

Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics

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
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ABSTRACT

Are apologies and other acts of contrition necessary to reduce threat and build trust between former adversaries? This has become an accepted conventional wisdom, despite the fact that the effects of contrition have not yet been tested. This dissertation outlines and tests an “apology theory” of international politics, thus contributing to debates within international relations theory about the role of intentions in threat perception between states, as well as to policy debates about the role of contrition in peace building.

The apology theory posits that a state’s “policies of remembrance” affect perception of its intentions in the eyes of other states, and thus influence the degree to which others see it as threatening. According to the theory, apologies foster perception of benign intentions and thus reduce threat perception. I test the apology theory in two empirical case studies: South Korean threat perception of Japan and French threat perception of Germany, both since World War II. To determine whether my findings appear valid in other cases, I conduct three “mini-cases”: Chinese and Australian perceptions of Japan, and British perceptions of Germany.

The study has three principal findings. First, the Japan case shows that denial of past violence (unapologetic remembrance) is pernicious for bilateral relations; it fuels distrust and increases threat perception between states. Acknowledgement of past violence is vital for former adversaries to establish productive and friendly relations. Second, the European case shows that moving beyond acknowledgement of past violence—undertaking extensive policies of contrition—yields little benefit. When the French discuss their perceptions of Germany, they emphasize factors other than remembrance. Third, moving beyond a basic acknowledgement of past violence to policies of contrition may actually be harmful for relations. The case of Japan suggests that policies of contrition can trigger domestic backlash, which in turn alarms observers. The potential backlash effect from contrition is an important finding for academic and activist literatures on post-conflict peace-building, which often recommend policies of contrition, but have neglected to consider its potential negative effects.

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Introduction

Everyone seems to be apologizing for something these days. Previously, states impenitently invaded, raped, pillaged, and plundered. Diplomats issued apologies only to paper over minor breaches of protocol. But in the years following World War II, states and groups have begun to offer—and victims have begun to demand—apologies and other acts of contrition for past violence.¹ Today leaders apologize to foreign victims of past atrocities or aggression.² Leaders even offer apologies for *inaction*, such as Bill Clinton's lament over America's failure to stop the Rwandan genocide.³ Religious institutions, groups, and private businesses have also joined the chorus of apologetic voices.⁴ As contrition grows more common, offenders who fail to offer it are

¹ As late as World War I, apologies were neither offered nor sought for war responsibility or conduct. The victors demanded massive reparations from Germany, and included in the Treaty of Versailles a "war guilt" clause in which Germany was forced to accept responsibility for having started the war. The Germans bitterly resented this clause and fought its inclusion until the last moment of the negotiations.

² Numerous German leaders issued apologies for World War II and the Holocaust: for statements by Theodore Heuss, Kurt Schumacher, Roman Herzog, Richard Von Weizsäcker, Helmut Kohl and others see Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). For the Czech-German joint declaration see Christian Caryl, "After a half-century, an apology exchange," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 23, 1996. On Japanese apologies see Edward W. Desmond, "Finally, a Real Apology," *Time*, August 28, 1995; Norma Field, "The Stakes of Apology," *Japan Quarterly* Vol. 42, no. 4 (October-December 1995), pp.405-418. Bill Clinton apologized to the Guatemalans for support of right-wing organizations there that killed tens of thousands of people. John M. Broder, "Clinton Offers His Apologies to Guatemala," *New York Times*, March 11, 1999, A1. British Prime Minister Tony Blair apologized to the Irish for British indifference to Irish suffering in the potato famine. Sarah Lyall, "The Irish Famine and the English," *New York Times*, June 8, 1997. On apologies among the Balkan states for atrocities in the Yugoslav civil war, see "Marovic Apologizes to Bosnians" (November 17), and "Belgrade, Zagreb Exchange Apologies," (September 15), Balkan Reconstruction Report newsletter, at <http://balkanreport.tol.cz>.

³ Emily Mitchell, "Apologies: who's sorry now?" Index of Censorship, May-June 1998; "Guilt Trip," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1998.

⁴ Pope John Paul II has apologized for numerous policies of the Catholic church, notably the church's failure to oppose the Holocaust. See Celestine Bohlen, "Vatican Repents Failure to Save Jews from Nazis," *New York Times*, March 17, 1998, p. A1; Paul Elie, "John Paul's Jewish Dilemma," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, April 26, 1998, pp. 34-39. In 1995 he apologized to "every woman" for the Church's stance against women's rights and for the historical subjugation of women. See "Um, Sorry About That," *Time*, October 13, 1997. On the apology from the IRA see Brian Lavery, "I.R.A. Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in its 30-Year Campaign," *New York Times*, July 17, 2002. On the Swiss Nazi gold controversy see Martin Gordon, "Swiss 'Blackmail' Apology," *Daily Telegraph*, January 16, 1997. On reparations claims to General Motors and Ford Motor Company by former forced laborers, see Edmund L. Andrews, "G.M. Opel Unit Says It's Likely to Pay Nazi-Era Slaves," *New York Times*, December 14, 1999.

criticized by other states and by the international media.⁵ Victims (both individuals⁶ and states⁷) increasingly demand recognition and apologies for their suffering.

As the visibility of contrition has increased in international affairs, so have claims about its significance. We all know that apologies are important between individuals. From childhood we were taught that after we do something wrong, we should say we're sorry. Psychologists validate mom's wisdom with arguments about the restorative powers of apologies in human relationships.⁸ Apologies from governments are also clearly meaningful to individual victims; former POWs and other victims of state-sponsored violence provide wrenching testimony about the effects of denials

⁵ Critical of postwar Japan are Paul Abrahams, "Japan's Wartime Ghosts: Ugly Memories of the Past Have Been Subject to Collective Amnesia," *The Financial Times*, November 28 1998, p. 11; Valerie Reitman, "Japan, China Renew Ties; War Apology Clouds Talks," *The Los Angeles Times*, November 27, 1998, p. A1; Jonathan Watts, "Tokyo's War 'Remorse' Fails to Satisfy Jiang," *The Guardian*, November 28, 1998, p. 20; Roy L. Brooks, ed., *When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice* (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Penguin Books, 1998). On East Germany's failure to apologize, see Herf, *Divided Memory*. On Turkey's refusal to admit the 1920 genocide of Armenians, and the negative effect of this on Turkish-Armenian relations, see Christine Chinlund, "Should We Call it a Massacre or a Genocide?" *Boston Globe*, May 5, 2003; Nora Boustany, "Armenians Save their Tears for a New Museum," *Washington Post*, May 8, 2002; on Serbian unrepentance see Lawrence Weschler, "Beyond Victimhood?" *The New Yorker*, April 12, 1999, p. 25; Richard Bourdreaux, "For Many Serbs, No Sense of Guilt Over Atrocities," *Los Angeles Times*, July 2, 1999, p. 1. On European criticism of Austria's failure to deal with its past, see Andrew Nagorski, "The Politics of Guilt: Austria's Bigot, Europe's Burden," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May/June 2000); Edward Wong, "Holocaust Group to Step Up Pressure on Austria for Reparations," *New York Times*, July 20, 2000.

⁶ Former slave laborers and prisoners of war (POWs) have sought apologies and reparations from Japan and Germany for World War II. Women rounded up to serve as sexual slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army have also sought apologies and reparations. See "Discomfited Japan," *Economist*, December 16, 2000; George Hicks, "Ghosts Gathering," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 18, 1993. Also see George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Sex Slaves of the Japanese Imperial Forces* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); C. Sarah Soh, *Japan's Responsibility toward Comfort Women Survivors*. Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper, no. 77 (May 2001).

⁷ Japan sought an apology for the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; this proposal was twice rebuffed (first by President George H.W. Bush and then by President Bill Clinton). On the Bush and Clinton non-apologies see Sadao Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds. *Living with the Bomb* (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 182, 184; "No Apology For Hiroshima," *New York Times*, April 8, 1995; Michael Wines, "President Rejects Apology to Japan," *New York Times*, December 2, 1991. Hungary is demanding that the Czech Republic repeal the Benes decrees (that led to the expulsion of ethnic Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia after World War II. See "Czech Decrees, Dating to '40s, Divide Europe," *New York Times*, February 27, 2002.

⁸ For example see Aaron Lazare, "Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry," *Psychology Today* Vol. 28, no. 1 (1995), p. 40; Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); Michael E. McCullough, Everett Worthington, and Kenneth C. Rachal, "Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 73 (1997); Barry R. Schlenker and Bruce W. Darby, "The Use of Apologies in Social Predicaments," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (September 1981), pp. 271-278.

on their peace of mind, and the healing properties of admission and contrition.⁹ Scholars studying “transitional justice” argue that truth-telling—admission, contrition, and forgiveness for violence committed within a state by a previous authoritarian regime—supports democratization and domestic political stability.¹⁰

It would also appear that contrition has benign effects between states. One example is the case of Franco-German reconciliation. Mortal enemies for hundreds of years, these two nations did their best to kill millions of each other’s people in multiple major wars. France’s worst fears about the Germans only appeared to be confirmed by World War II, when Germany conquered France in 1940 and went about methodically gassing and shooting eleven million people across Europe. The chance for reconciliation after such trauma would appear remote. However after decades of German contrition for its aggression and atrocities, French and German relations are their warmest ever. France and Germany are loyal allies who stand up to the Americans together; they have joint military brigades and defense production; officials from France sit in German ministries and vice versa. As one French scholar puts it, “The idea of conflict between us is absolutely unthinkable.”¹¹ But was German contrition necessary for Franco-German rapprochement? Even if it wasn’t the only factor—obviously many other factors contributed—is there evidence that contrition played an important role in Franco-German reconciliation?

Contrition—or rather, its absence—also appears to matter a great deal in the international relations of East Asia. Japan has vacillated between denying, glorifying, and apologizing for its past

⁹ For testimony from the sexual slaves of the Japanese Army see articles in the special issue of the journal *Positions*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1997); for the testimony of other victims see Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).

¹⁰For example see Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,” *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1996); Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commission: 1974 to 1997: A Comparative Perspective,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1994), pp. 597-655; Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 68-98; Jonathan D. Tepperman, “Truth and Consequences,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002), pp. 128-145; William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).

¹¹ Personal Interview, Centre d’Etudes et des Recherches Internationales, October 2002..

aggression and atrocities.¹² Many people in the region appear to hate the Japanese. Every visitor has a story about an otherwise amiable Korean or Chinese taxi driver who launched into a tirade about how much he hates Japan. In a politically correct era, many Asians do not hesitate to express their hatred of the Japanese, and they say they feel this way because Tokyo tries to whitewash its history of aggression.

Observers have concluded from these and other cases that contrition has important effects on international relations. Activists and commentators assert that apologies are important and exhort states to issue them.¹³ Scholars argue that apologies can be important in mediation and conflict resolution.¹⁴ Scholars argue that German contrition has contributed to peace building within Europe,¹⁵ and that Japanese denials increase tensions in East Asia.¹⁶ In sum, many people

¹² See "Paying for War Slaves," *Economist*, July 8, 2000, p. 20; "Japan's Murky Past Catches Up," *Economist*, July 8, 2000, p. 59; "Discomfited Japan," *Economist*, December 16, 2000; Abrahams, "Japan's Wartime Ghosts"; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan's Plans for Museum on World War II Mired in Dispute," *New York Times*, May 20, 1995; "Old Memories Never Die," *Economist*, July 9, 1994; "That's Japan, by Jingo," *Economist*, March 27, 1993; Hicks, "Ghosts Gathering." On the evolution of Japanese remembrance see Steven T. Benfell, "A Past Worth Forgetting: Politics and the Institutionalization of War Memories in Japan," Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999; Benfell, "Why Can't Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory since 1945," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* (Spring 2002); John Dower, "Japan Address Its Wartime Responsibility," Vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1995).

¹³ Brooks, *When Sorry isn't Enough*; Chang, *The Rape of Nanking*; Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998).

¹⁴ Israeli apologies, or statements of admission, have been proposed in exchange for the Palestinians relinquishing their right of return. See Joseph Alpher and Khalil Shikaki, "The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the Right of Return," Working Paper, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, May 1998.

¹⁵ Kristof, "The Problem of Memory"; Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* Vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-154; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 193-243.

¹⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80; Robert Dujarric, ed. *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*. (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 1998); Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. *East Asian Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 3-31; Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan's Depression Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 26-36; Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," in Brown, et.al, eds., *East Asian Security*, pp. 332-351; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing"; Gerrit W. Gong, "The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues," *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 45-57; Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller, eds., *East Asian Security*, pp. 332-351; Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989).

argue—and much evidence suggests—that contrition has important effects on threat reduction and peace building between states.

Although many diplomats, scholars, and journalists have argued that contrition promotes reconciliation between former adversaries, scholars have just begun to study its effects.¹⁷ Is it true that apologies and other acts of contrition help resolve conflicts and promote reconciliation between formerly adversarial states? Do they pave the way for increased reconciliation and international cooperation? Does contrition have any possible negative side effects that should be brought to light and weighed against expected benefits? This study addresses these issues.

Understanding the effects of contrition is important before we can reasonably urge leaders to pay the potentially high costs of pursuing it. Apologies in international politics—particularly for policies pursued during major wars—can be very costly. First, by apologizing to foreign victims, a leader is telling his or her electorate: you and your former government are culpable of great crimes; and, your son not only died for nothing, he died for an unjust cause. Contrition may be politically costly to a leader if it triggers a backlash among his or her people. It may also result in threats to the leader's security or even life.¹⁸ Second, contrition may entail real financial costs. An apology is by definition an admission of guilt. Admitting guilt may expose a state to large, even financially crippling claims for reparations.¹⁹ Can these potential costs of contrition be justified by the magnitude of positive benefits? Do apologies do so much good for international relations that a leader might decide to pay these costs in the interests of international peace?

From the standpoint of international relations theory, contrition may be an untapped, underutilized instrument in conflict resolution. Peace-building has traditionally focused on reducing threats by constraining material power: controls on the number and kinds of weaponry a state is

¹⁷ For previous studies of apologies in international relations see Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Long and Brecke, *War and Reconciliation*.

¹⁸ A Japanese rightist tried to assassinate Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1994; Hosokawa was Japan's first postwar leader to refer to World War II as a Japanese "war of aggression." The would-be assassin said he had "no choice" but to shoot Hosokawa because of his "diplomacy of appeasement." See *Mainichi Daily News*, August 31, 1994.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the legal ramifications of apologies, see Jonathan R. Cohen. "Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons," unpublished manuscript, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. August 27, 2001.

allowed to buy; inspections and transparency regimes; rules about weapons deployments; the creation of buffer zones; the insertion of third-party troops to keep the peace. Are apologies and other acts of contrition useful ideational confidence-building measures that states should encourage in order to prevent conflicts and thus save lives?

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This dissertation tests the effects of “policies of remembrance” (apologetic and unapologetic) on perception of threat in two cases since World War II: Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and France and Germany. The project has three major findings with implications both for international relations theory and for policy making.

First, I find that denial of past violence is pernicious for bilateral relations; it fuels distrust and increases threat perception between states. Acknowledgement of past violence is vital for former adversaries to establish productive and friendly relations. Evidence from the Japan-ROK case supports this point; Japanese denial of its past actions—e.g., statements by high-ranking leaders, and whitewashing of history textbooks—has fueled distrust and dislike of Japan within the ROK, and raised South Korean fears of a Japanese threat. Australians and Chinese also say they distrust Japan because of its unapologetic policies of remembrance. Further evidence for the importance of acknowledging past violence can be found in Europe. After World War II, the Allies felt it was vital to instill a candid presentation of recent history in West German textbooks. Candid history teaching was seen as essential for preventing a recurrence of West German aggression, promoting German democratization, and furthering the development of a transnational European identity through institutions.

My second finding is that moving beyond acknowledgement of past violence—for example, undertaking extensive policies of contrition—yields little benefit. The European case provides evidence for this point; when the French discuss their perceptions of German intentions, they emphasize factors other than remembrance: particularly institutional membership, territorial claims, and democratization. French threat perception of Germany is also strongly driven by capabilities

(particularly France's nuclear deterrent and Germany's low level of conventional military power). In sum, German acknowledgement of its past crimes helped start the process of Franco-German reconciliation—and had important interaction effects with other reassuring factors such as democratization and institutional membership. However, Germany's later acts of contrition had little effect.

Third, moving beyond a basic acknowledgement of past violence to policies of contrition may ultimately be harmful for bilateral relations. The case of Japan suggests that policies of contrition can trigger domestic backlash; as one leader apologizes for past violence, others react by denying, justifying, or glorifying the country's past behavior. Contrition may thus inadvertently have negative effects on bilateral relations because the backlash it triggers fuels distrust of the country's intentions and raises threat perception. Although significant backlash did not occur in West Germany—even in response to much stronger acts of contrition than were offered in Japan—evidence suggests Germany is likely to be an outlier in this regard. Other cases from around the world show that backlash is common; West Germany's unique circumstances after the war also suggest that it, not Japan, is an outlier. The potential backlash effect from contrition is an important finding for academic and activist literatures on post-conflict peace-building, which often recommend policies of contrition, but have neglected to consider its potential negative effects.²⁰

Implications

This analysis has implications for both international relations theory and policy. Regarding international relations theory, many scholars have debated whether intentions play a significant role in threat assessment.²¹ This study finds support for theories of threat perception that incorporate

²⁰ For a similar point about the intra-state literature about “truth-telling,” see David Mendeloff, “Is Truth Telling Necessary for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding? A Critical Assessment of the Literature,” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, March 2003.

²¹ Neorealists argue that capabilities drive threat perception; see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Defensive realists argue that perceptions of intentions can influence threat perception if signals are credible. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security* Vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970);

perception of intentions as well as capabilities. Perceptions of intentions do factor into threat assessment, and the empirical testing in this study shows they are influenced by policies of remembrance, regime type, territorial claims, and institutional membership. However this study also finds support for the central role of capabilities in threat assessment; states' only fear those states that have *both* the capabilities and the intentions to do harm. Observers of East Asia often argue that emotionalism and resentment based on historical memory may trigger spirals of conflict between Japan and her former victims.²² However this study finds that resentment of Japanese denials does not translate to irrational assessments of a Japanese threat; Japan is not feared because it does not have both the capabilities and the intentions to harm its neighbors.

This study also has implications for policy making. In the aftermath of conflict, states should acknowledge past violence in order to promote conflict resolution and peace building. Denials are harmful to future relations. Leaders should not deny or glorify past violence; textbooks should present a candid portrayal of the state's past actions. However although offenders should acknowledge past violence, they should not pursue policies of contrition that are likely to provoke denials at home, and thus prove counterproductive. For their part, victims should not pressure the former offender for apologies; even if they receive an apology, the former victims are unlikely to be comforted by the backlash that is likely to result.

The Franco-German case serves as a successful model for the use of remembrance and commemoration in bilateral reconciliation. This case suggests that states should design commemoration in ways that are less likely to create backlash. They should emphasize a shared

Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing"; David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: How Perceptions of Intentions Influence International Politics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2000. Scholars in the constructivist paradigm argue that threat perception will be affected by perception of intentions, including signals that demonstrate a state's liberal or peaceful identity. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp.171-200; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-399; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* Vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391-426.

²² Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," Dujarric, ed. *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*; Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia"; Kristof, "The Problem of Memory." Also see Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156.

history; they should seek to spotlight historical moments in which one side was clearly not more guilty than the other. For example, France and West Germany staged commemorative events that emphasized the need for the two countries to surmount the tragedy of European great-power politics, which had continually led to deadly wars. The two countries reached back to World War I as a focal point in their commemoration (such as at Verdun cemetery); this deflected attention from German barbarism, and French humiliation, in World War II. Such commemoration served to build positive images while reducing the likelihood of backlash in both countries.

PROJECT SUMMARY

I arrive at these findings through a qualitative, case-study analysis. In this project I develop and test an “apology theory” that posits that policies of remembrance in one state affect threat perception of that state in the eyes of others. The theory posits that apologetic remembrance reduces perception of threat by conveying benign intentions; unapologetic remembrance increases threat perception by conveying malign intentions. I define policies of remembrance as statements of apology, reparations, legal trials of perpetrators, history education, and commemoration. Borrowing from social psychology, I code a statement or policy as *apologetic* if it admits and expresses remorse for past events.

This study tests the effects of policies of remembrance on two dependent variables: first, I test whether policies of remembrance affect perception of intentions, and second, I test the extent to which remembrance affects overall threat perception between states. I test the apology theory in two case studies: South Korean threat perception of Japan, and French threat perception of Germany, both since World War II. First, I measure policies of remembrance in Japan and (West) Germany since World War II. Second, I measure South Korean perception of Japanese intentions—and French perception of German intentions—over the same period. To measure perceptions I rely upon public and elite statements in France and South Korea, ascertained by poll data, scholarly articles, media reports, and interviews conducted in both countries. I test for the effects of remembrance on perception of intentions by using congruence procedure (that is, do the values of

remembrance and intentions co-vary as predicted), and by examining the reasoning of observers: to determine whether they are talking about remembrance as they discuss the other state's intentions. Third, I measure French and South Korean threat perception, and conduct tests in congruence and reasoning, to test the relative weight of intentions (and remembrance) compared to capabilities.

In order to determine whether my findings from the Korean and French cases are more broadly generalizable, I also conduct three "mini-cases." I test the effects of Japanese remembrance on perceptions in Australia and China, and the effects of German remembrance on perceptions of Germany in Great Britain.

Plan of the Dissertation

This rest of this manuscript consists of seven chapters. Chapter One outlines the apology theory and the methods used to test it. The next two chapters present the case of Japan and South Korea; Chapter Two codes Japanese remembrance over time, and Chapter Three tests the effects of Japanese remembrance on South Korean intentions and perception of threat. Chapter Four evaluates two additional Asian "mini-cases"—Chinese and Australian perceptions of Japanese remembrance and intentions.

Turning to the other case study, Chapter Five codes German remembrance since World War II, and Chapter Six tests the effects of German remembrance on French perception of intentions and threat. Within Chapter Six I also assess British perceptions of Germany. The final chapter concludes with findings and implications for foreign policy and international relations theory.

Chapter One

The Apology Theory

Recently many foreign policy observers and practitioners have argued that the way a state remembers its past has important effects on its international relations. Everyone understands the restorative power of apologies in relations between individuals. Furthermore, research at the domestic level of analysis also suggests the beneficial effects of truth-telling, contrition, and forgiveness. People argue that German apologies and other acts of contrition have played a vital role in promoting trust of Germany in Europe, and that Japan's failure to atone will exacerbate the risk of conflict in East Asia. But is it correct that apologies are as important between states as they are elsewhere? Do apologies reduce fear and promote trust between states?

To test this proposition, this project creates and tests an "apology theory." By testing the effect of apologies and other acts of contrition on threat perception, this study contributes to debates within international relations theory, and tests the efficacy of a potentially useful confidence-building measure in peace-building.

THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEBATES

This dissertation contributes to policy debates about conflict resolution, as well as two political science literatures. First, the project tests empirically whether acts of contrition build confidence and reduce fear between former adversaries. Understanding the effects of apologies is important before this potentially costly policy should be recommended as an instrument of peace-making.

Second, this project contributes to the literature on historical memory, which focuses on the different ways states remember past trauma, and how memory affects domestic

politics.¹ Works on “transitional justice” study how policies of memory promote or interfere with democratization, and whether truth-telling fosters domestic political stability.² Many works within this literature argue that truth-telling and contrition are essential for stability and reconciliation between formerly adversarial groups.³ This project contributes

¹ Works on German remembrance include Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath, eds. *Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997); Norman Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*, Translated by Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Anne Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). David Art compares the evolution of German and Austrian historical memory. David C. Art, “Debating the Lessons of History: The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. On the case of Japan see Steven T. Benfell, “A Past Worth Forgetting: Politics and the Institutionalization of War Memories in Japan,” Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999; Benfell, “Why Can't Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory since 1945,” *Harvard Asia Quarterly* (Spring 2002); Norma Field, “The Stakes of Apology,” *Japan Quarterly* Vol. 42, no. 4 (October-December 1995), pp. 405-418; George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Sex Slaves of the Japanese Imperial Forces* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Hicks, *Japan's War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment?* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press, 1997); Mukae, “Japan's Diet Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay”; Yoshibumi Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia*. Translated by Ltd. Chogin Business Service Co. (Tokyo, Japan: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999). On the comparison of Japanese and German memory see Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994); Akiko Hashimoto, “Japanese and German Projects of Moral Recovery: Toward a New Understanding of War Memories in Defeated Nations,” Occasional Paper in Japanese Studies, 1999-01, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1999.

² Prominent works in the transitional justice literature include Jon Elster, “Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to Democracy,” *Archive of European Sociology* Vol. 39 (1998); Luc Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” *Law and Social Inquiry* Vol. 20 (Winter 1995), pp. 51-78; Carlos Santiago Nino, *Radical Evil on Trial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” *Yale Law Journal* Vol. 100, no. 8 (1991), pp. 2537-2615; Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*; Jonathan D. Tepperman, “Truth and Consequences,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002), pp. 128-145;

³ Analysts advocating truth telling as a means of conflict prevention and resolution include William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003); Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,” *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1996); Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commission: 1974 to 1997: A Comparative Perspective,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (1994), pp. 597-655; Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Truth v. Justice: the Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 68-98; Jeremy Sarkin, “The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999); Michael P. Scharf, “The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission,” *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, Vol. 7 (1997).

to the historical memory literature by expanding the study of remembrance from the *intra*-state to the *inter*-state level of analysis.

Third, this project also contributes to the international relations literature. International relations scholars have argued that memory affects a state's foreign policy,⁴ and affects the stability of interstate relations in both Europe⁵ and Asia.⁶ This study contributes to debates about apologies and stability by developing an analytic framework for the study of apologies, and by empirically testing the effects of different kinds of remembrance on interstate relations.

The study of remembrance also informs debates within international relations theory about how states perceive threats. This study posits that through apologies, states signal that they have rejected, and will not repeat, their past aggression and atrocities. Apologies are thus signals of benign intentions. A debate within international relations theory centers on the role of intentions in threat perception between states.

First, international relations scholars debate whether intentions matter at all in threat perception. Neorealist theories posit that states perceive threats from material capabilities.

⁴ Thomas Banchoff, "Historical Memory and German Foreign Policy: The Cases of Adenauer and Brandt," *German Politics and Society* Vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 36-53; Thomas U. Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy," *German Politics* Vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1997), pp. 39-59; Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Principle and Practice of 'Reconciliation' in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic," *International Affairs* Vol. 75, no. 2 (April 1999), pp. 333-356; Otto R. Romberg and Heiner Lichtenstein, *Thirty Years of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel* (Frankfurt: Tribune Books, 1995).

⁵ On the pacifying effects of German remembrance see Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49; Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* Vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-154; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 193-243. Arguing for the importance of remembrance in interstate relations more generally see Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80; Robert Dujarric, ed. *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 1998); Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *East Asian Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 3-31; Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan's Depression Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 26-36; Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," in *East Asian Security*, pp. 332-351; Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles," *International Affairs* Vol. 64, no. 4 (1988), pp. 557-573; Kristof, "The Problem of Memory"; Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing."

Kenneth Waltz argues that states fear, and balance against, concentrations of power.⁷ John Mearsheimer writes that a state can never be certain whether or not another state's offensive power will be used against it; even if intentions seem benign, they can change quickly.⁸ However, other scholars argue that as states assess threats, they not only evaluate material factors, but also a state's intentions: whether or not it is likely to use force. Defensive realist scholars, constructivist scholars, and advocates of liberal institutionalism and the democratic peace all argue that states assess each other's intentions.⁹

A second aspect of the debate is conducted among those scholars who argue for the importance of intentions in threat perception: are certain kinds of signals about intentions more credible than others? Stephen Walt, in his pioneering work on intentions in IR theory, did not specify which factors states assess when they evaluate each other's intentions.¹⁰ Defensive realist scholars, drawing from an economics literature,¹¹ distinguish "cheap talk"

⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 31.

⁹ Defensive realists who argue for the importance of intentions in threat perception are Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: How Perceptions of Intentions Influence International Politics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2000. For constructivist arguments about identity and threat perception see Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-399; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* Vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391-426. Major works in liberal institutionalist theory include Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-179; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa M. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* Vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 39-51; Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Celeste Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). Major works on the democratic peace include Bruce Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," and Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?" both in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 58-81 and pp. 82-115; Michael E. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp. 3-57; John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp. 116-154; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp. 157-201; Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*.

¹¹ Major works on cheap talk from economics include Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* Vol. 50, no. 6 (1982), pp. 1421-1451; Joseph Farrell and Robert

from “costly signals.” They argue that states will simply dismiss cheap talk, but will pay attention to costly signals, which can credibly signal benign intentions. Robert Jervis argues that credible signals are “statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions.”¹² Charles Glaser argues that policies of unilateral disarmament and other military policies are costly signals.¹³ Although most realists emphasize costly signals associated with military power, some argue that ideational signals may qualify.¹⁴ Thus defensive realist scholars argue that states can send credible signals of benign intentions.

Other scholars argue that other kinds of signals—not only costly ones—are credible. Anne Sartori argues that because of reputational effects, diplomacy (verbal threats and promises) is not just cheap talk; diplomacy can serve as a credible signal of a state’s intentions.¹⁵ Scholars in the constructivist school of international relations argue that through ideas and symbols, states credibly convey information about what kind of state they are. Constructivists argue that a state’s adherence to liberal, multilateral, or peaceful norms

Gibbons, “Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining,” *Journal of Economic Theory* Vol. 48 (1989), pp. 221-237; Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* Vol. 10, no. 3 (1996), pp. 103-118. Also see Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 147-48; Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 65-66; James D. Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

¹² Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970): 18). Jervis uses different terminology (“signals” versus “indices”) but the logic is the same. Also on the “cheap talk” vs. “costly signal” distinction see James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 41, no. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90; Fearon, “Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1992.

¹³ Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* Vol. 50 (October 1997), p. 181.

¹⁴ Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing.” Kydd also argues that German contrition has reduced fears of Germany, and that Japan’s failure to apologize has increased distrust of Japan. (Ibid, p. 134)

¹⁵ Anne Sartori, “Deterrence by Diplomacy,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1998; also Sartori, “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 56, no. 1 (2002), pp. 121-149.

signals to others that its intentions are benign, and thus that it does not pose a threat.¹⁶

Thus, other theorists expand the concept of credible signals to areas that realist scholars would dismiss as cheap talk.

A third aspect of the IR theory debate on intentions relates to the *weight* of intentions in threat perception relative to capabilities. All scholars agree that wealth and military power influence perceptions of threat; diverge on the question of whether and how intentions also factor into threat assessment. As noted, neorealists say intentions do not factor in to any meaningful extent. Constructivists argue that intentions can weigh more heavily than capabilities: in other words, if a powerful state is perceived as having benign intentions, other states may not balance against it.¹⁷ Stephen Walt writes that states fear and balance against threat, not power, and that intentions affect perception of threat. However, Walt did not clarify how power and intentions interact in states' calculations. If a state's power is increasing but its intentions are seen as benign, Walt's theory makes no clear prediction for whether other states will view this state as threatening.

This dissertation contributes to these debates within international relations theory by empirically testing whether a state's policies of remembrance—a signal of intentions—affects threat perception in another state. In the course of testing the apology theory, I also empirically test the effects of other factors that scholars frequently cite as important in threat perception: for example, institutional membership and regime type.

In the remainder of this chapter, I outline the apology theory, explain how I am defining and measuring its variables, and discuss methods used to test the theory.

¹⁶ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory"; Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community"; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."

¹⁷ Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community."

THEORIES OF THREAT PERCEPTION

States assess the degree to which other states can threaten their homeland or other vital national interests. Scholars of international relations have observed that as states assess threats, they evaluate a number of indicators related to a state's power and intentions.¹⁸ This study accepts that both power and intentions are important in threat perception, but adds that threat perception is also driven by the extent to which a state has *constraints* on its ability to threaten others. Thus I argue that threat perception is a function of **capabilities** and **intentions**. I define capabilities in two ways: whether a state has the *power* to threaten another state, and whether or not there are *constraints* on its ability to do so.

Capabilities (Power + Constraints)

Capabilities are defined as the power that one state can bring to bear against another.¹⁹ *Power* is comprised of potential or long-term power (defined as wealth and population), as well as current power: power that the state has mobilized at the present time that could pose an immediate threat to others. I define current power as standing military forces, military expenditure, and a nationalistically mobilized population—willing to sacrifice blood and treasure in war.²⁰

To measure power, I rely upon the following indicators: GDP and population size (for long-term power); and number of military personnel and military expenditure (for

¹⁸ Stephen Walt argues that states balance against threat, not power alone; he argues that threats are perceived from aggregate power, offensive power, geography, and intentions. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*. This study relies upon a similar framework but builds on Walt's study in two ways: by factoring in constraints as well as power, and by specifying different indicators of intentions.

¹⁹ For theories of threat perception that focus on capabilities, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

²⁰ Classical realists argue that state power also consists of non-material factors; Hans Morgenthau argues that the mobilization of the populace in war-fighting ("national morale") is another component of state power. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973). Also see Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* Vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 26-60.

current power). In addition, I define a nationalistically mobilized population as one that supports the use of military force overseas (measured through poll data showing public support for the military establishment and for specific military operations).

The capabilities a state can bring to bear against another state are also affected by *constraints*. Constraints on a state's ability to bring force to bear against another state include the presence of an occupier, an "offshore balancer," or a balancing coalition.²¹ Another constraint might be the existence of a threat that ties up military forces on one front or otherwise consumes resources, reducing the state's ability to menace others.

The strength of a constraint imposed by an occupier or offshore balancer is measured by the presence of military forces stationed in a country for the purpose of its defense, and the existence of an institutionalized security agreement between the two states (for example, a treaty ratified by a Parliament.) The strength of constraints imposed by other security threats is measured in terms of the military power of those other states. State A is more constrained in its ability to menace State B if facing other powerful adversaries.

In sum, this framework assumes that threat perception of a state will be affected by a state's capabilities: the power a state wields, and any constraints on the state's ability to wield it.

²¹ On occupiers see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 78. On the United States as an offshore balancer in Europe, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 111, no. 1 (1996), pp. 1-38; François Heisbourg, "The European-U.S. Alliance: Valedictory Reflections on Continued Drift in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Affairs*, Vol. 60 (April 1992), pp. 665-678; Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984). The American military presence in Japan has been described as the "cork in the bottle" of Japanese military resurgence. Statement by Major General Henry C. Stackpole (USMC); see *Washington Post*, March 20, 1993. On the concept on constraining alliances in international relations theory see Jeremy Pressman, "Leashes or Lemmings: Alliances as Restraining Devices," Ph.D. Diss, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. On the strategy of offshore balancing see Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* Vol. 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.

Intentions

Factors related to power are not the only factors that affect threat perception. International relations scholars have also argued that intentions affect threat perception, and have identified a number of different factors that affect perception of a state's intentions.

Regime Type. The international relations literature on the "democratic peace" posits that regime type is one factor that affects a state's assessment of another state's intentions. The "democratic peace thesis" posits that mature democracies do not war against each other.²² Scholars argue that threat perception is lower among mature democratic states than among states led by illiberal regimes. John Owen argues that "Liberals believe that they understand the intentions of foreign liberal democracies, and that those intentions are always pacific toward fellow liberal democracies."²³ Thomas Risse writes, "actors infer external behavior from the values and norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners in the international system."²⁴ Risse and others argue that democratic states are unlikely to experience the suspicion and fear that underpins the security dilemma.²⁵ Democratic peace theory, however, only expects these benign effects among mature democratic states. Scholars have found that states undergoing a transition to democracy are actually more likely to become engaged in

²² Major works in this literature include Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace"; Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?"; Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs"; Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"; Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace"; Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets*.

²³ Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," p. 124. Also see Karl W. Deutsch, et. al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

²⁴ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 367. Also making this normative argument is Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 58-81; Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?" in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp. 82-115.

²⁵ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism"; Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community"; Russett, "Why Democratic Peace," p. 94; Barbara Farnham, "The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 395-416.

international conflicts than are other states.²⁶ Thus the democratic peace thesis posits that threat perception should be lower among mature democracies; mature democracies are more likely to view each other's intentions as benign.²⁷

Territorial Claims. A second factor that may influence perception of intentions is territorial claims: whether a country is claiming pieces of another state's land. This is not a nuanced theoretical issue: very simply, if one country claims a piece of land claimed by a different country, that state is likely to be viewed as hostile. The territorial dispute might be solved through negotiation, but the threat always exists that the state might decide to take it by force.

If a state is making a claim on another country's territory, it stands to reason that the first state will appear the most threatening in the eyes of the country that currently holds the territory. However, the existence of the territorial claim also makes the first state appear threatening in the eyes of other countries. Even though their own land is not threatened, threat perception of the claiming state will increase in their eyes as well. The state will appear more likely to use force in an effort to change the status quo; neighboring countries may fear that the state might expand its war aims beyond the acquisition of that one piece of territory. Furthermore, the use of force might have other unpredictable and destabilizing consequences within the region. Thus if a state has territorial claims against another country, the current owner of that territory—as well as other countries—will view its intentions as hostile.

²⁶ Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000); Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. Mansfield and Snyder test the effects of democratization on a state's likelihood to go to war in 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year periods. This suggests they view the process of democratization as finished after approximately 10 years.

²⁷ I define democracy as voting rights for most citizens, governments elected in competitive elections, and free speech. For discussion see Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, p. 72. In a more restrictive definition, James Lee Ray argues that a democracy must have demonstrated that elites have been defeated and replaced in an election. James Lee Ray, "Wars between Democracies: Rare or Non-Existent?" *International Interactions* Vol. 18, no. 3 (1993), pp. 251-276.

Institutional Membership. Third, scholars have also argued that a state's membership in international institutions will affect perception of that state's intentions.²⁸ First, institutions make it easier for states to assess each other's intentions by promoting transparency, thereby increasing the amount of information states know about each other. Thus institutions "ameliorate uncertainty by providing symmetric and credible information."²⁹ In contrast to ad-hoc interaction, "an established framework of negotiation makes it easier for states to evaluate patterns of policies, and thus intentions."³⁰ Second, through its very willingness to join an institution and abide by its rules, a state is sending a credible signal that it is cooperative. Abiding by institutions signals that a state's intentions "are not in conflict with fundamental assumptions under which states operate."³¹ Membership in institutions also "sets up a series of alarm bells that would have to be rung by any regime" that wants to return to a more aggressive posture.³² Constraints on state power imposed through institutional membership—such as demilitarized zones, ceilings on armed forces, or restrictions on weapons purchases—decrease state power in the short term. Although nothing prevents a state from withdrawing from an institution and increasing its military power, the institutional constraint is still meaningful because it creates a time delay between potential and current power. Thus through its willingness to join an institution, a state signals that it has no intentions of pursuing aggression in the near future.

In these ways, scholars argue that institutions create an environment in which "the

²⁸ Major institutionalist works include Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches"; Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory"; Martin, *Coercive Cooperation*; Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies*; Keohane, Nye, and Hoffmann, *After the Cold War*; John Gerard Ruggie, ed. *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, ed. *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). For a critique of this literature see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* Vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.

²⁹ Wallander, *Mortal Enemies, Best Friends*, p. 25.

³⁰ Wallander, *Mortal Enemies, Best Friends*, p. 26.

³¹ Wallander, *Mortal Enemies, Best Friends*, p. 26.

³² Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing."

security dilemma that states face may be less stark.”³³ According to institutionalist scholars, as states become more closely institutionalized, they should perceive each other’s intentions as more benign. Membership in institutions that serve only as “talk shops”—without imposing actual constraints on the behavior of members—should have little effect on perception of intentions, since any type of state (revisionist or status quo) would be willing to engage in “cheap talk.” Membership in institutions that make substantive demands on their members—and also have mechanisms for monitoring compliance—should have the most impact on perceptions of a state’s intentions.

Finally, perceptions of intentions may also be influenced by a state’s *past behavior*, or its *culture*.³⁴ Because these are constants rather than variables, this study does not track these over time, but I include discussion of these factors in the data when they arise.

THE APOLOGY THEORY

The apology theory highlights another set of factors that might affect threat perception. The theory posits that apologies, or “policies of remembrance” more generally, affect threat perception. According to the theory, less apologetic remembrance (denials, glorification, amnesia) *increases* threat perception; more apologetic remembrance (acknowledgment, contrition) *decreases* threat perception.

Mechanisms: How Might Remembrance Affect Threat Perception?

A state’s policies of remembrance might make a state appear more or less threatening to others through different mechanisms: either because remembrance is seen as a credible signal of a state’s intentions, or because it affects a state’s capabilities.

³³ Keohane and Hoffman, *After the Cold War*, p. 5

³⁴ Regarding past behavior affecting threat perception, Robert Jervis argues that statesmen “often use the recent behavior of others as important sources of information. They take the pattern they think they observe and project it into the future.” See Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 14.

First, one mechanism (consistent with the constructivist paradigm in international relations theory) would posit that remembrance affects threat perception because it signals how a state views aggression. Constructivists might argue that the act of recognizing and deploring past human rights violations shows that a state is committed to avoiding such behavior in the future. That is, through contrition a state demonstrates that it is a state that abides by peaceful liberal norms that are respectful of human rights. Other states should conclude from this that the state is less likely to pursue aggression in the future. Some scholars argue that contrition for past violence has become a norm among liberal states;³⁵ according to this view, apologetic remembrance demonstrates adherence to liberal norms more generally.

Furthermore, constructivists would add that the *way* a state pursues contrition may also make the state appear more peaceful and cooperative. For example, a state might engage in cooperative history textbook writing by working with UNESCO or other international institutions. A state might pay reparations on the basis that it had violated treaties it had previously signed. Policies of contrition pursued in the context of multilateral institutions bolster the image of the state as cooperative and respectful of international order (and thus less likely to pursue aggressive strategies). In sum, a constructivist interpretation would posit that contrition reduces threat perception because it provides an ideational signal of the country's attitudes toward human rights and the use of force.

A second mechanism—associated with the realist school of international relations—posits that remembrance could serve as a credible signal of a state's intentions if it affects a state's capabilities (namely power). According to this mechanism, remembrance affects state power because of its link to nationalism and domestic mobilization. Mobilizing a nation for war requires not only weapons and troops; but also mobilizing support for the

³⁵ See Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000); Gerrit W. Gong, "The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues," *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 45-57.

war among both troops and the wider general public.³⁶ To mobilize the people for war, leaders rally nationalistic and patriotic sentiment; typically in doing so they vilify the adversary while glorifying their own state's history, motives, and current goals.³⁷ Denials, whitewashing, and glorification of the state's violent past are common as politicians rally a populace for war.

States offering apologies are demonstrating the opposite kind of behavior. Apologies are self-critical; they confer respect upon the victim and de-legitimize violence against it. In the wake of self-critical remembrance, future elites will find it more difficult to purvey mythologized, whitewashed versions of past history. The public will have been educated under a different mindset, and would be forced to learn new views (thus creating either resistance or, at very least, a time delay). Actors within the media and academe will emerge as defenders of the self-critical view; thus attempts to revise this view will cause debate, rather than the unchallenged spread of the mythologized view of history.³⁸ Thus apologetic remembrance is counter-productive to domestic mobilization for war. In sum, according to this mechanism, remembrance affects a state's capabilities (power) because of the link

³⁶ On "national morale" as a component of state power see Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War"; Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power."

³⁷ On the ability of elites to manipulate national and ethnic identities see Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (NY: Norton, 2000); Benjamin J. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 845-877; Human Rights Watch, *Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995). On propaganda and the cultivation of hypernationalism in World War I and II see Charles Roetter, *The Art of Psychological Warfare 1914-1945* (New York: Stein and Day, 1974); Jay W. Baird, *The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); Eleanor Hancock, *The National Socialist Leadership and Total War 1941-5* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). On nationalism as a contributor to ethnic conflict, see Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001). Also see articles in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), including V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," pp. 132-168.

³⁸ For the view that liberal institutions promote critical self-evaluation that has restraining effects on state behavior and reduces conflict, see Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," Unpublished Manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 2002.

between remembrance and domestic mobilization.

This realist mechanism would posit that insofar as remembrance affects state power, it also affects perception of a state's intentions. If a state denies or glorifies its past history, its intentions appear malign because the state appears to be mobilizing its population, possibly with aggression in mind. Conversely, if a state offers apologies, its intentions appear benign because it is not only not mobilizing its population, it is taking actions that will make it more difficult to do so. In sum, according to the realist mechanism, because apologetic remembrance affects a state's ability to project power, defensive realists would argue that contrition is a "costly signal": a credible sign of benign intentions.

Realists would only expect contrite remembrance to reduce threat perception if it can truly be shown that it reduces state power. There are several possible reasons why this may not be so. First, the previous discussion posited that contrition creates domestic opposition or a time delay in nationalistic mobilization for war. However, it is also possible that public opinion is easily and quickly malleable; that a regime can quickly reverse public opinion such that today's ally will soon be seen as an enemy, or vice versa.

Second, it is possible that contrite views of the past can co-exist with a willingness to use force in defense of national interests or security. Because many—if not all—expansionist wars have been fought in the name of national security, contrition would not be much of a limiting factor if this were so.


Third, apologies would not reduce state power if they have backlash effects. Pressuring a state to apologize might create resentment within it, which may empower rightist governments into power, under the mandate of "restore our national pride" and "stop kowtowing to foreigners."³⁹ Thus, if apologies provoke backlash, apologies would

³⁹ This was the fear expressed by Allied opponents of re-education efforts in Germany after World War I and World War II. British Foreign Office official Eyre Crowe noted after World War I, "We should and do resent any such proceedings on the part of foreign governments in this country, and we should be careful not to fall into the same error ourselves." Quoted in Keith Wilson, "Great War Prologue," in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Germany & Her Allies After World War II* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), p. 46. The British Foreign Office argued in a 1943 policy paper that any outside interference aimed at "converting" the Germans would merely "harden their unrepentant hearts."

not decrease but would actually *increase* a state's level of nationalistic mobilization.

In sum, the apology theory posits that states assess threats based on a state's capabilities and intentions. Different mechanisms of the theory posit that policies of remembrance affect threat perception in different ways. Figure 1 outlines the general framework of the apology theory.

Figure 1: The Apology Theory



Independent Variable: Policies of Remembrance

A state's interpretation of its past history is evident in several different policies of remembrance. Leaders can issue official *statements*: apologies by leading officials that acknowledge and express remorse for past violence. Officials might also issue non-apologetic statements as well: statements that deny or glorify past violence. States can bolster their statements of apology by paying *reparations* to compensate former victims for their suffering. Furthermore, through *legal trials*, states may hold perpetrators of past violence accountable. *Education* also serves as an important area in which a state displays its interpretation of past events: through textbooks and curricula, states impart a view of the past to the younger generation.⁴⁰ Finally, states show their attitudes toward the past in their

Quoted in Lothar Kettenacker, "The Planning of 'Re-Education During the Second World War,'" in Pronay and Wilson, p. 66. Allied re-education efforts will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

⁴⁰ On education and nationalism see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 26-35; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 91-96; David A. Mendeloff, "Truth-telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia: Pernicious Historical Ideas, Mass Education, and Interstate Conflict," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001; Boyd Shafer,

official *commemoration*: the people and events they choose to remember and honor in national monuments, museums, ceremonies, and holidays. Thus a state's attitudes toward the past are discernable in many areas; this dissertation tests the effects not only of apologies, but of "policies of remembrance" more broadly.

In this project I assess policies of remembrance within a state, rather than unofficial remembrance. The people of a state remember the past in unofficial ways as well as official: their views are reflected in literature, film, art, or the activities of citizens' groups. Such areas often reveal a great deal of information about a state's attitudes toward its past.⁴¹ Future research is needed on whether such societal factors influence the perceptions and policies of other states. However, in this study I focus only on official remembrance. I assume that outsiders trying to gauge how a country feels about its past will look first and foremost at state policy as the most transparent and representative indicator of national remembrance.

Coding Policies of Remembrance

The goal of this study is to test the effects of policies of remembrance on perceptions within another state. Toward this end, I code a state's policies of remembrance in two steps.

Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972), 198.

⁴¹ For example, Germany's attitudes toward the past are evident in many non-official areas of German society. Scholars have highlighted the importance of the media in German remembrance (the Anne Frank diary and play; the 1979 broadcast of the miniseries *Holocaust*). Tony Kushner, "I Want to Go on Living after My Death': The Memory of Anne Frank," in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, eds., *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), pp. 3-25. Analysts have also commented on German attitudes reflected during the German book tour of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, author of a controversial book about widespread German guilt for the war and Holocaust. Goldhagen was welcomed by huge, fascinated crowds. See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1996); Atina Grossmann, "The 'Goldhagen Effect': Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New Germany," in Geoff Eley, ed., *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism--Facing the German Past* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Ulrich Herbert, "Academic and Public Discourses on the Holocaust: The Goldhagen Debate in Germany," *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 35-53. Scholars argue that French memory after the war was dramatically affected by the release of the film *The Sorrow and the Pity*. See Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome; History and Memory in France since 1944*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

Apologetic vs. Unapologetic? First, I code the value of remembrance as displayed within a given policy: a statement offered by a leader, a reparations package voted on by Parliament, a monument, or a museum. I code values of remembrance on a continuum from *unapologetic* to *apologetic*.

Drawing from the social psychology literature, I argue that “apologetic” policies of remembrance must demonstrate both admission and remorse about past events. That is, the state must admit that it did X, and must express remorse for having done X. Conversely, “unapologetic” policies of remembrance are policies that do not admit *or* do not regret the state’s past actions.

This coding rule is based on deductive and empirical rationales. First, deductively, it makes no sense to expect a policy to exert beneficial effects on perceptions within another state if that policy does not clearly identify and repudiate past behavior. It is illogical to think that a former victim will be reassured if a state specifies an act (but does not say it regrets it), or, if the state offers remorse for an act that it does not admit.⁴²

Second, this rationale is based on empirical studies within the social psychology literature about apologies among individuals. Social psychologists argue that among individuals, core components to apologies are admitting misdeeds, and expressing remorse for them.⁴³ They say “botched” apologies are lacking in one or both of these important


⁴² It is possible to express remorse without admission. For example in 1965 Japan issued a statement of apology to Korea that said: “We express remorse for the unhappy phase that occurred between our two countries.” In Richard Nixon’s resignation speech, the President said “I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course of events that led to this decision.” Both statements express remorse, but neither admits a specific offense.

⁴³ Aaron Lazare, “Go Ahead, Say You’re Sorry,” *Psychology Today* Vol. 28, no. 1 (1995), p. 40; Michael E. McCullough, Everett Worthington, and Kenneth C. Rachal, “Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 73 (1997); Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); Barry R. Schlenker and Bruce W. Darby, “The Use of Apologies in Social Predicaments,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (September 1981), pp. 271-278; Carl D. Schneider, “What it Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation,” *Mediation Quarterly*, Volume 17, No. 3 (Spring 2000), pp. 265-280; Beverly Engel, *The Power of Apology: Healing Steps to Transform All Your Relationships* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2001); Erin Ann O’Hara and Douglas Yarn, “On Apology and Consilience,” Working Paper No. 02-04, Vanderbilt University Law School, October 2002. For a previous treatment of apologies in international relations see O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*.

elements, and argue that botched apologies can actually damage relationships.⁴⁴ For these reasons, I argue that, to be considered apologetic, a policy must display both admission *and* remorse with regards to past violence.

The continuum between “unapologetic” and “apologetic” policies of remembrance includes several nuances in the ways states might interpret their pasts. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2: *Continuum of Remembrance*



At the unapologetic extreme, states might display *glorification*: they admit past violence but praise it (not only did we do it, we’re glad we did). Such states pursue policies of remembrance that honor invaders and occupiers of other lands as architects of the nation and liberators of oppressed peoples. Nearly as bad, a state might engage in *denial* (denying that aggression or atrocities ever happened, or that it committed them). Unapologetic state policies also include *justification* of past actions. A state may claim that at the time the violence occurred, moral standards were different; or it may claim that the violence was necessary given the prevailing situation. In sum, unapologetic policies include the following:

- Statements by political leaders that the violence was positive; or that it did not happen; or that it was caused by others; or that it was justified by the prevailing situation
- Compensation paid to perpetrators rather than victims of past violence (e.g. pensions or other benefits to leaders or bureaucrats who planned and executed events later judged as atrocities)
- Museums, memorials, or days of commemoration that glorify perpetrators rather than victims of violence; that remember events positively rather than negatively; that justify past violence.
- History textbooks that justify or glorify past violence

⁴⁴ For a typology of botched apologies see Engel, *The Power of Apology*, pp. 55-64.

Moving toward the middle of the continuum, states might also be unapologetic in more subtle ways. They might simply avoid discussing past violence (*amnesia*). In such states leaders rarely refer to the past violence in statements or speeches. The government does not pay reparations to victims, nor conducts legal trials of perpetrators. Museums, memorials, or days of commemoration about past violence do not exist, and history textbooks gloss over it. A state displaying amnesia might focus on the time period in which it committed the violence, but instead of discussing the violence it committed, it may focus on violence it itself suffered at that time (*self-victimhood*). Or, the state might erase the entire time period from its memory, choosing to highlight more flattering episodes in its nation's history.

Also in the middle of the continuum—though closer to the apologetic side—a state might display *acknowledgment* of past violence. This is the admission that the state committed acts of violence, however, discussion may go no further than that. Leaders might say that in the past the state was responsible for great atrocities, but say that it is time to move forward and look to the future. Textbooks might detail past violence to varying degrees (the discussion might tilt toward amnesia if the full scope of events are not presented; it might be more apologetic if events are documented thoroughly and presented as a tragedy). Discussions of the past might point out a range of interpretations: (“some people argue that X was a grievous war crime, while others argue it was essential for national security.”) The key attribute of acknowledgement is that it reflects truth telling absent moral judgment.

Finally, at the far end of the continuum, *apologetic* states not only admit past violence, but they express remorse about it to former victims and their own populations. They admit to having committed terrible crimes, and say the state was mistaken in committing them. Apologetic states educate their public and the rest of the world about their past crimes through various policies of contrition involving ceremonies, museums, monuments, and memorials. They reach out to former victims through reparations and

official apologies. Apologetic policies a state might pursue include the following:

- Apologies (statements that acknowledge past offenses and express regret for them) offered to former victims
- Restitution or reparations to victims in an attempt to compensate them for past offenses
- Legal trials of organizers or perpetrators of past violence
- Museums, memorials, or days of commemoration that educate the public about victims of the state's past actions
- History textbooks that educate the public about past violence committed by their state against others

Thus my first step in coding policies of remembrance is to assess the degree to which a given policy reflects admission and remorse regarding past violence. Policies reflecting both qualities are coded as “apologetic”; policies lacking in either or both are coded as “unapologetic” (acknowledgment, amnesia, self-victimhood, justification, denial, glorification).

Accord vs. Mixed Signals. The second step in my coding method is to aggregate the codings of numerous policies of remembrance within a given time period. I evaluate the various policies of remembrance pursued by a state during a single period, and examine whether or not the state's policies of remembrance in that period are generally apologetic, unapologetic, or mixed. The apology theory predicts that remembrance will have beneficial effects on others' perceptions only if a state's policies of remembrance are generally apologetic: that is, if the state demonstrates a reasonable level of accord with respect to interpretations of past violence. Consistently unapologetic policies, or mixed/inconsistent policies, are not expected to improve observers' perceptions of the state.

This coding rationale is based on the deductive logic that consistency is as important in international relations as it is in interpersonal relations. States sending consistently apologetic signals may reasonably be judged as having sincerely repented and renounced their past behavior, and thus can credibly be judged as unlikely to engage in such behavior in the future. Likewise, states sending consistently *unapologetic* signals may reasonably be judged as unrepentant and still tolerant of the ideas that motivated past violence. Thus observers can conclude that such states are more likely to repeat their violent behavior.

Finally, states that are inconsistent—states that send both apologetic and unapologetic signals—cannot credibly be judged as having repented and renounced past violence; clearly, defenses of past behavior are alive and well within the state, so uncertainty exists regarding the state's future behavior.

Avoiding Coding Pitfalls

In order to understand to what extent a state is remembering its past actions, I must first establish a list of events for which it might be expected to apologize. I can compare actual apologies against this list, and can then make judgments about to what extent the state has apologized for its past actions. I argue that the best method for determining what events belong on this list is to allow the victim to determine the events that belong on the list. As described below, this list is checked for historical accuracy. As social psychologists have argued, apologies are an inherently interactive gesture: they are offered *and* received.

Nicholas Tavuchis writes,

apologetic discourse is dyadic. That is to say, its exclusive, ultimate, and ineluctable focus is upon interaction between the primordial social categories of Offender and Offended. That means it cannot be understood in terms of one party to the exclusion of the other.⁴⁵

Therefore the effect of apologies cannot be understood without the perspective of the party to whom it was offered. Only the victim knows what it wants an apology for; thus I allow the victim to establish the list of offenses for which an apology is desired.

One might also say that only the victim knows when he has been properly apologized to, and that this fact requires that the victim code the level of apology. However this method is problematic for three major reasons. First, the wronged state may manipulate the apology issue, using it as a linkage tool for bargaining leverage in other issue areas. Thus even if the other state has offered an apology, the victim may keep insisting it is inadequate. Second, using the testimony of those in the wronged state to evaluate the other state's apologies is complicated by domestic politics. If the ruling party negotiates an

⁴⁵ Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa*, p. 46.

apology or reparations settlement, members of that party have a domestic political incentive to express satisfaction with the outcome (because it was their policy accomplishment). However, opposition parties have a domestic political incentive to express *dissatisfaction*: the apology was inadequate; the government was too soft on the other state, and their party would have extracted a better apology or a more lucrative settlement had it been in power.

Third, allowing the victim to code the level of apology risks conflating the independent and dependent variables of the theory. States that perceive threat from another state may tend to under-code its level of apology. If apologies are given, but have no effect on the victim's perceptions, this may be miscoded as if no apologies had been given at all. Thus allowing the *apologizee* to code the other state's apologies is complicated by these three problems.

To avoid either pitfall—that is, to avoid ignoring the sentiments of the victim state and to avoid politicization from biasing coding—I settle on a compromise solution that is both subjective and objective. First, I allow the victim to determine the list of offenses for which it wants an apology and other forms of remembrance. I draw up this list from media reports in the victimized state. I rely upon international historical research to confirm that these events did indeed occur; if historians have not established that they occurred, I remove them from the list. Second, I evaluate the offender's remembrance as apologetic or unapologetic based on whether it displays admission and remorse. The concepts of admission and remorse have been established by social psychologists as vital components of apologies between individuals. Although cultural differences in apologies do exist, psychologists have argued that admission and remorse are core elements of apologies between all human beings. In sum, this method tries to reconcile two contradictory demands: the need to include the perspective of the *apologizee* in measuring apologies, and the need to code accurately the level of apology displayed by the *apologizer*, without allowing politicization to taint coding.

Many readers may react to the above coding rules with suspicion. Given the extremely nuanced nature of remembrance and all the possible ways it might manifest itself, the very enterprise of assigning a certain “value” to a country’s remembrance may be seen as suspect: as insufficiently capturing the complexity of the issue within the state. These coding rules are not written under the assumption that policies of remembrance can be easily categorized into one box or another. Rather, I establish these coding rules for two major reasons: first, to impose consistency and reduce subjectivity in my interpretations of the data; and second, to allow readers to easily understand—and thus more easily debate—those interpretations.

Dependent Variable 1: Perceptions of Intentions

The apology theory posits that apologetic policies of remembrance cause perceptions of intentions to be viewed as more benign; conversely unapologetic policies cause perceptions of intentions to be seen as more malign. One dependent variable of the apology theory is thus perceptions of intentions.⁴⁶ Because perceptions dwell within peoples’ minds, they cannot be directly measured; thus I evaluate perceptions by a proxy measurement: *statements* made by the general public and elites in an observer country. For public “statements” I rely on public opinion polls and media coverage. (Media coverage is expected to both shape and reflect public opinion.) For elite statements I consult secondary sources, memoirs, elite-authored scholarly articles and op-eds, and archival documents. For the present day I rely heavily upon interviews with academics, journalists, think-tank analysts, and government officials.

The values the dependent variable may take range on a continuum from *benign* to *uncertain* to *malign*. First, when a state’s nature is viewed as *benign*, people’s statements

⁴⁶ “Perception of intentions” is distinct from “perception of threat.” I assume that perception of intentions is one factor that affects perception of threat. In this study I test the effects of remembrance on perception of intentions and on perception of threat (with perception of intentions as an intervening variable). This section discusses intentions; the following section discusses threat.

express trust and a lack of fear toward that state. People say they do not think the other state is aggressive. If any disputes exist, people say they believe the other state will resolve them through diplomacy rather than military force. The people do not express fears about military buildups or economic gains in the other state. People have no objections to the state's international activism and leadership.

When a state's intentions are viewed as *uncertain*, people say they are uncertain about whether or not they can trust the other state. They may see some cause for concern about a future military conflict. People say they are uncertain whether bilateral disputes will be resolved diplomatically or through the use of force.

If a state's intentions are perceived as *malign*, public and elites in the observing country will say that the other state is untrustworthy or hostile. If any disputes exist, people say they believe the other state is likely to resolve them through military force. People believe that the other state wants to own all or some of its territory. The people say they fear the other state's gains in military power or economic wealth. People object to the state's international activism and leadership.

Methods

To test the apology theory, I divide the post-World War II era into smaller time periods and use congruence procedure to determine whether remembrance and intentions are co-varying as expected. I also test for the influence of alternate variables, and test predictions about reasoning.

By creating smaller time periods, I create more observations on the independent variable, and thus more tests of the apology theory. From the standpoint of social science methodology, the only requirement about periodization is that periods should not span a time during which there was significant fluctuation in the value of a key independent variable. For example, consider a situation in which remembrance was *unapologetic* between 1940-1950, and intentions were seen as malign; remembrance was *apologetic*

between 1950-1960, and intentions were seen as benign. It would not be methodologically sound to create a period that spans 1940-1960, because this would lead the values to be “averaged out,” obscuring otherwise clear congruence between values of the independent and dependent variables. In general, periods should be defined in such a way such that they encompass a time in which the independent variable did not vary significantly. As long as they do not encompass a time in which there is variation in the value of the independent variable, periods may be further subdivided without biasing findings. I shall describe my periodization method in greater detail in each of the chapters in which I code policies of remembrance (Chapters Two and Five).

After having divided the post-World War II era into smaller time periods, I test the apology theory through congruence procedure using multiple within-case observations.⁴⁷ I track variation over time in the independent variable (policies of remembrance), by coding the level of admission and remorse as discussed. I then measure the dependent variable (perceptions of intentions) as previously discussed. I then compare the two variables over time to see if they co-vary. The apology theory posits that as a state’s policies of remembrance become apologetic, perceptions of that state in the eyes of others will grow more benign; as a state demonstrates unapologetic policies, others will view the state’s intentions as increasingly malign.

It is not possible to draw conclusions from congruence procedure alone because, as noted, other factors influence perceptions of intentions. Hence changes (or non-changes) in perceptions may actually be caused not by changes in remembrance, but by changes in other variables. With this in mind I perform two other tasks: I test predictions related to reasoning, and I track other variables that affect perceptions.

⁴⁷ On the method of congruence procedure see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," In *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Vol. II (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985); Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). On the use of multiple within-case observations, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

First, I test the effects of apologies on perception of intentions by evaluating the reasoning of observers. The apology theory predicts that people should say that their perceptions of the other state are influenced by the other state's policies of remembrance. People should say that a state's failure to apologize makes it appear more hostile; they should say that apologies make the state look more benign.

Second, I monitor changes in other variables that may be driving changes in perception of intentions. As noted, perceptions about a state's intentions might be influenced by several different indicators. To understand the relative influence of remembrance, this study thus monitors changes in other factors that might be driving changes (or non-changes) in the dependent variable.

In sum, to test the apology theory, I rely upon congruence procedure to determine whether changes in the dependent and independent variables are occurring as predicted. To control for the effects of other variables that might influence changes in the dependent variable, I track other variables over time (regime type, institutions, territorial claims), and evaluate predictions about reasoning.

Predictions

The apology theory makes two general predictions. The first prediction relates to congruence between the independent variable (remembrance) and the dependent variable (perception of intentions). *Ceterus paribus*, the more apologetic a state's policies of remembrance, the more benign its intentions should be perceived by others. Conversely, the more *unapologetic* a state is, the more negatively it should be regarded by others. In short, acknowledging and atoning for past violence makes a state's intentions appear more benign; forgetting, denying, glorifying, or justifying past violence makes a state's intentions look more hostile.

The second prediction relates to the reasoning of observers as they talk about the state. The apology theory predicts that people should discuss policies of remembrance as

they discuss the other state's intentions. People should say that apologies and other acts of contrition make them view the other state more positively; conversely, they should say the other state's failure to acknowledge or atone for its past makes its intentions appear hostile.

Dependent Variable 2: Perception of Threat

After testing for the effects of policies of remembrance on perception of intentions, the study then turns to the question of how policies of remembrance influence overall threat perception. How much do a state's policies of remembrance affect threat perception relative to other factors: capabilities or other signals of intentions?

I measure perception of threat in two ways: through public and elite *statements* and through state *policies* (military force posture, alliance membership, and diplomacy). I measure statements as discussed before: public opinion polls, media reports, interviews, and archival materials pertaining to perception of threat. Second, I assess state policy for what it reflects about the level of threat perception within the state. Against whom is the state configuring its military forces? Against whom, and with whom, is it aligned? I assess the nature of the state's diplomacy: that is, whether in its diplomacy with another country and with third parties the state attempts to isolate and punish the other country, and whether the state's diplomacy reflects a strong fear of relative gains by the other country.

The values that the dependent variable can take lie on a continuum: *low*, *moderate*, and *high* perception of threat. In a situation of *low* threat perception, the public and elites say the other state is not a threat; they voice no concern about a military conflict. If any disputes exist, people say they will be resolved through diplomatic means. People say they do not fear economic or military gains by the other country. Second, state policy is similarly benign. The state's military forces are not configured to repel a threat against the other country. The state does not respond to military buildups in the other country with military buildups of its own. The state has not formed alliances against the other country; diplomacy with third parties reflects neutrality or support for the other country. Examples

of states with low threat perception between them are the United States, Canada, and Mexico and the nations of Western Europe.

In a situation of *moderate* threat perception, people say the other country is a potential threat, but not an imminent one. People are uncertain whether the two states will resolve disputes diplomatically or through the use of force. People say they fear the other state's gains in wealth or military power. Second, state policy reflects hedging. The state may configure some military forces against a potential threat from that country. The state monitors and is sensitive to military buildups in the other country, and may respond to them by building up its own military forces or by looking for allies. Diplomacy toward the other country may be somewhat competitive, demonstrating sensitivity to relative gains. Examples of states with moderate threat perception of each other are the United States and China.

As for *high* threat perception, people say the other country is an imminent threat. The public and elites voice frequent and serious concern about the possibility of a militarized dispute with the other state. People believe that the other country wants to own all or some of its territory. They believe that the other country might attack at any time. Second, state policy is adversarial and competitive. The state configures military forces against a threat from that country. The state monitors and is sensitive to military buildups in the other country, and responds to them (either by building up its own military forces or by finding allies). In its diplomacy the state encourages other states to punish and isolate the other country; it is very sensitive to relative gains. Examples of states with high threat perception are Israel and the Palestinians, and North and South Korea.

Testing Whether Remembrance Affects Threat Perception

How important is remembrance, relative to other factors, in overall threat perception? To answer this question, I again rely upon congruence procedure, and evidence from reasoning.

One possibility is that remembrance strongly affects threat perception. Scholars frequently make this argument with respect to East Asian international relations; they expect

fear and resentment of Japan in the region to drive spirals of tension and possibly conflict.⁴⁸ If this hypothesis is correct, if a state's policies of remembrance are *unapologetic*, threat perception of that state should be *high* or at least *moderate*. In reasoning evidence I should find people linking the other state's policies of remembrance to how powerful it is or how menacing its intentions appear.

A second possibility is that remembrance has very little effect on threat perception. Other factors—related to either capabilities or intentions—matter more. In this situation, threat perception will tend to co-vary with other factors, and not with remembrance. Threat perception might be *high* while remembrance is *apologetic*; threat perception might be *low* while remembrance is *unapologetic*. In either case, remembrance cannot be having much of an effect on threat perception. In their reasoning, observers will emphasize the importance of other factors in discussions about threat assessment.

In sum, this study first asks, do a state's policies of remembrance affect perception of intentions as posited by the apology theory? Second, the study seeks to determine the extent to which remembrance affects overall perception of threat, relative to other factors.

CASE SELECTION

In this project I test effects of remembrance on threat perception in two case studies: South Korean perceptions of Japan, and French perceptions of Germany. I select these cases for several reasons. First, the cases provide variation (across the cases, and within the cases over time) in the extent to which each state has demonstrated admission and remorse. Second, these are the classic cases through which the concept of apologies has entered the lexicon of international relations. Third, choosing to study these two cases controls for many factors. Both countries suffered defeat during World War II, both gradually gained

⁴⁸ Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," Dujarric, ed. *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*; Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia"; Kristof, "The Problem of Memory." Also see Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156.

autonomy after a period of occupation, and both were allied with the United States in the Western alliance system. Finally, Germany is the strongest regional power in Europe, and Japan is its Asian counterpart: studying these countries is important simply because these countries are important countries in their respective regions. From an American standpoint, U.S. international military policy is based on promoting regional stability in Europe—largely contingent on the role of Germany—and regional stability in Asia, in which Japan plays a similarly pivotal role. Answers about whether or not these states are perceived as threats are central to American foreign policy.

I focus on perceptions of Japan in South Korea; with respect to Germany I focus on perceptions in France. I selected these cases based on several criteria. First, the cases should be countries that were significantly victimized by a former aggressor. One would expect such countries to be highly attuned to threats—or lack thereof—from the former aggressors. Second, the dyads should be strategically important—that is, that relations between them have important implications for security in their region. Third, the cases should exhibit strong variation in the independent variable: that is, they should have apologized at different levels, and should exhibit changes in them over time that would allow me to measure the effects of such changes. Finally, the cases should be "study-able" from the standpoint of availability of evidence. The cases of South Korea and France fit these criteria.

Generalizability of Findings

One possible objection to this study is that any generalization about apologies in international relations will be impossible from such a small number of cases. For example, one might argue that findings from the Korea-Japan case about the apology theory may be idiosyncratic—related to factors unique to Korea, such as its domestic politics or culture. One might similarly argue that findings about the apology theory gleaned from the Franco-German case are also unique.

To assess the degree to which the French and Korean cases might be idiosyncratic, I also conduct three “mini-cases” to assess whether findings appear to be upheld in other cases. To determine whether findings from the Korea case appear to “travel,” I assess perceptions of Japanese remembrance and intentions in **China** and **Australia**. To determine the extent to which the French case appears to be idiosyncratic, I looked to the case of **Great Britain**. These mini-cases provide broader support for my findings about the apology theory.

It is true that as a “small-n” case study, the results from this project still cannot serve as the last word on the effects of remembrance on threat perception. Further testing is needed to determine whether its findings and implications are broadly generalizable in relations between states, and whether findings also apply to relations between subgroups. However this project contributes to the international relations literature in several ways. It creates an analytic framework for the study of historical memory in international relations: a literature heavy on description and advocacy, and light on analysis. The project tests the effects of remembrance in two cases in which scholars argue that remembrance has had profound effects. And finally, it explores the plausibility of those findings in other cases.

Remembrance in the Japan-Korea Relationship

“The war inflicted horrific, indescribable suffering on many people in Asia and throughout the world. Reflecting deeply on the agony and sorrow of these people, I wish to express my deep remorse and humbly offer my heartfelt condolences.”

—Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, August 1994

“I do not think Japan intended to wage a war of aggression....It was thanks to Japan that most nations in Asia were able to throw off the shackles of colonial rule under European domination and to win independence.”

—Sakurai Shin, Murayama Cabinet member, August 1994

“How can we make friends with people who try to forget and ignore the many pains they inflicted on us? How can we deal with them in the future with any degree of trust?”

—ROK President Kim Dae-jung, August 2001



Chapter Two

Japanese Remembrance Since World War II

This chapter codes Japanese policies of remembrance over the postwar period (1945-2003).

After the introduction, I summarize the relevant history in the Japan-Korea relationship, in order to establish those deeds for which Japan might be expected to apologize. Next, I turn to Japanese remembrance. As background I first summarize policies of remembrance pursued in Japan under the administration of U.S. occupation authorities. Next, the chapter turns to policies of remembrance pursued by the Japanese themselves since World War II. Finally, I track the alternate variables that might have affected South Korean threat perception over this time period.

To measure Japanese remembrance over time, I divide the post-World War II era into time periods. First, as argued in Chapter One (pp. 45-46), the only requirement about periodization from a methodological standpoint is that periods be defined in such a way such that the independent variable does not vary significantly *within* a given time period. Therefore periods should first and foremost be determined by coding of the value of the independent variable over time. As long as a given period does not encompass a time in which there was variation in the value of the independent variable, periods may be further subdivided for convenience purposes (that is, to present the data in a manageable way to readers) without biasing findings. For both cases in this project, I use two criteria to subdivide time periods: 1) changes in the tone or content (but not the value) of remembrance, and 2) major substantive changes in the value of another key independent variable of interest, namely, capabilities.

Based on this periodization method, I divide the case of post-World War II Japan into three time periods. First, although Japanese remembrance varied greatly in its tone and level of

activity, I code it as *unapologetic* over the entire postwar era. Therefore from a methodological standpoint, there is no required division of the post-World War II era. This yields a single, and rather unwieldy, period of 1945-2003. To subdivide this period purely for presentation purposes, I rely on the other two criteria mentioned above. Japan first began making apologies (albeit unsatisfying ones) in 1965; hence I demarcate the first period as 1945-1964 to mark the first period in which Japanese apologies were nonexistent. Next, although I code Japan as consistently *unapologetic*, Japanese remembrance nonetheless underwent a major change in tone and level of activity after 1990. Hence I also mark 1990-2003 as another relevant time period. The year of 1990 also coincides with my second criterion for sub-dividing periods because it demarcates an important shift in Japanese capabilities: the change in constraints imposed on Japan by the Soviet threat.

In sum, using this periodization method, I divide the case of post-World War II Japan into three periods: an early phase (1945-1964), a middle phase (1965-89), and a late phase (1990-2000s).

SUMMARY

I argue that American policies of remembrance in Japan did not encourage remembrance of Japan's atrocities and war in East Asia. Although the Tokyo Trials brought to light some of Japan's aggression and atrocities, many perpetrators went unpunished, and many atrocities were not publicized. The United States deflected requests for Japanese reparations. An important exception to this general trend was the U.S. attempt to institute candid history teaching of the war through education reform.

In the early period (1945-64), Japanese remembrance was highly *unapologetic*. In their statements, Japanese leaders glorified Japanese colonialism and motivations for Japanese incursions in Asia. Japanese education glossed over the recent past, and commemoration highlighted Japanese rather than foreign victims.

In the middle period (1965 through the 1980s), Japanese remembrance remained *unapologetic*. Japan did begin issuing statements of apology during this period, starting with the 1965 apology to South Korea. Later, Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Nakasone issued apologies. Tokyo also adopted new policies of textbook screening in response to pressure from its former victims. But as apologetic policies increased, unapologetic policies increased as well. Japanese leaders made statements that denied Japanese aggression and atrocities; in education, increased coverage of the war in textbooks during the 1970s was undone as a result of conservative movements in the 1980s. Ministry of Education screening policies sparked two international diplomatic crises. Politicians honored Japanese war dead (rather than foreign victims) at the Yasukuni shrine. Thus Japanese policies of remembrance were *unapologetic* in the middle period.

In the late period (1990 through 2000s), the pace of remembrance increased in Japan: more remembrance, both apologetic and unapologetic, is evident. Some elites issued remarkable statements of apology, such as Hosokawa, Murayama, and Obuchi. At the same time, other elites denied or glorified Japan's past. The 1995 debate in the Diet over issuing an official apology highlighted unapologetic views prevalent among Japanese elites. In education, some textbooks presented detailed discussions of Japanese aggression and atrocities, but others continued to ignore these events entirely. Thus Japan's policies of remembrance overall remain

unapologetic in this period: largely because a large increase in unapologetic policies was, in effect, cancelled out by an accompanying increase in unapologetic policies.

BACKGROUND: JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS

Japan's 1910 annexation of Korea was the culmination of centuries of competition between Japan, Russia, and China over dominance of the peninsula.¹ Japan had previously invaded Korea in 1592; Japan's armies rampaged throughout Korea until finally expelled by a combination of Korean naval victories and the intervention of Chinese Ming Army forces.² Japan continued to battle its neighbors for dominance on the peninsula and finally took control of Korea after defeating both of them in wars (China in 1896, and Russia in 1905). Control of the Korean peninsula, as well as Manchuria, was viewed as important by the Japanese to establish economic security, and to better defend Japan against the menace of Western colonialism.³ Having finally beaten back its Asian rivals, Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910 as a Japanese colony; it ruled there until defeated by the Allies in World War II.

¹ For historical accounts of Korea-Japan relations, see W.G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan*, Second ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974); Beasley, *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999); Bruce Cumings, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea: A Comparative Perspective," Asia Pacific Research Center Working Paper, Stanford University, 1997; Carter J. Eckert, *Korea, Old and New: A History* (Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990); Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

² This invasion is far from a dim memory to Koreans. When discussing the Japanese threat, every single interviewee cited this invasion. Particularly identified with this event is the reviled Japanese military leader Hideyoshi Toyotomi, and the revered Korean Admiral Yi Sun-shin, whose innovative armored "turtle boats" and naval tactics led to the dramatic Korean naval victories. An imposing statue of Admiral Yi, complete with turtle boat, stands on a major thoroughfare in downtown Seoul.

³ For discussions of Japanese motivations for colonization in Asia see Michael A. Barnhardt, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Ramon Hawley Myers, Mark R. Peattie and Ching-chih Chen, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Under Japanese rule, Koreans experienced political, physical, and cultural oppression.⁴ The Japanese colonial authorities abolished Korean newspapers and political organizations; public assembly was banned. To stamp out opposition to Japanese rule, the police arrested leaders of the Korean independence movement and their family members; they were tortured, raped, imprisoned, or executed.⁵ Japanese repression of Korea extended into the cultural sphere, as Japan tried to remake Koreans into citizens of the Japanese empire. To this end, Japanese colonial authorities required Koreans to adopt Japanese names, the Japanese language, and Shintoism (the Japanese national religion). Korean schoolchildren were led every morning to sing songs about the glory of “their” Japanese emperor.

Japanese colonial policy grew more severe as Japan’s war in Asia strained Tokyo’s resources.⁶ Japan extracted food and resources from Korea, sending them to the Japanese homeland and other territories while Koreans suffered in increasing deprivation. Japan deported 750,000 Koreans to Japan and other colonial territories to work as forced laborers; they were undernourished, overworked, beaten, and often killed. Korean men were conscripted into Japan's Imperial Army. Perhaps 200,000 Korean women (along with women from other Japanese-held territories) were taken to the front to work as sex slaves in brothels for the

⁴ For accounts of Japanese colonialism in Korea, see Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1988); Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1963); Myers, Peattie and Chen, *The Japanese Colonial Empire.*”

⁵ This repression is vividly commemorated at the Seodaemun Prison museum in Seoul, where Japanese prison buildings still stand.

⁶ Japanese repression generated rising Korean dissatisfaction. On March 1, 1919 over a million Koreans nationwide demonstrated against the Japanese regime. This was violently suppressed by the colonial police. Death toll estimates range from the official Japanese figure of approximately 500 casualties to the Korean estimate of 7,500 casualties, plus thousands more wounded and arrested. After this uprising, Japan softened its policies to some degree in what was known as the “Cultural policy.” With this policy the Japanese colonial government legalized various organizations and relaxed censorship laws, allowing some Korean newspapers and magazines to be published.

Japanese army.⁷ By the end of the war, over 10 per cent of the Korean population was dispersed abroad.⁸ Thus Koreans suffered greatly from Japanese occupation, particularly after the demands of war led Japan to adopt even more severe measures than before.

Korea's suffering was only part of the devastation caused by Japanese aggression. 15 million Chinese perished in the war against Japan. Japan used chemical and biological weapons in its war against China, and unleashed germ warfare on Chinese civilians. Japanese soldiers inflicted killing sprees and rape on occupied cities (most notoriously, the Rape of Nanking and the Rape of Manila). Japanese strategic bombing campaigns devastated Chinese cities, killing more than 250,000 Chinese civilians.⁹ Famine and epidemics spread throughout Asia. Local economies were devastated; millions of refugees fled their homes.

The Japanese people also suffered from the policies of conquest they had launched. Once the region's most powerful military and economy, Japan lay devastated in 1945, stripped of sovereignty and subjected to occupation by the United States. 3 million Japanese had lost their lives in the war, including 1.2 million soldiers; over four million were wounded or ill. John Dower writes,

The emperor's soldiers and sailors left a trail of unspeakable cruelty and rapacity. As it turned out, they also devoured themselves. Japanese died in hopeless suicide charges, starved to death in the field, killed their own wounded rather than let them fall into

⁷ On the sex slaves—euphemistically referred to as “comfort women”—see Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations : Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000); George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Sex Slaves of the Japanese Imperial Forces* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Also see articles in special issue of *Positions* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1997). The Japanese Army's brothels were an effort to improve soldier health. Japanese soldiers acquired sexually transmitted diseases because of widespread rape of women in conquered territories. The brothels were designed to reduce the occurrence of rape and thus improve the health and war-fighting capability of the Japanese soldier. The sex slaves who worked at the brothels were frequently recruited through coercion or deception; survivors testify that peasant girls were often recruited for factory jobs and then were instead taken to the brothels. Tokyo at first denied any connection to the brothels, but later admitted that the Army was involved in their administration. It continues to deny that any of the women were forcibly recruited.

⁸ Cumings, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea.”

⁹ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 337.

enemy hands, and murdered their civilian compatriots in places such as Saipan and Okinawa. They watched helplessly as fire bombs destroyed their cities....¹⁰

Overseas, perhaps 3 million Japanese citizens living in the Japanese empire were expelled from their homes after the defeat; in the chaos they struggled to make their way to Japan. Japanese POWs perished or suffered for years under brutal conditions in Russian camps. The U.S. firebombing of Tokyo killed 80,000 people; Hiroshima and Nagasaki were blasted by American nuclear weapons, leading to 80,000 and 40,000 dead (respectively) and tens of thousands more suffering from wounds and radiation poisoning. 40 percent of Japan's urban areas were destroyed, and 30 percent of her urban population was homeless. Nearly 2 million Japanese civilians died during World War II. As John Dower has powerfully depicted, Japan's early days after the war were a desperate struggle for survival among millions of shattered families, orphans, widows, and dazed veterans.¹¹ The Japanese themselves suffered a great deal from their failed attempt to dominate Asia.

This chapter now turns to Japanese remembrance of these events. I begin with a summary of the policies of remembrance imposed on Japan during the U.S. occupation, and then analyze Japanese remembrance across three time periods after World War II.

¹⁰ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat : Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), p. 22.

¹¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*.

REMEMBRANCE DURING THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

Policies of remembrance under the U.S. administration of Japan set the stage for Japanese remembrance. The U.S. occupation authority was led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). SCAP's policies initially sought to encourage Japan to be more apologetic, but this goal was relaxed because of the exigencies of occupation and the nascent Cold War. One area in which the U.S. consistently advocated apologetic Japanese remembrance was in history education. Otherwise, U.S. policies promoted Japanese amnesia. In this section I will examine American occupation policies with respect to postwar justice, reparations, and education.

Justice

The U.S. and allied nations conducted both local tribunals and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (known as the "Tokyo Trials"), which lasted for two and a half years.¹² Planners of Japanese aggression were identified and punished; some were put to death. However, critics have argued that policies of justice during the occupation contributed to Japan's later amnesia about the war because the tribunals were flawed in several ways.

First, critics argue that the tribunal's rules and protocol were so flawed, this allowed Japanese to dismiss its findings as nothing but "victor's justice."¹³ The rules that excluded any

¹² On the local military tribunals see John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 449.

¹³ See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. Also see Timothy Brook, "The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking," *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2001), pp. 673-700; James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Richard Minear, *Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). Four of the judges submitted dissenting opinions at the conclusion of the trials: Justice Pal acquitted all defendants; Justice Röling found five not guilty. Justices Webb and Barnard "found the tribunal flawed and compromised by the decision not to bring the Emperor to trial." See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 459.

Japanese participation (except of course as defendants) contributed to this perception. U.S. occupation authorities blocked Japanese authority over any trials during the occupation, and forbade Japanese from participating in the Tokyo Trials as members of legal staffs. Laments John Dower, Japanese involvement “could have removed some of the stigma of victor’s justice from the trials” and might have “provided the nucleus for ongoing war-crimes investigations such as took place in Germany.”¹⁴

Second, critics argue that Allied justice was tainted by hypocrisy; some of the allied victors were trying to re-impose their colonial authority at the same time they were trying Japanese defendants for colonial aggression.¹⁵ The trials were also criticized for ignoring what the Japanese viewed as Allied war crimes, such as the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and U.S. incendiary bombing of Tokyo and other cities.

Third, Allied justice was seen as tainted because the tribunal neglected to indict or try numerous important figures. Emperor Hirohito was not tried for war crimes, because the Americans had agreed to Tokyo’s demand not to remove him from power.¹⁶ Furthermore, as John Dower writes, “No heads of the dreaded *Kempeitai* (the military police) were indicted; no leaders of ultranationalist secret societies; no industrialists who had profited from aggression and

¹⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 480.

Dower does note that there had been a few Japanese legal efforts in pursuing justice before U.S. occupation authorities blocked such activities. But he comments, the “relative leniency of sentences imposed in those few Japanese trials may have been a fair sample of what might have been expected if the government had been empowered to pursue war crimes at higher levels.” Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 477.

¹⁵ John Dower discusses the French in Indochina, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the British in Malaya. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 472.

¹⁶ In his dissenting opinion, Justice Webb wrote that Japan’s Class-A crimes “had a principal author who escaped all prosecution and of whom in any case the present Defendants could only be considered as accomplices.” Quoted in Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 461.

had been intimately involved in paving the ‘road to war.’”¹⁷ Numerous Japanese abuses went ignored and thus undocumented: grotesque medical experiments and chemical weapons use on POWs and civilians; forced conscription and forced labor of Koreans and Taiwanese; and the several hundred thousand young girls and women who were drafted into sexual slavery for the Japanese army. In sum, many critics of the Tokyo trials argue that the trial’s many failings encouraged later Japanese amnesia.

Although U.S. authorities initially favored bringing Japan to justice for its aggression, the onset of the Cold War decreased the American effort to encourage justice and repentance for Japanese violence. In what became known as the “reverse course,” the United States changed its strategy from de-fanging and enfeebling Japan to building it up as a strong anticommunist ally. Reconstruction required political, bureaucratic and industrial expertise; thus the United States could not try the people with such skills for war crimes. Faced with the choice between justice and economic reconstruction, the United States chose the latter for Japan.¹⁸ In sum, between the failings of the Tokyo tribunal and the influence of the Cold War, U.S. policies of justice in Japan during the occupation reflected and encouraged amnesia about Japan’s past actions.

Reparations

U.S. occupation policies also reflected amnesia because they discouraged Japanese payment of reparations to its victims. First, because of Cold War politics, the United States deflected restitution demands from Japan’s victims. Many nations were desperate for cash in the aftermath

¹⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 465.

¹⁸ Wartime Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru was released, pardoned and immediately returned to politics; the most notorious example is Kishi Nobusuke, who was instrumental in the colonization of Manchuria, and was Minister of Commerce and Industry in Hideki Tojo’s wartime cabinet. Kishi spent three years in jail and was released; he later became a key figure in forming the LDP, and became Prime Minister in 1957.

of the war and were clamoring for reparations from the Japanese invaders.¹⁹ Initially, the United States had favored Japanese reparations, including reparations in the form of dismantling Japanese industrial equipment and redistributing it among other East Asian nations to promote economic recovery in the region.²⁰ However after the reverse course, Japan's reparations burden would be reduced. Instead of sending scarce and precious capital to devastated victims, Japan would devote it to domestic economic reconstruction.²¹ In the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Americans had stipulated that Japanese reparations should not be paid to the extent that they damaged the recovering Japanese economy.²²

The two countries that had suffered the most from Japanese aggression did not receive reparations under the San Francisco Treaty. Because China had been "lost" to communism, the Americans blocked Chinese participation in the treaty. As for Korea, it was deemed a member of the Japanese empire during the war, and was thus designated as an *enemy* nation.²³ As an enemy nation, Korea was not an ally entitled to sign the peace treaty, nor was it entitled to reparations. Therefore neither China nor Korea received reparations from Japan in the

¹⁹ Japan's victims (the British, Australians, and numerous Southeast Asian nations) were rebuffed on this issue by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a diplomatic tour of the region in 1951. John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: The Althone Press, 1988), p. 50.

²⁰ In 1945-46, the report issued by U.S. reparations commissioner Edwin Pauley recommended a high reparations bill for Japan. Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), pp. 165-66.

²¹ The Draper Mission (a study group led by William Draper in 1948) argued that removing industrial facilities would be detrimental to the objectives of the occupation, and would place burdens on the American taxpayer (who was financing the occupation costs). An auxiliary mission led by Percy Johnston submitted recommendations that year that were much lower than the original amounts. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p. 313.

²² James Morley, *Japan and Korea* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

²³ Koreans protested this characterization of their status, arguing that they had been forcibly colonized by Japan, that Koreans were forcibly conscripted by Japan into the Japanese Imperial forces, and that a Korean provisional government had existed in Shanghai during the Japanese occupation of Korea. The provisional government in Shanghai was little-known and often defunct during the period of occupation. There was a Korean independence movement, which was highly fragmented and factionalized. The Korean Restoration Army, with about 3,000 members at its peak, was the largest Korean resistance group that formed and trained in China. See Eckert, *Korea, Old and New: A History*, pp. 324-25.

immediate aftermath of the war. In sum, in the face of potentially crippling reparations demands, the United States worked to minimize Japan's reparations burden. It should also be noted that Japan, struggling with its own devastation, evinced no independent interest in compensating victims.

Education Reforms

Education is the one area in which the United States promoted apologetic remembrance: the U.S. authorities wanted the Japanese to understand the death and devastation caused by Japan's authoritarian regime, in order to promote the virtues of democracy. The United States viewed Japan's 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education as a major contributor to Japanese hyper-nationalism.²⁴ According to one Occupation official, the Rescript was the "bible of modern state Shinto," from which "militarists and ultranationalists drew most of their ammunition."²⁵ Thus U.S. occupation reforms sought to change Japan's education system from a strongly centralized system promoting emperor-worship to a decentralized system that promoted democratic principles. As U.S. officials pursued education reform, they faced continual obstruction from Japanese elites, who saw no grounds for changing Japanese education.²⁶

²⁴ Imperial Rescript on Education, reprinted in Appendix I, *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 1963), p. 122. Herbert Bix writes that as Japan began its colonization in East Asia, the Ministry of Education undertook textbook reforms with the goal of strengthening unity and emperor-worship in Japanese citizens. Japan was portrayed as "an organic, harmonious, moral, and patriarchal 'family state' in which all Japanese were related to the emperor....For the first time, the impersonal emperor-state itself was presented as the supreme entity that took priority over all other values." Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 32.

²⁵ He argued that "By the most liberal interpretation it is out of spirit with the new draft constitution...it should not be read in the public schools or included in textbooks, except perhaps at the college level where it might be included as a historical document." Toshio Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945-1952* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 152.

