará was most pervasive: education and health. These local administrations inverted previous trends by enforcing a more pragmatic use of resources, clear criteria of management, universal access to public services, and eliciting strong accountability of governmental actions. In contrast to what most mayors do in Ceará, the mayors of these municípios rebelled against entrenched leaders, and set priorities that did not replicate the common Northeastern practices of hiring friends and kin, or using public funds unscrupulously. How could these mayors secure

⁷ Political chiefs and landowners of the local oligarchy.

broad electoral support for these reforms while acting against some of the most powerful and entrenched local elites?

In Chapter One I will present indicators of success of these local governments. In Chapter Two, decentralization of different levels of public services, funding, and fiscal performance will be discussed. I will show in Chapter Three how the struggle for emancipation enhanced pressure for good performance locally, and analyze how this success contributed to build legitimacy, accountability, and reinforced changes in the local government's public administration. Chapter Four will put together the explanations for these governments' impressive achievements, stressing that even accidental or idiosyncratic reasons for success may lead to replicable strategies.

Although all three municipalities succeeded administratively, Icapuí started its local government reform earlier (in 1986), and advanced more than the other two. Therefore, I will use the case of Icapuí for primary description, and compare it with Croatá and Horizonte as secondary references.

Methodology

I conducted three months of field research from June to August 1992 to understand why and how these municípios (shown in table 1) had achieved and sustained good standards of education and health, widely recognized throughout Ceará and Brazil. I explored the causes of efficiency in the

provision of these services, as examples of good municipal administration.

TABLE 1 1990 ESTIMATED POPULATION, DENSITY, and AREA of BRAZIL, CEARÁ, CROATÁ, HORIZONTE, and ICAPUÍ

	BRAZIL	CEARÁ	CROATÁ	HORIZONTE	ICAPUÍ
POPULATION					
Rural	25%	36.5%	85%	12%	89%
Urban	75%	63.5%	15%	88%	11%
Total	150,368,000	6,472,000	14,826	18,262	13,665
AREA (Km²)					
	8,511,966	146,817	621	192	406
MEAN DENSITY (Inhabitants/Km²)					
Total	18	44	24	95	34

Source: IPLANCE 1992.

My findings about municipal administration are based on 148 open-ended interviews (tables 5 and 6 in Annex One), plus 40 in-depth interviews with public employees and residents of Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte, and on data collected from newspapers, journals and official publications of federal, state, and municipal governments.

For the three municípios I studied in depth, I cross-checked my data at the municipal level with different categories of people and several residents. Especially with five high school and five elementary school students in each town, to see their opinion about the schools, teachers and how satisfied they were with the educational system. Furthermore I contacted two ex-mayors, four candidates for the forthcoming elections, one planning assistant, and one

federal revenue service public servant. I also talked to patients from hospitals and health posts, who evaluated the services they received. I interviewed managers of textile and boat construction businesses, five restaurant owners, three bar owners, four small farmers, two fishers, seven presidents of neighborhood associations and workers' unions, to evaluate how they view their governments. Catholic Church people who had an important role providing education and health also commented on recent changes, and elderly people told me the history of these towns.

In addition, I traveled by bus across the state, deepening my understanding of everyday life in these small towns through personal observation. More formal contact with high ranking state government employees in Fortaleza gave me a broad view of municipal administration in Ceará. I reviewed the literature on Brazilian fiscal federalism, citizenship rights and social movements to frame my questions about mechanisms of popular participation recently included in some local governments. I also reviewed the literature on primary health care and education to understand the public policy responses to the emerging pressures for schools and health services that occurred in these municípios.

Before choosing where I would do my field work, I visited 15 municípios--Aracatí, Canindé, Crateús, Eusébio, Guaraciaba do Norte, Ipú, Pacajús, Quiterianopolis, Quixadá, Quixeramobim, Santa Quitéria, Senador Pompeu, Sobral, Tauá,

and Tianguá--that gave me a general idea of what local government in the state looked like. Then, I chose Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte out of all 178 municípios of Ceará, because they had solved problems that were common to most of the 4,493 Brazilian municípios.⁸ They set a pattern of governance that other municípios in the state tried to emulate.

I used one week in Iguatú to contrast findings in a large town, and one month in Fortaleza, the state capital, to gather data from state government agencies (see tables Annex One). I also interviewed the ex-Secretaries of Social Action and Education, the president of the State Council of Education, seven professors of the Federal University of Ceará, a psychiatrist from the Center for Family Studies, and four UNICEF health and education consultants to the state and local governments. I got data from ATMSC (Municipal Technical Advisers) a private firm of accounting working with these municípios, and two NGOs, CIDADANIA (Planning Advisers for Public Policy), and INSTITUTO EQUATORIAL (Equatorial Institute of Contemporaneous Culture and Entrepreneurial Practices).

The achievements in the health and education sectors will be presented in the next chapter.

⁸ 90% of the Brazilian towns have less than 20,000 inhabitants, therefore the findings of these research showing mechanisms of decentralization and how local governments operate in these municipalities can easily be generalized to most of Brazilian Municípios. Municipalities of this size permit easier overall picture of different sectors at the same time. Links between different departments and agencies are faster to identify and to follow than in bigger cities.

CHAPTER ONE

Indicators of Municipal Performance

In this chapter I will first present these municípios' progress in education, then in health, and in subsequent chapters explain the reasons behind this sudden shift from traditional public administration to the new local government's performance and attitude.

As mandated by the new Brazilian Constitution, the municípios gained autonomy in the areas of political and fiscal control.⁹ The Constitution stresses the obligations which family, society, and the government each have towards providing health and education to children.¹⁰ Municipal responsibilities shifted from shared duties with the state to the sole municipal provision of primary education and health care.¹¹ Before the recent changes, the procedures to get disbursements delivered to local governments depended mainly on mayors and secretaries, who personally negotiated with high rank federal and state heads of agencies. Such procedures had often led to corruption and influence peddling. Now, as municipal autonomy grew with correspondent compulsory transfers of revenues from the federal government to the municípios, there are minimum

⁹ See Chapter Two for the FPM share, and other sources of municipal revenue

¹⁰ Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Article number 227, of 10-05-88.

¹¹ Education and health had many dimensions which were supposedly provided with mutual cooperation, such as building and maintenance of schools and health posts. Training for professionals and staff in both sectors were also shared, as well as inoculation campaigns.

conditions for municípios to operate within serious performance standards. Thus, these constitutional changes allowed for decisions at the local level to become based more on professional abilities, greatly reducing patronage and nepotism. Yet, only a few municípios immediately followed the new pattern of administration. The elected governments in Croatá, Horizonte, and Icapuí did that after emancipation.¹² For example, they assured within their possibilities that all school-age children receive good public education, and that the whole population receive health care.¹³

Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte were respectively the "backward" districts of Aracatí, Guaraciaba do Norte, and Pacajús. Before emancipation, the very lack of public services in these districts meant that the improvements in the sectors of health and education would be quite "visible." As districts they had lacked enough schools and teachers, and people needed political influence or "godfathers" to enter schools. In fact, the educational staff had almost no qualified personnel, and those who had "hot shoulders,"--a local way of saying political protection--would not work properly because they knew their jobs were secured by influential contacts.

¹² The process of emancipation will be detailed in Chapter Three.

¹³ Diário do Nordeste Fortaleza, CE. Terça-feira, 21 de Julho de 1992.

Medical assistance was even worse. At most, the doctor serving the town would come once a week or once in two weeks to the health post, that was distant from most homes. These three governments made a strategic decision to deliver key services to everyone by providing health posts, schools, teachers, and doctors evenly distributed among all communities. In this way they would be dismantling a long time structure of dependency to the former political chiefs. The rule in the interior of Ceará was the exchange of electoral support for a pair of shoes, a plate of food, a box of medicines, or rides in ambulances. Resources and benefits remained only in the seat of municípios, or in the districts that supported the current politicians in power.

There was discrimination against districts where other political parties had electoral supremacy. After political campaigns elected mayors and city councilors withheld money from districts where they did not receive support from voters. Schools and health posts initiated during electoral periods remained unfinished unless districts compensated for it by getting outside support from political factions opposing local politicians. Eventually, a federal representative (deputado federal) who represented the opposition would get funds to complete a health post in a neglected district. People proudly emphasized "it was done against the will of the mayor."

The governments of Icapuí, Horizonte, and Croatá reacted against this prior tendency of neglect inflicted by

politicians who monopolized services by distributing jobs and placing privileged children in the few available schools. Although most politicians dislike procedures that reduce their power, new leaders had to take in participation and popular control to dispute elections successfully. The process of emancipation had built greater political awareness in these three municípios, and once their local governments set specific goals for improving health and education corruption in the political behavior was greatly reduced. The wide access of inhabitants to these services ended their use as favors or privileges. The new political leaders got support from local residents shortly after they changed the previous pattern and adopted clear criteria to hire teachers, doctors, and nurses. Transparency in the process of delivering public services makes easier for everyone to know what they should be getting from the government.

Over the last five years the three municípios I studied performed among the top 10% in investments in their public services. The growing accountability of the governments of Icapuí, Horizonte, and Croatá earned them many honors. The Industrial Center of Ceará (CIC) nominated them for their Merit in Political Ethics in 1992.¹⁴ The Workshop of Municipal Administrations of the Interior¹⁵ listed these

¹⁴ O Povo. Fortaleza, CE. Saturday, August, 15, 1992. Ano LXV. No 21979.

¹⁵ "Administrações Municipais do Interior: Trilhando o Exito" promoted by the Equatorial Institute of Contemporaneous Culture and Entrepreneurial Practices.

three municípios among the best 10 in the state. The agency for Publicity, Promotions, and Events (PPE) sets annually a commission of distinguished public figures to choose the best 25 mayors of Ceará. In 1991 and 1992, the mayors of Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte appeared among the best. The mayor of Horizonte (in 1992) presided over the Mayors' Association of Ceará (APRECE), a forum where state mayors interact and exchange experiences.

United Nations Children's Funds (UNICEF) gave Icapuí the Child and Peace Prize of 1991 for its exceptional respect for children's right to education. State wide public recognition appeared not only in newspapers and magazines, but also in the interviews I conducted throughout the state with different categories of people. One resident said: "prizes such as the UNICEF Child and Peace, the Merit in Political Ethics, Best Mayor, and awards for vaccination campaigns show our good work." The recognition of various international, national, state agencies and organizations to Icapuí's work stimulated Croatá and Horizonte to likewise significantly improve their administrations in the same sectors.¹⁶ Most other recently emancipated municipalities had no such impressive outcomes. The fact that neighboring districts of other municípios want to join these successful ones is another indicator of their wide recognition.

¹⁶ It stimulated others too, such as Maranguape, Pereiro, Guaramiranga, Baturité, Santana do Acaraú, Brejo Santo, but they were slower in presenting their results.

Achievements in Education

In education, these governments started operating with two main goals:

The First Goal Was Universal Access to Public

Education: These three municípios reached in four years 100% school enrollment compared with less than 20% of enrollment rate before the emancipation. Icapuí took seriously its slogan "school for all" with an increase of 520% in its school enrollment in six years, between 1986 and 1991. The number of students grew from 800 in 1985 to over 4,200 in 1992.

