



Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

Technical Report

MIT-CSAIL-TR-2004-083
AIM-2004-029

December 31, 2004

Neural Voting Machines

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Abstract

“Winner-take-all” networks typically pick as winners that alternative with the largest excitatory input. This choice is far from optimal when there is uncertainty in the strength of the inputs, and when information is available about how alternatives may be related. In the Social Choice community, many other procedures will yield more robust winners. The Borda Count and the pair-wise Condorcet tally are among the most favored. Their implementations are simple modifications of classical recurrent networks.

1.0 Introduction

Information aggregation in neural networks is a form of collective decision-making. The winner-take-all procedure is probably the most favored method of picking one of many choices among a landscape of alternatives (Amari & Arbib, 1977; Maas, 2000.) In the social sciences, this is equivalent to choosing the plurality winner, which is but one of a host of procedures that could be used to choose winners from a set of alternatives. More importantly, in the presence of uncertainty about choices, the plurality winner is not the maximum likelihood choice (Young, 1995.) To obtain a glimpse into some of the problems associated with winner-take-all, consider the analogy where the input is a population of voters. Then the plurality winner - that outcome shared by most of the voters -- only needs to receive more votes than any other alternative in the choice set. Hence it is possible for the winner to garner only a very small percentage of the total votes cast. In this case, uncertainty and errors in opinions can have a significant impact on outcomes, such as when only a few “on-the-fence” voters switch choices. We sketch two other procedures that yield more reliable and robust winners. These procedures utilize information about relationships among alternatives, and can be implemented as neural networks.

2.0 Plurality Voting

To provide background, the winner-take-all procedure is recast as a simple voting machine. Let there be n alternative choices a_i with v_i of the voters preferring alternative a_i . The inputs to the n nodes in a neural network will then be the number of voters v_i sharing the same preference for a winner. The outcome is

$$\text{plurality_winner} = \text{argMax}(i) \{v_i\} \quad [1]$$

which can be found using a recurrent network whose dynamics is described elsewhere (Xie, Hahnloser & Seung, 2001.) Note that no information about any similarity relationships among alternatives is captured in [1]. In other words, the Plurality voting method does not consider second ranked preferences of the voters.

3.0 Borda Method

To improve the robustness of outcomes, we now follow recommendations in Social Decision-Making, and relax the constraint that only first choices will be considered in the voting process (Runkel, 1956; Saari & Haunsberger, 1991; Saari, 1998.) Specifically, we include second (or higher) rank opinions, weighting these inversely to their rank when the tally is taken (Borda, 1784.) The minimum of these weighted sums is then taken as the winner. Here, we use the reversed Borda method, with the first choice given a weight equal to the largest rank, the weight on the second choice being the next largest rank, etc. The winner is then the maximum of these weighted sums. To further simplify the computation and the network design, we assume the alternative choices are related by a model M_n that is held in common by all voters. Each voter's ranking of alternatives is now not arbitrary, but is also reflecting information about choice relationships (Richards et al, 1998, 2002.) Note that the effective role of M_n is to place conditional priors on the choice domain.




Fig. 1: Borda count network for shared model M_n

Although the shared model \mathbf{M}_n has typically been represented as a graph, \mathbf{G}_n , it is more convenient to use the matrix \mathbf{M}_{ij} where the entry “1” indicates the presence of the edge ij in \mathbf{G}_n and 0 otherwise (Harary,1969). For the graphical model of Fig 1, we would have:

$$\mathbf{M}_{ij} = \begin{matrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{matrix} \quad [2]$$

Here, for simplicity, we assume that the edges of \mathbf{M}_n are undirected, meaning that if alternative a_1 is similar to alternative a_2 , then a_2 is equally similar to a_1 . However, directed edges require only a trivial modification to the scheme.

With \mathbf{M}_n expressed as the matrix \mathbf{M}_{ij} we can include second choice opinions in a tally by defining a new voting weight v_i^* as

$$v_i^* = \{ 2 v_i + \sum_j \mathbf{M}_{ij} v_j \} \quad [3]$$

where now first-choice preferences are given twice the weight of the second-ranked choices, and third or higher ranked options have zero weight. (This is the reverse Borda procedure.) The outcome is then

$$\text{winner_Borda} = \text{argMax}(i) \{v_i^*\} \quad [4]$$

A neural network that executes this tally is shown in Fig 1, and is a standard winner-take-all (WTA) network supplemented by an input layer. (The collection of WTA nodes in the “winner’s circle” does not show all the recurrent connections.) The i th WTA node receives a synapse of strength 2 from the i th input node, which in turn is driven by v_i . This twice weighted input to a WTA node is depicted by heavy double arrows. The i th WTA node also receives synapses of strength \mathbf{M}_{ij} from the j th input. These inputs are depicted by the slimmer arrows, each of which represents the assertion of an edge in \mathbf{M}_n . In the neural network, one possible implementation of these assertions would be a layer of neurons that inhibit inputs from v_i to v_j in the winner’s circle if edge $[v_i,v_j]$ is not in \mathbf{M}_n . The highlighted WTA node 3 is the Borda winner for the inputs v_i given in the model \mathbf{M}_n . Note that the more common winner-take-all plurality procedure would pick node 1.