²⁶ The new Education Minister after the war, Maeda Tamon, declared that Japan's postwar education system should be founded on the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, whose "most precious virtue was the harmonious

The United States instituted a range of education reforms. First, SCAP's Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) sought to decentralize administrative control of education, devolving more authority to local, elected school boards. Second, SCAP abolished the teaching of moral education and emperor-idolatry, instead teaching citizens about democratic rights and values. Third, SCAP fired teachers who were deemed unacceptable, and reinstated teachers who had previously been dismissed for their liberal leanings.²⁷ Fourth, CI&E also monitored textbook content. MacArthur had noted in his 1945 education directive "the important psychological task of reminding the Japanese people of the total devastation brought on by the Pacific War."²⁸ To remind them, SCAP printed and distributed fifty thousand copies of the textbook *History of the Pacific War* and ordered the MoE to stop printing textbooks until new ones could be approved. Until the end of the Occupation, all textbooks were screened by the MoE and CI&E. Thus American occupational authorities pursued a variety of educational reforms aimed at decentralizing, liberalizing, and promoting remembrance in Japanese education.

Although the Japanese Diet did pass important education legislation in response to American pressure,²⁹ the attempt to decentralize control over content (curricula and textbook)

relationship it prescribed among the people and their loyalty to His majesty." Nozaki and Inokuchi 1998. Upon his resignation after the defeat, the Imperial Education minister Ota Kozo had informed the nation that "Japan's defeat had been brought on by the people's insufficient dedication to the emperor, along with their failure to bring into full play the spirit nurtured by their imperial education." Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, p. 148.

²⁷ MacArthur issued the directive "Administration of the Educational System of Japan," on October 22, 1945. Teachers deemed unacceptable were all career military staff, active nationalists, and enemies of the occupation.

²⁸ Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, p. 165.

²⁹ The Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law both passed on March 31, 1947. The Fundamental Law is considered a "constitution" for Japanese education, a declaration of educational values designed to replace the 1890 Imperial Rescript. It addressed issues such as equal opportunity and coeducation; it stated that "Education shall not be subject to improper control, but it should be directly responsible to the whole people." Quoted in Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi, "Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Court Challenges," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1998), p. 38.

ultimately failed. The 1947 School Education Law stated that "competent authorities" would screen, approve, and author textbooks: such authorities were the MoE and also local school boards that were to be created under the law.³⁰ These elected boards would control most decisions about local education, notably textbook content. CI&E also decreed that "prefectural and local boards of education had 'almost absolute control over the curriculum.'"³¹ But in actuality local boards, bereft of budget or expertise, looked to Tokyo for guidance. "The Ministry of Education's curriculum guide, *Courses of Study*, was swallowed whole by the local school boards, who took it literally as an instruction to them."³² CI&E told the MoE to inform local boards that its guidance was not mandatory, but simply meant to be informative. The head of CI&E said that the MoE "should never be allowed even to entertain the idea that it is responsible for the curricula of Japan's schools."³³ However despite American efforts, the MoE retained a great deal of influence over education content.

In sum, postwar Japanese remembrance emerged from the setting of the American occupation. Except for education policies, U.S. occupation policies (justice and reparations) tended to discourage Japanese remembrance of the war. I now turn to assessing Japanese remembrance over the three time periods since World War II.

³⁰ Nozaki and Inokuchi, "Japanese Education," p. 39.

³¹ Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, p. 214.

³² Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, p. 214.

³³ Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*, p. 215.

GLORIFICATION (1945-1964)

This period was a time of reconstruction in Japan; it was an era of self-preoccupation with the ravages of war and the challenges of recovery. Japan regained sovereignty in 1952, and in this decade was struggling to revive its devastated economy.

I code Japanese policies of remembrance in this transitional period as highly *unapologetic*. Japanese elites did not view colonization of Asia as an act for which Japan should apologize. It was characterized as defensively motivated by the threat of Western incursion into East Asia, and as economically advantageous for the former colonies. The full scope of Japan's actions in its colonial policies and the war were not admitted. No remorse was expressed for any policy.

Statements

Statements by Japanese leaders holding normalization negotiations with ROK were unapologetic about Japan's past actions in Korea. The two countries met in a series of four negotiation conferences starting in 1953. The Korean delegation walked out of the third normalization conference (1953) because of Japanese statements. The Chief Japanese Delegate Kubota Kenichiro complained when the Koreans used the term 'enslavement' to describe Japan's reign over Korea. Kubota called such language the "product of wartime hysteria."³⁴ According to the American ambassador's account of the contretemps, "Citing Japanese investments and other contributions to the development of Korea, Mr. Kubota also stated...that he did not consider the

³⁴ Declassified Documents Collection, "Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, Chapter 13: Inventory of Commitments and Problems—Korea," The White House, April 26, 1954, 29. For a summary of the remarks see Takasaki Soji, *Mogen no genkei* (Tokyo: Mokuseisha, 1990), 224-251.

Japanese occupation an ‘entirely unmixed evil.’”³⁵ Kubota said that “Japan also had the right to demand compensation from Korea because for 36 years Japan has changed Korea’s bare mountains to a flourishing country with flowers and trees.” Kubota commented that if Japan had not colonized Korea, “Korea would have been taken over either by Russia or China and Korea would have been in much worse situation if Japan had not colonized it.”³⁶ The ROK returned to the conference after four years of diplomatic back-and-forthing in which negotiators insisted that Kubota retract and apologize for the statement.³⁷ During these years, Kubota was not disciplined by a disapproving government; rather, other officials rallied to his defense. Foreign Minister Okazaki called Kubota’s remarks “perfectly rational”; he commented, “we did not utter anything wrong, and there is absolutely no reason for us to apologize for what we have conveyed.”³⁸ The Foreign Affairs Ministry commented that “Korea is solely responsible for the dissolution of the conference by intentionally distorting the private talks and we regret this.”³⁹ Kubota’s statement—and the way other Japanese elites reacted to it—reflects a very unapologetic view of Japanese policies in Korea.

Other Japanese statements issued during this period reflect little Japanese introspection about its actions. In the first normalization conference, the chief of the Korean delegation suggested, “let us bury the hatchets.” One of the chief Japanese delegates said, “What are the

³⁵ “Report of the Van Fleet Mission,” op. cit., 29.

³⁶ Won-Deog Lee, “Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations,” in Young-sun Ha, ed., *Korea and Japan: Past, Present and Future* (Seoul: Nanam, 1997), p. 83.

³⁷ For a detailed account of the issues in the negotiations, see Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

³⁸ Quoted in Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” p. 84; also see Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 187.

³⁹ Quoted in Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” p. 84

hatchets to bury?”⁴⁰ Another statement issued during negotiations was that given by Ono Banboku of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1958, who suggested that Japanese diplomacy toward the ROK and Taiwan be closely coordinated. He said, “If feasible, it would be nice to form the United States of Japan with the ROK and Formosa.”⁴¹ Such inflammatory statements reflect little recognition that Japan’s prewar policies had been harmful.

Another telling episode could have been Japan’s first apology, but ended up as a showcase for Japan’s lack of contrition. Japanese envoy Yatsugi Kazuo made a statement to ROK President Rhee Syngman during a visit to South Korea in 1958. Yatsugi, representing Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke, reportedly offered atonement for “the wrongs committed by Ito Hirobumi.”⁴² He said, “Prime Minister Kishi is regretful of the wrongs committed against Korea, and is making every effort to set them right.”⁴³ The statement received some attention in the Korean press, and drew sharp criticism in Tokyo. Grilled about the statement in Diet hearings, Kishi denied it. He said, “I am not familiar with what Mr. Yatsugi said in Keijo.” (Keijo was the Japanese colonial name for Seoul.) He added, “Whatever view Mr. Yatsugi expressed was stated as his personal view, not mine.”⁴⁴ Therefore statements by Japanese leaders during this period reflect an unapologetic view of Japanese colonialism in Korea.

⁴⁰ Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis*, p. 43.

⁴¹ Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis*, p. 43.

⁴² Ito, perceived by Koreans to be a symbol of Japanese imperialism, was Japan’s Special Ambassador to Korea in 1895; under Ito Korea was coerced into signing the Japan-Korea Protection Treaty, which established Korea as a Japanese colony.

⁴³ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 33, 36.

⁴⁴ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 41.

Reparations

In the immediate postwar period, Japan was more concerned about Japanese rather than foreign victims. 3 million ethnic Japanese—forcibly repatriated from the dissolved empire—had arrived penniless in Japan, had politically mobilized, and were demanding state funds. Similarly, the Japanese government also aided the *hibakusha* (victims of the atomic bombing).⁴⁵

Japan did pay reparations to victims during this period, but these reflect little in the way of admission or remorse, and appear to have been heavily influenced by American pressure and the prospect of eventual economic benefits to Japan. Japan negotiated bilateral reparations settlements with several former victim nations that amounted to about \$1 billion (about \$5 billion in 2002 dollars).⁴⁶ Japan paid reparations to Burma (1955), the Philippines (1956), Indonesia (1958), South Vietnam (1959), and Thailand (1963). Common uses for reparations (which came in the form of Japanese grants, loans, products, and services) were factories, dams, power plants, and railways.

Reparations—which consisted of products or services provided by Japanese vendors—were widely interpreted as a Japanese effort to gain an economic foothold in Southeast Asia.⁴⁷ The United States actively promoted Japanese reparations with an eye to Japanese economic gains in these markets; Washington saw Southeast Asia as Tokyo's "reward" for obeying the American policy of distancing itself from ties to Communist China, despite the vast

⁴⁵ On the politics of reparations to these victim groups within Japan, see James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

⁴⁶ Morley, *Japan and Korea*.

⁴⁷ Comments a U.S. State Department report, "With an eye to increased trade opportunities in Southeast Asia, Japan intends to make considerable sacrifices to obtain a normalization of relations throughout the area." Declassified Documents Collection, Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7331, "The Recent and Prospective Foreign Relations of Japan (1956-61)," Prepared by Division of Research for Far East, September 12, 1956, p. 10.

market potential there for Japanese firms. Richard Samuels has written that Japanese reparations toward these countries were also used as a tool of domestic political patronage.⁴⁸ In sum, Japanese reparations reflect little contrition; Japan was prodded into making these settlements, expressed no admission of crimes for which they were being paid, expressed no remorse, and found ways to pay reparations that were the most advantageous to itself.⁴⁹

Justice

Japanese policies of justice were unapologetic during this period. Japanese legal efforts with respect to the war were devoted to freeing people who had been convicted under the Tokyo Trials. The Diet passed resolutions demanding their release. In 1957, one of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's primary political goals was to secure the release of war criminals. Kishi persuaded the Eisenhower administration—who was urging Japan to rearm and to develop close economic ties with Southeast Asia—to expedite the release of prisoners who had been convicted for crimes such as murder, rape, and torture.⁵⁰ After prisoners were released, “the government paid their back salaries and restored their pensions—on the grounds that they had not been tried under Japanese domestic law and therefore should not be treated as ordinary, home-style

⁴⁸ For example, Samuels reports that Kishi Nobusuke saw reparations as “a splendid opportunity.” Samuels writes, “Kishi noted the language in the various peace treaties allowing reparations to be paid ‘in the form of capital and consumer goods produced by Japanese industries and services’”; “[Kishi] made sure that his business supporters would be the companies that supplied the goods and services. Kishi also increased the amounts being offered in reparations to the Southeast Asian countries as a way to direct even more public resources toward Japanese industry.” Thus Samuels argues that in addition as being a business opportunity in general, Japanese reparations benefited specific Japanese politicians who used them as political patronage. See Richard J. Samuels, “Kishi and Corruption: An Anatomy of the 1955 System,” *Japan Policy Research Institute*, Working Paper no. 83 (December 2001), p. 7.

⁴⁹ Regarding the individuals of these countries who had suffered from Japanese aggression, Norma Field writes, “These funds did not trickle down to those citizens most devastated by the war, and it is from amongst them that lawsuits have been launched against Japan nearly fifty years after the war.” Norma Field, “War and Apology: Japan, the Fiftieth, and After,” *Positions* Vol. 5 (Spring 1997), p. 11.

⁵⁰ Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 660.

criminals.”⁵¹ Far from seeking to prosecute people who had committed atrocities during the war, Tokyo continued to work for the release of prisoners, who were viewed as honorable victims of “victor’s justice.”

Education and Historiography

Japanese education policy during this period reflects no admission or remorse for Japanese actions during colonialism and war. Textbooks offered little coverage of Japanese aggression or atrocities in World War II; historiography of the time emphasized Japanese victimhood.

In a series of laws, the Japanese government undid many of the education reforms of the American occupation. LDP leaders accused the leftist-pacifist teacher’s union of fomenting a communist agenda; conservatives argued that Japanese education needed to foster patriotism and “defense-mindedness.”⁵² Thus they sought to reduce local controls over education (where teachers had the most influence) and to re-centralize education policy within the MoE. The LDP succeeded in passing new legislation (amidst strong public and political opposition) to appoint rather than elect local school boards.⁵³ LDP legislation to tighten textbook screening failed to pass, but the LDP changed its strategy and succeeded in enacting the desired measures through “regulation” instead. Later, the 1963 Textbook Law decreed that country-level school boards rather than schools would preside over textbook selection, and placed new restrictions on

⁵¹ Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 652.

⁵² Ironically, LDP members were supported in this effort by the United States, which was encouraging Japanese rearmament at the time; the United States also saw the leftist teachers (who were Socialist or Communist) as threats to the political stability of postwar Japan.

⁵³ Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education,” p. 40. The Hatoyama Administration succeeded in passing this bill only by bringing police into the Diet.

publishers in textbook submissions.⁵⁴ Thus during this period, the LDP reversed U.S. policies aimed at decentralizing control over educational content.

Once the MoE had regained control over textbook content, it began rejecting textbooks that depicted unsavory Japanese behavior during the war. In 1956 the Ministry rejected eight textbooks on the grounds that they had too many negative comments on Japan's wartime conduct. In its textbook screening role the Ministry not only hired full-time screeners but also advised publishers to remove certain authors from projects if their work was seen as conveying the wrong message. "The examiners not only checked for factual accuracy, but also evaluated the level of patriotism of each text."⁵⁵ In 1957, eight textbooks were rejected despite the fact that they exceeded the number of points required for approval, because they reflected "slanted" discussions.⁵⁶ Textbook author and historian Ienaga Saburo notes, "The certification has become stricter year by year, as I saw in 1952, 1955, and 1957." Ienaga's textbook *A New History of Japan (Shin nihonshi)* was finally rejected in 1963.⁵⁷

The Ministry of Education rejected Ienaga's book on the grounds that it was "too gloomy," and that the text was "excessively critical" of Japan's role in the Pacific War. The ministry selected three hundred items for complaint and told Ienaga to delete the following images and texts: pictures of maimed soldiers and the demolished city of Hiroshima, and passages about the Nanjing Massacre, rape by Japanese soldiers, and Japanese bacteriological experiments by Unit 731 in Manchuria. Furthermore, the word *shinryaku* (invasion or aggression) was to be replaced with *shinshutsu* (advance). Regarding the issue of rape, the ministry stated: "The violation of women is something that has happened on every battlefield in every era of human history. This is not an issue that needs to be taken up with respect to the Japanese Army in particular."⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 73.

⁵⁵ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 73.

⁵⁶ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 73.

⁵⁷ Saburo Ienaga, "The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit," *Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars* Vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1970), p. 8.

⁵⁸ Hyun Sook Kim, "History and Memory: The Comfort Women Controversy," *Positions* Vol. 5 (1997), p. 79; also see Buruma 1994, 189-200.

Ienaga commented, “we can clearly see the tendency of the Education Ministry to control the content of historical education through the enforcement of state certification.”⁵⁹ In 1965 Ienaga filed his first lawsuit against the Japanese government, launching a legal battle against the MoE that would continue for decades.⁶⁰

As the MoE rejected textbooks at high rates, publishers adapted and textbooks began to reflect increasingly vague treatments of the past. The elementary school text *Hyojun Shokaku Shakai*, “presented what can only be characterized as a patriotic narrative of Japanese continental aggression.”⁶¹ *Nihon Shoseki* taught junior high school students that “Thinking to liberate Southeast Asia from Western colonial control, [Japan] built a ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ encompassing all of East Asia, with Japan as its leader who could freely use the region’s resources.”⁶² Thus increased centralized control over education policy led to decreased admission in Japanese textbooks during this period.

Historiography

Historical studies commissioned by the Japanese government also reflect an unapologetic view of Japan’s past. First, A 35-volume report called “Historical Research on Japanese Overseas Activities” reported that accusations of Japanese colonial exploitation of Korea are “absurd and

⁵⁹ Ienaga, “The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit,” p. 8.

⁶⁰ For more detail on Ienaga’s lawsuits, see Buruma 1994, 189-201; Nozaki and Inokuchi 1998, 41-45; also see Ienaga 1996. Ienaga’s lawsuit argued that “government certification of textbooks is used to weed out, or force revision in, all books that fail to conform to an orthodox ideology,” which was a violation of the author’s freedom of speech, and the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947. Ienaga, “The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit,” p. 3.

⁶¹ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 90.

⁶² Quoted in Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 94.

lamentable,” “defamatory,” and disproved by Korea’s economic progress.⁶³ Second, the Japanese Foreign Ministry also released a report on the Japanese colonies in 1949 called “Statement of Economic and Financial Situation in the Ceded Territories,” the results of a study team assembled in preparation for the San Francisco peace treaty. The report states,

Japan’s statesmanship of these territories are not to be understood as so-called exploitation by a colonial power. On the contrary, these territories when the Japanese took over were the most underdeveloped regions, and each region’s economic, social and cultural advancement should be attributed to the Japanese. This fact is already acknowledged by the learned people of the world—including the natives of the lands....The word ‘exploitation’...is sometimes used against Japan, but this is merely a statement coming out of ignorance or strictly for the purpose of political propaganda.⁶⁴

The report laments the expulsion of “the Japanese inhabitants who made earnest living in these areas,” whose expulsion was “strongly against the normal international protocol.” Finally, the article also notes that Japan acquired the territories “through methods deemed legitimate by international convention,” and that thus Japan “strongly objects to the notion that it had obtained these territories [through criminal measures].”⁶⁵ Thus Japanese government historiography of this period glossed over Japanese abuses, and viewed occupations as beneficial rather than harmful.

Commemoration

Japanese commemoration in the early period reflects amnesia about the war. Japan commemorated Japanese rather than foreign victims of the war. First, starting in 1963 Japan began honoring its war dead at an annual “National War Dead Memorial Service” on August 15

⁶³ Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” p. 87.

⁶⁴ Quoted in Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” p. 85.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

(the day of the surrender).⁶⁶ Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi told the press that the ceremony showed “the entire nation’s sober desire to offer its sincere tribute to the more than 3 million whose sacrifice has given us today’s peace and development.”⁶⁷ At the ceremony, “the emperor read a message of regret, condolence for bereaved families, and appreciation to the dead.”⁶⁸ Japan’s victims are not commemorated on this day, nor on any other days of commemoration.

Second, the Hiroshima Peace Park was established in 1952, along with a monument for victims of the bombing (*hibakusha*). In 1955 the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum opened. The museum is one part of Peace Memorial Park which includes the “A-bomb Dome,” which is the preserved ruins of a building that was gutted in the attack. In 1958 Children's Peace Monument was unveiled. Every year the atomic bombings are mourned on August 6, when the Mayor of Hiroshima reads a “Peace Declaration.”

The Hiroshima museums and monuments focus entirely on Japanese victimhood. Because the Hiroshima Peace Museum’s coverage of the war begins on August 6, 1945, it does not focus on Japanese invasions in East Asia. Neither is Pearl Harbor mentioned. Hiroshima’s museums and monuments (as well as Nagasaki’s) emphasize Japan’s commitment to the “Peace Movement,” which translates to the “anti-nuclear” movement. Importantly, the focus of this kind of peace movement is Japanese—rather than Korean or Chinese—victimhood.

In sum, during this early period after the war, Japanese remembrance of war and colonialism was very unapologetic across all categories. (See Table 1, below.) Statements

⁶⁶ This service had been conducted since 1958 unofficially by the Japan Veterans Friendship League and the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, who celebrated the day in order to “enshrine the heroic spirits of all those who died for the country in the War of Greater East Asia.” Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 658. Bix notes that the term “heroic spirit” was associated with the notion of “holy war” and with emperor-worship.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 139.

glorified Japanese colonization and focused not at all on the sufferings of Japan's victims; reparations were small and offered in the spirit of conquering new markets rather than in contrition. Japanese leaders undid occupation reforms in education, thus reducing admission in Japanese education. There was no commemoration of any non-Japanese victims.

THE ONSET OF APOLOGY DIPLOMACY (1965-1980s)

In the previous era, apologies had not been on Japan's radar screen. During this period, however, Tokyo began issuing statements of regret about the war, thus initiating Japan's "apology diplomacy." These statements did reflect some remorse, but little in the way of admission. Japan was strongly prodded into its first apology by the United States, and subsequent acts of contrition always involved outside pressure as well. Thus I code Japanese policies of remembrance as *unapologetic* during this middle period.

Statements and Reparations

After years of negotiations, Japan and South Korea finally normalized relations in 1965. The settlement included an official Japanese apology to Korea for its 35 years of colonial rule. The South Koreans had demanded a Japanese apology as a prerequisite for normalization, and the United States had urged Japan to issue one.⁶⁸ As part of the normalization settlement, Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo read a statement at Kimpo Airport in Seoul. He noted an "unhappy phase" in Japanese-Korean relations, for which Japan "felt deep regret and deep

⁶⁸ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 137.

⁶⁹ Victor D. Cha. "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty." *Korean Studies* Vol. 20 (1996), pp. 123-160.

remorse.”⁷⁰ This apology—though an important gesture on Japan’s part—failed to specify any of Japan’s past actions in Korea for which the apology was being offered.

With the apology, Japan agreed to pay a financial settlement to the ROK for damages suffered as a result of Japanese colonialism. At first Tokyo had claimed it was *owed* reparations by the ROK. After negotiating with Seoul, Tokyo dropped this position and argued that Japan owed \$70 million in property claims to the ROK. Tokyo and Seoul negotiated over this sum, and finally Japan agreed to relinquish all claims against Korea, and to return *object d'art* and other cultural artifacts taken from Korea during the occupation. In addition, Japan agreed to compensate the ROK with \$300 million in outright grants, \$200 million in government loans, and \$300 million in private commercial credits.⁷¹ Importantly, in this settlement the ROK agreed to relinquish any further reparations claims against Japan.

Tokyo refused to refer to the settlement as “reparations.” Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira, negotiating with Kim Jong-pil, said that if the ROK insisted on receiving money in the name of “reparations,” then Japan would pay no more than \$70 million in grants (the amount Tokyo had calculated as Korean property claims). Ohira “suggested that the payment be described as ‘congratulatory in recognition of Korean independence....’”⁷² The 1965 settlement thus included a statement of remorse, but no admission of Japanese crimes; the apology was pried out of Japan most unenthusiastically in response to pressure from Washington and Seoul.

Other apologies were offered in 1984 by Japanese Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. The two leaders issued their apologies during the visit of ROK President

⁷⁰ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 194.

⁷¹ This was a large sum that was desperately needed by the ROK (\$800 million then is about \$3.5 billion in 2000 dollars).

Chun Doo Hwan to Tokyo. Hirohito said: "I feel great regret that there was an unhappy phase in relations between our two countries in a certain period of this century despite the close ties between us. I believe that such things should not be repeated."⁷³ A second statement, planned in tandem with the Emperor's, was read by Prime Minister Nakasone the day after the dinner.

...unfortunately the fact cannot be denied that Japan caused great suffering to your country and your people during a certain period this century. I would like to announce that the Japanese government and people express deep regret for the wrongs done to you and are determined to strictly caution themselves against repeating them in the future.⁷⁴

Although Japan and the ROK published a Joint Communiqué after the summit, it did not include a Japanese apology.⁷⁵

Later, Nakasone also offered an apology of sorts before the United Nations, on the 40th anniversary of its establishment in October 1985. He stated,

Since the end of that war, Japan has profoundly regretted the ultra-nationalism and militarism it unleashed, and the untold suffering the war inflicted upon peoples of the world and, indeed, its own people... Having suffered the scourge of war and the atomic bomb, the Japanese people will never again permit the revival of militarism on their soil.⁷⁶

Nakasone's statement reflects progress since Shiina's apology in 1965, and since the Emperor's apology the previous year. However one dissonant note is Nakasone's statements that Japan is committed to peace not because of the memory of Japanese crimes, but because of Japanese *victimhood*.

⁷² Memorandum of Conversation, 29 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Volume XXII (China-Korea-Japan), Document 282. "Kim said he told Ohira that he would not insist on the term 'reparations' as long so long as it was clear to the Korean public that the total included reparations."

⁷³ *A New Era in Korea-Japan Relations* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1984). This apology was drafted explicitly from Shiina's 1965 statement.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Chun-Nakasone Joint Communiqué, September 8, 1984. For text see Lee, *Japan and Korea*, Appendix C.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 106.

As some Japanese leaders engaged in apology diplomacy, other Japanese leaders began issuing statements that denied or glorified Japan's past. In 1986, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki, member of the Nakasone cabinet and a senior LDP Diet member, made controversial statements about Korea. Fujio wrote an essay that justified and downplayed the Japanese annexation of Korea. He wrote, "Japan's annexation of Korea rested on mutual agreement both in form and in fact. As such, the Korean side also bears some responsibility for it...Can we be sure that China or Russia would not have meddled in the Korean peninsula if Japan had not annexed it?"⁷⁷ Fujio commented that "a large portion of the blame should be allocated toward Korea also."⁷⁸

Responding to uproar from Seoul, Prime Minister Nakasone fired Fujio (who had refused to retract his statement or resign his post). Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari apologized to ROK Foreign Minister Choi, expressing "deepest regrets and sincere apology" for Fujio's statement.⁷⁹ Prime Minister Nakasone also apologized himself, saying, "I deeply apologize to the Korean people and President over former education minister Fujio's remarks, which seriously hurt the feelings of the Korean people."⁸⁰

A second episode occurred in 1988, when Okuno Seisuke, a member of the Takeshita cabinet, made another controversial statement. Okuno said, "It was the Caucasian race that colonized Asia...If anybody was the aggressor, it was the Caucasians. It is nonsense to call Japan the aggressor or militaristic."⁸¹ Okuno argued that Japan's war in Asia was a war of

⁷⁷ *Bungei Shunju*, October 1985.

⁷⁸ *Bungei Shunju*, October 1985. Also see Won-Deog Lee, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations," p. 107.

⁷⁹ Byung-il Lee, "Kuranari Delivers Japanese Gov't Apology to Choi," *Korea Times* 1986, p. 1.

⁸⁰ "Nakasone Makes Apology to Chun Over Fujio Case," *Korea Times*, September 21, 1986.

⁸¹ Quoted in Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 11.

“Asian liberation” that aimed to form a republican system “comprising the Japanese and Koreans, then Manchurians, Hans, and Mongolians....The people, long colonized by whites, needed to be liberated to give them stable livelihoods.”⁸² Okuno had objected to an exhibition on the Rape of Nanjing to be held in Japan, arguing that it should not be permitted as the facts surrounding the event were unclear.⁸³ Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita demanded a retraction; when Okuno refused, he was asked to resign. In sum, during this period Japan began offering apologies, but at the same time other officials made unapologetic statements about Japan’s past.

Education Policy

In the 1970s, discussion of Japan’s wartime past in history textbooks began expanding, however this trend reversed in the 1980s after conservative politicians regained power in Japanese politics.

Japanese textbooks of the 1970s began to show greater coverage of colonization and the war. Ienaga Saburo’s 1970 court victory over the MoE led to increased depiction of Japanese actions in World War II.⁸⁴ The MoE was forced to relax its screening procedures, and accept a broader range of material (such as information about Japanese wartime atrocities).⁸⁵ In 1973 the MoE approved an Ienaga textbook containing descriptions of Japanese colonial policy in Korea, and Japan’s invasion of China. James Orr notes that instead of celebrating Japan as an

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Lisa Martineau, “Outspoken Tokyo Minister Resigns,” *The Guardian*, May 14, 1988. Also see “A Japanese View of World War II Is Attacked,” *New York Times*, April 27, 1988.

⁸⁴ The Tokyo District Court ruled that the MoE had violated constitutional rights of freedom of expression “by extending its certification of textbooks to substantive content”. In the ruling, “the Court upheld the Ministry’s right to certify textbooks, but limited such certification to indicating typographical errors, misprints, and clear errors of ‘historical fact.’ It explicitly warned against scrutinizing an author’s selection of illustrative material or his interpretations and conclusions.” Ienaga, “The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit,” p. 3.

inspiration to Asian liberation movements, “From the early 1970s...texts dropped this favorable comment on Japanese imperialism in favor of increased treatment of indigenous popular opposition to Japan’s colonization of Korea.”⁸⁶ *Tokyo Shoseki’s* 1974 junior high textbook notes that Japan “tried to force the Koreans to assimilate by teaching the Japanese language and forbidding the teaching of Korean history.”⁸⁷ This text included discussion of the Korean March First independence movement, saying it spread because of “suffering under Japanese colonial rule.”⁸⁸ In elementary school texts, coverage of Asian liberation movements and the suffering of Asian victims began appearing in texts at the end of the 1970s. Orr notes that 1970s texts reflected “extensive coverage of Asian victimization at the hands of Japanese.”⁸⁹

The liberal turn in Japanese education during the 1970s prompted a counter-reaction in the 1980s. After large electoral victories by the LDP in the 1980 elections, LDP Diet members undertook educational reform as a primary goal.⁹⁰ Conservative lawmakers claimed that Japan’s textbooks had been hijacked by the left and should demonstrate more patriotism.

First, increased conservatism in 1980s textbook policy was reflected by the experience of Ienaga Saburo. A screener ordered Ienaga to change his text in ways that would gloss over Japanese atrocities, among them the Rape of Nanking. The screener commented, “Readers might interpret this description as meaning that the Japanese Army unilaterally massacred Chinese immediately after the occupation. This passage should be revised so that it is not

⁸⁵ Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education,” p. 42.

⁸⁶ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 97. Orr notes that interest in Asian liberation movements “probably reflect[ed] the growing interest in Asian history that followed the official policy of rapprochement with mainland China.” (p. 99)

⁸⁷ Quoted in Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 99.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 142.

interpreted in this way.”⁹¹ The screener also told Ienaga that he must remove passages about Unit 731 (Japan’s Dr. Mengele), because its activities were unsupported by scholarly evidence.⁹² Thus Ienaga’s experience reflects decreasing admission in 1980s Japanese education.

Second, reports by the Japanese media in 1982 drew attention to gaps and whitewashing in Japanese textbooks. In 1982 the Japanese media (erroneously) reported that government textbook screeners were requiring all 1983 high school textbooks to designate Japanese aggression into China as an “advance” rather than aggression.⁹³ The reports triggered a diplomatic crisis between Japan and its neighbors, and prompted intense scrutiny of Japanese textbooks.⁹⁴ After studying five texts, Seoul protested a description of the March First independence movement in Korea as a “riot,” and objected to the following description of forced religious assimilation: “Koreans were encouraged to worship at Shinto shrines.”⁹⁵ Chong-Sik Lee comments,

[MoE] censors had tried to mitigate Japanese responsibility for such events as the Nanjing massacre of December 1937, the massacre of Koreans during the March First movement in 1919, and the conscription of Korean laborers during the early 1940s. Japanese atrocities were often treated as reactions to provocations, and descriptions of harsh treatments of victims were modified or deleted. The number of victims was often deleted for reasons of ‘uncertainty of reports.’⁹⁶

⁹¹ See Masanori Nakamura, “The History Textbook Controversy and Nationalism,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1998), p. 26. The screener instructed Ienaga to eliminate any mention of rape, as this would imply that only Japanese soldiers raped women, when in fact rape was a common occurrence of war. Ienaga filed another lawsuit against the MoE after the episode.

⁹² Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731 : Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

⁹³ On these editorial changes see Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 142; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*; Isa Duce, *Status Power: Japanese Foreign Policy Making toward Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2002); “Kyokasho o meguru shinbun kyosokyoku,” *Chuo Koron*, November 1982, pp. 108-115; also Yayama Taro, “The Newspapers Conduct a Mad Rhapsody over the Textbook Issue,” *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 1983), 301-316.

⁹⁴ For good accounts of the textbook crises, see Lee, *Japan and Korea*, Chapter 6; Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*; Isa Duce, *Status Power*, pp. 46-52; Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989).

⁹⁵ See Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 145.

⁹⁶ Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 150.

In reaction to diplomatic protests, the MoE was defiant;⁹⁷ however the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the books should be rewritten in order to placate anti-Japanese sentiment abroad. Textbook revision standards were also changed, and an “Asian Neighbor’s Clause” was added to MoE guidance: a requirement that proposed texts “show the necessary consideration for international understanding and international harmony in their treatment of the events of modern and contemporary history between [Japan and its] Asian neighbors.”⁹⁸ Thus Japan pursued conciliatory policies during the 1982 crisis.

However, Tokyo did not fix the problems. In January 1984 a text approved by the ministry retained disputed passages (despite Tokyo’s assurances that it would be changed). A second textbook crisis would be touched off in 1986, upon the Ministry of Education’s approval of a new history textbook. The Suzuki administration’s conciliatory behavior in the 1982 textbook dispute angered conservatives, motivating them to form a group with the goal of writing a more patriotic textbook. The “National Congress for the Defense of Japan” was chaired by Japan’s former UN Ambassador; it called for “a revision of the peace constitution” and announced its goal of writing “a history textbook on its own to oppose prevalent school textbooks, which it says are written by leftist scholars.”⁹⁹ The group produced the textbook, *Shinpen Nihonshi* [New Edition: Japanese History], which was criticized as whitewashing

⁹⁷ Education Minister Ogawa Heiji told a press conference that South Korean and Chinese requests to change its textbooks amounted to “an interference in Japan’s internal affairs.” Ogawa added that the Education Ministry had no intention of changing the revised history textbooks. See “Japan Clarifies Ministers’ Remarks on Textbooks,” Yonhap Wire Service, August 3, 1982, in FBIS South Korea; also “Education Ministry: ‘No Intention to Change’ Textbooks,” Kyodo News Agency, August 5, 1982, in FBIS Japan.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ *Japan Times*, October 1, 1986.

Japan's aggression in Asia.¹⁰⁰ Beijing and Seoul were again infuriated, and Prime Minister Nakasone responded in a conciliatory fashion. He created an Ad Hoc Council on Education that discussed proposals for deregulating the textbook approval process (these reforms went nowhere). However after Nakasone intervened at the MoE, changes were made in some of the controversial passages.¹⁰¹

In sum, in Japanese education policy of this period, increased admission in the 1970s prompted a counter-reaction toward decreased coverage of Japan's wartime past. Some remorse is evident in Tokyo's willingness to be conciliatory toward its former victims.

Commemoration

As before, Japanese commemoration was very unapologetic; it continued to focus exclusively on Japan's war dead. During this period Japan also began to mourn at the Yasukuni Shrine those men whom the rest of the world regarded as war criminals. The shrine is a Shinto religious memorial honoring the Japanese who died in war. According to Shinto doctrine, because they died for the emperor, those enshrined at Yasukuni would become gods. The shrine has been internationally controversial because of the fourteen Class-A war criminals from World War II who are enshrined there, including General Tojo.

¹⁰⁰ The book argued that Japan's war in Asia had been a war of liberation for Asian countries. It talked about the "Nanking Incident"; said that Japan "turned Korea into a protectorate"; and lauded the Imperial Rescript of Education as "national morality" from "ancient times." See Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 177-78.

¹⁰¹ Regarding the Rape of Nanking, the eventual passage read, "The battle in Nanking was extremely severe. After Nanking fell, it was reported that the Japanese Army killed and wounded many Chinese soldiers and civilians, thus drawing international criticism." Chang, *The Rape of Nanking*, p. 208.

The controversy surrounding the shrine had previously deterred Japanese political leaders from making official visits, but this changed in the 1980s.¹⁰² In 1985 Nakasone Yasuhiro became the first to pay a visit in his official capacity as Prime Minister. On August 15, he visited the shrine and gave an expensive tree branch as a ritual offering, which was bought with public funds. The visit touched off student protests in China and the ROK, and condemnation from Beijing and Seoul. As a result, Nakasone did not go back the next year.¹⁰³ However, seven of his cabinet ministers went (including Education Minister Fujio).¹⁰⁴ In subsequent years, Prime Ministers Nakasone, Takeshita, and Kaifu all abstained from visiting. However fourteen of Kaifu's twenty cabinet members went in 1989, along with a delegation of 184 Diet members.¹⁰⁵

In sum, Japanese remembrance during this period was evolving; Japan began to issue statements expressing remorse (though these statements reflected little admission). However at the same time, many inflammatory events of this period—Fujio and Okuno's statements, the textbook disputes, Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni—reflect an unapologetic view of the past.

¹⁰² Emperor Hirohito, however, visited the shrine several times, starting in 1952. Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 653.

¹⁰³ On August 14 of the following year, his Chief Cabinet Secretary said, "We must stress international ties and give appropriate consideration to the national sentiments of neighboring countries." Quoted in Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁴ LDP conservatives maintained that Japanese leaders had a right to worship at the shrine, just as American leaders pay respects at Arlington National Cemetery. Fujio protested that visiting the shrine was the same as Chinese leaders wanting to visit the Confucius Temple or the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 63.

¹⁰⁵ "Fourteen Cabinet Ministers Visit Yasukuni Shrine." Kyodo Wire Service, August 15, 1989.

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK (1990s-00s)

Interest in Japan's role in the war surged in the Late Phase.¹⁰⁶ Debates about Japan's motivations for the war, and its actions within it, appeared in the Japanese public, and Japanese leaders frequently issued apologies about the war. Victims who had gone unmentioned for decades began to receive coverage (the "comfort women," slave laborers, and victims of the biological warfare unit 731).

In the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and particularly after the December 1989 death of the Showa Emperor, Japanese produced stacks of testimony, including books, documentary films, and archival research, on previously suppressed or ignored aspects of the war. That testimony has also clarified how difficult the war years were for most Japanese, so that memory of Japanese suffering has grown along with knowledge of suffering of others at their hands.¹⁰⁷

During this late period many Japanese statements reflect profound admission and remorse, and were freely offered. Japan did pay some compensation to the sex slaves of the Imperial Army. However, in a broad sense, Japanese remembrance remained unapologetic. Statements that deny or glorify the past were as common as Japanese apologies. Other more concrete policies (education, commemoration) reflected partial or total amnesia about Japan's victims.

Statements

Starting in the 1990s, more and more politicians began making statements about Japan's wartime past. While many were highly apologetic, others denied or glorified Japan's policies.

¹⁰⁶ The unprecedented attention to Japan's actions in World War II has been attributed variously to the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, and to the end of the Cold War.

¹⁰⁷ Laura Hein and Mark Selden, "The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change," in Hein and Selden, eds. *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 21.

Apologies. During this period, numerous Japanese leaders issued apologies. Their statements reflected varying levels of admission and regret, but in general displayed much more soul-searching than their vague predecessors. First, in 1990 the new Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki both apologized to Korea.¹⁰⁸ The Emperor made a statement to ROK President Roh Tae Woo that attempted to compensate for some of the shortcomings of his father's earlier statement to Chun Doo Hwan.¹⁰⁹ Akihito said, "When I think of the sufferings your people underwent during this unhappy phase, brought on by my country, I cannot help feeling the deepest regret."¹¹⁰ For his part, Kaifu distinguished himself by being the first Japanese official to voice the word *owabi* (apology). Kaifu said, "I would like to take the opportunity of Your Excellency's visit to express my sincere remorse and honest apologies for the fact that there was a period in our history in which Japanese actions inflicted unbearable suffering and sorrow on the people of the Korean peninsula."¹¹¹

Prime Minister Miyazawa issued a subsequent apology in 1991,¹¹² but in Korean minds the most memorable apology was offered in 1993 by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Emperor Hirohito died in 1989 and his son Akihito was crowned successor.

¹⁰⁹ This visit marked the first major politicization of Japanese apologies since the 1965 normalization treaty; this politicization stemmed from how unsatisfying the previous round of apologies (by Hirohito and Nakasone) had been to the Koreans. Before his visit to Tokyo, Roh demanded an apology from Akihito, noting his dissatisfaction that "the late Japanese emperor Hirohito used ambiguous expressions when he expressed regret over an 'unfortunate past' between the two countries." "Seoul Presses for Clear-Cut Akihito Apology for Past," *Korea Herald*, May 16, 1990. The ROK government negotiated with the emperor for several days, demanding that the Emperor "clarify Japan as an "offender" and Korea as a "victim" in his apology for the past relations between the two countries." "Seoul Demands Akihito Clarify Japan As Offender," *Korea Times*, May 18, 1990.

¹¹⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 25, 1990.

¹¹¹ Norma Field, "The Stakes of Apology," *Japan Quarterly* Vol. 42, no. 4 (October-December 1995), p. 413.

¹¹² Miyazawa said: "I would like to state frankly that the people of Asia and the Pacific have experienced unbearable torment and grief caused by Japan. We would like to, once again, convey our feelings of regretfulness and reflection. Also, we look straight in the face of our past atrocities and would like to convey the proper interpretation of the history to preclude this kind of misdeed from ever repeating itself again. And as a member of the international society, it is incumbent upon the Japanese to take the full responsibility for our past wrongdoings." Quoted in Lee, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations."

Rather than expressing vague regret, Hosokawa's apology reflects very high admission and remorse. He said,

During Japan's colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people were forced to suffer unbearable pain and sorrow in various ways. They were deprived of the opportunity to learn their mother tongue at school, they were forced to adopt Japanese names, forced to provide sex as 'comfort women' for Japanese troops, forced to provide labor. I hereby express genuine contrition and offer my deepest apologies for my country, the aggressor's, acts.¹¹⁴

Hosokawa was also the first Japanese Prime Minister who, at the annual National Memorial Service for the War Dead on August 15, referred to Asian war victims as well as Japanese.¹¹⁵ He invited representatives from other Asian nations to participate in the annual event for the first time.

Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi offered two important apologies in 1994 and 1995. Murayama (Japan's only Socialist Prime Minister) offered his "deep remorse" and "heartfelt condolences" for the "horrific, indescribable suffering" endured by Asians in the war.¹¹⁶ A year later (on the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender), the Prime Minister issued another apology:

During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and

¹¹³ Hosokawa was Japan's first leader in over 40 years who was not a member of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party. He was the first to characterize Japan's actions in World War II as "aggression"; he dubbed it "an aggressive war" or *shinryaku senso*. This is a term "preceding prime ministers—all from the LDP—had been careful not to use for fear of retaliation from rightists in the LDP." Masami Fukatsu, "The Eclipse of Showa Taboos and the Apology Resolution," *Japan Quarterly* Vol. (October-December 1995), p. 421. Fukatsu points out that subsequent to Hosokawa's statement, protests flooded the prime minister's office from right-wing Diet members, the Japan War Bereaved Families Association, and numerous other individuals and groups. Hosokawa thus toned down his talk of "aggression" in subsequent statements.

¹¹⁴ *Asahi Shinbun*, November 7, 1993.

¹¹⁵ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 254.

¹¹⁶ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 254.

state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.¹¹⁷

Notable in Murayama's statement was the first use of the words 'profound remorse' (*tsusetsu na hansei*) and 'heartfelt apology' (*kokoro kara no owabi*).

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, the Japanese Diet debated and passed a resolution of apology to Japan's war victims. This is significant because it was the first parliamentary apology passed by the Diet.¹¹⁸ For the text of the Resolution, see Figure 1.

Figure 1: The 1995 Diet Resolution¹¹⁹

**Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace
on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History**

The House of Representatives resolves as follows:

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world.

Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse.

We must transcend the differences over historical views of the past war and learn humbly the lessons of history so as to build a peaceful international society.

This House expresses its resolve, under the banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way for a future that allows all human beings to live together.

¹¹⁷ For a history of the political discussions surrounding the 1995 Diet resolution, see John Dower, "Japan Address Its Wartime Responsibility," *Journal of the International Institute, University of Michigan* Vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1995), p. 10.

¹¹⁸ On the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1991, the Socialist and Komeito parties had proposed a Diet resolution apologizing for the war. However LDP politicians refused to back the resolution and it went nowhere. For more on the episode see "LDP Holds Up Wartime Apology in Diet," *Daily Yomiuri*, December 6, 1991; Steven R. Weisman, "Pearl Harbor Remembered," *New York Times*, December 8, 1991.

¹¹⁹ Reprinted in Ryuji Mukae, "Japan's Diet Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay," *Asian Survey* Vol. 36, no. 10 (October 1996), pp. 1011-1030. Also see Dower, "Japan Address Its Wartime Responsibility."

This Resolution was passed amidst heated controversy. The Socialist party sponsors of the resolution had initially envisioned a much more contrite statement; the LDP wanted to scrap the Resolution altogether, but the Socialists threatened to pull out of the ruling coalition if it did so.¹²⁰ Even in this less controversial form, the resolution was voted in during a session boycotted by over half of the members of the Diet, and was never approved by the Upper House.

The next major Japanese apology came in 1998, at a summit between ROK President Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo.¹²¹ The Koreans insisted on a Japanese apology within the text of a planned Joint Declaration. The Japanese government eventually agreed. In return, “Kim Dae-jung proposed to have the two nations' reconciliation expressly stated in the Joint Declaration, thereby committing himself to the position that henceforth Korea would not again try to politicize the past.”¹²² The text of the declaration follows in Figure 2.

*Figure 2: Text of the Joint Declaration*¹²³

Reviewing bilateral relations between Japan and Korea in the present century, and recognizing with profound humility the historical fact that, for a time in the past, Japan by its colonial rule inflicted great damage and pain on the Korean people, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed deep remorse and most sincere apologies for this. President Kim Dae jung in good faith accepted and appreciated Prime Minister Obuchi's expression of his view of history and stated that the current of the times was such that the two nations are required now to live down the unhappy phase of their past history and to make their best efforts for reconciliation and for good neighborly and friendly relations.

¹²⁰ For the politics of the Diet Resolution see Dower, “Japan Address Its Wartime Responsibility.” Also see “Murayama Threatens to Quit Coalition over War Apology, with Little Effect,” *Daily Japan Digest*, June 1, 1995, 1.

¹²¹ President Kim had been elected that year in a historic election: the first opposition president elected in the ROK and thus the first peaceful transition of power from a ruling party to the opposition. A longtime political dissident, Kim had lived in exile in Japan for many years during the ROK's period of authoritarian rule.

¹²² The above section draws from Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, pp. 256-58.

¹²³ *Asahi Shimbun*, Evening Edition, October 8, 1998. Also see Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 257.

Finally, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi issued another Japanese apology during a visit to Seoul in November 2001.¹²⁴ Koizumi visited the Seodaemun Prison History Hall, a facility used during the Japanese occupation to imprison Korean independence activists and other opponents of the Japanese colonial government.¹²⁵ He gave an official apology in the Seodaemun Independence Park, laying a wreath at the memorial for Korean independence leaders. Koizumi said he felt “heartfelt remorse and apology for the tremendous damage and suffering Japan caused the South Korean people during its colonial rule.”¹²⁶ Koizumi’s visit to this site and his remarks reflect significant admission and remorse.

“*Gaffes.*” While some Japanese leaders were apologizing, others were issuing statements that glorified and glossed over Japan’s past. Hata cabinet Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto made one such gaffe in 1994. Nagano was a former Army captain and a former chief of staff of Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces. He said in an interview that the Rape of Nanking was a hoax designed to make Japan look bad, and that Japan’s war in Asia was a war of Asian liberation. He said,

I still think it is wrong to define [the Greater East Asia War] as a war of aggression...Because Japan was in danger of being crushed, the country rose up to ensure

¹²⁴ Koizumi also visited China, and issued an apology at the Marco Polo Bridge (where Japanese and Chinese forces battled in 1937). “PM Koizumi May Use Classic Apology to Mend Fences with China,” *Asahi Shimbun*, October 6, 2001, internet version.

¹²⁵ The grounds include the preserved prison buildings, execution site, and museum. The museum’s exhibits details the history of the Korean independence movement; in the basement are exhibits of torture rooms with mannequins in various states of bloodied abuse. After Koizumi visited the site, he said “When I looked at things put on display [at the park], I strongly felt...regret for the pains Korean people suffered during Japanese colonial rule. As a politician and a man, I believe we must not forget the pain of [Korean] people.” See “PM Koizumi Visits ROK President Kim Dae-Jung; Protesters Rage,” *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 15, 2001.

¹²⁶ Aya Igarashi, “PM Koizumi Meets ROK President Kim at Blue House; Visits ‘Prison’ Museum,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, October 16, 2001.

its survival. We also sincerely believed in liberating Asia's colonies and establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere...The objective of the war was a justifiable one, which was permissible in those days...I think the Rape of Nanking is a fabrication.¹²⁷

The South Korean press and government condemned Nagano's statements, and Nagano was forced to resign from his position as Justice Minister.

Another official glorified Japanese aggression in a statement just two days before Prime Minister Murayama's apology on August 15, 1994. Sakurai Shin stated that Japan's war in Asia was not aggressive.

I do not think Japan intended to wage a war of aggression...It was thanks to Japan that most nations in Asia were able to throw off the shackles of colonial rule under European domination and to win independence. As a result, education also spread substantially... and Asia as a whole was energized for dramatic economic reconstruction.¹²⁸

Prime Minister Murayama apologized on Sakurai's behalf, calling the remarks "inappropriate," and forcing Sakurai to issue a public retraction.¹²⁹

The events of the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender (the Diet Resolution and Murayama's apology) prompted several unapologetic statements by Japanese leaders. First, the most incendiary statement of this period was given by Watanabe Michio, a former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Watanabe denied that Japan took over Korea through force in 1910. Discussing the proposed Diet Resolution, he said in June 1995,

We should see to it that the proposed resolution not violate the spirit of the [Liberal Democratic] Party...As for Japan-Korea relations, Japan governed Korea for 36 years, but you would look in vain to find any reference to 'colonial rule.' Both sides have now recognized the legitimacy of the annexation treaty, agreed that there would be no reparations to be paid but cooperative financing to be provided...and that's exactly what we've been providing.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 5, 1994.

¹²⁸ *Asahi Shinbun*, August 13, 1994.

¹²⁹ See quotations in Chang, *The Rape of Nanking*, p. 204. Shin was the director of Japan's environmental agency at the time.

¹³⁰ Quoted in Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 14.

At a subsequent press conference, Watanabe clarified, “The Japan-Korea agreement has been worked out on the assumption that the annexation treaty was a peacefully concluded international agreement... You mention ‘colonial policy,’ but the annexation was completed peacefully, a different matter than colonization by the use of force.”¹³¹

Second, a few days before Murayama’s apology, one of his cabinet ministers (briefed about the apology the Prime Minister intended to give), issued an unapologetic statement about Japan’s war responsibility. Education Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu commented,

Two-thirds of the present population were born after the war. We are entering an age of complete innocence of that war, and it makes little sense to keep harping on the past and apologizing for one particular incident after another... Doesn’t it take two to wage a war... that is, mutual use of aggression?¹³²

Third, after Murayama’s apology, another Japanese official made off-the-record statements that were later reported in a magazine article. Eto Takami commented that “Prime Minister Murayama was wrong when he said that the annexation of Korea had been an act of coercion... In those years, the weak got taken advantage of, and nothing could be done about it.” Eto also commented that “not all that Japan did during the colonial years was bad.”¹³³ The remarks nearly resulted in Seoul recalling its ambassador and canceling a bilateral summit scheduled for that month.¹³⁴ Eto was eventually forced to resign.

Japanese gaffes continued into the next decade. In 2001, the former head of the Japan Defense Agency, Norota Hosei, told LDP supporters that Japan was not to blame for entering World War II. Norota said “Faced with oil and other embargoes from other countries, Japan had

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² *Asahi Shinbun*, August 10, 1995. Also see Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 13.

¹³³ Quoted in Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 187.

no choice but to venture out southward to secure natural resources... In other words, Japan had fallen prey to a scheme of the United States.”¹³⁵ At this time, Norota was an LDP member and the Chair of the Diet’s Budget Committee. In sum, during the late period, some remarkable Japanese apologies have been issued, but have appeared amidst statements that denied or glorified Japanese aggression in Asia.

Reparations

During this period, Tokyo’s policy toward one group of victims—the sex slaves of the Japanese Army—evolved from denial of government involvement to greater admission and some compensation.¹³⁶ Initially, Tokyo had maintained that women had provided sex for Japanese soldiers in World War II. However the government said that the women were prostitutes (and thus willing participants), who worked for private individuals and businesses.¹³⁷ After government documents were found that proved government administration of the brothel program, Tokyo apologized to the women and to Seoul.¹³⁸ Chief spokesman Koichi Kato said,

¹³⁴ “Reportage on Results of Japan’s Eto Remarks Seoul Considers Envoy Recall,” Yonhap, November 11, 1995 in FBIS South Korea.

¹³⁵ Rose Tang, “Japanese politician condemned for WWII remarks,” www.cnn.com, February 19, 2001.

¹³⁶ Two other victims’ groups are seeking Japanese reparations but have yet to meet with success: these are POWs from Allied countries, and victims of forced labor in Japan’s wartime industries. Former forced laborers Wartime slave laborers who were brought to Japan to work in war industries have not been compensated by Japan. Private-sector legal victories have produced small financial awards. In the first successful case, a settlement was awarded to some Chinese slave laborers. The plaintiff, the Kajima Corporation, was ordered to pay a ¥500 million (\$4.27 million) settlement to some of its Chinese wartime slave laborers, who were forced to work at its Hanaoka copper mine in brutal conditions. See Stephanie Strom, “Fund for Wartime Slaves Set Up in Japan,” *New York Times*, November 29, 2000, A16. For more on POW lawsuits, see Teresa Watanabe, “Japan’s War Victims in New Battle,” *Los Angeles Times* XXX, 1999, 1.

¹³⁷ Commented Tadao Shimizu (director-general of the Employment Security Office, where many historical documents related to the comfort women program should have been housed): the comfort women “had just been taken around with the Forces by private operators, so frankly speaking, I do not believe it is possible to obtain any results by investigation as to the true facts of the matter.” Quoted in Hicks 1995, 168. Similarly, Prime Minister Miyazawa commented that that no documentary evidence proved any Japanese government involvement.

¹³⁸ In January 1992, Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chuo University released five documents that proved Japanese government sponsorship and military involvement in the implementation of the brothels. On January 11, the *Asahi*

“We would like to express our apologies and contrition,” but said there would be no compensation.¹³⁹ During a visit to the ROK, Prime Minister Miyazawa expressed a “heartfelt apology for and expressed remorse on the Japanese government’s involvement in the conscription of tens of thousands of Korean women for forced sex for Japanese soldiers during World War II...”¹⁴⁰ On his last day in office, Miyazawa apologized again to the sex slave victims and to Korea. He issued “sincere apologies and remorse” to the women and their survivors.¹⁴¹ Thus Tokyo has admitted some degree of complicity in the brothel program and has issued apologies.

Tokyo denied it had a legal responsibility to pay reparations, but paid some compensation to the victims. In 1995 it announced it would provide victims with “sympathy money” (*mimaikin*). This money would come from an organization known as the “Asian Women’s Fund.”¹⁴² The Fund operates from a combination of private and public funds, and receives its operating budget from the Japanese government.¹⁴³ Prime Minister Murayama offered an apology upon the establishment of the Fund in 1995.

Established on this occasion and involving the cooperation of the Government and citizens of Japan, the “Asian Women's Fund” is an expression of atonement on the part of

Shimbun published excerpts from these documents. For the complete set of Yoshiaki's documents, see *Sekai*, March 1992.

¹³⁹ “Japan Apologizes,” *Washington Post*, January 14, 1992.

¹⁴⁰ “Miyazawa leaves only words,” *Korea Times*, January 14, 1992. After more documents were discovered, Tokyo issued another statement: “the deep involvement of the Forces of the time cannot be denied...the truth of the matter is rapidly being revealed by the efforts of scholars and citizen's groups. The facts will continue to be investigated through both official and private channels.” George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Sex Slaves of the Japanese Imperial Forces* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 206.

¹⁴¹ T.R. Reid, “Japan Apologizes To Sex Slaves: Premier Cites WWII Abuse of Captive Women,” *Washington Post*, August 5, 1993.

¹⁴² In Japanese, known as *Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin*. For more details see Soh 2001.

¹⁴³ C. Sarah Soh, “Japan's Responsibility toward Comfort Women Survivors,” Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper, 2001, p. 77.

the Japanese people toward these women and supports medical, welfare, and other projects.

...To ensure that this situation is never again repeated, the Government of Japan will collate historical documents concerning the former wartime comfort women, to serve as a lesson of history.¹⁴⁴

According to the parameters of the Fund, victims would receive “atonement money” and a letter from the Japanese Prime Minister expressing “apologies and remorse.”¹⁴⁵ South Korean victims would each receive 2 million yen, or about U.S. \$17,000.¹⁴⁶ Although the Fund is not official reparations, this policy does demonstrate some contrition through its statements of admission and remorse, and its compensation, and educational efforts.¹⁴⁷

Education Policy

Although Japanese education reflects greater admission of Japan’s wartime past relative to previous eras, many Japanese atrocities are still omitted or glossed over. First, during this period, the MoE approved mention of Japanese atrocities that had previously been omitted from textbooks. In 1996 the MoE approved discussion of the “comfort women” in junior high school textbooks.¹⁴⁸ Textbook coverage of Unit 731 became permissible after a 1997 legal victory by historian Ienaga Saburo. Ienaga had launched his lawsuit thirty years before, when his

¹⁴⁴ Asian Women’s Fund, http://www.awf.or.jp/01_e.html

¹⁴⁵ Asian Women’s Fund, http://www.awf.or.jp/01_e.html

¹⁴⁶ By way of comparison, in the 1988 Civil Liberties Act, the U.S. government agreed to pay \$1.25 billion (\$20,000 per person) in reparations to Japanese-Americans who were interned during World War II in the United States.

¹⁴⁷ Activists and scholars have argued that “sympathy money” is inferior to reparations voted on by the Japanese Diet accompanied with prosecution of the guilty. Norma Field writes, “In proffering money donated privately for ‘sympathy,’ the government is in effect canceling its confession of wrongdoing....There is no self-humbling in extending money out of ‘sympathy.’” Norma Field, “War and Apology: Japan, the Fiftieth, and After,” *Positions* Vol. 5 (Spring 1997). Seoul has been highly critical of the AWF. In 1998 Seoul announced it would pay 35 million won (about U.S.\$30,000) to each victim who refused payments from Japan. “Nonaka: Tokyo to Review Payments for ROK Ex-Sex Slaves,” Kyodo Wire Service, May 10, 1999, in FBIS Japan.

¹⁴⁸ For a survey of treatment of the comfort women issue in textbooks, see Tawara Yoshifuni, “*Ianfu*” *Mondai to Kyokasho Kogeki* [The “Comfort Women” Issue and the Textbook Controversy] (Tokyo: Tobunken, 1997).

descriptions of Unit 731 were censored by MoE screeners.¹⁴⁹ Thus during the late period, MoE policy permitted expanding coverage of Japan's wartime atrocities in history textbooks.

As a result of such changes, conservatives launched a counter-effort to decrease attention on such atrocities. In general, conservatives argue that focusing on war guilt is dangerous for Japanese patriotism. Nishio Kanji, the leader of the Association to Create New History Textbooks (*Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru-kai*) said, "Why should Japan be the only country that should teach kids—12- to 15-year old kids—bad things about itself?" he said. "I think it is ridiculous, and very sad and tragic that Japan cannot write its own patriotic history."¹⁵⁰ Conservatives strongly object to education about the sex slaves.¹⁵¹ Many conservatives maintain that Japan's actions in World War II were motivated by self-defense, or by the desire to protect other Asian nations.¹⁵²

The efforts of Kanji's group to promote their view of history triggered another diplomatic crisis over Japanese education. Kanji's group wrote its own history textbook, which it submitted

¹⁴⁹ In the 1997 verdict, the court ruled: "While Unit 731 has not been revealed in its entirety, the existence of such a unit within the Japanese Imperial Army with the purpose of conducting germ warfare, and that the unit conducted live experiments on many Chinese and others, was accepted by academia at the time." Quoted in Catherine Bergman, "Texts Illegally Censored, Japan Court Rules," *The Globe and Mail*, August 30, 1997.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Howard W. French, "Japan's Resurgent Far Right Tinkers With History," *New York Times*, March 25, 2001, electronic version.

¹⁵¹ Some argue that the sex slaves were willing prostitutes, some continue to maintain that the Japanese government was never involved at all (despite documentary evidence and Tokyo's own admission of involvement). Some argue that junior high is too young an age for students to learn about such matters, and prefer that they are included only in high school and college study. Personal Interview, Vice Chairman, *Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru-kai* October 2001.

¹⁵² In 1995 Tokyo University Professor Nobukatsu Fujioka founded a group that attacked Japanese leaders for bowing to foreign pressure, leading to unpatriotic textbooks that teach a "perverse, masochistic historical views." See *The Restoration of A National History* (Tokyo: Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, 1998). Fujioka founded the study group, "Liberal View of History Study Group," or *Jiyushugi shikan kenkyukai*. Fujioka published his own version of Japanese history in the book, *Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi* [The history that textbooks do not teach] (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun Nyusu Sabisu, Vols. 1 and 2 1996, vol. 3 1997, vol. 4 1998). In these books are heartwarming stories of ordinary Japanese people, and a criticism of the "Tokyo Trials" view of history. Fujioka's first two volumes of this book were best-sellers in Japan, and the serialized versions of the third and fourth volumes (that appeared in the *Sankei Shinbun* newspaper) also sold well.

to the MoE for approval in Fall 2000. The text argues that Japan's annexation of Korea was necessary "to protect Asia from Western imperialists."¹⁵³ It argues that Japanese control of Korea was necessary in order to prevent its seizure by a power hostile to Japan, which would have an "ideal base for that country to control Japan."¹⁵⁴ This text—known as the "Fuso-sha" text, after its publisher—along with seven others sparked a third diplomatic crisis over Japanese history education.¹⁵⁵ As a result of neighbors' criticism, Tokyo made numerous changes in the textbooks;¹⁵⁶ the MoE said it "requested the revisions to 'balance' the contents of the textbook in line with a clause in the criteria for textbook screening" (the Asian Neighbor's clause, adopted in 1982). Thus Tokyo made many changes to the books but approved their release.¹⁵⁷ Thus once again, Japanese government policy in the textbook crisis reflects some conciliation toward its neighbors but ultimately the book was approved.

During the late period, Japanese textbooks reflect much greater coverage of Japanese actions during colonization and war, but still have many omissions. Many Japanese texts do discuss past aggression and atrocities in some detail. The textbook *Nihonshi* says,

...in occupying [Nanjing], the Japanese army killed large numbers of troops who had already surrendered, prisoners of war, and other Chinese, and engaged in looting, arson,

¹⁵³ See "Group to Create A New History Textbook Says: "Annexation of Korea was Necessary," *Asahi Shinbun*, September 13, 2000, 37. Also "ROK's Yonhap: Japan Fails to Learn From the Past," *Yonhap Wire Service*, September 14, 2000, in FBIS South Korea.

¹⁵⁴ Quoted in Kitazawa Takuya, "Textbook History Repeats Itself," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July-Sept 2001), p. 55. This is a classic perception, as the saying goes in Japan, that Korea is a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan."

¹⁵⁵ On the 2001 textbook crisis see Frank Ching, "Japan Still Haunted By Its Past," *Far East Economic Review*, March 29, 2001; Masato Tanaka, "Chinese Envoy Criticizes Textbooks," *Asahi Evening News*, March 8, 2001; Don Kirk, "History Texts Divide Japan and South Korea Again," *International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 2001; "Japan's Sins of Omission," *Economist*, April 14, 2001, 38; Doug Struck, "New Text Reopening Old Wounds: Revisionist History in Japan Minimizes Atrocities Before, During WWII," *Washington Post*, April 18, 2001, A14.

¹⁵⁶ For details see "War Parts Revised in History Textbooks," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 5, 2001, electronic version.

¹⁵⁷ Ultimately, the Fuso-sha textbook was adopted by less than one percent of Japanese schools. See "Most Japanese School Districts Reject Disputed History Textbook," *New York Times*, August 16, 2001.

and rape in an episode that was to incur international criticism as the Nanjing Massacre. The number of those who died within a few weeks... totaled from 100,000 to 150,000.¹⁵⁸

Another text notes that “Japan, without a formal declaration of war, embarked on an overall war of aggression against China.”¹⁵⁹

With respect to the colonization of Korea, some books do present some details about Japanese colonial policies. A junior high school text reports that “Japan was to rule Korea by military force as a colony, inflicting indescribable suffering on the Korean people.”¹⁶⁰ The text *Osaka Shoseki* reports, “The new government stationed Japanese troops and police throughout the peninsula to suppress the resistance. In schools Korean children were forced to learn Japanese language and history.”¹⁶¹ Another text comments that through such policies, Japan “sought to deprive Koreans of their ethnic awareness and pride.”¹⁶² One textbook features a special section about a Korean slave laborer’s experience, and concluded that “violence [against the workers], together with accidents and malnutrition, led to the death of an astonishing 60,000 people out of the approximately 700,000 Koreans brought forcibly to Japan.”¹⁶³ Therefore some textbooks do go into detail about Japanese actions during the war.

On the other hand, many other textbooks, provide little or no coverage of Japanese atrocities. First, Japan did not colonize Korea; instead, “Japan entered into a treaty with Korea to

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in *Japan in Modern History: High School, Volume I* (Tokyo: International Society for Educational Information, 1996), p. 392. Hereafter cited as *High School*.

¹⁵⁹ *Shoshetsu Nihonshi*, quoted in *Ibid*, 391.

¹⁶⁰ *Kyoiku Shuppan, Rekishi*, in *Japan in Modern History: Junior High School* (Tokyo: International Society for Educational Information, 1996), 461.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, 263.

¹⁶² *Kyoiku Shuppan, Rekishi*, quoted in *Ibid*, 463.

¹⁶³ *Kyoiku Shuppan, Rekish*, quoted in *Ibid*.

take charge of its foreign affairs and control its domestic affairs and police.”¹⁶⁴ Similarly, another text blandly notes the “conversion of Korea into a Japanese protectorate.”¹⁶⁵ Rather than discuss independence movements---which the Japanese smashed by arresting, torturing, raping, and executing activists and their family members—one textbook says: “The leaders and people of each region at first had welcomed the Japanese army as liberators, but severe demands for their resources and military oppression betrayed their hopes.”¹⁶⁶

Second, discussion of the sex slaves is often completely omitted from texts. When it is included (often only in a footnote), the euphemism “comfort women” is always used, and no textbook presents any detail about the horrors of the program. One text says cryptically that “[Japan] rounded up the young women under the name of volunteer corps for the war.”¹⁶⁷ A footnote in one text reads: “Not a few Korean women were also taken forcibly to China and elsewhere to serve as “comfort women.”¹⁶⁸ A footnote in another text says: “Conscription systems were put into effect in Korea and Taiwan under which Koreans and Taiwanese were sent off to the battlefield. Some of their women too were obliged to work in comfort stations for troops in the battle zones.”¹⁶⁹

Third, other Japanese policies during the war continue to remain completely excluded from textbooks. This includes Japanese strategic bombing campaigns against Chinese cities (which killed 266,000 Chinese), biological warfare against Chinese civilians, Unit 731, and the

¹⁶⁴ *Atarashii Shakai Rekishi*

¹⁶⁵ *Shoshetsu Nihonshi*, 347

¹⁶⁶ *Gendai no Sekaishi*, quoted in *High School*, 379

¹⁶⁷ *Osaka Shoseki*, quoted in *High School*, 337.

¹⁶⁸ *Nihonshi*, quoted in *High School*, 40.

¹⁶⁹ *Gendai no Nihonshi*, quoted in *High School*, 141)

mistreatment of POWs.¹⁷⁰ In sum, many Japanese textbooks present very little detail about Japan's actions during the war. Euphemism and avoidance is common in discussions of the period.

Cooperative Educational Efforts. Some progress is evident in this period in Japan's willingness to work with its neighbors on the issue of history education. In 1997 the Japanese government refused to join a UNESCO-backed joint textbook panel with South Korea.¹⁷¹ After the 2001 textbook crisis, Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to Japanese participation in a government-supported textbook panel with the ROK. The two nations formed a bilateral research organization to study history issues in March 2002.¹⁷²

Commemoration

Japanese commemoration of this period remains highly unapologetic; it continues to focus exclusively on Japanese suffering. No foreign victim of Japan has a monument or memorial in Tokyo.

During this period, leading Japanese politicians made visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1994, MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (also the leader of the bereaved families' association) visited Yasukuni with several other cabinet members on the anniversary of the surrender. Hashimoto returned two years later, as Prime Minister, but visited on his birthday in July in what he said was a purely personal capacity. Later in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited

¹⁷⁰ Chinese casualty figures from Pape, *Bombing to Win*, p. 337.

¹⁷¹ The Track II level has seen much activity; private individuals (historians and other educators) from South Korea and Japan have formed study groups to discuss the representation of history in their respective countries. For details see Kazuhiko Kimijima and Hiromitsu Inokuchi, "The Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1998): 47-52.

¹⁷² Andrew Ward, "History Joint Research Body Launched to Settle Academic Differences," *Financial Times*, March 6, 2002, 10.

the shrine in August. Koizumi adapted his visit in several ways to assuage criticism.¹⁷³ But observers in Seoul and Beijing ignored the efforts at placation, and furiously condemned the visit.¹⁷⁴ Koizumi, however, visited the shrine again the following April.¹⁷⁵

Japan's museums reflect amnesia or glorification about Japanese atrocities and colonization in East Asia. The recently refurbished Yushukan museum (standing next to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo) glorifies Japan's policies and omits its wrongdoings in the experiences of war and colonization. Japan is portrayed as a liberator of Asian nations, forced into a defensive war by the devious European and American colonizers that had attempted to strangle Japan by cutting off its raw materials.¹⁷⁶ "Chinese terrorists" are blamed for the expansion of Japanese aggression in China. The attack on Pearl Harbor is described the inevitable result of American pressure. The museum describes the Rape of Nanking—said to have killed 100-300,000 Chinese in killing sprees and mass rape—as the "Nanking Incident."

¹⁷³ Koizumi said it was totally contrary to his wish "if my visit to Yasukuni Shrine...could lead people of neighboring countries to cast doubts on the fundamental policy of Japan of denying war and desiring peace." Koizumi changed his visit to August 13 to avoid going on the day of the surrender. Koizumi also issued an apology for the war. He said, "During the war, Japan caused tremendous sufferings to many people of the world including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region. Sincerely facing these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war." Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, August 13, 2001, Foreign Press Center Translation. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0813danwa_e.html. Finally, Koizumi did not follow the Shinto traditions of clapping and bowing, or offering a sacred tree branch to the shrine (as had Nakasone before him). He bowed once and sent a floral wreath to the shrine, paid for with personal funds.

¹⁷⁴ Koizumi's shrine visit reverberated during his visit to Seoul, where he was greeted by protesters. Lawmakers in the ROK ruling party also passed a resolution condemning the shrine visit and the textbook ruling. They asked that Japanese prime ministers not visit the shrine again in the future. See "Lawmakers adopt resolution calling for Japan's apology," Yonhap, October 17, 2001, in FBIS Korea, same date. The most macabre incident in ROK-Japan relations occurred as 20 South Korean men cut off their little fingers in protest of Koizumi's shrine visit. Michiyo Nakamoto, "Koizumi Attacked on Shrine Compromise," *Financial Times*, August 14, 2001, 7.

¹⁷⁵ Koizumi said he chose to visit in April instead of August in deference to China and Japan, and planned no visit for August 15. "Koizumi Visits Yasukuni Shrine," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 22, 2002.

¹⁷⁶ Paul Murphy, "Yasukuni Museum Tugs at Heartstrings to Keep Military Memories Alive," *International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shinbun*, August 15, 2002; Howard W. French, "At a Military Museum, the Losers Write History," *New York Times*, October 30, 2002.

The exhibit reads: “The Chinese troops were soundly defeated, suffering heavy casualties. Inside the city, residents were once again able to live their lives in peace.” Unmentioned are the women forced into sexual servitude by the Imperial Army, grotesque medical experiments of Unit 731, abuse of Allied POWs (such as the Bataan Death March), Japanese strategic bombing of Chinese cities, or Japanese chemical or biological weapons use against Chinese civilians. The chairman of the Japan Veteran’s Association commented, “The original purpose of the museum was to pay tribute to the souls of the war dead, by displaying their belongings. That way, their children can live with pride.”¹⁷⁷

Another new museum that opened in Tokyo was the *Showakan*: a museum commemorating the imperial Showa era (1926-1989). The glossy museum features photos and belongings of Japanese people during the war. It briefly details the American terror bombings against Tokyo and other cities, showing the number of casualties. Other than that, the museum focuses primarily on tenacity of Japanese citizens amidst the hardships of war: in particular, the “rubble women” who with bravery and hard work brought the nation from war to reconstruction.¹⁷⁸ The museum does not describe the war in Asia.

Third, commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end reflected extensive denial and glorification of Japan’s past. Dissatisfied with the Socialist agenda for an apologetic Diet Resolution, conservative politicians formed parliamentary groups with the aim of commemorating the surrender in a more patriotic fashion. The LDP’s large “Dietmembers

¹⁷⁷ Nicholas D. Kristof, “Japan’s Plans for a Museum On War Mired in Controversy,” *New York Times*, May 21, 1995. The museum’s refurbishing was funded largely by the *Nihon Izokukai* (War Bereaved Families Association).

¹⁷⁸ It should be noted that such a figure is perhaps the least controversial of all that could be commemorated. Japanese women in the 1930s could not vote, and thus bore no responsibility for the militarist government; they did not fight in the war; they certainly demonstrated strength, bravery and hard work under desperate conditions. The “rubble women” were also a popular symbol in postwar West Germany: the “Trümmerfrauen” received extensive media coverage and were seen as a positive, untainted symbol of reconstruction. On this symbol in West German

League for the fiftieth Anniversary of the End of the War” held various commemorative events in August 1995, including an invitation to various officials in neighboring countries to “thank the war dead and praise Japan for its contribution to the independence of Asian countries.”¹⁷⁹ Such groups drew on support from a variety of rightist/nationalist citizens’ groups, including the powerful National Shrine Association (*Jinja honcho*) and War Bereaved Families Association (*Nihon izokukai*). In sum, Japanese commemoration of the war in this period does not focus on Japan’s victims; it emphasizes Japanese victimhood and heroism in the war.

To conclude, Japanese policies of remembrance in the late period reflect more of everything: more apologies, more denials; more textbook coverage, more textbook crises. Although Japan has issued many impressive statements of apology, numerous denials have accompanied them, and other Japanese policies (commemoration and education) remains unapologetic.

SUMMARY: JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE, 1945-2003

This chapter coded the independent variable of the apology theory (Japanese remembrance). I code Japanese remembrance as *unapologetic* across all three periods. The early period was characterized by amnesia mixed with glorification. The middle phase saw somewhat of an increase in Japanese attention to the past—resulting in the onset of Japan’s “apology diplomacy.” However, overall Japanese remembrance remained unapologetic; apologies were vague and were

historical memory see Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany’s ‘Crisis Years’ and West German National Identity,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 354-395.

¹⁷⁹ Gavin McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to “Correct” History,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1998), p. 17.

This group included 212 Diet members (70 per cent of them from the LDP) Diet members. It was headed by Okuno Seisuke: the former education minister forced out in 1988 for saying that the Japanese were trying to liberate Asia and that the war was the fault of Caucasians. Also, the opposition *Shinshinto* party formed a similar group with 41

accompanied by denials. In the late phase, the tempo of remembrance increased dramatically. More and better apologies were heard. However with these apologies also came more denials and glorifications. Thus although the pace of remembrance increased, overall Japanese remembrance remained generally unapologetic. For a summary of remembrance in postwar Japan, see Table 1 (below). In the next chapter I use these codings to test the predictions of the apology theory in the case of Japan-Korea relations.

Table 1: Japanese Remembrance Since World War II

Key:

- + apologetic
- unapologetic
- /+ apologetic and unapologetic occurring at same time

	1945-1964	1965-1989	1990s-00s
Statements	-	-/+	-/+
Reparations	-	-/+	-/+
Education	-	-/+	-/+
Legal Trials	-	-	-
Commemoration	-	-	-

ALTERNATE VARIABLES

This dissertation tests the effects of policies of remembrance on South Korean perception of Japanese intentions, as well as the effect of those perceived intentions on South Korean threat perception of Japan. But other variables may influence both perception of intentions and overall

members. Called the "Dietmembers League for the Passing on of a Correct History," the group was led by Nagano Shigeto, notorious for his 1994 statement that the Rape of Nanking was a fabrication.

perception of threat. Thus in this study, in order to understand the effects of remembrance, I also track alternate variables over time.

Perception of Intentions

Other factors besides policies of remembrance affect perception of a state's intentions. This section codes regime type, territorial claims, and institutional membership across the post-World War II period. Chapter Three relies upon these codings to test the relative influence of remembrance on perceptions of intentions.

Regime Type. In this study I evaluate two alternate hypotheses with respect to regime type. First, democratic peace theory would posit that if Japan and the ROK were mature democracies, Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions should be benign. In Chapter One I cited one definition of a democracy, according to Bruce Russett: voting rights for most citizens, governments elected in competitive elections, and free speech.¹⁸⁰ According to this definition, Japan democratized in the early 1950s after the democratic reforms instituted in the U.S. occupation. As for the ROK, in the decades after South Korean independence in 1948, South Korean politics featured a series of military coups, dictators, dissolved parliaments, and martial law. In 1987 the ROK experienced its first peaceful political transition of power as President Chun Doo Hwan stepped down and was replaced by Roh Tae Woo in a competitive election (although Roh was a hand-picked successor from the same party). Therefore, according to Russett's definition of a democracy, both Japan and the ROK were full democracies after Korea's 1987 transition.

¹⁸⁰This definition is used by Bruce Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, p. 72.

According to this coding of regime type, democratic peace theory predicts that ROK should view Japan as having malign intentions from World War II until after 1987. Thus in the 1990s, after Korean democratization, Korean perceptions of Japan should grow more benign relative to earlier periods.

Second, in this dissertation I evaluate a counter-argument to the above theory and predictions. One might argue that we should not expect the beneficial effects of democratization between the two states because one of them—the ROK—is not yet a mature democracy. There are two justifications for the coding of the ROK as a democratizing state, rather than a full democracy. The first is the use of a more restrictive definition of democracy; namely, to be considered a full democracy, the state must undergo a peaceful transfer of power from a ruling party to an opposition party.¹⁸¹ In the ROK this did not occur until 1998, with the election of opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung. Indeed, in Japan this did not occur until 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party (which had ruled Japan since 1955) lost power and ruled within a coalition government. A second justification for coding the ROK as a democratizing state comes from its “polity scores” assigned by previous scholars. According to the dataset, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2001,” the ROK is considered a democratizing state after 1987, and achieves the score of a full democracy only in 1998.¹⁸² Thus using these justifications, one could code the ROK as a democratizing state after 1987, and a full democracy only after 1998.

According to this coding of regime type, a variant of democratic peace theory, authored by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, would predict harmful rather than beneficial effects in

¹⁸¹ James Lee Ray, “Wars between Democracies: Rare or Non-Existent?” *International Interactions* Vol. 18, no. 3 (1993), pp. 251-276.

Japan-ROK relations after Korean democratization (1987).¹⁸³ Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratizing states are more war-prone than other states; they suffer from several pathologies that increase the risk of war. These include the purveyance of hyper-nationalism, the adoption of diversionary tactics, and logrolling among elites.¹⁸⁴ Because of the existence of territorial claims between Korea and Japan, and because much of Korean nationalism is built on “anti-Japanism,”¹⁸⁵ Japan is a very likely target of Korean diversionary tactics and an ideal scapegoat to rally Korean hyper-nationalism. Mansfield and Snyder’s theory of democratization and war would thus predict that after 1987 Koreans should have increasingly malign perceptions about Japanese intentions. The theory also expects that Korean politicians will rally the public with anti-Japanese propaganda, and will use on diversionary tactics aimed at bolstering Korean national prestige vis-à-vis Japan. In such an environment, Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions should grow more malign after 1987, and should only begin to improve after 1998. Chapter Three tests both versions of democratic peace theory in the ROK-Japan case.

Territorial Claims. If a state’s territorial claims make its intentions appear more malign, then the presence of territorial disputes between Japan and the ROK (as well as between Japan and other neighbors) should be a consistently aggravating factor in ROK threat perception. Since Korean independence after World War II, the ROK and Japan wrestled over fishing rights and over the territorial claim of a group of islets (Tokdo in Korean; Takeshima to the Japanese).

¹⁸² Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2001,” Polity IV Country Report 2000 Series.

¹⁸³ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995): 5-38.

¹⁸⁴ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” pp. 31-34.

¹⁸⁵ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 19-23.

These are tiny, rocky, uninhabited islands that are perceived as valuable for their surrounding natural resources (principally fisheries). Japan and Korea nearly came to blows over the dispute over fishing rights in the 1950s. Since then the two nations have dealt with the fisheries disputes through negotiations. The two states are not actively negotiating over the Tokdo issue; Korea continues to claim it and the Japanese have so far avoided the issue. The issues of fisheries and Tokdo are highly politicized in Korea because of extreme sensitivity about any semblance of a Japanese attempt to control anything perceived as Korean territory. Thus if territorial disputes makes a state's intentions look more malign, Japan's claims on the Tokdo/Takeshima Islands should make its intentions appear more malign to the ROK throughout the post-World War II period.

Institutional Membership. Japan is a member of many international institutions, but because most do not impose real constraints on Japanese behavior, institutionalist theory would not expect membership in such institutions to signal credible information about Japan's intentions. Japan has long been an active member of many international institutions designed to promote cooperation in world trade, economic development, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan became a "dialogue partner" in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1977. Through the ARF, and ASEAN's "Post-Ministerial Conferences," Japan and its neighbors discuss security issues in an informal forum since 1993.¹⁸⁶ Japan is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), which analysts speculate could serve as a building block for greater regional political and security cooperation. Although at various times throughout the Cold War, regional security institutions for East Asia had been proposed,¹⁸⁷ the

¹⁸⁶ David E. Sanger, "Asian Countries, in Shift, Weigh Defense Forum," *New York Times*, May 23, 1993.

¹⁸⁷ For example, the United States tried to establish "NEATO" (Northeast Asian Treaty Organization) in the 1950s

region's institutional development has been meager compared to that of Western Europe. As Aaron Friedberg writes, "The rich 'alphabet soup' of international agencies that has helped to nurture peaceful relations among the European powers is, in Asia, a very thin gruel indeed."¹⁸⁸ Thomas Christensen describes East Asia's level of institutionalization as "anemic"; Avery Goldstein argues that "although the ongoing efforts of regional and extraregional actors to nurture the ARF make it premature to write off its possible future importance," he concludes that East Asia may currently be characterized by "weak institutional arrangements."¹⁸⁹

Because the institutions that do exist in East Asia do not place meaningful constraints on their members, institutionalist theory does not expect them to signal much information about members' intentions. East Asian institutions such as the ARF have the potential to evolve into more robust arrangements, but they are currently weak and informal. These institutions do not require Japan to pay significant costs of membership, nor impose significant restrictions on Japanese power or behavior. (An exception would be Japanese membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Thus most institutions do not convey credible information about Japan's intentions. In sum, an institutionalist theory of threat perception would predict that Japan's institutional memberships should not significantly affect perception of its intentions one way or another; Japan does not participate with its neighbors in multilateral institutions that limit its power or behavior.

but was met with firm opposition from Tokyo. In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev proposed regional security dialogues for East Asia at the United Nations. See Yuen Foong Khong, "Asean's Post-Ministerial Conference and Regional Forum: A Convergence of Post-Cold War Security Strategies," in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi and Courtney Purrington, eds., *United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions after the Cold War* (La Jolla, Calif.: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, 1995), p. 44. In 1990 Australia and Canada proposed a Conference for Security and Cooperation and a North Pacific Security Dialogue.

¹⁸⁸ Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," p. 20.

¹⁸⁹ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 49; Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 69.

Perception of Threat

As argued in Chapter One, states perceive threats based on capabilities as well as intentions. In Chapter One I defined a state's capability as *power* and *constraints* on its ability to project power. This section codes these factors in the ROK-Japan case since World War II in order to assess the relative importance of intentions and capabilities in threat perception.

This section argues that a theory of threat perception based solely on Japanese capabilities would predict **moderate** threat perception in South Korea in the early period, and that threat perception should drop to **low** during the middle period, remaining low thereafter.

Power

As argued in Chapter One, a state's power can be divided into long term power (the size of its economy and its population), as well as its current, mobilized power (such as standing military forces, military expenditure, and the mobilization of the populace for warfare).

Long-Term Power. Since World War II, Japan has been consistently more powerful than the ROK in terms of long-term power. First, Japan's population was consistently higher. Starting in 1960 Japan's population numbered 94 million, compared to the ROK's 25 million.¹⁹⁰ The disparity in population size decreased somewhat across the postwar period; Japan's population in 2000 is 127 million compared to South Korea's 47 million. Although Japan no longer has nearly four times the population of the ROK, it still has more than double the ROK's population. Japan's larger population is thus one factor contributing to Japan's advantage in terms of long-term power.

Second, Japan's long-term power is also much higher than South Korea's in terms of national wealth. The wealth disparity between the two states was most pronounced in the early

¹⁹⁰ All population figures from International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, various years).

period. After an initial period of postwar reconstruction, in what was celebrated as Asia's first economic "miracle," Japan's economy recovered to join the ranks of the world's great economic powers. The Japanese economy saw annual growth rates averaging 8% in the two decades after the war. By comparison, the Korean economy began its post-World War II economic development from a much weaker stage; in 1960 Japan's GDP was 24 times larger than the ROK's.¹⁹¹ In the 1950s the Korean economy languished, propped up by American aid.¹⁹²

Although the wealth disparity between the two states remained strong, Korean wealth began increasing in the middle period, and by the late period the disparity was much less stark. Japan's economy continued to thrive. Sustained economic growth—marred somewhat by economic troubles in the 1970s—eventually led Japan to overtake the USSR as the world's second-largest economy. In the late 1980s, speculation was rife that Japan was poised to overtake the United States as the next economic superpower.¹⁹³ In 1990, the Japanese "bubble economy" burst with the collapse of land prices and the Tokyo stock market crash. The Japanese economy languished throughout this decade, and the world stopped speculating about Japanese hegemony. Japan still remains, however, the world's second-largest economy, with a GDP of \$5.6 trillion in 2000.

Korea, for its part, began its process of economic development under Park Chung-hee. Park's export-led growth policies, initiated in the 1960s, fueled Korean economic growth, leading Korea to be dubbed one of the East Asian "tigers." Between 1960 and 2000, Korea's


¹⁹¹ ROK GDP was \$37 billion in 1960; Japan's was \$888 billion (figures in 2003 constant U.S. dollars). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database; deflators from United States Office of Management and Budget, 2003.

¹⁹² Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 55.

¹⁹³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 307-322.

economy grew from \$37 billion to \$620 billion in constant dollars. Whereas in 1960 Korea's economy had been 24 times smaller than Japan's, by 2000 its economy was 9 times smaller. (See Figure 3, below)


Figure 3: South Korean GDP



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2003

In sum, since World War II, Japan's aggregate power with respect to wealth was high relative to the ROK. The power disparity was highest in the 1960s when Japan's economy had recovered and Korea's was stagnating. Despite this growth, Korea remains a much less wealthy state relative to the world's second-largest economy. (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: Comparative GDP, Japan and ROK (1960-2000)



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2003

Since World War II, Korean economic growth succeeded in narrowing the gap between ROK and Japanese relative wealth; however, these countries are in very different situations. Japan is a great power; Korea is a small country that, despite its success at propelling itself into the ranks of OECD countries, remains in a different league than Japan. The wealth imbalance used to be 25:1; now it hovers at about 10:1. Thus the balance of power in terms of GDP used to be as lopsided as the current balance of wealth between the United States and Thailand (25:1). Now, after decades of Korean growth (and recently, Japanese stagnation), the gap has narrowed to 10:1—equal to the gap between the United States and Mexico. Korea remains a far weaker state in terms of long-term power.¹⁹⁴ In sum, in terms of both population and wealth, Japan has consistently held a strong advantage relative to the ROK.

¹⁹⁴ GDP figures, adjusted for purchasing power parity, from World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2003.

Current Power. There are two important points related to the current power balance between Japan and the ROK. First, since World War II, Japan's military expenditure was consistently higher than the ROK's, but its relative advantage decreased with time. Second, the ROK held the advantage in terms of other categories of current power (number of standing military forces and mobilization of population). Thus the current power balance was not as disparate as the long-term power balance, and Japan's advantage in this realm decreased across the postwar period.

Japanese military expenditure was always higher than South Korean defense expenditure, but the relative balance between the two states improved over time. In 1950, Korea was only recently an independent nation, suffused in civil war, and totally dependent on U.S. military aid for its national budget. Japan was an occupied state until 1952. Thus at the start of the early period, neither state could be thought of as even having a military expenditure to compare against the other. By the end of the early period, however, Japan had a decided advantage in terms of military spending (spending five times as much on defense than impoverished Korea).¹⁹⁵ In the middle period, the balance in military expenditure fell from a 5:1 ratio to a 2.5:1 ratio; increased Korean military spending narrowed the gap.¹⁹⁶ In the late period, the balance remains to Japan's advantage, at about 3.5:1.¹⁹⁷ Thus Japan has always spent more on defense than Korea, but the relative balance improved over time from Korea's perspective.

¹⁹⁵ In 1965 Japan and the ROK spent \$4.5 billion and \$862 million on defense (data in 2003 constant \$U.S.). Military expenditure data in current dollars from IISS, *The Military Balance, 1965-66*; adjusted with dollar deflators from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, OMB.)

¹⁹⁶ By 1990 Japan spent \$36.6 billion on defense, compared to the ROK's \$14 billion. (Data in constant 2003 \$U.S., from IISS, *The Military Balance, 1990-91*; adjusted with dollar deflators from U.S. OMB.)

¹⁹⁷ In 2000 Japan spent \$48 billion on defense; the ROK spent \$13.5 billion. (Data in constant 2003 \$U.S., from IISS, *The Military Balance, 2000-01*; adjusted with dollar deflators from U.S. OMB.)

Other aspects of the current power balance consistently favored the ROK. First, since World War II the Koreans raised and supported a larger military: the ratio in terms of the number of Japanese to Korean armed forces was consistently about 1:2.5 over time. (See Table 2).

Table 2: Number of South Korean and Japanese Armed Forces (total)

	1961	1970	1980	1990	2000
ROK	600,000	645,000	600,600	650,000	683,000
Japan	233,000	259,000	241,000	249,000	236,700

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, various years

Second, Tokyo’s failure to mobilize its population for warfare was another factor that lowered its current power relative to the ROK. Whereas South Korea is a state whose population is mobilized for war (against the North Korean threat), the Japanese population has been very gun-shy since the devastating experience of World War II. Observing Japan’s post-World War II political culture, some analysts have proclaimed Japan a “civilian power” or an “antimilitarist” state.¹⁹⁸ Scholars have exaggerated the extent to which antimilitarism actually constrains Japanese policy,¹⁹⁹ but their research has documented strong public opinion against the use of force, and a skeptical view of the military establishment.

Poll data also show an absence of support among Japan’s general public for aggressive (or even assertive) military policies. First, the Japanese prefer the less assertive defense posture of reliance upon the United States. Since the late 1960s, when Japanese people were polled

¹⁹⁸ On Japan’s “civilian” power see Hans Maull, “Germany and Japan – the New Civilian Powers,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (1990/91), pp. 91-107. Also see Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

about the best way to protect the nation's security, most respondents (40-70 percent range) said Japan should continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan alliance.²⁰⁰ Second, the Japanese people embrace institutional restrictions on Japanese power. From the 1960s through the 1980s, public opinion was opposed to revising the constitution to grant the military greater legitimacy.²⁰¹ This began to change in the 1990s; after 1992 a slim majority says constitutional revision is necessary.

