

OVERCOMING SHADOWS OF THE PAST:
Post-Conflict Interstate Reconciliation in East Asia and Europe

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the origins of interstate reconciliation after traumatic conflicts, mainly through the comparative study of postwar Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations. While Germany and Poland have basically achieved deep reconciliation, the Sino-Japanese relationship is still dominated by mistrust and simmering animosity. I test and compare two competing theories to explain the different reconciliation outcomes.

Realist theory argues that common security interests solely drive post-conflict reconciliation. I develop the second theory, historical mythmaking theory, which suggests that elite mythmaking of the conflict history for instrumental purposes will obstruct long-term reconciliation. Because national myths glorify and whitewash the action of their own nations and belittle others, they can cause the memories of former adversary states to clash. Such mutually divergent narratives will provoke negative *emotions* and perception of each other's hostile *intention*, both mechanisms contributing to bilateral conflict.

The case studies show the relative strength of historical mythmaking theory. The Cold War structural pressure initially blocked reconciliation in both dyads. At that time Chinese and Japanese war memories actually converged on a common myth that blames only a small handful of Japanese militarists for the war. It is because China tried to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people in order to obtain Japanese official recognition of the Communist regime. Since the Sino-U.S. rapprochement and East-West détente in the 1970s, however, structural conditions turned favorable to reconciliation. But China and Japan only brushed aside historical legacy to make way for diplomatic normalization. A Sino-Japanese honeymoon quickly disintegrated in the early 1980s when the changing domestic context prompted elites to create new national myths and escalate bilateral historiographic disputes. Since then, the history problem has aggravated mutual threat perception and popular hostility, seriously straining bilateral relations. In contrast, from the early 1970s West Germany and Poland narrowed their memory divergence through restitution measures and textbook cooperation. These efforts created a strong sense of closeness and trust, paving the way for the eventual reconciliation in the 1990s.

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Chapter One Introduction

How do states reconcile with each other after traumatic conflicts? Why have some former enemy states managed to establish durable peace while others remain mired in animosity? How important are history and memory, as compared to other domestic and international variables, in shaping post-conflict interstate relationship? This dissertation explores the origins of deep interstate reconciliation after traumatic conflicts. I argue that the key to realizing deep reconciliation is the harmonization of the national memories between the parties involved, while their memory divergence as a result of historical mythmaking tends to harm the long-term prospect of reconciliation. As H. Richard Niebuhr says in *The Meaning of Revelation*, “where common memory is lacking, where people do not share in the same past, there can be no real community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created. . . the measure of our unity is the extent of our common memory.”¹

This line of argument directly challenges the standard realist explanation of international conflict and cooperation. A hard-nosed realist, concerned about nothing but power, would equate reconciliation with political and military cooperation that should occur when states share common strategic interests. For them, remembering and forgetting of traumatic history is irrelevant to the question of interstate reconciliation. However, I propose in this dissertation the concept of “deep interstate reconciliation,” which means two states share a joint understanding that war is unthinkable and hold generally warm feelings about each other. It is a kind of relationship that has to be cemented by not only short-run security needs but also sustainable mutual understanding and trust. Because the enduring psychological and emotional consequences of past traumatic conflict constitute the main source of bilateral grievances and mistrust, one cannot avoid addressing the political significance of historical memory when searching for a path to deep reconciliation.

¹ Quoted in Donald W. Shriver Jr., “The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping Stones,” in Robert L. Rothstein, ed. *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 210.

Remembering the past is not a simple act of recording historical events, but a process of constant reinterpreting of those events in light of present social and political changes. From a realist point of view national collective memory is essentially reflection or justification of structurally defined national interest. However historical mythmaking theory formulated in this dissertation suggests that both international constraints and domestic attributes can shape the way in which a nation interprets its past; moreover, once formed, historical memory can take on a life of its own and exert independent impact on interstate relations. Therefore, one needs to focus on both the *causes* and *consequences* of historical memory when applying this theory to post-conflict interstate relations. Empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that the ruling class harboring special political-ideological goals tend to construct historical myths that try to glorify or whitewash the actions of one's own nation during past conflict while blaming others for causing the tragedy. The prevalence of historical myths in national consciousness would cause a sharp disagreement between two former enemy states on the interpretation of their past conflict, which then spark bitter mutual emotions and hostile perception of each other's intention, seriously slowing down or setting back the reconciliation process. On the other hand, when two former enemy states by and large agree upon the basic facts of their past conflict, take substantial measures to address the responsibility for causing the trauma, as well as to amend it, they are more likely to remove the historical root of public grievances and intergovernmental friction.

To emphasize the importance of shared history is not to reject the explanatory power of realist theory in its entirety. Realism is still right in pointing out that cooperation is unlikely for strategic adversaries locked in an intense game of mutual balancing. Although positive systemic conditions alone cannot bring about interstate reconciliation, this dissertation shows that at least some degree of compatibility between two states' security interests is helpful for the reconciliation process to burgeon in the first place. But it is also found that the work to stop national mythmaking and construct shared memory is a critical step towards deep interstate reconciliation, which could begin to take root even at a time of bilateral security conflict and, if greatly encouraged by governments, will flourish when the conflict lessens.

Understanding the nature of interstate reconciliation is the first step toward unraveling the complicated conditions and mechanisms leading to its rise and decline in international history. This introductory chapter first conceptualizes deep reconciliation and explains the importance of this topic to current international relations. It also reviews the existing literature and proposes two competing explanations for post-conflict interstate relations: realist theory and historical mythmaking theory. In what Imre Lakatos has termed “three-cornered fight,” this dissertation is designed to test the two theories against each other and against the null hypothesis. So the findings of this investigation will illuminate both the relative and absolute explanatory power of the two theories. Following that I offer an explanation of the qualitative case study method applied in this project. This chapter concludes with a summary of my major empirical findings for the two main cases in this dissertation: postwar Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF DEEP INTERSTATE RECONCILIATION

The concept of reconciliation can be simplified to restoring friendship and harmony between parties who are locked in a chronic cycle of mistrust, fear, and hatred by past traumatic experience.² In international relations, traumatic experience of a state usually originates from its protracted, destructive conflicts with the outside world in the recent history.³ Such conflicts not only generate massive combat casualties but also often involve gross violations of human rights and even result in national annexation, territorial loss, or pillage of important national resources that may threaten the survival of a nation. Besides, states suffer psychological wound of humiliation at the same time when they undergo horrendous physical damages. So collective sorrow and grief grow rampant and become national trauma,⁴ which predisposes states to mutual enmity and belligerence. To obtain

² Ann L. Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-Central Europe* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 52.

³ Traumatic experience could be incurred by both domestic and international conflicts, but it is the later that has more political and psychological impact on interstate relations. The concept of protracted conflict is discussed in Robert L. Rothstein, “In Fear of Peace: Getting Past Maybe,” and Herbert C. Kelman, “Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis,” in Rothstein, *After the Peace*.

⁴ Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000), p. 345.

deep interstate reconciliation is exactly to build a relationship devoid of mutual belligerence and grievances stemming from their traumatic history. Following this general presumption, a conceptual framework of deep interstate reconciliation embodies two key components, stable peace and amicable atmosphere, that cover both the inter-government and people-to-people relationships between former enemy states.

Stable Peace

The first conceptual component of deep interstate reconciliation is a high degree of peacefulness between former adversaries. It is a truism that peace is equal to the state of no war, when war is defined as “large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence” that may cause over one thousand battle fatalities.⁵ But modern history suggests that, even in the absence of intense armed conflicts, international relations can still be precarious and easily deteriorate into war. For example, the peace between the U.S. and Great Britain and its colonies such as Canada from 1776 was quite fragile and eventually collapsed with the war of 1812.⁶ Likewise, the so-called “long peace” during the Cold War was fraught with subsystem conflicts, proxy wars, and international crises and war brinkmanship.⁷ Also the “long peace” is more a retrospective conclusion than the cognition at the time when superpower war was a constant danger in the world.

Hence one need go beyond the “no war” definition of peace to take into account the stability of international relationship. In this dissertation I apply the notion of stable peace to define the peacefulness of deep interstate reconciliation. This notion evokes Immanuel Kant’s assertion in his classic work *Perpetual Peace* that peace is not simply a “suspension of hostilities” but rather “an end to all hostilities,” which means the elimination of “all existing reasons for a future war.”⁸ In Kenneth Boulding’s interpretation, “stable peace is a situation

⁵ Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for A Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 12.

⁶ Kenneth E. Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 44.

⁷ Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “International Crises and Global Instability: the Myth of the ‘Long Peace’,” in Charles W. Kegley, *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991).

⁸ Erik G. Yesson illustrates the connection between the “stable peace” concept and Kantian ideas. See Alexander L. George, Foreword to *Stable Peace among Nations* by Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. xiii.

in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.”⁹ Therefore, the benchmark held for peace here is not merely the absence of war but “a condition in which even the possibility of armed conflict has been virtually eliminated.”¹⁰

Stable peace is not absolutely short of conflicts. Disputes may still arise in such areas as trade, immigration or environmental regulations. If conflict refers to any “redistributional situation where there is gain for some and loss for others,”¹¹ it is almost an inevitable phenomenon in international relations. As someone said, “conflict seems to be a permanent truth – perhaps the deepest of them.”¹² Peace proves itself not by the absence of conflict, but by how conflict is dealt with. When stable peace is firmly established, “neither side considers employing force, or even making a threat of force, in any dispute, even serious disputes, between them.”¹³ In other words, there is a cognitive threshold in stable peace that both states perceive a minimal danger of war.¹⁴

Amicable Atmosphere

Reestablishing friendship between former adversaries is “a mutual, consensual process” that cannot be simply “legislated or imposed” by political institutions but need be supported by voluntaristic emotions and actions sprung from the societal dimension.¹⁵ Therefore, in addition to the notion of stable peace that largely pertains to the government-to-government relationship, deep reconciliation is also characterized by an amicable people-to-people relationship. Political cooperation and popular good will are two indispensable conceptual components of deep interstate reconciliation, for one without the other only makes superficial and fragile reconciliation.

⁹ Boulding, *Stable Peace*. P. 13.

¹⁰ Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. ix.

¹¹ Boulding, *Stable Peace*. P. 10.

¹² Quoted from Mervyn T. Love, *Peace Building through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland* (Aldershot, Brookfield: Avebury; Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1995), p. 4.

¹³ George, Foreword to *Stable Peace among Nations*, p. xiii.

¹⁴ Kacowicz, “Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework,” in Kacowicz, *Stable Peace among Nations*, p.16.

¹⁵ Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War*, p. 53.

Generally speaking, the atmosphere between two peoples is considered amicable if it is dominated by mutual trust and/or a sense of affinity. For countries that fought a traumatic conflict(s) in the past, amicable, harmonious popular atmosphere is not attainable unless the historically rooted grievances and animosity have been eliminated. This does not mean that history issue has disappeared from social discourses. People may still actively research, evaluate and commemorate the traumatic history, but they do not treat it as a major source of resentments or hold it against one another country. Although mutual complaints may still exist, especially at times of new bilateral disputes, the tendency to use history to justify or reinforce such complaints has been stalled or marginalized. To put it in a simple way, popular reconciliation means that the people of two former enemy states have permanently put behind them the traumatic history.

WHY DEEP RECONCILIATION MATTERS

Above I have argued that, as opposed to the commonsensical belief, a world without armed conflicts is not necessarily peaceful. Beyond stopping a war, much more work is needed to do away with the psychological and emotional shadow of past trauma that may cause the use of force once again. History of international relations keenly attests to this concern. Studies show that a great proportion of international militarized conflicts are concentrated in a small number of dyadic relations. This is the so-called “enduring rivalries” phenomenon, where the same enemies keep fighting with one another over an extended period of time.¹⁶ A rivalry became enduring not always because the same conflict of interest did not get resolved but often due to the fact that the psychological wounds suffered in the last traumatic conflict had never been treated timely and satisfactorily, begetting new rounds of conflict on and on. Deep reconciliation that aims at thorough removal of historical burden offers an effective solution to end the vicious cycle of repeated wars.¹⁷

¹⁶ See Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, “The empirical importance of enduring rivalries,” *International Interactions* No. 18 (1992): 151-63; Paul F. Diehl, *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press, 2000). Enduring rivalry is formally defined by Diehl and Goertz as a dyad that has experienced at least six militarized disputes in a time period lasting at least 20 years. See Diehl and Goertz 2000, p. 45.

¹⁷ The literature on enduring rivalry has offered some solutions or described certain conditions under which the rivalry can be ended, including conflict management, democratization of domestic politics, and international

The importance of this question is illuminated by post-Cold War international relations. Since the East-West ideological and strategic confrontation receded, the ancient bitterness about historical trauma has reemerged as one major threat to international peace. East Asia saw a resurgence of vivid memories of Japanese aggression during the first half of the 20th century. An unprecedented international barrage of anger has been charged against Japan in such forms as official criticism, mass demonstrations, and court actions.¹⁸ The lack of deep reconciliation between Japan and its neighbors has cast a dismal shadow over the prospect of regional security cooperation in Asia.¹⁹ Likewise, long-standing rivals in other regions, such as Israel and the Palestinians, and India and Pakistan, have not yet overcome their hereditary feuds to attain true peace.

This project would have no prescriptive value if history had not provided signs for optimism. Deep reconciliation was indeed accomplished in the case of postwar Franco-German relationship. Since the end of World War II, the two countries have formed a security alliance, engaged in the economic and political integration of the European community, and even jointly written history textbooks.²⁰ Similarly, despite their brutal fighting that was ended by the use of nuclear weapons,²¹ the U.S. and Japan put behind their

system change. See Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, Chapter 10 & 11. The first two solutions are more manageable by human efforts than the systemic approach, but they are either inadequate or not always necessary. I will address them in literature review following this section.

¹⁸ Tanaka Hiroshi, "Why is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?" *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 28 (1996): 1-14; "Not Bought Off: Former Sex Slaves Want Compensation, Not Charity," *Far East Economic Review* 159, no. 30 (1996); Kiuchi Fujiwara, "Sensō no Kioku, Kokumin no Monokatari (War Memories, Nation's Stories)," *Sobun* (April 1999): 18-21; "Japanese Call '37 Massacre A War Myth, Stirring Storm," *The New York Times*, January 23, 2000; "Japan's Murky Past Catches Up," *The Economist*, July 8, 2000.

¹⁹ On the negative impact of historical legacy on Japan's relations with other Asian countries, see Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 5 (1996); William Lee Lowell, "The Inheritance of War: Japan's domestic politics and international ambitions," in Gerrit W. Gong, *Remembering and Forgetting: the Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic International Studies, 1996); Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs* 77, No. 6 (1998); Thomas U. Berger, "Tangled Visions: Culture, Historical Memory and Japan's External Relations in Asia," paper submitted to the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1998, Boston, MA.

²⁰ For a recount of postwar Franco-German reconciliation in the context of European integration, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Stephen A. Kocs, *Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 1955-1995* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995). For Franco-German cooperation on textbook writing, see the section on "Joint History Writing" in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.

²¹ For understanding the enormous hatred and contempt held by the U.S. and Japan against each other during the Pacific War and the terror of American atomic bombing that left a irremovable scar on Japanese national

war history and established the most influential and solid alliance in postwar Asian-Pacific region.²² Profound changes epitomizing deep reconciliation have also emerged between Germany and its East-Central European neighbors, including Poland and the Czech Republic.²³ In some other cases where deep reconciliation has yet to materialize, various governmental and civilian efforts towards this goal are gaining momentum, as revealed in the progress of Russo-Japanese reconciliation since Gorbachev's reforms in the mid-1980s and the on-going peace rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.²⁴

So studying post-conflict reconciliation not only helps advance our theoretical knowledge about international conflict and peace, but also has practical significance. Through a comparative investigation of both successful and failed reconciliation processes, this dissertation yields important advice for political leaders and concerned activists to prevent negative historical legacies from destabilizing international relations.

ASSESSING THE EXISTING LITERATURE

psyche, see John W. Dower, *War without Mercy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese memory," *Diplomatic History* 19, No. 2 (Spring 1995); James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), Chapter 3.

²² Being a subject of heated debate among American and Japanese historians in postwar era notwithstanding, the memory on the Pacific War in general and American nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in specific has never been a significant source of US-Japan political and popular tension. For these historiographic debates, see Daizaburō Yui, *Nichibei Sensōkan no Sokoku (The Conflict between Japanese and American Views of War)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Laura Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); David Thelen, "History after the Enola Gay Controversy: An Introduction," *The Journal of American History* (December 1995); Otto Mayr, "The Enola Gay Fiasco: History, Politics, and the Museum," *Technology and Culture* 39, no. 3 (July 1998).

²³ Ann L. Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation: Germany in Central-East Europe," *German Politics* 7, No. 2 (1998); idem., *Power and Influence after the Cold War*, Chapter 3 & 4; Vladimir Handl, "Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation," *German Politics* 6, No. 2 (August 1997).

²⁴ For some recent works on Russo-Japanese relationship progresses, see Gilbert Rozman, *Japan and Russia: the tortuous path to normalization, 1949-1999* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); William F. Nimmo, *Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era* (Westport in Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1994); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew C. Kuchins eds., *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1993); Rajan Menon, "Japan-Russia relations and North-east Asian Security," *Survival* 38, No.2 (Summer 1996); William Nester, "Japan, Russia, and the Northern Territories: continuities, changes, obstacles, opportunities," *Third World Quarterly* 14, No. 4 (1993).

On Greek-Turkish peace process, see Suleyman Demirel, "The Need for Dialogue: Turkey, Greece, and the possibility of Reconciliation," *Harvard International Review* 21, No. 1 (1998); "Friendlier Greece and Turkey," *The Economist* 352, no. 8137 (1999); "Greek Foreign Minister on Landmark Turkey Visit," *The New York Times*, January 19, 2000; "Turkey and Greece: let's be friends," *The Economist* 363, no. 8268 (2002).

In the study of international relations, the outbreak and maintenance of peace between nation-states are understudied, if compared to the profuse scholarly attention devoted to the causes, conduct, and consequences of war. Geoffrey Blainey even declares that “for every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace.”²⁵ Since the 1950s when the area of peace research was first created in the modern social science tradition, it has been mostly focused on the earlier steps of conflict termination and resolution including negotiation, good offices, arbitration, conciliation, and mediation.²⁶ The literature has rarely addressed “how peace, once obtained, can be stabilized and maintained,” the question that critically bears on post-conflict reconciliation.²⁷

Three bodies of literature on peace research make the exception. The first is the booming studies on democratic peace, which stress that democracies are less likely to use lethal violence against one another because of their shared liberal norms and the constraints of their democratic institutions.²⁸ So it is suggested that democratization of both former enemy states should lead to stable peace.²⁹ If liberal democracy were the necessary condition for stable peace, then deep reconciliation between non-democracies or one democracy and one non-democracy would be far from reach. Yet history contains cases of durable peace between some non-democracies, such as members of the ASEAN, or between states only one of which is a democracy, like the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico until the 1980s.³⁰ Also, because bringing democracy to a state is a difficult and highly unpredictable

²⁵ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1988), p.3.

²⁶ For some latest peace study works that emphasize the importance of conflict management approaches, see Ho-Won Jeong, *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); idem., *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2000); J. Michael Greig, “Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, No. 6 (2001); C. R. Mitchell, *Gestures of Conciliation: Factors Contributing to Successful Olive Branches* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, *Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

²⁷ Kacowicz, “Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework,” p. 13.

²⁸ Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983); Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Chapter 2; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994).

²⁹ For example, Edward Friedman argues that China and Japan cannot peacefully coexist unless China becomes a democracy, see Friedman, “Preventing War Between China and Japan,” in Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, *What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

³⁰ Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia,” in Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kacowicz, “Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework,” p. 16.

process, this theory hardly gives any feasible policy prescriptions. The main purpose of this dissertation is to search for practical solutions to post-conflict reconciliation.

The second related literature is regarding security community, the idea that was pioneered by Karl Deutsch in 1957 and recently received an outstanding revisit from the constructivist perspective in the work of Adler and Barnett. According to these studies, pluralistic security communities featured by a shared regional identity and strong sense of community usually render stable peace between member states; among the essential conditions for the rise of security communities are shared main values, multiple ranges of communication and transactions, and considerable mutual predictability of behavior.³¹ However, the concept of security community holds a much higher threshold than the definition of stable peace, which does not always require common identity and sense of “we feeling.” Besides, this explanation tends to reverse cause and effect because security communities are more likely a result of stable peace than its cause. Therefore, the literature is more useful for identifying some important indicators of stable peace rather than for tracing its causal conditions and mechanisms.

The third body of literature focuses on the normative arguments and practical agenda of transitional justice in the aftermath of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or political democratization.³² A near consensus of these works is that redressing “historical injustices” – meaning unjust, criminal, exploitative, and genocidal actions that have ended but their consequences continue to impact on the survivors – between former adversaries is an indispensable step towards reconciliation.³³ The solutions they propose largely center on measures of restitution that correct wrongs, heal wounds and restore trust, including apology and forgiveness, compensation, truth-telling commissions, and restorative justice. These findings are useful for us to understand the institutions and practices through which

³¹ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Chapter 2; Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, Chapter 2.

³² For a sample of the recent literature boom on these topics, see Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations*; Rothstein, *After the Peace*; John Borneman, *Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Colin Knox and Pádraic Quirk, *Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Dorothy C. Shea, *The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of Reconciliation* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Lynn Berat and Yossi Shain, “Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional Phase,” *Law and Social Inquiry* 20, No. 1 (1995).

historical grievances can be considerably allayed between the relevant parties. But the transitional justice literature tends to be confined within domestic contexts where the reconciliation process mainly involves remedying harms committed by dominant groups against groups of ethnic minority or inferior socioeconomic status, or by authoritarian governments against political dissidents. For two sovereign states each of which makes its own national history and is sensitive to national interests and autonomy, however, the mechanisms in which history factor influences reconciliation process need major modifications.

EXPLAINING DEEP INTERSTATE RECONCILIATION

The inadequacy of the existing literature engenders the need to look for more useful explanations of the success and failure of post-conflict reconciliation. Two theories on international conflict and cooperation seem to be particularly pertinent. They are realist explanation that emphasizes common strategic interests behind interstate peace, and theory of historical mythmaking that stresses the importance of removing historical myths in favor of shared history between former adversaries. I briefly summarize these theories below and offer a full explanation in Chapter 2.

Realist Explanation

Realism makes no direct predictions about the pathways toward deep reconciliation as it is defined here. Realists assume that states exist in an anarchic world where there is no overarching international authority to protect them but they must look out for themselves. The dominance of the self-help principle prompts competitive security policies to balance against other states that may endanger their national survival. Therefore, cooperation is a rare phenomenon, especially between adversaries who are engaged in mutual balancing.³⁴ The only widely acknowledged form of international cooperation in realist literature exists

³³ For a discussion of “historical injustices” in common sense, see Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations*, p. xxx.

³⁴ On the scarcity and difficulty of international cooperation in an anarchic world, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30 (January 1978); Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization*

between allies who share common security interest to balance against an external threat.³⁵ And even alliances are not stable, for the international system often changes and states' security interests would alter accordingly.

Nevertheless, the realist approach need not be rejected offhand when one tries to understand the conditions under which different types of interstate relations may arise after a traumatic conflict. The logic that states come together or drift apart in accordance with their security needs at least suggests that, *as long as an international systemic pattern sustains*, states with shared security interests should maintain close political and economic cooperation, and their popular relationship will also be friendly for public feeling is entirely malleable and follow in the direction of critical national interest. This is in fact deep reconciliation, although conditioned on structural continuity. Likewise, two states will be less likely to develop such a relationship if they have very limited security interest in common, or even constitute security threats to each other, either directly or by their external alignment. This theory is primarily concerned with a state's position in the international system, treating such ideational variables of history and memory as nearly negligible.

Historical Mythmaking Explanation

Historical mythmaking theory disagrees with the realist view that international circumstances determine policy decisions while ideas merely serve to justify those rationally made decisions. Instead, it departs from a different assumption that beliefs and ideas, including historical ideas, can be an independent factor shaping international relations. According to this theory, chauvinist mythmaking of a nation's history, especially those traumatic or controversial episodes, is a powerful ideational force that can cause conflictual foreign policies, international tension, and even wars. Historical myths distort historical facts to perform self-glorification, self-whitewashing, or other-maligning roles.³⁶ They are created by political elites to mobilize public support to their domestic or international policies or to

42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 54-57.

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 13.

³⁶ Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994).

fortify the political and ideological foundation of their regime legitimacy. Despite the instrumental nature of their origins, the influence of historical myths can easily get out of control and stir up public animosity and threat perception that are often unintended by their creators.

The theory predicts failure of interstate reconciliation with the presence of historical mythmaking. If former enemy states form their collective memories based on these myths, their perceptions of the traumatic history will greatly diverge. The divergence of historical narratives will then aggravate threat assessment and poison mutual emotions. Specifically, both elite and public will hold strong mistrust against each other country, and emotions of grievances and frustration will prevail at the popular level, often falling into a spiral of finger-pointing and negative stereotyping. In addition, intergovernmental disputes over history-related issues will repeatedly heat up, and conflicts in other issue areas also become harder to resolve either due to governments' intention to utilize the history issue for political gains, or simply because the prevalent public resentments tend to heighten political sensitivity to any conciliatory policies. Even if the two governments agree on a mythical interpretation of history due to some more pressing internal or external needs at the time, the agreement tends to be fragile and quickly shatter once the old myths are challenged and replaced by new myths in an altered political situation, in which case bitter historiographic friction would follow and bilateral relationship regress.

Contrarily, if states reject national myths through bilateral history dialogues and institutional arrangements on historical restitution, their national memories of the past conflict will converge on a shared history of what happened, who is responsible, and what need to be done to amend wrongs. Shared history can heal the wounds of the victims and rehabilitate the moral and political image of the perpetrators, so as to bring back mutual trust and respect between the two peoples. Besides, historiographic convergence will dramatically decrease history-related disputes and foreclose political use of history that would have complicated political disputes in other issue areas. Other things being equal, the theory predicts that shared history will significantly facilitate interstate reconciliation.

METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION

Comparative study of historical cases is the primary methodology to be used in this dissertation. I mainly follow the congruence procedure and process tracing methods.³⁷ I first spell out the internal logic of the two theories and deduce from each of them a set of predictions on post-conflict interstate relations. My case studies make paired observations of values on the independent and dependent variables across different periods of time within each case, and then assess whether these values co-vary in a manner consistent with those predictions. In order to establish that the observed correlation is causal, not spurious, I not only examine the degree of congruence between the predicted and actual outcomes but also process-trace such outcomes to test the cause-effect links framed by the theories.

Cases studied in this dissertation are two postwar dyadic relationships between Japan and China, and between (West) Germany and Poland. The two dyads are similar in their geographic proximity, traditional economic and cultural ties, recent history of traumatic conflict, and the structural environment they faced immediately after the conflict. In addition, both ties experienced substantial variations in international structural conditions and the degree of bilateral historiographic divergence. Yet the outcomes of their reconciliation process are at great variance: as of the beginning of the 21st century, the united Germany has by and large achieved deep reconciliation with Poland, while the Sino-Japanese relationship is still dominated by a general atmosphere of mistrust and simmering hostility. When examining the Sino-Japanese relations, I widely use primary sources including archival and other governmental documents, interviews, memoirs, media data, and schoolbook texts, as well as pertinent secondary materials. The study of (West) German-Polish relations mainly draws upon secondary sources in English language.

Not only to test theories and explore the origins of reconciliation, the case studies also address a key puzzle in contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship, which is the emergence of the problem of history as a prominent source of bilateral tension since the

³⁷ For illustrations of these methods, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1984). Vol. 2; Gary King et al. eds., *Designing Social Inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

1980s. This phenomenon defies two aspects of conventional wisdom. First is the hope that time heals all wounds: the more distant the trauma is, the more likely that painful memories would fade away. Second is the belief that increasing diplomatic, economic and social interactions between both nations would mitigate historical grievances. Why then did China and Japan quarrel over history not immediately after the war but only from the early 1980s when the majority of their population had no direct experience of the war, and well after their diplomatic normalization and the development of thick economic and social ties? Uncovering the causes of this puzzle is useful to both evaluating the significance of historical memory in shaping international relations and predicting the future trend of the strategic and popular relationships between the two major powers in the East Asian region.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

I divide the case of postwar Sino-Japanese relations into three sub-cases: 1) 1950s-1960s, 2) 1970s, and 3) 1980s-1990s. The case of (West) German-Polish relations is divided into four sub-cases: 1) 1950s-mid 1960s, 2) late 1960s-late 1970s, 3) 1980s, and 4) 1990s. Overall, historical mythmaking theory passes six out of the total seven sub-case tests, failing to explain Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s, while realist theory only passes half of the tests, including Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s and 1990s (not the 1980s), and German-Polish relations in the 1950s-60s and the late 1960s-late 1970s.

Specifically, realist theory well explains the total lack of Sino-Japanese reconciliation in the 1950s-60s. During this period, Japan was allied to the U.S. who led the Western containment against the communist bloc including China. Their antagonistic positions in the bipolar world system determined their mutual expectation of immediate war, Tokyo's policy of non-recognition to Beijing and restrictions on bilateral trade, as well as the failure of Beijing's strategy to reverse these Japanese policies through the "People's Diplomacy."

University Press, 1994); Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

As for the historiography, ruling elites in both countries created and perpetuated self-glorifying and whitewashing myths with regard to the war history. But superintendingly, the war narratives of the perpetrator state Japan and victim state China converged on the mythical distinction between a small handful of Japanese militarists and the vast majority of innocent Japanese people, and Chinese official propaganda deemphasized any points of divergence with Japanese historiography. It is because China tried to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people in order to obtain Japanese official recognition of the Communist regime. This myth also supported the class-based communist ideology claiming that proletarians of all countries could form an international united front against the evil capitalist system. So historical mythmaking in the two countries, albeit indisputably significant, would still have allowed a certain degree of bilateral reconciliation if it had not been the negative structural conditions.

During the 1970s, profound structural changes, including the Sino-Soviet conflict and Sino-American rapprochement, were the primary driving forces behind the improvement of bilateral relations. They first normalized diplomatic relations and developed a much higher degree of political and economic cooperation than before. But historical mythmaking theory rather than realist theory explains the absence of deep reconciliation despite the positive systemic conditions in the 1970s. One of the major obstacles to the forging of a solid bilateral friendship was China's deeply entrenched bias against Japan. It is because Chinese and Japanese elites did not try to settle their historiographic disagreement but continue to limit, cover up or simply set it aside to clear the way for the more immediate strategic needs. Political gestures substituted sincere, concrete restitution, and propaganda of national myths prevented rigorous investigation of the historical facts and clarification of war responsibility. As a result of the Chinese suspicion of and antipathy to Japan stemming from bitter war memories, bilateral cooperation in security and economic cooperation remained limited, and the popular friendship was more superficial and imaginary than solid.

Historical mythmaking theory again fits the evidence in the Sino-Japanese relations after the early 1980s, when their honeymoon disintegrated despite the continuation of favorable structural conditions. The relationship downturn should be attributed to the new historical mythmaking patterns and eruption of bilateral memory conflict in the changing

domestic political context. In China, pragmatic leader Deng Xiaoping's economic reform and open-door policy met with strong resistance from the conservative old guards within the Communist Party. Meanwhile, after the Cultural Revolution the party's prestige in the country declined considerably. To solve these problems, the government propaganda shifted its focus from the communist ideology to an assertive nationalism, which portrayed the Western powers as a negative out-group that threatened the interest of the in-group, which is the Chinese nation. The assertive nationalism was useful both to appease the party hardliners and to strengthen national cohesion and enhance regime legitimacy.

In order to foster this assertive nationalist ideology, the government changed historical mythmaking patterns. Unlike its previous emphasis on class struggle and ideological conflict, Chinese school education now tried to promote a national history centering on the conflict between the Chinese nation and foreign nations that invaded China in the past, especially Japan. By targeting on Japan as the national enemy, the new narrative also tried to create a sense of solidarity between the Communist mainland China and Nationalist-controlled Taiwan and justify the cause of national unification, also an important pillar of the Communist regime legitimacy. The education campaign particularly highlighted Japanese war atrocities and Chinese sufferings. A direct result of the patriotic education campaign is an outpouring of Chinese victim consciousness and anti-Japanese sentiments. More and more ordinary Chinese people began to believe that the entire Japanese nation was brutal and aggressive.

In such a process of significant renegotiation and reconstruction, war narratives of the two countries directly clashed. Since the 1982 textbook controversy, the so-called "history problem" frequently flared up and strained bilateral relations by fomenting negative emotions and perception of hostile intentions. My research of Chinese popular opinions shows that historical grievance about the war history and the lack of Japanese contrition was a major source of Chinese popular animosity towards Japan since the 1980s. The majority of Japanese people indeed felt sorry for its war of aggression to China, but not so sorry to the extent that they would be willing to provide substantial restitution. As a result of the memory gap, emotions of disgust and frustration with China spread in the Japanese society in reaction to Chinese historical grievance. In terms of intentions, I found a clear pattern

among Chinese strategic elites since the early 1980s to associate Japanese historical amnesia with the Japanese tendency to act aggressively again in the world. However, most Japanese strategic elites rejected such a Chinese argument based on history but suspected that China tried to use history as a card to extort economic benefits from Japan or simply to justify its own assertive military strategy. Such negative emotions and perception of hostile intentions also interacted with one another and underlined uncompromising foreign policies at times of bilateral disputes, including the trade friction around the mid-1980s, the 1987 Kōkaryō incident regarding the legal status of Taiwan, two island disputes in the 1990s and the cut-down of Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) to China in 2000.

Realist theory fails to explain why the relationship worsened from the early 1980s rather than the end of the decade when the common Soviet threat vanished. Even after the Cold War, realist factors compounded but did not obscure the significant impact of historical myths. The sense of structural uncertainty in the 1990s and the active attempts of China and Japan to pursue military buildup and assertive international strategy contributed to the tension in bilateral relations. But the five year time lag between the disappearance of the common Soviet threat and the substantial increase of their fear of mutual threat, as well as the absence of major shift in their power balance, suggest that the relationship was determined by not just power distribution but also perception of intention, which was to a large extent influenced by the historical interpretations.

In contrast to the Sino-Japanese relations, postwar (West) German-Polish relations is a case of reconciliation success. Like in the Asian case, the Cold War structure initially locked West Germany and Poland, allies of the U. and USSR respectively, in mutual hostility and ruled out the possibility of reconciliation. By the mid-1960s, ruling elites in both countries created historical myths that demonized the entire nation of each other and clashed head-on regarding Germany's Eastern frontier and postwar expulsion of Germans from the Eastern territories. Such intense historiographic conflict aggravated the political barriers to bilateral reconciliation. So both theories pass the test successfully.

Then the rise of détente in Europe since the late 1960s allowed bilateral cooperation to emerge under more favorable structural conditions, which fits the prediction of realist

theory. Historical mythmaking theory also passes the test because it was from this phase that bilateral historiographic divergence began to narrow, due to German actions of contrition and the bilateral historians' dialogue sponsored by the German-Polish Textbook Commission.

In the tests against the next two phases of bilateral relations, historical mythmaking theory performs better than realist theory. In the 1980s, the trend of historical settlement through restitution and joint history writing persisted, which cushioned the negative impact that the decline of *détente* had exerted on bilateral relations. After the end of the Cold War, both countries have committed to fostering mutual understanding and trust through comprehensive exchange programs and efforts to construct shared history about their past traumatic conflicts. So even in the absence of pressing common security threat, historiographic convergence contributed to the institutionalized security and economic cooperation between Germany and Poland and their amicable popular relations, all indicative of the stage of deep reconciliation.

The subsequent chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter Two illustrates the operational definition of interstate reconciliation and lays out the theoretical assumptions and causal mechanisms of the two competing explanations. Chapter Three, Four and Five examine Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s, the 1970s, and the 1980s-90s respectively. Chapter Six addresses (West) German-Polish relations since the end of WWII up to the 1990s. Chapter Seven summarizes the findings of case study chapters, discusses the agenda of future research, and illustrates the theoretical and policy implications of the dissertation.

Chapter Two

Explaining Deep Interstate Reconciliation

Kenneth Boulding once argued that an international war-peace system consists of four general phases – stable war, unstable war, unstable peace, and stable peace – and the system shifts from one phase to another when the stability of the system varies substantially.³⁸ If two former adversary states constitute a war-peace system, their post-conflict reconciliation process stands for a system transition from the phase of unstable peace, where violent conflicts have been halted but possibility of more violence still exists, to the phase of stable peace, where the likelihood of war drops to nearly nonexistence. Before formulating explanations for such a system transition, I first illustrate how to identify and measure different phases of the system. After providing the operational definition of interstate reconciliation, I elaborate on the arguments and predictions of the two competing theories of reconciliation.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF INTERSTATE RECONCILIATION

This dissertation mainly draws on existing operational definitions of peace that place stable peace in a continuum of interstate relationships. Alexander George divides post-conflict international relationships into three categories of peace: 1) *precarious peace*, when peace between two states means little more than temporary absence of war and is maintained by immediate military deterrence, such as the Arabian-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani relationships for several decades; 2) *conditional peace*, when general deterrence plays the dominant role in maintaining a less acute, less heated conflict relationship while resort to immediate military deterrence is rare, like the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War; 3) *stable peace*, when both states consider it unthinkable to use military force or to adopt deterrence strategy backed by threats of military force in resolving any mutual disputes, such

³⁸ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, Chapter 2.

as the relationships among European Union countries.³⁹ Similarly, Benjamin Miller offers a typology including three types of peace as *cold peace*, where returning to the use of force is a present danger, *normal peace*, when most conflictual issues have been resolved but war is not ruled out as a policy instrument, and *warm peace*, when the use of force is unthinkable as a conflict resolution approach.⁴⁰

Building on these typologies, I define three stages of interstate reconciliation: 1) Non-Reconciliation; 2) Shallow Reconciliation; 3) Deep Reconciliation. The stage of Shallow Reconciliation is further divided into two sub-stages of “Friction” and “Rapprochement.” Each stage has distinctive characteristics in both intergovernmental and popular dimensions. I use three indicators to measure intergovernmental relationship: expectation of war, national recognition, and economic interaction. They illustrate respectively a state’s fundamental assessment of its security relations with the former enemy state, whether they recognize each other’s basic rights of survival and sovereignty, and whether they trust each other enough to engage in economic cooperation. Given the conceptual definition of reconciliation laid out in the introduction chapter, mutual expectation of war should be the most decisive indicator while the other two are subsidiary indicators that are useful in identifying changes in two important aspects of intergovernmental relationship. When defining popular relations, I use the indicator of popular feeling that captures the general atmosphere between the two nations. The divergent values on these indicators for various stages and sub-stages of interstate reconciliation are summarized in Table 1.

Non-Reconciliation

This stage refers to a bilateral relationship that bears great resemblance to the category of *precarious peace* proposed by George or *cold peace* by Miller. It is marked by intense mutual hostility and high danger of returning to the use of force. The following four indicators signify the stage of Non-Reconciliation.

³⁹ Summarized from Alexander George, Foreword to *Stable Peace among Nations*. George first presented these categories of peace in the Preface to *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations*, by James E. Goodby (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

⁴⁰ Introduced in Kacowicz, et al., *Stable Peace among Nations*, pp. 20-21.

Table 1: Measuring Interstate Reconciliation

	<i>Deep Reconciliation</i>	<i>Shallow Reconciliation</i>		<i>Non-Reconciliation</i>
		<i>Rapprochement</i>	<i>Friction</i>	
<i>Government -To- Government</i>	Common Expectation of No War	Moderate Expectation of War: Cautious Cooperation	Moderate Expectation of War: Prepare for Remote War	Imminent Expectation of War
	Full National Recognition	Partial National Recognition: Sovereignty Controversies Shelved	Partial National Recognition: Sovereignty Controversies Cause Tension	No National Recognition
	Smooth and Flourishing Economic Interaction	Limited Economic Interaction: Economic friction Manageable	Limited Economic Interaction: Economic friction Escalates to Political Disputes	Minimal Economic Interaction
<i>People-To-People</i>	Harmonious Mutual Feeling	Moderate Public Tension; Illusory Friendship Possible	Moderate Public Tension; Mutual Estrangement and Suspicion	Public Hatred and Fear

1) *Imminent Expectation of War*: Two former enemy states hold a common perception of an imminent war between them, which can be identified from policy comments by elite made in open or private settings, government strategic planning, or force postures of the military. This is the direct signal of a Non-Reconciliation type of political relationship, while the next two indicators are the corollaries of constant worry about war.

2) *No National Recognition*: Although the traumatic conflict between them has ended, the two states have yet to establish formal diplomatic relationship. Refusing to accept each other's national survival and identity, they openly clash on the issues of international legitimacy, national territories, and boundaries.⁴¹

3) *Minimal Economic Interaction*: Due to alarming security concerns over adverse relative gains and mutual vulnerability in economic interdependence, states normally reduce their trade,

⁴¹ For the notion that reconciliation should start with satisfying the fundamental needs of one another party, fulfilling their national aspiration, and accepting their national identity, see Herbert C. Kelman, "Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies," p. 198.

technological transfer and other economic interactions to the minimum.⁴² Trade embargoes against one another are common, and economic isolation is the standard state of affair, especially in a distinctly bipolar international system where the sensitivity to relative gains is particularly high.⁴³

4) *Public Hatred and Fear*: Antagonistic feelings against each other are widespread in the two countries, and the tendency to attribute whatever current bilateral disputes to the past traumatic conflict is prevalent. Besides, the two nations perceive serious mutual threat and believe a war between them can be imminent.

Shallow Reconciliation

This stage basically fits into George's *conditional peace* category or Miller's *normal peace* type. Here the open hostility between the two states has been considerably mitigated but war is still not ruled out as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. Two different types of relationship can be found in this stage – "Friction" and "Rapprochement." The former relationship is still plagued with frequent political disputes and simmering popular resentment, though there is no immediate danger of war; the later is generally devoid of serious mutual disputes, at least at the governmental level, but such political friendship

⁴² Realism predicts that states have a strong security incentive to resist adverse relative gains. Because wealth can be transformed into military capability, states fearing that another state might use force against them will be concerned about the "security externalities" of trade, especially if the gaps in their economic gains from trade favor the other state. So states are more inclined to trade with allies than with adversaries when the "specter of war" is present. See Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," The American Political Science Review 85, No. 4 (December 1991); Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joanne S. Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton: N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994).

On the question of economic interdependence, Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence should not be seen as mutual sensitivity but as mutual vulnerability, where "the costs of breaking their relations or of reducing their exchanges are about equal for each of them." So the more a state is dependent on another for imported goods and services, the greater damage it faces when the supplies are cut off, especially if the import is strategically important to the state. Hence states that are expecting mutual war will try to avoid economic dependence on each other by cutting down their trade. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 143. For a recent critique of the Waltzian view on the impact of security conflict on interstate trade relations, see Jack Levy, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade," Journal of Peace Research vol. 36, No. 4 (1999).

⁴³ It is true that states sometimes trade with their strategic adversaries shortly before or even during their military confrontation, but such phenomena are proved to be more common in a multipolar world where the security ramifications of relative gains are considerably lower than in a bipolar world. See Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security 21, No.1 (Summer 1996).

remains fragile and has short time frame. The subtle yet important differences between the two sub-categories are described below.

1) *Moderate Expectation of War*: the first and foremost feature of the stage of Shallow-Reconciliation is the reduced fear about war but also the lack of a common perception that their conflicts of interest never need be settled with force. In a “Friction” relationship, war is considered possible but unlikely in the immediate future. States in a “Rapprochement” relationship support mutual cooperation in the short run but do not definitely forgo war as an instrument to solve bilateral disputes; so they still take caution towards each other in case the cooperation fails at any time.

2) *Partial National Recognition*: Two states have normal diplomatic relations but still conflict over sovereignty issues: they may retain official or semi-official contacts with each other government’s rival regime, and/or fail to reach a permanent settlement on bilateral territorial or border disputes. However, “Rapprochement” states usually prevent these issues from damaging political relationship by downplaying or temporarily shelving them, while “Friction” states allow them to escalate into political crises.

3) *Limited Economic Interaction*: States begin to benefit from bilateral trade, technology transfer, and capital flow. But they are still wary of mutual vulnerability and tend to limit the level of trade dependence and/or the exchange of strategically important goods and technologies. Besides, security sensitivity to adverse relative gains can generate bilateral friction over trade deficit, delay in key technology transfer, and regulations of economic transactions.⁴⁴ Economic friction is usually subdued in a “Rapprochement” relationship but tends to cause political tension in a “Friction” relationship.

⁴⁴ Relative-gains sensitivity can be based on both security reasons and concerns about economic competitiveness and prosperity. See Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,” pp. 155-158. But economic frictions originated from these two sources of relative-gains sensitivity differ in two aspects. First, only states with equivalent economic capabilities in certain economic sectors worry that adverse relative gains may confer the other side competitive advantage in these sectors. If states with a high disparity of economic capabilities clash not in any specific economic sectors but over the overall trade policy, it is more likely caused by the concern that the extra gain of the other side from their trade would hurt their own national security interests. Second, economic frictions caused by competitiveness and prosperity

4) *Moderate Public Tension*: Public perception of imminent mutual threat has considerably abated, but history-derived mistrust and hatred nevertheless remain deep-seated, and bilateral disputes over various issues may still provoke widespread emotions of mutual enmity, especially in the “Friction” sub-stage. It is possible that governments can manipulate public attitudes to create an illusory atmosphere of popular closeness in the “Rapprochement” sub-stage, but the two nations have not truly developed deep mutual understanding free of the burden of historical legacies.⁴⁵

Deep Reconciliation

Deep Reconciliation is equivalent to George’s conception of “*stable peace*” and Miller’s definition of “*warm peace*.” As the following four indicators illustrate, in this stage the two former adversaries fully cooperate in political, security, economic, and societal exchange areas with abundant mutual understanding, trust, and respect.

1) *Common Expectation of No War*: War against one another has become unthinkable as a policy instrument to solve any bilateral conflict. States feel secure with each other and tend to engage in comprehensive, long-term political and security cooperation.

2) *Full National Recognition*: The two governments have formally recognized each other’s legal status according to normal standards of international law, ended bilateral controversies surrounding competing regimes, and reached permanent settlement on their territorial integrity and border inviolability.

3) *Smooth and Flourishing Economic Interaction*: Former adversaries that have deeply reconciled will not only develop large-scale economic interactions but also tolerate economic dependence on one another. Economic friction, although still present, is mainly due to concerns about economic competitiveness rather than national security and will be limited to the economic arena without damaging political relationship.

concerns tend to be limited to economic dimension, while that caused by security concerns will spread to other issue areas and lead to bilateral political tension.

⁴⁵ For the effect of a dynamic mutual understanding on uprooting old stereotype views, see Herbert C. Kelman, “Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies,” pp. 203-204.

4) *Harmonious Mutual Feeling*: The two nations now hold a feeling of mutual closeness and fondness, or at least strong empathy for each other. They also share a common wish for bilateral friendship and consider war unlikely in the foreseeable future. When bilateral disputes erupt, the public generally responds with calm and no longer associate current problems with past traumatic conflict.

The three stages of interstate reconciliation described above cover different possible outcomes in the aftermath of traumatic conflict. What explains such dramatic variations on post-conflict interstate relationship? Now we turn to theories of interstate reconciliation. In this dissertation, interstate reconciliation is treated as both a *process* and *result*, which is tied to not only the formulation and execution of accommodative foreign policies but also the positive effects of these policies. Therefore, a theoretical explanation is considered useful if its predictions match either the *outcomes of bilateral relationship* or *foreign policies* that by logic will lead to such outcomes.

REALISM

Realists argue that, in an anarchic world where no central authority will come to an individual state's rescue, a state is more likely to survive and prosper if it seeks to maximize its own capability vis-à-vis other states. Such a structural pressure for self-help behavior promises a prevalent inclination toward competition in international relations.⁴⁶ As a result, international cooperation becomes difficult, especially between adversaries, because anarchy “requires states to worry about the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that adversaries will cheat on agreements.”⁴⁷ Instead, states are commonly engaged in international balancing against other states or coalitions that may endanger its national security. Therefore, as Joseph Grieco says, “realism presents a fundamentally pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation.”⁴⁸ The only possible situation for interstate cooperation to take place is when they share common security interests. States

⁴⁶ For the nature and implication of self-help principle, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 105-107, 111-112.

⁴⁷ Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” p. 50.

⁴⁸ John M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, p. 27.

who are direct allies or belong to the same power coalition to counter a common security threat usually have the greatest shared security interests. Post-conflict interstate reconciliation is simply a form of political cooperation driven by states' common security needs. From these realist assumptions, I infer three concrete predictions regarding intergovernmental reconciliation, popular reconciliation, and the general trend of reconciliation respectively.

Prediction 1: *The more common security interests that two former enemy states share, the more positive are the structural conditions for their political cooperation, and the more likely they will reconcile with each other at the government-to government level.*

Realism claims that systemic factors have decisive impact on states' policy decision on external cooperation or conflict. Here I use the version of realism arguing that balance of threat rather than balance of power is the key systemic factor.⁴⁹ It predicts three outcomes of intergovernmental relationship under different systemic conditions.

The systemic conditions are *positive* if states face common security threat(s), which is often seen in relationships between security allies or states that belong to the same security bloc without necessarily forming a mutual alliance. States will have great incentive to provide mutual assistance and coordinate their policies in order to maximize their combined power vis-à-vis their enemies. So helping each other is a means of self-help. They naturally feel no need to use force against each other because that would undermine their balancing strategy against the external threat. If the positive systemic conditions are durable, such expectation of no war can last for a long term. Absolute gains concerns rather than relative gains concerns dominate bilateral relationship, and smooth and intimate political and economic cooperation will follow.

In contrast, states confront *negative* systemic conditions when they pose direct and immediate threat to one another. In order to prevent each other from gaining

⁴⁹ The definitive study proving that balancing is a far more common international behavior than bandwagoning and that states, especially regional powers, balance against security threat rather than the dominant or rising power is Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

predominance, they will either engage in one-on-one balancing, or join opposing power coalitions to get external assistance. However, mutual threat is not always the original reason for two states to join enemy blocs; they may do so in order to seek powerful allies to contain the threat from a third country. Yet the intense inter-bloc rivalry can be so overwhelming that it compels members of the two blocs to pursue conflict against one another regardless of their original intention. The security dilemma between either the two states themselves or the opposing strategic coalitions that they belong to constitutes negative structural conditions. Given the highly competitive international circumstances, war is considered an important policy option at times of serious conflict of interest, and relative gains concerns create immense obstacles for political and economic cooperation.

When states have neither common nor conflictual security concerns, they land in a situation of *neutral* systemic conditions. Typically, this occurs if their previous common security threat has diminished, or there is a sharp decrease of either mutual threat or the pressure from their bloc leaders for antagonism. Consequently, alliances will loosen or dissolve, and the erstwhile tension between adversaries will relax. The two states thus enter a fluid relationship, in which they are only potential rivals to each other, and war is considered a possible but less immediate danger. However sensitive to adverse relative gains, they also appreciate the benefit of absolute gains, given their moderate concerns about mutual threat and remote expectation of war. So under neutral systemic conditions, states have certain interest in mutual cooperation but also hold considerable reservations, and the trajectory of official reconciliation should be slow and tortuous.

Prediction 2: *The more positive the structural conditions are, the more likely that the two nations will reconcile with each other at the popular level, and vice versa.*

Realism emphasizes that nation-states are unitary, rational actors that behave primarily in response to national security needs. It dismisses the impact of unit-level attributes on international relations such as public opinion and state-society relationship because systemic factors are so powerful that they will trump disagreeing interests and orientations at societal or individual levels. When international structure undergoes


fundamental transformation, interstate popular relationship should vary in parallel with political relationship.

Concretely speaking, *positive* systemic conditions will create strong companionship between two nations. While embracing each other country to counter their common security threat, people would willingly put behind ill feelings associated with the past traumatic conflict. In the meantime, official policy of bilateral cooperation will facilitate societal contacts, eliminate negative mutual stereotypes, and convince the public of each other country's benign intention. The result is an overall amicable atmosphere which, combined with the general expectation of no war suggested by Prediction 1, indicates Deep Reconciliation as long as the positive structural conditions continue.

On the other hand, *negative* systemic conditions will antagonize two nations because they generate intense threat perception and distrust among the general public. People commonly use past history to attack each other, not because they are truly obsessed with the historical trauma but because it is a useful justification for the security-driven mutual hostility. Meanwhile, the official policy of bilateral confrontation discourages or even prohibits dynamic societal interaction, precluding genuine mutual understanding, confidence, and sense of closeness. So opportunity for popular reconciliation will be quite slim which, taken together with Prediction 1, suggests that negative structural conditions should lead to Non-Reconciliation.

By the same logic, *neutral* systemic conditions lead to general stagnation in popular relationship because there are neither immediate structural incentives for promoting public friendship nor insurmountable structural barriers against it. Governments show some interest in facilitating societal contacts but install certain limitations due to remaining security concerns. Also, intergovernmental relations rather than any genuine emotions about history sway the public feelings. At times of bilateral disputes, mutual popular antipathy tends to grow and the history issue is often utilized as a weapon to criticize the other country; when disputes calm down, the negative popular sentiments will abate and the history problem is also let go. Such a popular relationship, together with the limited political cooperation, forms the stage of Shallow Reconciliation. Prediction 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Structural Realist Explanation of Interstate Reconciliation



Prediction 3: *The trend of overall interstate reconciliation will follow the same direction of international system changes.*

Prediction 3 is logically deduced from the first two predictions. If the nature of both political and popular relationship between two states is correlated with certain kinds of systemic conditions, I infer that any substantial improvement in systemic conditions should lead to overall progress of interstate reconciliation, and any substantial deterioration in systemic conditions should cause the reconciliation process to regress. Other variables including historical ideas do not have independent impact on the general trend of interstate reconciliation development.

HISTORICAL MYTHMAKING

A theory on the casual links between historical memory and interstate reconciliation has not been formulated in the field. But the significant impact of beliefs and ideas,

including historical ideas, on international relations has been acknowledged in many existing works, particular in the burgeoning literature on “ideas and foreign policy.”⁵⁰ This body of literature rejects the rationalist view that international actors’ preferences and interests are given and political outcomes are only determined by variations in structural constraints. It also criticizes the reflectivists who admit the endogenous nature of preferences and causal beliefs but have been “slow to articulate or test hypotheses” of their political influence. Instead, beliefs and ideas are considered as not simply justification for political decisions made rationally but an independent source of foreign policy, and the causal role of beliefs and ideas in government policy-making can be identified and systematically examined.⁵¹ As two students of international relations recently claimed, “the issue is no longer whether but rather how and how much ideas matter under different conditions.”⁵²

This dissertation builds and tests a theory of historical mythmaking that purports to reveal how a certain type of idea, historical myth, shapes post-conflict interstate reconciliation development. The theory has its intellectual roots in the study of social memories, which stresses the social and collective nature of memory formation. Political scientists are new comers to the study of social memories, which has long been an endeavor carried out mainly by sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists after it became a distinctive research subject at the late 19th and early 20th century. A sociologist whose work is a particularly important contribution to this field is Maurice Halbwachs, who argues in his path-breaking book, *On Collective Memory*, that memory is essentially social and cannot be correctly understood unless it is placed in the perspective of certain social groups that collectively reconstruct memory.⁵³

⁵⁰ Some characteristic works on policy implications of ideational forces include Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Peter A. Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁵¹ Goldstein & Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy,” pp. 4-7.

⁵² Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating A Landmark Case for Ideas,” *International Security* 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), p. 6.

⁵³ See Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992). For a recent, comprehensive review of the literature on social memory studies, see Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (August 1998).

Starting from the basic assumptions of social memory studies, historical mythmaking theory argues that national collective memory is a narrative of a nation's past history that can shape and be shaped by concerns in the present. A common form of national collective memory is national myths. In this dissertation, I focus on national myths created by political elites, which are false narratives about the origin, identity and purposes of a nation.⁵⁴ They constitute an integral part of the ideological and spiritual foundation for nation and nationalism. As Anthony Smith states in his recent work, "what gives nationalism its power are myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the way in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias."⁵⁵ Although national myths contain obvious distortions of historical facts, they can be very popular because they present a picture of shared past that can evoke the deepest emotional resonance from the populace. In Lucian Pye's words, "national myths are thus objective factors in giving meaning to public life... The fact that they may not accurately report actual historical events does not diminish their significance."⁵⁶

Then what is the political ramification of these popular national myths? In building historical mythmaking theory, I draw on a number of recent studies arguing that myths are not value-neutral but have potential danger, such as to stimulate conspiracy theories, scapegoating, or xenophobia,⁵⁷ or to disseminate antisemitism and racism.⁵⁸ Other scholars further suggest a causal relationship between hyper-nationalism poisoned by mythologized national history on the one hand, and international conflict and war on the other hand. Stephen Van Evera argues that chauvinist mythmaking is particularly pernicious to international relations. It is because, by claiming "the rightness of its own cause, and the

⁵⁴ Not all national myths can be identified as totally false. Some myths are half-truth narratives, blending historical facts with traditional stories and legends, and others are not subject to falsification, such as the examples given by Jack Snyder, "it is good to be Ruritanian," or "Ruritanians deserve their own state." See Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996). My theory focuses on falsifiable national myths, and especially those conflict-prone pernicious myths made by ruling elites that are politically influential and can have significant impact on a country's foreign relations. This point will be discussed further in this section.

⁵⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9.

⁵⁶ Lucian Pye, "Memory, Imagination, and National Myths," in Gerrit W. Gong, *Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic International Studies, 1996), p. 21.

⁵⁷ George Schopflin, "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths," in Geoffrey A. Hosking and George Schöpflin eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 25.

⁵⁸ Chris Quispel, "Faithful Servants and Dangerous Beasts: Race, Nationalism and Historical Mythmaking," *Patterns of Prejudice* 33, no. 3 (1999).

wrongfulness and maliciousness of the grievances of others,” these myths would inculcate a sense of innate superiority, inflame mutual hatred and fear, and, as a result, exacerbate international misperception and provoke aggressive foreign policies.⁵⁹

The historical mythmaking explanation for post-conflict interstate relationship is largely derived from theories of pernicious historical myths and war. Below I first specify the origins and nature of national myths in question. The following section describes the institutional tools with which myths are purveyed. Subsequently, I outline two causal mechanisms of emotions and intentions through which historical mythmaking is linked to international conflict, and then propose historical settlement based on shared history and restitution arrangements as an effective measure to curb mythmaking. Finally, I will draw from historical mythmaking theory two predictions for post-conflict interstate relations.

Origins and Nature of National Myths

Where do national myths come from? One school of social memory studies argues that social actors intentionally seek to manipulate the interpretation of the past to serve particular purposes and interests in the present. Another school contends that historical myths are products of cultural constraints in the present. Here the concept of culture is very broad: it can be the political culture of an entire nation, or community culture in a specific locality, or a tribal tradition or class culture. Sociologist Michael Schudson labels these two approaches to collective memory as “interest theory” and “cultural theory.”⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23-24. Also see idem., “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” Other examples of recent studies on nationalism suggesting a causal relationship between elite mythmaking and war and conflict include Ben Kiernan, “Myth, Nationalism and Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, No. 2 (2001); Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000); David Mendeloff, *Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia: Pernicious Historical Ideas, Mass Education, and Interests Conflict*, Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001).

⁶⁰ Schudson also points out a third approach, “radical social constructionism,” which argues that there is no independent past for the past is totally dependent on the present interpretation. See Michale Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 52-55. Historical mythmaking theory acknowledges that the past has its own power and is not completely subject to the present rhetoric. I agree with sociologist Barry Schwartz that there is an independently existing body of raw materials from the past that shapes the perimeter of present memory discourse. The past can be discovered and rediscovered, can be reconstructed and manipulated, but there are limits on the malleability of the past: the past has its own power. See Barry Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory,” *Social Forces* 61, No. 2 (December 1982).

Both approaches have some utilities. Any self-interested social actors can construct their own distinctive myths about the national history. Myths made by such groups as families, gender groups, or local associations can be indeed based on the cultural orientations and backgrounds of the group members; they do not need to be instrumentally created and implemented, and are not always falsifiable. However, an interest theory better accounts for those myths created by elites, especially ruling elites. Ruling elites and other social actors are all engaged in the contestation of national collective memory, which is essentially a process of political struggle. As Michel Foucault says, “since memory is actually a very important factor in struggle...if one controls people’s memory, one controls their dynamism.”⁶¹ The political stake for ruling elite in the struggle over the past is particularly high, usually involving the survival in office. For this reason, ruling elites have greater incentives to create myths for instrumental purposes than other social actors.

Of course ruling elites do not always have to create falsifiable, pernicious myths because meddling with history can also entail costs, including the danger of damaging relations with foreign countries. But under certain conditions, such as when they are entangled in fierce domestic power struggle, when there is a serious regime crisis because of economic failure or social instability, or when the country faces imminent external threat, the political gains of mythmaking may outweigh its costs in the eyes of elites. Even if sometimes their historical ideas are genuinely motivated by cultural beliefs, when selling these ideas to the masses elites still need to employ exaggeration and manipulation to solve the collective action problem in a large group like a nation.

Ruling elites tend to create national myths to serve the following important political goals. First of all, national myths can be part of elite propaganda to justify national security policy, just like what realist theory predicts. But the factors driving elite’s mythmaking behaviors are not limited to strategic constraints but also include domestic political motivations such as regime legitimacy concerns, social mobilization needs, and diversionary strategy at times of internal political crisis.⁶² In addition to these state-centered interests, domestic parochial interests, such as factional and organizational imperatives and pressure of

⁶¹ Quoted from Olick & Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” p. 126.

⁶² Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” pp. 30-32.

special interest groups, may also deviate national historiography away from historical truth to support mythical interpretation of history.⁶³

Historical mythmaking theory focuses on three types of elite-sponsored national myths that can cause interstate tension and impede reconciliation process.⁶⁴ The first is self-glorification myths that explicitly incorporate inflated or false claims of special virtue and competence. Besides past achievements, perceptions of victimization can fuel self-glorification become they create a “cult of national martyrdom” that bestows a nation with moral superiority and legitimizes national missions and aspirations.⁶⁵ The second type of national myths, self-whitewashing myths, deny or rationalize past wrongdoing against others. The third type is other-maligning myths, which denigrate others with false accusations of their cultural inferiority, malicious intention, or primary responsibility for past trauma.⁶⁶

Spread of National Myths and Divergence of Historical Perceptions

⁶³ The impact of bureaucratic politics and organizational interests on foreign policy has been well studied by the decision-making literature. Some recently works have also explored the causal link between domestic parochial interests and the rise of certain national ideologies or doctrinal beliefs. See Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

⁶⁴ Here I mainly draw on previous categorization of pernicious national myths proposed in Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” pp. 27-30; idem., *Causes of War*, (PH.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984), Chapter 8: National Mythmaking; Mendeloff, *Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia*, pp. 86-87.

⁶⁵ The self-glorification role of victimhood myths has been revealed in many works on nationalism. On the role of victim consciousness in Polish nationalism, see Jan Tomasz Gross, *Polish Society under German Occupation: the GeneralGouvernement, 1939-1944* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 4-9; Andrzej Walicki, “The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism,” in eds. *Polish Paradoxes* (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 30-35.

On Jewish victimhood, see Michael Wolffsohn, *Eternal Guilt? Forty years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

On Japanese victim consciousness, see James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); Kūchi Fujiwara, “Imaging the Past, Remembering the Future,” *Social Science Japan* (April 1995): 3-5.

On Chinese victimhood and nationalism, see Neil Renwick & Cao Qing, “Victimhood and Identity in China's Political Discourse,” ISA Annual Convention, 1999.

⁶⁶ The tendency to remember only the evils of others nations while trying to justify and legitimat the wrongdoings that one's own nation perpetuated is commonly seen in national historiography. For examples of historiographic gap caused by national mythmaking between the Japanese and American, the Japanese and Russian, the Israelis and Palestinians, and Croats and Serbs in modern history, see C. G. Jacobsen, “Myths, Politics and the Not-So-New World Order,” *Journal of Peace Research* 30, No. 3 (1993).

National myths created by the ruling elites from the top down do not automatically become the *hegemonic national memory* and gain great political influence. They still need to compete with other versions of national memory constructed from the bottom up. Because a nation comprises of various social and political groups with different beliefs, interests, and aspirations, how to remember a nation's past is constantly contested. Whether elites can dominate national collective memory and shape the core ideas of national identity largely depend on whether they control institutional tools to purvey and perpetuate national myths.

In his study of the institutional origins of Japanese war memories, Steven Benfell argues that institutions can guide the development of ideas and interests, including historical memories and national identity; such institutions include not just formal organizations but also less formal rules, norms, symbolic gestures and even ritual activities.⁶⁷ In this dissertation, I concentrate on the following set of institutional tools of history-making. The first is mass education, particularly school textbooks, which is one of the most important venues to inculcate the public with authoritative "narrative of nationhood."⁶⁸ The war-provoking danger of history textbooks spreading chauvinistic national myths has been recognized since the end of WWI and directly stimulated the textbook reassessment and revision campaigns during the inter-war and post-WWII periods.⁶⁹ Still, postwar school textbooks, especially in countries that had experienced traumatic conflicts during the war, are still wrestling with truthful or mythologized interpretation of their national past.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Steven Benfell, "Selective Memories: Politics, Institutions, and War Memories in Postwar Japan," Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 2002.

⁶⁸ On mass education and particularly school textbooks as direct carriers of nationalist ideology, see Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Laura Hein and Mark Selden, *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Michael W. Apple, *Cultural Politics and Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996); Suzanne De Castell et al., *Language, Authority, and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook* (London; New York: Falmer Press, 1989).

⁶⁹ Post-WWI historians' scrutiny of history education lent strong support to the argument that pernicious national myths purveyed by prewar school textbooks was a significant source of international conflict. See John Langdon-davies, *Militarism in Education* (London: Headley Bros. Publisher, Ltd, 1919); Jonathan French Scott, *The Menace of Nationalism in Education* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926); V. H. Friedel, *The German School as a War Nursery* (New York: MacMillan, 1918); Mark Starr, *Lies and Hate in Education* (London: Hogarth Press, 1929).

⁷⁰ For some examples of studies critiquing postwar German school curriculum, see Hildegund M. Calvert, *Germany's Nazi Past: A Critical Analysis of the Period in West German High School History Textbooks*. Ph.D. dissertation (Muncie, Indiana: Ball State University, 1987); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," in Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*. On postwar Japanese textbooks, see Saburo Ienaga, "The glorification of war in Japanese education." *International Security* 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994); Yoshiko Nozaki and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, "Japanese

The second institutional tool is media control and manipulation. Studies of the political role of mass media suggest that mass media can act as “collaborators” or “coconspirators” of political and bureaucratic authority to enhance state legitimacy.⁷¹ So the theory of historical mythmaking assumes that political elites can use public communication methods including the print and broadcast media, films and literature to circulate national myths at a wide scale. It is done either directly or indirectly, depending on the extent to which media is centralized in a given country.

The third way to institutionalize national myths is public commemoration through museums, monuments, commemorative rituals, and ceremonies. Different from simply recording historical events, “commemoration is the evaluative aspect of chronicling,” celebrating people and events that the group deemed extraordinary under the present circumstances.⁷² Commemoration sites and activities serving as durable symbol or dramatic presentation of national myths can greatly accentuate the centrality of these myths in national collective memory.⁷³

Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” in Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*; Robert Fish, “From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages: The Pacific War as Seen in Postwar Japanese High School History Textbooks,” in Edward Beauchamp ed. *Education in Modern Japan: Old Voices, New Voices* (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2004).

On postwar Chinese textbooks, see Dorothea A. L. Martin, *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People’s Republic of China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); Weihsun Mao, *World History in China Mainland and Taiwan Secondary School Textbooks: A Historical and Comparative Study* (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1995).

On postwar South Korean textbooks, see Sōji Takasaki, *Hannichi Kanjo: Kankoku.Chōsenjin to Nihonjin (Anti-Japanese Emotions: South Korea.Korea People and Japanese People)* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), Chapter 1; Jae-jeong Chung, *Kankoku to Nihon: Rekishi Kyoiku no Shisō (South Korea and Japan: Thoughts of History Education)* (Tokyo, Suzusawa Shoten, 1998).

⁷¹ For some recent works on this subject, see Laurie Anne Freeman, *Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ellis S. Krauss, *Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

⁷² Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration,” p. 377.

⁷³ For more on the role played by public commemoration in the formation of nationalist memory, see John R. Gillis, *Commemoration: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); J. M. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: the Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lyn Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Sarah Boxer, “A Memorial Is Itself a Shaper of Memory,” *New York Times* October 27, 2001; Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997,” *The China Quarterly* 161 (March 2000); Barry Schwartz, “Commemoration and the Politics of Recognition: The Korean War Veterans Memorial,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 42, No. 6 (March 1999); John E. Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

Another important instrument to establish the official status of national myths is post-conflict resolution arrangements, including domestic compensation programs and interstate agreements providing reparation to the victim country. Political elites may seek to manipulate these resolution arrangements so that the primary blame for past traumatic conflict is placed on others while the pure innocence and victimhood of their own country receive state and international acknowledgment. Other institutional tools useful to purvey national myths involve tampering with legal prosecution of war criminals, disingenuous protection of nationalist symbols, such as Japanese monarchy system, and discrimination against alien residents, especially nationals of the former enemy states.

Historical Mythmaking and International Conflict

The triumph of pernicious historical myths in national collective memory would lead to divergent interpretations of the same historical events across countries. They tend to generate negative emotions and hostile perception of each other's intention, which often grow out of the control of the elite who created those national myths and are capable of straining intergovernmental and popular relationships.

Divergence of Historical Memories

The first issue of historiographic disagreement is about what happened in the past conflict. Each state claims its own mythical recount of the past conflict to be the only truthful chronicle while accusing the other side of lying. Secondly, starting from divergent historical narratives of what happened, the two states will define historical responsibility in dramatically different ways. They will disagree on their answers to the question of "who bear what kind of responsibility to whom for having done what during the past conflict."⁷⁴ Pernicious historical myths that glorify their own states' beneficent behavior and fine

⁷⁴ This is a formula delineating the key parameters of traumatic conflict responsibility. I derive it from existing writings on war responsibility by progressive Japanese intellectuals. For example, see Takeshi Ishida, *Kioku to Bōkyaku no Seijigaku (The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting)* (Tokyo: Akiishi Shoten, 2000), p. 165; Saburo Ienaga, *Sensō Sekinin (War Responsibility)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), pp. 29-35; Yukio Mochida, "Sensō Sekinin. Sengo Sekinin' Mondai no Suiiki (The Water Area of the Issue of 'War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility'," in Kentarō Awaya, *Sensō Sekinin & Sengo Sekinin (War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility)* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1999).

qualities, deny guilt for committing wrongdoings, and falsely blame others for all the sufferings will create an enormous gap between two nations' perceptions of the nature, severity and scope of responsibility for the traumatic conflict. Hence dishonest historiography tends to undermine the fulfillment of various obligations rendered by the historical responsibility, including acknowledging and apologizing for moral guilt, amending historical injustices with political rehabilitation and material compensations, and bringing culpable actors to legal justice. Unfulfilled obligations will then harden the perpetrator side's claim of their own innocence and the victim side's demand for payment of historical debts. So mythmaking begets mythmaking, and the gap between their national memories becomes wider and more definite.

The Mechanism of Emotions

Pernicious historical myths can exert great emotional impact upon people who experienced immense trauma in the past. Myths of victimhood and self-righteousness by the victim state will plant deep *grievances* toward the perpetrator state. They are first reflected in a sorrowful feeling, often to the extent of self-pity, about the nation's enormous sufferings in the traumatic conflict. Grievances also show in the sense of injustice by the victim side for not only its past loss and pain but also the continuing national humiliation, economic backwardness, and even hardship in individual lives, which are all blamed on the atrocious and predatory aggression of the perpetrator side. Besides, other-maligning myths can stimulate a strong feeling of *contempt* for the perpetrator country, who is condemned to be not only criminal but also morally despicable.

Human emotions can be noninstrumental, simply expressing feelings without raising demands for actions; they can also be instrumental, "trigger(ing) action to satisfy a pressing concern."⁷⁵ The emotion of *grievances* and *contempt* embody both noninstrumental and instrumental characteristics, the later affecting post-conflict interstate relations. First, the public grievances in the victim state give vent to the bitterness about their unwarranted

⁷⁵ The definition of emotion as an instrumental mechanism is drawn from Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hated, and Resentment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The quote is from p. 17.

suffering and pain, causing intense antipathy against the perpetrator side and scathing attitude toward all its actions. Second, grievances can translate into a strong sense of entitlement among the public that constantly demands concessions from the perpetrator side. Public emotions then put great pressure on the government to adopt an uncompromising position at times of bilateral disputes, often against the will of the government. More severe than these policies of pressure is a policy of confrontation, where the other state is treated as the nation's archenemy and any of their gains must be stalled because it is our loss. The most extreme kind of confrontational policy is a policy of retribution, which aims at settling historical accounts with violent means.

As far as the perpetrator side is concerned, its self-whitewashing and other-maligning myths will lead to remarkable lack of sympathy to the sufferings of others and utter failure to understand the victim side's animosity and bitterness. Dismissing the demands of the victims as unreasonable and self-indulgent, the people of the perpetrator state will develop strong *disgust* and *frustration* for the victim state. They do not just find it an annoyance that they are constantly reminded of their disgraceful past that they wish to forget, but also hold great *resentment* for having their national morality damaged and world image tarnished by the victim's accusation that they are criminals of murdering, raping, and looting. They feel a terrible national shame (not guilt), which is not blamed on their past crimes but on the victim's obsession with the past.


Such emotions of *disgust*, *frustration* and *resentment* held by the people of the perpetrator state not only poison the popular feelings toward and uglify the image of the victim state but also encourage policies of estrangement and hard lines. In their eyes, it is the victim state that is being unreasonable, intransigent and ridiculous by bringing up the past time and time again, so they tend to ignore its grievances and demands, or even refuse to deal with that state. If the government makes any concessions to the victim state, it will instigate considerable domestic backlash, which criticizes the government for being soft-kneed and the victim state for extorting with the history card.

The Mechanism of Intentions

Conflict over historical interpretation of the traumatic history also gives rise to negative perception of each other's intention. The perpetrator that evades responsibility for its past wrongdoings and refuses to amend them with political and economic measures makes the victim state suspect that the past aggressor may be mulling over renewed acts of aggression against itself. So the victim state tends to link the unrepentant attitude of the perpetrator to its evil intention, and constantly worries about the remaining or reviving aggressive ambition of the perpetrator. On the other hand, the perpetrator state finds the sense of entitlement of the victim side totally unjustified but only a disguise of its aggressive intentions. Especially the victim state's demand for vengeance will stimulate fear of revanchist menace on the perpetrator side.

Therefore, historiographic divergence can greatly amplify mutual threat perception. Not only the governments but also the general public will view each other's state as a major security threat based on their disagreement over the treatment of past conflict history. Even if the government tries to convince its people otherwise, the public will not easily change their view once they have internalized the linkage between the other country's historical attitude and its intention. The intense mutual mistrust and feeling of insecurity then prompt states to watch out for foreign attack and prepare military response to such attack. Consequently, expectation of war would rise high, and the bilateral relationship is dominated by sharp concerns over adverse relative gains that impede bilateral cooperation and contacts. The two causal mechanisms of emotions and intentions are illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Historical Mythmaking



Historical Settlement and Interstate Reconciliation

The most effective way to prevent egoist, pernicious national myths is for two countries to form common historical interpretation of their past conflict. The “reconciliation of memories” paves the way for the emergence of mutual trust and closeness pivotal to deep interstate reconciliation. Two states may try to establish shared historical memory about their past conflict through joint history-writing and serious restitution measures, which will contribute to a thorough settlement of bilateral emotional and physical debts. Based on such historical settlement states can engage in high level of cooperation in both governmental and popular dimensions.

Joint-history Writing

Shared historical memory has to be established first through joint research and dialogue between independent historians of relevant countries. Truthfully recording what happened during the past traumatic conflict often poses a formidable intellectual challenge to historians because of the particularly incomplete, fragmentary, and unstable nature of the

evidence pool.⁷⁶ So close collaborations between historians of both sides is essential for obtaining more comprehensive source materials and updated research findings. Transnational historians' dialogue can also bridge the gap between nationally bounded historical interpretations. History books written without external scrutiny are vulnerable to deliberate political distortions. In the past century, frustrated by the widening disparity of opinions vented through isolated national history-writing and its negative impact on interstate reconciliation, historians of some former adversary countries have taken the initiative to launch transnational dialogues. They include the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation set up under the auspices of the League of Nations between the two world wars, postwar UNESCO-supported multilateral and bilateral historians' dialogues, the textbook cooperation between (West) German and Polish historians from the 1970s onward,⁷⁷ and the serial East Asia History Education Symposium and Japanese-South Korean Joint Workshops on History Textbooks starting from the mid-1980s.⁷⁸

Restitution Measures

Having built the factual consensus on what happened in the past conflict and who was responsible, states still need to establish the dominant status of the shared history in

⁷⁶ For example, the epistemological challenge to historians studying Nanjing Massacre, the symbol of Sino-Japanese historical trauma, is elaborated in Daqing Yang, "Rekishigakusha e no Chōsen: 'Nankin Atrocities' no Kenkyū o Megutte," (Challenge to Historians: Concerning the Research of Nanjing Atrocities), *Shisō* (August 1998).

⁷⁷ For an overview of transnational historians' dialogues in Europe since the end of World War I up to the present, see Takahiro Kondo, *Kokusai Rekishi Kyōkasho Taiwa: Yoroppa ni Okeru 'Kako' no Saihen* (International History Textbook Dialogue: Reorganizing the Past of Europe) (Tokyo: Chūo Shinsho, 1998). For more on postwar international textbook research and revision efforts, see Volker Rolf Berghahn and Hanna Schissler *Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany, and the United States* (Leamington Spa; New York: Berg, 1987) "Introduction"; E. H. Dance, *History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias* (London, Hutchinson & CO. LTD, 1960), Chapter 6; UNESCO, *Bilateral Consultations for the Improvement of History Textbook* (Paris, 1953); Otto Ernst Schüddekopf, *History Teaching and History Textbook Revision* (Strasbourg, Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe, 1967); Library of Congress European Affairs Division, *Textbooks, Their Examination and Improvement: A Report on International and National Planning and Studies* (Washington, 1948); Isaac James Quillen et al., *Textbook Improvement and International Understanding* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1948).

⁷⁸ On Asian historian's exchanges, see Kazuhiko Kimijima, et al. "Rekishigaku to Rekishi Kyōiku no Aida (Between Historiography and History Education)," *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* (Journal of Historical Studies) 651 (October 1993); idem., "Kyōkasho Kokusai Kōryū no Keiken Kara Mita 'Kokumin no Rekishi' ('The History of A Nation': Viewed from the Experience of International Textbook Exchange)," *Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū* (The Report on Japan's War Responsibility), 29 (Fall 2000); idem., "The Continuing Legacy of Japanese Colonialism: the Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks," in Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*.

public memory both with the aforementioned domestic institutions of textbooks, media, and commemoration, and through inter-governmental agreements, especially regarding restitution measures. Restitution in strict sense means “the return of the specific actual belongings that were confiscated, seized, or stolen.”⁷⁹ Here it refers to a wide range of rectifying means including apology and forgiveness, legal accountability and material compensation that will mollify, but certainly never perfectly undo, the physical and psychological damage to the victims. If the past trauma cast a dire shadow preventing current relationship from moving on, “restitution provide(s) a mechanism for dealing with pain and recognizing loss and responsibility,” with which “victims and perpetrators collaborate in searching for an exit from the bonds of history.”⁸⁰

To begin with, the bitter grievances of the victims for their sufferings during the traumatic conflict demands unambiguous, complete, and public apology from the perpetrator state. With an apology, “the offender puts her fault and feelings of remorse on the record.”⁸¹ Apologies stated in public by government heads usually have the greatest power of impact. An apology should start with acknowledgment of specific acts of wrongdoings in the past. It should also accept ultimate responsibility and express sorrow and remorse. A message of regret that only admits harm but does not confess one’s moral wrong involved in the action is not a complete apology.⁸² Finally, a full apology should promise not to repeat the offense.⁸³ By publicly renouncing one’s past behavior and pledging no more wrongdoings, the perpetrator’s apology serves to console and rehabilitate the victims so that they can turn resentment to mourning, as well as to assure them of future peaceful coexistence.

Meanwhile, it is honorable for the perpetrator side to apologize for its fault, because it can end collective shame and restore cleaner consciences. It actually shifts the moral burden to the victim side, who is now obliged to issue forgiveness. In his study of political forgiveness, Peter Digeser argues:

⁷⁹ Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations*, p. xix.

⁸⁰ Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations*, p. XXIV, p. XL.

⁸¹ Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 183.

⁸² O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, p. 185.

⁸³ Nicholas Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Preface, 1991).

In a world in which what is done at one moment cannot be undone the next, forgiving relieves the burdens created by wrongful actions and unbearable debts. In relieving those burdens, forgiveness presents the opportunity to start afresh or reestablish a relationship of moral equality between victim and transgressor.⁸⁴ (emphasis is mine)

If apology uplifts the victims, forgiveness can set the perpetrators free. Particularly, forgiveness contains the commitment that the perpetrator's misdeeds in the past can no longer be used as a moral excuse for future actions against it.⁸⁵ So the exchange of apology and forgiveness will put history-based hostility to rest.

Still, the perpetrator's apology should precede victim's forgiveness to ensure long-term amicability. The governments may agree to let go the past for political expediency, but the pain and bitterness held by the public remain alive, which will trigger new tension in the future. In the same vein, true forgiveness will not be forthcoming if even the minimal demand of legal accountability is not met. Take blanket amnesty for example, there is absence of any investigations, prosecutions, or trials. It completely shuts down the pursuit of justice and twists forgiveness into insult because people do not even know "who is forgiving whom for what."⁸⁶ As Donald Shriver Jr. says, the slogan "cannot be forgiveness for the past and accountability for the future," but "accountability for the past as a step toward forgiving it."⁸⁷ After all, forgiveness is not forgetting.

Nonetheless, the fact that historical wrongs can never be completely undone renders perfect justice impossible.⁸⁸ And too much penalty will only become revenge. Domestic cases of regime transition remind us of other values equally important to legal justice. For example, during South Africa's transition to democracy in the 1990s, truth-telling actions carried out without prosecuting the guilty helped stabilize the process of democratization, due to the subtle power distribution at the time in South Africa. Mandela personally opposed Nuremburg-style tribunals or a public witch-hunt in protection of the spirit of mutual confidence. Instead, he stated that he was willing to forgive those perpetrators of

⁸⁴ Peter Digeser, *Political forgiveness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 11-12.

⁸⁵ O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*, p. 184; Digeser, *Political Forgiveness*, p. 71.

⁸⁶ Digeser, *Political Forgiveness*, pp. 55.

⁸⁷ Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation," p. 211.

⁸⁸ Digeser, *Political Forgiveness*, pp. 52-53.

past crimes as long as they came forward and publicly disclosed their behavior.⁸⁹ Same dilemma exists in interstate relations where retribution via prosecution may well trigger emotional and political backlash on the perpetrator side. The two most influential war criminal trials after WWII, the Nuremberg Trial and Tokyo Trial, have been not only long criticized from legalist point of view, but also vehemently rejected by right-wingers in the perpetrator states as “victor’s justice.”⁹⁰ So instead of relying on legal prosecution, governments should conduct serious investigation of past wrongdoings and encourage free discussions and debates about past conflict in the society. If doing so can bring the perpetrators to acknowledge their responsibility and issue sincere apologies, legal penalty can be even dropped as a gesture of forgiveness.

Lastly, governments need to address the bilateral historical debts with financial means. Like legal accountability, full compensation of loss is not always possible due to the difficulty to measure sufferings in monetary terms, and because it may spark new resentments from the perpetrator side if the payment threatens to drain national resources and destabilize the economy. On the other hand, some amount of material compensation is still necessary, especially if the victims are in desperate need of financial assistance, such as the poor and dying Korean comfort women. But even when retribution is done through material compensation, the issues of moral and legal responsibility must be clearly, publicly stated before the victims would be even willing to accept the payment.⁹¹

The joint history writing and institutional arrangement of retribution discussed above can thoroughly settle the historical account between former enemy states. Through the

⁸⁹ See Berat and Shain, “Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa?”

⁹⁰ For critiques on the legal problems of these trials, see David Lubin, “The legacies of Nuremberg,” *Social Research* 51, No. 4 (Winter 1987); Richard H. Minear, *Victors’ Justice; the Tokyo war crimes trial* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), Chapter 15: “Victor’s Justice, Loser’s Justice.” Political conservatives in Japan have been particularly upset about the verdict of Tokyo Trial since the first day of its announcement. Since the 1980s, the Japanese society has seen a resurgence of bitter resentments against Tokyo Trial and simultaneous rationalization of Japan’s aggressive war. For more details, see Yasuaki Ōnuma, *Tokyo Saiban Kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisō e (From the Tokyo Trial to Postwar Thoughts on War responsibility)* (Tokyo: Toshito, 1993).

⁹¹ For example, American POWs and Korean comfort women all made it clear that truth-telling and genuine official Japanese apology are their foremost demands, and financially they only ask for a token amount as a symbol of repentance. For a recent, comprehensive account of controversy surrounding the apology vs. monetary compensation choices for Korean comfort women, see C. Sarah Soh, “Japan’s Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors,” *JPRI Working Paper* 77 (May 2001).

process, both the victims and perpetrators are healed and rehabilitated, so as to be reintegrated “into some approximate positive civic relationship.”⁹² Specifically, the negative emotions of grievances and resentment will be discarded because the victim’s needs for honor and compensation have been addressed and perpetrator’s historical stigma is cleaned. Meanwhile, the perpetrator’s forthright acknowledgment of responsibility and pledge not to repeat past wrongdoings will eliminate worry about its future aggression, and fear of the victim’s revanchist threat will dissipate as the victim promises that past wrongdoings will no longer be held against the perpetrator state today. As threat perception and expectation of war diminish, two governments will be generally confident in carrying out comprehensive and deep-going cooperation in security, economic, and other areas. At the popular level, stereotyped negative image will be dropped and mutual understanding and trust will be restored, all of which will help bring the two nations into a truly amicable relationship.

Hypotheses on Historical Mythmaking and Interstate Reconciliation

Proceeding from the above assumptions and arguments, I infer two predictions on concrete outcomes of interstate reconciliation.

Prediction 4: *The greater divergence between two countries’ historical interpretation of their past traumatic conflict is, the more difficult they are to reconcile with each other; the more convergent their historical narratives are, the more easily they are to reach deep reconciliation.*

Historiographic divergence is the greatest when historical mythmaking of the two states constructs *combative narratives*, which have three characteristics. One is that these narratives do not just defame certain political or social groups of the other state but hold its entire nation from past to present accountable for the conflict. It will stir up indiscriminate, all-out hostile feelings and actions towards each other. Second, these narratives clash on issues of major interest to these states even up to the present, such as territorial/border rights and population dislocation, which calls for immediate, violent responses. Third, combative narratives place the issue of historical burden in the center of bilateral relationship, the resolution of which is made the starting point of any bilateral cooperation.

⁹² Donald W. Shriver Jr., “The Long Road to Reconciliation,” p. 213.

Therefore, combative narratives set a prohibitively high hurdle for reconciliation. The result is a typical Non-Reconciliation type of relationship.

Less divergent historical memories are presented in the form of *conflictual narratives*, where historiographic clash still prevails but room for compromise also exists. Countries holding these narratives still disagree on the scope and nature of historical responsibility, but they tend to blame not the entire nation of the other side but only certain groups, and make some distinction between the past and present behaviors. These narratives usually do not involve historical disputes that affect substantial national interests of the present day. In addition, although they contest with each other over whether and how much contrite actions should be made, they tend not to hold the perpetrator's action of contrition as a major precondition for their limited cooperation. Conflictual narratives still foster negative emotions and strong threat perception, but they do not inflame outright belligerence. They particularly exclude a policy of vengeance that may dramatically worsen the security dilemma between the two states. Animosity is simmering among the public, but will not form overwhelming pressure for political standoff or societal isolation. The result is the Shallow-Reconciliation stage of relations.


Convergent narratives first emerge from bilateral historian's dialogue and joint history-writing, which tends to give an honest representation of the historical facts in the past traumatic conflict as well as unambiguous definition of the responsibility for the conflict. Such a shared historical interpretation is further perpetuated through interstate restitution arrangements where the perpetrator state makes substantial efforts to redress its responsibility and promise no more aggression, and the victim state agrees to forgive if not forget. Convergent narratives serve to resolve both the physical burden and psychological trauma left behind by the conflict history. Intergovernmental cooperation and societal contacts will flourish, and popular atmosphere will become increasingly harmonious. Therefore, the outcome of Deep Reconciliation will follow.

There is still a possibility that the historical myths of the two sides may overlap in great part with one another, forming a shared but false historical memory. But this type of *quasi-convergent narratives* is usually based on tacit agreements between the ruling elites rather

than any serious bilateral measures of historical settlement. It may or may not suppress, but will never truly remove, the negative emotions and perception of intention deeply entrenched among the public, even though it could promote certain degree of cooperation between the governments. In addition, the expedient nature of elite agreements on a specific kind of historical myths determines that the agreements would be fragile and unsustainable, subject to elite readjustment of political priorities and societal demands for truth and justice. So the quasi-convergence in historiography can easily break down and develop into more historiographic divergence. The interstate relationship with such narratives fall into the stage of Shallow Reconciliation rather than Deep Reconciliation.

Prediction 4 is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Historical Mythmaking and International Reconciliation



Prediction 5: *The trend of interstate reconciliation should be consistent with variations in the degree of historiographic divergence/convergence.*

Assuming the validity of Prediction 4, we can draw another prediction that an increase of historiographic divergence will cause considerable setback in the reconciliation process, while an increase of convergence will lead to considerable reconciliation progress.

Chapter Three

Age of Darkness: Pre-Normalization Sino-Japanese Relations

The Chinese and Japanese nations are intimately related, not only from the point of view of communications but in all other respects as well. There is a saying among the people of both countries that China and Japan are brother nations, whose people are of a similar race and culture; that, therefore, they should join hands in common effort.

-- Sun Yat-sen⁹³

I believe, if we both abide by the five principles of peace and coexistence, the peaceful and friendly relationship will surely progress continuously, and the friendship between our two great nations will definitely pass on from generation to generation.

-- Zhou En-lai⁹⁴

With your country, there has emerged a relationship of mutual commitment to everlasting peace and friendship for the future, thanks to the enthusiasm and efforts of the two countries, and there are between them ever deepening exchanges in broad fields. I am heartily pleased at such a development of relations between our peoples and earnestly desire that such happy relations become immutable.

-- Emperor Akihito⁹⁵

The past fifty years of Sino-Japanese relations make a history of paradox. After World War II, the majority of Japanese population believed that diplomatic relations with People's Republic of China should be restored,⁹⁶ and Chinese government persistently sought breakthrough in official relationship with its proactive "People's diplomacy."⁹⁷

⁹³ Quoted from Sun's speech delivered at a welcome dinner on November 28, 1924, at the Oriental Hotel in Kobe. See Yat-sen Sun, *China and Japan: Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies* (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941), p. 135.

⁹⁴ Quoted from Zhou's toast to visiting Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei at a state banquet on September 28, 1972, the eve of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Huan Tian, ed. *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji (Documents on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1997), Vol. 2, p. 109.

⁹⁵ Quoted from Emperor Akihito's speech at a welcome banquet in Beijing held by Chinese president Yang Shangkun on October 23, 1992. *FBIS Daily Report: China*, , October 26, 1992.

⁹⁶ For example, in two opinion polls held by Asahi Shimbun in May 1952 and June 1953, only 10 to 11 percent of people questioned approved the absence of normal diplomatic relationship with Red China, while more than one-half were dissatisfied and urged a change. See Allan Burnett Cole & Naomichi Nakanishi, *Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Significance, 1947-1957* (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, 1959), p. 679, p. 691. A survey of Japanese elite opinion in 1954 shows even greater approval of closer ties with China among businessmen (62%), government officials (76%) and scholars and labor leaders (90%). See Douglas Heusted Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 235.

⁹⁷ For semi-official recount of the process of "People's Diplomacy" towards Japan, see Mouhong Xue, *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy)*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1990), Chapter 16; Taiping Wang, *Xingzhuangguo Waijiao Wushinian (Fifty Years of Chinese Diplomacy)* (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999). Chapter 3. Also for some recollections of Chinese diplomats who were personally involved in "People's Diplomacy," see Pinghua Sun, *Nihon to no 30 Nen: Chūnichi Yūkō Zuisoroku (30 Years with Japan: Occasional Thoughts on Sino-Japanese*

However, the two countries remained in a state of war for more than two decades before finally normalizing diplomatic tie in 1972. After a short interlude of friendship boom, Sino-Japanese relations since 1980s again displayed symptoms of mistrust and agony despite their mutually complementary economies and common interest in a stable relationship. They also began to quarrel about how to interpret the war history, something that they rarely did in previous decades.

Why have Sino-Japanese relations repeatedly veered off the track of smooth cooperation and solid friendship? Were there any lost chances? Why did the history issue become politically salient from the 1980s but not immediately after the war when most people had first-hand war experience? In order to answer these questions, one needs to take into account of not only structural conditions but also the influence of ideas, emotions, and perceptions that are particularly associated with national trauma suffered in the war. While the Cold War international structure initially blocked any meaningful cooperation between China and Japan that were allied to opposing strategic blocs, since the formal Sino-Soviet split and Sino-U.S. political rapprochement at the turn of the 1970s, the two former adversary countries were actually presented with a golden chance for deep reconciliation. This chance was however squandered, in large part because governments were so anxious to brush aside the history problem to make way for immediate political cooperation that they made few efforts to address historical trauma or eliminate their pernicious national myths that they created in the earlier period. When changing political conditions in the early 1980s, mainly domestic ones, exposed and escalated previously covered up bilateral historiographic conflict, Sino-Japanese Honeymoon quickly disintegrated despite the favorable structural environment. After the Cold War, with the history problem remaining outstanding and compounded by the diminution of the common Soviet threat, Sino-Japanese relations have stagnated in a state of political volatility and popular estrangement.

In this chapter I first outline the negative historical legacies between the two countries. Following that I introduce periodization of postwar Sino-Japanese relations by the standard of different reconciliation stages. The rest of this chapter will test realist theory

Friendship (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987); Xiangqian Xiao, *Eien no Rinkoku to Shite (Being Eternal Neighbors)* (Tokyo: Saimru, 1997), Chapter 1.

and historical mythmaking theory by examining pre-normalization Sino-Japanese relations. The next two chapters will test these theories against post-normalization bilateral relations in the 1970s and 1980s-90s respectively.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Postwar Sino-Japanese relations unfolded against the background of about half century of violent clashes, including two full-scale wars, from the late 19th century till mid-20th century.⁹⁸ The 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war, concluded with a military fiasco and fragrantly unequal treaties for China. In bilateral interactions during subsequent decades, the Chinese endured even graver pain and shame, marked by such infamous events as “Twenty One Demands,”⁹⁹ bloodbath in Jinan in 1928,¹⁰⁰ and the annexation of Manchuria since 1931. But nothing bears comparison to the all-out war between China and Japan from 1937 to 1945 in terms of scale, brutality, and destructiveness. The war left immense physical and psychological trauma to both nations that are beyond perfect cure.

Damages and Legacies in China

Estimates of Chinese casualties range from several million to 30 million. The Nationalist government officially states that total Chinese military casualties is about 3.3 million, and civilian casualties approximately 8.4 million.¹⁰¹ For several decades the Communist government had maintained a figure of more than 21 million Chinese casualties,

⁹⁸ With a more relaxed standard, Goertz Gary and Paul Diehl count 34 militarized conflicts between China and Japan over a period of 85 years from 1873 to 1958. See Diehl & Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, p. 146.

⁹⁹ An Japanese attempt to extend its sphere of influence to Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shandong, as well as to secure control of Chinese military, commercial, and financial affairs. First presented to the Chinese government in 1915 with an ultimatum, some important elements of the “21 demands” were forced on China in 1917 through a secret treaty. After the end of WWI, the German possessions in Shandong were awarded to Japan by the Versailles Treaty. But upon vehement Chinese protest, which culminated in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Japan had to withdraw its troops from Shandong.

¹⁰⁰ In Spring 1928 when China’s National Revolution Army approached Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province, Japanese troops moved in under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, and slaughtered Chinese negotiator and thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians.

¹⁰¹ “Kokumin Seifu no Kōnichi Sensō Sonshitsu Tokei (Statistics of the Nationalist Government on the Damages in China during the War of Resistance against Japan),” Quoted in Yanjun Yin, *Chūnichi Sensō Baishō Mondai (The Problem of Reparation for the Sino-Japanese War)* (Tokyo: Ojanomizu Shobo 1996), p. 384.

including 10 million dead.¹⁰² But in 1995 President Jiang Zemin dramatically raised the casualty estimate to 35 million in a public speech commemorating the end of WWII.¹⁰³ Today historians tend to agree that approximately 10 million Chinese people died and “uncertain millions” of people were wounded during the war.¹⁰⁴

Statistics of human loss only reflect one aspect of the catastrophic war, compared to which Japanese wartime atrocities are probably remembered more vividly. Indiscriminate killing of Chinese noncombatants occurred frequently after Japanese expansion in China began, but escalated to a massive scale in winter 1937 when Japanese troops captured China’s capital city, Nanjing. In the incident known as Nanjing Massacre, over two hundred thousand Chinese civilians and POWs are believed to have been killed, and approximately two thousand cases of rape and numerous cases of looting and destruction took place.¹⁰⁵ Such large-scale murders within a short period of time may be an isolated case, but Japanese atrocities were common phenomena throughout the war and occupation in China. In order to consolidate its control over the Communist areas in northern China, the Japanese military implemented the barbaric “three-all” policy of “kill all, burn all, destroy all” (*sankō-seisaku*), which led to as many as 19 million of population reduction during the period of 1941-1942.¹⁰⁶ The Japanese Imperial Army’s notorious Unit 731 used live human beings as biological test materials in Manchuria and killed thousands of people, most of whom were Chinese citizens.¹⁰⁷ Among the over 41,000 Chinese laborers who were brought to Japan by force, about 17% died of slavery working conditions there. The mortality rate even reached

¹⁰² *White Paper of Human Rights in China*, Information Office of the State Council of The People of Republic of China (Beijing, November 1991), Part 1.

¹⁰³ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, p. 948.

¹⁰⁴ Dower, *War without Mercy*, p. 296.

¹⁰⁵ The exact number of Chinese killed is still a subject of heated debate among historians. The verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East put the death toll at upwards of one hundred thousand, and the Nanjing War Crimes Trial held by the Nationalist government in 1947 stated that 300,000 Chinese were killed, which is also the official figure maintained by the Communist government. Today most historians accepted a middle-range estimate of two hundred thousand that was put forward by Japanese historian Tomio Hora. See Tomio Hora, *Nankin Daigyakusatsu (Nanjing Massacre)* (Tokyo: Dokuma Shoten, 1982), pp. 144-149; Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rapes of Nanjing,” *American Historical Review* 104 (June 1999), p. 844; Ikuhiko Hata, “The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable,” *Japan Echo* 25, No. 4, (1998), p. 50; Dower, *War without Mercy*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁶ Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the emergence of revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962); pp. 55-58.

¹⁰⁷ The death toll of Japanese biological warfare remains in dispute, in part due to the refusal of the Japanese government to open related files. See Ralph Blumenthal & Judith Miller, “Japan Rebuffs Requests for Information about Its Germ-Warfare Atrocities,” *The New York Times*, March 4, 1999

to 41 to 52% in about 33 mining units that claimed more Chinese lives.¹⁰⁸ Other Chinese war victims include those “comfort women” who were forced to provide sexual service to the Japanese military, and many ordinary citizens under the harsh and arrogant Japanese occupation.

In addition to personal sufferings, Chinese economic activities were paralyzed and social life deadly disrupted because totally 26 out of 30 Chinese provinces were engulfed in the war, 930 cities were occupied, and 23 provinces suffered Japanese air raids.¹⁰⁹ The eight years of full-scale war caused \$62 billion in direct losses and \$500 billion in indirect losses to China.¹¹⁰

The war ended in 1945 but many wounds inflicted by the war have remained open even up to today. The large quantity of Japanese chemical shells left in China have since the end of war killed or injured 2,000 Chinese. The cleansing of these chemicals was postponed until a bilateral government agreement was reached in 1996.¹¹¹ The war also created some outstanding political controversies, including the legal status of Taiwan, a former Japanese colony that Japan, and the territorial disputes concerning Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, part of the Taiwan colony but occupied by the United States until the 1970s. These problems still strain contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.

Japanese Experiences and Memories

Japanese official estimate of war dead is over three percent of the total Japanese population, including 1.7 million military deaths and nearly 1 million civilians killed in American firebombing of Tokyo and 60 other cities, atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the battle of Okinawa. Although Japanese people mostly remember the war

¹⁰⁸ Official statistics released by the Japanese government, cited by *People's Daily* on January 8 and March 12, 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Yin, *Chūnichi Sensō Baishō Mondai*, p. 380; *White Paper of Human Rights in China*, Part 1.

¹¹⁰ *White Paper of Human Rights in China*, Part 1.

¹¹¹ The Japanese government puts the number of its chemical shells in China at 700,000, while Chinese surveys in the 1950s estimate 2 million shells left in China. “China and Japan: Cleansing Job,” *The Economist*, April 5, 1997; “Kyū-Nihongun no Iki Kagaku Heiki Shori Hachimaru (Disposal of chemical weapons left behind by the former Japanese military starts),” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 2000; “Relic of War Adds to Strain in Beijing Ties With Tokyo,” *The New York Times*, August 12, 2003.

as Pacific War against the United States instead of China, even by Japanese government's own calculations, nearly 400,000 Japanese servicemen perished in China.¹¹²

Physical and psychological damages of the war are enduring. Hiroshima and Nagasaki stand out as the icon of Japan's national trauma. Atomic bomb victims, the bombed (*Hibakusha*), suffered radiation illness and psychological disorders long after the war was over, which was compounded by serious stigmatization of these victims in the postwar Japanese society.¹¹³ Today *Hibakusha* groups are still demanding state compensation for their enormous pains.¹¹⁴

Japanese memories remain vivid about the horrific firebomb raids of Tokyo that killed 100,000 people in one night and other devastating raids on Japanese cities in the spring and summer of 1945.¹¹⁵ Ordinary people also remembered that they experienced appalling food shortage at the end of the war, repatriates lost all their possessions and personal dignity when coming back to Japan, and war orphans and homeless children were abandoned to a life of misery. Not to mention the thousands of Japanese orphans who stayed behind in China and could not return to homeland until Sino-Japanese normalization.¹¹⁶ Last but not the least, the defeat and unconditional surrender, and the seven-year foreign occupation that deprived Japan of sovereignty rights are all regarded as national shame.