4.0 Bias Vector

A disadvantage of the Borda Count is that a weighting on preferences is imposed depending on rank. In our simple model using only first and second choice preferences, the weightings were 2 for the first choice and 1 for the second. Let this bias be represented as the vector $\{2, 1, 0\}$, where the 0 is the weight applied to all preferences ranked after second choices. Then it is clear that the bias for the Plurality method is $\{1, 0, 0\}$. But we could also invent another bias vector $\{1, 1, 0\}$ that would weight the “Top Two” choices equally. More generally, a normalized bias vector will have the form $\{1, b, c\}$ with $0 < b < 1$ and $c = 0$ for our simplified preference rankings. But now we see that the outcome of a Borda procedure will depend on the choices for b, c .

To avoid specifying values for b and c , alternatives can be compared pairwise. Each agent then simply picks the most preferred alternative of each pair – the one with the higher rank in his preference order. This method, proposed by Condorcet (1785) is a tournament, where the winner is that alternative beating all others.

Definition: let d_{ij} be the minimum number of edge steps between vertices i and j in M_n , where each vertex corresponds to the alternatives a_i and a_j respectively.

Then a pairwise Condorcet score S_{ij} between alternatives a_i and a_j is given by

$$S_{ij} = \sum_k v_k \operatorname{sgn}[d_{jk} - d_{ik}] \quad [5]$$

with the sign positive for the alternative a_i or a_j closer to a_k . Note that if a_i or a_j are equidistant from a_k , then $\operatorname{sgn}=0$ and the voting weight v_k does not contribute to S_{ij} . Furthermore, as in the Borda Count, we again impose a maximum on the value of d_{ij} of 2, which means that third or higher ranked alternatives do not enter into the tally.

A Condorcet winner is then

$$\text{winner_Condorcet} = \textit{ForAll}_{i \neq j} S_{ij} > 0 . \quad [6]$$

Although a Condorcet winner is a true majority outcome, it comes at a computational cost. For n alternatives, a complete pair-wise comparison would require ${}_n C_2$ or $O(n^2)$ separate tallies. Hence a neural network that calculates the Condorcet winner is superficially more complex than that for the Borda winner.

5.0 Condorcet Network

To reduce the computational complexity to $O(n)$, the trick is to choose a special subgraph of G_n , namely g_k , with $k \ll n$. Conceptually, the subgraph we choose is a ridge in the landscape of Borda weights. The ridge consists of the k nodes in G_n with the highest Borda scores. This choice is based on the observation that for connected random graphs with weights chosen from a uniform distribution, there is a 90% likelihood that the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner will agree.

5.1 Specifics for the subgraph g_k .

Let the Borda rank vector be $\{2,1,0\}$ as before, with the Borda scores v_i^* for each vertex i in G_n . Without loss of generality, label the vertices in G_n by the rank order of their Borda score, with vertex $i = 1$ having the largest score. In cases where the Borda scores are tied, simply choose the indexing arbitrarily among the tied vertices to create a total order. (If necessary, when ties occur for the k th and $k+1$ vertices, the size of g_k may be increased to include all vertices with scores identical to the k th ranked score.)

Definition: g_k is the spanning subgraph of G_n containing the vertices with the top k Borda scores.

Note that other definitions are possible. For example, we could require that g_k be a connected subgraph. In this case, for some G_n , g_k may not include all the top k Borda scores. Or, rather than ordering vertices using their Borda scores, the Top-Two bias vector $\{1, 1, 0\}$ could be used. This latter choice may be more appropriate for scale-free graphs or trees with long paths between large clusters. The principal advantages of our definition are (i) ease of computation and (ii) uniqueness.