However, revision remains highly controversial; people favoring revision say they favor it not because they want a more assertive military policy for Japan, but because they want Japanese law to condone Japan's participation in multilateral peacekeeping activities.²⁰² Polls also reflect disapproval for changing the status of the Japanese Defense Agency into a Defense Ministry, which would install a Defense Minister into the Cabinet, thus increasing the influence of the military establishment.²⁰³ The public desire to keep strong civilian control over the military reflects "a deep and abiding distrust of the military."²⁰⁴

Third, Japanese public opinion has opposed participation in overseas military operations. The public was opposed to participating in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq war

¹⁹⁹ For a critique see Lind, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy."

²⁰⁰ Data for this and subsequent views from Mike M. Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), p. 63. Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Bo'ei Hakusho* (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsu Kyoku, 1993). In this survey, only a small minority of respondents (hovering around 10 percent) favored a more hawkish posture, saying Japan should pursue "self-reliance with stronger defense forces." An equally popular minority view (also hovering around 10 percent) was the most dovish of all, saying that Japan should abrogate the treaty with the U.S. and reduce or eliminate the SDF all together.

²⁰¹ Opposed to revision were 61 percent in 1962, 72 percent in 1968, and 55 percent in 1986. Poll data for 1962 and 1968 from John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Althone Press, 1988), p. 421. 1986 data from Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, p. 64.

²⁰² Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, p. 65.

²⁰³ 54 percent disapproved of such a proposal in 1997, with only 20 percent approving. See *Asahi Shinbun* poll, September 10, 1997. Poll data from JPOLL, Roper Center. For a similar result see *Yomiuri Shinbun* poll, September 28, 1997; this poll indicated that 52 percent of the public opposed the action because they feared other countries would take the move as a sign of Japanese militarism. Source: JPOLL, Roper Center.

²⁰⁴ Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander, *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), p. 29.

(minesweeping operations) and the Persian Gulf War. In the 1990s, a proposal to send Japanese SDF forces to the Gulf provoked strong opposition and was defeated; Tokyo, however, was later able to pass the Peace-keeping Operations Law (“PKO Law”) that allowed the dispatch of Japanese forces to UN peacekeeping operations. Since then the public has tentatively supported Japanese peacekeeping activities contingent upon the cessation of hostilities.²⁰⁵ Unenthusiastic about participating in American or international operations, the Japanese populace is more hawkish about defense of the Japanese homeland. For example, when North Korean ships entered Japanese waters in 1999, Japanese vessels fired warning shots; whereas only 6 percent of respondents thought the actions too extreme, 52 percent of respondents said “the SDF should have been tougher and stopped those ships.”²⁰⁶ In the next encounter between North Korean and Japanese ships (December 2001), the Japanese Coast Guard sank a North Korean ship, with no negative political repercussions for the Koizumi administration. Japanese popular support for the use of force thus seems contingent on the interests at stake. Nevertheless, poll data reflect that Japan’s public is satisfied with a defensively oriented military strategy, and is skittish about empowering the military establishment and participating in most military operations.

The policies of the Japanese government also suggest that Tokyo has not taken steps to mobilize its population. From time to time, LDP leaders have noted the need to bolster

²⁰⁵ A 1994 poll showed that 36 percent of respondents supported Japanese participation in UN peace operations “not very much” or “not at all.” 38 percent said they supported it “somewhat,” with only 21 percent saying they supported it “very much.” *Yomiuri Shinbun* poll, March 30, 1994. Source: JPOLL, Roper Center. In a 1999 poll, respondents noted their objections to expanding Japanese non-military peacekeeping activities into the sphere of peace enforcement or disarmament. 42 percent said Japan should not expand its activities, with 26 percent approving of such a change. *Yomiuri Shinbun* poll, July 29, 1999. Source: JPOLL, Roper Center.

²⁰⁶ Nikkei Research Poll, April 4, 1999. Sponsored by *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*. Poll data from Japan Public Opinion Database, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, www.roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu. (Hereafter cited as JPOLL, Roper Center.)

patriotism and “defense-mindedness,”²⁰⁷ but their goal was to counter strong public distrust and dislike of the military—not to promote acceptance of aggressive policies. Japanese leaders since the war explicitly sought to rebuild national prestige and pride through economic rather than military might.²⁰⁸

Critics might counter by pointing to Japanese history books and commemoration as evidence of nationalistic mobilization. It is true, as previously argued in this chapter, that Japanese history books omit a great deal of Japan’s aggression and atrocities, and that such behavior is common among countries riling up nationalistic sentiment within their population in order to prepare them for aggression.²⁰⁹ However, Japanese textbooks do not glorify past violence, nor do they vilify Japan’s neighbors. Textbooks portray World War II as a tragic national mistake, and extol the virtues of liberal democracy and international cooperation. Japan thus does not look like a country that is mobilizing its population for war; Tokyo would have to substantially change its educational policies and political rhetoric before the Japanese people could potentially be brought around to a position of enthusiastic support for aggression. Thus, since World War II, Japan’s failure to mobilize its population has undercut Japan’s level of current power.

In sum, there are three important points with respect to the overall balance of power between Japan and the ROK. First, in terms of *long-term* power, Japan and Korea are simply in

²⁰⁷ On the campaigns of Japanese conservatives to reform Japanese education to make it more patriotic in the 1950s and 1980s, see Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy*; Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, pp. 139-141; Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp. 64-71.

²⁰⁸ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996), pp. 32-41.

²⁰⁹ Also, Tokyo officially reinstated some of the patriotic symbols of its Imperial era (its *Hinomaru* flag and *Kimigayo* national anthem), provoking strong criticism. On this see “Japan’s Right Turn,” *Korea Herald*, August 12, 1999; Mayumi Itoh, “Japan’s Neo-Nationalism: The Role of the *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* Legislation,” JPRI Working Paper no. 79 (July 2001).

different leagues. Although over the post-World War II era Korea succeeded in narrowing the gap in terms of both wealth and population, Japan is the world's second-largest economy, and Korea remains a small state. Second, the balance of *current* power between the two states was not so dire for Korea. Japan's military expenditure was consistently higher than the ROK's, but its relative advantage decreased with time over the post-World War II period as ROK military spending increased. The ROK actually held the advantage in other aspects of current power (number of standing military forces and mobilization of population). For a summary of these factors see Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of Japan/ROK Current Power Balance

	Early Period 1950-64	Middle Period 1965-89	Late Period 1990-00s
Military Expenditure (JPN: ROK)	Jpn advantage (5 : 1)	Jpn advantage (5 : 1 ~ 2.5 : 1)	Jpn advantage (2.5: 1 ~ 3.5 : 1)
# Armed Forces (JPN: ROK)	ROK advantage (1 : 2.5)	ROK advantage (1 : 2.5)	ROK advantage (1 : 2.5)
Popular mobilization	ROK advantage	ROK advantage	ROK advantage
Summary: Jse Current Power vs. ROK	Mod	Low	Low

Constraints

Since World War II, constraints have reduced Japan's ability to project power against South Korea. These include the constraints imposed by the United States (first as occupier and then as offshore balancer), in addition to threats Japan has faced from other countries in the region.

Chapter One argued that the existence of an institutionalized commitment, as well as military “boots on the ground” make the commitment of an offshore balancer appear stronger (and thus make it a stronger constraint). As for the constraints posed by threats from other states, Chapter One argued that threat perception within a given dyad is affected by the existence of threats from third parties. The more powerful the third-party states are, the more threatening they are (and thus the greater constraint they pose).

U.S. Offshore Balancer. The United States and Japan had an institutionalized security treaty since 1952; U.S. forces have remained in Japan since the end of World War II. The United States has been called “the cork in the bottle” of Japanese power.²¹⁰ However, in the early postwar period, it was not certain that this “cork” would stay in place. During the occupation, the U.S. presence was obviously a very strong constraint on Japanese power. However after Japan regained sovereignty in 1952, the question of alignment with the United States was hotly contested in Japanese politics, culminating in 1960 with massive protests that occurred upon the Japanese government’s extra-parliamentary renewal of the security treaty.²¹¹ Beyond Japanese ambivalence, observers in East Asia also worried greatly during the 1950s about whether the Americans would remain a major presence in the region.

After the renewal, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan’s alignment with the U.S. became gradually established, and the staying power of the U.S. presence in Japan became clear. From time to time, doubts emerged about the future of the United States in the region: in the mid-1970s after Nixon’s policies of “Vietnamization” and Carter’s proposals to withdraw troops

²¹⁰ Quote from Major General Henry C. Stackpole (USMC); *Washington Post*, March 27, 1990. Japanese politician Shiina Etsusaburo was also famous for his statement that the U.S. was a “honorable watchdog” (*go-banken-sama*). Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 242.

²¹¹ George Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

from the Korean peninsula; also in 1990 upon the collapse of the USSR.²¹² However during the Cold War, defense of Japan was a cornerstone of the American global fight against Communism, and no serious debates have occurred within Japan to terminate the U.S.-Japan alliance. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan and the U.S. renegotiated their institutionalized security treaty in the 1996 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.

As for “boots on the ground,” the United States has maintained a military presence in Japan since the occupation. The numbers of troops maintained by the United States dropped in 1950 (when military personnel deployed to Japan in support of the occupation were sent to fight in the Korean war), and were drawn down in later periods. However the United States has consistently maintained troops in Japan (most of them stationed in Okinawa); today these number about 40,000. In sum, since the initial uncertainty over the U.S. presence in the 1950s, the constraint imposed on Japan by the U.S. offshore balancer has been high.

Other Threats. Japan has faced constraints from regional threats since World War II. In the early postwar period, Japan faced hostile regimes in the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China. Of these states, none had significant power-projection capabilities against Japan, although Tokyo was concerned about Soviet (and later Chinese) nuclear weapons. During this era Moscow devoted the bulk of Soviet conventional military power to the European rather than the East Asian theater. After the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviets deployed more military forces in the Asian region, however, they consisted mainly of ground forces on the Chinese border.²¹³

²¹² On perceptions of the U.S. in Asia during the 1970s see Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, Chapter 5.

²¹³ Until border disputes in 1962, the Soviets maintained 12-14 divisions in the Far Eastern Military Districts, out of 160 total divisions (the rest were deployed along the Central Front in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, or in Central Russia. By 1971 Moscow had increased this number to 30 divisions out of 157 (deployed along the Sino-Soviet border). The Soviets also deployed tactical nuclear weapons and bombers on the Chinese border. Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications 1945-1990* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1992), p. 193. Divisional information from IISS, *The Military Balance 1963-62* and *The Military Balance 1970-71*.

China and North Korea were hostile to Japan but their military power was also predominantly ground-focused. Thus Japan did not face significant constraints from regional threats during this time period.

In the middle period, early on Japan enjoyed a more favorable security environment, but in the mid-1970s this deteriorated with the growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific theater. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the military power of potential regional threats remained low. Diplomacy among the great powers also created a more favorable environment for Japan; superpower détente and the U.S. normalization of relations with China enabled Japan to normalize and improve relations with Beijing, and to improve its relations with Moscow and Pyongyang.²¹⁴ As it improved relations with Pyongyang, Tokyo made moves to distance itself from Seoul, such as repudiating previous statements about Japan's concerns with security threats to the ROK, and assumptions about Japanese base usage in the event of a Korean war.²¹⁵ In the mid-1970s, however, Japan's threat environment changed as the Soviet Union began building up its East Asian military presence. The buildup included qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Soviet Pacific Fleet's ballistic missile submarines, surface ships, and amphibious capabilities.²¹⁶ The Soviets also built up their air force in Eastern Siberia, with larger deployments of MIG-23, MIG-27, and Su-19 attack aircraft, as well as the 1979 deployment of Backfire bombers. Particularly worrisome to Japan was the Soviet buildup of amphibious

²¹⁴ On this period see Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 104-106.

²¹⁵ This period included the notorious "Kimura Statement," made by Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio, in which he repudiated the 1969 Korea Clause that said the security of the ROK as "essential to Japan's peace and security." Rather, Kimura said the security of the Korean peninsula was essential to Japanese security. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 115-124.

²¹⁶ Kiev-class heavy aviation cruisers, introduced by the USSR in 1978, were perceived by U.S. military analysts as "a first step in challenging Western carrier and air-power dominance on the high seas." David F. Winkler, *Cold War At Sea*. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

capabilities in the Kurile Islands.²¹⁷ Along with the buildup in hardware, Moscow increasingly tried to intimidate Japan from pursuing closer alignment with China. “As the geographical and political pivot in the apparent anti-Soviet alliance, Japan was the target of the intimidating message implicit in the Soviet buildup.”²¹⁸ Before Japan signed a Friendship Treaty with Beijing in 1978, the Soviets issued numerous threats to Japan, and deployed amphibious troops to the Kurile Islands.²¹⁹ After the treaty was signed, the Soviets stepped up pressure against Tokyo in several ways.²²⁰ The Soviets also appeared more likely to resort to force in Asia after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Thus the Soviet threat to Japan worsened in the late 1970s. Growth in North Korean conventional military power also exacerbated the Communist threat in East Asia. Thus Japan was more constrained in the middle period (after the mid-1970s) because of the growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific.

In the late period, Japan has faced a decreased but still worrisome threat environment. The USSR collapsed in the early 1990s, leaving Russia in economic disarray, with its Pacific fleet (as well as other fleets) rusting at port. As for North Korea, the collapse of its Soviet patron had detrimental effects on North Korean power. North Korea has struggled with famine and

²¹⁷ Larry Niksch, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues,” *Naval War College Review* Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 1983), pp. 57-72.

²¹⁸ Derek Da Cunha, *Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

²¹⁹ The Kurile Islands (north of the northernmost Japanese island, Hokkaido) were deeded to the Soviet Union after World War II, but Japan continues to claim ownership.

²²⁰ Da Cunha, *Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific*, p. 94; Kensuke Ebata, “Soviets Simulate Attack on Japan,” *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 September 1985, p. 664. They increased amphibious troop strength in the Kuriles, extending deployments to another island (Shikotan). The Soviets increased the number of SS-20 tactical nuclear missile launchers deployed in Siberia. They increased their naval presence by doubling the number of transits though the Sea of Japan straits over the 1976-1988 period. In 1985, the Soviets held an amphibious landing exercise that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) viewed as a simulated attack on Japan's Hokkaido Island and control of Japanese straits. See Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds. *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986). The Soviet navy also conducted numerous exercises during this period, such as the 1975 Okean fleet exercises in which the Soviets practiced attacks on Western naval forces in the Pacific.

shortages of fuel and replacement parts, leading military analysts to judge the military balance on the peninsula as decidedly in the ROK's favor.²²¹ North Korea remains a nation hostile to Japan, but as before, presents no amphibious or maritime threat.²²² As for China, the rise of China has implications for the future of the balance of power in the East Asian region, but an assessment of current power shows China lagging behind Japan.²²³ China's GDP is four times smaller than Japan's, and China lacks military forces able to menace the Japanese islands, or to challenge the Japanese navy in the sea lanes.²²⁴ China may emerge as a state capable of balancing Japan in the future (which would impose a strong constraint on Japan), but this has not yet occurred in the economic or military realm. In sum, since World War II, constraints on Japanese power based on regional threats have been low except for the growth of Soviet military power in the East Asian theater during the late 1970s and 1980s.

Summary: Japanese Capabilities

This section evaluated Japanese capabilities (power and constraints) in the post-World War II era. Throughout this period Japan always held more power potential than Korea because of its

²²¹ Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security* Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135-170; Nick Beldecos and Eric Heginbotham, "The Conventional Military Balance in Korea," *Breakthroughs* (Spring 1995).

²²² North Korea threatened to attack Japanese cities with ballistic missiles (and in 1998 actually test-fired a rocket over Japanese airspace). It also has pursued a nuclear program, and may possess a small number of nuclear warheads.

²²³ On China's current weak level of power see Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Anticipating China's Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73; Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an opposing view see David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85. On perceptions of projected versus current power in threat perception, see William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

²²⁴ See Lind, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy"; Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer." On the growth of Chinese military power in recent years see *In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996); Jonathan D. Pollack, James Mulvenon, Derek Eaton, and Ken Gause, "The Future of Chinese and Japanese Naval Power: Implications for Northeast Asian Maritime Security," RAND Report, Santa Monica, Calif., 1998.

larger GDP and population. Even Korean successes in narrowing the gap still leaves Korea a much weaker state. However, from the standpoint of current power (which would affect ROK threat perception at a given time), the power balance between the two states improved in every respect. Japan's advantage in terms of relative military expenditure dropped over time. Japan was also consistently *less* powerful than the ROK in terms of number of armed forces, and the level of nationalistic mobilization of its populace. In terms of constraints facing Japan, constraints due to the U.S. offshore balancer were initially uncertain in the 1950s, and then high thereafter. The added constraint imposed by the increased Soviet threat (a threat to the ROK also) increased constraints on Japan still further in the late 1970s and 80s. To conclude, a realist theory of threat perception based on capabilities would predict that the ROK should fear Japan less as the period wore on; threat perception of Japan should initially be moderately high, but after the 1970s should fall to low. Table 4 summarizes the capabilities variable and its predictions for threat perception in this case.

Table 4: Japanese Capabilities Since World War II

	Early Period 1950-64	Middle Period 1965-89	Late Period 1990-00s
Jse Long Term Power (Advantage vis-à-vis ROK)	High	High	High
Jse Current Power (vis-à-vis ROK) (see Table 3)	Mod	Low	Low
Constraints from Other Threats	Constrained	Highly Constrained	Not Constrained
Constraints from Offshore Balancer	Uncertain; then constrained	Constrained	Constrained
Summary: Jse capabilities vs. ROK	Mod	Low	Low
Predictions for ROK Threat Perception	Mod	Low	Low

In order to test the apology theory in the case of Japan and the ROK, the first part of this chapter coded Japanese remembrance over the post-World War II period. The second part of this chapter coded alternate variables that might also affect ROK perceptions of Japanese intentions (regime type, territorial claims, institutions), and perceptions of threat (capabilities). Table 5 summarizes the predicted effects of the alternate variables on ROK perceptions of intentions and threat.

Table 5: Alternate Variables and Korean Perceptions of Japan

		1945-1964	1965-1989	1990s-00s
Perception of Intentions	Remembrance	↑↑	↑↑	↑↑
	Territorial Claims	↑↑	↑↑	↑↑
	Regime Type	n/a	n/a	↓↓
Perception of Threat	Capabilities	↔	↓↓	↓↓

Key: ↑↑ aggravating factor; ↓↓ reassuring factor; ↔ factor promoting uncertainty; n/a (no prediction)

PREDICTIONS

This chapter coded Japanese remembrance as *unapologetic* for all three periods. Based on this coding, the apology theory makes two kinds of predictions for ROK perception of Japanese intentions, related to congruence and reasoning.

Congruence Tests

The apology theory does not make specific predictions about the direction and timing of changes in Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions. Because Japanese policies of remembrance did not

vary over the post-World War II period, the portion of the dependent variable—*intentions*—that is driven by remembrance should be roughly constant across time. The dependent variable, however, might still rise or fall as other variables fluctuate. As a result, any pattern of changes in perceptions of Japanese intentions (i.e., growing more benign or malign) could be consistent with the apology theory.

For example, if we discover that Koreans believe that Japanese intentions are growing more malign over the period, this would be consistent with the apology theory: presumably this change is being driven by changes in other variables. The point is that the apology theory predicts that the component of Japanese intent that is being caused by remembrance is relatively constant; however perceptions of intentions overall may be growing more benign or more malign.

Nevertheless, a useful congruence test can still be performed. While the apology theory does not make predictions about fluctuations in Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions, it does make predictions about the range in which that fluctuation will occur. For example, the Japanese were consistently *unapologetic* in the post-World War II period; if remembrance has a significant effect on Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions, then Japanese intentions should be viewed as generally malign. Evidence that Koreans viewed Japanese intentions as benign, or evidence that Korean views of Japan fluctuated between benign and malign throughout the period, would be inconsistent with the apology theory: such a situation would either show that remembrance does not affect perception of intent, or at most, that it affects it very little.

In sum, the apology theory does not make predictions about changes in perceptions of Japanese intentions, but it does predict that Japanese intentions will remain in the “malign” range throughout the period.

The territorial claims theory makes similar predictions about Japanese intentions as the apology theory. Because Japan and Korea have a constant territorial dispute throughout this period, this theory makes no predictions about changes in intentions over time, but it does predict that Japanese intentions should be seen as at least fairly malign throughout the period (otherwise this variable is clearly of little importance).

Democratic peace theory does make predictions about changes in Korean perceptions over time. Because 1987 saw an advance in Korean democracy, and a still more significant advance in 1998, this theory predicts improvement in ROK perception of Japanese intentions starting after 1987, and then to an even greater extent after 1998. As noted, if this hypothesis is not borne out, I will evaluate the counter-hypothesis that Korea was a *democratizing* state; this hypothesis predicts increased discord between the two states, including malign perceptions of Japanese intentions until 1998.

Reasoning

The apology, territorial disputes, and democratic peace theories make predictions about the type of reasoning that Koreans should use as they assess Japanese intentions. The apology theory predicts that Korean assessments should focus on Japanese apologies/denials, reparations, textbooks, and commemoration. The territorial disputes theory predicts that Korean discussions should be dominated with talk of the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute. The democratic peace theory predicts that the focus of Korean discussions should shift after 1987: assessments of Japanese intentions should include discussions about the nature and strength of Japanese democracy. (The democracy counter-hypothesis expects this to occur only after 1998.)

To conclude, in this chapter I first coded Japanese remembrance and other variables that might affect perception of intentions (territorial claims, regime type, institutions). Based on these codings I inferred predictions for the different theories about Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions since World War II. To assess the relative weight of intentions versus capabilities in overall threat perception, I coded Japanese capabilities relative to the ROK over the same period.

In the next chapter I compare these predictions to measurements of ROK perceptions of Japanese intentions and threat since World War II. The chapter first codes ROK perception of Japanese intentions over time, and tests which theory of intentions best explains the sources and nature of Korean perceptions (i.e., malign or benign). Next, the chapter turns to the question of what drives overall threat perception. Using the measurement of Japanese capabilities (presented in Chapter Two), and the measurement of ROK perception of Japanese intentions (presented in Chapter Three) I evaluate the importance of remembrance in threat perception, relative to other factors.



Chapter Three

The Effects of Remembrance in Japan-ROK Relations

Diplomats and scholars have argued that Japan's failure to apologize to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and other neighbors intensifies threat perception of Japan, exacerbating the security dilemma in East Asia.¹ This proposition, however, has never been systematically tested. In this chapter I test the apology theory in the case of Japan-ROK relations. Does Japanese remembrance affect South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions? What is the relative importance of remembrance, relative to other factors, in South Korean threat perception?

This chapter has two major findings. First, I find substantial evidence that Japan's unapologetic policies of remembrance (glorification and denial) negatively affect South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions. I find that throughout the post-World War II period, most South Koreans have perceived Japan's intentions as *malign*. Furthermore, Korean newspapers, opinion polls, and my interviews with Korean elites provide strong evidence that Japanese denials have strongly influenced Koreans' negative impression of Japanese intentions. Another less commonly cited reason for animosity toward Japan is its territorial dispute with the ROK. Recently, a minority view has also emerged in the ROK: the view that Japanese intentions are benign because of its domestic politics (democratic institutions and political culture).

Second, although Japanese policies of remembrance clearly affect Koreans' perceptions of Japanese intentions, they have not played a major role in threat perception; ROK threat perception is driven largely by Japanese capabilities. Although South Koreans consistently viewed Japanese

¹ Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles," *International Affairs* Vol. 64, no. 4 (1988), pp. 557-573; Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Penguin Books, 1998); Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80; Robert Dujarric, ed., *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 1998); Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), pp. 5-33; Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001); Nicholas Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49.

intentions as *malign* over the post-World War II period, South Korean threat perception of Japan dropped substantially in the middle period. Evidence from South Korean reasoning shows that the most important factor in ROK threat perception of Japan has been the reassuring presence of the U.S. offshore balancer, which Koreans (particularly elites) view as an important constraint on Japanese power.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses sources and standards of evidence. The second section tests the apology theory: namely, it tests the effects of Japanese policies of remembrance on South Korean perceptions of Japan's intentions. The third section investigates to what extent remembrance influences overall threat perception, relative to other factors. The fourth section concludes.

SOURCES AND STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE

To measure South Korean perceptions of Japan, I use sources that reveal both public and elite opinions about Japan within the ROK. To find these statements I relied on a variety of sources. For the immediate postwar period (1945-64), when data availability is more limited, I rely upon secondary sources and American archival documents. Poll data for this period is lacking, and the ROK did not have a free press at this time; thus for this period I report elite opinions only. American archival documents from this period are useful because the United States was heavily involved in early ROK foreign policy-making, and the two states held numerous meetings to discuss issues of national security. Often the South Koreans discussed their views of Japan at such meetings; thus U.S. archives provide a useful source for ROK views of Japan. This evidence, however, may exaggerate South Korean suspicions of Japan. When talking with U.S. officials, the ROK was trying to extract protection and aid (and wanted to discourage U.S. aid to Japan), so the South Koreans had an incentive to exaggerate their views of a Japanese threat. For this reason the preferred sources would obviously be ROK archival sources. However, American archival documents provide an imperfect but useful substitute.

For the next period (1965-1980s), I add media reports to the types of sources already mentioned, and I also use poll data found in secondary sources by Korean scholars. Because the Korean media was controlled by the government until the late 1980s,² these data also reflect elite opinions. In addition, I rely upon scholarly articles written by Korean scholars for Korean English-language international relations journals. Ideally my research would cover Korean-language sources as well, but a large number of South Korean elites (because of their graduate training in the United States or Britain) regularly publish in Korea's English-language journals; therefore relying upon the Korean English-language scholarly literature provides a broader sample than one might otherwise expect.

Finally, I rely upon a variety of data for the late period (1990s-00s). First, poll data are widely available (polls are conducted regularly by the Korean media and think tanks, and also by organizations in other countries such as Japan and the United States). In the late period it is possible to weigh the plausibility of a given poll's results by comparing it to the results of other polls conducted by different organizations at different times. Second, I rely on newspaper coverage, using English-language Korean newspapers (the *Korea Times* and *Korea Herald*), and Korean-language articles that have been translated into English. Translated articles from Korean-language media sources were found in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) database, and in the journal *Korea Focus*. Third, I continue to rely upon scholarly articles written by Korean scholars for Korean English-language journals. When possible, I also read English-language surveys of the ROK international relations scholarly literature. Fourth, I conducted numerous interviews with Korean elites: think-tank analysts, professors of international relations, and government officials. Think tanks I visited included the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), and the Sejong Institute. I interviewed professors at numerous universities in Seoul, and spoke to government officials at the National Security Council, Ministry of National Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

² See Charles Lee, "Watching the Watchdog," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 149, no. 34, August 23, 1990, 24-26; "Read All About Some of It," *Economist*, April 16, 1988, 40-41.

Trade (as well as retired officials from these ministries). I conducted these interviews in English or occasionally in Japanese.

EXPLAINING ROK PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE INTENTIONS

This section tests the apology theory in the case of South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions over the post-World War II era. Chapter Two coded Japanese remembrance as *unapologetic* for all three periods. Based on this coding, the apology theory makes two kinds of predictions for ROK perception of Japanese intentions, related to congruence and reasoning.

Congruence. With respect to the remembrance variable, because remembrance does not vary over the post-World War II period, the apology theory does not make predictions for variation between the three different time periods. Any changes in perceptions of Japanese intentions will be driven by other variables. However, a useful congruence test can still be performed. Given the coding of Japanese remembrance as consistently *unapologetic*, the apology theory would expect remembrance to exert a noticeable negative effect on ROK perceptions of Japanese intentions; the theory would expect perceptions of Japanese intentions to be at least somewhat malign. If Japanese intentions are perceived as benign—despite consistently unapologetic remembrance—this would be a failure for the apology theory; given such a finding, remembrance cannot be very important. If intentions are perceived as malign in this situation, this is an inconclusive finding for the apology theory, but is at least consistent with it. Thus the apology theory predicts Japanese intentions should be seen as at least somewhat malign: Koreans should be saying Japan is not trustworthy and is hostile to Korea.

Second, regarding territorial claims, a similar situation is in effect. Because Japan and Korea have a territorial dispute throughout this period, this makes no predictions for variation across the periods, but predicts Japanese intentions should be seen as at least somewhat malign (otherwise this variable is clearly of little importance). Third, as for regime type, democratic peace theory predicts an improvement in ROK perception of Japanese intentions starting after 1987, and then again after 1998. As noted in Chapter Two (pp. 110-111), I will also consider a counter-

argument that Korea was a democratizing state in the 1987-1998 period; according to the Mansfield and Snyder theory of democratization and war, this period should feature increased distrust and conflict between Japan and the ROK, and Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions should not start to improve until after 1998.

Reasoning. The apology theory also makes predictions for reasoning; this is a more conclusive test for the apology theory. As Koreans talk about Japanese intentions, they should say they distrust Japanese intentions because of unapologetic Japanese remembrance. Otherwise, in their reasoning Koreans will say their judgments about Japanese intentions are driven by the other variables.

ROK Perceptions of Japanese Intentions

Since Japan's defeat in World War II, Koreans have perceived Japanese intentions as *malign*. In the immediate postwar years (1945-64), this perception was evident in statements made by Korean leaders, notably President Rhee Syngman. Rhee said he feared not only North Korea and the Soviet Union, but also Japan. Rhee wrote to U.S. President Eisenhower:

We are caught, of course, between our fear of Japan on one side, and of the Communists on the other. Japan has nothing whatsoever to offer the peoples of Asia, either substantively or psychologically. We all have learned by harsh experience the ruthlessness of Japan's ambitions.³

Rhee frequently argued that, of these countries, the Japanese were the most menacing. In a meeting with John Foster Dulles, Rhee said that the Korean people were more worried about Japan than the Soviet Union, because Japan desired to revive its colonial policies in Asia.⁴ In a letter to Dulles in 1954, Rhee said that if the United States tried to build up Japan, then Asians "would rather join with the Soviets to resist the Japanese."⁵ Rhee made a similar argument in his letter to Eisenhower.

³ Rhee letter to President Eisenhower, December 29, 1954. In FRUS Korea Vol. XV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1984), 1937-1941.

⁴ Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, *U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship* (New York, Praeger, 1982), p. 26.

⁵ Ibid.

We are conscious of continuing pressures to align ourselves more closely with Japan, economically and militarily. But the totality of our national fears is of such a nature that this whole situation impels many of our people to consider the possibility of accepting reunification on Communist terms as the only form of safety which they may expect from a renewal of Japanese dominion over our nation.⁶

Similarly, while campaigning for re-election, Rhee identified Japan as “a greater menace than the Communists.”⁷ ROK Foreign Minister Pyun Yong-tae accused the Japanese of manipulating the United States “to rearm the island with a view to using her in the coming armed conflict with Russia.” He warned, “Uncle Sam must be on guard not to be taken in by the kissing of his hand by the Japanese. They usually kiss a hand they cannot bite.”⁸ In talks with American officials, Pyun “stressed the danger...that the Japanese Government was intent, in the long range, upon reasserting its influence in Korea.”⁹ In addition, one Korean scholar wrote that Koreans had “deep-seated suspicion or fear of Japanese motives,” and that the Korean people “seem to share the feeling that the Japanese are not to be trusted.”¹⁰ Another scholar wrote, “Some Japanese may tell us that our fears and suspicions are imaginary and absurd. But those who advance this view may not have a full knowledge about the history of Japanese-Korean relations.”¹¹ Chong-Sik Lee argues that

most Korean leaders refuse to believe that Japan has undergone any fundamental change in the postwar period. As far as the Koreans are concerned, the reform programs of the United States occupation forces barely scratched the surface of Japanese society and the Japanese leaders are still obsessed by the mentality of the colonialists.¹²

Under the short-lived government of John M. Chang, the Korean President’s initial overtures toward rapprochement with Japan triggered a widespread and nationally destabilizing anti-Japanese

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Quoted in Declassified Documents Collection, Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7331, “The Recent and Prospective Foreign Relations of Japan (1956-61),” Prepared by Division of Research for Far East, September 12, 1956, 10.

⁸ Pyun Yong Tae, *Korea: My Country* (Washington, D.C.: Korea Pacific Press, 1953), p. 64.

⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, October 17, 1952. FRUS Korea, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Part 1 (1984).

¹⁰ Chong-Sik Lee, “Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1962/63), p. 321-22.

¹¹ Hui-sung Lee, “An Open Letter to Japanese Intellectuals,” *Sasangge* (December 1961), p. 49.

¹² Chong-Sik Lee, “Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective,” p. 322.

student revolt.¹³ In sum, South Korean leaders viewed Japanese intentions as hostile during the immediate postwar years.

Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions remained malign in the next period (1965s-80s). First, poll data reflect strong distrust and animosity toward Japan. In a 1975 *Chungang Ilbo* newspaper survey, respondents ranked Japan as one of the least-liked countries (behind Communist China and the USSR).¹⁴ The *Shin Dong-a* newspaper conducted a 1972 poll about Korean images of Japan.¹⁵ When asked how Japan could build a better relationship with the ROK, respondents said, "Japan must forget about any revival of militarism." 90% said memories and scars of Japanese militarism remained acute. When asked what first came to mind when they heard the word "Japan," the most common responses were militarism, colonial rule, forced oath to emperor, forced Japanese names, forced Shinto worship, and racial discrimination. A similar poll conducted in 1985 reveals the persistence of these negative images.¹⁶ Elites also commented on the animosity of South Koreans toward the Japanese during this time period. A poll conducted by the *Kyonghyang Shinmun* newspaper in 1982 found that only 10% of respondents viewed Japan as "a friendly country."¹⁷ One scholar wrote, "there is no genuine friendship between the two peoples," and that "to the Koreans...the only interest Japan has in Korea is to aggrandize itself by exploiting whatever opportunity Korea provides."¹⁸ One newspaper wrote that the legacy of Japan's colonial rule had "grossly embittered the Koreans and thus sowed the seeds of longstanding national

¹³ Hae Kyoung Cho, "South Korea's Relations with Japan, 1951 to 1987: From Hostility to Accommodation," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1988, p. 82.

¹⁴ *Chungang Ilbo*, August 14, 1975. This newspaper is Korea's second-largest daily, with moderate political inclinations. Quoted in Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era," *Asian Survey* (October 1976), pp. 981-995.

¹⁵ Kong Dan Oh, "Japan-Korea Rapprochement: A Study in Political, Cultural, and Economic Cooperation," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 1986, pp. 130-131.

¹⁶ Oh, "Japan-Korea Rapprochement, p. 137.

¹⁷ *Kyonghyang Shinmun*, October 6, 1982. Quoted in Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean Relations After the Park Assassination," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 1 (December 1982), p. 86.

¹⁸ Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985, pp. 1-2.

antagonism against Japan.”¹⁹ Perception of Japanese intentions was thus malign in the middle period.

South Koreans continued to distrust Japan in the later period (1990s-00s). First, this is frequently expressed in the media and by elites. Writes one author, “Japan has failed to win the trust of Asians and remains an object of distrust.”²⁰ A newspaper article noted that Japan is suspected “of edging toward resurrecting militarism.”²¹ Another editorial commented, “We are not alone in being concerned about and in watching where Japan, a country with vast potential power, may be headed. The whole world is watching.”²²

Second, the perception of Japanese intentions as malign is evident in Korean poll data. In a 1996 poll, Korean respondents were asked to rank their feelings toward 17 countries, on a scale from zero (dislike) to 100 (like). Japan was ranked second to last (41), above North Korea (27), in the company of Libya and Iran (41 and 42, respectively).²³ In a 2001 poll, Koreans reported that the countries they liked the most were Australia and the United States (each at 19%), Canada (12%), Switzerland (11%), and France (4%). The countries they disliked the most were Japan (63%), followed by North Korea (11%), the United States (7%), and China (3%).²⁴ To this day, Japan is disliked and viewed as untrustworthy by Koreans.

¹⁹ “Epoch in Korea-Japan Ties,” *Korea Times*, September 9, 1984.

²⁰ Nam Si-uk, “Future of Korea-Japan Relations,” *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995), p. 28.

²¹ “Japan’s View of History,” *Korea Herald*, May 7, 1994.

²² Rhee Kyu-ho, “A Review of Korea-Japan Relations,” *Shin Dong-A Monthly*, February 1995, translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1995), pp. 16-23. The *Dong-A Monthly* is a publication put out by South Korea’s large and second-oldest daily, the *Dong-A Ilbo*, which has moderate political leanings.

²³ 1996 RAND-Joong Ang Daily newspaper survey. Quoted in Sook-jong Lee, “Korea and Japan: Engaged but Distant,” in Robert Dujarric, ed. *The Future of Korea-Japan Relations*, p. 102.

²⁴ *Chungang Ilbo* Poll, September 21, 2001. See <http://bric.postech.ac.kr/bbs/daily/krnews>. Japan most likely scored so low because of two serious issues related to Japanese remembrance going on at the time: Koizumi’s August visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and the Japanese Ministry of Education’s approval of a controversial history textbook.

ROK Reasoning about Japanese Intentions: Policies of Remembrance

Across the post-World War II era, Korean intentions were influenced by several different factors. Japanese remembrance (apologies and denials) weighed heavily in Korean reasoning about Japan's intentions. Koreans frequently stated that Japanese policies of remembrance influence their perceptions of Japan's intentions. They said that Japanese apologies made Japan appear more benign. Much more frequently, Koreans argued that Japan's *unapologetic* policies of remembrance showed that Japan had malign intentions toward Korea. Koreans criticized many aspects of Japanese remembrance: Japanese statements of denial (or "gaffes"); inadequate apologies; textbook policies; and Japanese state visits to Yasukuni shrine.

Early Period (1945-1964)

During the immediate postwar period, South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions were influenced by Japanese apologies and perceived denials.

Apologies

Throughout this period, Koreans argued that Japanese apologies for its colonization of Korea were essential before Koreans could ever trust Japan. In the early period after the war, ROK President Rhee argued that Japanese contrition was necessary for good bilateral relations. Rhee said, "We are trying to forget and will forget the past. If the Japanese would meet the Koreans with truthfulness and sincerity, friendly relations would be renewed."²⁵ In a confidential memorandum to Korean diplomats negotiating with the Japanese over normalization, Rhee wrote,

Have the Japanese abandoned their arrogant and domineering attitude toward us? Have they finally and completely renounced their expectation of dominating us? These are the fundamental issues which, from our point of view, have to be decided before there is any hope of bringing the two nations together....²⁶

²⁵ Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 43.

²⁶ Quoted in Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 37.

To understand Japan's intentions, Rhee argued in the next paragraph of the memorandum that "What we most need from Japan...is a concrete and constructive evidence of repentance for past misdeeds and of a new determination to deal fairly with us now and in the future," and "convincing evidence that this change of heart has occurred and has become deeply rooted in Japan."²⁷

Furthermore, in 1955, a Christian leader in Japan had written an open letter in the *Mainichi Shinbun*, in which he sought forgiveness for Japan's misdeeds toward Korea, and called for improved relations between the two countries. Rhee responded in another open letter in that newspaper. He wrote,

I am ready for restarting new relations with Japan if the Japanese show the same cooperative spirit....Your apology for the forty years of Japanese rule over Korea drew my serious attention because it was, in fact, the first statement of such nature I have ever heard from prominent Japanese people. In the absence of such expressions as yours, one could understand why we Koreans have believed that the Japanese intent is not to be friendly toward the ROK, but to redominate Korea....²⁸

In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida, Rhee pressed Yoshida "to express that the militarists were responsible for everything and from now on there will be no militaristic aggression on Korea"; Rhee said that "some such statement would help the Koreans who still suspect and fear Japanese ambitions and attempts to control Korea again."²⁹ Thus Rhee argued that Japanese contrition was necessary to reassure Korea about Japanese intentions.

The Korean public and elites were adamant that a Japanese apology and reparations were required before Korea could normalize relations with Japan. The Korean National Assembly adopted a resolution demanding such a gesture.³⁰ ROK President Park Chung-Hee made the following statement in 1964, shortly before the normalization treaty was signed.

The Japanese people, especially Japanese leaders, should reflect on what they did to us during the past 36 years. It is the consensus of our national sentiment that Japan's normal reflection on and legal expression of its regret for its past aggression should precede any cooperation with Japan on our part.³¹

²⁷ Quoted in Lee, *Japan and Korea*, p. 37.

²⁸ *Mainichi Shinbun*, December 21, 1955.

²⁹ File of American diplomat Robert T. Oliver, quoted in Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*, p. 204.

³⁰ Adopted by the House of Representatives in the National Assembly on February 3, 1961; see TAKIA.

³¹ Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis*, p. 45.

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer commented that an apology was “the one really important Japanese concession” in the negotiations.³² Reischauer also said that a “clear Japanese apology for their colonial oppression of Korea in past would, of course, make major contribution to improved Korean attitudes toward Japan....”³³ One Korean scholar argued,

Many Koreans felt that Japan owed Korea an apology for the atrocities committed by the Japanese colonialists in Korea. The Koreans feel that the Japanese people, particularly the leaders, are morally responsible for the suffering of the Korean people in the past and that the Japanese leaders should atone for these offences by showing at least a more conciliatory, if not submissive, attitude.³⁴

When Shiina offered his apology, many Korean elites commented favorably on it. ROK Foreign Minister Lee Dong-won told an American official that Tokyo’s apology was very helpful in the normalization process. Lee commented,

...a couple of words in Foreign Minister Shiina’s arrival statement had helped a good deal. Shiina had said that he was sorry for the past and looked to a new and different future. Shiina was the first Japanese ever to say that, and his statement had had a most helpful effect. It was most important that solutions of remaining issues be acceptable to the Korean people; otherwise the whole purpose of the settlement would be defeated.³⁵

A Japanese official involved in the formulation of the apology agreed, noting: “It turned out that the speech had unexpected effects... Overnight, the mood in South Korea changed dramatically. It was unbelievable. A single statement can make such a difference!”³⁶ Thus in the early period, Koreans argued that Japanese apologies were vital for building their faith in Japan, and for establishing good bilateral relations.

³² Telegram From Embassy in Japan to U.S. Department of State, November 17, 1964.

³³ Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to U.S. Department of State, September 8, 1964, FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XXIX, Korea, Document 349. However, the Ambassador noted in this communication that “after many years of urging Japanese in and out of Government to do this, Ambassador has concluded that maximum Japanese statement, if obtainable, might do more harm than good. Japanese officials and public simply do not feel they owe any apology to Korea.”

³⁴ Chong-Sik Lee, “Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective,” p. 321.

³⁵ Declassified Documents Collection, “Current Korean Problems,” Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, March 22, 1965, p. 5.

³⁶ Yoshiro Fujita, *Kiroku Shiina Etsusaboro* [The Shiina Etsusaboro Record], Vol. II (Tokyo: Shiina Etsusaboro tsuitoroku kankokai, 1982), pp. 46-51; also see Yoshibumi Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia*, translated by Ltd. Chogin Business Service Co. (Tokyo, Japan: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999), p. 239.

Unapologetic Policies

During this period, Koreans condemned statements made by the lead Japanese negotiator during negotiations over normalizing diplomatic relations. Koreans walked out of a 1953 meeting and refused to continue the negotiations until the statements had been retracted. Kubota Kenichiro had told the Korean delegation that Japanese colonization had been good for Korea. (Among his remarks, Kubota said that Korea would have been worse off had Japan *not* colonized it; that if Japan had not colonized Korea, then Russia or China would have; and that the Koreans were the ones who should be paying Japan compensation, because Japan had transformed Korea into an economically productive country.) As the Koreans protested this by talking of Korean “enslavement” under Japanese rule, Kubota dismissed this as “hysteria.”³⁷ This attitude was unacceptable to the South Korean delegation; they refused to continue negotiating until Kubota retracted the remarks. After four years elapsed, Kubota issued a retraction, and the South Koreans returned to the conference. The ROK’s refusal to even talk to the Japanese about normalizing relations, at a time when it was desperately in need of capital and allies, reflects the importance of this issue in Korean minds.

Middle Period, 1965-80s

After the Shiina apology, South Korean attentions shifted to other areas in their relations with Japan. One scholar at the time argued that Koreans during this period were focused on three key areas in their relations with Japan: economic relations, the cultivation of Japan as a political and military ally against North Korea, and the attempt to discourage closer Japanese relations with North Korea.³⁸ Cultivating trade ties and Japanese capital was particularly important to the Park regime; “economic policy became the central thrust of the military regime’s entire political strategy at home and, to a large extent, abroad.”³⁹ Scholars have characterized Japan-ROK relations in the

³⁷ Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis*, p. XX

³⁸ Bae H. Hahn, “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 11 (1980), pp. 1088-89.

³⁹ Hahn, “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s,” p. 1089.

seven or so years following normalization as “cordial” and “harmonious.”⁴⁰ Thus the 1965 apology seems to have at least temporarily succeeded in moving Japan-ROK relations forward. Controversies over Japanese memory, however, would re-emerge in the 1980s.

Apologies

Koreans appeared satisfied with the 1965 apology and did not seek another for nearly two decades. One scholar (apparently satisfied with the language of the Shiina apology), wrote that in their normalization agreement, Korea and Japan had “[buried] the bitter memories of colonial experiences which both referred to as an ‘unhappy era’.” He argued that the normalization treaty “signified that the two nations would begin their relations on an equal basis.”⁴¹ The 1965 apology thus seems to have placated the Koreans for the years 1965 to the early 1980s.

During Korea and Japan’s first summit visits (under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Chun Doo Hwan in 1983 and 1984), the issue of remembrance of the colonial era again re-entered the dialogue between Japan and South Korea. The Korean government reacted very positively to Japanese apologies offered to Chun by Nakasone and Emperor Hirohito. Before his visit, Chun had said, “Not only myself, but every single Korean expects Japan to finally excuse itself for the pains Korea had to suffer in the past, that Japan at least admit its guilt.”⁴² Having received an apology, Chun urged Koreans to move forward. He said,

now is the time for us to move resolutely ahead...reflecting on the lessons of history with cool heads. We cannot be forever bound by the past. We must move forward. We cannot expect to explore the path for Korea in the world today when we keep the door to our neighbor locked.⁴³

Upon returning home, Chun commented favorably on Hirohito and Nakasone’s apologetic statements, noting that “we pledged ourselves to build a new era of neighborly friendship on the

⁴⁰ See Hahn, “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s,” p. 1091, and also Hong N. Kim, “Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era,” *Asian Survey* (October 1976), p. 982.

⁴¹ Seung K. Ko, “South-Korean-Japanese Relations Since the 1965 Normalization Pact,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1972), pp. 49-50.

⁴² “Real Friends,” *Der Spiegel*, September 3, 1984. Quoted in *New Era*, 48.

⁴³ Chun departure statement, September 6, 1984. Quoted in *New Era*, 107.

basis of mutual respect and trust, drawing lessons from the experiences of past Korean-Japanese relations.”⁴⁴ A ministry official commented that after the apologies, Japan and the ROK could “grow out of the past and begin to build an equal partnership with Japan on the basis of mutual trust.”⁴⁵ Finally, a scholar notes, “although Korean-Japanese relations have often been marked with tensions, the bilateral relationship is entering a new era,” because of the “formal expression of regret for Japan’s 36-year rule over Korea from the Japanese emperor.”⁴⁶ In sum, during the middle period ROK government officials argued that Japanese apologies were positive signs for the Japan-ROK relationship.

The Korean (state-controlled) press also reported favorably on the Hirohito and Nakasone apologies. One article commented that the apologies “resolved the residue of hard feelings between the two peoples resulting from the 36-year colonial rule of Korea by Japan,” and said that the remarks would “stimulate the opening of a brighter history of good-neighborly relations based on mutual respect and trust between Korea and Japan.” The article noted that the apologies would “pacify the turbulence of the Korea Strait.”⁴⁷ Another article argued that “we cannot remain obsessed and overshadowed by the unhappy past,” noting that “however painful it may be, we have to overcome the bitter memory and build up better relations” with Japan.⁴⁸ The *Chosun Ilbo* commented that Hirohito’s statement of regret was necessary to win over the Korean public; an editorial commented that the apology “can be viewed as a substantial turning point enabling Korea-Japan relations to develop with the support of their peoples.”⁴⁹

⁴⁴ “President Chon Arrives Home, Makes Statement,” Yonhap Wire Service (hereafter cited as Yonhap), September 8, 1984.

⁴⁵ Choe Nam-hyon, *Korea Herald*, September 7, 1984, 4.

⁴⁶ Chongwhi Kim, “Korea-Japan Relations and Japan’s Security Role,” *Korea and World Affairs* Vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1988), p. 108.

⁴⁷ “The Greatest Achievement Ever in Korea-Japan Diplomatic History,” *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 8, 1984. Quoted in *A New Era in Korea-Japan Relations* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1984), p. 74. Hereafter cited as “New Era.”

⁴⁸ “Epoch in Korea-Japan Ties,” *Korea Times*, September 9, 1984. Quoted in *New Era*, 91.

⁴⁹ “Forward Looking Atmosphere Created for New Korea-Japan Relations,” *Chosun Ilbo*, September 9, 1984. Quoted in *New Era*, p. 98. The *Chosun Ilbo* is Korea’s largest and oldest daily, known for its nationalistic tone.

Unsurprisingly, opposition politicians expressed less satisfaction with Hirohito and Nakasone's apologies. Whereas these elites agreed that Japanese apologies were essential for improving bilateral relations, they disagreed with the pronouncements of the ruling party that anything Japan was offering constituted a "real" apology. For example, opposition leaders debated whether the Hirohito apology could be considered as such. An opposition party leader said that Hirohito's statement "glossed over Japan's historic guilt and failed to make either a clear reflection upon it or a concrete apology for it."⁵⁰ Korean groups debated back and forth whether the remarks qualified as an apology; many said it fell short.⁵¹ The *Korea Herald* described the apology as "a euphemism or understatement," saying "many Koreans...believe the emperor should have acknowledged Japan's responsibility in a more clear way."⁵² Thus in response to Hirohito's apology, many Koreans insisted that a proper apology was necessary for Koreans to trust Japan—and this wasn't one.

Unapologetic Policies

As noted, South Korea's interest in Japanese remembrance—apologetic or unapologetic—faded for nearly two decades as Koreans focused other bilateral issues. However the issue of Japan's acceptance of its war guilt surged back into the forefront in the 1980s as Japanese politicians made public statements of denial, and as more information about Japanese textbooks became publicized.

The next famous Japanese "gaffe" occurred in 1986, in a statement by Japanese Education Minister Fujio Masayuki. Koreans lodged a diplomatic protest after Fujio stated that Japan's annexation of Korea was peaceful and legitimate. Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo said that the "shock and psychological damage" from the remarks would take a long time to dissipate among the Korean people.⁵³ Choi told the Japanese Foreign Minister that "Fujio's outrageous remarks have created a serious and important problem in the basic relations between the two nations and

⁵⁰ "Political Parties' Reactions," Yonhap, September 7, 1984, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵¹ "Groups Comment on Statement," Yonhap, September 7, 1984, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵² Choe Nam-hyon, *Korea Herald*, September 7, 1984, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵³ Lee Byung-il, "Kuranari Delivers Japanese Gov't Apology to Choi," *Korea Times*, September 11, 1986.

have greatly stirred up the Korean people's sentiments against Japan."⁵⁴ ROK Prime Minister Roh Shin-yong commented that the issue at hand was not so much Fujio specifically, but a broader problem with Japanese attitudes.⁵⁵ Similarly, a newspaper editorialized that the controversy centers not on Fujio himself, but "more fundamentally on the Japanese perception...to justify and even glorify their past wrongs."⁵⁶ The editorial commented,

There have been many claims, and indeed hopes, along with lingering misgivings, that post-war Japan has been rebuilt into a 'new Japan' based on democracy, and...devoid of its past militarism and colonialism which had devastated so many Asian countries. However, belying the claims...were repeated absurd remarks by none other than an incumbent Cabinet minister of the Japanese government.⁵⁷

The editorial called Fujio's remarks "abusive," "absurd," "astonishing," and "outrageous." Another editorial noted that Fujio's statement "might represent a shrewd 'venture' by Japanese conservatives to restore Japan's pre-war 'glory.'"⁵⁸ Thus Fujio's gaffe caused numerous South Korean statements expressing fear and distrust of Japan.

Koreans were also angered by another unapologetic Japanese policy during this period: revisions in Japanese history textbooks. Korean statements during two diplomatic crises over textbooks in the 1980s reflect strong distrust of Japanese intentions. ROK Education Minister Yi Kyu-ho criticized Japan for trying to "gloss over or beautify its past crimes." Yi commented, "South Korean concern about the reported erroneous historical descriptions in Japanese textbooks with regard to Korea-Japan relations is not for 'reminiscent resentment' but for the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries in the days to come."⁵⁹ Yi added that it is "reckless" for a country to attempt to increase its own national interests at the cost of international concerns and cooperation. ROK opposition parties also condemned the textbooks, saying: "the Japanese

⁵⁴ "Foreign Ministers' Meeting with Japan Postponed," Yonhap, September 8, 1986, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵⁵ "No Sing-yong, NKDP Discuss Fujio Remarks," Yonhap, September 11, 1986, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵⁶ "Japanese Absurdity," *Korea Times*, September 9, 1986, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵⁷ "Japanese Absurdity," *Korea Times*, September 9, 1986, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵⁸ "Firm Diplomatic Stance," *Korea Times*, September 10, 1986, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁵⁹ "Education Minister Views Textbook Issue," Yonhap, August 2, 1982 in FBIS South Korea, same date.

attempt to whitewash Japan's atrocities during its colonial rule of Korea in revised history textbooks was tantamount to an 'infringement on South Korea's sovereignty.'"⁶⁰ A Korean scholar wrote,

The Koreans...admire the Japanese ability to organize and accomplish important objectives, but this is also a cause for apprehension, since Japan once dominated Korea and imposed a harsh rule over Koreans. Not only are the Japanese unrepentant, but also many are proud of their 'accomplishments' in Korea.⁶¹

Another scholar wrote that Japan's whitewashing of history textbooks led Koreans to be wary of "Japan's basic stance toward its Asian neighbors as well as Tokyo's ulterior motives in revising the textbooks."⁶² Thus Korean elites viewed Japanese textbook policies as evidence that Japanese intentions were dangerous to the ROK.

Statements in the outraged South Korean dailies reflected similar sentiments among the public. A *Hanguk Ilbo* editorial condemned the actions of Japan's Ministry of Education (MoE), saying they were part of a militarist trend in Japan. The editorial said that what was most important were not quibbles over specific text but Japan's "attitude of accepting the truth."

The Japanese government should abandon its imperial view of history—universally accepted as nonsense—and should display courage in accepting the truth. It should repeal the anachronistic system of employing over 10 textbook reviewers and break the yoke of the preposterous, imperial view of history binding them....⁶³

The editorial noted that the "distortions of facts" in Japanese textbooks were manifestations of the "militarist trend" that had recently arisen in Japan, and asserted that correcting the books would check this trend. Finally, an editorial in the *Kyonghyang Shinmun* blasted Japan for its actions. It warned, "We can say that Japan's arrogant attitude toward Korea implies a likelihood of Japan's repetition of the crimes against Korea."⁶⁴

⁶⁰ "'Stronger' Reaction Urged," Yonhap, August 3, 1982, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁶¹ Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*, p. 2.

⁶² Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean Relations After the Park Assassination," p. 83, 85.

⁶³ "What is Required Is to Immediately Take Corrective Action," *Hanguk Ilbo*, August 5, 1982. The *Hanguk Ilbo* is a medium-sized, moderate, independent daily.

⁶⁴ *Kyonggyang Shinmun*, August 5, 1982.

The actions of the South Korean public also reflected strong resentment toward Japan over the textbook issue. In five cities, protestors held anti-Japanese rallies “protesting ‘distorted’ Japanese history textbooks and the remarks made by Japanese Cabinet ministers in support of them.” Most of the protesters were older citizens who had lived through the Japanese occupation of Korea.⁶⁵ A week later, protests had grown. The *Korea Herald* reported,

Outcry and fury over the controversial distortion of historic facts in Japanese school textbooks continued to rock the country...In Seoul yesterday, 13 social organizations established in memory of independence fighters and those killed for the cause of their motherland issued a collective statement in protest of the falsification of Korea-related history in Japanese textbooks.⁶⁶

In addition to protests, the Japanese Ambassador to South Korea, Maeda Toshikazu, received death threats and the embassy received a bomb threat.⁶⁷ Thus in the two textbook disputes during the 1980s, Koreans expressed fear and resentment of Japan based on its textbook policies. Also during this period, Koreans criticized Japanese leaders for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japan’s war dead. South Koreans expressed some criticism of Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the shrine, but China was far more critical of Japan at the time than the ROK.⁶⁸ In sum, Koreans said they perceived that Japan had malign intentions because of its unapologetic policies during this period.

Late Period, 1990s-00s

As the pace of remembrance quickened in Japan in the late period, South Koreans monitored and commented upon Japanese policies of remembrance.

⁶⁵ “Rallies Protest Textbooks,” Yonhap, August 5, 1982, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁶⁶ “Rallies Protest Textbooks,” *Korea Herald*, August 11, 1982.

⁶⁷ “Japanese Envoy Threatened,” *Korea Times*, August 11, 1982.

⁶⁸ See “Full Speed Ahead and Damn the Anchor,” *Economist*, August 17, 1985, p. 35; John Burgess, “War Memories Obstacle for Japan,” *Washington Post*, October 27, 1985.

Apologies

In this period, certain Japanese apologies were praised as grounds for optimism about Japanese intentions, and for bilateral relations. Apologies offered by Hosokawa (1993) and Obuchi (1998) were particularly well-received in the ROK. First, the 1993 apology by Prime Minister Hosokawa was highly praised, and was seen as a promising sign that Japan was becoming a more trustworthy neighbor. ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo said the summit between Kim Young-sam and Hosokawa “will be recorded in history as an important starting point for spiritual reconciliation between the people of the two countries,” and that because Japanese people were “looking at the past with a correct view of history, ROK-Japan relations would become reciprocal and stable.”⁶⁹ Political party leaders from across the political spectrum praised Hosokawa’s remarks. Even an opposition leader (with political incentives to be critical of the summit) grumbled that the summit had not tackled the issue of Japan’s compensation to former sex slaves; however, he noted that Hosokawa’s apology showed “Japan’s attitude has changed,” and that “Korea should try to work out a new relationship with it.”⁷⁰ A commentator wrote that the summit “may well go down in history as the meeting that helped the two countries close the book on the dark past and turn their eyes to the future.”⁷¹ Thus Koreans viewed Hosokawa’s apology as a sign that Japan’s intentions were friendlier toward the ROK.

Second, Japan’s apology within the Kim-Obuchi 1998 Joint Communiqué was viewed as evidence of Japan’s commitment to an equal and peaceful relationship. One editorial argued that

Although the words and the tone resemble previous apologies offered by Japanese leaders, Obuchi’s statement specifically mentions the Republic of Korea...the declaration encompasses guidelines for future bilateral cooperation in political, economic, security and cultural fields. Mutual efforts to implement these issues should facilitate the advancement of amiable relations between Japan and Korea into the 21st century.⁷²

⁶⁹ “Foreign Minister Writes on ROK-Japan Summit,” *Hanguk Ilbo*, November 10, 1993, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁷⁰ “Political Parties Evaluate Talks,” Yonhap, November 8, 1993, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

⁷¹ Yi Dong-min, “Korea-Japan Summit Help Close Book on Unhappy Past,” in Yonhap, FBIS South Korea, November 7, 1993.

⁷² “Japan’s Apology,” *Korea Herald*, October 9, 1998.

Another article commented that “the issue of apology has been a long-standing stumbling block in the way of a genuine rapprochement since Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial bondage in 1945,” but that “Prime Minister Obuchi’s expression of great remorse for his nation’s actions should be used as momentum to put an end to the long-running controversy.”⁷³ Another article said the summit produced a “landmark agreement,” and said “The ‘Joint Declaration on the New ROK-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century’ is highlighted by Japan’s first written apology for its colonial rule of Korea and a call for closer cooperation in security, the economy, politics, and expansion of civilian and cultural exchanges.”⁷⁴ In sum, in the post-World War II period, Koreans said that Japanese apologies were essential before Koreans would trust Japan’s intentions. They praised the Kim-Obuchi apologies as being steps in the right direction.⁷⁵

During the late period many Japanese apologies were regarded as inadequate. Koreans perceived many Japanese apologies as vague and reluctantly offered. Koreans said Japan’s inadequate apologies only reinforced suspicions of Japanese motives. First, the 1990 apology by Emperor Akihito had been strenuously negotiated between the two sides;⁷⁶ when it was uttered, Koreans received the Emperor’s words with some confusion. To express his “deepest regret,” Akihito used the word *tsuseki* (“T’ongsuk” in Korean), an infrequently used combination of Chinese characters that made puzzled Koreans reach for their dictionaries. His choice of this

⁷³ “Kim-Obuchi Joint Declaration,” *Korea Times*, October 9, 1998.

⁷⁴ “Partnership Agreement to Open New Era for Korea-Japan Cooperation,” *Korea Herald*, October 9, 1998.

⁷⁵ The Hosokawa and Obuchi apologies were seen as different from previous Japanese apologies for several reasons. Hosokawa’s was praised because it 1) clearly stated Japanese responsibility and specifically enumerated the wrongs Japan had committed; 2) Hosokawa simply offered the apology; Koreans didn’t have to request it and have their Foreign Ministries negotiate over the wording. The apology was also praised for including North Korea. As for Obuchi, his apology was viewed as different because 1) it was Japan’s first written apology, and 2) it included a statement of forgiveness by the ROK leader. On Hosokawa’s apology see “Official: Hosokawa’s Apology Included DPRK,” Kyodo News Service, November 8, 1993 in FBIS Northeast Asia, same date; Yi Dong-min, “Korea-Japan Summit Help Close Book on Unhappy Past,” in Yonhap, FBIS South Korea, November 7, 1993; “Foreign Minister Assesses Summit,” KBS-1 Television Network, November 7, 1993 in FBIS South Korea, same date. On Obuchi’s apology see “Kim-Obuchi Joint Declaration,” *Korea Times*, October 9, 1998; “Text of Japan-ROK Joint Declaration,” *Yomiuri Shinbun*, October 7, 1998.

⁷⁶ “New Tension Emerges Over Japan’s Apology,” *Korea Times*, May 16, 1990; “Seoul Presses for Clear-Cut Akihito Apology For Past,” *Korea Herald*, May 16, 1990; “Seoul Will Continue to Press Akihito For Full Apology,” *Korea Herald*, May 17, 1990. Seoul’s position was that Akihito’s statement “should include not only an expression of regret for the wrongdoing but also who committed them to whom.” (Ibid).

strange word did not sit well with Koreans, who didn't understand what the Emperor had said, and were exasperated that he couldn't just clearly say "We apologize."⁷⁷ Polls showed that over 70 percent of Koreans were unsatisfied with the apology.⁷⁸

Second, in the late period Koreans continued to hold highly negative views of Japan based on Japan's perceived failure to compensate the sex slaves (the "comfort women"). Although Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa apologized to the victims, Korean reactions were bitter and focused on Tokyo's refusal to offer compensation. During Miyazawa's visit, anti-Japanese rallies were held, and protesters threw eggs at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.⁷⁹ The ROK Foreign Ministry urged Japan to admit its crimes and apologize to the victims: "a true future-oriented and mutually beneficial relationship between Korea and Japan can be achieved only when Japan correctly recognizes past history and remorsefully reflects on its deeds."⁸⁰ An editorial commented that Japanese leaders apologize but "words were hardly matched by any concrete actions," and that the case of the sex slaves was "disappointingly no exception."⁸¹ It added, "the liquidation of the unhappy past is indispensable for building a healthy relationship" between Japan and Korea. A scholar wrote in an op-ed, "Japan has tried to distort the history of its aggressive war and deny culpability in the issue of its sex slaves. Under these circumstances, who would trust Japan?"⁸² An editorial argued, "the comfort women issue is an obligation that Japan must

⁷⁷ Personal Interviews, October 2000, Seoul, Korea.

⁷⁸ "Poll: S. Koreans Dissatisfied By Akihito's Apology," *Stars and Stripes*, May 30, 1990. The *Stars and Stripes* is a U.S. military newspaper.

⁷⁹ A Korean association of bereaved family members of war victims issued a statement: "We express indignation over the visit of the Japanese prime minister at a time when no compensation and no apology was made for Korean patriots tortured and killed by Japanese imperialists." Another statement, issued by the Korea National Council of Churches, said "Japan, with all its barbarian acts including mobilization of the comfort girls, is responsible for all the sufferings and hardships which the Korean people are experiencing now." See "Citizens Stage Rallies to Condemn Japan Atrocities," *Korea Times*, January 16, 1992.

⁸⁰ "Ministry Issues Statement on 'Comfort Women,'" *Yonhap*, April 21, 1998.

⁸¹ "Miyazawa Leaves Only Words," *Korea Times*, January 19, 1992.

⁸² Kim Kyong-min, "Why is Japan Distrusted?" *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 8, 1995.

overcome to regain its moral standing in the international community.”⁸³ Thus Koreans remain unsatisfied with Japan’s handling of this issue.

Third, Koreans had viewed the 1995 Diet Resolution as an opportunity for Japan to clarify once and for all its national perception of the past, but argued that the eventual resolution fell short. As one Korean commentator noted, a Diet Resolution was important “to put a stop to all the confusion arising from the occasional gaffes by cabinet members, contradicting the many apologies made by Japanese prime ministers and the emperors.”⁸⁴ Before the Diet voted, a Korean newspaper editorialized, “If Japan puts an apology into its resolution against war, this will contribute to securing peace in the Asia-Pacific area in the future.” The editorial implored Japan to “be frank.”⁸⁵ Hearing the eventual Resolution, South Koreans were puzzled. President Kim Young Sam commented,

I am perplexed by the fact that Japan’s Diet voluntarily set out to pass a resolution with the hope of promoting friendly relations with its neighbor countries by announcing Japan’s correct understanding of history, but the resolution ended up a washed-out and inadequate version. After all, it was not something which the ROK or China or any other country which had lived under the forced rule of Japan, had asked for.⁸⁶

An editorial dismissed the resolution as “an empty shell,” and “a bag of excuses,” saying “nowhere in the document can we find any indication of a sincere desire to apologize and repent.”⁸⁷ One scholar later wrote, “the acrimonious debate about the resolution and the compromise among political parties only yielded a lukewarm ‘sense of remorse’ which reinforced Asian suspicions that Japanese attitudes about its militarist past had not really changed.”⁸⁸

Another newspaper commented,

⁸³ “Japanese Court’s Ruling on ‘Comfort Women,’” *Hanguk Ilbo*, April 29, 1998. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1998).

⁸⁴ Seong Byoung-wook, “Debate on Security Cooperation: A Highlight of Korea-Japan Forum,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, September 12, 1994.

⁸⁵ “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” in FBIS South Korea, June 7, 1995.

⁸⁶ “Kim Young-sam Discusses Relations with Japan,” *Asahi Shimbun*, August 9, 1995, p. 8.

⁸⁷ “Japan’s Resolution Minus No-War Pledge,” *Hanguk Ilbo*, June 6, 1995. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995), pp. 125-128.

⁸⁸ Hahnkyu Park, “Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, <http://www.kida.re.kr/english/journal/park.htm>, page 9.

the question remains as to just how genuine Japan's self-reflection is. In the past, Japan sought to cloud the wrongs of its colonial and war legacy with ambiguous phraseology. Repeatedly, one heard opaque references to 'a sense of painful regret,' 'aggressive conduct,' 'a sense of reflection,' or 'profound apology,' all of which seemed an exercise in word games. As if these circumlocutions were not enough, Japan has come up with one rationale after another to excuse its past actions....Japan's evasive attitude toward the war has incurred the wrath, rather than the understanding of the world community. This is the root of why reconciliation between Japan and the rest of Asia remains as remote as ever.⁸⁹

Thus during the late period, although some Japanese apologies were praised by the South Koreans, others were dismissed as inadequate.

Unapologetic Policies

In the later period, numerous unapologetic policies led Koreans to infer that Japan had malign intentions. First, they criticized statements of denial by Japanese leaders. After the statement by Nagano Shigeto, an editorial commented, "If Japan does not face historical facts squarely and teach historical truths to its younger generation, how can we build a sense of trust toward Japan as a partner in the Asia-Pacific era?"⁹⁰ At this time another editorial noted that while some Japanese "pretend to be remorseful," others, "particularly intellectual and ranking government officials, do not hesitate to distort historical truths." The editorial argued,

such perversion itself is the very reason Japan's neighbors are suspicious about Japan; they see the distortions as reflecting the minds of the Japanese....This is all the more so at a time when Japan is suspected, more or less, of edging toward resurrecting militarism.⁹¹

Nagano was burned in effigy in a public protest. Similarly, after the statement by Shimamura, the ROK Foreign Minister said, "the history-distorting remarks Japanese Government leaders are making on the fiftieth anniversary occasion of Japan's defeat in World War II would greatly set back Japan's efforts to improve relations with the Asian countries which it invaded during the war."⁹²

⁸⁹ "'Apology' By Japan's Prime Minister," *Hanguk Ilbo*, August 16, 1995.

⁹⁰ "Japanese Diet Should Clarify Responsibility for Past Atrocities," *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 7, 1994. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1994), 142-43.

⁹¹ "Japan's View of History," *Korea Herald*, May 7, 1994.

⁹² "Japanese Minister's Remark on WWII Criticized by Political Parties," *Yonhap*, August 10, 1995, FBIS South Korea.

Koreans also expressed outrage over the 1995 statement by Watanabe (in which he denied that Japan took over Korea by force). Prime Minister Yi Hong-ku said the ROK government and people “cannot but express shock and worry over the absurd remarks made by the former Japanese foreign minister,” and that such remarks “are an obstacle to the future of South Korean-Japanese relations,” and to East Asian efforts at cooperation.⁹³ The dailies were filled with condemnations of Watanabe.⁹⁴ The moderate *Dong-a Ilbo* noted, “The absurd remarks by Japanese government officials and right-wing politicians regarding the occupation of the Korean peninsula are becoming more insolent with each passing day.” It called upon Japan to apologize properly for its World War II aggression.

Our nation is shocked the more deeply because [Watanabe’s] preposterous nonsense was made, of all conceivable times, on the fiftieth anniversary of our independence. His sophistry is nothing short of deliberate and malevolent abuse....⁹⁵

The *Hanguk Ilbo* argued that Japan’s “double-faced attitude, which officially apologizes for the annexation but denies it when our back is turned, will not help build [cooperation] between the ROK and Japan.”⁹⁶ The conservative *Chosun Ilbo* warned, “Japan is a secret and organized country. Thus, the ROK should constantly seek to keenly disclose Japan’s attempts to hide, distort, and fabricate history.”⁹⁷ The *Dong-a Ilbo* wrote, “If offenders apologize for what they have done and if the victims offer forgiveness, the ROK and Japan can jointly participate...as partners in a new friendship and in cooperation, departing from their historical antagonism and conflict.”⁹⁸ A scholar wrote, “Japan is apparently haunted by its illusion of building a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was a defining element of its militarist past. If not, how can Japan claim that its 1910 annexation of Korea was valid without squarely facing up to its past wrongdoings and

⁹³ “Japanese Minister Defends Colonial Annexation Remarks to ‘Negatively Affect Ties,’” Yonhap Wire Service, in FBIS South Korea, June 5, 1995.

⁹⁴ All editorials carried in June 6 editions, cited in “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” in FBIS South Korea, June 7, 1995.

⁹⁵ Also see Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 14.

⁹⁶ “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” in FBIS South Korea, June 7, 1995.

⁹⁷ “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” in FBIS South Korea, June 7, 1995.

⁹⁸ “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” in FBIS South Korea, June 7, 1995.

atoning for its misdeeds?”⁹⁹ One Korean scholar acknowledged that although in many ways “Japan is a different country” since World War II, “there are a number of elites who still think Japan is a divine country, and its colonialism was justified.”¹⁰⁰

The ROK people similarly condemned Watanabe’s remarks. Students threw Molotov cocktails at the Japan Cultural Center in Seoul. At the “Wednesday rally” (a weekly anti-Japan rally staged at the Japanese embassy in Seoul), people burned an effigy of Watanabe. They urged the Japanese government to give a clear-cut declaration of its colonial rule of Korea.¹⁰¹ Thus Koreans condemned statements of denial by Japanese leaders, saying they reflected Japan’s “true” hostile intentions.

Second, Koreans expressed alarm at Japan’s resurrection of symbols from its Imperial past. Koreans observed and criticized Tokyo’s official reinstatement of the *Kimigayo* national anthem and the *Hinomaru* flag (both used in Imperial Japan). Adoption of these symbols was linked to a rise in Japanese nationalism, as well as to a perceived increase in Japan’s military capabilities. One article said that Koreans “now see an unrepentant nation being given a green light to rebuild its war-making capabilities inspired by the ode sung by legions of imperial soldiers.”¹⁰² Another article commented that such changes were alarming given that they were occurring as the Diet considered the issue of constitutional revision. The editorial comments that these moves are in line with “the nationalist ‘desire’ of the Japanese ultra rightist forces,” which want to restore Japan to full rearmament, including the possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁰³ One scholar warned about “the recent revival of militarism and nationalism in Japan” and argued that “the formal adoption of the

⁹⁹ Lee Chul-seung, “Review of Korea-Japan Basic Treaty,” *Seoul Shinmun*, October 30, 1995. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995). The *Seoul Shinmun* (name subsequently changed to *Taehan Maeil*) is a pro-government daily.

¹⁰⁰ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000.

¹⁰¹ “Civic Groups Burn Japan’s Watanabe in Effigy,” *Korea Times*, June 8, 1995.

¹⁰² Editorial, “Japan’s Right Turn,” *Korea Herald*, August 12, 1999.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

country's national flag and anthem" indicated a trend that would "inevitably lead to efforts to amend Article 9 of Japan's Constitution."¹⁰⁴

Third, Koreans sharply criticized Japan for allowing the distribution of a controversial history textbook (known as the *Fuso-sha* textbook after its publisher). Throughout the dispute, the South Korean press provided extensive and sharply critical coverage. One editorial commented that "another attempt to whitewash historical facts is raising its ugly head in Japan," and said that the MoE's actions

illustrate the lingering influence of militarist sentiment in Japan. As far as the textbook issue is concerned, it seems as if the situation has regressed....The Japanese textbook publishers have inexcusably closed their eyes on the misery suffered by the victims. This attitude has much to do with the Tokyo government's reluctance to wholeheartedly admit its past crimes.¹⁰⁵

Another editorial noted that the issue of World War II history cannot be brushed aside "as a leftover problem from the past." It argued that "For Korea, in particular, building a forward-looking partnership with Japan without settling correct scores about the unhappy past may turn out to be a naïve illusion leading to a repetition of the same mistakes and tragedies."¹⁰⁶ An op-ed asserted that "the ghosts of Japan's wartime past have indeed re-emerged," and that nationalism displayed in the history textbooks will "place Japan on a more militarist footing."¹⁰⁷ Another article noted, "in an era of globalization, Japan has chosen chauvinism, reversing the trend in its recent history of reconciliation and peace with its neighbors."¹⁰⁸ A scholar commented, "in the long term I am not optimistic about Japan because of the emergence of the right wing there. In the Japanese education problem we see something very wrong with Japan."¹⁰⁹ Another scholar wrote,

¹⁰⁴ Kim Young-ho, "South Korea-Japan Relations Still Mired in Snowy Weather," *Munhwa Ilbo*, August 14, 1999, 105.

¹⁰⁵ "Japan Attempts to Whitewash its Past," *Korea Herald*, September 15, 2000.

¹⁰⁶ "Teaching Sadistic History?" *Korea Herald*, February 22, 2001.

¹⁰⁷ Shin Il-Chul, "Counting on Japan's Sense of Right and Wrong," *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 8, 2001. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2001), 15-16.

¹⁰⁸ Editorial, "Rocky Relations with Japan," *Chungang Ilbo*, July 9, 2001. Quoted in FBIS South Korea, July 10, 2001.

¹⁰⁹ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

“Japanese repeated attempts to distort its history...portend the revival not only of Japanese militarism, but also of its nationalistic sentiments reminiscent of the days of Japanese imperialism.”¹¹⁰ During the dispute, ROK President Kim Dae Jung said, “How can we make friends with people who try to forget and ignore the many pains they inflicted on us? How can we deal with them in the future with any degree of trust?”¹¹¹ As a result of Japan’s refusal to drop the books that the ROK found offensive, the ROK canceled imports of Japanese cultural goods (films, music, and computer games) that had only been allowed since the 1998 apology. It also canceled diplomatic visits and joint military exercises.

Fourth, Koreans also perceived Japanese intentions as malign because Japanese leaders visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japan’s war dead. In the late period, subsequent visits to Yasukuni created uproar in Seoul. An editorial entitled “Another Surprise Attack” said that Koizumi “visited the shrine on Sunday in a manner reminiscent of the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor at daybreak on a Sunday more than a half century ago.”¹¹² The editorial asks, “How can Japan be trusted in international society?”¹¹³ Koizumi’s visit was seen as evidence of “his nostalgia for neo-militarism,” and “tantamount to declaring another round of World War II.”¹¹⁴

At the Korean parliament, ruling party lawmakers issued a letter of protest to the Japanese embassy in Seoul, expressing “‘deep disappointment and a sense of betrayal’ at Koizumi’s shrine visit and demanded an apology from him along with a declaration that he would not visit the shrine again in the future.”¹¹⁵ The chairman of the ruling party said that the shrine visit was evidence of “resurgent militarism” in Japan. Former foreign Minister Han Sung Joo commented that “there

¹¹⁰ Won-Deog Lee, “Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations,” in Young-sun Ha, ed., *Korea and Japan: Past, Present and Future* (Seoul: Nanam, 1997), p. 100.

¹¹¹ See “ROK President Addresses Liberation Day Ceremony,” Seoul Korea.net, in FBIS South Korea, August 15, 2001.

¹¹² *Chungang Ilbo*, April 22, 2002 in FBIS South Korea, April 23, 2002.

¹¹³ *Chungang Ilbo*, April 22, 2002 in FBIS South Korea, April 23, 2002.

¹¹⁴ “Legislators Hold Various Meetings to Mark Aug. 15 Liberation Day,” Yonhap, August 14, 2001, in FBIS South Korea.

¹¹⁵ “S. Korea’s ruling party holds rally to protest Yasukuni visit,” Kyodo News Service, August 17, 2001, in FBIS Japan, same date.

is concern that this incident may signal a Japanese turn toward militarism.”¹¹⁶ A civic group said Koizumi “resurrected the specter of imperialism by paying homage at Yasukuni Shrine and disregarded the Korean people’s demands for truth and repentance for the crimes committed by Japan.”¹¹⁷ In one of the more macabre moments of the dispute, twenty South Korean men draped in ROK flags each cut off a finger in protest of Koizumi’s shrine visit.¹¹⁸

Koreans were so embittered by Koizumi’s visit to the shrine—as well as by the textbook crisis—they ignored a remarkably apologetic gesture by Koizumi in the October after his shrine visit. Koizumi’s visit to Seoul’s Seodaemon Prison History Hall was not appreciated but rather was scorned by Koreans. An article commented, “We cannot but ask again why he visited. It is true that the recent South Korea-Japan relationship is more strained than ever before.”¹¹⁹ Another article noted that Koizumi’s visit only proved that “as expected, there exists a vast difference in Japan’s words and deeds. It appears our differing approaches to history will remain difficult to reconcile in the future as well.”¹²⁰ It noted that Koizumi was “opportunistically” pursuing simultaneous policies of “reflections and apologies” on the one hand, and “distortions and official homage” on the other hand.¹²¹ Thus Koizumi’s shrine visit (as well as the textbook dispute) so embittered Korean opinion, people did not recognize his conciliatory gestures.

In sum, over the postwar period, Korean perceptions of Japanese malign intentions were strongly influenced by Japan’s policies of remembrance. Although some Japanese apologies were noted and viewed as hopeful signs, for the most part Japanese remembrance was viewed as unapologetic: as evidence that Japan could revert back to its old aggression toward Korea. In particular, throughout the post-World War II period, Koreans have reacted with shock and outrage

¹¹⁶ Han Sung Joo, “Japanese Textbooks: Stop Being Offensive to the Neighbors,” *International Herald Tribune*, July 18, 2001.

¹¹⁷ “Civic Groups Voice Opposition to Koizumi Visit,” *Yonhap*, February 24, 2003.

¹¹⁸ Jonathan Watts, “Japan’s Asian Neighbors Outraged by Junichiro Koizumi’s Custom-Breaking Tribute,” *Guardian*, August 14, 2001.

¹¹⁹ “Unsatisfied With Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to Seoul,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 16, 2001.

¹²⁰ Editorial, “Diplomacy with Japan,” *Choson Ilbo*, October 15, 2001.

¹²¹ Editorial, “Diplomacy with Japan,” *Choson Ilbo*, October 15, 2001.

to remarks by Japanese politicians that glorify, deny, or justify Japan's takeover and occupation of Korea. Such statements are known as *mang-on* in Korean (*mogen* in Japanese); these are commonly—and misleadingly—reported in the Western media as “gaffes.” Koreans do not view these remarks as mere slips of the tongue; they say these statements (rather than Japan's apologies) reflect Japan's true intentions, and those intentions are hostile. A journalist wrote that because of Japan's “anachronistic tendency to justify Japan's colonial domination over Korea,” “Japan has failed to win the trust of Asians and remains an object of distrust.”¹²² Another scholar commented that Japan's unapologetic remembrance was “a subject of concern because if they don't repent it means they can return to this behavior.”¹²³ Thus Japanese “gaffes”—as well as other unapologetic policies—serve to erode any positive effects of Japanese apologies.

ROK Reasoning about Japanese Intentions: Other Factors

Apart from policies of remembrance, other factors have also influenced Korean views of Japanese intentions. The most important factor is the territorial dispute between the two states.¹²⁴ Japanese intentions are universally seen as malign because of its claim of the Tokdo/Takeshima islands. Additionally, a minority view has emerged in Korea that Japan is trustworthy because of its democratic political institutions and peaceful political culture.

Territorial Disputes

Throughout the postwar period, Koreans viewed Japanese intentions as malign because they said that Japan, by claiming sovereign Korean territory, was once again trying to dominate Korea. In the

¹²² Nam Si-uk, “Future of Korea-Japan Relations,” *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995), 17-30. Quote on p. 28.

¹²³ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

¹²⁴ Other influential factors on ROK perceptions of Japanese intentions include Japan's treatment of its ethnic Korean minority; this was an issue that was always a point of contention between the two states. In its discriminatory treatment of ethnic Koreans, images of Japan's mistreatment of Koreans are kept fresh in South Korean minds. Furthermore, Japanese policies toward North Korea were another point of contention. Any perceived Japanese aid and comfort to the DPRK was viewed as evidence of Japanese hostility toward South Korea. After diplomatic normalization, the ROK continually tried to pull Japan diplomatically closer to the ROK, and to push Japan away from the DPRK. The ROK continually pressured Japan to recognize the South as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, and to abstain from any trade or other relations with the DPRK that might help Pyongyang.

early period, territorial disputes centered on fishing rights and the island chain known as Tokdo to Koreans, Takeshima to the Japanese. First, ROK leaders expressed fear of Japan over what they viewed as provocative Japanese behavior in the area of fisheries. After Japanese fishing vessels crossed into ROK coastal waters, Rhee proclaimed the “Rhee Line,” which he said Japanese fishing vessels could not cross. Vessels that disobeyed were seized by the ROK, precipitating a crisis between the two nations. Eventually the crews were released, but Japan began sending naval patrol escorts with fishing vessels.¹²⁵ The Americans feared this would lead to an armed confrontation between the two nations. American officials reported “Korean alarm with respect to [Japanese] fishing and patrolling activities close to Korean coast.”¹²⁶ A Korean political group reported that Japan’s desire to expand the Line closer to the Korean coast “is nothing but proof that Japanese imperialistic ambitions have not expired.”¹²⁷ A newspaper editorialized,

As past history teaches us, it was when Japan gained the command of the sea that Japanese imperialism started its invasion activities in earnest. . . . What Japan really wants is not marine products, but the expansion of her influence. We cannot acquiesce in the trick of the Japanese government to encroach on the Yellow and East seas from the standpoint of self-defense.¹²⁸

Rhee also argued that Japanese fishing in Korean waters reflected that they “probably would like to extend themselves even to Seoul. They had a good time for forty years in Korea.”¹²⁹ The ROK Foreign Minister wrote a letter to the U.S. Embassy, in which he expressed fears about the “very grave [situation] being created by [the Japanese government] sending massed fishing fleets to seas adjacent to [Korea] under convoy of patrols.”¹³⁰ The ROK Foreign Ministry said that Seoul would never have delegated military command of the area to the United States had it known

¹²⁵ At that time Japan’s naval arm was known as the Maritime Safety Agency.

¹²⁶ Telegram: Chargé in the Republic of Korea (Lightner) to Department of State, Document no. 601, September 25, 1952, FRUS China/Japan, Vol. XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), p. 1336-1337.

¹²⁷ Quoted in Sung-hwa Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea : Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 27.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, p. 27.

¹²⁹ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, pp. 27-28.

¹³⁰ Telegram: Chargé in the Republic of Korea (Lightner) to Department of State, Document no. 601, September 25, 1952, FRUS China/Japan, Vol. XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), p. 1336-1337.

that a freed [Japan would] ruthlessly and provokingly threaten the back of Korea with studied planning at government level even before hostilities were over and that against this deliberate invasion of that freed [Japan] even our own naval patrols [would] be prohibited from operating.¹³¹

After Rhee conveyed his alarm to the Americans, the CINC of the United Nations Command recommended barring Japanese fishing vessels from ROK coastal waters. President Rhee “was delighted,” as “that removed main cause his earlier concern,” namely, the Japanese naval patrols.¹³² Another U.S. official noted that as far as the “sea defense zone” was concerned, “the real purpose, never made public and never admitted to the Japanese or to the Koreans, was to stop a dangerous feud from breaking out” between the two nations.¹³³ Thus extremely malign ROK perceptions of Japan were evident in fisheries disputes of the 1950s.¹³⁴

Second, Koreans said that the territorial dispute between themselves and Japan over the Tokdo/Takeshima island chain also reflected Japan’s aggressive intentions. A Korean political group said that Japan had used the islands as “stepping stones for aggression on the continent of Asia.”¹³⁵ The group urged the American occupation authorities in Japan to recommend Korean ownership of the islets, to “deny Japan a bridge to the Asian continent.”¹³⁶ Korean newspapers editorialized about Japan’s “sinister designs” toward the islets, and said that if Koreans forgot the past, this would lead to “the repetition of [Japan’s] past sins.”¹³⁷ Therefore because of these two territorial disputes, over fisheries and over the Tokdo/Takeshima islands, South Korean perceptions of Japan were malign in the early period.¹³⁸

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Document no. 665, FRUS China/Japan, Volume XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), pp. 1465-1469

¹³⁴ For subsequent developments in the fisheries disputes see Taewoo Kim, “Japan’s New Security Roles and ROK-Japan Relations,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. 11, no. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 147-169; Lyou Byung-hwa, “Implications of Revised Korea-Japan Fisheries Accord,” *Korea Focus*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (1998), pp. 100-102.

¹³⁵ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, p. 40.

¹³⁶ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, p. 40.

¹³⁷ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, p. 45.

¹³⁸ One ROK diplomat had an creative solution to the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute. In a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State, Kim Jong-pil, director of the Korean CIA, dismissed the island chain as “a place for sea gull droppings.” and “suggested to the Japanese that it be blown up.” (The American Secretary of State replied that “this

The two countries “agreed to disagree” on Tokdo/Takeshima in the 1965 normalization agreement, and the issue died down at least at official levels. It would appear in headlines from time to time, and once again became a point of contention in the late period. The dispute frequently motivates protests in downtown Seoul; in one protest over remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Mori about Japan’s claim to Tokdo, “protestors characterized Mori’s remarks as being driven by Japan’s militaristic ambitions to invade other territories.”¹³⁹ A national headquarters for protecting Tokdo has been established by prominent social leaders.¹⁴⁰ Citizens organize trips to Tokdo and try to build buildings and monuments there; Korean legislators established a “Tokdo Devotees Group” and visited Tokdo to enact a resolution demanding that Japan drop its claim to the islands.¹⁴¹ Any legitimacy of the Japanese claim to Tokdo/Takeshima is steadfastly rejected; an editorial referred to “Japan’s absurd claim” and demanded that Japan renounce its claim, saying that otherwise the issue would “only serve to heighten suspicion among its neighbors.”¹⁴² South Koreans even encourage cooperation with Pyongyang on the issue.¹⁴³ One defense analyst argued, “Japan would seem less threatening if it stopped claiming that Tokdo was part of Japan.”¹⁴⁴ Another think-tank analyst complained, “Japan believes it owns Tokdo. We think there’s no dispute. This is one reason why we distrust them.”¹⁴⁵ During this period the ROK’s annual Defense White Papers featured pictures of ROK military aircraft flying patrols over Tokdo; the pictures appeared in the section discussing Japanese defense policy. In the 1990 White Paper, the

had also occurred to him.”) See Memorandum of Conversation, October 29, 1962 in FRUS Northeast Asia 1961-63, Volume XXII (1996), 611.

¹³⁹ “Civic Group Calls for Mori’s Apology for His Remarks on Tokdo,” Yonhap, October 6, 2000 in FBIS South Korea.

¹⁴⁰ “Pan-National Headquarters for Protecting Tokdo Opens Sat.,” Yonhap, December 1, 2000, in FBIS South Korea.

¹⁴¹ “Legislators Hold Various Meetings to Mark August 15 Liberation Day,” Yonhap, August 14, 2001, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

¹⁴² “Japan’s Absurd Claim on Tokdo Island,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, February 11, 1996; translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1996), 97-98.

¹⁴³ “Civic Group Calls For Inter-Korean Cooperation to Defend Tokdo,” Yonhap, August 29, 2000., in FBIS South Korea, same date.

¹⁴⁴ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000.

¹⁴⁵ Personal Interview, IFANS, October 2000.

text over the picture read: “Japan seems to be on its way to becoming a military superpower as it expands its military strength to fill the void left by the shrinking U.S. role in the region.”¹⁴⁶ In 1997 a spokesman from the Defense Ministry said that the photos of Tokdo “are intended to show Korea’s sovereignty over the islands and the Armed Forces’ willingness to defend them when challenged.”¹⁴⁷ The island dispute thus fuels a lingering sense of distrust of Japan among Koreans.

Regime Type and Political Culture

Democratic peace theory predicts that after 1987, because of the effects of mutual democratization, Koreans should view Japan’s intentions as more benign, and should say this view is based on faith in Japanese democratic institutions. In actuality, there is little evidence for this proposition. Most Korean people and elites do not discuss the effects of Japanese domestic political institutions on Japanese behavior. If they talk about Japanese domestic politics, they say Japanese politics reflects a surge of hyper-nationalism, and that Japanese laws instituted to restrict the growth of the military—as well as antimilitarist public opinion—are eroding.¹⁴⁸ People say this leads them to view Japanese intentions as malign. However, there is a minority view among some elites that regards Japan’s democratic political institutions and political culture as reassuring signs that Japan has *benign* intentions.

The Korean public does not discuss the pacifying effects of Japanese democratic political institutions. When people discuss Japanese politics, they talk about Japanese political culture. Koreans do not see Japan’s domestic politics as reassuring; they argue that both institutions created

¹⁴⁶ *Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1990).

¹⁴⁷ “Defense White Paper ‘Stressing’ ROK Claims to Tokdo,” *Korea Times*, October 13, 1997.

