Negotiating Community amongst Spatial and Identity Boundaries:
The Case of "Unity in Diversity" in the Transmigration Settlement of Mopugad, Indonesia

by
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Abstract

In the 1970s, the Indonesian government undertook a massive national development program which involved the relocation of 1.5 million people throughout the islands of the archipelago. Known as *transmigration*, the program resettled people from Java and Bali, two islands experiencing overpopulation, urbanization and increasing poverty, to the "Outer Islands" of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Papua. One of the objectives of transmigration was the integration of the many ethnic and religious sub-communities throughout Indonesia to fashion Indonesian citizens which collectively would represent the national motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, or "Unity in Diversity." Unfortunately, many of the transmigration settlements were established as exclusively Javanese or Balinese enclaves resulting in instances of inter-communal conflict with the indigenous groups.

This thesis examines the unusual transmigration settlement of Mopugad, in Northern Sulawesi. Here the locus of integration is between two groups settled in the same town, creating an opportunity to assess whether the shared experience of migration is a condition of unification. We can see that in Mopugad the two communities, one Javanese and the other Balinese, have remained largely distinct and are apparently becoming increasingly distinct due to the evolution of religious culture. The relationship between the two communities can partly be seen in the negotiation of cultural and administrative jurisdictions visible in the changing physical order of the town.

Though diversity has been sustained at the expense of unity, it is not impervious to the changing circumstances facing the town which could allow a change in trajectory towards increased unity and a diminished diversity. Should residents of Mopugad jointly decide that diversity is a goal worth pursuit, they will have to work deliberately to sustain it by building local interdependence. The impending threat that nearby informal gold mining poses to the health and rice-farming livelihood of both sets of residents may be an opportunity upon which to base a conditional community, a precursor to shared communalism. The resulting shared communalism would be particularly applicable in other parts of the nation as Indonesia undergoes massive political and fiscal decentralization. The children of the pioneers of transmigration have the opportunity to become the new pioneers of decentralization.

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I visited the Dumoga Valley for the first time in the summer of 2004 when I was living in Manado, the provincial capital of Northern Sulawesi. The seaside city of Manado is unique in that it is a city with a Christian majority (a national religious minority) with churches and other religious institutions quite active in the larger urban community. The urban culture was quite unlike any with which I was familiar from the large part of my life spent in Java and traveling mainly through the southern parts of Indonesia and only as far north as Torajaland in Southern Sulawesi. Though also a Christian pocket in predominantly Muslim Indonesia, Toraja bears little resemblance to the culture of Manado and its surrounding Minahasan highlands. The Minahasan region is marked by cathedrals with gables of immense proportion, where gospel music, country and western music, the ever popular poco-poco, the recently indigenized electric slide, showcase some of the musical skills of which the Minahasa are renowned. The tiers of obeisance and etiquette of Java are replaced by candid and casual yet self-assertive mannerisms. Aspects of life, such as the often delicate topic of *SARA*[1] or ethnic/religious relations, are fairly out in the open for discussion.

The municipal government of Manado drafted SARA policy during a time when most cities and provinces in Indonesia thought it better politics to consciously ignore the issue. The widespread decision to ignore SARA was in itself a form of policy-making, much as is "color-blindness" in many institutions in the United States or the initial position of Mandela's African National Congress to create a South Africa that saw no difference between ethnicities.[2] In many parts of Indonesia, SARA is often treated as best unspoken, for fear that acknowledging difference between identity groups would affirm and enhance difference and erode the overarching unifying communal objectives. Manado, on the other hand, acknowledged the differences amongst its residents and has created a specific role for religious minorities within the primarily Christian city. Under thus policy, Muslims are asked to support Christian holidays and other ceremonies by offering their services as low-security guards, traffic officers and parking coordinators for churches, and conversely on Muslim holy days Christians are asked to reciprocate this service at the mosques. This policy fosters a system of mutual assistance which over time creates trust between the groups. In the larger regional context where conflict is often attributed to be inter-religious or inter-ethnic, this policy attempts to a pre-empt the occurrence of such conflicts. However, local governance in Manado has recently been undergoing tremendous revision since the undertaking of Indonesian political and economic decentralization. This massive project is not only realigning the city's relation to the national government but also redefining the role of the city in larger social movements and in emerging networks of sub-regional interdependences.

At the time of my visit I was researching the national transmigration program which relocated people to parts of Indonesia often quite culturally different. One of the program's explicit goals was to foster the national motto of "Unity in Diversity," a prescription for peace and prosperity. The project implementation largely encouraged unity over diversity and ignored the position of ethnic cleavages in the formation of new communities. The negative affects of transmigration have to a large extent lead to the social unrest throughout Indonesia today. Thus, when I heard of the transmigration settlements of the Dumoga Valley as a place incarnate of the national motto of "Unity in Diversity," my curiosity was piqued. I wondered how this pluralistic place had managed such comparable success relative to the many transmigration settlements of Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Papua and Sumatra. I further wondered about the types of community relations and policies that had made this place (at least locally) famous and how then the people of Dumoga were experiencing the challenges of decentralization.

---

[1] SARA stands for suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan, and can be translated as inter-group ethnic, religious or racial relations. The Indonesian "government has used the acronym since at least the late 1960s. It is meant to delineate the most sensitive political issues, those which may not be discussed in public let alone serve as a basis for potential mobilization and action." Liddle, p 293.

[2] Horowitz, p 28.

Upon my initial brief visit to Dumoga I was impressed by a cultural syncretism which seemed to represent "Unity in Diversity;" a successful instance that had neither lead to conflict nor to cultural assimilation and homogeneity. Still thirty years after its establishment, Dumoga seemed able to frame the multiple expressions of identity as brought by the various ethnic and religious transmigrant groups. Balinese Hindu temples, impromptu shrines and scattered offerings fell between the local Mongondow-style conically roofed mosques and the severely peaked gables of the Minahasan churches. These impressive religious structures seemed complimented and mediated by a creative diversity of housing styles, materials and colors. I assumed that there must be a fairly high correlation between the expressive built structure and community structure and that relationships must be woven into overlapping social, institutional and spatial networks. However, upon my second visit, my assumption about representational distinctions, proved to be almost entirely untrue.



Figure 1: Mosque, Church, and Balinese Hindu Temple in the center of Mopuya, Dumoga Valley.

The initial assumption was that levels of community diversity could be read through the town architecture and layout in space. Instead, upon my second visit I found that no resident of Mopugad is imprisoned in a closed geo-cultural system and that the role that difference or diversity plays in the growth of a community is constantly revised by the often shifting and changing boundaries of community. The space which I was able to visit captured only a static moment, conflating historic and contemporary negotiation. The structures of community are much more dynamic and constantly undergoing contestation. There was so much about the town of Mopugad that I could not read only in its physical structure and built form. My project became then a juxtaposition of changes in space with changes in social and institutional culture.

My goal in undertaking this project is to identify the mechanisms of a system in which diversity can thrive and where sectarianism can exist in representational distinction but not in active and violently performed conflict. If identified, such mechanisms could be used to model a management structure for shared communalism, where communities work cooperatively while maintaining their separate cultural integrity. A model for shared communalism applicable to an Indonesian urban or township context is particularly timely as governance and administration is increasingly deconcentrated from the national government in Jakarta to more localized government, most of which do not yet have policies for dealing with demographic diversity. By recognizing what mechanizes the shifting boundaries of community within a truly diverse place such as Dumoga, we can better understand the preferences for collective action and organization which should be the seeds of strong local government.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: WHAT COMPRISES A COMMUNITY?

I began learning about the transmigration settlements in Dumoga through a study done by cultural-anthropologist Brian Hoey, who in the spring of 2003 published an article in the journal *Ethnology* about community development in the five transmigration settlements located in there. Hoey drew a distinction between two types of settlement. The first two settlements comprised each of a single ethnic group, the Balinese, were established under the presidency of Sukarno. The next three settlements, established under the presidency of Suharto, were deliberately populated with people from two ethnic groups, the Javanese and the Balinese. A comparison of these two types of settlements lead Hoey to conclude that only the ethnically homogeneous settlement had a "palpable sense of community"[1] which could be seen in its "public spaces and civic engagement in village affairs."[2]

Hoey's conclusion raises many questions about community. Is community always variably homogenous? If so what are the parameters of community? Does community seek stability? What then, is the role of identity in community and does the challenge, contestation and negotiation of identity not inherently threaten community? Doesn't negotiation of identity, and thus the parameters of community occur to a larger degree in more heterogeneous places? Further, what is the role of space in this dialogue? I decided I wanted to take a closer look at the communal and inter-communal dynamics of one of the heterogeneous towns of Hoey's study to try to reach a better understanding of "Unity in Diversity" a phenomenon which preoccupies so many politicians, planners and artists in our globalizing, urbanizing world.

Created communities: the Dumoga Valley transmigration area

The area of focus, as mentioned above, is the Dumoga Valley in the province of Northern Sulawesi. Dumoga is within the administrative jurisdiction of the regency or *kebupaten* of Bolaang Mongondow, originally defined by the geographic extent of the Mongondow ethnic group. The valley itself measuring about 1,300 square kilometers was fairly sparsely populated prior to transmigration in the early 1960s. According to official population estimates about 4,000 people (almost entirely Mongondow, with trace number of Minahasa, Gorontalo and Bugis ethnicities also present) inhabited the densely forested valley and farmed it with shifting agricultural methods.[3]

The population in the last forty years has changed dramatically, booming to over 70,000 people[4] and shifting in ethnic composition where indigenous Mongondow are no longer the dominant ethnic presence. According to a sample taken in 1996, the statistical extrapolation reveals that Mongondow may only comprise 34% of the population, about equal to the proportion of Minahasa (35%), originally the ethnic neighbors to the east. Additionally, transmigration has added Balinese and Javanese, who respectively comprise about 17% and 12% of the population of Dumoga. Generally, this composite population clusters spatially into ethnic pockets mostly by town but also by neighborhoods within towns. This tendency towards ethnic centripetality is historically common in Indonesia. Now, however, the populations have grown and the towns of Dumoga are categorized by ethnic clusters bordering immediately upon others.

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[1] Hoey, p 116.

[2] Hoey, p 120.

[3] Hoey, p 115.

[4] Hoey, p 116.

Transmigration Phase One

The first wave of transmigrants to Dumoga were from Bali. These transmigrants were natural disaster transmigrants *(transmigran bencana alam)* that departed from Bali after the eruption of the island's major volcano, Gunung Agung, erupted in 1963. The refugee group of about 300 families was invited to the Dumoga valley by the *bupati* head of the regency of Bolaang Mongondow, though they were also given options to relocate to alternate locations on other islands.[5] Upon arriving together from Bali, these original settlers lived for over half a year together in a camp while clearing the land. These first migrants settled the towns of Werdhi Agung and Kembang Merta.

Transmigration Phase Two

The second wave of transmigrants to Dumoga were of mixed ethnicity and origin. This second wave which took place during the implementation of Suharto's Five Year Development Plans or *Repelita*, had more central government involvement in its deliberation, planning and oversight. The villages that were established in the 1970s under this program, Mopuya, Mopugad and Tumokang Baru were each a designed "modern village" which, according to a local official were "complete, efficient, and consistent with the national scope."[6]

According to Hoey, these later settlements were fully equipped with "nearly complete infrastructure before prospective villagers even arrived as voluntary migrants looking to better their standard of living. Transmigration program workers cleared most fields for planting and built roads, schools and markets in advance. Homes and places of worship stood essentially ready, at least in semi permanent form.[7] Mopuya was built with a unique central square with a place of worship each occupying a quadrant of the square. Side by side a mosque, a church and a Hindu temple each occupy a square of about four hectares, with a quarter of the square left empty should any Buddhists decide to move to Mopuya. Such attention to religious diversity brought together into a communal space reveals the government's "deliberate objectives to create and maintain an "imagined community," on a national scale, of unified Indonesians drawn together into a single model of citizenship."[8]

Two phases, Two models of community

The two phases of transmigration incorporated different attitudes towards and expectations of community. The first primarily relied upon a pre-existing ethnic solidarity which was expected to ease the adjustment to the new place and lifestyle. The second banked upon the shared experience of mutual unfamiliarity to bring to previously distinct groups together to forge an entirely new type of community. Both plans, however, sought to create ties amongst inhabitants where they had previously not existed. To better understand the dynamics of community ties and inter-communal relations, the literature on urban communities provides a sturdy base upon which to understand how an immigrant may weave him or herself into different scales of community and thus how a community may be homogeneous or heterogeneous at different orders.

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[5] Hoey, p 116.

[6] Hoey, p 118.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Hoey, 109.

Community Theory

There is a huge amount of anthropological and sociological study on community. The myriad social networks in Indonesia align with this body of theory in that it seems that for any definitive theory of community and human interaction, there are numerous counter-examples and counter-cultures. The theory that I have selected then to inform my project are just a few voices amongst many. However, these were the voices that spoke to my questions and curiosities. The themes which follow address community solidarity such as ethnic neighborhoods, the dynamics between subcultures, the extensiveness and confinement of social networks, and the scales of community in different orders of space. All of these theories would apply to a definition of community as "a group of people with a common characteristic or interest living together within a larger society."[9] The principle points of difference are how these people navigate toward new social ties and the risks and benefits of seeking new community partnerships.

Ethnic Neighborhoods, Community Solidarity

There are many case studies of ethnic enclaves of immigrants in cities. These studies focus primarily on how these communities both maintain their integrity (i.e., do not become diluted by the presence of people of other ethnic communities) and interact with the larger urban community (which may be comprised of myriad other communities and/or be dominated by a hegemonic community). Many of these studies identify these migrant communities through their shared country of origin, often conflated with ethnicity. For the purposes of this paper, and as is applicable to this Indonesian case study, I will also continue to refer to people from the same place as being of the same ethnicity.[10]

MacDonald and MacDonald attribute the integrity or sustainment of ethnic neighborhoods to "chain migration," the continual arrival of new migrants from the same place of origin. This continued influx "feeds on itself and builds self-contained ethnic communities within big cities."[11] Though the networks which allow for this are fairly "impersonally organized," they do rely upon a system where prospective migrants from the homeland can "learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment *arranged by means of primary social relationship with previous migrants*."[12] Thus, according to MacDonald and MacDonald, ethnic solidarity is neither sustained in self-defense, nor from discrimination, income disparity, housing type or location preference. However, as long as residents don't sever ties with their place of origin, these long-distance communal bonds will prevent cultural assimilation.

Bruner writes similarly of the migrant context in Indonesia.[13] Though in his case study the Toba Batak ethnic community in Medan, Sumatra is spread throughout the city and not concentrated in one or a few specifically ethnic neighborhoods, his case concurs that many of the urban Batak have closer ties with their village of origin than with their next-door neighbors in the city. Bruner's hypothesis as to why ethnic communities exist and thrive in Medan is economically based. He notes that that while economic improvement is thwarted by structural problems and the government is not able to provide necessary social services, the mutual support networks, based on the common "ethnic" kinship, provide for times of crisis or need. Thus,

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[9] Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.

[10] Chapter Two and Chapter Three will elaborate more upon how this term is defined specifically in Indonesia.

[11] MacDonald and MacDonald, p 226.

[12] Ibid, p 227.

[13] Bruner, p 122.

Bruner hypothesizes that ethnic networks continue to be strong in Medan because of government and economic instability. Like Bruner, Fischer argues that subcultures in urban places provide increased security for its members against the "disorganizing aspects of urbanization, such as migration, economic change, and alternative subcultures."[14] Expounding upon the economic component of ethnic neighborhoods, MacDonald and MacDonald note that in fact chain migration leads to community "chain occupations" within diversified urban economy.[15] Ethnic economic specialization can be found in cities from Boston to Surabaya, Indonesia.

As ethnic community is reinforced economically, it is understandable why then it plays a role in often economically sophisticated urban places. The acknowledged necessity of an intermediary community group, larger than the family but smaller than the greater urban community, results in an ethnic identity that is distinguished and active in the city structure, quite unlike the inactive role of ethnicity in villages, often quite homogenous places in terms of shared culture. The urban ethnic identity is strengthened precisely because it is based on the "imagined community"[16] of potential networks, economic or otherwise. In such an imagined community, the unique roles of individuals are largely displaced by shared identity. Shared group identity then is equally, if not more, useful in a largely anonymous urban space.

One of the most famous studies on urban ethnic community is that of Herbert Gans who studied a community of second-generation migrants from Italy who inhabited and came to define the culture of Boston's West End neighborhood. Of the West End's Italian-American community, Gans describes, "their ethnic –that is, Italian- characteristics, as well as the impact of acculturation on the Italian culture, and of assimilation on the social structure."[17] Though the neighborhood was not exclusively Italian-American, Gans focuses on the solidarity of the social structures of the Italian-American community within it. Though most of the aspects of Italian culture have been lost with only culinary and traces of linguistic culture surviving the acculturation, *assimilation*, "the disappearance of the Italian social system – has proceeded much more slowly. Indeed, the social structure of the West End . . . is still quite similar to that of the first generation. Social relationships are almost entirely limited to other Italians."[18] As well as social structure, "relationship to the church is also similar to that of the immigrant generations."[19]

Within this structure Gans distinguishes three tiers of the of social sectors; the primary, predominantly family and peers, the secondary, defined by relations around "Italian institutions, voluntary organizations, and other social bodies which function to support the workings of the peer group society," and the out-group, which covers a variety of non-Italian institutions in the neighborhood as well as in Boston at-large and America in general.[20] It is the intermediate of these which Gans calls the community. He writes that within the community, status is allocated to those who make "the most material and nonmaterial contributions to the group, without using these to flaunt or to indicate his economic or cultural superiority,"[21] so that group status is allowed to those who prioritize group over individuality. Amongst this community, MacDonald's "chain occupation" had sequestered the Italian-American West Enders in a working-class bracket. Due to the politics of class in America, the West Enders were then held in disdain by the hegemonic Boston "out-group" who then disaggregated the community from the neighborhood through "urban redevelopment," wiping out the neighborhood-based community solidarity. Gans postulates that inability to form an affective organization against the external threat was because of the group was comprised almost entirely of people in the same economic class. Granovetter suggests, however, that perhaps the insular nature of the community solidarity, and the limited ties to the "out-group" restricted access to resources which may have allowed them to mobilize against the cultural domination.[22] Thus, though community solidarity can offer economic security to migrants, it can also be dangerously weakening and stagnating.

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[14] Fischer, p 1333.
[15] MacDonald and MacDonald, 227.
[16] Anderson.
[17] Gans, p 32-33.
[18] Gans, p 35.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Gans, p 36.
[21] Gans, p 27.

Community solidarity in Werdhi Agung

A community needs a shared point around which to identify. In Werdhi Agung, the villagers' shared experience of the long journey from Bali to Dumoga and living together in barracks for six months allowed for the germination of community. The refugees had come from various parts of Bali affected by the volcanic eruption and thus "represented important regional cultural differences."[23] However, "Rather than allowing people to align along these differences, village leaders pared down and standardized ritual practices and observances and fashioned a unique system peculiar to that village as a kind of cultural common ground."[24] Thus, community solidarity was synthesized by overriding differences with commonalities.

The communal culture in Werdhi Agung is based upon shared religious values. Hoey quotes a Hindu religious leader from Werdhi Agung as saying that the community has focused on the guidance of religion, not *adat* (customs and cultural traditions), which they could not preserve in Werdhi Agung. In his opinion, the problem of competition between everyday customs and religion in Bali, is resolved in Werdhi Agung by focusing to a greater degree on religion in Werdhi Agung. However, forging community solidarity on an assumed religious homogeneity does not address the consequential exclusion of the Balinese Christian minority. Though the Christian community did express their appreciation of the "cultural editing," which allowed them also to more clearly distinguish between secular aspects of Balinese culture and religious Hindu culture, ironically the majority of the Balinese community chose to increasingly identify with religion as a result of the cultural editing. The "public displays of community" then, are Hindu displays of community. Though churches have more recently been built up and elaborated in Werdhi Agung, the Christian involvement in public life is marginalized by the dominant and cohesive Hindu Balinese community. Thus, in the creation of community solidarity in Werdhi Agung, Balinese ethnicity was conflated with Hindu religion, to the exclusion of the Balinese religious minority.

Ethnic neighborhoods in Mopugad

Unlike Werdhi Agung, the town of Mopugad is comprised of ethnic neighborhoods. Whereas Werdhi Agung was founded by a group of people who arrived together at the same time, Mopugad was established in waves of migrants. The three successive waves which happened each year between 1974 and 1976 lead, initially at least, to three distinct neighborhoods.

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[22] Granovetter, p 1373.

[23] Hoey, p 116.

[24] Hoey, p 117.

The initial wave brought 225 families from Bali under a special Presidential Aid program or *Bantuan Presiden*. This initial group of transmigrants live in what they refer to as the Banpres area and often identify as Banpres people. As special *bencana alam* (natural disaster) refugees, these migrants were not fully provided for like general transmigrants and lived in camps or with other families in towns nearby for the first few months. They trekked daily to Mopuya to clear the forest to allow passage, which they then laid with boards to become streets, and then to clear plots on which to build their own houses. To this end, the Banpres people split into work teams (*regu*) roughly according to district of origin in Bali. The Banpres neighborhood today, which is divided into five *Regu* from north to south, occupies the eastern half of both North and South Mopugad. Though the group was predominantly Balinese, a few families from Eastern Java joined the group in Bali, participating in the activities of the *regu*.

Two subsequent waves of settlers came to Mopugad one and two years after the arrival of the Banpres settlers. The people that arrived in 1975 comprised 100 families all having come via a transmigration center in Bandung, West Java, and were primarily Javanese with a few Sundanese also from Java. They had lived at the center for three months where they had learned farming as well as other skills. When they arrived in Mopugad, they were provided with land that had been prepared prior to their arrival; each family received two hectares, one-and-three-quarters hectares of the sawah surrounding the village for rice farming and one-quarter hectare (a fifty by fifty meter *kintal)* on which stood a five by seven meter house. Upon arrival, this group was relegated to the northwest quadrant of the town of Mopugad which became known as the Jabar neighborhood, abbreviated from Jawa Barat or West Java.

The final group of transmigrants arrived a year later in 1976 and were again a group from Bali. Like the Jabar group before them, these Balinese had followed the official transmigration program and likewise received the same standards and measures of pre-prepared land and housing. This third group is referred to simply as *Umum* or "general (transmigration)" and the neighborhood in which they were settled completed the southwest quadrant of the town. This area, sometimes (though rarely) referred to as Umum, now comprises the western half of South Mopugad. Interestingly, two of the 76 original Umum families were Javanese families who had moved to Bali to be able to participate in transmigration.


town boundary
Jabar
Banpres
Umum
To
Tumokang
Baru
To
Mopuya
0
100
250 meters
(Scale: 1 cm = 100 meters)
Balinese
Javanese
N

Map 1: Ethnic neighborhoods as a result of three stages of transmigration.

Community integrity and change in Mopugad

Over time the physical distinction between two of these three neighborhoods has been diluted. Banpres and Umum have been socially permeated, resulting in a larger Balinese community spanning across the neighborhoods. The neighborhood which has remained relatively intact is the Jabar neighborhood, whose inhabitants maintain their cultural independence from the larger Balinese community. These distinctions have largely been maintained, as MacDonald and MacDonald suggested, by continual in-migration. This sustained influx of migrants from Bali and Java is continued by a word of mouth network. Ten out of the thirty residents --six of the Balinese and four of the Javanese-- that I spoke with, had come to

Mopugad volunarily as *trans spontan*, or spontaneous transmigrants, after hearing of Mopugad from relatives, friends, friends of friends, relatives of friends, or friends of relatives.

Hoey questions the integrity of the larger Mopugad community which he sees as civically apathetic and divisive. He criticizes the seemingly secondary regard for what he sees as public places. He writes that whereas, "Werdhi has strived to build impressive public temples shared by the entire Hindu community of the village, Mopuya and Mopugad's public temples have remained simple, functional spaces hardly changed over the years."[25] Hoey, however, fails to note that these "public" temples are only used by one of the two major sub-cultures within the community and thus are not truly public in nature but rather represent specifically culturally programmed space. In a multi-religious community such as Mopugad, a deliberate modesty of religious structure may attest to a larger sense of community across religions. Thus, it makes sense that, as Hoey notes, the Balinese Hindu families in Mopugad laud more decoration and designate more resources for their more private extended-family and household temples. The constitution of community in Mopugad is less cohesive than that of Werdhi Agung and more accentuated sub-communities and their corresponding sub-cultures.

In addition to the different forms of cultural integrity in the community structure of Mopugad and Werdhi Agung, differences of administrative integrity are also quite marked. In 1987 Mopugad was divided into two townships, North and South Mopugad, as their population had exceeded the 3,000 people mark which is a common administrative division in the Bolaang Mongondow district. Werdhi Agung, conversely, resisted such a division of their town and until today remains a singular administrative entity. Hoey attributes this resistance to "an enduring sense of proprietorship" in contrast to Mopugad and other villages which "seem fragmented and lacking social cohesion."[26]

Furthermore, in villages like Mopugad Hoey writes "the simultaneous and spatially coextensive identification was far less significant."[27] The protective insularity of the community of Werdhi Agung and the protection of its town borders can been further illustrated by the local fear that new migrants will settle in Werdhi Agung and the "distinct history and practices"[28] of the pioneering generation will be lost. The administrative division may also be understood to allow larger representation for minority groups. Such an understanding may have been that of the Christian minority in Werdhi Agung who favored administrative division. Thus, the community of Werdhi Agugn may be said to be protecting its town from outsiders at the expense of protecting the minority voices within its borders. Hoey's claim that government control was always stronger in Mopuya and Mopugad than in Werdhi Agung, could also been reworked to read that governance in the case of Mopugad takes the place of communal unity and singular consensus in Werdhi Agung.

The Benefits of Diverse Community

Though "public display and civic engagement in village affairs" are not apparent in Mopugad, community in Mopugad would be wrongly understood as "lost community" –to borrow a phrase used by Barry Wellman to describe the theory that communal ties in cities have been replaced by ties that are "impersonal, transitory and segmental."[29] Instead the existence of sub-cultures within the town could be seen to potentially allow for Wellman's "liberated community" comprised of individually forged, inter-communally cross-cutting ties. Though Wellman admits this type of community may resemble lost community in that though it allows for "structural room to maneuver, it may also create a disorientating loss of identity, as it is no longer as clear or simple to which group (among many) one belongs."[30] This type of identity confusion does not seem to be an issue in Mopugad, with each person primarily identifying with ethnicity or religion. However, the weak ties which define a liberated community do seem to exist between the Balinese and the Javanese to some degree of "weakness" if only in mutual recognition and tolerance.

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[25] Hoey, p 119.

[26] Hoey, p 119.

[27] Hoey, p 120.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Wellman. The Community Question. p 1201-1231.

"The strength of weak ties," [31] allows for degrees of individual agency within community structures. In this way, weak ties can be understood as conditional ties which are utilized towards specific goals. Unlike more categorical ties --which are unconditional and, like the strong ties of family or ascriptive identity, largely involuntary-- conditional ties imply a negotiation between actors based on a set of conditions. Should these conditions be altered by one or both parties, the weak tie may be broken. Such breakages do not often occur amongst those who have strong ties. However, where strong ties are *not* unconditional, such breakage may occur as the result of an action such as an unsanctioned inter-marriage or religious conversion. These breakages, however, are rare in comparison to those of weak ties.

Negotiation is a key aspect of weak ties. Not only is negotiation important between the actors involved in the weak tie, but personal and intra-communal negotiation is also important in reconciling these weak ties with the strong ties of one's community. Conditional roles of weak ties are likely quite different from the more obligatory roles of an individual to his or her community and requires a sophisticated toggling of identity. Describing this negotiation between the multiple identities of a Toba Batak migrant in the city of Medan, Bruer notes that sometimes "conflicting sets of role expectations" requires minimizing conflict between these roles through "considerable skill and finesse."[32]

The multi-faceted aspects of these different types of relationships are largely activated on different scales of identity. Community is not singular and an individual can be a member of more than one community. At different orders of space and administration, different communities are activated. Each of these communities also has its own structure, though some are more highly structured than others. It is often to a more highly structured community that an individual claims primary allegiance as these groups are better at maintaining stability and security. More important here, though the residents of Mopugad primarily identify as Javanese or Balinese transmigrants, they also identify as residents of Mopugad, and Dumoga, and Northern Sulawesi and Indonesia, depending upon who they are interacting with and with whom they are negotiating ties.

Thus we can see the significance of different sorts of inter-personal and inter-communal ties at different orders of place. The apparently paradoxical supposition put forth by Granovetter, that strong ties breed local cohesion which subsequently lead to larger social fragmentation, makes sense only in this context. Though community solidarity at a small scale may prove beneficial to its members, it indirectly (and negatively) affects the larger community of which the same members are a part. Conversely, weak ties strengthen larger order communities and as Granovetter remarks, "play a role in effecting social cohesion." Therefore, highly concentrated community solidarity at a local level can threaten administration at the town, city, district or provincial level. The deterioration of the greater national social integration is indeed what has inspired the Indonesian government toward decentralization and a system of affiliated representative political parties.

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[30] Wellman. Community Question. p 1227.

[31] Granovetter.

[32] Bruner, 129.

Until decentralization, the migrant resident groups in Mopugad have been able to easily identify with the Balinese and Javanese transmigrant diaspora as an intermediary community between the ethnic neighborhood in Mopugad and the central national government, largely responsible for general governance, law and order, and the distribution of services and infrastructure. With the disbanding of many of these functions of the central government, communities in Mopugad will have to rely to a greater degree on the provincial and district government, and therefore will have to establish weak ties with the Minahasa and Mongondow groups which control these administrations and less on the more geographically expanded Javanese and Balinese networks.

Though the fact that the Balinese and particularly the Javanese comprise, in a sense, a new political minority in Bolaang Mongondow, whereas before they had national leverage, diversity is an asset to the residents of Mopugad. However, diversity needs to be activated to be used effectively. To access a wider array of resources, the communities which inhabit Mopugad must establish ties and utility networks with one another, to access a wider array of resources. Promisingly, Wellman and Wortley have found that weak ties are self-reinforcing as "the very act of exchanging services cements ties and reassures recipients that network members care about them."[33] Though the strengthening of these weak inter-communal ties could threaten the role of the community, they found that in their study of a neighborhood in a Canadian city, "neighbors often do not really like each other despite their frequent exchanges of services,"[34] attesting to the supposition that these weak ties are not necessarily reinforced to the point where they become strong ties. The weak ties of diversity are self-reinforcing as long as the each community member is not entirely "liberated" from his or her community. Similarly, Fischer claims that the more heterogeneous a place, the less it induces assimilation, and the greater the maintenance of ethnic identity. Diversity, in its flexibility and resilience, can thus strengthen the community at large while not threatening the integrity of the community identities which comprise it. In distinction to primary communities, this greater community structure contains the conditions for fostering diversity, which I will call "shared communalism."

It is important to remember that Mopugad is still a village defined by strong ties and sub-community solidarity and that most theory about weak ties and liberated communities specifically refer to urban environments. Many urban theorists including Kevin Lynch and Charles Tilly have found that the larger a population of a place, the more, smaller cultural communities are allowed to resist assimilation and maintain and develop the culture of the community, where integration with other groups is based on "exchange, negotiation, *and conflict* among the various subcultures of the city."[35] (italics my own)

Though Mopugad is ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, it is not *highly* heterogeneous; indeed, it is only comprised of two significant major communities. Nor does Mopugad fit into the description of a rural place, whose social dynamics can be described as one defined primarily agricultural occupation.[36] Though the residents of Mopugad largely engage in agricultural occupation, this does not allow for an understanding of the town which incorporates the multiple identity groups and involves a sophisticated inter-communal dynamic. As we will see, even the primary role of agriculture is undergoing revision in Mopugad. The question facing Mopugad is whether its small size can sustain diversity.

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[33] Wellman and Wortley, p 567.

[34] Ibid, p 570.

[35] Fischer, p 1337.

[36] Sorokin and Zimmerman, 1929.

Though the precise scale of community and diversity in Mopugad is open to wide interpretation, it is clear that the town has undergone and continues to undergo processes of community negotiation and cultural editing. Hoey argues that Werdhi Agung incorporates "self-determined intentionally in cultural editing expressed and experienced as an abiding sense of community- and village- based tradition." He also claims that "In those villages established later, engineering has resulted in a diminished sense of community,"[37] falsely implying that the negotiation which creates community does not exist in Mopugad. Political engineering has resulted not in a diminished sense of community, but rather a different sense of community, and one which continues to undergo cultural editing, particularly as politics at the regional scale are changing. The editing, the effects of which range from altering public, shared culture to affecting people in their private identities, is much more complex in heterogeneous space like Mopugad where community is nested in various levels.

Cultural Turn

Culture is always undergoing editing, whether community is strong or whether it is "diminished." The type of community, however, determines which sorts of changes are taking place. Culture becomes conservative when the role of weak ties is underprivileged. These weak ties create a forum for cultural contestation and negotiation, extension of trust, and expansion of fluidity with members seen as cultural outsiders. The lack of these weak ties can be seen in both Gans's urban villagers who were excluded from the larger Boston community, as well as amongst the inhabitants of Werdhi Agung, where the ties which could draw in members of subcultures, largely Christian Balinese, are not included in the cultural narrative of the place.

We have already seen that weak ties encourage diversity where strong ties encourage homogeneity and consensus. To deliberately ignore that any community, however solidary it sees itself, has room for weak ties within it, results in cultural constraint. Cultural constraint has been the historical line of anthropological theory where many indigenous cultural systems were seen as closed, holistic and perpetually maintained, until the more recent sociological burgeoning of the idea of the "cultural turn."[38] For us here, the cultural turn is more relevant, for though it does not describe the role intricacies of communal relationships it does outline some basic assumptions which I in this paper quite closely abide by.

One contributing principle of the cultural turn, identified by Suny, is that culture is not perpetuated "fixed systems of meaning," or such frameworks as spatial cosmologies as I will describe later, but rather on political contestation and struggle between actors that are "either empowered or constrained."[39] In effect, we can recognize culture as the result of socio-political policy. Thus, each apparently solidary community, is also a victim of values or norms which are activated by leadership. The politicization of culture introduces a large amount of normative questioning which currently confounds many philosophers, planners and politicians today. Such dilemmas are the focus of the work of Kymlicka, who introduces the role of policy in restricting freedoms.[40] Kymlicka is particularly concerned with the conundrum of minorities within minorities, which are often ignored in the interest of the larger group. Such is the conundrum of the Christians in Werdhi Agung who have not been designated a role in the larger, characteristically Hindu, community of Werdhi Agung.

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[37] Hoey, 122.

[38] Cowherd. The American Dream Overseas, p 1.