TABLE 2 Total of Students Enrolled in ICAPUÍ 1986/1992

GRADES	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Pre-school		99	141	164	190	296	373
Kindergarten	1,141	430	514	659	818	882	853
First	540	1,144	543	743	681	775	682
Second	335	475	575	702	606	604	560
Third	210	247	334	409	422	528	506
Fourth	151	195	179	247	290	329	368
Fifth	110	100	160	168	180	249	262
Sixth	73	96	94	128	139	120	186
Seventh	52	60	90	87	77	110	103
Eight	22	54	46	81	66	101	120
1st Pedagogic		58	55	19	26	13	8
2nd Pedagogic			28	19	17	10	11
3rd Pedagogic				20	14	11	10
High School:1st				47	79	71	88
Second					13	23	50
Third						28	17
TOTAL	2,634	2,938	3,059	3,493	3,618	4,150	4,197

Source: Prefeitura Municipal de Icapuí.

Prior to 1986 when the first mayor took office, there were only eight schools open, which was an insufficient number to allow for all children and teenagers to attend.

Now 34 public schools with 194 municipal teachers assist 100% of the population from pre-school to senior high school. School enrollment in Horizonte grew 327% in four years, from 1,170 in 1988 to 5,000 students in 1992. The number of students in Croatá grew from 2,557 in 1988 to over 4,483 students in 1992. Croatá has 32% of its total population attending school compared to 17% before emancipation.¹⁷

TABLE 3 Number of Students, Schools, Classrooms, Teachers and Percentage Increase after Emancipation

	CROATÁ			HORIZONTE			ICAPUÍ		
	1988	1991	%	1988	1991	%	1986	1991	%
STUDENTS	2,557	4,483	570	1,170	4,968	327	800	4,197	520
SCHOOLS	20	54	37	30	38	21	8	34	77
CLASSROOMS	54	83	35	33	67	51	16	74	21
TEACHERS	-	152	-	-	157	-	32	194	17

Source: IPLANCE 1992.

To accomplish this goal all three municípios needed to improve the general conditions of education (see table 2). I will describe how their local governments did visible improvements tackling first the lack of schools and teachers, and then making sure that children had conditions to attend school by providing transportation, school lunch and other measures to reduce the previous high rates of school drop-out. These three local governments adopted the following solutions:

¹⁷ The rate is even higher considering that it includes the population of areas in dispute with the neighboring municipalities of Ipueiras and Ipú.

1) Adaptation of the Existing Physical Structure -

These municipios had insufficient and deteriorated school buildings, although their priority was not necessarily to build new schools they had to meet an unsatisfied demand for classrooms. For instance, in 1985, Icapuí had schools for only one fifth of its children in contrast to a coverage of 50% in the municipio's seat Aracatí. Nevertheless the precarious conditions of the eight available buildings, they had to be used on an interim basis while the administration raised funds to repair them. First, the municipal government had to rent houses from private owners, because it had no capital funds to build schools. While the government negotiated transfers from the state Department of Education to build new schools, the Catholic Church lent parochial space in each community to be used as additional classrooms.

2) Provision of Free Transportation for Students - The three municipios adopted the idea of free transportation to assure that all students, even from distant districts, could attend school in each municipio's center. Contrary to the custom of using the access to school as personal favors, the politicians of these three towns used money from the municipal revenue to do this. Only recently (in 1992), complementary resources came from the state government for expenditures with students' transportation. The Municipal Department of Education has contracted a private firm since 1989 to provide transportation for Icapuí's children.

Croatá bought a bus, and a jeep to transport its children where roads are bad. Only Horizonte could afford a brand new micro-bus, that is used also to transport teachers from Fortaleza to give evening classes in the high school.

Both solutions, the purchase of vehicles or contracting a private firm, incur similar and substantial costs whether in maintenance of old buses or in rental fees. For example, Icapuí spent US \$3,590 in June of 92 in bus rental.¹⁸ All participants in the meetings to decide about local government's expenditures had agreed that, since education was a priority and children should attend school, the only way of achieving this goal was by providing transportation from the place of residence to the nearest school.

Considering that Icapuí has 52% of its population bellow 20 years of age, distributed among 22 communities, the money spent on transportation is justified. One educational clerk said: "The strain of children walking on the hot sands of Icapuí justify our decision in providing transportation to make public education available to the remotest places."

One mayor commented: "The sight of a broken down bus filled with children on their way to school illustrates our troubles while assuring that all children attend school."

The idea of free transportation complements other educational improvements, and increased significantly school attendance, thus its high costs are justified. This idea

¹⁸ Cr\$ 14 000,000.00 when each dollar was worth Cr\$ 3,900.00.

has rapidly spread to other places of the state, and I saw it operating also in Iguatú and Guaraciaba do Norte.

3) Selection of Qualified Professionals - All three municípios established public contests to hire teachers in contrast to the previous practice of hiring friends and political proteges. The local government lately extended the practice of using merit based competitions to hire public servants for other sectors too. The public contest was a major turning point in public management because it interrupted the vicious cycle of patronage that existed before, and ensured a minimum standard of training among those selected. In the education sector for example, the government advertised the contest in newspapers and it was open to anyone with the required qualifications, which included proper training or at least a high school degree. A commission of state employees conducted the exams and evaluated titles. The fact that they were not linked to municipal politics assured neutrality in choosing those most qualified for the position. Furthermore, it freed mayors and secretaries from old pressures to use their power to benefit friends and relatives, and helped to keep corruption away from the public sector.

4) Improvements in Teachers' Careers and Salaries - These local governments pay their teachers with salaries above the minimum-wage, which is the state average for teachers.¹⁹ For example the administrations of Horizonte

and Icapuí set a new municipal plan for career and wages. Public employees won improved working conditions because these governments had decided to attract good professionals for the public sector. They additionally provide transportation and housing as benefits to keep teachers working.

5) Teachers' Training - In addition to the open selective process and high wages, these local governments encouraged training for teachers already on the job. Most available teachers in the interior are "lay teachers," known for having only four years of elementary school. To improve the quality of education these governments made salaries proportional to the teachers' qualifications. Wages became correspondent to the years of schooling.²⁰ To cope with the lack of skilled people, the government of Icapuí, Croatá and Horizonte insisted on training and enrolled as many teachers as possible. Although training courses were usually short and some functioned on weekends, teachers were scarce hence these cities only could maintain teachers outside the classrooms for a limited time. Indeed these governments valued professionals, encouraging their public servants with incentives to enhance their qualifications by offering them food coupons and bus tickets to attend state training

¹⁹ The minimum wage in Brazil is meant to be equivalent to US\$100 since January of 1993 but inflation of around 28% a month, it barely keeps its value as such, for instance when at first of January it was settled as Cr\$ 1,250,000.00 = \$100.00, at the end of February it was Cr\$ 1,250,000.00 = \$60.00, and at the end of March Cr\$1,250,000.00 = \$43.00.

²⁰ High school teachers need College education and Icapuí, Horizonte, and Croatá already have training for teachers Pedagogic course "Curso Normal."

programs and professional meetings in Fortaleza, Limoeiro or Messejana.²¹ For example, the municipal Department of Education in Icapuí sent lay teachers to an intensive program (LOGUS) in Aracatí to finish high school.

In addition to training provided outside, these three towns also started secondary schools to form their own teachers. To do that they had to recruit and hire outside college graduates to teach in their new course.²² For example, Icapuí started its secondary school in 1988, and had its first High School graduation in 1990. Icapuí also encouraged its high school graduates to enter college in Mossoró.²³ The approval in the "vestibular" of 12 Icapuí high school graduates was an impressive result.²⁴

The Second Goal Was to Increase Literacy: The three municípios also reduced illiteracy quite dramatically. Icapuí ranks well above the Ceará's average adult literacy rate of 60%, at almost 80%. Although lower than Icapuí, Croatá and Horizonte also improved their adult literacy rates by 10% and 12% respectively. These local governments used the following ways to reach this goal:

²¹ During my field work health professionals went to meetings in Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, the capital of the state of Minas Gerais. A group of students left for a sports' competition, and another for a theater presentation in adjacent towns. Teachers attended a training program in Fortaleza.

²² The implications of non-local personnel will be discussed in Chapter Three.

²³ Mossoró in the state of Rio Grande do Norte is the nearest town that has college. Mossoró is nearer than Fortaleza or Iguatú. The first students who graduate in High School of Icapuí receive transportation to attend college there. College degree is a valuable title and gives high status in Brazil.

²⁴ "Vestibular" is a tough competition to enter college because few students get in.

1) Adoption of New Techniques like the "Culture Circles" and "Constructivism." One important educational innovation by the Education Department of Icapuí was the adoption of a new method (Constructivism) that made children enjoy being in school. The story of Honorato shows how children got attached to Icapuí's schools after reform. Honorato moved with his family to another town and could not adapt to his new school. He wrote to Icapuí asking to come back, stay, and be adopted by the town. The local administration deliberated with leaders in the communities before accepting the responsibility of bringing him up. The city adopted him, and he is currently living with the Secretary of Health.²⁵

The "Constructivism" method has its roots in Piaget and other educational philosophers. It approaches education comprehensively and handles the learning process around the child's own environment. Inclusion of cultural traits in the learning process eases the interaction between teachers and students, making the whole process more effective. For instance, fishers' themes, or agriculture related issues are used as motivation to introduce new topics. Students are stimulated to bring their everyday habits in the writing, telling stories that are intelligible to their classmates.

This method also relies on teachers' creativity. The capacity of Icapuí teachers of adapting the method to their

²⁵ The municipal government set a minimum wage to pay for his living expenses, and he directs one of the city's street theater groups. He writes plays, promotes the rehearsals for local and neighboring cities' presentations.

children's environment touched most observers. In a training session, when the speaker was stressing the need for creativity, one teacher told of her own method. She made a song to teach letters using all sorts of common household objects. She reported that the children seemed to learn much quicker since the letters suddenly had more meaning. She intuitively realized the need to innovate and revert from the usual teaching procedures by doing simple things as introducing games to teach numbers. In Icapuí, also because this new method gives more stimulus than the traditional way of teaching, the first and second grade students and teachers developed their own text book. Consultants from UNICEF and the Federal University of Ceará are considering its publication adapted to the realities of other towns in the state.

"Constructivism" got to Icapuí by chance. The southern state of Rio Grande do Sul was the first to use it in Brazil since 1985. One of its leading educators introduced this educational technique to some of Icapuí's teachers while in vacations there. It responded Icapuí's demands reducing flunking. Ceará's Department of Education created a study group to launch Constructivism in other municípios in the state. Teachers undergo training to use the method. Horizonte was the first to send observers to Icapuí before replicating the method in its schools, and college students

from Fortaleza frequently come to observe Icapuí's educational experience.²⁶

Another innovation was the adoption of Paulo Freire's culture circles--"círculos de cultura"--a program based on a dynamic method to teach adults how to read and write. The impact of the Paulo Freire method was first to increase adult literacy, and second, to open a channel for changing political relations by giving information to previously excluded groups. The circles of culture, besides motivating parents to learn, encouraged their participation in the school's affairs, and in administrative matters of their communities too. Icapuí since 1987, and then Croatá in 1990 started successfully their circles, as one teacher stated: "Old parrots do learn to talk! or better yet, old people do learn to write and read!"

2) School Calendar Adjusted to the Communities' Economic Needs. Part of the reason for the low school attendance in Ceará is that families need their children's labor during the agricultural season. In rural communities the school attendance drop to half during the cashew harvest like in many of Icapuí's communities.²⁷ Children had to collect cashews from October till January to increase their families' income. The government responded to this

²⁶ Visits come from within and outside the state. When I was there 35 teachers from five Northeastern states visited the schools of Redonda to observe their educational experience.