¹⁴⁸ For such views see “Japan’s Wind of Right-Wing Conservatism,” *Hanguk Ilbo*, September 24, 1995, in FBIS South Korea, same date; Lee Chul-seung, “Review of Korea-Japan Basic Treaty,” *Seoul Shinmun*, October 30, 1995, translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1995); Kim Young-ho, “South Korea-Japan Relations Still Mired in Snowy Weather,” *Munhwa Ilbo*, August 14, 1999; “Japan’s Right Turn,” *Korea Herald*, August 12, 1999; Chi Myong-kwan, “Japan’s ‘Mob Nationalism’ at Stake,” *Shin Dong-a Monthly*, March 1995, in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March/April 1995), pp. 24-33; Yoo Kun-il, “Lessons from Japanese Elitism,” *Chosun Ilbo*, March 4, 1995, in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (March/April 1995), pp. 122-124.

to pacify Japanese foreign policy and antimilitarist public opinion have both weakened in Japan. An article laments, "The voices of Japan's leftists and its large pacifist community have fallen silent."¹⁴⁹ A *Korea Herald* article cautions, "Unlike in the past when the Japanese right wing has been on the move, this time around resistance from the nation's liberals and pacifists has been weak to non-existent."¹⁵⁰ Ignoring changes in Japanese political institutions, a commentator argues that "it is an illusion to believe that post-war Japan represents a fresh rebirth with no ties to the past. The truth is that post-war Japan is essentially a continuation of prewar Japan."¹⁵¹ An article notes that

[Koreans] cannot feel at rest. . . . In the past, to all intents and purposes, Japan rendered hollow the various principles that it had maintained since the end of World War II in accordance with its constitution. . . . This move stemming from ulterior motives is one of the factors that make us distrust Japan further.¹⁵²

In sum, the Korean public pays little attention to the restraining effects of democratic and "antimilitarist" institutions such as Article 9 of the constitution; when people discuss Japanese political institutions, they say the Japanese people are increasingly nationalistic and Tokyo is increasingly unfettered by antimilitarist institutions.

Conversely, there also exists a minority view among Korean elites with respect to Japanese political institutions. Starting in the middle period, some scholars began arguing that Japan was *not* dangerous because of its democratic regime and strong civilian control over the military.¹⁵³ (In the earlier period, Koreans had not discussed these factors.) One scholar wrote that "Japan of the postwar years is not the Japan of the prewar years."¹⁵⁴ He argued that Japan will not seek an offensive military capability in the near term because of strong civilian controls in Japan; he notes

¹⁴⁹ Kim Yong-hie, "Impact of North Korea's Satellite Launch," *Korea Focus*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (1998), 23.

¹⁵⁰ Lee Kyong-hee, "New role for Japan's army troubling for past victims," *Korea Herald*, August 16, 1999.

¹⁵¹ Park Young-jae, "Japan's Recent Veer to the Right," *Chosun Ilbo*, August 16, 1999.

¹⁵² Editorial: "Ominous Argument on Japan's Nuclear Argument," *Seoul Hangyore* October 20, 1999.

¹⁵³ Soong-Hoom Kil, "Japanese Defense Posture in the 1980s," *Korea and World Affairs* Vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1979): 495-515; Kil, "Two Aspects of Korea-Japan Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* Vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 1984); Chongwhi Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security Role," *Korea and World Affairs* Vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 105-116.

¹⁵⁴ Kil, "Japanese Defense Posture in the 1980s," p. 514.

that “the pacifist Japanese postwar constitution... has commanded absolute majority support among the Japanese public.”¹⁵⁵ He wrote, “South Korea is fully aware of the fact that Japanese domestic forces such as the civilian control system” and “deep-rooted dovish public opinion” will keep Japan from pursuing military expansion.¹⁵⁶ Another scholar writes that because of Article 9, a “rapid military buildup is viewed by many Japanese as violating the ethos of its postwar constitution and thus poses serious political problems.”¹⁵⁷ Another scholar wrote that Japan “will not pose a military threat to her neighbors, including the two Koreas, in the foreseeable future.” He argued that “domestic constraints include Japanese aversion to ‘things nuclear’ and a campaign by the opposition parties against military rearmament of Japan.”¹⁵⁸ Thus starting in the middle period, some Korean elites viewed Japanese democracy and political culture as evidence of Japan’s benign intentions.

In the late period, some elites have also begun to talk about a “democratic peace” between Japan and the ROK. These elites see Japanese democracy and the dovish attitudes of Japanese public opinion as reassuring. Korean elites cite Japan as a capitalist market economy and democratic country, and thus a natural ally for Korea. One scholar comments,

Japan has a very different government and people now. They are the most pacifist country in Asia. This may change; they might find new reasons to use force. But still, their general mood is much more pacifist than their neighbors. I think Japanese democracy, and the Japanese people’s attitude toward conflict will inhibit it from repeating its past history.¹⁵⁹

Another scholar commented, “We should note that in Japan there is a well-organized, anti-militarist force, made up largely of intellectuals,” and that “this is important to keep in mind as we consider Japan, for this could be one element that makes it unlikely that Japan will choose a militarist path in

¹⁵⁵ Kil, “Japanese Defense Posture in the 1980s,” p. 497.

¹⁵⁶ Soong-hoom Kil, “South Korean Policy Toward Japan,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, no. 2 (Spring 1983), p. 43.

¹⁵⁷ Kim, “Korea-Japan Relations and Japan’s Security Role,” p. 112.

¹⁵⁸ Young Whan Kihl, “Changing U.S.-Japan Relations and Korean Security,” *Journal of Korean Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (July 1976), p. 35.

¹⁵⁹ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000.

the future.”¹⁶⁰ An IFANS researcher also pointed out that Japan, the United States, and Korea all share market economies and democratic systems, “so we all have common interests.”¹⁶¹ A professor commented, “If Japan continues to be based on a sound democracy then I think some military buildup is ok. The ROK and Japan are both democracies, both market economies; we have the same values, so why should we perceive threats from each other?”¹⁶² Another academic commented, “Because Japan is a democracy, like the ROK, we can all work together with the U.S. to build a democratic community in Asia.”¹⁶³ Another scholar noted, “If you look at the current system, it’s easy for us to say that our partners will be the U.S. and Japan. If you look at China and Russia, since they are not democracies we are more afraid of them.”¹⁶⁴ In sum, there is a minority view in Korea, held by academics (not bureaucrats or politicians) that Japan has benign intentions because of its regime type. However the vast majority of Koreans do not pay attention to Japanese domestic political institutions when they discuss Japan; if they do, they discuss resurgent Japanese nationalism and the weakening of anti-militarist political institutions.

Conclusion: Perception of Intentions

Throughout the post-World War II period, most South Koreans have perceived Japan’s intentions as *malign*. Given Japan’s consistently unapologetic policies of remembrance across this period, this is consistent (though inconclusive) evidence for the apology theory. Results from congruence testing are also consistent with the expectation that territorial claims create perceptions of malign intentions. As for reasoning, many Koreans say explicitly that they think Japan has malign intentions because of Japan’s failure to apologize to Korea, and because of Japanese denial and

¹⁶⁰ Rhee Kyu-ho, “A Review of Korea-Japan Relations,” *Shin Dong-a Monthly* (February 1995). Translated in *Korea Focus* Vol. 3, No. 2 (1995), 16-23.

¹⁶¹ Personal Interview, IFANS, October 2000.

¹⁶² Personal Interview, MOFAT, October 2000.

¹⁶³ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

¹⁶⁴ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

glorification of the past. In their reasoning, people also refer to the Tokdo-Takeshima territorial dispute when invoking Japan's malign intentions toward Korea.

Regime Type: Democratic Peace or Democratic Conflict?

As for the issue of regime type, the data are not consistent with predictions that democracy in Korea and Japan will cause Koreans to perceive that Japan has benign intentions. Korean perceptions of Japan since 1987 have not improved; except for a small minority confined to academics, Koreans do not discuss Japanese political institutions when they talk about Japanese intentions.

Given this result, I evaluate a counterargument to this test of democratic peace theory. Namely, as described in Chapter Two (pp. 110-111), one could also code the ROK as a democratizing state in the 1990s.¹⁶⁵ According to this coding, the Mansfield and Snyder theory of democratization and war predicts poor relations and increased risk of conflict between Korea and Japan in that time period. Evaluating whether malign Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions are being driven by Korean democratization is important because this is a possible counter-argument to the apology theory's explanation for negative Korean perceptions of Japan over the same time period. In other words, negative Korean perceptions of Japan may not necessarily be driven by Japanese denial, but rather by pathologies related to Korean democratization.

There is evidence that some of the problems associated with democratic transition are evident in South Korea in the 1990s. Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratizing states suffer from several pathologies that increase the risk of war (weak institutions, the pervasiveness of hyper-nationalism, the adoption of diversionary tactics, and logrolling among elites).¹⁶⁶ Indeed, the Korean media appears young and in an early phase of development—in a “yellow journalism”

¹⁶⁵ This coding could be justified by the existence of a more restrictive definition of what is a democracy (that is, a state that has undergone a transfer of power from a ruling party to the opposition (Ray, “Wars Between Democracies.”). This coding would also be justified by South Korea's “polity scores” assigned by social scientists; according to these scores, South Korea was a democratizing state after 1987, and not a full democracy until 1998. See Marshall and Jaggers, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2001.”

¹⁶⁶ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” pp. 31-34.

phase.¹⁶⁷ The South Korean press disseminates shrill and sensationalist media coverage; portrayals of Japan by this media are often highly negative, not only in commentary but also in news reporting. In South Korean politics, there is some posturing vis-à-vis Japan as politicians employ prestige strategies to satisfy the Korean drive for respect and a humbling of the former oppressor. To this end, politicians' rhetoric over Tokdo seems excessive relative to the ROK's maritime weakness (and thus its limited ability to actually take a hard line against the powerful Japanese navy in any maritime standoff). Korean leaders frequently criticize or pressure Japan in reference to apologies, textbooks, and the Yasukuni shrine: these are popular themes that resonate within the Korean public. Thus some of the expected features of the democratization process are evident in South Korean politics.

Despite the presence of some problematic symptoms of democratization, there are three reasons why Korean perceptions of Japan's malign intentions are not being driven by Korean democratization. First, although Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions are indeed malign in the 1990s, they are not *worse* than they were prior to Korean democratization. The Mansfield and Snyder theory would predict that Korean perceptions of Japan should worsen, and relations should grow more conflictual, after the onset of Korean democratization in 1987. However this is not the case; Koreans viewed Japanese intentions as consistently malign across the entire post-World War II era. If anything, relations between the two states are growing more cooperative and less conflictual; the nadir of Japan-ROK relations was undoubtedly the early 1970s when the two states haggled over repeated diplomatic crises (some of which were related to Korean authoritarianism).¹⁶⁸

Evidence that ROK perceptions of Japan have remained similar both before and after Korean democratization can be found by looking at recurrent crises. Seoul protested Japanese

¹⁶⁷ See Lee, "Watching the Watchdog"; *Economist*, "Read All About Some of It."

¹⁶⁸ The crises of the 1970s include the assassination attempt of ROK President Park Chung-hee (and the killing of Madame Park) by a Japanese resident; the KCIA's kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung from a Japanese hotel; the later trial and death sentence decreed on Kim; as well as the ROK's infuriation at Tokyo's distancing of its diplomatic stance from Seoul in favor of Pyongyang. For discussion of this time period and crises see Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), Chapter Four.

whitewashing of history textbooks in 1982, 1986, and 2001. Seoul protested Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to Yasukuni shrine in 1985 (Nakasone), in 1996 (Hashimoto), and in 2001 (Koizumi). In all instances, Korean reactions were similar: Seoul protested Japan's actions, the ROK media featured negative reporting of Japan, and the Korean people staged demonstrations in protest. There is no evidence that, since Korean democratization, elites increasingly seize upon such opportunities to rally the public and curry domestic support; the textbook dispute in 2001 played out much the same as did similar disputes in the 1980s.

Second, evidence from process-tracing also shows that Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions are not being driven by Korean democratization. The mechanisms through which Mansfield and Snyder expect perceptions to worsen (and conflict to grow) are for the most part not materializing. As noted above, there is some domestic political posturing over Tokdo, but Korean elites are not actively pressuring the Japanese government on the issue, let alone pursuing aggressive diversionary policies over the islets. As for the expectation that Korean elites will purvey anti-Japanese nationalism in order to better their political fortunes, this is not occurring. On the contrary, Korean elites talk about the need to educate the public about the necessity of cooperation with Japan, and the need for elites to manage public opinion to make it more tractable.¹⁶⁹

Third, evidence from other East Asian cases supports the interpretation that Korean perceptions of Japan's malign intentions are indeed linked to Japanese remembrance, rather than to particulars of the ROK case (such as Korean domestic politics). As I will discuss in Chapter Four, the dynamics of remembrance in Japan-Korea relations are much the same as in Japan's relations with Australia and China. Both states express dissatisfaction with Japanese remembrance; they dismiss Japanese apologies and say they distrust Japan because of denials. This is further evidence that negative Korean views of Japan are not being driven by factors specific to Korea, such as democratization.

In sum, given the finding that democracy in Korea and Japan is not improving South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions, I evaluated a counter-argument that the democratization

process may actually be creating negative perceptions of Japan within Korea. Evaluating this hypothesis is important because it presents an alternative explanation for ROK perceptions of Japan in the late period; it suggests that Korean resentment and distrust of Japan is related more to the specifics of Korean domestic politics rather than to Japanese remembrance. However, I do not find evidence to suggest that Korean views of Japan have been significantly affected by democratization.

EXPLAINING ROK THREAT PERCEPTION OF JAPAN

The previous section demonstrated that Koreans perceived Japanese intentions as consistently *malign* over the post-World War II era, and that much of Korean distrust of Japan stemmed from Japanese policies of remembrance. But did Korean suspicions about Japanese intentions cause Koreans to perceive Japan as a serious threat? How important was remembrance in overall Korean threat perception of Japan relative to other factors? In this section I test the relative weight of different factors in threat perception by using both congruence tests and by assessing Korean reasoning.

The apology theory posits that threat perception is a function of both capabilities and intentions. As argued in Chapter Two, since World War II, Japan's capability to menace Korea with military force has been low. Japan lacks ground-attack capabilities, such as land-attack cruise missiles, large numbers of ground forces, amphibious capabilities, sealift and airlift capabilities, a Marine Corps, or airborne assault troops.¹⁷⁰ Its offensive air capabilities—lacking substantial inventories of precision-guided munitions with which to target air defenses and take out airfields—also limit Japan's ability to menace the Korean peninsula. Japan did acquire substantial maritime capabilities in the 1970s and 80s, giving Japan one of the world's few powerful blue-water navies; this power could be used offensively against substantially weaker Korean maritime forces in the sea lanes.

¹⁶⁹ Personal Interview, National Security Council, Blue House, October 2000.

However, over the post-World War II period the biggest limitation on Japan's capability to menace Korea has been the constraint of the United States as an "offshore balancer." In the early years of the Cold War—throughout the 1950s—observers in East Asia worried that the United States might not maintain a large military presence in the region. The durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance was highly uncertain; Tokyo's acceptance of alliance with the United States was highly contested in Japanese politics in the 1950s. Koreans also feared that Washington's push for Tokyo and Seoul to normalize relations was motivated in its desire to perform another "hand-off" of Korea to Japan, as the United States had done in the Taft-Katsura agreement in 1905. However the durability of the U.S. presence improved after 1960 (the U.S.-Japan security treaty renewal) and 1965 (Korea-Japan normalization and assurances from Washington that the U.S. would not abandon Korea). Thus although Japanese power has grown over the period, the U.S. offshore balancer has been a credible constraint on that power since the mid-1960s.

Predictions

As noted in Chapter One, remembrance may either have strong effects on threat perception, or little or no effect. In this chapter I assess evidence from congruence testing and from observers' reasoning to determine the importance of remembrance, relative to other factors, in threat perception.

Congruence. One hypothesis posits that remembrance has a strong influence on threat perception. In Chapter Two I coded Japanese remembrance as *unapologetic* throughout the entire post-World War II period. Because the value of this variable does not vary in this case, we cannot make clear predictions about fluctuations in threat perception over time (see discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 130-31). However, we can predict that the level of threat perception should remain relatively high. If it is true that remembrance has a strong affect on threat perception, ROK threat perception of Japan should thus be *high*, or at least *moderate*, throughout the period.

¹⁷⁰ For an assessment of Japan's military power in the land-attack versus maritime roles see Jennifer M. Lind, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy," unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.

Another hypothesis is that remembrance has little effect on threat perception. Denials may make a state's intentions appear more menacing—or apologies may make it look friendlier—but ultimately other factors (intentions or capabilities) drive the extent to which a state is viewed as a security threat. Given that Japanese remembrance was coded as *unapologetic* across the entire postwar period, if Koreans' assessment of the Japanese threat varied dramatically in the post-World War II period, or if it was *low*, this would be evidence that remembrance has little or no effect on threat perception.

Reasoning. The two hypotheses also make distinct predictions about Korean reasoning in their discussions of a Japanese threat. If remembrance is a very important factor, Koreans should say that Japanese denials make Japan more militarily powerful, or make its intentions appear more menacing. On the other hand, if remembrance is not very significant, we should see Koreans emphasizing other factors (intentions or capabilities).

This section is divided into subsections. First I code ROK threat perception *vis-à-vis* Japan throughout the post-World War II era. I code threat perception by observing South Korean security policies, and by examining statements by the ROK elites and public. I find that Koreans—especially the Korean elite—have perceived a low level of threat from Japan since the early 1960s, which is consistent with the argument that says that remembrance has little effect on threat perception. Korean threat perception appears to most closely co-vary with changes in Japanese capabilities—particularly the existence of the constraint of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the second subsection I examine the reasoning that Koreans offer for their assessment that Japan poses a low threat. With great consistency, Koreans tie their threat assessments of Japan to Japanese capabilities. Koreans explicitly connect their *low* threat perception to the constraint of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Korean elites specifically say that absent the U.S.-Japan alliance (i.e., absent the key constraint on Japanese power), they would fear Japan. Interestingly, those members of the Korean public who believe that Japan does pose a threat to Korea tend to believe that the United States will not constrain Japan. In other words, they fear Japan because they assess Japanese capabilities differently.

These findings suggest that remembrance plays a relatively minor role in threat perception. Earlier in this chapter I established that Japanese denials contribute significantly to Korean dislike of Japan and distrust of Japanese intentions; however, these denials do not lead Koreans to perceive a security threat from Japan in the absence of Japanese capabilities. Capabilities thus appear to weigh the most heavily in Korean threat assessments. Perceptions of intentions, however, do play a role; perceptions of malign Japanese intentions based on Japanese denials exacerbate Korean fears of the time in which constraints on Japanese power might be lifted (e.g., when the U.S. offshore balancer departs the region).

Level of Threat Perception: Statements and Policies

In this section I code the level of threat perception in the ROK over the post-World War II era. I use evidence from Korean policy (military force structure, diplomacy, bilateral cooperation) and from Korean statements.

Early Period (1945-1964)

ROK threat perception of Japan was *moderate* in the immediate postwar period. In their statements Koreans expressed strong fears of Japanese aggression. During the Rhee era, Rhee said the threat from Japan was more menacing than the threat from Communist North Korea. Rhee talked about Japan's "ruthless ambitions" and said he feared a "renewal of Japanese dominion over our nation," saying that Japan wanted to "revive its colonial policies" in Korea.¹⁷¹ Foreign Minister Pyun Yong-tae said that Japan was intent on "reasserting its influence in Korea."¹⁷² Rhee protested to the Americans that Washington was allowing "Japanese imperialism" to grow under its protection, and that the United States should take care to prevent Japan from returning to "its old

¹⁷¹ Quoted in "The Recent and Prospective Foreign Relations of Japan (1956-61)," Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7331, Prepared by Division of Research for Far East, September 12, 1956, Declassified Documents Collection.

, Department of State, September 12, 1956. Declassified Documents Collection. Also see Rhee letter to President Eisenhower, December 29, 1954, in FRUS Korea Vol. XV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1984), 1937-1941; also Lee, *Japan and Korea: the Political Dimension*, p. 26.

militaristic ambition.”¹⁷³ During normalization negotiations, Korea opposed diplomatic normalization with Japan, fearing that Washington was only encouraging it to depart and “pass off” Korea to the Japanese. Victor Cha notes that Korean opposition to normalization stemmed from fears that it would “[subjugate] Korea once again to Japanese dominance.”¹⁷⁴

ROK threat perception of Japan during this period is also evident in Korean policies. The ROK fought a punishing war with North Korea from 1950-53; protecting itself against the imminent threat from Pyongyang remained South Korea’s first priority for its military planning.¹⁷⁵ However, because of fears of Japanese resurgence, the Koreans were concerned about maintaining military parity with the Japanese. Korean fears of falling militarily behind Japan were reflected in Korean diplomacy with the United States. Korean leaders negotiated with the Americans to refrain from rearming Japan, and to give Korea weaponry. A U.S. official reported “ROK appeals that...its army, air force, and navy be at least as strong as their projected Japanese counterparts.”¹⁷⁶ One U.S. State Department official noted Rhee's concerns about military parity with Japan but dismissed them, saying

The present disparity between some sixteen equipped and experienced ROK divisions and four partially equipped and organized Japanese divisions of internal security forces would speak for itself. We have promised President Rhee to help build up his army to approximately twenty divisions. If necessary, we can tell him that we know it will be a long time, if ever, before the Japanese reach any such level. However, President Rhee may complain that we have given more naval craft to Japan than to the ROK navy. This is correct. But we have also agreed to help him in supporting naval forces.¹⁷⁷

In sum, in the early period, ROK threat perception is evident in the desire of South Korean leaders to maintain military parity with Japan.

¹⁷² Memorandum of Conversation, October 17, 1952. FRUS Korea, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Part 1 (1984).

¹⁷³ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, pp. 27-28.

¹⁷⁴ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 33.

¹⁷⁵ The ROK fielded a large army, and a small air force and navy. Its ground forces consisted of 18 divisions, including 40 artillery battalions and 7 tank companies. Its small navy had only 6 destroyers and frigates, 12 minesweepers, and 44 smaller craft. Its air force was also small (one wing of F-86F fighter-bombers and one squadron of F-86D interceptors). All force data from *The Military Balance, 1961-62* (London: IISS, 1961), 23.

¹⁷⁶ Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Document no. 665, FRUS China/Japan, Volume XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), pp. 1465-1469.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Second, Korean opposition to even the barest minimum of bilateral cooperation with Tokyo—diplomatic normalization—reflects its strong fears of Japan. Negotiations for normalizing relations stretched out for fourteen years and were marked by an atmosphere of hostility and distrust. President Park Chung-hee's pragmatism won out; Park steered the two countries toward normalization, in light of pressure from the United States and the opportunity to use expanded trade and financial relations with Japan as an instrument of political patronage.¹⁷⁸ However Park, even within his own Cabinet, was very much the minority. As the two states moved toward normalization, most Koreans remained concerned about the dangers of opening the country up to its former oppressor.¹⁷⁹ They feared that the United States was engineering the normalization because it wanted to turn Korea over to Japan, and depart the region. Because of these fears, Korean students and intellectuals formed a national movement against normalization in March 1964. Korean cities were paralyzed by demonstrations throughout that spring; in June President Park Chung-hee had to declare martial law, and brought four army divisions into Seoul to restore order. Park's entire Cabinet also resigned. After the treaty was signed, Park conveyed a special session of the National Assembly to ratify it, and the opposition parties resigned en masse in protest. Park rammed the treaty through anyway in a secret session in which the opposition was not present. Thus aside from Park and very few others, Koreans opposed even the barest minimum of cooperation with Japan, fearing that Japan would benefit relatively more than Korea, and would use its advantage to dominate the country once again. This reflects perception of Japan as a potential threat to Korea. In sum, ROK statements and policies of the immediate postwar period reflect moderate threat perception of Japan.

Middle Period, 1965-80s

¹⁷⁸ Victor D. Cha, "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty." *Korean Studies* Vol. 20 (1996): 123-160.

¹⁷⁹ Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*, pp. 49-54.

ROK threat perception dropped in the middle period, specifically in the 1970s. Even in a period in which Koreans profoundly distrusted Japanese intentions, their statements reflect a new view that Japan was a valuable partner against the Communist threat in East Asia, and South Korean policies also reflect greater cooperation with Japan.

South Korean discussions of expanded Japanese military roles reflects Korean approbation rather than fear. ROK President Chun Doo-Hwan commented that “Japan should reinforce its defense capabilities not only to protect its territory but also to safeguard the peace of the region and to ensure the sea lanes will be kept open.”¹⁸⁰ The *Korea Herald* commented, “we were pleased” that Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki had accepted greater roles within the alliance.¹⁸¹ Similarly, Japan’s move to patrol the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles was called “a positive response” to pressure for burden-sharing from Washington.¹⁸² Some Korean hesitation was evident; the South Korean government noted that it “plans to closely watch Japan’s defense maneuvers” and requested that Tokyo consult Seoul in the event of any military operations near Korea.¹⁸³ One MND official noted that Japan’s increased military activity during this period “would cause a sense of insecurity” if it was a sign that the U.S. was looking to Japan to take over the role of regional hegemon.¹⁸⁴ An article expressed “certain misgivings about the possibility of Japan emerging again as a military power,” but noted that Japanese contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance would be a positive thing.¹⁸⁵ A Korean scholar wrote that “South Korea has expressed concern...about the possibility that Japan might undertake a military buildup either under U.S.

¹⁸⁰ Quoted in Soong-hoom Kil, “South Korean Policy Toward Japan,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, no. 2 (Spring 1983), p. 38.

¹⁸¹ “Japan’s Nuclear Allergy,” *Korea Herald*, May 23, 1981.

¹⁸² *Korea Herald*, May 10, 1981.

¹⁸³ “Government to Watch Japan’s Naval Maneuvers,” Yonhap, January 26, 1983, in FBIS Asia/Pacific, South Korea, same date.

¹⁸⁴ Park Yong-Ok, “Korean-Japanese-American Triangle: Problems and Prospects,” RAND Report P-7138 (September 1985).

¹⁸⁵ “Japan Urged to Boost Defense Capabilities,” *Korea Times*, May 19, 1981.

pressure or under her own nationalistic mood,” which was a subject of concern because “South Korea recalls how a militarily strong Japan was a direct threat to her.”¹⁸⁶

South Korean policies also reflect that Japan was regarded as less threatening. First, South Koreans did not show any signs of pursuing military parity with Japan (who was undertaking a substantial military buildup starting in the late 1970s). South Korean force structure reflects that the ROK was focused on countering the North Korean ground threat. The ROK pursued a major military modernization project during this time (the Force Improvement Plan of 1975). However, this plan—including its modernization of maritime capabilities—had nothing to do with Japan; it was totally geared toward North Korea.¹⁸⁷ In sum, ROK military planning during this period was focused on combating a North Korean ground threat; Seoul was not trying to achieve parity in maritime forces with Japan.

Second, South Korean policies toward Japan grew much more cooperative during this period.¹⁸⁸ An MND official notes that in this period, “a phenomenal expansion in Korean-Japanese military contacts is noticeable.”¹⁸⁹ In 1979 Japanese Defense Agency head Yamashita Ganri made a historic visit to Seoul (the first high-level military official to conduct talks with the ROK). At this meeting, defense chiefs discussed closer security ties between the two nations. ROK newspaper coverage welcomed Japan's new recognition of the need for ROK-Japan security ties, citing the desirability of expanding trilateral cooperation. One article noted Japan's limitations on such cooperation due to constitutional restrictions, but nonetheless urged Japan to make “substantial contributions to the regional security system in logistical support and exchanges of

¹⁸⁶ Kil, “South Korean Policy Toward Japan,” p. 43.

¹⁸⁷ The ROK president announced that the FIP's goal was to “[secure] a defense capability to repel North Korean aggression.” The \$5.5 billion program was directed at military procurement of ground forces, and some improvements of naval and air forces. See Korean Overseas Information Service, *A Handbook of Korea* (Seoul: 1978), p. 451. The naval improvements were not related to Japan: “under the five-year modernization plan, emphasis was placed on upgrading the ability of the fleet to counter the fast vessels, often disguised as fishing boats, that were employed by North Korean infiltrators.” *Area Handbook of ROK*, 1975, 354. For details of the FIP see [Sneider, 1979 #530, Ch. 6]. The ROK military buildup was also fueled by the fear that the United States was withdrawing its troops under the Carter Administration. See Cha 1999, 163-68.

¹⁸⁸ On patterns in ROK-Japanese cooperation see Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*.

¹⁸⁹ Park, “Korean-Japanese-American Triangle: Problems and Prospects,” p. 14.

military intelligence,” as well in defense industries.¹⁹⁰ In 1983, Japan and the ROK had their first presidential summits ever. That year, after the USSR shot down a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet, the ROK sought “increased defense cooperation with the United States and Japan to check the Soviet military expansion in the Far East,” citing Seoul’s “strong desire to strengthen tripartite cooperation among Korea, the United States, and Japan.” An article noted that although “Japan has been reluctant to have any form of military connection with Korea,” perhaps the incident of Soviet aggression would lead it to reconsider.¹⁹¹ One scholar, noting the changing military balance in the region, argues that Tokyo and Seoul should increase their security cooperation. Another article noted, “Korea and Japan exist in the northeast Asian context. When looked at from this broader perspective, the two countries are required to bury ill-feelings and work hard in close cooperation in two important enterprises, one vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the other vis-à-vis North Korea.”¹⁹² Thus South Korean policies during this middle period reflects decreased threat perception of Japan.

Late Period, 1990s-00s

As reflected in ROK policies and statements, South Korean threat perception of Japan in the late period is also *low*, however Koreans appear to be thinking about Japan as a potential long-term threat.

Threat Perception Currently Low

In their statements, Koreans say that Japan does not currently pose a threat to the ROK. One professor noted, “Japan is not a source of threat from the ROK perspective.”¹⁹³ Another said, “I don’t see a Japanese threat because they don’t have the military capability right now.”¹⁹⁴ The

¹⁹⁰ “Regional Security,” *Korea Times*, July 26, 1979.

¹⁹¹ “Trilateral Military Ties Urged,” *Korea Herald*, September 6, 1983, 1.

¹⁹² Kil, “Two Aspects of Korea-Japan Relations,” p. 509.

¹⁹³ Personal Interview, Korea University, October 2000.

¹⁹⁴ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

Director of the MND's study group on military modernization commented, "Certainly I don't see Japan as a threat today."¹⁹⁵ Another member of the RMA group comments, "I don't think a direct Japanese military challenge is a threat to us. I am optimistic about Korea-Japan relations. We have enjoyed the benefits of close relations for a long time, and our relationship benefits us mutually. Even with much animosity toward Japan, I think practically we need each other."¹⁹⁶ A KIDA analyst commented that Japan did not pose a threat to Japan as long as Tokyo continued its policy of "defensive defense."¹⁹⁷ Another defense analyst noted, "If Japan's policies of self-defense change then this will be a threat to the ROK, but they aren't right now."¹⁹⁸

Current South Korean policies also do not reflect threat perception of Japan. First, South Korean military force structure has not attempted to prepare for a Japanese threat. Japan's Self Defense Forces have strong maritime capabilities, but little land attack capability.¹⁹⁹ The ROK military continues to be overwhelmingly geared to a North Korean ground threat; its maritime forces are weak. ROK military forces are concentrated in ground weaponry and personnel. Out of 672,000 active duty military personnel, 560,000 of these are ground troops.²⁰⁰ The ROK is strong on tanks, artillery, and anti-armor assets.

Second, low South Korean fears of Japan are reflected in Seoul's efforts to continue expanding Japan-ROK security cooperation during this period. Most Korean analysts speak approvingly of increased security cooperation with Tokyo, saying that closer ties would reduce tensions and promote regional stability.²⁰¹ South Koreans are very enthusiastic about cooperating with Japan within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, or within regional multilateral security institutions—which they strongly support developing. And, as Victor Cha has argued, the two

¹⁹⁵ Personal Interview, MND, October 2000.

¹⁹⁶ Personal Interview, MND, October 2000.

¹⁹⁷ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000

¹⁹⁸ Personal Interview, IFANS, October 2000.

¹⁹⁹ Lind, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy."

²⁰⁰ IISS, 2000-2001.

²⁰¹ For several writings to this effect see articles in Ralph Cossa, ed., *U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a 'Virtual Alliance'* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1999).

states in the past have at different times succeeded in expanding their security cooperation.²⁰² The ROK and Japan recently began to conduct joint exercises; they conducted a search-and-rescue drill for the first time in 1999, and since then have conducted them biannually.²⁰³ Thus the two states cooperate in many ways, and Koreans are interested in expanding this cooperation.

A Future Japanese Threat?

Although South Koreans do not currently view Japan as a threat, their statements and long-term policy planning and statements reflect that they are worried about a potential Japanese threat in the future. First, in South Korean defense planning for the post-unification era, trends in Korean military procurement reflect increased attention to a Japanese threat. In August 2000 the Ministry of National Defense (MND) issued a pamphlet, “National Security and the Defense Budget in the 21st Century,” that described necessary ROK military modernization.²⁰⁴ The document argues that the future Korean military should be smaller, but more modern, with high technology weaponry and the ability to exploit information technology. The document argues that the ROK faces a threat from North Korea in the short term, and threats from regional powers in the long term. In the pamphlet the MND notes that Korea cannot match the strength of Japan or any of the other great powers—nor would it be desirable to try. But, Korea needs to have minimum adequate strength to deter these forces.

Korean long-term defense planning reflects an emphasis on maritime rather than ground power. Military reform includes the creation of a more balanced force, with less emphasis on ground capabilities and more emphasis on air and naval forces. An MND official argues, “Our military is not balanced; it’s too heavy on ground forces. So it’s natural in this situation to start to develop our navy.”²⁰⁵ ROK maritime modernization projects include advanced destroyers (the

²⁰² Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*.

²⁰³ On Japan-ROK military contacts see David Ivison, “S. Korea Halts Military Links With Japan,” *Financial Times*, July 13, 2001; “Korea, Japan Resume Naval Exercise,” *Korea Times*, September 12, 2002.

²⁰⁴ In Korean, *21 Segiui Gukka Anbowa Gukbangbi*. (Translated by LTC Jiyul Kim, U.S. Army Fellow, KIDA.) Portions of document were published in the *Dong-a Ilbo*, August 19-20, 2000.

²⁰⁵ Personal Interview, MND, October 2000.

3900-ton KDX destroyer, the nearly 5000-ton KDX-II destroyer, and the AEGIS-capable KDX-III destroyer for advanced air defense).²⁰⁶ (Interestingly, the KDX-II destroyer will be named “Yi Sun-shin,” in honor of the famous Korean admiral who defeated the Japanese fleet.)²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the ROK Navy also seeks to purchase “a submarine capable of operating further from South Korean shores.”²⁰⁸ Thus in military planning for the post-unification era, the ROK is building up its maritime power.

Observers of ROK defense planning argue that Koreans seem to be planning for the post-unification period. One article comments, “most of the weapons systems South Korea is looking to buy are not focused exclusively on North Korea, but have more strategic applications to defend against a possible Chinese or Japanese threat.”²⁰⁹ *Jane’s Defence Weekly* notes that the ROK is exhibiting “an effort to develop a more balanced force, with increased emphasis on maritime and air capabilities that would find limited application in an intra-Korean conflict.”²¹⁰ Thus observers of ROK military planning note Korea’s focus on maritime threats for the post-unification era.

ROK statements also reflect the view that Japan will be seen as the next security threat to Korea. Among elites, two rationales can be heard for trends in long-term defense planning; both involve Japan, either directly or indirectly. First, many Koreans identify Japan as the next threat to Korea. The MND’s “National Security and the Defense Budget in the 21st Century” identified principal regional threats as Japan and China. It cited that Japan has the money and technology to build a superior military force. Japan has already committed itself to acquiring AWACS, Aegis, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the advanced F-2 fighter. One Korean military analyst writes, “it is well known that Japan has the technological capability and the financial resources to go

²⁰⁶ Sah Dong-seok, “Seoul to begin building 7,000-ton Aegis Class Destroyer Next Year,” *Korea Times*, October 3, 2000.

²⁰⁷ Yi Chong-hun, “Submarine Christened ‘Yi Sun-shin-ham’ *Sisa Journal*, June 4, 1998, in FBIS South Korea, June 5, 1998. The *Sisa Journal* is a popular weekly devoted to current events.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Robert Wall, “Korea Détente No Bar to Military Buys,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 18, 2000, 38.

²¹⁰ “New Interests Spur Force Development,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, May 22, 1996, 23.

beyond its agreed task of protecting waters within a perimeter of 1,000 nautical miles from the island of Honshu.”²¹¹ Many proponents of the ROK’s submarine program specify Japan as the central threat at which this program is aimed. An analyst writes that the ROK would be outmatched in a war over the Tokdo Islands; “because of its absolutely inferior naval power, the ROK Army cannot land on Japanese soil,” and Japanese air defenses are too formidable for ROK fighters to attack Japan.²¹² Analysts have also noted that the KDX and the long-stalled next-generation submarine projects was approved only after a 1996 crisis with Japan over Tokdo/Takeshima, in which the ROK navy was criticized for its inferiority to Japanese naval forces.²¹³ These programs were later scaled back after Korean budgetary woes in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.²¹⁴ Therefore the view that Korea needs to prepare for a future Japanese military threat is present in South Korean defense debates.

Second, Korean analysts talk about the need for Korea to prepare for an indirect threat from Japan. That is, they argue that Korea must defend itself from getting caught up in great-power competition. Elites frequently highlight 19th century Korean history, in which China, Russia, and Japan competed for influence on the peninsula, usually razing Korea in the process. In interviews, numerous elites said that Korea is an “avenue” or a “boulevard” or a “thoroughfare” that great powers cross in order to fight each other. The Director of the MND’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Group—tasked with recommending direction for reform for the ROK military—argues that Korea must have the military capability to deter great-power intervention as has been the case over history.

²¹¹ Seo-hang Lee, “Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: the Case of Korea,” *Korea Focus*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1997), p. 31.

²¹² *Sisa Journal*, April 30, 1998, pp. 50-53. In FBIS South Korea, May 7, 1998.

²¹³ One scholar notes that although ROK Admiral An had long been seeking approval for the program, it was not granted until 1996, when “The incident of Tok-to occurred. Japan claimed its territorial rights over Tokdo...This brought a flood of self-criticism that our Navy was hopelessly behind Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces. For Mr. An, it was like acquiring an ally.” Kim Min-sok, “Drifting Next-Generation Submarine Project: Too Busy Reading the Feelings of Strong Conglomerates and Big Powers,” *Wolgan Chungang*, May 8, 1999. In FBIS South Korea, same date.

²¹⁴ See Shim Jae Hoon, “South Korean Projects May Face Further Delays,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, April 11, 2001.

When Korea is unified someday, we will face the same threats we faced before—Korea will be between powerful continental and maritime powers. If Korea is strong enough it will work as a stabilizer between two great powers; if it is not strong enough, then Korea will again be used as an avenue (one direction or another) between the great powers. This is the threat to us. I explain our military plans by saying we don't want Korea to be this avenue anymore, so we need to be strong enough to deny an attempt by either side.²¹⁵

Korean analysts argue that one indirect threat to Korea is disruption in the sea-lanes that could adversely affect Korean trade. Korean naval expansion is seen as necessary to ensure that the sea-lanes remain open. Writes one analyst from the Sejong Institute,

The defense of major maritime trade routes has been greatly emphasized in recent years. Korea's economic viability depends almost entirely on sea-borne foreign trade...[this has] contributed greatly to greater interest in defense of sea-lanes....South Korea has moved unilaterally to secure shipping in its own waters.²¹⁶

Admiral Kang Tok-dong comments that "Korea needs to place top priority on building up its navy to secure sea lanes in the event of a crisis in the Pacific or a threat from a neighboring power."²¹⁷

He commented that "In the event of a conflict, the ROK Navy would be required to keep an assertion of maritime power by an aggressor country at bay and protect the country's sea traffic."²¹⁸ With this maritime mission in mind, ROK analysts argue that the ROK military must be reformed. A former MND Vice-Minister comments,

We need to prepare for a new political environment after unification. Korea is surrounded by great powers, and we need to be wary of them. We have this huge number of ground forces that will no longer be meaningful in the new situation. So we need to modernize our forces.²¹⁹

Thus Korean analysts argue that a future threat to Korea is great-power competition (among Japan and the region's other large states). To prepare for this threat, Korea needs to maintain a capable army and build up its currently low level of maritime power.

Koreans say they need to build up for an uncertain future, but it is significant that their prescription for this uncertainty is to build up greater maritime power. Japan clearly has the most

²¹⁵ Personal Interview, October 2000.

²¹⁶ Seo-hang Lee, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," p. 29.

²¹⁷ "Admiral Says Top Priority Should be Building Navy," *Korea Times*, May 1, 1998.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000.

powerful maritime forces in the region; China has weak maritime capabilities.²²⁰ Any Chinese threat to Korea would come across its land border with the unified Korean state. Korea is not currently talking about the need to maintain a high level of ground capabilities; rather, it is talking about shifting efforts away from ground power into maritime forces. This reflects increased attention to threats from Japan, rather than from China.

As evident in poll data, the ROK general public clearly believes that Japan is the next security threat to Korea. Lee Sook-jong, of the Sejong Institute (that conducted a 1995 poll) writes,

it would seem that regardless of age or education, fully half of all South Koreans view Japan as the most likely threat to South Korea's security, which is reflected in the widespread concern among many South Koreans toward Japan's remilitarization.²²¹

Lee notes that in response to questions about future ROK security options (i.e. ally with the U.S., unilaterally reinforce the ROK's own self-defense capability, or pursue regional security),

the survey found certain correlations between which countries were perceived as posing a threat to South Korea and what South Korea's security response should be... The most popular opinion, reflected in about one-third of the responses, combined the view that Japan poses the greatest threat to South Korea and that South Korea should reinforce its self-defense capability.²²²

In a poll conducted by the *Chun-an Ilbo* newspaper in 1996, when asked who was the most likely security threat to the ROK in the future, 60% of Koreans answered Japan; 18.9% answered China, followed by the United States and Russia at 6.8 and 4.9%.²²³ In a 1996 poll conducted by RAND, 54% of respondents said the "greatest future danger to Korea's military security" was Japan, followed by China at 33% of respondents.²²⁴ Also in the RAND poll, a large majority of Koreans said that if Japan acquired nuclear weapons, Korea should as well.²²⁵ In 1996, 92 percent took this

²²⁰ Lind, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Security Policy"; Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-219.

²²¹ 53 percent of those surveyed identified Japan as the most threatening country in the future; 24 percent indicated China; 15 percent indicated the United States; 8 percent indicated Russia. Sook-jong Lee, "Korean Perceptions and National Security," *Korea Focus* Vol. 3, no. 4 (July/August 1995), p. 17.

²²² Lee, "Korean Perceptions and National Security," p. 19

²²³ http://bric.postech.ac.kr/bbs.daily/krnews/200109_2/20010921_4.html

²²⁴ Norman D. Levin, *The Shape of Korea's Future: South Korean Attitudes toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), p. 18.

²²⁵ Levin, *The Shape of Korea's Future*.

position, and this fell off slightly to 87 percent in 1999. Thus, poll data reflect fears of Japan as the next threat to Korea.

Evidence of Public/Elite Divergence in Perception of Japanese Threat

Among Koreans, the public evinces a much more visceral dislike and fear of Japan than is apparent among Korean elites. A member of the ROK National Security Council comments, “There is a big divide between the people and the government about threat perception. The people focus on the past historical legacy so they fear Japan. But government officials feel quite comfortable working with Japan.”²²⁶ Korean elites do say that Japan would pose a threat outside of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but otherwise do not see it as threatening. Fears among Korean elites about a Japanese threat tend to be indirect (e.g., Korea caught between a Sino-Japanese rivalry); Korean elites are more likely to express fears of China than fears of Japan. Korean elites say that Japan might be more threatening to Korea in the future, but until that point arrives, ROK elites are in favor of security cooperation with Japan; they see Japan as a potential ally against a potentially hostile China. One scholar comments, “I think our goal should be to build up against nonspecific threats—don’t define which country it will be. We can be a junior balancer in the region along with the United States. China and Japan perceive threats from each other, but threats to the ROK are not clear.”²²⁷ Thus Korean elites perceive a lower level of threat from Japan than does the Korean public. I explain this divergence in the next section on reasoning.

In sum, this section has coded ROK threat perception of Japan since World War II. I argue that South Koreans perceived a *moderate* level of threat in the immediate postwar period, and that threat perception dropped in the 1970s, and has remained *low* thereafter.

²²⁶ Personal Interview, Blue House, October 2000.

²²⁷ Personal Interview, Korea University, October 2000.

How Koreans Assess a Japanese Threat: Reasoning

Throughout the post-World War II period, Koreans tied their assessments of a Japanese threat to Japanese capabilities. They explicitly connect their assessment of threat to the existence of constraints imposed on Japanese capabilities by the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Early Period (1945-64)

Moderate ROK threat perception of Japan in the immediate postwar period was due to two factors: fears that the Americans were going to depart the region—leaving South Korea in the hands of the Japanese—and fears of Japanese rearmament.

Fears of Unconstrained Japan

During this period, South Korean insecurities about the possibility that the United States would leave the region were evident in their statements, in their constant seeking of assurances that the United States would guarantee its security, and in South Korean debates about normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. First, Foreign Minister Pyun Yong-tae noted that “the possible courses for America to pursue in the Orient may include leaving it to the domination of Japan, a course already tried...”²²⁸ In an article entitled “Is Uncle Sam to Usher the Japs Back?”, Pyun argued that the United States “may bid Korea good-bye at any moment.”²²⁹ Rhee constantly pressed American diplomats to clarify that the Mutual Defense Treaty would “guarantee the ROK against Japanese aggression.”²³⁰ In a 1953 *aide-memoire* to President Rhee, the State Department confirmed that “The Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea applies to attacks from any quarter,” and that “we can assure the Koreans that we will not tolerate in the future the resumption of any aggressive or oppressive measures by the Japanese in economic, political, or military fields

²²⁸ Pyun, *Korea: My Country*, p. 64.

²²⁹ Quoted in Pyun, *Korea: My Country*, p. 83.

²³⁰ Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Document no. 665, FRUS China/Japan, Volume XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), pp. 1465-1469

concerning Korea.”²³¹ In a 1954 letter to President Eisenhower, Rhee sought additional security guarantees against a Japanese threat. Rhee lobbied for a non-aggression pact between the United States, ROK, and Japan. He argued,

Should any of the three become an aggressor, the other two would combat that aggression. Such an accord, seriously entered into by the three nations, should assure their peaceful and friendly relationship for the foreseeable future. Once this were signed, Korea may be prepared to negotiate a commercial agreement with Japan and enter into amicable social and cultural exchanges. On this basis, the anti-Communist position in north Asia would be greatly strengthened.²³²

Thus ROK fears of Japan are apparent in its constant quest for security guarantees from the United States.

Second, South Korean fears of abandonment by the United States were also evident in debates over the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in the 1950s and early 1960s. Many Koreans opposed normalization of relations because they feared that Washington’s enthusiasm for normalization was rooted in the American desire to hand-off their “unstable stepchild” to the Japanese.²³³ It should be noted that after a half-century of American internationalism, interventionism, and later primacy, this view might appear paranoid; however, in the 1950s Koreans only knew that a half-century before, the United States had made an agreement with Tokyo to give Japan a free hand in Korea (the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905); and then, in the years after World War II, prominent American leaders proclaimed Korea as outside of the U.S. security perimeter.²³⁴

Koreans frequently expressed fears that normalization would lead the United States to quit the region, leaving Korea to suffer Japanese domination once again. ROK Foreign Minister Lee Dong-Won said that Koreans were concerned that normalization with Japan would lead the U.S. to

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Rhee letter to President Eisenhower, December 29, 1954. In FRUS Korea Vol. XV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1984), 1937-1941.

²³³ Phrase used in Memorandum from Robert W. Komer to President Johnson, National Security Council, July 31, 1964. Declassified Documents Collection, Johnson Library.

²³⁴ General Douglas MacArthur made statements to this effect in 1949. Dean Acheson’s famous security perimeter speech was delivered in January 1950 at the National Press Club. See Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 355-358. Senator Tom Connally’s similar remarks appear in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, 64-66.

downgrade its commitment to the ROK.²³⁵ Korean Ambassador Il Kwon Chung, in a discussion with President Kennedy, “raised the question of whether or not our interest in the ROK-Japanese settlement presaged a reduction of U.S. commitments and an attempt to shift the responsibility to Japan.”²³⁶ A subsequent Korean ambassador to the United States reported “apprehensions among the Korean people” that after normalization, “the role of the United States of America in supporting Korea would be shifted to Japan. Therefore, a reassurance by the United States of continuous support to Korea is necessary.”²³⁷ Yun Po-sun, a former ROK President, stated that a plan that gave Japan responsibility for Korea was like expecting “a loan shark to do philanthropic work.”²³⁸

American policy makers commented on ROK fears of Japan, and the need to reassure the South Koreans that the United States would not abandon it after normalization. Early in the negotiations, a U.S. State Department report noted that Rhee, “is convinced that there is a group in the American Embassy in Tokyo which wants to give Korea back to Japan.”²³⁹ Similarly, President Eisenhower protested when he heard Koreans express fears of Japan, and said that “the United States sent its men...to protect Korea [in 1950]. He could not conceive how we could be accused of trying to make Koreans bow their necks to the Japanese.”²⁴⁰ After a trip to Seoul, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that Koreans feared “that the Japanese economic cooperation which is to follow the normalization of the relations between the two countries may result in a reduction of United States assistance to Korea.”²⁴¹ The State Department reported that one

²³⁵ Quoted in Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 32.

²³⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, October 9, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Volume XXII (China-Korea-Japan), Document 21.

²³⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, January 21, 1964. FRUS 1964-68, Volume XXIV, Korea, Document 333.

²³⁸ Yun Po-sun, “Debates on Gains and Losses at the Final Stage,” *Choson Ilbo*, March 18, 1965. Translated in Kim 1971, 106.

²³⁹ Report of John M. Allison, Document No. 620, December 5, 1952. FRUS 1952-54, Vol. XIV, China/Japan, Part II (1985), 1367.

²⁴⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, July 29, 1954. FRUS 1952-54, Volume XIV, Japan, Document 781, 1688.

²⁴¹ Airgram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, February 5, 1964. FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XXIV, Korea, Document 3.

“widespread fear” was that “with normalization US would attempt shift burden of Korea to Japan and perhaps ‘abandon’ Korea.”²⁴² Victor Cha writes that the anti-treaty movement in Korea “rested on the argument that the American motive in forging a normalization pact was to shed commitments in the ROK, thereby subjugating Korea once again to Japanese dominance.”²⁴³ Thus Korean threat perception of Japan during the early period was in large part due to Korean doubt in the durability of the U.S. presence.

Fears of Japanese Power

In the early postwar period, because Koreans were afraid that the United States was going to depart, they objected to Japan increasing its military capabilities. They also feared Japan’s superior economic power.

ROK President Rhee was alarmed by the U.S. Cold War strategy of rebuilding and rearming Japan as an ally; he urged Washington to not follow this policy. Rhee complained that “Japanese imperialism is now growing under the protection of the United States” and that instead of rearming Japan, the United States should support South Korea to prevent Japan from reviving “its old militaristic ambition.”²⁴⁴ Rhee wrote to President Eisenhower, “American development of renewed power in Japan cannot but be regarded by all Oriental peoples as hastening the time when they must once again prepare to resist or be victimized by a resurgence of Japanese imperialism.”²⁴⁵ While meeting with Dulles, “Rhee complained that it was not wise to build up Japan economically and militarily.” ROK Foreign Minister Pyun Yong-tae also noted that among Koreans, “increased concern had been caused by the action of the United States in building up Japan, both economically and militarily.”²⁴⁶

²⁴² Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, May 12, 1964, in FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XXIV, Korea, Document 341.

²⁴³ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 33.

²⁴⁴ Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea*, pp. 27-28.

²⁴⁵ Rhee to President Eisenhower, July 11, 1953, FRUS Korea, 1952-54, Vol. XV, Part 2, p. 1368-69.

²⁴⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, October 17, 1952. FRUS Korea, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Part 1 (1984).

The Americans also noted Rhee's fear of Japanese rearmament. Dulles responded to Rhee by saying that the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty would protect Korea from Japan as well as from the Soviet Union, that the United States also wanted to prevent Japan from again becoming 'a dominant power,' and that Japanese-Korean cooperation was needed for the security of the Western Pacific."²⁴⁷ Dulles argued about

the need for President Rhee to change his thinking regarding Japan in order to take account of Japan's status and importance....both Korea and the United States should look at the situation as a whole, because it is necessary to recognize that Japan must be allowed to live. If Japan goes communist, Korea will be lost....President Rhee must recognize as a problem of ROK national security the necessity for keeping the Japanese economy viable and strong.

Another American official noted,

After some forty years of severe Japanese domination of Korea, the Korean emotional reaction to Japan and the Japanese is understandable. However, it is necessary for the United States and Korea, both of which suffered from Japanese imperialism, to recognize the realities of the present-day world and look to the future.²⁴⁸

A U.S. State Department official noted President Rhee's complaints that U.S. rearmament of Japan "will lead to the imperialism he fears."²⁴⁹ Thus American officials noted South Korean apprehensions toward Japan at this time.

Koreans also expressed fears of Japan's superior economic power potential. This was a major theme during debates over diplomatic normalization with Japan. Although normalization promised increased opportunities for Japanese aid and for trade relations, the Koreans did not view normalization as having mutually beneficial results. By the end of the 1950s the Japanese economy had recovered and was beginning its stunning growth. Korea, on the other hand, languished. The Koreans feared Japan would benefit relatively more than they from normalization, and that—as in the colonial period—Koreans would be exploited by Tokyo and its large conglomerates. ROK President Park Chung-hee commented to U.S. leaders, "It was a fact that some knowledgeable people in Korea expressed concern at possible Japanese economic aggression if relations were

²⁴⁷ Editorial Note, Department of State, FRUS China/Japan, Volume XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), p. 1465-1469.

²⁴⁸ Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Document no. 665, FRUS China/Japan, Volume XIV, 1952-1954, Part 2 (1985), pp. 1465-1469

normalized, especially in view of past history.”²⁵⁰ An American CIA report noted that “Koreans distrust the Japanese and...fear that Japan’s economic strength might lead to renewed domination by Tokyo.”²⁵¹ Dean Rusk noted, “The Koreans fear that an influx of the Japanese capital into Korea may result in what may be called “an economic invasion” by Japan.”²⁵² Thus during the immediate postwar period, Korean feared that the United States was going to quit the region, and as a result also feared increases in Japanese power.

Later Periods (1965-2000)

The decline in ROK threat perception since the first period was due to the fact that the U.S.-Japan alliance appeared increasingly durable. Evidence for this is apparent in several kinds of statements. First, South Koreans said they viewed the United States as a constraint on Japanese capabilities. They said that absent the United States, they would fear Japanese power. Second, Koreans expressed approval of any policies that strengthened the health of the U.S. –Japan alliance. Furthermore, South Korean moves to prepare for a possible Japanese threat in the future are linked to uncertainty about the U.S. presence in East Asia.

The United States as a Constraint on Japanese Capabilities

During the middle period, the United States military presence was viewed as an important restraint on Japanese capabilities. Korean observers made clear that they only approved of Japan’s taking on greater military capabilities and roles as long as these remained confined to the U.S.–Japan alliance. A scholar noted that Japan should only “augment U.S. military capabilities, if and when some of the U.S. military units now deployed in the Western Pacific have to be shifted elsewhere in

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, November 14, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. XXII (China-Korea-Japan), Document 246.

²⁵¹ Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “The Future of Korean-Japanese Relations,” March 18, 1966, Declassified Documents Collection.

²⁵² Airgram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, February 5, 1964. FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XXIV, Korea, Document 3.

an emergency. It should not replace the U.S. presence in the area. Also, Japan's Self-Defense Forces should be integrated into the U.S. defense network."²⁵³ An article commented, "we have to be frank that there are certain misgivings about the possibility of Japan emerging again as a military power... Nonetheless, Japan should play a positive role... to contribute to the stability and peace of the western Pacific."²⁵⁴ Tokyo's announcement that it would be responsible for blockading Korea's straits in the event of war in the region was not considered threatening because it was taken within the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. One article noted, "Japan's plan for blockading the straits... should be understood from such a viewpoint."²⁵⁵ An MND official writes,

The Japanese defense buildup effort and regional security role can contribute to Korean security and stability if the U.S. remains a mighty Pacific power, [and] if Japan increases her defense capability in such a way as to augment the U.S. regional strategy.²⁵⁶

He also argued that if American plans for "an increased military role for Japan" were part of "the American strategic design either to reduce their defense burden or to fill a power vacuum in Northeast Asia... it might cause a sense of insecurity in both Korea and Japan over the years to come."²⁵⁷ Thus in the middle period, the U.S. -Japan alliance was viewed as an important constraint on Japanese capabilities.

In the late period, Korean elites also perceive a low level of threat from Japan because they see Japanese capabilities as contained by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Elites explicitly state that the alliance is a "cork" in the Japanese bottle.²⁵⁸ Korean elites said that if Japan were to end the U.S.-

²⁵³ Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security Role," p. 115.

²⁵⁴ "Japan Urged to Boost Defense Capabilities," *Korea Times*, May 19, 1981.

²⁵⁵ "The Plan for Blockade of the Korea Strait and Our Stand," *Kyonghyang Sinmun*, January 26, 1983. In FBIS Asia/Pacific, South Korea, January 28, 1983.

²⁵⁶ Yong-Ok Park, "Japan's Defense Buildup and Regional Balance," *Korea Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. 3, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 98.

²⁵⁷ Yong-Ok Park, "Korean-Japanese-American Triangle: Problems and Prospects," RAND Report P-7138 (September 1985).

²⁵⁸ This saying was made famous by the blunt statement of U.S. Major General Henry C. Stackpole. Stackpole, commander of the 3rd Marine Division in Japan, commented in a 1990 *Washington Post* interview that U.S. forces were like a "cork" that keeps "a rearmed, resurgent Japan... in the bottle."

Japan alliance, they would fear the buildup of Japanese power that would certainly ensue. One scholar wrote,

The presence of U.S. forces in Japan at present is not so much to protect Japan as to contribute to the stability of the entire Asian region by restraining Japanese power and applying political control over it...the U.S. military presence in Japan is regarded...as a restraint against the revival of Japanese militarism or imperialism. This is why plans to scale down the U.S. military presence tend to heighten fears that Japan may become a military superpower.²⁵⁹

A KIDA analyst called the US-Japan alliance a “safety valve to prevent Japan from emerging as a military power.”²⁶⁰ A MOFAT official noted, “If U.S. forces leave, then Japan will want to build up its military, and we’ll be in trouble...As long as the U.S. relationship is maintained, I don’t worry about Japan.”²⁶¹ Another MOFAT official noted, “Our threat perception in the future depends on how U.S. policy in the region evolves. We would worry about a Japanese buildup to defend themselves; they already have strong capabilities, but these could grow...”²⁶² Another MOFAT official noted, “Japanese capabilities are already very high, but we don’t worry about them as long as U.S. leadership is maintained.”²⁶³ Two Korean scholars, conducting a survey of the Korean-language international relations literature on Japan, concluded that “Korean scholars view Japan as a strong military power (but not as a military great power) who wants to expand its power by military means. The majority of IR experts in Korea recognize the limits of Japanese military power under the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.”²⁶⁴ One scholar wrote,

the Japanese defense buildup effort and regional security role can contribute to Korean security and stability if the U.S. remains a mighty Pacific power, if Japan increases her defense capability in a way as to augment the U.S. regional strategy, and if the Korea-U.S. military cooperative relationship is firmly maintained.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁹ Rhee Kyu-ho, “A Review of Korea-Japan Relations,” *Shin Dong-a Monthly*, February 1995, translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1995), p. 21.

²⁶⁰ Personal Interview, October 2000.

²⁶¹ Personal Interview, MOFAT, October 2000.

²⁶² Personal Interview, MOFAT, Asia-Pacific Affairs section, October 2000.

²⁶³ Personal Interview, MOFAT, October 2000.

²⁶⁴ Choon Kun Lee and Jung Ho Bae, “Korean Perspectives on Security in the Post Cold War Era: analysis through the selected writings of Korean scholars on international relations,” presented at Korean Association in International Studies/Japanese Association of International Relations Conference, September 11, 1999, Tokyo, Japan.

²⁶⁵ Yong-Ok Park, “Japan’s Defense Buildup and Regional Balance,” p. 98.

The scholar noted that if the United States were to reduce its military presence “so as to encourage a rapid expansion of the Japanese military capability and regional role...it would adversely influence Korean security as well as...regional stability.”²⁶⁶ In its 1990 and 1991 Korean annual Defense White Papers, Korea’s Ministry of National Defense declared, “Japan’s expanding role for regional peace and stability is increasingly becoming cause for concern to its neighbors. As long as it is pursued within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security cooperation, however, the larger Japanese role will contribute directly and indirectly to the balance of military power, the protection of SLOCs and war deterrence in the region.”²⁶⁷ Thus among Korean elites, threat perception of Japan is low because the U.S.-Japan alliance is viewed as an important constraint on Japanese military power.

Korean elites argue that absent the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan would build up its military power, and that this would be threatening to Korea. One professor noted, “Japan is not a source of threat from the ROK perspective. It would be if it builds up its military, but it’s not right now.”²⁶⁸ Another said, “I don’t see a Japanese threat because they don’t have the military capability right now. They could soon; they already have a pretty strong military.”²⁶⁹ The Director of the MND’s study group on military modernization commented, “someday Japan may be a threat if it builds up its military. Certainly I don’t see them as a threat today; I just need to consider them a potential threat.”²⁷⁰ A KIDA analyst commented that as long as Japan continued its policy of “defensive defense,” he did not fear Japan; however, “if they start changing this policy, then it becomes a threat to the ROK.”²⁷¹ Thus Korean elites argue that absent the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan would build up its military power, and that such a buildup would be threatening to Korea.

²⁶⁶ Park, “Japan’s Defense Buildup and Regional Balance,” p. 99.

²⁶⁷ *Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1990).

²⁶⁸ Personal Interview, Korea University, October 2000.

²⁶⁹ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

²⁷⁰ Personal Interview, MND, October 2000.

²⁷¹ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000

Approval of Policies that Strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Because they see the U.S.-Japan alliance as the major factor that prevents Japan from threatening the ROK, Koreans approve of measures to strengthen it. Thus Koreans approved of Japan's military buildup and new military roles in the 1980s, which Americans were demanding at the time in response to the increased Soviet threat in East Asia.²⁷² One article pointed out that "in the face of the growing Soviet military buildup in the region," there was a need for "a substantive boost in Japan's defense capabilities...to safeguard the U.S.-led defense framework in northeast Asia and the western Pacific."²⁷³ Another scholar writes, "More than anything, it is the Reagan administration, with an eye toward the Soviet Union, that is pushing Japan to increase military spending and assume a greater defense role."²⁷⁴ In response to a Japanese domestic scandal that erupted over the revelation that American warships docking at Japanese ports had been equipped with nuclear weapons, an editorial mocked Japanese reactions and urged Tokyo to get its priorities straight. It said, "We hope that the current controversy will awaken the Japanese to the need for revising their three non-nuclear principles."²⁷⁵

Media coverage of the 1981 meeting between Ronald Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko reflects approval of Japan's accepting a larger role within the alliance. When Suzuki promised that Japan would be more active in the U.S.-Japan alliance, the *Korea Herald* commented, "we were pleased."²⁷⁶ After Japan accepted the major new role of patrolling the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles, an article called this move "a positive response to Washington's desire that Japan take up the defense of a large area of the western Pacific north of the Philippines and Guam."²⁷⁷

²⁷² Sang-il Han, "Japan's Defense Capability and Defense Policy," *Korea and World Affairs* Vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 677-709; Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security Role."

²⁷³ "Japan Urged to Boost Defense Capabilities," *Korea Times*, May 19, 1981, 2.

²⁷⁴ Kim, "Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security Role," p. 115. Also arguing that Japan's buildup was due to the need to expand its burden-sharing in the wake of the increased Soviet threat is Kil, "Japanese Defense Posture in the 1980s," p. 496.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ "Japan's Nuclear Allergy," *Korea Herald*, May 23, 1981.

²⁷⁷ *Korea Herald*, May 10, 1981.

After the January 1983 meeting of Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, ROK media coverage was similarly enthusiastic about Japan's expanding military role. A Japanese official noted after the talks that Japan's new military role would include blockading the Korea Strait in case of Soviet aggression in the region. Seoul was untroubled by this statement. The ROK government only commented that it "plans to closely watch Japan's defense maneuvers." Seoul said it was "'desirable' for Japan to have prior consultations with the Seoul government before launching military operations on the high seas between the two countries, although Seoul is not in a position to meddle in Japan's military maneuvers."²⁷⁸ An article noted that these plans had aroused concerns within the Soviet Union because they signaled an end to the postwar order in northeast Asia, and a Japanese military buildup. But the article did not mention Korean concerns about the buildup.²⁷⁹ Thus, during this period Koreans approved of Japan's military buildup and greater roles within the U.S.-Japan alliance, because they viewed these as necessary for the health of the alliance, and thus for regional security.

In the late period Korean elites also expressed approval of policies designed to strengthen the alliance. A major policy initiative was the revised Guidelines for Military Cooperation, announced in a U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration in 1996. In the Guidelines Japan specified several rear-area support missions it would perform in the event of a second Korean war.²⁸⁰ The ROK government's position on the Guidelines was cautious approval; it urged Japan and the United States to consult closely with Seoul, and urged Tokyo to maintain transparency with respect to its defense policies.²⁸¹ The ROK Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying the Guidelines "will contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, because the declaration made it

²⁷⁸ "Government to Watch Japan's Naval Maneuvers," Yonhap, January 26, 1983, in FBIS Asia/Pacific, South Korea, same date.

²⁷⁹ "The Plan for Blockade of the Korea Strait and Our Stand," *Kyonghyang Sinmun*, January 26, 1983. In FBIS Asia/Pacific, South Korea, January 28, 1983.

²⁸⁰ For more on the Guidelines, see Hisayoshi Ina, "Post-Defense Guidelines: Nine Issues Japan Will Face," *Gaiko Forum* in FBIS Japan, December 1, 1999. Also see Sheila A. Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 69-93.

²⁸¹ "Assessment of the Revised 'U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines,'" ROK Ministry of National Defense, in FBIS South Korea, October 2, 1997.

clear that the United States will continue to maintain its role in securing peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.”²⁸² A Foreign Ministry official said that Guidelines “will serve to quell the move toward revision of [Japan’s] Constitution by strengthening the joint security alliance.”²⁸³ He argued that “the more military commitments the United States make in Asia, the less possibility of Japan actively operating militarily in Asia,” and that “What we should worry about is, on the contrary, the possibility of the United States retreating from Asia.” Thus, he said “we welcome the Security Declaration.” The ROK Prime Minister said that fears expressed by other Asian nations after the Guidelines would prove to be “utterly groundless.”²⁸⁴

Similarly, scholar and former ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo wrote that the Guidelines would put U.S.-Japan relations “back on a cooperative track,” and that “the new U.S.-Japan security declaration” would have “a considerable effect on regional security.”²⁸⁵ Another scholar argued, “the proposed revision should be understood as aiming to further solidify the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is indispensable for establishing a durable regional security order.”²⁸⁶ A researcher noted, “Japan’s military is structured within the U.S.-Japan alliance. As long as the alliance lasts, then we don’t see a threat from Japan. The passage of the Guidelines is a good thing, because it is a reflection of a strong US-Japan relationship.”²⁸⁷ In sum, in the late period, Korean elites approved of policies designed to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.

²⁸² “ROK Foreign Ministry Welcomes U.S.-Japan Security Declaration,” Yonhap, April 18, 1996, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

²⁸³ “ROK Foreign Ministry Welcomes U.S.-Japan Security Declaration,” Yonhap, April 18, 1996, in FBIS South Korea, same date.

²⁸⁴ (note contradictory alarmist headline)--“Premier Concerned About Changes in Japan’s Defense Policy,” Yonhap Sept 2, 1999 in FBIS South Korea.

²⁸⁵ Han Sung-joo, “New U.S.-Japan Security Ties,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 28, 1996.

²⁸⁶ Kim Woo-sang, “New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” *Joong-ang Ilbo*, June 12, 1997. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1997).

²⁸⁷ Sejong Institute, Personal Interview, October 2000.

Uncertainties About Future U.S. Policy

Signs of increased threat perception of Japan for the future are consistent with the pattern that South Korean threat perception of Japan rises when the American commitment to Asia is more uncertain. Currently, elites express cautious optimism about the future of the United States in East Asia. They were gratified by American policies to strengthen its alliance with Japan, seeing these as signs of a renewed U.S. commitment. One scholar notes, "Koreans anticipate that for the next few decades the U.S. will persist as the hegemonic power in East Asia."²⁸⁸ However, many statements reflect uncertainty about the future of the United States in the region. One scholar asks, "Would the United States maintain her policy of active engagement in the region or change it to the policy of isolationism?"²⁸⁹ Another scholar writes, "America's role in the region is gradually decreasing." He noted that in many post-Cold War conflicts, the United States followed a wait-and-see policy before committing forces; "Nobody can guarantee that such an attitude will not be taken in relation to the Korean peninsula....Accordingly both South Korea and Japan must try to persuade the United States to maintain its military presence in the region and play a positive role as stabilizer."²⁹⁰ Another scholar writes that a potential threat to Asian security is "the power vacuum that may result from disengagement of the U.S. military presence," and "the fear that China and Japan may well fill the vacuum should [it] materialize."²⁹¹ In sum, when ROK elites think about future threats to Korea, their statements and policies reflect that they are considering a Japanese threat, at the same time that they are uncertain about the staying power of the United States in the region.

²⁸⁸ Sang-woo Rhee, "Korea-Japan Security Cooperation: A Prescriptive Design," in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., *Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies* (Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000), p. vi.

²⁸⁹ Woosang Kim, "Northeast Asia Regional Security Order and the Importance of Alliance Structures," in Rhee and Kim, eds., *Korea-Japan Security Relations*, pp. 3-22.

²⁹⁰ In-taek Hyun, and Masao Okonogi, "Coping with the North Korean Nuclear Nightmare," in In-taek Hyun and Masao Okonogi, eds., *Korea and Japan: Searching for Harmony and Cooperation in a Changing World* (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 253.

²⁹¹ Byung-joon Ahn, "Korea and Japan in Asia and the Pacific after the Cold War," in Hyun and Okonogi, eds. *Korea and Japan: Searching for Harmony and Cooperation in a Changing World*, p. 17.

Public/Elite Divergence in Views of Japan

As noted above, some divergence in elite and public perceptions is apparent in South Korean threat perception of Japan. The South Korean public express higher threat perception of Japan than do South Korean elites. This divergence is due to different assessments of Japanese capabilities.

The public views the United States as encouraging Japanese rearmament, rather than restraining it. Whereas elites see the alliance as a “cork,” the public sees it as an “egg” (Japan is growing within the protective shell of the alliance). One article noted that Japan’s incremental increases in its military activism “are in line with the post-Cold War U.S. strategy to strengthen Japan’s military role.” An article warns, “Japan is growing under the protection of the United States.”²⁹² Another article argues, “as soon as Japan prepares to play an important role in regional conflicts, even if only within the U.S.-Japan security framework, we are critical and on our guard against Japanese rearmament and militarization.”²⁹³

Because the public does not view Japan as constrained, they tend to have stronger fears of any increases in Japanese military power. First, South Korean media coverage lambasted Japanese policies in the wake of North Korea’s 1998 launch of a three-stage rocket over Japanese airspace. The media criticized Japan in spite of the fact that Japan had been the victim of a provocative act by a shared adversary, and in spite of the fact that Japan’s reaction to the event was minor (Tokyo agreed to participate with the United States in development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and it made the decision to procure its own military reconnaissance satellites). Articles criticized Japan for using the event as “an excuse” to rearm, and warned South Koreans of the threat this rearmament presented to the ROK and to the region. The *Seoul Hangyore* newspaper noted that Japan had decided to procure “spy satellites,” and cautioned that “The changes brought by one ballistic missile test are enormous.”²⁹⁴ Another article warned that “in three years, Japan’s—the

²⁹² CITE

²⁹³ “Passage of Guidelines Bills Viewed,” *Chungang Ilbo*, April 27, 1999. in FBIS South Korea, April 29, 1999.

²⁹⁴ Han Sung-tong, “Perfect Chance for the Japanese Army to Emerge,” *Seoul Hangyore*, March 25, 1999, in FBIS South Korea.

second-strongest military power in the world—defense expenditures will increase again with the excuse of the North Korean threat.” The article cautioned,

By putting forward the North Korean threat, the Japanese Government and the Defense Agency are not just pursuing an increase in the SDF’s military power and the expansion of the defense-only concept. Their ultimate goal is to revise the current constitution, which denies the rights of belligerency and prohibits war, and the restoration of the SDF as the regular force, the Japanese forces. In this respect, Japan will race toward the ultimate goal faster than the bullet train.²⁹⁵

Reaction in the *Dong-a Ilbo* was more measured; an editorial noted that Japanese fears of North Korean missiles were understandable given the rocket launch. However it nonetheless argued that the launch was a “pretext” for Japan to expand its military role; “such concerns cannot fully explain the strengthened role and capabilities of the SDF, which are now underway at a rapid pace.” It concluded, “we have no choice but to watch the Japanese SDF’s moves with keen interest.”²⁹⁶ Similarly, an article in the *Korea Herald* warned that after the rocket launch, Tokyo’s reactions “may portend events of more grave significance for its neighbors than the mere self-defense of the island nation.” Because of these changes in Japanese defense policy,

August this year has turned out to be a time of extraordinary anxiety and apprehension for many Koreans. Irrelevant as it may seem, we cannot but prick up our ears to the resurgent imperial trumpets growing ever noisier from across the sea.²⁹⁷

Thus the Korean media expressed fears of Japan based on its policies undertaken after the 1998 rocket launch.

Second, statements show that unlike elites, the South Korean public disapproves of *any* increases in Japanese military power, regardless if these measures are undertaken with the health of the U.S.-Japan alliance in mind. The Korean media issued baneful warnings that the revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation represented a major increase in Japan’s military power. One article referred to the Guidelines as “a signal announcing the emergence of ‘Japanese Forces’ both

²⁹⁵ Ch’ae Myong-sok, “Ever Increasing Self-Defense Forces—Everyone, Except the United States, Come and Fight,” *Sisa Journal*, September 9, 1999 in FBIS South Korea.

²⁹⁶ Editorial: “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces’ Bases in Singapore,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 5, 2000 in FBIS South Korea.

²⁹⁷ Lee Kyong-hee, “New role for Japan’s army troubling for past victims,” *Korea Herald*, August 16, 1999.

in name and substance.”²⁹⁸ An editorial commented that “Japan is suspected of persistently trying to transform itself into a militarily strong country” and that in reference to the Guidelines, “We would like to ask Japanese leaders whether this is not against the article in the Japanese constitution that prohibits possessing military power.”²⁹⁹ The *Seoul Hangyore* newspaper called the Guidelines legislation “the conversion of Japan to a military power.”³⁰⁰ Therefore in media coverage of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, Japanese military participation was portrayed as threatening to the ROK. In sum, the Korean public fears any perceived increases in Japanese military capabilities.

Divergence in ROK perceptions of Japan stem from differing assessments of the degree to which Japan is constrained. Otherwise, perceptions of Japan are remarkably uniform. As argued in the first section of this chapter, both the general public and elites distrust Japanese intentions. Where their views diverge is on perceptions of the United States: on the perception that the United States constrains Japanese capabilities. Elites see the U.S. as a cork on Japanese power: hence they do not fear small increases in Japanese military capabilities, and they approve of measures undertaken to strengthen the alliance. The public does not see the United States as a cork, but rather views it as enabling Japanese military resurgence. Thus the public does not express the same faith in the U.S. cork, and disapproves of any increases in military capabilities (including those undertaken to strengthen the alliance). For a summary see Table 1, below.

Table 1: ROK Public versus Elite Perceptions of Japan

	ROK Public	ROK Elites
Perception of Jse Intentions	Malign	Malign
Assessment of Jse Capabilities	MODERATE (not constrained)	LOW (constrained)

²⁹⁸ Han Sung-tong, “Perfect Chance for the Japanese Army to Emerge,” *Seoul Hangyore*, March 25, 1999, in FBIS South Korea.

²⁹⁹ Editorial, “PRC, Japanese Arms Buildup Disturbs Peace,” *Dong-a Ilbo* August 5, 1999, in FBIS South Korea.

³⁰⁰ Editorial: “Ominous Argument on Japan’s Nuclear Argument,” *Seoul Hangyore* October 20, 1999.

Perception of Jse Threat	MODERATE	LOW
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Summary: ROK Threat Perception of Japan

This section assessed the relative weight of remembrance in South Korean threat perception of Japan. It relied upon data from South Korean policies, statements, and reasoning to code the ROK's level of threat perception. Given that Japanese remembrance was *unapologetic* across the post-World War II period, if remembrance is a factor that strongly affects threat perception, ROK threat perception should have been consistently *high* or at least *moderate*. This was not the case.

Rather, I find that since the middle period, Koreans have not feared Japan. Congruence testing shows that ROK threat perception appears to co-vary with capabilities. Fears of Japan were higher when constraints on Japanese power were uncertain: during the immediate postwar period (and also in future Korean defense planning for the uncertain era beyond unification).

Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by evidence from South Korean reasoning. With great consistency, Koreans tie their threat assessments of Japan to Japanese power and constraints; they explicitly connect their *low* assessment of threat to the existence of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Korean elites specifically say that absent the U.S.-Japan alliance (i.e., absent the key factor constraining Japanese power), they would fear Japan. Interestingly, those Koreans who believe that Japan does pose more of a threat to Korea (the public) also tend to believe that the United States does not constrain Japan. In other words, the public fears Japan because the people assess Japanese constraints differently than do elites. In sum, this case finds although Koreans are outraged and agitated at Japanese denials, ultimately remembrance plays little role in threat perception. Korean threat perception appears to be the most influenced by capabilities. By far the most important factor in ROK threat perception of Japan was the constraint of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

CONCLUSIONS

This case study yields several findings about the effects of remembrance as well as alternate variables on perceptions of intentions and threat in the case of Japan and South Korea.

Apologies Cause Denials

In Japanese politics and society, as described in Chapter Two, apologies and denials did not simply co-exist, but rather had a cause-and-effect relationship. Apologetic statements and gestures by Japanese officials frequently caused domestic backlash. The Suzuki administration's conciliatory behavior in the 1982 textbook crisis—the willingness to revise textbooks and to institute the “Asian Neighbor's Clause”—led a group of Japanese conservatives to write and publish a history textbook viewed as whitewashing Japanese aggression. When the Ministry of Education approved this new book in 1986, this touched off the second textbook dispute. Subsequently, Prime Minister Nakasone's conciliatory behavior in that textbook dispute prompted the 1986 statement of denial by Education minister Fujio Masayuki.³⁰¹ Similarly, Okuno Seisuke's denials in 1988 were triggered by the showing of an exhibition about the Rape of Nanking in Tokyo.

Backlash from apologies continued in the 1990s. In 1994, Prime Minister Murayama's apology triggered Sakurai Shin's statement that Japan had not committed aggression.³⁰² The cause-and-effect relationship between apologies and denial was never more evident as in the case of the 1995 Diet Resolution. LDP members of the coalition government, and powerful members of the Diet, hastened to distance themselves from the Socialist Murayama and his Resolution. Thus the Diet Resolution directly led to the unapologetic statements of Eto Takami, Sakurai Shin, Shimamura Yoshinobu, and—the worst of all from the standpoint of Korea-Japan relations—Watanabe Michio. Later, in the exact pattern observed in the 1980s, the Ministry of Education's approval of the mention of the “comfort women” in Japanese textbooks was the event that caused Japanese conservatives to mobilize and write a textbook with the goal of presenting a

³⁰¹ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 180.

³⁰² See Chapter Two, p. 85.

less “masochistic” interpretation of Japanese history. The approval of this textbook triggered the third dispute over textbooks in 2001. Thus in Japanese politics, apologies and denials do not simply co-exist, but rather apologies frequently cause denials.

What now appears to be a clear causal connection between apologies and denials has been partially obscured by media reporting about Japanese denials. The Western press, and frequently the Japanese and Korean press, report statements of denial as “gaffes”; news coverage creates an image of bumbling extremist politicians afflicted with a sort of hyper-nationalistic Tourette syndrome. In fact, mainstream, powerful politicians deliberately offer these statements in defense of a competing interpretation of Japanese history, and a competing philosophy about the role of history education and patriotism. It makes perfect sense that conservatives are more likely to air these views when the views are being challenged by new interpretations. Another point that is entirely omitted from highly critical media coverage of Japan’s “gaffes” is that in many other countries, conservative politicians with similar views about the purpose of history education engage in identical debates.³⁰³

The finding that apologies provoke denials has two implications, one regional and one more general. First, solving East Asia’s history problem requires more than yet another Japanese apology. Many observers of Japan argue incorrectly that “Japan hasn’t apologized” for World War II.³⁰⁴ This view implies that the solution to East Asia’s history problem is that a Japanese leader should stand up and make a statement, so that the issue may finally be put to rest. Some

³⁰³ For a call for patriotic history in the United States, see Lynne V. Cheney, “The End of History,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 20, 1994, p. A22. Also on the U.S. case see Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996). For the U.S. as well as other cases see Mark Selden and Laura Hein, *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2000); Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, *History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000). On British proclivities to emphasize positive history see “History Lessons,” *Economist*, November 3, 2001. Battles over German history writing grabbed headlines in West Germany during the 1986 “*Historikerstreit*,” or “historian’s dispute,” as discussed in Chapter Four.

³⁰⁴ For example, Nicholas Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49; this view is also suggested by the title of Steven Benfell’s “Why Can’t Japan Apologize?” ADD CITES.

scholars argue the U.S. should pressure Japan to make an apology.³⁰⁵ However, as this case study has shown, the situation is not so simple. Japanese leaders have apologized, many times—sometimes quite impressively. People do not criticize Japanese remembrance because apologies are nonexistent, but because apologies are contradicted by the denials they provoke. Another statement by a Japanese leader would not only have no positive effect, it may actually make matters worse, because it would probably trigger more denials.

Thus people who say “Japan should apologize” should understand that they are actually saying, “Japan should stop denying.” No simple policy prescription follows from this. Cracking down on unapologetic policies would require curtailing free speech in Japan. Politicians who deny the past or visit the Yasukuni Shrine would need to be disciplined by political parties—particularly within the LDP—until politicians and candidates are socialized into understanding the “correct” view of Japan’s past. The Ministry of Education—previously criticized for excessive micro-management of history books—would need to abandon its *lassiez-faire* policy, and re-enter the realm of textbook content control. (Ironically, it was criticism from the Left and from Japan’s neighbors in the 1980s that led the Tokyo to restrict the MoE’s role to fact-checking rather than content). Finally, those commentators who argue that Washington should pressure Japan to apologize are in effect saying that the U.S. should actively intervene in Japan’s domestic affairs: the LDP party platform, the right of a citizen to visit a religious shrine, and education policy.

In sum, the “history problem” in East Asia will not be solved by a Japanese leader ascending a podium and issuing another apology. Japan’s “problem,” if it is indeed a problem, is that Japan is a democratic society in which competing views are freely aired. Preventing denials in Japan would require more government intervention in the realm of education and political speech. This is obviously a controversial solution, which many people might find more problematic than the current state of affairs.

Second, the finding that apologies cause denials highlights a problem with the policy prescriptions of the peace-building literature. This literature enthusiastically recommends that

³⁰⁵ Kristof, “The Problem of Memory.”

groups and states engage in contrition and truth-telling, but has not mentioned—let alone studied—the potential for backlash from such policies. The finding that apologies cause backlash suggests that contrition in post-conflict peace-building is a far more complicated issue than advocates currently suggest. This finding focuses our attention on the question—which I will discuss further in the conclusion of this dissertation—of whether democratic states should apologize for past wars as they attempt to reconcile, or whether doing so will actually worsen, rather than improve, relations.

Remembrance and Intentions

The Japan case also shows that when apologies cause denial, apologies will have no positive effect on perceptions of intentions. However the denials have a strongly negative effect on perceptions of intentions.

Although Japan's apologies increased in frequency and quality during the 1990s, Japan's apology diplomacy did not help South Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions. Koreans welcomed and cautiously praised Japanese apologies, but ultimately the benign effects of Japan's apologies were "cancelled out" by subsequent denials. In media coverage, scholarly articles, and interviews, Korean elites testify that Japanese denials eroded any goodwill they might have felt from Japanese apologies. A former South Korean Ambassador to Japan writes,

It is true that Japan has apologized for its past on a number of occasions....However as soon as official apologies are given, contradicting statements are made by some cabinet-level officials. This raises a serious question in the minds of Japan's neighboring countries about Japan's sincerity in its apologies for past aggressions.³⁰⁶

A foreign ministry official commented, "Koreans think that Japanese apologies aren't backed up by their true feelings....In textbooks Japan hides its history so this is proof of discrepancy between what they say and how they really feel."³⁰⁷ In response to a question about the watershed Obuchi-Kim summit, one defense analyst said, "I know about the Kim Dae Jung apology by Obuchi, but

³⁰⁶ Ambassador Gong Ro-Myung, quoted in Akira Ogawa, Jr., "The Miracle of 1998 and Beyond: ROK-Japan Security Cooperation," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. X, No. 2 (Winter 1998), p. 40.

³⁰⁷ Personal Interview, MOFAT, October 2000.

right after that visit, the new Prime Minister Mori made remarks that frayed our nerves.”³⁰⁸ A scholar said bluntly, “The Korean people do not want more apologies. They want officials in Japan to stop making those undesirable comments. We don’t really care if they make more apologies, but just stop making gaffes.”³⁰⁹ Another scholar said, “Japan has not apologized enough...they say one thing one day and the next day they say the opposite. And if you look at textbooks, you see the wrong view of history still present.”³¹⁰ A researcher commented, “I am satisfied with Japan’s apologies but on the other hand there have been so many slips of the tongue by Japanese ministers and journalists. So I don’t trust Japan’s apologies.”³¹¹ Thus elites dismiss Japanese apologies because of denials.

The media echo this view. In reaction to the Nagano gaffe in 1994 (when Justice Minister Nagano said the Rape of Nanking was a hoax designed to make Japan lose face in the international community), an editorial commented, “Japan has made, retracted and apologized for such outrageous statements so often that we can hardly distinguish what reflects Japan’s true intentions.”³¹² One article reported that the 1995 Diet Resolution was important because it would demonstrate accord within Japan about the past. “The intention is for the Diet, the highest Japanese constitutional organ, to put a stop to all the confusion arising from the occasional gaffes by cabinet members, contradicting the many apologies made by Japanese prime ministers and the emperors.”³¹³ As argued earlier in this chapter, the denials emerging from the Diet Resolution created more damage than any goodwill generated by the tepid Resolution.

The proposition that denials undo apologies was never so clear as in the case of Koizumi’s 2001 visit to Seoul. By any measure Koizumi’s visit to Seodaemun Prison Hall was a deeply

³⁰⁸ Personal Interview, KIDA, October 2000.

³⁰⁹ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

³¹⁰ Personal Interview, Yonsei University, October 2000.

³¹¹ Personal Interview, Sejong Institute, October 2000.

³¹² Editorial, *Dong-A Ilbo*, May 7, 1994. Reprinted in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May-June 1994), pp. 142-143.

³¹³ Seong Byoung-wook, “Debate on Security Cooperation: A Highlight of Korea-Japan Forum,” *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 12, 1994.

apologetic gesture. His visit reflected admission of Japanese crimes, and drew explicit attention to them, increasing Japanese and global awareness about past Japanese atrocities. Koizumi laid a wreath at the memorial to Korean independence activists, and offered a contrite statement. The reaction in Seoul? Crowds of shouting protesters berating the Japanese Prime Minister because of his visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and because of the Ministry of Education's approval of the *Fuso-sha* history textbook, both earlier that summer. Although Koizumi's visit to Seodaemun was actually one of Japan's stronger apologies, the gesture went unnoticed because of these two other policies that were viewed as denying or glorifying Japan's past. In sum, Japanese apologies did not improve Korean views of Japanese intentions because they provoked denials.

This case also finds substantial evidence that Japanese denials lead Koreans to perceive Japanese intentions as malign. Evidence from congruence testing was consistent with the apology theory (though inconclusive); evidence from the reasoning of observers strongly confirmed that Koreans judged Japanese intentions as malign because of Japan's glorification and denials of its past aggression and atrocities. In their reasoning, Koreans frequently say that they dislike and distrust Japan because it has failed to atone for its past aggression and atrocities.

This case study also yielded findings about the effects of alternate variables on perceptions of intentions. Congruence evidence was consistent with the hypothesis that territorial claims affect perceptions of intentions. However, evidence from congruence testing was not consistent with the expectation that regime type affects perceptions of intentions: namely, that democratization promotes trust between two nations. Democratic peace theory would predict that South Korean perception of Japanese intentions should be growing more benign after the 1990s, and (except among a minority confined to academics), they are not. Japan and the ROK have not yet reached a stage where they express trust in the other state based on liberal values. Given this finding, I evaluated whether ROK perceptions of malign Japanese intentions were consistent with the expectations of the Mansfield and Snyder variant of democratic peace theory. Evidence from congruence, process-tracing, and from other East Asian cases (as will be discussed further in the next chapter) shows this is not the case.

How Much Does Remembrance “Matter”?

The first section of this chapter demonstrated that Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions were strongly affected by Japan’s unapologetic remembrance. Although Koreans were very interested in the issue of Japanese remembrance, and it strongly affected the extent to which they like or trust the Japanese, the second part of this chapter found no evidence that remembrance plays a significant role in overall threat perception. Both congruence and reasoning evidence showed that Korean threat perception of Japan was driven by Japanese capabilities—overwhelmingly, by the existence of the constraint imposed by the U.S. offshore balancer.

In sum, how much does remembrance “matter” in the Japan-Korea relationship? In the realm of high politics—in threat perception—remembrance matters much less than capabilities. The case shows that while Japanese power is low or constrained, “spirals of conflict” fueled by disputes over history will not materialize. However remembrance still “matters” in at least two ways. First, Koreans view Japanese intentions as malign because of Japanese denials. Although this case study shows that assessment of intentions is less important when a state is constrained, it stands to reason that given the absence of these constraints, people will be more interested in assessing intentions. That is, if the U.S. or Japan terminates their alliance, perceptions of Japan’s malign intentions—greatly fueled by Japanese denials—will increase fears of Japan.

Remembrance also clearly matters in ways unconnected to the “high politics” of international security. Japanese denials torment the individual victims of Imperial Japan. Denials affect the affinity with which Koreans view the Japanese people. Furthermore, bilateral diplomatic conflicts over remembrance have frequently erupted between the two states, leading to cancelled summit visits, the suspension of military exchanges or exercises, trade friction, the recall of ambassadors, and the cancellation of cultural activities.³¹⁴ These events are indeed disruptive to

³¹⁴ On psychological barriers to security cooperation see Taewoo Kim, “Japan’s New Security Roles and ROK-Japan Relations,” *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. 11, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 147-169; Hahnkyu Park, “Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, <http://www.kida.re.kr/english/journal/park.htm> (p. 14). On the cancellation of military exercises

bilateral relations. However in the East Asian security literature, scholars frequently use such contretemps as evidence that a security competition will emerge between Korea and Japan; this study finds no support for this assertion, unless Japan's capabilities are also strong.

because of the textbook dispute see David Ibison, "S. Korea Halts Military Links With Japan," *Financial Times*, July 13, 2001. On Seoul's refusal to lift restraints on cultural imports, as a result of the textbook dispute, see "S. Korea to Delay Lifting Japan Cultural Import Restrictions," *Asia Pulse*, July 13, 2001. On the ROK's refusal to back a Japanese bid for the UN Security Council, because of Japanese remembrance, see "ROK to Resurface Old Disputes, Oppose Japan UNSC Seat," *Choson Ilbo*, January 24, 1998, in FBIS South Korea, same date; "IFANS Urges Caution Over Japan's UNSC Bid," *Yonhap*, November 3, 1999, in FBIS South Korea, same date; Editorial, "New Horizon For Seoul-Tokyo Ties," *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 9, 1998. Translated in *Korea Focus*, Vol. 6, No. 5 (1998), pp. 95-96; "Assembly Adopts Resolution on Textbooks," *Korea Times*, July 14, 2001.