[39] Suny, Ronald Grigor. In American Historical Review 107, no. 5 (December 2002) as cited in Cowherd, The American Dream Overseas, p 4.

Constantly responding to struggle, it follows that culture is always changing, an even more central assumption of the cultural turn.[41] The acceptance of this assumption poses problems for the meaning of the word "traditional," which has historically been used to describe practices and manners which apparently don't change. In my theory, however, I have tied to use the word "traditional" explicitly to refer to those things which were learned from parents or the generation before and which may have changed within that generation. In Indonesia, there wasn't a word for traditional until the English word was adapted as *tradisi*. I believe that the contents of what is deemed traditional change in the transfer between each generation, and the weighty baggage of this heritage transition is the assumption that the package is identical with that that which was passed between the generations of predecessors.

Following the cultural turn, I propose that neither is culture a "system of meanings," as Geertz would have it, nor is a structure of reference points which frame interpretation. Thus, there is no "one-to-one" systematized relation of practice, manner, attitude to meaning, but rather spheres of understanding. Elaborating upon Bourdieu's "practice" of culture, I see culture as tools for negotiation, a package containing preconceptions which allow for judgment and assessment, for the engagement in the forum of negotiation, the community. Both culture and community work together in negotiation, the forging of inter-personal relations and relative identity. Community, the forum, determines the relative positions of each actor. Thus, in spatial metaphor, community is the staging around unset tasks and culture are the tools of maneuverability within this space for negotiation. Thus, we can see community as a pre-institutionalized surprise, a relatively unplanned group, the result of the loosely inter-related workings of cultural tools.

My goal in this thesis was to use the place of Mopugad to illustrate these intricate cultural workings and to describe the process then of the adaptation of community. Here, I was beginning with Bourdieu's heavily structuralist interpretation of inhabited space known as "habitus" where "Social structures inform the construction of the built environment in ways that reinforce the norms and values of the structure. The built environment in turn operates to structure the lives of its inhabitants."[42] Though this paper may substantiate Bourdieu's argument to a large degree --indeed this is a major incentive for the urban planner to aim to rebalance stagnant and weighted power structures-- I contend with one aspect of this proposition. The organization and physical structure of space does not result in the blind reinforcement of "the norms and values of the structure," but is a tool in itself that allows itself to be seen, interpreted, and with a large amount of consciousness, responded to. It is not a final consummation of norms and values but a more tangible and thus malleable. Indeed, I would argue that the value of space is as an asset shared by all members of the community, both those empowered and those not. By filling space, each of us individually, have relative agency for control of space and are not victims or prisoners shackled to our environment.

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[40] Kymlicka.

[41] Suny, Ronald Grigor. In American Historical Review 107, no. 5 (December 2002) as cited in Cowherd, The American Dream Overseas, p 4.

[42] Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977 (1972). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. As cited in Cowherd, The American Dream Overseas, p 16.

Methodology

My methodology attempted toward that of a passive anthropological observer. Though I arrived with sets of specific questions about the experience of moving and resettling in Dumoga, the social and institutional networks of friendships, acquaintances and farming or business collaborations, I allowed for conversation to ramble and diverge so that I could have a better chance of learning what the residents thought were interesting or important and how these topics were framed differently from the way my questions were framed.

With the permission of the town mayors of both North and South Mopugad and their wives, I was able to speak with thirty families, fifteen Muslim Javanese families and fifteen Balinese families, mostly Hindu but two Christian. Most of these families were located in North Mopugad, which contains the Javanese neighborhood. I had hoped to interview a total of thirty-five families, which would have represented one-tenth of the population, but due to the extended nature of most of the interviews, which I deliberately allowed to ramble and diverge, I was not able to reach my target. The selection of houses was not random in that I specifically targeted a number of houses that indicated that their inhabitants were either Balinese or Javanese and others due to their visual ambiguity.

Amongst the questions and topics discussed were which groups or institutions the interviewee participates in: collective mill, their children's school, religious activities, economic groups such as money savings, loans or import/export collaboratives, health, shopping, taxes or other dues, town cleaning, sports teams. Questions about social networks included those such as: where do your friends or co-workers live, do you share food or resources with them, where do you spend your time, which ways do you walk, do you share common languages or have language barriers, do you have friends outside Mopugad, how did you meet your husband or wife, where do you children's friends live, what language do they speak and are you lenient towards their intermarriage with partners of other ethnicities or religions? Finally, I asked about the process of building or transforming their house through questions such as who were the people that helped to build or design, and what were the resources such as money, materials, or skills. Also, I took pictures and measurements of their house and yard.

Secondly, I mapped the plots of the largely residential town and the program and function of each block or *kintal* each measuring fifty by fifty square meters. Speaking with the mayors, past-mayors and residents, I was able to map the location of Balinese and Javanese households. Whereas the interviews allowed me an insight into private space and the private interpretations of community values and practices, the mapping project allowed me to identify spatial changes within Mopugad.


town boundary
10
3
6
8
2
10
3
7
11
1
2
11
1
5
13
9
12
15
5
6,7
4
12
14
15
13
4
9
14
8
0 100 250 meters
(Scale: 1 cm = 100 meters)
Balinese
Javanese
N

Map 2:
Families interviewed

Balinese

1. Pujung
2. Wayan Tiase
3. Gusti Bawan
4. Suriyani
5. Nyoman Jati
6. Gusti Patra
7. Gusti Parsa
8. Kota
9. Merta
10. Oka
11. Old Couple
12. Suran
13. Wati
14. Wayan
15. Yepta

Javanese

1. Jawia
2. Wawan
3. Diran
4. Raspan
5. Warsem
6. Rutah
7. Nurliyah
8. Turipan
9. Kusri
10. Squatters
11. Demi
12. Sirah
13. Macis
14. Sudarno
15. Muhlis

Limitations

My methodology has a few key flaws which I have tried as best possible to correct for. The first is my local bias. By focusing my search for community structures and the shifts in cross-cutting ties within the geographical boundaries of Mopugad, I have fallen victim to what Wellman describes as a fault of many community analyses which "have tended to take as their starting point extrinsic mappings of local area boundaries and then proceeded to enquire into the extent of communal interaction and sentiment within these boundaries,"[43] in affect assuming that primary ties, identities and communities are localized, which may very well not be the case, particularly with migrants who may likely have strong ties with the communities which they left. I have tried to correct for this flaw partial through incorporating the "thick-description," to use Geertz's phraseology, of the larger geo-political, historical and religious cultural contexts at the national level in Chapters Two and Three. I must acknowledge that my analysis however, insufficiently accounts for both sub-national regional contexts and for influential extra-national contexts. My analysis has also responded to Wellman's second criticism of community analysis which he says tend to "suffer from a normative filter that values integration and consensus over difference," and I hope you may come away from reading it with the understanding that I am only in favor of "integration and consensus" when these are necessary for a task and not merely for the sake of creating harmonious mutual accord.

Secondly, I realize that architecture and built fabric is only one feature of cultural expression and that no one indicator can fully capture the complex processes of community negotiation and change. As will be seen, if housing was taken solely as an indicator of community dynamics one would almost undoubtedly conclude that the Javanese and the Balinese communities were each being subsumed to a national-global community, and that that housing suggested that the Javanese and Balinese were melting into a culturally indistinguishable solidary community. Furthermore, as language is an agency of those who had the power to fashion it, according to such theorists as George Orwell and Homi Bhabha, architectural repertoire is also limited to the great majority of us. Though this has been understood as a handicap to expression, there is a counter argument that degrees of cultural conservatism are vital to personal integrity, which will be further discussed in Chapter Four. In my opinion the mediation of culture between bound conservatism and expression of identity, renders the study of such a place as Mopugad, where differentiation is visible and people daily confront the liminality of their frames of reference as physical and social repertoire is expanded, all the more exciting.

Summary of Chapters

This chapter has served to introduce my argument that community is dynamic and not merely founded on a feeling of communalism but instead is a product of a process of constant contestation over space, administration and resources and renegotiation of identity. The summary of the remaining chapters is as follows:

Chapter two will provide a "thick description" of the ethnic layer of community which exists in Mopugad. Through describing national identity as a key factor of Suharto's developmentalism, and its role in transmigration, we can better understand these historical effects on community culture. This "thick description" will continue by adding the political and religious layers currently under national contestation. Thirty years after its establishment

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[43] Wellman, p 1202-1203.

Mopugad is now entering its second generation coupled with the new circumstances of political decentralization and the primary role of political parties, including those with religious agendas, and new minorities.

Chapter four will comb through the dynamics within each of the sub-communities with a major presence in Mopugad, the Balinese and the Javanese, through looking at tiers of communal relations from the private to the intra-communal "public." Here we see that Balinese have experienced more continuity both in their secular and religious aspects of community whereas the Javanese has notably undergone a shift towards increasing religious community. Finally, chapter five will apply these changes to basic spatial analysis divided between the house, the neighborhood, culturally programmed space and public space. Though housing would indicate inter-communal assimilation, we can see that in there is contestation between groups over the control of neighborhood and public facilities which is driven largely by economic factors.

In conclusion, I propose some options for the people of Mopugad to take an active informed role in negotiating the Mopugad to come. From policies which would eradicate the co-existence of sub-communities towards increased homogeneity and community solidarity to policies which could resolve shared concerns while maintaining the integrity of the two sub-communities, the negotiation of these possibilities, and the conflict created from it, is what can most truly be said to represent community.

CHAPTER TWO
NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY

It is important to remember that the negotiation of culture and politics in space is not contained within the boundaries of the towns of Dumoga Valley but is driven also by more distant actors. This chapter will address the national policies during the period of transmigration under Suharto while the following chapter will describe the types of influences currently affecting negotiation of space and identity in Mopugad. Suharto's political exercise can be described as taking place in defined space around a centralized, geographically integrated focus. In contrast, the present political situation has created an arena for negotiation in dispersed, yet undefined, spaces, ironically with more of a focus on national themes in the administrative decentralization to sub-national groups.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the significances of ethnic, national, public and private were juggled to create new types of identity throughout the archipelago. The national planning of the time deliberately involved cultural editing to revise the role of ethnicity as the major defining feature of group solidarity. Suharto's governance could be said to have strived toward the firming of fixed identities in fixed politics and set a direct and standardized relationship between identity and politics. Transmigration, a major social engineering and national development project, was one of the ways in which this centralizing program was carried out.

Transmigration

Transmigration was an adaptation of the Dutch Colonial resettlement policy known as *kolonisasi*. Though *transmigrasi* was revised from kolonisasi by the post-independant president Sukarno, it was implemented in full force under the subsequent authoritarian president Suharto through a series of Five-Year Development Plans, or Repelita, which began in 1969. Transmigration, the relocation of certain segments of the Indonesian population, was a key element of engaging the geographical entirety of Indonesia in national development.

The primary official goal of transmigration was the redistribution of population from the rapidly urbanizing and increasingly poverty-stricken islands Java, Bali and Madura to the "underdeveloped" and sparsely populated Outer Islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Papua (then known as Irian Jaya). At the time, Javanese comprised 64% of the total population though the island of Java comprised only 7% of the total land of the archipelago, and it was logical that the Outer Islands might relieve some of Java's density.

Under Suharto, the goals of transmigration were expanded from purely poverty and density alleviation towards economic development, agricultural reform, and the integration of the Indonesian people. In 1974, President Suharto decreed that, "The exploitation of thinly populated areas outside Java would create big economic potentialities as well as increase work opportunities. Therefore, transmigration, including local transmigration, should be carried out seriously and integrated to regional development activities."(*sic*)[1] Increased emphases was placed on the strategy of transmigration after the Basic Transmigration Act in 1972 and with the second Five-Year Development Plan which began in 1974. The second *Repelita* thus incorporated the creation of institutions to assist transmigration: the National Housing Policy Board, the National Housing Development Corporation (Perumnas) and the National Mortgage Bank (BTN, the organization now infamous for defaulting on World Bank loans in 1997.)

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[1] *Masalah Bangunan*, Vol. 22 no. 1, March 1977. p 29.

The many types of migration programs included the resettlement of spontaneous or voluntary migrants, compulsory migrants (those who had to be moved after a disaster or due to an impending development project), political dissidents, urban undesirables, and retired army personnel. Though some of these undertakings included the people indigenous to the Outer Islands, such as in the relocation of isolated tribes to more "developed" settlements, the emphasis remained on Javanese inter-island movement.

The Second Five-Year Development Plan aspired to move 250,000 families, or 1.25 million people to the Outer Islands. Though this lofty goal was not attained within the five year period, between 1970 and 1997 over one million people were relocated to the Outer Islands. During this time, the population of Indonesia grew by over 40 million people. Thus, the effort had a practically negligible effect in relieving the density of Java. However, transmigration had a significant effect on the Outer Islands. Though the plan prescribed the incorporation and engagement of local traditions, local materials, and local labor, such prescriptions were deliberately unheeded, resulting in tremendous regional political and cultural disruption.

Ethnicity subset of Indonesian community

The disregard for the indigenous people of the Outer Islands and their local customs can be explained by one of the less formalized goals of transmigration as envisioned in the Suharto era. This was the integration of a developmental national Indonesian identity which was to be shared by all Indonesian citizens and override ethnicity as a primary identity of the people of Indonesia.

Drawing on the histories particularly focused upon Java and their corresponding myths and ideologies,[2] Suharto authored a new Indonesian identity on the ideology of *Pancasila* or the Five Principles. These principles consist of the belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice. These democratic ideals allowed Suharto the sovereignty necessary to mould a narrative to build an "imagined political community," as Benedict Anderson has described the concept of nation.[3] The tools Anderson prescribed for nation-making were set in place by Suharto. Bahasa Indonesia which had been used in the 1920s in resistance to the Dutch had been ratified as the national language in the 1950s. Under Suharto this national language was propagated throughout the archipelago through the national schools as well as through the extensive nationally programmed radio and television networks which was a major infrastructural priority in the New Order. These networks disseminated the feeling of homogeneous, shared time and conflated space throughout the archipelago, creating "deep, horizontal comradeship"[4] or fraternal identification necessary for identification with an "imagined" group in that it is larger than one can possibly physically encounter. As Liddle writes of the Indonesian language, "it provides the common vocabulary with which succeeding generations reassess and renegotiate their relationship to both nation and state."[5]

Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism as belonging only to those who are able to participate in the imagining of the community[6], offers an understanding of the Javanese lead national development. Though Anderson claims that in the shared imagining of the national community Sumatrans, who "share neither mother-tongue, ethnicity, nor religion with the

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[2] These histories and myths range from those of the Buddhist Empire of Srivijaya to the Hindu Majapahit Empire, Nusantara sea linkages, to the Dutch consolidation of the archipelago.

[3] Anderson, p 7.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Liddle, p 313.

[6] Anderson, p 15.

Ambonese, . . . during the last century [they] have come to understand the Ambonese as fellow-Indonesians," Sumatrans and Ambonese alike acknowledge their role to play in Indonesia focused around an imagined pilgrimage center in Jakarta.[7]

One of the principles of the national ideology complicates this shared imagining. The third principle, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, often translated as Unity in Diversity, allows for the segmentation of a unified, communal Indonesian identity. The national ideology officially endorses diversity, but has been practiced quite differently. In the integration policies of transmigration, an emphasis on unity over diversity is apparent.

Unity valued over diversity

Indonesia is considered one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world if ethnicity is used as the marker of heterogeneity. Ethnicities in Indonesia are based on geographic regions and tied to cultural heritage through parentage. Officially, Indonesia has over 300 ethnic groups or *suku* subscribing to a variety of world religions often unofficially espoused with local beliefs.

In the crafting of a national identity, Suharto's New Order geographically codified ethnicity within Indonesia making it a subset of what was considered to be Indonesian. Under Suharto, ethnic groups were defined geographically within the official districts and provinces of Indonesia. Though of course ethnic groups, or *suku*, were of various size and often spilled into other districts and provinces, by segmenting and standardizing these groups in space, each suku was declared a separate component of the Indonesian nation. This standardization and subordination to national scope painted the national level of government as ethnically neutral.

Ethnicity as a geographical identifier was complicated by transmigration, which mixed ethnicity in an effort to integrate the people of Indonesia. Transmigration created isolated pockets of migrants who continued to ethnically identify with their place of origin. Thus, though many provinces grew to contain populations of mixed ethnicity, the borders continued to represent primordially defined ethnic regions.

Transmigration however, saw unity, not diversity as the key to development. The diffused nature of the people considered to be Indonesian posed a problem to the central government whose plans revolved around a concentrated, singular and shared Indonesian identity with a shared agreement of development toward the future. Cultural pluralism was seen as an impediment to the development strategies planned on a national scale. To create an equality amongst citizens, acknowledgement of differentiation was discouraged. The Minister of Transmigration in 1985, Martono, clearly stated the program's position on unity and diversity; quoting from the concluding remarks of a Youth Congress, Martono reminded, "We are one nation, the Indonesian nation; we have one native country, Indonesia; one language, the Indonesian language." He then went on to state, "By way of Transmigration, we will try to realize what has been pledged: To integrate all the ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation. The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration and there will be one kind of man, Indonesian."[8] The dissolving of difference in the national narrative, was repeated again in a Transmigration department assessment in 1977 in that they pledged to continue their work of "social and cultural unification . . . until there is no difference between them, in keeping with the [state] motto of Unity in Diversity [*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*]."[9]

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[7] Ibid, p 110-112.

[8] Hoey, p 112.

[9] Ibid, p 111.

Transmigrants were encouraged by the government as "the pioneers of development" and were asked to "co-operate" by not comparing the new settlements with their original villages.[10]

New developmental culture to replace traditional culture

In the utilization of transmigration policy towards the manipulation of local identities into national identity, traditional culture was often seen as non-modern, backwards and representing under-development. The traditional values and *adat* (customary laws) of most of the ethnic groups of the Outer Islands were devalued and seen to be in need of replacement by a new culture. Such a new culture is remarked by the Minister of Manpower, Transmigration and Co-operation in 1976, Subroto, who announced, "It is hoped that the whole country will benefit from the result of this 3 dimensional development pattern; i.e. a pattern that stretches to remote spots, penetrates deeply into villages and expanding by involving all classes of society."*(sic)* He continued that "there rests now only the development of the cultural pattern which is hoped to harmoniously formulate a national integration."[11] However, the "cultural pattern" that was intended to develop a presumably more integrated, national culture, was left roughly undefined.

It is more clearly described what this new culture was *not* to be. Anthropological studies published in the National Department of Housing English-language journal, *Masalah Bangunan*, of Outer Island indigenous groups, critique cultural aspects as distinctly non-developmental, primitive, and backward. Ritual practices and performed traditions were conflated with cultural values. The analysis of the traditions and culture of the Dayak ethnic group of Eastern Kalimantan is exemplary of the government interpretation of indigenous culture. The plan for these "isolated tribes or ethnic groups still holding their ancient and 'primitive' tradition and custom" was to resettle them and provide them land and work, to allow them to share in the benefits of national development. The same article claims that the settlement of isolated tribes is "an effort in humanity, to exchange in an instant a cultural pattern of the 'stone age' into the 20th century's.*(sic)*"[12]

To this end, between 1972 and 1974, forty resettlement locations were established for the more than 1.5 million Dayak people in East Kalimantan. In addition to these settlements set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Labour Force, Transmigration and Cooperatives (TRANSKOP) established eleven transmigration settlements, with the intent that, "It is further expected that transmigrants from Java, Bali, and Lombok will set an example in village and community development."[13] In addition, it was planned that the army would send 6,000 retired officers to Kalimantan between 1974 and 1975 to settle in some of the transmigration areas.

Masalah Bangunan, or Building Problems, was a quarterly journal published from 1956 to 1997 by the Indonesian Ministry of Public Work's Regional Housing Center and then its Institute for Human Settlements, in conjunction with the UN Regional Centre for Research on Human Settlements. It contains articles on technology, planning, architecture and housing, particularly in regards to Indonesian development as envisioned in a succession of Five-Year Plans and transmigration. This journal, dedicated to development, also claims to celebrate the diverse architectural styles throughout Indonesia. Two specific reasons were given by *Masalah Bangunan* for discouraging the traditional culture of the Dayaks of Eastern and Central

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[10] *Masalah Bangunan*, Vol. 21 no. 1, p 30.

[11] *Masalah Bangunan* Vol. 22 no. 1, March 1977, p 31.

[12] "A View on Transmigration and Resettlement in Indonesia," in *Masalah Bangunan*, December 1974, p 8.

[13] "A View on Transmigration and Resettlement in Indonesia," in *Masalah Bangunan*, December 1974, p 8.

Kalimantan. The first is a criticism that the Dayak culture may be thought to be politically subversive. The second is a criticism that the Dayak longhouses are symbolically and developmentally backwards.

Architecture as politically subversive: Central Kalimantan Dayaks

The Dayak of Central Kalimantan live in villages comprised of three to five raised long-houses or *lamin* which each may house anywhere from five to fifty families. These longhouses are continuously expanded by the addition of apartments at the ends and can surpass a length of 300 meters. The main platform of the house is divided lengthwise. A communal gallery runs along the half of the structure along which a narrow central corridor provides access to the doors into the individual family apartments, which usually consists of a main room with a kitchen room behind, which opens to the other side of the structure.[14] The construction and maintenance of the house is a cooperative effort. This type of housing represents to the Dayak a strong communalism and a de-emphasis on individual property.

The 1974 description of the resettlement of this "isolated tribe" community into settlement housing includes the resistance of the community to the government provided nuclear family housing. The article retells that after the Dayaks of central Kalimantan were converted to Christianity, and were forced to abandon their traditional long-houses, two new communal buildings were introduced to replace the shared communalism displaced by the new single family households. These new structures were the church, of obvious missionary influence, and the men's house, which was of a Javanese inspired model. However, neither of these structures were used for long because the church was considered too formal and the men's house too exclusive. "Thus, even to day, bible readings are done often in old LAMINS where people gather in relaxation in the old ceremonial hall."(*sic*)[15]

This article further remarks that the Dayak are reluctant to build their own new single-family houses. The author attributes this to Dayak unfamiliarity with new construction materials, and that therefore these houses are constructed by the "imported labourers,"[16] in other words, the imported transmigrants. However, one Dayak family asks why they can't live in modernized apartments similar to their long-houses. Quoting one, "A traditional Lamin may be dark and unhealthy according to today's health standards. But why can't we live in a "modern" big house with a central hall, with apartments along its sides; where we live as we used to do. After all the houses in (Kalimantan) towns look also like Lamins."[17] Thus, according to the author, the people are not inherently resistant to a more modern type of village settlement, as long is it resembles characteristics which they valued in their longhouses. Thus, though the journal recognizes that the Dayak are resistant to the new housing types and would prefer something more along the lines of an apartment-like shared housing type, it is notable that the Ministry of Social Welfare, under whose auspices lies the settlement of Isolated tribes, continued to build nuclear family type housing.

The exclusion of the Dayak opinion in the development process may be attributed to a more general governmental suspicion of isolated tribes. According to Michael Dove writing in 1988, "military and police posts in the rural areas of Indonesia's outer islands still routinely categorize forest-dwelling tribal peoples as their greatest "security" problem, calling them

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[14] "To Dwell on the Water Side," in *Masalah Bangunan.*

[15] Ibid, p 33-34.

[16] "To Dwell on the Water Side," in *Masalah Bangunan*, p 34.

[17] Ibid.

"communists" or "primitive communists" or "people susceptible to communist influence."[18] Dove further claims that the Dayak tribes are "suspected of subversive tendencies because they live in long-houses and oppose ill-planned development projects."[19] After the communist led coup in 1965 communism came to be considered the enemy of the Indonesian State. Ironically, the coups was lead almost entirely by Javanese and Balinese who were then resettled in transmigration camps in the Outer Islands, joining the many "pioneers of development." Therefore, the explanation of a suspicion of communism can only be partially true. More likely, the Dayak communities were seen as a barrier to development and the decentralized nature of the larger community of Dayak peoples allowed the central government to pressure these groups to live as it preferred them to live.

This cultural colonization under President Suharto, claiming to support a "traditional" style contained a political aspect which dovetailed with the democratizing and anti-communist agenda of lenders such as the US, the UN and the World Bank among others. The fear of communism after the coup of 1965 was a major cause of a encouragement of nuclear families and single family housing. Many people in the Outer Islands besides the Dayak had lived in village communities based upon tribal lineage and lived in communal houses or buildings with extended family apartments with villages comprised of only five or six such buildings, like the Dayak lamins. The numerous adat systems of traditional law throughout the Outer Islands elevated the importance of communal land holding. The property-rights and land-survey system of the central government's Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 constantly chaffed at the adat system of communalism.

Architecture as symbolically backward: Eastern Kalimantan Dayaks

The 1978 *Masalah Bangunan* article by Sumintardja, "The last Lamins of the Dayaks," recounts the government project to resettle the Kenyah and Kayan Dayaks of East Kalimantan. The author states that the number of their traditional "Lamins" or long-houses is diminishing and "no new ones will ever be built again."[20] The article states that these "Dayak tribes of East Kalimantan will find themselves modernized as their tribal cousins in central Kalimantan, the Ngayu Dayaks." The explanation or justification for this process of the elimination of a cultural housing type is hidden in the details of the description of the traditional *lamin* longhouse. The author subtly and effectively barbarizes the culture that produces the longhouse, and the building tradition itself. The author attributes two important elements in the construction style to practices which had been abandoned by the Dayak people. He indicates that the main pole of the house "will rest, on the body of a virgin crushing it, layed on the bottom of the pit." Sumintardja writes, "At the turn of the century, the Dayak tribes around the upperstream of the Kahauan, Katingan and Kapuas rivers were nomadic. They were intensively converted to Christianity by the missionaries, resulting in certain traditional customs having to be abandoned. In this is included the practice of the construction of 'long houses' which was usually preceded with head-hunting, necessarily for the initial ceremony."(sic) That it had become the mission of the government to continue this imperialistic "civilizing" effort of eradicating such a barbaric custom as the building houses may be read to carry a symbolic association to head-hunting, though the Dayak no longer actually partake in head-hunting.

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[18] Dove, p 21.

[19] Ibid, p 32.

[20] Sumintardja, "The last Lamins of the Dayaks" in Masalah Bangunan. Vol. 23, no. 1, March 1978. p 33.

The articles on the traditional Dayak architecture of East Kalimantan is an example of the use of the mode of archiving which disguises the cultural editing through eulogizing what is being destroyed. While ostensibly celebrating the wide range of cultural manifestations, it eulogizes the imminent loss of tradition for the development of the future. The handling of the traditions of the Dayak exemplify what Hoey writes of as "promoting "tradition" on the one hand while simultaneously eliminating meaningful cultural distinctions on the other."[21] Here we can see that in fact diversity was not valued by the central government and that cultural distinction was used as a sign of underdevelopment.

Micromanaged tradition

The first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, also an architect and planner, hadn't seemed concerned with such pluralist identities and regionalism, and, instead, had focused on developing the city of Jakarta into a fulcrum of modernity for the developing world, indeed a "beacon of the emerging nations."[22] His successor, President Suharto instead lead a fierce manipulation of Indonesian culture, under which urban historian and social anthropologist Abidin Kusno suggests was given "birth to the idea of "tradition" in architectural culture."[23] Suharto's "tradition" however was unique in that it was merely symbolic and surgically removed from its corresponding values which allow tradition to continue. President Suharto knew the importance of creating an understanding of the culture of Indonesia in undergoing national development.[24] As Hoey writes, there was a "New Order preoccupation with micromanaging cultural expression,"[25] which was achieved by upholding arts, architecture, dance, and music over adat laws and traditional values. Liddle similarly concludes that "the government's main reason for celebrating and subsidizing artistic culture is that it is a politically safe response to the desire of local groups to maintain their unique and separate identities and to have their collective interests recognized."[26]

In Suharto's interpretative framework, symbols were interpreted as more important than values. The exhibition of culture that was made manifest at the Indonesian cultural theme park, Indonesia Indah Taman Mini, or Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park, was the political definition of Indonesia. At the park's inaugural address in April 1975 on the outskirts of the capital city Jakarta, President Suharto claimed that the park represented "little Indonesia which describes great Indonesia." In it, a three-dimensional cultural pattern was made incarnate. In effect, the representation serves as an arm of the government describing to the Indonesian people what the government defines as Indonesia, as much as that which it doesn't consider worthy to be included in Indonesia. Geertz's interpretation of Taman Mini was as a model for and not a model of Indonesia. In this version of Suharto's Indonesia, cultural diversity is preserved in a fully integrated whole, in a single space.

Taman Mini is a perfect example of reducing culture to mere symbols. As Hoey writes, Taman Mini is a "macro level act of cultural editing."[27] In this editing, Suharto's central government was able to freeze symbols and subsequently assign new values to ethnic traditions. Taman Mini then allowed for an image of diversity without actual differentiation of values.

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[21] Hoey, p 111.
[22] Kusno, p 1.
[23] Ibid, p 18.
[24] Kusno, p 18.
[25] Hoey, p 113.
[26] Liddle, p 307.
[27] Hoey, p 114.

Thus, the creation of Taman Mini was central to the ideology of transmigration as "Unity in Diversity" which was no more than rhetoric for the idealized image of Indonesia.

The 120 acre park, displays "life size" traditional houses of Indonesia's twenty-six provinces as well as a youth park, a fruit garden, and a fish pond among other recreational facilities. The traditional housing types are situated around a landscaped archipelago within an 8 ½ hectare Geography Lake. A review of the opening of the Mini Park, in *Masalah Bangunan* in 1975, notes that as the houses are designed to function as exhibition pavilions, there has been an allowance for spatial and interior re-organization. The article further reveals that "The grouping of the houses is based upon the representation of a province's cultural wealth and characteristics. Consequently, the overall landscaping has its limitations since every individual site would like to express its highest show-effect. For some provinces populated by several ethnic groups, the land allocated seems too small to avoide the various types of buildings to be squized together. On the other hand, several provinces are populated by ethnic groups similar to its neighboring provinces. In order to fill the allocated plot new variations of traditional houses are being invented."(*sic*)[28]

Taman Mini displayed a hierarchy of traditional culture through architecture to reveal the culture's relative importance to the whole of Indonesian architecture. In its ability to compartmentalize ethnic culture where each is contained and managed within a confined area. The "primitive" house from the "megalithic island" of Nias is shrunk to a much smaller size to become a souvenir shop for Northern Sumatran handicrafts.[29] What is determined to be "primitive" is relegated a minor role in the cultural pangaea of Indonesia whereas each of the 26 provincial representations also has "one big house of the high society style is to become the display center of the development taking place within the Provincial, one smaller house (peasant/rural type house) where handicrafts are exhibited and which also functions as an art shop."(*sic*)[30] So that "many distinct ethnic cultures are dissolved inferiorly within the mayor [major] ethnic group in the respective Province."(*sic*)[31]

There was political hypocrisy to the display of symbols at Taman Mini and the simultaneous removal of people that actually lived in such traditional architecture because it was seen as non-modern and thus not fitting to Indonesia. Particularly in regard to the isolated tribes, the attitude taken in the Second Five-Year Development plan, "to change the attitude of these people from traditional static to more rational, dynamic and productive attitudes," by raising their "consciousness" of a need for better housing[32] is at odds with the formation of a national Indonesian identity based on the national principle of pluralist harmony Unity in Diversity, as represented at the Miniature Indonesia Park.

This representation of a cohesive whole was a strategy to overcome a lack of control over the disparate groupings in Indonesia. By exhibiting and describing the multiple Indonesian cultural variations and the affirmation of national diversity, the authority of the central government extended to the actual regions in which these cultural variants were traditionally practiced. This authority, coupled with an authority over the process of development and modernization, then allowed the government a screen behind which they could refashion culture to better suit the national agenda. This cultural pattern of Unity in Diversity remained within the

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[28] *Masalah Bangunan* Vol. 20, no. 2, July 1975. p 35.

[29] *Masalah Bangunan* Vol. 20, no. 2, July 1975. p 36.

[30] *Masalah Bangunan* Vol. 22, no. 3-4, September-December 1977. p 48.

[31] Ibid, p 50.

[32] *Masalah Bangunan*, Vol. 21, no. 2, p 4-5.

Javanese imagining of Taman Mini whereas the cultural pattern occurring in the Outer Islands was one of acculturation and modernization.

Javanese centralization

Both the engineering of a singular Indonesian identity, as well as the geographical spread of the transmigration project, favored the Javanese. As Liddle describes it, "the Javanese are perceived as wanting to impose "feudal" values of hierarchy and deference toward authority on traditionally more egalitarian non-Javanese cultures."[33] The Javanese had long been at the center of Indonesian economy and thus, according to political scientist Ernest Gellner, naturally became the core of the nation. For Gellner, economic production is key to necessitating the state. Indeed, Gellner states, "the social organization of agrarian society, however, is not at all favorable to the nationalist principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units, and to the homogeneity and school-transmitted nature of culture within each political unity. On the contrary, as in medieval Europe, it generates political units which are either smaller or much larger than cultural boundaries would indicate."[34] As the island of Java rapidly experienced densification, land available for agricultural production became increasingly scarce. Javanese became dependant upon the agricultural production of the Outer Islands and was then able to adopt manufacturing into their economic repertoire.

In 1996, Java, Bali and Sumatra brought in four-fifths of the GDP, whereas the contribution to GDP from the "Outer Islands" such of Sulawesi (4%), Maluku (0.7%), Papua (1.6%) and Nusa Tenggara (1.6%), was almost negligible. The Outer Islands have been said to be floating "in an economic vacuum."[35] Policies were created which favored manufacturing, indirectly favoring the Javanese whereas agriculture continued to be subject to regulations and restrictions. Other policies were implemented so that the centralization of the economy around Java remained intact. During the Suharto era, the Outer Islands were required to channel their exports through the Javanese ports of Surabaya or Jakarta which allowed Java a cut of the export income.[36] Each of these regions has also become dependent upon importing agricultural goods such as rice, sugar, and salt from Java. The national government's coordinating ministries have perpetuated this geographic dependency.

Thus, the officially standardized equal treatment of each ethnic group is challenged by economics. Javanese account for about half of the population, but disproportionately benefited from the national economic structure. Liddle writes that "tension between the Javanese and other groups has been exacerbated by the trend since the late 1950s toward centralization of power and decision-making in Jakarta. Both the population of the capital city and the personnel of the central government are multi-ethnic, but the sheer numbers of Javanese, and their physical proximity to the capital, make centralization seem equivalent to Javanization to many non-Javanese."[37] In the next chapter we will then see how Benedict Anderson's concept that the modern nation relies on the precondition that religious identities are subsumed to geographical ones when a country becomes involved in "a system of production and productive relations,"[38] will become complicated by the unraveling of the relations of dependency.