²⁷ Fishing represents the Icapuí's main activity since 1970, with 50% of the population dependent on fishing for their livelihood. Nevertheless, one fifth of the município's territory comprises cashew enterprises, besides long areas with coconut trees, and a smaller but significant portion now is producing melon and watermelon for export.

constraint by instituting a school break. In this area school starts in January and ends in October. In contrast, the period that takes students away from classrooms to work in the fields in Croatá is the rainy season that goes from January through May. Recognizing this fact, the municipal Department of Education in Croatá decided since 1989 to start classes in May. Icapuí and Croatá dropout rates declined 50% after their school calendars changed in response to the need for seasonal work in agriculture.²⁸

This responsiveness of the school calendar to economic needs of the communities made Croatá's rate of absence per student to drop to an average of 0.8% monthly, only 6.4% yearly compared to 6.25% monthly before the calendar change. The school calendar adaptation turned absenteeism down to the United Nations' ideal rate of 6% yearly. Horizonte population is mainly urban (see table 1) and does not need a calendar adaptation. The adoption of simple measures such as the calendar change solved problems that a common curriculum does not address. Since municípios were granted autonomy they could bring each of their obstacles into consideration and design accordingly their educational programs. Mandatory education and legal mandates are not enough to solve educational problems.

3) The Relevance of Involving the Community in School Affairs. People really valued education for their children

²⁸ Students and parents were completely satisfied with the measure, but some teachers complain about having different leaves from other teachers.

because it meant future access to jobs and broader economic opportunities. Therefore parents were willing to go to the school meetings because they felt the local government would respond to suggestions as had been demonstrated by the case of the calendar adaptation in Icapuí and Croatá. One household head put it simply as that: "The study I didn't have will make my boy an important guy. He already went to places I have never been to, like Jandius in the state of Rio Grande do Norte because of the escambo."²⁹

The elected commission of teachers in Redonda's school exemplifies how the community introduces new approaches to solve difficult management situations. Parents and teachers expressed dissatisfaction to the principal until she resigned. After a brief period with a substitute, they petitioned to the Secretary of Education for a tentative solution in which the school would be directed by the commission of five teachers. The experiment worked so well that was permanently adopted in Redonda.

Hunger during droughts, and rough periods in agriculture or fishing also causes poor children to evade school because they become weak and sick due to malnutrition. The knowledge about causes of the school evasion depends on a broader understanding of the socioeconomic and cultural context in which the phenomenon is happening. The provision of school lunches with whatever

²⁹ Escambo means a competitive presentation of various street theater groups that started in towns administered by the Workers' Party.

food came from state or federal agencies helped reduced the incidence of high school drop-outs rates and flunking.³⁰ Figures have not been collected to verify the effectiveness of this assistance, but information from teachers and administrators strongly suggest that school lunch program has greatly decreased the drop-out rates of young children.

Health Care Achievements

Achievements in the health sector in the three municípios also stood out compared to most of the municípios in Ceará. Interestingly, their governments took two different approaches.

Icapuí stressed prevention and health education and relied heavily on health workers. This approach meant health care could be distributed evenly throughout the município while keeping it cost effective. Horizonte and Croatá opted for a more conventional approach.

Icapuí's rate of 50 deaths per 1,000 living births is lower than Ceará's rate of 70\1,000, and the national average of 61\1,000 in 1991. With the program of monitoring child from birth to six years Icapuí's infant mortality fell by 50%. The decline between 1991 and 1992 is even more impressive because it refers to a crisis period. High infant mortality rates usually happen during the critical "paradeiro" (the lobster reproduction season when capturing

³⁰ In Icapuí high incidence of school evasion happens during bad fishing seasons in Requenguela and Barreiras. Similarly, Croatá's districts of Santa Tereza and Olhos D'Agua experience the same as Icapuí because of bad harvests. Considering that the national average of flunking just in the first grade is above 50%, and the forecast for the year 2,000 is that 90% of the whole population will have less than four years of schooling any effort to reduce it is worthwhile.

lobster is forbidden), when family incomes decrease, milk is watered down, and malnutrition, diseases and diarrhea rise in neighborhoods such as Redonda, Peroba, and Retiro Grande. Despite this seasonal increase in infant mortality, the municipal Health Department controlled its causes and targeted worse areas for more assistance. Here are some steps the local government took to increase health care:

1) The municipal Health Department assured that a pediatrician, a general physician or a nurse visited the poorest neighborhoods daily, and health posts were put in walking distance of every neighborhood. The Health Department had to fulfill the goals of universal access to health care before massively investing in complex health units. Thus the idea of local systems of health "SILOS" was fully carried out in Icapuí.³¹ This idea came from The Eight National Conference of Health of 1985, attended by medical students that later came to work in the town.³²

2) Monitoring children from the prenatal stage through the age of six has permitted the identification of diseases and led to their effective treatment since 1990. Pediatricians fill detailed information about each child's health. Health agents measure and weigh children monthly and register their growth in each child's chart.³³ "Even if

³¹ It only had at the time of the first municipal government a L1-type of health unit of the SESP foundation, with four offices and a small dispensary.

³² See Chapter Three.

it storms or the sun burns," said a health worker, "children get what they need." Another one said "I do my duty either by foot, by bike, or by 'jegue'."³⁴

3) The coverage of all vaccines for avoidable diseases (tetanus, diphtheria, measles, mumps, etc.) became routine not only in Icapuí, but also in Horizonte and Croatá. Indeed, small pox and TB (tuberculosis) had already been eradicated before 1986, and Polio has been under control ever since.

In contrast to Icapuí, Horizonte and Croatá established their health systems with a stronger curative emphasis, giving priority to the building of a hospital and hiring doctors. Yet, they incorporated some of Icapuí's experience, such as adopting regular campaigns to increase immunization against avoidable diseases.

In spite of different priorities within the health sector for each of these three municípios, they all apply more than 20% of their revenue to health services, in contrast to most others that roughly apply the constitutional 10%. For instance since 1989, Icapuí has been investing a monthly average of 23% of its total revenue in health. Croatá and Horizonte complement their own revenue using federal resources from the Unified Health System funds (SUS) because having hospitals they are

³³ Child's Health Chart. (Caderneta de Saúde da Criança. Prefeitura Municipal de Icapuí. Com o Povo Rumo ao Novo. Secretaria Municipal de Saúde Pública e Saneamento. Secretaria de Saúde do Estado. Projeto Nordeste).

³⁴ A small donkey that is fit for the arid conditions of the Northeast Brazil.

eligible to receive from the Hospital Internment System (SIH). Icapuí at the time of the research was yet finishing its hospital.

All three municípios use resources from the State Health Department to hire and train health workers. They also recruit professionals using medical networks. For instance, contacts with the universities in Fortaleza periodically bring senior students of dentistry, nursing or medicine to work one month free as interns in the Health Department of these towns.³⁵

In sum, irrespective of which approach--preventive or curative--these municípios used, all three improved their health conditions more than the state average. The infant mortality in the state fell one third from 1986 to 1989, the rate of immunization increased 40%, and the 1992 measles epidemic killed 700% fewer children than the previous epidemics.³⁶ The impressive drop in infant mortality all over Ceará shows the progress in primary health care supported by the state government.³⁷ The collaboration between Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte and the state department of health resulted in their superior sanitary conditions

³⁵ CRUTAC internship is a program similar to the "Rondon Project." The program provides a first contact with rural areas, and shows to students the conditions of work in the interior. It prepares students for taking their practices outside the school.

³⁶ Jornal do Brasil, 11/12/92. UNICEF praises Ceará's health programs.

³⁷ See Freedheim 1993.

compared with bordering municipalities, as shown during the cholera epidemics of 1992.³⁸

These three municípios dealt with the crisis by doing simple things such as distributing small bottles of chlorine to every family. Health agents, nurses, and social workers taught community residents how to mix a few drops of chlorine with water, letting it rest half an hour before cooking or drinking.³⁹ The distribution of water filters, the treatment of water reservoirs with chlorine, teaching basic notions of hygiene, and assuring regular medical assistance in health posts and hospitals made the whole difference.

The health agents were supposed to do that throughout the state, but the task is more difficult when the proportion of health agents to the population is insufficient to reach all the families in the municípios. The averages are 0.10% for Ceará, 0.23% for Icapuí, 0.21% for Croatá, and 0.06% for Horizonte. Although Horizonte obtained good health results they derive more on the investments made in the health sector and on the high wages paid to health professionals than to the health agents' program, which scores below the state average. Despite all investments in the health sector the program (PAS) does not work there as it should because the município does not hire

³⁸ See in Introduction recent figures on the cholera epidemics.

³⁹ This measure proved effective even in the districts where water conditions were the worst, e.g., most far away districts lack running water, and the process of carrying water from wells and public faucets easily contaminates it.

a nurse to coordinate it. That should be Horizonte's counter part to the state program.⁴⁰

All these municípios achieved remarkable success such as 100% in school enrollment and immunization rates. Both health care and education became accessible in areas not formerly served. Where did they get the funding to do all this? In Chapter Two I will show how decentralization and funding allowed this success to occur.

⁴⁰ The Secretary of Health, who is a nurse, accumulates the functions of coordinator of the program with those of the Head of the Department of Health. The health supervisors in Fortaleza think this reflects a lack of the local government support to the program. They argue that although spending a lot with wages, building a good municipal hospital, the administration does not spend any money with the program. Therefore the quality of the agents' work proved better in places where the commitment of the government to the program is demonstrated by a greater proportion of health agents to the total population.

CHAPTER TWO

Municipal Autonomy and Fiscal Changes

Looking at municipal government, funding is a major constraint. I will describe in this chapter how Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte by using their municipal autonomy more effectively than other municípios managed to improve all their public services. They also were best at staying within their municipal budgets despite current fiscally stringed limits of the national economy. This finding contradicts most local politicians in Brazil, who argue that municipal budget is never sufficient to support good government. How could they perform well in a fiscally stringed context?

Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte governments found interesting solutions for increasing and maximizing their revenue within the legal advances brought by the recent municipal autonomy. The new Brazilian Constitution granted to the states and municípios a greater share of the federal tax revenues.⁴¹ Since 1988, there has been a legal mandate for municípios to spend 25% of their revenue in education, and 10% on health.⁴² Yet most of them disregard this

⁴¹ In 1988 the National Constitutional Assembly promulgated the new Constitution of Brazil. In 1989, the State Legislative Assemblies passed states' Constitutions; and in 1990, each município had its Organic Law approved by the local legislative body--Câmara de Vereadores. The Brazilian Constitution recommends the use of participatory mechanisms in public administration.

⁴² See Afonso & Resende (1988), Afonso (1989).

constitutional rule, and divert these percentages for other purposes.

Prior to these changes, the excessive centralization of the federal government imposed constraints for states and municípios to fund their basic responsibilities. Because the distribution of resources was so centralized, all sorts of irregularities were possible while transferring money through the various bureaucratized layers. Disbursements depended on the power relations between the local and central governments at the moment of the transaction. For example, an ex-mayor reported that a road would only be financed if it benefited the farm of a prestigious landowner, politically connected with the federal agency. "The colonel had the means to make the process go." Another mayor said that "The resources to build a dam depended on the will of the politicians at the State Legislative Assembly. They often pledged a job for someone related to the head of the agency financing the dam; otherwise, the forms requesting the money would be kept endlessly in the drawer of a bureaucrat's desk."