Chapter Four

Japanese Remembrance and Perceptions in China and Australia

The previous chapter reported findings for the apology theory based on the case of South Korea and Japan. In this case I found that the Koreans dismissed Japanese apologies (e.g., claimed that Japan has not apologized) despite the occurrence of Japanese statements of apology and other policies of remembrance. Second, I found that Koreans were agitated about Japanese denials; they said that statements of denials and other unapologetic behavior made the Japanese appear untrustworthy. The Japan-Korea case thus yielded the following conclusions for the apology theory. First, I concluded that because apologies are likely to provoke denials, they do not have positive effects on another state's perceptions of intentions. Second, I conclude that denials or other unapologetic policies lead intentions to be perceived as malign.

A counterargument to my conclusions for the apology theory is that perhaps Korean reactions to Japanese apologies are idiosyncratic. Perhaps for some reason the Koreans are particularly unreceptive to Japanese apologies, and sensitive to Japanese denials: for example, because of their culture (highly contentious, emotional, or nationalistic), their domestic politics, their wartime experience, or their country's status relative to Japan.

To assess this counterargument I briefly turn to the cases of China and Australia, and their perceptions of Japan over the same time period. Both countries had bitter memories of Japanese aggression after World War II. The Chinese had been invaded and occupied by Japan after 1931, and Japan turned Manchuria into the colony known as "Manchukuo." Unlike in the Korean experience, Chinese forces battled the Japanese Imperial Army in the Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945). Estimates vary, but scholars have argued that China lost 10-20 million civilians

and soldiers in this war, with many hundreds of thousands suffering brutal atrocities at the hands of the Japanese. The most notorious include the 1937 Rape of Nanjing (in which Japanese army troops occupied the Chinese capital city and slaughtered inhabitants, with estimates of casualties ranging 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese citizens and troops, also raping innumerable girls and women.¹ Chinese in other smaller cities were similarly terrorized and killed. As in Korea, Chinese laborers were mobilized to work at the front or were sent to Japan to work in Japan's war industries. Chinese girls and women were mobilized into sexual slavery as "comfort women" in Japanese brothels run by the Imperial Army. The Japanese used chemical and biological weapons against Chinese civilians, troops, and POWs, most notoriously in a macabre army laboratory run called Unit 731. After the surrender, Unit 731 released plague-infested rats into the population, killing 30,000 Chinese civilians.² Japanese air forces killed over 180,000 Chinese civilians through strategic bombing of Chinese cities.³ China thus suffered greatly at the hands of the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war, and during Japan's occupation of Manchuria.

As for Australia, it also had bitter memories of fighting Japan in World War II. Japan never invaded nor occupied Australian territory during the war. However, for the first time in their history, Australians feared invasion of their country: particularly after Japanese advances in New Guinea. The war was brought to Australian shores upon the Japanese strategic bombing of Darwin in February 1942. Japanese air forces also attacked Broome and other coastal towns. Sydney Harbor was raided in May 1942 by Japanese midget submarines. Australian naval forces

¹ See Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York: Penguin, 1997).

² Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731 : Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

³ Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 337-38. For more details of Chinese suffering in the war see Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-making* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 14-16.

fought with the Allies in the naval battles of the Pacific, and Australian soldiers fought in the bitter island campaigns. Important Australian efforts were seen in Milne Bay in Papua, in which the Japanese suffered their first defeat on land, and in the Kokoda campaign, which halted the Japanese advance on Port Moresby. During the war, Australian and other Allied prisoners of war (POWs) suffered horrendous treatment, torture and execution in Japanese POW camps. The Japanese held over 20,000 Australian POWs, and over one-third of them perished in captivity.⁴ Japanese mistreatment of POWs, and the extremely high fatality rate in Japanese camps relative to other POW camps, fueled bitter Australian resentment of Japan that lingers to this day. Both Australians and Chinese thus emerged from the World War II experience with strong memories of their suffering at the hands of the Japanese.

In order to bolster my conclusions about the apology theory from the Korea-Japan case, the following findings should be evident in these two other cases. First, given the low level of Japanese apologies, we should see no benign effects on Chinese and Australian perceptions of Japanese intentions. That is, Japanese apologies should also not register with the Chinese and Australians. Second, denials should cause perceptions of malign intentions. That is, Chinese and Australians should be as agitated as Koreans about Japanese denials and other unapologetic policies. They should say that Japanese denials lead them to perceive malign Japanese intentions. Both of these findings were borne out.

This chapter does not claim that South Korean, Chinese, and Australian reactions to Japanese remembrance, or assessments of Japanese intentions, were uniform. National differences certainly appear. However despite differences in the timing and extent to which

⁴ Gavan Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese* (New York: Morrow, 1994).

Australia and China reacted to Japanese remembrance, since World War II both countries have observed Japanese remembrance, dismissed Japanese apologies, and lambasted Japanese denial. China and Australia attributed negative intentions to Japan based on Tokyo's perceived failure to come to terms with its past. South Korean reactions to Japanese remembrance are thus not idiosyncratic, but are shared by other states in the region. This bolsters my findings about the apology theory in the previous chapter.

JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS

Findings noted in the case of Japan-Korea relations appear consistent in the case of Sino-Japan relations since World War II. First, the Chinese monitored Japanese policies of remembrance; they commented favorably on apologies that were given, although they dismissed them in the wake of Japanese denials. Second, as the Chinese observed Japanese denials, they inferred malign Japanese intent from them.

Apologies Have Little Benign Effect

In Sino-Japanese relations, the dynamics of the apology issue appear broadly similar to those in South Korea. The Chinese have repeatedly sought Japanese apologies, and when they are offered, they initially praise Japanese contrition as hopeful signs for the future. However, after subsequent incidents of Japanese denial, Chinese observers accuse Japan of failing to apologize, and question the sincerity of Japan's contrite statements.

In the early postwar period, the Chinese displayed little concern with Japanese remembrance. Separated by Cold War politics, China and Japan did not normalize diplomatic relations until 1972. However as in the case of South Korea, as soon as China and Japan

normalized relations, the Chinese sought a Japanese apology for the war. Japan and China issued a joint communiqué that said “the Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself.”⁵ Japan also agreed to provide China with a low-interest loan—which many people in both states viewed as equivalent to reparations. Beijing agreed to renounce any further reparations claims. However as with South Korea, Japan's failure to link the funds directly to war crimes would create later dissatisfaction toward the Japanese.

As in Korea, once China received an apology at normalization, the issue died down. The issue of past history jumped back into Chinese headlines in the 1980s. By the late period, the remembrance issue had become more important than ever before. The Chinese media monitor apologies offered by Japanese political leaders.⁶ As they monitored Japanese remembrance, Chinese observers commented that Japanese apologies were hopeful signs. Prime Minister Murayama's visit to China's Marco Polo Bridge and memorial hall—commemorating Japan's launching of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937—was reported and praised. The Chinese commented favorably on Murayama's 1995 apology. One article said “his courage should be welcomed”;⁷ another wrote that Murayama “must be praised for his courage” because he “has gone farther than any other Japanese leaders in accepting his country's responsibility for

⁵ *China Quarterly*, 1972, no. 52, pp. 782-83. Japan also recognized Taiwan as part of China as part of the normalization agreement; Japan's normalization with China followed closely on the heels of the Sino-American rapprochement.

⁶ In addition to coverage cited below see Wang Guotai, “Resolution That Fails To Distinguish Right From Wrong,” *Renmin Ribao*, June 27, 1995; “Japanese Democratic Party Director-General Visits Nanjing Massacre Memorial,” Xinhua News Service, May 5, 2002; “Japanese PM Apologizes to Chinese People,” Xinhua News Service, October 9, 2001.

⁷ “A Valuable Step Forward: Difficulties in the Future,” Xinhua News Service, August 17, 1995 (FBIS China, August 21, 1995).

aggression...and apologizing for it.”⁸ An article pointed out that Prime Minister Koizumi's abstention from a 2002 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and an apologetic statement he gave on August 15 were “cause for optimism that nationalists have not yet hijacked the country's China policy,” and argued that “each small step away from distrust and resentment is a step toward a more stable and prosperous region.”⁹

However, as in Korea, Chinese approval of Japanese apologies was short-lived. After Japanese statements of denial, Chinese observers argued that Japan had never apologized for its past aggression, that it had apologized insincerely, or that apologies were isolated statements by individuals rather than expressions of national sentiment. First, general media commentary regarding Japan's history of apologizing shows that apologies had little positive impact on Chinese perceptions. One article commented, “The Chinese people have never received a decent apology from Japanese officials concerning wartime atrocities committed by Japanese troops.”¹⁰ The Chinese accuse Japan of having a “double standard when it comes to apologies.”¹¹ Another article lambasted, “Denials of past atrocities...attest to the fact that [Japan is] unwilling to face its past and repent wrongdoing.”¹² Even as one newspaper article reported the 2001 Koizumi apology, it cautioned that, “earlier this year, however, Japan took a series of negative moves on the history issue that resulted in a blow to China-Japan relations.”¹³ “Its apologies,” criticized

⁸ “Japan Apology Should Be a Formal Resolution,” *Hong Kong Standard*, August 16, 1995 (FBIS China, August 17, 1995).

⁹ “An Apology, Sort of,” *South China Morning Post*, August 16, 2002.

¹⁰ Jing Xian, “China: To the Point,” *China Daily*, January 26, 2000.

¹¹ “China: Japan's ‘No’ to Apology Rooted Deeply,” *China Daily*, June 2, 2001.

¹² “Truth of Massacre Cannot Be Denied,” *China Daily*, December 14, 2002.

¹³ “Japanese PM Apologizes to Chinese People,” Xinhua News Service, October 9, 2001.

one article, “made under pressure, are hardly convincing.”¹⁴ The article concluded that Japan’s “wish to distort the facts and rewrite its notorious history is indicative that Japan has not and will never take responsibility” for its aggression. After Chinese construction workers were killed and wounded after excavating Japanese chemical weapons from World War II, one commentator condemned Japan for having “refuse[d] to apologize” (despite the fact that Japan apologized for the incident).¹⁵ Another commentator argued that according to one view, Japan was tired of Chinese demands for apologies because “Some Japanese maintain that Japan has apologized to China many times.” He argued that this view was incorrect because

Confronted with Japan’s successive and increasingly more eager attempts to reverse the verdict [on Japanese aggression], do the Chinese government and people have any other choice except demanding that the Japanese people adopt a correct attitude towards history? This issue is not caused by the Chinese side’s incessant demand for apology but by the Japanese side’s incessant attempt to reverse the verdict, to provoke China, and to stimulate and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.¹⁶

The author also argued that Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine—“before the ink was dry” on his apologies—undermined the sincerity of his statements to China. He comments, “How can the Chinese people believe his apology is sincere?”

Second, although the Chinese media offered praise for Murayama’s apology, they ultimately dismissed it. One article noted the “considerable difficulties putting the spirit of Murayama’s speech into practice” because “great differences inside [Japan’s] ruling party over the issue still exist.”¹⁷ The article said that “once Murayama leaves the cabinet, his speech may

¹⁴ Xi Mi, “China: Never Forget Infamous History,” *China Daily*, February 26, 2000.

¹⁵ See “Japan’s Attitude is So Contemptuous That China Should Get Tough On It,” *Ming Pao*, October 21, 2003; Japan had issued a statement saying, “The government of Japan considers such an accident extremely regrettable, and also expresses its heartfelt sympathy to the victims, while feeling strong compassion for them.” For statement see Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan apologizes to China for mustard gas remnants,” *New York Times*, August 14, 2003.

¹⁶ Lin Zhibo, “Doubts of ‘The New Idea on Relations with Japan’,” *Renmin Wang*, July 22, 2003 (FBIS China, same date).

¹⁷ “A Valuable Step Forward; Difficulties in the Future,” op. cit.

simply be cast aside.” Media coverage also argued that “the significance of the [Murayama] statement was undermined by...visits to Yasukuni Shrine by nine Cabinet members.”¹⁸ Another article dismissed the apology because “it was made at a news conference and not at the more formal commemoration meeting,” and said it should be “translated into a more formal resolution of parliament.”¹⁹ But the Diet Resolution was dismissed as “watered down” and “failing to distinguish right from wrong.”²⁰ Thus in this episode the Chinese media focused on the shortcomings of Murayama’s statement and the contradictions in Japanese remembrance.

Finally, Chinese observers maintained that Japan’s textbook policy cast doubts on the sincerity of Japanese apologies. The Education Ministry’s approval of a history textbook in 2003 had “thrown doubt upon Japan’s sincerity of remorse toward its past atrocities.”²¹ Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said that the textbook incident raised “serious doubts among the international community as to what position the Japanese government is taking on the historical issue and whether Japan was sincere in its introspection and apologies made in the past.”²² In sum, as in South Korea, although the Chinese praise Japanese apologies when offered, these apologies have negligible beneficial effects; they are forgotten or dismissed because of subsequent denials.

¹⁸ Tan Jianrong, “Politicians Should Face Up to the Past,” Xinhua News Service, August 16, 1995 (FBIS China, same date). Another article said the Yasukuni visit “directly weakened the authoritativeness of Murayama’s speech.” See “A Valuable Step Forward,” op. cit.

¹⁹ “Japan Apology Should Be a Formal Resolution,” op. cit.

²⁰ For coverage of the Diet Resolution see Wang Guotai, “Resolution that Fails to Distinguish Right From Wrong,” op. cit.; “Japan Apology Should Be a Formal Resolution,” op. cit.

²¹ “Japan Tarnishes Its International Image,” *China Daily*, February 12, 2003.

²² “China Slams Japan Over History Textbooks,” Xinhua News Service, April 3, 2001.

Denials Have Malign Effects

As in South Korea, the Chinese monitor Japan's unapologetic policies and infer malign intentions from them. This was not initially the case; during the early postwar-period, the Chinese did not pay significant attention to Japanese remembrance. After Japan's surrender, Chinese condemnation of Japan was toned down, such as the treatment of descriptions of Japan's wartime atrocities in Chinese textbooks. Yinan He argues that China's approach to the history issue was shaped by its strategic circumstances—civil war and the establishment of the Guomintang on Taiwan, plus war with the United States over Korea, and a hostile USSR after the Sino-Soviet split. Because of these circumstances, He argues, Beijing focused its animosity not toward Japan but toward Taiwan and Chiang Kai-Shek.²³ The CCP pursued “people's diplomacy” in order to bias Japanese public and political opinion in favor of China against closer alignment with the United States. As Caroline Rose argues, China was “intent on achieving diplomatic normalization” and “used many devices to try and attain that objective.”²⁴ Thus during the early postwar period, China did not criticize Japanese policies of remembrance.

During the middle period, however, the Chinese began protesting unapologetic Japanese policies of remembrance. First, the Chinese expressed resentment and distrust of Japan in two crises over textbooks, in which Beijing—even more than Seoul—expressed vocal criticism of Japanese whitewashing of history.²⁵ After changes in Japanese textbooks were reported in the

²³ Yinan He, “Politicization of History-Making and Sino-Japanese Relations,” Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Chicago, Ill., March 2001, p. 13.

²⁴ Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 43. Rose argues, “The chief objective of ‘people's diplomacy’ was to create a large body of public opinion in Japan favourable to the view that the PRC that would put pressure on the government to normalize relations with China.” (Ibid)

²⁵ For a discussion of the diplomacy in the crisis see Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, Chapters 5-6; Hidenori Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization,” in Christopher Howe, ed., *China and Japan: History, Trends, Prospects* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 60-82. For a discussion of media content analyses and the argument that Chinese coverage of the issue was carefully managed by Beijing, see Tanaka

Japanese and international media, Beijing protested the changes to Tokyo. The Chinese media picked up the story; Allen Whiting notes,

a full-scale campaign ensued, recapitulating the story of Japanese aggression and atrocities in vivid detail. Photographs, films, reminiscences, and political cartoons accompanied dramatically worded captions, headlines, and commentaries that specifically warned against the danger of renewed Japanese militarism.²⁶

Caroline Rose reports, "Chinese television programmes showed graphic pictures of the aftermath of some of the atrocities and interviewed eyewitnesses. Photographic exhibitions depicting the events of the war were held in a number of cities..."²⁷ In addition, in 1985 the Chinese objected to the official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.²⁸

Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian complained to his Japanese counterpart about the shrine visits. Chinese leaders expressed measured approval of Nakasone's decision to abstain from future visits to the shrine. The Chinese media also picked up the story. Thus in the 1980s the Chinese began criticizing unapologetic Japanese remembrance.

Chinese observers argued that Japan's unapologetic policies of remembrance (history textbooks, and visits to Yasukuni Shrine) were signs of malign Japanese intentions. First, the Chinese media proclaimed Japan's "distortion" of history textbooks as "an attempt to pave the way for militarism which jeopardizes international security and world peace."²⁹ Japan said to be

Akihiko, "'Kyokasho mondai' o meguru Chugoku no seisaku kettei," [Decision-making in China over the "history textbook issue"] in Okabe Tatsumi, ed., *Chugoku gaiko: Seisaku kettei no kozo* [China's Foreign Policy: The Structure of Policymaking] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1983), pp. 193-219.

²⁶ Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 146.

²⁷ Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 2.

²⁸ Japanese Prime Minister Miki Takeo had visited the shrine unofficially in 1975 and had not prompted a major response in Beijing. However, in 1978 1,068 convicted war criminals, including Prime Minister Tojo Hideki and 13 other Class-A criminals, were enshrined at Yasukuni.

²⁹ Chen Tiquiang, "Conclusions Confirmed by History," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 35, August 30, 1982, p. 28.

“cherishing the spirit of Japanese militarism.”³⁰ Textbook revisionism represented “a hostile attitude toward China and its people.”³¹ It was said to “signal a very serious danger” that should be watched carefully, because it represented an “an attempt by some people to revive militarism because historically, Japanese militarist education began at primary school.”³² As the *Renmin Ribao* newspaper editorialized, “Memory of the past is the teacher for the future.”³³ The Chinese media criticized the Japanese Education Ministry for attempting to “obliterate” history and “lay the basis for reviving militarism in Japan.”³⁴ The media blamed “a handful of militarists who refuse to draw lessons from the wars of aggression and instead try to prettify them.”³⁵ The media urged the Japanese people to “prevent a resurgence of militarism,” which could only be prevented “if they refuse to forget that period of history and use its concrete facts as a lesson for successive generations.”³⁶ In Whiting's study of Chinese perceptions of Japan, interviewees stressed the importance of Japanese history books for bilateral relations. Whiting quotes one saying that the Chinese ‘want to make certain that the younger generation is properly taught the true lessons of history’;³⁷ Whiting concludes that the Chinese perceive that a group in Japan is “capable of totally transforming public opinion over time through such indirect means as textbook revisions of history.”³⁸

³⁰ “We Must Bear in Mind this Lesson,” *Renmin Ribao*, July 20, 1982.

³¹ Ren Yan, “Friendship Grows Only By Respecting History,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 32, August 9, 1982, p. 10.

³² Ren Yan, “Friendship Grows Only By Respecting History,” p. 10.

³³ *Renmin Ribao*, August 15, 1982.

³⁴ “Japanese Government Should Be True in Word and Deed,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 38, September 20, 1982.

³⁵ Liu Zheng, “Japan Should Draw a Lesson From History,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 34, August 23, 1982.

³⁶ “Japanese Government Should Be True in Word and Deed,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 38, September 20, 1982.

³⁷ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 146.

³⁸ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 147.

Second, the Chinese also viewed the 1985 Nakasone visit to Yasukuni Shrine as a sign of lingering militaristic sentiment in Japan. The *Renmin Ribao* newspaper called Yasukuni “the spiritual pillar of Japanese military ideology,” and said that “to officially visit the shrine and to worship the dead including the Class-A criminals implies that Japan has made a public announcement of its refusal to admit its war responsibility to the world.”³⁹ A Xinhua commentary said, “China hopes that the Japanese government will bow to the historical facts” because “this is the best guarantee against the renewal of militarism and the recurrence of any such crime.”⁴⁰ The Yasukuni visit was said to have put Asians “on their guard once again” with respect to Japan.⁴¹ In September (on the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931), large anti-Japanese student demonstrations broke out in Beijing and other cities. Students “marched through Beijing’s Tiananmen Square shouting ‘Down with Japanese militarism,’ and ‘Down with Nakasone.’”⁴²

Third, Chinese observers expressed outrage and expressions of distrust in Japan after Japanese cabinet members made statements of denial in the 1980s. After remarks by Education Minister Fujio Masayuki in 1986, articles cautioned that the Chinese people must “exercise vigilance to ensure historical truth and prevent a resurgence of militarism.”⁴³ After similar remarks by another Minister, Okuno Seisuke, in 1988, similar sentiments were expressed. One

³⁹ *Renmin Ribao*, August 11, 1985, quoted in Xiaohua Ma, “Security Multilateralism and Conflicting Memories in East Asia: The Promise of a Multilateral Dialogue for Confidence Building,” Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, February 25-March 1, 2003, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Xinhua is the official Chinese news agency. Quoted in Xin Zong, “Nakasone’s Shrine Visit Draws Fire,” *Beijing Review*, Vol. 28, no. 35, p. 12.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² See Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization,” p. 70. On the demonstrations also see Whiting, Chapter 4. Nakasone abstained from a planned visit to the shrine during an October festival. Ijiri, p. 71.

⁴³ “The Trend of the Times is Irresistible,” *People’s Daily*, September 10, 1986, in FBIS China, same date.

article warned, “there really exists an extremely dangerous force and trend of thought in Japan. It is necessary to pay attention to the direction in which Japan...will develop towards in the future.”⁴⁴ The article noted that this strain of Japanese nationalism “contains elements...of racial superiority and expansionism.” Another article agreed that the lesson from the Okuno incident was that “to prevent a repeat of the war,” Japan’s neighbors must be vigilant.⁴⁵ Okuno’s gaffe was said to “testify to the existence of Japanese people still dreaming to create the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere planned by Japanese militarists during World War II.”⁴⁶ Thus during the 1980s, many Chinese observers commented that Japan’s failure to atone for its past aggression and atrocities was a sign of malign Japanese intentions.

In the post-Cold War era, the Chinese continued to lambast Japanese denials and to say they are signs of Japan’s malign intentions. During this period, Chinese paid much greater attention to the issue of Japanese atrocities in the Sino-Japanese war, as well as to Japanese remembrance.⁴⁷ The Chinese criticized and expressed fears of unapologetic Japanese remembrance.

First, during the Diet Resolution debate, Chinese observers said Japan’s failure to come to terms with its past was a sign of its malign intentions. Condemning the remarks made by Education Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu in 1995, one article argued that “politicians should take responsibility for historic interpretations...for their perceptions of history are often taken as

⁴⁴ Mei Zhenmin, “Background to Okuno’s Defense of Aggression,” *Liowang*, May 23, 1988, no. 21 (FBIS China, June 2, 1988). [Weekly journal of Xiaohua news service.]

⁴⁵ Liu Wenyu, “What Can Be Learned From Okuno’s Resignation,” Xinhua News Service, May 13, 1988 (FBIS China, May 16, 1988).

⁴⁶ “Friendship Group’s Reaction,” Kyodo News Service, April 28, 1988 (FBIS China, April 29, 1988).

⁴⁷ Yinan He, “Politicization of History-making and Sino-Japanese Relations,” p.26. For example, coverage of the Murayama apology and Diet Resolution in 1995 was accompanied by long feature articles about Japanese atrocities in the Sino-Japanese wars. See “Unforgettable Aggression: Time to Ponder Two Sino-Japanese Wars,” *Beijing*

attitudes of their nation over relations with other members of the international community.”⁴⁸

Another article denounced “right-wing forces” “clamoring for the spirit of militarism.” It noted that it was impossible for “countries in Asia and the rest of the world” to “rest assured” about Japan, because of the debate within Japan about its guilt in World War II. The right-wing view was “to refuse to admit their guilt, but also try openly to reverse the verdict on the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’” The article said the question at hand was, between the “contradictory historical perceptions of war,” “which will transcend the other”?⁴⁹

Second, the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine once again appeared in the headlines, with the Chinese warning that visits to the shrine represented disturbing signs of Japanese militarism. Koizumi’s 2001 visit was lambasted by the media; one newspaper said “To worship and pay respect to those war criminals is tantamount to an official sanction of Japan’s past aggression and beautifies Japan’s militarism.”⁵⁰ The *People’s Daily* reported, “It is well known that the Shrine is a tool used to manipulate the feelings of the Japanese people, and to stir up militaristic spirit,” and that the shrine was “a virtual symbol of Japan’s overseas aggression and expansion in modern history.”⁵¹ After Koizumi’s January 2003 visit, the Chinese foreign ministry lodged a complaint to the Japanese ambassador. Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang argued that “only a correct understanding of history can avoid a replay of historical tragedies” and “can

Review, August 21-27, 1995, no. 34, pp. 8-15 (FBIS China, August 21, 1995); “People Never to Forget Japanese ‘War Crimes’,” Xinhua News Service, August 16, 1995 (FBIS China, same date).

⁴⁸ Tan Jianrong, “Politicians Should Face Up to the Past,” Xinhua News Service, August 16, 1995 (FBIS China, same date).

⁴⁹ Wang Guotai, “Resolution that Fails to Distinguish Right From Wrong,” *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ *Jiefan Jun Bao*, May 12, 2001, quoted in Ma, “Security Multilateralism and Conflicting Memories in East Asia,” p. 5.

⁵¹ See Xinhua News Service, “Article Slams Japanese PM’s Shrine Visit,” August 14, 2001.

ensure the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region.”⁵² The shrine visit led Beijing to refuse a proposed summit between the two countries, saying “Koizumi’s official visit to China is contingent on the Japanese premier not paying homage at Yasukuni Shrine.”⁵³ Pointing out the re-institution of Japan’s flag (*Hinomaru*) and national anthem (*Kimigayo*), one article laments that Japan was still haunted by “the ghosts of militarism.”⁵⁴

Third, in another dispute over history textbooks, the Chinese criticized Japan for “whitewashing” its wartime aggression, saying that Japan was clearly under the influence of “ultra-rightist” political forces intent on remilitarization. After the submission of a controversial history textbook for approval, one Chinese article said “it seems that the Japanese Government is trying to shirk the blemishes and shadows caused by the war before the new millennium so its new generation will have no memory of the historical problems because they will have all been erased.”⁵⁵ Another article argued that “ever-growing Japanese rightist forces” had “pushed the government to take action from time to time to distort historical facts.”⁵⁶ The book was criticized for “conscious ignorance of the truth,” and its approval “paraded the strong influence of Japanese rightist forces” in Japanese politics.⁵⁷ Chinese observers argued during the textbook dispute that Japan’s approval of the textbook was a sign of Japan’s malign intentions. Several Chinese officials denounced Japan during the dispute. The Chinese Foreign Minister said that history

⁵² “Shrine Visit Jeopardizes Relations,” *China Daily*, January 15, 2003.

⁵³ Takeshi Sato, “No Progress on Koizumi’s Trip to China: Officials,” *Kyodo Wire Service*, April 1, 2003.

⁵⁴ “Japan Needs Self-Analysis,” *China Daily*, August 18, 1999.

⁵⁵ “Japan Dodges War Crimes,” *China Daily*, November 12, 1999.

⁵⁶ “Japan Tarnishes its International Image,” *China Daily*, February 12, 2003.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* The *People’s Daily* said that the approval of the textbook “exposes the existence of the right wing in Japan that has been in a bid to deny and gloss over the history of Japanese aggression.” See Xinhua News Service, April 5, 2001. Another article said “These officially-endorsed textbooks indicate once again that in today’s Japan a handful of ultra rightist forces are still trying by every means to reverse the verdict on Japan’s wars of aggression in the past, a verdict which was based on conclusive evidence.” Xinhua News Service, April 4, 2001.

was a mirror to the future, and that Japan's misleading of its younger generation "could lead to endless trouble in the future."⁵⁸ Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said that the textbook incident "reveals once again that in Japan there exist ultra-rightist forces who have been trying to deny and whitewash that country's history of aggression, and who are still bent on aggression," and that "their actions call for a high state of vigilance from peace-loving people around the world."⁵⁹ The Chinese Education Ministry spokesman argued that "history textbooks should reflect true history, so as to cultivate the correct history perspectives of the youth and prevent the recurrence of historical tragedies."⁶⁰

The Chinese media also reported the textbooks as a sign of Japan's malign intentions. One commentator warned, "the Japanese Government is stepping further on the road to militarism."⁶¹ Another article said, "The books cannot but arouse profound concerns among the public in Japan and the countries that fell victim to these wars and the international community at large."⁶² The *People's Daily* said, "in recent years, Japanese rightists, though small in number, have been using the sluggish economy to drum up nationalism and militarism."⁶³ Thus in the post-Cold War period, China continues to observe Japanese remembrance, and observers say that Japan's failure to apologize and atone signals Japan's malign intentions.

⁵⁸ "Chinese FM Stresses Significance of Sino-Japanese Ties," Xinhua News Service, July 10, 2001. This view was also echoed by Li Peng, a high-ranking official of the People's Congress, who said that China was concerned about the textbooks because "the younger generation must be taught the correct history so they can learn the lessons of the past and not repeat them." Shao Zongwei, "Basic Principles Vital for Better Ties," *China Daily*, April 4, 2002.

⁵⁹ "China Slams Japan Over History Textbooks," Xinhua News Service, April 3, 2001.

⁶⁰ "Japan's Decision on Textbook Unacceptable: Chinese Education Ministry Spokesman," Xinhua News Service, July 9, 2001.

⁶¹ Jing Xian, "China: To the Point," *China Daily*, January 26, 2000.

⁶² Zhang Huanli and Gang Ye, "Japan's Rightists Must Not Tamper With History," Xinhua News Service, April 4, 2001.

⁶³ See Xinhua News Service, April 5, 2001.

In sum, Chinese reactions to Japanese remembrance were very similar to those of South Korea. The Chinese also 1) observed Japanese apologies, but ultimately dismissed them because of subsequent Japanese denials; and 2) inferred malign Japanese intentions from Japan's unapologetic policies of remembrance. The China-Japan case thus shows that the Korea case does not appear idiosyncratic, which bolsters my findings about the apology theory.

JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE AND AUSTRALIAN PERCEPTIONS

In order to demonstrate further support for my conclusions about the apology theory, I now turn to the case of Australian perceptions of Japanese intentions after World War II. For the Australia case to support my earlier findings, we should see the following: first, given the low level of Japanese apologies, we should see little benign effect on Australian perceptions of Japanese intentions. That is, Japanese apologies should also not register among Australians. Second, denials should lead Australians to view Japanese intentions as malign.

In the Japan-Australia case, both findings are borne out. Australians, though initially positive about Japanese apologies, dismissed them in the wake of denials. And, Australians followed Japan's unapologetic policies of remembrance, and argued that they were reasons to distrust Japanese intentions. Confirmation of these findings in the Japan-Australia case thus bolsters my findings about the apology theory in the Japan-Korea case. Those factors that might make Korea hypersensitive about Japanese apologies and denials—culture, regime type, wartime experience—are totally different in the case of Australia. Australia has a different, Anglo-Saxon culture, stable democratic governance, and a different wartime experience than either China or Korea. However Australian reactions to Japanese remembrance were very similar to how those two countries viewed Japanese remembrance, and Japanese intentions.

Apologies Have Little Benign Effect

Japanese apologies to Australia, though initially received positively, were ultimately dismissed as insincere in the wake of Japanese denials. As with Korea and China, an initial Japanese apology to Australia succeeded in removing the issue from the radar screen for several decades. However, the issue later reappeared, and Australians maintained—despite the early apology as well as subsequent ones—that Japan had not atoned for its past aggression and atrocities.

Japan apologized to Australia in 1957, and Australians accepted and praised the gesture. As a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Australia—unlike non-signatories China and South Korea—normalized relations with Japan earlier than did the other two states. As with these two countries, the apology issue arose early in the process of normalization and reconciliation between Japan and Australia. As security partners thrown together by the combination of U.S. influence and the Communist threat in Asia, Japan and Australia began to reconcile in the 1950s. This process included a series of summit visits in both countries. Japan first apologized to Australia when Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke visited there in 1957. Kishi laid a wreath at the National War Memorial. At a Parliamentary luncheon he also issued a statement of apology, saying, “it is my official duty, and my personal desire, to express to the people of Australia our heartfelt sorrow for what occurred in the war.”⁶⁴ Australian Prime Minister Menzies received the statement graciously; he acknowledged that World War II created “the most bitter of feelings” between the two states, but said that the enthusiastic attendance of the day’s event was “reassurance that we have reached the wise conclusion it is sometimes better to hope than always to remember.” He added that Australia and Japan should “concentrate our

⁶⁴ *Canberra Times*, December 5, 1957, p. 1.

minds on peace.”⁶⁵ Broader Australian reactions to Kishi’s visit were also positive.⁶⁶ There were stirrings of controversy during the visit,⁶⁷ but overall Kishi’s visit and apologetic gestures were well received, and the visit deemed a success. Some anti-Japanese sentiment lingered in the years after the visit, but in general, Australians did not appear interested in the issue of Japanese apologies until several decades later.

In the post-Cold War world, despite the 1957 apology—and Japanese apologies of the 1990s—Australians say Japan has failed to apologize for its past aggression. The issue of Japan’s war guilt surged into Australian headlines upon the death of Emperor Hirohito in January 1989. Australians debated Hirohito’s war responsibility, and Japan’s record of atonement.⁶⁸ Australians also monitored Japanese textbooks and visits to Yasukuni shrine (see below), followed the evolution of the “comfort women” issue,⁶⁹ and discussed Japan’s actions in the war

⁶⁵ “Mr. Kishi Apologises to Australia for War Happenings,” *The Age*, December 5, 1957, p. 5. In a visit to Tokyo that year, Menzies had also made gesture of forgiveness that surprised and gratified his Japanese hosts. Menzies called Japan a “great” and “proud” country, and commented that “it is part of the tradition in British countries that when you have had a fight you shake hands and have friendly relations.” Quoted in Alan Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 31.

⁶⁶ Press coverage of Kishi’s Australian tour was favorable and light in tone, confined to upbeat reports about the various stops on the Prime Minister’s visit (such as a picture of a smiling Kishi holding a Koala bear on the front page of *The Age* newspaper). See “Japanese PM Arrives,” *The Age*, November 30, 1957, p. 1.

⁶⁷ One veterans’ organization’s attempted to prevent Kishi from attending the wreath-laying ceremony. This protest was rejected by the Returned Servicemen’s League (RSL), who viewed Kishi’s gesture as “a respectful salute to Australians who perished in all theatres of war,” and “a sign of the growing awareness of the need for a strong mutual link between our two countries.” See “No Support of 8th Div. Protests,” *The Age*, December 2, 1957, p. 7. Later, an individual caused a minor stir and elicited some media coverage with a demonstration at the ceremony. Canberra resident Mr. R. Greenish shouted at photographers not to document “an infamous day for Australia”; after Kishi laid the wreath, Greenish walked up to the monument and placed on it several sheets of paper, which were copies of depositions from war crimes trials. See “Protest on Kishi Visit at National Shrine,” *The Age*, December 5, 1957, p. 3. In general the public was turned off by the display, as seen in letters to the editor of major newspapers. See “A Protest at Canberra,” *The Age*, December 7, 1957, p. 2.

⁶⁸ Candace Sutton and Julie Power, “Hirohito: Fury Over Funeral,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 8, 1989, p. 1; “Sympathy and Praise and Not a Little Bitterness,” *The Age*, January 9, 1989, p. 8; Sophie Arnold and Hugo Kelly, “Boycott Hirohito Funeral, Says Halfpenny,” *The Age*, January 7, 1989, p. 1; “Row Over Hirohito Funeral,” *Sunday Morning Herald*, January 10, 1989, p. 1; also “Prime Minister and Emperor,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 11, 1989, p. 12.

⁶⁹ “Comfort Women Haunt Summit,” *The Australian*, January 27, 1997; “Japan Apologizes,” *The Australian*, June 24, 1996; “Comfort Women Accused,” *The Australian*, June 7, 1996.

after the release of a film about a World War II women's POW camp.⁷⁰ One article commented that Japan "has shown a doggedness in refusing to acknowledge responsibility for some of the worst atrocities in human history."⁷¹ Another article noted that many Australians "feel that Japan owes an apology to Australian victims of World War II, particularly former prisoners of war and their descendants."⁷² It commented that an apology "is a sign of maturity" that "acknowledges a historical responsibility." The Returned Serviceman's League (RSL) continued to criticize Japan's failure to pay reparations to former Australian POWs.⁷³ RSL members staged protests against Tokyo's policies, such as turning their backs on Emperor Akihito while he passed by in a parade,⁷⁴ and successfully lobbying to remove the word "Peace" from a "Japanese Peace Park" built in Canberra.⁷⁵ After Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Australian War Memorial, declaring himself "moved and impressed," by exhibits at the museum there, one commentary noted that the two states have grown to be

⁷⁰ D.D. McNicoll, "Film-maker Rejects Japan-bashing Charge," *Weekend Australian*, April 12, 1997; Richard Jinman, "Too Tough? These Men Stole My Youth, Says Camp Victim," *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 17, 1997; K.D. Sligo and Narelle Pasco, "Survivors of Paradise Road are Proof of Film's Accuracy," *The Weekend Australian*, April 19, 1997.

⁷¹ "Time to End this Deafening Silence," *Australian Financial Review*, June 1, 2001, p. 83.

⁷² John Kilner, "Should We Say We're Sorry?" *The Age*, May 22, 2002, p. 11.

⁷³ Under the terms of the 1951 peace treaty, signatories (including Australia) renounced the right to further reparations claims from Japan. With this in mind, the Australian government has not sought reparations from Japan, but rather has compensated former POWs itself. After the war, Japanese assets in Australia reverted to possession of the Australian government; proceeds from the sale of these assets were distributed to former POWs. In 1952 POWs also received payments in the range of \$4000 in today's (Australian) dollars; they also received free health care. In 2001 the Department of Veterans' Affairs dispensed a one-time payment of A\$25,000 to eligible claimants. See "Department of Veterans' Affairs Budget Factsheet—POW," May 22, 2001, available at www.dva.gov.au.

⁷⁴ Christopher Henning, "Former POWs Will Turn Their Backs On Emperor," *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 23, 1998.

⁷⁵ The RSL argued that "the [park's] name was inappropriate when Japan had not fully apologized for the war." See *The Australian*, January 31, 2001, p. 1.

friends, although “those who suffered at the hands of the Japanese are unwilling to forgive and forget.”⁷⁶

In the 1990s, exhortations by several Australian Prime Ministers for Japan to apologize also demonstrate that Kishi’s 1957 apology had not finalized the issue. In 1991 Prime Minister Bob Hawke “urged Japan to acknowledge its guilt for war-time horrors.”⁷⁷ The next year Prime Minister Keating urged Japan to take more responsibility for its wartime actions.⁷⁸ In a state visit to Tokyo in 1995, Keating said again that “we believe that Japan should not allow these events to be forgotten.”⁷⁹ In 1998 Acting Prime Minister Tim Fischer said “an appropriate gesture would be sought” from Tokyo in the next state visit.⁸⁰ In 2002 Prime Minister John Howard said “I think there is a problem in Japan in relation to history,” which was “understandably a problem with many people in Australia.”⁸¹ Howard said “I do hope that they face the realities of their past as all societies must and debate it.” In his remarks Howard compared Japan and Germany in this regard, and found Japan wanting. Australian leaders as well as the media thus regard Japan as impenitent for its aggressions and atrocities in the war.

In the case of Australia—as in the case of Korea—an early apology seems to have laid the issue of war grievances to rest for a long period of time. Both Koreans and Australians turned their attentions to trade and FDI, as well as security partnership, in their relations with Japan. However the issue of Japan’s perceived failure to apologize for the war would re-

⁷⁶ Jonathan Este, “POW’s Hard Road to Forgiveness,” *The Weekend Australian*, June 14, 2002. On Koizumi’s visit see Matt Price, “Koizumi Moved by Images of War Dead,” *The Australian*, May 2, 2002.

⁷⁷ *Australian Financial Review*, March 20, 1991.

⁷⁸ *Courier-Mail*, February 20, 1992.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment*, p. 39.

⁸⁰ “Japan War Apology Tipped,” *The Australian*, January 14, 1998, p. 3.

⁸¹ Lincoln Wright, “Howard Tells Japan to Face Up to Human Rights Record,” *Canberra Times*, May 4, 2002.

emerge—particularly after 1990; both Koreans and Australians would charge Japan with impenitence, and would continue to press Japan for apologies.

Denials Have Malign Effects

After Kishi's early apology, Australians did not monitor Japanese remembrance (either apologies or denials) until the issue re-emerged with a vengeance in the 1990s. In the post-Cold War years, Australians argued that Japanese denials were grounds for distrusting Japanese intentions. One article pointed out regional trepidation at Japan's expanded security responsibility after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, saying that "few nations in the region are willing to forget Japanese aggression in World War II partially because not too many of Japan's post-war leaders" were willing to apologize for the war.⁸² The Guidelines were called "a major step away from its post-World War II pacifist stance."⁸³ Several articles mentioned Japanese whitewashing of history textbooks and visits to Yasukuni shrine as nascent signs of Japanese militarism. One criticized the "drumbeat" of nationalism in Japan and commented, "we can never be entirely comfortable about a partner which has failed conspicuously to come to terms with its past."⁸⁴ Another article, noting Australian support for a broader Japanese security role, mentioned concerns "about a resurgence of Japanese militarism."⁸⁵ Another argued that although Australians were raised on the history of Japanese aggression, which was an

⁸² Russell Skelton, "Asia Casts Wary Eye on Wartime Aggressor," *The Age*, September 25, 1997, p. 17.

⁸³ Russell Skelton, "Pact Gives Tokyo Stronger Military Role," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 25, 1997, p. 10.

⁸⁴ "Time to End this Deafening Silence," *Australian Financial Review*, June 1, 2001, p. 83.

⁸⁵ "Reassessing Japan's Role in the Region," *The Australian*, May 30, 2001, p. 12.

“unchallenged fact of recent history,” “at the Yasukuni museum, there is a different story.”⁸⁶

The article argues that Japan’s “lack of real contrition has now assumed an even greater importance,” because facing threats from North Korea, “conventional and possibly nuclear Japan is shedding its pacifist robes, assuming its most aggressive defense posture since 1945.”⁸⁷ It questions, “Should we worry about Japan’s new defense posture? Probably not. But as long as Japanese prime ministers continue to make visits to Yasukuni, it is an assurance that must be qualified.”⁸⁸

A fourth article discussed various signs of Japanese nationalism (education, Yasukuni, statements by leaders), and noted, “What must be of concern to Japan’s neighbors, including Australia, is the possibility that the ghosts of wartime past are increasingly able to influence developments in Japan.”⁸⁹ The article noted that increased Japanese military roles were viewed approvingly by Australia, given the need for increased burden-sharing. However (invoking the U.S. arming of the Afghanis against the Soviets in the 1980s), the article pointed out the danger of empowering an ally that one might later have to fight. The article warned, “How can other nations trust a Japan that appears increasingly determined to forget and ignore its past aggression?”⁹⁰ Thus Australians expressed distrust of Japanese intentions because of Japan’s unapologetic policies of remembrance.

In sum, in this section I turned to the case of Japan-Australia relations in order to demonstrate further support for my conclusions about the apology theory. In order for this case

⁸⁶ Shane Green, “Japan’s Lack of Remorse Troubling as it Moves to Rearm,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 19, 2003, p. 15.

⁸⁷ Green, “Japan’s Lack of Remorse Troubling as it Moves to Rearm.”

⁸⁸ Green, “Japan’s Lack of Remorse Troubling as it Moves to Rearm.”

⁸⁹ Brian Victoria, “Right Face! The Return of Wartime Ghosts,” *Australian Financial Review*, August 9, 2002, p. 3.

⁹⁰ Victoria, “Right Face! The Return of Wartime Ghosts.”

to support my earlier findings, we should see the following: first, given the low level of Japanese apologies, we should see little benign effect on Australian perceptions of Japanese intentions. Second, denials should cause perceptions of malign intentions. Australians should say that unapologetic Japanese remembrance should lead them to perceive malign Japanese intentions.

Both findings were borne out in the Japan-Australia case. Though initially positive about Japanese apologies, Australians discounted them after witnessing Japanese denials. Australians argued that Japan's unapologetic policies of remembrance were reasons to distrust Japanese intentions. Confirmation of these findings in the Japan-Australia case thus bolsters my findings about the apology theory in the Japan-Korea case.

CONCLUSION: AUSTRALIA AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN

Chapter Three, which tested the apology theory in the case of Japan-Korea relations, reported the following findings for the apology theory. First, because the Koreans dismissed Japanese apologies, I concluded that denials cancel out any positive effects of apologies. Second, because the Koreans argued that they did not trust Japan based on its unapologetic policies of remembrance, I concluded that denials or other unapologetic policies lead intentions to be perceived as malign.

One counterargument to the findings from Chapter Three is that perhaps Korean reactions to Japanese apologies are idiosyncratic. Perhaps the Koreans are particularly unreceptive to Japanese apologies, and sensitive to Japanese denials, because of their culture, domestic politics, or their wartime experience. To assess this counterargument I turned to the cases of China and Australia.

For Chapter Three's conclusions about the apology theory to be supported, the cases of Australia and China should also show 1) that these countries also dismissed Japanese apologies because of subsequent denials; and 2) that these countries also inferred that Japan had malign intentions based on its denials, and other unapologetic policies of remembrance. Both of these findings were borne out. Like the South Koreans, the Chinese and Australians condemn Japan's perceived failure to apologize for its past aggression and atrocities; media coverage and leaders' comments within all three countries reflect suspicion of Japanese intentions based on Japanese remembrance. The views expressed in democratic Australia are often as bitter and suspicious as those expressed in Communist China. Thus, these mini-cases demonstrate that the Korea case does not appear idiosyncratic, thus bolstering my findings about the apology theory.



Remembrance in the Franco-German Relationship

Germany had unleashed a war that was more terrible than anything that had taken place until then and it suffered the most terrible defeat that one can imagine. Europe was in ruins, from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the Arctic circle to the Mediterranean coast. Millions of members of all European peoples, including the German one, were dead....Millions had lost their relatives, their friends, and their homes, or were in the process of losing them. Millions came from prisoners-of-war camps or were on their way to them. Millions had been maimed. Hundreds of thousands of women had been raped. The stink of the crematories and the smoldering ruins was heavy over Europe.

—German President Roman Herzog, May 8, 1995

The Germans: unbeatable at both the crime and at repenting it.

—Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*

For the generations of Germans to come, there is a happy medium to find between irresponsible repression and paralyzing culpability: between the desire for normality and the necessity of preserving the memory of the Third Reich.

—Pascale Hughes, *Le Point*



Chapter Five

German Remembrance Since World War II

This chapter codes remembrance in West Germany¹ (and then united Germany) over the post-World War II period. After this introduction and a summary of findings, the chapter has four major sections. First, I provide an overview of the history of relations between France and Germany. Second, I summarize policies of the Allied occupation of West Germany that shaped West German policies of remembrance. Third, the chapter measures German policies of remembrance across three periods of time: the early postwar period (1945-1950s), the middle period (1960s-80s), and the post-unification period since 1990. The fourth section of this chapter briefly tracks alternate independent variables over this time period.

To measure German remembrance over time, I divide the post-World War II era into periods. As argued in Chapter One (pp. 45-46), the only requirement about periodization from a methodological standpoint is that periods are defined in a way such that the independent variable does not vary significantly within a given time period. Therefore periods should first be divided according to values of the independent variable over time. As long as periods do not encompass a time in which there is variation in the value of the independent variable, they may be further subdivided (for ease of presentation) without biasing findings. As noted in the Japan case, in this project I use two criteria to sub-divide periods: 1) changes in the tone or content (but not the value) of remembrance, and 2) major changes in the value of another key independent variable of interest, namely capabilities.

Based on this periodization method, I divide the case of post-World War II West Germany and unified Germany into three time periods. First, I code German remembrance as *unapologetic*

¹ The German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) demonstrated markedly less contrition during this period; it paid no reparations, offered no apologies, and was hostile to Israel. Because united Germany is the successor state of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), this chapter is focused on West German contrition. Memory in the GDR is examined extensively in Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: the Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

in the 1950s, and *apologetic* after the early 1960s. Thus from a methodological standpoint, I must divide the postwar era into a minimum of two time periods: the 1950s, and 1960s-2000s.

Next, I further sub-divide the second period at the juncture of 1990: German unification. This is an appropriate place to sub-divide based on both criteria; first, the extent of German contrition increased even beyond its already high level, and second, 1990 demarcates an important shift in German capabilities (the removal of the Soviet threat and thus the lifting of a major constraint on German power).

In sum, in this chapter I measure German remembrance across three time periods: an early period (1950s), a middle period (1960s-89), and a late (post-unification) period, 1990s-00s.

SUMMARY

In the early period (1950s), following the Allied occupation of Germany, I code West German remembrance as *unapologetic*. West German policies of remembrance displayed a mixture of unapologetic and apologetic policies. West Germany neither glorified nor denied the crimes of the Third Reich; Nazi crimes were acknowledged by German leaders and in German textbooks. Bonn paid reparations to Israel in 1952, and many West German opposition leaders spoke eloquently about the need for Germans to remember and atone. However, West German remembrance at the time was for the most part characterized by amnesia of German crimes and a focus on Germany's own suffering. Political conservatives in power, among them Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, preferred to minimize rather than cultivate West German remembrance. Conservatives favored an end to denazification and to legal trials of war criminals. The surrender and the Holocaust were not observed in West German commemoration of this period; these issues were dodged in public education. West German remembrance emphasized the suffering of German POWs in Soviet camps, strategic bombing of German cities, and ethnic cleansing of Germans from Eastern Europe. Adenauer did negotiate an important reparations settlement with Israel in the early 1950s, but he did so amidst clear public and political opposition, and under Western pressure.

German remembrance increased markedly in the middle period (1960s-89), which I code as *Apologetic*. Bonn conducted legal trials of war criminals, and began educating youth in the recent history of German aggression and atrocities. West Germany began commemorating the Holocaust. Bonn negotiated reparations settlements with victims that had previously gone without compensation. As the social-liberal government pursued *Ostpolitik*, the FRG negotiated reparations agreements with Eastern European states. It expressed remorse toward Poland, such as Chancellor Willy Brandt's famous fall to his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto.

This upswell of memory sparked a counter-reaction during the 1980s, in which conservative intellectuals and politicians sought to "draw a line under the past." Attempts to normalize German memory, such as through new revisionist historiography, were sharply rebuked by a vocal Left, who argued that Germans must never forget their past. Similarly, a speech by Bundestag President Philip Jenninger portrayed as insensitive to German victims led to outcry and Jenninger's resignation. The result of 1980s battles over memory was that a commitment to remembrance—previously the domain of the Left—now extended across the West German political spectrum. Thus West German remembrance of this middle period remained *Apologetic*.

Finally, I code German remembrance of the late period (1990-00s) as *Apologetic*. The already high level of admission increased as one of the FRG's lingering myths—that ordinary Germans were unaware of and uninvolved in the Holocaust—was challenged in the mid-1990s in debates prompted by Daniel Goldhagen's book and the "Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*" museum exhibition. Germany continued to display remorse through reparations (bilateral agreements as well as reparations to former forced laborers). Important commemorations of this time include the Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, a commemoration day established for Holocaust remembrance, and ceremonies held on the fiftieth anniversary of the German surrender. Thus Germany's later policies of remembrance have been extremely *apologetic*.

BACKGROUND: FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS

“We have torn each other apart for a hundred years,” lamented Charles de Gaulle to Konrad Adenauer after World War II.² Until the recent past, the Franco-German relationship was indeed characterized by death and destruction. Napoleonic France defeated Germany; then Germany under Bismarck defeated France in the 1871 Franco-Prussian war. Germany and France fought again in World War I. After the immensely costly war and the German defeat, France and her allies imposed punishing peace terms on the Germans.³ Germany was demilitarized and forced to accept responsibility for damages from the war, including the payment of an impossibly high bill for reparations.⁴ A disarmed, impoverished, and resentful Germany would eventually bring the Nazi party into power. After rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia, Hitler invaded and conquered Poland in 1939.

Germany invaded France in May 1940. The French lost 92,000 dead and 200,000 wounded in the short campaign. The French government debated their course of action,⁵ and under Phillippe Pétain signed an armistice on June 22 in the railway car at Compiègne (where Germany had been forced to accept the harsh peace terms after World War I). In the armistice, a quasi-sovereign French state was allowed to continue; France was divided into an occupied zone (northern France and the western coast), and an unoccupied southern zone. The French army was reduced to 100,000 men and the navy was disarmed at port. France agreed to pay for Germany’s occupation

² Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy under De Gaulle* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 70.

³ 8 million Frenchmen had been mobilized to fight, of whom 1.3 million were killed and nearly 1 million crippled. Northeastern France—the most advanced industrial and agricultural region—was devastated, and the nation’s industrial production and economic growth plummeted.

⁴ In the Treaty of Versailles, the population and territory of Germany were reduced by about 10 percent; France inherited the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the west (lost to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War), while other nations received other pieces of German territory. The coal-rich German Saarland was placed under international supervision. The treaty imposed on the Germans a “war guilt” clause, which identified them as aggressors in the war and held them liable for an enormous \$33 billion in reparations. Although economists argued that payment of this magnitude was impossible, the Allies insisted that Germany be made to pay. As Germany fell behind on payments, French and Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr valley to extract reparations. Furthermore, the Versailles treaty placed strict limitations on future German military power.

⁵ Undersecretary of War in the fallen Reynaud cabinet, General Charles de Gaulle, fled to London and in a radio appeal on June 18 summoned the French to continue to resist. He continued to lead French resistance throughout the war.

costs. In early July the French parliament met in Vichy and voted itself and the Third Republic out of existence. Hitler relied upon the quasi-independent Vichy state to help administer the occupation of France. Both Pétain and his deputy Pierre Leval—wary of safeguarding France’s colonial possessions, and expecting a German victory—advocated Franco-German collaboration.

In many respects, the occupation of France was mild, relative to German brutality in other occupied areas. Occupied France retained some independence in the cultural sphere; French schools, publishing houses, theaters, universities, and many newspapers were allowed to continue as before.⁶ French businesses thrived under German military contracts for construction and manufacturing.⁷ Goods the Nazis needed were requisitioned rather than seized; the owner received a receipt that (in theory) was redeemable from Vichy or the German authorities.⁸ Occupation troops were billeted in French households; the disruption versus benefits of such arrangements varied greatly, but in general, billeting did not result in violence or looting.⁹ Socially, fraternization was commonplace. Thus in many ways German occupation policies in France were far less harsh than those pursued in other lands.

But the French did suffer a great deal from war, occupation, and the chaos in the aftermath of the eventual German surrender. Vichy paid vast sums in occupation costs and reparations (as required by the armistice). Towns were forced to designate hostages, who would be shot if any harm came to German occupying forces.¹⁰ Later the Germans abandoned the use of hostages and instead deported troublemakers to concentration camps in Germany. The Nazis relied upon the 1.5 million French POWs (in camps in France and Germany) as a large supply of hostages, whom the Nazis used as bait to extract concessions from Vichy. 650,000 French people were deported to

⁶ Philippe Burrin, *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise* (New York: New Press, 1996), p. 187.

⁷ Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation, 1940-1945* (London: Macmillan, 2002), p. 84.

⁸ Gildea, *Marianne in Chains*, p. 79

⁹ A famous 1942 French novel, *La Silence de la Mer*, recounts the experience of a French family hosting a German officer.

¹⁰ Burrin, *France Under the Germans*, p. 133; Gildea, *Marianne in Chains*, p. 49.

Germany to work in German war industries; forced labor was instituted after 1941 and negotiated between the Nazis and Vichy (presided over by Laval). Laval also oversaw the persecution and deportation of Jews to death camps,¹¹ instituted a reign of terror policed by a French fascist militia (*Milice*), and attempted to eradicate the French Resistance.

Although the majority of the French people accepted the Vichy government and went about life in German-controlled France, some resisted German rule.¹² In May 1943 several French resistance groups were unified by Jean Moulin into a National Resistance Council. In London, de Gaulle established an organization called Free France, and proclaimed the French National Committee, for which he claimed the status of a legal exiled government. Thus although most French went about life as usual under German rule, some did rebel.¹³

The Allies liberated Paris in August 1944, and de Gaulle led a triumphant parade into the city. Pétain and Laval fled eastward with Germans and claimed to be the exiled rightful French government. After the end of the war, Pétain died in prison, and Laval (who had attempted suicide) was executed with many other convicted collaborators.

In summary, as of 1945—the starting point of this dissertation—France had fought three major wars with Germany since 1871, at astronomical financial and human cost. Over these wars France lost and regained, then again lost and regained territories in French provinces bordering Germany. In World War II—unmistakably caused by German aggression—a total of 600,000 French citizens lost their lives: a third on the battlefield, and the rest in executions, massacres, death camps, or in civil war in France or its colonies. At the war's end, France descended into chaos as

¹¹ Vichy deported 76,000 Jews to camps, only 3 percent of whom survived.

¹² Resistors transmitted military intelligence to London, helped downed Allied airmen escape to England, circulated anti-German leaflets, or sabotaged railways and German installations. French resistance increased after the German invasion of the USSR (as French Communists joined in), and after the Vichy government began conscripting labor. Guerilla bands in the hills called Maquis engaged in militant opposition.

¹³ In the “resistantalist myth,” advocated by de Gaulle and others after the war, the French exaggerated the size and scope of the Resistance. After the turmoil of the immediate days after the war (in which approximately 10,000 summary executions were carried out), for the most part collaborators were granted amnesty and over time, were reinstated with their full rights back into society. As in many countries, France did not enjoy dwelling on the subject of collaboration with the enemy during its days of occupation. For more on French memories of the Vichy days, see Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

Vichy loyalists clashed with the Free France movement led by Charles de Gaulle; French soldiers fought each other in the colonies in Syria and western Africa. Back home, the postwar power struggle resulted in 10,000 summary executions that were unauthorized by any court, and carried out by Free French and resistance forces against accused collaborators. Women who had consorted with Germans were thrown into the town squares to have their heads shaved in front of crowds, and were banished from their towns. German aggression unleashed profound upheaval and terror upon France.

The invasion of France was only a part of German aggression and atrocities during World War II. This was the most destructive war in history; estimates of casualties range from 50 to 64 million (among them, approximately 28 million Soviets were killed). Hitler's racial views privileged and even admired the French in many ways; he did not regard the French (as he regarded many other peoples) as racially inferior. For those deemed inferior—particularly Jews and Slavs—German occupation meant deportation and murder. Hitler attempted to annihilate the Poles, killing 6 million of them (including three million Polish Jews). Mobile killing squads (*Einsatzgruppen*) systematically shot Jewish populations on conquered Soviet territory at the rear of the advancing German armies. A total of 11 million people perished in the Holocaust: six million Jews and five million others.¹⁴ In addition, over seven million Europeans were conscripted into slave labor for German factories, working in deplorable conditions that often led to disease and death.

The Germans themselves suffered greatly from the war they had unleashed on Europe. German cities were leveled by Allied bombing raids, such as the firebombing of Dresden. 600,000 Germans perished in Allied bombing raids, and over three million were made homeless.¹⁵ Ethnic Germans living in Eastern Europe were ethnically cleansed, their properties appropriated by vengeful locals. 12 million German refugees trekked to Germany, with over two million perishing

¹⁴ Among the 5 million were political dissidents, homosexuals, Christian clergy, Jehovah's Witnesses, Sinti/Roma (gypsies), the disabled, and the mentally ill.

¹⁵ On the destruction and terror of Allied bombings in Germany, see W.G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction* (New York: Random House, 2003).

on the way. The Soviet army, as it swept into eastern Germany and occupied Berlin, raped an estimated two million German women.¹⁶ Nine million German soldiers languished in Soviet POW camps after the war. In sum, the German invaders who inflicted so much devastation on Europe also suffered greatly from their aggression.

THE OCCUPATION OF WEST GERMANY

After the German surrender, American, British, and French military governments in three zones of occupation worked to build a democratic and peaceful West German state. They established democratic institutions within West Germany, and they organized multilateral institutions in order to link the new state to the West. The Allies also pursued policies of remembrance as part of the occupation; in this section I summarize policies of justice and de-nazification, re-education, and reparations.

Justice/De-Nazification

Allied military governments pursued extensive—and controversial—policies of justice in the West German zones. First, the International Military Tribunal convened in Nuremberg from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946, and held twelve successor trials between 1946 and 1949. The trials

established that Hitler and the Nazi regime had launched World War II as a war of aggression and racism, had ordered and implemented the mass murder of European Jewry and millions of others in the concentration camp and death camps, and in so doing had drawn upon the cooperation of tens of thousands of officials in the Nazi government and army.¹⁷

Successor trials focused attention on the involvement of intellectuals, as well as involvement of “doctors, judges, diplomats, civil servants, industrialists, and the leadership of the Wehrmacht.” Military courts during the occupation also presided over trials against concentration-camp and

¹⁶ Anthony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin 1945* (New York: Viking, 2003).

¹⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 206.

euthanasia program personnel.¹⁸ In Nuremberg and the later trials, 1,517 persons were convicted; 324 of these received the death penalty, and 247 received life sentences.

These trials were for the most part unpopular with the public and German political leaders. After the establishment of a West German government, German politicians successfully pressured Allied officials to commute many death sentences and to free a large number of the political prisoners who had been convicted under the International Military Tribunal. One of the first laws passed by the West German Bundestag in 1949 was a general amnesty law, which extended to over 800,000 people.¹⁹ Thus the Allies did prosecute war criminals under the International Military Tribunal, but their efforts waned under German pressure.

Second, the Allies pursued policies of de-nazification within West Germany. Between 1946 and 1948, Allied officials required over 16 million West Germans to fill out questionnaires about their activities during the Nazi era. Less than one percent of these resulted in a guilty verdict. The Allies also purged 73,000 people from industry, and 150,000 people from government.²⁰ The German public—as well as both conservative and liberal political leaders—were deeply opposed to policies of denazification. As with legal trials, de-nazification was eventually abandoned under German pressure, particularly after the West decided to rehabilitate the German economy and military.

Education

Because support for German aggression had been cultivated in the education system, Allied military governments undertook extensive reforms of the West German educational system. Arthur Hearnden writes, “The National Socialist regime had provided a telling illustration of how effective an agency the school system could be in pursuit of political ends.”²¹ Nazi Germany’s education

¹⁸ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 206

¹⁹ Norman Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*, Translated by Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 24.

²⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 206

²¹ Arthur Hearnden, *Education in the Two Germanies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 29. Robert Lawson writes. “Subject matter was oriented to Nazi ideology and aims. German language classes became a means of

system had been highly centralized and Party-controlled, and had indoctrinated the public with a curriculum of hatred toward perceived enemies of the Reich, both foreign and domestic. In order to provide a foundation for German democracy and peace, the Allies imposed numerous changes related to the structure and content of the German education system.²²

As for content, the first goal was to expunge Nazi propaganda from school curricula. Syllabi were revised “to ensure that all traces of National Socialist thinking were removed. Schools could not open until the education officers were satisfied on this score. The process was obviously at its most critical in the case of the history syllabus.”²³ Allied military governments “had to replace texts that were unusable because they contained anti-Semitic, nationalistic, militaristic propaganda.”²⁴ Thus the Allied military governments eradicated Nazi propaganda from West German textbooks.

The Allies also sought to cultivate an appreciation of and support for democracy within the West German schools. In the first edict on German re-education, an Allied Control Council Directive issued in 1947 laid down ten principles for “Democratization of Education in

forwarding the particular folk-culture idealized by Hitler, and other languages were de-emphasized. History was especially applicable to the glorification of Germany, abuse of other nations, and intensification of racial issues. A sample history curriculum appearing in the *N.S. Educator* listed subject topics such as Conspiracy Against Germany, German Struggle and German Want, The Stab in the Back, the Bleeding Frontiers, National Socialism At Grips with Crime, and German Youth at the Helm.” Robert F. Lawson, *Reform of the West German School System, 1945-1962* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan School of Education, 1965), p. 26. Lawson notes that “Each topic was related to the Jews, under such titles as: The Jew Becomes Prosperous from German Want, Jews Enter Germany From the East, Judah’s Foe (Hitler), and Jewish Instigators of Murder.” (Ibid)

²² Administrative control of education was dispersed to individual German states (*Länder*), whose education ministers would make policy for their state. Equal access to education was extended to all citizens; education would be compulsory and free, including materials and textbooks. Teacher training was mandated at the university level. For discussions of these and other structural reforms of the German education system, see Lawson, *Reform of the West German School System*; Harold Marcuse, “The Revival of Holocaust Awareness in West Germany, Israel, and the United States,” in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1998), pp. 421-438; Nicholas Pronay and Keith M. Wilson, *The Political Re-Education of Germany & Her Allies after World War II* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Walter Stahl, ed. *Education for Democracy in West Germany* (New York: Praeger, 1961); James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

²³ Arthur Hearnden, “The Education Branch of the Military Government of Germany and the Schools,” in Pronay and Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Germany*, p. 100.

²⁴ Hearnden, “The Education Branch of the Military Government,” p. 102. In 1946 in Braunschweig a “History Working Party” was set up consisting of German historians and educators. “This group produced the first curricula for the re-introduction of history in schools, taught on new lines. They held innumerable meetings and discussion groups with teachers at all levels.” (Ibid)

Germany.”²⁵ Included in this document was the admonition that “all schools should lay emphasis on education for civic responsibility and a democratic way of life, both by means of the curriculum and by the organization of the school itself; school curriculums should promote international good will and understanding in every way possible.”²⁶ Thus the schools that once advocated murder and conquest now championed democracy and peace.

Third, Allied military governments wanted Germans to know about the horrors that Nazi Germany had inflicted on the world. A report noted that the German school curricula should reflect “Demonstration of Germany’s past errors.”²⁷ Outside of the schools, other Allied officials engaged in a campaign to acquaint the Germans of the extent of their crimes. General Eisenhower ordered films to be made and broadcast that included horrifying images from the extermination camps and atrocities committed by the German army.

All channels of the mass media were utilized in the campaign. Newspapers printed numerous articles and ran didactic series on the camps; placards showing heaps of corpses with texts such as “YOU ARE GUILTY OF THIS” were posted in cities, towns, and Military Government offices everywhere; picture exhibitions were displayed in storefronts; pamphlets collecting the most shocking images were printed and distributed free and sold; radio reports about the camps were broadcast at regular intervals...²⁸

Generals Eisenhower and Patton ordered German citizens to tour the death camps and view the horror firsthand. Military governments often required Germans—particularly Nazi party members—to clean camps and bury corpses. Harold Marcuse comments, “This order shows that the tours had two primary purposes: to document the atrocities by obtaining reliable German witnesses, and to ‘teach a lesson’ especially to Nazi Party members singled out for participation.”²⁹ The results of this campaign were mixed. On the positive side, it acquainted large numbers of Germans with the realities of Nazi crimes, thus reducing the likelihood that Germans would deny these crimes in the future. On the other hand, many observers after the war noted that

²⁵ Lawson, *Reform of the West German School System*, p. 36.

²⁶ Lawson, *Reform of the West German School System*, p. 36-37.

²⁷ Lawson, *Reform of the West German School System*, p. 46.

²⁸ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 61.

²⁹ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 56.

Germans did not associate themselves in any way with the Third Reich's crimes.³⁰ In sum, Allied military leaders during the German occupation presided over major reforms of Germany's education system in both structure and content. Allied occupation policies also sought to educate the Germans about the horrors of Nazi crimes.

Reparations

Reparations extracted from the West German zones were in no way symbols of German contrition, because they were controlled by the Allies. Mindful of the lessons of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies kept these extractions low (relative to damages they had suffered), and tabled the issue of reparations to Germany's multitude of other victims until Germany regained sovereignty and economic stability.

The Allies had negotiated the issue of German reparations at the Potsdam conference in 1945. The Agreement stated that "payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance."³¹ The Agreement directed the USSR to remove its reparations from the zone of Germany it occupied; the claims of the United States, the United Kingdom "and other countries entitled to reparations" would be met from removals from the Western zones. All of the occupiers of Germany could also receive reparations "from appropriate German external assets."³² The French estimated that they had sustained about \$388 billion (in 1996 dollars) of wartime losses.³³ They extracted reparations in a variety of forms from their zone in the FRG totaling about \$6 billion, and the Germans paid for occupation costs.³⁴

³⁰ Alfred Grosser writes that the Germans tended to focus more on their own sufferings. "Listening to the complaints from almost every German they met, foreign visitors were invariably struck with their extraordinary self-centeredness. People in Germany were quite unconcerned at hearing about the meagre rations in occupied France, and were even unaware that the French were still rationed....The Germans could not or would not comprehend the horrible acts of which their misery was the sequel." Alfred Grosser, *The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament*, Translated by Richard Rees (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 82.

³¹ Quoted in Claus Hofhansel, "The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes," *German Politics* Vol. 8, no. 3 (December 1999), p. 105.

³² Quoted in Hofhansel, "The Diplomacy of Compensation," p. 105.

³³ Calculated in 1996 dollars.

³⁴ France recovered \$2.5 billion from all four zones, in the form of vehicles, farm machinery, livestock, personal belongings, and artwork. Its administration of the Saar region was valued at \$170 million. Its control of German

In sum, during the occupation, Allied military governments pursued several policies that set the stage for German remembrance. First, the Allies initiated controversial and unpopular policies of justice. The Nuremberg trials had, however, contributed to German awareness of Nazi crimes, and thus may explain the absence of denial in mainstream West German society.³⁵ Second, the Allies democratized German education and expunged nationalistic history-telling from West German schools. Third, the Allies extracted reparations, but at a rate far lower than damages to them would have called for, with sensitivity to potential backlash effects.

SILENCE AND SELF-PITY (1945-1950S)

Under the conservative leadership of West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, West German policies of remembrance during the early years after World War II were *unapologetic*. Leaders in the opposition Left were arguing for more remembrance. However conservatives feared that too much memory would cause a backlash, and would empower the far right; above all, conservatives valued a democratic West Germany that was firmly anchored to the West.³⁶ The policies of limited memory that this would prescribe were at any rate preferred by the West German public; the public was too stricken with their own devastation and suffering to reflect on the suffering that they themselves had caused.

Statements

Statements of German leaders during this period reflected amnesia and self-victimhood: they emphasized German suffering, and a desire to move on rather than examine German crimes and aggression. In this period, West German leaders acknowledged Nazi crimes; no mainstream

external commerce from its zone was estimated to amount to \$3.3 billion. France also received 22 German factories as reparations. All figures in \$U.S. 1996 dollars. See Roy F. Willis, *The French in Germany 1945-1949* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 125.

³⁵ Jeffrey Herf writes, "In view of the evidence presented in Nuremberg, no major national political figure in East or West Germany publicly raised doubts about whether or not the Nazi regime had actually carried out a genocide of European Jewry and waged a race war on the Eastern front." Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 207.

³⁶ Conservatives include the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union*, CDU), its Bavarian counterpart the Christian Social Union (*Christlich Soziale Union*, CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (*Frei Demokratische Partei*, FDP). These parties governed in coalition during this period.

political leader denied Germany's crimes,³⁷ and indeed, many opposition leaders argued passionately for greater remembrance.³⁸ However the public favored the conservative Konrad Adenauer and the Christian Democrats with their platform of limited memory.

Adenauer's statements reflect amnesia in several ways. First, Adenauer objected to postwar trials and de-nazification, making what have been called "embarrassing appeals" for the release of war criminals from imprisonment by the Allies.³⁹ Adenauer said, "The government of the Federal Republic, in the belief that many have subjectively atoned for a guilt that was not heavy, is determined where it appears acceptable to do so to put the past behind us..."⁴⁰ Adenauer commented about de-nazification that "in view of the confused times behind us, a general *tabula rasa* is called for."⁴¹ Second, Adenauer's statements were preoccupied with *German* suffering, rather than the suffering of Nazi Germany's victims. For example, nine million German POWs were in Soviet camps at the end of the war; Adenauer argued that assuming each POW had two concerned relatives, "18 million Germans" were paying the costs of Nazi aggression.⁴² Third, in his speech announcing German restitution to Israel, Adenauer acknowledged and expressed remorse for German crimes, yet emphasized not the crimes but German resistance efforts, and German ignorance of Hitler's genocidal policies. Adenauer said,

In an overwhelming majority, the German people abhorred the crimes committed against the Jews and did not participate in them. During the period of National Socialism, there were many Germans... who at their own risk were willing to assist their Jewish fellow citizens. In

³⁷ Jeffrey Herf writes that 'Holocaust denial' [was] on the fringes of postwar politics" and that "no major national political figure in East or West Germany publicly raised doubts about whether or not the Nazi regime had actually carried out a genocide of European Jewry and waged a race war on the Eastern front." Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 207.

³⁸ Herf argues that although their policies of remembrance were unrewarded at the polls, the West German Left offered an important legacy from which future leaders would draw. Theodor Heuss, Ernst Reuter, and Kurt Schumacher "made the politically damaging argument that democracy should and could be based on more rather than less memory of the dark chapters of the Nazi past. Although they did not speak for the majority in 1945-49, all three left a valuable legacy which eventually found broader acceptance." Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 226.

³⁹ Wulf Kansteiner, "Mandarins in the Public Sphere," *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999), p. 88. Adenauer argued that it would be wrong to divide Germans into "two classes...those without political blemishes and those with such blemishes." Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 271.

⁴⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 271.

⁴¹ Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*, p. 6.

⁴² Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 223.

the name of the German people, however, unspeakable crimes were committed which require moral and material restitution....⁴³

In sum, Adenauer's statements of this period reflect amnesia.

Policies of Justice

Policies of justice during this period also reflect amnesia. West German officials opposed Allied policies of de-nazification and trials of war criminals.⁴⁴ From early on, Adenauer had argued that "in order to avoid a renewal of German nationalism and Nazism, economic recovery and political democratization must take priority over a judicial confrontation with the crimes of the Nazi past." Adenauer preferred measures that were less invasive to most German voters, such as restitution to Jews remaining in Germany, and the development of positive relations with Israel.⁴⁵ Thus under conservative political rule, Adenauer and other conservatives did not make efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to justice.⁴⁶ In 1951, when West German courts were first allowed to conduct their own trials, only 21 sentences were pronounced. Bonn passed another general amnesty law in 1954, expanding its amnesty policies beyond those that had already been extended in the 1949 law. Thus West German "legal attempts to deal with the legacy of the [Nazi] past were sluggish in this period and soon came to a halt."⁴⁷

Amnesia is also evident in West Germany's initial failure to create institutions to assist the victims of Nazism. Instead, the FRG created an institutional advocate for Germans who had suffered from the war. In the FRG a cabinet-level office represented expellees, refugees, and others damaged by the war. "In Adenauer's cabinet, there was no Ministry for Survivors of Nazi

⁴³ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 282.

⁴⁴ Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*.

⁴⁵ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 209.

⁴⁶ Although the Allies had advocated a thorough purging of government officials, "a remarkable continuity of personnel marked the Adenauer era in the area of jurisprudence, in parts of the government bureaucracy, and in the country's educational institutions." Lothar Probst, "German Pasts, Germany's Future: Intellectual Controversies since Reunification," *German Politics and Society* no. 30 (Fall 1993), p. 24.

⁴⁷ Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler, "Memories of the Second World War and National Identity in Germany," in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, eds., *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), p. 241.

Persecution and Nazi Concentration Camps, intent on acknowledging, ordering, analyzing, and sanctioning the suffering of victims of Germans.”⁴⁸ However, one such institution was ultimately created in 1958 in Ludwigsburg: the Central Office for Pursuit of National Socialist Crimes of Violence. Thus West German disinterest in victim’s assistance or trials of Nazi perpetrators during this early period reflects amnesia.

Reparations

West Germany demonstrated some contrition through its reparations policy in this period. First, on September 10, 1952, Bonn signed the Luxembourg Agreement in which it agreed to pay 3.5 billion DM to the state of Israel and various Jewish organizations.⁴⁹ As a result of this agreement, between 1954 and 1991, a total of 110 billion DM were paid to Israel, and the FRG sent crucial goods to the young state. Goods included “ships, machine tools, trains, autos, medical equipment, and telephone technology that were crucial for the construction of infrastructure. The West German deliveries amounted to between 10 and 15 percent of annual Israeli imports.”⁵⁰ West German reparations to Israel at this time were thus highly significant to the new Israeli state.

These reparations were vital for Israel at this time, but the magnitude of contrition they displayed on West Germany’s part is debatable. First, the idea of reparations enjoyed little support from the public or from conservatives. Adenauer supported the bill and essentially muscled it through against the will of the general public, his own cabinet, and his party. “Adenauer’s finance minister, Fritz Schafer, doubted the Federal Republic’s ability to pay. His own CDU expanded the definition of “victims” of Nazism to include Germans who had suffered in the war. His ‘liberal’

⁴⁸ Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” *American Historical Review* Vol. 101, no. 4 (October 1996), p.1032.

⁴⁹ On the diplomatic history of the Luxembourg Agreement, see Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*; Otto R. Romberg and Heiner Lichtenstein, *Thirty Years of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel* (Frankfurt: Tribune Books, 1995); Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

⁵⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 288.

coalition partners in the FDP, led by Thomas Dehler, were less than enthusiastic.”⁵¹ In his efforts to pass the measure, Adenauer did have allies in the Social Democrats, and in Western officials.

Second, to convince his party to vote for reparations, Adenauer emphasized not the moral imperative (which he did believe in), but rather the argument that restitution was the price West Germans must pay for acceptance into the civilized community of nations. High Commissioner John J. McCloy indeed presented such a demand to Adenauer. McCloy “believed that a generous policy was essential to convince liberal and Jewish opinion in the United States that a new Germany was emerging, one intent on making amends for Nazi crimes. McCloy told Adenauer that without a restitution agreement, ‘Germany’s integration into the West would be either endangered or made impossible.’”⁵²

A third reason why the Luxembourg Agreement may not reflect the noblest form of German contrition was that, as Jeffrey Herf has shown, the arguments Adenauer used to convince his party included disturbing themes from Nazi propaganda. Adenauer argued that a West German failure to pay restitution would result in “a foreign policy catastrophe of the first order”: the FRG would be denied foreign credits. Adenauer said that restitution would be necessary if the FRG wanted to obtain such credits from the West, because “Now, as before, the power of the Jews in the economic sphere is extraordinarily strong.”⁵³ Therefore because of little support in West Germany, because of foreign pressure, and because of the tenor of the Luxembourg Treaty debates, the degree of contrition reflected by this settlement is less than it appears.

⁵¹ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 284.

⁵² Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 287. Herf also notes that McCloy was aware that “American pressure could also backfire by encouraging a nationalist response in West Germany. Given the balance of power considerations demanded by containment of the Soviet Union, the United States needed West Germany as an ally more than it needed West Germany to pay restitution to the Jews. A West German refusal to make restitution would have offended liberal and Jewish opinion in the United States, though it is hard to imagine that it would have led the architects of the Cold War to refuse to integrate the Federal Republic into the Western alliance.” (Ibid). On McCloy’s role also see Schwartz, *America’s Germany*.

⁵³ Quoted in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 286-87.

West Germany also paid a second form of reparations, known as the “BEG” laws.⁵⁴ These laws compensated individuals who were persecuted by the Nazis because of their race, religion, nationality, or ideology.⁵⁵ The German government reports that 4.4 million claims have been submitted under these laws, and most were settled. Of settlements, 20 percent were German residents, 40 percent lived in Israel, and the remaining 40 percent were residents of other countries. Berlin reports that as of 1998, BEG compensation amounted to DM 78 billion, and the government anticipated it would be paying out a further DM 17 billion in the future.

Third, Bonn also passed legislation that provided guidance for property claims from victims of Nazi persecution. This law, known as the “BRüG” law, passed in the National Assembly on July 19, 1957.⁵⁶ As of 1987 over 700,000 claims were settled in the amount of DM 3.9 billion, with a small number of claims pending. BRüG legislation was expanded in four supplementary laws, the last of which passed in 1969. In sum, in the early period West German reparations policy—more than other policies of remembrance at this time—was apologetic.

Commemoration

West German commemoration policy during the early postwar period reflects amnesia and a desire to honor slain Germans rather than Germany’s victims. This was evident in the lack of official ceremonies commemorating the Holocaust, West German days of remembrance commemorating the war, and West German monuments.

First, several small commemorative ceremonies were held at historical sites but were not attended by politicians of the ruling party. Presiding over such ceremonies were members of the opposition Social Democrats, such as Ernst Reuter who spoke at Plotzensee (where members of the

⁵⁴ In German, *Bundesentschädigungsgesetz*. The “Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution” was passed October 1, 1953. Source: German Information Office website, <http://www.germany-info.org>.

⁵⁵ The BEG legislation provided compensation for physical injury and damage to health, restrictions on personal freedom, damage inflicted upon economic and professional growth, and damage done to personal property. German Information Office website, <http://www.germany-info.org>.

⁵⁶ The Federal Restitution Law (*Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz*, or BRüG).

German resistance had been executed), and Theodor Heuss and Nahum Goldmann, who spoke at a 1952 ceremony at Bergen-Belsen.⁵⁷

Second, official ceremonies remembering the German surrender (May 8, 1945) did not take place in the first decade after the war. Jeffrey Olick writes, that in the 1950s, “there was no official marking of the occasion, certainly no celebration. In the context of postwar depredations, few saw May 8 as a happy occasion....”⁵⁸ The 10-year anniversary of the surrender in 1955 also passed without official commemoration.

Third, in the commemoration that the FRG government *did* embrace, Bonn chose a more positive spin on the recent past. Starting in this period West Germany began commemorating two days: 20 July, and a national day of mourning. The first day honored German resistance against the Nazi regime; on July 20, 1944 a group of German Army officers had attempted to assassinate Hitler. The Plötzensee prison (where the conspirators had been housed and then executed) was turned into a memorial for them and other members of the German resistance.⁵⁹ In this way Germans mourned a set of victims of whom they could feel proud.

Bonn also established a “people’s day of mourning” (*Volkstrauertag*) in 1952 to honor the victims of war. SPD and KPD leaders had initially suggested to commemorate the day in honor of Nazi victims. However, Adenauer commented that although such a day was justified, it should be more broadly conceived as “a special day for the victims of war, that is, those who lost their lives as victims of National Socialism on the field [of battle] or at home.”⁶⁰ The day’s focus was

⁵⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 319. Herf notes that the commitment to candid remembrance displayed by these leaders was important both then and later: these leaders established a tradition (although a dissenting one at the time) of remembrance in West German society, on which later advocates could build. Heuss’s speech at Bergen-Belsen featured a haunting and famous refrain, “No one will lift this shame from us.”

⁵⁸ Jeffrey K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” *American Sociological Review* Vol. 64, no. 3 (1999), p. 387.

⁵⁹ Knischewski and Spittler, “Memories of the Second World War,” p. 243

⁶⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 224

broadened even further to include victims of World War I *and* German victims of the GDR regime.⁶¹

Fourth, West Germans reached farther back into German history in an effort to find commemorative subjects of which they might feel proud. Rudy Koshar notes that large events were held to honor the distant and glorious past, such as the Frankfurt national assembly's centennial, and the 200th year of Goethe's birth (1949). Koshar writes that "These events and commemorations marginalized the recent past by establishing heroic continuities, focusing on German survival in the face of insurmountable odds."⁶²

Fifth, Bonn's choices of what to rebuild—and not rebuild—reflected the CDU/CSU political agenda of selective memory. While serving as mayor of Cologne before assuming his later role as chancellor, Adenauer "identified [churches] as the key goal of reconstruction in 1944." Churches "were seen as relatively uncompromised by Nazism."⁶³ Koshar writes that "in the west right after the war, Christian and largely unpolitical themes dominated the still-limited construction of places of memory."⁶⁴ Adenauer wanted rebuilding to proceed immediately, so that the country could move forward. He "[rejected] others' demands for leaving the heavily damaged steeple of Groß St. Martin as a 'memorial to the wickedness of our time.'"⁶⁵

Those monuments that were *not* built during this time similarly reflect the conservative agenda of limited memory. Concentration camp sites, and other sites of Nazi atrocities within Germany, were not initially preserved as memorials.

⁶¹ The group responsible for organizing the parliamentary event is the *Volksbund Deutscher Kriegsgraberfürsorge* (VDK), a citizen's group sponsored by state funds that since 1919 has been tasked with the mission of maintaining the graves of Germany's war dead. This group has a strong Christian identity and is associated with protecting the memory of World War I. On this point see Knischewski and Spittler, "Memories of the Second World War," p. 242.

⁶² Rudy Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill, N. Carolina: UNC Press, 1998), p. 208.

⁶³ Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts*, p. 205. Koshar notes that actually "the churches had implicitly or explicitly supported the regime...but it is also true that they resisted Nazism or did not comply with it through the formation of the Confessing Church and the battle against euthanasia."

⁶⁴ Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts*, p. 208.

⁶⁵ Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts*, p. 219.

West German society was dominated by utilitarian thinking rather than mourning and commemoration. Places in which [Nazi] atrocities had been committed were either used for different purposes, e.g. as clinics for the mentally ill or as accommodation for refugees, or they were even razed to the ground, as was the case in Dachau.⁶⁶

Bonn initially did not take steps to preserve the concentration camp at Dachau, which would later become an important monument and museum. Harold Marcuse writes, “for decades local and regional officials tried to make the former Dachau camp difficult to find.”⁶⁷ Locals in the village of Dachau in 1955 wanted to tear down the camp remains in order to discourage visitors.⁶⁸ The villa at Wannsee—where the “Final Solution” had been plotted—was converted into a youth hostel; not until the 1990s did it become a museum. In sum, during this early period, West German leaders did not set aside concentration camps and other sites of Nazi atrocities as places of commemoration. Days of commemoration and commemorative ceremonies also reflected amnesia about the recent past, and a focus on German victimhood.

Education and Historiography

West German education and historiography of the early period (shaped by Allied educational reform) did acknowledge the Nazi past, but was eager to absolve the greater German population of guilt, and to emphasize German suffering. This is evident in prevailing scholarly historiography, government-sponsored research, and school textbooks.

1950s German historiography featured three major themes, all of which minimized German guilt for Nazi aggression and crimes. First, historians did not view Germany as responsible for causing World War I. Because of this view, they interpreted World War II as an aberration marring an otherwise proud German tradition. Although the majority of foreign historians operated under the assumption that Germany had launched World War I as well as World War II, in

⁶⁶ Knischewski and Spittler, “Memories of the Second World War,” p. 242.

⁶⁷ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Germany, “such an interpretation was heretical.”⁶⁹ History of the period portrayed the Third Reich as

an accident in the works...cut out of the mainstream of German history prior to 1933 which was deemed to have been basically ‘sound.’ By the early 1950s, concentration on these themes had become so ubiquitous that the French historian Jacques Droz appealed to his colleagues across the Rhine to abandon their apologetic and sterile nationalism and also to display a greater openness to the new methods of the social sciences.⁷⁰

Second, 1950s historiography heaped the blame for Nazi aggression and atrocities on Adolph Hitler. Volker Berghahn and Hanna Schissler write, “West German historians in their majority continued to write the history of politics and diplomacy and great men. Of course, Hitler did not qualify as such and came to be portrayed as a demon who had descended upon the German people from another planet.”⁷¹ In his book *The German Catastrophe (Die deutsche Katastrophe)*, historian Friedrich Meinecke argues that Hitler was maneuvered into power, and that he actually enjoyed little popular support; once in power, Hitler alone had been responsible for the Holocaust and other crimes.⁷² This Hitler myth “was duly seconded and refined by Gerhard Ritter and others...The worst features of Nazism, Ritter explained, were imported—Social Darwinism...from England, wayward nationalism from France, gimcrack racism from Austria.”⁷³ Therefore West German historiography in the 1950s often placed the blame for German crimes either on Hitler or on dysfunctions present elsewhere in Europe, thus moderating the blame affixed to Germans.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Bosworth 1993. The historical interpretation of German guilt was supported by the massive study by Italian historian Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, published in 1952-57.

⁷⁰ Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, “Introduction: History Textbooks and Perceptions of the Past,” in Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, eds., *National Identity and Perceptions of the Past: International Textbook Research in Britain, the United States, and West Germany* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1987), p. 11.

⁷¹ Berghahn and Schissler, “Introduction: History Textbooks and Perceptions of the Past,” p. 11.

⁷² Meinecke also argued that Hitler’s rule had no roots in German history and instead was attributable to “European” phenomena. Meinecke wrote, “He had had no genuine backing, at least among the best elements of German society. In office, he had simply imposed a tyranny and that was that.” R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 62. Also see Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, pp. 210, 217; Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 113-14, 73-74.

⁷³ Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima*, p. 62.

⁷⁴ Conservatism by German historians of this era may be partly explained by the fact that many German academics had either tacitly or overtly supported Hitler’s regime, often to the extent that they wrote papers supporting and finding historical precedent or justification for Hitler’s agenda. In addition, after the war, many former Nazi officials

Third, 1950s German historical research fixated on the issue of German victimization. Bonn commissioned an eight-volume *Documentation of the Expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe*,⁷⁵ which detailed the experiences of ethnic German expellees and refugees. The project included over 11,000 eyewitness accounts, generally horrific stories of “terror, rape, plundering, the separation of families, forced deportations, starvation, slave labor, and death.”⁷⁶ Starting in the 1950s, Bonn also collected testimonies of German POWs. Over twenty years, this project produced 22 books describing the areas where German POWs had been imprisoned, and the treatment they had suffered including slave labor, torture, malnutrition, starvation, and mass shootings by the Red Army. Robert Moeller notes that “in neither documentation project did the editors elicit testimony about Germany’s war of aggression on the eastern front or German rule in Eastern Europe; both projects recorded and sanctioned silence and selective memory.”⁷⁷

Education

This historiography of evasion and self-pity extended into the realm of public school textbooks and curricula. West German education glossed over contemporary political history, and emphasized German cultural or social history. Alfred Grosser writes that West German youth were shown a “distorted” picture of their country.

[Textbooks] present a romantic and rural Germany, still unsullied by noisy towns and factory chimneys--a land of forest and heath where war and its ruins are unknown. There are very few passages from contemporary writers, for the books are composed almost entirely of extracts from the works of nineteenth-century novelists and story-tellers. Thus the child’s mind is constantly steeped in a dream-world.⁷⁸

were absorbed into West German academia. “West German universities were notorious for sheltering former Nazis”; the elites in academia had “successfully resisted denazification.” Earl Jeffrey Richards, “National Identity and Recovering Memories in Contemporary Germany,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999), p. 83.

⁷⁵ This publication (written in German) is entitled *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, and was published by the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte. The first volume appeared in 1954. See Moeller, “War Stories,” p. 1023.

⁷⁶ Moeller, “War Stories,” p. 1024.

⁷⁷ Moeller, “War Stories,” p. 1026.

⁷⁸ Alfred Grosser, *The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament*, Translated by Richard Rees (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 166-67.

Richard Evans writes, “Very little was said about Nazism. Next to nothing was taught in the schools....Critical enquiry into the German past was discouraged.”⁷⁹ Grosser comments that “the teachers keep as much as possible to the study of the distant past....To judge by most curricula, one might think that German history ended before Bismarck.”⁸⁰ Author Sabine Reichel (*What Did You Do In the War, Daddy?*) provides a personal testimony to this point. She wrote that as history classes approached the subject of contemporary history, “A shift of mood would creep into the expansive lectures about kings and conquerers from the old ages, and once the Weimar Republic came to an end our teachers lost their proud diction...We could feel the impending disaster.”