PERIODIZATION OF POSTWAR SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

¹¹² Dower, *War without Mercy*, pp. 297-299. The Chinese government claims that 70% of total Japanese war casualties took place in China. See Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 949.

¹¹³ The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings* (New York: Basic Books, 1981); John Dower, "The Bombed."

¹¹⁴ "Hibakusha Declaration for the 21st Century," adopted at Nihon Hidankyō Annual Conference in 2001 (<http://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/english/declaration.htm>). Also see *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 2001. For a historical study of postwar Japanese Hibakusha's struggle for state compensation, see Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp. 142-169.

¹¹⁵ "100,000 People Perished, but Who Remembers?" *The New York Times*, March 12, 2002.

¹¹⁶ "Chūgoku Zanryū Hojin Kazoku Goto Shien: Koseisho Seisaku o Tenkan (Assistance to Japanese Nationals Remaining in China: the Ministry of Health and Welfare Adjusts Policies)," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 2000.

Postwar Sino-Japanese relations can be divided into three periods. In the first period, the 1950s and 1960s, China and Japan were stuck in a state of Non-Reconciliation. They treated each other as enemies and prepared for immediate danger of violent conflict. They had neither formal diplomatic relationship nor large-scale economic interaction. Meanwhile, short of normal means for personnel exchange, the two societies were isolated from one another and negative stereotyping prevailed in mutual public perceptions.

After normalization in 1972, China and Japan entered the stage of Shallow Reconciliation, during which their relationship went through several twists and turns. The second period, the 1970s, was in the sub-stage of “Rapprochement”, in which political and economic cooperation expanded smoothly and mutual feeling became generally benign. But they never accomplished stable peace because the inter-government cooperation failed to reach a comprehensive level, especially on security affairs, and the warm atmosphere between the two peoples was more a product of political manipulation and romanticized imagination rather than truly mutual understanding and trust. In the 1980s-90s, the third period, the short-lived “Rapprochement” was replaced by the sub-stage of “Friction,” in which the theme of friendship has been drown out by bilateral quarrels and conflicts in both inter-governmental and popular dimensions.

The following sections evaluate and compare the contributions to pre-1972 Sino-Japanese relations by international structural pressures and state’s historical mythmaking behaviors. I begin with coding international structural conditions and historical mythmaking actions of Japan and China, as well as inferring predictions for reconciliation development from the two theories. Then I process trace the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations during this period to examine the degree of congruence between predictions and evidence. Of this, I argue that systemic constraints and incentives played more decisive role while historical mythmaking was the subsidiary factor at this stage. However, the formation of historical myths was not entirely penetrated by international structure but also had domestic political motivations, and historical mythmaking theory makes fairly accurate predictions for the policy preferences of the two countries, if not the policy outcomes.

CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS

I. The International System: Antagonism at Creation

At the end of WWII in Asia, formal Sino-Japanese tie was out of the question because Japan was placed under American occupation and China embroiled in an all-out civil war. By the time they became united, sovereign states, the Cold War had already unfolded, forcing them to make strategic choices between the American and Soviet blocs. Japan endorsed strategic collaboration with the United States in order to regain national sovereignty and receive generous economic assistance, while China sought security and economic partnership with the Soviet Union. Despite the absence of direct mutual threat, China and Japan nevertheless were deeply enmeshed in the global rivalry between the East and West blocs. For about two decades structural conditions were quite unfavorable for bilateral reconciliation to take place.

Containment and the US-Japan Strategic Collaboration

After the war, the United States secured exclusive occupation of Japan as well as obtained military control of mandated islands and Okinawa for building forward bases in the Pacific Ocean. But in the early stage of the occupation, the US mainly desired to disarm and demilitarize Japan to make sure that it would no longer pose a military threat.¹¹⁷ It was George Kennan's conception of containment policy that harbingered the intimate integration of policy towards Japan with American national security policy. In his X article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1947, Kennan argued that it was in America's vital interest to restore the economic health and armed strength of Western Europe and Japan so that they would not be vulnerable to Soviet military attack or material lure.¹¹⁸ Kennan's proposal to accord strategic priority to Germany and Japan was soon embraced by the Truman administration, which on October 7, 1948 approved NSC 13/2 stipulated the so-called "reverse course" of

¹¹⁷ See the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" released on September 22, 1945, in Chihiro Hosoya ed., *Nichibei Kankei Shiryōshū 1945-97* (A Documentary History of U.S.-Japanese Relations) (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1999), p. 28.

¹¹⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Chapter 2.

US occupation policy in Japan, which shifted the focus of occupation from punishment to rehabilitation of Japan.¹¹⁹ Soon after, Washington articulated the key role of Japanese defense in American strategy in Asia on a number of occasions including the NSC 48/2 of December 1949, and the speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950 declaring the Pacific “defense perimeter” to run from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and down to the Philippines.¹²⁰

With Japan ascending to a position of vital importance for America to win the Cold War, Washington began to press Japan to rearm. After the outbreak of the Korean War, it made rearmament and military bases in Japan as preconditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. In January 1952 Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru gave his promise to establish a National Security Force (*Hoantai*) immediately after the peace treaty was signed.

The US-Japan security treaty further knitted Japan into a broad defense framework by granting the U.S. with exclusive rights to use military bases in Japan, and agreeing that American forces stationed there would be utilized “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” The geographic boundary of “Far East” was never spelt out, but in the context of the Cold War in Asia this clause actually carried with it a profound connotation that Japan should provide base facilities and other support to American military actions in China, Taiwan, Soviet Union, or on the high seas.¹²¹

The Yoshida government was not mainly driven by security fear to committed to strategic collaboration with the U.S. not mainly because of its. It is revealed in later analysis that Yoshida did not perceive the threat of monolithic international communism, and believed the security benefit of rearmament, American military bases and other restrictive provisions was outweighed by their economic and political cost. However, such seemingly rational cost-benefit calculation made little sense to a country that was still under occupation

¹¹⁹ NSC 13/2, “Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan,” October 7, 1948, The National Security Archives.

¹²⁰ See Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 91-92; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 355-358.

¹²¹ Igarashi, *Sengo Nichibei Kankei no Keisei (The Formation of Postwar US-Japan Relations)* (Tokyo: Koudansha, 1995), pp. 280-286.

and dependent on American economic aid and political backing for national rebuilding and state legitimacy. Since the security alliance was directly linked to an early conclusion of peace treaty and restoration of Japanese sovereignty, the former was actually *quid pro quo* for the later. Japan had few other choices but to become America's Cold War ally.¹²²

Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Korean War

Just as Japan was not America's natural ally, neither was China America's natural enemy. The U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually maintained a reasonably good relationship during their wartime cooperation.¹²³ In the Chinese Civil War, however, the Communists grew increasingly resentful that Washington provided its political adversary, Kuomintang or the Nationalists (KMT), with large-scale military aid. However distrusting the Truman administration, the CCP believed it was still possible to get American recognition when it won the civil war.¹²⁴ This anticipation was not entirely off the mark, given the Truman administration initially adopted Kennan's proposal of strongpoint defense and excluded Taiwan from its scope.

But recognizing the Chinese Communist regime and abandoning Taiwan would have rendered serious inconsistency in Washington's overall containment strategy when it was trying to convince the reluctant public and isolationists in the Congress to underwrite the anti-Communist programs in Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia.¹²⁵ Meanwhile, CCP's policies hardly convinced the Americans that it was not a Soviet puppet and Chinese Titoism would separate the two Communist states. In June 1949, Mao Zedong declared that China would lean to one side, the side of socialism, and dismissed it as a naïve idea that China

¹²² Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 370.

¹²³ The good relationship lasted until the Yalta Conference from when Washington focused on improving the international status of the KMT regime and denied the CCP of American support. Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 145-146.

¹²⁴ Since mid-1949 Chinese Communist diplomats approached American representatives in China on a number of occasions to appeal for normal diplomatic relationship, including Huang Hua's meetings with American Ambassador Stuart in Nanjing in May and June 1949 and Chen Mingshu's visit to Stuart in July. For a detailed discussion of the content of these meetings and the authenticity of relevant documents, see Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 85-91.

¹²⁵ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, p. 101.

needed help from the imperialist British and U.S. governments.¹²⁶ After the founding of the Republic, Mao committed to resolute removal of Western influences in China, a policy named with a metaphor, “sweeping the house clean before inviting guests.”¹²⁷ Moreover, in February 1950, China signed a formal treaty military alliance with the U.S.S.R.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty challenged the fundamentals of Truman’s China policy. Hard-liners such as John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk argued that the CCP, supported by Soviet aid, “constitute(s) an increasing threat to the already greatly weakened United States position in the Far East.”¹²⁸ They strongly demanded a reconsideration of China policy, especially to increase military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. But a fundamental policy reversal did not take place until the outbreak of the Korean War, shortly after which the Truman administration adopted the NSC-68 that had been shelved ever since being approved in April 1950. The document called for containment of Communism worldwide and brought Kennan’s strategy of strongpoint defense to the end.¹²⁹ To mark a departure from its previous China policy, Truman ordered a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait and declared that the future status of Taiwan must await determination. China saw American action in Taiwan Strait as “aggression against the territory of China” and vowed that “all the people of our country will certainly fight to the end single-mindedly to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors.”¹³⁰ Chinese suspicions only loomed larger when the American-led U.N. troops crossed the 38 parallel and advanced towards Yalu River that divides Chinese and Korean territories. The situation turned so perilous that China feared

¹²⁶ See Mao Zedong’s speech “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship: in commemoration of the 28th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, June 30, 1949,” in *Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong)* Vol. 4 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991).

¹²⁷ “Sweeping the house clean before inviting guests,” “lean to one side,” and “make a fresh start (meaning to scrap old diplomatic relations established by the Nationalist government with foreign countries and replace with new ones built on the basis of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit)” were the three principal decisions on foreign relations that Mao Zedong made shortly before the PRC was founded. See Xue, *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao*, pp. 3-5.

¹²⁸ Rusk to Acheson, May 5, 1950, quoted in Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, p. 128. Also see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two China’ Policy,” in Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 237; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 103.

¹²⁹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Chapter 4. On domestic political competition as a major cause of the over-stretched US containment strategy, see Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, Chapter 7, “America’s Cold War Consensus.”

¹³⁰ See “Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai’s Statement on American Armed Invasion of Chinese Territory Taiwan, June 28, 1950,” in *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (A Selection of Zhou EnLai’s Writings on Foreign Affairs)* (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 18-19.

that the U.S. might launch a two-front attack from Manchuria and the Taiwan Strait, at which point Mao decided to face down the U.S. in the battlefield.¹³¹

Cold War in Asia and the Roles of China and Japan

Thus far, the rise of bipolar international structure since the late 1940s had not only drawn China and Japan into the opposing strategic camps but also made them adversaries in the first hot war in the postwar history. The evolution of Cold War in Asia after the Korean War continued to entangle the two countries and directly pitted them against one other.

The U.S. China policy in the following two decades was characterized by A. Doak Barnett as “containment and isolation.”¹³² President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles saw Communist China as a belligerent, untrustworthy enemy and believed that China would not be weaned from the Soviet Union unless it was dealt with maximum pressure rather than by conciliation.¹³³ Washington maintained its security commitment to Taiwan, leaving little room for Sino-American political compromise. Twice in the 1950s, during the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, the Taiwan issue pushed the two countries to the brink of war. During the Kennedy/Johnson period, Sino-Soviet split became so obvious that most American strategists no longer believed the threat of monolithic communism. But they still perceived China as the principal threat to American interest in the Asian-Pacific region, especially when China became a nuclear weapon power in 1964.¹³⁴ And Chinese conviction of ulterior intention of “American imperialists” never wavered. Sino-American hostility was exacerbated after the U.S. intervened in Vietnam. Washington viewed the conflict closely related to its struggle against Communist China and was afraid that soft American reaction in this essentially peripheral area would damage its credibility among

¹³¹ For discussions of the difficult circumstances under which Mao made the war decision, see Jonathan Pollack, “The Korean War and Sino-American Relations,” in Harry Harding & Ming Yuan, *Sino-American relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of A Critical Decade* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1989); Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, pp. 153-172; Jian Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 171-189, 200-209.

¹³² Congressional Quarterly Inc., *China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1966*. Washington, D.C, 1967, p. 279.

¹³³ John Lewis Gaddis, “The American ‘Wedge’ Strategy, 1949-1955,” in Harding & Yuan, *Sino-American relations, 1945-1955*, p. 168; Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 207-208.

¹³⁴ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 210; Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: the United States and China since 1972* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 30.

principal allies. In the meantime, China maintained an uncompromising stance on Indochina, providing Vietnamese Communists with large-scale military aid until 1968.¹³⁵

American containment against China required active cooperation with its Asian allies. Eisenhower and Dulles tried to construct a ring of states aligned with the U.S., including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, to deter Communist aggression. Japan played a critical role in this framework. First of all, Japan was encouraged to expand trade and investment to non-Communist countries in Asia in order to increase the economic strength and political stability of this area.¹³⁶ Besides using Japan as the regional economic engine, the U.S. also emphasized Japan's military duty. The Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) concluded in March 1954 committed Japan to incremental remilitarization and promised to revive Japanese defense industry and supply millions of American weapons and military equipment to Japan. The agreement clarified the U.S.-Japan security relationship and confirmed Japan's indefinite entanglement with America's containment strategy in Asia.¹³⁷

Japan's embracing of US policy placed it in directly opposite position against China. The most divisive issue was Taiwan's international status. In Chinese eyes, the close political and economic cooperation between Japan and Taiwan was an outright defiance of Chinese security interest. Regarding South Korea, from the early 1950s the U.S. urged Tokyo to improve its relationship with Seoul in order to ease the cost of containment in Korea.¹³⁸ The two countries normalized their relationship through the 1965 Japan-South Korean Basic Treaty. Because South Korea was China's adversary during the Korean War and an important military ally of the U.S., China was sensitive to Japanese assistance to South Korea. Chinese anger over Japanese cooperation with Taiwan and South Korea soared especially when Prime Minister Sato agreed in the joint statement with Nixon in 1969 to link

¹³⁵ See Thomas J. Christensen, "Worse than a Monolith: Leninism, Nationalism, and Containment in Cold War East Asia, 1949-1969," unpublished manuscript, March 2001; Jian Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," in *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

¹³⁶ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 429.

¹³⁷ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. p. 460. On the MSA negotiation between the United States and Japan, see Kūichi Miyazawa, *Tokyo - Washington no Mitsudan (Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington)* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Sha, 1999), Chapter 5; John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1988), pp. 97-113.

¹³⁸ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 91-93.

Japanese national security to the defense of Taiwan and South Korea. Besides, Sato publicly justified the American war in Vietnam, facilitated its military operations from bases in Japan, and provided aid to Southeast Asia. Such Japanese attitude again clashed with the interest and policy of China.

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

The systemic conditions for Sino-Japanese reconciliation were very *negative* in the 1950s and 1960s, which was mainly caused by the inter-bloc confrontation rather than direct security dilemma between the two countries. Realist theory predicts that they would stay in the stage of Non-Reconciliation. First of all, imminent expectation of bilateral armed conflict should be prevalent among elite, not because war was intended as an effective policy to counter mutual threat, but due to the fear that they would be dragged into the conflict between the opposing power blocs. Mutual national recognition was because the bloc leaders would exert pressure stop their regional allies from flirting with their own Cold War adversaries. In addition, economic cooperation should also be scarce, which is not a natural phenomenon, given their economic interests, but the result of the irresistible demand from their bloc leaders to cut down economic ties with the enemy bloc.

Moreover, realist theory predicts that the Japanese and Chinese people would be openly hostile to each other, not because of their bitter memories of the recent war but due to the negative structural conditions that set apart the people. First, there should be intense mutual aversion and fear among the public, which should arise from government propaganda promoting the perception of incompatible national security interests. Although people might still bring up the war history, they do so mainly to justify or reinforce official criticism against the other state's current policies rather than to seek rectification of historical wrongs. Systemic constraints should also minimize the freedom of bilateral personnel exchange and information flow, which would diminish the chance for the public to develop opinions about each other country independent of government propaganda.

II. Historical Mythmaking: Conflictual/Quasi-Convergent Narratives

The aftermath of Sino-Japanese war saw both nations trying to come to grips with their traumatic experiences. In the process of remembering and forgetting the past, Japanese and Chinese ruling elites engineered and perpetuated through various institutional tools the mythologizing of war memory that embodied a clear bias to glorify or whitewash the actions of one's own nation while blaming others for causing the tragedy. These myths were driven by a multitude of instrumental motivations including strategic goals, domestic political interests, and ideological doctrines. Evidently divergent in a number of different ways, the narratives of the two sides both assigned war responsibility to only a small group of Japanese militarists. Consequently, mutually conflictual war narratives with important elements of quasi-convergence emerged.

Myths in Japanese War Memory

Domestic and International Motivations in Historical Mythmaking

Japan's conservative elites tried to reconstruct a national history in postwar Japan that would best serve their domestic and international interests. This group centered around Yoshida Shigeru, a prewar diplomat who reemerged as a leading conservative leader in postwar Japan. Those closely affiliated with this group include prewar high-ranking bureaucrats, the imperial court officials, conservative party politicians, big capitalists, and conservative intellectuals. They represented continuity from prewar politics as many had been loyal supporters of the imperial government and after the war still tried to maintain traditional patterns of authority. But this group soon faced challenge from the resurrection of the political Left, who moved rapidly to the political stage in the early postwar years. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) alone won 20% of Diet seats in the first postwar election (April 1946) and even organized a short-lived coalition government under Katayama Tetsu. Meanwhile, the leftists were active in promoting the "revolution from below" through labor movement, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) supported by labor unions increased its

representation in the Diet from 4 to 39 in January 1949 election.¹³⁹ Conservative fears of the leftist competition for power were exacerbated by the attitude of the occupation authorities, especially the idealist “New Dealers” in the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). The “New Dealers” were sympathetic to the leftists, who in their eyes possessed the strongest democratic credential for they had “spoken publicly and unequivocally against the war, and have languished in jail for their temerity.”¹⁴⁰ In contrast, the conservative group was politically vulnerable because of its close ties to the wartime government and many of its members were targets of occupation purges.¹⁴¹ Not surprisingly, the JCP leader Nosaka Sanzo once declared, “we communists are the true patriots and the true service brigade for democracy.”¹⁴² Under the serious threat from the Left, the conservatives were confronted with the urgent task of strengthening their control of state power.

Power consolidation was also important to fulfilling the group’s agenda of economic recovery and prosperity. The conservative elites tied in their strategy of economic reconstruction with the triple alliance of bureaucracy, business class, and the conservative parties, which was aimed at the regensis of a business-dominated economy. But their interest clashed with that of the political Left, who admonished that social equality was no less important than pure economic growth and any economic recovery program should not be implemented at the expense of labor interest.¹⁴³ Heavily influenced by socialist ideas, the leftists made it their top priority to fight for “people’s democracy” through grass-roots mass movements, which jeopardized the capitalist socioeconomic interests represented by the conservatives.

The rivalry between the conservatives and leftists also involved Japan’s international strategy. The conservative mainstream deemed American political and security support

¹³⁹ Steven Benfell, *Rich Nation, No Army: The Politics of Reconstructing National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1997), pp. 66-67.

¹⁴⁰ Benfell, *Rich Nation, No Army*, p. 221.

¹⁴¹ For example, the occupation purge implicated all but three members of the Shidehara Cabinet. The three cabinet members spared in the purge were Prime Minister Shidehara, Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru, and the Health and Welfare Minister Ashida Hitoshi. See Shiichi Kitaoka, *Jimintō (The Liberal Democratic Party)* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1995), p. 34.

¹⁴² John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 256.

¹⁴³ According to 1955 data on the support structure of the of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and JSP, about 68% of LDP supporters came from the traditional sector of farmers and owners of small businesses,

critical for ending the occupation early and maintaining conservative dominance of domestic politics. Also they depended on American economic aid to alleviate immediate food shortage and rebuild the national economy. But the policy of strategic collaboration with the West was far from a national consensus. With the advent of “reverse course” in the occupation policy, those on the left who initially embraced occupation reform programs now drifted away from the pro-U.S. stance. The Communists and the radical wing of organized labor turned explicitly anti-U.S., while the moderate liberals, such as the prominent intellectual Nanbara Shigeru, were also disillusioned about the Americans and came to advocate that Japan should stay neutral and detach itself from the U.S. containment policy.¹⁴⁴

The two sides particularly collided on the question of peace treaty. Whereas the conservatives wanted to follow the U.S. direction to negotiate separate peace (*Tandoku Kōwa*) with only Western allies, the leftists and liberals opted to sign an overall peace treaty (*Zenmen Kōwa*) with all belligerent states including the Soviet Union and China.¹⁴⁵ The Diet voting that passed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in late 1951 crystallized the polarization of opinions across the political spectrum. 461 out of total 481 approval votes were cast by conservative parties, while 71 out of total 92 opposition votes came from the JCP and the left wing of the JSP.¹⁴⁶

Therefore, in the years after the end of the war Japan’s conservative elite met considerably political hurdles in carrying out its domestic and international policies. It was imperative for them to find some powerful ideological instruments to boost the prestige and influence of conservative power. To this end, they used historical mythmaking to reinvent a national tradition that would win the hearts and minds of the public. Specifically, the conservatives created myths to resurrect the national identity of “Kokutai” and exonerate the emperor and other important members of the conservative group, minimize Japan’s war

whereas the JSP drew 59% of its support from blue-collar and white-collar workers. Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 120-121.

¹⁴⁴ For a review Nanbara’s opinions on Japan’s international strategy, see Takashi Kato, *Nanbara Shigeru* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 160-164.

¹⁴⁵ See Igarashi, *Sengo Nichibei Kankei no Keisei*, pp. 180-182; Shuichi Katō and Rokurō Hidaka, *Doujidaijin Maruyama Masao o Kataru (Contemporaries’ Recollections about Maruyama Masao)* (Yokohama: Seiori Shobo, 1998), pp. 58-63.

¹⁴⁶ Igarashi, *Sengo Nichibei Kankei no Keisei*, p. 222.

responsibility, and reclaim national pride by emphasizing Japanese victimhood and pacifism and praising the glory of the imperial soldiers.

Myths of Self-Whitewashing and Glorification

1. “Emperor First”¹⁴⁷

When trying to consolidate power, Japanese conservative elites attached great importance to preserving the *Kokutai*, or “national polity.” Essentially an ideology that reveres the emperor as the symbolic head of a nation united by blood ties, the *Kokutai* idea served as a powerful spiritual tool for the imperial government to unite the nation behind its military expansion policy. After the war, the conservatives continued to anchor national identity on the historical and psychological legacies of the *Kokutai* ideology in order to retain power. But at the time there was widespread suspicion that Emperor Hirohito bore irrefutable responsibility for starting, expanding, and prolonging the war. It was inconceivable to many that the emperor could completely avoid responsibility because at the very least he signed the declaration of war.¹⁴⁸ So enormous pressure came from both allied countries and Japanese progressives demanding that the emperor step down and be indicted.¹⁴⁹

However, an image of the emperor tarnished by war guilt would have led to the crumbling of the *Kokutai* ideology and political justification of the conservative rule. The conservative group was determined to defend the absolute impunity of the emperor. The main tactic was to portray him as a pacifist, anti-militarist, and passive onlooker who

¹⁴⁷ I borrow this phrase from Herbert Bix’s description of the political psyche of postwar Japanese conservatives, “emperor first, economic reconstruction second, and morals last.” See Herbert P. Bix, “The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, No. 2 (1992), p. 312.

¹⁴⁸ For many decades after the war discussing the Showa emperor’s historical role had been a taboo in Japan. As time went by and especially after his death in 1989, historians have found more evidence to prove that Hirohito was not simply a passive figurehead manipulated by people surrounding him but a major protagonist in making the war. For a most recent scholarly study on this subject, see Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000). For critiques against Bix’s argument, see Ben-Ami Shillony’s book review in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 28, No. 1 (Winter 2002) and Andrew Gordon’s book review in *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 2, No. 2 (2001).

¹⁴⁹ For discussions of internal and external pressure for the emperor to abdicate and stand war crimes trial, see Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 5; Bix, “The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility,” p. 305, pp. 312-317; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 320-322.

himself was deceived by the jingoist military. In the “Imperial Rescript for Ending the War” broadcast to his “Good and Loyal Subjects” on August 15, Hirohito described Japan’s decision to capitulate as a magnanimous act that might save all human civilization itself from annihilation. Not even once did he mention Japan’s aggression, neither did he give the slightest hint of his personal responsibility for the war. He concluded by calling on the Japanese people to remain united as a great family and devote to the reconstruction of a nation that would preserve its traditional *Kokutai* identity.¹⁵⁰ In a matter of a few hours after the emperor’s surrender broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki praised on the radio “His Majesty’s gracious benevolence” for his sacred decision to end the war and stated that the whole nation “sincerely apologizes to His Majesty” because they failed to attain victory. Here again the emperor was commended as a magnanimous peacemaker, and it was his subjects who must assume responsibility, not for Japan’s aggression, but for its defeat.¹⁵¹

The primary mission of the succeeding Higashikuni Cabinet was to preserve imperial institution. In a statement issued on August 28 of 1945, Higashikuni reiterated Suzuki’s point by declaring that Japanese collective penitence, the so-called “the repentance of the hundred million” (*Ichiokeu Sōsange*), for losing the war was the first step toward national reconstruction.¹⁵² Furthermore, on November 5, the Shidehara Cabinet issued the following official statement establishing a mythified image of the emperor as a peace-loving constitutionalist and principled seeker of diplomatic solutions to US-Japan conflict, in a patent attempt to fend off domestic and international attack on his war responsibility:

- “1. That we believe the Empire was compelled to embark upon the Greater East Asian War in view of the surrounding circumstances.
2. That His Majesty the Emperor worried over negotiations with the United States and did not give up trying to reach a peaceful settlement until the very end.
3. Concerning matters such as the decision to begin hostilities and the carrying out of operational plans, His Majesty the Emperor followed established constitutional practices and did not reject the decisions of the imperial headquarters and the government.
- 4...
5. The imperial rescript declaring war was an internal rescript, intended for the nation.
- 6...”¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Hosoya, *Nichibei Kankei Shiryōshū* 1945-97, p. 15.

¹⁵¹ Bix, “The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility,” p. 302; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 287.

¹⁵² Yutaka Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan (The Japanese Views of War)*, (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1998), p. 26; Ōnuma, *Tōkyō Saiban kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisō e*, pp.160-162.

2. Minimalist Definition of the Scope of War Guilt

Due to their inextricable ties to the wartime ruling circles, the conservative elites were caught in a difficult situation in the bid for power against their morally cleaner leftist adversaries. So removing their historical stain became critical to the political legitimacy of the conservative government. To this end, the conservative historiography took a minimalist approach to defining the scope of Japan's war responsibility.

First of all, the conservatives created a "myth of military clique" to drive a wedge between the evil militarists on the one hand, and the innocent emperor, the majority of the conservative ruling class, and ordinary Japanese people on the other hand. After Japan surrendered, numerous conservative elites including Prince Konoe and Yoshida lobbied the victors that war criminal investigation should exclude the emperor but go after Tōjō Hideki, a general and prime minister of Japan during much of the Pacific War.¹⁵⁴ At the same time, they were alerted by the public backlash against the notion of collective penitence that absolved the conservative elite while holding the ordinary Japanese people, who sacrificed far more than the senior military and civilian officials, responsible.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, the 89th Diet session during the Shidehara administration passed a bill asserting that "war responsibility should not extend to ordinary people (*ippan kokumin*) who, after the declaration of war, dedicated themselves to duty in a lawful manner in order to conduct the war, obediently following the orders of the state."¹⁵⁶ So those who should bear war responsibility were only a small group of militarists like Tōjō, who were accused of usurping authority from the emperor and politicians and duping the populace into waging an aggressive war.

Second, they argue that, given the hostile international environment in the 1930s, Japan really had no alternatives but to go to war to defend itself. By blaming the external conditions for the Pacific War, they watered down Japan's imperialistic ambition and left out its aggression in Asia that could not be readily explained away by the argument of Western power encirclement. This notion of self-defense war first emerged in the emperor's

¹⁵³ Quoted in Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," p. 306.

¹⁵⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 480-484.

¹⁵⁵ George L. Hicks, *Japan's War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment?* (Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield: Ashgate, 1997), p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," p. 310.

surrender rescript, where he maintained that Japan resorted to war with the West to ensure “the survival of the empire and stability in East Asia.” Later in a personal testimony to be used in the upcoming Tokyo Trial, the emperor again reflected that if he “had not granted permission to stand up and act in that time of crisis,” there would have been “enormous civil strife at home” like a coup and “ultimately, a furious war would have developed anyway and would have brought about a tragedy far worse than this war.”¹⁵⁷ Postwar conservative governments quickly picked up the self-defense argument as part of the official historiography and wrote it into school textbooks.

Third, the conservatives accepted Japanese responsibility for opening hostilities with Western countries, but de-emphasized Japanese atrocities during the war and colonial occupation, especially in Asia. Acknowledging and thoroughly investigating war crimes would have incriminated a wide range of people outside the military clique. Hence the conservative narrative of war history was featured by Western centrism. In this view, the 15 years of belligerence between Japan and China was never a war but a string of incidents (*Jiken*), and Japan was defeated only because of the overwhelming American power, which the militarists either grossly underestimated or intentionally concealed from the Japanese people. This narrative was an outright distortion of historical facts, for even after 1941, about 30-60% of Japanese military budget and a large proportion of army forces were drained by Japanese operations in Chinese mainland, not even to mention the cost of colonizing Manchuria, Taiwan and Korea.¹⁵⁸ Neither did it acknowledge that the tenacious indigenous resistance movement in China and other Asian countries dealt severe blow to Japan’s imperialist expansion and accelerated its defeat.

3. Victimhood and Pacifism

The above myths were all predicated on a strong sense of Japanese victimhood, which emphasized that the vast majority of the nation were unfortunate victims because of

¹⁵⁷ Quoted from the Emperor’s Monologue that his aides helped him compile shortly before the opening of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. This document was believed to have been handed over to the International Prosecution Section (IPS) but was never published until 1990 after the Showa emperor died. See Hidenari Terasaki & Mariko Terasaki Miller Eds. *Shōwa Tennō no Kokuhakuroku (The Showa Emperor’s Monologue)* (Tokyo, Bungei Shunju Sha, 1991), p. 137. A translation of this section can be found in Bix, “The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility,” p. 350.

¹⁵⁸ Yutaka Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 102-103.

the intentional deception and disastrous misjudgment of the military clique, the precarious external conditions, or Western material superiority. By highlighting Japanese suffering and whitewashing their wrongdoings, the conservative historiography tried to shape a clean image of Japan in postwar international society.

The myth of Japanese victim consciousness was closely related to a pacifist view of history. The conservative narrative argued that because the Japanese people suffered so much during the war and generally loathed more external violence, postwar Japan naturally became a peace-loving country. During the occupation years, Yoshida repeatedly issued passionate statements of pacifist ideals to regain international acceptance of Japan.¹⁵⁹ Admittedly, Japanese people suffered tremendously during the war, but the suffering itself should not in any way exculpate Japan of the guilt for invading other countries and killing numerous civilians.

4. Sacrifice as Hero

Another myth of self-glorification was to honor those who “served and died for the nation” during the war. The conservative government gave the imperial army special honor and care because they answered the call when the country needed them and have made great sacrifices, or *Gisei*, for the country. When it came to their responsibility for fighting an aggressive war and committed atrocities, the government defended the glorious image of the military by arguing that the soldiers simply followed the order of their superiors. Even those convicted war criminals were also held as heroes because they did what they believed was good for the Japanese nation. Perhaps the first official gesture that eulogized the imperial army and obscured their war responsibility was the speech by Prime Minister Ikeda at the first annual ceremony in commemoration of “the End of War Memorial Day,” or *Shūsen Kirenbi*, on August 15, 1963. The main thrust of the speech, which was often repeated by later prime ministers, conspicuously brushed aside the question of war responsibility with the claim that those died in the war paved the foundation for today’s prosperity of Japan.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in A New Era* (Washington: AEI Press, 1992), pp. 21-22.

¹⁶⁰ Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 109-112.

It is worth noting that the conservatives were not solely responsible for the rise of pernicious national myths in Japan. The left-wingers did not always reject and in some cases even readily echoed with the government. On the question of Japan's war guilt, the progressive historiography also shunned the responsibility of "the people," or collective responsibility.¹⁶¹ It also converged with the conservatives on Japanese victimhood and pacifist outlook, although due to quite different political motivations. At the end of the 1940s, the political Left launched the "peace movement" to press the government for Japan's strategic neutrality and an overall peace treaty with all former enemies. In this tradition, a massive anti-nuclear campaign broke out in the mid-1950s to oppose the non-democratic, capitalist state and its dangerous foreign policy. But the anti-nuclear movement dwelled more on war destruction at home than Japanese atrocities abroad, and its indiscriminate opposition to all wars blurred the distinction between Japanese war of aggression and the war of resistance by Asian people.

Institutionalization of Mythologized Historiography in Japan

Since the end of war until the 1960s, Japanese conservative elites took advantage of some important institutional tools, including war crimes trials, media and school education, war compensation policies, and commemoration, to legitimize these self-whitewashing and glorification myths. In addition to the convenient access to state apparatus by the conservative elites, the inherent paradox of the occupation policy and its dramatic shift from liberal reforms to strengthening the conservative power in Japan in the late 1940s helped these myths prevail in national collective memory.

1. The War Crimes Trials

Postwar penalization of individuals bearing war responsibility was the most important legal institution to establish an official view of war history. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial held between 1946 and 1948 stood by the conservative position on the

¹⁶¹ The term "collective responsibility" is used as opposed to "collective guilt." As German president on May 8, 1945, Richard von Weizsäcker pointed out in his world-famous speech in the *Bundestag*, "there is no such thing as the guilt or innocence of an entire nation. Guilt is, like innocence, not collective, but personal." But speaking of individual guilt does not negate the "collective responsibility" of a nation, including for its younger

emperor's innocence and the minimalist approach to defining Japan's war responsibility. The conservatives achieved their goals by skillfully playing into the needs and interests of the occupation authority. For one thing, the prosecution staff relied heavily on their cooperation because a large portion of Japanese government documents had been destroyed right before surrender. But a more important reason for the close collaboration between the conqueror and conquered on war crimes trials lied in the Truman administration's policy to achieve occupation objectives with an "indirect rule" of Japan, mainly through the monarchy system.¹⁶²

MacArthur and his military secretary and the chief of his psychological-warfare operations, General Bonner F. Fellers, were among the most enthusiastic American advocates of the "indirect rule." In March 1946, before the Tokyo Trial was opened, Fellers specifically coached Japanese politicians to persuade Tōjō to "bear all responsibility at his trial" while the emperor should be proved to be "completely blameless."¹⁶³ Chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan representing the United States absolved the emperor of all responsibility at the outset of his case.¹⁶⁴ So the American prosecutors, Japanese conservative elites, and defendants in jails acted in concert to detach the emperor from any hint of war responsibility charge. In the end, only twenty-five officials of the imperial government were convicted, of whom seven were sentenced to death. Besides Tōjō, all but one of the other six executed were former army officers. Thereafter, no further trials promised were carried out, and all other suspects were released. Those sentenced to imprisonment were also set free after the San Francisco Peace Treaty.¹⁶⁵

The war crimes trial also perpetuated a strong Western-centrist bias in Japanese war memory. Only three (from China, the Philippines, and India) of the eleven justices were Asian, while the rest were from Western countries. Besides, the bulk of the prosecution time was devoted to "crimes against peace" through "overall conspiracy," while guilt of atrocities,

generation to keep alive the memories and acknowledge the disgraceful aspects of its past. See Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 357-358.

¹⁶² For a detailed account of the Japan-US collaboration to preserve the monarchy system, see Herbert Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-1952," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 21, No. 2 (1995).

¹⁶³ Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-1952," pp. 343-344.

¹⁶⁴ Benfell, "Selective Memories," p. 10.

¹⁶⁵ Hicks, *Japan's War Memories*, p. 13.

a far more important issue in Japan's war in Asia, was greatly downplayed. Except for testimonies on Nanjing Massacre and "Rape of Manila," the tribunal failed to investigate many notorious Japanese war atrocities.¹⁶⁶

2. Media Control and Educational Policies

The occupation authorities used media censorship and decentralization reform of education system to end the imperial indoctrination of militarism, xenophobia, and intolerance. In addition to dismantling the ideological foundation of wartime militarist politics, the occupation authorities also established the so-called "Pacific War View of History" (*Taiheiyo Sensōkan*) as the official interpretation of the war history. Spread by the occupation authorities mainly to define the aggressive nature of the war, this view also met the Japanese conservative needs to minimize Japan's war responsibility.

In September 1945, the GHQ publish the "Press Code," prohibiting inflammatory media reporting that would compromise the interests and authority of the occupation forces.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, every month the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) within the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) issued a checklist of prohibited subjects in media reports. National newspapers serialized "A History of the Pacific War" penned by the staff of CI&E, and NHK broadcasted the 10-week long program "This is Truth" (*Shinsō wa kōda*). Both programs stressed American military superiority as the main cause of Japanese defeat, shedding little light on resistance movements in Asia. On Japanese war guilt, they only held the military clique accountable while portraying the rest of the nation as mere victims who were kept from learning the truth.¹⁶⁸

Concerning school education, the SCAP ordered the purge of ultra-nationalist personnel from the teaching and bureaucratic ranks, outlawed State Shintoism in education materials, and suspended the teaching of geography, history and morals courses, the three subjects deemed most pervasively nationalistic. The CI&E also exercised direct supervision

¹⁶⁶ Yoshibumi Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), pp. 105-107; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 465.

¹⁶⁷ Matsuura Sōzō, *Senchū.Senryōka no Masukomi (Mass Media in Wartime and Occupation Years)* (Tokyo: Ōgetsu Shoten, 1984), p. 19.

¹⁶⁸ Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, Iwanami, pp. 30-33.

over the drafting of new curricula and teaching materials. However, the new textbooks such as *Kuni no Ayumi* (Footsteps of the Nation), *Nihon Rekishi* (Japanese History) and *Minshushugi* (Democracy) presented a historical view largely consistent with the Japanese conservative perspective, which laid the war responsibility solely on the militarists and left the emperor and everyone else unaccountable.¹⁶⁹ Later when the conservatives regained much of its prewar power over education policy, they made renewed efforts to introduce traditional values into school textbooks.¹⁷⁰

The abortive occupation reform of education institutions mainly accounted for the prevalence of conservative historiography in school textbooks. SCAP failed to reach the alleged goal of devolving power over education to elected local Boards of Education, as stipulated by the 1947 Fundamental Education Law and 1948 Textbook Law. In the spirit of “indirect rule,” SCAP let Mombushō (Ministry of Education) take charge of textbook certification system as a temporary measure and planned to distribute power to local boards of education once they were set up. However, the certification process passed entirely into Mombushō’s control after the end of textbook censorship by SCAP in July 1950. Furthermore, in 1956, the government abolished elective boards of education and let heads of local governments appoint the boards instead. As a result, Mombushō was able to use centralized textbook certification system and the publication of teaching guidelines as two important institutional tools to control educational content.¹⁷¹

An examination of history textbooks published in the early 1950s shows that the 1931-1945 was depicted as a period of “fascism from above” (a term coined by an influential Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao) in Japan. They typically ascribed the blame to only the military faction and a small group of right-wing members of the government, who had duped the Japanese people. And they all focused on the battles much more than the suffering of the people in the occupied territories.¹⁷² Since mid-1950s, the anti-nuclear movement spread nationwide, causing an ephemeral change in textbook coverage. More

¹⁶⁹ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 77.

¹⁷⁰ This was reflected in the government attempts to recodify public ethics by reviving moral teaching in school curricula in the 1950s. See Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 354-355.

¹⁷¹ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 351-352.

¹⁷² Robert Fish, “From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages,” Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp. 80-83.

detailed accounts of Japanese experience of atomic bombing were added to school textbooks, which accentuated the theme of an exceptional Japanese atomic victimhood and justified the mission for Japan to fight for absolute world peace.¹⁷³

The progressive sway over textbooks soon diminished when the conservative government began to crack down the influence of the left-wing Japan Teachers' Union (JTU). In the so-called campaign of "The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks (*ureubeki kyokasho mondai*)," the government attacked the textbooks recommended by the JTU for spreading communist thoughts in Japan and tightened textbook screening from the late 1950s. In the Textbook Certification Investigation Council that provided expert opinion on textbook authorization, liberal members were replaced by people with conservative mind. Publishers were put under greater pressure to keep their textbook content in conformity with Mombushō's instruction.¹⁷⁴ Consequently, textbooks released since the late 1950s tended to "sanitize" the war history. They claimed that Japan's policy of aggression was understandable in the hostile international environment and the populace were patriotic supporters of the war efforts. The description of Japanese people's suffering was cut down, including that on the atomic victim consciousness.

Treatment of war in textbooks of the 1960s textbook was the most ambiguous and conservative. The militarists and the right wing were much more clearly singled out from the rest of the nation than in the previous stage. Concerning other powers, the textbooks included only an antiseptic and minimal coverage of both American air raids and the atomic bombs while emphatically criticized the Soviet Union for launching an undeclared war that violated their 1941 neutrality pact.¹⁷⁵ So in 1965, a well-known progressive historian Ienaga Saburō filed his first law suit against Mombushō for historical distortion, beginning his three-decade legal fight for textbook freedom.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp.83-89.

¹⁷⁴ For a detailed discussion of the *Ureubeki kyokasho mondai* in the mid-1950s, see Benjamin Duke, "The Textbook Controversy," *Japan Quarterly* 19 (July-September 1972), pp. 348-350.

¹⁷⁵ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp. 89-97; Fish, R. "From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages."

¹⁷⁶ For more on Ienaga textbook litigation against the Mombushō, see Saburō Iegana, "The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuits," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2, No. 4 (1970);

3. Postwar Resolution Measures

The institutional framework to “bring resolution to the postwar” (*Sengo Shori*) also helped perpetuate the conservative historiography. During the occupation, the system to pay special compensation to military personnel was abolished. Only days after regaining sovereignty, however, Japanese government promulgated the Wounded Veteran and Bereaved Family Assistance Act to resume payments to injured and killed soldiers and their families “in the spirit of state compensation” (*Kokka Hoshō no Seishin ni Motozuku*). Following that was a formal revival of military pension system, *Gunjin Onkyū*, through the Pension Law enacted in August 1953, offering blanket reward to the military for their service for the nation. The law even made it clear that having received a sentence as a war criminal would have no effect on their eligibility for benefits.¹⁷⁷

Compared to its swift action to compensate the military, the government dragged its feet in providing relief to general victims of war. Statistics show that the cumulative payments for military pensions and survivors’ benefits by 1959 reached 567 billion Yen, while that for aid to repatriates and families of those stranded abroad totaled 13.4 billion Yen, only about 2% of the former.¹⁷⁸ State compensation to *Hibakusha* in particular was largely put off. Since the mid-1950s when the atomic victimhood was accepted by the society due to the rising anti-nuclear movement, *Hibakusha* asserted their entitlement to state compensation. Despite so, the 1957 Atomic Bomb Victim Medical Care Law still treated relief to *Hibakusha* as a special kind of social welfare rather than state compensation and only extended small amount of payment to a limited number of *Hibakusha*.¹⁷⁹ The large discrepancy between government compensation policies to military and non-military victims testified to the intention of the conservative government to defend wartime policies and avoid addressing the national disaster that such policies had led to.

Ronald P. Dore, “Textbook Censorship in Japan: The Ienaga Case, Notes and Comment,” *Pacific Affairs* 43, No. 4 (Winter 1970-1971).

¹⁷⁷ Hiroshi Tanaka, “Nihon no Sengo Seikin to Ajia: Sengo Hoshō to Rekishi Ninshiki (Japan’s Postwar Responsibility and Asia: Postwar Reparation and Historical Consciousness),” in Taiichirō Mitani ed., *Ajia no Reisen to Tatsushokuminchika (The Cold War in Asia and Decolonization)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 188-192.

¹⁷⁸ Hiroshi Tanaka, “Nihon no Sengo Hoshō to Rekishi Ninshiki (Japan’s Postwar Reparation and Historical Consciousness),” in Kentarō Awaya, *Sensō Seikin to Sengo Seikin (War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility)* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1999), p. 44.

However unevenly distributed, government compensation to domestic victims still by far exceeded its external reparation. The vast majority of Japanese people were so preoccupied with their own pain that they could not grasp the magnitude of Asian people's war suffering, nor were they willing to face up to their obligation to compensate such suffering. It is calculated that up to 1993 domestic war compensation was 40 times of what Japan had paid in external reparations. Meanwhile, a "citizenship clause" has been applied to almost all domestic compensation programs to exclude former colonial subjects from receiving benefits. This attested to what a Japanese historian called the "Japan first, Japan only" characteristic of postwar resolution policy.¹⁸⁰

4. Commemoration

Memorializing the war dead was granted great significance in postwar Japan. The first official public commemoration for this purpose was held on May 2, 1952, shortly after the occupation ended. The emperor presided at the ceremony, offering "condolences" to "innumerable victims" of the war and urging the nation to uphold pacifist ideals.¹⁸¹ The emperor's remarks set the tone for subsequent memorials, which since 1963 were turned into annual public commemoration ceremony on August 15, the anniversary of Japanese surrender. At such ceremonies Japanese leaders would eulogize those who gave their lives for their country but avoid commenting on the aggressive nature of the war or Japanese responsibility for inflicting trauma on other Asian people.

Besides holding official ceremonies, the government also tacitly encouraged memorial service sponsored by Yasukuni Shrine that glorified the patriotic spirit of Japanese military. On November 19, 1945, Showa emperor, other royal family members, and Prime Minister Shidehara and his cabinet members joined about 1,000 war bereaved family members in Yasukuni Shrine to honor WWII Japanese war dead that had not been formally enshrined there.¹⁸² But when state Shintoism was banned in December, Yasukuni was turned into a pure religious entity whose connection with the government was formally

¹⁷⁹ Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 144.

¹⁸⁰ Tanaka, "Why Is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?" pp. 6-8.

¹⁸¹ Benfell, *Selective Memories*, p. 14.

¹⁸² Tadashi Itagaki, *Yasukuni Koshiki Sanhai no Sokatsu (An Overview of Official Worship of Yasukuni Shrine)* (Tokyo: Tenden Sha, 2000), p. 294.

severed. Soon after the occupation ended, conservative Diet members requested that WWII war dead be honored there. Outside the government, an important interest group, Japanese Bereaved Families Association or JBFA (*Nihon Izokukai*), passed a resolution in November 1952 demanding state financing of Yasukuni's memorial services, *Kokka Goji*, and launched in 1959 a nationwide signature campaign to solicit public support.¹⁸³

In response to their calls, beginning from 1953, the Diet authorized the transportation section of the government to provide special price discount to bereaved family members who would travel to Tokyo to worship at Yasukuni. In April 1956, the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an official notification directing all levels of local government to work with Yasukuni to investigate those soldiers who had died in the recent war and inform their families, with all cost underwritten by state budget. According to this notification, every year Yasukuni Shrine would hold memorial services twice for those deceased soldiers whose names appeared in the list compiled by the government. This actually circumvented the constitutional principle of separation between religion and politics and extended de facto state sponsorship to Yasukuni memorial rituals.¹⁸⁴ Emboldened by implicit governmental endorsement of their self-glorification historiography, Yasukuni Shrine gradually scaled up its commemorative activities. It began to enshrine BC-Class war criminals in 1959 and A-Class war criminals in 1966, and succeeded for the first time in 1975 in having the prime minister worship Yasukuni Shrine in official capacity.¹⁸⁵

Japanese war commemoration did not only honor the dead soldiers but also gave great emphasis to national suffering. First opened in 1955, the Atomic Bomb Memorial Museum concentrated its exhibition on portraying the horror of the atomic bombing and conveying a pacifist message that condemned all wars as evil.¹⁸⁶ Besides, since 1946 the city administration and parliament have held annual memorial ceremony on August 6, the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The prime minister usually sent a

¹⁸³ Nobumasu Tanaka, et al., *Izoku to Sengo (War Bereaved Families and Postwar)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 207-209.

¹⁸⁴ Itagaki, *Yasukuni Koshiki Sanhai no Sokatsu*, pp. 306-310; *Asahi Shimbun*, August 11, 2001.

¹⁸⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 11, 2001.

¹⁸⁶ The Peace Museum underwent a renovation around 1994 when the Socialist Party took lead of the government. Since then the museum has featured more exhibits on the historical context of the atomic bombing and Hiroshima's link to the Japanese war of aggression.

nationally reported supporting message to the ceremony, and the attendance by cabinet members began in 1960.¹⁸⁷ What was absent from the Hiroshima memory was the Japanese reflection on the historical context of the atomic bombing, including Japan's provocation of the war, its prolonged, cruel victimization of foreign people, and its rejection of the Allies' demand for an early surrender.¹⁸⁸ Another sign of Japan's lack of guilt feeling was the exclusion of foreign victims, most notably the 20,000 to 30,000 Korean atomic bomb dead, from the official representation of Hiroshima history until 1970.¹⁸⁹

Myths in Chinese Historiography

Domestic and International Motivations in Historical Mythmaking

In the first period of Sino-Japanese relations, historiography was used by the communist government as a convenient ideological weapon to arouse public enthusiasm towards the communist cause and hostility against reactionary forces, including the KMT regime in Taiwan, American imperialism, and any other political actors that aligned with the KMT and U.S. The purpose was to consolidate the power and legitimacy of the CCP regime, counter foreign threat to national security, and ensure the smooth implementation of domestic and foreign policy agenda.

In the first few years after the CCP won the civil war, the government faced a volatile situation at home. First, the CCP had not gained absolute political dominance because officially China was ruled by a coalition government joined by a number of influential, bourgeois-minded "democratic parties" (*Minzhu Dangpai*) that had rights to question the policies of the central government. In the meantime, anti-Communist guerrilla forces supported by the KMT and America still operated in various parts of the mainland. The war-wrecked national economy was slow to recover, compounded by the complexity

¹⁸⁷ Satoru Ubuki, *Heiwa Kinen Shikiten no Ayumi (The Steps of Peace Memorial Ceremony)* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1992), pp. 75-78.

¹⁸⁸ Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 17-18.

¹⁸⁹ Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

involved in the nationwide land reform, crackdown of economic crimes, and the emergent demands for the Korean War. Besides domestic instability, the internationalized Taiwan problem also posed an external challenge to the Communist regime legitimacy. Because the U.S. treated the KMT regime as the sole legal representative of China, the CCP government was excluded from the United Nation.

Domestic programs of socialist transformation only completed in the mid-1950s, when the focus of government policy shifted from political struggle to economic development. But stability did not last long. The subsequent two decades or so saw the wax and wane of radical socioeconomic policies such as the “People’s Commune” and “Great Leap Forward,” factional conflicts between Mao and his political opponents like Liu Shaqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao, campaigns of class struggle like the “Anti-Rightist Movement” in 1957, and even mass turmoil like the Red Guard riots during the Cultural Revolution. Domestic politics was often in flux, and Mao was constantly concerned that bourgeois ideas or his political critics would endanger his supreme authority.

On the international strategic front, Chinese communist leaders believed that the U.S. and China had a fundamental clash in their national security interests. First of all, the American government supported the rival regime in Taiwan and denied the survival right of the communist state, which was a direct cause of persistent tensions across the Taiwan Strait throughout this period. Second, U.S. was seen to have the intention to overthrow the CCP government either by direct military invasion or through support to domestic subversion. The U.S. also organized military encirclement among China’s surrounding countries and enforced anti-Chinese international trade embargoes. Therefore, the central theme of Chinese grand strategy in this period was to balance the threat of “American imperialism,” by strengthening Chinese defense capabilities and seeking external assistance, especially from the USSR.

Related to the struggle against the U.S. was China’s strategy toward American allies. Chinese leaders saw the world not merely dominated by confrontation between two superpower blocs, but also containing tensions between superpowers and smaller powers. If

China could build a “United Front” spanning both socialist countries and smaller Western powers, it could erode the international support to American Cold War strategy and eventually break down the Western isolation of the CCP regime. Being the biggest American ally in Asia, Japan was treated as an important target of the “United Front” strategy.¹⁹⁰ Differentiating Japanese ruling class and ordinary people in remembering war history was useful for increasing favorable impression of Communist China in the Japanese society and gradually encouraging Japanese government to abandon the US-Japan security alliance and anti-China policy.

The imminent goal to stand up against the aforementioned domestic and international pressures prompted Chinese communist ideologues to invent a national identity that would effectively rally public support to the government. The official propaganda was primarily predicated on the communist ideology of class struggle rather than ethno-nationalism. Instead of drawing the dividing line between the China and foreign perpetrator countries, the communist national identity emphasized the irreconcilable antagonism between capitalist and imperialist forces on the one hand, and the proletariat mass on the other hand. To fit into the ideological framework, Chinese official representation of national history twisted, covered up, or misinterpreted facts to instate a class-based, Marxist historiography. The narrative about the Sino-Japanese War in this period exalted the role of the CCP in China’s campaign of national liberation and independence, demonized the KMT and American governments, condemned the Japanese militarists but sympathized with the Japanese people, and praised the heroic resistance by the Chinese people but wiped off the disgraceful history of Chinese collaboration with the invaders.

Myths of Self-Glorification and Other-Maligning

1. Leadership and Heorism of the Chinese Communists

¹⁹⁰ For the evolution of Chinese “united front” strategy, see Tatsumi Okabe, *Chūgoku no Tainichi Seisaku (China's Japan Policy)* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1976), pp. 22-39; Jisi Wang, “International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994).

Chinese official historiography established the CCP as the sole leader of the “Great Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression,” and the CCP-led Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and other guerrilla troops were praised as the predominant resistance forces in China. The role of Nationalist troops in the resistance campaign was generally ignored. Foreign assistance to Chinese resistance also received scarce treatment. Only Soviet military aid was briefly mentioned, even though they were given to the KMT rather than the CCP forces during the war. Therefore, the Chinese communists took the main credit for driving out Japanese aggressors.

It is noteworthy that Chinese war history during this period did not encourage victim consciousness because it conspicuously avoided elaborate treatment of Japanese war atrocities and Chinese casualties. Instead of having Chinese people perceive themselves as tragic war victims, the communist ideologues constructed a triumphant narrative that could boost national morale and public confidence in the successful leadership of the CCP.¹⁹¹

While highlighting the patriotic, heroic image of the CCP, the Chinese war narrative whitewashed the CCP’s negative actions. The KMT and CCP had a short period of entente in the first two years of the war, but since 1939 their forces clashed frequently in an intense contest for influence in various Chinese regions, and in some cases involved severe casualties. Such internal strife was strategically harmful to the overall resistance campaign against the Japanese.¹⁹² Refusing to admit its own share of responsibility, the Communist government always claimed that the communist attacks on the nationalist army were both

¹⁹¹ In fact, the political principles guiding Chinese art works during this period made it clear that individual happiness would never be placed ahead of the revolutionary cause. Otherwise they would be accused of disseminating sentimentalism and capitalist humanitarianism that would “dilute our hatred of imperialism” and “lower our morale” against the enemies. So any artist attempts to “reflect the real life” or “human nature” by showing individual tragedy or instinct for survival during the revolutionary struggle were sternly criticized. See Bo Chen, “Genggao di Juqi Mao Zedong Sixiang Hongqi, Wei Chuangzuo Gengduo Genghao de Geming Junshi Ticai Yinbian er Nuli (Lifting Higher the Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thoughts, Striving for Creating More and Better Revolutionary Military Movies),” *Dianying Yishu (Film Art)*, Beijing, August 1960, pp. 5-6.

¹⁹² For an overview of wartime Nationalist-Communist friction, see Lyman Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945,” in John K. Fairbank, et al. *The Cambridge History of China: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2*, Vol. 13, (Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University Press 1986), pp. 659-671.

self-defense and patriotic actions because the KMT attempted to stop communist troops from marching to the anti-Japanese battlefield.¹⁹³

2. KMT and the American Imperialism as China's Worst Enemies

The Communist narrative described the KMT as a corrupt and oppressive force that exploited the people, persecuted political dissidents, and was totally reactionary in trying to wipe out the communist movement in China. The KMT leaders were accused of kowtowing to and actively collaborating with the Japanese aggressors in exchange for their own safety and power. So everything that the KMT said and did was against the Chinese national interest and would have incurred total Japanese conquest of China if the CCP had not stood up and saved the nation.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government was depicted as another dangerous enemy of the Chinese nation. The official Chinese historiography neglected to mention American military aid to fight the Japanese troops, nor did it introduce U.S.-China joint military operation in the China-Burma-India theatre or the broader picture of U.S. struggle against Japan in the Pacific War.¹⁹⁴ Instead, it proclaimed that America sat idle while the Chinese people were suffering, and tried to profit from Sino-Japanese conflict by playing one country against the other. The worst charge against the Americans centered on their assistance to the KMT government to suppress Chinese communism.

3. Condemn the Japanese Militarists, Unite with the Japanese People

¹⁹³ One of the highlighted incidents of CCP-KMT friction was the "Wannan Incident" in 1941, which the Chinese textbooks said was an evil ambush by the KMT army of a New Fourth Army unit that was on its way to take up strategic position in the anti-Japanese military campaign. But the incident actually took place amidst the KMT-CCP struggle to gain greater area of influence, and the KMT's attack was an act of revenge for the loss of its unit in an early military clash with the communist troops in North Jiangsu area.

¹⁹⁴ Soviet Russia was the Nationalist government's first generous friend once the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out in 1937, supplying thousands of planes, weapons, munitions, pilots, military advisers. The flow of Soviet aid decreased after the European war began in 1939 but continued until Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in 1941. Western aid came late. In late 1941 that the U.S. began to send military aid to China under the Lend-Lease Act, and General Chennault's volunteer group "Flying Tigers" joined air combat in China theatre. From then on Western aid flowed into China in such large quantity that it caught up with the level of Soviet aid. For more on foreign military aid to China during Sino-Japanese War, see Lloyd E. Eastman, "Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," in John King Fairbank, et al., *The Cambridge History of China: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2*, Vol. 13.

Chinese official war history devoted almost equal space to negative treatment of the reactionary actions of the KMT/U.S. and the Japanese aggression. But unlike its outright demonization of the former, Chinese historiography took a qualified approach to Japan's role in the war, making Japan look like a lesser evil. On the one hand, it decried the long-time aggressive ambition of Japanese imperialists towards China and the barbarian actions of the Japanese military during its invasion and occupation in China. On the other hand, however, a line was explicitly drawn between "the small handful of Japanese militarists" and the ordinary Japanese people, who were treated as the Chinese people's fellow victim of the Japanese militarists. As Zhou Enlai told a visiting Japanese Diet delegation in 1954, "(the history of Japanese militarist aggression) has been something of the past. Chinese people are able to make distinction between militarists and the people." In the same occasion, Zhou went so far as to praise those "Japanese friends" who joined the PLA to fight against the KMT army during the Chinese Civil War or stayed in China after the war to serve the Chinese people.¹⁹⁵

4. Patriots vs. Traitors

The eight years of Sino-Japanese hostilities was not a clear-cut history of aggression versus heroic resistance. The actual relationship between the two sides was much more complicated, involving not only regular and guerrilla warfare, but also puppet governments from central to local levels, hundreds of thousands of Chinese military defections, and numerous petty collaborators living in the Japanese-occupied regions.¹⁹⁶ However, admitting that the Chinese nation did not unite in fighting against aggressors and many Chinese were not patriotic by strict nationalist standards would have compromised the reputation of the CCP as the successful leader of heroic Chinese struggle for national independence. So the Communist propaganda offered a simplistic interpretation that divided Chinese people into only two categories, the vast majority being patriots and a minority being *Hanjian*, or Chinese

¹⁹⁵ "Zhou Enlai's Remarks in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic Survey, October 11, 1954," in Tadao Ishikawa & Mineo Nakajima, Masaru Ikei eds., *Sengo Shiryō: Nitchū Kankei (Postwar Documents: Japanese-Chinese Relations)* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1970), pp. 27-33.

¹⁹⁶ For historical studies of wartime Sino-Japanese political collaboration and life under Japanese occupation, see Jie Liu, *Nitchū Sensō Ka no Gaikō (Wartime Sino-Japanese Diplomacy)* (Tokyo: Yoshigawa Hirobumi Kan, 1995); Lloyd E. Eastman, "Facets of An Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and Atrocities During the War, 1937-1945," in Akira Iriye ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mark S. Eykholt, *Living the Limits of Occupation in Nanjing China, 1939-1945*, Ph.D. dissertation in history (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1998).

traitors.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, the narrative shunned concrete treatment of those people who might fall into neither category, such as ordinary people under Japanese occupation. It simply claimed that these people were either miserable victims or brave members of underground resistance campaigns led by the CCP.

Institutionalization of Myths in Chinese National Memory

Compared to Japanese conservative elites, Chinese communist ideologues enjoyed an even greater degree of monopoly over the reinterpretation of national history. With their exclusive control of state power and thorough penetration of societal life, the CCP were able to establish with ease the hegemonic position of these self-glorification and other-maligning historical myths in national collective memory.

1. School Textbooks

After the founding of the PRC, the State Publication Administration quickly put together the Editing and Screening Bureau to compile teaching materials.¹⁹⁸ But time was not enough to compose new textbooks before school started that year, and some existing teaching materials were put into use as temporary substitute.¹⁹⁹ One year later, the National Publication Conference decided to centralize the compilation and distribution of secondary school textbooks. A key step was the founding of the People's Education Press (PEP) as the specialized institution to prepare school textbook. This was the inception of tight central control of education policy in China. Specifically, the government exercised direct authority over the educational content through Curricular Standards, or called Teaching Guidelines since 1952, which were drafted by the State Education Commission (SEC) and updated every few years. The SEC then entrusted the PEP to gather textbook authors to prepare

¹⁹⁷ The Communist propaganda almost always attributed the responsibility for the existence of *Hanjian* to the Nationalist policy. For example, on the question of military defection, instead of telling the complexity in the process, communist propaganda adopted a conspiratorial interpretation that accused Chiang Kai-shek of ordering his own units to defect to the Japanese in order to preserve them for anti-communism campaign. See Eastman, "Facets of An Ambivalent Relationship," pp. 284-292.

¹⁹⁸ Liqun Ye, "Huigu yu Sikao: Zhongxiaoxue Jiaocai Jianshe 40 Nian 1949-1989 (Review and Reflection: 40 Years of Developing Secondary School Teaching Materials)," in Institute of Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research ed., *Kechen Jiaocai Yanjiu 10 Nian (10 Years of Research on Curriculum and Teaching Materials)*, (Beijing: People's Education Press, 1993), p. 11.

official textbooks based on Teaching Guidelines.²⁰⁰ So throughout the period, all Chinese pupils were educated under the so-called *Yigang Yiben*, or “One Guideline, One Textbook” system.²⁰¹

In the school textbooks published in the 1950s and 1960s (see Appendix 1 for a list of Chinese textbooks examined in this dissertation), policies of the KMT and CCP were constantly compared and contrasted to drive home the fundamental difference between the traitorous, reactionary KMT and the patriotic, progressive CCP. Specifically, all textbooks of this period held Chiang and his armies accountable for Chinese military defeat, territorial loss, and human suffering. They criticized that the KMT’s troops were so military incompetent that they were routed at first encounter with the Japanese military (*Yichu Jikui*) and the whole KMT frontline collapsed like a mountain tumbling down (*Bingbai Rushandao*). They mostly left out or downplay the important battles fought by the KMT troops but always gave detailed coverage of communist military actions.²⁰² Besides, these textbooks greatly emphasized the importance of anti-Japanese base areas set up by the communist armies and guerrillas. They claimed that the CCP base areas had resisted 400,000 Japanese troops by 1938, more than half of total Japanese troops in China,²⁰³ and altogether the

¹⁹⁹ These substitute materials include history readers used by schools in Shan/Gan/Ning area held by the CCP during the civil war, and history materials originally prepared for party cadres. Interviews with the research staff of the National Textbook Library affiliated with the People’s Education Press, Beijing June 2000.

²⁰⁰ Up to the mid-1960s the PEP had totally produced four editions of official textbooks under four different Teaching Guidelines. Except for the radically leftist edition published in 1960 and only used for a very brief period in limited areas, all three other editions were used by secondary schools nationwide. When the mania of the Cultural Revolution swept China since 1966, schools were shut down and no textbooks were either produced or in use. See Ye, “Huigu yu Sikao: Zhongxiaoxue Jiaocai Jianshe 40 Nian 1949-1989,” pp. 31-32.

²⁰¹ Donggang Zhang, “Zhongri Zhongxue Lishi Jiaokeshu Bijiao (Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Middle School Textbooks),” *The Journal of Tianjin Education College*, No. 3, 1992, p. 42.

²⁰² For example, only two substitute textbooks published in 1950 (STM 1, Vol. 2, p. 115; STM 3, pp. 199-200) mentioned the Nationalist military’s major victory in the 1938 Taierzhuang Battle, but tried to play down its significance by arguing that the battle was won largely because the Eighth Route Army pinned down most of Japanese troops and the Nationalists quickly lost their advantage in subsequent military fiasco. In contrast, all textbooks gave great prominence to the communist victory in the Pingxingguan Battle of September 1937, even though it was a battle of much smaller scale than Taierzhuang, and was only one part of the Shanxi Campaign jointly fought by the Nationalist and Communist troops. In fact, The Taierzhuang Battle was the first major Chinese victory in conventional warfare against the Japanese, which lasted about two weeks and claimed 30,000 Japanese dead. The Pingxingguan Battle was a one-day ambush fight led by the famed communist military commander Lin Biao, killing about 500 Japanese soldiers. See Lloyd E. Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945,” p. 555; Lyman Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945,” p. 639; Danian Liu *Zhongguo Fuxing Shuniu: Kangri Zhangzheng de Banian (The Turning Point of Chinese Resurrection: The Eight Years of War of Resistance against Japan)* (Beijing, Beijing Press, 1997), pp. 31-32, pp. 45-47.

²⁰³ HST 2, Vol. 4, p.68; MST 4, Vol. 4, P.117; HST 3, p. 61.

communist troops resisted 64% of Japanese troops in China and 95% of total puppet troops.²⁰⁴ These textbooks not only attacked the KMT for its cowardliness and ineptitude but also were eager to expose its atrocities against patriotic mass, close contacts with the Wang Jingwei puppet regime and wartime diplomatic negotiation with Japan, which were said to be evident of its intention to betray the Chinese nation.

Compared to the vivid, detailed description of the contrasting strategies of the KMT and CCP, textbook treatment of Japanese policies and actions was much simpler. Textbooks of this period did not mince words to condemn Japan for embracing long-time ambition of imperialist expansion and never hesitating to use conspiracies, lies, and violence to extend its interest. But most textbooks focused their attack not on the Japanese nation as a whole, but on *Ridi* (Japanese imperialism), *Rjun* (Japanese military), or *Rikou* (Japanese invaders). Besides, their treatment of Sino-Japanese military battles was intended not so much to expose the evilness of the aggressors as to highlight the difference between the KMT and CCP policies.

These textbooks usually covered Japanese atrocities in general terms, such as “brutal killing, burning, raping,” and “cruel economic exploitation and enslaving education and cultural policies.” Only the Japanese attack of communist base areas received more detailed treatment,²⁰⁵ but even on this subject equal length was devoted to relate the CCP-led tenacious military struggle and effective political and economic policies in the base areas. Nanjing Massacre was the only concrete case of Japanese atrocities mentioned in textbooks, with the number of 300,000 used as the total victim toll. More intriguingly, many textbooks blamed the failure of the KMT defense strategy in Nanjing just as bitterly as their condemnation of the Japanese barbarism.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ STM 3, pp. 246-247.

²⁰⁵ For example, the various tactics employed by the Japanese military were detailed in these textbooks, such as *Sanguang* (Burn all, Kill all, Destroy all), *Saodang* (mop-up), *Canshi* (nibbling), *Qingxiang* (clearing the countryside), and biochemical warfare.

²⁰⁶ Only one textbook named the Japanese war criminal convicted by the Nationalist government’s war crimes trial, Tani Toshio, but the same textbook immediately digressed from the course of narration to bash Chiang Kai-shek’s sending back Japanese war criminals in the name of “loving your enemy.” See SMT 3, p. 199.

All textbooks of this period differentiated the roles played by different foreign countries in Chinese war of resistance. They praised the Soviet Union for providing loans and military supplies and stated that the Soviet declaration of war and attack at Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1945 accelerated Japanese surrender.²⁰⁷ Conversely, they criticized the U.S. for sending arms and ammunitions to the Japanese military and dismissed American sympathy to China as hypocritical. On the American intervention in Chinese politics in the last stage of the war, the textbooks said that U.S. assisted the KMT to instigate a new civil war, with the ultimate desire to destroy the CCP and realize its exclusive colonization of China after the war ended.²⁰⁸

Lastly, textbook content varied in accordance with the change of domestic agenda of the communist government over time. A telling example of domestic political interference with historiography is the correlation between the change of textbook content and the downfall of Peng Dehuai, an out-spoken critic of Mao's policy of Great Leap Forward. Peng was dismissed from his position as defense minister in 1959 and, as soon as the Cultural Revolution started, disappeared from public view after being arrested and losing his governmental posts. Only until 1978 was his political reputation rehabilitated. So for over 20 years all textbooks deleted the famous Hundred Regime Offensive that Peng commanded during the war of resistance against Japan, and only until 1981 did textbooks resume description of this battle.

2. Commemoration

The government built various memorial sites to commemorate the victory of Chinese revolution, but very few of them were particularly dedicated to the war of resistance against Japan. The most famous site was the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. A 36 meter obelisk built in 1958, this monument commemorates the hundred year Chinese struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary forces. Of the ten relief sculptures on the monument depicting various revolutionary events in Chinese history, only one sculpture presents scenes from the anti-Japanese war. So Chinese official commemoration defined this war as just one episode in a lengthy history

²⁰⁷ Most textbooks told the concrete number of Soviet aid with the exception of the substitute materials published in the early 1950s. See SMT 1, Vol. 2, pp. 121-122; SMT 2, Vol. 2, pp. 117-118; SMT 3, p. 210.

of Chinese struggle for national independence and liberalization, which ended with the CCP's triumph over the KMT in 1949.²⁰⁹ This again supported an ideologically based historiography in China. As Rana Mitter says, these commemorative sites show that the “defining fundamental fissures” upon which the People’s Republic was rested for decades “was less that between China and Japan than that between the Communists and the Nationalists.”²¹⁰

The state-controlled media also played an important role in commemorating the war against Japan. The first media intervention in war commemoration came on September 18, 1946, the 15th anniversary of the Manchuria Incident, when the Yanan-based communist mouthpiece, *Jiefang Ribao*, published an editorial presenting three major reasons why Japan was able to invade China. Besides the reactionary rule of the Japanese financial magnates and military clique, the article went into great length condemning Chiang’s numerous acts of betraying the country and American connivance of the Japanese imperialists as the second and third reasons.²¹¹ This practice of issuing anti-KMT/U.S. commemorative editorials or speeches of government leaders around such important war-related dates as July 7, September 2, and September 18 was turned on and off throughout the subsequent two decades.

3. Cultural Propaganda

Artists were also summoned to propagating historical myths through literature, theatres, and movies. Take the film industry for an example, revolutionary war movies took up more than half of total movies made from 1949 to 1952, the most difficult period of domestic power consolidation and external conflict. When political situation stabilized between 1953 and 1957, this number sharply dropped to only ten percentage. By the end of the 1950s production of war movies picked up momentum once again, coinciding with the sharply intensified domestic and international conflicts at the time. In the year 1959 as many as 20 war movies were produced to mark the 10th anniversary of PRC. In fact, up to one

²⁰⁸ For examples, see HST2, Vol. 4, p. 70, pp. 83-84; MST4, Vol. 4, p. 119.

²⁰⁹ Wu Hung, “Tiananmen Square: A Political History of Monuments,” *Representations* 35 (1991), p. 100.

²¹⁰ Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum,” p. 283.

²¹¹ “Huigu 15 Nian: Jinian 9.18 (Reflecting on the Past 15 Years: In Commemoration of 9.18),” *Jiefang Ribao* (Yanan), September 18, 1946, in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, Vol. 1, pp. 33-36.

quarter of total movies made from 1959 to 1964 were dedicated revolutionary wars. Only since the mid-1960s did a substantial decline in these movies take place due to domestic political changes.²¹²

In terms of the content, these war movies covered several periods of communist revolutionary history, from the peasant uprising in the 1920s and 1930s, to the war of resistance against Japan, the Civil War, and the Korean War. Most movies on the Sino-Japanese war told stories about brave campaigns carried out by communist-led regular armies, guerrillas, and underground resistance. They highlighted “the valiant, unyielding patriotism of the Chinese nation” and extolling “the revolutionary vigor and heroic spirit of revolutionary soldiers and people.”²¹³ On the other hand, they portrayed negative images of not only the Japanese aggressors, but also the KMT reactionaries, and traitors who were usually described to have colluded with the KMT. Almost all war movies avoided showing the horror of Japanese atrocities and the suffering of Chinese people. Instead, artists were compelled to create an ideal image of the fearless Chinese nation inspired by “revolutionary optimism and heroism.”

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

The perpetuation of historical myths in both countries inevitably led to both divergence and quasi-convergence between their national memories. On the one hand, some Japanese myths of self-whitewashing and glorification, such as the glorious image of the imperial army and the Western-centrist perspective, conflicted with the Chinese historiography that condemned the Japanese military and praised the resistance movement against Japan. On the other hand, Chinese official propaganda to draw distinction between Japanese militarists and innocent Japanese people echoed the “myth of military clique” and

²¹² Following Mao’s instructions of late 1963 to mid-1964 that art work should be more devoted to reflecting “socialist revolution and construction,” the literary and art circle cut down production of war movies in favor of those movies reflecting the “13 Years” since the founding of the PRC. Once the Cultural Revolution erupted, the entire film industry was paralyzed and a handful of “Model Theaters (*Yangbanxi*)” made from an extremely rigid ideological angle dominated the scene of performing arts. But even “Model Theaters” avoided revolutionary war topics, which was considered by the political radicals as too remote history to provide strong motivation for the ongoing class struggle. See *Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying (Contemporary Chinese Movies)* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1989), Vol. 1, p. 78, p. 133, pp. 183-184, p. 233, pp. 283-286.

²¹³ *Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying*, Vol. 1, pp. 81, p. 78.

myth of victimhood propagated in Japan. So Chinese historiography did not hold the entire Japanese nation accountable but only condemned a small group of Japanese militarists. Meanwhile, other-maligning myths targeted at China were missing in Japan. In fact, despite the prevalent self-whitewashing myths, a lot of Japanese felt a guilt feeling towards China, albeit never expressed in any official forms. Therefore, the war narratives of the two countries were not mutually combative but only conflictual, with some notable area of convergence, which should not inflame belligerent emotions and justify total confrontation. Such history-making actions should predict a Shallow-Reconciliation type of relationship characterized by limited inter-governmental cooperation and restrained popular tension.

Concretely speaking, war historiography would have significant impact on elite expectation of bilateral war. Chinese elites should worry that Japan might never have abandoned its intention for aggression and uprooted militarist institution. But their perception of hostile Japanese intention should not be linked to any imminent threat of armed conflict with Japan for Japan was only considered a secondary enemy of China, compared to the U.S. and KMT. Meanwhile, Japanese elites should fear that China was hostile to Japan but would go so far as to launch a war with Japan because Chinese historiography did not embody any explicitly revanchist demands. Secondly, the two countries should accept partial national recognition for neither critical disputes over territories, resources, ethnic relationship existed, nor would their quasi-convergent historiography require historical atonement as a precondition for normalization. Still, their mutual mistrust should cause them to drag feet on permanently resolving issues of sovereignty controversy, such as the status of Taiwan. Thirdly, the two countries should be engaged in a limited degree of economic interaction during this period. Relative gain concerns should be prominent in cases of economic friction, and should stem directly from national memory about their economic conflict during the war.

In terms of popular relationship, historical mythmaking theory predicts that the public should be concerned about mutual threat. The Chinese would found Japan threatening because of its failure to address their suffering through apologies, legal measures, or material compensation. Their historical grievances should also trigger emotional public

reaction to any bilateral political disputes. But the emotional power would not result in overwhelming public opposition to establishing formal diplomatic contacts or demand for total confrontation because Chinese people were told that their hatred should be targeted at only Japanese militarists and their present heirs, not the entire Japanese nation. As for the Japanese people, without realizing Japan's war responsibility, they would find Chinese alarm about the Japan threat totally unfounded and a mere justification for its own belligerence. In the mean time, the two nations should be willing to develop societal contacts to a limited extent, but because of the lack of any serious measures of historical settlement such contacts would not eliminate poor stereotypes and substantially foster mutual trust.

EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME

The predictions of realist theory rather than historical mythmaking theory match the actual outcome of Sino-Japanese Non-Reconciliation in the 1950s and 1960s. Process-tracing of case history also shows that this outcome was chiefly caused by the Cold War structure. Severe security concerns as a result of their antagonistic positions in the bipolar world system constituted the most important cause of the expectation of immediate war among both strategic elite and general public of the two countries. The overwhelming systemic constraints also accounted for Japanese policies of non-recognition toward the Beijing regime and restriction on bilateral economic interactions and societal contacts, as well as the failure of Beijing's long-term efforts to revert these Japanese policies through gradual measures of "People's Diplomacy."

Such a relationship could not be a product of the historical mythmaking behaviors of the Japanese and Chinese elite that only predicted bilateral friction but not straightforward confrontation in both intergovernmental and popular dimensions. Both nations indeed kept vivid memories of their past war and a lot of Chinese people even formed negatively stereotyped image of Japan based on such memories. But no evidence shows that their historically rooted emotions were ever widely vented in public discourse or played any significant role in exacerbating bilateral relations. It was mainly because Chinese government deliberately stressed the convergent part of the two countries' war memories

but de-emphasized or even suppressed the conflictual part. It did so in order to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people and eventually lure the Japanese state to the Chinese side of the Cold War fault line. Nor was Japanese policy of isolation to China driven by historical legacy. Without the strong U.S. opposition, most Japanese leaders would have countenanced a considerably higher degree of cooperation with China in light of their common economic interest, historical ties, and the Tokyo's desire to enhance its international status through an autonomous diplomacy to China. So the historical mythmaking factors, although oftentimes consistent with *policy preferences* of both Beijing and Tokyo, were trumped by structural factors in shaping the actual *policy outcomes*.

I. High Alert for War

Chinese and Japanese strategic thinking and planning during this period revealed keens concern about bilateral violent conflict and their readiness for military responses. I argue that elite perception of the precarious situation was more based on realpolitik considerations than grievances and mistrust derived from their divergent interpretations of the traumatic war history. For Chinese strategists, war with Japan was imminent not because of direct Japanese military threat but due to Japan's intimate collaboration with the U.S. containment strategy in Asia. For Japan, a variety of factors, including Sino-Soviet alliance, military capabilities, communist infiltration and the danger of conflict entanglement, explained the anxiety held by different schools of Japanese elites over another war with China. As for the history factor, an examination of the Chinese media bashing of reviving Japanese militarism and Japanese reaction from the late 1960s to early 1970s illustrates that their disagreement on war history interpretation only shaped a moderate level of mistrust on a regular basis, while incidents of sudden spike of threat perception were actually caused by their fundamental strategic conflict.

Chinese Perception

In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950, China clearly treated Japan as an imaginary enemy. The first portion of Article One of the treaty reads:

Article I. Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Parties will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.²¹⁴

Here China explicitly warned of the danger of Japanese attack and promised prompt use of force to respond to such an attack. In 1953, a People's Daily editorial reconfirmed that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty "is targeted at aggressive Japanese militarists," and vowed to destroy any invaders coming into Chinese territories while at the same time "maintaining peace in the Far East and opposing the resurrection of Japanese imperialism."²¹⁵

Why did the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty target at Japan, which was still under American occupation at the time and had no standing army? Even when Japan gradually developed its military power after the occupation ended and built a ground force of 170,000 men by the end of the 1950s,²¹⁶ its capabilities were dwarfed by the multimillion strong PLA.²¹⁷ So fear of Japanese military power was unlikely the main cause of Chinese security concern about Japan. Chinese perception of Japan has to be put into the broad context of American containment against China, of which Japanese defense force was seen as an integral part. In September 1951 Zhou Enlai lashed out at the newly established U.S.-Japan alliance for posing a serious threat to China and provoking a new war:

"The U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty was intended to rearm Japan and pave the way for completely transforming Japan into an American military base. This is indisputable evidence of American government's preparation for aggressive war at greater scale in Asia and Far East. The central government of the People's Republic of China considers that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty signed under American coercion have posed severe security threat to the PRC and many other Asian countries."²¹⁸

From then on, the Chinese official media frequently accused Japan of reviving militarism by serving as an American "vassal state," "military bridgehead," or even "running

²¹⁴ Harold C. Hinton, *The People's Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey*, Vol. 1, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1980), pp. 123-124.

²¹⁵ "People's Daily Editorial: An Analysis of Sino-Japanese relations, October 30, 1953," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, p. 158.

²¹⁶ Bōei Sangyō Kyōkai, *Jieitai Nenkan (Yearbook of the Self Defense Force)*, 1959 (Tokyo: Bōei Nippō Sha), p. 139.

²¹⁷ During the Chinese Civil War the PLA had about 4 million troops. After two major force cut in the 1950s, the number dropped to its all-time low of 2.4 million by 1958. Since 1959, the PLA began massive expansion and by 1971 its total strength reached 6 million. See Aiping Zhang et al. Eds, *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun (The Chinese People's Liberation Army)* Vol.1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994), p. 48, 144, 155, 254.

dog.” Typically, China’s rhetoric assault would escalate if Tokyo showed stronger consolidation with American Cold War strategy. So when Kishi carried out active diplomacy to America’s other regional allies, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Southeast Asia, and revised the U.S.-Japan alliance treaty, he was accused of taking bold steps to “participate in the American-led aggressive military organization” and “plot new aggression and war.”²¹⁹ The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of November 1967 that emphasized Chinese military threat due to its nuclear menace and political intransigence also provoked a Chinese media onslaught that dragged on for over four years. It culminated in late 1969 following the issuing of Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué with the “Korea and Taiwan” clause, which in the Chinese eyes signaled U.S.-Japan joint military adventurism in China’s surrounding area. Beijing also accused the communiqué’s clause on Okinawa settlement of allowing deployment of American nuclear weapons there and setting the precedent for future nuclear deployment elsewhere in Japan, a scheme called “Okinawaization of Japanese mainland (*Riben Bentu Chongsheng Hua*).”²²⁰

China expected Sino-Japanese violent conflict not really in another Japanese aggression of China, but rather over some strategically important surrounding. As a leading Chinese historian Yang Kuisong informed us, around the time that Sino-Soviet alliance was formed, the Chinese leaders were worried about possible military confrontation with the U.S. in three areas, Taiwan Strait, Vietnam, and Korea.²²¹ Because Japan provided with the U.S. with military bases that facilitated its interventions in these areas, Beijing considered conflict with Japan almost inevitable. For example, during the Korean War, Mao was seriously worried that MacArthur would send Japanese soldiers to fight against the Chinese forces.²²² Indeed, Japan closely cooperated with the U.S. during the war by providing

²¹⁸ “Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai’s Statement Regarding the San Francisco Peace Treaty Signed by America and Its Lackey Countries,” September 18, 1951, in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, p. 1951.

²¹⁹ Quote is from “People’s Daily Editorial on Steadfast Objection to US-Japan Military Alliance, January 15, 1960,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, p. 479.

²²⁰ See “People’s Daily Editorial on the Evil Conspiracy of American and Japanese Reactionaries, November 28, 1969,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 903-906; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshū (Basic Documents on Japanese-Chinese Relations)* (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), pp. 323-325.

²²¹ Kuisong Yang, *Zhonggong yu Mosike de Guanxi (The CCP-Moscow Relations)* (Taipei: Dongda Tushu, 1997), p. 621.

²²² For a discussion of Chinese top leaders’ concern about America’s direct use of Japanese troops in containing China, see Thomas J. Christensen, “A Troubled Triangle: US-Japan Relations and Chinese Security Perceptions,” paper presented at the China-Japan-US Triangular Relations Conference (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asian Center, 1999), pp. 22-23.

transport, communication, and maintenance support, and the newly formed Japanese military even engaged limited military operations under American command. Japan's endorsing of U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and intervention in Indochina throughout the 1950s and 1960s only vindicated Beijing's concern.

Another concrete example of China's expectation of conflict with Japan was its reaction to the controversial "Three-Arrow Research" (*Miya Kenkyū*) project of the Japanese Defense Agency that was incidentally leaked to the public. Secretly conducted around the mid-1960s, this project was a military plan that envisioned the use of Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) if an international conflict in Korean Peninsular spilled over to Japan.²²³ Conceiving this project as a secret war plan aimed at China and North Korea, Beijing vehemently condemned that "Japanese reactionaries were colluding with the American imperialists in advancing dangerous, aggressive policy in the Far East." It then urged Chinese, Korean and people of other Asian countries to maintain a high degree of caution against aggressive conspiracy of Japan and America.²²⁴

Japanese Perception

It almost seemed strange that Japan would expect war with China after its peace constitution had denied Japan of a military force and renounced war as a legitimate means of settling international disputes. But in reality, except for the first few years of the occupation, the conservative government always claimed that Japan was entitled to the right to use force for self-defense purpose.²²⁵

²²³ Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho: Sengo Gojunen no Mosaku (National Security: A Search in the Postwar 50 Years)* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1997), pp. 215-216.

²²⁴ "People's Daily Editorial on the Living Ambition of the Japanese Militarism, February 19, 1965," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 780-782.

²²⁵ In January 1950 Yoshida stated that "to abide fully by the renunciation of war does not mean renunciation of the right of self-defense." In December 1954, the Director of Defense Agency Ōmura Seiichi issued an official statement on Japan's defense policy. The main thrust of the statement was that the constitution did not deny the right of self-defense nor the right to use force for self-defense purposes; while the peace constitution was to be left unchanged, Japanese SDF was constitutional because it was for defending Japan from external invasion rather than to settle international disputes. See Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 381; Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, p. 146.

In terms of the source of security threat to Japan, the conservative rightwing pointed to the global ambition of the ironclad international communism. Chinese policy of “leaning toward one side” and the anti-Japan focus of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty became the main evidence for their worry, which reached its height during the Korean War. Ashida Hitoshi, president of the Democratic Party and a leading conservative opponent of Yoshida, wrote in his diary in February 1951 that “Communist China was completely under Soviet control... Japan would be in great danger if it does not join those increasingly strong liberal countries to strike hard at Communist China.”²²⁶ His diary written between 1951 and 1952 revealed grave concerns about Chinese force concentration in Manchuria and Korea, as well as the Soviet troop deployment in Far East, all believed to be aiming at Japan.²²⁷ In September 1951, he prepared a report on Soviet military action towards Japan in which he stated that “in light of the current situation, initiating a world war by the Soviet Union and China was inseparable from their policy towards Japan.”²²⁸

Such a view that China was merely a Soviet satellite state and Chinese intervention in Korea was part of Soviet global strategy of encircling the West or striking it from its weakest point was common in elite opinions during the Korean War.²²⁹ But even then many people were skeptical that China would infinitely lean to the Soviet side.²³⁰ More importantly, the conservative mainstream represented by the Yoshida faction disagreed that China by its own military power or the alliance with the Soviet Union was a serious threat to Japan’s national security. Yoshida in particular held strong contempt for Chinese military power based on his prewar experience in China. After the establishment of the PRC, Yoshida commented that Chinese military was merely “primitive coolie army” with no cross-ocean capabilities that would threaten Japan. His evaluation of Chinese military was not even swayed by its

²²⁶ Quoted from *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (Diary of Ashida Hitoshi)*, February 19, 1952 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986), Vol. 4, p. 103.

²²⁷ Explanation of *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki*, Vol. 4, pp. 8-9.

²²⁸ Ashida Hitoshi, “Sochugun no Tainichi Sakusen Handan (Judgment on Soviet-Chinese Military Operation towards Japan), September 5, 1951” in *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (Diary of Ashida Hitoshi)*, Vol. 7, p. 420.

²²⁹ See Eiichi Kōgo et al. “Soren wa Tsuigi ni Dō Deru ka? (Whither the Soviet Union),” *Chūo Kōron* (December 1950); Hitoshi Wada, “Chūgoku no Nashonarizumu (On Chinese Nationalism),” *Chūo Kōron* (January 1951); Masayoshi Kagami, “Soren no Sekai Seisaku: Tai-Eiseikoku Seisaku (The World Policy of the Soviet Union: Toward Satellite States),” *Chūo Kōron* (April 1951).”

²³⁰ For example, Wada believed that Chinese reliance on the Soviet Union had its limit because of both nationalist resistance and its economic agenda that could not be accomplished without capital and technology from the West. See “Chugoku no Nashonarizumu (On Chinese Nationalism),” pp. 257-258.

performance during the Korean War.²³¹ He also objected the American thesis of monolithic communism. In his memoirs published in 1957, he argued that the proud Chinese culture would not tolerate long-term submission to an outside power and predicted the eventual breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance.²³² The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty did not seem a real danger to Yoshida and his entourage. When negotiating with the U.S. regarding peace treaty with China, the representative of the Yoshida government, Okada Akira told Dulles that the treaty was of a similar nature as the one signed by the Nationalist government and Soviet Union in 1945, “both being the natural result of the interaction between two neighboring powers.”²³³

Another event that aroused Japanese anxiety about Chinese military capabilities was China’s first nuclear test in 1964. Believing that “Chinese acquirement of nuclear arms is the most important trigger of great changes to the overall strategic system in the Far East,” some Japanese defense experts called for serious reassessment of Japan’s air defense capabilities and an end to the previously optimistic and care-free attitude towards national defense.²³⁴ A small minority of them even cried for either independent nuclear arms or introduction of American nuclear weapons into Japanese territory in case Japan became the target of Soviet and Chinese nuclear attacks.²³⁵ But the elite majority responded to the nuclear test with calm, which was best reflected in the following excerpt from a statement by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Research Council on National Security (*Anzen Hosho Chōsakai*) on November 18, 1964:

²³¹ Zhaobin Chen, *Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku Seisaku: 1950 Nendai Higashi Ajia Kokusai Seiji no Bunmyaku (Japan’s China Policy in the Context of East Asian International Relations in the 1950s)* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 2000), pp. 12-13.

²³² Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaisō Junen (Recollections of Ten Years)* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957), Vol. 1, p. 270. For Yoshida’s view about Sino-Soviet relationship, also see Yoshida’s conversation with Okada Akira in 1958, recorded in Akira Okada, *Mizudori Gaiō Hiwa: Aru Gaiōkukan no Shōgen (Secret Stories of Waterfowl Diplomacy: Testimony of A Diplomat)* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Sha, 1983), pp. 58-62.

²³³ It is true that in the famous “Yoshida Letter” of December 1951 that formally committed Japan to a peace treaty with Taiwan, Yoshida brought up the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty as a major threat to Japan. But this was done mainly for tactical reasons because otherwise it would have been impossible to justify the absence of peace treaty with the Communist government. See Chen, *Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku Seisaku*, pp. 63-64.

²³⁴ For example, see Shūjirō Kotani, “Gunbi Kanri to Nihon no Anzen Hosho: Chūkyō no Kakubusō ni Taisuru Ichitai (Arms Management and Japan’s National Security: A Proposal Regarding Communist China’s Nuclear Arms),” *Bōei Ronshū (The Journal of National Defense)* 3, No.1 (April 1964).

²³⁵ For the flurry of Japanese media coverage of Chinese nuclear test and various kinds of responses from the Japanese political circle compiled from a somewhat hawkish perspective, see *Kokubō (The National Defense)* 13 (November 1964), p. 45, pp. 83-84.

“The success of Chinese nuclear test does not mean that Chinese military nuclear power would immediately pose a threat (to Japan). Moreover, even if China develops further certain types of nuclear arms, it would still be a little plus on top of the Soviet nuclear power that has threatened Japan from the past, so it is not necessary to be disconcerted and feel particularly shaken now. Rather, the question is whether Japan’s previous attitude and countermeasures vis-à-vis Soviet nuclear power would suffice to be a perfect solution. If our attitude and countermeasures vis-à-vis Soviet nuclear power are a perfect solution to the newly built Chinese nuclear power, it would be good if we could discuss the attitude and countermeasures regarding the further development (of Chinese nuclear power).”²³⁶

According to the observations of a leading Japanese defense scholar, Wakaizumi Kei, the kinds of security countermeasures that the government envisioned mainly focused on strengthening national defense system and maintaining the security alliance with the U.S. rather than adopting any radical changes of national security policy.²³⁷

A more widely agreed form of China threat was not Chinese military power but its communist infiltration into Japan. Conservative politicians from various factions believed an “international Communist conspiracy,” that is, the domestic radical Left was not an isolated organization but received support from communist countries to incite anti-government riots. The fact that the JCP abandoned its previous strategy of “peaceful line” after being criticized by the Cominform and the CCP in early 1950 seemed to confirm their suspicion.²³⁸ The Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) of the Ministry of Justice closely watching the JCP’s influence even estimated Japan had up to one million Communist sympathizers by 1956, with the JCP members in the center, and a host of “front organizations” and “sympathetic organizations influenced by the JCP,” such as the Japan Teachers Union (JTU), forming the outer circles.²³⁹ Yoshida called these Japanese communists “a destructive force” in his memoir, a view that hard-liner LDP members like Ashida also shared.²⁴⁰

Another point of broad consensus not only among the conservatives but across the entire political spectrum in Japan, was the fear of conflict entanglement that may cause another war with China. The political Left argued that because Japan was committed to

²³⁶ Quoted from Kei Wakaizumi, “Chūgoku no Kakubusō to Nihon no Anzen Hosho (Chinese Nuclear Arms and Japan’s National Security),” *Chūo Kōron* (February 1966), p. 76.

²³⁷ Wakaizumi, “Chūgoku no Kakubusō to Nihon no Anzen Hosho,” p. 76.

²³⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 272-273; Benfell, *Rich Nation, No Army*, pp. 77-79.

²³⁹ “Some Aspects of the Internal Security Situation in Japan, January 11, 1956,” Confidential U.S. State Department Special File – “Japan, 1947-1956,” Reel 39.

²⁴⁰ Benfell, *Rich Nation, No Army*, pp. 68-69.

collective security with the United States to defend Japan and a vaguely defined “Far East” area, Japan would be easily dragged into American military conflict with the U.S.S.R. and China even if it did not want to. Conservative elites were also nervous about Japanese entanglement in international military conflict, not because of the alliance with the U.S., which they believed would defend Japan, but due to their understanding that the Communist expansion and the consequent East-West confrontation had created a number of serious flash points in East Asia. These flash points included crises in Korean peninsular and Taiwan Strait, which particularly boded ill for peace between China and Japan. During the Korean War, Yoshida refused to rearm Japan rapidly in part because he worried that the U.S. would want Japan to join the fight against Chinese army in Korea, which would replay the historical nightmare in the last war that numerous Japanese troops were bogged down in China.²⁴¹ In 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama even told the Diet that, with the Chinese Communists crying to liberate Taiwan and the Nationalists vowing to return to the mainland, there was a high risk of war across the Taiwan Strait which would very likely escalate into World War Three.²⁴² The “Three Arrow Research” project of the 1960s was an example of Japanese defense planning in response to the possibility of Sino-Japanese military conflict inadvertently triggered by tensions elsewhere in the region.

Reviving Japanese Militarism: Indulgence in the Past or Anxiety about the Present?

The above analysis shows that elite expectation of violent conflict between the two states was mainly the product of the power struggle and tension between the two Cold War strategic blocs. But did war memory also have significant influence on Chinese and Japanese strategic thinking? It is true that Chinese rhetoric often warned of Japanese militarist revival, and based its claim on a crude historical analogy that the anti-China policy of the Japanese government was a replication of its aggressive policy during the past war. In line with this general analogy were some more specific arguments that Japan supported Chiang because of its intention to restore Japanese historical colonization of Taiwan, same explanation applying to Japan’s policy to South Korea.

²⁴¹ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 388-389.

²⁴² *Kokkai Kaigiroku (Proceedings of the National Diet of Japan)*, Budgetary Committee of the House of Representative, March 26, 1955.

However, in terms of the cause of militarist revival, China usually blamed the American government for intentionally propping up Japanese militarism in order to wage Cold War rather than Japanese historiography that evaded war responsibility and rejected repentance. As mentioned above, there was a pattern that Chinese propaganda would step up attack on Japanese militarist revival when the current Japanese government closely followed the footsteps of American containment policy. In the meantime, dissatisfaction about Japanese historical attitude was nearly absent in either Chinese media or the public or private statements of Chinese government officials.

Take the Chinese media campaign against Sato from the late 1960s to early 1972, the longest and most fierce one on the subject of reviving Japanese militarism, for an example. Using the method of content analysis, political scientist Okabe Tatsumi carefully studied the way in which Japan threat was discussed in Chinese media during this campaign. Okabe concluded that Chinese criticism of Japanese aggressive nature tended to be made in general and abstract terms rather than with specific reference to Japanese capabilities or military plans. Oftentimes, the use of such phrase categories as “overseas deployment of troops,” “arms buildup,” and “anti-China” were used to criticize the negative consequences of U.S.-Japan security relations rather than Japan threat itself. So what the Chinese media really suggested was that the revival of militarism equaled Japanese political subordination to the U.S.²⁴³ This revealed that China’s biggest grievances about Sato stemmed not so much from historical memory but his intention to integrate Japanese power and resources into American military containment system in Asia.

One rare occasion in which the Chinese did raise concern about Japanese historiography was during the semi-official negotiation over Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade negotiation in spring 1970. Taking place shortly after the declaration of Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué, this round of trade talk was fraught with Chinese delegation’s bombardment of Japanese militarist revival, with the Japanese delegation busy defending the policy of its government. To rebut the Japanese delegation’s denial, the chief Chinese negotiator Liu Xiwen made a particularly harsh speech on April 2 that listed four major signs of Japanese militarist revival: 1) Japanese support to Taiwan, troop dispatch to South Korea,

aid to South Vietnam, economic expansion to Southeast Asia, 2) military buildup in the name of “independent defense” posture, 3) military budget increase, and 4) the public showing of the movie *Yamamoto Isoroku* in Japan that was criticized for glorifying Japan’s national history and openly calling Manchuria “Japan’s life line.”²⁴⁴ But in the next seventeen days of the negotiation, the Chinese side failed to pursue the last point but only concentrated on the first three plus the issue of military base in Okinawa. In the joint statement that they finally reached on April 19, the Chinese side scathingly condemned the Nixon-Sato Communique and the “new aggressive activities of American and Japanese reactionaries” in Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam. The statement was concluded by Japanese side’s promise to oppose Sato administration’s hostile policy to China and a joint appeal for bilateral friendship and regional peace.²⁴⁵ Nowhere in the joint statement was the Japanese historiography criticized or changes of its interpretation demanded. Hence, the earlier reference to the historiography issued by the Chinese negotiator was only meant for tactical purpose, not to address Japan’s historical myths in a genuine way.

As far as the Japanese reaction to Chinese bashing campaigns is concerned, except for some left-wing elite, the conservative mainstream completely disagreed that the peril of Japanese militarism was on the rise. Sticking to their own historical myths of victim consciousness and pacifism, some conservative politicians even felt the Chinese were wrongly obsessed with their traumatic past and held malevolent intent with no legitimate reasons. In the aftermath of the 1970 Memorandum Trade negotiation, the LDP issued a party statement that blamed the Chinese government for “making one-sided criticism and assail without opening their eyes to the background and facts of postwar Sino-Japanese relations,” and claimed that “Chinese criticism full of hostility to the Japanese nation was not only a pure slander but also led to such a suspicion that it was intended to compromise Japan’s friendly relationship with other Asian countries.” While admitting that the unfortunate past of the bilateral relations was indeed unforgettable, this statement contended

²⁴³ Tatsumi Okabe, *Chūgoku no Tainichi Seisaku Seisaku*, Part II.

²⁴⁴ Seiichi Tagawa, *Nitchū Kōshō Miroku: Tagawa Nikki – 14-nen no Shōgen* (Secret Stories of Japan-China Negotiations: Tagawa Diary – Testimony of Fourteen Years) (Tokyo, Mainichi Shinbun Sha, 1973), pp. 226-227.

²⁴⁵ “Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade Negotiation Joint Statement, April 19, 1970,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol.1, pp. 913-915.

that “Japanese people also paid painful sacrifice for the defeat and are now working towards the goal of ensuring world peace and building a peace state of Japan.”²⁴⁶

But this harsh statement did not reflect the opinions of all LDP politicians but only the party hawks. The majority of conservative elite did not attribute Chinese bashing of reviving Japanese militarism to its indulgence with past trauma and excessive anti-Japanese theme of its historical memories. Instead, they either sympathized with Chinese argument or thought it was understandable despite their overall disagreement. While the LDP party meeting was passing this statement, the chief Japanese negotiator of the trade talk, Furui Yoshimi, walked out the meeting in protest. Furui was one of those dovish LDP politicians who believed that certain Japanese policies were indeed easy to trigger Chinese misunderstanding and special efforts should be made to reassure China.²⁴⁷

Not only the party doves but also some hard-liners openly stressed the necessity to mitigate Chinese suspicion. For example, in his Diet speech in response to LDP politician Nishimura Naomi’s harsh censure of Chinese attitude, Prime Minister Sato who was the number one target of Chinese media offensive said that Chinese isolation from the rest of world accounted for its strikingly poor understanding about the real situation in present Japan; so regardless of Chinese intentional distortion or fundamental misunderstanding, Japan should adhere to its peace constitution while keeping up the efforts to explain Japanese policies to China.²⁴⁸ Another important LDP politician who remained calm was Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served as the director of JDA at the time. Even after being named by the Chinese media for advancing militarist policy because he advocated independent Japanese defense and published the first Japanese defense white paper, Nakasone testified at the Diet that he did not blame the Chinese for being unreasonable or hostile but only

²⁴⁶ Mantarō Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi (History of Postwar Japan-China Relations)* (Tokyo, Hara Shobo, 1981), pp. 299-301.

²⁴⁷ In fact, during the trade talk Furui had tried strenuously, with little success though, to convince the Chinese side that the Sato government was not seeking to revive militarism and the vast majority of the Japanese people remained opposed to militarism despite a small number of remaining militarists. See Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 292-293.