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[33] Liddle, p 279.
[34] Gellner, p 39.
[35] Dick, p 12.
[36] Sondakh, p 300.
[37] Liddle, p 279.
[38] Anderson, p 43.

Javanese Imperialism in the Model Village

Though the miniature archipelago at Taman Mini represented Indonesia as a place of close-knit cultural exchange, in reality the transmigration designs did not include policies which fostered such environments. Though the reach of transmigration extended far it did not allow for much inter-ethnic interaction. Instead, transportation and inter-regional mobility became the primary strategy of consecrating unification.

Major highways were constructed along the spines of Sumatra and Sulawesi and through the heart of Kalimantan and transmigration settlements were built along these major highways.[39] Not only did this planning allow for more accessible settlement construction and migration transportation, but also facilitated the shipping and distribution of the fruits of the transmigrants' labour. These highways, however, did not take into account indigenous settlement patterns and bypassed or bulldozed most of the pre-extant communities.[40] By not being linked up through the transportation system, most of the people of the Outer Islands were physically excluded from the planned regional development. Transmigration assessor, Mayling Oey writes of the Second Five- Year Development Plan's transmigration program, "As a result (of not taking into account potential for a holistic local or regional development) there are transmigration settlements which are completely isolated, far from settlements of indigenous people, and therefore with little communication between the settlers and the locals."[41]

The settlements established in the first three Five-Year Development Plans were not designed as integrated settlements and were built for the most part for singularly Javanese, Madurese, or Balinese communities. The settlements were designed for 500 families each, some clustered in enclaves including 25 to 35 families corresponding to a traditional Javanese *dukuh* or township.[42] Depending on the region, transmigrants were given a house and a few hectares to farm. The houses in the settlements were aligned in a linear pattern along a single roadway so as to allow for growth created by the spontaneous transmigrants expected to follow.[43]

Noting that "residential exclusiveness will continue to be an impediment toward total integration," Oey writes that the larger the community, the higher the degree of self-containment and thus a lower need to develop relations with those outside the community. Though there were suggestions to reduce the size of the settlements to 200 or 300 families in the Third Five-Year Development Plan, 500 families was agreed to be the size practical and most efficient for the service of public school and the larger standard size was continued.

Model housing was designed for a five person nuclear family unit. This model came in two variations, one raised on stilts for a wetter and more marshy terrain, and the other with an earthen floor for dry ground. Some of these houses incorporated local materials such as timber which was abundant in many of the Outer Islands though increasingly precious in Java. In the settlements of Southern Sumatra, Gondowarsito notes that the small houses were built with wooden boards, whitewashed, and roofed with corrugated iron. In many places this tin roofing was imported from Java though in settlements in West Kalimantan traditional *rumia* thatch roofing material was often used.[44] Some of the wealthier settlers imported clay tiles from Java.[45] Many of the settlements, particularly in the earlier years were constructed by the government, though increasingly more houses were built by the transmigrants themselves through the process of mutual self-help or *gotong royong*, following the models provided by the government. The houses however, did not tend to reflect local tradition or incorporate any features of the local architecture, and if anything, resembled a simplified Javanese prototype with the double pitched roof.[46] However, these models did lack the traditional visiting room, or kamar tamu, so important to Javanese culture even for the most poor, who comprised the bulk of the transmigrants.

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[39] Hardjono, Promotion of Unassisted Transmigration, p 71.

[40] Oey, p 159, and Gondowarsito, p 280,

[41] Oey, p 135.

[42] Oey, p 169.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Bandiyono, p 11.

[45] Gondowarsito, p 246.

Among the services provided for within the settlements was included a place for worship, interchanged with the less neutral word "mosque" in World Bank documents[47] indicating that the Bank believed all transmigrants were Muslim. This period of regional development did indeed see the arrival of what has become an "Indonesian" or Pancasila mosque type, throughout the archipelago.[48] This type, "traditional" in that it was based on a Javanese style, was comprised of a square prayer hall surmounted by a multi-hipped *meru* roof, which was preceded by a pendopo or reception platform covered with a lower meru roof. This design, which represents both the inner sphere and the communal space of the outer realm is taken from a traditional Javanese house type.

The prevalence of this mosque type throughout Indonesia today can be attributed to the period of transmigration and the resulting cultural colonization. As Abidin Kusno writes, "During the early 1980s, a nationally-constituted programme of mosque building was established for remote and less prosperous communities throughout Indonesia," in which "the adoption of the image of the traditional Javanese mosque is perhaps an attempt by the New Order to construct its own authority as different from that of its predecessor."[49] In this way the New Order created a form which they deemed traditional as opposed to the modern structures promoted by Sukarno, tradition which was incarnate of a Javanese culture.

Transmigration consultants remark at the similitude of transmigration settlements to typical Javanese village neighborhoods and many migrants saw their settlements as a "New Java" or Javanese satellite towns, with a complete transfer of *kejawan* or Javanese-isms.[50] Even the World Bank acknowledges the Javanese pockets alienated from indigenous people which "constrains the regional development of the program."[51] However, the verisimilitude with Java should not be exaggerated. According to the Indonesian government, the "the pioneers of development" were asked to "co-operate" by not comparing the new settlements with their original villages.[52]

The failure of many transmigration sites to sew together the multiple diverse cultures has received international criticism as well as violent reaction from within many of the regions of the Outer Islands which were chosen as the resettlement destinations, including Kalimantan, Papua, Maluku and Sumatra (specifically Aceh). The first signs of this failure were indicated by the numbers of transmigrants who returned back to Java, of migrants from Jakarta who were said to cause trouble in their refusal to adapt to quaint rural life, and of isolated tribes which would return to the jungle due to what was understood as "the too great mental pressure to exchange their customs in a too short period."[53]

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[46] Gambar-Gambar Teknis.

[47] IBRD Appraisal, 1976.

[48] Tjahjono. A Traditional Shape Packaged.

[49] Kusno, p 2-3.

[50] Gondowarsito, p 314.

[51] IBRD Appraisal, 1976, p 7.

[52] *Masalah Bangunan* 21/1/ p 30.

Conclusion: Layers of identity

Regardless of, or rather resiliently out of, the exclusive and alienating features of transmigration, Mopugad is a transmigration settlement still intact. Hoey would argue that such resilience occurs where the aggressive national objective to homogenize into community did not trump the "assertion of local purpose,"[54] and that the true national identity is not formed by policy, but by community. Hoey writes, "National culture is not simply reproduced in these settlements, but may be adapted or challenged, interpreted, and shaped in the context of community-building."[55]

Chapters Four and Five will look more in detail at community in the settlement of Mopugad thirty years after the establishment of the planned community. Mopugad is characteristic not of standard transmigration settlements, however, in that the majority ethnic group is Balinese and thus the political critique of Javanization is not a key element of the town. Also, in the 1980s transmigration officials ended their collaboration with Mopugad. Now in its second generation, local negotiation of community between these two groups of settlers continues. I argue that this negotiation, now emerging from the shadow of Suharto's national identity, and perhaps into yet other shadows, is based upon changes and continuities within and between these two communities due to the past 30 years of co-habitation as well as contemporary influences. The next chapter will offer a summary of the contemporary influences coming as a result of national political change and cultural redefinition.

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[53] *Masalah Bangunan*, Vol. 19, no. 4, p 10.
[54] Hoey, p 109.
[55] Hoey, p 110.

CHAPTER THREE
NATIONAL IDENTITY RECONTESTED BY POLITICIZED RELIGION

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has been in a whirlwind of political and cultural redefinition. Whereas under the centralization of Suharto's New Order, where the project to create a holistic Indonesia involved the standardization of ethnic identities which were then fixed in relation to politics, the fixatives have become unstuck as identity and politics become reworked by a variety of new actors. The process of decentralization, the devolution of decision-making to more local government to align better with the preferences of local groups, is being interrupted by actors trying to forge a new national narrative. This competition is being performed in locally specific spaces.

The regional diversity assumed for the geographically based decentralization to succeed is no longer impervious to cross-border identity seepage. Though the national parliament is undertaking an impressive attempt at reallocating power, they are stitching together a weak federalism that leaves national minorities vulnerable to dissent within their allocated boundaries. Though power will be redistributed to ethnic groups, the minorities which need more representation, indeed more protection, are not ethnic but religious minorities.

This chapter will describe some of the key features of the national decentralization and its various impacts on the realignment of identity groupings. The awareness of the potential consequences of decentralization are invaluable to an understanding of local dynamics between various ethnic groups. People at the local level, particularly in diverse areas such as transmigration sites, are highly aware and concerned about the ramifications such changes in government may have upon their community, psychologically as well as administratively. The consequences of decentralization will determine which identities are activated at various levels of political power. Ideally, this process may lead to a heterogeneous political public able to activate different identities at different tiers of government. More pessimistically, it may lead to the domination by one identity group and a focus of power at one level of government. One may argue that the latter consequence seems to be occurring, with national politics currently dominated by debates of governance particularly pertaining to religious identity.

In an effort to structure the various changes that are occurring presently in Indonesia, this section will compare the identities activated at the national level by political parties, the identities activated in contested regional space, and popular Indonesian perceptions of identity as compiled in national surveys. At each tier of government (the national and the district or provincial) a different identity is being activated. Decentralization places increased emphasis on the provincially activated identities that may be contested in the larger national metanarrative which can align with sub-provincial minorities. Ironically then, the devolution of authority to district levels allows space for co-option of the loosely governed pan-Indonesian national identity.

Decentralization

In a laudable attempt to more fairly represent the many people of Indonesia and their differentiated identity groups, as well as to prevent the country from Balkanizing, the Indonesian state is undergoing a major process of decentralization. Through the administrations of the four presidents since the deposition of Suharto in 1998, a substantial amount of political and fiscal authority has been devolved to the country's provinces and the districts within them. Just last year, Indonesia experienced a complete restructuring of the parliament as well as for the first time a direct presidential election.

Political parties have once again taken over as the key political actors. Political parties were first formed in the 1940s. These parties, according to Liddle, were organized primarily along religious lines and secondarily along class and cultural lines.[1] Under Suharto, however, these parties were for the most part disbanded.

Though the newfound role of political parties in Indonesian politics is still undergoing definition, there are many benefits to the existence of political parties in a democracy, particularly in a highly heterogeneous country. As described by Peter Mair, political parties are instrumental in "organizing and mobilizing citizens, aggregating diverse interests, recruiting leaders for public office, formulating public policy, and serving as an essential link between the citizens and the state."[2] Paige Johnson further remarks that without the symbols and packages of policy options that parties offer, the information costs of political participation are too high for individual voters.[3] Finally, a forum of diverse opinions though multiple parties offers an institutional space in which reforms may act and minority voices may be heard.

However, parties are forced into a much more difficult role when forced to collaborate towards the establishment of a democracy or the restructuring of the state. The dilemma of political parties in such a situation lies between its self-interest to capture as large a constituency as possible by coercing followers to its cause, and the recognition that powerful parties hold the power to manipulate representation so that each identity or opinion is more accurately heard. Political parties in Indonesia are doing a laudable job at reallocating political resources, however this release of political power is not complete.

The six parties elected to the parliament in 1999 have been very active in disaggregating the centralized government and creating conditions for regional autonomy. Under the Presidency of Habibie, immediately following Suharto, the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) passed Law number 22, the Autonomy Law, and Law number 25, the Fiscal Balance Law. These two laws, key to the new structure of Indonesian governance, were passed in April 1999 and implemented January 2001. Law 25 outlines a new fiscal relationship between the central government and the regions by replacing direct subsidies with general-purpose funds that will be applied at the discretion of the provincial and district bodies, and subsequently passed through the provincial assemblies. Also, Law 25 grants permission for local governments to directly garner foreign loans, shifting foreign investment also to the level of the province.

However, Law 22, the Autonomy Law, is much more open to interpretation, indeed to interpretation by each region. It broadly states that "Regional Autonomy shall be the authority of the Autonomous Region to govern and administer the interests of the local people according to its own initiatives based on the people's aspirations in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations." These "Autonomous Regions . . . shall be the legal community units having certain boundaries, authorized to govern and administer the interests of the local people according to their own initiatives based on the people's aspirations within the boundaries of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia."[4] One of the more concrete clauses of this law states that the provincial parliaments (DPRD) will now independently elect their provincial governor. Though the governor is still subject to veto by the President, it is no longer a presidentally allocated position. As Liddle predicts, "the province, historically the level at which rebellions have been mobilized, would become a poorly bureaucratic unit, losing even its legislature, while the districts and municipalities would be given new policy making responsibilities, large block grants of funds from the center, and their own tax bases."[5]

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[1] Liddle, p 280.

[2] Mair, p 34.

[3] Johnson, *Streams of Least Resistance* p 4.

[4] The People's Representative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia. Law Draft of The Republic of Indonesia Number 22 Year 1999 Regarding Regional Governance.

Restructuring the political order at the national level has involved disbanding the Peoples Consultative Council, or the MPR, which had previously included the elected parliament along with providentially appointed seats, which were usually reserved for the military. Now the entire parliament has been restructured so that there is no longer a MPR body but rather an entirely elected parliament consisting of the DPR and the newly created DPD, which, similar to a Senate, hosts regional representatives regardless of the population of the region. Each province will send four representatives to the DPD. The DPD will be in charge of monitoring the laws of regional autonomy, and newly decentralized tax, education and religious structures and mechanisms.[6] The 550 seats of the DPR are now elected by a proportional representation system between the 69 electoral districts. Depending on the size its population, each district will have 3 to 8 seats.

As of the 2004 inaction of Law 23, on the General Election of the President and Vice President, 2004, the president is no longer elected through the DPR and is now elected via direct popular vote. To ensure that presidential candidates reach across various party lines, thresholds have been placed on Indonesian candidates. The president has incentives to reach out to other provinces as he or she must win a minimum threshold of 20% of the votes in at least half of the provinces. The election process is a proportional voting system based on an open list, with the president required to win at least 50% of the votes. Thus, Susilo Bambang Yudho won in a run-off vote between himself and Megawati in September.

Dominant ethnic and religious group at national level

Political parties have taken over from the president as the new main actors at the national level politics. Acknowledging the important role that these parties play in negotiation of national identity, the current president, Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, cautioned in 1998, that "there is no problem with the establishment of new parties. But one has to think carefully, whether or not it is correct to form parties which are based on most sensitive points: ethnicity, religion, and race."[7] However, allowing parties to form along these lines and acknowledging that parties already exist along these lines, should be considered together. By neglecting that national parties favor dominant groups, the national government is subscribing to a "metaconflict" in representation. Donald Horowitz describes such a "metaconflict" as existed in South Africa immediately after apartheid, where a taboo against talking about distinctions exists because of a fear "that talking about ethnicity creates or reinforces ethnic divisions."[8] In such a situation, where ethnicity was decided to "have no officially recognized part in public life and . . also that those affiliations should play no part, even informally, in political alignments or collective action,"[9] the government is susceptible to "informal" dominance or co-option by one identity group or affiliation.

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[5] Liddle, p 297.
[6] Simanjuntak, p 69.
[7] Media Indonesia, June 8, 1998.
[8] Horowitz, p 29.
[9] Ibid, p 28.

SBY won the 2004 election with a new party, which claimed no affiliation to a specific ethnic, religious or racial group. However, one ethnic group and one religious group heavily dominated SBY's party and his new cabinet, as well as the other political parties that participated in the national elections. Though perhaps unintentionally, Javanese and Muslims are the main actors on the national level of government. In the previous election in 1999, each of the six parties that won 88.5% of votes for the parliamentary election granting them 92.9% of the seats,[10] was heavily Javanese. Four of these parties were also based on Islamic affiliations.

Of the two secular parties, the PDI-P party, who won 33.7% of the vote in 1999, was a party whose supporters were predominantly Javanese and Balinese. Its party leader Megawati, who was to become president in 2001, was the daughter of Indonesia's first president Sukarno, and considered by some of her followers as the mythical *ratu adil*, or just ruler, according to Javanese tradition.[11] Golkar, which won 22.4% of the vote and the second most number of seats, was said to be, "the only organization that could potentially reach into all the inhabited islands and scattered villages of the diverse Indonesian archipelago."[12] Though the party of Suharto, Golkar benefited from the Suharto-established inter-island infrastructure and networks of bureaucrats, and through the asset of familiarity, has maintained its influence in the Outer Islands. Golkar, like PDI-P, was a secular oriented party.

The four remaining parties of the big six all grew out of Islamic organizations. Of the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the PKB or National Awakening Party) which won 12.6% of the vote, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the PPP or United Development Party) which won 10.7%, the Partai Amanat Nasional (the PAN or National Mandate Party) which won 7.1% and the Partai Bulan Bintang (the PBB or Crescent and Star Party) which won 2% of the vote, only two of the parties favor increased Muslim intervention in politics, the PPP and PBB. However, it cannot be denied that all four of them appeal to Muslim identity in their constituencies.

Such a strong presence of Muslim parties may be due to the Suharto regime. As Hefner writes, "an important side effect of the New Order's economic development policy has been an extraordinary growth in the number of pious Muslims and in their role in modern Indonesian society."[13] This can be attributed to the expansion of the educational system in the 1970s and 1980s where compulsory religion classes crafted a more unified interpretation of Islam amongst the various strands which had existed previously, as well as to the addition of prayer rooms to all government offices and many private businesses.[14]

These primary identities have been allowed to become active, indeed the Outer Islands have put up with a Javanese dominated politicization of religion, I would argue, for two reasons: legal restrictions which limit "Outer Island" parties and a general popular political conservatism. Firstly, the regulations determining which parties were declared able to participate in the national elections limited the opportunity to form political parties. In an attempt to encourage more regionally distributed political power, parties were required to appeal to geographically balanced constituencies from a variety of locations throughout Indonesia. A threshold of inter-island endorsement was set for parties wishing to receive a license to operate in politics at the national level. For parliamentary elections of May 1999, political parties had to be present in 9 provinces (which at the time was a third of all provinces) and have branch offices in at least half plus one of these provinces. Under this restriction only 48 of the 181 parties were eligible to run. For the 2004 elections, these restrictions, ironically created to ensure pan-Indonesian representation, became even more stringent. Parties were required to have branches in half of the provinces to get a license, which further whittled the number of parties in the election to 24.

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[10] Johnson, p 6.

[11] Ibid, p 7.

[12] Ibid, p 9.

[13] Hefner, Robert, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class" in *Indonesia*, No. 56. Oct 1993. p 1-37 as cited in Liddle, p 302.

[14] Liddle, p 302.

These new laws which require parties to capture a certain percentage of Indonesian provinces to be eligible in the parliamentary or presidential race, created an immediate disadvantage to Outer Island political parties which did not have networks with such a geographical scope. Such restrictions limited the ability for newer, province-initiated parties to enter the race. Parties with longer histories, name recognition or more monetary resources and political connections are still able to dominate party politics.

Furthermore, the parties that already control political resources continue to hold these positions. The 1999 "2% Rule" requires that a political party win at least 2% of the seats in parliament to be eligible to compete in the following election period, which shuts the door to small minority interest parties. Political parties at the national level have also proven adept at reaching out Javanese or Muslims who are minorities in certain areas. By coercing pockets of Javanese transmigrants, who are then able to transgress their status as local minorities, the political parties are able to activate religion at the national multiparty level.

A second reason for the uncontested Outer Island vote, is the history and familiarity this voting block has with the national parties. Though parties were restricted under Suharto, political parties have continued to exist since the first national election in 1955. During the New Order, three parties were permitted to organize: the ruling party, Golkar, the nationalist party, PDI and the Muslim party, PPP. PDI and PPP were never considered contenders for control of the state. They were rather seen as complimentary expressions of Golkar with PDI (originally crafted in the combination of three previously nationalist parties and two Christian parties) representing "the material aspirations of the Indonesian people," and PPP (originally formed from four Muslim parties) to represent the "spiritual aspirations of the Indonesian people." By thus co-opting the contending political parties in the crafting dummy parties, the New Order was able to limit partisan mobilization.[15] PPP and PDI could be seen as controlled extensions of the Golkar party, that were established to co-opt the constituencies whose interests lay in furthering democratic ideals or allowing religious ideals some voice in government. Despite the impotence of these parties, their presence during the New Order should not be discounted. The exposure afforded to them throughout the 32-year dictatorship, lives on in the memories of voters today across the archipelago. Prior exposure and not necessarily political ideology can be considered to have allowed Golkar, PDI and PPP to win majorities outside of Java even after Suharto.

National identity groupings contested in local spaces

The limits on a properly redistributed representational government has lead to localized contestation. As Liddle notes, "there are very few organizations in Indonesia representing purely ethnic interests, in the sense of regionally based cultural groups."[16] He continues that this is mysterious, "given the many cultural groups in Indonesia, their regional concentration (which should facilitate organization), the strong sense of ethnic solidarity within most groups, and the general pattern of suspicion or antagonism toward other groups."[17] He remarks "ethnic-based organization is un-Indonesian."[18] Thus, religion, more than ethnicity, has become a battlefield upon which to reconcile the gap between local and national identities.

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[15] Ibid, p 303.

[16] Liddle, p 305.

[17] Ibid.

Ethno nationalist now religious

Jacques Bertrand argues in "National Models: Ethnonationalist Violence and Democratic Consolidation" that ethnonationalist violence is a natural occurrence in the process of democratization. He argues that this type of conflict is part of the claim to participation in the formation of a new national model. He argues, much in the vein of Anderson's imagined national community, that symbolic, cultural, linguistic and religious distinctions must be incorporated into the national model. Until the plurality of ethnic groups is factored into the new model, conflict and demands for secession will continue.

The definition of identity as fluid and layered applies well to the Indonesian situation as the orders of government (national, provincial, district) wrestle to activate religion or ethnicity. In the Indonesian case, religion is the identity activated nationally, across-provinces and across-districts, whereas ethnicity can be seen as relatively bound within the borders of provinces and the districts within them. However, the borders of ethnicity are not protected from the national contestation which spills over into local areas. The ethnonatinalist movements with which Suharto struggled in places like Aceh, Papua, East Timor, have now become specifically religio-nationalist. Though Indonesia saw itself under threat of Balkanization into many ethnic islands, which indeed is threatening to its national economy, the nation is more accurately threatened by non-geographical contestations, with religious identities a more fearsome actor.

Arguably, even toward the end of the presidency of Suharto, religion was surfacing as a contestant for primary national identity. Suharto's response, in typical New Order fashion, was to try and bureaucratize it, much as he had tried to micromanage various levels of identity. Hefner writes that a new Indonesian religiosity that arose in the final years of Suharto that emphasized "belief in a supreme being, the need to replace "wasteful" ritual festivals with simple acts of devotion, and stricter bureaucratic controls over rural religion."[19]

Ambon

As an example of such national contestation at the local level, I will begin with the case of the violent contestation over space and authority, which is occurring in the southern Maluccas, or Maluku Selatan. Upon the founding of the Indonesian nation in 1945, Southern Maluku was a province that strongly vied for federalism. Such a position may have been largely due to the fact that Christians made up a majority of the population of the islands of Maluku and did not want to be subjugated to a Muslim dominated central government. The movement through which this sentiment was expressed, the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), was considered by the national government a threatening separatist movement. The central government "remedied" the concerns of the Maluccan Christians by relocating Muslims from Java and Madura to southern Maluku through transmigration, so that by 1998 the population of the region was quite evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. With the collapse of the central government, the balance system between the religions or SARA, known locally as *pela*, was upset as Muslim and Christian militia groups wrestled to become the louder political presence in the area.

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[18] Ibid, p 306.

[19] Hefner, R. W. 1990. The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretive History. Berkeley. p 221 as cited in Hoey, p 112.

Since 1999 the region around the island of Ambon has undergone violent redefinition. The causes of such redefinition range from an ideological religious war to the contestation over political positions, which in the opinion of some Christian Maluccans were disproportionately allocated to Muslims. In January of 2002, Ambonese officials asked the central government to withdraw the military, which had been assigned to enforce peace, but were increasingly suspect of sympathizing with the Muslim side and aggravating the situation. It was determined in May of that year that the major rabble rousing from the Muslim side was not instigated by members of the local community, but that the Indonesia-wide, Java-based, Muslim militia, Laskar Jihad, had been responsible for inciting much of the acts of violence. Thus, the Maluccan attempt at local definition was thwarted by its selection as a geographical space in which external agents waged a battle of national ideology.[20]

In the Malaccan case we can see more clearly the political actors and their struggles for governance. Kathleen Turner argues that both the Muslim and the Christian elite hearken to RMS to ideologically mobilize the population to suit their purposes of redefining the new Southern Maluku. Prominent Muslim leaders of the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World and the Muslim Workers Brotherhood Union, both in Jakarta, "identified the RMS in a new ideological construction of a Christian threat not based on religious grounds but from a more secular, nationalistic perspective."[21] Thus RMS continued as a secession movement in the minds of these Javanese Muslims, who then saw it as their duty to defend national unity.

This reasoning, Turner writes, "was one of the only ways to bid for the army's support, since the army normally strictly oppose conflicts based on SARA and would thus under no circumstances be justified in participating in such a conflict."[22] This separatism was not entirely fictitious. Though created by mainly Christian Maluccans, the Maluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM) claimed to be non-religious and instead based on the Alifuru ethnic common ancestry and "related perceptions of homeland and origin."[23] According to Turner, this ideology was adopted to resemble that of the Kai Islands in southeastern Maluku, where religious warring was stopped by appeals to common ancestry. The distinction the FKM drew between southern Maluccans and outsiders could be seen as antinational. As Turner writes, the grass-roots representative of FKM "constructed distinction between a virtuous "us" sanctioned by a Supreme Being –that is, God – and the "them" or the "outsiders" who have engendered stress and humiliation and threatened the emotional and physical security within their homeland."[24] However, to Muslim Maluccans this claim had flaws in that many of the Christian Maluccans had foreign names indicating that they had migrated from elsewhere and that the larger Islam umat was also an ancestral community. Thus, the religious contingent could be said to working for the national government, whereas the ethnic contingent could be said to be working for the district level of government.

Northern Sulawesi

Northern Sulawesi (Sulawesi Utara, or Sulut) is another region that is struggling for local control and using ethnicity to disguise religious cleavages. Here Anderson's usage of ethnicity as a political tool is applied to its usage by the Minahasa who are suddenly responsible for imagining a political community with districts which they are contesting Minahasan authority.

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[20] Jacobsen, p 4 - 5.
[21] Turner.
[22] Turner.
[23] Turner.
[24] Turner.

Though Christian militias have formed to defend against what is seen as the national threat of Islam, Northern Sulawesi has not experienced clashes, as has Maluku. Some of these militias are deploying to in another region's religious contestation in Central Sulawesi. One such militia, as described by Jacobsen, has an extensive inter-island network of informers.[25] The degree to which religious identity was activated here is illustrated in the militia take-over of the role of the provincial military.[26]

Northern Sulawesi was at the forefront of regions supporting a decentralized government as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s. *Permesta*, the Sulut based movement, which the national government claims was a rebellion, vocalized concerns that Sukarno's government was creating an imbalance between the Outer Islands and Java and suggested a federal-like system to restore equal governance. Ironically, with the aims of the movement realized forty years later, Sulut is replicating the centralized, hierarchical model within its provincial government. The region around the provincial capital, Manado, is receiving investment and infrastructure for an economic development zone, while the western parts of the province are neglected. Minahasa, the dominant ethnic group, held 29 of the 45 seats in the provincial assembly in 2002.[27]

The westernmost districts of the Province seceded in January 2001 to become their own Province of Gorontalo. The new Province was composed of ethnically Gorontalese people. As Jacobsen writes, "the Gorontalese has always occupied a marginalized position, partly because of poor education and partly because of colonial related factors that made the Dutch favor the Minahasa."[28] Further districts are splintering within the still remaining Province of Sulut. Thus the process of identity legitimization takes the form of struggle for orders of government. As Jacobsen writes, the collapse of the centralized top-down governance of Suharto's New Order, "is producing a localized multiplicity of identities understood as a set of tools to be used when navigating in the current changing social and political landscape."[29]

Jacobsen claims that the reorganization of geopolitical structure has allowed Sulut to increasingly define itself as Christian, though entire regions of the province are Muslim majority. Thus, though decentralization was supposed to allow for increased self-representation, it does not account for minorities *within* minorities. Thus, decentralization has allowed for geographical inclusion at the expense of regionally distributed minorities. The "re-politicization" process then involves what Jacobsen calls a "quest for identity as cultural roots," which invariably defines groups by excluding others.[30] Such a situation has occurred in Sulut because the provincial government is geographically centered in the predominantly Christian, ethnically Minahasan region which allows the immediate constituency a greater participation. In its defense, the Provincial government has merely fashioned its own model of the national elite-driven Java-centered political structure.

Districts borders divide ethnic identities in Sulut. Devolving power directly to the district level has allowed for a Balkanization into small, ethnically homogeneous pockets that could then be seen to be more vulnerable towards ethnic and religious conflicts.[31] These identities can be considered constructs of past government systems and thus malleable and susceptible to further fracturing. Jacobsen fears that even the dominant Minahasan ethnic group, invested in a large scale process of rediscovery of their "cultural roots" through NGO and governmental projects, may just as likely realize that their "roots" as based in opposition to the post-colonial Indonesian state were forged by Dutch colonialism, and splinter into even earlier groupings dependant on dialect. Perhaps then unity is artificial. A more certain conclusion can be drawn from the case of Sulut; the restructuring of the province illustrates that the provincial level is not capable of managing ethnicity as activated as the district level.

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[25] Jacobsen, p 23.
[26] Jacobsen, p 24.
[27] Jacobsen, p 15.
[28] Jacobsen, p 12.
[29] Jacobsen, p 2.
[30] Jacobsen, p 6.
[31] Jacobsen, p 18.

Chinese, a "non-native" ethnic group

One identity group does not fit the model of religious contestation at the national level and ethnic contestation at the regional level. Ethnic Chinese-Indonesians make up about 3% of the population, or about 6 million of the 220 million Indonesians.[32] Though primarily concentrated in Java, Chinese-Indonesians are spread across the archipelago and have no province, district or region in Indonesia which is identified as a homeland. It is important to note that the group is not religiously homogeneous: Buddhists comprise about two-thirds of the population, Christians almost one-third, and Muslim Chinese a small minority.[33]

This group has a history of suffering tremendous discrimination since the 1960s communist scare. These antagonisms erupted again during the riots of 1998 and 1999 where Chinese were targets of blame for the economic crisis in Indonesia. Though Chinese-Indonesians had been involved politically in the 1950s, Suharto reversed their protected non-indigenous or non-*pribumi* status and forbade the use of Chinese language and the practicing of Chinese customs, closed Chinese schools, and forced Chinese-Indonesians to take more "Indonesian" names.[34]

In 1999, Chinese-Indonesians were once again allowed to establish political parties. These parties are now reviving the cleavages within the Chinese-Indonesian community that had surfaced briefly during the political activity of the 1950s. Then, the Chinese voice was divided between the party Baperki, which sought to coalesce all Chinese-Indonesians into an ethnic party to "show the indigenous Indonesians that Chinese Indonesians were committed to Indonesia,"[35] and those that disagreed with such an "ethnic approach" and preferred to join national or religious parties. Now, the Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia, or the Indonesian Chinese Reform Party, is a revival of the ethnic party with a mission of promoting "racial harmony between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians."[36] A Chinese Muslim party was attempted but under subscribed. Many Chinese still prefer to remain in indigenous-dominant parties.

The only Chinese party that qualified to participate in the 1999 election was the National Democratic Party or PND. This signified their ability to quickly establish operations throughout the archipelago. However, as CNN reporter Maria Ressa writes, "Many Chinese-Indonesians are also hedging their bets. All five of the major political parties have admitted that part of the funding comes from the ethnic Chinese community."[37] The existence of Chinese-Indonesian political parties, *which are the only parties that are openly acknowledged as ethnic parties,* concerns many Indonesians and so many in the Chinese community are actively coalition building and investing in multiple parties.

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[32] Suryadinata, p 3.
[33] Suryadinanta, 3.
[34] Ibid, p 4.
[35] Ibid, p 6.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ressa.

Such coalition building, together with the Chinese involvement in non-political anti-discrimination organizations, has seemed to reap benefits for the community as several discriminatory laws against Chinese culture, once thought threateningly identical with communism, have been repealed, including the forbidding of use of the Chinese language. Further, in 1999, President Habibie was said to have walked through a Chinese neighborhood that had been targeted in the riots, and urged them to stay in the country.

However, as the Chinese community is said to control from 70% to 90% of the Indonesian economy, much discrimination arises from what is sensed as unequal distribution in their favor. Even the former president, Habibie, during his presidency was quoted as saying, "it is absurd that the ethnic Chinese, who make up 3% of the population, is controlling 90% of the economy. I would like to give the opportunity to the *pribumi*, who make up the largest population and build them up."[38] Nonetheless, the Chinese ethnic group seems to be emerging from a long period of political suppression which may be partially due to its lack of territorial claim.

Public Opinion about Identity

The Chinese-Indonesian case of not largely activating their ethnicity is in accord with national public opinion about ethnicity as a secondary identity. In 1999, in a "Summary of Public Opinion Preceding the Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia", only 8% of the people polled thought their ethnic group was the most salient feature of their identity. 43% identified their Indonesian citizenship as more important. However, about an equal percentage of people, 40% saw the two positions as equally important.[39] This suggests that in 1999 there was still a tremendous amount of maneuvering for politicians appealing to either of these identities.

It is further important to note that though the survey intended to be nationally representative of the entire adult population of Indonesia, for "security and practical reasons" people in the regions of East Timor, Irian Jaya, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and East Nusa Tengara were excluded from participating in the survey.[40] Of course, many groups in these regions were and still are in the process of politically contesting the Indonesian central government and their participation in it. It is not surprising that a high number (71%) of the respondents, from the non-violent regions described relations between ethnic groups as good, while only 21% described these relations as bad. Also, religion is notably absent from the choices of primary identity.

Public opinion in 1999 was critical of the parliament, which was viewed as the least responsive branch of government, following behind the President, seen as most responsive, Armed Forces, Provincial Government and National Police. "Surat Buat Wakil Rakyat," a pop song by the famous Indonesian political singer, Iwan Falls, written in the 1970s in a plea to a House Representative to listen to start listening to his constituents, is still very popular today. However, the multiplicity of political parties was favored by 72% of respondents saying that they wanted more than two political parties.[41] 53% said they had ample information about the political parties, with a lesser 35% saying that they did not feel they had very much information about the parties.

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[38] Interview with Nihon Keisai Shimbun, March 1998.

[39] Wagner, p 29.

[40] Ibid, p 1.

[41] Ibid, p 19.