Reichel continues,

There were fifteen pages devoted to the Third Reich, and they were filled with incredible stories about a mass movement called National Socialism which started out splendidly and ended in a catastrophe for the whole world. And then there was an extra chapter, about three-quarters of a page long. It was titled “The Extermination of the Jews”...Six million Jews were killed in concentration camps....We never read that chapter aloud with our teacher as we did with so many other ones. It was the untouchable subject, isolated and open to everyone’s personal interpretation. There was a subtle, unspoken agreement between teacher and student not to dig into something that would cause discomfort on all sides.⁸¹

In sum, early West German education and historiography de-emphasized the recent past, fixated guilt on Adolf Hitler or even foreign sources, and emphasized German rather than foreign victimhood.

In sum, in this early period it is important to note that West Germans acknowledged Nazi crimes, and they did demonstrate some contrition by paying reparations to Israeli and other victims of Nazism. However, also in this period, the statements of political leaders, and a wide range of other policies of remembrance (judicial, commemorative, and educational) reflect amnesia and a preoccupation with German victimhood.

⁷⁹ Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 11.

⁸⁰ Grosser, *The Colossus Again*, p. 167.

⁸¹ Sabine Reichel, *What Did You Do in the War, Daddy? Growing up German* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

AWAKENING, 1960S—1989

West German remembrance in the middle period was influenced by two important political transitions. In the late 1960s the Left gradually gained power and ruled until 1982 in what was called the social-liberal era. Coalition governments between the SPD and the KPD were led by Chancellors Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982). Complementing this political development was the student and social movement known as the “1968” movement. Part of the diverse political agenda of the “68ers” was a push for greater understanding of German actions during the Third Reich.⁸² As a result of these political and social changes, policies of remembrance during the social-liberal became increasingly *apologetic*.

The conservatives regained power in 1982, and indeed policies of remembrance in the 1980s reflected decreased focus on Nazi crimes; more and more elites began to argue that Germans should move forward from their past. However despite increasing controversy about the past, denial remained on the political fringe; West Germans continued to admit and regret Nazi crimes. Controversies during the 1980s actually established a commitment to remembrance across a broader political spectrum.

Statements

Statements of German leaders during this period increasingly reflect a more apologetic approach to the past. However, some elites (particularly in the 1980s) reacted to the upsurge of memory by encouraging people to move forward, and by arguing against collective guilt.

West German leaders issued many apologetic statements during this period. First, in 1978 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made an important speech on the fortieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht*

⁸² It should be noted that the Left became deeply divided during this period. A particular source of division was the 1967 Six Day War. While political conservatives and older liberals praised Israeli victories, young leftists saw Israel as “another link in the chain of American imperialism.” Ironically, remembrance of Auschwitz now led young leftists to denounce Israel; “parts of the West German New Left...concluded that facing the “fascist” past implied opposition to Zionism and the state of Israel. Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 349. Jacob Heilbrunn writes, “part of the ’68 movement degenerated into the terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof Red Army Faction, and others went on from anti-Nazism to pacifism and anti-Americanism....They claimed that the Federal Republic was not a real democracy but, in some ways, a continuation of the Nazi regime.” Jacob Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996), p. 84.

(November 9). Schmidt called the Nazi attack on German Jews and the complaisance of other Germans “a cause of bitterness and shame.” He detailed the violence, arson, and arrests of the pogrom, and said: “All of this came to pass before the very eyes of a large number of German citizens...most people, faint of heart, kept their silence.” Schmidt emphasized that Germans had to reflect on this past.⁸³

Second, a number of West German political leaders gave important speeches on May 8 anniversaries of the surrender. Commemoration of the day began in 1970 with contrite speeches by Federal President Gustave Heinmann and Willy Brandt. In his speech, Heinmann “clearly locates the horror before 1945, not after as had been common in the 1950s.” In Brandt’s speech to the Bundestag on that day, the Chancellor—in “a remarkable departure”—also acknowledges that German suffering after the war followed from German aggression.⁸⁴ In 1975, President Walter Scheel stated that “the German tragedy” began not in 1945, but in 1933, with the election of Hitler. Scheel spoke to those Germans who “want to hear nothing more about our dark past.” He argued that “all words of a national dignity, of self-respect, remain hollow if we do not take on ourselves the entire...pressing weight of our history.”⁸⁵

Federal President Richard Von Weizsäcker gave perhaps the most memorable German apology on the fortieth anniversary of the surrender in 1985. His speech was extraordinary in several ways. Rather than emphasize German victimhood, the President mourned “the six million Jews who were murdered in German concentration camps,” and the nations who suffered in the war “especially the countless citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland who lost their lives.”⁸⁶ Von Weizsäcker spoke of victims who had had been previously unmentioned in previous

⁸³ He noted that most Germans alive then were “individually free from blame,” but that they “can become guilty, too, if they fail to recognize the responsibility for what happens today and tomorrow deriving from what happened then.” Quoted in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 347.

⁸⁴ Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 389.

⁸⁵ Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 389.

⁸⁶ Text of speech can be found in Geoffrey H. Hartmann, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 262-73; quote on p. 263.

commemorations.⁸⁷ Rather than emphasize German resistance, Von Weizsäcker talked about German apathy.⁸⁸ The President departed from the usual ambivalence surrounding May 8 and declared the day one of German liberation. Finally, the President exhorted his audience to learn the lessons of history. “We need and we have the strength to look truth straight in the eye—without embellishment and without distortion.”⁸⁹ Thus, culminating in Von Weizsäcker’s speech, West German leaders gave contrite speeches on May 8 anniversaries of this period.

Third, on the fortieth anniversary of Bergen-Belsen’s liberation, Chancellor Kohl delivered an apologetic speech. Unlike many speeches of the previous era, Kohl clearly enumerated Nazi crimes and singled out the Jewish people as the most victimized. Kohl said, “we are gathered here in memory of the many innocent people who were tortured, humiliated, and driven to their deaths at Bergen-Belsen, as in other camps.” He said the Jews “were deprived of their rights and driven out of their country.”⁹⁰ Kohl rejected the “we didn’t know” defense,⁹¹ and exhorted Germans to remember their past. He said, “One of our country’s paramount tasks is to inform people of those occurrences and keep alive an awareness of the full extent of this historical burden.”⁹²

Fourth, in April 1987 West German leaders offered contrite statements during the visit of Israeli President Chaim Herzog: the first Israeli leader to visit the FRG. President Von Weizsäcker

⁸⁷ For example, the Sinti/Roma gypsies, the handicapped and mentally ill, and homosexuals.

⁸⁸ Von Weizsäcker noted that the German response to Nazi persecution of the Jews had ranged “from plain apathy and hidden intolerance to outright hatred.” He said, “Who could have remained unsuspecting after the burning of the synagogues, the plundering, the stigmatization with the Star of David, the deprivation of rights, the ceaseless violation of human dignity? Whoever opened his eyes and ears and sought information could not fail to notice that Jews were being deported.... There were many ways of not burdening one’s conscience, of shunning responsibility, looking away, keeping mum. When the unspeakable truth of the Holocaust then became known at the end of the war, all too many of us claimed that they had not known anything about it or even suspected anything....” Quoted in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 265.

⁸⁹ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 262.

⁹⁰ Kohl noted the “demonic official dogma that certain lives are not worth living” that led to the euthanasia program and medical experiments by Mengele and others.” Hartmann, *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, pp. 244-250.

⁹¹ Kohl said, “The decisive question is... why so many people remained apathetic, did not listen properly, closed their eyes to the realities when the despots-to-be solicited support for their inhumane programme, first in back rooms and then openly out in the streets.” (Ibid)

⁹² Hartmann, *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, p. 250.

and Chancellor Kohl offered apologies and a commitment to remembrance of the German past.⁹³ Thus statements of German leaders were apologetic during the middle period.

During this period some West German elites began to advocate less remembrance rather than more. This trend gained momentum particularly after conservatives regained power in the 1980s. First, many West German leaders were calling for a *Schlußstrich*, or, “drawing a line under the past.” Gustave Heinmann argued in his otherwise contrite 1970 statement that Germany should move on.⁹⁴ On May 8, 1975, Chancellor Schmidt argued that Germans should focus on the FRG’s achievements since the end of the war; they should not feel perpetual guilt.⁹⁵ Returning from a visit to Israel in 1981, Schmidt said that “German foreign policy can and will no longer be overshadowed by Auschwitz.”⁹⁶ Several other statements advocating less rather than more memory were heard in West German politics.⁹⁷

Second, during a 1984 visit to Israel, Chancellor Kohl made a statement regarded by many as an attempt to dismiss responsibility for Germany’s past. Kohl commented that he and his

⁹³ Von Weizsäcker said, “We cannot and must not fade out any particular chapters of that history or see them in absolute terms. Our task is rather to accept the entire legacy, which carries over to successive generations the responsibility for its consequences for the future....History never permits us to draw a line under the past....” Quoted in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany*, Vol. 2., 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989), p. 446. Chancellor Kohl said that the German “genocide in its cold, inhuman planning and deathly efficiency was unique in the history of mankind....We never want to forget the Nazi crimes. We shall also resist every attempt to suppress or play them down.” Quoted in Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 17.

⁹⁴ He said, “We know today that it does not lead forward to mourn what is lost and that it is now above all a matter of bringing the task of reconciliation also with the East to completion.” Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 389.

⁹⁵ “We Germans,” Schmidt said, “do not need to go around in hair shirts in perpetuity.” He noted that “the great majority of the Germans living to day were born only after 1933; they can in no way be burdened with guilt.” Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 392.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Siobhan Kattago, “Representing German Victimhood and Guilt: The Neue Wache and Unified German Memory,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 16, no. 3 (Fall 1998), p. 96.

⁹⁷ The Minister-President of Bavaria, Franz-Josef Strauss, said that Germans had to get off their knees and learn to “walk tall” again. Germany must “emerge from the shadow of the Third Reich” and “become a normal nation again.” Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 19. Former FRG president Karl Carstens commented that the younger generation that had fought for greater memory in the social-liberal era was unaware “that many of the National Socialist regime’s terrible deeds were not known to the majority of Germans at that time.” (Ibid) In 1982, CDU politician Alfred Dregger urged Germans “to come out of Hitler’s shadow—we must become normal.” Dregger argued that the German Army hadn’t committed war crimes; “responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich lay with Hitler and the Nazi leadership. Most German soldiers, he said, knew little or nothing of the crimes of National Socialism. Evans 1989, 55.

generation enjoyed a “grace of late birth” (*die Gnade der späten Geburt*). The comment triggered international and domestic controversy.⁹⁸

Third, a peculiar incident occurred with the speech of Bundestag President Philip Jenninger on the fiftieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht* on November 9, 1988. Jenninger’s speech admitted and condemned the violence, but the speech was written and delivered so awkwardly that it made listeners think he was endorsing rather than condemning the pogrom. Jenninger used Nazi terminology. He posed rhetorical questions such as “Didn’t the Jews deserve their fate?” and “Didn’t Hitler give the German people back their pride?” Jenninger also questioned whether it wasn’t reasonable for Germans to vote for Hitler in 1933. He answered all these in the negative, but the damage had been done. Many Bundestag members left the room in protest. “What Jenninger saw was a sea of stony faces intermingled with parliamentarians who buried their faces in their hands. Those who stayed in their seats seemed to do so involuntarily, as if under a spell.”⁹⁹ Facing condemnation from both conservative colleagues and the Left, Jenninger quickly resigned.¹⁰⁰

In sum, statements of German politicians of this period grew increasingly apologetic. Calls for moving forward did appear frequently in the 1980s.

Justice

Judicial proceedings during this middle period both reflected and created greater remembrance. In the 1960s the FRG conducted trials of death camp and execution squad personnel. In Frankfurt, trials of Nazi personnel from Auschwitz-Birkenau were conducted from December 1963 to August

⁹⁸ The SPD said Kohl “wanted to acquit his cohort and everybody younger of German guilt.” Bark and Gress, *A History of West Germany*, p. 424; Kattago, “The Neue Wache in Unified German Memory,” p. 96; Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 392.

⁹⁹ Elizabeth Domansky, “Kristallnacht, the Holocaust and German Unity: The Meaning of November 9 as an Anniversary in Germany,” *History and Memory* Vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1992), p. 66.

¹⁰⁰ See Knischewski and Spittler, “Memories of the Second World War,” p. 248; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, pp. 367-68; Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 397. Interestingly, “People began to read the speech’s text and—to their surprise—did not find much wrong with it.” It was Jenninger’s style that was deemed objectionable. Domansky, “Kristallnacht,” pp. 67-68.

1965. These trials produced “spectacular and horrifying testimony” that riveted the West German population.¹⁰¹ Trials of former members of the *Einsatzgruppen* death squads were also conducted, and “offered further details to the German public about the Holocaust and the death camps in Poland.”¹⁰² One of the most important trials, for both German and international remembrance, was the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961.¹⁰³

In addition, the West German Bundestag held four debates between 1960 and 1979 about the statute of limitations on crimes of murder. In the early debates parliamentarians debated whether to extend the statute, and later, whether to eliminate it all together. Early on, advocates from the opposition Left found little or no support for extending the statute from the conservative majority. Later, the SPD enjoyed not only majority status but also increasing support from conservatives for extending and then abolishing the statute. CDU member Ernst Benda challenged those members of his party who said that trials would harm German honor. Benda said that national honor came from demonstrating that “this German people is not a nation of murderers.”¹⁰⁴ Ultimately, the Bundestag twice voted to extend the statute of limitations, and then abolished the statute of limitations in 1979. The four Bundestag debates on the statute of limitations both reflected and built support for bringing Nazi perpetrators to justice.

On the other hand, West German policies of justice even during this period were not as thorough as they might have been. During the Middle Phase, West Germany was criticized by the

¹⁰¹ “The trial itself spawned not only some of the most important historiographical works on the systematic nature of Nazi criminality...it sparked a number of essayistic and literary reflections and its relationship to the Nazi past as well.” Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 214

¹⁰² Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 338

¹⁰³ Eichmann was a former Nazi SS Lieutenant Colonel who administered the “Final Solution.” Eichmann had been apprehended in Argentina by the Israelis, and was kidnapped and brought back to Israel for trial. The first televised trial in history, Eichmann’s trial riveted the Israeli people, as well as German and other audiences around the world. In West Germany, the trial served to “jolt German complacency”; it was “an emotionally explosive event that revealed for the first time to a shocked world audience the Nazi campaign to exterminate European Jewry.” See Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994), p. 148; <http://www.pbs.org/eichmann/intro.htm>. Eichmann’s defense was that he was just following orders. He was found guilty on 15 counts and hanged.

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 338 SPD members Adolf Arndt and Fritz Erler also spoke eloquently in these debates on the need for justice. Arndt invoked the Germans’ “‘historical and moral guilt’ for their failure to protest Nazi anti-Jewish measures.” (Ibid, p. 339)

GDR, Israel, and its own Left for allowing people with Nazi credentials to continue participating in West German political life. The GDR published *War and Nazi Criminals in the Federal Republic*, known as the “brown book,” which listed over 1900 former Nazi officials currently working in influential positions in West Germany.¹⁰⁵ Controversial figures in West Germany were Hans Globke, chief of staff in the Adenauer administration, who had helped to draft the Nuremberg race laws of 1935;¹⁰⁶ also West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who had worked as a highly-ranked propaganda official in the Hitler’s Foreign Office.¹⁰⁷ Political scandal erupted in 1969 when Federal President Heinrich Lübke (CDU) withdrew from the next presidential election because of East German charges that during the war his construction business built concentration camp and slave labor barracks. In sum, during this middle period, West Germany saw increased attention both to justice done—and justice undone. Policies of justice, though imperfect, were more apologetic than those of the previous era.

Reparations

During this period, the FRG expanded its compensation policies for victims of the Nazis. The BRüG legislation was expanded in four supplementary laws, concluding in 1969. As for the BEG laws, in 1979 the Bundestag supplemented these with an additional 400 million DM for Jewish individuals whose health had been harmed by the Nazi regime, and had not previously obtained restitution. Soon thereafter the Bundestag added 100 million DM for non-Jewish victims in similar circumstances.

During this period West Germany negotiated “global agreements” with 11 Western European nations (Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, France, Belgium,

¹⁰⁵ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 185.

¹⁰⁶ After the arrest of Adolf Eichmann in 1960, the GDR lambasted Globke as “the Eichmann of Bonn.” The East German government staged a nine-day mock trial of Globke, in which they “sentenced” him to life in prison for crimes against humanity. Jeffrey Herf notes, “The mere mention of his name became shorthand for the failures of denazification in the Federal Republic.” Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 184.

¹⁰⁷ An event that shocked West Germans occurred in a CDU party congress, when a woman (Beate Klarsfeld) walked up to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, called him a ‘Nazi,’ and slapped him. Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 427

Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Sweden). Between 1959 and 1964, the FRG gave the governments of these nations a payment of over DM 2 billion that those governments then apportioned out to its citizens.¹⁰⁸ When the FRG negotiated its treaty with Poland in 1970, Poland agreed to reaffirm its 1953 renunciation of reparations claims. However, later (after Brandt's re-election and the ratification of the treaty in the Bundestag), Poland re-opened the reparations issue. Eventually in 1975, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Polish leader Gierek agreed upon "a global settlement of pension claims, a large West German credit, and Polish assurances on emigration possibilities for the German minority in Poland."¹⁰⁹ Thus West German reparations policy continued to expand in the middle period.

Commemoration

West German commemoration in this period changed substantially from the amnesia of the 1950s: increasingly, West Germans honored the victims of Nazism. In the 1980s, this trend reversed somewhat as Chancellor Kohl pursued policies of commemoration —with his NATO allies—that blurred the distinction between victims and aggressor.

Starting in the 1960s, sites from the Holocaust increasingly served educational and commemorative functions. In 1965 a large plaque naming concentration camps was installed in West Berlin. Exhibitions opened at Neuengamme, and Bergen-Belsen in the mid-1960s; Dachau opened "a more realistic and critical exhibit" in 1965 that showed "how the 'murderous system' of mass killing developed."¹¹⁰ Touched off by the "Anne Frank wave" in the mid-1950s,¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Hofhansel, "The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes," p. 109; also see <http://www.germany-info.org>

¹⁰⁹ Hofhansel, "The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes," p. 107.

¹¹⁰ Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts*, p. 246.

¹¹¹ The book *The Diary of Anne Frank* was published in 1955, and later the play achieved great popularity in West Germany. It prompted much greater interest in the Holocaust, and particularly in Bergen-Belsen, where Frank perished. For analysis of the role *Anne Frank* played in leading Germans and others to come to terms with the war, see Alex Sagan, "An Optimistic Icon: Anne Frank's Canonization in Postwar Culture," *German Politics and Society* Vol. 13, no. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 95-107; Tony Kushner, "'I Want to Go on Living after My Death': The Memory of Anne Frank," in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, eds., *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), pp. 3-25.

school field trips to Dachau and other camp sites increased rapidly. From 1968 to 1969, school groups to Dachau doubled (to 911), and by the end of the 1970s was up to 5,000 per year.¹¹² Attendance at Dachau's commemorative events similarly doubled during this period.

In the process of improving relations with Poland, West German politicians made important commemorative gestures toward that country. Chancellor Willy Brandt argued that atonement for Germany's past was essential for building trust in Europe.¹¹³ The first commemorative gesture—perhaps the most famous act of contrition then or since—was a simple gesture offered by Brandt in 1970.¹¹⁴ Visiting Warsaw to conduct treaty negotiations, Brandt paid his respects at a memorial for the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. “In a deeply symbolic gesture he knelt down. Neither before nor since has there been a gesture which better signified the stance the political Left in the FRG has taken towards responsibility for National Socialism and its war.”¹¹⁵

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt offered another commemorative gesture toward Poland in November 1977. Schmidt addressed a ceremony at Auschwitz-Birkenau in Poland: the first West German leader to do so.¹¹⁶ He said “the crime of Nazi fascism and the guilt of the German Reich under Hitler's leadership are the basis of our responsibility. We Germans of today are not guilty as individual persons, but we must bear the political legacy of those who were guilty. That is our responsibility.”¹¹⁷ Thus in the words and deeds of Schmidt and Brandt, acts of contrition formed a part of rapprochement with Poland during the policy of *Ostpolitik*. Thus as is evident at numerous

¹¹² Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 430.

¹¹³ He wrote in 1968, “I do not ever forget that it was Hitler's ‘Greater Germany’ above all that brought so much unspeakable suffering to Eastern Europe.” (quoted in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 344. Brandt hoped that memory would eliminate the “underbalance of trust” that was the result of “criminal activities for which there is no parallel in modern history,” which had “disgraced the German name in all of the world.” Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 345.

¹¹⁴ Brandt's gesture has become the international gold standard of contrition. Republika Srpska President Dragan Cavic said in 2003 that Bosnia needed “three Willy Brandts” for apologies to improve relations. See “Marovic Apologizes to Bosnians,” November 17, 2003, Balkan Reconstruction Report Newsletter, <http://balkanreport.tol.cz>.

¹¹⁵ Knischewski and Spittler, “Memories of the Second World War,” p. 243. Brandt's “*Kniefal*” was heavily criticized by the right in Germany.

¹¹⁶ Jeffrey Herf, “Legacies of Divided Memory for German Debates About the Holocaust in the 1990s,” *German Politics and Society* Vol., no. 52 (Fall 1999), p. 25.

¹¹⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 346. Herf notes that the speech centered on German-Polish reconciliation, and “was strangely silent about the fact that Auschwitz-Birkenau was above all a death camp in which the Nazis had murdered 1.5 to 2 million Jews.” (Ibid)

different ceremonial events and days of remembrance, West German commemoration was increasingly apologetic during this period.

West German commemoration undertaken with its NATO allies during the 1980s reflects a diminished focus on Nazi era, and a blurring of distinctions between victim and oppressor. First, in September 1984 France and West Germany held a ceremony at the World War I cemetery of Verdun, where both French and German soldiers are buried. French President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl were photographed holding hands over the graves, with a field of white crosses as a backdrop. This ceremony served as a great equalizer; rather than emphasize German crimes and French victimization, it sent the message that two countries that had fought wars were now reconciled and allied. Second, the United States and West Germany conducted a ceremony at Bitburg cemetery in 1985. At the ceremony, Reagan and Kohl laid wreaths at the graves of German soldiers to demonstrate NATO unity and reconciliation. Shortly before the visit it was made public that the cemetery included dozens of graves of the *Waffen SS*, an elite army unit used for “cleansing” operations. This disclosure created a storm of controversy in West Germany and worldwide.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Reagan and Kohl went through with the Bitburg ceremony as planned.¹¹⁹ Thus West Germany’s commemoration with France reflected a focus away from the Nazi era specifically; its commemoration with the United States reflected a blurring of victims and perpetrators. Otherwise, German commemoration of the middle period was much more apologetic compared to the previous era of amnesia.

¹¹⁸ The chairman of the board of the Central Council of Jews in Germany stated that “This planned gesture of reconciliation...overlooks the suffering of millions of Jews in the German concentration camps.” See FBIS Western Europe, FRG, 3 May 1985, “Jewish Council Chairman’s Remarks on Bitburg Visit.” On April 19, the U.S. Senate voted 82 to 0 against Reagan’s visit. 257 U.S. Representatives sent letters to Kohl asking him to withdraw the invitation, and 53 U.S. senators wrote to Reagan urging him to cancel the meeting.

¹¹⁹ Reagan commented of the *Waffen-SS*: “those young men were victims of Nazism also...They were victims, just as surely as the victims in the concentration camps.” Quoted in Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 394. Olick notes that “Despite all the years of denial, defense and construction of Germans as victims in the German discourse, such a bald elision of distinctions was something that would have never been dared by a West German leader, whatever the sentiments...” Ibid, p. 395.

Education and Historiography

In West German historiography and history education, West German remembrance evolved greatly over this time period. An increasingly self-reflective trend in West German historiography led in turn to the emergence of revisionist histories in the 1980s.

West Germans initiated education reform during this period because of the perception that the schools were failing to educate students adequately about the past. The impetus for this increased attention to West German history education is frequently attributed to the horrified reaction of West Germans to anti-Semitic vandalism that occurred across the country in the late 1950s.¹²⁰ After the vandalism, education officials in the Länder and the federal government began taking an interest in prior research by progressive historians, which had examined the teaching of contemporary history in West German schools.¹²¹ This research criticized the inadequacy of German education about the recent past. One report comments,

The “insufficient knowledge’ of the juveniles with respect to the most recent past was frequently deplored. It was emphasized again and again, that for the political education of the citizens of tomorrow a thorough examination of the history of the 20th century and, in particular, of the theory and practice of the totalitarian state, was required.¹²²

Studies sponsored by the federal and regional governments “confirmed the results of previous research suggesting that the treatment of Nazism was woefully inadequate.”¹²³ Thus evidence of anti-Semitism in Germany prompted greater attention paid to research demonstrating that young Germans were not learning about Germany’s past crimes and aggression.

¹²⁰ Synagogues and Jewish cemeteries were desecrated in the late 1950s. See Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 210; Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres,” p. 388; Anton Rabinbach, “Beyond Bitburg: The Place of the “Jewish Question” in German History after 1945,” in Kathy Harms, Lutz R. Reuter and Volker Durr, eds., *Coping with the Past: Germany and Austria after 1945* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 187-217.

¹²¹ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 210.

¹²² Helmuth Leichtfuss, “A Study of the Present Situation Regarding Contemporary History Instruction in the High School of Land Hesse,” in Walter Stahl, ed., *Education for Democracy in West Germany* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 140.

¹²³ Marcuse notes that “A directive issued by the National Conference of Ministers of Culture, “coupled with critical reports in the press about the obvious inadequacy of didactic materials about the Holocaust, prompted a number of official and unofficial analyses of history textbooks.” Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 210

As a result, educators and officials undertook several reforms. First, in October 1959, in Lower Saxony, “the Minister of Culture called the attention of all school superintendents in the State to neo-Fascist youth organizations and ordered that the State officials must counteract the beginning of such organizations.” The Minister ordered the state’s educators to follow directions for political education.¹²⁴ Ministers in the other Länder issued similar directives.¹²⁵ Second, during this time educators also responded constructively to external criticism: foreign governments were also critical of German textbooks, and the FRG government responded by participating in multilateral work on UNESCO textbook commissions. One commission participant, German historian Georg Eckert, commented that “after the swastika-smearing incidents, I fully share the opinion of my British colleagues that the analysis of those historical events cannot be left to the discretion of the teacher but must be included in the text books.”¹²⁶

As a result of these internal studies and international collaborations, the FRG made efforts to publish school textbooks that included greater detail about the Nazi period. Hannah Vogt’s *The Burden of Guilt: A Short History of Germany, 1914-1945* was the first West German text to deal openly with the Nazi period, and was distributed widely.¹²⁷ Thus during this period, West German education began examining the crimes and aggression of the recent past.

Historiography

German historiography about the Third Reich, the war, and the Holocaust evolved dramatically during this period. Entrenched beliefs of 1950s historiography would come under fire during this period: the Hitler myth, German innocence for the start of World War I, and the accompanying view that World War II had been an accident. Yet this increased interest in German guilt triggered an emergence of revisionist histories in the 1980s, which had wide political reverberations.

¹²⁴ Leichtfuss, “A Study of the Present Situation,” p. 144.

¹²⁵ Leichtfuss, “A Study of the Present Situation,” p. 142-144

¹²⁶ Walter Stahl, ed. *Education for Democracy in West Germany*. New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 117.

¹²⁷ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*.

Historians of the middle period began focusing less on German suffering and more on German guilt. Younger historians were trained in more modern historical methodologies, and held a greater interest in the recent past, motivated by current events such as the Eichmann and Auschwitz guard trials.¹²⁸

The German conservatives' version of totalitarianism...began to seem as questionable to the new generation of German scholars as it was becoming elsewhere in liberal or left-wing circles...the young historians, like so many others in the Sixties generation, took to asking that simplest of questions: 'What did you do in the war, Daddy?' and the answer which the older generation gave was hedged and unsatisfactory.¹²⁹

German historians began researching the Holocaust for the first time: previously, such scholarship had been conducted only in foreign countries. "By the mid-1960s there was an extraordinary renewal of West German historical scholarship concerning National Socialism from a variety of perspectives."¹³⁰ Research that continued in the 1950s tradition of emphasizing German victimhood was sharply criticized, as in the case of Helmut Diwald's book, *History of the Germans*.¹³¹ Thus West German historiography began focusing on victims of Nazism during this middle period.

The work of historian Fritz Fischer regarding World War I also led to a major upheaval in German historiography of this period. Fischer "broke ranks by presenting a meticulously documented account of Germany's far-reaching plans for European hegemony and world power between 1914 and 1918."¹³² Under Fischer's interpretation, World War II had *not* been an

¹²⁸ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*; Rabinbach, "Beyond Bitburg."

¹²⁹ Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima*, p. 62.

¹³⁰ Rabinbach, "Beyond Bitburg," p. 200.

¹³¹ This work aroused criticism for its excessive focus on the plight of German expellees; the book included only two pages on the Holocaust and other German atrocities. The book's "reputation among serious historians is nil. Even conservatives were shocked by the attempt to minimize the significance of Auschwitz." Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow*, p. 15.

¹³² Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow*, p. 113. Fischer's book *Griff nach der Weltmacht* [Grab for World Power] was published in 1961, in English under the title, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. Fischer later published a more explicit version of his argument in a 1969 published monograph, *Krieg der Illusionen* (War of Illusions).

accident, but was simply the latest German attempt at European hegemony.¹³³ One scholar writes that Fischer's work was a 'time bomb' that exploded the sacred view of the German past.

Perhaps there was a continuity in German history... which ran from 1870 (or 1848) to at least 1945. Whereas, in the Imperial era, Germans had been trained to be proud of their *Sonderweg*, their special way, which was making them ever more rich, powerful, and respected, now the *Sonderweg* was reversed and converted into a negative process. Maybe there was something wrong with Germany....¹³⁴

Fischer's research thus refuted the interpretation that World War II had been an accident. His research was complemented by the release of William Shirer's international bestseller, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*.¹³⁵ Shirer argued that Nazism—rather than being an accident in an otherwise proud historical tradition—arose directly connected out of the German past.¹³⁶ Thus during this period West Germans began to confront uncomfortable questions about German society and culture, and their role in Nazi aggression.

Although German historiography increasingly explored themes of German guilt, during the 1980s revisionist historians offered a counter-narrative. Their works prompted the "Historian's Debate," or *Historikerstreit*, which included a sharp rebuke from the academic and political Left.¹³⁷ Revisionist histories of the 1980s offered two major new interpretations of Nazi aggression and atrocities. First, they suggested that German aggression and the Holocaust were defensively motivated.¹³⁸ In the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) newspaper in 1986-87, a series of

¹³³ Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow*, p. 114. Also see Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts*, p. 296.

¹³⁴ Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima*, p. 60.

¹³⁵ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960).

¹³⁶ Shirer's book was attacked by many critics in West Germany. The author "was virulently attacked as a German-hater who had a 'simplistic and inadequate' comprehension of German history." Atina Grossmann, "The "Goldhagen Effect": Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New Germany," in Geoff Eley, ed., *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism--Facing the German Past* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 98.

¹³⁷ For more on the *Historikerstreit*, see Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima*, Chapter 4; Bark and Gress, *A History of West Germany*, Chapter 5; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 365; Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

¹³⁸ Michael Stürmer argued that Germany's difficult geopolitical position between the Soviet Union and France led Germany to launch what was essentially a defensive war. Stürmer was a historian turned public intellectual, who regularly published articles in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. He lectured widely and served as an advisor to

articles discussed the theory that Stalin had planned to invade Germany in 1942 or sooner. The paper depicted World War II as “‘a war of the dictators’ in which both sides were acting on more or less equal terms.”¹³⁹ Historian Ernst Nolte argued in a book and in a famous subsequent article, “The Past That Will Not Pass Away,” that the Holocaust was a defensive response to the Bolshevik threat.¹⁴⁰ Nolte argued that Nazi policies of genocide had first been committed by the Soviets. Thus, he argued,

the following question must seem permissible, even unavoidable: Did the National Socialists or Hitler perhaps commit an ‘Asiatic deed,’ merely because they and their ilk considered themselves to be potential victims of an “Asiatic” deed? Was not the Gulag Archipelago not primary to Auschwitz? Was the Bolshevik murder of an entire class not the logical and factual prius of the ‘racial murder’ of National Socialism?¹⁴¹

In this vein, revisionist historian Andreas Hilgruber compared the Holocaust to the Turkish genocide of Armenians.¹⁴² Thus historians of this school argued that Nazi aggression and atrocities had perhaps been defensively motivated.

Second, revisionist historians argued that West Germany had veered away from Adenauer’s sensible policies of limited memory, toward excessive self-flagellation. Stürmer and other revisionists argued that West Germany’s most important responsibility lay not in contrition but in democracy, whose stability would be threatened by too much memory.¹⁴³ Stürmer argued, “We cannot live by making our own past...into a permanent sense of endless guilt feelings.”¹⁴⁴ Nolte

Chancellor Kohl. See Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 104; Jerry Z. Muller, “German Neoconservatism and the History of the Bonn Republic, 1968 to 1985,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 18, no. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 22.

¹³⁹ Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ Nolte’s book, *The European Civil War*, was published in 1987 and excerpted in several articles in the FAZ. Translated into English in Knowlton and Cates 1993, 18-23. Nolte’s article was entitled “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will.”

¹⁴¹ *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust*, Translated by James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1993), pp. 21-22.

¹⁴² Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, p. 52.

¹⁴³ Stürmer criticized “a land without memory,” in which the future is won by those who coin concepts and interpret the past.” Quoted in Muller, “German Neoconservatism and the History of the Bonn Republic,” p. 22; also see Karl Wilds, “Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition: Recasting ‘Normality’ in the Berlin Republic,” *German Politics* Vol. 9, no. 1 (April 2000), p. 85; Evans, *In the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 104.

¹⁴⁴ Evans, *In the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 104.

argued that the German past was “suspended over the present like an executioner’s sword.”¹⁴⁵ He urged the FRG to stop wallowing in its past guilt, and to educate its people in a more patriotic version of history focusing on West Germany’s postwar democratic success.¹⁴⁶

Historians on the Left argued that these revisionist ideas were attempts to whitewash Germany’s past crimes, and were irresponsible in light of Germany’s special obligation to remember and atone for its past. The *Historikerstreit* generated over 1,000 articles, mostly from the Left.¹⁴⁷ Philosopher Jürgen Habermas was the first to identify the writings of Stürmer, Nolte, and Hilgruber as evidence of a revisionist trend in West German historiography. Habermas charged that these historians were trying to reduce the significance of the Holocaust by “relativizing” it to other mass killings in history; he argued that Nolte, Hillgruber, Hildebrand, and Stürmer placed “revisionist history in the service of a nationalist renovation of conventional identity.” One scholar writes that the revisionist histories “appeared to left-liberal thinkers as a retrograde development which awakened fears of a ‘renationalisation’ of west German political culture and a weakening of the social taboo over neo-or post-Fascist positions.”¹⁴⁸ Thus in West German historiography during this period, an initial trend toward more acceptance of German guilt was followed by a revisionist trend in the opposite direction. This second trend was decisively put down by the West German Left.

In sum, West German remembrance evolved dramatically in this middle period. Policies of remembrance became commonplace on the West German political scene. Politicians and intellectuals focused less on German suffering, and admitted Nazi aggression and atrocities. This trend then prompted a conservative counter-movement, particularly in the 1980s. During this era, the *Historikerstreit* and other 1980s controversies—Bitburg, the Jenninger scandal, and Kohl’s statement about late birth—transformed the politics of memory in West Germany. Previously only

¹⁴⁵ Nolte, in Knowlton and Cates, *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 18.

¹⁴⁶ Evans, *In the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 20.

¹⁴⁷ For a useful collection of original documents translated into English, see Knowlton and Cates, *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*.

¹⁴⁸ Wilds, “Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition,” p. 85.

the German Left had held a strong commitment to remembrance; after the threats to remembrance of the 1980s, conservatives also began to defend the need to remember the Nazi past.¹⁴⁹ This was evident in the sweeping and historic 1988 speech of conservative leader Richard von Weizsäcker, conservative outcry against their colleague Philip Jenninger, and the commitment to remembrance demonstrated by Helmut Kohl.

UNIFIED AND CONTRITE (1990S AND 00S)

German remembrance in the Late Phase—following German unification—has been very *apologetic*. Many Germans and foreign observers were apprehensive that because of unification euphoria, and because of the need to deal with the new burden of East Germany's authoritarian past, Germany would choose to forget its unpleasant history.¹⁵⁰ However this was not the case: unified Germany's policies of remembrance have continued to be very apologetic.

Statements

Statements of German leaders during this period are apologetic. First, at the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, a statement by Chancellor Kohl was read, which said that “the darkest and most horrible chapter of German history was written in Auschwitz,” and that “one of our priority tasks is to pass on this knowledge to future generations so that the horrible experiences of the past will never be repeated.”¹⁵¹

Second, on the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender (May 8, 1995), German President Herzog gave a major address. Herzog said,

Germany had unleashed a war that was more terrible than anything that had taken place until then and it suffered the most terrible defeat that one can imagine. Europe was in ruins, from

¹⁴⁹ David C. Art, “Debating the Lessons of History: The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.

¹⁵⁰ On this history see Anne Sa'adah, *Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

¹⁵¹ Quoted in Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 379. Marcuse comments, “This unequivocal statement of acceptance of Germany's brown-collar past was a far cry from Kohl's homage to German victimhood at Bitburg a decade earlier.” (Ibid)

the Atlantic to the Urals and from the Arctic circle to the Mediterranean coast. Millions of members of all European peoples, including the German one, were dead, fallen, torn to shreds in bomb attacks, starved to death in camps, and frozen on the roads during their flight, and other millions—in particular Jews, Romanies, and Sinti, Poles, and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks—fell victim to the largest operations of eradication that human minds had ever conceived. Millions had lost their relatives, their friends, and their homes, or were in the process of losing them. Millions came from prisoners-of-war camps or were on their way to them. Millions had been maimed. Hundreds of thousands of women had been raped. The stink of the crematories and the smoldering ruins was heavy over Europe.¹⁵²

Herzog commented on the FRG's initial postwar amnesia. He said that in the early days "there was certainly no lack of attempts at reckoning, finding collective excuses, and collective whitewashing." Herzog noted the importance of commemorating the war's end, "of remembering, and of dealing honestly and relentlessly with our history."¹⁵³ Thus Herzog's statement was extremely apologetic.

The controversy surrounding Germany's need to remember continued from the 1980s into this decade. In 1998, writer Martin Walser touched off another debate within German politics and society after a speech in which he implored Germans to move on. Walser lambasted the "instrumentalization" of the Holocaust to achieve political ends, and the use of Auschwitz as "a moral cudgel."¹⁵⁴ Walser later debated the head of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, who defended the importance of recalling the Holocaust in public memory. Thus, in the late period Germans continued to debate whether and how the past should be remembered.

Reparations

During this period, unified Germany further expanded its already extensive policy of reparations to the victims of Nazi Germany. First, restitution was extended to victims living within the former East Germany.¹⁵⁵ Second, Germany made numerous bilateral agreements that supplemented

¹⁵² "Herzog Addresses 8 May Ceremony in Berlin," Munich ARD Television, May 8, 1995. FBIS Germany, same date.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Bill Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich* (London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 7.

¹⁵⁵ The Bundestag passed a new law in 1992, the "Law on Compensation for Victims of National Socialism in the Regions Acceding to the Federal Republic." This law recognized that persons had been denied compensation by the GDR, and invited them to submit new applications to the unified German government. German Information Office, <http://www.germany-info.org>

restitution paid out under the earlier BEG and BRüG laws. One was the Czech-German fund, which featured a joint declaration of regret by both sides for their past actions.¹⁵⁶ In addition, united Germany concluded a Friendship Agreement with Poland,¹⁵⁷ agreements with successor states to the Soviet Union (Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine); it also extended new benefits to Holocaust survivors living in the United States and Israel. Finally, in 1996 the Bundestag agreed to set aside funds for foundations yet to be negotiated with Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and the states of the former Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁸

Third, in March 2000, a group of German companies and the German government concluded a \$5 billion reparations agreement for forced laborers of the Third Reich.¹⁵⁹ In 1944, about 7 million slave laborers were working in the “Greater German Reich,” (about 5 million civilians and 2 million POWs). Their working conditions, supervised by the SS, were horrific; death, disease, malnutrition, and torture were routine. The reparations settlement also established an educational foundation. The German government states, “In setting up the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,’ the Federal Republic of Germany and German companies want to signal their historical and moral responsibility for these events and supplement existing restitution arrangements.”¹⁶⁰ At a private ceremony honoring victims of forced labor,

¹⁵⁶ Nazi Germany invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia during the war. After the war, the Czech government ethnically cleansed Germans from its territory, leading to a massive refugee crisis; over one million Germans died in expulsions from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European nations. In the 1996 agreement, Germany contributed DM 140 million, while the Czech government provided DM 25 million (\$93 and \$17 million in 1996 U.S., respectively). For the joint declaration see Hofhansel, “The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes.”

¹⁵⁷This treaty established the “Foundation for German-Polish Reconciliation.” The German government paid DM 500 million toward this foundation. Those receiving compensation were 40,000 former concentration camp inmates, 30,000 victims who as children had been imprisoned or had served as forced laborers, and about 500,000 former forced laborers. Hofhansel, “The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes,” p. 111. Another issue between Germany and Poland was Poland’s insistence that Germany recognize the finality of Poland’s border with Germany (after World War II Poland had received chunks of German territory, which Germany had never officially recognized as legitimate). The two nations signed a border treaty as well as this friendship treaty in 1991.

¹⁵⁸ Hofhansel, “The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes,” p. 118.

¹⁵⁹ Companies involved included: Allianz AG, BASF AG, Bayer AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Friedr. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp, Hoeschst AG, Siemens AG, Volkswagen AG, BMW AG, DaimlerChrysler AG, and Degussa-Hüls AG.

¹⁶⁰ German Information Office website.

German President Johannes Rau said, “I pay tribute to all those who were subjected to slave and forced labor under German rule, and, in the name of the German people, beg forgiveness.”¹⁶¹ Thus the reparations agreement for forced laborers, as well as the Bilateral Agreements, expanded the number of Nazi victims who would receive compensation.

Education and Historiography

German education and historiography in the later period is also very apologetic. First, German textbooks candidly discuss the crimes of the Third Reich. Yasemin Soysal writes that German textbooks “reflect a condemnation of the Nazi past,” and provide “extensive and negative coverage of the Nazi history as a time of violence, persecution, death, and destruction.”¹⁶² In striking comparison to the textbooks of immediate postwar era, “contemporary history in German textbooks is given a more prominent place. Ancient and medieval history is relatively marginalized in comparison with coverage of the Weimar Republic, the Nazi period, and the Cold War.”¹⁶³ Thus the aggression and atrocities of the Third Reich receives extensive coverage in German textbooks.¹⁶⁴

In teaching the lessons of the past, German textbooks link such lessons to current issues facing Germany, such as integration and multiculturalism. First, texts prepare German students to be citizens of Europe and a globalized world. Mark Selden and Laura Hein argue, “German leaders have adopted a ‘tamed’ national identity that celebrates both regional diversity within Germany and integration—political, military, economic, and cultural—within the European

¹⁶¹ Quoted in Roger Cohen, “Wiesel Urges Germany to Ask Forgiveness,” *New York Times*, January 28, 2000, A3.

¹⁶² Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, “Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1998), p. 57.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 56

¹⁶⁴ In teaching the lessons of the past, German textbooks link such lessons to current problems facing Germany, such as integration and multiculturalism. Texts prepare German students to be citizens of Europe and a globalized world. Mark Selden and Laura Hein argue, “German leaders have adopted a ‘tamed’ national identity that celebrates both regional diversity within Germany and integration—political, military, economic, and cultural—within the European Union.” Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change,” in Hein and Selden, eds., *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 13.

Union.”¹⁶⁵ Second, lessons of the past are linked to current problems within German society, such as violence against immigrants and guest workers. “Through references to these lessons of the past, civics textbooks emphasize how necessary it is today to understand the ‘other’ and have solidarity with them as fellow human beings.”¹⁶⁶ Thus German textbooks use the past to instill tolerance and an internationalist identity in German students.

Historiography

German historiography in this period delved into one of the lingering beliefs about Nazism: that it had been planned and carried out by Hitler and his SS henchmen, and thus the broader German society was not guilty. In this period, this belief came under attack from the book by the American historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, and from the museum exhibition on “The Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*.”

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s book, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, prompted a spectacle of remembrance in Germany. The book argued that ordinary Germans had participated energetically in the killing of Jews, and that they had required no special indoctrination in order to do so, because of anti-Semitism that ran deep in the German national character.¹⁶⁷ The book was dismissed by many academics; historians criticized its originality, methods, and evidence.¹⁶⁸ *The Economist* called it “a painfully bad read” based on its German national character thesis. “Polemical and pretentious,” wrote Fritz Stern in his review in *Foreign Affairs*.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Hein and Selden, “The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change,” p. 13. German educators and officials are highly responsive to international criticism about their education system; “one curriculum on Hitler for high school students was re-written after the Israeli government protested that it was insufficiently critical of the Third Reich. German texts now sharply downplay nationalist in favor of internationalist themes.” (Ibid, 14)

¹⁶⁶ Soysal, “Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks,” p. 58.

¹⁶⁷ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1996).

. For more on the “Goldhagen debate,” see Grossmann, “The ‘Goldhagen Effect’”; Max Frankel, “Willing Executioners?” *New York Times*, June 28, 1998. Many useful sources can be found on websites of Goldhagen and one of his main critics: www.goldhagen.com and www.normanfinkelstein.com.

¹⁶⁸ Josef Joffe, “Goldhagen in Germany,” *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 43, No. 19, November 28, 1996, 18-21. Also see review by Omer Bartov in *The New Republic*, April 29, 1996.

¹⁶⁹ *The Economist*, July 20, 1996, 45; Fritz Stern, “The Goldhagen Controversy: One Nation, One People, One Theory?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996), 128-138 (138)

On the other hand, the general public effused over the book and its charismatic author during his 1996 book tour. Goldhagen “became the darling of the German public. TV talk shows could not book him often enough, and panel discussions sold out without exception.”¹⁷⁰ A private foundation awarded Goldhagen the German Democracy Prize. Facing audiences who cheered Goldhagen and booed his critics, mainstream German academics (including the conservative Historian’s Association) for the most part chose to keep out of the fray.¹⁷¹

In the debate over *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, many German intellectuals, and clearly the German public, viewed academic quibblings as secondary to a larger societal goal of promoting remembrance of the Nazi past. For example, Jürgen Habermas praised the book in spite of acknowledged flaws because it contributed to Germany’s “ethical-political process of public self-understanding.”¹⁷² Karl Wilds notes that Goldhagen’s popularity in Germany “appear[s] to confirm that far from promoting the suppression of historical memory of the crimes of the [Nazi] state, the mainstream political culture of reunified Germany is marked by the prominence of open contrition for National Socialism and the Holocaust in particular.”¹⁷³ In sum, the Goldhagen debate reflects a very apologetic view of the past within German society.

The tendency of postwar Germans to assure themselves that ordinary Germans had not participated in the Holocaust also came under attack in a museum exhibition that opened in 1995. The exhibit was called “War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944”; it toured Hamburg, Berlin, Potsdam, and Stuttgart, and by 1999 had attracted 860,000 visitors in 32 cities in

¹⁷⁰ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 381

¹⁷¹ Herbert writes that this was most likely a lesson of the 1980s *Historikerstreit*, from which moderates and conservatives learned that “a ‘golden silence’ was the safe option during the Goldhagen debate, from which one could only emerge a loser.” Ulrich Herbert, “Academic and Public Discourses on the Holocaust: The Goldhagen Debate in Germany,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999), p. 46.

¹⁷² Quoted in Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 381.

¹⁷³ Wilds, “Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition,” p. 94. Josef Joffe writes that Goldhagen’s German reception demonstrated the prevalence of enlightened thinking about the past; Joffe disagrees with scholar Jacob Heilbrunn who argued in 1996 that the German “New Right,” intent on historical amnesia, was a nascent and powerful political force. Joffe wrote, “If Heilbrunn were even half right, 80 million Germans should have risen in violent protest against the impudent American Jew who would once more stick them with the notorious ‘German national character’ thesis.” Josef Joffe, “Mr. Heilbrunn’s Planet,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 152-157.

Germany and Austria.¹⁷⁴ The exhibition attacked the comfortable and long-held belief that the SS—not ordinary German soldiers—had carried out the Holocaust. The exhibit featured hundreds of photographs and unsent letters collected by the Soviets from captured Germans.

In picture after picture, letter after letter, and report after report, the exhibition detailed the daily participation of all ranks of the German army in executions and hangings of unarmed civilians, and the deportation and mass murder of Jews across the eastern front. These documents made clear beyond doubt that large numbers of Germans from all walks of life had heard and seen firsthand testimony about brown-collar crimes.¹⁷⁵

Leftist politicians promoted and facilitated the showing of the exhibition. On the other hand, the CDU/CSU and FDP criticized the exhibit as one-sided, protesting its omission of the role of the Army in the 20 July coup attempt against Hitler. Conservative politicians attempted to block funding and venues. A proposal in the Bundestag to house the exhibition in their lobby was rejected by the conservative majority, but the proposal did prompt a poignant Bundestag debate about German responsibility for the war.¹⁷⁶ After touring Germany and Austria, the *Wehrmacht* exhibit closed in response to criticism about the accuracy of photographs, but re-opened in 2001 after errors were corrected and documentation expanded.¹⁷⁷ Thus, as with Goldhagen's book, the historiography of the *Wehrmacht* exhibit reflects increased admission of Nazi crimes. The societal reaction to these events reflects the dominance of apologetic remembrance within German politics and society.

Commemoration

Commemoration in unified Germany is very apologetic. This is evident in monuments, days of commemoration, and the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the 1945 surrender. First, Berlin

¹⁷⁴ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 380. The English-translation catalogue of this exhibit is: Hannes Heer, *The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and other Civilians in the East, 1939-1944* (New York: New Press, 1999).

¹⁷⁵ Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 380.

¹⁷⁶ Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past*, Chapter 6

¹⁷⁷ In the second iteration of the exhibition, the head of the historian's committee in charge of the exhibit commented that the theme remains the same: that "the *Wehrmacht* participated to a large degree in the planning and the execution of a war of extermination against a single race." Michael Adler, "Exhibition on Nazi Army War Crimes Opens in Berlin," *Agence France Presse*, November 28, 2001.

features numerous monuments about the Nazi era. As James Young writes, “Berlin and its environs are rich with excellent museums and permanent exhibitions on the Holocaust...from the Wannsee villa to the Topographie des Terrors, from the new Jewish museum on Lindenstrasse and the Spielberg video archives it will house, to the insightful exhibitions at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.”¹⁷⁸ Other notable memorials include the Memorial to the Bookburning at Bebelplatz, the memorial to the deportation of Jews at Grunewald station, and the “Places of Remembering” (street signs) in the Bavarian Quarter.¹⁷⁹

Second, perhaps the most important Berlin memorial is now under construction: the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.¹⁸⁰ In June 1999 the Germans voted to erect this memorial in a huge plot of land near the Brandenburg Gate. The massive memorial consists of over two thousand stones of irregular height, resembling tombstones, over an awkwardly sloping field. It will also have an information center on the Holocaust. The scope of the memorial—not to mention the internal debate it produced—reflects a high level of apology within Germany.

Third, German days of remembrance established during this period reflect admission and remorse over the Nazi past. In June 1995 the Bundestag established Holocaust Remembrance Day, observed on January 27 (the day Auschwitz was liberated). This day serves commemorative and educational purposes in Germany, where it is typically observed with ceremonies at concentration camps. November 9 is another important day of commemoration of the Nazi past in Germany. Although the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, the German government chose to commemorate unification on October 3 (the official first day of unification) because November 9 was the anniversary of the first night of *Kristallnacht*, the anti-Jewish pogrom of 1933; the Germans did not

¹⁷⁸ James A. Young, “Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999), p. 55.

¹⁷⁹ Another famous memorial in Berlin, the Neue Wache, was rededicated in 1995 as the “Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny.” The rededication of this memorial inspired controversy among those who objected to lumping together victims and perpetrators. On this memorial see Kattago, “The *Neue Wache* and Unified German Memory.”

¹⁸⁰ On the memorial see Young, “Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial.” Also see Omar Sacirbey, “Berlin Struggles to Pick A Memorial to Holocaust,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 27, 1998, electronic version; Roger Cohen, “Berlin Holocaust Memorial Approved,” *New York Times*, June 26, 1999; John Grimond, “The Burden of Normality,” *The Economist*, February 6, 1999, S3; Roger Cohen, “Wiesel Urges Germany to Ask Forgiveness,” *New York Times*, January 28, 2000, A3.

want to overshadow commemoration of *Kristallnacht*. This decision reflects a strong commitment to remembrance, in the face of temptation to commemorate more pleasant events.

Fourth, official remembrance of the fiftieth anniversaries in unified Germany was very contrite, but was accompanied by calls to move forward. Germans commemorated the liberation of Auschwitz with a major international ceremony at the site of the extermination camp. Officials attending the event included German President Roman Herzog as well as two of four vice presidents of the German parliament. A statement by Chancellor Kohl was read, which said that “the darkest and most horrible chapter of German history was written in Auschwitz,” and that “one of our priority tasks is to pass on this knowledge to future generations so that the horrible experiences of the past will never be repeated.”¹⁸¹

Official commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the German surrender on May 8 also displayed apologetic remembrance. Germany hosted leaders from the former Allied nations; attending the commemorative ceremony in Berlin were the French President, the British and Russian Prime Ministers, and the U.S. Vice President. As detailed above, President Herzog gave a very contrite speech at the occasion.

During these commemorations, neo-conservative politicians and intellectuals attempted to present a different, less self-accusatory, view of the past. 300 German elites signed a petition that ran as an advertisement in the *FAZ* newspaper in April 1995 (the advertisement became known as the *Aufruf*).¹⁸² These conservatives condemned the media’s “one-sided” presentation of the German surrender as an act of liberation; they argued that May 8 should be seen as the “beginning of the expulsion, terror, and new oppression in the East and the division of our nation.” The advertisement argued,

a conception of history that is silent, represses or relativizes these truths cannot serve as the foundation of the self-understanding of a self-confident nation, something we Germans

¹⁸¹ Quoted in Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 379. Marcuse comments, “This unequivocal statement of acceptance of Germany’s brown-collar past was a far cry from Kohl’s homage to German victimhood at Bitburg a decade earlier.” (Ibid)

¹⁸² Known as “*Aufruf gegen das Vergessen*,” or “Against Forgetting.” The *Aufruf* was drafted by neoconservatives Rainer Zitelmann, Karlheinz Weissmann, and Heimo Schilk. Heilbrunn, “Germany’s New Right.”

must become within the family of European peoples if we are to prevent similar catastrophes from occurring in the future.¹⁸³

Thus some conservatives argued during fiftieth anniversary commemorations that Germans should focus less on Nazi Germany's sins, and more on German sufferings.

However, as had occurred before, conservatives failed to gain from their campaign on the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end. Karl Wilds writes,

the response to the *Aufruf* at party-political and government level...represented a decisive rebuttal of the thrust of the [New Right]. Whilst one might well have expected left-liberal and critical thinkers to attack the sentiment of the New Right, it was perhaps surprising to note the concerted criticism which emerged from within the *conservative* spectrum.¹⁸⁴

Bundestag President Rita Süßmuth of the CDU lambasted the *Aufruf*. Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber "made an impassioned speech denouncing those who argued for drawing a line under the German past and stated that the crimes of the Third Reich demanded a sense of historical responsibility from contemporary Germans who, if they succumbed to a culture of amnesia, could enjoy no future."¹⁸⁵ Josef Joffe concludes that the most interesting lesson from the *Aufruf* episode "was the German reaction to the 're-education' shenanigans of Zitelmann, Weissmann, et al. If this was a cancer, the German body politic soon unleashed powerful antibodies."¹⁸⁶ Thus, similar to the *Historikerstreit* of the 1980s, the debate about the *Aufruf* reflects the dominance of apologetic remembrance in German politics.

SUMMARY: POSTWAR GERMAN REMEMBRANCE

Observers are frequently critical of the way in which Germans have remembered, mythologized, or forgotten important aspects of their past aggression and crimes. Scholars introduced the terms

¹⁸³ Quoted in Heilbrunn, "Germany's New Right," p. 91. For more on this conservative movement see Wilds, "Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition," p. 94; Muller, "German Neoconservatism and the History of the Bonn Republic," p. 15.

¹⁸⁴ Wilds, "Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition," p. 94;

¹⁸⁵ Wilds, "Identity Creation and the Culture of Contrition," p. 94. Presidential candidate Stefan Heitmann had commented that it was time to draw a line under the German past. After this statement the CDU withdrew its support for his candidacy. See Olick, "Genre Memories and Memory Genres," p. 399.

¹⁸⁶ Joffe, "Mr. Heilbrunn's Planet."

“second guilt” and “third guilt” to connote the “silencing, relativization, minimization, and historical revisionism supposedly transferred from the war to postwar generations.”¹⁸⁷ Certainly in the early postwar period, the Germans acknowledged Nazi crimes but made little effort to remember them. Early West German remembrance focused on Germany’s own suffering. However, since the 1960s, German remembrance has been remarkably apologetic. (See Table 1 below for a summary.) Across a range of policies—educational, commemorative, and judicial—West Germany admits and expresses remorse for its past. Since unification, German contrition has only increased to a level unattained by any other country in history.

Table 1: Summary of Postwar (West) German Remembrance

	Early (1945-1950s)	Middle (1960-89)	Late (1990s-00s)
Statements	-/+	+	+
Reparations	+	+	+
Legal Trials	-	+	(ceased)
Education	-	+	+
Commemoration	-	+	+

(Key: + apologetic; – unapologetic; +/- apologetic and unapologetic occurring at once)

ALTERNATE VARIABLES

This study tests the effects of policies of remembrance on perceptions of intentions and threat.

However, French perceptions may have been affected by many other factors since the end of World War II. Thus in order to understand the effects of remembrance, I also track alternate variables over time.

¹⁸⁷ Hermann Kurthen, “Antisemitism and Xenophobia in United Germany: How the Burden of the Past Affects the Present,” in Hermann Kurthen, Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, eds., *Antisemitism and Xenophobia in Germany after Unification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 42. Ralph Giordano coined the term “second guilt.” Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*, p. 374 (fn 7-9).

Perception of Intentions

Other factors besides policies of remembrance affect perception of a state's intentions. This section codes German democracy, territorial claims, and institutional membership across the post-World War II period. I use these codings in Chapter Six to test the effects of remembrance on perceptions of intentions.

Regime Type. Democratic peace theory posits that mature democratic states are more likely to view each other's intentions as benign. Thus after its initial democratic transition, West German democracy should make West German intentions appear more benign to democratic France.

The FRG democratized in the 1950s, and has been a very stable democracy ever since. The Western Allies merged their three zones of occupation, and in 1949 West Germany was invited to draft a constitution ("Basic Law"). The occupation officially ended in 1955, and the Federal Republic of Germany was born. The first West German elections had been held in 1949, and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (along with its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Socialist Union) won the majority.

The next several decades were characterized by peaceful transfers of power. The CDU/CSU ruled in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) until 1966, with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in opposition. When the FDP switched alliances, the Social Democrats were brought to power in coalition in 1969. The "social-liberal era" in West German politics lasted until 1982 when the FDP again changed partners, returning to a coalition government with the CDU/CSU. Helmut Kohl of the CDU was elected chancellor.

In 1990, Germany was reunified: the former East Germany was peacefully annexed to West Germany. The unified German state was democratically governed under the Federal Republic's democratic institutions and Basic Law. Kohl continued to govern unified Germany until 1998, when the Socialists were restored to power under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In sum, West German democracy has been characterized by stability since the birth of the Federal Republic. Democratic peace theory would therefore predict that, after an initial period of

democratization (1949-1950s), West German democracy should make West German intentions appear more benign in the eyes of democratic France.

Territorial Claims. As described in Chapter One, a common belief is that if a country has claims on the territory of others, this will make its intentions look malign. The two major territorial issues in this case are West Germany's desire for unification, and West German territorial claims to its 1937 borders. If territorial claims affect perceptions of intentions, both of these territorial issues should make West German intentions appear more malign to the French.

First, West Germany wanted unification with East Germany. After the war Germany was divided into the Western and Eastern zones of occupation, with the Soviet Union ruling in the Eastern zone. German division settled into stalemate, but the West Germans consistently pressured their allies to expedite unification. In negotiations in the 1950s, West Germany's allies persuaded it to accept division, with the promise that the allies would help Germany toward this goal in the future. In 1958, pressured by Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer agreed to not seek unification for the time being. During the Cold War, the nightmare of French, British, and American officials was that Germany would make a deal with the Soviet Union for unification with East Germany, thus abandoning NATO and the Western camp. If territorial claims make a state's intentions appear malign, German behavior based on the goal of unification should make West German intentions appear more malign during the 1945-1990 period.

The second territorial issue was the question of Germany's borders. At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies agreed that the eastern Oder-Neisse line would constitute a temporary German border until a peace treaty was signed. German public opinion was steadfastly opposed to the Oder-Neisse border. In the 1950s Konrad Adenauer said repeatedly that the West German government viewed Germany's 1937 borders as the correct borders. Adenauer contradicted Soviet assertions that Potsdam had settled the border issue.¹⁸⁸ A vocal group of Germans who had refugeeed or been ethnically cleansed from the Eastern territories kept up calls for restitution and

¹⁸⁸ Walther Hubatsch, ed., *The German Question* (New York: Herder Book Center, 1967), pp. 307-09.

exerted political influence on the ruling CDU/CSU party. However Adenauer reassured neighbors that the FRG did not plan to settle the border issue through the use of force.

In subsequent decades, uncertainty over the border continued, and West Germany exhibited both dovish and more hawkish positions. During Chancellor Willy Brandt's visit to Poland as part of his policy of *Ostpolitik*, Brandt signed a treaty describing "the present boundary line" as the "legal western border of Poland."¹⁸⁹ However after conservatives regained power in 1982, FRG Chancellor Kohl denied the legality of the border, and in 1985 attended the annual rally of Silesian expellees in Hanover, at which people held banners proclaiming "Silesia Remains Ours."¹⁹⁰

Upon negotiations over German unification in 1990, it was uncertain whether unified Germany would accept its postwar borders. Eventually Kohl settled the issue in November 1990 by signing a formal treaty with Poland that recognized the permanence of the border; the German Bundestag ratified the treaty a year later.

In sum, if territorial claims affect perceptions of intentions, this factor should make West German intentions appear more *malign* from 1945-1990. Germany's acceptance of its postwar borders (and the settling of the reunification issue) should make German intentions appear more *benign* after 1990.

Institutional Membership. Institutionalists argue that a state's membership in international institutions makes its intentions appear more benign to other members. By agreeing to join institutions that place real constraints on its national power and policies, a state signals that it does not intend revisionist behavior. West Germany and its neighbors have been engaged in a process of building both economic and security institutions since the immediate aftermath of the war. Thus institutionalist theories would predict that this factor should make French perceptions of West German intentions appear more benign throughout this period.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in John Dornberg, "The Oder-Neisse Border: Where German-Polish Prejudices Meet," *German Life* (December 1996/January 1997).

¹⁹⁰ Moeller, "War Stories," p. 1041.

First, West Germany has been a major driving force behind the creation of economic and political institutions. France and the FRG were major forces among the founding six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established under the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The ECSC was expanded in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome with the creation of a European atomic energy community, Euratom, and a European Economic Community, or EEC. All three communities were merged together in 1967 to form the European Community (EC). In 1986, the Single European Act represented further progress toward deepening integration, as progress was made on expediting voting through the creation of majority voting under some issue areas (as opposed to national vetoes). A major step in deepening European institutionalization occurred after German unification, at Maastricht in 1991. The EC was transformed into the European Union, which included the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹⁹¹ Subsequent deepening was undertaken through the decision to adopt a common currency (the Euro, in 1999).

Second, West Germany and France negotiated constraints on German power and established bilateral institutional links in the course of several summits that culminated in 1963 with the signing of the Elysée Treaty. The FRG agreed to renounce weapons of mass destruction and to not make territorial claims for its 1937 borders. The Elysée treaty established numerous government, military, and cultural links between the two countries. Institutional links between the French and West German governments and militaries created transparency in West German policy.

Third, West Germany and her neighbors have developed security institutions through NATO and later through the EU. West Germany was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1955. The allies stipulated that West German membership in NATO was contingent on Bonn's acceptance of numerous real constraints on her military power. The West Germans agreed to "refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character" of the NATO and Brussels treaties.¹⁹² Adenauer pledged that West Germany would

¹⁹¹ Robert Art notes that earlier moves toward this level of political integration had been stalled. See Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 111, no. 1 (1996), pp. 1-38.

¹⁹² For the German declaration see Paul B. Stares, *Allied Rights and Legal Constraints on German Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1990), pp. 3-9.

renounce the right to produce any weapons of mass destruction on German territory.¹⁹³ West Germany would also agree not to produce certain conventional weapons, such as long-range missiles, strategic bombers, and large battleships. The FRG also agreed to measures aimed at policing her compliance with these restrictions: inspections conducted by officials from the Brussels Treaty Organization (later Western European Union, WEU). Furthermore, all West German conventional forces would be assigned to NATO's Central European Command (headed by a French general). West Germany was allowed no general staff for its armed forces, and no national guard.

Moreover, NATO membership promoted transparency about German military policies that institutional theorists would argue should promote perceptions of benign German intentions. NATO is not simply the administrative framework used by the offshore balancer to contain Germany, as discussed above. During and since the Cold War, Germany and her neighbors conducted their primary security policies through NATO, which increased transparency in the security realm, and established a tradition of consultation and joint training. Germany and France stepped up their security cooperation in the 1980s, leading to the development of a Franco-German brigade.

Upon German unification in 1990, the future of Germany's membership in both political-economic institutions, as well as its membership in NATO, was in doubt. However unified Germany pledged to deepen political-economic institutions, and pledged to remain within NATO. Kohl also pledged that unified Germany would continue to accept constraints on her military power. He pledged to adhere to a troop ceiling of 370,000 soldiers, and pledged that unified Germany would continue to abstain from developing WMD.¹⁹⁴ In sum, Germany and France have cooperated in the construction, management, and expansion of numerous European institutions

¹⁹³ For discussion of the limitations on West German power imposed by German admission to NATO, see Stephen A. Kocs, *Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 1955-1995* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), p. 17-18.

¹⁹⁴ Kocs, *Autonomy or Power?*, p. 216.

since the end of World War II. These institutions have included measures to promote transparency into German policy making, as well as substantive constraints on German power.

An institutionalist theory predicts (as many scholars have argued), that such institutionalization would make French perception of German intentions more benign.¹⁹⁵ This should have been particularly evident after the many institutions created in the 1950s. Furthermore, West German intentions should appear still more benign upon subsequent institutional development: the EC (1967), the Single European Act (1986), the EU (1991) and European Monetary Union (1999). One exception would be 1990, when German membership in these institutions was in doubt at the time of German unification. However, after Germany agreed to remain within NATO and the EU, its intentions should once again appear more benign.

Table 2 sums up the expected effects of different variables on French perception of German intentions.

Table 2: Variables Affecting French Perceptions of German Intentions

	1945-1950s	1960-1989	1990s-00s
Remembrance	↔	↓	↓
Territorial Claims	↑↑	↑↑	↓
Institutions	↔	↓	↓
Regime Type	↔	↓	↓

Key: ↑↑ aggravating factor; ↓ reassuring factor; ↔ factor promoting uncertainty

¹⁹⁵ On the Franco-German case see Stanley Hoffmann, "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe," in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffman, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 127-147. Celeste Wallander tests an institutionalist theory in German-Russian relations. Celeste Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Perception of Threat

As argued in Chapter One, states perceive threats based on capabilities (power and constraints) as well as intentions. This section codes these factors in the Franco-German case since World War II in order to assess the relative importance of remembrance in threat perception.

Power


A state's power can be divided into long-term power (the size of its economy and its population), as well as its current, mobilized power (such as standing military forces, military expenditure, and the mobilization of the populace for warfare).

Long-Term Power. In terms of long-term power, France and Germany are both great powers, but Germany derives an advantage from both its higher population and higher GDP. First, in the postwar years West Germany had 1.1~1.2 times France's population; the German lead increased to 1.4 times after unification.¹⁹⁶ Second, the two states are both among the world's wealthiest nations, but Germany has a somewhat larger GDP. After postwar economic reconstruction, the two states demonstrated parity in terms of national wealth, but Germany began to surpass the French GDP in about 1970. Since then, German GDP has ranged from 1.2 ~ 1.4 times the size of France's GDP.¹⁹⁷ (See Figure 1, below.) In sum, Franco-German long-term power is roughly comparable, but Germany derives an advantage from its somewhat larger population and GDP.

¹⁹⁶ West Germany's population in 1960 was 54 million, compared to France's 45 million. After unification this increased to 81 million (compared to France's 59 million). Population data from the period in International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, various years). Hereafter cited as IISS.

¹⁹⁷ In 1970 GDPs were \$548 billion (Fr) and \$587 billion (Ger); in 1980 \$1.1 trillion (Fr) and \$1.5 trillion (Ger); in 1990, \$1.2 trillion (Fr) and \$1.5 trillion (Ger). Data in 2003 constant U.S. dollars, from IISS, *Military Balance*, various years; adjusted with dollar deflators from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2003.


Figure 1: French and German GDP Comparison



Source: IISS, *The Military Balance*, Various years.

Current Power. France and Germany are roughly comparable in terms of current power. With respect to military expenditure, defense budgets in the two states were at near parity since World War II. During the Cold War, French defense budgets ranged from .8 ~ 1.1 the size of Germany's. After German unification, French military expenditure has outpaced Germany's; since 1995 the French have spent 1.4 times more on defense than Germany. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2: French and German Military Expenditure



Source: IISS, *The Military Balance*, various years.

A second—and extremely important—aspect of current power is whether or not a state has a nuclear weapons capability. With regards to this factor, this is the one area in which France has an indisputable military advantage over Germany. The French began pursuing a nuclear program in the 1950s, with the goals of expanding domestic energy sources and also producing enough plutonium to make a small number of nuclear bombs. The French successfully tested their first nuclear device in 1960, and since then have maintained a nuclear weapons capability. Currently the French have about 350 strategic nuclear weapons, deliverable by ballistic missile submarines and by aircraft.¹⁹⁸

On the other hand, neither West Germany nor unified Germany sought ownership of nuclear weapons. As a linchpin of NATO's military strategy against the Warsaw Pact, West Germans were involved with the nuclear defense of Europe. Although nuclear munitions were in theory under American control, West Germans controlled delivery vehicles.¹⁹⁹ In the 1950s, Bonn had agreed to renounce ownership of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a prerequisite for

¹⁹⁸ Data on French nuclear weapons stockpile from Natural Resources Defense Council (<http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nuclb/datab16.asp>). Also see Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.

¹⁹⁹ On West Germany's role in the nuclear defense of Europe see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

membership in the European Defense Council (which never came to be), and later for membership in NATO.²⁰⁰ Helmut Kohl also agreed to renounce WMD capabilities for unified Germany as a prerequisite for unification.

A third aspect of current power is the number of armed forces that a state raises. With respect to this factor, postwar France and Germany also exhibited near parity across the World War II era. Starting with a sizeable advantage in terms of number of troops, France demobilized a substantial portion of her army after the withdrawal from Algeria in the early 1960s.²⁰¹ By 1965 the French had only 1.3 times the number of troops than did West Germany; for the remainder of the cold war period France had at most 1.1 the number of West German troops (see Table 3, below). In the post-Cold War world, this ratio has dropped very slightly; France in 2000 had .9 the number of military forces compared to unified Germany. Thus despite French nightmare scenarios for unified Germany, the latter has steadily reduced its number of armed forces relative to the cold war.

Table 3: Number of French and German Armed Forces

	1965	1975	1985	1995	2000
France	557,000	502,500	476,560	409,000	294,430
(West) Germany	438,000	495,000	478,000	339,900	321,000

Source: IISS, Military Balance, various years.

A final aspect of a state's current power is the extent to which it mobilizes its population—through nationalistic/patriotic sentiment—to support the use of military force. Since World War II, the French have actively participated in military operations overseas; the public is neither particularly jingoistic nor phobic about the military establishment or about the use of

²⁰⁰ Richardson, *Germany in the Atlantic Alliance*, p. 23.

²⁰¹ France had over 1 million troops in 1960, compared to West Germany's 330,000. Data from IISS, *The Military Balance 1961-62*.

military force. With respect to nationalistic mobilization, German current power has been weak since World War II. Analysts have identified Germany as having a “culture of reticence,” or “culture of antimilitarism,” which is manifested in the German public’s opposition to the use of force, expressed in public opinion surveys and anti-war protests.²⁰² Since the war, Germans

were uncomfortable with the notion that responsible democracies could and should, under certain circumstances, use military force to preserve stability or to uphold principles of international law. It became increasingly fashionable in Germany to argue that Germans had learned the lessons of history and that German policy should aim to create a world where force was no longer a legitimate tool to achieve desired political goals.²⁰³

West Germans, and later the people of unified Germany, consistently supported German membership in NATO over an independent defense policy as the best strategy for providing German security.²⁰⁴

After Germany’s defeat, war weariness amidst the populace was reflected in passionate Leftist opposition to German rearmament within the EDC and then NATO; support among the broader public (influenced by appeals from the CDU/CSU) was stronger yet unenthusiastic.²⁰⁵ Grassroots peace movements emerged to oppose rearmament; in the 1950s, Germany’s role in American nuclear defense planning led the peace movement to shift its focus to campaigning against nuclear weapons, with the slogan “fight atomic death.”²⁰⁶

In the middle period, German reticence continued. Survey data reveal popular consensus “in favor of the existing, minimalist approaches to defense and national security.”²⁰⁷ The focus of peace movements shifted toward new issues; the “1968ers” student movement protested against the Vietnam War. Survey data shows that 88 percent of the public opposed the deployment of

²⁰² See Ronald D. Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall, 1990-1993* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994); Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

²⁰³ Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, p. 12.

²⁰⁴ For survey data see Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, p. 32.

²⁰⁵ James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 22.

²⁰⁶ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 49.

²⁰⁷ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 115.

German forces (even logistical forces) to Vietnam.²⁰⁸ Later, the environmental and peace movements protested the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on German territory in the early 1980s. The West German Green Party emerged as a credible force in national politics. One scholar, in a popular book in the 1980s, dubbed the Germans “the Tamed Germans,” writing that they were unable to think about the world in terms of geopolitics and military power.²⁰⁹

In unified Germany, support for German participation in military operations has increased over previous levels but remains conditional on humanitarian need. In a 1993 poll, 95 percent of respondents supported German participation in humanitarian missions; there is moderate support for participation in economic sanctions and UN peacekeeping missions. Only 18 percent supported UN-sanctioned military interventions such as the Gulf War.²¹⁰ By 1999, 60 percent of the German public supported air strikes against Serbia in NATO’s war over Kosovo.²¹¹ German Tornados flew in missions against Belgrade: Germany’s combat action since World War II. During this war, Germany was racked by debate, particularly within the traditionally pacifist Green Party (a partner in the ruling coalition with the Social Democratic Party). However, haunted by the West’s failure to prevent Serbian massacres in the earlier Bosnian war, and by Serbian ethnic cleansing of Albanians in 1999, many traditional pacifists argued that Germany had a historical duty to prevent humanitarian disasters, even if it required resorting to force.²¹² The magnitude of debate the Kosovo war generated within German society illustrates how challenging it would be to mobilize German support for offensive military action taken with less charitable goals in mind; indeed, in 2003, Germans were strongly opposed to the U.S. war against Iraq. In sum, since World War II,

²⁰⁸ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 113.

²⁰⁹ Quoted in Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, p. 12.

²¹⁰ RAND poll quoted in Asmus, *German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall*, p. 63.

²¹¹ Quoted in William Drozdiak, “Germany’s Greens Urge Temporary Bombing Halt,” *Washington Post*, May 14, 1999.

²¹² See Michael Binyon, “Holocaust Memories Haunting Europeans,” *The Gazette*, April 3, 1999; Roger Cohen, “Crisis in the Balkans: Germany; A Generation of German Pacifists Finds Itself at Odds over the Kosovo Air War,” *New York Times*, May 16, 1999; Josef Joffe, “A Peacenik Goes to War,” *New York Times*, May 30, 1999.

West Germany and now unified Germany displays strong reticence when it comes to public support for military operations.

In sum, regarding the balance of current power between France and Germany, the two states have displayed parity with respect to military expenditure and number of armed forces. West German and unified German current power has been reduced by the lack of mobilization of the German population, and by Germany's lack of a nuclear weapons capability. (See Table 4.)

Table 4: Summary of Current Power Balance

	Early Period 1950-64	Middle Period 1965-89	Late Period 1990-00s
Military Expenditure (FR: GER)	Parity (1 : 1)	Parity (1 : 1)	Parity (1-1.2 : 1)
Nuclear Weapons	Parity (none)	FR advantage	FR advantage
# Armed Forces (FR: GER)	FR advantage (3 ~ 1.3 : 1)	Parity (1.3 ~ 1 : 1)	Parity (1 ~ .9 : 1)
Popular mobilization	FR advantage	FR advantage	FR advantage
Summary: German Current Power vs. France	Low	Low	Low

Constraints

Since World War II, constraints have reduced West Germany's ability to project power against France. These include the constraints imposed by the United States (first as occupier and then as offshore balancer), in addition to the Soviet threat. Chapter One argued that the existence of an institutionalized commitment, as well as military "boots on the ground" make the commitment of an offshore balancer appear stronger (and thus make it a stronger constraint). As for the constraints posed by threats from other states, Chapter One argued that threat perception within a

given dyad is affected by the existence of threats from third parties. The more powerful the third-party states are, the more threatening they are (and thus the greater constraint they pose).

Offshore Balancer. If the presence of an offshore balancer reduces threat perception, then the presence of the U.S. offshore balancer in West Germany should reduce French threat perception of Germany across the postwar period. American troops were present in Germany after World War II in support of the military occupation, and after extensive debates on the postwar settlement, the United States and its allies accepted West Germany into NATO in 1955.²¹³ To deter a Soviet attack, upwards of 300,000 American troops were stationed in the FRG and other NATO states. (France, Britain and other NATO nations also stationed troops in West Germany.) Upon German unification, this long-existing arrangement was called into question as unified Germany faced the choice of whether to continue to accept the presence of foreign forces. Thus uncertainty in 1990 about the durability of this constraint should raise threat perception within France at this time. However, unified Germany accepted the continued presence of American and other troops. In sum, the presence of the American offshore balancer—confirmed after the mid-1950s—should reduce French fears of West Germany after that time.

Other Threats. As argued in Chapter One, a state's behavior is also constrained by the threats it faces. Threat perception within a given dyad is thus affected by the existence of threats from third parties. Threats from State C drain resources that State A might use to aggress against State B (hence making A appear less threatening to B). *Mutual* threats may bring opportunities for A and B to align against C. Thus the presence of other threats shapes and constrains a state's behavior, reducing how threatening that state appears to another.

West Germany faced a severe security threat from the Soviet Union for the entire period, 1945-1990. The Soviet Union was one of the world's two superpowers during this period; its GDP was the second- or third-highest in the world, and its military defense budgets were second to the United States. The Soviet Army was the largest in Europe, and the USSR consistently stationed

²¹³ On the making of the postwar settlement see Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*.

20 ground divisions in East Germany.²¹⁴ Soviet-provoked crises threatened to escalate to all-out war between the two blocs along the Central Front in Germany (the 1948 Berlin Airlift; the Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s, also the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.) The Soviet threat to West Germany did fluctuate over time with changes in NATO or Warsaw Pact procurement or deployments.²¹⁵ However, overall, I argue that throughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat fluctuated always within a “high” band; West Germany faced a threat from one of the world’s two nuclear-armed and militarily powerful superpowers, which stationed hundreds of thousands of troops in the other half of German territory. The Soviet threat to West Germany was thus high from 1945-1990, imposing a serious constraint on West German behavior.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marked the end of this constraint on Germany. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the USSR withdrew troops from Eastern Germany. After 1990, Germany faced an extremely benign threat environment, with its powerful NATO alliance intact, and no invasion threat from any quarter.

Summary: German Capabilities

The question at hand is the extent to which France should have felt threatened by German capabilities since World War II, *if* capabilities drive threat perception. Germany has had advantages in terms of long-term power, with greater national wealth and a slightly higher population. However France has been very secure relative to Germany in terms of current power; it has enjoyed either parity or an advantage in terms of military expenditure, and—perhaps most importantly—since the 1960s has possessed a nuclear weapons capability, in the absence of German nuclear weapons. Germany’s ability to project power against France has also been reduced by the existence of serious constraints: the presence of three Allied occupiers (and later the presence of NATO troops

²¹⁴ IISS, *The Military Balance*, various years.

²¹⁵ For writings on the net assessment of NATO/Pact forces see John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980); Barry R. Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment,” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3. (Winter, 1984-1985), pp. 47-88; and John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Summer, 1982), pp. 3-39.

on West German soil), and the existence of a severe security threat from the Soviet Union. Thus German capabilities should not threaten France in the postwar period (French threat perception based solely on capabilities should be *low*).

The only exception would be in 1990, when the future of German capabilities was called into question because of German unification. French threat perception with respect to German capabilities should briefly spike to *moderate* in 1990. The factors that France had previously found reassuring could change with unification. The German population and economy would rise. More importantly, the Soviet constraint was disappearing; no one knew the future of NATO; Germany might get nuclear weapons.

None of these unification fears were borne out; the power balance between France and unified Germany remained much the same of that between France and West Germany during the Cold War. Germany today is much less constrained than it was as a divided nation facing the Soviet army; however, it continues to accept constraints imposed by NATO institutional restrictions and the presence of foreign troops. Perhaps most importantly, France continues to be protected by a nuclear deterrent that is unmatched by the Germans. In sum, based solely on the balance of capabilities between France and West/Germany, French threat perception of Germany should be *low* since World War II, with a brief spike to *moderate* in 1990 upon German unification.

Table 5: German Capabilities Since World War II

	Early Period 1950-64	Middle Period 1965-89	Late Period 1990-00s
German Long Term Power (Advantage vis-à-vis France)	Low	Low/Mod (GDP)	Mod (Population)
German Current Power (see Table 4)	Low	Very Low (Fr nukes)	Very Low (Fr nukes)
Constraints from Other Threats	Highly constrained	Highly constrained	Unconstrained
Constraints from Offshore Balancer	Uncertain; then constrained	Constrained	Constrained
Summary: German capabilities vs. France	Low	Low	Low
Predictions for French Threat Perception	Low	Low	Low

In order to test the apology theory in the case of France and Germany, the first part of this chapter coded German remembrance over the post-World War II period. The second part of this chapter coded alternate variables that might also affect French perceptions of German intentions (regime type, territorial claims, institutional membership), and perceptions of threat (capabilities). Table 6 summarizes the predicted effects of different variables on French perceptions of intentions and threat.

Table 6: Alternate Variables and French Perceptions of Germany

		1945-1950s	1960-1989	1990s-00s
Perception of Intentions	Remembrance	↑	↓	↓
	Territorial Claims	↑	↑	↓
	Institutional membership	↔	↓	↓
	Regime Type	↔	↓	↓
Perception of Threat	Capabilities	↓	↓	↓

Key: ↑ aggravating factor; ↓ reassuring factor; ↔ factor promoting uncertainty

PREDICTIONS

This chapter coded German remembrance as *unapologetic* (amnesia/self-victimhood) in the early period, and as *apologetic* since the mid-1960s. I also coded alternate variables that scholars argue affect perceptions of intentions and perceptions of threat. Based on these codings, I can make two kinds of predictions to test the apology theory against these other theories: predictions related to congruence and reasoning.

Congruence Tests

This chapter coded three variables (remembrance, democracy, and institutional membership) that predicted an improvement in French perceptions of German intentions. For all three factors, the timing of the improvement should begin in the 1960s. I also coded one variable (territorial claims) as predicting continued distrust of German intentions from 1945-1990, and benign perceptions after 1990. Based on these codings I can conduct two congruence tests.

The first is a “hoop test,” which, if failed, falsifies three theories (apology theory, democratic peace, and institutions theory).²¹⁶ All three theories predict that French perceptions of German intentions should be *more benign* in the middle and late periods than in the early period. Thus if in the middle and late periods, French perceptions of West German intentions are *malign*, this result would show that none of these variables could be very significant. Such an outcome would thus falsify all three theories. However, if I find that perception of West German intentions is *uncertain* or *benign* during these periods, this is consistent with any of the three theories’ predictions. This outcome would be inconclusive because I would not be able to discern between them.

Second, I can also conduct a “hoop test” for the territorial claims theory. Germany had a territorial claim from 1945-1990, which disappeared after 1990. Thus the territorial claims theory predicts that perceptions of German intentions should be (1) more *malign* between 1945-1990, and

²¹⁶ On hoop tests see Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). To remain viable, a theory must “jump through a hoop.” Hoop tests are those in which failing the test represents a decisive failure for the theory, but passing it does not yet establish the theory’s veracity.

(2) more *benign* after 1990. If I find (1) *benign* perceptions between 1945-1990, or (2) *malign* perceptions after 1990, this would be inconsistent with the theory; territorial claims clearly cannot have much of an impact on perceptions of intentions. On the other hand, if I find (1) a finding of *malign* or *uncertain* from 1945-1990, or (2) a finding of *uncertain* or *benign* after 1990, both of these would be consistent with the theory's expectations. However, these findings would be inconclusive because they are also predicted by the other variables.

Reasoning

The apology theory and its competing theories also make predictions for how the French should discuss their perceptions of German intentions. According to the apology theory, as the French discuss West Germany in the early period, they should say that they are uncertain about Bonn's intentions because of West German amnesia. Starting in the 1960s the French should say they have increased faith in West German intentions because of Bonn's apologetic remembrance.

According to the democratic peace theory, in the early period the French should talk about the need for democracy in West Germany, and should express uncertainty about West German intentions in the early years of democratic governance. By the end of the 1950s, and continuing thereafter, the French should express more confidence in West Germany because of the stable democracy that it became.

The institutionalist theory predicts that in the middle and late periods, the French should discuss German membership in international institutions as evidence of benign German intentions. Finally, the territorial claims theory predicts that between 1945-1990 the French should refer to this issue as grounds for distrusting West German intentions. After 1990 this issue should not arise.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I coded the key variables of the apology theory (as well as other theories of intentions and threat perception). Based on this coding, I drew predictions from each theory about French perceptions of German intentions in the post-World War II period.

In the next chapter I compare these predictions to perceptions among the French elite and public to see which theory better explains French assessments of German intentions. In addition, I then test the effect of German remembrance, relative to other variables, in overall French threat perception of Germany.

Chapter Six

The Effects of German Apologies on Franco-German Relations

Observers across the world laud Germany as a model for how states should deal with past violence.¹ Scholars and journalists have argued that apologetic policies of remembrance in West Germany, and then unified Germany, reduced fears of a German threat in Western Europe.² This proposition, however, has not been systematically tested. To test the apology theory, I turn to the case of France and Germany. Has German remembrance affected French perception of German intentions? How has remembrance affected overall French threat perception relative to other factors? To evaluate the uniqueness of the French reaction to German remembrance, this chapter also briefly evaluates British perceptions of German remembrance over the same time period.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This case study yields findings for the apology theory, as well as two other related findings. First, the Franco-German case offers weak support for the apology theory. As the first section of this chapter will argue, there is some evidence that policies of remembrance affected French perception of German intentions. In the early period, the French viewed candid German remembrance of the

¹ "At War with History," *Newsweek*, August 27, 2001; James E. Young, "Berlin's Holocaust Memorial," *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1999), 54-70; Kim Kyong-min, "Why is Japan Distrusted?" *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 8, 1995; Kim Young-ho, "South Korea-Japan Relations Still Mired in Snowy Weather," *Munhwa Ilbo*, August 14, 1999; Kim Choong-seek, "Is Japan Still Blind to its Past?" *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 18, 2000; "Truth of Massacre Cannot Be Denied," *China Daily*, December 14, 2002; Xi Mi, "China: Never Forget Infamous History," *China Daily*, February 26, 2000; Frank Ching, "A Tale of Former Allies," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 2, 2000, p. 35; Tang Tianri, "Two Contrastive Looks at the History of Aggression," quoted in Xinhua Hong Kong News Service, August 28, 2000. For more Chinese sources comparing Japan and Germany see citations of Chinese comparisons of Germany and Japan in Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma," p. 54

² Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49; Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* Vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-154; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 193-243.

Nazi past as essential for eradicating hyper-nationalism and for democratizing West Germany. To prevent West Germans from denying their past in their history textbooks, the French undertook educational reforms during the occupation, and also worked with the West Germans in joint history textbook commissions.

In the middle and late periods, media coverage and scholarly writing show that many French appear very interested in German remembrance. Observers monitor its evolution, and praise German efforts at contrition. Sometimes observers link German remembrance to perceptions of German intentions. However, throughout the post-World War II period, French leaders did not talk about German remembrance when they discussed German intentions. They did not discuss German remembrance during debates over German unification, when the apology theory would have expected French leaders to talk about German contrition as a reassuring factor. Furthermore, in interviews, French elites never independently raised the issue of remembrance when discussing Germany; they focused on other issues. In sum, this case yields weak support for the apology theory.

As for French threat perception of Germany, remembrance had no discernable role. French threat perception was influenced by other factors (related to both intentions and capabilities). The French feared Germany in the early postwar period because Germany was rearming, because it was not yet permanently constrained by the United States or multilateral institutions, and because the French were suspicious of German intentions due to territorial claims. Similarly, upon German unification in 1990, French threat perception increased not only because of an anticipated increase in German capabilities, but also because of uncertainties about German intentions regarding territorial claims and institutional membership.

The Franco-German case also yields two other findings. First, the French appreciate and admire German remembrance, but many observers say Germany has actually gone too far. The French—and also the British—are very aware of the potential for an "apology backlash"; they fear that German contrition may have destabilizing effects on German democratic stability.

Second, during the postwar years, the French and West Germans used policies of remembrance to further their goals of reconciliation. France did not pressure Germany for apologies regarding World War II. But the two states cooperated in joint textbook commissions in support of the goal of European integration. To create images of Franco-German reconciliation—again in service of European integration—Paris and Bonn staged commemorative events at Rheims Cathedral (1962) and Verdun cemetery (1984). In contrast to the logic of the apology theory, Franco-German commemoration was bilateral rather than unilateral; instead of focusing on World War II it reflected amnesia about the recent past, and included French gestures of forgiveness.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses sources and standards of evidence. The second section tests the apology theory: that is, tests whether German policies of remembrance have influenced French perceptions of Germany's intentions. The third section then turns to the question, how much does remembrance influence threat perception relative to other factors? Before concluding, I briefly consider the case of Great Britain, in order to evaluate the uniqueness of French reactions to German remembrance.

SOURCES AND STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE

To measure French perceptions of Germany, I assess French statements (public and elite) as well as the reasoning in their statements. For public statements, I rely upon poll data and newspaper coverage. I use poll data published in French public opinion journals, as well as polls found in newspaper and magazine articles. Poll data is ample even in the early days after the war; because of the significance of the "German Question" to the French, many polls were conducted on this topic, and it is possible to check the plausibility of a given poll's results by comparing it to the results of other polls conducted by different organizations.

As for newspaper coverage, I rely upon French-language newspapers from across the political spectrum. Articles were found through electronic searches in French databases and Lexis-

Nexis in the United States, as well as from clippings files from the library of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris.