²⁴⁸ *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors, 63rd Diet Session, May 9, 1970.

lamented that his real intention was misunderstood and expressed the hope to do as much as he could to resolve the misunderstanding.²⁴⁹

Other conservative politicians looked for more convincing explanations for the timing and intensity of Chinese media campaign in China's domestic political conditions and international environment. The leader of the still influential Yoshida faction, Ōhira Masayoshi, argued at a round-table discussion held by *Asahi Shimbun* on April 24 that the Chinese government set a sharp tone in the joint statement of the Memorandum Trade because it was waging another blatant war of words against the Soviets and felt obligated to uphold stringent political principle when dealing with other countries like Japan. He also defused the criticism of some LDP hawks that China was particularly hostile to Japan by pointing out that China's volatile domestic situation at the time had exacerbated its relationships with many foreign countries, not just Japan. Furthermore, Ōhira suggested that the primary hurdle for smooth Sino-Japanese relationship was nothing but the Taiwan issue, without a decisive change of Japanese policy on which Japan could only expect greater Chinese hostility.²⁵⁰ The somber-minded Ōhira later played a critical role in fostering Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization while serving as the foreign minister of the Tanaka administration.

Therefore, even though the mainstream Japanese elite found Chinese bashing campaign something hard to accept, they nevertheless rejected the view that Chinese hostility and belligerence was only reserved for Japan due to biases in Chinese historical memory.

II. Absence of National Recognition

The San Francisco peace treaty that ended the state of war between Japan and belligerent countries left out China, the country that fought Japanese aggression the longest time and suffered the most. Not only so, Japan signed Japan-ROC peace treaty in April 1952, which recognized the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the sole legal representative of

²⁴⁹ *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, Cabinet Committee of the House of Representative, 63rd Diet Session, October 28, 1970.

²⁵⁰ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 301-302.

the Chinese nation. For as long as two decades since then, Japan not only refused to develop formal relationship with the Communist regime but also actively opposed its U.N. representation. In 1961 when it became possible for the U.N. to reconsider PRC's membership, the Ikeda administration joined the U.S. and other three countries to submit the "important question" proposal that required 2/3 of votes from all member countries for approving PRC's U.N. seat. This proposal was endorsed and effectively barred China from the U.N. for another 10 years. Furthermore, in 1971 when the majority of U.N. members supported the PRC's entry, Tokyo again proposed with Washington the double representation of both the Communist and Nationalist governments. This time the U.N. general assembly tossed out the Japanese proposal and recognized the PRC as the only legal government of China.²⁵¹

So by the time the PRC entered the U.N. in September 1971, Japan had yet to give its formal recognition. The stubbornness of Japanese government in maintaining the policy of non-recognition was driven home by Prime Minister Ikeda's words in 1964. When questioned at the Diet why Japan still refused to recognize PRC while even some Western powers like Great Britain and France had already recognized it, he answered that "there is the view that if Japan becomes the last nation to recognize China, it is not good from the standpoint of future diplomatic relationship. However, if there are good reasons, then it is all right to be the last nation."²⁵² Japan was not the last nation to recognize China, but it certainly lagged behind many other countries.

The absence of mutual recognition was an important indicator of Sino-Japanese non-reconciliation relationship because it suggested the continuation of the state of war between them and their refusal to acknowledge each other's right of national survival. Mistrust or hatred generated by divergence of their historical interpretation was not a good explanation for Sino-Japanese diplomatic isolation. It is because Beijing implemented an active "People's Diplomacy" to pave the way for eventual diplomatic normalization with Japan, in the process of which it replicated the mainstream Japanese myth of military clique while

²⁵¹ Akihiko Tanaka, *Nitchūkankei 1945-1990 (Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945-1990)* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1991), pp. 54-55, pp. 71-72.

²⁵² *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, Budgetary Committee of the House of Representative of the 36th Diet Session, January 31, 1964.

restraining public discourse and government actions that would have rendered a much more serious inquiry into the question of Japanese war responsibility. Despite Beijing's almost unilateral actions to write off Japan's historical debts, the "People's Diplomacy" still failed to bring about Japanese recognition, due to the systemic constraints of the Cold War mainly manifested in the Taiwan Hurdle.

Writing off Historical Debts

As discussed earlier, China and Japan neither shared a common interpretation of their past war nor reached a thorough settlement of historical burdens. But this should not constitute a major obstacle to bilateral recognition. At least Japan's failure in satisfying Chiang's demands for historical settlement did not stop it from establishing formal relationship with Taiwan. Pro-Taiwan LDP parliamentarians typically argued that Japan should maintain closer political and economic ties with Taiwan because of both their common interest in countering communist threat and Chiang's act of "repaying violence with virtue" after the war, to which all Japanese should feel indebted.²⁵³ But a comparison of how war-related issues, including justice and truth-telling, reparation, and repatriation, were handled by the Nationalist and Communist governments during this period indicates that the Taiwan Lobby was dishonest in proclaiming that Chiang was more magnanimous than Mao. During this period, the Communist government never showed any more interest than the Nationalist government in rectifying Japanese historiography, nor did it make diplomatic normalization with Japan conditional on any measures of historical settlement. On the contrary, Beijing adopted an exceptionally generous policy on the history issue designed to convince the Japanese people of its good will.

²⁵³ A telling example on this kind of opinion is made by Kaya Okinori, a diehard figure of the pro-Taiwan faction, who published an essay in August 1972 titled "Remonstrance against the recklessness of abandoning Taiwan," in which he elaborated on Japan's "four-fold deep indebtedness" to Taiwan: (1) Chiang swiftly and safely repatriated the 2.2 million Japanese soldiers and residents stranded in China after the war despite the sheer chaos in transportation systems and other domestic infrastructure; (2) Chiang frustrated USSR-led machinations to abolish the Emperor system by insisting that whether to retain it was up to the decision of the Japanese people; (3) it was also Chiang who saved Japan from being divided and occupied by multiple powers after the war; (4) although most entitled, Chiang's China renounced claims for war reparation and protected Japanese economic reconstruction and development from being crippled. See Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, pp. 126-128.

Justice and Truth-telling

Recent studies of Japan-ROC diplomacy suggested that immediately after the war Chiang was by no means ready to let Japan off the hook of repaying historical debts.²⁵⁴ Chiang was determined to punish both Japanese war criminals and Chinese traitors, in big part because doing so would contribute to rebuilding national morale and enhancing his regime legitimacy. After the war, the Nationalist government held its own war crimes trials, sentencing 149 Japanese to death (29.7 percent of total accused convicted) and 83 to life in prison.²⁵⁵ The government also conducted nationwide damage surveys as well as serious investigation into Japanese atrocities, based on which a large body of evidence was compiled and presented to war crimes trials held in Nanjing and Tokyo. Besides, in two years after the war as many as 30,828 Chinese traitors were prosecuted.²⁵⁶ These traitor trials altogether convicted 15,391 people and meted out severe punishment including death penalty.²⁵⁷

Compared to Chiang, Mao was by far more lenient to Japanese war criminals. Soon after the Japanese surrender, the CCP government pressed for severe punishment of Japanese war criminals ranging from the military to Emperor Hirohito, the Zaibatsu, pro-war politicians and bureaucrats, and any perpetrators of war crimes.²⁵⁸ It was highly critical of the excessively generous verdict of the Tokyo Trial and announced that it reserved the right to try some noted Japanese war criminals that had been absolved and returned to Japan by the Nationalist government.²⁵⁹ But the Communist attitude began to soften since the mid-1950s. In October 1954, Zhou Enlai told visiting Japanese Diet delegation that China had

²⁵⁴ Chiang did decline to occupy Japan mainly because he was afraid that once China participated the occupation the Soviet Union would be let in as well, which would make it difficult to stop Soviet influence from coming into China and strengthening the CCP. See Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 130.

²⁵⁵ Philip R. Piccigallo, *The Japanese on Trial: Allied war crimes operations in the East, 1945-1951* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 173.

²⁵⁶ Among those openly tried included such famous figures as Chen Gongbo, Acting President of the Nanjing puppet government, Zhou Fohai, Minister of Finance and Deputy Director of the Executive Yuan of the Nanjing government, and Zhou Zuoren, a famed writer who agreed to manage cultural and education affairs under Japanese occupation in Beijing.

²⁵⁷ See Jie Liu, *Kankan Saiban (Traitor Trials)* (Tokyo: Chūo Kōron Sha, 2000), Chapter 5-7.

²⁵⁸ “Jiefang Ribao Editorial on Severely Punishing War Criminals, September 14, 1945,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 20-22.

²⁵⁹ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 57-59, p. 77. In fact, punishing war criminals was included as one of the eight preconditions that Mao raised in January 1949 for opening peace negotiation with the KMT. See *Zhou Enlai Nianpu 1898-1949 (The Chronicle of Zhou Enlai)* (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing Companies, 1998), p. 827.

been exercising leniency on Japanese war criminals and wished to settle this issue soon.²⁶⁰ By this time, about 1,000 Japanese war criminals were detained in China, most of them in Fushun War Criminal Prison in south Manchuria, where they were receiving vigorous Chinese reeducation.²⁶¹ When the reeducation program approached its end in late 1955, the legal authorities prepared a prosecution list of 107 war criminals, 70 of whom were to be sentenced to death. But they were soon told by Zhou Enlai that the CCP Central Committee had decided on two principles of dealing with war criminals: no single war criminal should be executed or sentenced to life in jail, and verdicts of imprisonment should be limited to a very small number of people.²⁶² Furthermore, the First Plenary of Chinese People's Congress passed a resolution before the trial, ordering lenient treatment Japanese war criminals, in reference to "the changes in the 10 years after Japanese surrender and current situation, the current development of Sino-Japanese friendly relationship, and various degree of contrition by the majority of these war criminals during their detention period."²⁶³ Such policy adjustment was clearly consistent with the new Chinese strategy of "peaceful coexistence" proposed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 to broaden the international united front and the "People's Diplomacy" to Japan that was directly linked to the strategy.

Consequently, the war criminal trial held in June-July 1956 only sentenced 45 to prison, while over a thousand Japanese war criminals were pardoned and quickly repatriated. Among those 45 sentenced war criminals, except one person who died during the prison term, all the others were released by March 1964.²⁶⁴ Japanese war criminals pardoned or released early commonly expressed their deep appreciation for the Chinese leniency and many of them became pro-China activists after they returned to Japan.²⁶⁵ On this score, Chinese policy of good will paid off handsomely.

²⁶⁰ "Zhou Enlai's Remarks in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic Survey, October 11, 1954," in *Sengo Shiryō: NitchūKankei*, p. 32.

²⁶¹ Yuan Jin, *Qiyuan: Yige Zhanfan Guanli Suozhan de Huiji (Unusual Destiny: Reminiscences of A Director of War Criminal Prison)* (Beijing: PLA Press, 1999).

²⁶² Jin, *Qiyuan*, Chapter 25.

²⁶³ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 272-273.

²⁶⁴ Jin Yuan, *Qiyuan*, Chapter 25-27; Tian Huan ed., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxian Ji 1945-1970*, pp. 716-718.

²⁶⁵ The most active ones of them organized the Liaison Organization of the Repatriated from China (*Chūgoku Kikansha Renrakukai*, or *Chūkiren* for short) in 1957, which for decades has been actively exposing the Japanese atrocities in China, supporting compensation claims of Chinese war victims, and advocating Sino-Japanese rapprochement and opposing US-Japan alliance.

Besides the general policy of pardoning Japanese war criminal, Chinese government never showed interest in criticizing the cover-up of war atrocities in Japanese textbooks during this period. Moreover, it deliberately discouraged domestic truth-telling on Japanese atrocities. According to historian Daqing Yang, scholars in the History Department of Nanjing University conducted the first Chinese comprehensive study of Nanjing Massacre in the early 1960s. But its publication would have been out of tune with the “People’s Diplomacy” intending to befriend as many as Japanese people as possible while downplaying the issue of Japanese war responsibility. So for many years this study remained unpublished but was only printed for internal circulation in 1979. Another example of suppression of open discussion of Japanese war atrocities was when the Chinese justice at the Tokyo Trial, Mei Ruao, called on historical research of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1960s, he was accused of “stirring up national hatred and revenge” against the Japanese people, and his writing about Chinese defeat and misery in Nanjing was criticized for accentuating the strength of the enemy and, therefore, being unpatriotic.²⁶⁶

Reparation

Chiang also made a more serious attempt than the Communist government to make Japan pay war reparations.²⁶⁷ As early as 1943, Chiang ordered war damage survey and the preparation of Chinese proposals on postwar policy towards Japan, including demands for Japanese compensation. Having consulted with great powers at Cairo, he began implementing the policy by confiscating Japanese public and private properties in areas under its control. Following Japanese surrender, the Nationalist government actively provided information to the Pauley reparation mission that conducted several months of investigation in China, which contributed to the harsh demand for Japanese reparation in the Pauley mission report of December 1945. True that at the time Chiang advocated *Kuanda Zhengce*, or a policy of generosity towards Japan, but by “generosity” he actually referred to the handling of Japanese monarchy system and repatriation of Japanese nationals rather than war reparation. Chiang was afraid that a soft position on this issue might spark public

²⁶⁶ Yang, “Convergence or Divergence?” p. 858.

²⁶⁷ A recent systematic study of the Nationalist government’s reparation policy towards Japan from wartime to the signing of Japan-ROC treaty can be found in Yin, *Chunichi Sensō Baishō Mondai*.

resentment at home, which would exacerbate his public support crisis and weaken his power in the struggle against the communists.

But since 1947 the U.S. shifted the focus of its Japan policy to restoration and rearmament, which required a dramatic cutdown of reparation burden on Japan. His power deteriorating rapidly during the Chinese Civil War while dependence on the U.S. aid growing, Chiang was put in an increasingly weak position to resist the U.S. pressure. Nevertheless, he maintained reparation demands to Japan even after his government was driven to Taiwan. He was only forced to drop the demands after the U.S. announced the seven principles for Japanese peace treaty in November 1950. He did so in order to win the invitation to attend the peace conference, but he attached a condition that if any other country got reparation, the Nationalist government should get equal benefits.²⁶⁸ Later when negotiating the terms of the Japan-ROC treaty, Taiwan again demanded Japanese compensation of Chinese loss through labor service. Japanese negotiators rejected the demand and threatened that Japan would refuse to apply the peace treaty to the area beyond Taiwan if Chiang insisted on getting reparation. Afraid that Japan would refuse to recognize the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China, Chiang finally gave up reparation claims.²⁶⁹

The history of the Nationalist reparation policy indicated that Chiang did not act in a spirit of forgiveness that was later extolled by the Taiwan Lobby. He would not have renounced reparation claims had it not been for his weak bargaining position in the peace treaty negotiation. In contrast, the Communist government lacked interest in obtaining Japanese war reparation almost from the very beginning of postwar era. After the Japan-ROC treaty was signed, Beijing declared that the treaty was illegitimate and it reserved the right to demand Japanese war reparation. But what really concerned Beijing was Japanese

²⁶⁸ Yin, *Chūnichi Senso Baisho Mondai*, p. 215, pp. 227-228.

²⁶⁹ Taiwan negotiator still made a last-ditch effort to request that the treaty text should mention that Japan has the responsibility to pay reparation for having inflicted tremendous pain and loss on the Chinese people, and then the ROC side would renounce reparation claims citing the miserable situation in Japan and the principle of generosity. If accepted by the Japanese side, this proposal would have led to implicit admission of Japanese war responsibility and saved the Nationalist government some face. But Taiwan negotiators were not even able to get these words written into the final text. See Akira Ishii, "Nikka Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho o Meguru Jakkan no Mondai (Several Problems Concerning the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiation)," *Kyōyōgakka Kiyō* (The Journal of the Department of Liberal Arts, the University of Tokyo) 21 (1988), pp. 85-90.

recognition of Taiwan, to protest which it refused to accept any agreements reached between Japan and Taiwan, including that on reparation. Since then Beijing never raised this issue as a precondition or bargaining chip during interactions with Japan. Not only so, from the late 1950s it gradually moved to the position of giving up reparation. In 1957, a member of a visiting JSP delegation, Katsumada Seiichi, asked Zhou Enlai if Chinese government could adopt a lenient policy on reparation similar to its handling of war criminals when bilateral diplomatic normalization was realized some day. Zhou was unable to give a clear reply immediately, but this incident triggered an internal debate among the top leaders in early 1960s, which led to a decision that China would give up reparation to show friendship to Japanese people.²⁷⁰ This internal decision was later announced as China's official policy on reparation in early 1970s when the normalization negotiation was launched.

Repatriation

On the question of repatriating Japanese nationals, the Chinese Communists were no less active and cooperative than the Nationalists. By the time that the PRC was founded, approximately 35,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were still stranded in mainland China. For three years no progress was made towards a solution, due to the lack of formal diplomatic relations. The turning point came in late 1952. In May, one of the three Japanese Diet members who came to China and signed the first Sino-Japanese non-government trade agreement, Kōra Tomi brought the issue to the attention of their Chinese host.²⁷¹ In response, Chinese official media said in December that Chinese people clearly understood that Japanese militarists were our enemies but Japanese people were our friends, and that Chinese government was willing to help those remaining Japanese who wished to

²⁷⁰ Incidentally this decision was leaked in 1965 to the passionate pro-China politician, Utsunomiya Tokuma, who then told Japanese journalists about the news, very likely because he wanted to boost the image of a friendly China in Japan. After Yomiuri published this news, Zhou Enlai's right-hand man on Japan policy, Liao Chenzhi, issued a correction statement that China did not say if it would give up or request reparation, though he also expressed Chinese reluctance to use Japanese reparation for socialist construction. The decisionmaking process of Chinese reparation policy from late 1950s to the 1970s is recollected by Zhang Xiagnshan, an important member of Zhou En-lai's inner group on Japan policy, in his anthology published in 1998. See Xiangshan Zhang, *Zhongri Guanxi: Guankui yu Jianzheng (Sino-Japanese Relations: My Humble Opinions and Testimony)* (Beijing: Dandai Shijie Press, 1998), pp. 66-70.

²⁷¹ Furukawa, *Niichū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 58.

return to Japan.²⁷² In the following two years, the Chinese Red Cross and three non-governmental Japanese organizations signed agreements on concrete procedures of both group and individual repatriation, according to which about 29,000 remaining Japanese were repatriated by March 1955.²⁷³

Beijing's repatriation policy was a unilateral, unusually friendly move, considering that at the same time Tokyo was dragging its feet in allowing Chinese residents in Japan to return home at their free will. As many as 32,000 of Chinese POWs and forced laborers who had been taken to Japan survived the war. Only till mid-1953 did Japan allow 551 people and the ashes of 560 dead to be sent back to China with the assistance of non-governmental organizations. To make things worse, the Japanese government sent some Chinese residents to Taiwan and imposed strict rules prohibiting all Chinese residents in Japan to visit the PRC. So the Chinese government actually repatriated Japanese nationals without getting reciprocal actions from the Japanese side. But in light of the deep anxiety that Japanese people felt in getting their family members come home after the war, China's policy appealed to many corners of the Japanese society and facilitated the its "People's Diplomacy." According to Xiao Xiangqian, member of the Zhou Enlai's inner group on Japan policy, *Liaoban* (the Office of Liao Chengzhi), the settlement of the repatriation issue marked a great breakthrough in Beijing's efforts to cultivate friendly non-governmental relations with Japan.²⁷⁴

Structural Factor: The Taiwan Hurdle

Japan: U.S. Pressure and Taiwan Lobby

²⁷² "The Reply of the People's Central Government on Questions Regarding Japanese Residents in China, December 1, 1952, in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, pp. 139-140.

²⁷³ "The Announcement on Assisting the Return of Japanese Residents, March 5, 1953;" "The Consultation Memorandum of Chinese Red Cross, Japanese Red Cross and Japan-China Friendship Association on the Repatriation Issue, November 3, 1954;" "The Statement of PRC Diplomatic Spokesman," in *Sengo Shiryō: Nitchū Kankei*, p. 27, pp. 33-35. Also see The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo Shi (The History of Sino-Japanese Friendship Movement)* (Tokyo: Seinen Shuppan Sha, 1980), pp. 59-62.

²⁷⁴ Xiangqian Xiao, *Eien no Rinkoku to shite: Chunichi Kokō Kaifuku no Kiroku (Being Eternal Neighbors: Records of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization)* (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1997), p. 23.

The Cold War structure rendered the international status of Taiwan the focal point in Sino-U.S. strategic conflict. Taiwan issue was so crucial to Chinese national security that whether a foreign country recognized Beijing or Taiwan was one of the most important yardsticks for China to judge that country's intention. Japan's official recognition of Taiwan thus convinced China of Japanese collusion with the U.S. to contain China and became in the eyes of Chinese leaders the chief obstacle to normalizing Sino-Japanese relationship. But Japan's policy embodied the structural constraints on the trajectory of Japanese foreign policy rather than its own diplomatic preference. Although most Japanese leaders in this period wished in various degrees to reopen official relations with the PRC, they had to restrain the desire so as not to jeopardize Japan's fundamental relations with the U.S.

First of all, it was under the U.S. pressure that the Yoshida government decided rather reluctantly to recognize the Taiwan regime, not Beijing.²⁷⁵ As for his personal opinion, Yoshida believed that political and economic interaction with China would be useful to bring about changes in Chinese domestic and foreign policy, while the policy of non-recognition would only drive China to the Soviet side. As he pointed out in a letter to Dulles in February 1951, the first priority in containing communist expansion in Asia was to "pluck off China from the hand of the Soviet Union." He went on to suggest that because of its traditional ties with China, Japan could try to infiltrate the "Bamboo Curtain" and break down Moscow's control over China. However, being afraid that his disagreement with the U.S. on China policy might complicate the ongoing US-Japan peace treaty negotiation, he later decided not to send out this letter. On the eve of the San Francisco peace conference Yoshida yielded to Dulles and promised that Japan had no intention to negotiate peace treaty with Beijing.

²⁷⁵ The formation of Yoshida's China policy in the early 1950s has been extensively researched. The brief account offered in this section is largely drawn from the following works that are mainly based on Japanese and Western archival records: Chen, *Sengo Nihon no Chugoku Seisaku*, Chapter 1-2; Akira Ishii, "Taiwan ka Pikin ka (Taiwan or Beijing)?" in Akio Watanabe ed., *Sengo Nihon no Taigai Seisaku (Postwar Japan's Foreign Policies)* (Tokyo: Youhikaku, 1985); idem., "Nikka Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho o Meguru Jakkon no Mondai;" Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 400-414; Warren I. Cohen, "China in Japanese-American Relations," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen eds., *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1989).

Although Yoshida never intended to recognize Beijing as the only legitimate Chinese government, he did hope to maintain ties with both the Communist and Nationalist regimes, that is, a two-Chinas policy. Now that the U.S. would not tolerate any form of official relationship between Japan and the PRC, Yoshida envisioned that Japan could establish an unofficial relationship with Taiwan focusing on economic affairs or an official relationship with a government that only represented Taiwan. Both options would leave Japan with political leeway for future interaction with China. So after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, Yoshida deliberately procrastinated on developing substantial political contacts with Taiwan, and even suggested to the Diet a plan to set up official office in Shanghai.

Yoshida's attitude made the U.S. suspicious of Yoshida's loyalty to the anti-Communist camp. Dulles admonished Tokyo to conclude Japanese-ROC peace negotiation as soon as possible, or the American congress might refuse to ratify the San Francisco Treaty, which seemed a highly credible threat given the rising fervor of China Lobby and McCarthyism in the U.S. Undoubtedly, having the occupation dragging on was Yoshida's worst fear, to avoid which he chose to comply with the U.S. demand. Such was the background of the famous "Yoshida Letter" sent to Dulles in December 1951 in which Yoshida gave his formal words that Japan would sign a peace treaty with the ROC "applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of" the Nationalist government. The Japan-ROC peace treaty was eventually signed on April 28, 1952, the same day that San Francisco Treaty became effective. These two treaties set the status quo of Japanese policy to China for the next two decades.

The status quo was so tenacious that the efforts of a number of succeeding Japanese leaders failed to break it down. Hatoyama and Ishibashi stood out among postwar Japanese conservative leaders by their expressed desire to improve diplomatic relationship with China. Leader of the right-wing Democratic Party and long resentful of Yoshida's one-sided dependence on the U.S., Hatoyama proclaimed as soon as he took power an autonomous orientation of Japanese foreign policy, including reopening political contacts with Moscow and Beijing.²⁷⁶ However, he did not really emphasize the two Communist countries equally. The Democratic Party platform advocated "restoration of normal diplomatic relationship

with the Soviet Union” but only development of trade relationship with Communist China.²⁷⁷ Normal Japanese-Soviet relationship was crucial to Japan’s entry to the U.N. and to resolving a few emergent issues left by the war such as Japanese nationals remaining in the Soviet Union and the territorial problem of the Northern Islands.²⁷⁸ Besides, it would not hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance because Washington itself maintained formal ties with Moscow. On the contrary, normalizing relationship with China would have meant termination of Japan’s formal ties with Taiwan, which would substantial challenge the U.S. Cold War strategy in Asia. Hatoyama only intended to expand the margin of Japanese autonomy within the basic framework of US-Japan alliance.

In the meantime, the US pressure against Sino-Japanese official relationship loomed large. American concern about Japan’s strategic neutrality was particularly aggravated by the welcome attitude of a wide scope of Japanese social forces to Zhou Enlai’s call for international peaceful coexistence at the Bandung Conference and to China’s “People’s Diplomacy” to Japan. It seemed necessary for Washington to step in and cool off Hatoyama’s enthusiasm to China. When Hatoyama hinted that he might establish limited official contact with China such as exchange consuls, Noel Hemmendinger, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs suggested that the U.S. should intervene to raise strong objection on the basis that “it is hardly probable that Red Chinese consuls would stick to consular and commercial functions in Japan and it is also difficult to imagine Japanese consuls on the Chinese mainland functioning without performing acts which would imply recognition of the Peiping regime.” Hemmendinger also advised that Tokyo should be told to stop promoting informal contacts with China and not to think that Washington might recognize Beijing.²⁷⁹ Given such strong American objection, it would be hard to imagine that Hatoyama would fail to understand the structural limitations on any major modification of Japan’s China policy.

²⁷⁶ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 76.

²⁷⁷ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 76-77.

²⁷⁸ Kitaoka, *Jimintō*, p. 66.

²⁷⁹ “Japan-Red China Consular Relations, May 18, 1955,” Confidential U.S. State Department Special File – “Japan, 1947-1956,” Reel 33.

Similar to Hatoyama, Ishibashi also sought to augment Japanese diplomatic autonomy by expanding political contacts with China. A genuine liberal, Ishibashi had been famous for his cosmopolitan sympathy to Asia from the prewar time. After the war, he advocated to anchor Japanese international strategy in closer cooperation with Asian countries rather than unilateral dependence on America.²⁸⁰ Therefore, when Ishibashi became prime minister at the end of 1956, therefore, people's expectation for Sino-Japanese diplomatic breakthrough rose high at home and abroad, only to be disappointed a few months later by the disintegration of the Ishibashi cabinet due to his illness. During the 71 days of his rule, Ishibashi encouraged trade relationship with China and refused to give in to the U.S. and Taiwan pressure against the escalation of political contacts through the Third Sino-Japanese Non-governmental Trade Agreement. Nevertheless, even Ishibashi failed to take major moves to challenge the U.S.-Japan alliance and the status quo of Japanese official relationship with Taiwan.²⁸¹

The Cold War structure in Asia and the US pressure on Japanese foreign policy remained prominent throughout the Kishi years. A right-wing nationalist politician who actively supported the Pacific War, Kishi seemed to have made a turnaround when he addressed the U.S. senate in 1957 that "the most important problem with regard to our relationship with the free world was the cooperation with the U.S."²⁸² But in fact Kishi's political aspiration after the war had changed from an anti-American ideology to a tactic to capitalize on the indispensable status of Japan in American Cold War strategy for greater international influence of Japan. So Kishi actively responded to Eisenhower's call for strategic collaboration by sending anti-communist overtures to South Korea, seeking active economic cooperation with Southeast Asia, and becoming the first postwar Japanese prime minister who personally visited Taiwan. On the eve of this visit, Kishi explicitly told Indian Prime Minister Nehru that Japan could not recognize China because it was designated by the U.N. resolution as an aggressive state (during the Korean War).²⁸³ During the visit, Kishi repeatedly announced that Japan would adopt neither pro-communist nor neutral strategic

²⁸⁰ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, Part III, Chapter 4.

²⁸¹ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 135; Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978* (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 9.

²⁸² Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 140.

²⁸³ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 138.

stance, and that Japan and Taiwan should establish particularly intimate cooperation. He even offered his endorsement of Chiang's cause to recover the mainland territory because "the danger of communist infiltration to Japan from China was greater than from the Soviet Union."²⁸⁴

Also enthusiastic about expanding Japanese diplomatic horizon, Prime Minister Sato took the China question as the most important issue facing Japan and envisioned fundamental readjustment of China policy. On November 10, 1964, one day after taking power, Sato released a statement implicitly expressing his desire to promote Sino-Japanese relations:

"...Japan-Korean negotiations and the question of Communist China are fundamental issues of Japanese diplomacy, and therefore important questions that are being imposed on the Sato cabinet... Fortunately or unfortunately, Japan had concluded a peace treaty with the Nationalist government. But, I do not think that the goodwill displayed by Generalissimo Chiang at the end of the war will constrain the way Japanese people live. I am very grateful to Generalissimo Chiang, but cannot dispose of this issue by such an emotional argument."²⁸⁵

What dealt a fatal blow to Sato's plan to revamp China policy was undoubtedly the escalation of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and intensified Sino-American tensions since mid-1960s.²⁸⁶ But the structure pressure was further compounded by a new change in Japanese domestic politics, the rise of Taiwan Lobby. It was Kishi's political ascendance that brought about the thriving of Taiwan Lobby. In the late 1950s, Kishi and Ishii Mitsujirō created the Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee made up of pro-Taiwan LDP parliamentarians. Soon after Sato came into power at the end of 1964 pro-Taiwan conservative politicians regrouped into the powerful organization of Asian Problem Study Group (APSG) as a response to Sato's expressed wish to improve relationship with China with a forward-looking attitude.²⁸⁷ Because APSG drew most of its members, varying

²⁸⁴ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p.139. For overall assessment of Kishi's foreign policy, see Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 9-10; Kitaoka, *Jimintō*, pp. 75-96. For Kishi's policy towards China, see Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 133-144. For Ambo revision in 1960, see Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke: Kensei no Seijika (Kishi Nobusuke: A Powerful Politician)* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995); Welfeld, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 141-161; Tadashi Aruga, "The Security Treaty Revision of 1960," in Iriye and Cohen eds., *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*.

²⁸⁵ Quoted from Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 50.

²⁸⁶ Eizō Yamada, *Seiden: Sato Eisaku (Authentic Biography: Sato Eisaku)* (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1988), p. 56.

²⁸⁷ Fukui Haruhiro summarized APSG's basic stance on China policy as follows: (1) As long as the Communist China does not give up its "aggressive" attitude, it should not be admitted to the UN; (2) For the sake of Japan's own national security, we should prevent Taiwan from being put under communist control; (3) Japan must maintain the "important question" formula of the issue of China's UN representative status; (4) Based on

between 80 to 100 Diet member in the 1960s, from mainstream factions of the LDP that had helped Sato won the presidential election, including Sato's own faction, Sato was extremely susceptible to the influence of the pro-Taiwan policy stance.

Under the double pressure of external and internal conditions, Sato had to shift his diplomatic focus from China to the reversion of Okinawa and Bonins Islands as a major symbol of Japanese prestige enhancement. In order to reach this objective, Sato took an active attitude towards collaboration with the U.S. Cold War policy. Before his 1967 visit to the US to hammer out the agreement on Okinawa, Sato made a tour of America's major regional allies, including Taiwan. Sato even consented to Chiang's three opinions that "Two Chinas" was wrong, the Communist China must not be recognized, and current disorder in Vietnam provided a good opportunity for striking back and recovering mainland China.²⁸⁸ When Sato visited the U.S. to finalize the agreement on Okinawa in November 1969, he agreed to the provocative "Korea-Taiwan" clause. Almost ironically, starting with a positive stance on China policy, Sato ended up drastically digressing from his original course and became the worst target of Chinese mistrust and hostility in the postwar period.

China: Taiwan Problem as the Fault Line

Tokyo's refusal to break diplomatic relations with Taipei undoubtedly impeded its diplomatic normalization with Beijing. But it did not stop Beijing from gradually building non-governmental ties with Japan through "People's Diplomacy" in the hope of eventually extending these ties to official level. As Zhou Enlai told a well-known Japanese left-wing activist Ōyama Ikuo in September 1953, before the establishment of formal relations between the two government, China would encourage the peoples of both countries to develop their friendship through cultural and economic exchange.²⁸⁹ In this spirit, Beijing

the separation of politics and economies, the use of Export-Import Bank capital should be prohibited in Sino-Japanese trade and Japan must not grant China more beneficial conditions than it gives to Taiwan, South Korea and other countries of the "free world." See Haruhiro Fukui, *Jiyuminshu-to to Seisaku Kettei (Party in Power: The LDP and Policy-Making)* (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1969), p. 316.

²⁸⁸ Yamada, *Seiden: Sato Eisaku*, pp. 107-108.

²⁸⁹ "Zhou Enlai's Discussion with Ōyama Ikuo on Sino-Japanese Relations, September 28, 1953," Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 150-151; *Nitchū Kankei Kibon Shiryōshu*, pp. 50-52. Also see Sayuri Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety: Japan-U.S. Controversy over Recognition of the PRC, 1952-1958," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 227-228.

tolerated Japan's Cold War choice and tried to work out an indirect path to secure Japanese recognition of China. But no matter how shrewdly designed, Beijing's "People's Diplomacy" could not really bypass the Taiwan issue and Chinese tolerance of Japanese relations with Taiwan had critical limitations. When it believed that Tokyo was developing significant strategic cooperation with Taiwan, Beijing felt little hesitation to alienate Japan and forego whatever it had accomplished through the "People's Diplomacy."

The Taiwan issue particularly discouraged Chinese enthusiasm in exploring diplomatic relationship with Japan in two occasions, both bringing the bilateral interactions to an exceptionally low point. One occurred after the aforementioned Nixon-Sato joint communiqué. Beijing was so outrageous about Sato administration's pro-Taiwan stance that it launched a protracted campaign bashing the reviving Japanese militarism. Sato further angered Beijing by proposing the double representation of both the PRC and ROC in the U.N. in 1971. Having learned of Sato's decision on the U.N. representation issue, Zhou Enlai told the delegation of the Japan-China Normalization Promotion Diet Members League (*Nitchū Kokkō Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei*) on September 30 that no breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relationship would happen as long as Sato stayed in power.²⁹⁰

Another case was the Nagasaki Flag Incident during the Kishi administration. In May 1958 a Japanese man was detained for hauling down PRC's national flag at a Chinese commodity exhibition in Nagasaki but was released the next day without being prosecuted. Beijing was so furious that it unilaterally decided to cut off all bilateral ties in May.²⁹¹ But the deeper cause of the relationship breakdown was Chinese resentment against Kishi's policy to Taiwan. Since coming to power in February 1957, Kishi showed unusual interest in political collaboration with Taipei. He had intimate ties with the political circle in Taiwan and was the founder-father of the pro-Taiwan faction within the LDP.²⁹² He even made a personal

²⁹⁰ Tagawa, pp. 350-351.

²⁹¹ The abruptness and harshness in this decision could be attributed to the general radicalization of Chinese domestic politics and belligerent foreign policy around 1958, embodied in the Great Leap Forward, second Taiwan Strait Crisis, and blasting of Yugoslavian revisionism. But the origin of Chinese resentment against Kishi undoubtedly lied in his Taiwan policy and obstruction of the non-governmental trade agreement. For illustration of Chinese internal and external situation in late 1950s, see Okabe, *Chūgoku no Tainichi Seisaku*, pp. 30-34; Thomas W. Robinson, "Restructuring Chinese foreign policy, 1958-1976," in K. J. Holsti, *Why Nations Realign: foreign policy restructuring in the postwar world* (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

²⁹² Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, pp. 131-132; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 121.

visit to Taiwan in June, when he vowed to develop close cooperation with Chiang Kaishek to help restore freedom in the Chinese continent.²⁹³ So Beijing began to criticize his policy openly from July.²⁹⁴ If these were not enough to convince Beijing of Kishi's hostility, his policy towards bilateral trade relationship certainly dealt a lethal damage. In March 1958, the Kishi administration issued a statement that it would not recognize the newly signed Fourth Non-governmental Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement and any diplomatic prerogatives that the agreement granted China, such as the right to fly PRC flag at Chinese trade representative offices in Japan. This was a great departure from previous Japanese policy of tacit consent to trade development and was obviously intended to accommodate the demands of Washington and Taipei.²⁹⁵ It was against this backdrop that Beijing used the Nagasaki Flag Incident to retaliate the Kishi government.

III. Minimal Economic Interaction

Commerce between China and Japan had been significant to both economies since the beginning of the 20th century, thanks to their geographic propinquity, divergent resource endowments, and complementary industrial structures. By the 1930s, Japanese direct investments and loans in China had outstripped all other foreign investments by four times. Bilateral trade reached 23 percent of Japan's total trade in 1903 and remained over 20 percent throughout the prewar period.²⁹⁶ During the Sino-Japanese War, two-way trade amounted to one third of Japan's total foreign trade. Before war ended, the level of Japanese dependence on China market had surged to over 90 percent, due to Japan's isolation from other markets.²⁹⁷ Besides being an export market, China also occupied a vital

²⁹³ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 132.

²⁹⁴ For some examples of Chinese official criticism of Kishi, see "Premier Zhou Enlai's Remarks on Sino-Japanese Relations to Japanese Journalists, July 25, 1957," "People's Daily Editorial: Assessing the China Policy of the Kishi Nobusuke Cabinet, July 30, 1957," "People's Daily Editorial: Absolutely No Tolerance for Kishi Nobusuke Government's Sabotaging Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement, April 3, 1958," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 312-315, pp. 321-323, pp. 351-354.

²⁹⁵ Tanaka, *Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 49-52; Furukawa, *Nitchu Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 146-157.

²⁹⁶ Roy Hidemichi Akagi, "Japan's Economic Relations with China," *Pacific Affairs* 4, No. 6 (June 1931), pp. 498-499.

²⁹⁷ Nancy Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years: Politics and Prosperity," *Diplomatic History* 8 (Summer 1984), p. 185; Osama Ishii, "Taichū Kinyū to Nihon no Keizai Jiritsu (China Trade Embargo and Japan's Economic Viability)," *Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)* No. 85 (May 1987), p. 115.

position in supplying important raw materials to Japan in the first half of the 20th century, including iron ore, coal, cotton and soybeans.

But with Japanese defeat and the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, trade volume in 1946 slumping to 3.6 percent of prewar level and 1.2 percent of wartime average.²⁹⁸ The outbreak of the Korean War then cut off trade between China and the American occupied Japan. After the war, Japan joined the multinational trade embargo institution against China, CHINCOM, which lasted until 1970. In result, bilateral economic interaction was confined to an informal, small scale of trade relationship managed by non-governmental organizations. From 1952 to 1957, China and Japan signed four non-governmental trade agreements, none of which were fulfilled completely. In the peak year of 1956, bilateral trade only accounted for 2.6 percentage of Japan's world trade. Following the 1958 Nagasaki Flag Incident, even the informal trade tie was suddenly suspended.

Trade did not resume until 1960 in the form of Friendship Trade, whereby only a selected group of Japanese "friendly firms" were allowed to trade with China. Two years later, Liao Chengzhi (L) and moderate LDP politician Takasaki Tatsunosuke (T) signed the first long-term (5 years) trade agreement, the LT Trade Agreement. LT Trade transformed into Memorandum Trade (MT Trade) since 1968 after non-governmental trade representatives of the two countries delegation issued a joint communique to continue their trade relations.²⁹⁹ Through Friendship Trade and LT/MT Trade, Sino-Japanese trade grew steadily and, largely because of the decline in Sino-Soviet trade, in 1964 Japan became China's leading trading partner and China's share in Japan's Northeast Asian trade exceed that of Taiwan and South Korea.³⁰⁰ Nevertheless, China market remained economically insignificant to Japan, if compared to Southeast Asia and the U.S., with which trade made up about half of Japan's total trade (Table 2). Not to mention the complete absence of

²⁹⁸ Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 194, p.203.

²⁹⁹ For more discussions on the non-governmental commercial relations between China and Japan during the 1950s and 1960s, see James W. Morley, *Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies toward Japan, 1950-1957* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), Chapters 3, 7-9; Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China." In Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); pp. 178-185; Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, Chapters 2-5; Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety."

³⁰⁰ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 1, p. 46.

Japanese investments and industrial activities in China, an important aspect of their traditional economic relations.

Table 2: Trends in the Composition of Japan's Trade by Market, 1952-1970 (by %)

	China		Southeast Asia		U.S.	
	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
1952	0.0	0.7	N/A	N/A	18.0	37.9
1955	1.42	3.3	N/A	N/A	22.3	31.3
1960	0.1	0.5	32.2	20.4	27.2	34.6
1965	2.9	2.8	26.0	17.2	29.3	29.0
1970	2.9	1.3	25.4	16.0	30.7	29.4

SOURCE: MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade, Japan)*; Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan (Japan Statistical Yearbook)*, various years.

In addition to the low level of trade volume, bilateral dependence on strategically important goods was negligible. In terms of the composition of commodities, Japan's exports to China consisted of textiles, insecticide, general machinery, and small amount of iron and steel materials. Besides, China purchased plant and technology mainly from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1950s. In the 1960s, China tried to switch to Western Europe and Japan in the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated. Despite its rapid technical innovation and economic growth at the time, Japan offered little technology to China. Only one plant contract was concluded with China in the 1960s for a polyvinylalcohol fiber plant.³⁰¹

The lack of substantial economic interactions between the two countries was by no means a natural phenomenon, had they acted purely based on economic interests. Actually, after the war both countries were enthusiastic about resuming trade, with China hoping to use trade with Japan to frustrate American policy of isolation and promote postwar reconstruction, and Japan anxious to rely on Chinese market for economic regeneration as well as to weaken China's link with the Soviet Union. But their common interest in trade expansion was trumped by the Cold War structure in Asia. American containment design

³⁰¹ Yokoi Yoichi, "Plant and Technology Contracts and the Changing Pattern of Economic Interdependence Between China and Japan," in Christopher Howe, *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects* (Oxford New York, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 130.

prohibited Japan from establishing formal, substantial trade relationship with China that would have strengthened Chinese comprehensive capability and led to dangerous Japanese economic dependence on China. China also applied political preconditions and principles to bilateral trade that sacrificed economic benefits for strategic gains.

Compared to strategic and economic factors, historical legacy was a rather insignificant component in both governments' calculus on trade policy. Japanese trade embargo against China in early 1950s and later its insistence on separating economic and political relations were mainly driven by the overall strategic choice of collaborating with the U.S. containment strategy rather than fear of Chinese revanchist threat. Nor did Beijing consider Japan's lack of historical repentance an obstacle to promoting trade with Japan. And the continuation of colonial-era trade pattern, selling Chinese raw materials for Japanese industrial products, did not elicit Chinese worry about the comeback of Japanese "economic aggression," as it did in the 1980s.

Japan: Trade Embargo and Separation of Politics and Economy

Postwar Japan faced the daunting task of rebuilding the war-ravaged economy. But the limited amount of high-priced raw materials and food shipped from the U.S. fell short of the demand of Japanese economic reconstruction, and resentment arose in Japan toward the economic policy of the occupation authorities.³⁰² It was a common understanding in Japanese business and political circle in the late 1940s that restoration of the traditional trade links with mainland China was the real cure to domestic economic crisis because it would provide Japan with low cost raw materials and a convenient, vast market. Not only pro-China Japanese political forces like the JCP, but also members of the private sector, such as Osaka businessmen that had long-term business relationship with China, pressed for China trade. The government also expressed support. In November 1949 the trade minister of the Yoshida administration, Inagaki Heitarō, revealed that the government had been planning to promote trade with China up to 25 to 30 percent of Japan's total foreign trade.³⁰³

³⁰² Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 422-424.

³⁰³ Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," pp. 194-195.

At the time, ideological considerations were often downplayed to make way for an economic argument based on mutual benefit. Kodaki Akira, administrator general for international trade of the MITI, believed that China would welcome trade with Japan because it desperately needed Japanese industrial products.³⁰⁴ Despite Chinese announcement of “lean-to-one-side” policy in June 1949 and introduction of strict control of foreign trade in September, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was still optimistic in an October report that China would accommodate economic contacts with Japan because they were important to its own economic reconstruction. Another report of the Foreign Ministry on Chinese trade policy argued that China knew it was too costly to depend completely on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and would only use it as the “*Saigo no Kirifuda*” (last trump card).³⁰⁵

Perhaps the best manifestation of Japanese eagerness to trade with mainland China regardless the ideological problem was Prime Minister Yoshida’s words said in 1949, “I don’t care whether China is red or green. China is a natural market, and it has become necessary for Japan to think about markets.”³⁰⁶ Besides its economic benefits such as obtaining Chinese coal at cheap price with convenient transportation, to Yoshida the trading relationship would also lead to profound changes in Chinese political behaviors. It was precisely in the context of this economic strategy of influencing China and weakening its ties with the communist camp that Yoshida once suggested to Dulles that businessmen could serve as the “fifth column of democracy.”³⁰⁷

Despite the national consensus on the importance of Sino-Japanese trade, Japan’s economic activities with China activities during the 1950s and 1960s were kept artificially low. The causes mainly lied in Japan’s participation in the U.S.-led economic warfare against the socialist bloc and commitment not to allow economic interactions to undermine the Cold War strategy of isolating China politically.

³⁰⁴ Tucker, “American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years,” p. 195.

³⁰⁵ The First Division of the Investigation Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, “Chukyō no Genjo to sono Shōrai (The Current Situation and Future Development of Communist China),” October 15, 1949; “Chukyō no Boeki (Enkaku, Seisaku-Hen) (The Trade of Communist China: History and Policy Part),” March 1951. Also see Chen, *Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku Seisaku*, pp. 9-10.

³⁰⁶ Tucker, “American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years,” p. 193.

³⁰⁷ Chen, *Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku Seisaku*, pp. 39-41.

Beginning from 1948, export regulations targeted at the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were introduced that prohibited export of items of direct military utility, the so-called 1A List of commodities, and set quantitative controls over less militarily useful goods, the 1B List items. This is the so-called “R procedure,” which constituted the policy basis for the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) of the Consultative Group established in January 1950, an international organization coordinating export control against the socialist bloc.³⁰⁸ Around the same time, the U.S. government deliberated anti-China export control measures. In March 1949, President Truman approved the NSC 41 that subjected western export to China, including export from occupied Japan, to the “R procedure” system. But the NSC 41 also acknowledged the importance of China market to Japanese self-support, and warned that extreme isolation of China from Japan and the western world might drive China “into a position of complete subservience to the USSR.” So the document instruct the SCAP to encourage trade with China in a cautious fashion while at the same time divert Japan’s external economic interaction away from China to other markets, especially Southeast Asia.³⁰⁹

The moderate measures of export control on China stipulated by NSC 41 were dramatically changed after Chinese military intervention in Korea, when the Truman administration leveled a total economic embargo against Beijing. Occupied Japan was also prohibited from trading with China, which did not seem an immediate loss to Japan because a surge of American military orders, known as special procurements, created a temporary economic boom in Japan. When the war drew to the end, Japan was again in great need of Chinese market and raw materials, but only to realize it impossible to defy the structural constraints to recover its traditional economic interactions with China. By this time Japan had already started searching for alternative economic basis to substitute China. Responding to the U.S. call for a triangular integration of Japanese economy with the U.S. and Southeast Asia, Japan sent its first economic mission to Southeast Asia in mid-1951. In February 1952,

³⁰⁸ For U.S. export control against the Soviet bloc, see Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968); Yoko Yasuhara, “Amrika no Tai-Kyōsanken Kinyū Seisaku to Chūgoku Boei no Kinshi 1945-1960 (U.S. Economic Warfare and the Embargo on China 1945-1990),” *Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)* No. 70 (May 1982); Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America's Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 24 .

Sutō Hideo, head of the Economic Stabilization Bureau, submitted a report to the U.S. government promising that Japan would “cooperate more actively with the economic development of South East Asia... and thereby increase the imports of goods and materials from this area...”³¹⁰ Having settled the national economic strategy on the two legs of U.S. aid and Southeast Asia trade, the Japanese government then submitted in May an application to join the COCOM. Japan was later admitted into the China Committee (CHINCOM) that coordinated anti-China trade embargoes.³¹¹

Japan’s commitments to the U.S. Cold War in Asia, including the U.S.-Japan military alliance and trade embargo against China, forced it to pursue economic relations with China within the limit of *Seikei Bunri*, or the separation of politics and economics, in the next two decades. A highly pragmatic policy doctrine to create a modus vivendi with relation to China within the Cold War framework, *Seikei Bunri* accepted some degree of China trade to satisfy domestic business interests and sooth public resentment against western isolation of China, but still strictly banned official relations with China that might spring from the trade relations.³¹² The doctrine determined the failure of the joint efforts of Beijing and Japanese private organizations to expand non-official trade relations freely, not to mention the goal of realizing de facto Japanese official recognition of China.

The first bilateral trade agreement was signed in June 1952, right in the middle of U.S.- Japan negotiation over Japanese membership in COCOM. The three Japanese parliamentarians from opposition parties who signed the agreement had come to China by way of Europe without Japanese government permission.³¹³ And the Japanese Foreign Minister soon assured the American embassy that the trade agreement was no more than a written statement of intent to trade because of too many unresolved practical problems in bilateral trade.³¹⁴ The Yoshida government also had little to do with the second trade agreement, which was signed by a delegation of Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet

³⁰⁹ NSC 41, “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China, February 28, 1949,” the National Security Archive.

³¹⁰ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 425-427.

³¹¹ Ishii, “Taichū Kinyū to Nihon no Keizai Jiritsu,” pp. 117-121.

³¹² Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety,” p. 223.

³¹³ The three Diet members are Hoasi Kei and Kora Tomi of the Ryokufu-kai, and Miyakoshi Kisuke of the Kokumin Kyodo Party.

Members League (JCTPDML), that actually did not anticipated the agreement before they arrived in China in September 1953. After the Chinese side presented a trade proposal, this delegation agreed to negotiate and later signed the agreement only in the name of JCTPDML.³¹⁵ The memorandum attached to the agreement included a proposition that permanent trade missions would be established in each other's country, which provoked concerns from Tokyo and Washington. Tokyo publicly dismissed the agreement as nonbonding and again tried to explain to the American embassy that it would neither expand Sino-Japanese trade significantly nor change Japanese policy of nonrecognition to China.³¹⁶

The implementation of these two agreements was also hampered by the American-led trade embargoes against China. In fact, around this time, Washington brought strong pressure upon Tokyo concerning export control against China. In July 1953 the NSC just approved a policy directive (NSC 152/2) that urged the U.S. government to “continue intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China.”³¹⁷ And the CHINCOM list of export control was already more restrictive than that of COCOM against the Soviet Union and its East European allies, which was known as the China differential. It was only until March 1954 that the NSC adopted the State Department proposal to “release Japan gradually, as appropriate, from its obligations under the US-Japanese bilateral agreement... to maintain export controls higher than the CHINCOM levels.”³¹⁸ Restrained by the stringent export control regulations, the total Sino-Japanese trade value between 1952-1954 of approximately \$109 million fell far short of what was expected in the two trade agreements (about \$84 million under each agreement). Moreover, the two agreements designated 40% and 35% of total trade value respectively to strategic commodities of “Category A,” such as Japanese iron and steel and

³¹⁴ Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety,” p. 227.

³¹⁵ Established in May 1949, JCTPDML was a supra-partisan organization that served to promote mutual personnel exchange and push the Diet to pass resolutions concerning bilateral trade increase in the 1950s. But since the LDP withdrew in 1958, the organization lost its supra-partisan nature and stopped to be active ever since. See Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 32-33.

³¹⁶ Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety,” p. 231.

³¹⁷ NSC 152/2, “Economic Defense, July 31, 1953,” National Security Archives.

³¹⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54*, Vol.14, Part 2, p. 1615.

Chinese coal and iron ore. But Japanese export of such commodities was only a small fraction of the designated level.³¹⁹

The Hatoyama administration responded favorably to internal and external pressure to promote China trade, but its actions were still limited by the Cold War framework. In March 1955, a Chinese trade delegation arrived in Japan to negotiate the third trade agreement. During the negotiation, the director of the JCTPDML that became a signatory of the trade agreement, Ikeda Masanosuke, conveyed Prime Minister Hatoyama's "support and cooperation" to the trade agreement.³²⁰ But American diplomats soon intervened in various ways to "stifle the courtship between Japan and the PRC" under the direction from the top of the State Department, including Dulles. Although failing to prevent the third trade agreement from materializing, American pressure did succeed in making the Hatoyama government promise that the prime minister would not endorse the specific provisions of the agreement.³²¹ As for the implementation of the trade agreement, Sino-Japanese trade in the following two years again failed to live up to the standard designated in the trade agreement because the constraints of the China differential that existed until 1957.

Ishibashi was enthusiastic about expanding Sino-Japanese trade, but his short tenure prevented him from achieving anything in this respect. It was during the Kishi administration that the fourth Sino-Japanese trade agreement was concluded. Although an adamant anti-communist and pro-Taiwan politician, Kishi did not object to expanding pure economic relations with China. He would have granted Chinese trade representatives in Tokyo quasi-diplomatic treatment had Washington and Taipei not exerted unprecedented heavy pressure on Kishi. Taipei even threatened to suspend all business ties with Japan.³²² Unwilling to sacrifice existing economic interest in Taiwan for future interest in China and afraid to alienate the American government, the Kishi government decided to impose explicit political restrictions on economic relations with China. An official letter was sent to Japanese signatories of trade agreement on April 9 that the government would give support

³¹⁹ Japanese export of iron and steel materials to China in three years amounted to only \$70,000. See MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho*, respective years.

³²⁰ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 36-40.

³²¹ Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety," pp. 233-239.

³²² Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety," pp. 240-247.

and cooperation to trade expansion only “within the scope of our national laws and on the basis of the non-recognition of the (Chinese) government, and taking into account the current international relations.” On the same day, the Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi issued a statement that “the Government had no intention to recognize Communist China, nor to give privileged public status to the private trade representative that this private agreement seeks to establish.” Aichi particular stressed that the Japanese government would not recognized some diplomatic privileges stipulated by the fourth trade agreement such as flying the national flag of the Communist China.³²³ Such was the prelude of the Nakasaki Flag Incident of May 1958 and the total rupture of bilateral exchanges.

When Ikeda Hayato, a disciple of Yoshida, replaced Kishi to become the prime minister, Sino-Japanese trade relationship resumed, thanks to not only the moderate attitude of the Yoshida faction on China policy, but also China’s de facto acceptance of the *Seikei Bunri* principle. In August 1960, Zhou Enlai enunciated the “three trade principles” that allowed space for three forms of bilateral trade, including governmental agreement, private contract, and individual consideration. As China admitted defeat in pulling the Japanese government into bilateral trade agreements, bilateral trade was able to develop more smoothly, although never allowed to go beyond the limit of *Seikei Bunri*. Being a faithful follower of the “Yoshida Doctrine,” Ikeda attached great importance to an ambitious agenda of economic growth, the income-doubling plan, the success of which was primarily dependent on economic cooperation with the U.S. rather than China. So when President Kennedy expressed concern over the newly opened Friendly Trade between China and Japan at the June 1961 US-Japan summit meeting, Ikeda explained that private trade with Beijing was only of slight scale and value, and reassured Kennedy that Japan did not wish to disturb her economic relations with the U.S. merely for trade with Beijing because it would lead to a Japanese economic collapse.³²⁴ In October 1962, Ikeda told the press that not only would the government not take a formal stand on the non-governmental trade relationship, but also the importance of this relationship should not be over-stated. “There is no

³²³ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp.38-39. Similar statements were made by Kishi in his address to the Foreign Correspondents' Club on April 25 and to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Upper House Diet on April 30. See Morley, *Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies toward Japan, 1950-1957*, p. 22; *Sengo Shiryō: Nitchū Kankei*, pp. 73-74.

³²⁴ “Memorandum of Conversation: Sino-Japanese Relations, June 21, 1961,” *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. 22, p. 697.

‘dreaming of another dream,’ thinking of the old continental trade,” said Ikeda, “Communist China would want to buy a lot of things from Japan, but what would Japan buy from Communist China?”³²⁵

Interestingly, as Ikeda confined Sino-Japanese trade to the political boundary of U.S.-Japan relations, the U.S. government stayed on the sideline without much need to step in to give warnings and objections. The more visible external interference with the trade relationship, according to Soeya Yoshihide’s study, came from Taiwan instead. It was due to the concerted protest of the Taiwan government and domestic Taiwan Lobby that the Ikeda government put off the granting of export credits by the Export-Import Bank to the export of a Nichbo chemical fiber plant to China in year 1964.³²⁶

The dual pressure of Cold War structure and Taiwan Lobby continue to restrain trade development during the Sato administration. While Sato stepped up policy coordination with the U.S. on a wide range of issues from Taiwan and South Korea to Vietnam, it was out of the question that he would tolerate a breakthrough of the non-official, small-scale Sino-Japanese trade relationship. In various public occasions, Sato repeatedly reconfirmed the principle of *Seikei Bunri*. Regarding the issue of export credits, Sato not only denied its use for plant exports to China, but also applied the restriction to other commodities. In result, plans to export about forty plants and related facilities to China were canceled, and the Chinese third five-year plan excluded Japanese plants and compensated that with European ones.³²⁷

China: Politics First, Economy Second, and History Last

The Chinese Communist government was also eager to promote bilateral trade since the end of 1940s, hoping to obtain from Japan machinery and other industrial products.³²⁸

³²⁵ Quoted in Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 48.

³²⁶ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 95-99; Cohen, “China in Japanese-American Relations,” pp. 53-54.

³²⁷ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 99-100.

³²⁸ In 1949, the CCP leaders made it known to American diplomats that China would barter coal and salt or pay in scarce gold or U.S. currency on deposit in Hong Kong for some Japanese goods important to Chinese

But the economic importance of Sino-Japanese trade decreased greatly since China formed alliance with the Soviet Union, which provided China with generous economic aid and “the most comprehensive technology transfer in modern industrial history.”³²⁹ During 1951-1952, about 60-70 percent of China’s total foreign trade was conducted with the Soviet bloc countries. Almost all of Chinese exports of strategic and other important materials went to these countries, who also supplied China with a large proportion of needed iron and steel and other industrial products that had been traditionally imported from Western countries.³³⁰

Even less important than economic incentives was the factor of historical perception. The harrowing memory of the colonial and war history when Japan used China as a source of cheap raw materials and market for Japanese industrial products had little impact on China’s trade policy to Japan. It neither held back Chinese interest in restoring commercial links with Japan nor made Beijing reject the old trading pattern. In 1954 Zhou Enlai made the following statement to Japanese visitors suggesting that exchange of Chinese resources for Japanese finished products was perfectly acceptable to China:

“If Japan needs our coal, we can try to explore more mines and increase production of tens of thousands tons per year, which is a lot of coal. Also, people’s demand (for Japanese products) is enormous. If everyone of the 600 million Chinese people uses a bit more commodities, that amounts to a considerable quantity. What we mean by peaceful coexistence is precisely mutual benefits on equal basis, supplying each other’s needs, and coexistence and co-prosperity.”³³¹

Rather than economic or historical factor, political interest was the most powerful driving force behind China’s economic policy to Japan. Throughout this period, China carried out an active campaign of “People’s Diplomacy” towards Japan, the concrete strategy of which was to “start with the people, and use the people to influence the government” (*Minjian Xianxin, Yimin Cuguan*).³³² Private economic agreements and cultural exchange activities were some important channels through which Beijing tried to build “people-to-people relations” and increase China’s friends in Japanese society. The immediate objective

economic survival. See Tucker, “American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years,” pp. 192-193.

³²⁹ Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Robinson and Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, pp. 235-236.

³³⁰ Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, p. 94, 108.

³³¹ See *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, p. 90.

³³² Peizhu Jiang & Guohong Qiu, “Zhongri Guanxi Wutaishang de Huihuang Yuezhang” (A Shining Chapter on the Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Stage), in Jianzhang Pei, *Yanjiu Zhou Enlai: Waijiao Sixiang yu Shijian (A Study of Zhou Enlai: Diplomatic Thoughts and Practice)* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 226-234.

was to win Japan's recognition of the PRC, but ultimately China hoped to detach Japan from the American containment strategy. Zhou once gave the following optimistic forecast of the "People's Diplomacy" to Japan:

"As the 'People's Diplomacy' carries on, more and more Japanese non-government groups will come and more and more our groups will go. When (these groups) finish doing everything needed between the two countries, what is left is only for the foreign ministers of two countries to put down signatures and drink champagne."³³³

To these ends, China constantly sought to augment the political implications of bilateral economic relations. First of all, all four bilateral trade agreements signed in the 1950s designated a large proportion of Japanese export to be strategically sensitive items, including metal products, large machinery, and transportation equipment. The Chinese side classified trading commodities and insisted that exchange of strategic items had to be carried out before less "strategic" commodities could be exchanged.³³⁴ Such a regulation was intended not so much to meet Chinese needs for strategic materials as to test the limit of western trade embargoes on China.

Second, in a so-called *tsumiage* (piling up) fashion, China attempted gradual upgrading of the political profile of these non-government trade agreements and eventually obtaining Japanese official recognition. The second agreement had a memorandum attached to it that stipulated the establishment of trade representatives in each other's country, while the third agreement stated that trade representative office in both capitals would enjoy diplomatic privileges, and that commodity exhibitions would be held in each other's country. The fourth agreement went the furthest and specified the diplomatic privileges of trade representatives to include freedom of travel, the right to fly the national flag, and no fingerprinting. Moreover, since the third trade agreement, a special article was included stipulating that signatories should urge their own governments to hold bilateral negotiation on trade affairs as early as possible. It was precisely the escalation of Chinese "People's Diplomacy" through trade agreements that compelled the Kishi government to reassert political limitations on economic relations in Spring 1958.

³³³ Jiang & Qiu, "Zhongri Guanxi Wutaishang de Huihuang Yuezhang," p. 227.

³³⁴ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 34.

Interestingly, around the same time of Nagasaki Flag Incident, an incident involving historiographic conflict also took place. Escaping in July 1945 from a coal mine in Hokkaido where he was forced to work under severe conditions, Chinese national Liu Lianren stayed in hiding for 13 years without knowing that war had long ended. On February 9, 1958 Liu was found by the Japanese authority and since then his story became public. Chinese initial reaction to this incident was rather slow and cautious. Only in mid-March did the *People's Daily* published a short article criticizing Japanese government for holding Liu under the charge of illegal entry and calling it a ungrateful action in light of Chinese friendly treatment of Japanese nationals in China.³³⁵ But since April Beijing escalated the Liu Lianren Incident, which coincided with Kishi's intervention in trade policy. On April 9, the semi-official Chinese Red Cross issued a rebuttal of Japanese official explanation that Liu and other workers were not taken to Japan by force but sent under legal labor contracts, and demanded thorough investigation of Chinese forced labor in Japan during the war. One week later, a lengthy editorial appeared in *People's Daily* that explicitly held the Kishi government responsible for the Sino-Japanese war and Japanese war crimes.³³⁶ It was the first time since the war ended that the Chinese official media demanded Japanese actions to address war responsibility. But instead of concentrating its charges on postwar Japanese historiography, the editorial attributed Japan's handling of the Liu Lianren Incident to Kishi's subservience to American Cold War strategy. The fact that the miserable situation of Chinese forced labor in Japan, no news to the world by then, did not draw Beijing's attention until the point of bilateral standoff over the trade relations suggested that the Liu Lianren Incident was a highly politicized event that China used to add moral as well as political pressure on Kishi.

Besides, the Liu Lianren incident played no role in China's decision to suspend bilateral contacts in May. When Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi announced the suspension of relations, he only cited Kishi government's refusal to recognize the PRC and collusion with the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek as the main reason for Chinese indignation.

³³⁵ "People's Daily Editorial on Japanese responsibility for Liu Lianren's situation, March 17, 1958," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 343-344.

³³⁶ "Chinese Red Cross Spokesman on Japanese government's full responsibility for Liu Lianren Incident, April 9, 1958"; "People's Daily editorial requesting the Japanese government to explain the Liu Lianren Incident, April 17, 1958," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 355-356, pp. 364-366.

Nor was the history issue included in the preconditions that China proposed afterwards for reopening bilateral exchanges. In meeting with a visiting JSP Dietman of the Upper House, Sada Tadataka, in August, the Chinese side demanded the Kishi government to stop its hostile policy against China, conspiracy to create “two Chinas,” and obstruction of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.³³⁷ Later called the “three political principles,” these preconditions did not make any reference to history accounts but only focused on political issues.

Based on Zhou’s “three trade principles” in 1960, Beijing agreed to a new form of trade relations, Friendship Trade, which means China would trade with those “friendly firms” recommended by private Japanese organizations. A nod to economic exchanges involving private business actors, Friendship Trade still subordinated economic interests to political considerations. China juxtaposed the “three political principles” and the “three trade principles” as equally important preconditions for Friendship Trade. While Japanese trade organizations recommended “friendly firms,” Beijing had the final say on which Japanese firms would be accepted. Typically, only those firms that endorsed the “three political principles” were allowed to do business with China.

China’s connections with the political forces behind Japanese trade organizations also affected the selection of “friendly firms.” Initially, Japanese firms close to the JCP-supported Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) were most privileged. But after the JCP-CCP rift since mid-1960s, China eliminated pro-JCP elements from Friendship Trade, and the dominant position of JCTPA-affiliated firms was soon taken over by firms backed up by the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT).³³⁸ Its original internationalist orientation notwithstanding, in order to continue China trade the JAPIT had to accept political conditions set by Beijing, which became increasingly militant in the later part of the 1960s. In March 1967, a JAPIT delegation to Beijing agreed to sign a joint communique with China that not only reaffirmed the “three political principles,” “three trade principles,” and the principle of inseparability of politics and economics, but also

³³⁷ “The Report of the visit to China by Japanese member of the House of Councilors Sada Tadataka, August 29, 1958,” Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanshi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 392-399.

³³⁸ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 67-74.

designated the U.S. imperialism, Japanese reactionaries, Soviet revisionism, and JCP revisionists as the “four enemies” that all friendly firms must oppose.³³⁹

The second channel of bilateral trade in the 1960s, LT/MT Trade, was originally envisioned to correspond more directly to economic interests. The 1962 LT trade agreement avoided mentioning any political conditions. The reason probably lied in the semi-official nature of this channel, which involved LDP politicians close to the Japanese governments and bureaucrats from various ministries. Opening such a semi-official trade link itself was already a political success for China. However, when Sino-Japanese relations worsened during the Sato administration, LT/MT Trade was subject to political heat as well. The MT agreement in March 1968 also included the “three political principles” and the principle of inseparability of politics and economics. Meanwhile, China insisted to reduce the term of the agreement from five years to one, citing Sato’s anti-Chinese policy as the reason. Deeply embroiled in the Chinese media campaign assailing reviving Japanese militarism, subsequent Memorandum Trade talks became an annual ordeal for Japanese negotiators. As analyzed earlier, it was not really Chinese historical resentment toward Japan but rather political opposition to Sato’s collaboration with Washington and Taiwan that was fanning the fierce campaign. Not only the joint communique of MT Trade signed in April 1970 but also the additional preconditions for future bilateral trade development enunciated by Zhou Enlai, dubbed “Zhou’s Four Principles,” were entirely political by nature.³⁴⁰ These new conditions were then applied to both Friendship Trade and LT/MT Trade.


IV. Popular Hostility

³³⁹ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp. 870-872; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, p. 304. Examples of Chinese political pressure on friendly firms also include such requirements for them to show support to “The Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” protest Sato’s Taiwan policy, and even study “Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong.” See Soeya, *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 77.

³⁴⁰ “Zhou’s Four Principles” stated that China would not deal with (1) trading firms and manufacturers supporting aggression of mainland by Chiang Kai-shek and of North Korea by Park Chun-hee, (2) trading firms and manufacturers with large investments in Taiwan and South Korea, (3) enterprises supplying arms and ammunitions to the US imperialism for invading Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and (4) US-Japan joint enterprises and subsidiaries of US firms in Japan. See Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 302; Ogata, “The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy,” p. 1185; Soeya, *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 113.

The mutual images held by the Japanese and Chinese public were predominantly negative during this period. Japanese public opinion surveys show that the percentage of those Japanese who disliked Communist China by far exceeded those who felt affection (Chart 1). In fact, China was the second least favorite country to the Japanese, only to be topped by the Soviet Union.

Chart 1: Japanese Public Feeling about China and the USSR, 1960-1971.



SOURCES: *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook)*, Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbō Shingishitsu, various years.

In China, the tight control of public thoughts by the government and the lack of objective polling data made it a hard task to gauge genuine Chinese popular feelings about Japan. Nevertheless, with the textbooks, media and other officially sanctioned propaganda tools all portraying Japan as a belligerent, brutal nation with a historical penchant for aggression of China, it is difficult to imagine that Chinese people would feel anything else about Japan other than believing it was a dangerous and hostile country. The public not only was antipathetic about Japan but also strongly supported a policy of confrontation with to Japanese government. At least in the 1960s a number of mass demonstrations occurred in various Chinese cities denouncing Japanese government policy.³⁴¹

The public feeling of repugnance between the two countries was largely shaped by national security imperatives in the context of Cold War. The Chinese public opinions were

greatly manipulated by the strategically oriented government propaganda, while the Japanese perception of China was worsened by fears about Chinese security threat. Bitter emotions rooted in the traumatic war history did reinforce Chinese negative perception of Japan, but they did not prove an important factor in explaining Japanese popular feelings about China. Besides, negative perceptions were exacerbated by the lack of societal contacts that prevented objective mutual evaluation and a sense of closeness between them. What mainly stood in the way of bilateral societal contacts were not historical memories but the travel restrictions applied by the Japanese government, who feared that unrestrained personnel exchange might undermine Japan's policy of non-recognition to China.

Origins of Popular animosity: History or Structure?

After the war ended, Chinese people held fear and hatred of Japan, which was manifested in the spontaneous student movement of *Fan Meifuri* (Opposing the American build-up of Japan) in 1948 that involved Chinese of all political shades and persuasions.³⁴² The Chinese feeling of bitterness toward Japan stemming from personal war experience was exacerbated by the official propaganda on Japanese militarist revival and the lack of information about postwar Japanese society. Chinese people easily formed poor stereotypes of Japan as a single-minded aggressor with the kind of ferocity and brutality challenged by few other foreign countries. Chinese utter disgust for Japanese was personified by the household word in China, *Riben Guizi* (Japanese Devil), referring to Japanese soldiers, who they believed were the typical representatives of Japanese nation.

But given the conflictual rather than combative nature of Chinese and Japanese historical myths of this period, it was doubtful that historical memory would have generated articulated political demands for confrontational Japan policy. Emotions alone could not explain several large-scale public demonstrations held from the late 1960s to early 1970s decrying the Japanese reactionaries in the Sato administration and supporting the government's firm position dealing with Sato. All these mass campaigns were actually

³⁴¹ See Kuang-sheng Liao, *Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986), p. 269, 270, 282, 284.

³⁴² Hong Zhang, "Fan Meifuri: The Chinese Student Movement Opposing the U.S. Rehabilitation of Japan, 1948," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 5, No. 2 (Summer 1996).

organized by the Chinese government as part of a concerted political offensive against Sato, whose unusually close relations with the U.S., Taiwan and South Korea had alarmed Chinese strategists.³⁴³ So the Cold War reality had direct impact on Chinese popular perception of Japan. But the public would not have become such captive audience of the government propaganda on reviving Japanese militarism had they not been also influenced by memories about the traumatic Sino-Japanese history. Here historical memory functioned as an aggravating factor in the public mobilization campaign by the Chinese government to meet national security needs.

The influence of historical memory on Japanese public perception of China was even more ambivalent. On the one hand, Japanese people remembered vividly the bloody war scenes in China and the wartime hardship on the home front.³⁴⁴ On the other hand, even if there were some bitter emotions about the former enemy and resentments about Chinese media attack of Japanese militarism, they would have been well offset by different opinions about history.³⁴⁵ Historically, Japanese people had a sentimental attachment toward China stemming from the two countries' racial, cultural, and geographic affinity. A Japanese survey in 1970 showed that 79 percent of all respondents agreed that Japanese culture took influence from China, 72 percent believed that Japanese people understood Chinese emotions better than the Americans did, although they did not feel the Chinese had reciprocal deep understanding of themselves.³⁴⁶ Such a sense of closeness was perpetuated by a strong nostalgia for China held by numerous Japanese people who had lived there before, blended with which was a certain degree of guilty consciousness. Although the mainstream historiography did not acknowledge Japanese war responsibility to China, many

³⁴³ Besides strategic motivations, the desire to consolidate power and strengthen leadership by the pro-Mao leftists also contributed to the vigorousness of these anti-foreign mass movements that they organized in late 1960s. See Liao, *Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980*, pp. 184-185.

³⁴⁴ Japanese veterans recollections about the war that came out in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly written by former staff-class officers who served in the navy or air force and did not fight hand-to-hand with the enemy so much as the army did. Nevertheless, memories of the truly bloody and barbaric ground battles in China theater were kept alive in the mind of Japanese military repatriates, who later came forward to speak about their experiences in the 1980s. See Hicks, *Japan's War Memories*, pp. 23-24; Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 90-97.

³⁴⁵ For studies on the complexity in Japanese feeling about China in the 1950s-60s, see Shao Chuan Leng, *Japan and Communist China* (Kyoto: Doshisha University Press, 1958), Chapter 6; Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy*, Chapter 9; Sadako Ogata, "Japanese Attitude toward China." *Asian Survey* V, No. 8, (August 1965).

³⁴⁶ Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbō Shingishitsu, ed. *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan: Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa no Genkyō (Opinion Polls Yearbook: Current Situation of National Public Opinion Investigation)*, 1970, pp. 558-559.

Japanese people regretted deeply in their heart about what Japan had done to China during the war, and left-wing activists and intellectuals even openly expressed their guilt feelings.³⁴⁷

Another positive view of China from historical perspective was the traditional lure of mainland China market. The Kansai area (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe) in particular had a uniquely strong desire to recover its traditionally intimate economic ties with mainland China. Speaker Yoshimune Sadayuki of Osaka municipal assembly, For example, said in a 1957 interview that “Osaka’s industry and economy have long depended on trade with China so you can’t think of Osaka’s prosperity without it.”³⁴⁸ The traumatic war history meant very little to these Japanese who had a keen interest in commercial links with China and were ready to put behind the past for the sake of current business benefits.

It was not memories of the past war but rather their fears about Communist China threat or inadvertent violent conflicts with China that mainly explained the negative image of China in Japan. For one thing, most Japanese people disapproved and feared the Communist ideology.³⁴⁹ While the public opinion polarized between the two strategies of allying with the West and staying neutral, the vast majority of Japanese people persistently stayed away from the third option of being associated with the Communist bloc.³⁵⁰ In addition, Japanese perception of China contained worry about Chinese military power, which they thought was posing a great security threat to Japan. In a 1970 poll, China was perceived as a dark (64%), strong (69%), cold (62%) and sharp (54%) country.³⁵¹ Japanese apprehension worsened particularly when China obtained its own nuclear weapons and strategic delivery means. Upon hearing the news that China would carry out a nuclear test,

³⁴⁷ For a famous example, an influential writer Takeuchi Yoshimi once asserted that Japan need not be sorry about fighting with other imperialist powers but must bear the responsibility for invading China. See Ōnuma, *Tōkyō Saiban kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisō e*, p. 175. Yet, these positive sentiments about China could not be exaggerated because the postwar generation, which exceeded half of the total population since 1960, was less affected by the sense of kinship and guilt feeling and more receptive to the historical myths purveyed by conservative elites.

³⁴⁸ Quoted from Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy*, p. 226.

³⁴⁹ Left-wing Japanese elite admired Chinese Communist revolution as the model of Asian nationalist movement and believed that the two countries were fighting the common enemy of American imperialism. However, such a romantic feeling about Communist China existed only in a limited circle.

³⁵⁰ See annual opinion polls conducted by Jiji Tsushin Sha, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, various years.

³⁵¹ National public opinion survey on “China and Chinese People,” Mainichi Shimbun, March 1970, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1970, p 560.

68 percent respondents said that Japan's national security would be endangered.³⁵² In another survey of 1970, 58.4 percent of people said they felt threat from China because it was developing nuclear weapons one after another and now even launched a man-made satellite that was capable of delivering those nuclear weapons.³⁵³

Apart from Chinese military strength, the danger of Japan being dragged into a Sino-U.S. war also contributed to Japanese feeling of threat. Polling data in Table 3 show a high degree of public concerns about war entanglement.

Table 3: Japanese Worry about War Entanglement

		Nov. 1965 Sōrifu Kōhōshitsu	August 1965 Asahi Shimbun Sha	April 1969 Mainichi Shimbun Sha	Dec. 1969 Kyōdo Tsushi Sha
A: Worry about war entanglement or national security		49%	60% (Vietnam War spillover to Japan)	55%	56.6%
Reasons for A (multiple choices)	East-West confrontation	16.5%			
	Age of nuclear war	14.1%			
	Conflicts in Asia	20.1%		Korean Peninsular 72% Sino-Soviet border 36% Taiwan Strait 23% Southeast Asia 23%	Korean Peninsular 42.8% Taiwan Strait 7.7% Southeast Asia 14.7%
	U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. military bases in Japan	12.1%	35%		
	Other	21.2%	25%	23%	34.8%
B: Do not worry about war entanglement or national security		22%	19%	38%	28.8%
C: Do not know		29%	21%	7%	15.6%

SOURCES: *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook)*.

The major causes of international conflicts cited here included general tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs, the unpredictable nuclear age, and more importantly, the spillover of regional crises in Korean peninsular, Taiwan strait, and

³⁵² Tokyo Shimbun survey, March 1963, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan 1962* (covering April 1962-March 1963), p. 73.

³⁵³ Yomiuri Shimbun survey on U.S.-Japan alliance and national security, May 1970, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1971, p. 538.

Indochina, all involving a great danger of dragging Japan into violent conflict with China. The fear of war entanglement in Asia loomed even larger when Okinawa was returned to Japan by the end of 1960s with the U.S. military bases attached. In a 1969 survey, 56 percent of those questioned said Japan should reject American request to send troops from Okinawa to the Korean Peninsular and Taiwan, 20 percent thought it depended on the concrete situation, while only 9 percent said Japan should accept such request.³⁵⁴ When asked in another survey in 1970 if they were worried about military reprisal on Japan if American war planes took off from bases here to fight the enemy, 77.2 percent gave positive answer.³⁵⁵

Structural Constraints of Societal Contacts

Like non-governmental trade links, bilateral personnel exchange was also a target area of Chinese “People’s Democracy” to cultivate pro-China interest in Japanese society and eventually bring about positive change in Japanese government policy toward China. Historical memory about past Sino-Japanese war did not compromise Chinese efforts to promote larger scale and wider scope of exchange activities, for the Chinese official position to distinguish bad Japanese militarists and good Japanese people provided the justification to put behind historical burdens. Beijing’s enthusiasm about societal contacts was reciprocated by the interest of left-wing Japanese social and political groups. Ever since the occupation period ended, these Japanese groups began unyielding endeavors to facilitate trade, cultural and political cooperation with China.

But the fear that too many societal contacts might challenge the official policy of nonrecognition of Beijing prompted Tokyo to impose restrictive policy of immigration regulations and tight border control to restrain such contacts. Therefore, in May 1952 the three Japanese parliamentarians who signed the first bilateral non-official trade agreement had to travel to Beijing via third countries. After returning to Japan, they were immediately prosecuted for violating passport regulations and traveling to prohibited “Communist

³⁵⁴ Asahi Shimbun survey on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the return of Okinawa, August-September 1969, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1970, p. 500.

³⁵⁵ Kyodo Tsushin Sha survey on national security, U.S.-Japan alliance, price and daily living, cabinet and party approval rates, April 1970, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1971, p. 521.

area.”³⁵⁶ The government also turned down the travel application of a Japanese delegation including representatives of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sōhyō*) and other left-wing groups to go to the 1952 May Day celebration in Beijing. When this delegation plotted to sneak out of a Japanese port, all members were arrested before they made the attempt.³⁵⁷ Representatives of Japanese labor organizations were again prohibited from going to China before the May Day of 1953 and 1954.³⁵⁸ The first Japanese group permitted to travel to China was a delegation entrusted with the important mission of obtaining Chinese cooperation in repatriating stranded Japanese nationals. They were allowed to visit Beijing in January 1953 only because the enormous public concerns about repatriation issue had created great pressure on the Yoshida government to seek an early solution.³⁵⁹ Also the first group of Chinese visitors that entered Japan in October 1954 was a Chinese Red Cross delegation to reconfirm the joint settlement on the repatriation issue.³⁶⁰

Tokyo's stonewalling position on personnel exchange was slightly relaxed since Hatoyama took power. The three years of 1955-1957 saw the same *Tsumiage* (piling up) pattern of bilateral trade development working in the field of societal contacts as well. For example, exchanges between Japanese and Chinese labor organizations won permission since the May Day of 1955. Besides, contacts extended to such areas as science and technology, medicine, culture and religion, and media. Exchanges even spread from national organizations to municipal and prefectural levels.³⁶¹ But even during the *Tsumiage* period, restrictions on mutual visits were never completely removed. For example, the official ban on visit to China by Chinese immigrants in Japan was strictly enforced. In an incident in October 1956, where ten Chinese immigrants were rejected of reentry visas after returning from a trip to China, triggered widespread appeal in the Japanese society for free travel to China. Japanese government finally made a small concession in April 1957 to grant identification certificates issued by Japan Red Cross instead of formal passports to Chinese

³⁵⁶ Xiao, Eien no Rinkoku to Shite, p. 18.

³⁵⁷ Homusho Nyūkoku Kanrikyoku (Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice), *Shūnyūkoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbō (Retrospect and Prospect of Immigration Regulations)*, 1981, p. 271.

³⁵⁸ The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo*, pp. 79-81.

³⁵⁹ The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo Shi*, pp. 60-61.

³⁶⁰ Homusho Nyūkoku Kanrikyoku, *Shūnyūkoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbō*, p. 277.

³⁶¹ The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo Shi*, pp. 67-84.

immigrants in Japan who desired to go to China only for such “humanitarian needs” as meeting relatives or visiting family tombs.³⁶²

Table 4 shows the scarce number of mutual visitors in the 1950s. The exchange boom since mid-1950s was brought to a sudden halt following the Nagasaki Flag Incident, which served a reminder of the existence of structural constraints on further development of bilateral societal contacts. Non-governmental exchange programs gradually recovered from 1960 and reached another height around the mid-1960s. But the total volume of personnel exchange was kept artificially low, especially the number of Chinese visitors to Japan (Table 5). From the very beginning, Chinese applications for Japan visa were ruled on the case-by-case basis, where numerous cases were rejected on the ground of political sensitivity. Even the Ikeda and Sato government that took a moderate stance toward societal contacts did not hesitate to keep out Chinese visitors whose objectives of travel were deemed detrimental to Japanese strategic relationship with the US and official policy on the Taiwan issue.³⁶³

Table 4: Travelers between Japan and China, 1952-1959

Year	Japan to China		China to Japan	
	Group	Individual	Group	Individual
1952	11	50	0	0
1953	16	139	0	0
1954	21	192	1	10
1955	52	847	4	100
1956	108	1,182	7	142
1957	133	1,243	16	140
1958	Unknown	594	5	93
1959	20	191	0	0

SOURCE: Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 43.

³⁶² See Homusho Nyūkoku Kanrikyoku, *Shūnyūkoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo*, pp. 85-86. It was only until 1970 that Chinese immigrants began to be granted certificates issued by the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice and were allowed to visit China not only for “humanitarian needs” but also business matters.

³⁶³ Among those denied of entry visas in the 1960s were such important Chinese political figures as Peng Zheng, then member of CCP Central Poliburo and Beijing Mayor, Zhao Anbo, Secretary-General of the China-Japan Friendship Association and one of the core members of the *Liaoban*, and Liu Ningyi, then Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Table 5: Visitors between Japan and China, 1964-1971

Year	Japan to China	China to Japan
1964	1,508	562
1965	3,921	576
1966	2,869	503
1967	1,526	150
1968	1,170	11
1969	661	16
1970	1,447	139
1971	5,176	283

SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Justice, *Shūnyūkoku Kanri Tokei Nenpo (Annual Report of Immigration Statistics)*, various years.

The biggest tumult caused by Japanese travel restriction policy was a three-month standoff in 1965 between the Japanese government and members of a Japanese youth delegation who were denied passports to visit China. Since late June Beijing began to prepare a large-scale bilateral youth exchange program to escalate political pressure on the Sato administration that had just denied the provision of Export-Import funds to China for purchasing Japanese plants and signed the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. Japanese Labor Union and many left-wing groups actively responded to Chinese invitation by assembling about 500 young Japanese people selected nationwide. Well aware of the purpose of this program, the Japanese government reluctantly issued passports to 281 people before it suddenly announced on August 18 that no more passports would be issued because a 500-men delegation to China would be against the national interest and endanger public security. While those who had obtained travel permission embarked on the trip to China, the rest people staged prolonged demonstration outside government offices where violent clashes between the protesters and riot police occurred. These people finally managed to go to China after getting their passports in November.

Both groups of Japanese youths were received by Chinese leaders including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and arranged to visit many cities, where they vowed with their Chinese hosts to oppose Japanese government collusion with the “American imperialism” and the revival of Japanese militarism. The first group even held a joint parade with Chinese youths in Shanghai and shouted anti-American slogans to about 100,000 cheering Chinese

people along the route, which was an obvious product of Chinese government mobilization. The completely politicized goal of the youth exchange program easily explained why the Sato government dragged its feet in issuing travel permission to the Japanese delegation. One year later, the government turned down passport application of the entire Japanese delegation of 670 people.³⁶⁴

The consequence of these political restrictions on bilateral societal contacts denied the public of unbiased, independent source information about one other country. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, only senior Chinese government officials or cultural elites had the privilege to visit Japan, largely to serve as agents of Chinese “People’s Diplomacy,” while ordinary Chinese people did not have first-hand experience of postwar Japanese society. So the public knowledge about contemporary Japan was confined to government propaganda.³⁶⁵ In the meantime, most Japanese could only understand Communist China from books, news, school teaching, or anecdotes told by others who had visited China.³⁶⁶ The shortage of free information in both societies only exacerbated negative stereotypes people held toward each other country.

³⁶⁴ The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo Shi*, pp. 133-140. The youth exchange program held in August and November 1965 were visually recorded in two Chinese documentary films titled *Zhongri Qingnian Diyijie Youhao Da Lianhua* (The first friendship gathering of Sino-Japanese youths) and *Tuanjie Jiushi Liliang* (United we have power). For descriptions of the two films, see *Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts)*, No. 6, 1965 and No. 3, 1966.

³⁶⁵ For a keen observation by a Japanese intellectual that even the few number of Chinese cultural elite who were fortunate to visit Japan once or two after the war ended failed to understand the postwar Japanese society, see Takeshirō Kuraishi, “Chūgokujin no Mita Sengo no Nihon (Postwar Japan in the Eyes of the Chinese),” *Chūō Kōron* No. 4 (1957). Having studied in China in prewar years, Kuraishi returned to Japan and taught at Kyoto University and Tokyo University until the 1970s as an expert on Chinese language. He was also famous for compiling the acclaimed Iwanami Chinese Dictionary.

³⁶⁶ National public opinion survey on “China and Chinese People,” *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 1970, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1970, p. 559. Admittedly, Japanese literature or stories told by Japanese visitors to China, especially those left-wing Japanese, often gave favorable descriptions of China. Certain segments of the Japanese public were attracted to China by their romanticized feeling about China’s socialist achievements rather than deep, dynamic understanding of present Chinese politics and society. The majority of the Japanese people, however, were deeply suspicious of the leftist portrayal of a bright and liberated China. See Leng, *Japan and Communist China*, pp. 114-117; Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982,” *Pacific Affairs* 59, No. 3 (1986), p. 400.

SUMMARY

The historical evidence collected from Sino-Japanese relations during the 1950s-60s to test the two theories of interstate reconciliation is summarized in Table 6. It shows that predictions made by realist theory are more congruent with the general outcome of Sino-Japanese Non-Reconciliation and match the causes and formation process of the four indicators of this relationship, the high alert for war, lack of national recognition, minimal economic interaction, and outright public animosity. Historical mythmaking theory does not fit the total lack of reconciliation momentum between the two countries during this period, although its predictions sometimes reinforce phenomena also predicted by the realist theory, such as the Chinese elite suspicion of the Japanese militarist revival and public hostility to Japan.

However a less useful explanation for the reconciliation outcome, historical mythmaking was still important factor in bilateral relations. First of all, historical ideas make predictions consistent with the policy preferences of the Chinese and Japanese elites, who would have embraced a higher degree of bilateral cooperation if there had not been the overwhelming structural pressure of inter-bloc confrontation. It is true that historical ideas were partially manipulated to serve such diplomatic preferences in the first place, such as China's accepting Japanese myth of military clique and suppressing anti-Japanese narratives in order to facilitate the "People's Diplomacy." But Chinese elites also had strong domestic political and ideological objectives in mind when they created those myths convergent with Japan's, and to better manage the relationship with China was never the main driving force of historical mythmaking in Japan. So the causes of national myths proved to be not entirely dominated by international structure as realist theory would predict but was to a great extent also shaped by domestic political and ideological motivations.

Second, historical myths constructed and institutionalized during this period gained tremendous staying power. They became the default national collective memory that proved extremely hard to change in later periods. The resultant huge gap between the two countries' historical memories not just prevented thorough settlement of historical account

at the time but also blocked the path to such settlement in the future. For example, the Chinese acceptance of the innocence of the vast majority of Japanese people and the decision to renounce its claim to war reparation in this period largely denied the future chance of readdressing historical issues with legal and financial measures. Study of post-normalization bilateral relations in the following chapters shows that serious history problem later really harks back to historical myths made during the 1950s-60s.

Table 6: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1950s-60s)

	PREDICTIONS		OUTCOMES	THEORY ASSESSMENT
	(I) <i>Realist Theory</i>	(II) <i>Theory of Historical Mythmaking</i>		
Causes of Historical Myths	N ational myths are mere elite propaganda to justify national security policy	N ational myths are shaped by a multitude of instrumental motivations including strategic goals, domestic political interests, and ideological doctrines	<p>Japanese conservative elites created war myths to consolidate state power and justify Japan’s strategic collaboration with the U.S.;</p> <p>Chinese Communists used war myths to invent a class-based communist national identity that could rally public support to the government’s internal and external policies</p>	Theory II better fits the evidence
Interstate Reconciliation Result	N on-Reconciliation as a result of negative structural conditions (inter-bloc rivalry rather than direct bilateral security dilemma)	S hallow-Reconciliation as a result of Conflictual/Quasi-Convergent narratives	N on-Reconciliation	Theory I better fits the evidence
Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Stage	<p>1:</p> <p>High alert for war caused by inter-bloc confrontation</p>	<p>Moderate expectation of war because the historical narratives generated mistrust but did not instigate immediate confrontation</p>	<p>Expectation of imminent mutual war –</p> <p>Chinese perception was mainly shaped by concerns about the U.S.-Japan collaboration in containment;</p> <p>Japanese right-wing feared monolithic communism and Chinese military power, while both right wing and moderate mainstream feared communist infiltration and war entanglement;</p> <p>China’s media camapaign to attack reviving Japanese militarism can be explained by strategic reasons;</p> <p>Japanese reaction to Chinese media campaign was rather rationally than emotionally based.</p>	Theory I better fits the evidence; Theory II supports Chinese suspicion of Japan on a regular basis but not high alert of war

Table 6 continued

<i>Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Outcomes</i>	2: No national recognition because of pressure from bloc leaders	P artial national recognition because narratives did not contain critical land/resources/ethnic disputes or raise historical atonement as precondition for normalization	No national recognition – D espite its exceptionally generous policy on history to write off Japan’s historical debts, Beijing’s “People’s Diplomacy” failed to bring about Japanese recognition because Japan was constrained by both the U.S.-led Cold War framework and domestic Taiwan Lobby to recognize the Taiwan regime	Theory I better fits the evidence; Theory II is consistent with policy preferences rather than policy outcomes
	3: Scarce economic interaction due to the fear of adverse relative gains	L imited economic links with frictions fed by negative historical legacies	Minimal economic interaction – J apan’s economic policy to China was constrained by its participation in the U.S.-led economic warfare against the Socialist Bloc for fear of adverse relative gains and commitment not to allow economic interactions to undermine the Cold War strategy of isolating China; C hina tried to manipulate bilateral economic relations to serve strategic goals of undermining U.S. containment, for which it was willing to sacrifice economic interests; H istorical legacies was never an obstacle to bilateral economic interaction	Theory I better fits the evidence; Theory II is consistent with policy preferences rather than policy outcomes
	4: Outright popular animosity caused by perception of bilateral strategic conflict or government manipulation of public opinion to foster such perception	S immering grievances and mistrust derived from historical memories should lead to popular estrangement but no request for direct confrontation	Public hatred and fear – C hinese public opinion was largely manipulated by strategically-oriented government propaganda and reinforced by historical memory; J apanese feeling was mainly shaped by disgust with Communist ideology, fear about Chinese power, and concerns about war entanglement	Theory I better fits the evidence; Theory I and II both support Chinese popular hostility to Japan

Chapter Four

The “Honeymoon” Period: Sino-Japanese Relations, 1972-1981

This chapter explains the significant progress in Sino-Japanese reconciliation from their diplomatic normalization in 1972 to the beginning of the 1980s. I first examine the two causal variables in question, international system and history-making practices in both countries, and deduce from them competing predictions for bilateral relations. The subsequent section will test the degree of congruence between the predictions and actual outcomes by process-tracing the development of Sino-Japanese relations during this period. This section argues that the profound change in international power structure was the primary driving force behind the relationship improvement while their historiographic disagreements were intentionally limited, covered up, or simply set aside to clear the way for the more immediate strategic needs. On the other hand, the case study also shows that positive systemic conditions alone failed to bring about deep reconciliation predicted by realist theory. Japan’s reluctance to form a tight military alliance with China provocative to the Soviets and China’s deep-rooted suspicion of Japan derived from bitter war memories stood out to be the major obstacles to the forging of solid bilateral friendship. So the combination of both structural factors and historical memory brought about a generally warm and cooperative relationship that nevertheless falls short of truly stable peace and amicable atmosphere, which is best categorized into the sub-stage of “Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement.”

CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS

Positive International Structural Conditions

Sino-US Rapprochement and the Fragile Détente

The international power configuration underwent profound transformation during this period when China formed strategic collaboration with the U.S. to balance a more imminent threat from its former socialist ally, the Soviet Union. Such a sea change in international system created rather *positive* structural conditions for China's reconciliation with Japan, America's most important Asian ally.

Tensions between the two socialist giants, the Soviet Union and China, began to rise since the late 1950s due to their intense competition for the leadership of the international communist movement and Chinese grievances about what they saw as Soviet chauvinistic attempt to infringe on China's sovereignty rights and force China into a status of subordination in the alliance.³⁶⁷ Moscow showed gross disrespect for the national sovereignty of its junior allies in its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated post hoc that tried to justify its right for armed intervention in other socialist states to manipulate their regimes. Worse than that, Moscow built up its forces along China's northern border and promoted a hostile Asian collective security pact with China's regional adversaries, such as India, Japan, and Vietnam. Heated border clashes occurred in March 1969 between Soviet and Chinese troops along their border formed by the Amur River and Ussuri River, and spread from there to Central Asia. Soviet military deployment along the Sino-Soviet border increased from 30 divisions in 1970 to 44 divisions a year later.³⁶⁸ With Washington beginning its gradual extrication from the war in Indochina through the policy of Vietnamization and Moscow's hostility to Beijing showed no signs of abating, the Soviet Union replaced the United States to be a potentially more dangerous and immediate adversary to China.

In order to find a counterweight to neutralize the immediate Soviet threat, Beijing moved away from its strategy of struggling against both superpowers in the 1960s and reached out to the West. Chinese intention coincided with the interests of the Nixon administration that was seeking Chinese support to its immediate policy of ending the

³⁶⁷ On the history of Sino-Soviet friction since late 1950s to mid-1960s, see Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), Chapter 4.

³⁶⁸ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "Mao Zedong's Perception of the World in 1968-1972: Rationale for the Sino-American Rapprochement," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 7, No. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1998), p. 251.

Vietnam War and the long-term goal of balancing the Soviet power that had managed to reach a rare strategic parity with the U.S. So Harry Harding argues that it is perception of each other's weakness vis-à-vis Moscow that brought Washington and Beijing together. Sino-US ambassadorial talks reopened in Warsaw in January 1970, but a breakthrough in their relations did not materialize right away because of internal opposition, represented by Lin Bao, to Mao's dramatic shift of strategy and the escalation of the war in Indochina following American invasion of Cambodia in May.

It was only until the autumn that Mao's policy of rapprochement with the U.S. was adopted as the party's general line and progress in bilateral relations started to take place. After a series of diplomatic exchanges including ping-pong diplomacy and Kissinger's two legendary missions to China in 1971, President Nixon went to China in February 1972 and signed the Shanghai Communique. The Chinese government was particularly pleased with the fact that Nixon visited China before going to Moscow and accepted a reference in the communique to oppose to "hegemony," China's code word for the Soviet Union.³⁶⁹ Therefore, the Shanghai Communique heralded a new strategic partnership between China and the United States, who had been fiercely hostile to each other in the past two decades but now shared the common security interest to check the Soviet predominance.³⁷⁰

But the US-China-USSR triangular relations did not instantly shift towards an ostensible Sino-US alignment against the Soviet Union, the direction that China would have preferred. During the Nixon-Ford period, American foreign policy was to improve relations with Beijing and construct détente with Moscow simultaneously. In its annual foreign policy report issued on the eve of his trip to China, Nixon dismissed the view that American policy toward China was aimed against Moscow.³⁷¹ Henry Kissinger, who was the key architect of détente policy, said in his memoir that "It (triangular diplomacy) must avoid the impression

³⁶⁹ The Shanghai Communique, February 27, 1972, in Hinton, *The People's Republic of China, 1949-1979*, pp. 2362-2363.

³⁷⁰ The discussion here of dramatic transformation of the U.S., USSR and China strategic triangle in the 1970s draws heavily on Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics* 33, No. 4 (1981); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), Chapters 6-7, Chapter 20; Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, Chapter 2.

that one is 'using' either of the (other) contenders against the other; otherwise one becomes vulnerable to retaliation or blackmail. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other."³⁷²

Washington's even-handed policy towards Beijing and Moscow only melted away towards the late 1970s, when Moscow adopted an active policy of military intervention in the Third World, including the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and Soviet support of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and its own invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. As superpower détente deteriorated into confrontation, Washington drew closer to Beijing, who had persistently treated Moscow as the most dangerous enemy even during the détente years. As a result, China and the U.S. signed the communique of diplomatic normalization in December 1978 that announced American diplomatic recognition of the PRC and reiterated the anti-hegemony line. Shortly afterward, Deng Xiaoping visited America, where he openly denounced Soviet hegemonism and sought American endorsement of China's military action to contain the Soviet-supported Vietnam. China also began to receive limited amounts of American military technology since 1980.³⁷³ By that time, the strategic triangle had transformed from a "romantic marriage" structure pivoted on the U.S. to a "stable marriage" between China and the U.S. in the face of increasingly audacious Soviet expansion.³⁷⁴

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

Realist theory would predict significant progress in Sino-Japanese reconciliation process. Concretely speaking, the escalation of Sino-Soviet confrontation by the end of the 1960s and the subsequent dramatic Sino-US rapprochement should drive China and Japan,

³⁷¹ "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace; A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Issued on February 9, 1972. Quoted from Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, p. 266.

³⁷² Quoted from Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, p. 277.

³⁷³ William T. Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 137; Robert E. Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 182.

³⁷⁴ Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle," p. 59.

the most important American ally in Asia, towards strategic alignment against their common Soviet threat. Such positive structural conditions should play a decisive role in diminishing elite expectation of armed conflict with one another state and propelling their diplomatic normalization and settlement of major controversies on national sovereignty. Common security interest should also give rise to their close military collaboration as well as comprehensive economic interdependence in terms of both economic sensitivity and strategic vulnerability.

Regarding popular relations, realist theory suggests that the security incentives to counteract the Soviet threat should generate firm solidarity between the two nations because popular feeling is malleable and can be fully penetrated by structural conditions. Consequently, a strong sense of closeness and mutual trust should grow between the ordinary Japanese and Chinese people, and any negative emotions and perception of threat derived from historical memory should be eliminated. The positive structural conditions should also remove previous travel restrictions imposed for political reasons, which would greatly facilitate intimate, dynamic interaction between the two nations. Therefore, the amicable atmosphere at the popular level should not be the product of people's imagination or pure government propaganda but based on reasonably accurate information of each other society. In general, one should expect to see the emergence of deep reconciliation between China and Japan during the 1970s.

Historiographic Continuity

In the years between 1972-1981, the pattern and content of historical mythmaking by Japanese and Chinese ruling elites were by and large unchanged from the previous period. War memories of the two countries continued to converge on some mythical interpretations while their points of divergence were intentionally limited or covered up, albeit due to a different set of reasons from the previous stage. Consequently, despite their historical mythmaking and lack of settlement of historical account, bilateral political controversy over war historiography was by and large absent during this period.

Continuity in Chinese Historiography

Chinese war historiography retained most of the self-glorifying, other-maligning and self-justification myths constructed and institutionalized before. First of all, the sharp contrast between the righteous CCP and evil KMT was still a central theme in official war history. It is true that the security and legitimacy challenge to the Communist government posed by the Nationalist regime in Taiwan diminished significantly. However, Taipei was still a strong political and military adversary of Beijing because Washington kept diplomatic relations with Taipei until January 1979 and maintained defense commitments to it throughout the 1970s. Although the possibility of a direct attack by “the U.S. imperialist and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces” seemed low, it was still a top political agenda for the Chinese government to isolate Taiwan on world diplomatic stage and insulate its influence from ordinary Chinese people.

In the meantime, the communist ideological propaganda remained strong despite the decline of class struggle campaign after the climax of the Cultural Revolution and China’s accommodative policy to the capitalist America. It was partly due to inertia, but more importantly because of the still strong influence of the radical forces in Chinese domestic politics after Lin Bao died. But even after the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, a class-based ideology was still much needed to salvage public reverence to the party leadership that had been clearly responsible for initiating and perpetuating the radical, catastrophic political turmoil. Facing challenge from the burgeoning dissident movement in the late 1970s calling for “the fifth modernization,” democracy, the new generation of communist leaders was determined to reconfirm the orthodox status of Maoist ideology lest the party’s political dominance be undermined.