The lack of autonomy undermined the municípios' ability to conceive long-range plans. Usually federal agencies transferred resources directly to their state or municipal counterparts. For example, for the local government to build low income housing, the municipal department of social development would have to deal directly with the federal agency under the National Housing Bank (BNH). The secretary

would have to fill many forms to contract the debt, which would go to various departments and sections before the money could reach its end. By that time, it no longer would be sufficient to cover for the whole project. Inflation also eroded resources during this interminable process.⁴³

Changes in the fiscal structure assured the minimum amount needed for municípios' basic operation through regular transfers of money from the federal and state governments to the municípios. With this tax reform, the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) became the main source of municipal revenue.

TABLE 4 PARCELS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME REVENUE, AND INDUSTRIALIZED PRODUCTS' TAX COMPULSORILY TRANSFERRED TO THE PARTICIPATION FUND OF MUNICIPALITIES AND STATES

YEAR	FPM	FPE ⁴⁴
1988*	17.0%	14.0%
1988	20.0%	18.0%
1989	20.5%	19.0%
1990	21.0%	19.5%
1991	21.5%	20.0%
1992	22.0%	20.5%
1993	22.5%	21.5%

Source: MINISTÉRIO DA ECONOMIA, FAZENDA E PLANEJAMENTO, 1991.
(PLANNING, ECONOMY, AND FINANCE MINISTRY)

* Before 10/04/88

The FPM is a formulae-based compulsory transfer of tax revenue from the federal government, which distributes to

⁴³ Monthly inflation rates in Brazil stay approximately around 30%.

⁴⁴ The main source of state revenue comes from the State Participation Fund (FPE), a formulae based transfer from the federal government. The state also shares with its municípios the Commercial and Services Taxes (ICMS).

municípios a share proportional to their population and inversely to per capita income. In 1966, the 10% of Federal Income Tax (IR) and Industrialized Products Tax (IPI) went to FPM. The share municípios received had been increasing since 1988, from 17% to 22.5% in 1993, when it stabilized.

The local administrators' capacity to mobilize resources is a major indicator of their success (Olowu & Smoke, 1992).⁴⁵ Although the opportunity to get extra funds is open to all municípios, just a few pursue it because they usually do not have impressive achievements to back them up in their requests. There is still untapped revenue potential in most municípios and local taxes can be more widely used to generate more municipal income.⁴⁶ Successful municípios like Croatá, Icapuí, and Horizonte stopped neglecting these other sources, such as property and service taxes, but yet, the FPM share remains their main revenue.

In contrast to most small municípios that do not yet collect their taxes, Icapuí has taken advantage of some of these potential sources and ICMS has replaced oil royalties as its largest revenue generator.⁴⁷ Icapuí ranks in the 19th place in ICM collection in the whole state. Horizonte increased its own sources investing massively in industry

⁴⁵ See Olowu & Smoke (1992), Shah (1991).

⁴⁶ The municipal revenue in the country has more than doubled since 1985; in 1990 it was 5.2% of GNP. Municipal revenue amounted to 17% of the share in total revenue of Brazil in the same year. Only 1% of this 5.2% was generated by municípios' own sources.

⁴⁷ Icapuí has the biggest oil basin in Ceará, and royalties contribute monthly with an average of 10% of the municipal revenue.

because its privileged location near Fortaleza permits the use of its urban population and fiscal incentives of the semi-arid region.⁴⁸ Croatá still relies mostly on intergovernmental transfers as source of revenue because the receipts accruing from agriculture began recently with intensive vegetable gardening. Only in 1992 Croatá started charging local taxes.

Increasingly demand for services created new incentives to collect local taxes. The decision to collect the property tax (IPTU), usually has political and administrative costs most mayors fear are higher than benefits.⁴⁹ Therefore, governments needed legitimacy to enforce property taxes' assessment and collection properly without eliciting great resistance. The better performing municípios which had proven themselves were able to tax property, services and other sources to increase their municipal revenue. As examples, Icapuí and Horizonte are already collecting IPTU. Croatá finished in 1991 its first properties' directory, and recently started charging IPTU, revealing the same decision of developing its tax administration capacity. Since 1988, Brazilian municípios have increased their tax collection by an average of 109%.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Among the three municípios Horizonte has the highest urban percent (see table 1).

⁴⁹ See Dillinger (1989). Beyond the collection of Urban (IPTU) and Rural Property Taxes (ITR), municípios should charge for services (ISS), tax on property sales (ITBI), tax motor vehicles registration (IPVA), and fuel tax (IVVCLG).

⁵⁰ Veja No. 40 (1992).

The fiscal changes after 1985 have been criticized by some economists who claim that municipal autonomy will lead to parochialism and corruption, and that the federal government will be deprived of substantial revenue to operate properly. But, standardized procedures of disbursement after 1988 gave clarity to the process of getting money, and spared mayors and secretaries the strain of being solely responsible for carrying resources to their jobs. This compulsory flow of resources gave the necessary stability for continuous operation of services, which enhanced further administrative innovations in progressive municipalities.

Funding Innovations in Public Management

The mayors of Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte by showing great improvements in their priority sectors got additional federal and state resources to improve education and health. This helped them build accountability to constituencies, to the state government, and to the public. Awards from the state, or specific projects negotiated with UNICEF and other international agencies like GTZ (contacted in Germany through the Catholic Church) complement their municipal budgets. Although these extra-sources of revenue are intermittent, they significantly add to the minimum 10% set for health, and the 25% for education.

They did not use the money like most other towns with the local top bureaucracy, (no expensive cars, no luxurious public buildings, headquarters, or offices to serve the

mayor and secretaries). Instead they have put at least an extra 10% into areas such as teacher training. For example, Icapuí used the money to install a modest, yet efficient health system; to give subsidized housing, food, or transportation for teachers from neighboring towns to come and work in its schools; or paying for students to compete in other towns' contests.⁵¹ Horizonte has a project for recycling educational material in its elementary schools funded by UNICEF. Before I left, UNICEF was also negotiating an educational project with Croatá.

Gains from public recognition - During 1991 National Measles' Campaign, Ceará government gave another prize to Icapuí for the highest rate of inoculations in the state (100% compared to an average of 90% in others). This award exemplifies both the effect of public recognition and how it innovated health management. Icapuí used this cash-prize to buy a computer to compile socioeconomic and health data. The local government considered the information about its population's health status essential for planning and operating an efficient health system. Knowing the standard of living, economic conditions, the need for sanitation, the size and material of houses helped the Health Department to devise appropriate measures of primary health care to fight common diseases and morbidity. It could evaluate which

⁵¹ The local government installed itself in an old small house, after being temporarily in a school room waiting for the money to come from the state in the beginning of 1986. Since then, it kept a modest pattern of installation, with 400 employees (3% of total population), although the public sector is a major employer in the município. 60% of the municipal budget goes to wages and expenditures with personnel, training, transportation, subsidizing housing and related matters.

districts demanded more assistance, which groups had frequent work-related illnesses to be treated, which preventive health care was recommended for each community.

Since the UNICEF award (see page 19), Icapuí has attracted attention, appearing in VEJA (the largest selling weekly news read all over Brazil) as among the best administered cities in the whole country.⁵² This award also helped the local government gain the confidence of inhabitants, and induce them to participate in the collective planning of the governmental actions. The increasingly popular involvement in planning the allocation of resources distinguished Icapuí administration from conventional local governments. Furthermore, outside recognition eased the state government's boycott to its initiatives on the grounds of political party differences, (see Chapter Three). Croatá also gained notoriety when an educational TV program presented the results of its school calendar adaptation. Newspapers in Fortaleza advertised Horizonte's public contest and highest wages in Ceará for specialized personnel.

Another way of carrying more resources to these towns was through extracurricular activities and joint educational programs with federal and state agencies, such as the Brazilian Center for Child and Youth Assistance Foundation (FCBIA), the Ceará Society for Culture and Environmental Protection (SOCEMA), and UNICEF. One example is the course

⁵² Horizonte and Croatá were also briefly mentioned in Veja's article.

on environment protection in Icapuí, which taught children to preserve local mangroves and sand dunes as habitat of perishing species. The Ministry of Education, the Students' Assistance Foundation (FAE), and the Educational Foundation (EDUCAR) also financed other initiatives.

Another change in policy which supports fiscal responsibility is the direct negotiation of projects with the donor agencies. As local governments' decentralization progressed, these functions previously restricted to the mayor or to the secretary of each municipal department were delegated to the heads of local associations. For example, presidents of neighborhood associations or community organizations in Icapuí frequently negotiate the financing of their projects directly with the agencies. The municipal department of the respective area in which the project will be developed assist them, but the money goes directly to the association, instead of going first to the administration. This procedure avoids bureaucratic delays. The emerging interaction among associations' local boards and the public sector improves local policies benefiting both private and public sectors.

Most local governments still depend a lot on negotiated intergovernmental transfers to finance their services. Thus, the gained autonomy does not completely exclude bargaining from the mayor's agenda. Mayors and municipal secretaries still need outside sources of revenue to provide health, education and other services to their constituents.

But what is important about the intergovernmental transfers is that they gained clear criteria of operation, and became part of the municipal budget. Their predictability made them less dependent on "under the table" arrangements of politicians and bureaucrats. For example, when a municipal department receives money to build a school or a hospital, the secretary need to be accountable not only to the state or to the federal agency that is financing the work, but also to the mayor and to the constituencies as well.

Local governments had difficulty in the municipalizing services because they lacked managerial and technical expertise. It took them a while to overcome constraints like the conditions imposed by INAMPS to release resources. These conditions require the calculation of the amount to be released be based on the number of the total population, of health professionals and on the capacity of the health equipment installed in the município. The Unified Health System (SUS)⁵³ imposes a limit to release the payments for the Ambulatory Information System (SIA) and Hospital Internment System (SIH) bills.

Small cities rarely meet these requirements, so, they seldom receive the full amount they should be entitled. For instance, Croatá's allowance for dental service covers each inhabitant going to the dentist once a year. Croatá does not receive the 14,823 dental appointments it should because

⁵³ SUS was created by Law 8080 of 1990 to replace SUDS (Decree Law 94657 of 1987)

it has a limited number of dentists, and this cut down the SUS resources intended for dental service. Then, the city is not eligible to receive the full amount it needs. A vicious cycle led to a general deficiency of the health sector because the system underpaid for service provided, and did not satisfy demand, e.g., it only pays dentists a maximum of three patients an hour even if they see more. However, once Croatá's administration dealt with this problem by using funds from the municipal budget to hire two part-time dentists the município was able to qualify for an increase in the SUS resources.

Decentralization in Different Styles of Governments

The explanation for the success of these three municípios local governments is usually attributed to the argument of decentralization. One could think that decentralization alone explains it. But, not all municípios that have decentralized worked equally well. In fact, even the municípios that have worked well have used diverse styles of government. Icapuí advanced more than the other two, in the sense that decisions were shared by the municipal government agencies with the organizations representing the civil society. For example, collective demands have priority over individual demands. This practice discourages clientelistic behavior because although the government is constantly open to hear anyone from the population, negotiations always involve more interlocutors than just authority-demander (See Chapter Three).

Most politicians resist decentralization because they lose power from not having any grants to mediate with the central government. These politicians, and some specialists in public management claim that decentralization does not lead to the intended universalism in the provision of public services. Some local politicians realized that improved services after decentralization give them the popularity needed for good electoral performance.

One example of how Icapuí's administration reformed finance was the way it budgeted education and health. The task was not an easy one, but it was possible because of pre-existing neighborhood associations, which were stronger and older than in Croatá and Horizonte. The administration found support in these associations to organize "self-help collective efforts" to build schools and health posts. The capacity of tapping into existing community initiatives cut costs of providing the services needed. Instead of providing everything the public sector recognized and gave prestige to long standing community groups to cooperate with the administration.