To measure elite statements, I relied upon four types of data. First, I relied upon secondary sources in French and in English. Second, I consulted scholarly articles by French academics. I searched all major French-language international relations journals, as well as journals related to Germany. Third, I conducted interviews with many French elites: mostly professors of international relations and analysts at French foreign policy think-tanks. Think tanks I visited included l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Maison Science d'Homme, L'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, and the Centre d'Etudes et des Recherches Internationales. Fourth, I relied upon documents from American archives and the writings of American decision-makers for insight into French perceptions. Heavy U.S. involvement in European foreign policy after the war meant that the United States held numerous meetings with French leaders in which the French were discussing their views of Germany.

EXPLAINING FRENCH PERCEPTION OF GERMAN INTENTIONS

This section tests the apology theory in the case of post-World War II France and Germany. Chapter Five coded German remembrance as *unapologetic* in the early period (reflecting amnesia and a focus on self-victimhood), and as *apologetic* since the 1960s. Chapter Five also coded alternate variables that influence perceptions of intentions: democracy, territorial claims, and institutional membership. Based on these codings, I can test predictions for the theories related to congruence and reasoning.

First, I conduct congruence tests for three variables that predict improvement in French perceptions of German intentions across the period (remembrance, democracy, institutions). As described in Chapter Five, the apology theory, democratic peace theory, and institutions theory all expect these factors to make German intentions appear more *benign* starting in the 1960s. Thus if French perceptions of German intentions are ever *malign* in the middle or late periods, this would be inconsistent with all three theories; these variables cannot be having much of an impact on

French perceptions. A finding of *uncertain* or *benign* intentions in the middle and late periods is consistent with all three theories and is thus inconclusive.

I also test the importance of territorial claims using congruence procedure. Chapter Five noted that this variable should make French perceptions of German intentions appear more *malign* in the early and middle periods. The resolution of the territorial issue in 1990 should make German intentions appear *benign* after that point. Thus, it would be inconsistent with this theory if I find that French perception of German intentions is (1) *benign* at any point between 1945-1990, or (2) *malign* after 1990. It would be consistent with the theory if I find that French perception of German intentions is (1) *malign* or *uncertain* between 1945-1990, or (2) *uncertain* or *benign* after 1990. However, as noted, these latter findings would be inconclusive for the theory because they are also consistent with the predictions of the three other variables mentioned above.

The theories also make predictions about the reasoning the French should employ as they discuss German intentions. According to the apology theory, in the early period, the French should say they doubt German intentions because of West Germany's amnesia and focus on self-victimhood. Later, they should say Germany's apologetic remembrance makes it appear more trustworthy. Similarly, the other theories (democratic peace, institutions, territorial claims) predict that their variable should weigh heavily in French discussions of German intentions.

French Perceptions of German Intentions

In this section I code French perceptions of German intentions over the post-World War II era, using data from French statements. I code French perceptions of German intentions as *malign* in the immediate postwar years; they improved starting in the late 1950s. I code French perception of German intentions as *uncertain* in the middle period, *uncertain* during negotiations over German unification (1990), and *benign* in the late period.

Early Period, 1945-50s

In the immediate years after the German defeat—after a four-year occupation by the German conqueror—French perceptions of German intentions were *malign*. In a 1950 poll that asked respondents to rank various nations in order of preference, “the French placed the English and then the Americans at top places in their sympathies; but the Germans came last, in a position of clear enmity—and, it should be pointed out, after the Russians. The recollections of evil had not been wiped out.”³ A 1951 poll reports that over 60% French viewed Germany with antipathy.⁴ In a 1953 survey, when asked to identify France’s enemy, 17% picked the Soviet Union, 16% picked Germany, and the rest were undecided.⁵ In a survey conducted in 1954, during the heat of a debate over German rearmament, responses of the French public reflected that “the Germans are regarded as deeply fond of war.”⁶ A 1956 poll showed that 66% of the public had “not much confidence” or “no confidence” in German intentions.⁷ Scholars comment that during the immediate postwar period, “the masses viewed Germany with unmitigated hostility.”⁸

Perceptions of German intentions among French elites were also malign. President Auriol told American officials that “the Germans were revengeful, nationalistic, and could not be trusted.”⁹ Premier Robert Schuman argued that Germany might be tempted toward “*revanche*” and “bellicose imperialism.”¹⁰ Politician Jacques Soustelle predicted that Germany would

³ Jean Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 74.

⁴ “L’Europe et l’Allemagne,” *Sondages* no. 1 (1951), 20-21.

⁵ Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” p. 88.

⁶ Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” p. 74. The author notes that attitudes of “the Anglo-Saxons” had softened markedly since the immediate postwar years; although British and American views were as bitter in the immediate postwar era, Americans and British later favored more tolerant policies in keeping the with need to contain the Soviet threat.

⁷ “Les relations avec les pays étrangers,” *Sondages* Vol. 18, no. 3 (1956).

⁸ Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory & Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 125.

⁹ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 552.

¹⁰ Quoted in Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), p. 41.

“inevitably become the most dynamic and dangerous force within the Western Union.”¹¹ The Speaker of the National Assembly, Edouard Herriot, said that France “was certain Germany desired to regain her former grandeur,” and “was not so sure the Federal Republic would respect her signed obligations.”¹² Paul Reynaud commented, “It is a nation that is never static, always in movement, always unsettled. The proponents of a ‘hale and hearty’ war, the militarists, the former Nazis will take the lead in the new independent Wehrmacht.”¹³ One French scholar writes, “It was understandable and inevitable that German aggression and brutality should produce a reaction of terror and repulsion towards Germany.”¹⁴ Thus French perceptions of German intentions among both the public and elites were *malign* in the early period.

Middle Period (1960s-80s)

French perception of German intentions improved markedly starting in the late 1950s. French scholar Alfred Grosser writes that whereas in 1944 the French view had been “no enemy but Germany,” by 1960 this had shifted to “no friend but Germany.”¹⁵ Scholars analyzing French public opinion note, “The anti-German attitude of the French public and elites immediately after World War II seems to have disappeared almost entirely. Public opinion polls... show a reversal of public attitudes on the suitability of Germany as an alliance partner.”¹⁶ In polls, the French began identifying Germany as a friend. In 1965 Germany received the most votes as “the best friend of

¹¹ Quoted in Alexander Werth, *France 1940-1955* (London: Robert Hale, 1956), p. 406.

¹² Quoted in Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 211.

¹³ *Journal Officiel*, 4478, quoted in Alfred Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds. *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 69.

¹⁴ Alfred Grosser, *The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament* Translated by Richard Rees (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 231.

¹⁵ Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy under De Gaulle* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 6.

¹⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study in Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 66.

France.”¹⁷ In 1983 Germany retained this position; 48% of respondents selected West Germany as one of France’s best friends.¹⁸ The French people also showed increasing support for German unification throughout this period. The percentage of people saying they supported German unification was 33% in 1960, rising to 62% in 1987.¹⁹

Like the general public, elite attitudes also improved. De Gaulle’s Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, writes, “The meeting at Colombey-les-deux-eglises marked the new departure of relations between Paris and Bonn.”²⁰ A later French ambassador commented, “The late fifties and early sixties were the turning point, when Adenauer first visited General de Gaulle in 1958, thus starting a process which led to the signature of the Elysée treaty in January 1963.”²¹ De Gaulle remarked that between 1958-1963, the bilateral meetings and efforts at reconciliation established relations between France and Germany “on foundations and in an atmosphere hitherto unknown in their history.”²²

Despite the remarkable improvement in French perceptions of German intentions, some uncertainty lingered. First, deep-seated ambivalence toward the Germans among the general public were occasionally revealed. For example, anti-German sentiment flared up in 1976 when German Chancellor Schmidt made a remark that many French perceived as offensive. This episode prompted *Le Monde*—after a full year of receiving outraged correspondence on the topic—to query

¹⁷ In 1965, 20% of French identified West Germany as “the best friend of France”; the next-highest countries were Britain (14%), the U.S. (12%), Belgium (11%), followed by several other countries. Poll by Institut Français d’Opinion Publique, published in *France Soir*, March 18, 1965.

¹⁸ 48% chose West Germany, 38% chose Belgium, 33% chose the United States, 16% chose Britain, 16% chose Italy, among other countries. Poll, “L’image comparée de la France et l’Allemagne de l’Ouest,” *Sofres* (May 1983), 1.

¹⁹ (*Sondages*, no. 3 (1960), p. 71) For the later poll see “La Reunification Allemande?” *Geopolitique* (1987), 6-9.

²⁰ Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une Politique Etrangere, 1958-1969* (Paris: Plon, 1971), p. 238.

²¹ Speech by François Bujon de l’Estang, French Ambassador to the United States, February 26, 1998, Berkeley, California.

²² Charles de Gaulle, Charles, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, Translated by Terence Kilmartin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), p. 181.

French scholars about why the French had lingering dislike of Germany. Scholars cited memories of the war and occupation, and fears of German militarism and Nazism, as explanations.²³

Second, in the middle period, elites retained some reservations about future German behavior. Opinion analysts note that French elites “tend to be more reserved, to qualify in a number of ways the Franco-German rapprochement...and to fear a revival of German strength.”²⁴ They comment that surveys of elites reflect “a latent fear of Germany.”²⁵ Other scholars note that views of Germany were more wary among “the Parisian *classe politique*.”²⁶ All in all, I argue that perceptions of German intentions among the French improved markedly compared to the earlier period, but remain *uncertain*.

French views of German intentions during the unification negotiations in 1990 were also *uncertain*. The French public generally approved of unification (more so than elites). In November 1989 *Paris Match* reported that 61% of respondents said that German unification would be “a good thing for France,” and a similar result was found in a Figaro-Louis Harris poll that month (60%).²⁷ Two months later, in January 1990 the *Economist* also reported their own poll that 61% of French favored German unification.²⁸ Media coverage expressed more caution. One article commented, “Will German restraint persist? I don’t know.” Journalist Daniel Vernet wrote that “a nagging question from the Rhine to the Oder was: should one be afraid of Germany?”²⁹ Another article queried, “What role will Germany play from now on?”³⁰ Another article speculated, “it is not assured that [Germany’s cooperative spirit] will always persist; power easily engenders arrogance and the appetite for domination.”³¹

²³ “Ombres sur le Rhin,” *Le Monde*, December 13, 1978.

²⁴ Deutsch, et. al, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*, p. 67.

²⁵ Deutsch, et. al, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*.

²⁶ Markovits and Reich, *The German Predicament*.

²⁷ *Paris Match*, November 23, 1989; Figaro-Harris poll in *Le Figaro*, November 13, 1989.

²⁸ *Le Monde*, January 27, 1990, 34.

²⁹ Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, January 9, 1991.

³⁰ Jérôme Vaillant, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1990, 1-3.

³¹ Andre Fontaine, “Plus fort que Bismarck,” *Le Monde*, October 3, 1990.

Among elites, French perceptions of German intentions were very uncertain during unification negotiations. American negotiators commented that in conversations with the French, “it was made clear that all these politicians started from the preservation of the realities of the postwar period, including the existence of two German states. All of them will consider raising the question of the unity of Germany as extremely explosive.”³² Stephen Szabo notes that “The French were the most disoriented by changes which began with the opening of the Wall.”³³

Late Period (1990s-00s)

In the post-unification period, both the public and elites perceive that Germany has very *benign* intentions. Poll data reveals that Germany is considered one of the most loyal allies of France (receiving the highest number of votes at 56% of respondents).³⁴ In another poll, 61% called Germany “the principal ally of France.”³⁵ When asked “is France correct in fearing Germany?” 32% agreed, but 59% of respondents said no.³⁶ Elites view German intentions as very benign. One scholar comments, “we work together so closely that the idea of conflict between us is absolutely unthinkable.”³⁷ Another comments, “there is no deep antagonism between France and Germany, unlike that which is often seen between France and the UK.”³⁸ In sum, perceptions of German intentions in the late period are *benign*.

³² Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 88.

³³ Stephen F. Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 48. French President François Mitterrand viewed German unification as a frightening prospect. In her memoirs Margaret Thatcher writes, “[Mitterrand] was clearly irked by German attitudes and behaviour....The trouble was that in reality there was no force in Europe which could stop reunification from happening. He agreed with my analysis of the problems but said he was at a loss as to what we could do.” Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 797.

³⁴ Taken from a 1993 poll. This had risen since 1989 when 44% of respondents gave this answer for West Germany. Other results in the 1993 poll: USA at 42%, Belgium at 38%, Britain at 35%, and Switzerland at 22%. Source: *Le Monde*, January 23, 1993, 7.

³⁵ *L'Evenement du Jeudi*, no. 639 (30 January 1997), 446.

³⁶ 9% undecided. Source: *L'Evenement du Jeudi*, no. 639 (January 30, 1997), 446.

³⁷ Personal Interview, Centre d'Etudes et des Recherches Internationales (CERI), October 2002.

³⁸ Personal Interview, L'Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), October 2002.

In sum, this section has coded French perception of German intentions as *malign* in the immediate postwar period, improving to *uncertain* in the late 1950s, *uncertain* from 1960 to 1990, and *benign* in the post-unification years.

French Reasoning about German Intentions

Across the post-World War II period, French perceptions of German intentions were influenced by several different factors. Leaders most often discussed territorial claims and democracy. They also focused great deal on institutions, but in the early and middle periods, they talked about institutions as constraints on German power rather than as reflections of German intentions. (Thus evidence about intentions in those periods is presented in the second part of this chapter.) As for policies of remembrance, I find weak evidence that the French viewed this issue as indicative of German intentions.

Early Period (1945-1950s)

During the early postwar period, French perceptions of German intentions as *malign* were driven primarily by the vivid memory of the recent past, and by German territorial claims. During this period the French were deeply committed to democratization of West Germany, which they said was necessary before Germany could become a trustworthy neighbor. As for remembrance, the French viewed West Germany's candid history education as essential to prevent denial, and to further the goal of democratization (by eradicating hyper-nationalism). The issues of democratization and remembrance were thus linked in French minds. Apart from the realm of education, the French showed no interest in any other forms of German remembrance.

Territorial Claims

In the early postwar years, malign perceptions of German intentions were in large part driven by fears of German territorial claims. Germany claimed no part of French territory. But as scholar Raymond Aron writes, French leaders saw West Germany as a revisionist and thus potentially aggressive state both because it would seek reunification with East Germany, and because the new

Germany would want to reopen the question of its borders. “Germany, they said, is a claiming power and does not accept the present *status quo* in Europe. Today she claims reunification with the “Popular Democracy,” of East Germany, and tomorrow she will claim back the Eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse.”³⁹ General Charles de Gaulle said after World War II, “only one question will dominate Germany and Europe. Which of the two Reichs will seek unity?”⁴⁰

French perceptions of malign German intent due to its territorial claims were evident in the French National Assembly’s 1953 debate over whether France should ratify the European Defense Community (EDC).⁴¹ EDC opponents argued that Germany was a revisionist power that would entrap France and its other allies in a war against the Soviets as it sought to recover its lost territory. Alfred Grosser notes that French elites feared “that a rearmed Germany would attack the west tomorrow” and also that “she would one day involve the western nations in a world war for the recovery of her eastern territory.”⁴² Grosser notes that elites feared both the “old German danger” (German tendencies toward aggression), but in addition the “new German danger”: that “a rearmed Western Germany is apt to lead the West into war against the East to gain its reunification and to recover the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse.”⁴³ Defense Minister Jules Moch commented in negotiations with the United States that he “was not prepared to support a crusade for the recovery of Königsberg,’ which he was sure was ever German’s fondest wish.”⁴⁴ Robert Schuman had initially opposed the formation of a centralized West German state on these grounds,

³⁹ Raymond Aron, “Historical Sketch of the Great Debate,” in Lerner and Aron, eds., *France Defeats EDC*, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Pierre Maillard, *De Gaulle et L’Allemagne: Le Rêve Inachevé* (Paris: Plon, 1990), p. 89.

⁴¹ In French, CED. The EDC would consist of a 50-year treaty, with 20 divisions of 600-700,000 soldiers. It would include a “range of supranational institutions such as a European executive authority, ministerial council, parliamentary assembly, and court of justice, to be supplied and financed through a single common system and fund.” McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 138. West Germany would commit 12 divisions but would have no decision-making authority (i.e. no General Staff or Minister of Defense). For more detailed descriptions of the extensive negotiations over German rearmament and the EDC, see Aron and Lerner, *France Defeats EDC*, and Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

⁴² Grosser, *The Colossus Again*, p. 238.

⁴³ Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” p. 67.

⁴⁴ David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 92.

because “Any plan which resulted in establishing and authorizing a central power would present to Germany a temptation and to us a permanent and growing threat, first of *revanche* and then of bellicose imperialism.”⁴⁵ Politician Jacques Soustelle argued that “with her territorial ambitions and her attention and energies concentrated in Europe (since she had no overseas territories), [West Germany] would inevitably become the most dynamic and dangerous force within the Western Union.”⁴⁶ Thus during the early period, the French said German intentions were malign because of German territorial claims.

Democracy and Remembrance

After Germany’s surrender, the French were committed to democratizing West Germany as an essential step towards the creation of a stable peace. In French minds, authoritarianism was linked with German hyper-nationalism, and both of these had caused German aggression. Thus the French aimed to democratize Germany and to control German nationalism. Many French elites argued that Germans were, by national character, impossibly militaristic, and that efforts to reform them were doomed to fail.⁴⁷ However, French occupation authorities ultimately rejected this view.

The French effort to democratize West Germany, in company with British and American efforts in their respective zones, included reforming education in order to promote the spread of democratic ideas and to eradicate hyper-nationalism. One scholar wrote that French intervention in German education was necessary “because of the concerted aggression of Germany against humanity”; he noted that Germany is “culpable of having disintegrated the world and created there hell on earth.”⁴⁸ During the occupation French politician Jean Le Bail gave an impassioned speech for the need to control German nationalism.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Furniss, *France, Troubled Ally*, p. 41.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Werth, *France 1940-1955*, p. 706.

⁴⁷ On this debate see Raymond Schmittlein, “Briser les chaines de la jeunesse allemande,” *France-Illustration*, September 17, 1949, 18. Also see Roy F. Willis, *The French in Germany 1945-1949* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 93.

⁴⁸ Edouard Vermeil, “Les Allies Et La Rééducation Des Allemands,” in Helen Liddell, Edmond Vermeil and Bogdan Suchodolski, eds., *L’éducation De L’Allemagne Occupée* (Paris: Librairie Marcel Riviere et Cie, 1949), pp. 28.

We know that nationalistic and chauvinistic currents have a tendency to develop much more quickly in Germany than anywhere else. The present generation, which has seen the war and suffered from it, will be replaced by less cautious generations, that could become, if we do not keep watch, equally dangerous....⁴⁹

One scholar wrote, “there is agreement among the victorious Powers that the aim of educational policy in Occupied Germany is to change the outlook of the German people, to replace an aggressive, militarist, and undemocratic spirit by a co-operative, peace-loving, democratic outlook.”⁵⁰ A scholar noted that German education should be imbued “with a new spirit, oriented toward democratic ideas, and desirous of preparing the German generations to come for the integration of Germany within the European community.”⁵¹ French leaders at the time thus argued that “books and syllabus must be fundamentally revised, ‘not only from the angle of de-Nazification but also from all traces of an aggressive spirit.’”⁵² Another scholar notes that “Of the three Western allies it was the French who approached the ‘re-education’ issue with the greatest precision....policies were adopted somewhat in the spirit of a *mission civilisatrice*, designed in this case to awaken in the Germans a love of freedom and individualism as revealed in French cultural traditions.”⁵³ France’s extensive policy of introducing French and foreign textbooks into German schools was admired by authorities in the other zones.⁵⁴ The French also initiated through UNESCO joint history textbook commissions with German historians and educators, with the goal of developing a historical narrative both nations would agree upon.

The French viewed the successful democratization of Germany and the eradication of hyper-nationalism there as inherently linked to candid German remembrance of its past violence.

⁴⁹ *Journal Officiel*, 6745, quoted in Grosser 1957, 70.

⁵⁰ Helen Liddell, “Introduction,” in Liddell, Vermeil and Suchodolski, eds., *Education in Occupied Germany*.

⁵¹ Vermeil, “Notes Sur La Rééducation En Zone Française,” in Liddell, Vermeil and Suchodolski, eds., *L’education De L’allemagne Occupée*, p. 58.

⁵² Helen Liddell, quoting 1947 manuscript by Marek St-Korowicz, “Le Probleme du desarmement moral de l’Allemagne.” Liddell, “Introduction,” in Liddell, Vermeil and Suchodolski, eds., *Education in Occupied Germany*. St-Korowicz noted, “All textbooks must be revised and all allusions to war or glory, all biographies of ‘men of the sword and of conquest’ must be removed as well as all tendentious references to revisionism.”

⁵³ Arthur Hearnden, *Education in the Two Germanies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 37.

⁵⁴ Willis, *The French in Germany*, p. 169.

Alfred Grosser writes, “From the earliest days of the new German democracy, foreigners and Germans alike evaluated that democracy according to the manner in which it interpreted the Nazi past and came to terms with it.”⁵⁵ Jean Solchany agrees: “Critical reflection about...the heavy burden of the Nazi past participated in the democratic consciousness of postwar Germany.”⁵⁶ Similarly, Edouard Husson writes, “Democracy could only be implanted into Germany by the grace of an immense effort to surmount the German past.”⁵⁷ Grosser notes the importance that, from the beginning, West Germany had accepted responsibility for the terrible Nazi legacy. He notes,

The new state, [Adenauer] decided, must accept responsibility for Germany’s appalling heritage in order to be once again respected among nations and recognized as the true successor as the undivided Reich. Reference to the past was not, of course, the only means of achieving this end: the American alignment, for instance, enabled West Germany to obtain certificates of internal democracy and international good behavior. But acceptance of civil liability for Germany’s former commitments and crimes represented a more basic choice than any other.⁵⁸

Grosser notes that “The decisive year in this regard was 1952,” when the FRG settled the issue of the Third Reich’s external debt, and then signed the Luxembourg Agreement with Israel that included reparations.⁵⁹ In sum, the French viewed West German democratization as essential, and they saw West German admission of Nazi crimes as necessary to support democracy.

Middle Period (1960s-80s)

French perceptions of German intentions as *uncertain* during this period were driven by continued concerns about German territorial revisionism. As for policies of remembrance, leaders were not

⁵⁵ Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, Translated by Paul Stephenson (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 210.

⁵⁶ Jean Solchany, *Comprendre Le Nazisme Dans L'Allemagne Des Anées Zero 1945-1949* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), xiii. This and other translations by the author.

⁵⁷ Edouard Husson, *Une Culpabilité Ordinaire? Hitler, les Allemands, et La Shoah* (Paris, François-Xavier de Guibert, 1997), 13. Note that this view directly contradicts the beliefs of West German conservatives, who predicted that excessive focus on past crimes would have a backlash effect that would destabilize German democracy, and ultimately would be its downfall. See Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

⁵⁸ Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 301.

⁵⁹ Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 301.

discussing this issue. However I find evidence that French scholars and the media were tracking German remembrance, and linked it to perceptions of German intentions. In this period the French continued to link remembrance to the health of West German democracy.

Territorial Claims

During the middle period, French concerns about possible German territorial revisionism were evident at summit meetings. At the meeting of de Gaulle and Adenauer at Colombey in 1958, de Gaulle pressed Adenauer to renounce territorial claims. De Gaulle wrote in his memoirs,

On the all-important question of Germany's future, my mind was made up. First of all, I believed that it would be unjust and dangerous to revise the de facto frontiers which the war had imposed on her. This meant that the Oder-Neisse line which separates her from Poland should remain her definitive boundary, that nothing should remain of her former claims in respect of Czechoslovakia, and that a new Anschluss in whatever form must be precluded.⁶⁰

De Gaulle “declared that Germany must accept its territorial losses from World War II, and not ‘reopen the question of [its] present frontiers to the west, the east, the north, and south.’”⁶¹ De Gaulle noted from his discussions with Adenauer that West Germany had no intentions of reclaiming its prewar borders. He commented, “Devoted as [Adenauer] was to his country he did not intend to make frontier revision the present and principal aim of his policy, knowing full well that to raise the matter would produce nothing but redoubled alarm and fury from Russia and Poland and reproachful anxiety in the West.”⁶²

The French also feared a German bid for unification. At Colombey, the French president demanded of Adenauer, “unremitting patience as regards unification.”⁶³ De Gaulle noted that Adenauer “agreed that, although [unification] was a goal which Germany would never relinquish, no time limit should be set for its achievement.”⁶⁴ Adenauer’s willingness to accept these demands

⁶⁰ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 173.

⁶¹ Jeffrey Glen Giaque writes that de Gaulle’s ultimatum “went directly against Bonn’s long-held position that nothing in the outcome of the war could be considered permanent until Germany was reunified and a formal peace settlement was signed.” The West Germans were furious at de Gaulle’s demand but muted their criticism in the interest of maintaining good relations with Paris. Giaque 2002, 89

⁶² de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 176.

⁶³ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 176.

⁶⁴ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 177.

contributed to increasingly benign views of German intentions. However, “behind the Franco-German façade of brotherhood always continued to lurk the traditional French sensibility to *les incertitudes allemandes* (in the sense that Germany might be tempted to sacrifice its western orientation for unification).”⁶⁵ One scholar notes that “still as of 1969, she had not clearly accepted the territorial repercussions” of the war, and that Germany was “*the* European problem.”⁶⁶ Thus the French remained concerned about German territorial revisionism into the middle period, and German assurances improved French perceptions of Germany at this time.

Remembrance

In this period, there is some reasoning evidence in support of the apology theory. French leaders did not talk about this issue amongst themselves when talking about Germany; nor did the blunt and loquacious de Gaulle mention this issue in conversations with Konrad Adenauer. In the 1960s and 70s, landmark German apologies received little or no attention in the French media. Later the French media did begin to discuss German remembrance such as the famous 1985 speech by Richard von Weizsäcker.⁶⁷ Thus German remembrance was not a prominent issue in the minds of French leaders during this period.

On the other hand, French scholar Alfred Grosser argues that the Federal Republic’s policies of remembrance served as an important confidence-building measure. Grosser participated in the Franco-German youth efforts established in the 1963 Elysée Treaty. He said, “At the first youth meetings I explained to Germans what had been done. The fact that they know what they did

⁶⁵ Van Ham 1999, 4

⁶⁶ Jacques Vernant, “Le Général de Gaulle et la politique extérieure,” *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 35, No. 6 (1970), p. 627.

⁶⁷ Noting Von Weizsäcker’s apology is Daniel Vernet, “Le scandale Jenninger en RFA L’ombre portée du nazisme,” *Le Monde*, November 14, 1988. For later articles that discuss the importance of his speech see Jean-Marc Gonin, “Allemagne: l’héritage du président,” *L’Express*, May 19, 1994, 74; Lorraine Millot, *Libération*, May 6, 1995. After Willy Brandt’s famous gesture at Warsaw, French Foreign Minister François Seydoux commented: “Brandt infused sentiment into the policy he was pursuing. Kneeling with famous humility before the victims of the Nazis, he gave a burst of generosity. It showed him to be a statesman, for whom the misery and unfairness of war caused repulsion.” François Seydoux, *Dans L’intimité Franco-Allemande: Une Mission Diplomatique* (Paris: Editions Albatros, 1977), p. 166.

was the key to advancement of our relationship.”⁶⁸ As for German history education, Grosser noted that the FRG was slow to begin examining its past, but he praises West German policies of remembrance.

[C]ertainly the mention of Nazi atrocities in schoolbooks and elsewhere was a necessary sign of democratization and moral rehabilitation of postwar Germany; and it was right that men and women who had been adults in 1933 or even in 1945 should be reminded again and again of what the Nazi regime, which they had cheered so loudly, had meant to other nations, and to those Germans who opposed Hitler...It is right, too, that the great majority of people in Germany today who were children or still unborn in 1945 should know what their country meant to other countries at a recent period of its history.⁶⁹

Grosser wrote that West German legal trials of the 1960s not only served to bring Nazi perpetrators to justice, but also educated the West German public about Germany’s past aggression and atrocities, fostering benign domestic political conditions by 1970.⁷⁰ He noted that in the FRG, “the extreme right, which barely conceals its admiration for the past, is of negligible importance: there are tiny groups and publications without number, but they have no real influence.”⁷¹ Thus West Germany’s acceptance of the past, and its policies of remembrance, did not go unnoticed in France.

The French discussed the evolution in German memory during the 1980s—Kohl’s “grace of late birth” statement, the Bitburg Cemetery commemoration, the *Historikerstreit*—and noted a trend toward less apologetic remembrance. In reaction to the “grace of late birth” statement, one article noted, “Helmut Kohl became the spokesperson of a German generation that a line should be drawn under the past for once and all.”⁷² Another article criticized Kohl, saying he was “the man who visited the tombs of SS soldiers in Bitburg,” and the man who “tolerates by his side Hans Klein, an admirer of the Waffen SS and author of antisemitic gaffes.”⁷³ Another article argued, “It

⁶⁸ Personal Interview, October 2002.

⁶⁹ Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 212-23.

⁷⁰ Grosser wrote that “the nature and extent of the atrocities committed had been once again brought into the public view as a result of spectacular trials, particularly that at Frankfurt....The quality press gave the trial much publicity, with the result that many young Germans came to understand more fully what Auschwitz stood for.” Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 218.

⁷¹ Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, p. 222.

⁷² (In French, “grâce de naissance tardive.”) Luc Rosenzweig, *Le Monde*, January 22, 1987.

⁷³ Luc Rosenzweig, *Le Monde*, October 5, 1990.

is necessary to condemn...the Germans who with Chancellor Kohl in 1985 at the Bitburg Cemetery.”⁷⁴ After the Philip Jenninger speech, one article noted that Jenninger’s gaffe was “a scandal of international dimensions that damaged the reputation of his country.”⁷⁵ Daniel Vernet wrote, “The recent Historian’s dispute proves that it is very difficult for Germans to not shift between two extremes.” He noted, the revisionist historians “want to some extent to minimize Germany’s responsibility.”⁷⁶ Some articles pointedly said the trends in German remembrance did not bode well for Germany’s future behavior. One article notes, “one can...be worried about this impatience [to forget] that manifests itself in contemporary German society.”⁷⁷ Another article commented on the *Historikerstreit*,

It would be too easy to...see these historians as Nazis who gauged that finally the moment had come to show their true selves. No, real questions need to be posed...Patriotism is for them a right, a responsibility—but what kind of patriotism is it? How are relations between German generations, and how are each of them in touch with the Nazi past?⁷⁸

Thus, the French discussed the evolution in German remembrance in the 1980s, and some French observers expressed worries about what it implied for future German behavior.

Other French scholars and journalists who observed German remembrance of the 1980s took positive lessons from the controversies. Many French argued that they proved that West German democracy was robust, and that the majority in Germany was committed to defending candid remembrance. One article, though very critical of West German revisionist historians in the *Historikerstreit*, pointed out the efforts of German youths who were engaged in researching the Nazi past in their neighborhoods and towns. It noted that they were “refusing the banalization of history,” and overall concluded that “frank explanation of your own history is a mark of vibrant democracy.”⁷⁹ A scholar also noted that the *Historikerstreit* reflected “an exceptional civic and

⁷⁴ Jean Lesieur, “D’Auschwitz à Hiroshima,” *L’Express*, February 2, 1995, 57.

⁷⁵ *Le Monde*, November 12, 1988. Also see Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, November 14, 1988.

⁷⁶ Daniel Vernet, “Le scandale Jenninger en RFA L’ombre portée du nazisme,” *Le Monde*, November 14, 1988.

⁷⁷ Luc Rosenzweig, *Le Monde*, January 22, 1987.

⁷⁸ Jean-Jacques Guinchard, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1987.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

pedagogical pugnacity—a new collective reflection, orchestrated by the free media, about the nature of Nazism, and the place of those twelve tragic years within the political life of the outer-Rhine. In this sense, this debate is the pride of the democracy of Bonn.”⁸⁰ An article noted that Kohl’s “grace of late birth” statement had “sickened a large part of the German intellectual milieu who dreaded the return of a revanchist right.”⁸¹ Kohl was a complex figure when it came to remembrance; he can be remembered for many important acts of contrition as well as some less contrite policies and statements. This complexity was not lost on the French, many of whom viewed Kohl positively in this regard. One scholar praised Kohl for urging West Germans “to guard the memory of the German past,” and noted that the Chancellor “conveyed an obligation for every German to assume the responsibilities of their history.”⁸² In French media coverage of Bitburg, Ronald Reagan, not Kohl, bore the brunt of French criticism.⁸³ Thus many French took positive lessons from the controversies of the 1980s.

In sum, territorial claims and German democracy were prominent in French reasoning about German intentions during the middle period. I find some evidence for the influence of German policies of remembrance on French perceptions of Germany. French leaders did not focus on remembrance as they discussed Germany, even with German leaders. However, the French media monitored the evolution in German remembrance during the 1980s. Some observers argued that it had worrisome implications for German intentions; others viewed it as a reassuring sign of robust West German democracy.

Unification (1990)

French perceptions of German intentions were highly *uncertain* during the process of unification. In discussions about German unification, French leaders did not talk about German

⁸⁰ Joseph Rovin, *Le Monde*, March 25, 1988.

⁸¹ Henri de Bresson, *Le Monde*, May 24, 1994.

⁸² Véronique Charléty, “Fragment du memoire,” *Politix* no. 33 (1996), p. 139.

⁸³ See *Le Monde*, April 18, 1985. The article criticized the U.S. president, saying that “there is no justification for allowing reconciliation...to grow stronger on the scattered ashes of forgetfulness.”

remembrance.⁸⁴ As they evaluated German intentions, the French discussed German territorial claims, institutional membership, and democracy.

Territorial Claims

The French were uncertain about German intentions during this period because of lingering German territorial claims.⁸⁵ Faced with domestic political constraints, Kohl had been vague about accepting Germany's current borders.⁸⁶ In a February 1990 meeting, Mitterrand told Kohl, "We are building in Europe institutions that are going to attenuate the definition of borders. But it is necessary to settle the problems of borders beforehand."⁸⁷ In response, Kohl protested, saying that this would "reinforce the extreme right" in his country. Mitterrand insisted, "there is a problem of European equilibrium" concerning "the problem of the eastern border"; he said that the treaties of 1919 and 1945 are very unjust, but one lives with them. It is very important not to reopen a collective frenzy in Europe." After Kohl gave a press conference on March 1, in which he sidestepped the border question, Mitterrand was "furious with Kohl's behavior" and told an aide "to ask Germany to clarify its position unambiguously."⁸⁸ One newspaper article questioned, "What kind of a game is Chancellor Kohl playing with the German-Polish border?"⁸⁹ Mitterrand told Bush: "The FRG should be very clear on the problem of borders."⁹⁰ The French president

⁸⁴ U.S. President Bush noted with approval German efforts to come to terms with its past. He wrote, "I was, of course, mindful of Germany's history of aggression, but I knew the country had done a lot to live down its Nazi past, to compensate for the horrors it had inflicted on Jews and others across Europe. I felt that the Germans had made amends and that they hated the brutal chapters in their past just as much as the rest of Europe did." George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. 187.

⁸⁵ Glenn Frankel, "France Presses Kohl on Border Pact," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1990; Ian Davidson, "Old European Ghosts Return to Haunt Germany," *Financial Times*, March 22, 1990; Thomas L. Friedman, "Evolution in Europe; 2 Germanys Vow to Retain Border with the Poles," *New York Times*, July 18, 1990. For previous controversies about the border issue see Susan J. Smith, "Soviet Bloc Storm over Interior Minister's Remarks," *Associated Press*, February 2, 1983.

⁸⁶ The large population of ethnic Germans who had been expelled from Eastern Europe and settled in West Germany after the war was a powerful force in the CDU and particularly the CSU.

⁸⁷ Transcribed in Jacques Attali, *Verbatim*, Vol. III (Paris: Fayard, 1995), p. 424. On this point also see Baun, "The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics," p. 615.

⁸⁸ Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 436.

⁸⁹ Claire Trean, "La controverse sur la frontiere germano-polognaise," *Le Monde*, March 3, 1990.

⁹⁰ Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 377.

was hostile to unification until the territorial issue was settled; it was only after “the settlement of the Polish border issue that the French President turned toward a more constructive policy” toward German unification.⁹¹

Institutions

French perceptions of German intentions were also uncertain in 1990 because of fears that West Germany would abandon European institutions. The French feared unified Germany would pull out of NATO or from the EEC. One article comments, “All efforts should be made to maintain with unified Germany the historic miracle that was the ‘marriage’—concluded by Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Adenauer and confirmed by de Gaulle, Schmidt, François Mitterrand, and Kohl—between the two hereditary enemies. With the growing intimacy of common links, national rivalries will become anachronistic.”⁹² Another article comments, “Will [German] restraint persist? I don’t know. But for the moment the commitment of Germany to European construction can be taken in good faith.”⁹³

In negotiations, French elites demanded that Kohl make clear commitments to maintain and deepen German institutional membership. Jacques Delors wondered whether the Germans “are really interested in economic and military union”; he called for “clear political commitments without ambiguity.”⁹⁴ Delors argued in 1989 that European federalism was “the only satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question,” and in January 1990 called for the acceleration of the political unification of Europe.⁹⁵ Stanley Hoffman writes that French policy during negotiations “aimed at ‘smoking out’ Bonn, at probing and prodding in order to find out whether the constraints of NATO and, above all, the EC, were still acceptable to the Federal Republic, and

⁹¹ Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification*, p. 50. On Mitterrand’s stance on the border question see FBIS Western Europe, June 15, 1990; April 24, 1990.

⁹² Andre Fontaine, “Plus fort que Bismarck,” *Le Monde*, October 3, 1990.

⁹³ “L’Allemagne au Singulier,” *Le Monde*, October 12, 1990.

⁹⁴ Quoted in Fontaine, “Plus fort que Bismarck,” *Le Monde*, October 3, 1990.

⁹⁵ *The Economist*, October 21, 1989, p. 50.

indeed whether Chancellor Kohl was willing to tighten the bonds to the community....”⁹⁶ One scholar argued, “François Mitterrand’s entire European policy can be explained by one simple motive: the obsessive fear of German power.”⁹⁷

Mitterrand’s concerns about German institutional membership were reflected in his meeting with foreign leaders. Former U.S. President Bush writes that at a meeting in Kennebunkport, “François did emphasize that what happened in Germany must be linked with NATO and the EC... ‘Otherwise,’ [Mitterrand] warned, ‘we will be back in 1913 and we could lose everything.’”⁹⁸ In a meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on December 6, 1989, the French president similarly commented, “I don’t want to return to Europe in 1913.... We have to make progress with the construction of the European community, so that the German problem will be minimized.”⁹⁹ Mitterrand said that France is very friendly with Germany and has signed numerous treaties. However, he said:

I have a responsibility regarding the equilibrium of Europe and peace. I don’t want to hurt the Germans, but I told them that the German problem can only be raised after there is resolution on other questions—in the west, the European community.¹⁰⁰

In diplomacy with the West Germans, Mitterrand also emphasized that German unification could only occur in concert with the further deepening of European institutions. In an EC summit in Strasbourg in December 1989, the French demanded that the West Germans stop vacillating about European monetary union. At the summit the Germans accepted the French demand to set a date for an EMU conference in 1990, in exchange for “a postsummit statement endorsing the idea of a single European state, as long as unification took place within the context of broader European integration.”¹⁰¹ Mitterrand commented that this through this compromise, the danger of “a

⁹⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, “French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe,” in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffman, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 135.

⁹⁷ Edouard Husson, *L’Europe contre l’amitié franco-allemande* (Paris, François-Xavier de Guibert, 1998), 36.

⁹⁸ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p. 201.

⁹⁹ Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 364.

¹⁰⁰ Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 364.

¹⁰¹ Michael J. Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Winter 1995/96), p. 613.

rupture” in Franco-German relations “was avoided.”¹⁰² In bilateral diplomacy, Mitterrand’s emphasis on German institutional membership was also clear. Mitterrand said bluntly to West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: “German unity will be undertaken after European unity, or you will find against you a triple alliance (France, Britain, and Russia), and that will end in war. If German unity is enacted after European unity, we can help you.”¹⁰³ Thus during debates over German unification, the French were uncertain about German intentions because of uncertainty about German institutional membership.

Democracy

During unification debates, the French frequently compared present-day Germany to Weimar Germany. The French expressed the view that today’s German democracy was much more stable, and thus durable, than Weimar. One article commented, “[Germany] is a state of democratic rights... which distinguishes it fundamentally from other united German states in history from 1870 to 1945.”¹⁰⁴ Another article commented that the FRG was superior to the Weimar republic in two ways, which would make it more stable: a strong economy and an effective democratic government.¹⁰⁵ Former Foreign Minister Couve de Murville commented, “the FRG is a state obviously democratic and highly civilized, a member of the Western world that is dedicated to liberty; a country who lives with the esteem and friendship of her neighbors.” He noted that in contrast to Weimar, “In the FRG, the Germans [gave] themselves a truly and solidly democratic regime for the first time in their history.”¹⁰⁶ In sum, French perception of German intentions during the unification debates focused on the issues of territorial claims, institutional membership, and democracy in debates over unification. There is no evidence that French leaders were talking about German policies of remembrance.

¹⁰² Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics,” pp. 613-14.

¹⁰³ Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 364.

¹⁰⁴ Jérôme Vaillant, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Oct 1990, 1-3.

¹⁰⁵ Maurice Duverger, “Allemagne—Une Seconde République de Weimar?” *Le Monde*, September 11, 1990.

¹⁰⁶ Maurice Couve de Murville, *Le Monde En Face* (Paris: Plon, 1989), p. 48.

Late Period (1990s-2000)

French perceptions of German intentions during the post-unification period are extremely benign. As they discuss Germany, the French emphasize German institutional membership, democracy, and German remembrance as signals of benign German intentions.

Institutions

First, the French say that they do not fear Germany because of its continued participation in European institutions. In 1990 Mitterrand and Kohl said in a joint statement, “we consider necessary to accelerate the political construction of the Europe of the Twelve. We think that this is the right moment to transform the whole of the relationships among the member States into a European Union and to endow it of the necessary means of action.”¹⁰⁷ An article noted that as Germany reunified, “Germany’s leaders resolutely chose Europe.”¹⁰⁸ A scholar writes that at the time of unification, “The position of the West German leaders was perfectly clear. The fundamentals of German foreign policy since Chancellor Konrad Adenauer remained indisputably the integration of the Federal Republic within the western community.”¹⁰⁹ An analyst said, “Germany’s pro-Europe stance has been key in making it look unthreatening to France.”¹¹⁰ Commenting that “the EU has changed everything,” another scholar comments that “No one can think of a military conflict between France and Germany.”¹¹¹ One journalist argued that Germany “recovered her sovereignty and was reconstituted as a nation-state when...she consented to important transfers of sovereignty within the European Economic Community.”¹¹² Germany’s

¹⁰⁷ The Treaty on European Union was negotiated at Maastricht in 1991 and came into force a year later. Source: <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/acta.htm>

¹⁰⁸ Bernard Bosson, *Le Monde*, September 11, 1990.

¹⁰⁹ Stephan Martens, “Le Traité 2+4: L’anti-Versailles ou l’intelligence multilatérale,” *Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui*, no. 146 (October-December 1998), 286-307; quote p. 290.

¹¹⁰ Personal Interview 5, IFRI, October 2002.

¹¹¹ Personal Interview, Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), October 2002. Asserting that French acceptance of German unification was largely contingent on Germany’s acceptance of continued European integration, the scholar notes, “Imagine the shock of German unification without the EU.”

¹¹² Jérôme Vaillant, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1990.

willingness to remain within European institutions made French observers view its intentions as *benign* in the late period.

Democracy

In the late period, French perception of Germany's benign intentions also has much to do with German democracy. Daniel Vernet writes, "Germany is reunified...it has democratic institutions that have proven themselves by weathering political and economic crises." Vernet notes that democratic Germany is "impervious to any expansionist impulses."¹¹³ Another article argues, "[France] knows Germany is resolutely pacifist and has established a tried and true democratic system."¹¹⁴ A scholar notes, "it's clear that Germany has changed a great deal—it's a democratic nation that we can work with. It suffered a terrible defeat, and was totally destroyed. The German people won't forget that."¹¹⁵ German political culture, as well as political institutions, are also seen as reassuring. One scholar notes, "German pacifism reassures us: we really think they are peace lovers. This was evident with the debates in West Germany over the stationing of nuclear weapons there. The influence of the Greens is also an example of this."¹¹⁶ Thus the French say they trust German intentions because Germany is a strong democracy with a pacifist political culture.

Remembrance

In the late period, there is weak evidence for the importance of German remembrance in French perceptions of German intentions. In interviews, when asked about what reassures them about Germany, foreign affairs scholars and officials never once raised the issue of remembrance; they focused overwhelmingly on other factors. French leaders also do not discuss German remembrance. On the other hand, scholars and journalists write do about this issue, and sometimes link German remembrance to German intentions.

¹¹³ Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, December 9, 2000.

¹¹⁴ Gilles Martinet, "Europe faut-il avoir peur de l'Allemagne?" *Le Monde*, January 15, 1992.

¹¹⁵ Personal Interview 2, IFRI, October 2002.

¹¹⁶ Personal Interview, CERI, October 2002.

First, the French media and scholarly community monitors trends in German remembrance. An article notes that “a half-century after the end of the war, Germany is seized by a fever of commemoration.”¹¹⁷ Several articles list the numerous commemorative activities pursued by the Germans after unification: one comments on “the Jewish museum...the exposition of the crimes of the *Wehrmacht*, along with the construction of the museum of the ‘Topography of Terror’... [and] the memorial of the Holocaust.”¹¹⁸ Another comments, “Along with their willingness to pay reparations, Germany has opened an important Jewish museum in Berlin and has launched at the same time a vast debate centering on the monument dedicated to the Shoah.”¹¹⁹ The French monitored with puzzled interest Germany’s effusive welcome of American scholar Daniel Jonah Goldhagen.¹²⁰ The French media also reported on the “Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*” museum exhibition in Berlin.¹²¹ One scholar writes, “All in all, one will make the case for the utility of the [Wehrmacht] exhibition and for the Goldhagen debate, which bear witness to the incessant progress of the critical examination of the past within democratic Germany. Contrary to those who might have thought, the end of the Cold War signified the intensification of studies about the Third Reich.”¹²²

Second, the French express great praise for German remembrance. One article argues, “The manner in which Germany assumes culpability of its Nazi past and the Holocaust could be

¹¹⁷ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1995.

¹¹⁸ Lorraine Millot, *Libération*, January 28, 2002.

¹¹⁹ Maurice-Ruben Hayoun, *Le Figaro*, January 25, 2003.

¹²⁰ Daniel Vernet, “L’Allemagne, Le Pen, la Shoah...” *Le Monde*, September 28, 1996; Henry Rousso, “De Nuremberg à Goldhagen,” *L’Express*, no. 2376, January 16, 1997; Alain-Gérard Slama, “Les Allemands et la Shoah,” *Le Point*, no. 1271, January 25, 1997; Pascal Thibaut, *La Croix*, April 7, 1997; Eric Roussel, “L’honneur perdu de la Wehrmacht,” *Le Figaro*, March 4, 1999; Olivier Vieviorka, “Wehrmacht=SS,” *Libération*, March 25, 1999; Alfred Grosser, “La mémoire et le pardon,” *La Croix*, October 6, 1999; Alfred Grosser, “Allemagne: Goldhagen et la vérité,” *L’Express*, October 14, 1999. Also see Edouard Husson, “Hitler, Les Allemands, et La Shoah,” *Revue d’Allemagne*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan-March 1997), pp. 83-106; Marcel Tambarin, “Nous sommes tous des victimes de l’Holocauste,” *Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui*, no. 159 (Jan-March 2002), pp. 57-74.

¹²¹ Bernard Henri Levy, “Les Damnés et les autres,” *Le Monde*, February 8, 1999; Eric Roussel, “L’honneur perdu de la Wehrmacht,” *Le Figaro*, March 4, 1999; Olivier Vieviorka, “Wehrmacht=SS,” *Libération*, March 25, 1999; Lorraine Millot, “A Berlin, dits et non-dits de l’Holocauste,” *Libération*, January 28, 2002.

¹²² Edouard Husson, “Les Allemands et l’Holocauste.” *Documents*, no. 3 (1997), pp. 5-14. Quote on p. 14.

the most positive chapter of its history.”¹²³ Another article notes, “Germany “has not hesitated to look with courage at her Nazi past.”¹²⁴ Another article praises Germany’s “positive national conscience,” saying “only a country at ease with itself and self-confident is reliable and credible.”¹²⁵ The French note that such contrition is extremely rare in the world, and praise Germany for having the courage to pursue it. Alfred Grosser writes, “the culture of negative memory is particular to Germany. Successive generations have examined the criminal past with an intensity that doesn’t exist elsewhere.”¹²⁶ One article notes that Germany was “the only of the former Axis countries to come to terms with its past.”¹²⁷ Anne-Marie LeGloannec comments, “It’s very positive how Germany has dealt with its history; they haven’t always dealt with it well, but they’ve constantly dealt with it. It’s the one country in the world that has done a good job of this.”¹²⁸ One scholar argues, “We look at German repentance and realize that it’s a very useful process.”¹²⁹

Third, in their reasoning the French sometimes link German contrition to benign German intentions. One scholar argues that “with the fear of seeing the resurgence of Germany’s old demons, the pressure mounted for the reunified German state to assume, in visible fashion, its historical culpability to the world.”¹³⁰ She argues that Germany is “a country that—at the moment of reformulating its national identity—erects a monument at the center of its capital to the memory of the most heinous crime in its history: an enterprise without precedent that is taking place under the vigilant watch of world opinion.”¹³¹ Another article comments, “Unification gave rise to the

¹²³ Lorraine Millot, *Libération*, January 28, 2002.

¹²⁴ “Allemagne: Jubilé réussi,” *Les Echos*, May 25, 1999.

¹²⁵ Stephan Martens, “Allemagne: Les paradoxes de la ‘normalisation,’” *Le Figaro*, July 6, 2002.

¹²⁶ Alfred Grosser, “Passés Allemands,” *La Croix*, November 17, 1999.

¹²⁷ Marc Semo, *Libération*, September 26, 1998.

¹²⁸ Personal Interview, Centre Marc Bloch, October 2002.

¹²⁹ Personal Interview, IFRI 2, October 2002.

¹³⁰ Irène Kruse, “Le Mémorial De L’Holocaust de Berlin,” *Vingtième Siecle* Vol. 67 (2000), p. 25.

¹³¹ Kruse, “Le Mémorial De L’Holocaust de Berlin,” p. 32.

fear of one dominant Germany (economically if not politically) within Europe.” But “educated in the lessons of the past...the Germans reveal astonishing restraint in their international affairs.”¹³² Another scholar compares German remembrance and its political effects with the situation in Japan. She notes that German contrition “makes relations between France and Germany much easier. There’s nothing standing in our way. With Japan, it’s clear that the past is an obstacle.”¹³³ In sum, the French monitor German remembrance; they praise German contrition and sometimes say it reflects Germany’s benign intentions.

The French also comment upon incidents in which Germans seem to be moving away from apologetic remembrance, and express worries about a possible trend. First, Daniel Vernet notes the recent popularity of research and literature that focuses on German suffering during the war; he comments, “this seems to be the hour in which Germans rediscover themselves as victims, as if the period of mourning and contrition were over.” Vernet comments, “The risk is that the Germans would abandon self-flagellation to fall into self-pity, to feel sorry for themselves and for the fate reserved for them.”¹³⁴

Second, some French observers commented unfavorably on the accession of the new German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. After Schröder declined to attend commemoration ceremonies with Jacques Chirac in 1998, the French saw him as less committed to German contrition.¹³⁵ An article speculated, “Has Schröder the nationalist succeeded Kohl the European?”¹³⁶ One scholar wrote, “Will the end of German partition and the accession of the ‘Republic of Berlin’ under the new Chancellor Gerhard Schröder coincide with the end of the culpability caused by the genocide of the Jews?”¹³⁷ Another scholar commented, “We were

¹³² Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, January 9, 1991.

¹³³ Personal Interview, Centre Marc Bloch, October 2002.

¹³⁴ Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, January 16, 2003.

¹³⁵ Schröder had been invited to a commemoration of the World War II armistice. But he declined, commenting, “We have to remember the past so the bad things will not be repeated, but it is also a mistake to live in the past.” Source: BBC Special Report, November 4, 1998, electronic version.

¹³⁶ CITE

¹³⁷ Nicholas Weill, “La Culpabilité Allemande, Entre Mythe Et Réalités.” *La Revue internationale et stratégique* Vol. 33, p. 70.

concerned when Schröder succeeded Kohl; he is less concerned about the past. He doesn't think he needs to be constrained by Germany's past." The scholar noted that "as a result there was a revival of concern about Germany, that it would behave badly in the future. Not through the use of military force, but in attempts to dominate through their influence."¹³⁸

Third, the French media provided extensive coverage of the debate sparked by the comments of German novelist Martin Walser. Articles expressed concerns about the implications of the debate, wondering if Walser's comments represented the beginning of a new Germany: one less apt to remember its past, and more likely to assert itself.¹³⁹ An article noted that Walser's brief comments were "enough to discover the fragility of that which would appear more solid within the conscience of the former West Germany: the consensus over the relationship to the Nazi past."¹⁴⁰ The article notes that "the current polemic... goes well beyond a simple German debate." It commented that debate is focused on the more complex issue of "how to define the German identity?"¹⁴¹ French scholar Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, speaking about the Walser controversy, observed that "For a long time, Europe was a substitute identity" for the Germans, and that "this is less the case today. One can fear that this spirit may find expression in a German retreat."¹⁴² Another scholar comments that the Walser debate

provides evidence of the appearance of fissures within the façade of normality claimed by reunified Germany, and raises some fundamental questions, over the form and the place of

¹³⁸ Personal Interview, Sorbonne, October 2002.

¹³⁹ Lucas Delattre, "L'Allemagne décomplexée face au passé," *Le Monde*, November 9, 1998; Pascale Hugues, "Faut-il oublier le passé?" *Le Point*, no. 1373, January 9, 1999; Bernard Henri Levy, "La tentation de l'oubli," *Le Monde*, February 6, 1999; Alain-Gérard Slama, "Faut-il avoir peur de l'Allemagne?" *Le Figaro*, June 14, 1999; Daniel Vernet, "L'Allemagne, puissante et fragile," *Le Monde*, December 9, 2000; Jean-Marie Rouart, "La nostalgie d'avoir été une conscience," *Le Figaro*, March 15, 2001; Daniel Vernet, "Les tentations populistes des libéraux allemands," *Le Monde*, July 14, 2002; Jacques-Pierre Amette, "L'affaire Walser," *Le Point*, no. 1554, June 28, 2002; Lorraine Millot, "L'Allemagne par-delà le mal," *Libération* September 4, 2002. Also see Regine Robin, "La honte nationale comme malédiction: Autour de l'affaire Walser-Bubis," *La revue internationale et stratégique*, no. 33 (spring 1999), pp. 44-69.

¹⁴⁰ Joseph Mace-Scaron, "L'Allemagne contre son passe," *Le Figaro*, December 18, 1998.

¹⁴¹ Joseph Mace-Scaron, "L'Allemagne contre son passe," *Le Figaro*, December 18, 1998.

¹⁴² Interview with Anne-Marie Le Gloannec in Joseph Mace-Scaron, "Un renforcement identitaire," *Le Figaro*, December 18, 1998.

memory within Germany within transition, that merit more than condemnations and conventional responses.¹⁴³

Another scholar writes that the French perceived that the essence of the Walser debate could be summed up as follows:

a nation squashed by a half-century of culpability, of reparations of every kind, of commemoration and the education of the Holocaust...this nation finally wishes, at the start of the 21st century, to shake off the yoke of a memory become oppressive and intends to make itself normal.¹⁴⁴

Other observers argued that people should not have such a dire interpretation of the Walser debate.

One article writes that by denouncing the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, “Martin Walser has paradoxically permitted the advocates of the Holocaust memorial to reinforce the legitimacy of their project.”¹⁴⁵ Scholar Alfred Grosser actually *agreed* with the German novelist, despairing of purely negative coverage of Germany. Grosser wrote, “Such films, documentaries and debates on Nazism, on the camps, on the Shoah! Such an absence about the democratic life of the FRG over the past half-century!”¹⁴⁶ In an interview Grosser said, “Martin Walser was perfectly right to say that he could not stand it anymore.”¹⁴⁷

On balance, French observers note that German remembrance remains extremely apologetic. Although some commentators criticized Schröder, others praised him for moving forward from the weight of the past. One article noted French fears that the current generation of German leaders “may not recognize the inhibitions of the elders’ brutal past,” but praises Schröder’s approach to memory. It argues that Schröder’s view is that

Germany has finally become an ‘adult nation’: characterized by self-consciousness that faces history and never calls into question her historic responsibility, but a nation turned

¹⁴³ Marcel Tambarin, “L’Avenir du passé: la polémique Walser-Bubis,” *Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui*, no. 149 (July-September 1999), pp. 31-47. Quote p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ Weill, “La Culpabilité Allemande,” p. 70.

¹⁴⁵ Lucas Delattre, *Le Monde*, June 26, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Alfred Grosser, “Chantage sur le passe allemand,” *La Croix*, December 17, 1998.

¹⁴⁷ Personal Interview, October 2002.

resolutely toward the future. The lessons of the past should be mobilizing, not paralyzing.¹⁴⁸

Another article notes that Schröder wants Germans to feel positively about their country “without forgetting”; his government was the one to negotiate the indemnity to forced laborers, and set into motion the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe.¹⁴⁹

French observers also note that Germans advocating a break from the past are confined to the fringes of German politics. An article comments, “within the major parties, left as well as right, there is no question about accepting, clearly and entirely, the German responsibility for past crimes.”¹⁵⁰ A scholar discusses the German debate over the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe; she praised Kohl’s leadership and noted, “it was difficult for a responsible politician to contest the need for a national commemoration. Those who did so risked situating themselves at the margins of the political arena.”¹⁵¹ In reaction to the *Aufruf*, an article discusses the efforts of German revisionists, but dismisses them, saying that in Germany, “If one believes the polls, their call was barely heard.”¹⁵² A scholar comments that the *Aufruf* was put forth by “a fringe of the intellectual world” who believed that Germany should “turn the page of confrontation with the Nazi past.”¹⁵³ An article comments, “neo-Nazis do not pose a real threat, even in Germany.” It discussed the failing efforts of German neo-Nazis “to break with their past and their Holocaust-related guilt.”¹⁵⁴ One scholar commented, that “nationalistic themes have not become a major debate within Germany”; he noted revisionist attempts are seen, such as the Historian’s Debate in 1986, “but it doesn’t seem to me...that this has had a direct influence on the German people.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁸ Stephan Martens, “Allemagne: Les paradoxes de la ‘normalisation,’” *Le Figaro*, July 6, 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Lorraine Millot, *Libération* May 10, 2002.

¹⁵⁰ Marc Semo, *Libération*, September 26, 1998.

¹⁵¹ Kruse, “Le Mémorial De L’Holocauste de Berlin,” p. 26.

¹⁵² The *Aufruf* was the protest by German conservatives about self-critical observances of the 50th anniversary of the surrender. Quote from *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1995, 20.

¹⁵³ Edouard Husson, “Les Allemands et l’Holocauste,” *Documents* no. 3 (1997), p. 8.

¹⁵⁴ CITE

¹⁵⁵ Jean-Pierre LeFebvre, “La rêve de la normalité,” *Esprit* no. 221, (May 1996), 110-124. Quote p. 114.

He commented that “the German population has ordinary forms of nationalism, as we also have: excessive chauvinism in sports exploited by the newspapers and television, xenophobic outbursts....”¹⁵⁶ Thus French observers argue German nationalism and a desire to move away from the past is not the mainstream in Germany.

In sum, in the post-unification period, benign perceptions of German intentions are driven by German acceptance of its postwar borders, its continued membership in international institutions, and its stable democratic government. I find some evidence that German policies of remembrance contribute to benign French views of German intentions.

Conclusion: French Perception of German Intentions

This section tested the apology theory in the case of post-World War II France and Germany. With German remembrance *unapologetic* in the early period, and *apologetic* thereafter, the apology theory and alternate theories make predictions about congruence and reasoning.

Remembrance

This case finds some support for the apology theory. The theory passes the congruence test because German intentions were seen as *uncertain* in the middle period, and then *benign* in the late period: this is consistent with the theory’s expectations. However the congruence test is inconclusive because this finding is also consistent with the expectations of other variables.

Reasoning data provides some support for the apology theory. In the early period, the French were very interested in the issue of West German education: they were intent on purging West German education of hyper-nationalism, and wanted to prevent denial. The French were not interested in any other policies of remembrance (apologies, justice, commemoration). In the middle and late periods, scholars and, in particular, the French media appear very interested in German remembrance. They monitor its evolution, and praise German contrition. Sometimes they link German remembrance to perceptions of German intentions. However, throughout the post-World

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 117.

War II period, French leaders did not talk about German remembrance when they discussed German intentions. They did not discuss German remembrance during debates over German unification, when the theory would have expected French leaders to talk about German contrition as a reassuring factor. Furthermore, in interviews, French elites never once independently raised the issue of remembrance when discussing Germany; overwhelmingly, they focused on other issues. In sum, this case yields weak support for the apology theory.

Other Variables

This case study also tested the effects of other variables on French perceptions of German intentions. First, I find support for democratic peace theory. Like the apology theory, democratic peace theory passes the congruence test: French perceptions of German intentions as *uncertain* and then *benign* in the middle and late periods is consistent with the theory's expectations. Democratic peace theory is also supported by evidence from reasoning. In the early period, the French were very preoccupied with the need to democratize West Germany in order for it to be a trustworthy neighbor. In the middle period (particularly during the unification debate) and in the late period, I find evidence in French reasoning that links benign perceptions of German intentions to Germany's robust democracy.

Second, I find support for the institutionalist theory. As with the first two theories, the institutionalist theory passes the congruence test, but this finding is inconclusive. I find more support for the theory in reasoning data. In the early and middle periods, French leaders were very focused on institutions, but tended not to talk about institutional membership as a reflection of German intentions. As I will show in the next section, leaders spoke of institutions as constraints on German power (as if Germany had no choice in membership). However, this changed during the unification era and the late period, when—after reunification and the end of the Soviet threat—it was very clear that Germany did have a choice. During unification, the French linked uncertainty about German institutional membership to their uncertainties about German intentions. In the late period they linked their benign perceptions of Germany to its choice to remain within institutions.

Fourth, I find strong support for the territorial claims theory. This theory explains malign perceptions of German intentions in the early period, and continued uncertainties about German intentions in the middle period. This theory is consistent with French uncertainty during unification debates, and with the improvement in French perceptions of Germany thereafter. Extensive reasoning data from all periods directly links French perceptions of German intentions to this variable.

EXPLAINING FRENCH THREAT PERCEPTION OF GERMANY

The previous section finds that German territorial claims, institutional membership, democracy, and, to a lesser extent, remembrance, have affected French perceptions of German intentions since World War II. This section turns to the following question: what is the weight of remembrance, relative to other factors, in overall French threat perception of Germany?

The apology theory posits that threat perception is a function of both capabilities as well as intentions. Chapter Five coded German capabilities (power and constraints) since World War II. West German capabilities were *moderate* in the early 1950s (high potential power, low current power, and uncertain constraints). After the FRG's admission to NATO in 1955, which was also accompanied by the military presence of the U.S. offshore balancer, West German capabilities were more constrained, and thus fell to *low*. In 1990, upon the negotiation of German unification, many countries anticipated that German capabilities would rise, but they did not change substantially over Cold War levels. German capabilities following unification remained *low*.

Predictions

As noted in Chapter One, remembrance may either have strong effects on threat perception, or little or no effect. In this chapter I use evidence from congruence testing and from observers' reasoning to determine the relative importance of remembrance in overall threat perception.

Congruence. One hypothesis predicts that remembrance has a strong effect on threat perception. In Chapter Five I coded German remembrance as *unapologetic* in the early period, and

apologetic thereafter. Based on this coding, if remembrance is an important variable in threat perception, French threat perception should be *high* or at least *moderate* in the early period, and *low* thereafter.

Another hypothesis is that remembrance has little effect on threat perception. A failure to apologize might make a state's intentions appear suspect; apologies may make it look somewhat friendlier—but ultimately other factors (intentions or capabilities) affect the extent to which a state is viewed as a security threat. Because German remembrance was unapologetic in the early period, and apologetic thereafter, if French threat perception was initially *low*, or *higher* later on, would show that remembrance plays little role in threat perception. If this hypothesis is true, French threat perception should co-vary with changes in other variables (intentions or capabilities).

Reasoning. The first hypothesis predicts that the French should emphasize German remembrance as they discuss a German threat. In the early period they should say that West Germany's unapologetic behavior makes it appear more powerful or more menacing. In the later periods, they should say that German contrition reassures them that Germany is not a security threat. Conversely, the second hypothesis predicts that the French will discuss other factors as they discuss a German threat.

This section is divided into subsections. First I code French threat perception of Germany across the postwar era. I find that French threat perception was initially *moderate*, dropped to *low* after 1960, and remained *low* thereafter. French threat perception briefly spiked to moderate in 1989-90 as West Germany and her neighbors were negotiating German unification. This outcome is congruent with changes in German capabilities, although it is also possible that perceptions of *benign* German intentions may have lowered threat perception beyond what it might have been otherwise.

In the second section I examine the reasoning that the French offer for their assessments of a German threat. The French say that their threat perception of Germany is strongly related to low German power, and the existence of constraints on that power. However the French also discuss

factors related to German intentions: most importantly, territorial claims, institutional membership, and democracy. German remembrance appears to have at most weakly positive effects.

Level of Threat Perception: Policies and Statements

In this section I assess French threat perception as reflected in French statements and policies: military policy, diplomacy, and bilateral cooperation. I code French threat perception of Germany as *moderate* in the early period, and *low* thereafter. French threat perception of Germany spiked to *moderate* during unification debates of 1989-90.

Early Period, 1945-1950s

In the early postwar years, French policies reflect *moderate* threat perception. Germany, defeated and devastated, was not seen as an immediate threat, but her potential power was viewed as very threatening. Thus the French advocated policies of squelching German unity and military power.

First, the French wanted to keep German power low. This is reflected in French statements at the time. Immediately after the war's end, the French public "wished Germany to be rendered powerless for a long period," and "strictly controlled."¹⁵⁷ According to polls taken in September 1944 and 1945,

The harshest treatment for Germany, any solution leaving her in a state of inferiority, was approved by the great majority...Prolonged military occupation, transfer of the most harmful elements of population, dismemberment annexation of the Saar to France, lasting allied control of German industry, international trusteeship of the Ruhr, pastoralization of Germany according to the Morgenthau Plan—any measure seemed acceptable as long as it was radical and severe.¹⁵⁸

French policies during the occupation also reflect fears of Germany, and a desire to contain it.

"There was a view in France that having won the war in 1918 they had bungled the peace, and that this must not happen in 1945. The risk of further German aggression must be eliminated once and for all."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Grosser, *The Colossus Again*, p. 231.

¹⁵⁸ Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," p. 73.

¹⁵⁹ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 11.

French leaders thus advocated policies that would reduce German power. They advocated the dismantling of German factories, international controls over the coal-rich Ruhr region, a customs union with France for the coal fields of the Saar region, permanent military occupation of the Rhineland, the creation of a Military Security Board to preside over German demilitarization, and the complete dismemberment of the German state into a loosely grouped and totally decentralized German confederation. But lacking the power to enforce these demands, and facing pressure from the United States to agree to less punitive policies in Germany (in order to receive U.S. aid), France was forced to abandon many of its demands. The Allies instituted numerous safeguards against future German power, but fewer than French leaders would have preferred. After negotiations on these topics (the 1948 Foreign Ministers' conference in London), French Foreign Minister Bidault reported the Allied decisions back to the French National Assembly. He was lambasted by politicians fearful of German resurgence, and was later fired as Foreign Minister.¹⁶⁰ Thus French fears of Germany are apparent in their enthusiasm for stringent occupation policies aimed at preventing German resurgence.

Second, threat perception of Germany during this period is also evident in its French diplomacy. Even while the war was still going, France concluded alliances against a future German threat. "The Franco-Soviet alliance, signed on 10 December 1944 by de Gaulle and Stalin, comprises a commitment to take to the end of the conflict 'all necessary measures to eliminate any new menace coming from Germany,' to obstruct 'all initiatives liable to make possible a new attempt of aggression on her part.'"¹⁶¹ In 1947 the French signed the Treaty of Dunkirk with Great Britain—also a safeguard against a future German threat. In 1948 the French concluded the Brussels Pact with Great Britain and the Benelux countries; in the Pact, signatory nations agreed

¹⁶⁰ Gildea, *France Since 1945*, p. 12. Gildea writes that "Bidault was squeezed between the realities of the international situation and public opinion in France, which had been persuaded by the rhetoric of the politicians that Germany was going to be dealt with in such a way as to make any future revival impossible." (12)

¹⁶¹ Jules Moch, *Histoire Du Rearmement Allemand Depuis 1950* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965).

“to take measures judged as necessary in case of ‘repeated policy of aggression on the part of Germany.’”¹⁶²

The French fear of a resurgent German threat led many French to advocate policies of neutrality rather than Western alignment. The Germans were regarded by many as just as menacing—if not more so—than the Soviets. More French favored a foreign policy of neutrality in the nascent Cold War rather than close affiliation with the Western camp. Whereas 37% of respondents said France should be in the Western camp, 39% said France should be neutral, and 22% were undecided. In the event of war between the U.S. and USSR, 53% said France should be neutral; 23% had no opinion, and 22% advocated fighting on the U.S. side.¹⁶³ Jean Stoetzel notes, “The threat from the East does not appear so blinding as to obliterate the dangers run in the recent past from Germany; and these dangers still exist. Committing itself to the West, the public fears, may increase the risks.”¹⁶⁴ In sum, French threat perception of Germany in the early period is evident in French statements and policies.

Middle Period, 1960s-1980s

Starting in the late 1950s, changes in French policies reflect a drop in French threat perception toward West Germany. French diplomacy grew less adversarial toward West Germany; the French accepted West German rearmament within NATO. The French also intensified bilateral cooperation with Germany. De Gaulle and Adenauer held a series of important summits from 1958-1963, culminating in the 1963 Elysée treaty. The treaty established twice-yearly summit meetings between the two heads of state, and quarterly meetings by foreign ministers. It created regular bilateral roundtables about defense, education, and human welfare. Perhaps the most famous result of the 1963 agreement was the establishment of the Franco-German youth office (*Office Franco-Allemand pour la jeunesse*, or OFAJ), which instituted numerous youth exchanges

¹⁶² Quoted in *Le Monde*, November 4, 1954.

¹⁶³ Polls from 1954, quoted in Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” p. 76.

¹⁶⁴ Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” p. 78.

between the two countries. The Elysée treaty also established a framework for extensive security consultation and cooperation; however, these aspects of the agreement stalled until the 1980s.¹⁶⁵ Franco-German security cooperation deepened after 1982, at which time the two sides decided to activate the security consultations established under the 1963 treaty. The French, who had always been coy about whether they would come to Germany's defense in the event of a Soviet attack, began promising their support and preparing the French military for such a mission. During the 1980s France established a rapid reaction force (*Force d'action Rapide*), three of whose divisions were intended for the defense of the West Germany. The French and West Germans staged a major joint military exercise (Bold Sparrow) in Southern Germany in 1987.

French also intensified its efforts to cooperate with West Germany within the larger European context. Progress toward deeper European integration was seen with the 1957 Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community), the 1962 Common Agricultural Policy, and the 1970 Luxembourg Treaty. Between 1975 and 1982, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (famed for their extremely warm relationship) negotiated the European Monetary System (EMS), which tied several currencies to the West German deutsche mark and allowed them to fluctuate within defined limits. The 1986 Single European Act was signed in 1986, pushed forward in particular through the efforts of French politician and EEC Commissioner Jacques Delors, who viewed economic and monetary integration as essential components of European unity. Thus French cooperation and diplomacy in the middle period reflects decreased fears of West Germany.

Unification (1990)

The French had *moderate* threat perception of Germany during the 1990 debates about German unification. The French media published scores of articles speculating on what German unification

¹⁶⁵ The French had envisioned the Elysée treaty as the establishment of a Franco-German "third force" to balance the U.S.-Soviet conflict. In the early 1960s the Soviets had acquired a second-strike nuclear capability, thus calling into question the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to its Western European allies. The French effort was accepted by Konrad Adenauer but rejected by the German Bundestag, which voted unanimously to insert a preamble to the treaty reaffirming the FRG's commitment to NATO.

implied for France, and whether unified Germany would seek hegemony in Europe. One article framed the issue succinctly: “France asks herself, what is her future—prey, or ally?”¹⁶⁶

French policies also reflected fears of German unification. During unification the French attempted through diplomatic efforts—notably with the British and the Russians—to prevent or delay German unification. Stanley Hoffman writes that Mitterrand’s trip to meet with Gorbachev in Kiev “could not but evoke the ghosts of Franco-Russian alliances against the German danger and of German obsessions about encirclement.” The President “also went to London to consult with the Iron Lady, who... was even more, and more openly, upset about a reunified Germany.”¹⁶⁷ Eventually, Mitterrand was reconciled to the reality that he could not prevent unification from occurring, sought assurances about future German behavior. He sought limitations on German military power, guarantees that Germany would deepen rather than abandon European institutions, and the renunciation of German territorial claims. Thus French diplomacy during the negotiations over German unification reflects the perception that Germany could be a future threat: *moderate* threat perception.

Late Period (1990s-00s)

In the post-unification period, French policies toward Germany reflect a *low* level of threat perception. First, this is evident in interviews with French elites. A representative view of French security is: “Major threats to France are global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; we need to figure out how best to preserve the Atlantic community, and how France can be a major actor in the world of new threats.”¹⁶⁸ Regarding Germany, the vast majority of French elites report that the “German problem” has been solved; any concerns France has about Germany are about its influence within the EU, not about military threats. One scholar commented, “Germany is no longer a threat, it’s a partner. The German problem belongs to the past. Germany no longer wants

¹⁶⁶ Bruno Frappant, “Puissants voisins,” *Le Monde*, October 13, 1990, 31.

¹⁶⁷ Hoffman, “French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe,” p. 130.

¹⁶⁸ Personal Interview 2, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), October 2002.

to dominate Europe by military means.”¹⁶⁹ One former official commented that during a decade as a defense official, “I never attended a meeting in which people said Germany might be a threat to France. The idea of Germany as a threat has disappeared from French political culture.”¹⁷⁰

Low French threat perception of Germany is also evident in French policies. French officials sit in German ministries and vice-versa—even occasionally representing the other country at international meetings. France also continues to cooperate closely with Germany in the security realm. The two states created the Eurocorps in 1992, and activated the Franco-German brigade in 1993, under the auspices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework. Soldiers from the Eurocorps, including German soldiers, paraded down the Champs d’Elysées on July 14, 1994 to cheering crowds. The two states pursue numerous cooperative efforts in the defense industry, including helicopter and aircraft production, and the merger of large defense companies (France’s Aerospatiale Matra and Germany’s DASA in 1999).

The French and Germans also cooperate closely in the cultural realm. The OFAJ continues to conduct bilateral youth exchanges; over two million youths from both countries have participated in its activities. The two states also established a Franco-German television channel in 1992 (Arte), which is based in Strasbourg and features historical and cultural programs of interest to both countries.

French diplomacy toward an expanded German military role has been supportive. During the Gulf war, French commentary in reaction to Germany’s abstention noted that Germany lacked either the military capabilities or domestic consensus to participate; media coverage did not express fears of German militarism.¹⁷¹ German military participation has been increasing; German pilots flew sorties over Kosovo during the 1999 war against Serbia, and Germany provided support in the “out-of-area” mission in Afghanistan. The French express support for Germany’s increased military roles. In coverage of the Kosovo war—in which German Tornados flew sorties over

¹⁶⁹ Personal Interview 2, IFRI, October 2002.

¹⁷⁰ Personal Interview, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, October 2002.

¹⁷¹ Luc Rosenzweig, “Espace Europeen,” *Le Monde*, November 14, 1992.

Serbia—the French media reported that this was the first time Germany had participated in military operations since World War II, and again focused on German domestic political debates. Coverage was generally favorable, noting the German contribution to the international community. One article said, “Germany has become a partner like the others at the heart of the Atlantic alliance.”¹⁷² Another article noted cheekily, “for the first time in history, Germany fought on the good side!”¹⁷³ French government officials similarly praise German contributions to international security. A former French defense official said that the French government views the normalization of German military roles as a positive thing. He commented, “we always tried to help Germany toward military normalization. We view Schroeder’s position on Iraq as a step backward. We welcome progress such as German participation in Kosovo and in counter-terrorism.”¹⁷⁴ Thus French policies in the late period reflect *low* threat perception of Germany.

In sum, this section coded French threat perception by examining French statements and policies toward Germany over the post-World War II era. I code French threat perception as *moderate* in the early period, and *low* thereafter. An exception was when, during German unification, French threat perception spiked to *moderate* in 1990. This finding is consistent with the expectations that capabilities dominate intentions in threat assessment.

Reasoning: How the French Assessed a German Threat

In order to understand the weight of different factors in French threat perceptions of Germany, it is necessary to examine statements and reasoning. The evidence suggests that both capabilities and intentions have been important in influencing French threat perception. Throughout the period, the French have viewed constraints on German capabilities as essential. Perceptions of shifts in German capabilities (such as rearmament and unification) were also influenced by perceptions of German intentions (most importantly, territorial claims and Germany’s membership in international

¹⁷² Arnaud Leparmentier and Daniel Vernet, “L’armée allemande sans tabous,” *Le Monde*, June 21, 1999; also see Lorraine Millot, *Libération*, June 15, 1999; Michel Colomès, “Kosovo: le sans-faute des Allemands,” [so far so good, Germans] June 11, 1999.

¹⁷³ Colomès, “Kosovo: le sans-faute des Allemands.”

¹⁷⁴ Personal Interview, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, October 2002.

institutions). I find weak evidence that remembrance influenced French perceptions of German intentions.

Early Period (1945-50s)

Moderate French threat perception in the early postwar period was caused by uncertainties about German intentions (notably territorial claims), as detailed in the early part of this chapter. In addition, the French feared Germany because of issues related to German capabilities: constraints on German resurgence did not yet appear credible or durable, and Germany was rearming.

Constraints on German Power

In the immediate postwar period, French reasoning reflected fears of unconstrained German power. Because they viewed the supranational organization of the EDC as inadequate to contain Germany, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty. To contain Germany, France accepted German membership in NATO, because it came with security guarantees from Britain and the United States. France also worked to build institutions with the goal of containing German power.

First, French reasoning in the debates over the European Defense Community (EDC, or CED in French) reflects French fears that West Germany would not be adequately constrained by this institution. EDC proponents—“*les Cedistes*”—argued that German rearmament was inevitable and dangerous for France, and that West Germany could best be contained within a European supranational structure. Pierre Maillard writes,

The EDC would permit the “tying up” of Germany, to prevent its forces from being utilized for purely national ends, to imprison them within a Western system, both military and political, removing all risks of her returning to her past ambitions. This perspective is founded both on distrust and on moving beyond the idea of the nation.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ Maillard, *De Gaulle et L'Allemagne*, p. 136.

The French delegation making the case to other Europeans for the EDC said it was “the best guarantee against the rebirth of German militarism.”¹⁷⁶ One of the slogans of *les Cedistes* was “EDC or the *Wehrmacht*.”

Conversely, opponents of the EDC argued that the organization would not succeed at containing Germany; Germany would end up dominating it and turning on her erstwhile allies. Jacques Fauvet notes that French elites feared that

from a military standpoint no legal framework would be strong enough to keep Germany’s rearmament within limits. The checks would be lifted and France’s right of veto would be just as useless as it had proved to be in NATO’s councils against the rearmament of Germany....Germany’s military might would therefore outgrow France’s forces, especially as the French have their hands tied by their difficulties in overseas territories.¹⁷⁷

A *Le Monde* story cautioned that Germany would break free of any restraints the EDC tried to impose, until it controlled the institution.

Which precautions are the twelve (notably the United States) counting on taking in order to prevent the renaissance of Prussian militarism? It is declared that the Germans... will be included in a unified force. But in what manner?... How to oppose their ten generals [of the ten proposed German army divisions] and their 20 brigade generals from restructuring into a clandestine, underground *Oberkommando*—whose counsel, obligingly channeled to the Supreme Commander, could one day eventually prevail over the viewpoint of officials of the Atlantic Force?¹⁷⁸

French elites were afraid that West Germany would be the first to create army units within the EDC and then it would “use its relatively superior position for greater advantages.”¹⁷⁹ Robert McGeehan writes that “French fears were seemingly justified, as Bonn officials manifested what the French considered a dangerous willingness to assert their new independence... The feeling in Paris was that EDC had given Germany ‘not only the right to equality but a chance for mastery.’”¹⁸⁰ Politician Jacques Soustelle cautioned that “If the system you are proposing to us materializes, then Germany will carry more weight in Europe than we do. And the reason for this is

¹⁷⁶ *Rapport de la Délégation Française au Gouvernement* (Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiel, 1952), 28. Also see Furniss, *France, Troubled Ally*.

¹⁷⁷ Fauvet, “Birth and Death of a Treaty,” p. 192.

¹⁷⁸ October 5, 1950.

¹⁷⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1951.

¹⁸⁰ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 214.

obvious. She will become America's privileged ally on the Continent, and will receive top priority in the supply of armaments."¹⁸¹ Alfred Grosser comments that the fears of French elites were probably not unfounded.

French leaders in 1950 used the prestige attaching to the European idea to cover up their acceptance of German rearmament. It could be claimed, of course, that the international character of the plan made impossible the creation of a German army with any aggressive spirit; but German military power would certainly predominate in the Europe of the six powers, at least so long as there was a French expeditionary corps locked up in Indo-China.¹⁸²

Other opponents of EDC ratification argued that the treaty would never hold West Germany; the FRG would rearm within the scope of the EDC and then would withdraw, turning against France and the West. The Speaker of the Assembly, Edouard Herriot, said "guarantees on paper are not enough"; the French knew from history that "Germans [do] not have an undue respect for signatures."¹⁸³ Herriot said "German independence and power were being restored under U.S. pressure too rapidly, at a moment when France was certain Germany desired to regain her former grandeur but was not so sure the Federal Republic would respect her signed obligations."¹⁸⁴

Second, the French desire for security guarantees from the United States and Britain reflects fears that without the offshore balancers, German power could not be constrained. Robert McGeehan writes, "What France really wanted, and what could not be had, was an unequivocal American guarantee that Germany could never withdraw from the EDC."¹⁸⁵ The Cabinet thus informed Foreign Minister Schuman that he should demand from the Anglo-Saxons

a precise commitment against the secession of any member from EDC; a guarantee by Britain and the United States against the restoration of an autonomous German Wehrmacht; and a general declaration that the allies would not allow Germany to become stronger in Europe because of France's overseas responsibilities. The British and American ministers said they could not give any guarantee directed solely against Germany.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Werth, *France 1940-1955*, p. 705.

¹⁸² Grosser, *The Colossus Again*, p. 237.

¹⁸³ Large, *Germans to the Front*, p. 142; McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 211.

¹⁸⁴ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 211

¹⁸⁵ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 204

¹⁸⁶ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 207

Schuman told the Americans and British that he sought assurances that France would not be left alone on the continent “face to face with Germany.”¹⁸⁷ Fearful of discriminatory treatment against Germany (because of the backlash it might provoke there), the Americans and British refused to give such assurances. They said only that “they fully supported the integrity of the EDC”,¹⁸⁸ Dean Acheson assured Paris that U.S. would be “seriously concerned” if Germany withdrew. Schuman told U.S. and British officials that without Anglo-American security guarantees, there was not enough support within the National Assembly to ratify the EDC. Indeed, the EDC failed on November 30, 1954, accompanied by the singing of the Marseillaise and shouts of “Down with the *Wehrmacht!*”¹⁸⁹ After the defeat of the EDC, Anthony Eden’s plan to rearm Germany within the Western European Union and NATO succeeded in winning the approval of the French National Assembly only because both Britain and the United States agreed to station military forces in Europe. West Germany joined NATO in 1955 and was rearmed, with limitations, under its auspices. Thus debates over the EDC and German rearmament reflected French concerns about the need to constrain West German capabilities:

Third, in French discussions of institutional creation, the French discussed the need to contain German power within European institutions. A French Foreign minister later commented on the French postwar strategy of institutional creation:

Memories of the war... would dwell within the minds during the early debates about European construction. The ‘Fathers of Europe,’ French and others, saw within these future European institutions a good instrument for efficiently encasing West Germany within an ensemble, which made the renewal of nationalism out of the question.¹⁹⁰

At the time, because French plans to enfeeble Germany had been rejected by the United States and Britain, the French advocated institutions to contain West Germany. Robert Schuman advocated the “integration of a peaceful Germany in a United Europe, a Europe in which the Germans... will

¹⁸⁷ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 200

¹⁸⁸ McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, p. 200

¹⁸⁹ Gildea, *France Since 1945*, p. 15.

¹⁹⁰ Couve de Murville, *Le Monde en Face*, p. 50.

be able to give up all idea of dominating it.”¹⁹¹ French moderates said that West Germany must be bound to the west, saying “insofar as sufficiently close bonds continue to unite Germany to the West, the poisons which are active in Germany will be neutralized.”¹⁹² Assembly member Alfred Coste-Fleuret noted that

Germany is in full growth, but this is a growth which has never stopped. It is precisely at the moment when we could conceive some fears about this development that the Schuman Plan intervenes opportunely to stabilize the situation and to take from the German State, as it does from the French, the disposition over her heavy industry for war-purposes.¹⁹³

Coste-Fleuret also argued that “the two sources of power of modern Germany in recent times” are the Ruhr arsenal (which France aimed to neutralize by creating the European Economic Community), “and the national German army, which we also want to neutralize by integrating German soldiers into the discipline of a supra-national army. German growth is a fact, but the question is to control its direction.”¹⁹⁴ Socialist Jean Le Bail presented an impassioned speech for the need to bind the FRG firmly to the West.

Let us not repeat the same errors on German problems that we made in the period between the wars. We did not trust the German Weimar democracy. . . . However, at the same time that we refused her our confidence, we left her free to act at her own will. . . . We kept making errors, and at the end of this long succession of mistakes there was Hitler and the war. . . .¹⁹⁵

The desire to contain German power, in a non-discriminatory manner so not to anger the Germans, was the key motivation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Jean Monnet wrote in draft of the ECSC plan, “a totally new situation must be created: the Franco-German problem must become a European problem.”¹⁹⁶ Robert Schuman declared that “the solidarity in production. . . will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely

¹⁹¹ Simon Serfaty, *France, de Gaulle, and Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 11.

¹⁹² Fauvet, “Birth and Death of a Treaty,” p. 187-88.

¹⁹³ *Journal Officiel* 8862, quoted in Grosser 1957, 65.

¹⁹⁴ *Journal Officiel* 4451, quoted in Grosser 1957, 66.

¹⁹⁵ *Journal Officiel*, 6745, quoted in Grosser 1957, 70.

¹⁹⁶ Quoted in Edwina S. Campbell, *Germany's Past and Europe's Future* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), p. 61. Campbell writes, “the ECSC proposal was the first European initiative in the creation of an institutional status quo with the Germans in which the latter would have a stake. . . . France's offer to place its own coal and steel industries under the control of an international authority, if West Germany would do the same, was explicitly designed as a first step toward breaking the cycle of past mistrust.” (62)

unthinkable but materially impossible.”¹⁹⁷ A conservative politician, Alfred Krieger, was skeptical; he asserted that German steel and coal industries would only “guarantee her predominance” within the community. He said, “I believe that Germany has a sincere desire to construct a new Europe and to bring an end to the outdated Franco-German antagonism. But hear me well, one should never tempt the devil.”¹⁹⁸ However, Schuman and Monnet’s views won out; France built multilateral economic institutions designed to constrain German capabilities, firmly link West Germany to the West, and thus prevent future German aggression. In sum, French debates over the EDC and other institutions, and French efforts to obtain security guarantees from the U.S. and Britain, reflected French fears of unconstrained German power.

Fears of German Power

The French also discussed their fears of resurgent German power: both German unification and German rearmament. First, French leaders said they feared German unity; Germany must be kept divided in order to keep her weak. Charles de Gaulle opposed even the unification of the three zones of occupation; one scholar notes “the vehemence of his reaction to the London communiqué that proposed the fusion of the three occupation zones, predicting there the reunion of a constitutional assembly ‘where should proceed the reestablishment of unity of what today is torn apart.’” De Gaulle said in 1946:

It is true that Germany is no longer a subject of immediate alarm for the nations that should be building the peace. But after one war of 30 years, one doesn’t make peace only for the short-term. Whatever her ordeals, Germany remains Germany : that is to say, a great people in massive numbers installed in the center of Europe, who within the abyss remember their summits. The demon of war could again tempt her one day, if the chance was offered to recover her grandeur....This is why France, facing herself and others, should oppose Germany returning to a unified and centralized state, whose arms and impetus were always the conditions of her warlike enterprises.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Robert Schuman. “Declaration, 1950,” in Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nichol, eds., *Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 44.

¹⁹⁸ *Journal Officiel*, 8912, quoted in Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” p. 65.

¹⁹⁹ Quoted in Maillard, *De Gaulle et L’Allemagne*, p. 89.

De Gaulle said that any German unification “entails the gravest risks for Europe and for peace.”²⁰⁰ De Gaulle said, “realize that we are the neighbors of Germany, that we have been invaded by Germany three times in one lifetime, and conclude that never again do we want a Reich.”²⁰¹ He warned, “If a grand Reich should reappear, regardless of in what fashion, what would be the chances for France?”²⁰²

French debates over the rearming of West Germany within the EDC also reflected strong fears of German rearmament. After the North Korean invasion in June 1950, American diplomats began discussing the need to rearm Germany in the defense of Western Europe. With the Korean example in mind, Americans feared a repeat of communist aggression against West Germany. They assessed that the current balance of power favored the Soviet Union on the ground, and that Western Europe’s defenses must therefore be bolstered. American diplomats began discussing German rearmament with the Europeans, who reacted with wary resignation—except for the French, who viewed it with great alarm. The French did not concur with the American viewpoint that the Soviet threat was severe or credible enough to warrant risking rearming a dangerous enemy. Faced with American pressure, however, the French government responded to American plans for German rearmament by proposing a Europeanized plan: the EDC.

The French public was strongly opposed to German rearmament. Poll data from 1953 shows that most of the public believed that “the existence of German troops constitutes a threat to France” (57% of respondents) and in 1954, that “German rearmament is a danger in any form” (56%).²⁰³ Jean Stoetzel notes that public opinion in France on the German question was eminently clear.

General consideration of postwar French public opinion gives the impression of stability and constancy. The opinions collected are parallel, if not identical, for almost ten years....Rightly or wrongly, French opinion could not think of German rearmament without manifesting the most violent fears. There was no majority at any time in favor of German

²⁰⁰ Quoted in Maillard, *De Gaulle et L'Allemagne*, p. 89.

²⁰¹ Maillard, *De Gaulle et L'Allemagne*, p. 87.

²⁰² Maillard, *De Gaulle et L'Allemagne*, p. 90.