Therefore, Deng Xiaoping gave an important speech at the theoretical conference of the party in March 1979 that enunciated the following “Four Cardinal Principles (*Sixiang Jiben Yuanze*)”: We must keep to the socialist road; We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”³⁷⁵ And in an authoritative evaluation of the Cultural Revolution and the legacy of Mao that the CCP Central Committee completed in

³⁷⁵ See “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” in Xiaoping Deng, *Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 166-191.

1981, it was claimed that Mao had been correct 70 percent of the time and at fault for only 30 percent of the time, and any attempt to use Mao's mistakes to "try to negate the scientific value of Mao Zedong thought and to deny its guiding role in our revolution and our construction" would be "entirely wrong." So it was concluded that "socialism and socialism alone can save China."³⁷⁶

So in a new ideological offensive to shore up the party's prestige and legitimacy, and the antagonism between the CCP and KMT in the history again made a typical example of the irreconcilable contradiction between the proletariat and capitalist classes. The first two editions of post-Cultural Revolution Chinese history textbook published in 1978 and 1981 hardly changed the wording in glorifying the CCP leadership and bashing the defeatist and reactionary KMT government during the war of resistance against Japan.³⁷⁷ The movie industry resumed production of revolutionary films since 1979 along a similar propaganda line. However, compared to those made in the earlier period, new movies on the war focused more on individual experiences than the military struggle themselves, and depicted the heroic image of the CCP-led soldiers from a more humanistic perspective.³⁷⁸

The continuing salience of communist ideology also sustained a generally negative image of America in official interpretation of the war history. History textbook still criticized American assistance to the KMT in waging the civil war against the communist forces. However, apparently reflecting the newly formed Sino-American strategic alignment, textbooks and media commemorative articles no longer accused the U.S. of conniving Japanese aggression. Meanwhile, except for one sentence on Soviet attack of Japanese troops in Manchuria by the end of the war, the 1978 history textbook deleted past treatment on Soviet aid to Chinese war efforts. Only when Sino-Soviet relations began to thaw in the early 1980s did the topic of Soviet aid receive brief mentioning in the 1981 edition textbook.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁶ Quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 679.

³⁷⁷ See MST 5, Vol. 4; MST 6, Vol. 4.

³⁷⁸ Interview with a senior faculty member of the Beijing Film Academy on November 22, 2002. Also see *Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying*, Vol. 1, pp. 362-366; Si Chun, "Zhuoyi Miaoyie Renwu de Dute Minyun (Concentrating on Describing the Distinctive Fates of Individual Characters)," *Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts)*, April 1980.

³⁷⁹ See MST 5, Vol. 4; MST 6, Vol. 4.

Another major myth that was kept intact was the distinction between Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people. Unlike in the previous period when this historical myth was promoted to encourage the Japanese government to adopt a less hostile policy to China, now it was used to justify the newly established friendship between the two countries. Japan's strategic and political cooperation was important to China's strategy of forming a broad anti-Soviet alignment. In addition, Japanese economic aid and advanced technology were also essential to the success of China's ambitious program of "Four Modernizations," which was first proposed by Zhou Enlai in January 1975 and designated as the top national priority at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978. So the official Chinese war historiography de-emphasized the conflict period, stressed their friendly interaction in the long history of bilateral relations, as well as highlight the common victimization of both the Chinese and Japanese people during the war. All these themes converged with the prevailing "myth of military clique" and victim consciousness in Japanese mainstream historiography.

So Zhou Enlai reaffirmed this historical view at the welcome banquet for Prime Minister Tanaka on September 25, 1972, when he stated that the few militarists must be strictly distinguished from the vast majority of the Japanese people, and that both the Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.³⁸⁰ For a whole decade since then, Chinese government statements and official media had consistently propagated this contrast of good Japanese versus bad Japanese. Textbook coverage of Japanese military savagery and Chinese people's suffering was confined to simple and general descriptions. The above-mentioned new war movies also paid little direct attention to these aspects of the war. In fact, during this period the film industry made less movies on the war of resistance against Japan than those on CCP revolutionary struggle with the KMT before and after the war. Besides, due to the nation's fresh memory of the Cultural Revolution, a so-called "the Literature of Wounds" reflecting on the most recent horrors and tragedies became so popular that artistic representation of the war was pushed down the ladder of importance.

The only exception to such low-key treatment of the war by the film industry was the sensational movie, *Yipan Wei Xiawan de Qi* (An Unfinished Go Game), jointly produced by

Chinese and Japanese artists to commemorate the 10th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic normalization.³⁸¹ This film was made under the direct supervision of the Culture Department of the Chinese State Council. The movie tells a tragic story of two families of go players, one from China and the other from Japan, whose dream to bring the skill and art of go-playing to perfection through cross-national exchange was smashed by the evil Japanese militarists. The intimate links between the two families, a symbol of Sino-Japanese friendship, was highlighted by their common cultural roots, ties by marriage, and shared experience of suffering – almost to an equal degree of severity, as one family lost a son and the daughter of the other family was mentally traumatized – at the hand of Japanese military police during the war. This movie conveys a straightforward message that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of the Japanese militarists and they should move beyond past trauma to construct a relationship of peace and friendship.

Dominance of Conservative Historiography in Japan

Just like in the previous period, to remain in power was still the primary political goal of Japanese conservative elites. By the end of the 1960s, traditional opposition parties like the JCP expanded electoral gains while several new opposition parties were created, including the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the Kōmeitō, mostly in response to LDP's failure to address various social ills generated by the rapid industrialization. While ideological polarization had contracted in the Diet due to the sharp decline of the JSP's share of popular votes and diet seats, the opposition competition was no less intense in light of the budding multiparty system.³⁸² In the 1972 general election, the LDP won fewer seats than ever before, sparking for the first time the fear of an end to its political dominance since the “1955 system” was established. At the local level, the party hegemony confronted credible threat from the rise of opposition prefectural and municipal governments, as well as the

³⁸⁰ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 103-104.

³⁸¹ While the movie was released in August 1982 in the middle of the Japanese textbook controversy, the script revision and film production process was mainly conducted between 1979-1981 when Sino-Japanese relations were still in the honeymoon period. For more on this movie, see Hong Zhou & Kang Tong, “‘Yipan Wei Xiawan de Qi’ Juben Chuangzuo Shimo (The Beginning and End of the Script Production Process of ‘An Unfinished Go Game’),” *Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts)*, November 1982; Wang Binnan, “Zhunzhong Lishi, Zhenxi Youyi (Respecting History, Cherishing Friendship),” and Pinhua Sun, “Xiezai ‘Yipan Wei Xiawan de Qi’ Shangying Zhiqian (Written before the Show of ‘An Unfinished Go Game’).” In *Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian (The Yearbook of Chinese Movie)*, 1983, pp. 328-329.

surging citizen movements demanding better government service to improve the quality of life that had been ignored by the growth-oriented policy before.³⁸³ These challenges were compounded by the economic disarray following the Oil Shock and public resentment of LDP corruption, which culminated in the Lockheed scandal that even implicated Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei.

In the face of mounting societal dissatisfaction, Japanese conservatives again found historical mythmaking a useful strategy to consolidate their control of state power and arrest the popularity decline of LDP leaders. In the 1970s, the same kind of whitewashing and self-glorifying myths regarding the past conflict with China continued to be purveyed as the mainstay of national historiography. The government maintained an evasive attitude on the issue of war responsibility while praising the military for its spirit of sacrifice and emphasizing Japanese victimization. On August 15, 1975, Miki Takeo became the first postwar Japanese prime minister to worship at Yasukuni. Since then, Japanese prime ministers routinely worshiped there, even though executed Class A war criminals including Tōjō were enshrined there in 1978. Moreover, newly found documents suggested the Showa emperor's significant role during the war and polling data showed that more than half of Japanese people found the official position on the emperor's innocence suspicious. But when the emperor visited Europe in 1971 and the US in 1975, in both trips Japanese government avoided the question of emperor's war responsibility.³⁸⁴

Neither did Japanese government make any significant restitution efforts to address its historical debts to Asian war victims. It is true that Tokyo took some major diplomatic actions to foster political and economic cooperation with Southeast Asia, South Korea, and China during this period. In a famous speech at the end of his tour of six ASEAN countries in August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo proclaimed that Japan desired to develop a heart-to-heart relationship with ASEAN countries. This is the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine," which marked an important milestone in postwar Japan's diplomacy towards Southeast Asia. However, Japan's issuing of "Fukuda Doctrine" was by no means driven by an aspiration to

³⁸² Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, pp. 18-30.

³⁸³ Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, pp. 62-64.

³⁸⁴ Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 161-164.

atone for its past aggression, but by some more practical interests important at the time. In his memoir Fukuda explained that, in the wake of the fall of Saigon and U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, Japan's closer cooperation with Southeast Asia would ease the feeling of uncertainty permeating the region and contribute to a stable environment; and it was also essential to the economic prosperity of Japan itself.³⁸⁵ Similarly, relationship between Japan and South Korea progressed considerably in the late 1970s, motivated by both their common concern about American policy of retrenchment in East Asia and mutual economic interest.³⁸⁶ But Japan took hardly any concrete measures to express repentance for causing suffering to Korean people during the colonial era. When addressing domestic audience, Prime Minister Tanaka even sought to justify Japan's colonial rule of Korea by saying that it made positive contribution to the development of Korean education and economy.³⁸⁷

As far as mass education of war history is concerned, since the early 1970s textbooks gave some coverage of Asian people's suffering inflicted by the Japanese military. Often buried in footnotes and without boldface print, however, the new information had very limited pedagogical impact.³⁸⁸ In the meantime, Ienaga won partial victory in his textbook lawsuits when Tokyo District Court ruled twice in 1970 and 1974 against the abuse of power by Mombushō in ordering specific changes in educational content, but the verdicts still affirmed the constitutionality of government screening of textbooks. In 1973, the Ministry approved Ienaga's textbook that contained more detailed descriptions of Japanese aggression in South Korea and China.³⁸⁹

But such slight revision of the canonized conservative historiography soon provoked a new wave of push for tightening up textbook control. In 1980, conservative elites launched the so-called "Biased Textbooks Campaign (*Kenkō Kyōkasho Kyanpein*)," the second postwar crackdown on progressive elements of textbook content since the "Ureubekī" campaign of the 1950s. A host of articles published in conservative journals to attack the

³⁸⁵ Takeo Fukuda, *Kaiko Kijūnen (Recollection of Ninety Years)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 276-280.

³⁸⁶ Victor Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Chapter 5.

³⁸⁷ Tanaka's speech at the plenary session of the Lower House on January 24, 1974, quoted in Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, p. 139; Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, pp. 195-196.

³⁸⁸ Fish, "From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages."

³⁸⁹ Nozaki and Inokuchi, "Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," p. 111.

progressive trend in school education were echoed by some LDP cabinet members such as Justice Minister Okuno Seisuke and Education Minister Tanaka Tatsuo, who issued statements criticizing the lack of patriotism in current school textbooks. The LDP even set up several subcommittees at the end of 1980 to consider the reform of the entire education system. In June 1981, the Subcommittee on the Textbook Problem published a report that advocated the strengthening of textbook authorization and limiting of the influence of the left-wing JIU. Based on the report the LDP called for revising school textbooks. History textbooks was a natural target of the campaign. Education Minister Tanaka explicitly told textbook writers and publishers in their preparation of textbooks for the 1983-6 triennium to “soften their approach to Japan’s excesses during World War II” and place more stress on patriotism. As the statement issued by the LDP party conference in January 1982 pointed out, the conservative government desired to use school education to “cultivate the Japanese spirit and foster national pride.” As a result, Japanese school textbooks in this period continued to glorify the Japanese military while encouraging public amnesia of its crimes.³⁹⁰

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

To sum up, in the 1970s Japanese and Chinese ruling elite basically perpetuated those old historical myths originally constructed and purveyed in the 1950s and 1960s. The relationship between their war narratives remained *conflictual/quasi-convergent*, not combative. There was considerable overlap between some of their important interpretations, and public attention to those areas where significant disagreements existed was rather lacking. With little variation on the independent variable from the previous stage, historical mythmaking theory would predict no major change with regard to the dependent variable of bilateral relations. Sino-Japanese relations should stay in Shallow Reconciliation in the 1970s if the history factor is indeed the dominant driving force of interstate reconciliation.

EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME

³⁹⁰ Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-making* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 68-71.

Upon diplomatic normalization the two countries progressed significantly on the path of reconciliation, which is more congruent with the prediction of realist theory than historical mythmaking theory. Process-tracing of the four main indicators of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s also demonstrates that the shift in international systemic environment generated the biggest momentum for their close cooperation in inter-governmental dimension while bilateral disagreements on the history issue did not stop such cooperation from taking place. However, because the two governments attempted to conclude the history issue with haste and prematurity, they failed to bridge historiographic gap through serious joint research and restitution measures. This impeded the neutralization of negative public emotions and the rise of genuine mutual trust between both the two countries, which constituted an important factor preventing bilateral relations from reaching the stage of deep reconciliation. So the relationship outcome was in the Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement stage, which fits the prediction of historical mythmaking theory better.

Moderate Expectation of War

Strategic Incentives for Sino-Japanese Cooperation

As the Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated sharply while China and the U.S. reached political rapprochement, defending the country against the Soviet threat rather than “American imperialism” became the primary goal of China’s security policy. Therefore, for the first time in postwar history, China’s security interests came to great convergence with that of Japan, which also saw the Soviet Union as posing the most serious challenges to its military security. The emergence of a common security threat created strong incentives for China and Japan to develop a new relationship of strategic cooperation.

The formidable Soviet threat notwithstanding, China and Japan would have been less eager to join hands if they had received unwavering American support to their national defense. As Victor Cha argues in his quasi-alliance model, two states facing high threat levels may not form tight alignment if the common ally maintains a strong commitment to collective defense. It is because their security needs have been met while additional

commitments between themselves would only raise the danger of entrapment.³⁹¹ But in the 1970s China did not find American security support sufficient and reliable. Beijing actually watched the East-West détente with great anxiety. As mentioned above, America's even-handed policy towards Beijing and Moscow prevented the Sino-American rapprochement from espousing a clear-cut theme of confrontation with Moscow. Mao reportedly complained to Kissinger that the U.S. had been ineffective in resisting Soviet expansionism.³⁹² So while opting to align with "American imperialism" because it feared the "Soviet social imperialism" even more, Beijing did not take American cooperation for granted and intended to bring more countries into the struggle against Soviet hegemonism.

Beijing's desire to expand international support base was evidenced by its revival of the "united front" strategy since 1970 that had been left in obscurity during the height of the Cultural Revolution. At the twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of October 1968 and Ninth Party Congress of April 1969, the scope of united front was expanded to include not just socialist countries and all the oppressed people and nations but also "countries having different social systems" on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence that Zhou Enlai advocated during the Bandung Conference.³⁹³ Along this line Beijing formulated the "Three Worlds Theory," which was formally presented by Deng Xiaoping in a speech at the United Nation Assembly in 1974. The theory categorized the America and Soviet Union as the "First World," the middle-sized Western powers the "Second World," and the developing countries including China itself as the "Third World." And it argued that superpower competition for hegemony was the main source of international instability, to curb which all "progressive forces" of the Third World and the Second World should combine their power to struggle for world peace and development.³⁹⁴

The strategic goal of building a broad international united front against the Soviet Union clearly motivated China to seek early diplomatic normalization with Japan, an

³⁹¹ For an elaboration of the quasi-alliance model, see Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism*, pp. 48-50; idem., "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000), pp. 265-270.

³⁹² Sadako Ogata, *Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), p. 36.

³⁹³ Cheng, "Mao Zedong's Perception of the World in 1968-1972," pp. 243-244.

³⁹⁴ William T. Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," p. 130.

important representative of the Second World in Asia. In a classified report on international situation presented within the party in December 1971, Zhou Enlai made it clear that China's main enemies were the United States and Soviet Union, and China should extend the international united front to the two "Intermediate Zones," the first including Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the second including West Europe, Japan, Canada and Oceania. He further suggested to scale down ideological attacks on countries of the second intermediate zone and develop relationship with members of the capitalist ruling class so that China could have fewer enemies and more allies.³⁹⁵

In addition, shortly before Prime Minister Tanaka came to China to finalize normalization terms, the CCP Central Committee issued a document on the significance of the upcoming negotiation with Tanaka on diplomatic normalization. It called the negotiation "an important strategic step of Chairman Mao and the party" because it would first of all "contribute to the struggle against the American and Soviet hegemony, especially the Soviet revisionism," and also be useful to fighting Japanese militarism, liberating Taiwan and mitigating tension in Asia.³⁹⁶ In the text of Sino-Japanese joint communique of September 1972, Beijing insisted on inserting an anti-hegemony clause, which had clear strategic connotation of counterbalancing the Soviet Union.

Another direct result of its desire to turn Japan into a security partner against the common Soviet threat was the dramatic shift in China's attitude toward Japanese rearmament and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Until the opening of Sino-American secret talks on rapprochement, Beijing had persistently opposed Japanese military buildup and demanded U.S. troops withdrawal from Japan. In these talks, Kissinger reassured China that Japanese rearmament was in response to the Soviet threat in the region rather than to threaten China and that the U.S. presence in Japan actually corked the revival of Japanese militarism rather

³⁹⁵ "Shū Onlai Kokusai Jōsei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu (Zhou Enlai's Secrete Speeches on the Current International Situation)," *Chūō Kōron*, November 1976, pp. 163-169.

³⁹⁶ "Guanyu Jiedai Riben Tianzhong Shouxiang Fanghua de Neibu Xuanchuan Tigang (The Internaal Propaganda Outline Regarding the Reception of Japanese prime minister Tanaka), September 7, 1972" in Mao Zedong, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao Wengao* (The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the Nation) (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1987-1990), Vol. 13, p. 316.

than encouraged it.³⁹⁷ When Nixon visited China in February 1972, he again stressed that Japan should not be left “neutral and unarmed,” and it was in the common interest of China and the U.S. for American military presence in Europe and Japan to be maintained at its present level. “If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless,” Nixon warned Zhou Enlai, “they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves. If we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where they were concerned.”

What Nixon alluded to in these remarks was the prospect of Japanese-Soviet alignment or the strengthening of Japan’s independent defense capabilities, both striking the sensitive nerve of the Chinese leaders.³⁹⁸ While the later option had more to do with Chinese memory of Japanese aggression, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the former was more a *realpolitik* concern. In fact, throughout the 1970s, Chinese leaders were never completely confident that Japan would stand firmly with China in the general atmosphere of East-West *Détente*. Since the end of the 1960s Moscow had tried to sell to Asian countries the idea of forming an Asian collective security system, which was seen by Beijing as a conspiracy to encircle China. Almost immediately after the Sino-Japanese normalization, Moscow made open protest to Tokyo regarding the anti-hegemony clause of the joint communique, in response to which Foreign Minister Ōhira flew to Moscow in October to explain to Soviet foreign minister Gromyko that the clause was not intended as an anti-Soviet mutual defense pact.

Largely in order to appease Moscow, the Tanaka administration set out in the next year to negotiate Japanese-Soviet diplomatic normalization. It was rather disturbing to Chinese leaders that Japanese-Soviet negotiation gave the Soviets another chance to persuade Japan to support the Asian collective security system.³⁹⁹ In an inner-party speech of March 1973, Zhou Enlai noted the multiple characters of Japanese foreign policy by pointing out that Japan was relying on the U.S., embracing China, while at the same time

³⁹⁷ See recollections of John Holdridge, who accompanied Kissinger to Beijing in July 1971, that were quoted in Christensen, *A Troubled Triangle*, pp. 33-34.

³⁹⁸ Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 567. Also see James Mann, *About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), pp. 43-44.

³⁹⁹ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 86-89.

trying to improve relationship with the Soviet Union. Zhou indicated his belief that Japan actually adopted anti-Soviet policy politically and militarily, though in appearance it was seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union. Then, as if to address remaining concerns of himself and other Chinese leaders, he still admitted that Japan was standing at the cross-road without deciding where to go, and suggested that much work was needed to further China's connections with Japan.⁴⁰⁰

It is the fear that Tokyo might opt for neutrality that propelled Beijing to accept Nixon's view that the U.S.-Japan security alliance should be taken as an integral part of the overall strategy of balancing the Soviet threat. As if to add annotation to the American argument, former JDA director and then Minister of International Trade and Industry Nakasone showed a map to Zhou Enlai on January 17-19 1973 that the majority of Japanese military power was concentrated in Hokkaidō and meant to guard against the Soviet Union rather than China.⁴⁰¹ Nakasone's map might have indeed impressed Chinese leader for it was on January 18 that Zhou told visiting Dietman Kimura Takeo about China's positive attitude regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, which it used to accuse of threatening China's vital national interest. In the meeting Zhou said that "it has to be admitted that U.S.-Japan security treaty is necessary for Japan, so is American nuclear umbrella to counterbalance the Soviet Union."⁴⁰² In October, Chinese foreign minister Ji Pengfei further explained to the Japanese that China could understand the alliance because "(it) needs to be maintained in order to protect yourselves from Soviet threat. Although it is desirable for Japan to keep independent defense capability, Japan is now placed under American nuclear umbrella, making it unrealistic to scrap the alliance relationship. I think that Japan has to depend on the U.S. to certain extent."⁴⁰³

In line with the attempt to draw Japan to an anti-Soviet strategic alignment, Beijing endorsed and sometimes even encouraged Japanese defense buildup.⁴⁰⁴ Deng Xiaoping,

⁴⁰⁰ "Shū Onlai Kokusai Jōsei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu," pp. 169-175.

⁴⁰¹ "Shū Onlai Kokusai Jōsei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu," p. 163.

⁴⁰² "Japanese newspaper report on Premier Zhou Enlai's remarks to Dietman Kimura Takeo on US-Japan alliance treaty and other issues, January 18, 1973," *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, pp. 455-456. Also see Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, p. 242.

⁴⁰³ Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, pp. 242-243.

⁴⁰⁴ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," *International Affairs* 61, No. 1, (1984/85), p. 92.

who was temporarily restored to power in the mid-1970s after being purged by the political radicals, told visiting Japanese Diet members that “it is necessary for China and Japan to join hands to be prepared for the ‘North,’” and he “support the strengthening of Japanese self-defense power.”⁴⁰⁵ When meeting visiting Japanese defense experts in 1977, Liao Chengzhi gave a three-point message that criticized Japan for being too relaxed about the Soviet threat, admitted that the U.S.-Japan security system was the most important foreign policy for Japan, and pointed out the significance of the Sino-Japanese relations. Considered in the context of the ongoing China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) negotiation, Liao’s message was intended to show that Japan’s equal-distant diplomacy to Beijing and Moscow was merely wishful thinking and urge Japan to develop necessary military capabilities to counterbalance the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁶

Soon after the PFT was signed, Liao reiterated Chinese position that the U.S.-Japan alliance was now useful in light of Soviet expansion and Japan needed more self-defense power. And to the surprise of the outside world, Liao openly expressed disagreement with China’s long-time political friend, the JSP, by claiming that China had never supported unarmed neutrality of Japan since 1952.⁴⁰⁷ Perhaps China’s most straightforward urging of Japanese defense buildup within a reasonable scope was conveyed by Wu Xiuquan, then the Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, in April 1978 to the delegation of Japanese military reporters:

“The SDF’s role has two aspects of both oppressing the people and defending (national) independence. (We) should emphasize the second aspect and must not treat the SDF as enemy. As far as China is concerned, we hope that the SDF would strengthen its capabilities and become a military that can defend Japan independence. We must oppose it if the SDF becomes militaristic, but I do not think it is turning militaristic.”⁴⁰⁸

As far as Japanese leaders are concerned, many existing studies argue that whether or not Japan could normalize relations with China “was a matter of survival in domestic politics.” Tanaka was able to win the prime minister election in July 1972 precisely because he vowed to pursue bilateral normalization as the government’s top priority and won backup from multiple factions within the LDP. So the normalization issue between China and Japan

⁴⁰⁵ Tadashi Itō, “Kore ga Beichūnichī Gunji Teikei no Jittai da (This Is the Fact of U.S.-China-Japan Military Cooperation),” *Chūō Kōron* No. 10 (1978), p. 164.

⁴⁰⁶ “Chūgoku no Gunjiryoku o Mite (Observing Chinese Military Power),” *Chūō Kōron*, September 1977.

⁴⁰⁷ Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente*, p. 101.

⁴⁰⁸ Itō, “Kore ga Beichūnichī Gunji Teikei no Jittai da,” p. 165.

actually became one between various Japanese political actors (the so-called *Nitchū Mondai wa Nini Mondai*).⁴⁰⁹ But the urgency of the issue did not originate in domestic politics but resulted from the profound shift in systemic environment. The first Nixon Shock, that Nixon announced in July 1971 his plan to visit China the next year without prior consult with Japan, made Tokyo realize that Japan had lagged behind in adjusting to the new international situation. In the past Japan had often wished to extend the horizon of its autonomous diplomacy to China but was prevented from doing so by American insistence on political isolation of China. Now the U.S. constraints had quietly evaporated but Japan was kept unknown about it. The Japanese felt strongly that they would lose another opportunity to assert an autonomous foreign policy if it again acted too slow and simply followed the steps of America. This explained the unusual swiftness with which Tokyo approached Beijing and realized the diplomatic normalization.

Besides the desire to enhance Japanese diplomacy autonomy, weakened confidence in the U.S. commitment to Asian defense also compelled an active Japanese diplomacy toward China. Japanese worry about U.S. retrenchment in Asia was first aroused by the Nixon Doctrine issued on Guam in July 1969, which essentially urged American allies to assume a greater burden to defend themselves. The subsequent Nixon Shock further alienated the Japanese who were afraid that their national interests might be neglected in political deals among big powers. Some feared that the U.S.-Soviet détente and Sino-U.S. rapprochement would prompt Washington to redefine its “defense perimeter” based on the Pre-Korean War island-chain notion that left out Taiwan and South Korea, in which case Japan would have to bear the brunt of Soviet threat. Perceiving that it was now caught in the narrow valley (*Tanima*) of the Sino-U.S.-U.S.S.R. triangle, Japan found it an urgent task to improve relations with all foreign countries, especially China, lest it be isolated and become “an orphan of Asia.”⁴¹⁰

The negotiation of the Sino-Japanese PFT provides compelling evidence that strategic imperative decisively caused the remarkable improvement of bilateral relations. The treaty negotiation almost completely focused on the anti-hegemony issue. Because of

⁴⁰⁹ Ogata, *Normalization with China*, p. 50; Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 360.

Japanese resistance to the clear anti-Soviet signal that this clause would send to the outside world and also the unstable Chinese domestic politics in the mid-1970s, the talk did not conclude in half year as many predicted at the time but dragged on for four years since it started in 1974. It was until Deng returned to power in July 1977 and the U.S.-China-U.S.S.R. made another important shift at about the same time that the treaty negotiation gained momentum. By 1978, American-Soviet relations had severely deteriorated and the Carter administration had to nurture the China connection to balance the Soviet Union, which was the so-called “China card” strategy.

In the meantime, Japan’s effort since 1972 to settle territorial disputes with the Soviet Union, a major step its omnidirectional diplomacy, had gone nowhere as the Soviets refused to make concessions. Nor was Japan’s trust in U.S. security commitment completely restored during the Carter administration, which considered withdrawing American troops from South Korea and kept U.S. involvement in Asia a low priority while intending the “China card” to substitute such involvement.⁴¹¹ Japan was left with no other choices than consolidating the relationship with China as the U.S. wished. The systemic pressure must have been keenly understood in Tokyo because Japanese foreign minister Sonoda told the LDP Committee of Foreign Affairs in January 1978 that the United States intended to view the Sino-Japanese PFT as “one link of its global strategy.” When questioned in the Diet on what he actually meant by this statement, Sonoda said he was merely describing America’s thinking, not Japan’s. But he also pointed out that the U.S. policy and the treaty were not completely unrelated because of their implication to peace in Asia.⁴¹²

Reservation was certainly obvious on the Japanese side, especially in the field of military affairs, lest the Soviets have any misperception about a Sino-Japanese alliance. But in the eyes of the Soviets, the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause itself embodied an unmistakable message of opposing the Soviet Union. Soviet suspicion was exacerbated by the observation that Washington explicitly encouraged Prime Minister Fukuda, such as

⁴¹⁰ For a typical example of this line of argument, see Hiroshi Shinohara, “Beichū Sekkin to Nihon no Boei (Sino-US Getting Closer and Japan’s Defense),” *Chūō Kōron*, October 1971, p. 149.

⁴¹¹ Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente*, p. 184.

⁴¹² *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, Budgetary Committee of the House of Representative, the 84th Diet session, February 15, 1978.

through Carter-Fukuda summit in March 1977 and Brzezinski's visit to Asia in April 1978, to conclude the PFT with China as soon as possible.⁴¹³ So despite Tokyo's statement that it wished to build omnidirectional relations with all foreign countries, Moscow charged that the Sino-Japanese PFT clearly signaled Japanese intention to take uniform action with China in future Sino-Soviet conflicts.⁴¹⁴

The image of U.S.-China-Japan military alliance loomed even larger in early 1979 as China and America normalized relationship and, when conflict between China and Soviet-supported Vietnam intensified, China requested political backup from both the U.S. and Japan. What China used to justify its demand to Japan was precisely the anti-hegemony clause of the PFT. The "demonstrable effect" of the PFT was so enormous that even the Vietnamese media sounded the alarm to the rising "Beijing-Washington-Tokyo axis."⁴¹⁵ Thus, regardless of its resistance, Japan was still entangled in Sino-Soviet conflict.

Reduced Danger of Mutual Conflict

The Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 led to a dramatic lessening of their mutual expectation of war. Their joint communique signed on September 29 not only terminated the state of war between the two countries but also enunciated the principles of mutual nonaggression and peaceful resolution of all disputes without resorting to the use of force or threat of force.⁴¹⁶ In the aftermath of the diplomatic normalization, government leaders and political elites of both states generally held an optimistic outlook for future Sino-Japanese peace and friendship. On September 30, *People's Daily* published an editorial entitled with an eye-catching headline, "*A New Chapter in the History of Sino-Japanese Relations.*" It proclaimed that, despite their different social systems, the two countries could solve any problems between them and peacefully coexist "as long as they refer to the spirit of mutual understanding and seek common ground on major issues while accepting existing minor

⁴¹³ Ogata, *Normalization with China*, p. 95; pp. 172-173.

⁴¹⁴ Nobutoshi Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōhei no Akushū (Shake-hands by the Emperor and Deng Xiaoping)* (Tokyo: Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1983), pp. 301-304.

⁴¹⁵ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 142.

⁴¹⁶ Upon the insistence of the Japanese government, the text of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique avoided the strictly legal term of "the state of war" but rather used "the abnormal state of affairs." For the text in Chinese and Japanese languages, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 110-111; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshū*, pp. 428-429.

differences.”⁴¹⁷ In Japan, the immediate reactions of the political circle to the diplomatic normalization mostly struck a positive note. On the 29th, the ruling LDP party issued a statement praising the joint communique as “an epoch-making document in postwar Japanese diplomatic history” that “laid down the foundation for lasting friendship between the two countries in the future.” It explicitly acknowledged the improvement of bilateral security relationship by stating that “(diplomatic normalization) not only has great significance to enhancing Sino-Japanese mutual understanding and cooperation but also contributes tremendously to peace and prosperity in Asia and the whole world.”⁴¹⁸

The PFT signed in August 1978 further promised to reduce the risk of militarized disputes. It reiterated the principles of nonaggression and settling bilateral conflicts by peaceful means, and vowed to “develop durable relations of peace and friendship.”⁴¹⁹ So the congratulatory article in *People’s Daily* announced that, with the signing of the treaty, the two countries had entered a new stage of friendship, which it predicted would “last generation after generation.”⁴²⁰

Amid the warm atmosphere brought about by the diplomatic normalization and PFT, China and Japan no longer viewed each other as the apparent imaginary enemy. In Tokyo, the notion of China threat was greatly played down. At a Diet committee hearing in 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka said with a definite tone that since he came back from Beijing he believed that Chinese nuclear weapons were not a threat to Japan.⁴²¹ Meanwhile, previous concerns about monolithic Communist expansion basically disappeared from Japanese strategic analyses and military operation plans published in defense-related journals. Instead, these journals chiefly focused on Japanese countermeasures to Soviet military trend, especially since the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relationship and the escalation of Vietnam-Cambodia conflict in late 1970s. Chinese military doctrines and defense postures continued to be closely examined, but mostly under the assumption of China’s keen perception of

⁴¹⁷ See Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 115-116; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, pp. 446-448.

⁴¹⁸ See Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 117-118.

⁴¹⁹ For the text of Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 228-229; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, pp. 514-516.

⁴²⁰ “People’s Daily Editorial on Everlasting Sino-Japanese Friendship, August 14, 1978,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 230-232.

Soviet military threat.⁴²² In 1978, Chinese vice prime minister at the time, Deng, assured Japanese foreign minister Sonoda Tadashi that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty that included an anti-Japanese theme existed only in name, and expressed China's intention to terminate the treaty in accordance with the treaty provisions.⁴²³ China did announce on April 3, 1979 that it intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, clearing Japan's last doubt.

China also held a much more relaxed assessment of possible security conflict with Japan than before. This was best reflected in China's action to seek a greater military role of Japan in the anti-Soviet united front. Not only supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance and a limited improvement in Japan's national defense capabilities, Beijing now showed strong interest in exploring military exchanges with Japan. Since 1977, a number of Japanese defense researchers, active and retired SDF officers were invited to visit China, which constituted indirect communication between China and the JDA. Beijing actively promoted military-to-military contacts with Japan because they would not only strengthen the symbolic significance of the Sino-Japanese strategic alignment but also benefit China's military modernization and increase its capabilities to counter the Soviet threat.⁴²⁴

Limits of Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation

Despite the generally cordial relationship in the 1970s, it would be mistaken to believe that China and Japan had developed close security cooperation. An important reason was that Japan was fearful of provoking Soviet hostility and getting itself embroiled in big power conflict. Having learned Washington's reassurance of its engagement in the Korean peninsular and also perceived lessened Soviet threat during the mid-1970s, Japan felt

⁴²¹ *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, Cabinet Committee of the House of Representative of the 71st Diet Session, June 26, 1973.

⁴²² For some examples of Japanese defense analyses related to Chinese military power, see Sei Matsutani, "Betonamu Sensogo no Tōnanajija no Dōkō (Southeast Asia in Post-Vietnam Environments)," *Shin Boei Ronshū* (*The Journal of National Defense*), Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1973; Tsutomu Akechi, "Takyoku Sekai no Senryakuteki yōsō to Nichibeī Ampo no Keizokusei (Strategic Aspects of Multipolar World and Continuity of U.S.-Japan Alliance)," *Shin Boei Ronshū*, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1974; Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Chūgoku no Gunji Rosen ni Kansuru Ichi Kōsatsu (China's Military Policy) 1-3", *Shin Boei Ronshū*, Vol. 4, No.3 & 4, Vol. 5, No. 1, December 1976 to June 1977.

⁴²³ Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shohei no Akushu, pp. 286-287.

⁴²⁴ "Chūgoku no Gunjiryoku o Mite"; Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente*, p. 98-99.

that a too close strategic alignment with China would not bring much security benefit but only increase the danger of Japan's entrapment in future Sino-Soviet conflict.⁴²⁵

So Japan was rather cautious in establishing formal military contacts with China. When three Japanese military technicians specializing in tank development were invited to China, the JDA declared that it had nothing to do with the invitation.⁴²⁶ Only in late 1979 did the JDA approve a medical inspection visit by SDF medical officers to China.⁴²⁷ Beside, Tokyo openly rejected the use of Japanese economic aid to China for military purposes. In December 1979 when the Ōhira administration unveiled the first Yen Loan Package for China, it announced three principle of economic aid to China, one of which denied any form of military assistance to China.⁴²⁸ As Nakasone clearly indicated to the PLA Vice Chief-of-Staff Wu Xiuquan in April 1980, the military area was to be excluded from the fields of Sino-Japanese cooperation.⁴²⁹

The tortuous process of negotiating the PFT also attested to Japanese hesitation to be firmly tied to China's strategic blueprint. In the course of the negotiation, Beijing was often frustrated by Tokyo's attempt to dilute the practical implication of the anti-hegemony clause. In September 1975, Foreign Minister Miyazawa of the Miki administration brought up the "Miyazawa's Four Principles" that tried to neutralize the anti-Soviet strategic implications of the anti-hegemony clause by denying that it was aimed at a third country or implied Sino-Japanese common action.⁴³⁰ Unready to negotiate "the third country clause" when domestic radicals were still in power, Beijing called back its ambassador to Japan to express displeasure at Tokyo. The talk was brought to a halt, and did not resume until July 1978 when both sides softened their positions. While Tokyo accepted the anti-hegemony clause, Beijing also had to acknowledge in private the "Miyazawa's Four Principles" to the

⁴²⁵ For a discussion of Japan's perception of lessened external threat and fear of entrapment in the mid-1970s, see Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism*, pp. 103-109.

⁴²⁶ Joachim Glaubitz, "Japan," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, *Chinese Defense Policy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 228-231.

⁴²⁷ Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente*, p. 99.

⁴²⁸ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 109-110.

⁴²⁹ Joachim Glaubitz, "Japan," p. 230.

⁴³⁰ The Miyazawa's Four Principles include: 1) hegemony will be opposed not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also anywhere else, 2) anti-hegemony is not directed against a specific third party, 3) anti-hegemony does not mean any common action by Japan and China, 4) a principle that is in contradiction to the spirit of the United Nations Charter cannot be accepted. See Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 141.

new Prime Minister Fukuda and agreed to include the “third country clause” in the treaty text.⁴³¹ Evidently, Japan’s reluctance to endorse China’s strategic goal of countering the Soviet Union in joint actions accentuated the temporary and tenuous nature of the Sino-Japanese cooperation, a relationship that Bedeski calls a “fragile entente.”⁴³²

The second major obstacle to forging a highly stable and truly trustful relationship was the shadow of history, which served to remind the Chinese that Japan would always be a potential threat even though the immediate danger of conflict seemed to be low. Undoubtedly, Chinese acceptance and even encouragement of Japanese defense buildup marked a drastic departure from prior harsh condemnation of Japanese attempt to revive wartime militarism in the name of national defense. But China’s attitude change did not take place in a carefree fashion. Witnesses of Sino-U.S. secret negotiations on rapprochement testified the deeply entrenched mistrust and panic that Chinese leaders had towards an economically and militarily powerful Japan, to mitigate which American negotiators resorted to the even bigger and more imminent Soviet threat.⁴³³ While persuaded by the practical security interest to form strategic alignment with Japan, Chinese leaders did not forgo suspicion regarding Japan’s intention and future trend. In the inner party report on world situation given in March 1973, Zhou expressed his opinion about Japan’s ambiguous policy if free of the U.S. restraint:

“Japan is afraid of Soviet military threat. In the past it depended on the nuclear umbrella of the United States, but what would it do now? If it becomes completely reliant on America’s military protection, it is clear that America will hold the economic throat of Japan. Therefore Japan has no choice but to develop its own military power. But with military buildup there is the worry that Japan may walk down the old path of militarism! Japan is currently agonized by this problem.”⁴³⁴

In a formal statement on China’s official policy issued in 1973, the vice chair of the China-Japan Friendship Association Zhang Xiangshan echoed Zhou’s concern about potential Japanese threat:

“We are by no means optimistic about the current world situation. While digging trenches to get ready for surprise attacks by the Soviet Revisionism, we are considering the worst scenario with four enemies (attacking us): the Soviet Revisionism from the north, American imperialism from the South, Indian reactionaries from the west, and reviving Japanese militarism from Qingdao and Shanghai...China, Japan and the United States have promised that none of the three countries would seek hegemonism in Asian-Pacific region, but the joint communique between the United States and

⁴³¹ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 406-411.

⁴³² Bedeski, *The Fragile Entente*.

⁴³³ Christensen, *A Troubled Triangle*, pp. 33-35.

⁴³⁴ “Shū Onlai Kokusai Jōsei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu,” p. 174.

Soviet Union did not make such promise. Now that Japan is carrying out peace treaty negotiation with the Soviet Union, (we wonder) how this question will be dealt with in the negotiation.”⁴³⁵

Given its fear of Japan’s repeating the history of aggression in the first half of the century, China’s attitude to Japan did not shift from outright hostility all the way to whole-hearted embracing, but rather guarded optimism. The Chinese media campaign since late 1960s to bash Japanese militarist revival began to decline in late 1971 and diminished sharply since early 1972. But alert for Japanese militarism remained alive among Chinese political elites and was brought up every now and then, even in the mist of the media chorus adulating bilateral friendship. In fall 1972, Liao Chengzhi reminded people of the right-wing power in Japan led by people like Kishi Nobusuke and Kaya Okinori, and expressed concerns about residual Japanese militarism.⁴³⁶ When he signaled Chinese acceptance of US-Japan alliance in January 1973, Zhou Enlai cautioned Japan not to revive militarism in the name of self-defense.⁴³⁷ And when the negotiation on PFT stagnated, a *People’s Daily* editorial commemorating the war of resistance against Japan in 1975 once again mentioned the existence of a small political group in Japan that was still dreaming of reviving militarism.⁴³⁸

Problems of National Recognition

The Dissolution of the Taiwan Hurdle

In the 1950s-60s the Taiwan issue was a matter of crucial national security interest to China and Japan’s recognition of Taiwan was the biggest hurdle for Beijing and Tokyo to establish normal relations. In June 1971 when meeting with Kōmeitō central committee chairman Takeiri Yoshikazu, Zhou Enlai put forward “Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations” with Japan, all focused on Taiwan. The “Three Principles” demand Tokyo to acknowledge that (1) the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China, (2) Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of the Chinese territories, and (3) the

⁴³⁵ Takeji Muno, “Pikin de Kangaeta Nihon to Chūgoku no Dansō (The Dislocation between Japan and China Being Considered in Beijing),” *Chūo Kōron*, July 1973, pp. 216-217.

⁴³⁶ For example, see “Main Points of Liao Chengzhi’s Discussion with the Delegation of Japan-China Friendship Association, October 16, 1972,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 122-125.

⁴³⁷ “Japanese newspaper report on Premier Zhou Enlai’s remarks to Dietman Kimura Takeo on US-Japan alliance treaty and other issues, January 18, 1973,” *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, pp. 455-456.

Japan-ROC treaty is unlawful and should be abolished.⁴³⁹ It was now clear to Tokyo that diplomatic normalization with Beijing would not be possible unless a dramatic change of its policy on the Taiwan issue was to be introduced. Fortunately, China's top priority now was to expand the anti-Soviet united front that should be stopped by none including the Taiwan issue. Also the Sino-American rapprochement removed much of the external constraints that had deprived Japan of the diplomatic choice of recognizing the Chinese communist regime in the past two decades. So the new international system created the motivations and conditions for Japan and China to reach compromise on the Taiwan issue.

The first sign that China softened its policy was sent out in May 1972, when Zhou Enlai told the visiting "old friend" Furui that China would give due consideration to the investment that many Japanese companies had made in Taiwan, which was a reversal of the harsh "Zhou's Four Principles" and appealed to the interest of Japanese business circle.⁴⁴⁰ At that time, Beijing was not yet ready to make further concessions regarding the legal status of Taiwan. As Zhou told Takeiri, now serving as the secret messenger of prime minister Tanaka, in July that the Sino-Japanese joint communique of diplomatic normalization should include the "Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations" and declare the termination of the state of war between the two countries.⁴⁴¹ But this so-called Takeiri Memo still signaled Chinese willingness to tolerate Japan's links with Taiwan at the practical level even after Sino-Japanese normalization.

Unlike in the past when China's insistence on the legal status of Taiwan always created deadlock in Japanese decision-making process, this time Tokyo was able to move ahead with the support of a rare internal consensus. At the Conference of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization (*Nitchū Kokkō Seijōka Kyōgikai*), reorganized in July on the basis of the LDP Research Council on China Problem (*Chūgoku Mondai Chōsakai*) to be directly supervised by the party president, the proposal to push for normalization was passed with a

⁴³⁸ People's Daily Editorial Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, September 3, 1975," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 190-192.

⁴³⁹ "Zhou Enlai's Talk with Japanese Kōmeitō central committee chairman Takeiri Yoshikazu, June 28, 1971," Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 20. Also see Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 69-70; Nagano, *Tennō to Tō Shōbei no Akushū*, pp. 12-13; Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 111.

⁴⁴⁰ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 365-366.

big margin despite the opposition by the pro-Taiwan faction. Having learned China's objection to official relationship between Japan and Taiwan from the Takeiri Memo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in August the official position of the government that Japan would be unable to continue diplomatic relations with the ROC once normalization with the PRC was realized, though practical links in trade and economic affairs would be dealt with in a pragmatic manner. When asked to enunciate the nature of Japan's relationship with Taiwan after Sino-Japanese normalization, Ōhira and Tanaka put out the argument of "natural termination," which stated that the Japan-ROC peace treaty would have to lapse, and their diplomatic relationship would end accordingly.⁴⁴²

Partial Settlement of Sovereignty Right Issues

Although overruled in the decision to cut formal relationship with Taiwan, the pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP did manage to retain existing non-official contacts with Taiwan. Moreover, their stubborn opposition also prevented the government from making further concessions to China regarding the legal status of Taiwan and the Japan-ROC peace treaty. So Tokyo sent two delegations to China led by Furui and chairman of the Conference of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization Kōsaka Zantarō in early and middle September 1972, to appeal for understanding of the domestic political obstacles in Japan to accepting China's terms.

It was in the talk with Furui that Zhou Enlai agreed to the Japanese demand that in the joint communique Japan would not comment on the legal status of Taiwan but only express respect to China's position that Taiwan was part of China, neither would the text mention the termination of Japan-ROC treaty. By the end of the talk, however, the two sides still could not reach agreement on the point of "the end of the state of war," but Zhou told the Japanese delegation not to worry because he would use "good wisdom" to solve this problem. Later when Tanaka visited China, the two sides quickly worked out a tactical solution that the term of "end of abnormal state" would be used in the communique text.

⁴⁴¹ For the text of the Zhou-Takeiri Meeting Memo during July 27-29, 1972, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 89-96; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, pp. 410-418.

⁴⁴² Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 375-377.

Some suspected that Zhou was already prepared for concession even when he met Furui.⁴⁴³ After all, it was not his intention to waste time solving complicated legalistic problems when Beijing was eager to form anti-Soviet strategic alignment with Tokyo.

So diplomatic normalization failed to bring a conclusive end to the sovereignty controversy regarding Taiwan. The 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communique only adopted China's first principle of restoring relations, "the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China," in its entirety while making only indirect reference to the other two principles.⁴⁴⁴ Besides, the communique announced the termination of "the abnormal state of affairs" rather than "the state of war" between the two countries because Japan insisted that the later had been declared in the Japan-ROC treaty. Only in a press conference did Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi state that "the Japanese government's stand is that as a result of normalization with China the treaty ceased to be significant and came to an end," implying that the treaty had been valid up to then.⁴⁴⁵

In fact, semi-official contacts between Taiwan and Japan carried on throughout the post-normalization period. Immediately after the Joint Communique was announced, the LDP's pro-Taiwan faction formed the Japan-ROC Parliamentarian League, which sent a large delegation of as many as 74 incumbent and former Diet members to Taiwan in fall 1973. From then on, delegations of the League traveled to Taiwan on annual basis and many influential conservative politicians visited Taiwan on various occasions, including ex-prime ministers Sato and Kishi, former speakers of the House of Representative Ishii Mitsujiro and Funada Naka, former vice president of LDP Shiina Etsuzaburo. Meanwhile, high-ranking Taiwan officials were often invited to Japan, and Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan and National Assembly Council of the Taiwan government all sent delegations to

⁴⁴³ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, pp. 379-390.

⁴⁴⁴ The communique reaffirmed the stand of the Chinese government that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China," followed by Japan's understanding and respect for this stand and its promise to comply with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation that had stipulated that Japan should return all the territories taken from China. With such circuitous expressions, Japan avoided taking a direct position on the status of Taiwan and tried to maintain political leeway in maintaining contacts with Taiwan. The communique also made no mention of the 1952 Japan-ROC peace treaty, the declaration of whose abolition was included in China's initial demands. See Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, p. 111.

⁴⁴⁵ Yoshihide Soeya, "US-Japan Relations and the Opening to China: the 1970s," Working Paper 5, the U.S.-Japan Project of the National Security Archive, 1996.

Japan every year, let alone various semi-official organizations and institutions that served to maintain intimate contacts between Japan and Taiwan.⁴⁴⁶

The lack of complete settlement of the legal status of Taiwan regime did not develop into serious political problems because Beijing largely tolerated the semi-official Japan-Taiwan contacts in the 1970s. The chief diplomat of Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative in Japan Ma Shuli testified that during the 12 years of his mission since 1973, the Chinese government abhorred these contacts but did not exert such pressure that would force Japan to reject entry visa of high-ranking Taiwan officials, a phenomenon that often took place in the 1990s.⁴⁴⁷ But such close Japan-Taiwan contacts nevertheless generated mistrust between Japan and China and sowed the seeds for future disputes when the Taiwan problem regained political salience in Chinese politics.

Another controversial issue that was temporarily set aside in the 1970s was the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. After the end of WWII, these islands were administered as part of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, by the U.S. government. When the 1971 Okinawa reversion agreement transferred to Japan the administration of these islands, the PRC government protested the transfer and claimed its sovereign right over these islands. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement in March 1972 to rebut China's claim.⁴⁴⁸ But this issue was not even included in the normalization negotiation as both sides were eager to establish diplomatic relations. As Zhou Enlai told Takeiri in their meeting of July 1972, "there is no need to mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count a problem of any sort compared to recovering normal relations (between the two countries)."⁴⁴⁹

During the negotiation of the PFT, island disputes were again brushed aside so that strategic interests would get the priority. In 1974, Deng Xiaoping proposed three guidelines for the treaty negotiation in a meeting with the delegation of the Japan-China Friendship

⁴⁴⁶ Kinkei Lin, *Ume to Sakura: Sengo no Nikka Kankei (Plum and Cherry: Postwar Japan-ROC Relations)* (Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1984), pp. 602-605; Shuli Ma, *Shiri 12 nian (12 Years on Diplomatic Mission to Japan)* (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye, 1997), Chapter 5.

⁴⁴⁷ Ma, *Shiri 12 Nian*, p. 162.

⁴⁴⁸ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 78-79; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, p. 403.

⁴⁴⁹ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 92; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, p. 414.

Association: 1) China would want to eliminate as early as possible all barriers to the conclusion of PFT; 2) treaty negotiation can be started either after or at the same time with the agreement on routine affairs; 3) it is better to shelve the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands for the time being because settling the issue may take several years or more. It is the first time that Beijing suggested to shelve the territorial issue, which was clearly motivated by the desire to accelerate PFT negotiation.

Things were only slightly twisted in April 1978 when a fleet of more than 80 armed Chinese fishing boats protested near the islands against some LDP politicians for using the island dispute to derail peace treaty negotiation. The exact cause of this incident is still unclear, but the two governments quickly agreed that it was merely “accidental occurrence” and would not become problem for the treaty negotiation. After the PFT was signed, Deng asked visiting LDP politician Suzuki Zenkō to convey his proposal that China and Japan may jointly explore the oil resources surrounding the disputed island without touching on the sovereignty issue, and Japan is expected to contribute in the technological aspect.⁴⁵⁰ Thus, Beijing not only put away a controversial issue that could have potentially paralyzed the newly established Sino-Japanese strategic alignment but also turned it into an area of common interest and cooperation. But the problem was never resolved during this period and later became of a point of bitter contention between the two countries.

Historical Burden Brushed Aside

As mentioned above, the gap between the two countries’ war narratives did not close up in this period due to their continuing practice of historical mythmaking. Eager to secure smooth political cooperation, however, the two sides were willing to trade less immediate interests, including the need to resolve historical legacies. Instead of seizing the favorable international environment to carry out joint history research and arrange serious war restitution measures, they used diplomatic tactics to cover up mutual disagreement on war historiography lest it hamper alignment formation. Therefore, the history problem, even though remained unresolved, did not really obstruct their mutual national recognition.

Symbolic gestures of contrition were not rare in Japanese diplomacy toward China in the 1970s. Even before becoming prime minister, Tanaka revealed his belief that Japan's apology for the war was the foremost precondition for a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relationship.⁴⁵¹ During his visit to Beijing to sign the joint communiqué, he spoke of the "unfortunate period" of bilateral history, over which he expressed "deep reflection." Nevertheless, such an apology was too ambiguous to serve any good purpose in regard to historical settlement because he did not tell who caused the "unfortunate period" or use the word "apology." Nor did Tokyo offer economic settlement of the historical account at the time of diplomatic normalization. In fact, in his real thinking, Tanaka did not perceive Japan's actions clearly as aggression. In a Diet session of February 1973, he evaded the question whether the war with China was aggression:

"The fact that at one time Japan did send troops to the Chinese continent, that is a historical fact. On this question, I am not in a position to mention in a straightforward manner whether, as you say, the sending of troops was or was not aggression. This kind of evaluation is for historians of the future to judge."⁴⁵²

But Beijing was rather quick to accept Japanese superficial apology and concede claims for war reparation in exchange for early diplomatic normalization. A quick Sino-Japanese normalization was highly profitable to China in strategic terms, compared to which settling historical account was considered secondary interest. So at the first of the three meetings between Zhou Enlai and Takeiri in July 1972 that were actually the preparatory talks before reaching the joint communiqué, China already offered to forgo war reparation and shoveled the history problem out of the way.⁴⁵³

Conflict on the history issue did emerge during Tanaka's visit to Beijing in September. According to an article by Tanaka published in 1984, the Chinese did raise the question of war reparation in the negotiation right before the signing of joint communiqué, which took the Japanese side by surprise. When Japanese chief negotiator Takashima Masurō replied that this issue had been settled by the San Francisco Treaty, the Chinese side

⁴⁵⁰ "Vice Premier Deng's remarks to member of the House of Representative Suzuki Senko on China's emulating Japanese modernization experience and jointly exploration of the Diaoyu Islands without involving the sovereignty issue, May 31, 1979," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁵¹ Tanaka made this point in his speech at a Diet hearing in March 1972. See Shigezō Hayasaka, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei* (Tokyo: Shuei Sha, 1999), pp. 400-401.

⁴⁵² Quoted in Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 179; Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 138-140.

⁴⁵³ Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 91.

was so outraged that it informed Japan that “if it is such a delegation, we would like it to go home immediately.” Takashima later also recollected that he made the statement that Japan could only realize normalization with China in the framework of the San Francisco treaty system that contained the Japan-ROC treaty. Because China never accepted the San Francisco system and always condemned the Japan-ROC peace treaty, it viewed Takashima’s statement as an outright challenge to the PRC’s international legitimacy. Zhou Enlai’s reaction was fierce – he called Takashima “legal bandit” (*Fafei*) – but it was the Japanese reluctance to refute the legitimacy of the Taiwan regime completely rather than its refusal to pay reparation that was the real cause of Chinese anger. In the end China agreed to renounce war reparation “for the sake of the friendship between the two nations,” which was even a softer statement than that in the Takeiri Memo, where China was to renounce “*the right for* (emphasis added) war reparation claims.”⁴⁵⁴

In another occasion, disagreement on the wording rather than substance of the historiography arose in the diplomatic negotiation. Zhou took issue with the phrase that Tanaka used at the welcome banquet, “Japan caused trouble to Chinese people,” when he referred to the war. China managed to have the joint communiqué include a more serious expression that “Japan would express deep reflection for being responsible for inflicting immense loss on the Chinese people through the war.” Zhou then generously pointed out right away that both the Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.⁴⁵⁵

The opportunity to reopen the issue of historical settlement did not come until the late 1970s when the Ōhira administration decided to extend low-interest yen loans to China. Japanese economic aid was to some extent seen as compensation for the historical debts Japan owed to China, but other political and economic interests were actually more important in prompting Ōhira’s decision, which will be discussed in the following section. Moreover, it was just a tacit agreement between the two governments while no official statement was ever provided to establish explicit linkage between the aid programs and Japanese aggression. Especially the Chinese public never considered that Japan had fulfilled its responsibility to compensate Chinese victims. However, when Chinese popular demands

⁴⁵⁴ Akira Ishii, “Chūgoku ni Otta Mugen no Beishō (The Infinite Compensation Owed to China),” *Chūō Kōron*, No. 8 (1987), pp. 170-171; Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 388.

for Japanese war reparation emerged in the later stage, the formal diplomatic documents that the two governments hastily signed at this point became the insurmountable political and legal hurdles to meeting these demands. From then on, they officially claimed that China had waived all Chinese compensation claims to Japan in the 1972 joint communiqué.

Economic Cooperation

Economic Interaction Promoted by Strategic Interest

Once the international political environment turned favorable, Sino-Japanese economic interaction also received a remarkable boost because past political restrictions on economic interactions were removed rapidly. In July 1972, Minister of International Trade and Industry Nakasone approved the use of export credits in the vinylon plant export to China, lifting the official ban on export credits in China trade stated in Yoshida's letter to Chiang Kai-shek in May 1964.⁴⁵⁶ Because the ban was originally introduced to set a clear boundary between pure economic interaction and political links, the new decision clearly indicated Japan's intention to expand both economic and political cooperation with China.

Following their diplomatic normalization, the two countries were able to develop long-term, officially sanctioned trade ties that were never seen in postwar history. The first inter-governmental trade agreement was signed in Beijing in January 1974. In February 1978 the two governments reached the Long Term Trade Agreement for guiding bilateral trade from 1978 to 1985, which paved the political foundation for a robust economic relationship between the two countries. As a result, the period of 1972-1981 saw an unprecedented bilateral trade boom, with the absolute value increasing more than nine times. The prospect of bilateral economic relations was so bright that a "China fever" swept the Japanese business circle, which swiftly concluded four dozens of investment contracts with the Chinese around 1978.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁵ Wang Taiping ed. *Xingzhongguo Wajiao Wushinian*, pp. 443-445.

⁴⁵⁶ Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 375.

⁴⁵⁷ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Engagement of China: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination." *NBR Analysis* 12, No. 5 (December 2001), p. 10.

The structural imperatives also facilitated certain degree of strategic interdependence in this period. As mentioned earlier, China was particularly interested in seeking Japanese assistance to its defense buildup to counteract the Soviet threat. It is reported that a Chinese team of machinery inspection handed to some prominent Japanese weapon production companies in 1975 a list of modern weapons that China wished to purchase, including anti-tank, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, tanks, fighter jets, anti-submarine patrol planes, ground-based radars and communication facilities. China also showed great interest in engaging close cooperation with Japanese space industry in the field of defense-related space development. But these requests were given cold shoulder in Japan because transferring weapons or military technology would violate Japan's official ban on weapon exports and contradict the COCOM restrictions that remained applicable to Japan's trade with China.⁴⁵⁸

Since Japan was not the only source of weapons to China because the U.S. and West European countries were also interested in becoming such suppliers. So China later shifted its focus from obtaining Japanese weapons to introducing advanced Japanese technology in industry, energy production, transportation and agriculture that would enhance China's national defense capabilities in the long run. This new policy received positive response from Japan, who considered economic aid to Chinese modernization program not only less provocative to the Soviet Union than military aid but also conducive to Japan's own security interest. In December 1979, Ōhira visited China and extended the first Yen loan package that was designated to assist Chinese energy industry and infrastructure improvement.⁴⁵⁹ Before leaving for Beijing, he made clear the strategic significance of Japanese economic aid to China in a meeting with high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“By and large China has settled with the Hua-Deng (Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping) system, although one cannot say that domestic opposition to this system has completely disappeared. To the Hua-Deng system, the future problem of stability will arise if the national goal of modernization is frustrated. In terms of the interest of Western powers and Japan, (China's) pragmatic line of advancing modernization is a good policy. In order to let China to continue the posture of adopting the pragmatic line, our country will keep extending yen loans to China.”⁴⁶⁰

The new economic relations not only brought to China advanced Japanese technology and capital assistance much needed in modernization program, but also provided

⁴⁵⁸ Itō, “Kore ga Beichūnichi Gunji Teikei no Jittai da,”

⁴⁵⁹ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp.109-110.

⁴⁶⁰ Quoted in Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 111-112.

Japan with an opportunity to diversify its external sources of natural resources. After the eruption of the oil crisis, Tokyo was determined to carry out an autonomous energy policy, which stressed the diversification of oil imports. Assisting Chinese energy industry and purchasing Chinese natural energy resources was made an important step of the so-called “resource diplomacy,” which was designed to reduce Japan’s dependence on the Middle East and major oil consortiums for its oil supply. Since the early 1970s Japan had been buying Chinese crude oil produced onshore and later became directly involved in offshore oil exploration projects in China, providing substantial technical and financial support.⁴⁶¹ This policy was welcomed in Beijing. After the Cultural Revolution, China was eager to obtain advanced Western technology to accelerate industrial modernization, to pay for which it needed hard currency that could be earned by selling natural resources. Oil export to Japan in exchange for Japanese technology, plants and machinery was actually made the centerpiece of the 1978 Long Term Trade Agreement.

Limits of Economic Interdependence


Remarkable expansion of bilateral economic interaction notwithstanding, positive structural conditions did not bring about significant increase of bilateral economic interdependence in a strategic sense. Considerable the discrepancy existed between the levels of their economic dependence on one another. Trade with Japan already amounted to over 17 percent of China’s world trade before 1970, and rose to the level of about one fourth of China’s total trade by 1980. But China’s share in Japan’s total trade only grew in a gradual fashion and never exceeded five percent throughout this period (See Chart 2).

In addition, mutual supply of strategically important goods was kept at a rather low level so that a rupture of trade relationship at times of bilateral security conflict would not cause major damage to their economy. Historically, Japan has heavily relied on overseas supply for four categories of commodities including foodstuffs, crude and raw oils, coal, and

⁴⁶¹ For a detailed treatment of Japanese involvement in China’s oil development and oil trade between them in the 1970s, see Chae-Jin Lee, *China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1984), Chapter 3.

iron ores.⁴⁶² China used to be a significant supplier of these commodities to Japan before the war ended. By 1934, 33 percent of Japan's iron ore and 72 percent of pig iron was from China, and Japan's import of coal from China, the bulk of which was high-grade coking coal, amounted to 77 percent of its total coal import.⁴⁶³ After Sino-Japanese normalization, China once again became a potential source of natural resources for Japan. But the breakdown of Japan's import goods by country shows that its reliance on import from China for foodstuffs, oil and coal was always lower than 5 percent during the 1970s, and China never again supplied iron ore to Japan (See Table 7).

Chart 2: Shares of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other's Total Trade, 1970-1999



Source: MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade, Japan)*.

As for China, the bulk of its imports from Japan comprised of machinery and other industrial products, excluding any strategically important goods and technology, like computer or military equipments. Although Japan filled most of China's plant and technology contracts with foreign countries in the 1970s, bilateral cooperation in areas with

⁴⁶² 1976 data shows that Japanese dependence on such imported goods as crude oil, iron ore, wheat and cotton was as high as over 96 percent. See Takashi Baba, "1985 Nen goro ni okeru Waga Kuni Shuyō Shigen no Saitei Shoyō Yunyuryō ni suite (Minimum Import Amounts of Main Resources Required for Japan in 1985)." *Shin Bōei Ronshū (The Journal of National Defense)* 7, No. 3 (January 1980). The situation has remained largely unchanged up to the present day. According to 1999 data, Japan is 97 percent reliant on foreign coking coal, 99 percent on foreign crude oil. In fact, Japan is by far the world's largest importer of coal. See International Energy Agency, *Energy Statistics of OECD Countries 1998-1999*, *Coal Information 2000*, and *Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2001 Review*.

⁴⁶³ Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 185.

military significance was virtually absent. The 1974 official trade agreement endorsed the “most-favored nation (MFN) status” that was practiced by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) member-states. But due to Japan’s adherence to COCOM restrictions in its China trade, the MFN treatment only extended to the areas of customs duties, internal taxes, and customs rules, formalities, and procedures, but not to the “issue of import and export licenses.”⁴⁶⁴ Besides, China received Japanese ODA in the form of yen loans under the conditions that yen loan programs were to be carried out in a way that would not damage the interests of Japan’s other important trade partners, and that Japanese aid would not be used for military purposes.⁴⁶⁵

Table 7: China’s Share in Japan’s Total Imports of Important Natural Resources (1972-99)

	Foodstuffs	Crude & Raw Oils	Coal	Iron Ore
1972	3.4	0	0	0
1975	2.3	3.8	0.5	0
1979	3.0	3.0	1.9	0
1985	6.0	6.4	3.5	0
1990	6.2	7.2	4.2	0
1995	7.0	5.1	6.9	0
1999	11.9	2.5	8.7	0

SOURCE: MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade, Japan)*, various years.

Various factors account for the limited fashion of bilateral economic relations. The COCOM restrictions on Japanese trade with socialist countries was one reason, and the above-mentioned Japanese fear of getting caught in Sino-Soviet conflict also stopped Tokyo from extending bilateral economic cooperation to strategic areas. In addition, Japan was concerned about external dependence on a narrow source of strategic materials. Collaboration with China’s energy industry was just one of the many Japanese efforts to diversify the countries supplying Japan’s natural resources, so that Japan’s national economy would not be put at mercy of certain energy suppliers.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁴ Lee, *China and Japan*, p. 14. For the text of the 1974 trade agreement, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenzianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 149-151; *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, 457-460.

⁴⁶⁵ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 110.

⁴⁶⁶ Other energy development plans under consideration at the time included projects to develop North Sea oil with Britain, to develop natural resources in Africa with France, and to cooperate with the Soviet Union in exploring Siberia oil resources. See Gerald L. Curtis, “The Tyumen Oil Development Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” in Robert A. Scalapino ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley:

Still another important restraining factor in bilateral economic activities was bias in people's thinking. Although their direct impact on bilateral economic interaction was still mild during this stage, negative feelings derived from the unresolved history problem potentially spoiled the atmosphere in which such interaction was carried out. The first problem is the Chinese antipathy to the central-periphery relationship that had dominated Sino-Japanese trade in the colonial era. In the 1950s-60s, China tolerated or even encouraged such a trading style in order to maintain non-official channels of communication with Japan when formal diplomatic links were lacking. After diplomatic normalization, however, Chinese attitude changed. Since 1971, major Japanese trading corporations such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni-Iida and Ito-Chu that had largely refrained from doing business with China in the past decided to expand to the market there. They were particularly interested in China's commodity market and natural resources supply. While welcoming them to participate in the new economic relationship, the representative of China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade Liu Xiwen informed the Mitsubishi delegation in late 1972 that China would not become a market for large quantity of consumer goods or a country of natural resources supply, nor would China allow the entry of foreign capital.⁴⁶⁷

To the Chinese, all three issues – foreign commodity dumping, resources drain, foreign investment – were not merely the oppressive characteristics of imperialism but also prominent symbols of China's humiliating history of foreign conquest and exploitation. Small wonder that even though yearning for industrial modernization by introducing western technology and capital, China did not legalize foreign investment until a new constitution was promulgated in 1982. Such a policy was justified by both Leninist ideology and nationalist sentiments. The fear of Japanese goods dumping remained low in the 1970s because the bilateral trade volume was still small, not that China did not care about it. When bilateral trading volume rapidly expanded in the 1980s, Chinese resentment about trade deficit soared, as shown in the next chapter.

University of California Press, 1977), pp. 148-154; Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, pp. 156-148.

⁴⁶⁷ Toshio Maeda, "Bei-So-Chū to Nihon no Keizai Kankei: 1972 nen (Economic relations between US-USSR-China and Japan: 1972), *Kokubō* 23, No. 1 (1974).

Signs of Chinese sense of historical entitlement that would severely twist bilateral economic relations in the next period of time also emerged in the “honeymoon” period. Many Chinese officials in charge of bilateral economic cooperation affairs felt that Japan should make concessions in negotiating cooperation terms because of the war history. Chae-jin Lee observed in his seminal study of the Baoshan steel project, a symbol of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation from the late 1970s, that anti-Japanese bias was prevalent among China’s top economists and high-ranking economic bureaucrats. Whereas the Chinese side was extremely sensitive to any signs of Japanese arrogance and dishonesty, the Japan side tended to hold the newly opened up China to a high standard and was overly critical of China’s inconsistent economic policy or inefficient performance.⁴⁶⁸ When China unilaterally decided to postpone Baoshan Steel’s second-phase construction and canceled all the relevant contracts in late 1980, Japan responded with fury to what it saw as indication of China’s lack of respect to international business customs. Chinese officials then reacted with equally bitter repulsion.

The Baoshan dispute was later settled with a funding package that Japanese government put together to keep the project going. It was not a purely economically driven settlement but was in part formulated under the pressure of Chinese sense of historical entitlement after China renounced its war reparation claims.⁴⁶⁹ While the major cause of the Baoshan disturbance lied in the dramatic shrinking of foreign plant purchase following China’s readjustment of economic policy around 1980, the emotionally charged mutual criticism in the course of the event left both sides psychologically bruised, setting an ominous prelude to more serious conflicts in the next period.

Popular Relations

Diplomatic Normalization and Warming Up of Popular Relationship


Improvement of the structural environment was the main cause of the rising warmth in popular relations. In Japan, the annual opinion polls conducted by the Office

⁴⁶⁸ Lee, *China and Japan*, p. 57, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁶⁹ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 114.

of the Prime Minister shows that Japanese aversion to Communist China significantly decreased in the 1970s while a feeling of closeness and affection for China flourished in its place (see Chart 3). The increase of Japanese public feeling of closeness to China coincided with the diminishing of perception of China threat. In a 1969 survey, China (15.6%) was rated as the second largest security threat to Japan closely behind the USSR (20.4%).⁴⁷⁰ But a public survey done in April 1972 shows that the percentage of people who felt China (9%) a most threatening country fell far behind that for the Soviet Union (34.3%) and even United States (16.6%).⁴⁷¹ Opinion data indicated that the Japanese public clearly viewed the U.S. and China as standing on the same side of Japan and sharing the common interest of checking the Soviet threat. Data about Chinese public opinion in the 1970s are still lacking, but the fact that the intense government media attack at Japanese militarism quickly disappeared once Japanese defense program was considered useful to balancing the Soviet Union testified to the function of structural incentives.

Chart 3: Japanese Public Feeling of Closeness towards China, 1978-1999



SOURCES: *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook)*, various years.

The surge of popular friendship between the two nations was aided by the steady increase of bilateral economic, scientific and cultural links. In the past the two governments

⁴⁷⁰ Yomiuri Shimbun survey on public perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance, June 1969, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1970, p. 492.

placed strict restrictions on societal contacts due to security concerns and their irreconcilable opinions on the problem of national recognition. As soon as they normalized relations, previous travel restrictions were scrapped and bilateral personnel exchanges increased rapidly. Two types of grass-root exchange activities were worth noting. One was the widespread youth exchange programs to promote mutual understanding of the younger generation. In the form of “youth ships” or “youth wings,” numerous locally initiated groups of Japanese young people came to China by ships and airplanes and youth groups organized by the Chinese government also paid return visits. The other type was the program of friendship cities. By May 1980, friendly exchange relations had been established between 15 pairs of sister cities.⁴⁷² The most famous symbol of bilateral friendly ties was the two giant pandas that Chinese government gave to Japan after normalization to be shown at the Ueno Zoo for the first time. The two pandas soon inspired a sensation throughout Japan, reflected in the production of such big cultural hits as Miyazaki Hayato’s animation “Panda, Go Panda” (*Pandakopanda*). The Japanese enthusiasm about panda and their affection about China associated with this gift were dubbed the “Panda Boom.”

Another important symbol of free societal contacts, an agreement on civil aviation, was also made possible after the political constraints of the Taiwan issue loosened. The negotiation of the aviation agreement was formally started in spring 1973 but soon reached a standstill as the Taiwan Lobby opposed tenaciously against the demotion of national airlines of the ROC to a local company that could only operate in Japanese domestic airports. It was until Ōhira held personal consultations with Mao and Zhou in January 1974 and that an agreement based on mutual compromise began to emerge. While China accepted the future continuation of commercial flight routes between Japan and Taiwan, Japan stated “it was important to avoid contradiction between this matter and the new Sino-Japanese relations,” and promised to treat Japan-Taiwan flights as non-official exchanges and disapprove any national signs on these flights.⁴⁷³ The agreement was finally signed in April 1974 and regular exchange of commercial flights between Tokyo and Beijing began since September 29.

⁴⁷¹ National survey on Japanese attitude toward the United States and China and approval rates of cabinet and party by Japan Research Council of Public Opinion, April 1972, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1973, p. 395.

⁴⁷² National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, *Nitchū Yūkō Undo Shi*, p. 186, pp. 222-226.

⁴⁷³ See the excerpt of the speech of Japanese ambassador to China Ogawa Heishirō after the signing of the civil aviation agreement on April 19, see Furukawa, *Nitchū Sengo Kankei-Shi*, p. 401.

Remaining Public Estrangement

Uncertainty nevertheless exists when one tries to assess the degree of amicableness between the two nations during the “honeymoon” period. The shortage of opinion data on the Chinese side constitutes much difficulty in determining whether ordinary Chinese people indeed thought strategically or merely kept their true feeling to themselves in front of the sweeping propaganda about the importance of anti-Soviet hegemonism campaign. What was certain was that, despite many high-profile gestures of goodwill and the feverish air of bilateral friendship, little efforts were made to foster deep mutual understanding in the 1970s. For one thing, direct, free access to each other’s society was still not possible. Published trip reports of those Japanese visitors to China during this period displayed obvious traces of deliberate arrangements on the Chinese side insomuch the Japanese guests would only see what Chinese government wanted them to see. Besides, although gradually growing, the overall level of societal contacts was rather low in this period, lagging far behind that between Japan and many other Asian neighbors (see Table 8). Ordinary Chinese people had far less opportunities than Japanese people to have direct contacts with foreign countries. So their warm feeling about Japan, if any, was largely built upon imagination and effective government propaganda rather than personal judgment.

Table 8: Japan’s societal contacts with Asian Neighbors

Year	China		Taiwan		South Korea		Indonesia	
	C visitors to Japan	J visitors to China	T visitors to Japan	J visitors to Taiwan	SK visitors to Japan	J visitors to SK	I visitors to Japan	J visitors to Indonesia
1972	994	8,052	47,536	204,939	85,757	180,220	6,543	15,895
1975	4,441	16,655	77,091	358,621	129,186	319,984	11,377	25,278
1977	2,266	23,445	74,525	482,832	46,803	447,519	14,652	42,794
1979	9,406	54,074	148,249	618,538	61,858	526,327	12,341	57,406
1980	15,328	71,473	217,087	584,641	67,919	428,008	17,310	62,098

SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Justice, *Shunyūkoku Kanri Tōkei Nenpō (Annual Report of Immigration Statistics)*, various years.

A more serious barrier to mutual understanding in this period was the lack of honest dialogue between the two countries’ historians on the bilateral war history. Narrowly focusing on the practical interest of strategic alignment, the two governments covered up

bilateral historiographic divergence with politicized historical myths at home and superficial and hasty settlement of historical burden on the diplomatic stage. Negative public emotions about the history were never eliminated but just temporarily suppressed by the overwhelming friendship propaganda, which developed into widespread public cynicism towards such propaganda in both countries in a later period.

SUMMARY

Table 9 summarizes the results of theory-testing against the history of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. In terms of the causes of historical myths, findings in this study corroborate those of the previous period. In addition to the structural pressure for the two countries to form a strategic alignment, the motivations of the ruling elites to strengthen their domestic power should not be overlooked. Historical myths in this period did not merely serve as justifications of national security policy but also played a significant role in domestic politics.

As for the development of bilateral relations, while realist theory accounts for the significant increase in their political and economic cooperation and conspicuous warm-up in popular atmosphere, its predication of deep reconciliation falls short in reality. Other than Japan's fear of being caught in the Sino-Soviet conflict if it drew too close to China and the internal obstruction from the pro-Taiwan faction in Japan against tight relationship with China, the war-related grievances and mistrust vis-à-vis Japan in China was an important restraining factor in the reconciliation process. Unable to explain the dramatic change in bilateral relations given the similar history-writing pattern from the previous period, historical mythmaking theory still correctly predicts the relationship outcome to be in the Shallow Reconciliation stage. Such a result suggests that, if driven by common security interests, former enemy states can quickly turn around and form a collaborative relationship even without eliminating their pernicious historical myths; but the failure to settle historical debts would result in the lack of genuine mutual understanding and trust and prevent the advent of deep reconciliation.

Table 9: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-1981)

	PREDICTIONS		OUTCOMES	THEORY ASSESSMENT
	<i>(I) Realist Theory</i>	<i>(II) Theory of Historical Mythmaking</i>		
Causes of Historical Myths	National myths are merely part of elite propaganda to justify national security policy	National myths are shaped by a multitude of instrumental motivations including strategic goals, domestic political interests and ideological doctrines	Japanese conservative elites maintained war myths to enhance public support to the LDP government and U.S.- Japan strategic collaboration; Chinese war myths were used to support communist ideology and justify the newly formed strategic alignment with Japan	Theory II better fits the evidence
Interstate Reconciliation Result	Significant progress in reconciliation; Deep Reconciliation as a result of positive structural conditions following Sino-Soviet confrontation and Sino-U.S. rapprochement	No change in bilateral reconciliation outcome; Shallow Reconciliation as a result of Conflictual/Quasi-Convergent narratives	Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement	Theory I better fits the relationship change; Theory II is more consistent with the relationship outcome
Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Stage	1: No expectation of war because of common security interest to counterbalance the Soviet threat	Moderate expectation of war because the historical narratives generated mistrust but did not instigate immediate confrontation	Lowered expectation of war – China was eager to form anti-Soviet strategic alignment with Japan, for which it accepted the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese defense buildup; Japanese elite felt compelled by the changing pattern of U.S.-China-Soviet triangular relations to develop political cooperation with China; Bilateral security cooperation was still limited because of Japanese fear of entrapment in future Sino-Soviet conflicts and Chinese deep-rooted suspicion of the danger of Japanese militarism	Theory I explains better the great lessening of mutual expectation of war; Theory II supports remaining Chinese suspicion of Japan

Table 9 continued

<i>Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Outcomes</i>	2: National recognition and full settlement of sovereignty controversies because of the removal of pressure from bloc leader and common security interest	Partial national recognition because narratives did not contain critical land/resources/ethnic disputes or raise historical atonement as precondition for normalization	Partial national recognition – Japan recognized China because the U.S. pressure for Japan-Taiwan formal relations dissipated and the security importance of Taiwan issue diminished after Sino-U.S. rapprochement; Sovereignty controversy remain unresolved because of domestic political factors such as pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP; History burden was set aside for immediate strategic gains and did not block normalization	Theory I explains better the success of normalization negotiation
	3: Smooth economic interaction and high strategic interdependence because of the need of mutual assistance and the domination of absolute gains concern	Limited economic links with frictions fed by negative historical legacies	Limited economic interaction – Bilateral economic interaction grew fast because of the lift of political constraints and their mutually complementary economies; Mutual economic dependence was asymmetric and strategic interdependence low because of COCOM restrictions, Japan’s fear of provoking the Soviet Union, and Chinese nationalist bias against foreign economic influence and sense of historical entitlement vis-à-vis Japan	Theory I explains better the development of economic interaction; Theory II explains the limits in such interaction
	4: Harmonious popular feeling due to the sense of solidarity that generated by the common security interest	Simmering grievances and mistrust derived from historical memories should lead to popular estrangement but no request for direct confrontation	Moderate public tension – Popular feeling warmed up after normalization because of the improvement of the structural environment; Estrangement remained because of the shortage of comprehensive societal contacts and failure to promote history dialogue	Theory I explains better the improvement of popular atmosphere; Theory II explains the lack of true mutual understanding and trust

Chapter Five

Old Feud Comes Back: Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1980s and 1990s

The 1980s and 1990s saw a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations, where the overall cordial atmosphere in the 1970s was replaced with frequent political disputes between the two governments and simmering popular resentment, all typical features of the “Shallow Reconciliation-Friction” stage of interstate reconciliation. This chapter applies the two competing theories of reconciliation to this period to assess their relative explanatory power. The congruence test suggests that historical mythmaking theory, which predicts a decline in Sino-Japanese relations since the first half of the 1980s, offers a more useful explanation than realist theory that predicts the decline would not occur until the end of the decade. A close examination of the evolution of various aspects of the bilateral relationship suggests that it was the negative emotional and perceptual forces generated from the sharply widening gap the two countries’ historical interpretations that mainly accounted for the deterioration of bilateral reconciliation in the 1980s. In the post-Cold War era, despite the lack of a major shift in bilateral power balance, realpolitik factors played a negative role in bilateral relations, given the “rise of China” and assertive international strategies of both countries. But the structurally rooted sense of uncertainty did not obscure the psychological effect of historical mythmaking that exacerbated mutual perception of threat and stimulated public opposition against diplomatic compromises at times of economic and political disputes.

CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS

I. The International System: From A Stable Triangle to Uncertain Structure

In the 1980s, the U.S.-China-USSR strategic triangular relations were by and large unchanged from the 1970s because the U.S. and China continued to collaborate on political and security affairs to counterbalance the common Soviet threat. In the 1990s, however,

with the demise of the Soviet Union and decline of traditional alliance politics, the international system turned more complex and uncertain, prescribing neither clearly defined concordance or discordance of strategic interests between China and other major powers. Consequently, structural conditions for Sino-Japanese reconciliation were still *positive* in the 1980s but changed to a *neutral* state in the 1990s.

The 1980s: Continuing Sino-U.S. Strategic Alignment

In the first two to three years of the 1980s, Sino-U.S. relations experienced a low tide. Before then, Beijing had complained about President Carter's "two-China" policy of the U.S., reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in April 1979 that declared the U.S. commitment to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan, and the administration's contacts with Taiwan government officials. The stability of Sino-U.S. relations was further challenged when Ronald Reagan, whose campaign statements had vowed to pursue more official U.S.-Taiwan relations, entered office in January 1981. In the ensuing bilateral negotiation, Beijing insisted that Washington should not only prevent the sale of the advanced FX fighter jets to Taiwan but also curtail all other weapon sales, and better to agree to a fixed date for terminating all arms sales to Taiwan. But these terms were not acceptable to either the conservatives in the Congress or President's bureaucratic lieutenants, such as National Security Adviser Richard Allen and Secretary of State George Shultz.⁴⁷⁴ Shultz represented the pan-Asia faction, as opposed to the pro-China faction led by his predecessor Alexander Haig, in the administration advocating that American policy in Asia should be reoriented to focus on the strategic importance of Japan in the anti-Soviet global coalition, and that China's cooperation was valuable to the U.S. but not to the extent that would warrant the sacrifice of other U.S. interests such as in Taiwan.⁴⁷⁵ The Chinese side was so frustrated with the Reagan administration's Taiwan policy that it refused to continue military exchanges or purchase American weapons and even threatened to downgrade diplomatic relationship.

⁴⁷⁴ Robert S. Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: the United States and China, 1969-1989* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 175-195; Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, pp. 108-116; Mann, *About Face*, Chapter 6.

⁴⁷⁵ David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," in Robinson and Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 203; Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," p. 138; Mann, *About Face*, pp. 129-131.

In the meantime, the Chinese strategic elites began to reassess international security environment in light of the changing American-Soviet power balance. In a comprehensive study done in 1982, international affairs specialist Huan Xiang and his colleagues drew the conclusion that the Soviet threat to China had decreased and, given Reagan administration's defense buildup and aggressive intervention in the Third World, the two superpowers now posed an equally "hegemonic" threat to world peace. Unlike in the 1970s when it encouraged active American policy to check the Soviet expansion, China now believed that the strategic balance had begun to tilt towards the U.S. and worried that the increasingly confrontational American policy would entangle China in Soviet-American disputes.⁴⁷⁶ So China embarked on a quest for greater strategic autonomy in the triangular relations while abandoning an unqualified pro-Western foreign policy. Formally endorsed at the 12th Congress of the CCP in September 1982, the so-called "independent foreign policy" had a trifocal approach of improving relations with Moscow, continuing good relations with Washington but to avoid getting too close to it, and reaffirming solidarity with the Third World.⁴⁷⁷ As a result, Sino-Soviet normalization talk resumed in October 1982, and bilateral relations made "slow but steady progress" ever since then.⁴⁷⁸

However, the "independent foreign policy" was much less an immediate change of international strategy than a rhetoric to express Beijing's unhappiness with Washington, as well as to appease CCP hard-liners who resented the pro-Western bent of domestic modernization and reform programs, which will be discussed later. China may have envisioned a neutral stance between the two superpowers eventually, but Chinese foreign policy in the remainder of the 1980s could not be truly independent of the U.S. strategic support because the Soviet Union remained the principal security threat to China. When responding to Leonid Brezhnev's speech at Tashkent in March 1982 that offered an overture of rapprochement to China, the General Secretary of CCP Hu Yaobang said China would take "deeds, rather than words" as the real indicator of Soviet intentions. China particularly demanded the removal of three obstacles – the massive Soviet military deployment in

⁴⁷⁶ David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," p. 204; Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, pp. 121-123.

⁴⁷⁷ James Chieh Hsiung, "Introduction," in Hsiung ed., *Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenge for the U.S. and Its Asian allies* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 3-4.

⁴⁷⁸ Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980s: From Confrontation to Conciliation," in Samuel Kim, *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan – as the precondition for any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The responses of Brezhnev's successors by mid-1980s that refused to address the three obstacles were rather disappointing to Beijing.⁴⁷⁹ Even when Gorbachev issued the Vladivostok speech in July 1986 that signaled the Soviet intention to establish cooperative economic and political ties with the nations of Asia, especially China, China still reacted with skepticism. In an interview with an American journalist in September, Deng Xiaoping expressed cautious welcome to the speech and his willingness to meet Gorbachev, pending the removal of the “three obstacles” in the bilateral relations.⁴⁸⁰

Military tensions between China and the Soviet Union indeed remained high in the 1980s. From 1983 to 1985, Hanoi's offensives in Cambodia supported by Moscow provoked Sino-Vietnamese skirmish along their border. Meanwhile, the Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far East placed China within the range of Soviet nuclear attack and Tu-16 bombers deployed in Cam Ranh Bay threatened the security of Southern China. So the Soviet military threat to China did not abate but only worsened in the mid-1980s.⁴⁸¹ In fact, the Soviet security threat to China continued until 1988, when Gorbachev agreed to the complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in the Geneva accords, encouraged Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, and announced significant reduction of Soviet military presence in the Far East and central Asia.

Such structural continuity in the most of the 1980s determines that China would not sacrifice its strategic cooperation with Washington for the sake of rapprochement with Moscow. When China and America successfully put aside the question of American arms sales to Taiwan through a joint communique of August 1982 and addressed a few other controversial issues around 1983, bilateral relations considerably warmed up. Bilateral military cooperation particularly reached an unprecedented level. High-level consultations among military and civilian officials from the two countries were held regularly, and the two

⁴⁷⁹ Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, p. 123; Chi Shu, “Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980s,” p. 113.

⁴⁸⁰ “Replies to the American Correspondent Mike Wallace, September 2, 1986,” Xiaoping Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992*, pp. 170-177.

⁴⁸¹ Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, pp. 164-165.

military establishments also established working-level exchanges. Besides, the two countries shared intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and the CIA even paid for Chinese military goods to be conveniently supplied to the anti-Soviet resistance forces in Afghanistan. In terms of arms transfer, in May 1983 the Reagan administration loosened its controls on high-technology exports to China and put China in an export control category that included many of America's friends and allies. Since 1984 China was even made eligible for America's Foreign Military Sales program, allowing it to buy sophisticated American weapons with the federal government financing these purchases. Their cooperation in various aspects developed so remarkably during the second half of the 1980s that it was considered the "Golden Years" of Sino-American relationship.⁴⁸²

1990s: Towards A Multipolar World

The Soviet collapse and American victory in the Gulf War at the beginning of the 1990s seemed to have transformed the international system from loose bipolarity to unipolarity, where only America "possesses imposing strength in all categories of great power capability."⁴⁸³ But the U.S. failed since to instate a Pax Americana structure around the world. Relations with Western allies turned more competitive because alliance politics had atrophied and countries like Japan and Germany were making strides toward "normal states" with great power capability. American relations with Russia and China could hardly develop beyond a state of cautious, peaceful coexistence due to their disagreement on issues like arms control, human rights, ethnic conflicts, and national unification issues. The American-advocated new world order in the Asia-Pacific region was particularly overshadowed by the "rise of China" as a result of China's phenomenal rate of economic growth and continuous increase of defense budget. Besides, smaller states also expressed their uneasiness to the American preponderance, such as in the occasion of the Nonalignment Movement Meeting.⁴⁸⁴ So for a decade the scholarly mainstream of international relations believed that American hegemony was ambiguous and held skepticism

⁴⁸² Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, p. 141, pp. 165-169; Mann, *About Face*, pp. 136-143.

⁴⁸³ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, No 4 (Spring 1993).

⁴⁸⁴ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," p. 275.

to its durability. To them the international system seemed more like “uni-multipolarity” than simple unipolarity, and some even predicted the rise of multipolarity in the near future.⁴⁸⁵

The great uncertainty in this process of systemic transition caused the lack of consensus within individual states in answering some of the most consequential questions of national security policy, such as “what are the essential national interests and goals,” “where would the threat come from,” “who are the friends and foes of the state,” and “what kind of political and military remedies should the state take to obtain essential national goals.” Calculation of international power distribution could not provide clear-cut guidance to national grand strategy. The sensational argument of “China threat” that emerged around the mid-1990s, for example, was quite controversial because it was still in debate whether the China’s rise had challenged the status quo of global or regional balance of power. So the focus of the question shifted from the measurement of national power to the evaluation of states’ intention, which was never an easy task for it tends to be subject to distortion by inaccurate information, ambiguous interpretations, and even value judgment and emotions. Of importance to states’ foreign policy decisions in the 1990s was no longer so much the international structure as non-structural forces embedded in domestic politics and societal dynamics.

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

Realist theory predicts *de facto* deep reconciliation between China and Japan through the 1980s, just like in the 1970s, because the common Soviet threat still compelled them to cooperate closely. However, when world power distribution was in flux and traditional alliance declined after the end of the Cold War, structural conditions turned neutral, and the security incentives that had promoted bilateral cooperation should decrease accordingly. Therefore, realist theory should predict a downturn in bilateral relations in both the

⁴⁸⁵ See Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion;” Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of A Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security* 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998); Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/1997). An exception is William C. Wohlforth, who argues that the U.S. unipolarity is not only unambiguous but also durable. See Wohlforth, “The Stability of A Unipolar World,” *International Security* 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999).

intergovernmental and popular dimensions since the end of the 1980s. Moreover, the rise of mutual suspicion and concerns about armed conflict should be directly caused by the strategic judgment that new security menace after the demise of the Soviet Union came from the power balance shift between themselves. Besides, bilateral disputes should become more frequent and acrimonious because it was no longer necessary to compromise important national interests in sovereignty rights in exchange for their alignment against the Soviet threat and concerns about relative gains became more prominent in matters of economic cooperation. Likewise, a negative change in popular feelings should arise as a result of a widespread belief that the time for the two countries to unite against the Soviet Union had ended and now the other country was posing a potential threat to their own critical national interests.

II. Historical Mythmaking: Mixture of Conflictual and Combative Narratives

Since the 1980s national memory of both countries have entered a stage of renegotiation and reconstruction. The mainstream national myths were challenged and reshaped replaced by both top-down moves to adjust to the new political needs of the ruling elites and bottom-up trends of the social groups and even individuals who try to project their own political views through historical reinterpretation. While the Japanese conservative elites managed to maintain their dominance in framing national collective memory, the grip of communist historiography on Chinese public gradually became slackened. More and more Chinese people have come to hold hateful emotions about the entire Japanese nation rather than just the small military clique. With the Chinese narrative turning more combative and Japanese domestic debate over war history interpretation evolving into a focal point of international attention, the bilateral historiographic divergence actually grew more dramatic and became an outstanding source of bilateral political disputes and tensions.

Old and New Myths in Chinese Historiography

Changing Political Environment

Since the beginning of the 1980s, pragmatic leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and his protégés, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, gave primacy to modernization programs, the success of which were largely hinged on a general strategy of reform and opening to the West, including Japan. But these reform-oriented Chinese communist elites confronted resistance from conservative old guards in the CCP who loathed indiscriminate emulation of the Western model in economic and political realms. Economically, conservatives like Chen Yun, Bo Yibo and Yao Yilin gained influence while carrying out drastic economic readjustment at the end of the 1970s to curb the frenzied spree of foreign plant importation.⁴⁸⁶ These leaders advocated more centrally planned economy, and opposed too tight strategic collaboration with the West and excessive reliance on Western import goods, technology, and investment. They were skeptical of reform principles of encouraging enterprise autonomy, free market mechanisms and private sectors, especially when negative side effects of reform and openness such as unemployment and inflation, commercialism, and higher crime rate hit the society.⁴⁸⁷

Conservatives' criticism of the economic policies was still relatively moderate if compared with their relentless attack on reform in the area of defense and ideology. For one thing, Deng Xiaoping's action to modernize the PLA through budget cut and personnel reduction, including forced retirement of older military officers, sparked bitter complaints from senior military leaders that Deng's modernization program mistakenly emphasized "pragmatism over ideology" and reduced the role and prestige of the PLA.⁴⁸⁸ These military leaders found political allies among party elders who blamed the reform leaders for their

⁴⁸⁶ Lee, *China and Japan*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁸⁷ Among those most dissatisfied with the economic reform in the 1980s were many urban workers, who felt that reforms had generated highly unequal opportunities for them, reflected in official corruption, widening income disparity between workers in private and foreign-owned enterprises and those in state-owned enterprises, and the rise of job insecurity after companies began to introduce layoff as a management means. Another widely complained issue was inflation. The inflation rate jumped from 2.8 percent per year during 1978-84 to 12 percent during 1985-88. Although their material lives considerably improved since the reform began, urban wage earners saw the price increase eating away a big part of their nominal income increase. A 1986 national sample shows that official corruption and inflation were the two issues that citizens were most upset about. For more on the complicated social-economic consequences of economic reforms and the dissatisfaction in Chinese urban society, see Andrew G. Walder, "Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s," in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, *State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

⁴⁸⁸ Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp. 72-77.

laxity in ideological indoctrination that had given rise to increasingly widespread, dangerous criticism of the party leadership and petition for political system reform. Since spring 1981, the PLA and party elders waged several ideologically charged political campaigns against outspoken intellectuals who sought political reform following the model of Western democracy. Among them were the 1981-1982 attacks on “bourgeois liberalization” embodied in the “wounded literature” that criticized the party’s role in the Cultural Revolution, the 1983-1984 campaign against capitalist “spiritual pollution,” referring to the demands of democratic elite to reinterpret the Marxist ideology to accommodate more liberal ideas, and 1986-1987 renewed campaign against “bourgeois liberalization” detected in the flourishing public discussions on the direct reform of political institutions.

To Chinese top leaders like Deng Xiaoping, unmistakable priority was placed on reform policies that would reinvigorate national economy, modernize the army, and overhaul the administrative institutions. But Deng also had to make compromises and tactical retreats, especially on the political and ideological front, to appease the hard-liners and build a broad support base for the general strategy of reform and openness to the West. In fact, Deng repeatedly threw his support to the army and party elders in the above-mentioned ideological campaigns and was willing to sacrifice his reformist associates, including Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, when necessary. These moves were not always taken involuntarily because Deng himself was afraid that too much freedom in ideological debate would instigate public demands for Western style democratic reform and undermine the ruling power of the CCP. So Deng’s reforms were characterized by Liu Binyan, a noted dissident intellectual, as having a very long economic leg and a very short political leg.⁴⁸⁹

Deng’s attitude to the West was also ambivalent. While accepting international economic interdependence and emphasizing Western assistance to restoring China’s former greatness, he also insisted on preserving the national essence and autonomy vis-à-vis the outside world, especially if Western political influence seemed to threaten the ruling foundation of the CCP regime. Deng’s unparalleled prestige within the party since the beginning of the 1980s and his encompassing contacts and experiences all contributed to the

⁴⁸⁹ Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 192.

formation and prevalence of a new Chinese national identity. So an odd mixture of what Michel Oksenberg and Allen Whiting call “confident nationalism” and “assertive nationalism” emerged. The former acknowledged the importance of Western technology and investment while the later depicted the Western powers as a negative out-group that challenged the interests of the in-group, the Chinese nation.⁴⁹⁰ The xenophobic “us versus them” theme in the second type of nationalism dominated the state propaganda in political and cultural arenas, including official interpretation of national history. It was not only useful to fend off domestic conservative criticism against the reform policy for being soft in foreign relations. Because of the inseparability of the nation from the party and government, the “assertive nationalism” also served to stimulate patriotic emotions among the general public, defuse their resentments about the social-economic problems generated by economic reform, and defeat societal demands for political reform.

In the 1990s, Deng and his successors continued to wrestle with the leftist opposition within the party against the open door policy on the one hand,⁴⁹¹ and the tumbling government prestige among the public following the armed crackdown of June 4th incident and mounting public complaints of social inequality, officials corruption, and failure of social welfare policy. With the popularity of communist ideology in steady decline, nationalism became the centerpiece of government propaganda for intra-party power consolidation and public mobilization. The nationalism was more or less confident and affirmative in economic sphere where China could boast its recent achievement with the aid of international commercial links. But it remained rigid and assertive in ideological and cultural domains not only because the government could not afford appearing weak to the foreigners in the face of conservative resistance to open-door economic reform, but also for purpose of diverting public resentment away from the communist regime to foreign countries.

Related to the rise of “assertive nationalism” since the 1980s was a conspicuous redefinition of the cross-strait relations. In the early Cold War years, Taiwan was a major

⁴⁹⁰ Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Confident Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs* 65, No. 3 (1987); Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng,” *The China Quarterly* No. 142 (June 1995).

⁴⁹¹ For a detailed study of the factional struggle within the CCP from the June 4th incident of 1989 to 1993, see Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng.”

security problem to China because it threatened to invade the mainland with Western support or simply served as the launching base of imperialist American military to contain China. Such threat diminished since Sino-U.S. rapprochement, but in the 1980s the danger of Taiwan independence and legalization of the cross-strait territorial separation increasingly concerned China. To re-embrace Taiwan, a province ceded to Japan by an unequal treaty, was now a question of national pride as the government propaganda geared up the nation for a cause of cleaning foreign humiliation and restoring national glory. So since the early 1980s, the government tuned down the communist ideology of class struggle but stressed national unification and revival, and dramatically departed from its previous harsh stance towards the KMT. Deng Xiaoping approved the renovation of Chiang's old residence and family graveyard in mainland China, Ye Jianying published "Nine Principles for Peaceful Reunification" in 1981, and in July 1982 Liao Chengzhi sent an open letter to Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, appealing for the KMT and CCP to "jointly overcome previous alienation and complete the great undertaking of national unification (*Tongjuan Qianxian, Gongjing Zuguo Tongyi Daye*)."⁴⁹²

National unification issue became even more pressing in the 1990s when the pro-independence force, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), achieved great political ascendancy in Taiwan. Because the KMT still represented the anti-independence constituencies in Taiwan, the mainland government and the KMT found common interest in their struggle against the DPP. Now an important ally in the national unification cause, the KMT was no longer treated as China's archenemy but received much more positive evaluation from the mainland propaganda regarding its historical and present functions.

The Patriotism Education: Rehabilitate the KMT, Blame the Japanese

The rise of "assertive nationalism" and the change of Taiwan policy during this period led to considerable reconstruction of Chinese war historiography. Generally

⁴⁹² See Zhuwei Tie, *Liao Chengzhi Zhuan (The Biography of Liao Chengzhi)* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 578-586; Rongde Li, *Liao Chengzhi He Tade Yijia (Liao Chengzhi and His Family)* (Shenyang, Chunfeng Wenyi Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 343-352.

speaking, the new history no longer centered on the ideological and political conflict between the communist CCP and capitalist KMT. Instead, the “defining fundamental fissure” for Chinese national identity was now drawn between the Chinese nation and foreign nations, especially those nations that had invaded and humiliated China in the past, the most ferocious one being Japan. This was best reflected in the revival of patriotism education that de-emphasized ideological indoctrination and highlighted China’s national struggle with Japan and Chinese suffering during the war.

Chinese patriotism education dates back to the “Five-Love Education” (*Wunai Jiaoyu*) – love the motherland, people, work, science, and public properties – promoted in schools shortly after the PRC was founded. But the program was soon overshadowed by ideological indoctrination when Mao Zengdong criticized in 1957 that young students seriously lacked training in Marxist ideology and understanding of current political affairs. As “The Directive on Educational Work” issued by the CCP Central Committee and State Council in September 1959 pointed out, the fundamental policy of educational work was “to make education serve the proletarian politics,” which required all schools to carry out Marxist and Leninist political education. The tradition of “Five-Love Education” was not formally restored in school curriculum until the mid-1980s, when the State Education Commission (SEC) ordered the curriculum reform of the “thoughts and politics” (*Sixiang Zhengzhi*) subject. A policy document of the SEC of April 1990 further instructed that “(schools) should place patriotism in an extremely prominent position” and should “integrate patriotism education and education of the condition of our country with the education of loving socialism and loving the CCP.”⁴⁹³

With nation-centered patriotism replacing class-based ideology to be the key component of moral education, an education campaign using past history of resisting foreign aggression swept Chinese schools. In late 1991, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television selected 140 movies on patriotism and revolutionary tradition to be shown to school pupils nationwide.⁴⁹⁴ In 1995 and 1996, the SEC and cultural propaganda

⁴⁹³ For an overview of the government policy on patriotism education in Chinese schools since 1949, see Weizhong Pu, et al eds. *Aiguo Zhuyi Yu Minzu Jingshen (Patriotism and National Spirit)* (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 63-84.

⁴⁹⁴ *Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian (China Film Yearbook)*, 1991, pp. 47-48.

departments came up with a list of 100 patriotic songs, 100 patriotic books, and 100 bases of patriotic education around the countries.⁴⁹⁵ Not to mention the large quantity of extracurricular reading materials on Chinese cultural traditions and moral concepts, and national symbols, history and geography that were produced to meet the demand of the campaign.