The process works as follows. Representatives of neighborhood associations and other organizations deliberate with city councilmen, secretaries and with the mayor about the government plan and its budget. Many local meetings in all communities discuss which demands should be presented in global meetings that lead to the formulation of the budget. There are also meetings to evaluate the progress of the

local government actions taken during the year. Revenues and expenditures are checked monthly. There is even an innovative way of presenting the balance, it is printed on the wall of the mayor's house for every citizen to go over the numbers.

In contrast to Icapuí, financial decisions in Horizonte are much more centralized. Yet, Horizonte's administration succeeded despite less participation. Instead of a broad number of associations taking part in the elaboration of the municipal budget, a group of friends and relatives helped the mayor to define the government plan. The mayor chose a nurse, who is also his sister, to be the secretary of health. What one would expect from these kin and cronies appointments? The mayor avoided opposition by working closely with the president of the Rural Worker's Union, chosen by him as the secretary of agriculture. Yet, he carried out a public contest to hire public employees, and the city became known for having the highest health salaries of Ceará.⁵⁴ This fact of paying good wages is crucial to secure professionals in the interior, otherwise they migrate to bigger cities, where they have better opportunities.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Diário do Nordeste Fortaleza, CE. Quinta-feira, 25 de Junho de 1992.

⁵⁵ Despite the investments made in the health sector, and the high wages paid to health professionals, the health agents' program is not working well there. The health supervisors in Fortaleza think that the program lacks support from the local government. One evidence of that is that the secretary of health accumulates the function of coordinator of the program. Although spending a lot with wages, the município did not hire a nurse to coordinate the program. To have a nurse as coordinator is essential to a smoothly running health agent program. Without a nurse this job goes to the Secretary of Health. So the absence of a nurse, and the busy schedule of the health secretariat, leaves the secretary of health with no time for the program, and the program remains neglected. People in Horizonte see the great potential of the health agents' program, but they feel that it lacks the mayor's support. In order for this program to be successful it must be taken seriously into the government agenda.

Nevertheless less participatory characteristics Horizonte's government improved health and education sectors.

Croatá's mayor works in the most individual fashion. He is a successful tomato farmer who went to college in Fortaleza before returning to his hometown. He was elected in 1988, and took office in January of 1989. Opinion-polls acknowledge his good government. People do not see corruption going on in Croatá, though the mayor's wife is the secretary of finance, and his sister-in-law administers the hospital. Although the mayor chose his kin to occupy top positions--keeping him informed about what was being spent in the município--he also promoted public contests to hire public employees. Even while his wife controlled the municípios' finances, he gave relative autonomy to the secretaries, letting them decide about appropriate policies for their areas. Later on, the mayor chose other secretaries based on professional competency to neutralize for appointing immediate collaborators within friends, and family. He advertised open positions for physicians in the capital's newspapers. He knew that to attract good professionals to a distant place, such as Croatá, the only way was seducing them with high salaries (calculated in dollars).

The mayor recognized that education and health sectors were crucial to promote the necessary changes in the município. He trusted the people he chose to take care of the sectors. The secretaries of health and education got

their jobs, even without being friends or relatives. Their competence was the main criterion for the choices, because the mayor intended to replicate in Croatá the efficiency they had led in other places. The experienced educator he brought had an outstanding familiarity with rural education. The secretary had participated in educational radio programs for people of the country side, and had developed programs of adult literacy. The mayor invited him to be his secretary of education, although they were from different political parties.

The first secretary of health in Croatá did not satisfy the mayor, therefore, using the competence criteria as in education, he chose another secretary. The new secretary came from a neighboring town where he had done a good job as secretary of health. He structured the health system very much inspired in Icapuí, emphasizing primary health care. The health agents' program started in the município, and the number of health units increased. The secretaries of both health and education departments launched joint programs. They went to each locality of the município, giving talks at schools' and neighborhood associations' meetings, conducting discussions about major educational and health problem.

Observing all this finding it became clear that autonomy alone was not sufficient to enable them to perform so well. The process of emancipation, the dissemination of innovative measures, and a new orientation in public policy will be discussed in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE

Reasons for Good Public Sector Performance

Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte had been among districts which longed for independence because their former municipal seats had prevented their development. In response to the increasing tension between neglected districts and their municipal seats, the state government conducted a referendum in each of the contentious areas. Based on those results Ceará created 27 new municípios between 1984 and 1991 wherever local people gathered enough support for emancipation. The new municípios also needed to meet other criteria for emancipation. They had to sustain themselves, organize their staff, establish their tax assessments and collection processes, build sufficient authority over their responsibilities and funds to hold their independence.

In this chapter I discuss how the struggle to become new municípios affected Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte, and why it improved the governments' performance. The three municípios won their emancipation almost simultaneously, through similar processes. I present Icapuí as the leading case to describe the importance of emancipation for future developments, contrasting it briefly with Croatá and Horizonte. I analyze how the struggle created pressure on the new leaders to perform well; how it enhanced participatory mechanisms and innovations in their public administration; and how professional, kinship, and political

party ties are important for disseminating successful experiences.

The Emancipation Struggle

The município of Icapuí has 406 square kilometers in the eastern shore line of Ceará.⁵⁶ It pertained to the município of Aracatí, one of the oldest and more important in the state. Since 1938, inhabitants of the area had attempted to begin a new município. At that time, the name of this district of Aracatí was Caiçaras, but in 1942, the administrative reorganization of Ceará had it renamed as Icapuí.⁵⁷ In 1951, the state created another district in Aracatí named Manibú, which became part of the new unit, when in 1985, the state finally installed the município of Icapuí.⁵⁸

The movement toward emancipation gained momentum in late 1950s, with the leadership of a priest, Padre Abílio; and in late 1970s and early 1980s, when another priest, Padre Diomedes and new leaders joined the struggle. In 1958, Ceará's Legislative Assembly agreed that Icapuí could

⁵⁶ Icapuí people insist--as some historians' assert--that the first navigator to come to Brazil was not Pedro Alvares Cabral, who came to Bahia in 1500. They believe that at the end of the Fifteenth Century, Vincent Pizon came to Ponta Grossa, one of Icapuí's shores, and met Tremembé Indians. After 1500, the Portuguese occupied the lands of the native Tremembé, followed by the Dutch in 1658. Finally, later settlers from the Semi-arid interior--"sertão people"--started fishing along the município's shores, and colonized the area. Then, evolved the communities of Ponta Grossa, Retiro Grande, Redonda, Peroba, Barreiras, Barrinha de Mutamba, Requenguela, Peixe Gordo, Melancias, Tremembé, Quitérias, Belém, Serra de Cajuais, Cajuais, Serra de Mutamba, Mutamba, Ibicutaba, Morro Pintado, Berimbáu, and Icapuí.

⁵⁷ Icapuí is the nickname for the native Tremembé word igarapui, which means a small and fast canoe with the form of a needle. Tremembé was the Indian tribe that lived there before the Portuguese arrival. The change of names (decree number 1114) occurred because there was another place in the state with the same name.

⁵⁸ Decree 1153.

become a new município. Yet, in a strategic counter-move, the local oligarchy of Aracatí (led by "colonels" of the powerful Costa Lima family) delayed the act's publication in the Ceará's Official Diary until January of 1959. They held up the whole process in order to prevent their members from losing prominence in the state and in the federal governments. Once the município was split, the current officials would lose constituents (approximately 20%) and political power. Consequently, they kept postponing the installation of the new município. Although the supporters were ready for emancipation since 1958 the process depended on the next scheduled elections. Unfortunately, prior to the election a military coup in 1964 stopped the process for 27 years (from 1958 until 1985).

The "praianos"--people from Icapuí--blamed Aracatí politicians for Icapuí's backwardness, and continued to push for independence. In 1980, Fortaleza University students from Icapuí created the Cultural Association of Icapuí (ACICA). A larger association appeared in 1981, the Aracatí University Students Association (AEUA). Both associations had significant roles in the struggle for emancipation. ACICA nominated a student leader to be candidate to the Aracatí City Council. Although the candidate faced strong opposition in Aracatí, he was elected one of the city councilors in 1982.⁵⁹ He defended Icapuí emancipation

⁵⁹ He won an impressive third place out of approximately 20 candidates. Icapuí held 20% of Aracatí voters.

against most of the Aracatí members in the council meetings. Later, when Icapuí finally became a município, the ex-student leader became its first elected mayor, supported by the members of ACICA, and by "praianos" interested in independence.

The process of emancipation required, among other things, a referendum to verify if the inhabitants really wanted independence. Political leaders in Aracatí campaigned against it, counter-arguing that separation at that point would ruin Icapuí's chances for development. They said it was necessary to wait a little longer, maybe two or three years more, until it had sufficient economic strength to be independent. Although emancipators defeated their opponents by two-thirds of the votes, they were disappointed by what they considered a small difference--as they had expected unanimous results in the referendum.⁶⁰ Finally emancipation was granted in 1985. As one third of the population dissented against it and the legal and financial requirements to remain independent depended on efficiency, the new leaders were under tremendous pressure to perform well and to win people's support.⁶¹

The same history of long dependence linking former districts to their municípios' seats, as with Icapuí and

⁶⁰ Icapuí had the smallest difference in the results among the 10 municípios which Ceará emancipated that year: 59% of the inhabitants (1223) voted yes and 41% voted against emancipation (841).

⁶¹ The Brazilian Constitution Art. 18, # fourth establishes the conditions for emancipation and fusion of municípios, leaving to the states more specific regulations.

Aracatí, also happened between Croatá⁶² and Guaraciaba do Norte, and between Horizonte and Pacajús. A local teacher said: "'Guaraciabenses' treated 'Croatenses' as if they were 'illiterate savages': 'Indians' whom they could deprecate and exploit." Croatá reacted against Guaraciaba do Norte and became a new município in 1988, with four districts: Barra do Sotero, Betânia, Santa Tereza and São Roque.⁶³ Horizonte reacted the same way to become independent from Pacajús, and got its emancipation in 1987 with the districts of Aningas, Dourado, and Queimados.⁶⁴ As in Icapuí the struggle for independence created both the enthusiasm for reform, the determination to show tangible and quick progress and pressure to perform in an accountable way unlike the clientelism and exploitation of the past, as I show bellow.

Roots of Participation

I will discuss in this section how the emancipation struggle built popular support for the change in attitude and performance of local governments. These cases exemplify a process with delayed effects,⁶⁵ making institutional

⁶² Croatá is the name of a very common plant in the "carrasco" of the Ibiapaba region of Ceará.

⁶³ The creation of all them were respectively published in The Official Diary of the state under the decrees n. 11430 of 1988, n. 6529 of 1963, decree n.11206 of 1986, decree n.004 of 1989. Croatá had 7,002 voters among a population of 14,492 inhabitants, in 1990.

⁶⁴ Decree number 11 300, and its districts were created at the same time. During the 1990 elections it had 9,559 voters among a population of 18,262 inhabitants, in 1990.

⁶⁵ See Salamon (1979) for these delayed effects and how they interfere in future outcomes of projects, usually not considered in follow up evaluations.

innovations feasible.⁶⁶ The emotions evoked by experiencing a common history set the basis among town citizens for a sense of belonging, and for the will to develop and preserve their place.⁶⁷ In Icapuí, the strong sentiment of identity felt by "praianos" can be seen in the following example: UNICEF conducted research among school children in coastal towns of Ceará before awarding its Education Prize. In contrast to what researchers found in other towns, children were very proud of Icapuí. Children liked their home town and did not want to go to São Paulo to pursue a better life when they grew up. Inhabitants had transferred to their children the belief in Icapuí's economic prospects, connected to this feeling of belonging. They felt they had a responsibility to improve their town.