5.2 Sketch of a Neural Network

Here, our objective is to obtain a crude sense of the complexity of a plausible neural network that calculates a winner for g_k . There are three design challenges: (1) finding g_k , (2) computing the Condorcet winner for each pairwise comparison, and (3) to determine which alternative (node) beats all others. We assume that the maximum Borda ridge (nodes in g_k) has already been found. If g_k can be unconnected as defined, then a clipping algorithm might suffice. Alternatively, if we wish to impose a connectivity constraint on g_k , then some form of a greedy algorithm beginning at vertex $i = 1$ seems appropriate. Simulations based on random graphs G_n , for $n=40$ with edge probability $1/4$ and weights chosen from a uniform distribution show that in over 96% of cases, the winners with $k=8$ are the same regardless whether the definition of g_k is satisfied precisely, or found using a greedy algorithm. This equivalence might be expected, because the vertices with the

highest Borda scores will typically have the largest vertex degrees and hence the greatest connectivity. In either case, this step is of complexity $O(n)$.

The second challenge is to implement ${}_k C_2$ pairwise comparisons [Eq. 5]. The trick requires noting whether the vertices being compared are adjacent or not. Consider first the case where two vertices in \mathbf{g}_k are not adjacent in \mathbf{G}_n (and hence also not adjacent in \mathbf{g}_k .) Then we simply need to sum the weights of the neighbors to each vertex, plus the weight of the vertex itself, and then compare these two weight sums to determine the pairwise winner. Note that this is equivalent to using the Top-Two bias vector $\{1,1,0\}$ for each vertex, and then picking that vertex with the largest score. If the two vertices being contested are adjacent, however, then note that the weight of each vertex will be added to the score of the competing vertex. Hence the weights of the vertices themselves will be cancelled if the Top-Two bias vector is used. The patch is simple: just double the weight of each vertex when adjacent vertices are being contested. This is the Borda bias vector $\{2,1,0\}$. Hence, when calculating each pairwise Condorcet score, the rule is to use a Top-Two bias vector $\{1,1,0\}$ when vertices are non-adjacent in \mathbf{G}_n , and to use the Borda bias vector $\{2,1,0\}$ when adjacent (Richards et al, 2002.) This requires making explicit whether or not the ${}_k C_2$ edges in \mathbf{g}_k are adjacent or not in \mathbf{G}_n .

The third challenge is to determine that node or vertex beating all others. As will be seen below, this can be handled easily by a logical AND of the WTA outputs from each pairwise comparison.

Fig. 2 depicts a \mathbf{g}_k network with six layers. The computation is carried out as follows:

- (i) the k -maximum Borda ridge (nodes in \mathbf{g}_k) is given, as well as the neighborhood sums in \mathbf{G}_n for each node in \mathbf{g}_k .
- (ii) activate the ${}_k C_2$ set of nodes in an “edge assertion” layer to make explicit which edges in \mathbf{M}_n are present in \mathbf{G}_n (as was done previously in the Borda network.) Note that this activation controls inputs to both the neighborhood sums layer, as well as to nodes in the comparator layer.
- (iii) for every node in \mathbf{g}_k , find the sum of the weight of vertex i and its neighbors (neighborhood sums.) Again, this step is analogous to that used in the Borda network of Fig. 1, except at this stage the sum uses the “Top-Two” bias vector. The second input for the weight of vertex i itself will be added in step (iv) depending upon edge connectivity in \mathbf{G}_n .





Fig. 2: Condorcet network for G_n , $n = 9$; with subgraph g_k , $k = 4$ (heavy edges.) Note that Borda counts for nodes 1,2,3,4 are respectively 17, 14, 18, 14.

- (iv) project the “Top-Two” activity of neighborhood node sums onto each member of a pair of nodes in the “comparator” layer that has the same vertex label.
- (v) project the weight of vertex i itself onto the appropriate member of all pairs in the comparator layer, but only if the two vertices in the comparator layer are adjacent in \mathbf{g}_k (as controlled by the edge assertion activations in (ii).)
- (vi) use a WTA procedure to select the winner of each pairwise comparison in the comparator layer, and send either a “0” (loser) or “1” (winner) signal into the appropriate node in the “winner’s circle”.
- (vii) do a logical “AND” of the inputs to each of the k nodes in the winner’s circle. If there is a unique winner, then only one node will remain active. If there is no such unique winner, then there is either a tie or a top-cycle. (A top-cycle is when alternative a_i beats a_j which in turn beats a_k , and then a_k beats the original alternative a_i .)