The reason chosen for favoring a certain party was mainly dependant on the party's message and values (33%) and secondly the party leader (11%), with only 1% endorsing a party because they like the local party candidate or official.[42]

Conclusion

From this chapter we can see that national identity is undergoing major revision, that differences between ethnic and religious identity is more highly political now than it was under Suharto, that sectarian identity is activated in political strategy, and that the choice of primary identity thus has political consequences. Though Mopugad is not a location such as in Maluku where identity is being outwardly and actively contested, the local awareness of these contestations is high. The factors which drive these larger national movements are by no means left outside the boundaries of Mopugad, and this political backdrop is invaluable to an understanding of the staging of culture and the platforms of community in Mopugad.

In the study which follows, I have not included the indigenous people in the measurement and calculation of community and cultural change. Though inter-ethnic dynamic of local Mongondow with the Balinese and Javanese inhabitants of Mopugad is key to the political negotiation at the district level, the Mongondow only peripherally play into negotiation within town culture and administration in Mopugad –the focus of my study. Moreso, in the relationships between the transmigrants and local Mongondow a pre-existing condition to negotiation, the local claim to territorial propriety, as well as district level political leverage, provide for an imbalanced relationship. By comparing and contrasting changes in the two ethnic groups neither of which are indigenous to the area of settlement, I hope to bypass the territorial ownership metaconflict, towards an understanding of how community is forged in the absense of preconditions which I hope then will have implications for a wider array of diverse communities.

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[42] Ibid, p 22.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE CULTURAL PATTERNS OF TWO SUBCOMMUNITIES

The two previous chapters have provided the national historical and political context to ethnic and religious communities and migration in Indonesia which is necessary for a better understanding of Mopugad. I do not claim that these larger narratives had direct consequences in the alignment of groups in Mopugad; these chapters were included to give some understanding of broader contestations over community and identity from pan-Indonesian to localized, ethnic to religious, but all involving struggles over popular endorsement and the administration of people and resources. The inhabitants of Mopugad are quite aware of these socio-political circumstances, not unlikely due to the fact that they straddle communities which are at least geographically distinct. Regardless, most personal relationships in Mopugad remain amongst people of the same ethnicity. Community institutions have also preserved these insular affiliations. This chapter will look closely at continuities and changes within the two significant and quite distinct sub groups in Mopugad, both in the culture of the private life of the residents and in communal life, to determine the decisions made and thus the values of each of these two communities.

The continuities and changes in the constitutions of Javanese and Balinese culture and thus the constitutions of their respective groups are all the result of cultural choices, both deliberated and unconscious, that rework the constitution of the community. Deliberations over cultural change occur both within each household, in the private realm of the family, as well as in larger group forums. These conscious decisions are what Hoey referred to as "cultural editing." However, many cultural continuities are largely unconscious and are sustained because their innate familiarity does not allow for them to be easily compared with other systems. Cultural choices pose questions such as which traditions each group brought from Java or Bali and which were left, which have been sustained and or lost and which new community cultures have been formed or elaborated in Mopugad.

This chapter will provide the cultural information necessary to proceed to Chapter Five's analysis of how these socio-cultural shifts in the conceptions of community influence space and co-habitation and whether these indicate that the two communities are being brought closer together or being pushed further apart.

Religious community and Ethnicity community in Mopugad

It will become quickly apparent that many of the indicators of community are religious and not ethnic. It must be noted that ethnicity is not synonymous with religion in Indonesia as it is in Bosnia, India or Ireland. However, in Java, over ninety percent of Javanese are Muslim[1] and in Bali, 87% of the Balinese are Hindu.[2] We have seen in Chapter Three the powerful role of Islam in the Javanese community. Hinduism plays a similar role in the Balinese community. Robert Pringle, who sees a "fierce antinational pride and possessiveness of Balinese culture as a national asset . . . and a traditional intolerance toward foreigners, by which is meant Javanese" also remarks, as USINDO writes, "some antipathy toward non-Hindu Balinese such as Christians, who have been somewhat successful in making converts in some northern villages."[3]

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[1] "Java Overview." 2001. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. The President and Fellows of Harvard College. http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_java_overview.php. [Accessed May 7, 2005].

[2] Pringle, Robert. "Bali Hai!: Trouble in Paradise?" USINDO brief, April 25, 2002. Washington, D.C. http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali.htm. [Accessed May 7, 2005].

These high percentages of religious affiliation are mirrored, and, in the Javanese community, exaggerated, in Mopugad. According to many of my informants, the Javanese in Mopugad are all Muslim. The one non-Muslim Javanese woman that I met was married to a Balinese man, had converted to Hinduism, was learning to speak Balinese and, having moved from Manado, did not consider herself a part of the Javanese community in Mopugad. Supporting the fact that religion plays a stronger role in the community than ethnicity is the inclusion of non-Javanese Muslims, who are ethnically Sundanese (also from Java), Mongondow or Gorontalese, within the "Javanese" community.

Amongst the Balinese in Mopugad, however, there is a religious minority. Balinese Christians account for a large proportion of the 25 families which attend one of two Christian churches in Mopugad together with a few Minahasan families. One of my informants was a Balinese woman who had converted to Christianity when she married a man from Ambon (itself a historically Christian though recently religiously contested place as we can see from Chapter Three) and now attended the Pentecostal Church. The other Balinese Christian that I spoke with was the owner of the town's gold mill. Originally Hindu, he converted to Christianity for his third wife who was Minahasan and has remained Christian for his forth wife who was also Minahasan. From these two people we can see that intermarriage with Minahasan, and not perhaps Christianity brought from Bali, is what is causing this religious sub-community. Though at least a few of these 25 families are Minahasan, as many as 23 may contain Balinese members, accounting for a little less than 4% of the Balinese population.[4]

Though largely separate, the Christian Balinese have not been entirely excluded from the Balinese community. The Balinese woman who converted for her Ambonese husband was still able to borrow a house temporarily from a Balinese Hindu. Pak Sider, the gold-mill man, suggested that the reason the Christian Balinese community was able to exist in Mopugad was precisely because Balinese Hindu were relatively open to intermarriage with Chrisitans. He remarked this in contrast to the rarity of Balinese intermarriage with Muslims for dietary reasons, particularly the restriction on consuming pork or dog for Muslims. Furthermore, the religious affiliations within the Christian community vary. Whereas the Balinese-Ambonese couple said that their community is primarily the Christian community, the gold-mill man's primary identification was with the Balinese community as he was not a church-goer.

The follow description of changes and continuities in Balinese culture in Mopugad, however, focuses largely on Balinese Hindu traditions and community groups and likewise around the role of Islam in the culture of the Javanese. The separation between secular and religious aspects of Balinese culture has not been performed as it has in Werdhi Agung and the two are largely indistinguishable. Where possible, I have tried to note cultural aspects which are not to some degree defined by Balinese Hinduism. Similarly, the long history of Islam in Java has lead to a large degree of conflation of secular and religious culture. Mulder writes that this syncretism is usually understood as "some generous mix in Moslem ideas with the Hindu-

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[3] Pringle, Robert. "Bali Hai!: Trouble in Paradise?" USINDO brief, April 25, 2002. Washington, D.C. http://www.usindo.org/Briefs/Bali.htm. [Accessed May 7, 2005].

[4] Population data provided from the 2004 Census conducted by the central district Puskesmas clinic in Mopuya counts that 767 families live in North and South Mopugad combined. Subtracting the 114 Muslim families accounted for by the mosque in Mopugad, this leaves 653 non-Muslim resident families, of which 25 are Christian. At least two of these Chrisitan families are Minahasan, so 23/653 gives an approximate number of Balinese Christian families in Mopugad.

Buddhist heritage from the period that preceded the advent of Islam, others juxtapose Catholicism, ancestors worship and theosophy, while still others relish combining cabalism, freemasonry and Javanese concepts of biology, without ever bothering for a moment about questions of compatibility."[5] However, the traditional "syncretism" of Javanese Islam, which has been argued to be disappearing in Java since the last half-century, is undergoing revision more similar to that amongst the Balinese in Werdhi Agung than the cultural revision amongst the Balinese in Mopugad.

Private Culture: the home

Balinese private culture

The Balinese approach to housing has traditionally been quite different from that of the Javanese. The *rumah adat bali*, or traditional Balinese house, or more accurately, housing compound, is a walled, highly ordered space designed along principles very specific to the geography of the island of Bali.[6] In Bali, private space, the space of the home, is highly ordered by specific spatial and architectural prescriptions. According to these principles, Bali is a ritually ordered cone with the mountains as the tip of the cone from which the topology slopes down to the surrounding sea. Geographic orientation has traditionally been along a single axis, the radius of this cone, in relation to these two natural features. The inwards and upwards direction, *kaja*, is thought to be a more sacred direction than the more profane direction of *kelod*. In the *rumah adat bali*, this kelod-kaja axis is a meta-order, which is then paired with two other orders, the nature of the land upon which the house sits and which surrounds the house, and the body of the owner of the house. Spiritual leaders determine building sitings based on a set of guidelines referred to compositely as the *Asta Kosala Kosali Bhumi* which were originally inscribed on a *lontar* palm leaf in Javanese during the Majapahit rule of Bali.[7]

A standard ritual process for citing and building a new home follows a basic three step process which determines the relationship of the three important elements of the house, the pura, the main house, and the gateway to the property. This key relationship is known as Trimandala or Trihita Karana. The first designation is that of the pura, or family shrines, which is located on an area of land nearest kelod which is also topographically suitable, i.e., does not lie in a gulch. The pura is of central importance in the placement of the house. To designate where the house should be built in relation to the pura involves a calculation with the size of the land parcel and anthropomorphic measurements of the feet of the owner. Finally, to determine the location of the gateway to the property, which is then enclosed in a high compound wall, numerology derived from the owner's measurements analyzes which locations are most auspicious. Specific citings, depending on which sides of the house open onto a street, may be as detailed as to not allow an opening wide enough for a car.

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[5] Mulder, p 115.

[6] It is important to note that there is a group of mountain dwellers in Bali, referred to as *wong bali aga*, or the original Balinese people, who are said to predate the arrival of Hinduism with the Majapahit, who do not subscribe to many of these principles in the order of space. Indonesian Heritage Society, 38.

[7] Indonesian Heritage Society. p 36.



Figures 2 & 3: Astha Kosal Kosali Gumi, book of measures

Until about the mid-20th century, traditional houses in Bali were comprised of multiple freestanding structures, in combinations of open wooden pavilions and brick enclosed rooms, both thatched with strong grasses and raised a few steps on stone foundations. These buildings were arranged around a central courtyard, kept clear of vegetation.[8] The arrangement of these buildings is determined by the ritual cosmology with the parent's bedroom to the north, and the kitchen, work area and more profane space located to the south or west. Many of the houses built in Bali today no longer strictly abide by these housing prescriptions. As Adrian Vickers has written, Balinese culture has been redefined to allow for reinterpretation of *adat Bali*, or customary laws, to include an adaptive mechanism known as what Vickers refers to as "*Bali moderen*."[9] The partial "modernizing" of traditional culture allows for the still highly valued spiritual element of (Hindu) Balinese culture to remain in tact.

Locating Balinese housing tradition in Mopugad

The original allocation of space amongst the Balinese transmigrants did not follow kelod-kaja or other traditional determinants such as higher ground for higher social caste. Upon the arrival of the Banpres group in 1974, plots were allotted depending on which *Regu* or team the family belonged to, which was determined by which district in Bali the family had come from. Besides a clustering which corresponded to the geographical boundaries of district, families were given plots fairly randomly within these areas.

Ibu Kota, who had come from Denpasar and so was a part of *Regu Four*, said that she and her husband received a most undesirable piece of land. Their ¼ hectare house plot, located at the southern border of the town, was located immediately beside their 1.75 hectare field plot. Their field plot, located directly beside the river, was unsuitable for growing rice, however, so they sold their house plot and moved onto the field plot. These decisions were made for economic reasons and because of geo-spiritual associations.

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[8] Indonesian Heritage Society, p 37.

[9] Vickers, "Modernity and Being Modern: An Introduction."



Figures 4 & 5: Ibu Kota's house. Left, kitchen behind compound wall. Right, gate to pura.

Surprisingly, however, Ibu Kota's house, with its functions fairly separated into distinct buildings, has a particularly Balinese look to it. A prominent family shrine, or *pura*, rises above the compound wall in the corner of the property which abuts the town's main southern intersection. Over the wall, one can also see distinctly separate roofs clustered closely together. Though the Kota family had moved onto an extremely large piece of land at 1.75 hectares, their house is squeezed into a tiny corner of the property. This house compound, immediately fronting the street, had a particularly urban compactness reminiscent of the city of Denpasar. The husband and wife did not comment as to whether the housing compound had been designed with the Trimandala. However, when they built the house 15 years ago, they paid more than twice as much for the pura than they did for the house itself. Thus, the sacred component of the private space of the house was deemed important enough to pay substantially more for it.

Amongst the Balinese residents of Mopugad, opinions vary as to the importance of the sacred ordering of private space. One of the bastions of Balinese tradition in Mopugad, the stone carver Pak[10] Suran, said that it was not important to have a traditional Balinese house in Mopugad. The natural character of his land, he said, did not lend itself to Balinese architecture, as it was so hilly. He said it was just coincidence and not with any deliberate intent that his house consisted of separate detached buildings clustered around a central yard area, with the kitchen, toilet, and pig sty located to the west and the house to the east. His family pura, however, was located as religiously prescribed, to the northeast of the rest of the house which, where the sun rises, has become the kaja of the displaced Balinese. One of the stupas in the pura is directly related to the spirituality of the house and symbolizes its protection.

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[10] Pak is an abbreviated form of the Indonesian language word Bapak for Mr. or Sir. Ibu refers to a woman and literally means mother.



Figures 6 & 7: Pak Suran's housing compound. Left, looking down from pura into central yard. Right, pura.

Others, such as Gusti Nyoman Parsa, feel that it is important to maintain spiritual space in Mopugad. Pak Gusti had been the head of the Hindu community and had served as an advisor to many people looking to build houses within the traditional Balinese ordering of space. Though he admitted that not everyone continues to follow the *Asta Kosala Kosali Bhumi*, he noted that these prescriptions were respected at least to a limited degree, as everyone locates their pura in accordance with this geo-spiritual tradition. Indeed, each of the Hindu Balinese people that I interviewed had consciously placed their pura to the north or east of their house. Pak Gusti mentioned one family in Mopugad who had built their family pura in the southwest corner of their property and said that people were surprised but too embarrassed to point out the mistake to the pura's owner. He said that rumors ran from saying that the owner was perhaps merely ignorant of Balinese tradition, to saying that the owner was perhaps trying to showcase his pura by placing it beside the major road. In any case, the owner's prerogative to place the pura, an unmistakably religious element of his home, remained a private issue.

Following the Balinese spiritual tradition in the design of his house was important to I Gusti Gede Bawan, a Balinese man who moved to Jabar with his parents directly from Bali in 1983. Even though Gusti does not own any land and receives a meager salary for his administrative work at the clinic in Mopuya (supplemented by his wife's selling of homemade sweets at the market), in 2000 he was able to buy his own property in Jabar near that of his parents. Though he could not afford a Balinese style house, the layout of his property does follow the Trimandala plan. Other religious characteristics of his house include abiding by the prescription that the foundation of the house needs to be lower than that of the pura and that the kitchen is more south-westernly than the main house.



Figure 8: Kids in front of Ibu Wati's pura located on the second storey balcony of the shophouse.

For others, however, the trimandala is not important. Ibu Wati, who moved from her gated house compound to a shophouse at the market, no longer lives in a space entirely ritually ordered. Still, the location of the pura is not random. Instead of being located geographically, her main pura is located on the narrow second storey of her shophouse. Wati told me that there were no bedrooms on the second floor because the pura must be located above where the family sleeps. Others, Wayan Tiase for example, who lives in a compound which emulates a traditional Balinese compound, also did not use anthropomorphic measures or locate new structures in the compound according to spiritual guidance.

Changing housing models

Other than the layout and plan of the *rumah bali adat*, the design or style of the house does not continue to have religious significance in Mopugad. Thus, housing styles in Mopugad have undergone transformation from those of the older, traditional house compounds in Bali. Housing in Mopugad has been altered both for reasons of local materials as well as economic means. The materials once readily available in Bali are not easily available in Dumoga. The grasses necessary for the traditional thatch roofing are not available in Mopugad (nor are they necessarily still preferred in Bali). The strong stone for the house foundations as well as for the decorative stone detailings of wall panels, columns and pura stupas, is also not available in Mopugad where a cement mixture is substituted for the stone. For sculptural detailing, wooden moulds are built to make rough geometric casts which are then set to dry for three days before carving can begin. Perhaps most importantly, to build the multiple structures of a traditional Balinese compound requires substantial economic means which have not yet been achieved by many people in Mopugad.

When Balinese in Mopugad have achieved the economic means to be able to build a permanent house, there are a variety of housing models employed. Some engage traditional Balinese elements, which is open to fairly wide interpretation. The head Balinese carpenter of the town, Pak Suriasa, said that only one true Balinese "house" existed in Mopugad. The pavilion structure, which he had built for Pak Nangah between the main house and the kitchen behind was officially only used for ceremonies such as the coming of age, tooth-filing ceremony. Otherwise, it was hung with a hammock and used as a platform for washing clothes, fish, preparing food or a temporary shelf. Besides this structure, Pak Suriasa said, no other structure in Mopugad qualified as a Balinese house in terms of its specific measures and materials. On the other hand, houses which struck me as particularly representative of houses in Bali, such as that of I Gusti Patra, with its multiple free-standing units, were not considered by their owners to be particularly Balinese.

Bali *Moderen* Style

The aesthetic of the Balinese house has been adopted by some Balinese in Mopugad. The Balinese aesthetic was important for Ibu Pujung, who moved to Jabar from Banpres in 1993. After tearing down the house of the Javanese who had lived on the property before her, she hired Balinese carpenters to build her house and pura in 1996. Made of brick and raised on a high platform, her house, she said, was particularly Balinese because of the "stone" plaques and column capitals. These cast concrete panels and bulky geometric capitals were yet uncarved. Ibu Pujung said that when she is able to save up enough money, she will have them carved with the heads of guardians and floral motifs. The carved combs of the roof, which Pujung calls "accessories," were also a style used in Bali, she said. In her case, these accessories displayed the date of construction of the house. Her house was set on an almost square plan and quite compact, and recalled boxy single function structures of traditional Balinese housing. She said that though the Spanish Style (as described below) was just a passing fashion, a Balinese house will never go out of style.



Figure 9 & 10: Bali *moderen* houses. Left, Ibu Pujungs columns and plaques.
Right, Wayan Tiase's new Balinese house and compound wall.

Also situated on the main road which separates the Jabar neighborhood from the Banpres neighborhood, three kintals north of Ibu Pujung, Wayan Tiase's family is also building a Balinese style house. Like Pujung, they bought their land from a Sundanese family from Java who had left Mopugad in 1979. However, unlike Ibu Pujung, who tore down the house of the previous occupants, Wayan Tiase's parents continue to live in the long Javanese house which sits in the middle of the ¼ hectare property. To the south of this house, Wayan Tiase recently built a shophouse for himself and his new family. To the north of the Javanese house, his brother is building a new house, modeled after a house that his father had seen in Gianyar on a trip to Bali. Wayan Tiase said that though it is a modern type house (like Ibu Pujung's) and not an *adat* Balinese house, it is distinctly Balinese with a raised foundation on a square plan, carved stone roof crests, and unextended roof eaves. He said that after they finish with his brother's house and save some more money, the family plans to rebuild his parent's house and finally his, in more Balinese style. Their family compound is already partially enclosed in a compound wall painted bright orange and lined with a carved ridge. Two openings allow entry to the compound, one wide enough for cars, the locations of which were not determined by the Trimandala. An inner wall surrounds the designated pura area in the northeast corner of the compound, which currently contains temporary stupas. Wayan, who goes to Bali often to find ship work, thinks it is important to maintain Balinese culture in Mopugad.

Spanish Style

The "Spanish style" house, which looks like it was modeled after California-Mediterranean villa housing types seen on television, is currently the most popular style of house amongst Balinese and Javanese alike. Indeed, the Spanish style can be seen in cities and more affluent towns throughout Indonesia. This style is defined by its multiple sloping roofs where overlapping eaves create a set of nestled tympanum which are suspended over the central entryway. At the front of the house, a square portico is often marked by two fluted columns with molded Corinthian capitals.



Figure 11: Spanish style house in the nearby town of Ibolian.

Nyoman Jati is a Balinese who in 2000 relocated to the Jabar neighborhood. Unlike Ibu Pujung and Pak Wayan Tiase who remained on the edge of the neighborhood, Pak Nyoman bought a narrow piece of land, a quarter of a kintal, measuring 12.5 meters by 50 meters in the western part of the Javanese neighborhood. Though he followed a somewhat traditional Balinese layout in locating his pura to the northeast of the house, the house itself has nothing particularly Balinese about it. The Spanish style, with its plastered concrete columns, tiled porch, and bedrooms which branch off a central room which serves the dual function of family room and guest receiving room, reveals nothing about the ethnicity of its inhabitants. Nyoman said that the house was drawn by a Balinese drafter and constructed by Mongondow masons.



Figure 12 & 13: Spanish style. Left, Nyoman Jati's house. Right, Gusti Bawan's wooden adaptation.

Another Balinese in the heart of the Jabar neighborhood, I Gusti Bawan, could not afford to build a Balinese style house and instead adapted a Spanish model using wood which was cheaper than brick or cement. He is in the process of weaving a bamboo mat to serve as the ceiling for two of the rooms. Decorative touches such as the installation of a Balinese door which he bought in Bali add a Balinese aesthetic. Though he carved the wooden sections of his stupas himself, he needs to save for a carver to finish the decoration of the concrete moldings.

Other Housing Models inhabited by Balinese in Mopugad

It is important to remember that particularly off the main streets many people continue to live in what they refer to as temporary or emergency housing. These houses are of the type originally built by the Banpres settlers, many of whom have been able to save up to build permanent houses. As migrants continue to arrive in Mopugad, such housing continues to be built. These houses consists of wide planks of cheap wood, usually *cempaka* (a tropical magnolia or frangipani), often without windows and with a strategically nailed sink roof.

Another type of house is the shophouse, which is found not only at the perimeters of the market and along the main east west axis of the town, but also scattered through the neighborhoods. Of the Balinese, Wayan Tiase in Jabar, Suriyani in Umum and Ibu Wati at the market, live in shophouses. These houses are a similar type to those provided to the Jabar and Umum settlers by the transmigration officials. Though none of the original 1970s transmigration houses remain, this style of house has been expanded upon to become the shophouses of Mopugad. This type of house has a high and wide front elevation to allow an open view and inviting access into the store. Wayan Tiase had built his shophouse in 2002 so that his wife could have an occupation. Similarly, half of the house that Suriyani lives is used as a store. The location of shophouses is very important, as Pujung, who had tried to run a small store beside her house noted. Similarly, Ibu Wati moved to a shophouse at the market as her house on Jalan AMD was not a good location for a business. The market shophouses, though bearing no mark of specific ethnic or religious determinants, are designed with economic determinants which are shared between the two communities.



Figure 14, 15 & 16: Various shophouses. Houses from left to right: Wayan Tiase, Suriyani, Ibu Wati.

A final house model which can be seen to be inhabited by Balinese in Mopugad is the National Model. Though the national model is now out of fashion, it is the housing type which impressed me on my first visit to Mopugad. This model struck me because it represented a syncretism in Balinese housing with elements of a standard Javanese village house. It resembled Javanese architecture in its use of slender wooden columns and horizontally slatted, louvered jalousie window panes set into a front facade of a long row of vertical wood-paneled frames. The extended roof eaves of the roofs cover wide porches, like those in Java. I would have mistaken many of these houses, particularly located in the Banpres area, for Javanese houses had not there been a pura beside the house or a high wooden shelf for *sagen* offerings in the gateway. After my first visit, I came away from Mopugad thinking that this type of housing may indicate a high degree of cross-cultural exchange, which may have been due to sharing carpentry skills or other shared social fibers. When I asked about these housing models, I learned that they were known as National Style houses and they were popular in the 1970s and 1980s before the Spanish style became popular. Such houses were derived from styles of Suharto's model communities and were built with partial assistance and advice of transmigration officials. Therefore, the National style houses would likely have been built by the Balinese settlers regardless of whether Javanese settlers also lived in Mopugad and would also have been built in the absence of a Javanese community belying a direct cultural influence of the multi-ethnic community. At one point in the early 1980s, this national style was shared between Javanese and Balinese, though not for reasons of cross-cultural exchange so much as outside influences, much like the Spanish style is shared today.



Figure 17: National style house of Pak Oka.

Balinese housing decisions

Balinese preferences in housing can be said to be one type of privately made decision about cultural identity in Mopugad. Of course, housing is largely driven by economic ability, and had greater or lesser numbers of Balinese been well-off enough to choose among styles the resulting Balinese housing stock could be quite different. In contrast, tt is important to note that the continuity of traditional spatial ordering is a relatively cost-free decision and one which seems to divide Balinese families evenly between those for whom the traditions are still important and those for whom they are not thought relevant to life in Mopugad. In conclusion, we can note that these same decisions are being made in Bali, where Spanish style houses are as popular, and therefore the continuity with Balinese culture in Bali is quite great.

Javanese private culture

The Javanese community has also changed its preferences for housing since coming to Mopugad in the 1970s. Javanese preferences for housing are now more similar to those of the Balinese. Even more than the Balinese, however, there is little value placed on the traditional type of Javanese house. Today, over any other style of house, Javanese would prefer to have a Spanish style house. Pak Wawan, actually a Sundanese, and his wife, who both moved to Mopugad in 1990 from Jatiluhur in Western Java built their Spanish style house in 1995. He says he chose the style after driving around then nearby city of Kotamobagu and admiring the columned porticos of the new houses there. Ibu Warsem also has a Spanish style portico and roofing system and her younger sibling, who was in the process of building a house on the same kintal, was using a Spanish style frame. Some people, Pak Raspan, for example, noted that the column capitals of a Spanish style house are not unlike those of Balinese houses, and therefore it was rare for Javanese to engage such motifs.



Figure 18, 19 & 20: Spanish style houses of the Javanese. Left to right, Wawan, Wayan and Wayan's sibling.

Unlike most the new Spanish style homes of the Balinese, however, the Javanese Spanish style homes are all wood frame and walled in wooden plank, unlike the cement and brick houses of the Balinese. This is largely for economic reasons, described below, but also may be partially due to the fact that the Javanese builders in Mopugad are all carpenters and not masons. The current economic situation of many Javanese also does not allow many of them the option of building new houses. For this reason, Spanish style houses in the Javanese community are more rare than they are in the Balinese community.

Though many Javanese are not currently building, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the houses of the second generation with those of the first generation. After a few years of settling in Mopugad, many of the first generation pioneers tore down the house provided them by the government and built houses that better suited them. These houses have a Javanese characteristic in that the measurements of the wood used were smaller than those used by the

Balinese, particularly noticeable in the thin columnar supports of the verandah, those which would be soon after used in the National style. Most of these houses were simple hipped roofed structures of a general *kampung* or village type, like that of Pak Raspan or Pak Diran. (see appendix)

A carpenter from Central Java, who only lived in the village for a short while in the early 1980s explicitly to build houses, built about 15 houses in a *nenekmoyang*, or traditional, Central Javanese *kerajaan* style, more elaborate from those traditional amongst the Javanese or Sundanese of West Java.[11] Though the inhabitants were from West Java, they were from regions near the boarder with Central Java and thus were familiar with the central Javanese housing style.



Figure 21 & 22: Kerajaan houses in Mopugad. House of Demi's parents at left, Jawia's at right.

The *kerajaan*, or royal, house type built by the carpenter is based around four central king-posts, which are located in the center of the main front room of the house and support the hip of the roof which runs the width of the building so that the front and rear elevations are quite wide whereas the two sides are relatively narrow. The front façade is usually paneled with sets of louvered doors sometimes also inset with jalousie windows. The front of the house usually sports a verandah, which, supported by delicate and simply carved wooden columns, runs the width of the house. The slight slope of the roof which extends over the verandah seems to serve as a springboard for the roof of the main body which peaks half-way into the house. A second crest may mimic the first, where a kitchen and extra bedrooms are added onto the back of the house.



Figure 23: Traditional Central Javanese *kerajaan* house type as drawn by friend of Pak Turipan.

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[11] Sumintardja, 53.

In Mopugad, only about five *kerajaan* houses remain today. The second generation inhabitants of *kerajaan* houses that I spoke with didn't particularly like the style of house and many would prefer to live in a newer house. They tend to alter the almost entirely open interior space by subdividing it. Ibu Jawia divided the space of her house with furniture: a wall of boudoirs and entertainment cabinets provide a curtain for a separate bedroom. Pak Kusri's son Marijo lives in a room more permanently walled off thanks to the building of a new internal wall. The large communal space is no longer seen as desirable.



Figure 24 & 25: Interior of *kerajaan* houses. At left, four king-posts of Pak Kusri's house. At right, subdivision of space with furniture in Ibu Jawia's house.

The preference away from the traditional kerajaan house has apparently happened quite recently. Pak Macis's son, who is also the Imam of the mosque, built a house directly beside his parents' in the same kerajaan style. The single Eastern Javanese family living in Banpres also liked the traditional style and bought a kerajaan house from a departing Javanese transmigrant and had it moved from Jabar to their plot in Banpres. The popularity of the Central Javanese style amongst a wide array of Javanese and Sundanese at least for a while could be said to have assimilated the groups at least in the architecture of their home.



Figure 26 & 27: Kerajaan houses of Pak Macis, at left, and Pak Sudarno, at right.

The one house which I had trouble placing in a historical cultural context was the house of Mbak Sirah. Mbak Sirah and her husband, both quite elderly, told me that their house was built in the late 1970s. This would place it at the time that the first *kerajaan* houses were being built in Mopugd. Two aspects of the house were particularly striking. Unlike all of the other houses I had seen in Jabar, Banpres, Umum, or indeed in the towns surrounding Mopugad, Mbak Sirah's house was made of large stones which were whitewashed. Traditional construction in the towns of Western Europe, particularly Ireland, came to mind. They were not able to offer any explanation for why their house was so different from all of the others in the town and merely said that as their plot is on the edge of town the stones were readily available. Also striking, the roof of the house was done in the local Spanish style, which did not become popular in the region until at least the late 1990s. The juxtaposition of Mbak Sirah's house with all of the others in and outside the Javanese community, lead me to conclude that she must be a traveler of both time and space. Obviously, this interesting exception deserves more study.



Figure 28: Mbak Sirah's stone house with Spanish style roof.

A large majority of Javanese, however, continue to live in quite basic housing locally referred to as *darurat*, emergency, housing or non-permanent housing. Like those also in the Balinese community, the relatively makeshift housing is built for the most part by the owner of the house and consists of a square or rectilinear plan which is raised a few centimeters above the ground on compacted dirt which comprises the floor. The wide boards are nailed together at the corners of the house and a sink roof may either be nailed on or a tile roof set. Pak Turipan, who said building his own house was his training to become a carpenter, has a house like this. Even more rudimentary are the compact houses of Ibu Ruta, Nurliyah and Demi. (see appendix)

Religious aspects of Javanese housing

Traditional Javanese houses have been long disassociated with religious significance.[12] The orientation, layout, style or even decorative features of the house are not determined by its owner's religion nor necessarily reveal the religion of the occupant. The only exception to this which I noted is in the house of Pak Turipan, where a small back room has been designated *tempat sholat*, a place specifically for prayer.

The process of building a new house, however, has an important religious component. After the house is built, but ostensibly before it is occupied, the owners invite guests to a *selamatan*, or house warming. In Mopugad, Javanese families have a *selamatan* once they have built a permanent house. Pak Wawan said that he had a *selamatan* for his house in 1995 serving yellow rice sculpted into a high cone to the guests who joined in prayer for the new house and the family. The prayer component he said was important, so though he originally said he invited all of his neighbors, he later clarified that it was only an invitation to the Muslim neighbors. Other people I spoke to, such as Ibu Demi and Pak Turipan, who still lived in semi-permanent houses, had not had *selamatans* for their houses. One person whom I spoke with, Ibu Warsem, mentioned that she had also asked for religious guidance to determine an auspicious day to begin building, a common practice in Java.

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[12] Sumintardja, 50.

Another element of the house which corresponds to religious purposes is the ability to use it for communal gatherings. Pak Wawan said that when he designed his house, he specifically designed a large uninterrupted interior space so that he could fit a lot of people for gatherings. He was then able to host about 40 families at his *selamatan*. For the everyday use of the house, a board is erected to create two separate spaces: the receiving room at the front and the family room at the back. Similarly, though Ibu Jawia had remarked that the interior of her traditional Javanese house was too vast, she said it was useful for the weekly *arisan* women's gathering. However, *arisan* can also be held at houses with small spaces, such as at Ibu Demi's, who accommodates the guests by removing the single table in the room and having everyone sit on the floor.



Figure 29 & 30: Interior spaces. Left, Wawan with room divider behind. Right, Demi's living room.

According to Ibu Tuti, Pak Raspan's wife, Islam forbids that the children over the age of four or five sleep in the same room with their parents. Children must have their own bedrooms with girls and boys separated. Traditional *nenekmoyang* houses like the *kerajaan* house likely had parents and children sleeping in the same large open space of the house, with the bedroom used mostly for parental intimacy or to care for a sick member of the family. The modern Javanese house, according to Ibu Tuti, requires multiple bedrooms.

Organization and economic uses of private land

Javanese tradition of inheritance involves parents distributing assets equally amongst all children, sons and daughters equally. As Geertz and other economists have pointed out, this system made have lead to the increased densification and poverty that Java has experienced and which lead to transmigration in the first place. This practice is continued in Mopugad. Thus, in a particularly Javanese way, the Jabar neighborhood is becoming more dense with each original housing plot of a quarter of a hectare now shared between two or three houses. All of the Javanese families I spoke with but for one, had designated spaces for their children to build homes or had sold off or bought just partial land plots. Pak Turipan was the single exception with a kintal intact as his children are still young. Such land division policy is quite unlike that of the Balinese who distribute land only to the sons of the family.

Another important difference exists between the Balinese and the Javanese in the use of the private space for home-based economy. Though both groups use the home for work purposes and supplementary income generation, the Balinese have a significant economic edge.

Whereas members of both groups may have a store on their property, grow fruits and vegetables in their gardens, or raise animals such as chickens and fish, due to Muslim dietary restriction against pork, only the Balinese raise pig. This distinction is significant because pigs fetch a high price in the region of North Sulawesi, where the majority Christian population enjoys pig particularly on holy days such as Christmas and Easter. The Javanese community is not able to participate in this lucrative extra-income generating activity because of religious culture.