²⁰³ Stoetzel, “The Evolution of French Opinion,” p. 82

rearmament, and the defeat of the EDC is inscribed in the collective conscience, still hypersensitive after three wars.²⁰⁴

French media coverage of the EDC debate also reflects strong fears of German rearmament. After Dean Acheson first discussed the idea of German rearmament with the Europeans in fall 1950, the communist newspaper *L'Humanite* reported, "The choice is clear, Acheson and the Nazi general Guderian have triumphed: the new *Wehrmacht* is going to be created."²⁰⁵ *Monde* reported that in reaction to Acheson's first proposals, the French government was "horrified." The author asked, "Will one pretend that German rearmament of today, whatever the form, no longer offers the dangers that it presented yesterday? All the evidence points to the danger remaining the same." This story took the position that the EDC was preferable to admitting a rearmed West Germany into NATO, for "Within NATO, it was, pure and simple, the resurrection of the *Wehrmacht*."²⁰⁶ Following the defeat of the EDC treaty in the National Assembly in 1954, *L'Humanite* proclaimed: "Victory to the French people and to peace! The EDC is rejected."²⁰⁷ The newspaper *Combat* reported with satisfaction, "The monster of the EDC is dead."²⁰⁸ Thus media coverage of the EDC debate reflects strong French fears of German rearmament.

French elites across the political spectrum displayed strong fears of German rearmament in the early 1950s. Dean Acheson's initial proposal to rearm Germany was called "La Bombe." In early discussions, French Defense Minister Jules Moch reported that "No one, in the course of the long debate, supports the argument of accepting the American plan: Acheson does not possess any supporter within the Cabinet."²⁰⁹ General Billotte (Gaullist) commented, "There will [again] be fine and good German divisions [and they will be the source] from which a new German military

²⁰⁴ Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," p. 89.

²⁰⁵ September 27, 1950

²⁰⁶ November 4, 1954

²⁰⁷ August 31, 1954

²⁰⁸ Quoted in Moch, *Histoire Du Rearmement Allemand Depuis 1950*, p. 333.

²⁰⁹ Moch, *Histoire Du Rearmement Allemand Depuis 1950*, p. 132.

supremacy could one day spring.”²¹⁰ Gaullist Pierre Labon also opposed rearmament, declaring: “Germany invaded us in 1792, in 1814, in 1815, in 1870, in 1914, and in 1940. I have only gone back to 1792, but the problem is much older.”²¹¹ A Socialist, Max Lejeune, cautioned that German soldiers “will soon resume these traditional tendencies which we know, increasingly in fact as the staff of the German army, integrated or not, comes, ten years after the war, out of Hitler’s Wehrmacht.”²¹² Paul Reynaud said, “the Wehrmacht has marched down the Champs Elysées and through all the French towns....Do not allow the great military staff of Germany to be restored, since it would control the German government—for the history of the pressure of the German military forces is too well known, too bloody....”²¹³ Radical Edouard Daladier said that “Bonn would surely go the way of Weimar as soon as a German military caste was allowed to establish itself.”²¹⁴ Author Jacques Fauvet notes that French Nationalists refused “to accept any German participation in Western defense which would not be discriminatory....They considered Germany as dangerous as the USSR and therefore any non-discriminatory defense system as an evil.” German rearmament would be dangerous ‘for her neighbors and for peace.’²¹⁵ After defeating the EDC, the French National Assembly tried to block German accession to NATO. In ratifying the NATO pact, the Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Commission decreed that approval of the admission of new NATO members could only be granted by the National Assembly. One scholar wrote,

This proviso was clearly due to the fear that France’s allies would soon be pressing for the admission of Germany. Notwithstanding this safeguard, [French Foreign Minister] Schuman deemed it prudent to give the deputies an unequivocal assurance of Germany’s permanent exclusion.²¹⁶

²¹⁰ Large, *Germans to the Front*, p. 141-42.

²¹¹ *Journal Officiel*, 4444. Quoted in Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” p. 67.

²¹² *Journal Officiel* 4399. Quoted in Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” p. 69.

²¹³ *Journal Officiel*, 4478. Quoted in Grosser, “Germany and France: A Confrontation,” p. 69.

²¹⁴ Quoted in Large, *Germans to the Front*, p. 142.

²¹⁵ Fauvet, “Birth and Death of a Treaty,” p. 185.

²¹⁶ Furniss, *France, Troubled Ally*, p. 38.

Schuman told the National Assembly, “Germany does not yet have a peace treaty. She has no army and will not have one. She has no armaments and will not have any.”²¹⁷ Defense Minister Jules Moch concluded bitterly, “The period of groping toward German remilitarization is finished. In a few years, Bonn’s conventional forces will become the strongest in Western Europe.”²¹⁸ Thus the statements of French politicians—regardless of political affiliation—reflected fears of Germany based on German rearmament.

Gaullist opponents of the EDC objected to the treaty because they viewed it would enhance West Germany’s power relative to France. Gaullists objected to the supranational character of the EDC; they argued that an EDC based on equality, and robust enough to prevent the revival of the German national army, would by definition prevent the survival of the French national army. De Gaulle himself was a vocal opponent. He said, “I guarantee that the European Army will never be created. I will do all that will be in my power against it. I will work with the Communists to block that road. I will set off a revolution against it. I would prefer to join forces with the Russians again in order to stop it. It will not pass. I repeat, I will launch a revolution to prevent it.”²¹⁹ Gaullists fought the EDC with slogans such as “EDC revives the German Army and destroys the French Army”; “EDC rearms Germany and disarms France”; “Europe would be constructed on the corpse of France”; and “The French Union would be delivered into the hands of Germany and Italy.”²²⁰ Gaullists argued that the EDC would effectively cut the French Army in two: divisions committed overseas in defense of colonial territories (notably in Indochina and Algeria), and divisions committed to the EDC. Because the FRG had no such overseas territories, its army would not suffer from such bifurcation. Thus Gaullists opposed the EDC because they said it empowered

²¹⁷ *Journal Officiel*, p. 5312. Quoted in Maillard, *De Gaulle et L’Allemagne*, p. 132.

²¹⁸ Moch, *Histoire Du Rearmement Allemand Depuis 1950*, p. 375.

²¹⁹ Quoted in Maillard, *De Gaulle et L’Allemagne*, p. 133. Pierre Maillard notes that de Gaulle’s position stemmed less from fears of German rearmament than from the General’s abhorrence of supranational institutions, and his conviction that France must maintain a national army.

²²⁰ Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner, eds., *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 11; Fauvet, “Birth and Death of a Treaty,” p. 142.

West Germany relative to France, and they expected Bonn could use its relative power to menace France once again.

The French also revealed their fears of German rearmament in conversations with the Americans. After the Korean invasion in 1950, American officials had concluded that Western European security was in a dire situation, and that German rearmament was vital to deter Soviet aggression.²²¹ The French did not share these views. Dean Acheson reports that “Each Franco-American meeting evoked a variety of French viewpoints, varying from deep suspicion of Germany to great hopefulness of Soviet tractability.”²²² State Department official Henry Byroade advised U.S. Defense Secretary Marshall about French Defense Minister Moch:

Moch is apparently becoming more and more bitter on [German rearmament] and determined to fight it even to the extent of resignation from the Cabinet. In working himself into this state of mind he has apparently become complacent about the Russian threat and espouses the real danger as being Germany.²²³

Byroade reported that Moch “analyzed the fighting capabilities of the Germans and their tendency to side with the force displaying the greatest military strength. He was very frank in his skepticism and went on to suggest that Germany would not remain loyal to the West if the military situation were in favor of the Russians.” Byroade also noted that Moch made the point that “West Germany would not fight their brothers” in the event that “hostilities be undertaken by [the East Germans].”²²⁴ Byroade recommended that Secretary Marshall should “reassure Moch on the question of German units and at the same time [lay] the rather terrifying military situation on the

²²¹ American intelligence reported that “Soviet forces are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations without warning; They could at any time seize and occupy Western Germany east of the Rhine, the North Sea ports, and the Low Countries. With limited preparation and troop movement indicative of such intention, they could initiate an attack to overrun the entire continent of Europe....” Byroade to Marshall, 16 October 1950, Annex 2, FRUS 1950, Volume III, 1411.

²²² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 551.

²²³ Byroade to Marshall, October 16, 1950, FRUS 1950, Volume III, 1409.

²²⁴ Ibid. Moch also told the British ambassador to France that “a German contingent would actually *weaken* Western defenses because two Allied units would be required to watch over each German unit to ensure that it did not ‘go over to the East Germans.’” Quoted in Large, *Germans to the Front*, p. 91.

line *in a most forceful manner*, to convince him that the situation is such that he cannot, as Defense Minister, oppose available assistance in the defense of his country.”²²⁵

American diplomats discussed French fears of German rearmament as they gloomily monitored the French EDC debate. The American ambassador to France, David Bruce, reported “fear of Germany as a military power,” and noted that in the Assembly debate, “distrust motivated most speakers against German rearmament.”²²⁶ French President Auriol told Averell Harriman that the Germans were “revengeful, nationalistic, and could not be trusted”; he told Acheson the same after the signing of the EDC. While meeting with Auriol, Acheson found him “passionately and dramatically disturbed.... What had I done, he asked tragically, mistaking the real danger in Europe and leading Schuman into the dreadful error of rearming Germany? For an hour he reviewed the unchanging menace of Germany.”²²⁷ Thus in the 1950s, French debates about German rearmament reflected strong fears of German power.

In sum, French threat perception of Germany was *moderate* in the 1950s. The French feared Germany during this period because—although Germany was currently disarmed, disunified, and occupied—they did not view that its power was permanently constrained, and they saw it as moving toward rearmament and the recovery of her former strength. The French rejected the EDC as insufficient to contain German power; Paris sought commitments from offshore balancers in order to help contain German power, and ended up accepting German rearmament within NATO when promises of commitments were made. The French also worked to develop European institutions to contain German power.

Middle Period, 1960s-80s

In the middle period, French leaders said that constraints on German power made West Germany appear less threatening. First, leaders said they did not see Germany as threatening because of

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Bruce to Acheson, December 13, 1950, FRUS 1950, Volume III, 1442.

²²⁷ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 650.

limitations on German power (both the continued division of Germany, and limitations on West German military power). French leaders discussed the importance of European institutions as constraints on German power.

First, statements of French leaders reflected low threat perception of Germany because of its continued division. De Gaulle said, “For the first time in her history, [France] was unhampered by any threat from her immediate neighbors. Germany, dismembered, had ceased to be a formidable and domineering power.”²²⁸ He noted, “now that she was sliced into three segments, with the forces of her conquerors stationed in each, she was no longer a direct threat to anyone.”²²⁹ De Gaulle also told Konrad Adenauer, “After the terrible ordeals inflicted on her as a result of Teutonic ambitions in 1870, 1914, and 1939, France now faced a Germany which had been defeated, dismantled, and reduced to a pitiful international position, which entirely altered the circumstances of their relationship.”²³⁰ De Gaulle and other French leaders feared the increase in German power that would result from reunification, and thus argued against such a move. De Gaulle commented during this period that “France was not in a hurry for the reunification of Germany.”²³¹ De Gaulle’s views were shared by others; a poll of French elites demonstrated that “over two thirds...consider German reunification to be a threat to French security.”²³² French views were best summed up by French novelist François Mauriac, who famously commented, “I love Germany so much I’m glad there are two of them.”

Second, low French threat perception of Germany was contingent on West Germany’s acceptance of limitations on its military power. The French were reconciled to the idea of conventional West German military power, under NATO command, in the standoff with the Soviet

²²⁸ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 164.

²²⁹ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 172.

²³⁰ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 175.

²³¹ Jeffrey Glen Giaque, *Grand Designs & Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 92; Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 268.

²³² Deutsch, et. al, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*, p. 67.

Union. However, they were firmly opposed to West German nuclear weapons. At the 1958 Franco-German summit at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, de Gaulle demanded that Germany renounce forever ownership of weapons of mass destruction. The French President commented in his memoirs, “the right to possess or to manufacture atomic weapons...must in no circumstances be granted to her....”²³³ In 1963, Foreign Minister Couve said that “France was dead set against the idea of a German nuclear force.”²³⁴ De Gaulle commented to Herve Alphand, “We have no intention...of helping Germany to become a nuclear power, and neither of accepting it if she did.”²³⁵ France itself had acquired a nuclear weapons capability, and was committed to preventing the Federal Republic from doing the same. Thus low threat perception of Germany was contingent on Bonn’s acceptance of constraints on its military power.

Third, the French viewed European institutions as important constraints on West German capabilities. De Gaulle wrote, “As for France, who certainly had the best of reasons for preventing her principal neighbor from becoming warlike again, but also good reasons for cooperating with her, she bowed to the realities and saw to it that Bonn, contained within a sensible European grouping, remained as closely linked to her as possible.”²³⁶ Thus de Gaulle said his policy “aimed at “ the setting up of a concert of European States which in developing all sorts of ties between them would increase their interdependence and solidarity.”²³⁷ De Gaulle’s foreign minister writes,

It was also necessary to have the courage—or the good sense...to know that she was too formidable for us to approach alone; that always it was necessary that we be sheltered behind others or covered by some international combination....Going head to head with Germany is the greatest danger that France should avoid at all costs.²³⁸

²³³ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 173.

²³⁴ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, p. 392.

²³⁵ Quoted in Herve Alphand, *l’Etonnement d’Etre*, p. 445 (CITE)

²³⁶ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 227.

²³⁷ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 177. He also commented, “I considered it essential that she should form an integral part of the organized system of cooperation between States which I envisaged for the whole of our continent. In this way the security of all nations between the Atlantic and the Urals would be guaranteed, and a change brought about in circumstances, attitudes, and relationships which would doubtless ultimately permit the reunion of the three segments of the German people.” (173)

²³⁸ Couve de Murville, *Une Politique Etrangere*, p. 236.

During debates about the EC, the French government spokesman “argued before the Assembly that the EC would bind the Federal Republic to the West with ‘a thousand small linkages,’ thereby minimizing the possibility of Franco-German conflict or German-Soviet rapprochement.”²³⁹ One scholar later commented, “The main process of threat reduction in France was due to Europeanization: the Rome Treaty in 1957, the Elysée Treaty in 1963, et cetera. Foundations laid by de Gaulle and Adenauer explain the reduction of threat in both countries.”²⁴⁰ Thus the statements of French leaders in the later periods reflect French emphasis on the need to keep Germany contained: through division, limitations on military power, and the development of institutions.

Unification (1990)

As argued in the previous section of this chapter, French perceptions of German intentions were very uncertain because of fears that Germany would not accept her postwar borders, and would pull out of European institutions. In addition, French threat perception rose in 1990 because of fears related to German capabilities.²⁴¹

French threat perception increased in 1990 because of the expected increase in German economic and military power. Daniel Vernet wrote, “Unification gave rise to the fear of one dominant Germany (economically if not politically) within Europe.”²⁴² He commented that “a nagging question from the Rhine to the Oder [was]: should one be afraid of Germany?”²⁴³ An article argued, “Unified Germany will be the premier economic and demographic power in the EEC, and this worries Europeans. What role will Germany play from now on?”²⁴⁴ Another

²³⁹ Quoted in Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 104.

²⁴⁰ Personal Interview, Sorbonne, October 2002.

²⁴¹ For summaries of French media reports, see Nicholas Moll, “L’Allemagne de nos obsessions,” *Documents*, no. 2 (June 1990), 11-17; also Stephan Martens, “Le Traité 2+4: L’anti-Versailles ou l’intelligence multilatérale,” *Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui*, no. 146 (October-December 1998), 286-307.

²⁴² Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, January 9, 1991.

²⁴³ Daniel Vernet, *Le Monde*, January 9, 1991.

²⁴⁴ Jérôme Vaillant, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1990, 1-3.

commented, “When Germany becomes larger, it is inevitable that this evokes the phantom of a grand Germany whose ambition spilled blood in crimes across Europe.”²⁴⁵ Another article speculated, “it is not assured that [Germany’s cooperative spirit] will always persist; power easily engenders arrogance and the appetite for domination.”²⁴⁶ During unification negotiations, Mitterrand demanded that unified Germany renounce a nuclear weapons capability. Paris’s demands that Bonn agree to work for the deepening of European institutions also represented an attempt to contain future German power; as one scholar writes, France was “desperately searching for ways to tie down and keep pace with its more powerful neighbor.”²⁴⁷ Thus the French feared that after unification, German power would grow relative to France.

Late Period (1990s-00s)

French threat perception of Germany dropped again after 1990, to its lowest level in the post-World War II era. As argued in the first part of this chapter, this drop had much to do with perceptions of benign German intentions based on Germany’s willingness to accept its postwar borders, and to remain in constraining institutions.

In addition, in the late period the French say that Germany is not a threat because of its low level of military power. One scholar noted that since unification “Germany has had falling defense budgets, and is very weak.” He commented that “All the nightmare post-unification scenarios did not come true. Germany hasn’t become an economic or political giant. There is still a balance of military power between France and Germany.”²⁴⁸ Another analyst echoed the sentiments of many of his colleagues when he said, “We’re not trying to keep Germany down; it’s the reverse. We’re trying to get them to do more, to increase their defense budget.”²⁴⁹ He noted, “Germany is no longer a threat because its military capabilities are low. There was fear after German unification that Germany would become a great power but then we saw that not only did they not want to be a

²⁴⁵ Bruno Frappant, “Puissants Voisins,” *Le Monde*, October 13, 1990, 31.

²⁴⁶ Andre Fontaine, “Plus fort que Bismarck,” *Le Monde*, October 3, 1990.

²⁴⁷ Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics,” p. 622.

²⁴⁸ Personal Interview 5, IFRI, October 2002.

²⁴⁹ Personal Interview 4, IFRI, October 2002.

hegemon, they were terrified of even being thought of as a threat.” Scholars also comment that French fears of German military power have been erased by France’s nuclear arsenal, and by Germany’s renunciation of acquiring such weapons. One analyst notes, “With French security ultimately guaranteed by nuclear weapons, the ‘German question’ moved from one of ‘security’ to ‘influence’—that is, the realm of competition moved from questions about how much military power Germany had to how much *influence* Germany had within the EU.”²⁵⁰

It is interesting to note that the French no longer view the U.S. military presence in Germany as an important constraint on German power. In interviews, when asked whether Lord Ismay’s famous statement²⁵¹ still applied to NATO, French elites dismissed this suggestion. One scholar said, “NATO is not needed to keep Germany down. NATO’s only purpose is to keep the U.S. in. We like relying on U.S. capabilities.”²⁵² Another analyst commented, “Some people thought after German unification that NATO would be even more important to keep the Germans down, but this simply didn’t pan out.” He noted, “If the U.S. pulled out its troops, I wouldn’t see this as a problem at all, so long as we find a way to maintain U.S.-European security ties.”²⁵³ Another scholar argued, “We don’t need the United States as a balancer within Europe. Competition within Europe is about influence, not about security. The Germans have no stomach for adventure.”²⁵⁴ This perception is both dramatically different from French perceptions in earlier periods, and from the Japan-Korea case, in which an American departure from the region is strongly feared by Koreans. In sum, French threat perception of Germany has fallen to its lowest level since World War II. German capabilities continue to be constrained; German military power

²⁵⁰ Personal Interview 1, IFRI, October 2002.

²⁵¹ The former NATO Secretary-General commented that NATO’s purpose was: “To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”

²⁵² Personal Interview 4, IFRI, October 2002.

²⁵³ Personal Interview 5, IFRI, October 2002.

²⁵⁴ Personal Interview 1, IFRI, October 2002.

is low; German intentions are judged as benign on every indicator. As one scholar commented, “they have told us in all practical terms that they would never wage war against us.”²⁵⁵

Summary: French Threat Perception of Germany

This section sought to assess the relative weight of remembrance in French threat perception of Germany. It coded French threat perception using data from French policies, statements, and reasoning. Given that German remembrance was *unapologetic* in the 1950s, and *apologetic* thereafter, if remembrance is an important influence on threat perception, French threat perception should have been *high* or at least *moderate* in the 1950s, and *low* (or at least *moderate*) thereafter. I found that French threat perception was *moderate* in the early period, then *low* thereafter, except for a spike to *moderate* in 1990 upon German unification. These findings are consistent with the expectations that remembrance has a strong effect on threat perception, although they are also congruent with predictions about the effects of other variables.

The jump in French threat perception in 1989 to *moderate* may appear to run counter to the expectation that apologies reduce threat perception. West Germany had spent the past 30 years apologizing, paying reparations, and teaching its youth about past aggression and atrocities—why wasn’t this more reassuring?

However, it is possible that German unification would have been even more alarming to the French in the absence of German contrition. French leaders were alarmed at the prospect of unification, and devoted some energy to blocking or delaying it; however their reaction might have been much stronger. They might have sought a formal alliance with the Soviet Union or Britain. They might have chosen war rather than to accept a unified German state.²⁵⁶ Thus the “delta” between the *high* threat perception that might have occurred—and the *moderate* threat perception

²⁵⁵ Personal Interview, IFRI 4, October 2002.

²⁵⁶ This may seem extreme but recall that Mitterrand said explicitly to West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: “German unity will be undertaken after European unity, or you will find against you a triple alliance (France, Britain, and Russia), and that will end in war. If German unity is enacted after European unity, we can help you.” Attali, *Verbatim*, p. 364.

that did occur—may have been the threat reduction that resulted from German contrition. Indeed, the same logic holds for any of the other intentions variables; perhaps the French were less alarmed by unification because of German institutional membership, acceptance of territorial claims, or democracy. Although in counterfactual analysis it is impossible to be certain what factors might have been the most important, one would expect that if something was particularly reassuring to the French, they would have discussed it at the time.

In reasoning data from the post-World War II period, the French link their perceptions of a German threat to both capabilities and intentions. First, the French have viewed it as essential that German power is contained in some way: by security guarantees from offshore balancers, and by constraining institutions. The French also advocate limitations on German military power. Capabilities are thus prominent in French threat perception.

Second, perceptions of intentions also factored into French threat assessment. The French were alarmed by German unification not only because they anticipated it would trigger an increase in German capabilities, but because they were uncertain of German intentions related to territorial claims and institutional membership. When the Germans accepted the territorial status quo, and when they agreed to remain within European economic and security institutions, French debates show that these decisions reassured the French about Germany's intentions. The French were also reassured by Germany's robust democracy. I find no direct evidence from French leaders that they recognized or felt reassured by German remembrance; however, this issue was discussed in the French media and in academe. In sum, this test provides only weak evidence that apologies reduce threat perception.

COMPARISON CASE: GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMAN REMEMBRANCE

In this chapter, I argue that apologetic German policies of remembrance contributed in a limited way to benign French perceptions of German intentions. This test of the apology theory thus yielded the conclusion that even the strongest policy of contrition yielded only weak positive effects.

Ultimately, French perceptions of Germany (German intentions and German perception of threat) were most affected by other factors.

A counterargument is that the French case is idiosyncratic for political or cultural reasons, or for reasons related to the specific Franco-German experience in World War II. Perhaps the French are more preoccupied with *realpolitik* or institutions than another country might have been; perhaps another country might have been more interested in the apology issue and more reassured by German apologies.

To address this counterargument I turn to the case of Great Britain. Britain, like France, fought the Germans in both World War I and World War II. The British did not suffer German occupation, but had vivid memories of European battlefields as well as the Battle of Britain. The German Luftwaffe conducted bombing raids against British cities in 1940-41 to attempt to coerce her to withdraw from the war. In those two years, over 44,000 British civilians were killed, and approximately 250,000 wounded.²⁵⁷ Millions of people were evacuated from the cities to the countryside to escape German bombing. On the battlefield, approximately 300,000 British soldiers died over the course of the war. Britain was thus a historic adversary of Germany, with bitter memories of German aggression in World War II.

For the finding from the French case to be supported, I should discover a similar pattern in the case of British perceptions of German intentions. First, the British should demonstrate some interest in German remembrance—mainly in the realm of education. Second, I should find that German contrition had weak positive effects on British perceptions of Germany. To determine whether these findings are borne out, I assess British perceptions of German remembrance and German intentions over the post-World War II period.

Early Period

Like France, Great Britain also occupied part of the Western German zones. In the early days after the war, the British—like the French—sought to reform German education because of its

importance in the democratization of West Germany. As in France, many British had voiced opposition to the idea of re-educating the Germans, seeing German aggression as rooted in an unchanging German national character, or fearing nationalistic backlash caused by resentment at foreign interference in domestic policy.²⁵⁸ However the philosophy of re-education prevailed,²⁵⁹ the British pursued policies to re-educate the Germans in order to promote respect for democracy and human rights. British scholar E.H. Carr “was one of the first to realize that military defeat would be accompanied by ‘a state of moral and intellectual exhaustion and chaos’ and that a new European perspective had to be opened up to the young Germans.”²⁶⁰ As seen in a Foreign Office memorandum for postwar planning, “there was widespread agreement that no amount of allied control or inspection would ensure the adoption of democratic methods or prevent the revival of nationalistic teaching, without a successful Allied education policy toward Germany.”²⁶¹ British occupation authorities aimed “to help build up in Germany an education which will make it a

²⁵⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 343.

²⁵⁸ The most famous British Germanophobe was Lord Robert Vansittart of the British Foreign Office. In 1941 Vansittart wrote that all Germans —“the vicious and guilty German race”—were responsible for Nazi aggression; that European peace would eternally be threatened by “a deep-seated flaw in the German ‘national character.’” Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941); on the Vansittart debate also see Lothar Kettenacker, “The Planning of ‘Re-Education’ During the Second World War,” in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies after World War II* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), pp. 60-63. Vansittart proposed a motion before Parliament to guide postwar policy toward Germany, but it was defeated by those favoring an attempt at re-education. Vansittart was not alone in his views on Germans, and was not alone in his opposition to re-education. Opposition to interference in Germany’s domestic affairs was very strong in the German government, particularly among conservatives. For example, another British official, T.H. Marshall, wrote “We cannot re-educate Germany....The Germans have their own problems to solve, born of their own historic experience.” A Foreign Office report argued, “any scheme for the re-education of Germans, young or old, by means of textbooks, teachers, censors, or advisors, may be ruled out as futile.” Quoted in Kettenacker, “The Planning of ‘Re-Education’ During the Second World War,” p. 63.

²⁵⁹ After World War II, one of the most powerful arguments in favor of re-education was the fact that this idea had been rejected after the First World War and the ultimate result was hyper-nationalist Nazi education and war. As a top planner in the British re-education effort later pointed out, post-World War II decision making was influenced by the fact that “in 1918 we had pretty well left it to the Germans to decide for themselves how their society should be changed at a time when...much of German preferred to persist rather than to change. There was general agreement that they had made a pretty inadequate job of it.” Michael Balfour, “In Retrospect: Britain’s Policy of ‘Re-Education,’” in Pronay and Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies after World War II*, p. 141.

²⁶⁰ Kettenacker, “The Planning of ‘Re-Education’ During the Second World War,” p. 63.

²⁶¹ Sabine Lee, *Victory in Europe: Britain and Germany Since 1945* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Ltd, 2001), p. 15

country of free men, ready to live at peace with its neighbors, and to use its immense gifts for the benefit of the world and not for its destruction....”²⁶² The British, with their allies, planned “to build up democracy ‘from the bottom upwards’ with the help of new democratic forces which were to emerge in Germany with the help of re-education.”²⁶³

The British viewed instilling Germany’s candid remembrance of its past crimes as an important part of their re-education efforts. Re-education was seen partly as a “vehicle for German atonement and ‘guilt mobilization.’”²⁶⁴ British education official Michael Balfour discussed the issue of war guilt in a policy paper entitled “German Guilt—To Plug or Not to Plug,” in which he made the distinction between collective guilt and collective responsibility. Balfour argued that “the question of guilt was fundamental to Britain’s relationship with the German people,” and that “with one eye clearly on the experiences of Versailles,” he argued that unless justice and an accurate history of the war were established, “it will remain (in German eyes) merely the kind of settlement which the victorious side imposes by force of arms at the end of the war.”²⁶⁵

In their re-education efforts, the Germans targeted a few key issues for German remembrance of the war. First, the British were determined to promote German remembrance of World War II as a total military defeat. The British felt that they must prevent the emergence of “another stab-in-the-back legend which would allow the myth of military invincibility to linger on. The lesson of defeat was supposed to be more salutary than any other for the purpose of teaching the Germans that war does not pay.”²⁶⁶ Second, the British wanted Germans to understand the

²⁶² Robert Birley, Education Advisor to the Military Governor in the British zone, quoted in Kurt Jürgensen, “British Occupation Policy After 1945 and the Problem of Re-Educating Germany,” *History*, Vol. 68, no. 223 (June 1983), p. 239.

²⁶³ Barbara Marshall, “British Democratization Policy in Germany,” in Ian D. Turner, ed., *Reconstruction in Postwar Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), p. 191.

²⁶⁴ David Welch, “Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British ‘Re-Education’ Policy in Germany After the Second World War,” in Ian D. Turner, ed., p. 219.

²⁶⁵ Welch, “Priming the Pump of German Democracy,” p. 220.

²⁶⁶ Kettenacker, “The Planning of ‘Re-Education’ During the Second World War,” p. 71. The “stab-in-the-back” legend, or *Dolchstoßlegende*, was the myth purveyed by the German military after World War I that Germany had not lost the war on the battlefield, but rather on the homefront; that Leftists, foreigners within Germany, Gypsies, and the Jews had undermined German unity and morale, spreading disaffection and revolution and thus leading to the nation’s defeat.

crimes committed in their name. In one of the centerpieces of the British re-education effort, the POW re-education program at Wilton Park, “Every prisoner was required to sit through an American film on the liberation of Belsen.”²⁶⁷ Among German civilians, the British Information Services Control office also launched a propaganda campaign to educate people about the death camps, arguing that “the moral responsibility for these crimes must be laid wholly and solely on the German nation.”²⁶⁸

In sum, during the occupation, the British—like the French—adopted policies of re-education of Germany because most concluded that they were essential for the promotion of democracy and peace. As part of the re-education effort, the British promoted German remembrance of Nazi aggression and atrocities.

Middle Period

After the occupation, like the French, British leaders showed little interest in German remembrance such as apologies or commemoration. British discussion of German remembrance did not emerge again until the British began observing West German struggles with memory in the 1980s.

As they monitored West German debates about its past during the 1980s, the British media expressed the view that Germany was backsliding toward nationalism. The media observed Helmut Kohl’s attempts to move Germany forward from its past; the media were often critical of Kohl’s “clumsiness” with regard to remembrance.²⁶⁹ The British press also reported on the Bitburg visit, arguing that it “has re-opened the deepest wounds in their society, stimulated angst and let loose a

²⁶⁷ Balfour, “In Retrospect,” p. 149. Wilton Park was a residential college to which German POWs and later civilians were sent for a 6-week re-education program. See Jürgensen, “British Occupation Policy After 1945,” p. 238.

²⁶⁸ ISC policy directive, quoted in Welch, “Priming the Pump of German Democracy,” p. 220. The occupation authorities understood the need to balance re-education with the establishment of order, and thus noted that “ISC would continue to emphasize German war guilt, as long as it was ‘considered to be psychologically desirable.’” (Welch, p. 221)

²⁶⁹ “After decades as a model democracy, a pillar of the Western Alliance and the European economy, it is time Germany relegated the Holocaust to history.” Michael White, “History—Or Living Horror?” *Guardian*, May 8, 1985.

torrent of recrimination.”²⁷⁰ The British media also expressed worry about the Historian’s Debate in 1986. One article reported, “four decades later, the Germans still haven’t come to terms with ‘the whole truth’” and that German historians were making excuses for the Holocaust.²⁷¹ The article linked this backsliding of German memory to the recent Jenninger gaffe, which was called “the tip of the iceberg” of German revisionism. Thus the British media criticized West German controversies over memory in the 1980s.

While following these events, however, the British press was frequently sympathetic in their reporting. As the media reported Kohl’s attempts to move Germans forward, they portrayed his statements and actions as an effort for Germans to “gain confidence” or gain “a sense of identity” rather than as a pernicious nationalistic ploy. Like the French, the British press was measured in their portrayals of Kohl. One article noted, “to be fair, Kohl doesn’t want the Holocaust forgotten or excused. To clear any doubt on that he went to Auschwitz to make the point.”²⁷² The British press also reported Kohl’s speech at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.²⁷³ In reporting of the Bitburg cemetery visit, the British also placed more attention and blame on Reagan than on Kohl.²⁷⁴ One article on Bitburg, through criticizing the visit, concludes with a positive take on West German memory. It notes the extensive and contrite West German depictions of the war, arguing that a “sense of guilt has entered deeply into the West German character. It is kept there in the classroom, where schoolchildren are taught about Naziism, and in school outings to the sites of extermination camps. A close watch is kept on extreme right-wing groups, even though their following is negligible.”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ White, “History—Or Living Horror?”

²⁷¹ Walter Schwarz, “A History that Won’t Go Away,” *Guardian*, December 27, 1988.

²⁷² Michael White, “History—Or Living Horror?”

²⁷³ John Ezard, “Hopes for the Future on May 8, 1985,” *Guardian*, May 8, 1985; Anna Tomforde, “Kohl Says Belsen is Never-Ending Shame,” *Guardian*, April 22, 1985.

²⁷⁴ Alan Travis, “Cemetery visit disowned: British Premier Thatcher critical of US President Reagan’s visit to Bitburg, West Germany,” *Guardian*, April 26, 1985; “Sensitivities tend to outweigh commemoration,” *Guardian*, April 22, 1985; Tomforde, “Kohl Says Belsen is Never-Ending Shame”; “Biting the Bitburg Bullet,” *Guardian*, May 1, 1985; “Reagan balm washes Bitburg scars,” *Guardian*, May 6, 1985.

²⁷⁵ “The Past is Not Prologue,” *Economist*, May 4, 1985.

The British media also reported favorably, and in great detail, Von Weizsäcker's speech on the fortieth anniversary of the surrender.²⁷⁶ Von Weizsäcker's speech was lauded by comparison to the recent Jenninger gaffe, and one article concluded that von Weizsäcker in his speech had conveyed "the official view of wartime guilt." The article noted that the Federal President frequently acted as "a counterweight to Chancellor Kohl's reckless bouts of nationalism."²⁷⁷ Thus in their coverage of the events of the 1980s, in addition to keeping a critical and watchful eye on signs of German revisionism, the British press also emphasized West Germany's willingness to come to terms with its past violence.

The British frequently linked German debates over memory to the future of German identity and German intentions. One article commented that Kohl's efforts to normalize German memory represented "an ambitious and controversial step towards answering the question that has long tormented historians and philosophers: Who are the Germans, and what is Germany?"²⁷⁸ Von Weizsäcker's speech was later said to "have redeemed much of his country's reputation."²⁷⁹ While following the Historian's Debate, the press noted its significance went far beyond a simple scholarly dispute. One article said, "The Historian's Quarrel about the Nazi period is really about the future," and about "What kind of people should the Germans be in the nineties?"²⁸⁰ In sum, throughout this period, the British—like the French—observed and sometimes criticized developments on West German remembrance, but viewed German struggles with memory in a measured and sympathetic manner. The British also linked West German remembrance to German identity and German intentions.

²⁷⁶ Anna Tomforde, "VE-Day: Germans Told to Reflect on Past," *Guardian*, May 9, 1985.

²⁷⁷ Walter Schwarz, "Tell It Like it Was." Von Weizsäcker was invited to address a joint session of Britain's Parliament, the first Federal President to be invited for such an event. One article commented that "it was partly on account of that speech that the privilege was given." Jonathan Steele, "The Good Soldier Baron," *Guardian*, June 28, 1986.

²⁷⁸ Anna Tomforde, "History Lesson Raises a Storm," *Guardian*, October 29, 1987.

²⁷⁹ Jonathan Steele, "The Good Soldier Baron."

²⁸⁰ Walter Schwarz, "Tell It Like it Was: Germany's Future Will Depend on How it Understands its Past and the Part Nazism Played in it," *Guardian*, December 28, 1988.

Unification

During debates over unification, the British (like the French) discussed remembrance to a limited extent, but focused their attention on other factors.²⁸¹ Both states expressed fear about an anticipated increase in German power. Both states were concerned about the territorial issue; both states drew reassurance from German democracy. The British and French differed in the extent to which they drew comfort from continued German institutional membership and the U.S. military presence in Europe. The French were less preoccupied with the U.S. offshore balancer than they were with enmeshing unified Germany in European institutions. The notoriously Euro-skeptical British drew no comfort from German institutional membership²⁸² and instead emphasized the need for a continued U.S. military presence in the region.²⁸³

The British debate about German unification yielded conflicting views about the significance of German policies of remembrance. One opinion held that through their admirable efforts at contrition, the modern Germans had restored their national reputation. Proponents of this view cited West German contrition as grounds for trusting unified Germany. In the leaked minutes of Margaret Thatcher's March 1990 meeting on German unification at Chequers, Charles Powell (diplomat and Thatcher's private secretary) transcribed the discussion as follows: "1945 was quite different and marked a sea change. There was...no more militarism. Education and the

²⁸¹ For British discussions of German intentions during the period of German unification, see Sabine Lee, *Victory in Europe*, Chapter 9; James and Stone, eds., *When the Wall Came Down*, pp. 221-252; Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), especially pp. 130-134.

²⁸² Margaret Thatcher herself criticized the view "propagated by the French, but swallowed by the US State Department too—that only a 'united Europe' could keep German power responsibly in check." She stated that this argument "was false," and that "'united Europe' would augment, not check, the power of a united Germany. Germany would pursue its interests inside or outside such a Europe." Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), pp. 783-84. Thatcher noted that "Germany is more rather than less likely to dominate within [a European] framework; for a reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe." (Ibid, p. 791) One scholar wrote, "it is not a fear of jackboots marching through the streets of London, but the fear of a loss of British sovereignty to a Franco-German dominated Europe with the Germans in the driving seat. Ironically, it is not so much the old Germany of the Nazi era that haunts the dreams of Britain's politicians but the specter of the new "Euro-friendly" Germany...." Nile Gardiner, "Forever in the Shadow of Churchill? Britain and the Memory of World War II at the End of the Twentieth Century," Occasional Paper, no. 9, International Security Studies, Yale University, January 1997.

writing of history had changed. There was an innocence of and about the past on the part of the new generation of Germans. We should have no real worries about them.”²⁸⁴ Another participant at the Chequers meeting, Oxford historian Timothy Garton Ash, later wrote:

As several participants pointed out, one of the signal strengths of West Germany has been its capacity for constant, relentless, sometimes almost masochistic self-examination and self-criticism, soundly based on a strong, free press and an exemplary critical historiography. Neither Japan nor Italy, nor indeed Austria, could match this.²⁸⁵

Chequers participant Lord Dacre (Hugh Trevor-Roper) commented at the meeting that he had viewed the Auschwitz war crimes trials at Frankfurt, “and was delighted to see how the younger generation were totally untouched by the spirit of Nazism and were appalled by what they had heard at the trial. This, he said, convinced him that there had indeed been a sea change in German thinking.”²⁸⁶ Historian Gordon Craig argued at the meeting that “one couldn’t make any criticism of the Nazi past that had not been made by the Germans themselves a thousand times over”; he noted that “some of the breast-beating was almost embarrassing.”²⁸⁷ Participant George Urban wrote in his account of Chequers, “no one would wish to deny the Nazis’ guilt, least of all the Germans themselves.” Urban noted that most participants had agreed that although there could be no guarantee of benign German behavior in the future,

we could say that the record of the Federal Republic had been very good. German attitudes, both private and public, had fundamentally changed since 1945. The teaching of history in German schools was so thoroughly reformed that we need not fear a return of extreme nationalism, much less any kind of Nazi mentality.²⁸⁸

²⁸³ Thatcher argued, “Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest states in Europe -- Britain and France -- are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European super-state.” Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 791.

²⁸⁴ Charles Powell “What the PM Learned About the Germans,” in Harold James and Marla Stone, eds., *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification* (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 234.

²⁸⁵ Timothy Garton Ash, “The Chequers Affair,” *New York Review of Books*, September 27, 1990. Also reprinted in James and Stone, *When the Wall Came Down*, pp. 232-246.

²⁸⁶ Lord Dacre’s remarks reported by George R. Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher: An Insider’s View* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 134.

²⁸⁷ Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion*, p. 142.

²⁸⁸ Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion*, p. 134.

British historian Martin Gilbert also opined that “now that the Germans have acknowledged and paid for their war crimes,” they can put their past “behind them.”²⁸⁹ Thus many British observers argued that German policies of contrition were grounds for trusting unified Germany.

A second view expressed during this period, however, dismissed German contrition as an unreliable or irrelevant signal of German intentions. Advisors who met with Thatcher observed that it had apparently never occurred to the British Prime Minister to be reassured by German contrition. George Urban wrote in his diary,

I think the prime minister was not quite aware of [German contrition]. She seemed to have no knowledge of the strength of the anti-Nazi element in German politics, or of the power of self-incrimination in the whole of post-war German political culture. This point...was strongly made by several of us, especially Gordon Craig, but also by Lord Dacre, none of which, however...made a decisive impression.

Thatcher and others argued that although West Germany may have pursued deferential policies in the past, things would be different in unified Germany. Thatcher’s dismissal of German contrition was partly based on her view that the introduction of the East Germans would change the politics of the Federal Republic. She questioned, “could the Germans be trusted? What about those Prussians and Saxons who were now joining West Germany but had had no experience, since 1933, of any political system other than Nazism and Stalinism? How did we know what they might do or think?”²⁹⁰ Others also argued that unified Germany would abandon policies of deference and contrition in favor of nationalism. One leading journalist commented, “Reunification will be celebrated with an explosion of nationalist enthusiasm, and rejection of everything thought to have been imposed on Germany.”²⁹¹ He commented that revisionism would replace contrition in unified Germany: that “Germans have spent too long groveling to foreigners” and that “now Germany will get off its knees.” The author noted that “Nationalist intellectuals will explain that

²⁸⁹ Martin Gilbert, “Finding a New Weak Link,” *New York Times*, September 27, 1990. Also reprinted in James and Stone, *When the Wall Came Down*, p. 247.

²⁹⁰ Margaret Thatcher’s remarks at the March 1990 Chequers meeting, reported by participant George Urban. Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion*, p. 133.

²⁹¹ Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Beware, the Reich is Reviving,” *Times*, October 31, 1989. O’Brien was former editor of the London *Observer* newspaper.

true Germans should feel not guilt but pride about the Holocaust....The self-awarded 'not-guilty' verdict will be welcomed by the German public."

Other observers made arguments about Germany's future behavior based not on Germany's more recent policies of contrition, but on its more distant history of aggression and genocide. British discussions of an unchanging and malign German national character,²⁹² most common among members of the generation who had experienced the war, dismissed the view that through remembrance (or democratization, or anything else), the Germans have "changed their spots." As one scholar summarized, "there is a populist, age-old suspicion of the German race, coupled with resentment mixed with fear, which has resurfaced in the 1990s in reaction to German unification and Chancellor Kohl's vision of a unified Europe."²⁹³

The German "national character" thesis was expressed repeatedly by Prime Minister Thatcher. Thatcher wrote in her autobiography, "I do believe in national character," and argued that "since the unification of Germany under Bismarck...Germany has veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt."²⁹⁴ Thatcher told advisors, "We know perfectly well what the Germans are like...and how national character basically doesn't change."²⁹⁵ Chequers participant George Urban noted that Thatcher listened to the arguments of scholars at the meeting who discussed German atonement for the war and Holocaust, and the Federal Republic's resounding success at creating a responsible, stable democracy. Urban comments, "I'm not sure that MT was swayed by any of this, because she went on and on telling us, 'Yes, yes, but you can't *trust* them.'"

²⁹⁶

Inherent distrust of the Germans was also bluntly expressed by Trade Minister Nicholas Ridley in an infamous interview with the *Spectator* magazine in 1990. Ridley said that European

²⁹² This view harkens back to "Vansittartism": distrust of Germany based on an unchanging and violent national character. See fn 258.

²⁹³ Gardiner, "Forever in the Shadow of Churchill?", p. 30.

²⁹⁴ Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, p. 791.

²⁹⁵ Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion*, p. 104.

²⁹⁶ Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion*, p. 134.

monetary union was “a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has to be thwarted.”²⁹⁷ Ridley added, “I’m not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might just as well give it to Adolph Hitler, frankly.” Ridley’s comments sparked outrage in the British media, and he was eventually fired from his post. However, as the *Economist* argued, “Mr. Ridley’s words, however ill-advised, reflect the visceral feelings of millions of fellow-Britons, thousands of Tory party workers and scores, if not hundreds, of Tory MPs.”²⁹⁸

In sum, during debates over German unification, the British were chiefly preoccupied with the increase in German power. Like the French, the British were concerned with territorial issues. They were the most concerned with maintaining a U.S. military presence in Europe (viewing European institutions as insufficient to restrain German power, unlike the French). British journalists and scholars also discussed the issue of German remembrance during debates over unification, although opinions were mixed about how reliably it signaled Germany’s future intentions.

Late Period

In the years after German unification, the British, like the French, continued to monitor German remembrance and expressed the view that German contrition was a sign of benign German intentions. The media reported and expressed concern about revisionist trends in German memory and commemoration. The press followed the controversy sparked by Martin Walser’s statements that Germany should no longer be preoccupied with the shameful past.²⁹⁹ The media described the activities of German conservatives upon the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender (the attempt to

²⁹⁷ Dominic Lawson, “Saying the Unsayable About the Germans,” *Spectator*, July 14, 1990, p. 8.

²⁹⁸ *Economist*, July 14, 1990.

²⁹⁹ “Historical Dilemma Sparks Strong Reactions,” *Financial Times*, June 1, 1999; “Holocaust Debate Highlights a Divided Germany,” *Financial Times*, December 15, 1998.

emphasize Germany's victimhood).³⁰⁰ One article reported "for the first time since the war, a process is under ways that stresses not only Nazi crimes but the wrongs done to the Germans."³⁰¹

Nevertheless, for the most part the British recognize Germany's extensive campaign of remembrance and express admiration for it. The media report a myriad of German commemorative and cultural events, memorials, and museums: the memorial to the 1933 book burning; the opening of the museum at the Wannsee villa; German reactions to the film "Schindler's List"; and the charitable activities of German youths abroad.³⁰² One article said that the German media "have flooded the public with recollections of the war years. Every town has felt obliged to mount lectures and exhibitions. Berlin alone is staging more than 40 war exhibitions or performances. 'Never again' has been the signature to this deluge."³⁰³ Another article points out "the massive cultural and educational efforts to raise Germans with a strong sense of history and awareness of their past. There are few subjects at school that play as big a role as history. Classes focus on discussions, rather than dates, and critical questions are encouraged."³⁰⁴ A survey of German literature survey reports that the country's bookstores "cater amply to a national taste for self-flagellating doom and gloom."³⁰⁵ Another article discusses the near-annual intellectual debates that play out in academe and the national media; the article notes that such debates "always focus on the past and the issue of coming to terms with the Third Reich," and argues that the debates are "therapeutic" for German political culture.³⁰⁶

The British press covered two post-unification events in great detail: the "Goldhagen debate," and the German debate over the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. Goldhagen's

³⁰⁰ "German Right Puts Fresh Gloss on Nazi History," *Guardian*, May 9, 1995.

³⁰¹ "German Right Puts Fresh Gloss on Nazi History."

³⁰² "Berlin At Last Opens Memorial to Holocaust," *Guardian*, January 20, 1992; "Testimony to Shame," *Evening Standard*, January 21, 1992; "'Library' Recalls Berlin's Shame," *Guardian*, March 22, 1995; "Schindler's List Taxes Germans," *Guardian*, March 2, 1994; "Volunteers: The Guilt Trip," *Guardian*, June 19, 1996.

³⁰³ "German Right Puts Fresh Gloss on Nazi History."

³⁰⁴ "Historical Dilemma Sparks Strong Reactions."

³⁰⁵ "Do Mention the War," *Financial Times*, November 1, 2003.

³⁰⁶ "Ritual Rows that are Running Out of Steam," *Financial Times*, December 16, 2000.

book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (see Chapter Five) was said to reopen “an angst-ridden debate on what it is to be a German and whether his verdict of collective guilt is valid.”³⁰⁷ The author attracted a following that the British noted was comparable only to “Michael Jackson concerts,” and Goldhagen’s book tour was referred to as a “road show.”³⁰⁸ One article noted that the book “struck a chord in young Germans”;³⁰⁹ another commented that “those who believed discussion of the Holocaust had come to an end in Germany now have to accept that the opposite is the case.”³¹⁰ As for the Holocaust memorial, the British media commented that the extensive debate it provoked centered on “the eternal question of how Germany addresses its past,” and “should Berlin wallow in remorse or build afresh?”³¹¹ Another article noted that the memorial “in the heart of reunified Berlin “has raised questions about Germany’s attitude to its history...and to its vision of the ‘Berlin republic.’”³¹² In sum, in the post-unification period, like their French counterparts, the British observed German remembrance, noted Germany’s extensive efforts at contrition, and linked these efforts to the broader issues of German identity and German behavior within Europe.

Summary: British Perceptions of Germany

In the introduction of this section, I argued that to uphold the findings of the apology theory in the French case, I should find the following to be true in British perceptions of German remembrance. First, the British should be interested in German remembrance, particularly education; second, German contrition should have weak positive effects on British perceptions of German intentions.

Both findings were borne out in this brief examination. First, the British media and scholars do monitor German remembrance (like the French, British leaders rely much less on this

³⁰⁷ “Book Ignites Holocaust Row,” *Guardian*, April 16, 1996. Also see “Holocaust Historian Brought to Book,” *Guardian*, August 23, 1997.

³⁰⁸ “German Guilt Brought to Book,” *Guardian*, September 11, 1996.

³⁰⁹ “Holocaust Historian Brought to Book.”

³¹⁰ “German Guilt Brought to Book.”

³¹¹ “Blank Page in National History Book,” *Financial Times*, August 31, 1998.

indicator). In the occupation and thereafter, the British were clearly the most interested in German education policy out of all the various forms of remembrance: because of the perceived importance of defusing nationalistic sentiment in education policy as a means to encourage successful democratization.

Second, as in the French case, German contrition had positive effects on perceptions of German intentions, but to a limited extent. Contrition was frequently discussed without comment about what it signified about Germany; usually, it was presented as an interesting news story rather than as a signal about Germany. Many British observers were skeptical whether contrition was more telling than a more permanent—and negative—German national character. Finally, other British observers expressed doubts that contrition would last beyond German unification; some people viewed it as an artifact of Germany's years of division, to be abandoned once Germany got what it had wanted all along. In sum, sometimes people expressed very positive views of German intentions based on West German contrition, but others expressed doubts that it was sincere, lasting, or reliable as a signal of true German intent in the future.

Thus I find that German contrition had a weak positive effect on British perceptions of German intentions. My examination of the British case thus yields further support for the findings about the apology theory found in French case; parallel findings in both cases bolsters the assertion that French reactions to German remembrance were not idiosyncratic.

CONCLUSIONS

The case of Franco-German relations since World War II yields evidence for the effects of remembrance and other variables on threat perception, as well as two other findings.

³¹² "German MPs Back Jewish Memorial," *Guardian*, June 26, 1999. Another article commented that "The debate over the memorial has highlighted the complexity of Germany's relationship with its history." See "Haunted Still: A Bow to the Past Clouds Germany's Future," *Guardian*, August 12, 1998.

Perception of Intentions

This case provides some evidence in support of the apology theory. As argued in the first section of this chapter, there is some evidence that policies of remembrance affected French, and British, perception of German intentions. In the early period, the French viewed candid German remembrance of the Nazi past as essential for German democratization. To support candid German remembrance, the French undertook educational reforms during the occupation, and also worked with the West Germans in joint history textbook commissions. The British also perceived a link between history education and the pacification and democratization of Germany.

In the middle and late periods, scholars and, in particular, the French media appear very interested in German remembrance. They monitor its evolution, and praise German contrition. Sometimes they link German remembrance to perceptions of German intentions. During negotiations over German unification, observers expressed optimism about German intentions based on German contrition; following unification, people expressed relief that unified Germany continued with policies of contrition, rather than more nationalistic policies. Reactions among British commentators were similar.

However, throughout the post-World War II period, French leaders did not talk about German remembrance when they discussed German intentions. They did not discuss German remembrance during debates over German unification, when the theory would have expected French leaders to talk about German contrition as a reassuring factor. (British Prime Minister Thatcher was also apparently unaware of or uninterested in German contrition.) Furthermore, in interviews, French elites never independently raised the issue of remembrance when discussing Germany; they focused on other issues. In sum, this case yields weak support for the apology theory. Although one may argue that the French case is idiosyncratic for political, cultural, or historical reasons, an examination of the British case provides further support for these findings.

Perception of Threat

Remembrance may have played some role in reducing French threat perception of Germany, but it appears to have been much less significant than other factors. The French were most preoccupied with German capabilities and other signals of intentions. In the early postwar period, the French feared West Germany because it was rearming; it was not yet credibly constrained by the United States or multilateral institutions, and German intentions were suspect because of territorial claims. French threat perception of Germany dropped because of the imposition of credible constraints, such as the presence of offshore balancers, and institutional constraints on German power.

Upon German unification, French threat perception increased not only because of an anticipated increase in German capabilities, but also because of uncertainties about German intentions: namely, uncertainties about whether Germany would demand territorial revision, or would it agree to constrain its own power within international institutions. In sum, French threat perception was affected by factors relating to both German capabilities and intentions. Remembrance may have lowered French threat perception of Germany, but this factor appears to have played a much smaller role than capabilities or other intentions variables (territorial claims, institutional membership, and democracy).

In addition to the findings about the apology theory, the Franco-German case raises two other important contributions to debates about remembrance in international relations.

Apology Backlash

The French are aware of the dangers of “apology backlash.” The fear that German contrition might provoke domestic backlash has troubled the Allies—and, indeed, the West Germans—since the early days after World War II.³¹³ Today, the French express admiration for German contrition,

³¹³ Fear of German backlash, which would empower the right, was a prominent objection to Allied policies of re-education during the occupation. See Kurt Jürgensen, “British Occupation Policy After 1945 and the Problem of Re-educating Germany,” *History*, Vol. 68, no. 223 (June 1983), p. 242; Lothar Kettenaker, “The Planning of “Re-Education” During the Second World War,” in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies after World War II* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), pp. 63-67. Jeffrey Herf argues that West German conservatives wanted to downplay policies of memory and contrition in the 1950s, because they feared they would have destabilizing effects on the young German democracy; their priority was to first establish the FRG as a strong German state, and they viewed contrition as potentially interfering with this goal, as it might

but many observers say Germany has gone too far, and that in the end, contrition may prove to be destabilizing. The French are not alone in this view; it is a common theme in British thinking as well.³¹⁴ The French argue that what is most important for peace is the stability of German democracy; they say excessive contrition threatens to empower German rightists, who could use latent popular dissatisfaction with German self-flagellation to propel themselves into power. One scholar comments, "We should admire and congratulate the Germans for remembering. They're still doing it. But I understand that the youth are weary of it."³¹⁵ Another scholar comments, "Germany's admission of her past and her willingness to deal with it... is a major component of Germany's rehabilitation. But sometimes there are debates within Germany that this has gone too far."³¹⁶ Alfred Grosser comments, "Germany has issued too many apologies: speeches, monuments, articles, etc. Martin Walser was perfectly right to say he cannot stand it anymore. A lot of young people in Germany sympathize. I worry that the far right in Germany will prey upon this feeling."³¹⁷ Interviewing a museum curator at the "Crimes of the *Wehrmacht*" exhibition, a journalist asked, "Aren't you risking going too far? Provoking reactions such as Martin Walser's?"³¹⁸ An article notes, "For the generations of Germans to come, there is a happy medium to find between irresponsible repression and paralyzing culpability: between the desire for normality and the necessity of preserving the memory of the Third Reich."³¹⁹ Germany's extensive

provoke a backlash that would bring nationalists back to power. For discussion see Chapter Five, p. 249; also Herf, *Divided Memory*.

³¹⁴ Noting that "Germans feel that they are given little credit" for their efforts at remembrance" is "Historical Dilemma Sparks Strong Reactions," *Financial Times*, June 1, 1999. Another article comments, "Many Germans, especially younger generations, are tired of being branded abroad as Nazis and tainted by events which they see as belonging to the country's distant past." "Holocaust Debate Highlights a Divided Germany," *Financial Times*, December 15, 1998; also see "Ritual Rows That Are Running Out of Steam," *Financial Times*, December 16, 2000;

³¹⁵ Personal Interview, CERI, October 2002.

³¹⁶ Personal Interview 6, IFRI, October 2002.

³¹⁷ Personal Interview, October 2002.

³¹⁸ Lorraine Millot, "A Berlin, dits et non-dits de l'Holocauste," *Libération*, January 28, 2002.

³¹⁹ Pascale Hughes, *Le Point*, January 9, 1999.

policies of contrition are even cited as evidence of a dangerous cultural tendency toward excess.³²⁰ Thus German efforts to not appear fanatical are viewed as—fanatical. In sum, the French express fears that there is a happy medium when it comes to contrition, and that the Germans have gone too far, with potentially destabilizing consequences.

The Past in Service of the Future

Although the French did not seek German apologies, they and the West Germans did use commemoration to further their goals of reconciliation. The French and West Germans pursued bilateral commemoration, rather than unilateral German apologies; it actually promoted amnesia of World War II, and it featured gestures of forgiveness as well as contrition.

First, the French did not demand or expect German apologies; rather French and West German leaders staged joint commemorative events. President de Gaulle advocated bilateral commemoration that would symbolize and reinforce Franco-German reconciliation. Hence the joint mass attended by de Gaulle and Adenauer at Rheims Cathedral, and the joint Franco-German military parade. De Gaulle wrote that the visit to Rheims was an important symbol of Franco-German reconciliation; Rheims was

the symbol of our age-old traditions, but also the scene of many an encounter between the hereditary enemies, from the ancient Germanic invasions to the battles of the Marne. In the cathedral, whose wounds were not fully healed, the first Frenchman and the first German came together to pray that on either side of the Rhine the deeds of friendship might forever supplant the miseries of war.³²¹

Later, in the 1984 ceremony at Verdun cemetery, President Mitterrand continued in this tradition of creating positive new focal points: images of reconciliation to replace images of death and devastation. Mitterrand commented that he felt the commemoration at Verdun “would be a symbol, and such symbols were important.”³²² Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

³²⁰ One scholar commented, “There is an element of fanaticism, extremism in German culture so we have to doubt them. Even the Green party today, in its fanatical pacifism, scares me a little bit. There is an element of German extremism that cannot be denied.” Personal Interview 4, IFRI, October 2002.

³²¹ de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 180.

³²² Quoted in the *Guardian*, September 24, 1984.

were photographed at Verdun holding hands over the graves of French and German soldiers (700,000 perished in the World War I battle). Mitterrand commented that it was one of those grand moments in which “*la coeur parle*” [the heart speaks].³²³ The two leaders issued a joint statement, saying “We have been reconciled.” It proclaimed, “We make a historic gesture today to show that our two peoples have irreversibly taken the path of peace, reason, and friendly cooperation.”³²⁴ After Verdun, the French media celebrated Franco-German reconciliation. The haunting image of the two leaders decorated French newspapers and magazines. One article notes, “François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, hand-in-hand, sealed Franco-German reconciliation.”³²⁵ An editorial comments, “the silent meditation of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl standing hand-in-hand in front of the Verdun graves last fall was an emotional symbol for the French and German people.”³²⁶ Thus part of Franco-German reconciliation included bilateral commemorative efforts.

Second, Franco-German commemorations actually reflect amnesia rather than remembrance of World War II. In their commemoration, the two countries did not recall images from World War II. Verdun was a World War I battlefield. Indeed, at the time, Alfred Grosser criticized the commemoration, saying that to reconcile after World War II, the two leaders should have met at Dachau.³²⁷ However another scholar argued that amnesia about recent events was exactly what made reconciliation possible. He commented that “Kohl and Mitterrand could reconcile themselves at Verdun because it symbolizes World War I, not World War II.”³²⁸ One scholar later noted, “Franco-German reconciliation was based on forgetting—there was a tacit agreement not to talk about the past.”³²⁹ Henry Rousso argues that although French and German leaders

³²³ Quoted in the *Guardian*, September 24, 1984.

³²⁴ “Franco-German Joint Statement,” Agence-France Presse, September 22, 1984.

³²⁵ “France-Allemagne: la paix de Verdun,” *Quotidien de Paris*, September 24, 1984.

³²⁶ Editorial, “Moral Confusion in Washington,” *Le Monde*, April 18, 1985.

³²⁷ Alfred Grosser, *La Croix*, September XX, 1984. For similar reactions after de Gaulle’s visit to West Germany in 1962, see Marcel Fourier, “...Mais il a oublié d’aller a Dachau!” *Libération*, September 10, 1962.

³²⁸ Director of IFRI, quoted in the *Guardian*, September 24, 1984.

³²⁹ Personal Interview, IFRI 2, October 2002.

remember the Holocaust, “France and Germany forget one dimension of World War II: they forget the major confrontation between two European great powers.”³³⁰ Rousso and others comment that this might be interpreted as a French desire to avoid focusing on a humiliating and painful period, and similarly as a German desire to focus on events that minimized German culpability, and instead fixed blame on geopolitics, rather than on German barbarity. However Rousso argues that the focus on World War I is also a positive thing, because “to understand and solve the Franco-German problem, you need to go back further to World War I and before.” Rousso comments that Franco-German remembrance was explicitly geared toward furthering the policy goal of European integration: “all of this memory is a way to reinforce European consciousness and the need for European unity.” Another scholar also argues that in de Gaulle’s commemoration with West Germany, “he implicitly placed the Second World War within the line of the 1870 and the 1914-18 wars, imputing to these conflicts the same objective: that of European unity.”³³¹ In short, Franco-German remembrance stressed deep historical themes. It did not commemorate the German invasion of France or German war crimes; it put the blame for past violence on European geopolitics rather than on German barbarism. Remembrance was put in service of the goal of European integration, which was heralded as the solution to these deeply rooted problems.

A third key feature of Franco-German remembrance is the element of forgiveness. This was a dramatic theme of de Gaulle’s 1962 visit to Germany. One scholar writes that

[one] objective of the voyage was to seal definitively Franco-German reconciliation, rooting it within the collective unconscious of public opinion; this was impossible as long as the German national identity remained strained under the weight of culpability regarding France.³³²

With the goal of easing this burden of guilt, De Gaulle astounded the Germans during his visit with his respectful and generous remarks. Addressing West German youth he said, “I am happy for

³³⁰ Personal Interview, October 2002.

³³¹ Cécile Leconte, “Resurgence De La Question Identitaire en Republique Federale.” *Allemagne d’Aujourd’hui* Vol. 149 (1999), pp. 101-117.

³³² Leconte, “Resurgence De La Question Identitaire,” p. 102.

you to be the children of a grand people—yes! A grand people, who at times committed in the course of their history great errors...but who also enriched the world, who bequeathed it a rich spiritual, scientific, and philosophical heritage.”³³³ The West Germans were stunned. West German commentators discussed “the immense emotional impact of the speech,” calling it “a veritable revelation.” Headlines in West German papers proclaimed: “de Gaulle and the surmounting of the past”; “de Gaulle returned Germans their history”; “de Gaulle taught Germans to recover their national pride.”³³⁴ Although the French president’s approach was not without its critics, the element of forgiveness appears to have played an important role in Franco-German remembrance and reconciliation.³³⁵ In sum, remembrance—vague, non-accusatory, and forgiving—has featured in Franco-German reconciliation. As former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine comments, “From De Gaulle and Adenauer at Rheims cathedral, to Mitterrand and Kohl at Verdun, symbolism has been essential to remind us of our history, its excesses, and joint action we have taken to rebuild the Franco-German relationship from the top down.”³³⁶

³³³ Quoted in Leconte, “Resurgence De La Question Identitaire,” p. 103.

³³⁴ Quoted in Leconte, “Resurgence De La Question Identitaire.” p. 103.

³³⁵ Alfred Grosser wrote at the time: “The fashion in which General de Gaulle evoked the German past is not without danger for the future of the German democracy.” Grosser, *La Croix*, December 9, 1962.

³³⁶ Quoted in *Libération*, November 24, 1998.

Conclusion

Apologies and other acts of contrition would appear to have beneficial effects on international relations. They restore relationships between individuals, and lessen the torment felt by individual victims of government-sponsored violence. Scholars argue that truth-telling and contrition contribute to reconciliation and peace building within states. The experiences of post-World War II Europe and Asia also suggest that contrition is important reconciliation *between* states. West Germany's unprecedented efforts at contrition have been accompanied by a dramatic reconciliation between Germany and her neighbors. Images of Hitler and the Nazis have been replaced by images of the solid German bureaucrat, and the loyal ally standing hand-in-hand with François Mitterrand at Verdun. Furthermore, the importance of apologies is also suggested by the negative effects of denials. The world criticizes Japan for failing to come to terms with its past. Japan sees itself as pacifist, cooperative, and a generous global citizen, with a strong anti-war and anti-nuclear identity. But over a half-century later, Japan's neighbors still see bayoneted babies. Relations between Japan and her neighbors remain fraught with distrust. Thus all of this suggests that contrition is a necessary and powerful force in international reconciliation.

Although many people have advocated contrition in peace building, its effects have never been empirically tested. Hence this study addressed the question of whether one state's policies of remembrance—apologetic versus unapologetic—affect the extent to which the state is seen as threatening to others. This project finds extensive evidence for the damaging effects of unapologetic remembrance such as denials; an offender's acknowledgement of its past violence appears essential to build trust and reduce threat perception in the eyes of former victims.

However this study also finds that the added gains from pursuing policies of contrition are actually small, and that contrition may have backlash effects that ultimately worsen relations.

PROJECT SUMMARY

This project outlined and tested an “apology theory” of threat perception. The apology theory posits that apologetic remembrance reduces threat perception between states by conveying benign intentions. Conversely, unapologetic remembrance (such as denial or glorification) increases threat perception by conveying malign intentions. “Apologetic” remembrance is defined as policies or statements that reflect admission and remorse for past violence; “unapologetic” remembrance is defined as policies of remembrance that lack either attribute.

I test the apology theory in two cases: South Korean threat perception of Japan, and French threat perception of Germany, both since World War II. First, I test for the effects of remembrance on perceptions of intentions, and then I also evaluate the extent to which intentions (including remembrance) influence threat perception relative to capabilities. As I test the apology theory, I take into account competing variables that scholars have argued affect perceptions of intentions (territorial claims, regime type, institutional membership) and perception of threat (power and constraints).

To assess the extent to which findings from these cases might be idiosyncratic, I test to see if they are upheld in three “mini-cases”: Chinese and Australian perceptions of Japan, and British perceptions of Germany.

Japan and South Korea

Japanese remembrance was unapologetic in all three periods after World War II. In the early postwar period, leaders said frankly that Korea was a backward nation that was lucky to have

been colonized by Japan because Japanese policies there contributed to its economic development. Korea, they said, should be paying *Japan* reparations. The Japanese did not reflect on the policies of violence pursued by Japan in the course of the occupation. Starting in the 1960s, Japan began its “apology diplomacy”; apologies were offered by Shiina, Hirohito, and Nakasone. However, Japan also exhibited less apologetic remembrance. “Gaffes” disputing or justifying Japanese aggression were made by Fujio and Okuno in the 1980s. LDP efforts to make Japanese education more patriotic caused two domestic and diplomatic disputes in that decade over the perceived whitewashing of textbooks. Politicians began paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, which was perceived by domestic and international critics as veneration of war criminals. In the post-Cold War period, a surge in Japanese remembrance occurred. Leaders began issuing remarkable apologies, notably Hosokawa, Murayama, and Obuchi. After decades of silence, Tokyo acknowledged the sex slaves of the Imperial Army. The Japanese Diet debated a resolution to apologize for the war. Legal victories by Professor Ienaga Saburo expanded coverage of Japan’s wartime atrocities in Japanese textbooks. The increase in contrition sparked strong domestic controversy; many leaders made statements justifying, denying, or glorifying Japan’s past actions. A conservative group wrote a history textbook that was criticized as whitewashing Japanese aggression and atrocities; approved by the Japanese government in 2001, this sparked another international dispute over textbooks. Today, Japanese remembrance remains highly contested, with forces from the right and left both battling for dominance of the national narrative.

Because Japanese remembrance was *unapologetic* across all three postwar periods, the apology theory makes predictions for congruence and reasoning. The theory does not make predictions for variation across the time periods, but it expects the level of South Korean

perceptions of Japanese intentions to be at least somewhat *malign*. Koreans should be saying Japan is not trustworthy and is hostile to Korea. Furthermore, in their reasoning Koreans should link negative perceptions of Japanese intentions to Japan's unapologetic remembrance.

Evidence from this case upholds these predictions. Korean perceptions of Japanese intentions have been consistently *malign* across the postwar era. In their reasoning, Koreans consistently link their negative perceptions of Japanese intentions to Japan's unapologetic remembrance.

Having coded ROK perceptions of Japanese intentions as *malign* across all three periods, I then tested the extent to which policies of remembrance influence overall Korean threat perception of Japan relative to other factors. I find that remembrance had little effect on threat perception. Despite the perception of *malign* Japanese intentions since World War II, Korean threat perception dropped in the middle period and remained *low* thereafter. Evidence from congruence testing and from Korean reasoning shows that the most important factor in ROK threat perception has been constraints on Japanese capabilities: the presence of the U.S. offshore balancer. Evidence from this case shows that, contrary to pessimistic assessments of East Asian security, irrational spirals of conflict related to historical memory will not develop in the absence of real capabilities. However given strong Japanese capabilities, *malign* perceptions of Japanese intentions—based on Japanese denial—will exacerbate regional threat perception.

France and Germany

This study also examined the dynamics of remembrance in relations between Germany and France. In the immediate postwar years, German remembrance was unapologetic about Nazi crimes; like Japan, the West Germans focused on their own suffering. The West Germans acknowledged Nazi crimes, and under Adenauer, accepted moral responsibility for them by

paying reparations to Israel. However in the early period, West German ceremonies, commemorative sites, and textbooks avoided focusing on Nazi crimes. West German remembrance underwent a profound transformation in the 1960s. In both unofficial realms such as the media and academe, as well as in state policy, West German efforts at contrition began in earnest and continued through the “social-liberal era” of the 1970s. Concentration camp sites opened as museums. Willy Brandt knelt before the Warsaw Ghetto in a powerful gesture of atonement. Political leaders began attending commemoration ceremonies, offering profound statements of apology. West Germany began indicting perpetrators of World War II atrocities, and began paying reparations to victims. All of this contrition sparked a counter-movement in the 1980s. Many German elites sought to “normalize” the German past through a blurring of victims and perpetrators. This trend led West German conservatives—who had formerly sought to downplay remembrance—to join with the Left in support of contrition.

After Germany reunified in 1990, the end of the Cold War, the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender, and the need to situate German pasts within a unified national identity led to a tremendous upsurge in German remembrance. German contrition burgeoned through museums, monuments, days of commemoration, and increased reparations. Although this upsurge of contrition prompted criticism from some German elites, most Germans continued to stress the need for contrite remembrance after unification.

I code German remembrance as *unapologetic* in the early postwar period, and as *apologetic* thereafter. Thus the apology theory predicts West German intentions should appear more *benign* starting in the 1960s. If French perceptions of German intentions are ever *malign* in the middle or late periods, this would be inconsistent with the apology theory. The apology theory also makes predictions for reasoning; in the early period the French should talk about

German amnesia as contributing to their doubts about Germany; later they should say Bonn's apologetic remembrance makes West Germany appear more trustworthy.

Evidence from the case provides weak support for the apology theory. The apology theory passes the congruence test because, consistent with the theory's expectations, German intentions were seen as *uncertain* in the middle period, and then *benign* in the late period. However the congruence test is inconclusive because this finding is also consistent with the expectations of competing variables (institutions and regime type).

Reasoning data also yields some support for the apology theory. In the early period, the French worked to promote a candid acknowledgment of the past in West German education, with the goal of democratizing the FRG. They showed no interest in other West German policies of remembrance. In the middle and late periods, scholars and the media appear very interested in German remembrance. They monitor and praise German contrition. Sometimes they link German remembrance to perceptions of German intentions. However, throughout the post-World War II period, French leaders did not talk about German remembrance when they discussed German intentions. They did not discuss German remembrance during debates over German unification, when the theory would have expected French leaders to mention German contrition as a reassuring factor. Furthermore, in interviews, French elites never raised the issue of remembrance when discussing Germany; overwhelmingly, they focused on other issues. In sum, this case yields weak support for the argument that contrition has important effects on perceptions of intentions and threat.

I next tested the relative weight of remembrance in French threat perception of Germany. French threat perception as *moderate* in the early period, dropping to *low* after 1960. Threat perception spiked briefly to *moderate* in 1989-90 upon German unification. This pattern is

congruent with changes in German capabilities, although benign signals of German intentions may also have reduced French threat perception. In their reasoning, the French emphasized factors related to German capabilities and German intentions (most importantly, territorial claims, institutional membership, and democracy). It is possible that German contrition reduced French fears of Germany, but this factor appears relatively unimportant compared to capabilities and other signals of intentions. I found no direct evidence that French leaders were reassured by German contrition; the French media and academe, however, followed German remembrance of its past and some expressed confidence in Germany because of its acts of contrition.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The project has three major findings with implications both for international relations theory and for policy making. First, I find that denial of past violence damages bilateral relations; it fuels distrust and increases threat perception between states. To establish productive and friendly relations, states must acknowledge past violence. Evidence from the Japan-ROK case supports this point; Japanese denial of its past actions—e.g., statements by high-ranking leaders, and whitewashing of history textbooks—has fueled distrust and dislike of Japan within the ROK, and raised South Korean fears of a Japanese threat. Australians and Chinese also say they distrust Japan because of its unapologetic policies of remembrance. Further evidence for the importance of acknowledging past violence can be found in Europe. After World War II, the Allies felt it was vital to instill a candid presentation of recent history in West German textbooks. Candid history teaching was seen as essential for preventing a recurrence of West German aggression, promoting German democratization, and furthering the development of a transnational European identity through institutions.

My second finding is that moving beyond acknowledgement of past violence—for example, undertaking extensive policies of contrition—yields little benefit. The European case

provides evidence for this point; when the French discuss their perceptions of German intentions, they emphasize factors other than remembrance: particularly institutional membership, territorial claims, and democratization. French threat perception of Germany is also strongly driven by capabilities (particularly France's nuclear deterrent and Germany's low level of conventional military power). In sum, West German acknowledgement of Nazi crimes helped start the process of Franco-German reconciliation—and had important interaction effects with other reassuring factors such as democratization and institutional membership. However, Germany's extensive contrition policies had little effect.

Third, moving beyond a basic acknowledgement of past violence to policies of contrition may ultimately *hurt* bilateral relations. The case of Japan suggests that policies of contrition can trigger domestic backlash; as one leader apologizes for past violence, others react by denying, justifying, or glorifying the country's past behavior. Contrition may thus inadvertently have negative effects on bilateral relations because the backlash it triggers fuels distrust of the country's intentions and raises threat perception. Although significant backlash did not occur in West Germany—even in response to much stronger acts of contrition than were offered in Japan—evidence suggests Germany is likely to be an outlier in this regard. West Germany's circumstances after World War II were unique, and other cases from around the world show that backlash is common. The potential backlash effect from contrition is an important finding for the academic and activist literatures on post-conflict peace-building, which often recommend policies of contrition, but have neglected to consider its potential negative effects.

Implications

This analysis has implications for both international relations theory and policy. Regarding international relations theory, many scholars have debated whether intentions play a significant

role in threat assessment.¹ This study finds support for theories of threat perception that incorporate perception of intentions as well as capabilities. Perceptions of intentions do factor into threat assessment, and the empirical testing in this study shows they are influenced by policies of remembrance, regime type, territorial claims, and institutional membership. However this study also finds support for the central role of capabilities in threat assessment; states only fear those states that have *both* the capabilities and the intentions to do harm. Observers of East Asia often argue that emotionalism and resentment based on historical memory may trigger spirals of conflict between Japan and her former victims.² However this study finds that resentment of Japanese denials does not translate to irrational assessments of a Japanese threat; Japan is not feared because it does not have both the capabilities and the intentions to harm its neighbors.

This study also has implications for policy making. In the aftermath of conflict, states should acknowledge past violence in order to promote conflict resolution and peace building. Denials are harmful to future relations. Leaders should not deny or glorify past violence; textbooks should present a candid portrayal of the state's past actions. However although offenders should acknowledge past violence, they should not pursue policies of contrition that

¹ Neorealists argue that capabilities drive threat perception; see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Defensive realists argue that perceptions of intentions can influence threat perception if signals are credible. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* Vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing"; David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: How Perceptions of Intentions Influence International Politics," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2000. Scholars in the constructivist paradigm argue that threat perception will be affected by perception of intentions, including signals that demonstrate a state's liberal or peaceful identity. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp.171-200; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-399; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wendt. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* Vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391-426.

² Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," Dujarric, ed. *Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia*; Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia"; Kristof, "The Problem of Memory." Also see Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156.

are likely to provoke denials at home, and thus prove counterproductive. For their part, victims should not pressure the former offender for apologies; even if they receive an apology, the former victims are unlikely to be comforted by the backlash that is likely to result.

The Franco-German case serves as a successful model for the use of remembrance and commemoration in bilateral reconciliation. This case suggests that states should design commemoration in ways that are less likely to create backlash. They should emphasize a shared history; they should seek to spotlight historical moments in which one side was clearly not more guilty than the other. For example, France and West Germany staged commemorative events that emphasized the need for the two countries to surmount the tragedy of European great-power politics, which had continually led to deadly wars. The two countries reached back to World War I as a focal point in their commemoration (such as at Verdun cemetery); this deflected attention from German barbarism, and French humiliation, in World War II. Such commemoration served to build positive images while reducing the likelihood of backlash in both countries.

CAVEATS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

A few caveats should be kept in mind along with the findings from this project. First, findings can only be suggestive as they stem from only two case studies. Cases were chosen because they are prominent cases in debates about historical memory, with important implications for regional security—not because attributes of the cases make findings from them broadly generalizable. I conducted “mini-cases” (China, Australia, and Britain) to determine whether or not findings from the two cases appeared to “travel” elsewhere. However further research is necessary. The apology theory should be tested in additional dyads: for example, the Polish-German and Russo-German cases, and the Sino-Japanese case. Furthermore, in the cases tested here, the broad sweep of time covered also created data limitation problems: for example, coding South Korean

public opinion in the 1950s—in a poor, devastated authoritarian state with no free press—was a challenge. This study would also benefit from replication using more Korean-language sources.

This study sheds light on important areas for future research. First and foremost is the question of under what conditions contrition is likely to provoke backlash. Other issues are what causes contrition, and has a “contrition norm” emerged since World War II.

When Does Contrition Provoke Backlash?

As noted above, the case of Japan revealed a strong pattern in which apologies that were offered by some Japanese leaders triggered denials—competing interpretations of Japan’s past history—by other leaders. However in West Germany, far more extensive efforts at contrition did not lead to domestic backlash. The most pressing question that emerges from this study is therefore: from which national experience should we generalize? Under what circumstances do apologies cause denials? Understanding the dynamics of backlash is key before scholars can responsibly recommend the use of contrition in post-conflict peace building.

While recognizing the need for further research, I argue that 1) Germany, not Japan, is probably the outlier with respect to the occurrence of backlash, and that 2) in general, apologies are more likely than not to provoke denials.

The German Outlier

In one of the two cases examined in this study, apologies did not produce backlash. Perhaps there is something about Japan—its culture, wartime experience, or domestic politics—that makes it more prone to backlash; perhaps backlash is actually rare and Japan is the exception. I argue that for several reasons, Germany (not Japan) is likely to be the exceptional case.

First, Holocaust denial is actually illegal in Germany. Article Five of the Basic Law in Germany provides for free speech and decrees that “there shall be no censorship.” However, the German government curtails free speech on the issue of *Auschwitz-Lüge* (the Auschwitz lie): according to Federal Constitutional Court rulings, it is illegal to deny the Holocaust because these events were proven to have occurred, and to deny them is defamatory to the victims. Holocaust denial is a punishable offense under the German criminal code. Thus of the two cases examined in this study, the country in which backlash did not occur was one in which freedom of expression is curtailed on this issue.

Second, West Germany’s domestic politics appear to be unique in that no group had an incentive to contradict the dominant contrite interpretation of the past. The group that would have been expected to speak out against contrition—West German conservatives—had strong disincentives to do so. In the Japan (and American) cases, calls from the Left to apologize were met with calls from conservatives to stop apologizing and be more patriotic. Imagine the joy of the American Republican party if the Democratic presidential candidate in ’04 decided to adopt the “let’s apologize for Hiroshima” platform. The Republicans would lose no time in reaping political gains by opposing this issue, and adopting the “patriotic” anti-apology platform. Why didn’t West German conservatives protest contrition in order to bolster their political fortunes? What explains why the German conservatives “didn’t bark?”

Understanding the goals of the German conservatives is essential to explain their behavior. West German conservatives were committed to German democratization. Early on, conservatives opposed emphasis on the Nazi past, because they feared this would undermine West German democracy. Konrad Adenauer took the position that “in order to avoid a renewal of German nationalism and Nazism, economic recovery and political democratization must take

priority over a judicial confrontation with the Nazi past.”³ However, German conservatives were also committed to reunification, rearmament, and integration with the West in NATO and in the EEC. The west advocated German rearmament because of the Soviet threat, but convincing Germany’s former adversaries that the FRG was a responsible and cooperative partner—let alone convincing them that it should reunify—required demonstrating that West Germans weren’t a bunch of Nazis.⁴ Thus, even after the successful stabilization of a democratic government in the FRG, German conservatives had disincentives to speak out against apologies for the Holocaust while they were trying to integrate with their former victims and lobbying for unification. In sum, given West Germany’s unusual Cold War circumstances, it is dangerous to generalize from this case that apologies will be a popular domestic political move. More likely, the domestic—and therefore international—dynamics of apologizing will resemble the Japanese experience.

Other Evidence for Backlash

Other kinds of evidence also suggest that contrition is more likely than not to have backlash effects. First, although West German contrition never provoked denial or glorification of Nazi atrocities, German remembrance also exhibits an action-reaction pattern. After the moves toward greater contrition by the German Left during the social-liberal era, German conservatives tried to “normalize” German memory in the 1980s by emphasizing the need to move forward. The decade also produced the *Historikerstreit*. The upswell of contrition at the fiftieth

³ Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 209.

⁴ Adenauer got this message early on in pressure from High Commissioner John J. McCloy and other U.S. officials. Jeffrey Herf writes that restitution to Israel in 1952 would “be a signal to an outside world which did not know” whether the CDU agreed or disagreed with what had been done to the Jews.” Adenauer argued to his highly oppositional CDU colleagues that restitution to Israel was not only a moral responsibility, but a political and economic necessity, a prerequisite to integration with the west. See Herf. *Divided Memory*, p. 285-86.

anniversary of the surrender in 1995 produced a conservative counter-reaction in the *Aufruf*; unified Germany's extremely contrite policies also prompted Martin Walser's statements.

Second, the British and French also recognize the potential backlash effects of contrition. This fear has existed among the Allies (and indeed among many Germans) since 1945; it was prevalent in Allied debates over occupation policies. Today, the French and British express admiration for German contrition but say they are worried that Germany has been *too* contrite; they fear that the German right will someday seize on latent discontent with this issue to bring themselves back into power, which would have negative implications for European cooperation and stability.

Third, evidence from other countries, particularly the United States, further supports the proposition that contrition provokes a backlash.⁵ When Smithsonian museum curators designed an exhibition about the Enola Gay that discussed the horrors of Hiroshima and debated whether the bombing was necessary, this triggered a storm of protest from veterans' groups, Congress, and commentators; the exhibition was revised.⁶ Washington never issued an apology to Japan

⁵ The case of Britain's apology to Ireland also provides a relevant case. On Tony Blair's apology to the Irish about the potato famine, see Sarah Lyall, "Past As Prologue: Blair Faults Britain in Irish Potato Blight," *New York Times*, June 3, 1997. For subsequent backlash against Blair's move see Mervyn Pauley, "Blair Walks into Mire of Controversy Over Famine," *Belfast News Letter*, June 9, 1997; "I'm Proud of Blair Protestors' Says Loyalist MP," *Press Association*, October 17, 1997; "Blair Urged to Seek Apology from Adams," *Belfast News Letter*, December 11, 1997. Blair also considered apologizing to the Irish for the 1972 "Bloody Sunday" massacre. See Patrick Hennessy, "Blair to Say Sorry for Bloody Sunday," *Evening Standard*, January 16, 1998. This proposal also resulted in backlash. See "Paras Commander to Warn Blair Against Any Bloody Sunday Apology," *Irish Times*, January 19, 1998; "No. 10 Dilemma on Bloody Sunday," *Evening Standard*, January 19, 1998; Mark Almond, "Blair Betrays Us All With Apology to the IRA," *Daily Mail*, January 25, 1998. The proposed apology for Bloody Sunday was eventually abandoned.

⁶ According to one article, "The original five-part exhibit script -- which in large part reflected debates that have been underway in academia for nearly 30 years -- has been denounced as "partisan," "left-wing," "anti- American," "politically correct" and "historical revisionism at its worst" by critics ranging from the columnist Charles Krauthammer to the American Legion. Two dozen members of Congress have signed a formal letter of protest, and outraged veterans by the hundreds have flooded the Smithsonian with letters and petitions and phone calls." Ken Ringle, "2 Views of History Collide Over Smithsonian A-Bomb Exhibit," *Washington Post*, September 26, 1994. The Senate *unanimously* passed a resolution that stated that even the revised exhibit is still "revisionist, unbalanced and offensive" and that reminded the museum of its 'obligation to portray history in the proper context of the time.' (Ibid)

for the atomic bombings, but when Tokyo even broached the issue, furious uproar ensued in the United States. Even the suggestion of a U.S. apology prompted outraged letters, op-eds, and statements from U.S. presidents (George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton) about why dropping the bomb was a good policy.⁷ In sum, based on evidence from case of post-World War II Japan, as well as other suggestive evidence, contrition appears likely to trigger a backlash of denial, justification, or glorification.

Conditions for Backlash?

The relevant research question that follows from this study is thus under what conditions do we expect contrition to have backlash effects? Evidence from the cases, as well as deductive logic, suggests a few possible conditions. For two reasons, backlash seems more likely if apologies are offered for major wars. First, major wars are more likely to have mobilized a large portion of the state's population. Many people are implicated in the violence; many people lost loved ones in the conflict. For conflicts involving fewer people, backlash after an apology is not likely to be significant. For example, there was no notable backlash to President Clinton's apology for U.S. actions in Guatemala. This was not an operation in which large numbers of the U.S. population participated, or even knew about.

Second, backlash after apologies for major wars is more likely because in major wars leaders tend to rally their population in a widespread propaganda campaign. If people were told that the enemy was vicious, merciless, and evil; and if they were told that they were liberators fighting a noble cause, it stands to reason that they will be much less receptive to later hearing that, actually, *they* were aggressors fighting an unjust war, and the enemy was really a victim.

⁷ "World Class Cheek," *Washington Post*, April 20, 1995; "No Apology for Hiroshima," *New York Times*, April 8, 1995; Michael Wines, "President Rejects Apology to Japan," *New York Times*, December 2, 1991; also see letters to

Thus for these two reasons related to domestic mobilization, backlash is logically more likely to occur after apologies for major wars.

Furthermore, the Japan case suggests that backlash is more likely to occur in democratic states. People are free to react to apologies by writing letters to the editor, holding demonstrations, ranting on Fox News, organizing citizens' groups, pressuring leaders, and writing textbooks. Elected leaders will be receptive to their concerns—particularly to the concerns of large, mobilized, and influential groups (which are often conservative veteran's or victim's groups). Ironically, the same attributes that empower people in democratic states to pursue contrition—an independent judiciary, a free press, academic freedom—also empower people to contradict them. In sum, deductive logic and evidence from the Japan case suggest that backlashes are most likely to occur after apologies for major wars issued by democratic states.

Because the issue of backlash has been neglected in the peace-building literature, and because this study suggests that contrition (through the backlashes it provokes) may have damaging effects on postwar relations, further research on the issue of when backlashes occur is essential before policies of contrition should be recommended in post-conflict peace building.

What Causes Contrition?

Scholars should also investigate the question, what causes a state to pursue contrition in the first place? Several possible hypotheses might be tested. A cultural explanation has been offered—e.g. that certain cultures are more inclined than others to apologize to “out-groups”.⁸ Although cultural influences on contrition are quite likely, a crude cultural argument that says

editor in “Outrageous Revisionism,” *Washington Post*, March 27, 1995.

⁸ Akiko Hashimoto, “Japanese and German Projects of Moral Recovery: Toward a New Understanding of War Memories in Defeated Nations,” Occasional Paper in Japanese Studies, 1999-01, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1999.

“Japan didn’t apologize because of its culture” and “West Germany apologized because of its culture” is clearly wrong. During the Cold War, Japan’s remembrance (or lack thereof) resembled remembrance in East Germany, which was of course culturally identical to West Germany, and culturally very different from Japan. Indeed Japan (in its tendency to emphasize self-victimhood and whitewash its own past crimes) is similar to every other country in the world (including West Germany in the 1950s). The crude cultural explanation also papers over great heterogeneity in Japanese views about remembrance; many people have worked diligently to promote greater remembrance within Japan.

The causes of contrition might be rooted either in international pressures or in domestic politics. West Germany appears to have had important international incentives to “make nice” with its neighbors. Bonn was a divided nation facing a dire security threat; West German security, and the future of German unification, depended on its neighbors’ trust. At the same time, much of West German contrition appears to have been generated at the grassroots level: “bottom-up” impulses rather than the “top-down” policies that would be expected if politicians were managing policies of remembrance because of their international political goals. In sum, future research should investigate what caused West Germany, and other states, to decide to pursue policies of contrition.

A Contrition Norm?

A related research question generated by this study relates to changes in the world since Germany began atoning for its past in the 1960s. Has Germany’s behavior contributed to the emergence of a global norm of truth-telling and contrition? International media coverage, as well as interviewees, frequently cite Germany’s way of dealing with its past as the global gold

standard, against which Japan suffers by comparison.⁹ One can easily exaggerate the strength of a “contrition norm” in the world, given that in reality states and subgroups generally continue to glorify, deny, and forget about unsavory aspects of their past. However, it is undeniable that today, relative to earlier time periods, more and more moves toward justice and contrition are evident; and it is possible that German contrition helped fuel this trend.¹⁰ Germany’s role in promoting an emergent norm of contrition is thus another important area of future inquiry.¹¹

In sum, though other areas of future research still need to be explored, this study has advanced our understanding of remembrance and international politics in several ways. It substantiates the claim that denials of past aggression have damaging effects on relations between former adversaries. Acknowledgement of past aggression and atrocities is essential to build trust and reduce threat perception. However, contrary to the conventional and scholarly wisdom on the benefits of contrition, I find that pursuing contrition actually yields little gain, and

⁹ “At War with History,” *Newsweek*, August 27, 2001; James E. Young, “Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1999), 54-70; Kim Kyong-min, “Why is Japan Distrusted?” *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 8, 1995; Kim Young-ho, “South Korea-Japan Relations Still Mired in Snowy Weather,” *Munhwa Ilbo*, August 14, 1999; Kim Choong-seek, “Is Japan Still Blind to its Past?” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 18, 2000; “Truth of Massacre Cannot Be Denied,” *China Daily*, December 14, 2002; Xi Mi, “China: Never Forget Infamous History,” *China Daily*, February 26, 2000; Frank Ching, “A Tale of Former Allies,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 2, 2000, p. 35; Tang Tianri, “Two Contrastive Looks at the History of Aggression,” quoted in Xinhua Hong Kong News Service, August 28, 2000. For more Chinese sources comparing Japan and Germany see citations of Chinese comparisons of Germany and Japan in Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma,” p. 54

¹⁰ Suggesting the existence of an international norm of truth-telling is Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000); Gerrit W. Gong, “The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues,” *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 45-57.

¹¹ Theoretical studies of norm emergence include Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-917; Chaim Kaufmann and Robert D. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *International Organization* Vol. 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 631-668; Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” *International Organization* Vol. 44 (1990), pp. 479-526; Robert E. Goodin, “What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?”

may actually have harmful effects. Although states can use policies of remembrance to further reconciliation (as shown by the French and Germans), they should design commemoration carefully with potential backlash in mind.

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