During this campaign, the Sino-Japanese war was always an indispensable source material. No longer buried in the China's longtime struggle for national independence, the war of resistance against Japan was singled out as the most important military and political conflict in Chinese history not only for its unprecedented scale but also because in this war "China could claim its first complete victory against foreign invaders."⁴⁹⁶ This war was even defined as the turning point of Chinese national fate from decline to resurrection for it was credited for having paved the foundation for Chinese modernization.⁴⁹⁷

Noticeably, the new narrative gave considerable credit to the KMT's military resistance. It still criticized Chiang's anti-communist attitude, but also stressed that he had never given up resistance campaign against the Japanese and even claimed that the KMT and CCP shared common interest in countering foreign aggressors and reviving China. Textbooks published on the basis of the 1986 Teaching Guideline for the first time introduced detailed treatment of the conventional military campaigns fought by the KMT-led troops. They not only acknowledged the military significance of the KMT-fought battles, such as the rare victory in the Taierzhuang Battle, but also lauded the patriotism and courage of the Nationalist army, and even called a number of KMT generals who died in these battles "martyrs," a phrase that used to be reserved for communists only.⁴⁹⁸

Meanwhile, war movies replaced negative stereotyping of noted KMT characters such as Chiang with a more realistic approach, in feature films like *Xian Shibian* (Xi'an

⁴⁹⁵ *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian (The Yearbook of Chinese Education)*, 1996, pp. 957-964; *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian*, 1997, pp. 147-149.

⁴⁹⁶ See "Jiang Zeming's Speech at the Veterans' Symposium Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, August 25, 1995," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 939.

⁴⁹⁷ Liu ed., *Zhongguo Fuxing Shuniu: Kangri Zhangzheng de Banian*, pp. 1-5.

⁴⁹⁸ MST 7, Vol 4; HST, Vol. 2.

Incident) released in 1980, *Xuezhan Taierzhuang* (The Sanguinary Battle of Taierzhuang) in 1986, and documentary films like *Kangri Fenghuo* (The Flames of War of Resistance against Japan) in 1985. The movie *Xuezhan Taierzhuang* particularly stood out as the first film made in the mainland that directly broke the taboo on the subject of the Nationalist resistance campaign. The directors testified that the production of this movie got strong support from top party leaders and propaganda departments for it not only could stimulate Chinese patriotism but also contribute to CCP-KMT cooperation in national unification cause.⁴⁹⁹

Official commemoration of the war also changed emphasis to stress the international conflict between China and Japan rather than the internal conflict between the CCP and KMT. A high-profile memorial institution, the War of Resistance Museum, was first opened in the Beijing suburb of Wanping in 1987. While highly eulogizing the role of the CCP in the anti-Japanese war, the exhibition also praised the Nationalist government for carrying out “some effective policies relating to resistance to Japan and the establishment of reforms in the political, economic, cultural and foreign relations fields.”⁵⁰⁰ Budgets were also provided for local governments to build or refurbish memorial sites dedicated to major battles fought by the KMT army, such as the memorial hall of Taierzhuang Battle, and the tombs of KMT officers and soldiers killed during the war including Generals Tong Linge, Zhang Zizhong and Zhao Dengyu.⁵⁰¹

Not only the KMT’s contribution to the war victory but also Western aid to Chinese war efforts was explicitly acknowledged. Textbooks in the 1990s commonly mentioned American air raids of Japanese territories and the decisive role that the American nuclear bombs played in imposing unconditional surrender on Japan. With the negative descriptions of the KMT and U.S. governments both taken out from the official historiography, what was emphatically deplored was only the “vicious Japanese imperialist aggressors.” Not simply condemning Japan’s long-time aggressive ambition toward China as in the past narrative, the new interpretation gave much emphasis to the atrocious war crimes committed by Japanese

⁴⁹⁹ “‘*Xuezhan Taierzhuang*’ Daoyan Yishu Zhongjie (Summary of Director Art on *Xuezhan Taierzhuang*), *Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian* (The Yearbook of Chinese Movie), 1987, pp. 3/12-3/16.

⁵⁰⁰ Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum,” p. 284.

⁵⁰¹ See “Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi (Ruins, Old Sites, and Memorial Facilities),” in Zhang Shaosi et al. Eds., *Zhongguo Kangri Zhangzheng Dacidian* (The Dictionary of Chinese War of Resistance against Japan) (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1995).

army in China. Since late 1980s, textbooks greatly expanded treatment on these crimes, covering a more comprehensive range of crimes than before, providing vivid descriptions, concrete figures, pictures of these crimes, and even naming individual villages or persons victimized by Japanese atrocities.⁵⁰²

War movies made since the 1980s also shifted focus from praising Chinese revolutionary heroism to disclosing Japanese brutality and Chinese suffering. For example, a number of films made in this period were particularly dedicated to the Nanjing Massacre, including the documentary film *Nanjing Datusha* (Nanjing Massacre) released in August 1982, and feature films *Tucheng Xuezheng* (Bloody Testimony of Massacre in A Captured City) and *Nanjing Datusha* (Nanjing Massacre) produced in 1987 and 1995 respectively. The Chinese government also subsidized the production of a horror film around 1988, *Hei Taiyang 731* (Black Sun 731), on the germ warfare conducted by the secret Japanese Unit 731 in Manchuria during the war. Such a phenomenon was unthinkable in the past when revolutionary heroism dominated propaganda and art works dealing with national suffering were denounced as preaching defeatism or bourgeois humanitarianism.⁵⁰³

At the same time, war commemoration in China brought Japanese brutality and Chinese suffering to the center of collective war memory. An editorial published in *People's Daily* on September 18, 1991 called the anniversary day of the Manchuria Incident “A Day of National Humiliation.”⁵⁰⁴ In his official statement on the 50th anniversary of the end of war, Jiang Zemin gave exceptionally high figures of Chinese human casualties and economic cost during the war, and called the crimes committed by Japanese aggressors as the most barbarian and brutal in Chinese history.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰² See MST 7, Vol 4; HST, Vol. 2.

⁵⁰³ Yijun Luo, “Fan Faxisi Dianying Fasilu (Reflecting on Anti-Fascism Movies)” and Hong Qi, “Shijie Fan Faxisi Ticai Dianying Yantaohui Zai Nanjin Juxing” (Conference on World Anti-Fascism Movies Held in Nanjing), in *Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian (China Film Yearbook)*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Dianying Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 230-236, pp. 325-326.

⁵⁰⁴ “People’s Daily Editorial: Self-respect, self-confidence, and Self-strengthening, in Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the ‘September 18 Incident,’ September 18, 1991,” Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 800.

⁵⁰⁵ See “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Beijing Assembly Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan and Anti-Fascism World War, September 3, 1995,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 948.

War museums commemorating Chinese suffering mushroomed across the country. The Memorial for the Compatriot Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by the Japanese Invading Troops was completed on August 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. The name of the building was in Deng Xiaoping's handwriting. On display are numerous photographs, written documents, testimonies of survivors and witness, as well as human skeletons of victims of the massacre. On the front wall inscribed "VICTIMS 300,000" – the official Chinese estimate of killed victims – in Chinese, English, and Japanese. The ending part of the exhibition indicates that this museum has been designated as an important site for patriotic education for school children, youths, and military across the country. Besides this grand memorial, smaller monuments were also erected at about 13 sites of Japanese killings in Nanjing.⁵⁰⁶ In other places of the country, museums were constructed since the 1980s at various sites of Japanese atrocities, including the Museum of the Criminal Evidence of Unit 731 Bacteria Troop built in 1985 in Haerbin, and the September 18 Historical Museum in Shenyang that was originally built in 1991 as a broken calendar opening at the page of September 18, 1931. When the Shenyang museum reopened in 1999 after renovation, it added a bell inscribed by Jiang Zemin's handwriting "Never Forget National Humiliation" (*Wuwang Guochi*).

Academics were also encouraged to conduct deeper investigations of Japanese atrocities. The past two decades saw an unprecedented amount of academic works and released government documents on Nanjing Massacre, as well as the holding of several international academic symposiums on this historical event.⁵⁰⁷ Chinese research works on Japanese war crimes now used a wide scope of materials including data of systematic surveys and interviews with survivors and witness, as well as primary sources in English and Japanese languages. New academic journals specialized in the study of the war, such as the

⁵⁰⁶ See "Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi," Daqing Yang, "Contested History: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar Japan and China," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific Wars*. Takashi Fujitani et al. eds. (Durham, N.C.: The Duke University Press, 2001).

⁵⁰⁷ For examples, see *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao (Historical Narratives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China)* (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987); Chenshan Zhu ed., *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Xincunzhe Zhengyanji (Testimonies of the Survivors of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China)* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994); Chinese Second National Archives in Nanjing ed., *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Dangan (Archives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China)* (Nanjing: Jiansu Guji Chubanshe, 1997); Anji Chen ed., *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji (The Anthology of the International Symposium on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China)* (Hefei: Anhui

influential *Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu* (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War Against Japan) started in 1991, also made investigation of Japanese war atrocities as one of their most important topics. In addition, provincial and municipal governments started digging and compiling local history of war suffering.

Last but not the least, the change of tone in official historiography was soon echoed throughout the society. The nonfiction work entitled *The Great Nanjing Massacre* by an army writer, Xu Zhigeng, was one of the most successful bestsellers on the topic of Japanese war atrocities. First coming out in December 1987 on the 50th anniversary of the massacre, the book was sold 150,000 volumes in the first month and reprinted time and again afterwards to meet the market demand. It was soon included in the reading list of patriotic education in numerous factories, schools and army units, and also won many high prizes in national book competition.⁵⁰⁸ Since then, Japanese war atrocities became a hot topic of Chinese pop culture. Numerous books for public consumption have been published on the subject in the past two decades, many of which were products of the initiatives of local government and individual publishers and authors.

Victim Consciousness and Societal Challenge to Official Myths

The new focal point of Japanese brutality and Chinese miserable experiences during the war in the official historiography since the 1980s gave rise to an outpouring of victim consciousness among the Chinese public vis-à-vis Japan. While the government propaganda maintained the simultaneous victimization of Japanese ordinary people, the general public preoccupied with Chinese suffering felt little sympathy for Japanese war experiences and were disgusted with official slogans about Sino-Japanese friendship. They blamed the official historiography for being still too restrained in telling the real terror of war and going too far in stressing peace and humanitarian values that meant little to a deeply traumatized nation. A movie critic angrily called the movie *Nanjing Massacre* a work of

Daxue Chubanshe, 1998). For a recent, comprehensive review of Chinese historiography on Nanjing Massacre, see Daqing Yang, "Convergence or Divergence?"

⁵⁰⁸ Zhigeng Xu, *Nanjing Datusha (The Great Nanjing Massacre)* (Beijing, Jiefangjun Wenyi, 1987). The English translation of the book came out in 1995. See Zhigeng Xu, *Lest We Forget: Nanjing Massacre, 1937* (Beijing: Chinese literature Press 1995).

pseudo-humanitarianism because it gave more attention to a Japanese female victim than numerous Chinese victims and showed too few killing scenes to convey to audience the barbarism of Japanese army. At a symposium on WWII movies held in Nanjing in 1995, another critic scathingly asked why the Chinese film industry was so interested in telling stories about Japanese orphans left in China but neglected to address Chinese orphans whose parents were killed by Japanese army.⁵⁰⁹

The prevalence of victimhood in Chinese society brought into question a national myth that the government had tried to maintain thus far, which is that Japanese militarists are the enemy but Japanese people are our fellow victims and innocent. Chinese popular understanding of the war history in this period well blurred the distinction between good Japanese and bad Japanese. Bestselling books, internet chat rooms and other private discussion forums on Japan and war history commonly ascribed the Japanese action of aggression to the character and culture of the Japanese nation, including its narrow-minded egoism, emperor worship, and bellicose Bushido, or the way of warriors. So they accused the entire Japanese nation of being brutal, aggressive, and unrepentant.⁵¹⁰

Hence, parallel with the government endeavor to construct new myths and maintain some old myths, a new type of memory representing the surging public cynicism against the official historiography was emerging in Chinese society. Not only that the dual approach to Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people lost its appeal among Chinese public, but also some cultural elites made open bids for renegotiating national history and identity with their own historical conception. One of the early controversial art works on the war was the international acclaimed film *Hong Gao Liang* (Red Sorghum) based on a short novel by famous writer Mo Yan and directed by Zhang Yimou, a leading member of the “Fifth Generation” of Chinese filmmakers. Belonging to the post-Cultural Revolution generation of literature elites, Mo were disgusted with rigid, politicized representation of historical

⁵⁰⁹ Yiming Li, “Lishi Zaixian yu Renmin Jiayi: Ping ‘Nanjing Datusha’ (Historical Reconstruction and People’s Memories: comments about the movie ‘Nanjing Massacre’);” Hong Qi, “Shijie Fan Faxisi Ticao Dianying Yantaohui Zai Nanjin Juxing,” in *China Film Yearbook 1996*, pp. 267-269, 325.

⁵¹⁰ For some examples of bestselling books with a sweeping anti-Japanese view, see Qiang Song et al., *China Can Say No* (zhongguo keyi shuo bu) (Beijing: Chinese Joint Press of Industry and Commerce, May 1996); idem., *China Can Still Say No* (zhongguo haishi nengshuo bu) (Beijing: Chinese Wenlian Press, October 1996);

events and sought instead to uncover the embedded human emotions and desires. The key characters in the novel were men and women working in a rural wine refinery, who “do not consider themselves to be part of any organized fighting force, nor do they consider themselves to be fighting on the side of righteousness . . . For these fighters there is no PLA, no Communist Party, no Chairman Mao. They fight to survive, they fight for their land, their native soil (*xiangtu*). To be a hero is to fight the Japanese.”⁵¹¹ Mo actually wrote the novel based on orally transmitted stories in his hometown, so it was a ground-breaking work conveying the private memories of the war in China that had always been alive but missing from official propaganda. The very intention of the film to rid of excessive ideological and political themes incurred simultaneously a barrage of grave criticism and wholehearted praise from different Chinese film critics.

Hong Gao Liang was only one of many literature works produced in this period that emphasizes ordinary people’s life and reactions, which was the non-governmental aspect of the war that had been ignored by the orthodoxy historiography. Examples include *Riben Guizhi Laile* (Here Come the Japanese Devils), a novel published in 1991 by Ye Zhaoyan, and the trilogy on the war of resistance by novelist You Fengwei completed in mid-1990s. Unlike previous propaganda that tended to portray Chinese people as brave and patriotic warriors who always won the final victory no matter going through how much hardship, these works centered on the harmless but often gullible, weak, ordinary Chinese people who do not have the instinct to fight but embrace too much wishful thinking about foreign invaders; when they do rise up to fight, they are often self-organized rather than having any partisan leadership and do not necessarily have a national cause but only strive for the survival of their own community.⁵¹²

One of You’s trilogy novels, *Shengcun* (Survival), was later made into a movie, *Guizhi Laile*, or Devils at Doorstep, by a vanguard Chinese film director, Jiang Wen.⁵¹³ Adding his

Keqin Sun, *Containing China* (ezhi zhongguo) (China Yanshi Press, 1996); Jiwen Xiao et al., *Riben: Yige Bukeng Fuzui de Guojia* (Japan: A Country that Refuses to Admit Its Crimes) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998).

⁵¹¹ Peter Li, “War and Modernity in Chinese Military Fiction.” *Society* 34, No. 5 (July/August 1997), p. 86.

⁵¹² Zhaoyan Ye, “*Riben Guizhi Laile* (There come the Japanese Devils),” in *Cai Hong Ling* (*Gathering Red Water Chestnut*) (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1993); Peifan Xu, ed. *Cong ‘Shengcun’ dao ‘Guizhi Laile’* (*From Novel ‘Survival’ to Film ‘Devils at Doorstep’*) (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999).

⁵¹³ For some reasons yet to be disclosed, this movie has been banned in China so far.

sarcastic touch, Jiang turned the movie into a farcical story that mocked the illusion held by a group of Chinese villagers about peaceful coexistence with Japanese invaders who had no conscience but only greediness and barbarism. Like Mo and Ye's works, this movie also touched on the sensitive issue of ordinary Chinese people's life under Japanese occupation, including petty collaboration, human weakness, and everyday psychological suffering. The following remarks of Jiang Wen stated in a media interview revealed his intention to advance a competing historical outlook than the official one:

"I do not like to avoid sensitive questions. Actually, I think that only sensitive and controversial questions can get to the heart of a problem. I am particularly interested in the relationship between the aggressors and the victims, and the way that violence is nurtured. We tend to believe that violence is nurtured by the aggressor, but is this the case? Could the victim also provide the seed for violence? I am also interested in the relationship between human beings and war. Why do we make war even though we claim we hate it?"⁵¹⁴

You and Jiang's works exemplify a society-based intellectual attempt to debunk the half-century long official national myths about an honorable and triumphant war, and the heroic image of the nation under the leadership of the CCP during the war. Their narratives also sought to challenge the politicized historical view on the Japanese militarists/people distinction and simple dichotomy between Chinese patriots and traitors. Concurring the official historiography in transforming the national image from hero to victim, they differed in that they did not solely blame Chinese suffering on the perpetrators but also try to reveal the natural, humanly reactions of the victims themselves in the face of foreign invasion.

Japanese Historiography in New Political Context

Japan's New Diplomacy and Self-Glorifying Historical Myths

By 1981, Japan became the world's most important capital exporter, which ushered in an era of so-called "Japanese subsidization of American hegemony."⁵¹⁵ Having made great success in its economic catch up with other Western powers, the Japanese government sought to aggrandize Japan's international influence and prestige starting from the popular leader Nakasone. He pointed out, "The first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having

⁵¹⁴ Interview of Jiang Wen by *Motion Pictures*, 2000, at http://www.filmfestivals.com/cannes_2000/official/guizi.htm

⁵¹⁵ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

‘caught up,’ we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves.”⁵¹⁶ Although still framed around the axis of the US-Japan alliance, Nakasone’s internationalist diplomacy was on the premise that Japan should no longer be a follower state but should take on more initiative and autonomy in world and regional political affairs.

In support of the new diplomacy, Nakasone called for “a transformation of national consciousness,” the key task of which was to nurture national self-confidence and pride commensurate with Japan’s new role of international leader. In his view, the humiliating defeat in WWII, seven years of foreign occupation, and Japan’s long-time status as a junior partner in the U.S.-Japan alliance stripped the postwar Japanese generation of a strong sense of national purpose. So he advocated looking for spiritual inspiration in traditional culture and national history.⁵¹⁷ Nakasone’s intention to reconstruct a positive national identity through historical reinterpretation was manifest in his attitude toward the Yasukuni Shrine issue. His predecessors never visited there in official capacity on August 15. But on August 14 of 1985, the Nakasone government issued a statement explicitly acknowledging the shrine as the central national institution to mourn Japanese war dead.⁵¹⁸ And on the next day he worshipped at the shrine in official capacity. Shortly before the worship, Nakasone openly expressed his disagreement with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that he believed had “spread throughout Japan a self-torturing belief that our country was to blame for everything.” “I’m against this.” he proclaimed, “whatever happens, the state must continue to exist. It is the people who inevitably either bask in glory or are exposed to disgrace, because they are the people. Casting disgrace aside, advancing forward in the pursuit of glory – this is the essence of the nation and of the people.”⁵¹⁹ For him, official worship at the shrine was an important symbolic gesture to encourage the Japanese people to walk out of the shadow of the disgraceful war and embrace a positive understanding of the history.

Nakasone’s appeal to the Japanese people to “cast disgrace aside” did not ignore the issue of Japanese war responsibility completely. Rather, he argued that some important

⁵¹⁶ Quoted from Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, pp. 90-91.

⁵¹⁷ Pyle, *The Japanese question*, pp. 94-101.

⁵¹⁸ Itagaki, *Yasukuni Koshiki Sanbai no Sokatsu*, pp. 123-127.

⁵¹⁹ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 171.

“political accounts” must be settled before Japan can embark on a new stage.⁵²⁰ It is because he was one of those realistic Japanese politicians who first realized that Japan’s quest for economic and political leadership would never succeed if it did not make some direct gestures of contrition to mitigate the high degree of suspicion still held by victim countries of its past aggression. In fact, his apology diplomacy effectively helped patch up the Japan-South Korean relations that had been troubled by the 1982 textbook controversy that will be discussed later.⁵²¹ He also spoke out at Diet sessions that the Sino-Japanese War was “a war of aggression,” a definite phrase that was first ever used by a Japanese prime minister.⁵²²

Nevertheless, Nakasone did not intend to carry out thorough settlement of historical debts with other countries. What he opted for was more straightforward apologies to these victim countries at open occasions, but once that was done, no further actions of historical settlement were necessary. As he said in a newspaper interview in 1997, “we have been apologizing, and the act of contrition has been performed. It is all over and done with.”⁵²³ Therefore, despite these gestures of contrition, Nakasone’s history policy did not differ noticeably from previous administrations in regard to historical fact investigations or substantial reparation programs for foreign war victims.

In the 1990s, diplomatical objectives continue to drive conservative efforts to cultivate nationalist emotions among the public using historymaking tools. The focus now was to mobilize public support to a more active policy on Japan’s military involvement overseas, which was triggered by the lack of international appreciation to Japan’s generous financial contribution to the Gulf War effort. Leaders and intellectuals felt imperative to increase Japan’s “international contribution (*Kokusai Kōken*)” not only in monetary terms but also with substantial logistic and personnel support if Japan were to win respect of the world society. In the words of Ozawa Ichirō, an outspoken conservative politician, it was time for

⁵²⁰ Nakasone proposed to carry out a “general postwar settlement of political accounts” (*Sengo Seiji Sōkessan*) in his inauguration speech in November 1982.

⁵²¹ In his speech to welcome visiting South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in September 1984, he admitted the fact that “Japan caused great suffering to your country and your people during a certain period during this century,” expressed “deep regret for the wrongs done to you,” and promised not to repeat these wrongs in the future. This speech greatly pleased Chun and the Korean public, paving the way for broader economic and political cooperation between the two countries.

⁵²² Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 169-170.

⁵²³ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 182.

Japan to become a normal state that “evades no responsibility or duty in international cooperation” to ensure world peace and stability.⁵²⁴ To this end, the conservative elites pushed for a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, passed legislation on SDF participation in international peacekeeping operations, and lobbied for constitutional reinterpretation or even revision to obtain Japan’s collective security rights. But they faced an uphill battle to reach these objectives given the deep-rooted anti-militarism in Japanese society that resisted the increased role of armed forces in case it would again threaten peace and democracy in a way similar to that in the war history. So glossing over the past war of aggression in historiography was needed in order to restore public trust in military organization and win their support to the new Japanese policy of international activism.

Not only to serve foreign policy goals, self-glorifying historical myths are also useful to salvage the falling prestige and power of the conservative force. Fierce factional struggle, failing economy, and most importantly, rampant political corruption since the beginning of the 1990s shook the legitimacy foundation of the conservative regime. The LDP suffered a fiasco in the 1993 election and lost power for the first time since it was formed in 1955. Although returning to office one year later, it now had to share power with a few small parties in a coalition government. At the same time, cynicism towards party politics became widespread, leading the voter turnout sharply down in both national and local elections in the 1990s. It would have been difficult for the LDP to stay in power if it had not been the fragmentation and incoherence of the political opposition. As the conservative government was unable to implement any decisive reform of the ailing economic and political system it had long promised, it had to resort to historymaking instrument to boost nationalistic morale and divert public complaints to its policy.

So Japanese leaders in the 1990s to a large extent inherited Nakasone’s tactics of minimal admission and remorse to win international acceptance of Japanese power but refraining from making unambiguous apology or responding to individual Asian victims’ demands for official compensation. During his visit to Singapore in May 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu stated the intention to do self-reflection over Japan’s actions that had caused

⁵²⁴ Ichirō Ozawa, *Nihon Kaizō Keikaku (Blueprint for A New Japan)* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1993), p. 104.

suffering to Asian people since the beginning of the Pacific War. But it was Hosokawa Morihiro of the newly formed Japan New Party who was the first prime minister after Nakasone to use the phrase “a war of aggression” at his inaugural press conference in August 1993. But this statement not only encountered vehement attacks from the LDP and Nihon Izokukai but also was considered improper by his own coalition government. Later Hosokawa had to change the wording to “acts of aggression” in his first general policy speech. Besides, the Hosokawa administration foreclosed any possibility of official reparation to foreign war victims by repeating the LDP’s long-term position that all war reparation issues had been resolved.⁵²⁵

In June 1994, Murayama Tomiichi, Japan’s first socialist prime minister in 47 years, came into power in a coalition with the LDP. On the 50th anniversary of the end of war, Murayama issued an unprecedentedly straightforward apology. He admitted that “Japan’s colonial rule and aggression inflicted immense harm and suffering” upon other Asian countries, “humbly acknowledge(d) these irrefutable facts of history,” expressed “deep remorse” and offered “an apology from the bottom of heart,” and even hoped that “no such mistake will ever be made in the future.” However, his position was soon attacked by conservative politicians, who prevailed in the drafting of the Diet resolution to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of war. In the end, the resolution that was supposed to bring an end to Japan’s historical burden failed to articulate Japanese war responsibility and express heart-felt repentance.⁵²⁶ So generally speaking, in this period Japanese government offered apologies in small doses and often with elements of double-dealing or considerable ambiguity.

As for war compensation to other Asian victims, Japan maintained the old position that all war reparation issues had been solved in international or bilateral treaties with former belligerent states. But this policy was shaken since the early 1990s when the “comfort women” bombshell embarrassed Japan in front of the world. Under enormous international pressure, in August 1993 the Hosokawa administration announced the results of the official

⁵²⁵ Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 4-11; Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 179.

⁵²⁶ See the text of “Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History” and analysis of the text by John Dower in *The Journal of the International Institute*, the University of Michigan (Fall 1995).

investigation of the comfort women issue and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei admitted direct and indirect involvement of the Japanese government in the forced mobilization of comfort women during the war. The Murayama administration established in 1995 the Asian Women's Fund to compensate surviving comfort women in the name of Japanese people rather than the government. So far Tokyo has refused to offer an official apology for the comfort women issue or provide state compensation.⁵²⁷ The same position remained unchanged when the government dealt with lawsuits from victims of other Japanese war crimes throughout the 1990s.

At the same time, the past two decades also saw a succession of “slips of tongue” by Japanese politicians, in which they openly glorified Japanese aggression in Asia and disproved any gestures of contrition that the government displayed publicly. Moreover, many Japanese cabinet ministers and diet members visited the Yasukuni on every “end of war day,” and in July 1996 Hashimoto Ryutarō resumed prime minister's worship nearly a decade after Nakasone's last visit.

Japanese textbooks since the mid-1980s gradually increased coverage of the suffering of other Asian countries during the war and, particularly since the 1990s, began to cover Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, and the conscription of Chinese and Korean natives as soldiers, slave laborers and comfort women. Despite these positive changes, Japanese publishers and textbook screening authority still made conspicuous efforts to hide certain important truths about history. A close study of Japanese textbook treatment of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1990s demonstrates that language was intentionally manipulated to take Japanese soldiers out of the story as perpetrators, to shift the objects of criticism from individual soldiers to the entire organization of the Japanese army or even the incident itself, and to separate those who committed atrocities from the Japanese people so that the majority of the Japanese nation can be spared moral and legal responsibility. In fact, the old historical myth of military clique was still upheld in textbooks produced in the 1980s

⁵²⁷ A letter from the Prime Minister of Japan to express “heartfelt reflection” was also sent when the compensation was delivered to individual victims, which is still qualitatively different from an open, official apology. For more on the Asian Women's Fund, See Yasuaki Ōnuma, et al. eds., *Tanfu' Mondai to Ajia Josei Kikin* (*Comfort Women' and Asian Women's Fund*) (Tokyo: Toshindo Publishing Co., LTD., 1998).

and 1990s that “avoid forcing students to reflect on the personal responsibility of ordinary Japanese citizens for various aspects of the war.”⁵²⁸

Domestic and International Political Turmoil of Japanese Historiographic Controversy

Although self-glorifying and whitewashing myths remained central in Japanese mainstream historiography in the 1980s and 1990s, they nevertheless were exposed to greater domestic and international scrutiny than ever before, which triggered waves of political turmoil at home and abroad.

Two progressive trends in Japanese society called for reconstruction of national collective memory as early as the 1970s. One was the surge of citizens’ campaigns to record war experiences of ordinary people, which was a departure from previous narratives that only centered on the monarchy, military clique, and high-ranking bureaucrats. Included in the new narratives was the memory of Allied air bombing of various localities, women’s war sufferings, and the dark, cruel war scenes remembered by Japanese military rank and file. A representative of the new trend was the book *Tōkyō Daikūshū* (Tokyo Air Raid) first published in 1971, which compiled reminiscences of ordinary Japanese people about that tragic event.⁵²⁹

The articulation of ordinary people’s war memories was closely related to the second trend in the society that urged Japanese people to face up to Japan’s role as a victimizer in the past war vis-à-vis other Asian countries. Although many Japanese had long held guilt feeling toward China based on their limited knowledge about the war, it was not until the 1970s that a great number of first-hand testimonies of Japanese war crimes appeared in Japan. Most notably, journalist Honda Katsuichi published a series of articles in *Asahi Shimbun* in 1971 that were later compiled into the famous book *Chūgoku no Tabi* (The Journey in China). Based on his personal visits to many areas in China and interviews of surviving Chinese victims, these articles were devoted to exposing Japanese army’s war crimes in

⁵²⁸ Fish, “From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages;” Christopher Barnard, “Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant: The Rape of Nanking in Japanese High-school Textbooks,” *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 22, No. 4 (2001).

⁵²⁹ Katamoto Saotome, *Tōkyō Daikūshū* (Tokyo Air Raid) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998).

China theater, including forced labor, biological warfare, Nanjing Massacre, and the “Three-all” campaign.⁵³⁰

Honda’s articles sent a shock wave through the Japanese society. It was in this context that the above-mentioned grass-root movement to tell ordinary people’s war stories began to record not just Japanese suffering but also admit Japanese war responsibility. From mid-1970s to mid-1980s *Sōkagakukai*, a Buddhist organization, sponsored the publication of a two-volume record of its members’ war experiences, including many personal testimonies of Japanese war crimes in China.⁵³¹ A more influential narrative was the well-known “The War” (*Sensō*) series of readers’ letters published in *Asahi Shimbun* between 1986-1987. Many of them testified the aggressive and victimizing nature of the war by revealing Japanese army’s war atrocities.⁵³² By the end of the 1980s, such activities of recording Japanese private memories had developed into straightforward truth-telling campaigns that involved testimonies of war experiences by not only Japanese people but also Asian victim nations. A noted example was the Osaka-based Association of Remembering and Sympathizing with the War Victims in the Asian Pacific Region (*Ajia-taiheiyo Chūki no Sensō Giseisha ni Omoi o Hase, Kokoro ni Kizamu Shūkai*), which held public hearings on Japanese war atrocities throughout East Asia and put out 12 volumes of these hearing records from 1988 to 1999.⁵³³

Not only facing domestic challenge, Japan’s mainstream conservative historiography also met unprecedented international attack since the 1980s. The 1982 textbook controversy marked the beginning of open, frequent historiographic disputes between Japan and its Asian neighbors. The incident started at the end of June when the Japanese media reported that Mombushō instructed the change of language on the war history in school textbooks to a more conservative tone in that year’s textbook screening process. The most obvious example often cited was the replacement of the term *Shinryaku* (invasion) by *Shinshutsu* (advance) with regard to the Sino-Japanese war. Although subsequent investigations discovered that the change from *Shinryaku* to *Shinshutsu* did not really take place that year and

⁵³⁰ Katsuichi Honda, *Chūgoku no Tabi (The Journey in China)* (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1994).

⁵³¹ Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp. 154-157.

⁵³² Asahi Shimbun Thematic Discussion Room, *Sensō: Detsu to Namida de Tsuzutta Shōgen (The War: Testimonies Written with Blood and Tears)* (Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama, 1987).

⁵³³ The Association on Remembering War Victims ed., “The Voices of Asia” book series (Tokyo: Toho Shuppan), 1988-99.

some original draft of textbooks had used the term *Shinryaku*, the media was right in pointing out that Mombushō had been gradually strengthening the authorization system since the “Biased Textbooks Campaign” first launched at the beginning of the 1980s.

Beijing did not respond to the Japanese media reports until nearly one month later, when the official press launched a campaign criticizing Japanese textbooks and the Foreign Ministry lodged formal protest to Japan. Beijing was soon joined by Seoul that also issued protest in early August. Thus an initially domestic dispute escalated into a truly international controversy. The incident was finally settled with Tokyo promise to revise those textbooks in dispute and also to pay attention to criticisms from Asian countries in future Japanese education and textbook authorization.⁵³⁴ The time lag between the initial outbreak of the incident and the Chinese official response clearly suggested Beijing’s intention to politicize the history problem to boost public patriotism and appease the conservative faction within the CCP. But unlike in the past that it always slighted or ignored Chinese historiographic disagreements with Japan, during the 1982 incident Beijing sharply accused Japanese historical myths of distorting history and raised outright demands for their rectification. This also happened when China and Japan were strategically aligned against the Soviet Union. It indicated a greater dominance of domestic political and ideological struggle than international structural constraints in determining Chinese policy to Japan. From then on, China maintained a firm position on the history issue, which led to more bilateral historiographic clashes particularly surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine and history textbooks.

Besides pressure from foreign governments, since the early 1990s, new campaigns led by non-governmental organizations in and outside Japan tried to push Japanese government to address its war responsibility with legal and financial measures. Ever since a group of Korean forced laborers stranded in the Soviet-occupied Sakhalin Island first filed a class-action lawsuit against the Japanese government in August 1990, some 59 cases of this kind had been submitted to Japanese courts by the end of 1999. Plaintiffs instituting these lawsuits included the Allied prisoners of war, slave laborers, comfort women, victims of biochemical warfare and financial exploitation who demanded Japanese government apology

⁵³⁴ For more on the process of the 1982 textbook controversy, see Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp. 80-120

and compensation, as well as Taiwanese and Korean soldiers of the imperial military who appealed for relief and condolence payment.⁵³⁵ These campaigns reached a climax at the end of the 1990s, with the International Citizen's Forum on War Crimes and Redress held in December 1999 and the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery in December 2000. In both occasions, surviving foreign victims and families of deceased victims of Japanese atrocities were joined by a large cohort of liberal politicians, intellectuals and social activists across the world to stage political offensives against the Japanese government. So now domestic opponents of the conservative historiography combined their power with international critiques to compel re-negotiation of Japanese collective national memory.

The domestic and international push to debunk myths of an honorable war and the glorious image of Japanese military in the mainstream conservative historiography indeed brought about a certain degree of victimizer consciousness and sense of collective responsibility in Japanese society. But the new trend also provoked a neo-nationalist backlash that challenged both the above-mentioned progressive historiography and the mainstream conservative historiography. Since the 1980s, Japanese far-right elites fiercely attacked the government's concession to foreign countries on the history issue, which they condemned of spreading a masochistic historical view among Japan's young generation. For example, upset with Nakasone's decision to cancel his official visit to the Yasukuni and intervention in the second textbook incident in 1986, an ultra-nationalist LDP politician, Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki, published a provocative article in popular journal *Bungei Shunju* trying to justify Japanese annexation of Korea.⁵³⁶ Also, in protest to the inclusion of Japanese war atrocities in authorized textbooks during this period, right-wingers tried to advance a self-glorifying view of history by organizing symposiums, publishing cartoons and popular readings, and even compiling competing textbooks of their own. A recent example was the controversial New History Textbook (*Atarashii Rekishii Kyōkashō*) that a neo-nationalist organization, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform

⁵³⁵ Details on Asian requests for individual war compensations can be found in the conference proceedings and supplementary materials distributed at the International Citizen's Forum on War Crimes and Redress, Tokyo, December 19, 1999, which include a tabulated summary of these lawsuits by Yoshibumi Tawara, "Sengo Hoshō Saiban Ichilanhō."

⁵³⁶ Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 200.

(*Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho O Tsukuru Kai*), compiled and pushed through the textbook authorization in 2001.⁵³⁷

Rather than accepting the Pacific War View of History that the war was wrong and Japan was the victim of the war, this trend of neo-nationalist historiography took a more radical position that fundamentally disagreed with the aggressive nature of the war. Such a view already existed in the 1960s when people like Hayashi Fusao spoke out to justify Japan's part in the war.⁵³⁸ The view was revived in the 1980s, especially when revisionist assessment of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial flourished in Japan. Neo-nationalists called the trial as nothing but victor's justice and claimed that Japan should not be singled out for punishment because other Western countries had done the same thing.⁵³⁹ Such right-wing backlash exerted great pressure on the government to retreat from a limited acceptance of the progressive historiography. Textbooks approved in year 2000 markedly deleted or watered down descriptions of military atrocities.⁵⁴⁰ Many of these changes were caused by the so-called "voluntary restraint" of textbook publishers during the textbook screening process, which was actually the result of political coercion by Mombushō and the Office of the Prime Minister.⁵⁴¹

Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations

To sum up, the new changes in Chinese and Japanese history-making patterns in the 1980s and 1990s turned their war narratives far more divergent than ever before. On the one hand, bilateral convergence on certain historical view was greatly undermined. It is true that both Japanese and Chinese governments still agreed on the aggressive nature of the war and maintained the old "myth of clique" about the issue of war responsibility. But public

⁵³⁷ "Group to Create a New History Textbook Says: 'Annexation of Korea Was Necessary,'" *The Asahi Shimbun* (on line), September 13, 2000; "Japan's Refusal to Revise Textbooks Angers Neighbors," *The New York Times*, July 10, 2001; "Japanese State Approves Disputed Textbook," *The New York Times*, August 9, 2001. For more on the neo-nationalist view of history and activities of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, see Gavan McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," in Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*.

⁵³⁸ Hayashi Fusao, *Daitōa Sensō Kōteiron (Affirming the Greater East Asian War)* (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1964).

⁵³⁹ Yasuaki Ōnuma, *Tōkyō Saiban kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisō e*, pp. 17-66.

⁵⁴⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 10, 2000; *Asahi Shimbun*, April 5, 2001.

⁵⁴¹ Yoshifumi Tawara, "Junior High School History Textbooks: Whiter 'Comfort Women' and the 'Nanking Massacre,'" *Sekai* (The World), November 2000.

support to such interpretation of the war history began to crumble. In Japan, the progressive view of history urged the ordinary Japanese people to admit their individual responsibility in victimizing other Asian people while the neo-nationalist historiography denied the aggressive nature of the war. In China, the general public no longer subscribed to the government position that differentiated good Japanese and bad Japanese but held a negative image of the entire Japanese nation. On the other hand, bilateral divergence on Japanese war crimes, Chinese victimization and the role of Japanese military during the war became more pronounced than ever before. Therefore, the war historiography of the two countries in this period mixed *conflictual* narratives in official propaganda and *combative* narratives in private memories, especially among the Chinese public.

According to historical mythmaking theory, the greater historiographic divergence since the 1980s should worsen the relationship to the stage of Shallow Reconciliation-Friction because the mechanisms of intentions and emotions should work to a more negative direction. First of all, the increasingly internationalized, politicized disputes surrounding the history issue highlighted the lack of contrition in Japanese historiography, which would intensify Chinese suspicion that Japan had the hidden ambition to exploit China by force once again in the future. Meanwhile, the seemingly never-ending Chinese complaints about history and demands for contrition should cause Japanese concern about possible Chinese policy of historical retribution toward Japan. So Chinese and Japanese expectation of war between them would heightened significantly, though it should fall short of predicting immediate armed conflict because the mainstream historical views of both countries still did not call for total bilateral confrontation.

Second, Chinese emotions of grievances towards Japan's lack of remorse and Japanese emotions of disgust and resentment about Chinese historical self-indulgence and scathing criticism of Japan should rise high, which would directly poison popular feelings toward each other nation. Ordinary people should be more vocal in expressing their mutual antipathy, although they should refrain from spontaneous actions of confrontation because of both government suppression and absence of immediate foreign threat to their personal interest. The negative emotions between the two nations should also encourage hard-line government policies towards each other country because elite perception of negative

intention and mounting public pressure would prevent governments from engaging close mutual cooperation and making necessary compromise in areas of disagreement. So friction concerning sovereignty rights should come to the surface in this period regardless of their strategic implications because these issues were often intertwined with nationalistic historical myths and concessions were often political costly. Similarly, economic interdependence should still fail to match the level of potential mutual interests, and the high degree of mutual distrust and public resentments should create more pronounced and damaging disputes in commercial relations.

EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME: TEST OF REALIST THEORY

Test of realist theory against the history of Sino-Japanese relations of the 1980s and 1990s produces mixed results. On the one hand, the theory proves a weak explanation for both the general outcome and evolution process of bilateral relations in the 1980s. While the structural conditions were still positive as in the 1970s and bilateral balance of power was short of major shift, Sino-Japanese relationship did not develop to deep reconciliation as the theory predicts but deteriorated from “Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement” to the stage of “Shallow Reconciliation-Friction.” Chinese suspicion of Japanese military defense programs and popular animosity toward Japan were on the rise since the early 1980s, and Japanese popular feeling of closeness to China also began to decline since mid-1980s, a few years before the real impact of the Soviet readjustment of global strategy reached Japan. The continuity of international structure also fails to explain the sudden intensification of controversies on sovereignty rights and economic frictions that often escalated into serious bilateral political disputes.

On the other hand, realist theory is by and large correct in predicting that the dissipation of the Soviet threat from the end of the 1980s and the shift of the Cold War alliance structure to an uncertain multipolar world would correlate with a Shallow-Reconciliation type of Sino-Japanese relations. Process-tracing of this period, however, suggests that international power structure considerably contributed to but unlikely solely determined the worsening of bilateral relations. A 5-6 year time lag exists between the

disappearance of the Soviet threat and the rise of the perception of China threat in Japanese strategic circle and the considerable toughening of Japanese economic policy to China. And the fast-paced military buildup in China and Japanese activism in regional security affairs in the 1990s did not really alter the power balance between the two countries. So the test suggests that, in the neutral structural environment of the post-Cold War era where neither a common threat nor fundamental strategic clash existed between two countries, it was not just power distribution but also mutual perception of intention based on non-structural factors that shaped states' foreign policy calculations.

I. Moderate/Heightened Expectation of War

The 1980s

In the 1980s, Sino-Japanese solidarity in security matter did not sustain and suspicion and feeling of uncertainty considerably arose between the two countries. First, since mid-1982 China de-emphasized the theme of “anti-hegemonism” alignment in bilateral cooperation. The three new principles for bilateral relations that Premier Zhao Ziyang proposed during his visit to Japan in May and June were short of strategic denotation – peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and long-term stability. In September when Prime Minister Suzuki came to Beijing to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Sino-Japanese PFT, Zhao stressed the three principles along with the “independent foreign policy” without even mentioning the anti-hegemonism issue that triggered most controversy during the PFT negotiation process.⁵⁴²

Not only the rhetoric about bilateral strategic collaboration underwent noticeable cooldown, but also their already limited military cooperation was further scaled back. Since the second half of 1982, the number of groups of Japanese military personnel visiting China decreased sharply.⁵⁴³ When Nakasone proposed to the visiting general secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, in November 1983 that the two countries should exchange information and jointly press the Soviet Union to reduce numbers of SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far East,

⁵⁴² For texts of Zhao Ziyang's remarks on Sino-Japanese relations from May to September 1982, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 346-352, pp. 382-394.

he received no response from the China side.⁵⁴⁴ The two countries did not start to hold security talks at the Director-General level of foreign ministry until 1993, when exchange channels were necessary to mitigate tension between them regarding defense affairs.⁵⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Chinese official statements conspicuously retracted support for the U.S.-Japan alliance. In late 1982 two Chinese Polibureau members told Japanese politicians that “China has never opposed nor supported the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.”⁵⁴⁶ Besides, different from its previous positive attitude toward the strengthening of Japanese SDF, Beijing now openly expressed concerns over the prospect of a militarily strong Japan with offensive weapons. In February 1983, shortly after Nakasone stated in his trip to Washington that Japan’s weapon export ban was not applicable to its ally the U.S. and that Japan should serve as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and strengthen military cooperation with the U.S., Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told the special envoy of Nakasone the following message: “As an independent, sovereign state, Japan is entitled to maintain an armed force for defense against external threats. But such an armed force should be defense-oriented and of appropriate size, so it would not constitute a threat to its friendly neighbors.”⁵⁴⁷ Since then, China increasingly questioned the necessity and intention of Japanese defense buildup programs. When the Nakasone administration announced the decision to break the one percent GNP ceiling for annual defense spending in FY 1987, Chinese media responded with a flurry of warnings that Japan may be seeking the status of a military great power.⁵⁴⁸

Chinese security concern about Japan could not be explained by the global power structure because for the most part of the 1980s that the Soviet Union remained a powerful threat for both China and Japan, and Sino-American strategic collaboration continued to be tight. Neither was it warranted by any major shift in Sino-Japanese power balance. When

⁵⁴³ Glaubitz, “Japan,” p. 231.

⁵⁴⁴ Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy in the 1980s,” p. 96.

⁵⁴⁵ Sino-Japanese official security talk was upgraded to vice-ministerial level in 2002. *Beijing Xinhua*, FBIS, March 19, 2002.

⁵⁴⁶ Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy in the 1980s,” p. 96.

⁵⁴⁷ “Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian’s Remarks to Special Envoy Susumu Nikaidō, February 18-19, 1983,” in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 408-409; Joachim Glaubitz, “Japan,” p. 231.

the Nakasone administration advocated active sea-lane defense and broke the one percent GDP limit of military budget, his main purpose was to establish a symbolic image of Japan as a normal state with international stature as well as to show strategic solidarity with the United State. Japanese military capabilities only increased incrementally in the 1980s and were particularly restrained in offensive weapons or strategic power projection. This is not only because military manpower and equipment are extraordinarily expensive in Japan but also due to the fact that various domestic and international constraints on Japanese defense policy-making have determined the incremental nature of Japan's defense buildup throughout the postwar period.⁵⁴⁹

This is not to dispute the Japanese superiority vis-à-vis the PLA in naval and air defense power, if not in ground power, but it did not first emerged in the 1980s but had taken hold by the late 1970s. At that time, the American retrenchment in Asia after the Nixon Doctrine forced Japan to share more self-defense burden and Japanese economic miracle permitted fast increase of defense spending even below the one percent GDP ceiling. Under the U.S. pressure to upgrade its sea and air defense capabilities, the Miki Cabinet decided at the end of 1976 to acquire F-15 interceptor aircraft. Then in 1978 the Japanese government formulated the Mid-Term Planning Estimate that planned to procure 77 F-15s, 37 P-3Cs antisubmarine patrol aircraft and many escort and minesweeping ships, submarines, and antisubmarine and minesweeping helicopters. In the year of 1978 alone Japan ordered 23 F-15s and 8 P-3Cs.⁵⁵⁰ So by the time Nakasone became prime minister and actively pushed for national defense upgrading, the air and naval power Japanese SDF had well exceeded that of the PLA.

The 1990s

⁵⁴⁸ Jun Yasuda, "Boei Yosanan 'Tai GNP Hi 1% Tobatu' ni Taisuru Chugokugawa no Hanno (China's Reaction against FY 1987 Japan's Defense Budget 'Surpassing the One Percent of GNP Defense Spending Limit')," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 15, No. 1, June 1987, p. 97.

⁵⁴⁹ On the incremental nature of Japanese defense budget growth and emphasis on defensive strategy, see Joseph P. Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, N.Y.; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), Chapter 1; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism", *International Security* 17, No.4 (Spring 1993), pp. 126-127.

⁵⁵⁰ Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, pp. 67-70.

Japan strategic elites began in the 1980s to study Chinese program of military modernization with acute interest, but did not perceive any major increase of China threat.⁵⁵¹ The dissipation of the common Soviet threat by the end of the 1980s also did not seem to have brought about immediate deterioration in Japanese strategic perception of China. To the contrary, in the first few years after the June 4th incident of 1989, Japanese concerns about China's expanding military capabilities and uncertain intention were temporarily moderated. A Japanese strategic expert observed in late 1990 that China's national security focus had gone beyond pure military arena to the goals of cementing domestic stability and steady economic growth.⁵⁵² Another defense analyst argued that the PLA was particularly weak in naval power and it did not possess the capabilities for overseas campaign because strengthening the navy would take time; so in terms of possible China threat to Japan he opined that such threat was more likely to be in the form of large-scale refugee exodus rather than military attack.⁵⁵³ This is because, even though the bipolar structure that mandated Chinese strategic cooperation with the Western bloc had collapsed, it was not replaced by a clearly defined power distribution system where each country could easily locate its strategic adversaries. In fact the structural conditions stayed neutral and China and Japan did not suddenly develop conflicting strategic interests.

It was only until 1994 that Japan began to demonstrate anxiety toward the prospect of the "rise of China," mainly triggered by China's rapid economic growth and aggressive military upgrading programs. Chinese GDP achieved double-digit growth each year in 1992 and 1993, and Chinese military spending increased over 20 percent from 1990 to 1993 even

⁵⁵¹ Most Japanese military analysts admitted in the 1980s that Chinese budgetary priority had shifted from defense spending to domestic economic reinvigoration, and generally refrained from speculating the impact of Chinese military modernization on Japan's national security. But the fact that many of them tended to discuss this in the context of China's closer relationship with the USSR implied greater uncertainty they felt towards Chinese military trend than in the 1970s. For some examples of Japanese military analysis articles on Chinese military modernization in the 1980s, see Akira Ichimiya, "Chūgoku no Kokubo Seisaku (The Defense Policy of China)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 8, No. 1 (June 1980); Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Daigoki Zenjindai Daisankai Kaigi kara Mita Chūgoku no Gunji Mondai (Chinese Military Problems Viewed from the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 8, No. 4 (March 1981); Koichirō Takahashi, "Saikin no Chūgoku Gunji Jōsei to Taibei Taiso Kankei (China's Recent Military Affairs and Foreign Policy to the U.S. and the Soviet Union)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 10, No. 1 (Jun 1982); Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Saikin no Chūgoku Gunji Jijō kara Chugokugun no Heiryoku Hyakuman Sakugen (On One Million Reduction of the Chinese Armed Forces – Recent Chinese Military Affairs)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 13, No. 1 (July 1985).

⁵⁵² Nasaaki Kasahara, "Chūgoku ni totte Atarashii Anzen Hoshō (China's New Security Concept)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū*, 18, No. 3 (December 1990), p. 47.

by a conservative standard.⁵⁵⁴ In the same period the PLA also purchased up to \$2 billion worth of Russian weapons, including 100 A300 SAM missiles and 26 advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft.⁵⁵⁵ In addition, China conducted four nuclear tests in 1992-1993, the test of May 1992 being its largest underground test ever since.⁵⁵⁶ But recent studies have shown that the seemingly phenomenal rise of China has been short of challenging the status quo of global balance of power or catching up Japanese superiority in either economic prowess or air and naval power vis-à-vis China.⁵⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Tokyo openly criticized Chinese military modernization program since 1994. When visiting China in March, Prime Minister Hosokawa formally demanded self-restraint in nuclear test programs. Japan even suspended grant assistance to China in 1995 upon its new nuclear weapon tests that year. This action had profound implication because it was the first time that Japan leveled unilateral economic sanction against China.⁵⁵⁸ In the meantime, an explicit sense of China threat gradually took shape, particularly held by Japanese defense establishment but also shared by many high-ranking officials and politicians. Yuken Hironaka, then director of the Institute of Defense Research, argued in a 1994 article that China's military power and its marked progress towards modernization constituted one of the three unstable factors in the security of East Asia and Pacific

⁵⁵³ Katsuichi Sugiyama, "Kyokuto no Gunji Josei to Kyoji no Yoso (Military Situations in Far East and Aspects of Threats)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 18, No. 2 (September 1990), pp. 38-39.

⁵⁵⁴ Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994); Richard Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security* 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 23.

⁵⁵⁵ Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security* 19, No.1 (Summer 1994).

⁵⁵⁶ For data on China's nuclear tests between 1964-1996, see the website of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) at <http://www.nti.org/db/china/testlist.htm>

⁵⁵⁷ For some recent studies that cautioned of over-estimation of Chinese economic and military power, see Kenneth W. Allen, et al., *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995); John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, "China's Search for A Modern Air Force," *International Security* 24, No. 1, Summer 1999); Andrew Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Gordon G. Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China* (New York: Random House, 2001). For an analysis of Japanese security confidence in the face of the rise of China, see Kenneth B. Pyle and Eric Heginbotham, "Japan," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg eds., *Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose* (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), pp. 97-99.

⁵⁵⁸ Yoshihide Soeya, "Kokusai Seiji no Naka no Nitchū Kankei," *Kokusai Mondai* 454, No. 1 (1998), p. 53; Michael Green and Benjamin Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival* 38, No.2 (Summer 1996), pp. 36-37. The real first time Japanese economic sanction against China was applied after June 4 incident of 1989 in concerted action with other western countries.

Region.⁵⁵⁹ An influential work that well summarized the military reasons for Japanese perception of China threat, *Chūgoku Gunjiron* (On China's Military) was published in April 1994. In this systematic study of Chinese military organization, doctrines and weapon programs, former uniformed officer and current research fellow of the Institute of Defense Research Kayahara Ikuo argued that perception of Chinese military threat to Japan's national security and the regional stability of Asia was caused by China's lack of transparency in military spending, assertive naval strategy, and unrestrained arms export.⁵⁶⁰

China also became disturbed by Japan's potential military threat, but not so much because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat or Japanese defense buildup but due to Japan's surging enthusiasm in playing a greater role in regional security affairs. Japan began in 1990 legislative efforts to enable its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and succeeded in sending SDF units overseas since the 1992 peacekeeping mission to Cambodia. These provoked repeated warnings from Chinese official media that urged caution and self-restraint in Japanese political decision to sending its troops abroad. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese concerns over Japan's external actions concentrated on its military involvement in future cross-Taiwan Strait conflict. The reconfirmation of U.S.-Japan alliance since 1996 failed to exclude explicitly Taiwan from the Far East region where contingencies of instability would invoke collective security commitments of the alliance. So China was afraid of the possibility that Japanese military may intervene if China used force to prevent Taiwan independence.⁵⁶¹ An influential Japan expert, Liu Jianguo, pointed out in 1997 that the readjusted collective security arrangement of the U.S.-Japan alliance allowed Japan to interfere with regional conflicts with military means, which signaled a profound change of nature of the alliance into an organization of "international police in Asia-Pacific region" to establish joint hegemony in this region.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁹ Yuken Hironaka, "Toajia Taiheiyo Chiiki no Anzen Hosho ni Tsuite (On the Security of East Asia and the Pacific Region)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 21, No. 4 (March 1994).

⁵⁶⁰ Ikuo Kayahara, *Chūgoku Gunjiron (On China's Military)* (Tokyo: Ashishobo, 1994).

⁵⁶¹ For Chinese perception of threat from the recast U.S.-Japan alliance, see Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).

⁵⁶² Jianguo Liu, "Zhongri Guanxi de Tiaozheng he Fazhan (Readjustment and Development of Sino-Japanese Relations)," in Zhang, Yunling ed., *Zhuanbian Zhong de Zhongmeiri Guanxi (Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relations in Change)* (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1997).

While China became worried about Japanese military involvement in future cross-strait crisis, Japan was also alerted by China's willingness to use force externally that would disturb regional stability and compromise Japan's national security interest. Japan reacted to China's missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 1996 with poignant anxiety. In June 1995, Chairman of the Joint Staff General Tetsuya Nishimoto openly expressed Japan's concern to China over its missile exercises surrounding Taiwan.⁵⁶³ Another Japanese defense analyst even bluntly calls Chinese actions in Taiwan Strait as "undisguised military coercion," an expression that was only used for describing Soviet threat in the Cold War years.⁵⁶⁴

The examination of Chinese and Japanese strategic perception in the 1990s suggests that some realpolitik factors like military budget increase and foreign policy assertiveness indeed contributed to a heightened mutual expectation of future conflict. But the outcome did not completely match two more crucial structural factors – the timing of global power structure change and the state of dyadic power balance. If realist theory does not provide a sufficient explanation, there must exist some non-structural factors that also functioned simultaneously with power factors to worsen mutual threat perception.

II. Sovereignty Rights Disputes

Similar to the test of the first indicator, common security interest between China and Japan in the 1980s did not facilitate their accommodation on questions of sovereignty rights, particularly the Taiwan issue. The Kōkaryō Case erupting in 1987 brought the controversy over the international status of Taiwan into open light. A small and old student dormitory, Kōkaryō was purchased by Taiwan in 1952 but known as a dormitory occupied by pro-Beijing students. Taiwan tried to evict these students from the dormitory through lawsuit since 1967, but the Kyoto Lower Court in 1977 rejected Taiwan's demand on the ground that its ownership should be transferred to PRC after the Sino-Japan normalization. In 1986

⁵⁶³ Green and Self "Japan's Changing China Policy," p. 36.

⁵⁶⁴ Shigekatsu Kondo, "Reisen Shuketsugo no Amerika no Toajia Anzenhosho Senryaku: Taiwan Kaikyo Kiki to Taigai Senryaku ga Naiho suru 'Mujun' o Megutte (U.S. Security Strategy toward East Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: The Lessons of the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the Condition in U.S. Engagement Policy)." *Shin Boei Ronshū* 24, No. 4 (March 1997), p. 27.

and 1987 respectively, however, the Kyoto Lower Court and Osaka High Court reversed that verdict from the viewpoint of international law that non-diplomatic assets should belong to the previous government even in a case of switch of diplomatic recognition from one country to another. A bitter war of words then broke out between Beijing and Tokyo, which lasted for about one year. It was no longer possible to pretend that the problem of partial national recognition between the two countries since the 1972 normalization would not compromise their formal relationship⁵⁶⁵

In the 1990s intense friction over the question of Taiwan was rekindled, first by the 1994 Asian Games incident and then by the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis.⁵⁶⁶ Chinese worry about foreign military intervention in Taiwan Strait was particularly aroused by the 1997 new defense guidelines of the US-Japan alliance. Chinese concern was that that Japan might assist American military intervention in future crises over Taiwan independence, which had been exacerbated since Japan and the US launched joint development of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system.⁵⁶⁷

Island disputes also resurfaced in the 1990s, evolving into a source of major bilateral friction. In 1990 the right-wing Japan Youth Federation (JYF) petitioned to the Japanese government to recognize the lighthouse on the islands that it erected in 1978 and went back to repair it in 1989. Reports that the petition was likely to be grant soon provoked a standoff between Taiwan fishing boats and Japanese navy, as well as anti-Japanese demonstrations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The crisis again ended with an agreement between the Japanese and PRC governments to shelve the issue.

⁵⁶⁵ Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization." In Howe, *China and Japan*.

⁵⁶⁶ On September 12, 1994, the Japanese government issued visa for Hsu Li-The, vice-president of Taiwan's "Executive Yuan" to visit Japan for the Opening Ceremony of the Asian Games regardless of China's strong opposition. China protested vehemently and bilateral relationship was seriously strained. This is the so-called Asian Games Incident. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis took place as a result of surging Sino-US tension over Washington's granting visa for Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui in May 1995 and culminated in Chinese missile exercises targeted near Taiwan in March 1996. For a detailed recount of the crisis, see Robert Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force." *International Security* 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000).

⁵⁶⁷ Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," pp.65-66; Junichi Abe, "21 Seki no Toajia Anzen Hosho Kankyo no Naka no Chūgoku Fakutaa: Chūgoku no Gunkindaika to TMD o Chūshin ni (The China Factor in the 21st Century East Asian Security Environment)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū*, 27, No. 4 (March 2000), pp. 8-16.

But problem quickly arose when the Chinese NPC passed the Territorial Sea Law in 1992 that included the islands in Chinese territorial waters. Prime minister Hashimoto responded in May 1996 that the islands were sovereign Japanese territories and announced the decision to extend Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to cover them. At this juncture, the JYF returned to the islands in September to repair the lighthouse, triggering a month-long crisis involving protests in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. After the 1996 crisis, both Japanese and Chinese governments have maintained their sovereignty claims over the islands. Since then tensions continued to simmer in the waters surrounding these islands, where protesters from Hong Kong, Taiwan and even mainland were often reported to confront the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.

Sovereignty disputes in the 1980s contradict the realist predication that the need for strategic cooperation to balance the common Soviet threat would compel the two countries to put away their disagreements in other issue areas. But the persistence of such disputes in the 1990s matches the prediction that the removal of the common Soviet threat would reduce the structural incentives for the two countries to reach compromise on various political and economic issues.

Yet the intensity of these disputes over sovereignty rights was still puzzling, given that these issues lack strategic importance. On the question of Taiwan, after the PRC was admitted into the U.N. as the sole legitimate representative of China and the U.S. pulled out troops from Taiwan as well as pledged the "One China" policy in the 1970s, the legal status of Taiwan was no longer a matter of national survival for China. Similarly, those islands disputed by the two sides are merely barren and windswept rocks that lack significant economic or strategic significance. Reports about potential oil reserves near the Senkaku Islands appeared since the late 1960s, but hard evidence of oil has yet to be found. As the US Geological Survey has stated, "the prospects for recoverable oil in the Diaoyutai (Senkaku Islands) and the East China Sea areas are much poorer than that for the South China Sea."⁵⁶⁸ Not only that these issues were not crucially important to their national

⁵⁶⁸ Keith Robinson, "Assessment of Undiscovered Conventionally Recoverable Petroleum Resources in Offshore Tertiary Basins of the PRC," *US Geological Survey Open File Report 84-329*. Denver, US Geological Survey, 1984. Cited in Phil Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The Unwanted Controversy," Kent

interest, but that too much competition over them may threaten the security of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) that were indispensable to both countries whose economies healthy were heavily dependent on foreign trade through these lines. Realist balance of power theory cannot explain the high degree of bilateral political tension in areas of convergent national security interest.

III. Troubled Economic Interaction

The 1980s

It was in the 1980s that economic modernization surpassed the long held goal of struggling with international superpowers to become China's top national priority. Deng Xiaoping pointed out in September 1982 that "economic development is at the core" of the three major tasks for the Chinese people in the following decade.⁵⁶⁹ The shift of national agenda shifted increased the importance of cooperation with Western countries, especially the neighbor country Japan, from which China could obtain the much needed financial aid, advanced technology, and management skills. Hu Yaobang's report at the 12th National Congress of the CCP in September 1982 and Zhao Ziyang's government working report to the 6th plenary of the NPC in June 1983 both reaffirmed the three principles of Sino-Japanese relations that Zhao proposed in June 1982— peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and long-term stability – that indicated the government emphasis on relationship with Japan despite the recent textbook controversy.⁵⁷⁰

As the general tone of Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation was set, economic interaction quickly expanded in the first half of the 1980s. Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone each brought to Beijing a generous yen loan package in 1982 and 1984 respectively, which were dedicated to a number of grand projects of infrastructure construction and energy production. Through these projects, Japanese fund and advanced

Papers in Politics and International Relations (UK, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1996) URL: <http://www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/publications/journals/kentpapers/deans.html>

I would like to thank Daniel Landau for bringing Deans' paper to my attention.

⁵⁶⁹ "Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, September 1, 1982."

In Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992*, p. 15.

⁵⁷⁰ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 126-129.

technology were transferred to China. Chinese personnel also began to arrive in Japan to receive technical training in such fields as transportation, business management, agriculture and forestry, and health and medical care. Bilateral trade increase was particularly remarkable, with the absolute volume doubling in only three years from 1982 to 1985. Besides, a tax agreement was signed at the 3rd bilateral cabinet meeting in 1983. It is the first foreign tax agreement that China ever signed with a foreign country, which cleared the problem of double taxation on firms doing business in the other country and improved the environment for Japanese direct investment in China.⁵⁷¹

However the harmony in bilateral economic relationship was both superficial and temporary. Several problems accompanying the interaction crippled Chinese enthusiasm for deeper cooperation with Japan. One was that bilateral trade continued to be of grossly disproportionate importance to the two economies. While Japan trade counted for approximately 20 percent of China's total foreign trade during this period, China's share of Japan's total trade rarely exceeded 10 percent. The Chinese felt uneasy about this asymmetry. When meeting with former British Prime Minister Edward Heath in April 1985, Deng complained that Japan's share in China's total foreign trade was too high and expressed willingness to diversify commercial ties with European countries.⁵⁷² At a time when the two countries still faced the common Soviet threat and economic cooperation with Japan was crucial to China's national power increase, such Chinese concern about excessive dependence on Japan was hard to explain from a realist perspective.

Equally puzzling to realist observers was China's high sensitivity to negative relative gains in the bilateral commercial interaction even though it delivered to China great economic benefit. One source of Chinese concern was its huge trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan, which reached its peak in 1985 and almost caught up with China's total export to Japan. Chinese trade deficit actually increased persistently ever since normalization (see Table 10), but did not become a political issue until mid-1980s when Beijing began to criticize Japan for its lack of response to the skyrocketing trade deficit. At the 4th bilateral cabinet meeting

⁵⁷¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō (The Recent State of Japan's Diplomacy)*, 1984, p. 86; Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 129.

⁵⁷² Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 99.

in July 1985, the head of Chinese delegation Gu Mu emphasized that China's trade deficit was "a major obstacle to normal development of bilateral relationship," and demanded active Japanese policy to remedy the trade imbalance, promote direct investment and expand technology transfer to China."⁵⁷³ Chinese officials also repeatedly threatened to cut imports from Japan if Tokyo failed to open its market to Chinese goods. For example, then vice minister of the State Economic Commission Zhu Rongji warned Japanese business leaders in February 1987 that "economic relations between the two countries will not grow unless the Chinese trade deficit with Japan declines." Since the mid-1980s, China took conspicuous steps to diversify the suppliers of imported goods including the U.S. and West Europe so as to both mollify trade deficit with Japan and curtail dependence on Japanese goods.⁵⁷⁴

Table 10: Sino-Japanese Trade, 1972-2000

	Sino-Japanese Trade (\$1,000)	Growth Rate of Sino- Japanese Trade (%)	Trade Balance for China
1972	1,100,035		-117,805
1975	3,789,653	240	-727,501
1980	9,401,709	150	-754,961
1985	18,960,130	100	-5994,760
1990	23,199,280	20	907,755
1995	57,853,150	150	1399,147
1997	63,535,450	10	20157,060
1998	57,189,980	-10	16980,260
1999	66,551,970	16	19653,670
2000	85,453,842	28	24,777,650

SOURCE: MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho*

Another problem was the Chinese accusation that Japan was only interested in selling finished products but rather reluctant to increase capital investment and technology transfer to China. The Chinese also complained that Japanese goods exported to China were not first-class stuff and oftentimes of even shoddy quality. All these economic problems were accorded political importance and sometimes even led to serious strains in bilateral relations. In a rather controversial conversation with a Kōmeitō leader in June 1987, Deng Xiaoping raised the problems of trade deficit and Japan's passive attitude to transfer advanced technology to China, admonished Japan to provide more assistance to Chinese

⁵⁷³ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 135-137.

⁵⁷⁴ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, pp. 104-105.

economic development in view of the war history.⁵⁷⁵ This conversation sparked resentful responses from Japanese officials that escalated into a serious diplomatic dispute.

On the heel of this dispute followed the “Toshiba Incident,” where the Japanese government stopped the Toshiba Machine Company, which had violated CoCom rules when transferring militarily related technology to the Soviet Union, from exporting civil machines to China, only to vindicate Chinese complaints about Japanese delay in technology transfer. To make things worse, college students staged demonstrations in several Chinese cities in 1985-1987 to protest Japanese militarism and renewed “economic invasion” to China, mainly referring to Japanese dumping of cheap commodities in Chinese market. This pattern of economic problems damaging bilateral political relations would have been avoided if strategic interests remained the dominant factor shaping their mutual policies as in the previous decade.

The 1990s

Chinese complaints about trade deficit and inadequate technology transfer were muted in the 1990s when trade balance shifted to favor China rather than Japan and leading Japanese companies introduced many high-tech projects to China. Now it was Japan who was sensitive to relative gains in economic interdependence with China. But like the Japanese concern about Chinese military capabilities which did not arise immediately after the end of the Cold War, Japanese faith in commercial liberalism to China was not superceded by what Michael Green and Benjamin Self call “reluctant Realism” until the mid-1990s.⁵⁷⁶ Only then did the Japanese side become intolerant of China’s aggressive exports to Japan, wary of industrial “hollow-out” and damage to domestic job market due to surging FDI in China, and reluctant to maintain high level of ODA to China. The years since 1995 saw Japanese adopted a tough position on economic diplomacy to China, cutting down ODA amount, pressing for the appreciation of Chinese currency RMB, and even imposing

⁵⁷⁵ For excerpts of this conversation, see *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, p. 707; Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 643-644.

⁵⁷⁶ Green and Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy,” pp. 49-50.

emergency tariffs on some Chinese agricultural products, none of which were ever seen before in postwar bilateral relations.⁵⁷⁷

The five-to-six years of time lag between the end of the common Soviet threat and the rise of acute Japanese policy change on economic cooperation with China indicates a weak causal link from international structural change to bilateral economic friction. Alternative explanations are needed to account for the turnaround of Japanese attitude. One such explanation is the asymmetric growth of Chinese and Japanese economies in the 1990s. The Japanese bubble economy of the late 1980s failed in 1990, but the negative impact of effect was not immediately felt because the GDP growth continued to grow with the propping up by government spending. But the budget deficit grew so high in 1996 that pressure for “fiscal reform” soared. Once the public spending was scaled back since then, the economy soon lost steam, sagging to sub-1 percent GDP growth rate.⁵⁷⁸ The flagging Japanese economy stood in contrast to the vibrant Chinese economy that still maintained a remarkable seven to eight percent of annual growth in the second half of the 1990s since the double-digit growth period ended in 1995. Years of recession and financial crisis may have seriously dampened Japan’s enthusiasm to provide China with economic aid and accommodate Chinese aggressiveness in expanding export.⁵⁷⁹ But one need not overstate this “jealousy factor” because Chinese economy has been far from catching up with Japan despite its fast growth and its importance in global economy remained low compared to that of Japan.

Another explanation for the toughening of Japanese economic policy to China, especially on economic aid, since the mid-1990s has to do with Japan’s increasing concern about the diversion of Japanese aid to military use that would help increase Chinese defense capability and eventually shift bilateral balance of power in the long run. Among those

⁵⁷⁷ In this trade dispute case that took place in 2001, China levied 100 percent extra tariffs on imports of automobiles, mobile phones and air-conditioners from Japan in a retaliatory action against Japan’s import restrictions on Chinese agricultural products, pushing the two countries to the verge of a trade war, which was only called off by an inter-government settlement in November. See “China vs. Japan: A Phony Trade War,” *BusinessWeek Online* (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_28/b3740141.htm), July 9, 2001; *Asahi Shimbun*, November 9, 2001.

⁵⁷⁸ Richard Katz, *Japan, the System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 231-232.

⁵⁷⁹ “Japan Starts Picking on China,” *The Economist*, February 10, 2001.

strategic elites who advocated reduction of economic aid to China, some people argued that Japanese fund may have been directly used on military spending while others worried that some of the projects that the Japanese government had helped construct were for “military-civilian dual use,” such as the optical fiber cable projects that could also be used to build advanced communication networks within the Chinese military. Still other concerns centered on the role of Japanese aid in boosting China’s overall national power that could be easily converted to military capabilities when needed. For example, it was suggested that the railroads, airports and highways paid by Japanese money would enable China to move around troops rapidly in wartime, and the energy production projects that Japan helped build in desolate areas with harsh natural conditions but rich mineral resources would allow China to process these resources for defense purpose at low cost.⁵⁸⁰

Facing growing opposition in Japan to continue economic aid to China, Tokyo began to prepare major readjustment of the ODA policy at the beginning of year 2000. In May Foreign Minister Kōno told visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan that Japan would be “reviewing” its economic aid to China, citing high growth in the Chinese economy as the reason.⁵⁸¹ The Japanese Foreign Ministry set up an advisory panel to make recommendations, based on which the Ministry was scheduled to compile ODA guidelines on China by the end of the year.⁵⁸² But even before the panel reached a conclusion, tensions between the two countries soared with media reports on Chinese maritime incursion to Japan’s EEZ. It was reported that Chinese research vessels had conducted operations without the required permission inside Japan’s EEZ 30 times in 1999 and another 17 times up to early August of 2000. So in his visit to Beijing in late August, Kōno complained bluntly that Japan considered China’s actions at sea aggressive behaviors and threatened to withhold further economic aid to China.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸⁰ For some examples making the links between Japanese aid and Chinese military power, see Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Chūgokogun o Tsuyoku suru ODA (The ODA that is Helping China’s Military Buildup),” *Seiron* (November 2000); Hisahiko Okazaki and Yoshihisa Komori, “No’ to Ieru Nitchū Kankei ni Mukeru: Saraba ‘Koto/Shazai Gaiko’ (Towards A Sino-Japanese Relations that (Japan) Can Say ‘No’: Farewell to ‘Kowtow/Apology Diplomacy’),” *Shokun* No. 8 (1999), pp. 70-71.

⁵⁸¹ “Review of Japan’s Economic Aid Casts Pall on Japan-China Tie,” *Tokyo Kyodo*, May 10, 2000, in FBIS report.

⁵⁸² “Japan Sets up Panel to Review ODA to China,” *Tokyo Kyodo*, July 17, 2000, in FBIS report; “Japan RE-Examines Policy Directing Aid Flow to China,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 2000.

⁵⁸³ “Despite Tensions, China and Japan Reaffirm Ties,” *New York Times*, August 30, 2000; “Japan and China Eye Each Other Warily – As Usual,” *The Economist*, September 2, 2000.

Distrust of China touched off by the incident of research vessels was indeed strong, especially within the ruling LDP. Keizo Takemi, a LDP member of the upper house, stated: “In the waters off Boso Peninsula, an intelligence-gathering vessel reversed course and swung its antenna around, gathering intelligence. Near such bases as Hyakuri and Yokosuka they are gathering intelligence relating to our defense functions for the capital, which are the backbone of Japan’s security. This sort of thing shouldn’t occur between two countries whose leaders affirmed their friendly partnership two years ago. Japan values Sino-Japanese cooperation and takes care to avoid unnecessary confrontation, but no matter how you look at it, Japan is the only one cooperating. Isn’t this hegemonism on China’s part?” Another member of the lower house and chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs Division, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, spoke out that “The importance of Japan’s relationship with China is well known... As a country, however, there should be an integrity, philosophy, and logic to aid. We need the understanding of the people, who are the original owners of the tax money. Chinese ships are entering our waters at will; their naval vessels have cruised around Japan. It’s the same as if the Japanese people are under attack. We should not have such a relationship.”⁵⁸⁴

Criticism of China was so intense since August that consensus quickly emerged within the Japanese government on not whether economic aid to China would be cut back but how much. It was reported in December that LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Shizuka Kamei called for cutting Japan’s total ODA budget by 30 percent because he believed that continuing to provide aid to China would mean that Japan was indirectly helping China build up its military⁵⁸⁵ It was only due to the strong objection from the Foreign Ministry that the Japanese government proved a much less drastic 10 percent cut in Japan’s foreign aid in 2002 fiscal year. Meanwhile, the Plan on Economic Cooperation with China compiled by the Foreign Ministry in October 2001 stipulated that the government would determine the amount of low-interest yen loans on an annual basis, rather than giving

⁵⁸⁴ Takuro Noguchi, “Is ODA to China Japan’s ‘Insurance’? Pros and Cons of Continuing Aid to China,” *AERA*, October 9, 2000, in FBIS report.

⁵⁸⁵ “ODA Getting the Review It Needs,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, December 12, 2000; “LDP’s Kamei Says Japan Should Reconsider ODA as Diplomatic Tool,” *Asahi Shimbun (online)*, March 1, 2001.

a lump-sum package covering several years, and it would not take past aid to China as a given amount but instead work out the sum by adding up each individual project.⁵⁸⁶

These new policy changes indicated that the hawkish opinion on China policy had gained upper hand in the Japanese government, which led to not only considerable cutback of economic aid to China but also stricter terms on which such aid is to be extended to China. This analysis suggests that China's military buildup program and assertive behaviors in surrounding areas since the early 1990s indeed constituted an important cause of Japanese policy change in economic affairs to China.

IV. Popular Animosity

Like the other indicators of bilateral reconciliation development, the evolution of bilateral popular feelings did not seem to be shaped by the international structural change. For one thing, the advent of popular estrangement between the two nations and the prevalence of simmering resentment among Chinese public about Japan began in the early 1980s, long before the end of the Cold War. The widespread Chinese student demonstration between 1985 and 1987 against "reviving Japanese militarism" and "economic invasions" marked the beginning of public venting of bitter emotions against Japan and dissolving of the façade of "Sino-Japanese Friendship" long held by the official propaganda. Since then mass demonstration became a routine domestic and diplomatic concern on anniversary days of Sino-Japanese war. Besides, Chinese public sentiments tended to associate Japanese current policy with its past aggression and, if unchecked, would have burst into mass protests every time when bilateral disputes occur, such as in the student demonstrations in the 1980s and island disputes in the 1990s. Besides anti-Japan protests, societal demands for Japanese official apology and war reparation, as well as grass-roots campaigns demanding Japanese government compensation to individual Chinese war victims emerged since the early 1990s.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁶ For the Japanese text of the plan, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kuni/china_.h.html


⁵⁸⁷ "Students Demand Japanese War Reparation," *FBIS China Daily Report*, September 24, 1996; "Indemnity Claims during Emperor's Visit Discouraged," *FBIS China Daily Report*, October 2, 1992.

As far as Japanese popular sentiments are concerned, the percentage of Japanese people who felt close to China gradually decreased since 1986. Mid-1980s was also the watershed in Japanese public trust in China began to decline. (See Chart 3 of Chapter 4 and Chart 4). Can this be explained by reduced Japanese feeling of solidarity towards China when the common Soviet threat seemed to be in retreat after Gorbachev took power? The answer is a negative one. Since coming to office in March 1985, Gorbachev took a radically new course in foreign policy that was aimed at reducing East-West security dilemma and revitalizing the sick national economy through arms control agreements, mutual reduction of military spending, and strategic retrenchment from the third world. But the subsequent American-Soviet strategic negotiation did not go smoothly and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan continued. The first real breakthrough did not come until December 1987 when Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. And Soviet military pressure on Far East began to ease up in 1988 with its pullout from Afghanistan and Mongolia.

As far as Japan was concerned, it watched on the warming up of American-Soviet relations since Gorbachev with much suspicion and distrust. Gilbert Rozman's study of Japanese elite and public perception of the Soviet Union during 1985-1991 shows that, except for the minority left, the political mainstream and general public still treated the Soviet Union as an evil, dangerous state and viewed its conciliatory moves such as the INF with a high degree of skepticism and mistrust until early 1988. The *Asahi Shimbun* held a multinational poll at the end of 1987 that asked a question about whether the Soviets could be trusted. The Japanese trust level (34%) fell much lower than that of the West Germans (73%), English (66%), and Americans (51%). There was also a huge gap in the "mutual sympathy rate" that the Japanese (17%) and Soviets (88%) had toward each other, as well as in their mutual antipathetic feelings (47.4% of Japanese toward the Soviets and 2.4% of Soviets to Japan) and friendship feelings (60.2% of Japanese say unfriendly and 9.1% say friendly, as opposed to 63.2% Soviets who say friendly and 23.4% say unfriendly), as shown in a joint poll done by Kyodo News Service and Tass. In the meantime, bilateral relations were still mired in tension due to the lack of breakthrough in territorial negotiation, the 1987 Toshiba Incident, and the remaining of heavy Soviet military deployment in the Far East, including the medium range SS-20 nuclear missiles that could reach Japan. Japanese public

opinion about the Soviet Union only slightly improved in late 1988.⁵⁸⁸ So the deterioration of Japanese opinions about China did not correlate with an increase in positive feelings about the Soviet Union.

Chart 4: Level of Japanese Public Trust of China, 1979-1993



SOURCES: *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, various years.


The second, and more significant downturn in Japanese public opinion about China occurred after the violent crackdown of the June 4th democratic movement in 1989, when there appeared a profound Japanese disenchantment with China's promise of social stability and political democracy. But in the early 1990s, Japanese public perception of security threat from China was still well below that from the Soviet Union and even the United States. For example, a *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll in 1991 shows that only eight percent of Japanese respondents felt threat from China, compared to 24 percent who felt threat from the U.S. and 21.8 percent from the Soviet Union; another poll by *Jiji Tsushinsha* in 1994 indicates that the country that Japanese public feared most was North Korea (60.2%), followed by Russia (35.4%) and the U.S. (16.4%), while China trailed rather low at only 6.5%.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁸ Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower Views A Declining One* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 98-135.

⁵⁸⁹ *Yomiuri* national opinion survey, June 1991, See *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1992, p. 508; *Jiji Tsushinsha* national survey, February 1994, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1994, p. 519.

In the second half of the 1990s Japanese public perception of China threat soared (See Charts 5). Besides, both nations felt that the other country was a major military threat, if not an immediate or most dangerous threat. In the above-mentioned opinion poll by *Asahi Shimbun* and the Chinese People's University in 1997, 54 percent of Chinese respondents chose the United States to be the biggest military threat, next to which were Japan (21%) and Russia (3%); as for the Japanese respondents, 29 percent chose North Korea, followed by the U.S. (19%) and China (18%).⁵⁹⁰

Chart 5: Japanese Perception of China Threat, 1972-1998



SOURCES: *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, various years.

EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME: TEST OF THE HISTORICAL MYTHMAKING THEORY

Historical mythmaking theory provides a fairly persuasive explanation for bilateral relations in this period. It is because the increase in bilateral historiographic divergence as a result of the mutually *conflictual/combative* war narratives of the two countries since the 1980s coincided with the deterioration of bilateral reconciliation from the sub-stage of “Rapprochement” to “Friction” of the Shallow Reconciliation stage. Not only the covariance pattern but also process-tracing results prove that historical mythmaking performed a significant role in shaping Sino-Japanese relations throughout the 1980s and

⁵⁹⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1997.

1990s. The bilateral historiographic clash greatly heightened expectation of conflict through the mechanism of intention and stimulated mutual popular animosity through the mechanism of emotions. Regarding bilateral sovereignty controversies and economic friction, the two mechanisms not only exacerbated mutual negative perception but also increased domestic pressure against government compromise, which precluded quick, smooth settlement of these issues and significantly strained bilateral relations.

The Mechanism of Intention and the Heightened Expectation of War

The widening gap between the two countries in their historical interpretation of their past considerably stimulated their mutual perception of negative intention at both inter-governmental and societal levels. The Chinese side denounced Japanese amnesia about its past aggression as both a major cause and indicator of a potential political trend to revive militaristic defense and foreign policies. As for the Japanese, because of their disagreement with Chinese interpretation of the war history, they found China's historical argument unacceptable and suspected that China was using history as a political tool to bully Japan in international affairs.

China: Japanese Unrepentance and Remilitarization Trend

As we know, Chinese official media during the 1982 textbook controversy conspicuously associated Japanese historical attitude with the danger of its militarist revival. The PLA Daily editorialized in August that those Japanese conservative politicians who supported textbook distortion of history were following a militarist logic.⁵⁹¹ Another editorial published in September's *Hongqi* (Red Flag), the communist party's mouthpiece, warned of the danger of militarist revival in light of the Japanese textbook distortion incident.⁵⁹² As discussed above, the unexpected harshness of Chinese media campaign in 1982 was the result of political manipulation, but analysis of Chinese strategic perception of Japan since then shows that open debate on war history interpretation between the two

⁵⁹¹ "Jiefangjun Bao Editorial on Being Cautious of Militarist Logic, August 3, 1982," Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 357-358.

countries to a large extent spurred Chinese fear about Japanese remilitarization. Unlike in the previous three postwar decades where Japanese war amnesia and self-glorifying discourses went unnoticed in China, with the eruption of 1982 textbook controversy it became a routine that the history issue would be treated as an important factor whenever observations of Japan's current political situation and forecast of its future trend were made.

Chinese intellectuals' first cut on war historiography pointed to the negative impact that Japan's lack of contrition may have on its national self-image, particularly among the younger generation who had no direct experience of the war. Wen Jieruo, a famous Chinese writer, once reported her unpleasant encounter with some Japanese youth at a discussion forum in 1985 following the showing of a revisionist documentary film on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. While older Japanese audience commented that Japan's war in Asia ought to be condemned because of its destructive effect in many countries, several young people agreed with the film's interpretation that tried to normalize Japan's aggression and blame the tribunal for being unfair on Japan. Wen therefore expressed her deep concern that the young Japanese were being subject to the similar kind of nationalistic brainwashing as that in the prewar period and failed to form a correct understanding of the nation's role of oppressor in modern history of Asia.⁵⁹³

Wen's concern was shared by many Chinese experts of international affairs, who were particularly worried about the international implication of Japan's historical amnesia. To China's Japan watchers, the belief that Japan did nothing wrong in the past and need not feel guilty towards Asian victim countries would induce the young Japanese to act arrogantly in the world and develop a sense of national superiority, especially vis-à-vis other Asian countries, which was often seen in militarist Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. In their view, if the truth of Japan's aggression history was not passed on to the younger generation, as time went by more and more Japanese people would accept pernicious historical myths and once again embrace militaristic international strategy. For example, He Fang, former director of the Institute of International Studies affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, warned

⁵⁹² "Hongqi Editorial on Being on Guard against Japanese Militarist Revival, September 1982," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, vol. 2, pp. 371-375.

⁵⁹³ Jieruo Wen, "Yingpian 'Dongjing Shenpan' Ji Qita (Film 'Tokyo Trial' and More)," *Riben Wenti (Japan Studies)* No. 3 (1986).

that “the erroneous opinions of the right-wing revisionist historiography could poison the mind of the Japanese youth and inflame chauvinist sentiments which, if not constrained, may lead young people down the road of evil and cast a shadow over Sino-Japanese relations.”⁵⁹⁴

Elsewhere He Fang further spelt out the casual link between Japanese arrogance and dangerous foreign policy:

“There has been a flood of great-nation chauvinist sentiments, personified by the denial of responsibility for the aggressive war, reversion of historical verdict, and even revival of the old dream of ‘Japanese Empire,’ such as to think that Japan is superior and look down upon other countries especially Asian neighbors, and to be extremely overbearing owing to great wealth... This trend, if allowed to continue, will not only hamper Sino-Japanese friendship and peace in Asia and damage Japan’s international image, but also bring Japan down the road of militarism, the danger of which has been testified in the past.”⁵⁹⁵

In this context, the fact that Japan’s pursuit of greater international influence since Nakasone came to power was accompanied by conservative efforts to deny or whitewash the country’s history of aggression was particularly worrisome. Many Chinese strategic elites believed that what was driving Japan’s new internationalist policy was the “neo-statism” (*Xin Guojia Zhuyi*) or “great-nation chauvinism” (*Daguo Zhuyi*) ideologies, which would lead to aggressive Japanese defense buildup and military activism in international affairs.⁵⁹⁶ It is true that some analysts admitted that Japan’s defense policy readjustment was in part the product of American pressure, its current military capability was still not qualified for a great military power, and to remilitarize Japan would meet various domestic and international constraining forces.⁵⁹⁷ In the meantime, however, they felt extremely uneasy about the Japanese conservative attempt to shatter postwar political framework that had served as a brake on Japanese remilitarization trend, such as trying to revise the peace constitution, calling for greater political influence of the emperor, and seeking the permanent membership in the U.N. security council as well as the removal of the U.N. enemy state clause. In fact, in the eyes of Chinese strategic elites, the rise of neo-nationalist historiography, challenge to the

⁵⁹⁴ Fang He, “Zhengque Duidai Lishi (To Treat History Right),” *Riben Wenti* No. 5 (1986), p. 3. For some examples of articles making similar arguments, see Xinzu Gao, “‘Nanjing Datusha’ de Shishi Burong Mosha (Historical Facts about Nanjing Massacre Not to be Denied),” *Riben Wenti*, No. 4 (1986).

⁵⁹⁵ Fang He, “Zhongri Guanxi yu Yazhou Heping (Sino-Japanese Relations and Peace in Asia),” *Riben Wenti* No. 4 (1987), p. 6.

⁵⁹⁶ Yimin Song, “Zhanhou Riben Minzu Zhuyi Sichao Chuxi (A Preliminary Examination of Postwar Japanese Nationalist Thoughts),” *Riben Wenti* No. 2 (1987).

⁵⁹⁷ Junfeng Pan, “Ribei Hui Chengwei Junshi Daguo Ma? (Can Japan Become A Military Great Power?),” *Riben Wenti* No. 2 (1986), pp.13-16; Jiangyong Liu, “Lun Riben Duiwai Zhanlue de Fazhan (A Study of the Evolution of Japanese External Strategy),” *Riben Wenti* No. 1 (1986), p. 8.

peace constitution, and the move toward more active defense were all interrelated, signifying Japanese desire for great power status or even the revival of militarism.⁵⁹⁸

The widespread mistrust among Chinese strategic elites about Japanese strategic motive very likely prompted the change of Chinese official attitude to Japanese defense program. Although never specifying how Japan would make all the constraining forces go away and realize remilitarization, Chinese strategic elite did suggest a possible scenario that the Japanese may gradually strengthen its military capability beyond the need for defense purpose and achieve de facto remilitarization.⁵⁹⁹ So Beijing replaced its tacit tolerance and even positive encouragement with a cautious attitude to Japanese defense upgrading. In September 1983, Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian told his Japanese counterpart that China would support Japan's self-defense efforts provided that its military capabilities "would not exceed the levels Japan needs."⁶⁰⁰ After the Nakasone administration announced the decision to break the one percent GNP ceiling for annual defense, Wu Xueqian told visiting secretary general of Liberal Democratic Party Takeshida Noboru in January that "people of Asian neighboring countries are afraid of Japan's becoming a military great power," and demanded that Japanese government should set certain limit for defense buildup and take surrounding countries' feelings into consideration.⁶⁰¹ Likewise, Japanese military's participation in overseas peacekeeping operations and domestic political attempt on revising Article 9 of the constitution have often triggered warnings from Chinese strategic analysts that Japan was opting for becoming a political power free to intervene in regional affairs with military forces.⁶⁰²

In a similar vein, Beijing held an ambiguous attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance during this period. First troubled by the U.S. burden-sharing pressure for Japan to adopt

⁵⁹⁸ See Chaolun Shi, "Xiandai Ribenren de Tianhuangguan ji 'Xiangzheng' Tianhuangzhi Wenti (Modern Japanese Views about the Emperor and the Issue of 'Symbolic' Monarchy)," *Riben Wenti* No. 4 (1987); Feng Wan, "Youguan Junguo Zhuyi, Riben Junguo Zhuyi de Jige Wenti (A Few Questions Regarding Militarism and Japanese Militarism)," *Riben Wenti* No. 6 (1987), p. 14.

⁵⁹⁹ Junfeng Pan, "Ribin Hui Chengwei Junshi Daguo Ma?" p. 17; Feng Wan, "Youguan Junguo Zhuyi, Riben Junguo Zhuyi de Jige Wenti," p. 14.

⁶⁰⁰ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," p. 97.

⁶⁰¹ Yasuda, "Boei Yosanan 'Tai GNP Hi 1% Tobatu' ni Taisuru Chugokugawa no Hanno," p. 97.

⁶⁰² For example, see Zhang Dalin, "On Japan's PKO Bill," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies)* No. 2 (1992); Jie Liu, "Postwar Japanese Thoughts on Constitutional Revision," *Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu (Foreign Problem Research)* No. 1 (1995).

active, autonomous defense by the mid-1980s, at the beginning of the 1990s China worried that increasing U.S.-Japan economic friction would erode the political basis of their alliance that was already wearing thin after the collapse of the common Soviet threat. If the alliance was severely weakened or dismantled, it would mean the destruction of another important constraint on Japanese remilitarization. A military analyst predicted that the alliance would not last long and regional stability may be compromised as a result.⁶⁰³ Another Japan expert warned that the day when Japan said “no” to the United States would be the time when Japan became a political and military giant.⁶⁰⁴

However, following the reaffirmation of U.S.-Japan alliance around 1996, Chinese worry about a too loose alliance declined while the fear that the alliance is too tight increased dramatically. One leading advocate of the new opinion, Liu Jiangyong, rebutted the belief that Japan would become a great military power only when the U.S.-Japan alliance disintegrated. He argued that the alliance may be a “cork in the bottle” preventing Japan from developing nuclear weapons, but it was also serving as an “egg shell” encouraging Japanese upgrade of high-tech and conventional military capability’ so Japan actually used the alliance as a good cover for its military buildup programs. Liu even drew a comparison between Japan’s policy of active defense of its surrounding waters, sea-lane security and overseas Japanese nationals since 1996 with the history in the 1930s and 1940s and warned that history may replay for Japan invaded Russia and China with the excuse to defend these interests.⁶⁰⁵ Another military analyst even bluntly pointed out that Japan allowed the U.S. to station troops in its territory in exchange for U.S. support for Japan’s expansion to Southern Pacific and Indian Ocean, an evil plot reminiscent of its attempt to build “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the wartime.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰³ Yunzhong Yang, “Rimei Maodun de Jihua jiqi dui Guoji Guanxi de Yingxiang (The Escalation of Japan-US conflict and Its Impact on International Relations),” *Yatai Yanjiu (Asia-Pacific Studies)* No. 3 (1992).

⁶⁰⁴ Zhongying Pang, “Guanyu Xingcheng zhong de Dongya Anquan Zhixu yu Jingji de Ruogan Sikao (Some Thoughts on the Evolving Security Order and Economy in East Asia),” *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics)* No. 3 (1994).

⁶⁰⁵ Jiangyong Liu, et al., “1996-1997 Report of the Situation in Japan,” in *Study Report on International Situation* (Beijing, Chinese Strategy and Management Society, 1997). For more on the transition of Chinese strategic perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1996-7, see Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” pp. 58-64.

⁶⁰⁶ Yaqing Li, “What Is Japan Doing Southward?” *Jianchuan Zhishi (Knowledge of Naval and Merchant Ships)* No. 6 (1997).

Chinese criticism of Japanese policies in connection with the war history since the 1980s seemingly resembles its media bashing of reviving Japanese militarism in the 1960s for purely instrumental purposes. But major differences exist. In the 1960s the Chinese government did not really care about how history was remembered in Japan but only to cite history to put pressure on Japan in the hope of influencing its policy to China. And Chinese media campaigns were turned on and off in accordance with the belief/disbelief that Tokyo was carrying out an aggressively anti-China policy. Since the 1980s, however, Chinese media and strategic elite showed serious concerns about Japanese historical myths themselves. The logic is not “because Japan did bad things in the past, it will do it again,” but “because of its historical amnesia and lack of contrition about its bad behaviors in the past, Japan may do it again.” Such concerns were deeply embedded in Chinese strategic thinking and did not go away when bilateral relations were relatively smooth. And China usually demanded not only restraints in Japanese national strategies but also sincere contrition and serious reform of history education.

Mistrust of Japan was not limited to Chinese strategic elite but also widespread among the general public. There was a common impulse among ordinary Chinese people to condemn Japanese unrepentance about the war history and jump to the conclusion about Japan’s evil ambition. A 1996 Chinese best-selling book that created a sensation in China, *China that Can Say No*, conveyed such a clear message that Japan was not trustworthy because of its wrong attitude toward its past aggression and urged Japan to exercise self-restraint in revising constitution, building up defense capabilities, and seeking the permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The book even made it an eye-catching headline that “in some sense, to do nothing is exactly Japan’s contribution to the world!”⁶⁰⁷

The authors’ argument was actually shared by a great proportion of Chinese people. In a large-scale opinion poll conducted among Chinese young people with average age around 25 across the country by *China Youth Daily* in December 1996, such a question was posed to the respondents: “Japan has not done genuine introspection about the past even 50 years after the end of the WWII. Under such circumstances, do you agree that Japan should become a permanent member of the UN Security Council?” Nearly 95 percent of the

respondents said they disagreed. A similarly majority of respondents showed sensitivity to Japan's assertive international strategy: 75 percent expressed objection to the dispatch of Japanese SDF troops abroad for U.N. peace-keeping missions, and 89.5 percent said they were worried that Japan would capitalize on such opportunities to move toward a military power.⁶⁰⁸

Japan: Historiographic Gap and Japanese Fear of An Assertive China

From the mid-1990s, Japanese strategic elites often considered Chinese nuclear weapon development, military modernization programs and naval activities in surrounding waters as sources of a potential China threat. The Chinese refusal to take self-restraint in above areas and improve military transparency particularly frustrated the Japanese side. When Tokyo presses on Beijing over these matters, however, it was often dismayed by China's claim of historical entitlement because of its past suffering at the hand of Japanese aggressors. From the Chinese perspective, as a former oppressor of the Chinese nation who had yet to come to terms with its past crimes, Japan had no right to complain about China's national defense efforts to fend off foreign invasions. For example, when Japan protested Chinese nuclear tests in 1995 by freezing grant aid to China, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman responded that Japan should "understand the sentiment of the Chinese people especially on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the WWII" and urged Japan to reflect on its wartime atrocities rather than criticizing others.⁶⁰⁹

However, Japan found such Chinese argument based on the war history unacceptable. According to Japanese neo-nationalist view of the war history, Japan did not do anything exceptionally bad in China compared to what other major imperialist powers did in the early 20th century and Japan had already made more apologies than necessary. A moderate and probably more widely held view admitted Japanese aggression and agreed with the necessity to settle past account, but it treated current issues like nuclear tests as separate

⁶⁰⁷ Song Qiang et al., *China That Can Say No*, p. 115-119.

⁶⁰⁸ *China Youth Daily*, February 15, 1997.

⁶⁰⁹ "'Deep Regret' Expressed Over Japanese Aid Cut," Hong Kong AFP in English, *FBIS China Daily Report*, August 21, 1995.

from history and advocated a firm Japanese policy on these issues.⁶¹⁰ Both the views of denying Japanese war responsibility and dismissing that Japan's past behavior had anything to do with its present image in the world rejected the validity of Chinese sense of historical entitlement in defense policy. To them, Japanese national interest calculation, as well as the institutional and ideological constraints on military spending and overseas activities would suffice to prevent Japan from going back to the militarist era, so Chinese persistent warning against the resurgence of Japanese militarism had no realistic basis.⁶¹¹

If China's insistence on its own military buildup and criticism of Japanese militarist revival were not justifiable in the historical and present context, many Japanese believed that the Chinese excessively indulge themselves in the past history. Others held a cynical belief that Chinese argument only showed Beijing's manipulation of history to seek practical gains or a deliberate disguise of its international ambition. For example, the 1984 annual report of the Research Institute for Peace and Security speculates that "there is a resurgence of patriotism in China and it may be that the Chinese leadership has chosen to criticize militarism in an effort to demonstrate that they are not completely siding with Japan."⁶¹² Another argument goes that China used history to apply pressure on Japan for concessions on economic aid and Taiwan policy, which will be discussed in later sections. Perhaps Japan's biggest resentment of Chinese instrumental use of history was that by seizing the morally high ground and reducing Japan to a "special country" that was indebted to China, China tried to put Japan in a subordinate position in bilateral relationship. For example, an expert on international affairs voiced the following criticism of Chinese historical argument:

"Although ordinary Japanese people have deeply understood the nation's negative legacy vis-à-vis China, the way China raises the issue of 'historical consciousness' often tries to make generalization out of exceptional cases, which sometimes makes people feel that China tries to interfere with Japan's internal affairs. Moreover, one begins to suspect that China is using the issue of 'historical consciousness' as a diplomatic means to impose an upper-and-lower relations on Sino-Japanese relations and mold Japanese public acceptance that Japan should be submissive to China."⁶¹³

⁶¹⁰ For an example of this opinion of pressing for Chinese concession on military issues while accepting Japanese war responsibility to a non-masochist extent, see Jitsurō Terashima, "Nichibeichu Toraianguru Kuraishisu o Do Seigo Suru ka (How to Check Japan-US-China Triangular Crisis)," *Chūō Kōron* No. 8 (1996).

⁶¹¹ Hisahiko Okazaki and Shinichi Kitaoka, "Nihon Gaikō Machiukeru Shiren (Trials Awaiting Japan's Diplomacy)," *Chūō Kōron* No. 2 (1992), pp. 82-86.

⁶¹² *Asian Security 1984*, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, p. 85.

⁶¹³ Nobuo Miyamoto, "Nichi-bei-chū-ro' Shijusō no Fu Kyōwa On (A Disharmonious Note in the Japan-US-China-Russia Quartet)," *Chūō Kōron* No. 2 (1998), p. 145.

It was exactly the fear of Japanese humiliating “Kneeling-down Diplomacy” (*Dogeza Gaikō*) or “Tribute Diplomacy” (*Chōkō Gaikō*) that triggered some of the strongest objections in Japan against Emperor Akihito’s visit to China in 1992 and his issuing clear apology during the visit.⁶¹⁴ Many Japanese were also frustrated that China cited history to turn down Japanese application for the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council and blew the whistle on Japanese militarism whenever Japan tried to send its military overseas as international contribution. All these Chinese actions convinced them of China’s insensitivity to Japan’s national pride and deliberate effort to deny Japan of a greater role in the new world order.

Overall, like the way it caused Chinese resentment of Japanese arrogance, the bilateral memory divergence also brought about a strong disapproval in Japan of Chinese approach to international affair. In Japanese perception, China was developing a dangerous nationalist trend that tended to place the interest of other countries secondary to that of the “Greater China Nation.” Although it would still be far-fetched to think that China would come after Japan in a revanchist move right away, many Japanese elites were afraid that China would grow more assertive in foreign and defense policies while ignoring the rightful interest of Japan. So China was seen to have assumed the role of Japan’s principal rival in the region despite the lack of a major shift in bilateral power balance and fundamental conflict of interest between them.

The Mechanism of Emotions and Popular Animosity

Acrimonious controversies on war memories directly led to negative emotions toward one another nation. While the Chinese people felt bitter about their suffering and the lack of genuine Japanese atonement for its war guilt, the majority of Japanese people rejected Chinese grievances because they believed themselves as innocent war victims and Japan had displayed enough contrition for its past aggression. So the Japanese were greatly frustrated when the Chinese demanded reparation for individuals and even held deep

⁶¹⁴ Mineo Nakajima, “Tenno Hochū to Nihon Gaikō (The Emperor’s Visit to China and Japan’s Foreign Policy),” *Chuō Kōron* No. 9 (1992).

Japanese contrition as the preconditions for improvement in bilateral relations. As a result, feeling of animosity to Japan permeated the Chinese society, whereas disgust and resentment about China spread among the Japanese public, causing a downward spiral of popular relations between the two countries.