Communal Culture

Balinese Communal Culture

Now we will turn our attention from the unique Balinese and Javanese individuals and their private property to looking at the continuities and changes of the concerted groups, beginning with the Balinese. Unlike the private space of the house, Balinese community structure in Mopugad is much more clearly divided between religious and secular activities and organizations. As we will see, the Hindu religious community has remained resilient, whereas the institutions of secular communalism, of which the Balinese were a part, may be seen to be weakening.

Traditional Hindu Temple Structure

In Mopugad, the relationship between three communal temples has been continued. As in Bali, the central temple, the *pura puseh* or navel temple, is located near the center of town whereas the two temples which each relate to the *pura puseh* are located at the peripheries of the town. The *pura agung* is located in the direction of *kelod* and often on high ground whereas the *pura dalem* is located beside the cemetery towards the more profane *kaja*.

When the first group of Balinese transmigrants arrived in 1974 and began to clear land for their houses and their fields, they worked together to clear land for a *pura puseh* temple in the center of what today has become the Banpres neighborhood. The *pura puseh* covers a wide, mostly open space, with a large field in the foreground with a *balai* pavilion for meeting and music and dance performance. Soon after the arrival of the Umum transmigrants two years later, the corresponding *pura dalem* was built beside the land designated to be the Hindu cemetery. Later, the path up to the mountains was made and a *pura agung* in the hills to the northeast of the town, completing the spiritual relationship between the three places of worship prescribed for a Balinese town.



Figure 31, 32 & 33: Pura Puseh at left and center. Middle school run by Hindu Dharma at left.

Today, each family continues to contribute to the maintenance and repair of these three temples which are managed centrally by the head of the Hindu dharma, or congregation. The current leader of the Hindu Dharma, the successor to I Gusti Nyoman Parsa, is Pak Nangah, who has also recently been elected a member of the district parliament.

Religious Foundation

The Hindu community in Mopugad is extended in a way unique to Balinese Hindus. Besides the strictly religious functions of the Hindu community, the Hindu Dharma also runs a foundation, Yayasan Swadharma Cabang Dumoga. Through the foundation, the Balinese transmigrants have been able to respond where government was not able to provide them with adequate services. This foundation operates a private middle school in Mopugad where none has been provided. As the only middle school in the town, the school is also open for non-Balinese and non-Hindu students. The classes at the school are conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, the teachers are pooled from both the Balinese and Javanese communities (in fact the headmistress is Minahasan), and the curriculum follows that of a national public school. Bi-weekly supplementary classes include Bahasa Bali and Hindu religious songs and culture.

Pura Pam: communities of extended families

Another type of religious community organization has been maintained as it is in Bali. The sub-tier of communal religious activity is comprised of clusters of extended families who are related by caste, which ties them together by spiritual status. The semi-private temples of these castes are known as *pura pam*, of family temples. Pura pam networks in Bali are not determined geographically and the networks stretch across Bali. However, one family can not be affiliated with two pura pam and the wife usually joins the pura pam of her husband's family according to station. These regulations are still followed in Mopugad.

The abstraction of displaced geographic affiliation has also carried over. Ibu Pujung, for example, belongs to the Pura Pam of the Pandai Besi, or iron workers guild, located in Banpres, though she has nothing to do with iron working in Mopugad. Wayan's family, though they lived in South Mopugad, belonged to a Pura Pam located in the town of Toraut about 30 minutes drive from Mopugad where her grandfather lived, so they didn't go very often. Conversely, Ibu Wati's Pura Pam is quite near her house, located beside Pak Nangah's house in South Mopugad.

When I spoke with Pak Merte, he had just returned from spending the morning at his Pura Pam, which though he lived in South Mopugad was located in the northern part of the Banpres neighborhood, in a cluster of a few Pura Pam. He said that his *pura pam*, comprised of 22 families from all over Bali, gathers at least once a month. He said also that he is often busy at the Pura Pam preparing for ceremonies. His pura pam helped to pay for the *ngaben* funeral for his father five years ago, which took place in Bali and required sending the father's body as well as 15 people from Mopugad to the Balinese hometown of Klungkung. The returning of a deceased to Bali is not uncommon and Pak Suran said that they had just returned from escorting his mother's body to Bali. Thus, *pura pam* are very important in maintaining linkages with Bali.

Two families that I interviewed hosted the Pura Pam on their property. Pak Dewa Oka built the *pura pam* for his extended family in 1985. Also, the old couple who also live in the northern part of Banpres designated half of their kintal to be used by the *pura pam*. Though their Pam compound is not yet walled and has many cast yet uncarved guardian statues, its elaborateness is quite in contrast to their modest house. Thus, though a family may be poor, they may belong to a wealthy, high caste pura pam, which accepts them unconditionally.



Figure 34 & 35: *Pura pam* hosted by the old Banpres couple, left, and Pak Oka, right.

Secular Regu and Banjar

In addition to these two types of religious organization in the Balinese community, there is also a unit of secular organization. In Bali this unit is known as the *banjar*, which refers to a neighborhood or a small village and was traditionally the organization responsible for village governance. Though the term continues to be used in Mopugad, it connotes a different meaning. In Mopugad, the banjar has grown out of the *regu*s established during the period of initial settlement. Each of the five original regu formed in 1974 corresponded to a geographical region of Bali. Because the regus were created based on dividing people by place of origin, the teams corresponded largely with banjar origins. Regu One for example, primarily included people from Klungkung, such as Pak Oka, who all settled together in the northern part of the early town of Mopugad. Oka now partakes in the banjar Satriya which took over after the administration of the regu ended. Oka says he pays 15,000 Rp a month to the banjar, which will assist its individual members, like the Pura Pam, in situations of need.



Figure 36: *Banjar* meeting place in South Mopugad.

The Regu Four community of people from Denpasar are still an intact banjar of people who primarily still live in the southern part of Banpres, though Regu 2 and 3, have become mixed with people not originally from the regu and from a variety of places of origin in Bali. With the arrival of the Umum Balinese in the 3rd wave of transmigration, three new banjars were added to the five which had grown out of the regu teams. One of the initial banjars then split to create a total of 9 banjars.

Pak Merte noted that unlike Pura Pam, one could change their banjar affiliation, but like Pura Pam, each person could only follow one. Attesting to the secular alignment of the banjar, Pak Merte noted that the two Javanese families that had come to Mopugad with the Umum group from Bali had also partaken in the Balinese banjar system. The Balinese who have moved to Jabar continue to take part in their original banjar; Ibu Pujung continues to follow Regu Two's banjar Gunung Sari and I Gusti Gede Bawan still follows the banjar of his parents.

Other secular community activities

A few of the Balinese interviewed, particularly the women, expressed regret that non-sectarian gatherings were no longer organized in Mopugad. Wayan's mother said it was a shame that there were no longer monthly KTK (ketrampilan khusus) or "special skill" classes. These activities, she said, had been organized by the wives of the mayors and taught women home economics skills ranging from cooking to hair cutting. Wayan's mother said similar activities had been organized by the AMD (abri masuk desa), or the Army Comes to Town, programs that had existed under Suharto. For youth there had been Prada, which had organized sports and community service activities for teenagers. None of these groups were still functioning, largely attributed to budget cuts.

Oka's brother said he participates in cockfighting, a recreational pastime popular in Bali. In Mopugad, he said, the town mayor and the local police grant permission for these fights to be scheduled every 6 months. He also told me that there is a lot of illegal cockfighting also in Mopugad. In Bali, this pastime involves gambling, and it is said that the reason Balinese carpenters in Bali were traditionally women, is because the men were always cockfighting.

Public realm is temporal as well as spatial

A final point about Balinese private space in Mopugad was relayed to me by Diana, a Minahasan woman who lives in the center of the Banpres neighborhood. She said that both the Balinese and Javanese keep many traditional superstitions. When Diana was pregnant, her Balinese neighbors came and tied strings around the posts of her porch to announce that a baby was to be born and to ward off evil spirits. Her Balinese friends advised her not to leave the house after dark and said that if she must, she should wear a bit of garlic pinned to her. Also, when she was returning home late on night with her baby, the baby started crying while they were walking on the road. Diana said that people ran out of their houses at the sound of a baby outside at night and scolded her for taking her baby out of the house after dark, concerned that a spirit could follow or frighten the baby. As these instances indicate, public space at night is a closed space, particularly for Balinese women and young children, and families should be inside the private space of the house. Thus, the dividing line between the public and private realm, which occurs at the gateway to the house is figuratively closed at night. Night, then, is a break with the public realm for the Balinese.

In conclusion, Balinese community life has remained relatively continuous in Mopugad with the role of religious organization paired with secular organization. Both the religious and secular organizations are not ethnically exclusive, with the Hindu foundation acting also on behalf of the Javanese children in their school and with the admittance (at one point) of non-Balinese into the secular banjar community groups. However, as other secular inter-ethnic activities have died off and Javanese or others are no longer participants in the banjar, secular organization seems relatively stagnant compared to the active religious community lead by the Hindu Dharma and its foundation. Arguably, the secular organizations, the banjar, could not provide the services of the foundation as banjar are sub-communities within the larger Balinese community. At the level of inter-communal representation, the Balinese have only religious organization which represents the whole (at lease Hindu) Balinese community.

Javanese Communal Culture

Dissolution of secular organization

As far as I could tell, there are no longer any secular Javanese organizations or institutions in Mopugad. Upon arrival in 1975, however, the Javanese transmigrants formed teams or *rombongan*, much like the Balinese with their Regu. These rombongan comprised between ten and twenty male heads of household with one designated leader. Though it was not necessary that these groups clear their own land like the Balinese who came with Banpres, the rombongan worked together to irrigate swaths of fields. Whereas the Banpres teams were also residentially clustered, the Javanese rombongan were not as field location did not directly correspond to the localities of the owners' house plots. Soon after, the rombongan were activated for house rebuilding. They were however only active for temporary purposes and after a few years, they were dissolved. It is worth noting that should there have been a desire or need to maintain these organizational groups, these rombongan could have become longer term sub-community groups providing such joint services as communal farming or extended to domestic services such as childcare.

Though lacking a secular administrative body such as the rombongan, individuals within the Javanese community can still activate a more secular identity. The first, and longstanding, mayor of Mopugad Utara was a representative of the Javanese community, Pak Raspan, though a Bailnese man recently became the new mayor of Mopugad Utara. Regardless, Javanese still see themselves as political actors in Mopugad. There doesn't seem to be resentment that the mayor in no longer Javanese, there is frustration that the new mayor has not done much.

Religious Institutions

The stronger communal identity, undoubtably, is a religious identity. Indeed, the Javanese community is almost entirely conflated with the Muslim community and there is little room for religious deviance in the Javanese community of Mopugad. Pak Wawan and his wife Ibu Yati particularly emphasized that the mosque and mushola were their community, which is not surprising as Pak Wawan serves as the treasurer of the mosque. Ibu Warsem, Ibu Rutah, Ibu Nurliyah, Ibu Jawia, and the Macis couple confirmed this was their primary community within Mopugad.

These sorts of responses are not uncommon also amongst Javanese who live in Java; the mosque and the Muslim community are major forces of organizing and social networks and arguably increasingly so as the various traditional interpretations of Islam are becoming more fundamentalist and at least more unified. What is more important in the case of the Javanese in Mopugad, is that religion has remained an important focus of identity while other aspects of Javanese culture have dropped away. Religion has been more resilient than language, architecture or other features of secular Javanese culture because it has strong organization and institutional infrastructure.

Whether it has been resilient because of the strengthening ties to religion in Java or as a reaction and in distinction to immediate co-habitation with the Balinese community is not answerable looking at the limited context of Mopugad. Nonetheless, we can conclude that as the Javanese community in Mopugad identifies as Muslim and bases its social relations upon a unified Islamic community, it is consequently exclusionary of both Balinese Hindu and Christians. Here we must also realize that the conclusion that all Javanese are Muslim is not a given and may be a temporary marker of ethnicity.

The major religious institution in the Javanese community is the mosque. Most Javanese men pray at the mosque both before going to the fields in the morning and after returning from the fields in the late afternoon. Many also return mid-day for the noontime prayer. For the men, the mosque schedules their days. More than a few people from both the Javanese and the Balinese communities commented that because of the daily schedule of Muslim prayer, the Javanese working day is shorter than that of the Balinese; the Javanese often return from the fields at four o'clock in the afternoon to rest before the four o'clock prayer, whereas the Balinese stay in the fields until it twilight at six in the evening.

The days of the women are also defined by the schedule of the mosque. Though they tend not to be as rigorous in the punctuality of their prayer, the women prepare the family meals in alignment with their husband's prayer hours. Women and children pray at the *mushola*, a word used in Java to designate a neighborhood mosque where prayer is often both individual and more spontaneous. However, where the mosque exclusively serves the Jabar neighborhood, the mushola in Mopugad has been designated the women's and children's religious space for prayer and education.

Arisans, a "regular social gathering whose members contribute to and take turns at winning an aggregate sum of money,"[13] are another opportunity for the Muslim women to get together. Each Monday night, twenty or so women get together at one another's houses for an arisan paired with a Koranic reading session. The location of the arisan rotates and there is no one leader, through there is a treasurer. These meetings happen once a week and during my time in Mopugad both Ibu Jawia and Ibu Demi held one at their house – Jawia in her vast *kerajaan* living room, and Demi in her tiny living room. The men also have a weekly evening koranic reading group.

Men, women and children come together at the madrasa behind the mosque each Friday after the mid-day prayer. Though madrasa are traditionally schools, in Mopugad the madrasa is not used for religious instruction, but for the weekly pot-luck. Members of the Muslim community contribute to the coffers of the mosque for building and upkeep and to pay the religious leader, the imam. Pak Wawan, the treasurer of the mosque said that the 114 Muslim families that belong to the mosque each contribute as they are able. He said each family contributes 15,000 Rupiah (about US $1.50) per month with an additional Rp 5,000 (50¢US) per each asset such as a house or a rice field. After the harvests every six months, families with rice fields donate as much as three million Rupiah (about US $300). The mosque is saving to build a new fence. Though the fence will still be made of wood, in contrast to the stone and cement boundary walls of the Balinese, it will be much sturdier than the chicken-coop sticks used as a fence now.

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[13] Kamus Indonesia Inggris. Echols.



Figure 37: Mosque with fence.

In Java, Muslim religious schools or *pesantren* are quite popular particularly in Central and Eastern Java where public schools for a longtime did not reach many of the rural areas. Many pesantren cater specifically for poorer people as their fees are less than those of public schools and pesantren schooling often includes boarding. Traditionally, pesantren were self-sustaining units and the students helped to grown their own food. In Dumoga there are no pesantren, though there are some in the nearby district capital of Kotamobagu. However, of the Javanese families I spoke with, none sent their children away for pesantren. Only Ibu Nurliyah's husband had attended pesantren and he did this schooling in Makassar, Southern Sulawesi. Religious education nonetheless, is a priority to mothers such as Ibu Warsem whose middle-school aged daughter wears the *jilbab* head-covering.

Ibu Warsem commented to me that she believes there is quite a bit of intermarriage between Javanese Muslim and Balinese Hindu but that only a Muslim women will convert to Hinduism whereas a man will never leave Islam. It is now national policy that each family can only declare one religion, so whereas it was legal previously to have a husband and wife of different religions, now one or the other must convert. This did seem to be the case with the son of Pak Raspan having married a Christian Minahasan women who then converted to Islam to join his family. The one instance I came across of this was the wife of Gusti's son who calls herself Javanese though she is from a Javanese community long settled in the Minahasa region of North Sulawesi. Though she considers herself Javanese, she does not participate in the Javanese community. Thus, though there may be Javanese in Mopugad who are not Muslim, I would conclude from this that they do not partake in the Javanese community.

Cultural Difference and Personal Attitudes towards Members of the Other Community

Now that we have seen the different structures of community organization and the role of these organizations in maintaining distinction between the two community groups, it is important to note that these groups are sustained through continued immigration in each community. For the Balinese, ties to Bali are very important. Both Pak Merta and Pak Suran had recently returned from Bali where they had returned the bodies of deceased family members and staged a full funeral or *ngaben*, with the financial help of their *pura pam* communities. The carpenter, Pak Sudarno, also returns to Bali often to visit as does Pak Wayan Tiase to look for ship work. Five out of fifteen of the Balinese people I interviewed had migrated to Mopugad since the late

1970s because of personal ties to the Banpres or Umum transmigrants. The members of the Javanese community, in contrast, visit Java much less often and many no longer maintain strong ties with their extended families still in Java. However, there is an even greater degree of immigration in the Javanese community. Though some of the immigrants come to Mopugad because of personal contacts, such as Pak Raspan's invitation to Pak Wawan, most immigrants come as a result of a general knowledge of the transmigration network and through less personal ties.

The two slightly different types of immigration networks may account for an important difference between the constitution of the two groups. Balinese continue to speak Balinese in Mopugad whereas the Javanese say that they are losing their language in Mopugad. Though many of the now elderly original Jabar transmigrants only speak Javanese, the younger generations and their children speak bahasa Indonesia almost exclusively. Though some family said that they spoke Javanese at home with their children, bahasa Indonesia remained the language of the street, perhaps because quite a few Gorontalese and Mongondow now live in Jabar. The difference in the language resiliency is likely due to a larger and critical mass of Balinese inhabitants or the fact that it is a cultural priority of many Balinese parents who raise their children to speak Balinese. If Balinese marry into another ethnic group they speak bahasa Indonesia in the home or teach their spouse and children Balinese, whereas there is one example of a Javanese woman marrying a Balinese man and learning Balinese to use at home. Thus, though one might suppose that higher volume immigration would sustain traditions and cultural commonalities to a larger degree, as MacDonald and MacDonald argue, in the case of Mopugad the inverse seems to be more true.

Relations between communities

Though the next chapter will provide definition to one aspect of the relationship between the Balinese and the Javanese community, it is worth noting here some of the private assessments of the "other" group. These personal reflections are not to be considered representative of group sentiment as certain individuals may have been more or less willing to discuss issues of SARA, or ethnic and religious comparison, than others. Those who did not comment are by no means necessarily indifferent or neutral and the sensitivity of the topic can not be underplayed.

I Gusti Bawan said that though he was respectful of the Javanese, he himself did not have any Javanese friends. Another example of the respect and sense of unity between Balinese and Javanese was expressed by a visitor at Pak Suran's house who noted that the Javanese and Balinese are all one people since the fifteenth century when the Majapahit Dynasty moved from Java to Bali. That said there were no examples of Javanese friendships or co-workers noted by the Balinese, nor were examples of eating together or visiting houses of Javanese. The resentment, which I only heard at two households, was toward the indigenous Mongondow which stemmed from both the destructive and high-conflict mining practices in the mountains nearby as well as an instance where a Mongondow government official said in a public statement that the Balinese were dirty.

The Javanese on the other hand, had more to say about their relationship with the Balinese and the structure of the majority-minority relationship. A few noted that their children were picking up some Balinese language from their Balinese playmates. Pak Diran has also picked up some Balinese working alongside Balinese carpenters. He said that Javanese usually get along with Balinese though they don't often like the Balinese pig pens, considered by many

Javanese Muslims to be unsanitary. The aversion to the pig pens instigated one of Ibu Demi's friends to relocate away from a Balinese family who had moved next door to her.

Ibu Warsem reassured me that overall the relationship between the two communities was quite good. She was upset, however, that the only middle school in the town was a private middle school run by a Balinese Hindu foundation. She said that not only is it more expensive than a public school would be, but also offered religious and language instruction only for the Balinese community. The school also built a pura at the school for the teachers and students, which she did not protest to, though she resented having to chip in for it.

She also mentioned monthly inter-faith gatherings in Mopuya to which Mopugad sends two representatives of each of its religions. Others remarked that at one time such gatherings also occurred in Mopugad, where Balinese and Javanese women got together for shared activities such as jointly cleaning the places of worship. Ibu Rutah and Demi both said that the Javanese and the Balinese communities don't really communicate anymore as they had in their parents' generation. Though Balinese were invited to the open houses of the Javanese during the Muslim holy days, Demi said the Balinese don't come. Ibu Rutah said the only place where the two communities mix is at the market.

A more subtle economic differential was also sometimes mentioned. Arie Subandi noted that Javanese are more prone to sell their plots and move and that the plots are almost exclusively bought by Balinese who have "thicker wallets". Demi revealed that the comparative Balinese prosperity was due to the fact that Balinese raise pigs which substantially supplements their income. Somewhat ironically then, the Balinese who have maintained traditional aspects of Balinese culture to a higher degree than the Javanese, are also more able to exploit the regional (Minahasan Christian) culture.

Communally, both Javanese and Balinese identify and organize most with their respective religious communities. Though religion does not intervene much in Javanese private life, somewhat ironically, the raising of pigs, a religious taboo, has made a large difference between the private lives of the Balinese and Javanese. This cultural boundary then has become an economic boundary between the two communities and one which affects inter-communal relations.

The sustained differences between the both private the public lives of the Balinese and Javanese have ensured that the two communities remain largely intact. Similar to Gans's illustration of the West End sub-community, relationships with the other ethnic groups are friendly but infrequent.[14] The infrequency of these relationships is illustrated in the fact that Balinese don't pass through Jabar, nor do Javanese often go through Banpres or Umum. The "tolerant" or "respectful" attitudes mutually expressed resemble strains of Granovetter's weak ties. The question which then arises is whether these weak ties, as Granovtter would suggestion, are making for a stronger shared communalism. The contestation over the roles and boundaries of each group in this shared communalism will be looked at through the distribution and administration of space in the following chapter. In the next chapter we will see how the distinction and negotiation between the Balinese and the Javanese communities are played out in the configuration of space in Mopugad.

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[14] Gans, p 36.

CHAPTER FIVE
SPACE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF COMMUNITY BOUNDARIES

This chapter will look more closely at how these socio-cultural movements have affected space in Mopugad. From the previous chapter we can see that religious communalism in contrast to private religion is increasing in both the Javanese and the Balinese communities. On the other hand, private life seems less impacted by religion, particularly amongst the Javanese, which would indicate that perhaps inter-communal exchange was occurring in personal and not group interaction. I may also indicate possible residential integration where inter-communal relationships could be enhanced at the personal level.

These findings then lead to the question of whether cultural boundaries have been reified in spatial boundaries and to search for placement of centers of ethnic or religious community in contrast to spaces where there is cultural overlap. Hildred and Clifford Geertz wrote about the Balinese culture as a "pattern – a structure, essentially, of significant symbols – [which] is very general and flexible in form."[1] This chapter assesses this flexibility when in juxtaposition with another cultural pattern. Here I will replace the "structure of symbols" with the ordering and administration of space of the two cultural patterns. An exploration of four different tiers of space, from the private to the public, will hopefully illustrate the flexibility and integrities of the two cultural sub-communities.

Spatial organization and perhaps more so, *perceptions* of spatial organization strongly influence the degree to which a person feels familiar or comfortable. The spectrum of familiarity allows one to interpret identity differences through contrasting his or her own community with communities seen as separate. Cultural conservatism, or the tendency toward the familiar, according to Peter Marris is based on the assumption that the "impulse to defend the predictability of life is a fundamental and universal principle of human psychology."[2] Though the universalism of this psychological theory can not be accounted for here, it does caution the more post-modern reader against denigrating cultural conservatism. More applicable here perhaps, Marris writes that we need conservatism to be able to function and adapt, to interpret events and changes. He writes, "without continuity we cannot interpret what events mean to us, nor explore new kinds of experience with confidence."[3]

The individual needs culture to be able to understand or accept other cultures; culture creates the impetus for incremental change. According to John H. Flavell, "Assimilation is by its very nature conservative, in the sense that its primary function is to make the unfamiliar familiar, to reduce the new to the old. A new assimilatory structure must always be some variant of the last one acquired and it is this which insures both the gradualness and continuity of intellectual development."[4] This implies that assimilation is merely dependant on time and that over time everything is able to be assimilated, as the end result of "intellectual development" –which will be addressed in the concluding chapter in a discussion of developmentalism.

Here we will look at the trajectory of assimilation and segregation over the thirty years since the founding of Mopugad. The spatial pattern established by the first generation of settlers in Mopugad has largely determined interaction and relations within and between groups of the second generation. However, this pattern has also undergone revision through the first generation and will continue to be revised by the second and subsequent generations. In this chapter, I will be arguing that the Javanese and Balinese communities are not only distinct (the argument of Chapter Four), *but also overlap*. Shared space and the boundaries between unshared spaces are used as a tool for the renegotiation of community. The Balinese-Javanese inter-communal relationship, currently at a point of transition between generations, can best be measured in the control and negotiation of space. People must physically come together for mutual exchange. Members of different groups most anywhere come together in public space, shared by all groups. Indeed, Richard Sennet writes that the public realm is where diversity is encountered and experienced.[5]

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[1] Geertz, Kinship, p 3.

[2] Marris, p 2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Flavell John H., 1963, "The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. London, Van Nostrand Reinhold, p 50. As cited in Marris, p 9.

Shared space, however, is largely determined by local concepts of the private and the public realm. In some places, these distinctions are blurred whereas in others, they are quite defined. Hildred and Clifford Geertz write that traditionally amongst the Balinese, there is "A sharp distinction between the public and the private domains of social action," and that "the differentiation between private and public is clearly marked."[6] They describe a Balinese village as follows:

> "As one enters a Balinese village, the first impression is of a cross-road lined by high, blank, brick walls. The walls are broken only by narrow, inhospitable doorways, each with a short staircase leading up to it, often with a foot-high sill to restrain the wanderings of chickens, pigs, and small children, and, a few feet inside the door, a second brick wall placed in such a way so as to shield from view the courtyard within. These walls mark the division between the public world of village affairs and the private world of the family."[7]

Javanese notions of the division between privacy and public life, as exist in traditional village or urban neighborhoods, or *kampung*, are much less delineated and entirely public space and exclusively private space do not exist. In a Javanese town or city small streets comprise the unit of neighborhood organization. These small and tightly residential streets or *gang*, are at night physically closed to those from outside the community and patrolled by neighborhood residents. As Cowherd writes, "Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the *kampung* is the rich and finely variegated distinctions of private and public space."[8] Also, "Missing from the hierarchy of public-private spaces of the *kampung* are both the extremes of the completely public –so as to render visitors anonymous – and the completely private –so as to remove inhabitants entirely from view."[9] Such spatial blurring attests to a high association between community and space. Clearly the Balinese familiarity with space is quite different from the Javanese.

In the spatial analysis which follows I have utilized a private to public spectrum, which I hope will engage specificities of each group. Though I have particularly focused on four types of space on this spectrum, I hope it is apparent that most of these spaces are all potentially permeable and certainly open to alternate interpretation. The interplay of orders of space along the spectrum give the village a particular "urbanity,"[10] or a social sophistication that comes as a result of shared communalism. Space in Mopugad no longer only consists of the private family space within the larger public village There is also middle ground specific to the sub-communities and middle ground specific to location.

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[5] Sennet, p 87.
[6] Geertz, Kinship, p 158.
[7] Geertz, Kinship, p 46.
[8] Cowherd, Cultural Construction of Jakarta, p 52.
[9] Ibid.

Where it seems to enrich an understanding of Mopugad, I have made comparisons with another place shared between Muslims and Balinese-Hindus in Indonesia. Shuji Funo's study of Cakranegara in western Lombok[11] describes the spatial effects of various principles of organization established by a Hindu-Balinese ideal and then altered with the arrival of both Muslims and Chinese settlers. Though Cakranegara is a city of 50,000 people and a kecamatan like Mopuya, (and perhaps more comparable to Mopuya in its function as a symbolic as well as administrative center), the comparison of spatial designation and distribution to the organization of Mopugad, a place of much smaller scale, is particularly enlightening as to the importance of scale.

Funo follows a method of analysis similar to the one used here. He looks at street patterns and plot divisions, the structure and organization of neighborhoods, the distribution of religious facilities, residential segregation, as well as the physical and social evolution of the city based on field surveys. However, his case is quite different. Though the dominant religion of the island of Lombok is Islam, western Lombok which surrounds Cakranegara had been heavily influenced by Balinese Hinduism.[12] Cakranegara was in fact founded in the early 18th century by the Balinese Hindu King of Karangasam as a ceremonial city and, as Funo theorizes, was modeled on the ideals of a Hindu city according to Balinese cosmology. The Muslim community of Cakranegara is comprised of indigenous Lombok Sasak people and not a non-native Muslim population as are the Javanese in Mopugad.

That said, there are similarities between Mopugad and Cakranegara, perhaps most importantly of which is the sustained peaceful co-habitation of Hindu and Muslim communities. Indeed these groups have remained intact in Cakranegara for over 200 years, whereas Mopugad was only first settled 30 years ago. Furthermore, Funo's theory of the ideal Hindu city is based upon the existence of a street grid, which he claims exists nowhere else in Indonesia. Though I haven't the opportunity to confirm whether street grids did or did not exist in Indonesia prior to this period, a street grid does also lie as the spatial base for Mopugad along with many other transmigration settlements.[13] Both Cakranegara and Mopugad were planned by invasive governance to be ideal settlements. Another, albeit incidental, similarity is that the initial Balinese settlers of Cakranegara came from the royal seat of Karangasam, in Eastern Bali, as were the group who settled Regu One in northern Banpres.

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[10] Santoso, Suryadi, "Quarter Typological Approach in the Modernization of Urban Strcutre" paper presented at the seminar: Planning of New Yowns and Restructuring Urban Centers, Universitas Pelita Harapan, Lippo Karawaci, Indonesia (29 March 2000), p 11-12. As cited in Cowherd, Cultural Construction of Jakarta, p 52.

[11] Funo.

[12] Funo, p 201.

[13] Guinness, 147.

Housing: private space

Style and Identity

Whereas there does not seem to be great differentiation in the increasing secularization and similarity in the design of the homes of the Balinese and Javanese, the definition and function of this private space differs between groups. The Spanish style is largely favored by both groups. Though this would seem to be a result of architectural dialogue between the groups, this is apparently not the case. Most people who preferred the style said they were inspired by television or houses in places outside of Mopugad. The most personal space then does not signify allegiance to one community or another. Instead, the personal identity marker of the house is on the national or global scale. With a few exceptions, it is difficult to differentiate between many new homes of Balinese and the homes of Javanese. This would suggest that the relationship between ethno-religious culture and space is weaker than the relationship between the larger orders of identity and space in the domain of the home. In comparison, we will see that the community groups are conservative, building pura and mosques in as close replication as possible.

Only a few Balinese, and none of the Javanese, I spoke with prefer the traditional housing model over the Spanish style model. Even if they preferred a traditional look, most Balinese no longer follow the trimandala or other spiritual designations in planning their homes. This shift can be said to be community wide, and the new leader of the Hindu community, Pak Nangah, himself has a Spanish style house. Such was likewise the trajectory of housing in Cakranegara where the trimandala and Astra Kosali Kosala were lost and only the placement of the house pura remains intact.



Figure 1: Spanish style house of Pak Nangah, head of the Hindu Dharma.

Space around house: borders and yards

In many instances the use of the land surrounding the house, appears to be similar between Javanese and Balinese homes. Landscaping seemed to be of about equal importance to both groups; vegetable gardens and fruit trees fill the house plots, with the larger house plots containing quite a bit of wild foliage as well. Some families, both Javanese and Balinese had fences or otherwise delineated gardens; Pak Raspan had gardens with each species surrounded by a border of stones, Pak Wayan Tiase was building a small wooden fence surrounding his small garden in front of his shop-house. Many people, both Javanese and Balinese also had spaces for chickens, usually free roaming, and other cages for chicken, goats or other birds.



Figure 2 & 3: House gardens. Pak Raspan's at left, Wayan Tiase's at right.

Three notable distinctions exist between the function and delineation of Balinese house plots from Javanese. The first is the continued interpretation of private spaces as sacred. Each Balinese Hindu household has a pura, though it may be located less visibly at the back of the house depending on the location and orientation of the house plot. Also, Balinese place *sagen*, offerings of rice, leaves, flowers and incense, at specific location around the houseyard, often multiple times a day. Thus, though the Balinese appear to be losing religiously prescribed housing, the house*yard* still service a religious function.

The second distinction is the continued function of fairly exclusive privacy in the Balinese house. Most house plots in both the Balinese and Javanese neighborhoods are enclosed in a low to medium height hedge or shrubbery and trees of some kind. Low, fragile wooden fences occasionally delineate the property along its street frontage, though often such a marker is only confined to a small area immediately around the entry to the property. The wooden fence is the most permanent form of boundary delineation used to surround Javanese homes. Some Balinese houseyards have maintained the use of the high compound wall made of brick and plastered in concrete. Only three out of the fifteen Balinese families I interviewed had a compound wall, however the compound walls are highly noticeable along Jalan 10, where the more affluent Balinese live, and give the street a more closed off feel. Even the Balinese houses without a wall are not as accessible, and it is considered impolite to enter these house plot without invitation.

In contrast, the yards of the Javanese are made more open, often with a certain space cleared of foliage and left with a wide dirt area. At Ibu Demi's, this large area is used for *sepak rao*, a popular game of rattan hacky-sack, and is open to fairly public use.



Figure 4 & 5: Balinese walled housing compound, at left. Ibu Demi's open yard plan, at right.

This difference in private space also applies to different requirements for privacy at different times of day. As the Minahasan woman Ibu Diana mentioned, the Balinese private space closes at night. As Geertz notes in the Balinese home, "as night falls each houseyard draws together again. There is a warm, intimate, and relaxed atmosphere inside the walls, an atmosphere which contrasts strongly with the restraint, coolness, and caution in the road, marketplace and meeting hall."[14] This same concept of night privacy is not as true amongst the Javanese, where men returning from evening prayer at the mosque, may cut across other peoples' yards.

A final point of difference between the Javanese and Balinese uses of private space is its usage as a center of economic activity. Though Javanese and Balinese alike raise fruit and vegetables and small livestock at their homes, the Balinese also undertake the raising of pigs, often between a couple and fifteen or twenty, at home. Pigs require a pig sty as well as food and Balinese households set aside land to grow the leafy diet of pigs, *kangkun*. Only this final factor was cited by the Javanese as a negative aspect of Balinese culture. Even the most private space can impact those in the community.

Shifting demographics

Due to the fact that many of the newer houses are built in Spanish style, it is difficult to see that the demographics of Jabar are changing. Numerous new houses have been built throughout Jabar. Not until closer inspection, or speaking with the people of Mopugad, is it clear that almost all of these new houses have been built by Balinese moving into the neighborhood. When Balinese buy property in Jabar, they almost always demolish the pre-extant house. Traditionally this would be required so as to align the property properly with the trimandala and Astra Kosali Kosala, though fewer and fewer families are actually building *bali adat* houses. Though the houses are fairly indistinguishable, the fact that all of the new houses being built today in Mopugad are built by Balinese allows one to "see" the difference between the two groups. This circumstance, however, is economic and though circuitously cultural (in that cultural advantage has allowed Balinese to become economically successful through pigs), not directly so.