The mobilization which aimed to free districts from their previous municípios had some positive side-effects, which arose later and lasted longer than the struggle for emancipation itself. Sleeper effects emerged in municípios like Icapuí, where the popular mobilization movement had been the strongest. Inhabitants from different social backgrounds--landowners, business people, small farmers, fishers, and landless workers--fought as allies against a common enemy: their previous municipal seat politicians.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Putman (1992) also stresses the importance of history and tradition to understand some civic characteristics that appear in different outcomes of Italy's regional governments. His approach helps to see how the process of emancipation had its sleeper effects in quite shorter time (five years) than in the cases discussed by the two authors.

⁶⁷ See Barth (1969), Brandão (1986), Cardoso de Oliveira (1976), Goffman (1961, 1975), Tuan, (1974) Zarur (1991).

After struggling for municipal autonomy, all these people who otherwise had no social, political, or class affinity became committed to develop their towns together. The crucial threat of going back to the previous status of dependent districts haunted the new *municípios* after emancipation.⁶⁹ A return to the former *município* would be a loss of face for the new mayors, and a big frustration for all who participated in the struggle. Once the struggle had brought people together, the fear of failing economically sustained these alliances longer than expected. This threat pressured mayors and administrators to show quick results such as better provision of schools, more teachers, more doctors and nurses, better roads, and water sources. Consequently, municipal administrators needed accountability to remain legitimate in the minds of both the state government and their local constituencies.

While fighting for emancipation, people had learned that "the right amount of pressure at the right time" could obtain the desired results from the state government. During the struggle, they depended upon information about the state government's decisions to react either by influencing sympathetic state representatives, or by other forms of protest. They marched in the streets, participated in hunger-strikes, and collected signatures on petitions to

⁶⁸ See Tendler (1980), Zarur (1991) for comparable examples of situations of tension that bring people from different backgrounds together to face a common problem.

⁶⁹ I could not find any case of this threat being put in operation.

pressure government into providing housing, education, and health services. Therefore, they changed from simply protesting against neglect into more participatory behavior. People from each locality used informal meetings to discuss issues before presenting their claims for improvements formally to the municipal government. Information was as essential for fast and strong reactions against unwanted solutions concerning their communities, as it had been for getting the emancipation.

The government of Icapuí benefited more than the others from its long emancipation process because it taught residents and public employees to collaborate with each other. Social workers of the Health and Social Development Departments organized weekly talks in each community to list demands, and to discuss possible solutions. They also gave assistance to local associations. Social workers helped residents to elaborate projects for funding agencies, and to fill in forms for the appropriate donor agencies. Residents realized that things could work faster if they cooperate with the government. For example, when the government provided material and land, they willingly used their time to build the houses, health posts, and schools. Residents learned to make demands and press for what they wanted; they also understood better the importance of demanding accountability from their leaders.

The emancipation struggle had also taught government leaders to enhance residents' organizational skills so that

they could participate in the administration. In Icapuí, for example, the administration suggested health policies to be discussed in the local health committees. The nurses and social workers of the Department of Health prepared visual material to introduce the issue for discussion. They laid out the proposition's main objectives, what it would accomplish, and how people from the community could help. The very process of bringing some issues to discussion elicited new ways of thinking about possibilities of implementing fewer costly measures.

Yet, the democratization trend alone does not explain good municipal performance, neither does the emancipation process. The unusual return of educated people to the town is another interesting aspect about Icapuí, which enhanced participation. Usually, when people from small Brazilian towns go away to study (these towns do not have colleges, even high schools seldom exist), they stay in bigger cities after receiving their degrees. In contrast, in Icapuí the mayor could chose his secretaries among his long time supporters, former members of the students' movement in Fortaleza. Sevanteen peers in the movement returned to Icapuí hoping to carry out a long range plan of developing their town. These politicized ex-students returned to Icapuí as junior professionals committed to reform. They were engineers, agronomists, dentists, teachers, historians, economists, managers, physicians, nurses, social workers, and a geologist. They occupied key positions in the local

government: Communication, Planning, and Finance Assessors; Heads of the Municipal Departments of Social and Economic Development, of Education, of Health, of Work, of Administration; School Principals, and City Councilors.

After long debates in many community meetings, this idealist group of seventeen young professionals decided that education and health would be the administration's top priorities. They realized that they needed to target basic services to break the hold of the previous system of patronage. These sectors were fundamental to their goal of real change. The fact that they would give public education and medical assistance to everyone meant that the previous structure of favors and dependence would disappear. This broad access to services was the most significant step to break with the traditional way of doing politics in the interior.

Although the administration of Icapuí had this core group of Fortaleza ex-students that had returned to live and work in the interior, they were insufficient to fill all necessary positions in the local government. Outsiders were also incorporated and helped to make the government more efficient. For example, a public health specialist from Paraíba became the Municipal Secretary of Health because she had connections with health professionals of this core group through medical meetings in Fortaleza and João Pessoa. Doctors, dentists, and nurses came from Fortaleza, because they had studied with the people of Icapuí, or knew about

the work they were doing. This inclusion of outsiders with few ties to old-style local politicians further severed limits to the patronage system and helped the efficient delivery of services without eliciting claims of loyalty to coopt the new administration.

State Government versus Local Alliances

The first municipal election split some of the alliances of people which had been formed during the struggle for independence. After emancipation former allies took different sides while campaigning for opposing political parties. The electoral campaigns and the dispute over political positions in the three new municípios reflected diverging personal or economic interests; e.g., an uncle and a nephew ran against each other as mayoral candidates, and relatives competed to be appointed to important positions in the local government. Conflict appeared also when family members urged elected mayors or city councillors to replicate traditional practices of nepotism. Family ties and political loyalty in public and private administrations usually are indicators of inefficiency and corruption.

An interesting balance between the traditional and the new way of doing politics while governing their towns happened with the mayors of Croatá and Horizonte. (See details in Chapter Two) Although the mayors adopted innovations and improved services in their towns, they also succumbed to familiar pressures. So even using old nepotism oriented

choices to appoint a few key positions, these mayors avoided corruption in the government by adopting the criteria of merit and competence to select all public personnel. Furthermore they included participatory practices in the management.

The fact that family members of the mayors of Horizonte and Croatá took active part in the administration was a counter intuitive finding because the presence of relatives did not harm the credibility of these administrations. Despite this seemingly old style politics, the local administrations have performed efficiently neither incurring in corruption nor in patronage in the eyes of their constituencies.

The first mayor of Croatá previously had been a mayoral candidate in Guaraciaba do Norte (Croatá former municipal seat), in a rightist party called the Social Democratic Party (PDS). Defeated, he changed to a more progressive party--the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The first mayor of Horizonte also won the elections as a PSDB candidate, and took office in 1989. He had been director of an important construction firm in Fortaleza, with no previous electoral experience.⁷⁰ The first mayors of

⁷⁰ Horizonte poet Medeiros summarized strong feelings in this popular rime:
"An intelligent mayor does not despise his people ...
The voter who is clever voted for him because good voters do not sell their votes, and
Horizonte now has an educated and competent ruler ...
Searching for liberty he was a pioneer ...
Horizonte believes in the talent of this young engineer"

Horizonte and Croatá took office at the same time as Icapuí's second mayor.

Croatá and Horizonte mayors won the elections running in the same party as the state government, the PSDB. Therefore, both municípios got state support more easily than Icapuí, a PT administration. Although Croatá is far from Fortaleza, the município is still able to influence state government decisions favorably through political party ties. Horizonte was privileged in this respect because, in addition to using political ties, the mayor and the secretaries could pressure state departments personally and obtain faster release of money because of the proximity. Recently, despite of being in the opposition, Icapuí has been receiving state support because of its striking work.

The striking work of Icapuí is the result of a long process. The campaign to choose the first mayor continued to mobilize the same people grouped around the emancipation struggle. The candidate of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)⁷¹ won, and took office in 1986. This mayor had been the student leader, and the combative councilor who had led the struggle for emancipation. As mayor, he began making reforms, suppressing political influences, setting up social investments, and advancing the school and the health systems. These had been priorities since the beginning of his political campaign as mayoral

⁷¹ Formerly a leftist party, it became center, and now is pending to the right.

candidate, as well as recurrent demands while he served his term as city councilor in Aracati.

Although he had run as a PMDB, the commitment of the entire administration of Icapuí to change the old-style politics was an affront to the Ceará PMDB leadership. PMDB members regarded Icapuí's affiliates as radicals because they aimed at drastic changes. It became apparent after some time in office that the reformists lacked enough party support to pass their initiatives.⁷² In consequence, all members of the administration decided to change their party affiliation from PMDB to PT--the Workers' Party. Many respondents in my interviews pointed out: "PT is more suitable than PMDB for governmental reforms." People think this party has a more radical position in "favor of the poor," and that "PT gives voters access to school, medical care, and voice." The Workers' Party got reelected twice and began in January 1993 its third consecutive term in Icapuí.

The fact that Icapuí officially became a member of PT, an opposition party, exacerbated its difficulties because the state government was run by PMDB affiliates. Political party divergences forced Icapuí to assume sole responsibility for primary education and basic health care--a responsibility previously shared with the state government. Party politics led to the premature

⁷² A local newspaper printed in highlights in July, 1987: State government does not care about the road:"The governor is a step-father to Icapuí."

"municipalization" of basic services in Icapuí. Since education and health were shared responsibilities with the state (discussed in Chapter Two), most municípios had neither qualified personnel nor the necessary infrastructure to provide such services. The newly emancipated were the most deprived of all. In this case, the local government had an additional source of pressure for good performance. Despite all the constraints imposed by political confrontation, the young leaders opposed the state government to prove their ideals. It was a matter of local pride.

In a way, beginning from scratch the experience of installing a new município, with its inherent administrative and judicial difficulties, had prepared the local government to cope with the responsibilities of providing basic services in education and health. Fortunately, Icapuí managed to sustain some support from the state Department of Education in spite of its political party conflicts.

The state Department of Education had an extremely important role in providing training for teachers, both locally, in neighboring towns, and in Fortaleza. State training programs were available even to dissidents like Icapuí because the bureaucratic layers between the city and the governor's office were not concerned with ongoing political differences. The role of the state government is rather complex because tasks (like training) continue to be performed in a routine basis, despite major political

disagreements between the state and the municipal leadership. It goes beyond decentralization matters.

Assistance from state employees also solved some managerial problems. The município received outside help to do technical and even political tasks it could not do alone. When the proper assistance within the public administration framework fails, the mayor and secretaries looked for support in the private sector or from NGOs. Icapuí and Horizonte, for instance, hired a consultant firm from Fortaleza to do their accounting. They also used the services of other consultants to help them in their various presentations to get funding. Croatá did the same.