Chinese Historical Grievances

Chinese public grievances stemming from bilateral historiographic divergence played a significant role in shaping negative Chinese popular feeling about Japan. First of all, painful recollections of Japanese war crimes and Chinese people's suffering was commonly invoked when ordinary Chinese people were asked to describe the national image of Japan, thanks to the prevalence of victim consciousness in China since the 1980s. The first outburst of popular repugnance to Japan came between 1985 and 1987 when Chinese university students staged demonstrations in Beijing and many other big cities protesting the resurgence of Japanese militarism signaled by Nakasone's official visit to the Yasukuni, In the 1990s, the image of the Japanese nation among Chinese youth remained overshadowed by harrowing memories of the past. The above-mentioned public survey of 1996 by the China Youth Daily crystallized this phenomenon. When asked if they would think of "Japanese imperialist atrocities in China" upon seeing Japanese national flag, 76.4 percent respondents said "yes" and another 20 percent said sometimes they would. Another question asked what the word "Japan" would most likely invoke in their mind, the three most selected choices were Nanjing Massacre (83.9 percent), "Japanese devils" and war of resistance against Japan (81.3 percent), and Bushido (58.1%).⁶¹⁵

The emotional focus in Chinese perception of Japan was not only limited to the younger generation but also widespread among the general Chinese public. According to a joint public-opinion survey done by Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop in September 1999, when asked what would be called to mind if they hear the word "Japan," 39.2 percent of all Chinese respondents gave the answer of "war of aggression/war of resistance against Japan,"

⁶¹⁵ China Youth Daily, February 15, 1997.

which topped the list of all choices; besides, another about 15 percent respondents gave answers like Nanjing Massacre, barbarism, militarism, hatred, all closely related to the war.⁶¹⁶

Another evidence of the impact of memory difference on public feeling was the widespread conviction among Chinese people that Japan had not done sincere, thorough soul-searching regarding its past aggression. The student demonstration of the mid-1980s were in a big part provoked by the two textbook incidents of 1982 and 1986 and Nakasone's official worship at the Yasukuni in 1985, which all appeared to Chinese students that Japan remained unrepentant about history and might again become a aggressor in the future. In a questionnaire survey carried out on the campus of Beijing Aerospace University in 1997, over 80 percent of all respondents worried that Japan had not conducted conscientious self-examination but connived at the right-wing view of history.⁶¹⁷ In a recent Sino-Japanese joint opinion poll conducted in 2002, about 64.5 percent of Chinese respondents said they did not feel friendly toward Japan, as opposed to only 25 percent who felt very friendly or somewhat friendly. When the former group was asked why they did not feel friendly, nearly 80 percent of them picked the choice "because I think Japan does not do self-reflect on the history of its aggression against China and lacks a correct view of history."⁶¹⁸

The Chinese people were resentful about Japan not only for its whitewashing of the aggression history in textbooks and public commemoration, but also because of its lack of sincere efforts of restitution, particularly material compensation. The emergence of Chinese popular demand for war reparation is particularly noteworthy because the Chinese government never showed real interest in obtaining Japanese reparation and officially the issue was already settled at the time of diplomatic normalization. In the past, public dissatisfaction about the reparation issue was suppressed due to the strategic interest of Sino-Japanese cooperation. But since the outbreak of bilateral historiographic conflict in the early 1980s, public sentiments towards Japan have changed dramatically and people began to express disagreement with the government position in open occasions. A dissident journal run by overseas Chinese students, *Zhongguo Zhi Chun* (China Spring), published an article in 1987 by an influential political dissident, Fang Lizhi, on Sino-Japanese relations. Actually

⁶¹⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 30, 1999.

⁶¹⁷ *Daxue Sheng*, July 10, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, October 14, 1997.

written in November 1981 when Fang visited Kyodo and Hiroshima, the article was only published in China Spring and reprinted in *Chūo Kōron* in 1987. The following criticism of the Chinese government regarding its domestic and foreign policies, including the policy on the question of war reparation, probably made it too controversial to appear in the tightly censored Chinese media:

“For some reason or other, I felt that Chinese people’s heart is way too kind. At home we even believe the faint, empty smile of a tyrant, and externally we even believe the mere hypocrisy of those who brandishes the big stick of power... After the war, Japan ought to pay China war reparation in hundreds of billions of dollars, but with the consent of Premier (the debt) was completely canceled by one single stroke of writing. The premier’s consideration was correct, and it also showed the good and kind character of the Chinese people. However, we should not be fooled repeatedly by (other’s) empty smile and hypocrisy just because we are inherently good and kind.”⁶¹⁹

If in the 1980s Chinese elites like Fang Lizhi could only insinuate their disapproval of the government decision to renounce official claims to Japanese war reparation, since the 1990s they openly expressed sympathy to Chinese war victims and some of them even organized grass-roots campaigns to seek compensation from Japan. This dramatic change was directly triggered by the international stir after three former “comfort women” from South Korea filed lawsuit against the Japanese government in 1991. Around 1991-1992 Chinese people from various social strata formed a number of groups demanding war compensation, and activists of the redress movement began to appeal at the NPC for change of government policy.

The movement soon spread to university campuses and reached a climax shortly before Emperor Akihiko’s visit to Beijing in October 1992. In mid-September, a graduate student research group distributed around 1,000 questionnaires on Sino-Japanese relations to students and young teachers at Beijing University, People’s University, and Beijing Normal University. Some 58.6 percent of respondents in the survey said the 1972 bilateral agreement dropping war compensation claims damaged Chinese interests, 89.1 percent of the total respondents supported raising compensation claims. Regarding Japanese apologies, some 93.7 percent said the Emperor Hirohito bore full or some responsibility for Japanese war crimes, and 67.6 percent demanded a formal apology from Emperor Akihito when he visited China. About a week after the poll was conducted, university students in Beijing

⁶¹⁸ Tokyo Shimbun, September 22, 2002.

launched a citywide petition movement collecting signatures and students representatives attempted to deliver an open letter to the Japanese Embassy demanding emperor's public apology for war crimes and reasonable war reparations.⁶²⁰

The redress movement resonated so much among not only the general public but also government officials that it prompted the Chinese government to circulate a red-letterheaded document among cadres at the departmental and army level on the eve of the National Day, warning them “not to raise, encourage others to raise, and support any attempt to claim indemnity against Japan as the Japanese emperor is about to visit China.”⁶²¹ However, the government discouragement did not stop the redress movement from gaining more public support. Even periodicals sponsored by government think tanks began to publish articles sympathetic to individual demands for Japanese reparation.⁶²² As time went by, the domestic and international atmospheres turned so much in favor of war redress movement that it became difficult for the government to suppress these claims from its own people. So official restrictions on individual compensation claims gradually wound down. In March 1995, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen remarked that individual claims of war compensation to Japan were the rights of Chinese people, which the Chinese government will neither obstruct nor intervene.⁶²³ With the government permission and generous support from both domestic and foreign legal experts and social activists, Chinese war victims filed numerous lawsuits in Japanese courts in the second half of the 1990s.⁶²⁴

⁶¹⁹ Lizhi Fang, “Nihonjin no Seizai no Sensokan ni Tsuite (Regarding the Latent War View of the Japanese People),” *Chūo Kōron* No. 8 (1987), p. 176.

⁶²⁰ “Students Demand Japanese War Reparation,” *Tokyo Kyodo*, September 23, 1992; “Student Campaign for Japanese War Reparations,” *Hong Kong AFP*, September 24, 1992, in FBIS-CHI.

⁶²¹ “Indemnity Claims During Emperor’s Visit Discouraged,” *Hong Kong Ming Pao*, October 2, 1992, in FBIS-CHI.

⁶²² For some examples of Chinese scholars of international affairs in government think-tanks giving their support to the non-governmental activities in many Asian countries to demand Japanese compensation and even directly urging the lifting of official ban on such activities in China, see Biqing Zhang, “Ribei Jiejue dui Wo Minjian Peichang Wenti Ciqi Shi Ye (The Time Is Right for Japan to Settle the Problem of Non-governmental Compensation with China),” *Riben Wenti Ziliao (Materials of Japanese Affairs)* (internal circulation) No. 5 (1994); Weijiu Jiang, “Yanzhou Geguo Erzhan Shouhaizhe Peichang Susong Fenqi de Fenxi (An Analysis of the Mushrooming of Compensation Lawsuits Filed by World War II Victims of Various Asian Countries),” *Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies)* No. 4 (1995).

⁶²³ Ping An, “Ribei Qiye de Zhanzhen Zeren ji Minjian Peichang Wenti (The War Responsibility of Japanese Firms and the Problem of Individual Claims of War Compensation),” *Kangri Zhanzhen Yanjiu (the Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan)* No. 3 (1998), p. 194.

⁶²⁴ “Experts Advise Chinese WWII Laborers to File Class Action,” *People’s Daily Online* (<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn>), January 15, 2002; “The Hanaoka Incident: Corporate Compensation for

Therefore, towards the end of the 1990s, it became a national consensus that Japan was indebted to China and China should put more pressure on Japan for its contrition.

Japanese Rejection of Chinese Grievances and Sense of Frustration

In contrast to Chinese bitter feeling about the war history, the Japanese people remembered the war as a miserable experience for the Japanese nation itself while Japan's wrongdoings to other Asian people were largely filtered out of their historical memory. In an opinion poll conducted by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute shortly before the 40th anniversary of the end of the war, Japanese respondents were asked to tell what they usually talked about when the subject of the Sino-Japanese War or Pacific War were brought up. The most selected answers, including "shortage of food and other goods" (51.6%), "atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (47.1%), "the misery of war" (37.6%), and "experience of (allied) air raids" (24.2%), were experiences either exclusive to the Japanese or related to the distress of war in general. Topics involving Japan's war crimes or other nations' suffering, such as "the brutality of Japanese military" (24.3%), "war responsibility of the leadership" (14.2%), war responsibility of Japanese citizens" (5.6%) and "the sacrifices of other nations" (9.5%), received much less attention.⁶²⁵

With regard to Japan's war responsibility, while the majority of Japanese people admitted that Japan launched a war of aggression, they also accepted various excuses that would minimize the guilt of the nation or prove their personal innocence. A public survey in 1983 is particularly revealing. On the one hand, 51.4 percent of respondents said the fifty years from 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war to the Pacific War was a history of Japanese aggression against Asian neighboring countries, and 82.5 percent also believed that Japanese people should do self-reflection on Japan's wrongdoings to Koreans and Chinese since the Meiji era. On the other hand, when asked if Japan, short in resource supply, had no better choice than military advance to other countries to ensure its own survival, 44.8 percent of respondents said "yes," compared to 38.7 percent who said "no." And 45.5 percent

Forced Labor," *Sekai* 684 (February 2001); Joseph Kahn, "Shouting the Pain From Japan's Germ Attacks," *New York Times*, November 23, 2002.

⁶²⁵ "Survey on the Society and People's Life in Postwar 40 Years" by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, July 1985, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1986, p. 564.

thought that the Pacific War accelerated the liberation of Asian countries from the yoke of Europeans and Americans, with only 25.1 percent disagreeing. Moreover, 36.3 percent of respondents believed that ordinary Japanese people were innocent because they were duped by the militarists, and another 17.6 percent believed that Japan fought the war for self-defense and peace in Asia so whether Japanese people were the victim or victimizer should not become a question, compared to 29.5 percent who acknowledged that the majority of Japanese people acted as the victimizer because they collaborated with the militarists during the war.⁶²⁶

Focusing on Japan's own victimhood while accepting only limited responsibility for oppressing other Asian countries, Japanese historical myths diminished the desire of ordinary Japanese people to offer contrition in wider scope and greater depth. For example, in a conversation published in the popular magazine *Chūo Kōron* in 1995, two scholars of international affair tried to normalize Japan's war of aggression by arguing that it was not an unusual war but one of many wars in world history and Japan should not be singled out for blame; they also stressed that the issue of war reparation had been long concluded by postwar peace treaties, so it was just a matter of course for Japan to refuse providing compensation to individual war victims as no precedents ever existed.⁶²⁷

Such a view was widely shared among Japanese public. More people now came to believe that for the kind of wrongdoings the country had done in the past, Japan should offer some contrition but not too much. In a 1992 survey, whereas about 35 percent respondents wished that the emperor had expressed unambiguous apology or said something close to apology during his 1991 trip to Southeast Asia, 43.4 percent respondents said it was just fine for the emperor to limit his war-related remarks to Japan's determination

⁶²⁶ "Survey on Japanese People's View of Peace" by NHK Broadcasting and Public Opinion Research Institute, October 1982, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1983, pp. 575-576.

⁶²⁷ Takashi Ito and Seizaburō Sato, "Ano Senso to wa nani datta no ka (What actually was that war)," *Chūo Kōron* No.1 (1995). An attempt was also made in this conversation to water down Japan's responsibility, such as to argue that nobody could be innocent under the war circumstance, Japan was actually less evil than Germany because the Japanese militarists never contemplated systematic genocide, and the Soviet Union was also worse than Japan because they attacked Japan in violation of their non-aggression pact, took the northern islands, and enslaved large number of Japanese in Siberia.

to exist as a peace state without repeating the misery of war, and another 6.7 percent said that neither apology nor any mention of the war was necessary.⁶²⁸

Even to some people with a stronger sense of obligation for Japan to redress its war guilt, Japan had offered considerable contrition and further apologies or compensation to individual war victims was neither necessary nor reasonable because more problems would be created than solved. For example, while admitting that Japan was indeed obligated to apologize to Asian victim countries for its past aggression and colonization, Kitaoka Shinichi, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo nevertheless pointed out Japanese leaders had made a number of substantial gestures of apologies, including remarks of regret made by Kishi in his 1957 visit to Southeast Asia and Tanaka before the signing of 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communique. He found the option of individual compensation undesirable because it would disturb the long established legal framework of postwar settlement and also open up a Pandora's Box of endless claims from various parts of the Asian-Pacific region. So the best way to redress the war, according to him, was to encourage clearer explication of individual war responsibility through objective historic research.⁶²⁹

Therefore, many ordinary Japanese people felt sorry about what Japan had done to China in the past war, but not to extent that would call for substantial measures of restitution in addition to the superficial and limited efforts by Japanese government. Meanwhile, the majority of Japanese public rejected the Chinese argument that these measures should be the single most important precondition for constructing bilateral cooperation and friendship in the present day. According to the joint public-opinion poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* and the Chinese People's University in September 1997, the majority of both Japanese (58%) and Chinese (86%) public considered Japan had not provided China with adequate compensation for what it had done in the past war. However, regarding what the Japanese government policy should be devoted to regarding the past history, 74 percent of Chinese respondents picked "heartfelt apology," "monetary compensation" or "enhancing history education," with only 20 percent chose "constructing a new cooperative relationship unconstrained by the past." This makes a stark contrast to

⁶²⁸ National survey by Jiji Tsushisha, January 1992, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1992, p. 569.

the Japanese respondents, 61 percent of whom picked the last choices, while only 35 percent chose one of the first three.⁶³⁰

With the significant gap between their perception of how the past plays in the present, the Japanese public reacted to history-related bilateral disputes very differently from the Chinese. Such Japanese actions as textbook distortion or prime minister's shrine worship that the Chinese found absolutely outrageous were considered no big deal by a lot of Japanese, who often felt the Chinese had thrown much more blame on Japan than it deserved. For example, a public survey right after the 1982 textbook controversy asked respondents if they agreed with the Chinese accusation that Mombushō's attempt to change the term "invasion" to "advance" in textbook treatment of the war indicated a danger of militarist revival, only 9.1 percent fully agreed that danger was big, with 36 percent believing in some degree of danger and another 39.1 percent refuting any danger of this kind.⁶³¹ Similar Japanese attitude of defiance could be seen in their acceptance of Nakasone's shrine worship in 1985 in the midst of fierce Chinese criticism. Polling data show that half of the respondents thought the worship was good, and only 23 percent found it questionable.⁶³²

The result of the contrasting opinions about the history issue between the two nations was an overall downward spiral of mutual popular emotions. While the Chinese protested the lack of Japanese contrition with ever-growing bitterness, the Japanese were fed up with the seemingly endless Chinese criticism. Allen Whiting argues that the decline in favorable Japanese attitude to China between June 1985 and October 1986 after a steady improvement of such attitude in the previous five years was evident of Japanese resentment to the anti-Japanese student demonstrations and Beijing's Japan bashing campaign.⁶³³

Such an "action-reaction syndrome" again set in following Jiang Zemin's landmark six-day trip to Tokyo in November 1998. The first visit to Japan by a PRC president and

⁶²⁹ Shinichi Kitaoka, "Rekishi no Kenshō to Kojin no Sekinin (Historical Investigation and Individual Responsibility)," *Chūō Kōron* No. 8 (1995).

⁶³⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1997.

⁶³¹ Yomiuri National Survey, September 1982, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1983, p. 542.

⁶³² "Survey on News Reports, Politics of the Nakasone Cabinet, 'Hi no Maru, Kimigayo'" by *Asahi Shimbun*, October 1985, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1986, p. 492.

⁶³³ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 196.

meant to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the PFT, it was nevertheless marred by bitter contention over the history issue. During the visit, Jiang harshly criticized Japan's wartime history and demanded Japanese remembrance and contrition in a number of occasions, from the summit meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi, meetings with Japanese politicians and friendship organizations, speeches at Japanese universities, and even to the formal banquet given by Emperor Akihito.

Some speculated that Jiang spoke so ardently about the war because of personal experience, especially that his foster father died in the resistance campaign. A more persuasive explanation was that Jiang was venting his anger at Japan's position in the diplomatic negotiation prior to the trip. While it had just signed a joint declaration with South Korean president Kim Dae-jung in October that included a formal apology, Japan was only willing to give China verbal but not written apology, citing the phrase of "deep remorse" used in the 1972 Joint Communique and Emperor Akihito's remarks in his 1992 visit to China as evidence that apology to China had been done.⁶³⁴ A Japanese diplomat revealed that the Japan-ROK Joint Declaration was largely the result of Kim's initiative that South Korea would promise to put an end to issues of the past if Japan was willing to extend a written apology; but the Chinese government refused to offer a similar statement as Kim did, which sparked the fear that Japan would remain in the shadow of history even if it made a written apology this time.⁶³⁵ This testimony drives home the contrasting historical perspectives of the two countries: the Chinese side was angry about Japan's lack of contrition, something that was long past due, the Japanese side was dismayed by the prospect of perennial Chinese manipulation of history to exert pressure on Japan.

Jiang's tough attitude enraged many Japanese in and outside the government, who found him lacking basic diplomatic etiquette for openly expressing disapproval of Japan even when he was there as a state guest. A professor of international affairs at Kyōrin University in Tokyo, Takubo Tadae, lashed out that "Jiang Zemin failed to discern even the minimal

⁶³⁴ For the text of the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration in English, see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>

⁶³⁵ Interview in March 2001 with a Japanese diplomat who worked at the Seoul Embassy and took part in the negotiation of Japanese-South Korean Joint Declaration before Kim's visit to Tokyo. Also see Soichirō Tahara, "President Jiang Zemin's Visit to Japan Heightens Anti-China Emotions; Did Prime Minister Obuchi Speak out Clearly?" *Shūkan Asahi* (December 18, 1998).

level of diplomatic decorum and persistently maintained an attitude which could only be categorized as that of a 'slob'.⁶³⁶ Jiang's visit touched off so much resentment in Japan that Naoto Kan, head of the Democratic Party of Japan, was reported to call it "a failure."⁶³⁷ Japanese public perception of bilateral relations also cooled down considerably following Jiang's visit. While 45.6 percent of respondents in a poll done by the Japanese government in October 1997 thought that the relationship had been going well, compared to 44.3 percent who thought the reverse, a survey by the same organization in November 1998 shows that the figures changed to 41.5 percent and 47.9 percent respectively.⁶³⁸ Another opinion survey held in Japan in August 1999 shows considerable public dissatisfaction with Chinese government's way of handling the history problem. In this *Yomiuri Shimbun*-sponsored poll, out of a number of policy recommendations for the Chinese government to take in order to improve bilateral relations, the most selected choice is to "put an end to the 'history problem' with Japan" (34.8%), second to which was the choice, "eliminate illegal immigration to Japan" (24.8%)⁶³⁹

Societal Contacts Fail to Bring About Deep Mutual Understanding

It is true that mutual contacts boomed in these two decades, with Japanese visitors to China expanding about 20 times and Chinese visitors to Japan increasing 17 times (see Chart 6). The number of Japanese visitors to mainland China grew especially fast, surpassing the number of those going to Hong Kong in 1997 to make mainland China the second largest destination of Japanese visitors in Asia, only topped by South Korea.


⁶³⁶ Tadae Takubo, "Come to Think of It, Jiang Zemin Is Indeed Rude!" *Shokun* (February 1999).

⁶³⁷ Tahara, "President Jiang Zemin's Visit to Japan Heightens Anti-China Emotions; Did Prime Minister Obuchi Speak out Clearly?"

⁶³⁸ *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1998 & 1999.

⁶³⁹ Yomiuri national survey, August 1999, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 2000, p. 492.

Chart 6: China-Japan Mutual Contacts, 1972-1999



SOURCES: Japanese Ministry of Justice, *Shunyūkoku Kanri Tōkei Nenpō*, various years.

However rapidly increasing, Sino-Japanese societal contacts in this period are not yet comprehensive. First of all, the two societies interacted in an asymmetric pattern, with far more Japanese people than Chinese people able to visit the other country. Besides high travel cost that was beyond the means of many ordinary Chinese, visa restrictions placed by the Japanese Government was another major impediment to a substantial increase of Chinese tourists. The cause was the Japanese fear that some Chinese would illegally stay in Japan once they come. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice even long prohibited Chinese tourists from entering Japan on a tour package organized by travel agencies.⁶⁴⁰ The problem of excessive Japanese restrictions existed in other aspects of bilateral exchanges. The number of Chinese *Kenshūsei*, or students of technical training, rose rapidly since 1984 when Japan adopted a welcome policy. Still there are many complaints about the complicated application procedures required by the Japanese side. Tokyo was reluctant to relax regulations for fear of encouraging illegal stay, despite the fact that those who stayed in

⁶⁴⁰ The ban was finally lifted in September 2000, but with the extra regulations that Japanese travel agencies involved would receive bad evaluation if they fail to follow the rule of calling names whenever a tour group stops or even “lose” their group members. In fact, all members of the first Chinese tourist group went through strict background check in China and came to Japan with the Chinese government guaranteeing that no one would “disappear” during the trip. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 24, 2000.

Japan illegally did not surpass one percent of total Chinese *Kenshūsei* coming to Japan during 1989-1996.⁶⁴¹

Financial constraints also hampered comprehensive development of societal contacts. Because of the great wealth gap between the two countries, many exchange programs solely depended on the financial resources of Japanese sponsors. When Japanese economy sagged, budget for these programs also contracted. Besides, non-governmental organizations sponsoring training programs to promote Sino-Japanese friendship had no stable income but only relied on donations to finance their activities. So those Chinese who were interested in going to Japan had to compete for limited resources and opportunities. Before Chinese per capita income becomes comparable to that of the Japanese, it is hard for the two nations to conduct exchanges on an equal, free basis. So far the majority of Chinese people still depend on official media for a limited access to information about Japan.

Other limitations on bilateral contacts lied in the policy of the Chinese government. China did not begin to send students to Japan until 1978, and for many years since then only sent middle-aged personnel on official fund while prohibiting anyone from attending foreign schools on private fund. This restriction was eased in 1985, and finally from the early 1990s ordinary Chinese citizens were allowed to travel abroad for either official or private purposes. But that does not mean that Chinese people now could interact freely with foreigners. An outstanding problem with China's external exchange programs was the absence of truly non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In many exchange programs conveying Chinese government messages by the Chinese participants substituted free communication of opinions and information that would have better facilitated mutual understanding and sense of closeness.

Perhaps the most critical shortfall of the bilateral exchange programs in this period was their failure to promote joint history research regarding the war history. The 1982 textbook controversy triggered a number of joint history research and education exchange activities among historians of East Asian countries, mostly conducted by non-official or

⁶⁴¹ Satoshi Amako and Shigeto Sonoda eds., *Nitchū Kōryū no Shibanseki (A Quarter Century of Sino-Japanese Exchanges)* (Tokyo: Toyo Keizei Shinposha, 1998), pp. 97-98.

semi-official organizations. One example is the Symposium of East Asia History Education sponsored by the Association of Comparative History and Comparative History Education (ACHCHE), a non-governmental organization of Japanese liberal academics. Held once every five years since 1984, the symposium convened four times by the end of 1990s where historians and history educators from Japan, China, South Korea and, since the third conference in 1994, North Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan, were invited to address the question of bridging the narrative gap between one's national history and a shared Asian history. However, discussions at these conferences were not really framed to enable joint investigation of specific historical incidents or to reach concrete recommendations on textbook improvement, but tended to cover more broad topics ranging from introducing history education system of each country to examining the history of modern imperialism and comparing Asian historiography with Western perspective on modern history.⁶⁴²

The program that directly involved bilateral textbook discussion was the exchanges held between China Education Union (CEU) and the left-wing JTU. Exchanges between these two organizations begun since the mid-1950s and returned to an active state since 1978 after more than a decade of suspension during the Cultural Revolution. Since the eruption of the textbook controversy, the focus of the program shifted from class visits and teachers' meeting to examination of each other's history textbooks.⁶⁴³ In addition, since 1988 Chinese historians at the Institute of Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research of the PEP and Japan's International Society for Educational Information (ISEI) made joint textbook surveys and textbook translation efforts, and both Japanese historians of the History Educationalist Conference of Japan and ACHCHE sent delegates since 1985 to the annual meeting of the Association of Chinese History Education.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴² For brief reviews of the four conferences by ACHCHE, see *Rekishigaku Kenkyū (Journal of Historical Studies)*, No. 2 of 1990, No.3 of 1995, and No. 8 of 2000. Presentations and discussions in the first three conferences have been published by 2000. See ACHCHE ed. *Jikokushi to Sekaishi (National History and World History)* (Tokyo: Horupu Shuppan, 1985); *Ajia no 'Kinda' to Rekishu Kyōiku (Asia's 'Modern Time' and History Education)* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1991); *Kurosen to Nissei Sensō (Black Ship and the First Sino-Japanese War)* (Tokyo, Miraisha, 1996).

⁶⁴³ For a recent report of the exchange program between CEU and JTU, see Rokurō Hitaka, *Nihon to Chūgoku: Wakamono-tachi no Rekishu Ninshiki (Japan and China: The Historical Views of the Youth)* (Tokyo: Nasunokisha, 1995).

⁶⁴⁴ Hongzhi Wang, "Zhongri Lishi Jiaokeshu de Jiaoliu (Sino-Japanese History Textbook Exchange)," *Lishi Jiaoxue* No.1 (1999).

In most of these activities, however, genuine mutual critiques of textbook content were still lacking. Because they were set up mainly in response to the rise of Japanese neo-nationalist view, these exchange programs often provided Chinese historians and progressive Japanese historians with a venue to attack Japan's textbook distortion and evasion of war responsibility. In contrast, criticism or self-criticism of historical myths in Chinese textbooks was much more lenient, focusing more on the narratives of ancient history rather than modern history. Moreover, fear of breaking political taboos at home prevented historians from engaging in unreserved, honest discussions about the war history. Some Japanese historians who took part in history dialogue with China lamented that their Chinese counterparts were not speaking their mind when they insisted on China's official view that only the Japanese military was responsible for the war while ordinary Japanese people were innocent victims themselves.⁶⁴⁵ A textbook exchange program organized by the JIU in the early 1990s with Chinese historians even had to be suspended because the Chinese side found it hard to accept the Japanese progressive historiography that acknowledged war responsibility of not only the military clique but also individual Japanese citizens.⁶⁴⁶

In fact, the desire to protect the authority of such national myths as the military clique and national victimhood to a large extent accounted for the lack of government enthusiasm on both sides to support genuine historians' dialogues. The Japanese sponsors of most of the exchange programs were independent NGOs, with the exception of only a few that received some financial subsidy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as the ISEI. It was only until the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama took power in 1994 that Japan began official sponsorship of research cooperation with Asian historians regarding the history of Japanese aggression and colonialism. Under the umbrella program called "Peace and Friendship Exchange Plan," several research institutions were established, such as the

⁶⁴⁵ Japanese historian Sakai Toshiki made such comments in his presentation on history textbook exchange activities between Chinese, Japanese and Korean scholars at an international academic conference held in April 1995. For Chinese translation of his speech, see Sakai Toshiki, "Zhongguo Ying Zhuyi Riben Minzhong de Zhanzheng Zhiren (China Should Pay Attention to the War Responsibility of Japanese People)," *Tansuo Yu Zhengming (Exploration and Contentions)* No.7 (1995).

⁶⁴⁶ Interview with Japanese historian Kimijima Kazuhiko, October 25, 2000.

Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Center for Chinese History Research, and Center for Japan-South Korean Historical Records.⁶⁴⁷

But the Japanese proposals appeared unattractive to the Chinese side, which believed that the first and foremost solution to the bilateral history disputes was for the Japanese side to recognize the responsibility for invading China and make more soul-searching efforts while re-examining the war history or forming shared historiography based on joint research was not really necessary. The Chinese side even explicitly stated that it was not yet the right time for joint history research and China would only offer assistance if the topic was about Japanese self-reflection. Following this policy, Chinese official research institutions gave the Japanese a cold shoulder. It is reported that a secret directive was issued in the fall of 1995 by the CCP Propaganda Department, State Education Commission (SEC) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) to ban cooperation by Chinese research institutes or scholars with research projects sponsored by Japan's Center for Chinese History Research. Officially, the Chinese government also informed Japan that "free exchanges with Chinese research institutes or scholars are not acceptable," while at the same time it requested the Japanese side to provide financial assistance to scholars of both countries who would conduct their research separately and exchange opinions only via the CASS. Up to 1998, the Chinese government still demanded the Japanese side not to recognize the establishment of independent research institutions with Japanese fund or the participation of Chinese scholars in any research projects initiated in Japan.⁶⁴⁸

Interaction between the Mechanisms of Intention and Emotions: Historical Entitlement and Bilateral Disputes

In Sino-Japanese relations, human emotions did not simply serve as a vent for people's feelings but also had significant political consequences. The Chinese bitter emotions about their war suffering directly gave rise to a strong sense of entitlement to a glorious cause of national revival and to compromise by foreign countries on issues deemed

⁶⁴⁷ For Prime Minister Murayama's remarks in 1994 and the mandate of the "Peace and Friendship Exchange Plan" formulated in the aftermath of Murayama's remarks, see the information provided by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/>

⁶⁴⁸ Amako and Sonoda eds, *Nitchū Kōryū no Shihanseki*, pp. 122-126.

important to this cause, including sovereignty rights and national economic development. Japan's failure to comply with Chinese expectation would be immediately linked to its lack of repentance for past crimes, reinforcing the negative perception of Japanese intention. From the Japanese perspective, however, yielding to Chinese demands in all bilateral disputes was unacceptable. Most Japanese disagreed with the Chinese view that Japanese concessions in present bilateral relations were obligated as some kind of payback to China for the historical debts. They often view Chinese expectation of Japanese concessions on sovereignty rights and economic interests as manifestation of China's international assertiveness and malicious intent to interfere with Japan's internal affairs or even dwarf its international stature.

Not only nurturing negative mutual perception of intention, the Chinese sense of historical entitlement and Japanese repudiation of it also underlined the uncompromising policies of both sides at times of bilateral disputes. The governments were reluctant to take a conciliatory stance to each other side's actions perceived to have stemmed from evil intentions, and they also faced strong public pressure against any policy of "selling out" national interest. Consequently, bilateral frictions tended to be not only frequent but also acrimonious and damaging, and were easily accorded with great political importance to inflict heavy blow on overall bilateral relations.

Sovereignty Disputes

China: Say No to Japanese Harmful Intention

Mobilized by the aggressive campaign of patriotic history education mixing myths of victimhood and national accomplishments, the Chinese nation since the 1980s was keen on recovering "lost territories" due to unequal treaties with imperialist powers, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, as symbols of national resurrection. Ceded to Japan by the 1895 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki and never reincorporated to China even after Japan's defeat in 1945, Taiwan in particular was a present, bitter reminder of China's "century of humiliation." So unification with Taiwan was now a question of national pride and self-esteem to China. Since the early 1980s, the government stepped up domestic propaganda on the significance of this objective. It even included "the return of Taiwan to the motherland"

as one of the three major tasks for the nation to perform in the 1980s and continued to treat it as a national priority in the 1990s.⁶⁴⁹

Little surprising that since the 1980s China closely monitored Taiwan's non-official contacts with foreign countries and frequently took issue with those countries that attempted to upgrade such contacts to the political level. In March 1982 the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a memo to all foreign embassies in Beijing stating China's resolute opposition to any foreign countries that acknowledged the establishment in their country of Taiwan institutions with official character – such as trade representatives, intelligence offices or science and technology liaison offices – or the conduct of official contacts with Taiwan. And a further statement to foreign embassies was issued in June 1983, which requested their rejection of visa application by the above-mentioned liaison offices of Taiwan.⁶⁵⁰ Here history makes a perfect irony: like the Nationalist government did in the 1950s and 1960s, it was now the Communist government that went out of its way to oppose international recognition of the other regime.

Policy flexibility was particularly limited when problems regarding Taiwan arose between China and Japan. It is because China held Japan fully responsible for Taiwan's original severance from the motherland and partially so for the continuation of the territorial division in the early Cold War years. As President Jiang Zemin told Ku Chen-fu, Chairman of the Strait Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, in their talks in October 1998 that “the idea of using Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft was first contrived by Japan (through its fifty years of occupation) and taken over by the United States. It can be said that it was initially Japan who put Taiwan in its current position, and it was the United States which has maintained it.” What Jiang tried to convey here was his belief that Japan had a lot to do with the present chasm between China and Taiwan.⁶⁵¹ So China felt it was Japan's duty to assist Chinese

⁶⁴⁹ Deng Xiaoping laid out the three major tasks in a speech at a meeting of cadres called by the Central Committee of the CCP on January 16, 1980. The other two major tasks were opposition to hegemonism and economic modernization. See “The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us.” In Xiaoping Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982*, pp. 224-225.

⁶⁵⁰ Akira Ishii, “‘Mitsu no Chūgoku’ to ‘Hitotsu no Soren’ (‘Three Chinas’ and ‘One Soviet Union’).” *Chūō Kōron* No. 11 (1982), p. 144; Lin, *Ume to Sakura*, pp. 637-638.

⁶⁵¹ “Daily Reports Jiang Zemin Has ‘Anti-Japanese Sentiment’,” *Sankei Shimbun*, December 9, 1998, FBIS.

cause of national reunification. Japan's actions contradictory to this expectation were viewed with considerable suspicion.

Recall that the Chinese government largely tolerated semi-official Japan-Taiwan links in the 1970s, but since the 1980s it made a dramatic policy turn and began oppose the escalation of Japan's political contacts with Taiwan in the name of commercial and cultural exchanges. An early trigger of Chinese open criticism of such contacts was a Japanese delegation to Taiwan in July 1982 led by conservative politician Esaki Masumi, who went in the capacity of the special envoy of LDP president. This visit coincided with the climax of the Sino-Japanese textbook controversy. In light of the Japan's problematic historical views, its actions with regard to Taiwan, the former colony of Japan, looked ever more suspicious. A *People's Daily* editorial on July 23 leveled trenchant criticism on the use of the term "two states" in the talk between the Ezaki mission and Taiwanese officials.⁶⁵²

In the following two decades, Tokyo's political contacts with Taipei and ambiguous attitude to China's sovereignty claim over Taiwan constantly incurred Chinese criticism. It was not uncommon for Chinese strategic analysts to cite Japan's policy to Taiwan as one clear indicator of its "great-nation chauvinism" or even the revival of militarism. Nakasone's nationalist campaign of "postwar political settlement" and the rise of the rightist historical view in the Japanese society simply vindicated to them Japanese imperialist ambitions to Taiwan. He Fang argued that people who refused to admit Japan's aggression of China were exactly those who designed the active diplomacy to Taiwan and tried to create de facto separation of Taiwan from mainland China.⁶⁵³ Another analyst, having attacked Japanese prettification of its history of aggression history, official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine, defense spending increase and memorial activities in honor of Chiang Kai-shek, commented that "under such circumstances, victim countries and people of the Japanese militarist aggression could not help feeling strongly resentful as well as becoming vigilant against Japanese ambition in playing a greater role in world affairs."⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵² "What is Esaki trying to do in Taiwan?" in *People's Daily*, July 23, 1982. Cited in Ishii, "'Mitsu no Chūgoku' to 'Hitotsu no Soren'," p. 145.

⁶⁵³ Fang He, "Zhongri Guanxi yu Yazhou Heping," p. 5.

⁶⁵⁴ Louren Xi, "Dui Riben Cong 'Jingji Dagu' Zouxiang 'Zhengzhi Dagu' Wenti de Tantai (Exploring the Question of Japan's Moving from An Economic Great Power to Political Great Power)," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies)* No. 4 (1987), p. 37.

Beijing's exceptionally harsh reaction to the seemingly trivial Kōkaryō incident was indicative of the close linkage between the history problem and Chinese suspicion about Japan's malign intention regarding Taiwan. After the verdict favoring the Taiwan side was delivered on February 26, 1987, Chinese press continuously attacked the Japanese government for months and several Chinese leaders spoke out that Japanese action was tantamount to shirking its historical responsibility to China. State President Li Xiannian told JSP leaders in March that "Japan should not touch wounds of others and the one for China was the Taiwan problem," implying that the scar left by Japan's aggression had not healed.

However, it was Deng Xiaoping who explicitly invoked the subject of Japanese militarist revival in connection with the Kōkaryō case at a meeting with the pro-China Japanese parliamentarian Utsunomiya Tokuma on May 5. Attack on Japan was further escalated when *People's Daily* again tried to make a historical argument in an editorial on June 4. It claimed that Kōkaryō was China's national property purchased with the fund obtained by selling off those capital and materials that Japanese military plundered from China. Therefore, the article vowed Chinese vigilance, "*due to historical reasons,*" (emphasis is author's) on any Japanese actions in violation of the past international arrangements on Taiwan's status since the 1943 Cairo Declaration. On the same day, Deng Xiaoping made the aforementioned controversial statement that urged Japan to change its attitude on the Taiwan issue, economic aid to China and Kōkaryō case, citing Japan's historical debts to China.⁶⁵⁵ It is this statement that spurred a diplomatic row between the two sides.

One may try to argue alternatively that the Chinese government was not genuinely concerned that Japanese historical myths would fuel its ambition to Taiwan but just used history as a tactical tool to bargain for Japan's reducing its support to Taipei. For this argument to prove persuasive, one should find that the history issue was more often brought up at times of serious disputes regarding Taiwan, when Beijing needed more political leverage vis-à-vis Japan, than times absent of such incidents. Also the historical thesis should be conveyed in such a way that it can easily reach the Japanese audience. But the evidence one found is only partially consistent with these predictions. One cannot rule out

the possibility that the Chinese government used the history issue to dramatize disputes on Taiwan so that it could maximize pressure on Japan for its concessions. Chinese official media and government leaders tended to bring up Japan's aggression history when disputes over the Taiwan issue occurred, such the Kōkaryō case, the 1994 Asian Games incident, and Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan in 2001, in all cases of which the message was clearly transmitted to the Japanese government.

On the other hand, however, Chinese experts of international affairs commonly made the linkage between Japanese historical attitude with its Taiwan policy, in both eventful and relatively tranquil years.⁶⁵⁶ Besides, their works were published in domestic academic or policy-oriented journals meant to influence Chinese intellectuals and policymakers rather than the Japanese government. Because the historical argument first appeared in the works of Chinese strategic elites in 1987, it is possible that the government instrumental use of history in the Kōkaryō incident had an impact on their perception of Japan's relationship with Taiwan. Still, they persistently advanced the argument in journals with no clear propaganda function and their writings also generated important feedback for the government policymaking. These facts suggest that the historical factor could have independent political effect, even if it was originally introduced with instrumental purpose.

Besides elite perception of negative Japanese intention, public pressure also contributed to China's firm position on questions of sovereignty rights. It is because the sense of historical mission for national reunification instilled in the population by patriotic propaganda was so strong that it constituted an important pillar of national cohesion. The government could secure more public support by taking a steadfast policy but would face legitimacy crisis once it showed any signs of compromise.⁶⁵⁷ Especially if the transgressor

⁶⁵⁵ For Li's remarks, see Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 157; for Deng's remarks to Utsunomiya on May 5, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p. 642, for the People's Daily editorial, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 635-637.

⁶⁵⁶ For some examples of many articles making the historical argument about the Taiwan issue, see Shuiwang Li, et al., "Xian Jieduan Tairi Guanxi Pouxu (Analyzing the Present Taiwan-Japan Relations)," *Riben Xuekan (Japan Studies)* No. 5 (1992); Jiangyong Liu, "'Maguan Tiaoyue' Bainian Hou de Ritai Guanxi (The Japan-Taiwan relations A Hundred Years after the 'Shimonoski Treaty)," *Riben Xuekan (Japan Studies)* No. 6 (1995); Yunzhong Yang, "Ritai Guanxi Jinru Zhongshi Zhenzhi Jiaowang de Xinjieduan (Japan-Taiwan Relations Entering A New Stage of Emphasizing Political Contacts)," *Riben Xuekan (Japan Studies)* No. 3 (1996).

⁶⁵⁷ On the key importance of the Taiwan issue to the CCP's regime legitimacy, see Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," pp. 45-46.

was Japan, given the depth of emotions of grievances in Chinese public towards Japan, conciliatory policy appearing spineless to Japan was out of the question. Such public opposition against compromise could be sensed in Deng Xiaoping's remarks to a visiting Japan Kōmeitō Party politician on June 4, 1987, which explained that "(the Kōkaryō) case had caused strong repercussion among the Chinese public, especially the young people, (in light of which) the Chinese side must deal discreetly with it lest the people should object (to the result)."⁶⁵⁸ Considering the widespread anti-Japanese student demonstrations that had taken place since 1985, Deng's words were not a mere bluff.

Ironically, while interested in manipulating nationalist sentiments at home to either shore up regime legitimacy or score in diplomatic negotiation with Japan, the Chinese government was also afraid of excessive public animosity against Japan turning into criticism against the government itself, which was the case in the May 4 movement of 1919 and Xi'an Incident in 1936.⁶⁵⁹ So at times of disputes between China and Japan, the government had to stick to a non-conciliatory policy to Japan in order to mollify public anger while at the same time going out of its way to prevent massive public protests by forceful measures.

If public emotions functioned in the background of Chinese policymaking regarding Taiwan, they took the front stage in territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which considerably limited government policy choices. In the first Diaoyu dispute of 1990, it was reported on September 29 that Japan's Maritime Safety Agency was ready to grant official recognition of the lighthouse built by the right-wing Japan Youth Federation (JYF). Beijing did not respond until October 18, when a Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the recognition of the lighthouse as a violation of China's sovereignty and demanded Japanese government intervention to restrain the JYF. While both reiterated their sovereignty claims over the islands in the following diplomatic exchanges, they also showed willingness to restore the status quo. Japan's chief cabinet secretary cited Deng Xiaoping's 1978 statement that the sovereignty question over the islands should be settled by a later

⁶⁵⁸ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 159.

⁶⁵⁹ In the Xi'an Incident of December 1936, student demonstration in Xi'an attacking Chiang Kai-shek's non-resistant policy to Japan prompted Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng of the KMT to detain Chiang and forced him to ally with the communists to fight the Japanese. The Chinese government fear of anti-Japanese nationalism turning to anti-government movement is pointed out by Christensen in "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," pp. 54-55.

generation and the Chinese vice Foreign Minister appealed for joint development of the area's resources. So both sides applied restrained diplomacy and in about two weeks they reached agreement to drop the dispute.

But such a quick settlement provoked immediate criticism in Hong Kong press that Chinese response to sovereignty violation was "weak and inadequate" and amounted to concessions to or even "appeasement" of Japan. In the mainland, the government tightened security measures on university campuses and banned anti-Japanese demonstrations, but students still expressed their anger toward the Japanese through Western media. Not only so, the public turned their back on the Chinese government as well, blaming it for being too soft on Japan and wrongly suppressing public patriotic sentiments: "Is there any patriotism to speak of when they don't even want the territory?" "Diplomacy is diplomacy and public opinion is public opinion. Why can't the public express its opinion?" "This only proves that this country is not the people's country." It was also suspected that the government intended to sacrifice Chinese territory for economic benefit. Pamphlets were distributed in Beijing with such titles as "We Want the Diaoyu Islands, Not Yen," and anti-CCP posters were put out by students unhappy with government handling of the island dispute.⁶⁶⁰

Therefore, Chinese government paid a high domestic political price for its accommodative policy in the 1990 dispute. The pressing requirement for the government to toughen its position on territorial issues to soothe anti-government sentiments at home was very likely behind the major shift in China's territorial sea policy in the early 1990s. China declared its territorial sea of 12 nm from the straight baseline in 1958. But it was until February 1992 that China enacted the Territorial Sea Law. This law stipulates Chinese sovereignty rights over the disputed Diaoyu Islands.⁶⁶¹ This was a noticeable departure from Deng Xiaoping's policy in the 1970s to shelve the sovereignty issue of the islands and a

⁶⁶⁰ Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," *International Security* 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), pp. 129-131.

⁶⁶¹ For China's Declaration on Territorial Sea, 4 September, 1958 and The Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the People's Republic of China promulgated on 25 February, 1992, see Office of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration ed., *Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: Ocean Press, 1998). For a historical review of Chinese legislation on territorial sea, see Keyuan Zou, "Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea: Recent Sino-Japanese Endeavors towards Sustainability," presented at the Conference on Contemporary China-Japan Relations: Conflict and Cooperation, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, August 2002.

particularly assertive move at a time when Beijing was trying to create a harmonious atmosphere in honor of the 20th anniversary of diplomatic normalization with Japan.

To make things more complicated, China ratified the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UNLOSC) in May 1996, enabling it to claim a 200nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To avoid a direct provocation, the EEZ excluded Taiwan and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. But on July 20 the Japanese government ratified the UNLOSC as well, declaring a 200 nm EEZ that included Diaoyu islands. These legal moves set the stage for a new round of bilateral territorial dispute, in which the power of public emotions brought more turbulence and damage to bilateral relations than last time. First, five days after Japan ratified the UNLOSC, the JYF again applied to the Maritime Safety Agency for official recognition of a new lighthouse they erected on the island about two weeks ago. While the official decision was still pending, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni on July 29, which sparked widespread outrage in China. In addition, the “patriotic education” campaign that Chinese government launched to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the victory of war of resistance against Japan had just freshened up people’s memories about Japanese war crimes. So by the time another Japanese nationalist group, the Senkaku Islands Defense Association, visited the islands on August 18 to plant the Japanese flag, the anti-Japanese public sentiments in China had reached the boiling point.

Shortly after Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda denied the existence of a territorial issue between China and Japan during a visit to Hong Kong on August 28, nationalist groups in the mainland published an open letter to Jiang Zemin and the leaders of the Central Military Commission demanding them to send warships to dismantle the lighthouse on the islands.⁶⁶² Beijing realized if it failed to act sternly this time, the political cost would be much more severe than the 1990 dispute. Chinese official media began to denounce Japanese war amnesia and rise of militarist sentiments in connection to the recent Shrine visit and island disputes, and stressed that no give-up on sovereignty rights would be possible over the islands.⁶⁶³ At a press conference in early September, Foreign Ministry

⁶⁶² “Civilian Group Wants Troops Sent to Diaoyu Islands,” *Hong Kong AFP*, September 1, 1996, in FBIS-CHI reports.

⁶⁶³ For some examples of Chinese media blasting of Japan, see “Column on Japanese militarism, ‘Silence of a Larger Power,’” *China Daily*, August 28, 1996; “PRC: Spokesman: Japan Lacks ‘Right Understanding’ of

spokesperson Shen Guofang declared that Japanese loans would not affect China's sovereignty claim over Diaoyu: "Japanese loans to China will benefit bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, the Chinese government offers no room for compromise and will take whatever action necessary to safeguard China's territorial integrity and sovereignty."⁶⁶⁴

Chinese military also took a clearly tough stance. Its leaders repeatedly vowed to make no concessions and even stated that "there will be no new Li Hongzhang (who signed the Shimonoseki Treaty) and the Li Hongzhang era has ended."⁶⁶⁵ Although the PLA warships were not sent to the islands, the Chinese military took an unusually confrontational step, which was to dispatch troops from the Shenyang Military Zone to maneuvers from September 13-14, where they practiced seizing and defending hypothetical offshore islands in Liaoning Province.⁶⁶⁶

Nevertheless, both governments intended to end the dispute soon lest it do more damage to bilateral relations. In their meeting on September 24, Qian Qichen and Ikeda stated each side's sovereignty claim but agreed to place bilateral good relation above their dispute. But the surging public emotions prevented a quick diplomatic settlement. Mass signature campaign raged in Hong Kong trying to prevent soft Chinese policy on the matter, and mainland Chinese students also threatened to take to the street to stage anti-Japanese demonstration. Things went wild especially after a Hong Kong nationalist, David Chan, drowned when trying to swim to the islands on September 26. Subsequently, Chinese citizens in mainland also sent numerous petition letters to *People's Daily* and the *PLA Daily*, demanding resolute action by the central government to defend the islands.⁶⁶⁷ Public criticism of soft government policy again appeared, this time joined by more high-ranking officials and famed intellectuals. Still banning public demonstration as it did in 1990, Beijing this time negotiated fiercely with Tokyo on the crackdown of Japanese rightist organizations.

History," Hong Kong AFP, August 29, 1996; "PRC: Renmin Ribao Warns Japan about Diaoyu," August 30, 1996; "PRC: Commentary on Threat of Japanese Militarism," China Daily, September 6, 1996, in FBIS-CHI reports.

⁶⁶⁴ "Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings," Beijing Review, September 23-29, 1996.

⁶⁶⁵ "Military Source Reports 'Tough' Attitude on Diaoyutais," Hong Kong Ming Pao, October 21, 1996, in FBIS report.

⁶⁶⁶ Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," p. 134.

And it was reported that the Nanjing Military Region and the East Sea Fleet sent more than 10 advanced warplanes and naval vessels in late September to cruise past and fly over the Diaoyu Islands to demonstrate China's military strength and its resolve to defend Chinese territory.⁶⁶⁸ The crisis did not subside until the Japanese police raided the headquarters of the JYF and arrested its advisor on weapon charges one week after Chan's death and Tokyo announced that it had no intention to recognize the JYF lighthouse.

Japan: Resentment of China's Arrogance and Public Resistance to Government Concession

Because the mainstream historiography in Japan minimized its war responsibility vis-à-vis Asian victim countries, it seemed a far-fetched notion to the Japanese public that China was entitled to Japanese concessions on sovereignty issues just because Japan was the main oppressor of China in the past. Instead, China's obsession with national unification and territorial integrity was viewed as signs of Chinese ethno-centrism and international assertiveness.

Therefore, the promulgation of Chinese Territorial Sea Law in 1992 seemed an abrupt, presumptuous move to Japan. Japanese strategic elites were particularly alarmed by the law's authorizing the military to repel foreign ships invading Chinese territorial sea with force. They also watched with wary a series of Chinese policies other than the law, including the government report to the 7th NPC Plenary in 1992 that planned to strengthen Chinese maritime defense, the vow by Chinese naval commander in chief to engage the intense struggle for maritime interests "for the sake of Chinese national resurrection," and the escalation of China's conflict with some Southeast Asian countries in the disputed South China Sea.⁶⁶⁹ A Japanese defense expert suggested that "Chinese naval build-up entwined with territorial problems" had threatened regional security and created tension with its neighboring countries including Japan.⁶⁷⁰ Another widely shared opinion among Japanese

⁶⁶⁷ Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," p. 137.

⁶⁶⁸ "PLA Said to Make Show of Force off Diaoyutais," *Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao*, October 10, 1996, FBIS.

⁶⁶⁹ Shigekatsu Kondo, "Reisengo no Ajia-Taiheiyo Chiiki no Anzen Hosho wo Ika ni Kakubo Suru ka (How We Assure the Security of Asia Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 20, No.1 (1992), p. 69.

⁶⁷⁰ Kunio Kotaki, "Nichibei Taito no Gijitsu Koryu wo Mezashite (Aiming And Equal Defense-Technology Exchange between Japan and U.S.)," *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 20, No. 4 (1993), p. 41.

strategists argued that some Chinese leaders cherished a “Greater-China mentality” (*Chūka Shisō*), the desire to unify the country and recover the glorious empire it had in the ancient history. So the shift in Chinese maritime strategy and its actions of coercion in the Taiwan Strait were illustrative of Chinese willingness to fulfill this goal through the use of force, which would lead to extreme Chinese pride, policies of high pressure and even territorial expansionism vis-à-vis Japan and other Asian countries.⁶⁷¹

Still more castigation of Chinese arrogance stemmed from a strong impression among many Japanese people that Chinese demands on Japan were often made without trying to understand the concrete conditions in Japan. In the Kōkaryō case, China protested to Tokyo regardless its explanation on the Japanese democratic principle of “separation of three powers.” After China refuted that the case was not a legal but a political problem between the two countries and kept escalating the pressure, one official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, apparently frustrated with what he saw as Chinese overbearing attitude, openly called Deng “a man above the clouds” and said “anyone who gets old becomes hard-headed.”⁶⁷² Beijing immediately condemned it as a personal insult of Chinese leaders. Chinese anger was mostly smoothed over when the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made formal apology on June 16 and the two sides decided to move ahead with the scheduled ministerial meeting in Beijing on June 26-28. But the aftershock of the incident was still quite disturbing. On June 25, a monument erected by the Japan-China Friendship Association in Kyodo in 1984 inscribed with a poem by Zhou Enlai was found splashed with red paint, and handbills left at the monument accused China of interfering with Japan’s domestic affairs and vowed to “smash” the upcoming bilateral ministerial meeting. It reminded of Japanese public resentment with government “low posture” in handling disputes with China.⁶⁷³

⁶⁷¹ For some examples of Japanese strategic analyses along this line of argument, see Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Chūgoku Kaigun to ‘Chūku Sekai’ no Saikō (Chinese Naval Force and the Revival of ‘Sinocentrism’),” *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 20, No. 3 (1992); Kūichi Saeki, “Reisengo no Ajia-Taiheiyo no Anzen Hoshō (The Security of the Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era),” *Shin Bōei Ronshū* 21, No. 3 (1993), p. 10; Nobuno Miyamoto, “Chūro no Senryaku teki no Kyōchō wa Doko Made Susumu Ka (How Far Will Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation Go),” *Chūo Kōron* No. 7 (1996), p. 139.

⁶⁷² Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization,” p. 74.

⁶⁷³ “Kyoto Monument to Zhou Enlai ‘Desecrated,’” *Tokyo Kyodo*, June 25, 1987, FBIS China report.

In the 1990s, Japanese tactical retreats under Chinese pressure on sovereign issues provoked strong domestic criticism of a “kowtow diplomacy” to China. In the 1994 Asian Games Incident, there was immense undercurrent in Japan that prevented government’s yielding to China’s demand of not allowing high-ranking Taiwan officials to attend the opening ceremony. Chinese pressure was called imprudent interference with Japan’s internal affairs because, after all, things like whether to issue entry visa to whoever foreign visitors was the legal right of any sovereign state. As for territorial disputes, pressure from the general public also served to prevent a conciliatory Japanese policy. According to an opinion poll by Jiji Tsushisha shortly after the crisis in 1996, 45.6 percent of respondents thought government attitude concerning territorial problems was lukewarm and weak-kneed, compared to 26.8 percent who thought the status quo was fine and only 7 percent who believed that Japan should make concessions. The same poll also shows that 50.7 percent of respondents said the government should conduct tenacious negotiation regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, while only 16.6 percent supported joint exploitation with China and 3.6 percent thought Japan should give up the islands.⁶⁷⁴

Economic Friction

China: Japanese Economic Invasion and Insult in Economic Aid

Objectively speaking, problems in bilateral economic interaction were usually the result of a combination of structural factors, policy errors, and operational deficiency on both sides. The cause of the trade imbalance in favor of Japan in the 1980s was to a large extent rooted in the inherent inequality of exchange between primary products and manufactured goods entailed by the structural difference of the two economies. But the problem was certainly exacerbated around the mid-1980s by China’s overheated demands for foreign products, Japanese trade barriers to foreign exports, and by China’s lack of quality control, failure to ensure timely delivery and update product designs, and disorderly pricing, distribution and service systems.

⁶⁷⁴ National Survey by Jiji Tsushinsha in November 1996, see *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1997, p. 562. Another poll conducted by Jiji Tsushinsha in December 1997 yielded similar results. See *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1998, p. 573-74.

Likewise, the causes of stagnating Japanese technology transfer and capital investment to China were manifold. In the 1980s, the Cold War export control regime against communist countries, COCOM, was still in reign, which rendered the transfer of many high-tech products and facilities to China impossible. With regard to less politically sensitive areas, Chinese expectation of the most sophisticated technology was often regarded unrealistic by the Japanese counterparts, who were more bound by considerations of applicability, cost calculation and payment means during the process of technology transfer. Japanese direct investment was kept low in the 1980s because of both the problematic investment environment in China and its failure to recognize the interest of foreign investors in seeking profit. It was until 1986 when widespread complaints among foreign businessmen prompted Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Gu Mu to admit publicly that foreign investment should not only benefit the Chinese but also meet the goals of foreign investors to “make real money.”⁶⁷⁵ Similarly complicated was the problem about Japanese goods sold on Chinese market. It sometimes was caused by negligence in quality check when Japanese exporters were overwhelmed by the flood of orders, but could also have stemmed from the low purchasing power or overall technical conditions in China that made exports of most sophisticated and expensive products to China unattractive.

The multifaceted origins of bilateral economic problems made the difficulty in determining the overall responsibility for these problems. But the Chinese had a rather strong penchant among the Chinese to blame the Japanese side for all the problems between them, with the exception of a small number of economic experts who would admit, mostly in private conversations, that the Chinese side was also at fault to some degree. Such a biased attitude could not be solely understood as a negotiation tactics because it was widely shared by not just high-ranking government officials directly involved in bargaining with Japan but also the vast majority of Chinese people. Behind it was still the intractable Chinese sense of historical entitlement on Japan. Having devastated China’s national economy by its brutal aggression and rapacious exploitation in the past, Japan was now expected to provide generous assistance to the cause of Chinese economic modernization. Besides, Japanese economic aid to China was understood by both sides as disguised war

⁶⁷⁵ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, p. 110 and p. 112.

reparation, so the self-interest of Japanese businessmen in providing the aid should be all but secondary to Chinese interest. When Chinese expectation was not met, they reacted with a mixture of resentment, suspicion, and even outrage.

The most telling evidence of Chinese tendency to associate the current economic relationship with Japan's historical debt to China was Deng Xiaoping's remarks on June 4, 1987 that sparked a rare rebuke by Japanese diplomats discussed above. After pointing out the dissatisfying aspects in Sino-Japanese economic relations, including China's trade deficit and Japan's inactiveness in transferring technology, Deng went on to bring the past into the present:

"If viewed in light of the history Japan ought to do much more in order to help China's development. Frankly speaking, among all the countries in the world I think Japan is the one that is most indebted to China. At the time of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization we did not raise the demand for war reparation, which was a policy decision made with the consideration that both China and Japan were great nations close to each other and the decision would be good to our long-term interest. From the Japanese perspective that values reason, I think Japan should contribute even more to assist China's development. To be honest I have resentment in this respect."⁶⁷⁶

This is about the first time that a Chinese leader directly brought up the war reparation issue in connection with the demand for Japanese economic assistance, but it was widely considered as reflecting the real thinking of Chinese people since the 1980s that Japanese aid was well deserved because of the war history.⁶⁷⁷ Not only the government but also ordinary Chinese people frequently criticized Japanese intention to use China as a market of cheap commodities and to hold back Chinese technological development pace. Dissatisfaction with Japan's economic role in China was particularly concentrated on imported Japanese goods (*Rihuo*). A common belief was that "Japan exports first-class products to Europe and the United States, reserves second-class products for its own consumption, and sells third-class goods to China."⁶⁷⁸ In the eyes of many Chinese, it was Japanese contempt for China that led them to sell shoddy goods to the Chinese market. Besides, unbridled import of a large quantity of Japanese goods was seen as a serious threat to domestic manufacturers, causing the shutdown of Chinese factories and rise of unemployment rate. Students also suspected that the flooding of Chinese market by

⁶⁷⁶ For the major points of Deng's remarks on June 4, 1987, see Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, pp. 643-644, and *Nitchū Kankei Kihon Shiryōshu*, p. 707.

⁶⁷⁷ Akira Ishii, "Chūgoku ni Otta Mugen no Beishō," p. 165.

Japanese goods was their renewed attempt for “economic invasion” to China just like in the past when Japanese imperialists tried to take over exclusive control of Chinese market and resources. So one of the demands raised by student demonstrations in mid-1980s was to boycott *Rihuo*, an act to emulate the anti-Japanese mass movement in the 1930s.⁶⁷⁹

In the 1990s the trade imbalance turned favorable to China and Japanese investment and technology transfer also increased, but Chinese mistrust of Japan in the economic realm persisted. Despite its enthusiastic seeking of Japanese direct investment, Chinese government still checked the political credential of Japanese companies and did not hesitate to interfere to create difficulty for those considered “unfriendly” companies to do business in China.⁶⁸⁰ And it is common for Chinese people to stereotype Japanese businessmen as being greedy, shrewd, and selfish. In the China Youth Daily poll of 1996, 96.3 percent of respondents believed that the Japanese capital investment in China was to occupy market and seek profit, 50.7 percent thought it was to control China economically, and 45.3 percent thought it was to dump outmoded facilities, with only 9.5 percent believed it was to help Chinese economic development.⁶⁸¹

Bitter emotions about the war history not only stimulated negative Chinese perception about Japanese intention in economic interaction but also generated profound policy ramifications. Anti-Japanese student demonstrations rising one after another from 1985 to 1987 had direct impact on Chinese position in negotiating trade deficit with Japan. It was a typical phenomenon during these demonstrations that students frequently shifted the target of their condemnation from the “Japanese economic aggression” to “those in power” who took advantage of economic reform to augment private interests at the expense of the welfare of the populace. In order to placate the anti-government sentiments among the students and ward off their demand for democracy as a fundamental solution to social-economic problems, the government had to give in to their pressure to some extent

⁶⁷⁸ This is an argument frequently appearing Chinese best-selling books. See Song Qiang et al., *China That Can Say No*, p. 114.

⁶⁷⁹ Slogans are from wall posters made by students during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1985. Cited in Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, pp. 143-144.

⁶⁸⁰ Sugita Toshiaki “Foreign Investment and Its Subsequent Withdraw,” *JETRO Newsletter* 3, No.128 (1997), pp. 19-20.

⁶⁸¹ *China Youth Daily*, February 15, 1997.

regarding economic relations with Japan. Like in island disputes, the Chinese government confirmed that student actions were well-intentioned while urging students to take restraint and show consideration for national interest in general. Meanwhile, the government proclaimed an uncompromising position that China would not countenance continuation of the immense trade deficit with Japan and demanded immediate action of Tokyo.

Still doubts exist that the public pressure in China might not have imposed an unintended policy on the Chinese government but actually played into the hand of the government who had been looking for a bargaining chip against Japan. But studies of Chinese public opinions indicate that student demonstrations in the mid-1980s were spontaneous movement with genuine anti-Japanese emotions. Furthermore, public outrage against Japan very likely exacerbated the ideological cleavage in the government between the liberal faction and conservative old guards. In light of the Chinese enthusiasm in the first few years of the 1980s in recruiting Japan as a major economic partner in Chinese modernization, the abrupt shift to harsh policy to Japan in the mid-1980s would not have been possible if public pressure had not changed the balance of power between the liberal faction represented by Hu Yaobang and its conservative opponents.

Having staked his political career heavily in a harmonious Sino-Japanese relations and even developed an intimate, personal friendship with Nakasone, Hu's leadership in the party suffered a severe setback when the Chinese public reacted vehemently to Nakasone's shrine visit in 1985. Nakasone reportedly told Japanese press later that he cancelled the plan to worship at Yasukuni the next year because of the clear risk of provoking more Chinese criticism of being used by conservative forces in China who sought to bring down Hu.⁶⁸² When Tokyo announced the decision of no Nakasone's visit to the shrine in 1986, Hu immediately welcomed it as "a wise decision."⁶⁸³ In fact, party conservatives had already

⁶⁸² According to this 1991 interview of Nakasone, Nakasone asked Inayama Yoshihiro, then president of the Federation of Economic Organizations, to consult with Hu in Beijing whether he could continue to visit the shrine. Inayama was told by someone close to Hu that "resuming the visits will have an undesirable effect, so make sure that Nakasone does not go." Nakasone says, "From about that time, reports began to reach us that Hu was in a precarious situation... That person came to see Inayama out of concern that my continuing to worship at Yasukuni Shrine regardless of these warnings would be risky for Hu and people close to him because of relations with conservatives... Under the circumstances, it was better to give up, so I decided to stop worshipping at Yasukuni." Cited in Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, p. 176.

⁶⁸³ Tanaka, *Nitchū Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 152.

attacked Hu's liberal propensity regarding his political reform programs. The public challenge to the pro-Japan policy that he had spearheaded rendered him even more politically vulnerable. When anti-Japanese students demonstrations recurred in January 1987, Hu was forced to accept the responsibility for these demonstrations. Although the deeper cause of the oust of Hu lied more in ideological struggles, the raging student demonstrations and widespread public resentments toward Japan did play an important role in undermining the power base of Hu, who otherwise would have stayed a good chance of sticking to a more conciliatory approach to bilateral economic friction.

In other cases when Japan seemed to condition the aid program on political demands more directly, the Chinese rejected it as naked insult to Chinese national pride and even a policy of economic coercion. A telling example is Beijing's response to Japanese protest against Chinese nuclear weapon testing. Japan had expressed displeasure about Chinese nuclear tests since 1994, but it was not able to extract compromise from China through economic aid negotiation. As Yasuaki Tanizaki, director of the Foreign Ministry's loan-aid division, testified, "We told the Chinese repeatedly during the aid talks that we were concerned about their nuclear test program and about other issues such as arms exports and human rights. But they said they didn't want to link aid negotiations with politics."⁶⁸⁴ Following China's nuclear test in May 1995, the Japanese Diet passed a resolution in August protesting the test and Japanese government suspended grant assistance to Beijing that year, which meant a loss of \$75 million to China. This prompted Chinese Foreign Ministry to make the following statement that drew a linkage between the past and present:

"We deeply regret the Japanese government's decision to freeze most grant aid to China for the remainder of the 1995 fiscal year... This year marks the 50th anniversary of the world's victory in the anti-fascist war and China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The Japanese government should engage in deep introspection of previous war crimes and conscientiously draw lessons from history. Instead, the Japanese government is attempting to create a major issue concerning China's nuclear testing program. Therefore, one cannot help to wonder about the true political motives of their move, a move that could very possibly be detrimental to the sound development of Sino-Japanese relations."⁶⁸⁵

In the same month Premier Li Peng again suggested during a meeting with members of the Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation Association that Japanese economic aid was

⁶⁸⁴ "Eager to Please: Tokyo sets aside own rules in China aid package," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 26, 1995.

⁶⁸⁵ "New Briefings by the Chinese Foreign Ministry," *Beijing Review*, 18-24 September 1995, p. 9.

not just a gift for China because it also boosted Japanese economy and, even if considered as a form of war compensation, Japanese loans could never fully compensate for the great losses to China inflicted by the Japanese militarists in the invasion. So he admonished Japan not to “make a fuss over China’s nuclear tests and use economic means to exert pressure on China.”⁶⁸⁶ Meanwhile, little evidence shows that China’s policy of nuclear weapon modernization was swayed by Japan’s punitive economic policy. China went on to do two more tests in June and July of 1996 despite continued Japanese suspension of grand aid and the ongoing negotiations on the fourth yen loan package for 1996-1998. Although Beijing probably had made the basic decision to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in late 1995, Foreign Minister spokesman kept on issuing statements rebutting Japanese official protests until shortly before the declaration of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, so as to convey the message that China could be both reasonable and flexible but economic coercion simply would not work for China.⁶⁸⁷

Japan: Chinese Ungratefulness and Tactics of Extortion

The rationale of Japanese economic aid to China was understood very differently in Japan than in China. To the Japanese, providing aid was part of the economic diplomacy to attain certain national interests, with little difference from any other types of government policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, Japanese government initial decision to extend ODA to China was mainly driven by the strategic goal of promoting the strength of the anti-Soviet camp and the overall economic interest of Japan itself. While the immediate strategic implications had dissipated with the end of the Cold War, economic aid to China was still needed as a useful Japanese foreign policy tool to foster political harmony with a powerful neighbor and ensure access to China’s vast market and rich natural and human resources. Guilt feeling did function to some degree in Japanese decision-making, especially in agreeing to provide aid to China on more favorable terms than any other developing countries, but it

⁶⁸⁶ “Japan: Big Fuss Over Nuclear Tests,” *Beijing Review*, 16-22 October 1995, p. 22.

⁶⁸⁷ Johnston’s study of Chinese policy shift with regard to CTBT around mid-1990s shows that it was not Chinese fear of foreign sanctions but rather decision makers’ sensitivity to China’s image and status as a “responsible” major power that was a critical driver in their decision to sign onto the treaty. See Alastair I. Johnston, “The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (Foreign Policy) Actors?” in Daniel W. Drezner, *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

did not amount to the subordination of Japan's self-interest to moral obligations. Therefore, in contrast to the Chinese perception of Japanese economic aid as paying back its due, the Japanese expected the application of economic diplomacy a give-and-take process between two countries both seeking their own national interest.

Japan's understanding of economic aid to China in a rational, realpolitik sense led to its intolerance of China's seemingly endless quibbling of Japan despite the profuse flow of Japanese capital and technology to China. Many Japanese were irked by China's showing little gratitude for Japan's economic assistance. An article published in *Chūo Kōron* in March 2000 began with a scathing sentence of criticism: "Over the Past 20 years, Japan has committed 6 trillion yen in aid to China, but Japan and the Japanese people are still seen as villains in Chinese society." The author, journalist Komori Yoshihisa, complained Chinese government "has not made any attempt to tell its own people" about Japanese aid to many major construction projects, and even in those rare Chinese reports that did mention Japanese ODA, it was usually suggested to be part of a cooperative "joint effort."⁶⁸⁸

What irritated the Japanese even more was China's drawing the linkage between the present bilateral economic relations with the past history of Sino-Japanese war, which they believed was an artificial notion used by the Chinese side to extort economic gains from Japan without expending anything in return. Such doubt about Chinese purposeful use of history seemed to be confirmed by Deng Xiaoping's remarks of June 1987 on the war reparation issue in connection with Japanese economic assistance. This statement was understood as China's attempt to utilize its previous renouncement of war reparation to demand for infinite amount of reparation payment now, or even to use the war reparation issue to extract Japanese concessions in all aspects of bilateral relations.⁶⁸⁹ In 1995 Jiang Zemin again reminded Murayama that "China adopted an extremely generous attitude to the question of war reparation claims at the time of bilateral diplomatic normalization," and Premier Li Peng's made the above-mentioned remark claiming that Japanese economic aid to China that the later was simply no match for China's loss inflicted by Japan during the past aggression. Because Chinese leaders' renewed invocation of the war reparation issue

⁶⁸⁸ Yoshihisa Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken," *Chūo Kōron* No. 3 (2000).

⁶⁸⁹ Ishii, "Chūgoku ni Otta Mugen no Beishō," p. 165.

coincided with Japanese suspension of grant aid in response to China's new nuclear tests, Japanese resentments against Chinese strategy of historical extortion loomed large.⁶⁹⁰

The divergent perceptions of the nature of economic aid and the accompanying emotions of mistrust and grievances poised the Japanese side to adopt an increasingly tough position on bilateral economic affairs. A conspicuous indication was the emergence since late 1990s of Japanese official complaints to China for its failure to publicize about Japanese ODA. Apparently upset about the situation, the Japanese embassy in Beijing began appealing directly to Chinese mass media for better coverage and inviting Chinese reporters to Japan to take a closer look at Japanese ODA programs to China. The embassy also expressed the wish to the Chinese government that Japan would like a frank "expression of appreciation" for its economic aid.⁶⁹¹ To step up pressure on China, during his visit to Beijing in August 2000 Japanese Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei directly told his host about Tokyo's displeasure with the lack of Chinese public awareness of Japanese ODA programs.

Japan's effort to push more Chinese PR work in this respect seemed to have achieved some effects. In March 1999 two newspapers with nationwide circulations referred to "financial assistance from Japan" when reporting about a new inter-governmental agreement on Japanese grant to China, which was unprecedented in 20 years. Another step of Chinese concession was its holding of a "20th Anniversary Party to Commemorate the Results of Japan's Economic Cooperation" on October 9, 2000.⁶⁹² Nevertheless, Chinese concessions came rather grudgingly. According to Komori, some prominent Chinese newspapers like *People's Daily* still stuck to the expression of "joint cooperation" when referring to aid from Japan, and others failed to mention it at all; meanwhile, coverage on financial assistance from the Japan Export Bank,⁶⁹³ which was called by some as Japan's second ODA program, was nonexistent in China.⁶⁹⁴ In some cases when the Chinese government did try to smooth things over upon Japanese complaints, it took care to

⁶⁹⁰ Seki Tomoda, "Taichū Zenryaku Sairyō no Shinario Saiaku no Shinario (The Best and Worst Scenarios of Strategy to China)," *Chūō Kōron* No. 12 (1995), pp. 56-57.

⁶⁹¹ Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken."

⁶⁹² Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken;" "PRC to Hold Party in October in Beijing to Show Appreciation for Japan's ODA," *Sankei Shimbun*, September 7, 2000, in FBIS report.

⁶⁹³ Japan Export Bank merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund in October 1999 to become the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

admonish Japan to remember history and not to exploit Chinese conciliatory gestures. For example, in his address to Japanese reporters shortly before his visit to Japan in October 2000, Premier Zhu Rongji, while praising the role played by Japanese assistance in China's economic construction and admitting that the PR efforts of his government had been inadequate regarding this issue, went on to remind Japan that "special history problem is involved in the aid programs and they do not benefit the Chinese side only."⁶⁹⁵

Beijing's reservation of this kind was unlikely to satisfy Tokyo, so the later continued to complain. The LDP secretary general Yamazaki Taku said in his trip to Southeast Asia in August 2001 that "I am sure that people in this region were grateful (to Japan) but China is different, where Japanese ODA had not been understood well by the people."⁶⁹⁶ Meanwhile, domestic opposition to a conciliatory policy to Japan also prevented the Chinese government from making substantial concessions. After Kōno's visit a Chinese translation of Japanese newspaper articles on the visit appeared on the internet, which reported that "Beijing softened its stance due to pressure from the foreign minister." As result, the Chinese Foreign Ministry received complaints from the public calling Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan "a traitor who gives way to Japan."⁶⁹⁷ Similar complaints were directed to Premier Zhu Rongji when he tuned down the history charge during his visit to Japan.

Imposing political conditions on economic aid was another major step of the Japanese government to toughen economic policy to China. In 1992, Japan introduced the ODA charter in 1992 that required the government to review aid towards countries that had problems in four areas: human rights, environment, arms exports and development of weapons of mass destruction. The charter was invoked in 1995 to justify the freezing of grant program to China. This economic sanction lasted for two years and was supported by the majority of public opinion. In a poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* in October 1995, 90 percent of respondents said they felt angry about recent Chinese and French nuclear tests, and when asked how they thought about the government decision to freeze part of

⁶⁹⁴ Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken."

⁶⁹⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 9, 2000.

⁶⁹⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 23, 2001.

⁶⁹⁷ "Release on Internet of Translated Version of Japanese Articles Annoys Beijing," *Sankei Shimbun*, September 7, 2000.

economic aid to China, 45 percent replied that the policy was desirable, 44 percent complained it was too soft, and only 3 percent said the policy was too harsh on China.⁶⁹⁸

As discussed above, Japanese attempt to win Chinese concessions with economic means met with staunch resistance from China, who seemed willing to sacrifice economic interests for political needs or symbolic national pride. Still Japan was so unhappy about China that it was determined to end some favorable terms of economic aid to China and attach political strings to the aid permanently. In negotiating the fourth yen loan package, Tokyo tried to replace the thus far multi-year aid program with a system of settling aid commitments annually. As a former senior Japanese diplomat said, “the practice of committing aid to China over a period of several years, rather than for one year at time, means the Chinese can do anything they like once a new program has been agreed.” With China’s opposition, the two sides compromised on a five-year plan in which the amount of fund was specified only for the first three years from 1996 to 1998 while that for the next two years would be decided based on further study. And Tokyo made it clear that this would be the last multi-year aid program to China.⁶⁹⁹

Less sure at the time was whether the amount of ODA fund to China should be reduced as a clear expression of Japanese displeasure with China. Since Jiang’s problematic visit to Japan in 1998, however, a hawkish perspective regarding aid policy arose among Japanese strategic elites. This view fundamentally departed from the previous rationale of economic aid to China, which was that it was no longer in Japan’s interest to help build a powerful and prosperous China. One of the major causes of this view was that many Japanese were deeply frustrated with China’s sticking to its bold military buildup programs despite repeated Japanese protest and using history as a political tool to force its terms on Japan on every important bilateral issue. In their eyes, the ungrateful, overbearing and manipulative China was simply untrustworthy because it would override Japanese national interest whenever needed. As an article published in *Sankei Shimbun* in May 2000 argued, “In the first place, many Japanese people question why Japan, which is suffering from a fiscal

⁶⁹⁸ “Survey on Chinese and French Nuclear tests, gun-possessing society, the U.S.-Japan alliance and problem of military bases” by Asahi Shimbun, October 1995, in *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan*, 1996, p. 495.

⁶⁹⁹ “Eager to Please: Tokyo sets aside own rules in China aid package,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 26, 1995.

deficit, should give as much as 150 billion yen of the people's precious tax money and public funds each year to China, a major military power. It is quite natural to be skeptical about why China, which continues to build up its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and purchase cutting-edge destroyers and fighter planes, keeps on condemning Japanese policies, from defense to education, and persists on giving economic aid to developing countries, should be the foremost recipient of Japanese aid."⁷⁰⁰ So to the hawks on China policy, the continuation of large quantity of aid to China was both "kowitz diplomacy" that humiliates Japan's national pride and a self-defeating strategic policy.

SUMMARY

Summary of theory-testing results for this period (see Table 11) shows that domestic political needs to promote an "assertive nationalism" to replace communist ideology as the main spiritual tool to enhance regime legitimacy and facilitate social mobilization figured significantly behind Chinese official campaign to encourage victim consciousness and other-maligning national myths regarding the war history. In Japan, the goals of both consolidating power at home and advancing the internationalist diplomacy externally motivated conservative elites to perpetuate self-glorifying and self-whitewashing myths. But mainstream war narratives in both countries met with serious challenges from civil groups and even individuals embracing various political and ideological agendas, which aggravated bilateral historiographic clash and brought such clash to greater international attention. In the meantime, despite their prospering commercial links and societal contacts, the two sides failed to bridge the gap between their war memories through deep-going historians' dialogue or measures of historical restitution, largely due to domestic political constraints. So bilateral relations in this period attest to advantage of historical mythmaking theory over realist theory in tracing the rise of their historiographic disputes.

⁷⁰⁰ "ODA to China: Bold Review Based on Guidelines Necessary," Sankei Shimbun, May 12, 2000.

Moreover, historical mythmaking theory rightly predicts that Sino-Japanese relations would deteriorate from the early 1980s and a state of Shallow Reconciliation-Friction would last through the entire period. The realist prediction that the two countries would maintain deep reconciliation until the common Soviet threat disappeared at the end of the 1980s is not consistent with the reality. The development of the four indicators of reconciliation stage in the 1980s indicates that they were predominantly driven by the mechanisms of intention and emotions embedded in historical mythmaking theory. However, in the 1990s mutual expectation of war and bilateral economic and political relations were jointly determined by these two mechanisms, the sense of strategic uncertainty after the Cold War, and both countries' active military buildup and assertive international strategy. Since Chinese and Japanese attitude to one another worsened either much earlier or 5-6 years after the end of the Cold War, and their military buildup programs or uneven economic growth did not really upset bilateral power balance, pure realpolitik factors alone would not have been sufficient to bring out the specifics of the reconciliation outcomes.

Last but not least, this period of Sino-Japanese relations reveals both the instrumental and independent functions of ideas in international relations. On the one hand, governments created and purveyed national myths in a politically purposeful way and they sometimes applied history card in diplomatic negotiation to extract concessions from the other side. On the other hand, however, negative emotions and perception of intention arising from sharp disagreement on the war history interpretation were genuinely held by general public and also widely shared within the elite circle; they could not be turned off at will when bilateral disputes ended and government agenda shifted. So there existed a fundamental dilemma between the official desire to manipulate history interpretation for practical political needs and the fear of inability to control the resultant enormous public agitation that would seriously constrain government policy choices. Historical myths act as a double-edged sword in international relations: they serve as well as harm their creators.

Table 11: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1982-2000)

	PREDICTIONS		OUTCOMES	THEORY ASSESSMENT
	<i>(I) Realist Theory</i>	<i>(II) Theory of Historical Mythmaking</i>		
Causes of Historical Myths	N ational myths are merely part of elite propaganda to justify national security policy	N ational myths are shaped by a multitude of instrumental motivations including strategic goals, domestic political interests and ideological doctrines	J apanese conservative elites used war myths to mobilize public support to internationalist diplomacy and shore up the prestige and power of the conservative ruling class; C hinese war myths were used to support the “assertive nationalism” that could justify economic reform in the face of conservative opposition and mitigate anti-government sentiments and demands for democracy from the society	Theory II better fits the evidence
Interstate Reconciliation Result	D eep Reconciliation in the 1980s resulted from the positive structural conditions; M ajor decline of relationship at the end of the 1980s when the common Soviet threat dissipated; S hallow Reconciliation in the 1990s because of the neutral structural conditions	M ajor decline of relationship between 1982-1986 when bilateral historiographic divergence significantly widened; S hallow Reconciliation-Friction throughout the period as a result of the combative/conflictual war narratives	M ajor decline of relationship between 1982-1986; S hallow Reconciliation-Friction throughout the 1980s and 1990s	Theory I fits the evidence in the 1990s; Theory II better explains the timing of relationship change and the relationship outcome of the whole period
Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Stage	1: N o expectation of war in the 1980s because of common security interest against the Soviet threat; H eighted expectation of war in the 1990s because of the end of CW and concern about bilateral power balance shift	M oderate/heightened expectation of war throughout the period because the mechanism of intention should generate a higher degree of mistrust	H eighted Chinese expectation of war throughout the period, not because of a major shift of bilateral power balance or end of the Cold War, but mistrust of Japan due to its historical amnesia; H eighted Japanese expectation of war since the mid-1990s to some extent because of China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization programs, but also due to its rejection of China’s historical justification of its international assertiveness and use of history card to bully Japan	Theory I partially explains Japan’s perception of China in the 1990s; Theory II supports China’s perception throughout the period and partially Japan’s perception in the 1990s

Table 11 continued

<p>Indicators of Interstate Reconciliation Outcomes</p>	<p>2: Full settlement of sovereignty controversies in the 1980s because of common security interest; Sovereignty rights disputes in the 1990s caused by the end of CW and the strategic importance of these issues</p>	<p>Sovereignty disputes throughout the period, caused the mechanisms of intention and emotions when historiographic conflict worsens</p>	<p>Sovereignty rights disputes throughout the period not because of the strategic importance of these issues but due to the Chinese sense of historical entitlement and Japanese rejection of it, which generated deep mutual suspicion of harmful intention and mounting public pressure against conciliatory government position on these issues</p>	<p>Theory I is consistent with the outcome of sovereignty disputes in the 1990s; Theory II explains better both the process and outcome of such disputes throughout the period</p>
	<p>3: Smooth economic interaction and high strategic interdependence in the 1980s due to common security interest; Economic friction and political interference in economic affairs in the 1990s because of the end of CW and concern about bilateral power balance shift with the rise of China</p>	<p>Limited level of strategic interdependence and economic frictions and throughout the period, caused by the mechanisms of intention and emotions when historiographic conflict worsens</p>	<p>Economic friction and/or politicization of economic affairs throughout the period; China's confrontational attitude since the 1980s and Japan's toughening of ODA policy since the mid-1990s to China were the result of the Chinese sense of historical entitlement and Japanese rejection of it, which generated deep mutual suspicion of harmful intention and mounting public pressure against conciliatory government position on these issues; Japan's attitude change in the 1990s was also caused by concerns about Chinese military modernization and the misuse of Japanese economic aid for military purpose</p>	<p>Theory I fits the general outcome in the 1990s and partially explains Japanese policy change; Theory II fits the general outcome and explains Chinese attitude throughout the period, and partially explains Japanese policy change in the 1990s</p>
	<p>4: Harmonious popular in the 1980s feeling due to common security interest; Popular animosity in the 1990s due to the end of CW and concerns about balance of power shift</p>	<p>Popular animosity throughout the period, caused by grievances through mechanism of emotions when bilateral historiographic divergence widens</p>	<p>Chinese bitterness about Japan throughout the period due to their grievances toward Japanese historical amnesia and lack of war redress measures, and the absence of historians' dialogue; Japanese popular feeling about China decline in mid-1980s and in mid-1990s caused by their rejection of Chinese grievances and frustration over China's use of history card; decline in 1989 due to June 4</p>	<p>Theory II better fits both the process and outcome of popular relations throughout the period</p>

Chapter Six

When East Meets the West: Postwar (West) German-Polish Reconciliation

Germany and Poland, two neighboring countries in East-Central Europe, had a history of enduring, traumatic conflicts ever since the 18th century, which culminated on September 1, 1939 when the unprovoked German attack on Poland launched the immensely destructive World War II. After the war, the danger of military confrontation continued to haunt West Germany and Poland as they were separately allied with the US and USSR. However insurmountable the historical and structural hurdles seemed to be, the (West) German-Polish reconciliation process progressed ostensibly since the early 1970s and approached the stage of deep reconciliation in the 1990s. I argue that German-Polish reconciliation to a significant extent can be attributed to the institutional measures of historical settlement including German restitution and bilateral historians' cooperation beginning from the 1970s. Endorsed at a time when the systemic conditions turned favorable, these efforts created mutual understanding and trust that cushioned the impact of negative international conditions in the 1980s and paved the way for the eventual reconciliation between the unified Germany and Poland after the Cold War.

This chapter begins with an introduction of the historical background of German-Polish relations. The next section briefly outlines the four phases of postwar (West) Germany's foreign policy and its reconciliation process with Poland. Subsequent sections will apply realist and historical mythmaking theories to each phase and assess their relative explanatory power.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For centuries Poland was caught both geographically and politically between its two powerful neighbors, Prussia/Germany and Russia/the USSR, at the hands of whom the

Polish nation endured the most devastating and humiliating national trauma in its history.⁷⁰¹ The three partitions of Poland by Prussia, Russia and Austria from 1772 to 1795 reduced the once great European power into non-existence. Napoleon Bonaparte's victories brought a partial and ephemeral restoration of Polish national statehood. But with Bonaparte's defeat, the three partitioners soon regained the Polish land lost in the struggle with him, and the two Polish uprisings in 1830-31 and 1863-64 against the heavy-handed rule by the Tsarist Russia were ruthlessly repressed. Poles were deprived of not only national independence but also the right to use Polish language in public affairs and teach Polish literature and history in schools, especially in Prussian and Russian held areas.

After WWI, the Treaty of Versailles brought the rebirth of the Polish state. But the territorial ambition of its Slavic neighbor, now called the Soviet Union, did not relent. The Polish-Soviet War broke out in 1920 and ended with a significant Polish victory. However, the twenty years of inter-war period was only "a brief interlude in the over-all stream of stateless" for Poland.⁷⁰² On the eve of WWII, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, just like their political predecessors, conspired to wipe out Poland from the map. The notorious secret protocol attached to the Treaty of Non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the USSR, or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, "set the price the USSR charged for its benign neutrality in the forthcoming war – Bessarabia, Estonia, Latvia, and the better part of Poland, up to and including half of its capital Warsaw."⁷⁰³ This pact ended Hitler's haunting fear of a two-front war. On September 17, less than three weeks after Hitler invaded Poland and when the situation of Warsaw was precarious, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that the Polish Government had ceased to exist and ordered the Red Army to move west to occupy Eastern Poland.⁷⁰⁴ So Poland was once again carve up: its western territories were annexed into Germany, eastern area into the Soviet Union, and the central part became a German protectorate named the General Gouvernement.

⁷⁰¹ Unless specially indicated, the following review of Polish history in this section draws upon Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press Davies, 1982).

⁷⁰² Davies, *God's Playground*, p. 6.

⁷⁰³ Jan Tomasz Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: the Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9. For the text of the treaty and the secret protocols attached to the treaty, see General Sikorski Historical Institute, *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945* (DPSR) (London: Heinemann, 1961), Vol.1, p. 40.

⁷⁰⁴ Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War: A Complete History* (New York: H. Holt, 1989), p. 9.

German atrocities committed in the invasion and occupation of Poland were horrendous.⁷⁰⁵ Over six million Polish citizens were killed, which amounted to 22.2 percent of the total Polish population living under the German occupation, much higher than the death rate of the next two countries on the tragic list, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, who lost about 10 percent and 4 percent of their populations respectively. Polish Jews were the worst victims of German aggression. Hitler's racial extermination campaign involving the concentration, isolation, and eventual annihilation of Jews largely took place in Poland. Half of Polish deaths were Jews, who perished in the Jewish ghettos, concentration camps, and prisons, together with millions of Jews deported from other European countries conquered by German forces. Poles were also subject to a variety of brutalities, including mass execution, slave labor, live medical experiments on human beings, and daily terror and political persecution. Millions of people were forced to resettle in the General Gouvernement from the areas incorporated into the Reich. The Nazis systematically destroyed or looted Poland's valuable books, objects of art and documents, as well as exploited Polish natural resources for German war effort in such an extremely greedy fashion that by the end of the war Poland had been literally ravaged. To make things worse, Nazi Germany attempted to exterminate the Polish leadership stratum, massacred or deported the intelligentsia, banned publications and art performances in Polish language, and minimized the education opportunities for Poles. The goal of this policy was to turn Poles to a people of semiliterate and permanently end the existence of the Polish national identity.

Compared to the German invasion, the Soviet military conquest of eastern Poland seemed less damaging because it lasted only two weeks and incurred relatively small casualties (fewer than 3,000). The Red Army's use of violence during the occupation was in most cases selective as it mainly target Polish officers, policemen, and landowners in order to root out the ruling apparatus of the old Polish regime.⁷⁰⁶ But Soviet atrocities could be no less appalling than those of the Germans, especially in the first two years of the war when the Soviets killed many more people than the Nazis did, before the later's systemic mass

⁷⁰⁵ For further details on German victimization of Poland during World War II, see Jan T. Gross, *Polish Society under German Occupation*, W. adys aw Wszebór Kulski, *Germany and Poland: from War to Peaceful Relations* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976), Chapter 2; G*ówna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce, *German Crimes in Poland* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1982).

⁷⁰⁶ Gross, J. T., *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 42.

annihilation of Jews began. Most notorious Soviet atrocities include the Kaytn Forest Massacre in spring 1940 – 5,000 Polish POWs were murdered and another 10,000 missing – and the killing of as many as 100,000 people during the evacuation of prisons in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia during June and July 1941.⁷⁰⁷

Therefore, while the German action of Holocaust carried out largely on Polish land has no parallel in human history, the long-term, ruthless Tsarist and later Soviet aggression made this “Slavic brother” the second major perpetrator of Poland. Together the two neighbors posed the gravest threat to Polish national survival. It was this experience of dual victimization that led to considerable emotional and political paradox when Poland had to choose sides between the two in the postwar era.

PERIODIZATION OF POSTWAR (WEST) GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS

The postwar (West) German-Polish reconciliation process has gone through four phases. Phase One, from the end of WWII till the mid-1960s, was the stage of Non-Reconciliation. The structural conditions were negative because West Germany and Poland were allied to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. separately, which locked the two states into the East-West confrontation. During this period, the Christian Democratic government of West Germany headed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer carried out *Westpolitik* in foreign policy, which hinged such top national priorities as security, unification and economic revival on the strategic alliance with the Western bloc. To the Eastern bloc countries like Poland, Adenauer adopted a confrontational stance, refusing to make any compromise but only desired to impose Bonn’s terms on them when the Western alliance achieved absolute superiority over the East. To make things worse, the dominant historical narratives of the

⁷⁰⁷ For a comparison of Poland’s suffering in the German and Soviet occupation zones, see “Epilogue,” in Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*. Gross’s conclusion is that “if we measure the victimization of Polish citizens in terms of loss of life, of sufferings inflicted by forced resettlement, and of materials losses through confiscation and fiscal measures, the Soviet actions, relatively speaking, would prove far more injurious than those of the Nazis.” (P. 226) “And yet, despite the overwhelming suffering, the Soviet occupation was somehow less oppressive in its atmosphere and style than that of the Nazis... what was lacking under the Soviet occupation was the sense of pervasive discriminatory contempt, the *Übermensch* airs, so forcefully projected by the Germans.” (P. 230).

two states were combative against each other, which aggravated the strategic barriers to reconciliation.

From the late 1960s, the Social Democratic government led by Willy Brandt initiated *Ostpolitik* and ushered in the second phase of reconciliation with Poland that fits in the stage of Shallow Reconciliation. The focus of the new *Ostpolitik*, different from Germany's traditional strategy of Eastern expansion, was to improve relations with the Soviet bloc countries, including Poland, in order to foster inter-German contacts and pave the way for eventual German unification. Aided by the overall East-West Détente, West Germany and Poland were able to settle border dispute and the legal status of East Germany through the 1970 Warsaw Treaty. Still the Cold War did not end and Polish foreign policy was not free from the Soviet control, which set the upper limit for the improvement of German-Polish relations. It was from this phase that the two countries commenced history education dialogue, enabled by not only their diplomatic normalization but also West Germany's politics of reconciliation and the liberalization of the history profession in communist Poland.

Phase Three emerged in the beginning of the 1980s till the last few years of the Cold War. On the one hand, with the dissipation of détente, the diplomatic reorientation of the Helmut Kohl administration to commit to a tight alliance with the West, and the Polish government's crackdown on the Solidarity movement that espoused Western liberal values, the two states were once again alienated politically. On the other hand, the Social Democratic party, now becoming the opposition party, carried out a shadow Eastern policy to foster friendship with Poland and other Soviet allies, and from 1984 the Kohl government also resumed dialogue and cooperation with these countries in the spirit of *Ostpolitik*. In addition, bilateral historiographic divergence shrank in this phase, thanks to the unprecedentedly open debate in West Germany on war memory, the liberalization of Polish history-writing propelled by the Solidarity revolution, and the continuation of bilateral textbook cooperation. The progress in the regard of historical settlement greatly mitigated the escalated structural pressure. The two countries maintained a "Shallow Reconciliation" type of relations in most of this period.

The 1990s was the fourth phase of German-Polish reconciliation. The uncertain structural setting after the end of the Cold War exerted an indeterminate impact on their relations. Nevertheless, the two countries permanently settled their territorial disputes, institutionalized security and economic cooperation, and developed a sense of closeness and mutual trust at the popular level, all characteristics of the stage of Deep Reconciliation.

Two major driving forces contributed to such remarkable reconciliation progress. The first pertained to the Germany's immediate goal of achieving reunification and the long-term desire to neutralize the neighbor countries' mistrust of a unified Germany and attain a secure external environment in Europe. For this reason, Germany did not seek dominance in Europe through its power advantage, but opted for a multilateral, institutional approach to foreign affairs that closely tied German national interests with the integration and cooperation among European countries, including those in Eastern Europe. The second driving force was the increasing convergence of their national memories, due to the de-mythification trend in each country's national historiography, and the comprehensive bilateral exchange programs and historian's dialogue. Not only diminishing mutual threat perception and popular grievances, their shared memory of bilateral relations also gradually extended to include a common European history, creating a sense of European community between the two countries.

PHASE ONE: 1945 TO THE MID-1960s

During Phase One, the two states had no formal diplomatic relations, and their commercial and societal exchange activities were kept at a minimal level. Fear of imminent war and popular animosity toward each other country were prevalent. The main cause of the outright mutual hostility lied in the big power struggle for spheres of influence starting from the end of WWII and intensifying during the Cold War. In the meantime, international structural constraints and domestic political needs motivated ostensible practices of historical mythmaking in both countries, giving rise to squarely divergent historical interpretations about their past conflicts. The combative narratives the two countries held

about their past conflicts functioned as an aggravating factor in stifling any momentum of bilateral reconciliation.

I. International Structure, Heightened Expectation of Bilateral Conflict, and National Non-Recognition

As we know, Sino-Japanese confrontation in the early Cold War years was not so much driven by the clash of their own security needs as by the power struggle between the two strategic blocs that they were separately allied to. But West German-Polish security dilemma in Phase One was caused by both inter-bloc tension and the outstanding disputes between themselves, the later being the product of the former. First, the relationship between the two former enemy states was overshadowed by the East-West military confrontation in Europe. Second, the two countries had conflicting national interests in border disputes and the question of German division. These two issues directly set them against one another, creating a high expectation of bilateral conflict and prevented their mutual cognition of national existence and territorial sovereignty.

Inter-bloc Military Standoff

By the end of WWII, Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe had placed countries like Poland under Soviet control while western allied forces took over the western part of Germany. With the Cold War “Iron Curtain” descending in the late 1940s in Europe, the temporary division of occupation zones was turned into a fault line between the Soviet and American power blocs. Falling on the opposite sides of the fence, West Germany and Poland were antagonistic to one another not only politically but also militarily because they both constituted an integral part of the defense system of their respective alliances. Thus the security dilemma between the superpowers directly translated into tension between the two countries.

Poland was the most important Soviet ally in Eastern Europe in terms of its physical characteristics and military contribution to the bloc defense. Because of its vast land mass and position right on the lines of transportation and communication linking the Soviet homeland with Soviet Forces in East Germany, Poland was a key component of the East

European buffer zone for the defense of the Soviet heartland. Besides serving defensive purposes, Eastern Europe also constituted the launching ground for the Eastern bloc's rapid military offensives against Western Europe. To that end, the Soviet Union pushed for rapid military build up of these countries, and Poland in particular was turned into an armed camp. Its military was the largest in the region and assumed an indispensable role in the Soviet blitzkrieg strategy against Western Europe. Polish military was also Stalinized to the greatest extent among all Soviet allies. Not only Soviet style internal organization, training patterns, and doctrinal systems were indiscriminately imported, but also all important posts in the military, including the defense minister, chief of the general staff, and high-ranking commanders, were held by Polish nationals who had served in the Red Army as Soviet citizens in the past.⁷⁰⁸ Poland's active role in the Soviet-led defense system made it the most formidable military opponent in Europe, next to the Soviet Union itself, of the Western bloc.

In light of the military threat from the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, the United States also began to prop up its own allies. In the late 1940s, Washington formulated a two-pronged policy of boosting Western European strength and unity, with the Marshall Plan mainly addressing the economic weakness and political instability of the region and NATO being the chief military remedy to its security vulnerability. The decision to form a military alliance between the US and Western Europe was directly triggered by the struggle over Germany. Driven by the fear of a revived German threat through unification of the western zones and its integration with Western Europe, Stalin took a drastic action on June 24, 1948 to blockade West Berlin. But his provocation backfired because Western airlift succeeded in keeping Berlin well supplied and Western countries discarded hesitation and mutual disagreements regarding their military alliance. Within weeks of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the Berlin crisis ended.

From its establishment, NATO was open for the eventual participation of Germany. Germany was strategically important first because it was one of the five centers of industrial

⁷⁰⁸ For the significance of Poland's armed forces to the Soviet military strategy in Europe, see Andrzej Korbonski, "Soviet Policy toward Poland," and A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

and military power that, according to George Kennan, the West could not let fall to hostile hands. Germany could also provide the necessary defense space for Western Europe. Given the lessons of WWII and the military balance in postwar Europe, it was widely understood that NATO's East front would be indefensible in the face of Soviet Blitzkrieg and the defenders would have to engage in tactical retreats that cushion enemy assault and buy time for preparing counterattack. Bringing Germany into NATO would stretch the defense line far to the east and add great advantage to Western security both spatially and temporally.⁷⁰⁹

Since the end of the 1940s both the U.S. and Britain encouraged German rearmament and military integration with the West. The US push for Germany rearmament stepped up first during the Korean War and then after Eisenhower decided to reduce American ground forces in Europe and let European forces fill the gap. Although concerned about a possible resurgence of German militarism, France too desired to draw Germany into an integrated Western defense system. But when France's plan to build a European Defense Community (EDC) was defeated in French parliament, Germany's NATO membership was inevitable. West Germany became a formal member of NATO on May 6, 1955. Shortly afterwards, twelve German divisions were created as an important part of the forward defense strategy of the Western alliance.⁷¹⁰

The immediate reaction of the Eastern bloc to West Germany's inclusion in NATO was to conclude the Warsaw Pact on May 14. Poland was a member of the Pact from the day of its founding. Thus Poland and West Germany became the bridgeheads of their respective multilateral security alliances, vigilant against possible attack from one another and actively preparing for a war in case of such attack. Such inter-bloc security dilemma imposed a great danger of imminent war on the bilateral relations.

⁷⁰⁹ Stanford M. Lyman, *NATO and Germany: A Study in the Sociology of Supranational Relations* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), p. 84.

⁷¹⁰ For the history of Germany rearmament and Western integration from late 1940s to early 1950s, see F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967*; James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Lyman, *NATO and Germany*, Chapter 2 & 3.

The Dispute of the Oder-Neisse Line

The national interests of West Germany also directly clashed over the frontier issue, which drove the two countries to even tighter integration with their respective strategic bloc. The wartime great power design to carve out postwar spheres of influence sowed the seeds of German-Polish frontier disputes. Partially to weaken the German power and partially to create a pro-Soviet communist regime in Poland, Stalin presented a compensation theory at the Yalta Conference demanding Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland up to the Curzon Line and German compensation for Poland's loss with its territories east to the Oder-Neisse line. His proposal on eastern Polish border was soon accepted by other allied powers as it had already been a *fait accompli*, but the western border became a point of international contention. Winston Churchill fought most strenuously against the Oder-Neisse line for fear of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and even the whole continent. Roosevelt and his successor Truman had similar suspicion, but it was superceded by their desire to maintain a good relationship with the USSR at least before the war ended. After Churchill's government fell, the three delegations finally agreed on a joint communiqué at Potsdam that approved the Soviet demand. But the communiqué also stated that "the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement," suggesting that the tripartite agreement on the Oder-Neisse line was not a permanent settlement.⁷¹¹

The border issue drove a deep wedge between West Germany and Poland. For more than two decades the Bonn government rejected the Oder-Neisse Line as the final Eastern Germany frontier, a position supported by the U.S., Britain, and France.⁷¹² Also the dreadful expulsion of 8.5 million Germans from former Polish and annexed German territories stimulated mounting grievances among the expellees, who then exerted heavy influence on bilateral relations. So the German threat that the Soviets sold to the Poles when proposing the compensation theory became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Postwar Poland's worst fear was that Western powers would support West Germany's use of force to

⁷¹¹ On the great power settlement of the postwar German-Polish frontiers at wartime meetings, see Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, Chapter 3.

⁷¹² The French position on the issue of Germany's frontiers fluctuated from the end of the war until 1959, when de Gaulle became the president and made a dramatic turnaround to announce that he favors the establishment of a unified Germany that would remain within its present frontiers. See Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 90-94.

challenge the postwar territorial status quo in Europe, which was vindicated when NATO included West Germany with the endorsement of its foreign policy goal to recovering the lost eastern territories.