It is interesting that two of the newly built Balinese houses in the interior of Jabar are both built in the Spanish style (those of Pak Wayan and Pak Gusti), whereas the two Balinese houses on the border of the neighborhood, along the Jalan 10 edge, are in a more specifically Balinese, *bali moderen*, style (Ibu Pujung and Pak Wayan Tiase). Similarly, the pura at the houses in the Jabar interior are more modest, some still in temporary form, where on the borders the Jabar neighborhood, along Jalan 10 and Jalan Raya, the pura have been made more elaborate or are in the process of becoming so. All of the Balinese houses have pig sties.

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[14] Geertz, Kinship, p 57.

Neighborhood

Ethnic neighborhoods

Residential segregation of ethnic or religious groups within the cities and towns of Java and Bali is common. As towns grow into commercial centers and migrants arrive from other places, these migrants most often settle in neighborhoods with others from their home town, home region or amongst co-religionists. As Hans Dieter-Evers and Rudiger Korff note more regionally, "Since their founding different ethnic groups have resided in the Southeast Asian cities, usually in their own respective quarters. . . Besides these different ethnic groups, migration into the cities from rural areas has led to the emergence of segregated quarters."[15]

These settlements then take the name of the group's origin and are called villages, or *kampung*, which become neighborhoods of the city. Most Javanese cities will have an Arab kampung, a Chinese kampung, and kampungs of other towns in Java as well as from other islands. The Balinese also tend toward ethno-religious segregation. In Geertz's study of Tabanan, Bali, the town was also segregated. The residential area for all foreign Indonesians, was known very generally as "Kampung Java". Amongst the Balinese also there were levels of segregation by caste where "the block-long, high-walled noble "houses" clustered on a small hill at its center around the open square where the palace of the king once stood; the small, enclosed courtyard houses of the commoners, packed solidly together in neighborhood-sized blocks down at the foot of the hill."[16]

Differentiated neighborhoods also exist in Cakranegara. The Balinese majority group occupies the center of the city and the Muslim Sasak, indigenous to Lombok, reside on the edges of the city. Also, the Balinese amongst themselves live segregated by caste, with the Brahmans in the north and east, the Ksatriya in west and the Gusti in the south. There is a certain amount of inter-group residential mixing, particularly in the north and south of the city, where the Balinese only account for about 55% of the residents in these quarters.[17] The shop-houses of the ethnic Chinese community are located in the center of the city along the major streets. For the most part, however, the city is quite segregated, with only a few Muslims living in the city center in the Kampung Java and Karang Bedil neighborhoods. Each neighborhood was relatively self-sufficient with its own schools, market, and pura or mosques, and its own pattern of streets.

Whereas a street grid defines the neighborhoods within the city center, Funo writes, "There is a distinct contrast between the areas where individual houses are built to form a cluster within an enclosed quarter, and where houses are built along with the extension of the street."[18] He writes, "a maze of narrow lanes developed into settlements of Muslims."[19] In an almost stereotypical characterization of an "Islamic city" street pattern, he writes, "The streets zigzag, become narrow and end in cul-de-sacs. Accordingly, the dwellings face in many directions. The residential density is high and the number of households in a neighborhood unit also differs considerably from that of Hindu areas."[20] Independent facilities, street patterns and density distinguish ethnic neighborhoods from one another in Cakranegara.

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[15] Evers, Hans-Dieter and Rudiger Korff, p 4.

[16] Geertz, p 18.

[17] Funo, p 224.

[18] Funo, p 225.

[19] Funo, p 208.

Mopugad neighborhoods not visibly segregated

The neighborhoods of Mopugad are quite different from those in Cakranegara, likely be due to the great difference in size between a city of 50,000 and a combined township of North and South Mopugad together only consisting of 3,196 people.[21] However, Mopugad also exhibits ethnic segregation. This was a common policy in multi-ethnic transmigration sites. In Luwu, South Sulawesi, also a settlement of mixed Javanese and Balinese populations, the receiving strategy was to assign houses as the transmigrants arrived. Naturally, those that arrived together, usually from the same place of origin, were given houses next to one another.[22] Though Guinness, in his assessment of Luwu, notes that there was official discussion to residentially integrate Javanese and Balinese, the transmigration officials decided against it as the Balinese practice of pig herding "could prove offensive to other settlers."[23] Therefore, all of the Balinese were located downstream from the Javanese.

Like the settlements in Luwu, segregation in Mopugad was primarily a consequence of the settlement of distinct waves of transmigration. The first wave of settlers, those which settled the Banpres area, was all from Bali.[24] Javanese settled the subsequent Jabar neighborhood, in the second wave of settlement. Finally, the third group of *Umum* general transmigrants, settling what was to become the southwestern quadrant of the town, was all from Bali.[25]

The Jabar neighborhood, established beside the Banpres neighborhood, was accepted from the first as a place for the Javanese Muslim community of Mopugad. With the exception of the two remaining Muslim families in Banpres and one in a part of Umum which was annexed from a shrinking Jabar, the entire Javanese population lives in Jabar. Ibu Warsem noted that if Javanese or other Muslims move to the town, they settle in the Jabar neighborhood. Within the combined Balinese Banpres and Umum, the Jabar neighborhood is an ethnic-religious enclave.

The importance to the Javanese community of the physical integrity of the Jabar neighborhood is illustrated by the community decision to move the mosque to the neighborhood. Though the transmigration plan had located the mosque beside the central Hindu temple, mimicking the "shared religious space" created in Mopuya to unify people of different religions, the design was overridden by the desire for a spatial cohesiveness for the Muslim community. Though a variety of factors seems to have gone into the decision to move the mosque (including convenience, sense of ownership, and an opportunity to cement the Muslim neighborhood around a physical institution), the action taken on behalf of the Muslim community was a dismissal of the official agenda to integrate across religious or ethnic cleavages.

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[20] Funo, p 225.

[21] Puskesmas Kecamatan Mopuya. Census data 2004.

[22] Guinness, p 77.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Actually the Banpres group initially included a few Javanese and Muslim families. All but for two of these Javanese exceptions have returned to Java or relocated to the Jabar neighborhood.

[25] Here also, two families came to Mopugad in the predominantly Balinese Umum phase of transmigration.



Map 3: Relocation of the mosque to the Jabar neighborhood.

The residential segregation, however, is not immediately apparent. As noted in the previous section, the Spanish style house blurs the distinction between Balinese and Javanese homes and the Balinese markers of pura and pig are not always visible from the street. A small number of walled compounds, particularly along the northern extension of Jalan 10, clearly indicate Balinese residents. These more elaborate compounds are situated mostly on the borders between the neighborhoods and inside the neighborhoods these walled compounds are not prevalent to the extent that an outside observer could determine the demographics of the population. Though my sample size is not large enough to make any statistical significance of the following ratio to be able to generalize to the larger population of Mopugad 3 out of 15 of the Balinese I interviewed had walled compounds.

A more deliberate observer, however, would be able to distinguish the Balinese (Hindu) houses from Javanese or Christian houses. Each Hindu family will indeed have a pura and likely a pig sty. Other structures, such as shelves, are also allocated for the placement of offerings and day old offerings are often scattered around the house plot. Though the offerings and the pura are often highly ornate and apparently decorative, they are not intended for public visual consumption or even intra-communal Hindu consumption and are not intended to showcase difference from the Javanese residents. Though these specific cultural markers can be seen intermittently, creating a visual effect of cultural diversity, the diversity is not patterned to align with the distinct patterning of neighborhood demographics.

Between the neighborhoods --Jabar, Banpres and Umum-- there are no visual markers denoting border division or neighborhood separation. The only signs marking the neighborhoods may be said to be the Hindu statues that stand at the roads into these neighborhoods from the surrounding fields (see Map 6, p 95) though not at the intersections of roads from other neighborhoods. Therefore border distinction is rather focused toward the space outside of the town of Mopugad and not between groups within it. Also, because of the religious aspect of these markers, they are not intended as markers for people from other communities, but as markers for spirits. Such a marker, understandably, does not exist at the entry to the Jabar neighborhood from its external point of axis at the north tip of Jalan AMD.



Figure 6: Hindu pura marking eastern entrance to Mopugad.

However, the Hindu desire to share their spiritual markers with non-Hindus is illustrated by the story from Diana, a Christian Minahasan resident of Banpres, whose Balinese neighbors wrapped cloth ties around her house to protect it from spirits. Though they knew she was not Hindu, nor could they be said to have been attempting to convert her to Hinduism, the placement of these territorial markers outstepped the Hindu religious community into the protection of the neighborhood community.

Pervasive Street grid

Residential similitude between the neighborhoods and cultural communities is also largely due to the street grid layout pervasive throughout Mopugad. Quite unlike Funo's description of settlement patterns in Cakranegara, the Muslim neighborhood of Mopugad is not comprised of narrow, winding streets. Though the street grid was not implemented until after the initial Banpres migrants had settled, it complimented the orthogonal street pattern instigated by the Banpres pioneers. Extending the east west streets westward, transmigration officials designated the northeastern quadrant to the Jabar migrants and the southwestern quadrant to the Umum migrants. Orthogonal streets are easy to measure so as to be able to allot residential plots of equal size, as well as to provide with services and infrastructure. Also, street grids have been historically associated with ceremonial and symbolic functions, as Funo argues was the case in the planning of Cakranegara, and it is easy to predetermine the area which will become the city, or town, center.

In Cakranegara, the grid layout has three hierarchic levels of streets. The main streets, the bisecting and intersecting *marga sanga* (or "ten street", because of the width of the street) serve to quarter the settlement, an arrangement common to Chinese imperial planning and known also in historic Mediterranean cities as the cardo-decomanis. Within the four quadrants, the large urban blocks are defined by the second tier of street, the *marga dasa* or "nine streets." Each of these urban blocks in then further sliced by four smaller north-south running *marga*, the residential streets. Each of the urban blocks is comprised of 80 houses with 10 houses on either side of the four marga.



Figures 7 & 8: Comparison of street grid patterns. Cakranegara at left, taken from Funo. Mopugad at right.

The scale and order of streets in Mopugad is quite different. In Mopugad, there are also three tiers of streets. The two streets referred to as the *Jalan Sepuluh* (also streets ten meters wide) bisect the city. The secondary order of street is the *Jalan Lima* ("five street") which run north-south through the town. Finally, *lorong*, or small streets divide up the residential blocks from east to west.

Much less dense than Cakranegara, as is to be expected in comparing a city with a rural town, Mopugad's original house plots were four times the size of the house plots in Cakranegara, measuring 50 by 50 meters in comparison to Cakranegara's 25 by 25 meter plots. Whereas each square urban block in Cakranegara then ran 250 meters long, the "blocks" (as defined by houses between streets) in Mopugad measure only 100 meters (two house plots) north-south and 150 meters (three house plots) from east to west.

The grid in Mopugad, however, is incomplete and interrupted by features of the natural topography. A river that winds through the town along a southern course, splits the town roughly in half. The eastern extension of the major east-west axis of the town, is only accessible via two somewhat precariously aligned bamboo poles which serve as a footbridge over the river. What on the western side of town is the wide, finely paved Jalan Raya, or Main Street, hosting the market, the two mayoral offices, the mosque and one of the schools, to the east of the river becomes a hilly, dirt path full of stones. Most of Banpres is physically segregated by the river and does not enjoy the automobile accessible roads of western Mopugad. For this reason, it is not surprising that Balinese from Banpres move to Jabar if given the opportunity.



Figure 9: Bamboo bridge to Banpres from Jalan Raya.

Acknowledging the pervasive feature of natural circumstances, the town is named Mopugad from the Balinese words pugad-pugad which means criss-crossed or divided, for the very reason that it is divided by the river and many smaller streams. Bridges are key to the conceptualization of space amongst most of Mopugad's residents. To reach the school, the central Hindu temple (pura puseh) or the site of the initial mosque, one either must cross the bamboo poles or go the long distance to the southern, automobile accessible bridge and then north up the eastern parameter road.

Differing concepts and administration of neighborhood

Though the grid is all pervasive throughout Mopugad, the units of neighborhood definition and administration differ throughout the four quadrants of the town. The Balinese neighborhoods, following the organizational model of the initial Banpres pioneers, are organized into banjar, the Balinese word for hamlet or neighborhood association. The banjar, as Funo describes it, is the "community unit and functions for the management of community facilities, security maintenance, conflict resolution and settling of community problems."[26] In Mopugad, the banjar units, comprised of roughly 40 families each, correspond to the original regu work-team groups which were divided into units containing two parallel lorongs which run the width of the greater Banpres area and measure from 8 to 13 houses on each side of the street. Following the traditional Indonesian alignments along geographic community, the members of each regu came from the same district in Bali and subsequently today the spatial layout of banjar can be read as different districts in Bali.[27] The banjar was then adopted two years later into the Umum neighborhood. Though the Umum transmigrants were not responsible for clearing land or building houses, and thus had not immediate need for a regu, the banjar system easily translated from Bali. Thus, from the original five regu, there are now nine banjar neighborhood associations throughout both of the Balinese neighborhoods which correspond to districts in Bali.

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[26] Funo, p 216.

[27] From Funo. This banjar of neighborhood based on the lorong and consisting of about 40 houses, corresponds similarly to the 40 house *kriang* composed of two parallel marga street communities in Cakranegara, the only difference that whereas the streets of the community group run north-south in Cakranegara, they run east-west in Banpres and now also in Umum. However, whereas in Cakranegara, two kriang make a karang, the community body with more administrative as well as religious jurisdiction, the Regu of Banpres and Umum do not united into any larger unit of community, other than the larger Banpres or Umum neighborhoods themselves.



Map 4: Approximate administrative jurisdiction of each of the nine banjar in Banpres and Umum.

The Jabar community has none of these spatial sub-units of neighborhood organization. As far as I could discern from interviews, the entire quadrant is administered as one through the mosque. There is not order of administration which corresponds to the Javanese *gang*, or street, based model. Nor did any one seem to know whether the official hierarchy of administration applied to Mopugad. The official system corresponds more to the orders of administration practiced by the Balinese in Mopugad with street level community associations, the official order of *rukun tetangga* or RT, and the next level of order that of the neighborhood, or *rukun warga* or

RW. When pressed, residents said that each of the three neighborhoods did function as an RW reporting to the newly divided *kecamatan* of Northern Dumoga.

Changes in neighborhoods

The only neighborhood which has undergone substantial change is the Jabar neighborhood. The neighborhood, which has served as an ethno-religious enclave in the Balinese Hindu dominated Mopugad, has changed in two, partially interrelated, ways. The first is the increasing densification of the neighborhood, particularly in relation to the other two neighborhoods. In the rural settlement, this density is quite striking. Whereas rural towns usually expand outward rather than densify, however, the boundaries of the rice fields directly abut the residential area of Mopugad. The densification has happened at a faster rate in Jabar, where, as noted in Chapter Four, because of the subdivision practice of the Javanese where both male and female children inherit property. Densification can also be attributed to land value which has risen substantially, particularly in the past decade, and it is quite profitable to sell even a quarter of the large house plot.

The Balinese, in contrast, have not subdivided. A reason for this, as given to me by the former spiritual head of the Hindu Dharma, is that Balinese must maintain the whole of the land once it is properly religiously ordained and structured by the Astra Kosala Kosali. However, there were plenty of instances of Balinese plots which had been reorganized and restructured in defiance of the integrity of the initial ordinance. Also, Funo notes that in Cakranegara the Balinese have indeed subdivided or merged plots.[28] I assume that instead the reason the Balinese have not subdivided their properties in Mopugad is that they have been prosperous relative to the Javanese and have not had the need to subdivide.

The second possible reason for the unique changes in the demographics of Jabar is due to the patterns of continual migration. Though both Balinese and Javanese have continued to immigrate to Mopugad, only the Javanese have also emigrated from Mopugad. Javanese have been moving in and out since the late 1970s. Though transmigrants anywhere in Indonesia become linked to larger, often ethnically-based networks of migrants elsewhere, the Javanese transmigration network is particularly extensive as the have been the primary demographic involved in transmigration. Furthermore, Javanese are said to enjoy *merantau*, moving around away from home.[29] Oekan Soekotjo Abdoellah, comparing Javanese and Balinese transmigrants in Barambai says the following:

> "The Javanese in particular took advantage of this and used merantau as another means to survive, especially during the paceklik season. . . For the Javanese, mobility has been a positive response that has enhanced adaptability to the Barambai environment. By contrast, most of the Balinese are not interested in merantau, especially when they are unsure of securing employment in perantauan. The Balinese prefer to try to diversify off-farm activities by becoming traders or moneylenders. Their reluctance is basically derived from past experiences, when they had to pay the costs of merantau but gained little or nothing from the venture. The unwillingness of the Balinese to undertake merantau can be seen clearly among the first generation, who had – unlike the Javanese –little knowledge about and a lack of experience in staying in other places."

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[28] Funo, p 225.

[29] Abdoellah, p 122.

For this reason, the Jabar neighborhood has never been entirely stable. Many Javanese transmigrants to Mopugad have shifted between various transmigration settlements. Unlike in the Balinese neighborhoods where there has been less movement and the population remains Balinese, the resale of the landplots in Jabar does not necessarily stay within the Javanese community. Balinese buyers tend to be families crowded out of the Banpres and Umum neighborhoods or those from Banpres seeking greater accessibility. Continually arriving immigrants also buy in the Jabar neighborhood. Though initially Balinese tended to buy on the edges of the Jabar neighborhood, along Jalan Raya and Jalan 10, more recently Balinese are buying further within the neighborhood where they may be entirely surrounded by Javanese neighbors.

The loss of ethnic exclusivity is similar also to the Muslim neighborhood in Cakranegara, wherein can also be found "a few dwelling plots which have a sanga deity on their north-east corner," revealing the presence of Balinese Hindu residents. In Mopugad, as in Cakranegara, the residential infiltration by the dominant ethnic group is both a sign of a prosperous majority group as well as a limit on spatial expansion. The Balinese in Mopugad have indeed prospered, as described in Chapter Four, and the village of Mopugad, surrounded to the border by rice fields, would have to annex the valuable fields to expand its residential land area, which is has not, as of yet, been willing to do.

As stated previously, a negative side effect of the Balinese relocation to Jabar is the introduction of pigs to the Muslim neighborhood. Particularly with the erosion of the Asta Kosali Kosala land organization principles, there is no longer any prescription about where Balinese place their pig sties, and these sties may very well end up immediately beside the house of their Muslim neighbor. Thus, though the inter-mixing with the Balinese Jabar residents may signify physical integration, it does not necessarily signify cultural integration. The inter-communal attitudes to particular ethno-religious identifiers, such as the raising of pigs, underlies this.



Map 5: Balinese and Javanese housing plots in Mopugad.

The spatial patterns and more recent spatial overlap of the ethnic neighborhoods do not necessarily indicate that the communities are engaging in increased cultural sharing. As the Balinese community becomes less spatially bound to Banpres and Umum, the spatial integrity of the Javanese community is altered. Furthermore, where Balinese move into Jabar, the often continue to identify with the banjar and pura pam organizations in Banpres and Umum and thus the inter-communal ties are not necessarily made with immediate neighbors. The reverse is also true. The only neighbors invited by the Javanese to festivities such as the selamatan housewarming are Muslim. While Javanese community administration is left to the religious administration, there is indeed no place for a Balinese member, and the exclusion of the Balinese from neighborhood decision making is propagated.

Culturally Programmed Space

Land use in the two towns of Mopugad is largely residential. Though 88 % of the town is residential, comprised of private homes and the streets which string them together, 12 %of the land was set aside by the transmigration planners for public facilities. The public facilities consisted of a market, two open fields, a mosque, a Hindu temple, a clinic, a school and a mayor's office. The public facilities were strung along the major east-west road, Jalan Raya, and clustered around the central intersection of the town, with Jalan 10. The mosque and the temple were on the eastern side of the river in Banpres, the school was located at the northeast of the central intersection and the clinic, market and another field were located on the western half of Jalan Raya.

Since the 1970s, there has been little change in the position or function of most of these public facilities. What has changed are the spaces that were never truly public to begin with. These spaces, the temple and the mosque, each only cater to a sub-community of Mopugad. Thus, these spaces were not public in that they were never meant to be shared inter-communal spaces. These space, which I call here culturally programmed spaces, were provided in a deliberate act towards demographic diversity. Interesting also, there are no non-religious sub-cultural spaces specifically designated or later created by either the Javanese or the Balinese groups, for arts or performance.

Unlike public space in Mopugad, the culturally programmed spaces have each been altered, either expanded or moved, from the space designated by the government. This may indicate that space is more important in cultural programming or that the government did not properly assign their placement. The subsequent spatial arrangement of these religious spaces has been very important in defining boundaries of sub-communities. The geographical extension or contraction in the spread of the sites of cultural program may only abstractly hint at the spatial community created between the points of space. I do not mean to imply that the area encompassed between these places are engulfed in a cultural community merely because their house falls into an abstract triangulated area. However, these spaces are cultural reference points and the ties between these reference points, however spatially abstracted, are important not only in their cultural message by also in their administration. Therefore the spaces between the cultural nodes experience the effects of sub-cultural negotiation. The continuities and changes in the locations of religious sites I argue do indicate negotiation within as well as between the two groups.

Balinese culturally programmed space

Triad of Village Pura

Each of the ethno-religious groups owns and manages communal land for their religious community. For the Balinese, this is the temple or *pura*. The Balinese community began with the central pura, the location of which was determined by the transmigration officials in conjunction with the Banpres settlers. Though the central pura was not located directly in the center of the village (as it had been in Mopuya where the religious structures were given a central location at the major intersection of the town), it was located on the main east-west axis of Mopugad in the Banpres neighborhood. A few years after the arrival of the Umum transmigrants, the Hindu community build two other temples corresponding to the central temple and completing the temple triad traditional in Bali.



Map 6: Relationship between three main temples in Mopugad, *Kahyangan Tiga*

This temple system of three interrelated temples is called the Kahyangan Tiga.[30] In Bali, this triad is comprised of a central temple of the town, the *pura puseh*, the death temple located beside the graveyard, the *pura dalem*, and the *pura bale agung*, the temple of the council of gods. In Bali, the geographic arrangement of these temples is of crucial importance; the central temple is always located within the center of the town, the pura dalem usually to the south or west of the town and the pura agung usually raised above the town higher on the mountain slope so as to be able to overlook both the town and the rice fields. As Funo describes, this relationship between the three temples is found also in Balinese settlements outside of Bali. In Cakranegara, the central temple, the Pura Meru is also located on the main east-west thoroughfare of the town, though unlike the highly visible pura puseh of Mopugad surrounded by a low wall, the central temple in Cakranegara is "encircled by a high, red burnt-brick masonry wall."[31] In this city in Lombok, Mount Rinjani is substituted for the mountains of Bali as a point of cosmological reference. Thus, the pura dalem is to the west and Pura Sweta, or pura agung, is at the east end of the city. In Mopugad, the cosmological reference points for the temples have been abstracted onto the cardinal directions. Here the northeast is the sacred direction where the pura agung is located quite a ways outside of Mopugad, and the pura dalem is located to the west of the southern neighborhood, Umum.

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[30] Geertz, Kinship, p 14.

The scale of the spatial relationship of the three pura is the same in both Cakranegara and Mopugad, both encompass the entire town. In both places, also, there are residents who do not subscribe to the religious ordering of space but are nonetheless incorporated into the sacred triangle. A major difference between the two sites is that whereas in Mopugad the Hindu residents were aware that there were non-Hindu residents in the town, when Cakranegara was built by the King of Karangasem of Bali "as a symbol of the unity of all the kingdoms of Lombok,"[32] the settlers were entirely Hindu.

The scale of the Kahyangan Tiga is important and the choice between the scale of the entire village and the scale of the Balinese neighborhoods, must have been deliberate. The Balinese community of Mopugad chose to include non-Hindu residents in their temple cosmology. The entirety of Mopugad's residents, including the Javanese residents, live within the nodes of this order. If we accept Geertz's theory that the Balinese see "the temple system as a social matrix,"[33] in Mopugad this social matrix spatially includes the Javanese and other residents.

These ritual centers are still cared for and embellished by the Hindu community. During my visit Pak Suran was working to finish the carvings on the new ceremonial gate at the pura dalem. Though Hoey's article would have readers believe that in Mopugad the Balinese community does not value their village, in fact the Mopugad Hindu community is constantly improving their main village temples. Due to the fact that the pura do not occupy the most central spaces in the town, this effort is not immediately apparent. Perhaps also, Hoey is correct in claiming that more care goes into the semi-private extended-family temple compounds in Mopugad. However, we can not conclude that because the pura in Mopugad are not as centrally located and as visible as those in Werdhi Agung, the Balinese community is not as strong. We may otherwise argue that the displacement of these cultural structures and symbols is a spatial form of shared communal respect in that it does not aggressively dominate the character of Mopugad. However, the secondary religious markers indicate otherwise. Though I don't agree with either argument, we can see from these secondary and tertiary forms of religious expression, community is only less centralized and more variegated in Mopugad.

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[31] Funo, p 214.

[32] Funo, p 214.

[33] Geertz, Kinship, p 12.

Figures 10 & 11: Carving a new gateway at the *pura dalem*.

Secondary religious markers: Guards

The Hindu spatial pattern extends further than just the three main nodes of the temples into a secondary spatial system of town guardians and small shrines. At almost every major roadway into Mopugad, the Hindu community has erected a statuary shrine serving as a guardian for the town to ward off passing spirits. As well as alerting sprits, these small pura are also visual markers to residents and visitors that one is entering a Balinese Hindu place. Though the four main entry points to the town are marked by these statues, the exception is Jalan AMD, a highly trafficked road which leads from the mining and irrigation systems to the north of the town into Jabar. Though many Balinese have since moved to this neighborhood, and particularly along Jalan AMD, a Hindu guardian has not been erected where this road leaves the town.



Map 7: Spread of temple guards and central *tugu* throughout Mopugad.

The central intersection of the town has been recently filled with an impressive and imposing Hindu statue or *tugu* in the center of the intersection transforming it into a round-about. Upon initial arrival to Mopugad, one is immediately confronted by this large statue. The tugu was built in the 1990s, after the border markers, when the Hindu Dharma foundation was able to afford such an expensive public display. Commanding the central space of Mopugad, it marks the navel of the town to which all points lead. The tugu makes a loud visual claim to Mopugad's Balinese identity. Also particularly pronounced in the case of the tugu, the shrines and guards are not built on land owned by the Hindu community. By building in this space, the Hindu community is making an announcement that their cultural program extends past their areas of specific religious jurisdiction into the public spatial ordering of Mopugad.



Figure 12: *Tugu* located in the central intersection of Mopugad.

Religious extended-family networks: Pura Pam

A tertiary system of Hindu cultural program also illustrates another condition of Balinese spatial expansion. Pura pam are extended family temples which demarcate a semi-private space in the order between communal cultural program (the central temples) and the space of the home. Geertz writes of the Pura Pam in Bali as "the temple in the core houseyard, representing their spatial and genealogical point of origin, which forms the center of the system. It provides the conceptual framework, the normative force, and the emotional anchor which prevents Balinese families from disintegrating at each generation and enables them, when they find desirable, to organize into larger and more permanent kingroups."[34] Often, the land on which the Pura Pam is located is owned by a single resident who grants its use to the pura pam of which he or she belongs. The old couple in Banpres, though poor, lend out half of their property for their communal pura pam, as does Pak Oka nearby them.

The Pura Pam in Mopugad are unlike those in Cakranegara, where each pura pam acts as a satellite to the central temples and corresponds to a specific neighborhood where the religious administration of the pura pam and the secular administration of the banjar are one and the same. This spatial disassociation is different from Bali where families live largely together in one banjar.[35] However, though a Pura Pam may be hosted by one of its members, most of the other member do not necessarily have any physical proximity to it, unlike the residentially bound banjar pura pam. The pura pam in Mopugad are spread out to the extent that a family may belong to a pura pam in an entirely different neighborhood or town even. Wayan, who lives in South Mopugad, is a member of a pura pam in the town of Toraut, about thirty minutes drive from Mopugad.

Also different from Cakranegara, the pura pam communities in Mopugad are not conflated with the banjar neighborhoods and the religious and secular community groups have remained administratively distinct. Pura pam membership follows the structure of castes in Bali and members of a shared caste do not necessarily come from the same village in Bali. Thus, though the banjar is a collective of people from the same place in Bali, the pura pam has not had any specific geographic or spatial definition in Mopugad and has been disassociated from the residential neighborhood.

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[34] Geertz, Kinship, 59.

[35] Funo, 228.


Family temple
(pura pam)
Survey
areas
town boundary
To
Tumokang
Baru
To
Mopuya
0
100
250 meters
(Scale: 1 cm = 100 meters)
Balinese
Javanese
N

Map 8: Areas in North and South Mopugad surveyed for *pura pam* family temples.

The separation of secular community, which is spatially defined, and religious community, which is not spatially defined has implications for the nature of inter-communal change in Mopugad. The unrestricted nature of religious program allows it to move freely. Pura Pam, now able to move, have begun to spill over into the Jabar neighborhood. This is not only a spatial change, but also a social one. Most Balinese visit and gather with one another either at the bale banjar or the pura pam. Bringing a place where Balinese can gather in the Jabar neighborhood then transforms the Balinese use of Jabar from merely a bedroom community where their affiliations and activities continue to be tied to Banpres or Umum.

Javanese culturally programmed space

Unlike the spatial ramification of the Balinese cultural program, the Javanese religious community is quite spatially contained. There are no tiers of religious function and the Muslim spatial order is more localized in the Jabar neighborhood and far less ritually symbolic.

The mosque, the main gathering point for the Javanese community, is located at the southern border of Jabar on Jalan Raya. It was moved to its present location on the edge of Jabar from Banpres, where it had been originally located beside the central Balinese temple. The move of the mosque to the Jabar neighborhood signaled a defining moment within the Javanese Muslim community in that it brought their residential neighborhood and their cultural program together. Now, with the market directly across the street from Jabar, the Javanese community is quite spatially insular and many of its residents say they never have cause to into Umum or Banpres.

The spatial clustering is also comprised of three other religious spaces which are all within the Jabar neighborhood. The plot of land to which the mosque was relocated already contained the madrasa, which has never functioned as a school, as one would assume by its name, but rather is used as a gathering place after the mid-day Friday prayer. This property was one of the plots of land designated by the transmigration officials as a public land or culturally programmed land and the community is in the process of saving to build a more permanent fence around the mosque and the madrasa.



Figures 13, 14 & 15: Mosque at right, Muslim cemetery in center, and squatters on cemetery at right.


town boundary
To
Tumokang
Baru
To
Mopuya
0 100 250 meters
(Scale: 1 cm = 100 meters)
Balinese
Javanese
N

Map 9: *Waqf* lands owned by the Muslim community: the mosque, mushola, and cemetery.

The smaller neighborhood mosque, or *mushola*, primarily used by women and children, stands in a standard housing plot within the Jabar neighborhood a few blocks north of the mosque. Three small houses share the property with the mushola. Ibu Rutah, who lives on the mushola property, said that her parents had been granted permission to settle there free of charge when they had been in a position of economic hardship. Ibu Nurliyah, who had just recently moved to Mopugad also lived at the site. She said that when she and her husband moved from Makassar they lived with his parents for a time until being granted the land at the mushola to build their own house. These three households share the mushola well which is used for ablutions before prayer.

The Muslim cemetery, which, like the pura dalem and the pura agung of the Balinese communities, was a religious program space annexed from the northwest border of Mopugad's Jabar neighborhood. Recently, families from a variety of places including Java and Gorontalo have built houses on the edge of the Muslim cemetery just to the west of Jalan AMD. Though these people could be considered squatters, because they have not been asked to leave, residential permission from the Muslim community is assumed. Likewise, the land vacated in the transfer of the mosque which has remained communal Muslim land now hosts two families, one Javanese and one Balinese who have been allowed to settle on this vacated land free of charge.

The cemetery has not filled its designated space, the mushola only sits on a fraction of its plot, and the property of the old mosque is empty, and these spaces are all seen as spaces which could adopt a different program, namely housing. Such a permissive and flexibility communal attitude towards the utilization of space, as illustrated by the conversion of sacred land to housing, demonstrates a different perspective between the Balinese and Muslim communities. Such conditions of spatial leniency recall the development of *kaum* neighborhoods in Java where houses cluster around mosques.

Communal Javanese space can also be seen as responding to a need within the community which does not exist to the same degree in the Balinese community. The Javanese have experienced economic hardship to a greater degree than the Balinese as a consequence of not having a lucrative supplemental income to rice farming. Thus, Javanese are more dependent upon harvesting conditions and the market price of rice. Should a harvest fail or the price of rice plummet, both of which happen often, Javanese are largely affected by these depressions. The religious community, the only administrative community group for the Javanese, has responded to this trend by providing housing for a few of those negatively affected.

Summarizing the differences between Balinese and Javanese culturally programmed religious space we can see that Javanese religious communal jurisdiction is limited to the Jabar neighborhood, whereas the Balinese religious communal jurisdiction may be said to be more dispersed and wide reaching. The community spaces within the Javanese neighborhood have undergone functional redefinition in response to a non-religious community issue. The Balinese space on the other hand, is highly structured and the markers of the temples and guards mark the town in a way similar to hours and minutes mark a day. These spaces have not yet found a reason for restructuring. In effect, both the Balinese community land an the Javanese community land serve to protect their communities: the first, from the spirits and the second, from the economy.

Public Space

So far I have discussed the spaces occupied by the private realm, the neighborhood realm and the culturally programmed realm. When this community was planned however, the only specifically planned spaces were public spaces which were strung along the major east-west axis. Though, as I have noted above, really only the western part of this east-west road between the Jabar and Umum neighborhoods is centrally accessible, however, as no substantial bridge has been built over the town's dividing river. The mayors office and the market were located along Jalan Raya in what is now Southern Mopugad. Along the north side of the street were located an elementary school, a large field the size of a soccer field, and a clinic. These facilities were to be shared by both Balinese and Javanese residents within the Mopugad community. Though the larger Mopugad community has been divided into North and South Mopugad, all of the facilities except for the mayor's office continue to be shared by the residents of both parts of the township.

Of the public spaces the market was the most lively during the time I spent in Mopugad. Bustling with over 100 vendors on Tuesday and Friday mornings between about 5:30 and 8:00 am, this was truly a place where both the Javanese and Balinese came together. Nor was it entirely dominated with women; near half of the vendors were men and men comprised no small minority of the shoppers. Vendors came not only from many people in the village (three of the families I interviewed had a member that sold something at the market), but also from the neighboring towns of Dumoga and from as far as Gorontalo and Manado. There were instances of Balinese and Javanese, or either of these and Minahasan, Mongondow, or Gorontalo, managing joint-businesses and selling together at the market. The people I interviewed said that they were undiscriminating as to which sellers they bought from, except the Javanese were particular and went to halal Muslim vendors only when it came to buying their meats. The market was the space, as Furnivall writes, where the "plural society" with its different and residentially segregated groups, physically and organizationally came together.[36]

Figures 16 & 17: Balinese and Javanese at the market.