Another point concerning state-local relations refers to the asymmetry of information during decentralization (mentioned in Chapter Two), when the distribution of the decision making power, responsibilities, and funds impeded an even participation of all municípios. Two factors affected distribution: distance and political alliances. For instance, Croatá was very isolated because it is the furthest distance away from the state capital (352 km), about ten hours by bus. Icapuí, at five hours (206 km) distance should have gotten information faster than Croatá, but slower than Horizonte the nearest of the three. To offset distance Croatá has kept a strong bond with the state government because both belong to the same political party. Horizonte (40 km) is only one hour away from Fortaleza by bus certainly has double advantage--same political party and

the least distance. Horizonte draws resources faster than Icapuí because of its stronger political alliances. However, greater distance (like Croatá) may be an advantage. It provides autonomy to field-based bureaucrats or extension agents, and gives them more freedom to act because supervision by state employees may be weaker.⁷³

Antagonistic relations among municípios and the state government restricted the access to information and resources, keeping mayors from intervening in state government decisions. The crucial point in these cases refers less to the distance itself, and more to which mechanisms these municípios use to communicate well and to get what they need. Political party ties do play a decisive role in spreading information and giving support to the mayors. The vantage of sharing the same party as the state government is not sufficient to explain the success of Horizonte and Croatá. Icapuí, for instance, was able to overcome the handicap of being opposition and get the state support by performing exceptionally well.

In the next section I will present mechanisms of protest and participation as essential channels for democratic government. I will analyze why participation was relevant for good government, using Icapuí as the example.

Increased Popular Participation in Local Government

One of the reasons for local governments' success was

⁷³ See Lipsky, (1980).

public participation. The new Constitution allowed citizens to take part in the formulation of public policies. For example, there are two legal provisions explicitly for popular participation: a) representative associations taking part in municipal planning, and b) the possibility of at least 5% of the electorate to sign a proposal for a legislation to pass in the city council. Participation takes time out of other activities and requires democratic practices unusual for most people.⁷⁴ Participation also brings the responsibility to comply with decisions taken collectively. The simple presence of committees and councils involved in decision-making made actions difficult to conceal.

Formal citizen participation in the government, for example, became relevant in Icapuí when combined with reform-minded leadership. A wave of demonstrations that took place in Icapuí before and shortly after emancipation. The biggest march for emancipation brought almost half of the population to the streets in 1985. Mobilization continued after emancipation, and in 1987 public servants demanded on the streets the approval of the wage and career plan proposed by the local government but opposed by some city councillors. The mayor's plan passed and the demonstration served to give him legitimacy in the eyes of the "vereadores" and the town. Another manifestation

⁷⁴ See Watson (1992) for a detailed description of how local sanitation agencies interacted mainly with women because they had more time for meetings during office hours.

similarly buoyed up the city's second mayor. In 1989, a defeated mayoral candidate took legal action to contest the elections. People in the town say that he bribed a judge to suspend his opponent's mandate, which infuriated the whole population and led to high school students going on hunger strike to support the newly elected mayor, vice-mayor and some city councilors.

Health became an issue very "visible" in newly emancipated towns because of the prior neglect they had been through. Popular protest in 1986 forced the local administration to take over the town's only health post, operated by SESP (Foundation of the Special Service of Public Health). This protest forced the local government to take the health unit away from the SESP foundation, and assume the responsibility of providing for the service with its own budget and personnel. This episode started the process of municipalization of services--transferring to the município full responsibility of the medical service. The so called "municipalization" here resulted from multilateral pressures from residents, the local administration, and the state and federal governments. It was an opportunity for local government to improve the service and to extend it to more beneficiaries, and for the state and federal governments thus broadening their decentralization process.

Since 1986, when the first post-emancipation local government took office, mayors of Icapuí have been doing the opposite of what traditional mayors did. The local

administration itself was composed of ex-political activists, who came to power after being in the student's movement in Fortaleza. This combination of popular pressure and reform-minded management led to concrete improvements in the public sector. Equally ex-activists understood that participation had its shortcomings from their own experience. It lengthened the decision-making process and mobilization was difficult to maintain. The group recognized the need for community organizing. The group took advantage of its previous experience to foster participation in the local government effectively. Their experience became known throughout Brazil as a good municipal administration. This case affected distant places like Horizonte and Croatá, where no activists assumed offices in the government.⁷⁵

The openness of the administration changed the political power structure in Icapuí. All local associations worked together with public officials to formulate the government municipal budget. They discuss and decide how to allocate the government revenues. The mayor was no longer the all-powerful figure whom everybody else feared. The municipal staff had responsibilities and funds distributed among them, the flow of information was not monopolized by anyone in higher positions, nor was restricted to the core group. Therefore, presence in community meetings and

⁷⁵ There is the exception of the former secretary of education in Croatá, who had been an activist in the sixties and seventies.

popular representation became worthwhile, and inhabitants wanted to participate in local decisions. Organized neighborhoods received benefits faster than those lacking good representation. For instance, the local government guided by Redonda's neighborhood association solved the problem that impeded fishermen of stocking their product. They needed ice to stock lobster and sell it later at a better price than that offered by intermediaries. Fishermen discussed their problems first locally, then introduced it to the municipal government. The municipal Department of Social and Economic Development negotiated funds with the state department of social action to build an ice factory in Redonda, which came into operation in 1992. Fishermen then became independent from the sales intermediaries, and gained competitiveness for their product by selling it in larger amounts.

This success in Redonda helped stimulate participation of the less organized communities nearby. For example, the community of Belém had problems of land tenure for many years. After seeing the fishermen's results, the inhabitants of Belém also formed an association. They discussed their problems exhaustively with a social worker of the municipal staff, then they obtained the administration support to negotiate with the company that owned the land they lived on. At first, the contacts with company managers were difficult, but the inhabitants of Belém persisted and eventually they settled a very favorable

agreement. The company gave them land for the housing project. Before beginning the project, the company did a socioeconomic survey, planned different sized houses and utilities to meet the needs of the community. The municipal administration is providing all public services and building material, and community members are building the houses with technical assistance from company architects and engineers. Belém began to send representatives to every local meeting, even after the matter was completely settled.⁷⁶

One of the advantages of listening to local demands is that sometimes they suggest innovative solutions to their own problems. For example, isolated communities in Icapuí, such as Retiro Grande and Ponta Grossa previously unserved now receive visits from nurses and doctors by motorcycle. This was an affordable way to transport the Health Department employees within the município's 400 square kilometers of sandy soil.

One interesting aspect of the Department of Social Development is its direct interaction with the public. The Social Development Department functions in front of the main square of Icapuí. During office hours, the office of the social workers keeps its big window constantly open, so that people from the square will feel free to come in anytime,

⁷⁶ As a consequence of this episode, another very isolated community also started to organize itself to obtain a satisfactory solution to its similar problem of land. The community of Retiro Grande holds a small piece of shore, and has no access to the road because the manager of the big cashew plantation around forbids them of entering the farm lands. They only can leave their homes during the low tide. The medical assistance also only reaches the community by motorcycle by the shore line. When I left, they were beginning to meet regularly to discuss their problems, and had asked for assistance of the municipal staff, so I didn't get to see their meeting with the social worker.

and place their demands. They can also just walk in and talk to the Secretary in his inner room. It is not unusual that, after chatting for a while with the social workers, community representatives or residents call on the Secretary to plead their claims, or to show the benefits of their project. Presidents and treasurers of community associations are on hand to fill in accounting forms, provide account balances, and report expenditures to donors.

This interaction between public personnel and the population helps people to understand bureaucratic procedures. It also eliminates most of the information asymmetry between beneficiaries of government projects and their officials.⁷⁷ Furthermore, because social workers have the authority to solve many problems, the mayor's and secretaries' have more time to obtain available resources and advance further administrative reforms. Decentralization of decision making led to alternative strategies for making changes and improvements. I will discuss municipal councils next.

Municipal Councils

One major factor that enhanced participation was the implementation of the municipal councils which were mandated by the new Constitution of 1988.⁷⁸ Few municípios responded

⁷⁷ The municipal authority becomes less concentrated in the mayor and secretaries, which brings a fair amount of decentralization to local decisions. See for information asymmetry Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne (1990), and Weiss (1987) for cooperation among public agencies.

⁷⁸ The Child and Youth Council, the Municipal Council of Education, the Municipal Council of Health and Sanitation, the Municipal Council of Civil Defense, and the Municipal Council of Environment.

correctly to this mandate, especially concerning true participation in administrative decisions. The municipal councils in many municípios in Ceará still do not meet regularly. Some do not enforce councils' recommendations. Others choose weak representatives among the existing organizations to bypass control and to allow misuse of funds. In contrast, the three municípios I studied took the possibilities for change seriously, but each reacted differently to the inclusion of participatory mechanisms in their governments. They structured their councils according to their priorities. The so called "transparency" or complete information about government actions in Icapuí is the highest among the three.

The Municipal Councils began in Icapuí shortly after its Organic Law was approved in 1990 by the city council-- "Câmara dos Vereadores."⁷⁹ Municipal councils have delegates from each district and community, chosen from presidents of neighborhood associations, representatives of other organizations, church groups, and unions to present their demands. Each department of the local government also takes part in the municipal council of its respective area of action. The attendance at meetings has been increasing each year, and the task of representing local views in the council is taken seriously by those who the communities choose as delegates. The neighborhood associations and

⁷⁹ Organic Law of Icapuí Section 1 Municipal Administration Art. 82 includes consultant, assessor and decision bodies that might be formed by community representatives for each area. For instance, a Municipal Council of Health, etc.

other local associations each have their own requirement for quorum, and the members vote on simple majority basis. Delegates need to conform to the ideas of the people they represent. If they do otherwise, they receive complaints from other members and lose their position in the council. In small towns is not difficult to see their true position because the meetings are open to anyone. These meetings' internal dynamics reflect the increasingly interest of residents in the government's actions.

Besides neighborhood associations, unions, and the municipal councils there are smaller organizations more focused on specific problems, for example, the health committees. Icapuí's future health leaders attended the Eighth National Conference of Health, in 1985, and brought back the idea of health committees and SILOS (Local Systems of Health). Each neighborhood started its own health committee, which held monthly meetings for people to say what needed to be done, and to evaluate previous government actions. These meetings took place in health posts, now distributed within walking distance of most households. Afterwards these associations' representatives presented demands to the Health Council.

Each municipal council held monthly meetings to evaluate actions already undertaken, and each community presented new demands or suggestions to guide the government actions. All municipal councils continue to meet together at least twice a year to deliberate about the budget. For

instance, the Municipal Council of Education brings its plans, the Municipal Council of Health and Sanitation its demands, and they defend their propositions. At the end all propositions are voted and ranked in priorities, establishing which percentage of municipal revenue will be dedicated to each. These meetings also point to areas that changed with the direct demand from the beneficiaries.

These participatory mechanisms launched in public administration opened opportunities for previously excluded groups, such as inhabitants of faraway districts, to participate in the local government. Icapuí's local health committees, and the school collegiate body which replaced Redonda's elementary school principal, represent further steps in the direction of a broader participation in local government. The interaction between administrators and popular delegates in this forum significantly affects the public policy outcomes. Solutions are much more grounded on what is really going on. Technical solutions are discussed in simple terms, and this helps to generate an effective exchange of information among all segments involved. It also eliminates problems of misunderstanding among professional staff and the general population.

Simultaneously it reveals simpler ways of doing things.

One funny episode concerning the sanitary conditions of communities illustrates this interaction. Information about the spread of parasites through animals was disseminated in the community of Redonda by children going to each house to

ask people to stop the tradition of keeping livestock in the house. After a science class thought them more, these environmentally conscious children became very concerned with the consequences of pigs roaming on the beach, and made a concerted effort to change this practice.⁸⁰

Dissemination of Public Management Innovations

In this section, I will demonstrate how open communities increased the speed of change. Good performance itself triggers more efficiency within the administration with a catalytic effect. Reform happens in part by spreading information about what is successful elsewhere, through spontaneous networks, like kinship ties. For instance, a cousin of Icapuí's Secretary of Health brought the news of Icapuí's educational innovation to Iguatú. Another relative, a dentist cousin of another Icapuí doctor heard the story of how Icapuí had started "SILOS." He influenced the Secretary of Health to apply the same principles in the health system of Croatá. Relatives of the Croatá mayor told him about the successful dental care prevention program in Guaraciaba do Norte. Then, he decided to bring the same people to lower the rates of cavities, lost, and treated teeth (CPO-D) presented by Croatá children.⁸¹ The average of seven CPO-D found in the survey

⁸⁰ I never saw a pig on the beach while I was there, and I think it is a sign of success because it is usual to find chicken, pigs, and goats on the streets and on the beach in other places I visited in Ceará.