Its fear of German revanchist territorial claims forced Poland to depend on the security alliance with the USSR. The following excerpt from the Warsaw Pact clearly indicates that Germany was the chief imaginary enemy with whom Poland and other East European countries perceived a major war was likely:

Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the result of ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peaceloving states.⁷¹³

Poland's primary grand strategy since the late 1940s, to integrate its army with the Soviet military and preserve a balance of forces in Central Europe, was intended to communicate to West Germany the message that any territorial encroachment would be intolerably expensive for both the FRG and the US.⁷¹⁴ Therefore, both for protecting the interest of the entire Eastern bloc and for preserving its own sovereignty rights, Poland braced itself for war with West Germany.

The German Question

The West German-Polish frontier dispute prevented mutual respect of territorial integrity, an important aspect of national recognition. Another major obstacle to their national recognition was the division of Germany, the so-called German Question. While Poland endorsed a two-German policy, the Adenauer government of West Germany refused to accept the legitimacy of East Germany. Their refusing to compromise on German Question ruled out bilateral diplomatic normalization for as long as twenty years.

⁷¹³ From the text of "The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955," in *Internet Modern History Sourcebook* at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html>

⁷¹⁴ Richard K. Herrmann, "Comparing World Views in East Europe: Contemporary Polish Perceptions," in Ronald H. Linden ed., *The Foreign Policies of East Europe: New Approaches* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1980), p. 83.

Postwar German Question also had its genesis in great power struggle. The Yalta Conference drew up the blueprint for divided occupation of Germany by the four powers, the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and France. Soon after the war, fundamental clashes occurred between Stalin and Western leaders on political and economic policies in their respective zones. Berlin Blockade in particular repelled any Western hopes about German unity in the near future and prompted them to fuse the three western occupation zones into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in July 1948.

In the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established in October 1949 by the communist leader Walter Ulbricht in the Soviet occupation zone. Warsaw quickly sent in a letter of congratulations two days after the creation of an East German state. Due to its victimization in the long history of relations with Germany, it was Poland's unspeakable wish to keep Germany divided and weak once Germany after the war. In particular, the danger of German territorial revanchism would be effectively curbed if a socialist East Germany dependent on the recognition and support of the Soviet bloc existed on Poland's western border. On July 16, 1950, East Germany and Poland then signed a boundary treaty in Görlitz. The preamble of the treaty stated that the frontier issue had been settled at Potsdam, and Article One specified that the Oder-Neisse line constituted their state border. The utility of recognizing the GDR in perpetuating German division and preserving the territorial status quo was manifest in the following remarks of the First Secretary of the PUWP Władysław Gomułka in his interview with the London Times in February 1958:

“It would not be a misfortune if Germany continued to be divided still for sometime to come... Let us assume that unified Germany should become a great military power, armed with nuclear weapons. It would become a great European power... Certain people there (West Germany) do not conceal their claims to our Western Territories. Taking this into account, we must view the problem of unification of Germany more cautiously than the western countries.”⁷¹⁵

In light of the two-German policy practiced by the Eastern bloc, one possible way to solve German Question was for the FRG to stay neutral between the two superpowers. Moscow first presented this choice to Bonn in 1952 in the so-called Stalin Notes, which offered German unification in return for its strategic neutrality. In 1955, the Soviet government made another overture to the Federal Republic, alluding to the linkage between

normalization and “the restoration of the unity of a German democratic state.”⁷¹⁶ The Soviet offers aroused anxiety in the U.S., who was fearful of the revival of German “seesaw politics” of Weimar tradition. John Foster Dulles once emphasized the importance of “tying Germany organically into the West Community so as to diminish the danger that over time a resurgent German nationalism might trade neutrality for reunification with the view of seizing the controlling position between East and West.”⁷¹⁷

If viewed in the historical context, however, the strategy of staying neutral in exchange for unification was untenable. To West German elites like Konrad Adenauer, the worst nightmare was “Potsdam,” where the fate of Germany was determined by other powers without its consent.⁷¹⁸ Caught right between the East and West, a neutral Germany would likely be again deprived of a say in future trans-bloc bargaining that may further dismember Germany or annex its land. Instead of accommodating with the East, Adenauer’s goal of attaining German unification was tied to western integration. Collaboration with the West may not secure German unification immediately, but would shore up German national defense to balance the Eastern military threat at the FRG’s doorstep. It was also hoped that Germany and the entire Western world would eventually become so much more powerful than the East that it could force Moscow to assent to the absorption of the GDR by the FRG. This is Adenauer’s “policy of strength.” As he told the *Bundestag* in February 1952, “We may regain Berlin and the German East only through a united Europe.”⁷¹⁹

Adenauer’s “policy of strength” precluded any compromise with the Eastern bloc on the GDR’s international legitimacy. During his visit to Moscow in September 1955, Adenauer agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. But he also sent two letters to Soviet Prime Minister reminding that diplomatic normalization would neither modify the status of the FRG as the legal representative of all German people nor suggest

⁷¹⁵ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 96-97.

⁷¹⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 49-50. The quote is from p. 50.

⁷¹⁷ Quoted in Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and West German-American Relations,” in Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 121.

⁷¹⁸ Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, p. 49; Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and West German-American Relations,” p. 113.

⁷¹⁹ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 105-106.

German acceptance of the present frontiers. At the end of the 1955, the FRG government declared the Hallstein Doctrine, named after the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that it would rupture diplomatic relations with a third state that were to recognize the GDR. As the Soviet ties with the GDR were still tolerated because Moscow was one of the four great powers whose consent was necessary to achieving German unification, the obvious targets of the Hallstein doctrine were the Eastern European states. On June 28, 1956, Bonn's Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, reconfirmed that his government had no intention to establish diplomatic relations with the East European states and would not recognize the GDR and the present frontiers.⁷²⁰

Thus the conflicting approaches of Bonn and Warsaw to German Question created an insurmountable political barrier to their mutual recognition. Two opportunities for diplomatic normalization arose in Phase One, but both were doomed to fail by the Cold War structural constraints. The first opportunity emerged in the aftermath of the 1956 crisis in Soviet-Polish relations. After defeating the Stalinist faction in the Polish communist party, Gomulka expressed in June 1957 the wish to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany without any preconditions. But the Adenauer government refused to deal with Poland by citing the Hallstein Doctrine. Receiving no positive responses, the Polish attitude soon stiffened and once again demanded the FRG's recognition of the new frontier before normalization.⁷²¹ This was hardly a lost chance for their reconciliation because Adenauer never wavered on his conviction that western integration was the best means to gain national unity, and the Gomulka government was still under tight Soviet watch and did not enjoy full diplomatic autonomy. Viewed with hindsight, the late 1950s was an unlike time when the two sides would suddenly embrace each other in the absence of fundamental changes in the Cold War strategic context.

New hopes for bilateral rapprochement emerged following the "the hour of great disillusionment" when Western allies failed to respond harshly toward the erection of Berlin Wall by the Soviet Union and East Germany in 1961. The conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) became divided between the "Gaullists" who adhered to

⁷²⁰ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 109-111.

⁷²¹ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, p. 112.

Adenauer's of policy of strength and the "Atlanticists" represented by Gerhard Schroeder who stressed the importance of détente with the East.⁷²² Being the foreign minister in the Erhard government from 1963 to 1966, Schroeder developed a "policy of movement" to the Eastern bloc without requiring a quid pro quo, as opposed to previous theory of "maintained tensions."⁷²³ In line with this policy, Schroeder established West German trade missions in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria as the first step to establish official, friendly contacts with its eastern neighbors. But this policy retained a number of rigid, Adenauer-era premises such as that West Germany was part of the West strategic community, the Federal Republic must represent all German nation, and postwar frontier status quo with Poland would not be recognized. These terms were totally unacceptable to the Eastern bloc. Poland particularly refused to enter into any political agreement with the FRG without first settling their territorial dispute.⁷²⁴

To make things worse, the Erhard-Schroeder government tried to improve closer relations with the dissident Soviet allies, Romania and Czechoslovakia, while bypassing the GDR, Poland, and in effect also the USSR. This approach was retained by the succeeding Kiesinger-Brandt government of the Grand Coalition. Moscow was so irritated by the West's disrespect of its sphere of influence that it used violent measures at Prague Spring in 1968 to crush any deviation by its satellite states. What was also crushed then was the hope to realize West German-Polish rapprochement through the "policy of movement."

II. International Structural Polarization and Minimal Bilateral Economic Ties

Cold War East-West confrontation in Europe was the main cause of the minimal level of economic interaction between West Germany and Poland in Phase One. Each state obtained the capital and technological assistance from its bloc leader for national

⁷²² Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 41-47.

⁷²³ The Adenauer government had insisted that any move towards relaxing tensions with Eastern European states must be matched by moves towards German reunification. This is the theory of "maintained tensions." See Lawrence L. Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 12.

⁷²⁴ Even the conciliatory "peace note" that the Erhard-Schroeder government proposed in March 1966 included these highly contentious premises. See Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, p. 53. Also see Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, p.127; Rajendra K. Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991* (London: Sangam Books, 1993), p. 20.

reconstruction and modernization agenda, in exchange for which they had to comply with the inter-bloc export restrictions. The combination of their heavy dependence on superpowers and the East-West economic warfare greatly constrained bilateral economic interactions.

Traditionally, Poland's commercial relations with Western Europe, especially West Germany, were far prosperous than those with Russia and Eastern Europe. According to trade statistics in 1937, only 1.5 percent of Poland's total imports were from the USSR and the Baltic republics, and 6.0 percent from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania combined. However, Germany alone provided 14.5 percent of imported goods in Poland, and another 41.9 percent were from the rest of Europe.⁷²⁵ After WWII, such close economic ties between Poland and the West were expected to sustain. As predicted by a report published by the newly established Organization for European Economic Cooperation in December 1948, around 1952-1953 when the Marshall Plan was scheduled to end, trade between Eastern and Western Europe would reach approximately 80 percent of the exports and 73 percent of the imports of the 1938 level.⁷²⁶

However, the subsequent East-West trade fell far short of the expected volume and even declined from the 1947 level, mainly due to the rising hostility between the two superpowers. First of all, the US-Soviet Cold War denied Poland of access to Western economic aid and forced it to depend more on Soviet assistance. Offering massive economic assistance to help Europe out of chaos and starvation, the US-led Marshall Plan was supposed to be open to all of Europe. But soon after the first planning meeting of Marshall Plan in July 1947, Stalin decided to withdraw. He feared that a large influx of US dollars into the Soviet sphere of influence would increase its economic dependence on the West, and that the shipment of raw materials from East back to the West would damage Soviet strategic interests. The USSR also dragged out Poland and Czechoslovakia, who would have stayed in the program because of their traditional economic ties with the West. Meanwhile, few in the American government ever believed that Stalin would accept the offer and, even if

⁷²⁵ Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchi, *East-West Technology Transfer: Study of Poland, 1971-1980* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation, 1983), p. 9.

⁷²⁶ Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967*, pp. 157-158.

he had chosen otherwise, the Congress would not have funded a program that included the USSR.⁷²⁷

To compete with the Marshall Plan, Moscow proposed a Molotov Plan for Eastern Europe, which later evolved into the Soviet-sponsored economic grouping known as the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. Because Poland was a prime candidate for the Marshall Plan, it deserved a special compensatory gesture from the USSR. The Polish-Soviet Trade Treaty signed in January 1948 provided for their cooperation worth two million rubles over four years.⁷²⁸ Subsequently, the overall Polish foreign economic policy was subject to the intra-bloc coordination to enhance the self-sufficiency of the Eastern bloc and reduce its strategic vulnerability to the West. As a result, the direction of Poland's foreign trade shifted dramatically. Trade data in Table 12 indicate that from the early 1950s to 1970 Poland's imports from the USSR and East Europe combined were always two to three times as many as those from the rest of Europe.

Table 12: Ratios of Poland's Imports from Major Trade Partners, 1937-1970

Year	The USSR	East Europe	Other European Countries
1937	0.03	0.11	1
1947	0.57	0.18	1
1954	1.73	1.41	1
1955	1.39	1.11	1
1960	1.48	1.32	1
1965	1.75	1.70	1
1970	1.98	1.46	1

SOURCE: Fallenbuchl, *East-West Technology Transfer*, *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, various years.

The economic autarky of the Soviet bloc was not entirely self-imposed, as most communist leaders including Stalin himself appreciated the importance of Western exports, especially advanced technologies, to their countries' industrial modernization. The Western

⁷²⁷ Thomas G. Paterson et al. *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895* (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), pp. 245-246; William I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 42-43; Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof, *The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program* (New York, Berg: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 56.

⁷²⁸ Davies, *God's Playground*, p. 572.

policy of trade embargo policy also contributed to the East-West mutual economic isolation. In order to maintain its power superiority vis-à-vis the USSR, the U.S. decided around 1947-48 to instate restrictions on exports to Eastern bloc states. Export restrictions escalated after the outbreak of the Korean War, leading to the pass of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act) that prohibited all military, economic, and financial U.S. aid to any nation that permitted delivery of military goods to “any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States.”⁷²⁹ The Battle Act was obviously targeted at the USSR and its socialist allies. In the meantime, in November 1949 the American government orchestrated the establishment of CoCom, the Coordinating Committee, which was an institutional framework to coordinate joint embargo of strategic goods to the Eastern bloc.

The US-led embargo policy was not popular among its West European allies. These countries considered export restrictions, especially on non-military commodities, economically and politically irrational as it would hurt the West almost as much as the East. Nevertheless, they had to cooperate in the embargo because their foreign trade had been linked to the supply of US aid.⁷³⁰ West Germany was particularly vulnerable to the US pressure because it had yet to regain full sovereignty when the policy was introduced. Unlike other Western European countries where export control followed a non-binding “gentlemen’s agreement” with the US, West Germany’s foreign trade was subject to direct supervision of the three Western occupying powers. West German export control actually followed the American Positive List, which was longer and more severe than the general European CoCom list. West Germany was also desperately in need of American aid because its economy had been devastated by the war and now faced the enormous challenge of absorbing millions of refugees from the Eastern territories. From 1945-1955, West Germany was the third largest recipient of the US grants and credits, after the UK and France.⁷³¹ Such aid not only helped revive its economy but also ensured the very survival of

⁷²⁹ Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967*, p. 27.

⁷³⁰ For Attitudes in Western Europe to the embargo policy, see Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967*, Chapter 4.

⁷³¹ Susan Stern, “The Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View,” Germany Info (<http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html>); Maier and Bischofm *The Marshall Plan and Germany*, pp. 4-5.

the West German state. Bonn could not afford damaging its relationship with Washington by developing trade with the Eastern bloc.

The introduction of joint Western embargo effectively reduced East-West trade. Although the embargo lists were revised after 1954 to allow export of some less strategically important goods to the East, both the CoCom and Battle Act remained effective throughout this period.⁷³² In response to the Western embargo, the Soviet bloc implemented its own export control, sharply reducing export of strategic goods to the West. Though without a former institution like the CoCom, the counter embargo was well coordinated among the communist states.⁷³³ As a result, the communist bloc turned even more autarkic and further isolated economically from the West. West German-Polish trade was badly affected by such an inter-bloc economic warfare.

III. Penetration of Societal Relations by Structural Pressure

West German-Polish popular relations during this period were marked by a high degree of mistrust and animosity. In a public survey done by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach in September 1959, 36 percent of German respondents held “mainly negative attitude” toward Poland, compared to 24 percent who had positive attitude. Another poll show that in the eyes of most West Germans, the Russians and Poles were “deceitful” and “unreliable,” “unpredictable,” as well as “brutal” and “treacherous.”⁷³⁴ Meanwhile, the West Germans were extremely pessimistic about Polish perception of themselves. In a West German poll in 1959, 49 percent responded that “the Poles have nothing good to say about the Germans,” compared to only 12 percent who believed that the Poles had a positive attitude towards Germans and “would be prepared to live in friendship with us.”⁷³⁵ Most West Germans also abhorred close political ties between the two countries. Throughout Phase One the USSR and Poland were at the bottom of the list of countries that West German public would like their government to cooperate with.⁷³⁶

⁷³² Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967*, pp. 155-157.

⁷³³ Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967*, pp. 81-82.

⁷³⁴ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966* (Allensbach, Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), p. 555, p. 568. .

⁷³⁵ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, pp. 567-568.

⁷³⁶ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, pp. 510-511.

Such negative popular perception of one another nation was directly shaped by the Cold War inter-bloc security dilemma. One clear indicator of the penetration of public opinion by international structural pressure was the common concern among West German public about the danger of war in a polarized world.⁷³⁷ Public polls conducted in 1954 and 1956 demonstrate that most West Germans did not believe that in the long run Western democracies and Communism in the East could live together in peace. Polls in the early part of the 1960s similarly showed that more people were “constantly afraid of another war” than those who could “look calmly to the future.”⁷³⁸ A number of public surveys taken in different years during this period suggest that the West Germans who felt threatened by the USSR consistently outnumbered those who felt otherwise, and less people believed that the Soviets had “the good will to seek a reconciliation with the West” than those who did not believe so.⁷³⁹

The fear about communist threat deeply entrenched in West German society explains the overwhelming public support to Adenauer’s policy of western integration. In each of the three polls conducted in 1950, 1954 and 1965, the percentage of respondents who would “side with the West in the present world conflict” well surpassed those who would “side with East” or stay neutral.⁷⁴⁰ The U.S. always topped the list of countries that the public believed would be “Germany’s best friend,” and was the country that West Germany should “seek the closest possible cooperation” with.⁷⁴¹

The decisive impact of structural conditions on bilateral popular relations was also revealed in the uncompromising attitude of the West German public on such questions as the legal status of East Germany and the Eastern frontiers. Most people oppose any suggestion of recognizing an East German state and found Soviet attempt to conclude a

⁷³⁷ Analysis here will focus on the West German society. Data of Polish public surveys during this period are lacking, and they could be very unreliable even if they do exist. Yet because of the tight state control over education and propaganda institutions in Communist Poland in the 1950s and 1960s, Polish public opinions ought to have been brought into greater consistence than those in West German with the state policy of strategic confrontation with countries of the opposing bloc.

⁷³⁸ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, p. 598, p. 605.

⁷³⁹ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, pp. 553-554.

⁷⁴⁰ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, p. 523

⁷⁴¹ Noelle-Neumann. and Neumann, *The Germans*, pp. 509-511.

separate peace treaty with East Germany objectionable.⁷⁴² There was widespread public support to the government policy of stonewalling vis-à-vis East European countries that had recognized East Germany. The strongest expression of public determination to regain eastern territories was reflected in a poll done in April 1952. When asked what West Germany should do in response to Russian promise of German unity on the condition of renouncing the claim to the regions beyond the Oder-Neisse line, 55 percent respondents said the government should negotiate with Russians but “on no account should we forgo the regions east of the Oder-Neisse line,” and another 20 percent insisted on getting the territories back before negotiating for national unity, with only 9 percent willing to trade eastern territories with the unity of Germany.⁷⁴³

The East-West standoff in Europe not only generated imminent threat perception and widespread objection to mutual compromise among the public but also dampened societal exchange activities that would have been conducive to mutual understanding and trust at the popular level. Bilateral personnel exchanges in Phase One were rather scarce. Tourism data of Poland in Table 13 indicate that the number of tourists coming from West Germany lagged far behind that from Socialist countries, and increased much slower than the later.

Table 13: Foreign Tourists to Poland, 1960-1970 (in thousands)

Year	FRG	GDR	USSR	Czechoslovakia
1960	11.4	37.5	22.9	51.8
1965	26.6	330.6	148.2	355.8
1968	22.9	525.6	278.4	467.5
1969	25.7	542.6	319.2	643.0
1970	36	539	335	489

SOURCE: *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland* (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office of the Polish People’s Republic), various years.

IV. Historical Mythmaking and Intensified Bilateral Tension

The desire of ruling elites to use history to serve both strategic and domestic political needs led to rampant historical mythmaking in both countries in Phase One. West German

⁷⁴² Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, pp. 467-468.

conservative government led by Adenauer purveyed myths that promoted amnesia about Nazi atrocities against other nations while emphasizing German suffering from the Nazis as well as Soviet bloc countries who took Germany's territories and expelled millions of Germans. The Polish Communist regime also manipulated national history of external conflicts to highlight Polish national victimhood and identify Germany as the chief perpetrator, but covered up Soviet acts of oppression against Poland. Consequently, national collective memories of the two countries were dominated by *combative* narratives, which aggravated mutual perception of hostile intention and exacerbated emotions of grievances and disgust in people-to-people relations.

Historical Amnesia in Adenauer's Germany

German conservative elites had a high stake in national history-making in this period. First of all, to conservative leaders the German fiasco in the war and the denazification campaign, including war crimes trials, purges and reeducation programs carried out by the occupying powers, had been spreading a "defeatist mood" among West Germans and sapping the national morale.⁷⁴⁴ They believed that forcing the Germans to face the Nazi past would only undermine a fragile popular psyche or provoke anti-West nationalism in Germany.⁷⁴⁵ So there was an urgent need to rebuild national confidence based on a positive self-evaluation through history-making.

Electoral politics was another important factor shaping the conservative historiography of Germany's Nazi past. Those politicians who had past association with Nazism were eager to shake off the historical stigma so that they could reenter the social and power hierarchy in postwar Germany. Besides, there was a powerful conservative constituency in the 1950s, most of which opposed the postwar territorial status quo and cried for revenge against the Poles for their expulsion of German nationals from the eastern territories. Considering themselves as the victims of Hitler or Eastern European countries,

⁷⁴³ Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, *The Germans*, p.470.

⁷⁴⁴ For a detailed study of the denazification campaign in Germany by Western allies, see James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Nicholas Pronay & Keith Wilson, *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1995).

⁷⁴⁵ Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 224-225.

the conservative voters found the idea of admitting Germany's role of oppressor to other nations absolutely repugnant. The umbrella organization of the different regional groups of refugees and expellees, the Federation of Expellees, stood out to be the staunchest opponent to a forthright historiography on the Nazi past. Claiming three million members at the beginning of the 1960s, the organization constituted the power base of the Bavaria Christian Democratic Union, the right wing of the CDU. In order to win over the conservative constituency, Adenauer opted for encouraging public amnesia about Germany's criminal history.⁷⁴⁶

Adenauer's foreign policy of western integration, *Westbindung*, also required de-emphasis on Nazi crimes and individual war responsibility in war narratives. He maintained that military alliance and economic integration with the West could counter the Soviet threat and regain for Germany the status of an equal power with other West countries. He also believed that *Westbindung* could help Germany accomplish democratic revolution by replacing the collectivist and statist tradition of German conservatism with a type of Western-oriented, Catholic-influenced ideology containing a liberal and individualist view of the relationship of the state to the individual.⁷⁴⁷ So Adenauer tried to shift the focus of national psyche from self-reflection on Germany's past guilt to the Cold War strategy of containment. He blamed the allied denazification campaign in Germany as excessive and had "created a very unfavorable atmosphere" for German rearmament.⁷⁴⁸ If Germany continued to be chastised for its past history, it would only encourage Cold War defeatism and diminish Germany's will to resist the Soviet pressure. So he insisted that West Germany's integration into the Western alliance could not succeed unless the allies forgot and forgave Nazi crimes.

The above political interests drove West German conservative elites to gloss over Germany's past wrongdoings. During Phase One, they propagated and institutionalized a mythified interpretation of the war history that was marked by general amnesia of Nazi crimes against other nations, perception of Germans themselves as victims, and a sharp

⁷⁴⁶ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 226.

⁷⁴⁷ Herf, *Divided memory*, pp. 212-216.

⁷⁴⁸ Herf, *Divided memory*, p. 270.

contrast between conciliation with the Western allies and an unrepentant attitude toward the Eastern Bloc countries.

First, the Adenauer government constructed the myth of “good Germans and bad Germans” to minimize Germany’s war responsibility. Although openly acknowledging the burdens and obligations of the Nazi past, Adenauer rejected the notion held by the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) that the entire German nation should bear collective responsibility if not collective guilt for the Nazi crimes. Rather, he argued that the vast majority of Germans were innocent victims of a small number of Nazi leaders who corrupted “the German name” with shame.⁷⁴⁹ He spoke of the Wehrmacht soldiers in an honorable manner, without referring to their complicity in the race war in the East and the Holocaust. He also tried to exonerate the war responsibility of German big capital, who was the postwar political ally of the conservative CDU.

In line with its narrow definition of German war responsibility, the government took actions to end the allied denazification programs and pardon German war criminals. Adenauer emotionally opposed the prolonged war crime trials and repeatedly appealed for forgiveness and mercy rather than justice to German war criminals.⁷⁵⁰ Internationally, he demanded the release of convicted war criminals held by the Allies. Fearful that German frustration with the war criminal issue might lead to the nation’s reluctance to engage in rearmament and western integration, the Western allies yielded. By 1958, except for a handful of the original Nuremberg defendants held in Spandau and fewer than thirty “war-condemned” Germans held in Holland, France, Belgium, and Italy, all other German war criminals had been pardoned and freed.⁷⁵¹ Domestically, the *Bundestag* passed two amnesty laws at the end of 1949 and in summer 1954, absolved tens of thousands of Nazi perpetrators and ended all further legal measures to nail down individual responsibility for Nazi crimes.⁷⁵² Besides, *Bundestag* legislations around 1951 also rehabilitated public officials dismissed both during the Third Reich on political or racial grounds and in the course of

⁷⁴⁹ Herf, *Divided memory*, p. 212, p. 218.

⁷⁵⁰ Herf, *Divided memory*, p. 221.

⁷⁵¹ See Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp.229-230.

⁷⁵² Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*, Chapter 1 and 4.

postwar denazification. So numerous former Nazi sympathizers that had been purged by the Allies were restored to official and professional positions.⁷⁵³ These legislations delegitimized the prosecution of Nazi crimes and provided the legal foundation on a federal level for German historical amnesia.

In addition to whitewashing German war guilt war commemorative rituals sponsored by the government encouraged ordinary German people to think of themselves as war victims rather than perpetrators. Adenauer delivered his first postwar public statement in Cologne, a city that had been devastated by Allied air raid, to emphasize the subject of German suffering.⁷⁵⁴ According to him, the miserable experiences of Germans both during and after the war, such as the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the allied occupation of Germany, and Germany's division, formed the basis of German victimization.⁷⁵⁵ So in another open statement issued in Cologne in 1946, Adenauer supported the proposal for a memorial day "for the victims of war." Included in his category of "victims of war" were German soldiers, German POWs, and expellees.⁷⁵⁶ From 1952, a "national day of mourning" was established to commemorate German war victims. Conspicuously absent from official war commemoration during this period, however, were memorial rituals on the day of Germany's surrender and at the sites of concentration camps and other Nazi atrocities.

German war restitutions during this period were limited to victims in western-supported countries. In 1952 it signed the Luxembourg agreement with the state of Israel that obliged West Germany to pay reparation to Jewish survivors of Holocaust, a move very much driven by strategic considerations. Adenauer cited the "political power of Jews" in influencing the U.S. decision-making of extending foreign credits to West Germany and even shaping the general trend of the U.S. occupation policy. Washington also pressed Bonn to compensate Israel in order to convince domestic public opinion about the merit of integrating Germany with the West. Therefore, "restitution was part of the price of West

⁷⁵³ Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*, Chapter 3.

⁷⁵⁴ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 212-213.

⁷⁵⁵ Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca: N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 17-18.

⁷⁵⁶ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 224.

German entry into the Western alliance.” By 1971, the FRG government had paid about 40.4 billion German marks to Jewish survivors as reparation.⁷⁵⁷ On the contrary, West Germany showed no contrition to those Soviet bloc countries who suffered tremendous damages from Nazi Germany. The FRG government embraced the right-wing argument that Poles and Soviets were perpetrators because of their postwar expulsion of German compatriots, but did not mention that frontier alteration would not have happened if Hitler had not initiated an aggressive war that was generally supported by ordinary Germans at the time.⁷⁵⁸ By juxtaposing the Communist policies with Nazi crimes, the Adenauer government easily wrote off Germany’s debt owed to the numerous victims in the East.

The German society was not completely devoid of competing historical narratives during this period. Ever since the end of war the Social Democrats strove tenaciously to pursue both the legal and moral responsibility of the German nation and advocated for educating the young generation with historical truth. They argued that only an honest historical memory could prevent Germany from suffering another catastrophe caused by pernicious nationalism and lay down solid ground for German democracy. But the above-mentioned historical myths prevailed, due to the CDU’s long-time control of state power and the political weight of the large conservative constituency. As a result, the coverage of National Socialism in West German history textbooks was seriously inadequate, particularly regarding the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust, and the horrendous German occupation in the East.⁷⁵⁹ Instead, educational programs tended to perpetuate the traditional image of the Poles as an inferior nation, and taught German youths that Germany was entitled to the right of recovering the lost territories from Poland, and.⁷⁶⁰

Poland’s Selective Tradition

Poland’s national history was also manipulated by the communist elites during this period to bolster the political legitimacy of the Soviet-backed communist regime and justify Soviet transgression of Poland’s sovereignty rights. The first postwar government in Poland,

⁷⁵⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 288.

⁷⁵⁸ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, p. 88.

⁷⁵⁹ Calvert, *Germany’s Nazi Past*.

⁷⁶⁰ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, p. 89.

known in the West as the “Lublin Committee,” was established in Lublin 1944 and later became the core of the provisional government in Poland. Externally, it must compete with the Polish-Government-in-Exile based in London supported by the Western powers. At home, Communist movement had been so weak that it could never have won any open competition with bourgeois parties without Soviet military dominance in postwar Poland. Moreover, the Stalinist faction of Polish communism was challenged by the indigenous communists headed by Gomulka. So the postwar communist regime in Poland was rather fragile and depended on Soviet support for its own survival. Even when Gomulka ascended to top leadership in 1956, Warsaw refrained from defying Moscow because it feared the military superiority of the Red Army. The Gomulka regime continued to defer to Soviet control of its foreign policy, even though it was given limited autonomy to build the “Polish Road to Socialism” at home.

In addition to the problem of regime legitimacy, national security needs also warranted Poland’s submission to the USSR. Historically, Poland had deep-seated mistrust and fear vis-à-vis Germany. Although Germany was positively crushed during WWII, its past experience of resurrecting from ash and initiating aggressive wars again and again frightened Poland. The territorial dispute with Germany was another reason for fear of Germany. The onset of the Cold War promoted Western power to withdraw their support to the new German-Polish frontiers stipulated at the Potsdam Conference. Since only Moscow supported Poland’s boundary with Germany, the fear of the threat of German territorial revanchism compelled Warsaw to adhere to the military alliance with Moscow.

In order to meet these pressing domestic political and international strategic needs, Polish communist elites constructed the official historiography in a fashion of what Raymond Williams called a “selective tradition,” where “certain meanings and practices are selected for emphasis and certain other meanings and practices are neglected or excluded.”⁷⁶¹ Certain parts of Polish national history were emphatically presented as “the tradition” or “the significant past,” including Poland’s suffering at the hands of West Germans and its ideological solidarity with the USSR and GDR, while others such as these socialist countries’

⁷⁶¹ Raymond Williams, “Hegemony and the Selective Tradition,” in Suzanne De Castell et al., *Language, Authority, and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook*.

victimization of Poland and the Poles' own responsibility for the suffering of the Jews were covered up.

First of all, from 1948 to 1956, the history profession in Poland was subjected to direct Soviet intervention. The Polish government replaced the prewar Polish Academy of Learning with the Soviet-style Polish Academy of Sciences that exercised state control over all research institutions and universities, including the Institute of History. Moscow also issued detailed prescriptions for writing new school and university textbooks, and delivered lectures to Polish university professors and school teachers on Soviet historiography. Such strong Soviet influence led to the authority of historical materialism in Poland, a historiographic paradigm stressing class struggle as the motive force of change and proclaiming human history as a predestined march toward socialism. So the Polish official historiography depicted Russia/USSR as Poland's unfailing friend, while leaving out its history of aggression against Poland. The Stalinized Polish historiography also tried to justify the communist monopoly of power at home and external alliance with the Soviet bloc by obliterating all non-communist political traditions in Poland and its Western cultural connections.⁷⁶²

Besides the Marxist ideological overtone, another dominant theme of the official memory was the Polish victimhood. Polish nationalism since the 19th century had been strongly inspired by a romantic messianism that embraced a mythical interpretation of heroic defeat and martyrdom spirit. The Poles were peculiarly fond of celebrating national humiliation as a unique way to stimulate patriotic emotions. The "cult of national martyrdom" gave the Poles a feeling of moral superiority and sense of innocence in all past traumas.⁷⁶³ Communist elites adopted the old myth of national victimization, with a selective focus on West Germany as the chief perpetrator. Polish historians documented, with

⁷⁶² Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983," *Slavic Review* 44, No. 4 (1985), pp 663-664; Valkenier, "Stalinizing Polish Historiography: What Soviet Archives Disclose," *East European Politics and Societies* 7, No. 1(1993), p. 118. Valkenier nevertheless pointed out in the 1993 article that complete Stalinization of Polish history was never achieved for various reasons including Soviet historians' lack of confidence about their own knowledge of Polish history, and the resistance of some these historians to excessive manipulation of Polish history-writing in defense of scholarly standards and professional autonomy.

minute acerbity, the horrors of German occupation.⁷⁶⁴ Young Poles were brought up believing that patriotism meant hatred of the Germans. Meanwhile, Polish resistance against Nazi occupation was emphasized and even exaggerated. One important foundation of communist regime legitimacy was the communist-led resistance campaign during the war. Although other political forces made up the bulk of resistance activities, the communists claimed themselves to be the bravest anti-German soldiers.

Polish historiography was so preoccupied with a sense of self-pity and self-righteousness that historians were never allowed to touch on those historical events that might tarnish the innocent, glorious image of the Poles. Taboo topics of this kind included Polish anti-Semitism, Poles' complicity in the Holocaust, their collaboration with Germans under the occupation, and the postwar deportation of German nationals.

Combative Narratives and Negative Emotions/Intentions

The above-described elite historical mythmaking in West Germany and Poland resulted in mutually *combative* historical narratives. Because their myths stressed the victim experience of their own nation and refused to acknowledge the sufferings of the other side, extremely negative emotions about each other country prevailed in both societies. The Poles were bitter about the historical injustices that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans and were further aggrieved at West Germany's refusal to atone for their suffering. The West Germans held equally poignant grievances to the Poles for they seized German territories, expelled millions of Germans, and tried to perpetuate German division by recognizing the East German state. Such negative emotions were targeted not at a selected group but the entire population of the other nation. For Polish people, the whole German nation was "brutal, powerful, cold, and ruthless;" West Germans thought Poland was an ill-natured nation and viewed all Poles with disdain.⁷⁶⁵

⁷⁶³ For analysis of the romantic tradition of Polish nationalism, see Andrzej Walicki, "The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism," in Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky, *Polish Paradoxes* (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 30-33; Gross, *Polish Society under German Occupation*, pp. 4-9.

⁷⁶⁴ Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, p. 220.

⁷⁶⁵ Markovits and Reich, *The German Predicament*, pp. 109-110.

Accompanying the negative public stereotypes was the strong perception of hostile intention of each other country. Bonn's rejection of the postwar territorial status quo fuel the Polish panic about renewed armed conflict with West Germany. The lack of West German contrition for the Nazi past exacerbated the fear of the Poles, who believed that an unrepentant Germany would launch aggression again without moral reservation. But to the West Germans, the Polish suspicion of German revanchism was groundless because the FRG was a democratic, morally impeccable state that would never repeat the treacherous policy of Nazi Germany. Instead of acknowledging Poland's security concern, the public thought their territorial claims were completely legitimate and ascribed Polish objection to the aggressive policy of the communist country against the democratic FRG.

Such historically derived emotions and perceptions did not create but mainly intensify and escalate the security dilemma imposed by the East-West systemic confrontation. They tended to increase public support to the hostile policies of their governments that had been shaped by the Cold War structure, such as political and economic isolation and a non-compromising stance over the frontier issues. The function of historical mythmaking practice in West Germany and Poland in Phase One was not independent of the international system but only served to amplify systemic tensions and conflicts that impeded bilateral reconciliation.

PHASE TWO: THE LATE 1960s TO THE LATE 1970s

Relations between West Germany and Poland improved considerably during this period. The fear of imminent militarized conflict considerably abated and normal diplomatic ties were established on the basis of partial mutual recognition of essential sovereignty rights. They also developed commercial relations and personnel contacts at much greater scale than before. Such significant headway in bilateral reconciliation can be attributed to both the positive change in the international system and the domestically sprung momentum towards reconciliation through measures of historical settlement. Externally, the East-West détente greatly reduced the danger of war between countries from the two blocs as well as facilitated their political and economic contacts. Internally, the trend of political liberalization in West

Germany and Poland brought the decline of national mythmaking and wider appreciation of the importance of historical responsibility and reconciliation. West Germany adopted serious policies of restitution and historians of the two countries conducted regular dialogues regarding the content of their history textbooks, which contributed to both inter-governmental and popular reconciliation.

I. Positive Structural Conditions for West German-Polish Rapprochement

From the late 1960s to mid-1970s, a turn toward relaxation of tensions was introduced into inter-bloc politics. East-West Détente, as the period is often called, was a peculiar stage of the Cold War resulted from the U.S. relative decline in wealth and power vis-à-vis the USSR and the Soviet split with its Chinese ally. Both superpowers felt the need for a more stable world order where the risk of large-scale armed conflicts, especially nuclear war, would be diminished through negotiations. Inter-bloc agreements reached during détente on arms control and confidence-building measures, albeit limited in many ways, effectively moderated the expectation of war between members of the two blocs, including West Germany and Poland. Détente provided a favorable international setting for the Willy Brandt government to carry out a more open-minded and flexible type of *Ostpolitik*, which sought to foster inter-Germany contacts through a *modus vivendi* with Moscow and its Eastern European allies, something unthinkable prior to the advent of détente. So détente created the necessary structural condition for the West German-Polish political rapprochement, economic contacts, and improvement of popular ties.

Détente and Moderated Risk of Military Clash

A major characteristic of the détente era was the dominance of political negotiation rather than confrontation in East-West relations. The “pilot ship of negotiation” was the American-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which started in late 1969 and led to the signing of SALT I agreements in May 1972. An important part of the agreements was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that limited the development of ballistic missile defense, a critical area of strategic arms competition. The SALT I agreements also included measures to upgrade and better maintain the Washington-Moscow direct communication

link to strengthen crisis prevention and management. Taken all together, the SALT negotiation of the early 1970s contributed to the acceptance of concepts of parity, equal security, and strategic stability by the Americans and the Soviets.

As the superpower tensions mitigated, the risk of military conflicts in Europe also declined. Two symbols of the progress in European stability were the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR). At the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in May 1972 that marked an important milestone of *détente*, the two superpowers not only concluded the SALT I agreements but also agreed to proceed on a European security conference. About two years of negotiations among the thirty-five participants resulted in the Final Act of July 1975 that declared ten principles on interstate relations, including no threat or use of force, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Final Act also included agreements on confidence-building measures that would require advance notification of large military exercise. The CSCE agreements strengthened the climate of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence between Eastern and Western European countries.⁷⁶⁶

The issue of conventional force reduction was on the agenda of regional stability before *détente*. An official study group led by a West German general Heusinger started to submit reports in 1965, advocating the negotiation with the Soviet bloc for mutual reduction of the force level in Central Europe.⁷⁶⁷ The NATO Council adopted the Harmel Report in 1967 that had much in common with the Heusinger reports. Still, it was the May 1972 summit meeting that galvanized the MBFR process. Although the first stage of the MBFR talks till mid-1970s did not lead to any solid agreements, the very existence of the negotiation displayed the intention of both sides to dampen the prospects of armed conflict in Central Europe.

⁷⁶⁶ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, pp. 527-528.

⁷⁶⁷ Christoph Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR: West German policy priorities and conventional arms control," at <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/mbfr.doc>

While these broad negotiations on arms control and overall principles of regional stability moderated the inter-bloc military stalemate, a number of specific agreements directly eased the security dilemma surrounding Germany. Of most significance to Germany's security was the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed by the four occupying powers. The general atmosphere of détente enabled a smooth resolution of the problem of Berlin, which had been a powder keg for East-West crises in postwar Europe. The Soviets agreed to guarantee unimpeded traffic to and from West Berlin and granted de facto recognition of the existing ties between West Berlin and the FRG, while the Western powers accepted de facto East German control of East Berlin and refraining from treating West Berlin as a territory of the FRG.

In parallel with the negotiation of the Berlin Agreement were West German-Soviet security talks. During the preliminary SALT session at the end of 1969, West German Secretary of State Egon Bahr and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko resumed bilateral negotiations in Moscow, which led to the signing of Moscow Treaty in August 1970. The treaty was only the first of a series of bilateral agreements that West Germany concluded with the Soviet bloc countries under détente, including the Warsaw Treaty with Poland in December 1970, the FRG-GDR Basic Treaty in December 1972, and the Treaty on Mutual Relations between FRG and Czechoslovakia in December 1973. All these treaties stipulated renunciation of threat or use of force in settling disputes and the inviolability of national frontiers. They mollified the pressing security concerns of individual bloc members and to a large degree dispelled their imminent expectation of external military confrontation.

Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and Partial Settlement of Sovereignty Questions

After Willy Brandt became the head of the SPD-FDP (Liberal Party) coalition government in 1969, he and his protégé adopted a new *Ostpolitik*, defined as a policy towards the Soviet Union and its allied states in East and East Central Europe.⁷⁶⁸ The central concern of *Ostpolitik* was two-folded, to enhance West Germany's national security and to address the German Question. Previously, Bonn's rigid policy to attain unification only through integration with the West actually insulated West Germany from East Germany.

The worst scenario that Brandt wanted to forestall was the intensification of two German national consciousness as time went. When détente substantially alleviated inter-bloc confrontation, Brandt found it a golden opportunity to stake out a more independent, flexible policy to the East. The new policy was oriented to advancing political, economic, cultural and social contacts with the Soviet Union and East European countries, including East Germany. It would not only improve West Germany's security environment but also draw the two Germanys close to one another and foster a common German identity.

Although more open-minded than the Adenauer era, West Germany's *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s was still carried out within the structural limit of the Cold War. Détente was by no means the end of the Cold War and superpowers were still suspicious of each other's infiltration of their own spheres of influence. Brandt was aware of the concern of Western powers that West Germany's active Eastern policy might lead to its "Finlandization" and the resurgence of German nationalism.⁷⁶⁹ While seeking to expand Bonn's diplomatic horizon to the East, Brandt maintained the commitment to Western integration. So *Ostpolitik* must proceed in parallel with *Westpolitik* to convince the Western bloc that improving the relationship between West Germany and the Eastern bloc states was consistent with the strategic interests of the West.

Not only stressing ties with the West, Brandt also respected the Cold War political and territorial realities in Europe, in which the East bloc had a crucial stake. As discussed earlier, the attempt by two post-Adenauer German governments to approach Soviet allies but bypass the Soviet Union and Poland failed miserably. This fiasco taught Willy Brandt and his protégé a lesson that a solution to the German Question would be untenable if it failed to address the fundamental security concerns of the East bloc. It was clear to Bonn that a headway in German-German relations would have to go hand-in-hand with diplomatic normalization with the USSR and its other East European allies.

⁷⁶⁸ Ash, *In Europe's Name*, p. 35.

⁷⁶⁹ For the Soviet and American concerns that closer cooperation between the FRG and the Eastern states would weaken their respective alliances, see M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 35-36; Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, pp. 59-63.

Brandt's *Ostpolitik* agenda was to achieve rapprochement with the USSR, then to normalize relationship with Poland, and finally negotiate with East Germany.⁷⁷⁰ In order to open the gate to closer German-German relations and prepare for the unification in the long run, Bonn assured Moscow that its diplomacy to East Germany would not compromise the crucial interests of the Soviet bloc countries. In the Moscow Treaty, the FRG also recognized the inviolability of all postwar European boundaries, including the Oder-Neisse line and the inter-German border, and promised to make no territorial claims against third countries. The text of the treaty did not mention German unity and, by mentioning the GDR by name, gave Bonn's first official acknowledgement of East Germany. The German guarantee to respect the European status quo was recapitulated in the Warsaw Treaty between West Germany and Poland. At the same time, the Brandt government claimed that the treaty did not affect its eventual goal of national unification. German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel delivered to his Soviet counterpart Gromyko the "Letter on German Unity" stating that the Moscow Treaty "does not conflict with the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination."⁷⁷¹

Thus far, West German-Polish disputes on sovereignty rights were only partially settled the Moscow Treaty nor Warsaw Treaty provided only a provisional solution, and neither of them was peace settlements by the standard of international law. In a memorandum that it submitted to the *Bundestag* in December 1971, the Brandt government claimed that the FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse line on its own behalf and only for the duration of its existence, suggesting that the frontier question would be reopened when Germany became unified. The Polish government rejected the German interpretation and reiterated the Potsdam Agreement had permanently fixed the western frontier of Poland.⁷⁷² Despite their disagreement, the treaty structure in the early 1970s temporarily set aside sovereignty disputes between West Germany and Poland and removed the largest obstacle to their diplomatic normalization.

⁷⁷⁰ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, pp. 125-126.

⁷⁷¹ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 87.

⁷⁷² Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 192-195.

In return for Bonn's bold departure from its previous position on the status of the GDR and the eastern frontier, the Soviet bloc offered greater tolerance of inter-German contacts. The negotiation of the Four Power ambassadorial talks on a Berlin settlement took place at the same time as those of the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty, but the former only gained momentum after the later were signed. Also the Berlin Agreement came into effect only in June 1972, after the *Bundestag* ratified the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty in May 1972. Immediately after the treaty ratification, the FRG and GDR began their talks on normalization of relations, which led to the signing of the Basic Treaty about seven months later. Soviet pressure was critical to force the reluctant GDR government to accept the FRG's links with West Berlin. These progresses in German-German relationship would not have been possible had Bonn not made substantial concessions on sovereignty issues.

Moderated Economic Interaction under Détente

Ostpolitik succeeded in improving the FRG's relationship with the Eastern bloc states because it not only satisfied their essential security interests but also delivered handsome economic benefits, especially to Poland. The legitimacy of the Polish communist regime had plunged since the 1960s because it failed to bring about the promised national economic self-sufficiency and improvement of standard of living. The fast-growing party bureaucracy and crony politics only exacerbated public disgust of the government. In addition, neo-Stalinist influence reemerged after the fall of Krushchev in 1964 and affected politics in Poland, where the government tightened censorship in cultural affairs. This authoritarian trend seriously alienated liberal-minded people in Poland. The confluence of all these negative factors resulted in strikes, protests, and demonstration across the country, including three major crises in 1968, 1970, and 1976. The food crisis in December 1970 even forced Gomulka to step down from power.⁷⁷³

The hope of restoring regime legitimacy now became heavily dependent on the government's ability to achieve better economic performance. To this end the Polish government sought economic and technological aid from the West. Even before his downfall, Gomulka had desired to obtain from West Germany the market access, credits and

know-how that the USSR had been less and less able to provide because of its own economic difficulty. In his meeting with Brandt to conclude the Warsaw Treaty, Gomulka asked for a large, ten-year credit package, in exchange for which he offer to renounce Poland's compensation claims to the FRG for war damages.⁷⁷⁴ The FRG government responded positively to the Polish request because it believed that economic relationship could reduce the political and security tension with its Eastern neighbors. In October 1970, the governments of the FRG and Poland concluded a bilateral trade agreement. Four years later they signed a ten-year Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation that provided a framework for bilateral economic cooperation in various dimensions.

While the Cold War structure no longer hindered bilateral economic interactions as much as before, the obstacles now mainly came from the right-wing forces in West Germany, particularly the expellees organizations, who had felt betrayed by Brandt's concession on the frontier issue. They now demand the government to condition economic aid on Poland's agreement to increase the emigration of ethnic Germans to West Germany. The Polish authority was reluctant to relax its emigration policy for fear of both losing skilled manpower and inviting criticism from neo-Stalinists within Poland. It was until August 1975 when Gomulka and Brandt's successors, Edward Gierek and Chancellor Schmidt, met at the CSCE that the two countries partially resolved the thorny issue of German emigration. In this so-called "cash for people deal," Poland agreed to allow 120,000-125,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate to the FRG over four years, in return for which it would receive DM1 billion credit at a low interest rate and a one-time financial settlement of pension and accident claims in the amount of DM1.3 billion.⁷⁷⁵

Another breakthrough in bilateral economic diplomacy came in 1976, when Gierek made the first visit to the FRG by a Polish First Secretary since 1945. This visit resulted in a five-year economic agreement promising to expand bilateral exchange of raw materials and energy. Besides, the two governments also signed a Program of Cooperation between the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade


⁷⁷³ Davies, *God's Playground*, Vol. 2, pp. 588-591.

⁷⁷⁴ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 77.

and fourteen contracts between Polish state-owned enterprises and German companies and banks. Based on these contracts and those similar ones signed in the late 1970s, West German banks extended sizable loans and financial credits to some large Polish industrial projects.⁷⁷⁶

These official agreements quickly boosted bilateral economic ties. Trade increase accelerated after 1972. By the end of the 1970s, the absolute value of West German-Polish trade was about seven times larger than a decade ago (Chart 7). Although trade with the Eastern bloc was never a significant part of its total foreign trade, certain industrial sectors in the FRG were heavily reliant on such trade. For example, in the mid-1970s the East absorbed about 20 percent of the exports of the iron and steel exports industry in West Germany.⁷⁷⁷ For Poland, economic cooperation with the FRG was even more important. From 1973, the FRG overtook all its Eastern European allies including Czechoslovakia and East Germany to become Poland's second largest trade partner, next to the Soviet Union.

Chart 7: German-Polish Trade Relations, 1953-1999



SOURCE: *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, various years.

Reduced Public Tension

⁷⁷⁵ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, pp. 121-122.

⁷⁷⁶ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 124.

⁷⁷⁷ Garton, *In Europe's Name*, p. 246.

The people-to-people relationship between West Germany and Poland also improved substantially during this period. It is reported that the images of the Eastern European countries in West Germany in the early 1970s were unprecedentedly positive.⁷⁷⁸ Polish popular perception of West Germany also improved during the same period. One important reason was that détente and Brandt's *Ostpolitik* enabled partial settlement of the frontier issue and the problem of ethnic Germans in Poland, the two thorniest issues that had poisoned mutual popular perception.

In the past the Polish communist government had used the frontier issue to sell to the public a self-fulfilling prophecy about German revanchism. But the dramatic turnaround of German policy on the frontier issue greatly assuaged Polish fear of German revanchism, if not completely dispelled it. In West Germany, public obsession with the lost German Eastern territories also abated. Surveys done by *Der Spiegel* between October 1969 and December 1970 reported fast decrease of expellee reluctance to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line. The rest of the West German population was even more willing to accept the territorial status quo than the expellees. Polling data in 1967 and 1968 show that more than half of German respondents considered the Eastern territories were lost forever.⁷⁷⁹ The victory of the social liberal coalition in the ratification battle of the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty further demonstrated that the majority of the national population supported *Ostpolitik* and reconciliation with the Eastern bloc countries even if this meant relinquishing territorial claims.

As for the problem of ethnic Germans in Poland, another outstanding source of German antipathy toward the Poles, the 1975 "cash for people deal" provided a first-step solution. At the last minute before the deal was held up for *Bundestag* ratification, the Schmidt government squeezed further concession from Warsaw that other ethnic Germans would also be allowed to leave even after the four-year limit.⁷⁸⁰ Although still defending its

⁷⁷⁸ Eduard Mühle, *Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford ; New York, Berg, 2003), p. 169.

⁷⁷⁹ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 136-137; Harry K. Rosenthal, *German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern Myth* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), p. 144.

⁷⁸⁰ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, pp. 122-123.

postwar expulsion of Germans as a justified policy, Warsaw did make substantial efforts to address a great part of German grievances toward Poland.

Another factor that contributed to the positive trend in German-Polish popular relationship was the increase of bilateral societal contacts, also a product of détente and West Germany's *Ostpolitik*. The social liberal government in West Germany considered all-European ties conducive to deepening inter-bloc détente, gradually influencing the political behaviors of Eastern countries, and very importantly, facilitating the growth of all-German contacts.⁷⁸¹ At the same time, Warsaw welcomed limited expansion of such contacts. The government wanted to appease domestic political dissidents by relaxing restrictions on people-to-people interactions with Western countries. Contacts with the West was a means to increase Poland's political autonomy from the Soviet Union.

Government encouragement greatly stimulated bilateral cultural and societal contacts. When signing a series of agreements on economic cooperation in 1976, the two governments also concluded a cultural agreement and promised to continue their efforts for "more comprehensive knowledge and mutual understanding."⁷⁸² In terms of personnel exchange, German tourist visits to Poland increased three times in 1971-1974, far exceeding the French to be the largest group of Western visitors to this country. By 1974, annual tourist traffic from West Germany reached 220,000, compared to 36,000 in 1970.⁷⁸³

II. Trend of Historical Settlement as A Driving Force for Reconciliation

The thaw in the West German-Polish relationship need not be completely accredited to the systemic incentives generated by détente. Another important driving force for bilateral reconciliation was the trend of historical settlement, which was relatively independent of détente. Emerged in the mid-1960s, this trend had three interconnected components. First was the rise of politics of reconciliation as the moral dimension of German *Ostpolitik* that promoted bilateral rapprochement through institutional measures of

⁷⁸¹ Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, pp. 267-268.

⁷⁸² Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 124.

⁷⁸³ *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, various years; Mühle, *Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 169-170.

restitution. The second was the gradual decline of historical mythmaking in both countries. The third was the West German-Polish historians' dialogue in an effort to develop a shared memory of the war history.

West German Politics of Reconciliation and Inter-governmental Arrangements of Restitution

In Adenauer years, Bonn made restitution to Israel and Western countries as a part of its Westpolitik – to assure its Western allies of a peaceful, democratic Germany and obtain their support for German unification. By the mid-1960s German politics of reconciliation began to extend to the East. The new agenda was first set by the Evangelical Church of Germany. In October 1965, the church published a letter, encouraging the FRG government to formally renounce the eastern territories and called up the Germans and Poles to begin a process of healing through dialogue.⁷⁸⁴ On November 18, Polish bishops wrote back in a remarkably cordial and conciliatory tone. In the letter the Polish bishops pointed out dark periods in bilateral relations, including the brutal invasion and occupation of Poland by the Teutonic Knights in ancient history and the Nazis in WWII, in addition to those periods of cooperation between the two churches and two nations in the past. As for the frontier issue, while emphasizing that the Oder-Neisse Line was a matter of Poland's existence and the expulsion of Germans was one of the bitter consequences of Germany's war, the letter nevertheless implicitly acknowledged Polish responsibility for the sufferings of German refugees and expellees. The Polish bishops said: "Let us try to forget! No polemics, no more Cold War... We forgive and we ask you also to forgive." The German bishops then replied on December 5, conceding Germany's responsibility for the horrible experiences of the Polish nation during the war. "We, too, ask to forget, yes, we ask to forgive," the German letter said.⁷⁸⁵

The exchange of letters between German and Polish churches represented eager voices in the two societies advocate to address bilateral historical legacies and rebuilding a normal relationship. While the bishops' proposal was mainly inspired by Christian teaching of leniency and love, Brandt and like-minded politicians in the SPD embraced a

⁷⁸⁴ Ann L. Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation, p. 70; Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 16.

⁷⁸⁵ Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, pp. 133-135; Garton, *In Europe's Name*, p. 299.

reconciliation program as part of their *Ostpolitik*. Acknowledging Germany's past crimes was essential to rebuilding trust and normalizing relations with East European countries, which could facilitate inter-German connections, improve West Germany's security environment, and bring direct economic benefit. As Brandt said in his Government declaration in 1969, "We want to be a nation (*Volk*) of good neighbors." In his farewell statement in 1982, Schmidt also summarized the foreign policy of the social-liberal coalition that it "has, with its treaty- and reconciliation-policy towards the eastern neighbors, created the second pillar, the necessary addition (to Adenauer's Western ties) for peaceful neighborliness in all directions."⁷⁸⁶

In addition to fulfilling diplomatic goals, however, Brandt's foreign policy to the East had an important ideological and moral dimension. Contrary to Adenauer who tried to prettify national image by downplaying Nazi crimes, Brandt believed that one of the central pillars of postwar German national identity, democracy, would not be truly upheld until the nation came to terms with its past.⁷⁸⁷ Besides his advocacy for democracy, Brandt was a rare world leader in the Cold War who "recognize(s) morality as a political force."⁷⁸⁸ In his speech on 20 January 1989 in honor of Brandt, Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker made the following statement about Brandt's emphasis on morality in politics:

You have achieved something quite rare in politics: In your person you have overcome the tension between power and morality. There is no political responsibility without power. Morality without power does not solve any problems. It merely becomes ideology and condemns rather than helps. Power without morality is a dead-end street, because it finds no trust. You have found trust and used it."⁷⁸⁹

Owing to his genuine care about German national identity and morality, Brandt's politics of reconciliation was not a tactical move but embodied sincere contrition. He made unequivocal apology for Nazi crimes to Poland. In his official visit to Poland in December 1970, Brandt fell to his knees as he laid a wreath at the memorial for the Jews murdered in 1943 by SS units in the Warsaw Ghetto. With the entire world watching, Brandt's action sent a message to the Polish nation that Germans wished to offer their heartfelt repentance. Not only with symbolic gestures, the Brandt government also used financial means to atone

⁷⁸⁶ Garton, *In Europe's Name*, p. 300.

⁷⁸⁷ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 344/

⁷⁸⁸ Garton, *In Europe's Name*, p. 299.

for the Nazi crimes. The Warsaw Treaty that Brandt signed during this visit committed the FRG government to provide more than DM1 billion to pay for the pensions of Polish victims of Nazi occupation.

Unlike the Japanese LDP leaders who made some ambiguous apology to China at the time of diplomatic normalization and later claimed to be done with it, German SPD politicians made long-lasting efforts to express remorse and pursue the issue of war responsibility. Having pushed through the *Bundestag* the five-year extension of the statute of limitations on prosecuting crimes of the Nazi era in 1965, the SPD continued to fight for further investigations and trials of Nazi crimes. As a result, the Bundestag voted in 1969 to extend the statute to thirty years, and in 1979 finally abolished the statute of limitations on crimes of murder and genocide.⁷⁹⁰

In terms of war commemoration, Schmidt was the first West German chancellor to deliver a speech at Auschwitz-Birkenau, a prime symbol of Nazi genocidal crimes, in November 1977 to memorialize the sufferings of the Polish nation in the war. He said, “the crime of Nazi fascism and the guilt of the German Reich under Hitler’s leadership are at the basis of our responsibility. We Germans of today are not guilty as individual persons, but we must bear the political legacy of those who were guilty. That is our responsibility.” He made it clear that German contrition was the foundation for German-Polish reconciliation. “We know one thing, however: the path to reconciliation cannot avoid Auschwitz, but the path to mutual understanding must not and cannot end here in Auswitz,” said Schmidt. One year later, Schmidt made another forthright speech regarding the Nazi persecution on the 40th anniversary of the anti-Jewish pogrom. He gave a detailed description of Nazi crimes committed on that day, criticized the ordinary Germans who failed to protest the crimes, and urged the younger generation to face the history in case the same thing happened again.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁹ This speech excerpt is available at the website (http://www.bwbs.de/Brandt_E/111.html) of the Willy Brandt Foundation established in 1994 according to German federal law.

⁷⁹⁰ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 337-342.

⁷⁹¹ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 346-247.

Evidently, these statements of West German leaders laid out who (the German nation) was responsible for what wrongdoings (Nazi crimes) to whom (the Poles and the Jews), expressed sorrow and remorse, as well as promised not to repeat the wrongdoings. Enunciated in public occasions, these statements qualified for complete apology that is essential to historical settlement between a perpetrator and a victim state. Coupled with other restitution measures, the German official apology greatly mollified Polish public grievances. Although Poles' distrust of Germany could not be immediately swept away, they generally came to believe in Brandt's personal integrity and responded to his *Ostpolitik* with warmth. Since 1969 the Polish mass media conceded that there existed reasonable men among West German Social Democrats and Free Democrats (FDP) with whom Poles could peacefully coexist. So German politics of reconciliation improved the image of the Germans among Polish people.⁷⁹²

The Decline of National Mythmaking in West Germany and Poland

During Phase Two, war historiography in both countries experienced a gradual process of reconstruction, mainly due to internal political changes. In West Germany, public debate on war memory opened up since the early 1960s, over which the SPD gained increasing influence. At the same time, German education system underwent significant reform that not only introduced pluralistic elements to the education institutions but also increased textbook coverage of the Nazi history. In Poland, limited political liberalization since the late 1960s relaxed ideological constraints on public discourse and provided more space for liberal intellectuals to present their own interpretations of national history.

The *Bundestag* debates about the statute of limitations, or *Verjährungsdebatten*, ushered in an era of active public discussions in West Germany about the Nazi past. By the end of the 1950s the country faced a difficult problem that thousands of suspects of Nazi crimes could escape prosecution when the fifteen-year statute of limitations expired. In the first *Verjährungsdebatten* held in 1960, SPD politicians led the initiative to extend/eliminate the statute. They argued that the "mountain of guilt and havoc" obliged the German nation to a moral cause of rehabilitating the victims by bringing the criminals to justice. But this

⁷⁹² Kulski, *Germany and Poland*, p. 288.

proposal met steadfast opposition from the right-wing members in the CDU/CSU and even the FDP, who insisted that further trials would damage national honor and gave the world an impression that Germany is a nation of murderers.⁷⁹³ In the end, the SPD proposal was rejected at the *Bundestag*.

However, the issue of statute of limitations was suddenly put under the spotlight in 1961 when the Israeli government held the sensational open trial of Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann. Against the backdrop of growing domestic and international attention to the judicial failure in West Germany, three new rounds of *Verjährungsdebatten* took place in 1965, 1969, and 1979, and led to the eventual abolishing of the statute. These debates increasingly incorporated the memory of the Nazi past to West German public consciousness. As time went by, more and more German people agreed with the SPD on the issue of German war responsibility. True that by the end of the 1970s a national consensus on Germany's war responsibility had yet to take hold and biases against Eastern European victim countries remained strong. But the spirit of reconciliation preached by the left had captured the imagination of the German public.

Parallel to the parliamentary debates on the judicial issues, the German political circle deliberated over another important institution shaping national collective memory, the educational system. Since the early 1960s, criticism of German history textbooks from the domestic political left and international society mounted. The meeting of educational officials from all German states (*Länder*) in January 1960 to discuss revising the teaching of the Nazi history in schools marked the beginning of history education reform.⁷⁹⁴ More substantial reforms were initiated in the late 1960s in the state of Hessen and taken up by other German states as well. These reforms aimed at democratizing the decision-making process of educational policy and content, increasing the coverage of Nazi Germany in school curricula, and de-emphasizing nationalistic education themes.⁷⁹⁵ They contributed to the noticeable improvement of German textbook representation of the Nazi history in the 1970s. According to a comprehensive comparison of German secondary school textbooks

⁷⁹³ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 338-339.

⁷⁹⁴ Calvert, *Germany's Nazi Past*, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁵ Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," in Hein, *Censoring History*, p. 142.

published in the 1950s-60s and in the 1970s-early 1980s for college-bound students, the later editions provided more details on Nazi crimes.⁷⁹⁶

The practice of historical mythmaking also declined in communist Poland, although to a lesser extent than in West Germany.⁷⁹⁷ Since Gomulka took power in the late 1950s, a more relaxed domestic political environment enabled a partial restoration of professional ethics to the history discipline. Some historians began to question the biases in the official historiography, and advanced competing interpretations of Polish national history. This trend continued into the 1960s and 1970s. Historians used the opportunity to liberalize the profession and encourage plural views, and reaffirm academic standards of objectivity and rigorous research of historical materials. As a result, the dominance of official Marxist historiography in Polish national collective memory eroded during this period. One obvious sign was the change that the Polish Historical Association made to its statutes in 1979 to stop treating Marxism as the sole recognized method of scholarship.

During the 1970s, historians no longer confined their liberal opinions to specialized conferences and publications of small circulations, but tried to disseminate them widely in the society, such as through school education. The Catholic historian Bohdan Cywinski published a pamphlet in 1979 titled “Poisoned Humanistic Studies,” attacking the outright falsifications in Polish textbooks about post-1918 national history and calling for youth self-education to counter the influence of official historiography. Meanwhile, the non-governmental Association of Academic Courses, also known as the “Flying University,” gathered prominent historians with various schools of thought to offer lectures on Polish history in major university cities.

The liberalization of Polish historiography in this period had many limitations. The government was still able to manipulate education content through state censorship. Moreover, although historians sought to uncover the “full truth” of Polish history, such

⁷⁹⁶ This investigation found that there were still some areas of insufficient coverage, such as on the Warsaw Ghetto and the German occupation policies in Poland. Nevertheless, the progressive penchant of German textbooks in this period was evident. See Calvert, *Germany's Nazi Past*, pp. 176-187.

⁷⁹⁷ The following analysis of Polish historiographic changes draws from the Valkenier, “The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983,” pp. 664-671.

sensitive topics like Katyn Massacre and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remained taboos in public discourses. Besides, Polish historians in general failed to reflect on the Poles' own historical responsibility in Polish-Jewish relations. As one student of Polish historiography comments, in this period "(the representation of) the history of recent times remained at worst a travesty of truth, and at best a sadly truncated version."⁷⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the relatively relaxed official control of historiography and reinvigoration of the history profession in Poland reduced the ideological and political obstacles for Polish historians to communicate with their Western counterparts. This prepared the intellectual and societal foundation for the path-breaking program of West German-Polish textbook cooperation starting in this period.

West German-Polish Textbook Cooperation

While the domestic political trends unleashed a process of reconstructing national collective memory, the bilateral textbook cooperation pushed this process in the direction of attaining greater convergence.⁷⁹⁹ German historians' first appeal to Poland for joint history research came in March 1956, when a Germany history teacher, in cooperation with exiled Polish historians and the Braunschweig-based Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research first established in 1951 under the auspices of the German Commission for UNESCO, published his critiques of the inadequate, biased description of Poland in German history textbooks. Polish historians actually reacted positively to German historians. But the Warsaw Pact's intervention of the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956 suddenly tightened Poland's relationship with the West and dashed the hope for bilateral historians' dialogue.

Since the late 1960s, the German-Polish relationship warmed up against the backdrop of *détente* and *Ostpolitik*, but the gap between the two countries' historical memories was quite striking. Even the letters of Polish and German bishops in 1965 betrayed their contrasting opinions of German historical atrocities in Poland, the Eastern

⁷⁹⁸ Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983," p. 670.

⁷⁹⁹ The following history of West German-Polish textbook cooperation is drawn upon an in-depth study on this subject by Takahiro Kondo (*Kokusai Rekishi Kyōkasho Taiwa*, Chapters 2-3) and the information available at the official website of the Georg-Eckert Institute (<http://www.gei.de/english/index1.shtml>).

frontier, and the postwar expulsion of Germans from East Europe. So people realized that promoting a common understanding of their past traumatic conflict, in addition to other forms of cooperation, would strengthened bilateral reconciliation. In the fall of 1970, the German and Polish delegations to the UNESCO General Conference in Paris met and formally founded the German-Polish Textbook Commission. In February 1972, an 11-member German delegation led by historian Georg Eckert arrived in Warsaw and received an enthusiastic welcome from the Polish Academy of Sciences. This meeting inaugurated bilateral textbook dialogue.

Co-financed by the governments of the SPD-run West German *Länder*, the Textbook Commission was operated by professional historians and largely independent of governmental influence, especially on the West German side. Ever since 1972, historians of the two countries met roughly twice a year, in Warsaw and Braunschweig alternately, to discuss coverage of German-Polish relations in their history and geography textbooks. The first major accomplishment of these meetings was the publication of the famous “Recommendations on History and Geography Textbooks in the Federal Republic of German and the People’s Republic of Poland” (“Recommendations” hereafter) in April 1976. The “Recommendations” included 26 topics ranging from the Teutonic Knights in the ancient history, to the three partitions of Poland in the 18th century and Polish nation’s struggle for independence, Nazi occupation and Polish resistance movement, and such contemporary events as the postwar territorial alterations, and migration of ethnic Germans. The interpretation offered in the “Recommendations” not only looked straight into the acts of injustice done by the one nation to the other but also explored the historical consciousness at the time that justified these acts.

The initial responses to the “Recommendations” in West Germany were uneven. The bilateral cultural agreement signed in 1976 did promise to take into consideration the “Recommendations” in writing their school textbooks. But this promise by the federal government did not have a binding effect on the *Länder* who were responsible for their own curriculum matters. In fact, as soon as it started, the textbook cooperation project suffered fierce attacks from the conservative opposition party CDU/CSU and the expelled organizations. The Munich-based right-wing paper *Deutsche National-Zeitung* even denounced

the German historians participating in the dialogue as the “complicities of Pan-Slavist agitation” and “masochists of the nation.” Other conservatives criticized the dialogue as a politically driven “textbook diplomacy” sacrificing historical truth for the sake of reconciliation with Poland. Because the SPD supported the dialogue and a few key figures of the Textbook Commission such as Georg Eckert were SPD members, criticism of the dialogue became part of the conservatives’ power struggle with the liberals. The conservative offensive culminated in the publication in 1978 of the “Alternative Recommendations for the Treatment of German-Polish History in Textbooks,” authored by an German expert on East German History, Professor Josef Joachim Menzel at Mainz University.⁸⁰⁰ Responding to all the 26 topics covered in the “Recommendations,” Menzel’s report was a counterproposal that tried to whitewash Germany’s historical responsibility while blaming Poland for postwar German sufferings in the expulsion and territorial loss.

Predictably, the attitude polarization between the left and right led to contrasting policies across different *Länder*. Such CDU/CSU-controlled *Länder* as Schleswig-Holstein, Bayern, and Baden-Württemberg were critical of the “Recommendations,” whereas *Länder* governed by the SPD, including North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, Bremen, Hessen, and West Berlin, endorsed the “Recommendations” as the guidelines for textbook authorization and the reference for classroom teaching. West Berlin even invited Polish historians to participate in its own symposium of joint textbook research.

Toward the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, however, the West German debates on textbook cooperation tipped to favor the left. Conservative-dominated *Länder* also began to express understanding of and respect to the endeavor of the Textbook Commission. Niedersachsen where the Georg-Eckert Institute is located basically refrained from repudiating the significance of the project, and even distributed the “Recommendations within the state in 1978, albeit accompanied by a note warning that the historical views in the document remained controversial. Another CDU *Länder* Rheinland-Pfalz distributed both the “Recommendations” and Menzel’s report to all secondary schools

⁸⁰⁰ Von Karlheinz Lau, “Durchbruch zum Diskurs: Drei Jahrzehnte Deutsch-Polnische Schulbuchkommission (Breakthrough to Discussion: Three Decades of German-Polish Schoolbook Commission),” *Das Ostpreußen / Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen e.V./28* (Juli 2001). Available at <http://www.webarchiv-server.de/pin/archiv01/3001ob14.htm>

in the state. The government of Saarland also stated its willingness to fulfill the spirit of the Recommendations in history education. Even the state of Bayern, whose earlier attitude to the textbook cooperation was the harshest, now permitted the “Recommendations” to be held by schools as one types of teaching materials.

Evidence of the impact of the “Recommendations” on the West German textbook content was compelling. According to a 1982 assessment done by the Georg-Eckert Institute of 13 editions of history textbooks used across different *Länder*, the coverage of Poland reached the level of other major European countries such as France, and showed the tendency to further expand. Also, more than 90 percent of the changes in the textbook coverage of Polish history were made in the direction advised by the “Recommendations,” clearly suggesting that West German textbook authors and publishers had incorporated the Recommendations into textbook production. Because of the improvement of textbook content, ordinary German people no longer felt indifferent to Poland as they did in the Adenauer era, and the Weimar myth that the Poles were lazy, incompetent, and disgraceful lost currency.⁸⁰¹

The West German-Polish Textbook Cooperation contributed to the advent of historiographic convergence between the two enemy states. It is not to say that such convergence at the time was already complete or solid. Some critics of the project was right in saying that West German historians could not have a free dialogue with historians from the communist Poland. Due to the Cold War constraints and the Polish government pressure, the “Recommendations” failed to include such sensitive topics as the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Kaytn Massacre. Nevertheless, the Textbook Commission never purported the “Recommendations” to be the final product of their work, and treated these topics as the subject for future dialogue. It would take the upheaval of the Solidarity movement and the end of the Cold War to bring Poland’s suffering at the hands of the Soviets into the German-Polish shared memory.

⁸⁰¹ On the decline of the Weimar myth about the Poles in West Germany the 1960s ad 1970s, see Rosenthal, *German and Pole*, Chapter 5.

In conclusion, in the 1970s West Germany and Poland were still distant from reaching true and deep reconciliation, due to the strict limits set by Cold War bloc politics. But the political normalization legitimized and boosted bilateral contacts, and a largely relaxed domestic political setting contributed to the inception of historical settlement of past trauma at the societal level. Absent of these efforts, the two states would not have sustained mutual contacts when the Cold War tension escalated in the 1980s, neither would they have quickly moved to deep reconciliation in the early 1990s once the structural pressure dissipated.⁸⁰²

PHASE THREE: THE 1980s

West German-Polish reconciliation faced severe systemic challenge during this period when the renewed tension between the superpowers compelled the two countries into tighter political and military collaboration with their respective alliances. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the conservative CDU/CSU adjusted West German foreign policy to refocus on strategic commitment to the West, while Brezhnev, following the Polish crisis of Solidarity, also brought more pressure to bear on Poland and other Eastern European countries to stay the course of socialism. The Cold War imperatives particularly threatened to once again pit West Germany and Poland against each other.

Despite the negative structural conditions, the framework of bilateral reconciliation sustained in this period. Mutual national recognition and agreement on territorial status quo continued to hold, and economic interactions and societal contacts also grew steadily. Popular relations suffered from mutual mistrust and alienation, but did not return to the militant hostility in the early Cold War years. Three factors accounted for the resilience of West German-Polish reconciliation. First, Kohl's westward reorientation of foreign policy was to some extent offset by the liberal opposition to push for continued contacts with the East. Second, even the Kohl government itself adhered to the politics of reconciliation with Poland that had taken deep root in West Germany during the *détente* years. Thirdly, historians of the two countries persisted in their efforts to build shared memory through

⁸⁰² To be sure, Czechoslovakia's cold response to German politics of reconciliation in the 1970s caused the difficulty in German-Czech reconciliation in the 1990s, which had no foundation to build on but had to start

joint textbook research. The conflict between their historical narratives further abated, due to the emergence of West German national consensus on war responsibility after heated domestic debates, and the dramatic reform of Polish history profession after the Solidarity. Such a robust trend of historiographic convergence, combined with the legacy of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, effectively mitigated the repercussions of the new Cold War in West German-Polish relations.

I. New Structural Obstacles to German-Polish Reconciliation

The US-Soviet "Second Cold War"

Détente was in decline from the middle to late 1970s, thanks to the escalation of superpower competition in Africa and the Middle East. What marked the collapse of détente was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which prompted the U.S. to quit all cooperative contacts and negotiations with the USSR and shelve the ratification of SALT II indefinitely.⁸⁰³ By the time when Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, Washington and Moscow had been back to sharp antagonism. Adopting a hard line policy of containment, Reagan also revived the hostile rhetoric of the early Cold War period, ushering in the era of "second Cold War." He denounced the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and called for a "global campaign for democracy" and "freedom" to roll back the Marxist-Leninist influence in the world. He also strongly opposed making any compromise with the Soviets and assailed the conciliatory American policy during the détente years. "Détente," he said, had been "a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims."⁸⁰⁴

The end of détente unleashed a new arms race between the two superpowers, for both were trying to build up their military strength to prevent each other from attaining strategic superiority. From the late 1970s, the USSR began to strengthen its strategic nuclear forces aimed at American forward bases and other Western targets on the Eurasian

out all from scratch. See Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation, p. 72.

⁸⁰³ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, p. 955.

⁸⁰⁴ Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 8-11.

periphery. Crying for a growing Soviet threat because of the “relentless Soviet military buildup,” the Carter administration responded by extensive investment on strategic counterforce capabilities. Ronald Reagan was even more determined to pursue a policy of peace through strength, and launched the largest peacetime military buildup in American history.

Reagan’s aggressive defense spending left Moscow with no doubt that he was pursuing a policy of military superiority, which “worsens and complicates the international situation and creates the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.” To meet the challenge, Soviet military leaders vowed to invigorate the Soviet Union’s own military programs. “Under conditions of heightened aggressiveness by imperialism our party is showing great vigilance and is doing everything necessary to strengthen the defense capability of the country,” said Viktor Grishin, a hard-line Politburo member.⁸⁰⁵ Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov, said that “peace cannot be obtained from the imperialists by begging for it. It can be upheld only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces.”⁸⁰⁶

Euromissiles and Security Conflict between West Germany and the East

The deteriorating structural conditions as a result of the US-Soviet “Second Cold War” exerted negative pressure on West German-Polish relations in a number of ways. First, the issue of Euromissile deployment, a product of the renewed East-West confrontation, dramatically heightened the fear of military conflict in Europe. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union beef up its theater nuclear forces (TNF) to countervail the threat of the US nuclear delivery forces in Europe. From 1976, it began deployment of the new SS-20s carrying MIRVed nuclear warheads to replace the existing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe. These Soviet nuclear forces gravely alarmed West Germany. As Chancellor Schmidt warned in a 1977 speech, “Without weapon parity, hence without theatre weapons, the Western world’s security is in danger.”⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁵ This remark was made in November 1982. Quoted from Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 83.

⁸⁰⁶ Lawrence S. Wittner, “Did Reagan’s Military Build-Up Really Lead to Victory in the Cold War?” *History News Network*, January 19, 2004 (<http://hnn.us/articles/2732.html>).

⁸⁰⁷ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 141.

In response to the Soviet TNF buildup and trying to address the security needs of allies, NATO decided in 1979 on a “double track” plan to deploy 572 Pershing II missiles in West Europe, the so-called Euromissiles, coupled with a second track of arms control negotiations with Moscow. Moscow who accused the Euromissile plan of trying “to upset the balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the NATO bloc” because these missiles were capable of reaching targets deep in Soviet territories. Because the majority of Euromissiles were to be installed in West Germany, the Schmidt government much preferred the second track than the first track that would subject the FRG to heavy Soviet political and military pressure. Although Schmidt’s “shuttle diplomacy” between Moscow and Washington persuaded the Soviets and Americans to agree to continue negotiation efforts, he was unable to have them accept each other’s terms. As a scholar of German diplomacy lamented, “while Schmidt succeeded in bringing those horses to the water, he could not make them drink.”⁸⁰⁸

Not surprisingly, the US-Soviet TNF arms limitation talks from November 1980 to November 1983 did not produce any meaning results before they broke off. West Germany had no other choice but to rely on the NATO defense system for its security. The *Bundestag* approved the deployment of the Euromissiles in May 1981, which formally began from December 1983. At the same time, the Soviet deployment of SS-20s continued. By September 1983, 351 SS-20s targeting on West Europe had been installed.⁸⁰⁹ A good part of these missiles were based in Eastern European countries. The introduction of new, highly destructive weapon systems by both strategic blocs raised the specter of nuclear war in Europe and dramatically aggravated the security dilemma between West Germany and its Eastern neighbors.

Trend of Alienation: the Polish Crisis and Kohl’s Westpolitik

In the face of deteriorating US-Soviet relations, the Schmidt government still tried to maintain a “mini-European-détente,” by continuing a good relationship with the Eastern

⁸⁰⁸ Richard Lowenthal, “The German Question Transformed,” *Foreign Affairs* 63 (1984/85).

⁸⁰⁹ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, p. 943.

European neighbors.⁸¹⁰ Absent of superpower cooperation, however, the FRG's unilateral effort was unable to salvage détente. Two major events in the early 1980s embodied the effect of East-West confrontation to alienate West Germany and Poland. The first was the eruption of the Solidarity in Poland and the international repercussions of the martial law enforced by the Polish military leader Jaruzelski to crack down Solidarity. The second was the significant reorientation of West German foreign policy under the new leadership of Helmut Kohl.

The trigger of the Polish crisis was a series of strikes in protest of food shortages and other forms of economic hardships that workers faced everyday, including the heroic strike at the Lenin Shipyards of Gdansk in the summer of 1980. Since then, the nationwide labor unrest gravitated to a united, political movement with far-reaching demands for labor reform and greater civil rights. The charismatic leader of the Gdansk strike, Lech Walesa, was elected as the chairman of a free national trade union, or Solidarity. Having attracted a membership of about one fourth of Polish population and received explicit support from Pope John Paul II and the Catholic Church, Solidarity posed a formidable challenge to the communist regime.⁸¹¹

The rise of Solidarity also threatened Soviet Union's vested interest in East Europe. Moscow was afraid that the fall of communism in Poland would cause a "domino effect" of democratic movement in Eastern Europe and shatter the foundation of the socialist alliance. For Western countries, the greatest fear was the Soviet military intervention to Poland, just like what happened in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968. Kremlin indeed contemplated the use of outside forces to put down Solidarity. At a Soviet Poliburo session in January 1981, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov said, "We need to constantly keep pressure on the Polish leadership and constantly keep checking on them. We intend to hold manoeuvres in Poland in March. It seems to me that we should somehow bolster these exercises to make it clear that we have forces ready to act."⁸¹²

⁸¹⁰ Patricia Davis, *The Uses and Abuses of Economic Statecraft: West German-Polish Relations 1969-1990* Ph.D. dissertation (Maryland: University of Maryland, 1991), p. 82.

⁸¹¹ Davies, *God's Playground*, pp. 720-721.

⁸¹² On the Soviet and Polish decision-making leading up to the declaration of martial law by General Jaruzelski in December 1981, see Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, No. 2 (1999).

It was under the shadow of the Soviet power that General Jaruzelski acted on December 13, 1981 to quell Solidarity with a martial law. The Reagan administration angrily imposed economic sanctions against both Warsaw and Moscow, and demanded its European allies to follow suit. Western countries including the FRG answered the call and cancelled planned meetings to help Warsaw with its huge hard-currency debt, although they did not join the U.S. in its sanctions against Moscow. Moscow reacted to Western sanctions with condemnation. It also discouraged the economic and social ties between West Germany and Eastern Europe. Thus, when Bonn extended a DM1 billion credit to East Germany at a low interest rate, Moscow accused Bonn of using “economic levers and political contacts” to interfere in the internal affairs of East Germany.⁸¹³

To be sure, Bonn’s economic sanction against Poland after the martial law was half-hearted. Schmidt and his cohort believed that a Poland in chaos and bankruptcy would disrupt the East-West power balance and induce war.⁸¹⁴ Moreover, he wrote in a memoir in the late 1980s that he was afraid that harsh reactions on the Bonn side to the martial law would “supply the communist propagandists in Warsaw with argument against the alleged ‘German revanchism’.”⁸¹⁵ On December 15, soon after martial law was in place, West German Economic Minister Lambsdorff stated, “we have helped Poland up to now and we will do so again in 1982.” But there were serious limitations on Bonn’s diplomacy to Poland. Schmidt was under direct pressure from Regan not to respond to Polish appeal for economic aid. Although Bonn and Warsaw managed to sign a rescheduling agreement for Poland’s interest payments on commercial loans in April 1982, without the U.S. blessing, multilateral negotiation on rescheduling interest payments for state credits was out of the question, not to mention any fresh German credits to Poland.⁸¹⁶

Schmidt’s ambivalent reactions to the Polish situation offended both the Polish government and workers. Warsaw castigated Bonn’s economic sanction and its foot-dragging in providing Poland with the much needed financial assistance. Anti-German

⁸¹³ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 197.

⁸¹⁴ Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War,” p. 205; Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, p. 288.

⁸¹⁵ Quoted from Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, p. 304.

⁸¹⁶ Patricia Davis, p. 80, 210-211.

propaganda flared up again in Poland. The Polish government also joined the Soviet Union in condemning Bonn's credit to East Germany. The Soviet and Polish obstruction forced Honecker to cancel his planned visits to the FRG in 1983 and again in 1984.⁸¹⁷ At the same time, Bonn's accommodating attitude to the Polish government alienated the Polish society. Although sympathetic to the workers, Bonn did not want to destabilize Poland by any official contacts with Solidarity. Whether it confirmed the Polish anti-German propaganda in the eyes of the Poles was unclear, but Bonn's focus on the communist state brought them disillusion about the democratic West Germany.⁸¹⁸

If the international politics in the aftermath of Solidarity crackdown pulled Poland away from West Germany, the readjustment of German foreign policy in Kohl era also prevented West Germany from drawing too close to Poland. In October 1982, and the victorious Helmut Kohl became the new chancellor, which position he would keep until 1998. A leader of the CDU/CSU party, Kohl devoted to steer the FRG back to the track of West-centralism that his party had long adhered to. Specifically, he spelt out three pillars of the new Westpolitik. First was to stress Bonn's alliance with the U.S. and reaffirm its commitment to the TNF defense strategy of NATO. Second was to reassert Bonn's embrace of the Western integration and the resultant European Community. The last was to reemphasize Germany's goal of national unity, which had been somewhat downplayed during the détente years in order to soothe the East bloc countries.⁸¹⁹

All three policy priorities of the Kohl government were offensive to the Soviet bloc. Bonn's move to deploy Euromissiles in 1983 despite domestic opposition and Soviet protest only added insult to injury. West German-Soviet relationship quickly turned sour. From 1984 Soviet propaganda once again stepped up assault on the revanchist, neo-Nazi, neo-fascist trends in German politics. As Moscow's interest in maintaining political dialogue with Bonn tapered off, constraints on Bonn's contacts with Eastern European countries increased. In that year, visits by leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, Honecker and

⁸¹⁷ Patricia Davis, p. 94.

⁸¹⁸ Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, pp. 305-306.

⁸¹⁹ Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, p. 100; Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p.194.

Zhivkov, to the FRG had to be cancelled, so was West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's planned trip to Poland.⁸²⁰

II. Domestic Moderating Factors

The above analysis suggests that the end of superpower détente generated great structural obstacles to West German-Polish reconciliation. However in decline if compared to Phase II, bilateral relationship in the 1980s did not really go back to the situation of Phase I: inter-governmental ties and territorial agreements established in the 1970s sustained, bilateral trade quickly recovered from 1984 after the 1982-83 setback due to the economic sanction, and mutual feelings among the public did not downgrade to the rigid mutual stereotypes. Some domestic factors moderated the damage of the "second Cold War" to the relationship. They included the liberal and leftist opposition in West Germany, Kohl's refocusing on relationship with the East from 1984, and the reliance of the Polish government on German economic assistance.

The SPD's "Second Ostpolitik"

The SPD lost the driver's seat of German foreign policy to the CDU/CSU after its government collapsed in October 1982. While in opposition, the SPD carried out a shadow Eastern policy in order to preserve détente within the scope of Europe, which they called "a second phase of détente policy," or a "second *Ostpolitik*."

Egon Bahr, one of the original architects of Brandt's Ostpolitik, spearheaded the new strategic thinking of the party. In 1981 he proposed a bold notion of "common security" between the East and West. It argued that in the face of growing East-West tension, the Europeans ought to stake out their own, autonomous policies and refused to become "relative vassals of the superpowers." Acknowledging Western integration as a major cornerstone of the FRG's foreign policy, the new strategy also advocated West Germany's special responsibility to build security partnership with the East Bloc countries. The aim was "to create, on the basis of a security partnership of the existing alliances, a

⁸²⁰ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, pp. 196-197.

European peace order which overcomes the blocs.”⁸²¹ Egon Bahr’s new thinking was first endorsed as the new international strategy of the party at the 1983 Cologne party conference, when the party overwhelmingly rejected the deployment of Euromissiles by a vote of 400 to 14.⁸²² Later it was formally canonized in the “Government Programme 1987-1990” prepared for the SPD’s campaign for the 1987 federal election.

The SPD did not stop at making policy rhetoric but tried to fulfill it by carrying out interactions with political actors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. First of all, leading figures of the party formed joint working groups with the ruling communist parties in the Soviet bloc on economic, environmental, confidence-building, and arms control issues. The SPD’s direct contacts with the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) were particularly eye-catching. First set up in March 1984, a joint working group of the two parties held regular talks on security issues, which eventually resulted in a joint proposal in July 1988 for a “zone of trust and security.”⁸²³

In addition to the party-to-party contacts, SPD politicians frequently held policy talks with Eastern European communist leaders. The most influential events are Brandt’s meetings with Gorbachev, Honecker, and Jaruzelski. In May 1985, Brandt visited Moscow and discussed with Gorbachev on a wide range of issues concerning the current situation in the world and Europe.⁸²⁴ The Brandt-Gorbachev summit talk was significant in that it was the first meeting that this reformist Soviet leader had with a Western statesman after rising to the top party spot in March 1985.⁸²⁵ After that, Brandt visited East Germany and met with Honecker in September.

Two months after his visit to East Germany, Brandt made another significant trip, this time to the most important European ally of Moscow, Poland. Intended to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, Brandt’s visit to Poland was

⁸²¹ Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, p. 314, 316-317, 319.

⁸²² Jeffrey Herf, “War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The West German Peace Movement,” *International Security* 10, No.4 (Spring 1986), p. 197.

⁸²³ Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, pp. 320-323.

⁸²⁴ “M.S. Gorbachev Meets with Willy Brandt,” *Pravda*, May 28, 1985, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 19, 1985.

⁸²⁵ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 199.

welcomed warmly by the government and received prominent coverage in Warsaw media. Brandt reconfirmed the permanence of the Ode-Neisser Line as Poland's western frontier. He also asserted the SPD's interest in a stable Poland and declared his wish to influence the Kohl government so that it would broaden cooperation with the Polish authorities. Regarding the historical burden in German-Polish relations, Brandt spoke of the magnitude of Poland's suffering during WWII and stated his belief that the young generation in the FRG should know more about history. Expressing his support to a wide range of bilateral cooperation and exchange of information, Brandt particularly emphasized the importance of the Textbook Commission and hoped that the implementation of the "Recommendations" would move forward more quickly.⁸²⁶

It is not an easy task to evaluate the effect of the SPD's "second *Ostpolitik*." On the one hand, the party's shadow diplomacy did not seem to have brought about concrete changes in the FRG's foreign policy. On the other hand, these talks and working groups constituted an important channel of communication between the FRG and the Eastern bloc countries, given the pressure from the superpowers to curtail inter-bloc official contacts. In addition, in the eyes of the Eastern bloc countries, the personal charisma and prestige of prominent SPD politicians like Willy Brandt greatly empowered their statements even though they were not government leaders. Among others, Brandt's remarks on preserving peace in Europe and remembering Polish suffering considerably mitigated Polish antipathy to Germany. Historical memory was no small issue in Polish perception of Germany, as indicated by the following speech by Jaruselski at a dinner with Brandt:

"Also of key importance for us, for well known historical reasons, is the moral climate accompanying the development of our relations. Casual gestures will never substitute for honest self-examination. One cannot win the credibility of Poles by cosmetic measures accompanied by revanchist and SS rallies, historical falsifications and disgusting efforts to rehabilitate criminals who have been condemned by the entire human race. We are not concerned with complexes or morbid memories but with the truth, because only on this can a secure future be constructed. . ."⁸²⁷

So Brandt's forthright attitude to German war responsibility had a very salutary effect on nurturing mutual trust and understanding in West German-Polish relations.

⁸²⁶ "Text of report of Willy Brandt's press conference," Warsaw Home Service, December 9, 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 11, 1985

The “second *Ostpolitik*” also influenced West German public opinions if not the actual government policy, as reflected in the anti-missile movement led by the New Left in the FRG in the 1980s. The young, mostly well-educated German left wingers, were particularly resentful of Reagan administration’s presumptuous push for Euromissile deployment and reluctance to pursue arms negotiations with the Soviet bloc.⁸²⁸ They advocated German withdrawal from NATO and the neutralization of both Germanys. An independent political campaign, the peace movement was inextricably connected to the SPD, who provided moral and financial support. Although the peace movement failed to stop the government from deploying INF missiles or disrupt the FRG’s strategic ties with the U.S., it aroused widespread anti-American and anti-missile sentiments in the West German public.⁸²⁹

Kohl’s Diplomacy to the East and Polish Economic Needs

Kohl’s ascendance to power sparked fear in Warsaw that he would make a fundamental departure from the FRG’s previous acknowledgement of the territorial status quo in Europe and its cooperation programs with the East. Shortly before the fall of the SPD government, the Poland News Agency (PAP) published a commentary expressing worry that “many major cabinet posts might be entrusted to people who have notoriously questioned in public the final character of Poland’s Oder-Neisse Frontier.” It went on to make alarmist comments that a CDU government would place greater emphasis on revanchism with respect to Poland and nationalist trends with respect to the GDR.⁸³⁰

Despite his emphasis on cross-Atlantic relations, however, Kohl’s Eastern policy embodied a remarkable continuity from his social democratic predecessors. One obvious signal was that Genscher, Schmidt’s foreign minister and a key supporter of *Ostpolitik*, retained the post in the Kohl government. Another factor of policy continuity was the West German national consensus on the importance of a stable relationship with the East, thanks

⁸²⁷ “Willy Brandt’s Visit to Poland,” *Warsaw Home Service*, December 7, 1985, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, December 11, 1985.

⁸²⁸ Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement: Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany,” *International Security* 12, No. 1 (1987), pp. 81-84.

⁸²⁹ Herf, “War, Peace, and the Intellectuals.”

⁸³⁰ “The Collapse of the West German Coalition Government,” in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, September 23, 1982.

to the resounding success of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s. Many CDU politicians had taken to heart the idea that keeping dialogue and cooperation with Eastern Europe would contribute to a European peace order and promote the FRG's national security.⁸³¹ As soon as he took office, Kohl reassured Mikhail S. Solomentsev, an alternate member of the Soviet Politburo, that Bonn would be a "solid honest and reliable partner in relations to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the basis of existing contracts and agreements." This statement was tantamount to an implicit acceptance of the Eastern treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, and the GDR.⁸³²

One of Kohl's policy priorities, Germany's national unity, also mandated a cooperative relationship with the Soviet bloc countries. He emphasized the promotion of a common German culture and heritage between the two German states through intimate economic and personal contacts. But inter-German relations could not be insulated from the outside events. This linkage was evident in 1982-83 when the deterioration of the FRG's relationship with the Soviet Union and Poland undermined its diplomacy to East Germany: Soviet and Polish anti-German attitude as a result of West German economic sanction on Poland and the Euromissile deployment was the chief cause of Honecker's twice cancellation of his visit to Bonn. The Kohl government realized that in order to limit the damage to German-German relationship it must improve relationship with Moscow and Warsaw.

Kohl's attempt to amend relationship with Poland started with economic diplomacy. In January 1984, Kohl gave Economics Minister Lambsdorff the go-ahead to reopen economic relationship with Poland. But he also warned that the FRG should take these "small steps" cautiously without incurring suspicion of other Western countries. Another opportunity was the Polish invitation to Richard von Weizsäcker who became West German president in summer 1984 to pay a state visit to Poland. Weizsäcker made German-Polish reconciliation in the sense of the postwar Franco-German reconciliation as one of his main goals in office. But at last he declined the invitation to avoid embarrassing Kohl.⁸³³ To be sure, the Polish interest in normalization with the FRG at the time should not be

⁸³¹ Davis, *The Uses and Abuses of Economic Statecraft*, p. 90; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, p. 128.

⁸³² "Kohl Meets Soviet Aide, Urges 'Genuine Détente'," *Washington Post*, October 8, 1982.

overlooked. The Western economic sanction denied the Jaruzelski regime of economic aid that could pull it out of its serious currency debt crisis and help the Polish economy back on its feet. Jaruzelski was eager to reopen economic cooperation with the FRG, the Poland's largest western creditor and trading partner.

The real breakthrough did not come until the new Economics Minister Martin Bangemann, accompanied by prestigious members of the German business circle, visited Warsaw in March 1985. In this trip Bangemann renewed the bilateral trade agreement signed in 1974, and promised to restore export credit guarantees to Poland, which was the first western government to do so after the declaration of martial law. Moreover, he offered Bonn's influence to support Poland's application to join the International Monetary Fund, a significant gesture both to help rebuild the financial credit of the Polish state and end its international isolation. With government sponsor, by 1987 most German banks had written off up to 80 percent of their debt claims on Poland.⁸³⁴

Under such circumstance, West German-Polish economic cooperation made big strides. From 1985 German-Polish trade recovered to the level of 1980 after suffering setback during German economic sanction. When Poland's Deputy Prime Minister Szalajda and Foreign Minister Orzechowski visited Bonn in March, he got DM 100 million Hermes credit guarantee. Following Gorbachev's launching of the policy of glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring") in the Soviet Union, Jaruzelski also embarked on stabilization and restructuring programs. Bonn took great interest in encouraging political changes in Poland through economic cooperation. In May 1987, Bangemann visited Warsaw again and promised to provide further grace period for Poland's debt repayment, promote German investment and develop joint ventures, and resume government guarantees for credits to Poland. Overall, Kohl's economic diplomacy to Poland was an integral part of Bonn's overall strategy to promote trust and security in Europe and reactive inter-German relations. In September 1987 Honecker was finally able to make his much delayed visit to Bonn.⁸³⁵

⁸³³ Davis, *The Uses and Abuses of Economic Statecraft*, pp. 96-98

⁸³⁴ Davis, *The Uses and Abuses of Economic Statecraft*, pp. 215-218, 225, 228.

III. Progressive Development of Historiographic Convergence

Another important force favoring bilateral reconciliation in addition to domestic political factors was the continuing trend of active internal debate on war memory in the two countries and bilateral textbook cooperation. It enabled gradual de-mythification of their national history and created greater common ground between their understanding of the past conflict history.

Bitburg and Historikerstreit: German War Memory from Polarization to Consensus

As previously discussed, West German war memory in Phase One and Phase Two was highly polarized between the political left represented by the Social Democrats and right represented by the conservative. The struggle over national collective memory carried on into the 1980s. After the Christian Democrats recaptured power in 1982, the government interpretation of history stressed the conflict between innocent German people and the “Communist totalitarianism” in the Soviet bloc countries, a narrative that could best serve the new *Westpolitik*. The conservatives also downplayed German war guilt to foreign nation. When visiting Israel in January 1984, Kohl suggested that the German postwar generation including himself should not be held responsible for the Nazi crimes because they had not been adults during the war.⁸³⁶

Since the mid-1980s, however, active public debates on war memory broke out, in the course of which a national consensus on German war responsibility began to emerge. Several key events constituted the turning point of national historical consciousness. The first was the Bitburg incident in 1985. Kohl invited American president Reagan to attend a memorial service in honor of German war dead at the Bitburg military cemetery in order to symbolize the reconciliation and firm Cold War alliance between the two belligerent states during WWII. But the plan provoked immediate attack from German leftwing and the Jewish and veterans’ community in the U.S. because among those buried at Bitburg were also 49 men of the notorious *Waffen Schutzstaffel* (SS). By portraying the SS men as equal

⁸³⁵ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 199.

⁸³⁶ Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 351.

victims of the war, the Bitburg history that the German conservatives tried to promote blurred the formal and logical distinction between the victims and victimizers and refuted the notion of German collective responsibility.⁸³⁷

At last President Reagan went to Bitburg on May 5, but only after laying a wreath first at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. But the incident galvanized political debate surrounding the Nazi past. One important driving force of the debate was the liberal faction of the ruling CDU/CSU represented by President Weizacker. Only three days after the Bitburg incident, Weizacker made a world-famous speech in the *Bundestag* to commemorate the 40th anniversary of VE Day of WWII. This speech was a straightforward rejection of the conservative historical myth that the German nation was an equal victim of the war and the young German generation bore no responsibility for the Nazi past. Instead, he explicitly acknowledged Germany's collective responsibility, for there was no doubt that ordinary Germans witnessed or heard about Nazi crimes and yet allowed them to happen. Moreover, when speaking of the victims of Nazi Germany he crossed the Cold War fault lines and included "countless citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland" in his list. He also traced the roots of the postwar German division to the Nazi expansion rather than fixating on the evilness of communism. In short, Weisacker refused political manipulation of history but advocated a truthful interpretation. "Look truth straight in the eye – without embellishment or distortion," he said.⁸³⁸

Weizäcker's speech won remarkable resonance among the German public. Over 60,000 Germans wrote letters to him, 90 percent of which praised the speech. Over two million copies of the speech were distributed to schools.⁸³⁹ After the VE-Day commemoration, public debates between the conservative and liberal views of history intensified, first among the historians and then spilled over to the mass media. The well-known *Historikerstreit*, or the historians' conflict was stimulated by the publication of the works of several conservative historians around 1986, such as Andreas Hillbruber, Ernst

⁸³⁷ Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 10-16.

⁸³⁸ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 355-359.

⁸³⁹ David Art, "Debating the Lessons of History: Germany and Austria Compared," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2003, p. 16.

Nolte, and Michael Sturmer. This group of historians attempted “normalization” of National Socialism and Holocaust by comparing them with the atrocities of other brutal regimes in modern history, especially the Stalinist Russia. Nolte even suggested that Hitler’s Final Solution was inspired by the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, so Auschwitz was not “absolute evil” but simply a German copy of Soviet terror.⁸⁴⁰

Such apologetic views of conservative historians sparked sharp criticism from liberal historians such as Christian Meier and Hans Mommsen. Meier argued that Holocaust was singular in human history and remembering the crimes “must be an important part of the historical consciousness of the Germans.” He called on the Germans to learn to “bear the truth” and “accept responsibility for all that we caused and that was done in our name.”⁸⁴¹ Mommsen charged that the new Right in West Germany was carrying out “the politics of revision” for instrumental purposes: the equating of Nazi dictatorship with Communist regimes was designed to justify the anti-communist Atlantic Alliance and serve the domestic political agenda of the CDU.⁸⁴²

The historians’ debate culminated upon the intervention by Jürgen Habermas, one of the most influential philosophers in West Germany. Habermas sharply castigated the “apologetic tendencies in German history writing,” which he saw as part of the conservative agenda to whitewash the horrors of the Nazi past and revive “a sense of (German) identity naively rooted in national consciousness.” The danger of the revisionist view of history was that it would overturn the liberal democratic trajectory of postwar Germany and “destroy the only reliable foundation for our ties to the West.”⁸⁴³ So he reaffirmed that it was obligation of all Germans to “keep awake the memory of the suffering of those murdered by German

⁸⁴⁰ Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, pp. 16-33.

⁸⁴¹ Christian Meier, “Condemning and Comprehending,” in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit*, the controversy concerning the singularity of the Holocaust. (Atlantic Highlands: N.J., Humanities Press, 1993), p.28.

⁸⁴² Hans Mommsen, “Search for the ‘Lost History’? Observations on the Historical Self-Evidence of the Federal Republic,” in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 103.