During the times when the market wasn't in full operation, stores around the periphery of the market and along the main road in front of the market continued to operate. Also a soup shop and a pool table, where young men, both Balinese and Javanese would gather in the evenings, operated full time at the market. The stores stocked the basics of a neighborhood convenience store and catered to mixed-clientele.

Interestingly though, the residences of those who lived around the periphery of the market, in the building which were erected to serve as stores, were divided spatially with Muslim shophouse families living at the western edge of the market and Balinese shophouse families on the south and east border of the market space, as well as along the main road like Ibu Wati. This pattern, probably quite coincidentally, mimics the general residential patterning of the town, with the Javanese in western Jabar and the Balinese in the neighborhoods to the east and south. The residential use of the market is notably different from traditional Javanese and Balinese towns where the market tends to be both inhabited and largely operated by a single ethnic group. The market in Tabanan, Bali, for example is surrounded by the residences of and run by the collective "Javanese people" who are mostly "piously Islamic," but really are of mixed-ethnicity and come from all over Indonesia.[37] Here, though Balinese are not directly involved in the workings of the market, Geertz writes of this marketplace as having, what he describes as the defining attributes of "highly developed economic structures": two of which are universalism and neutrality.[38]

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[36] Evers, Hans-Dieter and Rudiger Korff, p 4.

The public buildings of the school, the mayor's office and the clinic, were notable because they were designed in the standard official "national" style of the late 1970s taken from traditional Javanese houseforms. Though they do not compare to the high-style Javanese joglo roofs of the school buildings in neighboring Mopuya, the buildings are clearly built by the Indonesian government. Pak Raspan recalled that when Mopugad was divided after his first year as mayor he had the new North Mopugad town office built in the "national style" which employed the Javanese pendopo style front porch as well as a limasan roof. Raspan clarified that the style was purely cosmetic as the rooms inside were not in any particularly Javanese arrangement.



Figures 18 & 19: Public spaces. North Mopugad mayor's office at left, public elementary school at right.

The schools, consisting of long buildings with each room accessed directly from the outside, are also taken from this national style of building. Though only one elementary school was planned, and still stands at the northwest quadrant of the main town intersection, another was built beside the mosque and yet another to the west of town. However, as the town grew, the government has made no accommodation for higher education. Therefore, in 1995 the Hindu community foundation, the Dharma Hindu, built a private middle school which is run by the foundation and staffed with teachers from Mopugad as well as those recruited from the surrounding towns. Though this middle school services both Balinese and the Javanese children, it offers an optional Hindu religious instruction, in Balinese and learning prayers, whereas it does not offer any Muslim or Javanese cultural instruction. Though none of the Javanese families were upset about this –they were thankful that there children had an opportunity to go to school at all – one woman complained that because it was a private school it was more expensive than a public school and that these funds went also into maintenance and upkeep up the school, including the religious pura which marks the space as protected for the Hindu teachers and students. Privately administrated middle schools are not at all uncommon in Java either. As an example, Geertz notes that these serve as the only form of middle school education in Modjokuto, Central Java in the 1950s.[39]

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[37] Geertz, Peddlers, p 26.

[38] Ibid, p 46.

[39] Geertz, Peddlers and Princes, p 9.

A new, unplanned for, public space has also arisen in Mopugad --the rice mill. In the town there are eight rice mills, many of which are owned by the town's wealthy and influential family, Ibu Warsem and Pak Nangah, and the rest owned by other Balinese families. There is no restriction on Javanese or other families owning mills, nor is there any economy of scale barriers or other network privileges. Simply, the Javanese families are not wealthy enough to start their own mills and though certain Balinese families, particularly Ibu Pujung and Ibu Wati, see opening a mill as one of their goals, similar goals were not held by any of the Javanese I spoke with. Though the rice-milling market is still in the process of evolving, Pak Diran, Ibu Suran and Ibu Pujung all noted that the mill owners were the "bosses" of Mopugad and money loans or credits are run through these bosses. Though this credit system usually takes the form of a certain percentage of the rice harvested, as Ibu Suran remarked, these mill owners may also hold many of the property titles to its "employees" houses. Though each person, for the most part, only works their own land, the process of shucking the rice ties one to a partial indentured economic system.

Conclusions

In conclusion we can see that housing, though having changed from the traditional housing, is becoming more alike between the two groups. However, this mutual assimilation, this shared acculturation, is marked by an economic differential between groups as only the Balinese group have the resources to build today in Mopugad.

Another traditional cultural element is changing, being changed, by the activity of both of the cultural groups –the neighborhood. The ethnic integrity of the neighborhood unit, traditional maintained in both Bali and Java, is disintegrating as the Jabar neighborhood becomes ethnically integrated. However, unlike the housing style, which denotes a shared cultural reorientation, the changes in neighborhood structure represent an imbalance between the two groups. The "balance" of the traditional kampung, or ethnic neighborhood has been thrown off by an economic disparity between the two groups.

Culturally programmed space, which is in my limited analysis confined to religious space, has also changed its position/ role in Mopugad since the establishment of the town. Though the cultural spaces of the majority group, the Hindu, continue in their original purpose (as Pak Suran continues to build and carve gateways), the space designated for use by the Muslim community is being used for different purposes, which again may be attributed to the economic restrictions upon the Javanese group.

Finally, though the market is still a shared space between the two groups, other spaces favor more the majority group, the Balinese, who either own or manage many of the spaces used jointly by both groups. These leverage over public institutions is a consequence of a demographic economic imbalance in Mopugad. Though demographic imbalance is common to many sustainable towns and cities in Indonesia, in these other places the balance is shifted the other way so that the minority group has the specific economic role in the village. However, the Javanese community has little economic leverage and so has little control over the public facilities in the town. Though the Javanese realize their economic asset is the land on which they live and farm, particularly as the market value of these lands consistently increases, these assets do them little good as long as they continue to farm and reside in Mopugad.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMUNITY OPTIONS

Negotiating Community

The previous two chapters have illustrated that community in Mopugad is not static, but is rather a process of continual negotiation between community groups and between groups and the individuals which comprise them over issues of space, administration, resources and identity. Like the plates of the earth's crust, ethnic and religious platforms are shifting, elevating or submerging, one another. Whereas amongst the Javanese, religion is currently elevated in the organization of the community, in the Balinese community the relationship between religion and secular aspects of culture are more balanced. It would be false to conclude, however, that the Javanese religious community became stronger *in reaction* to the dominant Balinese presence. Rather, as the mosque was the only community institution which survived within the Javanese sub-culture due to the fact that the community hadn't the critical mass to support more institutions, the Javanese became more dependant on the Muslim community. The Balinese, however, have been able to sustain a variety of community institutions, both secular and religious.

Each community, though, has clearly remained distinct from the other and thus, even with the presence of a few weak ties, is characteristically insular and has maintained a high degree of solidarity. The original "Unity in Diversity" goal of transmigration in Mopugad can be said to only be partially fulfilled. More accurately, diversity has been sustained at the expense of unity. Neither the Balinese nor the Javanese community succumbed to assimilation or acculturation, but neither have they cooperated towards any activities of the scale just outside of their sub-community, fostering inter-communal ties necessary for shared communalism. The current trajectory of Mopugad indicates a Balinese gentrification of the Jabar neighborhood as well as increasing Balinese control over public institutions. Thus, the diversity which has been sustained through the thirty years of the first generation may be quickly eroded. It is up to the second generation to set a more sustainable cultural pattern for Mopugad.

In conclusion then, I switch from my role as a scholar to that of a planner, or more accurately, a policy advisor. I will first outline some of the options facing the residents of Mopugad regarding planning toward desired cultural-demographic characteristic of their town. The residents may decide that diversity is not a priority for the community and allow the consequences of the current trajectory to unfold, likely resulting in an almost exclusively Balinese Mopugad. Conversely, they may create affirmative action to protect the Javanese enclave, perhaps at the expense of Balinese economic mobility, and enhance the capacity of sub-communal associations. Finally, should the residents of Mopugad decide that a more pluralist governance is in their best interest, they will have to work to sustain it through localizing economic interdependence. Each of these options will require different types of incentives to mobilize members of both communities. An economic and environmental crisis which is specifically threatening Mopugad, provides more than a sufficient imperative around which to harness joint involvement and I will give some examples of actions which could be taken towards this goal.

Javanese sub-culture dissolved

One situation would be if the Javanese community was dissolved. The Javanese have not expressed discrimination at the hands of the Balinese. However, the Javanese are at an economic disadvantage as they have not become successful through supplemental income generation. Such an imbalance has in the town's recent history caused many Javanese to sell their land to Balinese and to move out. However, this has been counterbalanced with the continual arrival of Javanese to Mopugad. Also, many of the Javanese residents remaining in Mopugad expressed their determination to stay, particularly since the land values are now so high. These high land prices, though, may likewise encourage them to sell should an opportunity arise or the family fall into a situation of economic crisis.

This may be an unlikely occurrence as many of the second generation Javanese firmly consider Mopugad their home and many neither have visited Java in their lives nor speak Javanese which would cast them as outsiders in Java. As we have seen, extensive transmigration networks of Javanese throughout Sulawesi and throughout Indonesia, offer the possibility of movement between these various agricultural areas. If transmigrants, Javanese or otherwise, continue to migrate within the network of the transmigration community which provides its own membership and an identity which is linked more loosely to ethnic identity, these networks will be reinforced, relegating ethnicity a secondary community within these networks.

Policies which would encourage the Balinese homogenization of Mopugad would include the proliferation of shared "public" institutions administered by the Balinese Hindu Foundation, like the middle school. This is not an unlikely case as decentralization has resulted in a huge funding cut to public employees in rural areas such as Mopugad where the mayors are aimless due to lack of a budget and the schools and health services, and the salaries of their employees, are suffering. However, as the head of the Balinese Hindu Foundation is a (wealthy) member of parliament, it is not unlikely that the budget of the foundation will be able to survive and grow. Enhancing the networks between all transmigrants, though the installation of the telephone, the creation of a travel agent in Mopugad, or the production of a news pamphlet covering the socio-economics of transmigration sites throughout the region would be some such activities towards enhancing networks while also providing access to information.

Such an increased accessibility of information which may lead to increased mobility of Javanese out of Mopugad, would likely not also result in more Javanese moving into Jabar, merely because they must to compete with the many well-off Balinese over land prices. Somewhat ironically then, the agency for increased mobility may result in a homogenous Balinese Mopugad. Though perhaps the overall welfare of each individual family and its opportunities should not be subject to demographics, it is important here to remember that the weak ties offered by proximity would also disappear. The fewer sub-cultures represented, the fewer the voices of negotiation within the new Mopugad community. The ideas and resources available to tackle such large issues as the impending mining problem would be minimized, allowing for an easier consensus, though lacking many possible tools and contacts for implementation.

Javanese preservation

Alternately, the towns of Mopugad, particularly North Mopugad, could adapt policy to deliberately sustain the Javanese community through protection mechanisms. Zoning could be established so that the Jabar neighborhood maintains its Muslim Javanese demographic and is identified as a specifically ethnic neighborhood. Restrictions upon Balinese and others would allow the Javanese affordable housing and land, and would relieve the sensitivities towards neighbors with pigs.

The community could be administered more clearly and effectively through an association with officers and meetings, much like the *dongan samarga* or "clan associations" of the Batak in Medan. Amongst the Batak, these associations institutionalize mutual aid and welfare. Bruner notes that many have also established scholarships or revolving loan funds in addition to the basic function of providing for each other in times misfortune as well as financing major private events such as weddings, funerals, house constructions or births.[1] Such an institution could also be responsible for maintaining some of the traditions from the places of origin in Java.

Potential inter-communal projects could redress specific Javanese concerns. The Hindu foundation which runs the school may adopt a parent-teacher association with a committee to explicitly address the values of non-Hindu students at the school. Another project could be fashioned between the mayors and neighborhood representatives to address the issue of potential overcrowding in Mopugad and its impact on land use. Jointly, Balinese, Javanese and others could address the residential encroachment on Muslim communally owned land, devise strategies for communal land as well as agricultural land in the long run, and designate alternate spaces or restrict spaces to those seeking residential space. The poorer residents of Mopugad would be accounted by the larger community.

This option, which I call the preservation option, would not only maintain ethnic solidarity, but enhance and essentialize it. It could be extended to encourage the integrity of "tradition" amongst the Javanese, which would also likely affect the expression of tradition amongst the Balinese. Such a policy towards ethnic enclaving would set the conditions for tourism, which was occasionally mentioned by members of the community as a potential economic avenue for Mopugad, and which favors destinations –the spatial definition of culture. The conditions for tourism, of course, would need to include the standard supplements of traditional architectures, foods, arts, and souvenirs.

As with the often simplistic delineations which go into the establishment of demographic quotas or sectarian parties, inherent is such preservation policies is an argument that difference can be measured. Contrarily, many of my interviewees responded differently about their relations or their perceptions of difference from the other cultural groups of the town. Boundaries placed on the units of difference do not allow much room for sub-cultural expression *within* the designated groups. Thus, such exclusionary policy would not favor extra-ethnic activities such as inter-marriage or Javanese Christians or the in-migration of Muslims from other parts of Indonesia. Though this approach would allow the Javanese to retain a presence in Mopugad, and would potentially allow for income-generating tourism, this cultural conservatism which strongly demarcates the boundaries of sub-communities may also lead to inter-communal competition over resources.

Conditions for Shared Communalism

A third approach towards a deliberation of demographic determination in Mopugad is shared communalism. Bearing close resemblance to Wellman's liberated community as described in Chapter One, this partially integrated community is formed out of weak ties strung between sub-communities. Primary ties may still be activated within each ethnic or religious group, ensuring both economic and cultural security, and indeed this intermediate social group is an important element of the shared communalism. The multiplication of linkages with other groups, however, is vital to the partially integrated community and saves it from fates like that of

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[1] Bruner, p 130.

Boston's West End community. Furthermore, the structure of shared communalism operates at a higher order than the sub-community or the neighborhood.

Shared communalism is spatially unbound and does not require the maintenance of ethnic residential clustering within Mopugad nor does it call for residential integration. Though sub-communities of Javanese or Balinese may decide to designate certain streets or blocks to be inhabited only by specific groups, unlike in the Javanese preservation option, it is important in shared communalism that *the entire* Javanese or Balinese community does not become residentially exclusive.

A key component of shared communalism, however, involves its circumstantial component. Here, weak ties between members of both communities could be reframed as imperative conditional ties. These ties are then not only maintained merely for the sake of maintaining weak ties, but are formed around specific circumstances and are retained only for the purpose of project completion. The projects would then play host to designated community ambassadors, much like the inter-religious guardian projects for holy days in Manado.

There are examples of weak ties in Mopugad which offer seeds for shared communalism. The market is one location of shared activity which hosts many weak ties between groups. As we have seen, marketplaces in large towns and cities in Indonesia serve to tie in minority communities allowing ethnic minorities market specialization. The market in Mopugad, however, is notably not dominated by any single group. It is structured so that neither group is gaining leverage over the other simply as a result of its functioning. However, the marketplace of which we speak is not actually the economic market of the town. Economic exchange is largely managed through the mill owners who ship rice directly to Manado and the other major export, pigs. Therefore, unless policies of local import-substitution are enforce on Mopugad so that the larger economic networks are altered, the weak ties of the marketplace will remain weak due to lack of imperative. Any shared communalism which results from the ties made a the market would be long-term, low-yielding ties which can probably not counteract the trajectory of the real estate market towards erosion of the Javanese community.

For a structure of shared communalism to take hold quickly enough to become an administrative body representative of Mopugad, the threshold of imperative must be must high. I would argue that only a crisis the order of mutual economic depression, violence, or an external threat could instigate shared communalism between the Balinese and Javanese in Mopugad. Ironically, then, I propose that conflict is necessary to mobilize communities to inter-dependence.

External threat: Crisis or Opportunity?

Actually, Mopugad is facing a severe crisis which affects both groups alike. The recent discovery of gold in the protected mountains to the north of Mopugad, or more accurately, the recent *deregularization* of gold mining in the mountains to the north of Mopugad, poses a huge threat to the rice-farming community of Mopugad. Initially, the informal mining resulted in inter-communal conflict between 1998 and 2000, largely between Minahasan and Mongondow people from outside of Mopugad. After a few killings, the conflict was resolved, according to my interviews, by a re-rationing of water so that more miners could access the water necessary to run the gold-processing *tromols* located conveniently near the mining sites. The siphoning of water to the miners, however, has resulted in a decreased allocation of water to the rice farmers in the valley below, the nearest of which are the people of Mopugad, who in Javanese and

Balinese paddy fashion use wet-farming techniques that requires flooding the rice fields. Since the mining compromise, Mopugad must ration the water from the mountains with Mopuya to its east and Tomokangbaru to its west. Whereas farming was previously a year-round occupation, the lack of water means that farming has been reduced to only a half-year, part-time occupation, causing the farmers to suffer because of the mining activity.

Besides the immediate economic threat, which targets the main livelihood of both groups and could entirely change the feasibility of an agricultural Mopugad, the environmental consequences are quite frightening. The processes which are used to separate the gold from the rock involve highly toxic chemicals such as mercury and cyanide which are freely entering the rivers which run through the villages of Dumoga and likely percolating into the ground water.[2] The horrific health consequences such chemicals have on humans as well as fish and other livestock has been recently illustrated by the Buyat Bay–Newmont mining scandal also in Northern Sulawesi. Cancerous tumors, central nervous system failure and severe birth defects are only a few of the symptoms experienced by the unfortunate victims of the fishing community located where the river, which carried the mining runoff, entered into the sea. Similarly, the improper disposal of these chemicals fatally threatens the health of the entire resident population of Mopugad, farmers, miners, women, children, carpenters and shopkeepers alike. Other negative consequences of gold mining, as outlined by Aspinall in his report on small-scale mining in Indonesia, include the destruction of the living environment, particularly deforestation, the destruction of riverbanks, the pollution of water, sedimentation resulting in river blockage or areas of quicksands, common mine accidents, anarchy and social unrest.[3]

This crisis can also be seen as a potential opportunity and the imperative condition necessary to foster shared communalism. The environmental and agricultural affects of mining are problems that the local community could best tackle in solidarity and a concerted effort would require ties to be woven across the two communities. Mining is an opportunity, a circumstance, for a partially integrated community. Another opportunity offered by the frighteningly serious threat of mining, is that by using it as a platform on which to stage mutual co-dependence, the project can likely bypass the sensitivities evoked with deliberation over demographic SARA policies.

Finally, such inter-communal collaboration could allow for redress of political decentralization. Where faltering budgets and lack of law enforcement characterize the post-Suharto period in Dumoga, a concerted challenge to policy fashioned to favor miners could reflect strongly on local governance structures and create a model of local governance which could be replicated. So as not to suffer the frustrations of financial and political recourse as experienced by the Buyat community, pre-emptive and proactive measures strengthen the fabric of localized governance. The opportunity for this is already presented –budgetless mayor are aimless and searching for new projects. Perhaps more importantly, one of these mayors is already involved in the situation, himself a miner.

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[2] According to a study done in 1999 by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, about 10% of mercury used in such a process in Kalimantan was lost in the river. The same study also notes the sedimentation of rivers from the mud byproduct of gold extraction. Manaf, p 7.

[3] Aspinall, 15.

Potential project: restricting mining activities

Policies which would restrict mining activities in the mountains bordering Mopugad to the north could be referred to as following the "economy lost" model, parallel to Wellman's "community lost" from Chapter One. Viewing the restriction of mining as "economy lost" would very likely be the attitude of the mayor of North Mopugad, also a miner who relies upon mining as his primary source of income, and making anti-mining policy less likely. The enforcement required to undertake such an action would at the very least have to be taken on by a level of administration with a police force larger than that based at the *kecamatan* level in neighboring Mopuya. Successful cases of halting illegal gold mining haven't occurred since the strong-army, Suharto days. One such instance occurred in 1993 in a "protected area" of Java much like the theoretically protected forests of Dumoga-Bone National Park, by offering extension programs to the miners jointly between local government and NGOs.[4] However, these extension programs were apparently not entirely successful as 4,000 persistent miners were physically removed from the park in 1994 and in 1995 the 350 tunnels of still more persistent miners were blown-up jointly by the government and a state-owned mining operation. According to t the World Bank, "Sporadic illegal mining attempts since then have been strongly resisted," and the park management has continued to be engaged in promoting income-generating activities as well as environmental awareness campaigns amongst the community.[5]

Mining in Dumoga has a similar history. In the 1990s the national forest surrounding Mopugad, the Dumoga Bone National Park, or more officially the Bogani Nani Wartabone National Park, was one of the best protected in terms of enforcement and abidance. The World Bank in 1999 actually considered it a model protected area.[6] This 300,000 hectare park, established in 1984, was developed together with the Kosinggolan and Toraut irrigation projects, the latter of which taps the watershed of the Dumoga River and has allowed for the enhancement of agricultural output for the Dumoga Valley, including the residents of Mopugad. However, by the early 1990s, after the collapse of the local clove and coconut industries due to license redistribution in Jakarta, small-scale gold miners, both independent and organized, were present in the park. In 1994, "a provincial-level combined police and army operation" evicted 300 gold miners from the park.[7] The collapse of Suharto's government has also seen a decline in the strong-arming of the government and sweeps of this scale are not often seen today in Indonesia.

The World Bank report found that "there is no suggestion that any of the transmigrants are involved in illegal mining, agricultural encroachment, or logging, these are presumably being carried out by the area's original population or by other local migrant groups."[8] In 1999, this may have been true, though today Javanese and a very few Balinese in Mopugad are dabbling in mining since irrigation has been restricted. Preventing mining, or even restricting it, though would have a most direct negative affect on the primarily Mongondow and Minahasan people who are engaged in mining because they do not have agricultural land and have families who live far from the mines. Though it would benefit the people of Mopugad, both Balinese and Javanese, particularly in the short-term, it may have more complicated negative effects if resentment on the part of the Mongondow and Minahasan lead to threats or violent repercussion.

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[4] Wells, et all. Indonesia's Integrated Conservation and Development Projects. 1999. World Bank Report.

[5] Ibid, p 79.

[6] Ibid, p 96.

[7] Ibid, p 97.

[8] Ibid.

Such a conflict is presently being enacted in Werdhi Agung, where local Mongondow communities are demanding reparations from land expropriated by the government in the 1960s for Werdhi Agung. Though most of the reparation cases are being processed through local courts, the slow speed of these claims has resulted in the poisoning of Balinese rice fields by frustrated Mongondow, at least according to the Balinese mayor of Werdhi Agung. Though the restriction of mining would on the whole be in the best interest of the rice-farming Balinese and Javanese, in the current situation of district-wide economic hardship, a lack of appropriate recourse for compensation or reparations may lead to a volatile situation, and one which the Balinese and Javanese would each like to avoid.

Potential project: Specialize in mining

A quite opposite approach but still a viable possibility would be to nurture a mining population. Already 20 Javanese men from Mopugad, accounting for about twenty percent of Javanese families, are involved in mining either as a primary occupation or as a source of supplemental income. Though I only identified two Balinese men engaged in mining, these two are enough to signify that mining is not restricted to members of the Javanese community in Mopugad. Further, the two men are significant members of the Balinese community, as one is the mayor of North Mopugad and the other the owner of the only gold processing *tromol* in Mopugad.

Carving a niche in small-scale mining could result in Mopugad becoming a specialized location much in the way that François Ruf describes Balinese transmigrants in Kasimbar, Central Sulawesi. The Balinese transmigrants in Kasimbar, following the lucrative lead of the Bugis, took the risk of investing in cocoa and abandoning rice. Ruf describes the economic situation and the cultural implications of this decision:

> "The Balinese have strong community ties and like to live around the village temple. This did not hold them back economically. On the contrary, Balinese culture and social organization, although less well adapted to migration than those of the Bugis, can clearly be highly successful. The Hindu temple and the Bugis mosque have similar functions, service to maintain social cohesion in an otherwise adventurous and migratory lifestyle. However, this form of social control has until now had more influence on the investments in land made by the Balinese. The *krismon* [economic crisis of 1997/98] seems to have changed that, at least in Kasimbar."[9]

The Balinese who learned about cocoa farming from a national company then transformed Kasimbar into a "cocoa-information center for thousands of rice-growing Balinese settled on transmigration schemes."[10] Cocoa farming also changed the characteristics of the town as now in front of each household is an ever expanding concrete surface for drying cocoa and motorcycles and cars (as well as frequent trips to Bali), and investment in housing, with only roughly 4% of income going towards improvements upon the house pura.[11] Ruf, Yoddang and Waris Ardhy describe what they see as a high level of organization and participation amongst the cocoa farmers as being perfect conditions for environmentally-conscious land management towards such tasks as maintaining belts of forest between the cocoa farms. In Kasimbar, concerted economic specialization has offered the community leverage in planning for their future.

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[9] Ruf, p 192.
[10] Ibid, p 180.
[11] Ibid, p 176.

Mopugad could tap into mining in a similar way. Even if the residents of Mopugad were not themselves directly engaged in mining, they may still benefit from the proximity of mining activity. Most people going to the mines in the mountains which define the northern border of the valley must pass through Mopugad to get there. These passers-through primarily use Jalan AMD or the other main north-south road which runs through the Jabar neighborhood. Mopugad residents could take advantage of their key location along these corridors and enhance the roads and develop shops and services along them that would cater to miners passing through.

Another option to support the small-scale mining industry could be to establish a miners union or cooperative in Mopugad, where miners could access information about mining and initiate inter-communal working relationships with other miners. In addition to technical and legal support, this cooperative may also offer credit or banking services or financial advice and relevant accounting skills for miners to self-assess long-term cost-benefit relationships of mining and various other investments or gambling ventures. Such a cooperative may also offer information about alternatives to the way that rice milling has been done in Mopugad, where farmers have become increasingly indebted to the "boss" of the rice mills.

Though the cooperative could work with unaffiliated miners so as they may continue to operate within the status (and freedoms) of illegal mining, or PETI (pertambangan tanpa izin), the national Ministry of Mines and Energy has expressed interest in working with official locally permitted village unit cooperatives, or KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa). In 1999, the ministry had permitted 24 specifically gold mining KUD ranging from one with thirty *tromol* or amalgamation processor units to the smallest one with 410 members sharing four tromol.[12] At that time, the ministry provided funding to help these cooperatives undertake environmental impact assessments as well as undertake feasibility studies, sampling, and training for the miners.[13] The explicit goals of the Ministry in supporting these community cooperatives were to curb the "increasing environmental problem, unhealthy competition among the miners and loss of national income from tax of fees."[14] Once officially incorporated, this mining cooperative could request a mentoring partnership with a larger mining company which more extensive resources.

Since decentralization, governments at the provincial and regency level have been in the process of drafting small-scale mining legislation.[15] Though relatively blind navigation of such yet unproved policies is frightening to economic actors such as small-scale miners, Mopugad could risk incorporation under these new structures of government and become a pioneer in helping to decipher local mining legislation. Though the government Ministry does not have a presence in Mopugad at this time, such presence may be negotiated through public pressure on someone such as the previous Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources and current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who as Minister stated that "small scale mining, or illegal mining, was going to be his first priority to solve."[16]

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[12] Manaf, p 4.
[13] Ibid, p 3.
[14] Ibid, p 2.
[15] Aspinall, p 7.
[16] Aspinall, p 28.

Policy Potential: Health and the Environment

Somewhere between the direct "economy lost" and "economy saved" options towards mining, is an approach where mining becomes one component of a more long-term economic and environmental sustainability project, which would involve the investment in learning more about the agro-mineral forecast for a town profile like that of Mopugad. Such a project could begin with the mayors or mayoral committees undertaking outreach within the kebupaten or province to see which economic sectors are forecasted to be important to the area or at a national or global market. Such forecasting should then be paired with enhanced knowledge of the immediate environment. Such environmental education programs could be run through a series of presentations from relatively local park rangers, some of the highly active environmental NGOs primarily based in Manado, as well as researchers from the universities in Kotamobagu, Gorontalo and Manado.

The local clinic which coordinates with the mayors' wives to runs monthly child health clinics, could also test for levels of mercury in children's hair and blood and possibly partner with universities to run testing for potential effects of cyanide or other mining byproducts. A community health check could also be expanded to the larger Mopugad community and include miners from outside the community which pass through the town. The local middle school could incorporate a water testing unit into their science and nature curriculum so that along with measuring pH-levels, students can measure directly for certain pollutants in their local water sources.

The exposure to representatives of higher education may encourage community members to invest in a Mopugad higher education scholarship program which would allow the community to send students to specifically study agriculture, geology or environmental studies and engineering. Cooperative community collections, perhaps coordinated by the Hindu Dharma Foundation in collaboration with the Muslim waqf and Christian churches, could fund students each year or every few years with the stipulation that the student then return to Mopugad during the summers and for a period after graduating to engage in specialized activities such as managing a cooperative, a small mining company, a rice mill or environmental testing programs. If applied to the community preservation model described above, the program may also include a clause for rotation of the scholarship between Balinese and non-Balinese residents. Though this program would involve a relatively high investment, such a program would likely reassure a longer and healthier future for Mopugad.

Planning and Choices

The policy directives above, both towards demographic control and toward the shared threat of mining, are all possibilities that will form different types of relationships amongst the residents of Mopugad as well as with those outside of the town. Project failures may also create deeper rifts in relationships. All of these options, from the Javanese entirely vacating Mopugad, to joint efforts towards the achievement of higher education, involve many choices not only on the part of communities and their resources, but also the perceptions and preferences of individuals. Many of these actions will be directly dependant upon the perceptions of political and, more importantly, fiscal decentralization. They will also depend upon various and delicate alignments of inter-cultural interaction versus intra-communal interaction and the strength of ethnic or religious nets versus the strength of place.

The situation in which Mopugad finds itself is illustrative of the many struggles happening across Indonesia, where decentralization is causing reassessment of identity after emergence from the Suharto era. Local structures of identity, each undergoing unique assessment, I would argue, could only benefit through practicing identity through self-governance and new types of projects.

I have attempted to offer a few frameworks and corresponding projects along which the community may choose to align itself. Through looking at aspects of private and intra-communal cultural dynamics, even an outsider can make more informed suggestions. For example, initial meetings toward any of these goals will likely take place within the sub-communities, likely at a house for the Javanese and at a *tempat banjar* for the Balinese. Each community will also assess its assets and what it might be willing to risk. For inter-communal action to take place, however, individuals need to feel that their sub-community and its institutions are insufficient for certain circumstances and realize that other intermediary groups may be more beneficial. Though I see the mining crisis as a deciding moment where communal action is for the first time necessary and produces the circumstance under which concepts of community are likely to be revised, this is neither an inevitability nor should it be forced.

The social engineering which goes into much development planning often neglects trends towards cultural conservatism. Here, a reiteration of Peter Marris proves insightful:

> "The impulse to defend the predictability of life is a fundamental and universal principle of human psychology. Conservatism, in this sense, is [part] of our ability to survive . . . for without continuity we cannot interpret what events mean to us, nor explore new kinds of experience with confidence . . . Resistance to change is, then, as fundamental an aspect of learning as revision, and adaptability comes as much from our ability to protect the assumptions of experience, as from our willingness to reconsider them."[17]

The "connections" and "linkages" often identified by planners are often quite abstract and require mental piecing together which assumes shared ways of thinking. Speaking about the misperception of development as the result of economic policies, Geertz wrote, "What looks like a quantum jump from a specifically economic point of view is, from a generally social one, merely the final expression in economic terms of a process which has been building up gradually over an extended period of time."[18] Likewise, policies other than economic policy, will not take hold if the social conditions are not set for them. The intricacies of strong and weak ties, and the position in cultural flux of the actors are key to the implementation of policy.

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[17] Marris, p 2-4.

Finally, I would like to conclude with a broader message about the often misunderstood nature of "ethnic conflicts" or the seeming solipsistic "self-segregation" of ethnic neighborhoods. Both of these are terms of scoffed at by outsiders as the results of political opportunism and narrow minded communal sentiments. However, both of these are forums for the expression of community.

This negotiation happens at all levels of governance and administration and every inhabited place is a space of negotiation. To use the political rhetoric of today, these are all spaces for the "practicing of democracy" where identity and value alignment is dynamic and constantly redefined. Indeed we need conflict in our communities to expand and distill the shared parameters meaning and understanding. We need it to make us more able to understand experience, share, feel, and ironically, prioritize peace. As Fischer suggested, we need criminals for there to be artists.[19] Though unity in diversity seems an impossible ideal, each of us lives it at each moment in a constant reworking of our identity in relation to our communities.

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[18] Geertz, Peddlers and Princes, p 2.

[19] Fischer, p 1337-1338.

FAMILY:
Ibu Pujung (Balinese)
Daughter Wayan (24)
Wayan's small children

SOCIAL:
Moved to Mopugad in 1979, following older sibling who had participated in Banpres.
Sold soy, now has 8 ha of fields, 2 public autos (Mngndw drivers), pigs, birds, dogs.
Wants to sell 1 auto (not enough passengers)
Tumor over right eye -scan Manado hospital
Afraid of operation
Member of family shrine "Pandai Besi" (iron workers guild) in Banpres
Member Regu 2 – Gunung Sari community
Had a small shop beside house for 6 years, closed the shop two years ago

HOUSING:
Moved from Banpres where it was hard (build own house unlike Jabar or Umum)
Bought ½ quarter-acre plot in 1993 from Javanese family who moved to Palu, Sulteng
Built house and shrine in 1996
Cost, 45 million Rp for house, 21 mill for shrine and 3 mill for small shrine, 20 mill for house in back (other family lives there) Total = 70 million rupiah
Balinese carpenters, 25,000 Rp a day and 50,000 Rp a day for head carpenter
Balinese style with carved stone
Has carvings atop roof (with date)
Will carve pillars and wall panels when have money (cost 60,000 Rp/ day for carver)
Neighbor/brother across street built Spanish style house in 2003, he said it was contemporary. Mrs. Pujung said Bali style will never go out of style.
Each said their style was most expensive.