⁸¹ CPO-D is the rate of bad teeth in the population. The program of Guaraciaba do Norte appeared in O Povo, an important Fortaleza newspaper.

in Guaraciaba do Norte really worried specialists because the World Health Organization (WHO) sets an ideal rate of three CPO-D.⁸² During my research, a similar survey was being conducted in Croatá, and the dentists in charge were expecting an even worse result. They had started a preventive program to teach to brush teeth, and to stress the habit of brushing teeth three times a day. Schools started fluorine applications weekly. Community meetings started discussing other measures to improve dental health with the professionals, as they had been doing about educational problems.

Professional ties also help to spread innovations, for instance, the mayors of Horizonte and Icapuí got acquainted during APRECE, the mayoral association meetings. Although they belong to different political parties, they talked about Icapuí's innovations. As a result, Horizonte teachers visited an Icapuí school to observe how they made their own text books.⁸³ Medical Meetings also spread the reforming trend of "municipalization" of services through good experiences that participants presented. It is significant how the exchange of information in these occasions leads to a proliferation of efficient administrative actions. For instance, the knowledge of other processes and experiences

⁸² There is no data for the average rate in the state to make comparisons with other places.

⁸³ It was a common effort of students and teachers to respond to constant delays in the distribution of school didactic materials by FAE.

made the adoption of SILOS principles in the local system of health much easier after tested in places like Icapuí.

The young professionals recruited to work in these three municípios knew current ideas of primary health care and education. They participated actively in professional networks. They had information about experiences in other cities in the state or beyond, and used it to foster administrative progresses. This had a major effect in the municípios' performance, e.g., the influence of preventive care in the system of health adopted in Icapuí. Other municípios that did not have this professional background had more trouble carrying out innovative government.

Horizonte and Croatá had no spontaneous return of educated people as Icapuí, neither they had the ideological commitment of the Icapuí group. Nevertheless, their local governments had a platform to orient the development of their municípios and they used some effective strategies to make up for this lack. Therefore, besides paying higher salaries and other incentives to keep qualified staff, they also gave more autonomy to the high-ranking employees to stimulate their creativity and commitment. The mayor of Croatá advertised positions for doctors in Fortaleza's newspapers, with wages calculated in dollars to attract medical professionals to his município. Otherwise, Croatá would not have been able to offer proper medical care to its inhabitants.

Horizonte used a different strategy. The mayor opened a public contest to hire teachers and doctors, offering in addition to high salaries, the opportunity of a flexible schedule. In this way, the município attracted qualified professionals, who could keep their jobs in Fortaleza as well. For example, one doctor accumulated his 20 hours a week doing his ten hour rounds on weekends. Another one worked only Thursdays and Fridays. The schedules were distributed so that a doctor would always be on duty there.

The need for expertise to deliver good services explains why the mayor of Croatá chose experts for the departments of health and education even if they were from different political parties. Although a PSDB member, the mayor chose the Secretary of Education from PMDB. The reason for this choice was the competence of the secretary to solve the problems and give the improvements expected to happen in Croatá. For example, at its beginning, the administration following the recommendation of this secretary called a meeting with representatives from all localities to discuss the priority problems to be tackled from 1989 to 1992. The first meeting was held in 1989 to identify all localities' problems and expectations, so that they would be included in the município's government plan. The former Secretary of Education coordinated this first meeting, and a second one--"Meeting for the Municipal Development of Croatá," in January of 1992. This second meeting evaluated the general administrative efficiency, and

concluded that the government had followed its plan closely. Periodical public opinion surveys conducted during the first three years of the administration have shown a high degree of satisfaction with the government.⁸⁴

To sum up, this chapter describes how the struggle for emancipation helped Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte to unify their communities, giving people experience in organizing and protesting. This experience translated in constant pressure on the public sector for administrative performance and forced mayors to incorporate public participation in the local government with excellent results.

⁸⁴ The Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion - IBOPE conducted these surveys with the following results: in 1990, 89% of the people interviewed classified the local government either good (49%) or excellent(40%). In 1991, 94% considered good (53%) or excellent (41%) The evaluation respectively ranked health excellent (57%) and good (32%), and education (59%) excellent and (38%) good. In 1992, the number of people satisfied grew to 97%, the ones considering the administration good were 64%, and 33% ranked it as excellent.

CONCLUSIONS

Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte presented outstanding local governments. They solved many public sector problems common to most Brazilian municípios. Several factors converged to make their local administrations more responsible, efficient, and democratic. First, the struggle for emancipation brought cohesiveness around shared ideals. During the process of emancipation the residents and the local government learned to interact and work together to solve local problems. The struggle also taught inhabitants of these municípios the value of collective action. Then, popular organizations, such as neighborhood associations, workers' unions, church-oriented groups efficiently demanded more schools, medical care, roads and other services. The protest and mobilization before emancipation turned into a steady pressure on the new governments to produce solutions to all pending demands, mainly concerning the lack of basic public services. The struggle produced delayed effects enhancing participation.

All three governments incorporated public participation. Each government did this differently, but in all three it improved administrative performance. These new governments gradually banished traditional politics and included popular organizations in the decision-making and ruling of their towns. They avoided previous corruption, patronage, and clientelism by spreading public services to

all inhabitants, breaking pre-emancipation links with nepotism and influence-peddling. The "soft sectors" were the root of most problems in the public sector. Thus, the universalization of medical assistance and education for all children became strategic goals to dismantle old values in politics.

Participation inserted in public management gave these governments constant feedback and evaluation about whether proposed actions had solved problems, while helping to plan future interventions. The process of planning collectively in the municipal councils presented a creative way of sharing information and maximizing resources between the government and the population. At the same time, governments gained legitimacy in the eyes of the local residents. Technicians, public employees and population shared their knowledge before reaching an agreement about which policy was to be enforced. Decisions about how resources and revenues would be distributed in the município took an important part of the planning and approval of the municipal budget. This process also created mechanisms of popular checking on government actions and expenditures.

Although these participatory practices seemed to follow an arduous and slow process, the enforcement of decisions proved easier and compliance proved greater than if less democratic decision-making process had been used. Deliberation on discordant issues presented some problems for the communities involved, and required the officials'

and the population's persistence. People became more cooperative during the exercise of sharing decisions. They were willing to participate, pay taxes and fees because they felt partially responsible for the government performance because they were participating in it. Optimistic expectations about local government performance set an important standard to guide procedures and to attain goals shared by all segments of these municipios' population. In these three cases, public regulations reflected the general concerns of the population. Thus, even taxation that usually evokes strong reactions, became much easier to enforce. A mayor put it this way: "When the population knew why the government was asking for more money, collecting taxes was no longer a big problem."

Third, Icapuí, Croatá, and Horizonte used the guidelines in the new Constitution to transform their conduct, adopting institutional innovations in their local governments. Progressive municipios used their autonomy differently than most other local governments. They used the opportunities opened by the national fiscal reform to explore untapped revenue. Their administrations received direct popular pressure to institute decentralized services. Decentralization gave financial support for many municipal reforms. For instance, now they went beyond charging property taxes and other local sources. They also gathered extra-funding from federal and state governments, or international agencies and NGOs to do specific projects.

Locally, decentralization of decisions led to better coordination of actions among all sectors of the local government. Some officials were able to push innovations further based on delegation of decision power to others. Each sector improved its own performance, thus assuring the general efficiency of the government. But, decentralization is not enough. Cooperation among local managers and the inclusion of new networks such as professional ties, besides kinship and political party proved an efficient way to bring support, and for spreading good experiences.

Fourth, the incorporation of qualified professionals into public administration reflected the new tendency for modernizing the public sector. The process of recruiting and keeping professionals in the interior brings success for local governments. Strategic solutions such as public contests to hire civil employees, payment of high salaries, and periodical training played a key role to advance reform. These solutions showed professionalism and merit as criteria of selection, thus establishing political credibility for the administrations. It was a politically astute way of obtaining administrative efficiency. Simultaneously the local government was detaching old-style entrenched politicians from threatening its performance through the action of loyal allies, who might sabotage the modernizing reforms.

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ANNEX ONE

TABLE 5 INTERVIEWS in MUNICIPALITIES

	CROATÁ	HORIZONTE	ICAPUÍ	IGUATÚ	QUITERIANOPOLIS
MAYOR	1	1	2	1	1
VICE-MAYORS	1	1	2	1	
CITY COUNCILPERSON	2		3	2	
SEC. ADMINISTRATION	1		2		
SEC. AGRICULTURE	1	1	1	1	1
COMDECS	1	1	5	5	1
EMATERCE	4	1	2	4	1
IBAMA				1 ⁸⁵	
SEC. EDUCATION	1	1	3	1	1
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF	5	4	8	3	2
SCHOOL PRINCIPAL	2	1	3		1
TEACHERS	8	4	9	2	2
LIBRARIAN			1		
FINANCE	1	1	2		
SEC. HEALTH	1	1	1		1
HEALTH AGENTS	3	2	8	2	2
COORDINATORS OF H.A.	1	1	1		
HEALTH SUPERVISORS	1	1	3		
DOCTORS	3	2	4	2	
BIOCHEMISTRY	1				
NURSES	2	2	4		
DENTISTS	2		2		
CRUTAC INTERNS	4		2		
SEC. SOCIAL DEVELOP.	1	1	1		1
NOTARY	1		1		1
COELCE				1 ⁸⁶	
CATHOLIC PRIEST	1		2		
TOTAL	49	26	72	26	15

⁸⁵ Brazilian Institute for the Environment.

⁸⁶ An engineer of the Ceará Electrification Company.

TABLE 6 INTERVIEWS in FORTALEZA

GOVERNOR	2
STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE	387
EDUCATION	688
HEALTH	389
PLANNING	990
SOCIAL ACTION AND WORK	891
TOTAL	44

TABLE 7 POPULATION GENDER

	CROATÁ	HORIZONTE	ICAPUÍ
Male	7,322	9,329	6,971
Female	7,504	8,933	6,694

87 At the Ceará Agriculture and Technical Extension Service (EMATERCE), and in its agencies in the municípios, I interviewed two directors, two veterinarians, six agronomists, two zoo-technicians, and an economist from the Center of Agriculture Studies and Research (CEPA).

88 I had a long interview with six school supervisors.

89 I interviewed three Coordinators for the Regional Directories (DERES)

90 I interviewed the Secretary of Planning, and at the Ceará Institute of Planning Foundation (IPLANCE) I interviewed the president, five assessors and three directors of Departments.

91 I interviewed the Secretary of Social Actions and Work, three assistants, the head of the Social Action Foundation (FAS), an assessor of the Technical Assistance (ADITEC), the head of the Center for Handcrafts (CEART), the head of the Department of Community Action (DAC), the head of the Division of Communities (DC), four social workers and two sociologists. I also interviewed three coordinators of the Drought Relief Program in the Civil Defense State Council (CEDEC).