⁸⁴³ Jürgen Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages: the Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing,” in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*.

hands,” and warned that “otherwise we cannot respect ourselves and cannot expect respect from others.”⁸⁴⁴

The historiographic controversy sparked by the Bitburg Incident and the *Historikerstreit* in 1986-1987 embodied an unprecedentedly intense process of memory contestation in postwar West Germany. Interestingly, more public debates did not magnify but dramatically lessened the polarization of historical consciousness because the majority of German public came to endorse the liberal school’s historical narrative. After the debates, a national consensus emerged that West Germany’s democracy and international status must be premised on a national identity more forthright about the nation’s responsibility for the Nazi past.

Continuing Liberation of Polish History Discipline and Bilateral Textbook Cooperation

The liberalization trend in Poland’s history profession and history education in schools continued in the 1980s. The Solidarity revolution in 1980-1981 brought about an outburst of societal demands for intellectual freedom.⁸⁴⁵ Soon after the Gdansk strike, the Historical Association passed resolutions to honor the striking workers and call for the removal of political constraints on scholarly research. At the same time, the teachers’ strike in Gdansk resulted in the formulation of guidelines for history education reform, which emphasized the necessity of teaching history based on facts rather than political needs. It stated, “the student has the right to get to know the history and culture of his country in their fullness. To this end, textbooks on history and literature, especially on modern history, should be verified... so that their contents do not contradict reality.” These guidelines were incorporated into the settlement between the government and the striking teachers, and also endorsed by the Historical Association when it negotiated with the government a written agreement that promised to overhaul the history curricula and granted teachers autonomy in classrooms. Besides the loosening of government sanction on school textbook content,

⁸⁴⁴ Jurgen Habermas, “On the Public Use of History: the Official Self-Understanding of the Federal Republic Is Breaking Up,” in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*.

⁸⁴⁵ The following discussion of the liberalization trend in Polish history profession during and after the Solidarity movement is distilled from Valkenier, “The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983,” pp. 672-680.

unofficial organizations emerged during the Solidarity period to articulate bottom-up, society-based historical memory. One example was the National Education Booklets produced by the Committee for Independent Education that contained a drastically different narrative than the official one.⁸⁴⁶

Not only to reform the history education in schools, historians also strived to reconstruct and publicize an objective interpretation of those sensitive episodes of recent Polish history, such as the Polish-Soviet relations, the history of the Communist Party, and the communist rule in postwar Poland. Leaders of this wave of historiographic rethinking came from not only Solidarity organizations but also the church, the universities, the army, and even the party. Their effort led to the compilation of several important scholarly works offering a reappraisal of some major political crises in communist Poland.

The liberalization movement in Poland's history research and teaching was so widespread and deep-reaching that the same degree of crude political manipulation of history never resumed even after the martial law. The entire intelligentsia had been transformed by the democratizing Solidarity revolution. Even though from 1982 the government reasserted their control over academic discussions and curricula content on history, the new censorship was much milder than before. While the liberal faction in the party was increasingly outspoken about the harmful consequences of manipulating history, even the conservative faction felt compelled to recognize the society's "historical consciousness." Liberal historians did not suffer severe persecution, and the Historical Association continued to press on the textbook reform agenda. The official intervention in the cultural life further waned since the mid-1980s when the government adopted a moderate, reformist policy agenda. Meanwhile, underground intellectual activities thrived. The underground presses provided the public with uncensored materials on Poland's recent history, and underground educational networks such as the Council of National Education taught history courses to the working class.

⁸⁴⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Granta Books in association with Penguin Books, 1989), p. 109.

So even after the crackdown of Solidarity, Polish public debates on national history continued both above and under the ground, effectively preventing the old historical myths from seizing the monopoly once again. One phenomenon epitomizing the societal desire to seek a more honest and balanced national history was the outbreak of intellectual debates on Polish-Jewish relations. Poland had a history of virulent anti-Semitism even before WWII, and the Poles acted as silent onlookers, collaborators, and sometimes even willing perpetrators in Hitler's genocide of Jews. A national embarrassment, Polish-Jewish relations was a taboo in postwar Polish historiography. In 1987 a Polish literary historian and critic Jan Blonski published an essay entitled "The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto," which initiated a heated discussion among Polish intellectuals about the Poles' moral responsibility during the Holocaust. Another notable trigger of Polish reexamination of the Polish-Jewish past was Claude Lanzmann's film *Shoah*, a nine-hour documentary that purported to be "an oral history of the Holocaust." When *Shoah* was shown in Poland, reactions were mixed. While most Poles did not like the separation of division of European society into the murders, their victims, and the bystanders during the Holocaust, many were shocked by persistence of crude anti-Semitic stereotypes in Polish society.⁸⁴⁷ Such open debates on the Polish-Jewish relations increased societal awareness of the negative aspects of the nation's past and called into question Polish victimhood, a major national myth. It contributed to the general trend in Polish society to unmask the history that had been distorted by politics.

At the same time of the de-mythification of national history in West Germany and Poland, bilateral textbook cooperation continued. As noted earlier, by the beginning of the 1980s the project had won wide recognition and respect in West Germany. The power transition from the social liberal coalition to the conservative CDU/CSU in 1982 did not bring the project to a halt. It was because, mainly financed by SPD-dominant *Länder* and run by professional historians, the Textbook Commission did not depend on federal government support for its operation. Another reason was the profound legacy of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in West Germany, which had convinced many Germans, including conservative elites, that Germany's democracy, national security and unification were all hinged on its reconciliation with eastern neighboring countries.

⁸⁴⁷ Antony Polonsky ed., *'My Brother's Keeper?': Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust* (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), "Introduction."

The Textbook Commission continued to meet regularly during this period and, since Kohl moved to repair relationship with the Eastern bloc in the mid-1980s, received formal endorsement from the CDU/CSU government. Under fire for the upcoming Bitburg affair, Kohl issued a statement on April 26, 1985 that acknowledged the contribution of the Textbook Commission to German-Polish reconciliation and expressed government support to the Commission's activities. West German president Weizacker and the Bundestagpresident Rita Sussmuth, both members of the CDU, openly praised the Textbook Commission as a matchless undertaking to hold continuous, free, and fundamental discussions between two nations that had fought intensely in the past.⁸⁴⁸

PHASE FOUR: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Since the beginning of the 1990s, German-Polish relations have gradually advanced toward the stage of deep reconciliation. Their frontier treaty signed in November 1990 not only brought about a permanent settlement of bilateral sovereignty disputes but also precluded the possibility of armed conflict over such disputes. Poland's entry to NATO, with crucial support from Germany, provided further guarantee for bilateral stable peace. Economic interactions also boomed and reached a high degree of interdependence, thanks to the expansion of German investment and economic aid to Poland as well as Poland's integration with European economy through the EU. Their popular relationship experienced remarkable improvement during this period. Although residual feeling of repugnance still existed between the two peoples, they did not cite history as a reason to limit bilateral political and economic cooperation.

Such significant progress in German-Polish reconciliation could be hardly attributed to the post-Cold War systemic setting in Europe, which was laden with uncertainty. What actually contributed to bilateral harmony were two other factors than the international power distribution. First was the need to settle the German Question and meet the security and economic interests of the two countries, which facilitated the resolution of bilateral territorial disputes and pushed for their security and economic integration with the European

⁸⁴⁸ Kondo, *Kokusai Rekishi Kyōkasho Taiwa*, p. 127.

community. Second was the rise of a shared, honest historical memory between the two countries. The increased public awareness of German war responsibility marginalized the German right-wing force and the national myths it supported, and Poland's democratization also divest xenophobic nationalism of political currency. Meanwhile, bilateral textbook cooperation and youth exchange programs focusing on history education carried on, and Germany took additional measures to atone for Polish suffering at the hands of the Nazis. Their converging collective memories of the past conflict and Germany's policy of restitution fulfilled bilateral historical settlement.

I. The Indeterminate Structural Force

Poland and Germany were directly involved in two major events marking the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the beginning of the "great transition" of the Cold War international system. One was the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern European countries, including Poland. In early 1989, the ever-increasing influence of the underground opposition movement forced the Polish government to convene round table talks with various political organizations, which granted Solidarity with legal status. In the national election held two months later, Solidarity won landslide victory and formed the first non-communist government in Poland.⁸⁴⁹ The other turning point was the fall of the Berlin Wall. A spontaneous, massive traffic of East Berliners to West Berlin starting from the night of November 9, 1989 quickly led to the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the iron curtain between the East and West.⁸⁵⁰ Soon after the Wall fell, the SED regime in East Germany crumbled. On September 12, 1990, Germany's four occupation powers, Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a two-plus-four treaty with the two Germany states, which cleared external obstacles to German unification.

The demise of Polish communist regime and German unification signified that the Cold War structural constraints on both countries had shattered. The two-plus-four treaty ending the four powers' right and prerogatives in Germany and subsequent Soviet troops

⁸⁴⁹ "Solidarity One Seat Short Of Clean Sweep," *Financial Times*, June 20, 1989.

⁸⁵⁰ For a classic chronicle of the events leading up to and immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, see Henry Ashby Turner, *Germany from Partition to Reunification* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 225-239.

withdrawal from Polish and East German territories removed the last traces of superpower supervision. Poland finally won complete independence from their Soviet overlord. Germany remained in NATO, but it was a policy by choice not by force.

What does the international structural change mean to German-Polish relations? On the one hand, they were no longer obligated to confront each other on behalf of their respective alliances. On the other hand, the systemic shift from bipolarity to an ambiguous unipolarity, or “uni-multipolarity” in Samuel Huntington’s words, generated considerable uncertainty and anxiety for Polish and German foreign policy-makers.⁸⁵¹

Central to the uncertainty that Poland faced was the advent of a unified Germany whose power had no equal in Europe. German unification reopened the frontier issue because previous bilateral agreements only committed to the current Western border of Poland if Germany was divided. The Poles felt nervous that a unified Germany would challenge the postwar territorial status quo in Europe and revive its traditional inclination for eastward expansion. While Poland used to depend on the Soviet Red Army for national security, the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Poland to face the perceived German threat alone. Moreover, its ancient fear of the expansionism of its historical rival Russia rekindled. So Poland found itself again being sandwiched between the two powerful neighbors, and many Poles worried about becoming a frontline state in any future military conflict involving NATO and Russia.⁸⁵²

Germany was also standing at the crossroad at the beginning of the 1990s. The demise of the Soviet bloc wiped out the strategic threat to Germany from the east. But how to deal with former Warsaw Pact states became a new challenge to German foreign policy. For one thing, these countries’ embattled economy and fragile young democracy was a heavy burden for Germany, who itself was trying to absorb the daunting economic and social costs of unification. More seriously, the end of the Cold War gave a new context to the long-standing German Question, which threatened to bedevil Germany’s relations with its

⁸⁵¹ Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999).

⁸⁵² On Polish national security thinking at the beginning of the 1990s, see the report of a conference sponsored by RAND and the Polish Senate Center of International Studies in Warsaw in June 1990. Ronald D. Asmus & Thomas S. Szayna, *Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing Europe: A Conference Report* (Rand: 1991).

Eastern neighbors. In 1990-1991 the previously marginalized expellee organizations in Germany resumed their push for recovering the lost homeland. They collected signatures in support of a referendum in Poland under the slogan "Peace through Free Choice." They then proposed two more initiatives for the Europeanization of the Oder-Neisse territories and the enfranchisement of the German minorities in Poland to vote in German parliamentary elections. Expellee activists also demanded "limited sovereignty" for Sudeten Germans in their homeland which had been Czechoslovak territory after WWII.⁸⁵³ Even though none of these demands succeeded, they did raise the specter of German revanchism in the eyes of countries like Poland and Czech Republic who had territorial disputes with Germany.

Not only Germany's relationship with the East but also that with the West needed redefinition. After the bipolar international structure vanished, whether Germany should stay in NATO became questionable because of the lack of a clear common threat. During the German unification negotiation, Moscow explicitly stated its desire to keep a unified Germany outside NATO and demilitarized. But the prospect of German neutrality aroused deep concerns in some Western European countries, especially France, about the potential threat of a strong, unified Germany on the European continent. French President Mitterrand initially did not encourage German unification because the sheer weight of German economy would challenge France's influence inside the European Community. Later Mitterrand changed his position to endorse the German unification timetable, but he set a precondition that German unification must be imbedded firmly in NATO and the European integration process.⁸⁵⁴ Therefore, Germany now had to reconsider how to position itself in Europe. Just because the Cold War ended does not mean that it was an easy decision for Germany to make.

II. German Question, European Integration, and Greater Bilateral Cooperation

⁸⁵³ Stefan Wolff, *The German Question Since 1919: An Analysis with Key Documents* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), pp. 156-157.

⁸⁵⁴ Rumors even circulated that Mitterrand sought Gorbachev's support to slow down German unification when they met in Kiev in early December 1990. Soon thereafter he paid a state visit to East Germany, which was seen by Bonn as an attempt to prop up the communist regime there. See Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 71, No. 2 (1992), pp. 132-133.

The above analysis demonstrates that one major effect of the uncertain international system after the Cold War was the fear and mistrust that neighboring countries held towards Germany. For German-Polish relations that had yet to overcome their negative historical legacy, the end of bipolarity particularly gave rise to two new sources of Polish suspicion, which was the reopening of the frontier issue and the rise of a unified, powerful Germany. From the turn of the decade the two countries began to search for solutions to these thorny problems. In the process, Germany's unification agenda and desire for a secure, prosperous surrounding environment accounted for a significant driving force for reconciliation with Poland. Meanwhile, Poland also sought greater security and economic interests through cooperation with Germany. The result was a bilateral agreement that permanently settled their territorial disputes, and the security and economic cooperation in the framework of European institutions.

Frontier Settlement: Land for Unification and Trust

Germany's goal of early unification was a decisive factor pushing for the final settlement of bilateral sovereignty disputes over frontiers. In some sense, Germany's renouncement of the eastern territories was the quid pro quo for its long-sought national unification. In addition, Germany was aware that a proper settlement of the sovereignty issue was a key to winning the trust and respect of its Eastern European neighbors.

From the inception of the German unification process, the Oder-Neisse Line became the primary issue in Germany's negotiations with Poland. Poland expressed nervousness about new German claim for territories east of the line. Such concern was not unfounded because, after the Warsaw Treaty was ratified in *Bundestag* in 1972, the German Constitutional Court held that a united German state would exist within the German borders as of December 31, 1937.⁸⁵⁵ Since 1989, German Foreign Minister Genscher expressed his acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line several times, but Chancellor Kohl did not publicly state his position, which stirred great uneasiness in Poland. Even in a far-reaching statement issued in Paris in January 1990 when Kohl said Germany would not "provoke in the Europe of tomorrow a discussion about frontiers," he stopped short of promising German

⁸⁵⁵ Alison Therese Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities: The Case of German-Polish Relations, 1989-1999*. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, 2000, p. 103.

renouncement of eastern territories once and for all. He repeated previous government policy that the definitive establishment of the country's borders could only come in a freely negotiated peace settlement after German unification.⁸⁵⁶ It was widely suspected that Kohl kept reservation because he wanted to appease domestic hardliners, especially the expellee organizations.

Therefore, once the two-plus-four talks on German unification began, Poland insisted that German unification must occur with the agreement of "all the interested parties and in a manner which, from the outset, will offer a credible sense of security to all those who require it and above all will guarantee the inviolability of the Western frontier of Poland."⁸⁵⁷ Poland even wanted the Four Powers to withhold full German sovereignty until Poland and Germany signed a border treaty.⁸⁵⁸ It argued that for Germany the frontier issue was "a historical-sentimental question" or "a card in the electoral game," but for Poland it was "a question of life and death, this is one third of our territory, this is one third of the populace, this is 85 percent of our access to the sea."⁸⁵⁹ Polish anxiety received sympathy from France, Britain and the US. From July 1990 Poland was invited to sit in the two-plus-four talks.

The pressure from Poland, other major powers, and even his coalition partner Genscher made Kohl realize that a frontier settlement was the price that Germany had to pay for unification. Bonn's policy began to change. On March 7, Kohl dropped a precondition he attached to the formal acceptance of the existing German-Polish border, which was for Poland to renounce WWII reparations claims against Germany.⁸⁶⁰ The next day he announced a coalition agreement to request the West German *Bundestag* and the East German *Volkskammer* to issue a joint declaration confirming the current frontier.⁸⁶¹ In a statement on June 17, Kohl spelt out the importance of the territorial settlement to German unification. He said that although the *Bundestag* resolution was tough for the expellees to

⁸⁵⁶ "Kohl Says Germans Do Not Want Discussion of Changing Borders," *The Associated Press*, January 17, 1990; "Kohl Pledges Reunification Will Not Affect Frontiers," *Financial Times*, January 18, 1990; "Kohl Says Germans Don't Want Border Debates," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1990.

⁸⁵⁷ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 212, 224.

⁸⁵⁸ Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities*, p. 133.

⁸⁵⁹ Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 225.

⁸⁶⁰ "Kohl Forced to Back Down on Polish Border Dispute," *Financial Times*, March 7, 1990.

take, but anyone who advised him against it would be asking him to put German unity in jeopardy. A few days later the *Bundestag* and the *Volkskammer* issued identical resolutions on the permanent inviolability of the border.⁸⁶²

In the meantime, Poland also backed down from its demand that the border treaty had to be signed before German unification. Formal bilateral negotiation began at the end of October, leading to the conclusion of a frontier treaty in November, where the two countries “declare that the existing border between them is inviolable now and in the future and obligated themselves to mutual and unconditional respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁸⁶³ The frontier settlement then paved the way for the signing of the bilateral Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation in June 1991.

The frontier settlement should not be viewed simply as a deal of “Land for Unification” but also had a far-reaching function of creating trust and security in East-Central Europe. German leaders understood that Germany would not enjoy a stable peace with its Eastern neighbors unless they could prove that Germany had no territorial ambitions to these countries. In his response to Polish demand for a border treaty, Genscher said that “Germany’s decision to place its fate within the fate of Europe is definitive and final. We Germans want nothing more than to live with our neighbors in unity, liberty, and peace.”⁸⁶⁴ The following excerpts from Genscher’s speech at the signing ceremony of the treaty on November 14 further explicated that a border settlement was indispensable to eliminating mistrust and enmity in German-Polish relations and forging stable peace for Germany and Europe:

“The Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany rightly describes the confirmation of the final nature of the borders of the united Germany as a fundamental component part of the peace order in Europe...Because the border between our states is now definite it puts an end to mistrust. Now people, Poles and Germans, can meet anew. They learn that they can make a joint contribution to the emerging Europe. A border that is not being questioned does not divide, it unites.”⁸⁶⁵

Institutionalization of Security and Economic Cooperation

⁸⁶¹ “Bonn Passes Resolution On Polish Border Issue,” *The Washington Post*, March 9, 1990.

⁸⁶² Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 224.

⁸⁶³ For the text of the frontier treaty signed in November 1990, see Wolff, *The German Question Since 1919*, pp. 203-204.

⁸⁶⁴ Quoted in Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities*, p. 133.

The same desire to win the trust of surrounding countries and secure a long-standing peace order in Europe also accounted for Germany's championing of the expansion of West European community to Eastern Europe, including Poland. As soon as the unification process began, Bonn was aware of the uneasiness and even perception of threat that other European countries felt about a unified Germany. Although Germany had the choice to return to realist normalcy, using its power advantage to maximize national interests, political leaders did not want Germany to be surrounded by an array of mistrustful countries. They decided to endorse "multilateral, institutionally mediated systems" that "softened" or "tamed" its newly gained sovereignty power.⁸⁶⁶ The unified Germany opted to stay in NATO, and acted as the major supporter of Poland's accession to NATO and EU. As a result, German-Polish security and economic cooperation became institutionalized in the framework of the European integration.

As soon as the Berlin Wall fell, Genscher reassured American Secretary of State James Baker that Germany would retain its membership in NATO and the EC. "Germany will not go its own way. We will develop our policy together with our allies," said Genscher.⁸⁶⁷ Soon Bonn began strenuous negotiations with Moscow to get Soviet agreement on the NATO membership for the united Germany. Bonn promised large amount of economic assistance and offered to reduce German troop levels to allay Soviet fears. At the time, other European powers wanted Germany to remain in NATO. For example, British Prime Minister Thatcher spoke in March 1990 that it was necessary to ensure that a unified Germany was "rooted in NATO and the European Community; content with its borders; and democratic in its government, strengthens the security and stability of Europe as a whole."⁸⁶⁸ Realizing that he could not prevent the inevitable from happening, Gorbachev finally accepted Germany's NATO membership.

At the same time, Germany began the push for their expansion of these Western European institutions to the East. His Ten-Point Plan for Unification issued at the end of

⁸⁶⁵ "Speech by German Foreign Minister on Signing of Polish-German Treaty," November 14, 1990, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 16, 1990.

⁸⁶⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4.

⁸⁶⁷ Quoted in Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities*, p. 110.

⁸⁶⁸ Quoted in Jain, *Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991*, p. 212.

November 1989 included a point that the EC should be open to the East, beginning with East Germany and extending to “other democratic countries in Central, East, and Southeastern Europe... The EC must not end at the Elbe...”⁸⁶⁹ When signing the German-Polish border treaty, Genscher promised full support to Poland’s membership in the EC. Genscher claimed that “together with our partners in the EC, we are working to integrate Poland and other reforming states in central Europe into the market economy-oriented trading and economic system... The nearer Poland gets to the EC, the more intensively we can use this framework also for German-Polish cooperation.”⁸⁷⁰

Poland also had great interest in returning to the West, compared to which other options such as keeping a neutral or non-aligned status or realigning with the Soviet Union/Russia, were undesirable because they would either turn Poland into a buffer zone again or force Poland to rely on a country that it actually feared. If allowed to join NATO and the EU, Poland would obtain security guarantee and regional economic benefit without becoming dependent on either the Soviets or Germans. The first country that supported that Poland’s application to European institutions was Germany, whose position was crucial in persuading the U.S. and France to give their support. According to Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, Germany’s attitude on NATO expansion was that “Poland’s security (became) the security of Germany, and the security of Germany is the security of NATO.” In early 1993, German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe became the first major Western official to state his support to Poland’s membership in NATO.⁸⁷¹

From the early 1990s, German-Polish security cooperation made considerable progress. In 1993 the two countries opened their military academies and training facilities to each other’s military.⁸⁷² Before Poland officially joined NATO in March 1999, more than one thousand Polish officers had received training in NATO countries, mostly in Germany and the U.S.⁸⁷³ Bilateral military cooperation received another boost in a commemorative

⁸⁶⁹ Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities*, pp. 111-112.

⁸⁷⁰ “Speech by German Foreign Minister on Signing of Polish-German Treaty,” November 14, 1990.

⁸⁷¹ Millett, *Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities*, p. 141, 144.

⁸⁷² Andrzej Bryt, “Political, Economic and Cultural Developments in Polish-German Relations since 1989,” in Hein-jürgen Stüting, et. al eds., *Change Management in Transition Economies: Integrating Corporate Strategy, Structure, and Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 9.

⁸⁷³ Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War*, p. 93.

ceremony held at Westerplatte, where Nazi Germany launched its first attack against Poland in WWII. At the ceremony held on September 1, 1994, the head of German military, General Klaus Naumann, laid a wreath at the Westerplatte memorial as a gesture of reconciliation. During his visit to Poland, Naumann also signed a military cooperation agreement with Polish army chief of staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki. Naumann said the agreement proved that “the German and Polish armed forces have stepped out of the past’s shadow and want to forge ahead into a good future.”⁸⁷⁴ It paved the way for the first maneuver on Poland’s soil that included the German military. From September 12, NATO conducted a weeklong joint military exercise with former East Bloc countries outside Poznan in Western Poland. The exercise signified a significant breakthrough in bilateral security cooperation. As Volker Ruhe said, “anyone who knows even a little bit about history knows this is not a routine event when Polish and German soldiers are working together. It shows how well German-Polish relations are developing.”⁸⁷⁵

Poland finally received an invitation to become a full NATO member at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, after which German-Polish military cooperation was further tightened within the collective security system. In September 1998, the Polish, German and Danish Ministries of Defense signed an agreement to set up the staff and headquarters of a North-East Corps in Szczecin, Poland, which was tasked to strengthen NATO’s Northeastern flank.⁸⁷⁶ Since the new NATO was not a traditional security alliance only designed to balance a common threat, but also constituted a security community that ensured peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes, Poland’s membership in NATO diminished the danger of German-Polish armed conflicts.⁸⁷⁷ The high degree of mutual trust and solidarity was illustrated by a widespread public enthusiasm for bilateral military cooperation. According to an opinion poll conducted in 1998 by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), a leading polling center in Warsaw, Germany was the Poles’ second most favorite military partner (43%), only next to the U.S. (59%) and much more popular than Poland’s traditional allies like Great Britain (15%), France (14%), Russia (12%), and the Czech Republic (6%).⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁴ “German Soldiers Join Poles in Marking War’s Outbreak,” The Associated Press, September 1, 1994.

⁸⁷⁵ “The Cold War Armies Meet, Just to Link Arms,” September 15, 1994.

⁸⁷⁶ Bryt, “Political, Economic and Cultural Developments in Polish-German Relations since 1989,” p. 9.

⁸⁷⁷ On the increasingly dual characteristics of NATO, see Steve Weber, “NATO Expansion,” CIAO Case Studies, September 2002.

⁸⁷⁸ CBOS, Polish Public Opinion (Bulletin), July/August 1998.

Like their security cooperation, bilateral economic cooperation was also close and institutionalized during this period. It was a function of not simply the economic interests of the two countries but also Germany's policy of assisting the economic transition in Eastern European countries and pushing for their inclusion in the EC. The policy was designed to stabilize the domestic situation in these countries and mollify their feeling of uncertainty and suspicion about the German power. In 1989 Germany led the creation of the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of their Economies) program by the EU. By 1995, Poland had received ECU 30,394 million, or 35 percent of total EU aid to Central and Eastern European countries, more than any other country in these areas. Poland also received a 45 percent reduction of its debts from the London and Paris Clubs in 1994. Germany was the main contributor to these clubs. Such massive economic aid greatly improved Poland's economic conditions and prepared it for the accession to the EU. Poland's accession finally realized in May 2004. German support was crucial to Poland's economic integration with the West.

German-Polish economic interaction in the 1990s was indeed smooth and comprehensive. First of all, bilateral trade grew rapidly during this period. The total trade volume jumped more than four-folded in 1989-1999. Germany's share in Poland's total foreign trade increased from 14.2 percent in 1989 to over one third after 1993.⁸⁷⁹ While Germany was undoubtedly Poland's most important trading partner, Poland also became the tenth largest importer of German goods, and Germany's top trading partner among Central and Eastern European countries. In addition to the flourishing trading relations, by the mid-1990s Germany became the biggest foreign investor in Poland.⁸⁸⁰ Industrial cooperation also thrived, with Polish factories making product components or providing outward processing traffic (OPT) services for German companies in such areas as automobile, textile, and chemical industries. The two countries also developed close cooperation in cross-border regions. Under the supervision of an intergovernmental commission for regional and cross-

⁸⁷⁹ *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*.

⁸⁸⁰ Witold Malachowski, "Polish-German Economic Relations in the 1990s: The Track Record and Its Implications," in Stüting, *Change Management in Transition Economies*, pp. 18-24.

border cooperation, several Euroregions were established since 1991, and cooperation there spanned the areas of environmental protection, infrastructure, scientific research.⁸⁸¹

Bilateral economic cooperation made such big strides in the 1990s that the Polish public commonly viewed Germany as the economic future of their country. In the same survey by the CBOS in 1998, 61 percent of the respondents chose Germany to be the country that they wished to be Poland's closest economic partners, overtaking the next two countries Russia (31%) and the US (30%) by a large margin.⁸⁸²

German-Polish economic relations in this period were not only highly interdependent but also characterized by remarkable stability. Unlike the Sino-Japanese case, incidents of German-Polish economic friction were not messed up by the bilateral historical legacies and never escalated into political disputes. Although Poland recorded a trade deficit with Germany almost throughout this period, and the cumulative deficit was even bigger than Poland's annual export to Germany, the problem of serious trade imbalance did not spark anti-German sentiments among the Polish public. Hardly anyone in Poland perceived German economic policy to Poland as "economic invasion" or trying to take advantage of Poland, as the Chinese public did about Japan. Another issue of economic friction was related to German FDI. While a few ardent Polish nationalists opposed German investment because they thought Polish economy would be sold out to Germany, most Poles felt the investment should be increased. The Polish government sided with the majority opinion, appealing for more rather than less German investment.⁸⁸³

III. De-mythification of National Collective Memory, Historians' Dialogue, and Popular Reconciliation

After the Cold War, both the unified Germany and democratized Poland began to search for a new national identity, in the process of which the national collective memories of the two countries both abandoned self-centered, mythical narratives. The national

⁸⁸¹ Malachowski, "Polish-German Economic Relations in the 1990s," pp. 22-25. For a detailed study of German-Polish border cooperation, see Ann Kennard, "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional Integration: Trans-Border Co-operation on the Oder-Neisse Line," *German Politics* 4, No. 1 (April 1995).

⁸⁸² CBOS, *Polish Public Opinion (Bulletin)*, July/August 1998.

consciousness of the new Germany was firmly predicated on an unswerving commitment to European integration and a forthright acknowledgement of Germany's responsibility for the Nazi guilt, while the resurgence of a xenophobic, bellicose nationalism was largely contained. In Poland, the democratic transition de-legitimized historical mythmaking and propelled dramatic reform of educational policies and commemorative institutions in favor of an honest, balanced interpretation of the national history. Such a historiographic de-mythification process cleared political and ideological barriers in German-Polish historians' dialogue. In this period, such dialogues greatly deepened, not only contributing to a shared memory of their past conflict but also nurturing their sense of European community and European identity.

German National Identity and Historical Memory after Unification

In the wake of German unification, many expressed concerns about the resurgence of ultranationalism as Germany once again became strong and proud. Their concerns were supported by the dramatic increase of violent crimes in Germany against immigrants and ethnic minorities in the early 1990s. German official data show a hike of criminal offences with racist motivation from 270 in 1990 to 1,483 in 1991, and to 2,285 in 1992.⁸⁸⁴ Although neo-Nazi activism rose in both East and West *Länder*, it was feared that East Germans were more amenable to nationalism because of its short history of democracy and the high unemployment rate.⁸⁸⁵ The right-wing extremism won sympathy from the New Right, a nationalist movement made up of young German intellectuals who sought to normalize the Nazi past, free the nation from the so-called "guilt mythology," and shift the core of national collective memory to German sufferings. In an ad published on the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, representatives of the New Right such as Rainer Zitelmann reminded people that May 8, 1945 was the "beginning of the expulsion, terror, and new oppression in the East and the division of our nation."⁸⁸⁶ The New Right was hostile to immigration and a multicultural society, which they saw as deadly threats to Germanness. They also advocated

⁸⁸³ Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War*, p. 93.

⁸⁸⁴ Ingrid Skrypietz, "Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Germany," *German Politics* 3, No.1 (April 1994), p. 131.

⁸⁸⁵ Lilly Weissbrod, "Nationalism in Reunified Germany," *German Politics* 3, No. 2 (August 1994).

⁸⁸⁶ Jacob Heilbrunn, "Germany's New Right," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1996). P. 91.

a normal, self-confident “Berlin republic” free of the institutional constraints of the western community.

The New Right was a seemingly dangerous movement because it boosted a populist trend in German party politics. Not only that Zitelmann joined the FDP and tried to transform it into a right-wing party, but also some young members of the CDU showed interest in collaborating with the New Right. The influence of the New Right also lent support to far-right parties, such as the Republikaner. The central plank of Republikaner’s platform was to promote a new nationalism that was rooted in a German-centered rather than Holocaust-centered memory of the Nazi past.⁸⁸⁷

However worrisome, the right-wing nationalism in the 1990s was too weak to challenge the dominant progressive historiography. First of all, far-right forces were actually marginalized in German politics. Despite its initial limited success in local and state elections, the Republikaner failed to surpass the 5 percent threshold to enter the Bundestag in 1994. It also lost all of its state seats and most of its communal seats in the following years in the 1990s. The New Right’s attempt to push the FDP rightward also miscarried. Pressure from the party’s liberal leaders and the rank and file eventually forced the right-wing members of the FDP to quit the party.⁸⁸⁸

Second, the danger that former East Germany would provide a fertile ground for nationalism to thrive was overstated. According to a poll in 1994, 18 percent of respondents in the west but only 4 percent in the east “strongly” agreed with the statement that Jews were exploiting the Holocaust for their own purposes. Another poll in 1993 shows that East Germans were more willing than West Germans to accept foreign refugees fleeing from human rights violations in their own countries.⁸⁸⁹ It is true that the historical consciousness of East Germans used to blame the monopoly capitalism for German fascism but lack

⁸⁸⁷ Roger Eatwell, “Towards a New Model of the Rise of Right-Wing Extremism,” *German Politics* 6, no. 3 (December 1997), p. 167.

⁸⁸⁸ David Art, “Debating the Lessons of History,” p.26, pp. 30-31.

⁸⁸⁹ Hans-Georg Betz, “Perplexed Normalcy: German Identity After Unification,” in Reinhard Alter and Peter Monteath eds., *Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany* (N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997), p. 56.

painful reflection on Nazi crimes and the long-time anti-Semitism in German society.⁸⁹⁰ When redefining their national identity after the unification, the Germans grappled with the dual legacies of Hitler and the Cold War. One immediate step they took was to overhaul the higher education system in East Germany to restore academic freedom to history research. This included closing down certain colleges, dissolving or reorganizing the entire history departments of many institutions, and setting up structural commissions with equal representation of academics from east and west to revamp history curriculum.⁸⁹¹

Another important measure to bridge the social psychological divide between the east and west included youth programs held at sites of Nazi atrocities for pupils from across Germany. A much highlighted location for such programs was Buchenwald concentration camp in East Germany, where the 250,000 inmates included Jews, Soviet citizens, German communists, and members of ethnic or religious minorities. During the Cold War, Buchenwald was a site for exposing Nazi crimes, condemning monopoly capitalism, and praising the courage and heroism of the inmates from the Red Underground. After unification, the teaching model of Buchenwald was transformed. The Service Civil International brought numerous student groups comprising of both east and west German youth to Buchenwald, where they learned the horror of the Nazi persecution and the multi-faceted resistance campaign through seminars, on-site research, and dialogues between the east and west youth. These education programs promoted a common, more objective German memory and encouraged the youth to recognize and the danger of contemporary xenophobia and racism.⁸⁹²

Third, despite the reemergence of Adenauer-era conservative historiography centered on “German victims,” the progressive view of history focusing on the “victims of Germans” prevailed in commemorative activities and public discourses. War commemoration in 1995 was a milestone for the victory of the left. Official

⁸⁹⁰ On the highly politicized historiography of the GDR on German national socialism and WWII history, see Wolfgang Ruge, “Historiography in the German Democratic Republic: Rereading the History of National Socialism,” in Alter and Monteath, *Rewriting the German Past*, Herf, *Divided Memory*, Chapters 5-6.

⁸⁹¹ Siegfried Hoyer, “The Path to Academic Freedom: An East German Perspective,” in Alter and Monteath, *Rewriting the German Past*, pp. 265-268.

⁸⁹² Gregory Wegner, “The Power of Selective Tradition: Buchenwald Concentration Camp and Holocaust Education for Youth in the New Germany,” in Hein and Selden *Censoring History*.

commemoration of the bombing of Dresden and postwar expulsion of ethnic Germans from East Europe stressed the German initiation of the war rather than the acts of allied countries as the causes of German sufferings. On April 27, together with former Israeli president Chaim Herzog, and president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Ignatz Bubis, Chancellor Kohl attended an assembly at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp to memorialize victims of the Nazis. Commemorations were also held widely in other concentration camps on the anniversary of their liberation. Museums in all major cities staged exhibitions about Nazism.⁸⁹³

One distinct feature of the commemorative activities in 1995 was their emphasis on the perpetrator role of not just the Nazis but also ordinary Germans. When delivering the central official speech to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of war, Bundespräsident Roman Herzog explicitly stated that while the Nazi regime was responsible for the war, those who carried out Holocaust were “the Germans.” “The basic feeling of collective shame, as Theodor Heuss put it so well, was there and became clearer with time,” said Herzog. The *Bundestag* even approved Bubis’s proposal to turn January 27, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz into a German national day of remembrance for the victims of Nazi persecution and genocide.⁸⁹⁴

In the second half of the 1990s, the Holocaust-centered historiography further consolidated its hegemonic position in national collective memory. Several debates heightened public consciousness about the war responsibility of individual Germans. One surrounded the publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s book *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. Goldhagen argued that the German people willingly endorsed Hitler’s genocidal project because of their deeply rooted tendency toward “eliminationist anti-Semitism” dating back to the 19th century. While widely criticized among American historians for lacking historical evidence, this book was received by the German public with extraordinarily enthusiasm, rendering the so-called “Goldhagen effect.” The book was a best-seller in Germany, and the *Journal for German and International Politics*, a mainstream political and intellectual monthly in Germany, selected Goldhagen for the 1997 Democracy

⁸⁹³ Eric Langenbacher, “Competing Interpretations of the Past in Contemporary Germany,” *German Politics and Society* 20, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 97; Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 367-370.

Prize. Because the book accentuated personified German accountability, it served the German left-wing as a powerful weapon to counter the renewed conservative attempt to normalize Nazi past and downplay German guilt.⁸⁹⁵

Other important events of memory contestation included the controversy over the Wehrmacht exhibition from its beginnings in Hamburg in 1995, the 1998/99 Walser-Bubis debate between the revisionist German writer Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis, the leader of German Jews and a Holocaust survivor, and the 1999 *Bundestag* debate on the construction in Berlin of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews in Europe. These debates stimulated lively, fruitful public discussions on how to remember the nation's shameful past and placed German perpetration rather than German victimization firmly at the center of German national consciousness.⁸⁹⁶

Fourth, the progressive historiography was institutionalized through international arrangements of war reparation. In the Cold War, East Germany did not pay compensation to any foreign victims of Nazi atrocities and West German legislations on war compensation excluded claims by victims living in Soviet bloc countries. Even the pension fund that the FRG gave Poland in 1975 was neither war reparation in strict legal term nor sufficient to meet the demands of numerous Polish victims. After unification, the German and Polish governments agreed to establish a German-Polish reconciliation foundation, which committed German government to pay DM 500 million to Polish war victims. It was a sorry amount of compensation, given the huge number of claims by nearly 600,000 victims. It was only due to the relentless prodding of German opposition parties that situation began to improve. One outstanding issue in this political battle was the compensation for forced laborers, whom the German government had long denied of the status of Nazi victims and eligibility for compensation payments. In 1997 the Greens and Social democrats pushed for

⁸⁹⁴ Herf, *Divided Memory*, pp. 369-370

⁸⁹⁵ Geoff Eley, "Ordinary Germans, Nazism, and Judeocide," in Eley ed., *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism – Facing the German Past* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

⁸⁹⁶ Anne Fuchs, "Towards an Ethics of Remembering: The Walser-Bubis Debate and the Other of Discourse," *The German Quarterly* 75, No. 3 (Summer 2002); William Niven, *Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), Chapters 6-8.

government legislation to mandate compensation to forced laborers by German companies.⁸⁹⁷

A breakthrough arrived after Gerhard Schroeder of the SPD became chancellor in 1998 and the lawsuits filed by Nazi victims demanding compensation in German and American courts mushroomed, including the sensational success of a class-action lawsuit against Swiss banks. Mounting domestic and international pressure compelled a significant solution. At the end of 1999, German government and industry reached an agreement to each contribute half of a \$5 billion fund to compensate former slave and forced laborers. The *Bundestag* then passed the bill with a large margin of 556 to 42, a clear manifestation of the consensus across the political spectrum on the need to settle Germany's historical account. Beginning mid-2001, payments began to arrive in the hands of surviving forced laborers in 25 countries including Poland. As many as 500,000 Poles were eligible for the compensation, the largest among all the beneficiary countries.⁸⁹⁸ Successfully addressing a major grievance of ordinary Poles towards Germans, the settlement of forced labor issue contributed to the dissolving of emotional and psychological barriers to German-Polish popular reconciliation. Annual CBOS polls show that the percentage of Poles who considered German-Polish reconciliation possible increased from less than 50% in 1990 to nearly 80% in 2001.⁸⁹⁹

Democratic Identity and the Decline of Nationalism in Poland

Poland's democratic transition created a cosmopolitan, reconciliation-oriented national identity because the new political leaders relied on democratic values rather than communist ideology or self-centered nationalism to legitimize their power. The "Solidarity ethos" that served as the spiritual glue of the new regime was defined as an ideology "based on truth, dignity, community, Christian humanism, respect for the individual, and solidarity

⁸⁹⁷ Claus Hofhansel, "The Diplomacy of Compensation for Eastern European Victims of Nazi Crimes," *German Politics* 8, No. 3 (December 1999).

⁸⁹⁸ "Germans Agree to Establish \$5 Billion Fund to Compensate Slave Laborers," *The New York Times*, December 15, 1999; "German Parliament Backs Fund for Nazis' Slave Workers," *The New York Times*, July 7, 2000; "Poles Start Receiving Payments for Slave Labor Under Nazis," *The New York Times*, June 29, 2001.

⁸⁹⁹ CBOS, *Polish Public Opinion (Bulletin)*, July 1999, June 2001.

with the weak.”⁹⁰⁰ True that Solidarity value had a nationalist dimension, as the movement presented itself as the “national front of all patriotic forces.”⁹⁰¹ But the nationalist ideas that the Solidarity leaders promoted by no means embodied intolerance or chauvinism. Having fought the authoritarian regime for years, they deeply appreciate the merit of cosmopolitan, pro-West beliefs. Even the Communists were forced to adapt, abandoning ideological dogma and narrowly defined nationalism. As Vachudova and Snyder comment, “the democratic redefinition of the state, which took place under the aegis of former dissidents, granted state institutions a new legitimacy and marginalized extreme nationalism.”⁹⁰²

The impact of Polish democratization on national consciousness was directly felt in history education reform. The reform started in June 1990, when the government closed the Main Office of Control of Publications and Presentations, ending censorship of mass media and creating free space for alternative discourses. As a result, the formerly state-owned publishing industry quickly privatized, and education reform programs aimed at decentralizing the decision-making process of the educational policy were set afoot. In 1991 the Ministry of Education formed the history curriculum reform group consisting of historians with different opinions, backgrounds, and working experiences in the educational system. Three rounds of history curriculum reform ensued, producing three versions of the basic curriculum in 1992, 1994, and 1997.

While shattering the monopoly of the official communist historiography, curriculum reform projects also brought a variety of previously unofficial historical narratives into the classroom, some of which smacked of narrow-minded nationalism. To steer the national collective memory to a liberal, healthy direction, a new wave of reform began in the fall of 1997 to fundamentally restructure the Polish school system. After the parliamentary elections in September, the leadership at the Ministry of Education changed hands. The new Ministry leadership introduced a three-tier, compulsory 9-year elementary school system that

⁹⁰⁰ See speech by Halina Bortnowska, a liberal theologian and member of the Citizens’ Committee of Solidarity, in December 199. Quoted from Tymowski W. Grabowski, “The Party That Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Citizens’ Committees in Poland,” *East European Politics and Societies* 10, No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 239.

⁹⁰¹ Grabowski, “The Party That Never Was,” p. 223.

⁹⁰² Milada Anna Vachudova and Tim Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989,” *East European Politics and Societies* 11, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 7.

was more compatible with that in other European countries. In terms of the goal of history teaching, the new curriculum stressed the importance of teaching pupils moral, cultural, and social values, and directing them to not only learn about the national history but also understand the connections between the nation and the surrounding world.⁹⁰³ As the “Pronouncement on the Basic Curricula for General Education Subjects” published by the Ministry in 1999 summarizes, the reform was aimed to create a school system that while

“respecting the Christian system of values...embraces universal ethical principles,...serves to develop children’s feelings of responsibility, love for the fatherland and respect for the Polish cultural heritage while simultaneously being open to values of European culture and the world... Stress is put on developing abilities which prepare the students for a responsible life in a democratic society with a free-market economy.”⁹⁰⁴

This document indicated that history education in Poland would not indoctrinate the younger generation a nationalist ideology fixated on national virtues and repulsion to other nations but teach them to embrace a more cosmopolitan, pro-democracy, and pro-Europe perspective.

The final version of the Basic Curriculum, signed into law in 1999, made notable improvement than previous versions. Among others, two previous taboo topics received prominent coverage. One was the inglorious aspect of Soviet policy to Poland during and after the war. The other topic was the Polish-Jewish relations.⁹⁰⁵ While the first topic debunked a primary national myths created by the communist regime, the second topic advanced a balanced view of the relationship between the Poles and other ethnic groups and repelled the influence of another old myth, the Polish victim consciousness. Although rooted in the long-held prejudices in the society, Polish public ignorance about the Jews was encouraged and reinforced by the communist indoctrination. Before the 1990s the national curricula was silent on Jewish subjects. Only from the mid-1990s did Polish education reformers begin to address this shortcoming. Of particular importance was the Polish-Israeli Textbook Commission established in 1994 to evaluate the treatment of Polish-Jewish relations in each other countries’ history textbooks. In 1995 the Commission published its

⁹⁰³ Christine S. Parker, *History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999* Ph.D. dissertation (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, Department of Educational Policy & Leadership, 2003), pp. 175-184.

⁹⁰⁴ Parker, *History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999*, p. 152.

⁹⁰⁵ See “Figure 2: Comparison of Contents of Basic Curricula for gimnazjum, 1997-1999,” in Parker, *History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999*, pp. 185-186.

recommendations for future Polish textbooks, which were the Basic Curriculum that Ministry finalized in 2001.⁹⁰⁶ In addition to the textbook improvement, a Polish-Swedish pilot project for increasing Holocaust awareness among high-school students was set up in Warsaw in 1998 with the title “The Holocaust and Contemporary Forms of Ethnic and Religious Prejudice.” In the same year, the first teacher’s guide for primary-school multicultural education was published.⁹⁰⁷

Youth Exchanges and Textbook Cooperation: Toward Mutual Understanding and A Common European History

The end of the Cold War brought about an instant boom to German-Polish personnel exchanges, similar to the case of Sino-Japanese relations. While in 1989 only 7.2 percent of total foreign visitors to Poland were from West Germany, by the mid-1990s the ratio of German visitors had increased to over 57 percent. In 2000 Germans made far more trips to Poland than any other people in the world.⁹⁰⁸ But different from the Sino-Japanese contacts that were mostly limited to economic and cultural areas, Germany and Poland devoted an important dimension of their societal contacts to building a shared memory of past traumatic conflict. One type of such contacts was the thick network of youth exchange programs designed to foster understanding of each other countries’ culture, society, and historical perspectives.⁹⁰⁹ The other was the bilateral textbook cooperation project that continued and expanded in light of the new international settings during this period.

The most influential youth exchange programs during this period were organized by the German-Polish Youth Office (GPYO) founded in 1991. The GPYO was modeled after the Franco-German Youth Office that was created several decades earlier. Financed by the two governments and run by a board filled with Germans and Poles proportionally, its structure reflected egalitarian and bi-national commitment. The GPYO sponsored exchanges and workshops for youth and journalists, and training for teachers. Young

⁹⁰⁶ Parker, *History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999*, pp. 191-204.

⁹⁰⁷ Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, “Attitudes of Young Poles Toward Jews in Post-1989 Poland,” *East European Politics and Societies* 14, No. 3 (2000).

⁹⁰⁸ Poland Central Statistical Office, *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1991; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland, 2001*.

⁹⁰⁹ I appreciate Verena Blechinger’s help with my research on German-Polish youth exchanges in the 1990s.

students from Germany and Poland were brought together not only to learn each other country's language, social life, and culture and religion but also to develop deeper understanding of the history of bilateral relations through history workshops, internships at museums, and tours of Holocaust concentration camps.⁹¹⁰

Besides government-sponsored programs, a number of private organizations also carried out youth exchanges. One example was the German War Graves Commissions (*Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge*), which organized summer work camps for youth, including Polish students, to visit soldier's graves and war memorials in Europe and attend seminars discussing issues of war, peace, and international understanding.⁹¹¹ Another private organization, German-Polish Youth Academy (*Deutsch-Polnische Jugendakademie e.V.*) of the European Youth Exchange Network, organized exchange programs aimed at facilitating mutual understanding between German and Polish youth.⁹¹² In addition, the party foundations of major German political parties – Konrad-Adenauer Foundation for the CDU, Hanns Seidl Foundation for the CSU, Friedrich Ebert Foundation for the SPD, and Friedrich Nauman Foundation for the FDP – all provided scholarships for talented university or graduate school students. Part of the fellowship was to pay for students to participate in seminars and workshops, including those held in historical sites in Poland.

The other major mechanism for bringing German and Polish historical memories to convergence was historians' dialogue, which gained unprecedented momentum as the Soviet bloc collapsed and the democratization movement proceeded in Poland. Since mid-1989, historians from the two countries set out to write a handbook series to support history teachers in their classroom instruction on twenty “cross-points in the history of German-Polish relations” selected by the Textbook Commission. In the spirit of constructing a genuinely shared memory, typically two historians, one from Germany and one from Poland, would team up to work on each cross-point subject. They jointly wrote the text of every historical event, compiled relevant source materials, and laboriously translated all the text and source materials into German and Polish languages. In 1991, the first handbook was

⁹¹⁰ See the website of the GPYO at <http://www.dpjw.org/html/index.php>.

⁹¹¹ For information on the youth work camps organized by the German War Graves Commission, see http://www.volksbund.de/jugend_schule/workcamps/

⁹¹² See the website of the German-Polish Youth academy at <http://www.muenster.org/dpja/>

published as a model, followed by a number of more handbooks and also tool books containing shared glossary and pedagogical details.⁹¹³ Another evidence of more comprehensive, free historians' dialogue was the involvement of East German teachers who had been excluded from the German-Polish textbook cooperation project in the past.

In addition to shaping convergence in memories of bilateral relations, the Textbook Commission decided in the 1990s to expand the topics of historians' dialogue beyond those related only to Germany and Poland. True that the "Recommendations" published during the 1970s needed improvement, such as to include facts about Soviet occupation of Poland and massacre of Poles during WWII. But it would be too narrowly focused to only deal with the history of German-Polish relations. The German side particularly opposed paying excessive attention to Soviet atrocities because that would dilute German sense of their own responsibility. Therefore, at the 26th conference of the Textbook Commission in 1994, German delegates proposed to conclude the discussions on the history of bilateral relations that had been going on since 1977 and shift the textbook cooperation project to a new agenda.

Acting on the German proposal, historians began to examine topics related to Germany and Poland's relations with other nations, such as minorities and neighboring countries of Germany and Poland, not least the Jews. The Textbook Commission conference in 1995 was held under the theme of "The Germans, Poles, Jews from the Enlightenment Era to the Onset of WWII," the first time that the Commission had a conference theme that included a third party than Germany and Poland. Not only German and Polish historians but also Israeli scholars attended the conference. The next year the Textbook Commission sponsored a seminar entitled "Understanding the Others: The Contribution of History Education to Europe" in Berlin.⁹¹⁴ In addition, it published a new teachers' manual in 2001 that spelt out the reorientation of the bilateral textbook cooperation project. The following quote from the summary of the manual drives home its broader commitment:

"The teachers' manual will make it difficult to sustain a portrayal of history that mainly emphasizes the national dimension, national homogeneity, and promotes latent xenophobic rejection of foreign

⁹¹³ Kondo, *Kokusai Rekishi Kyokasbo Taiwa*, pp.139-142.

⁹¹⁴ Kondo, *Kokusai Rekishi Kyokasbo Taiwa*, pp.139-148.

influences. The multitude of perspectives, especially expressed in the didactical reflections and the choice of primary sources, is intended to challenge national narrow-mindedness and one-sided emotional evocations. It encourages a common European future based on universal values.”⁹¹⁵

Therefore, in expanding the scope of textbook cooperation to the complex ethnic, cultural and social history of Europe, the Textbook Commission intended to transcend the psychological obsession of the Germans and Poles with their own national history and cultivate an atmosphere of reconciliation and community for the whole region.

SUMMARY

Summary of theory-testing results for postwar (West) German-Polish reconciliation development in Table 14 indicates that, while both theories fit the evidence of Phase One and Two, historical mythmaking theory makes better predictions than realist theory for Phase Three and Four.

Negative structural conditions in the first two decades after WWII determined that West German-Polish relations were in the stage of Non-Reconciliation. The two countries were set against each other by both the security dilemma between the Eastern and Western blocs and by two issues of direct bilateral conflict – both being products of superpower struggle – the frontier dispute and the German Question. Meanwhile, ruling elites of both countries aggressively practiced historical mythmaking. The conservative ruling elites in Adenauer’s Germany encouraged German amnesia about Nazi crimes and German victim consciousness so that they could build a positive postwar German national identity, ensure electoral success, and justify the FRG’s foreign policy of western integration. The official historiography of the Polish communist government highlighted Polish victimhood and German perpetuation but whitewashed Soviet victimization of Poland and the Poles’ own inglorious relations with minorities. These pernicious national myths created combative narratives about each other nations, which greatly exacerbated the bilateral hostility both at inter-governmental and popular level that had been generated by structural factors.

⁹¹⁵ The text of this summary can be found at the official website of the Georg Eckert Institute for International

The superpower détente since the late 1960s changed the previous negative structural conditions towards neutral conditions, creating strong structural incentives for bilateral cooperation. In the context of détente, the social liberal government led by Brandt and later by Schmidt implemented a new *Ostpolitik* that Poland also welcomed with enthusiasm. The two countries normalized diplomatic relations, temporarily settled frontier disputes, and developed moderate economic interaction and more societal contacts, all characteristic of the stage of Shallow Reconciliation. But West Germany's image among Polish public would not have improved considerably if the Bonn government had not paid serious apology and financial compensation to Polish war victims and Poland's own anti-German official historiography had not been challenged by a liberalizing history profession. Also instrumental to promoting popular feelings was the historians' dialogues organized by the non-governmental German-Polish Textbook Commission.

Bilateral relations in the 1980s suffered some setback, mainly due to the impact of negative systematic conditions under the collapse of East-West détente and the tightening of the connection between Poland and Germany and their respective alliance. On the other hand, the two countries remained in the stage of Shallow Reconciliation without returning to Non-Reconciliation, contrary to what realist theory predicts. What served to cushion the structural shock were two important countervailing factors. One was the independent diplomatic agenda of both the opposition and ruling West German elites Germany to seek contacts with the East despite the new East-West tension. The other was the decline of nationalist myths in West Germany and Poland as well as the bilateral textbook cooperation during this period, which further increased the common ground between their historical understanding and promoted mutual trust despite the worsening of the systemic environment at the time.

After the Cold War ended, the international structural conditions were neutral for German-Polish relations because both countries felt security anxiety and uncertainty but also faced multiple foreign policy choices. Nevertheless, bilateral relations did not remain in Shallow Reconciliation, as realist theory predicts, but progressed toward Deep Reconciliation, due to two main driving forces. One was Germany's desire for early

unification and winning the trust of countries surrounding the new, unified Germany, as well as Poland's security and economic interests in joining the European community. These factors facilitated a permanent territorial settlement and institutionalized bilateral security and economic cooperation. The other driving force was the de-mythification of German and Polish national memories and the convergence of their interpretation of past traumatic conflict through extensive youth exchanges, German restitution policy, and the bilateral textbook cooperation project. These factors not only diminished popular grievances about past suffering and promoted mutual trust, but also cultivated a sense of European community in both societies.

Table 14: Theory-testing Summary: (West) Germany-Poland Relations

	PREDICTIONS		OUTCOMES	THEORY ASSESSMENT
	(I) <i>Realist Theory</i>	(II) <i>Theory of Historical Mythmaking</i>		
Phase One: 1945 to the Mid-1960s	N egative Structural Conditions predict Non-Reconciliation	C ombative Historical Narratives predict Non-Reconciliation	<p>Superpower struggle in Europe caused inter-bloc security dilemma, the frontier dispute, and the German Question; they determined the heightened expectation of bilateral conflict, national non-recognition, minimal economic ties, and hostile societal relations.</p> <p>Historical Mythmaking in West Germany and Poland caused combative narratives, reinforcing mutual threat perception and popular hostility.</p>	Theory I and II both have explanatory power
Phase Two: the Late 1960s to the Late 1970s	N egative Structural Conditions changing in the direction of Neutral Structural Conditions, predicting Shallow Reconciliation	C ombative Narratives changing in the direction of Conflictual Narratives, predicting Shallow Reconciliation	<p>Superpower Détente enabled West Germany's new <i>Ostpolitik</i> and Soviet permission of Polish positive response to <i>Ostpolitik</i>; they caused partial national recognition based on a temporary settlement of sovereignty disputes, moderate economic interaction, and reduced public tension.</p> <p>West Germany's limited measures of restitution partially addressed Polish public grievances; the decline of national mythmaking in both countries and bilateral textbook cooperation project promoted mutual understanding and mitigated mutual threat perception.</p>	Theory I & II both have explanatory power

Table 14 continued

<p>Phase Three: the End of the 1970s to the Late 1980s</p>	<p>Negative Structural Conditions predict Non-Reconciliation</p>	<p>Conflictual Historical Narratives predict Shallow Reconciliation</p>	<p>Renewed superpower tension caused the deployment of Euromissiles, inter-bloc confrontation over Polish Solidarity crisis, and Kohl's decision to refocus on <i>Westpolitik</i>; they determined greater danger of West German-Polish military conflict and scaling back political and economic ties.</p> <p>Domestic factors like the "Second <i>Ostpolitik</i>" the SPD in opposition, Kohl's desire to solve the German Question, and Poland's economic needs determined the maintenance of formal diplomatic ties, territorial agreement, and moderate economic interaction.</p> <p>West German national consensus on war responsibility, liberalization of Polish history discipline, and bilateral textbook cooperation promoted mutual understanding and trust, and prevented popular relations from returning to open hostility.</p>	<p>Theory II fits the evidence better than Theory I; Some domestic factors not included in either theory also have causal effect</p>
<p>Phase Four: the Post-Cold War Era</p>	<p>Neutral Structural Conditions predict Shallow Reconciliation</p>	<p>Conflictual Narratives changing in the direction of Convergent Narratives, predicting a trend from Shallow to Deep Reconciliation</p>	<p>The collapse of Cold War structure brought about Polish uncertainty about Germany and Russia, and compelled Germany to redefine its relationship with the East and West.</p> <p>Germany's desire for unification and the trust of its neighbors and Poland's security and economic interests in joining the European community brought about a permanent territorial settlement and institutionalized security and economic cooperation.</p> <p>De-mythification in German and Polish national memories and their convergence shaped through history-related youth exchanges, German restitution policy, and bilateral textbook cooperation promoted mutual understanding and even cultivated a sense of European community.</p>	<p>Theory II fits the evidence better than Theory I; Other factors such as German unification and European institutions not included in either theory also have causal effect</p>

Chapter Seven Conclusion

In the aftermath of traumatic conflict, erstwhile adversaries Germany and Poland have approached the stage of deep reconciliation, while China and Japan remain politically and emotionally antagonistic. Having examined these two cases with different outcomes of post-conflict interstate relations, this dissertation concludes that a history of traumatic conflict does not necessarily doom states to future conflict. Instead, how relevant actors interpret and manipulate public memory of the conflict history largely shapes the likelihood of reconciliation. Elite mythmaking of national history in order to fulfill immediate practical goals would bring about substantial divergence between the national collective memories of former adversary states and spur both mutual perception of hostile intention and virulent popular emotions. Although international structural incentives are instrumental in scrapping certain barriers to inter-governmental cooperation, without curbing pernicious historical myths and fostering bilateral historiographic convergence, a state of deep trust and harmony between both the governments and the societies would not truly arise.

This chapter first reviews the two theories of interstate reconciliation, realist theory and historical mythmaking theory, and assesses their relative explanatory power against the main evidence presented in the case studies. I then consider the extension of my arguments to other cases of post-conflict interstate relations. Finally, I discuss the implications of my research for international relations theory and draw some policy-relevant conclusions on interstate reconciliation and current Chinese and Japanese international relations.

Explaining Post-conflict Interstate Reconciliation

In this dissertation I use a concept of “deep reconciliation” to capture the state of successful reconciliation between two former enemy states. To be characterized as “deep reconciliation,” an interstate tie must meet two standards. The first is stable peace, which means the two states share a common expectation that armed conflict is not a conceivable

means to solve their disputes. So war has become unthinkable. The second yardstick is an amicable atmosphere between the people of the two countries: people should feel a sense of closeness and mutual trust; more importantly, history should no longer be a source of popular resentment against each other nation.

I propose two theoretical explanations for post-conflict international relations. The first is realist theory, the dominant theory in the field of international relations. This theory treats reconciliation as a form of international cooperation. According to standard realist assumptions, cooperation is rare in a world of anarchy and tends to take place only when states share common security interests. So realist theory predicts that the more common security interests states share, the more positive the structural conditions for their cooperation are, and the more likely they are to reach deep reconciliation. If their security interests are in direct conflict, states face negative structural conditions for bilateral cooperation, and therefore hard to reconcile. When the shared security interests dissipate or direct security conflicts attenuate, interstate relations are governed by neutral structural conditions. The two states may develop certain degree of cooperation but lack mutual strategic dependence and genuine trust. Such reconciliation is superficial and fragile. It is not deep but shallow reconciliation.

Realist theory also assumes that international balance of power pressure can trump preferences and interests at societal and individual levels. So the patterns of popular relations should completely parallel those of the inter-governmental relations without any independent dynamics. In addition, historical memory should not make any difference in shaping post-conflict interstate relations because ideas and human emotions are simply determined by or serve as justifications for states' national security interests.

The second explanation is derived from historical mythmaking theory, a theory that I build in this dissertation. A central concept of the theory is national myths, which are false representations of national history. These myths tend to glorify their own nation's actions and experiences, whitewash its wrongdoings, and blame others for all the mistakes and sufferings. They are usually created by political elites, especially ruling elites, to serve various practical purposes, including the need to justify national security policy, but also some

domestic political goals such as to boost regime legitimacy, facilitate social mobilization, or establish the dominance of a certain ideology. Myths do not become politically influential until they are widely disseminated and institutionalized by such tools as school textbooks, mass media, commemorative rituals, and war crimes trials. If both nations adopt myths as the core ideas of their collective memory, then they will sharply disagree on what happened in their past conflict and who should take responsibility for it.

What are the consequences of historical mythmaking for post-conflict interstate reconciliation? The theory argues that mythmaking can obstruct reconciliation through two specific mechanisms, emotions and intentions. Specifically, the victim country will hold deep grievances and a strong sense of historical entitlement toward the perpetrator state for their suffering in the past conflict. But the perpetrator country, because of its different interpretation of the conflict history, tends to think the victim's attitude is unreasonable and self-indulgent. Therefore people in the perpetrator country will develop such emotions as disgust and frustration toward the victim country. In terms of intentions, the perpetrator that evades its war responsibility makes people in the victim country suspect that it will launch new aggression again in the future. Meanwhile, the victim that keeps bringing up history and demanding contrition makes people in the perpetrator country believe that it poses a revanchist threat. These bitter emotions and perception of hostile intentions will then seriously aggravate mutual threat perception, poison popular feelings about each other nation, and also put great pressure on the government to adopt a hard-line policy when there are any bilateral disputes.

Therefore, historical mythmaking theory predicts that historical memory matters in international relations: the more states' memories of past traumatic conflict diverge, the less likely they will reconcile. When their historical narratives are combative, meaning they demonize the whole nation of the other country, and/or clash on issues with direct implications for the current boundaries of their homeland, historical burden will be placed in the center of bilateral relations and effectively block reconciliation process. If their narratives are conflictual over some important aspects of history but nevertheless do not blame the entire population of the other side indiscriminately or involve current territorial disputes, deep reconciliation would not take place but limited cooperation symptomatic of

shallow reconciliation would be likely. A variant of conflictual narratives is quasi-convergent narratives, where two countries agree on a shared but false historical memory. I argue that this type of narratives is usually based on political expediency and fragile, and would not promote genuine mutual understanding and trust. Only when the two countries adopt joint history-writing and substantial restitution measures would they be able to bridge the gap between their historical interpretations and embrace an honest, shared memory of their past traumatic conflicts. The theory predicts that historiographic convergence would lead to deep reconciliation because it could eradicate negative emotions, foster mutual trust, and facilitate comprehensive bilateral cooperation.

Chapters 3-6 tested the above two theories against the historical evidence of postwar Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations. The findings of both cross-case and within-case investigations are illustrated in Table 15. I argue that historical mythmaking theory provides a better explanation than realist theory for post-conflict interstate relations, but both theories have significant absolute explanatory power.

Table 15: Summary of Theory Tests

		PREDICTIONS		OUTCOMES	THEORY ASSESSMENT
		(I) <i>Realist Theory</i>	(II) <i>Historical Mythmaking Theory</i>		
China-Japan	1950s -60s	Non-Recon	Shallow Recon	Non-Recon	Theory I fit
	1970s	Deep Recon	Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon -Rapprochement	Theory II fit
	1980s -90s	80s Deep Recon 90s Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon -Friction	Theory I partial fit Theory II fit
(West) Germany-Poland	1950s- mid 60s	Non-Recon	Non-Recon	Non-Recon	Theory I fit Theory II fit
	late 60s -late 70s	Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon	Theory I fit Theory II fit
	1980s	Non-Recon	Shallow Recon	Shallow Recon	Theory II fit
	1990s	Shallow Recon	Deep Recon	Deep Recon	Theory II fit

First of all, the predictions of realist theory fit the reconciliation outcomes in only half of the total seven sub-cases: China-Japan 1950s-60s, China-Japan 1990s (but not the 1980s of the same sub-case), FRG-Poland 1950s-60s, and FRG-Poland 1970s. The theory is right that negative structural conditions constituted the key obstacle to reconciliation in the initial postwar phase of both cases, but it cannot explain why West German-Polish relations did not regress to the stage of non-reconciliation in the 1980s despite the systemic environment turned negative during the “second Cold War.” Similarly, the theory correctly predicts shallow reconciliation when the structural conditions were neutral in the Sino-Japanese case in the 1990s and West German-Polish case in the 1970s, but it fails to foresee the emergence of German-Polish deep reconciliation in the post-Cold War neutral system in Europe. Moreover, realist theory fails the test when positive structural conditions did not bring about deep reconciliation in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s and 1980s. In both periods, the favorable international environment merely sustained limited inter-governmental cooperation but failed to eliminate the relative gains concerns in bilateral security and economic relations, nor was it able to produce an amicable people-to-people relationship.

In contrast, historical mythmaking theory well explains six out of the seven sub-cases, a higher successful rate than realist theory. It only fails the test of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s, when non-reconciliation occurred even though the two countries’ war narratives were not combative but quasi-convergent, a special type of conflictual narratives. In this sub-case, the structural tension between the two power blocs that China and Japan separately belonged to dictated their political isolation and confrontation, while the conflictual narratives only explained the policy preferences of the two countries rather than the policy outcomes.

The pre-normalization Sino-Japanese relations stands in contrast to West German-Polish relations in the 1980s, where the systemic environment was similarly negative and the historical narratives were mutually conflictual but shallow reconciliation rather than non-reconciliation arose. The difference should be ascribed to the political legacies of *Ostpolitik* of the 1970s. *Ostpolitik* prompted some dramatic actions of restitution by the FRG government to address its historical debts to Poland, facilitated the onset of bilateral textbook cooperation project, and shifted elite opinions about history and reconciliation. In

the 1980s, not only that the West German-Polish textbook cooperation continued, but also nationalist mythmaking declined in both countries as a result of the galvanizing domestic debate on war history and national identity. As bilateral disagreement on historical interpretation narrowed rather than widened, their mutual perception of threat and popular feeling of animosity also moderated, effectively offsetting the adverse impact of the “second Cold War.”

Two caveats limit the relative explanatory power of historical mythmaking theory. One is that, in a few cases – FRG-Poland 1950s-60s, FRG-Poland 1970s, China-Japan 1990s (but not the 1980s of the same sub-case) – the two theories make identical predications. Process-tracing evidence shows that both structural power and historical ideas were at work in shaping the specific reconciliation outcomes in these cases and, in the sub-case of FRG-Poland relations in the 1950s-60s, historical mythmaking was not a decisive but just an aggravating factor. However, in those strong tests where the two theories make different predictions, historical mythmaking theory still performs better than realist theory.

The second caveat is that negative structural conditions tend to make such actions as apologies, reparations, and joint history-writing out of the question. Even in the European case, the trend of historical settlement did not first emerge until East-West détente created a more relaxed external environment for the FRG and Poland to develop formal contacts. This finding suggests the strong absolute power of realist theory, that certain degree of compatibility between states’ security interests is useful to enabling the reconciliation process. My case studies of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s and (West) German-Polish relations in the 1970s and 1990s also show that whenever the structural environment improved, inter-governmental relations also progressed.

The weakness of realist theory mainly lies in the limited government ability to dictate popular relations, as demonstrated in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. Chinese and Japanese governments were able to create an atmosphere of friendship boom through propaganda campaigns and manipulation of public opinions, but they failed to impose genuine mutual trust and understanding between the two nations because they clung to pernicious national myths. Based on the findings of this sub-case and the German-Polish

deep reconciliation in the 1990s despite neutral structure context, I argue that positive international structure is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for deep interstate reconciliation.

My study also supports the absolute power of historical mythmaking theory. Historical ideas like national myths clearly have independent power in shaping international relations. In all four countries examined in this dissertation, historical myths are not totally penetrated by the international power structure but also shaped by domestic political and ideological motivations. Elite mythmaking is more likely driven by national security interests under negative structural conditions than under neutral or positive conditions. But even with the negative external environment in Sino-Japanese and West German-Polish relations in the 1950s-60s, such internal goals as consolidating ruling power to counter the political opponents, constructing certain type of national identity, or mobilizing public support for government political and economic policies played a significant role in framing the main parameters of national myths.

In addition, national myths can generate policy outcomes independent of their creators. On the one hand, elites create national myths to serve practical purposes. On the other hand, once in place, historical myths can create negative emotions and perception of hostile intentions. These two mechanisms cannot be easily shut down at will, and can seriously constrain government policy options.

But this theory also has its limitations. Investigation of German-Polish relations in the 1990s indicates that historiographic convergence alone may not be a sufficient condition for deep reconciliation, either, even though it is undoubtedly a necessary condition. In this sub-case, Germany's desire for quick unification and secure surrounding environment after unification was a main driving force for its steadfast commitment to staying in the European integration itself as well as incorporating Poland into the European community. The German overture was well accepted by Poland, who also had strong economic and security interests in rejoining the European community. True that the thriving societal exchanges related to historical studies, German restitution diplomacy to Poland, and bilateral textbook cooperation all contributed to mutual understanding and trust. But without the parallel

process of European integration, Germany and Poland may not have developed such tight, institutionalized security and economic cooperation so fast.

Future Research

In this dissertation I tested realist theory and historical mythmaking theory against two cases of post-conflict interstate relations that evolved in largely comparable systemic context but arrived at the stages of shallow reconciliation and deep reconciliation respectively. The current research can be advanced by applying my theoretical findings to more cases with different initial structural settings and eventual outcomes. Specifically, my argument regarding the relative power of international structural factors versus historical ideas in shaping interstate reconciliation is applicable to two more categories of cases, other things being equal. The first category includes cases where the systemic environment is favorable to reconciliation, such as postwar Japanese-South Korean relations and Greco-Turkish relations. The second category refers to cases with the final outcome of interstate non-reconciliation that has not been included in the dissertation. A typical example of this category is Israeli-Palestinian relations. With the acknowledgement that area-specific knowledge and language skills are needed for a in-depth, systematic study of these different cases, below I offer a preliminary probe to demonstrate the general applicability of my arguments.

Postwar Japanese-South Korean relations developed in the shadow of a history of traumatic conflicts. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea and completely deprived the Korean nation of its sovereignty. During the 36 years of Japanese colonization since then, not only immeasurable Korean national resources were looted and hundreds of thousands of people were tortured, killed, or conscripted – as soldiers, forced laborers, or even sex slaves – but also the symbols of Korean nationality, the Korean language and Korean names, were wiped out.⁹¹⁶ However, unlike in Sino-Japanese and West German-Polish relations where the former rivals were alienated by the East-West power struggle at least in the first two postwar decades, there were never any systemic obstacles to Japanese-South Korean reconciliation.

⁹¹⁶ For a classic overview of the legacies of Japanese colonization of Korea, see Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), Chapter 1.

These two countries belonged to the Western bloc through their separate alliances with the U.S. during the entire Cold War period. But the positive structural conditions did not bring about reconciliation. Despite repeated U.S. push for their rapprochement since the late 1940s, Japan and South Korea failed to come close to establish a normal diplomatic relationship until the mid-1960s. Even after they signed the Basic Treaty in 1965, the inter-governmental ties were characterized by a high degree of volatility, and popular relationship barely improved from the open hostility of the pre-normalization period. Only from the early 1990s did twilight of deep reconciliation begin to appear, but it happened after the Cold War international structure had dissolved.

With the systemic factor playing a minimal role, Japanese-South Korean relations were largely shaped by the interplay among non-systemic variables. In the 1950s, domestic conditions were least favorable to reconciliation because the Rhee Syngman government hinged its regime legitimacy and nation-building strategy on fanning the flame of anti-Japanese nationalism among the public. With his heavy-handed dictatorship, Rhee was able to set the tone for a hostile policy to Japan. In Japan, pro-South Korea forces were nearly non-existent, due to the general lack of interest in that country. As a result, historiography in both countries was grossly mythified, constituting the largest impediment to bilateral reconciliation. In South Korea, history textbooks and media propaganda never relented to accentuate memory of Japanese brutality and Korean suffering, but lacked adequate studies of the current Japanese society and government that might have modified the public stereotypes of Japan.⁹¹⁷ In Japan, the memory of the colonial experiences was truncated by an elite-sponsored national amnesia. The Japanese government refused to make concessions on issues of historical responsibility and compensation during the bilateral negotiation, and the society had nothing but ignorance of and contempt for Korea. Even the Japanese leftists, while protesting Rhee's dictatorial rule, failed to reflect on the historical trauma that Japan inflicted on the Koreans.⁹¹⁸

⁹¹⁷ Kazuhiko Kimijima, *Kyōkasho no Shisō: Nihon to Kankoku no Kingendaishi (Textbook Thoughts: Modern and Contemporary History of Japan and Korea)* (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1996), pp. 56-58; Tsutomu Nishioka, "Sengo Kankoku Chishikijin no Nihon Ninshiki (Postwar Korean Intellectuals' Perception of Japan)," *Chōsen Kenkyū (Korea Studies)* No. 6-11 (1983).

⁹¹⁸ Tsutomu Nishioka, "Zasshi 'Sekai' Wa Chōsen o Do Mita Ka? (How Does the Journal 'Sekai' View Korea?)," *Chōsen Kenkyū* No. 1-3, 7 (1980). On the history issue as a major stumbling block in Japanese-South Korean normalization negotiation in the 1950s, see Dong-Jo Kim, *Kannichi no Wakai: Nihon Kōshō Jūyō*

After Park Chung Hee took power by a coup in 1961, domestic conditions turned more favorable to reconciliation. The Park government made economic modernization the top policy priority, to realize which it needed large amount of financial and technological aid from Japan. For Japan, cooperating with South Korean was also beneficial to its economy that was increasingly reliant on foreign market. In order to obtain early diplomatic normalization, both governments compromised on history-related issues, with Park making concessions on Korea's property claims to Japan and Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburō issuing an apology speech in Seoul on the eve of treaty signature. But all these measures were taken in a tactical, politically motivated matter without truly settling the bilateral historical account.

National historiography since the 1960s continued to be manipulated by political interests, which prevented popular reconciliation from progressing and also hurt political relationship. True that the Park government adjusted education policy in the 1970s to promote “national history education” that aimed more at constructing South Korea's national identity under the condition of national division than at stimulating anti-Japanese sentiments. But until the beginning of 1990s, South Korean textbook coverage of Japan still centered on the colonial period and postwar Japanese history was completely missing. Japanese textbooks also maintained an imperialistic view of history, trying to justify Japan's colonization of Korea rather than reflect on its historical responsibility.⁹¹⁹ Japanese official apologies were deliberately kept vague, and the financial packages it extended to South Korea were dubbed the name of economic aid rather than compensation.⁹²⁰ Neither was any serious transnational historian's dialogue held before the end of the 1980s. So it was hardly

Nen no Kiroku (Korea-Japan Reconciliation: Seoul's Negotiator Recollects Normalization Talks) (Tokyo: The Simul Press, INC., 1993), pp. 3-95; Sōji Takasaki, *Kenshō Nihon-Kaidan (Investigating Japanese-Korean Negotiation)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp.1-64.

⁹¹⁹ Kimijima Kazuhiko, “Rekishi Kyōkasho o Meguru Nihon-Kankoku no Taiwa (Japan-Korea Dialogues on History Textbook),” *Rekishigaku Kenkyū (Journal of Historical Studies)* No. 651 (October 1993, An Extra Edition).

⁹²⁰ Japanese official apologies to South Korea in the 1970s-80s were largely modeled on the sentence that Shiina said in 1965: “We feel great regret and deep remorse over the unhappy phase in the long history of relations between the two countries.” This statement conspicuously left out who caused the “unhappy phase” and what happened during that phase. When Emperor Showa apologized to visiting South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in September 1984, he used almost identical expression except that he dropped the word “remorse.” In his statement on the following day, Prime Minister Nakasone clearly specified that it was Japan that caused “great suffering” to South Korea. But even his statement failed to include the word “remorse” or “apology.” See Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia*, Chapter 14, “The Political History of Japan's Apology Diplomacy.”

surprising that the Sino-Japanese textbook controversy in 1982 quickly spread to South Korea and escalated into a major political dispute.⁹²¹

The momentum for Japanese-South Korean reconciliation in the 1990s was primarily not structural because the Cold War had ended. Even the existence of the common North Korea threat was not a persuasive explanation, given that the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia continued to serve as effective deterrence and inter-Korea reconciliation was under way. Instead, increasing bilateral historiographic convergence accounted for the reconciliation progress. The triumph of the democratization movement in South Korea dramatically diminished the political motivation to use xenophobic propaganda to strengthen regime legitimacy. New South Korean leaders staked their political fate mainly on the fulfillment of such agendas as reinvigorating economy, improving legal order, combating corruption, and unifying the Korean nation through peaceful dialogues. In order to achieve these goals, close cooperation with Japan in various areas is considered highly important. President Kim Dae-jung in particular strongly believed that reaching deep reconciliation with Japan in the earliest possible time was in the long-term interest of the Korean nation. Kim's personal enthusiasm and charismatic leadership captured the imagination of the two nations and largely nullified stubborn opposition on either side against reconciliation. Meanwhile, ROK's democratization, its diplomatic normalization with Soviet Union/Russia and China, as well as the simultaneous entry of two Koreas into the UN quickly ended Japanese public antipathy to the Seoul regime. The Japanese government was interested in expanding cooperation with neighboring countries such as South Korea in order to attain greater international influence and prestige for Japan.

It was against such a backdrop of increasing domestic consensus on bilateral cooperation that the trend of historical settlement was set afoot. Different from before, Japanese official apologies about the colonial history were now much more forthright. When President Roh Taewoo visited Japan in 1990, Emperor Akihiko explicitly remarked that Japan brought suffering to Korean people during an "unhappy phase," for which he expressed the "deepest regret." The milestone in Japanese official contrition was the signing of the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration in 1998, when Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo

⁹²¹ Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism*, 185-196; Lee, *Japan and Korea*, 141-151.

expressed “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” and President Kim Dae-jung accepted this apology with a future-oriented vision about their relationship. This was the most significant step made by the two governments to address bilateral historical debts. Outside the government, since the end of 1980s historians of the two countries have held multiple workshop series to conduct joint history textbook research. While the first two stages of the historians’ dialogues, 1988 and 1991-93, focused on examining the weak points in Japanese textbook coverage of bilateral relations history, from the third stage of 1998-2000 the project extended to mutual critiquing of history textbooks. The goal of the current fourth stage starting from 2000 is to produce reference books based on the joint research to be used by secondary school history teachers in both countries.⁹²² Although not sponsored by governments, the textbook cooperation projects have made such prominent progress that their teaching recommendations have been gradually reflected in the history textbooks in both countries published in the recent decade.

The path leading to thorough historical settlement between Japan and South Korea is by no means straightforward. There are still many issues that have yet to be satisfactorily addressed, including most notably the lack of official Japanese apology and material compensation to Korean sex slaves and forced laborers. In the meantime, right-wing nationalism in Japan has grown more aggressive in a startling backlash against the apologetic moves by the government and progressive historians, which then provokes anti-Japanese sentiments among the South Korean public. Another challenge to attaining deep reconciliation between the two nations is for Japan to settle the historical account with North Korea. If handled poorly, the history issue may flare up again in the future, especially after Korean unification, and spark new hatred of Japan among the Korean people in both the north and south. Despite these potential problems, one can still claim cautious optimism for Japanese-South Korean reconciliation because of the increasingly open, resilient, and active citizens’ movements in both countries, who will tenaciously push for deep-going and widespread campaigns of historical settlement in the future.

⁹²² For an overview of the four stages of the development of Japanese-South Korean textbook cooperation projects, see Kazuhiko Kimijima, “Kyōkasho Kokusai Kōryū no Keiken Kara Mita ‘Kokumin no Rekishi’.”

Another case of post-conflict dyad that enjoyed similarly positive structural conditions is the postwar Greco-Turkish relations. Situated on the cultural fault line between the Eastern and Western civilizations, the two countries had a long history of conflict dating back to more than two thousand years ago, such as during the Trojan War and the Battle of Marathon. More recent traumas include the brutal Ottoman rule of Greece from the 15th century until the early 19th century, the bloody clashes during the Greek War of Independence in 1821-28, and Turkish resistance against Greek invasion in 1919-21. After WWII, the Eastern Mediterranean region became a focal point of American-Soviet power struggle. The famous Truman Doctrine that set the stag for the Cold War was issued exactly because the US government wanted to show its determination to prevent Soviet expansion to Greece and Turkey. Washington extended generous economic aid to both countries, and in 1952 brought them into NATO.

Despite their simultaneous memberships in the Western collective defense system, Greece and Turkey were mired in outright confrontation in both inter-governmental and popular dimensions throughout the Cold War era. In 1974, a full-scale war almost broke out when Turkey invaded the disputed island of Cyprus. The high degree of security tension between the two US allies would be hard to explain without taking into account the political manipulation of history that elites in both countries employed to legitimize their ruling power. Postwar Greek and Turkish national identity was defined on the basis of hatred and hostility to each other country. Textbooks typically included a militant interpretation of history that glorified their own nation, whitewashed their atrocities, and belittled the other nation. So for generations “Greeks and Turks have been educated to become antagonists and opponents.”⁹²³ As one student of contemporary Greco-Turkish relations comments, the case “follows the by now well-established finding that the existence of the other side as the ‘enemy’ is vital for the preservation of the ingroup-outgroup boundary. Arguably, the ultimate stumbling block to genuine rapprochement between Turk and Greek can be traced to the national historical narrative and the resultant national identity, an essential ingredient of which is the need to despise and belittle ‘the other’.”⁹²⁴

⁹²³ Hercules Millas, “History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey,” *History Workshop* No. 31 (1991).

After the Cold War, bilateral disputes such as the Cyprus issue and the boundary controversy in Aegean persisted and even twice drove the two countries to the brink of war in 1996 and 1998 respectively.⁹²⁵ Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1990s the push for reconciliation strengthened, due to a range of factors including the liberalization of political system and culture in the two countries, the linkage between regional stability and the pending EU enlargement to Cyprus and Turkey, and business interests in bilateral cooperation.⁹²⁶ A turning point came in 1999 when a terribly destructive earthquake hit both Turkey and Greece that promoted a wave of mutual humanitarian aid and public emotions of solidarity. Since then the two governments have developed broad cooperation and taken restraint in coping with bilateral disputes. Right now it is still too early to predict the durability of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement because the mutual suspicion and ill feeling held by the ordinary people will not abate quickly. But hope for their long-term, deep reconciliation arose when, following the “earthquake diplomacy,” the two governments agreed to review each other’s school textbooks. According to this agreement, a joint textbook commission has been established to rewrite textbook coverage of the history of bilateral relations in the spirit of ending their combative historical narratives and constructing a shared memory of their past traumatic conflicts.⁹²⁷

As for the second category of cases for further research, Israeli-Palestinian relations is a classic example of persistent non-reconciliation after traumatic conflicts. Although the Palestinians did not win self-rule until the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was inaugurated in 1993 according to the Oslo Accords, I treat Palestine as a national entity whose national aspirations greatly solidified after it was defeated in the 1948 Israeli War of Independence and began to strive for its own national independence.⁹²⁸ That war was traumatic to both the Israelis and Palestinians as each side committed appalling atrocities to the other. But the Palestinians clearly suffered much more because they lost a bigger part of their homeland and more than 700,000 of the Arab populations in Palestine were dislocated

⁹²⁴ Alexis Heraclides, “Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Detente: A Preliminary Evaluations,” The Review of International Affairs 1, No. 3 (Spring 2002), p. 28.

⁹²⁵ Erik Siegl, “Greek-Turkish Relations -- Continuity or Change?” Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs No. 18 (Summer 2002), p. 41.

⁹²⁶ Siegl, “Greek-Turkish Relations -- Continuity or Change?”

⁹²⁷ Jon Gorvett, “Truce Declared in Textbook War,” Times Education Supplement, 12/03/1999, Issue 4353.

and ended up in refugee camps in the Arab-controlled Palestinian territories and surrounding Arabic countries.⁹²⁹

After the UN-mediated armistice in 1949, a state of war persisted between the Arabs and Israelis and open hostilities repeatedly erupted, in 1956, 1967, and 1973. These conflicts inflicted further territorial loss on the Palestinians and human casualties to both nations. Moreover, for several decades they both rejected each other's national survival rights. Until the Oslo Accords was signed, the Palestinians did not recognize the Israeli state and the Israeli government insisted that Palestinians should be incorporated into the existing Arab states. After the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement at the Camp David, a large-scale Arab-Israeli war has been absent, but conflicts between the Israelis and Palestinians did not end. The Palestinian uprisings in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strips in 1987-1991 and from 2000 till today are the recent indicators of the total lack of bilateral reconciliation.

The post-1949 Israeli-Palestinian rivalry is first and foremost a territorial struggle, regarding who should have more or even full control of the land of Palestine. Other factors, such as religious and cultural clashes, are the consequences rather than causes of the territorial conflict. The interference of great powers and other Arabic states also did not create but only complicated or exacerbated their conflicts. The superpowers had much less success in building a clear-cut, stable alliance structure in the Middle East than in Asia and Europe, and the balance of power among the Arabic countries themselves had a high degree of fluidity.⁹³⁰ So the causes of Israeli-Palestinian relations were more internal than external, and more regional than global.

The theory of historical mythmaking seems a plausible domestic explanation for the failure of bilateral reconciliation. Elite manipulation of historiography accounted for the prevalence of pernicious myths in the national collective memory of both nations. After the 1948 War, the Israeli Zionists promoted "an extremely one-sided and narrow-minded

⁹²⁸ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

⁹²⁹ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's), 140-148.

⁹³⁰ A systematic study of the Middle-East alliance system during the Cold War can be found in Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Chapters 3-4.

ideology in order to mobilize the forces necessary for its (Zionism) fulfillment, consequently distorting the perceptions and ethos of the younger generation of Israelis.”⁹³¹ Palestinian political leaders also fostered an anti-Israeli nationalism to mobilize and sustain the resistance campaign. As a result, the school education and media propaganda of both sides purveyed flagrant historical myths glorifying their own peace-loving national character and military victories, blaming one other for provoking violence and blocking peace process, and whitewashing their own atrocities to the innocent women and children of the other nation. Moreover, both sides depicted themselves to be the victims of the conflict and disregarded each other’s pain and suffering. Israel used the history of Jewish victimization to justify its territorial acquisition in Palestine by force and claimed that Palestinian refugees left their homeland voluntarily. The Palestinian narrative accused the Israelis of causing the refugee problem but conspicuously neglected the Holocaust history. Besides, negative stereotypes prevailed in their portrayal of each other’s national image. Israeli and Palestinian textbooks refused to apply the term of “state” to the governments and territories of each other nation, and routinely used a hostile language that named each other “victimizer,” “gangs,” “terrorists,” and “incited mobs.”⁹³²

The two nations’ combative narratives about their conflict history was a major cause of the high degree of mutual hatred and mistrust that fed the perception of war danger and prevented the two sides from settling their territorial disputes and accepting each other’s national existence. Efforts to restrain historical mythmaking have been attempted in the recent decade, including the New Historians debate in Israel and the joint textbook research between Israeli and Palestinian historians. The New Historians is a group of young Israeli

⁹³¹ Mordechai Bar-On, “Historiography as An Educational Project: The Historians’ Debate in Israel and the Middle East Peace Process,” in Ilan Peleg ed. *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 23.

⁹³² For an overview of pernicious historical myths in Israeli and Palestinian national collective memories, see Stephen Van Evera, “Memory and The Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Time for New Narratives,” unpublished paper, 2003; Elie Podeh, “History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1848-2000),” *History and Memory* 12, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2000). For a comprehensive study of Israeli and Palestinian textbook content (both Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks for use in the occupied territories and the new textbooks published by the Ministry of Education of the PNA), pedagogical issues, and curricular development in the past decade, see Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations,” *Studies in International Textbook Research (Georg-Eckert Institute)*, Band 110/1(2004); Falk Pingel, ed., “Contested Past, Disputed Present: Curricula and Teaching in Israeli and Palestinian Schools,” *Studies in International Textbook Research* Band 110/2 (2003).

historians and social scientists who launched a crusade from the late 1980s against the mythical historical interpretation in Israel. Attacking the Zionist propaganda for instilling arrogance, prejudice, and hatred against the Arabs, the New Historians advocated an objective and self-critical reassessment of the Israeli historical experience.⁹³³ Besides, since 1990 the Georg-Eckert Institute has organized symposiums and seminars for Israeli and Palestinian historians to meet and discuss how to bridge the gap between the two nations' textbook treatment of their past conflicts.⁹³⁴ The prospect of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation will largely depend on whether the trend of demythifying national history and nurturing a common historical consciousness can win out in the contestation of collective memory in the two nations.

Implications for Theory

My dissertation contributes to theory of international relations in several ways. First, I question the decisive power of systemic constraints and argue that international relations theory should allow a major role for ideas. My study not only invalidates the realist assumption that ideas are subordinate to structure, but also advances the existing studies, such as the constructivist literature, that acknowledges the importance of ideas but fails to account for the origins of ideas or the causal mechanisms between ideas and foreign policies. My research provides a systematic exploration of both the causes and consequences of historical myth, an important ideational force in shaping post-conflict interstate relations.

Concretely speaking, I propose a multi-step approach to address the role of historical myths in interstate reconciliation that starts with determining whether political elites in a given country benefit from mythmaking and whether such benefit outweighs its cost. It should also examine the domestic political context to determine whether elites dominate the process of constructing national collective memory. It then measures the degree of divergence between the two countries' national memories and establishes causal links from

⁹³³ More on the recent debate between the old and new historians in Israel, see Bar-On, "Historiography as An Educational Project"; Jose Brunner, "Pride and Memory: Nationalism, Narcissism and the Historians' Debates in Germany and Israel," *History and Memory* 9, No.1 (Spring/Summer 1997); Haim Gerber, "Zionism, Orientalism, and the False Palestinians," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, No.1 (2003).

⁹³⁴ See the Editorial Note of Firer and Adwan, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations."

the historiographic divergence to the specific characteristics of mutual emotions and perceptions of intentions. Finally, it should process trace the impact of such emotions and intentions on government policies and popular feelings about each other country.

My dissertation also sheds light on the linkage between state-society relations and international relations. My case studies reveal that the elite-sponsored, top-down construction of memory does not eliminate competing voices from the bottom up. The formation of national collective memory is a process of constant negotiation and contestation between these different historical interpretations. The control of the institutional tools of memory-making does not always bring about a decisive victory in this struggle over the past. In authoritarian Poland in the 1980s and China in the 1980s-90s, for example, the society was able to pose a credible challenge to the official historiography by underground publication and schooling, mass demonstration, and a culture of cynicism. The two societies obtained new instruments of interest articulation and opinion advocacy because the Solidarity and Chinese reform programs caused the ruling elites to cede political power to the society-based sub-elites and the general public. So the changes in the state-society power distribution at certain critical junctures can alter the outcome of the national memory contestation and the degree of historiographic convergence with another state, significantly affecting their reconciliation development.

Another implication of my research concerns the importance of first-image variables in theory of international relations. Empirical evidence suggests that some government leaders, such as Mao Zedong, Adenauer, and Nakasone, presided over history manipulation with little concern about historical truth and the feelings of their own people and the other nation. They often did not believe in the myths they created themselves, and/or ignore the moral and international political consequences of these myths. However, other political elites attach great importance to presenting an honest history, upholding justice, fulfilling moral responsibility of their nation, and pursuing reconciliation. Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Richard von Weizsäcker are two good examples. The difference between these two types of elites may be ascribed to their individual personalities (e.g. narcissist vs. modest leaders), moral principles (e.g. the philosophy of ends and means), ideologies for nation-building (us-versus-them, self-centered ideology as opposed to cosmopolitan, liberal

ideas), and world views (valuing short-term practical gains or long-term peace and stability). So the personal attitude of political entrepreneurs to historical issues can play a critical role in shaping national collective memory and directing post-conflict interstate relations.

Implications for Policy

My dissertation is the first comprehensive study on the subject of post-conflict interstate reconciliation. The findings presented here contribute to the understanding of and policy response to contemporary issues of international peace and conflict. My dissertation particularly advances the study of Sino-Japanese relations. Historical legacy is commonly believed to have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations, but a systematic testing of the political power of history and the causal mechanism from history to bilateral relations is lacking. Filling this gap in the field, my dissertation has important implications for China and Japan's international relations.

So far the common approach to international peace has focused on terminating ongoing international conflicts through such means as international mediation and negotiation, arms control and disarmament, and confidence-building measures. But my research emphasizes the importance of post-conflict reconciliation to preventing recurring conflicts and attaining long-term, stable peace. My findings lead to an important policy prescription that world leaders who are concerned about interstate reconciliation should take historical memory seriously. Empirical evidence of postwar (West) German-Polish and Sino-Japanese relations clearly suggest that a shared memory between former adversary states about their past traumatic conflicts can greatly facilitate reconciliation while their memory divergence can obstruct reconciliation. Yet the normal ways of bilateral exchanges, such as economic and cultural ties, and official or non-official security dialogues, do not necessarily help bridge the bilateral memory gap unless they include the exchanges of opinion on historical interpretation.

My research particularly highlights joint textbook commission as an effective means to deepen mutual understanding of historical perspectives and promote the homogenization of national memory. Three lessons can be drawn from my case studies regarding textbook

cooperation and historians' dialogue. One is that a textbook cooperation project usually cannot proceed smoothly without government support, either financially or politically, but the historical dialogue itself should be carried out not by government officials but professional historians whose respect to academic integrity make them relatively impervious to the desire of instrumental use of history. Second, transnational historians' dialogue should critique textbooks of not just each other countries but also their own countries. Historians from two different countries can first lay out points of contention in the history of their interaction and present the interpretations of their own countries, and then jointly examine available source materials to evaluate these interpretations in order to narrow if now completely eliminate the area of disagreement. Finally, historians can contribute to the spread of a shared memory if they can incorporate the conclusions of transnational dialogue into school curricula at home and influence national collective memory.

My dissertation also illuminates the influence of regime type on international conflict and peace. Is democratization the necessary condition for interstate reconciliation? This question has important practical implications because it is commonly believed among Western policymakers that democracy can solve most problems of international conflict. But my research suggests that neither democratic states nor autocratic states are immune to historical mythmaking practices. Postwar history has seen crude political manipulation of historical memory in such liberal democracies as Japan and West Germany that constituted a major obstacle to their reconciliation with neighboring countries. Political liberalization is indeed contributive to the decline of national myths, such as in Poland after the Solidarity Revolution. But the onset of German-Polish textbook cooperation nearly a decade before the Polish communist regime was shaken by the Solidarity indicates that reconciliation process does not have to wait until democratization has taken place or succeeded.

Therefore, rather than to pursue the regime change in authoritarian states, which is often a daunting task and often creates instability both internally and externally,⁹³⁵ politics of reconciliation should instead focus on fostering a shared historical memory through joint history research. It is better to start such joint research sooner than later because the

legacies of earlier efforts, even if limited in academic depth and policy application, can prepare public opinion, build elite consensus, and create institutional framework for future work of reconciliation.

Another contribution is that this dissertation reveals the importance of historical memory and nationalism in contemporary Chinese politics and Sino-Japanese relations. Since the 1980s, Chinese official propaganda about national history has been focused on promoting an official nationalism that would facilitate social mobilization for economic reform and rapid growth strategy, stabilize the society, and enhance regime legitimacy. When promoting the official nationalism, the government resorted to pernicious national myths, including those that highlighted the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese nations. Such government mythmaking attempts inadvertently stimulated an outburst of anti-Japanese popular nationalism.⁹³⁶ While popular nationalism may be to certain extent conducive to national cohesion, it can easily turn into an anti-government force and stir social unrest.

Popular nationalism can constrain China's foreign policy options by forcing the government to adopt a hard-line position to the outside world. Not all scholars of contemporary Chinese nationalism believe that popular nationalism is potent enough to divert the fundamental course of Chinese foreign policy. Many point to the weak influence of public opinion on national policy-making in an authoritarian state, and argue that overall the Chinese government has exercised restraint when handling international disputes. These skeptics, however, overlook the reality that the reform and open-door policy has provided more public space for bottom-up emotional venting and policy advocacy, to which the government must cater to ensure its public support. The recent trend of media diversification, internet expansion, and the increasing influence of nationalist subelites also strengthens the power of Chinese popular nationalism. Meanwhile, the rise of the neo-

⁹³⁵ On the conflict-proneness of states in democratization process, Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield, "Democracy and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995); idem., *From Voting to Violence*.

⁹³⁶ On the domestic agenda driving the official discourse of nationalism and the distinction between official nationalism and popular nationalism in China, see Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 5, "The Official Discourse of Nationalism: Patriotism and the Constraints of Nationalism."

nationalist, arrogant perspective on history and foreign relations in Japan constantly incites China and provokes popular demand for extreme responses. The clash of Chinese and Japanese nationalism has severely destabilized Sino-Japanese relations in a number of ways: politicizing and escalating small, isolated friction into major diplomatic disturbance; preventing smooth, expeditious settlement of bilateral disputes; keeping controversial issues alive and inviting even more acrimonious disputes.

With Chinese economic success and military buildup and the resurgence of Japanese international assertiveness at the beginning of the 21st century, bilateral tensions have been particularly mounting in three issue areas. One is the increasing Sino-Japanese competition for energy supplies around the world, including the Russian oil pipelines through Siberia and potential oil reserves in East China Sea. Second is their territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Third is regarding the Taiwan issue, where China threatens the use of force to deter Taiwan independence while Japan fears that cross-Strait violence would not only jeopardize the security of its crucial oil routes from the Strait of Malacca to Japan but also entangle Japan into a catastrophic Sino-American war. None of these issues warrant another Sino-Japanese war, either due to their ambiguous strategic importance, such as the island dispute, or because alternative, peaceful solutions are much more attractive, such as on the energy security and Taiwan issues. However, if the hostile popular sentiment continues to grow, it would greatly exacerbate mutual threat perception, create a strong sense of zero-sum game between the two countries, and embolden hawkish policies. Therefore, popular nationalism can serve as a catalyst to future Sino-Japanese conflict that would otherwise be avoided.

Although realizing its danger of popular nationalism, the Chinese government has found it more and more difficult to reign in the popular nationalism that originally resulted from the mythmaking practice of the government itself. Clearly, the remedy to the rise of the baneful popular nationalism is to stop political intervention of historiography and nationalist history propaganda, and to allow professional historians to write unbiased, honest national history.

My dissertation also has implications for the study of Japanese foreign relations. Existing literature mostly emphasizes structural or material factors as the sources of Japanese foreign policy, such as external pressure from the United States, economic strategy, and domestic factional politics. Confirming the importance of these factors, my research identifies a new, increasingly significant constraining force on Japanese foreign relations, which is the emergence of an international normative context. Whereas the social democratic leaders in West Germany in the 1970s-80s took initiative to incorporate morality into their foreign policies to Eastern European countries, foreign policymakers in Japan, another major perpetrator country, had largely shunned the country's moral responsibility to compensate its former victim countries in Asia.

But with the spread of truth and reconciliation commissions and the concomitant diffusion of the ideas about morality, justice, and reconciliation in world politics, Japan can no longer insulate itself from the pressure of international norms. Such pressure is exacerbated by the widespread awakening of private memories in Asian countries of past trauma inflicted by the war of the imperial Japan and the increase of public demands for Japanese war compensation. The international moral offensive launched by Asian war victims and their numerous supporters all over the world in the past decade has not just brought Japan outright embarrassment and reputation cost, but also can severely damage Japan's economic and strategic interests. Japan needs to socialize itself with the new international normative tide that elevates morality and reconciliation in foreign policies, or its national goals and aspirations will be severely imperiled.

Appendix 1. Chinese Secondary School History Textbooks Examined In This Dissertation

Substitute Teaching Materials (STM):

1. *Chuji Zhongxue Shiyong Zhandai Keben: Jinbainian Shihua*, Xinhua Shudian, 1950
2. *Chuji Zhongxue Benguo Jindaishi Keben*, Xinhua Shudian, 1950
3. *Zhongguo Xinminzhuzhuyi Geming Shi: Chugao*, the People's Education Press, 1950

Middle School Textbooks (MST):

1. *Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1952
2. *Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1955
3. *9 Nian Yiguanzhi Shiyong Keben, Quanrizhi: Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1960
4. *12 Nianzhi Xuexiao Chuji Zhongxue Keben: Zhongguo Lishi, Shijiaoben*, the People's Education Press, 1962
5. *Quanrizhi 10 Nianzhi Xuexiao Chuzhong Keben Shiyongben: Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1978
6. *Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1981
7. *9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 4 Nianzhi Chuji Zhongxue Jiaokeshu Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1992

High School Textbooks (HST):

1. *Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1953
2. *Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1957
3. *Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, the People's Education Press, 1963
4. *Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Jindai Xiandai Shi*, the People's Education Press, 1992

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Beijing Review

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CBOS, Polish Public Opinion (Bulletin)

China Youth Daily

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Daily Yomiuri

The Economist

Far East Economic Review

FBIS Daily Report

Financial Times

Motion Pictures

The New York Times

People's Daily

Sankei Shimbun

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Tokyo Shimbun

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