FAMILY:
Pak Wayan Tiase (Balinese)
Wife
Baby

SOCIAL:
Lives on quarter-acre which he shares with parents and younger brother and his family
Wayan went to high school in Kotamobagu, Academy in Bitung and since 1996 has worked on large fishing ships.
Knows English and had traveled extensively
3 month break and then return to Bali company
Family to Bali every 2 years (still family there)
Bali family once to Mopugad
Balinese culture mustn't die
His baby is learning Balinese
Father and brother making new house
Father usually doesn't work, mother works in the fields, wife runs the small shop

HOUSING:
His house/ shopfront built in 2002
-good location and occupation for wife
His parents' house is in center of plot, Javanese house bought from Sundanese family in 1979
Building new house at NW corner of plot for younger brother after photo his father took of a house in Gianyar, near Denpasar, Bali.
Bali adat house specialist laid-out locations
(not with body measurements)
Partial Spanish style because popular in Bali
After brother's house will remake parents and then his into Balinese style.
Already have full frontal Bali compound wall with two gates (one for visitors, one for cars)
Wayan building bamboo fence around his flower garden.

FAMILY:
I Gusti Gede Bawan (Balinese)
Wife, 2 daughters

SOCIAL:
Moved to Mopugad in 1983 with family and 6 brothers who live just north up the street.
Just recovered from being ill.
Follows his parents' banjar.
Children speak Balinese.
Have pigs, birds, fish pond, no fields.
Children's tuition is expensive
He works at clinic in Mopuya
Wife sells sweets at the market
Socialize with family or wife's family (near statue at intersection)
Respectful of Javanese, no Javanese friends



HOUSING:
Bought ¼ quarter-acre from Javanese who still owns ¼ kintal on corner for 6.5 million Rp 2002
Built house with his brothers starting in 2003
35 days to build the floor
Balinese style too expensive, though his house follows Trimandala/ cosmological layout relationship between gate, house and shrine.
Shrine is higher than house.
Follows some Balinese customs – children to west, old people to north, kitchen to south
Described as suku "los" -national style
Used cheap wood for house and fine wood for shrine which carved himself.
He wants to have stone carved on shrine but not enough money.
Balinese door with handle bought in Bali.
He says in Regu there is another Balinese door.
No furniture in receiving room, bamboo xylophone.
He is weaving a bamboo ceiling for front room (like those of family room and bedrooms)
Presently doves drop into receiving room.
Also made a windsack which flies above
WC and well are in kitchen









FAMILY: Suriyani (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Moved to MopSel from Bali 1998 w/husband
Liked to watch television
New baby and a 5 year old girl named Desi
Missed her parents and prefered living there with them in Bangli, Bali
Husband given one of the parent's sawah

HOUSING:
House located after the banjar gathering place
Yet before the first lorong to south
Resembled a shop or Umum original house
But stood alone
Husband had built the house, w parents help
Not in Balinese style (according to her)
She said it was Mongondow style
Wide façade slopes down towards back
Wooden boards and sink roof
Shop/took takes up south half of façade
Living room to north half of façade
Kitchen behind
Inlaws house northeast behind pura temples
Husband also woodworker, built finely carved cabinet where TV was placed.







FAMILY:

Nyoman Jati (Balinese)
wife Ketut, 2 kids
Father, Wayan Parse

SOCIAL:

Husband/wife worked in sawah
Tried to find work in Manado
Want industry in Mopugad
Both had high school degrees
Nyoman studied computers
Father owned 3 dogs, original Banpres
7 hectare sawah, three on one side and 4 on the other, so that the rotation of irrigation doesn't interrupt his harvest.
Didn't mind living in javanese community.
Pig farm behind house with 10 pigs, said wasn't problem in the javanese neighborhood.

HOUSING:

Father had sold his house in the Banpres from 30 years ago. Now lived with son
Wayan said modern house, 5 years old.
Wife lived nearby to care for other grandkids
Nyoman bought ¼ kintal for 2 million Rp 5 years ago with Balinese friend (to south) total 4 mill Rp
Balinese made drawings for new house In Spanish Style
Mongondow from Ibolian constructed (initially said carpenters were Javanese)
Son said layout still was traditional Balinese, with the pura at the north east corner, (though pigs were even further to the east), behind which the property slopes down into a gulley
Main house consisted of central receiving room and three small bedrooms branching off of it.
Kitchen to east of main house
Front porch had columns but not intricately carved, Nyoman said would have been more expensive.
Spanish style because of the columns in front.
Tiled brick construction as are the modern houses which are called Spanish style here.




50m
Daughter's House
Pura
Pigs
Workspace
Bed
Bed
Bed
Well
WC
Chickens
Kitchen
Store

FAMILY: I Gusti Patra (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Teaches the bamboo xylophone
Runs small shop across street
Family speaks Balinese
Raise chickens and pigs

HOUSE:
Said built house right when they arrived
Colorful (pre-school looking) house at The northernmost Jalan 10
Across the street from a big pura pam on Jabar

Said it wasn't balinese style
three separate parts; he lived in center kids in northernmost/ newest house.
Kitchen and other sleeping rooms also to south
Entry gate at the western part of the plot.
Huge, long kitchen for daughter who taught cooking
Colorful "warung" (small shop) across street
Was closed for Muslim holiday/ national holiday.



FAMILY:	I Gusti Nyoman Parsa (Balinese)
SOCIAL:	Was builder as well as old regu team leader Had stroke Was Hindu cultural leader/ head of Parisada Hindu Dharma before Nangah Two sons, one married Javanese one Minahasa (both wives converted Hindu and speak Bali) Sons' families live on same kintal Sons both teachers, one Mopuya middle school one Mopugad middle school
HOUSE:	Three houses, the father at the most southernly part made of wood Sons houses to north, both made of brick.


Son's house
50M
Living
Store
Kitchen
Son's house
Pura
Parents House
Car



FAMILY: Ibu Kota (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Banpres trans with Regu 4 from
Denpasar
Received land during Banpres,
their land by river least desireable for
padi Ibu 75 and husband 80
(he was at least 14 during Japanese
occupation) Follow pura pam and
banjar
Said 5 Regus in Banpres
and 3 in Umum and Jabar (each like 1
regu) Sold a part of kintal to rice mill
Grew kankung
Grew coffee from Bali named Unggul
Before also grew choclate
100 sacks of SuperWin rice at mill
which they owe to mill boss from 5
million loan
harvested by daughter and her husband
Daughter and husband each have
motorbike
Ibu to Bali once since moving, and the
father never.
Liked Mopugad more, in Denpasar they
were poor.
Neither had any schooling
One daughter, Leli, married after
Elementary school to Javanese man
trans to Gorontalo
Her husband, Tutu, changed name to
balinese Wayan Sedana and converted
to Hindu Leli (now 35) and family
(eldest about 20) live with Kota.



HOUSING:
Live on southern perimeter road
Sold their house kintal (across the street)
to the petrol man and moved to "padi"
kintal.
Balinese looking house
Paid 4 million to build the house 15
years ago
First built pura for 9 million (about 25
million today), then house
Last year, new house to east for
grandkids for 5 million
Kitchen at back made out of wood w
colorful paintings of balinese dancers on
windows.





FAMILY: Merte (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Came with Umum from Klungkung,Bali
Born in 1948 and married in 1974
Moved with parents and wife.
Four kids, the first three girls
Eldest girl married a Javanese, became
Muslim moved Tumokang, kid speaks
Indonesia, Bali + Jawa
One married Balinese lives to west
of Mopugad, another works in Manado
and lives in Bali community
Can switch banjar, but not pura pam
Can only follow one of each
Pura Pam religious/ extended family
community. Purapam gather more often
than once a month
His Pura Pam in North in cluster of PPs
His Pura Pam 22 fams, from all overBali
Balinese often busy making ceremonies
Belonged to one of 9 banjars in town
2 banjar for umum/ same boat in 1976
Banjar included 2 java familiese, who
returned to Java and in banjar replaced
by people who bought their land.
Banjar more geo/community
Listed the 9 banjar in Mopugad
Officially dach quarter of town one RK
RK had 4 - 6 RT (every 2 streets)
Waiting for irrigation rotation.
His wife was in the fields.
Visits Balinese friends in Jabar
Minahasan friends outside town
invited him to gold mine but he didn't.
His mother, Ibu Mekar, lives at house.
She likes Mop., doesn't want return Bali
15 Mopugad people went to Bali for
ngaben funeral of father 5 years ago.

HOUSING:
Had been given land and 5x6m house
House of wooden planks and sink roof
32 m wide. Built new wood and plaster
by balinese carpenters
Bali house too expensive –Trimandala
not important
Only location of pura important.
Can differentiate btwn Java/ Bali house
-Balinese pillar w/ foot and capital.
Kitchen separate from main house
Sleeping rooms beside kitchen
Upacara w/ extended fam to build.



FAMILY: Oka (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Trans spontaneous 1974? w parents
From Klunkung, Bali
Followed Regu 1 all from Klungkung (said 8 kebupaten Bali in Mopugad. Regu 4 is Denpasar, Regu 2/3 mixed)
Follow banjar Satria, pay 15,000 each month, and extra for building
Banjar helps for funerals, one head for all banjar
Ibu said arisan too expensive, 50,000 Rp per week.
4 kids: 1 girl, 3 boys, one in university in Manado.
One brother making house for daughter (newly married, new baby)
One brother, raises roosters for cock-fighting for fights every 6 months (with permission
sangadi and police) but also underground.
Romanticized Bali –pura Besakih
Said rep from Bali government comes to check on the Mopugad Balinese community
Couldn't remember last time they came.
His wife is sick stomach/ heart.
Don't go to new places in Mopugad or outside, only Jabar on way to kebun

HOUSE:
They made their house after 3 or 4 years.
National style –father's idea.
Bali style is too expensive and have to use the siwokarma book.
Must have pura, but can have any style home.
They would like to live in a house like Ibu Wayan/ Pak Nangah





FAMILY: Old Couple (Balinese)

SOCIAL: Lost land because son is gambler/ drunk
No longer work in field
Wife sells folded leaves for sagen
offerings
At the market for 15,000 Rp each

HOUSING: Built house according to financial ability
Lend out part of their kintal for the Pura
Pam to east


Pura Pam
Bed
TV
Store
Bed
Pura
Work
Pavilion
30m
50m





FAMILY: Suran (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Trans spontan 1978 from Karang Asam
Lived w friends 1 year
1.5 hectare sawah from his younger sibling (Banpres)
Lives north of main east-west street
4 kids (in Bali,Gorontalo, Manado baby girl school in Bandung)
Two sons married to Balinese
Daughter will not receive inheritance so education important.
Carving new Pura Dalem gateway
No natural stone like in Bali
mix cement, water, ashes and lime
Two vistors, Werdhi Agung carver
(had carved tugu with suran)
and woman helping prepare sagen
Sagen for special Tuesday "kliwon"
50 around house every 15 days
Male visitor Banpres important that Balinese and Javanese together
(both one people, Java Majapahit)
Visitor: Mongondow camat leader said Balinese dirty
Then said, Balinese at least SD educated
Just sold 7 pigs for 5.5 mill Rp
Ibu borrowed Rps fr Ibu Wayan
2% interest (children's education)
Gave certificate of land until repaid but easier Wayan keeps deed.
Only visit Bali, not learn carving
Just returned from mother's *ngabn*
Died in Mopugad but body to Bali

HOUSE:
Bought section of kintal from East Javanese who left
Built by Balinese builders in 1983
Not balinese style because hilly
Have mandatory pura, northeast
Pura w balai/ pavilion and 5 stupas
Hadn't carved anything on his house
Said not important to have Balinese house here, Coincidence kitchen west
Toilet beside kitchen next to it was new
Toilet built because kids embarrassed about "WC alam"river
Pig stye to west (13 pigs)
Godung to north




Main Road
Parking Space
Hall/Storage
Bed
Family Room
Store
Bed
Bed
Storage
Kitchen
Pura
Work Area
16m
16m
Balcony
Pura
Storage
Pura
Second Storey over Hall/Storage

FAMILY: Ibu Wati (Balinese)

SOCIAL:
Married in Klunkung, Bali 1981
Moved to Mopugad with husband
Husband had come w parents w Banpres
Participate in Pura Pam in MopSel behind Nangah
Daughter Eka, 23, just graduated UNSRAT law
Son in SD (perhaps 12 years old) plays video games
Building a rice mill
Gorontalese wife of Javanese squatter helps at store

HOUSING:
Lives at the Market
1984 Moved into house (on Jalan AMD)
1992 (Feb. 2nd –auspicious day) moved to market
shop had been too quiet at the house
now let Yepta and family use house
started building present house 10 years
visit house pura every 5 days
want to sell house, waiting for price to go up will then move that pura to shophouse balcony
First moved to shophouse with only 2 Rooms -Had paid 3.5 million Rp
Sold shophouse for 10 million in 2001
1993 bought shop next to shophouse for 2.5 mill
2001 bought present shophouse beside shop 15 mill
new shophouse has 3 bedrooms all on bottom floor
have pura on second storey and balcony
Bali hindu can not live above pura
(so can't have bedrooms on second floor)
sunken kitchen behind runs width of house and shop





FAMILY: Wayan ((Balinese))

SOCIAL:
Wayan (18) cutting grass invited us in
Wayan is eldest of 5 girls
Graduated highschool in Kotamobagu,
Looked for work in Jakarta 5 months, just returned
Her parents were trans Umum in 1976
Belonged to banjar
Said Umum didn't have regu though
Banpres had 5
(But, Regu 1 - 5 in Banpres and 6 - 9 in Umum, and perhaps another is Jabar?)
Still have Balinese dance
Kids speak Balinese (thou imprefectly)
Pura pam in Toraut (outside Mopugad
Near forest) where grandfather lived
Father waiting a month for water/farm 6 month cycle
He spent morning with cows in field
Said that the gold miners took water
Worried about town/own future because of water.
After farming rice, can't return to corn, soy/ dry crop
Trans/ Dinas Pertanian (natioanl dept of farming)
taught to grow corn/soy, then rice
Mother lamented no longer monthly
PKK(ketrampilan khusus) organized by mayors' wifes to teach women skills
Suharto's AMD also taught home-economic classes
No longer org for youth, Prada, with
Sports, clean-ups

HOUSING:
Said house wasn't particularly Bali
only pura family important.
Had rebuilt from that they received from trans
Which had come complete with kitchen utensils




25m
Pura
Place to make cement
Work space
Kitchen
Bed
Living
Wayan
Well
Empty
Clothes
WC
50m

FAMILY:	Yepta (Ambon) Rahelayu (Balinese) Baby Josua
SOCIAL:	Father from Ambon, Christian Wife, Rahelayu from Mopugad converted to Christianity from Hinduism Her mother lives north of Banpres North of town border in fields Pentecostal Church (other church is GAMIM) 14 families every Sunday to church in Banpres 4 of these families from Jabar) Make/sell cement bricks for Bali Compound walls
HOUSING:	Live for free at house of Ibu Wati who lives at market Wayan Wati (owner) visits house pura Each holiday Half of house plot empty/ not enclosed in wall Wayan Wati (owner) wants to make rice mill there Mr. Wayan still has one room of house Yepta may move to wife's older siblings house







FAMILY:
Ibu Jawia (Javanese)
Pak Sayrun
Sri (8-12 years old)

SOCIAL:
Moved w/ parents in 1975, Jabar trans
Speak Javanese at home, Indonesian in street
Of the 100 original Javanese families only about 37 remained
Second generation now over 100 families, perhaps 137 families total – land division
Only Balinese sons inherit, Java entire family
Day before held women's koranic reading group
Pak Sayrun works in the gold mines (new)
He said can make Rp 80,000 for 10 grams and perhaps Rp 900,000 in a week or a month
About 20 Javanese mine, one has own gold mill
perhaps Pak Sider (gold mill) only Balinese

HOUSING:
Moved into house 4 years ago after parents' death, temporarily caretaking for youngest son who is studying in Jakarta.
Parents left their 1 rice field to 5 kids, so they rent it for money for their brother's marriage.
House built in 1980 by a Javanese carpenter who returned to Java.
House is Central Javanese "kerajaan" royal style
Elements such as father Tamiargo's initials TMAJ added by carpenter without consent, "accessories"
Selamatan ceremony before moving into house.
Think that the large main interior room is wasteful so they have divided house internally with furniture so that they have a family room for television.
Their house is a simple wood plank, sink roof next-door. If they build their own house they would not want the Javanese style but "today's style/ Spanish style."







FAMILY: Pak Wawan Wahyudi (Sundanese/ Java)
Ibu Yati
2 daughters

SOCIAL: Moved in 1990 with wife Yati from Central Java, they had met at a textile factory in Jatiluhur (Jabar?)
Moved because wanted farming schedule to raise kids (make own hours)
Their community is mosque and mushola (like Balinese banjar and pura)
Kids go to school in Mopuya, don't speak Javanese, only Indonesian.
Thinks Javanese community will remain as long as it is safe/ comfortable
Wawan is secretary of the mosque so **records that 100 original Jabar families,** now 114 families.
Each pay Rp 15,000 + 5,000 per asset per month and 3 million after each harvest (Every 6 mnths)
Mosque saving to build new fence

HOUSING: Bought land for 2.5 million in 1994 (1/4 quarter acre)
Built house in 1995
Carpenter Diran/ neighbor said
Wawan's house a mixture of Javanese (pendopo) and Spanish style (roof)
Wawan said it wasn't Java style, said Sunda style like Jabar style would have been raised wooden floor 1 meter above ground.
Chose the style of his home by driving around Kotamobagu (regional capital city) –spanish style with pillars
4 months to build
Selamatan ceremony with 40 families (neighbors, all Muslim to pray for house)
Knew all measures and costs of wood
Created temporary division (like Jawia) with a board, said good to be flexible for parties, divided where second eaves began (ridge aligned)
Walls do not meet roof and no ceiling
Kitchen has separate roof (3rd peak)
Clay tiles (not hot like sink) from Kota
-dangerous if earthquake or storm
Thinks he can sell his house + ¼ kintal for 8 mil.



FAMILY: Pak Diran (Javanese)

SOCIAL: Spontaneously trans from Java in 1979 w parents after older sibling came w Jabar 75 (who then moved to Palu).
Older bro sold sawah, so they don't have any.
Diran a carpenter –his own boss
Most new houses for Balinese (only they can afford new)
Can build in any style w picture, but not Balinese style - special.
Mostly spanyol style
Building in Tumokang/ bidan/ Kleak
Family speaks Javanese at home.
Don't want to go to Java or Palu- no opportunities ---will always be work in Mopugad
Only 40 remain of original 100 Jabar trans families
Said life is hard (but they have a playstation)
Learned Balinese from working w Balinese carpenters such as on Ibu Jero (bidan) house.
Said Javanese get along with balinese, but don't like the pig pens.

HOUSING: Kintal split into three, his sister to the south in makeshift looking house, himself in the middle and his older brother's house to the north looks permanent.
He built his house 5 years ago in a regular java style. He said his house was plain "Jawa biasa" and not traditional "Nenekmoyang" Jawa style.
Clay tile roof, no ceiling
Back bedroom, for mother, opened onto the kitchen. Behind the kitchen, which was quite large and at ground level unlike the raised floor of the other front rooms, was a working area which was and further behind a fish pond, which he let other neighbors use. Both of whose ridges ran north south and met in a gulley where the kitchen met the wall of the living room.








Chicken
Wood
Goats
WC
WC
Well
oven
Table
Kitchen
Dining Room
Bedroom
Public Path
TV
Bedroom
Satellite
Garden
Bedroom
Living Room
Store
Bedroom
13m
panel doorfront
porch
11m
Garden

FAMILY:

Pak Raspan (Javanese)
Ibu Tuti
Son Herrywitono (wife Manado/ Minahasa, convert Muslim)
Daughter Ratna, Daughter Henny Rahmawati (husband Gorontalo, baby)

SOCIAL:

In 1975 came from Gombong, Jateng, Kebupaten Kebumen after High School
3 months trans boarding in Bandung w 100 families to learn mixed farming
225 fam Banpres, 76 fam Umum
10% of Jabar trans were Sunda, others from near Central Jawa, -different dialogue and built in Central Java style (in Kebupaten Jiamis/ Banjar Sari).
Jabar rombongan groups =Bali family clusters regu. Gotong royong to irrigate
Married 1977 with trans daughter
Gov't helped them until 1980
Mayor twice from 1986 to 2003, 1987 village split. now North Mop: 115 java muslim fams and 250 bali fams.
Said national culture was still 100% intact Pancasila, Unity in Diversity, politeness, expressions. Before, Bali and Java projects (cleaning), but Balinese neighbor didn't speak to me.
Ibu: Muslim children can't sleep in room w parents. Keep chickens & goats.

HOUSING:

When Umum and Jabar came got small shop-like house. 1982 able to sell land, so moved when mom from Java
Bought main house (and land 50m x 30m) for 2.5 juta Rp in 1982 from a man who moved to Gorontalo.
Balinese own other part kintal
Added warung and bedroom behind it, garden with bamboo fences, community path to store/town center.
Now 1 kintal is 60 juta.
East Java and Central Java similar style and used by the Jabar community, once were 10 nenekmoyang houses, now 4 (Macis, Bapak Demi, Nyoman, Jawia) and Pak Sudarno/Banpres.
Bali Mahkota (capitals) are very busy whereas Java is simple.
Less Java style because not enough practice, and people don't like anymore







FAMILY: Ibu Warsem (Javanese)

SOCIAL:
Husband from Mopuya
Live on her parents land
She has never been to Java
Her parents haven't been back
Collect kapok from tree. In "Ngangur" season (resting)- Balinese don't: always grow kankung for pigs.
Road in front of her house main walking road (mosque, pasar, mines)
AMD too bumpy.
Middle school daughter photo w jilbab.
Upset that middle school private and more expensive. (17,500 Rp per month as opposed to 15,000. SD is only 6,000 or so a month)
Mopugad majority bali teachers, only have hindu classes not muslim and school pura building paid for by everyone
Hopes daughter can go HS in Mopuya
Monthly mixed religious (Hindu, Muslim, Christian) gathering in Mopuya (2 reps/religion/town)
Often intermarriage Hindu/ Islam
But if Muslim husband, wife must convert, then usually move to Jabar

HOUSING:
Shares the kintal with her parents who live behind in a traditional Javanese house,
has been rebuilt twice since 1975.
Younger sibling building a timber framed Spanish to south of her house.
Shrubs/ kapok tree divide property from Bali to south.
House is java style (though Spanish roof)
Husband drew plans, carpenter built
Asked for auspicious day to build house
Orientation of the house didn't really matter she said, only for Balinese.







FAMILY:

Rutah (Javanese)
Baby Agus

SOCIAL:

Moved w parents in 1975, she was 12
Her siblings moved other parts Sulawesi
Younger siblings lives on the plot of the old mosque in the Banpres area, which was divided by the town into his/her house and a balinese and perhaps another house.
Mosque moved because too far from Community
Parents sold sawah,
Husband works field of someone else.
Jabar gather at the madrasa behind the mosque Friday at 2pm, after prayer.
Madrasa meeting place not as a school
Women meet up Monday night and Friday night for koranic reading groups.
Said Javanese community and Balinese community don't communicate; I asked if it was more common in their parents generation and she said yes.
Pasar though is mixed, every Tuesday and Friday morning from 6am to 8 am only buy meats from different vendors.
Javanese also live at the pasar or right behind it.

HOUSING:

Live on mushola land with two other families. didn't have to buy her land house was her parents' house before they died (built in 1975)
Said it was java style house –no Specifics
Small house with living room in center, kitchen to the west and two bedrooms/ storage rooms
House faces mushola and well shared by families



FAMILY: Nurliyah (Makassar/ married Java)
2 small children (Marda – 3 years, baby)

SOCIAL: Originally from Makassar
Met husband who was stuyding in a Pesantren
Wore the long jilbab to her waist.
2 years ago moved to Mopugad from somewhere else in Dumoga.
Husband is from Jabar/ Mopugad
Initially stayed with the parents until the were granted the land at the mushola.
Ibu Nurliyah, more candid outsider?
Javanese aren't as financially advanced as Balinese -but she didn't know why.
With Rutah, Warsem confirmed that many of the original Jabar community have left and that Balinese buy their kintal, sawah and houses
They said that most Jabar like to go instead to Gorontalo, Palu or Sultenggah, because you can get a much larger plot of sawah for your money.

HOUSING: Built house in August 2003 after permission from mushola.
They didn't look for any auspicious day as did Ibu Warsem acrosst he street.
They started on a Monday because she said all days were just as good as long as it isn't raining.
She said her house was a Makassarese style but also didn't say why just that usually Makassarese houses are raised high on stilts (rumah tiang) –hers wasn't.







FAMILY:
Turipan (Javanese)
Wife
Daughter, 12
Baby, 2

SOCIAL:
Came with Jabar trans in 1975
Received shophous like simple house
Sold his house and land and
Moved to Luwu transmigration area in Central Sulawesi in 1994
In Luwu, received house with asbestos roof and WC
Recently (a few years ago) returned to Mopugad because land in Luwu was dry
Upon returning to Mopugad, had to buy plot of land for house, 1 kintal still intact
But doesn't work as a farmer
Now works as a carpenter
Wife had been sick with Malaria
Says Balinese are more well off
But Javanese have gotong royong – mutual self-help
And in 2004 gathered Rp 500,000
Says there are 137 Javanese families in Mopugad
And over 300 Balinese families

HOUSING:
Had received basic trans house in 1975 which he sold
Built his own house
It was his training house when he was learning build
Simple, wood plank with tile roof
Separate room designated for prayer
He would prefer to live in a Spanish style house
Says he can build any style
Has built national style and Spanish style
Though he has built for Balinese people, like the bidan/ midwife, he can not build in Balinese style




WC
WC
Kitchen
Bedroom
Bedroom
Storage
Dining Room
Work Area
Bench
Cupboard
Bed
Table
TV
Bedroom
Bedroom
Living Room
Window
Porch
15m
11m

FAMILY:
Pak Kusri (Javanese)
Marijo (his youngest son, 35 years old)

SOCIAL:
Kusri said he was over 100 years old!
Originally from West Java near central Java
Original Jabar trans and original plot
Still has the 1.75 ha of sawah from government
Has divided his sawah into four for his four children
who still live in Mopugad
Marijo not farming now, waiting for water
When Marijo marries he will get house
One (female) child is in Kendari (Central Sulawesi)
One (male) child is in Java
One (female) lives in house beside parents
Two (female) daughters live in houses on Jl. AMD
-one in a Spanish house
-one in a Javanese house
Said North Mopugad now 30% Javanese
Whereas Tumokangbaru is half Javanese (from central Java, not west Java)
And Mopuya is majority Java (from East Java)
Javanese move because searching for better land not for larger Javanese community

HOUSING:
Giant, old Javanese kerajaan house
With tiled roof
Two carpenters built it

Share kintal with older sibling
Built her house in 1985, and father paid for it

FAMILY: Squatter at cemetery (Javanese)

SOCIAL: “father/ caretaker” of ibu sangadi who had only arrived fairly recently
Originally from Jabar
had worked in the area as guide and cooking Padang food for foreign researchers
He was more interested in telling us about them and how one only at a piece of bread, a pill and water each day.

HOUSING: Live on land owned by Javanese Cemetery
Also surrounded cornfields, sunflowers
Built his own house out of cempaka
Found nearby.
Though modest, had painted the front screen of window
The house, which faced to the east a neat yard with grass consisted of one front room for receiving visitors and living, with a bed against the window in the northeast, a table beside it to the west and two rooms behind, one for cooking and the other perhaps for sleeping. Behind was a garden with many herbs and vegetables for cooking and which looked open over the fields to the west.











FAMILY:
Demi (Javanese)
Husband Sidoardo
Daugher Nia

SOCIAL:
She was hosting the women's group
koranic reading at her house that day
She said the women's community meets
every Monday to read the koran,
men meet every Thursday night.
Two elderly women, from bandung and
jabar, joined, neither understood bahasa
Indonesia, nor does her father
Garden with bananas. Sick chickens.
Her husband is orang gorontalo
She told us that pak Nangah brought
Electricity, but mayor now nothing
Pak raspan had done a lot as
mayor for the last two 5-year periods
Javanese don't communicate w/ Bali,
Keep separate.
Id-al Fitri, the Hallal bil Halal, the
Balinese are invited to stop by, mampir.
30% of the original javanese community
have left and that balinese buy up their
land plots. She said the Balinese are
more well off because they can raise and
sell pig which are very expensive.
Said her Javanese friend moved away
from new Bali neighbors with pigs

HOUSING:
Demi lived in modest house she and
husband built
Parents have kerajaan house built 1980
5 years after they arrived
They had first lived in a simple house,
Kerajaan built by a Javanese carpenter,
who built all of about 15 "Java style"
houses which are still left in Mopugad.
She said her father didn't have anything
to do with the design of the house; at
the time it was the only style available.
The Javanese carpenter has since moved
away from Mopugad and he had
previously lived in Sulawesi Tenggarah.
Now carpenters were from Mongondow
and Gorontalo and could build any style,
if she had the money she would build
"today's style" which was the modern
"espanyol" style like her balinese
neighbors across the street.
Turipan builds any style –w/ Nangah







FAMILY: Mbak Sirah (Javanese)

SOCIAL:

she was 75 years and her husband 80
Came as spontan after the Jabar trans.
About 1975 moved to Mopugad?
Have one greatgrandchild.
One of their kids lives in Palu
Other children all still in Mopugad, one near musholla, the youngest Ibu Ami near Ibu Warsem.
The woman across the street was daughter in law.
Father liked to take care of chickens.

Neighbor, Ibu Ami, has ¼ hectar which she bought
her parents have a sawah managed by the child that lives behind them.
They don't want to move because the land is quite valuable now.
Ami has two boys, 20 and 19 years old both finished high school, though work as tukang ompreng, motorcycle drivers
They share their income with mom.
They have arisan hasil panen, so if one reaps harvest they share depending on the price of the rice.

While we where there they got a small bag of goat from the mosque sacrifices.

HOUSING:

They bought the kintal when they first moved to Mopugad. They built their house, uniquely of stone, according to their financial ability. The father built with the help of neighbors, with no special style, though the roof looks newly spanyol. The father chose the layout and another person drew it out, though the father picked other houes as models which they then tailored to their budget.

They said that only 3 rooms were still Jawa and the rest had all become Balinese. In front of the house was sand and cement and they were going to renovate their house with a new verandah.









FAMILY: Macis

SOCIAL: Elderly couple
Spoke bahasa Indonesia with difficulty and strong betawi/ Jakarta accent
Ibu chewed sirih, betelnut.
Their children had become successful and were doctors and teachers, one lives in Jakarta, 2 di Sulawesi Tenggah and 1 right beside them to the east, whose house mimics theirs they said was built only 5 years ago though it looked quite a bit older.
They were very sad that the Javanese population was falling, they don't have friends anymore and on all sides are balinese.

HOUSING: Live in kerajaan house
They bought their house only and though it was Javanese style didn't really know anything about it.
Son who lives next door, the imam, has a house which mimics their kerajaan house.





FAMILY:

Sudarno /Banpres
Ibu Sukanti
Son Nacipto

SOCIAL:

The mom and kids had come as BanPres as one of 13 East Javanese families, they from Banyuwangi (air wangi), who had wanted to go to Kalimantan, but because there weren't enough families it didn't happen went to Bali and joined the Balinese group comming here, 1974. They were invited by the transmigrasi office. They said when clearing the jungle many people cried and screamed at night and from the first 13 families only 7 remain who all lived nearby.

They had temporarily lived in Kosyo, also in Camat Mopuya in houses of other people, like Pak Nangah
Had to build their own house, they only received a kintal 50 x 50 m (.25 hectare) and a sawah of 1.75 hectare, together equaling 2 hectares and farming tools
Pak Ciptos kebun is far in Doloduo and he has to ride his bike because they don't have enough to by a motorcycle.
They don't want to return to Java becuase they don't have anything there and already have many neighbors here.

Didn't say anything about pigs, actually retti (my assistant) said that people from east or central java eat pigs though they are Muslim.
Javanese and Minahasan neighbors (IbuDiana) hang out at house

HOUSING:

They had bought the house from a man in Jabar, and said the house was a west Javanese style and they didn't know much about it, but that they had taken it apart and moved it to that location to reassemble.
They had added a front room inside the wide main living area and the house had the same triangle shaped door leading to the back as Raspan, Muhlis.





FAMILY: Muhils (Sunda)

SOCIAL:
Muhlis only visiting wife's family for
Past 2 months
Originally from Jabar
Lived previously in Kendari
Wants to return, has rash in Mopugad
In Mopugad, all work alone in fields
Only goes to mosque, Jabar
Never to Mopugad Selatan or Banpres
Can shop anywhere at market, except
for halal food, no special section
Tugu is market on his map –though only
Mopugad North
Only interacted with other Javanese
Invited Ebhi, my friend, to pray w him
At sholat time, went in small room and
He lead the two of them in prayer
Has two small kids, wants them to go
To school in Kendari

HOUSING:
Didn't think house was Javanese style
Long wide receiving room –like
kerajaan
Trinagle doorways

EXTRA INTERVIEW: Arie Subandi

<Note: not done at house, so social and house were not kept as distinct notes.>

Ibu Sangadi sent her son Wayan to fetch us the map from the SekDes (Village Secretary), and soon after the SekDes himself, Arie Subandi, followed and described quite a bit about the town. Each family plot is 50x50 meters and each sawah plot 100x175 meters. At the original transmigration each family head was given one plot of each, and since many have been bought and sold and have been subdivided, some with 4 families on them.

Each 2 plots was another road, so every 100 meters so the town is quite orthagonal and each road is about 5 meters wide.
Together, the mayor and the village secretary weren't quite sure of the population of Mopugad Utara but it is over 400 families. Retti says the information should be readily avaiable as there was a census in 2003.
On his map also a mosque stood to the west of the pura puseh, which was moved so that the mainly muslim community wouldn't have to walk the 1 kilometer from their neighborhood Jabar. It moved to where the madrasa still stands today and the original land I think is still owned by the Muslim waqaf. He also confirmed that there are two churches in Mopugad, the pentecostal one in Mopugad Utara GPDI, Geredja Pentecosta Di Indonesia, on the first street to the north of the bunderan, and the GAMIM church in the south. They said that most of the congregations were Minahasan and some Bali.
He said the Javanese are more prone to sell of their plots as the Balinese have "thicker wallets", and that the Javanese are more often not as sucessful as the Balinese and they move to places such as Sulawesi Tenggah where they feel they may have more opportunity. Though he said that there are orang Jawa in Mopugad Selatan and not just the one that I thought before, as well as Javanese in the eastern Banpres area.

Himself a Javanese moved to Mopugad in 1985 (the same year he drew the map) from Gorontalo because there was not good irrigation in the Gorotalo transmigration site. He worked with Pak Raspan on the map.
They said that no one uses the word Marga for street from the Balinese, but instead use "jalan" aja.

The Balinese still have the caste system and Pura Pam (Family Puras –though different from the regular home puras) and of a lower caste

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