Note that although there are only k nodes in the winner’s circle, in the comparator layer there will be a much larger set of roughly $2 \times_k C_2$ depending upon the tiling. This comparator layer, and also the comparable edge assertion layer, are the critical components that govern the size of the network. If the diameter of \mathbf{G}_n is very large, the connectivities required become too distant. Some hint of this problem is given in Fig. 2 for $k = 4$. This depiction also makes clear that neither \mathbf{G}_n nor \mathbf{g}_k appear explicitly as graphs. Rather, the connectivity is represented by the filled nodes that indicate whether the vector $\{2, 1, 0\}$ or $\{1, 1, 0\}$ should be applied to the paired comparison in the comparator module. This representational form has the obvious benefit that weighted edges, i.e. correlations among alternatives, can be easily be incorporated by allowing analog, rather than binary inhibition by the “edge assertion” nodes in layer 3 (small circles.)

6.0 Success of \mathbf{g}_k

Figure 3 shows the success rate of the k -Condorcet procedure for graphs of size $n < 250$, with different choices for k . The models \mathbf{M}_n used were connected random graphs with edge probability $1/4$. A set of weights on the nodes was chosen from a uniform distribution. Winners were also calculated using both the Plurality (i.e. node with greatest weight) and Borda procedures for the same set of weights. The graph shows the failure rate of \mathbf{g}_k to yield the same Condorcet winner as \mathbf{G}_n , (There are over 100 trials per data point.) Also shown is the success of the Plurality method (M) and the Borda count, compared with the Condorcet choice. Regardless of n , the Borda and Condorcet winners differ only about 10% of the time. A small fraction of this percent is due to top cycles in \mathbf{G}_n . Likewise, the principal factor for different winners for \mathbf{g}_k and \mathbf{G}_n is the presence of additional top cycles in \mathbf{g}_k . In other words, when \mathbf{g}_k picks a winner, this winner is almost certainly

the G_n winner (98+% for $k > 8$.) The approximation by g_k is thus conservative: there are few false positives, instead no winner is chosen, unlike the Borda count.




Figure 3: Winners for g_k compared with winners for G_n , with the numbers along the curves indicating values for k . Over the range of n , the Borda winner matches 90% of the Condorcet winners (arrow.) The maximum weight node in G_n is rarely the Condorcet winner for $n > 12$, as shown by the curve labelled "M".

Figure 4 provides some additional insight into the robustness of the several aggregation procedures. Here again, random graphs of edge probability $1/4$ were generated, with weights on nodes chosen from a uniform distribution. Winners were then found using Condorcet, Borda and Plurality tallies, the latter being simply that node with maximum input weight. Then the input weights were diddled using a uniform sampling from $\pm 50\%$ of the initial node weight (hence an average of 25% variation.) Using the same graphical model M_n , a second set of winners were then calculated. Figure 4 shows the probability that the winners were the same.




Fig. 4 Percent different Winners with mean weight variation of 50%; B = Borda; C = Condorcet; P = Plurality (max weight node.)

For the Borda and Condorcet procedures, over 80% of the winners remained the same (curve labeled BC), and over 60% when the subgraph g_{12} was used to approximate G_n (curve c12.) In contrast, the Plurality method (P) was not robust to noisy input weights. Furthermore, as shown earlier in Fig. 3, the Plurality winner seldom agreed with the Borda or Condorcet winners for graphical models describing similarity relations among 10 or more alternatives. This difference shows the large effect prior knowledge about the domain can have on the determining optimal (maximum likelihood) choices.

7.0 Biological Feasibility

Obviously, the Plurality method is the simplest to implement, the Borda next, with the Condorcet network being the most complex. Two questions emerge: is the Condorcet network too complex? And second, is the additional complexity worth the benefit? Surprisingly, from a biological perspective, the Condorcet network is still rather trivial (Marr, 1969.) A more interesting issue is how the Condorcet network might actually be implemented in detail. For example, should the network be broken into overlapping modules or “receptive fields” of size k for the local calculation, but with global inputs of size n ? Local tilings with $k > 12$ seem unlikely. But, as seen from Fig 3, even with $k \sim 12$, similarity relations or correlations among over one hundred alternatives or events could still be evaluated quite successfully.

The Condorcet network has a rather surprising benefit over the somewhat simpler Borda network. Although each uses information about alternatives or similar

choices, the Condorcet network explicitly finds correlations among the most significant because it must make explicit whether edges in M_n are adjacent or not. This design thus gives the network the potential to learn priors on such correlations. Furthermore, it has a clear rejection strategy during the learning phase, namely the presence of top-cycles. No other method mentioned above has this kind of built-in feedback mechanism because all others always output a winner. Finally, it is not inconceivable to see the potential of such a layered network design in primitive cortical areas, even for the aggregation of rather simple features.

Acknowledgements

Supported under AFOSR contract# 6894705. An earlier version of this memo was presented at the annual meeting of the Cog. Sci. Soc. 2003.

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